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**POLITICAL ECONOMY OF**  
**BULUYIA:1900-19.64"**

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**November, 1989**


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
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DECLARATION


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
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This thesis has been submitted for examination with our approval as University supervisors.



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PROF. HENRY A. MWANZI



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DR. TABITHA M.J. KANOGO

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Abstract

The colonial era in Kenya is characterized by a sharp exacerbation of the contradictions inherent in the colonial political economy. These were contradictions between the imperialist British metropolitan government and the imperialist colonial state in Kenya on one hand and the unprecedented upsurge of the nationalist struggle in the colony on the other. They generated political conflicts, struggles and re-alignments that made necessary the adoption of measures of reform to resolve these contradictions by both the metropolitan power and the colonial state. One of the most important results of these conscious efforts was the creation of a new necessity namely decolonization that laid down the prospects for the final liquidation of colonialism. This historic development possessed and still possesses decisive significance in relation to the subsequent trajectory of post-colonial developments in the political economy of Kenya.

This study highlights and analyses the course of colonialism in Buluyia and the rest of the country using the basis provided by the epistemology of

materialist political economy. Within this epistemology, concepts of historical and dialectical materialism are used to provide a correct understanding of the numerous problems connected with imperial colonial policies pursued by Britain and the colonial state in Kenya. Thus, the study examines the Luyia pre-colonial systems of production and analyses their encounter with the capitalist mode of production introduced through colonialism and extrapolates on the patterns of social and political development in the area. On the whole, the political behaviour of the Luyia in the colonial and post-colonial economy is portrayed as a demonstration of the constant struggles and conflicts created by colonial capitalism in the Kenyan periphery.

But while the imperially inspired reforms that laid the prospects and terrain of decolonization were essentially conjunctural responses to intensifying struggles generated by new contradictions embedded in changes in colonial policy, the study demonstrates that because colonial capitalism was inhibitive, Luyia politics became characteristic of bourgeois politics in a stunted capitalist economy. Its parochialism, ethnocentrism, regional sub-ethnic rivalries and jealousies are understood in that light. Therefore,

against abroad background of evidence of concrete situations which gave root to the type of of Luyia politics in the colonial and immediate post-colonial eras explored in the study, the historical explanation provided about these trends and phenomena is posed from the standpoint of class struggle. Nevertheless, this analytical paradigm in Marxist political economy is augmented by the dependency perspective of underdevelopment notably the tenets of uneven development and unequal exchange. Given that classical Marxism was Europe-centred, the study attempts an alternative approach that is essentially syncretic although fundamentally materialist in approach.

However, the study also examines how Buluyia political economies have been influenced by the location and environment in which the societies existed. We underscore the role of the environment in the evolution of Luyia societies and argue that environmental management is as much a problem of political economy as it is of technological development. The study therefore explains why concepts of dialectical materialism must be extended to cover ecological questions and contends that the ecological theory which suggests that the environmental limitations determine production does not necessarily

départ from the general concept of class struggle.

This is because the very notion of ecological conditions likewise yields to a materialist analysis.

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## CHAPTER I

### 1.0 INTRODUCTION: HISTORIOGRAPHICAL TRADITIONS ON KENYA'S POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE ABALUYIA

#### 1.1. Historiographical Debates and the Theoretical Framework

The study of Kenya's political economy has attracted great scholarly attention. It has raised great controversies which reflect the existence of numerous schools of thought. Like elsewhere on the continent of Africa, historiographical approaches in the study of Kenya have tended to change in perspective, but, certain elemental features of imperialist historiography persist in different shapes. Thus, imperialist historiography in Kenya has somewhat "shed its aged and hideous scales" amidst bounteous criticism by nationalist and Marxist historians (Zezeza, 1986, 1982). The age old imperialist notions and misgivings about historical processes in Africa have somehow been renewed in Kenyan dependency historicism in remodelled themes and neo-marxist generalisations. In essence, they are still potent with the "same old poison" of-planned decolonization. Apparently, these renewals, despite the damages they may be causing to the general perception of history in Kenya, demonstrate the great intellectual and ideological duels there are over Africa. Consequently, our area of study namely Baluyia may not be felt out of the continuing polemical and

theoretical debates in African history. Our rejection of the dependency perspective therefore is clear in the study and we have sought to reformulate some of its tenable propositions. We find the concepts of unequal exchange, uneven development and peripherilization useful (See O'brien, 1979, 17).

Our research and interpretative efforts have as a result been carried out with these historical expositions in mind. Consequently, before our attempt at presenting empirical evidence and interpreting the historical picture that emerges from it, this introductory chapter will firstly explore some of the historiographical traditions on Kenya's political economy and proceed to examine the various approaches given in the interpretation of the country's nationalist history. It is in the locus of these historiographical debates and the subsequent literature review that the chapter will demonstrate the existent dearth of information on the Abaluyia of Kenya. The participation of the Abaluyia in the decolonization drama is a central theme in the study. Alongside the existent historiographical debates examined, the chapter will provide an interpretative framework that is both theoretically and empirically engrossing in an effort to contribute to the ongoing crytallization of divergent paradigms of analysis.

Lastly, the chapter will present a research methodology and a mode of interpretation and analysis that will be located within the wider theoretical basis of the study. Underdevelopment needs to be examined in terms of general analytical categories, where there is need, certain obsolete notions and approaches should be dismantled (De Silva, 1982, 1). Taking up the critique of orthodox Marxists but finding some concepts of dependency useful some scholars have taken a middle ground which combines the two approaches.

Historiographical debates on Kenya's political economy mainly centre around the Marxist critiques of the almost heretical dependency discourses on the trajectory of the country's economic development in recent years. Dependency scholars have attempted a systematic analysis of Kenya's underdevelopment from a neo-Marxist perspective in line with Gunder Frank's economic development in Latin America (Frank, 1967). Samir Amin's (1972, 1974, 1976). Immanuel Wallerstein's (1976) and Walter Rodney's (1972) periodization and reconstruction of African history. Their metropole-Satellite model examines interdependence in terms of unequal exchange without giving concrete examples of socialist transformation.

The dependency theory has its roots in the

findings and stipulations of the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) which was formed in 1948 (Prebisch, 1971). The commission posed challenges against conventional theories of international trade and economic development. It explained how the international division of labour was not a natural outcome of world trade and demonstrated how the centre or core derived greater benefits from it than the periphery. Consequently, it proposed the use of a structuralist and historical perspective to devise solutions for its eradication (Zeleva, 1982, 11). Nevertheless, it was Paul Baran who presented the first systematic study of underdevelopment from a Marxist perspective after the industrialization model of import-substitution proposed by the ECLA had apparently failed and encouraged writers on Latin American underdevelopment to seek for more radical analyses and solutions (Baran, 1956). This marked the beginning of a model which emphasises the analysis of unequal exchange in the third world where these countries interact with capitalism.

While the reformulation of ECLA analyses and strategies were going on, attempts were made by Latin American scholars led by Gunder-Frank to reconceptualise obstacles facing capitalist development and particularly industrialization in



the periphery as a result of pervasive 'feudal-imperialist' alliances. Hitherto, Baran had insisted that Western development had historically taken place at the expense of underdeveloped countries and that the dominant interests in the capitalist countries were inimical to economic development in the peripheral satellites. Gunder-Frank clarified this position by stating that this was through constant expropriation of surplus capital from the periphery to generate economic development in the metropolititan centres (Frank, 1967). In order to improve this metropole-Satellite model other dependency scholars came to define dependence as a relationship in a particular phase of capitalist development (O'brien, 1979, 17).

Perhaps it is important to note that Frank's reconstruction and periodization of Latin American history was repeated for Africa by Amin, Rodney and Wallerstein, and that these too had their Kenyan disciples. Perhaps it is important to identify some of their central arguments. These dependency scholars demonstrated that from the era of the Atlantic Slave Trade up to the time of formal colonization and the post-colonial period, Africa like Latin America had its history characterised by constant expropriation of its surplus value to the West. This was identifiably through numerous mechanisms, especially

that of unequal exchange." Thus, crucial in the analysis of dependency is the concept of unequal exchange which is seen as the linchpin of self-perpetuating exploitative relations of centre and periphery. Needless to mention, there is no simple and agreed measure of unequal exchange (Zeleva, 1982, 14). While the problems raised by the dependency perspective of unequal exchange have given rise to others, our comprehension of the issues involved and the resource to empirical data is by itself linked with attempts at achieving clarity in the analysis of issues which orthodox marxism had failed to consider.

According to the orthodox dependency perspective, the disparities between the poor and rich countries were conceived as products of imperialism, a phenomenon by whose very nature of definitive politico-historical process fosters uneven development. It dictates an international division of labour that is detrimental to poor countries since it fosters matrices of commodity exchange which negate their intrinsic component of social value. Against a grim picture of exchange relations between the rich and the poor countries, Arrighi Emmanuel based his understanding of unequal exchange on unequal rewarding factors of labour between the two

categories of countries (Arrighi, 1972, 1974). While agreeing with Arrighi's theoretical position, Samir Amin insisted that the polarization of the world between centre and periphery may be grasped well if viewed in a broader theoretical context of exchange relations between different social formations and not within the narrow confines of exchange relations within the capitalist mode of production (Amin 1974 and 1976). He locates the transfer of value from the periphery to the centre in the sphere of accumulation including primitive accumulation. For him, the practice of primitive accumulation entails unequal exchange since it espouses an exchange of products of unequal value or whose prices of production are unequal. Summarily, accumulation on a world scale involves an incessant process of primitive accumulation in the periphery for the benefit of the centre. However, while accepting the validity of some of these fundamental observations, a study of underdevelopment requires a return to the concepts of classical marxism based on the notion of class struggle as the motor of historical change. We must also perceive the factors governing the transition from one mode of production to another. This is because the primary analytical tool in historical materialism is that of mode of production (Crummey and Stewart, 1981, 23).

Within the old dependency analytical realms,

Wallerstein depicts capitalism as a trade based division of labour. He visualises capitalism as a system of labour rationalisation whereby the periphery is accorded specific economic roles within which unequal exchange is conspicuously notable (Wallerstein, 1974). He therefore goes further than the rest of the dependency scholars and portrays the world capitalist system as complex and mechanical. Thus, he systematises the dependency notions of transfer of surplus value, specialization etc. into a metatheoretical construct with which to explain the origin of capitalist development and underdevelopment (Zezeza, 1982, 16). Given that some elements of this construct are almost heretical, we propose the development of a theoretical framework that is syncretic, that offers room for dialogue between dependency perspectives and other Marxist approaches. The development of a theoretical framework requires a searching process of abstraction and distillation, based on the comparative knowledge of a phenomenon in a wide range of settings, both now and in the past (De Silvia, 1982, 2). All history must retain its sense of everyday material realities which dominate the lives of ordinary people, and the way in which these realities impinge on the affairs of society at large (Crumney and Stewar, 1981, 23).

Much of the underdevelopment theory conceives

underdevelopment of the periphery and the development of the centre as therefore constantly being reproduced through an intermittent stallite-metropolis chain, in which the surplus generated at each state was successively drawn to the centre. Viewing Kenya as part of the periphery whereby the underdevelopment syndrome has been entrenched by the foregoing mechanisms, the dependency theory was used on Kenya by Brett, Leys, Zwanenberg, Langdon, Phillips, Kaplinsky and Leo in macroscopic studies of the country's economic development. However, their theoretical as well as their methodological positions have raised great controversy to such an extent that there are calls for dialogue between the dependency perspective and Marxist approaches of class analysis (See Zeleza, 1985, 145). The need for such a dialogue is made even more apparent by the fact that the dependency theory has not really been transcended. The combination of new studies of the internationalization of capital and the study of class formation does not answer questions posed by the underdevelopment perspective (Beckman 1981, 9). The study of internationalization of capital and the new interest in accumulation and class formation in the periphery fails to provide what the dependency theory has provided, that is, the theoretical platform for the combined struggle against imperialism and the ruling

class. Although the dependency theory has been undermined and its deficiencies exposed, it remains somewhat valid as the alternatives offered seem unable to address themselves to the strategic issues at stake. Since concepts of capital accumulation are embarrassingly weak in inspiring useful political analysis, Marxism has yet to provide a scientifically adequate and politically appropriate analysis of imperialism, capitalist development and underdevelopment (Beckman, 1981, 11). An alternative approach, though syncretic, requires to examine a social phenomenon in several historical periods and in several regions, taking account of its peculiarities over time and space (De Silvia, 1982, 6). Orthodox marxism has been criticised for its incapacity to come to terms with nationalism as a political force.

But these alternative efforts must make Marxism the point of departure although classical Marxism has a Euro-centred political horizon, and has been criticised for its disinterest in admitting the possibility of the amelioration of the terms of exploitation. In studying a social phenomenon, Marx's methodology was one of detecting the general in the particular and the particular in the general. Marx said:

Events strikingly analogous but taking place in different historic surroundings

have led to a totally different result. By studying each of these forms of evolution separately and then comparing them one can easily find the clue to this phenomenon, but one will never arrive there by the universal passport of a general philosophical theory, the supreme virtue of which consists in being super-historical (Marx and Engels, 1943, 475-6).

Consequently, research and writing has to veer between the theoretical, that is, analysing the society at the level of abstraction, and the empirical. As such, there is no point of burdening oneself with a load of data to the neglect of a theoretical framework. John Dewey says "when hypotheses begin to play upon facts ... light dawns" (Quoted in Thompson, 1975). Our facts are geared towards vindicating the dictum that the economic structure of society is the real basis on which juridical and political superstructure is raised and to which definite social forms to thought correspond.

But when the dependency scholars sought to correct the Euro-centred political horizon of classical Marxism, its adherents however misdirected their identification of contradictions. But the challenge to theorists of underdevelopment of the dependency school of thought has not gone totally unheeded. Colin Leys one of the leading theorists of dependency (Leys, 1972 and 1975) has ever since abandoned the

underdevelopment perspective and unleashed a barrel of criticism towards it. Therefore, leading a package of dissent voices against tenets of the dependency perspective, he argues that dependency scholars have conceived capitalist production relations developing in particular places according to the dictates of market forces. Thus, they failed to focus centrally on the productivity of labour as the essence and key to economic development. They did not see the degree to which labour was centrally bound up with historically specific class structures of production and surplus extraction, themselves the products of determinations beyond the market. Consequently, patterns of development or underdevelopment were not seen as hinging upon the outcome of specific processes of class formation, of class struggle (Leys, 1982, 173-174). Class struggle is therefore a concept which plays a fundamental role in Marxian thinking.

Like Beckman and Leys, Kitching criticises the mechanical determinism of much of the dependency theory for its one-sided obsession with determination by external forces which denies Africans any role as effective agents of social change (Bernstein and Campbell, 1985, 11). He emphasises first that capitalist development is of necessity both episodic and unstable, a thing of spurts and pauses, booms and slumps. Secondly, he notes that the potentialities



and limits of capitalist development in Kenya are not simply ineluctable 'givens' but products and objects of class struggle within the human praxis of indigenous Kenyan capitalists, middle peasants or representatives of different forms of multinational capital (Kitching, 1980). These two fundamental perceptions which underlay Kitching's foregoing major study were also central in the work of Michael Cowen which focussed on the Kikuyu) Cowen, 1980 and 1982). The latter unveiled subtle mechanisms of class formation among the Kikuyu and therefore this necessitated some theoretical reflection.

These systematic critiques of underdevelopment theory were not without reactions from some of the dependency scholars. Kaplinsky attempted to correct Ley's deviation from his inaugural dependency position (Kaplinsky 1978) only to be met with further rebuffs, He was joined by Langdon and the two felt that the indigenous bourgeoisie in Kenya has not transcended its petty bourgeoisie or comprador character. It is largely unproductive and not capable of spear-heading a transition to real capitalist development. They argue that the principal source of this incapacity is the complete dependence of this class on foreign capital for which it operates as an agent, a subordinate partner. The nature of its relationship

with foreign capital is therefore essentially one of harmony or symbiosis and this is unlikely to change. But at the domestic front, the indigeous petty bourgeoisie is unproductive, inefficient, corrupt and its dependent nature is compounded by its extreme sectionalist tendencies which further diminish its ability to generate the appropriate conditions for successful capitalist transformation. Although it controls the state, state power is seen as a direct instrument of the foreign bourgeoisie, the only real ruling class or it is an organ of international capital. Consequently, state power is defined as being in the service of the symbiotic relation and the constellation of class forces in the Kenyan periphery. It is the basic source of underdevelopment as it ensures continued subordination to international capital (Beckman, 1980, 49-50). There is need to problematise dependence as a complex set of phenomena relating to the accumulation process.

Langdon vociferously defended the dependency position amidst attacks by Leys stating that the indigenous bourgeoisie is not dynamic and autonomous (Langdon, 1977). In his criticism of both Kaplinsky and Langdon, Leys contends that there has been sustained economic growth in Kenya and that an indigenous industrial bourgeoisie exists. This bourgeoisie has squeezed out foreign capital in

manufacturing and tourism and that the state has assumed an antagonistic position to foreign capital. Given this apparent conflict of interests, sustainable accumulation in large-scale industry will continue in the future at historic rates (Leys, 1978). He raises these issues in his attempt to assess current development in Kenya in the light of his theoretical re-orientation since his main work (Leys, 1975). This re-orientation reflects a widespread unease with some of the basic propositions of the dependency theory including the notion of 'blocked capitalist development'. He together with others mentioned sought to correct the confusion brought by the dependency theory with its lack of theoretical rigour and its ideological concept of development. The survey of theoretical confusion in Kenya's historiography and the polemical aspects of our problem therefore require a framework to which underdevelopment belongs. Such a framework inevitably includes the process of colonial expansion and imperialism (Bloch, 1978). It should transcend the failure of orthodox marxism to consider the differentiation of imperial and post-colonial relations in different contexts among peripheral countries.

Given that the imperialism in the dependency theory is theoretically mislocated, an alternative approach must be forged. This is necessary as underdevelopment reduced to a mislocated analysis of imperialism in most

of the dependency literature. It is reduced to specific actors, foreign firms etc, without making an effort to engross an analysis of the impact produced by foreign economic and political domination in the studies of the laws of motion of capitalism. The problem of course was that Marxist political economy being essentially a theory of the capitalist mode of production paid little attention to the manner in which peripheral societies were incorporated and transformed by capitalism (Beckman, 1981, 8). Capitalism in Africa evolved imperial relations in different social, cultural and political contexts.

Given that apart from the serious theoretical problem, the other ~~problem~~ of underdevelopment is historical. This study interprets and analyses economic and political phenomena, using more viable tenets of Marxist political economy. However, other than just attempt to transcend the limitations of some of the heretical approaches of political economy such as the dependency perspective by combining some of its selected elements with other Marxist analytical realms, we emphasize the use of the logical historical method in our interpretative endeavours. As Schumpeter says:

Nobody can hope to understand the economic phenomena of any society including the present epoch who has not an adequate amount of historical sense or what may be described as historical experience (Schumpeter, 1954, 12-13).

However, it is not enough to argue that material conditions should be given special attention and used as the point of departure of analysis. We relate systematically economic conditions to a conceptual framework when we pose the issue of the nationalist movement from the standpoint of class struggle. Even when we examine certain elements of the dependency and ecological theories, the method remains the same. The former theory is used with special attention to capitalism's generation of unequal exchange and uneven development, while the latter considers the inhibition caused to accumulation by ecological disasters.

It is our strong conviction that an approach combining the concepts of class struggle and the said elements of dependency all of which are marxist in orientation will not deviate from the essentials of Marxist methodology. Marxist political economy from which a number of approaches are derived in this sense is explicitly historical and none-disciplinary. It is an analytical paradigm within a broader doctrinal edifice of dialectical materialism which conceives history as an interlocking system of modes of production within which there are inherent processes of class struggle. On the whole, dialectical materialism as a philosophy permeates the entire Marxist concept of history and all reality in general and therefore spells

out approaches to enquire into laws governing that history and reality. Apart from political economy its other analytical approach is the Marxist theory of scientific socialism (Fagen, 1983, 13). Conceiving class struggle as the prime mover of historical change we analyse capitalism in Buluya and the rest of Kenya identifying its contradictions and disjunctions, its ambivalences and ambiguities.

The concept of class struggle is therefore at the core of the doctrinal philosophy of dialectical materialism and it concentrates on the processes of accumulation, class formation and class relations. Thus, in highlighting on these inherent processes of capitalist production, the approach of class analysis will underscore a series of salient elements. One important abstraction of laws governing class struggle is the premise that the most fundamental human activity in society revolves around the production and distribution of goods necessary for the people's survival and reproduction. But the nature of society is determined by key elements; notably, forces of production and the level of production (Cohen, 1982). However, it should not be thought that capitalist development fosters a steady societal progress along a straight line since it engenders productive relations which in their turn elicit new productive relations and the process begins a new cycle. This brings us to the

another important abstraction that every era in a society's history is conceived as a transitional one. It is transitional since the process unfolds in a series of disjointed forward and backward movements produced by resolution of contradictions between the material conditions of nature, the forces of production, relations of production and human needs. Moreover, at each stage of social change, the classes which are engendered by the productive forces, the appropriation of the social product and the relations of production, tend towards a bipolar model and they are also internally differentiated into fractions, strata and categories (Cohen, 1982). Hence, we argue that classes are in conflict because they constantly have different and often opposed interests in the changing process of production and the appropriation of the social product. This makes class struggle the human arena within which are played out the basic contradictions arising from the nature of production. As a result, the relations between classes are characterised by domination and exploitation (Wolff and Resnick, 1982, 15). These are abstractions which are applied to a concrete situation of the Abaluyia. Our validation of these abstractions with empirical evidence demonstrates the relationship between theory and practice.

In our class analysis we do not see class

relations as applying to individuals but economic activities and social practices. Most individuals occupy multiple, different class positions depending on the various social practices which they perform and therefore the focus of our analysis is on the exploitation of the labouring classes of the Abaluyia which produced surplus value while that value was appropriated by the capitalists who then decided to what value producing labour was applied. According to Marx and Engles, capitalists do not exchange commodities they own on the basis of their value. They make efforts "to wit labour power", whose use-value for the capitalist is its ability to produce new value much larger than its own exchange value (Marx, 1976, 174-5). Thus, because of the law of supply and demand for labour, labour power is kept "in the right rut", while the "oscillation of wages is penned within limits" satisfactory to capitalist exploitation. This way, the social dependence of the labourer on the capitalist, that indispensable requisite, is secured in an unmistakable relation of dependence (Marx, 1971, 975). Mechanisms are linked to the process of accumulation through which labourers are exploited, proletarianised and impoverished (O'brien, 1979, 125).

Moreover, of utmost importance in our class analysis is the study of the use of ideology by the ruling classes. Among the pre-colonial societies there existed



different ideologies. With the coming of colonialism, the colonial ruling classes imposed their own. In either case, ideology is a repressive device used to help reproduce the productive relations of a society. Through its use, dominant classes safeguard their positions of dominance. Ideology is therefore used as an instrument to perpetuate the hegemony of the dominant classes. Thus, in this study, we are also concerned with the nature of power and the use of ideology (see Partington, 1984, 257). We identify the ideological depersonalization of contacts across the colour line and show how the British sought to legitimise the distribution of political power and the allocation of economic resources.

Whereas this study employs the two concepts of unequal exchange and uneven development, they are used on the basis of Marx's concept of capital accumulation, surplus value and commodity exchange. In this light, an attempt is made to explain the pauperization of the Kenyan Luyia peasantry and the labouring classes among the people. Accordingly, an analysis is made of the roots of their political activism. Indeed, dependency concepts of unequal exchange and uneven development underscore the Marxian theoretical argument that labour is the fundamental activity through which man satisfies his need to subsist and develop his potential. But as was the plight of the Luyia, it is impossible to develop this

potential amidst unfair appropriation of workers' labour by the dominant classes. While the capitalist thrives on the basis of this appropriation (exploitation through poor remuneration) the labourers' living conditions decline. The same is true of the peasant whose agrarian produce is exchanged on unequal basis in the mercantile relations of the economy. It is in this vein that the concepts of unequal exchange and uneven development may throw light on the process of pauperization of the working class and the rural peasantry. Both dispense with their labour power but are perpetually victims of unequal exchange. Marx viewed a commodity as a complex of two things; use-value and exchange value. He also noted that labour too has this two-fold nature, ~~But~~ in drawing a major correlation, he concluded that as values, commodities are mere congelations of human labour (Marx, 1971, 9-20). The two are defined by the same dynamic of class that delineates cleavages between antagonistic elements: workers versus owners, labour versus capital.

This study, on the basis of the said approaches, examines the growth of political consciousness of the Abaluyia and shows how their material conditions of existence caused the various political activities in the region and elsewhere in the colony. It examines the actual patterns of capitalist development in the area and explains the political behaviour of the peasantry,

the working class and the nascent African middle class. It also examines the emergence of classes and the interrelationship of these classes in the nationalist struggle. Because of the centrality of class struggle in Marxist analysis, we underscore the need to identify shifting and transient alliances and opposition in the politics of decolonization.

The Luyia people of Western Kenya were no exception in fostering a political response to the problems passed by the colonial political economy. But although historians of modern Kenya have documented many times the economic and political struggles of African peoples with colonial authorities during the pre-independence era, less interest has been shown in the emergence of class structures and the inter-class struggles of these protest groups in Western Kenya. Previous studies have tended to obscure the nature and significance of these changes (Berman, 1981, 2). Nationalist consciousness was an inevitable consequence of colonial disruption of the African political economy. Naturally, this consciousness gained momentum as a result of political articulation of African interests through armed struggle which in turn led to the intensification of the process of decolonization (Alila, 1977, 7).

Many studies, as noted, ignore the structural

changes in the political economy of Kenya which preceeded and largely determined the very possibility and form of decolonization. A great fraction of Kenya's nationalist historiography focusses on the constitutional changes, land and labour policies, political organizations and factional antipathies during colonial rule. It is true these were evident during colonial rule. But they require to be problematised. The most outstanding among such works are Rosberg and Nottingham (1966), Bennett and Rosberg (1961), Tignor (1976), Carey-Jones (1966), Spencer (1983), Lonsdale (1964), Tamarkin (1973), Bogonko (1980), Frost (1978), Abuor (1973), Wa-Githumo (1981), Mboya (1963), Odinga (1967) and so on. Indeed the list of works using this approach is almost unending and it will therefore be futile to attempt to mention them all here.

However, another batch of analyses have emphasized the continuity of the colonial political economy and the country's external dependence. Although some of these studies analyse underlying social forces, they have raised sharp theoretical and ideological controversies in the explanation of Kenya's colonial and post-colonial experience. The issue of continuity has mostly been reinforced by dependency theories which offered radically different explanations of poverty, underdevelopment and neo-colonialism. From this theoretical position emerged a historical folly with the suggestion by

dependency and some imperialist scholars that momentous changes in Kenya like elsewhere in Africa came about as a result of wilful change of heart among the imperial ruling classes. Thus, decolonization in Kenya was a planned thing. It was a prescient, pre-emptive policy developed in London during the Second World War but not in response to the mounting nationalist tide in the country (Zezeza, 1985, 1). This position is reflected in Leys (1975), Leo (1976 and 1985), Langdon (1981), and a series of other dependency literature. To them, it is a question of marginalization versus integration.

The dependency literature breaks sharply from the 1960's studies. These ~~earlier~~ studies had used the concepts of 'development' and 'modernization' in their analysis of problems of poor countries but failed to offer enlightenment about the international dimensions of those problems. They also failed to make the most of the potential for critical analysis of politics and society in those countries (Leo, 1976, 18). The dependency perspective holds it that the relationships between foreign interests and the local bourgeoisie have a strong influence on domestic class formation and presumably upon domestic politics as well. But in practice, the dependency studies stop at that without tracing the problem of underdevelopment at the level of the local bourgeoisies. This explains why this lack of rigorous

theoretical analysis and description of domestic economic classes, of the historical process which shape them or the domestic politics of underdevelopment led to the dependency scholars' adoption of the planned decolonization thesis from earlier imperialist literature. There is need to discover the crucial dialectic which connects the twin poles of the capitalist system that made decolonization logical.

In trying to explain the last few years of colonial rule, imperialist scholars used models derived from pluralism and system analysis to argue that decolonization was essentially a bargaining process between Africans, the Asians and Europeans. They however note that the British Colonial Secretary played the role of Umpire. Rothchild is a leading exponent of this notion. He based his analysis on the pluralistic model with its cultural determinism and tended to absolutise racial and ethnic collectivities ignoring the horizontal ties of class (Ogot and Zeleza, 1988, 21). Wasserman later tried to improve the bargaining thesis by underscoring the fact that by the end of the 1950's the settler block was fractured into divergent conservative and liberal camps. Thus, each camp had distinct social bases, priorities and tactics. Out of this, he developed his thesis of consensual decolonization in which he contends that liberals succeeded in locking Kenya into

a neo-colonial system (Wasserman, 1976). He does so without showing how culture enters into the dynamic of class. It is where class becomes dynamic that lines of antagonism and alliance come together and apart (Sider, 1988. 9).

The consensual decolonization thesis erroneously makes decolonization a dual process of bargaining and socialization with independence the ultimate end. While the nationalist historians would see this interpretation as diabolical historical perfidy, an unashamed attempt to deny the primacy of nationalism in the decolonization drama, that independence was not granted but achieved, if not grabbed, it is true that the thesis constitutes an attempt to denationalise and delegitimise the post-colonial state in Africa, demobilise popular politics and search for alternative social systems (Zeleza, 1986, 188).

In the real sense, there was no initial imperial strategy of decolonization. What emerged were, rather, piecemeal and conjunctural responses to particular problems and crises (Berman, 1981). The colonial policy makers were faced with numerous such problems and crises among the Abaluyia to which they responded to further shape the underlying structural bases. An example of

of such crises as we shall demonstrate later in the study, were the activities of Dini Ya Msambwa which emerged as a militant organization opposed to colonial interests in Western Kenya. It emerged among sections of the Abaluyia and quickly spread to the Kalenjin in the neighbouring districts. It arose during the second World War. But little attention has been paid to the material conditions which fuelled this nationalist unrest. Despite the works of Were (1972), Wipper (1971 and 1977), Shimanyula (1978) and De Wolof (1971, 1980 and 1983) addressing themselves to the Dini Ya Msambwa unrest and its leadership, their lack of theoretical rigour shows the need to apply the problematic of historical materialism to the nationalist cause in the region. For historical materialism the concepts of class and class are interrelated (Crummey and Stewart, 1981, 24). Neither can be understood independently of the other.

Our contention is that decolonization of Kenya was neither a triumphant struggle for national liberation as is advocated by the nationalist historiography (see Wa Kinyatti, 1986) nor the preservation of the structures of colonialism through a neo-colonial co-optation of the nationalist movement. Nevertheless, political violence of the nationalist



struggle and efforts to maintain structural continuity were clearly features of the process (Berman, 1981, 2). From 1954, the colony began to be transformed from a periphery articulated into the world economy and attached to the metropole through a dominant class of white settlers and the expatriate officials of the colonial state. It was transformed into a "developing nation" in which articulation with international capital and international contradictions were managed by an indigenous dominant class in control of the national state. However, the very possibility of transition to independence and the character of this transition was largely determined by a number of changes in the forms and relations of production in Kenya and their linkage with international capital. It also was determined by changes in the metropole and in the structure of the local state. This fatally undermined the previously predominant positions of both settler capital and the traditional control apparatus of the colonial state (Berman, 1981, 2). The state is viewed as the necessary coercive instrument for the maintenance of social inequality and for the extraction of surplus. Thus, class is essential for the maintenance of the state for the explanation of its behaviour (Crummey and Stewart, 1981, 24).

## 1.2 Statement of the Problem

The purpose of this study is to present party politics in Western Kenya in their historical entirety against forces of economic change between 1900 and 1964. It is an historical account of the genesis, development and maturation of political consciousness in the area.

As a matter of conjecture, it may be stated that the Luyia of Western Kenya were among the most active peoples in the politics of regionalism in the latter part of the colonial period. Their prominent roles in the regional politics made them one of the most conspicuous of Kenya's ethnic communities. However, hitherto, the history of party politics in Western Kenya has not been adequately documented, especially on the last decade of decolonization. Thus, the rudimentary knowledge we have on parties which operated in the region is highlighted only incidentally in their connection with the history of other political organs and personalities in the nationalist struggle. Consequently, a study of nationalist question in the area will boost the body of Kenya's nationalist historiography when the twin processes of integration and marginalization are

are fully illuminated in Buluyia.

Indeed, the impact of colonial policy on the character of African politics cannot be gainsaid. The aim of this study is to reconstruct and analyse colonial economic and political policies and examine how they influenced the Luyia political behaviour. In other words, the study seeks to give a rigorous analysis of concrete situations in the colonial economy which gave root to the development of ethnic oriented politics. Secondly, it explores the development of politics and identifies the various partisan political organs among the people. Thirdly, the study seeks to examine the achievements and limitations of these ethnic political organs and explains factors which led to their failure or demise. Fourthly, the study looks at the issue of land expropriation among the Abaluyia and assesses its impact on the political behaviour of the people in the colonial economy. Lastly, the study investigates and analyses the origin of class differentiation among the Abaluyia and explains the phenomenon of class interrelationships in the economy and politics of the area. In a nutshell, it is a study of the political history of the Abaluyia of Western Kenya between 1900 and 1964 that shows their role in the allocation of economic resources, distribution of political power

and the differential access to occupational opportunities and privileges.

### 1.3 Research Premises

The major research premise of the study is that the evolution of ethnic politics among the Abaluyia was a reflection of a continuous struggle. This was a struggle that took the form of political activities which by themselves were results of the exigencies of the colonial economy as it affected land, their most fundamental means of production. In other words, the Abaluyia political ideology was to an appreciable extent the product of their socio-economic experience. The alienation of land or its scarcity and deterioration was a major factor in determining how they reacted politically. As such, the politics of ethnic alliances was an articulation of this economic displacement. The second research premise states that imperialist subjugation of the Abaluyia in the region and the systematic articulation of local Luyia economies with the capitalist economy led to the emergence of distinctive classes among the people. Notable forces and agencies of this articulation were education, trade and the oppressive execution or operationalization of colonial policy through local administrative officials. However, the process of class formation

which was sharpened by the dominant dynamic of colonial capitalist accumulation through trade, education and execution of colonial policy through colonial administrators varied from region to region. This variation was in accordance with the degree of articulation of the respective local Luyia economies with the capitalist economy. Lastly, the study proposes that the Luyia people readily accepted the alliance of liberal Europeans in the 1950's since their multi-racial proposals would safeguard their ethnic interests. Multi-racialism as envisaged by its propagators would maintain the Europeans in their positions of prominence in land ownership and therefore forestall likely Kikuyu encroachment on expropriated Luyia lands in the Trans-Nzoia and Uasin Gishu regions of the then "White Highlands".

#### 1.4 Review of the Related Literature

Although extremely useful to this study, macroscopic studies on Kenya's political economy have not hitherto posed the question of the nationalist movement from the standpoint of class struggle. This is true except for Berman (1981) and Ogot and Zeleza (1988). The two are well analysed studies and one feels this kind of problematization be attempted at a more regional level. In the foregoing work, Berman

demonstrates that the years of decolonization in the early 1960's were less a dramatic turning point and were more the pivot of an extended period of change within the political economy and state of colonial Kenya beginning during the emergency and actually culminating at the end of the 1960's, several years after independence. He sees decolonization as both a product of nationalist pressure and British manipulation over important elements of the politics of the period. Thus, the nature of the policies adopted in the administration's attempt to adapt the political economy to changing conditions was a function of the imperialist regime.

There were major shifts in colonial policy concerning the adaptation of the African politicians. These shifts hastened constitutional reforms and forced the issue of decolonization. But the changes in the structure of agriculture, industry and labour relations as well as the shifting balance of power within the colonial state and between it and the metropolitan authorities, opened up some choices and foreclosed others. This happened such that what appeared unthinkable in 1954 was eminently logical and compelling by 1960. Although this work is greatly resourceful and insightful, it essentially remains a macroscopic study and ignores political behaviour of groups at the

local level such as the Abaluyia. The Luyia did not undergo a mechanistic process of adaptation to requests and interests of imperialism. Their role in decolonization was a consequence of political struggle.

Ogot and Zeleza present an insightful critique of imperialist approaches to decolonization including the dependence perspectives and also criticise nationalist historiography for their myopia regarding the issue. They feel that both approaches simplify the process of decolonization treating the attainment of independence at the turn of the sixties as if it were a foregone conclusion by 1945. Thus, the conflicts, hesitations and uncertainties that littered Kenya's nationalist history are subsumed into an inevitable consummation of either African political militancy or imperial planning. Consequently, the unfolding political scenario is not therefore predicated on the changing material conditions in both imperial and colonial territories. They perceive decolonization in Kenya as a process which involved complex and bitter struggles arising out of and involving structural changes in the political economy which in turn altered the balance of power within the colonial state and between it and the imperial state. These changes were

partly contingent upon the growing articulation of the Kenya economy with international capital, itself a reflection of the post-war international division of labour. Decolonization then marked a turbulent transition from a settler dominated colony to an independent nation under an indigenous ruling class which used its political power to enhance the accumulation of the local bourgeoisie. Paradoxically, the economy was getting more widely and firmly integrated into the world capitalist system than before. This therefore maintained the ground for some of the old struggles to continue while the terrain for new social struggles and alignments was simultaneously being laid. The shifting and transient alliances and oppositions in a system of classes implies that the composition and internal structure of any particular class are fluid and dynamic (Sider, 1988, 9).

In earlier works Zeleza (1982, 1983 and 1985) argues for the need for more meaningful historical analyses. The first work traces the process of primitive accumulation and the coercive labour system which emerged in the first few decades of Kenya's dependent capitalism. The study also deals with the impact of the World War II on the Kenyan working class and further looks into the position of Kenyan workers



in a post-war world marked by deep transformation in the global and local political economies. Moreover, it focusses on the internal recomposition of the Kenyan working class during the emergency and shows the effects that this together with the contradictions arising out of the decolonization process had towards the bureaucratization and de-radicalization of the Kenyan trade union movement on the eve of independence. In the latter two works, he mostly amplifies the theoretical position advanced in his earlier work whereby he calls for reformulation of theory that would foster adequate analysis of particular conjunctures of struggle. Calling for a dialogue between certain dependency perspectives and marxist concerns with accumulation, international division of labour, and class struggle, his views together with perspectives rendered by Berman, Bernstein, Campbell, Kitching, Beckman, Palma, Cooper, Brenner and Forster-Carter have greatly influenced the theoretical realms of this study. It is based on their reformation of dialectical approaches in the wake of a barrel of critiques of dependency studies. But Zeleza's studies like those of his colleagues are macroscopic and they do not examine concrete local situations. Applying this perspective at the local level will enhance our understanding of the local setting itself. Understanding political

activities in the Luyia sub-periphery including its contradictions and disjunctions, we need to bring concrete evidence to bear on our theoretical propositions.

Since we have mentioned Ogot and Zeleza and Berman's displeasure with Wasserman's consensual decolonization thesis in our analysis of the various theoretical approaches, perhaps it is relevant to examine his discourse shortly. Wasserman (1976) examines what he calls the 'other side' of decolonization, that is the colonial interests involved. Central to the study is ~~the idea~~ that the decolonization process was shaped by an adaptive reaction of colonial and economic interests to the ascendancy of a nationalist elite and to the threat of disruption of masses. The study focuses on three aspects of decolonization of Kenya. 1. The actual process of moving from the colony to an independent state 2. European adaptation to this decolonization process and 3. The bargaining over the land issue: the central conflict. He harps on the critical issues which he thinks were of major importance to the settler and expatriate interests dominating the colonial policies, and sees decolonization accordingly as amounting to the effort to integrate the nationalist movement into the structures and

and requisites of the colonial political economy. Thus, it was adaptive, preemptive and co-optive according to the interests of liberal Europeans who eventually succeeded in locking Kenya in a neo-colonial system. Decolonization is merely reduced to a functionalist game of structural maintenance. Therefore as his critics would say (Ogot and Zeleza, 1988), history is turned into a a parody of wilful bargain and continuity. Wasserman's interpretation is so deformed because of the influence of imperialist historiographical concepts on decolonization. But contributing further to this deformation is his own one-sided use of European informants although he professes to have interviewed various factions of the African political elite. Consequently, he gravely overlooks the African side of the coin. But apart from these conceptual problems this work is extremely useful to this study even though it does not trace the phenomenon of land alienation in Trans-Nzoia and Uasin Gishu and explain its impact on the Luyia peasants in the region.

Based on the modernization theory Haberson (1973) examines the role of the central issue of land in Kenyan politics. He surveys land policies prior to the World War I, the interwar period and the post-war period. He argues that land transfer policies

stimulated the growth of African politics and the development of African nationalism in Kenya. He points out that whereas inter-war land policy dealt with land problems arising between the races, it did very little to ameliorate land problems with the African reserves. However, post-war policies emphasized the desirability of economic development in African rural areas with the reality of increased European influence. With the rise of Kenya African Union (KAU) the colonial government embarked on land reform and politics of accommodation. Consequently, the agrarian revolution progressed according to a political strategy that essentially endorsed the status quo. An echo of planned decolonization is also noticeable in Harbeson's thesis, an interpretation whose folly we have already pointed out. This work like the preceding ones examines land and politics at the centre without sufficient documentation of outlying communal responses to colonial land policy. Moreover, his analysis of settlement is not a study of its political economy. It differs from Wasserman's in that the latter develops a class analysis of the society although he does not carry out an analysis of the social relations of production including questions of property and its transfer and distinctive relationships between producers and those who organise production.

Wasserman exercised great influence on Christopher Leo. Because the former dealt with various factions of the African political elite and the European settler politics, Leo merely attempts to shed little light on economic development of social classes within the African society and how it contributed to the formation of the settlement programme and how the programme in effect affected the development of Kenya's class system (Leo, 1985). A similar approach is used by Apollo Njonjo (1977) although both these studies look at the adaptive, cooptive and pre-emptive processes of integrating a potentially disruptive nationalist movement into the structures and requisites of the colonial political economy. While Njonjo focuses on the African class development in the "White Highlands", Leo's study emphasises the role of Europeans settlers. However both examine, somewhat, the role of landless people in the decolonization process and highlight on its consequences for them. These works concentrate their efforts where dependency studies are weakest. They offer a class analysis and deal with the political implications of the case. Nevertheless, they highlight mostly on the Kikuyu class formation and the growth of landlessness and show how the introduction of

capitalism and its imposed structures on an African society from outside affected it and transformed it from within. By creating new economic opportunities, it caused class formation and class conflict breaking the ties of kinship which had held it together. It also brought mixed blessings and crises of the capitalist economic development by introducing into the society capitalist mechanisms of self-interest and profit. These works are extremely useful to this study albeit their conceptual problems with the issue of decolonization. We place this historical phenomena in its rightful place when we show changes in the material basis and productive activities of Africans and analyse the changing political and ideological claims, assertions and practices.

Swainson (1980) looks at the underlying mechanisms of capitalist development in Kenya during the colonial and post-colonial period. She mainly focuses on patterns of corporate accumulation in the country's economy and explains the political conditions which underlie particular periods of capitalist development. The study examines the different levels of corporate accumulation in three historical periods. The argument on the relationship

between capital and the state is supported by case studies of individual foreign firms. Firstly, she looks at the role of the state in colonial economic development and highlights the contradiction between the resident settler class and the metropolitan bourgeoisie. The driving force behind the entry of foreign firms into Kenya is identified as being the search for raw materials and the competition between European capital. Moreover, she reappraises the colonial state in the context of Britain's drastically altered position in the world economy after 1945. Finally, she examines the post-colonial political economy and demonstrates how the indigenous bourgeoisie when freed from the political constraints of colonial rule rapidly extended its economic base. Theoretically, she takes issues with some of the dependency explanations of underdevelopment and points out the major flaw in their conceptualization of capitalism. This great work which has made Swainson a leading authority on corporate capitalism in Kenya is an amplification of her earlier work (Swainson, 1978) in Kaplinsky's edited volume on Multinational corporations in Kenya<sup>1</sup>. A useful analysis

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1. Other contributors to this volume are Kaplinsky, Eglin, Langdon, Herman and Murray. However, this earlier work is not set in the context of current theoretical debates surrounding underdevelopment and neo-colonialism in the Third World. See. R. Kaplinsky, (ed.) Readings on the Multinational Corporation in Kenya. Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1978.

of capitalism and the peripheralization of the country is made.

The theoretical debate on Kenya's trajectory of class struggle and economic development followed Leys renunciation of his initial dependency position. This is understandable given that all his critics drew their inspiration from the conclusions of his main work (Leys, 1975) and they therefore felt betrayed by their master. In this major work, Leys concentrates on the interrelations between foreign capital and the local bourgeoisie and draws together some material relevant to the stratification of the Kenyan society and the impact of underdevelopment upon domestic politics. He noted that the Africanization of top positions gave the new Kenyan regime room to move and help it diffuse discontent over land, meet the needs of the new educated elite and therefore maintain itself in political power without challenging the economic base and power of foreign capital. He observed that comprador interests are inseparably bound up with the dominance of foreign capital and it is foolhardy to expect a comprador regime to eradicate that dominance. But he did not adequately analyse the politics of colonial and post-colonial Kenya despite he and Swainson having gone beyond most associates of the



underdevelopment school of thought in viewing Kenya's problems in a dynamic political way. His work is of great use to this study, although he has shifted his theoretical position as noted heretofore. He abandoned his dependency position on the basis of Cowen's findings (Cowen, 1978). It is time that African scholars set the terms of debate to avoid this kind of mistaken discipleship.

Cowen's historical work on Central Province of Kenya had unearthed a deeply rooted process of indigenous capital accumulation and class formation among African people there as early as the 1920's. In his contribution to a volume in which Leys also re-examines his theoretical premises, he noted that an indigenous class of capital in Kenya's Central Province was formed long before the agrarian reforms of the 1950's. By early 1920's an exclusive class had come to establish forms of commodity production which were based on the direct employment of wage labour. By the end of the 1940's individuals of the class had entered into competition with Asian and European merchant capitalists. They adopted aggressive strategies towards the acquisition of land and other instruments of production and commanded forms of political organization

(Kikuyu Central Association) which were directed towards removing the racial constraints over property ownership (Cowen, 1982). Racial constraints were linked with an institutional mechanism involving legislative sanctions and psychological devices whereby the Europeans maintained and rationalised their domination.

Cowen's work is essential to this study in the sense that it sets the terms of the theoretical debate and that he influenced Leys to abandon his earlier thesis that local bourgeoisie lacks capital. The latter had assumed that there would be a minimal investment of indigenous capital in production because of the small size of domestic enterprises when compared with foreign firms. His revision now asserts that an African industrial bourgeoisie is in the process of formation (Leys, 1977, 1978, and 1982). This position is vociferously attacked by Kaplinsky and Langdon. But without entering into the details of theoretical revisionism and terms of debate, suffice it to say, the intellectual theoretical and polemical exchanges between Leys, Swainson and Cowen on one hand and Kaplinsky and Langdon on the other, form a great resource material to be used by this study. The debate has also provoked us into seeing the need to devise

alternative premises of investigation and interpretation. Such alternative efforts do not show a propensity for deviation or revisionism but offers opportunity for further reflective thinking.

Beckman and Kitching articulate the basis of their disagreement with dependency literature as a means of establishment the groundwork of alternative approaches and interpretations. They reject the dichotomous logic of the development of underdevelopment. Whereas Beckman accepts much of it at the level of descriptive validity as we have noted before, Kitching's rejection of dependency theory is complete (Kitching, 1985). In his major study (Kitching, 1980), his most fundamental theoretical proposals are equally central in the work of Michael Cowen. This major work examines the impact of colonialism and imperialism on the internal structure of a dominated economy and society and especially on patterns of stratification within that society. Since social classes can only be understood within the contexts of the production process and the social relations of production, he presents a meaningful perception of the phenomenon of class formation and interrelationships. But beyond these classes and their material conditions, working class consciousness, collective organization and political activities

which were expressions of the same said material conditions are not examined. Apart from explaining the deformities of colonial land policy and how these together with other exigencies dispensed with to underwrite colonial exploitation, led to the upheaval of the peasants among the Kikuyu, he has nothing or little to say about the party politics of the period. Unfortunately, the question of intra-class struggle within Mau Mau and its relationship with the wider terrain of party politics was unfortunately left out of this, otherwise, engrossing study. One is left eager to know how class differentiation, class interests and class struggles determined the nature and extent of party political activism in colonial and post-colonial Kenya. Kitching also makes gross generalization about labour-time in Buluyia which this study accordingly corrects:

Langdon contributes significantly to the ongoing debate on the character of Kenya's political economy (Langdon, 1980). He shows that the pre-eminence of foreign capital and foreign enterprises in the modernization process of post-colonial Kenya was a fundamental part in the philosophy of those who organized the decolonization process. He states that multinational corporations emerged as the major owners

and controllers of capital and financial flows across their national boundaries during the post-war era and became the prime actors in foreign capital investment in Kenya. The colonial policymakers created a legal framework (a modus operandi) for the inflow of foreign capital, technical skills and skills and its management such that even after independence, the African nationalists who manned the emergent state operated within this framework, or passed laws, regulations and measures to safeguard their compromised interests. In this analysis he joins the bandwagon of dependency writers to whom the rise of underdevelopment is inherent in capitalist expansion and that the development of underdevelopment is an indispensable condition for capitalist development itself. His approach however, ignores the forces of production in the local African economies and the process of accumulation by an embryonic African middle class. Since the state had to confront the social consequences of changing structures of production, what emerged then depended not only on the ups and downs of the world system, the deterministic framework on which Langdon's perspective rests, or the requirements of the capitalist mode of production, but on encounter with Africans (Cooper, 1981, 42). Yet there is little

of this encounter in Langdon's work although he furnishes us with useful insights. Africans must be placed in their right place when writing the history of their country.

Brett attempts to explore the nature of the connection between colonialism and underdevelopment. He shows the economic basis of colonial politics and advances the view that the settler economy underdeveloped peasant economies in Kenya (Brett, 1973). Initially seen as a landmark in the re-interpretation of Kenya's pre-independence experience, he explains underdevelopment as having developed as a system with its historical origin in the relations between the capitalist and pre-capitalist modes of production and with its own laws of motion that enable the system to reproduce these same relations and thus itself. His analysis however is conservative as he centres his explanation of underdevelopment on the world systems theory. Thus, the basic contradiction is between the core and the periphery and therefore local class conflict and political struggles are beside the point. But then the focus on exchange or the siphoning of surplus value from the periphery is by itself incapable of separating development from underdevelopment and

hence the focus of any new study must shift to production with its class structures and political struggles. The acquisition of class consciousness guarantees the passage from a class in itself, an economic category, to a class for itself, a political (Jewsiewicki, 1981, 93).

Stichter in her major work dwells on the interrelation of settler large-scale farming and the subsistence peasant sector (Stichter, 1982). The strength of her work lies in its depiction of labour relations as manipulated by the powers that were and the flexibility which the migrant labour systems afforded the European establishment to accommodate circumstances beyond their control. Although this study scarcely documents the African side of the coin, it like Sandbrook's study of Kenyan proletarians is an argument in political economy (Sandbrook, 1975). The latter work is mainly concerned with post-colonial period although it traces the main elements of the colonial heritage which influenced the nationalist government's decision about an appropriate development strategy. One obvious legacy which he identifies is the dominance of oligopolistic overseas corporations mainly from Britain. An equally obvious legacy was the remarkable inequality in the distribution of wealth.

Thus, the historical context within which the post-colonial government had to choose an appropriate development strategy is ably analysed. Another work of similar magnitude is Leitner's study of peripheral capitalism in Kenya before and after independence (Leitner, 1975). Whereas Sandbrook views the trade union affairs from a political and economic view-point and therefore focuses on the politics and organizational-institutional aspects, and perceives political processes as a result of personalistic politics, Leitner's approach differs from this. The latter emphasizes the socio-economic position of the proletariat and the insufficiencies of the personalistic politics. Nevertheless, both Sandbrook and Leitner, despite their differences in specific aspects of emphasis, analyse trade unionism before and after independence. They do not analyse how policy was used as an ideological weapon to mystify real relations of exploitation in Kenya.

Van-Zwanenberg also pursues the themes of proletarianization, underdevelopment, dominance and dependence in an attempt to explain the nature of colonial accumulation in an effort to throw light on the changes and developments which occurred in the field of the economy and politics (Van Zwanenberg,



1975). He gives a clear and detailed study of the mechanism used by the colonial authorities to feed settler plantations with cheap African labour from the 'reserves'. He shows that colonialism represented a period of exploitation through white settlement and the process and patterns are given a deep analysis. Like other studies of this genre, he does not examine the African political response in relation to the numerous economic mechanisms that the study highlights. This work like that of Markhan Singh (1969) deals with the historical development of trade unionism in Kenya. Singh's book is written with a strong proletarian class consciousness which supercedes ethnic and racial thinking. It is therefore nationalistic as he attempts to overcome splits in the working class. However, he fails to identify shifts and tides of local politics as they were secured in the economic mainstream of society.

Other important works at the wider level of coverage include Rosberg and Nottingham's analysis of African antionalism (Rosberg and Nottingham, 1966). Although this is regarded as a standard text on African nationalism, it has grave conceptual problems and focuses mainly on the Kikuyu and the Luo. However, it makes a fair effort to trace early and later day

political activities in colonial Kenya in relation to the existent colonial policies and institutions. Also important is Rothchild's analysis of racial bargaining and decolonization in Kenya (Rotchchild, 1973). The book focuses upon the types of encounters which marked the pre-independence periods. As pointed out before, the transition to independence is erroneously analysed in terms of a model of shifting and bargaining relationships among the three main racial communities. The dialectics of integration bore in mind the inter-ethnic relations, the structure of privilege, and the pressure of African nationalism. Thus, the Africans were co-opted into the government process but excluded from a major share in the running of their country. Already, a critique of this position has been made and this need not tie us here. Nevertheless, this work will be a valuable work of reference. His co-edited work on independent Kenya will also be of great value (Goldschmidt and Rotchild, 1969). Bogonko in his major study examines unpopular policies which elicited African responses. He also gives detailed insights as to the historical facts surrounding secessionist movements in Kenya at the dawn of independence (Bogonko, 1980). However, like many texts on nationalism, the study concentrates on political activities in Central Province, Nairobi

and London. There is need to show how the economy and politics influence the lives of all the people regardless of whether or not some choose not to participate (Mulaa, 1981).

Since it is impossible to exhaust the list of relevant works on Kenya's economic and political history, let us review studies that have specifically addressed themselves to historical events in Buluyia. The most outstanding of these is Bode's analysis of the Luyia locality and the issues which dominated the area throughout the years of colonial rule (Bode, 1978). He concentrates on examining how colonialism changed the structure and norms of authority and how this created issues and matrices of conflict. Consequently, it is more of a study of inter-clan politics and rivalries than a study of the nationalist movement in the area. Indeed, party politics in Buluyia are left out of his focus of study. Nevertheless, in many ways this work will be resourcesful to this study especially on highlighting on the role of education, trade and local administrative activities in the area's socio-economic differentiation. It shows how rural capitalism produced ethnic politics in the countryside.

Also relevant to this study is Lonsdale's

unpublished thesis on politics in Nyanza (Lonsdale, 1964). He tries to give a picture of the historical setting within which political movements in the area evolved between 1883 and 1945. By so doing, he examines the factors which determined the membership and aims of the early political associations. He looks at the role of missionaries, traders and the educated elite in the rise and development of political disquiets in the area. However, his focus on both the Luyia and the Luo inhibits him from rendering a deep analysis of concrete situations of Luyia politics. Moreover, his analysis apart from lacking a strong theoretical premise, by virtue of its limited span of coverage, fails to examine the participation of the two communities in the politics of decolonization in the 1950's and the early 1960's. But despite these shortcomings, it is an invaluable resource to my work alongside his other articles in edited works and journals.

Dealing examines politics in Wanga between 1980 and 1914 (Dealing, 1974). He examines politics of the people in the context of the establishment of the hegemony of the Abashitsetse dynasty. He analyses the internal conflicts and pressures which the dynasty had to reckon with both during the pre-colonial and

colonial eras. Since the development and institutionalisation of the Abashitsetse power within and without Wanga created problems in the political economy of Western Kenya which this study envisages to explore in a wider context, this is a very useful work. Also basing his analysis on the institution of Nabongo is Berg-Schlosser's broad treatment of the social and economic bases of politics in Kenya (Berg-Schlosser, 1979). He devotes a chapter to the analysis of the political economy of Buluyia but since his entire study is broadly based, he is unable to examine the intricacies of party politics in the region. There is need for ~~provision of more~~ evidence on livestock and crop distribution and social exchange.

The institution of Nabongo has attracted a lot of historical study. This includes Osogo's biography of Mumia Nabongo (Osogo, 1978) and Were's analysis of the Wanga kinship ties in his main work (Were, 1967). In an earlier work (Osogo, 1966), Osogo tackles the highly complex issue of the origins and evolution of the Abaluyia. The two authors have presented us with the most up to date general history of the Abaluyia compared with Gunter Wagner's anthropological work (Wanger, 1948). Osogo's earlier work achieves the object with relative clarity and precision.

Nevertheless, the book focuses on the numerous local rivalries and warfare, local customs and practices and to a small extent social, cultural and administrative developments during the period of British rule. It is not a study of politics as such. Similarly, Were's foregoing work attempts to solve the puzzle of the peopling of Buluyia between 1500 and 1930. He explores the historical developments which contributed to the emergence of the Abaluyia by examining the different waves of migrants into Buluyia part of the interlacustrine region and their subsequent interactions with the neighbouring peoples. He proceeds to examine the history and functioning of the Wanga institutional stateraft and explains how the genesis of colonial rule articulated with this policy. His analysis of clandoms and lineage societies contrasts with major historiographical conceptions of the people as acephalous except for the Wanga.

In another work Were undertakes a study of the Dini Ya Msambwa (Were, 1972) and portrays the movement as having had many facets; political, religious and even having manifested attributes of a labour bargaining agency. This is the only historical work of note on the movement, but still, it does not explore the movement's alliance with the Bukusu Union and other

political organs<sup>2</sup>. Also writing on the movement are Wipper's biographical study of Elijah Masinde (Wipper, 1971) and the study of the movement and the Mumbo cult as rural protests (Wipper, 1977). Others are De Wolof's analysis as to whether the movement was a form of protest or millenarian promise (De Wolof, 1983), Usher-Wilson's study of the movement (Usher-Wilson's 1953) and Shimanyula's biographical study of Elijah Masinde (Shimanyula, 1978). Other contribution on the movement is the dialectical re-interpretation of its rise and leadership in Buluyia.

Other localised studies include Seitz's work on the history of the Samia (Seitz, 1978), Mutooro's seminar paper on Luyia reactions to colonial rule between 1880 and 1930 with special reference to the Bukusu (Mutooro, 1975/76) and Makila's treatise on the Bukusu (Makila, 1981). Observably these are not studies of political development although they contribute to the caucus of Western Kenya's historiography in different lights. Moreover, the majority of them suffer from grave conceptual

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2. The link between Dini Ya Msambwa and Bukusu Union is very apparent in colonial official records. See K.N.A. from P.C. Nyanza to Chief Secretary dated 9/7/49 Dc/NN/10/1/5, see also K.N.A. D.O.'s interview with Pascal Nabwana, (the president of Bukusu Union) dated 2/7/86 DC/NN/10/1/5.

problems. Thus, among the Abaluyia the analysis of dialectical materialism with its concept of history as an interlocking system of modes of production within which is located the central dynamic of class struggle has not been extended here. Theorists of imperialism have not provided a rigorous theoretically informed analysis of political behaviour at this local level. The need for such an analysis is however very real and this is partly the work of this study.

#### 1.5 The Significance of the Study

~~Therefore this~~ study is significant because unlike many texts on nationalism which have concentrated on political activities in Central Province, Nairobi and London, it will examine particular conjunctures of struggle at a regional level compounded with a wider embracing analysis of events at the national level. This is necessitated by the fact that other communities in Kenya have not adequately been brought into the picture of state formation. This has apparently been the case as if these communities did not exist within the boundaries of the colony or they played absolutely no part towards gaining independence. Moreover, since it is the first study that applies the



problematic of historical materialism to the nationalist movement in the area, it provides a new context for the study of colonial politics in other areas of Kenya.

#### 1.6 Methodology

The study poses the question of the nationalist movement in Western Kenya from the standpoint of class struggle. Moreover, it adopts elements of the dependency theory in a reformulated manner. It is based on the broad analytical approach of political economy which is materialist rather than behavioural. Its method of analysis is critical and analytical rather than descriptive. The data analysed in the study was collected from secondary and primary sources. The former includes information collected from published books, articles in journals and papers presented at various seminars and conferences. The latter sources include data harnessed from both archival records and oral interviews.

Oral interviews and archival research were the major sources of data. During the conduct of fieldwork, a temporary list of prospective informants was compiled on the basis of information yielding

from both library and archival research. But this list eventually was altered by insertion of other informants mentioned by the interviewees or withdrawal of names of the deceased. There were 6 categories of informants; leaders of the various political and social organizations, participants in these organizations other than leaders, leaders from outside the region, the educated intelligensia of the area, and the displaced peasants of Trans-Nzoia and Uasin Gishu. The criteria for the choice of informants was (a) mention by documentary sources (b) mention by other oral informants and (c) Advanced age (other but knowledgeable people were interviewed for displaced peasants and Luyia squatters in Trans-Nzoia and Uasin Gishu).

The oral data collected was cross-checked with documentary data. All data collected was used to support or disapprove the research premises and is the basis of our analysis and interpretation.

Perhaps it should be noted that the researcher worked in constant consultation with his supervisors to ensure that adequate and relevant archival and oral data was harnessed.

Armed with a temporary list of informants from archival and library reading, the researcher sought to locate the residences of these prospective informants using carefully selected local research assistants. This was done purposefully in order to establish a working rapport with the informants. In this regard we were particularly careful in observing the etiquette of the different Luyia people. At this stage, we arranged for an interview with the prospective informants on an agreed future date.

The actual interview schedules commenced in the second month of entry into the field area. However, prior to settling down for interview, we initially discussed freely small matters that even appeared irrelevant without showing impatience or pride as these were bound to jeopardise our future relations. We then systematically introduced the subject of our mission as simply seeking for information on the political history of the Abaluyia with regard to their experiences under colonial rule and their resultant participation in the nationalist movement. We pointed out that we intended to record this information and use it along with others to compile a political history of the people during the

colonial era. Such an effort would therefore preserve the history for future generations who may not have access to the informants, we often emphasized.

We administered questionnaires but these were not treated as rigid documents but as flexible guides to the material required. Nevertheless, a number of responses were obtained and these questionnaires were bound in one volume. Probing biographical questions were posed in these questionnaires. There were two sets of questionnaires. Those dealing with purely political matters and those dealing with purely economic matters. In order to collect all the data the informants would recall, we asked for their consent to record the interviews on tape. This effort met with only a limited degree of success as some of the informants felt unsafe to be recorded over such political questions. Where this was done, it was combined with the writing of notes. Tape recording was also done out of expedience especially in a bid to overcome the problem posed by the absence of facilities such as light, furniture etc. in some of the informants' huts. Additionally, it reduced interruptions during the interview and

enabled the researcher to keep check on the work of the reserach assistants. But where for example tape recording was completely resented, the researcher and his assistant made comprehensive notes. The tape-recorded information was transcribed at convenient times.

All interviews were conducted in the informants' homes or places of their choice. We refrained from conducting group interviews because the nature of the research topic sensitively militated against ~~it.~~

Since different areas of Buluyia have varying forms of etiquette, our research methodology was very flexible. Indeed, its dynamism reflected the experience encountered in the field. Nevertheless, one of the main strengths of the researcher was his ability to understand every Luyia dialect and his appreciable knowledge of their different modes of social behaviour. This was enhanced by our stay within the respective areas of research with the informants. Interviews often comprised more than one single sitting. They entailed dealing with

informants exhaustively as the case warranted.

The transcribing of tapes was closely monitored by the researcher to allow him to notice weak parts of the questionnaire, the type of materials that appeared popular, the oral data that required checking, further pursuit or supplementation by other informants and possibly which areas were either overcovered or undercovered. The transcripts were in vernacular but with an English translation alongside. These have been organised into serialised volumes with a table of contents and the ~~list of~~ informants for each volume.

The actual analysis and interpretation of data . . . uses elements of two approaches in political economy namely the logical historical method and the comparative dynamics. Since it is a pedagogical imperative for students of Marxist political economy to develop a sound grounding in its basic methodology, let us briefly explain what these two approaches entail. The logical-historical method entails the analysis and explanation of harnessed data both historically and logically (Onimonde, 1985, 38).

In this case the point where colonial capitalism starts in Western Kenya must also be the starting point of our train of thought. However, as it further progresses, it becomes simply, a reflection in empirically and theoretically consistent form of the historical course (see Kitching, 1980, 1-3). We are tied to using the logical-historical method because it is the core of the methodology of Marxist political economy. It constitutes the logical or abstract theoretical and empirical analysis of the historical development of economic phenomena. It corresponds to the relations of production which in turn are used to discern how the commodity organization of social economy develops, becomes transformed into capitalist economy, develops the productivity of labour, creates antagonistic classes and introduces elements which come into conflict with the foundations of the capitalist system itself. The logical historical method is therefore necessitated by the fact that a historical enquiry into social phenomena needs more than a mere knowledge of facts and events in their chronological order. Facts must be applied to establish the historical specificity of a social phenomenon in terms of its constituent

elements and of the relations between these elements which determine the structure of the phenomenon and give it coherence (De Silvia, 1982, 16).

The study also adopts a comparative approach by applying the comparative dynamics examining mode of analysis . This comes in handy when looking at the Luyia economies in the second and third chapter of the study. Comparative dynamics considers the imposition of capitalist relations on a generalised pre-capitalist society with neither privatised capital nor wage purchasing classes (see Onimonde, 1985, 39).

Given that the pre-capitalist Luyia producers and labourers were still owning the means of production at the advent of colonial capitalism, this approach is useful in analysing the introduction of capitalist labour relations with the wage system, private ownership of land, contracts and their associated relations, which were previously absent in Buluyia, and assess their implications. As the social and economic ties of the natives had to be severed in the colonial situation, the government emerged as the direct agency for the diversion of resources (labour and land) from traditional activities (Luxembourg,



1951, 370-71).

Summarily our mode of analysis and historical interpretation in this study will be within defined approaches of the basic methodology of Marxist political economy which emerged principally through the writings of Marx and Engels during the era of classical political economy in the first half of the 19th Century. The material basis of the rise of the method of dialectical materialism was the emergence of Marxist political economy during the industrial revolution which generated corporate capitalism and the first industrial working class and its historic struggle against the emergent bourgeoisie or capitalists.

Dialectical materialism is a method which gives primacy to material conditions, particularly economic factors, in the explanation of social life (Ake, 1988, 1). Economic need is man's most fundamental need. Unless he is able to meet this need he cannot exist in the first place. Just as economic need is the primary need, so economic activity is man's primary activity. The primacy of work, that is economic productivity, is the corollary of the

primacy of economic need. Man is first and foremost a worker or a producer. Thus, the methodological implication of this in historical inquiry is that one must pay particular attention to the economic structure of society and indeed use it as the point of departure for studying other aspects of society (Ake, 1988, 1). Economic conditions in Buluyia and the rest of Kenya help us understand why the country was colonised, why certain types of colonial political systems were established and how the nationalist movement arose.

On the whole, our methodology emphasises the dynamic character of society. It is built on the basis of dialectic thinking and does not see society as static. On the contrary, it leads us into seeing Buluyia and the entire Kenyan periphery in terms of continuity and relatedness, a historical specificity that is full of dynamism normally provided by the contradictions which pervade existence. We have therefore forged a synthetic approach that is materialist in perspective but inter-disciplinary in orientation. This is because the connectedness of the economic structure, social structure, belief systems and political systems demands an inter-

disciplinary approach, that is, drawing on each of the specialised social science disciplines used for studying the various aspects of Buluyia and the Kenyan Society. It is our goal not to do this in a haphazard and eclectic manner.

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CHAPTER II

2.0 BULUYIA ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SYSTEMS UP TO 1894

2.1 The Political Economy Approach and the Study of Pre-Colonial Buluyia

The principal field of African history in which Marxist influence has been evident is the study of colonialism. This has been the trend since the 1970's when Marxist thought emerged as a significant force in the historiography of Africa. There are, however, signs of a developing second wave of Marxist influence concerned primarily with the analysis of the economic and social character of African societies during the pre-colonial period (Greene, 1983, 83). This genre of analysis focuses on class struggle and pays much attention to the identification of the mode of production or the social formation in terms of the manner in which labour and the products of labour are appropriated by persons in positions of authority. It also examines ideology as a system of thought that reinforces and reproduces a particular mode or the entire social formation (Greene, 1983, 84).

This chapter briefly examines the major

influx of population into Buluyia and analyses the political economies that emerged in the area as its most notable consequence. In this analysis we are concerned with the issue of social conflict within the pre-colonial Luyia societies and discuss this primarily in terms of exploitative relations within the societies and their concomitant ideological support systems. Thus, we examine to what extent the structural organization of Luyia societies allowed for conflicts to occur or crises to emerge while promoting the reproduction of the existing order. The crystallization of material realities and ideologies of equality into a structure of social classes is a complex and non-linear historical process (Jewsiewicki, 1981, 94).

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It is obvious that the political economies of pre-colonial Buluyia were influenced by the location and environment in which the societies existed. Indeed scholars have started to show great concern and interest in problems of the environment. This is because ecological exigencies have produced a heightened awareness of the role of the environment in the total development process. Thus, emphasis ought to be laid to the fact that the environmental management is a much a problem of political economy as it is of technological development (Richards, 1975).

The pre-colonial Buluyia political economies

and the then existent ideologies were certainly organized so as to reinforce and reproduce the various Luyia social formations. While we underscore the role of the environment in the evolution of Luyia societies, specific attention is paid to the concept of social reproduction, the process by which all the main production relations in the societies were constantly recreated and perpetuated (Young, 1981).

## 2.2 Early Migrations into Buluyia

The major difficulty in studying the Abaluyia is defining ~~just~~ who they are. They are about 18 sub-groups who until recently each considered itself relatively eutonomous with only a vague concept of unity with their immediate co-ethnic neighbours. They comprise the Abalogoli, Abatirichi, Abanyoole, Abashisa, Abatsotso, Abawanga, Abanyala, Abanyala, Ababukusu, Abatachani, Abamarachi, Abakhayo, Abaholo, Abasonga, Abasamia, Abamarama, Abedakho, Abakabras and Abesukha<sup>1</sup>. They were not a single unified population which moved from a distant region en

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1. Quite often the number of the sub-groups is listed as 17. But the Abaholo form the 18th sub-grouping.

masse. Rather they have emerged as a cultural entity through several centuries of assimilation and consolidation of peoples of diverse backgrounds (Were, 1967, 60), 2-4).

The present day Buluyia region which includes the area between Mt. Elgon locally called Masaba and Winam (Kavirondo) Gulf was before the last quarter of the 14th century inhabited by early Bantu groups such as Bahima and the Abanguili. However; between the last quarter of the 14th century and the beginning of the 18th century, large numbers of Bantu speakers migrated from areas further west into the region (Burt, 1980, 13). Thus, the Abaluyia as they are constituted today with their varying traditional and relations of production are essentially the results of those movements. Given that their social and economic practices varied from one sub-ethnic group to the other, although there were certain remarkable similarities among them, there is need to examine various Luyia pre-colonial economic practices and relations of production and note their internal division of labour in relation to the distribution of power and authority in demographic collectivities. These relations are considered from the point of view of ownership,

expropriation of value, and functions performed (Garchedi, 1975, 36).

The origins of the Abaluyia remain a myth although some writers contend that since the Abaluyia sub-ethnic groups have a common language and almost a common culture, they are therefore ethnically homogenous in origin (Mutooro, 1975/76, 4). According to Professor Ogot, all the seventeen sub-ethnic groups of the Abaluyia moved into their present country from Eastern Uganda<sup>2</sup> (Ogot, 1967, 137-140). However, the most comprehensive account of the peopling of Buluyia is given by Professor Were according to whom the earliest settlers were Abalogoli, Abanyoole and Abatirichi who inhabited the southern region of Buluyia about 1250 A.D. These pioneers were later joined by the Ababukusu, the Abasamia, the Abamarachi and the Abakhayo (Were, 1967, 59).

Apparently, between the 13th and 18th Centuries, Eastern Uganda and parts of Western Kenya

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2. Ogot's categorization of the Luyia excludes the Abaholo who presently are in Nyanza and are virtually Luonised. They were transferred to Central Nyanza in 1963 after they had hitherto been administered from North Nyanza.



were gradually being occupied by groups of present day Bantu, Kalenjin and Luo inhabitants. Accordingly all these demographic influxes contributed to the emergence of an over-arching pattern of complex migrational movements and the amalgamation of all sorts of linguistic groups in the region. The linguistic character and the configuration of settlements of various demographic polities in Buluyia may be seen as an inevitable outcome of this historical process.

The Buluyia region in the second half of the 19th century consisted of several independent sub-tribal groupings each having its own institutions for settling domestic as well as external problems (Motooro, 1975/76, 4). Although they had a common language and a common culture, they did not have one name for themselves. They were given the name Bantu of North Kavirondo by the Europeans, with the establishment of colonial rule. The European administrators adopted the name when they realised their common background and the unifying possibilities of their language (Osogo, 1966, 8).

The term Abaluyia has been in use only since the 1930's to suggest a unified grouping of related

communities. After the Second World War, the name became popular locally. Translated, it means "people of the same fire" and today its use is universal (Osogo, 1966, 4-5).

The Abaluyia of northern Buluyia were Kalenjin in origin. Kalenjin speakers who migrated to the Mt. Elgon area from Lake Turkana area were bantuised by the first quarter of the 19th century (Were, 1972, 187). These were Abatachoni of Ndivisi, Trans-Nzoia part of Bukusuland and Kabras areas, the Abashieni of South Marama and some of the earliest clans of Wanga who when they became bantuised, they lost their original identity. Those who were not bantuised like the Bongomek, Bok and Kony of Elgon district retained their language and culture (Were, 1967, 61).

The Southern Luyia were immigrants from eastern and south-eastern Uganda who moved into the region in waves, the earliest having been about 1250 A.D. However, more migrants moved into the area between 1600 and 1750. By 1700 other Bantu speakers like the Gusii, the Kuria and the Abasuba split off from the Luyia migrants while the small groups of

earlier Bantu and Kalenjin speakers were absorbed by the massive migration of eastern Ugandan Bantu whose languages, social institutions and cultural practices were largely to define the emergence of the Abaluyia (Burt, 1980, 16). Of this emergent southern Bantu cluster, the Tiriki originated as an amalgamation of Bantu and Kalenjin speaking peoples about 1700. The Bantu who had entered Western Kenya from Busoga united with the Terik, Kalenjin speakers, and became the Tiriki in Central Nyanza before 1700. The group then later moved into their present location in Western province under pressure from the invading Luo. The pastoralist Terik in the merger adopted the Bantu language and became involved in agriculture. Nevertheless, they retained Terik circumcision practices and age-group organization. Their name Terik was modified to become Abatirichi (Kay, 1973, 24).

Maasai migrants joined the Bantu in the interlacustrine region between 1570 and 1650 from the east. They quickly became assimilated. In some areas particularly in Idakho and Kisa, they became the ruling clan. The Abedakho were the result of a union of Bantu and Maasai groups, a fusion which led

to the foundation of the Abashimoli clan. It grew to be the largest clan and emerged as the leader of the Abedakho clans. Other clans followed with additional Bantu migrants from the west. The Abesukha also fused with Maasai migrants from the East. Here they intermingled with migrants from both north and west and raised new descent groups (Kay, 1973, 29-30).

Although the Maasai element became the ruling clan in both Idakho and Kisa areas as noted, this could be said to be true of the Abashisa groups of the area. The western part of Kisa was occupied by new waves of Abasamia migrants which led to the settlement of Samia clans<sup>3</sup>. Between 1706 and 1773, the southern and parts of the northern half of Buluyia had already been settled by various groups of the people that were to form Abaluyia (Were, 1967, 61).

Most of the earliest ancestors of the Abaluyia in the northern and parts of Central Buluyia were also of Kalenjin and Bahima origins. The

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3. Busamia clans migrated to elsewhere in Buluyia especially in Bunyore, Idakho and Maragoli about 6 generations ago. They were mostly iron working clans vanously called Abaruli or Abatuli.

Kalenjin groups who settled in these regions between the 15th and 17th centuries were bantuised. The ancestors of the Abashieni who along with other Kalenjin groups such as the Abatachoni and some early clans of Wanga entered the northern and Central Buluyia between the 16th and 17th centuries had originated in the Mt. Elgon area. They were originally pastoralists but they eventually settled to agriculture. Some of these Kalenjin immigrants reached Bukhayo, Marachi and Bunyala areas where they were bantuised by pioneer Bantu settlers such as the Abasamia, Abasonga, Abamarachi and Abakhayo. Between 1760 and 1941, the last Ababukusu clans and Abanyala moved into the northern half from Bugisu and Eastern Uganda due to attacks by the Karamoja, the Maasai from Uasin Gishu, the Kalenjin and later the Teso. Thus, they joined the Abakhayo, Abamarachi, and earlier Abanyala who were of Kalenjin and Bahima origins but had been bantuised (Were, 1967, 61-64).

However, we should note that although the Abaluyia are an amalgam of all sorts, a hybrid community, by the beginning of the 18th century the majority of the present day clans and sub-ethnic groups had been founded. Although they had already

settled in their respective areas by this period, these settlements were somewhat disturbed by subsequent migrations of other linguistics groups. Luo migrants of the late 18th century pushed some of them off lands close to Lake Victoria and caused internal minor migrations among the Abaluyia sub-ethnic groups. But the Luo who settled in Samia, Bunyala and Busonga were assimilated (Were, 1967, 191)<sup>4</sup>.

Moreover, Teso movements from eastern Uganda during most of the 18th century pushed some Luyia speakers and dispersed them to many areas of Buluyia such as Bukusu, Samia, Bukhayo and others.

Nevertheless, by 1850 the Abaluyia had emerged as a people sharing closely related dialects and many cultural features (Were, 1967, 191).

Since distinctive features of Luyia societies had emerged by the middle of the 19th century, the period then forms an important watershed in the history of the Abaluyia. A

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4. Just as much as Luo groups were assimilated, Luyia groups in Buholo were luonised.

complex process of movement, adaptation and assimilation of diverse Bantu, Nilotic and Kalenjin cultures over the years had by the middle of the 19th century resulted into the emergence of political economies that were distinct from those of their neighbours. The advent of colonialism undermined these economies as the pattern of their articulation with the emergent capitalist mode of production was characterized by the interests and requisites of the colonial political economy.

### 2.3 The Political Economies of pre-Colonial Buluyia

There was lack of unity and a single central authority among the Abaluyia except for the Wanga. This was due to the heterogenous background of various clans and sub-ethnic groups. Because of this heterogeneity in origin, some Luyia sub-ethnic groups formed loose centralised states headed by respected elders. Each leader was variously called omwami, Omukasa, omukali, owengoma etc. He was assisted by a council of respected elders chosen from every clan or leading families to form omuse (Kumuse) or Eshina (Sisina) which in literal translation means court.

Its duty was to settle among other issues, clan disputes (Were, 1972, 189). This was true of the Ababukusu, the Abatachoni and the Abakabras who during the 18th century and particularly the 19th century began to organize themselves into larger political and social groupings (Burt, 1980, 26).

Among all the Abaluyia including the wanga, the clan was the central social arena where individual roles, groups, status acquisition, corporate action, religious and political authority were carried out (Sakwa - Msake 197, 8). Although Wanga kingdom was centralised, in practice it was a clan government whose presence was persistently felt and submitted to. Even here each clan was headed by a Liguru. However, among the Abatirichi, although the age-sets organised on the basis of initiation groups, were of primary importance to all major kinds of social activity, the clan still retained an important role in the community as it served as the basis for family and lineage relations (Kay, 1973, 25-26). Age-set activities were conducted on a regional (Lusomo) rather than clan basis. Initiation through circumcision gave all the Abatirichi a sense of brotherhood as the loyalties generated by the common initiation served as the basis



of co-operation among the Tsisomo (Sangree, 1966, 6).

The Abatirichi agreed on a uniform period of time to hold circumcision throughout the country and organized joint raids against common enemies while other Luyia sub-ethnic groups performed these functions on the basis of individual clans (Kay, 1973, 26). However, like the rest of the Luyia, myths and clan exogamy strengthened clan identity. Similarly, religious matters such as prosperity and social well-being of individuals was closely connected to favourable treatment by the spirits of their agnastic ancestors. Thus, throughout Buluyia the spirits of the ancestors were beseeched for assistance at homestead shrines called Tsisambwa<sup>5</sup> (Sangree, 1966, 4-5).

Tsisambwa were among other rituals which the Abaluyia practised such as rainmaking, divination etc. Around these emerged sacrificial

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5. It was this traditional practise which Elijah Masinde was to revive among the Luyia in the form of Dini Ya Msambwa as an opposition to European rule and Christianity. He enlisted followers from among the Bukusu, Kabras, Tachoni, and to a small extent Kisa and Batsotso.

priests who exercised considerable authority. But although they enjoyed high social status, and by virtue of their roles acquired great wealth, these attributes did not translate into political power. Their authority was limited to their particular domain and did not extend to matters outside their competence (Bode, 1978, 38). The formation of elders was a potential embryo of class (See Jewsiewicki, 1981, 97).

Although it is often said that the Wanga were the only Luyia sub-ethnic group which was united under a single political leader, it would be erroneous to term the rest of the Luyia groups as acephalous peoples simply because political authority was not as formalised, differentiated or centralised like the Wanga Kingdom. While it is true that authority in many areas was diffused through the social structure, it is also true that even single clans had their social and political head called Liguru. He presided over elders councils which made important decisions, settled disputes and were organized on the basis of lineage or clan. In essence, these were loosely organised states as they had territorially defined areas, had recognised leaders and had established machineries of dealing with everyday challenges within their demographic collectivities (Were, 1972, 192). The type of

government may be described as somewhat gerontocratic since the basis of influence was age and social relationships generally subordinated the young to the old, whether it was within the family or within the clan elders or warriors.

The Luyia forms of political and social control revolved around the clans variously called Tsimbia or Edzimbia. This were territorially exogamous groups which traced their descent patrilineally from common ancestors who had given them their names (Berg - Schlosser, 1979, 229). There was no regularised method of selection of clan heads but status and prestige and factors all difficult to measure were the criteria for leadership positions. However, the possibility of outstanding status was certainly inherited. In all but exceptional cases, an important clan elder came from a powerful and prestigious lineage. Quite often, sons of previous outstanding men benefitted most (Were, 1972, 192). But the position was not institutionalised and there was no formal installation ceremony or symbolic garb although like the Wanga chief, clan leaders wore a metal ivory bracelet as a sign of their position (Bode, 1978, 44). Nevertheless, the power of clan leaders rested on

kinship ties and they acted as representatives, spokesmen and negotiators for their families (Seitz, 1978, 9). Evidently, the dominant ideology was the lineage ideology based on the notion of seniority within kinship ties which gave 'natural' form to the relations of production and reproduction.

From time to time military alliances developed out of convenience among two or more sub-ethnic groups for defence against a common enemy. However, such efforts were informal in nature and usually temporary and did not demand loyalty from the individual to an entity beyond his or her immediate sub-ethnic group. In some cases especially in the northern Luyia the sub-ethnic group was the largest political unit where a rule of law operated (Osogo, 1970, 34). But the social and political organization around the clan or the sub-ethnic group was challenged in the central Luyia sub-ethnic groups by the rise and expansionist bids of a royal immigrant clan among the Wanga headed by Nabongo (King). Through alliance and warfare the Nabongo monarchs sought to expand Wanga influence especially during the 19th century but did not completely bring the affected Luyia polities such as Bukusu, Kabras, Bunyala, Marachi etc. under their own institutions for settling their domestic as well as external problems. Indeed, Paul Ogula aptly noted that the so called Wanga Empire was just one of

these independent groupings and none of these "sub-tribes" acknowledged the Abawanga as their superiors before or even after the coming of the Europeans (Ogula, 1971).

The origins of the Wanga kingdom go back to the beginning of the 17th century when according to oral tradition, a leading clan of the Abatirichi called Abalukhoba settled at Mumias and subdued the Abamuima to their rule. They founded the new dynasty of the Abashitsetse. Wanga, a representative of the clan established a hereditary monarchy based on Nabongo as the kingship. In the 19th century, this state employed Uasin Gishu Maasai as warriors of Nabongo and at a later stage purchased fire-arms from caravans of Arabs and Swahili traders (Berg-Schlosser, 1979, 236). The last Wanga king was Mumia who welcomed the British and at whose court they established their first provincial headquarters in 1894. In the same year, the whole of Western Kenya became part of the British East African protectorate over Uganda (Dealing, 1974).

Despite the loose form of political organization in most of Buluyia it is possible to

discern the dichotomisation of various Luyia polities such as that between the rulers and the ruled on whose basis one may analyse the various pre-colonial Luyia social formations. However, elements of class differentiation were still very latent although they existed in the framework of social relations embodied in the traditional modes of production within which the social interests of the Luyia citizenry were either amicably or antagonistically located. From our description we may deduce that the Luyia religious concept of Tsisambwa which underscored the primacy of ancestor spirits in the prosperity and well-being of individuals, families or even villages reinforced the domination of the elders over the young generation. Similarly religious beliefs revolving around ornamentation, production of certain crafts, warfare and death were instruments of control which fostered conditions of continuity. No wonder specialised activities were controlled through a system of rules and regulations that were spiritually sanctioned. These rules included the determination of eligibility for apprenticeship, distribution of practitioners, ritual and personal behaviour (Burt, 1980, 37). Apparently, the elders monopolised functional roles in divination, ritual priesthood and ancestor worship by virtue of

their alleged closeness to the spirits. Hence the elders especially those in positions of leadership subordinated the young to the old whether it was within the family or within the groupings of clan elders and warriors. Moreover, they were thought to have a powerful curse (Bode, 1978, 41).

But some elders had more influence than others. Among these highly rated men, one usually achieved pre-eminence and was acknowledged to be the clan leader. Influence flowed from a number of sources. One important factor was age but the others required reputation as warriors, (war leaders commanding respect among the new generation of warriors) and through the accumulation of wealth. A wealthy man could afford to entertain people as they should be entertained. He was also able to build up a following by aiding his poor kinsmen. The poor sought help from the rich by providing some labour but gave them public support in return (Bode, 1978, 42-43). Notably, surplus was given to the elders for motives which were not economic. Rights of appropriating surplus followed rules of kinship not residence.

The ideology reflected in the foregoing patterns of thought and practices helped to reinforce and reproduce the entire social formation of pre-colonial Buluyia. However, it should be noted

that the conflicts which were inherent in these social and political inter-relationships were minimised by the concomitant ideological support systems. The most outstanding of these was the belief in the benevolence of the ancestral spirits. Moreover, the people adhered to the strict observation of precedent in elders adjudicating in local moots. This way, the Luyia societies, who claimed that there was egalitarianism in their practices of government represented in their ad hoc meetings or elders' councils' deliberations, and that on the basis of open participation in the decisions agreed upon, disputes were settled, did not allow for virulent conflicts to occur or crises to emerge (Angolo, O.I. 1987). The structural organization promoted the reproduction of the existing order since political power was inextricably bound up with the social and religious authority as reflected in the open ad hoc meetings hitherto noted. Influence in this structural organization was embedded in the social structure which closely followed the outlines of the kinship ties. In an attempt to arrest the formation of other classes the dominant groups in these lineage societies made use of the tool of the ideology of kinship ties.

There existed a structural relationships between the political and economic systems, a



relationship that reinforced and reproduced the existence of social groups which could be termed as the rulers and the ruled, the privileged and non-privileged. This dichotomy can be seen, in part, in the ways in which labour and the products of labour circulated in Buluyia. The omwami received payment, usually in kind i.e meat, grain, beer and so forth. He settled cases and received fees (Were, 1972, 192). This exhibited mechanisms of tribute paying in the economies. Nevertheless, relations of production were based on kinship ties and since early planting and weeding required additional labour, apart from the Luyia kinsmen offering help to the omwami or an influential wealthy elder in return for public favours, cultivating on a kinsman's land, sending a child to assist a kinsman, asking for food aid etc. involved reciprocal rights and duties within offinal ancestry. The ideology of kinship was attached to the political control of territory of which the perpetual 'property' was symbolically held by the ancestors, and in reality by their representative, the elders (See Jewsiewicki, 1981, 94).

Given the above patterns of social relationships, the omwami and the clan elders who were appointed on the basis of influence, wisdom and impartiality to take charge of the affairs of the clan could hardly rise above local jealousies, rivalries and the attendant forms of favouritism.

Their dispensation with justice, accruing from the elders jurisprudence during the interpretation of customary law over land disputes, inheritance, the settlement of criminal and civil cases, reflected patterns of reciprocal relations within kinship affinities or other social and economic ties. Thus, at this level, the clan leadership bore the preponderance of structuring of Buluyia social life and in setting patterns of political action. From the look of things, however Luyia pre-colonial economies were basically peasant.

We have hitherto stated that the pre-colonial Buluyia political economies and the prevailing ideology were as explained organized so as to reinforce and reproduce these social formations and therefore shipwrecked the crystallization of social conflict in Buluyia societies. Nevertheless, the internal political class struggle decided the fate of the dissatisfied elements in these societies. Given that the class of the wealthy peasantry and their domineering rulers reproduced themselves and hindered prospects of social ascendancy among the the non-privileged through the society's orthodox mechanisms of government and social control,

disgruntled elements in these societies demonstrated the existent conflict of interests by opting for outward migration, usually of small affinal groups. Understandably in general recognition of the prevalence and inevitability of these social conflicts, throughout Buluyia, clans accepted the settlement amidst them of immigrant alien groups as Abamenya<sup>6</sup>. These were given rights to land if they met their obligations to their new hosts. This feature was characteristic of Abanyoole, Abashisa and the Abamarama (Lohrentz, 1977, 30).

Among many Luyia groups, the clan exercised authority over territory although people of different origins may have resided in the same area as indigenes or the Abamenya. The favourable physical environment had enabled the Abaluyia to develop a highly productive agricultural system. We have heretofore shown that even the pastoralist Kalenjin

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6. Probably this was the equivalent of a hoi among the Kikuyu, jodak among the Luo and squatters in the colonial political economy.

and Maasai who were bantuised in the area settled down to agriculture. The landscape was humanised with crops grown each year in most areas especially the season called Erotso (long-rains season). Crops grown during this periods were mostly millet, finger millet, sorghum and pulses. The other crops were grown during the season called Eshubwe or Murumbi (short-rains season). During this period sweet potatoes, beans pulses and various greens were grown (Kay, 1973, 27). Bananas were grown throughout the year (Bode, 1978, 17). The elastic kinship system of the extended family guaranteed redistribution of foodstuffs during periods of acute shortage.

Once land was under cultivation, the clan leader had no control over it whatsoever. Any clansman had a right to cultivate there. However, the clan leader with the approval of the clan elder could summon clansmen to clear uncultivated land to meet the threat of famine. He could with similar approval forbid clansmen from cultivating a certain piece of land on the fringes of a common clan land (Bode, 1978, 45). This was the practice among the Abalogoli, Abanyoole, Abedakho, Abesukha, Abakabras,

Abatsotso, Abashisa, Ababukusu, Abatirichi, Abanyala, Abakhayo, Abamarama and Abasamia. The Abashisa, Abedakho, Abesukha practised this in their respective areas where they lived since the 16th century. The Abalogoli established this economic practice in the area by the 18th century (Bode, 1978, 13).

Most Luyia families lived within the territories of their respective clans. Settlement patterns of the sub-ethnic groups and their homesteads were scattered across the landscape rather than in clustered villages. However, the Abesukha, the Abatachoni, the Ababukusu and the Abawanga built elaborate forts against Nandi and Maasai raids. These forts among the Ababukusu and the Abawanga broke up in the late 19th century with the dispersal of groups which eventually lost their territorial identity (De Wolof, 1971, 47-51).

The pre-colonial system of land tenure among the Abaluyia in a number of aspects resembled that of other Kenyan agricultural ethnic groups. But it also shows some deviations parallel to some of the differences in the social structure and kinship system. The basic land holding unit of the people was the

extended family consisting of the grandparents, the married sons and their families and their unmarried children (Berg - Schlosser, 1979, 224). It was essentially within these nucleated establishments that affinal reciprocal rights and duties were dispensed with and therefore ethnic consciousness at this level was not just an epiphenomena of the economy or the village state, it was real, a social determinant for the prevailing ideologies, collective cognitions and political life.

Rights of ownership were established either by inheritance of ancestral lands cultivated by one's grandparents or by clearing and cultivating a portion of virgin bushland called Oluangereka or Omutsuru (Wagner, Vol. 2, 1970). In addition to these lands utilised under the control of the clan head, a section of this land served as a communal grazing land for all members of the clan. The Abaluyia were basically a peasant community. As agriculturalists primarily, the role of cattle was not as important as among their neighbours, the Luo, except for the Bukusu. They played a significant role in the payment of bridewealth and feasts. They also kept goats and sheep and these were herded by boys.

Livestock was an indication of wealth and was therefore an important part of the traditional exchange economy (Seitz, 1978, 25).

The Buluyia pre-colonial economies were mainly designed to support a subsistence existence. There was little incentive to produce surplus. Nevertheless, there existed an appreciable amount of trade among themselves as conditions allowed. Mathias Ogutu notes that among the Abalagoli before the coming of the British, the individual Africans on their own initiative and enterprise organised inter-tribal trade at a time when colonialism had not been established. This system of exchange was based on barter (Ogutu, 1979, 216).

The traditional market areas were not established institutions but were irregular arrangements. They fluctuated in importance with seasons. However, they were most significant during famines. Indeed certain accessible areas became common ground for those desiring exchanges (Seitz, 1978, 27). Although by and large, each individual family was self-sufficient in producing most of its needs, specialization in production and the division

of labour militated for exchanges at the local and regional level. Unlike the Abawanga who had been touched by the expansion of caravan trade, the Abasukha, Abedakho, Abalogoli of Southern Buluyia etc. were merely involved in these local exchanges (Bode, 1978, 48). Towards the Ugandan border, the Abasamia, Abamarachi, Abasonga and Abanyala were involved in local trade exchanges. Samia trade markets such as Jamondo in Bulemia, Nanganda near Sio Port, and a Bunyala market at Mwayo attracted traders from other parts of Buluyia and even Buganda. The Baganda brought several varieties of bananas and different species of fish in exchange for the locally produced millet, potatoes, baskets or the highly priced Samia produced iron implements. The iron products of the Abasamia such as jembes and spears were so much greatly in demand that they were highly sought after. Consequently, their blacksmiths were known throughout Western Kenya. Utilising iron ore from deposits from Samia hills, the earliest Abasamia clans such as Abadebu and Abamanya are remembered to have practised iron smithery at their time of settlement from Uganda<sup>7</sup> (See Seitz, 1978, 29).

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7. During the collection of oral data this researcher was shown slabs of iron ore in some of the Samia hills attesting to the intensity of traditional iron industry in the area prior to colonialism.



Until the early 20th century, iron working was probably the most important productive industry from an economic point of view. The smith was usually one of the wealthiest individuals in the community. To be an iron-worker held many advantages for both the individual and the entire community. It was restricted by heredity and the knowledge was jealously guarded. Consequently, iron workers needed not fear great competition (Makokha, O.I., 1987). They produced their own tools and implements and were self-sufficient since their wives worked on the farms in accordance with the society's pre-colonial sexual division of labour (See Burt, 1980, 70).

Pre-colonial Luyia production and exchange also involved pottery, wood items, and basketry. Potters were specialised producers whose technological skill and necessary role was recognised by all Luyia societies. The specialization in pottery manufacture is as old as their history in the interlacustaine region. In Buluyia, the sex of the pottery specialists varied from one sub-ethnic group to the other. However among the Southern Luyia groups including the Abalogoli, Abashisa, Abanyoole, Abedakho and Abatirichi, potters were women (Osogo,

O.I., 1988). Similarly, pottery remained the preserve of women among the Abasamia, Abanyala and Abakhayo (Ngumo, O.I., 1987). But among the Abamarama, Abawanga and Abesukha, it was an occupation of the men, (Angolo, O.I., 1987). Unlike the foregoing two groups pottery among the Abatsotso, Abakabras, and Ababukusu was practised by both women and men (Burt, 1981, 98).

Woodcarvers produced utilitarian products and therefore their wares were central to the Luyia life-style. Seats, stools, mortars, pestles, milking jugs etc were manufactured in accordance to their social demand. In the 19th century, wood carving was a full-fledged occupation for the producers and so was basketry (Burt, 1981, 199). Therefore towards the end of the 19th century, these specialised activities were a great source of wealth, and they stimulated the local exchange... Thus, the Buluyia pre-colonial production and exchange were subsistence oriented. Nevertheless, there is remarkably little evidence to suggest that the local trade from village to village within Luyia geographical regions was restricted to local products. Clearly the commodities of exchange are an unreliable index for assessing the significance of pre-colonial

Luyia trade, its extent and for identifying the communities which were involved. It is possible more people and items were involved but the retrieval of these details has been made difficult by the subsequent minor migrations within the Buluyia area, a factor which has contributed to the juxtaposition of societies and historical traditions and reminiscences.

None-the-less, pre-colonial Buluyia subsistence oriented trade remained closely associated with subsistence agricultural production and pastoral commodities. It was subservient to the local kinship system and although the diverse challenges of social and economic questions of the time militated for the establishment of decentralised clan leaderships than just family patriarchs, these leaders did not interfere nor stifle Buluyia local exchange relations (Ngumo, O.I., 1987). However, it would appear that the mode and extent of the exchange made little impact on the subsistence economy as it did not generate a wide range of activities divorced from supplying the basic needs of Buluyia subsistence agriculture and pastoralism. Although the internal dynamic of division of labour and specialization was evident as demonstrated

in various productive roles, the impulse towards innovation and economic specialization was suppressed and shackled by the restrictions and prohibitions imposed on some of these productive roles. This explains why classes in pre-colonial Buluyia were not sharply differentiated. After all, the accumulation of property was essentially social and not economic although all people strove towards survival and affluence.

While cattle in pre-colonial Buluyia was a significant index of measuring the prosperity and bridewealth of Luyia homesteads, subsistence exchange activities also included pastoral products. The pre-colonial Luyia communities practised agro-pastoral production. In agro-pastoral production, cropping is usually the basic activity with surplus produce invested in cattle (Evangelou, 1984, 25). Pastoralism involves the subsistence oriented management of livestock grazing a natural resource base. It is an appropriate mode of production with pastoralists dependent upon the products of their livestock such as milk, meat and fat. Although the pre-colonial Luyia utilised these pastoral items there was no single Luyia community which practiced

exclusive pastoralism although the Bukusu and the Wanga domesticated more livestock than their southern, and south-western neighbours (Shipiri, O.I., 1987).

Livestock was an asset and Luyia clan organization provided safeguarding of natural grasslands and the primacy of livestock accumulation. Production was governed by private ownership of livestock and common access to the resource base (See Berg-Schlosser, 1979, 229-230). However, there was a distinction between product appropriation and command over resource use. All Luyia groups had a unlimited access to communal resources without limitation on livestock number or on timing. This clear dichotomy, between political control of common grazing lands and the social freedom of livestock appropriation, exploitation or exchange gave room for the division of labour and specialization to define roles in the local exchanges among most of the Luyia sub-ethnic groups. The man looked after cattle and other livestock and were responsible for all kinds of transactions concerning the transfer of livestock in kinship relations or other forms of exchange (See Berg - Schlosser, 1979-227).

The Luyia peoples were already agro-pastoralists by the period they emerged as a cultural and linguistic group in the interlacustrine region between the 18th and the 19th centuries. Whereas the earliest Bantu speaking people in the area had practised agro-pastoralism between 400 A.D. and 1500 A.D., the assimilation into Bantu societies of populations of several parts of the Kalenjin, Maasai and other stock meant the spread of a change in primary social value. Apart from the influence in adopting agricultural practices, the first loyalty for an individual became his territorially based kinship group than agemates (See Ehret, 1976, 16).

But pre-colonial Luyia exchange activities did not remain at the subsistence level. Coastal traders appear to have reached the region in the 1850's. By the 1870's there was an already developed trade in ivory. This trade lasted well into the 1890's but it had little impact on Central and Southern Abesukha, Abedakho and Abalogoli etc. Whereas there was some hunting in the area of present day Kakamega Forest and by 1896, there was a small depot for collecting tusks in the region, most of the hunting was done in the north east of Mt. Elgon while the

Centre of ivory was at Mumias. The Wanga Chiefdom offered food and porters as well as support against raids by other Luyia groups on caravans (Bode, 1971, 51-52).

The activities of the Araba and Swahili traders also intensified inter-communal wars. The first Swahili caravan to reach Lake Victoria via Maasailand had arrived in 1857 and although the new traders initially concentrated on the ivory trade, they later turned to slave raiding as a profitable sideline (Ogot, 1967, 231). However, the slave raids turned out to be disastrous to the northern Luyia sub-ethnic groups. Prior to the arrival of Arab and Swahili traders in Western Kenya, the relationship between sub-ethnic groups was that of equals and on occasions there could develop hostilities generated from local jealousies such as a sub-ethnic group having more herds of cattle and better grazing and farming grounds than the others. These hostilities of course ended up in raids and counter-raids between the Luyia sub-groups themselves or between one or more Luyia sub-group against their Nandi, Iteso or Luo neighbours (Mutooro, 1975/76, 5).

The slave traders found the Wanga Chief

Shiundu and later his son Mumia and his people very hospitable and as a result they established their headquarters amongst these Wanga friends at Mumias. From here, they went plundering the region as far as Samia to the South-west and Bukusu to the North. Thousands of men and women were killed while small boys and girls were captured as slaves (Were, 1967, 144-145).

The Wanga kingdom which had expansionist tendencies was generally weak without external assistance. It was faced with population pressures from the Nandi, the Ababukusu, Luo and Iteso. Therefore caught up in a spate of protracted and bitter struggles against these groups, it developed powerful allies in the Maasai, the Arabs and Swahili. The Uasin Gishu Maasai had established several settlements in Wanga after their defeat by the Laikipia Maasai in the 1870's. They hired themselves out to the Wanga Monarchs as mercenaries in various inter-ethnic clashes. Consequently, they amassed considerable wealth in livestock (Ogot, 1967, 231). They together with the Arabs and the Swahili raided the Abanyala, Abasamia and Ababukusu among the Luyia and therefore the Abawanga ruling clan earned itself



the hatred of her neighbours and even of Wanga families who had fallen victim to the trade (Mutooro, 1975/76, 6).

Despite the hatred which Maasai, Arab and Swahili activities in the area earned the Wanga, using diplomacy the Wanga Monarchs made military pacts with the Abatsotso, Abamarama and Abashisa for most of the 18th and 19th centuries. These pacts were maintained by inter-marriages. Friendly visits were also paid by their leaders to Itookho, the Wanga kings' court (Sakwa - M'sake, 1971, 16).

Apart from this trade which Wanga rulers monopolised through their association with the Arabs and the Swahili at Mumias whereby their caravans stopped enroute to Uganda, and which also served as a collection centre for ivory and slaves (See Memon, 1972, 140), there existed an inter-regional trade independent of this network as hitherto demonstrated. Nevertheless, the latter trade was subsistence oriented unlike the market-oriented Arab-Swahili caravan trade which began to create a number of far reaching economic innovations directly dependent on commercial opportunities. It generated new forms of

wealth among the ruling clique in the Wanga kingdom as human commodities and ivory began to acquire new economic values which they did not possess in the subsistence economy. Mumias took on a new significance as a market place handling exchange of human commodities, ivory with numerous luxury items such as cloth, beads, guns, salt and blankets brought from the coast by the caravans (Dealing, 1974, 549). Through service as porters and through exchange of goods, the market - oriented trade involved the adoption of new means of capital accumulation and the creation of new fields of consumer demand for imports. This way exotic luxury items acquired in the trade were carefully assimilated into the category of the ruling circles and circulated within the royalty in contrast to the subsistence foodstuffs which had been distributed to the entire Buluyia social formation in the subsistence oriented trade.

#### 2.4 The Environment and Social - Political Economies in Buluyia

The historical reality of pre-colonial Buluyia does not only fit in a one-sided and

exclusive discussion of modes of production and class relations without relating them to the interaction between stated demographics and their natural environmental conditions. This kind of approach would make us appreciate how the Abaluyia harnessed the resources of the environment and responded to the challenges and options rendered by it. The environment therefore is understandably the inescapable resource against which material productive forces are pitted and its importance has not been left out of the locus of historical materialism. Marxist political economy as an approach within historical materialism differs from classical political economy in that it seeks to understand the processes of production and reproduction not only in the sphere of the production of commodities but in the totality of the labour process, the production of life of consciousness, of ideas of religion, politics, the state and the material conditions of society (See Campbell, 1985, 8).

We must recognise that ecology as a factor is primal in all forms of human development as it largely determines the means of production, mode of production and even factors of production. The

ecological theory correctly suggests that the environmental limitations determine production (Bowles, 1979, 196). Thus, the dynamics of pre-colonial Buluyia social-political economies will be explained in terms of interrelationship with the ecology, access to the resources it bequeathed upon the society and the evident patterns of social practices in the normative structure of relations in the area. The Luyia farmer like other pre-colonial farmers and pastoralists demonstrated an energetic resourcefulness in meeting environmental pressures that threatened his security and at times his survival. Thus, as elsewhere in Africa where man strove toward affluence, organizing his activities in response to this basic thrust within the restraints of environmental limitations, the Luyia societies developed social and political institutions that were therefore in part attempts to ensure some sort of orderly process for the production, distribution and consumption of life's necessities. In sum, the environment dictated the means of production, the mode of production and even the factors of production which in themselves constituted the Buluyia pre-colonial material realities upon which various forms of consciousness developed and grew.

Seen in this light, environmental problems are ponderables which ought to set historians thinking in their analysis of localised societal characteristics that have evolved from age-old interactions with their ecologies.

The resourcefulness and exigencies of the environment in pre-colonial Africa acted upon by people's potential intelligence stimulated societal adaptation and inventiveness. This in turn characterised the growth of the African economies and the evolution of concepts based on their self-consciousness. It was within this perception that Marx stated that in the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite state of development of their material productive forces. Consequently, he concluded that the sum total of these relations constitute the economic structure of society, their real foundation, on which rises a legal superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of consciousness. This marxian formulation is significant because it summarised the principal theoretical construct which

formed the basis of the scientific method of historical materialism (Campbell, 1985, 8). According to this rich formulation, issues pertaining to the environment and its role in human development are not repugnant to the scientific method of political economy since legal relations as well as forms of state have their roots in the material conditions of life of which ecology is a preponderant index.

If therefore the environment as we have shown determined the means, mode and factors of production, we would therefore agree with Amílcar Cabral that the level of productive forces is the essential determinant of the content and form of class struggle (See Chabal, 1983, 170). Our acceptance of this theoretical proposition is premised on the understanding that the adoption of a mode of production and the development of productive forces are inevitable responses, adaptations and manipulations of ecological conditions. But we would disagree with Cabral in his proposition that at the rudimentary level of production whereby the mode of production corresponds to a low level of productive forces, private appropriation of the means of production does not exist and so there are no classes nor class struggle. Cabral would like us to

assume that class struggles were non-existent in pre-colonial Africa probably because there were no strikes, riots or even revolts. But perhaps we need to emphasize that the concept of struggle connotes also the daily struggles over the details in the workplace, market place and even residence (Cooper, 1983, 10).

There have always been social conflicts and competitiveness over resources even over simple appropriation of nature's products which involved little or no labour throughout human history. This is true of the pre-feudal communal agricultural and cattle raising societies in which the social structure was purportedly horizontal and stateless. But what historians have failed to grapple with are questions of the degree of self-interest and personal gain during these times. Observably, the motive of personal gain was stronger than has been perceived by the likes of Cabral and the accumulation of capital was social not economic. Thus, property played an important role in the achievement of influence and authority. However, it is true that the subsistence economies at this level had minimal political or social differentiation (See July, 1975, 111-112).

But it is also equally true that the environmental resources in pre-colonial Africa even at this stage of communal agriculture and pastoralism had become a kind of tangible census, a convenient means for identifying individuals and families, defining their social or political importance and relating them to each other and to the whole society. The essential feature of this pattern in which resources were appropriated is land, the most readily apparent manifestation of social organization. These resources and their utility created a degree of labour division allowing certain members to occupy themselves with politics, craft production and later, trade. This class lines developed along with aspirations towards improving individual status, power and prestige which became linked with accumulation of wealth (See July, 1975, 112). The production of a specific culture is a dialectical process of assimilation, rejection and adaptation of the ideological principles of the dominant mode of production, of cultural heritages and of innovations (Jewsiewicki, 1981, 94).

If division of labour gave rise to the formation of professional groups of all kinds which in their turn created classes and that these classes consequently nurtured interests which were in conflict with those of other classes unleashing a tempo of constant competition (See Fischer, 1973, 62-63), then communal Africa had classes characterised by early



modes of production and their attendant social accumulation of property. We may describe these classes as traditional classes since they were products of the dynamics of the traditional lineage based economy, moulded and adopted on the basis of problems and providence of the pre-colonial African environment. Given the multiplicity of pre-colonial modes of production and the complexity of the forms of capitalist development and given the theoretical difficulties one encounters in extrapolation based on a specific empirical case, to understand and describe classes generated by capitalism, one must analyse the ancient social forms (See Copans, 1985, 27). This is necessary because capitalist history in Africa and specifically Kenya is so recent that debates pertain to the very existence of new relations of production and therefore classes.

In the preceding section, we have demonstrated that pre-colonial Buluya political economies were reproduced through a process of a structural replication embedded in the agnatic ideology of clan based gerontocracy, religious beliefs and practices. Without drawing into details of how ties of

patrification and matrification within kinship relations affected the process of structural entrenchment of authority and therefore the reproduction of the entire social formation, let us state that Buluyia pre-colonial socio-political economies were consequential mechanisms of both the environmental providence and its largely determined mode of production and productive forces.

The availability and scarcity of certain resource materials within Buluyia and their social demand dictated the division of labour in their production and exchange. However, production was geared mainly towards internal consumption in the Luyia homesteads, exchange at a local or regional level and also to meet the demand for ceremonial and other social utilities. Economic and social activities in pre-colonial Buluyia were influenced by the location and environment in which the various sub-groups existed. The type of cultivation was shifting agricultural system within which various foods including sorghum, millet, bananas, potatoes, maize etc. were grown as suitable crops to the soils and climate of the region. Because of the widespread grasslands jointly controlled by the clans,

pastoralism was practised as a supplement to agriculture while fishing was a major activity in the Lake and the rivers as a dietary augmentation of both meat and vegetables. Moreover, given the abundant faunal variety, hunting was a significant endeavour to provide Luyia homesteads with both meat for consumption and skins or bones for making ceremonial paraphernalia (Angolo, O.I., 1987). All this was made possible because Buluyia was and still is a land of tremendous physical diversity. It comprises grasslands, forested river valleys and ridges and the whole forms an undulating plain with scattered hills such as Mwalie, Cherangani and Sang'alo in the north, Amukura in the west, Maragoli, Bunyore, Misango and Nyang'ori in the south-east and the Samia hills to the south-west (Were, 1967, 30-31).

The area was more broken and characterised geologically by prophyritic granities which according to the later 19th century explorer, Joseph Thomson; "weathered rapidly into reddish clays, leaving innumerable enormous blocks of the less vastly denuded parts "(Thomson, 1887, 481). It's topography, geology, fauna and flora have combined to determine

the societal economic activities and also immensely contributed to the social practices of various demographic regions.

In the previous section, we have observed that conflict among kinsmen was associated with the motives that induced persons to move away from previous residences to found households and realise their ambition to become political leaders. We need to note such movements were also caused by soil infertility, sickness and a series of other ecological exigencies. Like the Iteso, there is no evidence to suggest that the Abaluyia had either exhausted or over-crowded their pre-colonial environment since most land in Western Kenya appeared underutilised (Karp, 1978, 159). The Bukusu, Tachoni, Kabras, Marama, Batsotso, Samia, Bakhayo, Marachi and Banyala had plenty of land. The Maragoli, Banyore and Kisa had just enough<sup>8</sup>.

However, overcrowding had among other

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8. The Southern Luyia who in pre-colonial times had enough land were hard-pressed under colonialism. Their population growth, pressure from the reduction of North Kavirondo in 1913 to give room for settlement in Trans-Nzoia aggravated their land problems.

factors motivated the influx and settlement of various peoples into present Buluyia prior to the 19th century. Notably the Bukusu are said to have migrated from Bugishu in Uganda because of the apparent scarcity of grasslands given the topography of the region. Because of many valleys, their cattle could not graze properly. Moreover, these valleys had also prevented them from seeing their adversaries as they were often victims of persistent Karamoja, Uasin Gishu, Maasai, Kalenjin and later, Teso raids. The physical features of the areas worked against them in their attempts to build walls to protect cattle in their homes (Were, 1967, 65-84).

It is therefore no wonder that the Bukusu settled in their present location for long and undertook the building of gigantic wall enclosures for the same protective purpose after their sojourn from Bugishu. Apart from the Bukusu, forts were also erected among the Abatachoni, Abakabras, Abamarama, Abatsotso and Abawanga (Wagner, Vol. 2, 1970, p. 6). They were necessitated by the increasing enemy attacks in the 18th and 19th centuries. However, what is of particular interest to us here is the use of local clay murrum to construct mud walls about eight to ten

feet high and one foot thick surrounded by a ditch of upto 12 feet wide and 10 feet deep (Wandibba, 1972, 22).

Because of the suitability of this region for the erection of protective mud walls, the building of a fort became an issue of the entire societal concern. It was a large project which needed substantial organization of labour to guarantee swift completion. Thus, the labour for construction was volunteered by the community although the design and craftsmanship was provided by a specialist who among the Bukusu came from a special clan. These forts also served to define a social unit and each was ruled by an Omukasa (Wandibba, 1972, 24). This building of forts and other joint ventures demonstrated how the pre-colonial Luyia dispensed with their labour power to satisfy their various social needs.

In the southern areas such as Idakho, Isukha and Marama. forts were erected using a mixture of strong clay and stones (Burt, 1980, 334). Other Luyia groups such as the Abalogoli, Abatirichi, Abanyoole and Abashisa lived in villages which

comprised homes based on the extended family. Each of these villages which were based on patrifilial multiplication of one's progeny were defended individually. However, for social and political purposes the Luyia made distinctions between the extended family's homestead (Litala), the village (lusomo) and a territorial unit of several villages (lugongo). The various families marked their land holdings traditionally by simple strips of grass and these were recognised by communal agreement (See Wagner, Vol. 1970, 6), Osogo, 1966, 1 and Sangree, 1966, 1). Thus, by effecting change in materials of nature, the Luyia realised their own purposes in these materials.

All the Abaluyia had many categories of land which determined the rules for its use and proprietorship. As the most fundamental natural resource of pre-colonial Buluyia agro-pastoralism, each clan had land which it considered theirs by ancestral agnastic rights or prior occupation to be cared for, protected and sometimes expanded as they saw it fit. Sometimes the boundaries of clan territory were definite if delimited by rivers streams, hills and shorelines. However, they were disputable when there were no such discernible

markers (Burt, 1980, 327). However, specialized terminology was used to differentiate the various land categories within each clan such as water holes, salt-licks, grazing land, ceremonial land, cultivated land and unused bushland (Burt, 1980, 328).

Like the rest of the pre-colonial African agro-pastoralists, who demonstrated their energetic resourcefulness in meeting the environmental problems and pressures which threatened their security and at times their survival, the pre-colonial Luyia homesteads developed insurance against life's most predictable calamities through patrilineally extended families and the establishment of solidarity through clans and lineages (Angolo, O.I., 1987). Crop failure due to droughts or storms and natural sicknesses were insured against through the concept of close-knit families. Thus, within this mould of social relations lay a fundamental principle of diluting the impact of disaster by spreading its liabilities among a widening number of individuals (See July, 1975, 94). This was so because the labour process was not inextricably linked to profitable production. While this essentially made the appropriation of surplus produce and engagement of labour ostensibly revolve



within kinship ties on the basis of reciprocal relations, specialised production was controlled by certain clans which had exclusive skills and expertise in these activities and guarded them through a system of rules and regulations that were spiritually sanctioned (Burt, 1980, 37).

Not seeking to belabour how rules' of specialised production included determination of eligibility for apprenticeship, training procedure, certification of proficiency, distribution of practitioners, definition of product types and standards, ritual and personal behaviour, it is important to note that almost every object in pre-colonial Buluyia was practical in nature, it served a utilitarian purpose (Burt, 1980, 457). Consequently, the productive efforts of the people against vagaries of the environment and its resources portrays production and specialization as a complex interplay between the environmental resources, consumer behaviour and community beliefs within the pre-colonial social formation. Their physical and mental capabilities existed in a relationship to the means of production.

One may also note that a hierarchy of status

developed based on the importance of the material goods produced and the level of technology and skill needed for their production. Thus, iron-workers were afforded the highest status followed by potters, woodcarvers and basket makers (See Burt, 1980, 38). Until recently, the iron workers have been the single most important specialist in Buluyia community. They supplied the tools for food production and weapons for defense. They controlled the process of transforming raw earth into workable iron and had the ability to create objects imbued with spiritual powers and were therefore highly respected in the community. This way their contribution to the local economy was very important upto the beginning of the 20th century when changing circumstances began to diminish their position. When Harry Johnson visited Samia, he found numerous works, the ore being brought from regular mines in the Samia hills to the north (Thomson, 1887, 290).

Using locally dug gummy clay mixed with sandy clay, many Luyia societies manufactured pots. Pottery played a significant role in everyday life, mythology, ritual and religion. Not all the Abaluyia sub-ethnic groups made pottery although they all used

pots. However, most myths in the region about the origins of pottery suggest that it was invented because of the need to cook food (Burt, 1980, 90). However, the oldest Luyia pottery is found in caves in Mungoma Hill at the site of the original settlement of the historical founder of the Abalogoli called Mulogoli. This site has not been excavated yet, although it is estimated at 300 years old (Burt, 1980, 92).

A number of taboos were practised during the manufacture of pottery especially at the firing time. Pottery was always used for magico-religious purposes that transcended their functional designs. Given the occasional spates of drought in the region, rainmakers used pots in rainmaking rituals to store their efficacious magical ingredients. In woodcarving wood specialists used wood from closely grained hardwoods prepared from mature trees in the region to make particular items both for practical and spiritual reasons.

By the early 19th century the range of objects and the technology of production of wood was fully developed among the people and it was a

full-time occupation. Figurative carving was unknown to the Abaluyia (Osogo, 1969, 374). The preference of wood types varied among the sub-ethnic groups and probably reflected local availability of certain tree species. Like in many other places in pre-colonial Africa where trees provided the raw materials for stools, logs for hollowing-out of canoes, pestles and mortars and all sorts of wooden handles (See July, 1975, 260), the Luyia wood-carvers also produced wooden beehives, wooden digging blades, clubs, food bowls and a plethora of musical instruments. Male specialist clans included Abasilwa among the Abesukha, and Abatamanyini among the Abamarama (Burt, 1980, 165).

Men specialists also made baskets from available plant materials selected on the basis of appropriate characteristics. From such local green bushes as Tsinundu, emukusa and a local vines called amakhambi, the craftsmen made large baskets and granaries apart from making baskets for trapping fish, trays for winnowing and huge baskets for carrying grain. Basketry in pre-colonial Buluyia had no ritual and myths attributed to it (Burt, 1980, 204).

There were also forms of production of utility items which only required rudimentary skills although some specialization was needed for those such as thatching and drum-making. However, their production was not protected by special interest groups. The manufacture of barkclothes was probably known to the Abaluyia but was possibly abandoned because of the scarcity of appropriate trees (Osogo, 1965, 23-24). Older men and those who were held in great esteem earned the right to wear cloaks made from costly and rare animal hides. They may have been entitled by wealth and position to wear a colobus monkey skin or antelope hide cloak. None-the-less ordinary men wore leather aprons to cover their genitals to hide nakedness while children were sometimes dressed in banana fibre strings around their waist. Otherwise, children were kept naked except when it was cold (Osogo, 1965, 22-23).

The pre-colonial Luyia concept of ornamentation mainly was expressive of the peoples economic and economic positions. Most of the jewelry consisted of strings of beads, ornaments from natural animal and plant materials and even solid metal hangles. Beads were made from plant materials like the root

of a plant called Indako among the Abakabras and Oburiri among the Abanyoole. Others would be made from parts of animals like bones, teeth, crocodile nails and ostrich shells (Burt, 1980, 256).

Throughout the 19th century, clay and iron beads were made and potters also made clay heads. Iron beads were first made by the Wanga smithers and all these items were very popular until increased trade with the Coast in the 19th century introduced the imported variant. Moreover, the cowrie shell was established as an important symbol of wealth and provided quantities of them to be used to decorate ornaments. By the end of the 19th century, the cowrie shell had become the basic form of currency overshadowing the hoe (Osogo, 1966, p. 135).

A special type of ornaments were worn by both males and females as medicinal jewelry. Although bracelets were the most widespread form of medicinal jewelry, iron ornaments were also believed to afford protection or cure from illness. A case in point were the Tiriki whose women wore tiny iron charms hang from a bracelet to protect them from snakes and body pains while working in the

fields (Burt, 1980, 265). Nevertheless, necklets and wristlets made from the skin of sacrificial animals were greatly used in many rituals.

But apart from ornamentation most pre-colonial Abaluyia practised body painting to mark special occasions especially funerals. During this occasion the people used white clay to symbolize the transformation of humans from soil to flesh and finally from flesh to soil (Burt, 1980, 276). But body-painting was also done to protect the individual from cold water. . The Ababukusu for instance used red clay komutora and ochre kumupala mixed with animal fat to protect against cold weather as well as to decorate themselves. The Abesukha painted their face with clay to cure malaria as painting oneself was believed to have a medicinal effect (Burt, 1980, 276).

While body-painting was practised for ceremonial and medicinal purposes, the various Luyia sub-ethnic groups also possessed their ritual costumes. Men's costumes were mostly in the form of head-dresses such as a conical goatskin cap

called eshitwetwe (Osengo, O.I., 1987). It was decorated with vertical rows of cowrie shells and surmounted by a stick topped by a tuft of feathers from the isimbishira bird. The Abasamia called it Imwatu and it was usually won by a man of great deeds. He usually wore it during ceremonies such as funerals, weddings and enthronement of a clan head (Osogo, 1965, 23). In some areas a basketry hut covered with feathers and in a few cases a colobus monkey skin was won by dancers or was put on as a form of regalia (Burt, 1980, 280).

Women wore special costumes mostly in celebrations of weddings, births and funerals. They usually consisted of specially made skirts and cloaks, hair decorations and the wearing of certain local flowers and vines. Special modes of behaviour were expected in these outfits (Burt, 1980, 281).

Buluyia warriors too had their distinctive paraphernalia. Shieldmaking was the work of specialists and buffalo hides were preferred as they were the toughest skins available. But when buffalos became extinct in Buluyia by 1902, Hippopotamus and Ox hide skins were used. They were variously termed as



ingabo, ikuti or eshikhumba (See Johnson, 1902, 742). Although cattle raiding was not a major element of pre-colonial Buluyia economy, however, predations on the various sub-ethnic groups by the Nandi and Maasai often led to fierce battles between them. But apart from these cattle motivated raids, land disputes also brought about large-scale conflicts between sub-groups. Consequently, there were major wars with the Luo, Nandi, Maasai and Teso which were instigated by these communities desire for Buluyia land, foodstuffs and cattle, and women (See Burt, 1980, 282-283).

In addition to carrying shields prepared from the hides of large animals in Buluyia and spears prepared by various specialist smithers, warriors went into battle wearing head-dresses of a quail basket inserted with features or brimmed basketry-hats adorned with feathers. This was particularly true of the Abashisa, Abedakho, Ababukusu and Abasamia fighters (Burt, 1980, 290).

The Abaluyia also had hunting paraphernalia as the hunting of wild animals for food was a major occupation. The wild animals killed during these

efforts provided the skins, bones or horns mostly used for assembling the paraphernalia won in many of the ceremonial activities we have described earlier (See Osogo, 1965, 37).

We have hitherto explained that the pre-colonial Luyia divided their physical environment into zones, each of which was utilised for a particular purpose. Buildings were only erected in a few of these zones especially the residential compound or within the walled forts among the northern and central Luyia. Within the homestead were buildings which were set up to satisfy the needs of daily living, defense, storage and even ritual activity. These architectural structures were mostly round at the base and with a conical grass thatched roof. The most common tree used for building was Olusiola a local tree that mostly provided the vertical uprights and the horizontal rails (See, Wagner, Vol. 2, 1970, 3-4). The dwelling huts were mudded during the rainy season after thatching had been completed. The type of grass preferred varied from area to area although emphasis was put on those resistant to rotting and those commonly found. The Abalogoli, Abashisa and Abakabras commonly used

erembe or eshirembe readily available in their areas (Wagner, Vol 2, 1970, 5).

Houses were decorated by using engraving designs on the floor. The decorations were layered on a carefully smeared veneer of cowdug and mud using Ligaka among the Abalogoli or Olukakha among the other sub-ethnic groups to engrave patterns of marks on the floor (Burt, 1980, 405).

Having provided a cross-section of forms of appropriation of nature's products and production (apart from agro-pastoralist production) together with their social value in pre-colonial Luyia society, perhaps it is important to note that all these activities were graced by some form of music. However, a more vivified extravaganza of music for both communication and entertainment was exhibited in ceremonial festivities. Thus, the pre-colonial Luyia had a wide series of musical instruments which may be summarily put in the following categories; the aerophones, the chordophones, idiophones and the membranophones. In the first category were the horns of animals of several sizes of which the largest was called linakha or kisilwa by the Abalogoli and

and Abanyoole, or lulwika by the Ababukusu. There were also flutes and trumpets all of which were made from local materials. In the second category were harps (ovukhana) lyres (litungu) and fiddles (eshiriri), the last of which was introduced to the Abaluyia from Luoland in the last one hundred years (Burt, 1980, 431). The third category comprised bells, rattles, percussion sticks, etc. However, the last category was composed of ritual drums, double-headed drums and single-headed drums (Angolo, O.I., 1987). Indeed, it is impossible to exhaust all forms of production in pre-colonial Buluyia. However, a survey of some of them reveals that almost every object produced had relevance to the material conditions of existence of the people.

It would appear therefore that their preoccupation with self-adornment, artistic expression through music, and religious impulses were concepts based on their self-consciousness as much as other aspects of their political economies were. While one may argue that the cohesiveness of these political economies was based on a web of mutual obligations which rested upon consanguinity, it should otherwise be stated that ties of blood, tradition and

familial loyalty or even agnatic sentiments did not prevail for long as these clashed with antipathetic economic interests. There was an accumulation of capital which was social in nature and which was geared towards the achievement of influence and authority. Therefore, the differential adornment, paraphernalia or regalia won in ceremonial festivities demonstrated and sought to reinforce this. It was the social manifestation of accumulation at the production and exchange level which was internalised and accepted through spelled out mechanisms of social behaviour.

Be that as it may, the pre-colonial Luyia extraction of utility items from plants and animals within the region both for consumption, exchange or other social utilities underlines the basic reliance of a traditional lineage based society on its organic resources. Therefore, like we have stated before, environmental conditions are a necessary index of analysing the historical development of any community. Consequently, unlike those historians who have traditionally stuck at the spring of labour-capital relationships or the pursuit of profit within the mould of historical materialism, for us ecological

questions and threats in history seem to suggest a more widened paradigm of analysis. As Ronald Aronson states, the central concepts of historical materialism must be extended to do justice to the full meaning of material survival and reproduction as these are the most fruitful starting points of understanding the whole range of human life (Aronson, 1985, 90).

The ecological theory which suggests that the environmental limitations determine production does not depart from the general concept of class struggle. This is because the very notion of ecological conditions likewise yields to a materialist analysis. The common interest as perceived by otherwise conflicting classes of a single society, sharing a contiguous space, has no less reality than separate class interests. Moreover, the level of development and organization of a society's productive forces, their motive force, the structuring of social power and privilege, and the struggle to maintain it or transform its social organisation to combat scarcity turns out to perpetrate the scarcity and threat in its very midst (See Aronson, 1985, 90). Given that even Marx in the

The Germany Ideology stated that "man is the world of man, the state, society" and insisted on the basic human needs, a position he did not later depart from in his writings (See Mclellan, 1985, 123), any genuine materialist must insist that human beings are absolutely continuous with the rest of the natural world. However, they harness the resources of their environments and possibly transform them using their linguistic, productive and reasoning capabilities. In sum, this was the case of the pre-colonial Buluyia as this chapter has attempted to demonstrate. There was a peasant lineage based society although there were elements of feudal or tribute paying practices in those societies that were tending toward greater centralization of authority.

However, we are aware that dependency scholars only see peasants emerging in Kenya with the establishment of colonialism. This view is highly contestible given the lineage economic practices of the pre-colonial Luyia as we have described them. Peasant households are domestic units of production and consumption. They consume what they produce and so their subsistence and ultimate security depend upon rights in land and family labour (Shanin, 1971, 94).

Peasants too may be involved in a wider economic system which includes the participation of non-peasants in varying degrees.

But the first important and determining factor of the peasantry is that the family serves as the basic unit of social organization. More specifically, the family provides the labour on the farm. On the other hand, nearly only the farm provides for the consumption needs of the family (Shanin, 1971, 94). In other words, economic and social relations are closely interwoven and revolve around the family farm. Although land husbandry is the main means of livelihood and that it directly provides the major part of their consumption needs, the major methods of husbandry are basically traditional and manifest low levels of specialization. Nevertheless, peasant societies tend to reveal a specific traditional culture related to way of life of small communities (Ngethe, 1986, 93-98).

We have given evidence among the Abaluyia of the pre-colonial period which exhibited these features that were basically peasant. Thus, if dependency scholars insist peasants occupy an



underdog position to an external ruling class, even our evidence have shown the domineering position which the Wanga hegemony under the Nabongo and other clandoms sought to establish among the Luyia peasantries. It is our contention therefore that it was only the pattern of growth in peasant agriculture of the Luyia that was altered as we shall see in the next chapters. The area's societies were to be integrated into the colonial system of domination, extraction and control. The process of incorporation was to be characterised by "loss", imposition and "adaptation". There were to be other processes such as collusion and ~~confrontation~~ between the colonising forces and the indigenous forces. Therefore as Bernstein (1979) would say, the imposition of colonial rule marked a qualitative leap. The penetration of commodity relations in a more or less systematic fashion was to destroy the traditional economy as the colonial state organised the conditions of exploitation of Buluyia labour and land. This necessitated breaking the reproductive cycle of the systems of the traditional peasant economy.

CHAPTER III

3.0 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BRITISH ADMINISTRATION  
IN BULUYIA AND THE COLONIAL ECONOMY 1894-1914

3.1 Mechanisms of the Colonial System

In the previous chapter we have described and analysed mechanisms that were operative in the precolonial economies of Buluyia. We have demonstrated how the organization of human labour was crucial for the sustenance and reproduction of its regionally bounded social formations. Bearing in mind that the organization of labour and its capacity to reproduce itself varies between regional economies (See Bunker, 1984, 50), we have underscored how the Buluyia economies have evolved in relation to their environments although these had to be re-organised in response to changing circumstances. It is our contention that colonialism was a major impetus of change given that it introduced mechanisms of social transformation which we examine in this and the subsequent chapters. Under colonialism the peasants were to occupy an underdog position in relationship with the settlers. Thus, they were to be kept at an arms length from the social sources of powers. Consequently, their political subjection was to be interlined with cultural

subordination.

This chapter examines the encounter between Buluyia peasantries with colonial power which had its own requisites and interests. It also explains the mechanisms used by this power to establish a colonial administration and analyses the responses of various cadres of the Abaluyia in the budding political economy. But before we involve ourselves in the dialectic of British conquest and subordination, it is important to note that modernization theorists have not grasped how the colonial economy shaped regional differentiation and characterised the peoples subsequent ideological images. This is because they gave merely treated Africans as a factor of production and not as human beings with a cultural life, a family, a history and social needs (Campbell, 1985, 14). The canon for theories of modernization was set by Max Weber's account of rationalization of authority, the differentiation of bureaucratic structures and institutions and the mobilization of resources that define this process (Udofia, 1984, 354). But, although these theories' concept of colonialism in Africa portray imperialism in its most caricatured form as a bequeather of political order and pluralistic

democracy upon backward colonised African societies, it should be noted that the entire social fabric of the people was transformed in line with the Weberian bureaucratic norms established by the central government (Brett, 1973, 38). The government's creation of administrative agencies such as chiefs and headmen established a nucleus of an indigenous petty bourgeoisie. This class in the persons of chiefs and headmen was augmented gradually with the addition of educated people who became clerks, teachers and traders. It was a class that was to play a crucial role in defining the relationship of the peasantry to the colonial state chiefly by facilitating the exploitation of the peasantry through collection of taxes and the recruitment of labourers for public works and settler farms.

While it is true that the chiefs and headmen were local officials of a colonial state which served as the intermediary between the settlers and the peasants in Buluyia, their actions were supervised by a hierarchy of white officials conditioned by a set of general normative assumptions about the basis of administration by the Central government. They were influenced by these white officials whose general purposes and interests were imperial and whose policy formulation was on the basis

of underscoring European authority and signify their special places in defining social goals. Some of the European officials had been socialised in these bureaucratic norms and normative assumptions through the British upper middle class families, the public schools and the ancient universities. They had initially been posted to stations that were remote and therefore subordinated to the will of a hierarchy with the power to decide all future prospects of promotion. Thus, their attitudes developed within the broader limits of the established ethic (Brett, 1973, 38-39).

However, equally significant is the fact that conflict is an inescapable condition of all rule although all conflict does not lead to progressive change. The new forces of colonial rule generally conflicted with and undermined traditional practice. In addition, changes in social, economic and political structures meant the emergence of new social forces in the indigenous society whose interests could be expected to conflict on many levels with those of both the colonial and traditional elites (Brett, 1973, 1). It would appear that in response to changes brought about by colonial rule and domination, the Buluyia economies were transformed with varying intensity. Although sometimes co-operative with the state and

and sometimes recalcitrant, their political behaviour must be understood within the context by colonial pressure which radically altered the political economy of the region. Thus, the cultural syncretism adopted by the people and their changing economic practices must be seen as mechanisms of response and adaptation to the pressures and demands of the new political economy of the region. Although the myriad changes accompanying colonial rule and domination are too numerous to discuss in details here, two major intrusions require mention: The pacification programme which began in the region in the 1890's and early 1900's, and the introduction of a cash market economy largely based on settler production and the sale of labour.

The process of pacification and the introduction of a settler mode of production in Kenya was part and parcel of a calculated effort to expand capitalism into the area. This expansion was not only conditioned by the dynamics of the metropolitan development but also by the prevailing modes of production in the colony (Kinyanjui, 1979, 104). Consequently, resistance to capitalist penetration and incorporation was mixed depending on the societies concerned. However, the degree of resistance, violent or passive, depended on a host of factors ranging from military, political and economic organization to the cultural structure of the societies concerned. Violent

resistance, by protesting and fighting the colonialists demonstrated that there was more to live for than material gain or positions of power and prestige (Mutoro, 1975/76, 1). While this is reminiscent of the nationalist interpretation of African resistance to European imperialism and colonial rule by a series of studies in the historiography of Africa during the 1960's and 1970's, it should be noted that students of imperialism have also increasingly recognised the role of resistance in giving shape to imperial expansion. Imperialism and colonialism could not be understood without linking them to the specificities of African societies. Therefore ~~since~~ the 1970's resistance has been extended to include everything from footdragging to social banditry, arson, poaching, theft, avoidance of conscription, desertion, migration and riot. Then resistance in this sense becomes an activity that helped frustrate the operations of capitalism or of capitalism's creation (vail and White, 1986, 272), and not a mere process whereby people due to intense desire to defend their rights and freedoms, their social, political, religious, and cultural values steadily and systematically took up arms and heroically fought the intruders.

Nevertheless, without denying the tremendous impact that the penetration by the capitalist regime of exchange, labour recruitment and production had on the development of the Luyia peasantry, it may not be denied that the Africans participated actively in the shaping of their own economic and social organization. Their responses to pressures imposed by colonial and capitalist agents engendered new conflicts against the colonial state. It also created conflicts in the society as to make individuals rise against each other for control of key political and economic resources. Thus, the establishment of a colonial state and the subsequent white settlement marked the historical conjuncture upon which the penetration of capitalism occurred and upon which the incorporation of the country into the world capitalist structure was mediated and realised (Kinyanjui, 1979, 109).

While resistance as hitherto explained was a fundamental constituent of this historical conjuncture, its other significant element was collaboration with imperial intruders. In the latter case, certain ethnic groups or certain elements within them compromised with the colonial establishment after



calculating the benefits and having found the opportunities to manipulate the colonial power to advance their own personal interests in politics, culture and trade. Within the same vein, others collaborated because they found their enemies on the other side of the camp and had therefore to throw their lot on the other side that seemed to support them (Mutoro, 1975/76, 1). Indeed, it has often been argued that collaborators were opportunists who read the signs of the times correctly and willingly jumped on the colonial bandwagon ready to reap the fruits of their collaboration after the establishment of colonial rule as agents. But the historical process of the penetration of colonial capitalism entailed the juxtaposition of colonial rule and its dependent structures on the peasantry. The process helped to redefine the social relations between the rulers and the ruled during the first stage of colonial rule. This was followed by a period of unexpressed conflict which gave rise to new social forces which were ultimately to stand in opposition to both colonialism and its dependent structures (Legassick, 1977, 56).

While contending with the potency of the opposition, the colonial power was forced in its own

interests to transfer certain skills and resources to the indigenous population, i.e. leadership positions, roads, crops, change of the system of economic exchange etc. The scenario came to be dominated by a system of monolithic and exploitative control but incorporated some liberalised opportunities for Africans to acquire the skills required to exploit the new situation. Their success in doing so created new resources, new demands and new classes and also altered the structure of the society itself. The colonial state was now the midwife of the power struggle between various groups especially between the African peasantry and the settlers.

It is in the foregoing struggles that were to be found dynamics which moulded colonial and post-colonial society in Africa. In this sense Africans participated in the formation, reproduction and conservation of their societies (Vail and White, 1986, 272). But this participation took place within a general framework of grievance derived from perceived oppression and exploitation. The Africans were given those opportunities on very unequal terms; where their interests conflicted with those of colonial authorities, the latter used their power to

ensure their own preponderance. Consequently, the emerging indigenous classes perceived reality in terms of inequality, blocked economic opportunities and social discrimination (Legassick, 1977, 56).

That this was the case in colonial Kenya at this early stage is no surprise given that the international division of labour relegated the colonised peoples to the lowest ranks in the production process (Kinyanjui, 1979, 61).

Colonial generation of mechanisms for extroverted peasantisation of the indigenous producers marked a major transition from the traditional lineage peasantry in Buluyia to a capitalist oriented peasantry. But it was a transition that could not take place without the dissolution of the reproductive cycles of the traditional peasantry. These cycles were broken through a gradual process of integrating the traditional closely woven kinship peasantries into the colonial state from the 1890's. It was a process that started when decisions started to be taken that would affect the long-term character of Kenyan indigenous agriculture. The presence of the state began to be felt during the punitive expeditions, wars of pacification, the establishment of administrative

agencies, the imposition of direct taxation, the alienation of land and the expropriation of direct taxation, the alienation of land and the expropriation of labour.

### 3.2 The Advent of Colonialism and the Pacification of Buluyia

The present region of Western province once formed part of the Eastern province of Uganda stretching to Lake Naivasha. On April 1, 1902, it was transferred to the East Africa Protectorate (Later Kenya Colony) under the ~~new name~~ of Lakes Province. It evolved into Nyanza Province which, following independence, was split into Nyanza and Western Provinces (Makila, 1978, 26-27). While the region was still part of Uganda, the rest of present day Kenya comprised Ukambani, Jubaland and Tanaland Provinces of the East Africa Protectorate as had been administered by the Imperial British Africa Company<sup>1</sup> (Omosule, 1974, 26).

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1. The establishment of colonial rule in Africa was a culmination of a long chain of imperial activities. In British areas, the establishment of this rule was forerun by the chartered companies which were a creation of the victorian regime in Britain. These served the purpose of post-poning British official involvement in their spheres of influence.

The administration of each of the provinces had been placed under a Chief Commissioner or administrator who was responsible to a British officer at Zanzibar during the end of the company rule. This company owed its inception to John Kirk mainly who for many years staunchly upheld the interests of his country as a Consul-General at Zanzibar (Hobley, 1929, 67). The British government resorted to grant the company a Royal Charter in 1888 as a cheap and easy way of reserving the territory for Britain. By 1895, the company had expended some £450,000 in initiating a national service and after a considerable demur, the government offered it a meagre sum of £200,000 as compensation and payment of all tangible assets. The Chartered Company was dissolved and all important political matters had to be referred to Sir Arthur Hardinge the then British Consul-General at Zanzibar. When the East Africa Protectorate was proclaimed, the supreme control of its affairs devolved on him (Hobley, 1929, 73). as the First Non-Resident Commissioner:

The declaration of July 1, 1895 of a protectorate over the area between Mombasa and the Rift Valley came as a by-product of British involvement

and activities in Zanzibar and Uganda. Zanzibar formed a necessary base for British operations in East Africa, and the Protectorate was a kind of Zanzibar backyard which had to be made safe. Thus, the protectorate was to be administered from Zanzibar by career diplomats such as Arthur Hardinge, the First Commissioner of the protectorate who was also the British Agent and Consul-General in Zanzibar (Ogot, 1969, 255).

Because of the prospects of the company's withdrawal with the termination of what had been described as "the interregnum" of the imperial British East Africa Company (See Ghai and McAuslan, 1970, 24), the Earl of Kimberley requested Arthur Hardinge, Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General in Zanzibar to enquire into the arrangements to be made for a sub-commissioner in the region as had been recommended by the Committee on the Administration of East Africa in 1894 under Sir Percy Anderson. This was a Foreign Office departmental committee headed by Anderson the Head of the African Department in the office. Both Anderson and Hardinge belonged to it. In response Hardinge formulated proposals which were to become the basis for the administrative and judicial organization of

the territory (Omusole, 1974, 25).

Although the company had succeeded in establishing its presence at the coast and Buganda, as well as along the caravan route linking these two areas, it had not produced an administrative system. However, in the interior, the major concern of the foreign office between 1895 and 1901 was the construction of the Uganda railway for strategic and economic reasons. Thus, it was desirable for the line to be built with utmost speed and this could only be done if peace was maintained with the surrounding peoples (Ogot, 1969, 257). The completion of the railway in 1901 had its attendant problems i.e. Indian traders who moved inland as the railway progressed and were now established at several key points between Mombasa and Kisumu and European immigrants such as traders, adventurers, missionaries and settlers who now littered various areas. Since the government was responsible for their safety, the jurisdiction of several administrators had to be extended to include all areas in which the new comers operated. Thus, the country by 1904 had grown from a consular district into a colony (Ogot, 1969, 258).

After arguing that the British sphere in East Africa suffered from the multiplicity of legal and commercial difficulties existing within its limits, Hardinge had admonished the British government to take bold steps in establishing a homogenous working administration throughout British East Africa (Omusole, 1974, 26). When the Eastern Province of Uganda was transferred to the British East Africa Protectorate, it was both to consolidate the administration of the railway and the administration of the potential areas of European settlement (Brown, 1977, 75). The boundary transfer was an event following the formation of the colonists Association in 1902 by the dozen or so resident white settlers, a group that was joined by Lord Delamere upon his return to Kenya. He eventually converted the body to the planters and Farmers Association under his leadership.

Lord Delamere had first entered the highlands as part of a hunting expedition to neighbouring Somali in 1897 during which he was convinced that this area should become the nucleus of an extensive European settlement (See Ingham, 1962, 211-216). The extension of the British Commissioner's authority from Zanzibar to the protectorate was one of the events favouring



Delamere's vision. The other was the actual establishment of residency by a full Commissioner, Sir Charles Eliot at the new railroad in Nairobi, where he could oversee the security of the supply route to Uganda and the arrival of a handful of pioneering settlers in the wake of the railway (Brown, 1977, 73).

That the likes of Delamere had a vision of settlerdom in the Highlands of Kenya is not surprising given that these feelings had been expressed even when the British East Africa Company had been chartered by the crown as an instrument for conducting the preliminary economic penetration of Uganda under competitive pressure from both Germany and Belgium. Then, the principal agent of the company Frederick Lugard was considered to be one of the first Europeans to describe present day Kenya as something other than a forbidding impediment to the expansion of European activity in Uganda. In 1893, he referred to the highland region as a potential area for European agricultural settlement and stock farming (Lugard, 1893, 419-420).

Although the East Africa protectorate had

been viewed as the least developed and the least worthy portion of the new arm of the British Empire, the then colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain had been very ambitious and expansionist plans (Newton, 1947, 292). Thus, the decision to build the railway to Uganda and explore means of making it a paying venture somewhat in a way marked the turning point in the British government's indecisive attitude regarding its proper role in East Africa.

The first colonial administration of the British was instituted in 1894 under Valet Frederick Spire at Mumias. It was this officer who was to be involved in the first attempts to subjugate the neighbouring Luyia groups although his efforts ended in an entire fiasco. When he sent twenty-five Sudanese soldiers to demand Bukusu arms, all the twenty-five were captured at a walled village called Lumboka in spite of their guns. The Bukusu had barricaded themselves and were able to resist armed attack. The Bukusu already had guns of their own acquired from slave traders or exchanged for cattle with the runaway soldiers of the British administrative station at Mumias (Osogo, 1966, 129-130).

While Spire was attempting to exert control

over the ammunition left by his deserting soldiers, the British administration in the region was also faced by another setback. The Abanyala of Ndombi (the kakalewa) were harrassing the British troops some of whom were recruited from the Swahili people. They became adroit at guerilla fighting and ambused bona fide caravans thereby giving the British troops a headache (Osogo, 1966, 130). They had forced Spire to withdraw when he went out on an expedition to recover a stolen mailbag. Spire had undertaken this with the assistance of Nabongo Sakwa's men. It was not until the British used Sudanese troops, Baganda soldiers and Maasai Warriors under the command of Semei Kakunguru that the Banyala surrendered (Dealing 1974, 310).

We have hitherto noted how Arthur Hardinge had striven to establish an administrative machinery in the East Africa protectorate. However, British interest in Western Kenya, then part of Uganda, had been prompted by the needs of the Uganda administration. After the proclamation of a British protectorate over Buganda in 1894, Colonel Colvile who was in charge of that administration had despatched Valet Spire to establish an administrative post at Mumias (Were,

1967, 157). This station appears to have been chosen because of its position on the caravan route.

Following difficulties faced by Valet Spire in the region, Charles Hobley arrived at Mumias in 1895 to take over the first permanent administrative district of North Kavirondo (Osogo, 1966, 129). Thus, him and Spire were the earliest administrators of the area and both emphasized the need for efficient and rapid forwarding of mails and goods from the Coast to Uganda, the improvement of the existing lines of communications in Western Kenya and the collection of food by caravans. It is not surprising therefore that they were both involved in efforts of conquest and pacification of the peoples whose activities were inimical to the realisation of these goals.

The caravan route could not be improved or safeguarded without a British presence in the district. Equally significant, food for caravans and local products could not be efficiently collected without some measure of authority or organization being exerted. The country had to be gradually brought under control beginning with the immediate territory traversed by the caravans route.

Consequently when Hobley received instructions to return to Mumias to relieve Spire (Hobley, 1929, 80). it partly was his responsibility to establish the authority in the region.

But the establishment of British rule in the so called Kavirondo district was not without protest from company officials. The Imperial British East Africa Company which had signed the original treaties of friendship with some of the local rulers complained bitterly at the lack of consultation by the government before its appropriation of the area (Were, 1967, 159). The company's flag at Mumias had been removed by Mr. Spire and despite this action, the Company still had despatched Gilkson to resume charge of its commercial station in 'Kavirondo'. The latter built his own camp and reiterated to Colvile the British administrator in Uganda the company's right to exercise sovereign rights in all territories where it had signed treaties with chiefs. But when Colvile refused to recognise this Company authority and asked him to cease his activities, he reluctantly under protest handed over all his arms to Hobley the local administrative officer and abandoned the camp (Were, 1967, 160).

On his assumption of command of the station

at Mumias, it was from here at Mumias that Hobley brought Buluyia and other neighbouring regions under control. Thus, the protectorate which the British had declared over Buganda in 1894 was soon extended to include the Kisumu and Naivasha districts which in 1900 became the Eastern Province of Uganda (Ogot, 1972, 151). In an attempt to establish an administration gradually over the various sections of the communities of peoples who were collectively termed by the colonialists as the 'Kavirondo', between 1895 and 1900 Hobley organized several punitive expeditions including an attack against the Banyore of Emangali who were raiding the Southern Logoli (Lonsdale, 1964, 114).

Whereas these expeditions were aimed at pacifying these sub-ethnic groups whose activities were underwriting the collapse of the British administrative control in the area and the increasing activity of European traders plying between Buganda and the coast or hunting ivory in Nyanza, the general recalcitrance of Africans in the area was aggravated by the mutiny of Sudanese soldiers in Western Kenya. The British administration in Buluyia had come under pressure from the military to extract labour from the unwilling Luyia populace.

Consequently, friction was common especially between 1897 and 1898 when Sudanese Mutiny and the rebellions of Mwanga and Kabarega spacially necessitated such recruitment. But on their march from Eldama Ravine to Uganda, the Sudanese mutineers persuaded the Mumias garrison to join them and the Wanga Chief Mumia Nabongo had to intervene by calling out 2,000 spearmen to defend the station. Nevertheless despite their defeat the region had from 1896 to 1898 witnessed great pressures of looting by these mutineers (See Lonsdale, 1964, 115-116).

Both the mutineers and the British punitive expeditioners interrupted social life and devastated crops in Buluyia farmlands. This is evidenced by the fact that as the pacification proceeded, many peasants from various sub-ethnic groups in an effort to insulate the Wanga against the effects of the mutiny brought food for Sale at Mumias. There was another food market at Kakamega where there were stationed Swahili and Somali traders. Charles Hopley locally called Opilo among the Luyia, and Obilo among the Luo was always careful to dispense patronage in the shape of captured stock to those who helped in punitive expeditions (Lonsdale,

1964, 95). Later Hobley wrote:

The reaction of a native race to control by a civilised government varies according to their nature, and to their form of government, but in every case a conflict of some kind is inevitable, before the lower fully accepts the dictum of the ruling power (Hobley, 1970, 217-218).

On the whole, the concept of conquest and subjugation of African peoples was widely accepted by early British administrators. Indeed, Arthur Hardinge had once advised the Foreign office that "In Africa, to have peace you must first teach obedience, and the only tutor who impressed the lesson properly is the sword" (See Mungeam, 1966 20). It is not surprising therefore that Hobley adopted this method when he despatched punitive expeditions against recalcitrant Luyia sub-ethnic groups and their neighbouring Nandi and Luo.

For us as for other interested scholars, after the foregoing description of the sequence of events on Buluyia, the genesis of colonial rule in Buluyia needs to be analysed within the locus of the contradictory process of primitive colonial accumulation. On a wider territorial scale, the



colonial state was to act as an instrument of primitive accumulation on the settlers' behalf by appropriating African land, confiscating livestock, introducing taxation, building the Uganda railway and other transport networks, and creating marketing and financial structures favourable to settlers.

It is not our intention in this study to provide an in-depth explanation of the concept of primitive accumulation. We however recapitulate the exposition of Marx when he contended that primitive accumulation is nothing else than the historical process of divorcing the producers from the means of production. Thus, it was primitive because it formed the pre-history of capital and of the mode of production corresponding to capital (Marx, 1978, 875-6). Understandably, given that even Marx noted the history of this expropriation has been written in annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire and this expropriation assumed different aspects in different countries, running through its various phases in different orders of succession at different historical epochs, early colonial accumulation in Kenya was primitive. It was primitive because capital could not be derived from previous

accumulation of capital but had to be derived from pre-capitalist economies through brutal exploitation (See Zeleza, 1982, 65). This preceded the partial separation from the ownership and control of the means of production of African peasants by the colonial state in the subsequent decades.

It then appears that with accumulation as the primary objective, British punitive expeditions were given other explanations and justification to camouflage the underlying basic motivations. It is this kind of hypocrisy that prompted Michael Crowder to once note that European powers justified their occupation of Africa on the grounds that they were bringing order and civilization to a chaotic and barbarous continent. In this vein, they disguised their fundamental economic interests in occupying various parts of Africa by introducing arguments about their own inherent moral and racial superiority to the Africans (Crowder, 1970, 237). This is exemplified in Kenya by Hobley's view we noted. They demonstrate the clap-trap of colonial apologia that was geared towards clearing tainted imperial consciences. Indeed, a few colonial officers not none, have taken a neutral stand.

Colonial primitive accumulation went hand in

hand with the appropriation of political authority in Buluyia. The latter concept denotes the imperial efforts to extend over indigenous forms a tradition of paternalism that served to legitimise a political system in which authority was usurped and monopolised by a European elite. By 1900, the British administrators in the region had arrogated to themselves administrative and judicial prominence and also posed as arbiters in local conflicts to the extent that sub-ethnic groups competed among themselves to show loyalty to the new imperial force following the partial or outright success of punitive expeditions of the previous century. They exploited this situation such that Hopley recognised only certain individuals as heads of their particular groups and dealt with them only as long as they remained friendly and loyal to him (See Mutooro, 1975/76, 10).

To some extent the local ruling elite was allowed to get on with day to day administration though not unencumbered by close supervision. But the strength and pervasiveness of the overriding imperial ethic ensured that their actions would tend to reinforce rather than undermine the imperial connection.

Since the African subjects shared none of the assumptions or the historical experience of the subordinate classes in the metropole, it was only expedient that colonial white administrators establish, extend and maintain an authoritative system of social control over them (Brett, 1973, 42-43). They created a new set of institutions which would serve to maintain their authority in the political sphere. In this case they imported an appropriate set of justificatory myths to convince the subordinated African Chiefs of the imperial right to assert social discipline and the indigenous population of the need to obey. In sum, they politically devised an administrative structure which could maintain law and order, collect taxes and service the economy. Furthermore, they devised ways of setting up a political machinery capable of regulating conflicts within the African population and with regard to their relations with expatriate imperial administrators (Brett, 1973, 43).

Indeed, there were numerous conflicts between the various sub-ethnic groups of Buluyia. The early administrators found it reasonable to develop alliances largely determined by the

confluence of interests, past historical ties and other irrevocable considerations in the new dispensation of social control. A brief history of these alliances will be narrated in a short while.

However, prior to that, it is pertinent to point out that the appropriation of political authority largely came in the wake of military humiliations which were characterised by plunder and unwanton destruction of property. The retaliatory strike against the Bukusu both at Lumboka and Chetambe forts reduced these structures to their foundations killing thousands of men and women and this enabled the attackers to capture a lot of booty (Mutooro, 1975/76, 9). Capturing the events of the first expedition, Dealing notes that 450 cattle plus numerous sheep and goats were taken. The second expedition which decimated Chetambe returned 1,660 cattle, 1,476 sheep and goats and 312 prisoners most of whom were ransomed. After attacking and humiliating the Bukusu in August, 1895, by 1896 the Banyala of Kakamega were subdued and the same expeditionary forces were poised against the Kabras who were accused of similar transgression, and for their generally 'truculent' attitude to the British (Dealing, 1974, 313-315).

Cowed by the overwhelming defeat of the Banyala at the hands of the imperialist forces, the elders of the Kabras arranged for a peaceful settlement with Hobley (Were, 1967, 167).

When an expedition was directed against the Maragoli, the area's local chief was fined 50 cattle and his two sons were brought to Mumias. The reason for attacking the Maragoli was because of their alleged harrassment of the caravans on their way to Kitoto's, then a Gusii leader<sup>2</sup> near the eastern shore of the Kavirondo Gulf (Winam Gulf) presently identified as Miwani. Similar flimsy grounds were used against the Samia when a guard of the government was killed by a group of people. Without judiciously putting into consideration the indisciplined actions of porters and guards attached to European caravans which had created much hostility, the colonial administrators merely demanded and happily received reparations given by the people in the form of livestock. Mumia Nabongo received some share of this booty and enhanced his own wealth and influence (Dealing, 1974, 315). This seemed to demonstrate that although the administrators shared the assumption that colonised people are not capable of governing themselves under the strenous

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2. Kitoto was a famous chief among remnants of the Gusii in the area whose people were eventually assimilated by the Luo (Mwanzi, personal communication)

conditions of the modern world, Mumia's collaborative support called for avenues for reciprocity. This attitude reached its apogee in 1909 when he was pronounced paramount chief of the Abaluyia. Mumia was first appointed as a chief by the British under the village Headmen ordinance in 1902 and later as an official Headman (under the Native Authority Ordinance 1912) to whom all Headmen and Councils of elders in North Kavirondo were subordinate. Thus, he was gazetted as paramount chief of the then North Kavirondo and part of Central Kavirondo (KNA, OP/1/1328, 1945). All clan heads such Okwara and Dindi in Bukhayo, Busera Orodi and Kakai Chetambe in Tachoni, Onyango Ochola in Buholo, Busolo and Majanja of Bukusu Mboka and Ugari of Samia and Ngavo Kavyanga etc. were subordinated to Mumia.

### 3.3 The Wanga, Sub-ethnic alliances and the Establishment of Colonial Administration In Buluyia

The years between 1896 and 1914 saw the effective establishment of British authority in Buluyia. With the establishment of colonial rule, the people became subject to a number of forces working towards change. Their incorporation into a new and very large political entity which threw together many formerly independent African peoples and which also attracted European and Asian immigrants created an entirely new political context

which would have far reaching effects on them (Bode, 1978, 6).

With the creation of a formal colonial chieftaincy together with the local courts and councils, chiefs became the foundation of British power in the region throughout the colonial period. They became the single most important individuals in the localities and were the focus of much of social conflicts. It would then appear that the system of indirect rule in the region was institutionalised through the chieftaincies and native councils to regulate the affairs of the indigenous community. However, divergent and often contradictory discourses on the British policy of indirect rule in Africa merely trace its roots in the liberal colonial policy. This approach should be perceived in terms of British colonial ideology which developed within two major constraints, those imposed by the ideological presuppositions into Africa by the ruling class, and those originating in the exigencies of the local situation which they brought under their control (See Brett, 1973, 43).

British theory constantly assumed that the



contradiction between the need for change and the very limited availability of metropolitan resources to initiate and manage that change could be resolved through the divolution of power to effectively decentralised political and administrative structures (Brett, 1974, 55). Thus, the aggregate behaviour of British officials in the area tells the whole story, that Indirect Rule was a mere policy of convenience which could be tampered with whenever it was expedient. One could go as far as to say this explains why Indirect Rule instituted in Buluyia was of the most bastardised kind.

But subsuming British political behaviour in the region under the rubric of bastardised indirect rule presupposes a clear perception of the intrigues and distortions which they undertook in the various political set ups in the region. In this regard, a brief history of their inaugural diplomatic and administrative ploys in the region and their subsequent policies which they adopted is necessary. The inaugural European entry into Buluyia was in the form of exploration journeys, and the friendly overtures rendered by various chiefs of the area to these sojourners laid the basis of their future relations.

Henry Morton Stanley had touched the Luyia shores of Lake Victoria from near Mageta Island on his circumnavigation of the lake in 1875 (Barker, 1958). But he had hardly been involved in any protocol with the nearby chiefs. In 1883 Joseph Thomson and James Martin passed through Samia Chiefdom during the reign of Mugeni. The two also visited Bukhayo Chiefdom during the rule of Odunga and noted the good nature of the Bakhayo. Even the German Imperial agent Carl Peters passed through Odunga's home on his way to Buganda (See Osogo, 1966, 125-126). Apart of Wanga, there were chiefdoms among other sections of the Abaluyia whose hegemonies was recognised by the earliest European travellers.

Apart from having passed through Mugeni's area during their sojourn, Thomson also records having passed through Kabras and Wanga. In the later area, he reached the residence of Shiundu, a place famously called Kwa Shiundu. He noted in appreciation the abundance of food and other details of production and social life here (see Thomson, 1887, 284-287). Thomson described Shiundu as a sultan, a term that Carl Peters also used in his treaty of German protection signed with the other Wanga Nabongo Sakwa. The use

of the term Sultan shows a basic misapplication of kingly titles in Buluyia since the Luyia did not accord their rulers such a title. It was an erroneous generalization that was influenced by his first encounter with the Sultan of Zanzibar. But more significantly these encounters demonstrate the prior existence of Luyia chieftaincies apart from the Wanga Kingdom of Mumia. There were other kingly institutions not documented by these travellers and it would therefore be perfidious to describe the Luyia as acephalous except for the Wanga under Mumia like Berg-Schollosser (1979) and Bode (1978) would have us believe.

By the 1890's Europeans traversing through Buluyia for imperial reasons found themselves allying themselves with selected sovereigns of the area to advance their imperial aims. These alliances were made by the apparent sub-ethnic conflicts in the area caused mainly by slave traders. Indeed, Muslim traders from the Coast had been active even during Shiundu's lifetime. However, it was after Mumia Nabongo's accession to the throne that their involvement in Wanga affairs became significant. During this era, they began to exert some appreciable influence. It

was these Coastal traders who introduced into Wanga new products, new kinds of wealth and new sources of prestige and power especially in the form of guns (Dealing 1974, 253). They aggravated the conflicts between various sub-ethnic groups when they found the Wanga chief Shiundu and later his son Mumia very hospitable that as a result they established their headquarters amongst their Wanga friends. From Mumias (Lureko) the slave traders went plundering the region as far as Samia to the South-west and Bukusu to the North (Were, 1967, 144). Consequently various Luyia sub-ethnic groups found themselves faced with a formidable task of defending their lives, property, liberty and independence (Mutooro, 1975.76, 5).

Before his fateful death in eastern Uganda, Bishop Hannington who passed through the region on his way to Buganda twice refers to slaving activities with reference to the Kabras and the attendant suspicion of the local people in the Last Journals of Bishop Hannington (cited in KNA, DC/EN/3/1/2, see also Wagner, 1948-Vol. 1,32). Moreover, by 1890 Frederick Jackson in the report of his expedition described slave traders' activities during the reign of Mumia in Wanga and Msala in Samia (KNA, DC/NN/3/1).

Even Europeans passing through northern, central and south-western Buluyia chronicled similar events. Their accounts provide an extensive corpus of testimony. These activities intensified the hostilities between the Luyia sub-ethnic groups especially between the Bukusu and Wanga. Whenever the Bukusu defended their territorial integrity against some of these activities by killing some of the traders, the vengeance was often met with devastating pillage and plunder of their land. Those reprisals were characterised by massacres and commitment of horrible atrocities by the Arab-Swahili expeditioners. Against such background, the various sub-ethnic groups including the Banyala, Basamia and Bukusu were exposed to virtual destruction and annihilation by the Arab-Swahili - Wanga alliance. No wonder, these groups became amenable hostile to strangers especially if they happened to come from Mumias (Mutooro, 1975/76, 6).

Prior to the ascendance of Mumia to the Wanga throne, slave trade activities had led to a lot of hostility between the Wanga and the Banyala of Kakamega on one hand, and with the Batsotso on the other during Shiundu's lifetime. However, the southern areas of Kisa and Marama were under constant pressure from the

Luo as much as the Wanga were (Dealing 1974, 223). Consequently, they developed alliances and often sent warriors to fight against the Luo in concert with Shiundu's forces (Namungu, O.I., 1987). But far from acting as vassals, they collaborated basically on friendly terms. Kisa chiefs who sent warriors against the Luo in compliance with Shiundu's requests were Malika and Namukunda (Dealing, 1974, 223).

On the other hand, the hostility against the Bukusu by the Wanga was far from being baseless. It arose in the wake of internal struggles and conflicts within the body-politic of the Wanga state. This state had disintegrated into two separate polities on the ascendance of Shiundu to the throne after the death of his father Nabongo Wamukoya. Shiundu, the eldest son of Wamukoya found a rival to the Wanga throne in his uncle Kweyu. The latter moved from Lureko (Later Mumias), the capital of Wanga kingdom, and established his headquarters at Mukulu. There he instituted a new Nabongoship. His son Sakwa succeeded him and the political picture was such that Shiundu's early years as Nabongo overlapped with the reign of his uncle and rival Kweyu (Dealing, 1974, 185, 207).

It was when the political fortunes of the Wanga people were approaching their lowest ebb that a new factor was introduced. This was the arrival of Arab-Swahili traders, who allied with the Wanga. However, because of the rivalry within the Wanga sub-ethnic group, Sakwa came to terms with the Bukusu (Dealing, 1974, 208). Nevertheless, he retained Arab-Swahili influences. In 1889 and early 1890 Carl Peters described this influence in dress at Sakwa's court. Frederick Jackson also noted that Lureko had many residents who could speak Kiswahili fluently. The two also noted that there were settled coastmen at both Mukulu and Lureko (KNA, PC/NZA/3/45/1/1, 1909).

It appears that by 1887-90, the influence of the Coastal people had already been substantially intensified. Joseph Thomson described an attack against the Bukusu by 1,500 caravan men (see Thomson, 1887, 506). At the end of that period Frederick Lugard reports an effort by Mumia to sell ivory for guns. Furthermore, he records that four askaris who he discharged together with a great number of deserters from Jackson's swahili entourage formed quite a colony at Sakwa's and Mumia's (Lugard cited in Dealing, 1974, 402).

The Arab-Swahili traders did not attack the Marama, and the Kisa whom the Wanga had military pacts with. Using diplomacy the Wanga who had earlier on allied with the Maasai, then later Swahili-Arabs made military pacts with these Luyia sub-ethnic groups and maintained them by intermarriage. Thus, various personalities from these communities lavished friendly visits to both Mukulu and Lureko (see Sakwa-Msake, 1971, 16).

The Wanga people then had historically been involved in protracted and bitter struggles with their neighbouring Luyia, Luo and Kalenjin groups. Without external assistance the Wanga kingdom had proven vulnerable to attack and humiliation. It had therefore developed powerful allies in the Maasai and the Arab-swahili (Ogot, 1967, 231). Shiundu and after him Mumia needed Arab-swahili arms and ammunition not only to consolidate his position against his cousin Sakwa, a rival claimant to the throne but also fight enemies of Wanga such as the Bukusu, Nandi, Iteso and the Ugenya Luo. When the Uganda government under Colvile sent Frederick Spire to found a permanent administrative post at Mumias in November 1894, the Wanga had just suffered a devastating defeat in their first military



encounter with the Luo of Ugenya (Ogot, 1967, 232).

The British established their first administrative post at Mumias because of the Wanga's friendliness to Europeans. Although the European involvement in the region was ultimately to effect far-reaching changes in both values and institutions, The Europeans like the Arab-swahili were involved in the conflicts of the area. This involvement influenced patterns of traditional politics. The impact of their involvement remained. It was a cruel legacy. Their friendliness to Europeans was in part an outgrowth of earlier relations with the Arab-Swahili. After all, the first European to reach Wanga was Joseph Thomson who arrived in 1883 in the company of an Arab-swahili caravan, some of whose members were known to the local Wanga people. In 1885 when Bishop Hannington on his way to Uganda passed through the area, as we have noted before, Sakwa welcomed him warmly and so did Mumia (Dealing, 1974, 300-301).

In late 1889, there arrived in Wanga area three major expeditions within a year. These expeditions were larger and well equipped. Thus, they exerted a stronger impression on the Wanga

sovereigns. The first was led by Frederick Jackson and Ernest Gedge and it represented the Imperial British East Africa Company, a company then seeking to develop trade in East Africa. The expedition was concerned with mapping a serviceable route to Uganda. It also sought as much ivory as possible to defray expenses. Mumia sought from the expedition the kind of help he had hitherto received from the Arab-swahili traders. No wonder Jackson gave him an IBEA co. rifle (see Dealing, 1974, 301-302 and Were, 1967, 156-157).

The second expedition was led by a German, Carl Peters, who arrived in January 1890. He first arrived at Sakwa's and the latter made a request of assistance against the Teso and the Banyala of Kakamega. He promised to accept the German flag and half of the captured cattle for German help rendered. However, this flag was later to be lowered by Jackson and Gedge when they returned from Uganda and saw it hoisted at Sakwa's (Were, 1967, 157 and Dealing, 1974, 307).

The third expedition was that of Frederick Lugard. Both Sakwa and Mumia welcomed him. However, he hastily proceeded to Uganda. But before

he left, he hoisted the IBEA Co. flag at Mumias. Later both Mumia and Sakwa were cordial to other Europeans passing through the area. These included Captain Smith in May 1891, Bishop Tucker in 1892 and Sir Gerald Portal in March 1893 (Dealing, 1974 304).

There had been a continuing competition between Sakwa and Mumia. This struggle was a legacy of the dichotomisation of the Wanga state. But ever since Jackson and Gedge removed the German flag from Sakwa's and urged him to support the British, thereafter his loyalty was more suspect than Mumia's. In the days that were to follow, more company expeditions continued to use Mumias as a base while Sakwa's Mukulu was relegated to a mere stop over. The British Commissioner in Uganda, where administration had recently been set up, appointed Valet Frederick Spire in 1894 as a permanent government official at Mumias (Dealing, 1974, 307-309).

With the establishment of this administrative post, Mumia was therefore henceforth to deal with the British government and not private individuals. The post had been established to facilitate transport

to Uganda. There was not yet established an effective administration nor any effective control over the resources in the region. Consequently, despite the administrative post, the British had to somewhat depend on Mumia although they were suspicious of him and were unwilling to actively support his interests. None-the-less, because caravans were subjected to occasional raiding and harassment, this justified, in British terms, the new era of conquest and subjugation. Given the good terms in which the British and Wanga were and given their expansionist and extortionist interests, the two became partners in the new era of conquest and control. This way the pacification period at the end of the 19th century went hand in glove with "the search for a chief" (see Lonsdale 1964, 27). The chief was an institution that was to play a crucial role in defining the relationship between the peasantry and the colonial state chiefly by facilitating the exploitation of the peasantry.

The search for a chief in the whole of Buluyia resulted in the integration of all communities into a central authority, with the Wanga bearing the ultimate regional power. The new

authority was reflected in police and judicial activity, taxation, decision-making and the establishment of an administrative hierarchy revolving around Mumias. In this sense Wanga kingdom under Mumia institutionalised the Shitsetse power both within and without Wanga. Leaders from this clan affectively established dominance within the native authority system between 1902 and 1914 (Dealing 1974, 327).

Once the British administration was firmly in the saddle, regardless of the constraints in British colonial ideology, chiefs were accordingly appointed. Hobley was forced to consult his faithful allies, Mumia and his people on the question of loyalty to the British by sub-ethnic groups or clans. In cases where there were no loyal sub-ethnic groups or clans, a foreigner was appointed as chief over the unruly group. Such a leader was often from Mumia's family (Mutooro, 1975/76, 10-11).

The whole of Maragoli was placed under Khamadi, a Wanga of Arab-swahili extraction, as chief in 1903. He was also to rule over Bunyore; parts of Idakho and Tiriki and his headquarters was

put under Kadima, another close relative of Mumia (Bode, 1972, 12). These chiefs were placed above the pre-existing clan heads of the areas to the disenchantment of the local people.

By 1914 the whole of Buluyia was directly under Mumia and his brothers. He had been relied upon by the British to provide capable men who were fit in the British sense of political control to be appointed chiefs and headmen over various subdivisions. The search for a chief therefore culminated in the erection of an autocratic structure in Buluyia. Even the early policies of the missionary societies established in the ~~region~~ between 1902 and 1914 in selecting of chiefly lineages for their main evangelistic and educational attention reinforced this autocratic structure (Lonsdale, 1964, 28). On the whole, the conjunction between the administrators' requirements and the mission's early interest in influential families then certainly enhanced and reinforced the position of dominant lineages. Enlightened chiefs and headmen were anxious that their sons be educated. By 1910, a number of such youths were being educated at C.M.S. schools and Mill Hill Mission Schools (KNA, PC/NZA/1/5, 1910).

The administrative units of Buluyia were

instituted in 1908 by Geoffrey Archer, then acting D.C. He divided the area into 8 administrative units or locations including Gem, Alego and Buholo. Others were Bukusu (Kitosh), Kisa and Marama and Butsotso Samia was created in the South-West with boundaries following the Bukhayo and Iteso territorial areas. They were created bearing in mind the population distribution of existing clan and Luyia sub-groups. These administrative units became locations comprising heterogenous clans that were hitherto self-governing. The preponderance of Mumias's influence in the territorial demarcations was exemplified by the presence of Mumia and Murunga during the actual survey and demarcations by Archer. The chiefs and headmen who were appointed in these area were virtually turned into labour recruiters. They were issued with labour quotas. They were subjected to pressure and bribery to exact more labour from their areas and their recruitment method became a major point of conflict between chiefs and Luyia homesteads. Acting on orders for labour, they therefore arbitrarily picked batches of men from their locations. Notably, none of the local people were consulted, a fact which later caused a lot of political disquiet in most of Buluyia (see Were, 1967, 175).

The locations of Samia (then comprising Samia, Bunyala and Busonga) and Buholo were included in Wanga under Mumia although they were ruled on behalf of Mumia by Wanga agents such as Were in Buholo and Kadima in Samia as hitherto noted<sup>3</sup>. By 1914 Mumia was in virtual control of the then North Kavirondo District. All the headmen and councils of elders in the region were subordinate to him such that he was given the responsibility of appeal authority in all native cases and also empowered to settle boundary disputes (see Were, 1967, 177).

It is then clear that the district was divided into administrative sub-regions in which mostly people drawn from the Abashitsetse clan, and particularly from Mumia's family at Mumias (Lureko) and Mukulu were as British agents. It should be noted that from the very beginning the

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3. The Baholo clans had Tiriki origins when about six generations ago the Tiriki clans settled in Uholo. They lived among the Luo and eventually dropped their Luyia language and customs including circumcision. Also in Uholo were sections of the Wanga who also took to Luo language. The recognised head of the Waholo was Onyango Ochola.



policy aroused a lot of antagonism. On 15th November 1908 when Mumia was appointed paramount chief of the whole district, a keystone of this edifice of indirect rule was formally laid. Yet as early as 1909 resentment against Wanga agents started to gain momentum. Wambani was rejected in Butso while Tomia was rejected by the Banyala of Navakholo (in Kakamega). In Kabras the subordinate local headmen refused to submit to their Wanga agent Shiundu so much so that even when he was replaced by another Wanga agent namely Sunguti in 1915, resistance still raged on until Mulupi, a Kabras was appointed (Were, 1967, 178). In 1908, Mnyendo Shiundu was appointed chief over Buholo. Because of trouble in the area, he was deposed in favour of Were Shiundu in 1914 (KNA, DC/NN/3/1).

It then appears that the period 1908-1914 was a period of prestige, opportunity and influence for Mumia. Although Nabongo of Mukulu was recognised as chief in his own right, however, he was subordinate to Mumia. Even the Abamuima and Abamurono who had formerly been autonomous no longer had any judicial role. In compensation, Mumia gave a share of the fines he received to their head (Dealing, 1974, 338).

Sakwa the Nabongo of Mukulu had died in 1895 and he was accordingly succeeded by his elder son Tomia. The latter's step brother had been enthroned in Butso while he retained his Wanga Mukulu and Kabras as noted before.

Be it as it may, Hobley who had been engaged in the establishment of the British overrule in Western Kenya remained in the region up to 1903 (Ogot, 1967, 233). He had operated from Mumias up to 1900 when he left for Kisumu. By 1900 there was increasing activity of European traders plying between Buganda and the coast or hunting for ivory in Nyanza. These traders expected the caravan route to Uganda be kept open and therefore when inter-ethnic disputes disrupted trade, this invited administrative intervention (Lonsdale, 1964, 112). In 1901 Hobley was appointed sub-commissioner of Uganda's Eastern Province and was charged with exercising general political control over the relations between the various tax collectors and the Africans (Lonsdale, 1964, 112). The chiefs and headmen were the central figures in this exercise. In colonial official rhetoric, it was argued that taxation makes a better constituted society, and it was certainly an uplifting

unfluence as it connected the ordinary native with a paramount form of government.

Direct taxation as a regular system of taxation was unknown before the European occupation (KNA, PC/NZA/1/6, precis of Annual Report 1911). The tax in many areas constituted the first step in the introduction of the native to a cash economy. The first tax was collected in Buluyia area in 1900 and since collection had proved cumbersome, it had been necessary to establish collecting stations (Mwenesi, 1972, 10). In 1912, a total of Rs 305, 679 were collected in form of hut tax (KNA, PC/NZA/1/7, Nyanza Province Annual Report, 1912). For figures of the previous years see table 1 and 2. In Bukhayo the tax collector was Wesutsa while Welima, Mulama and Sunguti, Chitechi and Wambani collected in Marachi, Marama, Buholo and Butsosto respectively (Dealing, 1974, 69). These were appointed following a disastrous experiment with Arab-swahili collectors.

Hobley had exercised control over the Arab-swahili tax collectors that with his transfer from the area in 1903, there followed a period of administrative chaos with some 9 District Commissioners at Mumias and 4 Provincial Commissioners at Kisumu in 4 years (Dealing, 1974, 357). Mumias had long ceased to be the focus of administrative activity. Colonel Ternan who was Acting Commissioner in charge of Uganda had ordered in 1900 (when the railway was

Table 1: Taxation figures in North Kavirondo between 1906 and 1910.

Year	Tax Collected
1906-7	Rs 49,755
1907-8	Rs 75,615
1908-9	Rs 194,406
1909-10	Rs 207,324

Source: KNA, PC/NZA/1/7, NYANZA PROVINCE ANNUAL REPORT, 1912.

Table 2: Statement of Hut Tax from Some of the Locations of North Kavirondo in 1912

Location	Tax Collected
Kisa	20,460
Bunyore	22,593
North Maragoli	22,887
North Tiriki	7,677
South Tiriki	5,193
Nyangori	6,480
South Maragoli	16,107

Source: KNA, PC/NZA/1/7, NYANZA PROVINCE ANNUAL REPORT, 1912.

steadily approaching Lake Victoria) that the headquarters of the province should be moved to Kisumu (Hobley, 1929, 105).

The Arab-swahili played a big role in the early local administration especially in the collection of taxes. This was often with less acceptable results. When taxes began to be collected in the areas, as elsewhere in Uganda, the taxes were paid in labour, equivalent to 3 rupees per year or in kind (Osogo, 1966, 132). Taxes in kind included hoes, domestic animals such as goats, fowls etc.

Paying taxes in rupees was expected of the Abaluyia since the Indian currency had made its way into the area from earlier times. Between 1906 and 1910, the government had been encouraging the growth of marketable tropical products like cotton. It introduced seeds of the crop in the area and constructed connecting roads to facilitate trade. Trade centres were opened where the Luyia began to sell their produce and pay for imported goods in cash. In 1909, the local value of African produce railed from North Kavirondo was Rs 667,000. This had sharply risen from Rs. 287,460 in 1908

(KNA, PC/NZA/1/5, 1910). The main centres of trade were Yala (then in North Kavirondo), Mumias and Kakamega. Produce grown in the district included simsim, maize, wheat and potatoes. Increased trade in these commodities made Allidina Visram start to run 2 motor wagons between Yala and Kisumu (KNA, PC/NZA/1/5, 1910). The Luyia economy was becoming more and more monetised. Paying taxes in cash had become an additional impetus to trade.

Although the actual collectors were mainly Arab-swahili, chiefs got a commission for co-operating in its collection. There was some resistance over this by the Bukusu in 1905 and 1908. Moreover, given that a Wanga chief Mahero had been forced on South Bukusu from 1900 onwards, while Murunga had been forced on the Bukusu of Kimilili (together with Teso), the Bukusu began to migrate eastwards into Trans-Nzoia to avoid both the British-Wanga hegemony, and the payment of tax (Osogo, 1966, 132). Many settled in the distant regions as far as Cherangani Hills.

In 1910 a combined poll and hut tax called Obushuru bwe Inzu and Obushuru bomurwe began to be levied. Faced with these colonial pressures it is

not surprising that the Bukusu between 1900 and 1910 had began an exodus into Trans Nzoia given that they had historical ties to the region. Poll-tax was first introduced in the towns and the so called non-reserve areas of the province. Tradition attests to their occupation of Silikwa in Uasin Gishu Plateau prior to their western migration to Masaaba (Mt. Elgon), where they had built massive defensive walls around their villages. It is stated that after their westward migration, later, those who had a sentimental attachment to Silikwa went back (Makila, 1978, 145). They also occupied regions of present day Kitale which they traditionally called Sibwani (Makokha, O.I., 1988).

In their third leg of migration, probably in the 19th century some of the Bukusu who had settled in their present country migrated to Sibwani (near Kitale) owing to endemic warfare in the former area (see Were 1967b, 1982). The attachment to Trans-Nzoia had further been demonstrated by the flight of the Bukusu into various directions following their defeat at Lumboka where they had been military led by Wakoli against British expeditionary forces. They moved into places like Bokoli, Naitiri, Ndibisi, Sibwani near present day Kitale, Kiminini

and Chetambe near Webuye. Sibwani Kiminini and Ndivisi now form part of Trans-Nzoia district of Rift Valley.

The name of the Kisumu Province was altered to Nyanza by an official proclamation on the 1st October 1909. The previous name of Elgon District of the Abaluyia was altered to North Kavirondo (KNA, PC/NZA/1/5, 1910). Before long the concept of restricting natives to reserves was began in Buluyia by Sir Percy Girouard in 1910. The Bukusu who began early exodus from the District were an already settled community both in the then Kavirondo area and the Trans-Nzoia neighbourhood<sup>4</sup>. Girouard in a memorandum to all administrative officers expressed succinctly the need to preserve African nationalism in the native reserves. In the subsequent year his successor Ainsworth proceeded to create locational councils under the Native Courts Ordinance (Lonsdale, 1964, 154-155). However, it was not until 1920 that North Kavirondo was designated as a Bantu reserve in September (Makila, 1978, 27).

The supply of labour between 1902 and 1914 in the protectorate was largely confined to Kisumu district and North Kavirondo. This explains why the

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4. In 1911, the D.C Bwana Hoey and the P.C Dundes used Mumias to negotiate the resettlement of the Maasai occupants of parts Trans-Nzoia/Uasin Gishu around Hoey's bridge in Alego, Bukhayo, Butsotso, Marama and Wanga. On agreement the Maasai leader Ng'aibire took other Maasai past Sirigoi (see Dealing, 1974, 81).



Bukusu began an outward movement to Trans-Nzoia. A system of identification therefore was started in order to facilitate the recapture of deserters. Table 3 shows the registered number of labourers from Nyanza and their respective employers.

On the whole, the imposition of colonial rule made it easy for penetration of Buluyia by capitalism. Colonialism then effected the articulation of indigenous modes of production with the capitalist mode of production and the integration of African economies into the Western capitalist system through the institution of chiefs and other mechanisms. As pointed out, they were to define the relationship of the Luyia peasantry to the colonial state mainly by facilitating the exploitation of the peasantry through tax collection and recruitment of labour as we shall see in the next chapter. But the withdrawal of labour from the peasant use value production was to alter the traditional mechanisms which we have explained in the previous chapter. This undermined the material reproduction of the traditional Luyia peasant economy. At the same time, the imposition of an alien administration created mechanisms through which Buluyia could effectively be controlled by merchant capital although

Table 3: Kisumu District and North Kavirondo - Registered Employees in 1912

Employer	No. of Labourers
Mombasa water works	070
Uganda Railway	1,675
Magadi Railway	2,525
Kings African Rifles and Police	200
Government Stations	290
Settler farms in Uasin Gishu, Lumbwa and Muhoroni	1,200

that subordination was not total.

After, the establishment of colonial rule, the the Buluya economies shifted their emphasis from production for subsistence to production for sale in order to pay taxes and possibly purchase goods already in the markets of the district. Thus, marketing arrangements reflected the needs of these societies being primarily dependent upon the growth of subsistence crops, fishing and livestock (Fearn

1961, 30). The imported goods included cloth, blankets, hoes, soap, sufurias, lamps, etc.

Therefore, taxation, conscription of labour and the establishment of markets were effected through chiefs in Buluyia and these institutions interfered with the dynamics of the old society and its economy.

Government policies and demographic pressures, the enterprise of Asian middlemen, and the Luyia themselves among other factors, were to transform production practices and create a diversified economy in wage labour, trade and market production.

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These changes had started to take root in Buluyia during the wars of pacification. The early colonial period marked a stage of formal subordination of labour to incipient merchant and other capital. The labourers recruited to work on public projects and the labourers who enlisted in wage-labour following the alienation of land and inception of taxation were a people recruited through the efforts of chiefs. Various groups of people rioted against these moves. Notable among these sections were Bunyore, Kisa, South and North Tiriki (KNA, PC/7, 1912). The recruits were now not dispensing with their labour to effect a change of form in materials of nature such a land which they

had hitherto wholly owned and controlled. They were no longer to exist in an unfettered relationship to the means of production. Their self-realisation in the ownership of the means of production and capacity to work was transformed into a means of producing value for settlers and the colonial state. Through the impulses of incipient merchant and other capital, their labour process became inextricably linked to the struggle for profitable production. Hence the process of production did not combine the labour process with the self-satisfying creation of social value. The settlers and the colonial administration in Buluyia and other parts of the country now exerted partial control over the conditions under which the speed, skill and dexterity of the hired Luyia labourers operated.

When therefore, the wage labour process was subsumed under the control of the settlers and the colonial state, it involved an element of subordination of that labour. The newly instituted chiefs of Buluyia were to become oppressive in their activities of collecting taxes and recruiting labour that elicited opposition such as the one we have cited... It led to various forms of resistance through desertations. This was the case in Bukusuland when peasants began moving into Trans-Nzoia to avoid the problems caused

by excesses of the colonial administration in North Kavirondo. Because of this recalcitrance, attempts to regularise the flow and rationalise the use of forced labour reached their peak in 1915 with the enactment of the Native registration Ordinance (Makokha, O.I., 1988). Various offences against the state were punishable through Native Tribunal except for cases provided by other legislative procedure. By 1912, there were 10 protectorate courts in North Kavirondo.

But apart from ensuring the sustenance of law and order and the conscription of labour, the colonial chiefs and headmen forced the peasants to cultivate certain crops. This was particularly true of cotton (Dindi, O.I., 1987). Before 1914, Samia produced the bulk of cotton in North Kavirondo. In 1912, it produced a total of 260,000 lb of seed cotton. The pattern of growth in peasant agriculture was altered by these activities. However, the historical baseline of an extroverted peasantry coincided with the last quarter of the 19th century when the destruction of the traditional peasantires began following the growing demands of caravan trade in many parts of the region. The

peasantisation of the indigenous Luyia producers therefore marked a major transition from the traditional peasantry to a capitalist oriented one. It was a transition that could not take place without the dissolution of the reproductive cycles of the traditional lineage based peasantry. These cycles were broken through a gradual process of integrating Buluyia into the colonial state from the 1890's. The presence of the state began to be felt during the punitive expeditions, wars of pacification, the establishment of administrative agencies, the alienation of land, the expropriation of labour and the imposition of direct taxation. Moreover, other natural forces were to continue wreaking havoc on the Luyia peasantry. For instance, between 1906 and 1907, there was heavy hail-storm in Buluyia which destroyed crops especially sorghum in Maragoli. In the Maragoli region it also cut banana trees to 'ribands'. The scarcity of food that was brought by this caused riots in Bunyore when the Banyore were attacked by the Maragoli who believed that it was owing to the Bunyore rainmaker<sup>5</sup> (Nganyi) that their bananas were destroyed by hail (Angolo, O.I., 1987).

Other than just submit to the forceful impetuses of the colonial state, the peasants were obviously responsive to these ecological exigencies.

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5. On Mumia's orders, Nganyi the rainmaker of Nunyore had been arrested and jailed in 1905 on charges of withholding rain. A similar fate befell Odongo of Marachi.

Between 1910 and 1912, Rinderpest was severe in North Kavirondo. About, 10,000 head of cattle died. Around Yala River inhabited by the Kisa, Idakho and Maragoli, losses amounted to  $\frac{1}{3}$  of the stock (KNA, PC/NZA/1/7).

The chiefs were given immense powers. Their roles were defined by a new division of labour that was technical. While some of the peasants were recruited as labourers who were therefore, expropriated while performing the function of labour, the chiefs were expropriated while performing the function of capital as represented in the interests of the state and the settlers (see Garchedi, 1975, 409). Therefore, the creation of chiefs in Buluyia created a middle class which may be termed unproductive labourers. Their roles were now determined by the allocation of political resources by the state not subject to the rules of the traditional kinship lineage based division of labour. In a sub-title termed as classes, the P.C. for Nyanza Province acknowledged the existence of classes in 1912 when he said that the chiefs and elders were more less on the same grade. However, their importance was according to their wealth. After chiefs and rich elders came enterprising young men (KNA, PC/NZA/1/7, 1912).

By filling the position of chiefs in the colonial political economy between 1894 and 1914, their roles were not longer to be determined by kinship considerations. They were to form a social category of colonial functionaries, a middle class, which did not own the means of production but performed the global function of capital (see Garchedi, 1975, 361). They were to use their positions to influence the dexterity of African production on public works and therefore dominated the labour process and therefore interfered with the the surplus-value producing process on their holdings. The reproduction of their functional roles and middle class position was therefore determined by political and ideological factors, factors that we have explained in the earlier phases of the chapter. They performed their global function of capital collectively in a hierarchical structure that ranged from P.C. all the way to the village headman. Each office had its own etiquette. Thus, their immense powers were used to further subjugate Buluyia and commit it to the interests and requisites of colonial capitalism. By assuming responsibility, they were to eliminate evasion of tax payment, evasion of labour conscription, work stoppages etc. and therefore through their office, the colonial



state was to effect the conquest, control, and subordination of Buluyia.

### 3.4 The Impact of Merchant Capital in Buluyia

The Luyia experience clearly demonstrates that the transition from a pre-capitalist to a capitalist mode of production did not occur because of the internal dynamic of the Luyia societies. But it occurred because of the colonial state with its use of force to integrate their economies with the metropolitan capitalist economy and direct it into production for export, and the impact of merchant capital which generated its own impulses. In some respects, the two stimuli had a compounded effect. A colonial official noted:

Taxes undoubtedly stimulated industry and production. It has tended to make otherwise retiring and shy natives willing to trade. It has opened out the district and has brought the natives more into touch with the material objects of the world (KNA, PC/NZA/1/4).

While old patterns of trade were being

altered or even destroyed, new groups of traders were emerging. Ofcourse these traders faced numerous obstacles. They had problems in obtaining credit, capital, accurate market information, and getting access to other resources. The colonial government actually imposed legal restrictions against granting credit to Africans. Under the credit to Natives Ordinance, passed in 1903, no credit of more than £10 could be given to an African trader unless approved by a district officer. Despite these obstacles African traders increased. By 1910 African owned shops began to spread in the reserves (Zezeza, 1989, 56).

Nevertheless, withdrawal of labour from use-value production undermined the material reproduction of the traditional peasant economy with respect to agriculture, pastoralism, hunting and fishing or craft activity such as house-building, the manufacture of tools, weapons and other artefacts. At the same time, the monetization of some of the material elements of reproduction forced the rural producers into commodity production either through the production of cash crops or through the exchange of their labour-power for wages (Bernstein, 1979, 424). By 1914 all these activities had taken shape

in Buluyia. But before we provide further evidence of these activities in the next chapter, it is perhaps important to note that the establishment of the colonial administration between 1894 and 1914 destroyed the conditions of the traditional peasant economy and created the social conditions of commodity production and proletarianization.

But there is need to locate the place of merchant capital in the pauperization of Buluyia peasantries. Merchant capital had started the long process of penetration of these peasant economies coercing and rewarding production, transforming it with a highly intensified focus on the output of a few specific commodities. Although the pre-European caravan trade had already taken root in a few parts of Buluyia, its effects were comparatively less. Merchant capital of the colonial era intensified the process of incorporation of Buluyia peasantries into a world or inter-regional economy. Therefore, this set in motion powerful and more complex sets of processes which began to distance the peasants from each other politically, economically, socially and culturally.

Merchant capital is that form of capital which organises, one may say,

the circulation of commodities. Its operations are limited to the sphere of circulation and it can only acquire profit through unequal exchange. Merchant capital, as an agency had begun to mediate on behalf of production capital in the metropole by shaping the economic structures in the periphery (De Silvia, 1982, 416) of which the Luyia segment exemplifies herein the distortion of the peasantries by this force as to redirect their trajectories of growth towards underdevelopment.

In Buluyia, Indian merchants played a key role in this process. They began the historical process of concentrating of wealth through windfall profits from peasant produce. Relations of unequal exchange were established by the dominance of merchant capital when it established capital-peasant relations at the level of exchange. This in essence meant the superimposition of capitalist exchange relations on peasant pre-capitalist forms of production. This inevitably created a conflict of interests with aspiring Luyia small traders that was to be politically expressed in the subsequent years. The Indian traders were returning huge profits through a subtle mechanism of unequal

exchange. The exchange was unequal because no attention whatsoever was given to how the Buluyia peasants' commodities were produced. Moreover, with the support of colonial policy and the local administration, the British ensured that production was carried out and that a surplus of commodities was available to them. To some extent, they encouraged the production process but manipulated their knowledge of prices in overseas markets to procure peasant commodities. Too often, the peasants dispensed with their produce cheaply without knowing their actual international market value. They were duped through their ignorance about the conditions in foreign markets. Above all, they lacked access to these markets. Because of the increasing profitability of trade in local produce in Nyanza, in 1910, Allidina Visram, one of the leading magnets of Asian Merchant capital put out Rs 70,000 for the purchase of simsim in North Kavirondo. The viability of the trade made him start two motor wagons between Yala and Kisumu in view of increased simsim trade (KNA, PC/NZA/1/7). Simsim was sold at Rs 2.12 per frasila.

As merchant capital circulated through

Indian enterprises such as those of Allidina Visram and it established its dominance, it also accentuated the process of urbanization. Townships were established and trading centres emerged bringing upon the Luyia to bear the contradictions of urban Society. Mumias, Kakamega, Kimilili, Butere, Sio Port were already thriving by 1909. Many others were to follow such as Port Victoria, Bumala, Nambale Chavakali, Lubao, Lunyerere and so on. Merchant capital made such urbanization of Bulúyia countryside a self-propelling process as peasant producers dotted these markets for various exchanges. the Indian entrepreneurs were buying their produce below their value and selling the same at or above their value. Sorghum grain and flour was sold at 62 cts for 80 lbs, beans at 1 rupee for 80 lbs and Hides at 14 rupees per frasila (KNA, PC/NZA/4/5/5).

As such merchant capital contributed towards the dissolution of the reproduction cycle of the traditional peasantry. Together with other mechanisms such as taxation, land alienation and labour expropriation, it began the historical process of breaking the back of Luyia kinship ties a precursor of the state. In the previous chapter

we examined how kinship ties had revolved around the clan. However, following the generation of multifarious forces geared towards the dissolution of the reproductive cycle of the traditional Luyia peasantries whose reproduction was regulated by a clan based gerontocracy, dominant lineages whose survival hitherto had largely depended on extending the material bases of their reproduction were now undermined. They were undermined as relations of kinship reciprocity were displaced by relations of domination and subordination on the one hand and relations of unequal exchange on the market on the other.

Thus, although the clan was to retain an important role in the community, the traditional mechanisms of its operations were directly undermined. It no longer served as the only basis of family and lineage relations although clans retained their social and political head called Liguru, but whose functions were now spelled out by a colonial bureaucracy whose destiny and character bore close affinity to hierarchy and were protected by the state. The traditional Luyia land tenure system described in the previous chapter whose

operation had been regulated through mechanisms built in various Luyia clans changed with the commercialization of agriculture and the overwhelming impact of merchant capital. Moreover, the colonial concept of land ownership began to be gradually internalised by the Luyia following their inception of agricultural reforms built around the introduction of new crops and cultivation techniques. Although the Liguru could mediate in local disputes following the genesis of privatization of clan land by households over common places such as water-holes salt-licks, ceremonial lands and unused bushlands, land acquisition and the acquisition of rights to land were no longer to be a clan controlled affair - (Angolo, O.I., 1987).

Nevertheless, with individual households remaining the primary site of reproduction, household heads (the men) were to continue giving their sons rights to family land in the subsequent decades. This tendency was to breed an ugly land fragmentation in the Southern locations of Buluyia in the post-depression era. But one notable outgrowth of the colonial influence on the land tenure system was the right of households to



sell their land without recouring to the gerontocratic settlement of such alienation. Families were no longer to be fettered by clan prohibitions. On the whole, the colonial concept of land ownership and utilization now came to determine its use and proprietorship. But the appropriation of common clan lands by individual households especially the Amaguru, headmen or chiefs using the power of their offices bred social conflicts unprecedented in Buluyia historical experience. These were conflicts which were to be exacerbated by the land consolidation and adjudication measures of the late 1950's and the early 1960's.

### 3.5 Social Stratification and Sub-ethnic Rivalries in Buluyia

Class formation and the development of tribalism accompany each other (Saul, 1979, 347). When Buluyia was subjected to colonial conquest and subjugation, the peoples cultural identities began to be hardened into the image of a tribe perjoratively termed the Bantu of North Kavirondo. Their common language, common territory and kinship political systems were cultural identities which had insured

them against natural vagaries as the various corporate sub-ethnic groups linked by ties of trade and intermarriage variously exploited their respective ecological arenas (Lonsdale, 1989, 6). The image of tribe was being entrenched on the basis of these cultural identities and this was heightened by the competition for political resource allocation and the need to have access to the narrow institutions of the colonial state.

Because of the efforts undertaken by the colonial state to underwrite the entrenchment of tribalism that was culturally defined, it is necessary for us to problematise Luyia ethnic consciousness because the lines of antagonism and alliance come together and apart when culture enters the dynamic of class. Because of the centrality of the notions both of contradictions and of class struggle in Marxist analysis of history, it has usually been assumed that class systems can ultimately be delineated by fundamental cleavages between antagonistic elements: workers versus owners, labour versus capital (Sider, 1988, 9).

Ethnicity according to anthropologists has certain fluidity which allows it to be politically activated and de-activated, depending on the circumstances. Tribalism is the active political expression of ethnicity that has been situationally evoked and defined. Expressions of tribalism are most often new institutions and organizations which to some extent take inspiration and definition from the old. Their charters still derive from tribal solidarities whether they are genuine or of a colonially induced variety (Saul, 1979, 349). The British inherited the Luyia sub-ethnic form of authority at the locational and sub-locational level in which the pervading source of power was seniority of clans with their supportive ideologies of lineage descent. Hobley appointed chiefs and Headmen on this basis in Buluyia, an exercise that was continued by Ainsworth (KNA, PC/1/4).

Both Hobley and Ainsworth listed both chiefs and headmen to be in-charge of locations demarcated according to sub-ethnic boundaries. In a sense, as Luyia peasants were turned into a labour force to increase capital, in the process, capital was selecting staff to manage Buluyia on the spot.

The chiefs were given authority in the context of control and surveillance. The British search for chiefs and headmen in Buluyia therefore meant the creation of a middle class. Below are two tables showing the salaries of these by 1914.

Table 4: Native Administrations - Earning in 1909

Location	Chief	Headman	Salary in Rs
Wanga	Mumia(paramount chief) -		1,000
Marama	Mulama (sub-chief)	-	600
Buholo	-	Munyendo	240
Bukhayo	-	Okwara	300
Marachi	-	Otura	240
Bunyala (Busia)	-	Njira	144
Bunyala (Kakamega)	-	Munyuru	108
Kabras	-	Shiundu	240
Butsotso	Wambani(sub-chief)	-	240
		Tsuma	150
West Kakamega	Milimu (sub-chief)	-	240
East Kakamega	Ichivini (sub-chief)	-	120
North Bukusu	Sudi (sub-chief)	-	384
		Mahero	144
		Busolo	120
		Namasaka	120
		Opata	96
East Bukusu	-	Makhasa	240
		Matere	192
Kisa	Ndenda (sub-chief)	-	480

Table 4: Cont'

Location	Chief	Headman	Salary
Bunyore	Otieno Ndali	Msango	108
		Abundo	60
		-	240
		Limula	80
		Otiato	80
		Mtoko	84
		Teyie	84
Maragoli	Shivachi	-	300
		-	72
		-	96
		Odanga	92
		-	
Tiriki	Shikomi Michera	-	180
		-	60
		-	60
		-	60
		-	60

Source: KNA, NYANZA PROVINCE ANNUAL REPROT 1909.

Table 5: North Kavirondo - Salaries of Chiefs and Headmen - 1914

Location	Chief/Headman	Salary (in Rs)
Kabras	Mwanza	300/=
Kakalewa	Ndombi	108/=
North Kitosh	Murunga	330/=
South Kitosh	Sudi Majanja	500/=
Marachi	Oduya	250/=
Mukulu	Tomia	300/=
Samia	Kadima	350/=
Bukhayo	Okwara	300/=
Buholo	Mumere	300/=
Wanga	Mumia	1,500/=
Butsotso	Wambani	300/=

Source: KNA, NORTH KAVIRONDO ANNUAL REPORT 1915.

With the advent of colonial chiefs, the Luyia were no longer to be purely subject to the rules of the traditional division of labour. The determinant of their technical role was ideologically speaking, the allocation of political resources by the colonial state. Roles, in the social

structure were not now to be determined by traditional and kinship considerations but colonial economic motivations. Thus, the chiefs were a middle class identifiable in terms of contradictions between their non full ownership and control of the means of production and their functions in the colonial technical division of labour. Their accumulation of political and economic resources alongside the accumulation by other salaried cadres such as tax collectors, clerks to chiefs and the central administration provided the basis of the reproduction of classes. Reproduction of social classes depends on the reproduction of both positions and agents of production but the structure of positions is determined by political and ideological factors (Garchedi, 1975, 368).

The chiefs performed their functions collectively in a hierarchical structure and in new forms. Their responsibilities helped to subjugate the Luyia peasants, petty traders and migrant or local wage earners.

In political terms the Luyia learned quickly that progress in the abstract meant domination in the concrete. Thus, inter-clan

factionalism was generated as a compensatory reaction to the deprivations of colonialism and the contradictions created by the uneven development of colonial capitalism. Inter-clan rivalries and factional politics which began to characterise Buluyia therefore bore an ethnic interpellation that drew from common historical origins, common dialect and kinship ties. Ethnicity was a potent residue by default because the peripheral capitalist growth in Buluyia still generated a forceful ethnic interpellation in the area which represented an interaction between it and the area's pre-colonial lineage propelled peasant modes. Even though the Luyia had started to provide various cadres of labourers, pushed into harsh segments of the labour system and with the boundaries of segments changed with efforts of some groups to work their way into a better position, the working class were divided by the barriers proped by legal and institutional mechanisms (Cooper, 1983, 20).

But tensions, disjunctions, paradoxes and contradictions within the emergent middle class showed that culture does not form a functionally integrated whole. Disjunctions and contradictions



are continually restructured within a culture (Sider, 1988, 10).

Although the process of social stratification was still in its embryonic stages by 1914, the basis of rural land accumulation had been set. It depended upon the ability to use the government and its legal machinery, and access to wage income. It was only the chiefs and other colonial functionaries such as teachers, preachers, clerks, court interpreters and so on, who were in such a position. They sometimes used the cash they obtained from wages and their official positions to buy land and employ wage labour (Zezeza, 1989, 46-47). The peasantry became a transitional class that was moving from primitive cultivators to capitalist oriented cultivators who could be restratified into capitalists and semi-proletarians.

As early as 1914 tens of thousands of people were already being compelled to go out of the district in search of wage labour every year. In 1914, 10,394 men registered themselves for employment (KNA, DC/NN/1/2). Following the serious deterioration of the fertility of the soils in the

district and the consequent inability of land to support the increasing population, outward migration became an ever present feature. In colonial circles, it was continually argued that movement was to try and evade the hut tax (KNA, DC/NN/1/4. However, it is evident real economic hardship partly caused by exigencies of colonial policy and environmental disasters compelled many people to move out of the area by 1914 into the surrounding settler areas of Kaimosi, Trans-Nzoia, Uasin Gishu and Muhoroni either as squatters or casual labourers (Wafula, 1981).

The Luyia squatters in Kaimosi, Trans-Nzoia and Uasin Gishu were mainly Bukusu, Tachoni and Kabras in the latter two areas and the Tiriki and Maragoli in Kaimosi. The squatters continued their traditional practices of production on settler farms and also accumulated stock to the chagrin of their white hosts. This created an inevitable conflict over land rights and its utilization. The conflict occurred because the Luyia squatters carried their traditional concepts of land usage and tenure into the settled areas. In the previous chapter we showed how all land occupied by the Luyia was

originally mutually divided into clan locations having definite boundaries. Within this, the land was the common property of the members of the clan provided that any individual of the clan obtained right to land (KNA, DC/NN/1/1/3). This amounted to one fact that all Luyia were squatters on their clan land and therefore their squatting on clonial settlers' land was not antithetical to their traditional practices. To their dismay, in 1920 when the colonial government issued a labour ordinance which granted European farmers the right to hire and fire farm workers, the squatters were to be tied to farmers by forced arrangements which gave them the status of serfs (Osolo-Nasubo, 1973, 92).

Within the traditional land tenure practices in Buluyia, the original occupier of land had right to it even when left fallow. Any other cultivator had to seek for his permission. This when granted gave the new cultivator all rights which descended from father to son and included the rights to the old sites of villages which once vacated were cultivated (KNA, DC/NN/1/1/3). Given that by 1914, many of the farmlands cultivated by the Luyia were not developed by their settler owners, there had been misconception by the Luyia squatters as to their right of ownership. After all, when the districts were opened to settlers between 1908 and 1910, the Luyia sub-ethnic groups were expanding into these

areas. For a map showing the settled areas of Trans-Nzoia, Uasin Gishu and the Kaimosi farms see Appendix 3.

The ease with which these lands on which the Luyia were expanding were expropriated was characteristic of British imperialism. Oppressiveness and utter disregard of the rights and needs of the indigenous people bred the squatter phenomenon that was technically misunderstood by the Luyia. With the colonial state committed to capitalist farming, the African rights and needs were seen in terms of actual occupation only. The Luyia land tenure systems recognised rights to land not in current occupation but in terms of official needs in the shifting agricultural system and pastoralism practised before colonial rule (Wafula, 1981, 16-25). However, as will be demonstrated later, these squatters maintained a close interest in events back in North Kavirondo and were receptive to the area's political activism. They occupied an ambiguous position in the colonial economy in class terms. They were products of a superfluous proletarianization, workers estranged from the ownership of the means of production and yet driven by circumstances into small peasant farming on settler farms. Their

continued traditional practices of production and kinship ties became a clear testimony to the failure of imperialist invasion to completely subjugate the traditional economies through land, trade and fiscal policies. Nevertheless, they had to sign a three year contract and were given upto two acres of land on which to grow food for the family. Moreover they had not to sell their produce (Osolo-Nasubo; 1973). Disturbed by these controls, some squatters emigrated farther into towns to look for jobs. A further analysis of the squatter problem appears in the subsequent chapters.

CHAPTER IV

4.0 LAND ALIENATION, LABOUR EXPROPRIATION, COMMODITY  
PRODUCTION AND ECONOMIC CHANGE IN EARLY COLONIAL BULUYIA

4.1 The Early Colonial State in a Dialectical Perspective

Prior to the outbreak of the First World War, the question as to who would play the major role in economic development of the newly created colonial state of Kenya had already been decided (see Wolff, 1974, 55). The period witnessed patterns of protest among sections of Africans, innovative responses to the new challenges by others as well as efforts by colonial administrators to consolidate the colonial administration. This administration was to be used to support the fledgling settler-agriculture. But changes in Buluyia economies after the establishment of colonial rule did not take place evenly at this early time. These changes fluctuated in each area according to the influence of colonial socialization agencies such as the chief, headman, mission church and school, the colonial town and market on one hand and shifts in the world economy on the other. Nonetheless, before 1914, the most visible and perhaps the most significant change was the development of wage labour. As Rosa Luxemburg explained, "the social and economic ties of the natives" had to be relentlessly severed (Luxemburg, 1981, 370-1) as a means of providing servile labour.

Prior to the establishment of colonial rule, the exchange of labour for some kind of payment was vitually minimal. The obstacle to free voluntary labour was the abundance of land. By administrative means labour had therefore

to be prised out of primitive accumulation of capital during the era of pacification, a peasant farming (De Silvia, 1982, 24). After the initial stage of primitive accumulation of capital during the era of pacification of coercive labour system was instituted. The extremely authoritarian tendencies of the colonial state were conditioned by the weaknesses of its institutional reflexes given that as heretofore demonstrated in the previous chapter, its hegemony was contested from the very beginning, its security was uncertain and its autonomy narrow<sup>1</sup>. In its authoritarian reflexes, there was a constant interplay and discrepancy between constitutional position and political practice. One of the purposes of the colonial administration in incorporating chiefs in the state was to make use of their powers of government (Kimbe, 1985, 44). The chieftaincy was an effective means of accounting for every homestead and individual. But despite the institutional weaknesses of the colonial state, its sovereignty and legitimation resided in the imperial metropole. Here, the imperial ruling classes adhered to ideological specifications. Hence, authoritarianism was an unrelenting means of imposing on the Africans subjects the colonial imperial will. Expectedly, its institutions of rule, legal order, and ideological representation took the

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1. Operating within a political context that was surrounded by traditional economies which had to be destroyed, the colonial state became strongly interventionist in the economy. Its reflexes became conditioned to extreme authoritarianism.

pattern and form of metropolitan practices and traditions. Within these colonial realms and ideals several gradations of political participation in Buluyia were used as instruments of effecting imperial coercion and primitive accumulation in the so called pacification era. In the previous chapter we have examined how gradations of political participation were laid out through the Wanga influence and political expedience that culminated in the establishment of the chiefly based administrative machinery in Buluyia. In this chapter we will analyse how the imposition of colonial rule entailed the process of capitalist penetration of Buluyia economies prior to the outbreak of the First World War. We will therefore explain how colonialism affected the relationship between indigenous modes of production and the capitalist mode of production and particularly note patterns of integration of these economies into the Western capitalist system. We will also examine the processes of proletarianization and commoditization in the area and trace their effects on wage labour, production and trade.

While it is true that colonial patterns of class formation began to take root this early creating arenas of conflict which were to culminate in new colonial and political struggles, we will demonstrate how the peasant household was the primary site of production and reproduction for the majority of the Abaluyia.

Despite the absence of political centralization in the western sense of a state evidence has been adduced that various other Luyia communities had kingdoms in miniature as exemplified by the Banyalo, Bakhayo, Samia and Bukusu (see Manyasi, 1972,



25). Needless to reiterate how these clan based forms of social and political organizations were for the first time banded together in an Anglo-Wanga political hegemony, the British conception of the ways to administer battered, reshaped and reorganised these indigenous governments. As well, it modified their functions. The redistribution of economic resources and political power which the process entailed by far surpassed the impingement upon these societies by external trade relations or inter-communal political conflicts of the late 19th century. Notable in this effort to redistribute economic resources and political power that would not undermine the overriding imperial ethic was the creation of native authority.

The native authority system provided both the frame within which the bastardised form of indirect rule in Buluyia was moulded and the administrative structure within which it operated. The official chiefs and headmen who it legitimised as the local colonial executives, who operationalised colonial government policies, played leading roles in the early days of Taxation and coercive labour recruitment (see Lonsdale, 1964, 24). The historical evolution of this edifice began in 1902 with the enactment of the Village Headmen Ordinance as the first native authority in Kenya. In 1912 this ordinance gave way to the Native Authority Ordinance which in turn was amended in 1924 to make provision for the statutory establishment of Local Native Councils as local government bodies (Omusule, 1974, 24).

Through conquest and subjugation, which went hand in hand with political accumulation that was geared towards

fulfilling imperial interests, the self-legitimizing colonial state expropriated the means of production in sections of Buluyia on behalf of settlers. Here as was the case elsewhere in Kenya, conquest was necessary since the land tenure systems and religious beliefs of the people forbade the people from selling their land and livestock. The conquest of much of Western Kenya had been completed before the arrival of the first settlers. Nevertheless, because colonial records on land were chronicled by officials who were representatives of graduates of British academies of imperialism with their myriad justificatory myths on sensitive political questions, these state sponsored chroniclers took a pro-imperialist stand vis-a-vis the land question. They have, due to their insufficient documentation of land alienation, misled a wide section of historians on Kenya into assuming that this phenomenon was mostly predominant in Central and Coastal Kenya.

Writing on the Luo and Luyia of Western Kenya, Lonsdale (1977, 843) argues that there was scarcely any land alienation from the people under examination. This position is also reflected in Sorrenson (1968) and Middleton (1965) among others. But it is grossly mistaken as we shall shortly demonstrate. In Western Kenya, land was sequestered and its occupants either pushed back into the reduced North Kavirondo Reserve or into squatter conditions.

#### 4.2 Labour Recruitment in Buluyia

By 1914 neither taxation nor land alienation had yet broken the backs of peasant households for many of them to seek their reproduction through wage labour. We have hitherto

narrated how the northern Bukusu moved in great numbers into Trans-Nzoia between 1900 and 1910 when they could not cope with the exigencies of poll and hut tax recovery by the local administration. In the years before the First World War, the alienation of land to Europeans in Kenya was made by the administration of the day in the belief that no encroachment was being made on African rights (Fearn, 1961, 92). This, however, was not the case. When all land that was not in actual occupation was declared crown-land, Africans were left with only pieces on which they worked for their subsistence. But before providing evidence of alienation of land in Buluyia, a brief history of British efforts to procure labourers from the area is deemed necessary.

Turning to the apparently relative timing of an African society's confrontation with European political ambition an encounter that was detrimental to its regional network of African relations, one notices that until 1901 Western Kenya to the British represented little more than a section of the caravan route, an important refreshment station on the way to Uganda (Lonsdale, 1977, 849). Even the presence of caravan activities in the region had levied demands on the people in terms of portage and introduction of new trade items that were largely ornamental. In Chapter 2, the picture that emerged in our cursory look at the exchange and productive proclivities of the Abaluyia prior to the era of the trade was one of a people who were self-sufficient in their needs. While our analysis of the impact of the long distance trade in the area highlighted the somewhat altered terms of exchange and subsistence, it is

pertinent here to locate the disruption of this exchange and forms of subsistence at the hands of colonial policies especially those relating to production and exchange.

Historically, overt British interest in Buluyia may be traced back as far as 1877 when William Mackinnon who had built up a commercial steamship company plying between Britain and India, was offered a concession by the Sultan of Zanzibar to run the Sultan's customs and services (Ghai and MCAUslam, 1970, 6). As a result of this undertaking, Mackinnon had perceived the great commercial possibilities that existed in the region. In 1887, he established the British East Africa Association with the express purpose of opening up the British portion of East Africa to the so called commerce and civilization. On the basis of a royal charter which the association was granted in September, 1888, the association now reconstituted as the Imperial British East Africa Company, was empowered by the British government to enter the territory and stake out claims on her behalf and consolidate the gains thereafter. The company endeavoured to do this in frenzied determination until it was replaced by the British Foreign Office in 1895.

Labour recruitment in the area in the form of portorage was already being felt by the Luyia through the pulverizations of the company's caravan trade requirements. Indeed, the subsequent years were among the most crucial for the area and the entire country in the sense that it was a time for the British Government to decide as to how best the people and resources of the new territory would be exploited and "reaped off" for the benefit of the metropolitan bourgeoisie and

state (Wafula, 1981, 16).

The core of conquest of Buluyia as elsewhere was the accumulation by the British of local political resources albeit their having been extraverted to suit the aims of the colonial state whose sovereignty resided in the imperial metropole. Notwithstanding the imperial ethic of law and order, political accumulation went hand in hand with the appropriation of economic resources thereby demonstrating the dual nature of imperial punitive expeditions. But the pre-condition of political accumulation by the British was effected through illiances with certain Africans. It was hindered by the initial resistances in the area or the persistent recalcitrance of given sections of the Luyia community. This remained the trend so much so that much of the edifice of British control rested on mutually incompatible calculations of self-interest (see Lonsdale, 1977, 852).

For the simple reason that British political control rested on characteristic calculations of self-interest there arose contradictions within politics of imperial conquest. As much as there was political conflict in the allocation of power within Buluyia whereupon Wanga chiefs unpopularly acted as auxiliaries to the British interests and purposes of divide and rule, the exercise of British dominance on African resources espoused economic conflict. The first demand of that dominance was the demand for porter labour. From the earliest period of colonial rule, demands were put on the local people to provide food and portorage for government parties to help construct and maintain roads (Kay, 1973, 42).

Porterage was particularly unpopular among the Abaluyia. Prior to the advent of the British in the area, the Arab-Swahili had persuaded various people in the region to go along with them to work as domestic servants or porters. However, such people would be sold on reaching the coast (Dealing, 1974, 277). The apparent Arab-Swahili deception and predation had provoked the hostility of several Luyia sub-ethnic groups especially the Bukusu and Banyala of Kakamega. Even with the establishment of British hegemony whose first demand from the local population was porterage, many Luyia sub-groups remained indifferent. Consequently, faced with the growing reluctance to serve as porters, the British resorted to coercion.

It was the responsibility of the British station at Mumias to provide porters for the stretch of the caravan route between Busoga in present day Uganda and Eldama Ravine. Forty porters are remembered to have died during one of the trips and indeed it was a difficult journey across a high and cold country of which very few Luyia people had any experience (see Dealing, 1974, 333). But far from meeting the insatiable demands of the British, a second obligation imposed by the colonial state came into effect in 1900 when the administration began collecting a Hut-Tax. In 1910 a combined poll and Hut Tax began to be levied and evasion of tax became increasingly common (Osogo, 1966, 132).

Further still, the Abaluyia peoples had to meet yet another obligation. This involved labour service on roads and bridges and the construction of administrative stations. Local chiefs and headmen were required to provide these

labourers. The question of labour appropriation calls for a more engrossing analysis given the truism that the organization of human labour is crucial to the development or underdevelopment of regionally bounded social formations (see Bunker, 1984, 49). Luyia labour power appropriated by the colonial state on public enterprise created surplus values which enhanced the image of colonial physical infrastructure in a way that raised better avenues for its accumulation of more capital.

At the beginning of colonial rule massive supplies of labour were needed to lay the foundations of the colonial economy. Undercapitalised as the colonial state and the settlers were during this period, they could not provide wages and conditions that could attract and retain labour. Also, the need for Africans to sell ~~their~~ labour power was not yet compelling. Understandably, forced or compulsory labour was widely used and it became institutionalised during the first few decades of colonial rule. Professional labour recruiters were given a free hand and they used dubious and cruel methods in order to get labour. Chiefs were expected to recruit labour on behalf of the settlers and the government. They were also supposed to provide communal labour for public works programmes (see Zeleza, 1989, 27-28).

Wages being generally too low to be widely used as the primary incentive to induce men to migrate from their homes and become wage labourers, the colonial state resorted to direct taxation as the main determinant in pressurising Africans in Kenya into wage labour. Every married man had to pay his hut and poll tax (see Van Zwanenberg, 1975, 80). Yet the Southern

Logoli were reluctant to pay these taxes up to the period of the First World War. Before this war, most of the Luyia were in the Elgon District of Kisumu Province although a few were in the Kisumu District of the same province. After the war, the province was renamed Nyanza Province. Thus, Elgon District sometimes called Mumias District became North Nyanza while Kisumu District became Central Kavirondo (Bode, 1978, 65). Within this provincial administration, the first taxes to be collected resembled raids and the huts of the recalcitrant communities were burned and their livestock seized.

Colonial demand on Luyia prior to the outbreak of the First World War gravely affected the traditional patterns of labour utilization. Prior to establishment of colonial rule, the exchange of labour for payment was virtually non-existent. Labour had been mobilised through the kinship system on the basis of reciprocal relations<sup>2</sup>. Although this pattern continued to some extent, external demands for labour undermined the bases of its reproduction given that to some extent such labour was alienated. It was alienated because the labour process in the wage labour form ceased to be an extraction of value from materials of nature within which the workers realised their own purpose. The wage labour process was subsumed under the partial control of the capitalist. It involved a formal subordination of labour during the period of formal engagement as opposed to the traditionally established labour process (see Thompson, 1983, 41). In sum, the labour process of the semi-proletarianized Luyia who still owned land in their reserve became inextricably linked to the struggle for profitable

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2. Kinship was the ideological product of the social relations binding together members of a common production unit.



production.

In the 1890's and early 1900's forced labour was disguised as tribute labour. In 1908, forced labour for government purposes was legalised on the premise that the state was the agent of the so called civilizing mission. Thus, labour recruitment for settlers was to be made in the name of encouragement given that the supply of voluntary labour was held back by increased production in the regions where settlers hoped to draw labour, especially Central and Nyanza Provinces (Zezeza, 1989). The practice of involving women and children in communal labour was enshrined in the 1912 Native Authority Ordinance. This in effect amounted to forced labour for government purposes within the reserves and indeed forced labour recruiters included chiefs, D.C's private European and Asian recruiting agents.

The rapid development of labour migration from Buluyia was largely achieved by administrative pressures. After the First World War, 15% of the male population in the region was employed. The colonial government required labourers to act as porters on regular basis in the area before and during the war. Others were required to build roads and bridges within the various locations of the then North Kavirondo. Even early traders in the first and second decade of colonial rule depended on locally recruited porters to carry goods in and out of the district (Bode, 1978, 101). This was the picture given by a number of oral informants in Samia in Busia where Asian traders had already established themselves at Sio Port from very early. The same is true of Bukusu whereby as early as 1910 Malakisi was set up as a

prominent trade centre. Other trading centres were set up by the colonial government to increase trade through Indian traders. Between 1903 and 1909 Asian centres were established at Mumias, Yala, Butere and Kakamega (Ogutu, 1979, 217).

Although the labour market had a great demand of Luyia wage earners, such labour was difficult to procure during the months of January to March, and September to October. This was the period when the male labour force reverted back to their farms. During these times, they were either tilling their land or harvesting the crops. Nevertheless, this did not deter the determination of employers to secure the labour power of the Luyia. In his annual report of 1905-1906 the Provincial Commissioner of Nyanza Province noted that the highest demand for the so called ~~Kavirondo labourers~~ were government departments especially the Railway and the Public Works Department. Of great interest is his special note that the Railway preferred men from Mumias instead of from Kisumu since the former were "better workers" and had "better physique". Thus, he concluded that "if the Kavirondo are taken away from their country they work much better".

However, the simple fact that the Luyia male labour power was often not available at certain crucial times explodes the colonial myth that women did the greater part of the work on the farm and that they virtually earned the living for the men (see KNA, PC/NZA/1/1, 25). In a way, this disapproves Nasimiyyu's argument that because men spent considerably less time than women on productive tasks, they exploited women's labour (see Nasimiyyu, 1984). It is true that

they may have taken advantage of women in consuming about equal shares of their joint produce without devoting a commensurate amount of time to its production. Beyond this, they did not expropriate the products of women's labour for their own use. Both lived materially at the same level and on the same diet. Men's appropriation of cattle to use in exchange events became like other wealth items, tokens transacted in social contexts in which participants vied for status and influence not marketable products that would yield material profit. Moreover, although men outwardly assumed jurally superior positions, women evidently complied with the decisions and actions. They actually had limited control over women's behaviour. They could only constrain certain normative limits ascribed to by all. The division of labour among the people prior to the genesis of wage labour would appear to have circumscribed the structuring of relations of production not to facilitate exploitation of females. The same practices were evident among the Abasuba in South Nyanza whereby women did much of the agricultural production but their productive activities were mainly assigned by the homestead head<sup>2</sup>(Johnson, 1980, 83).

As if subscribing to the same colonial rubric on the indolence of the so called North Kavirondo men, Kitching erroneously concludes that traditional labour was underutilised in the sense that the male labour was not expended in material

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2. While women and girls were responsible for domestic tasks such as cooking, fetching water and handling domestic purchases, the young boys still herded cattle, sheep and goats. But aging men participated in agricultural production with respect to clearing fields, participated ploughing and weeding.

production for a large part of the working year. He particularly contends that the underutilization was evident in wasted male labour time that was lavished on non-productive activities (see Kitching, 1980, 14). Kitching attempted to conceptualise the wastage of Luyia male labour time in quantitative terms without elucidating on the extractive forms of production such as fishing, hunting, mining etc., within which the preponderance of labour power was exclusively a male dispensation. These activities added to the stock of individual communities given that this characteristic dispensation with masculine human labour was the means by which they produced use values and that as a totality "a labour process is an activity between man and various components of nature" (see Thompson, 1983, 38)

Kitching's notion of underutilization of labour needs to be both reconceptualised and reformulated to account for ecological interdependencies which this study has highlighted in the second chapter. For sure theories of imperialism need to systematically explore the internal dynamics of extractive systems as distinct socio-economic types with notable historical sequences.

As it were, if these historical sequences occurred within productive and extractive traditions, which only later were counterveiled by colonial pressures, whose sexual division of labour was not denoted by similar indices such as the physical strenuousness of the work, then the migratory adeptness of the Luyia males for wage labour may not be merely understood in terms of a mere redistribution of labour time. A redistribution of time within the population geared towards

creating a new pattern of production and a new division of labour is an inadequate means of monitoring the Luyia utilization of labour.

It is evident that Kitching ignored the actual nature of the colonial labour process and the fact that it did force very real sacrifices and important changes in peasant household labour allocation. He spuriously alleges without much substantiation that the impact of migrant labour on peasant production was minimal (see Kitching, 1980, 251). But he has nothing to say on forced labour and worker resistance although the practice of forced labour was widespread in the very early colonial period. However, it was not as yet real subordination, not because the colonial state was not authoritarian enough but because workers' resistance was pervasive (Zezeza, 1989, 25).

While many Luyia sub-ethnic groups had a few of their men go off or had been forced to work on settler farms or in the towns just beginning to emerge, the Samia, Marachi and Bakhayo were not involved in this early wage market (see Seitz, 1974, 155). This may be probably because the labour recruiters were not so aggressive there before the First World War. During this period a few changes had taken place in the bases of Luyia economic existence. Some new crops had been introduced, and trading centres had been opened selling new goods and were offering markets for any surplus produce or livestock (see Bode, 1975, 85). Whereas these changes had a negligible effect upon the basic characteristics of economic production as the Luyia largely still derived livelihood subsistently, the economic policy and system on whose basis the colony was to be developed had

been laid. Important in this respect was the alienation of land and the forced labour efforts that were to engage Luyia workers in the subsequent decades.

By 1906, the East African Standard, a leading newspaper had already spoken of a labour shortage in the country. By 1908 the colonial government had already conducted an inquiry to the matter (Moock, 1976, 46). Notably, Buluyia had long been marked as a major labour reservoir, created by the economic necessity of adult males to exploit employment niches outside the overcrowded Elgon district of Kavirondo.

Despite the fact that the Luyia were in the forefront of migrant labour in the colonial political economy, little has been done to explain the material foundations of the society in early colonial rule. There was a material situation characterised by ecological exigencies, the colonial intervention and the changing nature of their relations of production. Let us remember that due to the fluctuation of climatic conditions in the region, there were acute famines in Buluyia in 1906, 1907 and 1910 (see KNA, North Nyanza District political Records, 1910). Perhaps it should be added that even as Poll Tax was being introduced in 1910 rinderpest epidemic had killed 50% of the cattle in North Kavirondo District. Thus, coupled with the the colonial demand for taxes and wage labour, the state was set for the genesis of labour migration especially among the Banyore and Maragoli as a means of easing their precarious economic situation. Nethertheless, there was an initial reluctance in 1910 as the majority of the people detested working outside their home area (see Moock, 1976, 47).

#### 4.3 Land Alienation in Buluyia

Now that we have explained the labour situation in Buluyia prior to the outbreak of the First World War, there is need to assess the alienation of land in the area. Trans-Nzoia was opened up as a settler farming district around 1910 and the first phase of European settlement in the area ended with the First World War in 1918. By 1919 land administrative laws had been codified and unified. The second phase begun after the war and ended with the beginning and culmination of the end World War (Waweru, 1974, 10-14).

The previous chapters have already demonstrated how the various Luyia groups had already settled in sections of Trans-Nzoia many years before this period of European settlement. Infact oral traditions of the Abatachoni are equivocal on these peoples' origins within the Kalenjin speaking communities. The original homes of their ancestors are said to have been the general area of present day Pokot and Trans-Nzoia districts (Wandibba, 1985, 25). From here they together with the Bukusu had spread to Saboti, Kaptama and in the neighbourhood of Kamukuywa. But the Kalenjin, Bukusu and Tachoni habitation in Trans-Nzoia was punctuated by contant Maasai raids until the British conquest removed them from these grazing lands. It was then that the Kalenjin area of settlement began to expand significantly (Anderson, 1986, 400).


But both Kalenjin and Luyia expansion was restricted by the alienation of lands throughout the Western Highlands for European settlement in the early 1900's. In 1900 Sir Harry Johnstone, special commissioner of Uganda on his way back to

the Coast with Geoffrey Archer who was later to demarcate the boundary as D.C. for North Kavirondo reached the still unexplored western slopes of Mt. Elgon in search of reported land which he frequently referred to as "cool and empty of inhabitants" (Huxley and Curtis, 1980, 108). Here in the present day Trans-Nzoia plains Sir Harry Johnstone and his party camped at present day Kitale. Doubtlessly, the agricultural potential of the area had been noted and the desire to alienate the area for white settlement warmly embraced. Archer demarcated the native zone designated as North Kavirondo in 1908. This was eventually reduced in 1913.

Between 1906 and 1939, the boundaries of the settler "reserve" in Kenya remained fluid. The purpose was to keep reducing the area occupied by Africans as more settlers arrived. In this way delimitation of the Kenya Highlands increased the population pressure within the Africans areas (see Omwenyo, 1977, 10). The British government had made it possible for the protectorate authorities to expropriate land from the indigenous peoples through the evolution of the concept of "crownland" (see Breen, 1976, 20). Through a number of orders-in-council and other legal decisions, by 1902, all "wasteland" in the country had officially become the property of the crown and could be alienated to foreigners.

Charles Elliot the first commissioner in 1900 was charged with the immediate task of making the protectorate pay its own upkeep as quickly as possible. He became committed to the idea of European settlement and wrote of the territory as another New Zealand. According to him, most likely,





influenced by the likes of Johnstone, the territory was virtually uninhabited: a whiteman's country in which native questions would present but little interest" (see Elliot, 1966, 302). Consequently, his judgements and activities greatly influenced the trend of things especially as it related to White settlement. In 1902, several private individuals and firms in England founded a society to promote European settlement in Kenya. This published hyperbolically the country's riches in soil and climate and even underscored the abundance of cheap labour in the region (see Buell, 1965, 298). The administration was from the outset deeply committed to settler interests.

Against this background, dissatisfaction with South Africa after the 1899-1902 Anglo-Boer War and the concomitant opening of Kenya to European settlement led to a continuous immigration to Kenya by Europeans from South Africa before the First World War. Reconnaissance missions and the first settlers were warmly received in 1904 and 1905. By 1908, 50 families had trekked to Uasin Gishu plateau which had recently been opened to European settlement (see Groen, 1972, 149). The largest trek by Boers into the region was in 1911 but African resistance to this Boers encroachment was in the form of occasional murders of white settlers, stock raids and petty thefts (KNA, DC/UG/1/1, 152).

Farms in this general area of Trans-Nzoia and Uasin Gishu were being sold at 6d per acre in 1908. These were resold for 10s per acre in 1912. Towards the end of 1912, the same land changed hands on the market at £1 per acre. Thus, large tracts of land that were under-developed and unoccupied

were held by individual Europeans for speculation (see Omwenyo 1977, 20-21). Perhaps mention should be made of the fact that Uasin Gishu plateau was formally included in the Nyanza Province until 1908 when the province boundaries were transferred to Naivasha and to Southern Molo in 1909. Within the entire Nyanza Province this early, the first European settlers settled in a place then called Lumbwa (Kipkelion) in 1904 (KNA, PC/NZA/1/1, NYANZA PROVINCE ANNUAL REPORT 1907-1908, 3). However, with European settlement in Uasin Gishu, the provincial administration drew caution on the expansion of the Bukusu into the area by noting that the "Kitosh are coming in touch with Uasin Gishu settlers". But apart from seeing the potential of the Bukusu as wage labourers if more stringent legislation was enacted, they particularly took note of the new settlers' opposition to develop the land of the 'Kavirondo' to increase production and export. Infact a prominent settler in the area had remarked that "the native simsim is the settlers' curse" (see KNA, PC/NZA/1/1, 24). Evidently, there was a conflict between the peasant and the settler export sector.

The Kabras and Tachoni who bordered Uasin Gishu in the region of Chekalini, Lugari and Kipkarren lost their prospective lands of expansion with colonial massive land alienation. Official acceptance of this fact of alienation was evidenced in the statement by the district administration that the majority of the displaced people in Trans-Nzoia district were from Bungoma district. The majority of these were Bukusu and

Tachoni<sup>3</sup>. The displacement of these people was a problem the independent government was to grapple with in its resettlement programmes (see KNZA, DC/UG/2/8, 11).

The displacement of various Luyia communities from large sections of Trans-Nzoia and Uasin Gishu was realised on the basis of an emotive European call "come up to river Kuywa". The Luyia sub-ethnic groups in this area were greatly riled by this state of affairs. The place therefore which was designated as the boundary dividing the Bukusu and the European settled area has locally come to be called "Kamukuywa". (Makokha, O.I., 1987). Nevertheless, the displacement that followed this process created a population of Luyia squatters with no rights or security of the European areas. It also led to an exodus of large numbers of them to serve ~~as cheap~~ labour in towns, public enterprises and farms in the Trans-Nzoia and Uasin Gishu region (see KNA, MAC/KEN/30/9. "The Land Question" see also Waweru, 1974, 18). The economic and social changes associated with the growth of settler agriculture destroyed the equilibrium of the peasant economy and created a supply of landless wage labour.

In the decade 1903 to 1913 land grants in Kavirondo totalled 528,294 acres according to official estimates. Large chunks of this represented land alienated around Kericho, Muhoroni and Miwani for all purposes and obtained by Europeans

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3. The colonial officials referred to the Bukusu, Kabras and Tachoni as Kitosh. Because of this there was a lot of confusion around the actual identities of some of the people : as many scholars have erroneously assumed these people were all Bukusu.

(Fearn, 1961, 92) in the other area of the then Kavirondo region that were occupied by the Luo and Kalenjin Kipsigis. Changes in boundary and land ownership loosened the bonds which held together Luyia village economies, disorganised their corporate life and impoverished the cultivators. (arap Korir, 1976).

In North Kavirondo, certain areas which lay within the native District Boundary were alienated for the purpose of the roads from Yala to Mumias, Mumias to Kakamega, Mumias to Sio Port, Mumias to Mbale and Mumias to North Bukusuland. Others were alienated for building of the Mumias government station, Yala township, Butere township, Kakamega trading centre, Sio Port trading centre, the then Kitosh government station (Bungoma) and a number of mission stations (KNA, PC/NZA/1/8, 8). The mission stations included Friends African Industrial Mission at Kakamega, the Mill Hill Society at Kakamega, Church Missionary Society in Butere and Friends African Industrial Mission at Lugulu. These alienated a total of 593.24 acres. There were other alienations by the church Missionary Society at Maseno in 1906, American pentecostalists at Nyang'ori and Church of God at Kima in 1904 (Groot, 1975, 99). Generally, after 1902, following the subjugation of Western Kenya by the British Imperial expeditions and the building of the Uganda railway terminus at Kisumu, there followed an era of unprecedented missionary influx into Western Kenya. This influx meant a stiff competition between the different protestant missions and the Catholic missions. A competition that was characterised by state sponsorship in the alienation

of sizeable chunks of native land (Ogutu, 1981, 80-83).

Punitive expeditions had been directed at the Bukusu in 1894, 1895, 1901, 1903 and 1908, the Kabras in 1895, the Banyore, the Idakho, Isukha and Maragoli in 1896, 1897 and 1898. Following their pacification the period 1900-1910 could be defined as a decade of missionary scramble for Kenya. The FAM (Friends African Industrial Mission) had acquired Kaimosi in 1902, the P.A.C. (Pentecoastal Assemblies of Canada) Nyang'ori in 1909, the C.M.S. (Church Missionary Society) Maseno in 1906, the M.H.M. (Mary Hill Mission) Mumias and Mukumu in 1904 and 1906 respectively, and C.O.G. (Church of God) Kima in 1906. By 1914, the C.M.S. and the F.A.M. had added Butere and Lugulu in 1912 and 1914 respectively (Ogutu, 1981, 83).

The scramble for mission stations in Buluyia following the difficult era of conquest and subjugation of Imperial forces in a way depicts the manner in which colonization occurred. First, missions were used as pawns in the imperialist chess game, then as instruments of alienation by wilfully enticing the Abaluyia into accepting European ways of life, all in the name of civilization. Notably, the south-western corner of Buluyia inhabited by the Samia, Bakhayo and Marachi which was not gripped by missionary scramble prior to 1914 was late in joining annals of wage labour utilization in the colonial political economy.

Lest our perception of Buluyia on the advent of European land alienation be misconstrued, let it be remarked that European settlers who came to either Uasin Gishu or

Trans-Nzoia were given land which in some areas could only be availed by the physical removal of those who occupied it. Oral evidence attests to Luyia patronization of sections of these regions prior to colonial rule. These testimonies are corroborated by official documentary evidence in the form of provincial annual reports. Reporting in 1913, the Provincial Commissioner for Nyanza wrote:

With the advent of Trans-Nzoia farms, it became necessary to limit the North Kavirondo District boundaries on the North East to the extent of native district boundary viz Kamakoiwa (sic) River which emerges from the South Eastern slopes of Elgon down the river to the Kivisi River, thence to Nzoia River. This means that Kavirondo District has been reduced in extent from what it was formerly. The area east of the boundary described becoming part of the Trans-Nzoia lands (KNA, PC/NZA/1/8 NYANA PROVINCE ANNUAL REPORT 1913, 8).

Then, with the foregoing facts and figures on land alienation in Buluyia it is a grave oversight to deny that this exercise did take place in Luyialand like all manner of European historiography on Kenya seems to content. Clearly, the North-easterly Luyia such as the Bukusu, Tachoni and Kabras were physically removed and herded into the so called "closed district" from which they could not expand to new lands even if they became overcrowded. For a map showing this alienation see appendix 1 and 3 it appears that the imperial closure of the district was a measure to censor the laments, upheavals and reprisals that followed this action. No wonder, the Dini Ya Msambwa in later decades was to revisit the land question in the area as we will see in subsequent chapters. Nevertheless the administrators use of the concept of "closed" was undoubtedly

expedient and functionally multifarious. Not surprisingly, all matters pertaining to land in the colonial period are classed as highly secret and that whereas other official documentary evidences on other aspects of colonial rule have been rendered open and retrieved from the metropole, files on land are still closed and lying undusted in imperial archives in Europe. Basil Davidson rightly referred to this reserve policy as "ruin by enclosure" (see Davidson, 1971, 40).

In the Kaimosi area, as shown in appendix 3, probably the largest single piece of land outside Trans-Nzoia was alienated. As a result of these alienations, several families became squatters on farms that had hitherto been freely occupied by them. Before the Kenya land commission at Mumias in 1932, Dominico Mazulu (see Kenya Land Commission, Evidence, Vol. III, 1933, 2222) and Chief Mulama (see Kenya Land Commission, Evidence Vol. III, 1933, 2223-2224) gave evidence pertaining to traditional Luyia claims on both Trans-Nzoia and of Uasin Gishu. Mulama particularly recalled the case of the Tachoni Chief Kakai of Kipkarren area whose community's land was alienated. Thereafter these people including their leader became squatters on white farms up to the period of the sitting of the Kenya Land Commission in 1932. It was this massive alienation of both Tachoni and Bukusu lands which Middleton implies when he timidly acknowledges in the words that there was comparatively little land alienation in Nyanza except in the North and East of the area (see Middleton, 1965, 341-5). The alienation of land was to become the fulcrum of major political controversies in colonial Kenya not because of its cumulative effects on

agricultural development but because it created a new relation between settler agriculture and peasant agriculture. Perhaps we should now examine how this alienation affected productivity and exchange competitiveness in Buluyia alongside the semi-proletarianization of the Luyia peasantry.

#### 4.4 Peasants and the Settler Economy, Production and Trade in Buluyia

The imposition of colonial rule marked the onset of major historical qualitative changes. The penetration of commodity relations partially destroyed the Buluyia traditional peasant modes of production as the colonial state created the conditions of exploitation of African labour and land. Rural cultivators whom we term peasants have existed in very different types of society and in different historical epochs. But, colonialism has been a major historical force in creating peasantries with specific characteristics in the Third World (see Bernstein, 1979, 421).

In Chapter 2, there is evidence of pre-colonial Luyia rural producers having secured their livelihood through the use of household labour on family land, we also demonstrated how extractive forms of production did not necessarily revolve around family land. Nevertheless, while we conceive that perception of peasants in terms of land cultivation only is not of any analytical utility, we accept that the Luyia rural producers' traditional economy fulfils the first important and determining factor of the peasantry, that the family serves as the basic unit of social organization. But whether only the



farm by way of household or family labour provides all the consumption needs of the producing unit is a question of open debate (see Shanin, 1971, 94).

By the time the First World War broke out, economic and social relations of the peasantry were becoming closely interwoven. However, they were not revolving only around the family farm. The Buluya peasantries did not derive their livelihood from wage employment until colonialism forced upon them a new form of peasantization. Like other pre-colonial traditional peasants, land husbandry was the main means of livelihood which directly provided the major part of their consumption needs. The second important factor in conceptualizing the peasantry is a traditional land husbandry with the low levels of specialization as the main means of livelihood (see Ngethe, 1986, 43) this was demonstrated in our earlier survey. They too revealed a specific traditional culture that was characteristic of what we termed specified demographic collectivities or sub-ethnic groupings. However, they did not suffer any political subjection inter-linked with cultural subordination at the hands of any external ruling classes.

The process of political subjection inter-linked with cultural subordination ensued when the colonial state extended its hegemony in the 1890's and devised mechanisms of peasantizing the producer on a new basis. Bearing in mind the abundance of land as the major means of production prior to this period and that land and livestock were the principal means of subsistence, the process of integration into the state begun in the 1890's

when crucial decisions were taken that would affect the long-term future of indigenous production. The transition from the traditional peasant mode of production to capitalist production began. Indeed, the Kenyan debate on the peasantry revolves around conceptualization of this transition (see Ng'ang'a 1981, Njonjo, 1981, Gutto, 1981 and Anyang' Nyong'o, 1981).

Nevertheless the transition to capitalist production cannot take place without the partial or complete dissolution of the peasantry. It may be argued that the partial destruction of the traditional economies had begun in many areas before the 1890's through the methods characteristic of the global epoch of primitive accumulation of capital such as slave trade, coerced labour and other forms of plunder (see Bernstein, 1979, 423) as we saw in the areas of North-Western and Southern Buluya. But even though producers there retained some control over the organization of production.

In chapter 3, we made a survey of the establishment of a local colonial administration. This administration executed colonial policies enacted in Nairobi as an arm of that state. It comprised a hierarchy of civil servants making the African chiefs a nucleus of an indigenous petit bourgeois class. Following the frenzied scramble by missionaries to establish mission stations in Buluya and the establishment of isolated Indian shops by 1910, this class was augmented gradually with the addition of educated boys who became clerks, teachers and traders. This class was to play a significant role in defining the relationship of the peasantry to the colonial state, chiefly by facilitating the exploitation of the peasantry through

taxation and organised labour on settler farms (Ngethe, 1986, 96).

It would then appear that an aggression by relations of a new political economy constituted a problem for the Luyia from the very beginning, an imposed political authority was employed to monetarise the economy and to cause it to become extroverted. This extroversion forced a regression in peasant agricultural-technique (see Bowles, 1975, 4). Apparently, one major consequence of land alienation and relegation of some Luyia groups from their productive roles in Lugari, Kiminini, and Saboti (see Kenya Land Commission, Evidence, Vol. III, 1933, 2223-2224) among other areas to create room for settlers was that many of the affected people returned to the greatly reduced North Kavirondo Reserve, see map in appendix 2. They returned with all the consequences of overpopulation. The most notable one was the serious deterioration of the fertility of the soils in the district and the consequent inability of land to support the increasing population. Outward migration became common, but in colonial official circles it was continually argued that the movement was to try and avoid the Hut-Tax (see KNA, DC/NN/1/4, 4).

Peasants make up the major part of humanity and it appears that a proportion of them will remain peasants indefinitely. Prophecies of extinction have not come true in spite of all the changes that have occurred. Most probably they will never come true. In the future there will still be peasants (Warman, 1987). The question of rise and fall of the peasantry in Kenya during colonial rule, therefore, does not

arise (see Atieno-Odhiambo, 1976). Under colonialism in the period under study, a good number of peasants in Buluyia remained rural cultivators who produced and reproduced themselves socially in domestic units bound by primordial relationships. But due to economic and political subjugation, they were to transfer surplus production and political power to complex forces linked to the colonial state.

However, it is evident that real economic hardship caused by land policies, taxation efforts and deteriorating soil conditions compelled a number of peasants to migrate into the surrounding settler areas of Kaimosi, Trans-Nzoia, Uasin Gishu and Muhoroni either as squatters or casual labourers. As early as 1914 tens of thousands of migrant workers had already registered as wage labourers. In this year, 10,394 men from the district registered themselves for employment other than the military (see KNA, DC/NN/1/2, North Kavirondo District Annual Report, 1908-1919, 22).

It would then appear that with the coming of settlers in Kenya, the foundations of an extroverted peasantry were laid<sup>4</sup>. The settlers helped accelerate the extrovert peasantization of the indigenous producers by becoming another class to whom the indigenous producers had obligations to fulfil. Invariably, the state served as the intermediary between the settlers and the indigenous people. It straddled

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4. Pre-colonial trade in pre-colonial Buluyia was subsistent in nature. Items of trade were acquired through exchange and it largely supplemented people's subsistent productive efforts. It did not in itself become an impetus for production. It did not therefore change the inward looking nature of the pre-colonial Luyia peasantries.

rather uneasily between the conflicting demands of European settler farms and African peasants. Truly, it acted as an instrument of primitive accumulation of capital on the settlers behalf by appropriating some African land, confiscating livestock, introducing inequitable taxation, building rail and road transport networks, creating marketing and financial structures highly favourable to settlers, and finally through imposition and institutionalisation of forced labour (Zezeza, 1989, 23).

Nevertheless, the state had neither the power nor the will to dissolve the peasant economy. This was because the settler capital was weak and the state needed the continued existence of a peasant sector that was productive enough to generate surplus some of which could be appropriated by the state itself to be used for the running of the administration. This too would be used to subsidize settler production and to provide for such conditions that the maintenance and reproduction of the working class would be ensured. Anyhow, the initial contact between traditional peasants and the expanding local and external markets at the beginning of colonial ruled led to increased peasant commodity production. However, there was an initial phase of coercion to establish conditions of peasant commodity production (see Bernstein, 1979, 426).

The element of coercion in the establishment of conditions of peasant commodity production merely added to the severe constraints the African population in the reserves were being subjected to in the form of land alienation, extraction of labour and taxation. Notwithstanding the complete

far as Karamoja and Turkana (KNA, PC/2/3/1, NYANZA PROVINCE ANNUAL REPORT, 1906-1907). As a result licences had to be obtained for entry into the district. These regulations had a somewhat dampening effect on trade in the district most of which comprised the exchanging of goods obtained from Kisumu by caravans with ivory from Karamoja. But when all trade restrictions were removed as from 1909, the year marked the beginning of intensification of exchanges for profit. Every road and trade centre became open to traders. For instance, Yala opened in 1908 and became an important centre in 1909 because of the newly established simsim crop in the fertile Yala Valley (Memon, 1972, 144).

The southern Luyia of Kisa and Bunyore began to frequent the Yala market for various needs i.e. to sell simsim, maize and millet this early (Angolo, O.I., 1987). The government had distributed seeds for groundnuts among the Maragoli, Idakho and Isukha. Apparently these were doing well and one may see that collection of tax among other pressures was having an effect on the traditional economy. Generally, in the entire North Kavirondo, exports in rupees amounted to 2,169/= and 2,178/= in 1906/7 (see Memon, 1972, 143).

But as African peasants in Buluyia had no means of transport, itinerant trading was common. Yala Indians bought simsim produce from Africans at about 21 lbs a rupee and these buyers in turn sold their ware to big Indian merchants in Kisumu. Similar activities were taking place at Sio Port, Mumias, Malakisi, Butere, Lunyerere in Maragoli and Kakamega. Although trade was still in its infancy by 1912 a number of

Africans built shops in their villages and they derived their profits mostly from buying produce from fellow Africans and selling to Indians. But all the shopkeepers at the townships were Indians who depended on disposing of imported goods to the native and the native selling any surplus he might have. Most of it was by way of bartering (Angolo, O.I., 1987).

Blankets, cloth (especially the American type), wire and salt were the goods in great demand. However, a few local men started buying pipes, hats and boots. Because transport for maize and sorghum was not easy, the Indians only purchased these if the peasants transported them to the trading centres. The leading item of produce up to the time of the First World War was simsim and most of the Indians sold their collection in Kisumu. By 1910, Allidina Visram was running 2 motor wagons on the Yala Kisumu road because of its increasing volume. (see Memon, 1972, 145).

The main means of transport were Indian carts, donkeys and porters. But the latter were considered expensive unless they were used for higher paying products like simsim. The picture that emerges is that of Indian traders having monopolised all the trade and maintaining a tight grip on it through their commercial ability and kinship rites. Even those local inhabitants who opened up small shops in their villages, their activities helped push imported goods further a field. This caused an ever increasing demand.

Paradoxically, the colonial policy of stimulating African development through encouraging African peasants to produce surplus food and cash for sale was heavily dependent

on the Indian in his role as middleman in the townships and other trading centres (see Memon, 1972, 147).

Mention has been made of coercive introduction of some crops in Buluyia. Probably a few details will enlighten us more. In 1907, the British East African Corporation with the support from the Empire Cotton Growing Association initiated cotton production in Nyanza and the eastern province of Uganda (Phillips, 1974, 92). In 1908, this corporation had built a cotton ginnery at Kisumu (Alila 1977, 17) although other ginneries were to be established in Buluyia in the early 1920's at Luanda in Samia, Nambale in Bukhayo and Malakisi in Bukusu.

After the establishment of Kisumu ginnery Indians moved inland to trade and later build cotton ginneries in cotton growing areas especially in the lake region of West Kenya, and the eastern and Buganda regions of Uganda. Indians displaced the Wanga and Samia middlemen in the traditional exchanges centred around the Samia hoe. They introduced the European hoe to the Luyia peasants and replaced the Samia hoe currency with the repee (Were, 1972b). On the whole, cotton was first introduced in Samia, Marachi and Bukhayo in 1910. However, its introduction in the area was not achieved easily. It was introduced to facilitate an exchange economy and pay taxes (Fearn, 1961).

The peasant farmers had not only to be persuaded to plant the crop but its introduction had also to be effected in such a way as to facilitate supervision by inhabitants officer. Whereas experiments in Kano, Kajulu Seme and Nyakach



locations among the Luo failed and had to be abandoned, in present day Busia district cotton continued to be planted on both sides of Sio River. Its success was achieved through the supervision of the crops growing by Chief Mumias own relatives imposed as headmen. Their role was to convince and and sometimes force peasants into understanding the lucrative nature of the crop (Makhulo, 1985, 21).

As if persuasion was not enough, the chiefs and colonial administrators did not let the cash incentives or education provide the stimuli to change. There was a series of "Thou Shalt Not" orders requiring people to plant cash crops for tax purposes or and extra field of cassava as a reserve against famine. These were followed by orders which required Africans to plant in a specific way, rid their fields of proscribed abnoxious weeds or use a specific manuring technique. This way, the threat of coercion in agricultural reform continued to take place although to the peasants coercion was so objectionable (Alila, 1977, 8).

Through it all, the household continued to remain the unit of production. However, the commercialization of peasant agriculture and the development of settler agriculture and urbanization, an increasing international division of labour among other forces were to create a complex network of exchange relations (see Hans-Dieter, et al., 1984, 27). Despite the emergence of these complex networks of exchange relations in which the Indian traders established a monopoly as middlemen, most peasant production was fuelled by human energy. Most

producers used the energy-sapping hoe which involved a greater expenditure of labour time on poorer soils to produce food for both domestic consumption and sale. The state through its local representatives in Buluyia continued policing the countryside to ensure adherence to prescribed economic and political measures such as cultivation by-laws, compulsory land improvement schemes and extension work arrangements. These activities tied Buluyia producers more closely to particular minds of production up to the 1930's. However, as early as 1914, the cash economy had made minimal impact on the life of the ordinary peasant in Buluyia as there was not much change in the consumer behaviour of the people (Angolo, O.I., 1987, see also KNA, PC/NZA/1/1, 5).

Given that shifting cultivation which had been instrumental in the preservation of soil fertility was increasingly being abandoned because of population pressure especially in the southern Buluyia area (see Wafula, 1981, 31, Kay, 1973, 128 and Bode, 1978, 100-101), its abandonment directly resulted in a rapid deterioration of the fertility of the soils and serious problems of erosion. Consequently despite the inception of extended agricultural work by the colonial government, the production methods based on human energy of these Luyia peasants did not assure them of returns commensurate with the costs incurred and the labour time invested. This was coupled with deteriorating terms of exchange as the Indians controlled the terms of exchange for peasant produced commodities. Many Luyia peasants had to reckon with increasing costs of production and decreasing returns to labour

Thus, caught up in a simple reproduction squeeze amidst the low level of development of their productive forces, the households in these areas became extremely vulnerable to failure in their material elements of production. This state of affairs was aggravated by vagaries of climate such as hailstorms, seasonal irregularities, floods and drought (Angolo, O.I., 1987).

Even in the non-heavily populated regions of South-western, Central and North Buluyia, the incidence of ecological handicaps such as crop and animal disease and death, all testify to the vulnerability of Buluyia peasant farming. It was against a background such as the foregoing that the Luyia peasants especially the Banyore and Maragoli prodded to take advantage of the new economic and social opportunities colonialism presented. ~~In 1904~~ the Maragoli made up the majority of the labour force at Kaimosi (see Bode, 1978, 128).

#### 4.5 Education and Social Stratification in Early Colonial Buluyia

In the previous chapter mention has been made of the emergence of colonial patterns of class formation with the establishment of an alien administration and as the effects of incorporation into a capitalist mode of production began to be felt. As it was the case elsewhere in Africa, the introduction of a new capitalist form of economic development accompanied by its characteristic patterns of class formation, added to and sometimes replaced the pre-capitalist forms of stratification (see Tangri, 1985, 3). Stratification in Buluyia became differentiated with the spread of the state machinery at the local level and then exchange and education.

By 1914, there had emerged a small nascent semi-proletarian rural wage earners, poor and middle rich peasantry and a salaried civil service or missionary worker petit bourgeoisie.

In precolonial Buluyia, there were wealthy men who were constrained by the nature of the economy and by the obligations of the kinship system in their ability to accumulate resources and pass them on. During colonial rule a gentry emerged that was wealthier than the ordinary peasants. This rural elite was composed of two unequal elements defined in part by the sources of their wealth and status and in part by their life-styles. The dominant element in these incipient forms of stratification was the creation of a colonial state officialdom. Through the Headmen's ordinance and the Native Authority Ordinance, there was institutionalised a cadre of African officials within the district and local administration. These comprised chiefs, headmen and court elders (see Bode, 1978, 130).

These officials accumulated wealth largely because of their position and among them the chiefs, because of their pre-iminent positions acquired the greatest wealth of all. The chiefs, headmen and elders received salaries which were many times above the income of the ordinary peasant. When the political boundaries of North Kavirondo were laid down in 1909 after the completion of Mr. Archer's map and after some alienations had been done for the Trans-Nzoia farm area, the leading African salaried man in Buluyia was Chief Mumia. He ruled over Wanga, Marama North, South Ugenya, Bukhayo Marachi, Samia, Uholo North Bunyala and Kakalewa (Banyala in

Kakamega). Second to him was sub-chief Muranga. His area included North Bukusu, the Kalenjin regions of the district, Teso and North Tachoni. Then there were others such as sub-chief Sudi of South Bukusu, sub-chief Ichivini of East Kakamega sub-chief Milimu of West Kakamega, sub-chief Wambani of Butso, sub-chief Tomia of Mukulu, sub-chief Shiundu Sakwa of Kabras, sub-chief Odero Sante of West and East Gem and sub-chief Ng'ong'a of Alego, Usonga and South Bunyala (see KNA, DC/NN/3/1 POLITICAL RECORD BOOK, NORTH KAVIRONDO DISTRICT, PART I, 3).

Apart from the fact that chiefs such as Mumia had been recipients of a lot of booty as rewards for their assistance in the pacification campaigns, all the listed were given a generous 10% commission on Hut Tax collected in their regions. Prior to their use, between 1903 and 1905 Hut Tax had been collected by the Swahili. But swahili roughing up of the Luyia peasantry had led to the latter's retaliatory burning of 2 government huts in Bukusu (KNA, DC/NN/3/1, 17). Consequently, the Swahili's services were terminated.

The net total of Hut Tax collected in 1909 was RS 194,665/= (KNA, PC/NZA/1/4 NYANZA PROVINCE ANNUAL REPORT 1909, 89) of these the chiefs received a total of Rs 19,465/= in form of commission. Previously they had been paid half of the commission in seeds and economic products. The payment of commission ended when the colonial state started to pay salaries to chiefs and headmen (KNA, PC/NZA/1/4. 89).

From 1909 onwards, most chiefs and headmen earned more than Rs 100/=. Outstanding among them was Mumia who earned a total of Rs 1,000/=. He was followed by Mulama (sub-chief)

who earned Rs 600/=. By 1915 Mumia's salary had shot up to Rs 1,500/=.

In addition to their salaries, chiefs collected fees in the markets and received a share of the court fees. With such ample cash resources, location officials, especially chiefs, were able to secure ample labour either by hiring workers or by marrying more women<sup>5</sup>. They also secured labour by exploiting their authority and forcing individuals to work on their farms. Some among them extended their holdings into common lands. For example Milimu acquired land by manipulating his location court. Nevertheless, many of them were given plots to meet the needs of their entourage and guests during the first decades of colonial rule (see Bode, 1978, 130-131).

While channels of accumulation ~~were~~ open to these officials by way of their positions, enlightened chiefs and headman were anxious that their sons be educated. By 1910 a number of such youths were being educated in the Church Missionary Society and Mill Hill Missions (KNA, PC/NZA/1/5, NYANZA PROVINCE ANNUAL REPORT 1910, 6). The FAM had started the first literary classes in 1903 at Kaimosi. In 1906, 2 more stations were opened in Maragoli and Isukha. However, by 1913 it had a church, a dispensary and a school at Kaimosi (Kay, 1973, 80). While the FAM was opening the Vihiga and Lirhanda stations,

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5. Quite obviously this expropriation of female labour was an expression of the insatiable demands of capitalist demands for labour that were being realised through an institutionalised traditional practice of polygamy. Polygamy was a residue that was being re-launched to help chiefs reorganise the social organization of production in their homesteads.

in the same year, the MHM opened a station at Mukumu. On the whole the most successful strategy for filling their created classrooms was to persuade local leaders to send their sons and sons of their subjects to the missions for training.

This strategy started to pay off in 1906 when the British administrators began to systematise colonial rule in Nyanza. The colonial officials sought to create a self-perpetuating ruling elite by encouraging the newly recognised chiefs and headmen to educate their own children who would succeed them. By so doing, they hoped to make colonial administration more efficient. Each station was at least providing classes daily by 1910. Between 1912 and 1916 there were approximately 3,000 pupils in 42 schools (see Kay, 1973, 93).

Demographic differentiation may be said to correlate the size and relative prosperity of households with their place in the circle of generational reproduction (see Bernstein, 1979, 430). Indeed, the transformation of traditional society had started to proceed a pace however slow (see Rowe, 1958, 81-96). When the British organised the Abaluyia under chiefs and headmen beginning about 1906, they created a ruling class with the potential to profit handsomely from their new positions. Many of them quickly exploited the opportunities which their authority offered to garner wealth, education and political power for their lineage (see Lonsdale, 1970, 589-591).

The chiefs and headmen often hired sub-headmen, clerks, interpreters and hut counters from among members of the ruling

family. This random distribution of position of authority reconstituted the conditions of production in some households by enabling some peasants to make savings from wage labour in the government service. While some chiefs like Mumia and a few other headmen, not comprehending the need for education opted for the comfort and status of a position which they had acquired largely from possession of traditional wealth, some aspiring poor men got their children acquire education. Eventually, they were to aspire for more influential political and other positions and therefore demonstrate how even the foregoing random distribution contributed to subsequent class differentiation. Thus, western education had proven a powerful tool to bring a few of the people out of the traditional hierarchical structure while at the same time incorporating them into a capitalist hierarchy.

For those who took up missionary education, they were succumbing to the economic function of education in the colonial division of labour. The mission stations imported knowledge that was deemed essential in fulfilling supporting roles in the lowest ranks of the production process. The spatial distribution of schools and missions as we saw followed closely imperial efforts at pacifications, a pacification that was governed by economic interests. Thus, the development of education and trade were severely limited by the nature of capitalist development. They were also guided by unequal capitalist expansion. This explains the regional variations in Buluya whereby the intensity of missionary work in Kakamega district opened up the societies to faster economic change as



opposed to Busia and Bungoma areas where education filtered later. Whereas this reflects the unevenness of economic incorporation based on metropolitan interests, the establishment of the dominance of the colonial state, the creation of capitalist agriculture, the creation of an internal market for labour power and the inception of rigid terms of exchange all required a mechanism to foster their production. The role of education from this early became that of reproducing and legitimising the unequal relations of production and exchange.

In away, through the political and economic forces which we have been analysing in this and the previous chapters various groups of Abaluyia were integrated with the local centres of international and domestic capital however incipient this incorporation may have been before the outbreak of the First World War. This process inevitably interacted with the previously existing traditional peasant modes of production to produce an uneven regional development in Buluyia as well as a distinctive class structure. The historical dynamics of these processes and mechanisms will be examined later in this study. But even this early, the emergent classes of petty traders, chiefs and the emerging educated elite were not completely free from the interplay of clanism and sectionalism. Thus, ethnicity introduced ingredients into the ideological class struggle within the terrain of peripheral capitalist contradiction. A community which has been treated unjustly illuminates profound contradictions (Saul, 1979, 371) and ethnicity was one such paradox of colonial rule.

The white community which came into contact with these various Luyia social categories sought to impress on them consciousness of European racial superiority. Their high salaries were meant to maintain a style of living in keeping with their role as the ruling race. To spend like a whiteman became a popular aphorism which confirmed the Whitemen's image as expensive creatures. A propensity for extravagance however wasteful and irrational came to provide the ruling race with the facade necessary to assert its dominance (De Silvia, 1982, 70). Racial discrimination was linked with a whole institutional mechanism, involving legislative sanctions and psychological devices whereby the Europeans maintained and rationalised their domination. This justified the comprehensive repression of the Africans as a racial group, the pursuance of a policy of exclusiveness to an almost paranoid extent. The socio-cultural gulf which they created for this purpose, with a depersonalising of contacts across the colour line, sought to legitimise the distribution of political power the allocation of economic resources and the differential access to occupational opportunities and privileges (De Silvia, 1982, 71).

In Buluyia the effects of these racial prejudices was the internalization of European attitudes by the nascent middle class comprising chiefs, teachers, clerks and preachers who frequently came into contact with Europeans. They clung onto values and life-styles that were evidently different from the accustomed Luyia peasant modes of life. Thus the Luyia could not, even if they chose, ignore the new forces of change; christian culture, western materialism and civilization

(Kipkorir, 1973, 15).

But in the alienated areas, Luyia squatters and farm labourers who also came into contact with European settlers represented a half-way transition from traditional peasant mode of living to the new capitalist practices. By and large, they continued a fairly traditional mode of life to such an extent that during these early decades of colonial rule, the least westernised Luyia were these who worked or squatted on European farms. Even in the subsequent decades, they were missed out of the post-World War deal for African welfare.

Unlike the wage labourers and squatters on the settler farms, the chiefs, headmen, sub-headmen, clerks, interpreters, hut counters and soldiers had emerged in Buluyia as early as 1909. They formed a nascent Luyia middle class with the potential to profit from their positions. Many of them quickly exploited the opportunities their positions offered to accumulate wealth, education and political influence for their lineage (Kay, 1973, 1973, 108). By 1915, there was a basic rush for education in the area. Young men who had acquired education also acquired prestige and sought wealth. They began to defy traditions and imitated their European mentors and earn a similar niche in the modern world. Among the Maragoli, the epitome of the new literate elite was in Yohana Amugune (Kay, 1973, 120). Elsewhere there were such personalities like Musa Eshipili and Noah Achelo in Kisa, Canon Jeremiah Awori in Samia, Otieno, Otiato and Daniel Asiachi in Bunyore, Benjamin Songolo, and Ngoira in Tiriki and so on. A gentry emerged that was wealthier than the ordinary

peasants. This rural elite was composed of two unequal elements defined in part by the sources of their wealth and status and in part by their life-styles (Bode, 1978, 130). A good number of them purchased bicycles. However, Mulama had by 1917 acquired a motor-cycle.

But, in Wanga, extensive European contact prior to 1905 bore little relationship to the patterns of change especially in education.<sup>6</sup> That contact had primarily been confined to the Wanga political court. Contact with people outside the Wanga royalty had been slight and superficial (Lohrentz, 1977). Evidently, the penetration of colonial capitalism was uneven spatially and socially. Even education also developed unevenly in spatial and social terms. On the whole, those regions like Maragoli, ~~Bunyore~~, Kisa, Isukha and Idakho and individual households that were closely integrated into the new colonial economy and its patterns of education expanded fastest.

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6. Disdain for Missionary education in Wanga was aggravated by Mumia's attitude of indifference that was largely conditioned by his earlier conversion to Islam.

CHAPTER V

5.0 THE COLONIAL ECONOMY AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES  
IN BULUYIA DURING AND AFTER THE FIRST WORLD WAR

5.1 The Colonial State and its Conflicts

Africans in Kenya resisted the pressures imposed upon them by colonial policy-makers and agents of capitalist interests, growth and expansion. Their responses to these pressures and opportunities engendered new conflicts within their societies and with the representatives of the colonial state over the control of key political and economic resources. During much of the inter-war period these conflicts were located in a rational context of changes in the specific modes of operation by the colonial state to which determinate ~~policy~~ ~~entrenchments~~, shifts and ideologies were linked.

Prior to the outbreak of the First World War the colonial state had laid the foundations of a capitalist settler agriculture and reconstituted the internal dynamic of the traditional peasantries by integrating their economies with the metropolitan capitalist economy, Policy-decisions which facilitated these processes were entrenched in the period following the war. This came as no surprise since the reproduction of capitalist relations of production requires the domination of capital over labour (Burawoy, 1984, 25). The colonial government came out in full support of the settlers, it legislated additional labour laws precipitating greater control of labour, it implemented the soldier settlement scheme that expanded the number of settlers and

their landed holdings and it also improved the transport infrastructure for easier movement of settler produce (Kanogo, 1989, 113).

By devising mechanisms and strategies of capitalist development in colonial Kenya, the state simply did this as an instrument of metropolitan capital and the result was the recomposition of production into a social formation that may be termed as peripheral capitalism (see Bowles, 1979, 197). It is true that colonization had altered pre-colonial patterns of trade and marketing and introduced new ones. It had facilitated alienation of massive lands (the peoples main resource of livelihood) and relegated African labour power from its indigenous productive roles. Even when settler ~~production~~ proved unable to stand on its own feet that this called for constant government subsidies, the colonial government found it expedient to revive and encourage greater African peasant commodity production. This was a form of production that would be cheaper and without the complications of expensive capital, labour and other subsidy overheads that characterised the settler sector (Kanogo, 1986, and 1989, 1).

Nevertheless, these efforts did not obliterate kinship ties that formed the backbone of African ethnicity. Hitherto, to a great extent kinship relations functioned as production relations, political relations and as an ideological schemata. In essence, the economy was realised in kinship as we have demonstrated in Chapter two. Thus, for the fact that politics revolved around kinship ties in pre-colonial Buluyia, the subsequent alliance of the British with the Wanga under a

Nabongo ethnic hegemony exacerbated ethnic particularism. Therefore, it raised avenues of conflict with the non-Wanga Luyia. In a way, the colonial edifice of indirect rule gave allowance to the co-optation of certain traditional ruling hierarcies in the new system of administration and added new social dimensions in ethnic politics of the Luyia. The establishment of colonial rule in the area had affected the dynamics of clanship and inter clan relations in several important ways. Political authority which had traditionally been based on the principle of common mythical origin within the clan (Lohrentz, 1973, 62) was now centralised with the grouping of clans together in the new local administrative units. Thus, politics of kinship continued to be fostered in the new system in the regional appeals made by clans for their leaders to be recognised in the system.

In Kisa and Marama, Mulama, an alien Omushitsetse chief from Wanga imposed on these people in 1908 faced constant opposition from various political factions in the areas. A new generation of young leaders led a concerted campaign against Mulama thereby cutting off his links with the CMS alliance at Butere and seriously eroding his image of credibility before the colonial administration (Lohrentz, ;973, 1). He was eventually deposed in 1935 after the Marama Kisa branch of NKTWA had turned against him between 1928 and 1929 (KNA, PC/NZA/3/3/1/2). Other leading activists against Mulama were Daudi Lubanga, Jeremiah Nyangule, Luka Shiroya, Ezekiah Omukhulu, Daudi Otete and Johanna Achando.

Elsewhere there were related problems. The Bukusu

had refused Sudi Namachanja when he was placed over the entire Bukusu while he was a leader of one clan. They had accepted Murunga Wa Shiundu instead. But even the latter, the Northern Bukusu refused him because of his dominance in the south. Murunga was to retire from North Bukusu in 1934 (Sakwa-Msake, 1971, 27). In Butsotso, the struggle against the Wanga chief Wambani was spearheaded by Nduku the leader of the Abang'onya and later his son Joseph Omutsembi was to be appointed chief over Butsotso.

Apart from the struggle for appointment of chiefs from leading local clans, there were numerous disputes over sub-ethnic locational boundaries. This was true of conflicts between the Marama and Butsotso. The Butsotso protest over the boundary was led by Tsuma (Osengo, O.I., 1988). Other disputes arose among the Luo of Sidindi and those of Uholo in their rejection of Luyia domination under a Wanga sponsored local administration. These political wrangles were expressions of how colonial administration changed the political order of Buluyia and their kinship based society. It also continued to transform their economy.

These kinship based protests arose despite the government's revival and encouragement of African peasant commodity production which replaced relations of reciprocity with relations of domination and subordination. They were new manifestations of the preservation of kinship ideology in the new colonial material conditions. Even with the entrenchment of the colonial rubric of indirect rule, political activities



in Buluyia came to reflect various positions within the terrain of changing circumstances. But they still prevailed upon by the preponderance of ethnically based kinship subjectivism. Against a background of coalition of dominant lineages, their survival depended on extending their material and social bases of reproduction through official positions. A colonial official was to note:

The Chiefs and elders are more les on the same grade and their importance is according to their wealth. Hereditary Chiefs however rank in somewhat more important degree. The paramount Chief of North Kavirondo is however regarded by all as a most (sic) important personage and receives respect and consideration from all classes of Kavirondo irrespective of the district to which they belong (KNA, PC/NZA/1/7, NYANZA PROVINDE ANNUAL REPROT, 1912, 10-11).

Prior to 1914 native locational courts and councils had been established and geared towards assisting the administration. The euphoria of the colonial administrators in the region about the alleged unity and harmony which these institutions engendered was evident when the P.C. for Nyanza in 1911 remarked:

The policy of working the native administration (sic) through the medium of the various tribal authorities is slowly but surely having a marked effect to the advantage of the people and the country. These must be upheld to help retain the peoples confidence in the bonafides of the government towards them (KNA, PC/NZA/1/6, PRECIS OF ANNUAL REPORT - NYANZA PROVINCE 1910-1911, 1).

But the so called respect of the traditional cadres of administration was not accorded with as an overwhelming natural given like the colonial official chroniclers would

have us believe. Seeing them in this light makes their actual historical significance retain basic conceptual problems. On the contrary in 1913, there were disturbances in South Tiriki location whereby the people had endeavoured to contest the authority of the Chief. Similarly, in Kabras, some elders were reportedly failing to attend a Chief's meeting in what appeared to be a show of recalcitrance (KNA, PC/NZA/1/8, NYANZA PROVINCE ANNUAL REPORT, 1913, 3-4).

While the colonial government institutionalised the Luyia kinship ideology by building the native authority, its programme of education, migrant labour and the general modernization process cut across clan and tribal loyalties. The emerging educated Luyia and migrant labour force perceived the pressures and injustices of the colonial system in somewhat different terms. They mooted new means of political redress. Consequently, the tension between these two patterns became constant in the region's political history (Lonsdale, 1964, 136-7). Thus, for sometime there evolved a new pattern of official African leadership in the area. It was seemingly a compromise between the indigenous political structures and the needs of the British administration. Ironically, the modern African political awakening of the 1920's was led by both official Chiefs and mission teachers who had benefitted most from colonialism.

## 5.2 Agriculture During the First World War

During the First World War, the British conscripted between 350,000 and 400,000 Africans for the war. Some 150,000

to 200,000 came from Kenya of which about 92,906 came from Nyanza (Phillips, 1974, 146). With the removal of these massive numbers of potential producers, subsistence food production was severely disrupted. Famine followed and the weakened condition of the population made them highly susceptible to the severe epidemics such as Spanish influenza and small pox which appeared after the war. The diseases spread following the demobilization of the porters and reached severe proportions by 1920. A major famine occurred between 1918 and 1919 increasing the difficulties caused by the war. Thus, the removal of massive male conscripts during the war was critical for the unequal development of the settler sector and the peasant economy including the Buluyia region. Between 1915 and 1919 Nyanza Province supplied nearly 200,000 males for civil or military recruitment (Alila, 1977, 130).

As these men joined the ranks of the other army of wage labourers, women remained behind to carry out rural subsistence production so that their function was relegated to that of reproducing and maintaining cheap labour reserves. The demands placed on the peasant sector to increase production for the war needs increased commodity production in Buluyia. This, combined with all other demands made on the reserves by the colonial state and the settlers, led to the growth of economic differentiation between and within the regions and districts. It also led to the concentration of wealth and the formation of interest groups of accumulators in the regions and districts who contributed to subtle changes in the sexual division of labour (see Zeleza 1982, 88). All of these then represented

qualitative transformation in social relations and accordingly intensified the growth of antagonistic class interests in the Buluyia sub-periphery.

During this war period Luyia peasants disposed of their produce to meet their subsistent needs as well as sold off their surplus to meet war demands and conditions. They dispensed with their livestock according to official demands but the prices they were offered were far below their actual market value (Namungu, O.I., 1987). Most of the crops grown were food crops and most of the small holdings output were domestically consumed. As pointed out, surplus production was either marketed or used as payment for services received according to mutual agreement between individuals or homesteads. Crops to be marketed apart from cotton, maize, simsim etc included vegetables, beans and bananas. Other portions of small-holdings crops were distributed to relatives, friends, and churches (Angolo, O.I., 1987). Thus, an element of social exchange was apparent in this mode of distribution.

Like any other period, women did much of the agricultural production i.e weeding and harvesting apart from other female tasks such cooking, fetching water and handling domestic purchases. Many homesteads practised crop rotation and shifting cultivation in order to maintain soil fertility. A number of them began to apply manure to the soils as advised by the missionaries. At this time and throughout the colonial period, cattle were still acting a status markets and they were still highly desired as stores of value (Namungu,

O.I., 1987). That is why war demands on peasant livestock dealt a blow to the prestige behind cattle ownership.

Cattle had become related to agricultural production. Cattle loaning continued as before as this was seen as a way of cutting losses should cattle thieves land into one's homestead. Cattle borrowing was to eventually, with the spread of the plough, enable some people to establish a full ex-plough team. They were still passed between families as part of the exchange of wealth for rights in people which occurred through marriage. Cattle were also kept as repositories of wealth and could be exchanged for cash as the need arose. Wary of making the story too long, suffice it to say that the Luyia economy during the First World War period continued to exhibit profound peasant characteristics. Intensification of demands to meet the needs of the war merely entrenched mechanisms of extroverted peasantry as property continued ceasing to be a relationship between men and things destined for consumption. Property in a means of production increasingly lay in its private control rather than in the capacity to appropriate the goods created by its productive utilization.

The demands of the war caused major dislocations in the peasant economies of Buluyia as cattle requisitions depleted herds already affected by rinderpest. Over 50,000 head of cattle were acquired from the province.

### 5.3 Agriculture, Wage Labour, Squatterdom and Taxation During the Inter-war Period

The decade preceding the period of the World Derpession (1929-1938) was one which witnessed an increased consolidation

of settler agriculture. The First War-time boom had brought with it lucrative prices for settler crops and this had encouraged them to increase and diversify their production (Kanogo, 1989, 112). With the entrenchment of settler agriculture, the foundations of the modern peasant society were concretised. The settlers helped accelerate the peasantization of the indigenous producers. They did so by becoming a distinct class to whom the rural African producers now had obligations to fulfil. The state served as the intermediary between the settlers and the indigenous people (Ngethe, 1986, 96). However, to some extent the expansion of African agriculture during this period was also the result of the Africans initiative and their response to the money market. However, the emergence of the squatter phenomenon in the so called White Highlands demonstrated the inability of settler capital to completely operate full-fledged capitalist relations (Zeleza, 1989, 25-31).

Whichever way, the imposition of colonial rule marked a qualitative leap. The penetration of commodity relations in a more or less systematic fashion destroyed the traditional economy. This happened as the colonial state organized the conditions of exploitation of African labour and land which necessitated breaking the reproduction cycle of the traditional economy (Bernstein, 1979, 423). The withdrawal of labour from traditional use-value production continued to undermine the material reproduction of the lineage based peasant economy with respect to agriculture, pastoralism or craft activity. At the

same time, the monetization of some of the material elements of reproduction forced the rural producers into commodity production. This process was evident through the production of cash crops or through the exchange of their labour-power for wages. The means used by the colonial state to effect the creation of some of the social conditions of commodity production were the imposition of taxes earlier in the century and the use of forced labour on public works. These were part of the infrastructure necessary to the movement of commodities, the expansion of colonial administration and the enforcement of law and order.

In essence, the state was now the locus of the power struggle between three groups; the metropolitan rulers, the local colonial administrators and the settlers. The latter two groups were determined to appropriate surplus from the peasants although they differed in their methods (Ngethe, 1986, 97). But for the peasants including those of Buluyia, simple reproduction now entailed consumption of commodities to meet new needs developed following the erosion of the culture of production based on previous systems. Many traditional skills particularly in non-agricultural activities became lost over time following pressures exerted by the process of commoditization (see Bernstein, 1979, 424).

The period 1895-1920 had feebly been characterised by British attempts to establish dualism; the period between 1920 and 1930 witnessed a somewhat an aggressive approach in the development of African agriculture. In 1924, agricultural staff

were posted in African areas but on such a small scale. Knowledge about agriculture was so rudimentary and therefore the officers' impact was generally speaking minimal (Staudt, 1976, 110). Agricultural campaign organization was left to district officers who were allowed considerable discretion.

In the 1930's the government declared an intention to intervene comprehensively in the local economy. Earlier, it had concentrated on new crops and tools. The story of the spread of the plough in Buluyia is clearly explained elsewhere in this study. However, it was to influence the reciprocal exchange between small holders involved in the exchange of cash or labour for the use of an Ox-plough team (Angolo, O.I., 1987). Those who did not control capital in form of an ox-plough were already entering into such an exchange in order to produce crops sufficient for family needs. Farmers came to rely on Ox-plough teams to provide them with means to prepare their fields and produce an abundant crop. As such, a relationship of dependency existed among the Luyia small-holders in the area and these constituted significant social relations of production.

Apart from those areas where land was alienated, and in Southern Buluyia where land pressure due to population growth was generating conditions of labour emigration, the majority of the Luyia who worked for wages were land owners; both large and small. There was no significant class of landless workers apart from a proportion of the squatters as we have noted.

In Southern Buluyia especially in Maragoli and Bunyore, their plight of increasing land shortage was noted as early



as the 1920's. In 1925, the areas described as Native Reserves comprised some 47,000 square miles. While some 2,000 European settlers owned as much land as 400,000 Africans (Migot-Adholla, 1977, 47). By the early 1920's excessive land use, a result of population pressure, was causing so much erosion. In the 1930's migrants from the crowded Maragoli Hills were settling in Kisii having already expanded into Tiriki, Nyang'ori and Southern Nandi. Since the Kisii Highlands eventually became under pressure, the emigration of the Maragoli peoples continued into the sparsely populated Luo areas in South Nyanza (Johnson, 1980, 92). The Maragoli were followed by the Banyore.

However, the migration of the Luyia into South Nyanza generated a pattern of unequal land distribution and there ensued land conflicts between them and the Luo. Because of land shortage in Maragoli, land prices there shot up between 1925 and 1937 or even ten times. By the 1930's, the Maragoli area had one of the highest rural population densities in Kenya. This amounted to about 600 per square mile (Migot-Adholla, 1977, 83).

Apart from the operations of merchant capital in Buluyia, instead of being based on exploitative exchange relations, dependency was partly based on differential access to capital goods. It was entrenched by differential access to land with the emergence of a functionary class. This class facilitated the introduction and spread of certain crops. Cotton, first introduced in Busia, did not meet easy acceptance. The peasant farmer in the then Nyanza had only to be persuaded to plant

the crop. It was more successful in Samia and its success was achieved through the supervision of the crop's growing by Chief Mumia's own relatives, imposed as chiefs and whose role was to convince and sometimes force peasants into understanding the lucrative nature of the crop (Dindi, O.I., 1987). But the year 1923 marked the beginning of a more serious attempt to get cotton planted. This new phase in the cotton industry in the areas was heralded by the enactment of the Kenya Cotton Ordinance, 1923. Following this Ordinance, the Nambale, Samia (Muluanda) and Malakisi ginneries were opened up between 1923 and 1926. Eventually the crop spread to Marachi and other areas (Makhulo, 1985, 22).

Given the experience of Mumia's proteges in Buluyia cotton growing areas, it would appear that the crop was introduced through a crafty and brutal administrative machinery. Peasants were reluctant to take it up since they viewed it as a non-profitable crop whose labour input was too colossal (Dindi, O.I., 1987). Nevertheless despite the general reluctance, in 1911 and 1912 the cotton crop in Samia represented almost the total production in the entire Nyanza Province. Moreover, a good deal of simsim was grown and sold by the Samia between 1912 and 1915. This comprised 520 tons in 1911/12, 385 tons in 1912/13, 322 tons in 1913/14 and 19 tons in 1914/15. These were exported through Sio Port (Seitz, 1978, 139).

The Samia, Marachi, Bakhayo and Bukusu were all encouraged to grow cotton. But when the prices fell, the rural

producers were affected. Some gave up bothering themselves with the unedible crop (Wanyama, O.I., 1988). The growers' price had dropped to about 66% from 30 cents per pound in 1923 to 10.5 cents per pound in 1930/31. Farmers in the then North Kavirondo got disincented to the extent that even after the 1942 price increases, the response towards the crops was still poor (Makhulo, 1985, 22). The outbreak of war in 1914 had added to the difficulties of the crop. Lusumu river Ginnery closed down due to insufficient supplies.

Although several Luyia peasants took up cotton growing in the light of the nature of its introduction, they however noted its very inferior significance in the traditional agrarian set up of the people. It was inferior compared to sorghum and finger millet which had a cultural significance. Beer was brewed from these food crops and it was essential in traditional funeral, wedding and other related ceremonies (Wandabwa, O.I., 1988). Cotton which could not be exchanged for other crops, products or livestock as was the case with the cereals, was merely accepted as a peripheral crop. A ginnery site established at Malakisi in 1925, it was sold by the British Cotton Crowing Association to an Indian firm (Fearn, 1961, 64).

The other important crop introduced in the then North Kavirondo was maize. Many of the Luyia Communities had practised agricultural cultivation for centuries. They had, especially since the 2nd half of the 18th Century, produced crops like millet, sorghum, eleusine, pumpkins, cowpeas,

bananas and sweet potatoes. Even the Bukusu who had continued to lay greater emphasis on livestock herding gradually embraced agriculture by the second half of the 19th century (Wafula, 1981, 9). Although the Bukusu still engaged in livestock herding as a useful adjunct to agriculture and a source of social prestige, by the time of the imposition of colonial rule, the society had steadily undergone transformation and emerged basically as an agricultural one. More less, the entire Luyia communities were agricultural.

Maize had spread to the then North Kavirondo from the adjoining areas during the 1870's and the 1880's (see Hay, 1979, 96). By the end of that century it had become an important food crop in the region, and before the introduction of the oxen-drawn plough in 1913, the most important agricultural implement was a hoe used for cultivation. The hoe was still used despite the advent of the plough until the latter was to be generalised in the 1950's. In this period the heaviest burden of agricultural production fell on women (Nasimiya, 1984, 61). as prospects of cotton growing became increasingly dismal.

During the inter-war period, the then North Nyanza economy developed mainly upon the agricultural resources of the region. This was a development based on the pre-war tendencies. Between 1908 and 1914 the produce of African produce had increased. The amount of traffic was so great that by 1912 it was proposed to extend the railway from Kisumu to Mumias and perhaps beyond. The outbreak of the war held up the plans. It was not until 1928 that the railway to Butere

was finally constructed. Another line was being constructed towards Kampala through Eldoret, Broderick Falls (presently called Webuye) and Bungoma (Barker, 1950, 24). In July 1931, compensation for the railways was assessed following reservation of land for the line.

Although maize became an important cash crop for the region, many Luyia communities insisted planting the grade maize together with the native variety. The native maize was subsequently all pulled up following the introduction of grade maize from Kisumu. The crop was so successful in South Maragoli, Tiriki and around Kakamega in the early 1920's (KNA, DC/NN/1/4 NORTH KAVIRONDO DISTRICT ANNUAL REPORT, 1923, 30). Over 100 tons of maize exported from the then North Kavirondo in 1923 from the region north of Nzoia River, in actual fact, Bukusuland. They sold their crop at Sh. 1/50 per 60 lbs of load while the Southern Luyia like the Tiriki, Maragoli and Banyore preferred selling at Kisumu at Sh. 2/= (KNA, NORTH KAVIRONDO DISTRICT ANNUAL REPORT 1923, 28). Because of the increasing production of maize in Luyialand, grinding mills were established all over. At Malakisi, V.H. and Company established a grinding mill capable of grinding 90 bags of maize a day in 1938. Jivan Vital also put up a similar maize meal (KNA, INTELLIGENCE REPORTS: NORTH KAVIRONDO DISTRICT JANUARY 1938, 8).

By 1936, North Nyanza had 48,000 acres under maize and about 250,000 bags of the crop were sold in a normal year. Some of the maize was being sent to Kisumu posho mills for gristing for consumption and export to Uganda. Some local middle-men were involved in this trade (Memon, 1972, 150).

But the colonial government recognised the need to encourage African peasants in the area to produce surplus food and cash crops for sale. But this policy was heavily dependent on the Indian in his role as middleman in the budding townships and trading centres. The government supported this by opening up new trading centres and auctioning plots in these areas are requested to do so either by the local inhabitants or by the Indian traders. However, in an attempt to cut the Indian Middleman, the Kenya Farmers Association (K.F.A.) the settler produce marketing agency in the then White Highlands also got involved in marketing of African produced maize from the year 1938. The settler agency had in 1937 rented Local Native Council godowns in the North Nyanza District at Yala, Luanda, Butere and Webuye to purchase maize (Memon, 1972, 150-51).

The production of maize in Buluyia increased considerably with the people's embrace of the plough. In the 1920's ploughs were being sold in all major trading centres. In Bukusu hoes had been sold by Indians at Malakisi, Bungoma and Webuye. By 1943 they had approximately 240 hoes to sell to the public. The most notable ones were Mohamed Yusuf, Gulan Ali Meghji and Mohamed Kanji (see K.N.A., FILE NO. PC/NZA/3/2/2). By 1927, there were only 27 ploughs in Bukusu because of the peoples conservatism. Nevertheless, the total number of ploughs in North Kavirondo was 103. But in 1938, the number increased to 2,109 (KNA, PC/NZA/3/2/4).

Unlike other Luyia plough users, by 1936 the Bukusu had began to intensify the use of ploughs by forming ploughing companies. Between 1929 and 1936 Kimilili Division had 45

ploughing companies (Nasimiyu, 1984, 74). By 1939 one company alone had about 600 acres under cultivation. The company, Yalasi Farmers Farmers Club of South Kimilili consisted of eleven farmers (KNA, PC/NZA/3/27/23).

The earliest ploughing company was formed in 1929 by some members of the Friends African Mission at Lugulu. The mission boys had began to advocate for such a company in 1926 as the best means of competing with white settlers of the adjoining district of Trans-Nzoia in the production of maize (Ogutu, 1985, 67). The companies increased and spread to Roman Catholics. They were composed of between 4 and 5 farmers. In the 1930's the largest concentration was found in the ~~Chwele~~, Chesamisi, Lugulu and Kimilili areas (Vermouth, 1977/78, 77).

Despite the formation of ploughing companies in Bukusuland, it should be noted that the Co-operative Society Ordinance passed in 1931 had omitted the interests of the Africans altogether. But in the next decade, the government was forced to give way when it conceded to adopt the Co-operative Ordinance of 1946. However, before the depression of the 1930's only European maize was exported from the colony. It was not until 1934 when efforts were made to centralize marketing of the crop through the European monopolised K.F.A. This move was aimed at taking away the sale of maize from the hands of Asians to established places where K.F.A. could purchase the crop throughout the reserves (Ogutu, 1975, 65).

Predictably, the world depression had greatly dislocated the settler sector and driven the colonial government

to re-evaluate its economic policy. It is true the government found it expedient to encourage African peasant commodity production and therefore faced the challenge of restructuring African agriculture to supplement settler production and increase state revenue. But to a large extent, the economic politics introduced were closely tied up with the economies of the metropole. But when the depression struck, prices of various commodities fell. Maize was the most widely grown by both Africans and the settlers. Its price had dropped to 50% of its 1929 value by 1931. That is from Shs. 11.40 to Shs.5.06. This further plummeted to Shs. 3.30 in 1933 (Kanogo, 1986, 2). These events and the worsening conditions espoused a great deal of political consciousness. It made the period of the depression provide the first complete decade when economic entrepreneurship and political expression became a reality.

In Buluyia this culminated in the rise of the North Kavirondo Chamber of Commerce, an association of maize growers of the Kimilili and Webuye neighbourhood, in 1939. This had first appeared in the mid thirties in Maragoli and Tiriki and remained ineffective until some Bukusu Maize farmers joined it. The original Luo and Luyia body called Kavirondo Chamber of Commerce had been formed in October 1933. It marked the first formal African trading arrangement in Nyanza before eventually splintering into the Kisumu Native Chamber of Commerce, the Kavirondo Chamber of Commerce and the North Kavirondo African Chamber of Commerce. African Chamber of Commerce in 1934 (Lumwanji, O.I., 1987). By 1935 its Secretary was Habil Ndagalu of South Maragoli.



The parent chamber had hitherto recorded its strongest protest against the Indian hawker traders being allowed by the D.C.'s to place their clothes in front of the native shops. It placed the matter before the Acting Chief Native Commissioner and further opposed the increasing fees on native trades. It deplored the government restriction on cutting of trees in Central Kavirondo, hindering efforts of cultivation by Africans while at the same time permitting Europeans and Asians to cut timber in South and North Kavirondo which they sold in Kisumu (KNA, DC/CN/8/2, Kavirondo Taxpayers Welfare Association, 7). Although the colonial government was wary of the intentions of the North Kavirondo Chamber of Commerce and its permission to raise subscriptions stopped earlier in the year, the local British administration thought that:

The leaders of this Association seem progressive and ready enough to co-operate with the Agricultural staff in soil conservation and marketing measures. It is possible that they may develop into a useful co-operative body, if properly guided (KNA, DC/CN/1/1/3, NYANZA ANNUAL REPORT 1939, 10-11).

The earlier North Kavirondo African Chamber of Commerce was dominated by the Tiriki and Maragoli while the latter North Kavirondo Chamber of Commerce was dominated by the Bukusu (Akolo, O.I., 1987). These however were disbanded with the outbreak of the 2nd World War. Yet for the period of their existence they had articulated African interests within constraints of policy that imposed widespread obstacles in the paths of African peasants and petty traders. The transformation of the economy through the instrument of policy had caused it to be extroverted.

The extroversion of the peasant economy during the years of the depression was directed towards production for local consumption and cash. Although there may have been an increase in production in the growing of export crops which were more profitable than the traditional foodstuffs, needless to mention the fall of prices during the depression, it should be noted that increase of production were in fact accompanied by increase in labour (See Bowles, 1975, 3). But before long there was a decline in the reward of labour followed by regression in production as rural incomes were spent on either taxation or on purchasing imported goods as a replacement for goods formerly made by traditional craftsmen.

Throughout the inter-war period commoditization of the Luyia peasant economies was extremely uneven as the evidence adduced in this study tends to show. It was uneven in character both between social formations and within them. This unevenness was related to the concrete conditions in which the impetus of the money economy confronted and penetrated different traditional peasant economies. Nevertheless, the introduction of policies favourable to commodity production imposed desires and alternatives to the Luyia societies and transformed them from within however regionally different this may have been. It contributed to social differentiation by creating new kinds of economic opportunities and distorted the ties of kinship which had held the societies together. Thus, as demonstrated, the changing fortunes of the colonial economy influenced the development of a capitalist interpreneurship in the Luyia societies as evidenced in the

increasing involvement in petty trade and the adoption of an extroverted agriculture geared towards external demand.

But for many people during this period, contact with the modern economy took the form of undergoing the experience of working as labourers on large-scale farms. There were many reasons for this. For instance in the early 1930's locusts invaded the whole of Nyanza resulting in the long drawn out famine that came to be known as Nyangweso. Moreover, the marking of African produce on the basis of African produce ordinance of 1935 had the effect of not bettering the quality of production but embittering the peasants against the government (Atieno-Adhiambo, 1972, 226). Yet cash was needed to pay taxes and buy manufactured goods which entered the peasant economy either as agricultural tools or consummables (Anyang' Nyong'o, 1981, 1). There were better ways of earning money other than growing low-priced commodities. This was through selling labour power for wages either to the settler estate or private employers.

North Nyanza as did the rest of Nyanza provided an important labour reservoir which could be used without too much disruption of their indigenous economies. While part of this labour was recruited voluntarily, a large fraction also left as conscripted labour for war and labour for settler agriculture. During the World Wars, Nyanza supplied a large part of the Carriers Corps and soldiers (Anyang' Nyong'o, 1981, 2). Understandably, for the entire inter-war period like the rest of Nyanza, Buluyia continued to be an exporter of wage labour while the capitalist relations of production

stagnated in its countryside. Nevertheless, the expansion of commodity production in the region largely contributed to the development of a middle peasantry.

In Bunyore and Maragoli the expansion of commodity production in the inter-war period was inhibited by inadequate land resources. The predominant methods of agricultural production were unable to meet the food and income requirements of most village households. Other alternatives had to be found which could compensate for the limitations imposed by scarce land resources. This included reliance upon wage employment (Paterson, 1980, 4). But even in Kisa, as was the case in Bunyore and Maragoli, apart from opting for wage labour, people finding production constrained by limited land resources sought to enlarge their areas of production by borrowing, renting or purchasing land (Aseka, O.I., 1987). Population in these areas was growing fast from the 1920's creating considerable land shortage and ecological deterioration. This may have forced increasing numbers of the Luyia community to seek work on settler farms and in the towns for livelihood. In 1923, in Bunyore population density was already as high as 1,096 people per square mile (Wafula, 1981, 33-34).

But increased commodity production in the area, as was the case elsewhere, was marked by trends towards individualization of land and its concentration. It also led to the modification in uses of household or family labour and led to the beginnings of African petty bourgeois use wage of labour. As a result, expansion of surplus production and the

appropriation of surplus value led to accumulation of more land by certain families. This led to the alienation of the less successful from the means of production as kinship and family patterns and obligations were reshaped by shifts in land tenorial arrangements and the changes in the organization and division of labour that were taking place (Zezeza, 1982, 88).

As early as 1914 tens of thousands were already being compelled to go out of the district in search of wage labour every year. In 1914 10,394 men registered themselves for employment other than the military (KNA, DC/NN/1/2, NORTH KAVIRONDO DISTRICT ANNUAL REPORT 1908 - 1919, 22). By 1919 this figure had climbed to 13,946. However, by 1926 this had steadily risen to 29,213, comprising about 50% of the able-bodied adult males between 15-40 years (KNA, DC/NN/1/7, NORTH KAVIRONDO DISTRICT ANNUAL REPROT 1926, 16).

By 1928 there were over 31,000 Luyia registered labourers in employment. In 1944, this number had gone up to 41,834. So far, this was the highest tribal total of labourers in the entire colony (KNA, DC/NN/1/26, NORTH KAVIRONDO ANNUAL REPORT 1944, 2).

Outward migration manifested itself in squatting also. Official reports show a continuous process of movement to the neighbouring settled districts of the then North Kavirondo. Between 1934 and 1937, there were more than 2,000 Luyia squatters in Trans-Nzoia alone (KNA, DC/NN/1/19 NORTH KAVIRONDO DISTRICT ANNUAL REPROT, 1937, 34). Indeed in a meeting between

the Labour Officer and the Bungoma D.C. in 1963 the independent Kenya officials noted that the majority of the displaced people in Trans-Nzoia district came from Bungoma. Many of the displaced people were to refuse to leave farms on which they were squatting in Trans-Nzoia alleging that they had no where else to go to (KNA, DC/UG/2/8 ADMINISTRATION, 1963, 11).

There were scores of other Luyia squatters in the Kaimosi area. In this region, the farm labourers and squatters were placed under an African Chief called Amian whose relationship with the Kaimosi white settlers was reportedly amicable (KNA, DC/NN/3/3/11, POLITICAL RECORD BOOK Vol. II 1929). While the squatters in the Kaimosi area were mainly Tiriki and Maragoli, there was a large number of Kabras and Tachoni squatters in the Uasin Gishu district. Some of them are recorded to have settled there to avoid the Hut Tax and tribal obligations (KNA, DC/NN/1/4, NORTH KAVIRONDO ANNUAL REPORT, 1923, 4). But to trim the number of squatters in the Trans-Nzoia and Uasin Gishu districts, efforts were made by the respective D.C's to ensure that only those Luyia employed by the owners of the farms they resided on were allowed to squat (KNA, DC/NN/1/4,4).

As steps were taken to control squatting in the Trans-Nzoia, Uasin Gishu Districts and the Kaimosi areas, efforts were however being made to encourage Africans to enter the forest as squatters as a means of securing cheaper labour for planting of seedlings. But to this end there was virtually no response (KNA, DC/NN/1/1/3, NYANZA ANNUAL REPORT 1939, 67). In whatever form squatting otherwise called resident labour at contract farming

was purely and simply an exploitative system. Indeed, the degree of exploitation was unparalleled since the peasants covered their own reproduction costs either via the market and or their cultivated plots, and because family labour could extend their working hours almost indefinitely. No wonder, those peasants in contract farming experienced declining conditions (Buch-Hansen and Marcussen, 1982, 18).

While the supply of voluntary labour was abundant in Bunyore, Tiriki and Maragoli, the Central and northern Luyia regions dispensed with comparably few voluntary labourers. In these areas, the supply of voluntary labour was held back by partly the regions distance from the administrative headquarters of Kisumu and Kakamega. But generally in other Central Luyia areas, it was held back also by the fact that peasant commodity production afforded them some cash to pay taxes and meet their consumptive needs. However, in Bunyala, the occasional disastrous flooding of the Nzoia river remained an ecological hazard. This coupled with erratic rainfalls caused a number of food shortages. Many Bunyala migrated into Mombasa and Nairobi for work as manual labourers (Mukudi, O.I., 1987).

Notwithstanding, taxation was one of the primary fiscal measures utilised in this period to compel Africans to move into the labour market. Increased taxation was used to drive Africans out of the reserves throughout the colony. Before increasing taxation became necessary between 1910 and 1922, Africans were paying taxes on huts. But when taxation became a vital instrument for driving Africans to sell their

labour, a poll-tax was instituted. It was intended to capture the adult males who did not have to pay hut tax and who may not have had the need for money to compel them to seek wage employment. Between 1910 and 1920, the amount of tax required had more than doubled, that is, Shs. 6/- to Shs. 16/- per person (Kinyanjui, 1979, 123).

Restating the essence of colonial policy between 1912 and 1919 the Governor Sir Henry Belfield expressed the prevailing attitude by saying in 1913:

We consider taxation as the only possible method of compelling the native to leave his reserve for the purpose of work ... Only in this way can the cost of living be increased for the native (Clayton and Savage, 1974, 41).

Therefore it is not surprising that by 1932, Africans were paying more in taxes than they were receiving from colonial revenue. Indeed the policy of direct taxation and other indirect forms of taxation removed adult males from production in their home areas. It transferred the funds they had acquired from wage labour back into the European enclave (Kinyanjui, 1979, 123). Inevitably, a series of legal measures were adopted to regulate and stabilize labour. The Employment of Natives Ordinance of the late 1920's was promulgated as an amendment of the Master and Servants Ordinance of 1906 heretofore amended several other times. This came following a vicious decade of maximising labour utilization through legislation. In 1912, the Native Labour Ordinance had authorised compulsory recruitment of labour for public projects. This was to be followed by the



enaction of the Native Registration Ordinance, the Resident Native Ordinance and a concerted effort to increase taxation between 1918 and 1919. (Kanogo, 1987). These were mechanisms which institutionalised forced labour. They made it a punishable offence for an employee to break his contract, yet wages if paid were extremely low. They actually fell between 1910 and 1920 (Collier and Lal, 1986, 33).

As professional labour recruiters were given a free vein and they used dubious and cruel methods in order to get labour, chiefs were expected to recruit labour on behalf of the settlers and the government. They were also supposed to provide communal labour for public work programmes. Matters were made worse by the pressures of the First World war. This was because additional labour had to be secured for military forces and carrier corps. By 1917 the government resorted to recruitment through raids in order to increase the diminishing ranks of the carrier corps following the death of a large number due to bad conditions. It added grievous insult to injury when the British government refused to pay unclaimed carriers' pay despite requests by the Kenyan government and promises that the money would be used to improve African Welfare (Clayton and Savage, 1974, 90-1).

Nevertheless, an outcry in Britain and among missionaries in East Africa led to the abandonment of these regulations. But overt coercion as not entirely a reliable system of supply and control. As a result, settler farms came to rely heavily on resident or squatter labour as early as 1911 to counter the problem of perennial labour shortages. The trend towards the

resident labour system was first institutionalised by the passing of the resident Natives Bill in 1916, the first in a series of such bills. Postwar demands for labour therefore only served to reinforce pressures to expand and legalise the squatter system (Zezeza, 1989, 31). But this was not without efforts to curtail squatter rights and privileges.

When squatter production was challenging settler production, many squatters switched their rent payments from labour into money. This led to the government passing the Resident Native Ordinance in 1918 which required future payments to be made in labour. It is not true the Luyia were least affected by the squatter legislation since the majority of the non-resident labour power on farms was supplied from the Luo and Luyia (See Kitching, 1980, 19). Indeed, evidence has been adduced showing that they were not completely free from the squatter spectacle as many communities had been displaced in the Trans-Nzoia/Uasin Gishu regions.

Before 1918, it had been possible for squatters on European farms to cultivate large areas of land and keep a considerable number of cattle. Thus, with the increasing deterioration of conditions in North Kavirondo Reserve, some squatters had a much higher standard of living compared to the reserve. In addition, their social activity was not restricted and they practised their traditional rituals and traded freely with those in the reserves or other middlemen. The squatter conditions were so somewhat attractive that a steady flow of migrants continued even with the fall in wages on settler farms (Migot-Adholla, 1977, 51).

But as the result of the 1918, 1924 and 1937 Resident Native Labourers Ordinances (See Kanogo, 1986, 9) which were designed to protect and stimulate European agricultural production, there were increasing restrictions on the squatters economic activity. Their condition became more precarious. Limiting of squatter cultivation and their stock drastically reversed their fortunes and some of them moved back to the reserves. The policies were designed to pauperise the squatters and make them entirely dependent on wages from white farmers. It was to provide an additional impetus to the squatter discontent over land (Migot-Adholla, 1977, 52). In Nyanza, there were 19,396 squatters while in Trans-Nzoia there were 29,195 by 1930. In North Nyanza there were 432 squatters occupying averagingly 1.6 acres each (Osolo-Nasubo, 1973, 95-97).

A part from taxation being used as an instrument to compel Africans into wage labour, it also delimited peasant accumulation. Between 1916 and 1917 the hut tax was raised from 3 rupees to 5 rupees and a separate poll was made in Luyialand from 1918. This was being extorted against an average monthly wage of 5/99 rupees KNA, DC/NN/1/1, NORTH KAVIRONDO DISTRICT ANNUAL REPROT, 1917, 12). At the close of the interwar period large sums of money were being collected from Luyia peasants in form of tax. A total of Shs. 1,187,368/00, Shs. 1,165,362/00, and 1,122,972/00 were collected as hut tax in the then North Kavirondo District in the years 1936, 1937 and 1938 respectively. A further Shs. 20,000/00, Shs. 24,553/00 and Shs. 21,918/00 were collected as poll-tax during the same years respectively (See KNA, PC/NZA/4/5/5, NORTH KAVIRONDO

DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE REPROTS 1936-1938, 4). But these calculations excluded other numerous collections done by the Luyia squatters and wage labourers in the Trans-Nzoia and Uasin Gishu districts.

The picture that emerges from colonial labour policy formulation and taxation efforts in Buluyia is a dismal one. It portrays the period as one during which colonial primary accumulation was carried out. It led to the dispossession and horrific exploitation of the Luyia peasants on one hand and on the other the entombment, enslavement and general pauperization of the squatter and wage labourers in the settled areas of the North Kavirondo neighbourhood. Certain political consequences were to flow from this perceived state of affairs as the next section will demonstrate.

#### 5.4 The Gold Rush, Land Alienation and Political Activities in Buluyia

In the preceding section evidence has been adduced showing how the Luyia peasantry were heavily burdened with taxation. This was the plight of all Kenyan peasantries given that by 1930, Africans in the colony were responsible for 37% of the colony's total revenue (Ingham, 1962, 337). Together Hut, poll tax and customs duties accounted for 60 to 80% of the entire colonial revenue (Swainson, 1980, 23) and yet the settler sector benefitted most from these resources at the expense of the overburdened African contributors. These were the forms of injustices and exploitation which littered the colonial history of the entire colony.

Like the rest of the peasantries in the colony, the

transition from pre-capitalist peasant forms of production did not occur because of the internal dynamic of the traditional Luyia social formations but because the colonial state, mostly by use of force, integrated their economies with the metropolitan capitalist economy and geared them towards export. An increase of that production was punctuated by incessant increases of taxes paid in money and obtained in certain predetermined ways in the selling of agricultural produce and the selling of human labour. Nevertheless the continued use of force in introducing commodity production, levying of taxes and the alienation of land to force Africans into wage labour was likely to lead to political opposition. This was to be an opposition that would encapsulate a host of other trivia but which were all the same perceived to be ingredients and products of prejudicial colonial policy formulation and execution.

Alienation of land in the preceding decades had caused hardships to the displaced peasants of Trans-Nzoia, Lugari and Kaimosi. Existing populations had become squatters on land which was previously their own while others were forced into marginal areas by expulsion. Such displacements elsewhere in the colony had drawn constant African protest and petitions about the insecurity of their tenure of land. The overall result was the creation of Native Reserves in 1926 which were meant to safeguard African ownership of land. Notwithstanding, the discovery of gold in 1932 resulted in further violation of African reserves as further land was alienated for the exploitation of the precious metal (Kanogo, 1986, 14).

Following this latest alienation, even when the Kenya

Land Commission chaired by Sir Morris Carter wrote its report in 1933 to Her Majesty's government, it denied cases of massive land alienation in Nyanza. This study has given evidence to the contrary including revelations given to the Commission while it was collecting evidence in the then North Kavirondo. With regard to Nyanza, the commission concerned itself with the question as to whether the Reserves of the three Kavirondo Districts comprising a total of 3,114 square miles were adequate to the needs of a population estimated to be 1,029,422 people (Anyang' Nyong'o, 1981, 5). Contrary to the actual situation portrayed in the previous section, the report erroneously concluded that there would be no real land problem in Kavirondo if productivity was increased by modern methods of farming and if the fertile land lying unused was cultivated properly. The commission further argued that the productive forces could be developed without necessarily changing the land tenure system, in other words, the people's production relations. But the commission had ignored the demands of the Young Kavirondo Association who as early as 1921 had argued in a memorandum to the colonial administration in favour of individual land tenure (Anyang' Nyong'o, 1981, 6).

While the gist of the association's argument was that it would enable individuals to have access to loan capital for the purpose of developing productive forces, it should be noted that the surge of African protests in the early 1920's had a basic inspiration. Africans were driven by an apparent desire for greater local autonomy as a defense against the settlers who then dominated the central institutions of the colony (Lonsdale, 1970, 239).

The Young Kavirondo Association formed in 1921 had first agitated for a paramount chief and protested against the increased hut and poll-tax and the Kipande System (Mueller, 1972, 9). It was obviously in link with the East African Association whose roots were in the Young Kikuyu Association formed in 1919. The Association eventually took the name East African Association in 1922. Both organizations condemned land alienation by white settlers and sought redress. Given the militant and uncompromising approach to political change by the EAA leader, Harry Thuku, the conflict between the colonial administration and the organization culminated in the arrest of Thuku and the banning of EAA. Against a background of worsening economic climate, higher taxes, lower wages, the menace of increased European settlement, demands for labour and the hated Kipande registration, these were galling material conditions that provided fertile ground for militant political activism by the Luyia and Luo within the YKA (see Lonsdale, 1964, 219-20).

After the First World War changes in the economic life of the Luyia had gradually become noticeable. The demand for farm labour in the 1920's was high and then fell with the depression. These experiences together with those brought upon them to bear by the demands of the war made many Africans become aware of themselves as a distinct racial group. They perceived the importance of organized resistance and it is no wonder that the first political organization in Nyanza rose in this era (Groot, 1975, 102). The president of the Young Kavirondo Association was Jonathan Okwiri, a teacher at the C.M.S. school at Maseno. It held a mass meeting in July 1922

during which its leadership voiced opposition to unfair taxation, land and other policies as they affected the Africans (See Lonsdale, 1964, 267). Its first meeting had been held on 29th December 1921 at Lundha in North Gem.

All the leaders of the Young Kavirondo Association were Luo although they were in touch with thie Luyia C.M.S. adherents both at Maseno and Butere. The president of the association Jonathan Okwiri came from Uyoma, the secretary Benjamin Owuor from Seme and the Treasurer Simon Nyende from North Gem (KNA, DC/KSM/1/28/116, KAVIRONDO ASSOCIATION AND POLITICAL MOVEMENTS AMONG THE LUO, 1922, 1). The association held a meeting at Lundha in Gem on 13th January, 1922, attended by a crowd of 9,125 people in which protests were raised as to the changed designation of their country as "a colony". The meeting which was attended by eleven chiefs emphasised the need for an African leader for their motherland. No Luyia had attended the first meeting but were approached later to join the movement. The second meeting resolved; "even if the government imprison (sic) ten of our Chiefs, we will agree till we get what we want "(KNA, DC/KSM/1/28/116,1). These meetings came to be designated as "piny owacho", the "government has said" A founder member of YKA was Canon Jeremiah Awori from Samia whose early association with the C.M.S. Mission at Butere exposed him to the currency of early African politics in the area (Mukudi, O.I., 1987).

In a previous meeting held on 9th January 1922, the association had collected money to be sent to Harry Thuku, the leader of the East African Association through James Beauttah who had been a Telegraph instructor at Maseno Mission School in



the previous years and was known to be in touch with Thuku. Samia and Nyangori which were then part of Kisumu District were reported to have elements who expressed sympathy with the Okwiri's movement. But already a Luyia member of the association called Erastu Ligalaba was spearheading an anti-Luo faction by forbidding other Luyia mission boys of Maseno from attending its meetings (KNS, DC/KSM/1/28/116/, 20). Nevertheless, because of the movements' potential persuasion and involvement of the Luyia, the colonial administration took no chances. Often in its mass rallies, the D.C. of Central Nyanza who governed over the Luyia regions of Buholo, Busonga and Samia kept vigil and was helped by the DC from Kakamega (KNA, DC/KSM/1/28/116, PUBLICATIONS AND RECORDS: POLITICAL RECORDS, 1).---

When the government was contemplating banning the YKA, Archdeacon Owen saved it by renaming it the Kavirondo Tax Payers Association. The KTWa was created in 1923 and grew out of the YKA (Bode, 1975, 99). Its emergence pre-empted the confrontational politics which the earlier association had begun to gestate.

With himself as the president of the KTWa for a long time, Archdeacon Owen encouraged African priests to play an active role in local civil affairs. Under his leadership, the association devoted most of its income and energies to improvement schemes. Its style of protest was moderate, a show of Owen's overwhelming influence (Lonsdale, 1970, 236). Initially the KTWa was intended to combine both the Luo and the and the Luyia. For a very short time it did. But in 1924 it split in two. A Luyia branch emerged now called North

Kavirondo Tax Payers Welfare Association. Thereafter, the KTWA and NKTWA met only occasionally to collaborate on specific issues, otherwise they developed quite separately. They had antagonisms based on conflict over land and schools in the border locations where the Luo and Luyia were mixed. Such border locations had been recruiting grounds for the parent association (Bode, 1975, 99).

Prior to the breaking, the General Committee of the association comprised Chief Joseph Mulama, the Marama and Kisa Chief of North Kavirondo, Chief Ogada of Central Kavirondo, Chief Murunga of North Kavirondo, Chief Paul Agoi, a member of the Friends African Mission in North Kavirondo, Raphael Apindi, a senior Luo teacher at Maseno, Joel Owino, a clerk of the Central Kavirondo Local Native Council, Rev. P.H. White - a Technical Master at Maseno School and Archdeacon Owen (KNA, KAVIRONDO ASSOCIATION AND POLITICAL MOVEMENTS AMONG THE LUO, 1927, 7).

On realising the likelihood of catholic adherents conferring with the C.M.S. dominated NKTWA, the Mill Hill Mission formed the Native Catholic Union in 1924. The emergence of the NCU based at Mukumu Mission in Kakamega weakened NKTWA. The new association was to send a memorandum to the Kenya Land Commission in 1932. Even the KTWA sent a memorandum to the House of Commons and this was published in the Report of the Kenya Land Commission. In 1938, the Kikuyu Central Association and KTWA sent a memorandum to the Secretary of State for the colonies on the Native Lands Ordinance (Khamadi, O.I., 1988).

The militancy of KTWA even after its breaking into

respective tribal groups was manifested when it sent a memorandum to the Hilton Young Commission in 1927. This memorandum was published in the daily issue of the East African Standard on 30th December 1927 and in the weekly issue of the same on 31st December 1927. The memorandum was prepared by a sub committee of the association which included Chief Ogada, Chief Mulama, Chief Murunga, Chief Agoi, Raphael Apindi and Archdeacon Owen among others (KNA, DC/KSM/1/35/56, KAVIRONDO ASSOCIATION AND POLITICAL MOVEMENTS AMONG THE THE LUO 1927, 7).

The first part of the memorandum was an attack on the Government's Dual Policy of development that was first conveyed to the natives through Circular No. 4 of 20th January 1927 by which all District Officers were instructed to inculcate the doctrine of work both in the reserves and outside. The contents of the circular had been communicated to the Headmen and natives by the P.C. and his officers throughout the province. The association dissented by arguing that the native

must be taught by every means open to the government.....It is his duty to the community and to himself to work, and unless he is prepared to do a reasonable amount of work on his own account, it is his duty to go out to work either for Government or private employers in industrial employment (KNA, KSM/1/35/56, 1927, 5).

A part from its opposition to the Dual Policy of development, it also opposed the collection of poll tax. It condemned unpaid communal work as being illegal in contravention to the Native Authority Ordinance which prescribed 6 days of work in a week. Thus, the colonial administration sought an explanation from the Chiefs involved in the drafting of this

memorandum and contemplated taking a punitive reprisal against them for publicly condemning government policy through the KTWA. Government concern and general unease with native political activism was further demonstrated when the KTWA held another meeting at Lundha on 23rd December, 1927. This was a meeting attended by James Beuttah in which the KTWA members "were worked up" against the Registration requirements, the country's status as a colony among other issues. Not ready to take any chances, the meeting was closely monitored by the administration including the mobilization of the policy to move in case trouble erupted (KNA, KSM/1/35/56, 1927, 4).

Following the split of the KTWA in 1924, the Luyia association began to decline in 1925. But it eventually collapsed in 1948 when there were no more subscriptions forthcoming and the membership shrank to just an active core. Before the split, the parent body had Shs. 3,500/=, Two years later the Luyia offshoot alone had a balance of Shs. 13,500/= (KNA, DC/NN/1/6, NORTH KAVIRONDO ANNUAL REPORT 1925). But throughout the 1920's, two men dominated the political scene of the association. These were Paul Agoi from Maragoli and Joseph Mulama of Marama. They were Charman and Vice-Chairman respectively. For much of the period its members included Chiefs, headmen, elders, Catholics, Anglicans, FAM adherents and non-christians. Rv. Jeremiah Awori of Samia was its Treasurer (KNA, PC/19/12/29, DC/KMGA/1/6).

The NKTWA's money was used to offer scholarships for needy children as ARchdeacon Owen had first suggested prior to the splintering of the association. He remaiend a big

influence in both the Luo KTWA and the Luyia NKTWA. Infact he had played an advisory role in the two branches' combined memorandum submitted to the Ormsby-Gore Commission in 1924 and the Hilton Young Commission in 1927. A good deal of NKTWA's membership drew mainly from Marama and Bunyore. For example its 1929 general meeting held in Butere, the session was dominated by politically emotive Marama insurgents (KNA, NORTH KAVIRONDO ANNUAL REPROT, 1929).

The Hilton Young Commission which was investigating the possibility of an East African federation was sent a memorandum in which the KTWA and NKTWA insisted that Africans be given representation in any proposed federation. Moreover, they wanted the Local Native Councils extended as to give provision for the establishment of Provincial Native Councils and a Native Council for the entire colony. These would be pivotal in the expression of the African opinion in any proposed legislation (KNA, East African Standard, 31/12/1927).

The foregoing information provides a vivid backdrop against which Luyia political activism emerged and grew. When gold was discovered in Kakamega and massive land alienated in 1931, out of the urgency of the situation emerged the North Kavirondo Central Association (Bode, 1975, 108). By this time the NKTWA had virtually been overshadowed by the L.N.C. whose influential leaders like Mulama, Agoi, Murunga, Lumadede and Kisala were also members and officials of the NKTWA. Understandably, because of their dual membership there developed not a conflict, as the two had similar concerns and goals, but a fundamental shift of emphasis. When the government instituted

the L.N.C. in 1925 it comprised elected members and all chiefs as nominated members. Compared to the NKTWA and the executive constraints facing it, it drew more practical power and commanded a more resourceful financial resource especially when it began to disburse funds to be utilised on projects mooted by the NKTWA. By 1928 when the L.N.C's elected members became the majority in its official sessions, it emerged the official organ of Luyia opinion (See KNA, DC/NN/3/2/204 NORTH KAVIRONDO LOCAL NATIVE COUNCIL, INAUGURAL MEETING, See also KNA, NORTH KAVIRONDO ANNUAL REPORT 1928).

The NKTWA became moribund after instigating a series of political troubles. In March 1923 there had occurred a strike at Butere Vocational School which was blamed on the activities of Archdeacon Owen by the local colonial administration. This incident prompted a visit to Butere by the P.C. of Nyanza since the students had sought to discuss the administration of the colony and the school with the Archdeacon. Gershom Anzaya, a teacher in the school and a member of the KTTWA had instructed them to hold out in their demand (KNA, DC/NN/3/3/4, POLITICAL RECORD BOOK VOL. II). Anzaya was earlier reported to have plotted against the colonial government by writing letters that were circulated in North Kavirondo advising the people to resist the country being made a colony. He was termed as a rebel who was open in his defiance and often refused to salute the British Flag when on parade (KNA, DC/NN/3/3/4, POLITICAL RECORD BOOK VOL. II).

KTTWA dissidents were strewn all over. In Kisa was Jeremiah Nyangule who had openly defied all law and order

advocated for direct action against the colonial government. Thus, Anzaya and Nyangule were branded as "firebrands disturbing the district from time to time, both exceedingly cunning and most difficult to tract (sic), owing to their oily suave manners". Other dangerous elements were identified as Noah Luta, Yeremiah Katibi, and Daudi Lubanga. Gershom Anzaya operated in Kisa while the others operated in Marama (KNA, DC/NN/3/3/4, POLITICAL RECORD BOOK VOL.II). It is against a background like this that a demand by the Abamang'ali that they be granted independence in 1923 may be understood. Infact they are an ofshoot of the Abasamia in Kisa from which Anzaya hailed.

With the emergence of the NKCA, it was patronised by the Church of God mission at Kisa in Bunyore. Here, Ludwig, a leading C of G missionary was described by the administration as a consistently helpful man to the government who would stand no nonsense especially on matters relating to land. When the NKCA died out, a new association called Abaluyia Central Association rose in its place in 1939 led by the disgraced Chief Mulama. He had been dismissed as Chief after he had proclaimed himself as paramount Chief at a local baraza. Mulama had tried to use the NKCA to petition the Secretary of State for colonies on the issue of paramountcy to no avail in 1935. However, during 1939, they changed its name to Abaluyia Association and sent a similar petition on the same subject (KNA, DC/CN/1/1/3, NYANZA PROVINCE ANNUAL REPORT, 1939, 8). The organization was particularly strong in the southern locations. Many of its leaders were educated at Friends Mission at Kaimosi and its influence was spreading to the

north and West as the Friends Schools increased there. The government was particularly disturbed by its activities. For example, the P.C. regretted that it had failed to serve any useful purpose but rather continued to spread "untruthful and alarmist rumours about land policy" under its leaders Lumadede, Moses Muhanga and John Adala. Lumadede was its president (KNA, DC/CN/1/1/3, NYANZA PROVINCE ANNUAL REPORT, 1939, 10).

One really wonders what was so untruthful and alarmist about land policy when its parent body the NKCA served its political apprenticeship in a crisis over land. In 1934, the Mining Ordinance 1933, The Mining Regulations 1934, The Mining Amendment Ordinance 1934, and The Native Land Trust Amendment Ordinance came into effect. The Mining regulations introduced the protection Notice in place of the Discovery Notice and the Development Certificate. The object of the protective Notice was to be enable a prospector to examine an area of 160 acres in peace for 6 months without outside interference. The Mining Amendment Ordinance of 1934 provided for compulsory compensation of natives. Formerly only non-natives had been so entitled incase of land alienation for the mining enterprise. The Native Lands Trust Amendment Ordinance provided for the issue of Mining Leases in Native Reserves (KNA, DC/KSM/1/28/40, WARDEN OF MINES: ANNUAL REPORT 1934, 7).

The colonial administration not ready to admit the distresses which the gold rush engendered to the Luyia of the area gave very distorted accounts to the metropole. The Secretary of State for the Colonies is reported to have stated in a speech in London after his return from Kenya that:



He was absolutely convinced that no where in the world did better relations exist between natives and Europeans than in Kakamega. He was frankly surprised by the small disturbance over land which had taken place (KNA, DC/KSM/1/28/40, 7).

Efforts were therefore made to blackmail the NKCA and rallies were held regularly each month until September 1934 in Isukha, North Maragoli, Idakho and Kisa to counter claims and petitions made by the NKCA. The meetings also discussed matters of compensation to the Africans whose lands were alienated. But additional unrest was fostered by certain teachers at the Jeans School in Nairobi and the adherents of the Friends Mission. This unrest was confined to Nyang'ori, Bunyore and parts of Isukha. Thus, the Chief object was to prevent it from spreading into the mining area of West Kakamega as to affect the relations of the Isukha with the miners.  $\frac{3}{4}$  of the miners were in the Isukha region then called West Kakamega (KNA, DC/KSM/1/28/40, 8).

When the Kenya Land Commission Report and Mining Leases came under discussion in August and September 1934, agitation again surged to the fore. It again subsided following a vicious campaign by the colonial government at disinformation including in ecclesiastical circles. In 1935, the mining scenario was characterised by the decline of the influence of individual prospectors. Some large floatations were made by the East African Goldfields, Gold Areas of East Africa and the Rostermann Gold Mines Ltd. Others involved heretofore were the Kenya Consolidated Goldfields Ltd., East African Mining Areas and the S.M. Syndicate (KNA, DC/KSM/1/28/40, ANNUAL REPORT 1935, 1).

The number of Europeans employed in Kakamega by 30th June 1935 was 272 of which 111 were employed in the goldfields. There were 6,832 Africans out of which 3,654 were in the goldfields. The Rostermann Gold Mines Ltd exercised the option over the Rostermann Syndicate holding in February, 1934. It had an authorised capital of £400,000. The East African Goldfields Ltd absorbed the Kenya Development Ltd. and its capital was increased by £600,000. In total there were more than 30 companies operating in the gold region which produced over 445,303 bullion in the year 1935 (KNA, KSM/1/28/40, 2-8). On 23rd December, 1935, the whole Nyanza was declared a Mining district and the companies started to expand their operations. The Chief centre of mining was the 'piccadilly circus' where there was a considerable surface trenching also superceded by diamond drilling and shafts. But there was considerable activity along the Bukura ridge, at Tanami near Kakamega town and to a small extent near Etsaba (Edzawa) trading centre. The S.M. Syndicate operated near Kisa Hill and the small producing Mine belonging to the Edzawa Ridge Company. At the peak of the gold rush in 1934 there was an average of 400 Europeans (KNA, KSM/1/28/40, 1).

Because of the expanding nature of mining, the NKCA under its president Andres Jumba voiced its strong objections. It took up a case and agitated about the conviction of a man charged with assault on Mr. Hinds of the East African Concessions near Kaimosi. Between 1934 and 1935, the NKCA was particularly influential in Isukla and Tiriki. In these areas, it was agitating against new leases. Jumba himself

hailed from East Tiriki (KNA, KSM/1/28/40, 3).

In May 1935 NKCA sent its Central Committee to petition the DC of North Kavirondo over their opposition to any further grants of leases for Gold Miner's and at the same time demanded a paramount chief. When this was rejected, the association held a meeting at Chief Mulama's camp and illegally installed him as paramount chief to the chagrin of the colonial administration (KNA, PC/NZA/4/5/5. NORTH KAVIRONDO DISTRICT - INTELLIGENCE REPORT, JULY 1935, 1). While this was merely dismissed by the administration as "the vapourings of the association" which it had nothing to do with, the NKTWA concerned itself more with other issues. In a meeting held at Butere in April 1935 under the chairmanship of Archdeacon Owen, the matters of general interest to members which the session discussed included compensation to owners of land for new roads or alterations made to existing ones, and the general dissemination of what goes on at L.N.C. meetings (KNA, PC/NZA/4/5/5/, 1).

The NKTWA had been hit by dissensions ever since the NKCA was formed and several people changed their allegiance including Chief Mulama. Paul Agoi had attempted to compose the differences in 1934 with no success. Nevertheless, when the NKTWA held its Annual General Meeting at the C.M.S. Butere on the 8th October, 1938, its president was still Paul Agoi. Archdeacon Owen still signed the association's cheques with him. His membership in the association canalised political aspiration and restrained political agitation. Ever since the clergyman got involved in the association's political activism

in 1923, the body henceforth gave attention and impetus to issues such as better housing, food, clothing, education, spiritual growth and academic welfare. It also published the catechism of hygiene. The Archdeacon's overriding role in the association was demonstrated by his prolific contribution of articles and correspondence on African education, taxation, crime, general living conditions, land problems etc (KNA, PC/NZA/4/5/5, DECEMBER 1938, 1).

Consequently, his correspondence and articles were uncompromising over certain questions such as child labour. The association drafted a legion of memoranda outlining such matters as the effect of colonial policy on Africans, African political ambitions, the Legislative Council, the Federal Council and the franchise, taxation, land tenure and land alienation, organization of native administration etc. But the colonial government still saw it as a useful canalization of African immature political aspiration. It was a tolerable restraint to irresponsible political agitation despite confidential reports written on it by colonial officials which classified its activities as prejudicial to order and good government (KNA, PC/NZA/4/5/5, DECEMBER 1938, 2).

This explains why its general meetings, drawn agenda and activities were mostly uninterfered with while its counterpart, the North Kavirondo Central Association could not be countenanced. Yet in 1938, John Adala its secretary was also the secretary of the NKCA. This was paradoxical but may be explained by the government's unease with rebellious Joseph Mulama who was its driving force. Mulama had contacts with

the Kikuyu Central Association and some of its leaders including Joseph Kariuki visited Mulama in 1938 to solicit for NKCA's support in their opposition to the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1938. The KCA's fear was that through this ordinance more land would be set aside for Europeans (KNA, PC/NZA/4/5/5, SEPTEMBER, 1938, 2). Adala broke with the NKCA in 1938 and was succeeded by Herbert Moses Lubanga (Lubanga, O.I., 1988).

As early as December 1935, the colonial administration had identified Mulama as one of the active forces behind the NKCA whose influence could be traced in various directions where difficulties cropped up. Indeed Mulama had given offence to loyal Marama people by carrying on the leadership of the NKCA from his house in Butere and encouraging the constant presence of malcontents. Even the political disquiets of the Basamia against the Kisa were attributed to his influence. But understandably, the undercurrent of Mulama's non-conformist politics gained more emotive force when the Metropole and the local administration refused to grant provision for a successor to paramount chief Mumia. In August, 1935, the PC for Nyanza reported:

His Excellency said no successor would be given to Mumia as paramount Chief. He advised the association to confine themselves (sic) to making constructive suggestions through proper channels and not to have the impertinence to meddle in appointments (KNA, PC/NZA/4/5/5, AUGUST 1935, 1).

By 1939 the general acceptance won by NKTWA could not be claimed by NKCA. Unlike the NKTWA, mulama's contact with

the KCA embraced the beginnings of inter-regional contacts although the NKCA had no semblance of national aspirations. It was seen as an instrument of agitators. Official reports on the association noted:

At the present time, the North Kavirondo Central Association is causing some anxiety to the administration ... The more so as it is felt its activities are gaining an increased hearing to apprehension (sic) about what may arise out of the unsettled conditions in Europe. It is thought that if powers existed to regulate such meetings, opportunities to promote native apprehensions might be decreased and administrative anxiety allayed (KNA, OP/1/1326, NATIVE ASSOCIATIONS - NORTH KAVIRONDO CENTRAL ASSOCIATION, 1).

Not surprisingly, the Native Authority Ordinance was invoked and headmen asked to exercise powers within this ordinance to regulate as well as prohibit native meetings. The powers required that a previous notice should be given of any meeting that the association intended to hold and the headmen should lay down conditions under which the meeting would be held (KNA, OP/1/1326, P.C. NYANZA TO C.N.C. DATED 1/7/39). By the time the association changed its name to Abaluyia Central Association in 1939, the foregoing evidence shows that the colonial administration was making it extremely difficult for it to operate. Nevertheless, throughout its existence in the 1930's, it had made numerous representations on Gold Mines and African land, working conditions in the mines, the issue of paramountcy and a plethora of related issues.

The mining tempo had by 1939 increased and quite a number of companies were making profitable operations. These

included Rostermann Gold Mines, The Kenya Gold Mining Syndicate, Kavirondo Gold Mines Ltd and the Bukura Mining Company (KNA, DC/CN/1/1/3, NYANZA ANNUAL REPORT, 1939, 70). See figures of production in the table blow.

Table 6: Gold Production (unrefined gold)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Value</u>
1933	14,147 ounces	£ 67,665
1934	15,939 "	£ 83,617
1935	29,176 "	£162,904
1936	48,635 "	£269,947
1937	68,677 "	£379,626
1938	86,960 "	£499,601
1939	97,000 "	£608,754

Source: KNA, NYANZA ANNUAL REPORT 1939, pp. 70-71

Gold mining was such a profitable undertaking over the 7 years as shown in the above table of the larger companies and mines, Rostermann Gold Mines Ltd. registered production averages of 1,800 ounces per month in 1939 compared to 1,400 ounces in 1939. The new reefs discovered in 1938 had proven to be of considerable value. The Kenya Gold Mining Syndicate realised averages of 800 ounces per month in 1939 and was able to pay its shareholders dividends at 10%. Bukura Mining Company Ltd produced an average 560 ounces per month in 1939 and recorded profits in the vicinity fo 60% of the capital invested. Thus, it paid dividends at 45%. Nevertheless, there were a series of smaller and medium mines that produced an average between 250 and 400 ounces per month (KNA, DC/CN/1/1/3, 71).

The above figures show a colossal transfer of capital

in the form of dividends from the colony while the sums paid to the owners of the land were inexpressibly meagre. As if to add insult to irreparable injury, some mining companies were defaulting payment of wages forcing their African labourers to flee (KNA, OP/1/1326, INTELLIGENCE REPORTS - NORTH KAVIRONDO DISTRICT, 1937, 5). Other unscrupulous white employees were cohabiting with African women while residential patterns in Kakamega town, then booming with business as a result of the gold mining enterprise, were racially segregated.

In short, these were the economic and political conditions in which the NKTWA and NKCA operated. Their ~~membership and~~ leadership represented the emergent Luyia middle class drawn from religious teachers, civil servants and small-scale capitalists such as shopkeepers, traders and family farmers. They were petty bourgeoisie since colonialism had prevented the emergence of a fully-fledged and economically viable bourgeoisie. Mechanisms of this control have, already been given in this chapter and are important in perceiving the themes of proletarianization, underdevelopment, dominance and dependence and the nature of colonial capital accumulation. These are fundamental themes in understanding of changes and developments which occurred in the field of economics and politics (Van Zwanenberg, 1975, xxi). The policies which we have extrapolated herein, the First World War and Depression all generated material conditions which fuelled native unrest and political activism. This activism as we have seen in the involvement of the YKA, KTWA, NKTWA and NKCA operated within gross forms of political control that was characteristic of early decades of colonial rule.



CHAPTER VI

6.0 THE COLONIAL ECONOMY DURING AND AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES IN BULUYIA

6.1 The Notion of Class Struggle

It is true that a society does not form a functionally integrated whole, disjunctions and contradictions are continually restructured within it. Tensions and disjunctions, paradoxes and contradictions are generated by the same forces that connect people to the material and social realities of life. In these realities of life, classes develop common interests in order to wage a common battle against other common interests which antagonistic to theirs. Thus, since interests of classes conflict against those of other classes, every class struggle is said to be a political struggle (Marx and Engels, 1952, 53-60). Without denying the tremendous impact that the penetration of capitalist had on the development of peasantries and the emergence of a petty bourgeoisie during the colonialism of the first three decades, we have noted in the previous chapter how colonial policy formulation and execution had prevented the development of a full-blown and economically potent African bourgeoisie. Consequently, the processes of peasantisation, proletarianization and accumulation of capital occurred within restraints of policy and political pressures that gave them a perverted image.

Predictably, the Luyia petty bourgeoisie and peasantry resisted the pressures imposed by colonial rule during the inter-war period. Their responses to these

pressures and opportunities generated new conflicts within Luyia communities with each other and against the colonial state for control of key economic and political resources as evidence adduced has demonstrated. Therefore, it is the historical development and resolution of these conflicts during the period of the <sup>World</sup> Second War and its aftermath that this chapter seeks to narrate. Bearing in mind that the determining factor in history is the production and reproduction of immediate life, Marx's contribution to the theory of classes and class struggle included his recognition that the interests of one class at any given time coincide with the development of the productive forces and the impulse towards new social structures (Fischer 1973, 61-62). Productive forces and the social relations of production are essential elements of any mode of production. Social relations of production include questions of property and its transfer and distinctive relationships between producers and those who manage or organise production. Marx also noted that classes defend the established and the traditional because these correspond to their interests. He also noted that the social division of labour has given rise to the formation of professional groups of all kinds and after a lengthy development of class (Fischer, 1973, 61-62).

But because of the centrality of the notions both of contradiction and class struggle in Marxist analysis of history, it is sometimes wrongly assumed that class systems can ultimately be delineated by fundamental cleavages between antagonistic elements: workers versus owners, labour versus

versus capital (Sider, 1988, 7). Nevertheless, the shifting and transient alliances and oppositions in a system of classes implies that the composition and internal structure of any particular class are fluid and dynamic. It is fluid and dynamic due to changes in the material basis and productive activities of the class and due to the changing political and ideological claims, assertions and practices (Sider, 1988, 9).

For a class to be ripe for hegemony means that its interests and consciousness enable it to organise the whole society in accordance with its interests (Lukacs's 1971, 52). Although the crucial question in every class struggle is whether a particular class possesses the capacity and the consciousness to dominate and ensure that its interests predominate, the story of colonial rule in Kenya portrays it well. The colonial ruling class had such predominance which did ~~not~~ preclude the use of force<sup>1</sup>. But whether through coercion and restraints of policy or not, the tragic dialectics of the dominant class are often employed to ascertain the predominance of its interests on every particular issue. But competition for resources and opportunity determines the whole dynamic (Luxembourg, et. al., 1972, 24). There are numerous such instances of competition in Buluya

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1. For historical materialism, the concepts of class and state are interrelated. Neither can be understood independently of the other. From one angle, the state is viewed as the necessary coercive instrument for the maintenance of social inequality and for the extraction of surplus. From the other, class is viewed as essential for the maintenance of the state for the explanation of its behaviour.

that made the area's post-war history be littered with political antagonisms and struggles.

## 6.2 Agriculture, Trade and Reform Policies in Buluyia During and after the Second World War

During the period of the Second World War and the decade following it, there was an increasing outward migration from the North Kavirondo District. This was following the serious deterioration of the fertility of the soils in the district and the consequent inability of land to support the increasing population. By 1945, there were 50,733 Luyia in registered employment outside the district (Wafula, 1981, 38). Agriculture alone had proven unreliable during the preceding decade because of crop failure and fluctuating prices during the depression. Indeed, during the years of agricultural depression following the First World War and again in the 1930's, traders had taken advantage of concerted tax drives to lower the prices offered for African cattle. Huts were occasionally burnt to encourage the payment of the tax. In 1937 North Nyanza District earned £115,000 from sales of local produce while paying £59,750 in direct taxation (Lonsdale, 1964, 13).

While in 1932, 20% of the men in North Kavirondo were working outside the district, in 1937 this increased to 30%. The late 1930's and the Second World War set the stage for male migration as a permanent feature of the male life cycle. The number doubled in the 1950's (Staudt, 1973, 130). While such work patterns decreased the overall supply of labour on farms of the peasants and accounts for the lack of dramatic

changes in agricultural activity, there were demands for increased food during the war and there were substantial increases in marketed production in response to a guaranteed high price for maize. By the end of the war North Nyanza emerged as a major maize producing area. With the absence of substantial portions of working aged men, the role of women in this increased output must be recognised. But it was this increased output that contributed to an alarming state of soil erosion.

Wage-labour then appears to have been a valuable insurance against starvation and plummeting prices in years of crops failure. ~~But a~~ number of wage earners went into employment in order to save for cattle to pay their bride-wealth thereby circumventing irksome kinship obligations (Lonsdale, 1964, 12). For the period of the depression when prices collapsed and the settlers were forced to rely on the extremely limited domestic market in the colony, the economy stagnated and some efforts were made to put resources into the African peasant agriculture. The Second World War intervened before the contradictions of policy could precipitate a crisis, though not before African political consciousness had been raised to a higher level by the deprivations of the period. Down to 1940, the economy had been hamstrung by the distortions imposed on it in the interests of the settlers (Leys, 1975, 3-40).

It is true that the war reprieved the colonial economy and created the sustained demand which continued

after the end of the war, but it also generated material conditions which fuelled nationalist unrest. Moreover, it facilitated the resurgence of some of the gross forms of political control reminiscent of the early decades of colonial rule. Labour conscription, forced cultivation of certain crops, shortages of food, housing problems, spiralling inflation and falling real wages afflicted the rural areas and the towns (Zezeza and Ogot, 1989, 2). Inevitably, the six years of the war witnessed labour and rural unrest of unprecedented proportions. It was within this period that the militant Dini ya Msambwa gained root and became acceptable among the northern Luyia. It was basically a peasant and squatter revolt as we shall demonstrate later in this chapter.

In the previous chapter the picture portrayed of agriculture in North Kavirondo was one of a district just beginning to feel the impact of commercialization for the duration of the depression. Export production was mainly restricted to surpluses of maize and beans with a small amount of cotton grown in the Samia location of the then Central Kavirondo. This continued into the post depression area as households were involved more in market relations both as buyers and sellers. Most maize went out uninspected probably due to the neighbouring settler farms of Trans-Nzoia and Uasin Gishu. But as early as 1937, North Kavirondo was producing the bulk of maize exported from Nyanza and in these years the district was hyperbolically referred to as the "granary of Kenya". Between 1937 and 1938 the yield per acre for maize, sesame and beans had increased by 40%. This was attributed to

improved seed (Kitching, 1980, 84-104). It was during these years of increased production of maize that the North Kavirondo Chamber of Commerce came to be dominated by maize growers in Kimilili and Webuye region from 1939. In that year 384,000 bags were exported through the railway while another large number was sold to mining companies, sisal companies, private farms and other enterprises in the province for use as meal commonly called posho for their labourers (KNA, DC/CN/1/1/3, NYANZA ANNUAL REPORT 1939, 48). A summary of the produce exported in that year and its value is given in the table below:

Table 7: African produce and their value in 1939

<u>crop</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>value</u>
Cotton	8,169 bales	£44,250
Maize	453,000 bags	£136,000
Groundnuts	1,100 tons	£10,088
Simsim	1,666 tons	£13,397
Beans	513 tons	£2,232
Rice	365 tons	£2,004
Tobacco	62,285	£200

Source: KNA, NYANZA ANNUAL REPORT 1939.

In addition to the commodities in the above table, there was produced Finger Millet and vegetables of unknown quantity which were valued at £6,500 and £5,000 respectively. The value of hides and ghee exported was £67,500 while fish fetched £13,500. Thus, the estimated total value of African produce for export in North Kavirondo was £308,000

(KNA, DC/CN/1/1/3, 48). Cotton production had risen from 967 tons in 1931 to 4,089 in 1940, an average yearly output of 2,493 tons from 1930 to 1940. Expanding commodity production was also reflected in their increasing purchase of goods. In the late 1930's Africans in North Nyanza were purchasing goods worth over £304,800 of which about £180,000 was derived from the sale of agricultural products (Ogutu, 1979), 220).

The expanding commodity production in Buluyia is a testimony of how some of the peasantry and the colonial functionaries, in responding to opportunities availed by shifts in colonial policy, acquired skills and accumulated the capital necessary for participating in the fast growing modern sector of the colonial economy. In the process they embraced interests which in many ways were antagonistic to the traditional way of life and joined the ranks of a distinct social group, a nascent Luyia middle class. These were the individuals who had become amenable to formal political organization and were ready to adopt aggressive strategies towards the acquisition of land and other instruments of production. They had formed formal organizations both economic and political that were directed at removing the racial constraints over property ownership.

Throughout the colony, pressures on the farmers to produce more to maintain their incomes left only those who were able to employ labourers be in a position to carry out the advice of the agricultural officers. This was the trend so much that by 1961 the agricultural Department



admitted that out of 734,000 peasant holdings, it was concentrating on 30,000. These probably had sufficient labour and land. This group was forced by cash pressures to grow maize even when the price dropped. It comprised the prosperous peasants. Some of the poorer peasants gave up the growing of cash crops and became full-time or part-time labourers and were unable to care for their land properly (Bowles, 1979, 212).

Agricultural officers entered into the reserves to improve land usage and save Africans from themselves by checking soil erosion and introducing knowledge. They sought to increase productivity by educating Africans in the basic principles of agriculture. But in overpopulated regions of Maragoli and Bunyore where the topography was difficult, these measures did not avail much. They heightened the search for wage labour and accentuated the trend for households to invest less labour in agriculture. But among the people there existed pockets of accumulators not of land but of commercial capital (See Anyang'-Nyong'lo, 1981, 115).

Government involvement in the transformation of peasant agricultural practices reached new heights when by 1945 a memorandum on native land tenure policy by two administrators, H.E. Lambert and P. Wyn-Harris were to bemoan the "unrestricted growth of non-co-operative and irresponsible individualism among African farmers" and suggested ways of combating it (Berman, 1974, 120). The agricultural reforms which followed became part of the broader economic reforms parallel to political reforms initiated by the British

government through the Colonial Development and Welfare act of 1944 (Phillips, 1974, 218).

Before we narrate the story of the agrarian reforms and the reactions of the Luyia in the post-war era, let us examine some details of production and sale in this period. The table below shows this clearly. In 1944 the district accounted for 38% of the total output of cotton in the whole of Nyanza Province. The percentage for maize was even higher, 51%. In the following year these climbed to 48% and 50% respectively (Humphrey, 1947, 59). While maize thrived in the northern Luyia area of Bukusu, cotton grew here too at Malakisi and Teso. Other areas included Bukhayo, Marach, Buholo and Samia (Ominde, 1963, 230-4).

During this period, prices of other produce improved as the Maize and Produce Control's Procurement of produce was extended to cover sorghum, groundnuts, cassava and beans. This development together with the tax on cotton by the colonial administration explains the fall in cotton production (Kitching, 1980, 137). Thus, the postwar decade still saw North Nyanza assert its Pre-eminence as the alleged granary of the colony. At least by 1948 Buluyia traders were bypassing Indians by selling their produce directly to the Maize and Produce Control. A group of enterprising Africans emerged in the region specialised in African produce. After the war they began to successfully challenge the Indian traders. Good examples were Alushula Ambundo based at Khushiku Market in Kisa, Mbalanya Omwakwe and Joel Mukoya in Bunyore (Angolo; O.I., 1987). Elsewhere others were Sifano Odhiambo Otiato at Port Victoria in

Table 8:

Volume and value of marketed produce in North Nyanza District between 1940 and 1948								
	<u>Cotton</u>		<u>Maize</u>		<u>Sesame</u>		<u>Rice</u>	
	vol.	value	vol.	value	vol.	value	vol.	value
1940	2,325	-	25,570	-	854	-	36	-
1941	2,954	£28,256	27,653	£52,508	841	£7,539	121	£905
1942	1,789	£17,538	25,635	£70,205	1,316	£14,765	266	£1,985
1943	863	£13,422	16,307	£68,716	212	£1,522	1,052	£11,004
1944	1,092	£20,792	29,786	£140,115	15	£188	1,480	£12,800
1945	1,249	£20,855	28,237	£133,098	125	£1,541	1,483	£13,786
1947	1,043	£22,009	29,233	£154,599	85	£1,031	243	£3,477
1948	1,204	£8,325	17,143	£108,901	48	£806	1,258	£12,657

Source: KNA, NORTH KAVIRONDO ANNUAL REPORT 1940-1948

in (Otiato, O.I., 1987) and Philip Matere and Wilson Wanubi in Bukusuland (Wanubi, O.I., 1987).

From the 1950's these African traders had attained a dominant position in the marketing of maize and ousted Indian traders from that position (Kitching, 1981, 183). But while the marginalization<sup>2</sup> of the small retail traders which had began 3 decades before proceeded a pace with the decline of barter trading, by 1954 profit margins were appreciable in North Nyanza. They had an annual average turnover of £809 5s with a possible profit margin of £121 (Fearn, 1961, 184). But the marginalization of the retail traders culminated in the winding of many traders' business. As a result, the entire Luyia countryside is dotted with numerous abandoned shops that were active in the early 1940's and 50's. During our collection of data this was the picture at Nambale, Sio Port, Port Victoria, Bumala and Matayos in Busia, Lunyerere, Emanyulia, Khayega, Kilingili, Wekhomo, Luanda and Munjiti in Kakamega, Kimilili, Bokoli, Butonge, Webuye and Chwele in Bungoma<sup>3</sup>. These are living monuments which testify to the

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2. The process of marginalization refers to the mechanisms and phenomena which were set in motion, all linked to the process of accumulation, through which the Africans were exploited, partially proletarianised, impoverished and led to their individual or collective deprivation or exclusion.
  3. At these places there were many workers who were self-employed either as apprentices or quasi-wage earning craftsmen who undertook furniture repairs, bicycle repairs and tailors. They undertook servile occupations in production for more specialised markets.

marginalization of the small trader in Buluyia. Hitherto, between the world wars, African shopkeepers had begun to set up business around the rural markets. Butcheries, tea rooms and shops. The first local bus services appeared to link trading centres (Marris and Somerset, 1978, 9). However, to understand the twin processes of integration and marginalization, one requires to discover the crucial dialectic which connects the twin poles of the capitalist system (O'brien, 1979, 129).

Apart from the traders having lacked certain facilities such as wholesale service, transport and sufficient capital, their efforts were pulled down by problems connected with kinship ties. Relatives often wanted goods at cheaper prices while others took items on credit never to pay again (Kuya, O.I., 1987). This has remained a big problem in Buluyia and the majority of the informants were extremely averse to any retail undertaking in the rural area. Moreover, even at the infancy of their business, throughout Buluyia petty traders strained to erect stone buildings for their business. Ofcourse a good number were completed, not to mention those that remain incomplete, but they probably were never used. Capital invested in stone strained prospective retail traders and left them with meagre resources. Measures to overcome these difficulties were introduced in 1956. A fund of £230,000 having been created to finance loans to likely African shopkeepers, selected by local district boards. Provincial trade officers were appointed and courses for traders organised (Marris and Somerset, 1971, 10).

Nevertheless, they represented a nascent form of merchant capital that was apparently subordinated to Asian and European merchant capital which dominated the whole-saling of manufactured commodities and import/export network respectively (Kitching, 1980, 187). But its marginalization gave a clear manifestation of the global relationship between the dominant capitalist mode of production and the mass of the Buluyia population over which capital partially held sway.

With the inception of the Maize and Produce Control in 1942, North Nyanza L.N.C. benefited most from a fund established in the mid 1930's. This was the Agricultural Betterment Fund. Following its creation, its funds were credited to the L.N.C. account of the district in which African produce was marketed. By 1947, the North Nyanza L.N.C. had £133,276 credited from the Agricultural Betterment Fund. As early as 1946, the D.O of North Nyanza reported that his L.N.C. would have preferred to use monies from the Fund as a sort of Land Bank but the lack of securable assets by Luyia farmers as security prevented this (KNA, NORTH NYANZA ANNUAL REPORT 1946, 7). Given the crucial role played by the Land Bank in sustaining settler farming during the depression, here in Buluyia, we see evidence of the economic shrewdness in the area's petty bourgeoisie in their eagerness to apply what they had learnt from their European neighbours. The same group of actors called for the exclusion of the Indian traders from all intra-district trading through the L.N.C. It was a demonstration of a fundamental conflict of interests, those of

Indian traders against those of their African competitors in the district (Kitching, 1980, 195). Petty African traders emerged in Buluyia among the educated elite, the peasantry and the wage-labourers, thereby demonstrating the colonial inability of the economy to underwrite full capitalist relations of production and exchange. They exemplified how these people were a non-industrial labour force who were backward in technology and managerial performance.

When North Nyanza was realising great strides in the expansion of maize production partly stimulated by war-time prices, the trade in maize and livestock by these Luyia traders gained unprecedented prominence. During this period, heifers were highly priced and this may be explained by the increasing purchase of ploughs in the district which required the pull-power of these animals. Nevertheless, not all that was purchased went into farm. In 1948 a total of 26,916 cattle were slaughtered for human consumption in the district. In 1949 the figure fell to 25,985 before climbing again to 60,000 in 1950 (KNA, NORTH KAVIRONDO ANNUAL REPORT, 1948, 6 AND KNA NORTH KAVIRONDO ANNUAL REPORT 1950, 7). Markets for stock such as Lubao, Luanda and Bumala became prominent centres of buying and selling of stock. Some of the stock were purchased as far as from the Nandi at Serem in Tiriki especially from 1947 when the Nandi were prevailed upon by colonial officials to sell some of their cattle as the district was considered overstocked. For long, Nandi had been part of North Nyanza and in 1947, 6,041 animals were sold at official auctions through the Meat Marketing Board. By 1949 sales had risen

to 10,473 and climbed to 17,522 in 1952 (Kitching, 1980, 237).

Some of the cattle purchased by the Luyia was disposed of in Uganda where the prices were higher. Compared to Bukusuland and the central locations of Buluyia, the southern locations of Kisa, Bunyore, Maragoli and Tiriki were regarded as understocked. In most of these areas, unlike 1905 when the Luyia practised an apro-pastoral economy in which cattle played a prominent supplementary role to agriculture, by 1952 livestock had already been subordinated to agricultural production and production itself had largely become a form of petty commodity production<sup>4</sup>. This subordination was vivified by the replacement of livestock as a means of exchange by money. The latter became a unit of measuring wealth while cattle was restricted to a source of meat and milk. The essence of the subordination of the livestock economy had been the expansion of the cultivated area at the expense of grazing (Kitching, 1980, 237-242).

Even during this post-war era, the Luyia did not develop a permanent urban working force despite the area remaining a leading labour reservoir for the colony. This was due to incipient land hunger except in Maragoli and Bunyore. But even here, land hunger had not destroyed the traditional identification between the clan and its land

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4. The transition from petty to capitalist production involves the transformation of relations of personal dependence such as those normally found in domestic or family based activities and those involving traditional apprenticeships into commodity relations which enable surplus to be generated, appropriated and accumulated.



(See Lonsdale, 1964, 32). Still, these did not deter them from migrating for labour.

In 1928 North Kavirondo had 38.2%, of its adult male population in labour force. In 1933 it went down to 35.8%. But in the following decade it rose to over 50% in 1948. 23.9% of the male population were living outside the district (Kitching, 1980, 250-1). It is significant to note that poor clans had greater experience of migrant labour than wealthier ones. Evidently, the conjunction between the colonial administrators requirements and the area's early missions' interest in influential families had certainly reinforced the position of dominant lineages (Lonsdale, 1964, 28-29). By 1940 when almost all the prominent new men had attained official positions within the colonial or mission hierarchies, there was a close correlation between the dominant lineages, official political power, and the educational advantages that were increasingly necessary for the continued exercise of that power. There were a number of pronounced church and chiefly alliances (Lonsdale, 1984, 36).

While all this was happening, the peasant household remained the primary site of production and reproduction for the vast majority of the Luyia. Now that many of the males in these peasant households were involved in the wage labour spectacle, this elemental fact highlights the specificity, the dynamic and the contradictions of the migrant labour system. The system and the sponsored mobility of the mission adherents and the influential lineages introduced marked differentials in earnings in the peasant households and the

entire Luyia community without fostering a full transition from petty commodity production to capitalist production. Differentials had started to emerge as early as the 1st decade of colonial rule coterminously with the initial generation of wage labour in the region. By 1935, 14,115 men were in the gold fields of the province as clerks, office assistants, drivers, balcksmiths, carpenters, watchmen, headmen, surface and undersurface labourers, cooks and so on. This group was highly differentiated in their earnings. Many other employees were lined by the Kenya Uganda Railway, Public Works Department, the government and other private commercial enterprises. By 1953, the public service was better paying than the private industry. While 28% of those in latter earned about Shs. 100/=, 48% of the former earned a similar amount (Kitching, 1980, 263-68).

Whereas wage earners were highly differentiated in their income laying the basis of a social stratification that was to characterize the Luyia interest groups in this period and after, by 1950, the colonial administrators still assumed that the African was inexperienced and this precluded any serious claim to equality for at least a another generation (Marris and Somerset, 1971, 7). Perhaps this points to the intricacy of the question of marginalization versus integration. However, it is clear that capital needs and uses to its advantage traditional forms of domestic production and simultaneously incapacitates them. From this flows the physical decay, decline of productivity and widespread pauperization which began to appear in the early

1930s in many parts of Africa (Berman, 1984, 410).

After 1930, the high level wage earning migrants, including those who worked locally as chiefs, headmen, local teachers became land-purchasing households at a time when fixed reserve boundaries exerted pressure on the community. This was exacerbated by the unequal division of land, itself partly made possible by the rapid expansion of the cultivated area of some households. More wage labour migrants left in the 1940's and early 1950's responding to land fragmentation as households grew in size.

This way, male labour power was squeezed out of the smallest holdings into the lower end of the wage labour market and eventually into the market for agricultural labour on the other small holdings. Clearly, growing signs of differentiation between households linked to agricultural production and labour migration by myriad mechanisms of socio-economic change were established by 1952. The prime determinant of differentiation among cultivating households was the rate of savings and investment out of the farm income, of which wages were in turn the major form.

Nevertheless, the essential parameters of socio-economic differentiation among households were laid down as early as the late 1920's and the 1930's especially in the heavily populated and agricultural developed and commercialised areas of North Kavirondo (See Kitching, 1980, 277).

Thus, changes in land tenure and land use and the beginning of land accumulation added to the differentiation

process. This made land emerge as perhaps the most important dimension of growing inequality between African households. Changes in its tenure and use due to commercialization of agriculture also caused changes in bridewealth practices, in the sexual division of labour, and the link between farm and off-farm income expansion. All these changes became dimensions in the stratification process. Understandably, as land shortage increased, disputes over boundaries became rampant in North Nyanza and quite often these were resolved in Native Tribunal Courts in favour of the influential groups (Angolo, O.I., 1987).

The very inequality of land ownership combined with population pressure placed small land-owning households in a vulnerable position. A case in point is the loss of land by Javan Omoko to Alushula Ambundo in Busamia, Kisa Location even after the case was handled by the Khwisero Native Tribunal Court. The latter used his influence as a nascent maize merchant to get the case decided in his favour (Angolo, O.I., 1987). We came across similar reminiscences throughout Busia, Kakamega and Bungoma. These court and family conflicts over land have remained a lingering legacy of inter-household jealousies and hatred in Buluyia todate.

The foregoing inequalities were built up into the post- 1950 agricultural reforms and commercialization of production. Reforms in land ownership and use started in 1945 when the Kenya Ten Year Development plan 1946-55 was being prepared. Its establishment was described in Sessional

Paper No. 8 of 1945 which set out the Government policy on land Utilization and Settlement and defined the functions of the newly constituted Settlement Board for Africans called the African Settlement Board (ASB). Among its members were C.H. Williams, the P.C. for Nyanza, Archdeacon L.J. Beecher, S.V. Cooke, Eluid Mathu, Walter Odede and Jonathan Kala. The Board was allocated a sum of £3 million for the reconditioning of African areas and African settlement (Ministry of Agriculture, 1956, 1). The government was definitely responding to the memorandum of Lambert and Wyn-Harris pointed out earlier in this chapter.

When Messrs Mathu and Cooke resigned in 1947, the Board which had been renamed African Settlement and Land utilization Board (ASLUB) had among its new members, Samuel Akolo, Woresha Mengo and Chief Elijah Chepkwony. Between 1948 and 1950 its new members were chiefs Jonathan Okwiri and James Mwanthi. However there was a radical change in African agricultural circles when in 1951 as a prelude to the Agriculture Ordinance, an Interim Board was set up. The Ordinance was actually enacted in 1955. Before it, the Assistant Director of Agriculture Mr. R.J.M. Swynnerton who had been attending sessions of the Interim Board from 1951 was later appointed as Deputy Director of the Board. It was in this capacity that he was officially asked to draft a plan for agricultural reforms in African areas. In 1953, its last meeting was devoted to a review of the Draft

Swynnerton plan (Ministry of Agriculture, 1956, 228)<sup>5</sup>.

After setting up of the African Settlement Board in 1945 one of the problems that faced it was how to deal with the traditional forms of Land Tenure that were leading to increasing fragmentation of peasant holdings and misuse of grazing land. The Board had also to reckon with the tradition of inheritance of land by sons in North Nyanza and the so called conservatism and often non-cooperation of the peasant population. The peasants in North Nyanza were noted to have been particularly prone to group farming (Ministry of Agriculture, 1956, 11). When the Assistant Director of Agriculture Mr. R.J.M. Swynnerton was asked to draft a document which would be the basis of rural land reorganization and development, he had considered these factors together with the so called "cattle complex" of the pastoral groups (Swynnerton, 1954). The plan was initially drafted in late 1953 and was put in operation as early as 1st April 1954. By this period, the Board had been reconstituted as the African Land Development (ALDEV).

Operating under the aegis of the African Land Utilization and Settlement Board that came to be known as the African Land Development Board (ALDEV), the main aim of

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5. The Swynnerton plan was to lay the foundations of the capitalist farmer in the African areas. While the able, rich, or energetic Africans would acquire more land, bad or poor farmers would be squeezed out creating a landed and landless class.

the plan was to multiply by ten times the average cash income of 600,000 families in the lands of high rainfall and to increase greatly the value of the annual exportable surplus of 600,000 cattle from the African lands. The cost of completing the Swynnerton plan over five years was no less than £8<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub> million which included both grant and loan elements. Towards this the United Kingdom Colonial Development and Welfare Fund provided £5 million while the Colonial state provided the balance from the Aldev allocation (£950,000) and a further £2<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub> million. The rest was filled by the International Co-operation Administration of the United States and partly by the funds provided in the new Kenya Development Plan 1957-60 (Ministry of Agriculture, 1965, 11). The ALUSB was reorganised between 1953 and 1955. The Board was reconstituted as the African Land Development Board (ALDEV) with a special allocation of funds to effect agrarian reorganization in the African areas,

Between 1948 and 1955, a total of 102 people in the whole of Nyanza Province had responded to these capitalist impetuses and had taken advantage of the preceding Boards' agrarian plans and the subsequent Aldev Scheme. This was before North Nyanza was split into Elgon Nyanza and North Nyanza in 1956 and from this period the Province was looking to Aldev assistance as the price of cotton was falling and had to be stabilised for the first time from the Stabilization Fund (KNA, NORTH NYANZA ANNUAL REPORT, 1948-1956). The few prosperous farmers in Buluyia were evidence of the emergence of pockets of wealthy capitalist oriented peasants who now employed wage labour and attempted to accumulate as the Luyia

economies articulated with capital.

Prior to the adoption of the Swynnerton plan in 1954; in 1947 under the pre-Aldev plans, the agricultural Officer had emphasized the need for a radical change in land utilization to save soil and maintain and improve returns from African peasant cultivation. Hence the colonial officials passed a resolution that the policy of the Department of Agriculture for natives would be generally based on encouraging co-operative effort and organization rather than individual holdings. It was considered that only by co-operative action would African lands' productivity be raised and preserved. They felt that this was in accord with former indigenous methods of land usage and social custom (KNA, NORTH NYANZA ANNUAL REPORT, 1947). This was therefore a compromise in the relationship between the external forces of capital and the pre-existing social forces of an indigenous society. It was a compromise following a confrontation of two sets of forces each propelled by its own tendential laws of motion (Berman, 1984, 411).

At Bukura Farm Institute in North Nyanza, African farmers and their wives went in to live on model small-holdings for a period of one year at the end of which they returned to their own homes with the profits of their harvests which usually amounted to between £50 and £100. The system eventually gave way to a shorter course at the Jeanes School in Nairobi in 1956. All said and done, the immediate advantage obtained from group farming was the solution of fragmentation and soil erosion by the consolidation of



holdings, often on a clan basis and the farming of the whole feature as a single planned unit (Ministry of Agriculture, 1956, 147). But it demonstrated best the inherent contradictions in imperial agrarian policy as there followed a period of vacillation in policy.

Despite the above considerations, the spectacle of group farming failed in Buluyia. The failure of this effort ended a period of vacillation in policy, as the reportedly "mean-souled" peasants were unwilling to taken on strange capitalist practices of cultivation that were not based on their households and kinship ties. Individualism was left as the undisputed master. Therefore, as quickly as the principle of group farming had been adopted, so was it discarded. The basis of the system was the agreement of adjacent families to combine in farming their lands as a single unit within a drainage area on a planned system of contour strips running across the holdings with a regular rotation of arable cropping and grass reservations that were paddocked for common grazing. The farm unit was to be managed by the elected committee which directed the operations of the entire farm. On the group farm there was also a communal tree plantation for fuel and timber. Such a group could then afford a machinery pool of tractors and implements and piped water supply, thus escaping what colonial capitalist planners saw as the drudgery of the hoe and the long treks to the water holes (Ministry of Agriculture, 1956, 147). This refusal to be captured by capitalist forms of production showed how much compromise in certain respects collapsed or remained fragile.

The foregoing evidence demonstrates that the Luyia societies were not passive receptors nor active resistors of capital penetration as they reacted variously to the emergence of a distinct transition towards capitalist production.

Although there were 27 group farms in 1948 with 420 members, cultivating about 8,700 acres, most of the groups petered out by 1953 leaving only 2, when free assistance was withdrawn in 1949. The peasants had a mistaken impression that group farming included continuous free assistance. By December 1954, every group farm started in Nyanza Province was completely moribund (KNA, NYANZA PROVINCE ANNUAL REPORT, 1955). Nevertheless, by 1949 when the idea of group farming was at its climax the Agricultural Department School at Bukura trained Agriculture Instructors on 20 individual small holdings during which seven holdings were converted into a group farm. Whereas the original intention had been to convert all the holdings into group farms at least by 1950, the original policy was modified and only 2 group farms were created (Ministry of Agriculture, 1956, 147).

Great importance was attached to the training of wives and so families from the three Nyanza districts did a year's course at Bukusu either on group farms or the individual holdings. All the milk products, fruits and vegetables and a portion of grain crops were retained by the farmers. From 1949 to 1953, Aldev funds were spent on buildings water supplies and recurrent costs. In 1954, the Bukura Farm Institute was taken over by the North Nyanza

African District Council (ADC) the new name for LNC. By now, the idea of group farms in the area was already dead. It had been found impracticable to run a group farm effectively even under the close control and discipline of a specialised institute like Bukura. Because of the group farm fiasco, the institute reverted to annual courses on individual small holdings and similar institutes were established in South and Central Nyanza with funds from the Swynnerton and Cotton Cess Funds. This was resolved so since the trainees from Bukura Institute had contributed to the spread of better farming there (KNA, NYANZA PROVINCE ANNUAL REPORT, 1955).

In general, South and Central Nyanza like North Nyanza had a comparatively large Agricultural Betterment Funds (ABF) and Cotton Cess Funds to spend on land development. They used these funds in administering their agricultural development schemes and had little inclination to ask for Aldev assistance. One such scheme that was established in South Nyanza was the Oyani-Migori Rivers Scheme in which small loans were given to farmers for development of plots in the scheme. These were spent on fencing, terracing, manuring and purchase of machinery. The loans were given against security (not land as there were no individual title deeds for them). Nevertheless, capitalist oriented cultivators, men of "substance", acquired these loans as they were awarded against listed movable assets. They were administered by the D.C.'s on behalf of Aldev and these public officers relied on their agricultural officers to handle the applications. By 1948, loans totalling £25,582 were issued with each applicant getting upto

£100. In the year 1955, a total of £7,281 had been repaid (Ministry of Agriculture, 1956, 213). The process of the emergence of a class of wealthy peasants within the indigenous societies implied the dispossession and semi-proletarianization of other members of the community. This generated new forms of conflict over the accumulation of land and the control of labour (Berman, 1984, 411).

Following the adoption of the Swynnerton plan, under, the Agriculture Ordinance of 1955, A new Land Development Board was set up. This came in the wake of European dissatisfaction with the Adev's programmes and its antecedent Boards. These programmes had excluded European settled areas and were quick to point out the fiasco of what had hitherto been conceived as the Boards' panacea to Africans' agricultural problems. The Boards changed 4 times between 1945 and 1955 reflecting the insolubility of their approaches (Ministry of Agriculture, 1956, 228). However, more fundamentally, these changes illustrate the shift of emphasis away from the original conception of settlement in new areas to reconditioning, reclamation and settlement of existing African areas. Nevertheless, the Oyani-Migori Rivers Scheme had between 1949 and 1950 provided the settlement of Maragoli Luo, Kisii and Kuria farmers. Today the region is a Maragoli dominated territory (Kharinda, O.I., 1988).

The Swynnerton plan was therefore constituted within the wider new colonial policy with regard to Agricultural Development which now emphasized a major shift from earlier policies under which African reserves had deteriorated so

badly. The new reforms aimed at restoring the productivity of the land by initiating innovations such as planning and the extension services to be rendered by the Agricultural Development. The plan envisaged the introduction of intensive land use, contour ploughing, crop rotation, proper fertilization, use of insecticides, stock control and other practices. Under this plan, the widespread introduction and promotion of African cash crop production, land consolidation, and the modernization of land and agricultural practices were intended to lay new economic and social foundations for political stability within the so called African reserves. This was a major transformation of policy given that hitherto the colonial state had blocked the implementation of reforms in African areas because of the antagonistic interests of the settlers. It was a belated attempt to defuse political tension over the land issue (Hunt, 1984, 12). Apparently, the colonial state was actively involved in the process of articulation, the penetration and domination of capital in an arena of political struggle. The state took the central role of managing and representing the myriad encounters and struggles between classes and agents of different modes (Berman, 1984, 412).

Notwithstanding, the interests of the settlers were now overridden for the sake of greater economic interests of the British government and International capital in which corporations of the metropole had a stake. It coincided with the metropole's interests in removing the restrictions on expanded export production within the colony (Phillips,

1974, 243). The Second World War had laid the roots of import-substitution industrialization in the colony. This enterprise had expanded rapidly after the war under the aegis of multinational and Asian capital thereby accelerating the decline of settler economic hegemony. In essence, there was a relative decline in the amount of capital formation attributed to settler agriculture as a corresponding capital formation was directed into industry and other non-settler farming sectors (Zezeza and Ogot, 1987, 4). More importantly, industrial growth led to major changes in the composition and re-distribution of the labour force and laid strong foundations for labour organizations and activism.

Despite the stultifying effects of earlier colonial economic policies, by the late 1940's, there were isolated cases of an emerging Luyia land owning classes. Although this phenomenon happened to a lesser degree in Nyanza compared with Kikuyuland, it was in general recognition of this by the mid 1940's and early 1950's that colonial agrarian policy was now geared towards buttressing capitalist agriculture in African reserves. Reorganization of land tenure and utilization would form the basis of this. The Swynnerton plan of 1954 was adopted alongside other new political and economic policies to effect further structural changes in the colony's political economy. These included the Carpenter Commission and the Littleton Constitution (Leys, 1974, 953). These mechanisms will be examined in the next chapter.

But it is relevant to note that the numerous

agrarian changes embodied in the Swynnerton plan, both in volume and character, solidified rural agrarian class formation and also led to shifts in the articulation of African agriculture and the already entrenched international capital both of which contributed to the decline of settler agriculture. While the Swynnerton plan changed the character of African commodity production, the Carpenter Commission on African wages spurred the transformation of the dominant production relations in the colony to meet the needs of international capital (Berman, 1981, 3). Between 1957 and 1958 the effects of the land reform were already being felt throughout including Buluyia. African peasant and capitalist small holding in the reserves increased from £5.19 million in 1954 to £7.6 million in 1958 (See Njonjo, 1977, 149).

### 6.3. Political Activities in Buluyia During and after the Second World War

The native administration developed for Kenya which influenced the nature of local government development had been in essence a product of an interplay between the types of African political systems in existence at the start of British administration and the British conceptions of the best ways to administrate. While it battered, reshaped and reorganized the indigenous politics as well as modified their functions, the colonial system could not wipe them out (Omosule, 1974, 2-3). Legacies of these politics had a strong part to play in the communities' perceptions of the

unfolding political scenario both during the interwar and post-war eras. Many sub-ethnic groups with their varied cultural traits and who had been mutually antagonistic had been forcibly brought together within the Wanga favoured British edifice the indirect rule. An edifice that was hewn out of the native authority system that made provision for the Native Authority Ordinance under which the L.N.Cs were established in 1924.

This was the framework within which Luyia ethnic particularism and sub-ethnic conflicts and struggles were formented. It offered narrow bases of political participation and it is ~~not surprising~~ that several political gradations including the L.N.C. representatives and the petty bourgeois proto-nationalist organizations of the 1920's and 1930's articulated issues that were of concern to the Luyia sociality and that their intra-ethnic struggles revived sectional conflicts that were apparent even before the British sanctioned a Wanga hegemony in Buluyia. Various struggles against this hegemony have been a subject of historical explanation elsewhere in this study. But even when it was officially liquidated through the British refusal to retain the title of paramountcy in Buluyia in the 1930's, its legacy still bedevilled Buluyia as the clientelist beneficiaries of the office frantically sought for its retention through political activism in the pro-nationalist organizations, notably NKCA.

By the close of the war period, the NKCA later



renamed Abaluyia Central Association (ACA), had placed the issue of paramountcy at the core of its political clamour. But the office had outlived its usefulness to the British since there were not more expeditious alliances to be forged. All had succumbed to British supremacy and rule and the imperialists did not see the need of reconstituting offices that would divide the loyalty of Her Majesty's subjects. No wonder, when Mumia Nabongo died in disgrace in 1949 his death brought to an ignominious end the fortunes of the paramountcy.

Given the association's strong ethnic leaning in 1947, NKCA had taken upon itself the championship of the interests of the Samia, the Banyala and Basonga whom it felt were a depressed Luyia lot in Central Kavirondo. This agitation took the form of numerous letters to the colonial administration and had the effect of stirring up ill-feeling between the Luo and Luyia (KNA, DC/CN/1/3/1/ ANNUAL REPORT CENTRAL KAVIRONDO 1947, 7).

But while the NKCA was struggling with the issue of paramountcy, the KTWA's Luo branch was calling for the same upto 1940. In a meeting at Maseno on 25th May 1940 attended by Lumadede of North Kavirondo, part from addressing themselves to efforts to be undertaken to safeguard soil conditions and other issues of farm productivity, the members felt that the question of paramountcy be placed once again before the governor. The meeting was told that North Kavirondo wished Ex-Chief Mulama be considered for the post while Central Kavirondo had nominated Semeon Nyende. It was also the wish of the meeting that the association be reorganized to re-integrate the North Kavirondo membership (KNA, NYANZA

PROVINCE ANNUAL REPORT, 1939, 1).

Calls for the re-integration of the Luyias into KTWA had also been expressed in 1938 when in a meeting with Acting P.C. on 11th November members notified the P.C. that they wanted to combine all the Nyanza associations under a new name "The Nyanza Native Lands and Stock-Industrious Association". It has been felt that Archdeacon Owen would be excluded in the new amalgam association (KNA, DC/DN/8/2 KAVIRONDO TAXPAYERS WELFARE ASSOCIATION, 1938, 1). But these efforts came to no avail.

Nevertheless in 1940, the association was able to keep in touch with the Luyia branch ~~hitherto~~ called NKTWA in an attempt to broaden KCA contacts in Western Kenya. Thus, there ensued a spate of correspondence between the KCA and NKTWA on a number of questions although its debates were concentrated on parochial issues. In 1940, its membership underscored the issue of paramountcy and also pressed for a native president to the LNC. It was also critical of the constituted native chiefs and other authorities and asked for a say in the selection of these officials (KNA, OP/1/7323, ABALUYIA CENTRAL ASSOCIATION, 1940). Definitely there was an element of competitiveness and jealousy involved since most of the association's members were also members of the L.N.C. For a period, the association became moribund and it was not until 1954 when a request was made to the DC North Nyanza to recirculate it in the name of Nyanza Taxpayers Welfare Association. However, he objected on the grounds that the

draft constitution of the proposed association coincided with the aims and objects of the Location Councils and the DC could not countenance a parallel organization because it would lead to divided loyalties and divided leadership (KNA, OP/1/7323).

Despite an appeal to the P.C. Nyanza, the ruling against the resuscitation of the association was upheld. These efforts were spearheaded by its North Nyanza branch Chairman Jeremiah Awuor, and Andrea Jumba its Secretary (Akolo, O.I., 1988). Ironically, when the government was rejecting the application of the North Nyanza's proposed association, the same government had in 1953 registered a similar branch in South Nyanza namely South Nyanza African Tax-payers Welfare Association. This was probably because its protagonists including Paul Mbuya were avowedly anti KAU (KNA, OP/1/7323). Probably Andrea Jumba's KAU links had cost the North Nyanza branch its revival.

While the history of NKTWA was riddled with fluctuating fortunes, that of NKCA did not fair any better. It had established a stronger link with KCA through Joseph Mulama since the 1930's. Therefore, when KCA was banned in 1940, the NKCA now renamed Abaluyia Central Association received a political jolt. Prospects of its operation without interference during the war period looked dismal. Jumba wrote to the P.C. Nyanza notifying him of the body's readiness to stop its 'dissensionist activities' for the duration of the war. This must have been a relief to the administration for an official noted:

..... the D.C. intends to make full use of this offer its leader member Andrea Jumba is also a member of the Local Native Council and will be afforded every opportunity and living advice (KNA, OP/1/7323).

Note that Andrea Jumba again was a moving force in ACA in addition to his role in NKCA and the proposed Nyanza Tax Payers Welfare Association. After seizing active political dissent, the ACA became a body of harmless conformists that would throw parties at its annual general meetings and shower the administration with uncalled for rhetoric of support for the British cause during the war. This was the case between 1941 and 1944. Its leader had in 1943 called for the re-constitution of North Nyanza Local Native Council as Abaluyia Local Native Council since it is the Abaluyia who inhabited the district (KNA, DC/KMG/1/1/153, NORTH NYANZA PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION, 1943-1959). The only issue of note that the association questioned in 1944 was the right the Agricultural officers had to destroy standing crops of a former in Kimilili in the name of preparing ground for soil conservation (KNA, DC/KMG/1/1/153).

Although North Nyanza was under stricter colonial surveillance because of evidence of widespread political apprehensiveness, still Kenya African Union was able to find adherents in the area. The organization had sub-branches in Bukusu, Bunyala, Maragoli and Bunyore all of which operated under KAU Nyanza Branch. The Bukusu sub-branch was led by Mathew Makanda and had a membership of 200 people. He at one time in 1952 lamented in a letter to the Governor as to why

the Bukusu were being expelled from Suk District. (KNA, DC/KMG/2/2/136). The Bunyala sub-branch was led by Ex-Chief Samuel Mukudi and it operated under the guidance of W.W. Awori, a prominent petty bourgeois member of the parent body in Nairobi (Mukudi, O.I., 1987).

The Union in Maragoli was led by Boaz Samula. While, the Chairman of its Mbale subdivision was Elisha Ndanyi. Nevertheless, J.O. Otiende was a prominent member at the national level while John Adala was the Chairman of KAU North Nyanza Branch. Unfortunately the DC North Nyanza refused him to hold any meetings in 1952. Such meetings had been scheduled for Mumias, Kimilili, Malava, Luanda and Mbale and ~~were to~~ be addressed by Jomo Kenyatta and Achieng' Oneko the national petty bourgeois leaders of the party (KNA, CNC/10/48, The NATIVE ORDINANCE). However, the DC granted permission for KAU public meetings at Nambale on 2nd September 1952, Butula on 3rd September 1952, Bungoma on 5th September 1952, Malava on 8th September 1952 and Khwisero 11th September 1952 (KNA, CNC/10/48).

A previous KAU meeting in Maragoli on 1st July, 1952 had 40 in attendance. Their Secretary was John Endusa and delegates questioned the Agriculture Board Fund whose money they felt was not helping Africans. The meeting resolved to protest formally to the government against exorbitant collections from the natives for this fund. They wanted the natives to be left to utilise their land the way they wanted (KNA, CNC/10/49). Like the Bukusu sub-branch, this sub-branch was opposed to the repatriation of the Bukusu from

Suk and Sebei where they had been for a long time and would be strangers in North Nyanza. Alternatively, it recommended their being allocated farms in the area alienated for White Settlement (KNA, CNC/10/48).

It was not long before the Chief Native Commissioner announced the proscription of KAU. A meeting was called by the D.C. for all the chiefs to issue instructions against the party in the district. It was an orchestrated campaign against KAU and hereafter the D.C. in 1952 prohibited further meetings of the organization. In the subsequent year stricter measures were applied. The P.C. for Nyanza noted:

The total number of the Kikuyu employed in Nyanza Province is estimated to be 1,082 Resident Labourers and 1,049 casuals ... I consider that it would, in so far as possible be politic to tighten up the control of Kikuyu movement between farms within the province and its therefore my intention to make an order under Section 16A(2)a of the Emergency Regulations 1952 prohibiting such movement except on permit (KNA, CNC/10/48).

The above is clear evidence of the resurgence of some of the gross forms of political control that were reminiscent of earlier phases of colonial rule. Changing economic circumstances and growing political awareness had made the area witness militant rural unrest. The Dini Ya Msambwa was formed in Western Kenya among the Bukusu in the early years of the war, possibly in 1942. It sought to re-assert the significance and autonomy of African religion apart from manifesting characteristics of a nascent trade union (See Were, 1972, and De Wolf, 1972). The movement evolved in the

foothills of Mt. Elgon (Whipper, 1971, 157). Writing about the newly arisen movement the D.C. for North nyanza wrote:

The Kitosh have been restive since 1943... incidents of rioting, indiscipline and non-co-operation, disobedience or impertinence. The Dini Ya Msambwa is to simple people an attractive faith incorporating violent nationalism together with a certain amount of supersitition (KNA, Ref. NO. K.C./2/5/49).

Oral evidence revealed that Masinde had started DYM after his dismissal from the Local Tribunal (Wafula, O.I., 1988). He was arrested in 1944 when he became anti-government. His dissident activities were first demonstrated when he mobilised people and insitigated them to hinder the scheme for eradicating the Mexican Marigold (a type of weed) from their farms, and the recruitment of men for the forces and for labour for farms in the Trans-Nzoia and Uasin Gishu Districts(KNA, Dc/NN/10/1/15). Between 1942 and 1943, the movement had become active in the Trans-Nzoia, Hoey's Bridge (Moi's Bridge), Kitale and Eldoret area (Were, 1972, 86).

After his arrest Masinde was taken to Mathari Mental Hospital after he was allegedly certified insane. He remained there until 1947 but in his absence the movement continued under Wekukhe Sitawa. Sitawa was one of the people who were convicted in 1944 for their involvement in the clash with the Tribal Police in Bukusu (KNA, DC/NN/10/1/5). Despite the latter's arrest and charge in court on 30th September 1946, a contingent of Tribal police checking up cattle for stolen stock in Bukusu was attacked by adherents of the

movement to such an extent that the police partly considered it politic to withdraw (KNA, DC/NN/10/1/5).

Dini Ya Msambwa combined traditional religious aspirations with political aspirations and served as a fundamental vehicle of agrarian protest (Whipper, 1971, 157) and there is no doubt that it had a frontal link with Bukusu Union, a welfare association that had emerged in the mid 1940's but did not seek registration until 1957. Its aims appeared to be largely social but often got involved in politics (KNA, DC/KMG/2/2/136, MONTHLY REPROTS NORTH NYANZA, 1957, 1). As early as 1946 when DYM members were clashing with the Tribal police and Masinde was confined to a mental hospital, the Union held a meeting at Chwele in Bukusu and passed a number of resolutions. Notably, they

- (a) wished to revert to Bukusu traditional laws instead of being subjected to British law
- (b) wanted to know why the L.N.C. had agreed to the police going into the reserve. They wanted a satisfactory explanation from the D.C. or else they would obstruct the police
- (c) demanded for a new chief
- (d) wanted Bukusu to be part of Uganda so that they would be joined with their sub-ethnic cousins, the Bagishu
- (e) should despatch their leaders to meet and inform all the Bukusu in the Trans-Nzoia District to unite and claim their alienated land from Kamukuywa to Nairiri so that displaced Bukusu kinsmen could settle there.

The were resolutions at a meeting on 6th and 7th December 1946 under pascal Nabwana the Chairman of the Union



and Peter Wafula the Secretary (See KNA, DC/NN/10/1/5).

On 21st January 1947 another Union meeting was held at Misikhu in which only members were admitted. But of note is the meeting of the Bagishu Union (Uganda) held on 30th January 1947 in Uganda which was also attended by the Kimilili branch of the Bukusu Union including pascal Nabwana, Hudson Sanja and William Kibula (KNA, DC/NN/10/1/5, 4-5). When in May 1947 Masinde was released from prison, he immediately recommenced his activities with DYM during which he advocated the eviction of all Europeans and called for the return to the old customs (Wafula, O.I., 1988).

It was not long before cases of arson by his adherents were reported at the Salvation Army School at Malakisi, and violence reported at the Lugulu Mission. On 15th July 1947, he addressed a crowd at Kimilili in Bukusu. He emphasized that the Europeans would have to leave the country and the Africans would instal both an African ruler and an indigenous administration (KNA, DC/NN/10/1/5).

Between 1946 and 1947, leading DYM members to Kimilili and Broderick Falls (Webuye), he criticised Indian employers for (a) underpaying their employees, (b) overworking their employees, (c) charging high prices, (d) not producing invoices for all goods purchased, (e) bad housing conditions and (f) not giving employees tea during working hours. The leaders demanded that the situation be rectified or else they would incite the local people to withhold supplies of milk, fuel, eggs etc from unco-operative employers (Were, 1972, 95). This was a typical African petty bourgeois nationalist agitation. It

was mainly in this Masinde led anti-Indian campaign that Wekukhe Sitawa patrolled Kimilili township on 14th July 1947. But because of these activities, the latter was arrested on 16th February 1948 (KNA, DC/NN/10/1/5).

Meanwhile as DYM activities mounted, the colonial government again renewed its search for Masinde. In the wake of this manhunt, Bukusu Union came out openly to oppose the government efforts. Its Chairman pascal Nabwana demanded that the provincial administration explains why Masinde was being sought by armed policemen. The complicity of Nabwana and Bukusu Union in DYM activities had even been made more conspicuous when on 17th November 1947 he had addressed a Bukusu gathering on DYM and had led it in obstructing the chief in his efforts to get the people unite and drive out the adherents of the movement and hand over Masinde to the government (KNA, DC/NN/10/1/5).

Obviously, the Bukusu Union was inexorable from all these activities. Inexorable because at a meeting of Bukusu chiefs at Kimilili on 22nd June 1949, all the chiefs were unanimous that the union be condemned as a bad influence. They wanted the union prohibited as it had undoubtedly passed some seditious resolutions and stirred up alot of trouble. Thus, even though the colonial administration noted the obvious connection between Bukusu Union and DYM, the chief's recommendation that pascal Nabwana be deported was held in abeyance (KNA, REF Mo. K.C./2/5/49).

The colonial administration was being cautious with

a movement that had a wide appeal and which had the potential of flaring into a widespread political unrest. Thus the P.C. for Nyanza noted:

The native authorities have considerable sympathy with the national spirit which is prevalent and these facts must be borne in mind when considering giving concessions. Although we can overcome the violent expression as demonstrated by the sect, we cannot hope entirely to suppress the desire of the national expression (KNA, ADC/2/A/11/47).

This explains why the administration persistently sought the co-operation of its petty bourgeois leader pascal Nabwana and often attempted to persuade him to use his position as a member of the L.N.C., member of the Location Advisory Council, and a leader of the Bukusu Union to suppress the movement (KNA, L & O/8/2/92). Nabwana and Wafula, both members of the L.N.C. were the elements of the native authority which the P.C.'s personal correspondence to the Chief Native Commissioner in mid 1949 cited above implied. In June 1949, there had been an outbreak of labour unrest after Nabwana had visited Mr. Buswell's farm in Trans-Nzoia (KNA, DC/NN/10/1/5).

It is therefore evident that the two bodies were accomplices. This represented a distinct turning point in Luyia nationalism. It combined new petty bourgeois revolutionary ideas with radical millenarian promises and tactics. Musambwa's rallying cry was Kenya for the Africans and that Wazungu (Europeans) should go back to their country. Masinde walked the countryside preaching this (Wipper, 1971, 159). But repressing the movement cost the administration a great deal. Although it was not well organised and depended on individual

initiative, it proved difficult to stamp out. It's hard-core adherents retreated to the Elgon terrain that was ragged and operated from hide-outs of caves and rocks that were difficult to detect (Wipper, 1971, 162).

Masinde was able to exploit the grievances of the people by championing their cause and merely used religious millenarian promises to win their support. His movement exposed the wickedness of the established churches, representing Catholic and FAM denominations. He noted that these were not practising what they preached (Were, 1972, 90). It also deplored the imposition of hut and poll taxes, and argued that this was a measure to force hitherto self-sufficient peasants to leave their land and work for Europeans for petty wages (Wipper, 1971, 164). Notwithstanding, it was critical of compulsory work (conscript labour) and the kipande system), making the movement articulate fundamental basic social and economic grievances. Thus, it championed the cause and welfare of the people as a political organ (Were, 1972, 94) and promised its adherents God's help in their struggle to rid the country of foreigners.

The movement recruited a multi-tribal membership that included the Luyia, Gusii, Pokot, Nandi, Turkana and Karamojong. It was centred in Malakisi, Elgon, Kimilili and South Bukusu. But it spread to the Trans-Nzoia and Uasin Gishu where land had been alienated and where numerous squatters were trying to eke out a living by working on settler farms (Wipper, 1971, 164). As evidenced by the revelations of the movement and

earlier official colonial reports on Western Kenya, the Bukusu and Tachoni had been displaced from huge tracts of land in Trans-Nzoia all the way from Kamukuywa to Naitiri. Bukusu and Tachoni squatters were therefore among the countless squatters strewn all over in Trans-Nzoia and Uasin Gishu. This explains why in 1948, the DYM invaded Trans-Nzoia and Uasin Gishu. Settler farms were harassed in many ways and there occurred several strikes for better pay and working conditions. DYM undertook the writing of and threatening letters to settlers on the farms in the two regions. In 1948, a wave of arson broke out in Trans-Nzoia and the colonial intelligence system had to be strengthened (Wipper, 1971, 161) probably ~~to cope~~ with this danger.

The colonial administration resolved to repatriate the Bukusu and other related groups from these settled areas. In 1949, there were repatriated 121 Bukusu, 12 Kabras and 6 Kisa, all Luyia participants (Wipper, 1971, 161). There was even stricter surveillance in Bukusu where there were several riots and atrocities committed against the chiefs, police and tribal police sent to enforce law and order, and there were also attacks on police stations. There was a wave of arson that burned down mission churches, schools, administrative buildings and caused a variety of other harassments (Wipper, 1971, 157). This culminated in the famous Malakisi riots of 1948.

On 10th February, a huge DYM meeting was held by Masinde at Malakisi during which the crowd clashed with the police. When the police. When the police opened fire on the crowd, 11 people died and 16 were wounded. It was the climax

of a spate of lawlessness since 1943 that had witnessed among others, the burning of the Native Tribunal Court building at Kamutiong, the burning of three produce shops at the same place, several clashes with the police throughout Bukusuland, and the burning of the Salvation Army School at Malakisi. But because of the Malakisi incident, Masinde was arrested and deported to Lamu and hereafter the movement went underground for sometime. The Kabras adherents of the movement removed land beacons at Luandeti led by Mayafu, Maruti, Kawa Renji and Namanywo Renji. Mayafu had notebooks in which all beacons demarcating the boundary of settled areas and reserves were detailed. Earmarked for removal by the movement were beacons at Naitiri, Saboti, Bukhakunga Hill, Mukhai Hill, Chekulo Hill and Wachitambe Hill. The latter 4 places were Kabras lands prior to alienation (See KNA, DC/NN/10/1/5). During this period ghastly letters were sent to administrators including the D.C. North Nyanza in October 1952 (Were, 1972, 96-97). One such letter read:

Salamu sana. Lakini nyingi wazungu munasumbua wa (sic) Mungu sana Wazungu waa Kenya kwa sababu ya Dini Ya Musambwa. Nyingi nafikiri munafanya muzuri. Nyingi wapumbavu sana. Mimi apana weza kuacha kusoma Dini Ya Musambwa. Hata kama munaiuwa sasa. Wajeni watu was Mungu wasome mimi hapana fikiri mikitaka kua mimi na mwanamuke wnagu haya mutue. Wambia wazungu wa Kitale waache kusmbua watu. Ngoja tu. Mimi nitafundisha Dini hiyo tu. Kwaheri wasenji (KNA, Ref. No. KC/2/5/49)).

This letter written to the D.C. North Nyanza by a sender using a fictitious name of Teotori Munyasia Mutongole Ndamwe Hatari would in literal translation read thus:

Many greetings. But you whites of Kenya are really disturbing the children of God because of the Dini Ya Musambwa. You think you are doing something good. You are extremely stupid. I cannot whatsoever stop adhering to the Dini Ya Musambwa. Even if you kill me now. Leave the people of God alone to learn. I don't care myself and even if you want to kill me and my wife go ahead and do it, Tell the whites of Kitale to stop disturbing people. Just await. I will still teach people that religion. Bye you stupid ones.

The Malakisi riots followed chiefly seditious political catechism by Masinde and his hard-core followers. This had aroused emotive outpouring that started at a Roman Catholic station near Malakisi. When the police were called, they clashed with the unruly crowds that did not hesitate to confront them. On 16th February 1948, Masinde and his lieutenants Wekukhe and Joash were arrested and deported to Lamu (KNA, PC/CP/8/8/3). In Trans-Nzoia, Donisio is reported to have instigated arson. He was formerly a servant on the farms. He was in March 1949 together with other instigators accused of causing restlessness in the region. The other instigators are reported to have included pascal Nabwana (KNA, PC/CP/8/8/3).

After the Malakisi incident 34 people were sentenced to 9 months for taking part in an unlawful assembly. In the same month 11 were given a total of 10<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub> years in prison as sentences for rioting (Were, 1972, 98). Because of the recalcitrance of its adherents and the increasing lawlessness, the Native passes Rules which were introduced in the same year in Trans-Nzoia and Uasin Gishu were applied in North Nyanza now as the North Nyanza passes Rules 1949. These are

some of the measures which drove the movement underground in North Nyanza.

In the settled areas the situation was different. Between 1948 and 1949 there were 9 cases of arson. These were in Cherangani, Hoey's Bridge and Kitale areas. They included the burning of a farm school, farm buildings and a Native Tribunal Court House in Kitale. The movement threatened to burn Europeans off in their farms (KNA, ADM/2.A/11/47). Despite the Native pass Rules and the North Nyanza passes Rules which were applied to the affected areas, the movement was still gaining ground. The colonial administration took exception of this by reporting:

The sudden recrudescence of Dini Ya Misambwa in violent form among the Suk in April 1950 came as a startling revelation of the insidious penetration of which the movement is capable (KNA, PC/CP/8/7/3).

After 1950, there were increased secret meetings and sporadic violence in the settled areas and beyond. Thus, the movement was proscribed. The government police disarmed its Pokot adherents and 123 men were fined for being members of the DYM. The police were imposed on the district and these elicited clashes with armed Pokot during the year. This was the famous Kolloa incident whose Pokot leader was Lukas Pkiech. 28 of his followers were killed and others wounded (Wipper, 1971, 161). Its leaders were imprisoned or deported to remote areas of the country. Here as was the case elsewhere in the colony, the government dealt with the movement ruthlessly. It employed diverse punitive measures



including maximum prison sentences with hard labour, a reporting order for 5 years, detention and compulsory communal labour. This was in addition to the restriction imposed on movement in the affected areas (See Were, 1972, 989).

Lamu, Faza and Pate islands were the main deportation centres. But Migori works Camp, Athi River and Kapenguria were the chief rehabilitation camps. The latter were important because the administration resorted to the policy of reforming prominent and hard-core adherents of the movement through the establishment of rehabilitation camps where they undertook to deliberately indoctrinate them. Migori works camp had 71 detainees in 1958 while Kapenguria had 57 as detainees, restrictees and convicts. A few female convicts came from Wanga, Butso and Kabras Locations. In these places, the detainees did manual work and were also given a great deal of christian catechism (Were, 1972, 103).

While Masinde was confined in Lamu, DYM sympathisers in Mombasa collected money to help his family (Were, 1972, 88). His absence did not lead to the death of the movement. If any thing, it became even more explosive. With the outbreak of Mau Mau, the colonial government feared an alliance between Mau Mau and DYM. Consequently, stricter measures of control and coercion were increased. The DYM posed a greater danger than Mau Mau in the Western Highlands region since a large percentage of the labourers and squatters in the Trans-Nzoia and Uasin Gishu came from North

Nyanza (Wipper, 1971, 162).

The infiltration of the Bukusu and other DYM adherents into Suk areas had presented a political problem of urgent importance to the colonial administration since 1949 (KNA, PC/RVP/3/1/2, 1949). Even the talk of resuscitating the Bukusu Union in North Kavirondo by the President of the Native Tribunal Thomas Masibo could not be tolerated under these circumstances of uncertainty. Nevertheless, the Union which was seeking official registration (initially started by pascal Nabwana, a former teacher at Jeanes School) eventually crystallized into the Elgon Nyanza District Congress in the mid 1950's which sponsored the candidacy of Masinde Muliro in Legco in March 1957 (Bogonko, 1982, 107).

In the 1950's the activities of DYM increased among the Pokot. This culminated in the famous Kolloa incident as we have noted. But despite increased punitive reprisals by the government, the movement had not ebbed out. The Kenya Police was not withdrawn from the district until May 1951. By 1955 still one suspect was arrested at Nginyang and was imprisoned for 6 months (DC/BAR/1/3, 1955). Infact there were fears that the DYM and Mau Mau were planning to amalgamate. Pre-emptive steps were undertaken to prevent any further outbreaks of DYM or any link up with Mau Mau. This additional vigilance was made necessary by the attempted incursion of the Kikuyu into Trans-Nzoia and the increasing political activities of DYM in North Nyanza in 1953 (KNA, PC/RVP/3/1/2).

The Trans-Nzoia security needs were catered for by its own Emergency Liaison Committee led by the D.C.

The case of DYM in Buluyia is a sad but long one to tell. It is a good example of an attempted synthesis of the African petty bourgeois politics, the old religious practices and the new form of Christianity. It was a synthesis in that the movement's leadership attempted to change the structures of the imported christian model by reshaping and relaunching them in traditional and political terms. The petty bourgeois leadership of the movement together with their accomplices in the Bukusu Union therefore carefully worked out the synthesis as to allow for an alliance between the peasantry, the poor, the landless and the stifled nascent petty bourgeoisie. This was with the express purpose of fermenting potent political excrescence that would challenge the colonial status quo. Obviously, this synthesis covered up internal class issues and the DYM movement not only challenged the colonial status quo but together with other agrarian upheavals like Mau Mau intensified and accelerated the processes of change in the political economy of the entire colony. This indeed was the instrumental impact of nationalism in Buluyia and the colony at large. Political activism helped in forging the pace of decolonization in the colony. Therefore, to ignore the Luyia involvement in DYM, KAU and other earlier proto-nationalist organization's is to miss the very fundamental process of social change. A change that entailed a string of political acitivities which determined the very possibility and form of decolonization.

Therefore the issues highlighted in this chapter were part of those fundamental factors which the colonial administration could not afford to ignore in their policy formulation to resolve conflicts, contradiction, hesitations and uncertainties which their hegemony faced in the colony. But details this process will be given in the next chapter where we will explain the terrain of decolonization against a background of major structural changes in agriculture, commerce, industry and labour relations. These were changes which in turn altered the balance of power within the colonial state and between it and the metropolitan government.

CHAPTER VII

7.0 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ETHNICITY: THE ABALUYIA  
IN THE POLITICS OF MULTIRACIALISM AND REGIONALISM

7.1 The Background to Regional Politics

This chapter looks at the process of decolonization in Kenya and analyses the leadership and the shifting alliances of the Abaluyia in the moments of decolonization. The chapter examine the emergence of petty bourgeois leadership among the Abaluyia and highlight its responses to constitutional developments in the colony. Perhaps it should be noted that the demand for national independence was articulated by a deprived petty bourgeoisie who were able to carry with them the masses of peasants and workers against the colonial order. But in an impending new African state composed of disparate peoples, solidarity on the basis of cultural-linguistic affinity became a reality only in the context of competition at the centre over the distribution of power, economic resources and job opportunities.

Luyia politicians were therefore to gain tribal power bases by successfully manipulating the appropriate ethnic grievances and sentiments to articulate their peoples collective and individual aspirations. Understandably, a symbiotic relationship emerged between politicians who wished to advance their own positions and their people amidst fear of political domination and economic exploitation by other culturally distinct groups allegedly organised for these ends (Sandbrook, 1975, 11).

But until well after the Second World War, colonial administrators had consistently frowned upon evidence of political consciousness among the African people. African organizations with political aims were suppressed because they were seen as potential centres for fermenting discontent, and a decided challenge to colonial authority (Amolo, 1979, 36). But notwithstanding, in the process of the consolidation of the colonial economy and society, there developed political contradictions between the Africans and the colonialists. As these contradictions were generated and became more intense in the post-war era, African opposition to colonial policy mounted in strength and purpose. It was this anti-colonial consciousness which culminated in the demand for national political independence. Nevertheless, despite the contradictions within the African social echelon that were heightened by sensitivity to ethnic questions, the African bourgeois leadership was united in the political ambition of national independence as a fundamental prelude to its subsequent economic advancement. Thus, like other colonised territories in Africa, the goal of African state sovereignty introduced an element of cohesion (Tangri, 1985, 3).

Before the countrywide Kenya African Union (KAU) was formed in 1944, the real militant petty bourgeois politics which somewhat threatened the basis of colonialism in Western Kenya started with collaboration between the Young Kikuyu Association (YKA), East African Association (E.A.A.) and the Young Kavirondo Association (YKA). Their brand of politics were perpetuated in the collaboration of Kikuyu Central

Association (KCA) and the Kavirondo Taxpayers Welfare Association (K.T.W.A.), the North Kavirondo Central Association (K.C.A.) and the North Abaluyia Central Association (N.A.C.A.). The latter organization eventually became Nyanza Central Association in 1943 drawing most to its petty bourgeois leadership and membership from the F.A.M. and the C.M.S. adherents and a small number of the Islamised Wanga (Bogonko, 1982, 96). The activities of this leadership were geared towards political agitation which followed lines of a thinly veiled disrespect to the government. Quite often, leading agitators like Nicodemus Murunga, Nathan Bwabi and Musa Matsanza were ostracised because of what was termed 'their subsversive tendencies'. But even when African ambitions crystallised to form KAU in 1944, it was from this kind of bourgeois pool that it drew its leadership. At the district level, the Luyia petty bourgeoisie was represented in the persons of John Adalla, Joseph Daniel Otiende, and Wycliffe Works Awori (Bogonko, 1982, 106).

In the previous chapters, we have shown how KAU's campaign had succeeded in enlisting a number of the Luyia as members. But alarmed by its radical politics in the early 1950's, the colonial government decided to crack down on the efforts of the party in Western Kenya. It refused to grant permits for meetings in the area. Nevertheless, it was this party's central leadership which challenged the British Labour Government between 1945 and 1951 to prove its liberalism by granting important reforms in colonial Kenya. Through memoranda, petitions and resolutions, they demanded a

wider representation in the legislature, stoppage of further land alienation by whites and opening more land for African settlement, compulsory but free and better education for Africans, wider trading facilities for African traders, 'equal work' and better working conditions for Africans, and the abolition of the kipande system. However, the failure of both the imperial and the colonial governments to meet these demands in time prepared the ground for the Mau Mau eruption in 1952. The Mau Mau upheaval forced structural transformation upon the reluctant white minority. Thus, their structure of privilege which had remained undisturbed until 1950's became the object of reform (Rothchild, 1973, 105).

But while KAU was wide embracing in membership, it like its predecessors had failed to break the settler hold over production and distribution in the colony. A radical restructuring of political representation had not been carried out by the state and this is why it was incapable of incorporating or neutralising bourgeois nationalist demands (Swainson, 1980, 11-12). Therefore, it was only after the violent assault on the state by Mau Mau that the plans for immediate political representation for Africans were brought to the top agenda. Such plans were to be provided for by the adoption of the Lyttelton constitution of 1954. Thus, the crisis which the Mau Mau outbreak engendered and the reforms which the colonial state adopted in response underscore the significance of the period as a watershed in Kenya's political and economic transformation. It marked the beginning of an era of managing conflict through direct negotiation (Rothchild,



1973, 108).

The Lyttelton Constitution was inspired by an overwhelming desire to establish multi-racialism in Kenya. While it was the culmination and the embodiment of government reforms which began in 1944 under Governor Mitchell in anticipation of a multi-racial government, it actually opened almost a decade of intense political conflict. But multi-racialism as envisaged by Sir Philip Mitchell, Governor of Kenya was seen as a means of containing both European extremists and African petty bourgeois agitators. In theory, the policy undercut settler dominance in order to enhance the colonial structure and ties (Wasserman, 1976, 20).

The rise of the nationalist agitation and the emergence brought the first major African challenge to colonial authority. Land policies came to be employed unsuccessfully to change the focus and even counteract the development of African politics by posing economics as an alternative to political insurgency. As a result, the processes of economic development were to become suffused with political significance (Harbeson, 1973, 4-3).

But despite the failure of KAU to break the settler hold over production and distribution in the colony, the campaigns of KAU helped to produce the administration's drive for economic development programs in defence of the political status quo. It had maintained an assault on the injustices of the existing distribution of land not only in Kenya but in London as well. Perhaps the experiment in multi-racial

politics helped prepare the European community for the transfer of political power that was to follow even though it experienced very great strains during the transition period and its aftermath (Harbeson, 1973, 26).

Although the potency of the petty bourgeois nationalism and the Mau Mau peasant upheaval was certainly a contributing factor to the decolonization process, one cannot wholly attribute the prospects and results of the process to the rise of nationalism. The political ascendancy of the petty bourgeois leadership and a potentially disruptive African peasantry and labouring class forced a modification on colonial structures and institutions to contain the new situation. It involved programmes that were an abstraction from a series of local and imperial policies and whose eventual execution reflected an adjustment in political behaviour on the part of the colonial political and economic elite. The metropolitan state reacted to the conflicts and contradictions entailed in the situation by assuming the responsibility of the ultimate authority and participant with the greatest political resources in the bargaining process that ensued and were aimed at resolving these conflicts and contradictions. But the initiative was in the hands of African politicians.

Nevertheless, these conflicts and contradictions were not created by the Mau Mau outbreak and the emergency. They were merely intensified and accelerated by them. Thus, decolonization efforts in the 1950's was merely a culmination

of a process and not a plan. A process that began in the immediate post-war years with political and economic reforms as piecemeal and conjunctural responses to particular problems and crises. When responded to, each of these had further shaped the underlying structural changes in the colonial political economy. Out of them there gradually emerged a more self-conscious and purposive logic of decolonization which materialised in 1960-1963 (Berman, 1981, 2). Hence, the conflicts, hesitations and uncertainties that littered the winding road to self-government in Kenya should not wrongfully be subsumed into an inevitable consummation of either imperial planning or nationalist militancy. Decolonization then was a process, an unfolding saga that was predicated on the changing material conditions in both the metropole and the colony. In the metropole, the inability of British capital to compete with America on a global scale had led to the re-organization of the British economy away from laissez-faire capitalism. The enhanced interventionist role of the British Imperial state at home was to be accompanied by an equally interventionist role in colonial economies (Ogot and Zeleza, 1988, 8). Indeed, at the end of the war, Britain was in dire economic straits so that expanded and co-ordinated colonial production was seen in British ruling circles as imperative for the country's recovery and reconstruction. But while her colonial development policy developed from this, the weakened state in which Britain found itself at the end of the war reduced her capacity to hold on to the remaining empire. She nevertheless

sought to tighten her grip on economic matters (Ogot and Zeleza, 1988, 8).

However, in the Kenya periphery, direct intervention was prompted by the failure of the colonial state including the settlers to quell the social and popular struggles engulfing the country. But even as the emergency was being declared to preserve colonialism, settlers, the custodians of that very colonialism were the first to be sacrificed. They were sacrificed in its eventual generation of new social and political process which destroyed the basis of settler power, restructured the class and institutional bases of class forces so that both settlers and freedom fighters, the protagonists in the Mau Mau saga, became marginalised by the time of attaining internal self-government. They were marginalised because the British struggle against Mau Mau was exacting a heavy political price from the British Imperialists. Their military occupation of Kenya could not last indefinitely and neither could they return the country to the status quo ante. Reform became imperative (Ogot and Zeleza, 1988, 10-11).

Nevertheless, the imperial-inspired reforms were essentially piecemeal, conjunctural responses to intensifying political struggles within the colony. The reforms had to involve the political socialization of the African petty bourgeois nationalist leadership by expanding the participation of Africans in the bureaucracy and legislature. Moreover, this political socialization was geared primarily at preventing the formation and mobilization of a mass nationalist movement

as the political quiescence and subordination of the masses became the ultimate goal of the decolonization process. In other words, the fear of mass mobilization had catalysed the resolution to bargain (Wasserman, 1976, 7).

The political socialization involved largely those leaders that had been central in district parties of 1955. The Luyia, like other people of Kenya, did not have an organised forum through which to express their grievances after the banning of political organizations in 1953. It was not until 1955, nearly three years since the declaration of the State of Emergency, that the government allowed the formation of political parties at district level. These parties encouraged the introversion of national to local concerns and the emergence of local powerful political figures who would resist attempts at political centralization. These figures held the initiative and dictated the pace of events.

The Bukusu Union had apparently crystallised into the Elgon Nyanza District Congress during the era of District party politics. In North Nyanza there emerged the North Nyanza African District Congress in the same period. The two parties were led by Masinde Muliro and Joseph D. Otiende respectively (Bogonko, 1982, 107). Within the same period W.B. Akatsa formed the North Nyanza Progressive Party. Akatsa had been a leader of the Abaluyia Makerere Students Union that held occasional meetings to discuss topics of mutual interest to the Luyia. The Unions president was J.D.

Otiende (DC/KMG/1/1/153, ADMINISTRATION, NATIVE ASSOCIATIONS, 1943-1959).

The North Nyanza African District Congress held a series of public meetings. These included those held at Mbale and Khwisero in 1958. But the era of district organization in Western Kenya made these parties operate within what was basically a Luyia ethnic collectivity. District self-consciousness was heightened by the significant social cleavages introduced by different christian missions and the economic differences which existed between the sub-ethnic groups. In 1954 when the government adopted the Lyttleton constitution which provided for a multi-racial form of government in which Europeans, Asians and Africans would have a significant voice, it paved way for direct African representation in the Legislative Council. In March 1957, under a restricted franchise suggested by the Coutts Report<sup>1</sup> 8 Africans were to be elected to the Council to represent the whole of Kenya (Kenyatta, 1968, 70). These were to be elected in the elections of 1957 that were to arouse a great of political campaign in Buluyia. Indeed, political opposition by the African petty bourgeois nationalists in the colony had reached its climax in that year following the visit of the Secretary of State for Colonies in Kenya late in the year. After joining the Legislative Council,

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1. Coutts was Kenya's Chief Secretary who was to maintain in the Legislative Council on April 12, 1960 that Jomo Kenyatta would not be released as long as he was considered a danger to the security of the colony.

the new petty bourgeois leaders formed the African Elected Members Organization (AEMO) which immediately declared the Lyttleton plan as null and void (Kenyatta, 1968, 71-72).

Masinde Muliro had used the Elgon Nyanza District Congress to win the 1957 elections (Bogonko, 1982, 107). He defeated other candidates Wycliffe Wasya Awori, Siganga, Akatsa, Kadima and Otiende. On his victory, Muliro, had become a founding member of the AEMO. But even during his visit, the constitutional settlement proposed by the Secretary of State for colonies Alan Lennox Boyd still aroused AEMO opposition. Indeed, Lennox Boyd's visit had been prompted by the trip made to London by Tom Mboya and Ronald Ngala to articulate to the metropolitan leadership the AEMO's opposition to the Lyttleton Constitution which although it had granted Africans direct representation had not conceded the principle of majority nor challenged the concept of European leadership in Kenya (Roelker, 1976, 143). As a result of Lennox Boyd's visit in March 1958, Africans were given a further 6 elective seats in the Legislative Council now under new terms enshrined in the Lennox Boyd Constitution for Kenya (Kenyatta, 1968, 73).

Both the Lyttleton and Lennox Boyd Constitutions were instruments expediting increased African participation in the colonial political structures due to increasing political pressure from the African petty bourgeois nationalists. On the other hand, there was the overwhelming need to justify colonialism as a welfare-developmental system (Wasserman, 1976, 21).

Nevertheless, given that multi-racial concessions of the 1950's were also veiled attempts to maintain European political supremacy while, adapting to the ascendancy of an African petty bourgeois nationalist leadership, efforts at political alliance were forged with elements of this leadership. Not surprisingly, as early as 1954, the liberal Europeans had formed the United Country party that openly voiced its support of Lyttleton's constitutional proposals for multi-racialism. It was formed to counter the right-wing Kenya Empire party that was already calling for provincial autonomy. Although the former party founded by Michael Blundell was dissolved in 1957, its leadership founded the New Kenya Group in 1959 in which significant elements of the African petty bourgeois nationalists enlisted. This included Musa Amalemba, a leading voice in party politics of Buluyia (Amalemba, O.I., 1988).

But Musa Amalemba was not the only dark-hued ally of the European multi-racialists. In September 1959, Masinde Muliro had formed the Kenya National Party. It was basically multi-racial and had the support of other petty bourgeois nationalists including the coastal leader Ronald Ngala. The party's multi-racial compromises were strongly opposed by Oginga Odinga's Kenya Independence Movement formed at the same time and supported by Tom Mboya (Muliro, O.I., 1988). To the latter, Multi-racialism was the epitome of frustration.

But while Muliro and Amalemba had already embarked on the bandwagon of multi-racialism, J.D. Otiende and Clement Lubembe, the other forceful voices in the Luyia petty



bourgeois politics emphasized the need for blackanization of the political instruments of the state, apparently fearing continuance of European hegemony and its stultification of efforts by Africans to rise in all spheres of life (Lubembe, O.I., 1988).

Muliro's courtship with multi-racialism was to pit him against other Luyia fractions of the nationalist movement. After his defeat of Wycliffe W.W. Awori in the 1957 elections, Muliro had sought to establish a tribal power base. He visited the whole of Buluyia and even attempted to win Luyia support for Elgon Nyanza African National Congress by starting a similar North Nyanza National Congress. But J.D. Otiende's Maragoli refused and formed the North Nyanza Nationalist Association (Dindi, O.I., 1987). Therefore when the Elgon Nyanza African National Congress and the fledgling North Nyanza parties Congress (the latter led by Adagala and D.E. Luseno) became the backdrop of Muliro's K.N.P. in Buluyia, The North Nyanza Nationalist Association of Otiende threw their support behind Oginga Odinga's K.I.M. (Dindi, O.I., 1987).

The backfall of the AEMO into factional groupings which was characterised by the rise of K.N.P and K.I.M. in 1959 demonstrated the failure of AEMO to unite all district organizations through leaders conferences (Mboya, 1962, 82). But unlike the Buluyia based district parties, other urban district parties like the Nakuru District Congress (NDC), the Nairobi District Congress (NDC) and the Mombasa District

African Democractic Union (MADU) were multi-tribal. While the Nairobi District Congress enlisted the support of Jason Anyim Achieng', a Luyia from Buholo, the Nakuru District Congress saw the active participation of Richard Kuboka. He was the president of the latter party (Tamarkin, 1981, 33).

Masinde Muliro's multi-racial party was backed by Ronald Ngala, Daniel Arap Moi and Taita Arap Towett, the other petty bourgeois nationalists with budgeoning tribal power bases. The political alliances which were opposed to multi-racialism led by Oginga Odinga, Tom Mboya and Gikonyo Kiano, launched the Kenya Independence Movement which was however refused registration. But despite the splintering of the AEMO into factional groups, Ngala, who had replaced Tom Mboya as the Secretary of AEMO and who had appealed to all African elected members of the Legislative Council opposed to the Lyttleton Constitution to boycott the Council from 17th February 1959, was unanimously chosen as the leader of the African delegation to the Lancaster House Conference in January 1960 (Bogonko, 1980, 211, Odinga, 1967, 170). Lennox Boyd after his visit to Kenya in 1957 had agreed in 1959 to convene a constitutional conference in London in 1960 (Mboya, 1966, 82).

After the Lancaster House Conference of 1960, the idea of forming a national party was brought out at another leaders' conference in Kiambu. Out of its proceedings, Kenya African National Union (KANU) was formed and Jomo Kenyatta declared its president (Mboya, 1966, 83-84). However, because

of the continued detention of Kenyatta by the colonial government, James Gichuru was appointed Acting President. Others were Oginga Odinga (Vice-President), Tom Mboya (Secretary) and in their absence Ronald Ngala and Daniel arap Moi were elected Treasurer and Assistant Treasurer respectively (Mboya, 1966, 83-84). But ethnic interests eventually brought about an alliance between the Luyia, the Kalenjin, the Maasai and the Mijikenda, an alliance that crystallised into the Kenya African Democratic Union when it emerged in July 1960 (Bogonko, 1980, 251-252).

Therefore the objective of an all-embracing party was shattered by the formation of KADU, a body which came to be bitterly opposed to the idea of an absolute unitary mass party (Gertzel, 1972, 103). Muliro had therefore refused to co-operate in the formation of such a party and went a head to form the Kenya African People Party, a skeleton of KNP. It immediately forged links with the Kalenjin Political Alliance, the Coast African Political Union and the Masai United Front in early June 1960, bodies whose leaders like Muliro regarded with great suspicion the objectives and leadership of KANU (Gertzel, 1972, 109).

Somehow, their fears were sealed by the distribution of the most influential seats to the major ethnic groups of the Kikuyu and Luo. Of the Luyia nationalist intelligentsia, only Arthur Ochwada captured the seat of deputy secretary. But even Ochwada had been used by Odinga in his efforts to remove Mboya from the trade union movement in deepening

intra-Luo factionalism. However, Mboya's retaliation was to climax in the arrest and jailing of Arthur Ochwada, previously a member of Nairobi Peoples Convention Party and also a leader in the Kenya Federation of Labour (Nyamori, O.I., 1987).

Apart from Ochwada, other significant Luyia nationalist leaders of KAU such as J.D. Otiende and Wycliffe W. Awori seemed to have been relegated to the political side-show. Nevertheless, it should be recalled that after the declaration of the Emergency on 20th October 1952 and the arrest of Jomo Kenyatta, Achieng Oneko, Paul Ngei and Bildad Kaggia among others, Walter Odede, the Luo nominated member of Legco had become Acting President of KAU. However, on his detention, W.W. Awori had become its Acting President until it was proscribed on 8th June, 1953 (Gertzel, 1972, 105).

Both Joseph D. Otiende and Wycliffe W. Awori had been elected Vice-President and Treasurer of Kenya African Study Union (KASU)<sup>2</sup>, the predecessor of KAU (Abuor, 1970, 63). Apart from these two who had been active in KAU's reformist politics, the Luyia involvement in Mau Mau was exemplified by the membership of Elikana Okusimba in the Central Council of Mau

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2. The establishment of KASU saw it extend its activities in North Kavirondo. Its representative in the district was Adam Halanga. Eventually, the Bukusu Union was transformed into a branch of KAU. See F. Bode, "Anti-colonial politics Within a Tribe: The Case of the Abaluyia of western Kenya" in A. Ojuka and W. Ochieng' (eds.) Politics and Leadership in Africa. Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1975).

Mau (Abuor, 1970, 232-233). Many others were detained in connection with the movement. They included Reuben Demesi, Zephania Adola from Maragoli, John Adala a Munyore and John O'Washika, a Wanga (Mukudi, O.I., 1987). In Busia were Owino Onunga, Wanga Mahanga, Alekisius Odiabalo and Joseph Okumu (Ogula, 1974, 184).

In spite of their political activism in the reformist organs of the nationalist struggle, ethnic considerations seemed to be preponderant in the allocation of leadership positions in the later phases of the struggle. Muliro, himself a product of Bukusu Union that had opened a political front with KAU in the preceding decades became amenable to the ethnic factor that saw the nationalist movement disintegrate into tribal party factions.

However, despite the grudging discomfiture of the Luyia led by Muliro against the formation of KANU, KANU was the first party to establish itself in Nakuru. The Nakuru District Congress led by Richard Kuboka dissolved on 3rd July 1960 and became KANU's first branch. Its interim officers included 2 Luyia, 3 Luo and 2 Kikuyu. Surprisingly, its Luyia leaders refused to join KADU (Tamarkin, 1981, 32). This was the beginning of a major contradiction in the political alignment of the Luyia. Henceforth, the Luyia society was divided between KANU and KADU. Despite KANU's antagonistic factions in Nakuru, brought upon the party to bear by the divisive force of ethnicity, Richard Kuboka remained the party's interim Chairman (Tamarkin, 1981, 33).

But Nakuru's Luyia support for KANU became the target of Muliro's political onslaught in an effort to forge a KADU

headway in the town. The clout of that onslaught was expressed in the person of Wafula Wabuge. Hence, the contest between the parties became violent as was the case in other towns even before they evolved political blue-prints (Mukudi, O.I., 1987).

It was KANU's resolve to use the heretofore existing district party districts such as Nakuru District Congress, the Nairobi District Congress, the Nairobi People's Convention Party, African District Association (Central Nyanza), The South Nyanza District African Political Association, The Taita African Democratic Union etc as the backbone of its inaugural activities that sent KADU to reel back onto the ethnic sentiment. With the irreconcilable postures of the two parties, the split in AEMO's affairs of the late 1950's now took a definitive form. KANU emerged as a party while KADU represented the less potent and less cohesive forces of rural nationalism' (Goldsworthy, 1982, 146).

The parties formented a deep-rooted antagonism that ruptured what had heretofore been called in the settler press as the Nyanza clique following election of Tom Mboya in Nairobi, Oginga Odinga in Central Nyanza, Lawrence Oguda in South Nyanza and Masinde Muliro in North Nyanza during the 1957 elections. It was an election whose outcome had over-represented Western Kenya in the Legislative Council during this era of Kikuyu rustication (KNA, KENYA WEEKLY NEWS, 1957). It was a clique that had generated a lot of controversy during its campaigns by public meetings. Of crucial importance

had been the Kisumu meeting on 27th April, 1957 that was addressed by the clique (Goldsworthy, 1982, 77).

It was within the political forthrightness of the clique that Tom Mboya and Masinde Muliro had convened a meeting at Makadara Hall in 1957 to reiterate the opposition of the AEMO to the Lyttleton Constitution following the rejection of the demands of the AEMO by Lennox Boyd. The meeting and the controversy it generated led to the resignation of Michael Blundell, Briggs. Havelock and 2 Asian Ministers<sup>3</sup>. It was a resignation that spelt the breakdown of the Lyttleton Constitution and which prompted the Secretary of State for colonies to concede a new plan, the Lennox Boyd Plan (Muliro, O.I., 1988). Nevertheless, even this plan was also rejected by the AEMO although elections under the new plan brought into Legco: Gikonyo Kiano and Jeremiah Nyagah in Embu for Central Province in addition to Bernard Mate; Francis Khamisi for Mombasa in addition to Ronald Ngala of Coast; D.N. Mumo for Machakos in addition to James Muimi; Taita Towett for Kipsigis and Justus ole Tipis for Masai in addition to Daniel arap Moi of Rift Valley (Goldsworthy, 1982, 88). The Lennox Boyd plan also gave a special election provision which the AEMO boycotted. Nevertheless the special election brought into

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3. Following the resignation of Michael Blundell, Oginga Odinga, the Chairman of the AEMO demanded on April 3, 1959 that the Ministry of Agriculture portfolio left vacant by Blundell's departure be filled by a colonial Civil Servant and not a settler.

Legco Musa Amalemba from Buluyia, John Muchura from Luoland, Gibson Ngome from Coast and Wanyutu Waweru from Central. These African leaders became the target of Muliro and Mboya's scathing political attack especially Musa Amalemba who had accepted the post of Minister of Housing (Muliro, O.I., 1988).

But, perhaps playing true to the solidarity of the Nyanza clique, Mboya had influenced the rise of Clement Lumembe to the Vice-Presidency of his Nairobi Peoples Convention Party and Aggrey Minya another veteran Luyia trade Unionist was driven to capture the Vice-Chairmanship (Goldsworthy 1982). It was however a question of jostling for power in the parties. In 1957 when the African elected members of Legco came together to form the AEMO, they did so without the benefit of an all-embracing African nationalist party. They were strangers to one another and with some of their respected leaders like Kenyatta in jail, there was reluctance and fear among them of accepting any one man as interim leader. When in May 1958 a Convention of African Associations that aimed at uniting all the colony's African district parties and develop a common policy was refused registration, this promoted localism and tribal parochialism. It was almost impossible to counteract these tendencies and therefore in a situation where the African petty bourgeois leaders ran as individuals or cliques rather than as representatives of a mass movement, personalities became more important than ideology or other pertinent issues (Mueller, 1972, 46-48).



Not surprisingly, influence in bourgeoisie nationalism shifted from astute articulation of the African grievances and political aspirations to non-inspiring loyalties such as ethnic affinity. Therefore, without a viable political prognosis nor an economic blue-print prepared on the basis of a well-conveived party consensus, disagreement among the African leaders was reduced to personal antagonisms, petty jealousies and tribalism. By 1959 factionalism over questions of personality, tactics and power was increasingly intensified by tribalism. Thus, jostling for position had been rampant within the AEMO although it did not threaten its petty bourgeois nationalist solidarity in matters of constitutional gambitry (Goldsworthy, 1982, 104).

The Luyia petty bourgeois leaders led by Muliro and Amalemba could not be indifferent to these tribal and eventual racial entrenchments. It all started when Lennox Boyd rejected the idea of a constitutional conference and said that he favoured changes "within the armbit of the present constitution". Immediately, there followed new alignments among the African, European, and Asian elected members. The 14 elected African members on March 1959 met their Asian and Arab counterparts and one white liberal member S.V. Cooke for discussion. It was this group which decided to directly approach London to elicit a declaration by the British government of its intentions. With Odinga as the leader of the delegation, a delegation that included Muliro, Moi, Cooke among others, it was the first multi-racial grouping

ever (Goldsworthy, 1982, 114). Out of this concerned multi-racial experiment emerged the close flirtation between a section of the African petty bourgeois leaders and the liberal Europeans. A subsequent formation to emerge from this flirtation was the New Kenya Group that comprised 43 elected multi-racial members. It included all the specially elected Africans such as Musa Amalemba and was formed by Michael Blundell. Blundell accordingly called for a constitutional conference that would envision a multi-racial Kenya.

But in refusal to flirt with multi-racialism any further, a fraction of the African petty bourgeois nationalists reponded by forming the Constituency Elected Members Organization (CEMO). Thus, while the political talk in Kenya by mid 1959 was multi-racialism as the apparent key to the country's near future, CEMO organised a meeting with Lennox Boyd during which the Secretary of State for colonies conceded to the concept of a constitutional conference by its members (Goldsworthy, 1982, 116).

Notwithstanding the political isolation of Amalemba and his multi-racial cohorts in NKG, Muliro, along time antagonist of Mboya in the AEMO declared his unpreparedness to belong to one party with Mboya overruling their decisions. Therefore, when the Lancaster House Conference of 1960 set elections for February 1961 and a new constitution called the Macleod constitution was to come into force after the election in February 1961, there had emerged a division among

the AEMO members. These were the groups which were to form KANU and KADU (Muliro, O.I., 19889.

## 7.2 KADU and the Politics of Regionalism

Whereas the new constitution replaced the amended Lennox-Boyd Constitution set up through the Constitution order-in-council of 1958, and that it now gave Africans in Kenya a considerable measure of responsible government with the majority of ministers drawn from the non-official members of the Legco, the real basis of disagreement among African petty bourgeois leaders had nothing to do with their militancy in their nationalist struggle. Their acrimonies had much to do with tightly interwoven factors of ethnicity ~~and land~~ (Goldsworthy, 1982, 122).

We have mentioned the factional developemnt of KNP and KIM as the political constellations which crystallised into KADU and KANU. Perhaps it should be added that there was no disagreement between KNP and KIM on ultimate objectives. The real differences between Muliro and Mboya had come to a climax when KNP's first 2 public meetings were broken up by NPCP activists who kept shouting down Muliro, the party's president. They denounced his multi-racial partnership and urged him to disband KNP. Mboya also similarly attacked Francis Khamisi another staunch supporter of KNP through Denis Akumu (Aseka, 1984, 78-80).

While the KNP supporters who included Muliro, Khamisi, Towett and Ole Tipis, attempted to tread a multi-racial pathway when the government granted permission for the

resumption of party organization on a country-wide scale provided they were multi-racial, its meeting summoned to draft its official policy platform was not attended by Odinga. The meeting was chaired by Cooke and had also to contend with Mboya's opposition to its exclusion of concrete proposals for the transition period to self-government. His refusal to comply was supported by Gikonyo Kiano, Lawrence Oguda and Oginga Odinga. This was when the split in the ranks of the African petty bourgeois nationalists became open with the Kikuyu and Luo recalcitrant politicians pitted against their Luyia, Kelenjin, Masai and Coastal counterparts. Now forging a new trans-tribal solidarity, Odinga, Mboya, Kiano and Oguda called a meeting of the AEMO whereby they issued a policy declaration condemning the KNP (Muliro, O.I., 1988).

Notably, Moi and Ngala had not been in the KNP meeting although they had sent their apologies. However, following the failure of Mboya, Odinga, Kiano and Oguda to be able to operate under one political umbrella with Muliro and his KNP multi-racial colleagues, the African elected members of the KNP in a meeting decided to expel Odinga from the AEMO in absentia because of his partisan chairmanship. Accordingly they elected Moi as its Chairman. But while recriminations and expulsions for political expedience characterised the KNP response to the cross-currents of acrimony between its members and the Mboya-Odinga faction, the latter joined with leaders of eleven distinct parties and

announced the formation of KIM (Goldsworthy, 1982, 124).

When the new Colonial Secretary of State for colonies Ian Macleod announced that a constitutional conference would be held in January 1960, the African leaders were therefore gotten flat-footed. They all realised that a measure of compromise was inescapable despite their heretofore turbulent political inter-relationships. After some mediatory efforts by Ronald Ngala, all the African elected members were brought together for a leaders conference at Kiambu on 19th November, 1959. This explains why the concilliatory Ngala was chosen as the leader of the African delegation to the London talks as opposed to the strong-willed Tom Mboya. But since Ngala was in KNP, the secretary had to be Mboya, a member of the KIM (Goldsworthy, 1982, 127).

Nevertheless the divisiveness of the multi-racial concept also ruptured the KNP. Muliro with the support of fellow Africans in the party began to re-radicalise the KNP that saw the resignation of two leading Asian members J.M. Nazareth and K.D. Travadi while a third Asian withdrew voluntarily. Thus, Muliro's purge within the KNP followed clashes over land policy as Africans of KNP objected to the prospect of Indian farmers in the so called White Highlands. It was a radicalization that was also influenced by the growing fear of losing support within their own African racial enclaves. This was therefore related to the fears and jealousies over the land question. Consequently, Muliro's KNP abandoned its co-operation with minority groups (Goldsworthy, 1982, 127).

There is no doubt that the conference deepened the existing rift between the Mboya-Odinga faction and the Muliro-Ngala group. New problems were to give further lines to this cleavage especially as the various members of the African petty bourgeois nationalists jockeyed for positions following the new prospect of self-government which the conference formented,. Therefore when 'The Times' showered Mboya with credit for achievements and initiatives made at the conference in an editorial, Ngala and Muliro called a press conference and mounted an attack on Mboya re-asserting that Ngala was the real leader (KNA, The Times, 22nd February, 1960).

Still disenchanted by Mboya's maverick high-handedness, Muliro reiterated his inability to work with Mboya and noted that the Africans had merely agreed to stick together for the conference period but signified the inescapable choice to part ways after the conference (K.N.A., Daily Telegraphy, 25th February, 1960). This explains why Muliro refused to commit himself to the prospect of forming a national party in which all African members would operate as suggested by Odinga and Moi while still in London. Even Mboya refused this suggestion giving his reason to be Odinga and Arthur Ochwada's attempting to undercut him by approaching James Gichuru to be the leader of the new party. When there was held the 2nd second Kiambu leaders conference after the London Constitutional talks, the constitution of the new party called Uhuru Party was released. But because Muliro and Mboya were not in the

list of signatories to the new party and dismayed by Odinga's behaviour, Ngala withdrew his signature. Many others were outraged by his attempts to usurp their decision-making power and so appointed a new committee to work out details of the party. It included Odinga, Kiano, Argwings Kodhek, Njoroge Mungai, James Nyamweya and Henry Wariithi (Goldsworthy, 1982 139-144).

On the eve of the Kiambu conference, Ngala, Muliro and Moi were threatening to boycott the meeting if Mboya attended. Ngala and Moi had been elected to leadership positions in absentia as they were respectively in America and Britain at the time. Muliro too had missed the proceedings of the initial conference (Muliro, O.I., 1988). But although they had legitimate reasons for not attending, it appears that ethnic considerations influenced the decisions of both Ngala and Moi to refuse office in KANU. This is because while Muliro had publicly announced his discomfiture with Mboya and was bent on entrenching his tribal base by supporting the formation of the Buluyia Political Union in the mid 1960, Moi and Ngala were instrumental in the formation of the Kalenjin political alliance and the Coastal Africal Political Union respectively (Aseka, 1984, 100). These were to be the bastions of KADU's support among the Kalenjin and the Mijikenda just as Musa Amalemba's Buluyia political union in which Muliro was a member became the strong-hold of KADU in rural Buluyia (Aseka, 1984, 121).

The foregoing evidence demonstrates that when independence negotiations started at Lancaster House, Muliro

who was trying to build a party that could support him, formed several of them in quick succession. Finally, the Kenya National Party later called the Kenya African Peoples Party after shedding its multi-racial skin, was converted into a sub-branch of KADU towards the end of 1960. It was in the same period that Musa Amalemba founded the Buluyia political Union. The North Nyanza District Congress of Masinde Muliro affiliated itself to KADU while the North Nyanza Progressive Party later renamed the North Nyanza Nationalist Association, a party for the Maragoli, aligned itself to KANU (Mulaa, 1981, 101).

The alignment of the Maragoli to KANU was occasioned by the historical links of Maragoli nationalists like J.D. Otiende with Kikuyu nationalists. Also when the peasants of North Nyanza were mostly unconcerned about Mau Mau activities so that political calm held way in the district only the Maragoli and Bukusu were restive. While the latter huddled with the liturgy of the remnants of DYM, the Maragoli were reported sympathetic to the Mau Mau. The conditions which sparked off disturbances of the Kikuyu in Central Kenya were understandable to them. They, like the Kikuyu were heavily concentrated on their land and many of them had moved out of their homeland to seek paid jobs in towns and other parts of the country. This mobility led them into fraternising with nationalist politicians especially in and around Nairobi who influenced them in radical political activism. Not surprisingly, despite the crystallization of opposition in Buluyia in to KADU spearheaded by Muliro, the left-wing



North Nyanza Nationalist Association was converted into a branch of KANU (Mulaa, 1981, 100-101).

But unlike the Bukusu who formed the backbone of Muliro's North Nyanza District Congress, the Maragoli had no land claims to Trans-Nzoia, an area of major political concern to the former. Indeed the spur to the formation of KADU was the so called minority tribes' fear of Luo and Kikuyu domination. This fear revolved around the land issue in the Rift Valley when the Kalenjin Political Alliance and similar tribal associations became the constituent elements of KADU (Bienen, 1974, 133). As independence approached tribal feelings hardened especially after a rectangular area of about 200,000 acres was set aside in the western border of Uasin Gishu and Trans-Nzoia but mostly in Trans-Nzoia for government sponsored settlement schemes for the Luyia (Carey-Jones, 1968, 276).

But resettlement in the Highlands followed the ending of reservation of this area for Europeans in 1961 through the Land Control Regulations enacted under the authority of the Kenya (Land) order-in-council 1960 (Morgan, 1968, 211). In an effort to de-Europeanise the former white Highlands, settlement schemes sponsored by the British government, the Colonial Development Corporation, the World Bank and the government of West Germany were sited in areas contiguous to existing African land and area reserved for settlement by members of that tribe. Priority was to be given to settlement from the densely populated Kikuyu, Maragoli and Bunyore area (Morgan, 1968, 222). Having been the most displaced in

Trans-Nzoia, the most disturbing fear was the expansion of the Kikuyu in this resettlement process, See Appendices 5-7.

The first Lancaster House conference had initiated the Period of colonial transition in which Kenya was headed for independence. The independence day, 12th December, 1963, marked the end of colonial transition. But prior to that independence while the nationalists bargained for its timing and substance, issues that were to be thrashed out in the subsequent period following the first Lancaster House talks, the irreconcilable Luyia ethnic sentiment that culminated in the call for regionalism became a salient theme of decolonization. The resolution of the land issue, the composition of their overall political mouthpiece KADU, its alignments, divisions and strategies, all came to signify their attachment to the ethnic sentiment in the politics of decolonization. Kenya had been cast into a new mould with the adoption of a plan to de-Europeanise the Highlands followed by the British concession to the principle of self-government.

In the preceding decade, land-use policies had been employed unsuccessfully to change the focus and even counteract the development of African politics by posing economic development as an alternative to political insurgency. As a result, the processes of economic development were to become suffused with political significance to the extent that the culmination of multiracialism came in the removal of barriers to African ownership of farming lands in the Highlands. Thus, land transfer policies had stimulated the growth of African politics and the development of African

nationalism (Harbeson, 1973, 4-5).

This was in essence petty bourgeois nationalism as shifts and tides of local political activism were firmly secured within the economic mainstream of the colony. Thus, as the societies of the colony were transformed, new economic classes were created, classes which injected a new element in the politics of the colony (see Curry and Ade, 1968, 99). But the growth of the African sector both peasant and commercial had been stunted by exigencies of colonial policy and the outcome of adverse racial struggles over production and exchange. It was a struggle that subordinated the Africans and blocked their avenues of accumulation. That lack of full capitalist development only had generated an African petty bourgeoisie, a class that produced a type of politics that corresponded to its stunted growth. It was a politics that was ethnically based because its petty bourgeois propagators were products of an inhibited capitalism (see Mulaa, 1981, 99).

With the picture of inhibited capitalism clearly portrayed, the land loss to Europeans in the impending land transfer schemes sharpened specific dreams some African peoples had of territorial expansion thereby contributed to the regionalization of African nationalism as well as to the centralization of African nationalism based on common resentment of the Europeans and colonial presence (Harbeson, 1973, 5). The spectacle of political divergence between KADU and KANU may be perceived in this light.

The experiment in multi-racial politics probably

helped prepare the European community for the transfer of land and political power that was to follow even though it experienced very great strains during the transfer. But since the multi-racial experiment was premised on acceptance by farmers of both races of the importance of striving for economic development within a framework in which European political influence would continue to be very strong, the political overtones of economic development as well as multi-racialism itself appeared profoundly conservative to African leaders (Barbeson, 1973, 26). It was this perception which characterised K.I.M's rejection of multiracialism and greatly influenced Masinde Muliro's purge in KNP.

In the 1961 elections KADU's candidate in Nairobi Martin Shikuku was defeated by KANU's Mboya. He won with 31,407 votes against Shikuku's 1,557 (Goldsworthy, 1982, 76). In North Nyanza, KANU's Ginger Group man J.M. Oyangi and John O' Washika were heavily defeated by Musa Amalemba, the leader and sole candidate of the Buluyia Political Union. The Bukusu were placed in the new District of Elgon-Nyanza. They elected Masinde Muliro unopposed (Mulaa, 1982, 101). In Nakuru, Wafula Wabuge the other KADU man outperformed Arthur Ochwada of KANU (Ochwada, O.I., 1987).

The splintering of KANU in its formative year had witnessed the emergence of the so called Ginger Group within it. This comprised leftist radicals like Denis Akumu, Lucas Karisa, Joseph Mathenge and J.M. Oyangi among others. These are people who believed that the group would add some leftist "spices" to the moderate politics of KANU (Aseka, 1984, 121).

The group emerged in opposition to the moderate policies of KANU as articulated by James Gichuru and Tom Mboya. The two had spoken of the need to ensure a continuous flow of capital into Kenya, the necessity for rapid economic development and the country's dependence on investment and non-African skills. They also had stipulated that KANU would ensure that Kenya's economic conditions won confidence and security for investors and skilled persons.

The 'Ginger' group represented the extremist policies of KANU but this group eventually lost strength when two of its strongest adherents Opar Mboya and Lucas Karisa were convicted and imprisoned for carrying out clandestine and unlawful activities. They were managing unregistered leftist organizations especially in Mombasa where they sought to incite the working class by distributing leaflets from the communist countries (Aseka, 1984, 123). With the arrest of these two, the group was greatly weakened and it dissolved itself. Nevertheless, KANU published an amended constitution which aimed at catering for the needs and aspirations of the 'Ginger' group (Aseka, 1984, 124).

While there were efforts to bridge the rift in KANU's rank and file, the party led by Mboya braced itself to counter KADU's destructive opposition. In Legco, Ngala was seeking to attract some of KANU's members to cross the floor into KADU as to lead the way to independence. In poignant rebuttals, Mboya drafted and co-drafted a number of motions whose main purpose was to make KADU appear as a tool of the administration. He specifically pointed out the administration's pressure on KADU to vote against the proposal to release Kenyatta

immediately as a precondition of attaining independence<sup>4</sup>. Indeed, by April 1961, KADU was saying that Kenyatta's release and the formation of a government were separate issues (Goldsworthy, 1982, 182-184).

As KANU might have rightly noted, there had been important areas of co-operation between KADU and liberal Europeans since the former's creation in June 1960. Thus, the potential for an agreement was there since members of Blundell's New Kenya Group had been providing KADU with both finance and administrative assistance. They may even have helped to write its policy statements. In one such statement KADU pointed out:

We uncompromisingly, pledge ourselves to struggle for the establishment of an independent democratic Kenya nation now. The dignity of man is inviolable, to respect and protect it must be the prime duty of the state (INSTITUTE OF COMMONWEALTH STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF LONDON, KADU ELECTION MANIFESTO FOR 1961 SPRING ELECTIONS, 1).

The policy document addressed itself to a whole set of issues. It promised just enactment of laws to ensure the rights and facilities of all Kenyans are upheld by the state. It also guaranteed the freedom of conscience, freedom of movement and organization, and freedom of oral and written expression with due regard to the preservation of the state and its independence, and the protection of a democratic regime against any threats of violence and tyranny. On land, it noted that this was the greatest national asset and Kenya being primarily

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4. Jomo Kenyatta was to be moved from Lodwar to Maralal on April 4th 1961 but his restriction continued.

an agricultural country, it was imperative that it be properly utilised and safeguarded. It, however, believed that land reforms were urgently needed to settle land disputes throughout the country. While supporting the then ongoing reforms, it asserted that all alienated undeveloped and underdeveloped land should be acquired by the government and allocated to needy landless Africans (INSTITUTE OF COMMONWEALTH STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF LONDON, KANU ELECTION MANIFESTO FOR 1961 SPRING ELECTIONS, 2).

With regard to the restricted and detained members of the nationalist struggle, KADU regarded further detention and restriction as unjust and unfair and therefore demanded their immediate release (Muliro, O.I., 1988). It was however after the 1961 elections that KADU mooted the concept of regionalism otherwise called Majimbo. In its advocacy of the division of the independent state into regions, it pointed out in a press release that such regions will include many tribes and races joined together. KADU's ideologues felt that KADU's regionalism would remove tribal friction as KANU's proposed programme of centralised government would create suspicion and fear of domination by certain ethnic groups, a situation that would lead to tribal clashes (INSTITUTE OF COMMONWEALTH STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF LONDON, KADU - PRESS RELEASE 24TH OCTOBER 1961, 1).

These are some of the issues which KADU conferences and meetings paid constant attention to. They were expressed in constituency general conferences, Regional general conferences and meetings of the branches of the party

(INSTITUTE OF COMMONWEALTH STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF LONDON, KADU - THE CONSTITUTION AND RULES OF THE KENYA AFRICAN DEMOCRATIC UNION, 1-9).

But while KADU was concerned about the continued detention of Kenyatta, it was also irked by the continued confinement of Elijah Masinde, the imprisoned DYM leader. Through KADU, agitation for the release of Elijah Masinde was spearheaded by Masinde Muliro. In August 1961, Elijah was released and during his speech, made while visiting Nairobi since his release, he declared that he wanted to unite KANU and KADU. He toured the offices of KADU and also had a meeting with the KANU president (who was newly released) at Gatundu (Shimanyula, 1978, 19).

Perhaps a background to his release should be brought into the picture. Following the defeat of KADU by KANU in the 1961 February elections, both these parties had refused to join the government, for both had included in their election manifestos a call for the immediate release of Jomo Kenyatta. However, following conversations held in April 1961 between KADU, the Governor and the Secretary State for Colonies, KADU agreed to participate in the interim government. Administration was accordingly formed with KADU as a participant to the chagrin of KANU. The latter felt that by breaking the promise not to join the government unless Kenyatta was released, KADU had transgressed the promise made in its election manifesto. Meanwhile, KANU's position remained unchanged. It maintained its motto; "no Kenyatta no Government" (Odinga, 1966, 210-211).



KADU on the other hand felt that the Lancaster House Constitution of 1960 could be stretched to accommodate necessary changes. Therefore, while KANU was calling for a new conference to clear out constitutional questions, KADU decided to work from within the established machinery (Muliro, O.I., 1988). KANU felt that the Lancaster House Constitution of 1960 had served its purpose and a new constitution must be produced immediately to meet new challenges (Bennett and Rosberg, 1961, 195). There was need to phase out the questions of qualitative franchise, reserved seats and the Governors power to nominate some members of Legco, racial representation in the Council of Ministers and Government veto powers.

Because of KANU's recalcitrance and the mounting pressure for Kenyatta's release, he was set free on 21st August, 1961 (Odinga, 1967, 216). Prior to his release he had been transferred from Lodwar to Maralal and had in a press conference called upon Europeans and Asians not to fear an independent African government so long as they were willing to accept the concept of racial equality (Bennett and Rosberg, 1961, 195). But he too emphasized that the Lancaster House Constitution of 1960 had already served its purpose and a round-table meeting should be called immediately to discuss the next step towards independence. But the colonial government rejected Kenyatta's suggestion that the 1960 constitution required to be superceded immediately by another. KADU meanwhile maintained that there was no need for several conferences before achieving independence since the 1960 constitution was flexible enough to allow for independence (Bennett and Rosberg 1961, 202).

Nevertheless, KADU deemed talks and discussions with the British government as pre-requisites for flexing the 1961 constitution as to provide for the country's independence. But faced with these differing stances on the question of constitutional talks and independence, before his release, Kenyatta asked for consultation with the leaders of KANU and KADU. Out of his talks with them in Maralal, there was signed the KANU and KADU Maralal Agreement (Odinga, 1967, 215). The Agreement set a working committee to send a joint delegation to the Governor and the Colonial Secretary to demand for Kenyatta's release. It was also to study the land question and report back within a month on steps to be taken jointly by the two parties on a new constitution and for independence in 1961 (Odinga, 1967, 215).

But the efforts to send a delegation to the Governor and the Colonial Secretary to demand the release of Kenyatta as hitherto agreed failed. KADU retreated from strategizing for the next stage with KANU and announced that it was working for internal self-government. However, Kenyatta was released and later he presided over a joint meeting of KADU and KANU parliamentary groups. Eventually, they agreed to press for independence on 1st February 1962 (Odinga, 1967, 218). For a short-while after his release, Kenyatta did not commit himself to either KANU or KADU as he tried the best he could to reconcile the two parties. But when differences continued to grow, he resolved to join KANU and accepted the presidency of the party on 28th October, 1961 (Arnold, 1974, 159).

From the foregoing explanation of the growing cleavage in the bourgeois politics of decolonization, Elijah Masinde's release gave an additional political impetus. His disquiets were not of colonial incarceration but attempting to unite factions of Kenya's nationalist struggle. On 7th January 1962, he addressed a KANU rally attended by Kenyatta. He called for unity of all African national parties in his self-appointed role of mediator between KADU and KANU (Shimanyula, 1974, 20).

Defeated to reconcile the two political camps, Elijah Masinde jumped onto the bandwagon of KANU with a good number of his DYM followers. He was given a landrover for campaigning to counteract Muliro's activities and those of other KADU adherents in Elgon and North Nyanza districts (Shimanyula, 1974, 21).

Meanwhile, in the latter part of 1961, the KADU-European coalition was cemented by their joint support for the concept of regionalism, a KADU proposal calling for Kenya to be divided into a number of areas demarcated according to the ethnic criteria. These regions would have a measure of constitutionally entrenched autonomy and would serve as a base of political power for the so called minority groups even if they were unable to command much support at the centre. The idea of regionalism therefore appealed to the Europeans and these African groups. The Africans were in close link with Wilfred Havelock, Michael Blundell, R.S. Alexander and their associates all of whom were practising the art of political survival (Leo, 1984, 90).

With Kenyatta's election into Legco on 12th January, 1962, following the resignation of Kariuki Njiiri, he now led the KANU parliamentary group against both the opposition of KADU and the intransigence of the colonial state. In February 1962, the second Lancaster House Constitutional Conference was called and the Kenyatta led his party KANU. Ngala on the other hand led the KADU parliamentary group. However, by March, the conference encountered grave complications. These were brought about by KADU's insistence on regionalism as the only acceptable form of government for Independent Kenya and questions on land. On the other hand, intolerant of KADU's scheme regionalism, KANU advocated for centralization (Rotchild, 1973, 113 and Arnold, 1974, 152).

But it should be noted that in the meantime, KANU had been excluded from the government decision-making as KADU took credit for the programs the government was initiating. Musa Amalemba who stayed as Minister in the coalition government had been joined by Ronald Ngala, Masinde Muliro and Taita Towett. These are the leaders who had stressed the importance of adequate compensation of expropriated land while KANU addressed itself more to the problems posed by land allocated to Europeans (Harbeson, 1973, 104). Their recalcitrance and the government pressure had led to KANU's capitulation on the land issue to be brought before the conference, a matter it had hitherto felt should be settled after the attainment of independence. In January, 1962, Kenyatta had endorsed the government's plans for land resettlement. However, it was now thoroughly revised to incorporate a major expansion of the African peasant society,

heretofore KANU's greatest concern (Leo, 1984, 90).

Because of KADU's efforts from within the establishment, the new Secretary of State for the Colonies Reginald Maudling had endorsed KADU's majimbo programme in a statement in early 1962. The British government became exceedingly partisan to the idea. Thus, the conference of 1962 seemed to reward KADU for forming a government with NKG. The conference under the auspices of the British government gave institutional protection to the Majimbo Scheme (Harbeson, 1973, 126).

Although the constitutional solution devised was a ~~comprise~~ <sup>compromise</sup>, there was a KADU preponderance in the elements of the constitution. Whereas the 1960 Lancaster House Constitutional Conference had established one national legislative body, the 1962 conference insisted on two legislative bodies and Regional Assemblies that conformed to the seven provinces (Mutiso, 1983, 15). The rationale for a bicameral legislature was that one chamber would check the other and that the Upper House would give a better regional balance. Thus, at the conference KADU made its major concession when it endorsed the scheme of regionalism and the settlement plans of the government were ratified at the conference. The Europeans with the assistance of KADU played the ethnic game of divide and conquer to force KANU to accept both regionalism and the land transfer scheme (Leo, 1984, 122).

Although KANU was set on the road to power, it had to

make major concessions to KADU and the Europeans in order to get there. However, at this conference, KANU and KADU agreed to form a coalition government and to work towards a general election in May 1963 (Arnold, 1974, 1952). The next round of the conference took place during September-October, 1963 after the May elections and it produced the final independence constitution. According to Reginald Maudling, the May 1963 elections were followed by a period of self-government. The second round of talks was held to decide the eventual pattern and implementation of an independence constitution (Wangalwa, 1983, 2).

Elections held in May gave KADU 31 seats and KANU 69. In the Upper House KADU got 16 seats compared to KANU's 20<sup>5</sup>. In the Regional Assemblies KADU acquired 51 seats while KANU captured 88 (Wangalwa, 1983, 2). Because of KANU's overwhelming victory in all these bodies, it qualified to form a representative government with Kenyatta as the leader. He was sworn in as the first Prime Minister on 1st June 1963 (Arnold, 1974, 156).

On its formation of a government after its victory over KADU in the 1963 elections, in June 1963, KANU took complete control of the central government and put a halt to any further decentralization, a process started during the short spell of the KANU-KADU coalition government

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5. KADU's Luyia Senators were Nathan Munoko from Elgon Nyanza, A.R. Tsalwa from North Nyanza and W. Wamalwa from Trans-Nzoia. KANU's Luyia Senators were Clement Lubembe representing Nairobi and J.J.W. Machio from Busia, a newly created district carved out of North Nyanza and Central Nyanza. Machio defeated a KADU candidate Antony Ouma.

preceding self-government (Okumu, 1970, 242). With several of its members starting to cross the floor into KANU, KADU as the main proponent of regionalism began disintegrating. It was unable to take a firm stand against the erosion of regional powers by the ruling party. The KANU government could safely disregard half-hearted protests from the regions such as Buluyia of Western Kenya without fear of being challenged through the courts. Eventually, before the debate on the Republican Constitution took place in parliament in November 1964, the beleaguered party dissolved itself and thereby gave the government a free hand to determine the future of the so called regions (Okumu, 242-243).

The regions had been designed with legislative and executive power in such areas as agriculture, education, housing, crown-lands, common minerals and local government. The coalition government had been presented with a designated timetable for the transfer of functions from the centre. In addition, the senate (Upper House) had been designed to operate as the regions' chamber. Thus, the Majimbo and its mouth-piece the senate were to form an integrated block of protective institutions for minority interests. Although KANU captured most seats in the Senate and the Regional Assemblies, its preponderance was truly reflected in Central Eastern and Nyanza regions. KADU however controlled Coast, the Rift Valley and the Western Region (Goldsworthy, 1982, 215, 225).

When the Regional Boundaries Commission, set up by the British government after the Lancaster House

Conference of 1962 to fix regional boundaries, published its report, the Luyia found themselves in the Western Region with no administrative centre and sought to include Kitale and a further portion of Trans-Nzoia (Carey-Jones, 1968, 277). The Commission after considering all the evidence, memoranda and views presented to it recommended that Trans-Nzoia be divided into the smaller portion together with Kitale being transferred to the Western Region. This was opposed by the Kalenjins Kitale Municipal Board and this recommendation though hailed by the Luyia was never implemented (Muliro, O.I., 1988). The Commission also recommended the creation of a separate district for the Samia, Marachi, Bakhayo, Banyala and Teso.

### 7.3 Economic Change and bourgeois Politics in Buluyia

The long period of colonial rule in Kenya entailed numerous economic changes as some of the foregoing chapters have demonstrated. These changes induced by the colonial system produced an African elite capable of exercising some of the skills required for political organization. But the evolution of African opposition was a function of contact with colonialism since mobilization was most intense in the most developed cash-crop producing areas and hardly occurred at all in the areas out of touch with the cash economy (Brett, 1973, 308).

While shifts and tides of local politics were profoundly secured within the colonial economic mainstream of the colonial society and that as the society was transformed, new economic classes were created and that they injected a new element in the politics of the colonial society, its lack of full development produced a type of politics which corresponded to its stunted growth. Thus, the growth of rural capitalism introduced class



politics in the countryside (Mulaa, 1982, 99). But in dialectical terms, the nature of the evolution of opposition to colonialism was through a direct exposure to the contradictions created by processes of capitalist exploitation. Nevertheless, having emerged in a stunted capitalist sub-system which locked large sectors of the indigenous society into conditions of pre-capitalist dependence, this explains the weakness of the nationalist response when it did occur. The regional bourgeois class articulated demands that were limited in nature and it was unable to provide an alternative to an autonomous developmental strategy (Brett, 1973, 30)).

Therefore in Buluyia inhibited capitalism having spared the traditional linkages and relations, the petty bourgeois class could not transcend the ties and relations of their respective demographic collectivities. Its inhibited growth characterised its parochialism, ethnic orientations and sub-ethnic rivalries that riddled its state of political blunders and fascinating sectional and quick-willed power-plays.

The period following the Second World War had marked no sharp break in the economic development of the Luyia. Rather the changes initiated before the war were extended and intensified. Thus, production of crops for sale had increased (Fearn, 1941, Chapter 7 and 8). Whereas traditional crops such as sorghum and millet continued to be grown, the dominant crop remained maize. However, in the mid 1950's production of coffee and in the early 1960's the

production of tea were permitted but on a restricted basis (Sitialo, O.I., 1988).

Between 1943 and 1953 the price of maize quadrupled. This increase continued until 1958 when the price began to fall. Paralleling the expansion of agricultural production, trade among the the Luyia expanded. The number of Luyia licenced traders increased from 447 in 1946 to 1,322 in 1954 (KNA, NORTH NYANZA ANNUAL REPORTS 1946-1954)<sup>6</sup>. The number of shopkeepers and the number of livestock and grain dealers in markets throughout Buluyia increased (Okhiya, O.I., 1988). But Government licensing regulations restricted the number of Luyia traders who would operate in the more lucrative trading centres and towns in the district. However, pressure from these traders broke open these centres which had been once the monopoly of Indian traders (Bode, 1978, 233).

As the education system and government agrarian reforms expanded, wage employment also grew. By 1948, 24% of all Luyia males and 12% of all females living outside their locations were probably engaged in wage labour. Although there was a decline of male percentage in 1962 to 22%, there was increase in female percentage to 18%. But perhaps it is worth noting that there was a general decline in employment in the colony between 1955 and 1963 as employers now preferred hiring skilled labour as compared to semi-

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6. Because of the success of some of them, some were appointed as wholesalers. By 1964 Silfano Odhiambo Otiato became B.A.T.'s appointed wholesaler at Port Victoria.

skilled or unskilled labour. Nevertheless, wage labour continued to rise in densely settled areas, especially Idakho, Maragoli, Bunyore and Isukha (Bode, 1978, 234).

Faced with the shrinking holdings and the budgeoning incidence of landlessness, the difficulties of the Luyia especially in the southern locations were exacerbated by serious erosion and decline in soil fertility. This phenomenon reared its ugliest head in Maragoli (KNA, NORTH NYANZA ANNUAL REPORTS 1940-1949). While several Maragoli migrated into Tiriki and Nyang'ori regions and even far off areas like South Nyanza, the Luyia petty bourgeois leaders called for the dealing with these problems by seeking government assistance to African farmers. They also called for the introduction of cash such as coffee and tea with high unit values (Bode, 1978, 238).

But for political reasons, the colonial state opposed these requests and instead developed a programme of soil engineering which only met with adverse political response from the Luyia peasants<sup>7</sup>. Thus, owing to increasing political pressure from the Luyia and other Africans elsewhere in the colony, there was a change in government policy in the mid 1950's (Bode, 1978, 238).

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7. In the reserve there were political disquiets over the land consolidation programmes which in the towns the petty bourgeois leaders participated in labour protests throughout the colony. The Luyia traction dominated this leadership.

Between 1957 and 1959 Muliro had held a series of meetings in North Kavirondo concerning himself mainly with economic development. But talking to the people with the aura of a District Officer, he lost a certain amount of the popularity (KNA, NORTH NYANZA-MONTHLY REPORTS 1950-1959). It was in an attempt to establish his political clout that Muliro conceived the need to revive the almost defunct Abaluyia Peoples Association. It became the predecessor of the North Nyanza African District Congress that was launched in Kakamega on 28th June 1958. The latter body enlisted prominent African District Council members including Eric Khasakhala from Bunyore. But Muliro's efforts to raise North Nyanza District Congress to be the political mouthpiece of the district was meant to replace the North Nyanza Progressive Party to the chagrin of its Maragoli adherents. He had become unpopular with the Maragoli when in some of his later meetings he attempted to encourage the people to co-operate with government over the South Maragoli Hills Afforestation Scheme. This came in the wake of acts of disobedience on the part of the Maragoli Hills dwellers (KNA, NORTH KAVIRONDO-MONTHLY REPORTS 1955-1959). There were a few protest incidents in the area against the scheme. Reporting on the state of affairs a colonial officer noted:

The activities of the African elected members, both in and outside of the Legislative Council, are being closely followed by the intelligentsia who are much influenced by the critical attitude

adopted by these Elected Members of government policy. Opposition to the implementation of the South Maragoli Hills Afforestation Scheme has hardened as a result of recent speeches in the Legislative Council. No agitation against land consolidation has yet broken out in the District as a result of speeches by the Joluo (sic) elected members (KNA, NORTH KAVIRONDO-MONTHLY REPORT, APRIL 1957).

Although the Maragoli Hills Afforestation Scheme had already been agreed to by the South Maragoli Locational Council, the North Nyanza District Council, the Nyanza Local Land Board and the Native Lands Trust Board the initial agitation was led by Eli Ogola. This issue had been taken up by Muliro in Legco as their local representative (KNA, NORTH KAVIRONDO-MONTHLY REPORT FEBRUARY 1957). This Hills question came shortly after a lot of suspicion had been aroused in the area over the topic of land consolidation. A tour of the Nyeri Land Consolidation Scheme had been made for Luyia leaders from Maragoli and Bunyore in the previous months and these people who visited Nyeri were to become objects of public criticism (KNA, NORTH KAVIRONDO-MONTHLY REPORT, DECEMBER 1956).

The tour of Kikuyu land consolidation practice was arranged after several meetings were held in the district explaining the necessity for increased agricultural production to meet growing tax commitments and stress on the desirability of better farming. Colonial officials explained that such better farming could only be realised by land enclosure and where necessary the consolidation of fragmented holdings (KNA, NORTH KAVIRONDO-MONTHLY REPORTS, AUGUST 1956).

Needless to relate how this propaganda was being

given out to encourage better farming and take advantage of Swynnerton Scheme funds, it is perhaps pertinent to note that the late implementation of the Swynnerton plan in Nyanza had major economic repercussions. The consolidation of land without change in the labour process in the peasant households and the continued labour migration outside the province are some of the major factors explaining the stagnation in the area's developing a middle peasantry (Nyong'o, 1981 (Editorial)).

It is true the Swynnerton plan was a brilliant synthesis of the various projects for African agricultural development that had been formulated, brought together for an intensive drive and given a coherent philosophy. But the Luyia with a population of between 1400 and 1600 persons per square mile failed over the six years to respond to the persuasions, cajoleries and pressures of the colonial government to accept the idea of land consolidation (Carey-Jones, 1968, 270).

In 1953, agricultural officers had noted little improvements in the methods of the Luyia and infact only 240 farmers were classified as better farmers. In the subsequent years more systematic efforts were made to encourage African Agriculture in Buluyia through the Swynnerton plan. This was symbolised in the grant of £7 million to develop agriculture under the plan (Bode, 1978, 239).

But the elite who embraced the scheme accumulated holdings as compared to ordinary peasants. With the introduction of coffee in Buluyia in 1954 and tea in the early

1960's, by independence only 7,000 acres were under coffee throughout North Nyanza. In the South-East, 2,300 farmers in the area were growing coffee (Bode, 1978, 240). Although the new growers of exotic cash crops belonged to an emerged African gentry that had accumulated holdings as compared to ordinary peasants, the deepening stratification did not destroy traditional links. It was occurring in a stunted capitalist structure that remained open-cross, cutting ties, rooted in an earlier socio-economic order. It was an order that was characterised by ties of consanguinity both through patrification and matrifiliation. In other words, the influence of continued ties of kin and sub-tribe were to remain inescapable in any political activism of the area including all forms of petty bourgeois discontent.

CHAPTER VIII

8.0 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NEO-COLONIALISM: THE LUYIA IN THE POLITICS OF CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

8.1 The Basis of Kenya's Post-Colonial Bourgeois Politics

After colonisation, Kenya became tied to Britain economically. But in this partnership, the colony was an unequal member. It was a partnership that became so deeply-rooted during the sixty years of colonial rule that even the political bargains of decolonization proved insufficient to liquidate this unequal partnership. In explaining the genesis and rationale of the partnership, Zwanenberg says:

Kenya was tied to Britain, which meant that in general her economic development was tied to the needs of the British economy, and in particular that Kenya should be developed to import finished goods, textiles, cars etc., and to export food and raw materials like coffee and sisal. Kenya became an extension of the world economy and many British colonialists saw that the main purpose of colonies like Kenya was to support economic requirements of Britain (Zwanenberg, 1972, 5-6).

Politically, the British colonial politics were based on the idea of British domination of Kenya. Alien constitutional and governmental structures were planted in the colony while policies evolved and executed by these institutions were meant to underwrite the extraction and exploitation of both the colony's human and natural



resources. In other words, an imposed political authority was employed to monetarise the economy and cause it to become extroverted that it became directed to production for export (Bowles, 1975, 3). But by establishing a capitalist economy, British colonialism in Kenya brought alien relations into the productive process. African peasants were uprooted from their traditional relations on land, moved to settler farms or towns as wage labourers where they were able to sell their labour in exchange for meagre remuneration (Ojuka, 1975, 236). The consequent tension that developed was of colonial wealth versus indigenous poverty. This tension ramified into various expressions to fit whatever point was being stressed: colonization versus indigenous backwardness, knowledge versus ignorance, health versus disease (Ojuka, 1975, 237). It was this tension which gave rise to nationalistic clamours for independence. Thus, nationalism was a reaction against the economic iniquities of colonialism. The frustration of the peasants and the African petty bourgeoisie and the inhibitions of Kenyan peripheral capitalism had to be removed before there could be any hope of a contented African population (See Odinga, 1966, 12).

Understandably, the mentality that developed in the nationalist consciousness was the mentality of takeover. The Africans led by the petty bourgeois nationalists envisaged the takeover of the apparatus of wealth that had been created over the years under conditions of colonial

oppression and exploitation. But with independence, ownership of the economic state was to change and new attitudes needed to manage this change. These changes in attitudes could only take place within the political sphere (Ojuka, 1975, 240). Nevertheless, considering the choices created by the neo-colonial designs at independence, the leaders rushed into the shoes of displaced colonialists without having had sufficient time to build a community of interests. This was unlike in the Western world where bourgeois politics has always been predicated upon ownership of property and formal freedom to dispose of this property, whether in the means of production or labour-power, according to its wishes. Thus, Western capitalists essentially came to political power after building social power. They assumed political dominance therefore to consolidate that social power. In contrast, the African political petty bourgeois came to political dominance at independence prior to establishing social bases of that power. They as a result concentrated their efforts in building their economic empires and had little time to build social bases of bourgeois politics since they had no time to build a community of interests (Nyong'o, 1985 [editorial], 6).

But the failure of the African nationalists to establish social bases of bourgeois politics in Kenya may be explained in a more engrossing dialectic. Party politics was not an indigenous phenomenon. First and

foremost, anti-colonial consciousness had to be harnessed by the petty bourgeois nationalist and canalised within the framework of new politics, the politics of anti-colonial struggle couched in European ideas and language. Educated Africans who had grasped whatever opportunities they could find of mastering the strategems of nationalist Europe employed these mechanisms in their struggle during this haphazard process of decolonization (Davidson, 1975, 44).

Without overemphasizing the instrumental impact of African petty bourgeois nationalism in forging the pace of decolonization, this chapter seeks to give an analysis of the structural changes in the political economy of the colony which offered prospects of continuity and change at the country's independence. It also highlights the role of the Luyia political intelligentsia in these crucial processes that either liberated Kenya from British colonialism or locked her up in a neo-colonial relationship.

It is true that in the process of the consolidation of the colonial economy and society, there developed political contradictions between the Africans and the colonialists. But it is equally true to state that for those who emerged as the beneficiaries of the colonial system, they also developed a substantial stake in the system which made this possible (Leys, 1975, 53). But while these contradictions generated and became more profound, there emerged a political opposition which culminated in the

demand for political independence. This anti-colonial consciousness was a fundamental prelude which the colonial policy-makers could not afford to ignore in their policy formulation of the post-war era to resolve conflicts and contradictions of the period. These conflicts and contradictions in the colonial economy had a very clarifying effect on the way the various groups perceived their interests. For example, European politicians who thought in terms of continuing to influence affairs directly went into direct alliance with the moderate leaders all the way from the fledgling performance of multi-racial KNP upto the formation of KADU in 1960 (Leys, 1975, 58).

Although the terrain of nationalist struggle was littered with factional particularism and interests, the goal of African state sovereignty introduced an element of cohesion. Thus, the demand for national independence was articulated by a deprived petty bourgeoisie represented by KANU and KADU who were able to carry with them on their bandwagon of ethnic considerations the masses of peasants, plantation and urban workers against the colonial order. Nevertheless, the pattern of decolonization was carefully and externally influenced through the bargaining process to detach the emerging bourgeoisie from the radicalism of its partisan peasant and workers as exemplified by the outcome of the Mau Mau uprising. This imperialist inspired detachment led to much continuity in the regulated,

restrictive and unequal internal relations of the colonial past in the country (Langson, 1981, 43).

It was a continuity of a system that entailed discriminatory policy formulation in order to populate each division of social class with the capitalist values but elevate the nascent African bourgeoisie as the uppermost echelon. It's differential development of productive forces had yielded inequalities in exchange while continued capital accumulation under these conditions enlarged and extended uneven development in social labour, trade, agriculture and industry. In other words, uneven development was a product of proletarianization, accumulation which discouraged technical innovation, colonial policy which imposed stringency upon farmers and workers that created an imbalance in development (Onimonde, 1985, 170-71).

At independence the African petty bourgeoisie were able to strengthen their position within the social formation by allying with international capital while at the same time international capital secured the continuity of monopoly positions within the economy (Beckman, 1981, 2). Thus, African petty bourgeois nationalism emerged as a crucial political force in structuring the national capitalist economy including the development of its productive forces. Although at independence the nationalist leaders had travelled through the gruelling terrain of decolonization with all its bargains, uncertainties and blunders, it is on the other

hand clear that they failed to emerge as a class with common social bases of interest. They therefore could not concertedly pose as liberators in the sense of being anti-imperialist out to liquidate all the injustices and oppression created by imperialism. In a frantic orgy to build their economic empires, this class continued to be part and parcel of imperialist domination and oppression (Beckman, 1981, 7).

However, whereas the capitalist relations of production that had radically undermined Kenyan pre-capitalist relations of production were inherited at independence underwriting the continuity between the colonial system and the independent African state, there were some qualitative changes in the political economy which challenge the dominant radical analyses of the country's neo-colonialism. In years following independence, there were established new processes of transition to the capitalist mode of production whose principal force was the emergent fast accumulating bourgeoisie and the independent state apparatus under its control (Leys, 1978, 5). This class eventually embarked on squeezing out foreign capital in manufacturing and tourism and made the state assume an antagonistic position to foreign capital (Beckman, 1981, 49-50).

Nevertheless, despite the efforts at both Africanization and indigenization of industry at historic rates and that the new state became an organ of the domestic bourgeoisie there was established at independence the

infrastructure of unequal relationship with foreign capital which the new leadership was unlikely to radically challenge. There continued the inevitable emiseration of the country's urban and rural poor. International capital was to remain the force extracting and repatriating the economic surplus of these areas, a process that was facilitated by internal class forces and the state (Bush-Hansen and Marcussen, 1982, 13). But as much as the new state and leadership did not destroy the infrastructure of unequal relationship that had roots in its colonial predecessor, bizarre generalizations as to the impossibility of capitalist development under an African regime in Kenya is misleading. It is misleading because it disregards the fact that capitalism was constituted in different countries in a variety of ways under different historical conditions and with a varying degree of world market integration (Bush-Hansen and Marcussen, 1982, 14).

During its formative years in the 1920's, under colonialism all the way through the corridors of decolonization, the African elite may have been nascent or comprador bourgeois because of the myriad inhibitions forced upon it by exigencies of colonial policy. Therefore, as much as one appreciates the dialectics of integration of this nascent bourgeois leadership into a neo-colonial set up through the concessions, gaffes, blunders and victories secured during the decolonization and inter-group bargaining (See Rothchild, 1973), at independence, it

was later on longer to operate within the strait-jacket of discriminatory policy formulation which stunted its growth. A few years after independent, the Kenyan elite had manifestations of a full-fledged bourgeoisie.

## 8.2 Bourgeois Politics, New-Colonialism and the Colonial Legacy

During the greater part of the colonial period in Kenya, African leaders with supra-ethnic tendencies made great and continuous efforts to build countrywide organizations. But to a great extent, these organizations failed because of the anti-centralist policy of the government. Thus, organized or collective mass nationalism was never permitted to develop (Shiroya, 1974/75, 3). The policy of limiting and discouraging territorial nationalism hitherto formulated as early as 1917 came to be actually applied in 1922 when the EAA was banned. Understandably, Africans had no alternative but to establish associations based either on their respective districts or ethnic groups. This explains the rise of ethnic political associations among the Kikuyu, the Luyia, the Luo and later the Kamba, the Taita and the Mijikenda.

It would then appear that the parochial and fragmented character of African politics at independence was a cruel colonial legacy. Throughout the inter-war period, African politics evolved primarily within a rural setting. The thrust of administration policy limited



African participation in representative institutions to local councils. Through the same policy, the tribal reserve system was developed restricting land rights to local areas. It emphasized the distinctiveness of each tribal grouping (Rosberg and Nottingham, 1966, 71).

Because of the stringency of colonial policy, at the outbreak of Mau Mau, there did not exist yet a realistic basis of national political organization. Politics continued to reflect parochial issues instead of any wider unity (Ochieng', 1977, 170). At the point of independence, for nationalism to have been meaningful, it needed behind it a long tradition of trained, developed and responsible citizenry. A citizenry which had been inducted into a body of common goals and values. This body of citizens should have been socialized not only into the etiquette of Westminster models but also into a common conception of authority and social purpose, a new awareness and attitude.

However, what the colonial political scenario bequeathed upon independent Kenya was a cluster of tribal bossmen. Following the incarceration of the militant bourgeois leaders during the emergency, the men who took over leadership after the outbreak of Mau Mau were these tribal ambassadors who sprang to prominence with the formation of district associations in 1955 and the first direct African elections to the Legco in 1957. The 1957 elections were followed by the special elections of 1958.

Although the likes of Daniel Arap Moi, Taita-Towett, Masinde Muliro, and Ronald Ngala had built strong bases in their respective areas, each of these leaders was not subject to any common policy or discipline (Ochieng', 1977, 173). The intra-KANU divisions even following KADU's voluntary merger with it in 1964 cannot therefore be fully perceived in purely personal terms without attempting to trace their ethnic and social basis.

The neo-colonial era in Kenya demonstrates how the social structure of colonial society was consciously transformed during the tenuous terrain of decolonization and later by the independent African regime to ensure the preponderance of the domestic classes whose interests were closely tied to those of the imperial power and multi-national corporations. In this sense, the result of the decolonization was the integration of an indigenous leadership into colonial political, social and economic patterns (Wasserman, 1975, 14). At independence, the African leadership conditioned by years of exposure to the European reference, the political aim of taking over the economy, became merged almost imperceptibly with the individual tribal aspirations to take over the jobs, positions and life-styles which the economy made possible (Leys, 1973, 424). Nevertheless, the immediate problem appeared to be to take over the economy not to change it.

It then appears that the political takeover of the state by the African petty bourgeois nationalist was an

integral part of the mechanism of underdevelopment. It was part of this because this leadership was co-opted and socialised in mechanisms and processes which were inseparably bound up with the dominance of foreign capital. It was a dominance which it would later find difficult to liquidate. The take-over of this cadre of leaders expedited the adaptations of foreign capital to the transitions of independence and to changing world conditions (Leys, 1973, 424). They as a result perpetuated the political mechanisms and conditions which would continually enforce and reproduce inequality.

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Income inequality is a prevalent feature of underdevelopment economies since it is never the prime intention of capitalist economic activity to satisfy human needs. It's prime intention being gain, accumulation of surplus value, the interest of capital then is to reproduce itself (Ojuka, 1974, 83). Just as colonialism had subordinated Africans, it therefore created a situation of dominance and dependency. The post-colonial leadership upheld these features by enforcing the political impotence of the working poor, the unemployed and the peasantry. During the colonial period, the peasants who were alienated from the means of production, wage earners and the working class had been incorporated into the capitalist society purely subject to the accumulative interests of capital. These interests were to be safeguarded by the establishment

of a vast economic and governmental bureaucracy whose only interest was efficiency in the service of capitalist accumulation. It was the same bureaucracy which was bequeathed upon the post-colonial state and over which the domestic bourgeoisie jostled for power. In other words, it was this inherited bureaucracy which was to continue determining human relations in the economy of Kenya.

So to say, the authoritarian tendencies of the post-colonial state had their genesis in the exclusion of the general public from real power under colonialism. After independence, this disjuncture between civil society and the state was transformed into a tendency by ~~the state~~ to subsume popular politics and all actual or potential sources of power in the interests of the dominant classes, who, partly because of economic underdevelopment, were extremely insecure (Zezeza, 1986, 184). The dominant domestic bourgeoisie was to use the post-colonial state to accumulate, a situation that could not allow the flourishing of the working class since working class relations were mediated by the same state and articulated in its bureaucratic organs. Understandably, in rural areas, Africans were encouraged to work for cheap wages with no guarantee of job security, while Africans living in the towns could afford only the poorest housing and a culture of poverty continued to establish itself in these areas. The post-colonial politics of development were therefore in accord with the familiar benchmarks of colonial policy

(Crowley, 1967, 248).

By treading the familiar path of colonial policy, the bourgeois nationalist leadership by the nature of its feverish dread of dissent became primarily concerned with the retention of the structure of monopolistic regulation rather than changing that structure. Given that the bourgeois leadership had at the apex of the nationalist movement got support of small-scale peasants and increasingly better paid African workers, and had therefore excluded the poor and landless who had formed the most potent Mau Mau base, the menace of the latter was neutralised through the settlement schemes of the early 1960's (Langdon, 1981, 21). But whereas economic ascendancy and political struggle became interdependent, the nature of party politics inevitably changed as political participation shifted from mass movement to partisan manipulation of the post-colonial government (Morris and Somerset, 1971, 68). The political struggle for independence came to be transmitted into African capitalism. In other words, imperialism as a movement or as an ideology now latched on to nationalism. Thus, nationalism transformed itself into imperialism in a neo-colonial setting wherever the opportunity offered. Popular nationalism was corrupted when it passed into the service of imperialism (Udofia, 1984, 354). This became the plight of nationalism during the politics of transition and continuity in Kenya.

Following the Second Lancaster House Conference in 1962, the threat of economic and political disruption from

the settlers and the African landless necessitated a detour to mass "high-density" settlement programs on thousands of small plots than envisioned in the original settlement schemes carved out from former settler land on the border of the reserves<sup>1</sup>(Berman, 1981, 46). Although the new scheme represented a compromise between development schemes and social relief schemes, the process of accumulation and pauperization in agriculture became more extensive and these processes reinforced each other (Ogot and Zeleza, 1988, 44).

Therefore, in decolonization, the metropolitan authorities after Lancaster House knew what was at stake. Internally, they mooted settlement schemes, labour policy and covert administrative controls that were externally forged to sustain the patterns of capitalist development which had emerged over the previous decade and secure British interests in them. However, no clear political strategy emerged until after the Lancaster House Conference at which the metropole finally abandoned its heretofore backward looking efforts to maintain colonial control and the dominant position of the settlers. The displacement of the settlers ended direct colonial political domination and led to the transfer of the state and key sectors of the agrarian economy to an African dominant class (Berman;

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1. Selected Luyia dominated settlement schemes were Kabisi, Kabuyefew, Mautuma and Lumakanda. Other Luyia were settled in the inter-tribal Charangani Settlement Scheme. These schemes were segments of what came to be called Kamukuywa and Lugari in formerly expropriated Luyia lands of the Kabras, Tachani and Bukusu.

1981, 53).

Nevertheless, the transfer of political power and key sectors of the economy to an African ruling class involved linking key policies of transition to the advice and financial support of important international agencies and governments. This was done in a manner that would deter any radical changes or default on agreements<sup>2</sup>. The crucial institutions in this regard was the World Bank, which provided loans for the agricultural settlement and development programs. In the view of the metropolitan officials, it was important that the World Bank be linked with Kenya's development as it would constitute a most potent stabilizing factor (Wasserman, 1976, 161-62).

One of the paradoxes of an underdeveloped country such as Kenya is that the urban workers, though enjoying a higher income than the bulk of the population, could constitute a disruptive social force. This explains why the trade unions were still to be subjected to increasing state regulation to avoid their turning to subversive activities in order to wrest more of the fruits of neo-colonialism from the national bourgeoisie (Sandbrook, 1975, 3). This leadership inherited a machinery that had been set in motion by the colonial office when it began to experiment the guidance of trade unionism into responsible economic bargaining activities. It had done this by attaching experienced British trade unionists to colonial labour

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2. Luyia settlers in Kamukuywa and Lugari entered into agreement with the British Government to repay their loans in 33 years.

departments (Sandbrook, 1975, 36) . While the post-colonial state upheld the notion of trade unionism as responsible economic bargaining agencies, it should be noted that the process of decolonization itself had undermined the collaborative engagement between Kenya Federation of Labour and America-dominated International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. At the turn of the 1960's, the Federation found itself being challenged for its growing conservatism and continued affiliation to the ICFTU. The post-colonial state, being intolerant of powerful autonomous organizations which could challenge the central authority of the ruling ~~party and~~ the state, undermined the autonomy of organized labour. In other words, repression by the post-colonial state with its strong military and administrative apparatus inherited from the colonial state, its centrality in appropriating and deploying a large part of the economic surplus, and the growth of bureaucratic-authoritarian corporatism played a direct role in deradicalizing labour (Zezeza, 1986, 163).

But while the political pattern and state activity in the country may be best understood if considered against the perspective of the country's bourgeois interests, its capabilities and also the legacies bequeathed upon the state by the colonial period. It is noticeable that from the beginning Kenya's bourgeoisie sought to work within an inherited framework which then became much more difficult



to change than it might have first appeared. It would have been inconceivable to make revolutionary departures from colonial procedures and practices overnight without meeting with violent resistance from external or internal forces (Muliro, O.I., 1987). This was not an isolated case as all states that have moved from colonialism to independence have sought to shape their inherited institutions to the changing circumstances and ideas of that independence. Mboya, a leading ideologue of the post-colonial state noted:

It was quite understandable that at independence we should start with a brave rush to create our own political, social and economic institutions and attitudes. Our desire was laudible; that we must adjust our tactics of change. Certainly, there is no change for its own sake. Only if some special institution has meaning for our people or has utility within our special circumstances is it justified (Minogue and molloy, 1974, 149).

As apolegetic as this may appear for the post-colonial elites inability to re-orient the country's trajectory of economic and political development, there is no more telling confession of neo-colonialism and continuity than when he further states:

Look at the political institutions. In most cases we started off with those bequeathed to us by the former colonial powers. This is the system we have been used to working within. We may introduce certain superficial innovations but the principles and so much of the machinery remain the same. It is difficult to break away entirely, to steer a new course, to create institutions which are

African yet which are appropriate for modern society (Minogue and Molloy, 1974, 149).

Apparently, safeguarding the legality of colonial frameworks by the new state was a prime motive of the African domestic bourgeoisie in Kenya. Consequently, despite its populist pronouncements, the post-colonial leadership became incapable of overcoming injustices, exploitation and oppression created by imperialism. The tribal legacy from the colonial days as reflected both in KANU and KADU was to end in 1966 with the swing from tribal to class politics (Buijtenhuij, 1973). The irreconcilable and lasting opposition between KANU and KADU had been complexified by the British governments' support for regionalism<sup>4</sup> and its obliging the KANU leaders to accept it as the price of getting a date fixed for a fresh election (Leys, 1973, 213).

KADU leaders had been attractive to European politicians because of their strong commitment to private property and because of the relative abundance of land in their areas which they feared KANU might try to take away under the pretext of nationalization. They feared KANU would distribute this to landless people from other ethnic groups. One may say that KADU's fears over land were fulfilled to some extent even after it had dissolved itself and its members crossed over to join KANU. Greater parts of the Rift Valley, the former White Highlands, came into

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3. These were some of the considerations which influenced the considerations and decisions of the Regional Boundaries commission of 1962 and through which parts of Trans-Nzoia and Uasin Gishu were returned to Western-Province following independence.

the hands of the Kikuyu. The Kikuyu came to play a large role both as participants in the official settlement schemes in Nyandarua District and as private individuals or collective buyers of large farms in the districts of Nakuru, Uasin Gishu and Trans-Nzoia (Berg-Schlosser, 1979, 283).

Nevertheless, while the acquisition of land in the Rift Valley was to create a major conflict between the Kalenjin and Kikuyu ethnic groups, the post-colonial land disbursement led to a policy division amongst the KANU leaders. On the one hand was the Kenyatta - Mboya group which sought to keep relations with Britain and America good and therefore supported the willing-buyer willing-seller policy with complete compensation for the settlers. On the other hand was the Oginga - Kaggia group which advocated the seizure and distribution of the White Highlands to the landless Kenyans (Kanogo, 1976/77, 17).

Although with attainment of independence a new phase in the struggle for nationhood began, the struggle was encamped in a vicious conflict of interests in the ranks of the domestic bourgeois leadership. This conflict had pre-independent roots when policy questions had led to the splintering of KANU into dissident factions such as the Ginger group. The latter's advocacy of African socialism as ideal for post-colonial Kenya greatly influenced KANU's adoption of the concept as it was to be inscribed in sessional paper No. 10 of 1965, namely African Socialism and its application

to planning in Kenya (Aseka, 1984, 112-3). But not forgetting, the absorption of former KADU members into KANU in 1964, a group that had hitherto underscored the retention of private enterprise in the post-colonial era, the promulgation of the ideology of African socialism represented an effort to concoct terms that were to bear <sup>no</sup> significance to political practice and were, in sum, of no analytical utility. If there is no African chemistry, mathematics or economics, its critics were <sup>to</sup> wonder why, socialism had to be made to bear special Africanness. Understandably, the radical wing in KANU came to view it as a cloak for the practice of capitalism since the document failed to establish a major turning point in Kenya's trajectory of economic development (Karisa, O.I., 1933).

When KANU eventually broke into the so called moderate group led by Mboya and the so called extremists led by Odinga, these conflicts culminated in the breakaway of the latter group to form an opposition party in 1966 namely, Kenya Peoples Union. Not surprisingly, some of the adherents of the defunct Ginger group in KANU became leading members of the new leftist inspired K.P.U. These included Lucas Karisa, Dennis Akumu and Wasonga Sijeyo (Karisa, O.I., 1983). Luyia K.P.U. members included Samuel Mukudi<sup>4</sup>, Burudi Nabwera and Christopher Makokha,

Under the leadership of Odinga, the opposition party was a reaction to the exigencies of a neo-colonial situation.

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4. Son of the Maverick and politically potent colonial ex-Senior Chief Mukudi who had underwritten the spread of Mau Mau oathing in Bunyala in the 1950's.

Although leaders like Odinga had for long been strong advocates of the overwhelming need to build a one party state in independent Kenya, they swallowed their own words when they latter claimed that the stranglehold on political power by KANU's moderates encrippled the process of democracy in the country. Even after the voluntary dissolution of KADU in 1964, it was not long before divergence of opinion over the directions of national reconstruction and the question of political participation led to the eventual crystallization of opposition. Odinga was to later state that KANU's moderate leadership adopted African socialism as a cloak for the practice of capitalism. They ~~wanted~~ to build a capitalist system but were too embarrassed or dishonest to call it that. Despite their so called socialism they moved into jobs and privileges previously held by settlers and adopted policies on land and agriculture that were contrary to the premises the party had made in its election manifesto of 1963 (Odinga, 1967)

The dissent in Kenya's post-colonial leadership was to culminate in the promulgation of the K.P.U. manifesto on 19th May 1966. However, using apparatuses of the state to suppress KPU's opposition, the dissent party was eventually banned and its outspoken leaders detained. Thus, nothing came of the so called African socialism. Leaders of the independent era used their positions in politics to entrench themselves as a propertied economic group.

A self-entrenched class of politician-cum-businessman grew up in the cities and a large land-owning class emerged in the countryside<sup>5</sup> (Karisa, O.I., 1983). It then appears that the dissolution of KADU and the adoption of African socialism by all represented a marriage of convenience by fractions of the petty bourgeois strata in an alliance of common politico-economic interests vis-a-vis the leftist opposition and the dominated class. Thus, they subscribed to the ideology of African socialism not as a practicable demonstration of Africanness in development planning nor national reconstruction but as an instrument of preserving capitalist relations of production and exchange. It conformed to the nature and class-bound function of Western bourgeois democracy whose exploitative and oppressive nature of dominant classes is legitimised through unfair laws and coercive attributes of the state apparatuses. Not surprisingly, political dissent against the iniquities of both this ideology and the post-colonial development plans was liquidated using the provisions of law as contained in the independent constitution.

The adoption of the settlement scheme at the Lancaster House Conference had been aimed at diffusing rural unrest and promoting the interests of the landed class of Africans. Other squatter settlement schemes were to be launched after independence. But over half of the settler lands were transferred almost intact by sale to

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5. The Luyia fraction comprising the likes of Masinde Muliro, Eric Khasakhala, Wafula Wabuge, Martin Shikuku, Priscilla Abwao acquired acreages in the settlement schemes and other parts of Trans-Nzoia.

wealthy Africans organized in partnerships or limited liability companies (Ogot and Zeleza, 1988, 25). The settlement scheme was therefore reflected in a land policy based on class and not on race. The integration of Africans into what was formerly exclusively settler production was demonstrated by the states acceptance of Africans into the Kenya National Farmers Union. This enrolment was accelerated in the 1960's. It had been a settler organization formed in the mid 1950's and Kenyatta eventually agreed to become its president. By 1964, 1,700 African farmers had joined it. Later, P.N. Sifuma, a Luyia was to be elected to head the Union (Wasserman, 1976, 33). To show the debt burden which denied the farmers hard cash in Buluyia Settlement Schemes, See Table 9 .

Consequently, independent Kenya did very little to balance out the individual tenure policies as inherited at independence vis-a-vis fair distribution of this fundamental resource of livelihood. The Central Land Board created on 1st June, 1963 under the constitution for Internal Self-Government was confirmed by the constitution of Kenya for Independence on the 10th December 1963. Its function was to assist in the orderly transfer of farming land from European to African ownership. As a result, it inherited the purchasing function of the Land Department and Settlement. However, the primary purpose of the Central Land Board was to assess the fair purchase price, purchase of land on agreement and earmarking it for settlement.

Table 9: Repayment of the debt burden on a typical Luiya Settlement Scheme in 1966.

1. Maize price paid by Marketing Board	37/=	
2. Deduction for Co-operative Society Expenses (20%)	8/=	29/= remaining
3. Repayment of Loan (50%)	15/=	14/= remaining
4. Minimum Financial Return Loans - MFR from Agricultural Finance Corporation	10/=	4/= remaining
5. Balance Land Cash		4/= remaining

Source: ILO, Employment, incomes and equality : a strategy for increasing productive Employment in Kenya. Geneva: International Labour Office, 1977, p. 311.



This was therefore a continuation of the settlement programme which had been carried in out piece-meal states under the Swynnerton plan prior to independence (Muliro, O.I., 1988).

Anyhow, when the independence constitution transferred all former crownlands and crown leases from the Central government to the regions, the regions were in effect inheriting a landed pattern of crownlands and land relations as laid down by the Crownlands (Amendment) Ordinance 1954. This was an amendment that had merely facilitated the expansion of settlement schemes at the expense of crownlands (Muliro, ~~O.I.~~ 1988). However, the involvement of the regional leadership in matters affecting land had come about at independence with the country's adoption of a bicameral legislature and a quasi-federal constitution that attempted to reduce the power of the central government by strengthening the regions. This constitution had been forced upon KANU as a condition for independence. Under it were a bicameral legislature (the Upper and Lower House), and a series of regional legislative and administrative bodies designed to protect KADU's scattered bases of support (Aseka, 1984).

But despite these structural constitutional safeguards, the historical basis on which land appropriation and expropriation had been carried out were largely unaltered by these efforts. Colonial enactments still enjoyed their legality even in the jurisprudence of the independent nation. This was to remain the case even though

throughout 1964, the KANU government under Kenyatta devoted all its energies to the destruction of the KADU opposition and the quasi-federal constitution (Gertzel, 1973):

On the other hand, under the umbrella of Sessional Paper No. 10 with its rubric of African socialism, the encouragement of foreign investment in the new nation's economy opened more avenues of penetration by foreign capital into her peripheral capitalism more than before. This integration was to be speeded by the increasing internationalization of capital, a process that was to be often supported and mediated by international organizations and the post-colonial state. Not before long, the multinational firms which continued to operate in the country, foreign firms and local enterprises eventually came to operate in a highly competitive capitalist environment (Langdon, 1981). They obviously dominated the economy and although Sessional Paper No. 10 advocated for Africanization throughout the economy and administration, the new government was left in a quandary since at independence the country had very little skilled manpower (Mutungi, 1970).

Thus, the dominance of oligopolistic overseas corporations mainly from United Kingdom, in the impact trade, banking and manufacturing at independence was an element of the colonial heritage that was to greatly influence the new governments decision about its development strategy. It is not surprising that the colonial Kenya's

Company Act Cap. 486, Laws of Kenya, was a reproduction of the English Company Act of 1948 and that independent Kenya adopted this reproduced company Act of the colony without amendments (Kaplinsky, 1968).

Despite the euphoria of independence, decolonization in Kenya then appears to have permitted a significant deepening of the new nation's participation in the production networks of the world's capitalist economy. The country's post-colonial development plans have enmeshed the economy into this direction despite the idealistic dream of African socialism as an ideological motif. There was nothing in the political and economic conjuncture of the early 1960's that would have laid ground for a reversal of this historical continuity. Neo-colonialism may have been dreaded but it emerges as a powerful reality to students of Kenya's political and economic history. Thus, as Davidson would say; "regrouped within the independent nation-state was the colonial state with its old institutions and constitutional defences, its frail procedures" (Davidson, 1978, 294).

### 8.3 The Luyia in Labour activism and the politics of neo-colonialism:

The Luyia political petty bourgeoisie was integrated in the nationalist leadership of the post-colonial state at independence following a spate of ethnic antipathies. Even after KADU merged with KANU at the end of 1964,

factionalism within the governing party dominated the country's politics despite administrative attempts to limit the conflict (Stren, 1971, 148). In essence, the Luyia political petty bourgeoisie<sup>6</sup> was being co-opted in the leadership of a Kenyan post-colonial society whose common feature was deepening dependence and subservience to neo-colonial arrangements. Colonialism was the origin of this dependence since colonial administration had directed growth of the country's export economy that was owned by European and Asian personnel.

The basic economic structures which were handed over at independence had been thoroughly bred between 1945 and 1960. In so far as the the acquisition of national independence modified this situation with regard to the transfer of political power from the British to the Kenyans and altered the racial composition of the society, but the structure of power and wealth remained the same with small modifications here and there (Van Zwanenberg, 1974, 161). In other words, with the attainment of independence, the political petty bourgeoisie merely sought to Africanise the industrial and exchange relationship with metropolitan capitalist rather than changing the relationship. Thus, in its efforts to Africanise the structure of this exchange,

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6. Masinde Muliro was the Chairman of Maize and Produce Board and P.N. Sifuna was a member of the same. J.W. Masinde was a member of the Board of Directors for KCC, Peter Shiyukah for Kenya Power Company, Wafula Wabuge of Railways and Harbours, C.K. Libembe and J.T. Lubembe of East African Cargo Handling Services.

the post-independence state became even more regulative in its management of the economy (Langdon, 1974, 130).

Nevertheless, while the post-colonial state became more regulative in its management of the economy, foreign domination in the industrialization and exchange processes reduced possibilities for the post-colonial government to control the accumulation process with regard to the creation of employment, development of the productive forces and with regard to surplus and profit rates (Leitner, 1977a, 1972). The inhibition of the development of productive forces should be perceived with respect to choice of technology and the utilization of natural resources. That is to say, the immediate colonial government had little power to influence the development of incomes in various occupations.

It is not, however, because the Luyia political petty bourgeoisie did not recognise the underdeveloped nature of the Kenyan economy. In a catalogue of the obstacles to economic development and large-scale industrialization in the country, the Kenya Federation of Labour had particularly noted that the economy suffered from poor infrastructural development, low agricultural productivity, lack of capital, underdeveloped consumer markets, low wages, and economic extroversion. Thus, this economy was integrated with the metropolitan centres than with the other African economies (Zezeza, 1987, 160-161). Through scholarships offered to K.F.L. leaders by ICFTU, even a number of Luyia political

bourgeoisie became subjected to productionist and economic notions of trade unionism. To them the role of trade unions became that of adjusting the working community to address themselves to the fight for national sovereignty within which the members could be proud of their nationhood (Zezeza, 1982, 575-576).

At the centre of trade union politics of the pre-independence era and the immediate post-colonial era from Buluyia were Clement Lubembe, Arthur Ochwada, Joseph Mugalla, Peter Kibisu, Sammy Muhanji, Aggrey Minya, Wilson Mukuna, Walter Otenyo, Patrick Ooko, Fred Omino, George Inguka, and George Wanjala among others. In 1960, Lubembe and Kibisu had attended at ICFTU conference in Tunis as representatives of KFL (Lubembe, 1968, 118). Needless to mention, a good number of these leaders were also at the centre stage of party-politics during the era of decolonization and the independence period following it.

Tom Mboya merely strengthened the ICFTU/KFL relationship which Aggrey Minya had already initiated under the aegis of the Kenya Federation of Registered Trade Unions founded by him in 1952. After the fall of Minya following allegations of his misuse of I.C.F.T.U. funds Mboya had been elected as its General Secretary in 1953 (Lubembe, 1968, 80). Apparently, the Luyia political petty bourgeoisie played a central role in laying the groundwork of forging a relationship with I.C.F.T.U., a relationship that

facilitated the subjection of the Kenyan labour movement to the anti-revolutionary predilections of the ICFTU. The ICFTU connection merely entrenched the bread and butter trade union pragmatism which the British had hitherto undertaken to teach during the courses offered at Jeanes School Kabete to trade unionists including Tom Mboya, Clement Lubembe, Aggrey Minya and Christophehr Malavu. These courses were offered by the Industrial Realtions Officer Mr. Jas Patrick (Lubembe, 1968, 80).

This pragmatism was carried over into K.F.L. and COTU by the same leaders at a time when the Labour movement was pressing for the recognition of trade union leaders as nation-builders. But while before 1963, foreign political domination had only allowed congenial co-operation between the government and trade union leaders, a basic contradiction was to emergence when trade unionists themselves became executives in the post-colonial government (Leitner, 1977, 193). At the head of the trade union movement was Tom Mboya who at independence was at the same time Minister of Labour and then later as Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs. To resolve this basic contradiction, under his administration, the political role of the trade unions was defined in the Industrial Releations Charter as being one of the three parties, the government, employers and the unions. He steered the labour movement towards political accommodation with nationalist parties and leaders and coupled with

I.C.F.T.U. advice and money, reinforced internal trends towards the degeneration of the K.F.L. into a conservative oligarchy of economistic industrial trade unionism. In other words, the KFL abdicated revolutionary action in favour of reformism at the altar of collective bargaining (Zezeza, 1987, 162).

Thus, Tom Mboya made the trade unions succumb to the government by establishing his protege Clement Lubembe as the top executive in the KFL/COTU (Leitner, 1977, 193). Notwithstanding the intra-political struggles which these manoeuvres entailed, another Luyia trade union leader, Peter Kibisu, went to politics to escape the political pressure from Mboya. He was to become an Assistant-Minister for Labour in the subsequent year (Leitner, 1977, 193).

Kibisu had been the Secretary-General of Postal Workers Union and the Vice-President of K.F.L. Another Luyia trade union leader Arthur Ochawada had been embroiled in struggles against Mboya's domineering politics in the movement since the late 1950's. As a result, he had attempted to organise a splinter group by forming a rival Trade Union Congress in 1958 (Lubembe, 1968, 116). This dissidence led by Ochwada against Mboya continued into the early 1960's. For example in 1961, a struggle to axe Mboya and throw him out of the labour movement was led by Munyua Waiyaki and other breakaway K.F.L. dissidents such as



Arthur Ochwada and Gideon Mutiso. But because of Mboya's clout on the movement, this effort failed (Lubembe, 1968, 125).

But Kibisu's tribulations were not emanating from Mboya as a person. It was the nature decolonization itself which had undermined the autonomy of KFL. The Kenyatta government was intolerant of power autonomous organizations which could challenge the central authority of the ruling party and the state. As the acting General Secretary of K.F.L. he had been using the Labour movement's paper Mfanyi kazi to attack the policies of the Kenyatta government. In 1963, this brought him into open conflict with Kenyatta and the latter set out to silence him. However, Kibisu's battles demonstrated the opposition of certain elements in the KFL to the interference of the KANU party into the running of KFL as this undermined the workers independence (Lubembe, 1968, 181).

Not to forget, some of the officials of K.F.L. including Lubembe did not favour Kibisu's labour politics and they tried to disassociate themselves. When an effort was mounted to discipline K.F.L. leaders in the immediate post-colonial era, Kibisu resigned from KFL leadership. Thus, after independence, the Kenya state proceeded to undermine the autonomy of organised labour. The American government supported the clampdown on the KFL by the Kenyatta government and it is significant to note that they partly orchestrated the withdrawal of American financial

support for the K.F.L. Kenya now being an independent state, and overt support for the KFL was no longer constituted as helping a movement that was opposed to British interests, but one that could challenge the authority of a friendly indigenous government and therefore jeopardise American interests which had grown substantially. By 1967, American investments in the country were to reach \$ 100 million (Zezeza, 1987, 163-164).

in 1965, the subordination of the labour movement was also couched in the obscurantist tendencies inherent in the ideology of African socialism to which many trade unionists including the Luyia political petty bourgeois like Arthur Ochwada, Clement Lubembe and Fred Omido subscribed.

In 1965, in accordance with the Sessional paper No. 10, the government purposed to create one trade union body. A ministerial committee was appointed to investigate into the labour unrest. This was following the splintering of KFL into a Ginger Group led by Denis Akumu, Ochola Makanyengo, and the Luyia trade unionists, Patrick Ooko and Walter Otenyo. Towards the approach of independence, this leftist inspired group had been demanding for K.F.L's disaffiliation from I.C.F.T.U. Consequently, they constituted themselves into a rival body to K.F.L. called the Kenya African Workers Congress. In view of these developments following the country's acquisition of independence, characterised by a turbulent immediate post-colonial era,

the creation of a committee to investigate into the labour problem was most opportune. Accordingly, both KFL and KAWC presented their memoranda to the committee. When the committee published its report, it recommended the formation of one umbrella body called Central Organization of Trade Unions (Lubembe, 1968, 186).

While KFL welcomed this recommendation to form COTU, it was opposed by K.A.W.C. on the grounds that it was Western influenced. Despite K.A.W.C. dissent, the Trade Disputes Act of 1965 was published under which COTU was to function and the elections for the new body's office-bearers were called on October 10th 1965. Although Lubembe defeated Denis Akumu and Stephen Kioni for the post Secretary-General in the elections that were supervised by the Permanent Secretaries of the Ministry of Lands and Settlement and the Ministry of Internal Security and Defence Messrs Peter Shiyukah and Dawson Mulamba respectively, tribalism loomed large among the parliamentary political petty bourgeoisie towards the candidates they wanted. Apart from Lubembe the Secretary-General, the other Luyia elected official was Wilson Mukuna as Treasurer (Lubembe, 1968, 186). But even Aggrey Minya was to make a come back to the politics of trade unionism when he became the Area Secretary of COTU. The other Luyia veteran Arthur Ochwada had been appointed Vice-President of the Industrial Court when it was established in 1964. He held the position until 1967 (Lubembe, 1968, 195).

While appreciating how the growth of bureaucratic - authoritarianism played a leading role in the subordination of the labour movement, it should, at the same time, be recalled that when in 1962/63 political power was transferred to Africans, the terms of the transfer were set by the outgoing colonial masters. The new Kenyan leaders not only inherited a distorted economy but also a state machinery which so far had little to overcome these distortions. The most noticeable ones were regional imbalances, lack of an African controlled industrial sector, and inter-sectional African in productivity, production and organization and work performance which remained particularly sharp between the African economy and the settler economy with its Asian intermediaries (Leitner, 1977, 102-103).

However, as we have said elsewhere in the study, the crisis in the colonial economy had engendered a very clarifying effect on the way the various racial and ethnic groups in the country perceived their interests. European politicians who had thought in terms of continuing to influence affairs directly had gone into direct alliance with moderate leaders who had organised themselves into KADU (Leys, 1975, 58).

The leaders who took over assumed that the inherited distorted economy could be corrected through an expansion of the capitalist base and stop its persisting discriminations against Africans by fostering opportunities

through education and training, and political protection. They did not therefore change the capitalist system as such but the transfer of political power merely enabled Africans to make heavy inroads into the economy and its class system (Leitner, 1977, 109).

#### 8.4 Politics of neo-colonialism and The dissolution of KADU

At independence, Kenya inherited the "Westminster model" of parliamentary government. Under this model, political parties were regarded as electoral organizations whose functions were limited to stimulating popular interests and participation in politics, selecting and campaigning for parliamentary candidates, reflecting the interests and opinions of diverse groups in the society, and providing organised support for the government in power, as well as organizing opposition (Okumu, 1979, 44). It was within this model that several Luyia political petty bourgeoisie had already been politically socialised prior to independence. Individuals like Masinde Muliro, Musa Amalemba, Wycliffe Wasya Awori and Priscilla Abwao had various stages been members of the colonial Legislative Council.

Understandably, the Luyia political petty bourgeoisie thus socialised had sought to espouse changes in the colonial political economy through this forum. For example, at the time when the AEMO was carrying out a concerted challenge to Legislative patterns of recruitment in the

late 1950's, the nationalist used the Legco as a platform to express their views. Masinde Muliro introduced a motion urging the governor to request the British government to commission a specialist in constitutional affairs to examine the existing constitution and make recommendations which would form the basis of discussion at a constitutional conference. Although the motion failed it was supported by all African and other non-European members of Leg-Co. Most fundamentally, it showed that the nationalist demand for a constitutional conference had support from other groups in the Legislature (Perkins, 1968, 67).

When by the end of the ~~June~~ 1958, the same month Muliro had tabled his motion, Mboya submitted the constitutional proposals of the AEMO to then Secretary of State for colonies Lennox Boyd in a letter, Publishing the African demands in the letter, the New Statesman reported:

They are looking for Universal adult suffrage for Africans, 12 additional seats, which would, bring their number to 26 compared with 14 Europeans, Six Asians and 2 Arabs, the abolition of the specially elected seats, half of the unofficial ministries; and the abolition of the council of state. They are asking that these demands form the absis for a new constitutional conference to discuss the future for political development of Kenya (KNA, New Statesman LVI, July 19, 1958).

The political clamour of the African political bourgeoisie for increased representation in Legco, a

clamour that culminated in their boycott of Legco to demonstrate their opposition to the Lennox Boyd constitution, seemed to lay credence to their general acceptance of the need to adopt the Westminster democratic models in which the sovereignty of the Legislature is a cardinal concept. The Legislature according to Westminster democratic practices is reputed to have supreme power as well as direct and executive control over legislation. It exercises indirect control over activities and actions of the cabinet and the state bureaucracy. Legislatively, there are no constitutional restrictions over its authority. The courts are expected to enforce without question all laws it passes (Okumu, 1979, 44-45). No wonder, intra nationalist struggles and AEMO political vapourings were mainly over the question of Legislative representation at this crucial time of decolonization.

Reference is hereby made to intra-nationalist struggles because the African nationalist and their Asian allies had already suffered disunity by the end of 1959. They had formed the AEMO in the April of the same year to oppose the machinations of the New Kenya Group. But the unity of AEMO ended in July when 10 African, all Asian members and one European member organized themselves into KNP with Masinde Muliro as Chairman (Perkin, 1968, 102). But perhaps it should be recalled that in 1957 when the African elected members of Legco had come together as individuals without the benefit of a party platform, they

were tribal ambassadors and were strangers to one another. There was reluctance and fear of accepting any one man as the leader. Factionalism was therefore heightened. From 1959 on, factionalism over questions of personality, tactics and power was increasingly intensified by tribalism (Mueller, 1972, 50).

But prior to the disintegration of the solidarity of the AEMO, its members were openly hostile to the specially elected African candidates of Legco. The AEMO had boycotted the special elections of 1958 during which Musa Amalemba (Luyia), John Muchura (Luo), Gibson Ngome (Mijikenda) and Wanyutu Waweru (Kikuyu) were elected into Legco (Goldsworthy, 1982, 96). These became "despised cadre of the African political petty bourgeois members of Legco. However, the most despised of all was Amalemba who had promptly accepted the post of Housing Minister (Goldsworthy, 1982, 97). Even as late as 1960, the fractured AEMO solidarity was still lashing its tongue against Amalemba. Mboya, Muliro and Ngala were to demand the dismissal of Amalemba from his ministerial position, a demand which the governor Patrick Renison dismissed (Goldsworthy, 1982, 137-138).

Such vicious intra-class struggles were carried over into the era of nation-wide political parties. With the formation of KANU, Odinga and Ochwada, in an attempt to undercut Mboya, approached James Gichuru to accept



leadership of the new party KANU in the absence of Kenyatta. But despite their intra-class struggles, the political African petty bourgeois leaders increasingly had all along forged the initiative and realised the advantage of provoking crises (Berman, 1981, 39-40). Because of their recalcitrance, at this point, the colonial state was no longer in control of the pace of political change following the Africans' securing the agreement of Lennox Boyd to a new constitutional conference at the beginning of 1960. Thus, between 1954 and 1960, a process of negotiation and accommodation between the petty bourgeois African nationalist leader and the metropolitan and local state authorities, metropolitan capital and local business interests slowly and painfully emerged. Thus, no neo-colonial strategy sprung full-blown from the broom of some imperial athena (Berman, 1981, 30).

In the previous chapter we highlighted the role of the Luyia political petty bourgeois in politics of Multi-racialism. But multi-racialists led by Michael Blundell represented that element of local and external capital which saw economic and political reforms as inevitable and sought an accommodation with African nationalism. It was deemed as a necessary accommodation within a multi-racial formula that would preserve the basic political economy of Kenya and a predominant European position within it for an indefinite time into the future (Berman, 1981, 31-32).

But other than just noting the Luyia political

petty bourgeoisie's receptiveness to multi-racialism; it is more pertinent to observe that the strategy of the European liberal multi-racialists depended upon an apparent move from racial to class stratification as the basis of political alliance. This development therefore promoted the development of an African petty bourgeoisie as a basis of a new class alliance. Thus, what remained was the level of access and degree of formal political control to be accorded the African petty bourgeoisie, the terms for the removal of economic and political features of the colonial order which still blocked the consolidation of the class, and the stabilization of contradictions and struggles which remained to undermine the path of capitalist development to which Kenya had been committed. Nevertheless, despite the receptivity of some elements of the African political petty bourgeoisie to the hoodwinks of multi-racialism, there were local social, economic and political divisions underlying the broader regional cleavages which provided the basis for local factional and leadership rivalries (Ogot and Zeleza, 1988, 31).

Perhaps the experiment in multi-racial politics helped prepare the liberal Europeans for the transfer of political power that was to follow even though they underwent great strains during the transition period and its aftermath. they were enmeshed within the factional and leadership rivalries that were to characterise future inter-ethnic and inter-regional political re-alignments that were to follow

in the country based on the political campaigns of both KANU and KADU. The state was set for post-independence inter-ethnic relationships in the crucial years of 1960-1963 (Tamarkin, 1973, 273).

All the British government had to do was to select from the African politicians those who were well educated enough to be at the head of the administration and not too nationalistic or even socialist to oppose further foreign investments. In the face of determined KADU efforts assisted by Europeans to ensure that real power would lie in the regions, the Majimbo constitution was finally produced before independence. It was the price KANU had to pay for expediting the independence elections and self government (Lamb, 1974, 17-18).

One may say that at the root of factionalism in Kenya during the crucial process of decolonization lay the conjuncture of approaching independence in a society suffering from acute uneven development. Uneven development in the country had historically corresponded to, and had been intersected by, regional, ethnic and class interrelations. With the Central Province having registered a relatively fast level of development and with the emergence of the Kikuyu petty bourgeoisie that was numerically the largest in the colony, other regional petty bourgeois politicians feared that the former would be central to any post-colonial dispensation (Ogot and Zeleza, 1988, 29). It would then

appear that the ideological differences between KANU and KADU were not real. This explains why KADU dissolved itself so easily in 1964.

Ethnicity was then a major tool in the arsenal of Luyia political demagogues. The Luyia politician Masinde Muliro who was the architect of KADU had owed his political ascendancy to ethnic factors. The Bukusu had fielded him in 1957 as the Bukusu Union candidate for Legco to represent the then North Nyanza. They in reaction to Wanga hegemony fielded Muliro in an effort to translate economic strength into political power. The community's petty bourgeoisie had become prosperous because of maize farming (Fearn, 1961, 68). Because Muliro was hardly known outside the Bukusu area, after his election he took considerable effort to introduce himself to the rest of Buluyia (KNA, North Nyanza District Annual Report, 1957).

When his feelings of unease against the domineering politics of Mboya concretised in the resolve not to work with him anymore within the same party, his efforts culminated in the formation of KADU. Not surprisingly, Muliro's KADU forged an alliance with another ethnic party, Buluyia political Union formed by Musa Amalemba in 1960, a hitherto leading multi-racialist in the European dominated New Kenya Group (see Mulaa, 1981, p. 101).

But Muliro's efforts to use ethnic sentiments to sway all Luyia into KADU AND BPU were thwarted by the

dominance of the Luyia working class in the trade union movement over which Tom Mboya had immense influence. Although the major conflict in Buluyia for the leadership of the Luyia was seen to be linked through the major political participants Otiende and Muliro (Getzel, 1974, 61). Mboya's role in KANU led the Luyia working class and the petty bourgeois leadership of the labour movement on to the bandwagon of KANU. The workers decided to rally behind KANU since its Secretary General was Tom Mboya, the KFL leader. Thus, KFL boosted the image of KANU (Lubembe, 1968, 116). This explains the cleavage in the politics of the Luyia. Not to forget, Arthur Ochwada, Clement Lubembe and Peter Kibisu had been office-bearers in Mboya's Nairobi Peoples Convention Party. They would not have abandoned their leader at this crucial time. Not surprisingly, Kibisu was Mboya's successor as KFL Secretary-General. But when the labour leadership under Kibisu started talking of forming a Labour Party to protect trade Unions from the underhanded politicians in 1963, Mboya pre-empted this (Amsden, 1971, 109).

In spite of KADU's spirited campaigns in 1960 and 1961; KANU won a resounding victory in the 1961 elections by holding on the loyalty of the Kikuyu, Luo, Embu, Meru, Kamba and Kisii who amounted to 60% of the African population. But the party refused to form a government until Kenyatta was released (Berman, 1981, 42). This opened away for a tenuous eleven month minority coalition government

of KADU and New Kenya party. The Luyia political petty bourgeoisie were represented in both parties by the prominent roles of Muliro and Amalemba respectively. Thus, Muliro took up a Ministerial position alongside his other Luyia contemporary Amalemba. However, NKG disintegrated with the European personalities retreating from public political arena and embarking on a behind-the-scenes advice, persuasion and pressure on KADU. On the other hand, following his release in August 1961, Kenyatta quickly entered the legislature after a by-election and in April 1962 he led KANU into a coalition government with KADU (Berman, 1981, 43).

With KANU's entry into the coalition government in 1962, the ground was prepared for the granting of internal self-rule. It demonstrated the adoption of subtle mechanisms of continuity. Much of the basis of this continuity lay in the legacies of attitudes, styles of action and institutions which colonialism bequeathed upon its African petty bourgeois heroes. Thus, when internal self-rule was granted to Kenya after the 1963 elections, the country was far better prepared for African control as certain features were engrained into the political environment. These were a consistent African reverence of European paramountcy, the use of skills (pragmatic and rational) usually associated with Western political practice, and a national set of institutions for the procedural conversion of demands into policy (French, 1969, 140-141).

Kenya became independent under a quasi-federal constitution that attempted to reduce the power of the central government by strengthening the regions. Under the quasi-federal constitution otherwise called Majimbo, Kenya gained independence in December 1963 establishing a bicameral legislature and administrative bodies designed to protect KADU's ethnic interests (Okumu, 1979, 49). Prior to the Lancaster House Conference of June 1963 which promulgated the Majimbo constitution of 1962, the Regional Boundary Commission had received representations all intending to influence its decision on the spatial location of regions in the colony (Agevi, 1981, 48). To the Luyia political petty bourgeoisie, their major concern was over the Commission's decision on the spatial location of Trans-Nzoia district in general and of Kitale town in particular.

The Regional Boundaries Commission grouped ethnic groups according to the wishes indicated to it. When the Commission Report was published, the Luyia found themselves in the Western Region with no administration centre. Thus, they sought to include Kitale and a further large portion of Trans-Nzoia (Carey-Jones, 1965, 277). With the publication of the Commission's Report, tribal jealousy and the call for tribal exclusiveness became heightened. Masinde Muliro, KADU's deputy leader on 15th January 1963 led a Luyia delegation to Government House protesting against the inclusion of parts of Trans-Nzoia in the Rift Valley (KNA DAILY NATION, 15/1/63).

The inclusion of parts of Trans-Nzoia in Rift Valley followed the deferring of the initial recommendations by the Commission. After considering all evidence, memoranda and views presented to it, that Trans-Nzoia be divided into two, it resolved that the smaller part together with Kitale be transferred to the Western region while the rest remains in the Rift Valley Region. But this was opposed by the Municipal Board of Kitale and the Kalenjin Community. Therefore, this recommendation though hailed by the Luyia community was held in abeyance (Agevi, 1981, 1981, 51-54). Lugari area of Trans-Nzoia and Soy-Matunda area of Uasin Gishu were transferred to the Western Region while the Saboti, Kiminini and Naitiri regions remained in Rift Valley (KNA, DAILY NATION, 7/1/63). Nevertheless, these areas have remained bases of Luyia politicians especially from among the Bukusu ever since.

It then appears that the desire of Luyia leaders led by Masinde Muliro to have areas of Trans-Nzoia and Uasin Gishu included in the predominantly Luyia Western Region under the Majimbo constitutional framework bore the ingredients of the Kitale issue in the politics of decolonization (KNA, SUNDAY NATION, 28/1/62). With the vacuum of created by the dissolution of Trans-Nzoia Association, a European political association which operated in Kitale between 1958 and 1961 as avanguard of settlerism in the district, KADU and KANU grappled for political supremacy and control of Trans-Nzoia (Waweru, 1974, 32).

The Bukusu had been placed in a new district, hived off North Nyanza, in 1961 and designated as Elgon



Nyanza. It constituted a constituency while the remaining North Nyanza also constituted a other constituency. In the 1961 elections the Bukusu elected Muliro unopposed (Bennett and Rosberg, 1961, 45). In North Nyanza, during the 1961 elections, there were several candidates who included the Ginger Group man J.M. Oyangi. The other man was Musa Amalemba. Amalemba was the leader and sole candidate of Buluyia political Union. He had allied his B.P.U. with KADU. In the end KADU and B.P.U. outperformed KANU when Amalemba was elected to Legco (Mulaa, 1981, and Goldworthy, 1981, 181). In Nakuru, the other Luyia KANU leader Arthur Ochwada was bottom of the poll. The seat was won by Wafula Wabuge who narrowly won the election on a KADU ticket (Goldsworthy, 1981, 181, and Wanjohi, 1985, 18).

In November 1962 when Paul Ngei broke with KANU and formed Akamba's Peoples Party because of the persistent refusal by KANU leaders to assure him the local and national status which his strength in Ukambani warranted. Several other political petty bourgeoisie from other ethnic groups enlisted in APP. Among prominent figures from other ethnic groups who joined it were M.D. Odinga from Maragoli in North Nyanza and Elijah Omolo from South Nyanza (Gertzel, 1974, 110). The existence of APP encouraged further KADU dreams of enticing into it the Meru and even Embu, and for a few weeks, the parties agreed not to oppose each other in order to tear KANU to pieces.

But of more importance to note, during the elections

of 1963, Masinde Muliro shifted his political base from Elgon Nyanza to Trans-Nzoia. But despite the blood relationship between Muliro and Elijah Masinde, the most interesting development was the support of KANU by the latter against KADU. Muliro had been one of the elected leaders of Legco who had campaigned for the release of Elijah Masinde. However, after seeing his self-appointed role as mediator between KANU and KADU fail inexplicably, he had decided to be both a KANU member and spokesman in Bungoma and Trans-Nzoia (Shimanyula, 1978, 21). He was given a Land-Rover by KANU to campaign and counteract the activities of Muliro and KADU. With Muliro's shift to Trans-Nzoia, Elijah Masinde concentrated in the area while pascal Nabwana mounted the anti-KADU campaign in Bungoma, then Elgon Nyanza (Wanyama, O.I., 1988). Thus, a few months after his release, Elijah became embroiled in the cross-currents of Kenyan politics.

But even Elijah Masinde who had vociferously supported KANU in the politics of decolonization eventually felt betrayed when after independence, the alienated Bukusu lands in the newly designated Rift Valley were not returned to the Bukusu. Neither did the Europeans immediately quit from the area (Shimanyula, 1978, 21). This explains why Elijah Masinde continued his DYM activities even in the post-colonial era.

Anyhow, during the elections of 1963, Muliro won

The Kitale seat while in Wanga of North Nyanza, Ibrahim Mulama a KADU candidate defeated John O'Washika, a KANU candidate (Mulaa, 1981). In Butere, Joseph Martin Shikuku won the Butere seat after abandoning Nairobi where he had been trounced by Tom Mboya in 1961. In Bunyore, Eric Khasakhala captured the seat while in Rwambwa, James Osogo a KANU adherent captured the seat. KANU candidates, Oduya Oprong captured the seat in Teso, Joseph Otiende in Maragoli and Makokha in Busia (Lubembe 1968 and Gertzel, 1974). Those who captured seats in the Senate included K. Machio (KADU), Munoko (KADU) and Lubembe (KANU). But in Nakuru, the seat for the Lower House went to Achieng Oneko. He defeated Wafula Wabuge (Wanjohi, 1985, 18).

During the short spell of the KANU/KADU coalition, motions were passed in the House of Representatives (Lower House) which signalled the death of KADU. On 6th and 8th November 6 KADU members crossed the floor and on the 11th November Ngala announced the dissolution of KADU (Gertzel, 1974, 34).

But although the structure of the quasi - federal constitution had largely been altered, the bicameral legislature remained in being until December 1966 when a further amendment merged the Senate and the House of Representatives to establish a unicameral legislature (Gerzel, 1974, 34). But the dissolution of KADU came in the wake of devoted energies by the KANU government under Kenyatta to destroy KADU opposition and the Majimbo

constitution. First, the state bureaucracy, the only national institution with effective links to the grass-roots was manipulated by the KANU government to prevent the effective development of the regional administrative agencies provided for the the constitution. In this exercise, KANU's control of central government institutions also gave it effective control over regional administration (Okumu, 1979, 49). Secondly, the KANU government refused to implement the financial provisions of the constitution, which required the central government to decentralise financial control among the regions by June 1964 when the regions were to take over full financial responsibility. Finally, the KANU government also refused to transfer government institutions to the Regions preceding self-government in 1962. The various ministries of government would have effected the devolution of powers to the Regions had the coalition lasted longer. However, in June 1963, KANU took complete control of central government after winning an electoral victory over KADU and put a halt to further decentralization (Goldsworthy, 1981, 242, 243).

Prior to the amendment of the constitution to give way to the proclamation of a republic in Kenya, the prime Minister Jomo Kenyatta toured the Western Region between 20th and 23rd March 1964, Nyanza on 2nd August and the Baringo area of the Rift Valley Region in September 1964. During these tours he personally led a public campaign to win the acceptance of these areas of the new republican

plan. According to the first amendment to the constitution certain social services were not be transferred to the regions (Okumu, 1979, 50).

It is no wonder then when the rank and file of KADU became dispirited by KANU's refusal to implement the full provisions of the Majimbo constitution, they began to cross the floor, a cross-over that culminated in the party's voluntary dissolution. Mulama the Wanga KADU member was among the first to cross the floor (Mula, 1981, 101). Others like Martin Shikuku, Masinde Muliro and Eric Khasakhala somewhat dragged their feet. But when all KADU leaders crossed the floor in 1964 to join KANU, the hitherto prominent oppositionists became KANU cabinet leaders. They included Daniel arap Moi, Ronald Ngala and Masinde Muliro (Bienen, 1974, 68).

On the whole, the institutional transfer envisaged by the British never materialised although the legislature and the electoral process continued to exist after the attainment of independence (Barkan, 1979, 65). But as years passed by, the country's apparent acquiescence in neo-colonial dependence loomed large. This was a contradiction for a ruling class which came to power on the wave of a struggle against imperialism (Ake, 1979, 125). These factors put the country under powerful pressure to resort to defensive radicalism and therefore its post-colonial policies couched in the obscurantist ideology

of African socialism may be understood in this light.

Needless to mention, the post-colonial structure of politics and policy still underwrote the dichotomisation of the society into the exploiters and the exploited. There were to be throngs of poverty-stricken peasants and workers despite the high degree of political consciousness created by the decolonization saga. These features were to remain at the very core of the post-colonial development and the dynamics of the syndrome of underdevelopment were to generate strong revolutionary pressures as evidenced by the fracturing of what had heretofore been a fledgling nationalist solidarity over the question of socialism. African socialism as emphatically propounded by the Kenyan ruling political bourgeoisie was to emerge a baseless type of socialism which in essence masked their capitalist policies (Ake, 1979, 126-127).

Over the question of nationalization, Eric Khasakhala the MP for Emuhaya said:

It is most unfortunate that such a motion should come to this House, because already... in Kenya today, Africans own their own property which they are proud of us to own. You cannot say that you are going to divide the property of someone which belongs only to him as a person, (Official report, House of Representatives, first parliament, 2nd Session Vol IV April 1965, Col. 1156).

Nationalization was to be used only where national security was threatened, where higher social benefits could be obtained or productive resources were clearly and seriously

misused or when the means of control were ineffective and financial resources so permitted. Like the nationalization issue, the majority of the members rejected a recommendation by the Legislature to investigate methods by which fractions of the bourgeoisie owned large amounts of land. They sought to limit land which one individual could own (Gertzel, 1974, 50-51). But noting that the party and the government were deviating from some of the fundamental protocols of the party as enshrined in the KANU manifesto of 1963, apprehensions were demonstrable in the debates of the immediate post-colonial era.

The crystallization of criticism by the hard-core nationalists against KANU's policy led to the emergence of a fundamental block of opposition. During the debates of the subsequent intra-party politics they earned themselves the labels communists or scientific socialists. Needless to belabour the point, there was an ideological difference to resolve (official, Report, House of Representatives, First parliament, 2nd Session, 15th February 1966). This basis conflict had to be resolved by the hiving off by the leftists to form Kenya Peoples Union. It enlisted several Luyia including Samuel Mukudi, Christopher Makokha and Burudi Nabwera (Mukudi, O.I., 1987).

But the ingestion of KADU political groupings into KANU whose opposition was tribally based meant that this exercise introduced multifarious internal competition within KANU. It seems to have been well calculated.

Opponents of Odinga in KANU with his leftist political strands hoped to strengthen themselves by bringing in KADU leaders. Thus, when the KADU leaders joined KANU, the Odinga wing of KANU became increasingly isolated and eventually this group which became isolated split off to form KPU (Bienen, 1974, 69). But still the intra-nationalist struggles of the pre-independence days did not end there. Factionalism and personal rivalries continued. The estrangement between Mboya and Muliro continued and this reached its peak when the Luyia leader contested against the former for the post of Secretary-General of KANU. Nevertheless, Mboya survived the challenge that came in the wake of attempts to isolate him in the party. This challenge was orchestrated by Muliro (Gertzell, 158).

From the above picture it is evident that ex-KADU leaders were playing a leading part in a new tribal and class struggle within KANU. One result of the multifaceted struggle was the eventual removal of the radicals from positions of authority within the party and ultimately from parliament (Leys, 1975, 213-214). But within the party, some petty political bourgeoisie such as Martin Shikuku, J.M. Kariuki and J.M. Seroney became vociferous spokesmen of the petty bourgeois opposition (Swainson, 1980, 262). Both Shikuku and Seroney were ex-KADU members to its final stages. Following its voluntary dissolution they became critics of Kikuyu dominated Kenyan post-colonial bureaucracy and the country's economy dominated by outsiders such as the European and Asian



sectorial operations in manufacturing, finance, tourism and export/import concerns. By 1965, disagreement about the allocation of resources between districts and the emphasis on tribal position was the major source of conflicts by 1955 (Gertzel, 1974, 45). From Busia, Makokha the areas KANU leader voiced strong criticism of policies which he felt had become largely influenced by tribal considerations. Even Masinde Muliro had, in the previous year prior to the dissolution of KADU, lamented against the preference given to the Kikuyu and Luo in both appointments to the Civil Service and the allocation of resources. He particularly noted the favouritism in the allocation of loans to farmers and traders (Gertzel, 1974, 43).

Looked at from a different angle, with the emerging partnership of international capital with the domestic petty bourgeoisie in both industry and commerce, Lubembe the new KFL/COTU leader was to criticise Africans being used by foreign firms as Directors while the actual ownership and operations of these firms were externally controlled (Swainson, 1980, 279). He was not alone. In successive budget debates of the immediate post-colonial era, members in the parliament challenged government policy ranging from issues such as land and settlement and the loans policy to a myriad of other problems. Most members believed that the government had failed to deal satisfactorily with these practical problems.

But whereas the KANU government tolerated the intra-party opposition of the likes of Shikuku, Kariuki and Seroney until they were to become victims of detention orders much later in the post-colonial era, radicals who had jumped onto the KPU bandwagon began to be detained much earlier. Patrick Ooko, the Luyia General Secretary of the Common Services African Civil Servants Union was arrested and detained early in 1966 (Lubembe, 1968, 199). But despite the liquidation of intra-party opposition through detentions and excommunication from the party, this did not destroy prospects of new sets of political cleavages and radicalism emerging in the country. These were inevitable given that channels of authority and accumulation were availed to the tribally chosen few. Furthermore, the entire post-colonial economy as excised and practised in the country still rendered the majority of the people totally and perpetually dependent. The grinding pressure of leading a subservient life of toil, the incessant demands of post-colonial capitalism became primordial causative factors of dissent, intra-class conflicts and class struggles. In other words, the contradictions and dilemmas of the post-colonial ruling petty bourgeoisie generated new patterns of conflict in the Kenyan body-politic while its inherited mode of economy became the most durable arena of class struggles and social unrest.

With due respect to the Luyia political petty

bourgeoisie, their politics of alliance or factionalism came to involve one set of contradictions, its economics another. Indeed, this became a paradox of independence in Kenya. Nevertheless, the Luyia political behaviour would not have been the same if the trajectory of post-colonial growth and political leadership was ideologically different. Unlike the ascending bourgeoisie in Europe which transferred all political and economic institutions into its own image and became socially hegemonic, the evidence we have alluded here is on the contrary. The petty bourgeoisie in Kenya had no creation of its own. It merely inherited colonial institutions with which the mass of the people were sought to identify through populist politics of KANU and KADU prior to the demise of the latter. Therefore, the state which the Luyia political bourgeoisie represented, unlike the Western bourgeois state, was not entrenched in society as a whole. It was largely a bureaucratic contrivance.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

The foregoing chapters have tried to capture the historical processes through which Buluyia moved from pre-colonial political patterns to colonialism and then to independence within a wider panoply of nation-state relations. The different facets of this historical evolution have been analysed within the epistemology of materialist political economy. Thus, we have applied the concepts of historical and dialectical materialism by examining Luyia pre-colonial systems of production and analysing their encounter with the capitalist mode of production. Moreover, we have extrapolated on the patterns of capitalist development in the area and identified its integration in the world system. In sum, our methodology has been historical and critical, it has mainly focused on the radical transformation of Luyia society by capital.

In our analysis of the capitalist mode of production that was introduced in the area by colonialism, we took note of dynamic interaction of productive forces and their corresponding relations of production as the Kenyan periphery was transformed by colonial capitalism. It has been our contention that this transformation created classes that made the Kenyan periphery a durable arena of social conflict. In this sense we have perceived conflict as an intrinsic

phenomenon to the process of capital accumulation. Thus, conflict is spawned by inner contradictions within the capitalist mode of production. The basic contradiction of the capitalist mode of production is embedded in the social nature of the production process and the private appropriation of the products of labour.

The political behaviour of the Luyia in the colonial and post-colonial economy has been presented as a vindication of the constant struggle between classes which capitalism created in the Kenyan periphery. In the seventh and eighth chapters we have demonstrated the continuity of the colonial economic models into the post-colonial era. This meant that the trajectory of class struggle remained the same. In this light, we analysed the economic and political processes which have shaped the patterning of authority and ideology at the level of government and state.

The analysis in this study has been based on the theoretical premise that the most fundamental human activity in society revolves around the production and appropriation of the products of labour. The contradictions between the material conditions of nature, the forces of production, relations of production and human needs elicit conflicts whose resolution fosters disjoined backward and forward movements in the development of society. Thus, given that the exploitation of productive forces and the appropriation of the social product engender classes at each

stage of accumulation, we have demonstrated how various classes in Buluyia emerged and developed interests in a struggle against interests antagonistic to their own. Therefore, the terrain of conflict in Buluyia has been a basic reflection of this. It is a conflict whose dynamics were not just restricted to the area. It encapsulated the entire Kenyan periphery where Luyia peasantries, the working class and the petty bourgeoisie were located. It was a conflict that was manifested openly given the tremendous impact the penetration of capitalism has on the evolution of peasantries, a semi-proletariat and a petty bourgeoisie.

It is then valid to state that the processes of peasantisation, proletarianization and accumulation of capital occurred within the strait-jacket of colonial economic policy and political pressure and constraints. The Luyia had been subjected to colonial pressures from very early with the imposition of colonial administration in the area. The establishment of that administration was carried out using the twin mechanisms of conquest and subjugation on the one hand and co-optive collaboration on the other. But as we have explained, the degree of resistance of collaboration depended on a host of factors given that colonialism in itself became a major impetus of change when it introduced myriad mechanisms of social and economic transformation. While it is true that some Luyia sub-ethnic groups like the Bukusu, Banyala, Banyore had, due to an

intense desire to defend their rights and freedoms, their social and political values, steadily and systematically resisted the intruders, the other corollary of resistance was collaboration. It was on the basis of the latter that the edifice of indirect Rule was established in the area with the Wanga emerging as the beneficiaries of this dispensation.

Nevertheless, the phenomena of resistance and collaboration engendered conflicts against the colonial state and each other for control of key political and economic resources. As such, throughout the early decades of colonial rule in Buluyia, the political scenario was riddled with violence and non-compliance on one hand and skilful acquiescence on the other as the colonial administration entrenched its system of monolithic and exploitative control. It is true that even in the latter case, where the interests of the colonial ruling class in the area conflicted with those of the Luyia collaborating functionaries, the colonial authorities used their immense political resources to ensure their own preponderance. It is in this light that we have perceived the plight of the Wanga Abashitsetse dynasty after it had outlived its usefulness to the British. Mumia Nabongo, its custodian, died a miserable man hauling to the grave the ill-fated

British imposed paramountcy in 1949. But the British political strategems were conceptualised in terms of racial inequality, blocked economic opportunities for Africans and social discrimination. This was so because the capitalist international division of labour relegated the colonised peoples to the lowest ranks in the production process. This explains their marginalised participation in the colonial political economy which this study has variously demonstrated. Inexorably, the continuous strings of political activity that we have identified in Buluyia in this study were manifestations of the peoples political consciousness as colonialism continually generated new patterns of conflict and contradiction. They registered their political awareness during the just few decades of colonial rule and did so even more brazenly when the colonial administration adopted constant use of brutal force in its exaction of revenue, autonomy, security, legitimation of hegemony and alienation of land.

We have given indisputable evidence of land alienation in Buluyia and analysed its inextricable link to the appropriation of labour in the district. Prior to the onset of colonialism, our extrapolation of economic activity in pre-colonial Buluyia at the beginning of the study demonstrated the existence of self-sufficiency in the area's subsistent economies. We showed how labour-power in these societies was dispensed with to satisfy the various



social needs that arose. Thus, human labour, which was communally harnessed, was directed at production to create goods to serve those needs, for it was the only means of producing commodities with use values. Therefore, it was purposeful and was directed at nature or its raw materials that constituted the means of production. But with alienation of land and the relegation of many Luyia peasants into wage-labour, the labour process became inextricably linked to the struggle for profitable production.

Then, for the reason that the creation of use value for the societal well-being was no longer the goal of the colonial administration nor the private capitalists operating in Buluyia and elsewhere in the colony, their labour was therefore alienated. A good number of Luyia workers were estranged from their means of production through land alienation and were forced into wage labour or were enticed into it by voluntary labour recruitment drives. They were no longer to exist mentally and physically in a relationship to the means of production. They thereby did not realise their own purposes in the materials of nature based on it. On the contrary, these labourer's self-realisation in the ownership of the means of production and capacity to work was transformed into a means of producing value for the colonial state and private capitalists. Hence, the process of production did not combine the labour process with the self-satisfying creation of social value. Moreover, the colonial state and private

capitalists also exerted control over the conditions under which the hired Luyia labourers operated. It was against this exploitative background that a form of political consciousness grew that was to crystallise in the political activities of DYM in Buluyia and other neighbouring districts in the 1940's and 1950's.

But while the Bukusu peasants led by the African petty bourgeoisie provided the driving force behind DYM, Luyia workers elsewhere were demonstrating their resistance to administrative attempts to regularise the flow of labour. After being involved in desertions to avoid conscription into forced labour as colonial capitalism became entrenched from the 1920's and the 1930's, more Luyia workers became involved in struggles between labour and capital within the capitalist sphere of production. They participated in strikes which was an important mechanism of labour protest. Even though the African petty bourgeoisie could be granted exemption from such denigrating requirements as the Kipande Registration and Compulsory labour at a fee of £4, increasing African grievances over poll-tax, African housing and wages and so on generated nationalist and labour unrest in which they played prominent leadership roles. The labour movement in the colony was to grow as a remarkable feature of the post-war era in which Luyia petty bourgeois leaders like Aggrey Minya, Arthur Ochwada, Clement Lubembe, Peter Kibisu, Wilson Mukuna and Sammy Muhanji were to play

outstanding roles in the 1950's.

The Luyia peasantry and petty bourgeoisie like their contemporaries in the colony could not remain trapped in the traditional indigenous social order of the past, for it had been fatally disrupted and was rapidly disintegrating. Nor could they embrace the capitalist order fully since, its foundation was based on racial inequality and discrimination that was legally institutionalised. Hence, they developed a new means of expressing their political opposition through political organizations. The evidence we have provided in the study on the history of political developments in Buluyia has validated our initial hypothetical conjecture that the evolution of the Luyia ethnic nationalism represented an outgrowth of a continuous string of political activism brought by the exigencies of colonial economic policy.

The evidence too has laid credence to the second fundamental research premise that the imperialist subjugation of the different demographic units of the Luyia by the British administration and the incorporation of the local economies into practices and interests of capitalist production and exchange led to the emergence of economic social categories in the region. The picture that emerges from our analysis of colonial mechanisms of social differentiation during the colonial era contained from

chapter 3 to 7, contrasts sharply with that given in chapter 2. In the latter chapter we made an analysis of the economic and social character of the pre-colonial Luyia societies during which we examined the manner in which labour and the products of labour were appropriated. Moreover, we identified the role played by traditional ideologies in the reinforcement and reproduction of the Luyia social formations.

Thus, the articulation of colonial capitalism with these economies produced an uneven regional development in Buluyia as well as distinctive class interests. The historical dynamics of these processes and mechanisms have sequentially been examined and have demonstrated how the Luyia political ideology was to an appreciable extent the product of their economic experience. However, whereas some of the Luyia responses to the colonial pressures and opportunities generated new conflicts between themselves on one hand and the colonial state on the other, political activism on the whole helped in forging the pace of decolonization in the colony. Taken together, their grievances and those of their fellow oppressed Africans in Kenya and the effects of the peasant belligerence, labour militancy and petty bourgeois political excrescence constituted some of the fundamental factors which the metropolitan government and the colonial state could not afford to ignore. They could not overlook them in their

policy formulation to resolve conflicts, contradictions, hesitations and uncertainties which their imperial hegemony faced in the colony. It is in this light that we have analysed structural changes in agriculture, commerce, industry and labour.

Notwithstanding the imperially inspired reforms which were essentially conjunctural responses to intensifying political struggles within the area and the entire colony, evidence has been given to show that because colonial capitalism was inhibitive, Luyia politics became characteristic of bourgeois politics in a stunted capitalist structure. The process of articulation of capitalism with the traditional Luyia economies and the dynamic mechanisms of social change accruing from this process did not destroy completely ties of kinship in the region. Although the deepening stratification created new economic classes and these injected a new element in the politics of the Luyia society, its lack of full-blown growth relapsed its petty bourgeois propagators into solidarity on the basis of cultural-linguistic affinity. This was a type of politics that corresponded to the stunted growth of capitalism in the region and the colony at large. While shifts and tides of Luyia ethnic politics were reflective of the impact of stunted capitalist growth which locked large sectors of the Luyia society into adverse reserve conditions of the so called dual economy, traditional

linkages and relations were to become spices of bourgeois political parochialism, Luyia ethno-centrism and regional sub-ethnic revalries and jealousies. Our evidence on this trend in politics has been non-conflictual. We have examined the process of decolonization in Kenya and analysed both the leadership and shifting alliances of the Abaluyia in this process. It is in this light that a critical appraisal of the Luyia bourgeoisie in the politics of multi-racialism and regionalism is given.

It vindicates our last hypothetical conjecture that some of the Luyia people readily accepted the alliance with liberal Europeans in the politics of decolonization mainly because their multi-racial proposals would safeguard their ethnic interests in the very much contemplated post-colonial economy. However, we posed the question of ethnic politics in a materialist way. Moreover, the study has demonstrated that African nationalism was a reaction against the economic iniquities of colonialism by tracing Luyia politics against a background of western capitalist neo-colonial strategems in the new state following the country's acquisition of independence. This was necessary because as chapter 7 shows, the mentality that developed in the nationalist consciousness was the mentality of takeover. The Africans led by the petty bourgeoisie including the Luyia component had envisaged the takeover of the apparatus of wealth that had been created under conditions of colonial oppression and exploitation.

But with independence when control of the state was to change and new attitudes needed to manage both the state and the economy, these attitudes could only take place within the political sphere. Thus, chapter 8 has given an explanation of how the leaders rushed into the positions of displaced colonialists without having sufficiently built a community of interests. It was a scramble in which the Luyia political petty bourgeoisie participated. Consequently, new sets of political cleavages and radicalism emerged in the country as channels of authority and accumulation were availed to the tribally chosen few. As such, the study has demonstrated in this last section how contradictions and dilemmas of the post-colonial ruling petty bourgeoisie generated new patterns of conflict in the Kenyan body-politic. It's inherited mode of economy became a durable arena of class struggles, social unrest and inter-ethnic rivalries and antagonisms.

This way, the whole question of the Luyia political history has been constituted from the standpoint of social conflict as the motor of historical change. In other words historical processes in Buluyia have consistently been conceived as the result of struggles between social categories and groups. Consequently, in our analysis and interpretation of these processes and trends, we have striven to maintain a logical and historical perspective both empirically and theoretically. Within the theoretical and

methodological realms of materialist political economy, processes of social conflict, unequal exchange, uneven development and patterns of capital accumulation have been extrapolated.

We have carried out a logical, abstract theoretical and empirical analysis of political phenomena in Buluyia with emphasis on relations of production. But the other themes developed and studied have included the development of commodity organization of the social economy, the transformation of traditional societies into peripheral capitalist economy, the development of the productivity of labour and the creation of antagonistic classes which fostered the generation of conflicts in the foundations of the capitalist system. But whereas these have largely been posed within the class struggle realms of political economy, there has been an overriding consciousness to demonstrate capitalism's generation of unequal exchange and uneven development. However, presented within the broad epistemology of political economy, bearing in mind the problematic cross-currents of materialist analytical genres, some of these phenomena have been posed within the perspective of underdevelopment without adopting the entire logic of the dependency theoretical edifice. Although the dependency theories constitute a materialist attempt to re-interpret the Third World historical phenomena using Marxist philosophical and methodological approaches since classical marxism was essential.



Euro-centric, there are a number of constructs developed that are theoretically without discarding the entire problematic, we adopted some of its logical elements. We have used these to portray the retardation of indigenous enterprise in Buluya when the peasants were forced to conform to certain capitalist interests and economic stimuli. Thus, the incorporation of what in dependency terminology is referred to as the Kenyan periphery into the capitalist network, brought a picture of a complex dialectical interaction between change and stagnation. The system induced a self-contradictory character when it stimulated and repressed the development of productive forces by both opening and blocking the way for the development of capitalism in Kenya and specifically Buluya. Thus, as the capitalist economy in the Kenyan periphery developed, the more it underdeveloped the peasantry and the working class. But underdevelopment did not just involve an unevenness in development on a world scale as dependency scholars would have us believe, but differences in the degree of dynamism were existent in the traditional Luyia economies as they were in the world capitalist system and its peripheral satellite of Kenya that were spatially separated but symbiotically linked. These Luyia economies became part of the Kenyan periphery which was complimentary to the metropolitan centre within the framework of a world division of labour supported by unequal inter-territorial relations. However, apart from this inter-territorial

inequality within the periphery and metropolitan centre relationship, there was a type of inequality within the periphery that was regional.

The existence of variations in the colony including Buluyia has been attributed to the uneven impact of European rule in Kenya, creation of an occupational structure to which Africans were exposed to differently, and an introduction of a cash economy with different intensity in various regions of the colonies. In other words, uneven development was the result of articulation between the dominant international capitalist system with the Luyia traditional economies which it undermined and at the same time perpetuated. It was a process that engendered both dissolution and conservation of these economies. It set in motion complex economic and social relations which were mediated through the colonial state and its organization of operational apparatuses. Thus, the implications of the process affected both the form of production that emerged in the colony and the spatial and social structure of the colonial society.

Whereas the penetration of the capitalist mode of production in traditional Luyia economies led to the process of dissolution and conservation, the pattern taken in each area or sub-ethnic collectivity was governed by the internal dynamics of their societies as well as the historical mode of expansion of the capitalist relations

and forms of exchange. This expansion was determinate in terms of timing, spatial spread and the mechanism of imposition. The penetration of capital in the depth and breadth of the area was characterised by the process of imposition of colonial rule in Buluyia in itself vivified by the twin processes of resistance and collaboration. Therefore, the consolidation of the rule through pacification campaigns and reaping the convenience of collaboration, the articulation of capital with the hitherto prevailing traditional economies led to the spatial and social differentiation that emerged in Buluyia. Locally, for the Luyia peasants and migrant labourers described in the study from the beginning of colonial rule upto the period of decolonization, the alienated lands now dominated by European settlers and their service urban centres formed the centre of the colonial economy. Here, the division of labour which resulted in the penetration of capital in the periphery was marked in racial divisions.

In its mediation of the conflicts that emerged between these racial divisions, the colonial state favoured the European settler enclave in its allocation of political representation, revenue and terms of exchange. Therefore, although the Luyia were integrated with the local centres of international and domestic capital which in turn integrated Buluyia and the rest of the colony into the world economy, this historical process inevitably

interacted with the previously existing forms of production and space utilization to produce an uneven regional development of Buluyia and the rest of the colony. The southern locations Buluyia were regionally more developed.

The process of uneven regional development was reinforced by the process of unequal exchange. We have given evidence of how the earlier phase of colonialism in Buluyia was characterised by pure appropriation of livestock resources during the pacification campaigns. It was a collection of wealth in the form of booty. But more appropriation was in the form of delivery of peasant produce at the emergent Indian run trading centres for a pittance. When setting the prices of peasant produce, no attention whatever was given to how such produce was produced. On the contrary, the colonial officials, though not entrepreneurs, ensured that production was carried out and that a surplus of commodities was made available for sale. Both the Europeans and Indians involved in the exchange, without using force, manipulated their knowledge of the profits to be made in distant markets. They procured peasant produce while the rural producers were totally unaware of conditions in foreign markets and lacked access to these markets. They appropriated indirectly or through subtle means the African surplus which they helped create by encouraging petty commodity production among peasants. But the Luyia potential in this commercial

traffic was low, partly stultified by constraints of discriminatory economic policy. The Luyia traders were therefore locally domiciled. This arose from the relation between the rulers and the ruled.

The colonial administration had allowed the emergence of the Indian comprador merchants as intermediaries between the European trading houses and the peasant producers or consumers. These handled the imports such as fertilizers, agricultural tools, cloths, and other items which had an assured or predictable market, free from rapid or even erratic fluctuations. But business that was relatively safe was the prerogative of the European import-export firms. Thus, they established an expatriate trading sector where they ostensibly made 'super-normal' profits.

We have demonstrated how the Luyia petty bourgeoisie did not perceive this state of affairs as a natural given. It was a major grievance which featured centrally in the area's petty bourgeois political activism. Nevertheless, other than just provide evidence of how the colonial state was the direct agency for the diversion of resources through mainly labour, land and peasant produce, within the problematic paradigm of underdevelopment, we have also presented in chapter 8 an engrossing analysis of the role of the Luyia political intelligentsia in the politics of the independent country's neo-colonial development. The period of decolonization had been a formative one in the development

of the socio-economic structures and class relations that were to determine the politics of the independent state in the early 1960's. This period is generally regarded as the beginning of neo-colonialism as it marked the transition to a definitive stage in the control of the mantle of state without offloading the constraints of the metropolitan centre-periphery links. The political activism of the Luyia political elite in the power plays of the immediate post-colonial era was brought about by the fact that the liquidation of the colonial structures had to await a shift in power within the ranks of the nationalist movement that had newly assumed leadership of the country. In other words, independence had reared new conflicts and contradictions that characterised the post-colonial terrain of political antagonisms. However, we have shown that with the dissolution of KADU, the Luyia political elite was integrated into the post-colonial ruling class which controlled the process of effecting the provisions of the independent constitution. It was this class which did not completely sever the colonial umbilical cord and therefore failed to develop an independent bourgeois or uninterrupted radical change.

In view of the above concrete situations which gave root to the type of Luyia politics in the colonial and immediate post-colonial eras that have been explored in the study, with more emphasis, we reiterate the need to examine the achievements and limitations of these politics from

the standpoint of class struggle. Thus, as stated in this study, this approach in Marxist political economy has been augmented by the dependency perspective of underdevelopment despite its being deterministically structuralist. Because of the latter problem, only the elements of uneven development and unequal exchange have been used alongside the analytical realm of class struggle. But these processes are analysed with a return to classical marxism based on the modes of production and the factors governing the transition from one mode of production to another (See de Silva, 1982, 2).

Although Marx conceived human society as an interrelated nexus of both economic and non-economic elements, he clearly distinguished between productive and unproductive labor and therefore saw different classes as partners in exchange at the level of the market. Therefore, the creation and disposal of surplus value were now viewed in terms of productive factors abstracted from the social and political relations of production. The production relations condition the scope for the reproduction of capital although they may have developed independently of their external articulation (de Silva, 1982, 2-3). Thus, if a theory of colonialism and neo-colonialism is to explain underdevelopment such as the one besetting Buluyia, it should be grounded on Marx's basic concept of production modes, examining the effects of colonialism on class structures. In this study, we have conceived the processes of uneven development and unequal

exchange to signify production relations which became a barrier to the development of the Luyia productive forces. Thus, we have combined the methodological approaches of class struggle and some elements of the underdevelopment perspective for a common theoretical content and analytical effectiveness. Although we reject the dichotomous logic of the development of underdevelopment on the assymetrical relationship between an apparently omnipotent international capitalism and an indigenous bourgeoisie that is distorted, deformed or constrained by its subordination (Benstein and Campbell, 1985, 9), we recognise the need for an alternative approach which combines elements of dependency and Marxist perspectives (Zezeza, 1985, 14). This combination of perspectives is necessitated by the need to correct the confusion brought by the underdevelopment theory with its lack of theoretical rigour. Yet the underdevelopment problematic has not really been transcended since Marxist approaches of class struggle and the internationalization of capital do not answer the questions posed by the underdevelopment theory (Beckman, 1981, 9).

Given that Marxism has yet to provide a scientifically adequate and politically sufficient analysis of imperialism, capitalist development and underdevelopment (since classical marxism is Europe-centred), alternative or synthetic efforts such as the one attempted in this study



are necessary. They are necessary because knowledge has to be tested and developed through a process of confrontation. 'It is astonishing', said Keynes, 'what foolish things one can temporarily believe in if one thinks too long alone'. Moreover, development of knowledge is a process of interchange, and an individual's work must be adjusted to already existing work and also pave the way for others (de Silva, 1982). Accordingly, if the essence of imperialism is political, our analysis of imperialism during the colonial era and the immediate post-colonial era in this study is a pointer to the need for others to investigate the Luyia political participation in the latter phases of the post-colonial era. More effort is required to help us transcend the problematic of classical Marxism and underdevelopment when applying their identification of contradictions to concrete situations.

But when referring to the problematic of classical marxism, perhaps we need to clarify what methodological orthodoxy there is in Marxism. Marxist epistemological orthodoxy does not imply the uncritical acceptance of the results of Marx's investigations. Other than seen as a belief in Marx's classical synopsis of societal growth or the exegesis of his political economy, our notion of orthodoxy refers exclusively to method. The historical materialist and dialectical method can be developed, expanded and deepened only along the lines laid down by its founders (Lukac's, 1983, 1). But this must be done without leading

to oversimplification, triviality and eclecticism. Thus, we have conveyed the method of historical and dialectical materialism as the basis of classical marxism against which analytical paradigms and orthodoxy may be measured. On the whole, a discussion of the historical and dialectical materialist method itself turns a study such as this one into questions of theory and practice. Evidently, from our methodology, we have extracted the practical essence of the various Marxist theories in relation to their object, the Luyia society and its history in a manner which reflects Marx's notion of history when he defined the conditions in which a relation between theory and practice becomes possible. He said:

"It is not enough that thought should seek to realise itself; reality must also strive towards thought" (Marx, Bottomore ed., 1963, 52).

In this light, we have examined the themes of class struggle, unequal exchange, uneven development and peripheralization of Buluyia with such rigour as to overcome the incapacity of orthodox marxism to come to terms with nationalism as a political force. The syncretic approach we have given in this study and the empirical evidence we have adduced constitute our contribution to <sup>the</sup> historiography of Buluyia and Kenya in general.

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(h) Oral Interviews - List and Selected Details of Some the Outstanding Informants

Anyim Achieng', Jason - Interview on 11/7/87 at Uholo in Siaya. Achieng was a trade unionist between 1948 and 1951. A close associate of Agwings-Kodhek who greatly influenced the agitation of the Baholo to be included into Central Nyanza in 1963. He settled into business in Nairobi in 1954. He was an ex-soldier.

Onyimbo, Ongoli - Interview on 2/7/87 a founder member of the Buluyia political Union. He was also the Secretary of the Abaluyia Welfare Association (East Africa). Born in Kisa at Ekambuli. Very resourceful on ethnic politics.

Sitialo, Richard - Interview on 3/8/1988, a farmer from Bukhayo Bungoma who also carried some buying and selling of cattle at Amukura, Butere and Kimilili. Very resourceful on trade and agriculture in Bungoma.

Masitsa, Reuben - Interview on 5/8/1988, a farmer from Kabras Kakamega. Formerly a member of KAU in the 1950s and a member of the Kabras Locational Council in the 1950's and assistant Chairman of the Bushu Welfare Association. Resourceful on government administration.

Ingongolo, Lumbasi James - Interview on 24/7/1988, a carpenter in Kabras. He belonged to Dini Ya Msambwa and eventually became a supporter of KADU in Kabras. Knowledgeable on Kabras politics and support for DYM.

The Right Reverend Namango, Isaac - Interview on 5/8/88 at Khasoko Bukhayo in Bungoma. Was a school teacher and a church lay reader before rising into higher hierarchies of the Church as Bishop of the Nambale Diocese of the C.P.K. He was also a member of the district Land Board who also owned a lorry, built a shop and was an outstanding farmer with a total of 78 acres of land.

Fuchingo, Fanuel - Oral Interview on 29/9/1988 at Sivilia village Kabras in Kakamega. He was involved in the

North Kavirondo Tax payer welfare Association that operated in close contact with KCA. He was also a member of KAU. He was a businessman in addition to undertaking small-scale farming.

Op warā, Daniel - Oral Interview on 7/8/88 at Mungore village, Bukhayo in Bungoma. A successful farmer who also did some trading in milk cheese, sorghum and cattle.

Matere, Philip - Oral Interview on 8/8/88 at Chiliba Village, Bukusu in Bungoma. A former sub-chief who also undertook some amount of farming by employing labourers on his 20 acre farm.

Khaemba, Wetangula Dominic - Oral Interview on 5/9/88 at Mukhweya village in Bungoma. A retired teacher who had risen to the position of headmaster and Acting Director of Social Services. He was a successful trader in cereal and produce trade (small retail business) and concentrated on farming following his retirement from public service.

Wekesa, Machabe Donisio - Oral interview on 6/9/88 at Sikusi Village, Bukusu in Bungoma. A former headmaster in the 1930's who has since retired and engaged in sugar-scale farming. He also undertook some scale retail trade in the early 1960's.

Nabutola, John - Oral interview on 4/7/88 at Mateka village, Bukusu in Bungoma. An ex-chief who also had been a teacher and successful farmer during the 1940's and 1950's.

Wanubi, Wilson - Oral interview on 5/7/88 at Nasianda village, Bukusu, Bungoma. An ex-chief who had started farming in the early 1920's. Because of being a prominent farmer, he was appointed chief at a time when he was a teacher by profession. He built a shop and maize mill at Nasianda in addition to his 2 ploughs.

Baraza Jonathan - Interview on 23/8/88 at Butonge, Malakisi (Bukuau) Bungoma. A member of Bukusu Union in 1943 that worked closely with KCA. He was also a farmer and a headmaster.

Muyelele, Yohah - Interview at Kasiamo (Bukusu) Bungoma on 24/8/88. a member of KAU in the 1940's and the party's representative in the area. Worked closely with Joseph Mulama of North Nyanza. He became a headman and had to deal with unrest in his area following the activities of Dini Ya Msambwa.

Kitanyi, Noah - Interview at Butonge on 23/8/88 at Butonge. An adherent of the CMS that was rivalling the Friends African Mission in the area. He became a church teacher in 1925.

Kibaba, Elam - Interview at Cheskahi on 25/8/88 in Bungoma. A member of KAU and a former deputy headmaster at Chwele and opened a small retail shop alongside small-scale farming activities.

Masinde, George - Interview at Ndivisi in Bungoma. On 20/8/88. A farmer and a former teacher in the region in the late ~~1950's~~ before becoming a clerk in the area's local government.

Munyasia, Mukono Alphonse - Interview on 24/8/88 at Khaloba, Bungoma. A Catechist at the Catholic Mission from the late 1930's. Later became a village headman in 1950. A successful farmer and a small scale trader in farm produce.

Wang'asa, Ndinyo Vincent - Interview on 25/8/88 at Khachonge, Bungoma. A former headmaster between 1949 and 1954. Also a successful farmer and trader.

Wekesa, Machabe Dishon - Interview on 26/8/88 at Sikusi, Bungoma. A former headmaster in the 1940's, also a farmer and trader and also a former student of pascal Nabwana the leader of the Bukusu Union. He established a flour mill in the area in 1942 and acquired a lorry in 1950.

Wenani. Boniface - Interview on 26/8/88 at Nalondo, Bungoma. A farmer since the early 1950's and also a reknown headmaster between 1954 and 1956. He also became the Secretary of the area's Locatinal Council.

Masinde, Sebastian - Interview on 26/8/88 at Manani, Bungoma. A farmer since the late 1930's. He

installed a flour mill and undertook trade in other items.

Makokha, Sirengo Henry - Interview at Miende on 27/8/88 in Bungoma. A former soldier in the colonial army and a former sub-chief. Engaged in farming since 1952 on his 42 acre land and joined the administration in 1957.

Masibo, Sibi Peter - Interview at Matisi on 28/8/88 in Bungoma. A very knowledgeable man on the history of political activities in Bukusuland. A farmer

Kibisu, Peter - Interview at Sabatia in Kakamega on 3/1/89. A veteran trade Unionist during the colonial and post-colonial eras and a former member of parliament. Knowledgeable on labour struggles and political factionalism in Kenya's nationalist struggle.

Aseka, George - Interview at Ekambuli Village, Kisa Kakamega on 8/10/87. A former manager of the Maize produce depots in Yala and Bungoma, an-ex-Sub-chief and a retired Municipal employee. He was a school mate of Tom Mboya and a class mate of Masinde Muliro at St. Mary's School Yala.

Angolo, Josephine - Interview at Ekambuli village, Kisa Kakamega on 20/10/87. Among the first women to be converted to the American Church of God denomination when it was introduced in the area during the early 20th century. Born around 1905 she witnessed many of the events following the First World War in Kenya and has a lot to tell on the Wanga chief Joseph Mulama who was imposed on the Kisa and Marama.

Kuya, Julius - Interview at Ekambuli village, Kisa on 24/10/87. A resourceful informant who recounted his experiences when he was recruited into carriers corps during the Second World War. He operated a shop in Nairobi where worked with the Kenya Breweries following his return from the war.

Aseka, Susana - Interview at Ekambuli Village, Kisa on 19/10/87. A retired teacher and daughter to Daniel Najero Asiachi of Esalwa in Bunyore who was one of the leading African catechists of the



Church of God mission in Bunyore. Now a Church leader and small-scale farmer.

Asiachi, Frank - Interview at Esalwa village, Bunyore on 14/11/87. A former headmaster and retired Education Officer. Schooled at St. Mary's Yala with Masinde Muliro and other leading personalities. Now a church leader.

Akolo, Fanuel - Interview at Ekambuli Village Kisa on 22/10/87. A former Local Native Council employee and a resourceful informant on African experiences in the colonial political economy. Now a farmer and businessman.

Malumbe, James - Interview at Ekambuli Village. Kisa on 25/10/87. A retired teacher who taught most of the educated elite from Kisa and Bunyore including this researcher. Now a small-scale farmer.

Osengo, Josephat - Interview at Ematioli village, Butsotso in Kakamega on 25/10/87. A former recruit of the Kings African Rifles and a reknown football referee. He is now a small-scale farmer and a Minister of one of the pentecostal churches there.

Es hipili, Musa - Interview at Mwihila, Kisa in Kakamega on 29/10/87. A leading Minister on the Church of God who was involved in its initial spread in the area during early colonial rule.

Opakwa, Wellington, Interview at shisango village in Butsotso in Kakamega on 26/10/87. A reknown retired magistrate who started his career as a court clerk during the 1940's.

Makokha, Samuel - Interview on 2/7/87 at Busia town. Was involved in cases of land demarcation in Bukhayo in 1964. He was involved in migrant labuor on the European farms in Lugare and Kitale area where he served variously as a headman.

Dindi, Martin - Interview at Ikondoshela, Bukhayo, Busia on 3/7/87. A former student of Alliance Boys High School and an ex-education Officer. He was involved in the politics of KADU and was a very resourceful

informant on historical events in Western Kenya. He was a school-mate of leading personalities like Robert Matano, Ole Tamano, Jean Marie Seroney and Taita Towett. He taught others as a teacher at Government School Kakamega.

Kubebea, Boniface - Interview at Busia on 2/7/87. A businessman since the 1940's and a resourceful informant on agricultural and political trends in the Busia district area.

Ouma, Aggrey - Interview at Nambale in Busia on 2/7/87. Currently the Manager of Nambale Farmers Co-operative Union and the Nambale Cotton Ginnery. Very resourceful on Cotton farming in Busia district.

Otiende, J. Daniel - Interview at Mbale Market, Maragoli in Kakamega. A former teacher at Alliance High School who taught most of the educated elite of the country who passed through the school. A former member of KAU and a Cabinet Minister in the Independence era.

Oduol, Eliakim - Interview on 4/7/87 at Bumala in Busia. A former Railway apprentice qualified as a locomotive mechanic in 1940. He is retired and now farms at Iwanda village in Busia.

Barera, Anderea - Interview at port victoria, Bunyala (Busia) on 6/7/87. A former teacher in Nairobi in the early 1940's who eventually returned home to teach there. He began small businessness in wood-carrying of boats and fishing. Prior to these, he had served in the Second World War.

Otiato, Silfano - Interview at port Victoria, Busia on 6/7/87. Was recruited into the Kings African Rifles in 1939. On his return he began business with his army remuneration package. He is now a successful businessman. He is resourceful on the KANU/KADU rivalry in Bunyala.

Mukudi, Samuel - Interview at Lugale village, South Bunyala, Busia on 7/7/89. An ex-chief and son of ex-Senior Chief Noah Mukudi. A former KAU member who is very resourceful on the party activities in Buluyia and the Luyia involvement in Mau Mau. He also is knowledgeable on the KANU/KADU in Busia district.

Kanji, S.H. - Interview at Sio Port on 7/7/87. One of the surviving Asian traders at Sio Port who has carried business in the area since 1915. Resourceful on Asian enterprise in the area.

Mfuma, Zephania Ogalo - Interview at Sio Port on 7/7/87. A peasant farmer in the area who witnessed the coming of Indians in the area.

Ngumo, Abadnego Ogema - Interview at Namasali, Sio Port on 7/7/87. A peasant farmer born in the 1880's who witnessed the establishment of colonial administration in the area. Very resourceful on events of the period.

Wandera, Enos - Interview at Namasali, Sio Port on 7/7/87. A padre of Sigalame parish trained at Maseno Bible school in 1962 following his apprenticeship service as a religious teacher between 1950-1957. A very successful farmer and a knowledgeable informant on political trends in Busia district.

Ayienga, Samuel - Interview at Butere Kakamega on 8/8/87. A former agricultural extension officer at Butere. Has a lot of information on agricultural trends in Busia where he served as senior agricultural instructor.

Muliro, Masinde - Interview at Kitale, Trans-Nzoia on 23/4/88. Educated in south Africa and a leading participant in the politics of decolonization. He became a cabinet Minister in the post-colonial government. He has a lot of information on politics in Buluyia especially the Kalenjin/Luyia rivalry in Trans-Nzoia.

Kanani, Habil - Interview on 8/7/87 at Nambuko in Busia. A Makerere graduate who taught at Butere in 1957 as Deputy Principal at Chadwick Teacher Training College. He became a member of parliament in 1967 for Busia Central. He was a close associate of Senator Machio.

Nyamori, M.A. - Interview at Funyula Samia, Busia on 8/7/87. A recruit of the King's African rifles during the Second World War where he served as a clerk. Very knowledgeable on the subject of politics.

Kusinyi, Daniel Wabwire - Interview on 9/7/87 at Nangwe, Bukhayo Busia. A farmer in the area who is resourceful on clan rivalries in Busia including land disputes.

Kanani, Musa Makuli - Interview on 14/8/88 at Shibembwe Village, Tiriki, Kakamega. A KAU member who worked closely with Andrea Jumba. Very useful on the history of political events in Tiriki and Kakamega in general.

Khatambi, Elijah - Interview on 15/8/88 at Senende, Tiriki, Kakamega. A dealer in animal skins and hides. A KAU member who worked closely with Andrea Jumba and Benjamin Sangale.


Sangale, Benjamin - Interview on 15/8/88 at Shamakhokho in Tiriki, Kakamega. A member of KAU closely associated with Jacob Inyanje, Thomas Luteshi other Luyia KAU members. Knowledgeable on the activities of NKTWA. He was arrested together Andrea Jumba, and Jacob Inyanje in connection with KAU and charged with inciting villages through campaigns.

Kharinda, Jimakile - Interview on 16/8/88 at Lugari in Trans-Nzoia. A member of Dini Ya Msambwa who collaborated with Wekukhe, Zviaeli Khaoya and other DYM members. Resources on DYM activities in non-Bukusu areas. Currently, a businessman.

Libese, Levi - Interview on 16/8/88 at Lugari in Trans-Nzoia. A member of the Abaluyia Central Association together with Lumadede Kisala. Knowledgeable on the history of NKTWA, NKCA and the Abaluyia Central Association. A retired teacher and now a farmer.




APPENDIX 2: BOUNDARIES OF NORTH KAVIRONDO IN 1963




WESTERN KENYA (Source: K. P. Lohrentz "The politics of educational development in Central and Southern North Nyanza Kenya, 1903-1938" Ph D dissertation, Syracuse university, 1977, p 25)

APPENDIX 3: BOUNDARIES OF NORTH KAVIRONDO RESERVE IN 1930 SHOWING ALIENATED AREAS WITH LUYIA SQUATTERS.



Source: REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON NATIVE LAND TENURE IN NORTH KAVIRONDO RESERVE, NAIROBI, OCTOBER 1930, P. 22.


APPENDIX 4: NORTH KAVIRONDO IN RELATION TO THE 'WHITE' HIGHLANDS.



Source: ADAPTED FROM D. ANDERSON, "STOCK THEFT AND MORAL ECONOMY IN COLONIAL KENYA" AFRICA VOL. 56 NO. 4 1986 PP. 399 - 416.




APPENDIX 5: NORTH KAVIROONDO IN RELATION TO ALIENATED LAND THROUGHOUT KENYA 1934.





Source: R. M. BREEN, "THE POLITICS OF LAND, THE KENYA LAND COMMISSION (1932-33) AND ITS EFFECTS ON LAND POLICY IN KENYA" PHD DISSERTATION MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY 1976, p. 16.

APPENDIX 6: REGIONAL BOUNDARIES



KENYA NEW REGIONAL BOUNDARIES (Source: Osolo-Nasubo's ph. D dissertation 1973, page 183).

APPENDIX 7: SETTLEMENT SCHEMES IN WESTERN KENYA



APPENDIX VII: KENYA, AFRICAN SETTLEMENT SCHEMES IN THE UASIN GISHU AND TRANS NZOIA AREAS IN 1965

Source: Based on Kenya, settlement purpose map 1964 and map of Kenya land settlement schemes, 1965.