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
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Africa and the 'New World Order'

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AFRICA AND THE 'NEW WORLD ORDER'

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A PROJECT REPORT PRESENTED TO THE
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE OF THE
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FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
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(IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS).

BY

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DEDICATION


This work is dedicated to my parents:
Mr. Kanayo Onyilogwu and Mrs. May Onyilogwu;
and to my brothers and sisters: Ifeoma, Ikem,
Akachukwu, Chibike, and Chinelo.

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CERTIFICATION

ONYILOGWU, Kenekwukwu, a Post-Graduate Student in the Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria, has satisfactorily completed the requirements for courses and thesis for the degree of Master of Science in International Relations.

The work embodied in this project report is original and has not been submitted in part or in full for any diploma or degree of this or any other University.



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ABSTRACT

It is now recognized that 'new' international relations now obtain. The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe; the end of the cold war; and the subsequent break-up of the Soviet Union into its constituent Republics, have led to what is now regarded as a 'new world order'. This new global dispensation is essentially a unipolar order characterized by the preponderance of the capitalist west led by the United States of America.

Within the framework of the world-system theory, an attempt is made in this research work to discover the impact the new world order is having on Africa.

The central thesis of this study is that, on the aggregate, the new world order impedes African development due to Africa's peripheral position in the world capitalist system. The new world order represents an increased entrenchment of the capitalist mode of production globally. As predicted by the world-system theory, it is a continuation of the process of peripheralization and underdevelopment of Africa.

The study covers the period, 1985 to 1992. It is important to note, however, that at the time of generation of data from World Bank publications (in April 1992), the World Bank report for 1992 had not yet been published. As a result, World Bank figures used in analysis are for the years, 1985 to 1991.

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PREFACE

This study is a response to the need to investigate the impact the newly-emerged new world order is having on Africa. The central thesis of the study is that the complex of economic, political, and strategic international developments that is the new world order has been impeding Africa's overall development because of Africa's peripheral position in the world capitalist system.

Chapter one of the study is the introduction and it deals with the general introduction, theoretical framework, the method of study, among others.

Chapter two examines the origins of the new world order and also defines the characteristics of the new world order.

Chapter three revisits the concept of development to expose Africa's condition of underdevelopment, its cause(s), and its dynamics.

Chapter four - the core of the research work examines the economic, political, and strategic effects the new world order has been having on Africa's development. It is shown that the new world order has been impeding African development.

Chapter five is the concluding chapter in which recommendations are advanced with regard to how the

adverse effects on Africa of the new world order can be remedied. A path to African development is suggested.

This study covers the period, 1985 to 1992. It is important to note, however, that at the time of generation of data from World Bank publications (in April 1992), the World Bank report for 1992 had not yet been published. As a result, World Bank figures used in analysis are for the years, 1985 to 1991.

I am grateful to the Council for the Development of Economic and Social Research in Africa (CODESRIA) for providing the research grant used in conducting this research.

I am also grateful to several individuals who contributed in various ways to the preparation of this work. My thanks go to my supervisor, Dr. Echezona, for help and guidance he gave throughout the period of the research; as well as to my friends and colleagues for helping in one way or the other. I am also grateful to the library staff of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), Lagos for the assistance they rendered to me during the period of generation of data for this study. My special thanks must go to my parents,

and to my brothers and sisters for always providing me with invaluable support. To them, this work is dedicated. But, most importantly, I wish to thank the Almighty God for making this enterprise possible.

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October, 1992.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED

1. ABC - American Broadcasting Corporation
2. ACP - African, Carribbean and Pacific Countries
3. AEC - African Economic Community
4. AIDS - Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
5. BBC - British Broadcasting Corporation
6. CIS - Commonwealth of Independent States
7. COMMECON - Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
8. EPRDF - Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front
9. EEC - European Economic Community
10. FAO - (United Nations) Food and Agriculture Organization
11. G-7 - Group of Seven Industrialised Countries
12. G-77 - Group of Seventy-Seven Developing Countries
13. GDP - Gross Domestic Product
14. GNP - Gross National Product
15. IDA - International Development Association
16. IFIs - International Financial Institutions
17. IMF - International Monetary Fund
18. IRA - Irish Republican Army
19. MFN - Most Favoured Nation
20. MNC - Multi-National Corporation
21. NAM - Non-Alligned Movement
22. NIEO - New International Economic Order
23. NIO - New International Order

24. NWO - New World Order
25. OAU - Organization of African Unity
26. OECD - Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
27. OPEC - Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
28. RENAMO - Mozambican National Resistance Movement
29. SAP - Structural Adjustment Programme
30. TNC - Trans-National Corporation
31. UN - The United Nations
32. UNCTAD - The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
33. UNDP - The United Nations Development Programme
34. UNITA - Union for the Total Independence of Angola
35. US; USA - The United States; The United States of America
36. USSR - The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 General Overview:

In 1985, citing what he called "socio-economic stagnation, loss of momentum and inertia"¹ in Soviet society as reasons, the then Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, introduced the twin policies of 'Glasnost' (openness) and 'perestroika' (economic reconstruction). 'Glasnost' provided for political reforms including the guarantee of freedom of expression and of dissent; while 'perestroika' provided for economic reforms through the introduction of private ownership of some means of production, and other principles of free market economy. The economy was decentralised and trade was, to some extent, liberalised.

The introduction of 'Glasnost' and 'perestroika' in the then Soviet Union led to reform movements in Eastern Europe especially in early 1989. It inspired peace moves, multi-party political systems and liberalisation of political institutions worldwide. More significantly, it led to the demise or weakening of Communist parties in Eastern Europe. Communist parties either disappeared (as in the erstwhile German Democratic Republic) or changed names (as in the other

countries of Eastern Europe) and became Swedish-type social democratic parties.

Communism finally collapsed completely in Eastern Europe in September 1989.

This seemingly abrupt Soviet Switch from a marxist - leninist posture to ideas hitherto unthinkable in official (Soviet) circles unleashed demands for further liberalisation of Soviet institutions, (led to) nationalist ... uprisings within the country, (led to) the automatic collapse of the Warsaw military bloc, the re-unification of the former German Democratic Republic and Federal Republic of Germany, and led to the re-organization of the (erstwhile) communist trading block (COMECON) to adapt to ideas of hard currency trade based on Western models.²

The introduction of 'Glasnost' and 'perestroika' marked the beginning of the end of the cold war. The subsequent triumph of liberal political and economic principles as well as the break-up of the Soviet Union into fifteen independent republics have contributed to the emergence of the USA as the dominant power in the world today. "For the first time in over half a century, no single great power, or coalition of powers, poses a 'clear and present danger' to the national

security of the United States. The end of the cold war has left America in the ... position of being without an obvious major adversary."³ This fact was illustrated in the recent gulf crisis during which the USA mobilised an international war machinery against Iraq which had invaded and annexed Kuwait. It was the first time in history that the United Nations Security Council, with the consent of the USSR, authorized the use of force against a member country. The USA's preponderance in the world today means that it now exercises effective control of the United Nations. The new global configuration - essentially unipolar - has come to be characterized as a 'new world order'; new, in the sense of being distinct from the old bipolar order of the cold war era. Thus, a new international reality now exists; we are in a new international era.

1.2 Statement of Problem:

Inevitably, the new global equation demands examination from an African perspective: what impact is the 'new world order' having on Africa? Specifically, what effect is the 'new world order' having on African development? Is it enhancing or impeding African development? What are the prospects for

African development under the new global dispensation?

The purpose of this study, then, is to provide answers to the above questions.

It is important to note the variables involved in the problem stated above. The 'new world order' is the independent variable and it refers to a phenomenon whose main features have already been outlined in section 1.1 above and will be elaborated in chapter 2. 'African development' is the dependent variable and this concept will be elaborated in chapter 3.

1.3 Significance of the Study:

A critical review of the literature on the 'new world order' reveals that the question of the effects of the 'new world order' on African development has yet to be adequately addressed. This study will, therefore, fill a research gap.

The study is also timely: it comes at a time when virtually all African countries are grappling with increased socio-economic and political problems. The study will help explain why these problems persist and, possibly, proffer solutions to them.

The study will also serve to sharpen the definition of the concept of development as well as to elucidate the concept's relationship with certain

specific policies and phenomena (like regional integration, which will be examined in the context of Africa's attempts at overcoming underdevelopment).

1.4 Literature Review:

A critical review of existing literature on the 'new world order' throws more light on the phenomenon as regards its impact on Africa.

As might be expected of a global phenomenon that is new, most of the literature on the 'new world order' concentrates on articulating the nature of the order. There is, as yet, very little in the literature on the impact of the new dispensation on Africa.

There is disagreement in the literature as to whether the present global dispensation even constitutes a new world order. The view has been expressed by some observers that the world is in a transition period and that a new international order is still evolving. One such observer is Boris Pyadyshev who, in an International Affairs (Moscow) summit discussion, declared that "it's really too early to speak of the onset of a new world order. All that we can say is that while world politics has undergone deep changes and while the cold war has wound down or, indeed, drawn to a close, no new world order can emerge

overnight. It can only be a question of approaching or tackling the formation of a new system."⁴ With regard to the general nature of world order, pyadyshev further posits:

nothing could be more unsafe than to speak of a definite, established and balanced world order. No definite world order has ever existed, nor can one exist as a complete system. Everything is in a state of flux. This is how matters stand, now as in the past. Period follows period but the process is dynamic. And this raises a very important question about the mechanism of shaping an eventual world order.⁵

He then concludes that "the new world order is going to be rather like a new lack of world order"⁶ because things are, as yet, not properly defined; according to him, the order will be marked by confusion and uncertainty.

This concept of the 'new world order' seems to see it as something to be established willfully and which will then function according to the dictates of its establishers; or "as a quality that may or may not obtain in international politics at any one time or place, or that may be present to a greater or lesser

degree: order as opposed to disorder."⁷ 'World order' in the context it is being used today (in the phrase, 'new world order'). is used to denote 'global dispensation'; to denote "the totality of relationships among states, the international political system as a whole."⁸

Although pyadyshev's concept of world order will not be very useful for the purposes of this study, he captures the dynamic nature of the international system when he characterizes it as being in a state of flux.

Speaking in a similar vein, Ma Xusheng⁹ first characterizes 'international order' as "a legal system encompassing the principles, measures, and mechanisms by which international relations are coordinated and common international problems are solved."¹⁰ He then traces the need for international order to the rise of states and the development of contacts among them; although he points out that it is only in the modern history of international relations that establishing an international order in its complete sense became a practice.

His view agrees with that of Pyadyshev that international order is not and has never been immutable. "Rather, it's been constantly updated in

accordance with changes of the pattern of the world's balance of strength."¹¹ According to him, international order has been established twice in this century: firstly, the Versailles system established after the first world war; and secondly, the Yalta system established after the second world war and which has just collapsed. He contends that the third international order is yet to be established; that the world is still in transition. He also contends that the new world order will be different from the two previous orders in terms of formation, content, and purpose because the international situation has changed.

In terms of formation, he notes that the two previous orders were conceived during world wars and finalized under post-war circumstances. He then contends that "without the authoritative force of war playing a role, establishing a new international order in a matter of a few years is out of the question."¹²

In respect of content and purpose, he notes that "international order used to be based on hegemony and power politics, with a few major powers dominating international affairs and imposing their views on nations of the world through international mechanism. History proves that the above-mentioned order cannot

bring world peace."¹³ He insists that the new international order, to be successful, must have as its objectives, the consolidation of world peace and the promotion of common development.

Xusheng posits that these objectives will be achieved by either of two methods: Big-power domination or Common participation. According to him, big-power domination has two salient features: restricting the sovereignty of independent states and placing human rights above sovereignty; and taking ideology as the dividing line and meddling in the domestic affairs of nations that reject western democracy.

Under common participation, however, the new world order will be built on the principles of peaceful co-existence, sovereignty, equality, peace, justice, and non-interference in internal affairs of individual states.

Ma Xusheng contends that for now (which he characterizes as a transition period) big-power domination and common participation are playing a balancing role in settling international issues.

Thus it can be seen that, like Pyadyshev, Xusheng sees a 'new world order' as being still in embryo and not yet existent. He, however, acknowledges that "the new international order will take effect even

before a complete, 'pure' system is formed... thus it might be said that the new international order is actually present in the process of its own formation."¹⁴

Xusheng's contribution is significant to the extent that it constitutes what must be considered the communist view of the new global dispensation especially as regards the method of achieving the objectives of consolidation of world peace and promotion of common development (Xusheng advocates the method of common participation): Xusheng is a Deputy Foreign Minister in China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

It is curious, however, that he does not consider the Gulf war of 1991 forceful or authoritative enough to have brought about a new world order.

In contrast to Pyadyshev's and Xusheng's view, vityal Tretyakov¹⁵ insists that the new global configuration constitutes a new world order. According to him, "even if it's no order, it is something new."¹⁶ He outlines four factors to support his contention, viz:

1. The collapse of the Soviet communist bloc .
2. New subjects of foreign policy are appearing (for instance, new republics have emerged in

Yugoslavia. If he was writing after the break-up of the former Soviet Union, he would have added, new former Soviet republics).

3. International relations are taking new forms in certain regions. For instance, in the erstwhile USSR and eastern Europe which have opened their markets to foreign investments.
4. The unifying of national interests; the increasing congruence of national interests as a result of the collapse of the Soviet bloc.¹⁷

Of course, it is doubtful if there has been any 'unifying of national interests' but Tretyakov's contribution is useful because it highlights some of the characteristics of the new international dispensation. His contribution also highlights the need to read 'order' as the way things are in relation to one another, rather than as a condition in which everything is carefully arranged and is in working condition.

Writing before the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Ken Jowitt¹⁸ describes the collapse of communism in eastern Europe as the most significant event in the new global dispensation; in fact, as being responsible for the new global dispensation. This event he describes as a 'leninist extinction'. According to him,

the 'leninist extinction' has radically altered the geopolitical frame of reference that countries throughout the world have long used to bound and define themselves.

The third world, for instance, has bounded and defined itself since its beginning at the Bandung Conference of 1955 by distinguishing itself from the West on the one hand and the leninist world on the other."¹⁹

He contends that the capacity of the non-aligned states (of which virtually all African states are part) to obtain 'development assistance' was dependent upon the conflict between 'the other two worlds' the one led by the United States, the other led by the then Soviet Union. He further contends that "now the bipolar alignment with reference to which the nonaligned states of the third world defined themselves has disappeared,"²⁰ the capacity of the third world states (and by implication, of African states) to secure 'development assistance' has been reduced.

Jowitt posits that the new world order is a similar situation to the one described in the Book of Genesis of the Holy Bible whereby the major imperatives Yahweh was faced with were 'naming and bounding'. Similarly, the major imperatives of the new world

order are naming and bounding. According to Jowitt, this 'genesis environment' could lead to new ways of life or new ideologies. Jowitt concludes that,

the emerging international environment's primary characteristic will be turbulence of an order not seen during the cold war. In this new world, leaders will matter more than institutions, charisma more than political economy. It is precisely at such times - when existing boundaries and identities, international and national, institutional and psychological, are challenged - that charismatic leaders offer themselves as sources of certainty and promise.²¹

Jowitt provides a rather pessimistic prognosis of the new international era. However, he raises an important issue as regards the relevance of the non-aligned movement (NAM) in this new world order, an issue which will be addressed later in this study.

Fred Halliday²² contends that the cold war has ended because of the triumph of the west over the east, this triumph having been made possible by the collapse of Soviet power.

He considers if there is a new agenda in international relations. He contends that there will be two kinds of answer, depending on how the term 'international relations' is used. In the first

sense, the term 'international relations' denotes foreign policy and current affairs. In the second sense, it denotes the academic - the comparative and theoretical study of inter-state relations.

Addressing the issue of international relations in the first sense, he agrees that there is a new agenda dominated by the following issues: the environment (concern with depletion of the ozone layer; concern with global warming and the greenhouse effect); weapons proliferation; migration; international cooperation and human rights; drugs and the deadly disease, AIDS; and terrorism. He makes the point that certain key elements of the old agenda (Nationalism, war, and distribution of wealth) still persist.

In respect of international relations in the second sense, Halliday concludes that it confronts a new agenda only partially because of changes in the international situation and in the policy agenda. Changes in social science study as a whole have also affected international relations. The three broad issues, according to Halliday, that underlie the new international relations academic agenda are: the process of internationalisation in the contemporary world, and the reactions against it; the collapse of

the Communist bloc; and the question, posed by Francis Fukuyama, about change in the international system and the end of history.²³

Halliday's discourse is useful. It highlights the most important issues on the international agenda today. It also provides useful insight into theoretical challenges facing international relations as an academic discipline.

Segun Osoba²⁴ considers "the so-called new international order (NIO) as no more than hollow, even fraudulent propaganda."²⁵ He claims that "the west (in particular the USA, UK and France) see the new unipolar, essentially one-party structure of international politics as a unique opportunity for bringing under its heel all the former colonised peoples of the third world."²⁶ In this drive, according to Osoba, the west employs the United Nations Security Council as a military and political instrument to bring about its goal - the consolidation of the dominant, western, capitalist economic doctrine through the dominant United States power and influence. He cites the examples of the US - conceived and largely implemented 'operation desert storm' against Iraq and the US - masterminded imposition of military, economic,

and diplomatic sanctions on Libya over its alleged implication in the plane bombings over Scotland in 1988 and over Niger in 1989:

He contends that the new international order is sectarian and anti-democratic in character because the western-instigated Security Council is discriminatory in its policies - enforcing vicious policies against Iraq, Libya, and the Palestinians while treating Israel with kid gloves. Osoba also claims that the western powers are guilty of the very acts of aggression they accuse Iraq and Libya of. He cites the examples of the USA's acts of aggression against the Nicaraguan Sandinistas in the 1980's; against Grenada in 1983 to 1984; and against the Noriega government of Panama in 1989 to 1990.

He concludes that the new international order was "set up ... under the spurious and tarnished banner of human rights and multi-party democracy to subjugate the whole world to a rapacious and militaristic, capitalist world order and, thereby, foreclose the many genuine democratic options available to the peoples of the world in the realms of economics, politics and overall culture."²⁷ He then calls upon the peoples of the world to fight this 'subversive

plot'.

Osoba's discourse highlights the marginalisation of the 'third world' (and Africa) under this new world order. It also calls attention to what may be a hidden agenda of the western powers to completely dominate the world.

Edmond Keller²⁸ reviews political research in Africa and concludes that as a result of the waxing (between the mid-1960's and the mid-1980's) and waning (since the 1980's) of authoritarianism in Africa, political analysts have been forced to take stock of the tools at their disposal for understanding political change. According to him, while some scholars take 'democracy' as their unit of analysis, others take institutions like the one-party system and popular movements and their relationship to the achievement of democracy. Still others take the broad concept of governance. All of these approaches, Keller argues, do not tell us much about the process of change. He advocates that analysis should focus instead on 'regime change'. He defines regime as "the formal rules and organization of national political power, and the relationship of national authorities and institutions to society at large."²⁹ According to him, "the regime defines the normative order, structures the relation-

ship between public authorities and the rest of society, and determines who has access to political power and who does not."³⁰ According to Keller, the concept 'regime' is broader than the concept of government but narrower than the concept of the state. While 'government' refers to "the actual instruments of public rule including public office-holders"³¹, the state is represented "in a juridically defined, sovereign territory; in governmental institutions; and in the political organizations used by those who govern to achieve the goals of a particular regime."³² He notes that a government may change without the regime changing just like both a government and a regime may change without the character of the state changing.

Finally, Keller recommends that Africanist research re-focus on political change. He suggests that case studies should be made with countries where changes are most obvious and that studies should be at the macro - and micro-levels. Macro studies would involve "identifying, in a broadly comparative manner, how structural (domestic and international) variables interact with one another and with social - psychological (e.g. personality, small groups) variables in

the context of Africa's unique political culture to yield a particular pattern of regime transformation."³³

Micro-level studies would involve "case studies and 'small-n' comparisons applying the model (developed from macro studies) and giving it some texture."³⁴

Keller's review and taxonomy of political research in Africa is instructive. However, his recommendation of 'regime change' as the most appropriate focus of analysis of political change reflects a particular theoretical bias which is unacceptable for this study. A more appropriate focus would be the state.

In a class analysis of the economic crisis in sub-saharan Africa, Julius Ihonvbere³⁵ points out that while there is agreement on the depth and dimensions of the crisis and even on the implications for both Africa and the world community at large, such an agreement does not exist with regard to the origins and causes of the crisis. According to him, generally, there are two contending views as to the origins and causes of the crisis. One view holds that it was caused by external forces:

falling prices of primary exports, exploitation by Trans National Corporations, declining investment and foreign aid, failure of the west to transfer technology, and a generally hostile

international environment for poor, dependent and underdeveloped economies.³⁶

The second view holds that the crisis was caused and is being reproduced internally by "personal rule, human rights abuses, marginalisation of the majority from decision - making processes, corruption, mismanagement of the economy, failure to make radical restructuring of the respective economies, inefficiency; and the general disregard for democratic values, popular participation, production, and self-reliance."³⁷

Ihonvbere insists that the factors identified by both views as the causes of the crisis are, in fact, symptoms or manifestations of the crisis. According to him, the real issues behind Africa's economic crisis have to do with history, class, state, and production and exchange relations, in place since the early years of political independence. He argues that it is the production of these fundamental historically determined causes that have combined with other developments to deepen the African crisis."³⁸

Ihonvbere's analysis is illuminating highlighting, as it does, the harmful activities of trans national companies in Africa as well as how the ruling comprador Bourgeois class in Africa is an accomplice in the

exploitation of Africa.

Fei Zongwen³⁹ notes that due to the global movement from tension to detente, dialogue has taken the place of confrontation and this trend has had wide-ranging and far-reaching influence on Africa. According to him, this influence has been felt in the political, economic, and strategic spheres of African affairs.

In the strategic sphere, several inter-state armed conflicts have been settled. These include the Ethiopia/Somalia conflict and the Chad-Libyan conflict.

In the political/diplomatic sphere, Zongwen notes, there have also been positive changes in Africa. He notes that Algeria and Morocco have re-established diplomatic relations and that tension between South Africa and the frontline states has eased.

He also notes that Africa's economic crisis has led African countries to concentrate on economic 'rejuvenation'.

Zongwen cites the following factors as being responsible for the political, economic, and diplomatic changes in Africa:

1. The strong desire of the African countries for peace and development.
2. The impact of detente between the USA and the

Soviet Union and relaxation of the international situation as a whole.

3. The trend that many countries are paying greater attention to their domestic, especially economic problems. Emphasis on economic development has, in turn, made readjustment and reform the tide of the day in the world.
4. Driving force of the OAU (the Organization of African Unity) and the United Nations.

Zongwen notes, however, that given the multitude of problems left over by history in Africa and the complex nature of internal strifes, attaining political stability and economic development in Africa will not be an easy task.

Zongwen's analysis of the changes in Africa is helpful but some of the factors to which he attributes them are rather vague. For instance, have Africans not always had a strong desire for peace and development?

Timothy Shaw⁴⁰ reviews African political economy over the past decade (the 1980's) especially the last half of the decade. He examines the effects of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP's) African countries were forced by the western-controlled international financial institutions to adopt and

concludes that:

"adjustment is unfortunate as well as unworkable, because it reinforces Africa's colonial divisions and retards any prospects for regional co-operation. National reforms are incompatible with regionalisms. Collective as well as national self-reliance is eroded, although both may become inevitable in the future as adjustment terms become unbearable; literally, self-reliance by default.⁴¹

According to him, (economic) liberalisation, which the structural adjustment programmes have involved, has exacerbated increased dependence on foreign goods and fashions. He also notes that an increased lack of confidence in African economies has led to transfer pricing, capital flight, and external savings.

He notes that reactions to the deficiencies and drawbacks of the IMF/World Bank SAP prescriptions come from three inter-related sources:

1. The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, the ECA, which insists that adjustment does not advance development.
2. Other agencies within the United Nations e.g. the UNICEF (which prefers 'adjustment with a

human face') and the UN development programme, the UNDP (which insists on 'human development' as a whole rather than just economic development).

3. A set of academic evaluations of adjustment.⁴²

He concludes that Africa has entered a new period following that of decolonisation, Namibia being the last colony. According to him, in this new period, "class contradictions and coalitions are apparent, as revealed in patterns of, and opposition to structural adjustment."⁴³

Making recommendations for analysis, he contends that,

any persuasive, neo-materialist political economy for Africa in the 1990's must, then, include at least three salient elements, all of which involve revisionism around established perspectives, ... First, it should situate the continent's political economies in the global context of new international divisions of labour and power, in which novel balances of property and authority are transforming patterns of production, distribution, consumption, and accumulation, as well as destruction and deprivation. Second, it must recognize the transformed policy context in which the conditionalities of structural adjustment have come to undermine assumptions

about one - party, state-dominated systems of power and privilege. And third, it should incorporate changing social contexts: the dynamics and dialectics of the continent's distinctive political economies, particularly the expansion of informal and rural sectors, the contraction of industrial and state sectors, the recognition of female production and consumption, and the creation of novel forms of democratic participation and organization.⁴⁴

Shaw's analysis of African states and studies in this new world order is incisive.

Carol Lancaster⁴⁵ examines Africa's economic crisis, links its debt component to the overall need for external finance, relates that need in turn to the prospects for inducing the African countries to adopt 'required' economic reforms, and proposes institutional devices to achieve such a result.

She attributes slow development in Africa to the following reasons:

1. Economic inheritance at independence of African countries.
2. Accumulated problems of economic mismanagement by African leaders.
3. Sharp deterioration in the region's terms of

trade from the historic highs during the early 1980's.

She makes proposals for financing Africa's economic reform which includes a new initiative on debt to link debt reduction and debt relief to development needs and to performance on economics.

The proposal involves the merging of consultative groups, roundtables, and other co-ordinating groups plus the Paris club meetings into a single international grouping for individual countries - called here an Adjustment Review Consortium (ARC) - to be chaired by the World Bank with participation by creditor and donor governments and international institutions plus the individual African government.⁴⁶

She also advocates debt relief for African countries.

Lancaster's analysis of Africa's economic problems reflects a particular economic theoretical bent: the western, liberal tradition. This is not surprising given the fact that her study was conducted under the auspices of a noted western, liberal think-tank.

Her recommendations, in particular, are not acceptable although it is acknowledged that they

stem logically from her analysis.

Richard Joseph⁴⁷ examines the new drive towards plural democracy in Africa and concludes that the democratic movement is, infact, not new. According to him, "although the democratic movement in Africa first burst onto the headlines in 1990, it is not exactly new, nor is it merely an echo of events elsewhere in the world. Students of Africa can trace the roots of its democratic movements to individuals and organizations that have been harshly repressed for decades."⁴⁸

He notes that the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa also served as a catalyst to the contemporary democratic movement in Africa.

Joseph draws up a taxonomy of democratic transitions in Africa. He identifies seven models viz:

1. The national conference:

This has occurred in the Republics of Benin, Congo, Togo, and Cameroon.

2. Government change via democratic elections:

This occurred in Cape Verde and in Sao Tome and Principe between January and March 1991. In the Republic of Benin in March, 1991, Nicephore Soglo defeated Matthieu Kerekou (the president for the past

seventeen years) in free multiparty elections. In October 1991, Frederick Chiluba defeated Kenneth Kaunda (the president for the past twenty-seven years) in free elections held in Zambia.

3. Co-opted transitions:

This involves the ruling party co-opting the opposition into the government in an erstwhile one-party state. This has been witnessed in the Ivory Coast, Gabon, and the Senegal.

4. Guided Democratization:

In this model, a military regime retains virtually complete control of the transition process which is generally complex and deliberately prolonged. This has been the case in Nigeria and Guinea.

5. Recalcitrance and piecemeal reforms:

This has been witnessed in Mali, Ghana, Cameroon, Malawi, Kenya, and Sudan, among others.

In Mali, Mousa Traore was overthrown and reforms instituted. In Ghana, Jerry Rawlings finally agreed to convene a constitutional assembly leading to multiparty elections. In Cameroon, Paul Biya initially refused to allow a national conference that would supplant him and his party but he lifted press restrictions, permitted opposition parties to operate,

and granted amnesty to political prisoners.

Among the recalcitrants, the unswerving hardliners are found in Malawi, Kenya, and the Sudan, among others.

6. Armed insurrection culminating in elections:

The reduction in cold war tension (global detente) facilitated democratic changes in Namibia (leading to independence), in South Africa, and in Angola (where the Estoril accord provided for elections in late September 1992).

In Uganda, Yoweri Museveni's national resistance movement, after overthrowing Milton Obote, instituted a quasi-democratic system: no multi-party elections are provided for but press freedom and respect for human rights have been guaranteed. There is also provision for an Ombudsman.

In Rwanda, following an armed insurgency that began in late 1990, President Habyarimana agreed to introduce a multiparty system and other reforms.

In Ethiopia, a July 1991 meeting to establish a provisional government approved a charter that includes provisions of freedoms of expression, assembly, belief, and association. The meeting also announced plans for elections in 1992.

7. Conditional transitions:

These are cases where transitions are interrupted if there is threat to the regime or to the democratic aspirations of the people. This has been witnessed in Algeria and Tunisia where there are strong Islamic fundamentalist movements.

Joseph provides a good analysis of the political changes taking place all over Africa.

Claude Ake⁴⁹ agrees with Richard Joseph that the drive towards democratic pluralism in Africa is not new. He notes the interest of the west in this new drive and makes the point that the legacy of indifference to the fate of democracy on the African continent that the west is just overcoming "has its roots in the colonial era, when political discourse excluded not only democracy but even the idea of good government."⁵⁰

To Ake, the democratization drive is a welcome development. He, however, warns that the action of the International Financial Institutions (IFI's) constitute an impediment to democratization. This is so because the IFI's give autocratic African leaders the chance to substitute structural adjustment for democratization. This they do by supporting such leaders as submit to structural adjustment.

Ake cites the example of Somalia under Siad Barre.

He then concludes that,

the IFIs may be contributing to democratization inspite of themselves. If one is a leninist and believes that 'the worse, the better', one may indeed welcome their tenacity in pursuit of adjustment, for the escalation of political repression associated with it has helped to spawn the democracy movement in Africa. However, seeking progress by the intensification of contradictions is both costly and risky. It will cause a great deal of suffering and may give rise to extremist ideologies and political forms that serve neither development nor democracy.⁵¹

Ake's analysis is particularly illuminating as it highlights one paradox that obtains in Africa of today: the march of political democratization against increasing economic disenfranchisement of the African majority.

1.5 Theoretical Framework for Analysis:

The theoretical framework for analysis adopted for this study is the world-system approach of the political economy paradigm.

The world-system approach is a development theory that grew out of the dissolution and dispersion

of the dependency theory. It is a relatively new theoretical current that arose from the criticisms of dependency theory.

The world-system approach is normally associated with Immanuel Wallerstein,⁵² and with the more recent writings of Samir Amin, Andre Gunder Frank, and Giovanni Arrighi.⁵³

It is to be noted that there exist important differences between the conception of the world system by Wallerstein and A.G. Frank, on the one hand, and Amin and Arrighi, on the other. While Frank and Wallerstein perceive the dynamics of the world system as being 'mechanistic and deterministic', Amin and Arrighi see it as being voluntaristic. Thus, Frank and Wallerstein see the world system as a capitalist world economy, "as one integral system covering the whole globe and being moved by a single dynamics completely overpowering the individual states that make up the system."⁵⁴

Thus it is clear that Frank and Wallerstein's world system approach bears some theoretical resemblance to the dependency tradition. However, there is now a shift in the level of analysis "from the periphery to the centre-periphery structure of the

world system."⁵⁵

However, despite the differences between the Wallerstein/Frank position and the Amin/Arrighi position, the following can be summarized as the main strands of the world-system approach:

1. There is a social whole that may be called a capitalist world economy, which came into existence in the sixteenth century and has since expanded historically from its European origins to cover the globe. The appropriation by the world Bourgeoisie of the surplus value created by the world's direct producers has evolved direct appropriation at the market place as well as unequal exchange.
2. No analysis of individual states can be made without placing them in the context of the capitalist world economy.
3. Throughout the history of the capitalist world economy, there has been increasing organization of oppressed groups and increasing opposition to its continuance.
4. The struggle between capitalist and socialist forces cannot be reduced to a struggle between any two countries. The 'crisis' is worldwide and integral, and must be analysed as such.

5. After the second world war, the United States was the hegemonic power and able to impose relative order on the world system.⁵⁶

The world-system approach will provide theoretical grounds for the analysis of the impact on Africa of the new world order. It will show how Africa's relative (peripheral) position in the capitalist world economy has conditioned the new world order's impact on African development.

As has already been indicated, the world-system approach bears resemblance to both the dependency approach and the Marxist theory. It admits of the existence of a 'capitalist world economy'. However, unlike both the dependency and Marxist approaches, it sees the 'world system' as comprising the 'core-states' (analogous to the dependency school's 'centre' or 'metropolis'), the 'semi-periphery', 'the periphery' and the 'external arena'. "The semi-periphery consists of an intermediate but functionally important category of countries which are either turning into core-states, or losing their status as such, disappearing out into the periphery."⁵⁷ Today, this category would include countries like Turkey, Greece, the newly industrialising countries of South

East Asia, among others.

"The external arena is the set of areas which have not as yet been affected by capitalist penetration from the core-states."⁵⁸ As both A.G. Frank and Samir Amin have pointed out, 'the global accumulation of capital is a historical process that involves the incorporation of the external arena into the capitalist world economy (that is, peripheralization). This process, according to them, is now more or less complete as evidenced by the protests of the very few remaining 'aboriginal peoples' of the world.

An important distinguishing feature of the world system approach is that, unlike both the dependency and Marxist approaches, it sees the world system as a systemic whole, one which determines the development of each one of its component parts. In other words, both 'Europe' and Africa were made parts of the whole (the world system) at some point and their development thenceforth was determined by the whole. In this way, the world-system theory rejects both the 'Eurocentric' and the 'Afrocentric' interpretations of African history and development.

An analysis then must start from how the whole operates and of course one must determine what is the whole in a given instance. Only then may we be able to draw an interpretative sketch of the historical outlines of the political economy of contemporary Africa, which is ... an outline of the various stages (and modes) of its involvement in this capitalist world economy.⁵⁹

The first stage of African peripheralization, according to Wallerstein, was the period from 1750 to 1900. Before 1750, therefore, Europe and Africa were external arenas to each other. This first stage was marked by trade in luxury goods following the winding down of the slave trade. Infact, according to Wallerstein, the process of peripheralization brought to an end, the slave trade. Trade was governed by effective supply rather than by effective demand because the trade did not fulfill any important function to both economies.

The second phase of African peripheralization started around the beginning of this century. Wallerstein situates it in the context of the 'scramble for Africa' which led to the partitioning of Africa among European powers who now used their African

colonies as raw-materials production centres. This second phase of African peripheralization still persists.

With respect to Africa's future (that is, the third phase of Africa's peripheralization), Wallerstein insists that the process of Africa's underdevelopment (he uses the concept 'dependent development') will continue. According to him, some 'core-states' might be weakened and might even fall into the peripheral class; some semi-peripheral states, on the other hand, might become stronger and may even join the class of the core-states; some African states who now belong to the peripheral class might assume semi-peripheral positions (he mentions specifically, the Republic of South Africa, Zaire, Nigeria, Algeria and Egypt as countries who have the potentials in terms of size, raw materials, and industrial capacity). He, however, insists that the situation of the peripheral countries will worsen implying that their only hope for progress shall be a revolutionary transformation of the capitalist world system to a socialist world system.

Wallerstein then forecasts that the incorporation of Africa into the capitalist world system will be complete by the third decade of the twenty-first century. That reality would then correspond with

Karl Marxes model of the world capitalist system.

There are several merits in using the world-system approach:

Like both the realist and Marxist theories of international relations, it draws on historical experience and like the Marxist theory, it stresses structures of production; relations of production and exchange; and international capital. But it goes further than the original Marxian interpretation of history to extend the tenets and methods of Marxism to the problem of the 'development of underdevelopment' engendered by the 'global accumulation of capital'; a problem that was still in embryo during Marxes time.

1.6 Hypotheses:

In the light of the questions this study seeks to provide answers to, the following are put forward as hypotheses to be validated or invalidated by reference to facts:

- a) The 'new world order' has a mixed and differing impact on various aspects of African development. But on the aggregate, it impedes African development.
- b) The prospects for African development under the new global dispensation are poorer than they were

in the previous world order.

- c) The new world order marks a further entrenchment of the capitalist mode of production globally; a tilt in the balance of social forces in favour of pro-imperialist forces; and a continuation of the process of peripheralization and underdevelopment of Africa.

It is worth noting that, as in the case of the statement of problem, the variables in the hypotheses are 'the new world order' and 'African development'. The 'new world order' is the independent variable while 'African development' is the dependent variable.

The conditions for validating or invalidating the hypotheses are as follows:

The economic, political, strategic and other changes that have been engendered on the African continent by the new world order will be outlined. What constitutes development will also be highlighted. It shall then be determined whether Africa (using aggregate data for all countries) has developed at a faster or slower rate, during the period under study, than in the previous period, and whether such a faster or slower rate of development is attributable to the emergence of a new world order. If the rate of

development has been slower, as a result of the emergence of a new world order, then hypothesis (a) and, by implication, hypotheses (b) and (c) are validated. If the reverse is true, then the hypotheses are invalidated.

1.7 Method of Study:

The method of research to be employed in this study is generation and collection of data from content analysis of books, periodicals, newspapers, and institutional publications. In other words, secondary method of data generation will be used. The data so-generated will then be analysed to provide answers to the questions raised for this study.

The data will be analysed using the world-system theory. The analysis will show whether - as the world system theory suggests - the new world order reflects a continuing expansion of the capitalist world economy; whether the new world order reflects the continuing struggle between capitalist and socialist forces globally with capitalist forces increasing in their ascendancy at the moment. The analysis will show to what extent the impact of the new world order on African development has been conditioned by Africa's peripheral position in the capitalist world system.

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CHAPTER 2

THE ORIGINS AND FEATURES OF THE 'NEW WORLD ORDER'

2.1 The Concept of World Order:

As Roland Yalem has noted, although the concept of world order is very commonly used in International Relations, it is as yet, ill-defined and inadequately conceptualised. Yalem sought to present the concept of world order as it appears in the literature and to analyse the reasons for the plurality of definitions and the inadequacy of its conceptualisation. According to him,

definitional ambiguity is largely the result of the failure of scholars to explicate clearly the conceptual foundations of world order. Part of the difficulty lies in disagreement on the relative emphases accorded to law and power as elements of order; it also stems from a heavy emphasis on the prescriptive or normative thrust of conceptualisation and neglect of the empirical aspects.¹

There are various conceptions of world order viz:

Minimum world order:

This is conceived of as "a public order which establishes as authoritative, and seeks to make effective the principle that force, or highly intense coercion,

... is reserved in community monopoly for support of processes of persuasion and agreement and is not to be used as an instrument of unauthorized change."²

But, as Oran Young points out, this conception is ambiguous and exemplifies a widespread inability to define the concept 'world order' in a genuinely fruitful fashion.³

Optimum World Order:

This is "a public order which, beyond authoritative orientation toward the minimum of coercion and the maximum of persuasion ... is further designed to promote the greatest production ... of human dignity values among peoples."⁴

As with the 'minimum world order' conception, this conception is ambiguous, failing as it does, to provide empirical standards of measurement of the main concepts.

World Order as a War Prevention System:

In their study, Richard Falk and Saul Mendlovitz concentrate on "... the avoidance of war through the creation of a war prevention system. To conceive of world order as the strategy by which one system is transformed into another ... is the essence of the undertaking."⁵

This conception views world order as a future preferred goal in the form of a warless system. The implication of this conception is that there is no world order since this system does not exist. This is a questionable proposition.

World order as the negation of world disorder:

According to this view, the concept of disorder, whose elimination the world seeks, is easier to define; so that, by defining it, the different meanings of order will be better understood.

The problem with definition by negation is that there may be no global consensus as to what constitutes disorder and what constitutes order.

World order as a value:

This conception sees world order not merely as a condition but also as a value; "as a quality that may or may not obtain in international politics at any one time or place, or that may be present to a greater or lesser degree: order as opposed to disorder."⁶

Hedley Bull further defines world order as "a pattern or structure of human relations such as to sustain the elementary or primary goals of social existence among states."⁷

This definition is abstract. It fails to answer

the question: what kind of structure is required to sustain the value of social co-existence among states?

World order as a condition:

This view sees world order as an actual or possible condition or state of affairs in world politics; as "the totality of relationships among states, the international political system as a whole."⁸

This conception of world order seems to be the most useful for the present study. It stresses the present rather than the future.

It is worthy to note that these different conceptions of world order also dictate different approaches to the study of world order. These approaches can be broadly categorized into the normative approaches (including international law and international organization approaches), and the systems approach.

a) The International law approach:

Proponents of this approach include Richard Falk and Saul Mendlovitz.⁹

International law is an important ordering mechanism in International Relations. International law, at least theoretically, is a precondition for order in International Relations. It is, however, recognized that International law has not been very

effective in preventing determined states from flouting international rules and norms of behaviour. Despite this shortcoming, it is still widely recognized that International law is important as a pre-requisite to order in international affairs. There is, however, disagreement with respect to its relative importance. This disagreement stems from a lack of linkage between international law and international political relations. Many international lawyers - who are the main advocates of the international law approach - still see international law as an independent variable, ignoring social and political factors. Political scientists, on the other hand, treat international law within the context of international politics as a secondary influence on world order. This is as a reaction to the failure of international law to effectuate world order in reality. As Yalem has noted in addressing the question of the relative importance of law and power to world order, our concern should be the following: what is the relationship between law and power and how does the tension between them affect the nature of world order? Is order a function of law alone? If not, is order a function of power, especially balanced military power? Or are both law and power reciprocally

important factors in the attainment of order? Such complex questions should guide the search for knowledge of the nature of world order.¹⁰

Another criticism of the international law approach to world order is that it has a normative emphasis. It emphasizes "the future rather than the present on the assumption that the conditions of international life today are inadequate for the realization of the requirements of an effective world order."¹¹

It is clear, then, that "international law is not the only or even the most important factor for world order but one that cannot be denied. What is debatable is the extent of its importance. Other factors such as nuclear deterrence, technical aid, and regionalism may stabilise international relations and therefore contribute to the conditions of world order."¹²

b) The International organization approach:

Since the early twentieth century, international organization (manifested in the League of Nations and the United Nations) has been an important part of the search for world order.

Because world order "was conceptualised as a condition of legal order which could be facilitated

by the complementary operations of universal and regional organizations,"¹³ it was implied that universal organizations (like the League of Nations and the United Nations) and regional organizations could contribute to the attainment of world order.

The main function the universal international organizations - the League and the UN - were meant to serve was the maintenance of international peace and security. It is worth noting that "within the context of the universal organizations, order has been defined as the maintenance of international peace and security against those states that would disturb the peace by unauthorized violence."¹⁴

Although both the covenant and the charter placed either restrictions or prohibition on the use of force by member-states in the settlement of disputes, this has not prevented determined states from employing force when they desire. These organizations also "lacked the legislative authority to adjust situations of international injustice that often have precipitated aggression by one state against another."¹⁵ Thus, "as an approach to world order, international organization has been referred to as a kind of international constitutionalism."¹⁶ Despite

the constitutional provisions for international organizations, none of them has been able to function successfully as guarantor of international order. In the past, both the United Nations and the League of Nations have had success only in containing minor conflicts. They have been largely ineffectual in quelling major conflicts. This can be attributed to the big power conflict of interests that usually obtained in such conflicts especially in the post-second world war period characterized by the cold war between the east and west blocs. With the end of the cold war, however, and the subsequent preponderance of the USA in the United Nations, it is easier to achieve consensus needed to act in containing any conflict. The USA simply arm-twists every other country into going along. This fact was clearly demonstrated in the Gulf crisis of 1990 to 1991 which arose as a result of Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

As already indicated, regional security organizations also exist and their operations are meant to complement those of the universal organizations like the United Nations. However, after the second world war, there arose an imbalance of influence in favour of regional security organizations over the United

Nations which was more due to the ineffectiveness of the UN than due to "the responsibility of a disorderly flight to regional co-operation."¹⁷ It is also noteworthy that "regional security groups had not enhanced the prospects for order but had themselves contributed to an intensification of international tensions."¹⁸

One can conclude, then, that in the cold war period, "while the UN (was) a significant factor in establishing world order based on the nation-state ... it also perpetuated the drawbacks of sovereignty and brought moderation at the cost of making resort to limited or subliminal violence endemic and the recurrent explosions of unsolved disputes inevitable."¹⁹

In this new world order, however, as long as the dominance of the USA as the only superpower persists, it is likely that international organization will be more effective in maintaining international peace and security. In spite of this, international organization has never been, and is not expected to become in the near future, a guarantor of international order.

c) The systems approach to world order:

Systems analysts explore the question of how the structure of

(the international system) influences the intensity of inter-state conflicts and how the nation-states in turn influence the structure of the system in which they coexist. Structure is usually defined in terms of the number of major powers that is assumed to affect the stability or instability of the system, defined as its propensity for serious conflict.²⁰

System analysts also consider the factor of homogeneity or heterogeneity in the ideologies of the different states that make up the system as being of equal importance as the structure of the system. The assumption here is that while homogeneity in ideologies promotes mutual adjustment of differences, heterogeneity conduces to conflict.

According to Stanley Hoffmann, "security, satisfaction, and flexibility are the requirements for order in any political system."²¹ He goes further to differentiate between moderate and revolutionary international systems. According to him, their features are determined by the degree to which the earlier-mentioned requirements for order are met. According to Hoffmann, "in moderate systems, order is achieved because nation-states find it easier to

attain security, satisfaction, and flexibility while revolutionary systems reflect a fundamental disorder because insecurity, dissatisfaction, and inflexibility characterize the relations of states."²²

System analysts consider international law and international organization dependent variables whose effectiveness as ordering mechanisms is dependent on the type of international system (the independent variable). In this wise, the minimal influence of both international law and international organization in the post-second world war, cold war period can be explained by the revolutionary nature (characterized by uncertainties and conflicts) of the international system at the time.

By this reasoning, the new world order would be considered moderate and therefore the effectiveness of both international law and international organization as ordering mechanisms should be enhanced.

Thus, for systems analysts, the attainment of order among states is a political, rather than an organizational or legal problem.

The systems approach offers perhaps the most useful orientation for the analysis of world order because it encompasses a large number of variable

factors that influence the degree of order in international relations. Such factors as the distribution of power, the existence of ideological convergences or divergences, the nature of weapons technology, and the character of the means and ends of foreign policy assist in our understanding of the causes of order and disorder in the international system.²³

For systems analysts - who are basically realist scholars - world order is best secured through a balancing of (military) power. According to them, the balance of power in the international system is the most important factor that affects system stability.²⁴ If the balance of power is multipolar, order is likely to prevail in the international system because there will be a tendency towards moderation in the means and ends of foreign policy behaviour. In contrast, instability and disorder are likely to prevail if the balance of power is bipolar. By this logic, a unipolar power structure, such as exists today in this new world order, would be regarded as a negation of the balance of power concept, and therefore undesirable.

"The principal weakness of the systems approach is the failure to recognize the possibility of a

coexistence of revolutionary and moderate elements within the same international system."²⁵

All of the above approaches to world order study it as a value that is there or not there; or present to a certain extent.

As stated earlier, the first two approaches to world order - international law and international organization - are more normative being that they focus more on how to establish a future 'ideal' or 'perfect' order. The systems approach, on the other hand, is more useful since it focuses on the present. Furthermore, as Yalem recommends, the concept of world order should be reconceptualised.

Rather than conceptualisation in terms of ideal conditions that are unlikely to exist until or unless world government is achieved, we should accept the concept as a relative rather than absolute condition. We should recognize that the international system is a complex amalgam of orderly and disorderly elements and that the character or nature of order depends upon the relationship between these constantly changing elements instead of fixed conceptions of order.²⁶

For the purposes of this study, 'world order'

will be analysed as "the totality of relationships among states" and the 'new world order', as the present state of affairs in world politics; the present configuration of relationships among states. In this connexion, it is worth noting that since the beginning of this century, three 'world orders' have been established: the Versailles world order (1919 to 1939); the Yalta world order (1945 to 1985); and the new world order which is being variously referred to as the Potsdam world order and the Malta world order. Of course, prior to the twentieth century, there may have been other world orders from the period after the treaty of Westphalia (1648). For the purposes of this study, however, it is sufficient to focus only on the world orders of this century.

The next section briefly discusses the two earlier world orders the twentieth century has witnessed.

2.2 Previous World Orders (In the twentieth century).

(a) The Versailles world order:

This is the world order that prevailed between 1919 (after the first world war) and 1939 (when the second world war started).

The first world war ended in 1918 with the

defeat of Germany and her allies (Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey). Following the end of the war, a peace conference was held in Versailles, France from 1918 to 1919 as part of the process of resettlement of the war. The conference was attended by twenty-seven countries most important among which were the victorious great powers, the USA, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan.

The Treaty of Versailles, the major treaty ending world war I (was) signed at Versailles, France, on June 28, 1919, and (went) into force on January 10, 1920 following ratification by Germany and four of the principal Allied and Associated powers, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan. It was not ratified by the United States which made a separate treaty of peace with Germany in 1921 incorporating much of the treaty of Versailles by reference. The lesser Allied powers, except China, were also parties. Separate treaties of peace were made subsequently with Germany's allies, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey.

The Treaty of Versailles was based on the pre-armistice agreement among the Allies of November 5, 1918, and the

armistice, with Germany of November 11, 1918 accepting (US) president Woodrow Wilson's fourteen points as the basis for peace, with modification by the Allies of the points dealing with freedom of the seas, reparations, and the status of the Hapsburg Empire which had, infact, broken up.²⁷

At the end of the first world war, the USA was the most powerful country, the dominant power in the world. It was, therefore, not surprising that it was the fourteen-point 'Blueprint for peace' of the U.S. president that was adopted at the Versailles conference even though there were other proposals for peace such as those from the British government, and the French government. But the most comprehensive proposal came from the South African Prime Minister, Jan Christiaan Smuts who published a pamphlet known as 'The League of Nations: a practical suggestion'.

Also, as if to drive home the point about its dominance, the USA was the only country whose president personally led the national delegation to Paris.

The Versailles world order was marked by American political and military predominance. However, this political and military clout was not matched with corresponding economic pre-eminence.

Until the outbreak of the first world war, Great Britain had been the hegemonic economic power in the world. But a major consequence of the first world war was the collapse of British economic hegemony. This collapse was part of a wider collapse of the international monetary system at the time - the Gold Standard.²⁸ At the beginning of the first world war, the warring Nations acted promptly to safeguard their Gold supplies and disengaged from the system of fixed exchange rates so as to bring about the freeing and mobilization of their economies.²⁹

With the collapse of the Gold Standard, individual Nations assumed the responsibility of determining currency values.

The Gold Standard collapsed for the following reasons:

Nationalism:

Most governments, exercising their new independence in monetary affairs, placed more emphasis on the pursuit of domestic welfare objectives like full employment, than they did on a stable international monetary system.

Secondly, as a result of too high a par value at which the value of Gold was set, British economic

growth was stunted: There was a decline in exports and the working class experienced severe hardship. This caused the British government to become pre-occupied with domestic welfare rather than international financial management.

Thirdly, as a result of its industrial decline, a corresponding rise of new powers and the attendant shift in global distribution of economic power, Great Britain was no longer capable of managing the international monetary system.³⁰

Although the USA had emerged as the dominant (military and political) power at the end of the first world war, it did not possess such economic wherewithal as to assume the mantle of economic leadership. Thus, there ensued economic chaos which led to the fragmentation of the international monetary system into several blocs: The sterling bloc established in 1932 after the Ottawa Conference by Great Britain and her Dominions and trading partners; the Dollar bloc formed around the USA; and the Gold bloc formed around France, Germany, Italy, and Japan also tried to cash in on the confusion by attempting the creation of their own financial empires.³¹

On the whole, then, the Versailles world order,

though characterized by United States political and military pre-eminence, was also characterized by economic multipolarity.

At this time, virtually all countries of Africa were colonies of European countries and were used as raw materials production centres for the industries of Europe. Thus, under this world order, the marginalization of Africa was through its colonial relations with the core-states of Europe.

(b) The Yalta world order:

From February 4 to 11, 1945, a conference of the leaders of the second world war allied powers was held in Yalta in the then Soviet Union. The conference was held "to plan the final defeat and occupation of Nazi Germany."³²

The conference reaffirmed Allied agreement to accept only unconditional surrender by the Axis powers, planned a four-power occupation of Germany (Great Britain, the USA, the USSR, and France), and agreed to meet in San Francisco (USA) to finalise plans for the United Nations. It also brought about the Soviet Union's agreement to enter the war against Japan after the surrender of Germany.³³

Even before the Yalta conference, a conference had been held in Moscow on October 30, 1943 attended by delegates from the USA, Great Britain, the USSR, and China, at which the four countries made a 'Moscow Declaration' stating their intention to form an international organization for the maintenance of international peace and security.³⁴

Subsequently, a number of social and economic institutions to tackle specific problems were created. One of these was the international relief and rehabilitation administration which was set up in 1943, to take care of the refugee and other related problems arising from the second world war. In the same year, an international conference was held in the state of Virginia, USA, to discuss food and agriculture. It was out of this conference that the Food Agricultural Organization, the FAO, emerged. The following year, in 1944, another international conference was held in Bretton Woods in the State of New Hampshire, USA, on economic and financial matters. Out of this conference, two organizations emerged: the International Bank for Reconstruction and development (the World Bank) and the International Monetary Fund, the IMF.

Finally, in August 1944, informal talks were

held in Dumbarton Oaks, Washington, USA, firstly, between the representatives of Great Britain and the USA, on the one hand, and those of the USSR, on the other; secondly, talks were held between Great Britain and the USA, on the one hand, and the representatives of China. The talks with the USSR and China were held separately because at the time, the USSR was neutral in respect of the war in the far east in which China was very interested.³⁵

It is noticeable that all these international conferences that defined the emergent world order at this time were held in the USA and in the then USSR and attended by the USA, Great Britain, the USSR, France and China. The agenda discussed at these conferences were also those of these dominant powers.

At the end of the second world war, the world was split along ideological lines between the capitalist west and the communist eastern bloc. The capitalist western bloc was formed around the USA while the communist eastern bloc was formed around the USSR. These two countries became known as super powers because of the military might they possessed.

There ensued an arms race between the USA and

the USSR whereby each country tried to surpass the other in the acquisition of superior military technology. Alongside this arms race raged an ideological cold war.

Thus the Yalta world order was characterized essentially by military rivalry between the USA and the USSR, the two superpowers, and between the western and eastern blocs formed around these two countries. The principal contradiction in this world order was, therefore, between east and west.

Within the period of this world order, most African countries attained political independence. This political independence was, however, not complemented with economic independence as African economies remained dependent as the periphery of the capitalist world economy. The marginalisation of Africa continued, this time through Africa's neo-colonial relations with the core-states of the capitalist world system.

2.3 Origins of the New World Order:

The origins of the new world order can be traced to 1985 when Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the then Soviet Union. Before Gorbachev came to power, the Soviet Union had begun to experience economic stagnation and even decline. On coming to power, then,

in 1985, Gorbachev introduced the twin policies of 'Glasnost' (political reform) and 'perestroika' (economic reconstruction). The idea was to boost flagging productivity in the Soviet Union. Even before Gorbachev came to power in 1985, and while he was on a visit to Great Britain in December 1984, the then British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, had remarked that Gorbachev was "the man with whom the west would do business". Gorbachev was then a member of the thirteen-member Soviet Politburo in charge of agriculture. Shortly after that, former leader Constantin Chernenko died and Gorbachev ascended to power. Thatcher's remarks and the sequence of subsequent events has led some observers to speculate that the west may have had something to do with Gorbachev's ascension to power and the momentous events that followed. This is a speculation that cannot be verified for now.

It is useful to examine in greater detail why Gorbachev introduced his reform programmes and what they involved since the introduction of the reforms can be singled out as the most important catalyst to the emergence of a new world order.

According to Gorbachev, whereas the Soviet

society was now faced with different tasks, "the theoretical concepts of socialism remained to a large extent at the level of the 1930s - 1940s."³⁶

According to him, Lenin's ideas of socialism were interpreted

simplistically and their theoretical depth and significance were often left emaciated. This was true of such key problems as public property, relations between classes and nationalities, the measure of work and measure of consumption, co-operation, methods of economic management, people's rule and self-government and others.³⁷

As a result, parochial attitudes and general laxity reigned supreme leading to inefficiency and low productivity. There was a general slackening of discipline and order and official reaction to economic problems was, in general, inadequate. Gorbachev's introduction of reforms was, therefore, intended as "a timely and critical appraisal of the danger of the growth of negative tendencies in (Soviet) society and in the conduct of a section of the communists."³⁸

'Glasnost', which means openness, provided for political reforms in Soviet society. Open debates

on government and communist party programmes were now permitted. The programme insisted that "there should be no blank pages in Soviet history." Under 'Glasnost', literary works formerly banned or censored were now made accessible to the general public. One such book that was unbanned was 'Gulag Archipelego' by Nobel Laureate in Literature, Alexander Solzhenitsyn. Also, under the 'Glasnost' reforms, provision was made for multiple candidacy (though under one party) elections to the congress of deputies. The Congress of Deputies had been created newly under the 'Glasnost' reforms. It was responsible for electing the members of the Supreme Soviet.

'Perestroika', which means (economic) reconstruction, allowed for some measure of private ownership of some means of production. Individuals were now allowed to own small businesses as long as they employed only members of their families or where they employed others, that such employees were paid the minimum state wage. This was at the lower level of the reforms. At the higher level, trade with foreign countries by individual entrepreneurs was now permitted.

The introduction of the twin policies of 'Glasnost' and 'Perestroika' set off a chain of events. In other eastern bloc countries, pro-democracy movements sprang up and, encouraged by the reforms in the then Soviet Union, started agitating for political and economic reforms in their own countries. Within the Soviet Union itself, pro-democracy agitators demanded for further liberalisation of Soviet institutions and nationalist sentiments bottled up for decades, were given vent to. Different nationalities and Republics of the Union notably the Baltic States of Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia, began to agitate for independence.

Meanwhile, the Soviet economy continued to experience upheavals. There were huge shortfalls in food production which forced the Soviet Union to depend, to a large extent, on the USA and other western Nations for supply of grains and other foodstuff. These economic difficulties coupled with pressures both from home and abroad led the Soviet Union to pull out most of its troops from the countries of eastern Europe.

By September 1989, virtually all the communist regimes of Eastern Europe had collapsed. Faced with

severe economic difficulties, and needing financial aid from the west and western-controlled agencies like the IMF and the World Bank, these countries had accepted the conditionalities of the west to introduce political and economic reforms involving the introduction of multi-party democratic systems and market economic principles like privatization of state-owned enterprises.

Subsequently, the Warsaw Pact military alliance of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries was dissolved in March 1991. On the 9th of November 1989, the Berlin Wall was brought down and East and West Germany were re-united. This singular event was the most significant in the series of events defining the emergent world order. It seemed to signify a formal end of the Cold war; a bridging of the east/west divide.

On the 2nd of August, 1990, Iraq invaded and annexed Kuwait. In reaction, the USA, through the UN which it now controls, mobilized an international coalition that defeated Iraq in March 1991. The new world order took perfect shape after this Gulf war of 1991. Indeed, after the war, in a speech at an American War College, the US president, George Bush,

boldly declared that a new world order now exists.

Finally, in December 1991, the Soviet Union broke up into fifteen independent Republics bringing to an end, an era that lasted for several decades.

The events of the past few years have taken the whole world by surprise. The momentous changes of the past few years were unanticipated.

It can, therefore, be said that a new world order has emerged as a result of the collapse of Soviet power; as a result of the triumph of the USA and the west over the then Soviet Union and the east.

2.4 Features of the New World Order:

There is some controversy as to whether the new world order is marked by a unipolar power structure whereby the USA is the world's sole dominant power; or whether the global power structure is multipolar (specifically, Tripolar) with power centers in the USA, United Europe, and Japan. While scholars like John Lewis Gaddis³⁹ and Ken Jowitt⁴⁰, consider it unipolar, others like Christopher Layne⁴¹ and Fei Zongwen⁴² consider it multipolar. A third school is even discernible: those who see the new world order as a kind of universal empire, i.e. no single power or group of powers is dominant and the entire

world, through the United Nations, is now partaking fully in world affairs.⁴³

This debate, however, need not arise if the new world order is examined from different perspectives: from the political/military perspective and from the economic perspective.

In terms of political/military power, it is indubitable that the USA is now the pre-eminent global power. It is the sole superpower. This was evidenced in the way it conceived and led the implementation of 'operation desert storm'.

However, this American political/military pre-eminence is not matched with corresponding economic preponderance. In this respect, as Ali Mazrui has noted, the global power structure is tripolar: The Dollar bloc, built around the USA and including Canada and the rest of the Americas; the Deutsche Mark bloc, comprising European countries with Germany as the leader; and the Yen bloc comprising the far Eastern countries with Japan as the leader.⁴⁴

However, the whole issue of the new world order being politically/militarily unipolar and economically tripolar arises only if the world is viewed as being shaped primarily by individual countries. But if

the world is viewed, instead, as being shaped primarily by blocs of states, then the three economic power centres (the USA, Germany and Japan) would actually belong to one bloc (Indeed, they all belong to the group of seven industrialised Nations). In which case, the new world order is essentially unipolar with the western, industrialised countries led by the USA (and including Japan) dominating the rest of the world.

This conception of the world seems to be more useful especially for the purposes of this study which takes Africa as one bloc. It is also more useful in the sense that it permits a better understanding of the principal contradictions in the world today. For instance, there can not be said to be a principal contradiction in the relations between the USA and Germany. In contrast, the relations between North (North America, Europe, and Japan) and South (Africa, Latin America, and most of Asia) constitute a principal contradiction in this new world order. As the Indonesian Prime Minister Suharto has noted, domination of the North over the South looms large as the main unresolved issue in the new world order.⁴⁵ It is the primary contradiction in this new world order.

The relations between the North and Africa also constitute a principal contradiction in this new world order - as it has always done. The development of the countries of the North has, to a large extent, been predicated on the underdevelopment of the countries of Africa. With the emergence of a new world order this has been made worse as the inflow of capital from the North to Africa has been drastically reduced, most of it now being channelled to the countries of eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

A second contradiction that characterizes the new world order is that between the logic of the state and the logic of the market.⁴⁶ The logic of the state is going on side-by-side with the logic of the market. The logic of the state is manifested in the insistence on preservation of national boundaries, on preservation of national consciousness. This is evidenced in this new world order by the rise, worldwide, of nationalist sentiments and the increased agitation worldwide for self-determination and independence of nationalist and ethnic groupings; as well as in the actual break-up of several countries along nationalist or ethnic lines. For instance, the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.

In contrast, the logic of the market has two inter-related components: firstly, the movement of capital to wherever it can extract surplus value evidenced in increasing economic globalisation; and secondly, the movement of labour across national boundaries to wherever job opportunities exist as evidenced in the increase in migration (especially from Eastern Europe, North Africa, and Latin America to Western Europe, North America, and Japan).⁴⁷

A third contradiction characterizing the new world order is one between (economic) integration and (political) fragmentation. Worldwide, there is a drive towards integration. The countries of Western Europe are headed for full monetary union in December 1992 and there are moves to incorporate the countries of the former eastern bloc including the former Soviet Union in the Union. In July 1992, the USA, Canada, and Mexico signed an agreement bringing into being a North American free trade area. With a population of over 350 million, it surpasses United Europe as the largest single market in the world. Africa is also working towards integration, though not as enthusiastically as the countries of the North: African countries have signed a treaty to establish an

African Economic community.

Side-by-side with the drive towards (economic) integration is the incidence of (political) fragmentation. As a result of a rise in ethnic and national assertiveness, there is an increase in political fragmentation as evidenced in the number of countries that have either broken up or tending towards break-up: the former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Canada, Ethiopia, etc. Thus, as Jowitt has noted, there is "emerging worldwide conflict between liberally oriented 'civics' and insular 'ethnics', a conflict that directly calls into question the value and status of liberal democratic individualism even in the west."⁴⁸ Thus, obliteration of the nation-state is happening side-by-side with a rise in nationalism.

Yet another development, contradictory to the fragmentation of states, is evident: the fusion of states. This has led to the disappearance of two states - East Germany and South Yemen.


Thus, "the collapse of Soviet power has also had the opposite effect - of removing the support for states previously held to be separate."⁴⁹

A fifth contradiction in the new world order is that between the advance in productive forces and

increased socialisation of production. The advance in productive forces is brought about by an advance in technological know-how. As a result, the production of goods and services is now done more efficiently.

In contradiction to this is the increased socialization of production involving increased social division of labour and specialization. This contradiction has led to a situation of stiff economic competition for markets which in turn has led to a further impoverishment of the countries of the South since they cannot compete with the countries of the North. As a result of this increased mass poverty, the world is actually more insecure in this new world order than it was during the cold war.

At the dawn of the new world order, the then United Nations Secretary-General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, had declared that with the end of the cold war, and the subsequent reduction (or elimination) of the threat of nuclear war, the world is now more secure. This would be true if the threat of nuclear war is considered the greatest threat to world peace. But as the former Commonwealth Secretary-General, Shridath Ramphall, pointed out not long ago, poverty is the greatest threat to world peace because poverty is a great source of fear, and of envy which in turn lead men to war.



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CHAPTER 3

ISSUES IN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT

3.1 The Concept of Development:

According to Walter Rodney, "development in human society is a many-sided process. At the level of the individual, it implies increased skill and capacity, greater freedom, creativity, self-discipline, responsibility, and material well-being."¹

There are different conceptions of development, most having ideological imports.

Conventional conceptions of development (put forward essentially by modernisation scholars of the industrialised west) seldom grapple with the issue of development in its totality; instead, they focus narrowly on economic development alone. This conventional view of development equates it with economic growth and economic well-being. Thus, it sees a developed society as one which has attained a high degree of industrialisation and which has gone a long way in satisfying the demands of its citizens for goods and services.

But, as Jalloh has noted,

it is possible for a society to satisfy the demands for goods and services of its citizens without having to produce

these goods and services itself. This is the case, for example, of the oil-rich countries that can use their wealth to purchase from others those goods and services that they do not produce. While such countries are undoubtedly wealthy, they are far from developed. In the final analysis, they are dependent on others for their well-being.²

Another conception of development is the basic needs approach of M.U. Hag. According to him, "development goals should be expressed in terms of the progressive reduction and eventual elimination of malnutrition, disease, illiteracy, squalor, unemployment and inequalities."³

The problem with this approach as Jalloh points out, is "its one-sidedness. Concern with growth disappears or is at least minimized and so is the structural transformation of the economy."⁴

Another approach to development is the one that conceives of it as growth with redistribution.⁵

According to this approach,

development must be concerned with the level and growth of income in lower income groups. Distributional objectives therefore cannot be viewed

independently of growth objectives. Instead, they should be expressed dynamically in terms of desired rates of growth of income of different groups.⁶

Jalloh notes that,

while this definition is a step forward compared with definitions that equate development with growth, structural change or the elimination of poverty alone, it still lacks some important elements. These are the capacity of an economy to produce a wide range of goods and services that its citizens demand or need, and the ability of the society to enjoy a certain degree of autonomy from outside forces. Both are clearly related.⁷

This is where the question of the resource base of a country comes in. But more important is the issue of technological development of a society. A developed society has a comparatively high level of technological development.

Samir Amin sees development as a balance in sectoral productivity, high linkage among the sectors, and autonomy of the economy.⁸

This definition is inadequate because "it is possible to imagine a pre-modern economy with low

levels of production and productivity which meets the above three conditions of development."⁹ Still such a society cannot be considered developed relative to another with high levels of production and productivity.

Secondly, the definition "leaves out the humanistic element that is invariably behind the concern with development."¹⁰

In summary, it is clear that most definitions of development tend to be one-sided and incomplete; focusing as they do, on economic growth alone. It is true that economic growth, or economic development as such (the increase by a society of its capacity for dealing with the environment) is an important component of development. But it is only a part of it. A more useful definition of development should be broader and should include elements of growth, the ability to balance domestic consumption and production, reduction in poverty, less inequality, and greater autonomy.

As Blomstrom and Hettne have noted, "the traditional and still far from abandoned thinking on development is based on experiences which are specific to the western world and ... the claim to universal validity must therefore be repudiated. A truly universal theory of development must reflect the

development experiences of different societies."¹¹

It is clear that the global dominance of western development theory is based on intellectual penetration (of the periphery by the core-states).¹² Since the late 1940s, however, this western conception of development has been increasingly challenged; first by Latin American theorists of the dependency tradition and also by adherents of the Marxist, neo-Marxist, and modern world-system theories. The debate raged throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s and, as one scholar noted then, "we seem as far from a general theory as ever. Indeed, the flood of new knowledge seems to make generalizations of a kind useful for policy purposes in all developing countries more and more hopeless."¹³ Bernstein also arrived at a similar conclusion, viz: "a single body or theory about development is as unlikely to emerge as it is about any other major social theme engendering political conflict and sharp intellectual divergencies."¹⁴

Part of the difficulty in arriving at a generally accepted theory of development lies in the subjectivity of the social dimension (to development) which must be taken into account. In other words, "development is not merely economic growth, it is growth accompanied

by structural social and economic change."¹⁵

Accordingly, then, "it is perhaps inevitable that the impossibility of using a ceteris paribus approach to problems of development should engender difficulties in constructing a unified theoretical framework."¹⁶

But "it is obvious that it is not only the complexity of problems that stand in the way of constructing a unified theory, but also ideological and political differences."¹⁷

Thus with the emergence of a new world order characterised by a reduction of ideological and political differences, one might expect a tendency towards theoretical consensus on development to emerge. The debate may not be over yet and such a consensus is yet to emerge.

In general, however, development can be properly conceived of as comprising five elements: high income levels resulting from high growth rates; the absence of or a low level of poverty; a relatively low degree of income inequality; the capacity of the economy to produce a wide range of goods and services to satisfy domestic consumption; and a certain degree of autonomy.¹⁸ In other words, for a society to be considered developed, its economic growth must be

internally-generated and self-sustaining; its economic growth must be participatory - allowing for private initiative and broad-based people's involvement; its economic growth must be distributed well -benefitting all people; and its economic growth must be sustainable - since raising future production may demand current sacrifices. "People must be at the centre of human development. Development has to be woven around people, not people around development. It has to be development of the people, by the people, for the people."¹⁹

3.2 Africa: Development or Underdevelopment?:

As Walter Rodney has noted, "every people have shown a capacity for independently increasing their ability to live a more satisfactory life through exploiting the resources of nature."²⁰ Every continent, including Africa, took part in the early periods of the extension of man's control over his environment. Thus, "development was universal because the conditions leading to economic expansion were universal. Everywhere, man was faced with the task of survival by meeting fundamental material needs; and better tools were a consequence of the interplay between human beings and nature as part of the struggle for survival."²¹

Africa was the original home of man and for a while, was the focus of the physical development of man in the early period.

Although there have been periods of temporary setbacks, the general trend worldwide has been towards increased production and the increase in quantity of goods was associated with change in quality or character of society. Thus, as various societies developed, the forms of social relations within them changed. The nineteenth century scholar, Karl Marx, articulated this progression. He distinguished several stages of development within European history:

The first major stage was communalism. Under this mode of production, society was organized into simple bands of hunters. Property was collectively owned, work was done in common, and the goods of society were equitably shared out.

From the second stage, society was now divided into classes: a dominant class and a dominated class. The second major stage was slavery, "caused by the extension of domineering elements within the family and by some groups being physically overwhelmed by others."²² Slaves performed various tasks for their masters but their main duty was production of food.

The third major stage was Feudalism under which society was divided into Feudal Lords and Serfs. The feudal lords owned estates on which the serfs worked; unlike under slavery, the workers were no longer owned by the masters but they were "tied to the land" of a particular estate.

The fourth major stage was capitalism. Under this mode of production, factories now replaced agriculture as the major producer of wealth. The dominant class, the Bourgeoisie exploits the labour of the dominated class, the proletariat, which labour is now a commodity to be bought and sold.

Karl Marx then predicted that a fifth stage, socialism, would come about in which the principle of economic equity which obtained under communalism, would be restored. There would be a dictatorship of the working class, the proletariat, over the rest of society. This stage of socialism would then transist to the stage of communism which would be a classless society and in which the guiding principle of society would be: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his need."

An important point to note about the concept of development is that it is always used as a relative

concept. A country is developed or underdeveloped relative to some other country (or countries). This means that different countries or societies can be compared development-wise and, for the same country, its different epochs can also be compared.

It is a fact of history that, left on their own, different societies have developed at different rates. It is difficult to explain exactly why this is so; however, as Rodney offers, "part of the answer lies in the environment in which human groups evolved and part of it lies in the 'superstructure' of human society."²³

Rodney explains further,

as human beings battled with the material environment, they created forms of social relations, forms of government, patterns of behaviour and systems of belief which together constituted the superstructure - which was never exactly the same in any two societies. Each element in the superstructure interacted with other elements in the superstructure as well as with the material base. For instance, the political and religious patterns affected each other and were often intertwined. The religious belief that a certain forest

was sacred was the kind of element in the superstructure that affected economic activity since that forest would not be cleared for cultivation. While in the final analysis the breakthrough to a new stage of human development is dependent upon man's technical capacity to deal with the environment, it is also to be borne in mind that peculiarities in the superstructure of any given society have a marked impact on the rate of development.²⁴

There is general agreement that Africa is underdeveloped. The evidence of this is in the relative poverty of African countries; dependence of their economies on those of the North; relatively low life expectancy at birth; high infant mortality rate; high illiteracy levels, among other factors. There is, however, disagreement as to what brought about the underdevelopment; there is disagreement as to why Africa is underdeveloped.

The traditional, western view is that Africa is underdeveloped because of low rates of productivity, high levels of social waste, and inefficiency. Thus, while the "modern high-technology worker (in the developed North) produces a great deal in eight hours, (the African) worker produces less though he labours

longer hours because he works inefficiently with primitive tools and methods."²⁵ According to this view, political corruption, a parasitic social and bureaucratic structure and the failure to make appropriate investments in education, agriculture, and meet other preconditions for development, have impeded African development.

But the most important impediment to development, according to conventional western theorists, is a shortage of capital. Thus for them, "the most basic question ... then, is how and where (African countries) can raise the capital necessary to increase productivity to lift themselves from the cycle of poverty."²⁶ The fundamental source of capital for all economies is production itself obtained as a surplus of production that is saved and invested. Eventually, a 'take-off' point to self-sustaining growth is reached when gains from production become normal due to constantly rising investment. The problem, however, is that this take-off point is reached only under conditions of rapid capital accumulation. But this has not been possible in Africa due to poverty itself and due to inefficiency and waste - excessive military expenditures, luxury consumption, official corruption, etc.

According to this conventional view, the solution to shortage of capital in Africa - and to underdevelopment as such - is international aid from the advanced countries in the form of foreign aid, foreign investment, and technical assistance; and a judicious use of such aid under the supervision of the advanced countries.

However, the application of these recommendations over the years has not led to development in Africa. Instead, the underdevelopment of Africa has actually deepened.

In contrast to this traditional view is that of the modern world-system theory (and other Marxism-influenced theories) which holds that the advanced, capitalist countries are responsible for the underdevelopment of Africa (and other regions of the south).²⁷ Through a process of peripheralization (incorporation into the capitalist world economy) which began around the middle of the eighteenth century, the 'development of underdevelopment' in Africa started. The first phase of this peripheralisation terminated around the beginning of the twentieth century. The second phase which ensued was marked by the use of Africa as a raw materials - producing area supplying the

industrialised core of the capitalist world system.²⁸

With the advent of a new world order, we may have entered the third phase of the peripheralisation of Africa in which Africa's 'dependent development' is now intensified, and in which the incorporation of Africa into the world capitalist system will now, presumably, be made complete.

As Walter Rodney points out,

underdevelopment is not absence of development, because every people have developed in one way or another and to a greater or lesser extent. Underdevelopment makes sense only as a means of comparing levels of development. It is very much tied to the fact that human social development has been uneven and from a strictly economic view point, some human groups have advanced further by producing more and becoming more wealthy.²⁹

Rodney further notes that "modern underdevelopment ... expresses a particular relationship of exploitation: namely, the exploitation of one country by another. All of the countries named as 'underdeveloped' in the world are exploited by others; and the underdevelopment with which the world is now preoccupied is a product of capitalist, imperialist and

colonialist exploitation."³⁰

It may not be true that all countries named as 'underdeveloped' are exploited: the few remaining societies of the 'external arena' (for instance, aboriginal societies) may be considered underdeveloped, yet they are not exploited by others.

However, African societies, like those of Latin America and Asia, were developing independently before they were hijacked by the capitalist countries which had formed a world capitalist system earlier. Subsequently, Africa was integrated into the world capitalist system as part of the dependent periphery. This led to increased exploitation of Africa by the dominant core and to the expropriation and export of surplus derived from Africa by the dominant capitalist countries through their trans-national companies. This brought about the increased underdevelopment of Africa. Thus, the same mechanisms that produce capital accumulation and development in the core, produce economic and political underdevelopment in the periphery.^{31, 32}

Even after attaining flag independence, the countries of Africa remained economically dependent on the advanced capitalist countries (for technology and

finance capital). The advanced, capitalist countries, through their TNCs operating in Africa and other countries of the periphery, have continued to exploit Africa and the other dependent countries of the periphery - a phenomenon known as neo-colonialism. They are able to do this because they have a virtual monopoly over the means of production.

In summary then, there can be said to be two schools of thought with regard to the underdevelopment of Africa. One, the western, traditional school holds that internal factors are mostly responsible. The other view (held by Marxists, modern world theorists, dependentistas) holds that external factors are mainly responsible. The latter view clearly better captures the reality.

In recognition of their condition of underdevelopment, African countries (along with other dependent countries of Asia and Latin America) have been addressing the problem employing four broad strategies: autonomous or self-reliant development; economic regionalism or regional integration; the formation of commodity cartels; and the demand for the creation of a new international economic order.³³

Under the strategy of autonomous development,

two different sets of tactics have been used. One, advocated by structuralists involves placing emphasis on import-substitution, rapid industrialization behind high tariff walls, and reforms of international institutions. This option has been the more commonly adopted one. Most African countries have embraced this option. However, this option has not been successful as most of the industries established under this strategy enjoyed no comparative advantage (over those of the North) and in the end, high-cost, inefficient industrial structures were created.³⁴

The alternative route to autonomous development involves lessening or totally cutting links with the world capitalist system. This route has been attempted in a few African countries, notably Ghana and Tanzania. Though some measure of social and economic equity was attained, the strategy could not be said to have succeeded as those countries remained just as underdeveloped.

Regional integration is another strategy employed by Africa to overcome underdevelopment. Integration attempts have taken place at the sub-regional level in Africa, in East, West, central and Southern Africa. However, regional conflicts and economic rivalries

amongst the integrating countries have generally undermined integration attempts. Recently, African countries signed an African Economic Community (AEC) treaty, as a first step to economic union. It remains to be seen whether this will materialise.

Another form of regionalism which has been employed by African countries is forging special trading links with the developed countries or a particular group of developed countries. An example of this is the Lome convention between the European Economic Community (the EEC) and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries which gave about sixty ACP countries preferential access to the EEC for their commodity exports and certain manufactured goods. Again this form of regionalism had had very limited success as the countries of the North do not seem eager to offer genuine assistance to African countries.³⁵

A third type of regionalism involves playing down North-South trade and forging South-South co-operation. This strategy has been pursued mainly through the 'group of 77' forum. This seems to be a more bankable weapon but, so far, it has not been vigorously and effectively applied. Again, this can be attributed to lack of solidarity and rivalries among the countries of the South.

The third broad strategy employed by African countries to overcome underdevelopment involves trade union-type activities as carried on by economic cartels like OPEC, the organization of petroleum exporting countries. There have been proposals for such cartels to be formed for other commodities like copper, tin, bauxite, etc. OPEC has recorded some measure of success although, with the success of petroleum conservation measures in the west and increase in the number of non-OPEC oil producers, the power of OPEC has been somewhat blunted.

Finally, African countries have tackled their underdevelopment through conference-type arrangements. It was at one of such conference arrangements - the United Nations Conference on trade and development, UNCTAD - that the call for a new international economic order, NIEO, emerged. Through the NIEO, African and other underdeveloped countries are seeking the following: a restructuring of international trade with a view to shifting the terms of trade in favour of the third world countries; to promote processing and manufacturing in the third world and to secure a guaranteed market for some of the products; and most importantly, the transference of real resources to the

third world through indexing, technical assistance, and technology transfer.³⁶

By the mid 1980s, the challenge posed by the demand for an NIEO had been defeated. One reason for this was the resistance put up by the western countries led by the USA. Another reason was that the countries of the South were not united as several countries of the South pursued their own narrow nationalistic interests. The worst offenders in this regard were some OPEC members who even invested some of their financial surpluses in western countries.³⁷

All in all, then, the strategies employed by African countries to overcome their underdevelopment have, so far, not been very effective.

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CHAPTER 4

THE IMPACT OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER ON AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT

The new world order is having considerable impact on African development. This impact will now be examined under three broad categories: economic; political and diplomatic; and strategic.

4.1 Economic Impact:

The global changes we have witnessed these past few years have further entrenched capitalism as the world's dominant mode of production. The drive worldwide is towards trade liberalization and deregulation. This trend could be said to have begun with the introduction of 'perestroika' in the then Soviet Union. Initially, 'perestroika' provided for modest economic reforms involving private ownership only in small scale enterprises. Subsequently, however, the former Soviet Union and the former communist countries of Eastern Europe were forced to open up their economies even further to foreign investments.

With the collapse of communism in 1989 and the subsequent disintegration of the Soviet Union in December, 1991, the process of incorporation of the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Republics into the semi-periphery of the world capitalist

system has reached an advanced stage. Russia and other member-states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (the CIS) have already joined the IMF and the World Bank as part of the preconditions for receiving aid from those agencies and the countries of the west. Even before they joined, the USA had pledged a sum of \$12,000 million to be channeled to Russia and other CIS states through the IMF.¹ It pledged the sum of \$628 million in direct aid to them plus a large contribution to a stabilization fund for the Rouble (the Commonwealth's currency). It granted the CIS states most favoured nation (MFN) trading status and, for the first time ever, pledged to buy Russian nuclear and space technology. In addition, the group of seven (G-7) industrialised countries (of which the USA is a part) pledged an additional sum of \$24,000 million, including a sum of \$6,000 million as food aid to the CIS to enable it buy cereals from the west.

In July 1992, the IMF Managing Director, Michel Consseau, revealed that \$1,000 million out of the approved \$24,000 million had already been made available to Russia. Subsequently, G-7 leaders meeting in Munich, Germany also approved credits for Russia and for the countries of Eastern Europe.² Germany alone,

according to Chancellor Helmut Kohl, has spent the sum of over \$110,000 million in aid to Eastern Europe and the CIS. This consists of both the cost of industrial rehabilitation and modernisation of the Eastern part of Germany, and direct aid to the countries of Eastern Europe and the CIS.³

In addition to the countries of Eastern Europe and the CIS which are receiving special attention from the west, the west led by the USA, is also giving special consideration to Latin and central American countries. In April 1992, the Bush administration presented to Congress, a proposal for the forgiveness of most of the outstanding debt of Latin and Central American countries "to encourage democracy."⁴

In addition, the world's leading industrialised countries, the Group of twenty-four (G-24) countries (members of the organization for economic co-operation and development, OECD), meeting in Tirana, Albania in July 1992, pledged to continue to feed Albania, Europe's poorest country, until at least next year.⁵

All of the above show how undemocratic and biased against Africa the new world order is. Since the emergence of a new world order, there has been a diversion of western and multilateral development aid

from Africa to the countries of Eastern Europe and the CIS. This is despite the fact that the countries of Africa are the poorest in the world and that they are the most severely debt-distressed (see Table A3 in the Appendix); and that their economies are in the worst shape.⁶ Of the forty-one countries classified by the World Bank as 'least developed' twenty-seven are African.⁷

It is instructive to note, for instance, that the G-24 countries have undertaken to feed Albania while African countries like Somalia, Ethiopia and Mozambique who are poorer and are in deeper crises receive only token assistance. The new world order clearly marks a rise in racism. There seems to be a drive to integrate all white peoples into the core of the world capitalist system while excluding and discriminating against Black Africans.

To worsen matters, Ernest Stone, a Director of the International Development Association, the IDA, declared recently that the Agency - which provides virtually interest-free loans to the poorest countries - will find it difficult to raise \$18,000 million for its next round of aid to the poorest countries.⁸ This is because the western, industrialised countries who fund the agency are unwilling to provide the funds

preferring, instead, to finance the reconstruction of the eastern bloc countries and the CIS.

Another aspect of the new world order that has had considerable economic impact on Africa is the drive towards integration and the emergence of regional economic blocs. The countries of Western Europe are headed for full economic union in December, 1992 and arrangements are underway to provide for associate membership (in the first instance) for the countries of Eastern Europe; and later, for full membership. European integration means complete liberalization and deregulation of trade: there will now be free movement of goods and persons and this is expected to increase European competitiveness in the world market. The countries of North America, the USA, Canada, and Mexico, have also signed a treaty (in July 1992) establishing a North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA). With a population of over 350 million, it rivals Europe as the world's largest single market.

This means that the world is now divided into three major economic zones: North America (comprising the USA, Canada, and Mexico), a United Europe (Western and Eastern Europe and including the CIS), and the Pacific (comprising Japan, China, Australia, New

Zealand, and Asian newly industrialising countries like Singapore, Indonesia, Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, Thailand); on the one hand. And three minor areas: Africa, the near and middle East, and Latin and Central America; on the other hand.⁹ Within the weaker bloc, Africa is the most underdeveloped segment. "Integration (also) means that transnational actors like multinational corporations and economic cartels can have a powerful influence on what happens to national states."¹⁰

Thus, the increased globalisation of the international economy has brought about wider and more acute competition for scarce resources and markets. Economies, such as those in Africa, with weak and persisting primary structures are being outfaced in the competitive world markets for capital flows, technology, goods and services.¹¹ This development, along with the challenge posed by the rise of regional competition and regional politico-military conflicts, has reinforced the constraints posed by the existing problem set of the debt crisis, depressed commodity prices, volatility in the international financial market, protectionism in the industrial countries, high real interest rates, and fiscal and trade

imbalances.

A major impact the new world order has had on Africa, then, is increased loss of economic sovereignty by African countries as they are increasingly forced to take directives and accept programmes formulated by western-dominated IFIs like the IMF and the World Bank. This is because there is a gap between the resources Africa needs for its economic recovery and the actual funds that are available locally.¹² African countries, therefore, need to obtain financial assistance from abroad. In the past, they could count on some low-interest or interest-free loans from the former Soviet Union and other eastern bloc countries; but with the economic difficulties these countries are faced with such that they themselves require aid, financial aid to Africa from the eastern bloc has simply vanished. African countries are, therefore, forced to depend solely on the west for development assistance. This has given the west the increased leverage to dictate to African countries what economic policies to adopt. For instance, early in 1992, in Thailand, American officials meeting with Nigerian officials insisted that the Nigerian government devalue the Naira further such that its official exchange rate will be in tune with

the unofficial (i.e. black market) rate, as a precondition for further aid and rescheduling of debt. In March, 1992, Nigeria carried out this 'directive'.

It is also remarkable to note that while the USA and its western allies are insisting that African countries remove all trade tariffs and other barriers (according to them, so that there will be free competition which will in turn bring in comparative advantage and encourage efficiency in the African economies), they themselves are increasingly practicing protectionism in relation to African goods. It is true that these western countries practice protectionism in relation to themselves (USA vs. Japan and USA vs. EEC) but this is normally a question of; how much protectionism? And they always iron out their differences ultimately. With regard to Africa, however, the west is now insisting on total removal of barriers.

Even before the new world order took perfect shape, most African countries had, by 1986, been forced by dire economic straits to accept debilitating IMF and World Bank - prescribed Structural adjustment Programmes (SAPs).

The common feature of the IMF and World Bank programmes is that loans are made only if governments agree to make the

required changes to their economies. These changes are often very wide-ranging and affect most areas of government policy. Governments are given specific targets such as how much credit should be available, what wage increases are allowed, or what the interest rates should be. This is known as 'conditionality'.¹³

In effect, the country loses sovereignty as it is forced to implement economic policies that, in the long run, are not in its interest. These SAP policies include devaluation of the country's currency; privatisation of state-owned enterprises; and removal of subsidies. But, as official figures of the World Bank and the UNDP reveal, rather than boost exports and lead to an increase in the growth rates of GNP, GDP and per capita domestic investment and income, these growth rates and volume of exports have either stagnated or actually declined (see Tables 1,2,3,4, and 6 for the years 1985 to 1988 and Tables A.2, A.6, A.9 for the years 1988 to 1990 in the Appendix). Equally of concern is the precarious debt profile of the continent. The amount owed by the continent in 1989 has increased drastically over the 1985 figure and at least sixteen African countries owe more than

their respective GNPs (see Table A.3). Mozambique, the poorest and most aid-dependent country in the world, owes an amount that is almost six times its GNP.

The continent has also been recording a deficit in balance of payments for much of the period since 1985 (see Table 5).

It is true that this trend, the general economic decline of Africa, began before the advent of a new world order and the introduction of the structural adjustment programmes; but the crisis has clearly been deepened by the advent of a new world order and the introduction of SAPs. It is also true that there are a few African countries (Botswana, Mauritius, Cape Verde, Libya, Algeria, Gabon, Swaziland) that escape this dismal economic picture; but these are exceptions to the general rule. Most African countries are in economic crises of alarming depth, made even deeper by the emergence of a new world order that has meant falling prices of primary exports; increased exploitation by TNCs (since they (African countries) have been forced to further liberalize their economies); declining investment and foreign aid (as the countries of the 'North' channel their investments and aid to Eastern Europe and the CIS); and a generally hostile

international environment for poor, dependent and underdeveloped economies. Compared to the other underdeveloped regions of the world (Latin and Central America, and much of Asia), Africa is worse off and the gap is widening (see Tables).

Yet another fall-out from the new world order is the increased incidence of Brain drain from Africa. Africa is losing some of its best brains to the countries of the 'North' as increased poverty on the continent forces under-remunerated skilled manpower to seek better conditions of work in the advanced, capitalist countries.¹⁴

On the aggregate, then, the new world order with its entrenchment of the capitalist mode of production as the dominant mode of production in the world system, and the strengthening of the TNCs as the pre-eminent actors in the world system, has been having adverse economic effects on the African continent.

4.2 Political and Diplomatic Impact:

A major paradox or contradiction that characterises this new world order is that while the pre-eminence of the USA has led to its cherished political ideal of liberal, multi-party democratic principles being adopted worldwide, the world system itself has become more undemocratic and sectarian. It is more

undemocratic in the sense that the main organ of international decision-making and action, the United Nations, has been virtually hijacked by the USA (and its western allies). The USA, as the sole superpower in the world today, together with its allies in the UN security council, Great Britain and France, is able to force its decisions on the other members of the UN. The Soviet Union which used to present opposition to the USA in the Security council has disintegrated and Russia, the successor permanent member in the Security council, is in such economic crisis that it is now economically dependent on the west and can, therefore, not constitute a countervailing force to the USA. For the same reason, socialist China cannot, also, provide a counterweight to US power. For instance, in March 1992, the USA and Great Britain tabled before the UN security council, a resolution to impose economic and other sanctions on Libya for its failure to hand over for trial in the west, two Libyans accused of terrorist bomb attacks on western Airplanes. China threatened to veto the anti-Libya motion in the Security council but the USA threatened to cancel China's Most Favoured Nation (MFN) trading status if it did so. China backed down.

Further evidence that the world system has become more undemocratic and biased against African and other underdeveloped countries is the fact that the UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, has embraced the agenda of the west ('peacekeeping') rather than that of the South (third world economic development). This is reflected in the fact that shortly after assuming office in January 1992, he abolished several departments, two-thirds of which deal with third world development. In contrast, he established two new departments to strengthen peacekeeping. In spite of the fact that he gave the indication, on assuming office, that he may exercise the power (granted him by the UN charter) to raise the issue of poverty in the South as a threat to world security, he has not done so. This is because he is playing according to the dictates of the dominant western powers led by the USA. It is true that some of the calls for democratization of the UN decision-making process have come also from countries of the North (In January, 1992, Japan, supported by India, called for a new composition of the UN Security Council because according to them, the present composition no longer reflected the reality of 1992 but that of 1945. Japan, of course, is smarting because it is not included in the UN Security

Council).¹⁵ But this conflict within the western bloc can be considered a secondary one. The primary contradiction today in the UN decision-making process is between North and South.

In contrast to the increased undemocratic nature of the world system, is the increasing institution of multi-party democracies worldwide. In virtually all regions of the world, the new world order has brought in its wake, a movement away from totalitarianism and towards multi-party democracy. In eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the former communist regimes have collapsed; the same trend is noticeable in Latin and Central America; Africa has not been left out: "nearly three-fourths of the 47 countries South of the Sahara are in various stages of political liberalization. The few notable hold-outs include Kenya, Malawi, and those states like Liberia, Somalia, and the Sudan that are embroiled in civil wars."¹⁶ This political liberalization has involved some or all of the following: the release of political prisoners; reducing controls on the media; legalizing opposition political parties; redrafting constitutions and holding national elections.

A major reason for this move away from totalitarianism in the new world order is that the western

powers who now exercise hegemonic economic power over the globe (individually or through IFIs they control) now attach 'political conditionalities' as part of the prerequisites for the granting of loans. Given the severe economic crisis in which most African countries are, they normally have no choice but to accept the demands for political reforms.

Pressure from within African countries has also contributed to this trend: the international climate has emboldened civil and human rights groups within African countries even in such one-party or totalitarian states were, previously, they dared not raise their voices in agitation. Examples of such countries include the Republic of Benin, Zaire, Togo and Kenya.¹⁷

Thus, the era of personal rule and one-man or one-party dictatorships in Africa seems to be passing. Many totalitarian regimes have fallen: the nineteen year old Marxist regime of Mathieu Kerekou fell in April 1991. Due to pressure from western-backed pro-democracy agitators, he was forced to recognize opposition political parties and permit democratic elections in which he was defeated by Nicephore Soglo. In Zambia, the twenty-seven year old one-party government of Kenneth Kaunda fell when he was defeated

in multi-party elections in 1991 by Frederick Chiluba. In Ghana, the ban on political parties was lifted in May 1992, after an eleven year ban. In the Camerouns, Togo, Ethiopia, and the Senegal, multi-party political frameworks have been instituted. This same trend towards plural democracy is noticeable in much of the rest of Africa (see Table 1A). Even in countries like Zaire, Kenya, and Malawi where one-party or one-man dictatorships are proving resilient, the dictatorships therein have been forced to make concessions as human rights groups continue to agitate for political reforms.

While the democracy/totalitarianism paradox which characterized the old world order seems to be dying down, a new contradiction seems to have emerged with the new world order: one between integration and fragmentation. In the eastern European countries and in the CIS, forces of fragmentation are battling against forces of integration. In Yugoslavia, all but two of ^{the} former six constituent Republics (Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina) have declared independence. Only Serbia and Montenegro remain (as Federal Yugoslavia) as the integrationist forces. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbs who make up

one-third of the population are opposed to independence and are fighting Muslims and Croats who want independence. The erstwhile socialist Republic of Czechoslovakia was on 17th November, 1989, renamed 'the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic' to assuage ethnic tensions between the Czechs and the Slovaks. But these tensions have not completely disappeared. Only recently, the combined parliament narrowly failed to attain the majority required to split the country. Of course, the former Soviet Union disintegrated in December, 1991 into its fifteen constituent republics.

Even in Western Europe, long-standing nationalist conflicts still survive. In the United Kingdom, the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland is still conducting its campaign against the British Government. In Spain, Basque Separatists are still fighting for their independence.

In Canada, Quebec province separatists, in 1991, only narrowly failed to achieve their goal when they lost in a provincial referendum to decide whether the province should declare independence from Canada or not. To compensate the Quebecois, on 22nd August, 1992, an agreement was signed recognizing Quebec's distinct status; giving it a veto over future changes

to federal institutions and the creation of new provinces; giving it powers over mining, tourism, housing, recreation, regional development, municipal affairs, job training, and forestry; and guaranteeing it 25% of the seats in the House of Commons.¹⁸

Side-by-side with this fragmentary tendency is one of integration as evidenced in the re-unification of east and west Germany on 3rd October, 1990. It is, however, obvious from the comparative spreads of the two tendencies that fragmentation is the dominant of the two tendencies.

Although the integration/fragmentation paradox has not been very pronounced in Africa, it is nonetheless noticeable. Long-standing secessionist movements (in Ethiopia Somalia, etc) are still campaigning for independence. New secessionist movements have even sprang up (for instance in the Senegal, in Mauritania where Tuaregs to the North are fighting for independence).

One issue that has been thrust onto a prominent position on the global agenda since the advent of a new world order is the issue of environmental degradation. Everybody (the countries of both the 'North' and the 'South') agrees that environmental degradation

is a matter for concern and that the problem should be addressed. Where there is no agreement is on who is contributing more to the creation of the problem and who should bear the larger responsibility of solving the problem. The North accuses the South of contributing more to the problem through its indiscriminate deforestation practices which destroys biodiversity. The South, in turn, accuses the North of being more at fault by contributing more to carbon dioxide, CO₂, emissions which deplete the ozone layer.¹⁹

The UN conference on the environment and development (otherwise called the Earth Summit), held from June 3 to June 12, 1992, was a showcase for this environmental politics. There was concensus at the summit that for the South to preserve its biodiversity, it would require financial assistance from the countries of the North since it is in economic crisis. It was agreed that the sum of \$600,000 million per annum was required to preserve the environment and that the developed world would have to contribute \$125,000 million of that amount.²⁰ The North, led by the USA, refused to make that financial commitment. The total amount they pledged was a pittance compared

to the required amount: the USA pledged a total sum of \$325 million while Canada pledged \$25 million.²¹ The Bush government also refused to consider cutting back on the production of CO₂ from industries because it would require the loss of jobs in the USA.²² Finally, the US president refused to initial the Biodiversity treaty that sought to provide money to underdeveloped countries towards the preservation of biodiversity. According to him, the treaty is biased in favour of the countries of the South.

Thus, at the end of the Summit, although the countries of the South (which includes Africa) were able to stave off the attempt by the North to make them pay for environmental problems they are not primarily responsible for, they failed to extract the requisite financial obligation (to fight environmental degradation) from the North.

In effect, the agenda of the North, rather than that of the South, was adopted reflecting once again, the undemocratic nature of the new world order.

Yet another issue that has gained currency in the new world order is the call for reparations and restitutions by Africans (both on the continent and in the Diaspora). The call is predicated on the

fact that the countries of Europe colonised Africa for centuries during which time they plundered and pillaged the continent's resources, both human and material. African leaders are now demanding financial compensation for this plunder. The OAU has officially given its backing to the campaign by establishing a Group of eminent persons (GEP) with the Nigerian businessman, M.K.O. Abiola, and the former Director-General of UNESCO, Dr. Amadou M'bow of the Senegal, as the co-chairmen.²³

The call for reparations may well be justified: people who were robbed should be compensated. But a closer examination of the call shows it to be an attempt at politicising ethnicity at the international level. This is so because the call divides the world into the whites who colonised Africa, and the Africans. The call tries to present the White/Black contradiction as the primary one in the international system today. It is a contradiction but only a subsidiary one. If the campaign for reparations was being championed by people from the ranks of the masses of Africa, it would be more credible; but the people championing the reparations campaign are members of the African comprador Bourgeois class who, as Stooges of the Bourgeois class of the core capitalist states,

are helping to preserve and sustain the neo-colonial relationship of exploitation and domination of the North over Africa and the rest of the South.

Thus, the present campaign for reparations serves to camouflage the international class struggle so that the international contradiction is seen in terms of race rather than in terms of classes. This racial conception, of course, is misleading because it does not capture the international picture accurately. For instance, the Arabs were allies of the colonisers as slave dealers. Today, however, they are part of the exploited 'South'!

Equally importantly, some of the whites, the working class whites, actually have more affinity of interests with working class Africans. In the same way, the African Comprador Bourgeois class (including those championing the reparations campaign) have more affinity of interests with the Bourgeois class of the core capitalist states than with their fellow Africans of working class level. It is, therefore, more useful to view the international arena in terms of the class struggle (between the working classes and the Bourgeoisie) rather than in terms of racial struggle.

On the whole, then, the new world order is

having considerable political impact on Africa. The more undemocratic nature of the world system has been affecting Africa adversely. However, paradoxically, the ascendancy of the USA and its plural democratic ideals has spurred democratic changes within individual African states. This contradiction and the difficulty it entails was captured by OAU Secretary-General, Salim Ahmed Salim when he warned in June 1990 that "while Africa must democratize, our efforts will be hamstrung by the nondemocratic international economic (and political) system in which we operate."²⁴

The democratic changes constitute a welcome development. It has led to attempts (within the broader movement for democracy) to undo 'networks of oppression' to be found in African countries in the economic, cultural, and religious spheres. One example of this is to be found in the rights of women. Women have, generally, been weakly represented in African politics. But since the dawn of 'the democratic moment', "women in some countries have become alert to the opportunities that the democratic movement gives them to assert their special claims."²⁵ For instance, in Niger, "a public demonstration by women (there) ... ensured that they would be given

adequate representation on the committee that planned the national conference."²⁶

4.3 Strategic Impact:

The end of the cold war, the end of the arms race, the end of the strategic competition between east and west, is the major event that heralded a new world order. The talk of the global town now is on how to utilize the peace dividend (from the end of the cold war). In this regard, there has been consideration on how to bring about a transformation in the world strategic order from 'arms control' into a 'world security system'.²⁷ The 'arms control' regime, which held sway from 1945 and still persists, involves potential adversaries negotiating limitations on the quantity and quality of armaments (under which they agree to provide information and to have it verified) while maintaining considerable military forces.

But the perceived 'world security system' would be based on mutual control covering all kinds of nuclear, conventional, chemical and biological weapons (and) assumes that:

For arms of this type, all nuclear countries, including China, agree to participate in an arms control regime,

which is far from being the case;

the third world countries agree to participate in a control regime which, to date, extends only to the countries of the North;

the rich countries agree to pay the very high price of world economic and social integration.²⁸

Of course, the countries of the North have refused to pay the price of world economic and social integration.

The new world order has engendered strategic changes in Africa. The decisive factor that has led to these changes in Africa is the collapse of Soviet power. Consequent upon its weakening, the then Soviet Union withdrew from areas in Africa where it previously flexed muscles against the USA. The withdrawal of the Soviet Union from such areas has left the USA unchallenged and enabled it bring about changes it desires, and to instal governments and regimes sympathetic to its cause. For instance, in Ethiopia, the USSR (and its allies Yemen and Cuba) stopped financial and military support for the Marxist government of Mengistu Haile Mariam thereby enabling a U.S.-backed coalition of rebel

groups (the Ethiopian peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front, EPRDF, led by Melesse Zenawi) to overthrow it in June 1991. Also, following a New York accord between the USA, Angola, South-Africa and Cuba, Cuban troops were withdrawn from Angola in July 1991 paving the way for free multi-party elections in September 1992; just what the US-backed UNITA rebel group had been fighting for for 17 years. In respect of Mozambique, the rebel RENAMO leader, Alfonso Delakama, on 3rd October, 1992 in Rome, Italy, signed a ceasefire agreement - to end 16 years of fighting - with the government of Joachim Chissano.²⁹

One might have thought that with the end of the cold war, there will be a reduction in military spending as well as a reduction in the incidence of armed conflicts worldwide including in Africa. This has not happened. The defence spending of the US - led western powers has remained as high as it was prior to the advent of the new world order.³⁰ Arms transfers also remain high. Recently, the USA announced it will sell 150 advanced F-16 fighter planes to Taiwan, the first time the USA will sell arms to Taiwan since its switch of diplomatic recognition in 1972 from recognition of Nationalist

China (Taiwan) to recognition of Communist China.³¹

One reason for this sustained militarism in American (and western) foreign policy is pressure from its military - industrial complex. The military-industrial complex in the western countries wants to sell more arms and make more profit. Hundreds of thousands of jobs are also dependent on whether or not they make profit. For instance, the fighter plane deal with Taiwan will save ten thousand jobs in McDonnell-Douglas, the company manufacturing the fighter planes.

Thus, whereas the eastern bloc countries have been forced by economic difficulties to cut back on military spending and channel more funds to economic development, reduction in military spending by the west has not been witnessed and this is in spite of the fact that there have been attempts at disarmament: In 1989, an international disarmament conference was held in Kyoto, Japan under the aegis of the U.N. at which 31 countries discussed the non-proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons, nuclear test bans, and confidence-building measures in the political and military fields. The conference agreed that all countries that possess nuclear weapons should reduce

their nuclear potential by 50%.³² Also, on 30th July, 1991, the US president George Bush and the then Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev signed a treaty in Moscow for the elimination of long-range nuclear missiles in Europe.³³

It is true that the end of military competition between east and west has led to the end of certain military conflicts on the African continent - for instance, in Angola and in Mozambique - but some other conflicts have persisted and new ones have even surfaced. Virtually all military conflicts currently raging on the African continent are intra-state civil strifes rather than inter-state wars. Countries torn by civil strife today include: Liberia, Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, Mauritania, Morocco, and increasingly, South Africa. As at the end of 1990, 16 of the roughly 50 African states were engaged in military conflict internally or with their neighbours.³⁴ And as at October 1992, 14 were at war.

These conflicts persist inspite of the emergence of a new world order because they are not ideological conflicts. Rather, they are mostly ethnic, racial or religious conflicts and, therefore, strictly speaking, did not directly involve the western and

eastern power blocs.

Thus the new world order has had the effect of ending the few ideologically-motivated military conflicts on the African continent. It has, however, had little or no impact on the majority of military conflicts in Africa which are ethnically, racially or religiously motivated.

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CHAPTER 5CONCLUSION5.1 Summary and Conclusion:

The new world order which emerged with the end of the cold war is an essentially unipolar order characterized by the (increased) dominance of the core capitalist countries over the underdeveloped countries of the periphery of which Africa is a part. With the collapse of communism, the eastern communist bloc which used to act as some kind of buffer in the exploitation and domination of the South, has been unable to play this role as it is itself now dependent on financial aid from the core states. In effect, the eastern bloc has been incorporated into the semi-periphery of the capitalist world system (from the position of being more or less in the external arena).

The international system is, therefore, more sectarian and more biased against the countries of the South especially against Africa. The new world order is, therefore, having a considerable impact on African development. So far, the impact has been mixed and differing with respect to various aspects of African development. The most profound impact has been felt in the economic sphere. Here, the new world order

has been having a negative impact on African development.

With the emergence of the new world order, Africa has been further integrated into the world capitalist system such that Africa now finds itself "under two overlapping forms of international economic domination: a world trading system, now directed by TNCs, into which the continent has been integrated for centuries as a supplier of raw materials and primary agricultural products; and the operations of IFIs aiming to stabilize the continent's declining economies..."¹

Thus, African economies, already in crisis before the emergence of a new world order, have taken a turn for the worse. Today, over 60% of the total African population lives below the poverty line.² The average growth rate of GNP for the continent has dropped from 4.8% between 1960 and 1980 to less than 2.3% in the period, 1985 to 1990;³ and because the average population growth rate is more than this figure, average per capita income has actually been declining. The GNP of Africa as a percentage of the world total has dropped from 2.7% between 1960 and 1980 to 1.5% between 1985 and 1990; and as a result of a drop in commodity prices, the continent has

lost over \$60,000 million between 1985 and 1989.⁴

The disparity in the distribution of wealth between the core states and Africa is, therefore, wider.

With regard to the political development of Africa, the advent of a new world order has been having a mixed impact. On the one hand, it further disenfranchises African countries as a unit relative to the countries of the North. African countries now have little or no say in the U.N., for instance; as the USA and its western allies increasingly run the organization virtually as their exclusive property. The West has placed its priorities (including 'peace-keeping') at the top of the agenda and relegated Africa's priorities (economic development issues) to the bottom of the global agenda.

On the other hand, the new world order has spurred democratic and human rights movements in Africa and led to democratic changes on the continent that have made governments generally more accountable to the people they govern. Increasingly, basic freedoms such as the freedom of speech and assembly, are being guaranteed.

In respect of the strategic impact on Africa of the new world order, this has been minimal being that

most of the military conflicts in Africa are not ideologically-driven. Thus, most military conflicts in Africa persist.

Generally speaking, however, in the world as a whole (including in Africa), the end of the cold war has led to a reduction in the threat of war. This seems to be reinforced by the global drive towards plural democratic politics. As is widely recognized, "one of the few patterns that holds up throughout modern history is that liberal democracies do not go to war with one another."⁵

In conclusion then, the facts presented and examined by this study, have validated the hypotheses set out for this research work:

The 'new world order' is having a mixed and differing impact on various aspects of African development; but on the aggregate, it has been adversely affecting African development (especially economic development).

Africa's prospects for developing under this new world order are worse than they were in the previous world order.

The new world order marks a further entrenchment of the capitalist mode of production globally and an ascendancy of pro-imperialist social forces over those

opposed to imperialism. It is a continuation of the process of peripheralization and underdevelopment of Africa.

5.2 Recommendations:

Given Africa's increased marginalisation under the new world order, the question arises as to how Africa is to overcome the new impediments placed on its path to development. What is to be done?

The most pressing issue facing Africa today is how to overcome its economic crisis and achieve sustainable economic growth. In recognition of the fact that the TNCs are a major source of the underdevelopment of Africa, it used to be fashionable to advocate the nationalisation of the TNCs and adoption of an indigenous, self-reliant (preferably socialist) path to African development. It is true that the TNCs' activities in Africa are more deleterious to African development than beneficial. This has been clearly shown by empirical studies.^{6, 7, 8}

However, with the emergence of a new world order with its preponderant and all-embracing capitalist system, the suggestion that Africa de-link completely from the world capitalist system is no longer realistic. The increasing interdependence amongst countries

and regions of the world can not be overlooked. Besides, as the Tanzanian experience has shown, nationalisation of the TNCs is no magic formula for economic development. But while a blanket nationalisation of all TNCs in Africa will be ill-advised under this new world order, some form of rationalisation is essential to control the more deleterious activities of the TNCs. In this regard, the TNCs in the service industries (Banking, insurance etc) and those in construction should be nationalised since African companies can provide these services just as effectively.

What other measures should Africa adopt to free itself of this 'new enslavement' that is the new world order?

For Africa, part of the answer lies in collective self-reliance defined as the pursuit of autonomous and inward-looking policies through a common, unified African front.

In this regard, the recent signing of the AEC treaty is a welcome development. But just signing the treaty is not sufficient. "Experience ... has taught that the signing of a treaty is no more than a political declaration of intent to pursue the

objective enshrined in the treaty. The signing of a treaty of an AEC must be recognized as only the first in a series of practical steps that Africa must take to recover lost grounds."⁹ African countries should now follow the European example and move to actually integrate their economies through, among other measures, formulating and adopting common economic policies and adopting a common currency.

African countries must jointly chart a path of self-reliance by harnessing and building on local, technological know-how since whoever possesses the technological know-how for the production of goods and services can be either self-financed or financed by Banks or other financial institutions. However, this suggestion must not be seen as advocacy for autarchy but rather as a recommendation for autarky (meaning self-sufficiency). With the increased global drive towards integration, Africa must not only integrate, but must also seek to partake actively in the wider international community.

One weapon Africa should use to pursue and secure its interests in the international system today is the banner of fundamental human rights. Virtually all international documents and conventions

including the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, recognize nominally, the rights of all peoples to good food, to health, to education, and to clothing. Under this banner, African countries, along with other countries of the South, should demand concessions from the countries of the North to see that these requirements (of health, food, shelter etc) are fulfilled. Of course, the countries of the North may, as they have always done, resist these demands; and this is why the campaign demands unity of action not only among African countries but among countries of the south as a whole. This is where organizations and groups like the OAU and the group of 77 become relevant.

The non-aligned movement (the NAM) is also relevant in this regard. Some observers have suggested that with the end of the cold war, the NAM is no longer relevant. This conclusion derives from a particular (flawed) conception of the NAM. This conception "views the globe as a composite of strategic blocs and the NAM as a fluid entity or, more appropriately, a soft wood or brittle chip floating between these solid *blocs*."¹⁰ It is more useful, however, to view the world as being made up

of employers and employees. While the employers are formed into a solid association, the employees are trying to create trade unions at different levels. The NAM represents one of these trade unions in the making.¹¹

Thus, through the NAM and other associations of the South, Africa can push for democratisation of the international system. Through such fora, Africa can also push for its enormous debt to be cancelled by the countries of the North.

The much-talked about South-South co-operation should also be pursued more vigorously.

With regard to military/strategic issues, African countries should take a cue from the countries of Eastern Europe and cut down their military expenditures so as to have more funds for economic development.

Of course, some African governments may continue with high defence spendings on the grounds of 'ensuring internal security.' In this regard, they will do well to heed the advice of a former World Bank President, Robert McNamara, that "in a modernising society, security is not in military hardware although it may involve it, ..., security is development and without development there can be no security."¹²

Hunger and poverty are even bigger threats to internal security.

All the above recommendations must, however, be read as recommendations for the Comprador Bourgeois class in Africa; suggestions to the Comprador Bourgeois class regarding how it can extend itself and begin to acquire autonomy (from the metropolitan Bourgeois class). In effect, it is a call for the African Comprador Bourgeois class to become patriotic and transform itself to a national Bourgeois class. This is a tall order; and given the fact that this class is profiting from the structure of the international system, it is something that is unlikely to happen.

That is why the only true solution to the African crisis is for progressive, anti-imperialist forces to intensify the struggle against the pro-imperialist forces represented by the African Comprador Bourgeois class. This can be done by labour unions, student movements and other progressive forces in all African countries.

When victory over the Comprador Bourgeois class and other pro-imperialist forces is won (i.e. when they are overthrown), the victorious progressive

forces can then pursue the recommendations made above.

Even then, it must be recognized that the capitalist world system - because it is universal and all-embracing - imposes limitations that make it very difficult for Africa to achieve development just by the overthrow of local Comprador Bourgeois classes. The surest solution, then, to Africa's development problems is a transformation of the capitalist world system to a socialist world system. This means that the struggle of the working classes, of progressive forces, against the Bourgeois classes, must be globally conducted and globally won.

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1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	
470	540	570	570	510	470	470	420	340	330	SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
350	390	410	400	360	330	320	330	340	360	<i>Excluding Nigeria</i>
260	320	350	330	280	260	260	290	330	390	Benin
600	790	950	1,000	1,040	980	870	930	1,080	1,030	Botswana
160	180	190	190	160	140	140	160	180	210	Burkina Faso
170	200	250	240	250	230	250	250	250	230	Burundi
600	760	900	900	870	820	840	910	970	1,010	Cameroon
360	380	400	440	510	460	440	470	570	690	Cape Verde
290	320	330	340	290	280	280	290	340	390	Central African Republic
150	160	160	150	140	120	160	160	140	160	Chad
260	340	380	350	330	310	300	320	370	440	Comoros
640	850	1,140	1,330	1,230	1,170	1,060	980	930	930	Congo, People's Republic
980	1,170	1,130	960	760	660	630	700	740	740	Côte d'Ivoire
110	120	120	120	120	120	110	120	130	120	Ethiopia
3,120	3,830	4,240	4,370	3,920	3,420	3,320	3,340	2,780	2,970	Gabon
370	360	380	370	300	260	210	180	190	200	Gambia, The
370	400	410	380	340	370	370	390	390	400	Ghana
170	140	170	190	200	190	190	190	200	190	Guinea-Bissau
360	410	420	390	340	320	310	320	340	360	Kenya
360	420	490	550	520	510	420	360	370	420	Lesotho
590	590	600	550	500	470	480	460	450	..	Liberia
300	350	330	320	300	270	240	230	210	180	Madagascar
170	180	180	190	180	180	170	150	150	160	Malawi
210	240	250	230	180	160	150	180	200	220	Mali
390	440	480	450	460	420	400	420	440	480	Mauritania
1,200	1,190	1,260	1,210	1,130	1,080	1,100	1,230	1,500	1,810	Mauritius
..	190	160	170	170	210	160	100	Mozambique
360	430	440	380	320	250	240	250	260	310	Niger
860	1,020	1,090	1,120	990	910	950	700	370	280	Nigeria
210	240	270	260	270	260	280	300	310	320	Rwanda
450	490	470	490	420	370	370	410	510	630	Senegal
1,610	2,010	2,280	2,340	2,350	2,330	2,520	2,720	3,130	3,800	Seychelles
270	320	370	380	390	360	360	300	240	..	Sierra Leone
130	140	160	170	150	150	160	150	170	170	Somalia
440	440	440	420	400	350	320	380	450	480	Sudan
720	820	1,010	1,010	930	880	740	660	650	810	Swaziland
240	270	290	310	310	290	290	260	200	150	Tanzania
360	430	400	340	280	250	240	260	300	370	Togo
290	280	220	240	220	220	230	230	260	280	Uganda
410	430	400	340	290	200	160	150	150	170	Zaire
510	600	720	660	560	460	370	260	240	300	Zambia
580	710	860	900	850	730	640	590	590	660	Zimbabwe
190	230	260	270	270	270	270	280	290	320	SOUTH ASIA
120	140	160	160	150	140	150	160	160	170	Bangladesh
200	240	270	280	280	280	290	290	310	340	India
130	140	160	160	160	170	170	160	160	170	Nepal
250	290	330	350	350	350	340	340	340	350	Pakistan
230	260	300	330	340	360	390	410	410	420	Sri Lanka
360	420	460	470	470	480	480	470	490	550	EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC
260	300	320	320	320	330	330	310	310	340	China
1,580	1,750	2,000	1,870	1,700	1,770	1,630	1,750	1,600	1,520	Fiji
400	470	560	610	580	550	520	490	440	440	Indonesia
1,510	1,630	1,830	1,930	2,100	2,230	2,310	2,550	2,920	3,550	Korea, Republic of
1,400	1,680	1,890	1,910	1,900	2,040	1,970	1,850	1,830	1,940	Malaysia
710	760	810	790	730	710	690	690	730	790	Papua New Guinea
590	680	770	800	740	630	570	560	590	630	Philippines
440	410	510	570	550	590	500	580	600	630	Solomon Islands
590	670	750	780	810	840	800	800	850	1,000	Thailand
..	920	890	770	820	Vanuatu

Source: The World Bank, ³World Tables (1989-90 Edition)
Baltimore and London: World Bank/Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1990. p. 3.

Table 2: Gross Domestic Investment per Capita
(in U.S. Dollars)

1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	
110	120	120	100	80	60	70	70	60	60	<i>SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA</i>
70	80	80	80	70	60	60	60	50	60	<i>Excluding Nigeria</i>
50	60	70	70	30	20	30	30	20	20	Benin
330	420	410	380	250	240	370	320	Botswana
40	40	40	50	40	40	50	40	40	50	Burkina Faso
30	30	40	30	50	40	40	40	60	50	Burundi
150	160	220	220	230	210	220	220	170	130	Cameroon
170	130	200	200	..	180	190	220	230	230	Cape Verde
40*	20	30	40	60	60	60	60	50	30	Central African Republic
..	Chad
..	Comoros
260	380	670	880	720	620	570	370	Congo, People's Republic
310	360	270	220	190	90	130	100	100	110	Côte d'Ivoire
10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	Ethiopia
1,560	1,520	2,070	1,800	1,610	1,650	1,760	1,460	840	860	Gabon
90	90	90	70	70	90	80	80	80	80	Gambia, The
30	20	20	20	10	20	20	20	20	20	Ghana
60	40	30	40	40	40	40	40	30	30	Guinea-Bissau
100	130	120	90	70	70	90	70	80	80	Kenya
100	100	90	90	80	Lesotho
180	160	100	80	60	50	40	40	Liberia
100	90	60	50	50	50	50	40	50	60	Madagascar
60	50	30	40	40	20	30	20	20	20	Malawi
40	40	40	50	30	40	50	60	40	40	Mali
120	170	200	240	90	130	130	120	110	100	Mauritania
430	240	290	240	240	280	300	390	590	660	Mauritius
..	40	40	40	20	20	10	20	20	20	Mozambique
190	170	170	140	130	10	90	60	60	80	Niger
220	250	260	190	140	70	90	90	60	70	Nigeria
30	40	30	50	40	50	50	50	50	50	Rwanda
80	80	80	90	90	80	70	80	80	80	Senegal
20	900	800	940	Seychelles
40	50	60	50	40	40	40	40	30	..	Sierra Leone
30	60	40	50	40	30	50	40	50	40	Somalia
50	50	50	90	60	60	20	50	40	40	Sudan
50	390	290	270	290	250	Swaziland
70	60	60	60	40	50	50	50	50	50	Tanzania
210	130	120	100	80	80	100	100	80	80	Togo
10	10	Uganda
10	60	60	50	40	60	60	50	40	40	Zaire
130	160	140	100	70	80	80	110	60	80	Zambia
90	140	200	170	120	120	140	140	110	110	Zimbabwe
..	50	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	60	<i>SOUTH ASIA</i>
20	20	20	30	30	20	20	20	20	20	Bangladesh
60	60	70	60	60	60	70	70	60	70	India
..	Nepal
50	50	50	60	60	60	70	70	70	70	Pakistan
80	90	80	80	80	80	70	80	80	..	Sri Lanka
140	130	140	140	150	170	200	210	220	240	<i>EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC</i>
100	100	90	100	110	130	180	190	200	220	China
570	600	630	440	380	330	310	350	270	..	Fiji
130	130	230	210	210	180	200	200	170	170	Indonesia
670	520	520	550	620	700	720	800	910	1,010	Korea, Republic of
470	540	620	690	720	740	580	490	470	560	Malaysia
210	210	200	220	220	190	140	150	150	180	Papua New Guinea
220	220	220	210	190	110	80	70	90	110	Philippines
..	190	180	150	170	160	170	170	160	190	Solomon Islands
180	180	200	170	210	220	200	190	220	250	Thailand
..	Vanuatu

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Source: The World Bank, World Tables (1989-90 Edition)
Baltimore and London: World Bank/Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1990. p.15.

Table 3: Gross National Income Growth Rate (Percentage).

1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	
0.8	8.4	1.7	-0.4	-3.4	-2.8	4.5	-0.6	-1.3	2.3	<i>SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA</i>
2.0	3.3	1.3	1.8	0.2	1.1	3.3	3.0	0.0	2.1	<i>Excluding Nigeria</i>
5.0	4.8	4.6	5.7	-2.1	1.7	8.1	6.6	-3.7	2.4	Benin
28.6	24.8	-13.3	12.3	4.9	3.8	23.9	19.6	Botswana
4.9	1.2	3.6	9.2	2.0	-0.5	6.5	15.0	-2.3	9.4	Burkina Faso
3.6	-0.8	7.3	-3.8	9.7	-0.6	12.3	3.1	0.0	5.5	Burundi
7.4	14.6	12.1	6.5	6.2	6.1	17.3	-0.4	-7.3	-9.3	Cameroon
15.7	8.0	-0.7	5.5	6.2	5.3	7.0	5.1	Cape Verde
-4.3	-5.4	-2.9	7.1	-7.8	9.9	2.8	3.0	-1.8	1.5	Central African Republic
-25.1	-1.8	1.1	7.8	3.4	-6.7	26.7	-2.1	-8.9	12.8	Chad
..	Comoros
12.9	29.7	18.1	51.3	3.9	11.8	-3.8	-35.8	Congo, People's Republic
-1.7	2.3	-1.5	0.3	-1.0	0.0	6.2	8.0	-6.9	-7.1	Côte d'Ivoire
6.4	5.3	1.1	2.2	4.6	-3.6	-4.8	9.5	Ethiopia
..	Gabon
15.1	-10.8	12.1	7.3	-12.2	-0.1	-0.4	5.8	8.4	5.9	Gambia, The
-1.7	1.7	-3.5	-9.4	-2.8	9.9	4.3	3.0	5.7	5.2	Ghana
3.9	-20.3	25.2	2.6	-1.5	9.1	3.2	-1.4	4.3	0.5	Guinea-Bissau
2.9	3.3	0.6	1.3	-0.4	4.6	3.9	8.1	3.4	8.5	Kenya
-1.5	0.9	5.4	10.4	2.3	Lesotho
1.1	-7.7	-4.9	-10.5	0.9	0.9	4.6	-2.6	Liberia
6.5	-1.0	-11.0	-0.2	1.3	1.1	1.2	0.5	0.5	0.1	Madagascar
-4.9	-3.9	-0.9	3.1	3.2	7.7	4.2	-3.5	1.3	7.9	Malawi
10.7	-1.4	3.9	7.1	-3.8	3.5	-2.7	15.2	1.6	-2.9	Mali
0.3	4.5	10.2	-4.6	4.3	-2.2	11.0	7.5	1.7	2.0	Mauritania
3.7	-12.6	0.6	0.6	3.7	3.7	6.6	19.1	18.7	7.0	Mauritius
..	..	2.4	-9.9	-11.4	1.2	-17.9	2.4	0.8	3.8	Mozambique
16.9	1.8	4.4	1.4	1.3	-14.8	3.8	7.8	-4.8	4.6	Niger
-0.5	13.8	2.1	-2.7	-7.1	-7.0	6.1	-4.1	-2.8	2.6	Nigeria
14.6	4.4	6.5	4.0	6.3	0.0	2.2	6.5	-6.6	-1.0	Rwanda
7.9	-4.6	-1.8	20.4	-2.7	-2.2	2.5	3.5	5.2	4.7	Senegal
2.2	0.6	-6.2	1.5	Seychelles
6.9	2.5	8.4	-1.7	-2.8	3.0	-4.7	-10.9	7.2	..	Sierra Leone
-7.1	-2.7	9.5	7.7	-12.3	-4.0	11.1	0.5	6.3	-1.6	Somalia
-10.2	-0.2	1.6	13.1	1.5	-1.1	-11.1	10.8	8.5	-4.4	Sudan
9.6	-0.7	8.7	-13.3	18.6	18.3	Switzerland
0.1	-1.1	-4.1	0.1	0.4	5.3	-2.4	7.5	-2.2	4.5	Tanzania
-2.2	7.7	-7.8	-3.6	-5.6	4.6	0.8	4.6	-2.8	5.0	Togo
-16.4	-5.3	Uganda
5.1	0.1	-0.3	-6.2	-2.0	-3.1	4.1	0.4	2.6	7.8	Zaire
10.3	-3.1	1.4	-16.1	4.8	-0.9	5.8	-4.5	2.7	25.9	Zambia
2.9	12.0	11.1	2.1	1.1	-0.7	5.4	-5.9	-1.1	3.6	Zimbabwe
-3.7	4.7	6.4	3.8	8.4	3.5	6.4	4.5	4.7	9.0	<i>SOUTH ASIA</i>
4.5	2.3	5.6	-1.0	4.1	5.6	5.7	2.6	4.8	2.8	Bangladesh
-5.6	4.1	6.9	3.8	9.3	2.8	6.6	4.8	4.4	9.6	India
..	Nepal
4.4	9.8	4.4	5.7	5.7	6.2	7.5	3.6	7.0	7.5	Pakistan
2.0	2.6	1.8	7.6	10.1	7.9	0.2	3.1	2.0	..	Sri Lanka
7.9	5.5	5.6	5.7	8.3	9.9	7.4	6.6	10.5	9.6	<i>EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC</i>
7.0	6.4	4.9	8.2	9.5	12.9	11.6	5.5	11.2	10.4	China
9.0	-0.5	1.1	-7.8	-4.4	8.4	-4.5	9.7	-6.8	..	Fiji
13.2	18.2	13.0	-0.2	1.8	5.7	2.2	1.7	2.5	2.1	Indonesia
6.0	-8.5	5.4	9.0	12.9	9.9	6.2	16.5	14.6	13.0	Korea, Republic of
13.7	10.7	2.2	3.2	4.8	11.8	-4.3	-8.8	10.8	11.4	Malaysia
7.7	-8.2	-11.2	-2.5	5.0	4.3	2.1	4.1	6.6	2.2	Papua New Guinea
9.2	3.1	2.0	0.0	2.9	-7.8	-4.7	4.0	7.1	10.2	Philippines
..	..	-2.6	8.7	1.6	46.1	-22.9	-7.2	29.6	7.6	Solomon Islands
5.1	4.4	2.4	2.0	10.6	5.5	1.0	5.9	7.2	14.6	Thailand
..	Vanuatu

Table 4: Gross Domestic Product Growth Rate (Percentage).

1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	
4.6	3.4	-1.1	1.2	-2.2	-2.9	5.4	3.6	-0.8	3.0	<i>SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA</i>
2.2	3.3	3.3	2.5	1.1	0.8	3.7	4.5	1.7	1.7	<i>Excluding Nigeria</i>
6.4	6.5	9.1	6.8	-2.0	2.3	6.5	-0.5	-3.6	2.5	Benin
12.1	14.1	8.6	-1.0	23.8	19.9	8.2	8.0	10.6	8.1	Botswana
4.4	0.0	4.4	9.5	0.3	-1.8	10.0	15.8	-1.8	8.5	Burkina Faso
1.7	1.0	13.5	-3.1	7.0	-0.1	11.7	3.8	4.1	3.5	Burundi
13.3	15.6	12.9	2.7	7.8	5.8	11.2	7.5	-2.3	-7.7	Cameroun
11.0	5.0	5.2	14.6	32.6	4.0	8.6	2.9	7.0	3.2	Cape Verde
-2.7	-4.6	-2.3	7.5	-6.7	8.8	3.8	1.4	1.0	1.5	Central African Republic
-21.4	-6.0	1.0	5.4	5.6	-4.9	26.0	-2.5	-8.3	11.9	Chad
..	Comoros
12.0	18.8	13.9	26.1	7.7	7.3	-1.8	-7.2	-5.1	1.8	Congo, People's Republic
2.9	-0.8	4.3	1.6	-1.2	-4.4	9.2	3.6	-2.9	-6.4	Côte d'Ivoire
6.4	4.4	2.1	1.6	5.1	-2.2	-7.7	7.2	9.5	2.0	Ethiopia
0.5	2.5	-4.0	2.7	0.9	6.5	6.3	-5.6	-12.0	-1.0	Gabon
17.3	-9.8	10.2	12.7	-5.3	3.2	0.3	5.3	5.5	5.1	Gambia, The
-1.7	0.6	-2.9	-6.5	-4.5	8.7	4.5	5.0	4.4	5.9	Ghana
0.5	-18.9	18.9	4.4	-3.2	5.6	4.6	-0.5	5.6	4.4	Guinea-Bissau
5.2	5.3	4.6	2.1	1.0	2.0	5.8	6.8	5.7	5.9	Kenya
2.9	0.8	-1.4	1.0	-4.4	8.2	1.6	4.7	4.9	7.3	Lesotho
3.2	-4.5	-1.2	-2.0	-1.6	-1.6	-0.7	-1.7	-1.0	..	Liberia
9.6	1.0	-9.2	-1.2	1.1	1.9	2.3	2.0	1.2	1.8	Madagascar
5.6	-0.1	-5.2	2.3	4.0	5.3	4.6	0.9	0.1	3.3	Malawi
10.9	-1.3	4.6	6.7	-4.5	1.8	-0.3	17.6	1.3	-1.0	Mali
4.6	4.0	3.8	-2.1	4.9	-4.2	3.0	5.5	2.7	3.6	Mauritania
5.6	-10.4	5.4	5.8	0.3	4.7	7.1	10.1	10.7	7.4	Mauritius
..	..	1.3	-5.6	-11.4	-1.8	-17.1	2.0	10.9	10.3	Mozambique
7.1	4.8	1.2	-1.2	-1.8	-14.7	5.9	6.5	-4.9	7.1	Niger
7.2	3.4	-5.7	-0.2	-6.2	-7.4	7.6	2.3	-4.2	-4.7	Nigeria
10.0	10.2	8.8	1.7	6.3	-4.5	4.3	5.3	-0.8	-2.6	Rwanda
9.3	-3.0	-0.8	15.1	2.5	-4.4	3.7	4.4	4.0	5.1	Senegal
16.3	-2.6	-7.0	-1.5	2.1	3.5	9.4	2.4	4.1	6.2	Seychelles
8.0	3.1	8.7	0.0	-3.1	2.6	-4.7	-3.6	6.0	0.7	Sierra Leone
-3.3	0.2	6.5	3.9	-9.6	5.0	8.2	2.2	6.8	-0.2	Somalia
-10.4	1.0	2.1	12.7	2.1	-5.0	-6.3	12.6	1.3	-1.7	Sudan
-0.3	-4.8	6.7	1.2	-0.8	3.8	2.4	8.8	1.2	9.2	Swaziland
2.5	2.7	-1.0	-0.3	-0.5	4.5	0.9	4.8	4.0	5.2	Tanzania
-4.9	14.5	-3.4	-3.3	-6.0	2.5	3.8	3.5	1.7	5.7	Togo
-15.5	-5.2	9.5	-1.9	3.6	-10.1	6.5	0.9	8.4	7.0	Uganda
0.4	2.2	2.9	-2.6	1.5	2.8	2.5	2.7	2.7	2.5	Zaire
-3.2	3.0	6.1	-2.7	-2.1	-0.7	1.6	0.9	2.3	6.7	Zambia
2.8	11.4	12.6	3.4	1.3	-1.7	4.7	2.6	-0.1	6.4	Zimbabwe
-3.4	6.6	6.8	4.2	7.9	3.7	6.5	4.6	4.4	8.9	<i>SOUTH ASIA</i>
4.5	1.3	6.8	0.8	3.6	4.2	3.7	4.7	3.9	1.8	Bangladesh
-5.3	6.5	6.6	4.0	8.6	3.4	6.6	4.6	4.4	10.0	India
2.4	-2.3	8.3	3.8	-3.0	9.7	6.1	4.3	2.7	9.7	Nepal
3.7	10.4	7.9	6.5	6.8	5.1	7.5	5.5	6.5	7.1	Pakistan
6.4	5.8	5.6	7.5	3.9	1.7	7.9	4.4	1.2	2.7	Sri Lanka
7.0	5.3	5.6	5.9	8.2	10.1	8.5	7.5	9.5	10.0	<i>EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC</i>
7.0	6.4	4.9	8.3	9.8	13.5	13.1	8.0	10.5	11.2	China
12.2	-1.6	6.3	-6.0	-4.3	8.4	-4.0	8.8	-7.8	-2.5	Fiji
6.2	7.9	7.4	-0.4	3.3	6.1	2.5	4.0	3.4	5.5	Indonesia
7.5	-3.3	6.9	7.4	12.1	9.6	6.9	12.6	11.9	11.3	Korea, Republic of
9.5	7.5	6.9	6.0	6.4	7.9	-1.1	1.3	5.3	8.9	Malaysia
1.8	-2.3	-0.4	0.3	3.5	1.5	5.2	5.1	5.0	3.4	Papua New Guinea
6.3	5.3	3.8	2.9	1.1	-6.3	-4.5	1.4	4.9	6.5	Philippines
24.9	-6.0	13.4	2.9	13.9	1.3	0.9	19.8	1.7	4.3	Solomon Islands
5.0	4.7	6.3	4.0	7.2	7.1	3.6	4.4	8.1	10.9	Thailand
..	-11.2	3.6	11.6	3.0	7.1	1.4	-2.1	0.9	3.0	Vanuatu

Source: The World Bank, World Tables (1989-90 Edition) Baltimore and London; World Bank/Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990. p.23.

Table 4: Gross Domestic Product Growth Rate (Percentage).

1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	
4.6	3.4	-1.1	1.2	-2.2	-2.9	5.4	3.6	-0.8	3.0	SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
2.2	3.3	3.3	2.5	1.1	0.8	3.7	4.5	1.7	1.7	<i>Excluding Nigeria</i>
6.4	6.5	9.1	6.8	-2.0	2.3	6.5	-0.5	-3.6	2.5	Benin
12.1	14.1	8.6	-1.0	23.8	19.9	8.2	8.0	10.6	8.1	Botswana
4.4	0.0	4.4	9.5	0.3	-1.8	10.0	15.8	-1.8	8.5	Burkina Faso
1.7	1.0	13.5	-3.1	7.0	-0.1	11.7	3.8	4.1	3.5	Burundi
13.3	15.6	12.9	2.7	7.8	5.8	11.2	7.5	-2.3	-7.7	Cameroun
11.0	5.0	5.2	14.6	32.6	4.0	8.6	2.9	7.0	3.2	Cape Verde
-2.7	-4.6	-2.3	7.5	-6.7	8.8	3.8	1.4	1.0	1.5	Central African Republic
-21.4	-6.0	1.0	5.4	5.6	-4.9	26.0	-2.5	-8.3	11.9	Chad
..	Comoros
12.0	18.8	13.9	26.1	7.7	7.3	-1.8	-7.2	-5.1	1.8	Congo, People's Republic
2.9	-0.8	4.3	1.6	-1.2	-4.4	9.2	3.6	-2.9	-6.4	Côte d'Ivoire
6.4	4.4	2.1	1.6	5.1	-2.2	-7.7	7.2	9.5	2.0	Ethiopia
0.5	2.5	-4.0	2.7	0.9	6.5	6.3	-5.6	-12.0	-1.0	Gabon
17.3	-9.8	10.2	12.7	-5.3	3.2	0.3	5.3	5.5	5.1	Gambia, The
-1.7	0.6	-2.9	-6.5	-4.5	8.7	4.5	5.0	4.4	5.9	Ghana
0.5	-18.9	18.9	4.4	-3.2	5.6	4.6	-0.5	5.6	4.4	Guinea-Bissau
5.2	5.3	4.6	2.1	1.0	2.0	5.8	6.8	5.7	5.9	Kenya
2.9	0.8	-1.4	1.0	-4.4	8.2	1.6	4.7	4.9	7.3	Lesotho
3.2	-4.5	-1.2	-2.0	-1.6	-1.6	-0.7	-1.7	-1.0	..	Liberia
9.6	1.0	-9.2	-1.2	1.1	1.9	2.3	2.0	1.2	1.8	Madagascar
5.6	-0.1	-5.2	2.3	4.0	5.3	4.6	0.9	0.1	3.3	Malawi
10.9	-1.3	4.6	6.7	-4.5	1.8	-0.3	17.6	1.3	-1.0	Mali
4.6	4.0	3.8	-2.1	4.9	-4.2	3.0	5.5	2.7	3.6	Mauritania
5.6	-10.4	5.4	5.8	0.3	4.7	7.1	10.1	10.7	7.4	Mauritius
..	..	1.3	-5.6	-11.4	-1.8	-17.1	2.0	10.9	10.3	Mozambique
7.1	4.8	1.2	-1.2	-1.8	-14.7	5.9	6.5	-4.9	7.1	Niger
7.2	3.4	-5.7	-0.2	-6.2	-7.4	7.6	2.3	-4.2	-4.7	Nigeria
10.0	10.2	8.8	1.7	6.3	-4.5	4.3	5.3	-0.8	-2.6	Rwanda
9.3	-3.0	-0.8	15.1	2.5	-4.4	3.7	4.4	4.0	5.1	Senegal
16.3	-2.6	-7.0	-1.5	2.1	3.5	9.4	2.4	4.1	6.2	Seychelles
8.0	3.1	8.7	0.0	-3.1	2.6	-4.7	-3.6	6.0	0.7	Sierra Leone
-3.3	0.2	6.5	3.9	-9.6	5.0	8.2	2.2	6.8	-0.2	Somalia
-10.4	1.0	2.1	12.7	2.1	-5.0	-6.3	12.6	1.3	-1.7	Sudan
-0.3	-4.8	6.7	1.2	-0.8	3.8	2.4	8.8	1.2	9.2	Swaziland
2.5	2.7	-1.0	-0.3	-0.5	4.5	0.9	4.8	4.0	5.2	Tanzania
-4.9	14.5	-3.4	-3.3	-6.0	2.5	3.8	3.5	1.7	5.7	Togo
-15.5	-5.2	9.5	-1.9	3.6	-10.1	6.5	0.9	8.4	7.0	Uganda
0.4	2.2	2.9	-2.6	1.5	2.8	2.5	2.7	2.7	2.5	Zaire
-3.2	3.0	6.1	-2.7	-2.1	-0.7	1.6	0.9	2.3	6.7	Zambia
2.8	11.4	12.6	3.4	1.3	-1.7	4.7	2.6	-0.1	6.4	Zimbabwe
-3.4	6.6	6.8	4.2	7.9	3.7	6.5	4.6	4.4	8.9	SOUTH ASIA
4.5	1.3	6.8	0.8	3.6	4.2	3.7	4.7	3.9	1.8	Bangladesh
-5.3	6.5	6.6	4.0	8.6	3.4	6.6	4.6	4.4	10.0	India
2.4	-2.3	8.3	3.8	-3.0	9.7	6.1	4.3	2.7	9.7	Nepal
3.7	10.4	7.9	6.5	6.8	5.1	7.5	5.5	6.5	7.1	Pakistan
6.4	5.8	5.6	7.5	3.9	1.7	7.9	4.4	1.2	2.7	Sri Lanka
7.0	5.3	5.6	5.9	8.2	10.1	8.5	7.5	9.5	10.0	EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC
7.0	6.4	4.9	8.3	9.8	13.5	13.1	8.0	10.5	11.2	China
12.2	-1.6	6.3	-6.0	-4.3	8.4	-4.0	8.8	-7.8	-2.5	Fiji
6.2	7.9	7.4	-0.4	3.3	6.1	2.5	4.0	3.4	5.5	Indonesia
7.5	-3.3	6.9	7.4	12.1	9.6	6.9	12.6	11.9	11.3	Korea, Republic of
9.5	7.5	6.9	6.0	6.4	7.9	-1.1	1.3	5.3	8.9	Malaysia
1.8	-2.3	-0.4	0.3	3.5	1.5	5.2	5.1	5.0	3.4	Papua New Guinea
6.3	5.3	3.8	2.9	1.1	-6.3	-4.5	1.4	4.9	6.5	Philippines
24.9	-6.0	13.4	2.9	13.9	1.3	0.9	19.8	1.7	4.3	Solomon Islands
5.0	4.7	6.3	4.0	7.2	7.1	3.6	4.4	8.1	10.9	Thailand
..	-11.2	3.6	11.6	3.0	7.1	1.4	-2.1	0.9	3.0	Vanuatu

Source: The World Bank, World Tables (1989-90 Edition) Baltimore and London; World Bank/Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990. p.23.

Table 5: Current Account Balance before Official Transfers (Balance of Payments)

1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	
-3.3	-2.7	-9.2	-9.6	-7.2	-2.9	-2.1	-5.9	-7.0	-8.1	<i>SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA</i>
-7.4	-9.9	-10.9	-10.6	-8.6	-5.2	-6.0	-8.3	-8.0	-8.9	<i>Excluding Nigeria</i>
-14.0	-17.2	-26.4	-37.9	-10.5	-12.9	-11.2	-9.9	-9.4	-9.9	Benin
-14.0	-22.7	-36.5	-21.6	-13.5	-11.1	4.5	4.8	36.8	17.2	Botswana
-21.0	-20.3	-19.0	-24.2	-21.4	-17.0	-17.8	-16.5	-15.8	-16.7	Burkina Faso
-9.9	-13.9	-13.0	-17.7	-16.5	-16.5	-10.3	-11.3	-17.8	-14.9	Burundi
-2.7	-5.3	-5.3	-4.5	-0.7	2.5	3.9	-5.6	-9.3	-6.8	Cameroon
										Cape Verde
-14.5	-17.6	-11.2	-15.3	-16.4	-15.4	-16.7	-19.7	-18.0	-16.2	Central African Republic
-6.2	-2.2	-3.3	-7.4	-12.9	-10.1	-24.0	-32.0	-37.1	-27.5	Chad
			-26.3	-27.9	-59.7	-40.4	-29.1	-32.6		Comoros
-11.9	-13.5	-25.3	-16.7	-20.9	7.7	-9.3	-35.6	-13.3		Congo, People's Republic
-15.2										Côte d'Ivoire
-4.8	-4.5	-4.6	-7.7	-6.8	-8.0	-6.3	-6.7	-8.8	-9.2	Ethiopia
-7.0	8.2	9.7	7.8	1.9	2.5	-4.8	-31.8	-14.0	-18.9	Gabon
-25.4	-47.8	-46.2	-25.2	-25.5	-1.2	-0.4	-2.0	-16.7	-10.1	Gambia, The
1.0	-1.2	-12.0	-4.8	-6.1	-4.1	-5.4	-2.9	-4.3		Ghana
			-48.0	-44.0	-47.3	-48.1	-27.9	-35.5	-49.6	Guinea-Bissau
-9.5	-14.2	-10.1	-5.6	-2.8	-4.0	-3.7	-2.6	-8.0	-8.3	Kenya
-27.1	-30.6	-34.3	-23.8	-24.9	-27.8	-29.4	-28.2	-36.7	-31.6	Lesotho
-1.7	0.9	0.6	-8.0	-20.3	-9.6	-3.2	-7.5	-14.3		Liberia
-17.4	-19.5	-16.9	-13.6	-10.7	-11.1	-11.2	-9.4	-11.6	-13.9	Madagascar
-30.5	-25.2	-16.1	-13.5	-14.3	-2.0	-8.7	-3.9	-1.6		Malawi
-14.6	-14.4	-17.4	-16.6	-18.8	-19.3	-31.2	-23.4	-16.7	-18.0	Mali
-37.3	-35.4	-35.3	-49.4	-37.9	-29.9	-35.0	-36.6	-26.3	-17.9	Mauritania
-12.9	-11.5	-13.9	-5.7	-2.8	-6.1	-4.1	4.9	2.9	-3.4	Mauritius
	-17.5	-20.3	-23.4	-22.2	-18.8	-13.0	-13.9	-45.3	-58.4	Mozambique
-16.9	-16.9	-17.6	-21.9	-11.2	-10.8	-19.2			-10.3	Niger
2.2	5.1	-6.5	-7.8	-4.8	0.2	2.8	0.8	-0.3	-3.5	Nigeria
-7.5	-13.4	-13.1	-13.6	-10.7	-8.9	-10.3	-9.6	-11.8	-11.2	Rwanda
-14.0	-17.5	-25.9	-17.4	-18.1	-17.7	-17.7	-11.9	-10.1	-9.4	Senegal
-16.6	-20.4	-20.7	-34.0	-27.4	-18.7	-19.5	-23.3	-17.3	-17.4	Seychelles
-20.7	-19.0	-13.9	-15.4	-3.4	-4.4	-2.5	-9.5	-5.1	-6.5	Sierra Leone
-44.7		-28.0	-41.4	-38.5	-40.3	-33.0	-37.2	-45.2	-34.5	Somalia
-4.8	-9.6	-12.2	-16.3	-11.4	-10.4	-8.4	-8.7	-5.1	-9.8	Sudan
-37.9	-38.9	-28.1	-34.2	-32.4	-31.2	-25.2	-7.9	0.5	2.9	Swaziland
-11.1	-10.5	-4.7	-7.6	-4.4	-5.3	-5.4	-8.1	-22.5	-23.7	Tanzania
-33.4	-15.9	-13.4	-18.9	-14.5	-7.0	-13.1	-16.0	-12.9	-9.0	Togo
0.5	-7.0	-8.6	-8.3	-4.9	1.7	-2.8	-1.0	-6.0	-6.8	Uganda
1.5	-2.4	-5.2	-5.7	-8.4	-5.1	-8.7			-13.7	Zaire
0.1	-14.0	-20.3	-15.3	-9.3	-6.0	-17.9	-19.3	-8.2	-5.8	Zambia
-2.6	-5.6	-11.3	-11.0	-8.1	-3.6	-3.0	-1.0	-0.6	-0.9	Zimbabwe
-2.0	-3.0	-3.0	-3.1	-2.2	-2.3	-3.7	-3.2	-2.8	-3.3	<i>SOUTH ASIA</i>
-7.3	-11.2	-10.0	-12.0	-9.1	-6.8	-8.2	-7.0	-5.5	-5.8	Bangladesh
-0.7	-1.7	-1.9	-1.8	-1.6	-1.8	-2.8	-2.6	-2.5	-2.7	India
-2.3	-4.9	-4.4	-5.1	-8.9	-7.1	-7.3	-7.6	-7.4	-8.1	Nepal
-4.2	-3.7	-2.7	-3.6	-0.7	-2.2	-5.4	-3.9	-2.2	-4.4	Pakistan
-11.0	-19.7	-13.6	-14.5	-12.1	-3.3	-9.7	-9.2	-7.5	-8.7	Sri Lanka
-1.7	-1.6	-2.1	-1.7	-1.8	-0.2	-1.5	1.0	3.3	1.6	<i>EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC</i>
-0.3	0.3	0.9	2.3	1.7	1.0	-3.8	-3.0	-0.1	-1.0	China
-7.8	-5.0	-16.0	-9.4	-8.1	-3.8	-4.0	-1.0	-1.5	-0.2	Fiji
1.7	3.6	-0.9	-5.8	-7.9	-2.3	-2.3	-5.5	-3.3	-3.0	Indonesia
-6.5	-8.6	-6.8	-3.6	-2.0	-1.6	-1.0	4.3	7.5	8.2	Korea, Republic of
4.2	-1.3	-10.0	-13.5	-11.7	-5.0	-2.1	-0.6	7.6	4.7	Malaysia
-7.6	-22.8	-32.1	-31.3	-26.7	-24.5	-16.4	-12.6	-17.5	-10.8	Papua New Guinea
-5.5	-5.8	-5.8	-8.4	-8.6	-4.7	-0.7	2.5	-2.0	-1.8	Philippines
-7.0	-27.0	-34.1	-16.9	-17.0	-6.1	-22.8	-24.2	-27.2	-34.0	Solomon Islands
-7.7	-6.9	-7.7	-3.2	-7.6	-5.4	-4.5	0.2	-1.0	-3.2	Thailand
			-23.3	-17.4	-7.0	-19.1	-21.0	-31.5	-20.1	Vanuatu

Source: The World Bank, World Tables (1989-90 Edition) Baltimore and London: World Bank/Johns Hopkins University Press 1990 p.63.

Table 6: Percentage Growth of Merchandise Exports

1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	
17.6	-2.1	-21.2	-10.9	-5.3	10.6	9.2	-0.1	-1.8	1.2	SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
14.8	5.5	-2.8	-0.8	-4.0	7.6	5.0	2.4	2.9	-4.2	<i>Excluding Nigeria</i>
1.8	71.6	-18.4	-11.9	-14.2	20.3	14.4	-17.7	42.2	15.8	Benin
59.9	6.6	-16.4	16.5	42.8	7.6	12.9	2.8	70.4	-23.9	Botswana
4.7	12.0	8.8	-11.1	-6.3	8.0	14.0	22.3	11.4	5.6	Burkina Faso
40.3	-31.4	30.4	15.4	-7.9	14.9	16.4	17.1	-20.0	21.0	Burundi
44.7	11.8	22.8	-2.5	18.1	12.8	16.4	9.8	-15.7	-13.1	Cameroon
										Cape Verde
-10.2	12.6	-9.6	-4.7	5.6	-4.0	24.5	-2.3	-13.6	-3.2	Central African Republic
										Chad
										Comoros
151.0	21.2	6.0	19.1	-2.0	16.7	-6.0	-7.3	10.2	13.9	Congo, People's Republic
-5.3	27.1	-6.5	-5.9	-10.6	20.5	16.0	2.2	2.5	-24.3	Côte d'Ivoire
17.7	10.6	3.3	4.4	1.3	-5.8	-17.8	10.6	6.3	7.0	Ethiopia
22.2	-22.5	-5.1	6.2	0.1	3.3	3.4	-22.7	-0.9	5.0	Gabon
51.8	-50.4	-17.2	120.7	0.1	-4.3	6.8	8.7	5.5	-9.0	Gambia, The
-5.6	32.6	-0.8	-2.7	-47.5	1.6	-24.8	48.1	6.0	9.8	Ghana
										Guinea-Bissau
-8.3	9.2	-10.6	-3.9	-6.6	0.1	4.8	12.3	-5.0	6.6	Kenya
16.2	20.1	-8.6	-27.3	0.7	-16.6	-21.4	-3.1	74.5	7.7	Lesotho
-11.8	-3.5	0.2	-10.6	-4.0	6.3	1.9	-6.1	-12.0	-4.1	Liberia
-9.9	-0.7	-8.7	0.2	-4.1	4.8	-17.6	-2.5	16.7	-18.6	Madagascar
3.8	4.5	7.6	-3.7	2.3	25.8	1.0	-12.9	14.3	-8.2	Malawi
23.5	21.9	-21.1	11.7	3.9	15.4	12.4	15.8	-8.7	16.6	Mali
0.2	17.3	41.6	-7.1	39.6	-9.7	23.4	-6.5	25.3	-8.9	Mauritania
4.2	1.9	-19.9	22.9	2.6	7.3	15.4	29.3	18.1	12.3	Mauritius
										Mozambique
48.9	31.5	-23.1	-13.8	-12.3	-8.5	-16.3	41.2	21.8	-32.3	Niger
19.9	-7.9	-37.5	-24.7	-7.5	16.5	16.4	-4.1	-9.8	11.5	Nigeria
52.5	-30.4	-1.8	-8.3	19.4	6.0	-11.6	12.6	0.7	-13.4	Rwanda
8.6	-25.1	-1.6	28.1	8.1	2.9	-10.7	24.1	3.3	10.1	Senegal
1.0	-32.9	-23.3	-1.3	35.6	18.4	25.3	12.6	0.9	34.6	Seychelles
-8.5	2.9	-31.1	-15.5	9.1	8.0	3.1	5.1	-10.5	-18.3	Sierra Leone
-27.9	30.8	42.6	1.4	-44.7	-40.5	73.2	-0.8	-5.1	-42.2	Somalia
9.9	-11.0	-6.5	-6.8	21.6	27.3	1.5	-8.2	-16.3	0.9	Sudan
										Swaziland
-7.2	2.3	19.3	-24.8	-8.0	-13.7	-19.2	18.0	8.0	7.2	Tanzania
0.7	28.9	-21.1	3.7	-14.0	-17.2	15.6	16.3	12.9	3.1	Togo
-14.7	-15.6	-15.2	35.7	10.1	-1.9	-8.9	-12.6	26.2	-2.0	Uganda
71.6	18.9	-4.3	-16.9	-12.7	14.0	1.6	-7.2	3.9	-3.3	Zaire
9.5	-10.2	-9.7	9.7	0.0	0.6	-9.6	-13.1	-1.1	-5.3	Zambia
17.4	1.7	6.6	3.5	-16.8	4.9	6.3	14.3	-8.8	10.8	Zimbabwe
8.0	-4.3	-1.2	6.8	6.6	0.5	3.3	9.2	11.2	6.7	SOUTH ASIA
4.1	11.5	-9.4	1.7	6.2	7.3	7.5	2.2	21.7	6.6	Bangladesh
4.4	-10.1	-4.6	12.3	2.1	1.8	-2.0	7.7	14.3	9.3	India
-0.6	0.7	29.5	-2.5	-19.1	42.9	20.2	-19.7	0.4	22.4	Nepal
23.2	12.3	6.7	-5.8	28.7	-12.5	14.2	25.5	8.5	3.4	Pakistan
4.0	-3.0	6.8	3.6	-3.1	20.3	14.0	-4.5	6.9	-1.4	Sri Lanka
4.4	7.8	9.0	5.8	11.0	13.1	4.8	15.9	13.0	10.4	EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC
17.2	22.4	16.7	8.0	7.1	16.8	10.5	13.6	12.1	11.9	China
-6.4	-28.2	10.3	41.8	-13.5	26.4	12.2	15.9	7.7	-23.2	Fiji
-6.5	-2.9	-4.5	-3.1	16.4	-1.6	-3.0	15.9	-3.6	3.5	Indonesia
-0.5	9.5	19.4	7.0	15.0	18.5	-6.5	16.6	25.3	12.9	Korea, Republic of
15.8	-1.1	-0.3	13.6	15.6	12.7	4.5	-8.7	7.0	9.0	Malaysia
0.0	19.1	-5.2	-7.7	3.1	3.6	13.7	14.1	12.4	15.2	Papua New Guinea
7.1	15.4	7.1	-2.6	-6.7	2.0	-3.6	7.7	-1.3	8.7	Philippines
										Solomon Islands
10.8	10.4	18.9	19.1	-10.3	22.3	5.0	10.9	20.1	21.1	Thailand
										Vanuatu

Table A.2 GNP, population, GNP per capita, and growth of GNP per capita

Country group	1989 GNP (billions of dollars)	1989 population (millions)	1989 GNP per capita (dollars)	Average annual growth of GNP per capita (percent)					
				1965-73	1973-80	1980-89	1988	1989	1990 ^a
Low- and middle-income economies	3,232	4,053	800	4.2	2.5	1.5	1.4	1.4	0.0
Low-income economies	981	2,948	330	2.4	2.1	4.1	3.4	3.3	3.2
Middle-income economies	2,253	1,105	2,040	5.2	2.3	0.5	0.6	0.6	-1.1
Severely indebted middle- income economies	958	554	1,720	4.8	2.9	-0.3	-0.7	-1.3	-3.4
Sub-Saharan Africa	162	480	340	1.7	0.6	-1.2	-3.1	0.0	..
East Asia	841	1,552	540	5.2	4.7	6.3	9.5	2.2	6.4
South Asia	367	1,131	320	1.2	1.9	2.9	6.7	0.0	3.1
Europe, Middle East, and North Africa	944	433	2,180	..	1.8	0.4	0.0	-0.5	..
Latin America and the Caribbean	823	421	1,950	4.7	2.3	-0.5	-1.7	-1.2	-2.4
High-income economies	15,230	831	18,330	3.7	2.3	2.3	3.7	2.7	2.1
OECD members	14,748	773	19,090	3.8	2.3	2.4	3.7	2.8	2.1
Other economies	..	323
World	20,736	5,206	3,980	2.8	1.5	1.2	2.4	1.5	1.7
Oil exporters (excluding USSR)	478	553	..	6.0	1.0	-2.5	-2.1	-1.1	..

a. Preliminary data.

Table A.3 Composition of GDP
(billions of dollars)

Country group and indicator	1965	1973	1980	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990 ^a
Low- and middle-income economies									
GDP	389	867	2,430	2,550	2,655	2,745	3,030	3,303	3,476
Total consumption	309	660	1,807	1,938	2,024	2,051	2,237	2,451	..
Gross domestic investment	80	201	657	604	653	679	781	859	..
Net exports	0	6	-34	8	-22	16	12	-6	..
Low-income economies									
GDP	169	315	790	828	793	821	931	996	974
Total consumption	138	241	588	632	602	605	683	736	..
Gross domestic investment	32	71	202	223	220	234	272	283	..
Net exports	-1	3	0	-28	-29	-17	-25	-23	..
Middle-income economies									
GDP	215	549	1,640	1,722	1,862	1,924	2,099	2,308	..
Total consumption	167	415	1,218	1,304	1,424	1,448	1,555	1,716	..
Gross domestic investment	46	129	456	380	432	445	509	576	..
Net exports	2	5	-34	37	6	31	36	16	..
Severely indebted middle-income economies									
GDP	114	290	810	788	810	850	962	1,091	1,210
Total consumption	89	228	624	606	643	656	733	842	..
Gross domestic investment	24	61	205	151	155	178	210	226	..
Net exports	1	0	-19	30	12	16	19	23	..
Sub-Saharan Africa									
GDP	31	69	225	198	168	151	164	171	180
Total consumption	26	55	177	172	148	129	143	146	152
Gross domestic investment	4	12	45	24	25	24	26	26	28
Net exports	0	1	3	1	-5	-2	-4	-1	-0
East Asia									
GDP	91	206	547	589	585	644	780	895	892
Total consumption	70	148	379	406	395	416	504	588	..
Gross domestic investment	20	56	166	191	189	212	262	307	..
Net exports	1	2	1	-9	1	16	14	1	..

Table A.6 GDP and growth rates

Country group	1989 GDP (billions of dollars)	Average annual growth of GDP (percent)							
		1965-73	1973-80	1980-89	1987	1988	1989	1990 ^a	
Low- and middle-income economies	3,303	6.5	4.7	3.8	3.8	4.3	2.9	2.3	
Low-income economies	996	5.3	4.5	6.2	5.9	8.1	4.1	4.5	
Middle-income economies	2,308	7.0	4.7	2.9	2.9	2.7	2.4	1.1	
Severely indebted middle-income economies	1,091	6.4	5.2	1.9	2.8	1.3	1.3	-1.6	
Sub-Saharan Africa	171	4.8	3.2	2.1	0.2	2.9	2.9	1.5	
East Asia	895	8.1	6.6	7.9	8.9	9.7	5.5	6.7	
South Asia	351	3.6	4.2	5.1	4.3	8.2	4.5	4.2	
Europe, Middle East, and North Africa	828	7.7	3.9	2.9	1.2	2.1	1.5	-0.8	
Latin America and the Caribbean	964	6.5	5.0	1.6	3.1	0.5	1.3	-0.7	
High-income economies	15,021	4.8	3.1	3.0	3.5	4.4	3.4	2.6	
OECD members	14,537	4.7	3.0	3.0	3.4	4.4	3.3	2.6	
Other economies	
World	20,443	5.0	3.3	3.1	3.5	4.4	3.3	2.5	
Oil exporters (excluding USSR)	..	8.3	3.7	0.8	-0.3	2.5	2.2	..	

a. Preliminary data.

Table A.7 Structure of production
(percentage of GDP)

Country group	1965		1973		1980		1985		1987		1988		1989 ^a	
	Agri- cul- ture	Indus- try	Agri- cul- ture	Indus- try	Agri- cul- ture	Indus- try	Agri- cul- ture	Indus- try	Agri- cul- ture	Indus- try	Agri- cul- ture	Indus- try	Agri- cul- ture	Indus- try
Low- and middle-income economies	31	31	24	34	19	38	19	36	18	36	18	36	19	38
Low-income economies	44	28	38	32	33	37	33	33	31	33	31	34	32	37
Middle-income economies	19	34	15	35	12	39	12	37	13	37	12	37	12	36
Severely indebted middle-income economies	17	33	14	33	11	37	11	36	11	36	11	36
Sub-Saharan Africa	41	20	31	25	28	32	33	26	30	25	31	24	32	27
East Asia	42	35	35	40	29	44	27	41	25	42	24	43	24	44
South Asia	44	21	43	19	35	22	31	24	29	24	30	23	32	26
Europe, Middle East, and North Africa	16	..	13	41	14	37	15	37	15	35	15	..
Latin America and the Caribbean	16	33	12	33	10	37	10	37	10	37	10	37
High-income economies	5	42	4	37	3	37	3	34	3	31
OECD members	5	43	4	37	3	36	3	34	3	31
Other economies
World	10	40	8	37	7	37	6	35	5	32
Oil exporters (excluding USSR)	13	48	10	54	14	38	13	35	14	35	14	35

a. Preliminary data.

Source: The World Bank, World Development Report 1991 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank 1991) p.186.

Country group	Agriculture			Industry			Services		
	1965-73	1973-80	1980-89	1965-73	1973-80	1980-89	1965-73	1973-80	1980-89
Low- and middle-income economies	3.1	2.5	3.3	8.3	4.9	4.5	7.3	6.4	3.5
Low-income economies	2.9	2.1	4.0	8.8	6.6	8.6	5.8	5.5	6.2
Middle-income economies	3.3	3.0	2.6	8.1	4.4	3.0	7.7	6.6	2.8
Severely indebted middle-income economies	2.8	3.2	2.1	7.4	5.9	1.5	7.3	5.9	1.9
Sub-Saharan Africa	2.4	1.1	2.0	10.4	4.3	0.7	3.4	4.2	2.3
East Asia	3.2	2.5	5.2	12.4	9.4	10.4	9.8	7.2	7.7
South Asia	3.1	2.2	2.9	3.9	5.5	6.7	4.0	5.3	6.3
Europe, Middle East, and North Africa	2.9	3.1	2.7
Latin America and the Caribbean	2.8	3.3	1.9	7.5	5.4	1.6	7.5	5.8	1.6
High-income economies	..	-2.3	1.5	10.9	1.9	2.1	12.6	0.7	3.1
OECD members	..	-2.5	1.3	10.9	1.7	2.2	12.6	0.6	3.1
Other economies
World	2.4	0.2	2.6	10.6	2.3	2.4	12.1	1.2	3.2
Oil exporters (excluding USSR)	4.1	2.7	5.4	9.8	1.4	-1.1	7.9	9.8	1.9

Table A.9 Growth of export volume
(average annual percentage change)

Country and commodity group	1965-73	1973-80	1980-87	1987	1988	1989
Low- and middle-income economies	5.1	3.5	4.6	10.9	9.8	4.9
Primary goods	4.0	1.2	2.8	4.1	4.1	2.7
Food	2.5	4.9	3.4	11.6	-5.1	..
Fuels	5.3	-0.8	1.8	-4.2	7.2	..
Nonfood primary	2.4	3.1	0.3	-3.1	8.6	..
Metals and minerals	5.4	7.3	1.3	8.6	-0.4	..
Manufactures	10.9	13.0	7.0	20.4	14.7	2.4
Low-income economies	10.4	3.5	4.2	-7.7	9.1	6.0
Primary goods	12.7	1.4	0.8	-3.2	0.1	5.1
Food	0.6	3.9	3.7	7.1	-3.3	..
Fuels	23.6	-0.1	-0.5	-7.0	6.3	..
Nonfood primary	6.4	2.6	-0.3	-10.0	-4.9	..
Metals and minerals	6.6	5.6	-1.6	10.7	-5.7	..
Manufactures	..	10.3	10.2	21.6	18.9	8.6
Middle-income economies	3.9	3.5	4.7	11.9	10.0	4.5
Primary goods	2.1	1.2	3.6	6.7	5.6	1.9
Food	3.0	5.3	3.3	13.1	-5.6	..
Fuels	1.8	-1.2	2.9	-2.9	7.7	..
Nonfood primary	1.3	3.2	0.6	-0.5	13.7	..
Metals and minerals	5.0	8.1	2.2	8.1	1.1	..
Manufactures	14.7	13.9	6.0	20.0	13.2	..
Severely indebted middle-income economies	0.6	2.8	3.6	8.2	12.1	-0.6
Primary goods	-1.4	0.9	2.5	4.1	..	-1.4
Manufactures	15.6	10.9	7.4	20.7	23.9	-4.9
Sub-Saharan Africa	14.2	-0.2	-1.8	6.0	2.7	0.9
Primary goods	14.7	-0.8	-2.0	2.4	4.4	..
Manufactures	5.8	9.7	2.4	28.4	-9.2	..
East Asia	10.6	9.4	9.6	13.2	11.4	6.3
Primary goods	8.4	5.0	4.6	-3.3	-0.8	..
Manufactures	28.3	17.1	13.8	25.0	18.2	0.7
South Asia	-0.2	4.5	5.4	12.0	5.8	10.6
Primary goods	-1.9	2.1	3.7	-5.3	-2.2	..
Manufactures	1.1	6.3	6.2	22.8	11.1	..

Source: The World Bank, World Development Report 1991
(Washington, D.C.: World Bank 1991) p.187.

Table 1 — Types of African Political Systems

ESTABLISHED DEMOCRACIES	EMERGING DEMOCRACIES	DIRECTED DEMOCRACIES	CONTESTED SOVEREIGNTY
Botswana Gambia Mauritius Namibia Senegal	Benin Cape Verde São Tomé & Príncipe	Egypt Morocco Zimbabwe	Ethiopia Liberia Somalia Western Sahara
REGIMES IN TRANSITION - DEMOCRATIC COMMITMENT			
<u>Strong</u>	<u>Moderate</u>	<u>Ambiguous</u>	AUTHORITARIAN
Congo Côte d'Ivoire Gabon Nigeria Zambia	Angola Burkina Faso Guinea-Bissau Mali Mozambique Niger Rwanda Sierra Leone South Africa Togo Tunisia Uganda	Algeria Burundi Cameroon Central African Republic Chad Comoros Islands Ghana Guinea Kenya Lesotho Madagascar Mauritania Tanzania Zaire	Djibouti Equatorial Guinea Libya Malawi Sudan Swaziland

* Nations in the process of institutionalizing democracy.
 ** Systems in which formal institutions and practices of constitutional democracy are present, but in which the extensive powers of the ruling elite limit political participation.

Source: *Africa Dêmos* (July 1991), published by the African Governance Program of the Carter Center of Emory University.

The Kenyan scholar Peter Anyang' Nyong'o captured the two contrasting perspectives on the democratic movement in Africa when he observed that the movement appears "homegrown from the point of view of its advocates and foreign-imposed from the point of view of the defenders of the single-party regime."³ Indeed, complaints about the imposition of external models of democracy on Africa now seem to come mainly from either officials and apologists of the embattled regimes or unswerving ideologues. Most advocates of democracy, on the other hand, are pleased that foreign governments and international agencies are at last supporting the struggle for political pluralism and withdrawing their support from autocrats and dictators.

Although the democratic movement in Africa first burst into the headlines in 1990, it is not exactly new, nor is it merely an echo of events elsewhere in the world.³ Students of Africa can trace the roots of its democratic movements to individuals and organizations that have been

Source: Richard Joseph, 'Africa: The Rebirth of Political Freedom' in Journal of Democracy Vol.2. No.4 Fall 1991. p.12.