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Ibadan, Nigeria**

**THE STATE, DEMOCRACY AND  
DEVELOPMENT IN THE WORKS OF  
CLAUDE AKE**

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**BSc (Hons) Political Science (Zaria), MSc Political Science (Zaria)**

**(Matric. No. 126119)**

**A PhD thesis**


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the Requirements for the Degree of**

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## ABSTRACT

Most works on Claude Ake have been limited to a celebration of his intellectual pedigree and stature. This is partly because most scholarly commentaries on political theorists in Africa have been treated as either parts of the colonial liberation struggles or as parts of the neo-colonial historiographical narrations of African anthropology or metaphysics, with the veiled objective of denying the existence and reality of African political thought. The consequence of this oversight is that whereas in disciplines in the humanities and the liberal arts, accomplished Africans (ists) have been extensively studied; only very few social scientists have been studied. The profiles of social scientists in Africa and the diaspora have therefore remained a largely underdeveloped genre. This study investigated the relevance of Ake's works with a view to examining the constituents and prospects for knowledge production in Africa.

Data were obtained from both primary and secondary sources. Primary data took the form of extensive-unstructured in-depth interviews (IDIs) conducted with a purposively selected group of 20 key informants: five each from the contemporaries, old friends, colleagues and past students of the late Claude Ake. Secondary data were obtained from Ake's original texts, published commentaries, critiques and tributes written in his honour before and after his death by his colleagues and institutional bodies. Other sources included information drawn from Ake's curriculum vitae and the texts which focused not only on the debates and issues on which Ake worked, but also the general context of scholarship in Africa which was part of his concern during his life-time. The texts were subjected to content analysis.

Theoretically, a major contribution made by Ake to the understanding of political thought in Africa is his redirection of attention to the salience of the state in Africa, as a major determinant of the political and wider development process. He emphasizes the need to understand the character of the state, its unique features and their implications, not just for conflict, peace-building and democratic development but also for socio-economic transformation in the continent. He advocated the autochthonous transformation of the state as a basis for transcending the domineering knowledge systems of post-Enlightenment Europe and their epistemic assertion over other non-metropolitan knowledge systems. On knowledge

production, Ake engaged the question of how knowledge developed and appropriated by Africans on the basis of their historical experiences can be valorized for empowering the state in the pursuit of democracy and development. Ake did this through his advocacy of the need to replace the practice of scholarship in Africa as translation and extroversion with its engagement as an objective reflection of Africanness. He advocated the reconstruction of existing disciplinary fields following uniquely African critiques and interpretations.

Ake's corpus is a corrective intervention to the extroversions of Eurocentrism and advocates the practice of cross-regional non-hierarchical dialogue, in which neither the North nor the South is taken as the paradigm against which the other is pronounced inadequate. It recommends the reinvention of the state in Africa as a basis for sustainable democratic development in the continent.

**Key words:** Claude Ake, endogeneity, knowledge production, post-Marxist scholarship, the social sciences in Africa.

**Word count:** 500.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The large body of literature cited in this thesis testifies to my indebtedness to several authors, too numerous to be mentioned individually. It suffices to state, however, that these have been acknowledged in the main body of the work. They have also been given the pride of place in the bibliography. Other individuals and institutions to whom I owe an enormous sum of intellectual and moral gratitude in the course of preparing the thesis are also quite numerous.

I am happy to acknowledge my indebtedness to Professor Adigun A. B. Agbaje (PhD), my supervisor, under whose tutelage this study began and was completed. This study was motivated by my conviction in August 2002, after the defence of my MSc thesis at Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Nigeria, that a critical and nuanced study of the intellectual corpus of the late Claude Ake is historically important and academically feasible. I am therefore, very grateful to my supervisor for making this conviction a reality. While the idea of studying Ake's works is originally mine, direction and guidance as to which aspects of those works are best studied, and how, came from him. It was principally his guidance that reduced what seemed to be an almost impossible assignment to the level of achievement I have recorded in the study so far. He therefore deserves my special appreciation.

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In the course of this study, I have held visiting fellowship positions as a guest researcher at the Centre for Advanced Social Science (CASS), Port Harcourt, Nigeria; the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA), Dakar, Senegal; the Centre for Studies in Social Sciences, Calcutta (CSSSC), India; the African Studies Centre (ASC), Leiden, the

Netherlands; the Nordic Africa Institute (NAI), Uppsala, Sweden, and the Centre for Humanities Research (CHR), at the University of the Western Cape (UWC), Cape Town, South Africa. I have also received prestigious grant awards from different institutional bodies across the world, among which are the West African Research Council (WARC), Dakar, Senegal, in collaboration with the West African Research Association (WARA), at the African Studies Centre (ASC), Boston University, Massachusetts, USA; the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA), Dakar, Senegal, and the Carnegie Corporation, through the African Humanities Programme (AHP) of the American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS) in New York, USA. The funding for my one-year fellowship programme as a "SEPHIS Fellow" in India was provided by the South-South Exchange Programme for Research on the History of Development (SEPHIS) at the International Institute of Social History (IISH), Amsterdam, the Netherlands. I am very grateful to these institutions for the funding, which greatly furthered my research.

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I am happy to recall, with appreciation and excitement, the privilege of working with Partha Chatterjee and other penetrating historians and theorists while at the Centre for Studies in Social Sciences, Calcutta (CSSSC), India. The edited volumes and other writings of members of the subaltern studies group introduced me to "postcolonial studies" and drew my attention to some of what Africa stands to learn from India's intellectual and nationalist histories, especially, given my outsider location away from the continent at that time. I am glad to have taken a privileged drink from the intellectual brook that flows in India and South Asia.

Blessing O. T. Arowosegbe (my wife) as well as Emmanuel B. O. Arowosegbe and Daniel A. O. Arowosegbe (my sons), gave me the encouragement that I needed and took my occasional absence from home with understanding. My parents, Pa. Joshua Sunday A. and Mrs. Victoria

Arowosegbe also provided immeasurable support for me during the period of this study. I am very grateful to them. Lastly, I thank the Almighty God for the gift of life as well as the grace to commence and complete the programme with remarkable success. In my entire quest, I have not conquered Mount Everest. It has merely tolerated me. *Contrapunto*.

Jeremiah Oluwasegun Arowosegbe.

Ibadan, November 2010.

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## **CERTIFICATION**

I certify that this work was carried out by Jeremiah Oluwasegun Arowosegbe in the Department of Political Science, University of Ibadan.

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## DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to the late Claude Emele Ake, *a scholar extraordinaire and a leading touch bearer in African political thought, postcolonial studies and post-Marxist scholarship* who died on Thursday 7 November 1996, and from whose works I have learnt the most so far, concerning critical social theory.

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## ABBREVIATIONS

|                      |  |
|----------------------|--|
| AAPS                 | African Association of Political Science                         |
| AISA                 | Africa Institute of South Africa                                 |
| ANC                  | African National Congress  |
| ASA/AAI              | African Studies Association/Africa-America Institute             |
| ASC                  | African Studies Centre   |
| CASS                 | Centre for Advanced Social Science                               |
| CODESRIA             | Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa |
| CODICE               | CODESRIA Documentation and Information Centre                    |
| CSSSC                | Centre for Studies in Social Sciences, Calcutta                  |
| HIV/AIDS<br>Syndrome | Human Immuno-deficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency         |
| ICSSR                | Indian Council of Social Science Research                        |
| IDIs                 | In-depth Interviews  |
| IMF                  | International Monetary Fund                                      |
| IPSA                 | International Political Science Association                      |
| NDES                 | Niger Delta Environmental Survey                                 |
| NGOs                 | Non-Governmental Organizations                                   |
| NPSA                 | Nigerian Political Science Association                           |
| NUC                  | National Universities Commission                                 |
| OAU                  | Organization of African Unity                                    |

|       |   |
|-------|---|
| OPEC  | Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries |
| PhD   | Doctor of Philosophy                          |
| UNECA | United Nations Economic Commission for Africa |
| USA   | United States of America                      |
| WARA  | West African Research Association             |
| WARC  | West African Research Centre                  |

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## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

#### 1.1 Background to the Study

Africa is currently undergoing the most unprecedented crises in its entire history: economically, politically and socially (Momoh 1999 and Mkandawire 2005). Indications of these crises include the widespread collapse of the nation-state project; the recurring violence and state failure in different parts of the continent, especially since the last decade; the poverty and underdevelopment, which resulted largely from the agricultural commodity crash and the structural adjustment programmes imposed on these states by the Bretton Woods Institutions since the 1980s (Chege 2004). Other indications include the ethnic cleansing and violence witnessed during the 1994 Rwanda genocide, which involved about 800, 000 Tutsi and moderate Hutus by Hutu extremists (Berkeley 2002 and Joseph 1999); the civil wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan; as well as the HIV-AIDS epidemic, which threatens to alter the continent's demographic profile in drastically negative ways. These situations have contributed to governance failure and have set back the process of nation-building, state formation and consolidation across the regions. According to Amina Mama (2007: 3):

Africa is perhaps the continent of globalization's deepest discontents. It is the region where many of the most negative effects of free-market capitalism and the post-Cold War resurgence of militarism are being lived out. The overall scenario is familiar to us, and we all have some idea of what it means to the people in the various places we study. It is therefore difficult for us to fathom why major texts on globalization fail to give this continent of fifty-three nations and over eight hundred million people any serious consideration. African scholars have mounted extensive critiques of globalization. Africa's most rigorous analyses are thus reduced to nothing more than futile protest literature, while the continent's fortunes continue to decline.

From the 1980s, more than thirty African countries have come under the tutelage of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Yet, from this period, external factors, neo-colonial domestic policies, civil wars and wars of liberation as well as natural disasters such as drought and man-made disasters like ethnic conflicts have combined to spread economic crisis in these countries (Adepoju 1993 and Ferdnance 1995). With the possible exception of Eastern Europe and the defunct Soviet Union, very few regions of the world have matched Africa in terms of the depth and pace of its political convulsions, especially since the end of the Cold War (Young 2002).

These crises have become recurring issues in the debate on Afro-pessimism (Gana and Egwu 2003). Hence, Albert Hirschman's (1970) recommendation on the need to critically examine the detailed plurality of the causes behind the cataclysmic events that we see in the continent, rather than despair or become transfixed by elegant models, which mislead fundamentally. Accordingly, some scholars have focused on the entire continent while others have limited their quests to the accounts of individual states (Lemarchand 2002, Newbury 1988, Lema 1993, Chabal and Daloz 1999 and Mamdani 2001). As Rotimi T. Suberu (2000: 123) observes:

Although these conflicts have long been a feature of the African political landscape, they have recently acquired a new visibility and stridency owing largely to the declining capacity and viability of the state, the collapse of the continent's economies, the demonstration effect from the explosion of ethnic nationality passions in the former communist states, and growing external (donor) pressures for economic and political liberalization.

The scope of these crises, from the final decades of the twentieth century is complex and poses one of the most serious challenges to humanity in recent times. They affect virtually every facet of human existence and have attracted the attention of experts in all disciplines. The consequences are therefore more than the price, which developing societies must pay to face up to modernity and social change (Ekeh, 1985: 1). Unlike the 1960s, which were characterized by great hopes in developmental expectations, the present age is one of disillusionment. From the 1990s in particular, it has been sadly agreed that development in Africa has broken down, its theory is now, more than before, a politicized and hegemonized discourse, while its ideology is in a serious crisis of controversy. Hence, the advocacy for more nuanced political analyses of these crises (Amin, 1990: 3).

With such diverse and cruel spread, questions have been asked: What went wrong, why and how? Is it possible to locate the roots of these crises? By what handle shall we lay a firm grip on them and in what manner? Through which methodological and theoretical approaches can we assure ourselves that we actually understand these crises? Are they crises of the state? Or are they products of other experiences, which are external to the state in Africa? How are they connected to other problematic historical experiences? How have they been accounted for by scholars and solved by experts in the past? Who is to blame? What can be done? And how can Africa re-discover itself? How relevant or escapist, is the sustained reference to the colonial past and character of the state as an explanation for the current problems—such as the unequal development, poverty,

underdevelopment and marginalization—ravaging the continent? These questions have informed several efforts in critical thinking, intellectual renewal and a proper re-definition of Africanity based on well-defined interests, positions and standards (Ekeh 1985 and Momoh 1999).

Some have blamed the African crises on the nature and character of the state (Ake 1985a and 1985b, Amin 1991, Bayart 1993, Bayart, *et al.*, 1999). By this, reference is made to the genetic and historical defects of evolution, which emanated from the nature and patterns of the capitalist penetration of the continent through colonialism, and the specific character of the colonial state, its economy and society generally. Others have attributed them to the imperialist role and character of the world capitalist system, especially at this critical period of rapid globalization, with all its

contradictions for dependent economies in the South (Stiglitz 2002, Mkandawire 2005 and Olukoshi 2005). The crises in Africa have also been attributed to the failure to unite by member states within the continent (Nkrumah 1970); the post-Cold War abandonment syndrome; the failure of post-colonial leadership to transform the basic institutions and structures of peripheral capitalism into those of autonomous capitalist development, and the anti-revolutionary character of the nationalist struggles for independence, a factor that is held responsible, at least, for consolidating the neo-colonial character of the state and its inimical nature to democracy and development (Ayam 1990). Other arguments, which focus on the internal dynamics of the state point at the nature of petit-bourgeois politics; its excessive predisposition to primitive accumulation; neo-patrimonialism (Soest 2007) and the cake sharing psychosis of local elites as well as the distributive pressures for state power and resources, that result from such struggles (Cooper 2006). Another set of explanations focuses on the disarticulated nature of the economy, a logical consequence of the neo-colonial character of the state itself; inadequate theorizing; poor diagnosis and prognosis based largely on borrowed methodological models and theoretical paradigms; and the absence of detailed periodization in studying these crises (Copans 1977 and Amin 1981). Lastly, is the failure of International Financial Institutions, namely, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, which had promised accelerated development, resource mobilization, massive economic integration and an end to Africa's marginalization from the process of globalization through the implementation of macroeconomic stabilization and other reform policies like the structural adjustment programmes, pursued by the continent since the 1980s and 1990s, which only resulted in functional and structural contradictions of the state and society (Deng 1998, World Bank 2000 and Mkandawire 2005).

In this study, the African crises are interrogated from the point of view of the more fundamental crisis of ideas, that is, the crisis and culture of intellectual dependence and the attendant limitations of endogenous knowledge production in the continent. By these, it is meant that rigorous African analyses, perspectives and understandings, have not been deployed in explaining and resolving these crises. In other words, in Africa, a continent, which accounts for only 0.5 per cent of the world's scientific publications (Zezeza 2003), neither the Afro-centric nor the neo-Marxist interventions in the debate on the African crises have been sufficiently employed and applied (Momoh, 1999: 2). Thus, while the long-standing debate on the political economy of democracy and development in Africa has guaranteed a pride of place for Political Science as a discipline in the continent, a sore point highlighting the weakness in this pride of place, as in much of the intellectual

labour of knowledge production on the continent, is the relative lack of interest in the details of such enterprises in knowledge production. This is the major challenge, which this study engages. It addresses this weakness by examining the intellectual works of the late Claude Ake.

As this study shows, Claude Ake (1939-1996) is one of Africa's foremost political philosophers who worked extensively in the area of political theory and made original and uniquely perceptible contributions to the political economy of democracy and development in the continent. In addition, he is a major praxiological figure from whose works the real world in the continent can best be understood. His writings therefore constitute a significant entry point not just for understanding contemporary Africa, but also for rethinking globalization, modernity and other larger theoretical concerns, which are shared by post-colonial theorists throughout the world. The recurring topicality and significance of his contribution to African political thought assuredly place him in the pantheon of great African political thinkers, alongside such luminaries as Cheikh Anta Diop and Samir Amin (Martin, 1999: 4). Ake's works are particularly instructive given his successful application of the radical theory in illuminating 'the African condition' and as a guide to political action (Harris, 2005: 86). He has made penetrating contributions, which, although were unpopular in the past, are instructive points of departure today. As such, the foci of his works are bound to provoke widespread intellectual interest and attention across the world.

However, in spite of his contributions, Ake's works have not been critically examined in terms of their potentials for understanding the failings in the continent's democratic experiments and its development crisis. In particular, Ake's works are yet to be fully explored in terms of the prospects, which they offer, not just for understanding the problematic interfaces of Africa's contradictory trajectories, but also for resolving the manifestations and implications of the region's maladjusted economies, fragile politics and marginalization in an increasingly globalized world. This study takes on this task.

## **1.2 Statement of the Problem**

This study undertakes a critical assessment of Ake's intellectual works with the aim of drawing attention to vital aspects of those works that are relevant for resolving the democracy and development crises in Africa. It addresses the general question of the pitfalls, precepts, constituents and prospects of knowledge production in Africa with the specific case of a major African scholar in the area of political economy, namely, the late Claude Ake. It is not concerned with examining Ake's

contribution to the subject matter of knowledge production in Africa *per se*. It is also not concerned with the question of knowledge production in Africa alone as its central focus. Rather, knowledge production in Africa is examined as the major context for interrogating Ake's writings and also for assessing the problematic situations surrounding the state, within which democracy and development take place in the continent. Focusing closely on the themes of the state, democracy and development in Africa, this study examines Ake's contributions to the African social science and the global system of knowledge production at large. It interrogates the state in Africa, and examines the history of the idea and development of democracy in the continent. Also, it examines the specific contexts and historic roles played by different social forces in the struggles towards establishing and consolidating democratic institutions and structures in various states across the regions. It discusses the forms assumed by democratic struggles and transitions in the continent and assesses the status of African democracy vis-à-vis the operations of democracy in other parts of the world.

It problematizes 'development' as a historically produced discourse and locates the place of Africa within it. It examines the state of existing theories, historically dominant explanations, and the various schools of thought on the reasons why Africa is not developing. It also provides a detailed account of Ake's positions on the issues raised here. In doing these, the study locates Ake's contribution to the global social science enterprise in the context of an Afro-centric intellectual movement, which emerged within the international social science community from the late 1960s and early 1970s onwards (Jinadu 2004: 1-2). It turns to vital aspects of Ake's works and examines his views on governance in Africa; economic transformation through appropriate development strategies; neo-colonial dependence and the question of foreign interference; industrialization and agricultural policies across the regions (Mafeje, 1997: 79). By so doing, it establishes Ake's postulations on the possibilities of liberating the productive forces in the continent from (i) the crass opportunism and political vagrancies of the petit-bourgeoisie; (ii) the restrictions of Western imperialism and global capitalism; and (iii) the possibilities of either a socialist revolution or at best, autonomous capitalist development.

Specifically, the study answers the following questions in respect of its case study:

1. What are the biographical factors and intellectual influences that shaped Claude Ake's life and writings?

2. How does Ake aid our understanding of the role of the state in the pursuit of democracy and development in Africa?
3. Conversely, what relationship, if any, exists between the struggle for democracy and development in Africa, and the constitution of the state in the works of Claude Ake?
4. Why is it important to study the African crises from the point of view of Ake's intellectual writings? And, what specific options and alternative pathways does Ake offer out of Africa's current crises?
5. How relevant are the questions of political integration and the forging of nationhood in grasping the ramifications of the African crises? And, what insights are offered for the production of intellectual knowledge in Africa by the continent's intelligentsia, following the example of Claude Ake's works?

### **1.3 Objectives of the Study**

The general objective of this study is to examine the precepts, nature, pitfalls and prospects for knowledge production by African intellectuals with the specific case of an African social scientist. Specifically, the study aims:

1. To examine the factors such as biographical and environmental influences, macro-level politics, developments and changes across the global industry of knowledge production, which shaped Ake's career, scholarship and writings.
2. To examine the extent to which Ake's works further our understanding of the role of the state in the pursuit of democracy and development in Africa.
3. To examine the relationship, if any, existing between the struggle for democracy and development in Africa and the constitution of the state in the writings of Claude Ake.
4. To examine the specific options and alternative pathways offered by Ake out of Africa's current crises.
5. To examine the insights offered for the production of intellectual knowledge in Africa by the continent's intelligentsia following the case of Claude Ake's works.

#### 1.4 Significance of the Study

Four aspects of this study are justified and accounted for. These are (i) the significance of studying the African crises, (ii) the rationale for interrogating them in relation to the state, (iii) the focus on Ake's works as the ambience for the study and (iv) the basis for presenting knowledge production in Africa as the context for studying Ake and also for interrogating the selected issues. Why is it important to study the African crises from the point of view of Ake's intellectual works? How relevant are the chosen themes of the state, democracy and development for understanding Ake's corpus and the African crises? How does the notion of knowledge production in Africa help in establishing the needed connections between the issues involved in the study? This study engages these questions.

It is part of academic practice to provide documented accounts, especially intellectual-biographical accounts of persons who, through their contributions, have impacted greatly on the world. Such contributions may be academic, intellectual or even based on class struggles. Known examples of such works include the biographical accounts written in honour and memories of revolutionary thinkers like Karl Marx, Vladimir I. Lenin, Ernesto Che Guevara and nationalist leaders like Mahatma Gandhi. In the case of Ake, given his sudden death, he was not privileged like other great philosophers, such as Karl Popper (1976), to have provided an autobiographical account of himself and his scholarship. This is added to the fact that most works on him, have so far, been hagiographic. The few exceptions to this have been Okechukwu Ibeanu (1993), Archie Mafeje (1997), Andrew Efemini (2000) and Adele Jinadu (2004) which assessed specific issues in Ake's analyses. Others have mostly been limited to a celebration of his intellectual pedigree and stature. Such works have thus been limited in their perspectives and the profundity of their analyses. As Abubakar Momoh (1999: 4) observes, most African political theorists have hardly been properly understood. Their works have often been read and critiqued, wrongly from Euro-centric, rather than Afro-centric perspectives. This limitation underscores the need for uniquely African approaches in explaining of the continent's historiography.

Two, whereas in disciplines like history, philosophy and the liberal arts, accomplished scholars on the continent like Walter Rodney, Ngugi Wa Thiong'o, thinkers like Frantz Fanon, Kwame Nkrumah as well as revolutionaries like Ruth First and Amilcar Cabral have been extensively studied, within political science, very few dissertations and theses have

been written on African political theorists generally and on Ake in particular. Yet, scholars across the world have a lot to learn not just from interrogating the accounts of past events, but also from examining the experiences and works of accomplished authorities vis-a-vis what they lived for, and their contributions to humanity through their scholarship.

In addition, from such works, we are able to understand the state and society of their time; capture and appreciate their economic and socio-political problems; and learn from the strategies and solutions with which they solved such problems. Such works also provide illuminative prisms with which the 'unlived past' is viewed through the works of such heroes. For example, by studying the biographical accounts on Mahatma Gandhi—aided with an understanding of the social history of colonial India—one understands Gandhi's aversion to violence, and his adoption of non-violent resistance, as a strategy for national liberation in India (Chandra, 1994: 79-97).

The idea of interrogating the accounts of past scholars therefore enables an appreciation their roles as parts of the social forces, which shaped the societies of their time. Through such a systematic interrogation, this study establishes Ake's role as one of Africa's organic intellectuals, who, following Marx's example, spoke the truth to power in a manner that "the criticism fears neither its own result, nor the conflict with the powers that be" (Jega, 2006: 3). Lastly, this section explains the rationale for interrogating the crises in Africa from the point of view of the state. Importantly, either because of its newness, or on account of its ill-formations, the African crises have been related to the character of the state in the continent. Understanding their dimensions and sources are therefore dependent on a detailed analysis of the functions, origins and structures of the state, especially in terms of its structural defaults, lack of autonomy and its general inability to function adequately in the multi-state system of the late twentieth century (Ake, 1985b: 3ff and Ekeh, 1985: 1-9). The relevance of the state stands, in spite of intellectual reservations to the contrary in the past. It has also been argued that the Marxist contention, that the specificity of political practice depends on its access to state power as its object (Poulantzas, 1968: 43) is clearest in its crudest form in twentieth century Africa. This makes the state central for understanding political problems and other forms of crises, especially in the Third World. These considerations make it useful examining the African crises vis-a-vis the nature and character of the state in the continent.



## 1.5 Scope of the Study

This study covers the entire works of the late Claude Ake, but its central focus is limited to a critical assessment of those aspects of his writings, which focus on how the intelligentsia in Africa, through knowledge production, can enhance the role of the state in its pursuit of democracy and development in the continent. A relevant biographical fact about Ake is that he was concerned with and wrote extensively on a number of pertinent issues on Africa. These include the problem of political integration in Africa; the nature of political structures, processes and socio-economic formations in colonial and post-colonial Africa, among others. The study is however, limited to those aspects of his works, which are compelling for an interrogation of the chosen themes of the state, democracy and development, particularly, in Africa.

Generally, his published texts include *A Theory of Political Integration* (1967), *Revolutionary Pressures in Africa* (1978), *Social Science as Imperialism: The Theory of Political Development* (1979), *A Political Economy of Africa* (1981), *A Political Economy of Nigeria* (an edited work, 1985), *Democracy and Development in Africa* (1996) and *The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa* (2000) among others. However, in interrogating his specific positions on democracy, development and the state, the study focuses closely on four of his works, namely, *A Political Economy of Africa* (1981), *A Political Economy of Nigeria* (edited work, 1985), *Democracy and Development in Africa* (1996) and *The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa* (2000). Examples and Illustrations are however drawn from his other publications.

From these works, we see the summation of his ideas and views on the specific issues noted for this study. These texts also help us periodize him in relation to his writings mainly because they define the context within which he wished to be interpreted and understood. For instance, through them one understands that Ake was concerned about, and interested in the problems of nation-building, political leadership roles, political integration, and that he subscribed to the ideas of pan-Africanism, social justice, political order and socialism in Africa. These areas and issues with which he wished to be identified were noted in determining the scope of this study. In analyzing their relevance, theoretical positions, case studies and illustrations were drawn from different sources and states across the continent. This arrangement helps us narrow the study towards explaining why Africa is not developing, from the point of view of Ake's works, with a view to resolving the impediments noted in this regard. The study also explains why most African states have not been able to sustain

the twin processes of democracy and development, according to Ake. However, it should be noted that, placing Ake in an explicitly African setting is not to suggest that, his overall concerns and interests are limited to Africa.

## **1.6 Methodology**

A combination of methods proved enriching, as all the adopted methods complemented one another in gathering and analyzing the data for this study. These are (i) philosophical analysis, particularly, the aspect on epistemological analysis, (ii) Marx's notion of analysis, namely the materialist dialectics and (iii) vital aspects of conceptual, descriptive and evaluative analyses. Also included are (iv) data generated from extensive-unstructured in-depth interviews (IDIs) conducted with a purposively selected group of 20 key informants: five each from the contemporaries, old friends, colleagues and past students of the late Claude Ake. Secondary data were obtained from Ake's original texts, published commentaries, critiques and tributes written in his honour before and after his death by his colleagues and institutional bodies. Other sources included information drawn from Ake's curriculum vitae and the texts which focused not only on the debates and issues on which Ake worked, but also the general context of scholarship in Africa which was part of his concern during his life-time. The texts were subjected to content analysis. These efforts were complemented with (v) data generated from a detailed archival search carried out in libraries across the world, to which this researcher had access. The relevance of this archival search, particularly in libraries outside Nigeria should be explained.

Importantly, access to all the published works of Claude Ake on the issues examined is a requirement for this study. Accordingly, the needed archival search was carried out, at different periods in the libraries at the University of Port Harcourt, Port Harcourt, Nigeria, and the Centre for Advanced Social Science (CASS), Port Harcourt, Nigeria. Other locations within Nigeria, where archival search was also carried out included the libraries at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), Lagos, Nigeria, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Nigeria, and the University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria.

Outside Nigeria, the locations consulted for archival search for research materials on this study included the World Headquarters of the Arab League in Giza, Cairo, Egypt; the American University, Cairo, Egypt; the University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa; the Africa Institute of South Africa (AISA), Pretoria, South Africa; the collections at the CODESRIA Documentation and Information

Centre, that is, the CODICE section of the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA), Dakar, Senegal; the Centre for Studies in Social Sciences, Calcutta (CSSSC), India and the Indian Council of Social Science Research (ICSSR), New Delhi, India.

### **1.6.1 Philosophical and Epistemological Analyses**

In epistemological analysis, the guiding principle is that complex claims to knowledge are examined and justified by reference to simpler items and aspects of evidence, typically observations, concerning which a higher degree of certainty can be reached. The classical context for epistemological analysis is the empiricist theory that all evidence is, in one way or another, perpetual evidence and that, in so far as intellectual works are undertaken, it should be possible to provide an epistemological background and analysis of them which show how they can be supported by perpetual evidence (Routledge Encyclopedia, 1998: 223-224). Epistemological analysis is a central aspect of philosophical analysis mainly because epistemology itself is an aspect of philosophy. As an analytic tool, it is usually normative, and this normativity is a crucial aspect of all properly philosophical analyses, which expectedly, elucidate the priorities within different modes of consciousness. It is therefore a method of inquiry with which one seeks to assess complex and sometimes varied systems of thought and views by analyzing and categorizing them into simpler elements whose relationships are then brought into focus and clearer relief. Applied to this study, the analysis of Ake's works is extended to take account of the general structures of his thoughts in identifying significant elements of his philosophical doctrines. As a uniquely analytical method, philosophical analysis proposes certain procedural steps and analytical approaches in the conduct of both philosophical inquiries and investigations, all of which aim at making the analysis of Ake's writings clearer.

### **1.6.2 The Materialist Dialectics**

Secondly, the study adopts Marx's notion of analysis. This is a core aspect of Marxist-Leninist political economy, namely, the materialist dialectics, which demands that relations of production and complex systems of thoughts are studied in the processes of their emergence, development, transformation and change. As noted by Buzuev and Buzuev (1986: 20):

In political economy, a specific mode of thinking is used, a method of scientist abstraction that implies the extensive use of generalised concepts, abstracting from the non-fundamental aspects of the phenomenon under study, in order to reveal and emphasise its most important aspects. The chief means of abstract thinking are

analysis and synthesis. The breakdown of the object under study into individual components and investigation of each of them as an essential part of the whole is called analysis. Analysis breaks down the phenomenon under study into its component parts. The unification of the separate components into an integral whole is called synthesis. Analysis and synthesis constitute an organic unity of the two aspects of the same process of the scientific comprehension of reality. Analysis provides the basis for synthesis, without which there can be no complete study. The application in thinking of analysis and synthesis at the same time reveals the essence of economic phenomenon and economic laws and categories.

The materialist dialectics involves the application of Marx's principle of historical specification (Korsch, 1978: 43–57). With this, Marx comprehended all things 'social' in terms of a definite historical epoch. Applied to this study, the analysis of Ake's works is here examined from two perspectives. One, the study locates vital aspects of his works and captures them within the entire trajectory and span of his life. Two, it focuses on his specific positions, views and postulations on them as borne out in his studied reflections on them over time. By so doing, one establishes the continuities and changes in Ake's positions on the issues interrogated in the study within the period of his productive sojourn and scholarship. However, in explaining the reasons underlying the continuities and changes established in Ake's positions on these issues, this study provides two solutions. One, it provides a methodologically nuanced historical sociology of Africa in the period which covered the entire span of Ake's life, his scholarship and writings. Two, it provides the biographical account of Ake-'the man', 'the scholar' and 'social scientist', and establishes the specific biographical and intellectual influences, which shaped his life, career and writings. These approaches underscore the interrelation of theory and practice as crucial elements for evaluating his writings, especially, as attempted in this work.

### **1.6.3 Conceptual, Descriptive and Evaluative Analyses**

Since this study is a work in social and political thought, it necessarily undertakes detailed conceptual, descriptive and evaluative analyses of Ake's writings. These take the form of textual and semantic analyses of key concepts. They also involve making descriptions; judgments and evaluative assessments of Ake's positions on vital aspects of his writings based largely on the researcher's understanding of those writings, especially as informed by knowledge derived from other sources. This is done in a manner that enables this researcher in establishing his own prescriptive positions on aspects the issues evaluated.

Put together, these methods help us explain the whole of Ake's works by referring to their vital parts. Also, using tools of logical analysis and deep insights gleaned from critical reflections on such works, the study explains their inferential significance through providing an account of their logical

forms. This is arrived at by identifying the presence of vital logical aspects and constants in them and also by fitting them into a general theory, that is, an appropriate epistemological discourse, which shows how to argue both for them, and also from them. In addition, the study evaluates Ake's ideas. In doing this, it inquires about how valid, insightful and convincing those ideas are. It also assesses their explanatory power, with a view to seeing if they would stand up to close scrutiny and withstand the weight of evidence that will be adduced against them. It thus evaluates the cogency and force of criticisms made of those ideas by other reviewers of Ake. Following Adele Jinadu (1980: 5), in order to ensure that intellectual and philosophical interpretations do not become a capricious affair, the questions posed by Skinner (1969: 25-27) are engaged:

What are the appropriate procedures to adopt in the attempt to arrive at an understanding of the work? Does one rely exclusively on either the text itself or the social milieu or context within which the writer is or was operating? Are these textual and contextual procedures for interpreting the work mutually exclusive? What constitutes 'understanding' in the circumstances?

In response to these questions, two broad strategies are employed in interpreting Ake, and also in assigning meanings to his works. First, the study relies on autobiographical and biographical facts about him. Second, it relies on empathy and the researcher's intuitive judgment (Cioffi, 1964: 83-106). These are carefully undertaken since the selection of biographical considerations in the interpretation of intellectual texts could be quite tasking.

## **1.7 Conceptual Clarifications and Specifications**

This section explains some of the key concepts around which this study is built. Such concepts include 'the state'; 'democracy'; 'development'; 'knowledge production'; 'African intellectuals', or 'the intelligentsia in Africa', and 'the African crises'. Other concepts, which may be deemed necessary for clarification, shall be introduced and explained in other chapters and sections of the study. The idea of defining these concepts and of relating them to Africa is to enable us establish the relevance of Ake's positions on Africa as a continent within the global system, and therefore capture his specific recommendations to the social problems confronting the continent.

### **1.7.1 The State**

Generally, an understanding of the state is very central to the grasp of nineteenth and twentieth centuries political thought and practice. This fact underscores its intellectual re-discovery by political scientists, especially from the Marxist perspective. Statehood not only

represents a body of institutions but also a set of attitudes, practices and codes of behaviour, which we concretely associate with civilization. Aside being a complex concept, it is also an everyday reality, which we cannot afford to ignore (Vincent, 1987: 1-3 and Jalee, 1977: 90-99). At a broader level, the state is that domain within society squarely responsible for wielding public power. It is the nexus within which all human activities take place and therefore 'the all-permeating agency' for maintaining and preserving order. Beginning with Georg F. W. Hegel (1770-1831), the state is the human representation of order and one to which there should be no limits to the exercise of its authority. Being the central organ through which 'the good life' is assured, it constitutes the existence and reality of social authority, an objective arbiter among men, and the strongest expression of 'the public will'. It is therefore 'the single most powerful', 'continuously authoritative', and 'most inclusive' organization in the history of mankind. As a social phenomenon, it first appeared several thousand years ago. While several theories have been advanced to account for its origins and subsequent developments, the major thrusts of such efforts have however, been based on a lack of agreement about what a state is, what it does, why or how it develops, and what utility, if any, it has for its members. This in turn, stimulates the cacophony of academic voices on the state across various intellectual traditions.

Typically, bourgeois political metaphysics traces the origin of the state to the social contract espoused by Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) and presents the state as emerging from a contract by members of a society who submit their collective will, freedom and territory to it, thus allowing it command all such resources and institutions as are necessary for its purposes and operations. Vital among such institutions are the bureaucracy, the judiciary, the media, a well-established system of taxation and the monopoly of force. In return, the state assures its members of protection, security and other services needed for their collective welfare (Ekekwe, 1986: 10). In the context of this social contract, the need for the state arises from the contention that man without the state is 'a beast', especially given Thomas Hobbes' observation that life outside the state is 'solitary', 'brutish' and 'short'. However, the real questions about the state relate mainly not to its history, emergence or its capacity to protect, but to the exercise of its power, its class partisan or otherwise role, and consequently, the justifications for its continued existence. In fact, according to Eme Ekekwe (1986: 10), the state's role in maintaining order is agreed upon even by persons with different ideological

perspectives. What rather excite some debates are the questions regarding how, and in whose interest the state imposes order.

An understanding of the state is therefore, not only relevant to the subject matter of political theory, but also appreciating the issues raised in this study. In relating an understanding of the state to this study, one considers the specifics of different theoretical illustrations as they help us capture the dynamics of the state across the world. Applied to Africa, attention is focused on the historical processes of state formation, its peculiarities and differences from other developed capitalist states in Europe and North America as well as its place in the global system.

As the study illustrates, two vital processes shaped the evolution of the state in Africa, especially in its relation to society. The first involved the dissolution of pre-colonial states and other forms of non-state political entities, which had developed, *sui generis*, out of purely indigenous conditions, and their subsequent incorporation into an expanded system of colonization (Ekeh 1985). This was achieved largely through military conquest and political dissolution, which involved in most cases, open acts of conquest and violence, especially the degradation and humiliation of important kings, some of whom were killed, sent on exile or even reduced to chiefs, servants and slaves. With this, Africa lost its historical advantage of inherited traditions of governance and was bequeathed the crisis of legitimacy, the legitimation and institutionalization of violence as integral aspects of nationhood. The second process involved the selection of aspects of the imperial states, their engraftment and importation into the colonial states (Ekeh, 1983: 17-19) such that the colonial state, which essential characteristics have survived unto the present times, consisted of significant elements of the imperial state. This state was built on the notion of government based, neither on authority, nor on popular power in the democratic sense of shared participation by many citizens, but on violent imposition. According to Peter P. Ekeh (1985: 9):

These elements of the state were already well developed in capitalist Europe in the age of imperialism and at the time models of the European state were paralysed out of Africa (sic). In importing this ready-made model of the state to the colonies, European colonial administrators emphasized those aspects that specialized in coercion and dropped those that would act as societal brake on the powers of the colonial state (sic). In addition, and given the limitations of administering personnel and other exigencies of colonialism, a major characteristic of the colonial state is that the imported elements lacked their usual autonomy of existence by which they were identified in their metropolitan habitat. On the contrary, those elements tended to be fused together in a manner that lacked differentiation and what was reminiscent of the social organisation of pre-modern Europe. The elements of the European state that featured prominently in this export, but which were fused together in related institutions in

the colonial setting, were mainly the instruments of violence and coercion. These were first and foremost (a) the military and the police; (b) the judiciary and (c) the bureaucracy. Parliamentary assemblies were only added to the state apparatus in a advisory capacity in the twilight of colonial history. The evolution of government, as separate from the bureaucracy and the coercive forces of the state, was hardly achieved during the colonial era (sic).

These issues will be elaborated further in the study. However, following Peter P. Ekeh (1985: 1-9), the point that is emphasized here on the state in Africa, is meant to draw attention to the fact that, its character and context of evolution, and the peculiar circumstances of its social organizations are indeed, true expressions of the nature of the colonial society in Africa. State action, together with its decisions and policies, in the colonial and post-colonial periods, are therefore, fundamentally constrained by the colonial institutional settings and structures.

### **1.7.2 Democracy**

There are presently many contending notions of democracy in the literature. As Attahiru Jega (2006) observes, so serious is the conceptual disarray that more than 550 sub-types of democracy are identifiable. There are also very broad distinctions within its types, such as 'formal', 'minimal' and 'substantive democracy', or even between a more 'minimalist' and a 'maximalist' definition (Chan, 2002: 10). According to Jega (2006: 6-7):

The development of a democracy is a long and certainly incomplete struggle to do three closely related things, (i) to check arbitrary rulers, (ii) to replace arbitrary rules with just and rational ones and (iii) to obtain a share for the underlying population in the making of rules.

Chan (2002: 10) provides a 'minimalist' definition of democracy, based among others, on 'the participation of all adult members of a society', 'the freedom to formulate and advocate political alternatives', and 'the credible availability of such alternatives'. He presents the 'minimal' as a necessary condition for the 'maximal'. According to him, to achieve a more 'substantive' democracy, developing countries first need to develop a more 'minimalist' democracy and that since this minimal condition for democratic rule still presents difficulties for many countries, a more exhaustive set of criteria could only make the issue of democratization in these countries merely academic. There is hardly any country that makes statements denying being a government of the people. This is mainly because democracy is a universal concept for which there is no agreement on the uniformity of its meaning. As a form of rule, it has manifested itself in different forms, beginning with ancient communities, village societies and organizations. It has been used to signify almost all forms of government. This includes a form of government directly carried out by the citizens, and



one carried out by elected representatives. It has also been used to signify a form of government dominated restrictedly by social arms of the populations, like the rule of the proletariat or the middle class. Yet, the socio-cultural, economic and institutional contexts of individual states are so different that it must be clearly defined according to their peculiarities.

Applied to Africa, Rwekaza Mukandala (2001: 2) draws attention to two widely contested tales of democracy in the continent. One is 'popular democracy', which is as old as the continent, and embodies the record of struggles by the people for 'liberation', 'popular sovereignty' and 'genuine independence'. The other, which is younger, more recent and less than a century old, is the tale of 'liberal democracy'. Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja (1997: 11-15) conceptualizes democracy as a political concept founded on the ideas of 'value', 'process' and 'practice'. As 'a moral value', he sees it as a basic need, a necessity for establishing the human worth and therefore a political demand of all freedom-loving peoples throughout the world. More concretely, it symbolizes a permanent aspiration by man for freedom, an enhanced social and political order that is more humane, egalitarian, that establishes his or her quest for economically improved material conditions and political freedom. In this sense, democracy is both a moral value and a means towards realizing certain cherished ends, which are vital for preserving man's rights to life, dignity and security. Seen as 'a social process', it presupposes the continuous promotion of equal access to fundamental human rights and civil liberties for all. These include (i) the fundamental rights of the human person to life and security, (ii) freedom of assembly, association, expression, press and religion, (iii) cultural, economic and social rights as well as (iv) the rights of people, including the inalienable right to self-determination. In this sense, democracy symbolizes that social process through which people struggle towards expanding their rights and effectively establish a state system that not only defends such rights but also satisfies their material and spiritual needs. As 'a political practice', democracy is about a form of rule and a specific manner in which power is organized and exercised in accordance with certain universal norms and principles. The articulation of these takes place both at the level of the principles themselves, as well as at the level of the institutions and procedures of government, which are compatible with democratic practice. Nzongola-Ntalaja (1997: 13-15) identifies some of the most frequently mentioned universal principles of democratic governance as including:

1. The idea that legitimate power or authority emanates from the people, who exercise it either directly through popular assemblies (e.g. the African Palaver), or by delegation through elected assemblies, elected executives, or some other mode of representation...

2. The concept of rule of law ("Etat de droit" in French), which means that power should not be arbitrary, and that its exercise must be circumscribed by a set of rules with respect to its limits and mode of operation.

3. The principle that rulers are chosen by and are accountable to the people. The element of choice implies that democracy is government by the consent of the governed, who must approve not only the rules, by which they are administered, but also the rulers themselves, as well as the policies the latter will implement. Here is where the notion of accountability comes in: that rulers are accountable to the people for their acts.

4. The right of citizens to participate in the management of public affairs through free, transparent and democratic elections; through decentralized, governmental structures; and through nongovernmental organizations (NGOS). This implies the right to organize freely, political and trade union pluralism, and the independence of the organizations of civil society from the state.

5. Finally, the right of people to change a government that no longer serves their interests, or the right to revolution. The second notion associated with the concept of democracy as a political practice is the existence of institutions and procedures, which are compatible with democratic principles. Hence, democracy cannot be viable without free and fair elections, representative government, an independent judiciary, a vibrant civil society and a genuinely free press.

In this regard, S. P. Gueye (1997: 31) contends that:

The existence of a pluralist parliament working according to democratic procedures; the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers; the existence of laws guaranteeing fundamental freedoms of opinion and associations, as well as the right of man; equality of all before the law; and the principle of political alternation, which presupposes the organization of free and transparent elections—in brief all that is included in the concept of 'a state of law'—constitute the conditions without which any talk about democracy is an abuse of language.

Associated with 'democracy' are the concepts of 'democratization', 'democratic consolidation', and 'governance'. Attahiru Jega (2006: 7-8) describes 'democratization' as:

... a concept distinct from democracy and connotes the process of bringing about democracy: institutionally and attitudinally. It is the ways and means of developing democracy, and entrenching democratic institutions, values and practices over time. It is, additionally, the process by which governance is constitutionally driven, and which may lead to democratic consolidation.

Continuing, Attahiru M. Jega (2006: 7-8) describes 'democratic consolidation' as:

... a term, which describes 'a vital political goal for new democracies'. For countries in transition to democracy from authoritarian rule, it is a discernible process by which rules, institutions and constraints of democracy come to constitute 'the only game in town', the only legitimate framework for seeking and exercising power. It consists of 'overlapping behavioral, attitudinal and constitutional dimensions', through which 'democracy becomes routinized and deeply internalized in social, institutional, and even psychological life, as well as in political calculations for achieving success'.

Lastly, 'governance', especially in the democratic context, is all about the mechanisms wherewith an institution, in this case, 'the state', incorporates the participation of relevant interest groups and

competing segments in defining the scope and content of its operations. This includes its capacity to mediate among these interests, especially when they enter into conflict, and the means, with which it demonstrates to those who support it through its mission mandate and the application of its resources in pursuit of these goals (Saint, 1992: 71 and Gana, 1995: 6). The key words being 'popular participation' and 'accountability' are unfortunately, lacking at all levels of governance in most of Africa. Referring copiously to the colonial past as the historic source of this problem, Kayode Soremekun (2000: 271) notes that:

The argument here is that colonial rule did not promote the values associated with good governance in Africa. Despite the fact that the main colonial powers in Africa were themselves democratic countries, the institutions they created were first and foremost instruments of domination. Established to provide the means of control over vast areas containing disparate populations, they stressed functional utility, law, and order—but not participation and reciprocity. The colonial state also exemplified Western concepts of sovereignty and territoriality at the expense of notions like nationality and legitimacy. Within this highly authoritarian structure, connections between rulers and the ruled were strictly vertical; the definition of government lacked a popular component. Access to the colonial order was generally blocked and removed from the security of the people it purported to govern. A remote, bureaucratic, and patrimonial form of politics emerged under a state, which violated as a matter of routine the values of the normative dimension of governance.

Kayode Soremekun (2000: 271) avers that the pre-colonial experience in Africa suggested otherwise:

Naomi Chazan (1991) shed much light on quality (sic) of government in pre-colonial Africa when she asserted that despite the diversity of African politics, prior to the imposition of colonial rule, several democratic strands were discernible in most traditional political formations on the continent. The first, according to her, was the principle of public involvement in decision making. In segmentary societies, such as the Kikuyu of East Africa as well as the Tiv and Igbo in present day Nigeria, adults participated in an almost Athenian fashion in the planning and implementation of communal affairs and in the adjudication of disputes. In more complex societies, she reveals, notions of representation were deeply embedded. Youths, traders, artisans, religious leaders, and heads of kin groups had their own delegates in ruling councils. Ashanti (West Africa) and Buganda (East Africa) furnish excellent case studies in this respect. Even in some highly centralized states, consultation was the norm and the great empires of the Western Sudan (Mali and Songhai for example) practiced a form of indirect rule, which allowed for a considerable amount of local autonomy. Values of participation, representation, and involvement (all indices of governance) were evident in a multiplicity of political settings. Closely allied to indigenous provisions for popular inclusion were notions of consensus. Decisions in many areas were arrived at through lengthy debates whose purpose was to blur opposites, to find the middle road, and thereby to ensure compliance. The rules of the political game among the Igbo and the Tswana, for instance, put a premium on compromise. At the same time, emphasis was placed on discussion (frequently termed palaver) and the public airing of different positions. Debate was an essential feature of the practice of politics in much of pre-colonial Africa.

In another account, Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo (2005: X) describes the critical questions of democracy in contemporary Africa as including:

Who wins or loses the presidential, legislative, local, regional and national elections ...? What factors and conditions influence the electoral decisions, the behaviour of the candidates and the process of producing the electoral officials? What are the social significance and policy implications of the elections for the majority of the African people? Do democracy and democratic process matter, as

currently practised by the African state structures and people, and are they reflected in the economic, social and cultural conditions of the African struggle for progress?

In answering these questions, this study draws attention to the experiences and practices of democracy in the continent; the actual values that they represent in the different cases; the meanings and implications which they suggest for the policy arena; as well as their prospects for enhancing economic and social progress for the people (Lumumba-Kasongo, 2005: X).

### **1.7.3 Development**

Here, reference is made to 'economic development'. The study analyses the conditions and prospects for autonomous capitalist development in Africa, as distinct from other forms of development. In its relation to democracy, it seeks answers to vital considerations on the political determinants and correlates of economic growth and development in the regions. Its understanding of economic development consists of high rates of economic growth and the achievement of higher levels of human resource development suggested by the United Nations' Human Development Report (2006). It is also a class-based project, defined largely, in terms of space, time and contingent on specific social epochs as well as defined goals. These notions are also linked to Dudley Seers' (1979) conceptualization of development.

Andrew Efemini (2000: 1) defines development as the qualitative improvement in the material conditions, emotional and spiritual aspects of humankind. Following Seers (1979), this study draws attention to the changes taking place in the 'Gross Domestic Products', 'poverty', 'inequality', 'unemployment', 'health' and 'education', as well as 'gender discrimination'. These are certainly important determinants of whether or not a country is developed, or developing. Applied to Africa, we define 'sustainable development' in terms of the continent's capacity for absorbing global changes, while also seeking to institutionalize development programmes and initiatives that are determined by local needs and, which respond to questions of long-term considerations, strategies and initiatives, which are people-centred, rather than merely catering for the interests of global capital (AAPS, 2004: 1). As will be shown in the study, the dimmed prospects of development together with the entrenched poverty traps in Africa do not only correspond to Samir Amin's (1990: 1-28) characterization of '*maldevelopment*' in the regions, they are also products of the perpetual dependence on the world market and the lack of indigenous knowledge and control over the

region's natural and human resources, especially in terms of meeting the requirements of development at home.

#### **1.7.4 Knowledge Production in Africa**

The notion of 'knowledge production' here is extended beyond the restricted definition of generating or producing, appropriating and disseminating knowledge in the abstract sense of the word. It includes other vital considerations associated with the realization of self-definition in the pursuit of Africa-based solutions within the global system of knowledge production (Oladipo, 1995: 26). In particular, it emphasizes the question of endogeneity and raises issues at the intersection of old and emerging paradigms. It therefore contributes towards advancing new trends in the African social science community. These are done by addressing vital questions which emerge while forging a locally-sensitive and situation-specific social science scholarship. What does 'Africanity' symbolize? What does it mean to be 'African' in contemporary Africa? And, what is 'African' in African scholarship? What is the relationship between the 'local' and the 'global' in knowledge production in our context? What are the implications of Africa's multiple heritages for the epistemic dimensions of knowledge production in the continent? And, what relationship exists between scholarship and policymaking, between scholars and policy makers, between research and continental priority concerns? What is the history of Africa's dependence in knowledge production? And, how has it undermined its collective efforts for solving other larger problems in the regions? These are some of the questions, which the study engages in relation to knowledge production in Africa.

#### **1.7.5 The Intelligentsia in Africa, or African Intellectuals**

Studies on the intelligentsia in Africa are many. However, this study borrows largely from the positions of Mahmood Mamdani (1990), Ali A. Mazrui (2005) and Thandika Mkandawire (2005) in explaining their role, not just in the known area of knowledge production, but also as vanguards of social change in the society. A proper definition of the intelligentsia as a social category must therefore focus on the intellectual genealogy, intellectual and institutional contexts within which the social sciences have been developed

in Africa, particularly given the turbulent climate which each generation of African intellectuals has lived through (Mkandawire, 2005: 1).

Conceptually, intellectuals are members of the petit-bourgeois class within the modern bourgeois society. It represents that social class, which occupies the intermediate position between the bourgeoisie and proletariat under capitalism. It comprises the category of small manufacturers, shopkeepers, artisans, 'intellectuals' and those in the distributive sector. Mamdani (1990: 2) defines it as a broad and heterogeneous grouping whose social origin lies in the split between manual and mental labour, especially in class-divided societies. It is also that social category which work combines at once mental conceptions and organization of social processes and their theoretical explanation and application in society. It is the sub-class, or intra-class category of the petty-bourgeoisie under capitalism that is simultaneously technical and ideological, which technical specialization and ideological orientations give rise to material and ideological distinctions amongst the various ranks and categories of the intellectuals. As members of society in custody of knowledge, they develop not only a technical specialization but also 'points of view', which are shaped by, and which in turn shape the nature of struggles in society. According to Mamdani (1990: 2):

It is both through their capacity to develop a material and social space autonomous of the political power, and through their point of view, that intellectuals become "organic" to one or another broad social group. Thus the need to anchor the analysis of the intelligentsia in concrete historical and social processes.

Mkandawire (2005: 1) defines intellectual work as 'the labour of the mind and soul', and describes 'intellectuals' as persons who have played a major role in shaping 'passions', 'ideologies' and 'societal visions'. He explains the connections between these elements by illustrating the relationships between 'African intellectuals', 'pan-Africanism' and 'nationalism', relationships, which he describes as both 'fraught' and 'symbiotic'. As he puts it, "while pan-Africanism is the context within which African nations have been imagined, nationalism informs the radical context and basis for intellectuality in the continent". To him, African intellectuals have impacted significantly on these whole processes by explaining and reconstructing the past, interpreting the present and mapping out visions of the future. For Paul Baran (1962) cited in Momoh (1999: 55), the primary condition for being an intellectual

is the ability to tell 'the truth' even if the truth harms your interest. However, as Momoh (1999: 55) later surmises:

The so-called objectivity and value-free claims of modern social science only allow for ideological obfuscation of class struggle, hegemony and domination. A scholar with a sense of social responsibility cannot accept these positions... telling the truth is a moral issue and every class has its own morality. As Engels rightly submits, "men (sic), consciously or unconsciously, derive their ethical ideas in the last resort from the practical relations on which their class position is based...."

More concretely, Ali A. Mazrui (2005: 56-77) defines the intellectual as "a person who has the capacity to be fascinated by ideas and has acquired the skill to handle many of them effectively". According to Mazrui (2005: 56):

We can imagine intellectualism without pan-Africanism, but we cannot envisage pan-Africanism without the intellectualization of the African condition. It is not a historical accident that the founding fathers of the pan-Africanist movement were disproportionately intellectuals--W. E. B. Dubois, Kwame Nkrumah, George Padmore, Leopold Senghor and others.

Ali A. Mazrui (2005: 56-77) argues that intellectual endeavours on the continent have attained their full meaning and relevance mainly through the grounding of African intellectuals in the pan-African political projects and have become valorized through the actions of other social actors. Hence the world-views, the rise and dissipations of social movements which all have enormous implications for intellectual work across the regions.

#### **1.7.6 The African Crisis**

The concept of 'crisis' as used in this study is not intended to imply situations of 'total or permanent' breakdown of the socio-political order in Africa. Rather, it is meant to draw attention to its imminence. The study adopts Claude Ake's (1988: 488-491) illustrations in capturing the nature, character and dimensions of the crises in Africa. According to Ake (1988: 488):

From the 1960s on there was a downturn and eventually deep crisis, particularly in Africa. The growth rate in the manufacturing sector which was 8.5 per cent in 1960 - 5 had declined to 3.6 per cent in 1980 - 1 and then came down to 0.4 per cent in 1982 - 3. The growth rate of the mining sector which was 18.5 per cent in 1960 - 5 had fallen to -13.2 per cent in 1981 - 2 and then to -24.6 per cent in 1982 - 3. Agriculture declined from a growth rate of 1.4 per cent in 1960 - 5 to 0.4 per cent in 1982 - 3 (OAU, 1987, p. 3). Even in the period 1971-80 when agricultural production was growing at an average annual rate of 1.6 per cent the rate for developing countries as a whole was 3 per cent. In the food sector, the growth rate declined from 1.6 per cent for the period 1960 - 5 to 0.2 per cent for 1982 - 3. In the 1970s when the annual growth rate was 2.8 per cent, that of food production was only 1.5 per cent. Food self-sufficiency dropped from 98 per cent in the 1960s to 86 per cent in 1980. Food self-sufficiency ratios declined further in the period 1980 to 1984 as population grew at 2.9 per cent while food production increased at the rate of 1 per cent (OAU, 1986).

The crisis has been deepened by declining commodity prices and growing debts. A UNCTAD composite index of principal commodities indicates a drop of 24 per cent (1979 - 81 = 100) in dollar and SDR values (UNCTAD, 1983). The prices of Africa's commodities are at their lowest for about 50 years. In 1986, export revenue was \$ 45 million, down from \$ 64 million, or a 29 per cent drop from 1985. Africa's economic crisis has been compounded by a crippling debt burden. The Organisation of African Unity has estimated that between 1974 and 1985, Africa's total external debt, including short-term debt and the stock of accumulated arrears grew more than seven-fold to reach over \$ 175 billion in 1985.

The capacity to service this debt is ever diminishing: the gap between debt-servicing capacity on the one hand, and servicing obligations on the other, has approached the 50 per cent mark in many countries and if total debt-servicing obligations (including arrears) are taken into account, this ratio would exceed 100 per cent in many countries and would reach unbearable levels for some (OAU, 1986).

The burden of debt has exacerbated another feature of the crisis, namely capital outflows from Africa. The estimated net capital outflow for 1986 was over \$ 30 billion. In the last two decades the general picture of Africa has been a continent underfed or starving, staggering under the burden of impossible debt obligations and quite unable to generate any momentum for sustained growth.

The relevance of Africa's development efforts in the light of these crisis indications is therefore, a particularly important question. These are elaborated shortly in the thesis.

## **1.8 The Outline of Chapters**

This study comprises six chapters. Chapter One provides the introduction and background to the study. It also provides the methodology, research objectives and scope of the study, among others. Chapter Two is titled, 'Claude Ake: A Biography and Theoretical Orientations'. It examines the biographical factors and intellectual developments, which shaped Ake's life, his career, early influences and his scholarship. Other factors examined include the impact of collegial and environmental influences, macro-level politics, developments and changes across the global industry of knowledge production on his scholarship. In addition, the chapter examines the social origins of Ake's ideas, their gestation processes and the specific contexts within which they developed and changed. It captures the strands of ideological movements, which informed his scholarship and the development of his worldview. Chapter Three is titled, 'Claude Ake on the Travails of the State, Democracy and Development in Africa'. Among others, this chapter interrogates Ake's characterization of the state in Africa, his views on the marginalization of the continent, his analyses of the obstacles to development and his contributions on the problems and prospects of democracy in the region.

However, given his works on the place and role of knowledge, particularly social science knowledge in these connections, the chapter also captures Ake's key postulations, not only on



the social sciences in Africa, but also on the question of development in the continent. The chapter therefore, examines the relevance of the social sciences in Africa on the one hand, and the relevance of knowledge derived from critically studying the social sciences on the other hand, in fostering democracy and development in the continent, on the other hand. Chapter Four is on 'Ake's Contributions: A Critical Discourse'. This chapter provides a critique of Ake's works based on a detailed review of what others have written concerning him, particularly, his views and works generally. Based on the reviews and assessments done on the works of Claude Ake, the chapter evaluates the relevance of Ake's positions on the chosen themes of the state, democracy and development in Africa. Through a systematic examination of such works, the study explores the possibilities of relating them to an understanding of Ake's conclusions and key positions. The intention in this chapter is to reconcile the divergent positions on Ake's works with the aim of developing a symmetrical model towards explaining the issues noted for analysis. Chapter Five examines 'The Legacy of Claude Ake'. The aim here is to establish the specific relevance of studying Ake's works. The chapter establishes core areas within the African social science and the world at large, which have been positively affected by Ake's involvement and contributions to knowledge production. Examples of such areas include 'international institution-building, 'research networks', and 'objective activism'. Another aspect of his relevance which the chapter discusses is his advocacy on the need for us to put social science knowledge in the services of peace and human development, based on the pursuit of a systematic study of the conditions for peace and development, and through the elimination of all physical constraints and manifestations of violence.

Lastly, Chapter Six is titled, 'The State, Democracy and Development in Africa: A Conclusion Beyond Claude Ake'. This chapter puts across a number of findings, both empirical and philosophical, which are generated in the study. It summarizes the major positions and findings on Ake and the researcher's assessment of these findings. The chapter resonates some of the issues discussed in Ake's analyses and highlights their implications for policy, theory and practice. It concludes by offering recommendations and possible pathways to the future.

## CHAPTER TWO

### CLAUDE AKE: A BIOGRAPHY AND THEORETICAL ORIENTATIONS

#### 2.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a genealogical account of the life, career and scholarship of the late Claude Ake. It traces the historical experiences and factors, which shaped his worldview, personality and writings. It captures the issues and developments, which influenced different periods and aspects of his thoughts, his contributions to African political thought and the African social science in particular. The aim is to explain the details, contexts and implications of his paradigm shifts and other contentious issues noted in his writings. The chapter also provides the account of Ake's theoretical orientations in the known areas of political behaviour and the political economy approach, and his involvement in national and international institution-building (Sawyer, 1997: 41-43). These are done by establishing his role in professional associations like the Nigerian Political Science Association (NPSA), the African Association of Political Science (AAPS), the International Political Science Association (IPSA), the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA), and research institutions like the Centre for Advanced Social Science (CASS), the National Universities Commission (NUC), the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), the Sage Series on Modernization and Development in Africa, the Brookings Institution, and the United Nations University-World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER). Other issues and areas of his life, which are examined, include his involvement in public service and politics at the national level, his involvement in the Niger Delta struggle against marginalization and underdevelopment, and his subsequent resignation from the Niger Delta Environmental Survey (NDES).

In doing this, the study relied on data generated from both primary and secondary sources. Primary data took the form of extensive-unstructured in-depth interviews (IDIs) conducted with a purposively selected group of 20 key informants: five each from the contemporaries, old friends, colleagues and past students of the late Claude Ake. Secondary data were obtained from Ake's original texts, published commentaries, critiques and tributes written in his honour before and after his death by his colleagues and institutional bodies. Other sources included information drawn from Ake's curriculum vitae and the texts which focused not only on the debates and issues on which Ake

worked, but also the general context of scholarship in Africa during his life-time. These texts were subjected to content analysis. Of particular relevance were those texts, which explain the context of scholarship among 'progressive opinion' at the University of Dar es Salaam, in Tanzania, and other developments, which characterized the period of Ake's paradigm shift. According to Dani Wadada Nabudere (1978: VI):

These developments...remain a testimony to the vibrant intellectual atmosphere that has characterised the University of Dar-es-Salaam over the last few years, despite various reactionary efforts to stifle it, and to the democratic sentiments of the people of Tanzania and in particular the very enlightened leadership of Mwalimu Nyerere, despite the imperialist domination of the country which tends to negate democracy in general.

Particular attention is also paid to the Cold War era, during which radical scholarship and critical Marxist perspectives were quite popular, and indeed influenced many scholars across Africa and the Third World. Other factors and issues also examined are the impact of the collegiate spirit and peer influences, especially Ake's interactions with scholars like Walter Rodney, Abdulrahman M. Babu, Dani W. Nabudere, his access to the works of Frantz Fanon and the impact of the great debate at the University of Dar es Salaam, in Tanzania. To all these is added an examination of the social history of Africa, using a neo-Marxist approach. This is done by interrogating the historical sociology, not historicism, of Africa.

In historicizing Africa, the study avoids particularistic or reductionist approaches which limit analyses to one moment or trajectory, but focuses on the entire historical span of the continent and the periods both pre-dating and ante-dating the emergence and development of nation-states in the regions. It theorizes the whole of Ake's life and scholarship as a lived essentialism. As Abubakar Momoh (2002: 25) puts it, this is necessary mainly because moments and aspects of a scholar's life may throw up features and developments that could make primary determinants of her/his consciousness assume the form of secondary determinants of her/his scholarship and vice versa. It is therefore, methodologically incorrect and theoretically mistaken for anyone to use specific aspects and manifestations of Ake's life to generalize about the total character of his scholarship. Rather, the forms, contexts and contents of those manifestations should be critically interrogated, analyzed and explained by focusing on the details of his entire trajectory and life-time sojourn. As will be shown shortly, it is necessary to examine Ake's biographical and intellectual accounts, and historicize him in relation to the complex social history of Africa for a number of reasons. One, Ake's shift from '*homo rectus*' to '*homo sapien*' is not properly accounted for, unless we critically interrogate and analyze his life, scholarship and career in relation to the material conditions and

social processes, which facilitated the transformations noted therein. According to Momoh (1999: 142), this is because:

All theoretical discourses have an explanatory structure; and all explanatory structures have ontology and a domain of evidence. Social ontologies are primary structured sets of kinds of entity in terms of which explanations regarding society are given in discourses on society.

Two, establishing such vital connections helps one to show that, far from being abstract, Ake's scholarship, positions and experiences are products of the material world in which he lived and concerning which he wrote. In other words, just like those of other scholars, Ake's theoretical positions were socially developed and historically constituted in Africa. This suggests that the consciousness of men cannot be 'independently' understood and entirely abstracted from the specific social contexts and experiences within which they were developed. Consciousness therefore includes fundamental aspects of criticality, which is indomitable, and is also not mechanically determinable. Hence, the twin concepts of 'engagement' and 'relevance', which help us in appreciating the concept of socialization in relation to Ake, and by which reference is made to the material conditions within which his actions and thoughts were conceived and given expression.

This also suggests the need to critically interrogate and problematize Ake's works in relation to his specific context and social milieu. Doing these will reveal that Ake's works did not and were not developed in a vacuum. Neither did they arise independent of the complex realities, which informed his thoughts and concerning which he wrote. In fact, those ideas make sense only when juxtaposed with, rather than separated or isolated from the complex interactions of social forces and the mode of production of his time.

Three, through such an approach, one is able to appreciate his '*praxis*' of knowledge production in Africa and thus overcome the temptation of vainly condemning or glorifying either his paradigm shift or contributions to different areas and aspects of the African social science, without properly understanding the context of such contributions, especially the specific social history that gave rise and meaning to them. These considerations therefore make the examination of Ake's life and works in the context of the African experience and condition '*sui generis*'. As Momoh (1999: 144) argues:

The project of social transformation of society is the cardinal prerogative of classes and social forces. It is only a materialist interpretation of history that permits a thorough understanding of the role of such forces in history. It should be noted that the social consciousness of individuals, class or social forces is ineffective if it has no organisational platform/context. The organisation gives direction to such consciousness and its ideas. And within an organisation the ideas and consciousness of

individuals, class and social forces are shaped and reshaped in a dialectical manner. In this way, the ideas of the organisation are also shaped and reshaped.

From yet another perspective, Ake's ideas on African politics and the summation of his scholarship and experiences are expressions of the struggles of the African people as a collectivized social force. To deny the historical significance of such struggles is to abstract Ake, not only from his historical context, but also to undermine the struggles themselves, which informed his entire development.

The chapter therefore explains Ake's intellectual biography, not as an independent episteme but locates it within the complex interplay of different social forces, and the entire social structure in Africa as an organic whole. Two positions emerge from these exercises, which underscore the central argument of this chapter. One, theories, as a peculiar genre of writings in the social sciences are special forms of discourses based mainly on imagined categories, objectified realities and established relations, which are grounded in the experiences and mindsets of both the theorists themselves and the society or environment in which they are based. They are products of the literary imaginations of men and therefore must be critically engaged, scrutinized and problematized in terms of their boundaries, which are also constrained by the institutional parameters that inform and limit such thinking. According to Chun (2005: 529):

Theory, by any definition of it, has always been born out of social reality. Its content and forms have always been to some extent derived from attempts to codify experience. Its internal structures simulate if not recreate epistemic paradigms from a realm of possibilities already defined by its specialized community of practitioners (communicative producers and consumers). What the social sciences generally recognize as classical social theory (Marx, Weber, Durkheim, among others) began in fact as systematic attempts to critically assess the nature of the social experiences that dominated the world in which they lived, namely capitalism, modernity and rationality. In this regard, modern theories are not theories of modernity per se but rather social theories that mimicked to some extent the underlying structure and axioms of modern experience in their codification of the world.

Two, a balanced appreciation and successful 'revision' of theories are contingent upon a nuanced understanding of these experiences and mindsets, which are constituted in the specific contexts, and which shape and condition the subjectivity of the theorists as agents. Hence the contention by Chun (2005: 518):

I argue that there is a fundamental difference in the way social thought in the classical era, such as that of Marx, Weber and Durkheim, was articulated in reference to their own sociopolitical and intellectual context and the way their work has been appropriated in the context of contemporary disciplines as 'theory'.

## 2.2 Ake's Biographical Factors and Early Influences

Claude Ake's lifetime—from birth in his native home, Omoku, on 18 February 1939 until his death in an air crash on 7 November 1996—spanned the periods of European colonial domination and political independence in most African states. His native home, Omoku, is located in the present day Ogba-Egbema Ndoni Local Government Area of Rivers State. He attended the Kings College in Lagos, where he passed the Cambridge School Certificate Examination with distinction and earned a scholarship to study Economics at the University of Ibadan, in Ibadan, Nigeria, which was then known as the University College at Ibadan, an affiliate institution of the University of London (CASS, 1997: 3). He graduated in 1962 with a First Class Honours in Economics and then proceeded to Columbia University in New York, which awarded him a Doctorate (PhD) Degree in Political Science in 1966, with specialization in political economy, political theory and development studies (Ake's Curriculum Vitae, 1996). It should be noted, however, that an array of contrasting claims exists on the various accounts of Ake's educational background, especially at his First Degree level. Among such claims, Sam E. Oyovbaire (1997: 48) maintains that:

Ake's education was not, as the press has impressed upon the public, from King's College Lagos to Columbia University, or from London University to Columbia University, Carleton University, University of Dar-es-Salaam and University of Nairobi. I am not sure whether Ake was at London University as a student or professor. I know that he taught and did enormously valuable research at Carleton, Dar-es-Salaam and Nairobi, among many other centres of his scholarly sojourn. The more important fact of interest is that Ake attended the University of Ibadan for his undergraduate studies where he made an excellent and superior classification for the social sciences degree in political science. Somehow I feel, without imputing motives that the press has unwittingly ignored, omitted or played down the University of Ibadan in the making of Ake. I think I know the source of inadequacy of the press in this connection. Yet, I think too that Ake would like to be identified with the University of Ibadan in his intellectual growth.

Importantly, even though Oyovbaire (1997) claims to clarify the confusion of opinion surrounding Ake's educational background, especially at the first degree level, his contribution rather adds to the confusion. From all known biographical sources—oral and written accounts—none presents Ake as having studied Political Science at the first degree level, except Oyovbaire (1997: 48), a claim that is not backed up by Ake's curriculum vitae. This is added to his inability to properly clarify the inadequacy of the press, which he noted regarding the accounts on Ake's institutional affiliation at the first degree level. Our intervention in this regard is that: following a detailed analysis of the facts about Ake's

trajectory narrated in his curriculum vitae, and other insights gleaned from our oral interviews with some of Ake's contemporaries, Ake's scholarship and career are not as confusing as Oyovbaire (1997) and the press to which he alludes, have made them appear. To clear all doubts, Ake was actually educated at the University of Ibadan for his first degree, where he graduated in 1962. It was however known at that time as the University College in Ibadan. This is mainly because the University of Ibadan was at that time an affiliate institution of the University of London in the United Kingdom (CASS, 1997: 3). During this period, degrees awarded by the University of Ibadan bore the name, logo and institutional affiliation of the University of London. It was not until after a few years, especially in 1965 that the University of Ibadan became an independent institution, awarding degrees, diplomas and certificates in its own right and capacity, with the full weight of the law. As such, given the affiliation of the University of Ibadan to the University of London as the main institution from which degrees offered in Ibadan were awarded, Ake's educational training at the first degree level actually spanned both institutions in a technical sense. Consequently, those who describe him as having attended either the University of Ibadan or the University of London for his first degree are admissibly correct in this qualified sense. However, in arguing that Ake studied Political Science at the first degree level in either of these institutions, Oyovbaire (1997) stands alone and is far from being correct. To be sure, Ake studied Economics at the University of Ibadan and graduated with a First Class Honours Degree in 1962, and then proceeded to Columbia University in the United States where he studied Political Science, specializing in political economy, political theory and development studies and graduated in 1966. Our claims in reconstructing the contrasting claims on Ake's educational background are corroborated not only by the enriching insights gleaned from the discussions with some of his contemporaries, but also by his curriculum vitae and other documents made available to this researcher by the Centre for Advanced Social Science, a research/advocacy centre founded by Ake himself (see Ake's Curriculum Vitae and CASS 1997). It however remains doubtful whether or not these sources were consulted by Oyovbaire (1997) and the press before advancing their conjectural positions on Ake's background. For us in this study, a careful reconstruction of such positions on Ake's educational background is very important, not only because it helps us to set the records straight regarding his trajectory, but also because it helps us to advance our analyses and

conclusions on the departed scholar from clearly agreed, settled and confirmed premises, free from controversies, which might undermine the credibility of our conclusion. Having clarified this issue, we now narrate other aspects of Ake's background.

Ake had a very rich and versatile teaching experience, which began at the Columbia University in New York, as an assistant professor, a position, which he held from 1966-1968. In 1969, he relocated to Carleton University in Canada, where he stayed until 1977. While at Carleton University, Ake was a visiting professor of Political Science at the University of Nairobi in Kenya. This was from 1970-1972. From 1972-1974, he held a visiting professorial appointment at the University of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania. From 1975 to 1976, he was the Director of research for the African Association of Political Science. In 1977, he left Carleton University and returned to the University of Port Harcourt, in Nigeria, where he established the Faculty of the Social Sciences, which he served as the pioneer Dean from 1977-1983. Within this period, that is, from 1977-1983, Ake served as an adviser to the Committee on the Use, Protection and Maintenance of Public Property, of the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Also, from 1978-1979, he was chair to the Rivers State Housing Corporation and in 1978, he was appointed by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa as a consultant on Indigenization. From 1983-1986, he was a member of the Board of Directors of the National Universities Commission in Nigeria, and a member of the Editorial Board of the Sage Series on Modernization and Development in Africa (Ake's Curriculum Vitae, 1996).

By 1975, he became a member of the Editorial Board of the *African Studies Review* and a founding member of the *African Pugwash*. In 1979, Ake was a member of the UNESCO expert group on Social Science Development in Africa, which met in October in Zaire. Later, between 1984 and 1986, he served as the Vice President of the Social Science Council of Nigeria, and in 1985, he became the Editor of the *African Journal of Political Economy*, now known as the *African Journal of Political Science*. He was also a member of the Editorial Board of the *Nigerian Journal of Political Science*. He was an associate member of the Editorial Board of *Current Anthropology*, a world-class journal of the science of man, and a member of the Executive Committee, Association of Third World Economists, representing West Africa, in 1982. From 1981-1983, Ake served as the President of the Nigerian Political Science Association. Later in 1983, he was offered an appointment as a Visiting Fellow at



the University of Oxford in the United Kingdom, and in 1984, he was appointed as a Visiting Fellow at University of Cambridge in the United Kingdom.

Between 1985 and 1988, he served as the president of the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA), Dakar, Senegal, which was then an umbrella institution of the Social Science Organization in Africa. In 1988, he served as the Director of the International Development Research Centre in Canada, and in 1989, he was a consultant to the World Bank project on *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth*, based in Washington, D. C. In 1989, he was selected by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs in the USA, as a member of the International team to oversee the Election in Chile (Ake's Curriculum Vitae, 1996). From 1985-1989, Ake was a member of the International Social Science Council in Paris, France. Between 1987 and 1992, he was a member of the Board of Directors of the Social Science Research Council of the United States, one of two members, which represented the rest of the world. From 1987-1993, he was a member of the International Institute for Labour Studies in Geneva, Switzerland. From 1990-1991, Ake was a Research Fellow at the Brookings Institution, in Washington D. C. In 1990, he was a consultant to the United Nations Development Programme. From 1992-1993, he was a member of the Advisory Board of the UNHCR project on the *State of the World's Refugees*, based in Geneva, Switzerland. In 1992, he established the Centre for Advanced Social Science (CASS), a research and policy advocacy think-tank, which is being described as Ake's crowning glory. Also, in 1992, he was conferred the Nigerian National Merit Award and the Martin Luther Award for Community Service among others. From 1993-1994, Ake was a consultant to the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa on the Indigenization of African Economies. During the same period, that is, from 1993-1994, he was also a consultant to the African Development Bank and gave a lead paper on the occasion of the annual seminar of the Bank in 1994. From 1993 until the period of his death in 1996, Ake was a member of the United Nations World Commission on Culture. From 1994, he was a member of the World Bank's Council of African Advisers and a member of the Executive Board of the African Capacity Building Foundation, a position, which he held until the period of his death. In 1996, he was a Visiting Professor at Yale University and was also a member of the Niger Delta Environmental Survey, from which he later resigned. Other details of his professional awards and honours,

his published works and professional activities and achievements are found in the copy of his curriculum vitae.

As we noted earlier, Ake's university education was within the North American analytic tradition at the Columbia University in New York, which he joined as a postgraduate student in 1963 after graduating in 1962 from the University College in Ibadan, in Nigeria. He therefore began his career as a liberal scholar who was trained along the path of the North American liberal heritage. Of his liberal background Kelly Harris (2005: 74-75) remarks that:

Ake was influenced by the dominant behavioural approach, which was dominant in political science throughout the 1950s and 1960s. It was not until the late 1960s and early 1970s that the dependency theorists and post-behaviouralists began to offer significant challenges.

During this period, two central features characterised Ake's scholarship. One, he came under the influences and works of core liberal Euro-American authorities. Examples of such scholars are Herbert A. Deane, L. Gray Cowan, and Immanuel Wallerstein under whose tutelage his quest and research as a doctoral student began (see Ake 1967). Others included Gabriel Almond, David Apter, Douglas E. Ashford, Reinhard Bendix, Leonard Binder, Arnold Brecht, James Coleman, Robert Dahl, Ralf Dahrendorf, Karl Deutsch, Emile Durkheim, S. N. Eisenstadt, Amitai Etzioni, Sigmund Freud, Carl Friedrich, Ernst Haas, Richard Harris, Carlton J. Hayes, Frederick Hertz, Thomas Hodgkin, M. Hondmon, Samuel P. Huntington, P. Jacob, Morris Janowitz, Harold Lasswell, Hans Kohn, William Kornhauser, W. H. Lewis, Niccolo Machiavelli, Gaetano Mosca, Franz Neumann, Felix Oppenheim, Talcott Parsons, Lucian Pye, Carl Rosberg, George Simmel, Edward Shils, Herbert Spencer, Ferdinand Toennies, James Toscano, Sidney Verba, Max Weber, W. H. Wriggins and Aristide Zolberg, among others.

The other feature, which characterized Ake's scholarship and worldview within this period, as seen in his early writings was that, most of his works were also of very liberal character and ideological leaning. Examples of such works are many (see Ake's Curriculum Vitae 1996). For example, his research and scholarship took the form of theoretically exploring epistemes and concepts like 'charismatic legitimation' and 'political integration', 'rights' and 'utility', 'political integration and political instability in the new states', 'the social contract theory and the problem of politicization'; 'modernization' and 'political instability'. Importantly, even though he researched Africa, he did that from an entirely liberal perspective, and was not involved in using the critical traditions of the neo-

left scholarship. His writings at this period did not reflect either the Afro-centric engagement or the neo-Marxist intervention in the debate on African studies.

### **2.3 Ake's Paradigm Shift: From Liberal to Radical Scholarship**

Later, however, especially from the 1970s, Ake's posture as a liberal scholar was challenged by a number of developments, which suggested an alternative paradigm to him. Adele L. Jimadu (2004: 1) captures these developments within the context of 'an Afro-centric intellectual movement', which emerged within the international social science community in the late 1960s and early 1970s. According to him, it was an intellectual movement, which was defined by, and which *raison d'être* was derived from its engagement with Africa's marginalization in the world economy. It was also a form of intellectual-political struggle, which interrogated the cumulative consequences of the historical developments within the world economy for African and world politics. This period was marked, largely by the world economic crisis, which was due mainly to the economic recession in the major capitalist countries, and for which an end was hardly in sight. In Europe and North America, the spectacle of the monetarist new right regimes of Reagan, Thatcher, Kohl and others were already growing. In Africa and other parts of the Third World, the rightward drifts of the imperialist countries had been accompanied by more pressures on the conservative, neo-colonial regimes and progressive states to adopt or favour more pro-capitalist strategies in combating underdevelopment. Accordingly, by the 1970s, about a decade after the attainment of formal independence by most African countries, the strangleholds of the international capitalist system on African initiatives had become more blatant, while political influences and enforcements had also become more overt. The Editorial of the *Journal of African Marxists* (1984: 2-3) observed with dismay, the developments within Africa, which characterized the emergence of this movement:

From the early stages of the independence era it was argued by some radical nationalists and by socialists that the end of formal colonial rule was being turned against the African workers and peasants in that no comprehensive restructuring of the institutions and relations inherited from the colonial state was envisaged in the newly independent states. Indeed, it was felt that the spate of decolonisation settlements in many instances arose from a desire on the part of the imperialists to preempt popular struggles which would otherwise sweep away the pliable crop of nationalist leaders, thereby forcing onto the agenda more radical solutions on issues of internal development and relations with the major capitalist powers. The effect of this thwarting of true independence was 'neo-colonialism' - the outward trappings of independence, without the uprooting of the colonial state.

As Adele Jinadu (2004: 1) recounts, the intellectual roots of this movement lie in the radical tradition and reactions of the black African critique of colonialism and the international system, which date back to the 18th century, and which received powerful revolutionary inspirations, re-statement and reformulations in the writings of Frantz Fanon and Walter Rodney among others, in the penultimate decade of the decolonization process. According to Jinadu (2004: 1):

More specifically, the movement crystallized itself within the conducive political environment, "the dynamism that prevailed at the University of Dar-es-Salaam", to use Nabudere's expression, in the 1970s, with its magnetic attraction for a diverse array of leftist intellectual scholars from all over the world, at a time when the cold war was raging and the liberation movements in Southern Africa were gaining increscent momentum.

Within this period, efforts were made to re-think the continued relevance of the neo-classical development approach, particularly the new role of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which by virtue of being the collective voice of Western capital were able to dictate terms to Third World governments. Also questioned was the debate on neo-colonialism, with the emphasis placed on the need to transcend its limitations, especially the dominant role, which it assigned to external factors, almost exclusively. New approaches were therefore introduced, which focused on the nature of African regimes, the crisis of neo-patrimonialism, the character of the African state and the ideologies that have informed its disastrous performances. African revolutionaries were thus encouraged to address their attention to the nature of state power and the critical role of vanguard forces in facilitating popular democracy (see the Editorial, *Journal of African Marxists*, 1984: 3). Efforts were also made to provide platforms for critical debates, discussions and information with the aim of generating sound theoretical bases for political action by African revolutionary scholars and intellectuals.

#### **2.4 The Neo-Marxist Debate at the University of Dar es Salaam**

The most important factor or influence, which significantly changed Ake's worldview and writings during this period, was the great debate at the University of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania, followed later, by his association with Walter Rodney and the writings of Frantz Fanon. According to Yashpal Tandon (1982), in 1976, there opened a great debate at the University of Dar es Salaam, which focused on class, state and the role of imperialism in Africa. It took off on the heels of Issa Shivji's (1973) *Class Struggles in Tanzania*, and Dani

W. Nabudere's critique of the book. Other publications, which also provoked the debate, were Mahmood Mamdani's (1976) book, *Politics and Class Formation in Uganda*. The debate raised a number of important issues. It also suggested the need for absolute clarity, which was proposed by both the supporters and opponents of Shivji's book. It later extended into other areas, and brought forth contributions from comrades and scholars who were not initially involved. As Tandon (1982: Cover Page) observes:

In the Marxist-Leninist tradition the exchanges were sharp and uninhibited by bourgeois politeness or hypocritical applauses.... that debate, was not only important to Marxists in Tanzania but also to Marxists elsewhere in Africa and outside in their study of imperialism and the struggle against it.

According to Katabaro Miti,<sup>1</sup> the intellectual situation at the University of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania contributed immensely to Ake's paradigm shift, especially from 1972-1976. As Miti recalled, during this period Tanzania attracted several socialist scholars from all over the world and the University system had a lot of academic freedom. He noted that there were always public seminars, which normally spanned between three to four weeks, and that most of these seminars focused on Tanzania's socialist experiment. To him, these debates and seminars suggested to most people the need, to re-think socialism in East Africa and to re-read the entire literature on Marxism. According to Miti,<sup>2</sup> during this period, the Department of Political Science at the University of Dar es Salaam had the highest number of professors in the whole of the University—Hamza Alavi, Goran Hyden, Walter Rodney, Justin Rweyemamu, Claude Ake, Colin Leys, John Saul, Dani W. Nabudere, Issa Shivji and Mahmood Mamdani—were all professors in the Department. Miti argued that Claude Ake was not the only one who was changed by these radical intellectual renditions. Abdulraham M. Babu (1982: 1) describes the debate as a vigorous discussion of the most burning issues of the day—imperialism, finance capital, monopoly capitalism, neo-colonialism and classes in the neo-colonies—issues which, according to Babu (1982), had either been entirely ignored in Africa or had deliberately been subjected to an oversimplified and therefore misleading

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<sup>1</sup> An oral interview conducted with Katabaro Miti during the Social Science Conference in Johannesburg, South Africa, in September 2006. Katabaro Miti (PhD) is a Professor of Political Science at the University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

investigations by opinion leaders, who themselves, had developed vested interests in both neo-colonialism and the pro-imperialist status quo. As Babu (1982: 1) observes:

It is heartening that this excellent discussion by some of the finest brains in East Africa should have occurred at this moment when all of us need a clearer understanding of what is taking place under our very noses. Significant changes in our societies are occurring now and it needs a clear analysis which subjects them to serious scrutiny in order to bring out into the open their underlying causes and tendencies (sic).

The debate brought together the works of A. M. Babu (1982), Yashpal Tandon (1982), Dani W. Nabudere (1982), Issa Shivji (1982), and several other scholars. According to Babu (1982: 10):

Finally, what is the purpose of these essays? They originate in response to the publication of three most important books to come out of East Africa. One of these is Issa Shivji's *Class Struggles in Tanzania*, one is Dan Nabudere's *The Political Economy of Imperialism* and third is *Politics and Class Formation in Uganda* by Mahmood Mamdani. These books have inspired a lot of thinking among East African intellectuals [unfortunately they could not reach the masses because they are written in English] and especially among those with Marxist inclinations.

The purpose of these essays is obvious; Marxists do not engage in debates just for the fun of it as in school debates. Their principal task is to change the world. Their debates are about the correct understanding of the world around us. Once this world is understood then the task is to outline policies, which will guide their struggle-to draw up the general line. This is arrived at by concrete analysis of the concrete situation in any given area. To do this they use the dialectical methodology, which is universally applicable, and they relate it to their concrete situation.

On the impact of Ake's interactions with Walter Rodney on his scholarship, Okello Oculi (1997: 28-29) notes that Rodney had earlier written with commendable oral narration to what he calls the 'tumultuous intellectually battered, psychologically and emotionally hungry crowds in street corners in Jamaica, about the glorious histories of the Benin Empire, Songhai, Mali and the Oyo empires'. According to Oculi (1997: 29):

Ake met his age mate, Walter Rodney, at a time when both brilliant men were groping for ways of seizing African post-colonial realities with their rare intellects. Rodney whose book would suggest his early contact with George Padmore's radical *Work: How Britain Rules Africa* (published in 1955), had made earlier contacts with revolutionary Marxist analysis of world history combining that with his research on the history of the slave trade on the West African coast, it was easy for Rodney to force Ake out of the liberal American social science rails, Ake's wrath after his moment of seeing the light is the burden of his work *Social Science As Imperialism*. The traditional scholar that he was, he felt the responsibility to expose, from within, the entrails of Western scholarship, its structures and imperialist political strategies (sic).

Thus, after having such an inconspicuous beginning, Ake later distanced himself from his earlier positions. Harris (2005: 76) notes that Fanon's call to 'set afoot a new man' is much apropos for describing the nature of his radical departure, especially as seen in his subsequent writings in contrast to the earlier ones. In this respect, Jinadu (1997: 24-25) observes that Ake actually followed the works of Frantz Fanon, Fanonist scholars and others like Samir Amin and Colin Leys. Jinadu (1997: 25) also notes that Ake significantly advanced their contributions in several respects.

Archibald B. M. Mafeje<sup>3</sup> argued that Ake's paradigm shift was influenced principally by the ideas of black nationalism. He noted that from the period of his shift from the North American political science tradition, he has been involved in intellectual-political struggles against Western imperialism and the military in Africa. He cautioned that he does not know 'everything' about Ake. He differentiated Ake from other African scholars, like Ali A. Mazrui, who, according to him, do not really have an African constituency, either within or outside Africa. He noted that Ake's involvement with CODESRIA, especially as the President of the Council suited him greatly because it provided him with the needed institutional platform as a pan-Africanist and a neo-Marxist authority at the same time.

He observed that Ake was greatly loved especially in the West, by the Scandinavians and also in North America, and that in spite of his paradigm shift away from the liberal school of thought, he was still not entirely rejected by the liberal school in North America. He contended that, this explains why Ake was given the fellowship at the Brookings Institution and the others, which were put in place to memorialize him after his death. However, Mafeje was of the opinion that Ake actually undertook another paradigm shift, namely, from radicalism to what he calls 'mild liberalism', towards the end of his life. According to him, Ake's (1996) *Democracy and Development in Africa* was neither 'critical' nor 'radical' enough, especially when compared with his earlier writings.<sup>4</sup> He observed that the tragic circumstances of Ake's death did not allow us see how this 'mild liberalism' was to be fully expressed. Yet, he noted that a few insights could be gleaned from his later works (see Mafeje, 1997: 79-92). He cautioned that, in critiquing Ake's second paradigm shift, we need to properly situate him within the context of the pressures, which he faced in his scholarship,

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<sup>3</sup> An oral interview conducted with Archibald B. M. Mafeje during the Social Science Conference in Johannesburg, South Africa, in September 2006.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

especially at the later stage of his life. To Mafeje, at such a stage in one's life and career, it is difficult to stick entirely to an exclusively radical stance or orientation. He explained this in terms of the material conditions, which characterize the collective experiences of African scholars generally within the global system of knowledge production. By this, Mafeje referred to their struggles to generate funding for their research, meet their individual commitments and family needs for survival.

Within the African social science community, Bernard Magubane is another worthy contemporary of the late Claude Ake who came to know him, mainly through reading some of his works. This is added to his other encounters with Ake at conferences and seminars, especially at the meetings of the African Studies Association in the United States of America. He referred to the efforts of the Dar es Salaam School of Marxist history as having gone a long way in changing Ake's worldview from liberalism to radical African scholarship.<sup>5</sup> Magubane argued that what he liked most in Ake's personality was his humility and self-effacing characteristics, which he presented as more or less 'deceitful' tendencies, which made most persons, who were not familiar with him to hardly notice him among the crowd. He however appreciated Ake's theoretically solid scholarship, which to him, is hardly rivaled on the continent. He said, to these features of Ake, were added his commitment and devotion, with which he pursued all his assignments and whatever he believed in. He recounted that after his graduation in 1966, he, Magubane took up a job at the University of Zambia and later on, at the University of Connecticut at Storrs, in the United States of America.<sup>6</sup>

He observed with dismay, the fact that most European writings on African anthropology and sociology were not only Euro-centric, reductionist and biased, but that they also focus wrongly on the tribal features and ethnic divisions between and among the various African societies as units of analyses. According to him, after a critical reading of some of Ake's interventions on these issues, he gleaned the appropriate insights and summoned courage, not only to teach sociology from an African perspective, but also to write critical articles, in which he challenged the intellectual myopia of some of the leading European sociological writings on Africa. He described Ake as a rare scholar, who drew the attention of members of the African social science community to the need to take the indigenous African context

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<sup>5</sup> An oral interview conducted with Bernard Magubane during the Social Science Conference in Johannesburg, South Africa, in September 2006.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.



seriously, both in intellectual and existential terms, as a condition for being globally relevant. He appreciated him for reviving the debate on 'endogeneity' within the social sciences in Africa, through the development of a social science that is based on the ideas of interdisciplinarity, and which disciplines are, in epistemic terms, rooted in their locales, and thus become relevant in international policy circles. Magubane submitted that when he died, the announcement of Ake's death came to him as gloomy news.<sup>7</sup>

Thandika Mkandawire argued that the radical turning point in Ake's career and scholarship was the neo-Marxist debate at the University of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania, in the 1970s. He noted that Claude Ake, together with Emmanuel Hansen and other members of that group were the ones who later formed, not just the African Association of Political Science in Tanzania in 1973, but also the various professional associations in the respective African countries.<sup>8</sup> According to him, the Dar es Salaam school actually interrogated the question of how power was organized, articulated and exercised in Africa, and its implications for the composition of the African society. To him, a major area of focus in Ake's writings is his argument that governance is in crisis in Africa. Mkandawire called this "the crisis of democratization and governance in the continent".<sup>9</sup> He argued that as a political economist, Ake took economics very seriously, but that he doubted if African leaders actually wanted a truly developmental state. Remembering some of his endless debates, which he had in the past with Ake, Mkandawire recalled that for Ake, the actual concern about development centres on getting 'governance' right, rather than getting the 'market' right. He however observed that, towards the end of the 1990s, Ake actually became conscious of his leftist positions and began to limit them gradually.<sup>10</sup>

Mkandawire concluded that the best way to study Ake without unduly glorifying or vilifying him, is to properly historicize him and contextualize his works, his paradigm shifts, and the totality of his scholarship, around the developments, which surrounded his time.<sup>11</sup> Michael Neocosmos drew attention to two vital aspects of Ake's contributions, namely, the light, which he shed on the political economy approach, and his detailed theoretical exploration of

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> An oral interview conducted with Thandika Mkandawire during the Social Science Conference in Johannesburg, South Africa, in September 2006.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

the struggles and developments, leading to the democratization of popular forces in Africa.<sup>12</sup> He commended Ake's commitment to his vision of 'speaking life' to popular struggles in the continent.<sup>13</sup> Abdul Karim Bangura pointed at issues of pan-Africanism in Ake's writings as vital aspects of his contributions to the global system of knowledge production. He described these as Ake's pan-African contributions to knowledge production in the continent.<sup>14</sup>

Adebayo O. Olukoshi maintained that as a young social scientist, what he found most attractive about Ake was that he engaged issues within the social sciences and went onto the height of the modernization debate, raised a lot of controversial issues and interrogated their applicability to Africa.<sup>15</sup> To him, even though Ake's (1967) *A Theory of Political Integration* was a seminal work, after his interactions with members of the Dar es Salaam School of Marxist history, Ake saw the limitations in the liberal paradigm and redirected his ideological leanings accordingly. He noted that a major plus to Ake's method was his ability to simplify issues and cut out the jargons within his written works, which can only be obscurantist.<sup>16</sup>

Eme Ekekwe, a former colleague of the late professor at the Department of Political Science, University of Port Harcourt, argues that by Ake's tragic passage, Nigeria has lost its most brilliant social scientist ever. Ekekwe, who noted that he had known Ake since 1975 as one of Ake's graduate students at the Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada, commented that the fallen scholar stood for nothing but excellence in academics (see Uwujaren, 1996: 14-20).

According to Ekekwe (1996: 19):

I knew Prof. Ake in 1975 when he taught me at Carleton. He was one of the most brilliant people I have ever met. In those days, many Canadians enrolled at the Political Science Department simply because of Ake.... Ake hated mediocrity and could be rigid on theories, most of which he often successfully proved. His book, which was originally written for his doctoral thesis, *A Theory of Political Integration*, was for many years the recommended text for political economy in many North American universities.

S. W. E. Ibodje, together with whom Ake founded the Department of Political Science and the Faculty of the Social Sciences at the University of Port Harcourt, Port Harcourt, Nigeria, also spoke glowingly about his departed senior colleague. As Ibodje (1996: 15) recounts:

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<sup>12</sup> An oral interview conducted with Michael Neocosmos during the Social Science Conference in Johannesburg, South Africa, in September 2006.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> An oral interview conducted with Abdul Karim Bangura during the Social Science Conference in Johannesburg, South Africa, in September 2006.

<sup>15</sup> An oral interview conducted with Adebayo O. Olukoshi during the Social Science Conference in Johannesburg, South Africa, in September 2006.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

Ake was hard to please in terms of academics because he demanded the best. To many he was difficult to get along with because his standards were very high, but mind you, he wouldn't expect you to do anything that he was not better at.

Mofia Akobo (1996: 19), a medical practitioner based in Port Harcourt, who knew Ake for about three decades, also comments:

He was a serious-minded, objective and committed person. He was also dispassionate about issues. He was highly independent minded. He drove other people the way he drove himself and I believe it is very difficult to find people who understood their subject matter as Ake did. The fact is: the world will miss him.

In a cover story report, in *The News* magazine (1996), the following remarks are instructive about Ake:

He was internationally acclaimed as a scholar of repute. He belonged to the elite club of gifted Nigerian professors whose intellectual brilliance remains the only source of respect for the Nigerian academia. Ake was perhaps one of the deepest thinkers in the social sciences and a world class authority in political economy. His rich academic exploits in this area, earned quietly and almost unobtrusively invite superlatives even from the most cynical critics of his own brand of radical social science. He was an intellectual flower that bloomed with an ethereal sparkle. Not even the cult of mediocrity and anti-intellectualism so rife in the Nigerian academia could remove the shine from Ake. His genius shone so brightly that it was acknowledged at home by even the military, the target of most of his critical commentaries. In and outside the university, Ake has retained a puritanical devotion to his first love: teaching and research. At a time professors in Nigerian universities, clobbered by the general rot of their environment, had virtually stopped 'professing', Ake was still busy churning out one research paper after another at his non-governmental think-tank, the Centre for Advanced Social Science (CASS).

Nearly all his works are delivered with a brilliance and erudition that are uniquely Ake's. Though not a particularly charming personality, Ake was for his brilliance eminently popular amongst colleagues, students and the general public.

In addition to the sources cited above, there are still other works on Ake. Most of them are in the forms of monographs and profiles, memorial lectures, theses and dissertations, edited volumes, texts, tributes and essays, journal articles and proceedings among others. These are J. O. Abiodun (1998), J. Bayo Adekanye (1996), Victor A. O. Adetula (1997), Eme O. Awa (1998), Obafemi Awolowo Foundation (1998), Yusuf Bangura (1997a and 1997b), ASA/AAI (2003), Hairat A. Balogun (1998), CASS (1997 and 1998), Drillbits and Tailings (1997), Lawrence Efan (1996), Andrew O. Efemini (2000), A. Essien-Ibok (1998), Dapo Fafowora (1997), B. Founou-Tchigoua (1996), Kelly Harris (2005), Okechukwu O. Ibeanu (1993), Julius Ihonvbere (1989), Attahiru Jega (2006), Adele L. Jinadu (1997, 1998 and 2004), b. Ly (1997), Akinola Mabogunje (1998), Guy Martins (1997), James Mittleman (1997), Walusako Mwalilino (2000), Okello Oculi (1997), Ogban-Iyam (1998), Sam E. Oyovbaire (1997), Amos Sawyerr (1997), T. Tamuno (1998), A. L. Thoahlane (1998), S. Tolofari (2001), Ukoha Ukiwo (1997) as well as the Yale Bulletin and Calendar (1996) among others. Of all these works, three are particularly instructive. They are Adele L. Jinadu (1997) and Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja

(2000) that capture some of Ake's key contributions and Okechukwu O. Ibeanu (1993), which critiques an aspect of Ake's analysis of the state in the periphery.

## **2.5 Claude Ake's Death: 7 November 1996**

On Thursday 7 November 1996, Claude Ake died in a plane crash in Nigeria. The airplane was flying between the cities of Port Harcourt and Lagos when it plunged into a lagoon outside of Lagos. There were no survivors. He was killed along with 131 other passengers and nine crewmembers in the Boeing 727 aeroplane, which crashed into a lagoon in a mangrove jungle 25 miles northeast of Lagos. The cause of this crash was described, especially by government sources as 'unknown' (Adekanye 1996: 563-564). Even though the cause of Ake's tragic death in the plane crash remains unknown and uninvestigated, this study traces it to the rot in Nigeria's aviation industry; the negative developments and features, which characterized the Nigerian state during the despotic years of military rule under the inglorious leadership of the late General Sani Abacha. Within this period, the political terrain in Nigeria was turned into a theatre of war, in which human beings were unsafe, and lives were lost with intimidating alacrity. These situations reflect the primacy of politics, which assumes its singularly negative turn in the desperate quest for state power and its control, and the pursuit for power as an end in itself by African leaders.

The detailed account of the events, which surrounded the period of Ake's death is to be found in his involvements and subsequent resignation from the Steering Committee of the Niger Delta Environmental Survey (NDES), which represented both the Oil companies and the Federal Military Government, under the late General Sani Abacha—a leadership—that was widely known across the world for its limited vision, lack of conscience, lack of respect for human rights, and tyrannical inclinations. As noted by the Yale Bulletin and Calendar (1996), before his death, Ake's final projects were focused on the roots of violence in Africa; political violence in Nigeria; and concepts of ethnicity. Importantly, on 16 November 1995, following the executions of Ken Saro-Wiwa and the other eight Ogoni, Ake resigned his membership from the Steering Committee of the Niger Delta Environmental Survey (NDES). In a letter titled, 'Letter of Resignation', dated 15 November 1995, and addressed to Mr. Gamaliel Onosode, the Chairman of the Steering Committee of the Niger Delta Environmental Survey, Ake (1995: 1) reasons out his position:

In the light of the demise of Ken Saro-Wiwa and his colleagues, I have had to rethink NDES. For me agreeing to serve in the Steering Committee of NDES was a leap of faith. For if past experience is any guide, there is no reason to assume that the Petroleum industry in Nigeria is the least concerned about the plight of the oil

producing countries including their susceptibility to environmental hazards and it was not reasonable to fear that NDES might be a cover-up (sic).

In the end I decided to serve and allow for the possibility that the Petroleum industry in Nigeria might have finally recognized the need to reconcile the profit motive with social responsibility. I have always felt that until this reconciliation is achieved, the oil producing communities will be increasingly alienated and hostile and all stakeholders will suffer in a rising tide of violent conflict. This is why I have been trying to initiate dialogue between them. The distinguished representative of the Oil companies in the NDES Steering Committee can testify to these efforts.

Continuing, Ake (1995: 1) observes that:

Unfortunately, the efforts did not succeed and conflict escalates with unfortunate consequences. It is clear now that NDES is too late and does not represent a change of heart. To begin with, it does not enjoy the enthusiastic support of the oil industry at large. Clearly there is nothing in the recent performance of the oil companies notably Shell, NAOC, Elf and Mobil to suggest that NDES is associated with increasing sensitivity to the plight of the oil producing communities. It is telling that as the tragedy unfolded in Ogoniland, Shell, whose perceived insensitivity engendered the conflict, in the first place did not intervene forcefully for conciliation. And when the disaster occurred, Shell expressed regrets but pointedly stated, according to the British press, that it was not considering any change in its current practices.

Considering the tragic enormity of recent happenings, and the crisis of conscience arising from them, NDES now seems to my mind diversionary and morally unacceptable. By all indications, what we need now is not an inventory of pollutants, but to look ourselves in the face, reach to our innermost sources and try to heal our badly damaged social and moral fabric.

Please be so kind as to accept my resignation.

On 23 November 1995, Ake granted a public interview and issued a press statement explaining further the circumstances, which surrounded his acceptance to serve in the Steering Committee of the Niger Delta Environmental Survey. According to Ake (1995: 2):

It is with regret that I announce my resignation from the Steering Committee of the Niger Delta Environmental Survey (NDES), which took effect from November 16, 1995.

I must confess that the decision to serve on that committee had been a difficult one to begin with, given the oil companies' past record of arrogance, insensitivity to the humanity of host communities and to environmental sustainability. But in the end I decided to serve, encouraged by Ken Saro-Wiwa, who argued that the NDES could be a window of opportunity for constructive engagement.

Continuing, Ake (1995: 2) explains his role as a member of the Steering Committee of the Niger Delta Environmental Survey:

As the designated "representative" of the communities in the Committee, I tried to sensitize the Committee to community concerns and to develop a mechanism to facilitate communications between NDES in particular and the Oil Industry in general with Communities. This was reflected in the fact that at the stake holders meeting in Port Harcourt on October 24, the Ijaw National Congress, Ogbakor Ikwerre, Ogba Solidarity, Ogbakor Etche, Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People, Oyigbo Forum, Bonny Indigenous Peoples Federation, Ndoni Community Association, Uzugbani Ekpeye and O'Elobo Eleme presented a common position paper on NDES and

it was clear that the acknowledged success of the meeting was partly due to the fact that despite their doubts they too felt that something positive could come out of NDES.

He however regrets that these whole efforts did not achieve their intended expectations.

Lamenting, Ake (1995: 2) notes that:

Unfortunately, the realities intruded. It was clear that NDES did not have the enthusiastic support of the Oil industry. Apart from that, there was nothing in the posture and practices of the major oil companies, Shell, NAOC, Elf and Mobil, to signal the fact that NDES could be regarded as a forward movement. Rather as the agenda of NDES developed, it became difficult despite the good number of competent and well-meaning people on the Steering Committee, to expect much from NDES.

I was already seriously considering resignation before the tragic turn of the Ogoni struggle culminating in the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and his colleagues. I do not think that the Oil industry in Nigeria, particularly Shell whose crude practices and insensitivity engendered the struggle in the first place, did enough to diffuse the situation.

Their reaction to the tragedy was more unfortunate still. They have in effect been assuring everyone who cares to listen that nothing has changed and nothing will change. I cannot help thinking that even silence would have been better than such unfeeling belligerence. For, given the rising tide of resentment in the oil producing communities, this posture is bound to be catastrophic for Nigeria and self-defeating for the oil companies.

These circumstances have left me no choice but to resign. For they have, to my mind, transformed NDES to an unwelcome division and rendered it morally unacceptable.

It was later noted by undisclosed sources that his decision to have resigned from the Steering Committee of the Niger Delta Environmental Survey, particularly the press statement, which he issued, in which he publicized his resignation from the NDES, went a long way in endearing him to the anger and utter displeasure of the powers that be in Nigeria, especially the military junta in power. From that period on, up to the time of his death, it was noted that wherever he went, he was repeatedly under 'State surveillance'. There were also insinuations that his resignation and the subsequent press statement, not only compounded the crisis of legitimacy for the government of the late General Sani Abacha, but also that they indicted the federal government greatly and drew local and international attention to the huge moral crisis, which characterized the administration. Hence the plots to either assassinate or exterminate him.

## **2.6 Claude Ake and His Historical Context: A Historical Sociology of Africa**

In any society the dominant groups are the ones with the most to hide about the way society works. Very often, therefore, truthful analyses are bound to have a critical ring, to seem like postures rather than objective statements.... For all students of human society sympathy with the victims of historical process and scepticism about the victors' claims provide essential safeguards against being taken in by the dominant mythology. A scholar who tries to be objective needs these feelings as parts of his working equipment (Moore, 1966: 523).

This section provides a materialist interpretation of Africa's social history within the period under review. This is also known as the historical sociology, not historicism, of the continent. It captures the material conditions and social milieu, which characterize Africa in the period before, during and after Ake's life, scholarship and writings. It sums up the important details about his biographical account as the subject matter of analysis and situates him within the context of the material conditions and social relations of production discourse in Africa. The epigraph at the beginning of the section speaks to the contradictory nature of power relations in every typically capitalist society. Following Momoh (1999: 141), the study characterizes the social structure in Africa in terms of the social and material conditions of the existing classes and examines how these gave impetus to the formation of Ake's consciousness and ideas, his role in class and political alliances, and his involvements in activist and political struggles. It draws attention to the various developments, experiences and personages, which influenced and shaped Ake's consciousness within that historical period and therefore defines the context of his praxis. According to Momoh (1999: 142):

The pursuit of praxis is the most distinct aspect of our being in the context of social ontology. In this sense the contradictions in material (social) relations, cause (force) us to undertake certain actions which shape and reshape our notions and ideas of the world and, above all, the reproduction of our being through praxis has fundamental implications for: (i) understanding why there are contradictions in society (ii) class position and class alliances and (iii) political action and struggle.

The section therefore examines issues at the interfaces of class structures, struggles and contradictions, the mode of production nuclei, base-superstructure relationships in Africa, and other related concepts, which are the critical stuff of Marxist analysis. As Abdulrahman M. Babu (1982: 2) puts it:

Marxism sees process and development through the struggle of opposites and contradictory forces it traces decisive historical conflicts and changes to roots in the mode of production (sic). These are known as the class struggles. Behind these struggles lie the essential economic relations. These are the most important elements, which are isolated and analysed through abstraction. Earlier philosophers could not see the economic basis of contradictions and they resorted to logical illusions of the illogical world.

In the attempt to construct a historical sociology of Africa, this study unwittingly explores 'the chains of historical causations'. As noted by Peter Gutkind and Immanuel Wallerstein (1976: 7), 'this chain of historical causations' is best studied by means of the model of 'political economy'. As Lionel Cliffe (1976: 112-131) has shown, the full task of the political economy of Africa 'must' start with an analysis of the pre-capitalist mode of production. Tade Akin Aina (1986: 1-16) and Stephen Langdon (1976: 123) have suggested a few definitional guides on the notion of political economy. The relevance of this approach is widely acknowledged, despite the intellectual attempts to the contrary

by some liberal scholars. As illustrated by Aina (1986: 1-16) and Momoh (1999: 144), the political economy approach is useful, not only for providing scientific and totalizing explanations of African politics, economy and society in the pre-colonial era, but also for exposing the role of colonial anthropology as a hegemonic ideology and a product of racist European scholarship. Writing on the history, applicability and relevance of the approach to Africa, Aina (1986: 11) notes that:

This mode of analysis, which flourished in the 1970s among the radical social scientists of the East African school (associated in particular with the University of Dar es Salaam) initiated an era of critical production of materials on colonialism, imperialism, underdevelopment and unequal development, the state and politics, the state and class struggles, rural transformation, industrial development and so on - all within the political economy approach. Work within this broad framework was not limited to political scientists alone but also contained significant contributions by economists on such issues as global accumulation and sectoral underdevelopment. Important examples of this kind of work include the contributions of Samir Amin and Justin Rweyemamu. It should, however, be noted that work in this context went beyond scholarsticism and emerged mainly from a commitment to the liberation and transformation of the conditions of existence of the majority of the peoples of the African continent. Pressing political and economic issues, such as the liberation struggles in Africa, the southern African question and the various problems of African attempts at nation-building, economic development and self-reliance, were the sources of their inspiration.

The political economy of Africa is therefore best interrogated historically, using appropriate methodological and theoretical approaches to historical analysis, and in particular the multidisciplinary approach, as a way of explaining social realities in Africa—the realities of the introduction and spread of colonial capitalism, all the major complex processes as revealed in the specific political, economic and social matrix of colonial and post-colonial Africa. These are best understood in terms of the relations of various African states in the international power structure and the social classes, which this power structure reproduces within the dominated formations (Magubane, 1976: 169–198). As suggested by Gutkind and Wallerstein (1976: 7):

The contemporary economy and polity of Africa, while its antecedents are indigenous, must be analysed in the context of the specifics of an evolving world system of economic and political relations starting in the sixteenth century, leading at first to the gradual involvement of Africa with worldwide exchange relations and later, by the middle of the nineteenth century, into more direct incorporation and finally, by the early twentieth century, to the subordination of the continent to the economic and political needs and objectives of the major Western powers.

Geographically, contemporary Africa is divided into five sub-regions, namely, Central, East, North, West and Southern Africa. Each of these sub-regions comprises several independent states-systems within it. It is also divided into Northern and sub-Saharan Africa. The continent has been described as the world's second-largest and second-most populous continent, after Asia (Pulley 1999). Having about 30, 370, 000 km<sup>2</sup> including adjacent islands, it covers 6. 0 per cent of the Earth's total surface area, and 20. 4 per cent of the total land area (Pulley 1999). With more than 840, 000, 000 people—as of 2002—which are



scattered in 61 territories, the continent accounts for over 12 per cent of the world's human population. In the period before European penetration into these sub-regions, the various states, which make up present day Africa, existed then as separate and independent entities. These pre-colonial entities were largely divided into centralized and decentralized political systems. There are different accounts on the economic, political and social interactions between and among members of these societies on the one hand, and the outside world on the other hand. Referring to the experiences in Southern Africa, CODESRIA (2003: 1) was apt to note that:

Southern Africa as a region has known some of the most interesting political developments in the history of Africa. In the period prior to the onset of formal colonial domination, the area was host to major projects of state formation, dissolution and recomposition characterised by interesting and well-documented experiments in statecraft.

Samir Amin (1981: 28–44) periodizes Africa into four historical periods. These are (i) the pre-mercantilist period, which stretched from the earliest days until the seventeenth century, in the course of which relations were established between Black Africa and the rest of the Old World, from Dakar to the Red Sea, and the Mediterranean, (ii) the mercantilist period, which stretched from the seventeenth century to 1800, a period which was characterized by the slave trade, (iii) the period from 1800-1890, which was characterized by attempts in certain regions within the influence of Atlantic mercantilism, to establish a new form of dependence with that part of the world where capitalism was firmly entrenched by industrialization, though with limited backing, and (iv) the period of colonization, which completed the work of the previous periods in Western Africa. It took over from Oriental mercantilism in Eastern Africa and developed with tenfold vigour, the present forms of dependence of the continent according to the models of the three macro-regions mentioned above.

Colonization and the capitalist penetration of Africa began with the European scramble for the continent. As Ake (1981: 26) has shown, these occurred mainly in the last three decades of the nineteenth century. It involved virtually all African states, with the exception of Ethiopia and Liberia. It should be recalled that the colonization of Africa was necessitated by the need to resolve the internal contradictions of Western capitalism, which reduced the rate of profit and arrested the capitalization of surplus value. Such contradictions did not only

transform capitalism in Europe, but also transplanted and exported it to Africa and other parts of the Third World. This transplant of capitalism from Western Europe to Africa was accomplished through colonial imperialism—a process—which has had the most profound impact on the economic and political history of Africa. According to Ake (1981: 20), in Africa, imperialism and the integration of African economies into the world capitalist system took three forms, namely, (i) the pillage of Africa's resources, (ii) trade, and (iii) formal colonization. Thus, colonialism and the capitalist penetration of Africa were articulated mainly through the monetization of African economies, the imperialism of trade, and foreign colonial investment.

Later on, contradictions developed within the colonial economy, which informed the various liberation and decolonization struggles in Africa to upturn and replace the colonial system of domination. As argued by Ake (1981: 68), the contradictions of the colonial system were not only fundamental and dynamic, but also subverted and changed it. These included (a) contradictions between colonial capital and the emerging African petit-bourgeoisie, (b) contradictions between colonial capital and African labour, (c) contradictions between colonial capital and African peasants, and (d) those contradictions, which were inherent in the character of the colonial ideology itself (Ake, 1981: 71-87). The manifestations of colonial contradictions and the mode of articulation of these decolonization struggles took different forms in different parts of the continent. For example, Central Africa witnessed some of the most brutal and oppressive forms of colonial domination played out in African history. Nowhere was this more exploitative within this region than in The Congo, where the Belgians imposed a veritable reign of terror on the people.

In East Africa, one remembers the brutal nature of the colonial experience, which informed various bloody liberation struggles such as the Mau Mau resistance movement against British colonial rule in Kenya (CODESRIA, 2003: 1). North Africa recorded the exploitative experience of French colonial domination in Algeria and the corresponding violent reactions of hostilities, which French colonialism attracted (see Fanon 1977). In Southern Africa, capitalist penetration took the form of settler colonialism, which made the region the site of some of the most violent, systematically institutionalized systems of racism, racial domination and exclusivist politics known in the continent.

The establishment of colonial rule therefore had one of the most violent histories in Southern Africa, which also made the region one of the earliest sites of resistance to foreign domination, and white minority rule in the continent. Several liberation forces and movements also emerged within this region, which fed into the pan-African quest for the people's liberation from colonial domination. Among others, the role of nationalists like Nelson Mandela in the apartheid era in South Africa, the examples of political parties like the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) inspired other nationalist politicians within this sub-region to intensify their quest for national liberation.

In Angola, Portuguese colonial presence dates back to 1483, when Portugal first settled at the Congo River, where the Kingdom of Kongo, Ndongo and Lunda existed. Understandably, colonial economic exploitation did not give room for the social development of the native Angolans, especially given the discriminatory character of such colonial policies, which encouraged white immigration into the colony after 1950, and also intensified racial antagonisms and increased Portuguese presence in the colony to 5 per cent of the total colonial population by 1970. West Africa also recorded its share of widespread colonial exploitation, in the period of capitalist penetration into the sub-region, a process, which began first, with the slave saga, followed later, by formal colonial domination in the periods before and after the Berlin Conference. These experiences provoked the pro-independence movements in colonial Africa. They also made the struggles for independence to assume very hostile character. Hence, Okwudiba Nnoli's (1986: 129) assertion that colonial and neo-colonial societies in Africa are characterized by struggles, which do not have their actual origins in locally-induced changes within the system of production and class relations. The articulation of these grievances against the colonial state and society took different forms and lasted for different lengths of time across the regions. As John A. Ayam (1990: 1–2) illustrates, these struggles generally took the forms of armed or liberation struggles and constitutional negotiations and settlements. Liberal struggles were however, central in articulating nationalist politics—especially from Algeria to Kenya, from India to Ireland, and also, from Vietnam to South Africa. According to Nnoli (1986: 129–130):

The Mau-Mau uprising in Kenya in the 1950s, the armed struggle of the Algerians in the 1950s and 1960s, and the wars of liberation in the Portuguese African colonies and in Zimbabwe constituted its violent genre. In other African colonies the struggle was waged more peacefully even though here and there in such societies violence was inescapable. Thus, for example, although the Nigerian nationalist struggle for independence was essentially peaceful in character, bloodshed was evident in the shooting of the Enugu coal miners in 1949.

So spontaneous were these struggles that the colonialists could no longer stem their democratic tide (Nyong'o, 2004: 1-5). The struggles were waged and articulated through a number of wars of national liberation, which included the Algerian, Angolan and Eritrean wars of independence among others. They also derived significant inspirations from the American, Bangladesh, Chilean, Indian and Irish wars of independence. By the end of the Second World War, the West African sub-region became the major hotbed for the development of African nationalism and for advancing the pan-Africanist 'ideal'. The nationalist past therefore provides the background to any detailed understanding of decolonization in Africa. Intellectuals and scholars in the continent also contributed to the African liberation struggles. According to CODESRIA (2003: 1):

The earliest generation of African scholars cut their teeth in the context of the nationalist struggles for self-determination and independence, struggles underpinned by a broad-based quest for an African renaissance and the unity of African peoples. In the immediate aftermath of independence, with the fire of nationalism and pan-Africanism still burning strongly, intellectuals were called upon to respond to the challenges of sustaining independence and making it meaningful for the broader populace in the medium and long terms. Whilst these challenges provided scholars with a clear historical context for the definition of their identities and role, the record of the post-independence nationalist period, including especially that of the politicians who inherited state power, and the organisational framework they adopted for the realisation of the dream of pan-Africanism, left a great deal to be desired. Little wonder then that the scholarly community's relationship with the nationalist and pan-Africanist projects gradually became strained. Matters were not helped by the crystallisation, in the post-independence period, of myriad political, economic, and social problems that together resulted in direct challenges to post-independence nation-statism by social movements of the disenchanting and intellectuals sympathetic to their claims.

Describing the role of these scholars in working towards an independent Africa, Nyong'o (2004: 1) states that:

...the first generation of African Social Scientists who came into the intellectual stage immediately after independence (together with Ali Al'Amin Mazrui in East Africa, Claude Ake in Nigeria, and Martin Kilson in the African diaspora) ...made a lasting impact in a profession hitherto dominated by European expatriates. We owe that generation of African scholars a lot. In their category we must include such luminaries as historians Ade-Ajayi (sic), Adu Boahen and B. A. Ogot; anthropologists like Archie Mafeje; and geographers like Simeon Ominde and Akin Mabogunje.... literary giants like Ngugi wa Thiong'o, Ezekiel Mphahlele, Wole Soyinka, Ousmane Sambene, Chinua Achebe, Christopher Okigbo, Okot pBitek and many others...

At a time when Africa was full of hope, African scholars gave African studies and the African academic community an energized and new sense of direction, and what is now called "local ownership".

Some external developments and factors also aided the decolonization struggles in Africa. Jacob Ade Ajayi (1994: 64–66) presents the consciousness based on the African understanding of their

nationalist history as a significant factor, which influenced the struggles for independence in colonial Africa. According to Ade Ajayi (1994: 64):

The concept of national history has a significant role both nationally and internationally in the very struggle for independence, the struggle to undermine the ideologies and myths which had sought to give some legitimacy to the crumbling empire (Ade Ajayi, 1961: 206-213).

Ade Ajayi (1994: 64) argues that the idea of national history challenges fundamental notions of the Euro-centric assumptions about Africa and decolonizes the minds of the masses including many of the new political elite who had been nurtured on such credulous ideas. Examples of such assumptions, according to Ade Ajayi (1994: 64-65) include the thinking:

... that Africans were a people without a history; people for whom time stood still; people who had no writing and who had invented nothing; people outside the march of human progress. The ideological challenge was thus specifically on the plane of history. Not only was the supposed absence of history regarded as a mark of inferiority justifying the imposition of colonial rule, it also reflected adversely on the state of their preparedness for independence and their future capacity to manage a state in the modern world. The state itself was said to be a creation of the colonial rulers; the vociferous leaders were creatures of Western education who required several more years, if not generations, of further tutelage.

The essentials of the counter-arguments to these assumptions, summed up here above, according to Ade Ajayi (1994: 65) include the claims that:

- Africa, the cradle of mankind, has been very much part of the historical world and Africans, like other peoples, have their history and cherish it;
- the new nation owes its existence to its history and not to the fortuitous act of the colonial power. The nation is not just the territory brought together by the act of partition, and to that extent a creation of the colonial power, but the peoples whose history extended back to long before the act of partition;
- there was nothing in the history of the intergroup relations in the pre-colonial past to indicate that the people could not live together and form a nation just like the warring peoples who now lived peacefully together within such nation states as Germany and Britain, not to mention the USA and the Soviet Union (sic);
- the nation's pre-colonial history provides enough demonstration of remarkable ability to establish and manage major political institutions.

The foregoing are some of the essential historical features and particularities of the African state both in the pre-colonial and colonial periods. In post-colonial Africa, however, a number of developmental challenges have steered the continent in the face. For instance, the Central African sub-region has been in quest of an effective framework for establishing a truly democratic and

representative government capable of serving the goals of nation-building and the autonomous capitalist development of the state.

The role of the imperial powers in preserving their economic interests and spheres of influence within this sub-region has been advanced largely, through numerous neo-colonial machinations, which have often included the promotion of different divide-and-rule tactics and the reduction of the area to a playground of the superpowers, especially at the height of the Cold War. These attempts have made the various post-independence experiments in nation-building occur in highly conflictual contexts with limited results being recorded in the direction of success (CODESRIA, 2003: 1).

In East Africa, most states in the sub-region are also faced with broadly similar challenges of nation-building and socio-economic development—problems, which are not helped by the highly pluralistic manner in which domestic political alliances have been forged along ethnic and religious lines, and which also exhibit significant levels of social polarization. In Southern Africa, following the end of the white minority rule and the eventual installation of a black majority government, there has been the preoccupation with democratization, regional co-operation, integration and continental renaissance. In West Africa, in spite of the recorded achievements of the Afro-centric and other pro-independence movements, and the promises, which came with the first decade of independence, the sub-region later threw up a range of challenges, which resulted from both domestic problems and serious external constraints. Some of the clearest expressions of such challenges included the loss of confidence, which built up between the nationalist politicians and various social movements whose support gave meaning, content and a democratic spirit to the national liberation struggle.

## **2.7 Conclusion**

This chapter has examined a number of issues, which must be properly understood in order to appreciate the biography and theoretical orientations of the late Claude Ake. It has drawn attention to the nature of government, politics and social relations in Africa in the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods. It captured the factors, developments and contradictions in Europe, which necessitated the capitalist penetration of Africa. It has also discussed the character and mode of organization of the colonial economy including the contraptions and contradictions, which characterized the colonial state and society. In doing this, it situated the development and emergence of nationalist agitations and decolonization struggles within the context of the crises and

contradictions of the colonial state and economy. Further, attention has been paid to the emergence and role of popular forces and the various social movements in the struggles for an independent Africa. The chapter has therefore examined issues at the intersection of Africa's economic, political and social history. These have helped in capturing the political and socio-economic structures of the continent.

The central argument, which has been emphasized so far, is meant to demonstrate the fact that the antecedents of intellectual and political struggles in colonial and post-colonial Africa, together with the African experiences of struggles in the pre-colonial era, shaped and informed Ake's ideas, scholarship and writings. These experiences, together with the intellectual renditions, which accompanied the struggles for independence and local ownership of the African social sciences, constitute the actual intellectual roots and sources of Ake's radical inspiration, paradigm shift and revolutionary inclinations. The study has therefore shown Ake to be a scholar who, though was influenced by the realities of the colonial situation, was not limited to it.

By situating Ake's biography and theoretical orientations within the experiences and realities in Africa, the study has presented Ake's scholarship and works as products of such experiences, rather than abstracting him from the complex social history, within which he lived and worked. In this sense, the story of his biography is therefore best narrated in a manner that centres among others, on how he as an individual not only comes into existence, but also makes sense of his existence and concretizes that existence.

The methodological implication of our approach is that Ake's life and writings, together with his consciousness and experiences must be evaluated through an interrogative analysis of the historical interplay of such interactions between the various productive forces and class relations, which make up the entire social structure in Africa. This helps us appreciate not just how his ideas are represented and constituted, but also his contributions towards resolving the epistemological and other challenges confronted in the enterprise of knowledge production in the continent.

## CHAPTER THREE

### CLAUDE AKE ON THE TRAVAILS OF THE STATE, DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

#### 3.1 Introduction

This chapter converges around the argument made by V. G. Afanasyev (1980: 281):

No question has been more confused by bourgeois sociologists than that of the state...because no other question is as vital to the interest of the ruling classes. Bourgeois ideologists picture the state as some kind of supernatural force given to man by providence since time immemorial. It supposedly has no class character and is merely an innocuous "instrument of order", an "arbiter" called upon to resolve disputes which may arise between people regardless of their class affiliation. Such a "theory" of the state serves to justify the privileges of the bourgeoisie and the existence of exploitation and capitalism.

How does Ake aid our understanding of the state, democracy and development in Africa? What issues are implicated in his theorization of the state, democracy and development in general theoretical terms and also in relation to Africa? What are the implications of his writings and postulations on these concepts for an understanding of political thought in the continent? And, how does an understanding of such works further our understanding of the larger history, nature and character of the state, the crisis of democracy and the problems impeding the development processes in the continent? This chapter is an attempt to answer these questions. In doing this, the chapter examines the ideas about the state and society, democracy and development in colonial and post-colonial Africa, as set forth in the intellectual works of Ake. It examines his writings on the features of the state in Africa, the role of the state in advancing democracy, development and industrialization, the context and obstacles to development as well as the problems and prospects of sustainable democratic transitions in the continent.

Methodologically, the approach that is adopted in the chapter captures Ake's contributions and positions on these three concepts. It limits the chapter to an examination of the concepts, and other relevant issues raised, only within the works of Claude Ake. The analysis and evaluation of his contributions are presented elsewhere in the chapter that follows. Similarly, the arguments of other scholars on these concepts and issues are examined in the next chapter. This approach is premised on the researcher's thinking that, unless we begin with a clear recapitulation of his major arguments and theoretical positions on these concepts, the analyses, critiques and conclusions reached on them may not bear well, or adequately capture



the details of his works. The epigraph at the beginning of this chapter illustrates how contentious the issues and questions, which impinge on the state, are, not only for political theory, but also for members of the dominant classes of every society, particularly capitalist societies. According to David Held (1985: 1), nothing has been more contested and central to political and social theory than the issues, which concern the nature of the state. Held (1985: 1-6) describes them as 'real issues' and 'great matters of politics', around which unlimited conflicts of interests and interpretations exist. Such conflicts of interpretation have been articulated through numerous questions.

For example, it has been asked: How have modern states been formed and how has the relationship between the state and society changed in the process? What processes informed state formation in different historical contexts and geographical settings? What historical forces, factors and experiences informed the development of modern states in Western Europe and North America? Similarly, what processes and experiences shaped the development of the modern state in Africa and other parts of the Third World? What constitutes the 'modernity' in modern states? How does one define it and through what social processes did they acquire such pronounced features? How do the states in the North and South respond to the challenges of nationalism, rapid social change, globalization and a host of other influences—internally and externally—which impact on state formation and sovereignty? In particular, how is the African state negotiating globalization, modernity and other global developments? And, how is historical transformation taking place in post-colonial societies generally? Lastly, what are the implications of the different trajectories of state formation in the West and the East for the development of the modern state? Focusing on Ake's corpus, these questions form the core concern of this study. But first, let us follow and capture his arguments.

### **3.2 Ake on the State in Political Theory**

This section evaluates Ake's positions on the state in a general theoretical sense. In doing this, his works on the state are located within the neo-Marxist theory of the state, particularly in relation to Africa. This way, such works are treated as parts of a larger body of theoretical works on the state in Africa and the Third World. Put together, these are contributions by leading political theorists from the South, developed in response to the limitations noted not just in classical and neo-classical theories of the state, but also in orthodox Marxism—especially—in their reference to non-metropolitan societies. In addition to the established

weaknesses in orthodox Marxism, these neo-Marxist theories were developed in response to a vital question posed by Marx, quoted in Colin Leys (1978: 241):

The most important question of all those which are at stake in the debate about "dependency", "underdevelopment", "imperialism" and "the state" in Africa is whether (or not) there are enough theoretical reasons for thinking that the ex-colonies can or cannot (as Marx put it) "adapt the bourgeois mode of production" and develop their productive forces within it.

Focusing on different aspects of the historiography of Africa and the Third World, these theories were put together by a group of radical scholars, largely of Third World origin. These scholars include Claude Ake, Samir Amin, Hamza Alavi, Paul Baran, Gunnar Myrdal, Mahmood Mamdani, Dani W. Nabudere, Issa G. Shivji and Emmanuel Hansen. Others are Ashis Nandy, Bipan Chandra and Partha Chatterjee, Theotonio Dos Santos, Andre Gunder Frank, Giovanni Arrighi and Celso P. S. Furtado, Walter Rodney and Ernesto Laclau. At another level, these scholars include Edward Said, Arghiri Emmanuel, Doug Mceachern, Peter B. Mayer, G. R. Knight, P. L. Burns, J. Castro, Jagdish Bhagwati, Amartya K. Sen, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Teodor Shanin, Achille Mbembe and Peter P. Ekeh.

Ake's writings on the state are divided into three. First, he captures the 'historical status' of the state, its 'features' and 'particularities' in a general theoretical sense, especially with reference to the advanced capitalist societies in Europe and North America. Second, he compares the experiences of the state in the advanced capitalist societies in the West with the known experience of the state in Africa. In doing this, he contrasts 'the trajectory of the state and power' in Europe and other 'core' capitalist societies, from what obtains in Africa and other parts of the 'periphery'. Third, focusing on Africa, he discusses what he calls 'the unique features of the state in Africa' and other peripheral formations. He then spells out 'the implications of the manner in which the state is constituted in the continent', for conflict, democracy, development and other expectations of statehood. Conceptually, Ake (1985a: 105) observes that even though it is very rich and profound in meaning, the concept of the state is one of the most difficult concepts to define in the social sciences. He affirms that more than anywhere else in the world, the controversial and conceptual ambiguities in the meaning and theoretical status of the state, are most compounded in Africa. He therefore emphasizes the need for adequate conceptual clarity, added with an understanding of the state, and its status in both social and political theory. Ake (1985a: 105) argues that:

It is difficult enough to write about the state, much more its future. To the extent that we hardly understand the state and its laws of motion, it is difficult to see our way toward its future development. All these difficulties are compounded in the case of Africa where the common sense notions of the empirical referents of the state do not appear to apply. It is not clear whether we have states in formation or a new complex totality that is already fully formed.

Generally, Ake (1985a: 105) defines the state as a set of relationships and interactions among social classes and groups, which are organized, regulated and sustained by political power. As the nodal point of the transformation of these relationships, political power implies the monopoly of the legitimate means of physical coercion and a set of institutions over a given territory. According to Ake (1985a: 105):

The state is a specific modality of class domination. This modality is one in which class domination is mediated by commodity exchange so that the system of institutional mechanisms of domination is differentiated and dissociated from the ruling class and even the society, and appears as an objective force standing alongside society. The essential feature of the state form of domination is that the system of institutional mechanisms of domination is autonomised and becomes largely independent of the social classes including the hegemonic class.

Importantly, even though he recognizes socialist and other non-capitalist formations, Ake presents the state as essentially a capitalist phenomenon. He underscores the particularities of the capitalist mode of production as the ideal typical setting for the development of the state form of domination. According to him, the thoroughgoing generalization of commodity production and exchange, which characterize this mode of production allow the high degree of autonomization of class domination (Ake, 1985a: 106). He demonstrates this by illustrating the relationship between the pervasive autonomization of commodity exchange and the autonomization of class domination. He stresses that under the capitalist mode of production, particularly, under conditions of 'pervasive commoditization', which include that of labour power, society becomes highly atomized, such that people are first and foremost commodity bearers, even when their sole commodity is their labour power. In the process, society is reduced increasingly and perpetually to a market economy, society is governed and operated mainly by the logic of the market and the dictates of capital—and social life revolves around the norms of individualism, competition and equality—such that as they pursue their particular interests, members of this market economy become individually interdependent and collectively dependent on the forces of the market. Again, such forces of the market are produced and reproduced through their daily interactive decisions, which appear as an

independent force that subordinates and dominates them. Ake (1985a: 106) represents these by what he calls 'the autonomizing matrix of domination for solidarity', which coerces all into interdependence and subordination, and behind which is the domination of man by man, and the domination of labour by capital. These are constituted in such a manner that economic domination seems to operate independent of the social groups that dominate, and is therefore perceived as a natural force within society, or at any rate, as an impersonal market force.

The central feature of the state both in political theory and also in the 'core' capitalist societies in the West, according to Ake (1985a: 106-107), is most clearly expressed in what he calls "the autonomisation of the mechanisms of domination". As Ake puts it, this does not mean that the state is entirely neutral, but that it is significantly independent and autonomous of the existing social and even hegemonic classes within it. Ake (1985a: 107) confirms this:

The autonomization of the mechanisms of domination does not mean that the state is class neutral. On the contrary. Although the state is institutionally constituted so that it is relatively independent of the social classes including the dominant social class, it is by no means independent of the mode of production. State domination remains class domination not in spite of autonomization but precisely because of it. Autonomization, among other things, institutionalises the equal treatment of unequals that underlies the capital relation. Thus epitomized as the rule of law, autonomization reproduces the rule of capital over labor by the very rights it guarantees, for example, the worker's right to sell his labor to whoever he or she pleases, the capitalist's right to surplus value and its free disposal.

Here, it becomes clear that Ake identifies 'autonomization' as the essence of the state, not only in political theory, but also in the advanced capitalist societies. According to him, the notion of autonomization as the most important and objective essence of the state is concretely expressed in two ways. One, as noted earlier, and to a very significant extent, in the fact that economic domination operates independent of the social groups that dominate and is perceived as a natural force, or, at any rate, as an impersonal force. Ake (1985a: 106) calls this 'market forces'. Two, in the political sphere. Ake argues that the autonomization of domination is generated and reproduced through the mediation of commodity production and exchange, namely in 'the manner in which the state is constituted'. As Ake (1985a: 106) puts it:

The executive powers of the state evolved historically, neither in abstraction, nor independent of, but from the economically and socially atomised, formally free, equal, self-interested proprietors and commodity bearers, which developed as independent public forces that operate in conformity to the rule of law within the society.

In this sense, just as the laws of supply and demand operate in the sphere of the economy, the rule of law expresses the disembodiment of political domination. Ake (1985a: 107) then describes the nature of the state's autonomization in socialist formations:

Socialism comes in the maturity of capitalism with all its special features, pervasive commoditization and exchange, social atomisation, and the emergence of the legal subject as the political correlate of the commodity form. Socialism does not simply abolish or reverse these features. It initially lives with them though not without modification according to its necessities. Most importantly, it does not initially abolish private property but rather changes its form—at least this is true of historical socialist states generally. What historical socialist states tend to have is public ownership of property. Under this form of ownership, the control of the means of production is effectively monopolised in a few hands and, apart from these few monopolizers, the bulk of the society still faces the problem of the separation of labor power from the means of its realization. Those who control the means of production in the name of the state are able to subordinate and dominate the others all the more completely because they also have political power and because there is no free mobility of labor, a feature that disguises wage labor. Thus labor remains alienated and opposed, if not to ownership, at least to control. Historical socialist formations are still a long way from social ownership of the means of production and the liquidation of alienation and subordination.

In summary, even though he concedes that socialist and other non-capitalist forms of the state's domination also exist, Ake presents the state's form of domination under capitalism as that under which autonomization and other essential features of the state are well expressed and most developed. He thus makes a great deal of efforts not only in theorizing the state, but also in explaining its historical evolution, particularities and features in Europe and other advanced capitalist formations. This helps us, not just in establishing the differences in the historical development, particularities and features of the states in the East and West, but also in appreciating their implications for democracy, development and other expectations of statehood in these regions.

### **3.3 Ake on the State in Africa**

One major argument in Ake's analysis of the state in Africa is that an understanding of the history, nature, character and composition of the state is very important in trying to capture the dynamics of its operations (Ake 1985a and 1985b). To him, this is mainly because the state is the central locus of politics and therefore the major determinant of the direction of most societal activities and processes. The following positions are central in Ake's analyses of the state in Africa. One, deriving from his presentation of the state as essentially a capitalist phenomenon, Ake (1985a: 108) refrains from using the concept of 'state' for referring to the social formations in Africa. He characterizes the capitalist mode of

production as the ideal typical setting for the development of the state's form of domination. That is, he presents the state's form of domination under capitalism as that under which autonomization and other essential features of the state are actually developed. From this, he describes the specific form of capitalist development, which occurred in Africa as both 'enclave' and 'peripheral'. Inferring that the state in Africa is a colonial creation, he doubts and questions, the conceptual appropriateness of referring to the social formations in Africa as 'states'. As he puts it, this is mainly because, "the process of state-formation in the continent appears to be bogged down by knotty contradictions, which stubbornly resist transcendence" (Ake, 1985b: 3 and 4ff). As such, instead of using the concept of 'the state in Africa', he rather talks of 'the social formations in Africa'. According to Ake (1985a: 108), "In Africa, there are few social formations that are capitalist enough or socialist enough to be identified as clearly boasting the state form of domination".

Two, Ake (1985a and 1985b) examines the history of 'the modern state in Africa'. He traces this to the impact of two historical processes and developments, which reinforce each other, especially, in terms of their structures and impact. These are, (i) colonialism and the capitalist penetration of Africa, and (ii) the eventual political legacy of colonialism for the continent (Ake, 1981: 1-6). He argues that the peculiarity of Africa's colonial experience was markedly different from what obtained in the Americas, Europe and Asia. According to him, even though the colonial state was created by the peculiar circumstances of the colonial situation, colonialism in Africa was unusually 'statist'. His definition of colonial statism suggests that the colonial state was both 'absolute' and 'arbitrary'—a combination—which translated into an unusually autocratic situation (Ake, 1996: 1–3). Ake (1996: 2) illustrates this position:

The colonial state redistributed land and determined who should produce what and how. It attended to the supply of labor, sometimes resorting to forced labor; it churned out administrative instruments and legislated taxes to induce the break up of traditional social relations of production, the atomisation of society, and the process of proletarianization. It went into the business of education to ensure that workers could do the jobs they were required to perform and would remain steadfast in the performance of their often tedious and disagreeable tasks. It built roads, railways, and ports to facilitate the collection and export of commodities as well as the import of manufactured goods. It sold commodities through commodity boards. Indeed, it controlled every aspect of the colonial economy tightly to maintain its power and domination and to realize the economic objectives of colonization.

As Ake (1996: 2–3) argues, having emerged 'to do everything' and 'perform all functions', the colonial state was unusually powerful. It combined all powers within the colonial society. It ruthlessly eliminated all forms of democratic resistance and resentments, hostilities and

oppositions from the colonized, and also perpetuated the foreign interests of the colonial order. This 'statism' of the colonial state made it both 'absolute' and 'arbitrary'. These absoluteness and arbitrariness of the colonial state were articulated through the policies and programmes of the various colonial administrations. Through these policies and programmes, the colonial state changed the material circumstances of the colonized Africans by forcefully integrating them into the colonial and later, world capitalist economies and by compelling them to participate in colonial economic activities, which were dominated by profit motive, thus reorienting their economic world outlook. Ake (1985: 2) illustrates these experiences with the situations in East and West Africa:

For instance, the colonial governments made the colonies produce the commodities they needed. When the Gold Coast (now Ghana) was colonized, it did not farm cocoa. The colonial government decided that the country would be suitable ground for farming cocoa and duly introduced the crop. In 1865 the country started exporting cocoa, and by 1901 it was the leading producer of the commodity in the world. It quickly became a monocultural cocoa economy; by 1939 cocoa accounted for 80 per cent of the value of its exports. In Kenya, the Coffee Plantation Registration Ordinance of 1918 forbade the growing of coffee, the country's most profitable commodity, by Africans. The purpose was to make Africans available for wage labor by keeping them from becoming independent producers as well as to prevent them from stealing coffee from European farms by ensuring they could not legally possess coffee. Other examples of arbitrariness include the reservation of the White Highlands in Kenya for European farmers and the Marketing of Native Produce Ordinance of 1935, which restricted wholesale marketing to Europeans and barred Africans.

The 'statism' of the colonial state, together with its 'arbitrariness' and 'absoluteness' created some other features for this state. On the one hand, rather than including the people, it was an excluding state, which alienated and left out majority of the people in its economic and political, decision-making processes. It was also 'autocratic' and 'undemocratic'. In particular, the undemocratic nature of the colonial state was illustrated not only in the colonial governmental processes, but also in the unrepresentative character of the various constitutional processes, which characterized the struggles towards independence. Rather than being inclusive, tolerant and participatory, the colonial state repressed and exterminated opposition to its rule and interests with unimaginable cruelty. According to Ake (1996: 3), all these features of the colonial state shaped the nature and character of politics in the colonial and post-colonial periods. They were also compounded by the failure of the colonial state to transform its efficiency norms into either legality or legitimacy norms. As Ake (1996: 3) emphasizes:

As if to underscore the arbitrariness of the power of the colonial state, its officials showed hardly, any interest in transforming domination into hegemony, beyond the notion that their domination was also a civilizing mission. The colonial situation was not unlike Hobbes's pre-political state, in which all claims are arbitrary and all rights are only powers. In the essentially military situation of imposing and maintaining colonial domination, the colonizers had no choice but to reject in principle any restrictions on their use of power. There may have been circumstances in which the use of state power was not arbitrary in practice, but it was always in principle.

Continuing, Ake (1996: 3) argues that:

Colonial politics was thus reduced to the crude mechanics of opposing forces driven by the calculus of power. For everyone in this political arena, security lay only in the accumulation of power. The result was an unprecedented drive for power; power was made the top priority in all circumstances and sought by all means. As the rulers and subordinates extended their rights to their powers, the idea of lawful political competition became impossible, and politics was inevitably reduced to a single issue: the determination of two exclusive claims to rulership. This politics hardly encouraged moderation and compromise.

Ake describes 'state-building' in the continent as a product of these critical historical processes. He explains the development of the state in Africa from two related activities which occurred under colonialism. First, from the centralization of power, based on the imposition of political control and domination by the imperial powers over the discrete pre-colonial social formations, which hitherto existed as separate and independent political entities. He calls these processes of centralization 'vertical articulations of power'. According to Ake (1997: 3), these were put in place through:

.... the imposition of a chain of command, the extraction of political allegiance and taxation, the making and administration of law, the transformation of the subject social formations into a coherent polity and economy and the breakdown of centres of resistance to the centralizing nucleus. Vertical articulations, started since colonial times, continue today with only modest achievement in state-building.

Second, he argues that given the threats, which they posed on the emergent socio-economic formations, these vertical processes in the centralization of power also reproduced 'horizontal articulations', by which Ake (1997: 3) refers to:

.... the renewal of primordial identities and solidarities as a defence against the coercive incursion of central power and competition among the subject communities to access central power and if possible capture it, competition to capture the economic resources and opportunities accruing from economic development, strategies for evading the state's demands and coercive sanctions, alliances and projects for local empowerment, the cultivation by groups of identities and solidarities, manoeuvres for forms of exclusivity by which elites of particular groups and communities attempt to disable or to disenfranchise potential competitors.



From these, he dismisses the misplaced assumption that state-building either took place, or is taking place in Africa. He argues that what occurs in Africa is rather a regrettable negation of it. According to him, being built on domination, rather hegemony, in a context of deep social cleavages, the absence of an objective force to mediate conflict, a rudimentary development of the rule of law, and the phenomenon and incidence of violence, the various groups of ethnicities and nationalities, which the state seeks to unite rather tend to disintegrate in spite of the overwhelming coercive apparatuses of the state in Africa. Underscoring the implications, which these have for the integration of the state, Ake (1997: 3–4) notes that:

People tendentially retreat into primary groups, which become the beneficiary of their residual loyalty. This centrifugal tendency is enhanced by changing international attitudes towards the necessity of state building and the sanctity of the state. The international community is giving stronger support to human rights, minority rights and democratization in full knowledge that such support affects the stability and viability of states. There is more tolerance of the prospects of state disintegration after the cold war when the strategic interests of the great powers and the conditions of global stability have been redefined. The process of globalization especially economic transnationalization and regional integration and the new telecommunications technologies have created a situation in which the state no longer looks like the inevitable political organization of humankind.

In the post-colonial situation, these realities about the state in Africa have not changed. Even though independence changed the composition of the managers of the state, the character of the state remains the same, much as it was in the colonial period. The scope of the state's power remains totalistic and its economic orientation has continued to be largely statist. The state presents itself as a mighty apparatus of violence, with a very weak economic base, and limited or no representation in social and popular forces, thus unduly relying on coercion as its sole mechanism for realizing compliance. These situations are worsened by the decision of 'the nationalist elite' to 'inherit', 'consolidate' and 'appropriate' the colonial system of oppression, rather than transforming it. Ake (2000: 37) captures the salient features of the post-colonial state:

As we have seen, in post-colonial Africa the state was everything. It controlled the economy, polity and society, its presence was ubiquitous and its power enormous, unchecked by constitutional constraints, a mature political culture or a vibrant civil society. Those who did not have access to state power were at the mercy of those who did. In most of post-colonial Africa the only way for elites to secure life and property and some freedom was to be in control, at any rate, to share in the control of state power.

Three, from these, Ake (1985a: 108–110) examines what he calls 'the unique feature of the state in Africa'. This is by no means the 'only feature' of the state in Africa, but rather, the

'main' or, 'central feature' of the state in the continent. According to him, the unique feature of the socio-economic formations in post-colonial Africa is that, "the state, if we can properly talk of such an existence at all, has extremely limited autonomy". With this, Ake (1985a: 108) argues that:

The state is composed in such a way that it enjoys limited independence from the social classes—particularly the hegemonic social class—and is immersed in class struggle. Because autonomization is the essence of the state as a modality of domination, it is not clear whether we can properly talk of the state in postcolonial Africa. That is not to say that government does not exist, or even that there is no coercive apparatus for the subordination of some social groups to others. After all, the state is only a particular modality of class domination.

This, according to Ake (1985a: 109) suggests the case for thinking of the post-colonial state in Africa in terms of "states in formation". Reflecting on this concept, Ake (1985a: 109ff) attributes the limited autonomy of the state in Africa to two mutually reinforcing factors, namely, (i) the non-pervasiveness of commodification, and (ii) the low level of development of productive forces. Theoretically, these suggest two features, in the economic and political spheres of the state. In the economic sphere, this means that in contrast to the experiences in the 'core', or advanced capitalist societies, in Africa, the state's form of domination, including economic domination, do not exist independent of the social groups that dominate, and that the state is neither independent, nor is it perceived as an impersonal force. In the political sphere, 'the manner in which the state is constituted' does not allow for the autonomy of the state's form of domination. Relatedly, the state's form of domination, which clearly reflects a case of non-autonomization was neither developed, nor reproduced through the mediation of commodity production and exchange relations, but instead, through colonialism, and later, in the post-colonial period, through the accumulative tendencies, cake-sharing psychosis and other distributive pressures of members of the dominating classes, who seek state power, not as a means for serving the people, but for their own selfish interests.

In other words, in Africa, the state developed not from any group of people or social classes who were socially atomized, formally free, equal and self-interested proprietors, which Ake (1985a: 106) calls "the community of commodity bearers", who work towards the evolution of the state's executive power or government as an independent public force, that operates in conformity to the rule of law. To the contrary. In Africa, the state emerged not only as a

negation of the rule of law, but also as a perversion of the conditions of a market society. According to Ake (1985a: 109):

In the social formations of Africa that are supposedly capitalist, the capitalist sector that dominates the economy is small and retains an enclave character. The bulk of the socioeconomic formation is only partially atomized and is engaged in commodity production and exchange in a limited manner. For the most part, pre-capitalist relations of production prevail though in various stages of decay. Inasmuch as the commodity form is developed in only a rudimentary form, so is the legal form. The legal subject is yet to emerge fully and so the bulk of the population is only nominally in civil society. In the circumstances, the social formation cannot institutionalise individualism, competition, freedom, and equality as its operative norms. The net effect of all this is that there is only a rudimentary autonomization of class domination.

Even in situations where socialism coterminates with other non-socialist modes of production, Ake (1985a: 109) observes that the experiences are not 'fundamentally' different:

In the African social formations that are purportedly socialist, the problem is somewhat different. Socialism, such as it is, has not come in the maturity of capitalism, but upon a social formation in which the development of productive forces is at a primitive stage and pre-capitalist social relations remain strong. So there is a very limited possibility of class domination being mediated and autonomized effectively by commodity production and exchange. As we have seen, the autonomization of the socialist state depends a great deal on those societal features that are associated with the existence of mature capitalism.

He traces the limited autonomy of the state in post-colonial Africa to (i) the implications of the colonial domination of the continent, (ii) the sustained systems and structures of economic and political power relations left behind by the imperial powers, and (iii) the ongoing capitalist exploitation of the continent. The connections, which he establishes between the limited autonomy of the post-colonial state in Africa and the political legacy of colonialism are further understood, if we consider the implications of his definition of 'the post-colonial state', as the discursive referent for the post-independent polities in Africa. With this concept, he suggests that decolonization struggles in Africa left the character of the state largely unquestioned. According to Ake (1981: 88):

The expression 'postcolonial'... does not mean that an economy has been decolonised, i. e. that it no longer possesses the features of a colonial economy...The expression which follows conventional usage here is merely a convenient way of talking about the economy at a particular historical period—namely, the period following the winning of formal political independence.

The untransformed character of the neo-colonial state in Africa is what Ake refers to as the extension and continued dominance of the logic of the colonial state. By this, Ake argues that the current logic, which drives the post-colonial state, derives from the historical mode of Africa's incorporation into the world capitalist system and the dominant forces controlling that process. With this concept, Ake bemoans the decision of the nationalist elites to take over the colonial system, rather than transforming it—a decision—which alienates these nationalist leaders from the masses of their people, and also makes the genuine pursuit of development all but impossible (1993: 70 and 73). According to Ake (1981: 88):

By contrasting the structures of African economies in their colonial and postcolonial phases there is an implicit assumption that the winning of political independence was a watershed in the history of Africa, and that it was a change which could reasonably be expected to have had a major, if not decisive, impact on the future development of African economies. This assumption is not unreasonable. The nationalist petit-bourgeoisie which fought for independence had insisted that political independence was the essential preliminary to a fundamental restructuring of the colonial economy, and many students of Africa seemed to agree that the political hegemony of the colonisers was a critical factor in the underdevelopment of African social formations. After....decades of political independence in Africa available evidence on the validity of this assumption is ambiguous.

Thus for Ake, given its history and the context of imperialism, the state in Africa, like other peripheral formations in the Third World, not only enjoys very limited autonomy from the social classes, particularly, the hegemonic classes, but is also immersed in the struggles. In effect, political struggles assume the Hobbesian character in which differences are not easily mediated. The state is therefore often immersed in such struggles and its rules—whatever they are—which govern political competition and other aspects of the social life do not have adequate institutional guarantee of their impartiality. These lead to normless political and economic competitions, which are conducted in clear preference of efficiency to legitimacy norms. According to Ake (1985):

Contending groups struggle on grimly, polarising their differences and convinced that their ability to protect their interests and to obtain justice is coextensive with their power. That creates the politics of anxiety. In this type of politics, there is deep alienation and distrust among political competitors. Consequently, they are profoundly afraid of being in the power of their opponents. This fear in turn breeds a huge appetite for power, which is sought without restraint and used without restraint. This is the type of politics that has prevailed ...since independence.

Four, he examines 'the implications of the limited autonomy of the state in Africa'. These are many, but only six will be considered here. One, the limited autonomization of the state in

Africa hampers the historically progressive role of capitalism in stimulating the development of productive forces. As he explains, this occurs, because the manner in which the state is constituted allows for accumulation without compelling any objective involvement in productive activities. Two, is what he calls the limitations inherent in 'the possibilities of increasing the autonomy of the state through the universalisation of the proletarian condition in the continent'. Ake describes these as highly limited, especially given the constraints imposed by the state on the development of productive forces, and the small size of the proletariat itself as a social force. According to Ake (1985a: 109):

It is not clear what the universalisation of the proletarian condition would entail in the circumstances or what the objective interest behind such universalisation would be. Nor is it easy to see how the rule of law is to be institutionalised in a context in which the commodity form is underdeveloped, the legal form less developed still, and the bulk of the people only nominally in civil society. More often than not, we find a socialism of public ownership (and not social ownership) that conceals a crude form of private ownership, a socialism of arbitrary power exercised by a small group with a very narrow social base. It would appear that in Africa, both socialism and capitalism tend to exist as caricatures.

The third implication of the state's limited autonomy in Africa, which Ake examines, is illustrated, not only in the immersion of the state in class struggle, but also in the fact that the state is neither neutral nor strong enough as to mediate it. Related to this, is the fact that the rule of law itself is not properly instituted, with the result that political competition is without norms, and is conducted often, without respect for moral, legal, or constitutional restraints. According to Ake (1985a: 112), all these, together with the centrality of the post-colonial state, place a high premium on political power and also make the struggle for power, largely 'Hobbesian'. Four, Ake argues that the summation of this state of affairs tends to block the development of productive forces generally and economic development in particular. Ake (1985a: 112) explains this:

First, because the power struggle is so intense, politics becomes an absorbing pursuit to the detriment of everything else including economic development. Those in power develop a siege mentality and see everything in terms of increasing their power. A tradition of authoritarianism and brutality has made mobilisation for development impossible.

Five, from this, he explains the concept of 'political repression' as a prominent feature of the social formations in Africa, which is now so absorbing that it negates the people as the 'essence' and 'end' of development. Ake (1985a: 112) confirms this:

...there is now no question of any meaningful pursuit of self-reliant strategy of development that is so badly needed because such a strategy can only work if the people themselves undertake development for their own good. Finally, the high premium on power and the absorbing political struggle of the dominant class has reinforced (to the detriment of development) the division of labor between the African bourgeoisie and international capital. It has encouraged the African bourgeoisie to continue to concentrate on maintaining the political conditions of accumulation while leaving the production side to international capital.

The last implication of the limited autonomy of the state in Africa, which Ake discusses, is what he calls "the contradiction between the form and content of the prevailing modes of production in Africa", namely, 'capitalism and socialism'. He extrapolates this contradiction from his illustrations of the implications of the limited autonomy of the state in Africa. With this, he refers to the cotermination of capitalism and socialism with non-capitalist and non-socialist modes of production in different places and times in the continent. Ake maintains that this contradiction is reflected among others, in the existence of 'enclave', 'dependent' and 'deformed capitalism', which reinforces the vicious circle of the non-autonomization of the state and the underdevelopment of its forces of production. According to Ake (1985a: 113):

In the capitalist formations, an essentially enclave capitalism exists in contradiction to a social formation in which precapitalist social relations widely prevail. But more importantly within this enclave capitalism, the form and content are in stark contradiction. For when the practice is examined, it invariably reveals that labor is often not free; there are many vestiges of primitive accumulation; a tendency to use state power for accumulation, and associated with that the interposition of coercion in the labor process to the impediment of the operation of the law of value; and a ruling class that is quite dissociated from production. This deformed capitalism cannot fulfil the historical role of liberating the forces of production.

Continuing, Ake says even in the 'socialist' countries in Africa, once we look beyond the stated stance or formal ideological commitment to scientific socialism, this same contradiction of form and content also exists. According to him, in practice, there are no entrenched systems of social ownership of the means of production. Ake (1985a: 114) observes that:

What we see is a public ownership of property that turns out to be a singularly regressive form of private property: separation of labor from the objective conditions of labor; the concentration of control of the means of production in few hands; the concentration of political power in the same hands and along with that a high degree of authoritarianism; and the political demobilization of the masses. Again the possibilities of socialist development are blocked because socialism presupposes that the objective interests of the masses take command and the people become the engine and the end of development.

In Ake, we see that the history of the state in Africa, its unique features and their implications, are traced to the political legacy of colonialism for the continent. In the post-colonial situation, Ake (1996: 3) argues that even though political independence came with some changes in the composition of the state and its operators:

.... the character of the state remained much as it was in the colonial era. It continued to be totalistic in scope, constituting a statist economy. It presented itself as an apparatus of violence, had a narrow social base, and relied for compliance on coercion rather than authority.

Ake blames the persistence of the neo-colonial character of the state in the post-colonial period, on 'the politics of independence', and other limitations of the decolonization struggles, which he identifies with the politics of the petit-bourgeois class and the emergent nationalist elites. To him, these aggravated the exclusivity of the competing political formations, which in turn increased the premium on political power, the intensity of political competition and the desperate quest for access to the state (Ake, 1996: 5). For example, given the weak material base of the new political elites who had been economically marginalized by the discriminatory economic policies of the colonial regime, when they eventually came to power, they obviously had very limited experience of entrepreneurial activities or initiatives, and very little capital. The only leverage, which they had to explore, was the control of state power as a means of strengthening their material base. According to Ake (1996: 6):

The need for a more secure material base drove the indigenous elite to increase the statism of the economy. An increasing range of economic activities was brought under the control of the state, notably by nationalization, to facilitate the appropriation of wealth by means of state power. The use of state power for accumulation, associated as it is with statism, monopoly power, and the interposition of coercion in the labor process, raised to new heights the premium on the capture of state power.

The last issue, which Ake examines on the state, is 'the future of the state in Africa', and 'the possibilities of resolving the contradictions within it'. He derives this from his earlier argument that the dynamics of social forces in post-colonial Africa reproduces the non-autonomization of class domination and the stagnation of productive forces. From this, he conjectures that the future of the state in Africa is already here and that what we refer to, perhaps improperly, as the state in Africa is the image of its future. Ake (1985a: 114) mobilizes the following argument in support of his view:

That is not to say that there are no possibilities for development or that there are no uncertainties. Such possibilities do exist especially in the deepening contradictions engendered by the reproduction of underdevelopment. Sooner or later these contradictions will mature to resolution. In all probability they will not be resolved in the direction of breakthroughs in capitalist economic development and the founding of a liberal society. Rather, it is more likely to be through socialist revolutions. But these revolutions, reflecting prevailing objective conditions, will be initially distorted to the familiar pattern of excessive repression and hierarchic organization, and the maintenance of private property under the guise of public ownership. However, this will in effect be a non resolution and pressures will mount for an authentic revolutionary resolution and it may well be that there will be real movement in this direction. In this case, the state in Africa will gain autonomization from the universalisation of the proletarian condition. Nonetheless, it will still reflect its history.

To recapitulate, this section has examined some of the issues raised in Ake's analyses of the state in Africa. As we have seen, Ake devotes a detailed attention to the examination of the state in Africa. It has also been shown how the state might best be understood from the point of view of Ake's works. The study has therefore shown Ake as a scholar, who, in accounting for the history and features of the state, derives a lot of inspirations from the colonial situation, although he is not limited to it. In the process, it was shown that in most of Africa, although the specific experiences of individual states are different, the context of evolution of the state and the dynamics of its developments and operations are similar. For instance, as shown above, in most of the settings, colonialism played a major role in developing not only the colonial and later post-colonial states, but also their structures and systems of operations. Accordingly, the issues, which shaped and determined the political-intellectual struggles against the colonial regimes, were also similar.

### **3.4 Ake on Democracy in Africa**

Ake's contribution to the understanding of democracy in Africa is broad, but the following are the major aspects of such contribution. In particular, Ake wrote on the following issues in relation to democracy in Africa, (i) the three arguments in the North against democracy in Africa, (ii) the disturbing misconceptions about democracy in the continent, (iii) the North's attitude to democracy in Africa. By this, reference is made to the politics of democratization in Africa and the sudden preoccupation of the West with the prospects of democracy in Africa, (iv) liberal democracy and the hegemonization of Western interests and values in Africa, especially after the Cold War, (v) Africa's long neglected democracy movement and its support at home and abroad. With this, reference is made to Africa's long and tortuous struggle for democracy, its multiple components and results, (vi) the dynamics of



democratization in Africa, (vii) democracy and economic development, (viii) the feasibility of democracy in Africa, especially in relation to internal factors—namely social classes, Africa's social experiences, social needs—and the international environment, (ix) the role of democracy in resolving conflict and humanitarian emergencies, and (x) Ake's recommendations on the feasibility of democracy in the continent.

Four points are evident from all these, which need to be underscored for explanation. One, Ake's theoretical discussion of democracy and development are anchored on the state in Africa. As we shall see shortly, Ake not only subscribes to the idea of the state as the central instrument of political power in a class society, but also gives the relationship between the state, democracy and development in Africa—particularly, the dependence of democracy and development on the nature and character of the state—the appropriate pride of place. Two, the causal relationships between the character of the state in Africa and the issues of democracy and the developmental potentials and possibilities of the state in Africa are also intrinsically connected in Ake's analyses. Three, many issues are raised in Ake's analyses of the state, democracy and development in Africa, so that what we have examined in this study are only based on a careful selection of some of the most salient aspects of Ake's works. More issues can still be raised, especially by future researchers focusing on other aspects of Ake's works. After all, a single study such as ours cannot in any way capture, or justifiably claim to have captured all the issues raised in Ake's many writings. Hence, the issues examined here are only examples and aspects of his works, which fall within our selected theme, and which also appear in the limited understanding of this researcher to be most desirous of immediate engagement and analysis.

Lastly, in Ake, we do not find any straight-jacketed definition of democracy and development. Rather, what we see are lucid characterizations and illustrations of democracy and development in Africa, his notions of their limitations and constraints, followed by his considered opinions on the possibilities for change. He thus clarifies and debunks a lot of misconceptions about these concepts—especially as they apply to the continent. The selected aspects of his works, noted here for analysis, capture Ake's central theses on democracy, not only in Africa, but also in the world at large. In particular, they capture the crux of his reflections, which show that the triumph of democracy is rather more apparent than real, and that even liberal democracy, which replaced democracy, is itself atrophied in a long process

of devaluation under pressures from bourgeois political quarters and market values, which have compromised its redeeming democratic elements (Ake, 2000: 29). We now proceed to examine the major strands in Ake's works on democracy.

### **3.4.1 Ake on the Arguments in the West against Democracy in Africa**

One, Ake (1993: 72–74) examines the traditional arguments in the West against democracy in Africa and the issues implicated therein. Three issues are raised in this connection. First, it was claimed that Africa has its own unique history and traditions, which are not only inimical to democratic governance, but are essentially rooted in autocracy and despotism, and that the introduction of democracy—an entirely alien concept to Africa—would violate the historical integrity of the African culture. Implied in this notion is the misconception that democracy is solely a Western creation, a misconception, which stems *inter alia*, from the confusion between the principles of democracy and the institutional manifestations of those principles. In response, Ake (1993: 72) identifies the principles of democracy, which include widespread participation, the consent of the governed and public accountability of those in power. He argues that these principles may well prevail in a wide variety of political settings, which may not necessarily be Western and which may also naturally vary according to different historical and sociological conditions. He makes a case for democratic values in pre-colonial political systems in Africa, which he describes as 'invariably patrimonial', and in which he says, consciousness was communal. Other democratic credentials, which Ake (1993: 72) identifies in such political systems include the fact that:

.... everything was everybody's business, engendering a strong emphasis on participation. Standards of accountability were even stricter than in Western societies. Chiefs were answerable not only for their own actions but for natural catastrophes such as famine, epidemics, floods, and drought. In the event of such disasters, chiefs could be required to go into exile or "asked to die".

Secondly, is the argument about the social pluralism of African societies, particularly, their ethnic differences. It was held that given the widespread nature of ethnic conflict in Africa, and their often fragile and immature political culture, societies in the continent must be firmly governed by strong autocrats, and that the liberties offered by democracy would only inflame and multiply the spread of ethnic rivalries, while also posing the danger of political disintegration. The high incidence of ethnic conflict in Africa, and its markedly destructive

nature, especially in Uganda, Equatorial Guinea, Burundi, Nigeria and Rwanda was cited as an illustration of this position. In response, Ake (1993: 72) clarifies that the actual problem in Africa is 'bad leadership' and not 'ethnicity'. Theoretically, he contends that there is nothing inherently conflictual about ethnic differences in any society and that in Africa, such differences lead to strife only when they are politicized by the elites in their quest for power and political support. In addition, he notes that leaders in Africa use the threat of ethnic conflicts to justify political authoritarianism. According to Ake (1993: 72):

Even now, after 30 years of self-government, some African leaders still enlist this spurious defense to rationalize one-party rule. President Daniel arap Moi of Kenya, under increasing pressure to democratize, has repeatedly made this claim. So has Zambian president Kenneth Kaunda, who warned that the adoption of a multiparty system would bring "chaos, bloodshed, and death". President Paul Biya of Cameroon has defended the power monopoly of his Cameroon People's Democratic Movement with similar language; he stresses the party's vanguard role in creating "a united Cameroon devoid of ethnic, linguistic, and religious cleavages". Somehow these leaders cannot see that repeating this argument after 30 years is precisely its refutation. A treatment applied for 30 years that continues to worsen the illness cannot be right.

Thirdly, the question of democracy in Africa was cleverly tied to economic development, asserting that the democratic quest must be reconciled to, and considered in the context of the most pressing needs in the continent, namely, ignorance, poverty and disease. It was reasoned that democracy in itself would neither feed the hungry, cloth the naked, heal the sick, nor will it provide shelter for the homeless. The argument was therefore mobilized that democracy was not the most appropriate priority on the agenda for Africa, because people must be educated and fed before they can appreciate democracy; that there is no choice in ignorance; and that there are no possibilities for self-fulfilment in extreme poverty. In response, Ake (1993: 73) debunks these postulations and describes them as both 'seductive' and 'misguided'.

In advancing his response, Ake makes three vital claims. One that the fundamental issue is not 'whether' eating well is more important than voting, but 'who' should decide 'what' is more important and 'for whom'. In other words, he says, it is up to the people to determine their democratic and developmental needs, based on their own interests and cherished values. His response here is extended into the argument that the determination of Africa's democratic and development needs and agendas by external interests, institutions and forces, 'is in itself' a major negation of both democracy and development. Two, that Africa's failed development experience illustrates that the idea of postponing democracy does not necessarily promote

development or further its chances. Three, that it is rather mistaken to talk about the failure of development in Africa, a continent, where development has never really been tried with the seriousness of attention and sense of purpose, which it deserves. Instead, Ake clarifies that so far, what has taken place in Africa is nothing more than a crudely fabricated plan that 'an embattled and distracted leadership puts together for the sake of appearances', often with the aim of luring prospective donors, for covering its class status and for hiding its detachedness and emptiness in relation to vital developmental and entrepreneurial initiatives. Ake (1993: 74) qualifies this form of development:

Development strategies, reflecting both the scientific dogmatism of development experts and the isolation of African leaders, worked from the top down and were imbued with attitudes hostile to the poor majority. The common people were seen as a major obstacle to development: their expectations were too high, they consumed too much of their meagre incomes, they lacked ambition and self-reliance, they were too lazy and too superstitious. In short, the common people were inherent enemies of progress, even their own progress. This became a justification for disregarding their interests and for brutalizing them in the name of development. As a result, most Africans tend to view the state and its development agents as hostile forces to be evaded, cheated, or thwarted as opportunity permit. They conform as they must and get on with their struggle for survival. They are simply not available for development.

Two, Ake examines some of the disturbing misconceptions about democracy and its processes in Africa. The first, according to him, is the tendency to see democratization as a narrow product of the survivalist strategies engendered by the African crisis. According to him, this notion misconceives democracy in Africa as a process that is limited to the development and onward entrenchment of associational community-based organizations at the grassroots levels. The second misconception in relation to democracy, which Ake corrects, is about democratization as entailing 'destatisation', a view, which Ake sees as becoming widely held in the West, especially among international financial institutions. Ake laments the failure of this theory to differentiate 'the size' of the state in Africa from 'its strength'. He questions the sincerity and applicability of the view that 'weakening' the state can actually further democracy, a correlation, which he describes as empirically invisible. According to Ake (1993: 76), even though the public sector in most African states have become overgrown and over bloated so much so that they now perpetuate corruption, this does not justify the misplaced advocacy for a 'weakening' of the state.

Three, Ake examines the North's attitude to democracy in Africa. Here, reference is made to the politics of democratization in Africa and the sudden preoccupation by the West with its

prospects in the continent. Ake notes that the sudden interest of the West in democracy in Africa had been preceded by a legacy of indifference from the same West to the fate of democracy in the region—a legacy—which he traces to the colonial era, during which the prevailing political discourse not only excluded democracy, but also ignored the entire idea of good government, and during which politics was reduced to the clash of one exclusive claim to power against another. He notes that the same attitude persisted after independence, especially given the limited vision of most African leaders, who rather chose to inherit the colonial system instead of transforming it. In the immediate post-independence period, Ake recalls that the rest of the world heartily encouraged these anti-democratic tendencies by African leaders and that the highest form of support for these autocratic tendencies came from the West, particularly, from Africa's former colonial powers, who were anxious for leverage with the new leaders and therefore gave them their indulgent support. As Ake (1993: 70–71) observes:

The great powers ignored human rights violations and sought clients wherever they could. All these factors helped crystallize a climate of opinion in the West hostile to democracy in Africa. From time to time (as during the Carter administration in the United States) human rights abuses in Africa became an issue, but never democracy. On the rare occasions when Western leaders did discuss democracy in Africa, it was mainly to raise doubts about its feasibility.

Continuing, Ake (1993: 71) explains that:

In the past, the West adopted a posture of indifference to issues of human rights and democracy in Africa in order to avoid jeopardizing its economic and strategic interests and to facilitate its obsessive search for allies against communism.

In accounting for the 'revised' preoccupation of the West with democracy in Africa today, Ake points at the reforms in Eastern Europe, which provided the West with a dramatic vindication of its own values and a sense of the inevitable triumph of liberal democracy. This, according to Ake, contributed to the change in position by the West about the preoccupation with democracy in Africa. To elaborate, in addition to the eventual reform of Eastern Europe, the aggressive vacuity of the Cold War was replaced by the mission of democratization, a project widely believed and accepted in the West, would firmly consolidate the hegemony of Western values all over the world. At another level, Ake (1993: 71) explains the West's changing attitude toward democracy in Africa in terms of the continent's economic marginalization:

The world is now driven less by trade than by capital movements; there has been a massive shift from the production of goods to the provision of services, and from material-intensive to knowledge-intensive industries. At the same time, advances in science and technology have created an increasing number of synthetic products more flexible and more versatile than those that Africa has traditionally exported. These changes have made Africa's primary economies far less relevant to the current economic needs of the West. Now, with the winding down of the Cold War, Africa's strategic significance to the West has also greatly declined. As Europe draws near to unification, even the former colonial powers—notably France—are finding it necessary to downgrade their special relationships with their former colonies, relations far less useful now than they have been in the past.

This, according to Ake, is the context within which the hegemonic West regards and accepts democracy as an important item on the African agenda. Nevertheless, he says, the understanding of this class-informed context of the West's interest and support for democracy in Africa is not enough reason for according it a docile, uncritical and an unqualified appreciation of its advocacy for democratization in the continent. Rather, he says, we must proceed from this premise to ask other critical and thought-provoking questions in this direction. In this connection, he asks: "What role, if any, should the West play in the democratization of Africa"? In other words, to what extent, and, at what level should the West be involved in Africa's quest for democracy? What should be the nature of such involvement and what are the implications of an externally driven democratization process on the values of the people? Ake argues that these questions must be properly answered, because, just like development, even though democracy and its variants can be borrowed, employed and applied to different cultures, settings and locales, the people have a duty to struggle for it and make it happen on their own and in their own way. He says, democratization cannot be made to happen for one people by another. Ake then proposes that beyond the usual verbal exhortations to democratize, the West should exert the leverage available in its relations with Africa for furthering democracy in the continent. He maintains that this leverage can be exerted in two ways, (i) through bilateral relations, and (ii) through Western influence over international financial institutions, especially, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. He recommends an objective use of economic pressures and other political conditionality for coercing autocratic regimes into democratic transitions, and respect for human rights. He describes these measures as capable of weakening the collective capacity of anti-democratic regimes from oppressing democratic forces and also from blocking democratic transitions in the region. He however, questions the political will of the West in

applying such sanctions. He also condemns the selective manner in which such measures have been applied so far. From these, Ake (1993: 240) cautions that:

The international support for democracy from the West rides on the universalisation of the Western model of society. In this context customizing democracy to African conditions is not entirely desirable because it might detract from the universalism of the Western model.

### **3.4.2 Ake on Liberal Democracy in Africa**

Four, is the account of Ake's postulations on the internationalization of capitalism, through the institutionalization of liberal democracy and the hegemonization of Western interests and values in Africa. His main work, in which these are contained, is his posthumous book, *The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa* (2000). Here, he inquires about the process of democratization and its feasibility in Africa. He notes that far beyond Africa, there are questions on the feasibility of democracy all over the world. He observes that an inquiry about the feasibility of democracy in Africa is essentially an interrogation into the crisis of democracy in the world at large. He therefore historicizes this crisis from the point of view of Africa and conceptualizes it within the context of the continent's experiences. He notes that the collective international preoccupation with the triumph of the 'democratic revolution' dates back to the immediate period after the Cold War, when democracy was widely accepted as the unifying discourse meant to tame national and international politics and 'further' peaceful coexistence in a world that was oddly set at loggerheads by the ideological struggles of the Cold War. He however, avers that given the current facts of the international system, the world is far from experiencing the triumph of democracy. Ake clarifies that what presently appears to be the globalization of democracy is nothing more than its reduction and trivialization to the level of a non-offensive class phenomenon and practice, which allows local and international capitalists to embrace democracy and enjoy democratic legitimacy, without observing or respecting the notorious inconveniences of democratic practice.

He historicizes democracy and traces it to the early classical period, during which collective and non-biased efforts were made with obsessive rigour across the ideological divide in classical Athens to refine it and carefully operationalize it in practical political arrangements. He describes Athens as a context where the citizen's involvement in the exercise of political sovereignty is the major business of life. According to Ake (2000: 8), this period in Athens marked the 'apogee' in the historical development of democracy. However, with the decline

of Athens, which occurred when Sparta superseded and overran it, democracy also began to decline. As he puts it, from this period on, the ideal of the 'homo politicus', in which democracy was associated with direct political participation, was replaced and superseded by the notion of 'homo militans', which is nothing more than its negation. He notes that this continued even into the period of the Roman Empire. From the periods of the Christian Middle Ages up to the Renaissance, there were not many changes, until the French Revolution, which heralded a new turn in the development of the modern polity and the modern world. Commenting on its revolutionary character, Ake (2000: 8) maintains that:

The French Revolution was a phenomenal emancipatory struggle, which heralded the beginning of the modern polity and the modern world. It changed the world profoundly by introducing remarkable innovations such as universal citizenship and the idea of inalienable rights of humans and citizens. The French Revolution was a watershed in another sense. It reached back, at any rate, tried to reach back, to the Athenian ideal of popular power. This was aptly expressed in its theory of popular sovereignty and political participation. In this, it created implacable enemies not only against itself but also against democracy.

In other words, the French Revolution almost restored the historic glory, with which Athenian democracy was identified in the classical period. Unfortunately, this offended the class interests of the rising bourgeoisie in Europe who felt that their class interests would be undermined under a political arrangement, which entirely eliminates their class dominance and reconciles property to the equality of political rights. Put differently, the European bourgeoisie understood that the preservation of their class interests needed the rejection of democracy as popular power. So they strove hard and replaced it with liberal democracy. According to Ake (2000: 8):

The rising European bourgeoisie, which had welcomed the French Revolution because of its hostility to the institutions and values of feudalism, was appalled by the implications of popular sovereignty, especially its radical egalitarianism, the emphasis on equality and the prospect of the majority having absolute power over everything including private property. They understood only too well the threat, which this posed to their right of property and the privileges, which they enjoyed by virtue of their social and economic status. Inevitably, they undertook to wage war against these dreaded prospects.

This is Ake's (2000: 8) account of the whittling down of democracy into its compromised liberal version. From this premise, Ake traces the theoretical foundations of liberal democracy to the social contract theorists, especially Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. He says Thomas Hobbes like Niccolo Machiavelli, was concerned with 'political order'. In Hobbes, we see the illustrations of an irresistibly egoistic inclination in human nature,



manifested in terms of the continuous quest to satisfy man's endless stream of desires, 'a striving that ends only in death'. Hobbes saw man as desirous of an escape from the pre-political state of nature, which was markedly characterized by the war of all against all, and in which there was no leisure, no peace or culture, except the perpetual fear of death. This, as Ake reports, was the regressive alternative to political order, which underscores the relevance of the social contract for the formation of a state-systemed society. Hobbes then explains how men contracted among themselves, surrendered their right of nature to a neutral person, in this case 'the Leviathan', 'the sovereign', and formed the state, which holds in trust the rights of all men, imposes the rule of law upon them, but is not bound by it. It should be noted that while the sovereign in Hobbes's theorization incurs no obligations to the subject, there are no limits to the obligations of the subject to the sovereign, except self-preservation, which is the fundamental objective essence of the contractual undertaking. Remarkably, in drawing from Hobbes, Ake notes the crucial features, which characterized his milieu. Vital aspects of Hobbes' context certainly, influenced his thinking on the state. For example, in addition to civil strife, Britain at that time was plagued with political instability and was threatened by ambitious rival neighbours, especially, Spain. Not surprisingly, therefore, Hobbes' political theory was a dedicated search for the most solid foundation for political order in Britain.

As Ake (2000: 13) later infers, although what Hobbes offers is mainly a theory of political order and not a functional theory of democracy, Hobbes is nevertheless, regarded as the father of liberal democratic theory. He says, this appreciation comes from the established affinity of his theory to democracy, whether liberal or not. And that, in spite of its limitations, in Hobbes, one finds a theory based on the consent of the governed. Other scholars have however traced the development of monarchical political systems, especially, absolute monarchies to the writings of Hobbes.

Contrasting Locke's political theory with that of Hobbes, Ake notes that even though Locke accepts the notion of a pre-political state of nature contained in Hobbes, for Locke, it was a state of peace, rather than war. In Locke, rather than being a state that lacked government, the state of nature was one that was ruled by God through the laws of nature, which men understood through reason. In essence, in Locke, Ake sees more democratic prospects than in Hobbes. Reflecting on its changing phases, Ake (2000: 17–21) traces the continued

theoretical development of liberal democracy to the writings of Max Weber, James Schumpeter, Emile Durkheim, D. B. Truman, S. M. Lipset, Robert Dahl, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, in which the trivialization of democracy is well illustrated. He maintains that the contemporary social science has been involved in this subtle, but ideologically far-reaching trivialization of democracy, especially, through the successive waves of theorists, who claim to be clarifying its meaning and furthering its understanding among members of the world society, but are rather motivated by their class bias, the aim of which is to annihilate the real meaning of democracy and reduce it to the point of the lowest level of threat to bourgeois interests. He cites the 'pluralist wave' as the most important example of these waves and traces it to the inspiration and limitations in Schumpeter's theory of democracy. He however, establishes the inadequacies and limitations of this theoretical position. According to Ake (2000: 19):

Following Schumpeter, the pluralists dismissed the feasibility and even the desirability of classical democracy as well as the nineteenth century theorists of representative democracy including John Stuart Mill. They held that ordinary people never really exercise influence in politics, being ignorant, apathetic and lacking power resources, nor do the representatives of the people really ever represent them. More often than not, they lead, manipulate or dominate them. Like Schumpeter, the pluralists accepted that the essence of democracy is not participation in rule but the choice of those to rule. These affinities reflect the fact that the pluralist school largely shared Schumpeter's prejudices regarding the moral, psychological and intellectual limitations of the masses.

The last issues, which Ake examines here in relation to liberal democracy, are what he calls, 'democracy and the market', as well as 'the new threat to democracy'. Having discussed the relationship between democracy and industrial capitalism, which he hinges on the demise of democracy, Ake links the development of liberal democracy with the rise of industrial capitalism, especially, as driven by industrial capital. The result of this, according to Ake (2000: 21) is the reproduction of core market values in the political sphere, thereby making liberal democracy nothing more than the political correlate of the market. He traces this to the established 'homology' of liberal democracy to industrial capitalism and notes that all the classical sociologists and early political economists agree that capitalism actually created an entirely new society, which takes the form of the market society. Examples of such classical sociologists and political economists, to which Ake refers, include Ferdinand Toennies, Emile Durkheim, Karl Marx, Auguste Conte, James Schumpeter, Adam Smith and Max Weber. Describing the market society as one, which is based on a principle of solidarity that

is radically different from the primordial ties and the traditional authority of feudal society, Ake (2000: 21) notes that its basis is the nexus of exchange relations. In this kind of economy, the reciprocity and complementarity derive from the self-seeking nature of all men, who regard others as a means to their mutual ends. From this understanding, Ake argues that the bourgeois society epitomizes the maturation in the development of the unique qualities of man, namely, egoistic entrepreneurship and mutual dependence. From these, he explains how the market society determines the development of not only the state, but also of the specific form of the political organization of the state under liberal democracy. Tracing these to the affinity between the core values of the market and liberal democracy, he shows that the market society has its own logic, which determines the prevailing form of government, administration and political ideology, and which he sees as reflected in the fit of the capitalist economy and liberal government in Adam Smith. As Ake (2000: 22) illustrates:

Smith posits that the social order created by the interdependence of commodity production and exchange is the frame of government. The state is formally engendered as support for the liberties whose dialectics constitute this social order. For Smith, the basic operational principle of the state is that 'every man as long as he does not violate the laws of justice, is left perfectly free to pursue his own way and to bring both his industry and capital into competition with those of any other men'.

Further, he points out the asymmetry between the values of the market and those of liberal democracy. First, he says, that in exchange, the commodity bearers, as distinguished entities, act self-interestedly. Second that the exchange relation is in this sense, a relation of property owners. Third, that it is based on the freedom of the commodity bearers. And fourth, that there is the notion of the equality of these commodity bearers. All these, according to him, are integrated, not only through the use of money as the standard medium of exchange, which homogenizes the entire economic system, but fundamentally, through the operationalized and politicized role of law, which is 'homologous' to liberal democracy and the market society, and, which rests entirely, on the values of commodity production and exchange. He presents this law as abstract, universalistic and devotedly focused on the reign of private property. From this, he illustrates the formalistic character of this law, which he associates with the distinction between the universalized categories such as property owners and actual persons, in which what appears in court as an abstraction, 'the defendant', is also a person and his or her physical presence cannot be entirely denied. The last aspect of law

under liberal democracy, which Ake sees as underlining its historical specificity to the capitalist economy, is that this law is about 'property'. Here, Ake (2000: 24) argues that:

The exchange relation is a contractual relation between free persons who mutually recognize each other's rights. In the act of exchange, the exchangers constitute a contractual relation and posit the recognition of their rights of private property and its free disposal. As Ferdinand Toennies has argued, 'as a product of the rational will, the law centers around the elementary phenomenon of property transfers or the exchange of goods' (Toennies 1963). This characteristic of the law so obvious in substantive law is evident in the nature of legal proceedings.

On 'the new threat to democracy', he argues that this consists basically in the process of globalization, which he defines rather simplistically, as 'the stretch of processes, practices and structures across space, especially the national space to globality or the transnationalization of things'. From this, one might ask: How does globalization threaten and undermine democracy from the point of view of Ake's works? He explains this in terms of the traditional assumption of its effect, namely that the nation-state, as the basic political organization of mankind is faced with unending problems, principally because globalization, through its false agencies of homogenization and transnationalization, undermines the nation-state and its relevance, thus leaving its future in limbo and doubts. Underscoring the gravity of this situation, Ake (2000: 27) explains:

As the relevance of the nation-state diminishes, so does that of democracy especially liberal democracy. For democracy is ideally articulated in the context of the national organisation of political power. The nation-state, the traditional repository of sovereignty, has the consummate power which no sub-state or super-state political formation can legitimately claim or exercise. This consummate power, including the power of life and death within the national territory of the nation-state, is the other side of democratic freedom and self-realization. For it is what gives concreteness to them since there is no freedom in powerlessness and no point in democratic arrangements when power resources are minimal or nonexistent. When we apply the concept of democracy to any social or political formation apart from the nation-state, its use is largely metaphorical.

Ake shows the negative implications of globalization for democracy in three ways. One in terms of how global processes whittle down the powers of the nation-state. Two, in terms of how such global processes undermine and threaten the annulment of the social. He describes this as connected with the constitution of the prevailing capitalist hegemony, which emerged after the Cold War, in which the liberal theory not only prevents and prohibits the state from financial independence and entrepreneurial initiatives, but also openly makes a case for a reduction in the power and role of the state in economic processes, thereby privileging the

market over the state and society, thus establishing it as a living reality, which transcends the domain of being just a metaphor or an abstract analytic concept. Ake calls this 'the desocialisation' of life under the market society. The third way, in which he shows how globalization threatens democracy is that as the market subsumes society and consumerism becomes the overriding identity, democratic politics, like any other type of politics, becomes not only difficult, but is rendered almost irrelevant. He explains this in terms of the contradictory nature and character of the market society on the one hand and democratic politics on the other. For instance, he says, while the market is based on self-seeking inclinations, private concerns and epitomizes the moment of particularities, democratic politics, on the other hand, is about the collective enterprise, the resolution of common concerns and therefore epitomizes universality (Ake, 2000: 27).

Ake describes this as the wider international context within which Africa is democratizing. He also shows its implications for the developing regions of the world, especially Africa. First, he presents these international realities as questioning the long-held notion of 'a real world of democracy', a world of flourishing and well established democracies to which Africa is invited, and one which is able and anxiously seeks to midwife and facilitate democracy in Africa. Second, he argues that 'the established democracies' are not able to offer the developing world any set of credible, clear and meaningful standards of democratization to relate to. This, to him, is due to the fact that the North itself has no such clear and meaningful standards of democracy, a reality, which arises from the entrenched alienation of democratic practice from the Western ontological ideology of democracy and the concerted efforts by powerful economic interests to deradicalize democracy by deliberately conflating its meanings with what it is not, thus, offering a profusion of definitions, which not only trivialize it, but fundamentally misrepresents democracy to another ruse for concealing westernization (Ake, 2000: 29).

Three, he regrets the fact that Africa is democratizing in an international context in which there is apparently no allowance made for the fact that liberal democracy is a historical product. He laments the failure to separate the values and principles of democracy or liberal democracy from the particular historical practices, which characterize these values and principles in their specific historical settings. As Ake (2000: 30) maintains:

Since this issue is not usually raised, the question of finding solutions to it does not generally arise. And, if the question had been raised, it would have been quite difficult given the rich harvest of meanings of democracy, which have come from decades of trying to mystify it and to appropriate it for political practices that are far from democratic.

As Ake (2000: 30) shows, this poses a great danger for Africa, which looms large for democratization in the continent. This danger lies in the daunting task of operationalizing the principles and values of democracy in historical conditions that are markedly different from those of the established liberal democracies in the West. Describing liberal democracy as emanative from industrial capitalism, Ake (1993: 242–243) notes that:

Liberal democracy which pretends to universalism is historically specific. It is a child of industrial civilization, a product of a socially atomized society where production and exchange are already commodified, a society which is essentially a market. It is the product of a society in which interests are so particularized that the very notion of common interest becomes problematic, hence the imperative of democracy.

Contemporary Africa remains a far cry from this. It is still predominantly pre-capitalist and pre-industrial. Primordial loyalties and pre-capitalist social structures remain strong. Apart from the urban enclaves, African society is still essentially constituted as mechanical solidarity. Africa is still a communal society, and it is this communalism which defines the people's perception of self-interest, their freedom and their location in the social whole.

Concluding his views on liberal democracy, Ake recommends that the foundations of a truly democratic society must be established in Africa. He sees this as pressing and imperative in meeting the material needs of the toiling masses in the continent, who struggle for it as a 'second form of independence' from their leaders as opposed to the first independence, which wrestled power from the colonizing powers. As he puts it, 'the repeated language of this demand shows that it is a matter of survival and a demand, which arises from a shared feeling that the economic mismanagement and brutal repression of indigenous leadership in most parts of the continent have become life-threatening for the ordinary people'. Ake (2000: 32) confirms this:

If these expectations are correct, then democracy has a role of unprecedented importance to play in Africa. But it cannot play this important role by following the line of least resistance or by mimicking the liberal democracy of the West. It has to be articulated in an extraordinarily creative way. To the extent that this happens, it may be that it is in the last-start regions, especially Africa, that democracy will finally fulfil its historical mission or betray it.

In establishing the foundations of a truly democratic society in the continent, it must be emphasized that Ake (1993: 241 and 242) makes a case for the mass involvement of the ordinary people of Africa, based on their concept of popular power and participation. He says one cannot deny the fact that the people's desire for material empowerment is part of the motivational forces fuelling democratization in the region. Based on this, he argues that democracy is unique in Africa not only because it reflects the specific socio-cultural realities of the region, but particularly, because it symbolizes the basic economic needs and aspirations of the people for material empowerment. He however observes that such a democratic quest must not be expected to emerge automatically from a rational blueprint, but as a product of the people's involvements, based on their practical experience and improvisation in the course of a hard struggle. He maintains that the democratization process must be shaped and underlined by the singular reality that those whose democratic participation is at issue are the ordinary people of Africa, most of whom are illiterates, poor and sick rural Africans, who dwell in an essentially pre-industrial and communal society. According to him, steadily keeping this in focus will not only facilitate the building of a more relevant democratic process and system, but will also enhance its meaning, as well as give it depth and sustainability. From these, Ake (1993: 241) makes the following recommendations, which he considers instructive for the continent:

In order for African democracy to be relevant and sustainable it will have to be radically different from liberal democracy. For one thing, it will have to de-emphasize abstract political rights and stress concrete economic rights, because the demand for democracy in Africa draws much of its impetus from the prevailing economic conditions within. It is not surprising, for example, that in Zaire, Cameroon, Benin, Togo, Niger, Gabon and Congo sovereign national conferences were held, or strongly demanded, at times when economic austerity was exceptionally harsh.

Ordinary people do not separate political democracy from economic democracy or for that matter from economic well-being. They see their political empowerment, through democratization, as an essential part of the process of getting the economic agenda right at last and ensuring that the development project is managed better and its rewards more evenly distributed. This is made evident in the demands and debates at national conferences.

The emerging political theory of the democracy movement in Africa sees the 'economic regression' of the continent as the other side of 'political regression'. It recognizes that the

cause of development is better served by a democratic approach that engages the energy and commitment of the people who alone can make development possible and sustainable.

On this note, Ake (1993: 244) warns that if the quest for democracy in Africa follows the line of the least resistance charted for the continent by Western liberalism, then it will achieve only 'the democracy of alienation'. This, according to him, is because at its best, liberal democracy offers only a form of political participation, which is markedly different from, and arguably inferior to the African concept of participation.

### **3.4.3 Ake on the Struggle for Democracy in Africa**

Ake (2000) qualifies Africa's history as that of a long and tortuous struggle for emancipation from bondage and oppression, which took the form of sustained struggles from Portuguese and Arab slave traders, politically compromised and overzealous missionaries, French ideologues and British imperialists, home-grown autocratic governments, their neo-colonial collaborators and foreign counterparts, sustained underdevelopment and development bureaucracies, all of which have advanced the argument that democracy is not relevant for Africa, and that it is not the next priority on the continent's agenda. These struggles were hardly treated seriously by the outside world, especially, the developed capitalist countries, nor were they accorded the status of democratic struggles, so much so that discussions about democracy in Africa only focussed on its impediments and dismissed its possibilities. Within the continent, he says, most of the leaders in the early post-colonial period were besieged by a multitude of hostile forces, which their betrayal of popular aspirations, exploitative practices and political repression had bred. They therefore operated in a hostile political environment, in which the conduct of governance was done in a state of siege, which relied heavily on the use of force and led to the alienation of the elite from the masses.

These experiences were not only played out in the conditions of political monolithism, repression and persistent underdevelopment, but also defined the context, which engendered the democracy movement in Africa. The movement arose mainly as a demand for incorporation by marginalized elements within the elites for political incorporation into the colonial and later, post-colonial state, and among the masses as demands for material prosperity. The desperation for inclusion by marginalized fragments within the elite is best understood against the backdrop of the cake-sharing psychosis and other prevailing practices,



which induce holders of state power to defer to, and share the spoils of office with only a tiny coterie of their collaborators, especially, given the privatized nature of the state itself. As Ake shows, within this privatized context, those who benefit most from state policies and resources are often drawn from the leaders' communities, religious beliefs or faith, geographical regions, ethnic or tribal base, as we saw in Liberia under Samuel Doe, Nigeria under Generals Ibrahim Babangida and Sani Abacha, Cameroon under Paul Biya, Kenya under Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel arap Moi, Somalia under Siad Barre, Togo under Gnassingbe Eyadema, Ethiopia under Mengistu, Rwanda under General Habyarimana, Benin under President Mathieu Kerekou, Mali under Moussa Traore, Burkina Faso under Blasé Compaore, Uganda under Idi Amin, Sudan under Niemeiri, Niger under President Diori and Zaire under Mobutu Sese Seko (Ake, 2000: 38–40). He however, qualifies the demands of the masses for economic incorporation and material prosperity as truly emancipatory, and shows how they are often contained by the leaders, often using either accommodationist or preventive strategies.

It is in this sense, especially, in the 1990s, that Ake (1993: 239–241) describes Africa's long-neglected democracy movement as a second form of independence and noted with appreciation, the support, which it now enjoys at home and abroad, especially, in spite of the considerable confusion about what the movement is and what it portends to be. This movement, according to him, has the following components, namely, 'out of power politicians', for whom democratization is less a commitment than a strategy for power acquisition; 'ethnic, national and communal groups', who are obliged to wage struggles for democratic incorporation because a manipulative leadership has seized state power in the name of an ethnic or national group; 'the ordinary people', who are calling for a second independence having realized and concluded that the politics of the present leadership, far from offering them any prospect of relief from underdevelopment, rather deepens it immensely; 'international financial institutions', especially, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, for whom democracy provides the political requirements and leverages for the operation of international market forces; as well as 'Western governments' who support democracy in Africa as an instrumental ideological process, through which the universalization of the Western model of the human society can take place. Given this confusion of meaning and the contradictory forms of interests by members of these different

groups, Ake finds it difficult to discern what specific kind of democracy is emerging in the continent. Locating the masses as the most important stakeholders within this democratic ferment, he describes them as members of a society, which is still pre-industrial and communal, a society whose members are barely surviving on economic activities within the informal sector and subsistence farming, and to whom very little attention has been given so far.

He captures 'the disappointment of independence' and 'post-independence projects', especially, 'the failed development plans', as 'the foundation upon which Africa's renewed democratic quest' is based. He blames 'poor leadership', 'structural constraints' and 'a host of other impediments', which turned the expectations of independence into an irrecoverable nightmare, a situation, which led to the alienation of the people through the massive use of brute force by most leaders rather than imploring the ethics of democratic consensus. According to him, even though these elites have an exceptionally high pedigree in the democracy movement in the continent, and also largely dominate its leadership, they do not constitute its social base, and that such explanations, which attribute the provenance of this movement to the revolutionary liberalization of Eastern Europe, or, to the liberalizing dynamics of structural adjustment, are rather suspect and misleading. He notes that the tragic consequences of the undemocratic nature of elite politics across the continent have not only led to a vicious circle of coercion and the alienation of the people, but have also worsened and undermined the prospects for development, leading to the collapse of physical and social infrastructures, and the intensification of poverty, all of which have mired the economies in chronic crisis and have forced the people into revolt. Ake (1993: 240) recalls that:

Throughout Africa ordinary people are demanding a second independence, this time from the indigenous leadership whose economic mismanagement, together with brutal repression, have made mere survival all but impossible. There is an increased awareness among Africans that the monopoly of power enjoyed by this failed leadership has to be broken in order that power can be transferred to the people who have little to lose and much to gain. That is why demonstrations for democratization persist in spite of repression, and why radical lawyers and previously isolated civil rights activists have found a growing and reliable political base. The democracy movement in Africa is a powerful, objective, historical force in that it expresses the desire of ordinary people to gain power and material improvement.

He relates this renewed democratic quest of the people to the African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation, and described it as the product of the Arusha Conference of 1990, a conference, which presented the absence of democracy in

Africa as a major cause of the chronic underdevelopment in the continent. From there, he argues that these genuine democratic struggles have yielded some appreciable results—results—which he considers to be too impressive and too widespread to be ignored. Some of the results, which Ake (1993: 71) recounts include, the popular rejection of military rule in Nigeria, the eventual demise of apartheid rule in South Africa, the defeat and downfall of Samuel Doe in Liberia and Kerekou in Benin Republic, the accrued gains of pluralism and multiparty democracy in Niger, Madagascar, Cameroon, Zambia, Algeria, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Gabon, Zaire, Mozambique, the Congo, Angola, Sao Tome and Principe, and the renewed pressures for democratization in Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, Cameroon and Zimbabwe.

From the fore-going, Ake (1993: 241) establishes a paradox, namely, the linking of political democracy to economic development. He observes that from the 1990s, the United Nations positions and documents on Africa have widely adopted this view. As a corroboration to this position, he remarks that while the World Bank is also edging towards this view, Mr. Barber Conable, then President of the World Bank (1986-1991) listed 'better governance' as a primary requirement of economic recovery in Africa, a view, which was later espoused by the Organization of African Unity. He notes that the desire for material improvement as a fundamental influence fuelling the democratic quest in Africa has the following implications: One, it means that the feasibility of democratization will depend mainly on the correlation of this process with better economic prospects. Two, that the critical importance of the economic factor in the continent's democratic movement will entail a change of emphasis from abstract legal and political rights to concrete social and economic rights. That is, from laissez-fairism, the consolidation and toleration of economic inequality to the acceptance of considerable economic intervention in the market place in the name and interests of growth, followed by a redistribution of economic wealth. Three, the reconciliation of democracy to the vital interests and features of its social base. It is from these that he develops the idea of 'democratizing development', which he explains as going beyond the notion of making the people the essence of development. To him, it means that the people must functionally 'possess' their development, which they must be encouraged to do for themselves, make happen by themselves, in their own circumstances and ways, rather than having it done for them by some other external persons, governments or institutions with whatever kinds of

intentions, qualifications or experiences. In other words, rather than alienating them, development in this sense must necessarily empower the people and constitute a product of their lived experiences, and not the other way round. Ake (2000: 87-92) calls this 'the democratization of development'.

#### **3.4.4 Ake on the Feasibility of Democracy in Africa**

From the fore-going account, we have seen that two incompatible types of democratic practices are incubating in the continent. These have been captured and discussed within the sociology of democracy movements in the region. However, in Ake, the form of democracy whose feasibility is at issue is the socialist type of democracy, which emphasizes concrete economic rights, political equality as well as the substantial upliftment and empowerment of the ordinary people who constitute the social base of both society and the democracy movements themselves. However, even though these masses have paid the highest price for dictatorial leadership in the past, they are by no means the only stakeholders in the democratic quest. Other stakeholders in the democratization agenda include, 'the complex international system itself', within which the democratic quest finds expression, 'counter-elites' and 'degenerated fragments of the political class', left out of the power equation, and for whom the quest for power is a do or die affair, 'members of the business class', 'activists within the civil society', such as 'students', 'teachers', 'lawyers', 'trade union groups', 'women's rights advocates', 'minorities formations', and the 'masses and peasants'. None of these social categories is neutral. Rather, for each, democracy is approached, not in an undifferentiated sense, but as a calculated means to vital ends, among which economic self-preservation predominates.

As Ake (1992, 1993 and 2000) shows, for democracy to be relevant in Africa, it must meet the fundamental interests of the different social groups and stakeholders mentioned above. It must also answer the equally important question of economic development. This means that, 'the feasibility of democracy in Africa' will depend largely, on how it intervenes and mediates in the material conditions of the people, how it relates to their social experiences as well as how it speaks to their social needs. Much has been said on these issues when we examined the idea of linking political democracy to the question of economic development. However, given the centrality of economic development as a crucial democratic expectation, we shall

examine this again in greater details, this time, in terms of how it determines the feasibility of democracy. In order to achieve this, Ake (2000: 75) suggests that we must pursue democracy essentially, as an instrumental value, and explore its utilitarian values rather than limit our quest for it to a merely theoretical or consummatory one. He says this utilitarian approach to the democratic quest must be gauged in terms of the values, concerns and priorities of the ordinary peoples. He raises the question of the relationship of democracy to economic development, and presents this as one of the most widely debated aspects within the utilitarian discourse of democracy. In getting to the heart of this debate, Ake (2000: 76) suggests that we must answer the following questions:

Is democratization conducive to economic development? Or could it be dysfunctional to development, at least in the short run? Are developing countries in general and Africa in particular better off seeking development with authoritarian regimes? Or is the prospect of development indifferent to the authoritarian or democratic character of regimes?

In answering these questions, Ake suggests that we go beyond the limitations of conflating development with economic growth, a mistake, which he says, currently dominates the scholarly literature on this subject matter. He admonishes us to properly capture the relationship between democracy and economic development as the pertinent problematic of the discourse and transcend the often impressionistic trend, which is either silent about the differences between economic development and economic growth, or at best, advances an avoidable trade-off between democratization and economic development. An examination of the contributions of S. M. Lipset, and the critiques on them offers a useful insight into Ake's thinking on the relationship between democracy and economic development. On the role of authoritarian regimes and the question of how they foster development, Ake (2000: 81) observes that this is yet to be devotedly studied with critical attention and rigour as that of democratic regimes. He dismisses much of what exists on this subject as merely theoretical, impressionistic and argues that they give much less insight for nuanced and properly informed conclusions than the case for democratic regimes. According to Ake (2000: 81), the uncritical reference to the East Asian experience, which wrongly privileges authoritarianism as a *sine qua non*, first for economic growth and ultimately for economic development does not help matters.

Quite often the case is rested on the experience of the East Asian economies. Here again it is rather loosely made, as Bhalla among others has shown. In the debate concerning the relation of democracy and growth, the empirical studies tend to test regime types and economic development. Often there is not enough attention to the specifics of the salient characteristics which constitute the regime types. Should one be testing the relation between regime types and growth, or between freedom and growth? Bhalla thinks that it should be freedom, in which case one is dealing with a composite index which has at least two important elements, political and economic. Part of our confusion over the East Asian experience is that describing these countries as simply authoritarian conceals, too much for in these countries relatively small amounts of political freedom have co-existed with relatively large amounts of economic freedom (Bhalla, 1994: 29).

On the role of the military in fostering democratization and democratic transitions in Africa, Ake (1995: 34) advances a very clear objection. He describes the very idea of military presence in politics as a regrettable negation of the very essence of democratic politics. According to him, the structures, nature and orientations of the two spheres and institutions are not in any way complementary. He says, while democracy recognizes the notions of plurality and diversity, premised on the recognition of human rights, sociability and the encouragement of participation, the military is the state's organized tool of legitimized coercion, a taut chain of command, which demands unreserved submission based on the principles of force. To him, the political failings of the past in the continent are neither those of either politics nor of democracy itself, but of the militarization of politics, which he qualifies as 'a testimony to the incompatible nature of military and democratic values'.

Ake (1995: 34) mobilizes three arguments in illustrating his position that the military can neither foster democratization nor midwife a successful democratic transition. One, he argues that in managing democratic transitions, the military misrepresents politics as a game in hostility, a disease and a threatening confusion, which must be strictly controlled, with the result that those who dare to practice and engage in politics are also subjected to all manner of humiliation and penance through a barrage of rules, which often over-regulates them. He says, in initiating politics, the military denigrates and debases it to the extent that it fails even before it starts. Two, he argues that every military government chooses its successors based on its values and interests, and that being congenitally authoritarian, hierarchized and deeply suspicious of the seeming disorder of democratic processes, it chooses surrogates as its successors, who are not only obedient and subservient, but are also 'sell outs' against the larger democratic interests of members of the society. Three, using the Ogoni struggle against marginalization and economic exploitation in Nigeria's Niger Delta region as an example, Ake (1995: 34) argues that the military creates and sustains a political community

in which right is co-extensive with power, and one, which undermines the efficacy of democratic politics. In this way, the democratic question is posed as one of equating rights with power, thus, divesting power from legitimacy, through the presentation of democracy as both authoritarian and majoritarian dictatorship (Ake, 1995: 34, 1992, 1993, 1996 and 2000). In summary, Ake (2000: 81) concludes that the case for authoritarianism does not answer the democracy-development question in most of Africa, particularly, as the experiences in Zaire, Kenya, Uganda and Nigeria in the 1990s illustrate. He says, this relationship is at best still unresolved. In Ake, we find an engaging examination of the question of democratization in Africa, which exhumes the ambiguities and implications of trying to adopt wholesale, Western theoretical paradigms on democracy in deviance of objective social realities, which are peculiar to the region. He also exposes the ambivalence in the hegemonic support for democratization in the continent by the international community, especially, the West and North America. Given the direness of the African predicament, in a continent subjected by the ravages of ignorance, poverty and diseases, he recommends popular democracy as both the strategy and sine qua non for redemptive progress in the region. According to Ake (1996: 132), with due regard to the continent's social pluralism, poverty, its relatively low level of literacy and other social problems, the kind of democracy, which Africa needs should be:

A democracy in which people have some real decision-making power over and above the formal consent of electoral choice. This will entail, among other things, a powerful legislature, decentralization of power to local democratic formations, and considerable emphasis on the development of institutions for the aggregation and articulation of interests.

A social democracy that places emphasis on concrete political, social, and economic rights, as opposed to a liberal democracy that emphasizes abstract political rights. It will be a social democracy that invests heavily in the improvement of people's health, education, and capacity so that they can participate effectively.

A democracy that puts as much emphasis on collective rights as it does on individual rights. It will have to recognize nationalities, sub-nationalities, ethnic groups, and communities as social formations that express freedom and self-realization and will have to grant them rights to cultural expression and political and economic participation....

A democracy of incorporation. To be as inclusive as possible, the legislative bodies should in addition to nationality groups have special representation of mass organizations, especially youth, the labor movement, and women's groups, which are usually marginalized but without whose active participation there is unlikely to be democracy or development.

Without contradicting oneself, the fore-going is a summation of Ake's positions on democracy generally, and also, with reference to Africa. The next section examines his positions on development both theoretically and also with reference to Africa.

### 3.5 Ake on Development in Africa

This section begins with an examination of Ake's (1988: 485–497) contribution to the political economy of development in general theoretical terms. It is followed with an evaluation of his analysis of the subject matter of development in Africa, which is the main focus of the section. Essentially, Ake (1988: 486) begins with a very pertinent question:

Is there a future for the political economy of development? That is by no means an idle question, for we are up against a present reality which promises no future. The scientific status of the political economy of development, never much to begin with, has shrunk to vanishing point. At every turn, it is cruelly mocked by the experience it is supposed to explain. Its dynamism appears to be totally dissipated. Disconnected from the social sciences, it is unable to draw inspiration from them. And it has been captured by politics.

Ake (1976: 1–23) identifies the major approaches to the political economy of development and classifies them into two, namely, the neo-classical and the neo-Marxist approaches. From this, he argues that in order to properly understand its demise, we must situate it within its appropriate political context, especially, from the period of the Cold War, when it was first captured in its most pronounced form by politics. He describes the neo-classical approach as including the modernization theory (Ake, 1976: 15-17), the classical political economy approach from Adam Smith to Karl Marx (Ihonvbere, 1989: 51-52), and contemporary development economics. A major issue, which Ake raises, bears on the validity of the neo-classical approach, especially, when applied to the South. He argues that within the neo-classical tradition, and also within the entire enterprise of mainstream Western social science, there is hardly any significant scientific theory developed specifically based on a genuine concern with the conditions and experiences in the South. He describes this limitation as a general tendency of all forms of economic doctrines from the West. Ake (1988: 486) puts it this way:

The Third World has not engaged the great minds of the West and concern with it has not yielded any scientific breakthroughs, or landmarks by the standards of Western economics, or even really interesting errors. What this tells us is something which should have been clear all along, namely that for any given society scientific progress occurs in those areas which matter most to that society, at any rate, to its hegemonic social groups. The corollary is that the Third World has simply not mattered very much to the West.

He says while the underdeveloped countries may not have mattered so much, they still attract attention from the West without engaging any serious or devoted interest in understanding



them. It is thus assumed that the South is understandable to the West insofar as it understood itself and that the tools of analysis, with which it understands itself, would do, or at any rate, have to do, in understanding the South. Developing societies are therefore not only denied the ideas of specificity and historicity, but are also reduced to the thinking that everything of Western origin was relevant to them and that nothing was either special or peculiar to their history, understanding and experience. As a result of this reductionist approach, all that guides development in the South is entirely derived from mainstream Western social science, routinely applied to the Third World, in a manner that not only undermines adaptability, but also leaves out the peculiar experiences, realities and practices in these regions. Ake (1988: 486) blames this error partly on the ideologically charged atmosphere of the post-war period during which everyone discovered the need to develop the Third World as the world powers geared up for the Cold War:

At this historical conjuncture, the Third World countries, in varying stages of revolt, became the coveted trophy of the combatants. Which of the two warring camps would they vindicate by adopting, or being made to adopt, its *Weltanschauung*? That was the question and it was a momentous question indeed.

These shortcomings limited the adaptation and application of the Western sciences, especially, 'the sciences of societal development', to the realities of the developing countries. Later, that is, between the 1950s and the 1960s, the theory and practice of development became a little inventive and challenged some of the limitations and conclusions in Western assumptions and modalities. Nevertheless, even within this period, such revisions were limited and illusory, mainly because they still accommodated and reflected the prevailing fashion in mainstream Western thinking, namely, the ascendancy of Keynesian economics, particularly, the privileging of structuralism over classicism. Above all, no radical break was made with Western orientations, nor did they come to terms with the unique experiences of the countries in the South. The last development, which ended the relevance of the neo-classical approach in relation to the developing societies was its deviation and variance from social practice, manifested among others, in the dismal record of the development effort, particularly, the economic crisis, which began only to linger as a permanent feature of life in Africa and other developing countries.

The other development approach, namely, the neo-Marxist and scientific socialism approach provides a detailed, though negative critique of the capitalist growth process and its implications, especially, for the periphery. It is represented in the works of Samir Amin and Andre Gunder Frank, among other scholars. Two arguments, which capture the kernel of this approach are, (i) the contention that given its internal logic, capitalism is inherently contradictory and therefore incapable of ensuring full employment, equality, and any meaningful form of development, (ii) the argument that given the implications of the derived nature of capitalist development in the periphery, capitalism is unable to play its historically progressive role of developing the productive forces in these regions. Among other limitations, this approach suffers the utter lack of relevance, especially, when applied to the periphery and therefore could not be sustained as a reliable body of development thinking for these regions. Ake (1976 and 1988) traces this limitation to Marx himself and the contradictory nature of Marxism, which although is meant to be a theoretical negation of capitalism, but is also unwittingly in a dialectical unity with it. Added to this limitation is the regrettable legacy of indifference and disdain by this approach for backward peasant societies, a legacy, which Ake (1988: 491) again traces to Marx and subsequent Marxists. An emblematic illustration of this prejudice is found in Marx's treatment of the Asiatic mode of production, which he characterized as (i) discontinuous in relation to the other modes of production, (ii) lacking in internal dynamism, and (iii) lacking the specificities of the dialectics of development that are peculiar to it. From these, Marx described peasants as 'a reactionary force' and dismissed peasant societies as 'a drag on historical progress'. This attitude has persisted and has not encouraged any detailed study of these backward societies, or even of the impact of capitalist development on them, especially, given their 'peripherilization'. Ake (1988: 491) later remarks that:

It does not help matters that Marx did not undertake a study of the development of capitalism in the backward parts of the world, limiting his attention to the maturing capitalism of Western Europe. To be sure, he understood capitalism to be a global phenomenon and treated it as such. Here and there, we encounter indications of the impact of the development of capitalism on backward countries, merely as passing references.

In essence, even though Marx and other classical Marxists actually raised and discussed issues impinging on the progressive role of capitalism in the periphery, and even though

Marx himself later examined the implications of the export of capital, particularly, the devastating effects of imperialism on these economies, such treatments still suffered some fundamental flaws. One, the whole of the Third World was wrongly treated as one homogenous economic system. This was added to the fact that such studies were far from being nuanced. For example, even though Marx examined what he called 'the colonial question' in India, such studies were not detailed enough and so, could not establish the gamut of the dialectical connections between the issues examined. Two, much of the life and works of Marx were limited to the period during which capitalism was still in its evolving, emerging, incipient and embryonic stage. In other words, as a world economic system, capitalism was still in its competitive stage of development, with the result that most of Marx's writings on it were merely 'predictive'. Since he was born in 1818 and died in 1883, Marx did not experience the full maturation of capitalist development in the age of imperialism. Put differently, since the export of capital and colonial-imperialism occurred during and after the monopoly stage of capitalist development, Marx did not witness these developments in terms of their full-blown manifestations. This is because he lived, wrote and later died in 1883, during which the export of capital was just occurring and its devastating impact were not yet fully developed. Relatedly, although Roselyn Luxemburg (1871-1919) examined the nature and impact of capitalist development in what she called 'emerging areas', her study merely took the whole of these regions together as 'one entity', without establishing the specific nature and impact of capitalist development in them as individualized categories. Three, as Ake (1988: 491) shows, although Marx was aware of the harsh effects of imperialism, he still asserted to the end that capitalism and imperialism were the necessary conditions for advancement in the backward countries. This discouraged any devoted interest in examining the nature and impact of the capitalist penetration of these regions, especially, since it had been prematurely agreed that the impact of the export of capital was good for the 'periphery' as it has always been for the 'core' countries. To Ake (1988: 492) therefore, this preposterous and prejudiced conclusion, which uncritically privileged capitalism and imperialism, foreclosed and pre-empted the chances of, or interest in any exhaustive examination of the conditions and implications of the capitalist penetration of the South by most Western scholars.

In effect, the need for a critical examination of the nature and impact of capitalist development in Africa and other parts of the Third World was over-shadowed by 'other more pressing issues', on which most of these classical Marxists focussed, namely, (i) the revolution of 1905, (ii) the First World War, (iii) the collapse of international socialist solidarity, and (iv) the surprising ability of capitalism to increase real wages. Ake (1988: 492) confirms this:

The crop of notable works such as Hilferding's *Finance Capital*, Luxemburg's *Accumulation of Capital*, Bukharin's *Imperialism and the World Economy* and Lenin's *Imperialism*, all broke new ground in articulating the globalization of capitalism and the relation between the industrialized countries and the backward ones. But they were mainly interested in the historicity of capitalism and the possibilities of socialism. None of them took a detailed look at the backward countries which Western capitalism was aggressing. In any case, they assumed that what happens to the backward countries is determined essentially by what happens to capitalism at the centre: it is thus the centre which needs to be studied and understood.

These limitations led to the development of 'neo-Marxist theories', most of which examine different aspects of the nature, dynamics, character and impact of capitalist development in Africa and other parts of the Third World. Earlier in this chapter, we illustrated aspects of these, and other phenomenal developments, which informed the development of neo-Marxist theories in the countries of the South. We have also illustrated the subject matter, strands and orientations of each of these theories. These theories began in the late 1940s and continued into the early 1960s, during which the feasibility and desirability of capitalist development became the focal interest of the neo-Marxist political economy of development. In this period, the thesis on 'the progressive role of capitalism in developing the periphery' was contested. The classical Marxist view on these questions was challenged by a series of influential writings, most of which presented capitalist development in the Third World as both 'unfeasible' and 'unprogressive'. On these issues, Ake (1988: 492) recalls that:

The first major work to break ground in this direction was Baran's *The Political Economy of Growth* published in 1957. Among the major influences of this school of thought are: Gunder Frank, especially his *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America*, and *Sociology of Development and the Underdevelopment of Sociology*; Samir Amin, *Accumulation on a World Scale*; the Economic Commission for Latin America (during the Prebisch era) and the Centro de Estudios Sociales, at the University of Chile.

Here again, Ake (1988: 492–493) exposes the weaknesses of this approach. One, with the exception of the work done under the auspices of the Economic Commission for Latin

America, the relevance of most of the early writings in this direction was rather limited. For example, most of them were written as critiques of the neo-classical approach and at best, as contributions to a largely theoretical debate within Marxism, which showed limited and incidental interest in the countries of the South. Two, even though the debate about the desirability and feasibility of capitalist development in the periphery continues to dominate the neo-Marxist approach in recent times, its focus has shifted to the classical Marxist view, which presents capitalist development as feasible and progressive in the Third World. However, although most of the writings in this direction were developed as critiques of the 'dependency', 'underdevelopment' and 'world system paradigms', such critiques are surprisingly lacking in concreteness, with the result that there is scarcely anything to match the concrete and rigorous analysis carried out by V. I. Lenin in his *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*. Three, most of these writings have been narrowly pre-occupied with the Marxist legitimacy and with showing that the writings in the dependency, world system and underdevelopment perspectives are 'not' Marxist enough.

Ake's (1988: 492–493) consideration of scientific socialism and the shortcomings within its theoretical approach to development are briefly examined here below. To begin with, the idea of a theory of development for the backward countries within the context of scientific socialism is rather fraught and problematic. This is mainly because, although scientific socialism provides a general theory of global development, which by its implications of being 'global' therefore captures and incorporates a theory of the development for the backward countries, such a theory does not examine the problem of development in these countries from the point of view of their interest. This is added to its 'rudimentary', 'simplified' and largely, 'over-generalized nature'. In other words, the theory neither focuses on, nor captures the specificities of the developmental challenges and concerns within the periphery. At its best, it merely illustrates a significant part of the problem of applying a general theory to specifics, in this case to specifics, which are of very marginal interest to the original theory. This, according to Ake (1988: 493) is because:

While scientific socialism posits a global revolution it remains focused on the industrialized countries for it is the dynamics of capitalism at the centre that powers the global revolution, which favours no special interest in the developing countries.

Two, in its application of Marx's writings as a theory of development to the analysis of contemporary social formations in the Third World, this theory suffers a great deal of handicap and repetitiveness. For instance, by using it, one is not sure how far one is extending or amending an existing theory. In other words, extensions and amendments keep referring unchangingly back and forth to questions and issues, which might have been tackled and exhausted in the original theory. Ake (1988: 493) captures this by noting that most Marxist or neo-Marxist analyses of contemporary social formations in the South appear to be stuck with the question of the desirability and feasibility of capitalist development in the underdeveloped countries. Another issue, on which most Marxist and neo-Marxist analyses seem to have been stuck, is the question of whether or not underdeveloped countries must engage in capitalist development in order to realize the goal of socialist development. This inadequacy underscores a lack of dynamism for this theory. Thus, based on the gaps identified above, Ake (1988: 493) questions the relevance of both Marxism and scientific socialism as a theory of development for the underdeveloped countries. It must however be noted as Ake observes, that the actual relevance of scientific socialism for the countries of the South does not lie essentially in the provision or creation of a theory of development, but mainly in illuminating the possibilities, conditions, rationale and modalities of a revolutionary struggle, a struggle to overcome and end exploitation through the development of human potentialities.

In concluding this sub-section, we must note that, the central argument, which Ake advances, suggests that in spite of all its theoretical insight for understanding social transformation and historical development in the world, the case for regarding either Marxism or scientific socialism as a theory of development for contemporary peripheral formations is rather problematic. He refers to this problematic status as a product of 'politics', reflected inter alia, in the demise of the political economy of development, especially, as illustrated in the critique of the theories examined here. Of this politics, Ake (1988: 494) surmises:

The contending powers knew that the path of development of the backward countries could be a significant vindication of their values as well as an asset in their struggle for the world's resources and for hegemony. So they offered 'the right way' and tried to pass off ideological representations as the science of development. Given their control over the conditions for the production and dissemination of 'knowledge', the political economy of development never had much chance of credibility, as it became a political pawn.

From these, he says, even though in the 1970s, matters were worsened with the new wave of political conservatism, which swept through Europe and North America, such conservative offensive was not intellectually articulate, but politically decisive, and was bent on cheaply deradicalizing the Third World. Later, in the 1980s, the deep and protracted crisis, which hit the South, aided the imposition of structural adjustment programmes on ailing economies in the Third World, without due consideration for whether or not they were actually solving the intended problems. These experiences have not only undermined the political economy of development, but have also reinforced the marginalization of the social sciences in the Third World. Lamenting the marginalization of the social sciences in the South, Ake (1988: 494) argues that:

The present state of the social sciences is not unconnected with the prevailing conservative disposition of the West, which, for one thing, has revived the end-of-ideology mentality, a complacent satisfaction with the existing social order, a tendency to think of its problems as relatively minor matters requiring marginal adjustment. This mood does not stimulate the social sciences, it does not encourage questions about fundamental social change, it gears social science practice to trivial concerns...

Even if the social sciences had been more innovative and exciting, it is unlikely that the political economy of development would have benefited greatly because it is disconnected from the social sciences. This disconnection is a manifestation of several contradictions: the production of social science knowledge at the centre and its consumption at the periphery, the dissociation of the received social science from the social needs of the backward countries, the conservative values of the received social science which is mainly a science of order, and the requirements of a social science of development which must be a science of radical transformation. While the political economy of development can only progress from a serious interest in development, the West's interest in the backward countries is ambiguous at best.

He therefore describes the political economy of development as being in a state of 'atrophy', particularly one, which occurs at a time when the crisis of underdevelopment is most tragic and the need for advancing development is most urgent. He chronicles the tragic manifestations of the dismal and atrophied state of underdevelopment in the South as including, stagnating incomes, fall and eventual collapse of commodity prices, unlimited debt burdens, a widening technology gap, which increasingly separates the advanced countries from the backward ones, most of whom are becoming irrelevant by virtue of their sustained

backwardness. He says, these tendencies are compounded by the greed, repressiveness, and other tyrannical inclinations of most leaders in the region.

Other manifestations include the alienation of leaders from their followers, the regrettable incidence of poverty, the intense struggle for surplus and the spoils of office, all of which combine to undermine the development process in these regions. Based on these experiences, Ake (1988: 495) observes that there is not going to be much improvement in most parts of the Third World. According to him, the combination of unpayable debt obligations, regressive trends in commodity prices, increasing tendency towards North-North interactions and economic investment, North-North trade, unprogressive trends in terms of trade for these backward countries, protectionism in the industrialized countries, intensifying class conflict in the backward countries and the pursuit of strong development strategies, all intensify stagnation and undermine the development prospects of the countries of the South. He says they also create a harsh political environment for the political economy of development, such that, if anything, the only form of development, which occurs in this kind of setting is likely to be 'exogenous', particularly, one, which is both disoriented and dissociated from the real-life experiences, struggles and the actual needs of the people.

### **3.5.1 Ake on the Development of Underdevelopment in Africa**

Importantly, Ake discusses the subject matter of development in Africa in relation to its opposite phenomenon, namely, 'underdevelopment', and locates the two processes, within the discourse of the political economy of Africa. He maintains that in order to properly understand the issues, which interface development and underdevelopment in the continent, we must not only understand the political economy of Africa in both the historical and contemporary periods, but that we must also properly understand the salient features, which characterize these periods as well as their implications on the configuration of social life. Such features, according to him, must also be juxtaposed with another set of features, namely, those features, which characterize African economies in order to clearly see and establish how they combine to create and reinforce underdevelopment and material contradictions in the region. From Ake's (1976: 1) account, the main features, which characterize the political economy of Africa include, intense ethnic conflict, the dominance of the single-party system, the high incidence of efficiency norms over legitimacy norms in



political competition, the recurrence of military coups and consequently, military rule, widespread political repression and the poor performance at economic development. Using the logic of the material base and the notion of the materialist dialectics, he contends that the features, which characterize African economies, are central in explaining the characteristics of the continent's political economy. Ake (1976: 1) captures the major features of African economies as follows:

They are highly statist, that is to say, the state dominates the economy-much more so than in the industrialised West. (ii) Their productive forces are underdeveloped and their economic surplus is meagre. (iii) They are highly dependent, particularly on the former colonial powers; for instance, practically all their technology is imported, most of their capital requirements are met from loans, grants, and foreign investments, and a high percentage of their Gross National Product comes from the export earnings of a few products. (iv) They are highly 'disarticulated'-the economic exchanges between sectors are very limited; the differences in productivity and incomes are of a high magnitude; the more dynamic sectors of the economy look outwards to other countries, and there is only marginal integration. (v) There is a juxtaposition of three modes of production, as follows: (a) The primitive community mode of production; (b) The simple community mode of production and (iii) the capitalist mode of production.

He remarks that while the primitive and the simple commodity modes of production were of indigenous and independent development in Africa, the capitalist mode of production in this region is a product of its transplant from Western Europe to the continent, a form of transplant, which was accomplished through colonial-imperialism. He shows that the capitalist penetration of the region took the form of the pillage of Africa's resources, trade and formal colonization, necessitated by the need to resolve the knotty contradictions, which tended to retard the rate of capitalization of surplus value; began with the European scramble for the continent, and occurred mainly in the last three decades of the nineteenth century, involving virtually all African states, with the exception of Ethiopia and Liberia. Hence, it is this process of capitalist development in the continent that must be critically interrogated in order to properly account for, and understand the details of the historical connections, which underline the current paradoxes and manifestations of development and underdevelopment in the continent. This, according to Ake (1976: 2 and 1981: 15) is because the integration of Africa into the world capitalist system by Western colonialism and imperialism is the critical *event*, which has had the greatest impact in shaping the economic and political development of the region in recent times.

Two points are clear from Ake's argument here. One, that the facts of the situation in pre-colonial Africa do not suggest either underdevelopment or a total dependence by the continent on the outside world. Two, in order to properly understand the dynamics of underdevelopment in contemporary Africa, we must examine the continent's history in the periods predating and antedating its contact with the Western world and other advanced capitalist states. We must properly historicize and theorize the nature of such interactions with a view to establishing not only the prevailing terms and conditions of exchange, which guide and characterize such relationships, but also understand the various interests at stake, how they are articulated and given expression and their impact on the continent as a whole.

By describing the salient features, which characterize the political economy of Africa and those features, which characterized African economies generally, Ake (1976 and 1981) provides a useful insight, which indicates how the political economy of contemporary Africa is to be explained and what might be usefully conjectured about its future development. The connection, which this study establishes, suggests that those features, which characterize the political economy of the continent, mainly help us in appreciating and accounting for the state of African economies, and to explain them either in the direction of 'development' or 'underdevelopment'. Put differently, this study infers from Ake's account presented here above, and argues that while the salient features, which characterize African economies, lead us to describe such economies as either developed or underdeveloped, the other features, which characterize the political economy of Africa are rather manifestations of the development or underdevelopment of such economies. They play out and show the complex matrices of interactions, which take place within the economies. In other words, the understanding and insight, which this study gleans from a reading of Ake (1976 and 1981) suggest that intense ethnic conflict, the dominance of the single-party system, the incidence of efficiency norms over legitimacy norms in political competition, the recurrence of military coups, widespread political repression, the poor performance at economic development and other features of the political economy of Africa only illustrate the underdevelopment of the continent, illustrated in the features, which characterize the continent's economies.

Many issues are raised in Ake's analysis of development in Africa. However, only five will be examined here in this study. One, his argument that colonial-imperialism engendered and sustains the development of underdevelopment in Africa. He illustrates this point in the

following ways: (i) through his argument on monetization, the imperialism of trade and the nature and impact of foreign investment, three different, but inter-related processes and phenomena, through which colonial capitalism penetrated Africa and consolidated itself in the region, (ii) in the disarticulation, dependence and other features of the colonial and later, post-colonial economies, and (iii) by examining the major contradictions, which characterize the colonial and post-colonial economies. It should be noted, however, that Ake emphasizes the role of the colonial ideology in realizing imperialist objectives in all parts of colonial and post-colonial Africa. Two, his argument that there is a deeply entrenched misconception about the meaning of development in the continent. Ake claims that far from being understood, development in Africa is widely misunderstood for what it is not. Three, his contention that politics largely underdevelops Africa, four, his claim that instead of autonomous capitalist development, Africa rather retrogresses and seeks to develop only by imitating the matured practices and experiences in the West. Imitation, as he defines it, takes the form of (i) borrowing and wrongly applying Western development paradigms and precepts to the problems, experiences and situations in Africa, (ii) imitating Western notions of consumerism and lifestyles, and (iii) duplicating foreign symbols of development, such as artificial urbanization, and a host of other supposedly developmental indices, or features, which do not reflect the actual levels of development in the region. The last or fifth issue, examined here, are Ake's conclusion and options for development in the continent. Each of these issues is examined here below in fairly elaborate details.

### **3.5.2 Ake on Colonialism and the Underdevelopment of Africa**

This is explained not only in terms of the characteristics of the colonial economy, but mainly, in terms of the contradictions, which this economy created, and which also developed under it. Significant aspects of the characteristics of the colonial economy have been examined earlier. The study has also emphasized their implications for the development of the continent. It therefore remains to be shown, how the contradictions of the colonial system contributed, not only to the development of underdevelopment, but also to the forms of changes and continuities, which took place in both colonial and contemporary Africa.

Ake (1981: 68ff) discusses these contradictions in relation to the general movement of the colonial economic history of Africa, which he divides into three phases. The first period of

the manifestation of colonial contradictions was before and in the 1930s, during which new commodities were introduced to the colonies and were aggressively promoted, leading to a massive increase in the export of countries like Senegal, Ghana and Cote d' Ivoire, among others. This period was marked by conflict and bitterness, which were appropriated and articulated through military battles for conquest and consolidation. Conflict between the colonial powers and Africans was intensive as a result of the newly introduced colonial policies, which had not taken deep roots. Such policies did not only generate widespread discontent, but also reinforced the hardships and constraints of World War I, which spanned the period from 1914-1918. The second phase was from 1930-1945 and it coincided with the period of the great depression. This period revealed the contradictions, which resulted from the integration of African economies to the world capitalist system. It compounded the problems in both the barter terms of trade and the income terms of trade.

During this period, the colonies in Africa suffered most from the depressed state of world commerce, which also resulted from the great depression. These situations informed a number of responses, most of which worsened the problems. First, the colonial government increased import duties, a decision, which made life much more difficult for Africans by raising the prices of imported goods. Second, it reduced government expenditure. The inclination to this decision was not surprising, since the government was not getting the revenue in the way it knew best and also because it was not going to transfer capital from the centre to the satellites, or colonies. This policy response led to a lot of reduction in the number and quality of public projects. It led to reduction in earnings, and less demands for both services and employment. All these multiplied the negative effects of the depression in the colonies. The third policy was rather preferential and took the form of trade regulation, the practice of which further increased the integration of the colonial economy into the world capitalist system by making it more responsive to the vagaries and pressures of the Western capitalist economies, and above all, more exploitable.

The third phase, which occurred from 1945 to the 1960s, marked the period of the post-War economic boom, the positive impact of which was rather negligible in resolving the economic hardships in Africa. Ake remarks that the discriminatory and exclusivist manner in which the benefits of the War were appropriated by the great powers and other dominant groups within the colonies compounded the contradictions in the colonial economy, drew

attention to their historical dynamics, manifestations and consequently, heightened the pace of decolonization activities. He categorizes colonial contradictions into three, namely, (i) contradictions between colonial capital and the emergent African petit-bourgeoisie, (ii) contradictions between colonial capital and African labour, and (iii) contradictions between colonial capital and the African peasantry. All these contradictions, together with the contradictory nature of the colonial ideology itself, contributed to the negation and eventual overthrowment of the colonial system.

From the foregone account, it remains to be stated that the contradictions of the colonial economy were products of the contraptions created and brought about by the colonial state. Such contraptions are evident in the features, which marked out the development of underdevelopment in Africa. Through the mismanagement of the colonial and post-colonial economy, and particularly, through the development and sustenance of all such contraptions, captured and reflected in the features of the economy, colonial-imperialism actually contributed to the development of underdevelopment in Africa. In colonial Africa, the major characteristics of the economy included, (i) the disarticulation of the economy, which was expressed in the transport and manufacturing sectors, as well as the development of export commodities, (ii) market imperfections and monopolistic tendencies, (iii) the reliance on a few export commodities, (iv) economic dependence, as illustrated in trade, finance, the monetary and technological systems and sectors, and (v) complexities and discontinuities in the social relations of production.

In the post-colonial period, these characteristics were further reinforced, but represented as, (i) widely underdeveloped and dependent economies, (ii) disarticulation, (iii) a very narrow resource base, which translates into poor performance at economic development, and (iv) the juxtaposition of the primitive, the simple commodity, and the capitalist modes of production. All these inform two instructive conclusions. One, that under colonialism, the development of underdevelopment actually took place in Africa. Two, that in spite of independence, decolonization, together with the efforts of the post-colonial state did not achieve much in either overcoming or transforming the historical structures of underdevelopment and dependency put in place by the colonial system. Rather, they consummated and consolidated them. These therefore informed the emphasis, which this study places on the major characteristics of the colonial economy. It has shown how they reflect the underdevelopment

of the continent. Also, with respect to the post-colonial era, the study has examined not only how colonial economic features were transformed and consolidated in the post-colonial period, but has also captured the question of how they were established, together with how they reinforce existing structures of dependence, underdevelopment and stagnation in the continent.

### **3.5.3 Ake on the Prevailing Misconceptions about Development in Africa**

The second issue raised in Ake's analysis of development in Africa, is his argument that there is a deeply entrenched misconception about the meaning of development in the continent. Among the myriad of issues, which Ake raises in connection with this are, (i) His critique of the meaning of development, (ii) His illustration of our misconceptions in the understanding, definition and practice of development, (iii) His clarification on the ambiguities and inadequacies, which characterize prevailing conceptions of development in the continent, (iv) His critique of the ideologies of development adopted by African leaders, (v) His aversion from the perfunctory and praxiologically bankrupt intellectual stance of African social scientists, (vi) His advocacy for new and more appropriate concepts of development for replacing the prevailing Western models, and (vii) His notion of the urgency for the need to articulate an alternative model of development for the continent. In Ake, all these are linked to the question of how social science knowledge can be made to further the developmental quest of the continent. We now examine the details of each of these issues as contained in Ake's account of development in Africa.

Importantly, Ake (n. d.: 1–2) offers a rigorous critique of existing definitions of development, which he bemoans as largely derived from Western theoretical models. He argues that since it is a universal concept, development must not be limited to the experiences of any group or society, but that, it must be properly defined according to the social experiences, needs and aspirations of the people, for whom it is meant. According to Ake (n. d.: 1), "For whatever else development means, it must mean the systematic increase of man's capabilities for mastering his environment, satisfying basic needs and realizing his potentials".

He explains what he considers to be our collective misconceptions in the definition and practice of development in the region. He illustrates these in terms of the contradictions,

ambiguities and confusion of meaning, which characterize our understanding of development both as a concept and as a process. He observes that these difficulties of conceptualizing development have rendered the very enterprise of development as a project altogether impossible and futile. Ake (n. d.: 3) notes that:

How can we clarify the relationship of social science to development when our conceptions of development are unclear, confused and contradictory. What is this goal, development whose achievement we seek to maximize by the aid of social science? We hardly know. Since Africans are fervently committed to development and have for all practical purposes made development their overriding national purpose, misconceptions of development could lead to misdirection of energy, waste of resources and the weakening of the sense of national purpose. Quite clearly one of the most important contributions that social science can make to development in Africa is to solve the problem of providing an adequate conception of development.

Next, he highlights the inadequacies in the prevailing conceptions of development and traces them to Africa's affinities not only with the West as a dominant international force, but also with Western theoretical models. He faults the acceptance by African leaders of the industrialized countries as the historical approximations of the ideals of a developed society and observes that these tendencies are not surprising for two reasons, (i) Given the West's historical involvements with Africa, and its decisive influences on the people's consciousness and material conditions of existence, and (ii) the impressive technological advancement of the West, its economic development and industrialization, which are not only emulative and inspiring, but also intimidating to African leaders. He clarifies that these are potential guarantors not of development, but only of the possibility of development. In other words, he says, the indicators of the possibility of development are being conflated with, and mistaken for the achievement of development. From this premise, he regrets and condemns the prevalent practice in the continent, which makes the West the model for African development. According to Ake (n. d.: 4):

On the conscious level the tendency is for African leaders and scholars to be very critical of Western notions of development. They are particularly critical of the West for confusing economic growth with development, for having too materialist a view of development. To all appearances, these criticisms are largely 'ritual'. They are quickly made and just as quickly forgotten. For the most part when African leaders and scholars move beyond the generalities to specify in concrete terms their development strategy and development policies, they gravitate towards the very concepts of development which they criticise so vehemently... Perhaps it is too much to expect that politicians pressed by the exigencies of politics and presiding over economies which are satellites of those of the industrialised Western countries would do anything other than follow the line of least resistance and make-do with Western notions of development. But one might have expected differently of African scholars, especially social scientists.

He laments the perfunctory and praxiologically bankrupt posture of African social scientists. He does not see any fundamental difference between these scholars and politicians in the continent, who shout and make critical comments about Western notions of development, only to quietly accept and implement them implicitly. He makes only a few exceptions to this and cites Samir Amin's (1974) *Accumulation on a World Scale*, and Justinian Rweyemamu's (1973) *Underdevelopment and Industrialisation in Tanzania*, as some of the exceptional works in this regard. Nevertheless, he says, in spite of all these pioneering and imposing works, the literature on development in Africa still lacks adequate intellectual efforts in creating a more appropriate concept of development, which spells out its practical features and the requirements for its realization and fulfilment. He laments the meagre contributions of African scholars in developing more appropriate concepts for replacing the prevailing Western models of development. He decries the calls for alternative development paradigms, most of which have been limited to theoretical platitudes, and which assert the centrality of man as the focus of development. He observes that even those calling for the adoption of a socialist alternative to Africa's development are not free from these shortcomings. According to Ake (n. d.: 6):

It is interesting that the United Nations Agencies such as the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa have made a more strenuous effort to evolve a more appropriate concept of development than research institutions, universities and individual researches. It is through the efforts of United Nations Agencies that we have new interesting concepts such as capacitation, and the unified approach. Some good examples of the attempt of the United Nations Agencies to point new directions are: Report on a Unified Approach to Development Analysis and Planning. (UN Commission for Social Development, E/CM.5/519, 5 December 1974). Applications of Unified Approach to Development Approach and Planning Under African Conditions (ECA, E/CM. 14 30 Sept. 1976.) A revised Framework of Principles for the Implementation of the New International Economic Order in Africa, Economic Commission for Africa E/CN.14/ECO/90/rev. 3 June 25 1976.

He notes that even though these initiatives by the United Nations are commendable, they still do not offer any alternative outside the Western notion of development, save for minor modifications, which are not fundamentally different from the Western recipe. He says although a few African leaders seem to have recognized this crucial need, what they propose rather complicates the problems instead of resolving them. Examples of such leaders, which he cites are, Sedar Senghor's *African Socialism* and Jomo Kenyatta's *Government of Kenya* Sessional Papers, Number 10. The most systematic effort towards development in Africa cited by Ake is the late Julius Nyerere of Tanzania. He describes his philosophy of *Ujamaa* as an



approach, which captures self-reliance not only as the central focus and most desirable form of development, but also as the most assured antidote to dependency. Nyerere's ideas of development are contained in published works, which illustrate his doctrines and philosophy of development in Africa with particular focus on Tanzania and the East African experience. However, given the undemocratic nature of these leaders, Ake argues that their development policies have neither succeeded in either clarifying the development process, nor in resolving the impediments undermining sustainable development in the region. As Ake (n. d.: 7) captures it, such policy options are either marginal or at most negative:

Marginal because their original concepts lack rigour and their operational meaning is obscure; negative because they often create confusion and mask policies, which perpetuate colonial economic structures. Even the countries, which have chosen scientific socialism, have fallen far short of reorientating development. The ideologues and theoreticians of these countries are yet to perform the necessary task of rethinking, indeed recreating socialism in the light of African conditions. Until this is done, pursuit of socialist development will only lead to bizarre results, and possibly even discredit socialism.

#### **3.5.4 Ake on Politics and the Underdevelopment of Africa**

The third critical issue raised in Ake's analysis of development is his account of how politics underdevelops Africa. Clearly, this is one of the most intriguing, yet instructive illustrations raised in his writings. He presents the underdevelopment of Africa by politics as a logical consequence of both the politics of independence and of the character of the post-colonial state itself. He describes these two features as the results and political legacy of colonialism. To appreciate the significance of Ake's position on development in the region, one must locate him within the body of explanations provided on why Africa is not developing. This enables us capture the uniqueness of his explanations of the problem of either underdevelopment or the utter lack of development in the region, especially, in relation to other explanations. Given the implications of the African crisis, many studies have drawn attention to its causes, among which the following have been mentioned, colonialism, corruption, insufficient technical assistance, an exploitative international system, unfavourable terms of trade, inadequate entrepreneurial skills, and incompetent management. Other factors have been mentioned in Chapter One of this thesis. However, for Ake, the case is different. He explains the underdevelopment of Africa as a product of 'politics' and points at 'political conditions' as the greatest obstacles undermining development in the region.

Beginning with 'the politics of independence', he argues that even though the contradictions of colonial rule generated intense anti-colonial struggles and left behind a legacy of sustained commitment to independence, or, the quest for a second independence, especially by the masses, these were not complemented with the development of ideas regarding the most appropriate economic policies in the post-colonial situation. Also, even though members of the various nationalist elite had articulated colonial grievances and struggled for the acquisition of self-rule, these efforts were limited only to the political sphere. In other words, the internal struggle for power through the replacement of the colonizers by the emergent African elite was narrowly defined as the absolute focus of attention. In effect, the post-colonial elite display a cake-sharing, rather than a cake-baking psychosis, which captures the kernel of their struggle for both independence and state power. This creates a hostile political condition, characterized by animosity, competition based on bitterness and exclusivity, all of which are not suitable for development. The immediate manifestations of these were to be found in, (i) the challenges encountered in advancing the integration of 'the new state', which was threatened by strong centrifugal tendencies, (ii) the disintegration of the nationalist movement, (iii) the fractured solidarity of political leaders, which suffers mainly because of the differences in the approach to the problems of administering and developing the state, problems, which still loom large, and most importantly (iv) the betrayal by the elites of the interests and economic aspirations of the masses for material fulfilment (see Ake, 1967: 17). As Ake (1967: 17-35) illustrates, in the immediate post-colonial period, all these regressive paradoxes were represented in the forms of, (i) the cleavages in the nationalist movement, (ii) elite competition, (iii) elite-mass gap, (iv) the fundamental problem of the lack of policy, especially, for economic and self-reliant development, and (v) other cleavages in the social structure. Consequently, Ake notes that 'the optimistic psychological atmosphere' characteristic of revolutions encountered problems at two fronts in Africa. On the one hand, it raised the people's expectations to heights that the new state could not possibly meet, especially, given the meagre resources at its disposal. On the other hand, it showed with pointed clarity not only the gap between the elite and the masses, but also the divergence of hopes and fulfilment, all of which caused frustration and alienation. Also, far from being a cohesive group, the nationalist movement suffers pronounced fissiparous tendencies and disintegrates with the elimination of colonial rule, which as an overriding aim, enabled it

assume the artificial posture of a dominant mass party, symbolizing the summation of all aspirations in the new state. According to Ake (1996: 4):

The nationalist movement was essentially a coalition of disparate groups united by their common grievances against colonial oppression. It was typically a network of nationalities, ethnic groups, religious organizations, syncretistic movements, secondary organizations, and professional interest groups.<sup>1</sup> But even though they cooperated against the colonial regime, their relationship was never free from tension and conflict.

After independence, the exclusiveness with which each group struggles for power exposes the superficiality of the atmosphere of consensus created by the nationalist movement. Also, the extremist nature of manoeuvring by each elite group to acquire and consolidate its hold onto power also negates the possibility of keeping up the semblance of unity. As time passed on, the political space becomes so much narrowed that the prospect for democratic politics is entirely nullified, such that, the increase in the political influence of one group implies the loss of influence and relevance for another. In the process, every group struggles to insulate itself against exploitation, a struggle, which not only endangers the solidarity of the nationalist movement, but also encourages the articulation of hitherto inarticulate interest groups to seek political influence at all cost. All these, together with the glaring lack of an articulate policy of economic development, created the foundational conditions, which engender the underdevelopment of the continent by politics. He decries the insensitivity of current theories of political integration to the complexity of the problem with which they are concerned, an insensitivity, which he describes as a major defect derived from the oversimplification of the problem and hence, leads to very limited and superficial answers. In explaining how the character of the post-colonial state engenders the form of politics, which underdevelops the continent, Ake argues that we must historicize colonialism in the continent and recapitulate its legacies for the region, legacies, which have already been illustrated earlier. However, for the sake of emphasis, it should be noted that the particular features and aspects of the colonial legacy, which speak to the underdevelopment of the continent by politics, are replete in the absoluteness and arbitrariness of the colonial and later post-colonial state. These features, together with the primacy of politics, which they condone, depoliticize economic interactions and processes within the state, thereby unleashing powerful social forces, including a form of political competition, which renders the task of overcoming underdevelopment impossible. To him, it is in this way that politics actually

underdevelops Africa. Ake (1989: 54) captures the dynamics and effects of the process of depoliticization:

1. As politics is repressed it becomes more and more primary and marginalizes everything else including economic development.
2. As politics becomes primary, the premium on political power rises and political competition becomes increasingly intense leading to the militarization of not only politics but also society to the detriment of economic development.
3. The depoliticization of economic processes expresses and reinforces the contradictions between the rulers and the ruled, and their mutual alienation; it leads to the dissociation of public policy from public interest and finally, stalls the struggle against imperialism.

From these, Ake extrapolates that we will never understand the crisis in Africa much less hope to resolve it if we continue to think of it as an economic crisis. This, according to him, is because the African crisis is primarily a political crisis, and that its economic manifestations and consequences are only incidental, not fundamental to the crisis of politics in the region. He identifies three elements, which shape and reinforce the underdevelopment of Africa by politics, namely, (i) political authoritarianism, (ii) the exclusiveness of entitlement and claims to rulership, and (iii) the deradicalization of both politics and of the nationalist movement, all of which lead to an apologetic apoliticism. These elements underline the pervasive use of force, the articulation of political competition based on the clash of two exclusive claims to rulership and power, the reduction of politics to a zero-sum game, and above all, the hegemonization of politics, all of which negate the very idea of democratic politics, and even politics itself, be it of any kind. The implications of these tendencies for the underdevelopment of the region are brought out in very clear relief if we examine the paradoxical relationship between the process leading to depoliticization and the objective conditions prevailing in Africa. These have been captured in the characteristics of the colonial and later, post-colonial economies and those features, which characterize the political economy of the continent. In addition, Ake (1989: 55) adds that:

For instance, economically the various regions and sectors of the typical African postcolonial economy looked outwards and lacked complementarity; politically, differences rather than similarities increasingly dominated political life once the colonial regime was removed showing that common resentment of its character was an important basis of political cohesion during the nationalist era. Most African countries are really a podge of nationalities or peoples who had little in common with each other before colonialism brought them under a common domination. Lastly, the mounting evidence that political independence had not done much for popular aspirations and popular interests undermined the legitimacy of the political leadership and sharpened class conflict.

All these engender the underdevelopment of Africa in a number of ways, (i) the struggle for power becomes so intense and absorbing that it overshadows everything else, including and especially, the pursuit of development. Fearing that the process might either demand too much from them or even undermine their class positions, *ipso facto*, Ake doubts if African leaders are genuinely interested in a developmental state. He shows that the Hobbesian struggle for power necessarily underdevelops Africa in three major ways: One, through the incompatibilities between the pursuit of development on the one hand and the quest for reproducing existing forms of domination on the other. He notes that leaders in the continent naturally chose the reproduction of domination at the expense of development with all the negative consequences that this choice entails. Among others, Ake (1989: 56) infers that:

The damaging effects of this conflict are everywhere. It leads to the misuse of manpower resources and to inefficiency and corruption. Invariably appointments into positions of power, even when they are positions, which demand specialized knowledge, tend to be made by political criteria particularly by regarding these appointments as part of survival strategy. Each time such an appointment is made, the conflict between survival on the one hand and efficiency and development on the other are reproduced. The damage to efficiency and development arises not only from the special performance criteria and likely incompetence of the persons so appointed but also from the general demoralization of the technically competent people serving under them who are often frustrated by their subordination to the supervision of people who are powerful but inept and whose concerns are often quite different from their own.

He describes this as the bane of not just the political system in the continent, but also of African ministries and parastatals, where ignorant and incompetent people occupy the very top of African institutions, while the really competent ones are either laid idle or even wasted, all for political reasons. Relatedly, owing to political influences, economic resources of the state are been channelled into unproductive uses, significant development projects are been initiated for the wrong reasons and are sometimes located in places where they are least needed or where are not economically beneficial, all on account of political considerations. In addition, Ake (1989: 56-57) recalls cases where huge contracts and licenses have been given to politically significant, powerful or strategic groups, but who are both unqualified and unable to deliver upon such gigantic state projects, leading to massive waste of national economic resources. He cites cases in which well-paid positions are created just to bribe and give jobs to people or individuals who are neither qualified nor needed, but, who have to be placated for the purpose of winning their solidarity. In the process, he says, the state incurs a huge debt from paying for nuisance value over services, which were neither needed nor

rendered. He also mentions the idea of paying or even over-paying 'politically fearful groups' for their role in delivering certain expectations, unconnected to their primary appointments, thus creating demoralizing disparities between efforts, inputs and reward.

Ake (1989: 57) faults the assumption in the literature on development in Africa that everyone, including the leaders are interested in development. He dismisses such hazy assumptions as taking for granted the primacy of power in African politics and its very conflictual nature with other goals. According to him, since the requirements of development and social transformation are at variance with the reproduction of the domination of those in power, they are not likely, and should not be expected to play this crucial role. He describes this role as being too costly for the survival of African leaders and that they will rather scratch on its surface than truly pursue it. He explains the aversion of African leaders from genuinely pursuing development in terms of their perceived fears concerning the implications of development for their class interests. He says this fear has forced them to prefer the consolidation of the inherited colonial social order, rather than a socio-economic transformation. In the face of all other options, they prefer having their economic liberty locked up into a dependency relation with the metropolitan economies, since it does not undermine the possibility of future accumulation within the domestic economies, but furthers their capacity for appropriation without necessarily engaging in production. Thus, development is entirely sacrificed and abandoned, with the result that where it occurs at all, much of what happens is nothing more than ambiguities and contradictions, in which its pursuit is merely a stated posture.

In Ake, the second way in which the Hobbesian struggle for power underdevelops Africa is through 'the militarization of social life'. It results from over-valuing political power, a desire, which explains the intense and normless struggle to acquire and keep it. This transforms politics in Africa into warfare, such that all forms of force are mobilized and deployed with the result that the winners win all, including absolute power, and the losers lose all, including their liberty, their invested resources and sometimes, their lives. In addition, the vocation and vocabulary of politics are changed from being an exclusively civilian affair into the domain of the most coercive and violent. In the process, the militarization of social life logically culminates into preatorianism or military rule in Africa, in which the master technocrats of

violence and coercive interactions take over and therefore alienate their civilian counterparts. Elsewhere, Ake (1996: 6) confirms this and notes that:

It was not the military that caused military rule in Africa by intervening in politics; rather, it was the character of politics that engendered military rule by degenerating into warfare, inevitably propelling the specialists of warfare to the lead role.

He however observes that military rule has had some of the worst consequences not only for the military as an institution of the state, but also for economic development in Africa. The third way in which politics underdevelops the continent, according to him, is through the perpetual economic subordination of the continent to underdevelopment, dependency and the political vagaries of the developed economies in the West and North America.

### **3.5.5 Ake's Notion of Africa's Development by Imitating the West**

The fourth major issue raised in Ake's analysis of development in Africa is his claim that instead of autonomous capitalist development, Africa rather retrogresses and seeks to develop only by imitating the practices and experiences in the metropolises. He says, there is no evidence to support the lamentations on the failure of development in the region, because it has never really taken place in the continent. He clarifies that so far, what has taken place in Africa is nothing more than a crudely fabricated plan that an embattled and distracted leadership puts together for the sake of appearances, often with the aim of luring prospective donors, for covering up its non-productive class status, for hiding its detachedness and emptiness in relation to developmental and entrepreneurial initiatives. According to Ake (1993: 74) at their best, the appearances of development in the continent have the following features: (i) they reflect the scientific dogmatism of development ideologies and experts from the metropolises, (ii) they perpetuate the isolation of African leaders from significant international settings where critical economic decisions are taken, (iii) they are worked from the top-down and are imbued with attitudes and orientations, which are rather hostile to the poor majority, (iv) the common people are presented as a major obstacle to development: their expectations are described as being too high, they are said to be consuming too much of their meagre incomes, they are condemned for lacking ambition and self-reliance, they are also presented as being too lazy and highly superstitious. In short, it is argued that the common people are inherently enemies of progress, even their own progress.

He therefore, concludes that the development paradigm in the continent is only a product of the realization by the elite of the need for some legitimizing theme with which to replace decolonization and other liberation ideologies in recent times. In other words, given their ideological bankruptcy and sparse resources of their own with which to work, these leaders therefore look up perpetually in absolute dependence on foreign powers to finance their national development aspirations, thereby reintroducing in the economic context some of the issues of dependence and underdevelopment, which ought to have been settled through the acquisition of political independence. It is in this sense that Ake (1996: 12-13) surmises that Africa's development paradigm is severely limited by the political interests that produced it. It is both insensitive as well as indifferent to the institutional framework and requirements of development. This is mainly because; it is not concerned with the question of social transformation and the material empowerment of the poor masses. It is also not concerned with the question of political structures and practices, environmental and administrative systems, or even the social institutions within the region, all of which affect and determine the prospect of development.

### **3.5.6 Ake's Options for Development in Africa**

What options abound for the development of Africa in Ake? How does he explain the prospects for development in the continent, and what are the implications of the recommendations, which he offers? These and other relevant questions are raised in this final sub-section. We focus on two central aspects of the recommendations offered by him. The aim is to capture the subject matter of Ake's development paradigm for the region, with a view to evaluating its particularities and implications in the next chapter. To begin with, he describes this paradigm as 'the residual option', which takes account of the present realities in Africa as well as the global environment at large. Most importantly, it is anchored and based on the energy and direct involvement of the ordinary people, the working masses, who have the most at stake in the development process, who are also the bearers of the yoke of social change and transformation at large. Far from being arbitrary, the paradigm is derived from a clear definition and understanding of the problem, other challenges and concerns of the lack of development in the region. The basic assumptions of this paradigm, according to Ake (1996: 125) include the ideas that:



Development is not economic growth even though economic growth in large measure determines its possibility. A development paradigm cannot therefore be judged merely by its conduciveness to economic growth, although this criterion of judgment is not irrelevant to its validity.

Development is not a project but a process.

Development is the process by which people create and recreate themselves and their life circumstances to realize higher levels of civilization in accordance with their own choices and values.

Development is something that people must do for themselves, although it can be facilitated by the help of others. If people are the end of development, as is the case, they are also necessarily its agents and its means.

Africa and the global environment are to be taken as they are and not as they ought to be. What the paradigm contributes is some idea of what they can be.

These assumptions, most of which are derived from the prevailing conventional wisdom of the development community are taken seriously by Ake and are applied systematically to the challenges and experiences in Africa. He asserts that if dutifully applied, especially, in a manner that overcomes frivolities and utopia, the results will certainly differ from the bitter experiences and results of our currently over-politicized interactions, which we shamelessly parade as development. First, Ake (1996: 126) argues that by the assumptions of the development paradigm, Africa can develop only in the context of democratic politics. He illustrates the relationship between development and democracy, or 'economic development' and 'political democracy', most of which has been captured earlier by this study. His central emphasis suggests that the people, who are the essence and end of development, hitherto marginalized in the past, must be centrally involved, not only in the development process, but should also be given the prerogative of making the necessary policy inputs, which affect the outcomes of development. He differentiates such an emancipatory process from a rather exploitative and oppressive process, which dubiously appropriates and enlists the people's support and resources for promoting and actualizing the leaders' notions of development. He says, while the former is self-reliant and therefore self-realizing, the other is rather self-alienating. He advocates the primacy of political democracy as an instrumental requirement for transforming the well-being and aspirations of the masses into the supreme laws of development. According to him, the only way in which social transformation is attainable without being derailed, compromised or dissociated from the well-being of the people is by instituting not just democracy, but essentially, social democracy. He therefore privileges democracy, notwithstanding the experiences in China, Thailand, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore and other newly industrialized countries, where rapid industrialization has been achieved in spite of authoritarian rule.

The second recommendation suggested by Ake is the transformation of the state. We have briefly referred to this point in preceding sections of the thesis. We shall also return to it again for analysis and evaluation later, in the next chapter. Lastly, he emphasizes the role of knowledge production through the social sciences in overcoming the current challenges undermining the development prospects of the region. According to Ake (n. d.: 7):

In sum, a very urgent task remains to be done. Africans, particularly social scientists have to apply themselves to finding a model of development more in tone with African realities than the Western models currently in use. Unless this task is accomplished, Africa will continue to misdirect her energy and to squander her resources. The accomplishment of this task is one of the most critical contributions that social science can make.

He presents this as a most difficult task, particularly, given the prevailing development ideologies and strategies, which do not only perpetuate the underdevelopment of the region, but also serve very powerful local and international interests. He says, such interests will not stop at resisting the turn to other strategies of development, but will also make the generation of indigenous ideologies difficult. Given their immense influences over the production of ideas in the society, the task of creating an appropriate model of development is a very complex one, one which is both an intellectual and a political struggle.

### **3.5.7 Conclusion**

This chapter has captured major aspects of some of the issues raised in Ake's analyses of the state, democracy and development in Africa. It has also summed up the major strands in the issues raised and examined. In the next chapter, these issues will be further examined and evaluated in order to provide a detailed critique of Ake's works on them. In particular, they will be placed in conversation with the issues raised in the works of other scholars in Africa, Asia and Latin America with a view to establishing possible improvements and where necessary, revisions on aspects of Ake's analyses and positions on these issues.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### AKE'S CONTRIBUTIONS: A CRITICAL DISCOURSE

#### 4.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a critique of Ake's writings on the state, democracy and development both in general theoretical terms and also in relation to Africa. It develops on the heels of what was attempted in the immediately foregone chapter. In the previous chapter, we examined some of the issues raised in Ake's writings on the state, democracy and development in Africa. In the process, the details of his theoretical contentions and illustrations on these and other related issues were given the pride of place. In doing this, we followed his arguments, focused entirely on his writings, noted and where necessary quoted extensively from his numerous works. The aim was to properly situate and locate where he stands in relation to his writings through capturing and establishing his specific positions and conclusions on the issues under consideration. However, in this chapter, the study moves further beyond the limits of the views expressed in those works. It provides a detailed critique of Ake through examining some of his positions vis-a-vis those of other scholars on some of the issues that will be raised in this chapter.

The methodological approach adopted places Ake in conversation with other scholars and writers in the early or ancient, classical, neo-classical and modern periods, all of who have written remarkable works of political and social history on Africa, Asia, Latin America and other post-colonial societies. The objectives are: One, to establish the sources, inspirations and specific influences of some of these scholars and authorities on Ake, in this case, the early, classical, and where applicable, neo-classical writers. The study raises aspects of the issues raised in Ake's writings and places them in conversation with those noted in the works of these scholars. Doing this helps us not only to see the extent of Ake's indebtedness to these sources, but also to establish an informed sense of continuity and change in terms of the development of those views and ideas, from the early periods down to Ake's period and milieu. Two, to establish the extent of consistency and relevance of Ake's writings on the stated issues in relation to the works of other authorities. Three, to establish the differences, aversions and where applicable, reservations, which some of these scholars have demonstrated, directly and indirectly to aspects of his works. Four, deriving immediately

from the third objective, we seek to explore the opportunities and prospects for developing an improved version of Ake's theses on the state, democracy and development in Africa.

Some of the early scholars whose works were of relevance in this exercise are Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527), Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), Edmund Burke (1729-1797), Thomas Paine (1739-1809), Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), Mary Wollstonecraft (1759-1797), William Godwin (1756-1836), Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), Karl Marx (1818-1883), Friedrich Engels (1820-1895), Max Weber (1864-1920), Vladimir Illich Lenin (1870-1924), Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937), Robert Alan Dahl (1915-Date) and Friedrich August von Hayek (1889- Date). Most of their works focus inter alia, on different issues and aspects of the classic conceptions of the state in political theory. Examples of some of the issues, which they examine include the historical conceptions and development of the state, the forms and types of the state, the necessities and justification of the state's existence, the depth and extent of the state's intervention in social and economic life, the role of the state in economic development and the changing forms of these issues over time. Some of the neo-classical scholars whose works are considered instructive and insightful for this exercise are Jurgen Habermas, Michel Foucault, Ian Hacking, Benedict Anderson, Edward Said, Anthony Giddens and Samuel P. Huntington. The works of these scholars help us in understanding how the issues, which impinge on the state, democracy and development in Africa in the writings of Claude Ake and also in general theoretical terms have been furthered by recent intellectual developments, debates and theoretical advancements on the philosophy of modernity, modern forms of power, governmental techniques, nationalism and Orientalism.

Within the ambit of post-colonial scholars, the thesis takes a closer look at the works of Aime Cesaire, Frantz Fanon, Samir Amin, Andre Gunder Frank, Ernesto Laclau, Giovanni Sartori, Arturo Escobar, Ariel Dorfman, Armand Mattelart, Paul Gilroy, Ngugi wa Thiong'o, Walter Rodney, Dani Wadada Nabudere, Thandika Mkandawire, Ranajit Guha, Asok Sen, Partha Chatterjee, Bipan Chandra, Amartya Sen, Jagdish Bhagwati, Homi K. Bhabha, Gayatri C. Spivak, Rabindranath Tagore, Arjun Appadurai, Ashis Nandy and Dipesh Chakrabarty. In developing this critique of Ake's works, the study focuses not only on Africa, but also draws illustrations from the experiences in South-Asia, particularly the Indian sub-continent. In referring to India, Asia and Latin America, we asked two major questions: (i) What does

Africa stand to learn from the intellectual, nationalist and other experiences in these societies? And, (ii) how do the experiences in these societies enable the African continent in fulfilling and making sense of the African revolution? This effort should be understood against the backdrop of Ake's repeated reference to India, Pakistan and Ceylon among other states within the South-Asian sub-region, especially in his earlier works among which *A Theory of Political Integration*, (1967) is very much remarkable. This is added to the fact that the draft chapters of this thesis were written in India. Consequently, in addition to the rich collection on African writers from the African social science community, the study examines the writings of scholars in other parts of the South, particularly, India and Latin America. This is meant to produce the critique of Ake's works in a manner that fundamentally differs from the conventional idea of uncritically eulogizing him, while also hoping to explore the possibilities of a South-South exchange of research ideas, as is the original intention of the South-South Exchange Programme for Research on the History of Development, the institution, which provided the funding for this study. It should however be clarified, that the idea of raising issues on India, South-Asia and Latin America is not meant to drift Ake's focus from Africa to these societies. Rather, it is meant to draw useful insights from the writings of scholars in these and other post-colonial societies who have focused on related issues for their analyses. The aim is to enrich our examination of the issues posed for assessment in Ake's works through drawing from aspects of the rich and critical debates, illustrations and arguments, which have engaged the attention of scholars in those regions of the South. After all, these societies share the similar predicaments, though in varying measures and are also products of similar historical experiences with most African states.

In order to deeply appreciate the reference to India in this study, we must recall that the Indian sub-continent is presently the world's largest, most complex democracy and therefore one of the richest laboratories for democratic experiments within the range of developing societies. This is added to the fact that given its seemingly slow but sustained efforts at overcoming underdevelopment and dependency, it provides an insightful example of a truly industrializing country (Chandra, 1994: 79–97). Besides, developments in India's nationalist and intellectual history have a remarkable—albeit indirect—influence not only on aspects of Africa's colonial and post-independence developments, but also on the scholarship and works of Ake. For example, it should be recalled that while the independence of India in August

1947 accelerated the pace of nationalist politics and decolonization activities across Africa, the critical debates among radical Marxist historians and other social scientists on the state, dependency, underdevelopment and other aspects of the state's intellectual history in post-colonial India certainly influenced the efforts by the early generation of African scholars in their attempts at establishing the indigenous character and identity of scholarship in the continent. Put differently, the unended debate among African historians on colonialism as either 'an episode' or as 'an epoch', the debate on politics and class struggles in Africa, the debate on the political economy and role of imperialism, finance capital, monopoly capitalism, and the debate on the role of neo-colonialism in the development and underdevelopment of Africa, all of which flourished in the continent in the late 1960s and 1970s among members of the African social science community especially, in Dakar, Ibadan, Nairobi and Dar es Salaam owe significant inspirations to earlier intellectual engagements in India. For Ake, given the role of ideas as travelling agents of political and intellectual mobilization, it is our contention in this chapter that having occurred in the period after the intellectual developments in India, 'the great debate' in Dar es Salaam, the struggle for the Africanization of the social sciences, the demand for more locally-sensitive scholarship, curricula and pedagogy and the clamour for local ownership as against 'foreign' or 'alien ownership' of the knowledge producing system in Africa contributed, not only to Ake's paradigm shift but also inspired other scholars within his mode. Hence the understanding that Ake and his contemporaries derived significant inspiration from the interactions and research exchanges by earlier African scholars with their Indian counterparts. These issues will be raised and discussed at length in this and the next chapter.

Lastly, it should be recalled that Ake (1978 and 1979) conceives of scholarship as a collective enterprise and describes social reality as complex, dynamic and dialectical, so much so that we will hardly understand it unless we learn to think dialectically. One way of interpreting Ake's position here is to understand him as implying that the issues, which engage the attention of scholars in Africa and Asia are also parts of the collective experiences shared in other regions of the post-colonial world. Hence, in addition to an eclectic method, the idea of a dialectical approach towards understanding such issues in deed produces a robustly detailed and comparative research orientation. The reference to India and other states within the South should therefore enrich the analysis of Ake's writings on Africa.

The study therefore presents the post-colonial world as 'a text' in which the peculiar African and Asian experiences are just chapters and sections within the larger system of 'textualized narration'. The immediately foreseeable advantage of this approach is that it helps us to understand, inter-link and establish a transnational account of the nationalist and intellectual histories of these societies as provided in the writings of the major scholars in these regions, while also emphasizing the Africa-specific issues as captured from the perspectives of Claude Ake's analyses. The approach therefore privileges the use of ideas and arguments in a highly intellectualized sense through engaging the ideas of these scholars with reference to the trajectories of lived experiences and the debates, which such ideas have generated. It is hoped that this approach will also help us not only in retrieving and enriching vital aspects of Ake's intellectual works but also appreciate the contributions of other original thinkers and provocative writers on Africa and the post-colonial world who share similar intellectual pedigrees and exceptionalities with Ake. Other insightful experiences and accounts, which are considered beneficial for understanding the issues raised in this study will also be discussed as the study progresses.

#### **4.1.1 The State in Political Theory**

This section provides a critique of Ake's positions on the state, especially, the modern state, which emergence is associated with the early development of the European state-system from the sixteenth century onward. It assesses his contributions to an understanding of the state through historical and contemporary approaches. The aim is to establish areas of observable inadequacies, with a view to developing upon them. On the whole, nine issues are raised in Ake's analysis of the state, which are considered deserving of closer attention, possible re-examination and revision. One, even though two types of the state are generally discernible within the modern state-system, namely, the state in the core, advanced capitalist societies in the West, Europe and North America as well as those in the periphery, developing and post-colonial societies, Ake focuses mainly on the state in Africa and other parts of the Third World. In other words, even though he makes occasional references to the historical accounts, experiences and development of the state in the West, he does so only for the purpose of illustrating the case, salience and particularities of the state in Africa and elsewhere in the Third World. This suggests that in explaining the historical development of

the state, Ake's accounts are limited only to the identification of colonial-imperialism and other forces, processes and factors, which shaped and determined the form of the state in Africa and the Third World.

From the observation noted here above, this study infers a limitation in Ake, namely that his works do not enable or further a nuanced understanding of the development of the state outside Africa and the Southern hemisphere. In other words, having limited the centrality of his focus to the state in Africa and elsewhere in the Third World, one cannot hope to understand the state in the advanced capitalist societies mainly or only from the point of view of Ake's writings. This is largely because he did not place his theory of the state in Africa side by side with, or in conversation with the theories of the state in the advanced capitalist societies of the West. One major source of this limitation is his well-premised contention that enough theoretical considerations have focused on the state in the metropolises and that this form of the state has been well represented and researched in the pioneering works of leading classical liberal as well as Marxist scholars, among which the writings of Immanuel Kant, Georg W. F. Hegel, Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels and Vladimir I. Lenin are both central and instructive. This is added to the fact that the state in Africa and the Third World, rather than those in the West, Europe or North America, is the subject matter of his enquiry. However, in spite of his well-premised contention, Ake's aversion from discussing the historical factors, experiences and influences, which shaped the development of the state in the metropolises, 'at least from the point of view of a Third World scholar', makes his works on the state limited in a significant sense. To be specific, by not exhuming the historical forces underlining the context of state-building and state-formation in the countries of the North, one is hardly able to derive or infer a detailed sense of comparative understanding and assessment of these two types of the state in Ake. This means that his writings do not enable us to see very clearly the details of the historical and operational differences in the state-building and state-formation projects and experiences in the metropolises and the satellites.

In essence, even though Ake appears to have used the history, features and particularities of the state in the West, Europe and North America as the specific operational models with which he criticizes and explains the salience, unique features and other attributes of the state in Africa, this effort still suffers a glaring handicap. To illustrate, by not exhuming and discussing the detailed accounts of the state in the metropolises, Ake's exposition on the



advanced capitalist state and in general theoretical terms is in a vital sense theoretically abstract and left hanging. This is added to the fact that readers who are not conversant with the details of the historical and contemporary realities or features of the state-system in the West may not be able to properly see, capture or clearly appreciate most of the issues and features of that state, to which only implied, rather than detailed historical references are made in Ake's writings. This shortcoming, which limits and undermines the comparative utility of Ake's theory of the state, is found, not only in Ake, but also in other African scholars, particularly those who focus obsessively, if not only on the colonial situation.

This section takes on the task of revising Ake's writings on the state in the light of this limitation. It illuminates and furthers his historical narration of the development of the state through providing an account of the historical experiences in the core capitalist states. The aim is to complement his account through examining the comparative implications of the experiences in the direction of state-building and state-formation in the two parts of the globe. In doing this, aspects of the salient issues, which define the terms of theoretical reference and debates about the state during this period, are exhumed. As observed by Held (1983: 1), in contemporary Western political thought, the idea of the state is closely linked with the notion of an impersonal and privileged legal-constitutional order, which has the legitimate capacity of administering and controlling a given territory. Although this idea of the state dates back to the ancient period, particularly, in Rome, its emergence as an issue of concern is linked with the development of the European state-system. Held (1983: 2) describes the modern state, which emerged from the sixteenth century as a product of the historical changes and transformation in medieval notions of political life, complicated processes, which included:

Struggles between monarchs and barons over the domain of rightful authority; peasant rebellions against the weight of excess taxation and social obligation; the spread of trade, commerce and market relations; the flourishing of Renaissance culture with its renewed interest in classical political ideas (including the Greek city-state and Roman law); the consolidation of national monarchies in central and southern Europe (England, France and Spain); religious strife and the challenge to the universal claims of Catholicism; the struggle between Church and State—all played a part. As the grip of feudal traditions and customs was loosened, the nature and limits of political authority, law, rights and obedience emerged as a preoccupation of European political thought. Not until the end of the sixteenth century did the concept of the state become a central object of political analysis.

The writings of Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527) and Jean Bodin (1588-1596) are instructive in capturing the details of these developments. Similarly, Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) in his *De Cive*, (1642) raises his famous concern about the state in what he calls 'a more curious search into the rights of states and duties of subjects'. Within this period, the idea of the modern state was associated with 'a form of public power separate from both the ruler and the ruled', and one, which constituted 'the supreme political authority within a certain defined boundary'. This idea of the state persisted until it was challenged and repudiated by Karl Marx in the nineteenth century. With time, the idea of the state as a public power together with the question of its relationship to the rulers and ruled soon became not only issues of controversy and uncertainty, but also raised critical questions, among which the following are central in Held's (1983: 2) account:

What is the state? What should it be? What are its origins and foundations? What is the relationship between state and society? What is the most desirable form this relationship might take? What does and should the state do? Whose interest does and should the state represent? How might one characterize the relations among states?

In Held (1983: 2–55), these questions are answered in terms of (i) 'liberalism', which became centrally preoccupied with the question of sovereignty and citizenship, (ii) 'liberal democracy', which advances liberalism's concern and focuses on the equally significant question of establishing political accountability, (iii) 'Marxism', which refutes the terms of reference of both liberalism and liberal democracy and concentrates on class structure as well as the forces of political coercion within the society, and (iv) 'political sociology', which from Max Weber to Anglo-American pluralism elaborates concerns with both the institutional mechanisms of the state and the system of nation-states. Focusing on the societies in the West, Europe and North America, this study argues that state-building and state-formation developed 'originally' and 'independently' through a number of internal processes and 'significant' external influences, which vary according to the historical experiences and specific social contexts of the individual states. Such influences include internal conflicts, changing relationships of power within members of the different social classes and groups, changes in the state apparatus itself, changes in the role of the state in industrialization and material production as well as the changing role and impact of nationalism. As noted earlier,

the logical entry point to this discourse is Western Europe in the sixteenth century, especially, given the growth and context of the absolutist state.

According to Perry Anderson (1983: 133–150) the absolutist states in Western Europe were a key element not only in the transition from feudalism to capitalism, but also in the development of the modern form of the state. The manifestations of such a state were found in the centralized monarchies of France, England and Spain, 'which represented a decisive rupture with the pyramidal, parcellized sovereignty of the medieval social formations'. Inter alia, through the introduction and development of standing armies, a permanent bureaucracy, national taxation, a system of codified laws, the beginnings of a unified market and other pre-eminently capitalist political and economic institutions, which had not previously existed in the medieval states of Europe, such monarchies furthered the progressive transition of society from primitivism through the medieval age to a higher social order. According to Anderson, during this period, even though absolutism was partly conditioned by the rise of a bourgeoisie, it still reflected the continued dominance of the traditional feudal aristocracy, with the result that its modern appearance belies an essentially archaic structure, which later necessitated not only bourgeois revolutions, but also the development of modern states and ultimately, unrestrained capitalist expansion. Of the archaic nature of the 'modernity', which resulted from this absolutist state, Perry Anderson (1983: 141) notes that:

The apparent paradox of this phenomenon was reflected in the whole structure of the absolutist monarchies themselves—exotic, hybrid compositions whose surface 'modernity' again and again betrays a subterranean archaism. This can be seen very clearly from a survey of the institutional innovations which heralded and typified its arrival: *army, bureaucracy, taxation, trade, diplomacy*.

Anderson's (1983: 137) account of the role of the absolutist states of Europe in the development of the modern state focuses on the rise and changes in the positions as well as societal conceptions of aristocracy and the peasantry, aristocracy and the bourgeoisie, private property and public authority, archaic notions of modernity as well as the eventual transition to capitalism. He calls these 'a plethora of historical processes and developments', which spanned a very long period of history, and which were also engendered as well as orchestrated by a number of other phenomena, among which peasant revolts were noteworthy. He captures the changes in the different forms of feudal exploitation, which supervened at the end of the medieval epoch as a significant turning point in this transition

and says such changes were responsible for bringing about the absolutist form of the state. According to Anderson (1983: 138), 'absolutism' was fundamentally 'a redeployed and recharged apparatus of feudal domination', designed to clamp down peasant masses back into their traditional modes and social positions despite and against the gains, which they had gotten from the widespread commutation of dues. He suggests that while not discountenancing the dimensions of the historical transformation involved in the advent of absolutism, we must also grasp and capture the full logic, import and impact of the momentous changes in the historical structures of the aristocratic state and of feudal property, all of which produced the phenomenon of absolutism in all its entirety and newness.

Focusing on France, Russia and China, Theda Skocpol (1983: 151–169) explains the development of the state in Europe in terms of 'social revolutions'. She compares the revolutions in France, Russia and China, all of which she says overthrew the state in 'agrarian bureaucratic societies'. She explains them not only in terms of the weaknesses in the structures of the state, but also says such revolutions led to the centralization and nationalization of the state. In contrast to Anderson, Skocpol maintains that there was nothing distinctively 'bourgeois' about the French Revolution. She argues that such revolutions occurred during the earlier world-historical phases of modernization in agrarian bureaucratic societies, which were either situated within, or newly incorporated into international fields dominated by more economically modern nations abroad. She describes each of these revolutions as a conjuncture of three developments, namely, (i) the collapse or incapacitation of central administrative and military machineries, (ii) widespread peasant rebellions, and (iii) marginal elite political movements. According to Skocpol (1983: 151):

What each social revolution minimally 'accomplished' was the extreme rationalization and centralization of state institutions, the removal of a traditional landed upper class from intermediate (regional and local) quasi-political supervision of peasantry, and the elimination or diminution of the economic power of a landed upper class...

Skocpol explains these three revolutions in three significant ways. First, she discusses them in relation to the institutional characteristics of agrarian states, paying due attention to their special vulnerabilities and potentialities, especially, during the earlier world-historical phases of modernization. Second, she points to the peculiar characteristics of old regimes and centres of feudal power in France, Russia and China, which made them uniquely vulnerable

among the earlier modernizing agrarian states to social–revolutionary transformations. Third, she suggests reasons with which she accounted for the similarities and differences in the outcomes of the great historical revolutions. From these, she defines an agrarian bureaucracy as an agricultural society in which social control rests on a division of labour and a coordination of efforts between a semi-bureaucratic state and a landed upper class, particularly, one in which the landed upper class typically retains, as an adjunct to its landed property, considerable undifferentiated local and regional authority over the peasant majority of the population. She conceives of modernization, not as an intra-societal process of economic development accompanied only by lagging or leading changes in non-economic institutional spheres, but also as a world-historic inter-societal phenomenon. According to her, even though societies have always interacted, two remarkably modernizing inter-societal features, which characterized modern Europe furthered the development of the state, not only in Europe but also in other non-European societies: (i) the state in Europe was based upon trade in commodities, manufactures and strategic politico-military competition between independent states, and (ii) it incubated and brought about the 'first self-propelling' industrialization of England after gaining commercial hegemony within the Western European-centred world market. She illustrates how the 'modernizing pressures' and 'influences' of these developments later reverberated throughout the world under two vital phases. According to Skocpol (1983: 152–153):

In the first phase of world modernization, England's thoroughgoing commercialization, capture of world market hegemony, and expansion of manufactures (both before and after the technological Industrial Revolution which began in the 1780s), transformed means and stakes in the traditional rivalries of European states and put immediate pressure for reforms, if only to facilitate the financing of competitive armies and navies, upon the other fiscal machineries. In the second phase, as Europe modernized and further expanded its influence around the globe, similar militarily compelling pressures were brought to bear on those non-European societies which escaped immediate colonization, usually the ones with pre-existing differentiated and centralized state institutions. [...]

From these, she contends that all modernizing agrarian bureaucracies had within them aggrieved peasants and that such bureaucracies also face unavoidable challenges of modernization as dictated from abroad. She calls these grievances 'built-in potential for social revolution' and argues that they exist in all modernizing agrarian bureaucracies, even though only a few have succumbed to change. This, according to her is mainly because it is weakness, especially, institutional weaknesses, rather than oppression, that breed revolution.

According to Skocpol (1983: 153), 'it is the breakdown of a societal mode of social control', 'which allows and prompts social revolution to unfold'. With respect to France, Russia and China, she sees the unfolding of social revolution as conditioned by the incapacitations of administrative and military organizations, which she says, is best explained, not as a function of mass discontent and mobilization, but in terms of a combination of pressures on state institutions from more modernized countries abroad. She concludes that only when administrative/military breakdown occurred in agrarian bureaucracies, especially, with insurrection-prone peasantries, could organized revolutionary leaderships have great impact upon their societal development, though not necessarily in the ways that they originally envisaged.

Edward Carr (1983: 181–194) and Tom Nairn (1983: 195–206) explain the development of the modern state in terms of nationalism. Carr's account illustrates how the social composition and status of the 'nation' changed in European history from its origins as shaped and determined under absolutism to the period of the World War II, that is, in 1945. He links the development of the state with the modern history of international relations and divides it into three epochs, namely, (i) the first, which was terminated by the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars, having the Congress of Vienna as its tailpiece and swan song, (ii) the second, a product of the French Revolution, which lasted until the catastrophe of 1914, having the Versailles settlements as its belated epilogue, the third, which features were shaped after 1870 and reached its apogee between 1914 and 1939. According to Carr (1983: 181–182), during the first period, there was the gradual dissolution of the medieval unity of empire and church, followed by the establishment of the national state as well as the national church. Carr (1983: 181) says the essential characteristic of the period was 'the identification of the nation with the person of the sovereign'. It should however be noted that this significant political feature was complemented with 'mercantilism', which in terms of its domestic and external policies, was aimed, not mainly at promoting the welfare of the community and its members, but the augmentation of the power of the state, which symbolized the sovereignty of the ruler.

Spanning the period from the turmoil of the Napoleonic Wars into 1914, Carr (1983: 184) describes the second period as the most ordered and enviable in the history of modern international relations. Among its many remarkable features, (i) this period balanced the

complex forces of 'nationalism' and 'internationalism', and (ii) established an international order, which strongly permitted a striking extension and intensification of national feelings without undermining regular and peaceful international relations on a wide scale. Consequently, at the political level, he says, national forces succeeded in asserting the claims of the nation to the state or, to statehood. Economically, international forces advanced the possibilities of transforming a multiplicity of national economies into a single world economy. Other features, which characterized this period, according to Carr (1983: 184) included the democratization of nationalism, the containment of nationalism as well as Pax Britannica. The third period was marked with the paradoxical growth of nationalism and the bankruptcy of internationalism. Even though the origins of these developments date back to the years after 1870, they reached their full overt maturation only after 1914. According to Carr (1983: 189), from this period:

It means that nationalism began to operate in a new political and economic environment. The phenomenon cannot be understood without examination of the three main underlying causes which provoked it: the bringing of new social strata within the effective membership of the nation; the visible reunion of economic with political power; and the increase in the number of nations [Eds' emphasis].

Other features, which characterized this period, according to Carr (1983: 189) include, the 'socialization' of nationalism, the multiplication of nations, as well as the spread of 'total' wars. He explains the socialization of nationalism in terms of the widespread rise of new social strata to the full membership of the nation, a phenomenon, which marked the last three decades of the nineteenth century across Western and Central Europe. He observes that these changes certainly affected the content and character of national policy in a revolutionary manner, especially, because they shaped the direction of the political power of the masses towards improving their own social class and economic lot. In other words, far from being limited to the maintenance and conduct of public business, the fundamental aim of state policy was forced to reflect and attend to the welfare needs of the masses, mainly, through enhancing their capacities for earning a living. Carr's account of the multiplication of nations is premised on the developments, which began in 1870. Before this period, he says the influence of nationalism was limited to the idea of diminishing the number of sovereign and independent political units in Europe. However, from 1871, that is, after the unification of Germany and Italy, there was a remarkable increase in the number of emergent political units

and states. He describes 'total wars' as rapid forms of struggle, which hastened the development, through the rapid capture and conquest of weaker states by stronger powers. Carr (1983: 193) notes further that:

The view of war as the exclusive affair of governments and armies was tacitly abandoned. Before hostilities ended, the obliteration of the traditional line between soldier and civilian had gone very far; attack on civilian morale by propaganda, by mass terrorism, by blockade and by bombing from the air had become a recognized technique of war. Popular national hatreds were for the first time deliberately inflamed as an instrument of policy, and it came to be regarded in many quarters as a legitimate war aim, not merely to defeat the enemy armed forces, but to inflict punishment on members of the enemy nation. In the Second World War any valid or useful distinction between armed forces and civilian populations disappeared almost from the outset; both were merely different forms of man-power and woman-power mobilized for different tasks and on different 'fronts' in the same struggle. [...]

All these, from Carr's perspective contributed to the rise and development of the modern European state. Other accounts of the origins of this form of the state also abound and will be examined later in the thesis. The point that is emphasized here is to complement Ake's accounts of the historical development of the state, which as we noted earlier, privilege the state in Africa at the neglect of the state in the West, Europe and North America. A useful observation, which becomes clear from the fore-gone illustrations suggests that, unlike the experiences in Africa and other parts of the Third World in which the state resulted mainly from the forced lumping together of disparate groups through externally-dictated processes of European colonial contraptions, state-building and state-formation in the West did not result fundamentally from externally mediated processes of impositions. Even though state-formation was shaped by significant external factors, it was not informed entirely on the determination of such external influences, however decisive. Rather, the state *in* the West developed largely in response to changes and developments *within* the West, which were however, complemented by a host of external challenges and influences. Also noteworthy is the fact that, in the West, 'nation-building' was both critical and central to the development of the state. In other words, nations were first formed and were later harmonized and consolidated into 'agreed nationalities' before the state eventually emerged. In such societies, the state 'later' emerged and was developed mainly as an autonomous institution meant for keeping these nations together under agreed terms and conditions of cohabitation, while also preserving order. In Africa however, the contrast is the case. In particular, given the decisive role and influences of colonial-imperialism in the development of the colonial and later, post-colonial state, 'nation-building' is essentially a 'post-state' or 'post-independence' project, and



one, to which the elite are only marginally and selectively committed. Lastly and most importantly, in contrast to the compromised experiences in Africa, which disregarded the peculiar sociological circumstances under which the struggles for state building and state formation were carried out, in the West, the development of the state, together with the democratic-revolutionary consummation of societies occurred mainly after the economic structures of those societies had been sufficiently developed and industrialized, followed rapidly, if logically, by the modernization of their social institutions.

These different historical experiences as well as factors, which shaped and conditioned the contexts and implications of the development of the states in the West and the Third World help us in appreciating the reasons why most states, including federal states in Africa are built upon the processes and principles of 'devolution' and 'fissiparity', rather than 'accretion' and 'aggregation' as is typical of Canada, Australia, the United States of America and other older federations. These accounts also enable us understand more clearly, especially, in elaborate and comparative terms, the context of structural as well as institutional weaknesses, which do not only characterize post-colonial African states, but also endear them to pronounced internecine conflicts and often fratricidal carnages. Among other sources, Ake's (1967: 17–35) account of the problem of political integration in Africa provide enough lamentation of the implications of the inherited character of the state in Africa, especially, given the posture of indifference maintained by the elite to the demanding, yet germane task of transforming the neo-colonial character of these states. These differences also enable us understand the nature of core-periphery or metropolises-satellite relations, and Africa's underdevelopment and marginality from the benefits of global developments.

#### **4.1.2 Nationalism and the Development of the State in Africa**

The second observation, which this study makes from Ake's analysis of the state, is on the place and role of nationalism in the development of the modern state in Africa as elsewhere in the Third World. Our contention here is that, Ake's focus and examination of the role of nationalism as a process, which contributed to the emergence of the state is either grossly limited or even entirely lacking. To be sure, even though he discusses the role of the nationalist elites and the factors, which informed the development of what he calls 'the new states' in Africa and the Third World, and although he discusses these issues and relates the

evolution of the state in Africa with the historical contradictions of the colonial system of oppression, he still did not discuss them in relation to nationalism, a most significant process in the formation of modern states across the world. The implication of this oversight is that in Ake, we do not find a theory of nationalism as a process or instrumental force associated with the development of the state either in abstract, that is, general theoretical sense, or in relation to the state in the advanced capitalist societies in the West or even Africa. This subsection takes on the task of revising Ake's accounts of the state through providing useful illustrations on the role of nationalism in the development of the state both in general theoretical terms and also with reference to Africa. This is done through drawing from the works of Benedict Anderson, Partha Chatterjee and Rabindranath Tagore, among other scholars, who have provided useful accounts of this process and phenomenon, especially, in relation to post-colonial societies.

John Plamenatz (1976: 23–36) cited in Partha Chatterjee (1986: 1–4) talks about two types of nationalism, namely, 'western nationalism', which emerged primarily in Western Europe and 'eastern nationalism', which is to be found in Eastern Europe, Africa, Asia and Latin America. In both cases, he defines nationalism as a cultural phenomenon, which takes on a political form. He argues that both types depend upon the acceptance of a set of standards by which the state of development of the national culture of a particular state is measured. Referring to western nationalism, he says, although there is the feeling that the nation is at a disadvantage with respect to other parts of the world, it is nevertheless 'already culturally equipped' to outgrow and live above those deficiencies. Plamenatz cited in Chatterjee (1986: 1) argues:

Thus, although the new global standard of progress may have been set for the rest of the world by France or Britain, they were based upon a set of ideas 'about man, morals and society' which, in their social and intellectual origins, were West European generally. Britain and France may have been the cultural, economic and political pace makers, and may have been envied or admired for this reason, but simultaneous with the process of their emergence as world leaders, there had emerged a 'comity of nations' in Western Europe 'which had already learned to think of itself as ahead of all the others'. Consequently, when nationalism emerged in the other countries of the West, despite the fact that it was the product of a sense of disadvantage with respect to the standards of progress set by the pace makers, there was no feeling that the nation was not culturally equipped to make the effort to reach those standards.

He says, having already possessed the necessary linguistic, educational and professional skills needed for a consciously progressive civilization, Germans or Italians therefore had

little need to culturally equip themselves by appropriating what was rather alien to them. He describes 'eastern nationalism' as one, which appeared to, and was adopted by peoples who were only recently drawn into a civilization hitherto alien to them, and whose ancestral cultures are neither well-suited nor adapted to success and excellence by these cosmopolitan and increasingly dominant standards. He notes that even though these 'backward peoples' have measured the backwardness of their nations in terms of 'the global standards' set by the advanced nations of Western Europe, there is also a fundamental awareness that those standards come from an alien culture and that the inherited culture of the backward nation did not provide the necessary adaptive leverage to enable it reach those borrowed or imposed standards of progress. He says eastern nationalism is therefore accompanied by the effort to culturally re-equip the nation in order to transform it. From this, Plamenatz (1976) cited in Chatterjee (1986: 2) observes that:

But it could not do so simply by imitating the alien culture, for then the nation would lose its distinctive identity. The search therefore was for a regeneration of the national culture, adapted to the requirements of progress, but retaining at the same time its distinctiveness.

From this, Chatterjee (1986: 1–35) argues that the quest for an understanding of the role of nationalism as a process and phenomenon in the development of the states in Africa, Asia and other post-colonial societies must first begin with a critical interrogation of what he calls the problematic nature of 'the nationalist thought' itself, particularly in relation to 'the liberal-rationalist dilemma' posed by its opposing interpretations to the West and the Third World. This, according to him, must be followed logically with an examination of those forces and factors, which shaped nationalism in the West as well as how the specific form of nationalism in the West also shaped the development of the modern state not only in the West, but also in Europe and North America. He says, it is mainly from this process and chronology that one is able to properly understand not only the role of nationalism in the development of the state in Africa and elsewhere in the Third World, but also the specific historical forces and factors, which informed the development of the specific kind of nationalism to which members of these societies and communities were introduced and initiated. He begins with Plamenatz's argument, presented here above and describes it as deeply contradictory in that it is both imitative and at the same time hostile to the same models that it imitates. He says it is imitative because it accepts the value of the standards set

by the alien culture, but also involves two ambivalent rejections: (i) the rejection of the alien intruder and dominator who is nevertheless to be imitated and surpassed by his own standards, as well as (ii) the rejection of ancestral ways, which are seen as obstacles to progress but are also cherished and considered worth-preserving as marks of the indigenous national identity. He says, even though this article is neither rigorously argued nor particularly profound, yet in it, Plamenatz, through making 'the distinction between the two types of nationalism', states with sufficient theoretical insight and clarity the premises of what he calls 'the liberal-rationalist dilemma' in talking about 'nationalist thought'.

Beyond Plamenatz, Chatterjee sees the same dilemma in the standard liberal histories of nationalism, particularly as represented in the works of Hans Kohn, which in its essential aspects, presents nationalism as the attempt to actualize in political terms the universal urge for liberty and progress. He avers that in spite of these liberal historical claims, nationalism, especially, its western variant, has given rise to mindless chauvinism, xenophobia and has served as justification for organized violence and tyranny. He argues that far from being a rational ideological framework, western nationalism has been used variously as the explanation as well as justification for some of the most destructive wars even seen, the brutality of Nazism and Fascism, that it has translated into the ideology of racial hatred in the colonies, that it gave birth to some of the most irrational revivalist movements and oppressive political regimes in the modern world, thus, underlining the irreconcilably opposing nature of nationalism and liberty. He observes that the distinction between the two types of nationalism does not only help us to come to terms with this liberal dilemma, but that it also uniquely explains how a profoundly liberal idea could be so carefully distorted and manipulated towards producing characteristically illiberal movements, systems of power and regimes of domination, mainly, through constructing a dichotomy between 'a normal' and 'a special type'. Referring to western nationalism, Chatterjee (1986: 3) points out that:

This type of nationalism shares the same material and intellectual premises with the European Enlightenment, with industry and the idea of progress, and modern democracy. Together they constitute a historical unity, defined with a fair degree of clarity in both geographical and chronological terms. This gives the liberal-rationalist his paradigmatic form in which nationalism goes hand-in-hand with reason, liberty and progress. The special type emerges under somewhat different historical circumstances. It is, therefore, complex, impure, often deviant; it represents a very difficult and contradictory historical process which can be very 'disturbing'. There is nothing in it, the liberal-rationalist would argue, that is necessarily illiberal. But being a special type, operating in unfavourable circumstances, it can often be so.

From these, Chatterjee (1986: 4) argues that, far from being the awakening of nations to self-consciousness, nationalism rather invents nations where they do not exist and that the two crucial social groups, which carry the struggle forward, are the proletariat and the intelligentsia. However, he says in advancing this struggle, members of these social groups do not serve independent or bias-free purposes. He locates colonial-imperialism and other exploitative exchange relations between the countries of the South and the developed European worlds as the historical sources of the specific forms of the nationalist dilemma inherited by these countries. According to Chatterjee (1986: 4), "If the liberal conscience of the West adopts the right moral attitude of sympathy and non-interference, these backward nations will find their own chosen paths to independence, freedom and progress".

He illustrates the historical connections between the industrial society in Europe and the development of European nationalism, particularly, the increasing influence of industrial capitalism in the determination of the specific form of nationalism, which marked the development of the modern form of the state in the West. From this, he argues that, given the 'conditions' in which nationalism made its appearance, there was little scope for genuine doctrinal innovation or even an independent philosophical defence at that. More pointedly, he says, 'the necessary philosophizing had already been done', 'in a different context—that of the rise of industrialism'. Chatterjee (1986: 5) then contends that:

(Gellner quaintly refers to Hume and Kant as the ones who 'explored, with unparalleled philosophical depth... the general logic of the new spirit...'<sup>9</sup>) By the time nationalism came on the scene, mankind was 'irreversibly committed to industrial society, and therefore to a society whose productive system is based on cumulative science and technology'. This commitment necessarily meant coming to terms with the requirements of industrial society, namely a cultural homogeneity and its convergence with a political unit. Cultural homogeneity was an essential concomitant of industrial society, 'and we had better make our peace with it. It is not the case... that nationalism imposes homogeneity; it is rather that a homogeneity imposed by objective, inescapable imperative eventually appears on the surface in the form of nationalism.

Against this backdrop, he submits that it was needless for nationalist thought in the West to investigate 'the general logic' of the specific kind of society it was trying to build because 'that logic was already given to it objectively'. It was only necessary to confront the problem of selecting from 'pre-existing cultures' in backward and agrarian societies some of the distinctive elements of this new homogenous national culture. In other words, in the enterprise of spreading and establishing its universality, Western nationalism uses some of

the pre-existing cultures from backward nations and societies in the Third World and seeks to transform aspects of those cultures, which are complementary and amenable, rather than critical or opposing to its forms of change, since it cannot possibly transform or even use all of them. Given the role of industrial capitalism in the determination of the specific form of nationalism, which characterized the development of the modern state in the West, 'pre-existing cultures' here as used by Chatterjee (1986: 4-6) logically refer to 'pre-industrial cultures', which are to be found in Africa and other parts of the Third World, regions of the world, which became recipients and objects of an imposed form of nationalism, shaped fundamentally by (i) the exigencies and implications of the industrial revolution in the West, and (ii) the harsh implications of the export of capital with all its contradictions to the neo-colonies. In this hegemonic project, those aspects of the pre-existing cultures from these backward societies, which appear to be unduly critical, intolerant or opposed to the desired forms of change imposed by the homogenizing impulses of western nationalism, are simply condemned into extinction. This was achieved inter alia, through tirelessly criticizing and presenting them as barbaric, static, inhumane and uncivilized. Following the logic of this argument, it becomes clear from Chatterjee's illustrations that while the subject matter, nature and character of nationalism in the West were defined by the specific context of industrial capitalism, especially, in the period of the industrial revolution, in Africa and other post-colonial societies, nationalism is a product of the regions' exploitative interactions with the West. More pointedly, in post-colonial societies, Chatterjee (1986: 5-6) says:

nationalism is, essentially, the general imposition of a high culture on society, whose previously low cultures had taken up the lives of the majority, and in some cases of the totality, of the population. It means that generalized diffusion of a school-mediated, academy-supervised idiom, codified for the requirements of reasonably precise bureaucratic and technological communication. It is the establishment of an autonomous, impersonal society, with mutually substitutable atomized individuals, held together above all by a shared culture of this kind, in place of a previous complex structure of local groups, sustained by folk cultures reproduced locally and idiosyncratically by the micro-groups themselves. That is what *really* happens.<sup>12</sup>

Chatterjee says, by reducing nationalism all over the world to the sociological requirements of an industrial society, nationalist thought, especially, its western variant poses special epistemological and philosophical problems, and that the historical and sociological conditions of the underdevelopment of the Third World are parts of the products of this universalized conception of nationalism, which masks the difficult conditions under which

the poor and oppressed nations of the world must strive in order to attain those universal values of reason, liberty and progress cherished by the West. Lamenting the unfortunate historical lag, which these societies must make up, Chatterjee (1986: 6) submits that:

The knowledge of backwardness is never very comforting. It is even more disturbing when its removal means a coming to terms with a culture that is alien. But that is the historical destiny of the backward nations. There can be no merit, as Plamenatz gently chides 'Western critics of nationalism', in expressing distaste for the failings of these backward peoples. 'In a world in which the strong and rich people have dominated and exploited the poor and the weak peoples, and in which autonomy is held to be a mark of dignity, of adequacy, of the capacity to live as befits human beings, in such a world this kind of nationalism is the inevitable reaction of the poor and the weak.

Therefore, in Chatterjee, nationalism in post-colonial societies is best understood not just as an alien or European export, but as one of the most pernicious European exports, which is not in any way a child of reason or liberty, but rather of its opposite: of fervent romanticism and of an indefensible political messianism, particularly, one whose inevitable consequence is the annihilation of freedom. In describing the elements of this nationalist thought, Chatterjee (1986: 9) surmises:

'Resentment and impatience, the depravity of the rich and the virtue of the poor, the guilt of Europe and the innocence of Asia and Africa, salvation through violence, the coming reign of universal love':<sup>27</sup> those are the elements of nationalist thought. Each of them is an export from Europe, like the printing press, the radio, and television. Nationalist opposition to European rule is driven by a faith in a theory. Yet the theory itself, and indeed the very attitude of faith in a theory, are gifts of Europe to the rest of the world. Nationalism sets out to assert its freedom from European domination. But in the very conception of its project, it remains a prisoner of the prevalent European intellectual fashions.

In conclusion, he asserts that an interrogation of the socio-historical conditions under which most nationalist movements were developed in the world reveals that nationalist thought is not an autonomous body of discourse. For Africa and other countries of the South, he says, this lack of autonomy is what underlies 'the problem of nationalism' in these regions. He argues that any attempt at providing answers to this problem must first take it out of the ambit of the bourgeois-rationalist thought, whether its conservative or liberal strands and place it within the wider discourse of power. He says, this should enable a critical questioning of the stated universality, the givenness, and acclaimed sovereignty of that thought from its roots. This according to him, is largely because it is not just military might or industrial strength, which conquers, subjugates and dominates, but also 'thought' itself. In other words, in rationalizing colonial-imperialism, nationalist

thought was also used to complement the colonizing project and enterprise of other conquest-oriented instrumentalities of the colonizing powers. As he puts it, this is mainly because, this form of thought is linked, albeit subtly, to a large extent, with the entire notion of discourse as a philosophical and scientific battleground of political power such that 'the problem of nationalist thought' is only a particular manifestation of a more general problem, namely, 'the problem of the bourgeois-rationalist conception of knowledge', which was established in the post-Enlightenment period of European intellectual history, as the moral and epistemic foundation for a supposedly universal framework of thought, which however perpetuates, in a real sense, colonial domination.

Benedict Anderson's (1983) *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, also provides a resourceful account of the role of nationalism in the development and emergence of the modern state in the West, Europe and North America as well as Asia, Africa and other post-colonial societies. It offers a major stimulus to recent debate about nationalism, especially, in the late twentieth century during which nationalism came to be regarded as an increasingly unresolved and often dangerous 'problem' not only within the spheres of academic imagination, but also in world affairs at large. In this book, Anderson refuses to 'define' a nation by a set of external and abstract criteria. In stead, he subverts the fundamentally determinist scheme by asserting that far from being uniquely produced through the constellation of certain objective social facts or factors, the nation is a political community 'thought out' and 'created' through human 'imagination'. His central arguments include the claim that nations were not so much the product of specific sociological conditions, such as language, race and religion, but were 'imagined' into existence, firstly in Europe and the Americas, and latterly by nationalist elites in Asia and Africa.

He tackles three major questions, namely, (i) What is a nation? (ii) What do members of a nation share? And (iii) What is the nature of that sharing? His method is both multidisciplinary and eclectic. He discusses the origin of the nation and nationalism in terms of their connections with different disciplinary histories, trajectories and careers of the state and relates them to the complex histories of capital, religion and cultures across the world. Using various models and case studies, he examines the conformity, similarities and differences in the objects being studied with a view to establishing its universal dimensions as well as its applications to specific cultural settings and environments.

He emphasizes three issues in respect of the nation, namely, (i) the universality of nationalism, (ii) its surprising capacity for being invented, and (iii) the role of religion, language and especially political



struggles in the imagination and invention of nationalism and the nation. Coming from the left and given the crucial importance, which the question of the nation posed for leftist scholarship in the 1970s, Anderson examines the enduring power of the nation, its identification with notions of self-determination, the more influential interpretations of Marxism to the national question, and the problem of nationalism in the non-European world where it took the compendium form of the national and colonial question, especially as long debated in the Second and Third International. With these, he establishes the conditions, which make it possible for the nation to emerge, first in the North and later, in the South. According to Anderson, these conditions principally include (i) print capitalism, especially in the West, (ii) the sociology of administration and other bureaucratic organizations, especially in the once-colonized countries of the South. He therefore presents the nation as a traveling phenomenon, which moves around the world, beginning first in Europe and later gets to the South.

Looking at the wars in China, Vietnam and Cambodia in the late 1970s, he observes that there was no 'grand theory of nationalism', which captures the detailed development of the modern state under the various historical conjectures that produced it. From this observation, he develops what he calls 'a theory of modern nationalism'. He begins with three interrelated paradoxes of nationalism, namely, (i) the objective modernity of nations versus subjective antiquity, (ii) the universality of modern nationalism, and (iii) the question of its relation to political power vis-a-vis its philosophical discourse. He explains all these paradoxes in one sentence using what he calls 'the idea of the nation as an imagined community' and argues that all communities are to be distinguished according to, or in terms of the manner of their imagination. Referring to the nation as the ultimate source of public reference, Anderson (1983) describes 'death', demonstrated mainly through the willingness to die for one's nation, as the explanation of the power of nationalism and says, through making such a worthy sacrifice, the individual privileges the nation and ultimately, nationalism over and above the self and religion. He suggests that the quest for a nuanced understanding of the determinants of nationalism in any part of the world must contextualize it alongside with the prevailing changes that occurred not only in its cultural systems, but also within its system of material production. From this premise, he asks: What historical forces, changes and developments led to the emergence of modern nations and modern nationalism in both the West and the Third World? In answering this question, he points at (i) the decline of the sacred languages and sacred religions into various vernacular versions. He says this also led to the 'vernacularization' of the sacred texts, (ii) the decline of the dynastic realms, and (iii) the apprehension of time. He

explains the decline of the sacred languages, religions and texts as a response to (i) the explorations and discovery of different worlds including the Third World, and (ii) the challenges posed on the sacred languages and religions, especially, the sacred texts, which on account of not been written in other languages restricted human access to 'the sacred truth of scriptures'. This position in Anderson is best understood against the backdrop of his conception of the role of language, especially, in religious communities as serving the dual functions of exclusivity and membership, depending on which side of the divide the individual finds herself/himself. This, according to Anderson, weakened the international hegemony and internal cohesion of religious societies, thus strengthening the development of new, mainly secular nations. He explains his idea of the decline of dynastic realms in terms of the changes in the composition of absolutism and the absolutist states in Europe. Lastly, he explains his notion of the apprehension of time using the concept of 'temporality', a usage, with which he privileges 'change' as both inescapable and the result of all processes, phenomena and human activities, which are subjected to an endless continuum. Using these illustrations, he presents the rise of modern nationalism as a post-eighteenth century phenomenon and argues that all these processes noted above are directly related to the development of the modern history, especially, human academic history.

Anderson (1983) says historically, the political community of 'nation' superseded the preceding 'cultural systems' of religious community and the dynastic realm. In the process there occurred 'a fundamental change mainly in the modes of apprehending the world', which more than any other development, furthered the thinking out of the nation (Anderson, 1983: 28). He says, it was the coalition of 'Protestantism' and 'print capitalism', which brought about this change. He refers to a half-fortuitous, but positively explosive interaction between a system of production and productive relations—'capitalism', a technology-driven system of communication—'print', together with the fatality of human linguistic diversity—the spread of multi-ethnicities and nationalities as the developments', which made the new communities imaginable (Anderson, 1983: 46). He says, the revolutionary constitution of print—languages, (i) created 'unified fields of exchange and communications' below Latin and above the spoken vernaculars, (ii) gave a new fixity to language, and also (iii) created new kinds of 'languages of power' since some dialects were closer to the print—languages and dominated them while others remained dialects because they could not insist on their own printed form. All these, according to him, contributed to the emergence of national consciousness.

He identifies three distinct models of nationalism. The first is 'Creole nationalism' of the Americas in the nineteenth century, which he calls *the* 'Creole pioneers'. His illustrations of this form of nationalism included (i) Bolivia's War of Independence of 1814 in South America, and (ii) Washington's declaration of the War of Independence of 1776. He describes these developments as being built upon the ambitions of classes whose economic interests were ranged against the metropolis, especially, in the nineteenth century. He argues that creole nationalism also drew upon liberal and enlightenment ideas from Europe, which provided ideological criticisms of imperialism as well as 'anciens regimes'. He says, the shape of the newly imagined communities was created by 'pilgrim creole functionaries and provincial creole printmen'. However, he says, as a model for emulation, this form of nationalism remained incomplete, mainly because it lacked linguistic communality and its specific form of the state was both retrograde and congruent with the arbitrary administrative boundaries of the imperial order. The second model was that of the linguistic nationalisms of Europe, which occurred mainly between 1820 and 1920. He explains this as a model of the independent national state, which henceforth became 'available for pirating'. According to Anderson (1983: 78–79):

But precisely because it was by then a known model, it imposed certain 'standards' from which too-marked deviations were impossible ... Thus the 'populist' character of the early European nationalisms, even when led, demagogically, by the most backward social groups, was deeper than in the Americas: serfdom had to go, legal slavery was unimaginable—not least because the conceptual model was set in ineradicable place.

He shows that the situations and experiences in Europe differed remarkably from what occurred in the Americas in two significant senses, mainly because, (i) the notion of national print languages was not an issue in Latin America, and (ii) given the peculiarities of the French Revolution. He describes the third model as 'official nationalism', found mainly in Russia. He explains this in terms of the naturalization of European dynasties and says most of the developments, which led to this form of nationalism, occurred largely in reaction to the developments in Europe between 1820 and 1920. Official nationalism, according to him, involved 'Russification', which was articulated through the imposition of cultural homogeneity from the top, through state action, a project, later emulated elsewhere in Asia, Africa and other parts of the Third World in the twentieth century. He notes that all these three forms of nationalism were available for the development of nationalism in the Third World and that just as creole functionaries first perceived a national meaning in the imperial

administrative unit, so did the 'brown' 'or black Englishman' when he made his bureaucratic pilgrimage to the metropolis. On his return, Anderson (1983: 105) says:

the apex of his looping flight was the highest administrative centre to which he was assigned: Rangoon, Accra, Georgetown, or Colombo. Yet in each constricted journey he found bilingual travelling companions with whom he came to feel a growing communality. In his journey he understood rather quickly that his point of origin—conceived either ethnically, linguistically, or geographically—was of small significance ... it did not fundamentally determine his destination or his companions. Out of this pattern came that subtle, half-concealed transformation, step by step, of the colonial state into the national state, a transformation made possible not only by a solid continuity of personnel, but by the established skein of journeys through which each state was experienced by its functionaries.

All these, according to Anderson, furthered the development of national consciousness, the spread and acquisition of which he explains by the fact that such journeys were now made by 'huge and variegated crowds'. On the whole, he says, given the enormous increases in physical mobility, imperial 'Russification' programmes sponsored by the colonial state, corporate capitalism as well as the spread of modern-style education created a large bilingual section, which could mediate linguistically between the metropolitan nation and the colonized people. In this process, the vanguard role of the intelligentsia, far from being independent, derived from its bilingual literacy, in which case, Anderson (1983: 107) remarks that:

Print-literacy already made possible the imagined community floating in homogenous, empty time ... Bilingualism meant access, through the European language-of-state, to modern Western culture in the broadest sense, and, in particular, to the models of nationalism, nation-ness, and nation-state produced elsewhere in the course of the nineteenth century.

Thus, in the twentieth century, Third World nationalisms emerged with the acquisition of this 'modular' character. He says, through drawing on more than a century and a half of human experience and also from three earlier models of nationalism, nationalist elites in these regions are therefore able to consciously deploy civil and military educational systems, most of which were modeled after official nationalism, such as elections, party organizations as well as cultural celebrations patterned after the order of popular nationalisms of nineteenth century Europe. Other borrowed aspects of the practices in these state-nations, which are of European heritages include the citizen-republican idea brought into the world by the Americas, including the very idea of a 'nation' itself, now firmly nestled in virtually all print-languages, as well as 'nation-ness', which is hardly separable from the conception of political consciousness. In conclusion, Anderson (1983: 123) surmises that:

In a world in which the national state is the overwhelming norm, all of this means that nations can now be imagined without linguistic communality—not in the naïve spirit of *nostras los Americanos*, but out of a general awareness of what modern history has demonstrated to be possible.

In summing up Anderson's theory of modern nationalism, it is important to note some of the instructive comments, which his work has generated. Among these are Chatterjee's insightful reservations, which he presents in three different works, namely, Chatterjee (1986) *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse*. Chatterjee (1993) *The Notion and Its Fragments: Colonial and Post-colonial Histories*, and Chatterjee (1999) *Anderson's Utopia*. Through his intervention and critiques, Chatterjee (1986, 1993 and 1999) offers an alternative genealogy of the modern history of nationalism, especially one, which not only takes into account the cherished heritages and peculiar experiences in Asia and Africa, among other non-Western societies, but also exhumes and critically engages the history, theory and politics of nationalism. This is achieved through his insistence on the interrogation of the specific socio-historical conditions under which most nationalist thoughts and movements across the world were developed, by demonstrating the possible influence of politics on nationalism, and also through establishing the implications of the derived and dependent character of nationalist thought in the Third World on the configuration of the state and the character of politics itself. His approach helps us to see through and make sense of the making of nationalist imaginations in non-Western societies. As Sudipta Kaviraj (1992: 1) argues:

To understand nationalism as an historical reality it is essential to step outside the history that nationalism gives to itself. Undoubtedly, this historical description is not entirely homogenous, and its axis shifts according to the political demands and exigencies of different periods. Still, there is a clearly identifiable narrative, which, despite all its internal variations, can be called the nationalist history of nationalism.

Chatterjee's (1986 and 1993) critiques are instructive interventions in the direction of Kaviraj's (1992) observation. They also represent aspects of the on-going radicalized attempts at turning historical thinking away from large, holistic and totalized histories of nationalism, a shift that is expressed inter alia in the turning of historical attention from a limited concern with abstract conceptions of political history to an interrogation of the nuances of cultural history; from events to discourses; and even within the history of ideas, there is the negotiated shift from the content of nationalistic thought to a more sensitive understanding of its forms. Thus, far from accepting the European account of nationalism as an undisputed universal truism, his approach probes into the various discursive formations within nationalism and establishes the peculiarity of the Asian and

African experiences. In addition to his resolution of major epistemological challenges posed in narrativizing nationalism in the Third World, the merit of this engagement lies in its insistence on alternative nationalist histories from the non-European world, through the restoration of a sense of complexity in history and the rejection of the earlier history of homogeneity; the offering of 'a history of difference' in the epochs of the anti-colonial struggles against the strong teleology of official narrations, based on the sanctioned experiences of the people in the Third World and the rejection of historicist notions of 'homogeneous history'. As we see in Kaviraj's (1992: 4) position:

Even within a seemingly homogenous history, it is often essential to ask whose history this is, in the sense of history *for* whom rather than history *of* whom, because there are changes in the telling. Within seemingly homogenous history there are conflicts between tendencies, the axis and the periphery, the mainstream and the embarrassing fringe, the self and the other. From being the inheritor of one stream, albeit the major one, such a history takes a small, subtle, perhaps historically inevitable step towards claiming to be the inheritor of all.

Lastly, Chatterjee's (1986 and 1993) critiques of Anderson's (1983 and 1991) positions have also been corroborated by Christopher Bayly's (1998) recent positions on nationalism and patriotism in India. In his book, *Origins of Nationality in South Asia: Patriotism and Ethical Government in the Making of Modern India*, Bayly (1998) refutes the idea that Indian nationalism was entirely constructed in dialogue with Western liberal nationalism of the nineteenth century. He maintains that even though they were later modified by colonial rule, the particularities of Indian nationalism have to be understood within the context of the genuinely Indian forms of social organization and ideologies of good governance, which pre-dated the full Western impact. Bayly's (1998) argument suggests that in the late nineteenth century, Indian nationalism drew upon and also recast some patterns of social relations, sentiments, doctrines and embodied doctrines, which had come into existence before British rule was established in the sub-continent. He refers to the precursors of Indian nationalism as old patriotisms and political ethics of Indian homelands that assumed a more defined form after the decline of the Mughal Empire and the subsequent emergence of regional kingdoms in the sub-continent, in the seventeenth century. In this sense, the nationalist and intellectual struggles for independence in India necessarily entailed efforts to retrieve and recapture aspects of the diverse heritages of the pre-colonial past. It should however, be clarified, that by referring to Bayly's (1998) account, the aim is to show that as Chatterjee's (1986 and 1993) illustrations suggest, there are indeed significant elements and aspects of the nationalist imaginations and aspirations, which are not only uniquely indigenous, but also premised on the notions of difference and aversion from the modular forms of nationalism imagined from the

Americas. The same contention is true of Africa. Above all, in making such claims, we are arguing that, although nationalism remains an instructive process through which the state, or nation-state was invented in Africa and other regions of the South, nevertheless, in that process, underlining the making of the nation, there are contributions from the different societies and communities from the South—even though, such inputs, together with their pre-colonial legacies were transformed by European colonialism. Thus, for us in Africa, the implication of this position is that, although nationalism is noted and appreciated as an instrumental process through which the emergence of the post-colonial state was made possible, that process is based on the one hand on the imagination and reaction of the colonized against the contradictions of the colonial system; and on the other hand, on the struggle for a recapitulation and retrieval of significant aspects of the pre-colonial past, which the narcissism of colonial domination sought to confine to extinction.

Another authority, whose works are worth examining on the origins of modern nationalism is Rabindranath Tagore, particularly, those aspects of his writings, which focus on nationalism in the West, Japan and India. Going by Pradip K. Dutta's account, Tagore (1861-1941) saw himself, as part of international developments. The trajectory for him was to look at the outside world from the point of view of India's situation, experience and involvement. Although he focuses on the international community, he however privileges India within that setting. His ideas were shaped by and hinged mainly on the question of resisting colonial domination and the question of India's position in the world. He is said to be both involved and detached from Indian nationalism. Among others, his writings on nationalism focus on (i) the critique of nationalism, especially, its Western variant, which he provides, (ii) his idea about the relationship of Indians to other cultures, especially, the English culture, and (iii) his idea about the relationship with one's own culture. He captures 'caste' and other racial discrimination as the major problem with Indian nationalism, a problem, which he says was given to India from the beginning. He presents this as part of the social problem in 'Hindustan'. According to Tagore, cited in Das (1996: 453), "our real problem in India is not political". "It is social". "This is a condition not only prevailing in India, but among all nations". He defines a nation as that aspect, which a whole population assumes when organized for a mechanical purpose. He says "the nation is the organised self-interest of a whole people, where it is the least human and the least spiritual". He contends that there is only one history, which is the history of man and that all other national histories are merely chapters within that larger whole. From another account, he describes nationalism as a great menace and one, which for years has been at the

bottom of India's troubles and woes. Of the colonizing impulses underlining Western nationalism, Tagore cited in Das (1996: 440) notes that:

The political civilisation, which has sprung up from the soil of Europe and is overrunning the whole world, like some prolific weed, is based upon exclusiveness. It is always watched to keep at bay the aliens or to exterminate them. It is carnivorous and cannibalistic in its tendencies, it feeds upon the resources of other peoples and tries to swallow their whole future. It is always afraid of other races achieving eminence, naming it as a peril, and tries to thwart all symptoms of greatness outside its own boundaries, forcing down races of men who are weaker, to be eternally fixed in their weakness. Before this political civilization came to its power and opened its hungry jaws wide enough to gulp down great continents of the earth, we had wars, pillages, changes of monarchy and consequent miseries, but never such a sight of fearful and hopeless voracity, such wholesale feeding of nation upon nation, such huge machines for turning great portions of the earth into mincemeat, never such terrible jealousies with all their ugly teeth and claws ready for tearing open each other's vitals.

Other accounts, which focus on the role of nationalism in the development of the modern state from the point of view of the experiences of individual states, also abound. Examples of these are found in Erik Lonroth (1994). In summary, the fore-gone accounts are some of the theoretical insights added to Ake's theory of the development of the state. As we noted earlier, the aim is to fill the gap, which was established based on the contention that Ake's explanation of the development of the state in general theoretical terms, in relation to the West, Europe and North America, Africa and other parts of the Third World neither focuses on the role of nationalism, nor are provided from the point of view of nationalism. It is hoped that this brief addition achieves the intended objective.

#### **4.1.3 The State in Africa as a Modern Regime of Power**

The third critique, which this study raises on Ake's analysis of the state focuses on the role of power, through the use of knowledge, military might and other disciplining institutions in producing the colonial and later post-colonial state, particularly in Africa. It flows from the immediately fore-gone illustrations on the role of nationalism in the development of the modern state in the West and post-colonial societies generally. In the last section, we noted that the specific forces, factors and developments, which shaped the form of nationalism in the West, differed significantly from those factors and experiences, which shaped the form of nationalism in the countries of the South. In particular, we argued, following Chatterjee's (1986: 5-6) illustrations that while Western nationalism together with the modern state in the West developed on the heels of industrial capitalism, Third World nationalisms and the state in these regions developed largely from the imagination and consciousness, which resulted from European interactions with these societies, especially, given the context and implications of colonial-imperialism. These different circumstances and historical



experiences in the development of the modern state in these societies also underline the fundamental distinctions associated with the operational character of these two states-systems in the modern world.

Applied to Ake, the argument that is advanced in this section is that, even though he captures colonial-imperialism as the essential historical process and context for the development of the colonial and post-colonial state in Africa, he still did not extend his arguments and explanations on these into a detailed theory of modern forms of power and techniques of governmentality. Put differently, even though Ake exhaustively discusses the role, context and impact of colonial-imperialism in the development of the institutions, structures and organs of the state under colonialism, and even though he discusses in appreciable details, the role of colonialism not only in the development of the colonial state-system, but also in the extension and continued dominance of this state in post-colonial Africa and elsewhere in the Third World, he neither extended nor consummated his discussion into an elaborate theory within what is today known as 'modern forms of power and techniques of governmentality'. Through focusing on the writings of Partha Chatterjee (1986 and 1993) on South-Asia and Africa, this section takes on this task. It extends Ake's illustrations on the role of colonial-imperialism in the development of the state in Africa into an elaborate theory of governmentality.

As it is with other power-driven systems and modes of thought, the discourse on modernity presents some of the most contested issues within the post-Enlightenment debates on the origins of human civilization and development. These issues have engaged the attention of social scientists, philosophical historians and literary writers across the world, especially, being itself a controversial and much difficult concept to define. From the point of view of the European Enlightenment, Western intellectuals have often defined modernity as the rule of modern institutions, which delivered mankind from the thrall of all that was 'unreasonable' and 'irrational', such that those who fell outside its ambit are described as either 'pre' or even 'non-modern'. Nationalists in the post-colonial world define it in terms of the promise of development. Much recently, given the insights introduced by anti-colonial, feminist, environmentalist and other social movements, all of which have radicalized our conceptions of democracy, some of these older definitions now produce a moral dilemma. Hence the question: Can the designation of something or some groups as non-or pre-modern ever be anything but a gesture of the powerful (Chakrabarty, 2002: xix-xxiv)? All these point to a discontent in the conceptual definition of what constitutes 'modernity', leading to endless

debates most of which question the teleological, if canonical understandings of the term and other entrenched notions of it as necessarily having an ideal-typical or even a universal form. In line with this discontent, Arjun Appadurai (1996) talks about 'modernity at large'. Chatterjee (1997: 3-20) talks of 'our modernity', as differentiated from 'others', or 'their modernities', an expression with which he points out different conceptions of 'modernities', each of which accommodates within it certain peculiarities and uniqueness such that the world is not agreed in terms of the variegated societal conceptions and definitions of what is 'modern', while Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar (1999: 1-18) emphasizes usages as 'alternative' or 'plural modernities'.

For Chatterjee, three significant influences, which informed his writings in this direction, are Jurgen Habermas (18 June 1929-Date), Michel Foucault (1926-1984) and Edward Said (1935-2003). Habermas' writings advance some of the strongest and most influential defence of modernity as a philosophical discourse. Among others, he focuses on the idea of the modern subject, which he describes as an 'atomized', 'autonomous' and 'self-conscious entity' (Habermas 1991). In response, Foucault's quest consists in proving that this conception of the modern subject as 'individualized', 'self-conscious' and 'critical' is both fraught and limited. He advances his critique by examining the place and role of power in producing this subject and shows how the notion of self-consciousness is a product of knowledge, mainly in the form of modern science and technology, all operating and shaped within the context of power. He asks: What are the 'systems', 'structures', 'processes' and 'techniques' through which this modern subject is produced? Using a profoundly genealogical and archaeological method, he criticizes Habermas' attributes of the modern subject against the backdrop of the notions of power and freedom (Foucault 1975).

However, while Habermas and Foucault focus largely on the industrial societies in the West, Europe and North America, Chatterjee (1993: 14-34) applies the insights gleaned from their writings in developing his theory of modern forms of power and techniques of governmentality in India and Africa. His argument presents colonialism as 'fundamental' and 'epochal' to the development of modern institutions and technologies of power in these societies. He sees colonialism, through the role and institutions of the colonial state as the historical force and experience, which introduced them, particularly colonial and post-colonial India, to the enterprise and project of modernity. According to him, the *raison d'être* underlining the role of colonialism in 'modernizing' India is best understood in terms of its ideological essence, which is captured in the work of Edward Thompson and G. T. Garratt (1934: 654) cited in Chatterjee (1994: 14-15):

Whatever the future may hold, the direct influence of the West upon India is likely to decrease. But it would be absurd to imagine that the British connection will not leave a permanent mark upon Indian life. On the merely material side the new Federal Government [the Government of India reorganized under the 1935 constitutional arrangements] will take over the largest irrigation system in the world, with thousands of miles of canals and water-cuts fertilizing between thirty and forty million acres; some 60, 000 miles of metalled roads; over 42, 000 miles of railways, of which three-quarters are State-owned; 230, 000 scholastic institutions with over twelve million scholars; and a great number of buildings, including government offices, inspection bungalows, provincial and central legislatures. The vast area of India has been completely surveyed, most of its lands assessed, and a regular census taken of its population and its productivity. An effective defensive system has been built up on its vulnerable North-East frontiers, it has an Indian army with century-old traditions, and a police force which compares favourably with any outside a few Western countries. The postal department handles nearly 1500 million articles yearly, the Forestry Department not only prevents the denudation of immense areas, but makes a net profit of between two and three crores. These great State activities are managed by a trained bureaucracy, which is to-day almost entirely Indian.

Using a typically Foucauldian approach, Chatterjee (1994: 15ff) infers from Thompson and Garratt's (1934) account the description of the modern regime of power, introduced by colonialism to India, especially, 'a regime' in which the exercise of 'power', in this case British colonial power, was meant to 'produce' a specific form and type of 'the state'. He says it is not without reason and significance that Thompson and Garratt (1934) have presented these inherited institutions and organs of the state as the 'permanent mark' left behind by the colonial presence in India. He notes that this further tallies with their decision of titling their text as *Rise and Fulfilment of British Rule in India*. Fundamentally, therefore, this leads to the understanding of colonialism not just as a conquest-driven or domination-oriented process that is limited only to the economic exploitation of weaker states in Asia and Africa by the colonizing European powers, but also informs its understanding as the specific process through which and under which 'the modernization' of state institutions, structures and organs in these pre-industrial societies was achieved. Chatterjee (1994: 14ff) argues that colonialism was not limited to the economic exploitation, underdevelopment and the development of the specific form and type of the modern state in post-colonial societies, but also brought about their socialization and initiation into modernity, albeit in a manner, which underscores a dependent status and position for the state within the prevailing global system. Colonialism in this sense, especially as captured in Chatterjee's works, is therefore both 'an instrumental process' with which the economic underdevelopment of Third World societies was achieved and 'the agent' for modernizing the social institutions in these societies. This, according to him, is mainly because through the institutions, systems and structures of state, economy and society, which it created, colonialism introduced new ways of defining the colonial and later, post-colonial 'modern' in these societies. According to Chatterjee (1994: 15) this argument holds and remains quite instructive, at least to the extent that:

The postcolonial state ... has after all only expanded and not transformed the basic institutional arrangements of colonial law and administration, of the courts, the bureaucracy, the police, the army, and the various technical services of government. M. V. Pylee, the constitutional historian, describes the discursive constraints with disarming simplicity. "India", he says, "inherited the British system of government and administration in its original form. The framers of the new Constitution *could not think* of an altogether new system".<sup>3</sup>

Remarkably, by referring to the changes introduced by British colonialism into the operations of 'the bureaucracy', 'the police', 'the army' and other institutions of the state, Chatterjee refers, not only to the modernizing influences and impact of colonialism, but also to the specific form and type of modernity, which colonialism introduced to the colonial and later post-colonial state in India. Following this line of argument, other nationalist historians in India have noted with dismay that (i) the inherited institutions of power in India are not 'modern' enough, (ii) that liberty, freedom and other value-loaded aspirations, which characterize the post-Enlightenment period in the West were only selectively introduced and applied to India and Africa through 'the controlled form of modernity', which accompanied the colonial project, and (iii) that these post-colonial societies merely look up to the West for inspiration on the practices of justice, freedom, liberty and other admirable ideals or values, which have proved difficult to entrench within their social system. In this connection, Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000: 4) argues that:

The European colonizer of the nineteenth century both preached this Enlightenment humanism at the colonized and at the same time denied it in practice. But the vision has been powerful in its effects. It has historically provided a strong foundation on which to erect—both in Europe and outside—critiques of socially unjust practices.

Hence the conclusion that far from establishing the foundations of a truly modern society, the conditions of colonial rule, which still besmirch and characterize the post-colonial state, necessarily undermine the ordered application of the true principles of an enlightened society and a modern administrative system in post-colonial societies. Following B. B. Misra, the nationalist historian of colonial bureaucracy, Chatterjee (1994: 15–16) identifies these limits as proceeding from two premises:

The first was the Indian social system which was governed by irrational and prescriptive customs rather than a well-regulated rational system of law and a common code of morality. The second ... was the British imperial interest, which bred discrimination in the Services on racial grounds as well as differentiation in respect of social status and conditions of service.

Chatterjee's central argument and contribution here is that, in addition to the economic underdevelopment and exploitation of Asian and African societies by the colonizing European powers, colonialism also served and was used for achieving another significant objective, namely, the modernization of the social, political and economic institutions of these 'pre-modern societies'. He says it is the combination of these interests and objectives that shaped the specific form and character of the colonial and later post-colonial state. In other words, unlike Ake, who limits his explanations to the role of colonialism in the development of the colonial and post-colonial state and the underdevelopment of African economies, Chatterjee (1994: 14-34) shows that in addition to the development of the state and the corresponding underdevelopment of Asian and African economies, which took place during and under these significant historical periods, colonialism was also an instrumental agent, through which modernity was introduced into colonial and post-colonial societies in Asia and Africa. He explains the articulation of this objective in terms of the modernization of existing social, economic and political institutions, systems and structures. This, according to him was achieved largely through (i) the displacement of pre-colonial social, economic and political institutions, (ii) their onward replacement by new systems and institutions, which were introduced from Europe to the colonial state and (iii) the continued dominance of those institutions even after the attainment of independence.

From a related account, following R. P. Dutt (1947) and I. Habib (1995), the typical Marxist position on this is that, in addition to the exploitation, underdevelopment and other perversions which accompanied the European export of capital to these societies, colonialism also brought about a certain kind of 'change' and 'fulfilment' of Indian and African 'destinies', and 'histories' without the consent of the colonized. This is because colonialism introduced all sorts of factors, systems and structures, which fundamentally disrupted the actual pace of historical progression in these societies. It should be added that the fore-gone illustrations are not meant to suggest that Ake's accounts entirely ignore the role and impact of colonialism in transforming economic, social and political institutions in colonial and post-colonial Africa. Rather, the argument that is advanced here consists mainly in two parts. One, that Ake focuses more on the role of colonial-imperialism in the economic exploitation and underdevelopment of African societies, with the result that he says very little on colonialism as an agent of modernization in the continent. His major influences for this focus derived inter alia from (i) V. I. Lenin's (1975) definition of imperialism as a subtle, albeit pernicious process, which involves the military conquest, political domination and economic exploitation of weaker states by stronger ones in order to establish and sustain relationships of

unequal exchange, and (ii) his widely acknowledged focus on the political economy of Africa, which although is premised on the interrelationship and interconnectedness of political and economic factors and processes, but emphasizes the dominance of political forces and experiences by economic considerations within the same arrangement. Two, even though he discusses the role and influences of colonial-imperialism through the various policies and programmes in transforming economic, social and political institutions in colonial and post-colonial Africa, he does not explain these in terms of the modernization of those institutions by colonialism. In other words, he does not explain colonialism as the essential historical process, which 'modernized' the various institutions in colonial and post-colonial Africa. This is added to the fact that even where he focuses on the economic involvement of colonialism in Africa, yet, by focusing only on its exploitative mission and its regressive nature, he does not emphasize the truly modernizing transformations introduced by colonialism into these economies. Consequently, even when these are noted in Ake, they are mentioned and cited only as incidental and as passing comments. Nowhere in his works do we find an elaborate discussion of these issues in the specific context of modernity, or as capturing colonialism as a modernizing project, which produced the colonial and post-colonial state as a species of the modern state in Africa, based largely on modern forms of power and techniques of governmentality. Focusing on India and Africa, these issues are raised and examined by Chatterjee in very elaborate theoretical details.

Chatterjee (1993: 14–34) presents the colonial state as a modern regime of power and argues that through colonialism, modern forms of power and techniques of governmentality were actually introduced and developed in African, Asian and other non-European societies. According to him, the three major innovations inherited from colonial modernity were (i) the colonial state itself, (ii) the colonial economy and (iii) the colonial educational system in which other disciplining institutions of the colonial system were incorporated. The basic narrative spine of his thesis is that the essential history of the concepts, practices and institutions of the state as we know them today is tied to the enterprise of colonialism and colonial modernity. Focusing on what he calls 'the mythical history of Empire' and 'the idea of colonial modernity', he recalls that the development of European-styled banking and postal systems, the police, the bureaucracy, the army, party politics, democratic and electoral systems of politics, systems of 'free trade' and other material aspects of social life are illustrations of the heritages of colonial modernities. Other legacies of colonial modernities, which Chatterjee cites include the very idea of enumerating and classifying population groups through the periodic conduct of census as we know and have it today; the development and consolidation of

imperial bureaucracy in India and Africa; the development and adoption of presidential, parliamentary and other forms of political democracy in Africa and Asia; the introduction and development of modern educational and industrial systems; the development of a sense of nationalism—at least in the modern sense of what it is today; the adoption of governmental practices of constitutionalism based on modern ideas and conceptions of rights, legal and political sovereignty and the rule of law. All these are presented within Chatterjee's (1993) discursive claim as enduring legacies of the European imperial presence. According to him, they were also reflected in the articulation of what constituted 'the colonial modern'. He says, through these innovations, colonialism introduced new ideas and conceptions of modernity and governmentality based on new ways of defining the 'colonial' and later, 'post-colonial' modern.

According to Chatterjee, under colonialism, there was a radical change in the understanding of the concept of 'political legitimacy' in the colonies. Through conquest, colonialism created a platform and condition in which the prevailing notions of power and the entire basis for political legitimacy were contested. In addition to the contest over the notions of political legitimacy, other issues also questioned included issues of law, the capacity of pre-colonial systems of government to actually 'protect' their people, and the ethical foundations of governance. Indigenous leaders were therefore challenged, especially in terms of their claims to power, failing which they were defeated, conquered and forcefully replaced. What then emerges was a different conception of ethics of governance, no longer based on hereditary or indigenous claims to power, but now based on the superiority of military might and the ability of those in power to 'defend' their territories and peoples. This way, colonialism introduced the idea of the 'territorial state' in its modern form into the colonies. Remarkably, even though the colonial powers faulted and condemned slave activities and other inhuman operations undertaken by indigenous African rulers, such practices were later replaced with more exploitative, inglorious and inhuman activities by the colonial authorities themselves.

As a corollary to the fore-gone account, Chatterjee divides the history of the colonial state into what he calls (i) 'the early absolutist era of the colonial modern' and 'the later anti-absolutist era of the colonial modern'. Following his illustration, the early absolutist era was the period under colonialism during which the colonial powers justified the centralized dominance of all aspects and institutions of the state with the pretext of defending the national territorial integrity of the colonies. On the other hand, the anti-absolutist era was that period under colonialism during which intellectual and

nationalist politics articulated the demand for self-rule, staked unrelenting claims of political liberty, national independence and accommodationist policies to the various colonial powers. In response, even though these struggles did not immediately achieve political independence, nevertheless they succeeded in compelling the colonial powers to expand and liberalize the structures, systems and institutions of colonial domination, especially the bureaucracy, thus opening up the hitherto non-existing political public space, particularly in the urban areas. As a way of deradicalizing the nationalist ferment, prominent nationalist figures were incorporated into the various organs of the colonial state, albeit in subordinate positions and of course, as surrogates of the colonial administrations. To sum up, Chatterjee's argument is that, just like what obtained in Europe, the trajectory of the state in India, Africa and other parts of the South also reflects significant features of the early 'absolutist' and later, 'anti-absolutist' eras, which rigorously challenged the tyrannical inclinations of the colonial state, leading to the opening up of the public space, the development and articulation of the ideas of civil society. From all these, he says, the history of the modern state in the South is therefore tied to the larger history of modern Empire, as a reflection of the operations of power, articulated, inter alia through imperial myths, military might and other ideological constructions, which project entrenched notions of the superiority of the colonizers. This in part, is what he calls 'the mythical history of Empire'.

Continuing, he argues that given the ambivalent role of colonialism in these societies, far from being truly modern, in the Western and European sense, the specific nature and character of the modern state, together with its forms of power and governmental techniques in these post-colonial societies are rather fraught and suspect. He describes this significant contradiction as the essential operational feature of the state in Asia and Africa, which underlies its dependent nature as differentiated from the state in the West, Europe and North America, which is both autonomous and efficient. He captures and explains this contradictory feature of the modern state in South-Asia and Africa as a product of what he calls "the rule of colonial difference". In a similar work, Homi K. Bhabha (1994) explains this in terms of what he calls "the ambivalence of colonial rule and the contradictory nature of its discourse". Focusing on India, Chatterjee (1994: 10) explains his conception of this "rule of colonial difference":

The colonial state, we must remember, was not just the agency that brought the modular forms of the state to the colonies; it was also an agency that was destined never to fulfil the normalizing mission of the modern state because the premise of its power was a rule of colonial difference, namely, the preservation of the alienness of the ruling group.



As the institutions of the modern state were elaborated in the colonies, especially in the second half of the nineteenth century, the ruling European groups found it increasingly necessary to lay down—in lawmaking, in the bureaucracy, in the administration of justice, and in the recognition by the state of a legitimate domain of public opinion—the precise difference between the rulers and the ruled. If Indians had to be admitted into the judiciary, could they be allowed to try Europeans? Was it right that Indians should enter the civil service by taking the same examinations as British graduates? If European newspapers in India were given the right of free speech, could the same apply to native newspapers? Ironically, it became the historical task of nationalism, which insisted on its own marks of cultural difference with the West, to demand that there be no rule of difference in the domain of the state.

Against this backdrop, he says, given this rule of colonial difference, even though back home in the metropolises, the colonial powers were not only democratic, but also respected and conformed with all the major features and requirements of modernity in their home countries, only a perverted version of it was introduced and entrenched in the colonies. He observes that although the imperialists all shared the belief in the self-evident legitimacy of the principles, which should universally govern the modern state and regime of power, it was however surprising that until the earlier half of this century, a persistent theme in colonial discourse was the steadfast refusal to admit the universality and applicability of those principles to the colonies and later post-colonies. In this sense, the articulation of the rule of colonial difference took the form of applying universal notions of fundamental human rights to all citizens in Europe and the West, and simultaneously denying them to Africans, Indians and other non-European populations. Another concrete form assumed by the rule of colonial difference is the 'crippled' and 'ineffectuated nature' of colonial and post-colonial institutions deliberately built into these institutions by the imperial powers, especially relative to their European and metropolitan counterparts, which are both 'efficient' and 'result-oriented'. Thirdly, and most importantly, while European institutions were respected and allowed the luxury of independent, indigenous and uninterrupted growth and development, traditional institutions in Africa, India and other non-European societies were required, encouraged and ultimately conquered and coerced to 'adjust' to different aspects of 'imperial innovations' as a 'condition' for conforming and approximating to 'modernity'. How was this ambivalent practice of deliberate 'denial' rationalized? To Chatterjee (1994: 16) the justification of this rule of colonial difference runs thus:

The policy of responsible and democratic government, "supposed to be of universal application", could not be applied to India because it went against "a deep stream of Indian tradition which has been flowing for thousands of years.... The ordinary men and women of India do not understand impersonal government.... They crave for government by a person to whom they can render loyal homage". The reason for the legitimacy of British rule in India lay in the fact that the King-Emperor was regarded by the Indian people as "the successor of Rama, Asoka and Akbar. Their heartfelt loyalty should not be quenched by the cold water of democratic theory".<sup>6</sup> In terms of social divisions, "India has been the battle-ground of races and religions from time immemorial", and the anticipation of a common political identity was "not justified either by the facts of history or by observation of present conditions". The fundamental principle of social organization in India was caste, which was incompatible with any form of democratic government. More importantly, the spread of modern institutions or technologies had not weakened the hold of caste in any way.

In conclusion, following Chatterjee's (1994: 14-34) account, we have tried to show that in addition to economic exploitation and underdevelopment, colonialism also modernized the political, economic and social institutions in South-Asia and Africa. The aim of this exercise is to extend and reinforce Ake's account of the state in Africa, which as we noted earlier, does not emphasize the modernizing role of colonialism in the continent. It has also been shown that while modernity in the West, Europe and North America was actually a civilizing and integrative process, which fed into the industrial, economic and democratic revolution of those societies, in Africa and South-Asia, given its controlled nature, modernity is not only a pervasion of what obtains in the West, but also a negation and corruption of on-going processes in pre-colonial African and South-Asian histories. In other words, through the specific form of modernity, which it introduced to these societies, which as we noted, rather perfected their perpetual dependence on the West, colonialism disrupted the natural historical progression of these societies to an indigenous form of modernity, especially, one, which would probably have introduced an entirely new kind of modern society and subject, that are altogether different from the contemporary Western and African conceptions of modernity. This contention is premised on Foucault's (1975) refutation of the Euro-centric idea of a unilinear history of modernity, a refutation, which enables the development of a critique of Thompson and Garratt's (1934) conception of 'the permanent mark' left behind by British colonialism in India. A similar position is found in Walter Rodney's (1976) critique of the political modernity bequeathed to the continent among other legacies of the European colonial presence. According to Rodney (1976), under colonialism, Africans actually lost power, and their collective capacity for independent initiatives was also lost; the enormous impact of the colonial presence reduced them to mere spectators not only in the making of world history, but also in determining their interests and future. According to Rodney (1976), on the ruins of colonialism emerged the caricature of a state-system, which is neither 'traditional' nor 'modern'. The decision by the elites to consolidate and appropriate,

rather than restructure and transform the inherited structures of colonialism—especially, its state and economy—not only constitutes the dilemma of the present juncture, but also explains the perpetuation of the colonial condition. Given the irreversible nature of the lived experiences around which theorization and experiments are based in the social sciences, the question regarding what the alternative nature of political modernity would, or might have been in Africa without European colonialism, is only a matter of 'conjectures' and 'counter-factual imaginations'. In other words, since we are not able to reverse and reproduce, or replicate African history through establishing alternative historical evidences, the imagination of what the alternative political modernity, together with the lived experiences of African societies would have been, barring the European colonial presence is difficult to imagine. Lastly, a similar argument is found in Said's (1978) illustration of *Orientalism*. According to him, colonialism was not limited to the economic underdevelopment of the East by the West alone. Rather, it entailed the production of knowledge about 'the Orient', which was later developed into a broader system of asymmetric knowledge used in both the colonial and post-colonial periods by 'the Occidental' for justifying the unequal relations of domination and control of the East by the West. Its articulation took the form of a very complex process, which spanned over two centuries of calibrated categorization of what constituted non-Western societies—culturally, economically, militarily and politically. It was manifested in the idea of the superiority of the West, based on the loss of the genius of the colonized population. It was also articulated in the essentialization of caste and ethnicity as the bases for interpreting social and political life in India and Africa respectively; and the positioning of the colonized within a particularly inferior conception of herself/himself, especially in relation to the West. This way, *Orientalism* provided an ideological defence of colonialism much more than the deployment of military might.

Three points are clear from the immediately fore-gone exposition. One, given his intervention, Chatterjee (1993: 14-34) answers a significant question posed not only for the state in India, but also for post-colonial historians all over the world, namely, the knotty question on the very nature and character of modernity in these societies. Focusing on India and Africa, he explains the modernization of social, economic and political institutions in these societies through the modernizing role of colonialism as a major legacy of the European Enlightenment for the non-European world. In corroborating Chatterjee's positions, Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000: 4) submits that:

The phenomenon of "political modernity"—namely the rule by modern institutions of the state, bureaucracy, and capitalist enterprise—is impossible to *think* of anywhere in the world without invoking certain categories and concepts, the genealogies of which go deep into the intellectual and even theological traditions of Europe.<sup>6</sup>

Concepts such as citizenship, the state, civil society, public sphere, human rights, equality before the law, the individual, distinctions between public and private, the idea of the subject, democracy, popular sovereignty, social justice, scientific rationality, and so on all bear the burden of European thought and history. One simply cannot think of political modernity without these and other related concepts that found a climatic form in the course of the European Enlightenment and the nineteenth century.

Two, his narration on the modernizing role of European colonialism in Africa and India enriches the unended debate in Africa on colonialism as either 'an episode' or 'an epoch'. Three, it helps us appreciate the fact that even though colonial and post-colonial institutions in South-Asia and Africa are oriented and patterned after those in the West, yet, given 'the rule and implications of colonial difference', these inherited institutions not only accommodate but also reflect within them weaknesses, which are absent in the models in the West, Europe and North America from which they were originally borrowed or imported. In particular, while such institutions reflect imposed features and aspects of a dependent modernity on the one hand, on the other hand, they also elicit the absolutist tendencies and tyrannical inclinations of the pre-modern state-systems obtainable in pre-colonial African societies. Again, Chakrabarty (2000: 4) corroborates Chatterjee (1993):

These concepts entail an unavoidable—and in a sense indispensable—universal and secular vision of the human. The European colonizer of the nineteenth century both preached this Enlightenment humanism at the colonized and at the same time denied it in practice. But the vision has been powerful in its effects. It has historically provided a strong foundation on which to erect—both in Europe and outside—critiques of socially unjust practices. Marxist and liberal thought are legatees of this intellectual heritage. This heritage is now global... Modern social critiques of caste, oppressions of women, the lack of rights for laboring and subaltern classes ... and so on—and, in fact, the very critique of colonialism itself—are unthinkable except as a legacy, partially, of how Enlightenment Europe was appropriated.

To Chatterjee (1993), this difference is mainly because, while the state in the West developed largely as an empowering institution, meant to enable the ordered operations of the civil society, the state in South-Asia and Africa emerged and was developed not only as an imposed or conquest-driven power, but fundamentally remains even in the post-colonial situation as a non-democratized, dispossessing and above all, alienating force. Applied to the army, the police and the prisons, this position helps us understand the dubious efficiency of these and other coercive apparatuses of the state in Africa, South-Asia and other post-colonial societies not only in effecting arrests but also in taking the lives of innocent, usually defenseless civilian members of their populations in situations of emergency and insurrections. Following these insightful illustrations, one understands the reasons why, even though they hardly succeed in peace-keeping operations and conflict resolution, the

state's apparatuses of violence in Africa are very much stronger and overdeveloped than civil and other democratically constituted institutions of the state.

Sudipta Kaviraj and Sunil Khilnani (2001) alluded to 'the modernizing role of colonialism in post-colonial societies' and corroborated Chatterjee's (1993) 'notion of the rule of colonial difference' in the operations of Western-styled institutions in both the West and the South when they argued that:

For historical reasons, nearly all societies of the Third World speak, as far as politics is concerned, a Western language. It is a language which identifies states and civil societies, speaks of bureaucracies, political parties, parliaments, expresses political desires for the establishment of liberal, Communist or socialist political forms, and evaluates political systems in terms of democracy and dictatorship. Yet it is common knowledge that these words do not denote objects which behave in the same way as in the West, where this language originated. The existence of a bureaucracy does not mean the untroubled operation of Weberian rules of rationalization; operation of democracy does not necessarily mean a secure understanding of inviolable rights of individuals or respect for minorities. Political institutions taken from the West are introduced into societies which have embedded forms of sociability that are very different from the common individualistic forms of the modern West. The actual manner of operation and historical effects of those political institutions are sometimes startlingly different.

Julius E. Okolo (1970: 1) advances a similar argument in respect of Nigeria. According to him, during the first half of the twentieth century, federalism and democracy were gradually evolved in Nigeria 'under' British colonial rule. Before independence in 1960, these institutions had been well established with the hope that they would successfully work in the country and hopefully make Nigeria a model for Africa. Similarly, Chatterjee is corroborated by Peter Ekeh (1985: 5-19) who argues that the processes, which shaped the development of the state in Africa, are central in understanding its inherited tradition of violence. He captures these processes as those, which involved (i) the dissolution and displacement of pristine African states, non-state and other stateless political entities and their subsequent incorporation into the colonial system of operation, (ii) the selection of elements and aspects of the European imperial state, after being pruned of their societal constraints in Europe, and their onward export, through imposition on African societies to constitute the colonial state. He says each of these processes leaves behind fundamental consequences for the colonial and post-colonial state. Commenting on the dissolution and displacement of pre-colonial states in Africa, Ekeh (1985: 7) argues that:

The dissolution of pristine states in Africa,<sup>6</sup> via violence and conquest leads to two enduring attributes of the state in Africa. Most, there is manifest discontinuity in the social formation of the African State: it did not arise from previous epochs. This means, ultimately, that the African State does not enjoy the benefit and advantage of inherited traditions of governance—that its conduct is not informed by the distillate of an ancien regime. The significance of the violent and sudden termination of rulership under colonial encounter may now be difficult to measure in the distant hindsight of its occurrence, but its consequences must be reckoned to include the crisis of legitimacy which has besieged the African state from its beginnings in colonialism. The second attribute of the African state, which flows from the violent termination of the existing forms of governance in pre-colonial Africa, is that it has led to the institutionalization of violence as an integral aspect of statehood. Government is a violent imposition, not authority—not even power in its meaning of shared participation by many citizens. Government agencies resonate violence in a manner that is rare in the history of the formation of states.

On the implications of the second historical process, which shaped the development of the state in Africa, Ekeh (1985: 8) says:

This colonial state was distinguished as far as states go, by its purity of coercive elements of statehood, that is, freed from any interference from the strength of African history and society and from control from the metropolitan "imperial factor"<sup>7</sup> with its void moral underpinnings. This process consists in what I have characterized elsewhere as "migrated structures" by which models of social organization imported from European nations were engrafted unto the colonial situation (Ekeh, 1983: 17-19). Thus, the colonial state, essential characteristics of which have survived unto the present times in modern African states, consists of selected elements of the state in the imperial European States but was bereft of other important constituent elements of the European State.

Drawing from Ralph Miliband's (1969: 50) account, which he describes as one of the most comprehensive listings of the features of the state both in political theory and also with reference to the West, Ekeh (1985: 8-9) argues that these features were already well developed in capitalist Europe, particularly in the age of imperialism during which they were paralyzed out of Africa. However, he contends that at the point of their export to Africa, European colonial administrators emphasized those aspects, which specialized on violence and coercion and dropped those features and aspects, which could act as societal checks or breaks on the excessive powers of the colonial state. Ekeh adds that, given the limitations of administering personnel and other exigencies of colonialism, a central characteristic of the colonial and even post-colonial state is that those imported features lack their usual autonomy of existence by which they were identified in their metropolitan habitat. Consequently, he says, even in the post-colonial situation, those imposed features tend to be fused together in a manner that lack functional differentiation and are therefore reminiscent of the social organization of society in pre-modern Europe. According to Ekeh (1985: 9) those aspects of the European state-system, which were over-blown and feature prominently in the modern state-system in Africa:

were mainly the instruments of violence and coercion. These were first and foremost (a) the military and police; (b) the judiciary and (c) the bureaucracy. Parliamentary assemblies were only added to the state apparatus in an advisory capacity in the twilight of colonial history. The evolution of government, as separate from the bureaucracy and the coercive forces of the state, was hardly achieved during the colonial era. sic

Therefore, the result of this biased importation of the features of the modern European forms of power and techniques of governmentality into Africa was the institutionalization of violence as a legitimized form of state practice through the culture of violence, which was entrenched in the state as well as the seeds of discord sown among the people. In fact, according to Hannah Arendt (1951: 136) cited in Peter Ekeh (1985: 10):

The first consequence of power export (in colonialism) was that the state's instrument of violence, the police and the army, which in the framework of the (Eastern) nation existed beside, and were controlled by, other national institutions, were separated from this body and promoted to the position of regional representatives in uncivilized or weak countries. Here, in backward regions without industries and political organization, where violence was given more latitude than in any Western country, the so-called laws of capitalism were actually allowed to create realities. sic

Also, Billy Dudley (1968: 26) again cited in Ekeh (1985: 10) observes that "colonial administrators were in fact practors and the system of rule was authoritarian and dictatorial". sic From all these accounts, Ekeh says, even though they owed their sources and origins to the metropolitan models, it is the coercive aspects, namely, the military and police forces that were most developed in colonial and post-colonial Africa. According to Ekeh (1985: 10):

In deed, for such of the colonial period of colonization, the leadership of the armed forces and the police were directly supplied from the metropolitan military and police forces. sic Beyond the formal military organization, the colonial situation was infused with the aura of militarism. Colonization attained its intensity in Africa and many parts of Asia in the period between the World Wars. A good many of the colonial administrators, from Europe, served in the World Wars. Even the governors and the lesser officials involved in colonization were regarded as military officers, as even their titles often shared and were dressed in military uniform in ceremonial occasions. It may be true, as Gutteridge (1970: 316) points out, that at the point of departure from the colonial scene, the European colonizers in Africa "cannot be accused of having left to their successors unwieldy or overlarge defence forces". What the British, the French and the other European colonizing nations left behind was a tradition of military rule that was to be expanded after independence from colonial rule. There is no question but that of all elements of the state the military (and the police) factor was the most pronounced in colonialism. sic

Going back to the second issue extrapolated from Chatterjee's intervention, namely, his position on the debate about colonialism, which we present as 'an epoch' in African history. To recapitulate, Chatterjee's approach locates the modernizing role of colonialism in the South within the larger context of the global project and enterprise of modernity, which derived its significant push and

inspiration from the post-Enlightenment period in industrial Europe. His argument on colonialism in the epochal presence in Indian historiography is that, just as industrial capitalism developed on the heels of the industrial revolution and remains as the decisive historical development, which perfected and concluded the project of modernity in Europe and the West at large, colonial-imperialism also remains the significant historical development, which introduced and consummated the enterprise of modernity in Asia, Africa and other post-colonial societies. According to him, in the West, Europe and North America this took the form of the modernization of the social institutions and their consummation through the democratic-political revolution. In Asia and Africa, he says, this took place through the various policies and programmes of the colonial state, all of which translated not only into the replication of Western types of institutions in these societies, but also ensured their integration into the world capitalist system in a dependent manner. Chatterjee (1993: 17–18) says since the principal justification for the modern regime of power is that by making social regulations an aspect of the self-disciplining of normalized individuals, power is made more productive, effective and humane, then there are three possible positions with regard to the universality of this argument:

One is that this must apply in principle to all societies irrespective of historical or cultural specificities. The second is that the principle is inescapably tied to the specific history and culture of Western societies and cannot be exported elsewhere; this implies a rejection of the universality of the principle. The third is that the historical and cultural differences, although an impediment in the beginning, can be eventually overcome by a suitable process of training and education. The third position, therefore, while admitting the objection raised by the second, nevertheless seeks to restore the universality of the principle.

He notes that while these three positions have been associated with distinct ideological formations, they are nevertheless produced in the same discursive field. He says the implication of this argument is that if the rule of colonial difference is part of a common strategy for 'the deployment' of the modern forms of disciplinary power, then the history of the colonial state, far from being incidental, is of crucial interest to the study of the past, present and future of the modern state. Applied to Africa, the case for referring to colonialism as an epoch in the continent's history is reinforced by the following realities. Politically, more than any other process or factor, colonialism shaped and determined not only the nature and subject matter of Third World nationalisms, but also the character of their nationalist thought, which as Chatterjee (1986: 1-35) argues, is both derived from and dependent upon the West. This is added to the fact that, through its subtle but decisive politics of hegemonic cooptation of the nationalist elites, colonialism also disabled and



undermined the achievement of both the nationalist movements and the decolonization struggles, which as we observed earlier, is limited to mere political independence. Economically, the decisive nature of colonialism in the dependent form of modernity, which it introduced to Africa, is obvious enough in the underdevelopment and dependent nature of both the colonial and post-colonial economies in the continent. Other features, which underline the underdevelopment and dependence of African economies, have been cited in Ake's characterization of the political economy of contemporary Africa. They all owe their origins and perpetuity in post-colonial times to the decisive logic and character of the colonial legacy. Socially, (i) modern institutions, apparatuses and organs of government, (ii) the inherited national languages or lingua franca, (iii) religious sentiments, ethnicity in Africa, the profoundly conflictual system of caste relations in post-colonial India, and (iv) a host of other centrifugal/fissiparous tendencies, which continue to undermine political integration and the forging of nationhood in Africa bear witness to the epochal character of colonialism in the histories of these societies. To sum up, the persisting problem of political integration and the crisis of political instability, manifested inter alia in the widespread breakdown of law and order in most states, especially in the immediate period following independence in Africa, together with the fragility of inherited institutions are not just indications of the long foregone colonial past, but also illustrations of the fact that colonialism is indeed an epoch in African history.

The above discussion draws attention to the following questions, which are not only imminent in the literature on African historiographies, but also logically arise from the issues raised in this section. One, what are the early histories of conquest in different parts of Africa? Two, what is the genealogy of the development of capitalism, the nation-state and colonial empires in these non-European societies? Three, what is the actual narrative frame within which one produces the account of colonial capitalism in Africa? Four, what do we know about the different discursive narratives and practices explaining the development of capitalism, the nation-state and colonial empires in the continent? Five, what are the ideological effects generated by the asymmetrical structures of power articulated in terms of oriental despotism in the colonies in Africa? Six, what links can we establish between the national histories of different European nations; the histories of different European imperialisms and European colonization of the continent? And lastly, what is the relevance of interrogating these distant histories and trajectories under the present juncture? Following the approaches introduced and employed in this section, we have tried to suggest answers to aspects of these questions, especially in the direction of the limited understanding of this researcher.

#### **4.1.4 Political Society, Subaltern Concerns and the State in Africa**

Flowing logically from the immediately fore-gone arguments, this section takes on a fourth issue, which is presented as a limitation in Ake's analysis of the state in Africa. It discusses a number of issues, which interface 'the political society' as well as 'subaltern studies' and examines the state of knowledge in the writings of Ake in capturing them. Among others, it is argued that in most of his works we do not find any theoretical representation of 'the political society' in Africa. This is added to the fact that such writings do not also provide any engaging study of the political society either in the problematic context of post-conflict Africa or in relation to subaltern concerns in the continent. Conceptually, 'the political society' is a category of the larger political community, which is independent of both 'the state' and 'the civil society'. Its development and emergence are tied to the politics of independence in Africa, namely the momentous maneuvering of the masses by the nationalist elite. This maneuvering also captures the betrayal of the political support of the masses by the nationalist elite during the struggle against colonialism. It is the segment of the political community, which is not incorporated either into the state or the civil society in post-colonial Africa and therefore remains marginalized, especially, given the narrowing of access and accommodation to the state and its resources by the privileged few as well as the exclusivist nature of state politics.

The relevance of this attempt derives from the fact that, even though Antonio Gramsci is widely acknowledged for being the first major political thinker or theorist to have used the Marxist concept of subalternity and actually discussed issues of subaltern concerns in modern political theory, his writings, just like those of Karl Marx, Frederick Engels and other great minds within the European intellectual tradition, focus more on the classes and groups in the West and Europe. In other words, subaltern concerns and other critical issues raised in Gramsci's writings and analyses did not focus on the peasants and other members of the subaltern groups in the countries of the South. This is added to the fact that such issues did not also receive any significant engagement in the writings of scholars in South-Asia and Africa until much recently in the late twentieth and twenty-first centuries, when they were critically discussed by Marxist historians in India. In the specific case of Africa, even though issues of minorities' concerns have been rigorously researched and exhaustively represented in the writings of Ake, his contemporaries and the succeeding generations of scholars after them, these issues have not been problematized and interrogated in the interesting, yet puzzling context depicted in this section, with the result that theoretical notions and the discourse on the political society and subalternity appear to be hardly familiar to members of the social sciences community

in Africa. This section takes on this task. It discusses the specific African experience on these issues in the established context of political society and subaltern studies. The aims are (i) to extend and therefore enrich Ake's writings through introducing related aspects of these issues into his theoretical analysis of the state in Africa, and (ii) introduce into the literature in the social sciences in Africa, the theoretical discourse on 'political society', 'elite' and 'subaltern politics', as inspired by Chatterjee (2004), Chakrabarty (2001 and 2002) and other members of the subaltern studies research group in India. As will be illustrated shortly, Indian historiography engages the issues noted above within the domain of 'elite' and 'subaltern politics' and are widely represented in the works of Ranajit Guha, Shahid Amin, David Arnold, Gautam Bhadra, Partha Chatterjee, Dipesh Chakrabarty, David Hardiman, Gyanendra Pandey, Asok Sen, Tapati Guha-Thakurta and Sumit Sarkar. However, this study focuses mainly on aspects of the contributions made by Partha Chatterjee and Dipesh Chakrabarty in this direction. It begins by capturing the kernel of their arguments on these issues and explains how they further the development of similar theoretical explanations on the experiences and situations in Africa. First, let us follow Chatterjee's (2004: 27-51) arguments on 'populations and political society'.

Chatterjee (2004: 27–51) locates his contribution within the opposing themes of 'popular legitimacy' and 'elite control', which he describes as the perennial problem of democratic theory itself represented by the mediating concepts of 'community' and 'property', particularly as embedded in the conception of Indian democracy from the very beginning. He argues that far from being resolved, such problems have only taken new forms as a result of the on-going struggles between 'elite' and 'popular conceptions of democracy', which are being played out in the debates over democratic modernization in India. His major influences on the concepts of 'governmentality' and 'subaltern politics' are Michel Foucault and Antonio Gramsci respectively. According to him, a detailed understanding of the origins, context, development and mode of operation of the political society in Asia and Africa is best appreciated if we examine it in relation to the experiences in the West and see how it is shaped by the workings and operations of law and politics in these different societies. This, according to him is because, while philosophical discussions on the rights of citizens in the modern state have hovered around the twin concepts of 'liberty' and 'community', the emergence of mass democracies in the advanced industrial countries of the West in the twentieth century has also produced an entirely new distinction between 'citizens' and 'populations'.

Following Michel Foucault, Chatterjee (2004: 34) points out that a major characteristic of the contemporary regime of power is a certain 'governmentalization of the state', which does not necessarily secure legitimacy through the direct involvement of citizens in matters of the state, but by claiming to provide for the well-being of the population. He captures this in terms of the modern state's idea of 'looking after', and says the twentieth century has been marked by the triumphant advance of governmental technologies all of which promise to deliver more well-being to the governed at very low costs. He characterizes this period as one, which has witnessed a high increase in the welfarist role and functions of the state. In this type of state, the essence of enumerating and classifying population groups is mainly for the purpose of welfare administration, a purpose, which leads to the proliferation of censuses and demographic surveys, thus making the workings of governmentality accountable in terms of numbers and the idea of representation by numerical population a reality. He says, while the history of citizenship in the modern West moves from the institutions of civic rights in civil society to political rights in the fully developed nation-state, leading ultimately to the relatively recent phase where government from the social point of view develops and actually takes over, in Asia and Africa, the chronological sequence is quite different mainly because in these societies, the career of the state is being fore-shortened. In other words, unlike the experiences in the West in which the technologies of governmentality developed after the political consummation of the nations by the state, in Asia and Africa, Chatterjee maintains that the development of the technologies of governmentality predated the nation-state, particularly, given the long experience of colonial rule. Following Nicholas Dirks, he describes the colonial state as an 'ethnographic state', especially one, which reduced 'citizens' to 'subjects' and therefore negated rather than recognizing or enhancing popular sovereignty.

According to Chatterjee (2004: 37) given the implications of the manner of development of the technologies of governmentality under colonialism and the problematic context of 'popular legitimacy' and 'elite control', two sets of conceptual connections emerge in terms of 'citizen' and 'population-state relations' in Africa and Asia. One is the line connecting 'civil society' to the nation-state founded on popular sovereignty and granting equal rights to citizens. The other is the line, which connects 'populations' to governmental agencies and thus, pursues multiple policies of security and welfare. He says, while the first line points to a domain already described in great details in democratic political theory in the last century, the second line points to a different domain of politics, yet to be properly researched in details in Africa and Asia, which he calls 'the domain of political society'. In explaining his idea of the political society, Chatterjee (2004: 38) notes that:

In a series of papers, I have attempted to sketch out this conceptual field in the context of democratic politics in India.<sup>21</sup> I have favored retaining the old idea of civil society as bourgeois society, in the sense used by Hegel and Marx, and of using it in the Indian context as an actually existing arena of institutions and practices inhabited by a relatively small section of the people whose social locations can be identified with a fair degree of clarity. In terms of the formal structure of the state as given by the constitution and the laws, all of society is civil society; everyone is a citizen with equal rights and therefore to be regarded as a member of civil society. The political process is one where the organs of the state interact with members of civil society in their individual capacities or as members of associations.

He argues that in practice, this claim is far from being true. He contends that most Indians are only tenuously, ambiguously and contextually right-bearing citizens in the sense imagined by the constitution. In the actual sense, he says, they are far from being free, equal and proper members of civil society and are not regarded as such by the institutions of the state. This does not however suggest that they are outside the reach of the state or even excluded from the domain of politics. As populations within the territorial jurisdiction of the state, they have to be 'looked after' and 'controlled' by various governmental agencies. These activities bring these populations into a certain 'political relationship' with the state, which however, does not conform to what is envisaged in the constitutional depiction of the relation between the state and members of civil society. Nevertheless, these are doubtless political relations, which may have acquired in specific historically defined contexts, a widely recognized systematic character, and perhaps even conventionally recognized ethical norms, even if subject to varying degrees of contestation. From these, he asks, how are we to understand and explain these processes?

Given these situations, Chatterjee (2004: 39) observes that some studies and institutions, especially, international financial institutions, aid agencies and non-government organizations advocate the expansion of the idea of the civil society to include virtually all social institutions that lie outside the formal domain of the state. Presenting them as 'unscrupulously charitable theoretical gestures', he argues that by presenting every non-state organization as part of the associative endeavours of the civil society, such an approach makes us lose sight of other vital and continuously active projects, which still inform aspects of the state's institutions in countries like India in transforming traditional social authorities and practices into the modular forms of bourgeois society. In particular, he says, even though as an 'ideal', civil society continues to energize an interventionist political project, but as 'an actually existing political form', it is demographically limited. He says these facts must be borne in mind when considering the relationship between modernity and democracy in the countries of Africa and Asia. He captures this significant 'demographic limitation', 'representational

difference' and 'default in the reach of civil society' in what he calls 'a split' in the domain of politics between "an organised elite domain and an unorganized subaltern domain", a framework, which according to him, was used in the early phase of the subaltern studies project. According to Chatterjee (2004: 39–40):

The idea of the split, of course, was intended to mark a fault line in the arena of nationalist politics in the three decades before independence during which the Indian masses, especially the peasantry, were drawn into organised political movements and yet remained distanced from the evolving forms of the postcolonial state. To say that there was a split in the domain of politics was to reject the notion, common to both liberal and Marxist historiographies, that the peasantry lived in some "pre-political" stage of collective action. It was also being political, except that they were political in a way different from that of the elite. Since those early experiences of the imbrication of elite and subaltern politics in the context of the anti-colonial movements, the democratic process in India has come a long way in bringing under its influence the lives of the subaltern classes. It is to understand these relatively recent forms of the entanglement of elite and subaltern politics that I am proposing the notion of a political society.

He illustrates the operations of the political society in India by examining several case studies in recent field works and shows how a form of politics emerges after independence from the developmental policies of government aimed at specific segments of the state's population, mainly the elite. He says, having being marginalized from the material, survivalist and other developmental policies of the state, and also because they entirely lack the needed representation in the civil society, members of the political society are organized in informal associations and therefore often transgress the strict lines of legality in their struggles to work and earn a living. Some of them live in illegal squatter settlements; make illegal use of water or electricity and travel without tickets in trains and other means or modes of public transport. In dealing with them, Chatterjee (2004) argues that the authorities cannot ignore, incriminate or entirely demonize their actions and activities, since they are among the thousands of associations, which represent the groups of populations, whose livelihood and habitations involve the violation of the law. These agencies therefore deal with these associations not as bodies of citizens but as convenient instruments for the administration of welfare to marginal and underprivileged population groups.

On their part, even though members of these groups accept their activities as often illegal, contrary and non-compliant to good civic behaviour, yet, they make a claim to a habitation and a livelihood as a matter of right. In other words, they profess a readiness not only to quit their illegal survivalist activities, but also show the willingness of being rehabilitated. State agencies acknowledge that these economically unaccommodated population groups do have some claim on the welfare programmes of the government, but those claims could not be regarded as justifiable rights since

the state does not have the means of delivering the benefits of modernity to the entire population of the country. To treat those claims as rights would only invite further violation of public property and civic laws, yet, as citizens of the state, they are fundamentally matters of right, even though the state cannot justify and meet up with the expectations and demands, which they pose. This default on the part of the state therefore creates a situation and context in which these contradictory issues as well as opposing claims are negotiated on a political terrain where, on the one hand, governmental agencies have a public obligation to 'look after' the poor as well as the underprivileged and on the other hand particular population segments receive attention from those agencies according to (i) the varying calculations of political expediency, and (ii) according to the varying measure of threats, which they are able to pose on the existence of the state and its institutions. Members of the political society therefore pick their way through this uncertain terrain through making a large array of connections outside the group, with members of other groups in similar situations, hopefully, with more privileged and influential groups, with government functionaries, perhaps with political parties and society leaders. In the process, they often make instrumental use of their voting power during elections, thus creating recurring overlaps in the field and notions of citizenship and governmentality. In conclusion, Chatterjee (2004: 41) advances the argument that, in order to ameliorate the often disruptive and widely dysfunctional consequences, which the activities of these frustrated and alienated categories often generate, the civil society, hitherto restricted to a small section of culturally privileged and equipped citizens, must descend from its high, dispossessing platform and seek to accommodate members of the political society. This task, according to Chatterjee poses a major question on the legitimacy and relevance of the state not only in India, but also elsewhere in Africa and Asia.

We now examine Dipesh Chakrabarty's (2002) account of subaltern studies in India. He begins by examining its historical origins. Using Dirlik's (1996: 306) reading of subaltern studies, Chakrabarty (2002: 3–19) argues that most Western critics of Indian historiography fundamentally misjudge the subject matter and orientation of the country's post-colonial intellectual project. From this premise and without wishing either to inflate the claims of its scholars or to deny what they may, indeed, have learned from the British Marxist historians, he shows reasons why subaltern studies could never be a mere reproduction in India of the English tradition of 'writing history from below'. He locates the early development of this intellectual project within the debate in modern Indian history, which resulted largely from research and discussions in various universities mainly in India, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Australia in the period after British imperial

rule in August 1947. During this early phase, he says, this area of scholarship bore all the signs of an on-going struggle between tendencies affiliated with imperialist biases in Indian history and a nationalist desire on the part of historians in India to decolonize the past, among others, by mobilizing Marxism in aid of the nationalist project of intellectual decolonization. He presents A. R. Desai (1966), Anil Seal (1968), D. A. Low (1968), Bipan Chandra (1969) and Bernard S. Cohn's (1988) writings as some of the major inspirations for this debate and other controversial issues, which centred around Morris David Morris' assessment of 'the impact of British rule in India', and the writings of other scholars in the 1960s on 'the nature and results of colonial rule in India', among other issues. The vibrancy of this debate benefited immensely from two other provocatively engaged debates, namely, (i) the debate on 'barbarism' as either 'a stage' or 'a state' in African and South-Asian histories, and (ii) the controversial debate regarding the legitimacy of European rule in Africa and India. Chakrabarty (2002: 4) captures some of the questions raised by these critical debates:

Did the imperialist British deserve credit after all for making India a developing, modern, and united country? Were the Hindu-Muslim conflicts that resulted in the formation of the two states of Pakistan and India consequences of the divide-and-rule policies of the British, or were they reflections of divisions internal to South Asian society?

While this debate lasted, two schools of thought emerged in defence of the two contrasting positions. The first, which used official documents of the British colonial government of India as well as other entrenched traditions of 'imperial history writings', portrayed colonial rule as being beneficial to India and its people. It applauded the British for bringing to the sub-continent 'political unity', 'modern educational institutions', 'modern industries', 'a sense of nationalism', 'the rule of law' and so on. On the other hand, Indian historians in the 1960s, most of who had English degrees and belonged to a generation that grew up in the final years of British rule, challenged this view. They argued and presented colonialism as having had deleterious effects on cultural and economic development in India. They also claimed that modernity and the nationalist desire for political unity were not so much British gifts to India, but fruits of the struggles undertaken by the Indians themselves. Thus, colonialism and nationalism emerged as the two major areas of research and debate, which defined the field of modern Indian history, especially, in the 1960s and 1970s. At one extreme end of this debate was Anil Seal, the Cambridge historian, whose 1968 *Emergence of Indian Nationalism*, describes 'nationalism in India' as the work of a tiny elite reared in the educational



institutions established by the British in India, a group of elite, which according to Seal, 'competed' and 'collaborated' with the British in their adeptly astute quest for power and privileges. At the other extreme was Bipan Chandra, a famous Indian professor of history at the Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi. As reported by Chakrabarty (2002: 5–6):

Chandra and his colleagues saw Indian history of the colonial period as an epic battle between the forces of nationalism and those of colonialism. Drawing on both Marx's writings and Latin American theories of dependency and underdevelopment, Chandra argued that colonialism was a regressive force that distorted all developments in India's society and polity. The social, political, and economic ills of post-Independence India—including those of mass poverty and religious and caste conflict—could be blamed on the political economy of colonialism. However, he saw nationalism in a different, contrasting light—as a regenerative force, as the antithesis of colonialism, something that united and produced an "Indian people" by mobilizing them for struggle against the British. Nationalist leaders such as Gandhi and Nehru were the authors of such an anti-imperial movement for unity. Chandra claimed that the conflict of interest and ideology between the colonizers and the Indian people was the most important conflict of British India. All others—whether of class or of caste—were secondary to this principal contradiction and were to be treated as such in histories of nationalism.

However, according to Chakrabarty (2002: 6), by the 1970s, these contending schools on modern Indian history reflected two major difficulties:

It was clear that the Cambridge version of nationalist politics without ideas or idealism would never ring true to scholars in the subcontinent who had themselves experienced the desire for freedom from colonial rule.<sup>10</sup> On the other hand, the nationalist historian's story of there having been a "moral war" between colonialism and nationalism wore increasingly thin as research by younger scholars in India and elsewhere brought new material to light.

In particular, new information began to emerge on the mobilization of the poor by elite nationalist leaders in the course of Gandhian mass movements in the 1920s and 1930s, some of which suggested a strongly reactionary side to the Indian National Congress, the principal nationalist party. Notable individuals like Gyanendra Pandey at Oxford, David Hardiman and David Arnold at Sussex, both of whom later became members of the subaltern studies collective, Majid Siddiqi and Kapil Kumar in Delhi, Histesranjan Sanyal in Calcutta, Brian Stoddart, Stephen Henningham and Max Harcourt in Australia, all documented the ways in which nationalist leaders had suppressed with a heavy hand, peasants' or workers' tendency to transcend the self-imposed limits of the nationalist political agenda, mainly through protesting the oppression meted out to them not only by the British, but by the indigenous ruling groups as well. In other words, neither the Cambridge thesis, which propounded a skeptical view of Indian nationalism nor the nationalist-Marxist thesis, which glossed over the real issues underlining the conflict of ideas and interests between the elite

nationalists and their socially subordinated followers was an adequate response to 'the problems of post-colonial history writing in India'. To this were added 'the persistence of religious and caste conflict in post-independence India', 'the war between India and China in 1962, which undermined official nationalism', thereby motivating the fascination towards Maoism among many urban educated youths in India, as well as 'the outbreak of a violent Maoist political movement in India known as the Naxalite movement', which drew many urban youths into the countryside in the late 1960s and early 1970s. As later argued by these subaltern historians, 'all these' and 'a host of other factors' combined and alienated young historians from what Chakrabarty (2002: 7) describes as "the shibboleths of nationalist historiography". By the 1970s, this alienation was furthered by the rise of peasant studies in popular measures among Anglo-American academics.

From 1982, 'subaltern studies' provide a major platform for intervention in the prevailing situation, an intervention, which takes the form of a major paradigm shift. It began by challenging the colonial roots of Indian historiography, which it presented as a product of the colonial educational system. It posed a major critique to both the Cambridge and the nationalist schools of Marxist history, which were accused of being largely 'elitist'. They are seen and interpreted as having written the history of Indian nationalism as that of the sole achievement of the elites, thus leaving out the significant contributions made by the masses. In addition, Ranajit Guha, under whose intellectual leadership the project of subaltern studies developed, argued that both 'colonialism' and 'nationalism' were involved in instituting in India a rule of capital in which bourgeois ideologies exercised 'dominance' without 'hegemony' and that the resulting forms of power in India could not be termed 'pre-political'. Using the concept 'pre-political', Guha challenged what he called the 'all stagist theories of history' and insisted on an alternative intellectual project, in the form of 'subaltern studies', which actually represents the subaltern 'ordinary people' within the post-colonial historiography. In effect, therefore, 'subaltern studies' tries to align historical reasoning with larger movements for democracy in India. Looking for 'an anti-elitist approach', it aligns more with the idea of 'history from below' pioneered in English historiography by Christopher Hill, E. P. Thompson and Eric J. Hobsbawm. In terms of shared similarities, both 'subaltern studies' and the 'history from below' approaches are Marxist in inspiration; both owe a significant intellectual debt to Antonio Gramsci, especially, in terms of trying to move away from the deterministic reading of Marx, particularly as provided in Stalinism. In terms of differences, however, 'subaltern studies' as an intellectual project is fundamentally different from the English Marxist historiography in the following ways. One, subaltern historiography necessarily entails a relative separation of the history of power from

teleological and universalistic histories of capital. Two, it entails a critique of the nation form. And, three, it accommodates as well as encourages the interrogation of the relation between power and knowledge. Through these differences, the project of 'subaltern studies' established the beginnings of a new way of theorizing the intellectual agenda for post-colonial studies. Above all, the declared aim of subaltern studies is the production of historical analyses in which the subaltern groups are viewed, captured and represented as 'the subject of history'.

In conclusion, as an emergent intellectual project within the post-colonial theoretical narrations of Indian historiography, 'subaltern studies' questions both the colonialist as well as the nationalist imaginations of the country in the nineteenth century. It faults the claims of the Cambridge as well as other British and European schools of history on India and examines the history of nationalism in India not as an entirely homogenous historical reality, but according to the shifting axis, political demands and exigencies of the different peoples and periods. In this sense, 'subaltern studies' is not only about a history of difference, but more specifically about the peculiar historical situations and experiences of the ordinary, subaltern peoples in India. According to Sudipta Kaviraj (1992: 2) even though 'history writing' about Indian nationalism meant, for a long time, compiling in increasing detail accounts of those political events and developments, which constituted this complex fact:

In recent years historical thinking has tended to turn in some measure away from large, holistic, totalized histories of nationalism. The shift is expressed in several ways, and at the risk of excessive simplification we could say that historical attention has tended to turn from political history to cultural history, from events to discourses, and even inside the history of ideas from the content of nationalistic thought to a more sensitive understanding of its forms.

As such, far from being a homogenous object of historical enquiry, Indian and in deed, Third World nationalisms are best projected as a fundamental political object—a movement, a force, a party, an establishment, a cultural interest, an ideology and finally, a state—especially one, in the nature of which is the attempt to coerce enquiry about itself into an agenda constructed by it (Kaviraj, 1992: 1–39). In summing up the point of departure of the 'subaltern studies' intellectual project, Kaviraj (1992: 4) argues that:

it is important to break down the abstraction of the national movement itself, and of a large formation like the Congress, in order to see the politics that are constantly at play inside historical accounts. Even within a seemingly homogeneous history, it is often essential to ask whose history this is, in the sense of history *for* whom rather than history *of* whom, because there are changes in the telling. Within seemingly homogeneous history there are conflicts between tendencies, the axis and the periphery, the mainstream and the embarrassing fringe, the self and the other. From being the inheritor of one stream, albeit the major one, such a history takes a small, subtle, perhaps historically inevitable step towards claiming to be the inheritor of all.

It is therefore argued that until the intellectual history of anti-colonialism is fully compiled, the historical narration of colonialism will remain unfinished. The materials for writing this history are to be retrieved from several discrete disciplines—'the history of nationalism produced mainly by Marxist nationalist historians', 'political thought systematized by political scientists', 'rituals and folk customs reported by anthropologists', 'myths collected by ethnographers' as well as 'issues of subaltern concerns retrieved and collected by 'political sociologists', 'historians' and 'political economists'. From these sources, this history must be written mainly because, just as the material is different from the history, history is preceded by a theoretical question and so, must philosophically constitute as well as defend the object, the history of which it writes. Presenting this history as a necessary integrative force, Kaviraj (1992: 35) argues that:

Unless the people who are subjected to colonialism are seen to engage in such an enterprise which—despite evident internal differences between periods, between high and folk culture, between the great tradition and the small, between the anti-colonialists and the nationalists, between the radicals and the conservatives—is seen as one—as a single, whole, historical enterprise—its history cannot be written.

Applied to Africa, the fore-gone accounts drawn from India help us both in imagining the dynamics of 'the political society' and also in developing appropriate theoretical explanations on 'subaltern concerns' in the continent. Such insights also enable us further Ake's theory of the state in Africa, which as we noted, does not entail any theoretical representation of either 'the political society' or of 'subaltern studies' in the region. To be specific, the failure of the state to integrate, incorporate and absorb members of these groups into its economic system is at the heart of most of the conflicts and wars in post-colonial Africa. Two major sources are immediately noted in the development of the political society in Africa. The first was under colonialism, during which the colonial state through its policies and programmes changed the material conditions of the people leading to occupational, linguistic and territorial displacements in the existing social structures. This was compounded by the introduction of new complications in the ethnic minorities' and nationalities' question. The second is traced to those segments of the political community under colonialism, which although were mobilized and carried along during the struggle against imperial rule but were later marginalized and betrayed by the elites in the sharing of rewards and other benefits of independence.

In contemporary Africa, there are in deed new patterns of political participation, which are yet to be adequately represented in the literature. For example, in addition to the sphere of the state, civil

society or even the governing elite, there are also non-state as well as informal social actors which are devising various strategies to survive the nested crises of state action and policy, economic development and political legitimacy. Although some significant works exist on these and other issues of concern to the interests of the masses in Africa, such works are not presented in the context of 'the political society' or even of 'subaltern studies'. Falling outside the confines of civic constitutional regulations, the activities of these population groups are certainly of continued concern and therefore deserve to be represented in the literature. Yet, not enough has been done theoretically in capturing the harsh experiences of members of these population groups, a default found also in Ake. This is added to the widely elusive consensus on the epistemological status of the very idea of civil society in the literature on Africa (Obadare, 2004: 1-18). Thus, borrowing from the experiences in India, the notions of 'political society' and 'subaltern studies' offer acceptable theoretical constructs for understanding these noted developments in Africa. The aim is to introduce the social sciences community in Africa to a new domain of 'citizens-society relations', namely, the domain of 'the political society'.

#### **4.1.5 The State and the Challenges of Nationhood in Post-conflict Africa: Ake's Theory of Political Integration**

The fifth issue raised in Ake's analysis of the state centres on his account of the problem of political integration and the challenges of forging of nationhood in Africa. In discussing these issues, the section extends Ake's theory of political integration into a wider theory of forging nationhood in the continent. The aim is to revise his writings on these issues and therefore incorporate aspects of the contemporary challenges relating to multiculturalism, globalization and a host of other issues, which do not only undermine nationhood but also question the sovereignty of the state in these societies. As will be shown shortly, Ake limits his task in this regard to the explanation of the problem and possibilities of political integration in the 'new states' in Africa. Relatedly, a careful examination of his writings shows that his considerations of these issues are limited mainly, if not only to the colonial and the immediate post-independence periods in African, Indian, Pakistani, Ceylonese and South-Asian histories. In other words, much of what he establishes focus mainly on the enduring fissiparous impact or legacies of European colonialism on the integration and cohesion of these new states. This resulted largely from the fact that Ake's (1967: 1) study was developed mainly from an analysis of the problem of political integration in the new states to the more general question of the

capacity of such states for undertaking social change on a large scale and for withstanding the disruptive impact of such change. As we see in his writings, he defines 'the problem of political integration' as a summation of two other related problems, namely, "(a) How to elicit from subjects deference and devotion to the claims of the state, and (b) How to increase normative consensus governing political behavior among members of the political system". In essence, 'the problem of political integration', according to him 'is one of developing a political culture and of inducing commitment to it'. Applied to Africa, Ake (1967: 17) argues that:

The crucial problem of the postcolonial situation is the integration of the new nation which is threatened by strong centrifugal forces. The nationalist movement, invariably a coalition of ethnic, professional, religious, and social groups, tends to disintegrate with the elimination of imperial control. At the same time, the solidarity of the political leaders suffers partly because of differences in approach to the problems of administering and developing the country which now loom large. The optimistic psychological atmosphere characteristic of revolutions raises expectations to heights that the new government cannot possibly satisfy with the meager means at its disposal. The divergence of hopes and fulfillment tends to cause frustration and alienation.

Some people seek to compensate themselves for the frustrations of colonial oppression by enjoying their newly won freedom with exuberance; sometimes there is an almost pathological hatred for all forms of social and legal control. And all these tensions and cleavages arise in a period of rapid social change when, because many traditional usages are being abandoned and habituation to new ones is yet uncompleted, expectations in regard to roles and responses are temporarily confused. This is the chaotic situation faced by a new government with limited experience and yet to establish its legitimacy. The crucial problem is how to establish and maintain authority under such difficult conditions.

The result of this limitation is that much of the current challenges, which undermine the forging of nationhood in these societies, especially from the late 1980s up to the present times are neither captured nor discussed in Ake's account of the problem and possibilities of political integration in Africa. For example, the accounts of the recent wars and conflicts in Sudan, Zaire, Rwanda, Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea and a host of other post-conflict reconstruction efforts in these states are not found in his writings. This therefore leaves the vital question of forging nationhood in the problematic state-nations inherited from colonial-imperialism unresolved and unanswered in Ake. In addition, given his privileging of material conditions as the decisive formative influences on social life, one expects that he would have related his discussion of the problem of political integration in much greater details to other problematic economic considerations and experiences such as ethnicity and a host of other concerns, which interface 'equity', 'exclusion' and 'liberalization' in the region. This section takes on this challenge. It re-examines Ake's writings in the noted direction and extends his theory of political integration into a more comprehensive account on the possibility of forging nationhood in the continent. The section thus uses Ake's writings as the platform, pretext and entry point for raising other larger issues on the question of forging nationhood in post-conflict Africa,

This should enable us answer the following questions, (i) How relevant is Ake's theory of political integration in forging nationhood in contemporary Africa? (ii) What factors or forces undermine the forging of cohesive nations in the continent? (iii) What is the role of the state in Africa, especially a democratic African state in resolving past and present challenges militating against the forging of well-integrated nation-states in the continent? Lastly, (iv) what role can the state play in overcoming poverty, marginalization and also in realizing other developmental expectations of the people?

In answering these questions, the objectives are (i) to interrogate the transition from conflict to post-conflict situations in Africa and therefore provide concrete suggestions not only for consolidating democracy, justice and peaceful co-existence, but also for enhancing the prospects of economic development in the continent, (ii) to contribute to on-going debates regarding the very bases of conflict and post-conflict transitions within the context of Africa's changing experiences, (iii) to develop policy inputs capable of forestalling future regression to conflict through addressing the actual roots of conflict and post-conflict consolidation, and lastly (iv) analyzing the ideological content, character and trends of externally-induced policies, which advocate the reconstruction of war-damaged economies by depending entirely on market-based economic reforms. The significance of this study is hinged against the backdrop of many African countries having passed through rather destructive civil wars. In this connection, the imperative of post-cold war reconstruction of fractured polities, damaged economies, divided societies and the entire process of healing old wounds remain writ large on the continent. Hence the need for detailed studies of post-conflict shifts and transitions in the continent with a view to arriving at concrete options, possibilities and prospects for forging nationhood across such fractured and disintegrated societies. And, given the context and implications of the post-cold war civil wars in West Africa, especially as the situations in Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and Cote d' Ivoire illustrate, a regime of ecological stresses, widespread socio-economic problems, identity politics, episodes of unrest and pressures for democratization have been provoked and intensified in these states. These experiences suggest the need to critically examine the changing dynamics of politics and conflict not only within this sub-region, but also in the larger continent in addition to an examination of the roles played by various local, national, regional and international actors and agencies in negotiating the post-conflict transition towards post-war reconstruction, peace and development.

Added to the generation of new ideas regarding the nature of the state and civil society interactions, the study should enable us answer the following questions, (i) How do we establish the guarantee

against future regression to conflict in Africa? (ii) How can a system of participatory democracy that empowers the people and gives them an effective choice be institutionalized in the continent? (iii) How can the state and civil society address emerging concerns for reconciliation, demilitarization, disarmament, rehabilitation and reintegration in a continent faced with wars and a host of other daunting political, developmental and security challenges? Lastly, (iv) what options abound for reconciling the demands of market concerns with the welfare roles and obligations of a democratic state?

To these ends, the study examines the accounts of other scholars whose writings complement and introduce new dimensions to the issues raised in Ake's analysis of the problem and possibilities of political integration in the continent. For example, A. H. Somjee (1984) offers additional illustrations on the problem of political integration in Africa, Gyanendra Pandey and Peter Geschiere (2003) provide some theoretical insights on the forging of nationhood, the contest over citizenship, ethnicity and the question of history writing in the countries of the South generally, while Mahmood Mamdani (2003) and Cyril Obi (1999) examine more recent accounts of these issues in the African context. Somjee (1984) emphasizes the relevance of liberal political institutions in achieving the expectations of political integration in Africa and South-Asia. He uses the term 'liberal political institutions' to suggest the institutionalization of what he calls 'give and take' or 'accommodationist' socio-economic and political strategies for keeping historically different peoples and heterogeneous groups together without necessarily accentuating the extant inequalities, differences and contradictions between and among them, which are capable of militating against peaceful as well as ordered co-existence. He discusses this by comparing the state in the South with the matured experiences of the state in the West. According to Somjee (1984: 1), in capturing the operational difference between these two states-systems, we must note that:

In marked contrast to the experiences of the developing countries, which set up their political institutions during the short period of decolonisation following the Second World War, the mature democracies of the West took two to three centuries to develop the operational efficiency and durability of their political institutions. And what is more, along with such a development, they also evolved the requisite political capacity and political skill to sustain and operate their political institutions and repel the periodic infractions against them.

In the countries of the West, the liberal political institutions developed along with, and as a result of, the growth of capitalism. Capitalism's modernising thrust and its search for increased profits forced the Western European societies to change their legal and political institutions and allow maximum entrepreneurial activity with minimum political restriction. Consequently, the major social and economic historians of European societies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, such as Marx, Weber, Sombart, Tonnies, Michels, Tawney, Lukacs and Moore, were inclined to treat the growth of institutional changes as the handiwork of history and its impersonal forces rather than the work of men. To these thinkers, however, the role of ideas and the direction given by creative thinkers and influential statesmen was also important. But these latter became significant to the extent to which they catalysed and released certain historical forces to shape the direction of human institutions and



processes. Consequently, for these thinkers the problem of sustaining newly created institutions did not arise. For them the historical forces which created such institutions also sustained them. When a different set of impersonal historical forces appeared on the scene, they either reshaped the existing institutions or created new ones. The relationship thus conceived was between historical forces and institutions rather than between men, in or out of office, and institutions.

Focusing on Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka in South-Asia, Saudi Arabia and Turkey in the Middle East, Brazil, Argentina and Mexico in Latin America as well as Kenya and Nigeria in Africa, Somjee (1984: 125-185) provides an account of the problem of political integration in the South and defines it as entailing the ability of these states to:

mobilise people out of the ascriptive groups to which they are born, into the wider political society to acquire a say in decision-making which affects their interests and well-being; build a political organisation and leadership which cuts across ethnic, religious and regional divides; increasingly involve a growing number of people in the political process so as to secure effectively the responsiveness and accountability of those who govern them; and, finally, operationally learn the political skills of building accommodations, give and take, consensus and normative-pragmatic balance in policy decisions and in political conduct in general.

Somjee (1984: 126–139) explains the problem of political integration in Pakistan in terms of the country's inability to develop a truly modern state system, which could sustain her constituent assembly, provide civilian control over the bureaucracy and army, periodically mandate political authority by means of an uncontroverted electoral process, build the political process to channelize conflict into a clash of perspectives, opinions and interests, mould and remould consensus in the face of a diversity of demands, and above all work these out within a broader and commonly shared normative-pragmatic process of politics. He identifies the continued traditional claims of Islam, which directly impinge upon non-religious matters as well as the exploitation of religious sentiments by politicians and soldiers as being of considerable significance to an understanding of the problem of building a cohesive political system in the country. Other issues of problematic character in this regard according to him, include, (i) the failure of the country to limit the teachings of Islam to the realm of norms and ideals and develop a more realistic and pragmatic approach to politics, (ii) the lack of well-established or entrenched political institutions, (iii) the distortion of the political process, which results from the conflictual rather than harmonized style of politics practiced by various leaders who came into power, coupled with constant interference by the bureaucracy and the army, all of which have prevented Pakistan from developing a legitimate political process into which the best energies of socially concerned individuals could flow, as well as (iv) the entrenched

legacy of Islam, which generates deep conflict among non-Muslim populations. According to Somjee (1984: 139–140):

From its inception, Pakistan was confronted by problems of national integration which were unprecedented among the developing countries. She began as a country whose two parts were divided by a geographical distance of more than a thousand miles, by language, culture and above all that complex group of sentiments which make all the difference to success or failure in social coexistence. The makers of Pakistan had hoped that the cohesive force of common religion, together with the presence of a big neighbour, India, would help to forge new bonds of coexistence. But that did not materialise. The divisive forces were intensified by selfish economic policies,<sup>15</sup> which seemed to favour the western segment as against the eastern, by the failure to appreciate the depth of sentiment associated with language, frequent spells of military rule and their excesses, and above all by the inability to develop and nourish a new political society, which, by means of its own political process, and also awareness of crucial dos and don'ts, could have sustained and strengthened the fragile bond between Pakistan's two segments.

He explains the emergence of the state of Bangladesh as a product of Pakistan's failure to pursue a political process based on the reciprocal spirit of give and take as well as mutual accommodation. He says even though they both coexisted together for nearly a quarter of a century, the stresses and strains between the two segments eventually undermined the attempts at concessions and adjustments, such that the birth of Bangladesh as a new nation in 1971 ended all hopes for possible political accommodation in the future. Yet, neither Pakistan nor Bangladesh has been able to establish an effective political process, involving the needed political skill for accommodation as well as for finding appropriate political solutions to a wide range of disagreements and conflicts in perspective, will and interests. Fighting for the rights of East Pakistan, he says, Bangladesh as an independent state resulted from the political movement spearheaded by students, the urban elites and politicians against the Pakistani state and its army. Somjee (1984: 142) however concedes that if its elite improve upon its accommodationist political skill, Bangladesh has the potential of becoming a truly liberal political system:

Such a political elite has a deep commitment to liberal values and will eventually build an effective political society to sustain liberal institutions and procedures. But before it evolves into such a position it will have to learn the dos and don'ts of the operational side of the political process. For such a process involves not merely commitment to certain liberal values but also a willingness to compromise, subordinate and enter into concerted political action with the spirit of give and take to achieve political results. In other words, the elite may have to moderate its fiercely uncompromising individualism which often makes concerted liberal democratic operations impossible.

From 1948, the period marking its independence, Sri Lanka has emerged as one of the countries in South-Asia with well established and sustained liberal political institutions. According to Somjee (1984: 143):

Sri Lanka enjoys the highest literacy rate among the Third World countries. In 1974 her literacy rate was more than 82 per cent. Similarly she has enjoyed universal adult suffrage since 1931, probably the longest ever among the developing countries. Her voter turn-out in 1970 was 85 per cent. The growing political skill of her political elite, able to evolve consensus on broad policy issues—despite hard bargaining, delays and political brinkmanship on the part of competing social and political forces—has earned her the respect of scholars, statesmen and international organisations.

All these, according to Somjee (1984: 143) are best understood in terms of the country's social and political history, her ethnic, religious and linguistic divisiveness as well as the accommodationist political process, policies and strategies of its elite. Historically, the country's succession of invasion began with the Chola rulers of South India, which conquered and occupied the island in the eleventh century, giving rise to the separate kingdom of the Tamils in Jaffna, in the north from the thirteenth to the seventeenth century. This was followed by the Portuguese, the Dutch and finally the British. Under each of these foreign occupations, Buddhism as a religion, culture and social organization suffered considerably despite its survival in a hostile environment. After independence, the tide of Buddhist revivalism and its association with the state and politics could not be stemmed, whatever the commitment to secular and radical political life. Hence, the upsurge of Buddhism in the 1950s and its consequent influence on public policy created another dynamics of problems between the Hindu and Muslim minorities. As Somjee (1984: 144) observes, this is added to the fact that:

Despite the early introduction of universal suffrage, a number of influential politicians sought to organise their own support on ethnic and religious lines, i. e., Singhalese, Tamil, Moor (Muslim), Burgher (mixed), etc. Secular minded politicians resisted such an attempt but were finally forced to resort to it. This in turn created new problems for Sri Lanka's liberal political society.

Religion, especially Buddhism among other social attributes and features therefore plays a very significant mobilizational role in the politics of Sri Lanka. Far from being only a source of inspiration and norms of justice, equality and humanity—all to be realized in 'practice' by means of appropriate dialogue, educational process, social movements and public policy—religion is a strong political force for mobilizing supporters for whichever political party promises favourable terms. On the question of ethnicity and its conflictual nature in relation to politics, Somjee (1986: 146) submits that:

The ethnic composition of Sri Lanka is difficult to identify for two reasons. First, in Sri Lankan society there is no commonly accepted referent for identifying social hierarchy, as is the case with *varna*<sup>28</sup> in the Indian caste system. Secondly, while Buddhism did not totally eliminate the caste system in Sri Lanka, it did reduce the sharpness of its differences.

The caste groups in Sri Lanka, nevertheless, do become a significant factor in society, economy, employment, education, election and politics in general. Some of the prominent caste groups are as follows: Goyigama (further split into Kandyan and the low country); Karava (engaged in fishing, carpentry and coconut cultivation); Salagama (cinnamon-peeling); Durava (toddy tapping). These castes stand in a lateral rather than subordinate relationship with each other.<sup>29</sup> Then there are Hena (washers); Huna (lime-burners); Berava (drummers); and Navanadanna (goldsmiths). At the bottom end are Rodiya, Vahumpara and Batgan. While the leadership and the bulk of electoral support of the two major political parties, i. e. UNP and SLFP come from the Goyigama caste, their success in winning elections often depends on building a patchwork of support structure with other castes. This they can do by nominating men whose castes may have maximum following in the constituency and who are also likely to appeal to the other castes. In that respect the role of the two lower castes such as Vahumpara and Batgan, along with their numerical strength, becomes quite significant. Even the left-wing political parties such as the CP and the LSSP deliberately concentrate their appeal on the lower castes.

Added to these are other significant influences, which include the effective role played by the extended family system in the politics of Sri Lanka.

To sum up on South Asia, as Jeyaratnam Wilson and Dennis Dalton (1982) observe, the South-Asian sub-region presents a very disturbing mosaic, 'a congeries of artificial administrative entities' left behind by the imperial powers. Before independence in August 1947, India was one state, only to become two with the creation of Pakistan. Even after this, India's integration was further threatened by the lapse and other continuing legacies of British paramountcy in the region. In 1971, Pakistan became two states with the secession of its East wing and the birth of the Republic of Bangladesh. Thus, under the present circumstances, it is difficult to 'say' what the future holds for the various groups, the breaking away and separatist factions in the region. As questioned by Wilson and Dalton (1982):

How long will the fragile unity last? What are the impediments to national unity? Can political secession be contained by constitutional designs that can satisfy the aspirations of discontented groups? To what extent does the presence of the two super-powers, as well as interest in the region on the part of Britain and the People's Republic of China, prevent further balkanisation or maintain greater coherence? Can India play a role which can fortify the *status quo*? Or will India itself suffer disintegration with the collapse of a centralising leadership? From still another perspective, can a viable political alternative to centralised government emerge in South Asia short of balkanisation or disintegration? Can there be a legitimate basis for a highly decentralised system of government in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka?

Focusing on Saudi Arabia and Turkey, Somjee (1984: 149-159) argues that in the countries of the Middle East, in spite of their widely acknowledged diversity, certain unifying political characteristics

are still identifiable. One, he says given the all-pervasive claim to obedience made in the name of Islam as well as the cultural and historical problems of accepting political opposition as intrinsic aspects of democratic culture, these societies are largely characterized by 'the difficulty of creating and sustaining a questioning political system'. The second is 'the absence of any demarcation or limit in the role and scope of Islam as a religion and other aspects of life, especially political life'. These features have been central historical signifiers of this region from time immemorial down to the days of Napoleon during which Arab reformers in Egypt, Turkey and North Africa tried to introduce liberal conceptions of politics as well as institutions of government into the region obviously with insignificant success. According to Somjee (1984: 149–150):

In some of those societies, despite efforts by scholars from Turkey, Egypt and Tunisia to redefine and restrict the role of religion and the scope of appeal to it in legal, political and economic matters, the bulk of these countries have neither succeeded in stimulating a public debate nor in obtaining formal acknowledgements for defining arenas and jurisdictions. In some of those societies, ironically, the search intensifies for the purest form of Islamic fundamentalism at a time when the forces of modernisation are irreversibly transforming their lifestyle. This has given rise to a situation in which religion, instead of becoming a source of normative inspiration, is being transformed, at least in theory, into the foundation of all other subsystems of society, i. e. political, educational, legal and economic. In practice, however, these subsystems ... inhibit the growth of an effective political society where the individual would acquire the role of a citizen and claim a share in decision-making and responsibility from those who wield public authority.

In conclusion, he says these societies are stubbornly characterized by 'informal uninstitutionalized political processes', in which a distinct legal and political statehood with a corresponding role for the citizen in the political system—where individuals are induced to enter from their ascriptive groups and involve themselves in a variety of legitimate political roles—failed to develop and their place was taken by a variety of shifting groups and power alliances. As noted by Clifford Geertz, cited in Somjee (1984: 153):

Structure after structure—family, village, clan, class, sect, army, party, elite, state—turns out when more narrowly looked at, to be an *ad hoc* constellation of miniature systems of power, a cloud of unstable micropolitics, which compete, ally, gather strength, and very soon over extend, fragment again.

Thus, the official business of politics is transacted in these societies based mainly on personalities rather than structures and institutions with the result that governance is conducted not according to duly constituted procedures, but according to idiosyncratic and other personality approaches, favours, marriages, and individual actors seeking the enhancement of their personal ambitions

follow and exploit the pragmatic dictates of political survivability rather than being committed to abstract norms and objective ideals of democratic politics.

In Latin America, with the exception of Colombia, Costa Rica, Venezuela and a few others, which have relatively strong liberal traditions of politics, most of the remaining countries are heir to their Iberic-Latin tradition of peculiar state-society relations, a tradition whereby society is organized on the lines of vast groups and corporations, such as parties, unions, the army, the church and other professions, all of which are different from the Anglo-Saxon liberal tradition and therefore require a corporatist analysis to understand the intricacies of their operation. Somjee (1984: 169-180) captures what he calls "the dominance of the centralist tradition", "informal political groups", "an extraordinary role of the state", "periodically manipulated populism" and "a corporative system" as major attributes of these states. Illustrating his notion of the centralist tradition, Somjee (1984: 169-170) observes that:

When compared with the countries of the West, the political societies of Latin America have been shaped by the *four absences*. They are: absence of feudal experience; absence of religious non-conformity; absence of a specific period of industrial revolution; and absence of those ideological currents associated with the French Revolution.<sup>84</sup> The other set of forces which have influenced the countries of Latin America are pre-industrial bureaucratisation and urban culture. Together they have been responsible for the unmistakable centralist tradition in Latin America. And because of the peculiar character of Spanish colonial administration some of the major revolutions in Western history did not touch the people of Latin America. Since independence, the Latin American countries have looked more and more to the liberal traditions of Britain, France and United States. But while these latter influenced some of their political ideals, the essential centralist tradition nevertheless continued.

Thus, given their legacy of Iberic-Latin organicist corporatism, these countries and in particular Brazil, Argentina and Mexico have a political idiom that is different from those that are influenced by the Anglo-Saxon liberal political traditions. In these countries, for instance, far from being the individual, the effective units of politics are the vast 'corporations', which include the party, union, church and the army among others, thus emphasizing the corporate character of such bodies as central in understanding the workings of politics in these societies.

In Africa, Somjee (1984: 159-169) explains the problem of political integration in terms of the challenges encountered in building a political system capable of 'sustaining' the newly established as well as highly vulnerable institutions inherited by the state under colonialism. According to Somjee (1984: 159) Kenya and Nigeria are instructive illustrations of this problem mainly because:

these two countries furnish us with the most significant examples of the problems involved in establishing multiracial, multiethnic and multireligious societies; developing within their framework political skills of give and take and accommodation; and striking a workable balance between what is desirable and what is possible in their political life in general. In such an exercise they have not always been successful, but they have gradually matured politically and have been able to bring about accommodations and balances between conflicting claims and interests with an increasing degree of effectiveness.

However, despite the efforts directed towards developing accommodationist political strategies, the state in this continent has witnessed some of the most serious challenges undermining the attempts at forging nationhood among all the countries of the South. Examples of such challenges include the struggles for the secession of Katanga in Zaire, 1964-1966 and Biafra in Nigeria, 1967-1970, which had ethnic colourations and very strong violent contents; the 30-year Eritrean war of independence and the protracted conflict in Sudan with all its ethno-regional features. In Mauritania, ethno-racial violence erupted in 1966, 1979, 1986 and 1989 in relations between the Moors and the blacks (Nnoli 1995: 1). Between 1982 and 1987 a fierce ethnic war raged in the Matabeleland province of Zimbabwe, while between 1958 and 1960 ethnic conflict in Cote d' Ivoire manifested itself in Sanwi irredentism and the Gagnoa massacre of 1974 (Nnoli 1995). In Uganda, ethnic violence of one form or another raged intermittently from 1966 to 1995. In Kenya, the assassination of Tom Mboya in 1969 led to open protest and violence between the Luo and Kikuyu ethnic groups, while in 1972 the failed attempt by the Hutu in Burundi to seize power in June led to violent vendetta against them by the Tutsi ruling group, which lasted till September of the same year. This violence exacerbated the reprisals in Rwanda by the incumbent Hutu against their Tutsi counterparts and was compounded in 1994 by the genocide in Rwanda. All these informed Nyong'o's (2004: 11) observation that:

The question of integrating conflicting ethnic and regional identities into the new nations presented a particular sense of urgency in view of what had happened in Katanga between 1960 and 1964, the problem of bringing the Buganda Kingdom under Uganda national constitutional frameworks, conflict between Northern and Southern Sudan, the Arab-African differences in Zanzibar and so on.

Added to these was the series of military coups, which occurred in 1965 in Benin—then Upper Volta, the Central African Republic, followed by Ghana, Nigeria and Congo in 1966. Hence, according to Oyeleye Oyediran (2000: 12), "The early entry of the military into African politics soon after independence, and in particular the coups of 1966 and the civil war of July

1967 to January 1970 in Nigeria opened up our eyes to the need to understand contradictions and conflict".

These developments also suggested 'instability' and 'conflict' as the popular catchwords with which the political scene in Africa was to be understood (Post and Vickers 1973). Much recently, the situations have been compounded by the ethnic clashes in the Kenyan Rift Valley, the conflict in Nigeria's oil-rich Niger Delta region, the resurgence of Zanzibari separatism in Tanzania (Suberu, 2000: 124), the secession of Eritrea and Somaliland from Ethiopia and Somalia respectively, the crisis in the southern region of Darfur, the insurgencies in Angola, Cote d' Ivoire and Liberia, the civil war in northern Uganda and the humanitarian crisis resulting there from—all of which represent some of the most violent flash points in the continent.

Using a political economy approach, Cyril I. Obi (1999: 47-69) captures the question of 'scarcity and competition for resources' as a major threat undermining political integration in Africa. In explaining this, he focuses on the conflict in Nigeria's Niger Delta region as well as the civil war in Sudan and relates the problem with what he calls "resource wars" and a host of other issues, which interface the complex linkage between population, resource insecurity and conflict in Africa. His quest is to liquidate the thesis that rapid population growth, beyond the limits of "the carrying capacity of the ecosystem or resource-threshold" generates stress and ultimately provokes conflict. In articulating his position, Obi (1999: 48-49) begins with two observations. One, that resource and environmental struggles play a significant role in defining conflict in the continent. This is particularly so since the adoption of structural adjustment programmes in most African countries in the 1980s and the end of the East-West Cold War, during which the continent witnessed a sustained trend towards resource wars and environmental conflict (Obi 1997). According to Obi (1999: 48):

It has been noted, for example, that environmental factors and the struggle for resources were hidden but critical elements in the following conflicts: Ogoni versus Shell, the Sudanese civil war and the Rwandan civil war (Renner 1996). Other instances abound of disputes over ecosystems or renewable resources that are shared by different communities, ethnic groups and countries. Examples include the communal clashes between the Ijaw and Ijaje, and those involving neighbouring communities over land in the oil-rich Niger delta, the quarrels between Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan over the waters of the Nile, and that between Senegal and Mauritania after the damming of the river Senegal (Timberlake 1985).

His second observation focuses on the contribution to conflicts by the population or demographic factor, which he explains as depending on the extent to which it is responsible for resource scarcities and environmental stress. This touches on how questions of causations, values and social relations can be posed in terms of the population-resource conflict nexus. In this regard, while some point at



the connection between the stress put on shrinking renewable resources by rapidly growing populations and the outbreak of violent conflicts, along with grave security implications (Obi, 1999: 48), others seek the answer in the interaction between economy and the ecology, the structural roots of degradation, and the global relations of power, which define resource use and its distribution. According to Obi (1999: 49):

Whichever way it is viewed, the population variable is critical to understanding and overcoming resource insecurity and conflict in Africa, as it approaches the twenty-first century. Yet, it is important to note that the population factor by itself cannot explain conflict in Africa. It is only through the interaction of the 'population' with 'nature', in a series of complex processes touching on issues of production, access, rights, power, equity and sustainability, that we can begin to come to grips with the interface between natural resources and politics. This in turn defines the social contestants for the control of resources.

He concedes that the relationship between the population-conflict nexus is not simple to construct and argues that a good deal depends on an understanding of the sociology of ideas, which poses the problem as a demographic trap, rather than focusing on the actual roots of resource-conflict as well as its linkages with the economic and political system, international actors and the question of access to power over resources. These he says should enable one to reconstruct the population-conflict argument, through critiquing the orthodox population discourse as a means for reaching the real roots of conflict. From these, he presents resource conflict in Africa, not only as a function of rapidly exploding population, but as the product of the struggles between socially defined groups for the control of the use and distribution of resources (Obi, 1999: 53–54). According to Obi (1999: 54) three instructive caveats, which consummate the understanding of this argument, must be entered at this juncture:

capitalism, through the state and the turning of Africa's resources into commodities, blocks the rights and access of Africans to these resources; these resources are subject to the imperatives of globally-led commodity production, commodity exchange and accumulation of capital; and the ever expanding logic of global capital places a premium on profit, without regard to ecological considerations (Saurin 1996: 86).

According to him, while not denying the risks created by the high population growth rates alongside dwindling economic resources, growing poverty and deepening economic crises, the debate must also take into account the often ignored but real threat posed to Africa's resources from a small fraction of mankind located in the industrialized North who are adeptly cornering the continent's natural wealth while also blaming its victims for being poor and promiscuous. He indicts the state in Africa not only as a central accomplice in this injustice, but as a central perpetrator and actor in the

contradictory interface between population and resources, especially being itself a creation and function of capital, with its hegemonic classes—all of which are aligned to global capital for the local accumulation of capital. According to Obi (1999: 56–57), given its nature as the captive of a coalition of social forces whose interactions broadly reflect the social relations of conflict:

The state and the social classes that define its hegemony intervene directly in the African ecosystem at the behest of global, national and local capital. The state promotes an agenda to turn the continent's resources into commodities, by guaranteeing the broad conditions for the accumulation of capital. Its penchant for technical, capital-intensive solutions to environmental problems end up by worsening these problems, which its unsustainable practices largely brought about in the first place. In its bid to defend the transformation of Africa's resources into commodities for the global market, the state intensifies oppressive social relations, which worsen existing ethnic tensions. It resorts to violence, coercion and divide and rule tactics, to break the blocking power of the alienated and dispossessed. The economic role of the state and its pervasive intervention in all spheres of African society underscore the extent to which it controls access to and distribution of resources, to the exclusion of the majority of the population.

It is therefore clear that resource scarcities in Africa are products of the subordination of the continent to the global system of capitalist exploitation, the character of the state and also of the subordination of local needs and markets to the demands and operations of the global markets. Conflict thus becomes inevitable, especially in situations where the threshold of extraction, degradation and repression directly threaten the basis of the population's survival. Hence the need to replace the self-complacent explanations, which blame resource wars in Africa on the continent's high population growth rates, with more critically balanced attempts to interrogate and expose the role of political and economic inequities together with external economic agents in causing these scarcities. In conclusion Obi (1999: 65-66) recommends the following, (i) that the structural roots, which provoke conflict must be exposed and addressed, (ii) that production and distribution-based inequities, which worsen the stresses and engender conflict must be eliminated, (iii) that all aspects of social life should be democratized followed logically with the realignment of the currently skewed power relations in a manner that effectively puts power in the hands of the toiling people, (iv) that the dominant economic system should be transformed with a view to halting the massive export of resources from Africa, and (v) that the definition of sustainable economic development must abandon the idea that unbridled market forces can rationally allocate resources in Africa.

Another instructive account of the problem of political integration in Africa is found in Mahmood Mamdani (2003: 227-270). Focusing on Rwanda, he captures this problem in terms of what he calls 'the Bahutu-Batutsi question' and locates the colonial state in Equatorial Africa as the context from which he illustrates the distinctive aspects of Rwandan history, especially in relation to how

colonialism through the colonial state created and consolidated not just "the force of tradition", but also the tradition of force". According to Mamdani (2003: 229):

While most colonies were organised as polyglot formations—with a central civil authority and a constellation of district-based customary authorities, each with a distinct ethnic identity—in Rwanda district authorities did not correspond to ethnic powers. Instead, the Batutsi were like a layer of cream spread over the entire society, administering a subject peasantry, the Bahutu. To understand the difference, one needs to grasp the distinctive nature of the process of state formation in Rwanda.

He makes three significant observations regarding the peculiar nature of ethnic configuration and inter-group relations in Rwanda. One, that Bahutu and Batutsi are bipolar identities reproduced by a form of the state, which institutionalized them as such. In this relationship, first shaped by the pre-colonial Rwandan state itself but fully crystallized and later consolidated by the colonial state, the Batutsi came to be identified with power and Bahutu with subjecthood. Two, that despite its limitations, the social revolution of 1959, which reverted this relationship, was a subaltern revolt similar to the Mau Mau insurrection in colonial Kenya and the Zanzibari Revolution of 1963. Three, that the search for a solution to the problem in Rwanda must incorporate three persuasive insights, namely, (i) the idea of bringing the perpetrators of the genocide to book as a way of forestalling its future occurrence, (ii) the establishment of a broad-based government, which incorporates all groups willing to renounce violence, including 'the Hutu power', followed by (iii) the entronement of institutional reforms in the state in a manner that accommodates voices and representations from below. He contends that a detailed interrogation of Rwandan history is important in this connection, not just because it establishes the actual origins of the Batutsi in relation to the Bahutu, but mainly because it helps us to see how through their coming together certain political institutions were created, which outlived that history and shaped a tragic future, which remains the issue at dispute. According to Mamdani (2003: 234):

The key political institution forged through their contact was the pre-colonial Rwandan state. It established a double domination, of a pastoralist aristocracy over a subject peasantry, and of Batutsi over Bahutu and Batwa. While the question of the historical origin of the Batutsi is shrouded in mystery, that of the nature of the state they built is not.

Being a highly centralized political system, pre-colonial Rwanda defined all rulers and subjects as belonging to either of the two distinct classes of pastoralist and agriculturalist. Within this hierarchized structure, the kings, which were considered as both noble and divine were all Batutsi, in

addition to being army commanders, leaving the Bahutu to the lower ranks of the administrative hierarchy. However, while these differences were accommodated in the pre-colonial period through the institution of the *Kwihutura*—an arrangement in pre-colonial Rwanda through which the rare and exceptional Muhutu could renounce and shed *Hutu*ness and achieve the political status of a Mututsi—and were prevented from translating fundamentally into a caste-like distinction, under colonialism, particularly under the Belgians, this flexibility was removed leading to the freezing of the differences between and among members of these distinct ethnic groups. This reorganization of power in colonial Rwanda—through the abolishment of the previous trinity system of chieftainship and the fusion of hitherto differentiated powers into a single agent or agency is important in understanding the contemporary regime of genocide and conflict in the country. In deed, as argued by Rene Lemarchand (1970: 119–120) cited in Mamdani (2003: 237):

the old balance of forces between cattle chiefs, land chiefs and army chiefs, which in previous times had served to protect the [Ba] Hutu peasantry against undue exactions was abolished. This concentration of powers in the hands of a single chief, exercising unfettered control over his people, was bound to lead to abuses: not only did it deprive the Hutu of opportunities to play one chief off against another, but it also eliminated the channels of appeal offered by the previous arrangement.

These were later consummated with the dismissal of all Bahutu chiefs in the lower cadres of the colonial administration and their replacement by those classified as Batutsi. In addition, Belgium's harsh colonial domination was supported, articulated and translated by the Batutsi chiefs, so much so that hundreds of thousands of Bahutu peasants fled into Uganda in the decade after 1928 to take up jobs as migrant labourers in the coffee farms of Buganda. As Mamdani (2003: 238) puts it:

At first, the colonial power found it convenient simply to pass on every demand—say, the upkeep of roads—to 'customary' chiefs so that they used their 'customary' prerogative to get the job done, without payment and with a minimum disruption of order. The chiefs also found it convenient to add their own demands to this list of 'customary' exactions. So the list grew. The land tax-*butake*-traditionally said to be one day in every five, was increased by chiefs to two or even three days in every six. Soon, this was supplemented by other forms of *corvee* which had never before existed, such as an obligation to construct chiefs' houses from durable materials.

These developments according to Mamdani (2003), under laid the historical structure of the Rwandan state under colonialism. After independence, he says far from being assuaged, the same contradictions rather besmirched the nature of inter-group relations in much more antagonistic proportions and therefore undermined Bahutu access not only to the state but also to other vital aspects of the socio-economic life of the society largely through Batutsi manipulation and

domination of the electoral, constitutional mechanisms and the state's apparatuses of violence. These situations and experiences of dominance and exploitation have in turn generated unlimited resistance and reactions, which led to the 1994 genocide experience. In conclusion, Mamdani's (2003: 246) illustrations help us to understand the problem of political integration in Rwanda in terms of what he describes as a stubborn challenge:

To break out of this notion of the state as a representation of a permanently defined majority is the challenge. For any society to continue to exist, democratic competition—whether party-driven or not—presumes the existence of an order based on the consent, not of a majority, but of all. If political competition is not destructive of life, all those who participate in it—whether they win or lose—must accept the rules of the game. The creation of a consensus based political community must precede the adoption of any majority driven political competition. Failure to learn this lesson will place Rwanda once again in a state of permanent tension. How to move from an order based on conquest to one based on consent is the challenge for Rwanda today.

In conclusion, this section has attempted a revision of Ake's theory of political integration in Africa. The aim as we noted earlier, is to extend his theoretical account of the problem of political integration and thus incorporate aspects of the contemporary challenges and developments, which have taken place in this regard through examining the writings of other scholars on this crucial problem. As was illustrated, although its forms and manifestations are varied, the problem of political integration is in deed a widespread and much serious challenge, which does not only confront the state in Africa, but also other countries of the global South. It has therefore been shown that, unlike Ake's account, which focuses mainly on the colonial and the immediate post-independence periods, this problem re-emerges and assumes other dimensions in recent times, especially given the increasing influences and implications of globalization, and a host of other developments. For example, in the early post-independence period, it took the form of 'the Biafra question' in Southern Nigeria. More recently, it takes the form of 'conflicts and resource wars', which result from scarcities and competition over resources in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria's oil-rich Niger Delta region and the civil war in Sudan, 'the development of accommodationist tendencies and strategies' in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Kenya and Nigeria, 'the Bahutu-Batutsi question' and 'the corresponding challenge of breaking out of the conflictual notion of the state as a representation of a permanently defined majority in Rwanda'. As Pandey and Geschiere (2003: 24-25) are apt to note, Mamdani's (2003) contribution on the ethnocide in Rwanda is based on a specific form of governmentality, which understanding drives home four instructive points. One, it shows some of the possibly dreadful consequences of building the nation on such reductionist colonial notions. Two, it confirms the

assertion that 'excessive claims of authenticity and other forms of insistence on notions of the pure' can actually have particularly damaging and divisive effects, especially when based as in Africa, on colonial and neo-colonial classifications. Three that the real causes of crisis and conflict in Rwanda and other states in the continent are tied to the nature and character of the post-colonial state as much as to its colonial predecessor. This suggests the need to interrogate the nation-state in the continent as 'a historically-constituted political community', rather than as one based 'exclusively' on 'an agreed cultural essence'. Lastly, Mamdani's (2003) contribution charges the proponents of an emancipatory politics to challenge 'the closed assumption' underlining the idea of the nation as a natural, eternally existing 'cultural community', to which 'some' people automatically belong, and 'others' never quite.

Other recent accounts of the problem of political integration abound, especially in relation to the forging of nationhood and are found in different parts of the Third World. For example in Cote d'Ivoire, this problem is formulated around the notorious question of 'Ivorite identite' consciousness. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the problem is woven around the disappointment of the Luba elites who—as trusted auxiliaries of the Belgian colonial trinity of 'the state'; 'church' and 'business' believed that they had become civilized enough as to claim the status of 'evolues'. In this case, the bland rejection of their 'Luluabourg Manifesto' in 1944 by the colonial authorities laid the foundation for Luba radicalism against the colonial and later, post-colonial state. Focusing on Ecuador and Bolivia in Latin America, Andres Guerrero and Rossana Barragan (2003: 17) pose the problem of political integration in terms of:

how to deal with the Indians and other 'dependents' who constituted the majority of the population? Maintaining a formal, separate status for them as dependents, as in earlier colonial legislation, was out of the question, since it went against the very principle of a 'modern' constitution. Yet, including them among the citizens was equally unthinkable.

More recently, using some 12-point indicators, which include 'nation-building abilities' and 'potentials', 'institutional strength and fragility', 'the vulnerability of states to violent internal conflict', 'societal deterioration' and 'other economic', 'political', 'social' and 'military considerations', the Washington-based *Foreign Policy Journal Index on Failed States* (2007) cited in *The Times of India*, (2007: 10) placed eight African countries among the first ten 'failed states' in the world. In a recent study, which ranked 177 countries based on data made available from more than 12, 000 public sources collected between May and December 2006, the Journal's Failed States Index

ranked Sudan as the first failed state in the world, with Somalia, Zimbabwe, Chad, Cote d' Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea and the Central African Republic ranked as the third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, ninth and tenth respectively in the world.

Lastly, it should be stated *inter alia* that, in spite of the acknowledged divergences noted in the dimensions and conceptualization of the problem of political integration in these countries, the experiences converge around the simultaneous acts of 'inclusion' and 'exclusion' as the main issues in the discourse on the forging of nationhood. They also confirm the argument that the criteria for inclusion and exclusion are never easily determined, just as they are also not arrived at without a prolonged contest. Rather, it is the complex histories of these prolonged struggles, spanning over a period of two centuries and more that has produced the recent dimensions, manifestations and challenges for forging nationhood on the heels of disintegrated experiences and societies in the South.

#### **4.1.6 The Future of the State in Africa**

Here, we focus on recent experiences and challenges, which threaten the sovereignty and continued existence of the state not only in Africa and the South, but also in general theoretical terms. The aim is to establish the extent to which these challenges and developments were anticipated or ignored in the writings of Ake. To recapitulate, Ake's (1985a: 114) position on the future of the state in Africa focuses mainly on the possibilities of resolving the historical contradictions associated with the state in the continent. He derives this from his earlier argument that the dynamics of social forces in post-colonial Africa reproduces the non-autonomization of class domination as well as the stagnation of productive forces in the region. From this, he conjectures that the future of the state in Africa is already here and that what we refer to, perhaps improperly, as the state in Africa is the image of its future. According to Claude Ake (1985a: 114):

That is not to say that there are no possibilities for development or that there are no uncertainties. Such possibilities do exist especially in the deepening contradictions engendered by the reproduction of underdevelopment. Sooner or later these contradictions will mature to resolution. In all probability they will not be resolved in the direction of breakthroughs in capitalist economic development and the founding of a liberal society. Rather, it is more likely to be through socialist revolutions. But these revolutions, reflecting prevailing objective conditions, will be initially distorted to the familiar pattern of excessive repression and hierarchic organization, and the maintenance of private property under the guise of public ownership. However, this will in effect be a nonresolution and pressures will mount for an authentic revolutionary resolution and it may well be that there will be real movement in this direction. In this case, the state in Africa will gain autonomization from universalisation of the proletarian condition. sic. Nonetheless, it will still reflect its history.

Ake's (1985a) illustration of the future of the state in Africa raises some questions. For example, going by his postulations summed up above, one might ask, (i) What are 'the uncertainties' regarding the future of the state in Africa, which he writes about, and what in particular does he define as 'these uncertainties'? Does he refer to the challenges, which are likely to confront the state in future times yet to come? Or does he mean the same set of historical and contemporary problems and obstacles with which the state is presently confronted? (ii) What specific challenges are anticipated in his writings in this direction? And, (iii) How does he explain the recent challenges posed by modernity, globalization and the struggles over nationhood, citizenship, ethnicity and history writing in Africa and other countries of the South? These questions are added to the fact that Ake (1985a) neither argues out nor explains how 'the state in Africa will gain autonomization from the universalization of the proletarian condition', an omission, which results mainly from 'the conjectural nature' of his illumination of the future of the state in Africa. This section answers these questions. The aim is to improve upon Ake's account of the future of the state in Africa, which as we argue, does not exhaustively discuss the details of these challenges. This is done by examining the works of Arjun Appadurai, Gyanendra Pandey, Peter Geschiere and Rajni Kothari.

Historically, the idea of the modern state began as a politico-philosophical construct meant to deal with widespread conditions of anarchy, chaos and uncertainties through establishing conditions of lasting peace, ordered co-existence and security in their place. This idea of the state later became central and germane to the human enterprise, especially towards the end of the Middle Ages when it was institutionalized as the major actor for promoting peace and security on a world scale. Within this period, given the adoption of the nation-state format by a large array of newly emergent countries after the Second World War, the nation-state together with the state-system provided the fulcrum around which the world was organized, such that neither the superimposition of the two superpowers nor of the United Nations reduced the importance of the state as the basic organizational unit within the world system. Given this arrangement, the state insisted not only on the originality and uniqueness of its identity as both prior and superior to all other institutions within its entities; it also reduced all other corporate identities to individualized categories, including the embodiment of civil society and of culture—according to the varying degrees of recognition, which it accorded them.

Amidst widespread diversities, the centrality and legitimacy of the state have informed a series of theoretical models, which define the relationship between the citizen and the state. Such models



also capture and reflect shifting perspectives on the state, especially following the quickening of the historical process in Europe and farther beyond as illustrated in the experiences of the two World Wars, the great depression following the collapse of the business cycle, the revolt of the masses ever since the French Revolution, leading up to the communist revolution and the social-democratic alternatives to it; the rise of fascism on the one hand and Soviet-styled totalitarianism on the other; the end of imperialism and the redefinition of the economic problematique in recent times, giving rise to new questions, alternative models and hypotheses. In the process, different types and forms of the state have emerged, some of which include the liberal-bourgeois democratic model of the state based on the theory of accountability; the social-democratic model, which assumes responsibility for social transformation and the welfare of the people as well as the Marxist model, which considers the bourgeois state as a committee existing mainly for managing the affairs of the dominant classes. More recently, the world has witnessed the development of a liberal-cum-neo-Marxist model of the state, as a space in which the struggles for civil and democratic rights are carried out with the aim of establishing the institutions that promote social transformation. There has also emerged within this period, the Gandhian model of the state, especially in India as a trustee and arbiter between conflicting arenas of interests, from the perspective of serving deprived strata of the society through constitutionally agreed modes of decentralization and participation. This changing nature of the state resulted mainly from the growing sensitization in the human dimensions to its policies and the realization of its increasingly repressive and exploitative thrust on society. Each of these models of the state has undergone significant transitions, facing as it does new challenges not only on the horizons of its existence, but also in the varied perceptions of its relevance and justifications for a continued existence by the citizens. For instance, while on the one hand there still exists a considerable degree of faith in the state, especially among the poor and oppressed people, most of who produce a kind of mystification of the state, on the other hand there is growing skepticism and a sustained doubt about its efficacy, leading to a demystification and decline both in the aura and prestige that it once enjoyed. In deed, according to Rajni Kothari (1997: 145):

Instead of centrality and a dominant status, we face a combination of growing marginalization in the state's role and status in civil society, accompanied by growing myopia, dehumanization and brutalization in its relationship with that civil society. Interestingly, the marginalization of the state that seems to be proceeding apace is a result of both overextension and shrinkage. The international order itself, which was long based on the state system (even the capitalist development model had accepted the state as a key instrumentality), faces an era of uncertainty, following the Reaganite-Thatcherite reaction to the right, some of which may now be wearing off, though the basic mindset continues and conditions the entire functioning of the world system.

The state is therefore not only under severe stress, but increasingly faces a number of bids to take it over and supersede it—all in the name of the economy, world security, religion, ethnicity and self-determination, especially by ethno-nationalists, indigenous peoples, ethno-classes, militants or politicized sects and communal contenders hitherto marginalized and-or suppressed. The major historical event in this regard, which marks the emergence, growth and spread of all anti-state developments is the collapse of the Soviet Union, followed immediately by the collapse of the Soviet model of state hegemony and later by the re-ordering of social and economic relationships across Europe and the decline of post-colonial movements for nation-building, all seeking both the autonomy and legitimacy of the state in large parts of the Third World. The collapse of the Soviet Union is therefore, the essential historical point from which one appreciates the growing erosion and marginalization of the powers of the state through its overextension. This is because, while the Soviet Union was the ultimate in the wielding of state power, it also constitutes the contradictory paradox of the same arrangement through the production of its own erosion and delegitimation, a growing admission of the incapacity of the instrumentalities of state and party as well as the loss of faith in them by both the rulers and the ruled. Again, according to Kothari (1997: 146):

While we are still too close to events in the former Soviet Union, the full significance of which is still unravelling, there is little doubt that what we witnessed at the end of the 1980s was in many ways unique in modern history and cannot be explained except by reference to the hollowness of the whole corpus of the state within it. The phenomenon of Gorbachev and what happened under him<sup>3</sup> has been pushed to the background following the coup against him and the rise of Yeltsin, whose wholly adventurist politics, intended to refurbish the Soviet state—in which task he is not likely to succeed—have received the sustained backing of the USA.

Three major challenges threaten the sovereignty of the modern state. First, technology rapidly replaces politics and other socio-economic factors in the functioning and administration of the modern society. This does not only affect the state's role in relation to the civil society, but also leads to a process of depoliticization, the displacement of the civil servant accountable to elected bodies and the people at large by the technocrat accountable only to a momentum generated by the rise of the micro-chips and the computer by impersonal forces. More than in the past, technology now organizes the whole world in a manner that its logic and dynamics are not subject to control by any nation-state. The world is therefore increasingly initiated into the dawn of an age of technology-driven fixes, which however lack humanly identifiable fixers. In effect, all aspects of technology, including military R and D, informatics, medicine or agriculture, genetics, eugenics and cloning are not only becoming autonomous, but are also subjecting mankind to a captive status. Of

this weakening and disembodiment of the state by the advance of technology Kothari (1997: 149) says:

Naturally, in a technologically determined world, where there is little scope for real choices of a socio-political kind, the state loses its importance and governance itself undergoes a radical transformation. The fast changing nature of world capitalism to no small extent draws upon this primacy of modern technology (itself undergoing major transmutations) and has in consequence provided a system of global management to which 'there is no alternative' (the TINA hypothesis). This has further deeply affected the nature of governance in our time. (The recent debate in conservative circles about governments losing control over the governed reflects a condition in which the term 'governance' itself has changed its meaning.)

The Second challenge is the increasing assertion of cultures, ethnicities, nationalisms and pluralisms, with the result that while tensions and violence are generated by the cult of consumerism, the resulting state of anomie precipitates the violence of terrorism and fundamentalism. In this process, the mediating role of the modern state decreases; the state also ceases to be either an independent embodiment of the civil society or of an effective protector of the poor, the weak and the oppressed. In the end, the state ceases to be a state and is rather reduced to a trivialized power and status, which one is hardly able to accurately describe. The third challenge is the emergence of a new ideology and a mindset proposed as a way out of all problems and crises, including those of the state. However, far from rejecting the role of modern technology, this mindset rather makes it 'the enslaving god of mankind'—far away from the old ideologies of liberty, equality and fraternity; away from an independent role or conception of the state in promoting these values into making human greed and avarice the prime movers of men and societies—through offering mankind the vain utopia of globalization. In qualifying globalization, Kothari (1997: 150) argues that:

It is a utopia that holds out the promise of a new integration of the human enterprise, of joining diverse cultures and civilizations into one single marketplace, nudging along governments and elites, and indeed the masses as well to catch up with this new fantasy. It is not integration based on diversity and of diverse entities finding a common ground, but one based on cut-throat competition and rivalry, using whichever means work, giving a new lease of life to the old idea of survival of the fittest.

From the fore-gone, it becomes clear how little we actually know in Africa about the different trajectories of modernity and a host of other global challenges, which threaten the existence of the state in the continent. It is also obvious that there are in deed many dimensions to the manifestations of globalization and the threats that it poses. For example, given the centrality of the energy sector in the international political economy, uncontrolled vicissitudes and changes in oil prices occasioned by hostage taking, attacks on oil company personnel as well as installations and a

host of other violent uprisings in Nigeria's Niger Delta region, the Middle East and other parts of the world have been adjudged as capable of causing instabilities and distortions in macroeconomic calculations across the world. Above all, the fore-gone illustration indicates how much there is to be learnt about these facets of the modern world from the point of view of the experiences in Africa and other post-colonial societies. It therefore goes without saying that the nation-state in the West, Europe and North America together with the state-nation in the South is in deed threatened by a series of global flows, exchanges and transnational networks. Large parts of these developments are far from being captured or covered by the existing scope of research on these issues, with the result that several questions still remain unanswered in the literature, which relates their explanations to Africa. For instance, what specific forms does the historical moment of modernity, globalization and the forging of nationhood assume now, a period marked by the apparent decline of the nation? And, whose nationalisms and whose nation-states are currently under threat? As noted earlier, the new phase of globalization is marked by the drive from the West not just to 'engulf' and 'homogenize', but also to 'Americanize' the entire world, an agenda, which has triggered off strong feelings of chauvinism and resentments both in the South and the North. Yet, according to Gyanendra Pandey and Peter Geschiere (2003: 9), in spite of all these:


The complex articulation of globalization and nationalism in the explosion of the atomic bomb by the Bharatiya Janata Party led regime in India, as a climax of national pride and also as an event of worldwide significance, shows how potent the concept of the nation remains despite the changing global constellation.

In this connection, questions impinging on nationalism, modernity and development will go a long way in helping us envision, examine and explain what might be usefully conjectured about the future of the state in both the South and the North. This is mainly because while the old debate in the 1960s and 1970s about development actually established the gross inadequacy and Euro-centric biases of the notions of development and underdevelopment as formulated by both the advanced social sciences and political establishments of the world, the same debate failed to question the meanings of modernity and development as articulated in these quarters. This is added to the fact that just like the development discourse, most writings on nationalism also reflect a dominance by the advancement and historical experiences in the North, with the result that even those which paid attention to the vicissitudes and experiences in the South are not only scant, but also derived their models from the developments and maturation of these ideas from the North. Above all, even though the historical idea of 'the nation as the self-evident basis for the state' emerged in Europe

and the Americas, the more recent accounts of nationhood and nationalism are clearly far from being straightforward. Rather, the struggles to realize nationhood and sovereign status, in addition to democracy and development have necessarily charted different historical pathways in both the once colonized or post-colonial countries in Africa, Asia and South America as well as Europe and North America. These developments emphasize the need to understand and explain the changing dynamics of the challenges confronting the modern state in recent times. One way of doing this is to 'de-emphasize' the historically dominant experiences of the West and the North through projecting the accounts of societies hitherto seen as 'secondary', 'backward' and altogether 'unhistorical'. By so doing, we would be furthering Ake's (1985) thesis on the future of the state in Africa, which as we argued, neither anticipated nor exhaustively discusses most of these issues. From another perspective, since 'the forging of nationhood' has long been associated with the need to build a modern state, the idea of critiquing this form of the state is another way of critiquing the nation. However, this attempt is replete with a dilemma. According to Pandey and Geschiere (2003: 26) 'this dilemma—of not being able to do without the state while not doing very well with it either'—is graphically illustrated by the striking reversals in the World Bank's dealings with the state in Africa:

Its 1989 report on Africa brought a first abrupt reversal. After sticking, ever since independence, to the postcolonial state despite increasing criticisms, the Bank decided abruptly that the state had become an obstacle to development instead of an instigator. The slogan of 'by-passing the state' then led to a rapid proliferation of NGOs which often were only 'non-governmental' in name, but which also actively participated in the politics of belonging and autochthony in quite problematic ways. Its reports on Africa over the last few years indicate that the Bank is now again seriously reconsidering its position.

Before concluding, it is worthwhile to examine Arjun Appadurai's (1997) contribution on 'the future of the nation-state'. This effort further helps us in consummating the understanding of most of the issues discussed earlier above. Importantly, Appadurai (1997: 158–177) places his contributions against the backdrop of the enormous challenges confronting both the state and the nation, which according to him suggest the need for scholars not only to 'think beyond the nation', but also to 'recognize the essential post-national social forms', which are capable of accommodating non-state and a host of other de-territorialized challenges with which the nation is currently confronted. He says, for more than half of a century now, the nation form, which constitutes the ideological alibi of both the territorial state and of ethnic totalitarianism, is under attack. This is added to the fact that, even though nationalism is still cherished as a global fashion, patriotism is increasingly reduced to an unstable sentiment, which thrives only at the level of the nation-state. He captures some of the



challenges, which undermine the union of the nation with the state. One, he says more than ever before, the nationalist genie is now itself diasporic, carried in the repertoires of increasingly mobile populations of refugees, tourists, guest workers, transnational intellectuals, scientists, illegal aliens and is increasingly unrestrained by the ideas of spatial boundary and territorial sovereignty. Consequently, modern nationalisms involve the communities of citizens in the territorially defined nation-states who share the collective experience, not of face-to-face contact or of even common subordination to a royal person, but of reading books, pamphlets, newspapers, maps and other modern texts together (Appadurai, 1997: 160).

Two, he says many recent and violent ethno-nationalisms are rather more implosive than are explosive. In this connection, one way of accounting for those cases in which cool identities turn hot and implosions in one place generate explosions in other places is to remember that the nation-state, having being replaced by other transnational loyalties, is no longer the only game in town. According to Appadurai (1997: 165):

The violence that surrounds identity politics around the world today reflects the anxieties attendant on the search for nonterritorial principles of solidarity. The movements we now see in Serbia and Sri Lanka, Mountain Karabakh and Namibia, Punjab and Quebec are what might be called "trojan nationalisms". Such nationalisms actually contain transnational, subnational links and, more generally, nonnational identities and aspirations. Because they are so often the product of forced as well as voluntary diasporas, of mobile intellectuals as well as hospitable states, very few of the new nationalisms can be separated from the anguish of displacement, the nostalgia of exile, the repatriation of funds, or the brutalities of asylum seeking. Haitians in Miami, Tamils in Boston, Moroccans in France, Moluccans in Holland are the carriers of these new transnational and postnational loyalties.

Consequently, while territorial nationalism is the alibi of these movements, it is not necessarily their basic motive or final goal. Rather, such basic goals can by far be darker than anything having to do with national sovereignty, as when they seem driven by the motives of ethnic purification and genocide. Three, Appadurai argues that while there are many separatist movements in the world today, such as the Basques, the Tamils, the Quebecois, the Serbs and others, which seem determined to lock nationhood and statehood together under a single ethnic rubric; to these have been added the experiences of oppressed minorities who suffer displacement as well as forced diaspora without articulating a strong wish for a nation-state of their own. Armenians in Turkey, Hutu refugees from Burundi who live in urban Tanzania and Kashmiri Hindus in exile in Delhi are examples of how displacement does not always translate into state-building. Rather, most of these anti-state movements revolve around the claims of homelands, soils, places of origin and the return

from exile. Given the subdued political status, which most of these images and movements reflect, Appadurai (1997: 166) observes that the:

incapacity of many deterritorialized groups to think their way out of the imaginary of the nation-state is itself the cause of much global violence because many movements of emancipation and identity are forced, in their struggles against existing nation-states, to embrace the very imaginary they seek to escape. Postnational or nonnational movements are forced by the very logic of actually existing nation-states to become antinational or antistate and thus to inspire the very state power that forces them to respond in the language of counternationalism. This vicious circle can only be escaped when a language is found to capture complex, nonterritorial, postnational forms of allegiance.

From the perspective of the Cold War, the world has become both 'unipolar' and 'multi-centric'; and in the process, the legitimacy of nation-states has steadily weakened; international as well as transnational organizations of every kind have proliferated; local politics and global processes now affect each other in increasingly chaotic ways, often outside the interactions of the nation-states. All these are not only characterized by international slogans, image transfers and pressure groups, but also by the birth of a variety of complex social formations organized around the principles of finance, recruitment, coordination, communication and reproduction, which in addition to being multinational and international, are also 'post-national' (Appadurai, 1997: 166–167). The appreciation of these developments requires a closer look at the variety of organizations, movements, ideologies, networks and an assessment of their cumulative impact on different aspects of society. In conclusion, Appadurai (1997: 176) submits that:

It remains now to ask what transnations and transnationalism have to do with postnationality and its prospects. This relationship requires detailed engagement in its own right, but a few observations are in order. As populations become deterritorialized and incompletely nationalized, as nations splinter and recombine, as states face intractable difficulties in the task of producing "the people", transnations are the most important social sites in which the crises of patriotism are played out.

Chatterjee (1997: 30–34) provides an important response to Appadurai's argument. His intervention is premised on the need to give a clearer theoretical shape to the practices, locations, solidarities and institutions that seem to be emerging beyond the familiar grid of the nation-state system. According to Chatterjee (1997: 30):

One obvious reason for the demand is empirical: there is little doubt that the volume of significant social phenomena that are in one way or another of a 'transnational' kind has grown considerably over the last three decades and ... these cannot be satisfactorily described or explained within a conceptual field that is still organised around the idea that a 'modern' society and people is, under normal circumstances, constituted as a nation-state. The second reason for the demand is moral-political: it is based on the perception that the authority and legitimacy of the nation-state is in crisis and that its capacity to act for the good of the people over

whom it claims to exercise authority has been exhausted or irreparably undermined. The two reasons together have produced the sense of urgency behind the demand to think beyond the nation.

Chatterjee (1997) says in spite of the acknowledged reasons noted above, for the same reasons, we should look within the nation rather than beyond it. To sum up, we have tried to examine a few theoretical insights on some of the recent challenges faced by the nation-state in both the South and the North—as it faces its future. Our approach used Ake's (1985a) positions on the future of the state in Africa as its entry point and pretext for raising these issues. One point, which becomes clear from this exercise is that the power-driven struggle by the West to 'Americanize' the whole world has led, not only to an increased consciousness across the world on the separateness and uniqueness of the identities of different peoples and nations, but also to the redefinition of national identities as well as new bases of relating to 'the international', thus giving rise to more widely contested notions of de-territorialized citizenship and subjectivity—some of which are manufactured by corporate notions of the media.

It has therefore, been established that in spite of Ake's (1985a) efforts at providing an illustration on 'the future of the state in Africa', a number of developments, which threaten the state in recent times still remain unaccounted for in his writings. As we observed earlier, this does not only derive from the conjectural nature of his illumination of the future of the state in the continent, but also from the fact that he limited his articulation to an examination of the possibilities of resolving the historical contradictions associated with the state in the continent. Given this approach, even though he focuses on the domestic and international dimensions of the implications of underdevelopment for the continent, he does not extend his account to cover some of the recent challenges, which we have tried to raise in the immediately foregone pages.

#### **4.1.7 The State and Development in Africa**

This section examines one major implication of Ake's (1985a) analysis of the state in Africa. It discusses the question of how the non-autonomization of the state perpetuates the underdevelopment and dependence of the continent. As noted in the last chapter, a major aspect of his writings is the contention that an understanding of the nature and character of the state in Africa is very important for capturing the dynamics of political and socio-economic processes within it. To him, this is mainly because the state is the central locus of politics and therefore the major determinant of the direction of most societal processes. To recapitulate, Ake argues that given its



history and the context of imperialism, the unique feature of the state in Africa is that it has very limited autonomy and so, it is immersed in the struggles by various social classes, especially the dominant classes.

This section discusses a major implication of the limited autonomy of the state in Africa as contained in the writings of Claude Ake, especially as it affects the question of development and underdevelopment in the continent. It explores the writings of other scholars in this regard with a view to extending Ake's theory of the state into an analysis of how the nature and character of the state in the continent complements and furthers its dependent and peripheralized status within the polarized system of international capitalism. In doing this, it focuses mainly on Samir Amin's (1991: 305–329) analysis of the polarization of the international capitalist system. The aim is to extend Ake's writings through reconciling them to a major intervention on this subject matter.

According to David Harvey (1989: 12) cited in Konduru Sivaramakrishnan and Arun Agrawal (2003: 2–3), recent usages of the concept of 'development' link it in an almost synonymous manner with 'modernity' and 'globalization'. In this connection, while 'modernity' is defined from its typically Western-centric perspective, 'globalization' is presented traditionally as a process, which ultimately homogenizes and integrates different parts of the world. Development, however, has been manifested under different guises, and has also been used as the most powerful influence for structuring social progress and economic transformation in this century, especially in the non-Western world. For example, in Africa, it was used for legitimizing the consolidation of colonial capitalism in the 1930s and 1940s. In the post-World War II period, it was appropriated by the leaders of various anti-colonial movements in the continent as the 'raison d'etat' in their struggle and demand for independence. In the immediate post-independence period, leaders in the 'new states' presented their 'commitment to development' as the justification for asking their citizens to tolerate one party-authoritarian rule and other neo-patrimonial tendencies. During this period, it was widely echoed in government quarters: 'keep quite', 'make no public criticisms of either the state or its policies', 'make no distractions', 'show understanding', 'we are working hard at developing the state'. By the middle of the 1980s, when there was local and international consensus on the abysmal economic performance by most of these states, 'development' was invoked as the pretext for imposing Structural Adjustment Programmes and other neo-liberal policy prescriptions by the major International Financial Institutions on African economies. As Gustavo Esteva (1992: 2), cited in Sivaramakrishnan and Agrawal (2003: 3) puts it, 'development' thus occupies the centre of

an incredibly powerful semantic constellation, and there is hardly any other thing in the modern mentality comparable to it as a force guiding thought and behaviour. According to Ashis Nandy (1995: 54), given its prevailing hegemony both as a discourse and as a practice:

It is almost impossible to criticize development today without being accused of social conservatism of the kind that snatches milk from the mouths of hungry third-world babies. It is even more difficult to criticize modern science without being seen as a religious fundamentalist or a closet astrologer.

There is also considerable confusion and disagreement among scholars regarding the actual origins of its modern history. For example, a common thread in the post-modernist anthropology of development literature is the claim that 'development' arose full-blown in the post-Second World War period as an ideological practice with few significant historical or intellectual antecedents. According to Esteva (1988: 665) cited in James Ferguson (2002: 412):

Until well into the nineteenth century, the word *development* [desarrollo] in Spanish was employed to describe the operation of unrolling a parchment: it signified to return an object to its original form. During the last century [the term] migrated through at least three scientific disciplines, where it was employed as a metaphor for opening new fields of knowledge. It remained for a long time confined to technical usage. In economics, neither Marx nor Schumpeter succeeded in gaining it general acceptance, except for very specific uses. But in 1949 something very strange occurred with *development*. Never before had a word achieved universal acceptance the very day of its political coining. On January 10, 1949, when Truman employed it in a speech, it immediately acquired a specific, distinguished meaning as Point Four of the Truman Doctrine. In a few days, two billion people became underdeveloped.

Ferguson (2002: 413) contests this account of the modern history of development. According to him, Esteva's (1988: 665) position neither captures, nor reflects a detailed appreciation of the concept's complicated trajectory. Ferguson then (2002: 413) posits that:

"Development" and "underdevelopment" were not, as the postmodernists claim, simply invented in a post-World War II effort to "remake" the Third World. These "constructs" have instead varied and complex roots in at least three historical-ideological watersheds: nineteenth-century Liberalism (and evolutionism), turn-of-the-century US neocolonialism, and the debate between Latin American Marxists and populists that date to the 1920s.

More provocatively, Ferguson (2002: 413) argues that:

Most Latin American countries attained independence burdened with weak notions of nationhood, property controlled by religious and community corporations, and economies which, despite a century of Bourbon reforms, were still shaped largely by metropolitan-oriented trade in a few primary products. Liberalism took root in post-independence Latin America as a *modernizing, developmentalist* ideology and practice aimed at overcoming this colonial heritage (C. A. Hale 1989; Katz 1991). Whether articulated as a struggle for "civilization" against "barbarism" (as in Argentina) or in more explicitly racist and social Darwinist terms (as in Mesoamerica

and the Andes), Liberal ideology contained definite notions of development (or "modernity") and underdevelopment (or "backwardness"). While the periodization and the specific practice of Liberalism varied in different settings, the Liberals' adoption of free-market, secular policies usually involved, among other things, increased foreign indebtedness to finance construction of transport infrastructure, especially railways; the creation in government executive branches of "Development Ministries" (Ministerios de Fomento); the privatization of church, community, and state lands; and major giveaways to foreign capital which, it was hoped, would facilitate the transition to "modernity". In Costa Rica, during the Liberals' late-nineteenth-century apogee, virtually the entire "national project", as articulated by intellectuals and politicians, "was precisely to come to be *equal* to the developed countries of Europe" (Palmer 1992: 182, italics in original). Both Liberal ideology and the measures that accelerated market penetration of the most remote spaces remaining outside of the economy are clear precursors of the "development" that postmodernists such as Esteva claim emerged from a virtually *tabula rasa* on a single day in January 1949.

Ferguson (2002) therefore claims that the post-World War II identification of 'development', which is found in the writings of Esteva (1988) and other post-modernist scholars, is only an extension of the third historical phase or period, which his intervention points at. It is beyond the scope of this study to elaborate the nuances of such historical claims in details. Nevertheless, the fore-gone illustrations are meant to draw attention to the often-confusing connotations, which most writings, debates and discussions on development have always elicited. As Jonathan Crush (1995: 2) aptly observes, one major reason for its persuasive appeal both in the literature and in the realities of everyday experiences of most people, is the apparent irreplaceability of a congeries of claims made by development theories and experts, which promises to redress the historical conditions accounting for the poverty and misery that continue to hunt millions of the world's populations. However, beyond the claims underlining them, it is recommended that, development programmes together with on-going projects of state formation be critically examined in terms of their outward links to the larger international political economy, paying due attention to the commitment with which different strategies of localization are being pursued. Inter alia, this should enable a deeper understanding of development, both as a performed practice and also as a formation to be interpreted. It should also enable us escape the trap of historicism, which remains alive and strong in all the foreign-induced developmentalist policy prescriptions, practices and imaginations of the African state.

Against this backdrop, Samir Amin (1991) locates the phenomenon of 'unequal development' within the global system of capitalist development. He draws attention to the role of the state, which he describes as central to the worldwide polarization of this capitalist system. He says far from being the product of just economic laws, this polarization is the result of a dialectical relationship between society and politics or the state on the one hand, and the operations of the economic laws of

capitalism on the other. Hence the need to focus analysis on the worldwide system of globalized capitalism as the basic unit of analysis in studying the contemporary world. He develops his argument from a comparative analysis of the relationship between the state and economic life in both the developed capitalist societies and also the peripheral, underdeveloped countries. He says in the developed capitalist societies, the state, though not directly experienced, is nevertheless present and its intervention is also of decisive significance. On the other hand, given the enclave nature of capitalist development in the peripheries, and also because capitalism there is far from being fully fledged, civil society is very feeble or even entirely non-existent. In these backward societies, Amin (1991: 307) says:

'Economic life' is sickly and seems little more than an appendage to the exercise of the functions of the state, which directly and visibly occupies the front of the stage. But this is only an illusion since the state here is in reality weak (in contrast to the true strong state, that of the developed centre). At the same time, economic life is reduced to a process of adjustment to the demands of accumulation in the centre.

In overcoming this difference, he asks: 'Why is this so?' 'Is it possible to 'surpass' this stage by imitating the institutions of the developed West', that is, 'by throwing open some areas of economic life to 'private initiative'?' He explains the difficulty of eradicating these historical default and difference (i) as an essential condition for reproducing the inequalities in the international capitalist expansion, which leads to the polarization between the core and the periphery, (ii) as an inherent feature of capitalist expansionism, and (iii) as a contradiction, which can neither be resolved nor overcome within capitalism. From these, he notes that, while not disputing the unequal nature of the global capitalist economy, the inequalities resulting from this process raise a lot of questions. He maintains that those regions once integrated as peripheries into the world capitalist system have remained perpetually peripheral to the present moment, with the result that while England, Canada, Australia and New Zealand were never peripheral formations, Africa, Latin America, the West Indies and most parts of Asia with the exception of Japan and China among others, were and have remained peripheral.

He defines 'global economic polarization' in terms of the unequal experiences of different regions of the world, especially one in which the metropolises experience and appropriate development while the satellites grapple perpetually with poverty, underdevelopment and dependency. He says the details of this relationship cannot be understood only in terms of 'the economics of the global system', which is limited only to the immediate expression of the realities governing the nature of

economic evolution. In explaining this polarization, Amin (1991: 309) argues that "the centrality of the question of the state stands out starkly". In other words, more than any other factor, it is the nature of the state, which makes it possible to classify societies within the world capitalist system into 'centres' and 'peripheries'. To illustrate, while the societies in the metropolises reflect the crystallization of a bourgeois national state, the essential function of which is to determine the conditions of accumulation through the national control it exercises over the reproduction of the labour force, the market, the centralization of surplus, natural resources and technology—thereby enhancing 'auto-centric accumulation', the peripheral state, far from controlling local capital rather fulfils the function of preserving the status of the dominant internal class. Such a peripheral state is therefore mainly an instrument for adjusting the local society to the demands of globalized accumulation such that its actual direction is determined by the dictates of the metropolitan powers. This difference further makes it possible to understand why the state in the advanced capitalist societies is a strong state while the state in the backward countries is rather feeble and weak. It also explains why access to true bourgeois democratization is practically closed to the peripheral state, and why the existence of the civil society, together with its operations are grossly limited in those societies.

Amin's (1991) thesis on the role of the state in the birth and sustenance of unequal development in the backward countries of Africa is corroborated and reinforced by Andre Gunder Frank (1981) and Eme Ekekwe (1986). Ekekwe (1986) underlines the role of the state in this process by arguing that the character of the state ensures that the accumulation and expansion of capital do not find their essential, dynamic component parts within the local economy, but that it is rather transferred to the metropolises through capital flight. Focusing on Nigeria's Niger Delta, Cyril I. Obi (1999) explains how the state partners with different multinational forces in underdeveloping the region, especially being itself, a creation and function of capital, with all its dominant classes aligned to global capitalism for the accumulation of local capital. On his part, Frank (1981: 188) observes that:

The state is the principal instrument used by capital to create, maintain, extend, and intensify the political conditions necessary for superexploitation, particularly ... around the Third World. The state functions as the watchdog of superexploitation by repressing first and foremost labor and its organizations, and then by imposing "austerity" "reform", and martial "law". These austerity measures are oftentimes enforced through repressive military regimes and then institutionalized through military and civilian authoritarian states.

Thus, the thesis about 'the peripheral bourgeois state' as first and foremost an instrument of the foreign bourgeoisie for providing and assuring the conditions necessary for its exploitation is therefore best illustrated in the countries of the South. In these countries, the state intervenes directly and visibly in the organization and operations of the economic, socio-cultural and political processes than in the advanced capitalist societies. Moreover, unlike in the metropolises, where the state is an active nexus between the national and world economy, in Africa and other backward countries of the South, the state is rather an instrument, which mediates the dependent role of these economies in the international division of labour and the capitalist process of capital accumulation. In conclusion, as Frank (1981: 231) suggests, it should be noted that even though the state in the South mediates between its national capital, labour and international capital, nevertheless:

as a dependent state it does so substantially to the benefit of international capital at the relative cost to national capital and at the absolute sacrifice of local labor. The exigencies of the process of capital accumulation and the international division of labor, worldwide and in the underdeveloped countries themselves, thus become the principal determinants of the role and the form of the state in the Third World (as elsewhere in the capitalist world).

Thus, by emphasizing its role and implications in sustaining the polarization of the world capitalist system, Amin's (1991) illustrations reinforce Ake's (1985a) analysis of the non-autonomization of the state in Africa. It should be noted that those pursuing a post-structuralist analysis of development discourses sometimes find out that in a sense, the state appears strengthened in the implementation of development, in the very failures of development projects. As Ferguson (1990) would argue, this strengthening of the state takes place, not because of the intent behind the actions of subjects, but in the systematic nature of the social reality that results from the actions of these subjects, thereby producing an unintended result. This cause and effect relationship between development discourse and unintended state building is far from being tenable. Rather, it is more fruitful to examine historically emerging state formations accompanied by scientific and different developmental worldviews, which serve such formations. In this regard, the strengthening of states' capacities may also be accompanied by rapid processes that strengthen those upon whom states seek to impose their will. Relatedly, arguments about the relationship between the nation-state, international development agencies, and development discourses need to recognize the changing character of this relationship.

Also, at the broad level, two major phases of development practices and discourse coincided with the shift in the global political economy, especially in the post-World War II period. The first phase was that of international Keynesianism and state-mediated capitalism; Fordist production; American international dominance; decolonization and the emergence of the Third World. During this period, multilateral institutions, such as the World Bank and the IMF partnered and worked with post-colonial states to create and further development-related policies. The second phase was characterized by the deregulation of neo-liberal capitalism, which emerged during the late 1970s, which later gained momentum, especially with the reign of Thatcher-Reaganomics and the decline of the Soviet Union, much of which is very still much with us. The impact of these developments has not only been inattentive to the nation-state, but have also weakened its sovereignty within the larger network of globalization, thus making it a far less significant actor in the production of multiple forms of identities. In addition, besieged as it is by several transnational flows of people, ideas of capitals and subnational challenges to its agencies, the state is increasingly rendered more and more insignificant in the production of different versions of regional modernities across various local and institutional sites.

#### **4.1.8 Reconceptualizing the State in Africa**

It remains to be shown how Ake's writings are complemented by those of other scholars. However, since we cannot focus on all aspects of his writings in this exercise, this section is limited to a major theoretical input, which furthers the understanding of his analysis of the state in Africa. This is found in Crawford Young's (1994 and 2004) writings on the concept of 'the post-colonial state' as the essential theoretical referent for the state in the continent. The aim of this exercise is to capture some of the renewed efforts and theoretical additions, which illuminate the understanding of contemporary Africa in the period following Ake's exit from the continent's intellectual scene.

As noted in the last chapter, having presented the state as an essentially capitalist phenomenon, Ake (1985a: 108) refrains from using 'the concept of the state' for referring to 'the social formations in Africa'. He characterizes the capitalist mode of production as the ideal setting for the development of the state's form of domination. That is, he presents the state's form of domination under capitalism as that under which autonomization and other essential features of the state are actually developed. From this, he describes the specific form of capitalist development, which occurred in Africa as both 'enclave' and 'peripheral'.

Inferring that the state in Africa is a colonial creation, he doubts and questions the conceptual appropriateness of referring to the social formations in Africa as 'states'. As he puts it, this is mainly because 'the process of state-formation in the continent appears to be bogged down by knotty contradictions, which stubbornly resist transcendence'. Thus, instead of using the concept of 'the state in Africa', he rather prefers to talk of 'the social formations in Africa'. According to Ake (1985a: 108), "In Africa, there are few social formations that are capitalist enough or socialist enough to be identified as clearly boasting the state form of domination". In essence, although Ake offers a clear illustration of what he considers to be 'the safe conceptual discursive referent' for capturing the theoretical status of the state in Africa, he does not historicize the conceptual trajectory of the state in the continent. Put differently, unlike Young (2004) who examines and exhumes the detailed historical aspirations, contexts and struggles, which produced the changing theoretical status and referents to the state in Africa, Ake rather adopts what appears to be 'a permanent theoretical referent' for the state in the region, which he calls 'social formations in Africa'. By implication, in Ake's writings the changing trajectories, experiences and other complex political dynamics of the state are neither captured nor reflected in terms of equally changing taxonomies, conceptual and discursive referents. This observation is not meant to deny the significance of Ake's conceptual referent to the state. To recast, a major contribution of Ake's taxonomical stance on this state is that it immediately reminds us of not only the specific historical processes, forces and developments, which shaped the eventual form of the state inherited by the continent as well as the perpetuation of the logic of the colonial order, but also points at its unique features and a host of other particularities, which distinguish it from the state in the West, Europe and North America. However, in addition to these useful insights, there is also the need to understand how changes in the historical existence of the state in both the colonial and especially the post-independence periods have shaped and informed changes in the conceptual trajectories, status and ultimately the discursive referents for the state in Africa over time. These insights are provided in Young's (1994 and 2004) writings.

Young's (2004) intervention suggests that no single discursive referent sufficiently captures the shifts, experiences and challenges with which the state has so far been confronted. It also informs the realization that there can be no permanent, totalizing or even an absolute discursive referent for the state in the continent. Rather, each discursive referent typically captures and speaks to specific issues and contexts of the state's existence under particular historical periods. However, this observation is not meant to argue that the issues raised, by Young (1994 and 2004) are entirely



lacking in Ake's writings and analysis of the state in Africa. To the contrary. The point that is being made is that Ake does not directly link these complex developments with the question of how they shape and correspond with the different discursive referents of the state in Africa. An examination of Young's contribution in this regard is now in progress.

At the moment of entry by African states into the international system of sovereign states, the main discursive referent for referring to them was 'post-independent'. For these 'new states', the achievement of independence was a defining historical moment, which reflected 'the apogee of an epic struggle', particularly one, which incorporated shared visions of liberation, transformation and the shedding of the colonial chrysalis. Later, however, the performance of these states, especially on the economic front questioned the applicability and appropriateness of the anti-colonial struggle and formal sovereignty as the defining attributes rather than their colonial origins. In particular, given the wholesale importation of the routines, practices and mentalities of the colonial state into its post-colonial successor, the limited nature of the state's independence was exposed. This ultimately led to the sharp replacement of the concept of the 'post-independent state' with that of 'the post-colonial state in Africa'. One obvious result of this discursive shift is that 'post-colonial studies' became an influential current in the larger tides of 'post-modern' academic discourse, especially by the 1980s. Above all, the eventual re-emergence of the defining features of the colonial state in its post-independence successor validated the characterization of the state in Africa as in deed 'post-colonial'.

A recapitulation of the legacy of the colonial state-system in Africa, which characterizes its post-colonial successor, is now in order. First, it should be recalled that the peculiar nature of colonial domination, which occurred relatively late in the age of imperialism with exceptional speed in Africa had significant impact on the formation of the colonial state in the continent. Occurring in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the annexation of the continent took the form of a highly competitive conquest-oriented system articulated after the 1884-1885 Berlin Conference by the imperial powers through the doctrine of 'effective occupation'. Through this doctrine, the metropolitan parliaments insisted on fiscal self-sufficiency for the new colonies in a manner that forced the continent to pay for its own subjugation. In the process and for the specific economic purpose of maximizing exploitation, the command colonial state developed, achieved unchallenged hegemony, especially after World War I, enjoyed an ascendancy sufficient enough to appropriate a significant fraction of the meagre incomes of its subjects, direct large amounts of labour into

economic pursuits desired by the colonial state for fiscal purposes, export crop cultivation, plantation labour and mining (Young, 2004: 26). In the last years of the colonial state, especially after the Second World War, major changes, which took the forms of advancements in 'colonial science' emerged, aiding the superstructure of imperial rule in becoming well professionalized with its European cadres trained in specialized institutes. In the process, the scope of the colonial state radically expanded. According to Young (2004: 27–28), from this period:

Developmentalism, which first appeared in the 1920s as state discourse, became central to the legitimation imperative of the terminal colonial state, now subject to an increasingly hostile international environment and a rising torrent of nationalist criticism.<sup>10</sup> The minimal social infrastructure, mostly provided by mission initiative earlier, now became an urgent target for expansion. Educational and health facilities multiplied. Dramatically swelling revenues facilitated this momentum of state expansion; Belgian Congo state expenditures increased eleven-fold from 1939 to 1950, then tripled in the final colonial decade; ... for the first time substantial aid came from imperial rulers; the doctrine of colonial fiscal self-sufficiency was finally abandoned. The command hierarchy was now fleshed out with a proliferating array of technical services, ... for the new young Africans who began to emerge from secondary schools in large numbers in the 1950s (and universities in the 1960s), government service was the natural end object of education. For the youth generation, state expansion and then Africanization provided extraordinary opportunities for social ascension... A striking paradox of the terminal colonial state is that, in the large majority of countries where decolonization was managed by negotiation, internal security was maintained with strikingly small military forces, notwithstanding the rising challenge of an impatient nationalism.

Characteristically, most of these features, which marked the colonial state also passed intact to its successor. Their manifestations included the central role and stance of the state in the war against poverty and ignorance as well as the management of transformation, in which the state was both the architect and primary theologian of development. It should also be noted that the reforms carried out by the retreating colonial hegemony during the terminal period of colonialism, which are captured in the immediately fore-gone quotation, helped the colonial system in managing and replacing physical or direct colonialism with the features, institutions and conditions, which make neo-colonialism possible in the post-colonial situation. As Young (2004: 29) puts it:

The racial subtext of colonial administration—that European agents by their presumed innate superiority and role as natural bearers of 'civilization' had an unquestioned right to rule—was transformed into a comparable prerogative of the youthful educated nationalist generation to exercise tutelage over an unlettered citizenry. The new governing elite, wrote Jacob Ajayi, 'staked their claims to leadership on their superior knowledge' of external models of rule and development, and 'took for granted the masses and the traditional elite's willingness to accept their leadership'.

The manner of implementation of development projects in the post-colonial period thus reflected a continued dominance by the state. In Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah argued out the continued need for a direct involvement by the state in development, a certitude, which derived from the attachment by

Africa's intelligentsia to different forms of socialism. All these were inspired by the vision of 'a high modernity' achievable by state action, which motivated the young generation of rulers towards realizing a rendezvous with abundance within a decade or two. In 1970, Mobutu Sese Seko mobilized support for his development programmes using 'Objectif 80' with which he promised new massive investments around the three 'poles of development' in Kinshasa, Kisangani and Lumumbashi, a promise, which appeared plausible to both domestic and international audiences at that time. Another remarkable feature of the post-colonial state in Africa is that its emergence at the period of independence also coincided with the apogee of the Cold War, in which these 'new states' were transformed into a diplomatic battlefield such that the two major blocs competed either maximally for affiliation with African states or minimally to pre-empt the other rival power from winning these states over to its side. During this period and also through the tactful deployment of economic and military aid, the orthodox non-aligned policy was drastically curtailed.

Economically, 'the new state' justified its independence and expansion with a number of promissory notes. In the process, young militants who provided the muscle for nationalist movements expected opportunities for employment, which they looked upon the state to provide; the new intellectual class expected assurance of incorporation into the upper ranks of the state's bureaucracy; parents hoped continually that pledges of rapid school expansion, including free and even universal primary education would materialize; clinics, safe drinking water, roads and other demands for social infrastructure resonated among rural and urban communities with irrepressible agitations. However, in hiding its inability to meet these unending demands, the new state traded all the blames on its colonial predecessor and accused it of creating the historical conditions for its present ineffectualities. As Young (2004: 31) observes:

The colonial state was chastised for its lethargy in meeting these needs; the fruits of independence would be social uplift. In the 1960s and 1970s, a very large down-payment on the pledges of a better life were made; a hefty fraction of the swelling rosters of state employees were teachers and agents of the technical and service sectors.

This led to the development in the 1970s of the underdevelopment and dependency theory, imported from Latin America, which indicted the colonial economy for its role and involvement in the backwardness, stagnation and underdevelopment of the continent through siphoning of resources and profits from extraction to the metropolitan economies. It also led to a two-front assault on alien economic dominance, mainly through: the nationalization of colonial corporations as well as the indigenization of pariah entrepreneurs. Accordingly, Algeria, Guinea, Tanzania and

other socialist countries began to undertake the nationalization of major neo-colonial corporations. By the mid-1970s, 80 percent of the medium and large-scale economic activity in Tanzania, which also accounted for 80 percent of total investment was in the public sector; in 1967, Mobutu nationalized the mineral giant *Union Minière du Haut Katanga*; in 1969, Milton Obote pledged to impose state majority control over a large part of the colonial private sector in Uganda in the name of 'a Move to the Left'; in 1969, Kenneth Kaunda also followed suit with the nationalization of Zambia's copper mines and by 1979 Nigeria had achieved about 60 percent control of the petroleum sector through the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation. As such, even though African states were not able to effectively control the downstream operations or directly manage many production operations, leading to the preservation of profitable opportunities with foreign corporations, which were managed as minority holders, nevertheless, Young (2004: 32) argues that, "...the key point here is that the state's role in managing resource extraction greatly expanded, and a large array of parastatal bodies emerged to assume these responsibilities".

Between 1968 and 1973 a wave of indigenization measures swept across Africa, which was most spectacular in terms of its racial cleansing of Asians, especially as implemented by Idi Amin in 1972 in Uganda, ordering their departure within 90 days. Governments in Ghana, Sierra Leone, Zambia, Malawi and Nigeria enacted indigenization decrees meant to check immigrant traders out of the commercial and light industrial sectors in favour of their nationals. In Congo-Kinshasa, this took place between 1973 and 1974 through the 'Zairianization' and 'radicalization decrees', which confiscated all foreign-owned agricultural and commercial enterprises, later allocated as patrimonial rewards for henchmen and clients while the most lucrative ones were reserved for Mobutu. In Tanzania, even though citizenship had been offered to long-time Asian and other European residents, the 1971 Acquisition of Building Act in which 97 percent of all the nationalized buildings were owned by Asians hit the Asian community very hard. In the process, the size of the state-owned sector also grew, especially through the role of the state as a surrogate capitalist formation. Again, according to Young (2004: 34) the:

Elimination of political competition and participation was hailed as a necessary device for the management of ethnicity: the departicipation strategy identified by Nelson Kasfir.<sup>31</sup> The single-party system dominated the African landscape until 1990. Military intervention became the sole mechanism to displace incumbents, but the putschist in power normally formed a new single party to legitimize permanent status for his rule. Thus citizen became once again merely subject, facing an exclusion from the public domain reminiscent of colonial times. One important difference: whereas the colonial state asked only obedience, the post-colonial polity demanded affection. Mere submission did not suffice; active participation in rituals of loyalty (support marches, assemblies to applaud touring dignitaries, purchase of party cards, display of the presidential portrait, participation in plebiscitary elections) was mandatory.

In addition to the successful centralization of power and the monopolization of the political space, the unhindered hegemony of the post-colonial state still required other more legitimizing measures and veneers to go with it. The command state could not operate on the basis of ultimate impersonal authority and coercive force alone. Indispensable were supplementary mechanisms, which translate state rule into personalized but shielded linkages with key intermediaries and their ramifying networks of clientele. With these, patrimonial webs of personalized circuits of distribution reciprocated with clientelist loyalty created a honeycomb of networks by which the ascendancy of the ruler was maintained, thus exerting great pressure for access to government resources since state power was the key source of accumulation. In all this period, the health of the post-colonial state was entirely tributary to expanding revenues, with which it paid for its proliferating apparatus and growing functions as well as lubricated patrimonial channels, which assured its legitimacy. All these arrangements benefited from the continent's favourable economic conditions. Within the first decade of its post-colonial history, commodity prices were more volatile, though less consistently advantageous than in the 1950s, but were nevertheless high by comparable historical standards; aid flows from the former colonizers continued to produce the robust growth of the 1950s and later increased; new as well as major sources of development assistance became available, Canada, the Nordic countries, the Netherlands and Japan on the one hand, and the major Cold War powers—the United States of America, the Soviet Union and China on the other, made their competitive entry into the aid scene in the continent. Even though aid flows had very limited developmental impact, they still remained significant components of the resource base for most of these countries, especially Tanzania where aid accounted for over 15 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in more than one third of the years between 1970 and 1993.

With time, however, this led to an excessive dependence on aid, a situation, which led to a crippling economic crisis, anticipated only by a few. The first indication of this crisis was the need for new funds to finance state expenditure by the end of the 1960s, though still negligible at this juncture, especially in countries in Southern Africa and Nigeria which had promising natural resources with which they mortgaged assets for increased foreign loans. In addition, with their large Euro-dollar reserves and with Western economies in the doldrums, major foreign banks found it attractive lending to African states, at least until the 1970s. In the mid-1970s, the post-colonial state appeared to be enjoying a robust hegemony over its populations with the rulers close to learning what Jean Copans (1981: 289) cited in Young (2004: 36) writing about Senegal terms 'an integral state':

The objective of the dominant groups in the state apparatus is the control, the maintenance, the augmentation of surplus extraction.... The lesson of recent years is the following: the interests of the Senegalese state have won over local private interests ... this growing role of the state, rendered concrete through the remodeling and multiplication of institutions for control of the peasantry, leads to a new policy. The Senegalese state aims more and more at a direct administrative, ideological and political control over the dominated masses, be they urban or rural.

This dominance over the civil society by the instruments of social control gave 'the would-be integral state' the appearance of an unchallenged strength achieved and accompanied by an extravagant personalization of power, exemplified in the rapturous encomium to the leaders. As Young (2004: 36) recalls, the Interior Minister in Zaire, Engulu Baanga had in 1975 said regarding Mobutu that:

In our religion, we have our own theologians. In all religions, and at all times, there are prophets. Why not today? God has sent a great prophet, our prestigious Guide Mobutu—this prophet is our liberator, our Messiah. Our church is the MPR. Its chief is Mobutu, we respect him like one respects a Pope. Our gospel is Mobutism. This is why the crucifixes must be replaced by the image of our Messiah. And party militants will want to place at its side his glorious mother, Mama Yemo, who gave birth to such a son.

By the end of the 1970s, the indications were clear that the post-colonial state in Africa was not only facing a systematic crisis but had also become the object of withering criticisms, with the result that an array of writings portrayed it as both 'predatory' and 'rent-seeking'. For instance, focusing on Ghana, Naomi Chazan (1982: 334–335) cited in Young (2004: 37-38) comments thus on the African crisis:

By the 1980s it was clear that Ghana had forfeited its elementary ability to maintain internal or external order and to hold sway over its population. Although its existence as a *de jure* political entity on the international scene was unquestionable, these outward manifestations did raise doubts as to its *de facto* viability.... Indeed, some kind of disengagement from the state was taking place ... an emotional, economic, social, and political detachment from the state element.

The same picture was found in the other states across the continent in which unsustainable debts, negative trends in primary commodity markets and a host of other harsh economic indices forced them to accept the structural adjustment programmes proposed by the international financial institutions. These were compounded by the sheer magnitude of the corruption of state institutions and parastatals, which became entrenched and were manifested in the desire for personal enrichment through divesting resources.

Much recently, an irresistible confluence of changes, both internal and external introduced the need to 'reinvent' and 'reconceptualize' 'the state'. This was added to the fact that most of the political and economic arrangements of the post-colonial state had become fundamentally unviable in an

increasingly changing global setting. For example, externally, the need for a comprehensive reformulation of these extant institutions corresponded in scope with the transition from communism in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, while Western powers together with international financial institutions made political and economic reform a condition for assistance. Internally, a potent contagion effect from the first episodes of successful confrontation of perennial autocrats operated in a manner that the utter delegitimation of the post-colonial state as merely 'predatory' and 'rent-seeking' made stonewalling seemed almost impossible. Beginning with the urban riots in Algerian cities in October 1988, street challenges to fossilize single-party autocracies sprang up in many countries and were emboldened by the dramatic fall of the Berlin wall. Corroborating Young, Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja (1997: 9) observes that:

Since 1988, the people of Africa have risen to replace one-party and military dictatorships with multiparty democracy. From its violent outbreak in October 1988 in the streets of Algiers, this new social movement for democracy has manifested itself all over the continent, changing the rules of the political game and bringing about meaningful reforms in the institutions of the postcolonial state.

This momentous development is above all a function of the declining capacity of the African state for development. In fighting colonialism, people expected that independence would usher in a new era of freedom and material prosperity.<sup>1</sup> What they inherited, however, was a state that was deficient in managing the economy and the natural environment on the one hand, and whose nature and performance often gave rise to divisions and conflicts, on the other. Hence the rise of the "second independence" movement in Congo-Kinshasa (Zaire), popular insurrections with a similar theme in Chad and Uganda, and numerous social movements elsewhere.

From the 1990s, a new pattern of civil society confrontation emerged in which leaders like Mathieu Kerekou of Benin were compelled by a powerfully mobilized populace to bring about a sovereign national conference, which sought to dissolve and replace the existing order with a democratic constitutional arrangement. Such aspirations compelled leaders across the continent to make at least minimal concessional gestures towards expanding the political-democratic space, leading to a high number of regime changes. However, in spite of all these optimism and euphoria, which attended the anticipation of rapid democratization and the shock therapy marketization at the start of the 1990s, the results fell far short of expectations. In fact, according to Young (2004: 42):

... by the middle of the decade the euphoria regarding democratization had faded. The political opening was in many cases only partial. Some of the external trappings of democracy were adopted without its internal substance. In many instances, external presentability seemed to drive political reform rather than a genuine commitment to liberalization: 'virtual democracy', in the words of Richard Joseph.<sup>58</sup> From a different perspective, one might characterize the outcome as institutionalized semi-democracy.<sup>59</sup> But despite the cosmetic nature of a number of transitions, and the success of such perennial autocrats as Ben Ali of Tunisia, Paul Biya of Cameroon, or Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo in splintering and sometimes repressing opposition forces, some important changes did occur.

Again in the 1990s, even though the economic trends were less disheartening than in the 1980s, the overall performance still failed to vindicate the optimistic promises made for neo-liberal policy prescriptions. What pervaded the continent were incomplete as well as half-hearted implementation of reforms, their subversion to entrenched patrimonial practices and the shrinking of state capacity. Remarkably, even though neither democratization nor economic reform met the intended expectations, they however challenged and reduced the earlier inclination by the post-colonial state to unencumbered hegemony. However, notwithstanding the reforms carried out within the states, they were once again weakened by new patterns of violence, disorder and civil wars, which dramatized the limitations of state capacity for managing these situations, especially in the Great Lakes region. As argued by Young (2004: 43), the scale and spread of civil disorder in Africa fed upon two altered international circumstances:

At the global level, the end of the Cold War removed the motivation for outside powers to intervene militarily in support of friendly African regimes. Within Africa, a new-found disposition for involvement in armed conflicts in neighbouring states, in support of either incumbents or rebels, eroded the older OAU doctrine of non-intervention. The Tanzanian invasion of Uganda in 1979, as spearhead for Uganda opponents of Amin, attracted criticism in much of Africa for the violation of sovereignty. By the time that eight African armies took part in the Congo-Kinshasa civil war in 1998, earlier OAU norms had all but vanished. Conflict thus readily flowed across borders, and instability had spillover effects in neighbouring countries: the 'bad neighbourhood' syndrome.

All these stood as a metaphor for a weakened state, in which internal wars and conflicts persisted over extended territories and periods even where popular backing was lacking for the insurgents. Even in countries where pronounced conflict did not occur, 'the contraction of state effectiveness rendered far more visible the crucial importance of the local in shaping outcomes (Young, 2004: 46).

To sum up, this section has introduced a major intervention in understanding the theoretical status of the state in Africa. It has examined some of the salient features, which characterize the state since independence and how they have informed changes in its discursive referents over time. The aim was to revise and improve upon Ake's writings on the state, especially his position on the theoretical status of the state in Africa, which adopts what appears to be a permanent discursive referent. Inter alia, the significance of this exercise is underscored by Abdi and Ahmed Samatar (2002) cited in Young (2004: 49) when they observed that:

Critical thinkers have certainly *written off* the African state in its *post-colonial form*.... However, .... their analytical animus is focused on the incapacity of the state in history *rather than the state per se*. In other words, African development has stalled because the state is of the wrong kind and, therefore, a re-thinking of its form seems to be of utmost necessity.



The section drew from Crawford Young. The following positions are central in Young (2004). One, the contention that the changes and shifts noted in the discursive referents to the state in Africa are not innocent of meaning. Two, the argument that given the challenges, developments and experiences, which have characterized the existence of the state in the continent, there can be no single, total or even a permanent referent for capturing and speaking to such shifts. Hence, efforts must be made to invent, reinvent and continuously link the state with the appropriate referent that suits the facts of the given period under consideration. Here, Young's position is very strong and deserves to be taken seriously too. For, if the concept of the post-colonial state is no longer applicable as a continuing discursive referent for speaking to the myriad of shifts, challenges and developments with which the state in Africa is confronted, then it would also imply, quite logically, that we also need to rethink the theory of the post-colonial state in Africa, to which we have always resorted for explanations on the changes and developments in the African state.

To recast, in the 1960s, the emergent referent for Africa was 'the post-independent state'. William Tordoff (1984: 1) calls this decade 'the annus mirabilis' of African independence. This period was marked by great hope, aspirations and expectations for ending poverty, for overcoming underdevelopment and also for superseding fundamental features and character of the colonial state. The understanding of African independence thus embraced a totalizing expectation in all aspects of state-society relations, which was to be consummated by a democratic-developmental state. At this period, it was hardly understood that 'the post-independent state' was not fundamentally different from its immediate colonial predecessor. However, the disappointment about its capacity to deliver later informed the debates and other intellectual efforts at interrogating its history, nature and character. It was then realized and in deed established that 'the post-colonial state' is nothing more than an extension of its colonial predecessor. In acknowledging the importation into the new states of the practices, routines and mentalities of the colonial state, the concept of 'the post-colonial state' thus acquired widespread currency. The imported colonial practices later served as the platform for a more ambitious form of political monopoly whose legitimizing veneer was 'developmentalism'. The appropriation of the legacy of the colonial state by the elite decanted into a patrimonial autocracy, which later decayed and relapsed into crisis by the 1980s, bringing about internal as well as external pressures for economic reform and state reconfiguration. In spite of these measures, the erosion of the stateness of most African polities could not be halted and by the 1990s, the scope for effective reform was grossly undermined, thus opening the door for a complex web of new civil conflicts, a renewed saliency of informal politics,

especially as local populations adapted to diminished state presence and service provision. All these questioned the pertinence, relevance and appropriateness of 'the post-colonial' as a label for referring to the state in this continent.

For Ake (1981, 1985a and 1985b), one point needs to be explained in greater details. To wit, he describes the state in Africa as 'socio-economic' or 'social formations'. Although he carefully avoids using the concept of 'the post-colonial state', yet his arguments, position and illustrations of the term 'post-colonial' feed into the larger theoretical ideas and conception of 'the post-colonial state in Africa'. This at least means that the revision and addition suggested to Ake's writings on the state in Africa, in this section have achieved the intended purpose. This is not intended to undermine or disparage the force of Ake's works in understanding the theoretical status of the state in the continent. Rather, the aim is to revise and extend their scope while also improving upon them. His use of the term 'socio-economic' or 'social formations in Africa' together with his illustrations of the characteristics of 'the postcolonial economy in Africa' project what appear to be permanent discursive referents to both the state and economy in Africa. Yet since the continent is still evolving, subject and amenable to changes, there cannot be any permanent referent that captures all these dynamics at once. After all, there can be no sense in which political theory entertains notions of a discursive finality since the realities, which theories capture and speak to, are far from being static but rather evolving and changing in an endless continuum. The need to capture these changes and developments, which take on different discursive referents to the state in the continent therefore informed the examination of Young's works, which answered to these expectations.

Four decades after independence, 'the post-colonial' as a continuing discursive referent for the state in Africa is hardly sufficient. The increasing implosion of wars, violent conflict and a host of other challenges threatening the state emphasize the need to 'imagine' and hopefully, 're-invent' new usages, conceptual tools and categories, which better capture and explain these challenges and experiences. In concluding Young (2004: 48) says:

Whatever the divergent forms taken by African states, most have long ceased to resemble the colonial state. The time elapsed since African independence now begins to approximate the time period during which African subjects experienced a consolidated colonial regime. New historical experience reshapes social memory and begins to obscure the colonial past. A rapidly diminishing number of Africans have any direct recollection of the colonial era. J. F. Ade Ajayi frequently reminded us that the colonial period itself was but a moment in the larger sweep of African history.<sup>82</sup> The same remark begins to apply to the post-colonial. Deeper continuities with pre-colonial social and political patterns, and novel experiences of coping with the realities of state decline in recent decades, combine to close a set of parentheses around the post-colonial as a defining condition.

According to him, while not denying the fact that, aspects of the colonial legacy 'may still be apparent', it should be noted that these are increasingly been overwritten by new defining events, moments, political practices and agendas. As Young (2004: 49) puts it:

The tides of globalization wash over the continent, depositing sedimentary layers of social exposure and economic impact. The rise of significant diaspora populations from many countries produces novel forms of international linkage. As these many processes work their way into institutional forms, political patterns, and social memory, the explanatory power of the post-colonial label erodes. In short, the post-colonial moment appears to have passed.

We will not end the discussion in this section without providing a candid assessment of Young's (2004) position, especially as it relates to that of Ake in this study. To recast, his contention on the conceptual trajectory and status of the state in Africa can be summed up as follows. One, the argument that different discursive referents are applicable and should be employed for speaking to the changing features, challenges and experiences characterizing the historical span of the state in Africa. Hence the need to look beyond a single conceptual category for capturing these dynamics of the state. Two, the position that the presence of new defining moments, practices and agendas—all of which wash over the continent in the increasing tides of globalization, appear not only to have ended the influences of the colonial past, but have also set a close on the parentheses around the 'post-colonial' as a continuously defining condition in the state's history. Our focus on Young's (2004) intervention on the conceptual status of the state in Africa should be understood. Much as we know, concepts have a decisive impact in building and determining theories. This consideration places Young's (2004) contribution in order. For, if the concept of the 'post-colonial' becomes questionable as a discursive referent for speaking to the situations in Africa, then we might as well begin to rethink the sustained reference to the theory of the 'post-colonial state' in the continent. In other words, since theories emanate from conceptual categories and constructions, if we question the concept of the 'post-colonial', then as a logical corollary, we must necessarily begin to rethink the theory of the 'post-colonial state' in the continent as well.

From the perspective of this researcher, while not denying the continuing presence of new challenges and developments in the history of this state, it is strongly argued that, these developments rather reinforce the 'colonial' and 'post-colonial conditions'. In other words, while appreciating the uniqueness and rigour of Young's (2004) argument and perspectives, especially in periodizing and identifying different phases in the history of the state with specific discursive referents, this should not be taken uncritically to imply the end of either the 'colonial' or 'post-

colonial' in the history of the state in Africa. Although a new insight has been added to the understanding of the developments in the state in the continent, especially from the point of view of its history. However, neither this insight nor the history and developments, to which it points, have undergone any radical departure from its known past. We must also recall that the basis for describing the African state as 'post-colonial' lies in the fact that, 'the very historical logic, which drives the colonial state continuously, remains so even up to the present moment'. As we noted in the last chapter, the source of this all-pervading limitation lies in the shortfalls of the independence struggle, which although succeeded in supplanting colonial political systems, failed in transforming the colonial economic system. This failure to overcome, supersede and transform all features and structures of the systems, especially the economic, is what underscores the presence and continued dominance of the logic of the colonial state.

To further illustrate, the perpetuity of the colonial order is far from being over. In Africa, in spite of the new dimensions assumed by violent conflict across the regions, we are still able to trace their actual origins and connect them with their development and determination under colonialism. For example, while the ethnocide and other conflict relations in Rwanda may have assumed new dimensions in recent times, they are nevertheless connected originally, with the removal of 'the *Kwihutura*' in colonial Rwanda by the Belgian colonial powers between 1929 and 1933—a colonial policy, which translated hitherto non-conflictual ethnic differences into antagonistic caste-like distinctions, especially in a manner driven and based on animosity, mutual alienation and hatred. In Nigeria, while there are many dimensions to the minority ferments, their actual origins lie in (i) the British colonial policies of divide and rule and (ii) the refusal of the British to resolve the contradictions generated by such policies and other associated disasters through implementing the recommendations of the Henry Willink Commission of 1957. The effects of these not only besmirch inter-ethnic group relations today, but also continue to undermine the prospects for integration and national cohesion between members of the three major ethnic groups on the one hand, and especially between and among members of these majority ethnic groups and their minority counterparts on the other. They have also informed conflictual claims and interpretations to what constitutes 'the national question' and its articulation vis-a-vis the destinies of the different peoples in the future of an uncertain federation.

In Southern Africa, following the logic suggested in Young's (2004) position, how are we to account for the persisting land question in Zimbabwe without appreciating the continuing influence of the

colonial past in the country's present history? And, how do we explain xenophobia and other disintegrative features of racial politics, which are very much alive in South Africa, independent of their colonial roots? In South-Asia, the establishment of the independent state of Pakistan has not resolved the conflict-ridden nature of inter-state relations between the country and India. The redefinition of Hinduism in violent opposition to Islam; the caste-based division of the people in India, which colonialism condoned and consolidated; the conflictual nature of Buddhist revivalism in Sri Lanka, especially in relation to the Christians and other minority religious populations together with the problematic question of Tamil nationalism—all of which trace their origins to the various colonial policies and programmes—testify to the fact that the 'colonial condition' and 'post-colonial moments' are far from being over. If anything, they rather continue to shape and determine future dynamics and vulnerability of the state in these regions. From another perspective, the ill-defined and porous nature of the boundaries of most states in South-Asia and Africa; the privileging of national sovereignty over and above cultural ties; the violent contests over identity, citizenship, territoriality, ethnicity and the Hindu-Muslim tensions arising from the boundary disputes between India, Pakistan and Bangladesh; the conflict between Pakistan and Kashmir over the Pakistani Occupied Kashmir territories (POK); the territorial-land disputes between China and North-East India; and their implications for social, economic and cultural integration are all illustrations of the unended presence of, at least the impact of the 'colonial' and 'post-colonial' 'condition'. For Latin America and indeed the South at large, it is the continuing presence and decisiveness of this repugnant past that account not only for the underdevelopment and dependency of these regions, but also their dispossession and continuing marginalization from the processes and benefits of globalization. Such influences also continue to weaken not only their collective capacities for independent action; but also their democratic transformation. As argued by Partha Chatterjee (1993: 15), the continuing influence of the 'colonial past' in the making of modern societies in Africa and Asia is underscored in the limitations of 'the post-colonial state':

The postcolonial state ... has after all only expanded and not transformed the basic institutional arrangements of colonial law and administration, of the courts, the bureaucracy, the police, the army, and the various technical services of government. M. V. Pylee, the constitutional historian, describes the discursive constraints with disarming simplicity. "India", he says, "inherited the British system of government and administration in its original form. The framers of the new constitution *could not think* of an altogether new system".

Chatterjee (1993: 10) connects this limitation with "the essence of the colonial state":

The colonial state, we must remember, was not just the agency that brought about the modular forms of the modern state to the colonies, it was also an agency that was destined never to fulfill the normalizing mission of

the modern state because the premise of its power was a rule of colonial difference, namely, the preservation of the alienness of the ruling group.

Although it was not intended to raise issues with Jacob Ade Ajayi and Crawford Young—especially given their much sagely contributions to the understanding of African history and politics—yet, we cannot avoid doing so, coming from the vantage point of Ake's writings and also, given the far-reaching implications of the issues raised in their analyses for understanding 'the state in Africa'. At the risk of being mistaken, we wish to restate our position: For Africa, colonialism is indeed a significant epoch in the history of the state and, the end of the 'colonial' and 'post-colonial' is far from being here. While conceding to Young's (2004) intervention on the need to invent new conceptual and discursive referents for reflecting on the state's changing dynamics, we however, argue that, such 'new' developments only 'reinforce', rather than 'defy' the pervasiveness of the 'colonial' and 'post-colonial' 'conditions'. Therefore, from our point of view, Young (2004) is far from being correct in presenting the 'colonial' and 'post-colonial' 'conditions' as superseded in African history. Nor do we accept Ade Ajayi's (mis) representation of colonialism as 'an ended' 'episode' for Africa. As Chatterjee (1993: 14) insightfully argues:

The idea that colonialism was only incidental to the history of the development of the modern institutions and technologies of power in the countries of Asia and Africa is now very much with us. In some ways, this is not surprising, because we now tend to think of the period of colonialism as something we have managed to put behind us, whereas the progress of modernity is a project in which we are all, albeit with varying degrees of enthusiasm, still deeply implicated.

As far as this researcher is concerned, by arguing that "the future of the state in Africa will unconditionally reflect the realities of its history", Ake (1985a: 114) deftly settles the issue—a settlement, which to us, correctly presents colonialism as an epoch—and by extension, argues out 'the colonial condition' and the 'post-colonial moment' as continuously relevant in determining changes and developments within the present and future conjunctures in Africa.

Our contribution to this theoretical engagement is that (i) instead of debating colonialism as either 'an episode' or 'an epoch' in an endless fashion, and (ii) instead of arguing out 'the end of the 'post-colonial' in Africa' and its replacement by new political dynamics in the continent; it seems more appropriate for us in this study, to understand and present the state's trajectory as reflective of 'a contradictory dilemma', especially one characterized by the cotermination of not only 'colonial' and 'post-colonial' 'features' of the state in 'the same historical conjuncture', but also one marked by the

dominance of the colonial order in the subsequent stages of its history—be they 'post-independence', 'post-colonial' and even in spite of 'the increasing plethora of new political dynamics', 'changing moments' and 'agendas' that are driven by supersonic forces across state borders. Nowhere in the modern world is the epochal nature of colonialism more enduring than in Africa, a continent, which after several foreign and home-grown policy recipes, has refused to recover from the nightmarish nostalgia of its conquered and dominated past.

#### **4.2 Democracy in Africa: An Extension of Ake's Writings**

It is clear enough in this study that the question of democracy is very pertinent to Africa, especially at this critical period of its history. Accordingly, Ake's enduring legacy lies, among others, in his incisive and thought-provoking engagement with the issues, which impinge on democracy in the continent. As we noted in the last chapter, Ake's writings on democracy in Africa focus critically on the following issues: (i) the arguments in the West against democracy in Africa, (ii) the leading misconceptions about the operations of democracy in the continent, (iii) the North's attitude to democracy in Africa, (iv) the politics of democratization and the sudden preoccupation of the West with the prospects of democracy in Africa, especially in the 1980s, (v) liberal democracy, the hegemonization of Western interests and values in Africa and other parts of the South, (vi) the changing nature and dynamics of democratization across the world, (vii) democracy and the question of economic development, (viii) the feasibility of democracy in Africa as well as Ake's recommendations on the sustainability of democracy in the regions. These issues have been examined in appreciable details in Ake with a significant focus on the state in Africa, thus establishing the impact of the character of the state on the feasibility of democracy and development in the continent. They have also been engaged and interrogated by a host of other scholars and experts.

However, in spite of his acknowledged contributions and profound theoretical insights on the question of democracy in Africa, Ake's writings do not provide a detailed account of the role and operations of the civil society in the continent's quest for democracy. In other words, either as a result of his choice of focus or a deliberate act of omission, we do not find in Ake a nuanced theoretical representation of the civil society as a part of the wider African society, which is capable of either furthering or undermining the quest for democracy in the region. In effect, the vital question of what role such a segment of the society can play in actualizing the democratic revolution is not answered in details in his narrations. This section takes on this task. It examines aspects of the

contentious debates on the civil society in general theoretical terms, on Africa, and on the possible role, which this section of the African society can play in furthering the democratic quest of its people. In addition, the section examines the history of the idea and development of the civil society in both colonial and post-colonial Africa, the factors and forces undermining its democratic operations, potentials and prospects, and how such challenges might be overcome. To these ends, the study poses the following questions: (i) Is there really a civil society in Africa? (ii) What is the specific history of its idea and development in the continent? (iii) Are its ideas, together with its operations in the South comparable with the experiences in the West, Europe and North America? (iv) What are the forms assumed by this institution under different settings and periods in the continent's history? (v) What are its pre-colonial origins and how do we account for its development under colonialism? (vi) What role did the colonial state play in either encouraging or stifling the development of this segment of the society? (vii) How entrenched are democratic values, principles and practices, which are capable of sustaining this significant segment of the larger society in post-colonial Africa? (viii) What is the state of knowledge on the civil society in the South and what is the nature of its invocation in that context? (ix) How tolerant is the state in Africa to the operations of associational groups, other non-state bodies and institutions in the exercise of legitimate, political-democratic rights? (x) What obstacles presently militate against the effective operations of the civil society in contemporary Africa? These are some of the unanswered questions on the civil society-democracy debate in the writings of Ake, which will be engaged in this section through examining aspects of the general literature, especially those, which focus on democracy in the continent. Our contention is that Ake's position and contributions to the operations of democracy in Africa will remain permanently incomplete if they do not incorporate significant aspects of the historical and on-going dynamics of the civil society debates and developments in the continent? It is against the backdrop of this reasoning that this section provides the following contributions, which seek to complement Ake's writings on democracy in Africa.

At the moment, the debate about the civil society in Africa is generally unclear and inconclusive. In most of the current literature, the idea of the civil society is used with substantially different meanings, in which its referents and usages are both ambiguous and confusing (Obadare, 2004: 8). Among others, these situations result from the conflated theoretical status of the concept, which is largely shrouded in unresolved theoretical semantics in terms of its complex historical trajectory, colonial distortions and contemporary complications in its current operational contexts. However, Sudipta Kaviraj and Sunil Khilnani (2001) identify three strands in the contemporary discussions in



which the idea of 'the civil society' figures prominently. One, in theoretical contexts and intellectual debates about 'what' the organization of society and its relation to the state in post-Communist societies should be, in which the notion is used with an unparalleled theoretical seriousness. Here, after successfully challenging the overstretched jurisdiction, excessive control of the bureaucracy and other institutions of the absolutist state in Communist Europe, the idea of the civil society outside and independent of the legal jurisdiction of the state was advanced and gained widespread significance. Within the sphere of 'leftist' political thought in the West, two other strands have also revived the idea of the civil society. One, after pronounced disillusionment with the ideas of socialism and a distinct soiling by Communist experiences, some radical theorists now seek to 'valorize' the idea of democracy through re-invoking notions of the civil society. Two, being critical of the retreat by the welfare state through the years of neo-conservative reaction in the 1980s, critical writers have concluded and now argue with relentless passion, that while it is impossible for socialists to revive the older traditions of trade-union militancy and statism, the increasing atomization of society by capitalism is equally unacceptable, leading to its severe criticism and sustained challenge, again, through articulating notions of civil society. Most of these strands argue and have sometimes invoked the British pluralist tradition, insisting on 'the revival of basically associative initiatives of non-state organizations within the domain of the civil society'. In fact, according to Kaviraj and Khilnani (2001: 2):

Evidently, there is a similarity between the post-Communist argument and the associational one; but the direction of critical enterprise is strikingly different. The first is directed at the excesses of Communist statism, the second at those of capitalist atomization. Another strand of current thinking in the West also concerns civil society: the arguments about new social movements. Again, there is a strong affinity between the associational argument and the idea that the new social movements, which are quite distinct from classical working-class movements in interest and form, are the carriers of radical democratic aspirations.

As elsewhere in 'the matured democracies', the context in which the civil society is invoked varies greatly among the countries of the South. For some, it means the reign of modern forms of sociability based on shared values and interests, which could be articulated and expressed without problematic obligations. In others however, it emphasizes the need for a secure and predictable legal-rational order. Added to the acknowledged fact of the confused contextual distinction between the operations of political institutions and practices in the continent is the confusion, which pervades the very European model from which the idea of the civil society itself is often borrowed. In other words, since the very idea of a civil society was never singular or uniform in its Western connotations, some of the ambiguities in the contemporary Third World discussions of the

term arose from its multiple meanings borrowed from the Western tradition. Hence it is not adequate to 'blame' theoretical ambiguities in the debate in Africa on the failure to look carefully at the Western dynamics of the concept. After all, there is no single, simply totalizing or even a unifying Western conception of the civil society. It therefore makes sense, only if we look precisely at what the idea sought to convey within distinct European traditions as well as the changing forms, which it assumes in Africa.

Historically, the European tradition of thinking about the civil society was shaped by three different, but significant strands, namely: (i) the legacies of the Scottish Enlightenment period, (ii) French Enlightenment thought and (iii) the preserved heritages from the German strand, which runs from Hegel to Marx. In Africa and other post-colonial societies, theoretical thinking about the civil society is entirely a derivative of this European tradition and occurs within two operational settings. The first is an intellectual and cultural context of 'received knowledge', 'borrowed paradigms and languages' through which individual writers not only 'reflect' and 'make sense' of their societies, but are also 'enabled' and 'constrained' by the operations of the borrowed languages and intellectual traditions. The second is that, political theorizing occurs under the weight of historically specific predicaments, especially serious problems confronted by generations of people who think their ways through them by continuously analyzing them theoretically. Through the production of political theory under the pressures of political practice, historical urgency thus elicits highly original uses of received doctrines and conceptual resources, such that far from being a calm act, political thinking is rather an act of intellectual desperation. It is in this context that we understand the idea of civil society, gaining currency and ascendancy in the West, is desperately pushed by scholars in the quest for solutions to historically specific problems in the Third World. In establishing the link between the European discourse of civil society and its discursive entry into the political discourses in non-European societies, we must examine the stretch of historical connections between the two by capturing their complex nature in the West and establish how they were introduced to the South, paying due attention to: (i) how the idea of a civil society passed into the political literature of European colonies in the nineteenth century, (ii) the introduction of European-styled systems of administration into the colonies, which brought along with them a certain type of discursive institutional fields, (iii) the absorption by modern elites in the colonies of Western influences and forms of behaviour based on these distinctions as in the Indian and Chinese political traditions, and (iv) the introduction of the modern state-system into Africa and other parts of the South through colonialism and the consequent transformation of pre-colonial structures and arrangements of

social power. Put differently, the idea of the civil society penetrated colonial discourses about politics in two significant ways. One, through the activities of colonial administrators, who themselves used the concept for justifying their patterns of interventions and non-interventions in the affairs of societies under their control. In this sense, it was mostly used for referring to matters, which were considered as existing outside the jurisdiction of the colonial state. Two, modern elites within the colonies, most of whom had absorbed Western influences also imbibed the use and reference to the civil society as a uniquely distinct sphere of associational life— independent of the state, thus legitimizing its entry into the discursive lexicon of the colonies. In addition to these two, there is also a more general reason, namely, the introduction of the modern state into the colonies disrupted and transformed historical distribution and arrangements of social power. As Kaviraj and Khilnani (2001: 4) brilliantly observed, "If colonial political structures had to be visualized conceptually as a 'state', this immediately brought in an implicit distinction from civil society":

With the arrival of European colonialism, the state became an undeniable, unavoidable part of the business of social living; and the institutional organization of the modern state invites a discourse in terms of a state/civil society distinction. If the state is considered too powerful and invasive, people must search for a concept that gives a collective definition to the spheres that are or ought to be left out of its control. European cultural influence always delivered this discourse, with this conceptual distinction at its centre, to the colonial intelligentsia. Thus, it is hardly surprising that with the coming of the modern state—with its enormous potentialities of collective action and equally vast dangers—this conceptual language began to be used outside the West.

In this section, our intervention on the concept of the civil society will interrogate issues interfacing (i) conceptual clarifications, (ii) its understanding in 'pre-modern' Europe, (iii) 'modern' conceptions and the development of the term, (iv) insights from John Locke, the Scottish Enlightenment and Hegel, and (v) its development in Africa and other non-European societies.

As a concept, 'civil society' has been defined from different perspectives. For example, Isaiah Berlin (1958: 124 and 127) cited in Khilnani (2001: 15) defines it as "a frontier drawn between the area of private life and that of public authority". Jacob Talmon (1952: 1), also cited in Khilnani (2001: 15) uses the concept for distinguishing 'the liberal from the totalitarian conception of democracy' and argues that the former "recognizes a variety of levels of personal and collective endeavour, which are altogether outside the sphere of politics". In the early post-Second World War decades, Marxists, both orthodox and dissident, used the concept negatively for indicting an identification with 'bourgeois society', a realm of contradictions and mystification sustained by established relations of power, the sphere of needs, inextricably linked to the productive base of capitalist

society, and one in perpetual need of constant policing and regulation by the state. Following Lukacs' interpretation of Hegel, members of the Frankfurt School defined the concept as 'a prism' through which conflicts and other contradictions of capitalism are refracted. More recently, Lloyd Sachikonye (1995) cited in John Mw Makumbe (1998: 305) defines it as an aggregate of institutions whose members are engaged primarily in a complex of non-state activities—economic and cultural production, voluntary associations, household life, and who in this way transform their identities through exercising all sorts of pressures and control upon state institutions. John L. Comaroff and Jean Comaroff (1999) cited in Obadare (2004: 2) describe it as the 'idée fixe' of the contemporary era, courted by sundry groups to champion, justify and promote various social and political projects. Inter alia, its activities are articulated through the operations of international agencies and lending bodies, private enterprises and organizations, church and denominational associations, self-employed workers' co-operatives, labour unions and the vast field of NGOS, which attract external interests and support in their bid to 'by-pass the central state' and achieve what they call 'non-state issues of interest'. As Khilnani (2001: 12) rightly surmises, most people who define or invoke it have one thing in common: the idea of the civil society incarnates a desire by society to recover aspects of the social, economic and political powers, which are believed to have been illegitimately usurped by the state. According to Khilnani (2001: 26):

Civil society presupposes a concept of 'politics': a conception which both specifies the territorial and constitutional scope of politics, and recognizes an arena or set of practices which is subject to regular and punctual publicity, which provides a terrain upon which competing claims may be advanced and justified. That is, it presupposes a conception of politics that embodies a common sense of its purposes, a sense of what it is that individuals and groups are *competing for*, of why they have associated and agreed to compete and disagree. This need not exclusively take the form of, say, participation in the electoral practices of representative democracy, premised on the expansion of a conception of the citizenry. It can involve different and 'informal' ways of entering and acting within the arena of politics.<sup>46</sup> In this respect, even in situations of great social heterogeneity, politics can function not simply to entrench social division, but it can act as a cohesive practice.

Importantly, 'modern' or 'post-Hegelian' understanding of the civil society differs remarkably from its 'pre-modern' or 'pre-Hegelian' European usage, especially in terms of its mental construction and the specific social phenomena associated with it. In 'pre-modern' Europe, the conception of civil society was based on the idea of 'societas civilis', itself derived from Cicero's definition of the state, 'civitas' as a partnership in law 'societas', with equality of legal status, but not of money or talent, among its members. With time, this became a generic term for a secure legal and political order, distinct from both a primitive and ecclesiastical society. As a nexus of relatively free individuals and groups who operated without reference to the state, its existence dated back to the twelfth century,

especially in towns, cities and metropolitan centres. As a form of aspiration, it found expression in popular consciousness and academic writings. Its articulation took the form of struggles for personal security or freedom from unlawful violence, the security of property, land, houses and goods from arbitrary arrests and seizure. Glossed with 'Stoic humanitas', it was most profoundly codified and expressed in the Roman legal system, in which much of its spirit and significant aspects of its provisions fed into the law of the church and of particular nations and states. Driven largely by notions of natural right, its values were conceptually distinct from religious revelation and were intended as a standard to which all human authorities must adhere. Its regulation of human relations secured individual ownership of property and also allowed for its transfer under defined legal procedures, making property relations predictable and property itself subject to rational exploitation. It legitimized commerce and provided the opportunity for people to trade. The conception of the civil society during this period was radically different from what later constituted its understanding in the post-Hegelian sense. Significant aspects of this difference included (i) the socio-political culture of pre-modern Europe, which was clearly different from the Greco-Roman, Byzantine and Islamic cultures in its articulation of liberty, (ii) the tension between civil ideas and what used to be called feudalism, the seigneur-vassal relationship, which involved conceptions of serfdom and the view of society as essentially hierarchical with inherited status, (iii) the simultaneous pursuits of secular and ecclesiastical academic activities in 'a collegia licita' manner that carried out the legal obligations indicated by the Digest as well as (iv) the conception of government as an integral part of the 'civil ideology', which prescribed the characteristics and parameters within which a proper civil government should operate. The significance of this difference will be clear from an examination of Hegel's contribution, which will be undertaken shortly.

For John Locke, the fundamental contrast defining the civil society lies in the state of nature. His definition of the state of nature was one of a predicament in which deeply held individual beliefs about how to act not only collided, but also one in which there was no authoritative answer to the question of 'who will be the judge?'. He therefore defines a civil society as one in which effectual answers have been found to this crucial and problematic question. As noted by John Dunn (2001: 39ff), Locke describes a true civil society as one in which governmental powers derive in more or less determinate ways from the consent of their citizens. To him, political legitimacy is best established on unbroken foundations of personal 'trust'. In this sense, a legitimate political society is that in which trust is the modality of all human interaction, such that, far from being a variably

chosen strategy contingent upon circumstances, it is rather the very premise of such an order. Both rulers and the ruled must therefore conceive of governmental power as 'a trust' and the psychic relations between them must also be governed by it. As Dunn emphasizes, an instructive aspect of Locke's works is his willingness to entangle two issues, which modern traditions of political understanding commonly treat as radically disparate, namely, the psychic and practical relations between individual citizens across the space of private life and the structural relations between bureaucratic governments and the subjects over whom they rule. In essence, much of what he tried to do was to resist the depersonalization and demoralization of political authority, which he saw as typical of his time.

He distinguishes the civil society from the state of nature and understood it as a condition in which there exists, standing laws, judges and effective powers of enforcement. A 'civilized society' to Locke was therefore not necessarily a systemic entity, but 'an aggregate of civilized human beings', most of who had succeeded in taming their bodies and disciplining their conduct. In order to achieve such a society, Locke says certain conditions were needed, among which are (i) the establishment of a representative political order, (ii) a system of private property rights, and (iii) the toleration of the freedom of worship, which in Locke, excludes the toleration of atheism. He says, the achievement of such 'a civilized habitat' could also be helped, at least in part, by (iv) processes of socialization as well as (v) through the inculcation of 'a penal conception of the self'. He gave no primacy to what Dunn calls 'special mechanisms', markets or the articulate division of labour, which to Dunn could engender and sustain a civilized society.

The main contribution of the Scottish Enlightenment lies in its response to the problem of civil society, proposed by the theorists of commercial society. Here, the language of the commercial society emerged during the eighteenth century as an attempt to resolve the mounting difficulties confronting the Christian answer to the problem of community. It tried to show how the processes within modern societies, which critics of commercial society assumed would undermine the hope of a virtuous community were in fact creating the basis for new solidarities, which in turn also enabled the operations of a new form of society. In this case, these solidarities were articulated in the form of a human association held together not by trust, but by 'the interdependencies of need'. These interdependencies, by their nature established the necessity of society while the dynamics of this process was captured by the concept of 'civilization', a concept, which described the progressive development of human capacity and manner. The viability of society in this sense also depended

upon the commitment to an effective system of justice, embodied in law and upheld by the operations of political authority. These institutions, which governed and ensured the possibility of effective markets, fulfilled existing needs while generating new ones and also created a form of dynamism, which allowed for a steady refinement of civility.

Importantly, even though a commercial society was not held together by the relations of utility and other conceptions of a rational self-interest, it still produced and sustained a realm of human interaction and relationship not governed directly by the idea of 'necessitudo', or need. In this sense, commercial society, which was both a socio-economic as well as a moral order, was therefore the product of unintended collective outcomes of private actions. In this case, the dissolution of older and other exclusive ties by the universalism of sympathy was central to the transition from barbarism and rudeness to more polished politeness, essential to the creation of the new moral sense required by the emergent commercial society. In turn, this model of universal sociability generated an independent social self-cohesiveness and consistency, collectively beneficial and entirely self-regulating, which served to replace the forms of governance associated with pre-commercial social institutions.

According to the theorists of commercial society, social practices and institutions such as the innate connections of marriage, the family and other wider webs of property and government were to be understood not entirely in terms of utility or their social function, but according to the sentiments, which animated them. Hence, the Christian conception of a universal community held together by the fear of the afterlife was substituted by the Scottish theorists in the eighteenth century with a wholly secular model of the moral order, which saw it as being created by natural social interactions. Thus, through enabling the emergence of this relationship governed by natural sympathy and need, commercial society integrated individuals into larger societies and successively connected them to a more inclusive nexus of groups. Through its possibility of creating friendship as a universal relationship of connecting all, impersonal markets thereby achieved the unintended but beneficial moral effect of allowing for the formation of private social relations, independent from the imperatives of rational self-interest and utility. This leads to the development and sustenance of stronger rather than weak social ties, leading to the existence of more matured associational ties of civil society. According to Khilnani (2001: 22):

the spirit of independence and individual liberty, characteristic of commercial societies produced not isolation and social solipsism, but a new type of public *moeurs*: it enabled a filigree of relations between individuals to

emerge, which endowed social relations with an independent consistency. This social self-cohesiveness could act as a restraining barrier on political power. It produced a self-equilibrating system, which allowed no single party or branch of government to gain enduring dominance. This system was founded on the idea of the mutability of political loyalties: 'as each individual, always independent, would largely follow his own caprices and fantasies, he would often change parties: he would abandon one and leave all his friends in order to bind himself to another in which he would find all his enemies: and often, in this nation, he could forget both the laws of friendship and those of hatred'.

For Hegel, the critical question underlining the development of civil society, which continues from that of Locke and the theorists of commercial society, had a lot to do with the possibility of creating and sustaining a community under modern conditions. Being a central figure in shaping contemporary understanding of the ideas of civil society, his views were developed in response to this question for which he introduced the distinction between 'the state' and 'the civil society'. He integrates the notion of individual freedoms specified by the natural law tradition from Hobbes to Rousseau and Kant with a rich conceptual understanding of community, which exists under conditions of modern exchange. According to Manfred Riedel (1984) and other influential interpreters, the strong novelty of Hegel's redefinition of civil society lies in the fact that he no longer used the concept as a synonym for political society, but defined it on the one hand as distinct from 'the family' and on the other hand, from 'the state'. According to Riedel (1984) cited in Khilnani (2001: 23):

... for Hegel civil society was the realm of instrumental relations between atomized and isolated individuals, an arena governed by utility. This was a realm devoid of moral qualities, which required management by external principles: the corporations, and the 'police'.

Arguing that such a definition misses Hegel's actual point, Gareth Stedman Jones (2001) cited in Khilnani (2001: 23) contends that:

For Hegel, civil society was not the object of criticism and antagonism, nor was it one which required external management. On the contrary, it embodied an intrinsically valuable acquisition: it was the space where the higher principle of modern subjectivity could emerge and flourish. But what was lacking, and what Hegel sought to provide, was an adequate conceptualization of this sphere, one which was richer than that found in the natural law tradition, which to Hegel gave too much prominence to the instrumentalities embodied in the contract.

A major motivation for Hegel in his conception of civil society was the attempt at incorporating what he saw as valuable in modern natural law, especially the conception of modern liberal individual freedom, entailing the idea of a moral and political life, which he calls the 'Sittlichkeit' of community. He arrived at this conception by means of two approaches, namely, (i) a revaluation of the concept of labour, the expressive significance of which he emphasizes and privileges over and above its



instrumental value, and (ii) his revaluation of individual subjectivity, which he saw as based on the dynamics of mutual recognition. In essence, contrary to the assertions of the natural law theorists, civil society was not the product of the social institutions of natural drives and instincts. For Hobbes, it was the instinct for self-preservation, for Rousseau it was men's natural inclination, while in Hegel, it was not merely the system of needs, but essentially the sphere of recognition. As Khilnani (2001: 24) puts it:

It was a horizontally rather than a vertically organized model. It enabled the possibility of identification between persons, and enabled connections of mutuality, based on rights and duties: it embodied rationally grounded norms which determined conduct and which required active inculcation. The rational self that inhabited civil society was not, for Hegel, a natural given (as natural law theorists tended to assume), nor could it be engendered as a simple by-product of the institutional relations of the market and contract. It could only emerge through institutionally mediated cultural and historical processes of interaction, through, above all, processes of social recognition. It was community itself that was the source—and not the outcome—of self-conscious rational being. The system of possession, property, and exchange, universalized across civil society, was an instantiation of this web of recognition, and this universality was made explicit and itself recognized in the state. The state was thus not an externally imposed construct, but rather the ratification of a pre-existing entity.

This, in short, is Hegel's solution to the Christian problem of community. In producing a political equivalent of the Christian community, united not by the fear of God but by the entrenched belief in the divinity of the political community, Hegel just like Locke, also ruled out the possibility of atheism and insisted that all had to profess some belief. So far, we have examined the European origins and contributions to the conceptual development of the civil society. For Africa, the details of how significant aspects of these European heritages were introduced to the continent, especially under colonialism as well as the differences in their institutional practices and articulation in the West, Europe and North America as opposed to what obtains in Africa have been argued out in appreciable details in some of the writings on Africa. In addition, the actual pre-colonial origins of civil society in the continent, its development and distortions under colonialism, its return, re-emergence and invocation in the post-colonial context, especially from the 1980s, have also been examined at length by Ekeh (1975, 1983 and 1998), Eboe Hutchful (1991) and Mahmood Mamdani (1997). Some of the issues raised in their works are captured in Khilnani's (2001: 11–12) summation:

In the West, disillusion with the given 'boundaries' of politics and with the restrictions of what are seen as the increasingly decrepit processes of party politics, has provoked interest in civil society as a means of rejuvenating public life.<sup>3</sup> In the East, the term has come more narrowly to mean—besides political and civil liberties—simply private property rights and markets.<sup>4</sup> In the South, the collapse of the theoretical models that dominated post-Second World War understandings of politics there has given new currency to the idea of civil society: intellectuals in India and in Latin America, in the Middle East and in China, Africa and South East Asia, are all infusing new and complex life into the category.<sup>5</sup> International agencies and lenders too have turned their attention to this idea. In an effort to accelerate and increase the efficiency of development tasks, they now seek ways to by-pass the central state and to assist directly what they identify as the constituents of civil society.

Of remarkable importance to this study, is Obadare's (2004) interrogation of the genealogy of civil society in Africa, which has the following merits among others. One, it questions the fixed and absolute exceptionality ascribed to the idea of civil society as an exclusively Western aspiration, dream and heritage that is limited only to the West and is therefore irreproducible in other non-European settings. Two, it challenges the description of civil society as connoting the possession of certain values, such as privacy, individualism and the market, which are not only present in, but actually define the West and are therefore permanently absent in non-Western contexts—a deliberate conceptual misrepresentation of civil society for human rights, such that authoritarian regimes lack it by definition; followed by its presentation as what the Greeks, the Enlightenment and the West have; and its consequent misrepresentation for what non-Western and other despotic governments, whether in the past or present, do not have and can never have. Three, it debunks its conceptualization as the highest and qualitatively the purest in the hierarchy of types of society achieved by different cultural communities, such that the idea of civil society is then used for separating non-Western societies which are allegedly rooted in 'absolutism', 'barbarism' and 'monarchism' from Western systems in which there are 'matured' and 'deeply entrenched' 'regulatory frameworks' accepted by all. In response, Obadare (2004: 7) surmises that while it is not contested that 'the modern conception' of the civil society is a child of Western political history, the arrogation and limitation of its capacity and dynamics of growth, development and change, especially its reproducibility to the West alone, is both fraught and questionable. According to Obadare (2004: 7):

It is one thing of course to argue that civil society's original spoor can be traced back to the West, but a different matter entirely to use the same fact as a marker between supposedly superior and inferior cultures. For instance, there seems to be more than sheer factual accuracy in Gellner's celebration of civil society as a 'social form among others',<sup>9</sup> one unlikely to be had by 'segmentary non-Western societies ...pervaded by awesome ritual' (p. 103) or for that matter 'ritual-pervaded cousinly republics, not to mention, of course, outright dictatorships or patrimonial societies' (p. 43). A similar affirmation of cultural exceptionalism is found in other thinkers, including Ferguson and, especially, Hegel, for whom civil society is, among other things, 'the *achievement* of the modern world...'<sup>10</sup>. This 'culturalisation' has triggered a multitude of reactions, most especially in other parts of the world where scholars have taken it upon themselves to debate the applicability or otherwise of civil society to their respective socio-cultural contexts. In the specific context of Africa, I have already indicated the existence of two divergent and apparently irreconcilable discursive traditions.

He concludes that the idea of civil society is a unique emanation from a specific conjuncture in Western social and cultural history, which has subsequently been parodied and invented in the intellectual, political and other non-state associational practices and settings in Africa and other regions of the South. In the rest of this section, we examine the conditions for the successful operations of civil society in Africa and other post-colonial societies.

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As Khilnani (2001: 26–27) argues, a major precondition for the successful operation of the civil society in Africa is a harmonized conception of politics, which reconciles divergent interests and embodies a common sense notion of its purposes in terms of what different segments of society are 'aspiring and competing for'. Here, the organization and conduct of politics 'must' encourage cohesion rather than entrenching social divisions. As yet, such conceptions of politics are unavailable in Africa. In particular, given the divided nature of beliefs about politics, the possibility of effectual civil society operations is deeply endangered in the continent. With particular focus on Sub-Saharan Africa, Jean-Francois Bayart (1986) cited in Khilnani (2001: 26-27) explains this default in terms of what he calls, "the absence of organizational principle for civil society", "the lack of common cultural frames of reference between the dominant and dominated groups and other shared conceptual maps". In India, this problem takes the form of an intellectual and conceptual failure identified as explaining the breakdown of domestic civility. As argued by Khilnani (2001: 27–28):

The consequences of this conceptual neglect have become most apparent in recent decades. The rapid and large-scale entry of agrarian groups into state and national level politics during the 1980s has had a massive impact on the conduct of parliamentary politics in India.<sup>53</sup> It has highlighted the chasm which exists between elite and vernacular universes of discourse, and it questions the possibility of creating an Indian civil society. An initial condition for a civil society, then, is the availability of a shared conceptual map which describes a collectivity (constituted by, say, 'citizens') and provides them with comprehensible (and plausible) conceptual categories which they can use to shape their dealings with one another ('rights', 'duties', 'parties', 'interests', 'secularism', 'law', and so on). Here one might adopt the distancing gaze of Michel Foucault (although it does not follow that one need share all his suspicions), and think of civil society as a set of practices which renders human beings governable: that is, as a technique of governance.<sup>54</sup>

A second precondition is the presence and conception of a particular type of the 'self': one that is mutable, able to conceive of interests as transient, able to determine, choose and change political loyalties and affiliations in a manner that does not undermine the survival of the system. Such a self must be willing to refer and resort to discursive persuasion and deliberations, which see interests not as fixed, pre-defined or pre-given, but as liable to change through dialogue, compromise and democratic consensus. This is attainable mainly through a corrigible conception of the self, especially one that conceives of, and is able to appreciate the distinction and gap between its own identity, interests and those of others. According to Khilnani (2001: 28):

This is not necessarily a liberal conception of the individual self (although it is obviously not unrelated to such a conception). In liberal conceptions, civil society seems to require the presence of a particular type of individual, a rational and interest-maximizing being, who possesses pre-given economic interests which await release and fulfilment. Yet this view of a self or individual guided by rational self-interest is excessively reductive: it would be more useful to speak of a self that is constituted and guided by 'civilized self-interest'—a conception which values restraint. The intimate link between the idea of civil society and individualism which liberal political theory insists

upon remains in fact a profoundly unstable relation, since individualism is itself one of the sources which can threaten and undermine the possibility of civil society.

In Africa, some of the impediments to civil society lie in the sustained loyalties of the people to their traditional communities. In such societies, individualism is both absent and undeveloped, while family and community structures only rarely enable the construction of notions of a private self, leading to the presence of identitarian solidarities of a sub-national character, which strives to secure identity recognition with absolute and indivisible claims.

A third, though problematic precondition for effective civil society operations is an institutionalized dispersal of social power, accomplished by means of a legal structure of property rights, a regulated system of markets where such rights can be exchanged, as well as appropriate legal recognition of political associations and voluntary agencies. However, the contradictory snag in this precondition is that as the continent negotiates its transition to both democratic and market systems, which hopefully establish firm operations of democracy and capitalism, a strong and effective state is also needed, especially one that has the capacity to neutrally enforce law and regulate social interactions. Consequently, Khilnani (2001: 30) says:

In the South, 'civil society' has come almost exclusively to mean all those forces and agencies which oppose the state and its efforts at regulation: it has been used to describe agents and practices which wish to 'recapture' areas of life from the state. Yet ... this stark opposition between civil society and state is not the most helpful one. If conceived in this way, as naming a kind of spontaneous order set apart from the structures of the state, then civil society drifts towards political indeterminacy.

Lastly, our examination of the civil society in this study focuses on aspects of Chatterjee's writings on the subject matter. His argument questions the sustained usage and theoretical reference to the civil society as a concept, which properly captures and adequately represents 'all' population categories, shades of opinions and activities outside the formal sphere of the state. We had examined aspects of his contribution on this issue earlier in this chapter. Here however, these issues are taken up more seriously in elaborate details with a view to emphasizing their relevance for the civil society debate in Africa and the South.

Chatterjee's intervention is developed from the need to review the applicability of the concept of civil society for referring to 'all' non-state segments of the political community, especially in India and Africa. In posing this challenge, his argument feeds into Ekeh's (1992: 188) sagely warning on the danger of ... "misapplying Western political constructs to African circumstances, especially when their analyses concern such history-soaked concepts as civil society". Focusing on 'the family', 'civil

society', 'political society' and 'the state'—four significant concepts of classical political theory—he observes that although Hegel's synthesis of these concepts in *The Philosophy of Right* articulated them in relation to what he called the 'ethical life' vis-a-vis the family, the civil society and the state, Chatterjee says, nothing is provided in Hegel on the political society as a distinct sphere. From this, he questions the effectiveness of civil society for theoretically speaking to all non-state associational groupings in the countries of the South and says, such categories are best represented and accounted for using the concept of 'political society'. According to Chatterjee (2001: 171):

... in understanding the structure and dynamics of mass political formations in twentieth-century nation-states, it seems to me useful to think of a domain of mediating institutions between civil society and the state. The sharpness of the nineteenth-century distinction between state and civil society, developed along the tradition of European anti-absolutist thinking, has the analytical disadvantage today of either regarding the domain of the civil as a depoliticized domain in contrast with the political domain of the state, or of blurring the distinction altogether by claiming that all civil institutions are political. Neither emphasis is helpful in understanding the complexities of political phenomena in large parts of the contemporary world.

He uses 'civil society' for referring to those characteristic institutions of modern associational life, which originate in Western societies and are based on equality, autonomy, freedom of entry and exit, deliberative procedures of decision-making, contract, recognized notions of rights and other related principles. However, since the history of modernity in non-European societies contains aspects of civil-social institutions, practices and relations, which do not conform to these Western principles, such relational patterns cannot be properly accounted for in terms of existing conventional notions of civil society derived also from the West. According to Chatterjee (2001: 172):

... it is precisely to identify these marks of difference, to understand their significance, to appreciate how by the continued invocation of a 'pure' model of origin—the institutions of modernity as they were meant to be—a normative discourse can still continue to energize and shape the evolving forms of social institutions in the non-Western world, that I would prefer to retain the more classical sense of the term civil society rather than adopt any of its recent revised versions.<sup>12</sup> Indeed, for theoretical purposes, I even find it useful to hold on to the sense of civil society used in Hegel and Marx as bourgeois society (*bürgerliche Gesellschaft*).

Yolamu Barongo (1980: 63) makes a related argument on the need for new conceptual tools for capturing developments in Africa and other regions outside the West:

Since 1960, (the beginning of African independence) many Western scholars professing expertise in the various branches of social science have been attracted to Africa to undertake studies of the problems confronting the emergent nations. From the outset the political scientists were confronted with a host of phenomena, which could not properly be accounted for within the established theoretical models employed in the study of the politics of the older states. Quite early these scholars observed that the trend of politics in the new states was towards what Western theoretical precepts considered to be undemocratic, characterized by the emergence of one party systems, authoritarian civilian and military regimes, and lack of effective political participation at the mass level.

An important consideration, which underscores the thinking about the relation between the civil society and the state in the modern history of the South is that, whereas the legal-bureaucratic apparatus of the state has been able to reach virtually all segments of the population as the target of its policies in colonial and post-colonial Africa, the domain of civil institutions is still very much restricted to a small section of the citizens. This hiatus, according to Chatterjee (2001: 172) is extremely important because, 'it is the mark of non-Western modernity' as "an always incomplete project of modernization", and of the role of an enlightened elite engaged in a pedagogical mission in relation to the rest of society. Given this lacuna in the operations of the civil society in India and Africa, a question logically arises. 'How do we conceptualize the rest of the society that lies outside the domain of civil society?'. Hitherto, this was done using of 'a traditional-modern dichotomy', an approach, which often led to the trap of "dehistoricizing and essentializing tradition", thereby denying this other domain of the possibility of coping with 'the modern' that might not conform to the Western bourgeois, secularized Christian principles of modern civil society. For Chatterjee (2001: 173), a notion of political society, which lies between the spheres of civil society and the state could help us in seeing some of these theoretical possibilities:

By political society, I mean a domain of institutions and activities where several mediations are carried out. In the classical theory, the family is the elementary unit of social organization: by the nineteenth century, this is widely assumed to mean the nuclear family of modern bourgeois patriarchy. (Hegel, we know, strongly resisted the idea that the family was based on contract, but by the late nineteenth century the contractually formed family becomes the normative model of most social theorizing in the West as well as of reformed laws of marriage, property, inheritance, and personal taxation. Indeed, the family becomes a product of contractual arrangements between individuals who are the primary units of society.) In countries such as India, it would be completely unrealistic to assume this definition of the family as obtaining universally. In fact, what is significant is that in formulating its policies and laws that must reach the greater part of the population, even the state does not make this assumption.

As a conceptual innovation, the idea of the 'political society' is therefore best understood against the backdrop of the conceptual shift from the idea of society as constituted by the elementary units of homogenous families to that of a population, which is differentiated but classifiable, describable and therefore enumerable. In Africa and other post-colonial societies, this innovation resulted not only from the deft application of Foucault's writings by the nationalist elites, but mainly from an interpretation of the contributions of colonial anthropologists and other colonial administrative theorists. In this sense, Chatterjee argues that we do not need to rectify the 'defect' in the classical conception by revising the definition of civil society through including within it social institutions based on other principles. Rather, he says, "retaining the older idea of civil society actually helps us capture some of the conflicting desires of modernity that animate contemporary political and

cultural debates in the countries of the South". To understand this mark of difference and its articulation in the operations of civil society in these countries, "we need to historicize more carefully the concepts of civil society, political society and the state in colonial and post-colonial conditions". According to Chatterjee (2001: 174):

Civil society in such countries is best used to describe those institutions of modern associational life set up by nationalist elites in the era of colonial modernity, though often as part of their anti-colonial struggle. These institutions embody the desire of this elite to replicate in its own society the forms as well as the substance of Western modernity....

Countries with ... histories of colonial modernization and nationalist movements often have an extensive and impressive network of civil social institutions of this kind. In India, most of them survive to this day, not as quaint remnants of colonial modernity but often as serious protagonists of a project of cultural modernization still to be completed. However, in more recent times, they seem to have come under siege.

In conclusion, we have examined some of the issues revolving around the civil society-democracy debate in Africa. In doing this, we noted the accounts and experiences of other countries in the South as contained in the writings of scholars from different regions of the World, especially India, a sub-continent where liberal democratic institutions are said to have performed more creditably than in other post-colonial democracies. The aim is to enrich the account of Ake's writings on democracy in Africa through incorporating aspects of the civil society debates and other relevant theoretical positions into his works. What we have provided here above is not in any way a comprehensive account of civil society in contemporary political theory. Nor is it an accurately nuanced illustration of its operations anywhere in the world. Rather, the section has only provided a fairly ambitious effort at raising issues, which impinge on the civil society-democracy interface both in a general theoretical sense and with specific reference to the context in Africa, while seeking to enrich Ake's writings on democracy in the continent, which as we argued earlier, do not provide a strong representational voice for the civil society in the continent. It is our humble submission that, several issues have indeed been raised in Ake's analysis of democracy in Africa. Many more are likely to be raised by future generations of scholars in the continent. Given his enduring legacy, which as we said, derived from his life-time engagement with these issues on a very critical basis, it cannot be otherwise. The issues raised in this study do not claim to constitute a complete critique or assessment of Ake's works. They are rather intended to provoke further, hopefully more nuanced and analytically enriching engagements with Ake's writings through drawing the attention of interested readers to vital aspects of his works—especially in the limited understanding of this author. In this quest, considerations on civil society are by no means the only issues deserving of such attention in the whole of Ake's works on democracy. But since we cannot focus on all of them



in this single study, we are therefore constrained to look very closely on the single issue of civil society. For, as Okoth (1998: 261) puts it:

An array of factors has been suggested by historians, economists, political scientists and other social scientists to explain the apparent failure of democracy and development in Africa. These include the colonial legacy, social pluralism, corruption, poor planning and incompetent management, limited inflow of foreign capital, and low levels of saving and investment. Singly or in combination, these factors are serious impediments to democracy and development.

Weaknesses in civil society operations, the limitations of its theoretical semantics, or, its utter lack are also examples of such serious limitations in the operations of democracy in Africa. The task of building a viable system of civil society is therefore one of the threatening challenges of democracy in the continent, especially, in the twenty-first century. The need to face up to this challenge is particularly pressing, given the paradoxical nature of the penetration by civil society of the continent's intellectual and political settings as a historically indexed and culturally structured legacy of the European Enlightenment. And, as historical experience in the last half of this century suggests, although the democratic impulse is irreversible, its consequences are both different and uncertain for different regions of the world. Hence the need for more context-specific assessments of the impact of the democratic revolution on the state in Africa.

#### **4.2.1 Democracy and Economic Development in Africa**

This section examines an issue raised, but not answered in Ake's (2000) work on democracy in Africa. This centres on the relationship between 'political democracy' and 'economic development', not just in Africa, but also in a general theoretical sense and across the world at large. Focusing on the contribution by Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub and Fernando Limongi (2000), among other scholars, this section takes on this challenge. The aim is to revise Ake's contribution on this issue by introducing significant insights from the critical efforts of these authors, with a view to incorporating within Ake's position recent discoveries and improvements in knowledge produced in this direction. Earlier in chapter three, we noted the important details of Ake's position on this subject matter. Nevertheless, a recapitulation of his position on this issue is now in order.

Ake's position on this subject matter is advanced in two senses. One, in his response to the arguments in the West against democracy in Africa. Two, in his more recent examination of the relationship between democracy and economic development, especially given the focus on the East

Asian tigers. As we noted earlier, three issues are implicated in the arguments against democracy in Africa. First, is the claim that Africa has its own unique history and traditions, which are not only inimical to democratic governance, but are essentially rooted in autocracy and despotism, and that the introduction of democracy, an entirely alien concept to Africa would violate the historical integrity of the African culture. Implied in this notion is the misconception that democracy is solely a Western creation, a misconception, which stems inter alia, from the confusion between the principles of democracy and the institutional manifestations of those principles. Second, is the argument about the social pluralism of African societies, particularly, their ethnic differences. It was held that given the widespread nature of ethnic conflict in Africa, and their often fragile and immature political culture, societies in the continent must be firmly governed by strong autocrats, and that the liberties offered by democracy would only inflame and multiply the spread of ethnic rivalries, while also posing the danger of political disintegration. Thirdly, the question of democracy in Africa was cleverly tied to economic development, asserting that the democratic quest must be reconciled to, and considered in the context of the most pressing needs in the continent, namely, ignorance, poverty and disease. It was reasoned that democracy in itself would neither feed the hungry, cloth the naked, heal the sick, nor will it provide shelter for the homeless. The argument was therefore mobilized that democracy was not the most appropriate priority on the agenda for Africa, because people must be educated and fed before they can appreciate democracy; that there is no choice in ignorance; and that there are no possibilities for self-fulfilment in extreme poverty. In response, even though he concedes that for democracy to be relevant, it must answer to the social needs and material conditions of the masses and other stakeholders; Ake says, it is nevertheless up to the people to determine their democratic and developmental needs based on their own interests and cherished values. Two, he says Africa's failed development experience illustrates that the idea of postponing democracy does not necessarily promote development or further its chances. Three, that it is rather mistaken to talk about the failure of development in Africa, a continent, where it has never really been tried with the commitment and sense of purpose, which it deserves. He acknowledges the East Asian experience as one of the most widely debated aspects within the utilitarian discourse of democracy. In getting to the heart of this debate, Ake (2000: 76) argues that we must answer the following questions:

Is democratization conducive to economic development? Or could it be dysfunctional to development, at least in the short run? Are developing countries in general and Africa in particular better off seeking development with authoritarian regimes? Or is the prospect of development indifferent to the authoritarian or democratic character of regimes?

In answering these questions, Ake suggests that we must go beyond the limitations of conflating development with economic growth, a mistake, which he says, currently dominates the literature on this subject matter. He admonishes us to properly capture the relationship between democracy and economic development as the pertinent problematic of the discourse and transcend the often impressionistic trend, which is either silent about the differences between economic development and economic growth, or at best, advances an avoidable trade-off between democratization and economic development. On the role of authoritarian regimes and the question of how they foster or undermine democracy, Ake (2000: 81) submits that this is yet to be devotedly studied with critical attention and rigour as that of democratic regimes. He dismisses much of what exists on this subject as merely theoretical, impressionistic and argues that they give much less insight for nuanced and properly informed conclusions than the case for democratic regimes. According to Ake (2000: 81), the uncritical reference to the East Asian experience, which wrongly privileges authoritarianism as a *sine qua non*, first for economic growth and ultimately for economic development does not help matters:

Quite often the case is rested on the experience of the East Asian economies. Here again it is rather loosely made, as Bhalla among others has shown. In the debate concerning the relation of democracy and growth, the empirical studies tend to test regime types and economic development. Often there is not enough attention to the specifics of the salient characteristics which constitute the regime types. Should one be testing the relation between regime types and growth or between freedom and growth? Bhalla thinks that it should be freedom, in which case one is dealing with a composite index which has at least two important elements, political and economic. Part of our confusion over the East Asian experience is that describing these countries as simply authoritarian conceals, too much for in these countries relatively small amounts of political freedom have co-existed with relatively large amounts of economic freedom (Bhalla, 1994: 29).

Ake (2000: 81) observes that the role of authoritarian regimes and their capacity for fostering democracy is "yet to be devotedly studied with critical attention and rigour as that of democratic regimes". Beyond this statement and the caution, which he sounds regarding the uncritical reference to the East Asian experience, he does not engage this subject matter further. In extending his writings and positions on these issues, this section examines aspects of the contribution made by Adam Przeworski *et al.* (2000) in this direction. It is particularly important to examine this issue, given its implications for strengthening or undermining the optimism and support for democracy across the world.

It has been widely argued among detractors that democracy, particularly in developing countries tends to be too messy, uncontrollably prone to manipulation and abuse and therefore cannot provide the stability and continuity needed for social and economic reform. Such arguments have however, been faulted on two grounds. One, while there is a justified scope for legitimate debates

on what policies and practices are best for stimulating economic growth, democracies are however, not worse off than other forms of government in boosting economic performance. In fact, democracies are better in meeting pressing social needs, most of which affect the poor masses of the citizens in every country, particularly at moments of crisis, reparation and displacements. Two, democratic participation is in itself a critical end of human development and not just a means of achieving it. Nevertheless, according to the United Nations Human Development Report (2002: V):

... whether we are talking about global governance systems confronting the myriad challenges of an increasingly interconnected world, national governments struggling to meet the needs of their citizens or the corporate and private forces in national and global life thrown up by the economic, social and technological changes of recent decades, it is clear that effective democratic governance is not yet a reality.

For Africa, barring a few exceptions, the democratic deficits have been quite alarming: widespread unemployment, unassuaged economic decline, civil wars and a host of other challenges combine with growing transnational threats such as HIV/AIDS and climate change in a global system in which economic integration, political liberalization and the interdependence forged by globalization create increased fragmentation between rich and poor countries. A regrettable, yet credible consensus across the world is that the prospects for achieving human development expectations and other Millennium Development Goals by 2015 are extremely bleak and have been most regressive in Sub-Saharan Africa in recent years. The genocidal war in Darfur, Western Sudan, caused by struggles for oil money, agricultural land and political power; the refugee situations across Southern Africa created by the pseudo-democratic regime in Zimbabwe in recent years; the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Malawi among other parts of the continent; the authoritarian reversal in the Democratic Republic of Congo; the conflict in Somalia, which has made the country a breeding ground for extremism and violent conflict; and the situations in Nigeria's Niger Delta region are disappointing confirmations of this position.

The case for dictatorships has often been that democratic regimes are incompetent in managing economic and social life; and that authoritarian regimes have the advantage of building stronger states, which are capable of making binding decisions in the long run interests of the people. However, beyond the attempt at presenting democracy as incompatible with economic growth, the empirical evidences supporting these claims are lacking. Scholars are therefore divided in terms of their positions on this issue. An examination of such contrasting positions confirms this observation. For example, Christopher Clague *et al.* (1996) present democracies as better guarantors of property

rights, the enforcement of which is essential for investment and growth. According to Stephan Haggard (1997), by virtue of being able to win the support of alienated groups, democracies are better at managing and consolidating economic reforms. However, some other scholars present democracy as inhibitive of economic growth. Within this mode, Silvio Borner, *et al.* (1995) claim that three empirical studies identified a positive relationship between democracy and growth; another three identified a negative association; while some ten studies established no conclusive relationships. Robert Barro's (1996) study tested a non-linear relationship and found that at low levels of democracy, more democracy is better for growth—but that at high levels, more democracy is harmful to growth. Jose Tavares and Romain Wacziarg (2001) argue that democracy increases human capital accumulation and lowers income inequality, thereby increasing growth. They however observe that in the process, physical capital accumulation is lowered, government consumption rises, while growth is lowered. A very striking result from their study is the claim that fertility rates are significantly lower in democracies at all income levels, and that they go up and down as countries undergo transitions between dictatorships and democracies. As they argue, this has strong implications for women's well-being. Focusing on Latin America, Todd Landman (1999) finds out that the level of economic development has no significant effect on the rate of change to democracy for any of the seven measures of democracy, which he adopted in his study. According to John B. Londregan and Keith T. Poole (1996), high-income countries are more likely to be democratic once other factors are taken into consideration. According to them, democratic regimes are more likely to survive in high-income countries, although they are not more likely to emerge. In addition, they contend that while empirical evidence suggests that authoritarian reversals are likely during periods of severe economic downturns, it is not clear whether bad economic performances cause democracies to fall, or whether democracies tending towards decline exhibit bad performance.

One of the strongest advocacies for democracy is found in Amartya K. Sen's (1999a: 3-17), which presents 'the return of democracy' as "the most important development of the twentieth century". In his typically thought-provoking approach, he recounts that so many events, developments and occurrences of enormous gravity and enduring legacies have been witnessed by humanity during this century. These include, the dissolution of European, especially British and French empires, which had exerted pronounced dominance on the world in the nineteenth century; the experiences of the two World Wars; the rise and fall of fascism and Nazism; the rise and fall of communism, as witnessed in the former Soviet bloc and the radical transformation of China; a marked shift from the

economic dominance of the West to a new economic balance much more dominated by Japan, East and Southeast Asia, notwithstanding the financial and other economic problems, which that region of the world is going through right now. According to Sen (1999a: 3–4):

among the great variety of developments that have occurred in the twentieth century, I did not, ultimately, have any difficulty in choosing one as the preeminent development of the period: the rise of democracy. This is not to deny that other occurrences have ...also been important, but I would argue that in the distant future, when people look back at what happened in this century, they will find it difficult not to accord primacy to the emergence of democracy as the preeminently acceptable form of governance.

As Sen (1999a) observes, although the idea of democracy actually originated more than two millennia ago in ancient Greece, and although piecemeal efforts at democratization were also noted in different parts of the world, including Africa and India, the democratic idea collapsed and was replaced with different forms of asymmetric and authoritarian rule until the twentieth century, when it triumphantly re-surfaced and gained widespread acceptance across the world. Its re-emergence was heralded by the signing of the Magna Carta in 1215; the French and American Revolutions in the eighteenth century; the widening of the franchise in Europe and North America in the nineteenth century; the eventual recognition and appreciation by democratic theorists, European powers and colonial anthropologists that a country does not have to be deemed fit for democracy, but rather that, it has to become fit through the continuous practice and engagement in the values of democracy; and the eventual acknowledgement and establishment of democracy as the 'normal' form of government to which all nations are entitled—whether in Europe, the Americas, Africa or Asia—whatever their histories, cultures and disparate levels of affluence and civilization. This is however, not meant to deny the internal variations in the operations of democracy across the world. Nor is it meant to deny the challenges confronted in the practices of democracy across different settings. As Sen (1999a: 5) argues:

This is a historic change from not very long ago, when the advocates of democracy for Asia or Africa had to argue for democracy with their backs to the wall. While we still have reason enough to dispute those who, implicitly or explicitly, reject the need for democracy, we must also note clearly how the general climate of opinion has shifted from what it was in previous centuries. We do not have to establish afresh, each time, whether such and such a country (South Africa, or Cambodia, or Chile) is "fit for democracy" (a question that was prominent in the discourse of the nineteenth century); we now take that for granted. This recognition of democracy as a universally relevant system, which moves in the direction of its acceptance as a universal value, is a major revolution in thinking, and one of the main contributions of the twentieth century. It is in this context that we have to examine the question of democracy as a universal value.

He describes the case for authoritarianism and other positions, which present non-democratic regimes as better guarantors of economic development as parts of "the Lee hypothesis", due to its

advocacy by Lee Kuan Yew, the leader and former President of Singapore. He argues that although certain disciplinarian states like South Korea, Kuan Yew's Singapore and post-reform China have had faster rates of economic growth than many less authoritarian states like Costa Rica, India and Jamaica, the Lee hypothesis is based on sporadic empiricism, drawing on very selective and limited information, rather than rigorous and detailed statistical testing over wide-ranging data. He maintains that a general relation of this kind cannot be established on the basis of very selective evidence: we cannot infer from the high economic growth of Singapore or China a 'definitive proof' that authoritarianism necessarily furthers the chances of economic growth; just as we cannot also draw the opposite conclusion from the fact that Botswana, the country with the best record of economic growth in Africa and, indeed one of the finest records of economic growth in the whole world, has been an oasis of democracy in the continent. According to Sen (1999a: 6-7), "we need more systematic empirical studies to sort out the claims and counterclaims":

Systematic empirical studies (for example, by Robert Barro or Adam Przeworski) give no real support to the claim that there is a general conflict between political rights and economic performance.<sup>2</sup> The directional linkage seems to depend on many other circumstances, and while some statistical investigations note a weakly negative relation, others find a strongly positive one. If all the comparative studies are viewed together, the hypothesis that there is no clear relation between economic growth and democracy in either direction remains extremely plausible. Since democracy and political liberty have importance in themselves, the case for them therefore remains untarnished.<sup>3</sup>

He observes that the question involves a more fundamental issue of the methods of economic research and suggests that we must not only look at statistical connections, but also examine and interrogate the complex causal processes involved in both economic growth and development. In this regard, he mentions some of the economic policies and circumstances that led to the economic success of the countries in East Asia. Some of these 'helpful policies' include the openness of the economies in those countries to protected and controlled competition, the use of international markets, public provision of incentives for investment and export, a high level of literacy and schooling, successful land reforms, and a host of other social opportunities, which widened participation and economic expansion. None of these policies is inconsistent with democracy or requires characteristically authoritarian regimes for its successful implementation. He therefore dismisses the idea of an existing tension between economic development and democracy in the literature.

In their book, *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990*, Przeworski, A., et al. (2000) raised some crucial questions. (i) Is economic development conducive to political democracy? (ii) Does democracy foster or hinder material welfare? Based on

the insights gleaned from their work, we might also ask (i) Given the complex nature of political regimes, is it enough to assume, or even conclude that by being costly and expensive to maintain, democracies, especially in the South are therefore inimical to economic development? (ii) Can we argue that by virtue of being able to repress popular demands, authoritarian and other non-democratic regimes are better able to manage and hasten processes of economic development? (iii) Given the experiences of the Asian tigers, does history and modernization theory not appear validated in terms of its prescribed models for economic growth and development? (iv) What explains the difference between the development-oriented authoritarian regimes in East Asia and the doomed dictatorships in Africa, such as Mugabe's Zimbabwe, Mobutu's Zaire, Arap Moi's Kenya and other parts of the continent? (v) Must we suspend the quest and aspiration for democracy in the immediate search for development? (vi) How complementary or incongruous is the quest for democracy and development? (vii) What lessons does Africa stand to learn from the experiences in Romania, Brazil, Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea, Japan and China? (viii) What forms does political dictatorship assume in different parts of the South–Africa, Latin America, Asia and the Middle East—and how do we account for the unscrupulous squandering of resources by leaders in these states and the havocs spawned by military governments in Central and South America? (ix) What impact does the material well-being of the people have on the stability of political regimes? (x) And, given the fact that most African countries are signatories to the international conventions on child, women and other minority rights, how representative has African democracy been, and how sensitive are democratic systems in the continent to women, child and other minority rights and needs of these vulnerable groups? (xi) How does democracy through representative politics answer to the questions of justice and other distributive concerns, and how are democratically generated pressures converted into binding policy outcomes? And lastly, (xii) What implications do our positions have for policy prescriptions and demo-optimism across the world? As argued by Przeworski *et al.* (2000: 1), these are by no means idle questions. Rather, they have continuously engaged the attention of scholars across the world and have dominated intellectual settings as well as political agendas over the past fifty years, especially:

... ever since the Atlantic Charter, signed by Churchill and Roosevelt in 1941, offered the "assurance that all men in all the lands might live out their lives in freedom from fear and want". For the first time in history, democracy and development, freedom from fear and from want, were conceived as the future of all the people in the world, not as the privilege of the "civilized" nations.



It is therefore understandable enough that the issues of democracy and its relationship to development are very pertinent to the contemporary world and Africa in particular. The questions raised above do not only prompt other issues of policy concern within the political economy of democracy and development, but also help to fore-ground our understanding of other larger issues, which although are relevant in the discourse, but are however hardly noted or linked with the subject matter. Following World War II, various authoritarian regimes across the world have presented themselves as 'forces for progress', 'agents of development' and 'shortcuts to modernity'. They argue that they are uniquely capable of mobilizing resources and energies to break the chains of poverty, build a better future and lead their countries to 'affluence', 'power' and 'prestige'. These regimes also promised to, "eradicate poverty, generate affluence, enable their countries to assume their rightful places among the powers of the world, and by the examples of their own success convert others to the righteousness of their dictatorial ways" (Przeworski, *et al.* 2000: 2).

Prominent among these countries, especially in terms of their records of successful economic performances were the East Asian countries. In the 1950s, one of the most successful economic miracles was communist Romania; in the early 1970s, the major economic wonder was military-ruled Brazil; in the 1980s, the economic tigers were the dictatorships of Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan; while from the 1990s, the dominant leader has been China. As a collectively shared attribute, none of these countries is democratic. As a consequence, given their spectacular successes, democratic optimism has not only been dampened, but is increasingly doubted by both committed and would-be democrats: whether or not development necessarily requires order and discipline; whether or not rationality would flow from authority; and whether or not democrats could continue to trust that their own ways would be capable of lifting the masses of the world's poor from their benign plight. According to Przeworski *et al.* (2000: 3):

Around 1960, when decolonization was giving birth to many "new nations", in an international context in which communist regimes still appeared to be developing impressively, many scholars and politicians concluded that the perceived economic effectiveness of dictatorships was simply a fact of life, one that should be confronted courageously by admitting that democracy was a luxury that could be afforded only after the hard task of development had been accomplished. To cite just a few typical voices of the time, Galenson (1959: 3) claimed that "the more democratic a government is, ... the greater the diversion of resources from investment to consumption". De Schweinitz (1959) argued that if the less-developed countries "are to grow economically, they must limit democratic participation in political affairs". La Palombara (1963: 57) thought that "if economic development is the all-embracing goal, the logic of experience dictates that not too much attention can be paid to the trappings of democracy". Dictatorships were needed to generate development: As Huntington and Nelson (1976: 23) put it, "political participation must be held down, at least temporarily, in order to promote economic development".

Arguing that these issues are wrongly formulated, Przeworski *et al.* (2000) maintain that the efforts at assessing the developmental potentials of states only from their regime settings miss the point, just as general statistical indicators do not always capture the detailed complexities of political regimes and transitions. Observing that they are not the first to study the impact of political regimes on economic performance, they submitted that there had been about forty empirical studies on this subject, with the first dating as far back as 1966. In spite of all their efforts, Przeworski *et al.* (2000) aver that earlier studies in this direction have repeatedly arrived at grossly invalid conclusions, mainly because they employed faulty methodologies. Tracing the history of such studies, Przeworski *et al.* (2000: 78-79) observe that:

First advanced in 1959, S. M. Lipset's observation that democracy is related to economic development has generated the largest body of research on any topic in comparative politics. It has been supported and contested, revised and extended, buried and resuscitated. And yet, though several articles in the *Festschrift* honouring Lipset (Marks and Diamond 1992) proclaim conclusions, neither the theory nor the facts are clear.

For S. M. Lipset, a much historical influence in this direction was perhaps the declaration in 1951 by a group of experts convened by the United Nations with the objective of designing concrete policy measures for the economic development of underdeveloped countries based on the ideas of 'hard choices', 'unavoidable sacrifices and trade-offs'. According to the United Nations' Department of Social and Economic Affairs (1951: 15):

There is a sense in which rapid economic progress is impossible without painful adjustments. Ancient philosophies have to be scrapped; old social institutions have to disintegrate; bonds of caste, creed and race have to burst; and large numbers of persons who cannot keep up with progress have to have their expectations of a comfortable life frustrated. Very few communities are willing to pay the full price of economic progress.

The central argument in the contribution by Przeworski *et al.* (2000) is that the questions regarding the relationship between democracy and economic development are wrongly formulated in the literature. According to these authors, given their complexities, political regimes combine within them, many institutional features, which can have emergent effects and may also work at cross-purposes. For example, they may encourage economic rationality but simultaneously hinder economic initiative; grant governments the authority needed to promote development, but also allow them the leeway to evade popular control; they may foster long-term thinking at the cost of short-term disasters and vice versa. Development, on the other hand, they say, is a multifaceted process of structural transformations, not only economically, but extends to the growth in income, productivity, consumption, investment, education, life expectancy, employment and all that makes for a better life. However, since all these values and ideals do not always go together, questions of

democracy and its relationship to development necessarily encompass more specific issues, most of which concern the impacts of particular features of political regimes on various aspects of economic performance.

A detailed assessment of the operations of political regimes on economic development must therefore examine (i) the internal conditions that determine whether democracy or dictatorship prevails in a given state, (ii) the factors, which cause political regimes to rise, endure and fall, (iii) the historical factors responsible for their transformations, (iv) an understanding of their preceding political history, cultural traditions, the fragility of political institutions as well as (v) the global political climate. The position of these authors suggests that broad categorizations of regimes do not help us understand the actual operations of democracy or tyranny in any system and their impact either on material well being, or even on economic development at large. Rather, they argue that specific institutional mechanisms and settings, which are internal to each system, must be critically interrogated in order to establish the features characterizing the polity under consideration over a given time. Within this connection, the question of democratic representation, the accountability of those in power to the larger public, and other issues of distributive concerns are equally paramount, for, as the United Nations Human Development Report (2002: 13) argues, 'assuring people's destiny also requires that they be free and able to participate in the formation and stewardship of the rules and institutions that govern them'. Other issues, such as popular control, the operations of civil society, checks and balances, the impact of a country's colonial heritage or legacies, the levels of regime or institutional fragility, weaknesses and flexibility, together with the degree of foreign interferences must also be examined in terms of how they impact upon the operations of government and the state at large. Only then can we explain the operational practices of democracy in the given state vis-a-vis the attainment of development. Even then, we can explain such operations only in terms of 'observed relativity', based on the historical exchanges in the democratic space and process, not in any absolute or final sense.

Although Przeworski *et al.*'s (2000) text offers one of the most comprehensive interventions on the relationships between democracy and economic development in different parts of the world, yet, given the limitations of time, space and a host of other restrictions, which actually constrain this study, we shall not delve into their elaborate details. It is nevertheless remarkable to note that they examine considerations impinging on (i) democracies and dictatorships as regime types and how they further or impair economic development, (ii) economic development and political regimes, (iii)

political regimes and economic growth, (iv) political instability and economic growth, and (v) political regimes and populations.

Their approach entailed the definition of 'democracy' and 'dictatorship', followed by the classification of observed regimes into these categories. Several classifications, covering different periods and countries were developed and improved upon using what they called (i) a better grounding in political theory, (ii) exclusive reliance on observables rather than subjective judgments, (iii) an explicit distinction between systematic and random errors, and (iv) more extensive coverage in time and space. According to Przeworski (2000: 10):

we develop a classification of political regimes guided by these objectives. This may appear to be the crucial step, because everything that follows hinges upon it. But even if regime classification has been the subject of some controversies, alternative definitions of "democracy" give rise to almost identical classifications of the actual observations. Our own classification, though more extensive than most, is no exception. It differs little from all others with which we could compare it. Hence, it turns out that in the end little depends on the way we classify regimes. If they were available for the same sample, other classifications would have generated the same results.

Once the regimes have been classified, we need to understand their dynamic. In particular, we must examine whether or not the rise and fall of political regimes have something to do with factors that also affect economic performance. We already know that if the same factors, whether or not we can observe them, affect both the selection of regimes and their performance, we must take this fact into account when studying the impact of regimes on performance.

We are thus led to reopen the problematic inaugurated by Lipset (1959, 1960) and subjected to innumerable empirical analyses since then.

This is extended into an interrogation of whether or not the incidence of democratic regimes is related to the level of development in those countries observed. This involves distinguishing whether this relation is due to the fact that democracies are more likely to emerge as a result of economic development or are only more likely to survive when a country is already affluent. Other considerations, such as (i) the impact of the global political climate, (ii) the political histories of the particular countries in question, (iii) their material and social conditions are also examined in this connection. This exercise is expected to enable the prediction and determination of the specific type of regime, known as 'selection rule', which a country has during a particular period and its impact on the prospects for economic development. After establishing this specific 'selection rule', Przeworski *et al.* (2000) further extend their study to the analysis of the impact of political regimes on material well-being. This takes the form of examining the impact of political regimes on the growth of total income, total consumption, the purchasing power parity of individual citizens within the economy,

per worker output, investment, labour force, and the functional distribution of income. Continuing, Przeworski *et al.* (2000: 11) argue that:

Whereas the question whether or not regimes affect economic growth is controversial, the assertion that political instability thwarts economic growth seems to be almost consensual. But "instability" turns out to be a muddled notion; distinctions are needed.

This consideration therefore leads the authors to examine the impact of past, current and expected instability on economic growth, separately and independently under democracies and dictatorships. Following Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1979: 38), Guillermo O' Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter (1986: 73), Przeworski *et al.* (2000: 18) define a regime as "the system of relations between the civil society and the state". It is a system of rules and practices that determine who has political rights, how they can be exercised and with what consequences for the control of the state. In general, they describe democracy and dictatorship as different ways of organizing political lives, of selecting rulers, processing conflicts, and for making and implementing public decisions. They observed that democracy has become an altar on which everyone hangs his or her favorite 'ex voto' and one to which virtually all normatively desirable aspects of political and sometimes, social and economic life are credited as definitional features of democracy—representation, accountability, equality, participation, dignity, rationality, security, freedom and other endless issues. In particular, they capture three major distinctions, which dominate modern political thought vis-a-vis democracy, namely, (i) Montesquieu's legacy (1748) based on the distinction between limited regimes and despotic regimes, (ii) Kelsen's contribution (1945), which, going back to Rousseau and Kant, was to distinguish between 'autonomy', (based on systems in which norms are determined by those to whom they apply) and 'heteronomy' (based on systems in which the legislators are distinct from those who are subject to the laws). Lastly, is Schumpeter's (1942) innovation, which emphasizes 'competition', or using Dahl's (1971) expression, emphasizes 'contestation' as the essential feature of democracy. Focusing on 'contestation', Przeworski *et al.* (2000: 15) submit that:

Our purpose is to distinguish between (1) regimes that allow some, even if limited, regularized competition among conflicting visions and interests and (2) regimes in which some values or interests enjoy a monopoly buttressed by the threat or the actual use of force. Thus "democracy", for us, is a regime in which those who govern are selected through contested elections. This definition has two parts: "government" and "contestations".

Clarifying further, Przeworski *et al.* (2000: 15) assert that:

In no regime are all governmental offices filled by elections. Outside of classical Greece, generals, who are public officials, have never been elected. Judges rarely are. What is essential in order to consider a regime as

democratic is that two kinds of offices be filled, directly or indirectly, by elections: the chief executive office and the seats in the effective legislative body.

Adopting Przeworski's (1991: 10) dictum on democracy as a system in which parties lose elections, Przeworski *et al.* (2000) argue that 'contestation' occurs when there exists an opposition that has some chance of winning office as a consequence of elections. In this sense, they say, democracies are systems in which incumbent parties actually lose elections. They therefore present 'alternation' in office as the 'prima facie' evidence of democratic contestation. From this premise, contestation is defined as comprising three other features: (i) 'ex-ante uncertainty', (ii) 'ex-post irreversibility', and (iii) 'repeatability'. According to Przeworski *et al.* (2000: 16–17):

By "ex-ante uncertainty" we mean that there is some positive probability that at least one member of the incumbent coalition will lose in a particular round of elections. Uncertainty is not synonymous with unpredictability: The probability distribution of electoral chances is typically unknown. All that is necessary for outcomes to be uncertain is that it be possible for some incumbent party to lose.<sup>5</sup> The best illustration of such uncertainty is the surprise expressed by an editorial in the Chilean right-wing newspaper, *El Mercurio*, in the aftermath of Salvador Allende's victory in the first round of the presidential elections of 1970: "No one expected that a Marxist candidate could win elections through a universal, secret, bourgeois franchise". The franchise may have been "bourgeois", the chances skewed, and the victory of a Marxist candidate may have been known to be unlikely. But it was possible. The eventual outcome was not certain ex ante.

This feature of democracies has practical consequences. Most people think that Argentina under President Arturo Illia (1963-66) was democratic, even though the largest party in the country was prohibited from competing in the elections of July 1963. In turn, most agree that Mexico is not democratic, even though no party is legally banned from contesting elections. The reason is that Illia won narrowly, with 26.2 percent of votes cast, and he could have lost. In contrast, in Mexico it was certain that the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) would win.

By "ex-post irreversibility" we mean the assurance that whoever wins election will be allowed to assume office. The outcomes of elections must be irreversible under democracy even if the opposition wins. In 1929, the dictator of El Salvador, General Romero, announced that his country was about to join the family of civilized nations by celebrating the first free and honest election. He issued a *decreto-ley* that specified when the elections would take place, who would be qualified to vote, what the ballots would look like, when the polling places would be open, and so forth. The last point declared that "Army contingents will be stationed in the polling places in case the Opposition wins". That was not a democratic election.

In Przeworski *et al.*'s (2000) empirical study, democracies are therefore clearly differentiated from dictatorships. In conclusion, two positions are instructive to this research from the contribution by Przeworski *et al.* (2000). One, the argument that there is nothing about dictatorships that naturally or inherently furthers economic development, just as democratic regimes in themselves also do not automatically bring about economic development. As we noted earlier, given the complex nature of political regimes, a host of other factors need to be critically examined and taken into consideration. These include:

1. The level of development (LEVEL), as measured by per capita income.<sup>2</sup>

2. The political legacies of a country, as summarized by two dummy variables that indicate whether or not the country became independent after 1945 (NEWC) and whether or not it was a British colony in 1919 (BRITCOL).
3. The political history of the country, as indicated by the number of past transitions to authoritarianism (STRA).<sup>3</sup>
4. The religious structure of the country, as indicated by the proportions of Catholics (CATH), Protestants (PROT), and Moslems (MOSLEM) in the population.
5. The ethnolinguistic (ELF60) and religious (RELDIF) fractionalization of the country, measured as the probability that two randomly chosen individuals will not belong to the same group.
6. The international political environment, as measured by the proportion of other democracies in the world (ODWP) during the particular year. By "other" we mean in countries other than the one under consideration (Przeworski, 2000: 81).

According to Przeworski *et al.* (2000: 4), if properly interrogated it would be established that beyond the formal features of political regimes, these factors actually impact upon the results generated in different states. This is added to the fact that, in spite of the seeming appearance of economic development attained by dictatorial regimes, the list of disasters generated by authoritarianism is long and tragic:

Even the economic collapse of communism pales in comparison with the destruction caused by dictatorships in many African countries, the squandering of resources in the Middle East, or the havoc spawned by military governments in Central America. For every developmental miracle, there have been several dictatorships that have engaged in grandiose projects that have ended in ruin, or else dictatorships that have simply stolen and squandered. In turn, the record of performance among the democracies, which has featured examples of spectacular growth (notably in Western Europe until the mid-1970s) as well as of rapid deterioration (as in Latin America in the 1980s), has not reached the extremes seen among the dictatorships. Hence, to assess the impacts of political regimes, we must examine their full record, not just the best performances.

Between 1950 and 1990, even though democracies experienced twice as many riots and demonstrations and thrice as many labour strikes, such events and the changes in governments did not undermine economic growth in democracies. Under dictatorships, they did. Dictatorships were also more prone to violent political upheavals, experiencing a war, on average, in every twelve years, as against every twenty-one years in democracies. Constitutional and other procedural requirements caution democracies from resorting to war on a frequent basis, while democracies generally hardly go to war with themselves. In Africa, the conflict situations make democratization a non-negotiable sine qua non for development. Among others, this is because, the political space and institutions that provide for open contests give frustrated and disenchanted opponents the hope that change is possible without having to destroy the system. In a comparative assessment of political regimes in Asia, the United Nations Human Development Report (2002: 3 and 57–58) makes a case for democracy and captures some of the life-threatening underbellies of authoritarian rule:

... democracy helps protect people from economic and political catastrophes such as famines and descents into chaos. This is no small achievement. Indeed, it can mean the difference between life and death. Nobel Prize-winner Amartya Sen has shown how elections and a free press give politicians in democracies much stronger incentives to avert famines.

Since 1995 an estimated 2 million people—a staggering 10 % of the population—have died of famine in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In 1958-61 nearly 30 million people died of famine in China. But since achieving independence in 1947, India has not had a single famine, even in the face of severe crop failures. Food production was hit hard during the 1973 drought in Maharashtra. But elected politicians responded with public works programmes for 5 million people and averted a famine....

As Amartya Sen has argued, democratic institutions and processes provide strong incentives for governments to prevent famines. Without opposition parties, uncensored public criticism and the threat of being thrown out of office, rulers can act with impunity. Without a free press, the suffering from famine in isolated rural areas can be invisible to rulers and to the public. "Famines kill millions of people in different countries of the world, but they don't kill the rulers. The kings and the presidents, the bureaucrats and the bosses, the military leaders and the commanders never are famine victims".<sup>14</sup>

Consider China, India and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In India famines were common under colonial rule—for example, 2-3 million people died in the 1943 Bengal famine. But since independence and the establishment of democratic rule, there has been no recurrence of famine—despite severe crop failures and massive losses of purchasing power for large segments of the population, as in 1968, 1973, 1979 and 1987. Each time the government acted to avoid famine. For example, food production fell sharply during the 1973 drought in Maharashtra, but famine was averted, partly because 5 million people were quickly put to work in public works projects. In contrast, during 1958-61, famines in China killed nearly 30 million people. And one of the worst famines in history continues in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, having already killed an estimated 1 in 10 citizens.

The second vital contribution from Przeworski *et al.*'s (2000) intervention is that we can neither infer a detailed account of what constitutes the problem of democracy for all countries in the world at large, nor can we understand its specificities in one country by focusing on the experiences of other countries. Rather, the determination of the challenges, obstacles and impediments to democratic practice must be sought within the countries under consideration, even though they may still be connected at other levels, with various chains of external factors and considerations. For example, in Africa, the problem of democracy revolves around the question of neo-patrimonialism, official corruption, the absence of a virile civil society, the cake-sharing psychosis and the distributive pressures, the entrenched legacies of hyper-centralized military rule—all of which define the context for bad leadership in the regions—especially given the dubious alliances between the privileged fractions of these elites and their international collaborators who are adeptly astute in looting the local resources while also helping such local elites stabilize their hold onto power through their legitimation of autocratic and other non-democratic regimes in the continent. Also, while in most parts of nineteenth century Latin America, the problem of democracy has for long been woven around the question of regime alternation (Przeworski, 2000: 16), in India, beyond the questions of voters' turn out, other larger issues, such as the translation of welfare and entitlement claims by members of the political society into matters of rights by the state, the inclusion and representation



of historically deprived groups in the political process, the constitutional pressures, struggles and demands for a balance in minority-majority status, especially by the Muslims and other minority religious groups vis-a-vis the dominant Hindu population, the question of socio-economic inequalities vis-a-vis class domination and caste hierarchies, the construction of caste history and the political articulation of caste interests, the sexual exploitation of women from other backward caste groups (OBC) and the constitutional negotiation of rights for labouring and subaltern classes are vital issues in assessing the health of democracy in the sub-continent.

To sum up, several issues are raised in the contribution put across by Przeworski *et al.* (2000) and this study does not claim to have captured them all. Rather, what we have tried to do is to open up the discussion on the relationship between democracy and economic development, while seeking to extend Ake's position to take into account aspects of the renewed insights in this direction. Among others, the United Nations Human Development Report (2002: 56) aptly captures the veracity of Przeworski *et al.*'s (2000) contribution:

... while the economic performance of dictatorships varies from terrible to excellent, democracies tend to cluster in the middle. The fastest-growing countries have typically been dictatorships, but no democracy has ever performed as badly as the worst dictatorships (Przeworski and others 2000). The same is true for poverty reduction (Varshney 2002). Thus democracy appears to prevent the worst outcomes, even if it does not guarantee the best ones.

According to the same Report (2002: 58–59):

Political incentives in democracies also seem to help societies avoid other disasters, especially economic ruin and the collapse of development. The worst economic crises in democracies have been much less severe than the worst under dictatorships. True, some of the highest economic growth has been achieved under non-democratic rule, notably in the East Asian tigers between the 1960s and 1990s. But authoritarian regimes have also taken countries to economic ruin—as in Mobutu Sese Seko's Congo, Papa and Bebe Doc's Haiti and Idi Amin's Uganda. Only 1 of the 10 countries with less than 1 % annual growth for at least 10 years between 1950 and 1990 was a democracy.

... democracies help spread the word about critical health issues, such as the negative implications for women of a large number of births, the benefits of breast feeding and the dangers of unprotected sex in the context of HIV/AIDS. In these areas open dialogue and public debate can disseminate information and influence behaviour. Sharp declines in fertility in highly literate Indian states such as Kerala were due not only to high literacy but also to its interaction with public debates on the benefits of small families.<sup>15</sup> Free, open public debates are the cornerstone of what Amartya Sen calls the "constructive role" that democracies can play in promoting development. And among countries with similar incomes, people live longer, fewer children die and women have fewer children in democratic regimes.<sup>16</sup> This hugely important result has strong implications for human development given the importance of lower fertility for the women's lives and choices and for the health of future generations. Understanding what lies behind this result and identifying the policies that made a difference are research priorities.

In addition, entitlement crises, reparation claims, the collapse of public services, environmental degradation, forced migration and displacements, breakdown in social fabrics, political repression,

personal trauma, insurgency and counter-insurgency operations, civil wars and pronounced conflicts are all prevented, or, are minimized and are better managed by democracies. Among other experiences, given their people-centred nature, natural havocs and disasters such as famines, earthquakes and floods are also better managed with usually more friendly and responsive approaches by democracies. Similarly, the armed conflicts in Angola, Congo and Somalia, the recruitment of children in combat operations in Sudan, Liberia, Mozambique and Sierra Leone are also best avoided by democratic regimes. This is because democracy in itself, is intrinsically important. The argument that, it is economic rights and freedoms, which give meaning to democratic and other political rights, is therefore not entirely correct. As Sen (1999a and 1999b) would argue, democracy is a universal value, and it has certain 'corrective', 'constructive' and 'constitutive' values, such as the possibilities of free speech, the operations of free media, and the feasibility of access to education, which make it possible for citizens to avert worst occurrences of epidemics, catastrophes, havocs and disasters like famine, through the development and articulation of 'anti-authoritarian' or 'pro-democratic resistance' by the citizens. From the fore-gone expositions, a major challenge for democracy in Africa is that of strengthening the state in translating welfare and other socio-economic commitments into developmental policy outcomes for the poor masses. This is crucial for overcoming regional underdevelopment and neglect, especially among backward and indigenous peoples. A major contribution in the efforts of Przeworski *et al.* (2000) is the devotion of their text to the development of rigorous methodological approaches for carrying out research towards assessing the impact of political regimes on economic development. Their methodological innovation entails (i) the refutation of previous attempts, which conflate economic development with economic growth, followed by an interrogation of the relationship between democracy and economic development—using well-being and other concrete indicators of human development—as the pertinent problematic of the discourse, (ii) a detailed examination of the overall performances of political regimes, rather than focusing narrowly on 'best practices', and (iii) a detailed examination of the impact of the global political climate, the political histories of the countries in question, their material and social conditions—and a host of other factors, which add up to the complex nature of political regimes and systems.

### **4.3 Development in Africa: A Critique of Ake's Writings**

As we have tried to show in chapter two of this study, the issues raised in Ake's analyses of the state, democracy and development in Africa have evoked numerous responses from other scholars.

The same applies to his writings on underdevelopment and marginalization in the continent. For example, while Walter Rodney's (1980: 128-163) examination of the role of violence in the creation of the colonial economy in Tanganyika, from 1890-1930, fore-runs and corroborates Ake's (1981: 32-87) account of the colonial economy in Africa, Mafeje's (1997: 79-92) critique represents one of such instructive interventions in this direction. At different levels, some of the issues noted in Ake's writings have also been examined either earlier, or later by other authors who focus on the continent. Some of such contributions are found in the volumes edited by Peter C. W. Gutkind and Immanuel Wallerstein (1976), Peter C. W. Gutkind and Peter Waterman (1977), M. H. Y. Kaniki (1980), D. L. Cohen and J. Daniel (1981) as well as Hamza Alavi and T. Shanin (1982). According to Mafeje (1997: 92), all these efforts show that "there is much to agree with and also much to disagree with in Claude Ake's works". Similarly, Ake's (1981) position on the role of European colonialism in the underdevelopment of the continent are corroborated by Chandra's (1994) analysis of nationalism, development and underdevelopment in both colonial and post-colonial India. Elsewhere, Ake's (1988: 485-497 and 1989: 100-113) interrogation of the political economy of development and the development discourse, especially in the post-World War II period are corroborated by Arturo Escobar's (1995 and 1997), Ivan Illich's (1971 and 1997) illustrations of "development as planned poverty" and Homi K. Bhabha's (1990) narration of colonial historiography in India and Africa. More recently, Ake's (1996a and 1996b) accounts on the marginalization of Africa are extended in empirically elaborate details in Mkandawire's (2005) writings. Arturo Escobar (1995 and 1997) presents the development discourse as a big political issue, which raises the following questions among others. (i) "Why did the industrialized nations of North America and Europe come to be seen as 'the appropriate models' of post-World War II societies in Africa, Asia and Latin America?" (ii) "How did the post-war discourse on development actually create the so-called Third World?" According to Escobar (1995: 39), in order to understand these questions and issues, we need to answer other more engaging questions:

What does it mean to say that development started to function as a discourse, that is, that it created a space in which only certain things could be said and even imagined? If discourse is the process through which social reality comes into being—if it is the articulation of knowledge and power, of the visible and the expressible—how can the development discourse be individualized and related to ongoing technical, political, and economic events? How did development become a space for the systematic creation of concepts, theories, and practices?

An entry point for this inquiry on the nature of development as discourse is its basic premises as they were formulated in the 1940s and 1950s. The organizing premise was the belief in the role of modernization as the only force capable of destroying *archaic* superstitions and relations, at whatever social, cultural, and political cost. Industrialization and urbanization were seen as the inevitable and necessarily progressive routes to modernization.

Escobar captures the development theories of the 1950s and 1970s, which focused on 'the basic human needs approach' as the context of emergence of the development discourse and notes that until the late 1970s, its central stake in the discussions on Africa, Asia and Latin America was on the nature of the development needed by these regions. Within this context, development policies became mechanisms of control, which were just as effective and pervasive as their colonial counterparts. Such policies were used for generating categories powerful enough for shaping the thinking of most of its critics, while also spreading poverty in the South on a massive scale. Homi K. Bhabha (1990: 72 and 75) calls this form of discourse "colonial discourse" and argues that it serves the purpose of binding a range of differences and discriminations informing the discursive and political practices of racial and cultural hierarchization:

Colonial discourse is an apparatus that turns on the recognition and disavowal of racial/cultural/historical differences. Its predominant strategic function is the creation of a space for a "subject peoples" through the production of knowledges in terms of which surveillance is exercised and a complex form of pleasure/unpleasure is incited.... The objective of colonial discourse is to construe the colonized as a population of degenerate types on the basis of racial origin, in order to justify conquest and to establish systems of administration and instruction.... I am referring to a form of governmentality that in making out a "subject nation", appropriates, directs and dominates its various spheres of activity.

In this sense, it should be understood that a discourse creates and delimits a space; it creates specific institutional sites, such as the IMF and the World Bank, within which it functions and makes sense. Its conceptions of 'truth-value', 'proofs' and 'meanings' are also discursively determined within the parameters set by the discourse itself as an analytic category. More importantly, it should be understood that discourses are politically produced. For example, while the reality of Africa's underdevelopment is obvious enough, the (mis) representation of the continent as culturally inferior to some other foreign cultures is not only discursively produced, but also politically informed within such discursive representations. Discourse analysis thus, enables us to see through and make sense of different plethora and myriads of politically motivated representations, which are imputed into various discursive components, including the discourse on development, while also appreciating the influence and presence of unintended, sometimes unanticipated outcomes vis-a-vis the limited nature of calculated objectives and intentions in the making of policy. Lastly, given Escobar (1995 and 1997), Illich (1971 and 1997) and Bhabha's (1990) interventions, the development discourse is therefore best understood as 'an ideological apparatus', with which the core capitalist countries assert their dominance on the backward regions of the world—an assertion, which generates numerous counter-reactions for political, social and economic independence from the South. For, as Heyer *et al.* (1981) and Galli (1981) cited in Ferguson (2002: 400) have noted:

official discourse on "development" either expresses "true intentions" or, more often, provides an ideological screen for other concealed intentions: "mere rhetoric". The bulk of "development" discourse, with all its professions of concern for the rural poor and so on, is ... simply a misrepresentation of what the "development" apparatus is "really" up to. The World Bank may talk a lot about helping poor farmers, for instance, but in fact their funds continue to be targeted at the large, highly capitalized farmers, at the expense of the poor. The much publicized "new strategy", then, is "largely rhetoric", serving only a mystifying function (Williams 1981).

Having noted aspects of the corroborations and critiques, which have been written in response to Ake's writings, the rest of this section is devoted to the examination of a very crucial, yet, neglected issue in the literature, namely, the impact of Africa's 'semi-peripheral' and 'peripheral' positions within the global system of international capitalism and their implications for political democracy. It flows from the argument that 'ceteris paribus', economically developed countries have higher prospects, better chances and potentials for achieving democracy more rapidly. Here, a lot of conceptual and theoretical issues are thrown up, especially in relation to the political economy of democracy, development and underdevelopment in developing countries generally and Africa in particular. This is carried out following the arguments and contributions made by Kenneth Bollen (1983: 468–479), among other scholars. However, before going into this account, we examine aspects of the intellectual history and the political context of emergence of the dependency theory, especially in Latin America and its subsequent importation to Africa and other Third World countries. Very shortly, a word is in order on this.

According to Ramon Grosfoguel (2000: 347), this is best undertaken through a detailed interrogation of "the *longue duree*" of Latin American history, especially paying due attention to a large canvass of issues and experiences, which included 'the context of nationalism in nineteenth century Latin America' and 'the development debates', which took place in the continent between 1945 and 1990. According to him, these debates not only form part of 'the geo-culture of modernity' that now dominates the world since the French Revolution in the late eighteenth century, but also constitute an important intervention, which has transformed the imaginary of intellectual debates in many parts of the world. From another account, Magnus Blomstrom and Bjorn Hettne (1984) argue that the dependency school originated mainly from three sources and trends, namely, 'neo-Marxism', 'the more indigenous Latin American discussions on development and underdevelopment in the continent', which eventually formed the intellectual tradition of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, and 'the Latin American critiques of the Modernization Paradigm'.

In this context, 'neo-Marxism' represents a sharp reaction against 'schematic Marxism', 'its analytic inadequacies' and 'the political inefficiency of orthodox communism'—three major shortcomings,

which undermined the direct application of orthodox Marxism in the development of the dependency theory in Latin America. Its development was greatly influenced by the fact that Marxism and other preceding systems of thought were introduced largely as an ideology rather than as a body of theories. Its inspiration was derived from the limitations in Marx's thought and writings about the problem of underdevelopment, which did not differ fundamentally from the prevailing 19th Century evolutionism. To be specific, barring the draft of a theory on the Asian mode of production, Marx's writings on Asia were merely journalistic (Blomstrom and Hettne, 1984: 29). This is because, he not only generalized his limited understanding of India to the whole of Asia, but, was also Euro-centric and disdainful in his reference to India and the Asian mode of production, which he denies of dynamism. Put differently, Marx's writings about the Asian mode of production were not only based on an old European tradition of thought, coined around the subject matter of 'oriental despotism', but also legitimized colonialism. According to Blomstrom and Hettne (1984: 29):

One of the key concepts in this context is 'the Asian mode of production'. In Marx's extremely tentative formulation this concept is of little value as a description of India, or indeed of the rest of Asia. Nevertheless, it offers an important insight into the nature of Marxism, since the later published work on pre-capitalist social formations (which included a discussion of the Indian mode of production) clearly documents a 'multilateral' view of development.<sup>4</sup> ...

Marx's contemporaries knew quite a lot about India, a little about China, and very little about Japan. When speaking of Asia, Marx mostly meant India (Kiernan, 1974, p 168). The same basic attitude is found when he does explicitly mention China. The general decline which was the result of the opium trade in China, for example, is dealt with in the following drastic terms: 'It would seem as though history had first to make this whole people drunk before it could rouse them out of their hereditary stupidity' (Marx and Engels, 1960, p 20).

Added to these limitations is the fact that neither Marx nor Engels referred extensively to Latin America in any of their numerous works. Their references to the continent were not only occasional and Eurocentric, but also dealt exclusively with politics, such as the Mexican-American War of 1847, which Engels described as 'a fortunate historically progressive development'; rather than the questions of underdevelopment. In conclusion, with the exception of the basic method, the writings of Marx provided a very limited basis for a genuinely Marxist analysis of the economic conditions and class struggles in Latin America. These shortcomings informed the reformulation and revision of orthodox Marxism to the explanation of the economic conditions in the continent. These efforts took the forms of interventions by 'the New Left' and other neo-Marxist scholars in the continent. Examples of such interventions are also found in the revolutionary role and writings of Ernesto Che Guevara (1965, 1968a, 1968b, 1969, 1971, 1987, 1995, 1996, 1996, 1997 and 1998), Paul Baran (1957) and the Peruvian Jose Carlos Mariategui, whose *Siete Ensayos de Interpretacion de la Realidad Peruana*, Seven Essays on the Peruvian Reality, written in 1927, remains, according to

Aguilar (1968: 12) the single most important attempt to understand a national dimension to the Latin American problem in a uniquely Marxist perspective.

The second major influence, underlining the development of the dependency theory in the continent was the more indigenous Latin American discussions on development and underdevelopment in the continent, which as we noted earlier, later informed the intellectual tradition of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America. This took place during the inter-war period and was followed by a growing number of analyses, based on 'concrete Latin American conditions', 'systematic social science research', 'indigenous analyses of the local economies', which appeared as 'orgies in self-criticism' and 'catalogues of Latin American weaknesses' (Hirschman, 1971). Remarkable examples of such influential efforts included Bunge's (1903) *Nuestra America*, and the Chilean Francisco Encina's (1912) *Our Economic Inferiority: Its Causes and Consequences*. These analyses informed such conclusions that were based on the idea of pursuing economic development through imitation. Later, however, following the impact of the First World War, the Mexican and the Russian Revolutions and the repeated interventions from the United States of America in the internal affairs of Latin American countries, there was a change in focus, which took the form of locating the faults underlining underdevelopment in the global system of capitalism, rather than in Latin America alone. Also within this period, social analyses began to focus more systematically on well-conducted research, rather than on some less subjective ideas, which were influenced by European social research and debates. The last major influence in the development of the dependency school is 'the Latin American critique of the Modernization Paradigm', represented among others, in the writings of Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Theotonio Dos Santos, Osvaldo Sunkel, and Andre Gunder Frank. Mentioning a few of their contributions, in 1966 Rodolfo Stavenhagen, a Mexican sociologist, wrote an influential essay in which he criticized what he called *The Seven Erroneous Theses on Latin America*. His critique questioned aspects of the modernization theoretical assumptions and positions, which stated inter alia, that (i) Latin American countries are dual societies, (ii) progress in the continent will come about mainly by the spread of industrial products into the backward, archaic and traditional areas, (iii) the existence of backward, traditional and archaic rural areas is an obstacle to the formation of an internal market and to the development of a progressive and national capitalism, (iv) the national bourgeoisie has an interest in breaking the power and the dominion of the landed oligarchy, (v) Latin American development is the work and creation of a nationalist, progressive, enterprising and

dynamic middle class, and the social and economic policy objectives of the Latin American governments should be to stimulate 'social mobility' and the development of that class, (vi) national integration in Latin America is the product of miscegenation, and (vii) progress in Latin America will only take place by means of an alliance between the workers and the peasants, as a result of the identity of interests of these two classes (Stavenhagen 1966).

Cardoso, a Brazilian, was one of the sociologists who carried out sociological studies of the 'entrepreneurs' in Sao Paulo and later wrote a general critique of the current social sciences, particularly the theory of modernization within the discipline of sociology (Cardoso, 1967: 94-114, Cardoso and Faletto, 1969: 8-10). Cardoso and Faletto (1969) pointed out that the pattern 'from tradition to modernity' was a reincarnation of Ferdinand Toennies' (1940) dichotomy of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*. They raised two objections to this. One, they argued that neither concept is broad enough to cover all existing social institutions, nor is it specific enough to distinguish the structures that determine the life-styles of various societies. Two, these concepts do not show the details of how various stages of economic development are linked to the various types of social structure characterized as either 'traditional' or 'modern'. In response, Cardoso and Faletto (1969) proposed what they called the historical-structural method as the alternative to the prevailing, schematic and mechanical analysis.

Theotonio Dos Santos, also a Brazilian, provided an instructive critique of the modernization paradigm, particularly the traditional ideas on development (see Dos Santos, 1968 and 1973). Osvaldo Sunkel, a Chilean economist formerly with the Economic Commission of Latin America posed a serious dissatisfaction at the way in which establishment social sciences explain Latin American reality and their failure to provide adequate guidelines for an alternative policy of development for the continent. He traced this failure to conventional theories of growth and modernization, from which the prevailing analysis of the development question was derived. According to Sunkel (1969 and 1971), this theory saw the mature capitalist economies as the goal and model of all development aspiration, and developing countries were analyzed only in terms of a previous stage and imperfect position on the way to this universalized goal. To Sunkel and Paz (1970), this idealized and mechanical vision of development ought to be replaced by a more historical and society-sensitive method, the result of which will be a balanced understanding of the real nature of the underdeveloped nations' structures and the dynamics of their changes over time. Commenting on Sunkel's (1969, 1970 and 1971) positions, Blomstrom and Hettne (1984) note that:



The approach suggested by Sunkel simply meant that the characteristics of underdevelopment should be viewed as *normal* results of the functioning of a specific system. In the case of the underdeveloped nations these results are well known: low income, a slow rate of growth, regional imbalance, inequality, unemployment, dependency, monoculture and cultural, economic, social and political marginalisation, etc. The conventional theory considered these symptoms to be deviations from the ideal pattern which, like children's diseases, would disappear with growth and modernization. It did not realize that behind this lay a system, the formal functioning of which produced these results, and that this would continue for as long as development policies attacked the symptoms of underdevelopment rather than the basic structural elements that had created underdevelopment.

His approach therefore suggested the fact that, considerable influence was exercised by external factors and forces, but that the emphasis on these external ties should not cover up the existence of internal structural problems. A realistic analysis of the problem and context of underdevelopment in Latin America must therefore be based on the assumption that the socio-economic system is shaped by two types of structural elements—external and internal. Lastly is Andre Gunder Frank, whose critique tried to show that the writings of Manning Nash, Bert F. Hoselitz, Marion Levy, Everett Hagen, David McClelland and other modernization perspectives were empirically untenable, theoretically insufficient, and practically incapable of stimulating any process of sustainable development in the Third World. Furthermore, pointing at 'the British deindustrialization of India', 'the destructive effects of the slave trade on African societies', and 'the obliteration of the Indian civilizations in Central and South America', Frank (1969) argues extensively and shows that, underdevelopment is neither 'natural', nor is it 'an original state of being', but rather 'a created' or 'man-made' condition. His illustrations suggest that the features of underdevelopment, such as poverty, backwardness, economic decline, malnutrition and perpetual hunger can neither be explained nor supplanted without understanding the complex operations of the international system of global capitalism, which generates socio-economic development and material progress for the privileged countries of the North and misery, dependency, backwardness and economic stagnation for the populations and countries in the South, mainly through processes, which ensure the cornering of their resources and their dispossession simultaneously. Having noted the fore-going issues, we now return to an examination of the subject matter of this section, namely, the question of 'world system positions and their impact on the prospects for political democracy' in different countries of the world.

There is a sense in the contention that, recent trends in dependency and world system analyses have redirected the attention of social scientists from the internal or 'intra'-national determinants of economic, political and social conditions of backward countries to the global or 'inter'-national level, where their political operations, social and economic fortunes are shaped and determined by other

factors, which are both external and independent of their domestic factors, environments and conditions (Frank 1969, Wallerstein 1974, and Chirot 1977). Accordingly, while many long-standing issues within the sociology of development are now being examined in the light of dependency and world system theory, recent empirical tests are increasingly being devoted to an examination of the impact of economic dependency on economic development, growth, the distribution of income and their overall implications for the prospects or chances for democracy in those countries in which they are engendered. While the relationship between dependency and economic development is still the subject of much theoretical and empirical controversy (Frank 1969, Cardoso and Faletto 1979, Portes 1976, Chase-Dunn 1975, Delacroix 1977), the hypothesis that dependency increases income inequality has received consistent empirical support. Instructively, the neglect of the potential consequences of dependency for political equality, and especially, the neglect of the impact of the dependency-democracy relationship in the literature is unfortunate for several reasons. One, the position touches on the debate about the relative importance of external factors of development in the determination of internal realities. For example, while economic development, a clearly internal characteristic, has been confirmed empirically as capable of increasing the chances and likelihood of political democracy (Lipset 1963 and Jackman 1973), other scholars have suggested, however, that economic dependency, or a dependent economic position in the global system, itself an external factor, may be a more important determinant of democracy than the country's economic development (see Kaufman *et al.* 1975: 306-309). In this case, the differences, effects and relative importance of other observed outcomes of the centrality of development or dependency in influencing democracy would need to be established using empirical studies. Two, the dependency/democracy hypothesis bears on a more general proposition, namely, that economic dependency or non-core position in the world system increases the chances for inequality and domination. In this sense, while political inequality is a major type of inequality, the argument is advanced that, a high level of political inequality not only undermines the autonomy of the country under consideration, but also lowers its prospects for political democracy. As a logical corollary, if non-core world system position and dependency affect political inequality, then, these should show a significantly negative effect on political democracy. Three, the dependency/democracy hypothesis is relevant to the democracy-income inequality controversy. By increasing income inequality, non-core status and dependency are therefore hypothesized as reducing the chances of political democracy. As a result, even though the relationship between

democracy and income inequality may be spurious, it does not invalidate the possible impact of dependency on democracy.

Lastly, according to Bollen (1979 and 1983), the world system position/dependency hypotheses bear on the relationship between the 'timing of development' and political democracy. In this connection, it is argued that while the countries in the metropolises are early and timely appropriators of development, the most dependent countries of the world, who occupy the semi-peripheral and peripheral positions, are generally the late developing areas of the modern world. Dependency and world system positions therefore become specific variables, used for creating an association between late development and low levels of democracy. According to Bollen (1983: 469) all these considerations emphasize the need for more focused research in the direction of establishing the impact of dependency on the prospects of political democracy in Africa and other developing countries.

According to Bollen (1983: 469), to understand the possible implications of economic dependency on a country's chances for political democracy, we must bear in mind the fact that (i) while many of the explanations for dependency's influence on a country's economy have direct implications for the political system, much of the world system and dependency writings have focused narrowly on the analysis of economic growth, development and income inequality at the neglect of democracy among other crucial issues, (ii) far from speaking with one voice, a wide range of views characterizes the writings in the literature on dependency and world system position. The result of this feature is that, while each of their arguments has its origins in this school of thought, no single dependency or world system researcher agrees with all the arguments and positions attributed to this perspective.

The starting point in this theoretical exploration is the traditional view of the socio-economic development and political democracy relationship, which is later, contrasted with the dependency and world system perspectives. Characteristically, the traditional approach considers political democracy to be an outgrowth of socio-economic development, especially under capitalism. In this sense, a major dividend of socio-economic development vis-a-vis the prospects of political equality is an educated and literate population, which is able to maximize its participation in the democratic affairs of the state through its ability to explore the benefits of free mass media. Widespread access to newspapers, newsmagazines, radios and televisions heightens awareness about national political processes. This increased awareness may then lead to greater demands for political power by

groups formerly outside the central power circles. Also, there is the argument that authority tends to become more diffused with socio-economic power and development. This occurs as many workers hold highly technical positions essential to the economy. In the process, knowledge and authority bring greater power to these workers, who although are outside the categories of the traditional elites, but must be depended upon by the elites.

In contrast with this traditional view of the socio-economic development and democracy relationship, many dependency and world-system theorists argue that dependency and a disadvantaged position in the world system distort most of the 'usual' consequences of socio-economic development, with the result that the progressive benefits espoused by the proponents of the socio-economic and democracy relationship are in this sense, far from being automatic (see Cardoso and Faletto 1979). Divided into three major components, namely, (i) the core societies, (ii) the peripheral and (iii) the semi-peripheral societies, the world systems theory contends that economic dependency is greatest in the periphery and semi-periphery and least in the core. Even though in certain sectors where non-core societies have organized the export of primary goods such as crude petroleum through the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) the core countries may be very dependent on the peripheral countries for such primary goods, nevertheless, the overall structure of the general relationship has been that of greater economic dependence by the non-core countries on the core capitalist economies. According to Chirot (1977: 13) cited in Bollen (1983: 469), the three components into which the countries of the world are economically divided are best understood in terms of their characteristics:

Core societies: economically diversified ... rich, powerful societies that are *relatively* independent of outside controls.

Peripheral societies: economically over-specialized, *relatively* poor and weak societies that are subject to manipulation or direct control by the core powers.

Semi-peripheral societies: societies midway between the core and the periphery that are trying to industrialize and diversify their economies.

According to Fernando H. Cardoso and Enzo Faletto (1979: 166–171) as well as Peter Evans (1979: 47–50), both cited in Bollen (1983: 470), most of the arguments, which emphasize a negative relationship between dependency and political democracy have their basis in the relationship fostered between the elites in both the core and the non-core countries. Being driven by the core countries, the global system of capitalism expands to the semi-peripheral and peripheral countries in search of cheaper raw materials, cheaper labour and less regulated investment environments. In

this quest, the penetration of the non-core countries by the elites from the core countries cannot be successful without the co-operation of significant segments of the privileged groups within the non-core countries. This aspiration leads to the emergence of common interests between members of the various classes of landowners, merchants and other fractions of the elites in the two countries. According to Richard Rubinson (1976: 641) cited in Bollen (1983: 470), "In this system, actors orient their economic activities to the world market, but constantly attempt to use their local state structures to secure and advance their economic advantages".

In exchange for the opening up of their local economies, the elites in the semi-peripheral and peripheral countries receive economic, political and sometimes, military backing from their counterparts from the core countries. Depending and as occasions permit, sometimes, this support takes the form of supporting even non-democratic regimes and their policies. However, the core's support of the elites in these backward countries hinders not only the socio-economic development of these countries, but also the development of democratic governments. As Bollen (1983: 470) argues:

The core's support of elites in the periphery and semiperiphery is thought to hinder the processes associated with socioeconomic development that contribute to democratic forms of government. For instance, an independent bourgeoisie plays an important role in challenging the political power of traditional elites. Yet the indigenous bourgeoisie may be weak in noncore countries. This is in fact the claim of one perspective in dependency theory which further argues that the weakness of the local bourgeoisie results from an alliance of the landowning classes and the merchants. These two groups join together to promote the export of raw materials and the import of manufacturing products and as a result undermine the domestic industrial bourgeoisie (Chase-Dunn, 1975: 723).

Cardoso and Faletto (1979) together with Evans (1979) cited in Bollen (1983: 470) represent a second school within the dependency thought, which rejects the above view of a suppressed industrial bourgeoisie. In stead, they suggest an active industrial and commercial bourgeoisie, which rather than challenging the dependency/exploitation relations, become a vital part of the system of domination. This means that the bourgeoisie, who in traditional development theory represent a prime force in the rise of political democracy, are an important link supporting non-democratic governments in the non-core countries of the South. Observably, even though the two dependency perspectives narrated above are based on different arguments and premises, they both conclude that the bourgeoisie are no longer a democratic force in the non-core countries (Bollen, 1983: 470). Relatedly, even though the working class is a crucial social group in the core countries, which promotes democracy, the alliance in the non-core countries between the elites in the two parts of

the world resists and represses the attempts by peasant groups and other fractions of labour to democratize either the productive forces of these societies, or a greater part of the state's power (Evans, 1979: 49). According to Bollen (1983: 470):

In other situations workers organizations may not have an independent basis of power, as can happen when wage earners in unions are tightly controlled by the state's ruling elites (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979: 167). If these arguments are correct, then even if socioeconomic development does lead to a larger, more industrial work force, this group cannot contribute to political democracy in noncore countries.

Lastly, Bollen (1983: 470–471) discusses another feature of noncore countries, which inhibits the chances of political democracy, namely, 'the quest by these countries for the development of a strong state'. As observed by Chirot (1977: 223–224), the power of the core governments and multinational enterprises are so enormous that only relatively autocratic governments can either cope or control their influences. However, although a strong state may succeed in limiting the domineering influences of the core countries, it is nevertheless, unlikely to be tolerant of internal dissension and other democratically motivated pressures. Thus, as the recent experience in Zimbabwe illustrates, governance in the semi-periphery degenerates, and assumes the dynamics of an iron-fisted form of rule, with the result that the operations and possibilities of political democracy are seriously compromised (Chirot, 1977: 80-81 and Bollen, 1979: 576). In other situations, given the long history of core-periphery relationships, there have been instances in which the independent authoritarian tendencies of leaders in non-core countries have been supported by the elites in the core countries. In both of these situations, democracy suffers and its chances are both curtailed and undermined.

In conclusion, we have tried to introduce an important issue to the writings of Ake. In this case, the question regarding the relationship between economic dependency and the prospects for political democracy has been examined. The aim, as we indicated earlier, is to extend Ake's position through examining and introducing some of the renewed theoretical efforts in this direction. As we noted, the dependency theory was developed as an intellectual reaction against the limitations of 'historicist' and 'stagist' 'conceptions of developmentalism', which characterized not only modernization theory but also orthodox Marxism. By recommending huge capital investments as a condition for developing the productive forces and economies in the backward countries of Africa and Latin America, modernization theory and orthodox Marxism not only advance a stagist conception of timing vis-a-vis development as a process and practice across the world, but also

mystify the actual root causes of underdevelopment, through the 'universalization' of the experiences in Europe as the condition for development in other non-European societies of the world—through their transformation and transition from primitivism and feudalism and ultimately to capitalism—based on a rejection of unprogressive traits and tendencies inherent in feudalism, and the emulation of the experiences in Europe. The dependency school, therefore, not only explains the underdevelopment of Latin America as a product of the Spanish colonial conquest and exploitation of the continent, but also recognizes the reality of 'coevalism', that is the simultaneity of development and underdevelopment as dialectically opposite and contradictory processes taking place in two different societies at the same time. It rejects and repudiates the historicist conception of history and time; it questions the unilinear notion of development and argues that we cannot make sense of the development enjoyed in certain parts of the world without simultaneously taking into account its consequences in the forms of the problems of payment deficits; the crisis of inflation; unemployment; the dispossession and alienation of the peasants from their land; marginalization and other features of underdevelopment, which make it impossible to initiate development and sustain industrialization in other regions of the world. Hence the notions of 'simultaneity', 'mutual causality' and the 'coequality of human history and time', rather than the 'unilinearity in the conception of time and development', advocated by modernization theorists.

Three positions are central in the arguments of the dependency school, (i) the contention that it is the structure of global capitalism that generates social progress, material and economic development for the countries in the West, Europe and North America, and underdevelopment, poverty and stagnation for Africa, Asia, Latin America and other non-core regions of the world. (ii) The emphasis on the need to interrogate the global history of capitalism in relation to the complex trajectory of underdevelopment as products of the same dialectical global processes. (iii) The conclusion that no meaningful development can take place in the backward countries of Africa and Latin America without first overcoming the contradictions of the capitalist system and its in-built exploitation. These positions are captured in the following illustration by Che Guevara (1964) cited in Rodney (1976: 9):

In contrast with the surging growth of the countries in the socialist camp and the development taking place, albeit much more slowly, in the majority of the capitalist countries, is the unquestionable fact that a large proportion of the so-called underdeveloped countries are in total stagnation, and that in some of them the rate of economic growth is lower than that of population increase.

These characteristics are not fortuitous; they correspond strictly to the nature of the capitalist system in full expansion, which transfers to the dependent countries the most abusive and barefaced forms of exploitation. It must be clearly understood that the only way to solve the questions now besetting mankind is to eliminate

completely the exploitation of dependent countries by developed capitalist countries, with all the consequences that this implies.

Some of the critiques of the dependency theory include the claim that, by focusing attention on the global system, the theory diverts the attention of critical scholars from the internal systems, dimensions and operations of the state, which either independently engender underdevelopment or, align and collaborate with the forces of global capitalism in perpetuating underdevelopment, marginalization and dependence. Two, as we see from the quotation above, the theory tends to advocate a form of autarky out of the existing system of global capitalism. Three, it does not offer any 'real option' out of the dilemma and contradictions of underdevelopment and dependence for the countries in the South.

In addition to the factors noted above, a note is in order on other factors, which undermine the realization of development in Africa and other peripheralized countries. One, as we argued much earlier, given the implications of globalization, the capacity and barriers of the state or the nation-state have become more and more porous than in the past. As a result, far from being a truly sovereign state, the state in Africa is rather helpless in shaping and determining the flow of transnational exchanges taking place within its borders. This reality undermines the capacity of the state in inducing any kind of autonomous development within the complex system of global capitalism, which it can hardly manipulate. Two, ethnicity, caste politics and other divisive aspects of the social systems in these neo-colonies undermine the possibility of effective class mobilization against both internal and other manifestations of global capitalism. This is also known as the fragmentation of the collective will and aspirations of the mass of the population using intensely divisive secondary contradictions, based largely on the manipulation of identitarian politics. Though introduced and planted under colonialism, these divisive features of the social systems in backward countries of Africa still persist not just as secondary contradictions, but remain effectively as centrifugal tendencies, which deradicalize the peoples' struggle and undermine the prospects for effective political mobilization against capitalism by the working people. Three is the politics of defensive radicalism, eloquently illustrated in Ake's (1978). Simply stated, this represents an attempt by bourgeois leaders and other pro-establishment ideologues to counter revolutionary pressures while claiming to be advancing them. Four, is the politics of hegemonic co-optation, by which interested fragments of the local elites are incorporated as parts of the local representations



of global capital, thereby neutralizing and liquidating their critical voices and positions against the exploitation of the local populations by global capitalism. Five are the frustration, annihilation and extermination of unrepentant anti-capitalist forces, individuals and agents. As Kelly Harris' (2005: 79) illustration rightly suggests, nowhere in Africa is Ake's idea of defensive radicalism better illustrated than in Zimbabwe, a country where the former President, Robert Mugabe, a one-time advocate of the empowerment of black farmers through land redistribution, exploited the historic animosity toward the defeated colonial power in the attempt to maintain a perpetual control of the state, despite popular indications by the citizens to the contrary.

In rounding up the arguments in this chapter, we seek to answer a major question. How do we account for the developments taking place in China, Singapore and other non-democratic regimes in East Asia? This question is particularly pertinent, given the conclusion reached by the dependency theory. Have these countries been able to entirely supplant and overcome the contradictions of capitalism? Or, have they been able to halt the exploitations perpetuated by global capitalism within their economies? How can we explain and possibly replicate the developments taking place in the East Asian countries in Africa and other Third World countries? The pertinence of these questions derives inter alia, from the position of the dependency school, which not only locates the structures of global capitalism as the source of the underdevelopment experienced in the South, but also rules out the possibilities of autonomous capitalist development unless the exploitative contradictions of the capitalist system have been supplanted. For us in this study, we argue that the forms of development taking place in the East Asian countries are at the expense of the people. In other words, since these states are not able to either limit, manipulate or constrain the operations of the global system of capitalism in their quest for development, they rather fall back internally to sacrifice and compromise the interests of their citizens, in their bid to eke out fragments of the development that are noticed in such countries. Put differently, given their positions as non-democratic regimes, the East Asian countries to which attention has been drawn in recent times in the debate regarding the relationship between political regimes and the prospects for economic development are able to suppress 'the will', 'aspirations' and 'interests' of their people while undergoing 'development'. To a large extent, therefore, their approach approximates to the idea of sacrificing vital aspects of the human rights of their citizens in the course of developing—an idea, which we traced to the 1951 declaration by the United

Nations Department of Social and Economic Affairs (1951: 15) based largely on 'making hard choices', 'making inconvenient sacrifices', 'undertaking painful adjustments' and 'trade-offs' as a condition for 'experiencing development' in the Third World. However, the question is: How credible and sustainable can such development be if it does not involve the people in its processes? In other words, since development is objectively about the people, how truly developmental can we qualify a process, which leaves out the people whose interests it seeks to advance? Given the fact that such processes necessarily entail 'sacrificing', 'suppressing' and 'compromising' the cherished needs of the poor, how do we qualify the developmental credentials of such processes? Lastly, in whose long-run interests would such initiatives be, since the processes are neither participatory nor accountable to the people? And, how sustainable can the processes be, if they entail, as they often do, the authoritarian repression of the people—given their non-democratic character? These are by no means idle questions. As some empirical studies have shown, the repressive and non-democratic character of the developments taking place in the East Asian countries is what explains their cotermination with famine, gross abuse of human rights, their death tolls and other problematic challenges. These issues are taken up in more elaborate details, hopefully in the last chapter on summary, conclusion and recommendations.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### THE LEGACY OF CLAUDE AKE

#### 5.1 Introduction

Capitalism, Marx said, was the first universal social form, at least the first form capable of a possible universality. It imposed, on most people with whom it came in touch, certain peculiar forms of suffering. These several sufferings at the various frontiers of capitalism gave rise to critiques in which those who suffered at its hands tried to make sense of their history. In a sense, each critique analysed and held up for criticism aspects of suffering related to capitalism which were opaque, unperceived and unreported to the others. But as critiques they are potentially connectable; they, as it were, waited to meet each other. It is only now, in the writing of history, that such a meeting is possible. In this, the critique of an aggressive, uncritical, all-conquering rationalist colonialism by the early nationalists is a necessary part. And it is only when these critiques are stitched together that a true map of the unhappy consciousness of humanity, when capitalism reigned, can be put together (Kaviraj, 1992: 34).

This chapter discusses the legacy of the late Professor Claude Ake. It presents him as one of the most fertile and influential voices within the social science community in Africa. Being a political scientist with an unusually broad intellectual horizon and formation, the chapter discusses Ake's production, during the last four decades, of a wide-ranging body of works, which have been quite instructive not only for their theoretical sophistication, methodological rigour and analytical acuity, but also for been remarkable works of magisterial erudition, the products of an exceptionally great mind working at its fullest and highest command of language and critical theory; written with a deftly profound authority, and also constituting significant aspects of the attempts to adapt the intellectual legacies of Marxist scholarship to the understanding of the political economy and social history of contemporary Africa, from a broadly critical perspective. The 'leit motif' is to establish the specific relevance of studying Ake's works. In addition, the chapter establishes 'an important area' within the African social science community and the world at large, which has been positively affected by his intellectual involvement and contributions. In doing this, an important caveat is entered, namely, that this chapter is in a vital sense a continuation of what we have tried to establish earlier in chapters two and four, especially in chapter four. However, while in chapter four we provided a detailed discourse of what we understood to be his major contributions, in this chapter we seek to establish the legacy of the departed scholar, at least from the point of the limited understanding of this researcher. In doing this, we shall try as much as possible to avoid referring to what others have noted or presented as Ake's legacy, except where otherwise necessary and unavoidable. Among other reasons, our decision in using this approach is informed by the fact that, earlier in chapter two, we have noted and discussed what other scholars within Africa and

across the world have pointed out as Ake's contributions and legacy. As such, limiting this chapter mainly to an illustration of the positions of this researcher helps us to avoid having to repeat most of what we have already accounted for in the previous chapters. In effect, our illustrations on Ake's contributions and legacy presented in the fore-gone chapters as captured by others authorities will only be employed here to serve as a guide in establishing Ake's legacy from the point of view of this researcher. However, this approach is not without its limitations. The immediately obvious implication of this approach is that it is an abridged account of Ake's legacy as provided by this scholar, drawing very little from other scholars.

Aspects of Ake's legacy, which are noted for discussion in this chapter include, his contribution towards 'the Africanization of the political economy approach', 'his contribution to international institution-building', 'research networking and activism', 'his advocacy of the need for us to put our understanding of the social sciences in the services of peace and human development', based on the pursuit of a systematic study of the conditions for peace, development and the elimination of all physical constraints and manifestations of violence. In addition to these, the chapter discusses Ake's legacy in terms of his contributions as a major post-Marxist and post-development scholar to the subject matter of post-colonial studies through the project of history writing not just in Africa, but across the South at large. The epigraph at the beginning of this chapter captures Sudipta Kaviraj's (1992) position that, post-colonial societies generally have been contentiously engaged by different shades of European historiography, which seek to dismember the making of their nationalist imaginations, their strategies for self-preservation and intellectual history writing. The epigraph also illustrates the fact that, although the history of the capitalist penetration of Third World countries is not entirely a homogeneous narration, nevertheless, the central thesis of that history has a potentially connectible character. And, given the connectible nature of the experiences of members of these societies across the world, the major preoccupation of post-colonial scholarship, is to engage what Kaviraj and Khilnani (2001) have called the constraining contexts of borrowed knowledge, paradigms and language within which the histories of these countries are been written. And, as Kaviraj (1992: 34) further argues, "unless an intellectual history of anti-colonialism is compiled, the history of colonialism will remain permanently unfinished". This, among others, is because, as Kaviraj (1992: 35) puts it:

Unless the people who are subjected to colonialism are seen to engage in such an enterprise which—despite evident internal differences between periods, between high and folk culture, between the great tradition and

the small, between the anti-colonialists and the nationalists, between the radicals and the conservatives—is seen as one—as a single, whole, historical enterprise—its history cannot be written.

The first general point that emerges is to recognize the seriousness of this enterprise, and to respect its authenticity. Serious historical reflection can exist in non-theoretical and non-historical works. What I wish to emphasize is the originality and distinctiveness of this intellectual enterprise; what was going on inside these intellectual performances was not just an attempt to counter or criticize western theories of social organization by the use of concepts and argumentative structures taken from the western theoretical discourse. Its originality lay in the fact that this critique was attempted from outside this orbit or circle of discourse; this originality is essentially an acknowledgement of the distinctiveness of ... discourse, the assertion of the abstract possibility of other universes of theoretical reflection.

To be sure, Ake's scholarship and career represent an engagement in this direction.

## 5.2 The Subject Matter and Development of Post-colonial Studies

Broadly, post-colonial studies is that intellectual engagement developed over the past thirty years on a set of issues, debates and articulations of points of interventions, performed mainly as a tri-continental project within the institutional sites of the universities and research centres across the world, especially outside the metropolitan intellectual centres (Young 2001), on a range of disciplinary fields, especially anthropology, history, political science, sociology, cultural, gender and literary studies. It stands at the intersections of different theoretical debates and engages issues of language, location or place, history, ethnicity and hybridity, conceptions of the body and the articulations of its performance, education, production and consumption, the politics and philosophy of modernity, democracy and development, modern forms of power, techniques of governmentality, citizenship, state-society relationships, nationalism and Orientalism (Said 1978 and Ashcroft *et al.* 1995). In addition to colonialism, its discussions examine the continuing impact of displacement and forced migration, slavery and suppression, gender, racial and cultural discriminations, other responses to the influential master narratives and discourses of imperial Europe such as history, philosophy and linguistics, and the fundamental experiences of speaking and writing by which all these come into being. On its own, none of these categories is essentially 'post-colonial', but taken together, they form the complex fabric of the field. As we see in the writings of its major exponents, post-colonial scholarship engages issues at the interfaces of 'universality' and 'difference' (Ahmad 1987, Achebe 1988 and Bishop 1990), 'representation' and 'resistance' (Said 1978), 'post-modernism' and 'post-colonialism' (During 1987 and Appiah 1992), 'nationalism' (Fanon 1967, Chatterjee 1986 and Bhabha 1990), 'hybridity'

(Bhabha 1988), 'ethnicity' and 'indigeneity' (Griffiths 1994), 'feminism' and 'post-colonialism' (Spivak 1985 and Suleri 1992), 'language' (Ashcroft 1989), 'conceptions of the body and the articulations of its performance' (Fanon 1968), 'history' (Chakrabarty 1992 and 2000), 'place' (Lee 1974), 'education' (Altbach 1971), 'production and consumption' (Altbach 1975). It is therefore an intellectual and political discourse inspired mainly by Marxist, structuralist and post-structuralist writings, and critically engages the legacies of the European Enlightenment for post-colonial societies generally and Africa, Asia and Latin America in particular. According to Bill Ashcroft *et al.* (1995: 1), it is a counter-colonial resistance project, which draws upon many indigenous and hybrid processes of self-determination to defy, erode and supplant the prodigious power of imperial cultural knowledge. In this sense, while post-colonial literatures are generally a result of the interactions between the imperial cultures and the complex of indigenous cultural practices, post-colonial scholarship represents an intellectual resistance articulated against the export to the colonies of European languages, literature, and learning as part of a civilizing mission, which involved not only the suppression of the vast wealth of indigenous cultures beneath the weight of imperial control, but also their dismantling and an unprecedented assertion of the cultural superiority of imperial Europe in post-colonial societies. Understood in this vital sense, post-colonial scholarship is thus based on the 'historical fact' of European colonialism and the diverse material effects to which this phenomenon has given rise. As Ashcroft *et al.* (1995: 2) emphasize:

We need to keep this fact of colonisation firmly in mind because the increasing unfocused use of the term 'post-colonial' over the last ten years to describe an astonishing variety of cultural, economic and political practices has meant that there is a danger of its losing its effective meaning altogether. Indeed the diffusion of the term is now so extreme that it is used to refer to not only vastly different but even opposed activities. In particular the tendency to employ the term post-colonial to refer to any kind of marginality at all runs the risk of denying its basis in the historical process of colonialism.

As a form of critique, post-colonialism does not only question the pejorative identification of these continents with backwardness, conflict, debt, famine, poverty, underdevelopment and dependency, but also explains these regressive features as consequences of the European presence in these societies at different historical periods. Importantly, although post-colonial critique was not the first to contest colonialism, its distinctiveness is however underscored by the comprehensiveness of its research into the cultural roots and political ramifications of

colonialism in both the colonizing and colonized societies, its engagement with the analysis of 'the political economy' and 'social history' of colonialism in these continents, its continuing investigation and establishment of the connections between the context of the past and the politics of the present. In tracing the history of this crucial thought, Bill Ashcroft *et al.* (1995: 1) state that, "Once colonised peoples had cause to reflect on and express the tension which ensued from this problematic and contested, but eventually vibrant and powerful mixture of imperial language and local experience, post-colonial 'theory' came into being". Qualifying the idea of the 'post-colonial', the terms and contexts of its usage, Ashcroft *et al.* (1995: 2) maintain that:

The term 'post-colonial' is resonant with all the ambiguity and complexity of the many different cultural experiences it implicates, and, ... it addresses all aspects of the colonial process from the beginning of colonial contact. Post-colonial critics and theorists should consider the full implications of restricting the meaning of the term to 'after-colonialism' or 'after-independence'. All post-colonial societies are still subject in one way or another to overt or subtle forms of neo-colonial domination, and independence has not solved this problem. The development of new elites within independent societies, often buttressed by neo-colonial institutions; the development of internal divisions based on racial, linguistic or religious discriminations; the continuing unequal treatment of indigenous peoples in settler/invader societies ... all ... testify to the fact that post-colonialism is a continuing process of resistance and reconstruction. This does not imply that post-colonial practices are seamless and homogeneous but indicates the impossibility of dealing with any part of the colonial process without considering its antecedents and consequences.

In the Western academy, 'post-colonial criticism' had been practised long before it was given the name under the rubric of Commonwealth literary studies in the 1960s and 1970s. After its origination in Europe, it quickly became influential in the United States of America and arrived last of all in the United Kingdom, particularly Britain where, even as late as the early 1980s, Terry Eagleton's (1983) seminal study *An Introduction to Literary Theory*, did not acknowledge it as a separate category of analysis. It was not until the late 1980s that a preliminary survey of post-colonial criticism, Bill Ashcroft *et al.*'s (1989) *The Empire Writes Back: Theory and Practice in Post-colonial Literature*, appeared. 'Post-colonial criticism', however is not the same as 'post-colonial theory' and in fact, the divide between the two appears to be growing. For example, while the former has in its lists writers and intellectuals from the tri-continent such as Chinua Achebe and Derek Walcott, the latter incorporates interpreters of the French high theorists like Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault and Jacques Lacan. Examples of major post-colonial scholars across the three continents are Asok Sen, Aijaz Ahmad, Ashis Nandy, Arjun Appadurai, Bipan Chandra, Ranajit Guha, Gayatri C. Spivak, Homi K. Bhabha, Hamza Alavi, Partha Chatterjee, Wang Hui, Silvia Rivera

Cusicanqui and M. S. S. Pandian in Asia; Paul Baran, Gunnar Myrdal, Theotonio Dos Santos, Andre Gunder Frank, Giovanni Arrighi, Celso P. S. Furtado, Ernesto Che Guevara, Ernesto Laclau, Arghiri Emmanuel, J. Castro, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Teodor Shanin, Enzo Faletto and Peter Evans in Latin America; as well as Claude Ake, Samir Amin, Ngugi wa Thiong'o, Martin Kilson, Ade Ajayi, Adu Boahen, B. A. Ogot, Archibald B. M. Mafeje, Bernard Magubane, Simeon Ominde and Frantz Fanon in Africa. While some of these scholars, especially Gayatri C. Spivak, Homi Bhabha, Partha Chatterjee and other South-Asian scholars have been greatly influenced by cultural and political critiques developed over time by structuralist and post-structuralist theorists like Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Antonio Gramsci and Louis Althusser, Claude Ake was influenced mainly by the legacies of Marxist scholarship, especially the writings of Karl Marx (1818-1883), Frederick Engels (1820-1895), Vladimir Ilich Lenin (1870-1924), Rosa Luxemburg (1871-1919), Rudolf Hilferding (1877-1941), Nikolai Ivanovich Bukharin (1888-1938) and Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937) especially as articulated in the Latin American contributions to the underdevelopment and dependency theories and the developments described in the preceding chapters of this study. As we see in Harris' (2005: 78), "Underdevelopment theorists clearly embrace much of the philosophy of Marx and Engels and Ake was no different. The Marxist vision of development seems closer to Ake's notion of development". At another level, Ake's scholarship and writings were also influenced, indirectly though, by the works of Jean-Paul Sartre, Aime Cesaire, Albert Memmi and Frantz Fanon. Indirectly because, although Ake was not directly influenced by the works of Jean-Paul Sartre, Albert Memmi and Aime Cesaire, nevertheless he followed the insights provided in their writings, which were advanced in the writings of Fanon. As Jinadu (1997: 24-25) observes, Ake actually followed the works of Frantz Fanon, Fanonism, and Fanonist scholars, among whom are Jean-Paul Sartre, Albert Memmi and Aime Cesaire, and others like Samir Amin and Colin Leys. As we see in Jinadu (1997: 25), Ake also significantly advances their contributions in several respects.

Sometimes, post-colonial theory has been wrongly used to mask and even perpetuate unequal economic and cultural relations. This happens when the bulk of the literary theory is wrongly presented as coming from the metropolitan centres, 'adding value' to the literary 'raw materials' imported from the post-colonial societies (Ashcroft *et al.* 1995: 2). As Ashcroft *et al.* (1995) rightly observe, such positions merely reproduce the inequalities of imperial power relations and are far from being true. Rather, representing the objective theorization of the colonial and post-colonial conditions, post-colonial theory has been produced in all societies into which the imperial force of Europe has intruded, though not always in 'the formal guise' of theorized texts. It should however



be noted that while its preoccupation has remained uniformly devoted to the 're-writing' and 'representation' of past histories and the present conditions of existence in these societies, the disciplinary focus and research orientations of its exponents are far from being the same. Rather, they range from leftist theoretical orientations in the political economy of Africa and other parts of the South, to demographic theoretical analyses, historical and cultural critiques, and a host of other approaches depending on the areas of interests and specialization of its exponents.

As an orientation, post-colonial scholarship challenges the hermeneutic approach to the construction of history and historical consciousness; it replaces it with competing constructions of the past, within various levels and kinds of empirical support, advanced through the growing self-confidence of scholars fighting objectivism and scientism in history. It is fundamentally distinguished from orthodox European Marxism by combining its critique of objective material conditions with the detailed analysis of their subjective effects (Young, 2001: 7). According to Ashis Nandy (1995) post-colonialism popularizes other modes of time perception built on new developments in science, especially in quantum mechanics and biological theory, or on the rediscovery of the older modes of knowledge acquisition such as 'Zen' and 'Yoga'; and on theories of transcendence celebrated in ecology and eco-feminism. It represents an exercise in self-correction, an attempt to correct what Nandy (1995: 50) calls "the excesses of a history modeled on the Baconian concept of science", which incorporates into historical consciousness crucial components of the moral universe of the ahistorical. In this sense, the historical conception of time inherited from the European Enlightenment is only one kind of time construction with which contemporary knowledge operates. In the present juncture, most sciences and now even a few of the social sciences work with more plural conceptions and constructions of time. As Nandy (1995: 44) argues:

The historical mode may be the dominant mode of constructing the past in most parts of the globe but it is certainly not the most popular mode of doing so. The dominance is derived from the links the idea of history has established with the modern nation-state, the secular worldview, the Baconian concept of scientific rationality, nineteenth-century theories of progress, and, in recent decades, development. This dominance has also been strengthened by the absence of any radical critique of the idea of history within the modern world and for that matter, within the discipline of history itself. As a result, once exported to the nonmodern world, historical consciousness has not only tended to absolutize the past in cultures that have lived with open-ended concepts of the past or depended on myths, legends, and epics to define their cultural selves, it has also made the historical worldview complicit with many new forms of violence, exploitation, and satanism in our times and helped rigidify civilizational, cultural, and national boundaries.

Elsewhere, Achille Mbembe (2002) also captures 'historicism' as a major factor undermining the development of conceptions that are capable of explaining the African past and present. According

to him, representing the intellectual articulation of all such efforts determining the conditions under which the African subject could attain full selfhood; become self-conscious; and be answerable to no one else, the African imaginaire was trapped in historicist thinking in two ways, each of which leads to a dead end. The first is 'Afro-radicalism', which takes along with it a lot of 'instrumentalism' and 'political opportunism'. The second is the burden of the metaphysics of difference, often articulated in term of 'nativism'. For the two currents of thoughts, three historical phenomena are fundamental, namely, 'slavery', 'colonization' and 'apartheid'. Three canonical meanings have been attributed to these separate but historically related developments. One, in terms of individual subjectivities, there is the idea that through the processes and activities of slavery, colonization and apartheid, 'the African self' became alienated not only from itself, but also from its history, context and society. Hence the idea of 'self-division', a concept, which speaks to a form of separation supposedly resulting in a loss of familiarity with the 'self' to the point that the subject, having become entirely estranged from him/herself is relegated to a lifeless form of identity signified in terms of 'objecthood'. As Mbembe (2002) argues, not only is the self no longer recognized by 'the other', 'the African self', now perverted and signified in terms of objecthood also no longer recognizes 'itself'. As we see in Mbembe's (2002) illustrations, most times this objectification of 'the self' is discussed in terms of alienation or deracination, and it features prominently in the Francophone critiques, which have most fully consummated the conceptualization of this representation (Fanon 1967).

The second canonical meaning relates to the conception of 'the African self' in relation to the ownership and acquisition of 'property'. According to the dominant narrative (Mbembe 2002), 'slavery', 'colonization' and 'apartheid' have led differently and collectively to the dispossession of the individual, a process through which juridical and economic procedures have been manipulated and perverted—leading to significant exploitation and expropriation of not just African labour through slavery, but also the loss of land, land-based resources, human and natural resources. This was followed by a unique experience of subjection characterized by the falsification of Africa's history by 'the other', a development, which leads to a state of 'maximal exteriority', 'estrangement' and 'deracination'. As Mbembe (2002) further observes, these two phases namely, 'the violence of falsification' and 'material expropriation' are the main components of not just Africa's uniqueness but also of the tragedy at its foundation. As he surmises, this construction is particularly applicable to English-language studies of Marxist political economy, anthropology or history, most of which advance aspects of the nationalist and dependentist theses (Amin 1973, Ake 1981 and Rodney 1981).

The third canonical meaning underscores the idea of 'historical degradation'. Here, 'slavery', 'colonization' and 'apartheid' are said to have plunged the African subject not only into 'humiliation', 'debasement' and 'untold sufferings', but also into 'a zone of non-being' and 'perpetual social death' characterized by 'the denial of dignity', 'heavy psychic damage' and 'the sustained torment of an exile experience'. As Mbembe (2002: 241-242) argues, these constitutive illustrations of slavery, colonization and apartheid informed the context of development and articulation of post-colonial scholarship as the unifying discursive practice embodying the self-reflexive desire of 'the denied objectified self' in Africa to know themselves and their community; re-write their own history; recapture their destiny and sovereignty; and belong to themselves in the modern world—in the context of independence and actual autonomy. Following his definition of post-colonial scholarship, Mbembe (2002: 242) laments its shortcomings and echoes aspects of Spivak's (1999) reservations on the discipline, some of which are discussed in this chapter shortly:

By following the model of Jewish reflection on the phenomena of suffering, contingency, and finitude, these three meanings might have been used as a starting point for a philosophical and critical interpretation of the apparent long rise toward nothingness that Africa has experienced all through its history. Theology, literature, film, music, political philosophy, and psychoanalysis would have had to be involved as well. But such a synthesis did not occur.<sup>8</sup> In reality, the production of the dominant meanings of these events was itself colonized by the ideological currents introduced above—the one instrumentalist, the other nativist—that claim to speak in the name of Africa as a whole.<sup>9</sup>

His work thus discusses these two currents, their major weaknesses and the ways out of the dead end into which they have led the reflections on the African experience of the self and the world. Kaviraj (1992) defines post-colonial scholarship as an attempt not just to narrativize the histories of Third World nationalisms, but also to capture the content, context and texture of such forms of thought and interactions, which antedate the Enlightenment. According to Kaviraj (1992: 34):

Historically, the great enterprise called the enlightenment had met three historical frontiers, separated from each other in terms of space and time. It had an internal frontier on the underside of bourgeois society, between the elites and the productive classes within capitalism. A second frontier was between its victorious, conquering colonial power and the peoples it subjugated and reduced to political ineffectuality and cultural silence. A final frontier is reached today when that civilization itself feels exhausted and has produced an interesting and complex internal critique.

In this sense, being based on the retrieval, reconstruction and identification of 'the self' in relation to 'the other', the narrativization of post-coloniality is articulated through the invocation of traditional conceptions of 'the collective selves'. Such a narrative does not therefore aspire to be a universal

form of discourse; but rather draws lines; it insists on a position of difference; and distributes people; unlike European rationalist theoretical discourses, which attempt to unite all people and positions in an illusive universe of ideal consensus. Its insistence on a position of difference, especially in relation to 'its other' should be explained. As a permanent feature, colonialism and other legacies of the Enlightenment left behind two contradictory heritages within the character of post-colonial modernities. One, they established and define not just the character and context of intellectual engagements and theoretical thinking in the Third World (Kaviraj and Khilnani 2001: 3) but also shaped and now dictate the very contents of the pedagogical engagements in these societies and their respective institutional sites (Said 1978). As Chakrabarty (2000: 4) observes:

Modern social critiques of caste, oppressions of women, the lack of rights for laboring and subaltern classes in India, and so on—and, in fact, the very critique of colonialism itself—are unthinkable except as a legacy, partially, of how Enlightenment Europe was appropriated in the subcontinent. The Indian constitution tellingly begins by repeating certain universal Enlightenment themes celebrated, say, in the American constitution. And it is salutary to remember that the writings of the most trenchant critic of the institution of "untouchability" in British India refer us back to some originally European ideas about liberty and human equality.

Two, colonialism and other legacies of the Enlightenment are also responsible not just for the underdevelopment and dependence of Third World societies, but also for creating the conditions sustaining their backwardness, marginalization and stagnation under the present situations. These two realities determine the mode of engagement with the European world and thought in the post-Enlightenment period, with the result that while seeking to emphasize the applicability of universal notions of rights and the equality of the human person to all societies regardless of race, sex and age, post-colonialism also seeks to establish alternative conceptions of time and history, through the presentation of underdevelopment and dependency not as original states of being in these societies, but as products of the unequal relations of the core countries with the periphery. Poised by the recognition of the need to recover and develop a local identity and a sense of distinction damaged by the imperial and colonizing discourse (Ashcroft *et al.* 1998: 78), Chakrabarty (1992 and 2000) advocates "the writing of a post-colonial history", which rather than returning to atavistic, nativist histories, or outrightly rejecting modernity in its entirety, invents a narrative that deliberately makes visible, within the very structure of its narrative forms, its own repressive strategies and practices.

Postcolonial scholarship is therefore committed, almost by its definition to engaging the universals, which include abstract conceptions and figures of the human or of Reason—forged in eighteenth-century Europe and which underlie the human sciences (Chakrabarty 2000). Given the occupation, domination and control of about nine-tenth of the world by the imperial powers in the post-World War I period (Young, 2001: 2) and the confirmation of Lenin's (1968: 223) theoretical positions on the complete division and 'future redivision' of the world, post-colonial analysis makes clear the nature and impact of inherited power relations and their continuing effects on modern global culture and politics (Ashcroft *et al.* 1998: 1-3). For countries of the South, political questions, which interface nation-state relations, development and underdevelopment are considered in clear reference to their colonialist past, while their analyses draw on a wide variety of theoretical positions and their associated strategies and techniques of analysis. Being a relatively new discipline, post-colonial scholarship has developed over the years conceptual vocabularies, which have not only been deeply contested, functioning in highly charged and contestatory contexts of intellectual exchanges, but have also remained in themselves sites of negotiation and progressive refinement. In recent times, concepts like 'aboriginal/indigenous peoples', 'abrogation', 'agency', 'allegory', 'alterity', 'ambivalence', 'apartheid', 'appropriation', 'binarisms', 'Black consciousness' and 'Black studies', 'colonialism' and 'colonial discourse', 'counter-discourse', 'Commonwealth Literature', 'contrapuntal reading', 'creole and creolization', 'critical Fanonism', 'cultural difference' and 'cultural diversity', 'decolonization', 'underdevelopment and dependency', 'diaspora', 'dislocation', 'essentialism and strategic essentialism', 'ethnicity', 'ethnography', 'ethno-psychiatry' and 'ethno-psychology', 'Euro-centrism', 'exotic and exoticism', 'exploration and travel', 'Fanonism', 'Feminism and post-colonialism', 'frontier', 'globalization', 'going native', 'hegemony', 'hybridity', 'imperialism', 'independence', 'manicheanism', 'marginality', 'material conditions', 'metonymic gap', 'metropolis and metropolitan', 'mimicry', 'miscegenation', 'modernism and post-colonialism', 'modernity', 'mulatto', 'nation language', 'nation/nationalism', 'national allegory', 'national liberation movements', 'native', 'nativism' and 'negritude', 'neo-colonialism', 'New Literature', 'orality', 'Orientalism', 'Other/other', 'othering', 'place', 'political economy', 'post-colonial body', 'post-colonialism/post-colonialism', 'post-colonial reading', 'post-colonial state', 'primitivism', 'Rastafarianism', 'savage/civilized', 'settler', 'settler colony', 'slave/slavery', 'subaltern', 'subject/subjectivity', 'surveillance', 'syncretism', 'synergy', 'testimonio', 'Third World/First/Second/Fourth', 'trans-culturation', 'universalism/universality', 'world systems theory'

and 'worlding' are examples of the conceptual innovations, which now characterize this discipline (Ashcroft *et al.* 1998).

The spirit of this engagement is found in the writings of Hichem Djait (1985), the Tunisian philosophical historian who accuses imperialist Europe of denying Africa its own vision of humanity. It is also found in Fanon's (1963) articulation of the African liberation struggle, which held on to the Enlightenment idea of the equality of the human person. The engagement with European thought is thus marked by the fact that the European intellectual tradition is almost the most dominant in the social sciences departments of most, if not all, modern universities today. And, as Samir Amin (1989) and Martin Bernal (1991) have observed, although the idea of the European intellectual tradition stretching back to the ancient Greeks is merely a fabrication of relatively recent European history, nevertheless, that is the genealogy of the thought in which social scientists across the world find themselves inserted. The point that is being emphasized is that, given the contentious nature of the opposing claims to history around which the genealogy of the social sciences is constructed, the critique of historicism is necessarily an aspect of the unended story of post-colonial scholarship, for, as Chakrabarty (2000: 6) argues:

the very history of politicization of the population, or the coming of political modernity, in countries outside of the Western capitalist democracies of the world produces a deep irony in the history of the political. This history challenges us to rethink two conceptual gifts of nineteenth-century Europe, concepts integral to the idea of modernity. One is historicism—the idea that to understand anything it has to be seen both as a unity and in its historical development—the other is the very idea of the political. What historically enables a project such as that is the experience of political modernity.... European thought has a contradictory relationship to such an instance of political modernity. It is both indispensable and inadequate in helping us think through the various life practices that constitute the political and the historical. Exploring—on both theoretical and factual registers—this simultaneous indispensability and inadequacy is the task of postcolonial scholarship.

From our point of view, it is mainly within this mode that Ake makes his contributions. As Kaviraj (1992) surmises, different issues characterize the experiences of post-colonial societies generally. And, given their connectible nature, post-colonial scholarship takes the form of a discursive practice, which critiques all manifestations and aspects of imperial representation, language and control. Qualifying the efforts in Africa in this direction, Mbembe (2002: 239) states that:

Over the past two centuries, intellectual currents have emerged whose goal has been to confer authority on certain symbolic elements integrated into the African collective imaginaire. Some of these trends have gained a following, while others have remained mere outlines. Very few are outstanding in richness and creativity and fewer still are of exceptional power.

In what follows, an examination of the leading arguments in some of the works of major post-colonial scholars is in order. Mentioning only a few, George Lamming (1960) cited in Ashcroft *et al.* (1995: 12-17) discusses the question of how Britain maintains its continuing cultural authority in post-colonial societies even under the current situations in which it no longer retains any direct hold on its former Empire and colonies. He examines the ways in which Euro-centric assumptions about race, nationality and literature have been used to undermine the production of post-colonial writings. Abdul R. JanMohamed (1985) cited in Ashcroft *et al.* (1995: 18-23) discusses the applied role and importance of the literary text both as a site of cultural control and also as a highly effective instrumentality for the determination of 'the natives' through fixing them under the sign of 'the other'. He shows how these literary texts contain features, which can be subverted and appropriated to the oppositional and anti-colonial purposes of contemporary post-colonial writings. Through his analysis, he portrays the literary text as a means of bringing into being and also modifying the controlling discursive practices of colonialism. Also, using Jacques Lacan's distinction of the imaginary and symbolic stages of development as a conceptual tool in his analysis, JanMohamed captures and emphasizes the self-contradictions characterizing binary constructions. His argument suggests that by properly understanding how the binarisms of the colonial discourse operate, 'the self-other', 'civilized-native', 'us-them', and other '*manichean polarities*', post-colonial critics can advance an active 're-reading' of such texts, through making them available for 're-writing' and 'subversion'. He demonstrates how this 're-inscriptions' is made possible through developing an analysis of the relationship between contemporary texts of post-colonial writing and the specific colonial texts to which they 'write back'. In this sense, far from sustaining a continuing dependence, such a process of 'writing back' is rather an effective means of escaping from the binary polarities implicit in the manichean constructions of colonialism and its discursive practices.

On her part, Gayatri C. Spivak (1988) cited Ashcroft *et al.* (1995: 24-28) questions the possibility of recovering a subaltern voice, which is not a kind of essentialist fiction. Importantly, even though she empathizes with the project undertaken in contemporary historiography to lend a voice to 'the subaltern' hitherto written out of record by conventional historical accounts, Spivak raises serious doubts and expresses huge reservations regarding its theoretical legitimacy and applicability in real life. Though sympathetic, she is critical of Ranajit Guha's subaltern studies project, which as Ashcroft *et al.* (1995: 8) puts it, seeks to obtain what Edward Said termed 'the permission to speak' by going behind the terms of reference of 'elites history' to include the perspective of those who are never taken into account—'the subaltern social groups'. She recognizes and applauds the project's

endorsement of the complex heterogeneity of the colonial subject, and gives a qualified approval to the politics of the efforts to speak on behalf of the people. Following these, she articulates what she considers to be the difficulties and contradictions involved in constructing 'a speaking position' for 'the subaltern'. According to her, given these constraints, one cannot construct a category of 'the subaltern' that actually has an unproblematically audible and effective 'voice', above the persistently multiple echoes of its inevitable heterogeneity. She says, for the true subaltern group, whose identity is its 'difference', there is no subaltern subject that can 'know and speak of itself'. As she puts it, "this is mainly because the major feature of the subaltern is its differentiated heterogeneity rather than a homogenized unity". She therefore cautions the intellectuals to avoid constituting and reconstructing the subaltern as an unproblematic field of knowing. Her conclusion is that "subaltern historiography must first confront and resolve the problematic conditions making for the impossibility of such gestures".

Homi K. Bhabha (1985) cited in Ashcroft *et al.* (1995: 29–35) takes on 'the deep ambivalences' and 'universal fixities' of colonialist epistemologies. He presents 'the emblem of the English book' as one of the most important aspects of the 'signs taken for wonders' and by which the colonizer controls the imagination and aspirations of the colonized. This, to him, is because the book assumes a greater authority than the experience of the colonized peoples themselves. He describes 'the colonial space' as 'an agnostic space' and notes that colonial authority simultaneously renders the colonial presence ambivalent, since, according to him, it only comes about by displacing those images of identity already held by the colonized society. According to him, despite the imitation and mimicry with which colonized peoples cope with in the imperial presence, the relationship becomes one of constant, if implicit contestation and opposition between the colonizer and the colonized. As Bhabha observes, 'mimicry' does not imply the rejection of opposition, but rather encompasses more than overt opposition. In this sense, opposition is not simply reduced to intention, but is implied in the very production of dominance whose intervention as 'a dislocatory presence' paradoxically confirms the very thing it displaces. As Ashcroft *et al.* (1995: 9) observe:

Spivak's and Bhabha's analyses are important and very influential warnings of the complexities of the task faced by post-colonial theory. But they have also invited responses, which see them, and their approach as too deeply implicated in European intellectual traditions, which older, more radical exponents of post-colonial theory, such as Frantz Fanon and Albert Memmi, had sought to dismantle and set aside. The debate is a struggle between those who want to align themselves with the subaltern and those who insist that this attempt becomes at best only a refined version of the very discourse it seeks to displace. All are agreed, in some sense, that the main problem is how to effect agency for the post-colonial subject. But the contentious issue of how this is to be attained remains unresolved.



### 5.3 The Legacy of Claude Ake

Having located him within the tricontinental project of post-colonial scholarship, this section discusses Ake's legacy not only for the African social science community but also the larger system of knowledge production on a global scale. Earlier attempts, which captured significant aspects of his contributions and legacy have been noted in chapter two of this study. A major aspect of his legacy to the African social science and the continent's knowledge production system is his 'Africanization of the political economy approach'. According to Abiodun (1998: 36-42) this is validly demonstrated in his analytical:

- i). Repudiation of the postulation that the export of capital to Africa and other backward regions of the world would develop their productive forces as it did in Europe and North America. This he did by showing (from Africa's point of view) (a) how capitalism would reproduce and multiply itself through (moribund and decaying) parasitism and an exploitative system par excellence, especially if not confronted with a revolutionary (socialist) overthrowment, (b) the nature of capitalism as a global phenomenon and process, (c) the nature and implications of the core-periphery relationship (s) and (d) the particularities and specificities of peripheral capitalism in Africa.
- ii). Acknowledgement of the contributions of major classical Marxist scholars such as Vladimir I. Lenin's (1899) *The Development of Capitalism and the World Economy*; Rudolf Hilferding's (1904) *Finance Capital*; Rosalyn Luxemburg's (1913) *Accumulation of Capital*, and Nikolai I. Bukharin, (1915)'s *Imperialism and the World Economy*.
- iii). Aversion from their restrictively Eurocentric vision—with the exception of V. I. Lenin's (1917) *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*, in which we began to see a major advance in dealing with capitalism as a global phenomenon.
- iv). Application and definition of the concept of the Africanisation of political economy as the attempt to employ the political economy approach towards studying the historical process (es) which integrated Africa into the global political economy through colonialism and the enduring (impact) of that process. More elaborately, Abiodun (1998: 38) recounts that Ake, cited in Ihonvbere (1989: 33-34) defines the political economy approach as an attempt to study social formations "... with particular reference to the elucidation of the global character of capitalism and its application to the periphery".
- v). Use and popularisation of the scientific value of the approach, which has resulted in many dissertations now written in the social science disciplines such as Political Science, Economics, Sociology and other disciplines where its methodological and conceptual thrusts have become instructive points of departure.

As recounted by Abiodun (1998: 36–42) others include his:

- vi). Commitment to treat social life and material existence in terms of their relatedness, through a sustained rejection of the single disciplinary specialisation approach; followed by a preference for the interdisciplinary approach. This he conceived and defended not as the simultaneous application of specialised disciplines, but through forging a synthetic discipline, a social science (on materialist foundations) to replace the Social Sciences.
- vii). Ability to simplify the nuances of political economy—thus making them popular with those who came across it. One of his all-time intellectual attainments is contained in what has become a classic in our milieu—his (1981) *A Political Economy of Africa*. In it, the processes of integrating Africa into global capitalism are succinctly explained, with such profound historical and empirical data. Also, the various stages and forms that colonialism went through and/or manifested in Africa—slave trade, mercantilism and settler colonisation among others—as

well as their catastrophic consequences on the development of productive forces, the antagonistic social relations that explain the instability of most African states are also addressed in the book. The study describes the continuing dominance by imperialism of the African social formations as the main explanatory issue at the root of Africa's instability. See Ake, C., (1981), *A Political Economy of Africa*, England: Longman.

viii). Dismissal of the current pre-occupation with market forces and the corresponding divestment of the state from productive activities as the panacea to the underdevelopment of the productive forces and the entronement of democracy in Africa. See Ake, C., (1978), *Revolutionary Pressures in Africo*, London: Zed Press; Ake, C., (1996), *Democracy and Development in Africa*, Spectrum Books Limited. Ibadan: Safari Books (Export) Limited. See also, Ake, C., (2000), *The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa*, Dakar: CODESRIA Books Series.

ix). Appreciation of philosophical and scientific knowledge as socially conditioned (human) heritages, hence his emphasis on the need for originality through the endogenous development of science and knowledge as objective bases for understanding and appreciating the profundity and relevance of the African knowledge systems in modern times. See Ake, C., (1986), 'Editorial: Raison d'Etre', *African Journal of Political Economy*, Number 1, in Jinadu, L. A., (2004), 'Social Science and the Challenge of Peace and Development in Africa: The Contribution of Claude Ake', Seminar paper presented as a Visiting Claude Ake Professor, Uppsala: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University.

x). Interrogation of the state in Africa, followed logically by the demand for the contextualisation of the specific type of state that would superintend the development of productive forces as well as the social forces for the assignment; backed up with the vigorous conceptualisation of the democracy relevant to Africa. As Ake (2000) illustrated, the liberal form of democracy would not suit Africa, mainly because, coupled as it is with the laissez faire economic philosophy and structure, Africa, which is more than other regions, outside the world's sphere of decision making and implementation, would further be marginalised.

Another legacy of the late scholar is his principled aversion from orthodoxy and dogma. As Jinadu (2004: 4) illustrates, this is evident in his pragmatic willingness and belief that all theories, paradigms, modes of thought and models of social action should be contextualized in a manner that they enable us transcend the temptations of wrongly generalizing from one context to the other without critically considering the specificities of individual cases, histories and cultures. His aversion from dogma is best understood in the position that, being part of the global system of knowledge production, social science scholarship in its application to Africa is a central cultural apparatus of expatriate domination of the continent, the agenda of which has been to ensure the realization of capitalists and imperialist interests across the world (Jinadu 2004: 4). Having exposed this aspect of the global system of knowledge production, Ake goes on to advocate the building of an alternative global system of knowledge based on the appreciation of the different histories, which ultimately produce the diverse knowledge bases across the world. To him, this is a crucial condition for transcending the limitations of the restrictive context of knowledge production in the modern world. As we noted earlier in our examination of Jinadu's (2004) insightful narration, it was in the struggle to achieve this objective that Ake became a central figure in the movement that gained momentum in the 1970s and 1980s within critical and radical African social sciences—to expose and

challenge the basic epistemic and theoretical assumptions of mainstream western liberal and Marxist globalized social sciences in their application to Africa.

For Ake, the universality of theoretical and empirical knowledge is only a ruse, which should be broken down into its different historical and cultural components; to be explored and pursued within the frameworks defined and provided by one's social experience and specific cultural milieu. In other words, for Ake, theoretical and empirical knowledge are to be universally explored and pursued; but such pursuits must respect and emphasize the frameworks defined and provided by one's context, social experiences and cultural milieu. In other words, he admonishes that searching for the universals, vaguely defined as 'the truth' or 'knowledge' must proceed from the point of view of an appreciation of one's history, context and environment. By extension, an understanding of Ake's aversion from orthodoxy and dogma helps us in appreciating his principled rejection of the pluralist, national integration and his modification of the neo-Marxist theories of underdevelopment and dependency in their application to Africa (Jinadu, 2004: 5-6). To him, western approaches, by virtue of looking at Africa's historiography using theories, prisms and perspectives derived from other cultures and contexts could not adequately explain the pathological trends underlying African politics. As Jinadu (2004: 6) puts it:

These approaches, according to him, were unable to explain adequately the underlying pathological trends and tendencies in African politics, because they were looking at Africa from intellectual prisms and perspectives, derived from other cultural and historical contexts. It also explains his movement away from the position he advanced in *A Theory of Political Integration* (Ake, 1967) and that was to inform his later publications, for example *Revolutionary Pressures in Africa* (1978), and *A Political Economy of Africa*. (1982) sic.

Lastly, we discuss here below Ake's legacy in terms of his contribution to international institution-building and knowledge production in the continent. Although aspects of these have been raised earlier in Sawyerr (1997) and other writers, nevertheless, we shall provide an independent account of this on Ake from the perspective of this researcher. From Ake's point of view, one fundamental area of Africa's dependence has been in knowledge production, appropriation and dissemination, a situation, which undermines the continent's ability to maximize its democratic potentials and development agenda (Ake, cited in Africa Institute of South Africa 2006). This is reflected mainly in the notion that Europe and North America largely define and must continue to determine the orientations and research directions governing the social sciences vocation together with the modes of engagement within their respective fields. Instances of this are found not only in the theories, paradigms and methods of seeking knowledge that define the fields of enquiry and practice but also in the kind of literature and scholarship that define the various disciplinary vocations. Consequently,

in anthropology, history, philosophy, political science and sociology, it is assumed that the entire vocation exists as an appendage and extension of European and North American scholarship. Also, these disciplines suffer intellectual dislocation; they lack context-sensitivity; and the needed originality with which they are to be pursued. As argued by the Africa Institute of South Africa (2006: 1):

This failure of context-sensitive scholarship is epistemic and analytic. Debates regarding ...African issues are often filtered through epistemic approaches that are products of other (largely western) contexts. From Economics to Sociology, from Philosophy to History, it was the depth of endogeneity that gave the canonical western works their vibrancy. As much as many may think of Economics as a science, for instance, we cannot understand the distinction between David Ricardo and Friedrich List, outside of the specificity of their locales; neither can we understand the profundity of the scholarship of Max Weber or Emile Durkheim, in Sociology, outside of the depth of their endogeneity.

Regretfully, even in the rare situations where there are engagements with uniquely African issues, such efforts often end up portraying findings on such studies as products emanating from an 'alien other', based on 'an area study approach' even in the post-colonial period. This is added to the relative neglect or lack of awareness of debates, scholarships and scholars from the rest of the African continent, with the result that while scholarly engagement with the rest of the continent remains largely perfunctory, in such areas where it exists, it is rather in the negative form, a sense of what Africa must never become. This is added to the dearth of scholarly engagements with the wider African scholarship, manifested in the relative lack of awareness, appreciations for and acknowledgement of celebrated works by African authorities, who for decades have engaged issues in the African social science community (Africa Institute of South Africa 2006: 1-2). To Hountondji (1997: 1), of the degree of this dependence we are sometimes only hazily aware. According to Ake (1986: iii):

...unless we strive for endogenous development of science and knowledge we cannot fully emancipate ourselves. Why this development must be endogenous should be clear for it is not a question of parochialism or nationalism. The point is that even though the principles of science are universal, its growth points and the particular problems, which it solves, are contingent on the historical circumstances of the society in which the science is produced.

It is against this backdrop that Ake evaluates the place of the African knowledge system within the global system of knowledge production. The major question with which he is preoccupied is on how knowledge, as developed or appropriated by Africans on the basis of their historical experiences, can be better valorized for empowering the state in the pursuit of democracy and development (Ake

n. d.). The pertinence of his intervention is underscored by his concern with endogenous knowledge production for the purpose of self-actualization and national liberation, especially at a time when the continent's political leadership has declared itself in search of a suitable framework for achieving an all-embracing continental renaissance. In one of its recent publications, CODESRIA (2006: 2) qualifies the context of this search:

After nearly three decades of unsuccessful orthodox economic reforms imposed by the international financial institutions under the guise of the so-called Washington Consensus, development thinking for the purpose of rebuilding the foundations of African economies appears to be at a dead-end and begs the question of alternatives that could enable the continent to turn the table of underdevelopment. Furthermore, a massive process of social re-ordering appears to be under way across Africa as various social players seek parts of the continent, including the collapse of state legitimacy and central governmental authority. These developments call for a re-thinking of state, economy, culture and society in ways that depart radically from conventional wisdom. In addition, a fresh commitment to extend the boundaries of pan-Africanism appears to be in evidence with the launching of the new, bolder African Union in replacement of the Organisation of African Unity, a development that has been accompanied by pleas for a harnessing of African knowledge for the advancement of peace, stability and unity. And yet, in the face of the different changes occurring across the continent and the intellectual challenges which they pose, the inherited analytic tools derived from the European scholarly heritage by which African scholars have sought to grasp the transitions and shifts taking place in their societies, appear increasingly ill-adapted to the phenomena they are meant to capture and the environment to which they are applied. Also, the institutional context of knowledge production and dissemination, epitomised by the university, is undergoing a severe crisis of identity, mission and relevance.

In terms of the foundational concerns with endogeny, epistemic and institutional challenges of the social sciences in the continent, Ake provides us with very useful intellectual tool kits for rethinking and making sense of the transformatory challenges taking place in the African context of knowledge production, especially in relation to the domineering impulses of imperial and androcentric scholarship. In this sense, Ake's legacy lies in his contribution to the development of a uniquely African social science, a contribution, which today challenges and enables us to transcend the extroversions and erasures that constitute the hallmark of imperial pedagogy and scholarship. Through this contribution, he challenges the impact of the foreign presence on the character of African scholarship through the articulation of protest scholarship, critical reflections and affirmation of the need for epistemic rupture and curriculum transformation. He was principally concerned with developing a form of scholarship, which takes its local intellectual and existential contexts seriously while also seeking to be globally reputable. In doing these, Ake builds on the works of older scholars, especially Fanon, Fanonist scholars, Walter Rodney and others, whose influences were noted in earlier sections and chapters of this study in our illustrations on the making of his

paradigm shift. He was also inspired by the writings of some of his contemporaries and other succeeding scholars.

His emphasis is hinged on the question of endogeneity, namely the development of a form of social science scholarship, which in epistemic terms is rooted in its culture and locale to create canons in its own right, and also one that takes the African social science and policy-making nexus seriously. From this, he critiques a major paradox and practice in the continent's universities, that is, the idea of teaching and deploying, especially in African policy-making contexts as 'nomothetic' what is rather 'idiographic' in other contexts. He argues that engaging 'a social science', which derives the source-codes for its epistemologies in local narratives is a condition and requirement for taking 'the practice of scholarship in Africa' beyond its conception as 'translation' or 'data-gathering for others in the global division of intellectual labour'. As we see in his (1979) *Social Science as Imperialism: The Theory of Political Development*, Ake exposes the inclinations of Western social science for teleological analysis (Harris, 2005: 78); he demonstrates and encourages further acknowledgement of the idiographic and particularity of Western social science and thought instead of blindly treating them as either 'universal' or 'nomothetic' (Adesina, 2006: 3). In foregrounding his positions on these issues, he recommends a collective recourse and resort to 'endogeneity' articulated through 'critical distancing' and 'a selective borrowing' from 'other epistemic contexts, settings and locales'. An illustration of Ake's (1979) positions on endogeneity is expressed in Adesina's (2005: 4) presidential address to the South African Sociological Association:

Contrary to the false claims of universalism and unicity of Sociology<sup>8</sup>, endogeneity is fundamental to the canonical works of what we call sociology.<sup>9</sup> "Universal knowledge", as Archie Mafeje notes, "can only exist in contradiction".<sup>10</sup> More importantly, "to evolve lasting meanings, we must be 'rooted' in something".<sup>11</sup> It is precisely because Marx, Weber, and Durkheim were firmly rooted in their specific contexts that they produced the canonical works that we today consider essential to Sociology. [As] Kwesi Prah reminded us ...: "If what we say and do has relevance for our humanity, its international relevance is guaranteed".<sup>12</sup>

Another remarkable legacy of Ake is that he addresses the critical question of agency in the struggle towards bringing about the desired forms of change in the continent's economic transformation and democratic revolution. He does this mainly not only by locating the critical intelligentsia as the vanguard of both the revolutionary struggle and also of endogenous knowledge production in the continent (Ake 1978, 1979 and n. d.) but also by

locating the people, the toiling masses as both the means and end of all democratic and development initiatives (Ake 1996). In illustrating some of the issues, which he painstakingly engages, two examples are in order. These generally concern the presentation of what Hountondji (1977) calls 'extroversion' as 'the nomothetic' and the unkind erasure of what is uniquely African from the collective global memory. One, as Adesina (2006) observes, Anthony Giddens (1996) defines sociology as "a generalizing discipline that concerns itself above all with modernity", "with the character and dynamics of modern industrialized societies". This is added to the attempt by most texts in the field to trace the emergence of the discipline to Auguste Comte (1798-1857), the nineteenth century French philosopher, and identify Karl Marx (1818-1883), Max Weber (1864-1920) and Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) as its founding fathers. This definitional attempt denies the uniquely African and other 'pre-modern' origins a position not only in sociology, but also in other social sciences. It also denies the contributions made to these fields and disciplines by Africans and other non-European authorities and societies. For example, Ibn Khaldun had written his three volumes *Magnus opus, Kitab Al 'Ibar* in 1378AD. Among others, in the first volume, *Muqaddimah*, Ibn Khaldun sets out the conceptual framework and methodological bases for adjudicating between competing data sources, all of which are self-consciously sociological. As Sayed Farid Alatas (2006: 397-411) cited in Adesina (2006: 6) notes, Ibn Khaldun outlines his new 'sciences' of human organization and society *ilm al-'umran al-bashari* and *ilm al ijtima 'al-insani*. In Adesina's (2006) estimation, this was 452 years before the first volume of Auguste Comte's six volume of the course of *Positive Philosophy*, was published. In the same work, Ibn Khaldun rigorously articulates the concept of *asabiyyah* in explaining the normative basis of group cohesion, its decomposition and reconstitution, the different ways in which it manifests at different levels of social organization and among different groups (see Dhaouadi, 1990: 319-335) cited in Adesina (2006: 6). Again, following Adesina's (2006) estimations, this was 515 years before Emile Durkheim's (1893) *Division of Labour* and its idea of social norms was published. However, in spite of these instructive and pioneering efforts, one hardly encounters any 'modern sociology' textbook available to African students and universities mentioning Ibn Khaldun, talkless of discussing his works. Carefully, but of course deliberately, the value of Ibn Khaldun's works has been repudiated on two major grounds. One, that they were ridden with 'excessively religious thinking'. Two, that they do

not conform or focus on 'real modern societies'. In other words, it is argued here, by most Euro-centric critics of Ibn Khaldun that most of his works are not 'modern' enough, and, are therefore not teaching, researching and the practice of 'modern sociology'. Definitely, there are other African and non-European authorities whose works have been repudiated and erased on similar grounds by the power-driven influences of modernity and the West, so that Ibn Khaldun is just one of the numerous examples and experiences of such instructive and pioneering scholars who have been dispossessed of the value of their intellectual labour and contributions to knowledge production in the continent and across the global South.

Two, in addition to the illustrated erasure of uniquely African contributions to the global system of knowledge production, is the simultaneous denial of systematic knowledge to the continent and its people, especially following the Hegelian logic and traditions (Adesina 2006). While not substituting 'erasure' for 'uncritical adulation', the point at issue here, is to highlight the immanently ethno-centric and largely racist inclination to create 'binary opposites' between 'knowledge' and 'ignorance' on the one hand, and 'science' and 'dubious magic' on the other hand. In this sense, while the West is privileged as 'the natural source' and 'original repository' of 'scientific knowledge', 'ignorance' and 'dubious magic' are presented as the signifiers of the non-Western 'other'. All these are taken on in Ake's (1979 and n. d.) engagement with Western social science. According to him, just as Africa has been reduced to raw material production and Europe specializes in the production of capital goods and products, there is also the ideological reduction of the continent to a source from which data is generated and exported to Europe for advancing the frontiers of knowledge, while theory is perpetually imported into Africa and the South in a global system dominated by Europe and the West.

Ake deals with what Hountondji (1977) calls 'the extroversion of African societies' and 'systems of knowledge production'. He traces the origin of this practice to the period and developments following the European colonial conquest of the Third World and says in spite of independence, extroversion is still immanent in the South's experiences and relations with the West, especially given its location in the global economy and system of knowledge production. He draws a parallel between the extroversion of the economies manifested *inter alia*, in the export of cocoa or gold and the import of chocolate and jewellery on the one hand, and the extroversion in the global system of knowledge production manifested also in



the reduction of African scholarship to the vain proselytization and regurgitation of received paradigms and discourses including those which do not speak to the continent's situations, but are nevertheless deployed by the West in explaining social reality within the continent. He says such efforts are targeted at entrenching the intellectual dependence of the continent on the West not minding their proven ineffectualities in addressing and explaining the dynamics of the African contexts.

To sum up, pitching 'endogeneity' and 'ontology' against the contradictions of Euro-centric 'extroversion' and 'idiography', Ake challenges us to work hard towards replacing the practice of scholarship in Africa as 'translation' and 'extroversion' with its engagement as an objective 'self-reflection' through a critical reformulation of the 'African condition' and 'self'. In this sense, while the practice of scholarship as 'translation' involves the articulation of African social science, cultures and ideas according to Western academic terms, its 're-articulation' and 'reformulation', which Ake advocates is based on 'a reconstruction', 'reframing' and 'reconstitution' of the various disciplinary fields and vocations following uniquely African theories, interpretations and critiques, through an appreciation of 'endogeny' and 'ontology' as the objective sources of 'epistemology' and 'philosophy', based on a proper understanding of the institutional and disciplinary histories of existing knowledge-producing frontiers, and also inspired by a corrective commitment to 'reclaim history' and 'rewrite the careless deployment of the ideas of neo-colonialism by the alien other', in narrativizing the African past (Ake 1978, 1979, n. d., Adesina 2006 and Zeleza 2006). In doing these, Ake is not alone. Rather, representing a strong voice, he is complemented within the continent by Cabral (1964 and 1966), Fanon (1967, 1980 and 1986), First (1970), Amin (1974, 1981 and 1988), Mafeje (1971 and 1973), Onoge (1977), Ekeh (1975), Akinsola Akiwowo (1999), Adesogan (1987) and Nabudere (2006). In India, South-Asia, Latin America and other post-colonies societies, similar efforts have also been articulated as we see in the works of some of the scholars cited in this study. Such efforts challenge hitherto 'grand' and 'dominant' narratives on the subject matter of 'Africanity' and African social science scholarship. As Harris (2005: 77) puts it, Ake's legacy challenges us to (i) be clear why western social science is inadequate, how to change it and why, (ii) clarify the idea of development, and (iii) invent an appropriate model of development which is based on mass-interest.

Before concluding this section, a word is in order on Ake's Africanization of the political economy. While appreciating his contributions to the development of this approach, it should also be noted however, that Ake mainly represents one among other African scholars who developed and nurtured this vital approach. And, although their writings focus on different issues and societies, nevertheless, most of these scholars ask the similar questions. 'What are the reasons for the poverty and underdevelopment of the continent?' Using the political economy approach, answers to this question are approached historically for it is the past, rather than some evolutionary dynamics, which has shaped the present. According to Gutkind and Wallerstein (1976: 8), in addition to the historical approach, the multidisciplinary approach is also employed as a way of explaining complex social realities—the realities of the introduction and spread of colonial capitalism, all the major processes as revealed in the political, economic and social matrix of colonial and post-colonial Africa. The application of the political economy and multidisciplinary approaches emphasize the specificities of the accounts and experiences of individual countries in terms of the dynamics of their changes and development rather than blindly treating them as single homogenized entities. This application is also based on Lukacs' (1971: 8) position that: Only in a context, which sees the isolated facts of social life as aspects of the historical process and integrates them in a totality can knowledge of the facts hope to become knowledge of reality. In addition to Ake, there are also other scholars who have undertaken extensive modification and reformulation of orthodox Marxism especially as pioneering efforts, in their study of social reality in the continent. For example Bernard Magubane (1976) argues that the political economy of poverty in Africa is best understood in terms of the relations of various African countries to the international power structure and the social classes that this power structure reproduces within the prevailing dominant formations. Philip Ehrensaft (1976) cited in Gutkind and Wallerstein (1976) argues that underdevelopment in the continent is not a condition of being several centuries behind the kinds of transformations experienced in the capitalist centres, but a condition of 'peripherilization' and 'satellization' forced upon the periphery since 1500. E. Alpers (1975) contends that the explanation of Africa's backwardness and underdevelopment goes beyond the integration of African economies with powerful external influences, but includes the reality of their domination, leading to fluctuating fortunes for non-European countries within that global system. According to Alpers (1975), each African country

responded differently according to their historical background and varying experiences to slavery, forced labour, administrative fiat and the destruction of their basic institutions—with the result that their ecology and resources, their systems of trade and exchange relations during the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods—were drastically affected in a manner that inhibits indigenous and progressive development. According to Alpers (1975: 267):

Interpretations which look to the structure of African societies for the roots of underdevelopment err in confusing a lack of development for the dynamic of underdevelopment. Those who seek these roots in colonialism err in assuming that trade between Europe and Africa, not to mention that between India and Africa, was equally beneficial to all parties. The evidence presented here suggests, quite to the contrary, that the historical roots of underdevelopment in East Africa must be sought in the system of international trade which was established by Arabs by the thirteenth century, seized and extended by the Portuguese in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and finally by a complex admixture of Indian, Arab and Western capitalism.

As Kay (1975) has shown, as African societies were drawn into new commercial and political relationships controlled by an imperialist outpouring of Western European competition for raw materials, the indigenous structures began to serve new ends, oriented largely towards trade and markets, outlets for mercantile and later, industrial capital. In the process, indigenous economic structures lost their functions, legitimacy and autonomy, especially as they were incorporated into the colonial state whose main objective was the extraction of physical and human resources. Also undertaken was the transformation of subsistence economies into a vast reservoir of human labour to be exploited according to the fluctuating fortunes of the capitalist economies. All these created the asymmetrical relationships between Africa and the industrially developed regions of the world. These unequal economic relations are manifested *inter alia*, in 'the proletarianization of the continent', and the 'centre-periphery dependency relations' between Africa and the metropolitan economies. These situations have also led to the generation of internal class divisions by these structural inequalities, a development, which intensifies older forms of social stratifications and sub imperialisms—as in some parts of West Africa—with the result that local elites, whose economic and political power stems from their incorporation into the colonial state automatically control the prospects for transforming the rural/local economies. Other issues examined by these scholars include 'the African mode of production and its controversial contrast with the Asian mode of production', 'the subordination of the continent

to politically enforced incorporation without significant transformation', 'the causes of the land question and agrarian underdevelopment', 'the underdevelopment of the agricultural sector in Africa', 'the unassuaged importation of food into the continent', the cotermination of pre-colonial modes of production with colonial and neo-colonial capitalism', 'the poverty and impoverishment of Africa, Asia and Latin America', 'the role of peasants and their transformation into urban workers in Africa and Latin America', 'satellization and its impact on the revolutionary potentials of social classes in the continent', 'white minority domination and the question of neo-colonialism', 'internal colonization and sub-imperialism in Southern Africa', 'migrant labour, urbanization, investment and industrialization in Southern Africa', 'the violent and socially destructive nature of colonial capitalism, especially during its early stages of penetration and consolidation in the countries, which it underdevelops'.

As is obvious in the fore-gone accounts, most of these scholars are concerned about the underdevelopment of the Third World—a condition—which results largely from externally imposed capitalist strategies, which seek to develop metropolitan economies through arresting and freezing traditional forms of production and technology by using legal and military repression, the expropriation of land, racial segregation, forced labour, the imposition of a low-wage economy driven and controlled from without, various forms and systems of taxation and other instrumentalities of imperial power. The political economy approach has therefore, featured prominently in the analyses of 'underdevelopment', 'imperialism' and 'colonialism' (Amin 1972 and Rodney 1972), 'contemporary underdevelopment' (Dos Santos 1970 and Frank 1974), 'ending underdevelopment', especially using 'reformist' and 'socialist strategies', and 'revolutionary decolonization', 'underdevelopment' and 'social change' and 'the politics of underdevelopment'.

As a major international institution-builder, Ake's legacy lies in his contribution to the development of continental and transnational ties, and research networking. Among those noted in earlier chapters of this study, Ake's institution-building capacities are most validly demonstrated in his leadership of the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA), which he served as the Executive President from 1985-1988, and the Centre for Advanced Social Science (CASS) a research and advocacy think-tank, which he founded in 1992 and served as the founding Director until his death on 7 November 1996 (Ake's Curriculum Vitae 1996). For Ake, the context of Structural

Adjustment Programmes and other neo-liberal policy prescriptions imposed on African economies by the major international financial institutions in the 1980s was a crucial factor, which characterized his tenure and leadership as the Executive President of CODESRIA, the continent's apex research institution, especially at a period, during which most educational and research institutions in the continent were faced with the problem of funding. The Council at this period was almost winding as its leadership was hardly generating the funds needed to pay the salaries of secretarial staff and undertake other basic services. It therefore took the ingenious interventions of Professor Ake in reviving the Council, repositioning it within the changing developments and realities of the time, and restoring the confidence of the Swedish Development Co-operation Agency (SIDA/SAREC), the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), OXFAM in Great Britain, the Ford Foundation, the MacArthur Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Danish Agency for International Development (DANIDA), the French Ministry of Co-operation, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Rockefeller Foundation and the Government of Senegal, among other funding agencies, which now fund and support the Council's research, training and publication programmes (CODESRIA Bulletin Numbers 3 and 4, 2004). He also solicited and attracted several other funding institutions for the Council during and after this period, thus helping the African social science community overcome the harsh economic consequences of limited funding or even an utter lack of financial support, which had otherwise threatened to cripple the Council.

A similar account is applicable to Ake's legacy and involvements with the establishment of CASS in Port Harcourt, Nigeria. The Centre owes its survival largely to the contributions left behind by Ake, its founder and pioneer Director. The qualities of research and policy advocacy issues at the national and larger continental levels, which are taken on by this Centre are also enduring aspects of the efforts of Ake. Today, the fact that both CODESRIA and CASS are currently living healthily after him, and are surging from strength to strength is also a testimony to his glowing success in the cherished direction of international institution-building. It should be stated that there are indeed several areas and aspects of research engagement and institution-building, which have been positively affected by Ake. What we have discussed here above is only a selective summary. We have referred to some of them in

the chapter, which focuses on his biography and theoretical orientations. And, others will yet be noted and discussed by future scholars focusing on his writings in the future. In addition to what we have noted above, are his efforts at mentoring upcoming scholars, most of whom are themselves established authorities in different universities across the world. These include Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada, from 1969-1977, the University of Nairobi, Kenya, from 1970-1972, the University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, from 1974-1976, the African Association of Political Science, which he served as the Director of Research from 1975-1976, and the Faculty of the Social Sciences, University of Port Harcourt, Port Harcourt, Nigeria, which he served as the pioneer Dean from 1977-1983 among others.

According to Mafeje (2006), Ake possessed two major qualities, which not only endeared him greatly to major funding institutions across the world, but also made him outstanding among other senior scholars within the African social science community. These are (i) his sensitivity to the research needs and focus of major funding bodies, and (ii) his undoubted integrity and financial discipline. These, according to Mafeje (2006) were evident in his principled commitment demonstrated in an uncompromising utilization of research funds for their intended purposes, his maintenance of unfaulted record of research performance not only during his leadership of multilateral institutions like CODESRIA and CASS, but also in his personal research engagements with the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and other funding bodies from which he obtained financial support for his research. Mafeje (2006) explains that, very few African scholars in Ake's generation have been privileged enough to have received approval and funding to conduct research at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC. He says, fewer still will ever qualify for a second successful appointment as a research fellow at the same institution like Ake, who was appointed at the institution between 1990-1991 and also in 1996, where he wrote and published his (1996) *Democracy and Development in Africa*.

#### **5.4 Conclusion**

This chapter has provided a discussion of Ake's legacy both for the African social sciences community and the global industry of knowledge production. It located him within the tricontinental project of post-colonial scholarship, which we defined *inter alia*, as 'a South-driven critique of historicism'—a revisionist Western conception of human history, which

obfuscates the understanding of African historiography, 'a South-driven critique of political modernity' and 'the very idea of the political'. We defined post-colonial scholarship as involving, by implication, the engagement with the practice of history-writing from the South. Lastly, we presented the impact of the imperial presence and other legacies of the Enlightenment as decisive to the continent's present and future histories. The aim is to further research on some of the issues raised in Ake's works. This is done through suggesting vital reasons why Ake's works are considered worth-reading, at least in the limited opinion of this researcher. Other issues related to these shall be taken up later in the next chapter. For now, it remains to restate our position. Following Jinadu (2004: 12), Ake's legacy is that we must put our knowledge of the social sciences in the service of peace and development. How should we go about this? Here again, Ake's life and works provide a framework with which to proceed.

This is how best to immortalize the departed scholar—through a committed search for the conditions for sustainable social democracy in a manner that addresses the foundations of social injustice, the oppression of women, children and other vulnerable groups, and the emancipation of the working masses.

## **CHAPTER SIX CONCLUSION**

### **BEYOND CLAUDE AKE ON THE STATE, DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT**

#### **6.1 Summary**

Here, again, as Ake is wont to say, it is time to pull and tie the strings together. Accordingly, Chapter One was an attempt to formulate the main research problem for investigation. The formulation of the research problem was complemented and articulated using a number of research-related questions. These were backed up with the research objectives, methodology, conceptual clarifications, specifications and analyses, an illustration of the scope and limitations of the study, the significance of the study and the outline of chapters.

Chapter Two focused mainly on an examination of Claude Ake's biography and theoretical orientations. In this chapter, we examined the biographical factors, early influences and other major developments, which shaped Ake's life, career and scholarship. In addition to these, we also discussed his paradigm shift from liberalism to radical scholarship and paid an emphatic attention to the contexts, experiences and other instructive events, which surrounded such a shift. In getting to the heart of the discussion, we emphasized the impact of the great debate at the University of Dar es Salaam, in Tanzania, a development, which was presented in the chapter as the most important factor and influence that significantly changed Ake's theoretical orientations and worldview at this period. We also presented the accounts of other African scholars, most of whom were his contemporaries, old friends, colleagues, and in some cases, past students. Among others, we reported the views expressed by Archibald Mafeje, Bernard Magubane, Adebayo Olukoshi and Thandika Mkandawire on what they considered to be the developments and major shifts surrounding Ake's trajectory, career development and paradigm shift. These were followed by a detailed treatment of the researcher's understanding of the circumstances surrounding his death, a sad event, which occurred on Thursday 7 November 1996 in a plane crash in Nigeria. Lastly, using a political economy approach, the chapter provided an account of Ake's historical context. As we argued in the chapter, being tied with the historical sociology of Africa, the understanding of Ake's historical context is best approached through an interrogation of the continent's social history. As our illustrations suggest, given his engagement with the continent on a life-time basis, rather than being independent, a detailed understanding of Ake's life, scholarship and career is tied to that of



the continent. This consideration informed our decision to interrogate the two issues together in terms of their mutual interconnectedness.

Chapter Three examined the major issues implicated in Ake's works. However, in doing this, we focused mainly on his analysis of the chosen themes of the state, democracy and development in Africa. On the state, some of the issues that we noted and illustrated included his positions on (i) the state in political theory, (ii) the state in Africa, (iii) the unique and other features of the state in the continent, (iv) the history, nature and character of the state, (v) the implications of the limited autonomy or autonomization of the state in Africa, and (vi) the conditions and possibilities for its transformation. On democracy in Africa, the chapter focused on Ake's positions in relation to (i) the arguments in the West against democracy in Africa, (ii) leading misconceptions about the operations of democracy in the continent, (iii) the North's attitude to democracy in Africa, (iv) the politics of democratization and the sudden preoccupation of the West with the prospects of democracy in Africa, especially in the 1980s, (v) liberal democracy, the hegemonization of Western interests and values in Africa and other parts of the South, (vi) the changing nature and dynamics of democratization across the world, (vii) democracy and the question of economic development, (viii) Africa's long neglected democracy movement and its support at home and abroad. That is, Africa's long and tortuous struggle for democracy, its multiple components and results, (ix) the feasibility of democracy in Africa and his recommendations on the sustainability of democracy in the continent. In Ake's analysis, the discussion of these issues is not only related to, but centrally anchored on the state in Africa. His method is characteristically eclectic, combining deep analytical insights with different historical methods and the political economy approach, depending mainly on the issues being interrogated and analyzed. On development, we captured his arguments in respect of (i) the development of underdevelopment in Africa, (ii) colonialism and the underdevelopment of the continent, (iii) the prevailing misconceptions about development in the continent, (iv) politics and the underdevelopment of Africa, (v) Ake's arguments on Africa's development by imitating the West, and (vi) his options for the development in the continent.

Chapter Four attempted a detailed critique of Ake's contributions on the three selected themes. Inter alia, the issues noted for analyses included the researcher's critiques, reservations and opinions on what remains to be added and revised to different aspects of Ake's theoretical positions on (i) the state in political theory, (ii) nationalism and the development of the state in Africa, (iii) the state in Africa as a modern regime of power, (iv) political society, subaltern concerns and the state

in Africa, (v) the state and the challenges of nationhood in post-conflict Africa, (vi) the future of the state in Africa, and (vii) the state and development in the continent. These were followed by (viii) a critique of Ake's writings on democracy in the continent, especially focusing on the operations of the civil and political societies in the continent, and (ix) democracy and economic development in the continent, particularly given the interventions by Przeworski *et al.* (2000) in their *Magna opus* and Sen (1999a and 1999b). Lastly, (x) a critique of Ake's positions on development in the continent. In doing this, we examined an issue, which we presented as being entirely ignored in Ake's writings on development in the continent, namely, world systems positions, in this case, the impact of Africa's peripheral and semi-peripheral positions on the continent's chances for political democracy was examined.

In Chapter Five, we articulated what in our understanding constitutes Ake's legacy both for the African social sciences community and the global system of knowledge production. In doing this, we presented him as a major post-Marxist and post-development scholar to the subject field of post-colonial studies through the project of history-writing not just in Africa, but also across the South. As we argued, post-colonial scholarship is a tricontinental research endeavour, which takes the form of 'protest scholarship' and articulates uniquely Southern intellectual responses to the impact of colonial-imperialism and other legacies of the European Enlightenment for non-European societies generally, and Africa, Asia and Latin America in particular. Within this mode, we discussed Ake's legacy in terms of his contributions to international institution-building and knowledge production in the continent. Other legacies of the departed scholar mentioned in the chapter included (i) his contributions towards 'the Africanization of the political economy approach', (ii) research networking and activism, and (iii) his advocacy of the need for us to put our knowledge of the social sciences in the services of peace and human development, based on the pursuit of a systematic study of the conditions for peace, development and the elimination of all physical constraints and manifestations of violence in the continent and the world at large.

## 6.2 Conclusion

From all the sources available to this researcher, while Ake was alive, of all the works written in response to his works, only one was engaging enough as to raise issues and provoke a critical debate insightful enough for rethinking some of the conclusions reached in Ake's analyses. This was Ibeanu's (1993) critique of Ake's positions on the state and the market in Africa. Also, after his

death, from all known accounts provided on him, none, except Mafeje's (1997) review has critically evaluated Ake's positions on some of the major issues impinging on the political economy of the continent, which Ake deftly interrogated. Some of the issues, which featured prominently in Mafeje's (1997) review included his assessment of Ake's positions on governance in Africa, his views on the continent's development strategies, foreign interference, industrialization, agricultural policies, and other major policy issues developed over a number of years. As far as this researcher is concerned, all the rest have rather focused either on establishing what they considered to be Ake's contributions and legacies, as we see in Jinadu's (1997a, 1997b, 1998 and 2004) attempts, or in interpreting different philosophical positions and arguments advanced by Ake, as Efemini (2000) tried to do. Some have also tried to establish other aspects of Ake's contributions as we see in the efforts of Abiodun (1998), Adekanye (1996), Adetula (1997), Awa (1998), the Awolowo Foundation (1998), Bangura (1997a and 1997b), ASA/AAI (2003), Balogun (1998), CASS (1997 and 1998), Drillbits and Tailings (1997), Efan (1996), Efemini (2000), Essien-Ibok (1998), Fafowora (1997), Founou-Tchigoua (1996), Harris (2005), Ihonvbere (1989), Jega (2006), Jinadu (1997, 1998 and 2004), Ly (1997), Mabogunje (1998), Martins (1997), Mittleman (1997), Mwalilino (2000), Oculi (1997), Ogban-Iyam (1998), Oyovbaire (1997), Sawyerr (1997), Tamuno (1998), Thoahlane (1998), Tolofari (2001), Ukiwo (1997), the Yale Bulletin and Calendar (1996). Taking the forms of monographs and profiles, memorial lectures, theses and dissertations, edited volumes, texts, tributes and essays, journal articles and proceedings, most of these works have focused mainly on celebrating and uncritically eulogizing Ake. Hardly do we find any critical engagement with the positions of the departed scholar in most of the sources cited here above. Barring the critical interventions provided by Ibeanu (1993) and Mafeje (1997), and to a much lesser extent, Jinadu (1997a, 1997b, 1998 and 2004), Efemini (2000) and Nzongola-Ntalaja (2000), nowhere do we find critical reservations and alternative positions being expressed in response to the writings of this great scholar. Wittingly or not, an impression is created, which presents the works of this scholar either as some sacrosanct truth or as seemingly final and entirely indisputable. Our argument here is that given the seriousness of the issues raised and implicated in Ake's analyses, such issues have not been engaged enough in the critical sense of our expectation. For example, it is clear enough that beyond their duplication, Ihonvbere's (1989) effort, which merely brings together some of Ake's unpublished works, would have done much better if it had been extended to include within it, an insightful critique of aspects of Ake's theoretical positions and conclusions.

Our research is motivated by these concerns. It is strongly felt that members of the African social sciences community and indeed, the world at large, have a lot more to learn not just from reproducing or compiling some of the unpublished writings of the departed scholar as we see in Ihonvbere (1989); interpreting and establishing the implications of his philosophy of development (Efemini 2000); or merely eulogizing him, as most writings on him have done, but also from critiquing vital aspects of his writings, especially his instructive positions on the state, democracy and development in the continent. To this extent, although Abiodun (1998), Adekanye (1996), Adetula (1997), Awa (1998), the Obafemi Awolowo Foundation (1998), Bangura (1997a and 1997b), ASA/AAI (2003), Balogun (1998), CASS (1997), Jega (2006), Mabogunje (1998), Martins (1997), Mittleman (1997), Sawyerr (1997), Tamuno (1998) and others are appreciated for painstakingly capturing and articulating different aspects of Ake's contributions and legacies, yet, we are persuaded that more of those contributions can still be established through critiquing his writings. As we have tried to show through our efforts in this study, a better way of establishing a scholar's contributions and legacies is through offering a standard critique of aspects of her/his written works. By doing that, we are able to (i) establish and critically focus on the issues raised and implicated in her/his analyses, (ii) establish their strengths and weaknesses, (iii) provoke debates and suggest alternative positions for thinking about already researched issues. All these are possible mainly because, the idea of writing such a standard critique enables one to get detached from narrowly focusing only on the personality details, potentials and attributes of a scholar, and critically focus on her/his works—and thus—establish where s/he truly stands in relation to her/his works. Such an engagement does not detract from one's appreciations and respect for the scholar whose works are subjected to such a critical scrutiny and analysis.

From another perspective, undertaking such critiques enables us not just in thinking through Ake's works, but also in establishing alternative perspectives and positions on aspects of the worrisome issues raised in his writings. This is added to the fact that it is only through undertaking such critical reviews and assessments that we are able to effectively provoke further debates mainly through exhuming the nuances and shortcomings embedded in his works. After all, as it is said among deconstructionist leftist thinkers, every piece of scholarly work accommodates within it, elements and aspects of its own weaknesses and defaults, which can hardly be noted except through a detailed perusal and exploration of all its contents and strengths. As is generally known concerning Ake, several issues are raised in his analyses. Some of these have been taken on directly and have

been answered by him. Several others have been left unanswered, and are therefore meant to inform future research. This, to us, is a normal stuff and aspect of scholarship. To illustrate, it is normal to encounter scholarly works in which many critical comments and very significant issues are raised but only a few of those issues are answered or responded to directly by the author. And, even for those issues, which are answered or engaged, it is also normal, and it is indeed a part of the universal practice of scholarship for other readers, reviewers and critics to express 'reservations' and possibly 'superior positions' to either aspects or even all aspects of the issues raised by the author. The beauty of this seemingly chaotic tradition is that, if properly articulated, especially in an appropriate and well-intended spirit, it always extends the frontiers of knowledge through the provision of alternative modes of thought regarding a set of issues.

In other words, while it is generally agreed throughout the world that scholarship is all about the advancement of humanity through knowledge production, there are however many ways of bringing about this improvement in human life. Among others, this could take the form of creating an entirely new body of knowledge. It could also be in the form of applying some borrowed theoretical positions, paradigms and precepts and applying them in explaining developments, events, occurrences and trends in other settings, as we saw in the efforts of Western and Eurocentric experts in Africa and Asia in the periods immediately following political independence who tried to apply Western theoretical precepts in explaining social and political life in the 'new states' in these continents (Ake 1978 and 1979, and Barongo 1980). It could also take the forms of interpreting different issues, positions and conclusions in already completed research as Efemini (2000) tried to do in respect of Ake's philosophy of development. Again, it could be done by establishing the contributions and legacies of outstanding doyens or touch-bearers in different disciplinary fields as undertaken by Jinadu (1997a, 1997b, 1998 and 2004) and other scholars cited in this section. As we have tried to show in this study, the improvement of humanity through knowledge production could also take the form of improving upon existing knowledge through critiquing and challenging the works, positions and conclusions reached by others, especially preceding authorities. Our research on the works of Claude Ake is a step in this direction. As such, while focusing on the writings of Ake, the study has tried to examine other important issues, which have not only been raised in his writings, but also have enduring implications for the future of the continent. As the fore-going pages reveal, following the writings of Ake and also, through examining some of the conclusions reached in his analyses, we have been able to raise other issues, which are

thrown up while interrogating others. Even though we have tried, as much as possible, to avoid deviating, yet we have also had to examine other issues, particularly those, whose explanations and meanings add value to, and enrich the quality of our analyses.

We must however provide a caveat, which takes the form of a candid disclaimer regarding the competence of this researcher in critiquing the works of the departed scholar. Being himself a traditional scholar and, given the devotion of his life, scholarship and career to the examination of issues of democracy and development in Africa, and the whole range of reviews and interventions, which such writings have elicited so far from much older and very senior colleagues, this researcher is persuaded about the fact of his incompetence in his ambitious quest. Nevertheless, this effort is advanced with the expectation that the researcher's exploration of Ake's writings will further his understanding of not just issues of the state, democracy and development in Africa, but also foreground that understanding within the political economy and social history of the continent. The study has therefore only examined 'some aspects', and certainly 'not all aspects' or 'issues in Ake's analyses of the state, democracy and development in Africa'. Accordingly, we duly acknowledge and most humbly submit that the issues implicated in Ake's analyses of these themes are clearly inexhaustible, at least, not in a single study such as ours. This study is therefore limited to those aspects of his works on the state, democracy and development in Africa, which appear in the limited understanding of this author to be most desirous of immediate attention and critical engagement. As much as possible, the study employed Karl Popper's (1976) idea of falsification as the ultimate test of theory in assessing the historical and continued relevance, and the consistence of Ake's works on the political economy and social history of Africa. The aim is to draw attention to some of these issues and further discussions on them through provoking a critical debate. We therefore do not, in any sense claim to have undertaken any conclusive assessment of Ake's writings or positions. To the contrary. Other scholars are welcome and invited to examine other issues in Ake's analyses generally and also to establish the limitations in the positions reached in our critique of his works. After all, 'the more of such critical engagements and interventions, the merrier'. Methodologically, it was realized that unless we 'critically analyze the details of his writings', the myriad of issues, which are implicated in Ake's shorthand expressions will hardly be captured. Hence, analysis helps us in making sense of the complex nuances of the issues raised in such writings.

Hopefully, three expectations have been achieved through our efforts. One, in addition to a detailed summary of his major works and positions generally, this study has tried to establish the author's

positions on the historical and continuing relevance of aspects of Ake's theoretical positions and conclusions. For example, it has been established that although Ake's doctoral work dated 1966, his first published textbook of 1967 and some of his published articles in the early and late 1970s interrogated and focused critically on different aspects of the problem of political integration not just in Africa but also in other Third World states, which he calls 'the new states', in the 1980s and 1990s up until his death in 1996, he did not revise such writings on political integration in Africa to accommodate emergent and other developments, threats and challenges, which not only undermine the nation-state, but also question the sovereignty of the state, especially in the disturbing contexts of globalization and multiculturalism. This is added to the fact that his theory of political integration in Africa is not extended into a theory of forging nationhood, especially across already fractured societies and disintegrated polities. As is obvious in our intervention, the implication of these oversight and limitations is that Ake's theory of political integration is no longer adequate for speaking to the recent shifts, threats and challenges undermining the cohesion of these states. As the study also shows, Ake limits his task in this regard not just to the explanation of the problem and possibilities of political integration in the 'new states' in Africa, but mainly if not only, to the colonial and the immediate post-independence periods in African and South-Asian histories in general. As was observed, this limitation resulted largely from the fact that Ake's (1967) study was developed mainly from an analysis of the problem of political integration in the 'new states' to the more general question of the capacity of such states for undertaking social change on a large scale and for withstanding the disruptive impact of such change. As a result, most of the current challenges, which undermine the forging of nationhood in these societies, especially from the 1980s up to the present period; the accounts of the recent wars and conflicts in Sudan, Zaire, Rwanda, Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea; the problematic issues and experiences related to ethnicity, which also interface 'equity', 'exclusion' and 'liberalization' across the regions; and a host of other post-conflict reconstruction efforts in these states are not accounted for in Ake's writings. This lacuna leaves the vital question of forging nationhood in the problematic state-nations inherited from colonial-imperialism unanswered in Ake's works. This shortcoming explains our recourse to more recent accounts of this issue, as provided in the works of Wilson and Dalton (1982), Somjee (1984), Obi (1999 and 2005), Pandey and Geschiere (2003) and Mamdani (2003).

Two, the study has tried to provide a comparative approach not just to the critique of Ake's writings but also to the discussion of the issues raised in his analyses. This was done mainly through placing

Ake's works in conversation with those of other authorities not only in Africa, but also in India, South-Asia and Latin America. The deliberate aim here is establish the positions of scholars in other post-colonial societies who have written remarkable works on the political economy, social history and other aspects of their societies and settings. Two approaches were employed in this respect, which deserve some explanations. One, in critiquing Ake's writings and positions, we tried to examine the works of scholars, who although are also post-colonial scholars, but are entirely focused on Africa. Two, we also examined the accounts of other scholars, who in addition to the political economy approach to which Ake and the African social sciences community are familiar, employed other approaches such as historical, cultural, literary and anthropological approaches. In doing this, the study did not critique or evaluate Ake outside the areas of his focus, but borrowed and employed other approaches, which were not used by Ake, and which have not also been quite popular in Africa in explaining aspects of the issues, which figured prominently in Ake's analyses. For example, in one of the renewed insights suggested to the writings of Ake, we observed that Ake (1981), unlike Chatterjee (1993) and Chakrabarty (2000) focuses mainly on colonialism as the historical process, which brought about the underdevelopment of African economies. Put differently, Ake limits his analysis of the implications of colonialism and the capitalist penetration of Africa to the exploitation and underdevelopment of African economies. Either because to his deliberate choice of focus or an oversight, he does not discuss colonialism as the essential historical process, which brought about the modernization of political, social and economic processes, institutions and structures in the continent. However, given the insightful interventions by Chatterjee (1993), Chakrabarty (2000), Kaviraj and Khilnani (2001), we added that, in addition to economic underdevelopment, exploitation and dependency, colonialism also initiated modernity to the colonies, albeit a much limited and perverted version. The limitation of ignoring the modernizing role of colonialism in the Third World is found not only in Ake but also in the writings of other African scholars. Three, the study has also tried to establish that most of the historical and on-going challenges, developments and experiences, which impinge on socio-political, economic and cultural lives in Africa also affect populations and communities in Asia, Latin America and other parts of the Third World. In other words, the study has tried to establish 'the connectible nature and aspects' of the experiences and impediments to development and the democratic revolutions across non-European societies generally. As Immanuel Wallerstein (1976: 30) has argued:

The historiography of modern Africa has been a battleground of so-called Eurocentric versus so-called Afro-centric interpretations, and we have passed from early crude versions of each to a state of



sophisticated and subtle arguments about analytical primacy. This intellectual battle of course reflects a wider social battle. At a certain point in time, both Europe and Africa (or at least large zones of each) came to be incorporated into a single social system, a capitalist world-economy, whose fundamental dynamics largely controlled the actors located in both sectors of one united arena. It is in the reciprocal linkages of the various regions of the capitalist world-economy that we find the underlying determinants of social actions at a more local level.

Importantly, while Ake's writings on the political economy of contemporary Africa are remarkable engagements in this direction, they are however, corroborated by the efforts of other scholars in India, South-Asia, Latin America and other parts of the South. These are evident in the works of Bipan Chandra (1994) and other intellectual and nationalist historians across the South cited in the study. For example, the subaltern studies intellectual project, history-writing and other efforts within the South-Asian historiography noted in Kaviraj (1992) are also remarkable efforts in this direction.

The literature on India, Asia and Latin America drew the attention of this researcher to the need to take advantage of his 'outsider location' in developing the critique on Ake's works and also in constructing a social history of Africa. In doing this, the following questions were noted. One, how is India, China and other post-colonial societies reconstructing new nations, states and conceptions of the self on the heels of their colonial experiences? Two, how are these states, especially India developing and industrializing? In other words, how are these countries negotiating industrialization and capitalist development? Three, what were/are the impact of the various European policies on these societies in the colonial and post-colonial periods? And, how are they coping with underdevelopment, poverty, economic misery and other problems threatening their fast exploding populations? Four, what are the histories of the ideas and debates inspiring the intellectual community in Africa, especially following the post-colonial period? Five, how have intellectual and political struggles against imperial domination been confronted and engaged in these countries? And, how have such struggles been represented in the works of the scholars in these countries? Six, how is China and India coping with the challenges of globalization? And, what lessons does Africa stand to learn from their intellectual, nationalist and other experiences in her efforts at actualizing the African revolution?

As much as possible, we have tried to illuminate the understanding of these questions and other vital issues through our focus on the writings of Ake. However, although the study is not based on a comparative assessment of Africa and Asia or even Latin America, yet, to an extent, in addressing aspects of the Africa-specific issues and concerns, we have had to place the conditions and

experiences in the continent in comparison with what obtains in India and other parts of the South. This was done in two broad ways. One, by placing the arguments, theoretical positions and conclusions reached in Ake's analyses in conversation with those of scholars in India, Asia and Latin America. Two, by comparing the conditions, experiences and responses in colonial and post-colonial Africa with what obtains in other regions of the South, especially as captured in the works of the leading scholars in different countries of the post-colonial world. These efforts should hopefully, enable the reader assume a fairly balanced understanding of some of the issues raised in the study from Africa's vantage point.

As our findings suggest, Africa certainly has some lessons to learn from the intellectual and other experiences in Brazil, China, India, Japan and other rapidly industrializing post-colonial societies. Indeed, Africa stands to learn and gain much more from the experiences of these emerging economies in the South than from the developed and already matured and consolidated experiences of the polities and economies in the West, Europe and North America, which rather seek to further plunder the continent using all sorts of theories and paradigms of development that neither guarantee any improvement in the African condition, nor correspond with the realities in the regions.

For example, in addition to economic development and industrialization, India has also recorded appreciable results in the health of its political system. As we saw in Chatterjee (2004), India is certainly one of the few countries in the whole of Asia where the institutions of liberal democracy have performed creditably well. A major lesson, which stands out clearly from the Indian experience points out to the need for countries in Africa to look inward, further empower and emphasize the development of indigenous systems and solutions to the continent's many problems.

With particular reference to knowledge production, there is the need for us to (i) deploy our knowledge of the social sciences towards searching for solutions to the problems of humanity in the continent, and (ii) emphasize the projection of what is uniquely African while also seeking to be globally relevant. As we saw in the works of Ake, these are attainable mainly through privileging issues at the interfaces of 'endogeny', 'epistemology' and 'ontology' in the continent. Such efforts will go a long way in helping us reduce the embarrassing and perpetual dependence on the West. Above all, such efforts will also go a long way in helping us provide lasting solutions to the many historical challenges and problems threatening the destiny of our continent and its people.

Before rounding up this section, a final word is in order on democracy and development in Africa. As we have tried to demonstrate in the study, it is clear enough that the issues of democracy and its relationship to economic development are very important to the contemporary world. For Africa, the pertinence of this renewed interest is hinged against the backdrop of the alarming crises situations across the regions, manifested *inter alia* in the widespread collapse of the nation-state project, the recurring violence and massive state failure in different parts of the continent, especially in the last decade, from which period Africa stands as a metaphor for a failed, or at best, a weakened state, and in which internal wars and violent conflicts have persisted over extended territories and periods even in situations where popular backing was lacking for the insurgents. Other indications of the crises situations in the continent include the legacies of the pronounced civil war in Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo-Brazzaville; anarchy and the lack of a central government in Somalia since 1991; the problem of child soldier in Sierra Leone, Chad, Somalia and other parts of West Africa; the civil war in Darfur, in Western Sudan; violence and chaos in Cote d'Ivoire since December 1999 (Chege, 2004: 8); sustained economic decline; bleak and regressive prospects for achieving the Millennium Development Goals; the challenges of pseudo-democratic regimes in Zimbabwe and Uganda; authoritarian reversal in the Democratic Republic of Congo; the conflict situations in Nigeria's Niger Delta Region; and a host of other challenges, which combine with growing transnational threats such as HIV/AIDS and climate change in a global system where economic integration, political liberalization and the interdependence forged by globalization rather create increased fragmentation between rich and poor countries. These crises have not only set back the process of nation-building, state-formation and consolidation in the regions (Sesay 2003 and Chege 2004) but also constitute disappointing confirmations of 'Afro-pessimism' (Gana and Egwu 2003) and the context within which Ake makes his contribution in his writings. Given the fact that most African countries have passed through rather destructive civil wars, the imperatives of the post-cold war reconstruction of fractured polities, damaged economies, divided and devastated societies and the entire process of healing old wounds remain writ large on the continent. These situations also underscore the need for detailed studies of post-conflict shifts and transitions in the continent with a view to arriving at concrete options, possibilities and prospects not just for successful democratic transitions, but also for forging nationhood across such fractured communities and experiences. It is in this context that a discussion of Ake's texts makes the intended sense.

As we noted in the introductory chapter, Claude Ake (1939-1996) is one of Africa's foremost political philosophers who has not only worked extensively in the areas of political theory and political economy, but has also made original and uniquely perceptive contributions to African political thought. In addition, he remains, as one of the major praxiological figures in the continent today from whose works the real world in the continent can best be understood. His writings therefore constitute a significant entry point not just for understanding issues of democracy and development in the continent, but also for interrogating and engaging other larger concerns such as 'nationalism' and 'state-society relationships' across the regions. As we see even in his (2000) posthumous work, a major question, which occupied Ake's attention, centres on, 'the relationship between political regimes', especially authoritarian and democratic regimes, and their capacity for delivering upon the expectations of economic development, among other democratic dividends. This question is not a recent one, but rather a much historical issue and debate, which has engaged the attention of scholars, especially since 1951, when it was first raised and 'advanced by the United Nations' Department of Social and Economic Affairs and was later formulated in 1959 by S. M. Lipset's observation that democracy is related to economic development, an observation, which has generated the largest body of research on any topic in comparative politics across the world. Ake is therefore not alone in raising this issue. He rather represents one of the major voices, which have contributed to the understanding of issues at this crucial interface and juncture. In Africa, the resonance of this question is best understood against the backdrop of the legacies of hyper-centralized military rule, the impact of the monocultural nature of most African economies, the failure of Structural Adjustment Programmes and other neo-liberal policy prescriptions imposed on these economies by the major international financial institutions. Added to these, is the failure of the on-going process of globalization to deliver upon its promises of 'economic reform', 'democratization', 'environmental protection', 'poverty reduction', 'debt control' and 'conflict resolution' made to the continent. As Mkandawire (2005) surmises, following this period, Africa's poverty and marginalization have been buttressed by the abysmal failure of most Western theories of adjustment, macroeconomic stabilization and reform policies, pursued in the 1980s and 1990s by the continent as suggested by the international financial institutions, namely, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, which only placed the continent on 'a low growth path' and from which the anaemic GDP growth rates of 3-4 percent appear as 'successful performance'—a rather regrettable contrast to the promised 'accelerated development', 'resource mobilization' and 'economic integration' made to the region. Above all, from the early 1990s, Africa's entrenched

marginalization from the benefits and processes of globalization, and the uneven development noticed in huge swatches of the South have evoked more indigenous African reflections on the need to rethink on-going reform policies being implemented across the regions. It is within this context that one appreciates the provocative interventions not just by Claude Ake (1996 and 2000), but also Adebayo Olukoshi (1993 and 2005), Achille Mbembe (2002), Thandika Mkandawire (2005 and 2006), and other critical thinkers within and outside the continent, especially Samir Amin's (1991: 305-329) analysis of the role of the state in Africa in the polarization of the international capitalist system and its impact on the development and underdevelopment of the South. The details of his responses, together with the interventions, which such responses have elicited, have been presented in the study.

With respect to knowledge production in Africa, two positions are clear from our examination of Ake's writings. One, far from being subservient, the intellectual tradition of African scholarship has been largely progressive in terms of its orientation. It has not been defined entirely by conventional and obedient discipline-based academic study. Rather, being shaped by, and having responded to significant inspirations and challenges in the eras of anti-colonial, pan-African and nationalist struggles for freedom and self-determination, it has been a critical tradition premised on an ethic of freedom and a search for the ideational basis of that freedom (Momoh 2003). It holds itself accountable, not to any particular institution, regime, class or gender, but to the collective imagination, aspirations and interests of the ordinary people. By challenging and subverting the constraints of dominant and received disciplinary approaches and paradigms, it seeks to be socially relevant and politically responsible in more than a neutral or liberal sense. It is guided by an ethic that simultaneously challenges and requires scholars in the continent to be identified with, and grounded in the broad landscape of Africa's liberation and democracy movements.

Two, while the ethical foundations of this scholarship are conceptualized, understood and framed by considerations of endogeny, epistemology, identity, methodology and ontology; and also, while Africa's radical intellectuals have truly engaged and pursued anti-imperialist ethics and self-determination for the people, the liberatory promises and dividends of the anti-colonial and nationalist eras have neither been fulfilled nor delivered. More recently, while the impact of pronounced economic crisis have been compounded by inappropriate structural adjustment measures and other aspects of the Washington Consensus, imposed by the donor community on heavily weakened governments and states, this crisis situation has led to other chains of far-

reaching implications. For example, the crisis captured and co-incided with the decline of Keynesian economics and social democratic policies and politics; the ascendancy of neo-liberalism on a global scale; the decline in Africa's bargaining position and that of the developing world as a whole; the consolidation of the United States' hegemony in the international system; the centrality of international finance capital and Washington's economic and geo-strategic interests in shaping the accelerated processes and structures of globalization (Olukoshi, 2002: 1-2). These harsh realities have also impacted negatively on higher education and Africa's context of knowledge production. In place of actual political independence and sustainable economic development, the current context is one in which the continent's marginalization within the global agenda appears to be reaching increasing extremes.

This study is informed by these sadly regretful observations. In particular, given the continent's current characterization as the region bearing the most abusive contradictions and negative consequences of globalization, Africa therefore offers a critical vantage point, well-attuned to the challenge of demystifying international policy dictates currently dominating the global landscape. And, as we have tried to argue, given the enormously entrenched nature of the African crises, it will not do, to end matters by merely recommending a more proactive engagement by African scholars with the methodological implications of their own liberatory intellectual ethics (Mama, 2007: 1-27). In addition to such efforts, there is the need for detailed interrogations and certainly, more focused and incisive analyses of the origins, dimensions and impact of these crises themselves—as a condition for suggesting lasting recommendations to them. Such analyses must also address the intellectual challenges of Africa's complicated and contradictory location in the world and ensure that our unique vantage points inform our methodological and pedagogical strategies, with which we pursue freedom and self-determination through knowledge production. Hopefully, this study, which engages the African crises from the perspectives of Ake's intellectual writings, offers a step in this direction.

### **6.3 Recommendations**

In this final section, we draw attention to areas in need of future research attention. This is undertaken largely in two forms. One, we note a few issues in Ake's analyses, which are yet to be fully covered and accounted for both in Ake's writings and also in this study. Two, we describe other general areas and issues, which are in need of future research and policy interventions. These are

hinged against the backdrop of our contention at the start of the study that, majority of the states in the continent are crises-ridden and are therefore failing in one or more aspects of the state-building projects adopted at independence. Illustrations of these crises situations include, (i) the inability of such states to sustain their projection of legitimate power over their territories, (ii) the continuing patrimonial, neo-patrimonial and prebendal tendencies based on the perception of the state as an unending pool from which resources are to be drawn without replacement by individuals and groups, (iii) the failure by these states to establish the rule of law and institutionalize power and authority, (iv) the capturing of the state by various ethnic, regional and-or religious sub-groups, and (v) the failure of these states to deliver upon security, welfare and other expectations of statehood.

In addition to the critiques and reservations noted so far in Ake's writings, two others are presented here below, which should hopefully be examined and treated seriously by future researchers. One is Ake's (1985) 'misuse of the concept of hegemony' in place of 'dominance'. Why do we describe Ake's (1985a and 1985b) use of 'hegemony' as mistaken? And, what constitutes the appropriate conceptual usage of the term in this regard? These questions are answered shortly in what follows. Here, we argue that, when Ake (1985a and 1985b) writes about 'hegemonic social classes', he did not get his concepts right. Rather, instead of calling them 'hegemonic social classes', he should have referred to them as 'dominant social classes', which they truly are. This is mainly because, while the social classes to which he refers are admissibly 'dominant', they are however, far from being 'hegemonic'. More concretely, in his illustrations of what he calls 'the unique features of the state in Africa', Ake (1985: 108) explains that:

The state is composed in such a way that it enjoys limited independence from the social classes—particularly *the hegemonic* social class—and is immersed in class struggle. Because autonomization is the essence of the state as a modality of domination, it is not clear whether we can properly talk of the state in postcolonial Africa. That is not to say that government does not exist, or even that there is no coercive apparatus for the subordination of some social groups to others. After all, the state is only a particular modality of class domination (our emphases are italicised).

Our 'conceptual observation' here is that, 'dominance' is not necessarily the same as 'hegemony', even though to some extent, 'hegemony' may involve, or take the form of 'dominance'. And, two, the acquisition of a 'dominant position' by members of a social class does not always, automatically translate into 'a hegemonic social class position'. By calling dominant classes 'hegemonic', Ake (1985a and 1985b) confuses and mistakes the meanings of what is 'dominant', to be 'hegemonic'. Conceptually, while the concept of 'domination' takes the form of 'an illegitimate access' and 'control' over resources or even a population, as it was, for example under European colonial rule in

Africa; 'hegemony' speaks to a form of political, economic and social control that is backed up by the agreed consent of the people and the constituted force of law. Given their advantaged positions in the economic systems of the countries in which they are located, the upper classes in Africa, often translate their class positions into a basis for controlling members of other less privileged social classes. This form of control is based mainly on their exploitative inclinations and, it is not backed up by the force of law. Nor is it grounded in the consent of those who are dominated. This is added to the fact that, the privileged social classes in Africa and elsewhere in the Third World, unlike their counterparts in the metropolitan economies do not emerge from the economic processes of capitalist production. This, according to Miliband (1969), is a major difference in the state in the advanced capitalist societies in the West and the state in the peripheries. In the West, members of the upper-privileged classes emerge from the processes of capitalist production. But, even in the advanced capitalist societies, the dominance of members of the lower social classes by members of these privileged social classes is not 'hegemonic'. In political theory, having emerged as the product of 'the collective will' of all within the society, only the domination and exercise of legitimate coercion by the state can be 'hegemonic'. This is mainly because the state's domination of its population, resources and its exercise of legitimate coercion are both 'authorized' and also 'derive from the contracted consent of the governed'. As such, by describing the upper social classes in Africa as hegemonic classes, Ake errs conceptually. This error derives not just from the fact that members of these social classes emerge from the extortions and exploitation of the people whom they dominate rather than from the production process, but also because their dominance over the people is neither backed up by the force of law, nor is it grounded in the consent of the people over whom such dominance is exerted. In particular, following Antonio Gramsci's (1971) illustrations of the concepts of 'hegemony' and 'dominance', we understand that 'domination' and 'hegemony' are not essentially the same, and that 'domination' does not necessarily translate automatically to 'hegemony'. While 'hegemony' refers to 'the legitimate possession and exercise of power', 'domination' relates mainly to 'the acquisition of crude force', often 'not constitutional', 'not morally sanctioned' and above all, 'not backed by the force of law'. In addition to Gramsci (1971), the concept of 'hegemony' as contrasted from 'domination' is also explained by Ashcroft *et al.* (1998: 116):

Hegemony, initially a term referring to the dominance of one state within a confederation, is now generally understood to mean domination by consent. This broader meaning was coined and popularized in the 1930s by Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, who investigated why the ruling class was so successful in promoting its own interests in society. Fundamentally, hegemony is the power of



the ruling class to convince other classes that their interests are the interests of all. Domination is thus exerted not by force, nor even necessarily by active persuasion, but by a more subtle and inclusive power over the economy, and over state apparatuses such as education and the media, by which the ruling class's interest is presented as the common interest and thus comes to be taken for granted.

Continuing, Ashcroft *et al.* (1998: 116) clarify that:

The term is useful for describing the success of imperial power over a colonized people who may far outnumber any occupying military force, but whose desire for self-determination has been suppressed by a hegemonic notion of the greater good, often couched in terms of social order, stability and advancement, all of which are defined by the colonizing power. Hegemony is important because the capacity to influence the thought of the colonized is by far the most sustained and potent operation of imperial power in colonized regions. Indeed, an 'empire' is distinct from a collection of subject states forcibly controlled by a central power by virtue of the effectiveness of its cultural hegemony. Consent is achieved by the interpellation of the colonized subject by imperial discourse so that Euro-centric values, assumptions, beliefs and attitudes are accepted as a matter of course as the most natural or valuable. The inevitable consequence of such interpellation is that the colonized subject understands itself as peripheral to those Euro-centric values, while at the same time accepting their centrality.

'Domination' is therefore, not the same as 'hegemony' and there are indeed clear-cut operational differences between the two. While 'hegemony' may entail some forms of dominance, 'domination' is not automatically analogous to 'hegemony'. As we know, in Africa, the dominance of members of the lower social classes by members of the upper, privileged classes does not enjoy the consent of the dominated social classes and groups. Also, such dominated classes are neither fooled nor mistaken to think, or see the interests of members of the privileged and dominant classes as either synonymous or complementary with their own interests. It is this clarity of difference in the mutually antagonistic nature of their opposing class interests that explains the competition for access to the state by members of these different social classes—in this sense—the dominant and the dominated social classes. It is also clear enough, at least to informed elements of the dominated social classes in Africa and the Third World, that members of those privileged upper classes who control the economies do not acquire and secure the access and control of the economy through their productive efforts or initiatives, but through brass opportunism, dubious and counter-productive alliances with their metropolitan allies with whom they unite in perpetuating the underdevelopment and exploitation of the local economies; and also through other indefensible exploitative practices and inclinations.

In addition, it is clear enough that, having emerged from such intensely controversial and deeply politicized circumstances, the comprador-regional bourgeoisie in Africa has not undertaken to transform either the state or its regressive material conditions. Above all, it has

also failed to justify its access and control over state power, resources and the people. Given this context, the control by such an unprogressive class cannot be hegemonic in any serious sense of the word. Rather, it relies on the use of brute force—an undemocratic tendency—which is also clear enough in the manner in which the state in Africa administers its populations. Thus, a major feature, which differentiates 'hegemony' from 'domination', is the place of 'force', 'consent' and 'legitimacy' in the exercise of power, especially as perceived by the recipients of such power. And, since the idea of 'consent' confirms the 'acceptance' of the exercise of power by the people on whom it is exercised—and ultimately its legitimacy, 'force' underscores the idea of 'an imposition' and therefore speaks more loudly to 'domination' rather than 'hegemony'. In the context of democratic governance, we understand that 'the more a government relies on the use of force in its relations to its citizens and populations', 'the more illegitimate is the popular conception of its power'. Clearly, it is this understanding, which characterizes military rule as mainly unconstitutional and illegitimate, particularly since it is based on the forced-imposed domination of the people in a context in which power derives neither from the constitution nor from the will and consent of the governed, but from 'the barrel of the gun'. On the other hand, and, by the rules of the same logic, the less a government is based, or relies on the use of force or imposed domination, the more it appeals to the will, consent, understanding, rationality and sensibility of its citizens. Ultimately also, the more constitutional, legitimate and hegemonic its power is/becomes.

Given the fore-going illustrations, we therefore question Ake's (1985a and 1985b) misuse of the concept of 'hegemony' in referring to 'hegemonic social classes'—whereas he actually ought to have described them as 'dominant social classes'. While hoping that future writings in this direction will discuss these issues further, our limited intervention here is meant to emphasize the need for taking concepts and conceptual categories seriously, especially in the conduct of social science research.

Another issue, which we consider to be in need of future research attention, concerns the debate about the recession of the developmental state given the resonance of neo-liberal market ideology, especially in the 1980s. This on-going debate is today titled 'beyond the welfare state' and has become very prominent not only in Africa, but also in general political theory and across the world at large. As argued by Gunnar Myrdal (1960), in contrast with what orthodox teaching would lead one to expect, economic inequalities between nations are

increasing, and this is bound to continue for as long as the free play of market forces is allowed to continue unchecked. While global economic realities underscore the need for developing countries to interfere directly with the operations of market forces as a condition for breaking the vicious circles of poverty, neo-liberal policy prescriptions suggest the opposite. There is therefore the need for more indigenous African reflections and analyses of the false assumptions, which have led African economic development programmes astray based largely on the prescriptions of orthodox economists. While aspects of this debate have already been discussed in Ake's (1996a and 1996b) analyses of development, globalization and marginalization in Africa, there is nevertheless, the need for further engagement with the issues thrown up by the debate, especially in the context of globalization. A remarkable intervention in this direction has been Gros and Prokopovych (2005). However, in addition to such writings, more are still needed to exhume the continuing impact of on-going reforms and neoliberal policy prescriptions being implemented in the continent.

In conclusion, we offer here below some general recommendations on how to improve upon the social needs and material conditions of the African masses. For us, the achievement of these expectations must take the form of transforming and improving upon the nature and character of the state and the long-run operations of democratic development in the continent. These issues are considered germane and in need of urgent attention as a condition for enhancing the performance of democracy in the continent. Concerted efforts should be directed at various institutional levels to re-direct the focus of research on what must be done to rescue the state from its on-going crises, its impending disintegration and collapse. Although some achievements have been noted in this direction, especially in the past fifteen years by the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) and other institutional bodies in the continent, there is still more to be done in terms of furthering research, which seeks to enhance the democratic operations of the state.

Two, there is the need to accelerate the current operations of democratic development and the reform of electoral autocracies across the regions. These are attainable through the expansion of the political-democratic space, the multiplication of opportunities for public voice and the exercise of rights through the strengthening of the media and other civic organizations, and the encouragement of the development of democratic institutions and structures. In addition, the international community should increase the costs of maintaining repressive

governments, which are already much higher today than they were in the past. On their parts, individual democracies should also concentrate on the delivery of political goods, such as the freedom of speech and association, the conduct of free and fair elections, the entrenchment of democratic norms, and access to political information and mobilization. There is also the need to rethink the external orientation of democratic institutions and structures in the continent and other regressive practices, which rather leave deeper underlying forms of indigenous strategies of political mobilization untapped.

Three, there is the need for concerned governmental and international institutional bodies to do much more in resolving and preventing the continent's many armed conflicts. This could be achieved *inter alia*, through improving upon existing regional strategies for conflict prevention and other peace-building initiatives. For example, there is the need for more nuanced analyses of the security environment in West Africa, focusing alternately on regional versus external, especially the United States' strategies and interventions. As the experiments with the African Union (AU), the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Southern African Development Corporation (SADC) illustrate, regionalism is increasingly emerging as a tool for reinforcing state-building across the regions. In order to further the operations of these regional organizations, it is imperative to strengthen their capacity for conflict resolution. Other disappointing confirmations of scepticism in the operations of these organizations should also be looked into. These include (i) the leader-driven and dominated nature of such initiatives, which leaves very little or no room for public inputs and involvements, (ii) the protocol-driven nature of these organizations, which undermines and cripples their action-prone capacities as well as effective result orientations, the cross-border distribution of the causes of conflicts, including resources and ethnic groups, the lack of resource capacity for improving upon their rapid response capabilities; the glaring powerlessness of SADC and ECOWAS in dealing with crises situations in the big, oil-producing regional leaders, a trend, which seemingly limits their effectiveness to the resolutions of conflicts and other problems in the smaller states. All these challenges suggest the need to improve upon the current state of regional organizations in the continent. There is also the need to look beyond these regions to further investigate the role and interests of the United States and other members of the international community in enhancing the stability of

African states. *Inter alia*, this should take the forms of critiquing and encouraging future interventions of the international community not only in partnering with these regional formations but also in sharing their burdens.

Of these options, the present administration in the United States is increasingly taking the first approach. Its interest in actual peace keeping and other interventionist strategies are at best merely rhetorical. This is clear enough in the United States' interests and actions in West Africa, which aim not only at defusing potential terrorist threats, but, also in ensuring a stable supply of petroleum from diverse sources. As noted by Logan *et al.* (2003: 5) oil interests have played a significant, but also a destabilising role in this region, both domestically—for the oil-producing states and also for the international community. As such, although the restoration of security is an immediate, short-term imperative in post-conflict societies generally, it is also important to work out long-term considerations of political and economic reconstruction. Given the marginal role and diminishing interests of the United States and other international parties in conflict resolution in Africa, the impetus for developing peace-building and peace-keeping partnerships must come from within the continent, as these do not really constitute pressing priorities for these international actors. The pertinence of this idea is clear enough given the fact that centralized coercion has quite often been more dangerous in Africa than the fragmented forms now feared by the West. On the whole, conflict management strategies should prioritize and place emphasis on disarmament, demobilization, reintegration efforts and other post-conflict military reform programmes across post-conflict states in the continent (Logan *et al.* 2003: 5).

Four, there is the need for the African Union and other regional bodies to collaborate with individual states in developing appropriate strategies for enhancing capital flows and local entrepreneurship. This is attainable, among others, through overcoming the impediments to greater capital flows and the promotion of local entrepreneurs. Five, efforts should also be made at the level of individual states to curb corruption and improve upon the performances of corporate and economic governance. As the experiences in Nigeria and Ghana illustrate, the anticipated success in curbing corruption suffers a number of impediments, among which are (i) the constitutional limitations encountered in enforcing horizontal accountability between the executive and legislative branches of government, (ii) the existence of weak regulatory frameworks, and (iii) the absence of a culture of good corporate practices in the

private sectors. Relatedly, the efforts of the international community in curbing the operations of corrupt governments in the continent in the 1980s and 1990s, especially through aid conditionality did not achieve much beyond the distortions caused in the relationships between domestic and various international partners, thus undermining government planning capacity in many African states, and destroying a sense of domestic ownership of economic policy. On the whole, while it is conceded that corruption actually cripples the efficient operations of democratic governance, it has proved quite difficult to tackle in Africa mainly because the actual dividends of reducing it are too small to be admired and convincing, just as the costs and other penalties of being caught in corrupt practices are too meagre to be scarring and deterring. This, for us, is a major factor accounting for its persistence over time notwithstanding the many policy advocacies by different states, all of which seek to eradicate its existence (Logan *et al.* 2003: 7).

Six, there is the need to reform and strengthen existing judicial systems and the operations of the rule of law in Africa. From Logan *et al.*'s (2003: 9) account, we see how Sierra Leone's politicized judiciary became an instrument of state interests, represented the failed governance, heightened economic and social exclusion and facilitated the state's eventual collapse. These concerns suggest the need to reform and improve upon the operations of the judiciary in Africa, especially in the directions of objective professionalism. Seven, there is the need for collective social actions, which aim at improving upon the response patterns to the HIV/AIDS pandemic. The need for these is underscored by the fact that, given its impact on the continent's demographic profile, and, despite major educational efforts and now nearly universal awareness of how the HIV/AIDS is transmitted, levels of condom use and other means of protection remain completely inadequate. Consequently, the continent's infection rates continue to climb and soar.

The elimination of this pandemic therefore requires the deployment of rather wholistic approaches, which properly focus on individual, societal and governmental factors. In addition, research on this subject matter must endeavour to continuously present the HIV/AIDS pandemic as a multifaceted problem, which also requires multidisciplinary approaches that account for both its economic and epidemiological, political, social and other multilateral aspects.

It is also important to back up research and policy-driven initiatives with culturally sensitive and relevant interventions, as these further the acceptability of such innovations. Seven, the states must explore the advantages offered by democratic governance in redressing the issues of exclusion, majority-minority ethnic relations, the lop-sided nature of different federations in the continent, and the demands for cultural rights in the problematic contexts of ethnicity and religious conflicts. The failure by most African states to provide sufficient resources to meet societal needs and the increasing competition for access to available resources from the 1980s-all need to be looked into.

These emerging concerns underscore the need to direct the focus of state policy to a continuous search for approaches, which are not only capable of resolving established threats to the continued existence of the nation-state in Africa, but are also uniquely dynamic enough as to anticipate future challenges in this direction. For example, while the mobilization of religious movements in Kenya reflects a relatively conservative social and political agenda, in Mali, such mobilizations take on the state, with a view to extracting its commitments in answering to different aspects of their needs. Within the same connection, the youths are today important elements in the movements, which aim at carving out new spaces for themselves and their interests. Thus, while a sense of individual and collective marginalization may be at the root of the resurgence of most of these groups, the responses and strategies deployed to their perceived problems seem to vary widely. What these suggest is the need for a continuous investment of research and policy resources in keeping an up-to-date account of such shifts and developments, with a view to finding lasting solutions to the increasingly innovative, imaginative, adaptive and possibly constructive mobilization of ethnic and religious identities. In addition, the need for such sustained interrogation of these issues is premised on the fact that, while the practices of new ethnic and religious spaces can indeed become despotic and unrepresentative, the proliferation of such spaces themselves can also endanger the state, while also undermining the inclusiveness of politics.

There is the need to confront the pressing challenge of building institutions and the expansion of human capital. Among others, these must necessarily take the form of developing domestic agendas as well as social and political action, which enable various stake-holders to drive institutional-strengthening efforts as well as policy making processes. In addition to the typical focus of democratization efforts on institutions of vertical accountability such as

elections and civil society, attention should be directed to the development and strengthening of stronger institutions of horizontal accountability within the state. Relatedly, the weaknesses of the state, quasi-state institutions, the parliament, the judiciary, universities, research think tanks, the bureaucracy and other institutional bodies, which constitute 'cause and effects of the international domination of the public policy process', also need to be critically reviewed and resolved. In addition, efforts to mobilize consensus and the collective orientation of the populations around public policies should be turned inward toward these horizontal institutions and the society at large. Other intractable problems of clientelist politics must be resolved. Lastly, sustainable internal alternatives should be explored and provided in place of the potentially authoritarian nature of most foreign funding institutions and other externally-driven cooperation initiatives, which compel African institutions to mimic and simply follow the lead and agendas of resource-providing international partners. This is attainable through the development and defence of indigenous institutional practices, research and policy proposals, which focus on the needs of the people, rather than been teleguided from some foreign quarters. All these must be complemented with the de-personalization of the policy-making arena and the re-valorization of individual capacity. The key problem in Africa is not always lack of capacity, but rather, the lack of political and other institutional spaces that allow professionals having the capacity to do their work. These issues should be engaged by future studies, especially those, which focus on the continent. It will not do, to simply dismiss the relevance or workability of the recommendations suggested in this section. Rather, as we have tried to show, what our recommendations suggest is the need for further research and critical debate on the reconstitution of the state, the recomposition of power and authority in the continent in a manner that the operations of democratic development are ensured in Africa.

It is important to improve upon the values governing state society relations at all levels in the continent. Such critical values and virtues, like selfless leadership, which actually promote accountable and democratic governance should be encouraged. Social engineering should also be undertaken in a manner that carries along the ordinary masses of the people on a continuous and inclusive basis (Aiyede 2009: 249-269, Oyeshile 2005, 2007 and 2008). Lastly, political and social science theorizing should be made to include the actual aspects as well as the richer dimensions of our existence (Ghosh and Chakrabarty 2002: 146-172).



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
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## **APPENDIX I**

### **THE NAMES OF CLAUDE AKE'S COLLEAGUES, CONTEMPORARIES, OLD FRIENDS AND PAST STUDENTS WITH WHOM DISCUSSIONS AND INTERVIEWS WERE CONDUCTED**

#### **COLLEAGUES**

Mark Anikpo  
Michael Neocosmos  
Olujimi O. Adesina  
S. W. E. Ibodje  
Thandika Mkandawire

#### **CONTEMPORARIES**

Archibald B. M. Mafeje  
Bernard M. Magubane  
Dani W. Nabudere  
Katabaro Miti  
Samir Amin

#### **OLD FRIENDS**

L. Adele Jinadu  
Fantu Cheru  
Horace Campbell  
Mahmood Mamdani  
Okwudiba Nnoli

#### **PAST STUDENTS**

Abdul Karim Bangura  
Adebayo O. Olukoshi  
Victor A. Isunmonah  
Joab S. Peterside  
Yakubu Ben-Charles Omelle.