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
**The federal character principle as an
instrument of national integration in Nigeria**

1998

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**THE FEDERAL CHARACTER PRINCIPLE AS AN
INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL INTEGRATION IN
NIGERIA**



**BY OBIYAN ALUEGBEBHOTOR SATURDAY
B.Sc (HONS) POLITICS, PHILOSOPHY AND
ECONOMICS**

**BEING A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT
OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, FACULTY OF SOCIAL
SCIENCES**

**IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN POLITICAL SCIENCE**


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ILE-IFE, NIGERIA**

1998

CERTIFICATION

I certify that this thesis - The Federal Character Principle as an instrument of National Integration in Nigeria - is a record of original research carried out by Mr. Aluegbebhotor Saturday Obiyan. It is the final part of requirements for the award of the degree of Master of Science in Political Science of the Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife.



Supervisor

Oye Ogunbadejo, Ph.D
Professor of Political Science

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DEDICATION

This study is dedicated to all those who have used, use or will use their positions for the benefit of humanity.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Conducting a research is a herculean task. Writing acknowledgement is no less a difficult task. This may sound a bit exaggerated. However, this problem will be appreciated when one considers the numerous people to whom one is greatly indebted in the course of one's studies.

From the ever present Almighty God, who made every step possible even when circumstances dictated otherwise, to all individuals whose encouragement, advice and other forms of assistance made this work possible, I cannot but show appreciation. I thank my supervisor, Professor Oye Ogunbadejo, for finding time out of his busy schedule to attend to this work meticulously.

Importantly too, I express my profound gratitude to the council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) for the grant given to me to aid this research. The grant has been particularly helpful.

In the course of this study, I had interactions with many people both within and outside the Department of Political Science of this University. These contacts were of immense benefit to me. At the Federal Secretariat, Lagos where part of my data was collected, some members of staff were exceptionally helpful.

Having received assistance from so many people in the course of this study, one tends to be in a dilemma. Acknowledging contributions by name would inevitably result in the omission of some names either due to space constraint or the human frailty of forgetfulness. Not to mention names may be misinterpreted as an exhibition of ingratitude.

I am genuinely thankful to everyone who has been instrumental, directly or indirectly, to the realisation of my objective: Everybody knows, as much as I do, the precise reasons for which I thank them. Not mentioning names does not imply less gratitude but rather fairness to all. Indeed, I owe everyone more thanks than I can give.

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ABSTRACT

This study examines the impact of Federal Character Principle on National Integration with focus on Nigeria. It seeks to ascertain whether the principle has positive impact on national integration. Furthermore, it examines how effective the operation of the principle in Nigeria has been in fostering national integration.

The study also aims at ascertaining whether or not there is a marked difference in the perception of, or attitude to, federal character principle by different ethnic groups in Nigeria. Finally, it seeks to find ways of making the principle achieve the objective of promoting national integration in the country.

In order to achieve the purpose of this study several hypotheses were tested. Relying on effective sample size of four hundred and sixty four, these hypotheses were subjected to scientific test. The questionnaire method of data collection was used to elicit pertinent information from respondents. Statistical percentages and descriptive methods were used to analyse the data.

From our analysis of the data, we found that federal character principle, in general, could contribute to the promotion of national integration. However, the findings show that its ability to achieve this objective is contingent on appropriate articulation and implementation of the principle. The study shows that the manner in which the principle has been implemented in Nigeria has worked more in the direction of disintegration.

We found out that the federal character principle will contribute to the promotion of national integration in Nigeria if it is carefully articulated and implemented in a way that does not undermine meritocratic principle. The findings show that this can be achieved if, in cases where meritocratic criteria of evaluation can be explicitly determined, the principle is applied not as an equalisation mechanism but as a means of ensuring the representation of unrepresented or grossly underrepresented group(s) arising from the application of merit principle.

We also found out that the areas where underrepresentation of groups mainly engenders disintegrative tendencies relate to top, visible administrative posts and political positions. The reasons for this, as the study reveals, are because those areas constitute the glare of the public and are crucial to policy determination. Thus, the emphasis of the application of the principle should be in such areas.

The findings also show that the use of geographical/political unit, in contradistinction to ethnic category, is less disintegrative and clumsy. However, the study reveals that representativeness will be better achieved if geographical spread is taken into cognizance in choosing people from multi-ethnic states.

With respect to attitude of various ethnic groups in Nigeria to the principle, we found out that, in the main, there is no significant difference. The few areas where there are differences of note relate to whether the manner of

implementation of the principle so far in Nigeria has enhanced the development of a nationally integrated community and the appropriate index of representation.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Statement of the Problem

One basic problem confronting ethnically diverse federations, as indeed all multi-ethnic countries, is how to have the citizens imbued with a sense of national feeling; ensure the attenuation of solidarity along primordial lines and foster increased loyalty to the nation; give to each citizen and group, a sense of belonging and feeling of oneness among them. In essence, how to assure national integration.

In the 1950's, many scholars influenced by modernisation theory had postulated a positive correlation between development and national integration. Each successive stage in the developmental process was seen as more depluralised than the previous stage. Developed countries which are plural in nature - in terms of ethnic, religious and other diversities - were thought to have transcended the threshold of national integration. In other words, such countries were assumed to have irreversibly overcome the problem of national integration arising from parochial attachments in plural societies.

One other conclusion that was drawn from above assumption was that the new plural states would be faced with less problem of national integration as they moved from one level of development to a higher one.¹ These

conclusions have however been contradicted by more recent observations and studies which have revealed that the problem of national integration is a feature of all political systems and assumes greater salience in culturally diverse states. Developed countries such as Britain, France, Belgium and Canada have, against early predictions, confronted basic issues relating to the fundamental nature of their constituent components.²

The Northern Ireland problem in United Kingdom, the Quebec issue in Canada and the Chechnya question in Russia are instructive of this situation. Thus the social and political upheavals with ethnic, racial, religious or class undertones in part of Europe such as Britain, as well as the United States of America³, underscore the pervasiveness and universality of the problem of national integration. Hence, in every country, regardless of the level of development, the pursuit of national integration is considered a worthy goal.

Even at the time that communism held sway in Eastern Europe, the strong ideology that prevailed as well as the highly militarised and totalitarian nature of these states at best merely succeeded in temporarily curtailing the problem; and at worst succeeded in suppressing, but not solving the problem. It was little wonder, therefore, that no sooner did communism begin to wane in those countries than a recrudescence of ethno-nationalism gained prominence leading to disintegration in such countries as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia.

In the African continent, the building of state-nationalism assumes a task of more herculean nature in most countries due to the manner in which the colonialist territorially shaped them without regard to ethnic composition and also owing to their relative short period of statehood⁴. Kenya, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, Zaire(now known as the Democratic Republic of Congo), South Africa and Nigeria are a few of the many African countries which are faced with problem of national integration.⁵

With the recent carnage in Rwanda and the seemingly endless bloody ethnic conflict in Burundi among a host of other conflicts, the problem of accommodating diverse groups within a single state whose loyalty and commitment to the national entity can be assured, rather than finding solace and solidarity purely under parochial organisation, invariably comes to the fore. In 1993, Ethiopia experienced the worst problem of integration as Eritrea broke away from the country after many years of armed secessionist struggle.

The recent wave of ethno-nationalism in many parts of the globe, some of which we have already mentioned in preceding paragraphs, has tended to make legitimate the fears of plural states of being plunged into similar crisis. While some of the victim states are exploring ways of rehabilitating and integrating their various groups⁶, some states are intensifying efforts to assuage feeling of marginalisation by some of their component groups by articulating

and reinforcing certain policies that will guarantee their participation in the political process.

This is premised on the belief that the exclusion of certain group(s) from a country's national institutions and a feeling of political inefficacy arising from lack of access to political power are inimical to national integration. Hence, multi-ethnic federations/societies have devised means of guaranteeing the participation or representation of constituent ethnic, geo-cultural units in the affairs and institutions of the country.

Nigeria has not been an exception to the concern over how to harmonise conflicting interests and engender integration in the country. Nigeria is an archetypal plural state. Extremely diverse in ethnic composition, scholars and writers using different classificatory modes have put the number of the country's ethnic groups at between 140 and 260, while the number of linguistic groups is estimated at between 100 and 400.⁷

One remarkable feature of Nigeria's ethnic and sectional diversity has been the politicisation of plural subgroups and their salience in the nation's major policies and politics. Prior to Nigeria's independence, the forces of disintegration had been at play and at independence Nigeria had to continuously contend with these forces. The civil war which took place from July 1967 to January 1970 marked the apogee of the internecine inter-ethnic/sectional conflicts in the country and betrayed the fragility of the Nigerian state in the

face of ethnic/sectional struggles. Today, the problem of national integration still stares the country in the face.

Policy makers in Nigeria have since recognised the need to consciously put in place policies that will facilitate understanding and national integration. In the country, a basic public policy which has been deliberately introduced in a bid to promote national integration is what has been variously termed "quota system", "representative bureaucracy", "federal character principle" and "power sharing formula". The principle of federal character which is seen as a hedge against marginalisation and arousing feeling of loyalty to the nation was given constitutional recognition in 1979 even though its antecedents can be found in the era prior to that time.⁸

In recent times, federal character principle has assumed greater significance by its extension to the highest political offices in the land in the next political dispensation. This is contained in the 1995 draft constitution and the broadcast by the Head of State, General Sani Abacha on October 1 1995.⁹ There has also been the development of institutional capacity for federal character principle by the constitution of a Federal Character Commission (as well as the proposed Federal Character Tribunal) which is expected to give more bite to the implementation of the principle.¹⁰

The 1994/95 National Constitutional Conference in adopting "rotational presidency" shared the view that

a properly structured and balanced federation implies that all geo-political areas or major units should have access to power in order to give all sections of the country a sense of belonging to the nation through well-worked out avenue for participation.¹¹

The conference, while retaining the "federal character principle" as existed in the two previous constitutions (1979 and 1989) sees the principle as a factor that is necessary for promoting a sense of belonging in the country, as it would help to "eliminate or at least minimise domination, resulting from imbalance in appointments". It retains the constitutional bulwark of federal character principle in the aforementioned previous constitutions which states that:

The composition of the Government of the Federation or any of its agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such manner as to reflect the federal character of Nigeria and the need to promote national unity, and also to command national loyalty thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few states or from a few ethnic or other sectional groups in that government or in any of its agencies.¹²

From the several quotations cited above it can be seen that there is an assumed relationship between federal character principle and national integration and this assumption constitutes a major rationale for the adoption of the federal character principle as a public policy in Nigeria. In other words, national integration is, among other things, seen as a function of federal character principle in terms of representativeness.

The need for national integration in the Nigerian federal system cannot be overemphasized. Given the extreme diversity of Nigerian society and the country's political history, the attention accorded to national integration can be quite appreciated.¹³ Thus there is the need for empirical assessment of this major public policy which is thought to be integrative. In this way, not only will the existing literature on the subject be enriched by its findings but also future disposition of policy makers and implementors regarding the policy could be conditioned by the knowledge provided by such research.

In the light of the foregoing, coupled with asymmetrical views regarding the relationship between federal character principle and national integration, this study represents an empirical investigation into the extent, if at all, to which the policy of the principle of federal character has gone in fostering national integration. Put differently, it seeks to empirically establish the relationship, if any, between federal character principle and national integration in the Nigerian setting.

1.2 Justification for the Study

The fact that no country can be said to have passed the threshold of national integration, irrespective of its level of development, makes continuous research focus in this area necessary. Its significance is accentuated in the

Nigerian case given the prominence the issue of national question has assumed in recent public discourse¹⁴ and the enhanced attention the government has accorded federal character principle. Given these facts, any research directed at federal character principle and national integration in Nigeria is of great moment.

Another reason why the problem which this study seeks to deal with is important is the lack of sufficient attention which federal character principle has received from researchers. Admittedly, many studies on several aspects of ethnicity and national integration have been undertaken by scholars.¹⁵ Yet, most of the efforts directed at Nigeria have been in the broad area of analysis of ethnicity and the analysis of instruments and/policies of national integration other than federal character principle. Most of the studies which have attempted to explore federal character and national integration have been either on areas which diverge from the specific line of inquiry being pursued in this study¹⁶ or are largely speculative.¹⁷

Furthermore, a perusal of existing literature reveals no attempts to systematically and empirically examine the relationship between these two variables - federal character principle (independent variable) and national integration (dependent variable) - in Nigeria. Consequently, the foregoing combination of deficiencies represents the lacuna which this study intends to fill.

1.3 Aims and Objectives of the Study

Broadly, this study seeks to ascertain the relationship between federal character principle and national integration, and whether there is significant difference in the perception of the principle by diverse groups that make up Nigeria. In more specific terms, it is intended to achieve the following objectives:

- (1). To determine whether federal character principle contribute to national integration in Nigeria.
- (2). To ascertain whether there is a marked difference in the perception of, or attitude to, federal character principle by different ethnic groups in Nigeria.
- (3). To suggest ways, based on the findings of this study, of making federal character principle achieve the objective of promoting national integration in Nigeria.

1.4 Scope of the Study

In seeking to determine the relationship between the federal character principle and national integration, we are limiting our study to Nigeria. Federal character principle is a multifaceted one. This study does not pretend to cover all aspects of the principle. It focuses on three aspects: recruitment (and

promotion) into federal bureaucracy and agencies; composition of federal cabinet; and the rotation of political offices at the apex level-speaker of House of Representatives, President of the Senate, Deputy Prime Minister, Prime Minister, Vice President and President. The application of federal character principle as a basis for students admission into federal tertiary institutions for example is excluded from this study. The reason for this is not because this aspect is inconsequential; rather, the decision is predicated on the imperative need to eschew dabbling into too broad an area at the expense of thorough investigation and analysis.

1.5 Methodology of Research

1.5.1 Data Collection

In generating data, we shall employ both primary and secondary sources of data gathering. The use of secondary source pertains to critical review of existing literature. This involves a perusal of relevant books, journals and magazines. We shall rely on primary source in generating data for testing our hypotheses. Collection of primary data will be based on survey method; more precisely, questionnaire shall be used to elicit pertinent information from our respondents.

5.2 Sampling Technique

Nigerian adults are our target population. Since federal character principle actually derives from the diversity of Nigerian population, we are interested in ensuring that our sample is representative of the diverse ethnic groups. Thus we are employing a twin sampling method, viz *stratified sampling and quota sampling*¹⁸. Stratified sampling enables us to divide the population into smaller chunks from which sampling can be drawn. Thus, for the purposes of this study, we identify four groups:

I. Hausa/Fulani

II. Yoruba

III. Igbo

IV. minorities

Furthermore, in determining the share of each category in the sample size, we give cognizance to their relative population size (quota sampling). Their population is based on the 1963 Census figures. It is instructive to note that the 1991 Census did not include ethnic category and thus is not useful for our purpose here.

According to the 1963 census, out of a total population of about 55.51 million, the population of the Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba, Igbo and the minorities was 16.42 million; 11.32 million; 9.25 million and 18.25 million respectively

. This represents 29.58 percent for Hausa/Fulani, 20.39 percent for Yoruba, 16.66 percent for Igbo and 33.37 percent for minorities.¹⁹ Thus, out of a sample size of five hundred we shall make conscious efforts to distribute it as follows: Hausa/Fulani - 148; Yoruba - 102; Igbo - 83; minorities - 167.

Our careful choice of these techniques is hinged on the need to ensure representativeness of our sample and thereby enhance the validity of our conclusions.

In choosing our sample some Nigerians in specific institutions are selected. These are drawn from workers in the federal public service and students in the universities. Certain basic reasons informed this choice. First, some of those in these institutions are likely to be beneficiaries and some others "victims" of the principle. Their views will therefore, be informed by experience.

Second, these institutions tend to represent a cluster of people of diverse ethnic background. This is particularly important given that our objective is to choose sample that reflects the various ethnic groups. The more so due to the non-feasibility, owing to resource constraint associated with research of this nature, of having to go to the regional base of each ethnic group.

The final reason for our choice, though not unique to people in these institutions, is that, they are likely to be adequately informed about the various dimensions and applications of federal character principle and thus able to

respond to questions in an informed manner. Random sampling shall be used to select members of our sample in these institutions.

1.6 Theoretical Framework

Scholars have adopted several theoretical framework in their analysis of plural societies.²⁰ In this study we adopt the "national accommodation" approach. This approach has been used by Smock and Smock in their comparative study of two plural societies-Ghana and Lebanon.²¹ It (the approach) gives recognition to, but not restricted to, public policies which pay attention to the existence of subgroups in the distribution of national resources and offices aimed at minimising parochial conflicts, ensuring stability in the political system and national integration. In other words, it provides a means of analyzing implications of such policies for political stability and national integration.

According to Smock and Smock:

National accommodation refers to a political strategy for communally fragmented societies in which the political system accommodates the communal groups at the same time that it attempts to promote a measure of common loyalty to the national community. By incorporating communal groups into the political system and giving them a stake in its survival, it moderates conceptions of communal self-interest. National accommodation has as its goal the achievement of unity in diversity. By promoting national accommodation, a sense of national

citizenship can be imposed over existing networks of subnational loyalties.²²

As an approach it affords us the opportunity of analyzing national integration in relation to public policies which take representativeness as a basis for distributing national resources and offices. This is one of the advantages that it has over such models of pluralism as the equilibrium model and conflict model.²³

The equilibrium model holds that crosscutting loyalties and multiple affiliations of members of a society make integration inevitable in a society. According to this model, there exists many associations and groups in a society (inclusive of communal such as ethnic, religious and linguistic affiliation in a plural society). The same individual belongs to several of these associations to which he shows his loyalties. These multiple affiliations and multiple loyalties mitigate intergroup conflict and hence promote integration in the society through the fluid interplay of political interest. Thus, equilibrium theory of plural societies holds that although a plural society may be beset by primordial divisions, multiple affiliation and loyalties assure integration.

The equilibrium theory has several drawbacks. First, while it may be true that multiple affiliations and loyalties can mitigate intergroup conflict, many studies by scholars have revealed that the loyalty of an individual to groups is not uniform and that primordial attachments are far stronger than

those of social and class affiliations. A consequence of this is that in plural societies, multiple membership does not necessarily obviate, if at all mitigate, intercommunal conflicts nor does it necessarily guarantee national integration. This is even worse in countries with weak non-communal associations.²⁴

Furthermore, one policy implication of this theory is that it tends to prescribe governmental effort at encouraging the emergence of more intercommunal groups in the society to the neglect of other policies as a way of facilitating national integration since it assumes that national integration is a natural consequence of multiple affiliations. Also, for researchers who are interested in the analysis of national integration in plural societies, equilibrium theory tends to divert focus away from other pertinent variables.

The conflict theory of plural societies, as propounded by Smith holds that the complete absence of any shared culture and values among groups make any cooperation or shared activities impossible. And in the absence of any cooperation, only political domination by a cultural minority can hold the society together. As has been contended by Smock and Smock, the assumptions of Smith's model (a rigid hierarchical ordering of groups, absence of any crosscutting associations or interest and a closed political system) do not hold for most plural societies. Crosscutting associations are inherent in every society, though they may be weak in some.²⁵ This theory, similar to the

argument we put forward in the case of equilibrium theory, restricts the foci of researchers.

We have gone this whole length to examine the equilibrium and conflict theories in order to make apparent the superiority of our model and the problems it avoids. Our adopted model - national accommodation - as we have pointed out overcome the problems which bedevil the equilibrium and conflict theories of pluralism in that it, among others, draws researchers' attention to deliberate public policies of mitigating conflict in the analysis of national integration. By including both a *means* of managing communal tensions and promoting improved intergroup relations as well as to the *character* of those improved relations, it allows us to analyse plural society and national integration within the context of compromised arrangement in access to national resources and power; the incorporation of primordial groups in the structure and process of the political system.

1.7 Hypotheses

In this study we have one major hypothesis from which sub-hypotheses are derived. The major hypothesis is:

Guaranteeing the participation of all component groups (of a plural society) in a country's national institutions, political power and affairs tends to

promote national integration, while the exclusion of certain group(s) from participation in national institutions, political power and affairs of a country tends to erode national integration.

We have the following sub-hypotheses:

1. Federal character principle-based recruitment tends to engender a sense of belonging to the nation²⁶.
2. Representation of a group in a nation's cabinet tends to evoke emotional attachment to the nation by citizens from such group.
3. Guaranteeing every group access to the apex of national office tends to promote national consciousness.
4. Power rotation among various sectional groups in a country tends to instill a sense of belonging to the nation.
5. There is no significant difference in the attitude of various ethnic groups in Nigeria to federal character principle.²⁷

We shall be guided in this study by the following research questions:

1. What is federal character principle?
2. How do Nigerians perceive it?
3. What is the attitude of the different groups in Nigeria to it?
4. Beyond the official conception of it as an integrative instrument, is it (seen as) integrative?; does it engender national consciousness in the country?

5. Is it an effective instrument of mitigating tensions and conflicts arising from the diversity of the country?

1.8 Definition of key terms and Operationalization

Two key terms are discernible in this study - federal character principle and national integration. These key concepts are not novel. They are concepts that are often used by many people. Yet their pervasive and frequent use does not imply monoconceptualisation or consensus in their meaning. The varying conceptualisations are elaborated in the next two chapters where a fuller exploration of the concepts are undertaken. Here it suffices to give working definitions of these principal concepts so as to obviate the cloud of fuzziness surrounding them.

There are three other terms used in this study that need to be operationalised. These shall also be briefly explained immediately after the key concepts in this section.

Federal Character Principle

By federal character principle is meant a method of recruitment, distribution of administrative and political offices and power as well as the country's resources in which the diversity of the country is taken into consideration. This method ensures that each defined group is represented in

the nation's scheme of things. In essence by federal character principle is meant that principle by which the composition and conduct of public institutions and affairs reflect the plural nature of the country. The term "federal character principle" apparently derives from the fact that Nigeria is a federation and diversity is a major feature of federations. Hence federal character principle ensures that the diversities are taken due cognizance of in the allocation of national resources. For purposes of lucidity and clarity, in this study by "federal character " we shall be referring to the diversity of Nigerian society whereas by "federal character principle" we shall be referring to the method of recruitment, representation and distribution reflective of this diversity.

In comparative terms, this principle of recruitment and distribution is found in many other plural societies-federal or otherwise - although by different nomenclature. However, the salience and dimensions may differ from one society to another.

National Integration

National integration should be seen as a process. It refers to increased identification with, and loyalty to national institutions and the state. National integration is not synonymous with uniformity of all interests in a country. As has been remarked by Olagunju, the process of national integration may be

characterized by more centralizing tendencies and more nationalisation of issues,

but the process itself should neither [need not] lead to the disappearance of local interests and feelings nor the homogenisation of our complexity and diversity.²⁸

Thus national integration does not mean that all diversities are pulverised and give way to uniformity. Rather, it implies less salience to parochial solidarity, enhanced sense of belonging and loyalty to, as well as identification with, the nation -state; a feeling that one has a stake in the country and is prepared to defend its integrity.

Federal system

Federal system has been used, particularly in the distant past to describe various political arrangements so much that its meaning sometimes become hazy to the uninitiated.²⁹ Put simply a federal system is that in which there is a constitutional division of powers between two or more levels of government each of which is independent and coordinate in its sphere of jurisdiction.

Wheare defines the federal principle as:

the method of dividing powers so that the general and regional governments are each, within a sphere, coordinate and independent.³⁰

State Nationalism

This is the building of solidarity on national sentiments. In this case, citizens identify with the nation - in contradistinction to primordial groupings such as ethnicity - and promote the national interest.

Ethnic-Nationalism/Ethno-Nationalism

This refers to solidarity and identification that is predicated on primordial cleavage. In this case, individuals identify themselves with communal categories and these loyalties and structural solidarities compete with the claim of the state. Increased ethno-nationalism tends to undermine identification with the country as a whole.

1.9 Organization of the Study

This work is divided into five chapters. The first chapter comprises the introduction which encapsulates statement of the problem, justification for the study ,aims and objectives of the study and scope of the study. The introductory chapter also includes methodology of research, theoretical framework, hypotheses, definition of key concepts and operationalisation and a summary of the organization of the study.

Chapter two deals with literature review. Here we take a critical perusal of relevant literature on federal character and national integration.

Chapter three embodies the social, political, cultural and ethnic framework of the Nigerian State which provides the context of federal character principle in the country. Specifically subsumed under this are a discussion of the plural nature of Nigerian society, the emergence and development of the federal solution and the evolution of federal character principle in Nigeria.

The presentation, analysis and discussion of data is carried out in chapter four. Chapter five contains synopsis and conclusion which include our findings.

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NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. See *inter alia* Mazrui, Ali. A : " Pluralism and National Integration " in Kuper, Leo and Smith, M.G.(eds) *Pluralism in Africa* (Berkeley : University of California Press, 1969), pp 333-349
2. Smock, David R. and Smock, Audrey C: *The Politics of Pluralism: A Comparative Study of Lebanon and Ghana* (New York: Elsevier Scientific Publishing Co-Inc, 1975), p 1
3. See Despres, L.(ed) *Ethnicity and Resource Competition in Plural Societies* (Hague: Monton Publishers, 1975); Petersen, William "On the Subnations of Western Europe" in Glazer, Nathan and Moynihan, Daniel P (eds) *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience* (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1975) pp 177-208; Dahl, R.A. *Democracy in the United States* (Chicago, 1976); Glazer, Nathan and Moynihan, Daniel P." Why Ethnicity?" *Commentary* 58 October 1974.
4. We are not suggesting that each ethnic group should have been constituted into a nation-state. Rather we have in mind reservations about such configuration which engendered politics of irredentism among, for example, the Somalis of Ethiopia.

5. On the crisis in some African countries see, for instance, various issues of *BBC FOCUS ON AFRICA* and, *Southern Africa Political and Economic Monthly*.
6. In Bosnia Herzegovania, for example, a triumvirate of Presidents drawn from the three component groups: Serbs, Muslims and Croats to jointly run the country is in place.
7. Ukwu, U.I. "Even Development in Nigeria: An overview" in Nwosu, E.J (ed.) *Achieving Even Development in Nigeria: Problems and Prospects* (Enugu: Fourth Dimension, 1982); Elaigwu, J. Isawa "Nation-Building and Political Development in Nigeria: The Challenge of unity in a Heterogenous Society" Proceedings of the National Conference on Nigeria since Independence, Zaria March, 1983 vol 1 *Political Development* edited by Atanda, J.A and Aliyu, A.Y (Zaria: The Panel on Nigeria since Independence History Project, 1985) pp 460-486; Ukwu, Ukwu "Federalism Integration and Development: Some Options in Ukwu, Ukwu 1 (ed) *Federal character and National Integration in Nigeria* (Kuru: National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, 1987) p 187; *Tell* (Lagos) 7 October, 1996 p 18; Joseph, Richard A., Taylor, Sott D. and Agbaje, Adigun "Nigeria" in Kesselman, Mark, Krieger, Joel and Joseph, William A. (eds)

Comparative Politics at the Crossroads (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1996), pp613 - 689.

8. Quota system actually existed in Nigeria prior to the time of independence, albeit to a lesser degree. For quota form of military organization in Nigeria see for instance Gutteridge, W.F. *The Military in African Politics* (London: Methuen & Co ltd, 1969)
9. There are minor differences between the two.
10. See section 154-160 and Third Schedule part IG of the *Report of the Constitutional Conference Containing the Draft Constitution Volume I* 1995 (Abuja: National Assembly Press, 1995).
11. *Report of the Constitutional Conference Containing the Resolutions and Recommendations Volume II*, 1995 (Abuja: National Assembly Press, 1995)
12. Section 14(3) of the *Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979*; section 15(3) of the *Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1989*; section 15(3) of the 1995 Draft Constitution (cited above).
13. The motto of the country begins with unity and various means by which the Nigerian state should promote national integration are spelt

out in section 15 of the 1979 constitution as well as section 16 of the 1989 constitution and 1995 Draft constitution.

14. On issues relating to Nigerian unity and domination in the country see, among others, *Tell* (Lagos) 8 July, 1996; 15 July, 1996; 11 November, 1996; *The News* (Lagos) 22 November, 1993; 19 June, 1995; *The African Guardian* (Lagos) 20 January, 1992; 8 November, 1993; *Ogoni Scope* April 1994).
15. cf Smock, David R. and Smock, Audrey C. *op cit*; Glazer Nathan and Moniyhan, Daniel P. (eds) *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975); Mazrui A.A. *Cultural Engineering and Nation-Building* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972); Smock, D.R and Bentsi-Enchill, Kwamena (eds) *The Search for National Integration in Africa* (New York: Free Press, 1975); Rothchild, D. and Olorunsola, V.A (eds) *State Versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983); Deutsch Karl.W. *Nationalism and Social Communication* (New (York; Wiley, 1953); Ake, Claude *A Theory of Political Integration* Homewood: Dorsey Press, 1967); Young, Crawford *The Politics of Cultural Pluralism* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976);

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16. cf, for example, the various studies in Ekeh, Peter P. and Osaghae, Eghosa E.(eds), *Federal Character and Federalism in Nigeria* (Ibadan: Heinemann, 1989).
17. cf various articles in Ukwu, Ukwu I.(ed) *op cit* and many articles in Nigerian dailies.
18. For a detailed examination of these and other sampling techniques, including their advantages and disadvantages, see *inter alia* Weisberg, Herbert F, Krosnick, John A. and Bowen, Bruce D. *An Introduction to Survey Research and Data Analysis* (Illinois: Scott, Foresman and company, 1989) especially pp 31-60.
19. *Population Census of Nigeria, 1963* Lagos, Midwestern Region, Eastern Region, Western Region and Northern Region. see Appendix B.

20. Cf, for example, Glazer, Nathan and Moniyhan, Daniel P. *op cit*; Smith, M.G. *The Plural Society in the British West Indies* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965); Kuper, Leo and Smith, M.G. (eds) *op cit*; Enloe, Cynthia H. *Ethnic conflict and Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown and co, 1973).
21. Smock, David and Smock, Audrey *op cit*.
22. *Ibid*, pp 14-15.
23. For the discussion of these models see 19 and 20 above. For criticism see also Connor, Walker "The Politics of Ethnonationalism", *Journal of International Affairs* Volume 27, Number 1 (1973), pp 1 - 21
24. Connor, *Ibid*.
25. Smock and Smock *op cit*.
26. The word, "nation", is used here as a synonym for state. This clarification is necessary since nation can also mean a homogeneous ethnic formation.
27. We need to point out that hypothesis no 5 does not necessarily derive from the major hypothesis. All the same it is important and germane to the problem being investigated in this study.
28. Olagunju, Tunji "Federal Character and National Integration: An Overview" in Ukwu, Ukwu I. (ed) *op. cit.* p 37.
29. On the differing use of federal system see, for example, Dare L.O." Perspective on Federalism" in Akinyemi, A.B. *et al* (eds)

Readings on Federalism (Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, 1979), p 26.

30. Wheare, K.C. *Federal Government* fourth edition (London: Oxford University Press, 1963) p 10.

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CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

There appears to be dearth of empirical studies in the area being pursued in this study. Essentially, what we intend to do in this chapter is to review works that are germane to our study. We shall first examine the concept of national integration in socio-political theory in order to clarify the concept. Next we shall look at factors and strategies that conduce to national integration from which we shall draw out a synthesis of federal character and national integration.

2.2 National Integration

For quite a long time scholars have expended their intellectual resources on exploring the concept of national integration. The issue of national integration has its origin in the political ferment that attended the Reformation even though it assumed political significance only towards the end of the eighteenth century.¹ This notwithstanding, a perusal through the existing literature on national integration reveals no single universally acceptable definition of the concept. Many scholars have viewed it from several differing stand points.²

Broadly, however, the writings on national integration can be categorised into two. This categorisation is widely acknowledged in the literature on national

integration as exemplified by Oluwajuyitan's study (see bibliography), among others. The first category embraces theorists who perceive national integration in terms of achieving progressive harmony or cohesion within the existing order. Essentially, this group consists of liberal writers.

The second category - which includes theorists of the Marxist tradition - has under its umbrella those who perceive national integration as impossible within the existing order. To them (that is those of the latter category) the achievement of national integration will be preceded by radical alteration of the existing order.

We must emphasize that this classification does not imply consensus of views among theorists in each category. As we shall show from the analysis below, variations exist within each category. And taken as a whole the difference between theorists in the two groups lies not so much in their conceptions of national integration as in the means of achieving it. We shall first examine those of the liberal tradition.

Wriggins, while giving two senses in which national integration can be construed notes rightly that there are other possible ways of looking at the problem (definition) of national integration. First, he states that:

National integration ... suggests the bringing together of the disparate parts of a society into a more integrated whole, or to make out of many small societies a closer approximation of one nation. ³

This definition looks at national integration in terms of de-emphasizing the parochial attachments in favour of a common identity such that people will find their real loyalty and sense of oneness within the nation as a whole as opposed to within

special subgroups based on region, language and religion. In many plural states, people find fellow feelings within subgroups but national integration will bring about the drawing together of the "diverse elements into something more cohesive, with the parts linked more closely together"⁴. Wriggins characterizes this as the transition from many societies into one large society.

Wriggins points to the salience of fellow feeling to a sound state. According to him, a sense of suspicion by members of a group towards members of other groups in the state is inimical to the emergence of fellow feeling. While intergroup differences cannot be eliminated, national integration is promoted when those seemingly inevitable differences

are held within bounds by overarching agreement on fundamentals and by institutions that put a premium on moderating and compromising conflicts⁵.

The second definition of national integration given by Wriggins relates to the ability of a state to penetrate the length and breadth of its territory. In some states there may exist areas of dissidence over which the government lacks authority; that is government's servants and national economic life, education and social way seldom penetrate such areas. In this context national integration will refer to:

a growing ability of the government to exert its authority throughout the realm.⁶

Discernible from Wriggin's analysis of his first conceptualisation of national integration (stated above) is the use of the concept broadly to include the attenuation (or whittling down) of certain differences in the society. For example he uses it to imply the bridging of the gap between the way of life of the rulers (elite) and the

populace as well as the narrowing down of the differences between the ways of life of urban dwellers and people in the countryside. He observes that there are substantial differences, in many new states, between these groups and that "only as national integration progresses will they diminish".⁷

A highly articulate attempt at classifying the various interpretations of the term integration is found in the work of Weiner. There are five classifications corresponding to what he calls national integration, territorial integration, value integration, elite -mass integration and integrative behaviour.⁸

First, according to Weiner:

integration may refer to the process of bringing together culturally and socially discrete groups into a single territorial unit and the establishment of a national identity.⁹

This definition of integration presupposes the existence of a diverse or plural society or the coming together of previously distinct independent units with which people identify. Hence in this sense, integration (synonymous with national integration) refers specifically to the problem of "creating a sense of territorial nationality which overshadows - or eliminates - subordinate parochial loyalties".¹⁰

A review of major works on national integration shows that the core element in the preceding definition of (national) integration exists in them. For example, this definition corresponds to "the challenge of *unity* (nation-building) which is one of the challenges of political development that have been identified by International Social Science Research Council."¹¹ The challenge of unity (creating unity among

heterogenous groups in the state) is concerned with efforts aimed at integrating the various groups with a view to building a 'nation' out of a state.¹²

This usage is also in consonance with one of the two usages in Coleman and Rosberg. In this sense they see (national) integration which they call "territorial integration" as referring

to the progressive reduction of cultural and regional tensions and discontinuities on the horizontal plane in the process of creating a homogenous territorial political community.¹³

This intellectual inclination with respect to the definition of integration is noticeable in the first usage of the concept by Wriggins which we have already discussed. On their part, Almond and Powell also follow this trend. They see national integration (which they term nation-building) as:

the process whereby people transfer commitment and loyalty from smaller tribes; villages, or petty principalities to the larger central political system.¹⁴

This definition by Almond and Powell, like others which construe national integration as involving transfer of commitment and loyalty from a subgroup to national political authority has been the butt of critics. For instance, Elaigwu disagrees with the definition on the ground that loyalty cannot be transferred in that manner. As he puts it:

... process of nation-building does not involve the *transfer* of "commitments and loyalties" from narrow or parochial levels of ethnic groups to a larger political unit, such as Nigeria.¹⁵

Elaigwu's disagreement with the definition which emphasizes transfer of commitments and loyalties derives from his polemic that belonging to a particular

ethnic group e.g Ibo, Yoruba, Hausa or Tiv "is a matter of identity" and "you cannot transfer it". You cannot cease being an Ibo or Hausa simply because you so declare". For him there are two dimensions of nation-building: vertical and horizontal. By its vertical dimension nation-building refers:

to the progressive acceptance by members of the polity of the legitimacy and necessity for a central government and the identification (as a result of widening horizons of parochial loyalties) with the central government as a symbol of the nation.¹⁶

Viewed from its horizontal dimension, nation-building

involves the acceptance of other members of the civic body as equal fellow members of a "corporate" nation - a recognition of the rights of other members to a share of common history, resources, values and other aspects of the state - buttressed by a sense of belonging to one political community.¹⁷

A close examination of Elaigwu's disagreement with definition of national integration which lays stress on transfer of commitments and loyalties from subgroup to the national entity reveals that it is based on at least two assumptions. First, he construes it to mean the denial or abandonment of loyalty to subgroups in favour of the state. Elaigwu's own definition (stated above) also assumes that national integration leads to identification with the national political unit. His conception however corresponds to "extension" rather than "transfer" of loyalties.

Given that national integration is a process,¹⁸ one can argue that transfer of loyalty from subgroup to national political entity represents a very high stage in the integration process. While in practice this may hardly be achievable, it is not logically impossible. So that rather than arguing that "nation-building *does not*

involve the transfer of commitment and loyalties" it should be stated that "nation-building *need not* involve the transfer (complete shift) of commitments and loyalties".

Second, Elaigwu equates commitment and loyalty to, and identification with, a subgroup with the very fact of being a member of a subgroup. In other words he assumes that loyalty to a subgroup is synonymous with being a member of that subgroup. Hence he thinks that by "transferring" one's loyalty to a higher political unit, one is renouncing one's membership of a subgroup which to him is impossible.

In his own words:

You cannot transfer it. You cannot cease being an Ibo or Hausa, simply because you so declare.¹⁹

Being an Igbo or Hausa is quite a different thing from identifying with or being loyal to such an ethnic group. One's loyalty to an ethnic group may stem from the fact that one is a member of that ethnic group. Yet, it is possible to belong to an ethnic group without feeling loyalty or commitment to it. An appropriate instance of this is an event that occurred in Nigeria during the civil war. In August 1967 an assembly of "leaders of thought" of Midwest Igbo met to debate the Biafran question. Opinions were diverse. However the conclusion reached was that *despite the fact that they were Igbo and Biafra cause was acknowledged as an Igbo cause, fidelity to Biafra was not a proper inference* (emphasis not in the original).²⁰ Furthermore one may feel loyalty to an ethnic group to which one does not belong.

Our arguments here attempt to lay bare the problems that bedevil efforts at defining national integration. It should be noted though that the last two sets of

definitions reviewed here acquiesce in the fact that national integration is concerned with identification with, and loyalty to, the national political unit.

We have thus far reviewed the first sense in which Weiner uses integration, that is as national integration and also examined the definitions by some other scholars, which fall within the category. The second classification made by Weiner relates to:

the problem of establishing national central authority over subordinate political units or regions which may or may not coincide with distinct cultural or social groups.²¹

Weiner refers to this as territorial integration. In contra-distinction to national integration (the first sense in which Weiner construes integration) which has to do with the subjective feelings possessed by individuals of diverse groups or historically distinct political units towards their nation, territorial integration has to do with the objective control which central authority has over the entire territory under its claimed jurisdiction.²²

We notice similarity in this conception of integration with the second sense in which Wriggins defines national integration. This definition also corresponds to the conception of the "challenge of authority or state-building"²³ which refers to the ability of the state to exert authority and control over its entire territory. Elaigwu defines the challenge of *authority* or state-building as:

the problem of the political center "penetrating or "controlling" the periphery to make its presence felt and to maximise its authority.²⁴

The third usage under Weiner's classification is the use of integration to refer to the problem of linking government (rulers) with the governed. This is the elite -

mass integration. This definition presumes a gulf between the elite and the mass. There is said to exist differences in goals, aspirations and values between the governing elite and the governed mass. Also in some societies, government may be so cut off from the people they govern to the extent that they find it difficult, if not impossible, to mobilise the masses. In such societies the masses may be unable to influence the governing elites. Thus integration in this sense will refer to the bridging of this gap.

Coleman and Rosberg whose definitions of integration include elite - mass integration give an apt definition of it. They refer to it as political integration. According to them:

political integration ... refers to the progressive bridging of the elite- mass gap on the vertical plane in the course of developing an integrated political process and a participant political community.²⁵

The integration of elite and masses does not connote a uniformity of the goals and values of the elites and the masses. For, as Weiner rightly puts it:

The integration of elite and mass between governors and the governed, occurs not when differences among the two disappear, but when a pattern of authority and consent is established.²⁶

When those who are governed accept the right of those who govern to do so, when there is increased capacity of the governors to mobilise the masses, and when there exists greater accessibility to and influence over the governing elites by the masses, then the society will be said to be moving in the direction of greater integration.

It is important to stress that the existence of a gap in the aspiration and values of the elites and the masses does not imply that there is always a consensus in the

values of the elites. Value preferences and preferred goals to be pursued by the state may differ among elites even though taken together there is a tendency that shared values are more common with people in the same class or group than those belonging to different classes or groups.

Much has also been written about the fundamental cultural and attitudinal gaps that exist between the elites and the masses in the developing nations. The former are usually perceived as secular-minded and western-oriented while the latter are perceived as oriented toward traditional values, fundamentally religious and vernacular-speaking.²⁷

This latter interpretation of elite-mass gap (in the preceding paragraph) seems to be less salient in the light of certain developments. With the exposure of more people (the non-elites) to Western influences through western education and greater access to information generally, the differences in this respect are being blurred. More specifically, such values as secular-mindedness and western orientedness cannot be said to be the exclusive preserve of the governing elites. Furthermore, evidence abounds to link some of the values attributed to the masses (such as religious fundamentalism and orientation towards traditional values) with some members of the governing elite.²⁸

Value integration which is the fourth sense in which Weiner uses integration refers to the "minimum value consensus necessary to maintain a social order".²⁹ This has to do with agreement on what social ends are desirable and should be pursued

and what social ends are undesirable. It is also concerned with the instrumentalities and procedures (i.e. means) for achieving goals and resolving conflict.

Lastly, Weiner also construes integration as "capacity of people in a society to organise for some common purposes".³⁰ In this sense integration is seen as "integrative behaviour".

The literature on national integration is quite extensive and its treatment here cannot be regarded as exhaustive. In his *Political Unification*, Etzioni sees national integration as existing in a community when such a community has:

effective control over the use of means of violence ... a center of decision-making capable of effecting significantly the allocation of resources and rewards ... [and] ... a dominant focus of political identification for a large majority of politically aware citizens".³¹

A common strand in many of these definitions is the existence of political identification and a sense of community. This element is also present in Deutsch's definition of national integration conceived as the process of bringing together a "security community". For him this involves a

sense of community and institutions and practise strong enough and widespread enough to assure for a "long time" dependable expectations of "peaceful change" among its population.³²

Deutsch's is a communications theory of integration. He contends that intensive pattern of communication will bring about a closer community.

Paden and Soja conceive national integration in terms of the coming together of previously autonomous primordial group with members developing national consciousness. For them national integration refers to

the aggregation of erstwhile independent and primordial groups into a larger more diffuse unit whose implicit frame of reference is not the ethnic but the nation state.³³

As we have earlier remarked, the literature on national integration is so extensive that it cannot be exhaustively reviewed in a work of this nature. Thus what we have done has been an attempt to cover the dominant theories in this respect. Although there are areas of divergence in many of the works covered, one common strand that cuts across these theories is that integration can occur within existing social order. This is where these theories differ from those of the Marxist persuasion.

Marxists view conflict in the society as basically class-based. To be sure, Marxists recognise other forms of cleavages (such as ethnic, religious, linguistic) in the society. However, other schisms are seen to derive directly or indirectly from class conflicts.³⁴

Thus, for Marxists, the problem of national integration arises out of class conflict. Hence national integration cannot be brought about within the existing order (characterised by class conflict). Here lies the major point of departure between Marxist and non-Marxist writers. Miliband accurately captures this difference when he states that:

In the liberal view of politics, conflict exists in terms of "problems" which need to be "solved". The hidden assumption is the conflict does not, or need not, run very deep; that it can be "managed" by the exercise of reason and goodwill, and a readiness to compromise and agree. However, the Marxist approach to conflict is very different. It is not a matter of "problems" to be solved but a state of domination and subjection to be ended by total transformation of the conditions which gave rise to it.³⁵

For Marxists, therefore, national integration will be engendered when a classless society is put in place.

We will observe from our analysis of literature on national integration that this concept has been subjected to multi-definitions. Varied as these definitions are, however, a common denominator can be identified among them namely, the definitions are all attempts to define what it is "which holds a society and a political system together".³⁶ In essence, the plural definition of integration stems from the fact that there are many ways in which systems fall apart hence integration can be defined in many ways.

For our purposes, Weiner's use of integration as national integration is germane and useful. Definitions by other theorists which have the element in Weiner's national integration present in them are also pertinent to this study.

There is no consensus of views among scholars regarding the path to national integration. The prescriptions (i.e. the recommended strategies for achieving national integration) are almost as varied as the conceptions of integration. In the next section we shall look at the various means by which national integration can be engendered.

2.3 Factors and Strategies for National Integration

In this study, we identify four contending perspectives on achieving national integration. The first one is the school of thought which holds that national integration will naturally but gradually take place in plural societies. According to this view, national integration is a stage-wise process and each stage is more

depluralised than its preceding stages and less depluralised than the successive stages. This school assumes that new states, through a gradual process, would move from one stage to another. It does not recognise reversal in the process of national integration.³⁷

This thinking is associated with a variant of liberal thought known as modernisation school which held sway in the 1950's. Regardless of the attitude of scholars in this school towards the significance of communalism and ethnicity in relation to national integration the common denominator is that with time all inhibiting factors against integration will attenuate. It also assumes a positive correlation between modernisation and national integration.

The above postulates have not been borne out by hard evidence: states have not progressed in a unilinear move along the process of national integration. Not only have many relatively new states been more ridden with crisis of national integration in recent times than at the very incipient stage of their statehood, even some of the old states, earlier thought to have transcended the threshold of national integration have experienced worst forms of disintegration as we have earlier pointed out.

To reiterate the instances cited earlier, we wish to draw attention to the threat to national integration in Russia and Canada. Russia whose independent status as a state was a by-product of the disintegration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) has in recent times been embroiled in a war of disintegration as evidenced in the protracted war of independence by Chechnyans. While the agitations for the separation of Quebec from Canada has not assumed such a dimension, the agitators

are all the same quite vocal. Similarly, the "symbolic" declaration of independence by an opposition leader in Italy for a part of the country betrays a deep crisis of national integration in that country.³⁸

Furthermore, modernising influences have not necessarily eradicated the impediments to national integration created by primordial attachments, such as ethnicity. This negates the assumption that primordial attachments will wither away as a nation is exposed to modernising influences thereby paving way for greater integration. This point was buttressed by Smock and Smock when they wrote that:

... modernisation often creates the very conditions necessary for the incubation of strong communal identities and sets the stage for communal competition.³⁹

Young's intellectual standpoint is also typical of this position. He contends that:

The rapid growth of cities creates social arenas where competition for survival is intense, and where the consciousness of other groups locked in combat for the same resources deepens. The importance of scarcity of resources and competition for status in the crystallization of contemporary identities can hardly be overstated.⁴⁰

The salient point being made here is that there is no necessary positive relationship between modernisation on the one hand and obviation or attenuation of sub-group attachment and greater level of national integration on the other. Some scholars, as epitomised by the above quotation, argue that modernisation creates the environment for parochial identities in that the purveyors of modernisation (e.g. roads, schools, market economy, participant politics, etc.) as well as opportunities and resources provided by modernisation accentuate intergroup conflict which is seen in terms of zero-sum game. Absence of strong class consciousness or organisations (such as

political parties) with strong ideological base makes communal groups easily susceptible as infrastructure for carrying out this struggle.⁴¹

Hence, Esman argues that it is not the case that modernisation brings in its wake universal perspectives and values that facilitate integration; and that modernisation does not bring communal harmony.⁴² Although, modernisation (industrialisation and economic development) may bring about non-traditional forms of social differentiation such as class and occupation, it does not necessarily weaken communal bonds. Besides, communal and non-communal identities may coexist within an individual each of which is activated in different contexts.⁴³

Thus the "liberal expectancy" that primordial differences between groups would become less significant in modern and modernising societies and that common systems of education and communication would level differences⁴⁴ have proved unrealistic.

If the "liberal" view were correct what this would have implied for a plural country such as Nigeria is that communal attachments would gradually erode with time. But we observe in Nigeria today that this line of cleavage is still an essential unit of reference and identification. Moreover, a policy implication of this view on the attainment of nationally integrated society is that the government need not take action to bring it about. As we have shown this position is fraught with problems.

The second school of thought on the attainment of nationally integrated society encapsulates those who doubt that national integration is possible in plural societies. They hold that plural societies tend toward fragmentation which is not conducive to

the achievement of national integration. Enloe views plural states as artificial collectivities which are often sustained by oppression.⁴⁵

The third perspective on attaining national integration embraces those who believe that notwithstanding the strong emotions evoked by communal attachments, plurality does not preclude national integration. This group, in contradistinction to the first one which sees the achievement of national integration as a natural consequence of modernisation process, stresses the need for conscious effort to manage cleavages, that is to achieve national accommodation within the framework of a plural political system. This latter school recognises that the government can promote national integration through the conscious initiation and implementation of public policies to accommodate diverse groups.

The fourth perspective includes scholars of Marxist orientation. For them integration can and will come about but not within the capitalist order. Marxists hold the view that the pertinent schism in society is classes. Classes, not ethnicity, religion and other divisions, constitute the veritable structure of the society. Through a dialectical process by which transformation occurs in the society, communism will eventually emerge, a classless stage at which integration will be achieved.

Thus this "radical expectancy" holds that class division is the critical line of division among people. Espoused by Karl Marx and his adherents, earlier lines of schism in society such as tribe, language, religion and national origin are thought to be superseded by that based on class.⁴⁶ According to this school of thought, class divisions would themselves ultimately disappear after revolution that will usher in communism.

Again, we find from the Marxist perspective that an acceptance of their position may not lead one to design policies to promote integration since integration is considered possible only in a conflict free society. This contrasts with the third perspective which recommends policies designed to accommodate groups as a means of promoting national integration.

With respect to public policy strategies for promoting national integration it has been contended that the choice of a strategy or strategies is conditioned by the pattern of social organisation in a plural society.⁴⁷ Geertz distinguishes five patterns of social organisation in plural societies.⁴⁸ The first pattern concerns countries in which a single group is dominant in numbers and authority and there are two or more minority groups. Second, countries in which a single group is dominant in authority but not numbers. Contemporary Rwanda and Burundi are good examples of this.

The third pattern of social organisation includes countries in which no single group by itself commands a majority nor is a single group politically dominant. India is an example of this. Fourth, countries of any combination in which one or more minorities cut across international boundaries. Fifth, countries where there are two nearly even balanced major groups.

What form of public policy is adopted in a given country is largely determined by any of these pattern that prevails in such country. Weiner identifies two public policy strategies that can be adopted.⁴⁹ The first one is the elimination of the distinctive cultural traits of minority communities into some kind of "national"

culture, usually that of the dominant cultural group - a policy referred to as assimilationist.

Obviously, this kind of strategy will not succeed in a country such as Nigeria. In Nigeria, attempts by government to pursue policies that were considered to have the effect of perpetuating the dominance of the cultural traits of a particular group have always been met with reactions capable of causing disintegration. Two examples will suffice here.

When the press reported that Nigeria had obtained full membership of the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC), it evoked strong reactions from other religious groups, particularly the Christians. In similar vein, suggestions that lingua franca be found locally for the country have always evoked strong reactions. Each of the major groups will not concede such ground to the other. The action of the representatives from minority groups in the Assembly who staged a walk-out protest against the adoption of the three major languages as media of communication serves to underscore the futility of using assimilationist approach to achieving national integration in Nigeria. Problem of this nature perhaps informed warning by some scholars that national integration does not necessarily involve the homogenization of cultural and political identities and that any attempt at simple replacement of primordial ties and identification by civil ones is sheer impossibility. The compromise as Geertz puts it, is to be found in "adjustment between them"⁵⁰

The second public policy strategy as enunciated by Weiner is the establishment of national loyalties without eliminating subordinate culture - the policy of "unity in diversity".⁵¹

This latter strategy seems to have found favour with most people in plural societies. In most of these countries public policies are aimed not at imposing a dominant culture but at increasing national consciousness and identification while recognising the societal diversities.

Public policy for promoting national integration could either be coercive or non-coercive. Coercive method refers to the application of force. Deutsch approves the use of coercive method (force) to achieve national integration as a last resort. As he puts it:

the use of force is approved as a last resort to achieve national integration, limited especially to the threats of periods of secession, crises or rebellion by member units of a polity.⁵²

We observe from the above quotation that Deutsch's recommendation of force pertains to situations when the unity of the political entity is threatened. An instance of this is found in the Nigerian case when the country was on the verge of disintegration sequel to the attempted "political divorce"⁵³ by one of the component units from the federation. To restore a state of equilibrium to the system the military option was adopted.

Non-coercive method essentially involves the use of persuasion as opposed to force. It includes attempt at using mobilisation. This could assume a psychological/attitudinal form such as efforts to persuade the citizenry to support the political

system and political leadership. Non-coercive method could also assume a structural form in which case government engages in institution- building that will facilitate intergroup interaction and participation with a view to promoting ethnic understanding and national integration.

This method is found in Nigeria in such areas as the policy of representativeness in national institutions and affairs and the establishment of National Youth Service Corps.⁵⁴ These are some of the specific means by which the Nigerian state has sought to promote national integration.

Wriggins identifies five of the numerous ways by which national integration can be promoted. These are the effort to cope with foreign foes; the political style of leaders who deemphasise differences and provides national leadership; and the character of political institutions, such as the bureaucracy, the army, the school system, communications in general and the political parties and legislature. The other two are the matter of a national ideology defining both goals and ways to achieve them; and the expansion of opportunity and broad economic growth.⁵⁵

The third means which relates to the character of national institutions is pertinent to our study. In the next section we will undertake a synthesis of the major works on the relationship between federal character principle (or its analogue) and national integration.

2.4 Federal Character Principle and National Integration

The study by Smock and Smock centred on Ghana and Lebanon⁵⁶. It was observed that the approaches adopted by the two countries in seeking to manage communal tensions and to create unity and stable politics were radically different. During the period covered by the study, Ghanaian leaders attempted to eliminate ethnic distinctions with a view to forging a unified society on the conviction that ethnic diversities are minor impediments to nation-building and that they will disappear as modernisation progresses. Conversely, Lebanese leaders explicitly recognised the strength of primordial attachments and they devised a system built on communal blocks which promotes intergroup equilibrium rather than assimilation.

A finding of the research is that the sharing of political power and offices among communal groups ensured relative stability of the political system in Lebanon, the growth in support for the system and the increase in attachment to the national community. Hence, they conclude that although the Lebanese political system may reinforce confessional groups, this does not mean that it inhibits the development of national loyalty or national consciousness.⁵⁷

Their study also shows that with respect to Ghana (which did not adopt quota system) Nkrumah's bid to remove ethnic differences and the benign neglect or active exploitation of ethnicity by his successor as opposed to communal representation did not pay off for national unity. The study shows that Nkrumah's twin strategy - the attempt at infusing national perspective into all political actors and endorsing programmes designed to instil greater national perspective, and the creation of one

party state failed to instil the desired national consciousness.⁵⁸ The study thus shows that representation of communal groups in political institutions promotes national integration.

Adekanye also examined the impact of quota system in Lebanon and Cyprus, but his focus was on the military. This comparative study of impact of the form of military organisation in the two countries for the period 1943-75 and 1960-74 respectively indicates that recruitment by ethnic quotas constituted the basis of military recruitment in these two countries. It also shows that this form of military organisation was an important explanatory variable for the political cum military disintegration of the two societies.⁵⁹ He however notes the conflictual character of those societies and the international dimension to the crisis.

In the case of Nigeria, while there is dearth of empirical study regarding federal character principle and national integration, relatively many writings exist on the subject. Here we review some of the major works.

In his study of the Nigerian military, Adekanye finds that the recruitment and organisational pattern in the Nigerian army in the pre-1966 period which was structured on a consciously institutionalised quota basis was a factor in the disintegrative conflict that afflicted Nigeria at that time.⁶⁰ Between 1958 and 1963 the Balewa government adopted the 50-25-25 (for the north, east and west respectively) quota formula for the organisation of the Nigerian army and society. After the creation of Midwestern region in 1963 the formula was modified slightly to 50-25-21-4. According to Adekanye:

The contribution of that form of organisation to the intra-army conflicts of 1966, its exacerbation of the political struggle raging in the wider society, leading to the attempted secession of the former eastern region (or "Biafra") from the federation of Nigeria, in contrast with other military forms adopted elsewhere in Africa is also well-known.⁶¹

The import of the foregoing is that the application of quota system to the Nigerian army in the period covered was disintegrative. Adekanye notes that during the civil war (1967-70) quota form of military organisation was superseded by a supra-ethnic kind of organisation based on individual loyalty and national service. He sees this kind of individualised and nationalised military organisation as engendering national consciousness.⁶²

It is a truism that centrifugal forces gained ascendancy in Nigeria from 1960-1966. Internecine rivalry with ethnic/sectional undertone among politicians for political relevance and hegemony was the rule rather than the exception. There was reliance on ethnic sentiments for mobilising political support which in turn made it imperative for political leaders to put first the interests of their ethnic based supporters in the distribution of political goods, establishing patron-client relationships rooted in primordial attachments. This fact of political life in Nigeria accentuated inter-ethnic distrust and fear of marginalisation.

The politicization of ethnicity negatively impacted on the development of national consciousness. The military was not insulated from this ill, as each group struggled to gain control. What is questionable however is the alleged role of army quota recruitment in this disintegrative conflict.

A major seed of discord in the Nigerian army in the immediate pre- and post-independence era and one of the reasons ethnic chauvinists among politicians were relatively successful in politicising ethnicity in the Nigerian military was the issue of domination in that important national organisation.⁶³

The perception of that institution as being dominated by people from a section of the country was itself capable of causing a feeling of alienation and heightening ethnic and political tensions. Indeed, for Gutteridge, this was a major explanatory factor for the "disintegration" of Nigeria in the 1960's. According to him:

The accident of initial Ibo predominance produced a spiral of mutual suspicion between the northern rulers, especially the Sardauna of Sokoto, and the Eastern elite, culminating in and substantially responsible for the disintegration of 1966-67.⁶⁴

The oft quoted statement of General Yakubu Gowon that there was no basis for Nigeria's unity - a statement reflective of the mood of the northern military officers who had initially planned to excise Northern Nigeria from the federation⁶⁵ - was apparently informed by the fear of domination and deprivation. This fear was aggravated after the January 15, 1966 coup by mainly Igbo officers in the army.

It is thus quite improbable that quota recruitment into the military which was meant to ensure ethnic balancing inflamed the political struggles which raged in the wider society "leading to the attempted secession of the former eastern region". As has been forcefully put by Wriggins, the army could serve as a nationalising agent,

If however, the army is not truly national, but is drawn only from certain elements of the society, it may sharpen envy and contradict unity.⁶⁶

The contribution of the mode of organisation of the Nigerian military to the failure of the wider society to move in the direction of integration was not so much (if at all) a function of the method of recruitment based on quota as in the perception of the institution as being dominated by a certain group. Although the equation has since been altered, those who now feel dominated have continued to hammer home the need to enforce the principle of federal character strictly in military appointment, promotion and even retirement.⁶⁷

On the other findings by Adekanye to the effect that national consciousness was promoted during the civil war and in the period immediately after the civil war under the "militantly nationalistic" regimes of Generals Murtala Mohammed and Olusegun Obasanjo - a development he largely attributes to the abandonment of quota system, certain strong reservations are called for. First the war situation in the country at the time demanded that hardly would anyone interested in the military service be turned back in so far as he was considered medically fit. Thus this put paid to tensions generated by lack of sufficient access to that institution by any section of the country. Furthermore, the willingness of those on the federal side to fight for the unity of Nigeria was engendered by a feeling of national consciousness in which case it was most unlikely that the "newly found" or imposed national consciousness at the time was mainly caused by the jettisoning of quota system.

Finally, as Adekanye himself has even remarked in spite of their resistance to formal quotas the three military rulers - Generals Gowon, Mohammed and Obasanjo - still took administrative steps to promote equitable representation of states

within the country's armed forces. They were conscious of the problem posed by ethno-political imbalances in the composition of the armed forces and appreciated the need to take measures to correct them. Only Ironsi's regime neglected the problem and paid the supreme price for it.⁶⁸

The salient point being made here is that though quota system was not "formally" adopted at the time, it was all the same taken into consideration in allocation of offices. In essence, quota system was still present and thus it could not have been the case that the improved national consciousness was as a result of the abandonment of quota system. And the Aguiyi-Ironsi's case noted above also buttresses the point that perceived ethnic imbalances, not quota system, had positive correlation with tendencies toward national disintegration.

Questioning in general the positive impact of federal character principle on national integration, Adekanye writes:

Is promotion of national unity through a cut-and-dried approach of "federal character" and the intergroup fears and tensions bound to be generated by the approach, not in fact counter-productive to the very goal (national integration) aimed at?⁶⁹

This seems to be an allusion to the contention of some members, albeit in the minority, of the Constitution Drafting Committee who argued that federal character principle was antithetical to the promotion of national integration. The position of that minority group was that:

the evolution of national loyalty can only be retarded by playing up the role of sectional representatives in the conduct of the affairs of state.

Reasoning in similar vein, Momoh debunks the notion that recruitment into public institutions on the basis of quota will facilitate national integration and even development. He contends that:

our peculiar politics of envy that seeks deliberately to retard the progress of those who are making sacrifices to obtain their level of development in order that the less developed can catch up will impede rather than accelerate the process of national integration and cohesion.⁷¹

The three quotations above (more explicit in the first two) again bring to the fore the question of whether by deliberately making the composition of public institutions reflect societal diversities the country is not unwittingly aggravating the arousal of ethnic sentiments and undermining national integration. For, as it has been argued, there is the probability that the principle of federal character will imbue public servants

with a constituency mentality which would frustrate the development of a national attitude and undermine their integrity and impartiality.⁷²

As the argument goes, federal character principle is capable of generating tensions that undermine the development of national attitudes. Indeed, public policies involving costs and benefits pertaining to ethnic interests are capable of generating tensions. As Raymond Breton observes:

The recognition of certain (ethnic) interests may produce anxiety among groups who feel that they are losers or could be losers in the process. The perceived losses can be in the form of increased taxes, a decrease in existing services, or a lowered symbolic status in the society.⁷³

The application of federal character principle (including its current extension) is not without costs and benefits to groups and individuals. The relative weight of

costs or benefits accruing to individual is, of course, determined by the group to which he belongs. Since the application of the principle to recruitment of staff to federal institutions, for example, there is no doubt that those who have had to bear the major cost of that policy are those from groups that are more educationally advanced. The loss has taken the form of, among others, reduction in the number of positions that could have been filled by qualified people from such group were recruitment to be based strictly on merit. This policy, therefore, may not evoke similar reactions from the different groups.

Similarly, the extension of the principle to the apex of political offices in the country tends to attract different reactions from different groups which is a function of the perception by various groups of their relative position in the new order of things (as opposed to the *status quo ante*). Many individuals from groups that are likely to be worse-off by the policy are likely to feel disenchanting with, and constitute veritable source of resistance to such policy.⁷⁴ These are all areas with great potential for tensions.

Thus, in deference to the antagonists of federal character principle, the application of the principle is bound to generate "inter-group fears and tensions". But to talk of the impact that such tensions could have on national integration requires a thorough examination and resolution of certain issues. Given that the absence of that policy is capable of igniting tensions and conflicts which could have debilitating effect on national cohesion, a question (a legitimate one at that) to ask is, is the cost (in terms of tensions and conflicts) of introducing the policy greater or less than the cost

of not adopting it? Further, on the whole how strongly do people feel about the policy?

There may be no single answer with universal applicability. The resolution of these issues demands that empirical studies be carried out in each context on the basis of which statement pertaining to causality between the two variables - that is, federal character principle (the independent variable) and national integration (the dependent variable) can be made.

In our case, while the argument on the ignition of ethnic sentiments by the adoption of federal character principle can be validly stressed to a large extent, we wish to make certain other remarks. Already, the politicization of ethnicity in Nigeria, as observation has shown, has engendered immense ethnic consciousness in the country. And when people from an ethnic group/section of the country are seen to be dominating the government of the country or public institutions, this readily constitutes the basis for distrust and conflict. Given this situation, even when ethnic consideration is not accorded a place in recruitment to public institutions, ethnic tensions are aroused once an ethnic group or a section is perceived to be lording it over others.

Moreover, a recognition of the diversity of a country need not *ipso facto* promote ethnic loyalty and retard national loyalty. As the study by Smock and Smock shows in the case of Lebanon, although the Lebanese political system (in the period covered by the study) reinforced communal groups, it did not impede the development of national loyalty or national consciousness.⁷⁵

So long as most people from the various groups perceive the system as fair, a sense of belonging to the nation will tend to develop. In this case, even though recognition is given to the plural nature of a society in recruitment and resource allocation, national loyalty will be promoted. This indeed may be a paradox of federal character principle.

There is another dimension to federal character principle which constitutes the basis for which its ability to promote national integration has been impugned. This relates specifically to the individuals that may be directly affected by it. When the promotion of career officers in public services is based on federal character principle then the mobility of some officers from certain section of the country may be restricted. In this case competent and well qualified officers may have less competent ones promoted over and above them (just because of the difference in place of origin) in which case the former may have to take directive from the latter. The crucial issue is what happens to the officers whose career prospects have been curtailed. As Longe has aptly put it:

[Will such officers] not thereby themselves become disaffected and in no frame of mind to promote national unity and bear unflinching loyalty to the nation?⁷⁶

Hence, it has been argued that the application of the principle of federal character is capable of creating many problems, as grave as that it was supposed to solve. The argument goes that:

it [federal character principle] is creating political tension among many, if not most, Southern public servants believe its main purpose is to deprive them of jobs for the benefit of northerners. This belief is shared by most unemployed people of the Southern origin. It is also

responsible for frustration among some public servants whose career expectations are adversely affected by the need to reflect the federal character.⁷⁷

Some have contended that the principle of reflecting communal interests in public institutions *per se* does not inhibit national integration but rather has potential for facilitating national integration. It is, however, argued that the problem that may attend the principle arises in the particular form that it assumes and/or its application. One of the works of Adekanye, "The Quota Recruitment Policy", is representative of this view.⁷⁸

In it, he argues that "extreme of quota system" in the military contributed to the "near disintegration" of the Nigerian army in the 1960's but stresses that the near disintegration was not a consequence of quota system *per se* but a variant of it which assured the domination of a constituent unit - the North. He views the federal character principle as representing a considerable advance on the old system. He argues further that it cannot logically be expected in its operation to produce the same tragic consequences as the old quota system.⁷⁹

He argues that quota system, that is, federal character principle has the advantage of, among others, portraying the army as a national institution which belongs to all segments of the society. Moreover, quota system, especially the variant that presently operates in Nigeria, has "considerable 'melting pot' potentials" capable of being employed "to advance the cause of national integration".⁸⁰

There are those who share the view that the continued use of political or geographical unit in contradistinction to ethnic category as index of representation in

Nigeria should be sustained.⁸¹ The reason adduced for this is the need to forestall overplaying ethnic differences through the application of federal character principle and thereby maximise the achievement of the integrative objective of the principle.

It is not the case that everyone shares this sentiment. Since the entrenchment of the principle of federal character in the Nigerian constitution (beginning from 1979) emphasis has been on the state as the pertinent unit of reference but this policy has not been insulated from criticisms. For example, it has been argued that:

the central pitfall in this arrangement is that it engenders a sense of alienation and furnishes a strong inducement to state agitation in the larger and more ethnically diverse state.⁸²

Despite the criticism against the adoption of state as the index of representation, it is not without its merits. It may appear to be the lesser evil. The adoption of ethnic, local government or federal constituency category for instance will seem unwieldy given the relative large number involved.

This argument regarding the convenience of state as the unit of representation notwithstanding there is a more fundamental issue pertaining to the appropriate unit of representation. The number of states today stands at thirty six. Some of these are multiethnic "states" while each of the major ethnic groups has several states. The question therefore arises as to whether the use of state as the basis of representation will guarantee substantial participation of all the demographic factors such as the multiethnic groups in the state and its religious variety.⁸³

This, indeed, is the crux of the matter. State as the index of representation may produce a situation where some ethnic groups are overrepresented while some

may be underrepresented or even unrepresented. Hence a school of thought believes that the objectives of federal character principle will be better achieved (if not only achieved) when ethnic formation is used as the relevant unit of representation. Ken Saro-Wiwa's assertion is representative of this view. According to him:

therefore, should we be desirous of acting in the true national interest, the application of the "federal character" principle must be based not only on the North-South confrontational syndrome but on broad based ethnic community consideration not only in Federal appointments but in all three tiers of government ... [which] will make for a more equal federation to which more people will owe loyalty because they see themselves represented meaningfully therein The federation gets stronger which is what we all want.⁸⁴

The above quotation shows that federal character principle is seen as an instrument of integration by Saro-Wiwa. This derives from the notion that when people see themselves as meaningfully represented then they are bound to be loyal to the federation. However, the integrative objective of the principle is construed as being accomplished within a context in which ethnic category serves as the index of representation since, in his view, this will ensure meaningful representation.⁸⁵

Others who have espoused the virtues of ethnic federation (that is a federation based on ethnic component units) include Awolowo⁸⁶ and Osuntokun⁸⁷. Osuntokun advocates the creation of an ethnic federation as a way of unifying Nigeria's diverse ethnic groups.

Osaghae's work also emphasizes the problematic of this element in federal character principle vis-a-vis its objective. He contends that by guaranteeing every part of the federation a place in central government and its agencies, the federal character principle represents a crucial instrument for resolving the national question.⁸⁸ He

however notes the basic problem which relates to the very definition of all "parts of the federation". As he puts it:

but it is precisely how adequate the conception of "parts of the federation" is, that determines the utility of federal character in resolving the national question and the nature of controversies which surround it.⁸⁹

Some others have also attempted to show, or argue, that federal character principle promotes national integration. As Dare attempts to show, equitable representation and distribution represented by federal character principle are vital ingredients for the survival of a federal system; the impact of government has to be felt in all parts of the country for all to transfer their primary loyalty to the nation state. National loyalty can be meaningful only when the people feel that the central government actively promotes the development of all parts of the nation.⁹⁰

This is in harmony with the intellectual disposition of Gboyega who argues that it works in the direction of national integration when people from all sections of the country are made to feel part of the federation. According to him when a group is excluded from adequate participation it will not feel adequately represented and such group will not give effective support to the system.⁹¹

The foregoing serves to underscore the polemic that federal character principle promotes national integration. It supports the view that perception of inequity by a section(s) of the country, in the distribution of national resources could form the the basis of national disunity. The oft quoted statement by National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) controlled government of eastern region (now defunct) issued in 1964 also lends credence to this position. The statement reads:

Take a look at what they [i.e. the NPC] have done with the little power we surrendered to them to preserve a unity that does not exist: Kainji Dam project - about £150 million of our money when completed - all in the north; Bornu railway extension - about £75 million of our money when completed - all in the north; spending over £50 million on the Northern Nigerian army in the name of the federal republic; military training and all ammunition factories and installation are based in the North, thereby using your money to train northerners to fight southerners. Building of a road to link the dam site and the Sokoto Cement Works - £7 million when completed - all in the north; total on all these four projects about £262 million. Now, they have refused to allow the building of an iron and steel industry in the east and paid experts to produce a distorted report.⁹²

This long passage has been deliberately quoted so as to make apparent the point being made. The statement by the then Eastern government shows disenchantment with the mode of distribution of national resources which it saw as inequitable. As Dare has contended, perceived inequality predisposes a section in a federation to wish to secede. And indeed, he argued that "the combination of political and economic deprivation fed eastern secession after the military took power".⁹³

The argument therefore is that to the extent that federal character principle ensures the participation of differing groups in national institutions and fair share of national resources, its potential for national integration is high in that people will feel a sense of belonging and loyalty to the country.

Our review of existing literature on federal character principle (or its analogue) and national integration has not yielded any uniformity of views or findings. As should be apparent by now federal character principle is a broad concept and the application of the multi-dimensional policy does not evoke similar reactions

in all its dimensions from varying groups. Majority of the works reviewed here support the view that federal character promotes national integration.

We also like to point out that there are several other issues that surround the concept and application of the principle of federal character such as the question of equity and its conflict with meritocracy.⁹⁴ While all the issues might not be rightly separated into watertight compartments, in our review of literature we have carefully dealt with aspect that borders on national integration.

In chapter four we shall present, analyse and discuss our empirical data on the relationship between federal character principle and national integration in the Nigerian federal system. The issue of federal character principle and national integration emanates from the fact that Nigeria is a plural society. It is our view that a proper appreciation of this demands an exposition of the context that produced the principle and within which it operates as well as the various dimensions and evolution of federal character principle in Nigeria. This, we think, will illuminate our understanding of this study. To this we now turn.

CHAPTER TWO

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Kedourie, E. *Nationalism* (London: Hutchinson, 1960); d'Entreves, A.P. *The Nature of the State* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967).
2. This is not helped by the use of such concepts as national integration, territorial integration, nation-building, political integration etc. Some of these are used interchangeably by some writers. Generally, however, national integration is used as a synonym for nation-building although Sklar writes of "a hidden difference of meaning between [the] two related terms" (Sklar, Richard L. "Political Science and National Integration - A Radical Approach" *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1967, pp. 1-11. For him, national integration is an expansive concept which implies the creation of durable bonds of unity within a state that are not, however, detrimental to other regional unities while nation-building may make a fetish of national sovereignty to the detriment of supranational integration. In spite of this attempt at distinguishing between these two concepts national integration and nation-building, as Sklar has even noted, are often used interchangeably (see *Ibid.*, p. 3). In this study, this dominant orientation is adopted; that is we use the two terms as having the same meaning.

3. Wriggins, Howard "National Integration" in *Dynamics of Growth* (New York: Basic Books Inc., 1966), pp. 181-191 quotation from p. 181.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 181.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 184-185.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 182.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 181-183.
8. Weiner, Myron "Political Integration and Political Development in Finkle, Jason L. and Gable, Richard, W. *Political Development and Social Change* second edition (New York: John Wiley & Sons Inc. 1971) pp. 643-654.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 643.
10. *Ibid.*
11. See *inter alia* Pye, Lucian *Aspects of Political Development* (Boston: Little Brown, 1962); Binder, Leonard; Pye, L.; Coleman, K.; Verba, S.; Lapalombara, J. and Weiner, M. (eds.) *Crises and Sequences in Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971); Almond, G., *Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown 1970); Binder, L. *Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962); Almond, G. and Powell, B. *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966); Huntington, Samuel, "The change to change: Modernisation, Development and Politics", *Comparative Politics*, Vol.

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12. Elaigwu, J. Isawa *Ibid.*, p. 460.
 13. Coleman, James S. and Rosberg, Carl G. (eds.) *Political Parties and National Integration in Africa*. (Berkeley: University of California, 1964).
 14. Almond, G. and Powell, B. *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach*, p. 36.
 15. Elaigwu, J. Isawa *op. cit.* p. 462.
 16. *Ibid.*
 17. *Ibid.*
 18. Mazrui identifies four stages of national integration viz: the stage of coexistence, stage of contact, stage of compromise and stage of coalescence. At the stage of coexistence - which represents the minimum degree of integration - groups merely coexist within the same border, they need not know of each other's existence. At the second stage - stage of contact - groups have minimum dealing with

one another. At the third stage - compromise - dealings between groups" become sufficiently complex, diverse and interdependent to require a climate of peaceful reconciliation between conflicting interests". At the final stage of coalescence - identities coalesce as the society becomes more technically complex and functionally integrated.

Mazrui, Ali "Violent contiguity and the Politics of Retribalization in Africa" *International Affairs*. Vol. xxiii No. 1, 1969.

19. Elaigwu, J. Isawa *op. cit.* p. 462.
20. Young, Crawford. *The Politics of Cultural Pluralism* (London: University of Wisconsin press , 1976), p. 473.
21. Weiner, Myron "Political Integration and Political Development" p. 644.
22. *Ibid.*
23. See 11.
24. Elaigwu *op. cit.* p. 460.
25. Coleman, James and Rosberg, Carl G. *op. cit.* p. 9. On this use of the term integration, see also Binder, Leonard "National Integration and Political Development" *American Political Science Review*, September 1964 pp. 622-631.
26. Weiner, Myron "Political Integration and Political Development" p. 650.
27. *Ibid.*

28. For further criticism of "gap" theories see Willner, Ann Ruth "The underdeveloped Study of Political Development" *World Politics* April 1964, pp. 468-482.
29. Weiner, Myron "Political Integration and Political Development" p. 644.
30. *Ibid.*
31. Etzioni, Amitai *Political Unification* (New York: Holt, Rhinehart & Winston, 1965), p. 4.
32. Deutsch, Karl *et al Political Community in the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957) p. 5.
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34. Miliband, R. *Marxism and Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977) pp. 18-19.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 17.
36. Weiner, Myron "Political Integration and Political Development" p. 645.
37. See for instance Mazrui, Ali A. "Pluralism and National Integration" in Kuper, Leo and Smith, M.G. (eds.) *Pluralism in Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 333-349; Smock, David and Smock, Audrey. *The Politics of Pluralism: A comparative study of Lebanon and Ghana* (New York: Elsevier , 1975) p. 3.
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39. Smock and Smock *op. cit.* p. 3.
40. Young, Crawford "Pattern of Social Conflict: State, Class and Ethnicity" *Daedalus* Vol III, No. 2 Spring 1982, p. 92 cited in Joseph, Richard A. *Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 6.
41. *Ibid.*, pp. 3-5.
42. Esman, Milton, "The Management of communal conflict" *Public Policy*, 21 (Winter, 1973) see Smock and Smock *op. cit.* p. 3.
43. Smock and Smock, *ibid.*, p. 3.
44. Gordon, Milton M. "Towards a General Theory of Racial and Ethnic Group Relations" in Glazer, Nathan and Moynihan, Daniel (eds) *Ethnicity Theory and Experience* (Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press, 1975).
45. Enloe, Cynthia N. *Ethnic Conflict and Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1973).
46. See Glazer, Nathan and Moynihan, Daniel, P. (eds.) *op. cit.* pp. 6-7.
47. Geertz, Clifford "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiment and Civil Politics in the new states" in Geertz, Clifford (ed.) *Old Societies and New Nations* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963). The excerpt also appears in Finkle Jason L. and Gabie, Richard, W. *Political*

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48. Geertz, Clifford *Ibid.* See also 49 below.
49. Weiner Myron "Political Integration and Political Development" p. 647.
50. Geertz, Clifford (ed.) *op. cit.* p. 155 see also Elaigwu, J. Isawa "*Nation-Building and Political Development in Nigeria: The Challenge of Unity in a Heterogeneous Society*" p. 463.
51. Weiner, *op. cit.*
52. Deutsch, Karl "Communication Theory and Political Integration" in Jacob P. and Toscana, T. (eds.) *The Integration of Political Communities* (Philadelphia, 1964) p. 60.
53. We borrow the usage of "political divorce" from Samuel Huntington who used it to mean secession. On this, see Foreword to Nordlinger, Eric A. *Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies*. Occasional Papers in International Affairs, No. 29 (Cambridge: Harvard University, Centre for International Affairs, Jan., 1972).
54. The National Youth Service Corps was established to promote national unity, see *National Youth Service Corps Decree 1993*. Decree No. 51 of 16th June, 1993 amended The National Youth Service Corps Decree No. 24 of 22nd May, 1973.
55. Wriggins, Howard "National Integration" in Weiner, Myron (ed.) *op. cit.* pp. 186-191.

56. Smock and Smock *op. cit.*
57. *Ibid.* pp. 326-329.
58. *Ibid.*, pp. 329-339.
59. Adekanye, J. Bayo "Political Ethnicity and Military Disintegration: The Contemporary Cases of Contemporary Cyprus (1960-1974) and Lebanon (1943-1975)" IDSA (*Quarterly Journal of the Institute of Defense Studies and Analysis*) Vol. xiii No. 2 Oct. - Dec., 1980. See his "The Quota Recruitment Policy: Its sources and Impact on the Nigerian military" in Ekeh, P.P. and Osaghae, E.E. (eds.) *Federal Character and Federalism in Nigeria* (Ibadan: Heinemann, 1989).
60. Adekanye, J. Bayo "Military Organisation in Multi-ethnically Segmented Societies" in Marret, Cora B. and Leggan, Cheryl (eds.) *Research in Race and Ethnic Relations: A Research Annual* (Greenwich, Conn., JAI Press, 1979), pp. 118-120; Adekanye, J. Bayo "'Federal Character" Provision of the 1979 Constitution and Composition of the Nigerian Armed Forces: The Old Quota Idea by New Name' *Plural Societies* Vol. 14 No. 1 & 2 Spring/Summer 1983 pp. 66-78.
61. Adekanye, J. Bayo "Federal Character: Provisions of the 1979 Constitution of the Nigerian Armed Forces" *The Old Quota Idea by New Name*, p. 66.
62. *Ibid.*, pp. 66-67.

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65. Madiebo, Alexander A. *The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War* (Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1980) p. 388; Young, Crawford. *The Politics of Cultural Pluralism*, p. 470; Kirk-Greene, A.H.M. *Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria* 2 Vols (London: Oxford University Press, 1971) pp. 54-55.
66. Wriggins, Howard *op. cit.* p. 188.
67. Nigerian newspapers are replete with stories relating to this. See also Ayoade, John A.A. and Suberu, Rotimi T. "Federalism" *Quarterly Journal of Administration* Vol. xxiv No. 3 April, 1990, pp. 158-159.
68. Adekanye, J. Bayo "Federal Character" Provisions of the 1979 constitution ... p. 69.
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70. *Report of the Constitution Drafting Committee* Vol. 1, Lagos 1977, p. viii.
71. Momoh, R.A.I. "State and Ethnic Interests" in Ukwu, Ukwu I. (ed.) *Federal Character and National Integration in Nigeria* (Kuru: National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, 1987) p. 57.

72. See Gboyega, Alex "The Public Service and Federal Character" in Ekeh, P.P. and Osaghae, E.E. (eds.) *op. cit.* p. 183.
73. Breton, Raymond "The Vesting of Ethnic Interests in State Institutions" in Frideres, James S. (ed.) *Multicultural and Intergroup Relations* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989) pp. 35-55, at p49.
74. An instance of this could be found on the issue of rotatory presidency debated upon by members of the 1994-95 Constitutional Conference. The most perceptible division on the issue was North-South dichotomy. See, among others, *The News* (Lagos) 15 May, 1995.
75. Smock, David R. and Smock, Audrey C. *The Politics of Pluralism: A Comparative Study of Lebanon and Ghana*, p. 329.
76. Longe, G.A. "Federal perceptions" in Ukwu, Ukwu I. (ed.) *Federal Character and National Integration in Nigeria*, p. 43.
77. See Gboyega, Alex *op. cit.* p. 183.
78. Adekanye, J. Bayo "The Quota Recruitment Policy: Its sources and Impact on the Nigerian Military" in Ekeh, P.P. and Osaghae, E.E. (eds.) *Federal Character and Federalism in Nigeria*, pp. 230-255.
79. *Ibid.* pp. 240-241.
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81. See for example Chiroma, Liman "Review and Conclusions" in Ukwu, Ukwu I. (ed.) *op. cit.* p. 183.

82. Ayoade, John A.A. and Suberu, Rotimi T. "Federalism", *Quarterly Journal of Administration*, p. 157.
83. Olagunju, Tunji "Federal Character and National Integration" An Overview" in Ukwu, Ukwu I. (ed.) *Federal Character and National Integration*, p. 39.
84. Saro-Wiwa, Ken *The Guardian* (Lagos) January 22, 1985 cited in Gboyega, Alex "The Public Service and Federal Character" p. 182.
85. For a discussion of the problems associated with the use of ethnicity as the index of representation see *inter alia* Gboyega, Alex *ibid*.
86. Awolowo, Obafemi *Awo* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960) esp. pp. 185-212.
87. Professor Jide Osuntokun is Nigeria's former Ambassador to Germany. On his suggestion, see *The Guardian* Friday, October 25, 1996.
88. Osaghae, Eghosa "Federal Character: Past, Present and Future" in Ekeh, P.P. and Osaghae, E.E. *Federal Character and Federalism in Nigeria*, pp. 441-457.
89. *Ibid.*, p. 442.
90. Dare, L.O. "Political Considerations in the Location of Industrial Projects" *Ife Social Sciences Review*, Vol. 6 No. 1 & 2 1983, pp. 67-73.
91. It is instructive to add that Gboyega identifies the problem of federal character principle as stemming from the abandonment of the aspect of the principle which emphasizes the reflection of federal character in the conduct of the "affairs" of the nation or its agencies. He reasons

that the objectives of the principle would have been met if the affairs of the government could be conducted in a manner that ensures even distribution, fairness and impartiality. *op. cit.* p. 183.

92. See Mackintosh, J.P. *et al: Nigerian Government and Politics* (London: Allen & Unwin 1966) pp. 557-558.
93. Dare, L.O. *op. cit.* p. 71.
94. On these see *inter alia* Huqe, Ahmed Shafiqul "Representative Bureaucracy: Arguments for a Realistic View" *Quarterly Journal of Administration* Vol. xix Numbers 1 & 2 , Oct. 1984/Jan. 1985 pp. 5-17; Various articles in *Public Administration Review* September/October 1974 especially pp. 425-452; Diamond, Larry "Issues in the Constitutional Design of a Third Nigerian Republic" *African Affairs*, 86 (1987), p. 212.

CHAPTER THREE

THE FRAMEWORK OF NIGERIAN STATE: THE CONTEXT OF FEDERAL CHARACTER PRINCIPLE

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter we give an analysis of Nigerian plural society that bred the federal solution and federal character principle. We shall also examine the evolution of Nigerian federal system and federal character principle. Of course it will be too simplistic a view to merely hold that the adoption of federalism in Nigeria was engendered by the diverse nature of Nigerian society without examining other factors that presumably encouraged it.

To this end, we shall critically examine the dominant schools of thought regarding the adoption of federalism in Nigeria. But, as we shall endeavor to show, the plural nature of Nigerian society is the single most essential factor that made the adoption of a federal system in Nigeria an option.

3.2 Diversity of Nigerian Society and the adoption of the federal Solution

Prior to the imposition of the British colonial order in what is today known as Nigeria, the peoples of Nigeria were organised into distinct political systems, such as empires and kingdoms, each of which had little or no contact with one another. At the genesis of the acquisition of the territories by the British colonialists much of what later metamorphosed into northern Nigeria was organised under a strong

feudalist system headed by the Fulani Emirs. The Fulanis had conquered Hausaland and imposed Islamic order as the state religion sequel to the successful "Jihad" led by Othman dan Fodio in 1804.

In the South there were the Oyo empire, the Benin kingdom and many small political communities (stateless societies) in Iboland. These were besides the many other small kingdoms that existed in other parts of the country. These precolonial political systems had distinct features. Among these people are found divergences in culture, religion and in some cases racial origin.

The advent of the British and the imposition of colonialism in these territories constitute the glue that stuck these diverse units together. Through a process that effectively commenced in 1861 with the establishment of its authority in Lagos (consequent upon its annexation) the British acquired the territories in bits and pieces.

The term "Nigeria" did not come into existence until 1897 when it was coined by Flora Shaw to describe British possessions around River Niger. By 1900, the British had succeeded in exerting control over the whole area but these were under three separate administrations: the Lagos colony, the southern protectorate and the northern protectorate. In 1898 the Selbourne Committee had recommended the union of the three separate administration and their division into two provinces- the Sudan and Maritime- with each under a Governor or some such officer.¹

The process of unification began in 1906 when Lagos colony and southern protectorate were merged. 1914 witnessed the amalgamation of northern and southern protectorates which climaxed the process of bringing the various communities in

Nigeria under the same political entity, even though, as it has been argued "the amalgamation failed to bring about political integration of the country as there were two different administrations", each attempting to orchestrate real and imaginary differences in the regions.²

At the completion of this artificial and coercive method of bringing the diverse groups together, Nigeria became a conglomeration of many diverse ethnic groups and political units with differing cultures and characteristics devoid of overarching sense of nationhood. This perhaps, informed Awolowo's statement that Nigeria is a geographical expression. According to him:

Nigeria is not a nation. It is a geographical expression. There are no "Nigerians" in the same sense as there are "English" or "Welsh" or "French". The word "Nigeria" is merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish those who live within the boundaries of Nigeria from those who do not.³

Awolowo also relied on the strength of the diverse cultures of the people of Nigeria as a ground for criticisms against Richards' constitution for fostering a unitary system of government on Nigeria. He contended that although the constitution provided for some form of decentralisation it was not sufficient to accommodate the differences.⁴ What we are attempting to draw out from here is the diversities inherent in Nigerian society.

In recognition of the salience of the diversities in Nigeria, Balewa, in 1947 posited that:

Since the amalgamation of the Southern and Northern provinces in 1914, Nigeria has existed as one country only on paper. It is still far from being united. Nigerian unity is only a British intention for the country.⁵

In consonance with this thinking, it has also been remarked that Nigeria is made up of a heterogeneous collection of people with little or no common bond holding them together.⁶ There have been bitter rivalries and suspicion among the three major ethnic groups - the Hausa-Fulani in the north; the Yorubas in the West and Ibos in the East - who constitute over half the population. Also, there are marked differences and conflicts between the major groups and the minority tribes such as Tivs; Kanuri; Nupe; Ibibio; Ijaw and Efik.⁷

The foregoing underscores the ethnic diversity of Nigerian society and the problem it poses for national integration. In addition to its ethnic plurality, physical diversity is also inherent in the country. Given this immense diversity, the Nigerian elites "naturally" opted for a federal arrangement when confronted with the choice of a political system to adopt.

As we have earlier noted not every one accepts this view that the adoption of federalism in Nigeria was made inevitable by the plural nature of the country. Indeed many schools of thought on the emergence of federalism in Nigeria exist. There is no disagreement that in legal terms (i.e. as a constitutional document) Nigeria became a federation in 1954. That was at the adoption of Lyttleton constitution although the antecedents to Nigeria federalism can be traced as far back as 1914.⁸ What scholars find contentious, however is the factor(s) responsible for this development or the degree of paramountcy of the various factors.

Before we proceed to examine the arguments, it is expedient and germane to provide a theoretical underpinning. Thus, we provide answers to the questions: What

is federalism? and theoretically what are the factors that could conduce to the establishment of a federal arrangement?

A federal government is said to exist when the powers of government for a community are divided substantially according to the principle that there is a single independent authority for the whole area in respect of some matters and that there are independent authorities for other matters, each set of authorities being coordinate with and not subordinate to the others within its own stated spheres.⁹ In essence, a federation is a type of polity operating a constitution which works on two levels of government as a nation and as a collection of related but self-standing units.¹⁰

Federalism provides opportunities at different levels for component units to effect compromises to protect their identities and pursue their priority programmes while traversing the same track with others.¹¹ In effect under a federal arrangement federating states surrender certain powers to a central government, while retaining jurisdiction over certain matters. The former deals with matters of common concerns and abdicates control over issues of local concerns to the regions. Thus in a federal arrangement there is "commitment to pairing of the two opposites, unity and diversity".¹²

At the theoretical sphere, there are many factors that could induce or encourage the formation of federation. Many scholars have identified such factors or pre-requisites.

Awa opines that

a study of the forces which constitute the basis for a federal kind of government is largely empirical ... , leaders in plural societies evolve a constitutional expression of diversity with what they think is necessary or what various forces compel them to accept as expedient'.¹³

William H. Riker put forward at least two circumstances encouraging a willingness to strike the bargain of federalism. According to him:

1. The politicians who offer the bargain desire to expand their territorial control. ...
2. The politicians who accept the bargain, giving up some independence for the sake of union, are willing to do so because of some external military diplomatic threat or opportunity.¹⁴

Thus Riker identifies two conditions (expansion and military-diplomatic) that could lead to the emergence of a federal system.

Considering some prerequisites of federal government, Kenneth C. Wheare opines that the question of federal government does not arise unless the communities or states concerned desire to be under a single independent government for some purpose¹⁵ and desire at the same time to retain independent regional governments in some matters at least;¹⁶ and also have the capacity to work it.¹⁷ He posits that for this to exist - if states are to have federal union - certain conditions must exist. These include:

1. a sense of military insecurity and of the consequent need for common defense;
2. a desire to be independent of foreign powers, and a realization that only through union could independence be secured;

3. a hope of economic advantage from union;
4. some political association of the community concerned prior to their federal union;
5. geographical neighbourhood or contiguity;
6. similarity of political institutions.

While noting that the aforementioned factors were present in the case of the United States, Switzerland, Canada and Australia, Wheare postulates that it is not the case that all these factors must be present for a federal structure to be put in place but at least most of the factors must exist. He suggested some other factors which may cause the pendulum to swing in the direction of federalism. These include *inter alia* the size of the federating states and disposition of political leaders.¹⁸

Awolowo enunciates four principles which could help in making a choice between federalism and unitarism:

1. If a country is unilingual and uni-national, the constitution must be unitary.
2. If a country is uni-lingual or bi-lingual or multi-lingual, and also consists of communities which, though belonging to the same nation, have, over a period of years developed some important cultural divergencies as well as autonomous geographical separateness, the constitution must be federal, and the constituent states must be organized on the dual basis of language and separateness.
3. If a country is bi-lingual or multi-lingual, the constitution must be Federal, and the constituent states must be organized on a linguistic basis.

4. Any experiment with a Unitary Constitution in a bi-lingual or multi-lingual or multi-national country must fail, in the long run.¹⁹

Awa also identified seven factors that determine whether a federal system of government will come into being in any political situation. These are: (1) geographical contiguity; (2) fear of insecurity (i.e. of attack by foreign power; (3) economic and administrative advantages; (4) ethnic and cultural factors; (5) historical association (i.e. common historical experience) and similarity of political institutions; (6) political leadership and (7) colonial policies.²⁰

A point to note is that federalism provides the theatre of conflicts as well as compromise between centripetal and centrifugal forces in a country and 'federalism may be operating in both the direction of integration and differentiation'.²¹ Thus, while factors such as common historical experience, economic complementarity, common culture and similarity of institutions could point to the direction of unity, factors such as multi ethnicism, different languages and geography may emphasize regionalism. Frank draws attention to the relevance of the ideology of federalism among a country's political leadership in the formation and subsistence of federalism.²²

On his part, Karl Deutsch identified nine essential conditions for federalism.²³

Among others, they include:

1. mutual compatibility of values;
2. expectation of stronger economic gains;
3. unbroken link of social communication;

4. representativeness of political elites;
5. mobility of persons.

In his *Nerves of Government*, Deutsch stresses the importance of communication to unification process.²⁴

From the foregoing analysis, we can give a synopsis of the major factors which may give birth to federalism as follows:

1. Military factor. When there is a common fear, among units, of attack or conquest by an external power, these units would likely come together to form a union as in the case of the United States when the constituent units were faced with military threat from European powers particularly Britain.
2. Geographical contiguity. Nearness of people and territories to one another can encourage the formation of union. Units having a combination of large territories would likely be disposed to a federal arrangement.
3. A forceful and united national leadership committed to unification. For example, John MacDonal and George Washington played key roles in ensuring respectively the federal union of Canada and the United States.
4. Economic and administrative benefits. Economic advantages accrue from a large union due to the creation of large market. Also, if the economies of the different regions are complementary, in contradistinction to competitiveness, units would likely be disposed to a union. There are also administrative benefits.

5. Colonial policies. The policies adopted by a colonial power goes a long way in determining the kind of political association units would prefer.
6. Ethnic and cultural factors. When territories are inhabited by people of diverse ethnic, religious or racial background a federal union rather than unitary is likely to emerge.
7. Common historical association and similarity of political institutions. These play important roles in inducing union.

When groups have claim to common historical experience and possess similar political institutions, there is a tendency for them to federate rather than separate.

In the case of Nigeria, scholars have used many of these factors to account for the emergence of federalism in the country.

Dele Olowu identifies what he calls 'five strong views' which have developed on the subject of which factors engendered the adoption of federalism in Nigeria.²⁵ One of these contending views suggests that federalism was imposed by the British colonialist on the eve of their departure in order to sustain their neocolonial links with politically independent Nigeria.

Second is the view which states that the logic of British colonial interests in occupied Nigeria favoured a strategy of 'divide and rule', a strategy that was corroborated by the infighting among British officials stationed in the different parts of Nigeria.

The third view argues that Nigeria's precolonial structure and the manner in which Britain conquered each of the kingdom, states, and empires separately and negotiated separate treaties with each of them made a federal or confederal arrangement inevitable. The fourth view states that federalism was a compromise solution worked out among Nigeria's regionally based elites in order to ensure that the country earned political independence when it did. The fifth viewpoint, attributed to Chief Obafemi Awolowo, is the preference of Nigerians for federalism when the choice between federalism and unitarism was given to the representatives of the people in local, provincial, regional and general conference assemblies between 1949 and 1950. Some theorists, Olowu noted, who look at the subject of federalism more theoretically have pointed to other factors (both centrifugal and centripetal) that predispose a country to federalism.

'Two analyses of the evolution of Nigerian federalism' according to Jide Osuntokun 'come easily to mind'.²⁶ The first is that the British deliberately imposed the federal system on Nigeria in order to maintain a neo-colonial control of the country after the lowering of the Union Jack. The other view emphasizes the fact that historical and geographical factors (the large and culturally variegated nature of the country) determined the political evolution of Nigeria.

It is obvious from the foregoing that various views on the factors leading to Nigerian federation exist. Although these contending views can be analytically differentiated, some of them are however interrelated. Thus, for the purpose of lucidity, convenience and analytic simplicity, we shall classify these contending views

into three positions which are subsumed under two major categories viz 'exogenous factors' and 'endogenous factors'.

The exogenous factors embrace the views that the emergence of a federal arrangement on the Nigerian scene was the consequence of British imposition and her colonial policies. The endogenous factors can be broadly divided into two: First, are those who subscribe to the view that federalism was predicated by Nigeria's inherent historical, geographical and cultural factors. Second, of the endogenous factors (which is the third position) is the contention that the Nigerian political elites, in the search for political options and the choice of federalism, 'made calculations on their economic interests and gain, and concluded that federalism was in their best interest.'²⁷

We use the word 'exogenous' to refer to the factor(s) that was /were externally imposed while the endogenous factors refer to the internal dynamics inducing Nigeria's federal arrangement. This classification is for convenience and should not be seen as having water-tight compartment.

Exogenous Factors

According to Afigbo:

The origin of Nigeria's federalism lie not in the pluralities of economic and geographical region or of ethnic nationalities, but in the plurality of colonial administrative traditions imposed by the British. Different administrative traditions were especially evident in the Northern and Southern regions of Nigeria.²⁸

Extrapolating from the above quotation, it can be seen that Afigbo attributes the adoption of federalism in Nigeria to British colonial policies. For him, these colonial administrative policies or traditions engendered regional rivalry and conflict which became entrenched in the Nigerian polity by the processes of consolidation and nation-building.²⁹ Afigbo is not alone in this thinking. While

elucidating on the same issue, Ayoade argues that

the roots of Nigerian federalism must be sought partly in the process of administrative structure which is itself a product of the process of colonial acquisition and the prevailing local conditions.³⁰

This school of thought contends that the British had the opportunity to de-emphasize the particularistic tendencies of different ethnic groups, by not giving any region a large measure of political autonomy,³¹ instead the British pursued measures that were divisive.³²

Afigbo contends that federalism was necessitated not by 'primordial federal features' of Nigeria (plurality of economic, geographical regions and ethnic nationalities) but by the manner of British acquisition of administration of Nigeria. He argues that the primordial federal features were not salient at the time certain crucial decisions (which made federalism inevitable) were taken in the halcyon days of colonialist autocracy. Each of the three colonial administrative units came into being for reasons of administrative convenience rather than out of concern for maintaining the integrity of geographical, cultural, and/or linguistic areas.³³

Osuntokun also discusses the primacy of British policies. He stresses that the amalgamation of 1914 was only on paper. Separate administrations were maintained for North and South with serious acrimonies between the two. The consequence of this was British failure under Lugard and his successor to develop a unified Nigeria; and local British officials succeeded in handing over to their Nigerian subjects, their own prejudice.³⁴ Thus colonialism became a divisive factor which promoted ethnicity in Nigeria.

The bottom line of the argument of this school of thought is aptly summarised by Falola and Afigbo. For Falola, the British imposed federalism on Nigeria out of the desire to have a neo-colonial hold on Nigeria after independence and to preserve British interests in the country. Federalism was also necessitated by the manipulation of ethnicity and the emergence of regionalism (following Richards' constitution).³⁵

Afigbo similarly concludes that geographic and economic configuration of Nigeria cannot be used to make a strong case for any particular arrangement - unitary, federal or confederal. Federalism was made inevitable by the uncoordinated manner in which British dominion in the area was asserted, the method, pattern and politics of amalgamation adopted in 1906 and 1914 and the administrative policies of post-amalgamated colonial Nigeria. It was only after these forces had led to Richards epoch-making changes of 1946 that the primordial federal features of indigenous Nigerian society (the pulls of geography and ethnicity) assume relevance in the emerging multi-national state.³⁶

This school of thought is not without its critics. For instance, it has been argued that the analysis failed to understand clearly why the British administration acted as it did, with respect to certain class interests. The division of opinion between the Southern and Northern administrators was to a certain extent due to their basic interest to protect the territorial jurisdiction over which they ruled. Also the northern administrators were much stronger defenders of the northern system because it tended to coincide with the British aristocratic tradition.³⁷

It has also been criticized on the ground that the analysis falls in line with a practice in this country to blame error on others; British policy it is further argued, was not to keep the country divided. Other scholars sympathetic to the British cause have argued that British decision to impose a federal system of government on Nigeria was occasioned by her sensitivity to the divisive, primordial features of indigenous Nigerian society.³⁸

Endogenous Factors

Another major position which attempts to articulate the factors that led to the adoption of Nigerian federal constitution is that which focuses on both centrifugal and centripetal forces within the country that predispose a country to federalism.³⁹ Here, scholars emphasize the ethnic plurality of Nigeria, of economic regions and of religion as well as the size and plurality of geographical regions.

With scores of nationalities or ethnic groups spreading across the length and breadth of the country, Nigeria is no doubt a plural society. Given the extent to

which these ethnic groups are geographically located and identifiable one can say, borrowing from Livingston,⁴⁰ that Nigeria leans toward a 'federal society'. Some of the main ethnic groups are Hausa, Yoruba, Ibos, Fulani, Kanuri and Edo. Awolowo put the number of Nigerian nationalities at sixty⁴¹, while some estimate it using the concepts of ethnic groups to be 250 and another 400.⁴²

Among these ethnic groups, there have been suspicion, distrust and fear of domination since they were brought under the same political entity by the British colonialists, a dimension which was accentuated, if not caused, by British colonial policies. The fear of domination was vehemently expressed by the minorities, especially just before the dawn of independence which resulted in the setting up of Willinck's commission.

Scholars have therefore argued that given this centrifugal forces of ethnic and cultural diversities among the peoples of Nigeria, if they are to be a political entity then a federal arrangement was imperative in order to give regions some degree of autonomy.

Another factor that has been identified as precipitating the adoption of federalism in Nigeria is the geographical size and terrain of the country. Nigeria covers an estimated area of 913,072.64 sq kilometres with several climatic and vegetation belts ranging from the thick forest belt in the extreme south to the savanna in the north. The large size and complexities in the geographical configuration ostensibly informed Azikiwe's suggestion in the 1940s for the adoption of a federal system based on geographical configuration of the country.⁴³ Another dimension to

the relevance of geography as a conditioning factor is the contiguity or nearness of the various territories and the relative communication linkages which encouraged a union among them.

Some scholars have drawn attention to the perceived economic advantages that would possibly accrue to the country as a factor which contributed to the adoption of Nigerian federalism.⁴⁴ Nigeria constitutes a large market. There is complementarity of economies of the region: the North produces groundnut and cotton, West produces cocoa and East and the former Midwest are rich in mineral resources. It was reasoned that a union of these regions would be to their mutual benefits.

Awa also identifies historical political association as an important factor in the emergence of Nigerian federalism.⁴⁵ Long years of political association among various units in Nigeria under the British tutelage, with similar values and institutions made federalism a possibility.

Another position which attempts to provide explanation for the basis of Nigerian federalism is the view that the Nigerian political elites settled for federalism because it was calculated to be in "their economic interest and gains".⁴⁶ According to this school of thought, the elites saw the regions as centre of political power which would also advance their economic power. Hence, in the search for political option, they settled for federalism for the pursuit of elite interest.

On the strength of the evidence provided in the preceding analysis we can deduce that no single position or factor sufficiently account for Nigerian federalism. Some of the factors which prompted the adoption of a federal constitution in Nigeria

are colonial policies and preference and the preference of the Nigerian elites. A question to ask, however, is why was this political arrangement preferred by the British colonialist and the Nigerian elites?

The argument that the British imposed federalism in order to maintain imperialist control of the country after independence lacks force in that it assumes wrongly that British imperialist control of Nigeria in the post independence era would be impossible if another kind of political arrangement, say unitary, were in place. The unitary system of government adopted in some former British colonies did not *ipso facto* preclude British influence in such countries. The ability of a country to be assertive in the international system is conditioned by factors other than the system of government that operates in that country.

Furthermore, if the British needed federalism to maintain its relevance in former colonies, why did they oversee the adoption of unitary system of government in some other former colonies? Also British policies might have been (and indeed some were) divisive. Yet this is not to say that in the absence of such policies federalism would have been jettisoned.

Thus, in spite of the arguments that British colonial policies and preference made federalism, rather than unitarism, inevitable, it is our considered view that even if the British had not adopted any kind of policy in administering Nigeria, it is unthinkable that Nigerians would have opted for unitary arrangement given the enormous ethnic plurality, population, immense size and variegated nature of

Nigerian geographical terrain. Hence, the option of a unitary system has never been ideal for Nigeria due to these factors.

There was even no sufficient intergroup harmony among the otherwise distinct ethnic and political entities to have made federalism an unacceptable option. To guarantee some degree of local autonomy, mitigate intergroup suspicion and minimise struggle for power at the centre, the "federal solution" becomes an attractive political system to large, plural societies.

The predilection of Nigerian elites for federalism flows from this. While some of the elites might have actually been concerned about their political and financial relevance in a unitary arrangement, we cannot deny the fact that there were real expressed fears of domination by "the other group", an outcome of the diversity of the Nigerian society.

Thus, the plurality of Nigerian society served as an important compelling factor that necessitated the adoption of a federal arrangement. Federalism was adopted as a means of containing the differences. The behaviour of the elites in the immediate pre and post independence era indicates that they have emphasised and exploited these diversities.⁴⁷ Intergroup suspicion and fears have therefore been accentuated, generating tensions that inhibit national integration. The attempt to mitigate this led to the adoption of federal character principle.

3.3 Evolution of federal character Principle in Nigeria

Federal character principle has been construed in at least two senses. First:

as one of the instruments with which members of the ruling class ... define and dictate the parameters and terrain of the struggle for power and control of state machinery.⁴⁸

The second view is that federal character principle is:

a means of ensuring national cohesion through public institutions that are representative of "ethnic" and other (sectional) interests within the polity.⁴⁹

For purpose of argument we wish to remark that these definitions are not mutually exclusive. They can be harmonised by way of construing federal character principle as elite design at dictating the parameters of the struggle for political power through public institutions that are representative (of elites) of the various ethnic groups with a view to ensuring national cohesion.

For our study, though the second conception is germane. This is so because it approximates closely the official conception of federal character principle. A proper assessment of a policy can only be rightly carried out within the context of its conception by policy makers. The constitution drafting committee defined it as:

the distinctive desire of the people of Nigeria to promote national unity, foster national loyalty and give every citizen of Nigeria a sense of belonging to the nation notwithstanding the diversities of ethnic origin, culture, language or religion which may exist and which it is their desire to nourish, harness to the enrichment of the federal republic of Nigeria.⁵⁰

The above definition has been criticized as vague. It will appear that in seeking to define the principle the members of the Constitution Drafting Committee were overwhelmed with concern about the objective of federal character principle, hence the emphasis of the above quotation on "national unity", 'national loyalty' and "sense of belonging". In spite of the above pitfall, a definition of federal character

principle is not far fetched. An examination of the various constitutional provisions relating to federal character principle and its application reveals the principle as referring to representation of the differing component units and communal groups in the country's institutions, agencies and positions of power.

The use of federal character principle as a form of recruitment has its root in pre-independence Nigeria but the principle was referred to as quota system. It was first applied to military recruitment. In 1950, nearly 80 per cent of all soldiers in the Nigerian army were of Northern origin, though the Igbos dominated headquarters personnel and tradesmen as well as the officer corps. The disproportionate Northern representation was occasioned by the criteria of recruitment initially adopted by the British which favoured those from that part of the country while the superior educational advancement ensured the dominance of southerners at the officer corps.⁵¹

Later on, there was the recognition of the need to ensure a conscious ethnic balance in the army, hence the adoption of the quota system of recruitment in 1958. A 50-25-25 quota system was adopted by which 50 percent of recruits were from the north while the proportion of eastern and western regions was 25% each.⁵²


At this time quota system was not applied to the officer corps which was dominated by the Igbo. See table 3.1.

Table 3.1

Distribution of officers in the Nigerian army by ethnic/regional origin in January 1961.

Ethnic/Regional Group	Number of Officers	Percentage of total
Igbo	60	74.07
Yoruba	10	12.35
North	11	13.58
Total	81	100.0

Source: Adapted from Gutteridge, F. *The Military in African Politics*, p. 69



In 1962 quota system of recruitment which had already been applied to the ranks in the army was extended to officer recruitment. This was occasioned by the concern of Northerners about ethnic imbalance at that level.⁵³ The quota system underwent a slight modification in 1963 (following the creation of Midwest region) from 50-25-25 to 50-25-21-4 with the West and the newly created Mid-west now allocated 21 percent and 4 percent respectively.⁵⁴

In the educational sector the term "quota system" appeared a long time ago. For instance, the IUC report of 1952 contained the expression. In the report, the introduction of quota system to university admission was rejected.⁵⁵ In spite of its early appearance in the annals of Nigerian educational system, quota as a basis of student enrolment did not emerge until much later, after the centralisation of admission process with the establishment of the Joint Admission and Matriculation Board (JAMB) by Decree No 46 of May 31, 1977.⁵⁶

In the recruitment of personnel to public office, although quota system is a relatively recent phenomenon rudiments of the notion of the principle can be found in colonial era. During that period, in the selection of persons to staff posts, special consideration was to be given to candidates of Northern province origin and "other areas where educational facilities (were at that time) more backward than elsewhere."⁵⁷

The Gorsuch Commission of 1954-55 in its report also made reference to the maintenance of "a healthy regional quota in the (federal) service" and the need for

the service to be "representative of the whole of Nigeria". But it emphasised that promotion and posting be based on equality.⁵⁸

During the 1958 Constitutional Conference, the northern region made explicit demand for the filling of the public service of the federation on agreed quotas. But it was rejected by the parliamentary committee mainly because it would ensure that several posts were kept vacant until there were qualified Northerners to fill them. Nonetheless, certain considerations were given the North.⁵⁹

Thus, the issue of conducting government business in a manner that reflect the country's diversities is not a novelty in Nigeria. Previous governmental policies sought to give recognition to this principle in the past. It was described as quota system rather than federal character principle and was not entrenched in the constitution.

In terms of being constitutionally enshrined, federal character principle has its origins in the 1979 constitution. Although the first use of the expression "federal character" has been credited, by some scholars, to members of the Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC), which was inaugurated on 18th October, 1975,⁶⁰ it was actually used by the then Head of State, General Murtala Mohammed, prior to the sitting of the CDC. In a speech he delivered at the inauguration of the CDC the head of state stated among others, the commitment of the federal military government to the emergence of a stable system of government through constitutional law which it believed could best be achieved through the setting up of political institutions that will guarantee maximum participation and consensus. He indicated the preference of the

supreme military council for an Executive Presidential system of government in which:

The president and vice - president are elected, with clearly defined powers and are accountable to the people ... that there should be legal provisions to ensure that they are brought into office in such a manner so to *reflect federal character of the country*;

and

the choice of members of the cabinet should also be such as would *reflect the federal character of the country*.⁶¹

We find in the above quotation the use of "federal character". Further, the principle of recruitment reflective of societal diversities is also embedded. It will appear therefore that what the CDC came up with, in terms of making public institutions reflect the country's diversity, was a *reecho* (albeit in a more extended form) of the position already taken by the supreme military council as revealed in the address of the head of state.

The issue of representativeness was debated upon by the sub-committee on the Executive and the Legislature which dealt with "how to promote national loyalty in a multi-ethnic society" Most members of the sub-committee supported the principle as a means of *inter alia* obviating, or at least curtailing a repeat of past practice marked by, inter ethnic rivalry in an attempt by one ethnic group or a combination of ethnic groups to secure the domination of government to the exclusion of others.⁶²

In the 1979 constitution, federal character principle was explicitly enunciated under the Fundamental Objectives and Directive principle of state policy. It states that:

the composition of the government of the federation or any of its agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such manner as to reflect the federal character of Nigeria and the need to promote national unity, and also to command national loyalty ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few state or from a few ethnic or other sectional groups in that government or in any of the agencies.⁶³

It was also extended to other levels of government. According to the provision:

the composition of the government of a state, a local government or any of the agencies of such governments, and the conduct of the affairs of the government or such agencies shall be carried out in such manner as to recognise the diversity of the people within its area of authority and the need to promote a sense of belonging and loyalty among all the people of the federation.⁶⁴

The constitution also compels the adoption of federal character in the composition of federal cabinet. Section 135(3) states that in forming his cabinet, the President must appoint one minister from each state. The composition of bodies such as the Federal Electoral Commission was to be representative of all states in the federation. The form in which the statement of the principle appeared in the 1979 constitution was essentially the same as that in the Draft Constitution. The minor areas of divergence lay only in semantics.⁶⁵

The constitution also extended the principle to the composition and operation of political parties. Section 203(b) for instance states that the composition of the executive or other governing body of a political party must:

reflect the federal character of Nigeria i.e members thereof must belong to different states not being less in number than two-third of all the states comprising the Federation.

These provisions were made in line with the thinking of making the country's constitution reflect its history; the need to mitigate the deleterious effects of the bellicose competition called politics that held sway in the past.⁶⁷

The federal character principle also appeared in the 1989 constitution. The provision in the constitution pertaining to the principle were more or less a mere replica of the 1979 constitution, except that the sections in which they appear differ.

Other areas of divergence are the specific requirement in section 150 of the 1989 constitution that the President should take cognizance of federal character in determining the composition of the boards and governing boards of statutory corporations and companies in which the federal government has controlling shares or interest and of councils of universities, colleges and other institutions of higher learning. Section 194 extends this requirement to the state level.

The constitution also provided that two (of the five) new bodies established under it - the Public Complaints Commission and Revenue Mobilisation, Allocation and Fiscal Commission - be constituted in such manner as to include one member for, or from, each state of the federation.⁶⁸

An elaboration and extension of the principle of federal character was undertaken by the 1994/95 constitutional conference. It extended the principle to the summit of political power through rotation. Proponents of rotatory principle among members of the Committee on Power Sharing had argued that zoning would remove the manipulation by a geopolitical group to keep the major posts of governance to itself," and in that regard, allay the fears of domination by other groups".⁶⁹

The Committee on Power Sharing could not reach a decision on whether or not to adopt rotational presidency, as there was a tie in voting by members. The committee therefore referred the matter to the conference for resolution and the latter subsequently adopted the principle and has been enshrined in the 1995 Draft Constitution.⁷⁰ The conference adopted multiple Vice Presidents (three to be precise). It also extended the rotatory principle to the state and local government levels.⁷¹

It is important to point out that the federal military government has slightly modified this. It has divided the country into six zones for the purpose of power rotation for a transitional period of thirty years. It has also jettisoned multiple vice-president, in favour of a Vice President, Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister in addition to the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. These posts are to be based on zoning among six geographical groupings namely North-East, North-West, Middle-Belt, South-West, South-East and Southern minority.⁷²

The rotatory principle emerged after intense debate in which North-South polarisation was quite apparent. Given the deep political problems in which Nigeria was enmeshed and the pattern of debate, it is safe to argue that the success of the proponents of rotatory principle was mainly influenced by the state of political context made extremely and perilously precarious by the annulment of the June 12, 1993 presidential election believed to have been won by a southerner. Views were being expressed in some quarters that the annulment was aimed at forestalling a shift in the repository of political power from the North to the South.⁷³

This "concession" therefore appeared to be a way of soothing frayed nerves and assuaging feeling of alienation and deprivation. The statement made by Justice Karibi-Whyte that rotational presidency saved Nigeria from disintegration is representative of this.⁷⁴

Another dimension to the federal character principle is the constitution of the federal character commission.⁷⁵ The commission is vested with the following powers:

- a) to work out an equitable formula subject to the approval of the national assembly for the distribution of all cadres of posts in the public service of the federation and of the states, the armed forces of the federation, the Nigeria Police Force and other security agencies, government owned companies and parastatals of the states.
- b) to promote, monitor and enforce compliance with the principle of proportional sharing of all bureaucratic, economic, media and political posts at all levels of government;
- c) to take such legal measures including the prosecution of head or staff of any ministry or government body or agency which fails to comply with any federal character principle or formula prescribed or adopted by the commission.⁷⁶

A Federal Character Tribunal is to try all offenders.

Thus the establishment of Federal Character Commission is to ensure effective implementation of federal character principle with the overall aim of ensuring the fair representation of the various groups in public institutions. This is expected to ensure their loyalty and the inculcation of national consciousness and hence engender national integration. In the next chapter we will analyse our data on the relationship between federal character principle and national integration in the Nigerian setting.

CHAPTER THREE

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CHAPTER FOUR

PRESENTATION OF DATA, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, we present and give a detailed analysis of our data. In the survey conducted five hundred questionnaires were administered. Of these, thirty questionnaires were first administered in Ile-Ife as a pilot study. The pilot survey was conducted to test for ambiguity and sensitivity of questions.

Three tertiary institutions (more precisely universities) were chosen for the purpose of administering questionnaires. These were Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria and University of Benin, Benin City. Other institutions that were chosen for the same purpose included Federal Civil Service commission, Federal Ministry of Health and Federal Ministry of Establishment located at the Federal Secretariat (Phase II) Ikoyi, Lagos¹.

The reasons for the choice of these institutions had already been adduced (see chapter one). We only need to explain why this pattern of choice of universities was adopted. In choosing our sample, we were mindful of the fact that it must reflect the ethnic diversities of the country. As has been stated earlier, this informed the categorization of sample into Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, Igbo and Minorities.

One way of accessing these groups was to go to their respective bases. However this approach would be too financially involving and time consuming. A more cost effective method of achieving the same objective was to select few

institutions where these groups are represented. Using the pre 1967 federal structure of four units it was thought that selecting one of the most prominent universities in each of the units would facilitate access to the diverse groups. Hence Ahmadu Bello University (ABU) in the North, Obafemi Awolowo University (OAU) in the West, University of Nigeria Nsukka (UNN) in the East and University of Benin (UNIBEN) in the Midwest were initially considered.

But given the relatively high number of Easterners in University of Benin and Obafemi Awolowo University, as observation and statistics have shown², it was thought that going to Nsukka was unnecessary. This is the more so when comments and reports as published in the press do not suggest divergence of views between Easterners resident in the east and those of them who live in other sections of the country. In contrast, given the paucity of number of Northerners in these institutions, the choice of Ahmadu Bello University was considered imperative and rational. These considerations culminated in the final choice of the three universities.

4.2 Analytic Technique

We employed statistical percentages in classification and analysis of data.

4.3 Presentation and Discussion of Data

As we have already remarked, this study relies on data collected from a sample size of roughly five hundred to test its hypotheses. For easy reference, the hypotheses are restated below. The major hypothesis is:

Guaranteeing the participation of all component groups (of a plural society) in a country's national institutions, political power and affairs tends to promote national integration while the exclusion of certain group(s) from participation in national institutions, political power and affairs of a country tends to erode national integration.

We have five subhypotheses stated as follows:

1. Federal Character principle-based recruitment tends to engender a sense of belonging to the nation.
2. Representation of a group in a nation's cabinet tends to evoke emotional attachment to the nation by citizens from such group.
3. Guaranteeing every group access to the apex of national office tends to promote national consciousness.
4. Power rotation among sectional groups in a country tends to instil a sense of belonging to the nation.
5. There is no significant difference in the attitudes of various ethnic groups in Nigeria to federal Character principle.

To test these hypotheses, five hundred questionnaires were administered in the various institutions as depicted by Table 4.1

Table 4.1

Distribution of Questionnaires by Institutions

Institution	No. of Administered Questionnaires	No. of Returned Questionnaire	Rate of Return (% of Questionnaires returned)
Ahmadu Bello University	150	139	92.67%
Obafemi Awolowo University	140	135	96.43%
University of Benin	110	104	94.55%
Federal Secretariat*	100	98	98.0%
Total	500	476	95.2%

*This encapsulates the three Federal ministries/ parastatals in which questionnaires were administered. Since the Federal Secretariat offices of these institutions were used for the purpose of administering questionnaires the name "federal secretariat" is adopted to represent these institutions because of its relative convenience.

A high rate of return of questionnaires was recorded generally and in each of the institutions. On the overall, four hundred and seventy six (out of five hundred) questionnaires representing 95.2 percent of administered questionnaires were returned. At Ahmadu Bello University 150 questionnaires were distributed. Of this number, 139 or 92.67 percent were returned.

At Obafemi Awolowo University and University of Benin the proportion of returned questionnaires was also encouraging. Of the 140 and 110 administered respectively in the two institutions, 135 (96.43 percent) and 104 (94.55 percent) were returned in that order. That of the Federal Secretariat was even more encouraging as 98 of the 100 questionnaires, representing 98 percent were returned.

The reason for the high number of returned questionnaires is attributable to the manner in which they were administered. In many cases, respondents were given specific period of time to fill the questionnaires after which they were collected back. At the Federal Secretariat, Official channels were employed, in some cases, to distribute and collect the questionnaires. Where official channels were not used, questionnaires were administered individually to some members of staff and were given two hours to complete them after which

Table 4.2
Distribution of Completed Questionnaires by Ethnic Groups

Ethnic group	Number of completed Questionnaires	Percentage (%) of total
Hausa-Fulani	137	28.78
Yoruba	103	21.64
Igbo	81	17.02
Others (Minorities)	155	32.56
Total	476	100.0

they were collected. Questioners were administered after obtaining permission from appropriate departmental heads.

The distribution of completed questionnaires according to our demarcated categories is shown in Table 4.2.

Our desired target with respect to distribution of questionnaires was to ensure that the number allocated to each group was proportional to its share of total population. By this the Hausa-Fulani group was to receive 29.58 percent of the total number of questionnaires while the Yoruba, Igbo and Minorities were to receive 20.39 percent, 16.66 percent and 33.37 percent respectively. The reason for this, as we earlier noted, is to ensure representativeness of our sample.

The distribution of completed questionnaires gave disproportionate numerical strength to the Yoruba and Igbo groups. Although the deviation was not so much, we reduced the number of questionnaires completed by members of these two groups by eight and four respectively in order to ensure more representativeness. These questionnaires were picked randomly. This reduced our effective sample size to four hundred and sixty four (464) distributed as shown in Table 4.3.

Table 4.3

Distribution of Completed Questionnaires (Effective Sample size) by Ethnic Category.

Ethnic group	No. of Questionnaires	Percentage of total	Desired proportion of each group (%)	Deviation
Hausa-Fulani	137	29.53	29.58	-0.05
Yoruba	95	20.47	20.39	0.08
Igbo	77	16.59	16.66	-0.07
Minorities	155	33.41	33.37	0.04
Total	464	100.0	100.0	0

To test our hypotheses a series of carefully designed questions were put to our respondents in questionnaire form. First, we sought to ascertain the relationship between federal character principle as a basis for recruitment and national integration. Respondents were asked how they would feel if in a recruitment exercise into federal bureaucracies (Ministries and/ or parastatals) based purely on merit only a relatively negligible number of persons was chosen from their ethnic group. Their detailed responses are shown in Table 4.4.

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Table 4.4

Reaction to a recruitment exercise, based on merit, in which only a relatively small number of successful candidates is drawn from one's ethnic group.

Ethnic Group	Reaction					Total
	Satisfied	Indifferent	Dissatisfied	Highly Dissatisfied	Lose a sense of belonging	
Hausa-Fulani	31 (22.63%)	40 (29.20%)	14 (10.22%)	31(22.63%)	21 (15.33%)	137
Yoruba	34 (35.79%)	41 (43.16%)	15 (15.79%)	3 (3.16%)	2 (2.11%)	95
Igbo	36 (46.75%)	19 (24.68%)	15 (19.48%)	6 (7.79%)	1 (1.30%)	77
Minorities	85 (54.84%)	41 (26.45%)	13 (8.39%)	16 (10.32%)	-	155
Total	186 (40.09%)	141 (30.39%)	57 (12.28%)	56 (12.07%)	24 (5.17%)	464

From the figures in Table 4.4 majority of the respondents would feel comfortable with the outcome of recruitment based on merit. The data show that 40.09 percent would feel satisfied while 30.39 percent felt they would be indifferent if faced with a situation where only few people from their ethnic groups are selected in a recruitment exercise guided by meritocratic principle. The table shows that only 29.52 percent of respondents would feel dissatisfied with such an arrangement. Their level of dissatisfaction differs as indicated in the table.

The pattern is generally similar across various ethnic groups. Although the proportion of those who would not feel unhappy with such situation differs among the different ethnic groups, the proportion is on the high side in each of the groups. This ranges from 51.83 percent (that is those who would feel satisfied plus those who would be indifferent) of respondents from Hausa - Fulani group to 71.43 percent, 78.95 percent and 81.29 percent of Igbo, Yoruba and Minorities respectively.

In comparison with other groups, the figure of 51.83 percent of Hausa-Fulani group is small. An explanation for this may be found in the fact that this group represents the least educated in which case they are most likely to be disadvantaged by undiluted application of meritocracy. Nevertheless, many of them would not feel uncomfortable with it.

The above question does not actually reveal everything about the relationship between the two variables being tested. Hence more direct, follow-up questions were asked. Overwhelming majority of respondents thought that federal bureaucracies are dominated by persons from particular ethnic group(s). Asked which of the groups

(whether dominant or non-dominant) they belong to, reactions were not uniform within each group. For instance, while some members of Igbo group (albeit a few of them) thought they belonged to the dominant group, others thought they belonged to the non dominant group.

But our interest did not really lie here. This was just a build up to a major question. A major concern was to know how people felt if they thought they were being dominated. We therefore posed the question: "If you consider your ethnic group as inadequately represented in these institutions what is your reaction to it? Table 4.5 shows the responses of respondents.

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Table 4.5

**Reaction to Perception of Inadequate Representation of One's
Ethnic Group in Federal Bureaucracies**

Ethnic Group	Reactions				Total
	Feel Strongly Alienated	Feel Alienated	Dissatisfied	Indifferent	
Hausa-Fulani	80(66.12%)	19(15.70%)	7(5.79%)	15(12.40%)	121
Yoruba	61(70.93%)	6(6.98%)	5(5.81%)	14(16.28%)	86
Igbo	53(70.67%)	12(16.0%)	2(2.67%)	8(10.67%)	75
. Minorities	85(60.28%)	15(10.64%)	11(7.80%)	30(21.28%)	141
Total	279(65.96%)	52(12.29%)	25(5.91%)	67(15.84%)	423*

* This number excludes those respondents who skipped the question.

Table 4.5 shows a similar trend in the reaction of respondents (across ethnic groups) to inadequate representation of members of their groups in federal ministries and agencies. Out of a total of 423 valid responses to this question, 279 (representing 65.96 percent) felt strongly alienated from the system because they thought that their ethnic groups were not adequately represented in federal institutions. Another 52 (that is 12.29 percent) felt a sense of alienation while 25 (representing 5.91 percent) were dissatisfied with the situation. A paltry number of 67 (that is 15.84 percent) felt indifferent to it.

Among the different ethnic groups there is no marked difference in reactions. Only 12.4 percent of Hausa-Fulani, 16.28 percent of Yoruba, 10.67 percent of Igbo and 21.28 percent of Minorities felt indifferent to the perception of lack of adequate representation of members of their groups in federal ministries and/ or agencies. The rest either felt dissatisfied with, felt a sense of alienation or felt a strong sense of alienation from the system.

This confirms that the exclusion of a group from a country's national institution is antithetical to national integration. Conversely, the representation of various groups in national institutions of a country works in the direction of national integration.

An unfettered application of meritocratic principle as the basis of recruitment into federal bureaucracies, may produce a situation where some section of the country will be unrepresented. Given this fact, it follows that when the plural nature of a country is also taken into cognizance in staffing national bureaucracies national

integration is promoted since it ensures the representation of otherwise unrepresented group(s).

We tested the perception of respondents on this in a blunt manner thus: "In general, do you think this method of recruitment (i.e quota system/federal character principle) engenders in the various groups a feeling of belonging to the nation?".

Table 4.6 contains the responses of respondents.

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Table 4.6

Perceptions of the Impact of Federal Character Principle as a basis of Recruitment on National Integration (a feeling of belonging to the national entity)

Ethnic Group	Responses			
	Yes	No	Don't Know	Total
Hausa-Fulani	106(77.37%)	21(15.33%)	10(7.30%)	137
Yoruba	52(54.74%)	21(22.11%)	22(23.16%)	95
Igbo	41(53.25%)	15(19.48%)	21(27.27%)	77
Minorities	91(58.71%)	29(18.71%)	35(22.58%)	155
Total	290(62.50%)	86(18.53%)	88(18.97%)	464

290 respondents (representing 62.50%) agreed that when staffing of federal (national) bureaucracies takes cognizance of the country's diversity it makes various groups have a sense of belonging to the country as a whole. 86 respondents (that is 18.53%) disagreed with this, while 88 respondents (or 8.97%) could not ascertain whether or not it promotes a sense of belonging.

With specific reference to the manner in which it has been applied in Nigeria's federal ministries and agencies most of the respondents thought that the principle has not engendered any feeling of attachment to the country (See Table 4.7).

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Table 4.7

Perception of the Impact of Federal Character Principle (as it has been in operation in Nigeria) on National Integration

Ethnic Group	Responses			
	Yes	No	Don't Know	Total
Hausa-Fulani	84(61.31%)	34(24.82%)	19(13.87%)	137
Yoruba	11(11.58%)	82(86.32%)	2(2.11%)	95
Igbo	8(10.39%)	66(85.71%)	3(3.90%)	77
Minorities	44(28.39%)	97(62.58%)	14(9.03%)	155
Total	147(31.68%)	279(60.13%)	38(8.19%)	464

31.68 percent of total respondents thought that the operation of federal character principle as a basis for filling positions in federal ministries and agencies has increased loyalty to the national entity. But most of the respondents thought otherwise. As indicated in Table 4.7, 60.13 percent of respondents thought that the manner in which federal character principle has been applied to recruitment of personnel has not fostered a feeling of belonging in the people. 8.19 percent of the respondents did not take either of the two positions. The foregoing analysis has not captured the detailed pattern of responses across groups. Only responses from three groups namely Yoruba, Igbo and Minorities are consistent with the overall trend.

In other words, most of the respondents from these groups (86.32 percent for Yoruba, 85.71 percent for Igbo and 62.58 percent for Minorities) disagreed that the way in which the principle has been applied to recruitment of personnel in Nigeria has engendered a sense of belonging in the people. Just over 11 percent, 10 percent and 28 percent of respondents from Yoruba, Igbo and Minorities respectively thought the principle has contributed positively to national integration in Nigeria. Responses from the Hausa-Fulani group show a reversed pattern from those of other groups. 61.31 percent of respondents from the former group thought that the application of the federal character principle as a basis for recruitment in Nigeria has enhanced the people's sense of national belonging. 24.82 percent of respondents from the group disagreed while 13.87 percent of them could not determine the impact.

The high positive response (that is "yes" answer) to this question from members of the Hausa-Fulani group may not be unconnected with the fact that they

belong to the group which constitute the major beneficiary of this principle. It is important to note, however, that on the overall most of the respondents felt the principle, as it has been applied to recruitment in Nigeria, has been disintegrative.

As a way of unearthing or explicating the problems surrounding the application of federal character principle as a basis of recruitment in Nigeria an open ended question was put to respondents who thought it has not enhanced a sense of belonging to the national entity. The question is: "If not (that is if they thought that the assumed benefit of sense of belonging has not been achieved) why do you think this benefit has not been realised in the country?". Varied responses were received from respondents. Nonetheless, some common strands flow across most of them. These are outlined below.

- 1.The relegation of or disregard for merit.
- 2.The promotion of mediocrity.
- 3.Manipulation of the principle to foster ethnic/sectional interest
- 4.The feudalisation of the principle.
- 5.Manipulation of the principle to perpetrate corruption and bribery
- 6.Selective application of the principle to areas that suit the powers that

be.

What emerges from the foregoing data and analysis is that although the appreciation of the diverse nature of a country in staffing its ministries and agencies could enhance a feeling of belonging to the national entity, the manner in which this has been implemented in Nigeria has denied the country this benefit.

It could be observed from the data that most respondents felt quite comfortable with meritocratic principle as a basis of recruitment. And a major cause of disenchantment with federal character principle as a parameter of recruitment has been the jettisoning of merit. An implication of this is that there is the need for modification of the application of the principle as a basis of recruitment. Recruitment of personnel into ministries and agencies should be based mainly on merit. A certain (very small) percentage of vacancies should be reserved for the application of federal character principle. This should not be carried out in such manner as to ensure equal representation of constituent groups/units. Rather it should be used to ensure that groups/units which are *extremely disadvantaged* by the application of merit are not left unrepresented in federal institutions. In this way merit will be accorded its deserved pride of place while no constituent group/unit is left unrepresented. This method is bound to minimize the deleterious effects and bellicose relationship that the operation of federal character principle has generated in the country.

We sought to know from our respondents the level and nature of jobs in federal bureaucracies where they would recommend the adoption of federal character principle. Table 4.8 shows their responses.

Table 4.8

Preferred level and Nature of Jobs in Federal Bureaucracies for the application of Federal Character principle

Ethnic Group	Responses									
	(a) Top and Visible Administrative Posts	(b) Middle Cadre	(c) Lower Cadre	(d) Technical Areas	(e) Point of Entry	(f) a and e	(g) All but d	(h) All	(i)	Total
Hausa - Fulani	18 (13.33%)	-	-	-	3 (2.22%)	9 (6.67%)	49 (36.30%)	35 (25.93%)	21 (15.56%)	135*
Yoruba	40 (42.55%)	1 (1.06)	-	-	3 (3.19%)	4 (4.26%)	-	2 (2.13%)	44 (46.81%)	94*
Igbo	24 (31.17%)	-	-	-	2 (2.60%)	8 (10.39%)	6 (7.79%)	-	37 (48.05%)	77
Minorities	31 (20.0%)	-	5 (3.23%)	-	5 (3.23%)	30 (19.35%)	5 (3.23%)	15 (9.68%)	64 (41.29%)	155
Total	113 (24.51%)	1 (0.22%)	5 (1.08%)	-	13 (2.82%)	51 (11.06%)	60 (13.02%)	52 (11.28%)	166 (36.0%)	461*

* This number excludes invalid responses.

Most of the respondents approved of the adoption of federal character principle in one area or another. In all 64.0 percent of respondents belong to this group while 36.0 percent completely disapproved of it. 11.28 percent of respondents recommended its use at all levels and nature of jobs while 13.02 percent supported its use at all levels except technical areas such as teaching. 24.51 percent thought that the principle should be applied to top and visible administrative posts only. This includes posts such as Directors, Deputy Directors and Assistant Directors.

0.22 percent would recommend its adoption to middle cadre only while just over that (1.08 percent) would recommend its application to lower cadre only. The adoption of the principle at points of entry only was approved by 2.82 percent of respondents. 11.06 percent recommended its application to both top and visible posts as well as points of entry only.

A close examination of the data reveals that areas where the adoption of the federal character principle was relatively highly recommended are top, visible administrative posts and points of entry in that order. 59.87 percent (that is $a+f+g+h$) of the respondents thought the principle should be adopted in the area of the former. 38.18 percent (that is $e+f+g+h$) of the respondents approved of its use at points of entry.

The basic justification for the relative high preference for top and visible administrative posts in the application of federal character principle by respondents is found in their responses to our follow up question which required them to justify their position. What emerged mainly from these responses is that since officers at

that level may be crucial to the content and direction of public policy in its making and implementation it is fair that their composition be made, to some extent, to reflect the country's diversity.

Furthermore, since these officers constitute the group in the glare of the public their geographical spread would assure the feeling that no group is left out in the scheme of things. The general responses are typical of the statements of three respondents quoted below.

1. "Directors and above represents (sic) the political umbrella of the country and should be well spread".
2. "This will ensure balance at the top level of administration since all eyes are on them".
3. "All ethnic groups will be represented in decision making".

What must also be mentioned here is that many of the respondents, in choosing preferred area(s) for the application of federal character principle emphasized the need to accord merit priority. According to them: "it should have merit as its strong basis"; "federal character principle should be applied after considering merit".

The data also show an overwhelming majority of respondents rejecting the application of federal character principle to areas that require technical expertise. Only a paltry number of 11.28 percent would want it adopted in technical areas.

Data by ethnic groups indicate that the majority of respondents from each group were in favour of the adoption of the principle in one area or another. They however differ in degree. This ranges from the generous support of 84.44 percent

for Hausa-fulani to the very slim majority of 58.71 percent, 53.19 percent and 51.95 percent for minorities, Yoruba and Igbo respectively.

With respect to promotion of officers, majority of respondents disapproved of its use and considered it as engendering a sense of alienation in competent officers discriminated against by the application of the principle. Rather than promoting a sense of loyalty to the national entity, most of the respondents were of the view that it has only tended to foster ethnocentric bigotry and primordial alliances.

This information was derived from responses to our questions namely, whether they thought federal character principle should be used as the basis of promotion (see Table 4.9) and if they thought such enhances a feeling of belonging to the national polity (see Table 4.10). In each case respondents were asked to justify their position.

Table 4.9

Reaction to use of Federal Character Principle as the basis of Promotion in Public Service.

Ethnic Group	Responses		
	Yes	No	Total
Hausa-Fulani	28(20.44%)	109(79.56%)	137
Yoruba	11(11.58%)	84(88.42%)	95
Igbo	9(11.69%)	68(88.31%)	77
Minorities	9(5.81%)	146(94.19%)	155
Total	57(12.28%)	407(87.72%)	464

As shown in Table 4.9, 87.72 percent of respondents disapproved of the use of federal character principle as the basis of promotion in the public service. A mere 12.28 percent support its use. With respect to distribution within each group majority of the respondents (79.56 percent for Hausa-Fulani, 88.42 percent for Yoruba, 88.31 percent for Igbo and 94.19 percent for Minorities) disapproved of its adoption.

Most of the respondents were of the view that competence, merit, excellence and experience should inform promotion. In the view of many of them promotion based on federal character principle promotes inefficiency, disaffection, local solidarity and disenchantment. What is discernible from these is that emphatic application of federal character principle to promotion in public service is antithetical to national integration.

Table 4.10

Perception of the Impact of Federal Character Principle-based Promotion on a feeling of belonging to the National polity.

Ethnic Group	Responses			
	Yes	No	Don't Know	Total
Hausa-Fulani	24(17.52%)	88(64.23%)	25(18.25%)	137
Yoruba	8(8.42%)	86(90.53%)	1(1.05%)	95
Igbo	7(9.09%)	68(88.31%)	2(2.60%)	77
Minorities	9(5.81%)	126(81.29%)	20(12.90%)	155
Total	48(10.34%)	368(79.31%)	48(10.34%)	464

Next, we asked a combination of questions that borders on representation of groups in the country's cabinet with a view to assessing its relationship with emotional attachment of citizens from varying groups to the country. First we asked if their ethnic groups have always been adequately represented in the country's cabinet. Conflicting responses emerged from members of each group.

This question was really a build up to a major question: "If your answer is No (that is if they thought their groups have not been adequately represented in the country's cabinet) how do you feel about it?" The detailed responses are indicated in Table 4.11.

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Table 4.11

**Reaction to Perception of Inadequate
Representation in the country's cabinet.**

Ethnic Group	Responses				Total
	Indifferent	Satisfied	Dissatisfied	Feel a sense of alienation	
Hausa-Fulani	27 (20.93%)	4 (3.10%)	19 (14.73%)	79 (61.24%)	129*
Yoruba	18 (19.35%)	3 (3.23%)	23 (24.73%)	49 (52.69%)	93*
Igbo	12 (15.79%)	10 (13.16%)	11 (14.47%)	43 (56.58%)	76*
Minorities	36 (24.49%)	10 (6.80%)	27 (18.37%)	74 (50.34%)	147*
Total	93 (20.90%)	27 (6.07%)	80 (17.98%)	245 (55.06%)	445*

* This number excludes respondents who skipped the question.

Most of the respondents (73.03 percent) who thought their ethnic groups have not always been adequately represented in the federal cabinet felt unhappy with the situation. This embraces the 17.98 percent who felt dissatisfied with it and 55.06 percent who felt alienated from the polity owing to inadequate representation. Just over 6.0 percent felt satisfied, while 20.90 percent were indifferent to it. This trend prevails within each group. 75.97 percent of respondents from Hausa-Fulani group, 77.42 percent from Yoruba, 71.06 percent from Igbo and 68.71 percent from Minorities either felt alienated or dissatisfied. What the foregoing suggests is that Nigerians tend to feel alienated when their ethnic groups are not adequately represented in the federal cabinet.

Mindful of the fact that when a group is not adequately represented in the cabinet a sense of alienation and/or dissatisfaction could arise not necessarily because of the very fact of inadequate representation *per se* but because one thinks that the procedure for selection of cabinet members was unfair, we then asked further probing questions.

We sought to know from respondents if they supported the view that the composition of the country's cabinet should be made to reflect its plural nature (see Table 4.12) and whether representation of their ethnic/sectional groups evoked in them any feeling of attachment to the country (see Table 4.13). We also asked if they thought that the incorporation of ethnic/ sectional groups into the country's political system will strengthen sectarian identity at the expense of national unity or strengthen identification with the national entity (see Tables 4.14 and 4.15). Further,

whether they would accord legitimacy to a government whose membership does not include person of their ethnic or sectional origin (Table 4.16).

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Table 4.12

Reaction to Composition of the Country's Cabinet in a manner reflecting its Plural Nature

Ethnic Group	Responses		
	Yes	NO	Total
Hausa-Fulani	103(75.18%)	34(24.82%)	137
Yoruba	81(85.26%)	14(14.74%)	95
Igbo	62(80.52%)	15(19.48%)	77
Minorities	133(85.81%)	22(14.19%)	155
Total	379(81.68%)	85(18.32%)	464

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Table 4.13

Impact of Representation of one's Ethnic/Sectional Group on one's Feeling of Attachment to the Country

Ethnic Group	Responses			
	Yes	NO	Don't Know	Total
Hausa-Fulani	102(74.45%)	25(18.25%)	10(7.30%)	137
Yoruba	75(78.95%)	9(9.47%)	11(11.58%)	95
Igbo	61(79.22%)	12(15.58%)	4(5.19%)	77
Minorities	130(83.87%)	22(14.19%)	3(1.94%)	155
Total	368(79.31%)	68(14.66%)	28(6.03%)	464

Table 4.14

Perception of the Impact of Incorporation of Ethnic/Sectional Groups into the Country's Political System on Consolidation of Sectarian Identity at the expense of National Unity

Ethnic Group	Responses			
	Yes	NO	Don't Know	Total
Hausa-Fulani	20(14.60%)	102(74.45%)	15(10.95%)	137
Yoruba	8(8.89%)	73(81.11%)	9(10.0%)	90*
Igbo	11(14.86%)	61(82.43%)	2(2.70%)	74*
Minorities	22(14.19%)	125(80.65%)	8(5.16%)	155
Total	61(13.38%)	361(79.17%)	34(7.46%)	456*

* This figure excludes invalid responses arising from contradictory responses of some respondents to questions analyzed in Tables 4.14 and 4.15

Table 4.15

Perception of the Impact of Incorporation of Ethnic/Sectional groups into the Country's Political System on Strengthening identification with the National entity.

Ethnic Group	Responses			
	Yes	NO	Don't Know	Total
Hausa-Fulani	103(75.18%)	20(14.60%)	14(10.22%)	137
Yoruba	73(81.11%)	8(8.89%)	9(10.0%)	90*
Igbo	61(82.43%)	11(14.86%)	2(2.70%)	74*
Minorities	125(80.65%)	22(14.19%)	8(5.16%)	155
Total	362(79.39%)	61(13.38%)	33(7.24%)	456*

*This figure excludes invalid responses.

Table 4.16

Granting of Legitimacy to a Government (cabinet) whose membership is not inclusive of person from one's Ethnic/Sectional Group.

Ethnic Group	Responses			
	Yes	NO	Conditional*	Total
Hausa-Fulani	11(8.03%)	115(83.94%)	11(8.03%)	137
Yoruba	11(11.58%)	80(84.21%)	4(4.21%)	95
Igbo	7(9.09%)	64(83.12%)	6(7.79%)	77
Minorities	8(5.16%)	115(74.19%)	32(20.65%)	155
Total	37(7.97%)	374(80.60%)	53(11.42%)	464

* While some of the respondents who chose this option stated the condition under which they would accept such government, others merely ticked the option without specifying the condition as required.

Majority of respondents supported the reflection of societal diversity in the composition of Nigeria's cabinet (Table 4.12). In more specific terms 81.68 percent lent support for this position while 18.32 percent did not approve of it. Similar pattern exists within each group. This ranges from 75.18 percent for Hausa-Fulani to 80.52 percent, 85.26 percent and 85.81 percent for Igbo, Yoruba and Minorities respectively who supported it. Only 24.82 percent, 14.74 percent, 19.48 percent and 14.19 percent of respondents from Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, Igbo and Minorities respectively disapproved of it.

79.31 percent of respondents agreed that the representation of members of their ethnic/ sectional groups evoke in them a feeling of attachment to the country (Table 4.13). 14.66 percent thought it does not while 6.03 percent did not know if it does. Significant difference does not exist in the responses from members of different groups. Those who hold that when the federal cabinet draws some of its members from their ethnic/sectional groups, it evokes in them a feeling of attachment to the country represent 74.45 percent for Hausa-Fulani, 78.95 percent for Yoruba, 79.22 percent for Igbo and 83.87 percent for Minorities.

18.25 percent, 9.47 percent, 15.58 percent and 14.19 percent in that order disagreed while 7.30 percent, 11.58 percent, 5.19 percent and 1.94 percent (also in that order) claimed not to know if it does.

Not many respondents agreed that the incorporation of ethnic/sectional groups into the country's political system strengthen sectarian identity to the detriment of national unity (see Table 4.14). 79.17 percent of respondents belong to this school

of thought. 13.38 percent disagreed, while 7.46 percent answered "don't know". This trend is also typical of the reactions from different groups. Most respondents from each group disagreed that the incorporation of ethnic/sectional groups into the country's political system strengthen primordial solidarity at the expense of identification with the national entity. This ranges from 74.45 percent for Hausa-Fulani category to 82.43 percent for Igbo.

Conversely, most respondents thought that incorporating ethnic/sectional groups into the country's political system strengthens identification with the national entity (see Table 4.15). 79.39 percent agreed with this, 13.38 percent disagreed while 7.24 percent did not know. Most respondents from each group also agreed: 75.18 percent for Hausa-Fulani, 81.11 percent for Yoruba, 82.43 percent for Igbo and 80.65 percent for minorities.

Majority of respondents would not accord legitimacy to a government whose membership does not include persons from their ethnic/sectional groups (see Table 4.16). Those who share this view constitute 80.60 percent of total respondents. 7.97 percent would grant recognition to such government. 11.42 percent made their recognition conditional. Some did not specify what the condition(s) is/are. For those who did, their recognition was generally made conditional on the selection of such government being based purely on merit and evidence that no person from their group qualified by that standard.

Distribution of responses within groups follow this pattern. 83.94 percent of respondents from Hausa-Fulani, 84.21 percent from Yoruba, 83.12 percent from Igbo

and 74.19 percent from Minorities would not give legitimacy to a government whose membership is devoid of persons from their groups. 8.03 percent, 11.58 percent, 9.09 percent and 5.16 percent for Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, Igbo and Minorities respectively would not mind granting recognition to such government. 8.03 percent, 4.21 percent, 7.79 percent and 20.65 percent for Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, Igbo and Minority, in that order, made their recognition conditional.

What is discernible from the foregoing is an unambiguous validation of the hypothesis that the reflection of a country's diversity in the composition of its cabinet promotes emotional attachment to the country. Reactions from majority of respondents to our questions tend to confirm this point. This is further corroborated by responses to another question put to respondents. Before the said question we first asked: "In your view, given the self-serving behaviour of many public officers, do you think the interest of your group will be necessarily guaranteed when the government includes person(s) of your ethnic descent?". To this virtually all respondents answered in the negative.

We then asked the question: "If your response to the above question is No, why would you prefer a government in which your ethnic sectional group is represented?" Table 4.17 gives the synopsis of their detailed responses.

Table 4.17

Reasons for Preferring a Government inclusive of Members from One's Ethnic/Sectional Group

Ethnic Group	Responses				Total
	(a) Gives psychological Satisfaction of being part of the federation	(b) Enhances one's chances of access to power	a and b	other reasons	
Hausa-Fulani	91(72.22%)	7(5.56%)	13(10.32%)	15(11.90%)	126*
Yoruba	70(82.35%)	3(3.53%)	1(1.18%)	11(12.94%)	85*
Igbo	58(79.45%)	3(4.11%)	5(6.85%)	7(9.59%)	73*
Minorities	118(79.19%)	6(4.03%)	11(7.38%)	14(9.40%)	149*
Total	337(77.83%)	19(4.39%)	30(6.93%)	47(10.85%)	433*

* This figure excludes respondents who skipped the question.

Most of the respondents would opt for a government in which their ethnic/sectional groups are represented because it gives them psychological satisfaction of being part of the federation. Those in this category represent 77.83 percent. This is in addition to another 6.93 percent who gave this reason as well as the fact that representation of one's group in government broadens one's chances of access to power. 4.39 percent chose the latter reason alone. 10.85 percent chose other reasons(s)". Out of this latter group some merely ticked without stating any reason. Some simply stated that they would not necessarily prefer a government representative of their ethnic/sectional groups while yet some adduced reasons not quite different from the other stated options.

This pattern also holds within each group. 72.22 percent of respondents from Hausa-Fulani, 82.35 percent from Yoruba, 79.45 percent from Igbo and 79.19 percent from Minorities preferred a government that draws some of its members from their group because of the psychological attachment to the system that it ensures. These figures are besides those who preferred this and another reason.

Through a combination of questions we also sought to test two hypotheses namely:

1. Guaranteeing every group access to the apex of national office tends to promote national consciousness.
2. Power rotation among sectional groups in a country tends to instil a sense of belonging to the nation.

As a prelude to a major question, respondents were asked if they would say that their ethnic groups have had their fair share of the leadership position of this country and to give an assessment of the chances of the country's leader emerging from their ethnic groups. Their opinion varied. We then followed up with the questions: "Assuming an absence of the possibility of the country's leader emerging from your group, how would you react?" Table 4.18.

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Table 4.18

Reaction to Impossibility of the Country's Leader Emerging from One's Ethnic/sectional Group

Ethnic Group	Responses				Total
	Satisfied	Indi-fferent	Feel estranged from the system	Take steps to ensure the situation is remedied	
Hausa-Fulani	2(1.46%)	7(5.11%)	109(79.56%)	19(13.87%)	137
Yoruba	-	4(4.21%)	77(81.05%)	14(14.74%)	95
Igbo	-	8(10.39%)	63(81.82%)	6(7.79%)	77
Minorities	3(1.94%)	33(21.29%)	112(72.26%)	7(4.52%)	155
Total	5(1.08%)	52(11.21%)	361(77.80%)	46(9.91%)	464

It can be observed from classification of responses in Table 4.18 that perpetual inability of component groups of a country to produce the country's leader causes a feeling of estrangement from the system. From our data 77.80 percent of total respondents thought that if they are confronted with such situation they would feel estranged from the system. This contrasts sharply with the 1.08 percent who felt satisfied with such arrangement. 11.21 percent felt indifferent while 9.91 percent would prefer that steps be taken to ensure that the situation be remedied.

Within each group the pattern is virtually the same. 79.56 percent of respondents from Hausa-Fulani, 81.05 percent from Yoruba, 81.82 percent from Igbo and 72.26 percent from Minorities thought they would feel estranged when existing structures make it impossible for their groups to produce the leader of the country. Thus overwhelming majority of respondents from each group expressed similar reaction.

It is however observed that a relatively high proportion of respondents from Minorities chose to be indifferent. The explanation for this might not be easily discernible. Nonetheless, we may hazard that the nature of politics in the country which has made it quite improbable for the country's leader to emerge from minority groups may have already instilled a sense of resignation in some members of this group.

On the basis of the polity being structured in a manner that hinders a group from producing the leader of the country most respondents covered in the survey thought they would rather secede from the federation, if given the option (see Table 4.19).

Table 4.19

Adoption of Secessionist Option (if permitted) when a Group is rendered Incapable of Producing the Country's Leader

Ethnic Group	Responses			
	Yes	No	Don't Know	Total
Hausa-Fulani	118(86.13%)	17(12.41%)	2(1.46%)	137
Yoruba	82(86.31%)	3(3.16%)	10(10.53%)	95
Igbo	62(80.52%)	6(7.79%)	9(11.69%)	77
Minorities	131(84.52%)	21(13.55%)	3(1.94%)	155
Total	393(84.70%)	47(10.13%)	24(5.17%)	464

Preference for this extreme measure betrays the sense of alienation that is engendered by a group's exclusion from the apex of national office in a country. This undermines the development or promotion of national consciousness. From the data shown in Table 4.19, 84.70 percent of respondents would wish to secede from the federation if given the choice when the configuration of the system is such that permanently deny them the possibility of a leader emerging from their group. 10.13 percent answered in the negative while 5.17 percent of respondents failed to make up their mind.

The figure is similarly high, within each group, among those respondents who answered in the affirmative: 86.13 percent for Hausa-Fulani, 86.31 percent for Yoruba, 80.52 percent for Igbo and 84.52 percent for Minorities. 12.41 percent, 3.16 percent 7.79, percent and 13.55 percent of respondents from Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, Igbo and Minorities respectively gave negative response while 1.46 percent, 10.53 percent, 11.69 percent and 1.94 percent in that order gave a "don't Know" response.

The above data validates the position that access of groups to political power and affairs of a country promotes loyalty to the national entity while denial of access promotes alienation. We put directly to our respondents the choice of

Table 4.20

**Support for the Principle of Power Rotation Among
Sectional Groups in Nigeria.**

Ethnic Group	Responses		
	Yes	No	Total
Hausa-Fulani	80(58.39%)	57(41.61%)	137
Yoruba	70(73.68%)	25(26.32%)	95
Igbo	62(80.52%)	15(19.49%)	77
Minorities	115(74.19%)	40(25.81%)	155
Total	327(70.47%)	137(29.53%)	464

power rotation. On the whole, majority of respondents support the principle (see Table 4.20).

70.47 percent of total respondents were in favour of power rotation in the country while 29.53 percent disapproved of it. In each group this pattern is maintained. That is to say most of the respondents from each group support the principle of power rotation in Nigeria. In the Hausa-Fulani group 58.39 percent support the principle while 41.61 percent did not offer support for it. Although most respondents from this group support the rotatory principle, the support is low when compared with that of other groups. This may be due to the advantage that members of this group enjoy under the current configuration. This is in tandem with the theoretical postulate that those who are likely to bear the cost of a policy tend to resist it³. Nevertheless, the data negate the popular belief that most members of this group do not support rotatory principle in order to stymie a shift in the locus of power to another group.⁴

The principle of power rotation as revealed in Table 4.20 receives tremendous approval of other groups - Yoruba, Igbo and Minorities. 73.68 percent, 80.52 percent and 74.19 percent of respondents from Yoruba, Igbo and Minorities respectively approved of it, while 26.32 percent, 19.49 percent and 25.81 percent (also in that order) disapproved of it. An explanation for the major support rotatory principle received from respondents belonging to these three groups may be found in the fact that they generally perceive political power in the country to have been monopolized

by members of the Hausa-Fulani group. Rotatory principle is, therefore, seen as the lever with which to pry loose this monopolistic hold of political power.

From the data which have already been presented (for instance Tables 4.17, 4.18 and 4.19) it is obvious as we have already analyzed that national consciousness is promoted when diverse groups are represented in political institutions, the more so at the apex levels. It follows that power rotatory principle enhances the promotion of national consciousness. This is so because it assures the participation of diverse groups at the highest levels of national political offices.

Besides these deductions that can be drawn from the above data, we sought to know directly the perception of respondents regarding rotatory principle and intergroup conflict as well as national consciousness. First, respondents were asked if they thought power rotation will minimize intergroup conflict and tension engendered by struggle for political power. Their sundry responses are shown in Table 4.21.

Table 4.21

**Perception of the Impact of Power Rotation on
Intergroup Conflict and Tension.**

Ethnic Group	Responses			
	Yes (i.e minimizes intergroup conflict)	No (i.e does not minimize it)	Don't know	Total
Hausa-Fulani	83(60.58%)	44(32.12%)	10(7.30%)	137
Yoruba	71(74.74%)	18(18.95%)	6(6.32%)	95
Igbo	60(77.92%)	6(7.79%)	11(14.29%)	77
Minorities	115(74.19%)	29(18.71%)	11(7.10%)	155
Total	329(70.91%)	97(20.91%)	38(8.19%)	464

Table 4.22

**Perception of the Impact of Power Rotation on National
Consciousness/a sense of belonging.**

Ethnic Group	Responses			
	Yes (i.e promotes national Consciousness)	No (i.e does not)	Don't Know	Total
Hausa-Fulani	83(60.58%)	44(32.12%)	10(7.30%)	137
Yoruba	70(73.68%)	18(18.95%)	7(7.37%)	95
Igbo	60(77.92%)	6(7.79%)	11(14.29%)	77
Minorities	115(74.19%)	29(18.71%)	11(7.10%)	155
Total	328(70.69%)	97(20.19%)	39(8.41%)	464

70.91 percent of total respondents (Table 4.21) were of the view that the principle of power rotation minimizes intergroup conflict and tension occasioned by intergroup struggle for the control of political power. 20.91 percent disagreed with this view while 8.19 percent of total respondents did not know if it does minimize intergroup conflict.

The responses within each group is consistent with this general trend. 60.58 percent of respondents from Hausa-Fulani group, 74.74 percent from Yoruba, 77.92 percent from Igbo and 74.19 percent of respondents from Minorities thought that power rotation is an instrument for minimizing intergroup conflict. On the other hand 32.12 percent of respondents from Hausa-Fulani, 18.95 percent from Yoruba, 7.79 percent from Igbo and 18.71 percent from Minorities disagreed with this view. Respondents who gave a "don't Know" answer represent 7.30 percent of respondents from Hausa-Fulani, 6.32 percent from Yoruba as well as 7.79 percent and 18.71 percent of respondents from Igbo and Minorities respectively.

70.69 percent of the overall respondents perceived power rotation as an integrative instrument. They support the view that the rotation of power among component groups in the country promotes national consciousness/a sense of belonging in the citizenry. Only 20.91 percent disagreed with this position while 8.41 percent thought they did not know if power rotation among different groups promotes a sense of belonging.

The pattern of responses in each group reflects the general trend. 60.58 percent of respondents from Hausa-Fulani group perceived power rotation as an

integrative instrument, 32.12 percent disagreed. 7.30 percent did not know. In the case of the Yoruba group 73.68 percent of respondents support the view that power rotation promotes national integration 18.95 percent hold contrary view while 7.37 percent did not support either positions.

77.92 percent of respondents from Igbo, 74.19 percent from Minorities thought that power rotation promotes national integration. 7.79 percent from Igbo, and 18.71 percent from Minorities disagreed while 14.29 percent and 7.10 percent of respondents from respective groups thought they did not know if it did.

Apart from the questions that were generally asked to test hypotheses, we posed a few other questions which all the same border on federal character principle and are germane to the creation of a stable federal system in Nigeria. One topical issue in the application of federal character principle as revealed in our literature review is the question of the most appropriate parameter for representation. While many options exist (as contained in our literature review) the frontline contenders are the state, which has served as the unit of representation since the introduction of the principle, and ethnic category.

We put certain questions bordering on this issue to our respondents. First, we sought to know from respondents of multi- ethnic state origin whether they thought their ethnic groups as opposed to states were adequately represented in federal institutions and affairs. Most of them answered in the negative.

Generally, we asked respondents if they would prefer ethnic group rather than state as the parameter of representation. Table 4.23 encapsulates their responses.

Table 4.23

Choice of Ethnic group as the parameter for representation

Ethnic Group	Responses		
	Yes	No	Total
Hausa-Fulani	15(10.95%)	122(89.05%)	137
Yoruba	16(16.84%)	79(83.16%)	95
Igbo	10(12.99%)	67(87.01%)	77
Minorities	89(57.42%)	66(42.58%)	155
Total	130(28.02%)	334(71.98%)	464

Table 4.24

**Reasons Against Choice of Ethnic Category as the
Unit of Representation**

Ethnic Group	Responses								
	(a) Major Ethnic groups will be under represented	(b) Will Over-emphasize ethnic schisms	(c) Unwieldy due to large number of ethnic groups involved	(d)a & b	(e) a & c	(f)	(g) a,b&c	(h) other reasons	(i) Total
Hausa-Fulani	25 (20.49%)	9 (7.38%)	26 (21.31%)	5 (4.10%)	52 (42.62%)	1 (0.82%)	3 (2.46%)	1(0.82%)	122
Yoruba	32 (40.51%)	12 (15.19%)	15(18.99%)	4 (5.06%)	11 (13.92%)	-	5 (6.33%)	-	79
Igbo	23 (34.33%)	7 (10.45%)	6 (8.96%)	-	21(31.34%)	-	10(14.93%)	-	67
Minorities	4 (6.06%)	15(22.73%)	22(33.33%)	-	-	21(31.82%)	3(4.55%)	1(1.52%)	66
Total	84 (25.15%)	43 (12.87%)	69 (20.66%)	9 (2.69%)	84 (25.15%)	22 (6.59%)	21 (16.29%)	2 (0.60%)	334

Table 4.25

Reasons for Choice of Ethnicity as the Unit of Representation

Ethnic Group	Responses								
	(a) Ensures equal Representat ion of all groups	(b) Ensures equal participation of all groups	(c) Mitigates inter ethnic tension	(d) a & b	(e) A & c	(f) b & c	(g) a,b & c	(h) other reasons	(i) Total
Hausa-Fulani	3(20.0%)	1 (6.67%)	7(46.67%)	4(26.67%)	-	-	-	-	15
Yoruba	4(25.0%)	-	10(62.5%)	2(12.50%)	-	-	-	-	16
Igbo	3(30.0%)	3 (30.0%)	3(30.0%)	-	-	-	1 (10.0%)	-	10
Minorities	21(23.60%)	25(28.09%)	4(4.49%)	26(29.21%)	-	1(1.12%)	10(11.24%)	2(2.25%)	89
Total	31(23.85%)	29(22.31%)	24(18.46%)	32(24.62%)	-	1(0.77%)	11(8.46%)	2(1.54%)	130

71.98 percent of total respondents were opposed to the adoption of ethnicity as the unit of representation for the purpose of the application of federal character principle. Only 28.02 percent would recommend its use.

This general pattern of responses holds for the three groups namely Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo. That is, minority of respondents from each of these groups answered in the affirmative to the question whether they would suggest that ethnic group rather than state be used as the parameter for representation.

The major difference pertains to the reaction of respondents from the fourth group - minorities. 57.42 percent approved the use of ethnicity as the unit of representation while 42.58 percent disapproved of it. An explanation for this may be found in the general notion that the minorities (or some of them) are more disadvantaged in terms of representation in national institutions and affairs under the *status quo*.

There are varied reasons for the rejection by some respondents and acceptance by others of ethnicity as the basis of representation. These are summarized in Tables 4.24 and 4.25. In rejecting ethnicity as the basis of representation some respondents thought that it would cause the under representation of major ethnic groups. It could be observed from Table 4.24 that this factor is a major explanatory variable for the comprehensive rejection of ethnic category by major ethnic groups. The total number of respondents who proffered this reason represents 69.67 percent, 65.82 percent and 80.60 percent for Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo respectively.

Other reasons for the rejection of ethnic category as the unit of representation include the belief that it is capable of overemphasizing ethnic schisms in the country and its unwieldy nature arising from the considerable number of ethnic groups existing in the country.

The general reasons for the preference, by some respondents, of ethnicity as the unit of representation are summarized in Table 4.25. It is thought that adopting ethnicity as the unit of representation will ensure equal representation and participation of all ethnic groups in national affairs.

In the next chapter a synopsis of the major findings, among others, is given.

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NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Some of the staff of the ministries housed at the Federal Secretariat, Ikoyi, have moved to Abuja in compliance with the directive of the Federal Military Government. However, not all of them have yet moved at the time the data were collected.
2. See various issues of *Annual Abstract of Statistics*, Federal Office of Statistics, Lagos; *N.U.C Annual Reports*; *JAMB Annual Reports*.
3. See for instance Breton, Raymond "The vesting of Ethnic Interests in State Institutions" in Frederes, James S.(ed) *Multi culturalism and Intergroup Relations* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989), pp. 35-55.
4. It is important to point out that vehement opposition to the principle of power rotation has, in the main, been from members of this group. The fact that many of them are opposed to power rotatory principle is underscored by the pattern of argument on this issue at the 1994/95 National Constitutional Conference and certain reactions as covered by the press. On these, see for instance newspapers and magazines of the time.

CHAPTER FIVE

SYNOPSIS AND CONCLUSION

5.1 Introduction

In this concluding chapter of the study, the findings of the research vis-a-vis the objectives of the study are synopsisized. In a precise and concise form, the chapter outlines the extent to which the hypotheses tested in the study have been validated. Furthermore, the major findings of the study as well as the implication of the findings for public policy and research are enunciated.

5.2 Overview

Against the background of the imperative need to ensure national integration in ethnically diverse countries, such as Nigeria, and the increased significance which federal character principle, assumed to be an integrative instrument, has enjoyed in Nigeria in recent times this study set out to empirically examine the relationship between federal character principle and national integration with Nigeria as the study area.

An extensive review of existing literature on related subject was undertaken and hypotheses were drawn. Relying on primary data, sourced from effective sample size of four hundred and sixty four, these hypotheses were subjected to test.

5.3 Major Findings

In general, all the hypotheses tested in this study were validated to a great extent. The study establishes that:

- (a) The recognition of a country's diversity in the recruitment of personnel to national institutions tends to engender a sense of belonging to the nation.
- (b) The reflection of a country's diversity in the composition of its cabinet tends to evoke emotional attachment to the national entity by citizens from such groups.
- (c) National consciousness is promoted when component groups of a country are guaranteed access to the apex of national office.
- (d) Rotation of power among sectional groups in a country tends to instil a sense of belonging to the nation.

The aforementioned four points simply establish the position that guaranteeing the participation of all component groups (of a plural society) in a country's national institutions, political power and affairs tends to promote national integration, while the exclusion of certain group(s) from participation in national institutions, political power and affairs of a country tends to erode national integration nationalism.

- (e) The study also established that, in general, there is no significant difference in the attitudes of various ethnic groups in Nigeria to federal character principle.

The few areas where differences worthy of note exist relate to whether the manner of implementation of the principle so far in Nigeria has promoted national

integration and the appropriate index of representation. On the first point, the position of most respondents from the Hausa-Fulani group differed from that of other groups. On the appropriate unit of representation, most respondents from Minority group favoured ethnicity as opposed to state category preferred by most respondents from other groups. Besides these areas, the pattern of responses across groups are essentially the same. Hence in general no significant difference exist among different ethnic groups in Nigeria towards federal character principle.

While the above points have been established by the study certain important observations are called for based on the findings of the study. With specific reference to the operation of federal character principle so far in Nigeria the study reveals that its manner of implementation has impeded the promotion of a sense of belonging envisaged by the principle. In this regard the unenviable position, if not outright jettisoning of merit in staffing and promotion in federal bureaucracies has engendered a sense of discontentment.

Most respondents from different ethnic groups in our survey felt comfortable with the application of merit principle. The study reveals that federal character principle would better achieve the objective of promoting a sense of belonging and national loyalty if the following measures are adopted.

- (a) If, where meritocratic standards can be explicitly prescribed, it (federal character principle) is applied not necessarily as an equalization mechanism but as a way of ensuring the representation of *extremely disadvantaged* groups arising from the application of merit.

This suggests that in recruiting personnel to federal bureaucracies merit should be given a pride of place; the lion's share should be reserved for merit while the remaining small share is reserved for compensating those who otherwise would have been unrepresented or grossly under represented. This approach, while taking cognizance of the country's diversities also ensures deference for merit and thus capable of mitigating tension arising from the present pattern of implementing federal character principle.

- (b) If, in the promotion of officers federal character principle is completely underemphasized in favour of merit where the latter principle can be clearly established. The reason for this is that as the study reveals the application of federal character principle in areas of promotion is one of the veritable areas of conflict occasioned by the application of the principle.
- (c) As the study revealed the major areas where under representation of groups elicit disintegrative tendencies pertain to top, visible administrative posts and political positions. The reasons for this, according to the study, are found not only in the fact that these areas constitute the glare of the public but also because of their relevance to policy determination. Thus, it works in the national interest of promoting a sense of belonging and loyalty of all citizens and

component groups if emphasis is placed on such areas in the application of federal character principle.

- (d) The study also discovered lack of encouragement (by respondents) of the application of the principle to areas requiring technical expertise. There is therefore the need to place such areas beyond the domain of federal character principle.
- (e) Although the study found a general preference for the continued adoption of state in contra - distinction to ethnicity as the unit of representation, some minority groups in multi ethnic states feel unrepresented as a consequence of that. In ensuring representativeness in national institutions, therefore, while state unit can be adopted, there is the imperative need to also ensure geographical representation in choosing people from multi ethnic states. This will ensure more adequate representation of groups.

5.4 Implications of Findings for Research and Public Policy

Our findings suggest the need for continued adoption of federal character principle as a public policy in Nigeria. The findings however call for modification of the principle in line with observations made in this study. Some of these observations have already been enunciated in the preceding subsection. Only few others need to be added here.

Based on the responses obtained from our survey, it was observed that a major attendant problem of federal character principle as it has been applied in Nigeria is the abuse or wrongful application of the principle. Most of the respondents in the employ of federal government, according to our survey, were agreed that the application of the principle has been manipulated in such a manner that encourages mediocrity. This has been a continued source of tension and suspicion between the beneficiaries and the other officers most of whom are actually more competent.

Furthermore a permanent and veritable source of frustration with the application of the principle is the fact (as put by many respondents) that it is used only when it suits the powers that be. It is emphasized only when and where it favours them. This is a veiled reference to the Hausa-Fulani faction of the Nigerian ruling class. Many respondents from other ethnic groups pointed to the forceful implementation of the principle in federal bureaucracies and agencies where ethnic groups, particularly from southern part of the country had initial advantage by virtue of their education. They also pointed to the reluctance to apply the principle to certain sensitive and prominent posts, areas which should ordinarily be the prime target of the principle. This ensures lopsidedness deliberately created in favour of a section of the country.

To eschew the danger which this portends for the unity and stability of the country, the bid to ensure fair representation of groups in national institution and

affairs through the policy of federal character principle demands the fair and equitable implementation of the principle.

The findings of the study also made open area where the implementation of the policy is most desirable. This relates to top, visible administrative posts and political positions. In implementing this policy therefore, such post should be given priority.

It could be observed from the study that majority of respondents favoured continued adoption of state as the unit of representation as opposed to ethnic category. While this pattern of responses was reflected in most of the groups (namely Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo) the reverse was the case in one of the groups (Minorities). Most respondents from the latter category favoured ethnicity as the parameter for representation. The major reason for the preference is the need to ensure representation and meaningful participation of all component groups.

For reasons already articulated - such as unwieldiness arising from the large number of ethnic groups in the country - the adoption of ethnicity as the parameter of representation is not likely to be feasible. What can however be discerned from this study is that while state can continue to maintain its status as the unit of representation cognizance should also be paid to geographical spread in representation from multi ethnic states. In this way the chances of representation of the various groups will be broadened.

Furthermore the creation and empowerment of viable units could reduce the quest for adequate representation at the centre. The extreme degree of power

centralization has aggravated the struggle for power at the centre and the quest for adequate representation. A process of decentralization which ensures the transfer of reasonable amount of power to viable units and the reservation of only essential general responsibilities for federal government will minimize the quest for adequate representation at the national level.

Contrary to general belief, the study shows that most respondents from Hausa-Fulani group support rotatory principle. General observation had portrayed members of this group as anti-rotatory principle. This was informed by the utterances of prominent persons from this group as typified by the debate on the issue at the 1994/95 National Constitutional Conference.

It is important to note that these persons belong to the elite group. Against this background and the data presented in this study (Table 4.20) it may well be that there is incongruity in the attitude of the (political) elite and other members of this ethnic group to rotatory principle. Our findings therefore open a new line of inquiry, namely whether there is marked difference in the perception of, or attitude to, federal character principle between the elites and the masses.

Furthermore, researchers can also adopt "regional approach" to explicating the problem which constituted the crux of this study. That is to say they can focus on specific sections of the country for more indepth case studies .

In conclusion, the representation and participation of component groups of a country in its institutions and affairs engender national consciousness and promotes loyalty of citizens. The implementation of this principle in Nigeria, as this study has

shown, demands fine tuning. Indeed, a reconceptualisation of the principle is needed. This study has contributed to the explication of the problem of federal character principle (representativeness) and national integration. There are still other specific lines of inquiry that can be pursued by researchers some of which have been identified in this study.

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APPENDIX A

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE OBAFEMI
AWOLOWO UNIVERSITY, ILE-IFE

RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE

The purpose of this questionnaire is to elicit information germane to the study regarding Federal Character principle and National Integration in Nigeria. It is purely meant for academic exercise and any information given will be treated in strict confidence. Indeed, your identity is not needed so be quite frank. Your maximum cooperation is highly craved.

Please tick the appropriate answer(s) where provided and state the answer where necessary.

1. Sex: (a) Male /_ / (b) Female /_ /
2. Which ethnic group in the country do you belong to?
(a) Hausa-Fulani /_ / (b) Yoruba /_ / (c) Igbo /_ / (d) others /_ /
3. Do you work or have you worked in any federal establishment?
(a) Yes /_ / (b) No /_ /
4. Suppose in a recruitment exercise into federal bureaucracies (ministries and/ or parastatals) based purely on merit, only a relatively negligible number of persons is chosen from your ethnic group how would you feel?
(a) Satisfied /_ / (b) Indifferent /_ / (c) Dissatisfied /_ / (d) Highly dissatisfied /_ / (e) lose a sense of belonging /_ /
5. In your view, are federal bureaucracies in the country dominated by people from particular ethnic group(s)?
(a) Yes /_ / (b) No /_ / (c) Don't know /_ /
6. If your answer to the above question is Yes which group do you belong to?
(a) the dominant group /_ / (b) the non dominant group /_ /

7. If you consider your ethnic group as inadequately represented in these institutions what is your reaction to it? (a) Feel strongly alienated /_/ (b) Feel alienated /_/ (c) Dissatisfied (d) Indifferent /_/

8. In recruiting personnel to these institutions would you support the position that the diversity of the country should be taken into consideration (as opposed to pure merit principle)?
(a) Yes /_/ (b) No /_/ (c) Don't know /_/

If you chose Yes would you say its application in Nigeria has yielded this benefit? (a) Yes /_/ No /_/

If not why do you think this benefit has not been realized in the country?

10. Would you recommend the application of quota system of recruitment (federal character principle) to all levels and nature of jobs in federal bureaucracies?
(a) Yes /_/ (b) No /_/ (c) Don't know /_/

11. If your response to the above question is No where would you encourage its use?

(a) Top and Visible administrative posts e.g. Directors /_
(b) Middle cadre (GL 07 - 11) /_
(c) Lower Cadre (GL 1-6) /_
(d) Technical areas e.g. teaching /_
(e) Point of entry /_
(f) Others (Specify) _____ Give
reason(s) for your answer _____

12. Where would you discourage its use?

(a) All nature of jobs /_
(b) Top and visible administrative posts /_
(c) Middle cadre /_
(d) Lower cadre /_
(e) Technical areas /_
(f) Point of Entry /_
(g) Others (specify) _____

13. Do you think federal character principle should be used as the basis of promotion in the public service?

(a) Yes /_
(b) No /_
Justify your position _____

14. Generally do you think promotion that is based on representativeness of diverse groups as against merit enhances a feeling of belonging?

(a) Yes /_
(b) No /_
(c) Don't know /_
Justify your position _____

15. Would you say your ethnic group has always been adequately represented in the country's cabinet?

- (a) Yes /_/ (b) No /_/ (c) Don't know /_/
16. If your answer is No how do you feel about it?
(a) Indifferent /_/ (b) Satisfied /_/ (c) Dissatisfied /_/ (d) a sense of alienation /_/
17. If you chose option d in the above question how strongly do you feel alienated?
(a) Very strongly /_/ (b) Strongly /_/ (c) Moderately /_/
18. Do you support the school of thought which holds that the composition of the country's cabinet should be made to reflect its plural nature? (a) Yes /_/ (b) No /_/
19. When the federal cabinet draws some of its members from your ethnic group, does it evoke in you any feeling of attachment to the country? (a) Yes /_/ (b) No /_/ (c) Don't know /_/
20. Do you think that the incorporation of ethnic/sectional groups into the country's political system will strengthen sectarian identity at the expense of national unity? (a) Yes /_/ (c) No /_/ (c) Don't know /_/
21. Do you think the incorporation of ethnic/sectional groups into the country's political system will strengthen identification with the national entity? (a) Yes /_/ (b) No /_/ (d) Don't know /_/
22. Would you accord legitimacy to a government (i.e federal cabinet whose membership does not include person of your ethnic/sectional origin? (a) Yes /_/ (b) No /_/ (c) Conditional (Specify)

23. In your view, given the self serving behaviour of many public officers do you think the interest of your group will be necessarily guaranteed when the government includes person(s) of your ethnic descent (a) Yes /_/ (b) No /_/ (c) Don't know /_/
24. If your response to the above question is No why would your prefer a government in which your ethnic/sectional group is represented? (a) Gives psychological satisfaction of being part of the federation /_/ (b) Enhances one's chances of access to power /_/ (c) Other reason(s) (Specify)

25. How would you feel when your group is unrepresented in government?
- (a) Prefer my group to secede from the Federation if possible /_/
- (b) Feel that the situation should be remedied under the existing structure /_/
- (c) Feel alienated /_/ (d) feel cheated /_/ (e) indifferent /_/ (f) Other reasons(s) (Specify) _____
26. Has your ethnic group produced the leader (ie. Chief Executive) of this country? (a) Yes /_/ (b) No /_/
27. Would you say your ethnic group has had its fair share of the leadership position of this country? (a) Yes /_/ (b) No /_/ (c) Don't know /_/
28. Given the existing configuration, how would you assess the chances of the country's leader emerging from your ethnic group? (a) Very bright /_/ (b) Bright /_/ (c) Dim /_/ (d) Impossible /_/
29. Assuming an absence of the possibility of the country's leader emerging from your group, how would you react? (a) Satisfied /_/ (b) Indifferent /_/ (c) Feel estranged from the system /_/ (d) Take steps to ensure that the situation is changed /_/
30. In the case of the scenario presented in the above question, would you rather your group secede from the Nigerian federation if given the choice? (a) Yes /_/ (b) No /_/ (c) Don't know /_/
31. Do you think the country's leadership is being dominated by people from a particular ethnic group(s) of the country? (a) Yes /_/ (b) No /_/ (c) Don't know /_/
32. If your answer to the above question is Yes, do you belong to the dominant group (a) Yes /_/ (b) No /_/
33. Do you support the principle of power rotation among sectional groups (proposed for the next political dispensation in the country)? (a) Yes /_/ (b) No /_/
34. In your view will power rotation minimize intergroup conflict and tension generated by struggle for political power? (a) Yes /_/ (b) No /_/ (c) Don't know /_/

35. Do you think rotation of power among sectional groups in the country will promote national consciousness/a sense of belonging in the people? (a) Yes /_/ (b) No /_/ (c) Don't know /_/
36. How many ethnic groups do you have in your state? (a) one /_/ (b) more than one /_/
37. If you chose option (b) above do you think your ethnic group (not state) is being adequately represented in federal public institutions? (a) Yes /_/ (b) No /_/ (c) don't know /_/
38. Would you suggest that ethnic group rather than state be used as the parameter for representation? (a) Yes /_/ (b) No /_/
39. If your response is No, what is/are your reason(s)?
 (a) Major ethnic groups will be underrepresented /_
 (b) Will overemphasize ethnic schisms /_
 (c) Unwieldy due to the large number of ethnic groups /_
 (d) Other reason(s) (specify) _____
40. If you prefer ethnicity as the unit of representation what is/are your reason(s)?
 (a) Ensures equal representation of all groups /_
 (b) Ensures equal participation of all groups /_
 (c) Will mitigate inter ethnic tension /_
 (d) Other reason(s) (Specify) _____
41. In your view what factor(s) act(s) as constraint(s) on the ability of federal character principle to promote loyalty of citizens to the nation?

42. Give suggestions on how federal character principle can be applied in such manner as to promote a sense of belonging and national consciousness in the citizenry?

APPENDIX B

POPULATION BY NATIONALITY AND ETHNIC GROUP - LAGOS

NIGERIANS	Both Sexes	
	Total	% of Total Population (Nigerians)
YORUBA	465,406	72.22
IBO	99,638	15.46
EDO	20,450	3.17
HAUSA	13,225	2.05
EFIK	12,606	1.96
IJAW	11,754	1.82
URHOBO	7,171	1.11
IBIBIO	5,819	0.90
ITSEKIRI	2,703	0.42
ISOKO	1,785	0.27
EKOI	658	0.10
NUPE	556	0.09
TIV	555	0.09
IDOMA	485	0.07
FULANI	434	0.07
IGALA	220	0.03
ANNANG	204	0.03
IGBIRRA	193	0.02
POLI	100	0.02
YELLA	67	0.001
OGONI	65	0.001
OTHERS	515	0.08
TOTAL	644,609	100.00


NATIONALITY - NON - NIGERIANS - AFRICANS

	Both Sexes
AFRICANS	
Cameroun	607
Chad	40
Ghana	2,626
Niger	58
Sierra Leone	698
Togo	4,345
Gambia	26
Dahomey	1,260
Rhodesia	12
Congo (Bra.)	29
Ethiopia	13
Ivory Coast	22
Liberia	407
Sudan	36
U.A.R.	156
Other Africans	134
Total	10,469

POPULATION BY NATIONALITY AND ETHNIC GROUP

MID-WESTERN NIGERIA (TOTAL)

Nationality and Ethnic Group	
<u>NIGERIANS</u>	<u>2,533,821</u>
Edo	852,570
Ibo	612,328
Urhobo	516,839
Ijaw	228,121
Isoko	172,815
Itsekiri	81,059
Yoruba	28,193
Hausa	9,389
Efik	6,945
Ibibio	4,636
Annang	3,873
Nupe	947
Igala	488
Tiv	344
Other Nigerians	15,274
<u>OTHER AFRICANS</u>	<u>423</u>
Ghana	178
Cameroun	88
Sierra Leone	80
Togo	32
Other African Countries	45
<u>NON-AFRICANS</u>	<u>1,118</u>
United Kingdom	514
Eire	123
United States	75
Germany	62
Netherlands	54
India	52
Scandinavian Countries	50
Italy	42
France	34
Greece	27
Other Countries	85
<u>UNSPECIFIED</u>	<u>477</u>
Total	2,535,839



POPULATION BY NATIONALITY AND ETHNIC GROUP

NORTHERN NIGERIA

Nationality and Ethnic group	
<u>NIGERIANS</u>	<u>29,699,282</u>
Hausa	11,550,975
Fulani	4,767,269
Kanuri	2,258,112
Tiv	1,374,440
Yoruba	1,144,034
Nupe	648,060
Igala	570,276
Idoma	473,944
Gwari	378,144
Igbirra	364,869
Ibo	357,915
Mumuye	294,202
Alago	249,438
Higgi	176,962
Bura	171,861
Chamba	162,326
Shau Arabashuwa	155,514
Kaje	151,992
Jari	146,976
Kambari	145,608
Eggon	143,007
Kobchi	141,194
Angas	137,717
Karekare	128,786
Biom	118,685
Yergam	116,204
Other Nigerians	3,370,772
<u>OTHER AFRICANS</u>	<u>29,959</u>
Cameroun	14,870
Niger	8,735
Chad	1,465
Dahomey	1,143
United Arab Republic	932
Ghana	822
Other African Countries	1,992

<u>NON-AFRICANS</u>	<u>72,715</u>
Iraq	27,641
Scandinavia	23,601
France	7,760
United Kingdom	5,211
United States	1,592
Lebanon	1,077
Pakistan	544
Other Countries	5,289
<u>UNSPECIFIED</u>	<u>6,702</u>
Total	29,808,658

POPULATION BY NATIONALITY AND ETHNIC GROUP

EASTERN NIGERIA

Nationality and Ethnic Group	
<u>NIGERIA</u>	<u>12,381,507</u>
Ibo	7,967,969
Ibibio	1,986,493
Ijaw	786,369
Ekoi	670,287
	342,839
Ogoni	201,747
Efik	132,559
Andoni	83,559
Yalla	53,566
Ukelie	26,106
Eleme	23,441
Ejagham	17,012
Hausa	15,948
Yoruba	15,272
Isoko	11,601
Igala	8,924
Tiv	8,556
Idoma	8,445
Urhobo	8,268
Edo	6,684
Other Nigerians	5,865

<u>OTHER AFRICANS</u>	<u>4,149</u>
Cameroun	2,441
Ghana	858
Sierara Leone	445
Other African Countries	405
<u>NON AFRICANS</u>	<u>7,126</u>
United Kingdom	2,651
United States	879
Netheriands	781
Eire	673
India	426
<u>OTHER COUNTRIES</u>	<u>1,716</u>
<u>UNSPECIFIED</u>	<u>1,679</u>
Total	12,394,464

These tables are excerpts from Population Census of 1963.

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POPULATION BY NATIONALITY AND ETHNIC GROUP
WESTERN NIGERIA

NATIONALITY AND ETHNIC GROUP	
<u>NIGERIANS</u>	<u>10,248,871</u>
YORUBA	9,667,612
IBO	208,563
URHOBO	101,903
HAUSA	63,210
EDO	59,764
IGBIRRA	45,979
IJAW	34,718
FULANI	15,439
ISOKO	11,844
TIV	9,754
EFIK	7,933
IBIBIO	5,500
NUPE	5,347
ITSEKIRI	3,593
IDOMA	2,608
IGALA	1,643
OTHER NIGERIANS	3,461
<u>OTHER AFRICANS</u>	<u>9,504</u>
GHANA	3,079
DAHOMAY	2,740
TOGO	2,504
CAMEROUN	428
SIERRA LEONE	339
OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES	414
<u>NON-AFRICANS</u>	<u>6,052</u>
UNITED KINGDOM	2,395
FRANCE	906
UNITED STATES	807
LEBANON	352
EIRE	249
INDIA	231
OTHER COUNTRIES	1,112
<u>UNSPECIFIED</u>	<u>1,421</u>
TOTAL	10,265,848

These tables are excerpts from Population Census of 1963.