



Thesis
By
OBASI, NNAMDI ISAAC

**UNIVERSITY
OF NIGERIA
NSUKKA**

**Asuu-government conflict in
Nigeria : an investigation into the
roots, character and management
of ASUU strikes**

JANUARY 1991



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ASUU-GOVERNMENT CONFLICT IN NIGERIA: AN
INVESTIGATION INTO THE ROOTS, CHARACTER
AND MANAGEMENT OF ASUU STRIKES.



BY

OBASI, NNAMDI ISAAC
B.Sc. HONS. (Ibadan), M.Sc. (Nigeria)
(PG/Ph.D/85/3317)

A Thesis submitted to the Department of
Political Science, University of Nigeria,
Nsukka, in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the award of Doctor
of Philosophy (Ph.D)

JANUARY 1991

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated as follows:

To GOD's GLORY, in appreciation
of HIS inestimable Favour;

To the Families of Mr & Mrs Innocent
N. Obasi; and Mr. & Mrs Albert B.O.
Eneh, for being worthy and wonderful
parents and parents-Inlaws respectively;


And finally to my God-Given Jewel:

Susan Nwakego.

CERTIFICATION

OBASI, NNAMDI ISAAC, a Postgraduate student in the Sub-Department of Public Administration and Local Government (PALG), Department of Political Science, and with the Reg. No. PG/Ph.D/85/3317 has satisfactorily completed the requirements for research work for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Public Administration.

The work embodied in this thesis is original and has not been submitted in part or full for any degree of this or any other University.



Rev. Fr. L.J.U. Ejiofor
Head, Department of Political Science




Dr. Cornelius O. Ejiofor
Supervisor


APPROVAL PAGE

This thesis is hereby approved

by



Dr. Cornelius O. Ejimofor
Co-ordinator, PALG.



Rev. Fr. L.S.U. Ejiofor
Head, Dept. of Political Science

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ABSTRACT

This study was on the causes and management of the conflict between the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) and the federal government of Nigeria from 1978 to 1988. The broad aims of this study are to identify the roots and character of ASUU strikes and to analyze why the settlement of ASUU-Government conflict was intractable.

Data were collected through questionnaire, interview and analysis of historical records. Three hundred academics were sampled from ten federal and state Universities. Selected ASUU and government officials were interviewed. Three sampling methods, namely multi-stage stratified, simple random, and purposive, were used. The analysis of data involved the use of percentages, frequencies, means and critical examination of documents.

The following major findings were made:

First, the roots of ASUU strikes, were found to be more embracing than the widely believed causes like the erosion of University autonomy and academic freedom, under-funding of Universities, and poor physical conditions of work, among others. These causes were found to be manifestations of a fundamental problem that is firmly rooted within the structure and character

of Nigeria's political economy. The fundamental problem has to do with the mismanagement of the economy which was generated and continuously reproduced by the prevailing social order, strongly reprobated and challenged by ASUU leadership.

Secondly, there was enough evidence to uphold the proposition that the primary motive behind the erosion of University autonomy and academic freedom, and under-funding of Universities, was to curb the radical orientation of academics and consequently make them supportive of the prevailing social order.

Thirdly, sufficient evidence are available to show that the perceived character of ASUU-Government conflict by the rank and file of ASUU members, was different from that by both ASUU leadership and the government.

Finally the proposition that the management of ASUU-Government conflict was intractable because of the asymmetric and structure-oriented character of the conflict, was confirmed. The proscription of ASUU was therefore a necessary outcome of this character of the conflict. The study confirms Anatol Rapoport's thesis that in asymmetric and structure-oriented conflict, the liquidation of one party to the conflict, is a

major resolution mechanism. It also confirms to some degree, Richard Hyman's proposition that strikes in the Third World, are a form of protest directed against the government, and are likely to possess an overpolitical dimension.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

To all intents and purposes, a doctoral thesis is, a product of collective intellectual enterprise. Although, the doctoral candidate is expected to provide much of the independent, original and critical intellectual input, the role of the supervisor is nevertheless very crucial to the successful execution of the entire academic project. This is largely because, the supervisor's critical intellectual judgement, plays a decisive role in the ability of the candidate to articulate very fast and properly too, the principal problems of the research. It is against this backdrop, that I now acknowledge the excellent and remarkable contributions of Dr. C.O. Ejimofor, towards the successful and timely completion of this Ph.D project.

I am exceedingly pleased to observe that some virtues of Dr. Ejimofor have continued to motivate me as a budding scholar. Such virtues are his unassuming and humane character, and a high sense of understanding and geniality. In addition to these, his availability and accessibility when needed, no doubt confer on any student working under him, a wonderful blessing and privilege. It is therefore my humble and sincere belief, that

no amount of rhetorical gratitude, can adequately match Dr. Ejimofor's conscientious discharge of his supervisory functions.

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Isaac Nnamdi Obasi
(Lecturer I)
Usmanu Danfodiyo University Sokoto

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
Title page	i
Dedication	ii
Certification	iii
Approval page	iv
Abstract	v
Acknowledgement	viii
Table of contents	xv
List of Tables	xxiii
List of Appendices	xxviii
Abbreviations	xxx1
 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION	 1
1.1 The Background of the Study	1
1.2 The Statement of the Research Problem	8
1.3 The Objectives of the Study	18
1.4 The Significance of the Research	19
1.5 The Scope and Limitations of the Study	22
1.6 The Hypotheses of the Study	24
1.7 Operationalization of Phrases and Concepts	25

	PAGE
CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF LITERATURE	30
2.1 Introduction	30
2.2 Causes and Roots of Industrial Conflict and Strike	36
2.2.1 The liberal Conflict School	37
2.2.2 The Class Conflict View-Point	47
2.3 The Management of Industrial Conflict and Strike	50
2.4 The Unionization of Academics	62
2.5 ASUU-Government Conflict	66
2.6 Conclusion: The Inadequacy of existing Literature	70
CHAPTER THREE: THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK	73
3.1 Introduction	73
3.2 A Political Economy Framework	74
3.3 The Class Framework of Analysis	77
3.4 ASUU-Government Conflict: A Framework of Analysis	81
3.4.1 Background Issues	81
3.4.2 State and Government: A Conceptual Clarification	83

	PAGE
3.4.3 The Character of the Nigerian State	85
3.4.4 The Motive behind Government Intervention in Industrial Relations	95
3.4.5 The Class Character of ASUU and the Mission of ASUU Leadership	107
CHAPTER FOUR: THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	111
4.1 Introduction	111
4.2 The Research Design	111
4.3 The Population of the Study	112
4.4 The Sample and Sampling Procedures	114
4.4.1 The Criteria for Selecting Universities	118
4.5 Data-gathering Instruments	123
4.5.1 The Documentary Instrument	124
4.5.2 The Questionnaire Instrument	125
4.5.3 The Interview Instrument	126
4.6 The Reliability and Validity of Instruments	128
4.7 Methods of Data Analysis	130
4.8 The Field Work Experience	132

	PAGE
CHAPTER FIVE: THE EVOLUTION, FORMATION AND ORGANIZATION OF ASUU	136
5.1 Introduction	136
5.2 The Essence of Character of the Academic Profession	136
5.2.1 Models of Academic-Government Relations ..	140
5.2.1.1 The Opposition Model	140
5.2.1.2 The Collaboration Model	142
5.2.1.3 The Independence or Autonomy Model	143
5.3 The Evolution and Formation of ASUU	146
5.3.1 Historical Antecedents	146
5.3.2 The Formation of ASUU	150
5.3.3 The Objectives of ASUU	152
5.4 The Structure and Organization of ASUU ..	155
5.5 The Operational and Ideological Characteristics of ASUU	158
5.6 Conclusion	160

CHAPTER SIX: PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF DATA - I

THE CAUSES AND ROOTS OF ASUU STRIKES ..	162
6.0.0 Introduction	162
6.1.0 The Causes of ASUU Strikes	163
6.1.1 The Issue of Inadequate funding of Universities	172
6.1.1.1 Were the Universities Really Under-funded? ..	172
6.1.1.2 Discussion	186
6.1.2 The Problem of Poor Physical Conditions of Work in Universities,	207
6.1.3 The Question of Erosion of University Autonomy and Academic Freedom (UAAF) ..	216
6.1.3.1 The Background	216
6.1.3.2 Dismissal and Premature Retirement of Academics	223
6.1.3.3 Appointment and transfer of Vice-Chancellors ..	225
6.1.3.4 The Role of the Visitor and Appointment of Visitation Panels	228
6.1.3.5 The Role of the National Universities Commission (NUC)	233

6.1.3.6	The Federal Ministry of Education Vis-a-Vis the Erosion of University Autonomy and Academic Freedom (UAAF)	240
6.1.3.7	Further Cases of Erosion of UAAF.	244
6.1.3.7(a)	Ban on Use of Public Facilities for Seminars			244
6.1.3.7(b)	Prohibition of Academics from Participation in Politics	244
6.1.3.7(c)	Usurpation of University Admissions' Function by JAMB	244
6.1.3.7(d)	Appointment of Members of University Councils	--	--	245
6.1.3.7(e)	Excision of ASUU from the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC)	246
6.1.3.8	Discussion	247
6.1.3.8(a)	General Issues	247
6.1.3.8(b)	Motive behind Erosion of UAAF	259
6.1.3.8(c)	Conclusion	273
6.1.4	The Issue of Poor Remuneration and Conditions of Service in Nigerian Universities	275

	PAGE
6.1.5 The Question of ASUU Radicalism and Confrontational Posture	294
6.1.5.1 Background	294
6.1.5.2 The Ideological Character of ASUU Rank and File	295
6.1.5.3 The Ideological Character of ASUU Leadership	297
6.1.5.4 Further Evidence on the Radical Posture of ASUU Leadership	304
6.1.5.5 Government's Reactions	315
6.2.0 The Roots of ASUU-Government Conflict	317
6.3.0 General Conclusions	323
 CHAPTER SEVEN: PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF DATA - II	
THE CHARACTER AND PERCEPTION OF ASUU- GOVERNMENT CONFLICT	
7.1 Introduction	326
7.2 The Critical Issues	326
7.3 Conclusion	341

CHAPTER EIGHT: PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF DATA - III	
THE MANAGEMENT OF ASUU-GOVERNMENT CONFLICT	343
8.1 Contending Issues in the Management of the Conflict	343
8.2 A Critical Anatomy of Contending Issues in the Management of ASUU-Government Conflict ..	355
8.3 Conclusion	374
CHAPTER NINE: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY	375
9.1 Summary and Conclusions	375
9.2 Practical and Theoretical Implications of the Study	384
9.2.1 Practical Implications	384
9.2.2 Theoretical Implications	388
9.3 Agenda for Further Research	391
Notes	394
Bibliography	396
Appendices	417

LIST OF TABLES

PAGE

Number	Title	PAGE
4.1	Proposed and Actual Sample of Academics based on Rank	117
4.2	Selected Universities based on Some Criteria	119
6.1	Respondents' Ranking of each of the Possible Causes of ASUU Strikes	165
6.2	Mean Response on each of the actual causes of ASUU Strikes	168
6.3	Actual Causes of ASUU Strikes in order of Importance	169
6.4	Opinion of Respondents on whether Universities are under-funded	170
6.5	Opinion of Respondents on whether University Autonomy and Academic Freedom (UAAF) are progressively being eroded	171
6.6	Opinion of Respondents on whether they are satisfied or dissatisfied with the facilities they work with	171
6.7	Recurrent Grants to Federal Universities from 1976 - 1987	174
6.8	Capital Grants to Federal Universities from 1976 - 1987	175
6.9	Amounts requested by the Universities from 1976 to 1980 and the actual amount granted to them by the federal government	177
6.10	Capital Allocation/Grant to Federal Universities 1981 - 1986	179

Number	Title	PAGE
6.11	Annual Magnitude of Under-funding for the University of Ibadan	182
6.12	Planned Capital Investment in Education 1962 - 1965	184
6.13	Opinion of Respondents on the possible reasons behind the under-funding of Universities	189
6.14	Mean Response on each of the possible reasons for under-funding of Universities ..	190
6.15	Opinion of Respondents on whether the various regimes had anti-intellectual posture ..	202
6.16	Opinion of Respondents on the possible reasons behind Governments' anti-intellectual posture	203
6.17	Opinion of Respondents on the possible reasons behind the erosion of U.A.A.F. ..	260
6.18	Mean Response on each of the possible reasons behind the erosion of U.A.A.F.	261
6.19	Opinion of Respondents on how satisfied they are on their job	277
6.20	Opinion of Respondents on whether poor Salary was a source of their dissatisfaction ..	278
6.21	Opinion of Respondents on whether poor promotional prospects was a source of their dissatisfaction	279
6.22	Opinion of Respondents on whether poor government response to the plight of Universities was a source of their dissatisfaction	280

Number	Title		PAGE
6.23	Opinion of Respondents on whether the alleged loss of Respect and Prestige associated with Lecturing was a source of their dissatisfaction	281
6.24	Opinion of Respondents about leaving their profession for better jobs	283
6.25	Opinion of Respondents on whether they would still like to be in academics in advanced countries after quitting in Nigeria..		284
6.26	Classification of former ASUU leaders on the ideological spectrum	298
6.27	Opinion of Respondents on the possible Roots of ASUU-Government Conflict	318
7.1	Opinion of Respondents on the possible primary motive behind ASUU strikes	328
7.2	Mean Responses on the possible primary motive of ASUU Strikes	328
7.3	Opinion of Respondents on whether ideology was a major dividing factor in ASUU-Government Conflict	333
8.1	Opinion of Respondents on whether they have faith in dialogue as a primary means of settling labour-management conflict	344
8.2	Opinion of Respondents on whether ASUU strikes would have been prevented if a good and effective collective bargaining machinery was in existence	345
8.3	Opinion of Respondents on whether the refusal by government to set up a collective bargaining machinery was due to ASUU's Confrontational and uncompromising posture	346

Number	Title	PAGE
B.4	Opinion of Respondents on the Possible reasons responsible for the failure to manage ASUU-Government Conflict	348
B.5	Mean Responses on the possible reasons responsible for the poor management of ASUU-Government Conflict	349
A.1	Respondents according to Faculty	417
A.2	Respondents according to Academic Rank	418
A.3	Respondents according to Sex	418
A.4	Respondents according to Years of Experience	419
A.5	Respondents according to Age	419
A.6	Respondents according to highest qualification possessed	420
A.7	Respondents according to Number of Publications	420
A.8	Respondents according to Number of Unpublished papers	421
B.1	Respondents that held office in ASUU	422
B.2	Respondents that were active members of ASUU	422
B.3	Respondents that attended ASUU meetings Regularly	423
B.4	Respondents that supported ASUU Strikes	423
B.5	Reasons why Respondents did not support ASUU strikes	424

Number	Title	PAGE
C.1	Respondents' Opinion on the most fundamental causes of Nigeria's economic problem	425
C.2	Respondents' Opinion on the Solution to the Fundamental Cause of Nigeria's economic problem	426
C.3	Respondents' Opinion on the major cause of Mismanagement and corruption	427
C.4	Respondents' Opinion on whether Nigeria should continue with the present Capitalist System	427
C.5	Opinion of former ASUU leaders on whether Nigeria should continue with the present Capitalist System	428
D.1	Respondents' Opinion on whether Trade Unionism is Compatible with the ideals of the academic profession	429
D.2	Respondents' Opinion on whether University academics should have Trade Union	429
D.3	Respondents' Opinion on whether they believe in the legal right of academics to strike	430
D.4	Respondents' Opinion on whether it is necessary for academics to strike in order to achieve their collective goals	430

APPENDICES

Appendix	Title	PAGE
A(1)	Respondents According to Faculty ..	417
A(2)	Respondents According to Academic Rank ..	418
A(3)	Respondents According to Sex ..	418
A(4)	Respondents According to Years of Experience	419
A(5)	Respondents According to Age ..	419
A(6)	Respondents According to Highest Qualification Possessed ..	420
A(7)	Respondents According to Number of Publication ..	420
A(8)	Respondents According to Number of Unpublished Papers ..	421
B(1)	Respondents that held office in ASUU ..	422
B(2)	Respondents that were Active Members of ASUU ..	422
B(3)	Respondents that attended ASUU meetings Regularly ..	423
B(4)	Respondents that supported ASUU Strikes ..	423
B(5)	Reasons why Respondents did not support ASUU Strikes ..	424
C(1)	Respondents' Opinion on the most fundamental Cause of Nigeria's Economic Problem. ..	425

Appendix	Title	PAGE
C(2)	Respondents' Opinion on the Solution to the Fundamental Cause of Nigeria's Economic Problem	426
C(3)	Respondents' Opinion on the major cause of Mismanagement and Corruption ..	427
C(4)	Respondents' Opinion on whether Nigeria should continue with the present Capitalist System ..	427
C(5)	Opinion of Former ASUU Leaders on whether Nigeria should continue with the present Capitalist System ..	428
D(1)	Respondents' Opinion on whether Trade Unionism is Compatible with the ideals of the Academic Profession ..	429
D(2)	Respondents' Opinion on whether University academics should have Trade Union. ..	429
D(3)	Respondents' Opinion on whether they believe in the Legal Right of Academics to Strike	430
D(4)	Respondents' Opinion On whether it is necessary for academics to strike in order to achieve their collective goals ..	430
E(1)	Questionnaire for former ASUU Rank and File	431
E(2)	Interview Schedule to Former ASUU Leaders	443
E(3)	Interview Schedule to Government Establishments	448
E(4)	Request for Information ..	451

Appendix

Title

F	ASUU, University of Benin branch News Bulletin	452
G	ASUU Memorandum and Log of Demands ..	456
H	ASUU: The University Crisis: Our Case ..	468
I	Students Enrolment in Universities 1962-87..	476
J	Types and Extent of Corrupt Practices in Nigeria, 1978 - 1982	477

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ABBREVIATIONS

- A.A.U.P. : American Association of University Professors
- A.B.U. : Ahmadu Bello University
- A.U.T. : Association of University Teachers
- A.S.U.U. : Academic Staff Union of Universities
- B.U.K. : Bayero University Kano
- C.V.C. : Committee of Vice-Chancellors
- J.A.M.B. : Joint Admissions and Matriculation Board
- N.A.U.T. : Nigerian (National) Association of University Teachers.
- N.L.C. : Nigerian Labour Congress
- N.U.C. : National Universities Commission.
- N.U.N.S. : National Union of Nigerian Students
- O.A.U. : Obafemi Awolowo University
- U.A.A.F. : University Autonomy and Academic Freedom
- U.D.U. : Usmanu Danfodiyo University
- U.N.N. : University of Nigeria, Nsukka

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1: The Background of the Study

Conflict is a common feature of Government-Labour relations in Nigeria. During the colonial period for instance, organized labour joined hands with nationalist forces to fight against British colonial rule. Although such labour struggle took an anti-colonial character, it was ultimately aimed at improving workers' wages and conditions of work. Hence in 1945, all government workers went on a strike to enforce their demand for a minimum wage and an increase of 50 per cent on cost-of-living allowance. This first general strike by labour was organized by the African Civil Servants Technical Workers Union (ACSTWU) (Tokunboh, 1985:45).

After independence, the unity between the nationalist leaders and organized labour collapsed. Labour leaders felt betrayed by newly installed nationalist government whose anti-labour actions dashed the hopes that independence would 'fight the evils of colonial imperialism' (Offiong, 1983:6),

one of which was exploitation of labour. Consequently, the general strikes in 1963, 1964, 1981 and 1988 were palpable manifestations of on-going government-labour conflict in Nigeria.

Besides general strikes, there were many strikes in various organizations. For instance in 1964-65, one hundred and ninety five strikes occurred, and in 1974-75, a remarkable number of three-hundred and fifty-four strikes were recorded (Ubeku, 1983a: 167). Then in 1980 alone, a total number of two-hundred and sixty-five strikes took place (Iwuji, 1987:207). These strikes were in addition to other forms of industrial disputes that did not result to strike actions.

Before the early seventies, workers in the senior cadre hardly used the strike weapon as a means of achieving their collective goals. But since the seventies, senior workers and professionals have adopted the strike weapon as a useful instrument for their struggle against management. For example, in 1973, the Nigerian Association of University Teachers (NAUT) went on its first strike action. In 1975, Nigerian medical doctors embarked on industrial action, while in 1984, the National Association of Aircraft Pilots and Engineers found the strike weapon necessary.

From 1973 to 1988, Nigerian University academics recorded four strike actions, in addition to other near-strike situations. These four strikes which occurred in 1973, 1980, 1981 and 1988, were remarkable manifestations of a conflict between academics and the government.

The formation of the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) in 1978 as a trade union, added great impetus to the struggle by the academics to protect and promote their corporate interests. In fact, with the formation of ASUU, the relations between academics and the Federal Government became more acrimonious and antagonistic. For example, the dismissal of some academics by the Federal Government in the same year that ASUU was formed, led subsequently to a galvanization and mobilization of the academics against government forces which were considered a threat to their corporate interests. This dismissal which was carried out on the basis of the alleged complicity of the academics in the nation-wide students' violent demonstration of that year, attracted wide condemnation from articulate and radical members of ASUU.

Subsequently, on several occasions, ASUU protested strongly against certain government decrees, policies and measures that

tended to erode University autonomy and academic freedom. Various ASUU communiques and press releases decried the increasing role of the National Universities Commission (NUC), the Federal Ministry of Education, the cabinet office, the office of the President, and the Joint Admissions and Matriculation Board (JAMB), in the internal affairs of the Universities. Then on various occasions, the academics protested vehemently against such issues as under-funding of the Universities; poor conditions of service in the Universities; poor working conditions under which the Universities operated; and the manner by which University Vice-Chancellors were appointed. They also objected to the rationalization and retrenchment exercises in the Universities; the National Minimum Standards and Establishment of Institutions Decree No. 16 of 1985; the composition in University Councils in favour of the government; new government policies on students' welfare; and the poor management of the economy, among other controversial measures.

Furthermore, on different occasions, the academics protested against the harsh treatment meted out to some of their colleagues in various Universities by the Federal Government.

For instance in 1932, the government ordered the dismissal of six professors from the University of Lagos. In 1987 also, the government dismissed Dr. Festus Iyayi - then national president of ASUU from the services of the University of Benin, on charges which many of his colleagues believed had more to do with his active role as ASUU president than on the alleged breach of the Code of Conduct for Public Officers. Again in 1988, two Ahmadu Bello University (ABU) lecturers (namely Patrick Wilmot, and Mrs Creachin Adelugba) were deported for reasons many academics believed had to do with their radical type of scholarship, than charges framed against them by the Federal Government. During the same period, many A.B.U. radical lecturers working on contract basis, were asked to go at the expiration of their contracts.

The antagonistic relations between ASUU and the government heightened in 1986 following the A.B.U. students' crisis which led to the setting up of the Abisoye panel. The report of the panel indicted ASUU members for their alleged role in fomenting students' crisis and promoting undue radicalism on campuses. Consequently, the panel recommended

that the government should flush out lecturers who are teaching what they are not paid to teach. Then, as part of her policy on the de-radicalization of the campuses and labour in general, the federal government later in that year, severed ASUU's affiliation with the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) through Decree No. 17 (Trade Unions Miscellaneous Provisions Decree 1986). This decree banned Senior Staff Unions from affiliating with the Nigerian Labour Congress.

The introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in the same year (1986) by the federal government strained further the already antagonistic relations between ASUU and the government. The programme which later imposed an unprecedented economic hardship on the masses, attracted severe criticisms from ASUU. The Federal government on several occasions considered such criticisms very uncharitable and as an act of confrontation. Under such strained relations, the slightest incidence of misunderstanding, could ignite the existing tension on both sides. That opportunity came in 1988 when the federal government was slow in the extension of the Elongated Salary Structure to University Workers; at a time when most public servants had been given. It was not surprising therefore that on July 1st 1988,

ASUU went on strike over the delay in the payment of the Elongated Salary to its members. ASUU also demanded the restoration of the right of University Senates to re-open their Universities when closed down as a result of Students' crisis. Furthermore, it demanded for the immediate re-opening of the Universities of Calabar, Jos, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, and Bayero University Kano, which were closed down following the nation-wide students' and workers' demonstration and strike against the government's withdrawal of fuel subsidy in April of that year. Reacting swiftly to the strike by ASUU, the government announced the proscription of the Union for failing to comply with its forty-eight hours ultimatum to call-off the strike.

By this proscription, ASUU ceased to exist as a trade Union. The ten years of existence of ASUU, leaves no one in doubt that militant Unionism was an essential character of industrial relations in the Nigerian University System. Also, whether it was by mere coincidence or a product of the alleged ASUU radicalism, students' crises within this period, assumed more militant character leading most often to the closure of universities. The parents and guardians of these students, as well as the general public, became exceedingly worried. Then many questions were raised in

the mass media as to the roots of industrial and students' crisis in the Universities. Many people wondered how suddenly university academics became very militant in the pursuit of their corporate interests as well as the interests of labour in general. One school of thought believed that there might be more to the industrial crisis in the universities than what had been advanced so far as their causes. Moreover, the speed with which ASUU was proscribed gives credence to this school of thought. Also, the Education Minister's statement that 'it is not the day the child breaks the soup pot that you spank him' (Alegbe et al 1988:33), seems to support this school. The prolonged nature of ASUU's conflict with the government, equally raised a lot of comments. Speculations were made and answers remained tentative regarding the roots of the conflict. But an issue as important as this, requires more than speculative and tentative answers. Indeed, there is need for a critical and deeper empirical exploration and analysis of the situation. This is precisely what this research project is all about.

1.2: The Statement of the Research Problem

Despite their significance, strikes in Nigeria have hardly received serious attention in industrial relations

research (Otobo, 1983:301). If this is true of strikes generally, the neglect becomes even more palpable with respect to strikes by professionals, such as academics, doctors, pilots, and engineers. As Isamah (1986:413) rightly observed, 'there exists very little information about the participation of educated professional employees in Nigeria in trade unionism.' The reason as Isamah further postulates, is that social scientists showed no interest in professional unionism because until very recently trade unionism was regarded as a working class phenomenon and generally thought to be inconsistent with the ethics and status of professional employees (pp 413-414). In fact, most organisations of senior employees call themselves associations rather than unions, preferring to operate on pressure group basis (Waterman, 1976:65). For example, prior to the formation of the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) in 1978, Nigerian University academics operated under the aegis of an association called the Nigerian Association of University Teachers (NAUT). And in 1978 for example, the leaders of ASUU opposed the idea of converting NAUT into a full-fledged industrial union (Nwala, 1988:10). This is hardly

surprising because academics had for long rejected trade Unionism as being incompatible with their image as professionals (Mayhew, 1969:338). And indeed part of the rationale legitimizing this belief was predicated by a plethora of works that advanced the view that militant unionism is incompatible with prosperous professionalism. Such works include those by Strauss (1963), Kadish (1968), Ladd and Lipset (1973), Aussieker and Garbarino (1973), Muczyk (1974), Begin (1975), Rhodes (1977) and Bigoness (1978).

The preceding observations notwithstanding, a paucity of works on professional unionism in Nigeria, nevertheless exists. Alubo's (1986) Political Economy Of Doctors' Strikes, and Isamah's (1986) Professional Unionism in Nigeria, are notable exploratory attempts. In addition, ASUU (1981, 1986, and 1987), Otobo (1987), Cookey Commission's Report (1981) and Nwale (1988), have all commented on the upsurge of industrial crisis in our Universities. However none of these has focused - in both breadth and depth - on the phenomenon of academics (ASUU) strikes and the character of their management. In short, little is yet documented and known about the roots, character, perception, dynamics, and management of ASUU strikes.

This present study is therefore partly an attempt to redress this existing neglect. However there are other research problems necessitating and justifying this present enterprise.

A closer look at the three strikes by ASUU (in 1980, 1981 and 1988) since its inception in 1978, will reveal that the following reasons were advanced as causes:

1. Erosion of university autonomy and academic freedom,
2. Poor remunerative structure and conditions of service,
3. Under-funding of Universities,
4. Poor physical conditions of work in the Universities, and
5. The delay in the payment of the Elongated Salary Structure.

However, as Hyman (1972) correctly contends, it could be very misleading to accept uncritically (on a face value) the reasons given by workers for embarking on strike actions.

In fact as Bilton et al (1981:491) aptly observed, 'strikes are invariably more complex than they appear on the surface and may have a wide range of causes, with not all the participants sharing the same motives for action.' As they rightly argue, the causes of strikes, as sometimes suggested by the media, may

very seldom be the real reasons. Moreover, as Edwards (1979:193) contends, a fundamental cause of strikes which underlies all the stated reasons for disputes, may not be apparent to the parties involved. It is possible therefore that the stated reasons for strikes might be mere surface manifestations of deeper and more fundamental causes. Put specifically, it could be true that the reasons given by ASUU for embarking on strikes were more of symptoms than causes. Consequently, the question as to whether the various reasons advanced by ASUU for embarking on strikes, actually constituted the root causes of its conflict with the Federal Government, needs a deeper and critical investigation. Hence one of the problems before this study is to unravel the roots of ASUU-Government Conflicts.

Based on these preceding observations therefore, it will be of immense research interest to probe into the motive behind some actions and policies of the federal government towards the Universities. For instance, what was the motive behind the alleged erosion of University autonomy and academic freedom by successive regimes? Secondly, why as it was alleged, were the existing Universities grossly under-funded (under the

excuse of the poor state of the economy) at the sametime when new Technological and Agricultural Universities, were established? Was political expediency an adequate and satisfactory explanation for this? Thirdly, what were the reasons behind the alleged anti-intellectual posture of the Federal Government - defined operationally in terms of its neglect of the Universities and its aversion to radical scholarship? Could it be that the Federal Government actions and policies were primarily geared towards making the conventional Universities (which she occasionally accused of undue radicalism) supportive of the existing social order? But were these Universities actually posing a threat to the existing social order and to established authority? An inquiry into these motives is very important, because as Kornhauser (1954:63) correctly observes, motives constitute a key explanatory concept since they are the processes in the person that do the 'directing', and function in the present to orient his behaviour toward the future.

The preceeding sections raise the crucial issue of what actually was the character of the strikes and indeed the entire conflict. Were the strikes for instance a bread and butter affair (sheer economism)? Were they politically motivated?

or were they motivated by the desire to promote professional academic interests, standards and excellence? In other words, were the strikes... symmetric and issue-oriented conflict, or were they, asymmetric and structure-oriented one? Hyman (1979:323) has for instance argued that Third World strikes are commonly a form of pressure or protest directed against the government and are likely to possess an overt political dimension. They are, he argues, an explicit challenge to established authority, and are intimately linked with other forms of popular protest.

How correct is it therefore to believe that ASUU strikes had political and revolutionary undertones and motive? Is it then right to assume that ASUU is an ideologically and politically cohesive group waging a class struggle against the establishment? Does the dominant ideological orientation of the rank and file of ASUU, support and sustain this view? In other words, can academics as a cohort (being members of a petty-bourgeois class) wage a class struggle against the prevailing social order that offers them more privileges than many other groups in the society? An affirmative evidence would no doubt contradict some views about academics. For instance, it is believed that academics as a group, seldom protest against the societal status-quo

(Altbach, 1980:8), and that academics in Nigeria are part of the entrepreneurial class (Eisenmon 1980:133). Equally, studies by Alain (1972), Ladd and Lipset (1975), and Shils (1975), support the view that academics as a stratum accept the status-quo which reflects their bourgeois character.

Yet, judging from the pronouncements of ASUU leadership (as could be found in its various communique, press conferences, press releases, and publications), one would believe that ASUU's conflict with the federal government had political undertones and motives. This therefore raises the important issue of whether the perception of the conflict by ASUU leadership was actually congruent with that of the rank and file of ASUU? But even if it is true to some extent, that the conflict was a political and ideological struggle, why didn't ASUU for instance support (or rather join) the various strikes organized by the National Labour Congress (NLC) against the federal government? Such NLC organized strikes were over crucial issues fundamental to Nigeria's political economy. And such strikes one would believe should have attracted the active support and collaboration of any politically and ideologically conscious labour union. How can one therefore explain the ambivalence characterizing ASUU's pronouncements and

actual behaviours? There is no doubt that these issues raised here are presently unexplored and unexamined.

Finally, it is very germane to examine how the conflict was managed. Why was the Federal Government reluctant to set up collective bargaining machineries in the University system, in spite of repeated calls by ASUU, as well as the observation by the Cooley Commission (1981:69) that such instrumentalities are inter alia effective means of resolving disputes, regulating work relations and making democratic decisions? Could it be that the political character of the conflict was primarily responsible for this reluctance? But could the existence of collective bargaining machineries have prevented the occurrence of the strikes or considerably contributed to their satisfactory resolution? All these questions we believe require deeper and critical exploration.

Consequently, this study is guided by the following four principal research questions:

1. What were the causes and roots of ASUU strikes?
2. What was the motive behind the alleged erosion of University autonomy and academic freedom by the Federal Government; the under-funding of Universities and government's anti-intellectual posture?

3. What was the character of ASUU-Government conflict and how was it perceived by ASUU rank-and-file, ASUU leadership, and the Federal Government?
4. Why was the management of ASUU-Government conflict intractable?

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1.3: The Objectives of the Study

This study has two broad objectives. The first is to identify and analyze the roots and character of ASUU strikes, while the second is to analyze why the settlement of ASUU-Government conflict was intractable. Consequently, the study seeks to accomplish the following specific objectives:

First, to determine the character of ASUU strikes by determining the extent to which ASUU strikes were fundamentally motivated by any of the following reasons: (a) sheer economic self-interests, (b) the desire to promote professional academic standards and interests, and (c) the desire to change the existing social order.

Secondly, to identify and analyze the motive behind the erosion of University autonomy and academic freedom, the underfunding of Universities, and the government's anti-intellectual posture.

Thirdly, to determine whether the perception of ASUU-Government conflict by ASUU leadership was congruent with that of either the rank and file of ASUU, or the Federal Government.

Fourthly, to identify and explain the major factor(s) that made the settlement of ASUU-Government conflict intractable.

Fifthly, to provide useful information required for the formulation and implementation of sound industrial relations policies in Nigerian University system.

And finally but by no means the least, to contribute towards the development and growth of knowledge on academic unionism in Nigeria.

1.4: The Significance of the Research

Bemoaning the paucity of research on the academic profession, Philip Altbach (1980:13) aptly observed that:

the importance of the academic profession is unquestionable but it is also unrecognized by many... It is even more surprising that there has been very little research concerning the academic profession either comparatively or in specific countries.

When we relate this observation to Isamah's (1986:413) assertion that very little information exists about professional unionism in Nigeria; and also to Otobo's (1983:301) worry over the neglect of strikes in industrial relations research in Nigeria, one begins to appreciate the need for a study that would contribute towards the development and advancement of

knowledge on academic unionism in particular and professional unionism in general, in Nigeria.

Much more importantly, there is yet to our knowledge, no systematic study on the roots, character, perception, and management of faculty strikes in Nigeria. This study we believe, will consequently serve as an original contribution towards the evolution and growth of knowledge on militant academic unionism and the specific character of the conflict between the academics and the government. Moreover as an exploratory work on the ten years existence of ASUU, it will serve as an indispensable guide for future research on academic unionism in Nigerian University system.

Furthermore, since the study examines both the attitudinal and behavioural aspects of academic militancy, its specific contribution towards the advancement of knowledge on the socio-psychological character of academic unionism in Nigeria, is no doubt immense.

Also as a study that focuses on the entire University system in Nigeria, its utility for generalization purposes, is very high.

And finally, this study has implications for public policy formulation and implementation in Nigeria. Universities are unique and important national institutions that are assigned crucial role in the quest for rapid socio-economic, political and cultural development. However, the extent to which this crucial role is conscientiously discharged, is inter alia, a function of the professional competence and ability of the academics, as well as on some intrinsic and extrinsic determinants of job satisfaction. In short, the organizational climate in which academics discharge their duties, is very crucial. But for well over a decade now, Nigerian academics have protested against the unsatisfactory, demoralizing and demotivating nature of their organizational climate. This subsequently gave rise to militant unionism and periodic disruption of services in the University system. To us therefore, a study that investigates the roots, character, perception, and management of industrial crisis in the University system, is very relevant to any serious attempt to formulate and implement, sound industrial relations policies in the University system.

1.5: The Scope and Limitations of the Study

This study focuses on the conflict between the Academic staff Union of Universities (ASUU) and the Federal Government of Nigeria. The conflict culminated in the proscription of ASUU in 1988 by the Federal Government. The three strikes by ASUU in 1980, 1981 and 1988 were the palpable manifestations of this conflict. The study therefore focuses specifically on the roots, character, perception and management of these strikes cum the entire conflict.

The study covers the period from 1978 when ASUU was formed, to 1988 when it was proscribed. However, relevant historical antecedents (between the period 1966 to 1977 when the National Association of University Teachers (NAUT) existed to protect and promote the interests of Nigerian University academics) would no doubt be appropriately integrated into the study.

The study limits its analysis on ASUU at the national level and does not go into the details of the activities of the various branches or their strike actions against the management of their individual Universities. The work therefore takes and looks at the Union as a unit of analysis. The various Universities are also taken as an entity linked together through various organs like the

Committees of Vice-Chancellors, Registrars, Bursars, etc. The study covers all ASUU members in both the Federal and State-owned Universities. There are currently twenty-two Federal Universities (with the inclusion of the University of Abuja, and Nigerian Defence Academy Kaduna) and eight State-government owned Universities. A representative sample will however be used to cover the entire population of ASUU members.

The activities of the federal government and those of some of its relevant agencies such as the National Universities Commission (NUC), Federal Ministry of Education, and the Federal Ministry of Employment, Labour and Productivity, would be analyzed in relation to the generation and management of the conflict.

It is important to state that in so far as the study focuses on ASUU at the national level, its utility for explaining the various conflicts and strikes between the local Branch Unions and their University authorities, is to some extent considerably limited. It is therefore hoped that future research should focus on the conflicts between local branch unions of ASUU, and their University authorities. Such a study no doubt, would among others, examine the relationship between

industrial crisis at the local levels and the degree of support which members at the local level, give towards militant Unionism at the national level.

1.6: The Hypotheses of the Study

This study seeks to subject the following propositions to empirical verification.

1. The mismanagement of Nigerian economy by the ruling class and the concomitantly dogged reprobation by ASUU leadership, constitute the roots of ASUU-Government Conflict.
2. The motive behind the erosion of University autonomy and academic freedom, and the under-funding of Universities was to curb the radical orientation of academics and consequently make them supportive of the prevailing social order.
3. The perception of the character of ASUU-Government conflict by the rank and file of ASUU, was different from the way both ASUU leadership and the Government perceived it.

4. The management of ASUU-Government Conflict was intractable, as a result of the asymmetric and structure-oriented character of the conflict.

1.7: Operationalization of Phrases and Concepts

Protest against the prevailing social order:

This implies the rejection of the existing capitalist social order and a desire for its change to an alternative social order.

Sheer economic self-interest:

This refers to basic pecuniary or economic rewards and benefits, such as salary, allowances, fringe benefits, and other privileges and prestige attached to a job.

Professional academic standards and interests:

This comprises high academic and intellectual output reflected in the quality of teaching and research. Such factors considered very essential to its realization include University autonomy, academic freedom, adequate funding of Universities, improved library facilities, well equipped laboratories and adequate funding of research.

Radical orientation of universities:

This implies severe criticisms by University academics against government policies and the ruling class as an indication of a preference for an alternative social order.

Anti-intellectual posture of the government:

Government's insensitivity to the poor working conditions in Universities, and its aversion to radical scholarship.

The character of a conflict:

This means the scope of issues a conflict covers such as bread and butter matters, professional oriented goals or ideological and political questions; and the intended effects of the conflict.

Political and ideological character of the conflict:

This comprises issues that go beyond the bread and butter demands of labour. This includes differences over ideas and policies relating to state power.

Radical political and ideological goals:

This refers to the desire and struggle to change the existing capitalist social order.

The structure and character of Nigerian Political Economy:

This refers to the way in which power and resources in Nigeria are generated, controlled and distributed.

Perception of the character of the conflict:

This implies the way the conflict is defined in terms of whether it is a bread and butter affair, a struggle to improve academic standards or a political and ideological struggle against the established social order.

Asymmetric and structure-oriented conflict:

Borrowing from Rapoport (1974), this is a conflict in which the systems (participants in a conflict) may be widely disparate - ideologically - or may perceive each other in different ways. And the conflict is not resolved unless the structure of either system or of the super-system changes. A revolt or a revolution is an asymmetric and a structure-oriented conflict.

Symmetric and issue-oriented conflict:

Also borrowing from Rapoport (1974), this is a conflict in which the participants are roughly similar i.e. ideologically

and perceive themselves as such. And the conflict is resolved when the issue is settled without involving a change in the structures of either of the conflicting systems or in the super-systems of which they are components.

Government:

This refers to the federal government unless otherwise explicitly stated. It is used to include all the four federal regimes from 1978 to 1988. The four regimes are at times used in a collective sense.

Faculty:

This is a synonym for University lecturer or academic, except when otherwise explicitly stated.

The mismanagement of Nigerian economy:

This comprises acts like corruption, embezzlement, abuse of office and the appropriation of surpluses by the domestic and international capitalist forces.

Dogged reprobation of ASUU leadership

This refers to the persistent radical, confrontational and uncompromising posture of ASUU leadership towards the government

and the ruling class, as a mark of its disapproval of the prevailing social order.

Management of a conflict

This implies the efforts made to settle or resolve a conflict.

Right-Wing ideological views:

This refers to conservative views that support the existence and maintenance of a capitalist system.

Left-Wing ideological views:

This refers to radical views that reject the capitalist system and advocate for the adoption of a socialist system.

CHAPTER TWO
REVIEW OF LITERATURE

2.1: Introduction

In this chapter, we are limiting ourselves to a review of past significant works. The review will be general as well as specific and will touch on the following:

- (i) Causes and Roots of industrial conflict and strikes.
- (ii) Management of industrial conflict and strikes.
- (iii) The unionization of academics, and
- (iv) ASUU-Government Conflict.

Before discussing all these however, it is relevant to examine briefly the concepts of industrial conflict, and strike.

The centrality of conflict in industrial relations is widely recognized. As Stephenson and Brotherton (1979:53) aptly observed, conflict is at the heart of industrial relations. And according to Hyman (1975:193), conflict is the necessary starting point of any serious analysis of industrial relations. As he further observed, no social order can provide perfect and permanent harmony since whatever is the institutional arrangement, work relations would generate some frustration and discontent and consequently antagonism (p. 202).

Conflict refers to an opposition of interests or perspectives which generally involves corresponding forms of action (Batstone 1979:55). Briefly put, conflict exists whenever incompatible activities occur (Deutsch 1973:10). Industrial conflict can therefore be seen as 'the total range of behaviour and attitudes that express opposition and divergent orientation between industrial owners and managers on the one hand, and working people and their organizations on the other hand' (Kornhauser, et al, 1954:13). Industrial conflict may be expressed by individuals alone or by groups, and it may be organized or unorganized (Batstone, 1979:55). According to Kerr (1964:171), industrial conflict may take the form of peaceful bargaining and grievance handling or it could be in form of boycotts, political action, restriction of output, sabotage, absenteeism and personnel turnover. Put differently therefore, there are various ways in which conflict is manifested in an organization, but as Kornhauser et al (1954:7-8) and Hyman (1975:186) correctly observed, strike is the principal overt manifestation, and the most spectacular and conspicuous.

A strike is a collective stoppage of work undertaken by workers in order to bring pressure to bear on their employers over

a demand, or to express a grievance (Griffin, 1939:20; Knowles, 1952:1; Hicks, 1963:140; and Akpala, 1982:241). This classical definition of strike has been severely criticized by Durand and Budois (1975), and Hyman (1979). According to Durand and Budois;

this classical definition of the strike conflicts with spontaneist or political interpretations. The calculative strike with its precisely formulated objectives is different from the strike as a revolt expressing, quite apart from any specific demand, workers' accumulated discontent with their total situation. It is equally distinct from the strike as a social movement or general strike which through its extent, size and gravity poses an explicit or implicit challenge to the policies of the very legitimacy of the political authorities (1975:9)¹.

Hyman on his part, argues that many Third world strikes do not "occur against an established background of 'free collective bargaining' between recognized unions and employers; and in most, the significance of workers' action extended far beyond the limits of what is normally conceived as 'industrial relations'" (1979:322-323). These criticisms of the classical definition of strike, form the basis of our understanding of this concept, in this study.

A strike is a complex phenomenon that has forms, scale, scope, status and effects (Waterman 1976:334; Brecher 1972:306-308).

As Breacher² further elaborated, the forms a strike takes can vary from those of work to rule or simple withdrawal of labour, work-in or take-over. The Scale on the other hand, varies from the smallest work group to the industrial, national and even international. Then its scope can extend from wages and conditions of work to a change in the political or social order. The status of a strike can be constitutional, illegal or insurrectionary. And finally, its effects can be disintegratory - dividing or destroying the political or social status-quo, - or integratory - leading to the incorporation of the workers into the existing social order. These also lead us to the taxonomy of conflicts.

According to Rapoport (1974:174) human conflicts can be classified on the basis of (a) the nature of the participants, for example individuals, groups, organizations, blocs or nations; (b) the issues involved, such as rights or privileges, control over resources, political power or in extreme cases the very existence of the participants as system; (c) the means employed, which may range from persuasive argument to physical annihilation. Consequently relating these classifications to the process of conflict resolution, a further classification can be made.

For instance, a distinction is made between exogenous and endogenous conflicts; symmetric and asymmetric conflicts; and issue-oriented and structure-oriented conflicts. (Rapoport pp 175-176).

In symmetric conflict, writes Rapoport, the participants are roughly similar systems and perceive themselves as such. For example two individuals in a fight say a husband and wife, or two comparable nations at war. On the other hand, in asymmetric conflict, 'the systems may be widely disparate or may perceive each other in different ways. A revolt or a revolution is an example of an asymmetric conflict' where "the system revolted against 'perceives' itself as defending order and legitimacy" while "the insurgents 'perceive' themselves as an instrument of social change or of bringing a new system into being."

An Issue-oriented conflict in Rapoport's view 'is resolved when the issue is settled' without involving 'a change in the structures of either of the conflicting systems or in the super-systems of which they are components.' On the other hand, 'a Structure-oriented conflict is not resolved unless the structure of either system or of the super-system

changes... A revolution is always a structure-oriented conflict.'

An Endogenous conflict is one in which the conflicting systems are parts of a larger system that has its own mechanism for maintaining a steady state; while an Exogenous conflict is one where the conflicting system are not within the control of a larger system.

Rapoport's taxonomy is of great value to this study especially with respect to our investigation into the character and management of ASUU-Government conflict.

In addition to Rapoport's taxonomy, it is relevant to note Deutsch's (1973:11-15) typology of conflict. Writing from a perspective of what he called 'the relationship between the objective state of affairs and the state of affairs as perceived by the conflicting parties,' Deutsch identified six typologies of conflict, namely veridical conflict, contingent conflict, displaced conflict, misattributed conflict, latent conflict and false conflict. Of particular interest to our study is his displaced and latent forms of conflict. The issue of manifest and underlying forms of conflict, is very crucial in our study that seeks to unravel the roots of ASUU-Government conflict.

Deutsch further identified five basic types of issues involved in a conflict. These are control over resources, conflict over preferences and nuisances, conflict over values, conflict over beliefs, and conflict over the nature of relationship between the parties (P 17). Again, these are important to our study especially in determining how the conflict over the control of resources, values, beliefs and nature of relationship between the parties, constituted either the causes or the roots of ASUU-Government conflict.

2.2: The Causes and Roots of Industrial Conflict and Strike

As Gouldner (1955:19) observes, 'a strike is a social phenomenon of enormous complexity which in its totality is never susceptible to complete description, let alone complete explanation.' This fact we believe is underscored by the existence of a motley of unending list of causes of strike identified by scholars of different schools of thought.

But generally speaking, two broad perspectives on the causes and roots of industrial conflict and strike, can be identified. These are the liberal conflict perspective, and the class conflict school of thought (Kraus, 1979:259-260).

These schools are what Waterman (1976:335-336) had called the fundamental industrial (or social harmony of interests paradigm), and the class conflict paradigm.

2.2.1: The Liberal Conflict School

Scholars³ of the liberal conflict school see industrial conflict as a legitimate phenomenon. They recognize the varying interests of capital and labour (Kraus, 1979:259). As Waterman (1976:335) remarked, this school sees industrial conflict as a phenomenon existing between two mutually competitive but mutually dependant parties with the state acting as a mediator and representative of the Society as a whole. According to him, strike is treated as a social problem to be diagnosed and remedied by the application of different combinations of persuasion, concession, reform or legal force.

The liberal conflict school accepts the capitalist order as given and does not question its legitimacy. It does not see conflict as fundamentally rooted in the capitalist system, but it rather explains it as a normal product of industrial organizations devoid of class antagonism and struggle. For

instance, the causes and roots of industrial conflict and strike, are associated with such factors as break-down of collective bargaining system, imperfect or limited information, low wages, inflation, poor working conditions, poor conditions of service, crisis of rising expectation, long hours of work, arbitrary treatment of workers by management, agitation and agitators, etc. Let us now examine specific contributions of some scholars.

One notable classical work on the causes of strike is 'The Theory of Wages' by J.R. Hicks (1932 or 1963). According to Hicks (1963:146-147),⁴ majority of actual strikes occur as a result of faulty negotiation between the management and labour. Consequently, any means which enables either side to appreciate better the position of the other, will make settlement easier, and adequate knowledge will make a settlement possible. The danger according to him lies in ignorance by one side of the other's disposition, and in hasty breaking-off of negotiations. Hicks' study gave birth to what is popularly called the bargaining model of strikes. Such a model examines the extent to which strikes result due to the relative bargaining strength or

weakness of the workers. Kaufman's (1981:333) bargaining model demonstrates the crucial role of limited information as a cause of strikes. In the same way, Mauro (1982:522) attributes the occurrence of strike to imperfect information.

Knowles (1952) classical study on the other hand is an attempt to provide a comprehensive explanation of strike. In examining the causes of strikes, Knowles was very critical of superficial explanations of strikes. For him, the root causes of strikes lie outside the sphere of union and management. (p xii). Unlike most works under the liberal conflict perspective, Knowles recognized that strike may be generated by the worker's reaction not only to his conditions of work but also to the social order in general (p xii). Yet like other liberal conflict scholars, he did not see strike as a form of class struggle. According to him, strikes in Britain from the period 1911 to 1947 were still mostly spontaneous lacking any attempt to fulfil some conscious economic or political grand strategy (p xi). Knowles then identified the causes of strikes in terms of their immediate and remote (underlying) character. The immediate causes of strikes are seen as multiple, various and limitless in number.

They reflect such issues as basic questions of wages and working arrangements as well as frictional and solidarity causes (pp 228-238). On the other hand, the underlying causes are ones that are not explicit and whose operation has to be inferred. Such causes can be grouped under three general headings namely bad social conditions, fatigue and frustration in industrial work, and the inferiority of workers position (pp 212-219). From our point of view, the relevance of Knowles' work lies in its effort to distinguish the underlying causes of strikes from their immediate and superficial causes.

Another noteworthy work on industrial conflict and strike, was carried out by Arthur Ross and Paul Hartman (1960). In their study titled 'Changing Patterns of Industrial Conflict,' Ross and Hartman (p. 42) advanced the thesis that strike will eventually wither away. According to them, 'strike has been going out of style or withering away' because their causes have been diminishing over the years. They identified three primary reasons why the strike has been going out of style. First, employers have developed more sophisticated policies and more effective organizations. Second, the state has become more prominent as an employer of labour, economic planner, provider of

benefits, and supervisor of industrial relations. Third, the labour movement has been forsaking the use of the strike in favour of broad political endeavours. More appropriately to our study, Ross and Hartman argued that the increasing affluence and economic planning of industrial societies had satisfied workers' economic wants, relieved them of economic insecurities associated with the pre-keynesian era. They also believed that the embourgeoisement of the working class was helping to reduce strike activity. And a decline in economic inequality was producing workers with middle-class mores and living standards who resist any extended interruption of income. In the process, class antagonisms and spontaneous inclinations to strike have declined.⁵ Although Ross and Hartman failed in their attempt to disprove the marxian thesis that a class struggle could bring a revolution, they nevertheless contributed in our understanding of how revolutionary zeal of exploited workers can be attenuated through the process of embourgeoisement. Their study also emphasized the importance of economic conditions of workers as a major factor in the occurrence of strikes.

The issue of economic cycle, as a factor in the occurrence of strike was underscored by Rees (1952:371-382; 1954:218-219). Rees identified the state of the labour market (specifically the amount of employment available) as the principal economic factor affecting union behaviour to strike. In his view, strikes occur during periods of rising employment to enable unions secure wage increases and other benefits. But in periods of falling employment there is a sharp drop in organizational strikes since workers will be afraid to strike as the bargaining power of the employer is higher than theirs. Rees (1954:220) has however observed that political events, government policies and the climate of public opinion, have important influence on the timing of strikes and will therefore account for many deviations from the normal cyclical pattern. Although he recognized that most industrial disputes are caused by social, psychological and economic forces which are noncyclical in nature, he however maintained that grievances can be stored up for long periods and then most likely boil over into strikes when business conditions promise that strikes may be successful. The specific contribution of Rees to the study of strike is in his identification of the conditions under which a strike successfully takes place.

In other words, the reason for going on a strike in a particular year when there is conducive business condition for the strike, might not justify a strike action in another year when the business condition is not conducive.

The issue of whether economic factors alone or political factors, play decisive role in determining the occurrence of strike, has become a lively debate in strike studies. Earlier studies by Hansen (1921:616-621); Griffin (1939); Yoder (1940:222-237); Rees (1952, 1954); Ashenfelter and Johnson (1969:35-49), VanderKamp (1970:215-230); Skeels (1971:515-525) and Walsh (1975:45-54), gave primacy to economic factors as determinants of strikes. As Synder (1975:260) observed, most of these studies indicate that strike activity varies positively with economic prosperity.

On the other hand, studies by Le Franc (1970),⁶ Perrot (1971),⁷ Shorter and Tilly (1974), and Synder (1975, 1977), have assigned more primacy to political and other factors from their findings. For instance, according to Shorter and Tilly, workers go on strike only when there is organizational capacity for such action. This also depends on the mobilization of the unions. In their view, strikes are in the short-run, efforts to bring pressure on employers and governments, but in the long-run, are

mechanisms through which unions struggle for membership in a nation's polity.⁸ For Shorter and Tilly therefore, political and organizational factors are the decisive predictors of strike actions. Synder (1977:325-340) challenged a solely economic explanation of strike that occurred in U.S. in pre-war II years. According to him, an expanded model of industrial conflict which includes organizational, political as well as economic variables, better explains strike activity. But in an earlier study, Synder (1975:259&274) argued that while recent investigations of French work stoppages assign more importance to organizational and political determinants of strike activity, as against the primacy given to economic factors by many studies, the apparent contradictory results are due to the institutional context of labour relations. Synder then concluded that there is a strong correspondence between institutional setting and fluctuations in strike activity.

Kaufman (1982:473-490) has however presented an alternative conceptual framework to the debate on the economic versus political-organizational model of strike. According to him, the regression results of his study 'the determinants of strikes

in the United States, 1900-1977' show that both the economic factors of unemployment and inflation, and various non-economic factors, are significant in explaining variations in strike activity. The results also show that economic and non-economic factors worked together to cause a marked reduction in the variation in strike activity. He then concluded (pp 489-490) that the decision to strike is conditioned on the total environment in which industrial relations take place. Such significant environmental variables are the institutional structure of bargaining, the organizational security, power resources and ideological positions held by each of the bargaining parties, and the economic climate in which bargaining takes place.

Divergent ideologies held by management and labour has been identified as a source of industrial conflict (Kaufman 1982:490; Blum 1972:71; Taft 1954:258). But Taft has however argued that workers seldom engage in strikes for purely ideological purposes. In his view, most workers do not have deep ideological convictions and cannot therefore be drawn into fighting for a revolutionary objectives but only for bread-and-butter objectives.⁹

The absence of collective bargaining and a crisis of rising expectation has been identified by Blum (1972:68&72) as other

factors that cause industrial conflict and strike. Commenting on the crisis of rising expectation, Blum contends that:

Conflict is not always a by-product of the marxian expectation that as things get worse and worse, the depressed and disadvantaged become more and more embittered until eventually they revolt. If the history of Western civilization has any lesson, it is somewhat the reverse of the marxian nightmare of the correlation between depression, despair and eventual revolution. On the contrary, when people who are or who feel they are at the bottom or near the bottom of the social hierarchy begin to improve their lot and move up the ladder of society, they then become more discontented and make more demands upon the society. This is part of the reason why strikes are occurring in Ireland today. (p 72).

A mobilizational approach to the explanation of strike occurrence has however been identified by Batstone et al (1978) as a crucial factor determining whether a strike will actually occur or not. According to them, the occurrence of strike is a function of the extent to which workers are mobilized. In their view, while the conditions under which strikes occur are important, the issue of whether they actually occur depends on the organizational capacity and mobilization of the workers (p 1). Let us now examine very briefly the class conflict school of thought.

2.2.2: The Class Conflict View-Point.

The class conflict perspective sees capital and labour as mutually antagonistic phenomena. Hence strike is seen as evidence of rising class consciousness and conflict (Waterman 1976:336).

This school of thought—a product of the marxist theory of the state, — contends that the relations of production in a capitalist society are necessarily antagonistic or conflictual. This it is argued derives from the exploitative and oppressive character of such relations. It further contends that the two principal classes in a capitalist society namely the bourgeoisie (the oppressive class) and the proletariat (the exploited class) have diametrically opposed and irreconcilable fundamental interests. And as a result, class conflict (struggle) is inevitable. This inevitability arises from the inherent contradiction between the economic situation and political status of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat (Volkov, 1985:42; Arnoldov et al, 1985:440). This basic contradiction of capitalism write Ryndina and Chernikov, (1985:89), stems from the antitheses of social character of labour to private form of appropriation. In other words, the private capitalist appropriation retards

the progress of productive forces, and the drive to maximize profit derives from the basic law of capitalism - a law that induces capitalists to produce the greatest possible amount of surplus - value through intensifying the exploitation of labour.

The class conflict school therefore locates industrial conflict within the fundamental structure of the capitalist relations of production (Hyman 1975:196). Accordingly, Hyman argues that strike is a vital weapon of the working class in pursuing its industrial objectives, and as such, it is an inescapable demonstration of the antagonism to capital (p 190).

Hibbs (1978:153-154) found out that strike is one manifestation of persistent class - linked conflict over the distribution of the national product. He reported that trends in industrial conflict has been shaped primarily by changes in the political economy of distribution and not by cultural, sociological or purely economic factors. Hibbs then dismissed Ross and Hartman thesis regarding the withering away of strikes, arguing that their thesis is at odds with empirical evidence. According to him, strikes are most usefully viewed as instruments

of collective working-class action which is one manifestation of an ongoing struggle for power between social classes over the distribution of resources principally (not exclusively) national income. Based on his empirical findings, he further argued that long-run changes in the volume of industrial conflicts are largely explained by changes in the locus of the struggle over distribution (p 165). For instance, strikes are comparatively high in countries where the state intervenes actively in support of the market by setting private sector wages, hours and conditions of work without socializing the consumption and distribution of a very large fraction of the national income (p 169). Hibbs however concludes that regardless of the larger political visions of many left-wing trade-union leaders, most workers are probably mobilized for strike activity not by slogans about workers' seizure of political power but by the narrower economic incentives (P 169).

Furthermore, Hyman (1972 & 1975) criticizing the liberal school contended that it is erroneous to attribute the cause of industrial conflict and strikes to the presence of agitators; faulty communication, bad human relations, lack of integration

of workers and technological factors among other factors. Dismissing these causes of conflict, he argued that 'work relations within capitalism are an inevitable source of dispute' (1975:186). And it is within this framework that causes and roots of conflict should be explained.

We shall now turn to an examination of the literature on the management of industrial conflict and strike.

2.3 The Management of Industrial Conflict and Strike

Existing literature on the management of industrial conflict and strike, largely reflect the orthodox and dominant industrial relations tradition on which the liberal conflict view-point is based. The lack of literature from the class conflict school derives mainly from the fact that in marxist theory, the panacea for industrial peace is the overthrow of what is called the exploitative and oppressive capitalist system. This general theory leaves no room for management of industrial conflict and strikes in capitalist societies, since such is regarded as a mere palliative measure. As Rapoport (1974:239) explained, 'conflict management in the sphere of structural

conflicts ignores the deeper underlying sources of such conflicts - the structure of the situation itself. It is somewhat analogous to the treatment of the symptoms of a disease rather than of the conditions in which the disease is rooted.' Marxist theory generally therefore has no faith in the institutions set up under capitalist societies to manage conflict and strikes. On the other hand, the establishment of a socialist order would remove the underlying cause of conflict prevalent in capitalist societies. It is against this background that we now examine the works of few scholars within the liberal conflict perspective.

According to Kornhauser et al (1954:267-268) three ways of managing industrial conflict can be identified. The first is a set of procedures for reconciling, compromising, or adjudicating controversies between unions and employers. Second are various attempts to eliminate the underlying sources of controversy. And third is a series of social controls imposed by the state.

Available literature have concentrated more on the first of these three approaches of managing conflict. The major reason perhaps is that since liberal conflict scholars do not

challenge the prevailing social order in which conflict is generated, much attention has unduely been paid to conflict management at firm or enterprise level. This entails examining just the efficacy of existing collective bargaining machineries at the level of individual firms.

Collective bargaining machinery comprises contract negotiation, grievance negotiation, mediation and arbitration (Kornhanser et al 1954:268). And according to Stephenson and Brotherton (1979:62) the setting up of these collective bargaining machineries and procedures, constitutes what is called the institutionalization of conflict. According to Dahrendorf (1959:271-272), such institutionalization provides workers a degree of industrial citizenship, and helps to isolate industrial conflict from other types of conflict. Institutionalization thrives on certain assumptions (Stephenson and Brotherton (1979:62). First, each party to a conflict recognizes the legitimacy of the other's existence. Second, both parties and the conflict between them are seen as facts of life. Third, there is some agreement or acceptance of certain rules of the game as a framework for relationships.

The necessary outcome of institutionalization is what Dubin (1954:46) called 'antagonistic cooperation.' The antagonistic element reflects the continued existence of conflict whose resolution produces social change. On the other hand, the cooperation element indicates the fact that the function of conflict is to establish a new basis of order and not to continue disorder. Dubin therefore regards collective bargaining as the primary mode for managing industrial conflict. According to him, it is the great social invention that has institutionalized industrial conflict in much the same way that the electoral process and majority rule institutionalized political conflict in a democratic polity. For him, collective bargaining system has created a stable means for resolving industrial conflict (pp 43-44). Flander (1973:369) agrees no doubt with Dubin when he conceptualizes collective bargaining as a process that continually transforms disagreements into agreements in an orderly fashion.

Harbison (1954:274) has identified three major functions of collective bargaining:

First, it provides a partial means for resolving the conflicting economic interests of management and labour; second, it greatly enhances the rights,

dignity, and worth of workers as industrial citizens; and third, as a consequence of the first two functions, it provides one of the more important bulwarks for the preservation of the private - enterprise system.

However, Stephenson and Brotherton (1979:62&66) doubt the efficacy of collective bargaining as a conflict resolution mechanism. According to them, collective bargaining machinery does not resolve conflict but only regulates it. The evidence being that the continued existence of the machinery is actually a recognition of the fact that conflict continues to exist. As they also further argue, the potential for conflict is ever present and there is no guarantee that established channels can control issues.

Rinehart (1978:9) has on the other hand also argued that collective bargaining process does not easily lend itself to the resolution of non-economic conflict. Hyman (1975:27) equally contends that non-wage demands for example do not provide ample scope for bargaining and compromise since they often involve questions of principle on which compromise is far more difficult.

Hyman (1975:199) has further argued that the process of institutionalization is itself beset by contradictions. According to him, the rise in strike activity in most industrialized nations;

increasingly ambitious wage demands and the explicit articulation of non-wage demands such as the control over production and the humanization of work, among other things, are highly threatening to social and economic stability. For him therefore, collective bargaining achieves a provisional containment of disorder, but where workers' grievances and discontents are not resolved, they give rise eventually to new forms of conflict which may involve new types of demand and new means of action.

It has been rightly argued that collective bargaining is a capitalist phenomenon which promotes and preserves the capitalist system. According to Harbison (1954:276) collective bargaining provides substantial support for democratic capitalism in three ways:-

First, it provides a drainage channel for the specific dissatisfactions and frustrations which workers experience on the job; second, it helps to 'humanize' the operation of an essentially impersonal prize system by making it more generally palatable to workers as a group; and third, it absorbs the energies and interests of the leaders of labor who might be inclined to work for the over-throw of capitalism if this avenue of activity were lacking.

Harbison has further commented on the conservative role of

collective bargaining and also accounted for why trade unions become job centered rather than politically oriented in their actions. According to him, the more a union leader concentrates on collective bargaining, the more conservative he is likely to become. And when this brings results, and commands the support of the rank and file, the union leader devotes more time and energy to it. The result is that unions become more job centred than politically oriented (p 277).

One important question is whether collective bargaining can succeed in a non-capitalist system. Harbison also makes a persuasive case against the prospects of collective bargaining in a capitalist system. According to him, collective bargaining

flourishes and survives only in the climate of private enterprise. It both creates the machinery and provides the rationale for endorsement of capitalism by employers, labor leaders and workers (pp 277-278).

Another relevant question is whether a union that endorses collective bargaining can pursue radical objectives.

According to Harbison still, a union that emphasizes collective bargaining is inevitably a conservative movement, for collective bargaining is inseparable from private enterprise. In fact as he argues, through the process of collective bargaining, a

union organizes and directs the discontents of labour in such a way as to bolster rather than to upset the capitalist system (p 278).

Apart from contract negotiation, one other aspect of the collective bargaining that is very important is arbitration. Bernstein (1954:312) describes it as being naturally a conservative process since most arbitrators are confined by the contract and hardly initiate a new policy. This, according to him, is why militant unions are averse to submitting important departures in policy to arbitration. Then commenting on the efficacy of arbitration as a conflict resolution mechanism, Bernstein posits that as part of collective bargaining, arbitration cannot eradicate conflict but can only mitigate its effect and rechannel its incidence into areas in which it can serve useful purposes (p 312).

Like arbitration, the efficacy of mediation as a means of resolving conflict has been criticized. According to Warren (1954:292), mediation is not a method for suppressing conflict but that for minimizing it. He sees mediation as a pressure method which involves personal, social, political and economic pressures to bear on the parties to a conflict. In some cases

the fact-finding method which is a strong form of mediation, is used when disputes could not be settled by normal mediation (p 299).

In spite of the shortcomings of collective bargaining as a conflict resolution mechanism, Ingham (1974:35) believes that it reduces strike activity. According to him, the development of procedural norms for the regulation of industrial relations, is associated with the reduction of strike activity.

Apart from collective bargaining method, conflict can also be managed through efforts aimed at removing the sources of the conflict before they get manifested. Myers (1954:319) has asserted that 'the terms on which the employee sells his services, the regularity of his employment, and the conditions under which he works are all basic employment relations which give rise to conflicts...' According to him, if the employer hopes to reduce the occasions for conflict, he must pay attention to areas of actual or potential conflict such as 'unfair' or 'inadequate' levels of wages; unstable and irregular employment; arbitrary and capricious management action; and inadequate employee status and recognition.

Along the same line also, Walker (1954:345) has identified work methods and working conditions as sources of conflict that need to be managed. According to him, while the demand for higher wages, union recognition and an organized machinery for handling grievances, can cause strikes, work methods and working conditions are basic causes of strikes. In managing conflict these should not be neglected.

Raney (1954:386&393) has on his part advocated for the recognition and utilization of employees' abilities as one of the ways of managing conflict. Industrial conflict can be lessened when management creates worker interest in job assignments. According to him, 'a factor in industrial conflict is the failure on the part of management to recognize the necessity for giving adequate consideration to worker goals of satisfaction and achievement in work through utilization of their abilities along with consideration to management's own goals of efficiency and productivity.'

Another perspective on the efforts to manage the underlying causes of conflict has been put forward by Haber (1954). For him, social-security legislation by the government against

insecurity in issues such as job, income, health, life, old age dependency or status, serves as a means of managing conflict. When this is not done, workers will demand for them in their work place and a failure by management to grant them could lead to conflict.

In addition to the collective bargaining method, and other efforts to remove sources of conflict, direct government intervention through laws and other social control measures, has also been identified as one of the ways of managing conflict. As Kornhauser et al (1954:407) observe, when the power struggles between management and labour spill out of the bargaining arena into the sphere of government, the organs of government inevitably get attracted to exercise control and constraint over that behaviour that affects broader social structure. With regard to the objectivity of such government control, Wolfson (1954) has argued that the values that underlie government control, have reflected the strength of the groups wielding significant social power. But the objective role of government is questionable because it is (at times) both the regulator, the decision maker and also the arbiter. Yet, when it intervenes the rationale is cloaked under the goal of protecting the public interest.

In conclusion, from the review so far on the management of industrial conflict and strike, it is clear that conflict resolution requires a multidimensional approach. However, this is only true to the extent that one believes that the causes of industrial conflict and strikes, are also multifarious as posited by the liberal conflict school. But if on the other hand, one believes that the causes of conflict stem from a common root - the exploitative and oppressive character of the capitalist system, then the central thesis of the class conflict view-point regarding the overthrow of capitalism as a requisite for industrial peace, becomes tenable.

In any case, it is very important to note that as Hyman (1975) earlier observed, 'no social order can provide perfect and permanent harmony,' since some frustration and discontent are inevitable. But as he rightly pointed out:

in a socialist society, industrial conflict would not be rooted in an antagonistic social structure: it would not stem from the exercise of control in the interests of a minority class of capitalist... Industrial conflict would therefore be less irreconcilable, less pervasive... Conflict would thus be frictional rather than fundamental (pp 202-203).

It is along this Hyman's class conflict perspective that our study would examine the causes, roots and management of ASU-

Government conflict. This framework would be the subject of discussion in the next chapter. Meanwhile, we shall now turn to the literature on the Unionization of academics.

2.4: The Unionization of Academics

The emergence of unionism and the use of the strike weapon by professional groups has been viewed as indications of the erosion of professional orientation. Some studies point to the negative association between professionalism and unionization among academics (Harrison and Tabor, 1980:434). Studies by Strauss (1963); Kadish (1968); Ladd and Lipset (1973); Aussieker and Gattarino (1973); Muczyk (1974); Begin (1975); Rhodes (1977); and Bigoness (1978); among numerous others, have argued that professionalism is incompatible with militant unionism. Kadish (1968:163-165) has for example offered the following reason as to why the two are incompatible. According to him, strikes threaten the commitment to and realization of the academics' ideals of professionalism in such areas as the service ideal, the moral basis of academics' professional claims, shared and cooperative decision-making, commitment to

reason and pursuit of distinction. On the other hand, studies by Kleingartner (1969), Corwin (1970) and Perterson (1973) among others, hold the view that there is positive association between professionalism and militant unionism. For instance according to Corwin (1970) professionally oriented teachers engage more frequently in militant action than their less professionally oriented counter-parts.

Regardless of the merit or demerit of this debate, many academic unions now exist. They also embark on strikes occasionally to back-up their demands. According to Kadish (1968:160), academics go on strikes for certain reasons. First, there is an increasing demand for economic returns. It is not, he argues, that academics are so exploited but the fact that other professions are improving their economic positions at a far faster rate than academics, place great pressure for a fairer share of the national product. Second, there is the growing claim for legitimacy of self-assertion for just claims that have been denied.

Kadish has also identified three types of strikes by academics. These are (a) the economic strike which concerns the issue of wages and working conditions; (b) academic interest

strike which tries to advance the ideals of professionalism such as academic freedom, shared government and university autonomy; and (c) political interest strike which aims at protesting against a political decision or policy.

Some scholars have argued that the unionization of academics is an attempt to secure more effective guarantee of status and privileges (Otobo 1987:264; Mandel 1969:47-54). Jessup (1978:44&51) on the other hand, identified the feelings of powerlessness in decision-making as an important motivating factor in the unionization of teachers.

In a study by Ferrille and Alardin (1976) several possible determinants of militant attitudes toward the employer-employee relationship among academics were investigated. It was found out that dissatisfaction with several job and organizational variables were significant predictors of militant attitudes. The strongest predictor of attitudinal militancy was found to be dissatisfaction with internal administrative context while money ranked next. This was followed by dissatisfaction with existing economic rewards and the fourth was dissatisfaction with external administrative context such as relationship between academics and external supervisory agencies (pp 139, 141-143).

But in their study of Israeli faculty unions and the strike weapon, Harrison and Tabory (1980) found out that environmental pressures, as well as ideological factors are important determinants of union behaviour towards strikes. The unions use the strike weapon to pursue their economic interests in a labour relation's environment characterised by intense competition by various unions for their share of the national budget (p. 434).

Then in his study of the correlates of faculty attitudes toward collective bargaining (Unionism), Bigoness (1978) found out that there is a significant relationship between job dissatisfaction with respect to work, pay, supervision, promotional opportunities, and felt need for unionization.

A structural explanation to militancy among academics has been offered by Mayhew (1969). According to him, the pre-eminent role assigned to external supervisory agencies and University presidents is an important factor accounting for militancy among academics. Another factor is the removal of decision making powers from Universities in critical matters of budget, programme approval (among others) to a more distant agency. Hence frustration and unease among academics stimulated a search for ways to counteract this distant decision-making. However, Mayhew contends

that structural changes were not sufficient to explain the sudden explosion of demands by academics. The feelings, desires and frustrations of individual academics are important predictors. Enlarged expectation and relative deprivation set the stage for academics to become militant (pp 342-344).

2.5: ASUU-Government Conflict

Research on ASUU-Government conflict is presently at a rudimentary stage. Very few published academic materials exist while a bulk of other materials exists in periodicals and dailies. It is against this background that we review the following few works.

There is no fundamental disagreement among existing literature regarding the cause of ASUU-Government conflict. For instance, the Report of the Presidential Commission on the Salary and Conditions of Service of University Staff (Cookey Commission), 1981 traced the genesis of ASUU-Government conflict to the Udoji Public Service Review Commission of 1974. The Cookey Commission identified the harmonization exercise by the Udoji Commission as setting the grounds for future conflict. According to the Commission,

the harmonization exercise upset the relativities enjoyed by University staff. The Commission also identified the gradual and progressive erosion of University autonomy and academic freedom by the federal government and its agencies, as another major cause of the conflict (p.3). Furthermore, the Commission observed that the absence of collective bargaining machinery for resolving conflict was a serious gap in labour-management relations in the Universities (p. 72). It round the poor level of funding of the Universities, and the ban on academics from participation in politics, as other causes of ASUU-Government conflict.

ASUU's identification of the causes of the conflict are also similar. In its memorandum to the Cookey Commission, it identified the following as major causes of its conflict with the government: (a) poor state of the Universities, (b) erosion of University autonomy and academic freedom, (c) poor conditions of service in Universities and (d) inadequate funding of Universities. These causes were also reiterated in its memorandum to the Akambi Panel in 1986, and in one of its publications titled 'ASUU and the 1986 Education Crisis in Nigeria' of 1987. These factors equally formed the major reasons it gave for embarking on various strike actions.

Isamah (1986) in the same manner identified the issues of University autonomy, academic freedom, better conditions of service, and adequate funding of Universities, as major areas of negotiation between ASUU and the government. He also identified the issue of retrenchment as one of the sources of the conflict (p. 422).

Nwala (1988) in a paper titled 'Industrial Crisis in the Nigerian University System's however offers a critical analysis of ASUU-Government conflict. One of the crucial factors he identified is the character of the relationship between the government and the Universities. According to him, the crisis of autonomy derives from the fact that the government is the one that establishes the Universities, draws up the laws governing them, and also funds them. Consequently he argues that the government that establishes and funds Universities would invariably undermine their autonomy and academic freedom (pp 10-13). Citing certain cases of clear violation of academic freedom and political interference by the government, Nwala asserts that:

These and many more episodes have systematically eroded the status, integrity, and effectiveness of the University system, demoralized and antagonized the academics and fuelled tension within the system. ASUU was the only platform from which collective resistance could be mounted (p. 13).

Nwala also identified other causes of conflict as: (a) government neglect of the Universities particularly in the area of funding; (b) poor conditions of service in the Universities; (c) differences in political and social perspectives and (d) internal governance and management of the Universities (pp. 14-19).

Nwala however argued that the greatest divide separating Babangida's regime and ASUU, is the issue of ideology for Nigeria. According to him, while the regime pursues a capitalist path to development, ASUU on the other hand advocates for a socialist and anti-imperialist path. ASUU's strong criticisms of the regime's development model which in its view unleashes poverty, crime, corruption, unemployment, inflation, hunger and disease, as well as constituting a threat to social and industrial peace, has exacerbated its conflict with the government (pp 16-17).

Eke (1988) carried out a study on Trade Unionism among academics in Nigeria with a focus on the development and impact of ASUU. Although still at the draft stage, its findings are worth noting. The study identified status loss, government fiat, and non-participation of academics in policy decisions—among others — as factors responsible for the unionization of academics (p.84).

The study also identified the causes of ASUU-Government conflict to hinge on three major issues namely (a) the government's insensitivity towards the improvement of the conditions of service of University academics, (b) the erosion of University autonomy and academic freedom; and (c) under-funding of Universities (pp. 106-107).

2.6: Conclusion: The Inadequacy of Existing Literature

The first part of our review of general literature on industrial conflict and strikes though relevant for identifying the general causes and management of industrial disputes, are however mainly macro studies that lack specific relevance for making generalizations on academic unionism. Specific studies therefore need to be carried out to find out how issues about academic unionism conform or deviate from existing general conclusions.

On the other hand, the second part of the review though much more specific and relevant nevertheless lacks some degree of contextual relevance with respect to the Nigerian situation. They are largely based on academic unionism in developed countries. The character of academic unionism in Nigeria needs therefore to be

studied to determine the extent to which it reflects existing general findings about academics.

The reviewed literature on ASUU-Government conflict in Nigeria are both specific, micro-oriented and contextually relevant. However, none of the works focused (in both breadth and depth) on the issue of academic strikes and their management. Secondly and much more importantly, no serious attempt was made to establish the roots of the conflict in a way that establishes the linkage among the identified causes of the conflict. The identified causes of the conflict surely do not exist in isolation of each other. Since such causes derive from federal government's actions or inactions, attempt should have been made to explain why the federal government behaved the way she did. For instance, an attempt should have been made to explain why the federal government was interested in eroding University autonomy and academic freedom, or why she was under-funding existing conventional Universities and at the same time establishing new ones that are not fundamentally different.

Thirdly, none attempted to explain why the federal government was very reluctant to set up a collective bargaining machinery

in the Universities in spite of ASUU's repeated requests as well as the prolonged nature of the conflict. Furthermore, none attempted to explain why ASUU, a supposedly radical trade union, was repeatedly asking for the establishment of a collective bargaining machinery - a request that contradicts its radical posture - since a collective bargaining system is a conservative machinery that promotes and preserves the Capitalist System. And since also a collective bargaining system allows meaningful bargaining on issues that are non-fundamental and non-ideological in character.

Finally, existing literature is inadequate in explaining how the ASUU-Government conflict was perceived by either the government or ASUU. This fact is important for understanding the character of the conflict. Moreover, existing literature assumes that the perception of the conflict by ASUU leadership was congruent with that of the rank and file of ASUU. The implication of this assumption is (perhaps) that ASUU is politically and ideologically a cohesive group. This assumption might not necessarily be correct. It can only meaningfully be established through empirical investigation.

It is hoped that our present study would help to fill these existing gaps in literature.

CHAPTER THREE

THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1: Introduction

This study is carried out within the political economy and class frameworks of analysis of socio-economic and political phenomena. We believe that these approaches have better and stronger explanatory powers needed for exposing the hidden and driving forces that shaped the character and dynamics of ASUU-Government conflict. In short, it equips us more than other approaches to unearth the roots of the conflict and to comprehend fully its essence. Generally, it helps researchers to make a comprehensive, deeper and critical analyses of phenomena. As Nnoli, (1981:17) rightly pointed out, this approach 'enjoins analysts to probe beneath what people say they are doing, and what they seem to be doing, in order to discover the laws of human behaviour which are critical for the development of society.'

An alternative framework like the liberal pluralist theory of industrial relations is quite incapable of unravelling the underlying forces that determined the origin, character, dynamics,

and management of ASUU-Government Conflict. For example, the pluralist theory sees industrial conflict, in terms of a rivalry between groups whose interests are not fundamentally opposed. Such conflict is defined in reconcilable and non-antagonistic terms and is assumed to be resolvable within the framework of institutional regulation, bargaining and compromise. In fact, the pluralists assume that industrial conflict is not so fundamental as to threaten the basis and legitimacy of the prevailing social order. They therefore neglect or underplay the political character of the struggle between labour and capital. This approach is ipso facto incapable of serving our needs in this study, hence our adoption of the political economy and class framework of analysis.

3.2: A Political Economy Framework

Political Economy is both a discipline and an approach. As a discipline, it is 'science which studies the social relations that evolve between people in the process of the production, distribution, exchange and consumption of the material benefits' (Volkov 1985:275). And as Ryndina and Chernikov (1985:13) aptly

put it, political economy analyzes the economic role of the state, its impact upon the economic system and its socio-economic consequences. In short, according to Ilyin and Motyler (1986:38), political economy 'studies the relations of production in their complex interaction with the productive forces and the superstructure.'

As an approach, it is based on dialectical materialism and relies a great deal on the conceptual apparatus and analytic framework of marxism (Ake, 1981:1; Ake, 1983:27; Ryndina and Chernikov, 1985:16). According to Ilyin and Motyler (1986:71-72), dialectical materialism assumes the primacy of matter and recognizes the universal interconnection of objects and phenomena and also regards motion and development as the result of a unity and struggle of opposites. It starts from a materialist understanding of history and brings out the inner driving forces in the interaction of the productive forces and the relations of production.

The major characteristics of the political economy approach include:

1. the primacy given to material conditions especially the economic factors in the analysis of social phenomena;
2. a dynamic view of reality and the significance of history in analysis;
3. acceptance of the basic categories and basic methodological and theoretical commitments of marxism;
4. focus on the nature of capitalism as a global phenomenon;
5. a comprehensive, interrelated and inter-disciplinary view of social phenomena;
6. an adoption of a developmental perspective in the analysis of phenomenon;
7. treatment of problems concretely rather than abstractly; and
8. focus on domination, exploitation and colonialism in the process of capital accumulation (Ake, 1981:1-4; 1983:31-32; Aina 1986:4-5; Lenin 1980:473).

One of the basic laws of dialectical materialism is the law of the Unity and Struggle of opposites. The concept of contradiction is central to this law. Contradiction can be antagonistic or non-antagonistic. Antagonistic contradiction exists where a society is divided into classes with incompatible interests.

And such contradiction cannot be resolved in the conditions of the social order that generated it (Krapivin 1985:167).

Before applying this framework to our study, it is relevant to discuss the class framework of analysis - a major component of the political economy approach.

3.3: The Class Framework of Analysis

A class approach to the analysis of social phenomena, is a marxist-oriented methodology which focuses attention on classes and class interests, the mechanics used by classes to promote their interests, and the character and dynamics of class relations.

According to Lenin (1980:421) classes refer to large groups of people differing from each other by the place they occupy in a historically determined system of social production, by their relation... to the means of production, by their role in the social organization of labour, and consequently by the dimensions of the share of social wealth which they dispose and the mode of acquiring it.

Classes are differentiated primarily by their relation to the means of production. This factor determines all other secondary basis of differentiation. For instance, it is because the bourgeoisie owns the means of production that it dominates not only economically but

also politically and ideologically (Volkov 1985:43; Arnoldor et al, 1985:417; Yermakova and Ratnikov, 1986; and Berbeshkina, et al, 1985:93). However Poulantzas (1973:27) has emphasized that classes are defined principally but not exclusively by their place in the production process. Hence in addition to the economic criterion, the superstructure (the political and ideological) should be recognized.

Classes emerged in society with the disintegration of the primitive-communal system. The emergence of a system of private ownership of the means of production and the development of productive forces, brought about surplus product, division of labour and exchange of goods. Consequently, economic inequality appeared and the propertyless became dependent on the propertied. This marked the origin of classes in society (Berbeshkina et al, 1985:94-95).

Under capitalism, the basic classes are the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. There is also the intermediate classes - the petty-bourgeoisie - made up of peasants, artisans, petty-traders, intellectuals, middle and upper level of the civil servants, the army, and the professionals (Volkov 1985:43; Nnoli, 1981:126).

The intellectuals constitute an important social category within the petty-bourgeoisie. And according to Arnoldov et al (1985:439), the petty-bourgeoisie has a dual character. On the one hand, it adjoins the working classes and plays active role in the struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. And on the other hand, some of its members align with the bourgeois class. It therefore possesses such negative qualities as political backwardness and instability, tendency to hesitate and waver on questions of ideology and politics. On the whole, it adopts a vacillating and inconsistent position which is not unconnected with its desire to own property. Yet a good number of the intelligentsia share characteristics of the proletariat. For instance, their wages differ insignificantly from those of industrial workers, hence they align with the proletariat. However, the left-wing flirtation of the petty-bourgeoisie is sometimes marred by its right-wing opportunism.

Different classes have particular interests they protect and promote. According to Arnoldov et al, (1985:441) class interest is an objective relation of a class to the existing mode of production, the social and state system. Class interest may

be fundamental or temporary. A fundamental class interest pertains to either strengthening the existing social order or advocating for its destruction and replacement. The fundamental class interests of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie are diametrically opposed and irreconcilable. Hence class struggle (conflict) is inevitable in a capitalist society where such antagonistic and irreconcilable interests exist.

Class struggle is a struggle between classes whose interests are incompatible or are in contradiction with each other (Volkov, 1985:42). According to Nnoli (1981:15-16), this struggle is not only waged by the underprivileged classes against the ruling classes. The ruling classes also wage a struggle against the under-privileged classes. For instance the ruling classes determine what is to be learned in schools, whether trade unions can participate in politics or how strikers should be controlled. These according to Nnoli are instruments of class struggle like the use of strike action by workers.

The three basic forms of class struggle in a capitalist society are the economic, ideological and political struggles (Yermakova and Ratnikov, 1986:126-133; Arnoldov et al 1985:442-443; Volkov, 1985:42; Buzuev, 1987:114-117; and Berbeshkina et al,

1985:99-104). In economic struggle, workers seek to improve working conditions, higher wages and shorter working hours. Ideological Struggle is a struggle of ideas in which workers seek to counteract the ideological influence of the bourgeoisie. The highest form of struggle is the political. Its aim is to achieve a radical transformation of the prevailing social order and consequently instal the dictatorship of the proletariat.

3.4: ASUU-Government Conflict: A Framework of Analysis

3.4.1: Background Issues

Our primary objective in this section is first to identify the character of the Nigerian state and the specific class role of its government in industrial relations. Secondly, the class character of ASUU and the mission of its leadership would be identified and analyzed in relation to how they conflict with the specific class role of the government. The relevance of these, is underscored by the following questions; what kind of state is Nigeria, and in whose interest does it operate? (Beckman, 1982:38). What form of ideology does the Nigerian state operate, and how does this determine the specific role of its government in industrial relations? What is the class character of ASUU and

how does the class role of its leadership conflict fundamentally with that of the government? Furthermore, does the Nigerian government play a neutral and mediatory role in the struggle between labour and capital, or does it play a partisan role? But to what extent can the Nigerian government play an objective, neutral and mediatory role in industrial relations, when it is a major employer of labour?

A critical look at these questions within the political economy and class framework of analysis, will enable us to locate properly the actual role which the Nigerian government plays in any conflict between labour and capital. But much more specifically, it enables us to expose the primary motive behind anti-labour laws, decrees, policies and actions of the Nigerian government. In short, it will equip us to identify correctly the real and hidden motive behind government's progressive erosion of University autonomy and academic freedom. It will assist us to expose the radical mission of ASUU leadership, and consequently unravel the roots and character of ASUU-Government conflict, and to explain why its management was intractable.

3.4.2: State and Government: A Conceptual Clarification

From the liberal perspective, the state is 'a territorial society divided into government and subjects claiming within its allotted physical area, a supremacy over all other institutions' (Laski, 1952:21). Its basic characteristics include a defined (or definite) territory, population (people), government, sovereignty and monopoly of physical force exercised by the government (Appadorai 1975:11; Nnoli 1986:16). Since this liberal conception gives a static and legalistic meaning, it is considered inadequate for our understanding of the state in our study. We will therefore define the state as 'a specific order of power relations characterised by the existence of a dominant class with its system of institutionalized mechanisms of domination' (Asobie, 1989 section X:96). Hence, according to Milliband (1983:62), the state exists to 'protect and serve the existing social order and the dominant class which is the main beneficiary of that social order.'

'The essence of any state' writes Belov (1986:23) 'is determined by its economic and social base. If society is founded upon private property and the exploitation of the poor by the rich, the state inevitably becomes an instrument in the hands of

the minority, for consolidating its dominance.' And as Lenin (1984:15) put it, the state in such a circumstance becomes 'an instrument for the exploitation of the oppressed class.' But on the other hand, 'if society is founded on common property and the objective conditions for inequality and exploitation of man by man are absent,... the state too becomes an instrument for expressing the will of the masses' (Belov 1986:23).

In relation to the state, the term government refers to an instrument for carrying out the will of the state. As Appadorai (1975:12) put it, government is the machinery through which the will or purposes of the state is formulated, expressed and realized. Put differently, therefore, government is just one but most powerful attribute of the 'state in action.' But occasionally for analytical purposes, some scholars use the terms 'state' and 'government' synonymously. While we recognize fully the differences between the two concepts, we will nevertheless use them synonymously in certain circumstances, since as Ake (1981:128) rightly observed, in a post-colonial state in Africa, 'the boundary between the state, government and the ruling class is very blurred.' It is also against this background that we will use the term

'ruling class' synonymously with government or state in certain circumstances. Yet, we recognize that 'the ruling class is the social class which by virtue of its control of the means of production is able to command a preponderance of social, political and economic goods and power' and that 'it is really the ruling class that is in power, the government being merely in office' (Ake, 1981:127).

Having noted that the state can be an instrument for the exploitation of the oppressed class, or for expressing the will of the masses, the crucial question now is: what is the character of the Nigerian state and what interest does it serve? These constitute the subject of discussion in the next section.

3.4.3: The Character of the Nigerian State

To understand the character of the Nigerian state, there is need to examine its evolution. This in turn requires examining Nigeria's colonial historical experience, as well as the interests that determined its incorporation into the international economic and political system.

The contemporary Nigerian state is a creation of British colonial authority. Certain reasons have been advanced to explain

the motive behind British entry into what is now known as Nigeria. These include imperialist and economic reasons, evangelization mission, humanitarian and philanthropic reasons, such as the effort to abolish slave trade and extend western education to the people of colonized territories - the civilizing mission (Ejimofofor 1987:9-31; Ayua 1985:407; Osuntokun 1979:92; Okoli 1980:11). But as Ejimofofor (1987:24) rightly observed 'critics of European imperialism are skeptical and cynical about the role played by philanthropy and humanitarianism in the evolution of British imperialism in Africa.' If ever the humanitarian and philanthropic motive exists, it 'was mixed with an equally compelling motivation - economic imperialism' (p 25). In short, British economic interest was a strong motivation. For as Ejimofofor also documents,

the industrial revolution produced an economic motive for colonial expansion in the 19th century. During the 1860's, Britain was an industrial giant producing one third of the worlds industrial goods including two-thirds of its coal and half of its iron and cotton cloth. As a result, there was an impulse to find new markets to sell the manufactured products and to buy the raw materials to feed the industries (p 32).

Consequently, as Otopo (1988:6) observed, the foundation of the modern Nigerian state was to all intents and purposes, laid

between 1860 and 1898 by European commercial firms, and local trading magnates engaged in cut-throat competition. Then, the annexation of Lagos in 1861 by the British marked the commencement of its colonial rule in Nigeria. Lagos according to Ejimofor was a strategic and commercial centre which the British found to be very useful for their operations and objective of colonial expansion (p. 21).

Before the commencement of British colonial rule in Nigeria, pre-colonial societies were communalistic in their economic and social organizations. But the introduction of colonial rule came with it the capitalist mode of production which subsequently destroyed this communal character (Nwala 1980:279). Through colonialism, Nigeria was incorporated into the world capitalist system and this incorporation created a class structure that facilitates its continuous integration (Oniemola 1985:936; Oyovbaire 1985:365; and Kwanashie 1984:144). As Williams (1980:23) correctly observes, through colonialism, 'the forces of production' were 'developed to meet the requirements of capitalism. The expansion of commodity production was made possible first by the elimination of the

trans-Atlantic slave trade and the promotion of legitimate commerce, and subsequently by the extension of formal colonial authority.' And as he also noted, 'imperialist domination of pre-capitalist economics opened the way for capitalist penetration and the development of productive forces.' As Williams further documents, colonialism subordinated rural

producers to the requirements of the metropolitan market and the colonial state which administered them through a culture to which they had no access. They depended for the realization of the value of their labour on the exchange of commodities in markets whose terms they could not control, which enabled mercantile companies, and subsequently the state and indigenous capitalist, to appropriate the surplus value of their labour (1976:21-22; 1980:30).

Right from the establishment of the Nigerian state, British colonial authority was actively involved in the promotion of capitalist development. In fact 'since 1807, British statesmen, philanthropists and businessmen had consistently emphasized the development of legitimate commerce' (Tamuno 1978:247). For instance the Duke of Marlborough, the former Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, had in 1906 suggested that the cotton fields in West Africa should be used to feed the Lancashire Mills (Tamuno 1978:247). As a practical step to

the realization of its economic objectives and interests, the colonial state according to Williams (1980:27) financed the development of railways and harbours. It rationalized the currency and encouraged the use of money. It also organized the forcible and voluntary recruitment of labour both for state purposes, railway and road building and portering and for private purposes.

The colonial government was the major employer of wage-labour and its wage policy was governed by the need to limit expenditure and to encourage people to seek opportunities in growing cash crops to serve the requirements of capitalist system. In 1897, a strike of labourers took place in Lagos because of low government wage levels (Williams 1980:32).

Then even after political independence, the economic and political structures of the colonial state were retained without any fundamental transformation. In fact as Williams (1980:33) also posits,

the development of the colonial political economy established the material and institutional foundations for the development of the neo-colonial political economy.

Nigeria therefore emerged at independence as a neo-colonial capitalist state being structurally integrated into the global

capitalist system. A neo-colonial link was carefully established before political independence. For example, the British colonial authority carefully cultivated a domestic petty-bourgeoisie to whom it handed over political power while retaining with other imperialists, their economic domination of the Nigerian state (Onimode, 1981:85). The efforts at cultivating a domestic ruling class, yielded at independence a sizable petty and comprador bourgeoisie with an objective interest in the consolidation and reproduction of the colonial pattern of economic life (Nnoli 1981:126). Ever since then, this domestic ruling class has continued to pursue policies that reproduce the colonially established bourgeois class-structure. Consequently, the contemporary Nigerian state acts to preserve the social order in which the capitalist mode of production is retained and reproduced (Sanusi, 1985:17).

But as Osoba (1978:66) rightly observed, the integration of Nigeria into the global capitalist order operates primarily for the benefit of the metropolitan economies and responded sensitively to their needs. This was because, the role predetermined for Nigeria is that of an exporter of raw

material and agricultural materials and an importer of finished or semi-finished manufactured goods.

From our discussion so far, the character of the Nigerian state can be summarized as follows. First, Nigeria is a capitalist state. This is because the Nigerian state

promotes capitalist accumulation and capitalist class formation... The state itself is a major owner of means of production and finance capital. It invests in large-scale productive enterprises, on its own or in partnership with foreign and domestic private capital. It takes an active part in promoting Nigerian capitalists through state banks, development corporations and support schemes... Heavy state investments in economic and social infrastructure clearly support further capitalist production (Beckman, 1982:37).

The Nigerian state is not just a capitalist state. It is a neo-colonial dependent capitalist state. Put differently, it is a peripheral capitalist state or a state dominated by imperialist forces and interests. As Beckman (1982:50) also aptly observes, the Nigerian state:

is a state of imperialism: imperialist social relations of production have been domesticated and the state itself is the very linch-pin around which the system of imperialist domination rotates. This is a new phase of imperialist domination: imperialist domination from within, with its specific contradiction, and its specific forms of resistance.

As a neo-colonial and peripheral capitalist state, the Nigerian state is an organ of international capital due largely to the fact that real control of the economy remains with international capitalist forces. In short, the Nigerian state can be described as a comprador one since state institutions and its officials operate as agents of imperialism (Beckman 1982:39). As Beckman also observes, the state provides the unity and cohesion of the international alliance of monopolistic forces which impose themselves vigorously and brutally on the Nigerian people (p. 51). Hence according to him, the comprador bourgeoisie 'uses its alliance with international capital to buttress its class rule and accumulation. Jointly the two parties cooperate to hold back popular pressures for social and democratic reform. As a result, capitalism in the Third World tends to take on a particular oppressive, backward and predatory character' (p 39). The distortion of capitalism and the role of the capitalist state has become a feature of neo-colonial states (see Ake 1981:125).

One other characteristic of the Nigerian state, is its adoption of a state-capitalist-model of accumulation which according to Ekuereh (1984:6; & 1986:206) involves the

predominance of the public sector in the generation of profits and determination of the structure of production in the economy. But as Ake (1981:179&183) pointed out, this state capitalism has generated massive political corruption in which the capitalist class uses state power for surplus appropriation. And according to Iyayi (1986a:33) through this primitive accumulation process, the government becomes the nucleus and breeding ground of indigenous capitalists who use state apparatus to accumulate private capital. Consequently a high incidence of corruption exists (See Appendix J). For instance, from 1978 to 1982, about \$5.98 billion was involved in corrupt practices. And this figure emerged from various bribes, frauds, kickbacks, and extravagant expenditure (p 36). Specifically as Obasi (1988(a):107-108) revealed, such institutionalized and pervasive corruption involved over-invoicing, award of contract to unqualified firms, arson to cover up frauds, direct embezzlement and inflation of contracts. The mismanagement of the economy by the ruling class, therefore remains one of the most visible characteristics of the Nigerian neo-colonial dependent capitalist state.

Having identified the character of the Nigerian state, it is germane to ask: whose interest does it serve? According

to Beckman (1982:45):

while the Nigerian state serves as an organ both for the penetration of international capital and for the emancipation of the domestic bourgeoisie, it cannot be reduced to either. Nor is it possible to comprehend the significance of either of the two aspects without examining such class functions of the Nigerian state for which the distinction between foreign and domestic is not relevant. The primary role of the Nigerian state, is to establish, maintain, protect, and expand the conditions of capitalist accumulation in general, without which neither foreign nor Nigerian capitalists can prosper (Emphasis added).

From the preceding paragraphs therefore, we can safely say that the Nigerian state serves bourgeois interests and plays a partisan class role in industrial relations. As a bourgeois state, it supports capital in any fundamental conflict between labour and capital. The imperative need to create the conditions conducive to capitalist accumulation and expansion, often compels the Nigerian state to adopt - when necessary - such repressive, regulative and ideological measures that would contain any organized opposition from labour. But the state in the process receives severe opposition from radical labour organizations, patriotic and anti-imperialist forces. For instance, the state as Beckman points out gets opposition from

workers whose efforts to organize in defence of their interests are suppressed by the state or by management with the backing or tacit support of the state. Resistance also comes from peasants and urban petty commodity producers (p. 50).

It is as Iyayi (1986a) argues the exploitation of labour that provides the power lever for the development of workers' class consciousness and the need for organization for self-liberating action (p. 38). Consequently the existence of this class antagonism shapes the character of state-labour relations. Let us now look more closely into the motive behind state intervention in industrial relations.

3.4.4: The Motive Behind Government Intervention in Industrial Relations.

At the core of an industrial relations system, is the interplay of three principal actors namely labour, management (employers) and the state (government) (Armstrong 1969:1; Levin 1958:viii; Ubeku, 1986:22; Dunlop 1958:7; Hyman 1975:13 and Akpala 1982:28-29). These three actors, writers Ubeku (1986:22-23) jointly create the web of rules which governs the workplace and work community. But out of these actors, the state may have broad and decisive role that it can over-ride the others.

In short, it is the dominant party especially in developing countries.

According to Yesufu (1984:32) state intervention in industrial relations refers to:

all the action, direct or indirect, by means of which a government promotes, sustains, or participates to influence or determine, the conditions of employment, and the relations between those directly involved in the employment contract - employers/managers on the one hand, and employees/trade unions on the other.

At independence in 1960, Nigeria's industrial relations system was fashioned in line with British doctrine of voluntarism (Fashoyin 1980:92). This laissez-faire philosophy according to Yesufu (1984:31) formed the basis of the economic policy of free enterprise which restricts the right of the state from intervening directly in industrial relations. It seems to us however that this claimed doctrine of voluntarism in Nigeria's industrial relations system, was more of theory than practice. Experience tends to support this. As Otobo (1988:166) correctly observed, the claim failed to separate official pronouncements from the actual tactics and methods employed by the state. But much more importantly, as Damachi and Fashoyin (1986:viii) also rightly observed, the belief that the doctrine of voluntarism characterised

Nigeria's industrial relations system prior to 1968, 'is correct only if the labour laws of the period are regarded as the only yardstick for regulating labour-management relations.' As they further observed 'there is overwhelming evidence of substantial state intervention and control in the actual practice of labour and management relations both during the colonial period and after independence and much of that emanated from outside the legal framework.' For example, while the government accepted (and occasionally re-affirmed its belief in) the principle of collective bargaining, its wage fixing procedure did not in practice obey this. Hence wage determination process in the public sector was largely characterised by unilateralism - a situation in which the government fixed wages by unilateral administrative decisions rather than by collective bargaining process (Obasi, 1988(b):9; Obasi, 1988(c):5). The doctrine of voluntarism should be placed in its proper class perspective. While it is possible for the state to adopt a laissez-faire attitude in some industrial relations matters that do not threaten the fundamental basis of the prevailing capitalist system, the state cannot afford to do so in matters that hamper its goal of capitalist accumulation and expansion. The class interest of the state is therefore an important factor in its decision to intervene and the extent

of such intervention in industrial relations matters. This factor explains why the state's intervention in industrial relations in the late sixties and onwards reflected drastic changes in Nigeria's political economy.

To demonstrate therefore its interest in controlling the character of industrial relations, the Nigerian government in 1968 promulgated the Trade Disputes (Emergency Provisions) Decree No. 21 which was amended in 1969 through Trade Dispute (Emergency Provisions Amendment) Decree No. 53. Under these Decrees, the government banned strikes and lockouts, and made arbitration compulsory. Later on in 1975, the government announced a new National Labour Policy in which (among other things) it stressed its right to intervene in both Union management affairs and labour-management relations (Fashoyin 1980:101). Although the government announced that this new policy 'will involve limited government intervention in certain areas of labour activity in order to ensure industrial peace, progress and harmony,' it however stated that 'Union activity especially at the central level is so important in our economic and social life that Government has of necessity to be involved to some extent' (Fashoyin, 1980:148; Ubeku, 1983a:212).

The policy among other things aimed at giving a new sense of direction and new image to the trade-union movement; remove completely ideological or external influences from the trade-union arena; and to rationalize the structure and organization of trade unions (Fashoyin 1980:147, and Ubeku, 1983a:211).

Ever since the adoption of new National Labour Policy, governments' attempts at giving trade unions a 'new sense of direction and new image' focused primarily at rooting out radical and militant unionism. It backed reactionary and pre-government labour leaders during elections into the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) executive councils. This happened during the Sumonu-Ojeli election tussles, as well as during the Chiroma versus Shammang election crisis. In all these circumstances, the various governments did not hide their aversion to radical labour unionism that challenged the prevailing social order. Prior to these, the government had in 1977 barred eleven trade unionists most of whom came from the radical section of the labour movement. Also by the Trade Unions (Central Labour Organizations, Special Provisions) Decree, No. 44 of 1976, the government cancelled the registration of four major central labour organizations, and refused to recognize workers - created NLC whose leadership came from the

left-wing section of the labour movement (Bangura 1985:806-807). The action of the government was hardly surprising to those who could correctly interpret the class basis of the 1975 new National Labour Policy. As Bangura (1985:811) rightly pointed out, it was government's intention to control the militant role of the left and therefore provide opportunity for the right wing forces to consolidate and organize themselves for the transition to civil rule.

Other anti-labour policies and actions of the government between 1975 to 1988 include:

1. Wage freeze and reduction in allowances and fringe benefits.
2. Ban on strikes in Essential Services under the Trade Disputes (Essential Services) Act of 1976.
3. Rationalization and retrenchment of workers.
4. Proscription of some radical labour unions and other patriotic organizations that challenged the policies of the government. For example, the government proscribed the Nigerian Medical Association (NMA), Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC), Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) and the National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS).
5. Detention of some militant and radical labour leaders.

There was no doubt therefore that through these measures, the government 'dictated what form industrial relations should take within the socio-political and economic framework in the society' (see Fashoyin 1986:47).

At this junction, it is relevant to examine the crucial question regarding the motive behind government's intervention in industrial relations. This question is similar to the question of the interest the Nigerian state serves. Liberal scholars believe that the government (or the state) intervenes in order to promote national interests. A typical argument of this school runs thus: government intervention in industrial relations is aimed at preventing labour exploitation and ensuring a reasonable standard of working conditions, maintaining industrial peace and encouraging both sides of industry to co-operate for their mutual benefit and in the national interest (Obiyan, 1965:41). According to Ubeku, (1986:29) government should intervene in order to enforce what it believes to be in the public interest since the material well-being of the society could be frustrated by inter-group conflict. Furthermore, the expanding role of government in management of the economy and

its commitment to the country's economic growth dictate that it must intervene in industrial relations. According to him, in a rapidly developing country like Nigeria, the high rate of inflation can be aggravated by uncontrolled wages which in turn has consequences for industrial expansion. And also in another work, Ubeku (1983(a):201) argues that in order to carry out its development plans in the interest of all in society, it is necessary that the government should be actively involved in industrial relations as a participant to ensure that employers and unions are associated with the development of the country.

In Akpala's (1982:273) view, the activities of the state in industrial relations, 'are to see that equity, fair play and safety are brought to bear in personnel administration in the interest of the worker and the society.

For Damachi and Fashoyin (1986:ix), government should intervene because it expresses the values and priorities of the parties in the industrial relations system. It is also necessary so as to ensure that industrial relations policies and practices are consistent with social and economic development objectives.

Although Yesufu (1984:34) correctly asserts that 'the logic of state intervention in industrial relations is rooted in economic, social and political foundations,' he however failed to link these foundations to the class-logic, driving forces and basic laws of capitalist relations and production. He then attribute the motive of government intervention to the need to protect the interest of the wider society. According to him,

poor industrial relations, including especially strikes which lower or suspend production, cut into the incomes and welfare not only of the workers directly affected, but of their children, wives and dependants. The state, as a guardian of the social conscience and welfare, feels compelled to ensure that working conditions are humane, fair and reasonable (Emphasis ours).

These liberal views do not really capture the essence of state intervention. In fact, these scholars have failed to probe deeply into the logic of state intervention. To begin with, they failed to specify what constitutes national or public interest. Secondly, they did not really explain fully how the workers benefit more than the bourgeoisie in such state's intervention. Thirdly they failed to appreciate the fact that national interest as defined by the state is merely the interest

of the dominant (ruling) class. For as Asobie (1989:95) has correctly argued,

whenever and wherever the phrase national interest is used, it should be understood as referring to the class interest of the state: and the class interest of the state means essentially, but not exclusively, the interest of the dominant class in society. The interest of the dominant class is that central or vital goal which the dominant class persistently pursues in relationship with other classes, at home and abroad. It is that goal which is essential for the continued reproduction of the dominant class. It is an objective reality which differs essentially with the differences in the class character of the state.

With regard to Yesufu's argument, Otobo (1988:160) has rightly observed that "little comfort can be drawn from the notion of the Nigerian state as 'guardian of the social conscience and welfare,' even if successive 'development plans' have contained state interventions to create a better tomorrow. In view of our history and the conduct of our elites, one would like to believe that what Yesufu has in mind is what the state ought to become." The motive behind government intervention therefore derives fully from the basic laws of capitalism and the crucial role the state plays in creating the conditions necessary for capital accumulation and expansion. In fact as

Hyman (1975:119) argues, 'the development of industrial relations has been powerfully influenced by the structure and dynamics of capitalism. And the growing instability of capitalism is reflected in industrial relations.'

The Nigerian state writes Yesufu (1984:33) constitutes by far the largest single employer of labour and as such could not afford to take a passive interest in industrial relations. However, it is erroneous to believe as Yesufu contends, that the state's active interest is to set example which would become the standard for the regulation of employer and employee relations in other sectors of the economy (pp 33-34). As Otobo (1988:157) correctly argues, Yesufu failed to examine the said example the state sets, for such would have thrown more light on the actual role of the state in industrial relations in Nigeria. And as Otobo further observes, the labour standards and conditions of employment prevailing in most of the private sector organizations since the early 1970s, have been superior to those of the public sector (p 158). The fact as he argues is that the logic of the state as the largest employer of labour and the constraints imposed by the dependent nature of the economy, render suspect industrial and labour policies presented as

being in the national interest (p 165). Ultimately therefore, the state uses its power to support capital and to protect the equally narrow interests of factions of the ruling class than for other purposes (p 165).

Yet, we recognize that as a neo-colonial state, it faces some ambivalence in discharging its function of promoting capital. For instance, it has two contradictory roles. It is required on the one hand, to regulate conflict among contending interests, and on the other hand, it serves as the instrument of these contending interests (William 1980:70-71). In any case, 'the involvement of the state in the class struggle makes it more difficult for the government to affect the air of impartiality' (Ake 1981:182). Hence according to Ake, such a state is interventionist and partial.

Having established that the Nigerian government promotes capitalist interest in its intervention in industrial relations, it is now relevant to examine the class character of ASUU and how the mission of its leadership, challenges and threatens the fundamental role of the government.

3.4.5: The Class Character of ASUU and the Mission of ASUU Leadership.

The intellectuals as we pointed out in section 3.3, constitute an important social category within the petty-bourgeoisie. And as Arnoldov et al (1985:439) rightly noted, the petty-bourgeoisie has a dual character. On the one hand, it adjoins the working classes and plays active role in the struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, and on the other hand, some of its members align with the bourgeois class.

With respect to ASUU, most of its members shared the ideology of the ruling class (bourgeois class). This point is examined in details in section 6.1.5.2. The leadership on the other hand projected a working class ideology that challenged the legitimacy of the bourgeois class. Commenting on the class character of ASUU, its leadership once declared:

In terms of all the criteria used for demarcating between workers and managers/employers (conditions of work, degree of authority and control exercised over other employees, ownership rights, etc), the members of our union are workers...

As a union of workers, our destiny is indissolubly tied to that of the other sections of the working people whether organized under the NEC or not...

It remains the responsibility of this union to struggle side by side with other sections of wage and salaried employees irrespective of industry, occupation, profession or category for the upliftment of the conditions of labour (ASUU 1987:43-44).

According to Olorode (1987:3) Nigerian academics though not members of the working class (proletariat) are becoming like them since the objective pressures of the Nigerian socio-economic life have increasingly reduced the differences in the material-political interests between them and the proletariat. However an insignificant section of academics has been catapulted into sudden riches in different ways such as big contracts, embezzlement, and political appointment etc. Although the rank and file has been ambivalent about key socio-economic and political issues, (a characteristic of a petty-bourgeois class), the leadership on the other hand 'usually responded on the side of the working class.' It also 'committed itself to the liberation of Nigeria's resources from the stranglehold of imperialism and its local agents in and outside the governments' (Olorode p 3).

It is this 'liberation mission' of ASUU leadership that earned it the number one enemy of the ruling class. It, for

instance, on several occasions called on the 'Nigerian working and oppressed people to struggle for the constant deepening of the democratic content and patriotic consciousness of the society so that a system can be created that ensures 'just and equitable distribution of power and resources', for according to it such struggle is between DEMOCRACY AND OPPRESSION, between true INDEPENDENCE and NEO-COLONIAL SLAVERY' (See ASUU, 1984a:22-23).

It further argued that:

no ex-colonial capitalist country has attained economic independence without first undergoing a thorough anti-imperialist and democratic revolution. Nigeria cannot and WILL NOT be an exception to this rule (1984a:22)

This virulent anti-capitalist ideological struggle was latter backed by several calls (by ASUU leadership) on labour and other progressive forces to intensify their struggle to overthrow the prevailing anti-democratic capitalist order and in its place instal a democratic system in which elected representatives of mass organizations such as peasants, workers etc, shall determine economic and political policies in the country (See ASUU 1986(b):3&6; ASUU, 1987(g):5&6).

From these radical statements by ASUU leadership, one is not in doubt about the ambivalent class character of ASUU.

Even though, members of ASUU belonged to the petty-bourgeois class, with bulk of its members sharing the ideology of the ruling class regardless of their progressive impoverishment, the leadership of ASUU on the other hand, promoted a working class interests. This radical role ran counter to the interests advanced by the government. And it is within this fundamental ideological difference between the government and ASUU leadership, that the conflict between Nigerian academics and the government is analyzed in this study.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

4.1: Introduction

The importance of methodology in any research undertaking cannot be over-emphasized. In fact, as Newcomb (1953:11) rightly observed, research results are no better than the methods by which they are obtained. It is against this background therefore that some relevant methodological issues are hereby elaborately discussed. These are: (a) the research design, (b) the population of the study, (c) the sample and sampling procedures, (d) data-gathering instruments, (e) reliability and validity of the results and (f) the methods of data analysis.

4.2: The Research Design

This study involves a documentary and a sample survey research design. This dual approach entails the examination of relevant historical documents on ASUU-Government conflict and the eduction of information on the relevant attitudes and behaviours of the dramatic personae. While a content analysis of the relevant historical documents focuses on the manifest content of the issues in the conflict, a sample survey

design on the other hand, is aimed at unravelling the latent issues in the conflict. The adoption of this dual approach is primarily meant to enhance the reliability and validity of the results.

4.3: The Population of the Study

The population of this study is made up of two groups. The first group comprises all academics in Nigerian Universities. This group is represented by the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU). The second group comprises relevant top federal government officials whose official actions and policies determine in one way or the other, the way the Universities are administered. This group is made up of Ministers, Director-Generals, members of University Councils, top National Universities Commission's officials, University Vice-Chancellors, among others. The group is however represented by the federal government as a single organizational entity. These two groups (ASUU and federal government) constitute the parties to the conflict under investigation in this study.

Members of ASUU were in twenty out of the twenty-two federal Universities, as well as in the eight state government-

owned Universities. The size of the population of these academics is 11,122 as at the 1987 National Universities Commission's official statistics (see NUC, 1987:26). There is however no doubt that due to the mass exodus of foreign lecturers and the current brain drain¹⁰ (as a result of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), this total figure must have been reduced significantly. Nevertheless, we decided to work with a population size of 10,000 academics in this study.¹¹

Nigerian academics are, by virtue of certain shared attributes, a cohort of people. For example, such factors like common academic background and training, attitudes and beliefs towards certain issues, professional academic interests, and common economic self-interests, are some of the shared characteristics of this population. However, certain dissimilar attributes also exist among the members of this population. These include different socio-economic background, status (position or rank), sex, age, academic discipline, religion, political orientation, type, age and location of institution, and the academics' personal career goals and ambition. These variables no doubt affect the attitudinal and behavioural characteristics of the members of this population. To this

extent therefore, they are crucial in any attempt to draw a representative sample from the population.

The relevant federal government officials on the other hand, share also certain common characteristics. They are the initiators, formulators, and executors of public policies. They share common bureaucratic values and interests, and a general conservative orientation towards the status quo (established social order). As a result of the anonymity and impersonality characteristics associated with their position and duties, a sense of collective responsibility is a major attribute. They can therefore be represented more generally and accurately by the adopted policies of government which they are expected to defend as long as they are in service. These facts make a representative view of this population, a relatively easier task to obtain.

4.4: The Sample and Sampling Procedures

Given a population of about 10,000 academics, the need for a representative sample was not in dispute. The problem however was how to minimize large sample errors. But as Nwana (1981:70,71-72)

observed, choosing such a representative sample has no fixed number or fixed percentage. For Nwana however, if for instance the population is a few hundreds, a 40% or more sample will suffice. But if many hundreds a 20%, while if several thousands, a 5% or less sample suffices.

On the basis of this specification therefore, this study took a 3% sample from a population of 10,000 University academics in Nigeria as follows:

Population	=	10,000
Percentage	=	3
Sample size drawn	=	$\frac{3}{100} \times \frac{10,000}{1}$
	=	<u>300</u>

A total number of 300 academics in Nigerian Universities was selected for this study.

We then adopted a multi-stage stratified sampling procedure. At each stage, there was a stratification, and within each stratum, a random sampling method was however taken.

For example, we divided the 300 into three major ranks

using the 1981 NUC funding regulation quota (criterion) of 15 - 25 - 60% for Professors/Readers, Senior Lecturers, and Lecturer I and below, respectively as a guide. This was done as follows:

1. A 15% sample size from 300 academics for the ranks

$$\begin{aligned} \text{of Professor/Reader} &= \frac{15}{100} \times 300 \\ &= 45 \end{aligned}$$

2. A 25% sample size from 300 academics for the rank of

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Senior Lecturer} &= \frac{25}{100} \times 300 \\ &= 75 \end{aligned}$$

3. A 60% sample size from 300 academics for the ranks

$$\begin{aligned} \text{of Lecturer I and below:} &= \frac{60}{100} \times \frac{300}{1} \\ &= \underline{\underline{180}} \end{aligned}$$

This stratification is adopted because it is believed that to some degrees the political, economic and social views of workers (academics inclusive) vary as they advance in their careers. For instance, professors are assumed to be more conservative (i.e. more establishment-oriented) than junior academics (Assistant Lecturers and Lecturers II and I).

Table 4.1 below summarizes the calculations.

TABLE 4.1: Proposed and Actual Sample of Academics Based on Rank

Rank	NUC Funding Percentages	Proposed Sample Size	Actual size Sampled*
Professors/ Readers	15	45	31
Senior Lecturers	25	75	93**
Lecturer I and Below	60	180	174
Total	100	300	298***

* See also table A.2 Appendix.

** We exceeded the proposed number for Senior Lecturers because we did not find it easy getting Professorial staff.

*** Two respondents did not indicate their ranks.

Having divided the sample into ranks, we also tried to reflect the various faculties and departments in a manner that helped to include academics from different disciplinary background. See table A.1 (Appendix) for the actual number of

academics sampled from each faculty. Looking at table A.I, one discovers that the Social Sciences, Sciences, Arts and Agriculture got higher figures. This was not without reasons. First, these higher figures reflect the 1987 NUC statistics which showed that these faculties have higher number of staff relative to many others. Secondly, during the administration of questionnaire, academics in these faculties showed higher degree of interest in the study. For instance on many occasions during the field work, some staff in Engineering and professionally oriented Faculties, asked me to meet those in Social Sciences whom they said were ASUU activists. So after stratifying the academics into faculties/departments, a simple random sampling method was used to select respondents within the stratum. There was the need as we have already said to adopt a loose proportional sampling technique to allow more representation from faculties/departments that have more number of academics.

4.4.1: The Criteria for Selecting Universities

The next issue was whether to select the 300 academics from all the Universities thereby limiting the number of academics from

each University, or to select a sample of the Universities and hence increase the number of academics from the sample of the Universities selected. For purposes of cost and convenience, we adopted the second alternative since differences among the Universities are not so remarkable as to warrant visiting all of them before getting a good result from the study.

Out of the twenty-eight federal and state Universities under our study, a sample of ten Universities were selected.

Table 4.2 below shows the criteria and the ten Universities selected from four regional locations.

TABLE 4.2: Selected Universities Based on Some Criteria

CRITERIA	REGIONAL LOCATION			
	North	East	West	Mid-west
First Generation of Universities	ABU	UNN	U.I	Benin
Second Generation of Universities	Jos	-	-	-
New Federal Universities of Technology and Agriculture	Makurdi	-	-	-
State Government-Owned Universities	-	Imo, RST P/H	-	-
Universities regarded as hot bed of Radicalism	-	-	OAU	-
Special Consideration (Capital City of Nigeria)	-	-	Lagos	-
Total	3	3	3	1

A purposive sampling technique was used in selecting the Universities. The selection of Universities under each criterion was to some degree both arbitrary and intentional. The aim was to reduce cost and at the same time to reflect regional or geographical spread. For example it was convenient to select Imo State University rather than say Cross River State University on the basis of cost minimization but at the same time to select Rivers State University of Science and Technology rather than say Anambra State University of Technology in order to ensure that one of the state Universities came outside the Ibo speaking areas among the three Universities selected from the Eastern region. Attempt was then made not to select the Universities from few states within the same region. This for instance guided the selection of Federal University of Agriculture Makurdi rather than that of Abeokuta, or the selection of a State University from the East rather than from the West where three Universities had already been selected. The reason behind regional representation was to reflect the heterogenous nature of the Nigerian society.

Again, the selection of one University by a certain criterion excluded the selection of that same University by any other criterion. For instance the selection of ABU under the

criterion of first generation of Universities excluded its selection as one of the few Universities known for being a hot bed of radicalism and militancy. And the selection of University of Ibadan under the first generation criterion excluded its selection as a conservative University.

Now, with regard to the number of academics selected from each of these sixteen Universities, a loose proportional sample procedure was considered appropriate. It is considered loose in the sense that the selected sample did not rigidly reflect the exact proportion of each University's population to the whole population of academics in the University system. This allowance was made to reflect inaccurate statistics or changes that occurred as a result of frequent staff movement in and out of some Universities.

Nevertheless the selection of respondents from each University was guided by the estimated staff strength of that University. For example the University of Ibadan (U.I) has an academic staff strength of about 1000 excluding non-Nigeria by the 1987 NUC statistics, hence its proposed share from the sample of 300 relative to the overall population of 10,000 was as follows:

$$\frac{1,000}{10,000} \times \frac{300}{1} = \underline{\underline{30}}$$

This figure served just as the minimum number expected. Then using the NUC funding criterion of 15-25-60% ratio (for professors/Readers, Senior Lecturers, and Lecturer I and below respectively), the number of staff selected from each of these three categories was then calculated. For example the number of Professors and Readers that we proposed to select was thus:

$$\frac{15}{100} \times \frac{30}{1} = 4.$$

But during administration of questionnaire we found out that some younger Universities did not have many professorial staff. So in order to make up for the few numbers of professorial staff got, we decided to increase the number we proposed for Ibadan, ABU, UNN and Lagos and even at that, we did not get our proposed figure hence we decided to include more senior lecturers.

On the whole, it is appropriate to observe that three sampling procedures were used for selecting respondents among the academics. These are the multi-stage stratified sample, simple random sample, and a purposive (non-probability) sample.

On the other hand, the selection of relevant top government officials for interview was done through a purposive sampling method only. Given the observed homogeneity of this group, as reflected in their common defence of official policies, only a few of them, were selected for interview from the Ministries of Employment, Labour and Productivity, NUC and Ministry of Education. We shall discuss further on this in section 4.5.3.

And finally, a purposive sampling method was used to select ASUU leaders that completed a particular questionnaire designed specifically for them.

4.5: Data-Gathering Instruments

Three types of data gathering instruments constituted the major tools used in this study. The use of the observation method however served as a minor tool for authenticating some of the data gathered through the other three instruments. The three major instruments used are, the documents, questionnaire and the interview.

4.5.1 Documentary Instrument:

Our first instrument of data collection are the various documents on ASUU-Government conflict. Such relevant documents include memos exchanged between ASUU and the government, ASUU publications, press releases, minutes of meetings, communiques, released after ASUU meetings and delegate conferences, government policy documents on Universities and policy statements by key government officials. Other relevant documents include the Report of the Presidential Commission on the salary and conditions of service of University staff; ASUU Memorandum to Akambi Panel of Inquiry into the 1986 Education Crisis in Nigeria; ASUU Memorandum to the Presidential Commission on Salary and Conditions of Service of University Staff; ASUU and the 1986 Education crisis in Nigeria; Report of the Negotiation in the Government Versus ASUU Industrial dispute; Federal Government White Paper on the Report of the Presidential Commission on the Salary and Conditions of Service of University Staff; Bulletin of the National Universities Commission; The log of demands of ASUU; and ASUU publication entitled 'How to Save Nigeria,' etc.

In examining these documents, efforts were made to find out what had been the major bone of contention. These were

used to compare the attitudes, opinions and behaviours of the parties in the dispute as found out through the other instruments.

4.5.2: The Questionnaire Instrument

A highly structured questionnaire made up of many dichotomous (fixed alternative) and multiple choice questions, as well as three open-ended ones, was personally administered to three hundred academics in ten Nigerian Universities. Initially, three-hundred and eighty copies of the questionnaire were distributed but three hundred and fifteen were returned. And out of the three-hundred and fifteen returned ones, nine copies were not fully completed, thereby leaving the total number of the duly completed ones at three-hundred and six. However, in accordance with our decision to work with a sample of three-hundred academics, we therefore decided to ignore the extra six copies that were duly completed.

Judging from the number of questionnaire distributed and the number returned, one can say that the response rate was encouraging. When one realizes the fact that the respondents are a very busy group of people, one would not hesitate to accept the

conclusion that the more than the seventy-per cent response rate recorded, was a significant achievement. Perhaps more would be said on this in section 4.8.

This instrument (See Appendix E(1)) was the most detailed when compared with the ones administered to former ASUU leaders and government agencies. The instrument among other things sort the opinion of ASUU rank and file on the roots, character, perception and management of ASUU-Government conflict. The indicators for measuring these are found in the instrument and need not be repeated here.

4.5.3: The Interview Instrument

Two slightly different sets of unstructured interview schedule, were personally administered to some selected former ASUU leaders, and officials of Federal Government establishments. In administering the interview, a purposive sampling method was used, so as to select only those considered very knowledgeable on the subject matter. Some of the questions asked were very similar to the ones we gave to the rank and file of ASUU except that in this case, we presented only open-ended questions to the

former ASUU leaders and few government establishments (See Appendix E(2) and E(3) for these instruments).

With respect to former ASUU leaders, we selected twenty of them out of which sixteen gave us full attention. We therefore administered our interview to the sixteen former officers made up as follows: two former national presidents, one national vice-president, one national General Secretary, financial secretary and treasurer, as well as branch Chairmen, Secretaries and ex-officio members. Most of these officers were members of the National Executive Council of ASUU which was one of the highest national decision making body of the union (See Chapter Five, Section 5.4). These national officers were not all selected from the ten Universities. For instance, we had to travel to Bayero University Kano, in order to interview one of the former national presidents of ASUU. Again, a former branch chairman at the Lagos State University (LASU) was also interviewed based on his active role during the 1988 ASUU strike. It was also very imperative that we should locate Dr. Festus Iyayi one of the most radical leaders of ASUU, who was at the time of our field work no longer a staff of the University of Benin.

In addition to the sixteen, a handful of other former ASUU leaders and activists, were interviewed on some general issues on the subject.

As regards interviewing federal government officials, we visited the Presidency, NUC, Federal Ministry of Education, and Federal Ministry of Employment, Labour and Productivity.

However, positive response came from NUC and the Labour Ministry. We however succeeded in securing the speeches made by the former Minister of Education in his capacity as one of the managers of Nigerian higher education since 1975. The Labour Ministry and NUC, which were very closely associated with the topic of our study, responded well to our questions.

4.6: The Reliability and Validity of Instruments

The adoption of a multiple data-gathering approach in this study, was aimed at improving the reliability and validity of the expected findings. There is no doubt that an investigation into the roots and management of ASUU-Government conflict entails probing deeply into the latent intentions which we believe a mono-data-gathering instrument might not adequately achieve.

The use of the documentary method for instance, was to enable us compare historical records on the conflict, with the perceptions, attitudes and behaviours of the parties to the conflict. On the other hand, the combination of the interview and the questionnaire techniques in the survey design, was to enable us to elude the correct information with the right instruments, from the most relevant and appropriate respondents.

In establishing the reliability of the study, we relied on an internal consistency method. By this we mean, putting in certain cross-checking questions so as to establish how consistent the respondents were in their answers to earlier questions. In other words consistency checks were built into the questionnaire and the interview schedule.

The validity of the study was established by using the content (face validity) method in addition to the use of external criterion to check how correct the findings of a particular instrument are. The use of content or face validity involves the need to make sure that the questions in an instrument were logically and relevantly measuring what the instrument wanted to measure. The use of external criterion on the other hand,

entailed comparing the results of one instrument with the existing knowledge about the phenomenon under investigation, or comparing such findings with available records on the subject. We did this in our study by comparing the findings got from the questionnaire and interview instruments with those existing in documents.

4.7: Methods of Data Analysis

Given the multifarious nature of the data that were generated, the analysis of the data was carried out with the help of both quantitative and qualitative techniques. The testing of the hypotheses required data generated through surveys and documents.

With the help of the Computer Services of the University of Nigeria Nsukka, the data from the three-hundred academics sampled, were analyzed. First we did the coding and later the Computer ran the required programme. All the relevant statistical analyses were done but we made use of the most relevant ones such as frequency distribution, percentage and mean which we presented in tabular form.

The data generated through the interview technique with respect to former ASUU leaders and government agencies, were manually analyzed and used at appropriate stages in the work.

Some of the issues analyzed and discussed required the use of 'mean responses' for accepting or rejecting opinion expressed. With respect to the analysis of the Likert-type questions, a five point rating score was used. Our cut-off point for accepting a factor was 2.49. In other words, our acceptance range was from score 1 to 2.49 while our rejection range was from score 2.5 to 5. Between these ranges, a factor might be considered very important, less important, slightly rejected or outrightly rejected, depending on its particular score on the acceptance-rejection continuum.

Other non-Likert-type questions, were simply presented in tables showing the frequency and percentage of respondents expressing opinion on the subject.

One important analytical approach adopted was the presentation of the survey opinions first and the use of data from historical records or documents to determine whether to accept such opinions or not. In some cases the data from both sources agreed but in some others, they disagreed. It was therefore

left to us in such cases to make conclusions based on the weight of evidence from either sources.

4.8: The Field Work Experience

It is quite usual for researchers in developing countries to bemoan the lack of finance in trying to execute their well designed research project. And very often such financial constraint induce many researchers to abandon some important aspects of their research project-especially in the area of carrying out a thorough field work. Our study would have suffered the same problem but for the generous grant we got from the Council for the Development of Economic and Social Research in Africa (CODESRIA), and a study leave from the Usmanu Danfodiyo University (UDU) Sokoto. The assistance from both institutions considerably enabled us to carry out one of the most expensive field works in a geographically wide country like Nigeria that is incidentally experiencing the pains of a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). Many visits were made to all relevant institutions in the collection of both documentary and survey data. For sure, these visits would not have been duly made had the study

been carried out without the grant from CODESRIA and a study leave from U.D.U, Sokoto.

The field work commenced during the third week of November 1989 and ended in mid-January 1990. Although we noted earlier that the response rate was high, this was not without cost. The field study was executed at a time ASUU had already been proscribed and as a result the enthusiasm was generally not there among those who felt the study was no longer useful. Secondly, many academics surprisingly declined to fill the questionnaire for no other reason than fear of being victimized. Some felt that the researcher was a security agent, while some others in a bid to avoid being associated with ASUU - 'a subversive organization' - referred the researcher to the Social Sciences where many academics are said to be at home with such matters.

One major problem we faced as a result of the proscription of ASUU, was getting access to its files especially during the early years of ASUU. The fact that the National Secretariat of ASUU at the University of Ibadan, was permanently locked by security agents, made it difficult for us to get access to relevant files. We luckily got over this problem by devising other methods.

Our decision to visit branch officials who - following the absence of physical secretariat for their branch union - were having some of the relevant ASUU files in their private offices, paid off significantly. Many of such officials we visited gave us their maximum cooperation. We wish to note that this research would have ran into serious methodological hitch if we did not succeed in getting access to relevant ASUU files.

One other issue that bothered us much during the research was the lack of up-to-date statistical records in the country and poor attitude towards taking such matter seriously. When we decided to collect the up-to-date statistics of academics in Nigerian Universities, we first consulted the National Universities Commission. When we were provided with what was the current figure, we discovered that it was for the 1987 session, although we demanded for the 1988 figure. Consequently in order to get the 1988 figure, we decided to write to all the Universities in the country, we could not visit personally. To our greatest surprise, our letter was not given any attention by over half of the total number of Universities. Even out of the thirteen Universities that replied our letter, two requested us to contact the NUC even though we later explained why we were writing the

Universities. The response was so poor that in the end, we had to use the 1985 NUC statistics on the academic staff strenght of Universities. Our letter to the Universities requesting for data on academic staff is found in Appendix I(4). It is however proper to acknowledge that few Universities actually provided the data the way we requested with respect to showing their distribution according to departments or faculties.

In conclusion, we believe that in spite of these problems, we had an exciting field work which involved exchanging critical ideas with a group that has the largest concentration of intellectuals in the country. The personal intellectual contact we had with the people sampled and those who declined to fill the questionnaire, considerably enriched this study. We hope that this study will open the way for many prospective researchers to turn their research light on the activities of the nation's most critical and articulate minds - the University academics.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE EVOLUTION, FORMATION AND ORGANIZATION OF ASUU

5.1: Introduction

This chapter focuses on the evolution, formation and organization of ASUU. But before doing this, there is need to examine the essence or character of the academic profession. This we believe is very relevant to any serious effort at understanding the character and dynamics of academic unionism in Nigeria. It is for instance germane to examine the question as to whether there are inherent qualities in the academic (or intellectual) profession which often make academics-government relations antagonistic. Generally speaking, what are the models of relations existing between academics and the government?

5.2: The Essence or Character of the Academic Profession

By academic or intellectual profession, we are specifically referring to the chosen work of men who are gifted either by nature or nurture to devote their lives to the business of

unravelling the mysteries of nature and human society' (ASUU, 1981:2). Such men of ideas and letters exist within or outside the University system. Our focus in this study however is on those working in the University system.

Academics are assigned certain basic functions in the Universities. These are (a) to promote inquiry and advance the sum of human knowledge; (b) to provide general instruction to students and (c) to develop experts for various branches of the public service (AAUP, 1948:150). In a nutshell these men are required to encourage the advancement and pursuit of learning in all its branches through study, teaching, research and community service (ASUU 1981:4; Nwala, 1988:5; and Cookey Report 1981:9). Generally, therefore,

Universities are recognized as institutions which ought to serve as centres of intellectual curiosity dedicated to teaching and research, engaging in creative work, innovating, seeking truth, advocating and propagating ideas and systems of thought through an empirical approach to the problems of learning, inquiry and knowledge. To an increasing extent Universities are also being called upon to use their expertise to make direct contribution towards providing solutions to various practical national problems (Cookey Report 1981:9).

Consequently, it is the role of the scholar "to seek the truth, teach and preserve the truth. This is so because, it is now widely accepted that the methods which scholars have developed over the ages enable them to discover the 'truth'... their ideas are believed to be truer of reality than the ideas of any other class of citizens. It is in this sense that Universities have been called 'watchdogs for and conscience of the nation',... Men of affairs differ from scholars in the sense that for them (men of affairs) there is often conflict between 'the demand of national interest and the exigencies of public policy'" (ASUU 1981:6; Nwala, 1988:384).

The performance of this role is no mean task and it is widely recognized that it requires critical and independent thinking. This entails what is popularly called academic freedom and university autonomy. And by academic freedom, three basic requirements are implied. These are 'freedom of inquiry and research; freedom of teaching within the University or college; and freedom of extra-mural utterance and action' (AAUP, 1948:144). Consequently, the art of seeking and preserving the frontiers of knowledge and truth 'requires among other things

that University teacher shall be exempt from any pecuniary motive or inducement to hold, or to express any conclusion which is not the genuine and uncolored product of his own study or that of fellow-specialists* (AAUP 1948:149). And expatiating this further, the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) asserts that:

indeed the proper fulfilment of the work of the professoriate requires that our Universities shall be so free that no fair-minded person shall find any excuse for even a suspicion that the utterances of University teachers are shaped or restricted by the Judgement, not of professional scholars, but of inexpert and possibly not wholly disinterested persons outside of their ranks... But it is highly needful in the interest of society at large, that what purport to be the conclusions of men trained for, and dedicated to, the quest for truth, shall in fact be the conclusions of such men, and not echoes of the opinions of the lay public, or of individuals who endow or manage Universities. To the degree that professional scholars, in the formation and promulgation of their opinions, are, or by the character of their tenure appear to be, subject to any motive other than their own scientific conscience and a desire for the respect of their fellow-experts, to that degree the University teaching profession is corrupted. Its proper influence upon public opinion is diminished and vitiated; and society at large fails to get from its scholars, in an unadulterated form, the peculiar and necessary service which it is the office of the professional scholar to furnish... The responsibility of the University teacher is primarily to the public itself, and to the judgement of his own profession (AAUP, 1948: 149).

It is therefore against this background that "the concept of a University is rooted in the historical development of the idea of 'a self-governing community of scholars'" (ASUU; 1981:2).

The crucial question then is: how does the performance of this unique task assigned to University intellectuals, determine the kind of relations between them and the government of the day?

5.2.1: Models of Academic-Government Relations

Historically speaking, three models of relations have existed between University intellectuals and the government. These historical models have from time to time characterized contemporary relations between academics and the government. The three models of relations are (a) the opposition model, (b) the collaboration model, and (c) the independence and autonomy models. These correspond to what ASUU (1981:2-4) called, (a) the Era of Opposition; (b) the Era of the Beautiful Bride; and (c) the Era of Independence and Autonomy.

5.2.1.1: The Opposition Model

In this model intellectual ideas run counter to the dominant and prevailing views of the established order on which

the legitimacy of the ruling class rests. Also in this model, intellectuals sometimes suffer great persecution in the hands of the ruling class.

As Ladd and Lipset (1975:11) vividly documented, 'the earliest Universities in Europe and English North America, were primarily teaching institutions, almost invariably linked to religion, with a clerical faculty. Their basic tasks were to train the clergy and to serve as centres of theological scholarship... Scientific research first emerged outside colleges and Universities often in academies... The emphasis on original scholarship began to penetrate the higher education world in the eighteenth century... The emergence of a focus on original scholarship produced tension between higher education and the religions and secular powers as leading scholars published articles and voiced opinions which were at odds with the interests and values of various extramural establishment...'
According to Nwala (1988:4), in this era, 'the truth as proclaimed by scholars were declared heretical by the powers that be.'

In 1798 for instance, President John Adams of the United States frightened by the role of intellectuals in the French

Revolution, rejected the admission of a group of French scientists into the USA. According to him, 'learned academics not under the immediate inspection and control of government, have disorganized the world and are incompatible with social order' (Adams 1853:596, cited in Ladd and Lipset 1975:12). In this same way, Arinori Mori (a former Japanese Minister of Education in the 1870s) proposed that Universities should be physically separated as much as possible from the general population and should not be allowed to train teachers for the rest of the system (See Nagai Michio 1964:30 as cited in Ladd and Lipset, 1975:12).

Other classical cases of persecution include for instance Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) the Italian physicist and astronomer who was forced to recant his views; Socrates the Athenian philosopher who was forced to drink the hemlock and die; Thomas Hobbes and John Locke who had to go on exile as a result of the views they held (See Nwala 1988:2-3).

5.2.1.2: The Collaboration Model:

As the results of intellectual endeavour began to manifest and their truths unfolded, opposition and confrontation gave way

to either tolerance or collaboration. Men of affairs consequently began to embrace the ideas of intellectuals and made extensive use of the fruits of their intellectual endeavours. Gradually many intellectuals in the process began in turn to bend their ideas to suit the whims and caprices of the men of affairs (Nwala 1988:4; ASUU-1981:3). In contemporary world, there exists a corps of system - supporting academics who are used by governments as advisers, consultants and legitimizers in public policy formulation and implementation. As Ladd and Lipset (1975:131) point out, 'assorted critics have drawn the conclusion that an academic Establishment increasingly functions as a major force upholding the status-quo, and conversely that the ready availability of governmental largesse is a corrupting and conservating factor.'

5.2.1.3 The Independence and Autonomy Model:

According to ASUU (1981:4) neither of the two models above served the interest of humanity. For instance, in the first phase, scholarship was a secret and illegal pursuit, while in the second phase, scholarship was respected but corrupted.

And, in fact it was against this background that the idea of self-governance became a Universally accepted principle for academic pursuit. This as we pointed out earlier, made the need for university autonomy and academic freedom an imperative one for a successful performance of the sacred task assigned to University intellectuals. Nwala (1988:5) summarized the role, essence and character of the academic profession when he wrote that the University system is first, a home of heresy where truth is sought and proclaimed in all fields of human endeavour without limit or hinderance; secondly that it is a unique institution in society, yet part of the society; and lastly that University scholars require a peculiar environment, a unique condition for the success of their task.

It is important to note that in these models, an essential attribute of the intellectual is an endowed power of critical thinking. An intellectual who is uncorrupted by the ruling class is first and foremost a critical thinker. And as Raymond Aron (1962:210) put it, 'the tendency to criticise the established order (is) so to speak, the occupational disease of the intellectual.' Ladd and Lipset (1975:13) have also pointed out, that

'the intellectual community of which faculty are a part, is inherently questioning, critical, socially disruptive. This commitment to an anti-establishment position has been deduced by many writers from factors inherent in the very concept of the intellectual and scholar... And ... inherent in the obligation to create, to innovate, has been the tendency to reject the status-quo, to oppose the existing or the old as philistine.'

Consequently as Ladd and Lipset (1975:125) observe, a body of Sociological analysis contends:

that the posture of academics as social critics derives in some large part from the nature of the intellectual role from its emphasis on innovation, creativity, on rejection of the traditional and the established within given fields of inquiry.

And in fact the capacity for criticism, and for the rejection of the status-quo is not (according to Ladd and Lipset (1975:132) a matter of preference by some intellectuals because the intellectual is one whose activities involved the creation of new knowledge, new ideas and new art in which reality is held up to the test of the ideal, the theoretical.

The academics' role as social critics often brings them into confrontation with the government especially when such role

challenges and threatens the social order from which the government draws its legitimacy. This mainly explains why academics in the Social Sciences and Arts are much more exposed to being at loggerheads with government forces than their colleagues in the science and professional disciplines. In any case, the crucial point to note so far is that one important source of conflict between academics and the government, is the inherent critical nature of the academic profession. And when such critical role is carried to the arena of labour unionism, its potential for militancy looms large. It is against this background that we examine the formation of labour union among Nigerian academics.

5.3: The Evolution and Formation of ASUU

5.3.1: Historical Antecedents: Nigeria's experiment in University education started with the establishment of the University College Ibadan (UCI) in 1948. Most of the lecturers that began with this University College were mostly expatriates. As Olorode (1987:3) observed, Nigerian indigenous academics prior to independence was as a group, numerically small and

socially inconsequential. So when in 1952 lecturers at this College formed the Lecturers Association (Post and Mobbs 1964:75) to protect the interests of lecturers, it was predominantly a whiteman's affair. The Lecturers Association was however not dormant in voicing out its views on matters that affected its members nationally and internationally. For instance, it 'had on occasion made representations concerning infringements of academic freedom elsewhere in Africa, notably in Southern Rhodesia' (Post and Mobbs 1964:75).

During the 1962-3 academic session, the Association of University Teachers (AUT) was formed at Ibadan (Ferguson 1965:24). During the same session (precisely in February 1963), 'it was decided at a meeting of members of the academic staff that an Association of University Teachers should be substituted for the former Lecturers Association. The object of the change was to facilitate the creation of a National Association of University Teachers and affiliation with International bodies of a similar nature' (Post and Mobbs 1964:75).

The Association of University Teachers (AUT) aimed at concentrating upon constructive actions that would benefit the whole University. Secondly, it was concerned with the principles

of University development in the country as a whole and elsewhere. Thirdly, the A.U.T. aimed at improving the conditions of service of its members. In its operation, it took active interest in promoting general amenities of communal life at the University. And lastly, it pursued a closer link between it and the International Association of University Professors, and actively promoted the creation of a National Association of University Teachers (NAUT); (Ferguson, 1965:24).

Some of its other earlier activities include the expression of its views publicly on issues of great national importance. For instance, in 1963, it issued resolutions on the statement by the Pro-Chancellor of the University of Ife that academics with opposing political views to that of the Government of Western Region, should have the courage to leave its service. In its resolutions, the A.U.T. protested against any attempt to limit the political freedom of members of University staff. Also in 1964, when Professor Oyenuga was dismissed from the University of Ife, the A.U.T. protested publicly (See Ferguson, 1965:24; Post and Mobbs 1964:76).

So, with the successful formation and operation of the A.U.T. at the University College Ibadan (UCI), encouragement was given to lecturers in other Universities to form theirs. And by 1964, branches of A.U.T. had been established in all the other four existing Universities at Ife, Lagos, Nsukka and Zaria. In that year also, Dr. R.J. Gavin Secretary of A.U.T. at Ibadan, was assigned the task of producing a draft constitution for a National Association. Consequently through the organizational effort of the Ibadan pioneer branch of A.U.T., a National Association of University Teachers (N.A.U.T.) was established in January 1965 (Ferguson, 1965:25).

The broad objectives of N.A.U.T. included the advancing of University education and research. It aimed at safeguarding the interests of its members by promoting common action among them. And lastly it aimed at making representation to the relevant authorities on matters concerning its members (See A.U.T. Constitution, University of Nigeria Branch). Membership of the Union was open to all those engaged in teaching and/or research work in Universities.

Between 1965 and 1978, NAUT and its branches made their existence felt. For instance in 1967, N.A.U.T. along with the Committee of Vice-Chancellors, submitted memoranda to Government on salary review (ASUU 1981:26). In 1970, NAUT made a case for improved salary scale for its members during the Adebo Salary Review Commission. It also did same during the Williams Review Panel following the report of the Udoji Commission in 1974. In 1973, it embarked on an industrial action to back up its demands for improved conditions of service. And in 1977, it submitted a memorandum to the National Universities Commission on the staffing problems in Universities.

In 1978 the N.A.U.T. ceased to exist following the restructuring exercise of Trade Unions by the federal government.

5.3.2: The Formation of ASUU

The formation of the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) in 1978, was a logical outcome of the implementation of The New National Policy on Labour of 1975 announced by the then Federal Commissioner for Labour Brigadier Henry Adefope to representatives of the four Central Labour organizations and the Nigerian Employers Consultative Association. One of the objectives of that New National Policy on labour was 'to rationalize the structure and organization of trade unions and to ensure that they are self-sufficient financially in future, and not dependent upon foreign sources for finance.' According to the New Policy,

the present structure of the Nigerian trade union movement is irrationally proliferated and out-dated. The Government would therefore adopt conscious and positive measures to restructure trade unions preferably along industrial lines... in order to accelerate the formation of amalgamations and federations of registered trade unions into bigger and more viable organizations. (See New National Policy On Labour as reproduced in Fashoyin, 1980:147-148; and in Ubeku 1983a:211-212.

Consequently in 1976, the government promulgated The Trade Unions (Central Labour Organizations) Special Provisions Decree No. 44 of 1976 which not only revoked the registration

of existing four central labour organizations but also appointed an Administrator of Trade Unions in the person of Mr. M.O. Abiodun. The Administrator was among others charged with the responsibility of effecting the formation of a single, strong and effective central labour organization to which shall be affiliated all trade unions in Nigeria (Fashoyin, 1980:29-30; Ubeku, 1983a:72 and Yesufu 1984:116).

The Administrator who completed his work towards the end of 1977 created a central labour organization known as the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC). In addition, it created forty-two industrial unions; nine Employers Association; fifteen Senior Staff Associations; and four professional unions (Fashoyin 1980:33). The Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU), was one of the four professional unions that were created (Fashoyin, 1980:154). And during the first half of 1978, all the new unions and the N.L.C., were inaugurated (Ubeku, 1983a:72). Hence by Trade Union Decree No. 22 of 1978, ASUU came into existence. Its name then was Academic Staff Union of Nigerian Universities and Associated Institutions (ASUUNUAI). And at the National Conference of the Council of the NAUT, held at the University of Ife from January

12 - 15, 1978, NAUT Constitution was amended and adopted for ASUUNJAI.

Under this new name, what used to be NAUT was merged with both Academic and Administrative staff of research institutes, non-academic staff of Teaching Hospitals and with teaching staff of Polytechnics. But reacting to this arrangement NAUT leadership wrote to the Federal Commissioner of Labour and protested in very strong terms. It therefore made a case for separate existence as a Union in its own right or at worst to merge with only academic staff of Research Institutes and Teaching Hospitals. Fortunately for it, the government granted the request that the Association be constituted into an industrial union on its own right (NAUT NEWSLETTER, 1978:53-54). And consequently latter the name ASUUNJAI was changed to ASUU.

5.3.3: The Objectives of ASUU

Under Rule 2 of the constitution of ASUU the principal objectives of the Union are as follows:

- (i) To organize all academic staff who are qualified for membership;

- (ii) To regulate the relations between academic staff and employers and between members;
- (iii) To establish and maintain a high standard of academic performance and professional practice;
- (iv) To establish and maintain a just and proper conditions of service for its members;
- (v) To advance the education and training of its members;
- (vi) To provide benefits and other assistance to its members as provided in the constitution;
- (vii) To encourage the participation of its members in the affairs of the University system and of the nation;
- (viii) To protect and advance the socio-economic and cultural interests of the nation; and
- (ix) To pursue such other objectives that are lawful and are not inconsistent with the spirit and practice of trade unionism (ASUU Constitution, 1978 as amended in 1984).

From the foregoing, it is a fact that apart from the professional goals of ASUU, one can agree with Olorode (1987:3) that the two principal goals of ASUU are the economic (bread and butter goals) and political goals. The bread and butter

goals, argues Olorode, arise precisely because political power determines who gets what, how, when and under what conditions (p. 3). It all means therefore that a struggle by a trade union to democratize political power, may ultimately have the goal of improving the bread and butter issues of its members. It is then against this background that one can understand the essence of the political, ideological and economic struggle of ASUU. For instance, the accusation in some quarters that ASUU leadership was more political and ideological in its struggle, seem to miss the crucial point that the exercise of state political power determines the extent to which the bread and butter goals could be realised.

And by extension, the extent to which the professional academic goals of ASUU can be achieved, depends to a large extent on how the use of political power by the state allows an adequate measure of economic resources to be allocated to the University system. The point therefore is that state (political) power is crucial in any attempt by ASUU to achieve its economic, professional and social objectives. This fact is important in comprehending the character and ramifications of ASUU-government conflict.

5.4: The Structure and Organization of ASUU

ASUU is a union of all those who are engaged in full-time teaching and/or research in Nigerian Universities (Rule 3(i) of ASUU Constitution). And according to Rule 5(ix), the government of the Union is vested in the following: (a) The National Delegates' Conference, (b) The National Executive Council, and (c) Local branches.

The supreme authority of the Union is vested in the National Delegates' Conference. The National Delegates' Conference is composed of the National Executive Council and four delegates from each branch. This body meets biennially in the month of March or thereabout at venues decided by the National Executive Council or by previous meeting of the body. However, a special National Delegates' Conference may be held at such time and place as the National Executive Council may decide or by a resolution of a majority of the Branch Councils received by the General Secretary or the President. The National Delegates' Conference is presided over by the President or in his absence by the Vice-President. The Conference considers and determines policy matters of the union. And it constitutes one constituency for the purpose of electing the National officers of the union (Rules 6 and 7 of the Constitution).

The administration of the Union in-between National Delegates' Conference is vested on the National Executive Council. The council consists of all principal National Officers, the immediate past president, and the chairman of each Branch or any person sent by a Branch in place of the Chairman (Rule 8). The National Officers of the Union include the President, the Vice-President, the Treasurer, the General Secretary, the Internal Auditor and Financial Secretary. All these are called the Principal Officers of the Union. All officers of the Union are elected except the General Secretary who is appointed by the National Executive Council. Also, with the exception of the General Secretary, all the officers are elected to serve for a term of two years at a time, provided no person holds the same elected position for more than three consecutive terms (Rule 10). To be elected a member of the National Executive Council, a candidate must obtain a majority of the votes cast by the delegates present and voting in secret ballot. The National Executive Council meets at least once in six months on dates and venues decided by the Council. However, an extra-ordinary meeting of the Council may be summoned at the request of at least eight members of the council. The council is presided

over by the President or by the Vice-President in his absence (Rule 8).

The Local Branches are vested with the function of seeing to the proper organization of the Union at the grass roots, to represent, and to follow the directives of the National Delegates' Conference and the National Executive of the Union in the conduct of its affairs. A Branch Executive Committee comprises of the Chairman, the Vice-Chairman, the Secretary, the Treasurer, the immediate past Chairman and five other members elected by the Branch meeting. A Branch is required to hold at least three general meetings every year. The Branch Executive is required to provide leadership at the local level and run the affairs of the Union in-between the General meetings (Rule 9).

The Union's organization is assisted by the services of three trustees who are elected at a National Delegates' conference. All the properties of the Union are vested in the Trustees jointly on trust for the Union (Rule 12).

Under Rule 17 of the constitution, the issue of strike is covered. According to the Constitution, members of the Union are not to take part in a strike or in any way withhold their

services from their employers without the express approval of the National Executive Council and the members as determined by a majority of votes of the members in a secret ballot. Consequently a strike or any other type of industrial action not authorized by the National Executive Council, is deemed unofficial. However, in deciding whether or not to authorize any form of industrial action, the National Executive Council is guided by the advice of the Branches and the provisions of the law.

The main sources of union funds are entrance fees, subscriptions, levies and proceeds of economic and social activities. The funds of the union are allocated on the basis of 40% and 60% to the local Branches and National Union respectively. All fees including deductions from salaries under check-off system are paid in the first instance to the local Branches which in turn remits 60% of such to the National Union (Rule 16).

5.5: The Operational and Ideological Characteristics of ASUU.

As we shall examine this issue in chapter six, we will only make passing remarks here for purposes of analytical clarity.

The membership of ASUU was made up of petty-bourgeois elements, the bulk of which shared right-wing ideological views (see tables C.1 to C.4 of Appendix). The majority of Nigerian University academics sampled were active members of ASUU (see table B.2 of Appendix), and attended ASUU meetings regularly or very regularly (see table B.3 of Appendix). A great majority of these academics, supported ASUU strikes (see table B.4, Appendix). As table B.4 shows, 82% of the academics sampled in this study supported ASUU strikes. And also a great majority of them believed that trade unionism is compatible with the ideals of the academic profession, and as such supported the existence of trade unionism among Nigerian academics. They equally held the view that academics should have the legal right to strike and should in fact strike when situation calls for it (See tables D.1 to D.4, Appendix).

These brief observations show that Nigerian academics were not uninterested in the trade union activities of ASUU. Although the bulk of these academics held right-wing views, the leadership of ASUU was however, dominated by radicals or

left-wing militants (See table 6.26 of chapter six, and table C.5 Appendix). The ideological character of ASUU leadership consequently shaped to a large extent, the trade union outlook of ASUU. It was this radical image of ASUU that determined how it operated and positions it took on crucial national issues. This conclusion does not however deny the fact that in matters that required the approval of the rank and file, ASUU leadership bowed to the decision of the rank and file. The issue of strike was one of such. Hence, despite the radical image of ASUU leadership, the petty-bourgeois character of ASUU membership, generated some contradictions in the operation of ASUU.

5.6: Conclusion

In this chapter, we examined the essence and character of the academic profession, the models of Academics-Government relations, as well as the evolution, formation, organization, operation and the ideological character, of ASUU. It was observed inter alia, that the basic functions assigned to academics, require institutional autonomy and academic freedom,

to be discharged satisfactorily. It was also noted that the inherent critical nature of the academic profession, is one major source of conflict between academics and the ruling class. And such potential source of conflict, is likely to be exacerbated when academics adopt radical or left-wing ideological predilection vis-a-vis a ruling class that defends a neo-colonial capitalist order. We shall be guided by this conclusion in subsequent analyses.

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CHAPTER SIX

PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF DATA - I
THE CAUSES AND ROOTS OF ASUU STRIKES.6.0.0: Introduction

As we explained in chapter four, a multi-method approach to data-gathering was employed in this study. According to Ukaegbu (1982:89-90) 'data-collected by such multi-method approach could... be analysed in different ways. There is the option of a simultaneous description of quantitative and qualitative data with the latter serving as an immediate illustration of the former. There is also the alternative of separate exposition with one acting as a reference point to the other.' We will adopt a combination of these options bearing in mind the special requirement of the particular subject under discussion. However, in doing this, the first option would be given more consideration in order to minimize the problem of unnecessary repetition usually engendered by the second option.

In this chapter, we shall present and discuss the quantitative data generated through the sample survey along side those gathered through the examination of relevant documents. The first major part of this chapter focuses on the causes of ASUU Strikes, the motive behind the erosion of University autonomy and academic freedom, and under-funding of Universities. The second part examines the roots of ASUU-Government Conflict.

6.1.0: The Causes of ASUU Strikes

From the inception of ASUU in 1978 to its prescription in 1988, certain issues featured prominently and regularly as the bone of contention between it and the federal government of Nigeria. This was in spite of the fact that within that period, there were four different regimes. Among the various contentious issues that featured, the following four were very outstanding: (a) erosion of University autonomy and academic freedom; (b) under-funding of Universities; (c) poor remuneration and conditions of service and (d) poor physical conditions of work. ASUU based its displeasure and strikes on

these issues. On the other hand, the government accused ASUU of radicalism and confrontational predilection.

It is against this background, that we set out to establish the extent to which these four issues actually constituted the causes of ASUU strikes, and to find out the degree of importance which respondents attached to these issues as causes of ASUU strikes. (See question number 29 of Appendix E(1)).

The respondents were therefore asked to rank each cause in descending order of importance (represented by 1st (highest) to 5th (lowest) positions). The results of this are found on table 6.1.

Table 6.1: Respondents' Ranking of each of the Possible Causes of ASUU Strikes.

Possible Causes of Strikes	Ranking of Causes/Number of Respondents						Total
	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	Undecided	
Erosion of University Autonomy and Academic Freedom (UAAF)	117 (39%)	41 (14%)	60 (20%)	64 (21%)	18 (6%)	0 (0%)	300 (100%)
Under-Funding of Universities	79 (26%)	87 (29%)	83 (28%)	45 (14%)	4 (1%)	2 (1%)	300 (100%)
Poor Remunerative Structure	54 (18%)	72 (24%)	70 (23%)	89 (30%)	12 (4%)	3 (1%)	300 (100%)
Poor Physical Conditions of Work	83 (28%)	86 (29%)	61 (20%)	54 (18%)	13 (4%)	3 (1%)	300 (100%)
Radicalism of ASUU Leadership	16 (5%)	4 (1%)	9 (3%)	18 (6%)	237 (79%)	16 (5%)	300 (100%)
Total	349 (116%)	290 (97%)	283 (94%)	270 (90%)	284 (94%)	24 (8%)	1,500 (500%)

*Rounded up.

Table 6.1 shows that the first four out of the five issues, were considered as the actual causes of ASUU strikes. Put differently, all the issues with the exception of radicalism of ASUU leadership, were considered as causes of ASUU strikes. Secondly three out of the four causes were considered the most important causes and these are erosion of University autonomy and academic freedom (hereafter referred to as erosion of U.A.A.F), under-funding of Universities, and poor physical conditions of work. Thirdly, more respondents (i.e. 39%) ranked the erosion of U.A.A.F, as the most important cause of the strikes. This was followed by poor physical conditions of work which got 28%, and under-funding which received 26% of the respondents. On the other hand, 18% of the respondents ranked poor remuneration and conditions of service as the most important cause. The table also shows that only 5% ranked radicalism of Union leadership as the most important cause of the strikes, thereby indicating a total rejection of this factor.

One modest conclusion from table 6.1, is that U.A.A.F is considered the most essential factor in the job satisfaction index of academics. This finding is consistent with Ukaegbu

(1982) who established that intrinsic rewards were stronger predictors of job satisfaction than were other job characteristics. Our result specifically confirms Ukaegbu's (p. 138) finding about the importance professional workers (such as academics) attach to autonomy in the performance of their work.

The finding also confirms the statement made by the Nigerian Association of University Teachers in 1977. According to the Association:

The common belief in Nigeria outside the academic community is that financial remuneration is the only factor in academic manpower problems in our Universities.... Though important, monetary advantages are not necessarily the over-riding consideration... Some of the important factors which enter into the calculation of an academically qualified person in deciding whether or not to take up (or remain in) University teaching are freedom of the Universities from undue internal and external restraints in the pursuit of his objectives and in the discharge of his functions; provision of adequate facilities which are essential for an efficient performance of his functions; and of course reasonably competitive level of and structure of financial compensation (NAUT, 1977:1-2).

Furthermore, our finding confirms the stand of ASUU in 1981 not to call-off its strike action even after the Shagari

regime announced a new salary structure for University staff. According to ASUU, (1981(d):5; 1981(e):2), Nigerian academics are a band of patriots rather than a bunch of mercenaries who are interested in mere salaries. The academics, ASUU maintained, are motivated by their love for Nigeria and her University system and not by lust for money.

A closer look at table 6.1, will reveal additional interesting findings with respect to the ranking of the causes. First, let us now present the mean responses on each of the causes, as calculated by the computer. Secondly, let us merge the results of the first-three-positions (i.e. 1st to 3rd) in the ranking of the causes, so as to determine the total number of respondents that consider each factor as important cause of the strikes. The results of these two exercises are presented in tables 6.2 and 6.3 respectively.

Table 6.2: Mean Response on each of the Actual Causes of ASUU Strikes.

Actual Causes of Strikes in Order of Importance	Mean Responses
Under-funding of Universities	2.34
Poor Physical Conditions of Work	2.39
Erosion of U.A.A.F.	2.42
Poor Remunerative Structure	2.75

Table 6.3: Actual Causes of ASUU Strikes in Order of Importance.

Actual Causes of Strikes	Number of Respondents	Percentage (%)
Under-funding of Universities	249	83
Poor Physical Conditions of Work	230	77
Erosion of U.A.A.F.	218	73
Poor Remunerative Structure	196	65

In table 6.2, under-funding of Universities has the lowest mean response (the lower the mean response, the more important a factor becomes) showing that many respondents see it as the most important cause of ASUU strikes. This finding is confirmed in table 6.3, where 83% of the respondents (the highest relative to others) consider it the most important factor. This is followed by poor physical conditions of work with 77%, and erosion of U.A.A.F which got 73%. On the other hand, poor remunerative structure got 65% indicating that it is not as important as others.

But in table 6.2, its position is clearly revealed. It got a mean response of 2.75, showing that it is not considered a major cause of the strike. We may recall that in chapter four, we indicated that a cut-off point for accepting a factor as important is 2.49.

In order to establish further how consistent the respondents are in their opinion regarding the major causes of the strike, we asked them specifically whether (i) Universities are under-funded; (ii) U.A.A.F is eroded, and (iii) they are satisfied or dissatisfied with their physical working conditions with respect to laboratories, libraries etc. The results of these questions are presented in tables 6.4 to 6.6

Table 6.4: Opinion of Respondents on Whether Universities are Under-funded.

Opinion	Number of Respondents	Percentage (%)
Yes	297	99
No	3	1
Total	300	100

Table 6.5: Opinion of Respondents on whether University
Autonomy and Academic Freedom (UAAF) are
Progressively being Eroded.

Opinion	Number of Respondents	Percentage (%)
Yes	292	97
No	7	2
Undecided	1	0
Total	300	100*

*Rounded up.

Table 6.6: Opinion of Respondents on whether they are
satisfied or dissatisfied with the facilities
they work with.

Opinion	Number of Respondents	Percentage (%)
Satisfied	1	0
Dissatisfied	231	77
No Opinion	68	23
Total	300	100

The data presented in tables 6.4 to 6.6 show very strongly that academics were highly dissatisfied with (i) the level of funding of Universities, (ii) the freedom and autonomy enjoyed by academics and the University System, and (iii) the facilities with which academics discharge their teaching and research functions.

Having confirmed these facts through the survey method, we shall now examine historical documents for more evidence. We shall however cover both the three most important causes of ASUU strikes as well as the less important and rejected factors.

6.1.1: The Issue of Inadequate Funding of Universities

6.1.1.1: Were the Universities Really Under-Funded?

With the federalization of Universities and the concomitant centralization of their management in the mid-seventies, the issue of funding of Universities became a very contentious one. Much of the controversy centred around the issue of poor level of their funding by the federal government. While Universities complained bitterly

of under-funding, the governments on the other hand were more interested in rationalizing such poor level of funding. In that process, the claims of Universities remained largely unchallenged. In any case, evidence suggest that the Universities had reasonable grounds to complain.

Writing about the poor financial situation in the Universities in 1978, the then Executive Secretary of the National Universities Commission (NUC) had this to say:

The financial situation of the Universities is serious, and that is no secret. The sharp deterioration started from about the 1976/77 session owing to the increased commitments of the Federal takeover of all Universities... Government grants brought with it greater deterioration in the year 1977/78 and even more so in this fiscal year, 1978/79... The figures for the current fiscal year, 1978/79 are noteworthy... Government grants have dropped to #148.8 million (Aminu 1986:103).

Aminu's observation in 1978 was to become in later years the dominant feature of the financial situation of Universities. Tables 6.7 and 6.8 illustrate this fact well.

Table 6.7: Recurrent Grants to Federal Universities from 1976 - 1987

UNIVERSITIES	1976/77 GRANTS	1977/78 GRANTS	1978/79 GRANTS	1979/80 GRANTS	1980 GRANTS	1981 GRANTS	1982 GRANTS	1983 GRANTS	1984 GRANTS	1985 GRANTS	1986 GRANTS	1987 GRANTS	TOTAL
Ibadan	21447500	29036000	25725000	25298430	28638199	41360550	40232619	39389227	48618605	48705667	42009553	32373038	4228433
Lagos	19331100	22923000	18487000	22098090	25562498	37404000	37532866	40055449	45730871	45652000	38488519	29645223	3829106
Nsukka	19659100	26497000	22299000	23144750	27036849	37017020	36482203	40058500	47503898	46068000	38941887	30043331	3949515
Zaria	21164700	27712000	23607000	25010800	29753549	41531825	41635674	46415116	51948723	52069667	44116101	33978661	4385730
Ife	16010800	22587000	18275000	23395450	27528798	38565450	36635563	41072543	45041896	45135000	38063983	29395000	3807064
Benin	9806800	1997000	10507000	11741950	15226399	21013150	21970217	26019816	28307507	28401000	27658422	21316000	2349652
Jos	2528200	4500000	5116000	8314700	11159550	17354350	17291381	19243636	21929022	22237667	20107946	15521200	1653036
Sokoto	813333	2483000	2727000	4643720	6399949	9323800	10021616	11735727	12931803	12923000	12095171	9292495	963905
Calabar	3025200	5061000	5438000	8052800	10492299	15273650	15441605	17750633	19526000	19476000	17987480	13910041	1514437
Kano	3294400	6182000	6350000	8128750	9599698	14329800	13696154	15283119	18066019	17389000	16101439	12456112	1408764
Maidu- guri	2713200	4355000	6974000	7076900	8817249	14279600	15594626	17744864	20283759	20560667	19547561	15127475	1530749
Ilorin	1513000	3486000	4083000	6371655	8382248	13678075	15137732	16676780	19141132	19040000	18473339	14251639	1402346
Port- Harcourt	81300	2452000	2850000	4635931	7068406	11025343	12189535	13827084	16312019	15812000	14674676	11441936	1131016
Oauch	-	-	-	-	200000	3141000	4162593	5835491	6217115	5753666	6212367	4751892	362741
Makurdi	-	-	-	-	100000	3009000	4616601	5198508	6343115	6021666	6368794	4804214	3646180
Owerri	-	-	-	-	-	3350623	4067998	4781976	5634422	5531000	6975561	5361742	357931
Akure	-	-	-	-	-	20000	2481245	3041940	3010805	3057000	4742556	3639145	199926
Yola	-	-	-	-	-	233699	2428028	2766043	3017211	2606000	3840684	2922571	178142
Abeokuta	-	-	-	-	-	-	2000000	2513077	4163750	2464000	3780972	2866134	177875
Minna	-	-	-	-	-	-	2000000	2111094	4414750	2780000	4382495	3367463	190556
A. Col.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ondo	3333235	1682000	1528000	1476000	1675225	2721000	2160000	2257000	2721468	2677000	2543973	1961744	267366
ATC	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Zaria	15142110	9318000	6472000	6524000	7924775	9279000	6663000	4836826	5728840	5696000	5399852	4162488	871960
DAC	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2131000	2577926	2484000	2453493	1889872	115462
IAL	-	-	-	-	-	-	260000	500000	500000	-	-	-	12600
Open Univ.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	250000	-	-	-	2500
TOTAL	140495678	181271000	160438000	185913926	225565691	333910935	343701156	381253449	439920659	432540000	394966824	304479416	3524456

Source: NUC Statistical Digest 1980/81 - 1985/86. A Publication of NUC August 1986.

Table 6.8: Capital Grants to Federal Universities from 1976-1987

UNIVERSITIES	1976/77 GRANTS	1977/78 GRANTS	1978/79 GRANTS	1979/80 GRANTS	1980 GRANTS	1981 GRANTS	1982 GRANTS	1983 GRANTS	1984 GRANTS	1985 GRANTS	1986 GRANTS	1987 GRANTS	TOTAL
Ibadan	3866500	4281000	5100000	5000000	18000000	19200000	14855082	8421264	1413860	3801166	5525000	3000000	924638
Lagos	8182650	2500000	6050000	6403000	16999999	20000000	7973662	5421263	1305086	1739166	5525000	3000000	850998
Nsukka	7061036	13500000	8750000	8700000	16538001	26000000	13938901	5421263	1413860	2896423	5525000	4625089	1143095
Zaria	7621000	14500000	14700000	10550000	21499999	23000000	8268304	6168988	1413860	1739166	5525000	3036653	1180229
Ife	10344500	12000000	3800000	5000000	16499999	16000000	7973662	5421263	1413860	3540131	7416668	9739410	991496
Benin	10858009	9000000	10050000	10000000	17999999	26481315	10963785	5421263	1413860	5239166	6863542	6109277	1204002
Jos	1784900	10900000	10240000	9940000	13949999	16926720	12957200	5815702	1915660	2280000	6550390	6063616	993241
Sokoto	1383850	6450000	10870000	10570000	14500000	21000000	11960492	5801702	1915660	2280000	6550390	11390615	1046727
Calabar	1784900	12350000	10030000	9730000	13760001	21000000	10027077	5801702	1915660	2280000	14571407	6202299	1094530
Kano	2214500	5500000	10400000	10400000	14130000	21000000	9967077	5801702	1915660	2280000	6550390	4226599	944359
Maidu- guri	1383850	4750000	10870000	10820000	14500000	21000000	9967077	5801702	2046660	2280000	6550390	4210540	941802
Ilorin	1383850	6400000	10030000	10577000	15760001	32000000	9967077	5801702	2095660	2280000	8039240	4571741	1089062
Port- Harcourt	1383850	5200000	9610000	9310000	14400000	27000000	11960492	5801702	2315660	2280000	6550390	10118658	1059307
Bauchi	-	-	-	-	20000000	18500000	13463785	6772773	2000000	1750000	6318269	3700000	545048
Makurdi	-	-	-	-	-	18500000	10963785	6772773	2000000	1750000	6318269	3700000	500048
Dwerrri	-	-	-	-	-	18500000	10963785	6772773	2000000	2673335	9979324	10666510	615557
Akure	-	-	-	-	-	20000000	10963785	6772773	2000000	2673335	6730918	4500000	356408
Yola	-	-	-	-	20000000	10963785	6772773	2000000	2500000	6318269	3700000	342548	
Abeokuta	-	-	-	-	-	-	24000000	8199425	2000000	2500000	6318270	3700000	251176
Mina	-	-	-	-	-	-	24000000	8199425	2000000	2673335	6730918	9522653	315263
A. Col	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ondo	-	-	-	-	-	-	2392098	1162243	1657620	1600000	850001	1000000	86619
ATC Kano	-	-	-	-	-	-	2392098	1162243	1474500	1267440	850001	1000000	81462
ATC Zaria	-	-	-	-	-	-	2392098	1162243	1474500	1267440	850001	1000000	81462
Open Uni.	-	-	-	-	-	-	5000000	25000000	-	-	-	-	30000
D.A.C.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1000000	10000
TOTAL	59193395	107331000	120550000	117000000	210538004	350108035	210575107	133150662	41101626	55570285	143007047	119783660	166790

Source: N.U.C. Statistical Digest, 1980/81 - 1985/86
A Publication of NUC August 1989.

Looking at tables 6.7 and 6.8, one may be tempted to conclude that grants to Universities have been on the increase over the years. But as Aminu (1986:104) rightly observed:

although the absolute amounts of grants have been rising, the shortfalls... have been rising, even faster. The Universities are therefore, becoming increasingly the poorer off financially. To that should be added the effects of inflation... The absolute deterioration of the funding of the purely academic sector is, therefore, even worse than it appears.

Perhaps the point can better be illustrated when we compare the total amount requested by thirteen Universities from 1976 to 1980 and the actual amount granted to them by the government. These figures are shown on table 6.9 next page.

Table 6.9: Amounts requested by the Universities from 1976 to 1980 and the actual amounts granted to them by the Federal Government.

Year	Total Amount Requested by Universities (#)	Actual Amount Granted by Government (#)
1976-77	187,904,788	137,000,000
1977-78	279,053,121	154,000,000
1978-79	393,973,538	140,090,000
1979-80	308,010,000	200,000,000

Sources: Adapted from

(1) Coockey Report, 1981:113&115

(2) ASUU 1981: Appendix G1&G3.

The wide gap between what was requested and what was actually made available as shown in table 6.9, became a dominant feature of government funding policy in latter years. It is however instructive to note that within the same period (i.e. 1975-1980) student enrolment rose from 32,286 to 57,772 showing a tremendous increase (Coockey Report, 1981:97).

Yahaya Aliyu, a former Executive Secretary of the National Universities Commission (NUC) provided an illuminating evidence on the under-funding of Universities. According to him:

Government subventions to Universities have shown persistent shortfalls from year to year... The National Universities Commission recommended subventions compared to actual subventions approved and released by government, however show increasing shortfalls by 14.4 per cent in 1979/80, 15.9 per cent in 1981 and 35.49 per cent in 1982. Capital subventions show a much higher shortfall. (Aliyu 1987:5).

The situation between 1981 and 1986, was the same with that of the period 1976 - 1980. This fact is shown in table 6.10.

Table 6.10: Capital Allocation/Grant to Federal Universities 1981 - 1986.

Year	Actual Grant	Special Grant	Total
1981	334,000,000	14,108,035	350,108,035
1982	195,206,672	15,368,435	210,575,107
1983	119,074,400	14,076,262	133,150,662
1984	40,390,626	711,000	41,101,626
1985	45,549,881	9,520,404	53,070,285
1986	127,221,855	-	127,221,855
Total	863,443,434	53,784,136	917,227,570

Source: NUC 1988:X.

Commenting on the figures in table 6.10, NUC (1988:X) observes that the total amount given was grossly inadequate to prosecute the necessary capital projects of the Universities. And as NUC (1988:4) also observes, the #1,945,298,749 amount got by Universities from 1980 to 1985 as recurrent grant which covered teaching and research equipment, was not adequate to satisfy the requirement of the Universities.

Also, lamenting over the gross under-funding of Universities between 1981 to 1985, Iyayi (1986(b):20) aptly said:

the first significant fact is that the total level of funding of University education has been on the decrease since 1981/82 when the highest level of expenditure was recorded. Thus the level of funding in 1982/83 was 85.5 per cent of the level achieved in the previous year - a decrease of 14.5 per cent. In the 1983/84, the decrease in funding compared with the 1982/83, came to 7.8 per cent or 21.2 per cent when compared with 1981/82. The level of funding dropped still further in 1984/85 when it approximated only 88.5 per cent of the level reached in 1983/84 - a drop of 11.2 per cent. Compared to the levels attained in 1982/83 and 1981/82, the corresponding reductions in government spending on University education were 19.1 per cent and 30.0 per cent. In short, the level of government expenditure on University education in 1984/85 reached only 70 per cent of the level attained in 1981/82.

Within the same period (i.e. 1980-1985), Iyayi (1986(b):19) observes that for the 'first generation' Universities, the average level of funding in relation to their actual requirements was 45.24 per cent. According to him, the 'second generation' Universities were equally seriously under-funded. The average level of funding for this group

was 57.03 per cent of their actual needs. The allocations for 1987 and 1988 were also inadequate. According to ASUU (1987(g):2), the figure for 1987/88 session was even worse. The sharp decrease reflected a shortfall between 30% and 40% vis-a-vis the figure for the 1986/87 session.

An illustrative case of gross under-funding can also be shown with two Universities as presented by their Vice-Chancellors. Using the University of Ibadan as an example, Olayide - its former Vice-Chancellor - said that 'the magnitude of under-funding for Ibadan in 1981/82 is #31 million, and by 1990 this figure is likely to be doubled.' According to him, such deficits depict the loud cry of the Universities that there has been progressive and highly significant under-funding (Olayide 1987:17). Table 6.11 shows the situation at the University of Ibadan between 1975 to 1982.

Table 6.11: Annual Magnitude of Under-funding for the University of Ibadan.

Year	Enrolment (1,000)	Deficit/student (#)	Total Deficit (# Million)
1975/76	6.961	35.43	0.247
1976/77	8.593	487.17	4.186
1977/78	8.900	1,886.47	16.612
1978/79	7.785	1,892.16	14.730
1979/80	6.979	2,496.76	17.425
1980/81	8.819	1,106.21	9.753
1981/82	10.500	2,951.31	30.989

Source: Olayide 1987:17

It was therefore Olayide's conclusion that increase in student population and decrease in funding per student are two critical causes of under-funding (Olayide 1987:18). The increase in student population in all the Nigerian Universities can be seen in Appendix I. For instance in 1962/63 session, there were 3,681 students but in 1985/86 session the number rose by 310 per cent to 114,724 students (See NUC, 1988:IV).

The second illustration is carried out with the University of Maiduguri. According to its former Vice-Chancellor Jibril Aminu, the University of Maiduguri illustrates the case of under-funding of Nigerian Universities. Describing the situation he said:

For Recurrent Grants; in the year 1982, our Council asked for 41 million naira. The NUC recommended 24.3 million naira but the Federal Government gave only 16.4 million naira which was two-thirds of what the NUC recommended and two fifths of what our Council requested. The respective figures for 1983, were #46.3 million, #32.5 million and #17.8 million naira. The operating budgets for the two consecutive years were respectively #26.7 million and #28.5 million, after savage cuts in all expenditure. For the Capital Grants; the NUC recommended #48.9 million for 1982. We received #10 million. For 1983, the respective figures were #51.5 million and #6.1 million.

At the Emergency Meeting of the Committee of Vice-Chancellors held in Lagos on November 14th, 1983, it was decided to request every University to give its own figures in the above format. After a few Vice-Chancellors spoke, it was found out that the pattern was the same, and there was no need to listen to the tale of woe round the table. (Aminu 1986:177).

Perhaps a clearer and incisive picture of the trend of government funding policy on Education, can be grasped when one looks at investment on Education in relation to other

sectors, between 1962 and 1985 covered by four-plan periods. This can be seen in table 6.12.

Table 6.12: Planned Capital Investment in Education
1962 - 1985.

Plan Period	Planned Capital Investment in Education	% Share of Education in Planned Total Capital Investment	Ranking of Education in Relation to other Sectors by Allocated Investment
1962-68	144,200	10.3	5
1970-74	270,000	13.5	2
1975-80	2,464,000	7.4	5
1981-85	7,703,079	10.9	7

Source: Iyayi (1986(b)) as adapted from

- (i) Fourth National Development Plan (1981-85)
- (ii) Ojo F. (1983): Nigerian University and High-level Manpower Development. Lagos
Lagos University Press page 23.

Commenting on the data in table 6.12, Iyayi (1986(b):20) aptly observed:

while phenomenal increases were recorded especially in the last two plan periods when planned expenditure increased by over 800 per cent in the Third plan period and by over 300 per cent in the Fourth plan period, the percentage share of education in total sectoral allocations was on the decrease as the 13.5 per cent level achieved in the second plan period fell to 7.4 per cent in the Third plan period and to 10.9 per cent in the Fourth plan period. Judging also from the ranking of the allocation to education in relation to other sectors, it can indeed be concluded that there was a decrease in emphasis on education. Thus while in the 1970-74 Second plan period, investment in education occupied second place, it had dropped to fifth and then seventh places in the Third and Fourth National Development Plans. (Emphasis ours).

The major conclusion from table 6.12 as stated by Iyayi above, summarizes for us the real trend in governments' funding policy on education over the years. There is no doubt therefore that with the decreasing emphasis on the educational sector, the financing of Universities over the years witnessed a serious set-back. The magnitude of the financial problem consequently engendered series of crises

in the Universities. And ASUU as the most vocal arm of University staff unions, never rested in its struggle for adequate funding of Universities. For instance, in 1983, ASUU demanded the sum of #30m for each University over and above the 1981 budgetary allocation to enable them rehabilitate their physical facilities (See Report of Negotiation between Government and ASUU, 1983:3). Again in 1983, ASUU complained that the level of under-funding has grown worse since its last strike action in 1981 and this it felt is far beyond what is warranted by the current economic difficulties (ASUU 1984b).

6.1.1.2 Discussion

From the quantitative data generated so far through the survey and documentary methods, there are ample evidence that Universities were under-funded between 1978 and 1988 - a period covered by our study. The evidence demonstrate that Universities were not after-all making empty noise when they were asking for more funds. The evidence also support the claim by ASUU that one of the major causes of its strike actions against the government was under-funding of Universities.

One issue that has not been properly addressed relates to the reasons given by government for the under-funding of Universities. Are such reasons adequate enough to convince the Universities?, or was the under-funding actually motivated by certain objectives of government hidden from the Universities? What really accounted for the shifting of emphasis from education to other sectors as shown on table 6.12? In short, what was the real motive behind the under-funding of Universities?

A typical government explanation for the under-funding of Universities is that the major source of its revenue (which is oil) has been adversely affected by the current world economic recession. According to the government, the progressive reduction in the price of oil in the international market, meant a reduction in government revenue with its concomitant demand for a reduction in government expenditure. As one top government official at the NUC put it, under-funding:

is a general problem of the nation occasioned by the down-turn of the economy and it affects not only the Universities but the entire arms of Government... It is a known fact that the nation is passing through a difficult period (economic-wise) with consequent attenuated revenue hence the problem of under-funding - since Government can only give what it has.

In order to examine the issue (the reason behind under-funding) very thoroughly, we decided to ascertain the opinion of academics (respondents) on what they consider to be the major reasons responsible for under-funding. Five reasons which were identified through literature search, were presented to the respondents who were required to rate them on a five-point Likert Scale. The results of this are presented in tables 6.13 and 6.14. (See pages 189 & 190).

The results in tables 6.13 and 6.14 show that the mismanagement of the economy is the strongest reason that caused under-funding. This is illustrated by the fact that 55% of the respondents felt very strongly about it while 32% just agreed thereby bringing the percentage of those who felt that it is a major factor to 87%. The mean response for this is as low as 1.40 indicating strong approval.

Following the mismanagement of the economy is 'the thinking of the governments to regiment the Universities by creating opportunities that would curb their radicalism or excesses'. Therefore, according to the respondents, the under-funding of Universities was just a way of trying to make




Table 6.13: Opinion of Respondents on the Possible Reasons behind the Under-Funding of Universities.

Possible Reasons for Under-funding	Number of Responses and their Percentages					Total
	Strongly Agree	Agree	Dis-agree	Strongly Disagree	Undecided	
There is world economic recession	17 (5%)	111 (37%)	78 (26%)	50 (17%)	44 (15%)	300 (100%)
Mismanagement of the economy	165 (55%)	95 (32%)	17 (6%)	1 (0%)	22 (7%)	300 (100%)
Universities are considered irrelevant by governments	53 (18%)	90 (30%)	130 (34%)	34 (11%)	20 (7%)	300 (100%)
Universities criticize the government alot and have become unduly radical	15 (5%)	65 (22%)	121 (40%)	64 (21%)	35 (12%)	300 (100%)
Governments want to make the Universities less radical	59 (20%)	123 (41%)	54 (18%)	23 (8%)	41 (13%)	300 (100%)
Total	309 (103%)	484 (162%)	373 (124%)	172 (57%)	162 (54%)	1500 (500%)

Table 6.14: Mean Responses on each of the possible reasons for under-funding of Universities.

Possible Reasons for Under-Funding	Mean Responses
World Economic Recession	2.44
Mismanagement of Economy	1.40
Universities seen as Irrelevant by Governments	2.39
Universities seen as over-criticising Governments	2.74
Governments want to curb radicalism of Universities	2.21

the Universities less radical or confrontational. This opinion is shown by the fact that 61% of the respondents felt that the reason is a major factor. The mean response for this is 2.21.

Two other factors which the respondents felt might have contributed to under funding are first the thinking by the governments that University education no longer constitutes a priority among the competing needs of national development. This reason is closely associated with the disappointment which governments have been expressing over the radical and confrontational tendencies of Universities since 1978. Some respondents therefore felt that when these two reasons are combined a clearer picture of the main motive behind under-funding emerges. This accounts for why 48% of the respondents support the view that perhaps Universities are considered 'irrelevant' by governments in the current scheme of things. This opinion got a mean response of 2.39 showing that it is just a factor but not a crucial one. The second minor factor identified by respondents is world economic recession. This, as we know is the major reason offered by the governments. The tables

show that 42% of the respondents with a mean response of 2.44 identify world economic recession as a reason for under-funding of Universities.

Tables 6.13 and 6.14 also show that the respondents rejected the view that under-funding had to do with the fact that governments were perhaps thinking that Universities were criticising them alot and have become unduly radical. Hence, only 37% of the respondents identified this as a factor. This result needs to be explained further. This factor was actually added in the questionnaire as a proxy for ascertaining the consistency of respondents' opinion with regard to two other factors namely 'governments want to make the Universities less radical,' and 'Universities are considered irrelevant by governments'. We feel therefore that the rejection of this, has to do with the phrase 'unduly radical'. Some of the respondents explained that the Universities are not unduly radical; they however never denied the fact that they are perceived to be atleast radical by the government. This we believe explains why up to 61% of the respondents hold the view that one of the major reasons for under-funding, was the desire of the government to make the Universities less radical.

Consequently, the rejection of the view 'that Universities criticize governments alot and have become unduly radical,' is therefore questionable. Perhaps the offensive word 'unduly' was a major reason for rejecting the view.

The results in tables 6.13 and 6.14 need further and deeper explanation. And the data on tables 6.7, 6.8, 6.9, and 6.12 are very useful for such closer examination. As we observed then, the problem of under-funding became a major source of concern to the Universities during the 1978/79 session just immediately after the 'Ali Must Go' students' violent demonstration. Table 6.9 for instance shows how the amount given to Universities in the 1978/79 session fell to #140m from the #154m given to them in the 1977/78 session. This drop we strongly believe might have more to do with government's disenchantment with the conduct of the Universities than perhaps the reasons offered by Aminu (1986:103) that (i) there was increased federal government commitment following its take-over of Universities, (ii) charging of fees was stopped in Universities and finally (iii) the charging of lodging fees was stopped in the Universities. There is no doubt that

these led to financial problems of Universities, but all of them were products of federal government actions. The government no doubt knew its financial strength and capability before taking-over Universities and adopting other welfarist policies on University education. Therefore to turn-round and use these reasons as alibi for under-funding, begs the question.

In any case, we notice that in table 6.12, the emphasis hitherto placed on the educational sector during the second National Development Plan period, was considerably abandoned under the Third and National Development Plans. As we noticed, the priority on the educational sector shifted from the second position under the Second National Development Plan to the fifth and seventh during the Third and Fourth National Development Plan periods. And of course the effect of this was a continuous shortfall in the allocations to the Universities. For instance, the shortfall was 14.4% in 1979/80, 15.9% in 1981 and 35.49% in 1982 (See Aliyu 1987:5).

Furthermore, the de-emphasis on the educational sector especially University education more than anything else,

reflects governments' thinking on the diminishing and 'negative' role of the Universities in national development. But such an image of Universities was not without any empirical reference. For instance, a good number of violent students demonstrations that claimed many lives, were recorded. In fact, many Universities had an average of two closures per session as a result of students' unrest which in some instances were 'associated' with the ideological influence of radical academics. As one top federal government official at the NUC asserted, 'it is obvious that in some Universities, the ideological teachings of some of the academics tend to incite the students against the government.'

The de-emphasis on the educational sector therefore had to do with the perception of the Universities then as not contributing enough to the developmental needs of the time. For as Aminu (1986:68) observed:

Universities are being accused of not achieving any major breakthroughs, of being irrelevant and of not being responsive to the needs of the society. University people would obviously refute such charges, but they are made by high functionaries of Government and are bound to affect official attitudes. (Emphasis added).

It is therefore doubtful if a public institution whose students carry out frequent violent demonstration that result to loss of lives and damage to many public properties, can be perceived as contributing positively to national development. Again, it is doubtful if a public institution whose staff are accused of adopting a permanent confrontational attitude towards the government, and also 'incite students to demonstrate against government,' can be perceived as making positive contribution to national development. There is every likelihood therefore that such perception actually influenced government funding policy on the Universities. Of course, this argument must have agitated the minds of many University people at a particular time that Aminu (1986:157) had to observe that the problem of under-funding of Universities is quite serious that it should be rectified, lest historians suggest that finance was once used to regiment the University system in the contry, and in that event he concludes, Universities themselves would be partly answerable.

Let us now examine very closely but briefly governments' oft-stated reason for under-funding, namely dwindling revenue

from oil as a result of world economic recession. As we saw in tables 6.13 and 6.14, up to 42% of the respondents with a mean response of 2.44, supported this government view. This is a slight or moderate approval of this government rationalization. There is no doubt that world economic recession had negative impact on Nigeria's economic fortune, but it is still highly doubtful whether this was the major reason for under-funding of Universities. We think so on the following grounds. First, the de-emphasis on the educational sector had started before world economic recession began to affect so badly the amount of revenue from oil. In fact, the de-emphasis started just after the Second National Development Plan period at a time the oil boom and its concomitant culture of wasteful expenditure was still a dominant feature of the economy. Secondly, even within the educational sector, emphasis shifted away from Universities, to the primary education level through the Universal Primary Education programme. And later the nomadic education programme as well as the gifted children programme became focal point of attention. Furthermore the secondary education level attracted

special attention through emphasis on Unity Schools (Federal Government Colleges) and special science schools. Thirdly attention also shifted to the maintenance, expansion and upliftment of military educational institutions both at the secondary and tertiary levels. For example, the Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA) was elevated to a degree awarding institution perhaps (we guess) to put a stop to the continued unhealth indoctrination which military personnel were exposed to in the Conventional Universities in Nigeria. Our intention here is not to question the propriety of government actions in all the cases mentioned above. Our interest however is to make the crucial point that even within the educational sector, the government was not completely unaware of the importance of education in national development. What actually happened was that she was not satisfied with the huge amount spent on Universities whose students and some staff often 'challenge and threaten national security.'

The establishment of new Universities within the period under study much as it had alot to do with political expediency and the need to expaise technological and agricultural education, was largely an attempt to declare

existing conventional Universities irrelevant. It is on records that during this period, convocation occasions became veritable grounds for inter alia castigating the Universities for being still an Ivory Tower in a country that needs urgent problem-solving research undertakings. Such statements that charged Universities to conduct researches that are relevant to the needs of the society became the vogue. At the same time, Universities were reminded that 'the society is a collection of various interest groups that are collectively catered for by any Government of the day. The academics should realise they form only one of the groups and should not super-impose themselves on the Government.' This quotation from a top official of NUC sums up part of governments' re-thinking on the relevance of the Universities. This was precisely what the President meant when at the 41st Foundation Day Ceremony (1989 Convocation) of the University of Ibadan he explained that the problem of under-funding of the Universities was not a deliberate policy of the government to punish the institutions but that it is only fair to recognize that there were so many other sectors that compete

with the Universities for public funds (see New Nigeria Nov. 21, 1989).

Lastly the issue of mismanagement of the economy as a major cause of under-funding needs further explanation. In table C.1 (see Appendix C), majority of the respondents (i.e. 76%) hold the view that the most fundamental cause of Nigeria's economic problem is mismanagement of the economy. It is interesting to note also from that table, that only one respondent representing less than 1% of the respondents, identified world economic recession as a fundamental cause. Furthermore in table C.2 (Appendix C), 63% of the respondents share the view that the major solution to Nigeria's economic problem lies in better economic management. It is on the basis of these views that the respondents attributed the major cause of under-funding to mismanagement of the economy (see tables 6.13 and 6.14). As we saw then, up to 87% of the respondents (with a mean response of 1.40), associated under-funding with mismanagement. The two tables therefore strongly associated under-funding with mismanagement.

But then, this opinion needs further explanation. For instance, why didn't mismanagement prevent the placement of emphasis on other sectors of the economy especially in the adoption and execution of some 'white-elephant' projects of the government during this period? Experience shows that during this period, millions and billions of contracts were signed, some of whose projects never got executed. In any case, mismanagement did not prevent the establishment of new Universities of Technology and Agriculture, the up-grading of NDA to a degree awarding institution, or initiating new programmes like the nomadic education, UPE etc. Therefore, much as the mismanagement of the economy was a major reason for under-funding, it does not however explain it all. This is because mismanagement itself is partly a dependent factor. It is a product of another factor which we will examine later in this chapter in section 6.2.0. But it suffices to say that governments' anti-intellectual posture especially with regard to its aversion to the activities of radical academics, student unrest and general confrontational attitude of academics towards the government, should be seen as a stronger explanatory variable than just mere

mismanagement. The data on tables 6.13 and 6.14 with respect to opinions given on some other reasons, support our claim. In other words, while evidence through survey method accept mismanagement as a very strong factor associated with under-funding, on the other hand, some evidence gathered through historical experience, suggest that mismanagement is essentially but not exclusively an explanatory factor. Hence government's anti-intellectual posture provides a better explanation. This position is supported by the evidence in tables 6.15 and 6.16 below.

Table 6.15: Opinion of Respondents on whether the various regimes had Anti-Intellectual Posture.

Opinion	Number of Respondents	Percentage(%)
Yes	243	81
No	54	18
Undecided	3	1
Total	300	100

From table 6.15, we observe that as high as 81% of the respondents believe that the various governments had anti-intellectual posture with respect to the way they treated academics and the University system in general. Then when we asked respondents to identify the major cause of governments' neglect of the Universities, the responses are as follows:

Table 6.16. Opinion of Respondents on the possible Reasons behind Governments' anti-Intellectual Posture:

Possible Reasons behind Governments' anti-Intellectual Posture	Number of Respondents	Percentate (%)
Governments' aversion to radical scholarship/Governments' feeling of insecurity as a result of incessant Criticisms by academics	230	77
Lack of adequate financial resources (by the Governments) to Support the Universities	12	4
No responses	58	19
Total	300	100

Table 6.16 shows that 230 respondents representing 77%, support the view that the major reason behind governments' anti-intellectual posture, was governments' aversion to radical scholarship cum a feeling of insecurity as a result of incessant criticisms by academics. The fact is that when an intellectual idea (ie. a product of intellectual inquiry) threatens the stability of an established order, the government of the day, could adopt any measure to prevent the dissemination of such idea. On the other hand, a government feels at home with an idea that helps to legitimize a social system on which it exercises authority. Experience shows that ASUU through its utterances made the various governments to feel threatened. In fact as one top federal government official put it, 'at times it looked like ASUU wanted to take-over the Government or was operating a minority government some where.' There is little doubt that such government thinking did affect its overall policies toward the Universities. As we know, finance is a major tool a government can use to retaliate those perceived to be hostile to it. And actually Nigeria's political experience demonstrate that ruling parties

under civilian regimes, had occasions to deny certain amenities to some areas largely dominated by opposition parties. The denial of adequate funding to Universities seems to us therefore to be one of the measures the various governments used to demonstrate that Universities were no longer considered a priority. In fact as Cookey Commission observed, 'the relative size of allocation to Universities would depend on the priority attached by the Government to the University sector.' (Cookey Report 1981:98). As the Commission further observed, 'governments in Nigeria ought to rank University education near the top of their priority scales.' And this according to the Commission means that Universities 'should be among the few sectors to be insulated against depressions in government overall financial resources... and financial allocations to them should be adequate to meet their legitimate needs.' (Cookey Report 1981:98). Although the Commission recognized the fact that 'there is no generally acceptable rule for determining the level of aggregate funding to the University system by Government', since as it also correctly pointed out, 'it is

a matter of both economics and politics,' it nevertheless concluded that (judging from the fact that countries like the U.S.A., U.S.S.R., West Germany, Brazil and Singapore devoted between 1-4 per cent of their gross national products on University education as against a less than one per cent devoted to such in Nigeria,) 'it could be seen that there is still much greater scope for additional funding to the Nigeria University system than has actually been achieved to date' (Cookey Report 1981:98). In conclusion, the point is that mismanagement of the economy though a reason, is not a sufficient explanation for the poor funding of Universities. Hence as we argued, governments' anti-intellectual posture which among other things induced them to adopt measures to regiment the Universities, provides a stronger reason for under-funding of Universities. The issue of anti-intellectual posture also touches on the erosion of U.A.A.F which we would discuss latter. Meanwhile we will now present the data and discuss the issue of poor physical working conditions as one of the major reasons for ASUU strikes.

6.1.2 The Problem of Poor Physical Conditions of Work in Universities

The problem of inadequate working facilities in the Universities such as poor laboratories, equipment, libraries and other poor logistical support, was one of the major grievances of ASUU for going on strike. As we observed in tables 6.1, 6.2, 6.3 and 6.6, this factor was rated as one of the major reasons for going on strike. In table 6.6 for instance we saw that as high as 77% of the respondents are dissatisfied with their physical working conditions.

The data on under-funding of Universities adequately explain why University staff work under poor physical conditions. In fact, inadequate working facilities, is closely related to under-funding. This is because, it arises as a result of poor funding. For as ASUU 1979(a) rightly observed, one of the chief sources of the deterioration of Universities is inadequacy of facilities due to lack of funds.

It is on the strength of this that ASUU made the issue of inadequate working facilities in the Universities one of the cardinal questions in its struggle throughout its period of existence. For instance, in a press release in 1980, ASUU declared:

Today equipment, research and laboratory facilities, teaching and office space, stationery, scientific tools, library supplies, and supportive services essential to the maintenance of teaching and research commensurate to University, are at a level of desperate inadequacy in our Universities. (ASUU, 1980(b))

And to underscore this point further, ASUU in one of its special bulletins in 1981 opined that the entire nation is aware that its grievances centre around the depressing and deplorable condition in which University students carry on the high level of intellectual activities that go on in the Universities (ASUU 1981(f)).

Also in 1981, ASUU in its memorandum to the Cookey Commission made the following observations regarding poor physical working conditions in the Universities:

- (i) Capital projects are halted thus affecting the construction of laboratories, lecture theatres, classrooms, office space, student hostels, staff quarters and other essential physical structures.
- (ii) Many faculties and Departments have no vehicles, no funds for faculty journals and books, equipments, etc. They can hardly sponsor conferences, nor can

they pay for their staff to attend when invited to participate elsewhere thereby retarding their intellectual growth and limiting their intellectual horizon.

- (iii) Departments lack the basic minimum facilities with which to operate - typing sheets, stencils, duplicating paper and ink, dusters and even chalk are grossly inadequate, and students have to subscribe to the provision of these materials when a handout is to be given to them.
- (iv) Many Universities have no University Publishing Press as there are no votes to finance such projects.
- (v) University Bookshops are directly affected. They cannot stock non-existent books and unpublished manuscripts and they have no money to purchase from abroad (ASUU, 1981:29-31).

It was against this background that ASUU declared its strike action in 1981. During this strike period, ASUU strongly declared that:

We cannot go back to the classroom unless we are sure that there are funds:

- for teaching aids including chalks, duster and paper.
- for classroom space
- for equipped research laboratories for effective study and research,
- for dormitory space,
- for office space
- staff quarters
- funds for travel
- vehicles for departments
- staff development
- medical treatments and drugs
- secretarial staff
- for books, journals and press
- for conferences, seminars and workshops
- for research grants (ASUU 1981(d):4-5).

One other crucial issue that bothered ASUU much was the student-teacher ratio. In 1981, ASUU observed that in several Nigerian Universities, the staff-student ratio is as high as 1:50 and at times individual lecturers handle a class of over 600 students, marking their scripts, assigning them grades and tabulating their scores, all alone (ASUU 1981(g)).

Then six years later, ASUU further decried this situation by observing that the staff-student ratio in the institutions of higher learning was 1:20, a figure that doubles the 1:10 recommended by UNESCO and 1:12 by NUC. (ASUU, 1987(a):1).

Describing the poor physical working conditions in Universities in 1986, The Guardian in its News Analysis observed that the tools with which academics are working are impoverished as laboratories are ill-equipped, research grants are vanishing, classrooms and other facilities are becoming increasingly inadequate (Komplafe 1986:9).

Such descriptions and observations reflect the situations in our Universities. Perhaps those who graduated from the Universities before the federalization and centralization of Universities, may think that the pictures presented above represent an exaggeration of reality. But to those who graduated between 1978 to date, the pictures presented do not really capture the frustrations which staff and students experience in a bid to maintain the high academic standards for which Universities world-wide are known and

respected for.

In the course of our field work, serious attempts were made to assess the physical conditions under which academics perform their teaching and research functions. Although there are variations as a result of the age of the Universities and according to faculties and departments, one thing that stands out clearly is the fact that the Universities in Nigeria have gradually been losing their distinguishing character of being a special and unique national institution. In some Universities, office accommodation is grossly inadequate. For instance, up to three lecturers share one office in some Universities while in few others, lecturers have no offices at all but are provided a common staff room very much similar to those found in Secondary Schools. A common trend was observed in all the Universities visited with respect to office accommodation for lecturers in the Social Sciences and Arts. Unlike their counterparts in science and Engineering faculties, who are provided with relatively spacious offices, lecturers in the Social Sciences, Arts and even Education, have inadequate office

accommodation. The policy of sharing offices affects them more seriously than others. Perhaps the emphasis on science education explains this fact. In any case, the crucial fact is that for a job that requires high rate of concentration, and high intellectual rigours which should be free from distractions, it is very unfortunate to put two to three lecturers in one office. Again the supervision of final year students projects requires that project students consult their supervisors occasionally for guidance. We found out during our field work that lecturers who share office accommodation suffer the problem of mutual distraction. Students keep on coming in, to the extent that lecturers invariably find themselves talking and disturbing their other colleagues. We met situations which looked like market environment and this happened when all the two or three lecturers had their students consulting them at the same time. This is just one aspect of the situation lecturers find themselves in the daily discharge of their functions. One of the consequences of this, is that some lecturers find it difficult to do private reading and writing in their offices which may not be suitably

carried out either in their homes or libraries. A lecturer's private study provides a more conducive environment needed for writing high quality academic papers than other reading places can provide. This is mainly because an avalanche of reference materials purposefully acquired over the years can easily be retrieved from the private library/study. But in situations, where offices are shared, lecturers find it difficult to keep such useful literature in common offices. The cumulative effect of such is that the intellectual activities of some lecturers are seriously impaired. Some of those affected might find it difficult to publish and advance in their career. Consequently, the expected contribution of such academics towards the advancement of knowledge would be considerably obviated. One of the greatest regrets (in life) an intelligent and industrious University scholar can have is to fail to achieve his intellectual potentialities as a result of a poor and frustrating working environment.

The importance which academics attach to a good working environment is underscored by the data on tables

6.1, 6.2, 6.3 and 6.6. The data show that good working environment is considered more important than mere good salary and attractive conditions of service. This is hardly surprising because with a conducive working environment a hardworking academic can always win national and international recognition the benefits of which far more outweigh mere attractive financial rewards. And of course, the success of an academic is measured not in terms of the number of landed properties, cars and other material possessions, he acquired over the years, but rightly in terms of the avalanche of published materials he has, to his credit. This fact therefore makes the issue of adequate working facilities an important one for academics. This factor alone can engender a strike action. As we saw in table 6.1, it was considered a part of the reasons for the strikes. We shall now turn to the next major cause of the strike action which over the years raised serious controversy between the government and ASUU

6.1.3 The Question of Erosion of University Autonomy and Academic Freedom (UAAF).

6.1.3.1: The Background

As we observed in chapter Five under the section on 'the Essence and Character of the academic profession,' one of the important functions of University academics, is 'to seek the truth, teach and preserve the truth'. It is against this background that Universities are called the 'watchdogs for, and conscience of the nations.' We also noted that a satisfactory performance of this important role, requires critical and independent thinking, as well as institutional autonomy and academic freedom.

By University Autonomy we mean essentially the freedom of the University to select its own students and its staff and to determine the conditions under which they may remain in the University; the freedom to set its own standards; the freedom to decide to whom to award its degrees; freedom to design its own curriculum taking due cognisance of national goals. This in a nutshell, means allowing the University Councils and Senates to perform the functions for which they have been set up (NAUT, 1977:8-9; ASUU 1981:8). To these are

also added the freedom to enjoy 'financial autonomy and other things necessary for a self-governing community' (Cookey Report 1981:121).

On the other hand, by Academic Freedom we mean the freedom of teaching, inquiry and research as well as the freedom of extra-mural utterance and action (AAUP 1948:144). This in essence refers to the right of University academics 'to seek the TRUTH and to proclaim their findings without let or hindrance' (NAUT, 1977:9). In an elaborate sense this means the

complete and unqualified freedom to inquire and investigate, to interpret data and to arrive at and announce conclusions, in and out of the classroom without the fear or reality of sanctions or control of any kind, whether direct or indirect, whether pecuniary or related to status or advancement, whether from within or without the institution (NAUT 1977:9).

From the definitions above, the importance of University Autonomy and Academic Freedom (UAAF) to the unfettered pursuit, and advancement of the frontiers of knowledge, needs not be emphasized. This point was properly articulated in chapter Five. It is against this background that we now present and discuss the data on the issue of the erosion of UAAF.

In table 6.1, we saw that the erosion of UAAF was identified as one of the major causes of ASUU strikes. In fact, out of the other factors, more respondents (i.e. 39%) identified it as the most important cause of the strikes, although we noted its new position in tables 6.2 and 6.3. In all these three tables (6.1 - 6.3), erosion of UAAF was highly associated with the strike actions.

Then in table 6.5 we observed that almost all the respondents (i.e. 97%) share the view that UAAF is progressively being eroded in Nigerian Universities. This explains why it was one of the most contentious issues in ASUU-Government relations from 1978 to 1988. A detailed examination of some historical experiences of the struggle for UAAF as found in documents will now be undertaken, to illustrate the fact that ASUU saw this issue as one of the areas it felt highly aggrieved.

Before the formation of ASUU the issue of erosion of UAAF was already a contentious one. For instance in 1963, the Pro-Chancellor of the University of Ife (now Obafemi Awolowo University (OAU)) made a statement which was interpreted

by academics as an attempt to erode UAAF. According to the Pro-Chancellor:

This University has implicit faith in the Government of Western Nigeria. Its duty is to support the Government and offer its Services to it in all the various fields of talent represented therein. This is the credo of the University and anyone who does not subscribe to it must have the courage to leave its service. (Gavin 1964:76; Ferguson 1965:24) (Emphasis ours).

Reacting to this, the Ibadan Association of University Teachers (AUT) adopted and issued resolutions in which it restated the fundamental principle of Academic Freedom as stipulated in the University of Ibadan Bill which was passed by the Federal Parliament. And according to clause 11 of this Bill:

No person shall be required to satisfy requirement as to any of the following matters, that is to say race (including ethnic grouping), sex, place of birth, or of family origin, or religious or political persuasion, as a condition... of any appointment or employment at the University... (Gavin, 1964:76).

Again in 1964, when the then Dean of the Faculty of Agriculture at the University of Ife, was dismissed on reasons that were not considered satisfactory to academics, the AUT at Ibadan, also issued a resolution protesting against the action (Gavin 1964:76; Ferguson 1965:24).

Also in 1964, one of the professors of the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, was suspended and later had his appointment terminated 'for criticising the University administration in a memorandum he submitted to the Senate' (Nwala, 1988:12).

Furthermore in 1965, the then federal government imposed a Vice-Chancellor on the University of Lagos in total disregard of the majority opinion of the staff and students of the institution. This action sparked off serious crisis at the University of Lagos. This crisis led to the resignation of many academics in protest. Such was also the case at the University of Ife in 1964 when a Dean of a Faculty was dismissed.

In all these cases, UAAF was seriously threatened. It was against this background that Aminu (1978:363) observed that autonomy of Nigerian regional Universities in the 60s, existed only in name since it was exercised in the context of the respective regional government and sometimes political party policy.

During the early and mid 70s, two major policies on Universities which subsequently made tremendous impact on the

exercise of UAAF, were adopted. The first was the harmonization policy in which the conditions of service of Universities were unified with the rest of public service establishments. This policy was one of the measures adopted by the government following the Report of the Public Service Review Commission (Udoji Commission) of 1974. This policy has been seen as the most serious source of erosion of UAAF (See Aminu 1986:68). Although the Udoji Commission endorsed the principles of UAAF as the basis of the organization, structure and management of the Universities and also warned that accountability should not be interpreted to mean arbitrary interference or partisan intervention in the internal affairs of the Universities, the government went ahead to adopt this policy on harmonization in its White Paper on the Report of the Commission.

The second policy which also (with hindsight) profoundly affected the exercise of UAAF is the federalization of the Universities and the concomitant centralization of their management. The take-over of Universities then by the federal government as well as the establishment of a statutory NUC, later brought the Universities under direct control by

the government through the NUC and Federal Ministry of Education.

The restraining effects of these two policies on the exercise of UAAF, no doubt led the Nigerian Association of University Teachers (NAUT) to complain bitterly in 1977. According to it, the federal government had in recent years persistently attempted in various ways to erode UAAF. Examples of such interventions are:

the appointment of Vice-Chancellors by the Federal Government; the increase in the power of the Visitor; the making of Universities an arm of the civil service under the direct control of the federal Ministry of Education which for example, now issues queries requesting Vice-Chancellors to account for the academic performance of their students; and the recent attempt to take away from Universities the power freely to select their own students. If this trend is not arrested and reversed, immediately, it will not be long before the powers of Universities to freely design their own curriculum and to determine the candidates that qualify for the award of their degrees are taken away. (NAUT, 1977:11).

The issues so far presented above formed the background that existed prior to the formation of ASUU in 1978. What happened therefore during the period of ASUU was only

different in terms of the scale and frequency of occurrence; for the struggle against the erosion of UAAF centred mainly on the same issues which ASUU's predecessor - NAUT - fought to redress. We shall now examine some of such cases that occurred during the period of ASUU's existence. These identified cases of interference into University's internal management during this period, happened under four regimes namely the Obasanjo, Shagari, Buhari and Babangida regimes.

6.1.3.2: Dismissal and Premature Retirement of Academics

University laws confer on the various Councils of Universities the power to appoint, dismiss and discipline their staff. But over the years, the various governments acting unilaterally or through directives given to University Councils, either dismissed, retired or disciplined University academics. The following cases were recorded. In 1978, following the April-May 'Ali Must Go' violent students' demonstration, the federal government removed some academics in the Universities of Ibadan, Lagos and Calabar. Incidentally all those removed were well known radical academics.

Secondly in 1980, the federal government removed six Professors from the University of Lagos after Justice Balonwu' Visitation Panel.

Thirdly, in 1987, the Federal Government either dismissed, retired or disciplined some academics (seven in number) of the University of Benin through a letter from the University Council titled 'The Visitor's Views on the Report of the Visitation Panel to the University of Benin 1975 - 1985.' Incidentally the then serving national president of ASUU was one of the principal actors affected.

Fourthly in 1988, the Federal Government deported two lecturers of the Ahmadu Bello University (ABU) from the country on the grounds that they were 'security risk.' One of the affected academics happened to be a well known vocal and radical intellectual. In any case, both of them had long been married to Nigerians and had stayed in the country for a long time. In the same University that year, the employment contracts of some well known radical academics, were not renewed, thereby causing their premature departure from the University. Again in 1989, at the same University, one vocal and radical Nigerian intellectual was sacked by the University authority on the directive of the Federal Ministry of Education,

for involving himself in partisan politics. This was in keeping with a Federal Government policy that any lecturer found participating in partisan politics would be summarily dismissed.

There were also in addition to all these some actions taken by individual University Authorities. For instance, in 1978, the Authorities of the University of Calabar illegally dismissed a lecturer for challenging the views of his 'Superiors'. And in 1981, the University of Ibadan arbitrarily suspended one lecturer for criticising the irregular appointment of certain University functionaries (Nwala 1982: 13&14).

It is however worthy to note, that in all these cases cited above, except those of the University of Benin the affected academics won their cases later either through the law court or persistent pressure on the relevant authorities to rescind their actions.

6.1.3.3: Appointment and Transfer of Vice-Chancellors

It is generally agreed that one of the ways by which the government exercises close and effective control over the

Universities, is through the appointment of Vice-Chancellors. Ordinarily, the Vice-Chancellors ought to be appointed by University Councils. However the prevailing and 'accepted' practice was for a joint Committee of Senate and Council to select three names in order of preference, which are subsequently recommended and forwarded to the Head of State (The Visitor) by the University Council, for appointment. It was also an agreed procedure that 'in order to further democratize the internal processes of the selection of Vice-Chancellors in the Universities,... the congregation should be involved in the selection process' (See Report of the Negotiation between ASUU and Government 1983:8).

In practice however, experience shows wide deviation from these guidelines, in the appointment of Vice-Chancellors in some Universities. For example cases of irregular appointment, removal, imposition and even transfer of Vice-Chancellors in the Universities abound. The following Universities experienced one form of problem or the other, in the appointment of their Vice-Chancellors: Lagos, ABU, Calabar, Benin, U.N.N, BUK, Jos. Minor cases occurred in other Universities. The most disturbing cases to academics were the imposition and transfer of Vice-

Chancellors. These occurred in many Universities including some newly established state government-owned ones. The Universities at a time became mere extensions of the Federal Ministry of Education in this regard but especially with respect to the transfer of Vice-Chancellors. The transfer of Vice-Chancellors happened both in the 70s and 80s in some Universities namely BUK, UNN, ABU, Calabar, among other places.

A good case of where an appointment of a Vice-Chancellor generated much heat was that of the University of Benin. The appointment of one of its Vice-Chancellors in 1985, was seen by ASUU as an imposition and this perception - coupled with the conduct of the Vice-Chancellor in dealing with the internal opposition at the University - resulted a serious crisis between ASUU and the Vice-Chancellor. The lack of cooperation which the Vice-Chancellor experienced from ASUU led to chains of actions which adversely affected the public image of the University. Our Appendix F, shows the happenings at the University from 1985 when the Vice-Chancellor was appointed. The facts contained in that Appendix clearly expose the danger inherent in any process of appointing some one from outside a University to be its Vice-Chancellor in the midst of internal opposition.

6.1.3.4: The Role of the Visitor and the appointment of Visitation Panels

The institution of visitorship has been firmly established in the Nigerian University system. Although this has been accepted as a means by which the Visitor - The Head of State, or the Governor in case of state government-owned University - exercises general policy direction to the Universities, the wide powers given to the visitor, remained a major source of controversy over the years. For example, the powers of the Visitor was seen as very wide and absolute by ASUU (See ASUU 1981:56). An example is the University of Lagos (Amendment) Decree of 1972, which 'empowered the Visitor to conduct or direct a visitation of the University as often as circumstances may require not being less than once a year' (See ASUU 1981:58). Another example which seems milder is the University of Nigeria Act of 1978. Section 13(2) of this Act empowered the Visitor to conduct a visitation on the University as often as the circumstances may require but not being less than once every five years. (See Cookey Report 1981:130).

The use of visitorial powers generated a lot of controversy over the years. It was through the exercise of visitorial powers that some academics were removed in 1978, 1980 and 1987 as already cited thereby depriving the University Councils the exercise of its power over appointment, and discipline of their staff.

One visible area where the various Visitors exercised their powers was in the setting up of visitation panels, and panels of inquiry in cases where students' disturbances occurred. Such visitorial powers affected considerably the exercise of UAAF. For example in 1978, the Uthman Mohammed Commission of Inquiry into the 'Ali Must Go' students' violent demonstration, recommended that the Universities should delimit the frontiers of academic freedom and work out a code of conduct for students and teaching staff necessary for upholding that freedom (See Cooley Report 1981:124). The acceptance of that recommendation led to the setting up of the Anya Committee on Academic Freedom. One of its terms of reference was to define the concept of

academic freedom and work out a code of conduct for staff and students necessary for upholding that freedom taking into account the functions of the Universities in the country among which is equipping the students with the knowledge and attitude supportive of the social system (See ASUU 1981:22) (Emphasis ours in the two cases)

Again the Mohammed Commission noted that some academics were not teaching what they were paid to teach hence should be disciplined, and as we now know this led to the removal of some academics. Then in 1986, the Abisoye Panel of Inquiry into the A.B.U. students' crisis also recommended that academics who are teaching what they are not paid to teach should be removed from the Universities. The government white paper in accepting this recommendation empowered the Minister of Education to 'flush out' all such academics without any option of a trial (See ASUU 1987:111). The target of the recommendation of Mohammed Commission and Abisoye Panel were the radical lecturers.

The most controversial Visitation panels are those on National Minimum Standards on Universities. These panels were

set up to prescribe national minimum standards for all courses taught in Universities. By these panels, the functions of the University Senate with respect to the determination of what is taught and how it is to be taught, were taken away from them. According to ASUU (1987(b):1), University Senate is the only body empowered by existing University statutes to carry out the function of setting, regulating and maintaining standards in Universities. It therefore felt that it was improper to delegate this all important functions to panels on accreditation and minimum standards. We shall examine this issue in full under the role of NUC.

Finally, the visitor on some occasions ordered the closure of Universities and vested the power of their reopening on himself. The most recent was in 1988 when following the nation-wide workers and students demonstration as a result of the withdrawal of fuel subsidy, the visitor ordered the closure of four Universities namely Calaba, Jos, BUK and OAU, the re-opening of which was at the pleasure of

the visitor. By this act, the power of the Senate of the affected Universities with respect to the opening and closure of Universities, was vitiated and usurped.

From the foregoing, it could be seen that the Visitor was really very active in the exercise of his powers. The manner in which such powers were exercised was as disturbing as the frequency of their use. For instance following the Abisoye Panel of Inquiry into the ABU students' crisis of 1986, the Visitor instituted four new panels namely:

- (a) The Akambi Panel (August 1986)
- (b) The Various Visitation Panels for some Universities (September 1986)
- (c) The Minimum Standard Panel (October 1986) and
- (d) The University Administrative Panels (July 1986).

These panels argued ASUU (1987(e) had one objective - to witch-hunt and victimize known ASUU activists and members. We shall also further explore the motive behind these panels under discussion later.

6.1.3.5: The Role of the National Universities Commissions (NUC)

Commenting on how the Universities feel about the role of the N.U.C., the Cookey Commission said:

From the evidence taken in the course of our assignment and particularly from the University community, there appears to have developed in recent years considerable concern over the role of the N.U.C. in the governance of Universities (Cookey Report 1981:125).

Based on this finding, the crucial questions now are: (i) of what importance is the NUC in the management of Universities, and (ii) how has the existence of NUC and the performance of its functions, affected the exercise of UAAF.

The NUC was first established in 1963 following the recommendation of the Ashby Commission. However, it was only advisory or administrative in character. In other words, it was set up to advise government on issues related to University education. But about ten years later, the dynamics of the Nigerian federal system dictated a need for a change in the status of the NUC.

Consequently, with the process of the federalization of Universities already in action in the early 70s, following the transfer of Higher education from the concurrent legislative

list to the Exclusive legislative list (Aminu 1978:366), the federal government in 1974 elevated the status of NUC from just being an advisory (administrative) body to that of a statutory one. Hence by Decree No. 1 of 1974, a statutory NUC was established to perform nine important functions. Four of those relevant to us here are:

- (i) to develop general programmes to be pursued by the Universities in order to ensure that they are fully adequate for national needs and objectives;
- (ii) recommend the establishment of new faculties or post-graduate institutions in existing Universities;
- (iii) to investigate the needs for University research and ensure that adequate funds are provided for this; and
- (iv) undertake periodic reviews of the terms and conditions of service of personnel engaged in the Universities.

Measured by the power accruing from these functions therefore, the NUC is a very important organ in the management of the Universities. By these functions, then, the effective

and efficient operation of Universities depend to a large extent on the NUC. But the way the NUC discharges its function affects its public image especially among the Universities.

Historically speaking, the Universities have for long seen the existence of a statutory NUC as a threat to the exercise of UAAF. Some of its functions are seen as a total usurpation of the powers of University Councils and Senate. For instance, the Universities maintain that the establishment of new faculties or institutes is a function which the University Councils perform. A look at one Act of a University supports this claim. According to paragraph 15(3)(k) of the University of Ife Act, the council is authorized 'to establish, after considering the recommendation of the Senate in that behalf; Faculties, Institutes, Schools, Boards, Departments and other units of learning and research; to prescribe their organization, constitution and functions and other units of learning and research; to prescribe their organization, constitution and functions and to modify or revise the same.' (See Cookey Report, 1981:126). Furthermore, the function of developing 'general programmes to be pursued

by the Universities,' are seen by the Universities as that of the Senate and Council. And on the other hand, the power of carrying out 'periodic reviews of the terms and conditions of service of Universities, is seen as that of the Council. It was therefore on the strength of these observations that the Cookey Commission recommended that these functions that erode the powers of Councils and Senate, should be deleted. Now going beyond these functions, the operation of the NUC with respect to its powers has over the years, also generated heated controversy.

One such issue of controversy is the National Minimum Standards and Establishment of Institute Decree No. 16. of 1985 which among other things confers on the NUC the 'power to lay down minimum standards for all Universities and other institutions of higher learning in the Federation and the accreditation of their degrees and other academic awards.' The decree also empowers the NUC to send inspectors to Universities in order to ascertain that lecturers are teaching what they are paid to teach. The lecturers are required to make available on demand their lecture notes for inspection by NUC officials. And failure to comply attracts a five hundred Naira fine or six months imprisonment.

A closer examination of Decree No. 16 of 1985 shows that it transferred to the NUC virtually all the functions normally assigned to University Senates and Councils especially sections 15(1), (2), (3), and sections 17, 18 and 22 (ASUU 1986:38; or ASUU 1987:27). As the Senate of the University of Ife (now Obafemi Awolowo University (OAU)) argued, many of the provisions of the Decree are not in consonance with the conventional role of the University. It argued further that the Decree conflicts with the University of Ife Edict No. 14 of 1970 and therefore seeks to trample upon the University autonomy (See University of Ife 1986 Senate Paper No. 2594).

Acting in accordance with its function and its newly conferred power, the NUC in 1987 directed that the Faculty of Law of the University of Ilorin should be closed down. In a directive signed by the Executive Secretary of NUC, ordering the closure of the faculty, reasons were given for the order. These include (a) non approval of the Faculty by NUC, (b) inadequate staffing strength, (c) financial stringency of government, (d) flouting of directives of NUC by the University administration (e) lack of a stated approval of the Faculty by the Council on Legal education and (f) the absence

of the Faculty from the 4th development plan of the University (See ASUU UNILORIN BRANCH 1987:1). In a letter to the Executive Secretary of NUC, ASUU expressed shock at the order to close the Faculty and urged NUC to rescind its decision (ASUU 1987(d):3). ASUU had earlier observed in a communique after its National Executive Meeting that the closure was a systematic way of subverting the autonomy of Universities in complete disregard of the wishes of the broader community (ASUU 1987(a):3).

The issue of rationalization of courses and retrenchment of staff became very contentious following the NUC order for the closure of the Faculty of Law of the University of Ilorin. Rationalization of courses and Retrenchment of staff are issues which bother on the functions of the Senate and University Council respectively as earlier noted. Therefore the exercise of these powers by the NUC was seen as an encroachment into the autonomy of the Universities.

Some other various actions of the NUC were also considered a threat to UAAF. For instance, ASUU in 1981 observed that sometimes Universities receive directives

from the NUC in the name of the Head of State/President, and many of such directives contradict the laws governing the Universities (ASUU 1981:57). Another example is the NUC policy on Funding Regulation, on promotions and Appointments in the Universities. This policy which is popularly called the '15-25-60 funding regulation', introduced a quota system in staff appointment and promotion. It allocates 15% of the staff strength in a department to professorial cadres (i.e. Reader/Professor); then 25% to senior lecturer cadre, and 60% to the lecturer I-Assistant Lecturer cadres. This quota policy on staff promotion was seen by ASUU as an infringement on University autonomy. According to it, the issue in question is one that should be handled autonomously by each University, taking into account each University's peculiar circumstances (ASUU 1981(b)&(c)).

It was on the basis of the fear expressed by ASUU with respect to the role of NUC in the erosion of UAAF, that ASUU (1981:61) called for the substitution of NUC with the University Service Commission (USC) which would perform functions that are not inimical to the exercise of UAAF.

6.1.3.6: The Federal Ministry of Education
Vis-a-Vis the Erosion of U.A.A.F.

The Federal Ministry of Education occupies a prime position in the management of educational affairs in Nigeria. The Minister of Education is vested among other things, with the responsibility of higher education. In performing this crucial function, the Minister is assisted by a director of higher education, who in turn is assisted by a very senior officer in charge of N.U.C matters in the Ministry.

The role of the Ministry of Education in the management of Universities was a subject of controversy between ASUU and the government. Specifically, the actions of the Minister were highly repugnant to ASUU leadership which on several occasions called for his removal. ASUU leadership saw the increasing role of the Minister in University matters as incursion into the self-governing status of Universities.

As we observed earlier, there were a lot of students' crisis in the Universities between 1978 and 1988. One of the consequences of this was the direct involvement of the Ministry of Education in the management of the crisis. This however attracted severe criticisms from ASUU leadership

on several occasions. Let us now examine some of the actions of the Ministry which were seen by ASUU as incursion into the self-governance of Universities.

In 1986, the Minister of Education held a meeting with heads of tertiary institutions. The outcome of this meeting had far-reaching impact on the exercise of UAAF. One of the decisions taken for instance, was that the reopening of any institution closed after a students' crisis would depend on the extent of the crisis. For example, the Minister of Education was alone empowered to reopen Universities when the crisis that led to a closure was part of a national development or involved loss of lives or destruction of properties. Another decision was the power given to Vice-Chancellors to close down their Universities in emergencies and later report to Senate and the Minister of Education. Furthermore, each University was directed by the Minister to set up a committee to recommend ways in which, without infringing on the freedom of expression and academic freedom, students are not indoctrinated by lecturers. The Minister also directed that all institutions should submit to the Federal Ministry of Education, within two weeks, reports on the students' crisis which took place there. It was equally

decided that deductions of union dues for ASUU from salaries of academic staff, should stop with effect from July 1986. ASUU was however given the option to collect the dues by itself. (See Federal Ministry of Education 1986: Minutes of a meeting between the Minister and Heads of Higher Institutions).

In 1987, the Ministry issued a circular to the Universities which directed that no University staff should attend Conferences and Seminars abroad without the Minister's approval (ASUU 1987(a):3). It was not surprising therefore that at the University of Benin, Dr. Festus Iyayi, a radical scholar and then the National President of ASUU, was prevented from honouring an invitation from the Union of Soviet Writers* and the Soviet Government, to participate at an International Writers' Conference in Moscow (See ASUU 1987(a):4). The Minister's directive and the action on Dr. Iyayi were seen by ASUU as gross violation of University laws and a deliberate attempt to stifle the opportunities of academics to expand their intellectual horizons (See also ASUU 1987(a):3).

Then in 1988, following the April nation-wide workers' strike and students' demonstration against the government's withdrawal of fuel subsidy, the government ordered that

four Universities should remain closed for what the Minister described as 'intolerable acts of vandalism and lawlessness carried out by their students' (Aminu 1988a Press Release). The power to re-open these four closed Universities was vested exclusively with the president of the country. The Minister also announced that 'any University which is closed down from now as a result of unrest, will similarly remain closed indefinitely. In that event, all federal government subventions to the institution shall sieze immediately and the federal government will review the position of the staff who would then be simply employed doing nothing. Any member of staff who is found to be in any way involved in inciting students, directly or indirectly will be dismissed from the services of the institution of learning in the public interest' (Aminu, 1988a Press Release).

ASUU in its series of reactions saw these decisions as measures to reduce Universities to gloried secondary schools. As one of its outspoken leaders observed much latter, the politicization of internal University management has emptied University autonomy of its halo (See Darah, 1989:15).

We shall now round up our presentation of cases with a citation of few miscellaneous ones.

6.1.3.7: Further Cases of Erosion of UAAF

6.1.3.7(a) Ban on Use of Public Facilities for Seminars: About 1985, the federal government issued a circular banning the use of public facilities for Seminars and Symposia. This action was seen by ASUU as being primarily directed against its members and as an attempt to limit academic freedom (ASUU 1986: 19; See also ASUU 1987:11).

6.1.3.7(b) Prohibition of Academics from Participation in Politics:

The ban on academics participating in political activities, and the subsequent decision of government to summarily dismiss any one found guilty of it, was seriously contested by ASUU as a curtailment of the right of its members to associate with others for the purpose of acquiring political power. ASUU argued that the ban amounted to pointless exercise which 'will have the effect of robbing the nation of the contribution of great majority of its ablest men and women' (ASUU 1981:48).

6.1.3.7(c) Usurpation of University's Admissions Function by JAMB:

The establishment of the Joint Admissions and Matriculation Board (JAMB) by the federal government, as a central admission body, was seen by ASUU as a usurpation of the right of the Universities to select their own students freely. This function

is one of the issues that border seriously on the erosion of University autonomy. The usurpation of this power enabled government to dictate the criteria for admissions into Universities - some of which infringed on some Universities' preference for students with outstanding records of academic achievement. Again as a result of this usurpation, JAMB now fixes quota for each department and has the power-through a government order, - to cut admissions into Universities. For instance, during the 1987/88 session, the government cut admissions into several Universities to the level of 40% and above. This measure was seen by ASUU as a prelude to the implementation of the controversial policy on rationalization and retrenchment in Universities (See ASUU 1987(g):3).

6.1.3.7(d): Appointment of Members of University Councils

The appointment of members of University Councils by government, is one of the means which the government can utilize to exercise closer and effective control over the Universities. As a result of this, ASUU had over the years pressed for an adequate representation of academics into the Council. ASUU asserted that University Councils were still

being dominated by government representatives - a situation seen as inimical to the exercise of UAAF (ASUU 1987:27).

This implies that even when University Councils are given the freedom to perform its functions, the exercise of such power would be seriously impaired, since government could easily give directives to such councils. The case of the Universities of Lagos in 1980 and that of the University of Benin in 1987 are cited as good examples. In these two cases some academic staff were sacked. When the court issued an injunction in one case, the decision of the council which was based on higher directives prevailed.

6.1.3.7(e) Excision of ASUU From the NLC: In 1986, the government promulgated Decree No. 17 which excised Senior Staff Unions from the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC). By this decree, ASUU was banned from affiliating with the NLC. The decree also abolished the automatic check-off system for ASUU. This measure was severely condemned by ASUU as an assault on its right to make effective input into the development of a genuine working class movement that would play its proper role in the country's quest for progress (ASUU 1987:43).

Having presented the various cases on the erosion of UAAF, we shall now carry out a discussion on the various issues raised. We deliberately avoided discussing the issues in detail as we presented them. The intention was to avoid repetition of issues that overlap while discussing them separately.

6.1.3.8: Discussion

6.1.3.8(a) General Issues

From the results on tables 6.1, 6.2, 6.3 and 6.5, there are enough evidence to believe that as far as academics are concerned, UAAF was (progressively) eroded from 1978 to 1988, and such erosion was one of the major reasons why ASUU went on strike. One of the Vice-Chancellors of the University of Ibadan speaking what one would regard as the mind of other Vice-Chancellors, corroborated the view about the erosion of UAAF when he said that Universities today are not as autonomous as when he first joined the services of the University of Ibadan. According to him, 'the presence of the government is more noticeable in the activities of the Universities than it used to be' (See Quality Magazine 1990:32). Explaining how autonomous Universities should be, he posited:

... On matters of how you set about teaching your curriculum, your syllabus, and so on, you need autonomy there. Autonomy resides in the functions of Senate. When we say Universities should be autonomous, you have in mind that everything should end in council which already has government input. If the government has confidence in the people it puts on council, interference in what goes on in Universities should be very minimal... What one is saying is that freedom of senate should be there and the authority of council should also be guaranteed. Traditionally, Universities are communities which regulate their own internal processes. The tendency has been for Universities to be absorbed into the civil service in the last few years which is not a good thing. I'm all for every University having its own character (Quality Magazine 1990:32) (Emphasis ours).

One of the most critical comments on the erosion of UAAF which we will quote profusely, was made by a former Vice-Chancellor of the University of Lagos Prof. Jacob Ade Ajayi. Writing from personal experiences as a former Vice-Chancellor and one of Nigeria's most distinguished historians, Ajayi boldly said:

The policy of the Federal Government suggests that they know that all is not well with the Universities, but the basic medicine they administer again and again is the curtailment of academic freedom and institutional autonomy. There are those of us, who have consistently argued that you cannot

even begin to diagnose let alone cure the problems of the Universities except on the basis of academic freedom and autonomy...

Disregarding existing contracts, the role of individual University Councils as employers of University staff was made redundant when, under Udoji Salary review, the Universities were brought under public service regulations.... The attempt of the Committee of Vice-Chancellors to run a Central office of Admissions controlled by the Universities was aborted, and government set up JAMB as an independent body under government direction to control admissions to the Universities...

The climax of centralized control was reached when government decided to move Vice-Chancellors round like headmasters of village schools...

One effect of over-centralization... is that appointments of council members and principal officers are politicised, based on various calculations in the Ministry/NUC without regard to the particular needs or even laid down procedures of the Universities... The control of individual University staff has now reached the stage when, like civil servants, it is a crime punishable by dismissal to be branded a radical or to be seen at a political rally or to help draft a political document.

The Minister of Education has ensured that the NUC functions like an arm of his ministry and not like an independent body acting as a buffer between the Universities and the government. He leaves no one in doubt as to who controls government policy on

higher education. His policy is clearly to increase direct government control over the Universities. Constitutionally, this is done through increasing the powers of the NUC over accreditation and rationalization of courses and programmes not only in Federal, but in all Universities in the country...

The government in the reform of the public service proclaims the virtue of deregulation and de-centralization. Government is yet to realise the merit of the same principle in dealing with the Universities (Ajayi 1989). (Emphasis ours).

Having known the views of academics and that of Vice-Chancellors with respect to the fact that UAAF was eroded, it is perhaps apropos to know the opinion of an independent body before we examine that of the government. Commenting on the issue of UAAF, the Cookey Commission observed:

The issue of autonomy and academic freedom is one that has caused so much dissatisfaction among University staff... It seems to us that the present Administration is really determined to restore to the Universities most of the powers previous governments had taken from them. (Cookey Report 1981:121).

And commenting specifically on the role of the NUC, the commission said:

In most of the major memoranda we received from the Universities as well as in oral evidence, allegations were made about the interference of the

NUC in the day-to-day administration of the Universities. Until the 1974 law establishing the NUC, the allegations claimed, the NUC was performing its normal duties well, with hardly any friction between it and the Universities, but since 1974, the NUC had gradually encroached upon the management rights of the Universities... It will suffice here to quote the view of the Justice Mohammed Report of 1978 on the extent to which NUC's influence is felt in the day-to-day administration of our Universities, particularly since the establishment of the new Universities in 1975. The Report observed that the creation of new Universities encouraged the NUC to involve itself in the internal administration of the Universities. Referring to the confusion that arose in 1978 about the announcement of the new fees to be charged in the Universities, paragraph 4.4 of the Report States: 'The creation of new Universities did not help matters, as most of them had neither a council nor a decree establishing them. In the circumstances, the NUC was drawn more and more into making certain decisions for them which when applied to the older ones meant an encroachment on powers already granted to them by law.' (Cookey Report 1981:64) (Emphasis added)

It is on the basis of these observations that the Cookey Commission recommended that 'the autonomy of the University governing councils which has been eroded in recent years should be restored to them;' and that 'vestiges of control which stifle University autonomy should be removed' (Cookey Report 1981:132, and 143). Also commenting on UAAF with respect to the role of the Visitor, a non Nigerian Professor of Law at Boston University once observed:

It would seem that the proliferation of internal University functions of the Nigerian Visitor may actually imperil his role as a settler of domestic disputes. He has become in a sense less a 'visitor' and more a 'resident' of the University Community. (Harvey 1978:81).

Having noted the views of an adhoc commission (study group), it will be relevant now to note those of the governments. As far back as 1979, the then President of Nigeria, in a convocation speech at the University of Ilorin on the 3rd of November, observed:

I am, therefore, relieved to find that a group which recently conducted a study of a situation prevailing in our Universities found that reasonable freedom is at present guaranteed in the Nigerian Universities in the determination of what is taught and how it is taught, research and dissemination of its result, and in the appointment of staff, excluding, of course, the appointment of Vice-Chancellors.

The, group however, identified areas in which the Universities consider their traditional area of authority to be threatened and eroded. These areas include appointment and transfer of Vice-Chancellors, dismissal of University staff, harmonization of conditions of Service with those of the civil service, infringement of what they consider traditional areas of University autonomy like determination of growth and the solicitation and receipt of aid.

(See Aminu 1978:363, or Aminu 1986:67). Secondly he argues that 'University autonomy is not a pre-requisite to academic freedom... These proponents make University autonomy seem an indispensable companion to academic freedom' (Aminu 1986:67 or 107). Thirdly, he maintains that 'academic freedom... has never been directly challenged in Nigeria, regardless of claims made in this respect. People conduct their research as they like, interpret their findings as they deem fit, and publish where they like when they choose.' (Aminu 1986:107).

It is difficult to show as the Minister argues that erosion of University autonomy does not impair the exercise of academic freedom. This is because the two though can be separated, are nevertheless closely intertwined. In fact as the Minister himself admitted, academic freedom can indirectly be interfered with by the denial of the wherewithal to undertake research (See Aminu 1986:107).

Again, at the time the Minister made these arguments, Decree No. 16 of 1985 had not been promulgated. Although as a top government official, one does not expect that he would easily agree to the contrary view which challenges the policies he significantly shaped.

In spite of these views the Minister actually came to terms with reality when he agreed that indeed the special position of the Universities, has been eroded gradually (See Aminu 1986:68 or 156). He then identified the following factors as some of the reasons 'that may have been responsible for the gradual erosion of the special position of the Universities.' At the risk of repetition, we shall present these factors fully.

- (i) Constitutional changes which have made all Universities... exclusively Federal Government owned. This centralization renders them more liable to Government intervention in their affairs.
- (ii) The nature of Military administration, with hierarchy, stern discipline and swift decision taking...
- (iii) Unification of the Public Service. This had the most serious effect on the special position of the Universities.
- (iv) Ascendancy of the Civil Service. This is inevitable in any unelected administration. Where the Civil Servants not only advise Government on the Universities,

but are made the custodians of the conditions of service in the Universities, the results are predictable.

- (v) Transient cash flow problems in the country. These are the sort of occasions bureaucracies find convenient to impose undue restrictions in the name of conserving scarce national resources on behalf of Government...
- (vi) Allegations of financial recklessness or mismanagement directed against the Universities, often started and encouraged by the University staff themselves...
- (vii) Problems of internal governance in the Universities - where there is undue authoritarianism, lack of initiative, lack of dedication to University ideals, or corruption, the institution is inviting external interference. This is usually triggered off by rumours, lobbying, petitions, industrial action by workers or by student unrest. Interference eventually does come under these circumstances.
(Aminu 1986:156 - 157; See also p. 68).

Having heard these from a person who was actively involved in

the management of higher education from 1975 to 1989, the question as to whether University autonomy and academic freedom was eroded, should be put to rest regardless of some official pretensions to the contrary. Although Aminu has given us above some of the reasons why the special positions of universities (a phrase he preferred to UAAF) was gradually eroded, it is still very important to probe further into the dominant motive behind the erosion of UAAF. But before this, it is important to note some of ASUU's official reactions against the erosion of UAAF.

Reacting to various assaults on UAAF, ASUU in its National Delegates' Conference held at the Bayero University Kano in March 1981, 'resolved to continue to fight for University autonomy and academic freedom, with respect to the right of academics to select their students; the right to teach, research and publish according to their understanding without direct or indirect censorship; and the right to free political expression and participation in the political processes of the country (ASUU 1981(b):4).

In 1980 while reacting to the removal of some academics at the University of Lagos by the Visitor, ASUU seriously contended that 'the Visitor has absolutely no powers under the laws and statutes of either the University of Lagos in particular or other Nigerian University in general, to direct that academic and administrative staff other than the Vice-Chancellor, be removed' (ASUU, 1980(a), see also ASUU 1981(a):7; ASUU 1981(b):5). Consequently in 1981, ASUU decried the role of the

Visitor much of which could not be reconciled with the much cherished ideals of University autonomy (See ASUU-1981:57).

Then reacting in 1987 against the dismissal of some of its members (including its former national president) ASUU (1987c) condemned the dismissal as an illegal, unjustified and unjustifiable act aimed at ridiculing, embarrassing and undermining ASUU and its cherished ideals and objectives.

From 1978 to 1988, there was hardly any year that the issue of erosion of UAAF was not a contentious one. The issue was so dear to ASUU that during one of its longest strikes, ASUU declared that it cannot go back to the classroom unless University autonomy is guaranteed and the constitutional right of political association and expression of its members, is accepted and respected (ASUU, 1981(d):5).

Now the crucial question before us is: why were the various governments gradually eroding UAAF in spite of their occasional pronouncements to the contrary? This question is very important in our effort to unravel the roots of ASUU-Government Conflict.

6.1.3.8(b) Motive Behind Erosion of UAAF

In order to probe deeper into the reasons and dominant motive behind the erosion of UAAF, we asked the respondents to show the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with certain

reasons provided as possible causes of erosion of UAAF.

The results of this are found in tables 6.17, and 6.18.

Table 6.17: Opinion of Respondents on the Possible Reasons behind the Erosion of UAAF.

Possible Reasons behind the Erosion of UAAF	Number of Respondents and Percentage					Total
	Strongly Agree	Agree	Dis-agree	Strongly Disagree	Undecided	
Lecturers are abusing UAAF by frequently challenging government policies	12 (4%)	26 (8%)	75 (25%)	158 (53%)	29 (10%)	300 (100%)
Lecturers hide under UAAF to indoctrinate students	5 (2%)	11 (4%)	93 (31%)	158 (53%)	33 (11%)	300 (100%)
Governments just really wanted to curb the radical orientation of Universities	115 (38%)	139 (46%)	10 (3%)	13 (4%)	23 (8%)	300 100*
Total	132 (44%)	176 (58%)	178 (59%)	329 110%	85 29%	900 (300%)

* Rounded up.

Table 6.18: Mean Responses on each of the Possible Reasons behind the Erosion of UAAF.

Possible Reasons	Mean Responses
Lecturers abuse UAAF	3.2
Lecturers indoctrinate students	3.3
Government wanted to curb the radical orientation of Universities	1.8

The results in tables 6.17 and 6.18 show that the respondents rejected the view that the reasons for eroding UAAF are (i) the belief that lecturers are abusing it by frequently challenging government policies and (ii) that lecturers hide under it to indoctrinate students. On the other hand, 84% of the respondents accepted the view that the major reason for eroding UAAF was because government wanted to curb the radical orientation of Universities. Within each of these two tables however there are contradictory findings. First from these tables, we observe that the respondents rejected the view that part of governments' reasons for eroding UAAF is that academics were abusing UAAF by hiding under such to over-criticize the governments or

indoctrinate students. Yet on the other hand, the respondents accepted the view that a major reason for erosion of UAAF is that the government just wanted to curb the radical orientation of Universities. Perhaps it was not obvious to many academics that as far as the government was concerned, the incessant criticisms of government by academics, the radical orientation of Universities, the alleged indoctrination of students and the incessant violent students demonstration, are abuse of UAAF. In any case, when we refer back to table 6.16 we find enough support for our claim that part of the reasons for erosion of UAAF is that governments felt that academics were abusing such, by over-criticizing the governments. In that table (6.16), respondents agreed that a major reason for governments' anti-intellectual posture is a feeling of insecurity as a result of incessant criticisms by academics.

Referring back to the Anya Committee on Academic Freedom, we recall that government worry over the exercise of UAAF is not in doubt. For instance the then government wanted the Anya Committee to work out a code of conduct for staff and students of Universities necessary for upholding academic freedom. We also recall that the governments expect the Universities to equip the

students with the knowledge and attitude that are supportive of the social system. But of course the reaction of Anya Committee is highly instructive. According to it, the government was wrong to 'presume that there is a prescriptive requirement for Universities to support all social system.' And as it concludes, 'the greatest contribution of the Nigerian Universities is not a blind support of all social situations, but its ability to save the nation from even temporary error by always pointing to the human values which are not only universal but necessary for our survival.'

Again a top official of the Federal Ministry of Labour, Employment and Productivity while commenting on the exercise of UAAF regreted that 'some of the grievances of ASUU were subterfuges for unbridled radicalism and ventilation of pen-up grievances.' He further regreted that 'it is obvious that in some Universities, the ideological teachings of some of the academics tend to incite the students against the governments.'

The observations in the last two paragraphs, show that governments were actually worried over the way academics used their UAAF. But if the citations in the preceding paragraphs

provide good evidence that governments felt threatened over the use of UAAF, a critical examination of Aminu's works provide additional and rich insights. Indeed, the views expressed by Aminu provide a better clue as to why the various governments intervened unnecessarily in the internal management of Universities.

According to Aminu:

Another source of 'disillusionment' with the Universities has been the conduct of staff and students in public affairs in the country. Student indiscipline, leading to violence and destruction of public and private property and molestation of innocent ordinary citizens, as happened in 1978, and what may be unfairly seen as the poor performance of some University men in public offices, did not help. Finally, some insecure Governments saw well and ill-motivated public policy criticisms by University men as subversion and the University attracted attention as centres of subversion - with searches, arrests, detentions and the like (Aminu 1986:68).

Aminu's observation should be seen in the light of what happened after the 'Ali Must Go' students' crisis of 1978. As we noted earlier, some radical academics were removed by the government for their role during that crisis. We will now present the statements made by some of them as evidence that government did

not take kindly the way academics were exercising their freedom. Immediately after the students crisis of 1978, three well known radical academics of the University of Ibadan, supported the students' demonstration and then condemned both the government and the capitalist system being operated. According to them:

We want to point out that during this period when the people's rights are being systematically contracted, we have witnessed an unprecedented expansion of the social and economic rights and privileges of the ruling elite. The class partisanship of the consolidating of the right and privileges of the elite and the simultaneous contraction of the rights of the masses, is blatantly undisguised.

For the historical records, we want to point out that it is the students as a group who have persistently and courageously resisted this pattern of mass repression by bourgeois militarism. We salute this historical role which our students' movement has been playing in our contemporary national life. (Oni, Onimode and Onoge, et al, 1978:23).

Then, castigating the prevailing capitalist system as the root of Nigeria's problems, they observed: 'the crucial factor is that in a neo-colonial capitalist economy such as ours, these resources which should be used for realizing the basic needs of all the people, are monopolised and directed for realizing the selfish

objectives and distorted priorities of the ruling elite' (Oni, Onimode and Onoge et al 1978:25-26). Is it a surprise that following the Mohammed's Commission that looked into that crisis, these lecturers among others were dismissed for 'teaching what they were not paid to teach'? Government's intention of sacking them was very clear - to get the Universities rid of radical intellectuals.

Again another group of lecturers who for reasons unknown to us escaped the dismissal order gave their total and unqualified support to the students' demonstration. One of these lecturers became few years later, the national president of ASUU. According to this group of lecturers:

We the undersigned members of the academic staff of the University of Ife wish to make the following statement in total, unqualified support of Nigerian University students under the umbrella of the National Union of Nigerian Students (NUNS)...

Free Education will Rise on the Ashes of the Present Wage System!
Destroy the Salary 'Ilabe'!
Destroy the Contractual Plunder!
(Osoba, Jeyifo et al, 1978:29-30)

It is instructive to note that after the 'Ali Must Go' students' crisis, the then federal government and indeed successive ones,

took closer and active interest over the activities of radical intellectuals in the Universities. This point is very important and should be kept at the back of our minds for us to have a thorough and proper grasp of the dynamics of ASUU-Government Conflict. The 1978 episode was just the beginning of what became later a perennial conflict between ASUU and the various governments Over the management of Nigeria's political economy in general, and Nigeria's higher education problems in particular. The various governments therefore interpreted the posture of ASUU on national issues as being anti-government or anti-establishment. ASUU was regarded as being permanently confrontational in its attitudes and actions towards the governments. It was such thinking on the part of government that actually determined its attitudes and actions towards the Universities. It also provided for it a rational ground for interfering in the internal matters of Universities. For as Aminu (1986:108 & 1989:13) argued if Universities are seen or believed to be working against government interests, by being identified with what is rightly or wrongly regarded as dissidence; or if some of its staff engage in political activities or in what Governments consider to be incitement, destructive criticisms or outright

subversion; or if their students engage in vandalism with destruction of property and even blockage of highways; Governments have to interfere, for after all University autonomy cannot remove the proprietor's right. Aminu (1986:108) then cautions that University staff and students should appreciate the damage to the system their actions occasion when out of grievance or nature, take delight in abusing leaders of the Government.

As far as the governments were concerned, University academics were abusing UAAF. And quoting Austin Dennis to derive home this point, Aminu (1986:107) ruefully asked: 'Autonomy - how many privileges have been safeguarded in thy name?' (Emphasis ours). Aminu (1986:107) then argued that UAAF 'are convenient issues often used as a cover to campaign for others like improved conditions of service.'

And still defending government interference in the internal affairs of Universities, Aminu (1986:108) argued that Universities through their internal lapses here and there, invite government interference. These according to him, include lobbies by University men, and the wild allegations of scandals, fraud, maladministration, etc that aggrieved or disgruntled staff make directly or using students, workers or any

combination of these. Arguing further, he asserts, that University men even use the invitation to outside interference as a threat to have their usually illegitimate ways in the Universities. This he said, makes the position of the Universities quite contradictory on the issue of University autonomy. For instance, when the interference from government is seen to be in their favour, they term it 'a timely intervention to save the situation,' and when it is not, it is called a 'flagrant violation of academic freedom and University autonomy', hence the 'Universities sometimes want both to eat their autonomy cake and have it' (Aminu 1986:106). Aminu then further argued that if government feels that Universities have become tribalised, and should be reformed by appointing a new Vice-Chancellor from another cultural or linguistic area, all sorts of occurrences can be expected, such as posting the Vice-Chancellor (Ibid).

There is perhaps no doubt that some of these lapses do exist in Nigerian Universities (for after all the Universities are in some respect part of the decadent Nigerian Society) or that they could have attracted government interference, as Aminu argued. But the crucial point however, is that what we

may here call the 'internal lapses theory' can hardly explain a lot of cases of interference and erosion of UAAF. For instance were internal lapses responsible for the promulgation of Decree No. 16 of 1985; the excision of ASUU from NLC; the usurpation of Universities' admission function by JAMB; the skewed membership of University Council in favour of government; the ban on use of public facilities for seminars and symposia; prohibition of academics from participation in political activities; or even the dismissal of radical lecturers from Universities? Aminu's internal lapses theory is therefore too weak to explain the main motive behind the erosion of UAAF.

But again, one of Aminu's further arguments contradicts his position above. For instance, he concedes that when it comes to issues which have important political repercussions, or which affect 'peace, order and good government,' the government has to interfere. Such interference depends to a large extent on the prevailing mood of the Government-University relationship, and of the pet ideas and prejudices of the rulers. Even though he argues that the prevailing mood rather than any fundamental philosophy determines how Governments deal with Universities, he

concedes that the prevailing mood are influenced by factors such as contemporary political, economic and security situations in the country, the image of staff and students among other things (Aminu 1986:107). But in making this concession Aminu forgets the fact that the factors he identified were actually the things that constituted government's fundamental philosophy which in turn determined largely its attitude and actions towards the Universities. In fact, the radical posture of academics (or ASUU) - which the governments were trying to curb through erosion of UAAF, - was actually a product of a fundamental principle of rejecting the prevailing capitalist system which was seen as the root of Nigeria's socio-economic and political problems. We shall return to this in section 6.1.5. Meanwhile, it suffices to state clearly that ASUU leadership openly and unequivocally rejected the prevailing capitalist order which the ruling class seriously defended and nurtured. And consequently, its rejection, as well as its struggle to change the prevailing social order, really complicated its conflict with the governments. For instance, it made the conflict to assume the character of an asymmetric and structure-oriented conflict, (a permanent or perennial antagonism). But much more relevantly, it largely

accounted for why the various governments tried to erode UAAF which they saw as a convenient cover for radicalism among academics. Specifically speaking, it determined inter alia, why (i) some radical academics were dismissed or deported, (ii) University laws were sometimes disregarded by governments, and (iii) the powers of the visitor, NUC, JAMB and the Federal Ministry of Education, were all strengthened at the expense of University Councils and Senates. And as we demonstrated earlier in section 6.1.1, it largely determined government's funding policy towards the Universities.

The fact that is worth emphasizing therefore is that the erosion of UAAF was not merely accidental and expediential, it was much more importantly a policy that consistently aimed at regimenting the Universities that were fast becoming too 'hot' or radical for the governments to accommodate and tolerate. In fact, it was a policy aimed at curbing the radical orientation of Universities and consequently making them supportive of the prevailing social order.

The erosion of UAAF should rightly be seen in the light of the clash of ideological principles between the government (ruling class) and radical academics. This framework of analysis

provides a better explanation than the 'internal-lapses theory' or 'the checklist of factors that eroded the special position of Universities,' as put forward by government officials.

6.1.3.8(c) Conclusion

From the data presented so far on the erosion of UAAF, there are enough evidence to uphold the hypothesis that 'the motive behind the erosion of UAAF by the government was to curb the radical orientation of Universities and consequently make them supportive of the prevailing social order.'

The framework that guided this conclusion can be re-stated as follows: The educational system particularly the tertiary level, is a major ideological apparatus of the ruling class. Although not all the intellectuals in the educational system share the same ideological conviction with the ruling class, the entire educational system is nevertheless expected to serve the dominant interests of the ruling class. One of the major functions it performs, is to generate and propagate ideas that help further to legitimize the prevailing social order. And in the process of doing this, it helps to breed students and people in society, that share and defend the dominant ideas of the ruling class.

But if on the contrary, the educational system, begins to produce students that reprobate rather than accept the dominant ideas of the prevailing social order, the ruling class will not sit on the fence and watch the liquidation of its empire. It could therefore adopt any measure to obviate any threat to the prevailing social order.

The history of the role of Nigerian higher educational system since 1978 as an ideological instrument of the state, shows that the ruling class had enough reason to feel threatened. The educational system challenged its legitimacy. And its corresponding reactions equally demonstrated that it was irrevocably committed to the ideas of the prevailing social order. Hence the realization by ASUU in 1981, that the main reason for the erosion of UAAF, was the impression in government circles that 'Universities are citadels of unpatriotism and subversive activities.' As ASUU elaborated:

The main reason for the incursion into Academic Freedom and University Autonomy, ... is that the vocal intellectuals in the Universities constitute a big threat to the existence of the powerful ones in the Society. These people wield significant influence in the corridors of power. They include powerful public officials, businessmen (nouveau riche), agents of multinational corporations, etc. These powerful

people fear the vocal intellectuals because of the latter having chosen to be society's conscience, frequently analyze Government policies, expose corruption and graft among public officials and businessmen and attack neocolonial exploiters. Consequently, it is felt that University dons should be silenced and Universities seriously controlled by Government all in a bid to safeguard the interest of our exploiters. (ASUU 1981:D6-D7).

Our conclusion is that government's reaction to ASUU radicalism can be understood in terms of the necessity imposed on it by the imperatives of capitalist survival i.e. to secure the conditions for expansion of capital in general at a time of rising working class resistance to oppression and exploitation.¹²

6.1.4: The Issue of Poor Remuneration and Conditions of Service in Nigerian Universities

Looking back at tables 6.1 - 6.3, we recall that the issue of poor remuneration or poor conditions of service generally, was not identified as one of the three major causes of ASUU strikes. We saw for instance that in table 6.2, it was poorly rated as one of the causes of the strikes. This shows that when compared with the other three causes (under-funding, erosion of UAAF and poor working facilities) poor remuneration was not a major cause of the strikes. And, since it was not totally

rejected like the issue of radicalism among union leaders, it means that it was nevertheless a relevant cause of the strikes. This supports the work of Kadish (1968:160), Harrison and Tabory (1980), O'tobo (1987) and Mandel (1969) that academics unionize or go on strikes in order to enhance their economic well-being.

As we noted in section 6.1.D., the results of tables 6.1 - 6.3, vindicate the statements made by NAUT in 1977 in which the issue of financial compensation was not considered among the two principal factors that can determine whether an intellectual would like to join the academic profession, or whether those already in the profession would decide to remain or quit. Again tables 6.1 - 6.3 confirm the reason why ASUU in 1981 decided not to call-off its strike even after the Shagari regime announced a new and attractive salary structure for the staff of Universities. In refusing to call-off the strike, ASUU maintained that Nigerian academics are a band of patriots rather than a bunch of mercenaries who are interested in mere salaries and who would jump at the sight of figures. According to ASUU, Nigerian academics are motivated by their love for Nigeria and her University system and not by lust for money. (ASUU 1981(d):5; ASUU 1981(e):2).

Having noted these, we shall now show that although poor remuneration was not considered a major cause of the strikes, it was nevertheless one of the causes of the strikes, for it made a lot of academics to be dissatisfied on their job. We shall explore this argument further by looking at both quantitative and qualitative data. We will start by asking academics to indicate how satisfied they are on their job.

Table 6.19: Opinion of Respondents on how satisfied they are on their Job.

Opinion	Number of Respondents	Percentage (%)
Very satisfied	14	5
Satisfied	88	29
Dissatisfied	160	53
Very Dissatisfied	34	11
Undecided	4	1
Total	300	100*

*Rounded up

Table 6.19 shows that more than half (or 64%, i.e. 53% + 11%) of the respondents are dissatisfied on their job. And among the 34% (i.e. 5% + 29%) of the respondents that are satisfied on their job, we discovered that most of those in the professorial cadre belong to this group. This as we know are people who have reached the pinnacle of their career.

But having found out how satisfied or dissatisfied the respondents are on their job, we sort to know the causes of their dissatisfaction with respect to the issue of poor salary or conditions of service. The results of these are found in the following tables.

Table 6.20: Opinion of Respondents on whether poor salary was a source of their Dissatisfaction.

Opinion	Number of Respondents	Percentage (%)
Yes	206	69
No	16	5
Not applicable/Undecided	78	26
Total	300	100

Table 6.20 shows that 69% of the respondents are not satisfied with their salary. This indicates that poor salary is a source of dissatisfaction among academics and confirms also that it was one of the causes of ASUU strikes. This confirms the findings by Kadish (1968:160), Harrison and Tabory (1980) that academics go on strikes to achieve economic goals.

The next we considered is the question of promotional prospects.

Table 6.21: Opinion of Respondents on whether poor promotional prospects was a source of their Dissatisfaction.

Opinion	Number of Respondents	Percentage (%)
Yes	196	65
No	18	6
Not Applicable/Undecided	86	29
Total	300	100

Table 6.21 confirms the view that poor promotional prospects was a source of dissatisfaction among Nigerian academics. It shows that 65% of the respondents are dissatisfied with the rate at which they are being promoted.

Table 6.22: Opinion of Respondents on whether poor government response to the plight of Universities was a source of their dissatisfaction.

Opinion	Number of Respondents	Percentage (%)
Yes	233	78
No	2	0*
Not Applicable/Undecided	65	22
Total	300	100

*Percentage less than 1.

Table 6.22 shows that more respondents expressed dissatisfaction over poor government response to the plight of Universities. This to them was why the University system is having poor conditions of service.

In tables 6.20 to 6.22, we might have observed that the number of those who indicated that they were dissatisfied was consistently higher than those who indicated such in table 6.19. This is because some of those who indicated that they were satisfied on their job still felt that some aspects of the conditions of service, are not conducive for an effective and efficient performance of their academic duties. For instance a professor in the physical sciences who said he was satisfied on his job, still complained that today there are inadequate laboratory facilities when compared to the time he joined the academic profession.

Table 6.23: Opinion of Respondents on whether the alleged loss of Respect and Prestige associated with lecturing was a source of their Dissatisfaction.

Opinion	Number of Respondents	Percentage (%)
Yes	170	56
No	35	12
Not Applicable/Undecided	95	32
Total	300	100

Table 6.23 shows that the issue of loss of respect and prestige associated with the academic profession, is also a source of dissatisfaction. It is however a source of dissatisfaction for 170 respondents i.e. just slightly above half of the respondents. Some of the respondents still feel that in spite of the neglect of the Universities, the academic profession is still a respected profession. They point to the respect still accorded to the fruits of intellectual endeavours such as break-throughs in the field of science and Technology. This view is in contrast with the one held by some other respondents. According to them, the University system is gradually being turned into a glorified secondary school - the laboratories are poorly equipped; there are no good library with current journals; the Universities System Scale or University Salary Structure (USS) has gradually spread to the other arms of the educational sector etc. These respondents also argue that many businessmen, emergency contractors, politicians etc, who go about displaying their ill-gotten wealth, have rapidly taken away the respect and privilege hitherto enjoyed by learned men. However looking at table 6.23, we observe that there is no doubt that the academic

profession is still being respected. For instance, some academics confirm that those who distinguish themselves in the profession still enjoy international recognition. They pointed to many distinguished Nigerian academics in both the Sciences and Humanities that have received international awards or prizes for their high contribution to the advancement of knowledge.

In addition to the issues we examined in tables 6.20 - 6.23, we asked further questions on whether the poor conditions of service along with other factors, would now induce the academics to leave their profession for better jobs. The results of the questions are presented in tables 6.24 and 6.25.

Table 6.24: Opinion of Respondents about leaving their profession for better jobs.

Opinion	Number of Respondents	Percentage (%)
Yes	187	62
No	106	35
Undecided	7	2
Total	300	100*

*Rounded up

Table 6.24 shows that 62% of the respondents would want to leave their present job for better job. However 35% of the respondents indicated that they would remain in their job in spite of poor working conditions and poor conditions of service. We however discovered that a majority of those who said they would quit the academic profession for a better job, also said that they would actually do so without hesitation. Then we further inquired whether the respondents would still like to be in academics in an advanced country if they quit here in Nigeria as a result of poor conditions of service among other things. Although this question was mainly directed to those who indicated to quit their job, we however found out that a majority of the respondents answered it. The results of this is in table 6.25.

Table 6.25: Opinion of Respondents on whether they would still like to be in academics in advanced countries after quitting in Nigeria.

Opinion	Number of Respondents	Percentage (%)
Yes	234	78
No	32	11
Undecided	34	11
Total	300	100

Table 6.25 confirms the view that most academics in Nigeria have intrinsic love for their profession. This means that given the right working environment most of them would want to remain in academics until they perhaps retire. The table shows that 78% of the respondents would still want to remain in academics under an attractive working environment elsewhere after they must have resigned from it in Nigeria. It follows that the desire of some to quit their job is not because they do not like the job but simply because the conditions under which they work no longer make it interesting for them to continue. For instance, one respondent from the University of Jos said:

I can only stay in academics if I do not get a good job. Academics is no longer for me, because lecturers are poorly paid, people do not appreciate their job, students even hate them and worst of all, government regard them as their worst enemy.

The struggle therefore by academics over the years demonstrate clearly that the issue of poor salary/conditions of service was actually a source of dissatisfaction among them to warrant making it a strike issue. A close look at some of the demands by academics over the years would illustrate this point.

The issue of poor remuneration was already contentious before the formation of ASUU. In 1964 for instance, the Committee of Vice-Chancellors (C.V.C.) set up a sub-committee to make recommendations about salaries in Nigerian Universities. And in 1967, it prepared a joint Memorandum with NAUT which it submitted to the government for a salary review. (See ASUU 1981: 25-26).

In 1970, the Committee of Vice-Chancellors (C.V.C.) made another case for new salary scale before the Adebo Salary Review Commission. In the memorandum to the commission, it argued that the salary scale being operated in the Universities then was introduced in 1958 and as such had become unsatisfactory owing to enormous rise in cost of living. Moreover it observed that salaries in other tropical African Universities with whom Nigeria Universities compete for top flight academic and research staff, were progressively rising over the past ten years while those of Nigerian Universities were left lagging way behind. According to it, in the University of Malawi for example, a professor's basic salary was £4,200 (Four thousand, two hundred pounds), while that of its Nigerian counterpart was £3,000 (Three

thousand pounds) (See C.V.C. Memorandum to Adebo Commission 1970:3&5). The C.V.C also sent memorandum to the Udoji Commission.

Then, NAUT also made a case for improved salary scale during the Adebo Commission, as well as before the Williams Review Committee that came after the Udoji Commission having refused to present Memorandum to the Udoji Commission on the grounds that its establishment was against the spirit of University autonomy (NAUT 1978:39).

The inability of the then government to meet the demands by NAUT as well as the earlier submission by the C.V.C., induced NAUT to embark on the first ever strike by Nigerian academics in 1973. According to its then National Secretary - Comrade Ola Oni - 'the University lecturers have had to take this step because four years of negotiation with University authorities, proved fruitless' (See Otojareri 1981:6). And the then president of NAUT was reported to have said that University teachers can no longer tolerate living in penury on grounds of patriotism (See also Otojareri 1981:6). Making the situation worse was the Government white paper on the Udoji Report in which the University's conditions of service were harmonized with those

of the civil service. Consequently the issue of new salary structure for Universities remained unresolved after the Udoji Commission. And as a result, NAUT in 1977 demanded that Universities should be pulled out of the Unified Public Service. Secondly it demanded that financial remunerations for University teachers should be reviewed with a view to radically restructuring the prevailing salary scale. And thirdly, it demanded that a special Review Commission should be appointed without delay to consider the conditions of Service in the Universities (NAUT 1977: 44 & 45). Earlier in 1976, the University of Nigeria branch of NAUT made a case for a comprehensive review of the salaries of University staff. In paragraph one of its memorandum, it lamented that academics 'have lost all initiative in the matter of being adequately remunerated for work done, especially since the emergence of military rule and the consequent and perhaps inevitable ascendancy of the civil service in the formulation and prosecution of national policies' (University of Nigeria A.U.T; 1976). Lamenting further it said:

Many experienced academics are fleeing from the frustrations of University life into more rewarding and more challenging sectors of our national life. This tragic development is one of the saddest chapters of our national life, but

it could hardly have been otherwise given the current loss of position and status by the Universities (University of Nigeria A.U.T, 1976).

It was against the background of unsuccessful attempts by academics to secure a new and befitting salary structure that ASUU in 1981 made a very strong case for an attractive salary structure before the Cookey Commission. In that year also, poor conditions of service became one of its reasons for going on strike. According to ASUU (1981:36), 'the practice the world over irrespective of social system is to separate University Academic Service from Civil Service'. This it argued 'is because of the Unique nature of University Service,' Justifying its position further, it identified the high standard of degree demanded; the long period of training and preparation needed to qualify; the very high and rigorous requirements needed for promotion, and the fact that University Service is not amenable to the 40-hour week of work that prevails in the civil service; among others, as its main reasons for demanding a different salary structure (ASUU 1981:36).

Between 1981 and 1988, the issue of poor conditions of service featured in most of the demands made by ASUU to the government. See for instance Appendix G for ASUU's log of demands

where in 1987, the issue of poor conditions of service was among the crucial issues raised. And again in 1988, one of the reasons which ASUU listed for going on strike was the delay in the payment of the Elongated Salary Structure to University Staff by the government. Even though ASUU made other demands, the issue of the Elongated Salary Structure was top in the list of demands. It is on record however that government never believed it was a major reason for the strike since ASUU according to it was just being confrontational but using that as a cover.

Whatever is the case, the issue of poor salary and conditions of service, was a source of dissatisfaction among University staff. Although mere fat salary alone does not seem to occupy a high position among other sources of dissatisfaction in the University, our evidence - quantitative and qualitative alike, - strongly demonstrate, that it is nevertheless an issue that should be given adequate attention.

It is perhaps necessary to comment briefly why the issue of poor salary and conditions of service, became a source of dissatisfaction among University academics. Commenting on this, the Cookey Commission observed very elaborately as follows:

From their inception until 1974, Nigerian Universities operated for their staff a salary structure and conditions of service peculiar to themselves and different from those applicable in the civil service and the parastatals. Such conditions provided the necessary flexibility and attraction to prospective employees within and outside the country and in those circumstances the Universities attracted the best brains and were able to retain their devoted service...

Notwithstanding the fact that the Udoji Commission failed to inform itself about the unique nature of the conditions in the Universities, it considered it convenient to include them in the unified public service structure which it recommended and which the Government accepted.

Before harmonization in 1975, the Salaries of University staff were a shade higher than those of equivalent posts in the civil service. The unified structure upset the relativities between the University and the civil service. This upset is, naturally, a main source of dissatisfaction in the Universities (Cookey Report 1981:3).

Although we agree with the Cookey Commission that the upsetting of the relativities between the University and the civil service, was a source of dissatisfaction, we however feel very strongly that there are two other important factors which made academics to be dissatisfied with their conditions of service. One of these factors was the rapid erosion of the purchasing

power of the Naira through devaluation with its concomitant high inflationary situation. The result of this was an unbearable high cost of living which gradually led to the pauperization of workers including those in the academic profession. It latter dawnad on academics that they were increasingly being proletarianized. Proletarianization in this sense is a situation where the position of academics shifted from autonomy to dependence, dominance to subordination, high to low status, and from relatively high to relatively low incomes (See Jonhson 1977:109).

The second factor which is closely related to the first, was the emergence of 'emergency contractors', currupt public officials and the existence of highly attractive conditions of service in the private sector, all of which reduced the hitherto high social status associated with the lecturing profession. The fact that academics occupied higher social status before the 70s, is not in doubt. Even up to the 70s, a study carried out by Ukaegbu in 1975, showed that on the prestige scale, the lecturing profession occupied a second position (See Ukaegbu 1975:57). As Ukaegbu latter observed, the degree of imporatnce attached to any occupation or profession varies with the changing

circumstances in the society (Ukaegbu 1982:49). With respect to our study, such changing circumstances include the ease with which members in the other chosen endeavours of life achieved high material success far above those in the academic profession. The matter was even made worse when many of those who acquired wealth through dubious means, turned round to display such ill-gotten wealth in an ostentatious manner to the utmost chagrin of intellectuals and the civilized community. The matter was not also helped by the fact that the fat salary and attractive conditions of service existing in the private sector brought a situation where young graduates employed in that sector, got salaries that were by far twice of those of their lecturers that produced them. In some banks, the differentials are indeed unimaginable. All these no doubt led to dissatisfaction among academics because they were increasingly rendered socially irrelevant in the scheme of things. For instance, most of them shunned ceremonies that involved donation of money, in order to avoid being embarrassed by young affluent members of the society. The feeling of status loss therefore is no doubt a factor in ASUU-Government Conflict (See Eke, 1988).

6.1.5: The Question of ASUU Radicalism and Confrontational Posture

6.1.5.1 Background

In the opinion of the government, 'ASUU radicalism and confrontational posture' was a major source of conflict between the government and academics. In fact, as far as the government was concerned, ASUU was a union led by few marxist-oriented academics who created the impression that ASUU-Government conflict was a permanent one, resolvable only within the context of a new Social order. It was therefore the strong view of government that ASUU consistently adopted an anti-government posture. Consequently, government saw the actions of ASUU as attempts to transform the prevailing social order. As the Industrial Relations Department of the government succinctly put it, 'some of the grievances of ASUU were subterfuges for unbridled radicalism and ventilation of pent-up grievances.' Indeed this assertion captures fully government's perception of the character of its conflict with ASUU.

Looking back at tables 6.1 to 6.3, we would recall that the opinion of the rank and file of ASUU sharply contrast those of the government, as expressed in the preceding paragraph. In these tables, the rank and file outrightly rejected the view that

'radicalism of Union leadership' was one of the causes of ASUU-Government Conflict. The relevant question now is whether we should - on the basis of the survey data on tables 6.1 to 6.3- reject the proposition that 'ASUU radicalism and confrontational attitude was a major cause of ASUU-Government conflict.' In order to answer this question objectively, we have to examine the ideological character of ASUU rank and file and ASUU leadership and secondly examine the pronouncements and actions of ASUU leadership during the entire period of existence of ASUU.

6.1.5.2 The Ideological Character of ASUU Rank and File

The analysis of our data shows that the ideological character of ASUU rank and file was quite different from that of ASUU leadership. The data on tables C.1 to C.4 (Appendix C) show that the bulk of ASUU members were liberal (right-wing) intellectuals. Although these academics might agitate for reforms and express their disenchantment with the dynamics of the prevailing social order, they however do not approve of any fundamental reforms that would completely transform the prevailing social order. This finding corroborates that of Eke (1988) which showed that majority of the academics he sampled were

oriented towards the ideology of 'mixed economy'. His study showed that radical academics are in the minority. These findings also support the works of Alain (1972) and Ladd and Lipset (1975). They also confirm the view advanced by Shils (1975:41) that 'radical teachers in practically all Universities form a quite small minority, but one which sometimes wields a disproportionate influence, because there are so many other dissatisfactions among those who do not share the radical ideology...'

In any case, the fact is that as a former secretary of ASUU at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, branch observed, the membership of ASUU was made up of people with different ideological orientation. But as a former president of ASUU rightly observed, 'many ASUU members share the same ideology as those in government,' but nevertheless, 'ASUU was a mass organization comprising all shades of ideology.' Furthermore, according to a former secretary of ASUU at the University of Benin branch, the rank and file of ASUU was not radical and progressive although the leadership of ASUU might have been so.

Having established the ideological character of ASUU rank and file, it is now germane to examine that of the leadership of ASUU.

6.1.5.3 The Ideological Character of ASUU Leadership

The data on table C.5 (Appendix) show that out of the 30 former ASUU leaders who filled the rank and file questionnaire, 17 of them (representing 57%) are left-wing academics. This indicates that majority of former ASUU leaders were radical academics. This conclusion is more assertive when we examine more closely the ideological character of the members of ASUU National Executive Council (NEC) which was really the organ responsible for the day to day management of ASUU. As we observed in chapter five, ASUU National Executive Council (NEC) was made up of Principal National Officers and Chairmen of each branch Union of ASUU among others.

Then, in order to classify these leaders, we interviewed some of them (See Methodology in chapter Four) on basic ideological questions such as the most fundamental cause of Nigeria's economic problem and the best solution to this fundamental cause. The result of this is presented in table 6.26.

Table 6.26: Classification of former ASUU leaders on the ideological spectrum.

Ideological Classification	Number of Respondents	Percentage (%)
Left-wing Academics	12	75
Right-wing Academics	2	12.5
Others	2	12.5
Total	16	100

Table 6.26 shows that 75% of the members of NEC of ASUU we sampled hold left-wing ideological views, while only 12.5% share right-wing ideological views. On the other hand, we could not easily classify two former leaders whose views showed no clear ideological predilection. For instance, one of them said that the most fundamental cause of Nigeria's economic problem is the 'lack of dedicated and informed leadership and... courage to adopt nationalistic economic policies.' And proffering a solution, he observed, that 'the problem has primordial roots and its dynamics will provide a solution at the appropriate time.' The other person we could not classify

however showed an inclination towards a left-wing ideology. For instance, according to him, 'the most fundamental cause of Nigeria's economic problem is the inability of the production system to provide the essential needs of the country due to among other things the rudimentary production forces.' And consequently he said that the best solution lies in the development of the production forces and the redirection of our economy to produce our essential and relevant needs.'

The data on table C.5 (Appendix) and table 6.26 above support the proposition that bulk of the members of ASUU leadership were radical academics. On the basis of these, we can now assert that ASUU was a trade union led by few but powerful radical leaders over a predominantly non-radical followers (rank and file). This assertion is very important in any attempt to comprehend the real character of ASUU-Government conflict.

The radical character of ASUU leadership largely shaped the views that ASUU projected to the outside world. In fact, the radical posture of ASUU leadership was effectively 'foisted' on ASUU as a Union to the extent that ASUU consistently held radical views on important national issues. However, when any

crucial issue required the approval of the rank and file, the radical posture of ASUU leadership usually got moderated in the process. In such matters, the liberal views of the rank and file largely determined the course of events. One of such issue that required the consent of the rank and file is that of a strike action. With respect to this, the rank and file only obliged when a strike was usually rationalized on a non-radical ideological terms. For instance, given the radical posture of ASUU leadership, one expected that ASUU would have joined in some of the strikes initiated by the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) that actually challenged the prevailing social order. The failure of ASUU to join in such strikes can be explained on the grounds that the rank and file was not easily mobilized on issues that do not touch on 'bread and butter' objectives or the improvement of professional academic standards. It was against this background that ASUU decided at its principal officers meeting on the 24th of September 1986, that 'greater efforts should be made towards mobilization of rank and file members whose level of consciousness should be raised beyond economism' (See ASUU 1986(d)). And also in the termination of the appointment of Festus Iyayi - ASUU national president - at the University of Benin, the rank and

file showed their reluctance to move along with the radical posture of ASUU leadership. The National Executive Council of ASUU had then requested that referendum be conducted in all the branches to secure the consent of the rank and file for a national strike in protest against Iyayi's termination. This proposed strike was not approved by many ASUU members although a former official of ASUU asserted that NEC got the expected approval. For instance, the A.B.U. branch (one of the largest branches) in rejecting the proposal argued that much as the termination of Iyayi and others at the University of Benin, was grave, it must not be made the basis of a strike action because it has no precedence (See Ifionu et al 1988:25).

The point we are therefore making is that while ASUU leadership used bread and butter issues to mobilize the rank and file very easily - for strikes, it at the same time used such strikes to wage its struggle against the prevailing social order. This confirms Hibbs' (1978:169) thesis that regardless of the larger political visions of many left-wing trade union leaders, most workers are probably mobilized for strike activity not by slogans about workers' seizure of political power but by the narrower economic incentives. Consequently, contrary

to the opinion of the rank and file (vide Supra, tables 6.1 to 6.3) ASUU radicalism and confrontational attitude was actually a major source of ASUU-Government conflict.

The views of ASUU leadership also confirm the proposition that ASUU radicalism was a major source of ASUU-Government conflict. While we shall examine such views latter, it suffices now to recount the views of some of the leaders of ASUU we interviewed.

According to the former General Secretary of ASUU, 'the vocal and critical views of ASUU on the management of the economic and political affairs are also source of the conflict with Government that has often been insensitive.' An ex-branch Chairman of ASUU at the University of Ibadan on his part also agrees with the proposition which he articulated as follows:

There are three basic sources of the conflict. Firstly, there is disagreement over Government policies. ASUU tends to be more radical than Government. Secondly, the policy process does not permit effective participation by ASUU. Thirdly, ASUU sees itself not merely as a trade union but as a mouthpiece of all under-privileged persons.

Furthermore, an ex-branch chairman of ASUU at the University of Benin who latter became its national president also recognized

the fact that Government was very sensitive to ASUU's radical posture. According to him, government was very suspicious of and hostile towards anything that is intellectually oriented, and equally hated divergent opinions.

Also a former branch Chairman of ASUU at Lagos State University, agreed with the proposition and then posited that opposition from ASUU was perceived by government as confrontation to its privileged position. And a former executive member of University of Lagos branch equally contends that 'government's perception of ASUU as a subversive or militant organization' was also a catalyst in the conflict.

Finally another ex-national president of ASUU from Bayero University Kano summed it up when he observed that there was the perception on the part of government that University staff are anti-government.

We shall now provide additional documentary evidence to substantiate our proposition that ASUU radicalism was a major source of the conflict.

6.1.5.4 Further Evidence on the Radical Posture of ASUU Leadership

Addressing a National Delegates' Conference of ASUU in 1986 at the University of Ife, (now OAU) the Vice-Chancellor of that University observed that ASUU has emerged today - in spite of the relatively privileged position of its members within the labour movement - as an arch defender of the interests of the poor, oppressed and exploited members of our society (See Komolafe 1986:9).

The radical tradition of ASUU which the Vice-Chancellor talked was no doubt established during the formative years of ASUU but it was perhaps effectively and firmly established during the tenure of Biodun Jeyifo as ASUU national president. As Komolafe (1986:9) observed 'since 1980 when Dr. Biodun Jeyifo became ASUU's president, the leadership of the Union at national and in some chapter levels, have been penetrated by scholars with working-class consciousness...'. Supporting this assertion also, one of the participants at the Ife National Delegates' Conference in 1986 observed that the 'trade union outlook of ASUU is a product of the activities of progressive scholars in the union in the last seven or so years' (See Komolafe 1986:9).

It was therefore customary for any person elected the president of ASUU to affirm his commitment to this radical tradition. For instance Iyayi declared in 1986 (after being elected) that he would be committed to ASUU tradition of seeing and explaining issues through a radical and progressive approach (See Komolafe 1986:9). Writing about Iyayi's radical orientation, Komolafe (1986:9) said:

His radical orientation and activities in the labour movement are of common knowledge. Iyayi's anger with the system are best translated in his two widely read proletarian novels: Violence and The Contract.

Apart from Iyayi, most ASUU presidents and other officers were committed radical scholars. And this was evident from the pronouncements made by them either as individuals or officials of ASUU. A review of some of these pronouncements - which reflected a preference for a total transformation of the prevailing social order, - would now be carried out in order to substantiate our thesis.

In 1978, after the 'Ali Must Go' students' crisis, a prominent radical intellectual who latter became ASUU General Secretary observed in a joint article as follows:

The present crisis like others preceding it must, therefore, be historically and structurally anchored in the bastardized capitalist political economy which we inherited from the Western Atlantic Community into which we are now deeply emerging ourselves (Eteng and Nwala, 1978:6).

Still commenting on Nigeria's economic problem, they added most virulently:

These pathologies constitute a genre whose mundane origin is traceable to the destructive, neo-colonized 'trading post' Capitalism to which the Nigerian leadership and its capitalist legitimizers have tenaciously clung. It is this system which operates as an appendage of the world capitalist hegemony that is gradually destroying all of us (Eteng & Nwala, 1978:6).

We will recall that in section 6.1.3.8(b), the views of some radical academics who supported the 'Ali Must Go' students' violent demonstration of 1978 were recounted as evidence that some important ASUU members supported the 1978 students' crisis usually regarded by government as attempts at a 'revolutionary change of government.' And it was from this period that government started very seriously to see ASUU as a radical organization. In any case, the pronouncements of ASUU as we will now show tended to lend credence to government thinking.

In its Annual Delegates' Conference held at the Bayero University Kano in 1981, ASUU clearly adopted an anti-imperialist/

capitalist posture. In its communique it noted with grave concern the role of international capitalist forces in Nigeria's economy. It consequently condemned unequivocally the growing foreign domination of Nigeria's economy by international capitalist forces (See ASUU 1981(b)). From 1981 to 1983, ASUU did not hide its aversion to the prevailing social order. The strike of 1981 and its aftermath, provided her the opportunity of exposing how the capitalist system being operated by Nigeria was the root of all its socio-economic and political problems.

However a remarkable period in the anti-imperialist/anti-capitalist activities of ASUU was between 1984 and 1988. In 1984, ASUU organized a national conference on 'The State of the Nigerian Economy.' The Conference which was held at the University of Benin was an epoch making event in the anti-imperialist/capitalist struggle of ASUU. In its widely publicized communique (now published in a pamphlet titled 'How to save Nigeria'), ASUU made a critical anatomy of the Nigerian economy, and then identified the following as the roots of Nigeria's economic crisis:

- (a) the incorporation of Nigeria into world capitalism by colonial imperialism;

- (b) Nigeria's dependent and weak position within a declining and crisis-ridden world capitalist system;
- (c) the exploitation and control of Nigeria's resources by multinational corporations;
- (d) the presence of a local exploiting class whose members aid the foreign firms to steal Nigeria's wealth and transfer it abroad;
- (e) government repression and oppression of workers through decrees, labour laws and policies, and wage freeze;
- (f) the stealing on a massive scale by foreign and Nigerian contractors, politicians, distributors and Commission agents who do not contribute to production (ASUU 1984a:2-3).

ASUU then rejected governments claim that 'the crisis is due to world-wide recession and a fall in oil revenue' (p.4).

Consequently ASUU concluded that:

no ex-colonial capitalist country has attained economic independence without first undergoing a thorough anti-imperialist and democratic revolution. Nigeria cannot and WILL NOT be an exception to this rule. Conference therefore calls on the Nigerian working and oppressed people to struggle for the constant deepening

of the democratic content and patriotic consciousness of the society so that a system can be created that ensures just and equitable distribution of power and resources (ASUU 1984a:22-23).

Again in 1986, ASUU reiterated its anti-imperialist/capitalist conviction in a memorandum it presented before the Akambi Panel of Inquiry into the May 1986 Education Crisis in Nigeria. In that memorandum, ASUU, re-emphasized its resolutions at the Benin Conference of 1984, and then asserted once more that the 'root cause of our recurrent crisis is the indisputable fact of domination by International capitalism' (See ASUU, 1986: 26; or ASUU, 1987:17).

And in the same year 1986, ASUU in a communique it issued after its NEC meeting at the Federal University of Technology Owerri, declared that the solution to the problems facing Nigeria requires a fundamental restructuring of both the economy and the power relations. According to it:

Unless the present exploitative system of production and the oppressive political system are dismantled and replaced by a truly democratic system under the control and direction of workers, peasants and other progressive elements, these ugly events will continue to occur. ASUU therefore calls on the NLC, all democratic and mass organizations including all patriots to come together in the struggle for total and genuine liberation of our people (See ASUU 1986(b):3&6).

With this language of class struggle, the government was not unaware that the prevailing social order which she was defending and promoting, was seriously being challenged and threatened. Then, ASUU also castigated top government officials who in its opinion epitomized the existing social order. For instance, during the same NEC meeting that was held at Owerri, ASUU called for the immediate dismissal of the then Minister of Education - Professor Jibril Aminu. And latter in a paid advertisement published in the Guardian Newspaper of August 1986, ASUU once again reiterated its several calls for the removal of Prof. Jibril Aminu as the Minister of Education. According to ASUU, Prof. Aminu was one of the central midwives (if not the main midwife) of the baby called educational crisis of Nigeria. And from his writings and statements since 1977, Aminu according to ASUU, consistently canvassed the ideas that brought the current crisis into being (See ASUU, 1986(c):88).

It is important to note that ASUU's radical pronouncements and activities were not only carried out by its National Secretariat. Some branches were also very committed to ASUU's radical tradition. For instance in 1986, the University of Ife (now OAU) branch organized a symposium on 'The 1986 Budget,

Human Rights and the Political Debate.' During the symposium, the government's liberal economic policies came under severe attack. For example, part of the resolutions of the symposium read as follows:

Contrary to the press ovations about the budget, ASUU is convinced that the cardinal aim of the Federal government is to make Nigeria a fertile place for foreign and local exploiters. The budget will make the Nigerian economy more dependent on multinational corporations... The budget is also a victory for I.M.F. For example, all the hated and rejected conditions for the I.M.F. loan are entrenched in the budget. These are removal of petroleum subsidy, privatization/commercialization, trade liberalization, naira devaluation/adjustment, disinvestment in business ventures, freeze on employment (ASUU 1986(e)).

It is against this background that participants at the symposium recommended that the primary and urgent step to take is to nationalize the key sectors of the economy, namely oil and minerals, banks/insurance and foreign trade (ASUU 1986(e)).

The introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in 1986 by the Babangida regime however, exacerbated ASUU-Government Conflict. As a capitalist-oriented programme, SAP attracted severe criticisms from ASUU and all radical intellectuals within and outside the University System. The introduction of SAP in 1986, coincided with the emergence of Festus Iyayi (former ASUU Chairman at the University of Benin branch, and a committed

left-wing militant) as the national president of ASUU. This coincidence indeed added a new dimension to the struggle by ASUU for a new social order. Subsequently, the leadership of ASUU at the national and in some chapter levels, became more militant in the conduct of some important union and extra-union affairs. For instance, SAP became a subject of discussion and reprobation in almost all meetings of ASUU leaders. And as government re-affirmed its irrevocable commitment to SAP, ASUU in turn intensified its anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist campaign.

Consequently in early 1987, ASUU made a virulent attack on SAP through its official publicity organ the CLARION. According to it, the deliberate destruction of education and social welfare programmes is a consequence of the government's slavish capitulation to the I.M.F and World Bank. These sinister designs of imperialism it argued, have been unambiguously rejected by the Nigerian people. It therefore called on Babangida administration to abandon what it termed the 'road of death,' the regime has chosen through SAP (See ASUU 1987(f)).

Not long after this call, ASUU issued a communique after its NEC meeting held at the University of Port Harcourt.

In this release, ASUU reviewed the economic and political policies of the government. It argued that (a) 'government policies and measures were directives from the detested I.M.F, the World Bank, other international imperialist interests and their Nigerian Collaborators'; and (b) that the 'central motive of the policies is to enslave the economy and the Nigerian people to these foreign and hostile interests'. On the basis of these, it contended that SAP is a backward and incorrect policy which is obstructive and detrimental to Nigeria's interests. It therefore repeated what it called its long-standing demand that SAP should be abandoned in favour of a programme of structural disengagement from the world's exploiting economic system (See ASUU 1987(a).

Then in its Special Bulletin of August 1987, ASUU among other things, catalogued how according to it, the federal Government has attempted to serve the I.M.F by destroying education in Nigeria. ASUU observed that it 'has again and again alerted the country to the fact that the measures will bring ruin and destruction not only to education but also to our country as a people.' It therefore declared that it 'will continue to struggle in defence of the rights of Nigeria' adding that it 'cannot be intimidated' (ASUU 1987(e)).

Again in another NEC meeting held at University of Sokoto (now Usmanu Danfodiyo University, UDU) on the 11th and 12th September 1987, ASUU repeated its call for labour and other progressive forces 'to intensify their struggle to establish a truly democratic system in which elected representatives of mass organizations shall determine economic and political policies in our country.' Concluding, it expressed the 'firm belief that sooner, rather than later, the will and genuine public interest of the people will triumph (ASUU 1987(g): 5&6). (Emphasis ours).

In another Press Release of September 22nd 1987, ASUU condemned the Debt-Equity Swap, and asserted that 'attempts to revamp Nigeria's economy are futile outside complete structural Disengagement from Imperialism (SDI)' (ASUU, 1987(h):1&2). In the same release, ASUU declared its open acceptance of Socialism which the people chose through the Political Bureau.

And finally in a letter to President Ibrahim Babangida in January 25th 1988, ASUU reiterated its call for the abrogation of SAP, and the structural disengagement from I.M.F, World Bank, and multinational Corporations. It then called for a people-oriented government (See ASUU 1988).

With all these marxist rhetorics, it is not surprising that as Babarinsa et al (1988:18) observed, all Nigerian governments (military or civilian) regarded ASUU as the hotbed of radicals. According to Oghuma et al (1988:17), ASUU has since its creation in 1978 been dubbed as an organization of intellectuals, radicals and non-conformists. The popular radical image of ASUU makes it to be seen as having the largest concentration of radicals nation-wide (Ifionu et al 1988:25).

6.1.5.5 Government's Reactions

As we argued in section 6.1.3, the various governments were very sensitive to the radical orientation of ASUU. It accounted for (as we argued) why governments embarked on the erosion of University Autonomy and Academic Freedom (UAAF) as well as the under-funding of Universities. The specific actions it took to erode UAAF showed clearly that it did not take kindly to ASUU's radicalism. And its excision of ASUU from the NLC for instance was to halt further radicalization of labour by ASUU left-wing militants. The various government's measures such as the dismissal of radical academics, promulgation of Decree No. 16 of 1985, the setting up of visitation panels, effective use of

visitorial powers in the appointment of Vice-Chancellors, opening and closure of Universities, the deportation of some radical academics, the decision to punish academics 'who were not teaching what they were paid to teach,' the arrest and detention of some radical academics; convincingly demonstrate that governments regarded ASUU radicalism and confrontational posture, as a major source of conflict between them and ASUU.

Government's anger with radical academics (as manifested in the behaviour of ASUU leadership), can be fully captured when one reads the statements made by Governor Lawan Gwadabe of Niger State after the deportation of Wilmot. According to the Governor, Wilmot did not concentrate only in teaching but used his position as the patron of some University organizations to 'champion the radicalization of our children in the University which had often threatened the security of the nation.'

Consequently the Governor warned that the federal government would henceforth deal ruthlessly with any lecturer, Nigerian or expatriate, whose radical views were similar to those of Wilmot, and especially those found indoctrinating students in acts of hooliganism or extreme radicalism (See Omotunde et al, 1988: 15-16).

It is against this background that one can explain the erosion of University autonomy and academic freedom, as well as the under-funding of Universities, by the federal government. It is also against this background that we shall now turn to the second major part of this chapter namely the roots of ASUU-Government Conflict.

6.2.0: The Roots of ASUU-Government Conflict

While an identification, analysis and discussion of the causes of ASUU strikes constitute an important aspect of this study, it is however more important to trace the roots (common source) of all these causes. This is very essential because an attempt to eliminate the immediate cause of a conflict without dealing with its root, is akin to treating the symptoms of a disease rather than its cause.

In identifying the roots of ASUU-Government Conflict, we shall test the hypothesis that:

The mismanagement of Nigerian economy by the ruling class and the concomitantly dogged reprobation by ASUU Leadership constitute the roots of ASUU-Government Conflict.

The data we presented in section 6.1.5 are supportive of the proposition that ASUU was strongly opposed to the ideology of the

Nigeria's neo-colonial capitalist system inhibits the capacity of the economy to cater adequately for the needs of the people. It encourages those occupying public positions to divert public resources into private use (vide Supra chapter three for our theoretical framework of analysis). In such circumstances, mismanagement of the economy through large-scale and pervasive corruption, is inevitably institutionalized. Consequently, mismanagement is a logical outcome of the dynamics of Nigeria's neo-colonial dependent capitalist economy rather than say greed as majority of the respondents believe (see table C.3 Appendix). This is because greed itself is also a product of the dynamics of the economy.

Mismanagement as a root of the causes of ASUU-Government conflict, generates directly and indirectly these causes. As we noted in section 6.1.1.2, mismanagement is partly one of the factors responsible for under-funding of Universities. This is because misappropriation of public funds by the ruling class would directly inhibit the capability of the government to cater adequately for the competing needs of the people in the areas of education, health, etc. Under-funding of the Universities could therefore arise as a result of mismanagement. But as we argued earlier in section 6.1.1., mismanagement is not exclusively


the cause of under-funding. A much more important reason for under-funding is governments anti-intellectual posture due to the dogged opposition of radical academics to the ruling class.

With respect to the issue of erosion of UAAF, mismanagement indirectly engenders it. A corrupt ruling class is highly prone to being sensitive to public criticisms from both radical and conservative opposition groups. A sense of insecurity occasioned by virulent criticisms, can induce a corrupt ruling class to adopt measures for protection and consolidation of its power. University intellectuals by virtue of their sacred duties, are the most articulate opposition force against a corrupt and ineffective ruling class. Part of the immunity they enjoy is their institutional autonomy and academic freedom. And when such is used to challenge a decadent social order, the ruling class can adopt measures to deny the use of such immunity. The Nigerian experience attests to this fact.

Furthermore the issues of poor physical working conditions, poor salary and unattractive conditions of service, are partly products of mismanagement and partly a result of the punitive measures meted to Universities for the dogged opposition of academics to the ruling class.

In conclusion, there are enough evidence in this study demonstrating the fact that the mismanagement of the Nigerian economy by the ruling class - a logical outcome of the dynamics of the neo-colonial capitalist system -, and the dogged (opposition) reprobation by radical academics, lie at the roots of ASUU-Government conflict. These roots generated the immediate causes of ASUU strikes. The diagram below illustrates this argument.

Diagrammatic Representation of the Roots and causes of ASUU-Government Conflict



6.3.0: General Conclusions

In this chapter, we identified and discussed the causes and roots of ASUU-Government conflict, as well as the motive behind the erosion of University autonomy and academic freedom, and under-funding of Universities.

Both the survey and documentary data presented, show that the most important causes of ASUU-Government conflict, were under-funding of Universities, poor physical working conditions in Universities, and erosion of University autonomy and academic freedom. On the other hand, the data showed that although poor remuneration/poor conditions of service of University staff, was a cause of the conflict, it was the least considered factor when compared with the other three factors. For additional evidence that these causes were sources of disaffection among academics, see Appendix G showing the elaborate 'Memorandum and Log of Demands on the Declaration of Trade Dispute Between ASUU AND (1) The Governing Councils of Universities, (2) NUC, (3) Federal Government of Nigeria.'

Furthermore, the study showed that the rank and file of ASUU rejected the proposition that ASUU radical and confrontational posture was a source of ASUU-Government conflict. This finding

however contradicts government's strong view on the issue. But sufficient documentary data demonstrate that government's position is more tenable than that of the rank and file.

On the motive behind the erosion of University autonomy and academic freedom, and the under-funding of Universities, there were enough data to show that government's actions were aimed at curbing the radical orientation of Universities and consequently making them supportive of the prevailing special order. There were sufficient evidence therefore to uphold the hypothesis with respect to the motive behind erosion of University autonomy and academic freedom, and the under-funding of Universities.

Lastly there are enough evidence to support the thesis that the mismanagement of the economy by the ruling class and ASUU's dogged reprobation of the actions of the ruling class, constitute the roots of ASUU-Government conflict. In other words, apart from mismanagement, the root of ASUU-Government conflict is traceable to the conflicting ideological values and interests propagated by the Government on one hand, and those of ASUU leadership on the other hand. While the government propagated and defended this ideological values of the prevailing social order, ASUU leadership on the other hand, challenged government's

position, and struggled for the transformation of the prevailing social order. But the study found out that the bulk of the rank and file of ASUU are largely right-wing academics who though advocated reforms, rejected a total transformation of the existing social order to a new one. The study discovered that radicalism among ASUU members was more an attribute of the leadership than the rank and file.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF DATA - II

THE CHARACTER AND PERCEPTION OF ASUU-
GOVERNMENT CONFLICT.7.1 Introduction

In this chapter, we will examine the third principal research question of this study, namely what was the character of ASUU strikes and how was it (the character of the strikes) perceived by ASUU rank and file, ASUU leadership and the government? Put differently, were the strikes mere economic or political and ideological in character, and how were they perceived by the actors in the conflict? Our point of departure will be a look at government's view of the conflict.

7.2: The Crucial Issues

While expressing government's long-standing view on the character of ASUU strikes, the then Minister of Education Prof. Jibril Aminu, asserted during the ASUU strike in 1988, that the strike was 'just a ruse, an excuse to continue the problem

that we had in April..., this country has had enough of disruption. This country is entitled to stability and peace... Some militant lecturers are now seizing the opportunity to use it to cause trouble for the University system and for the country' (Aminu, 1988(b):28). It may be recalled that the problem the country had in April of 1988, was the nation-wide strike organized by the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) in protest against the removal of oil subsidy by the government. This strike we may also recall, was seen by the government as having political undertone.

The Minister's view above succinctly represents how the government perceived the character of ASUU-Government conflict. But does government perception correctly reflect the character of the conflict? And is such a perception congruent with those of either ASUU rank and file or ASUU leadership? In order to explore this issue, we asked the rank and file of ASUU, to show the extent to which they agree or disagree with the statement that ASUU strikes were primarily motivated by certain reasons as indicated in table 7.1. The results of this question are shown in tables 7.1 and 7.2.

Table 7.1: Opinion of Respondents on the Primary motive behind ASUU strikes.

Primary Motive of ASUU Strikes	Number of Respondents and their Percentages					
	Strongly Agree	Agree	Dis-agree	Strongly Disagree	Undecided	Total
The desire to improve the economic well-being of ASUU members	74 (25%)	157 (52%)	37 (12%)	14 (5%)	18 (6%)	300 (100%)
The desire to improve professional academic standards	180 (60%)	94 (31%)	9 (3%)	3 (1%)	14 (5%)	300 (100%)
The desire to challenge and in the process change the existing capitalist system	25 (8%)	56 (19%)	125 (42%)	58 (19%)	36 (12%)	300 (100%)
Total	279 (93%)	307 (102%)	171 (57%)	75 (25%)	68 (23%)	900 (300%)

Table 7.2: Mean Responses on the Primary motive of ASUU Strikes.

Primary Motive of ASUU Strikes	Mean Response
The desire to improve economic well-being of...	1.9
The desire to improve professional academic...	1.4
The desire to challenge and in the process...	2.7

The results of table 7.1, show that first, as high as 91% (i.e. 60% + 31%) of the respondents were of the view that the desire to improve professional academic standards in Nigerian Universities, was one of the primary motives for ASUU strikes. It is noteworthy that up to 60% of this figure, held this view very strongly. Secondly, 77% (i.e. 25% + 52%) of the respondents, held the view that the desire to improve the economic well-being of ASUU members, was the next primary motive for ASUU strikes. Thirdly, and on the other hand, only 27% (i.e. 8% + 19%) of the respondents believed that the desire to challenge and in the process change the existing capitalist system, was a primary motive for ASUU strikes.

On table 7.2 also, these views are clearly shown through the mean responses. As we already know, our cut-off point for accepting a factor is 2.49, while the starting point for rejection is 2.5. Therefore by giving a mean response of 2.7 in one of the factors, the respondents, rejected the view that ASUU strikes were a form of class struggle aimed at establishing a new social order.

One of the major conclusions from tables 7.1 and 7.2, is that as far as the rank and file of ASUU was concerned, the strikes were characterised by the desire to improve professional

academic standards and economic well-being of academics in Nigerian Universities. On the basis of these data (on tables 7.1 and 7.2), ASUU strikes were academic (or professional) and economic in character, rather than ideological and political.¹³ This will therefore lead to the proposition that ASUU-Government conflict was not a class struggle at the ideological and political levels. We will however revisit this conclusion shortly.

As we noted in chapter two, three main types of strikes by academics are (a) economic strikes, (b) academic (professional) interest strike, and (c) political interest strike (See Kadish 1968). One part of our findings confirms that the rank and file of ASUU were involved at the level of economic and academic interests strikes, thereby giving support to the view by Harrison and Tabory (1980), Otodo (1987) and Mandel (1969) about the importance of economic interests, status and privileges, as determinants of Unionization and strike by academics. Another part of the finding rejects Harrison and Tabory's view that ideological factors are important determinants of union behaviour towards strikes.

It is instructive to observe that the data on tables 7.1 and 7.2 support those of tables 6.1 - 6.3 with respect to the

fact that academics were much more interested in the improvement of their professional academic standards, than in just asking for attractive conditions of service like a good salary structure. The data confirm the views of NAUT (1977) and ASUU (1981(d):5, or 1981(e):2) which we quoted in chapter six. These facts no doubt have serious policy implications for the government and University administrators.

As we concluded earlier, the character of ASUU strikes from the rank and file perspective, is oriented towards the enhancement of academic professionalism and the realization of economic goals. This conclusion however needs to be critically re-considered. For instance, the conclusion is only tenable when we assume that the dominant image and trade union outlook of ASUU, were shaped by the ideological values, views and interests widely shared by the rank and file of ASUU. But as we showed in chapter six (Section 6.1.5), such an assumption is erroneous, because the dominant image of ASUU was largely shaped by the ideological views of radical elements within ASUU leadership. As we noted, ASUU was led by radical elements who gave ASUU an image of a radical organization struggling for the overthrow of the existing social order.

These therefore show that the rank and file of ASUU perceived the character of ASUU-Government conflict differently from the way its leadership did. For example, while the rank and file was interested in using the strikes as a weapon for struggling for the improvement of professional academic standards, as well as for the enhancement of the economic well-being of academics, the leadership of ASUU in addition to these objectives saw in the strikes a veritable means of challenging the established order or for creating the necessary consciousness required for overthrowing the existing decadent social order.¹⁴ The data on ASUU radicalism which we presented in chapter six (Section 6.1.5) lend credence to this thesis. The finding supports Bilton et al's (1981:491) thesis that strikes 'may have a wide range of causes, with not all the participants sharing the same motives for actions'. For instance, on several occasions, ASUU called on all progressive groups to unite and struggle for the installation of a just and democratic government headed by peasants, workers, and other mass organizations (See ASUU 1986(b):3&5; ASUU 1987(g):5&6. among others). For the rank and file therefore, the conflict was symmetric and issue-oriented conflict, while on the other hand, the leadership of ASUU saw it as an asymmetric and structure-oriented one.

In order to investigate further the way the rank and file, perceived the conflict, and to demonstrate that its perception was different from that of the Leadership, we asked the respondents whether they think the issue of ideology for Nigeria, was a bone of contention in the conflict. The results of this are shown in table 7.3

Table 7.3: Opinion of Respondents on whether Ideology was a major dividing factor in ASUU-Government Conflict.

Opinion	Number of Respondents	Percentage (%)
Yes	102	34
No	188	63
Undecided	10	3
Total	300	100

This table shows that a majority (i.e. 63%) of the respondents felt that the issue of ideology for Nigeria, was not one of the major dividing factors between ASUU and the government. On the other hand, 34% of the respondents were of the opinion that ideology was a major factor in the conflict.

It will also be interesting to know further how ASUU leadership views the issue of ideology in the conflict. Although some of the leaders interviewed felt that ideology couldn't have been a major factor in the conflict, since ASUU was not ideologically cohesive; others who felt differently justified their position on stronger grounds. For instance, as one branch official from University of Lagos put it 'a neo-colonial government like Nigeria's, must detest radical scholarship.' And according to a former national financial secretary:

there were differences between the two parties on fundamental issues, such as the relationship between man and the state, and the place of man in the system of production.

But one branch Secretary at the University of Benin put it differently. According to him:

this ideological divide exists mainly between government and ASUU leadership (national and branch) not necessarily the rank and file membership.

This view to us explains no doubt why the differences in perception exist between ASUU rank and file, and ASUU leadership.

Since the bulk of the rank and file did not share the same ideology with ASUU leadership, it is not surprising that they did not perceive the conflict in the same way.

The leadership of ASUU saw the resolution of the fundamental crisis of the Nigerian economy which in its view was caused by a dependent neo-colonial Capitalist system, as a precondition for resolving the crisis in Nigerian higher education (See ASUU 1986; ASUU 1987, among others). As a former president of ASUU put it, the resolution of Nigeria's fundamental crisis requires 'disengaging the economy from its imperialist roots, dislodging the subservient ruling class and restructuring the economy, policies and society along socialist lines.' According to him, 'the University exists in society and any attempt to resolve the problems of the University outside of the structures and conditions of society will eventually and ultimately fail.' As we showed in chapter six, much as the rank and file wanted reforms within the entire system, they did not support a radical transformation of the system. Having now established that the rank and file of ASUU and its leadership perceived the conflict differently, it will be relevant now to examine further the perception of the conflict by the government.

As we observed at the beginning of this chapter, government perception of the conflict was that ASUU was being used by radical elements to destabilize the nation. The government actually saw the conflict as a direct threat or challenge to the established order especially when it blamed radical academics for being responsible for incessant students' unrest in the Universities. It is now germane to examine government views regarding radical academics and their role in the fomentation of crisis in and outside the campus.

First, the views of the Mohamed Commission of Inquiry on students' crisis in 1978, and the Abisoye Panel into the Ahmadu Bello University students' crisis of 1986, (concerning radical academics who were accused of 'teaching what they were not paid to teach), and government's acceptance of these views show how deeply convinced the government was, that radical elements in ASUU were responsible for students' unrest.

Writing about NAUT (ASUU's predecessor) in the late seventies, Aminu who was then the Executive Secretary of National Universities Commission, said:

The NAUT seems to feature only during a crisis. Like the banned NUNS, it failed to become an agent for positive contribution to the welfare of staff, and became only one of agitation...

The Association as it is organized and run does precious little work except during crisis. With the recent crisis, I see that the NAUT are active again, invariably negatively.

The problem of the NAUT is that senior and mature or moderate academic staff do not bother to take part in its activities. So the leadership falls into the hands of (few...) militants (See Aminu 1986:34-35).

And as Minister of Education later, Aminu had many occasions to castigate ASUU's radical leadership. For instance, in 1988, while announcing the proscription of ASUU, Aminu observed that 'ASUU with its already disgraceful record, its irresponsible behaviour totally unbecoming of an organization of academics remained intransigent, discourteous and uncouth' (See Alegbe et al, 1988:33).

Also seeing ASUU in this light, the government Department responsible for industrial relations observed in an interview with us that the demands of ASUU on University autonomy and academic freedom, under-funding of Universities etc, 'were mere subterfuges for confrontational positions which ASUU had always taken against the government, ASUU defied dialogue in resolving its issues.'

The NUC expressed the same opinion on ASUU when it said during an interview that:

As a trade union, the economic and professional interests of its members ought to have been accorded priority. Instead, areas that are of little or no importance to the welfare of its members are being dabbled into, all in the name of radicalism and assumed dynamism.

One of the harshest condemnation of radical academics was made by President Babangida himself at the Guardian Forum in 1989. This came after his regime had proscribed ASUU in 1988. According to him:

The tragedy of the society today is that those who shouted the most in the name of the people do not know their communities and what their communities want... They, instead of becoming chemists of ideas intent on separating the ingredients of ideology for development, are victims of dogma of varieties of Marxist/Socialist orientation alternating cyclically between half truth and the sparing use of truth about any government and its well-intentioned policies.

Our environment is inundated with these outmoded versions of marxist/socialist/radical ideas which encourage violence as a short cut to political power... I will want to see us go back to our various communities and contest elections into local councils or to other levels of government instead of converting the streets of our major cities or campuses of our Universities into theatres of war;..

Our kids who are being led to the streets by some leftists to burn and loot are yet to know what democracy is. (Babangida 1989)
(Emphasis ours).

It will be recalled that the President made these statements about two months after the anti-SAP riot of May 1989 in which many University students violently demonstrated against government's liberal economic policies. The riot escalated so much in certain cities that some workers, the unemployed and school children took active part in destroying government properties. This then led to the closure of eight Universities by the government. Although the government announced the closure of some of the Universities for one academic year, it later permitted their reopening after five months. As a punishment to the Universities for 'breeding radical students', the government announced that it would stop subventions to the affected Universities. It however reviewed this decision shortly after it was made.

From some of the evidence we presented in chapter six, under sections 6.1.1, 6.1.3 and 6.1.5, successive federal governments since 1978, held the view that radical academics were responsible for students' unrest in the Universities. It was for instance as a result of this perception of the negative role of academics that University autonomy and academic freedom was eroded; Universities were under-funded; and some radical academics were either dismissed, retired or deported.

It was therefore the belief of the government that ASUU's conflict with her had both ideological and political character. The government was not mistaken in its perception of the character of the conflict. ASUU also recognized this fact when it stated (See Section 6.1.3) that the impression in government circles was that 'Universities are citadels of unpatriotism and subversive activities.' ASUU also correctly perceived this when it contended that the main reason for the incursion into University autonomy and academic freedom is that vocal academics constitute a big threat to the existence of the established order (See also section 6.1.3).

From all these, one important conclusion is that both the government and ASUU leadership perceived the conflict in a similar manner. They were all conscious of the fact that the conflict between them went beyond the struggle by ASUU to improve professional academic standards in Universities and the economic well-being of academics. They saw in the conflict some elements of ideological and political struggles. This is where their perception differed from that of the rank and file of ASUU. For the rank and file for instance, the conflict centred simply on the inability of the government to create a conducive environment necessary for the improvement of the professional

academic standards and economic well-being of academics. They believed that with better economic management (See table C.2 Appendix) these can be achieved within the prevailing social order. They were therefore not involved in any struggle to overthrow the established order. As we showed earlier, the leadership of ASUU however made this, one of the cardinal objectives of its struggles. This character of the conflict was actually what sensitized the government in the early years of ASUU. It was this ideological and political character of the conflict that made its management intractable and indeed created the necessary conditions for the proscription of ASUU in 1988.

7.3 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the character of ASUU-Government conflict and how it was perceived by the various principal actors in the conflict.

The discussion was brief because of the fact that the bulk of the data for this chapter was presented in chapter six (sections 6.1.1., 6.1.3 and 6.1.5. A critical examination of the available data shows that ASUU-Government conflict had an

ideological and political character. Contrary to the opinion of the rank and file of ASUU which thought that the struggle was essentially and exclusively aimed at improving professional academic standards and economic well-being of academics, ASUU-Government conflict involved disagreement on fundamental ideological and political issues. Although both ASUU leadership and the government recognized this fact, as noticed from various repressive government measures against ASUU, the rank and file perceived the conflict differently.

From available evidence so far, there are enough grounds to accept the hypothesis that 'the perception of the character of ASUU-Government conflict by the rank and file of ASUU, was different from the way both ASUU Leadership and the government perceived it.'

CHAPTER EIGHT

PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF DATA - III

THE MANAGEMENT OF ASUU-GOVERNMENT CONFLICT

8.1: Contending Issues in the Management of the Conflict

The last two chapters examined the causes, roots, and perception of the character of ASUU-Government conflict. They also examined the motive behind the erosion of University autonomy and academic freedom, and the under-funding of Universities. In this third and final aspect of our data analysis, we shall examine the last of our four principal research questions, namely 'why was the management of ASUU-Government Conflict intractable?' To help us examine this issue are opinions from our respondents as well as existing literature on this problem. With respect to the survey data on this, we asked the respondents four questions. The outcome of these are shown on tables 8.1 to 8.5.

Question (a): Based on your experience in Nigeria, do you have faith in dialogue (through the collective bargaining system) as a primary means of settling labour-management conflict.

Table 8.1: Opinion of Respondents on whether they have faith in dialogue as a primary means of settling labour-management conflict.

Opinion	Number of Respondents	Percentage (%)
Yes	204	68
No	88	29
Undecided/No response	8	3
Total	300	100

Table 8.1 shows that majority (68%) of the respondents have faith in dialogue as a primary means of settling labour-management conflict. But only 29% of the respondents expressed a contrary opinion.

Question (b): Do you share the view that ASUU-Strikes would have been prevented if a good and effective collective bargaining machinery was in existence?

Table 8.2: Opinion of Respondents on whether ASUU Strikes would have been prevented if a good and effective collective bargaining machinery was in existence.

Opinion	Number of Respondents	Percentage (%)
Yes	267	89
No	25	8
No response	8	3
Total	300	100

Table 8.2 shows that a great majority (89%) of the respondents were of the opinion that a good and effective collective bargaining machinery would have prevented ASUU Strikes. The table also reveals that more of the respondents expressed faith in dialogue when compared with table 8.1. The reason is that some of the respondents who earlier said that they had no faith in dialogue explained that their response was influenced by the phrase 'based on your experience in Nigeria.' They explained that the Nigerian experience does not give them the basis to exercise faith in the collective bargaining system even though they know that the system works perfectly well in some countries. According to

them, the collective bargaining system in Nigeria is a one-sided affair because the government uses its power to determine the terms and outcome of any bargaining process.

Question (c): Do you believe that the federal government refused to set up collective bargaining machinery because it felt ASUU was confrontational and uncompromising.

Table 8.3: Opinion of Respondents on whether the refusal by government to set up a collective bargaining machinery was due to ASUU's confrontational and uncompromising posture.

Opinion	Number of Respondents	Percentage (%)
Yes	195	65
No	92	31
Undecided/No Response	13	4
Total	300	100

Table 8.3 shows that the majority (65%) of the respondents shared the view that (i) ASUU was confrontational and uncompromising, and (ii) that because of this the government did not see any need to set up a collective bargaining machinery. Implicit in this view is that ASUU was radical. This view is consistent with tables 6.17 and 6.18 where the respondents felt that the reason behind the erosion of University autonomy and academic freedom, was to curb the radical orientation of academics. In other words, the respondents believed that the government saw ASUU as being radical. This view therefore throws more light on the roots or underlying sources of the conflict namely the dogged opposition of ASUU to the ruling class.

From the 31% that felt ASUU was not confrontational and uncompromising, the majority felt that the reason why governments were dragging their feet on the establishment of a collective bargaining system, was principally because they were afraid of such a machinery which would have offered ASUU the opportunity to drive its message home. However, some of them argued that a good collective bargaining system would have unified the strength of all the three unions in the University system (namely Senior Staff Association (SSA), Non-Academic Staff Union

(NASU) and Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) against the government. According to them, the government used the non-establishment of the bargaining system, as a divide and rule tactic.

Question (d): The failure to manage ASUU-Government conflict was due to... (See identified reasons in the table).

Table 8.4: Opinion of Respondents on the possible reasons responsible for the poor management of ASUU-Government Conflict.

Possible Reasons for the failure to manage ASUU-Government Conflict	Number of Respondents and their Percentage					
	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Undecided	Total
The ideological differences between ASUU and the Government conflict	42 (14%)	91 (30%)	92 (31%)	26 (9%)	49 (16%)	300 (100%)
Communication gap	64 (21%)	151 (50%)	39 (13%)	16 (5%)	30 (10%)	300 (100%)
Dissimilar perception as to what was the underlying source of the conflict	71 (24%)	145 (48%)	42 (14%)	8 (3%)	34 (11%)	300 (100%)
Pride on both sides to the conflict	37 (12%)	78 (26%)	106 (35%)	29 (10%)	50 (17%)	300 (100%)
The fact that the conflict was a class struggle	26 (9%)	51 (17%)	109 (36%)	60 (20%)	54 (18%)	300 (100%)
Total	240 (80%)	516 (171%)	388 (129%)	139 (47%)	217 (72%)	1500 (500%)

Table 8.5: Mean Responses on the possible reasons responsible for the poor management of ASUU-Government Conflict.

Possible Reasons for failure to Manage the Conflict	Mean Responses
The ideological differences...	2.2
Communication gap	1.9
Dissimilar perception...	1.9
Pride on both sides to the conflict	2.3
The fact that the conflict was a class struggle	2.6

Tables 8.4 and 8.5 show that the respondents identified two major reasons responsible for the poor management of ASUU-Government conflict. These are 'communication gap', and 'dissimilar perception as to what was the underlying source of the conflict.' Two minor reasons were also identified, namely 'ideological differences between ASUU and the government'; and 'pride on both sides of the conflict'. The issue of ideology being identified here as a reason, needs to be explained, in the light of the fact that majority of the respondents had earlier

rejected ideology as a source of the conflict (See table 7.3). A closer look at tables 7.3 and 8.4 will reveal that in table 7.3, the percentage of those who felt that ideology was a factor in the conflict is 34, while in table 8.4, the percentage that said ideology was a reason for poor management of the conflict is 44. This shows an increase of 10%. This increase arose from the fact that as tables 6.17 and 6.18 showed, majority of the respondents upheld the view that the government believed the Universities were increasingly being inundated with radical ideology. As we noted then, the respondents accepted the view that the motive behind the erosion of University autonomy and academic freedom, was to curb this radical orientation. The point we are therefore making is that the 10% increase in the acceptance of ideology as a source of conflict, no doubt came from those who believed that ASUU was propagating a radical ideology. Added to this, the data on table 8.3 strongly support the view that ASUU was confrontational and uncompromising - a posture we know derived from its radical ideological predilection.

Another important point which tables 8.4 and 8.5, reveal is that the respondents rejected the view that the poor management of the conflict was because the conflict assumed a class dimension.

We may recall that as far as the respondents were concerned, ASUU-Government conflict was simply perceived as a struggle by academics to improve their professional academic standards and economic well-being.

On a global note, from the data on tables 8.1 to 8.5, the following conclusions can be re-stated. First, a majority of the academics sampled believe in dialogue as a means of settling their conflict with the government.

Secondly, they believe that ASUU strikes would have been prevented if there was in existence a good and effective machinery for dialogue.

Thirdly, they share the view that communication gap (arising because there was no effective machinery for dialogue), as well as dissimilar perception of what was the underlying source of the conflict, were the two major reasons responsible for the poor management of the conflict. However about one-third of them felt that ideological differences, as well as pride on both sides to the conflict, contributed to the poor management of the conflict.

Lastly, they hold the opinion that the failure of the government to set up a collective bargaining machinery was due to the fact that ASUU was seen as confrontational and uncompromising.

It is germane here to examine the views of some of the leaders of ASUU on why the management of the conflict was intractable. One of the former national presidents of ASUU said that the problem was:

the highhandedness of the regime and its agents, government's refusal to obey its own laws and resort to the use of force and violence against ASUU activists.

Another former national president of ASUU listed two factors as responsible, namely (i) 'Government's intolerance and insensitivity, and (ii) ASUU's dogged stand on principles of fairness over which it never compromised.' One former branch Chairman of ASUU on his part said that 'there was no direct contact between ASUU leaders and Government' and secondly that 'there were irreconcilable differences.' Another branch Chairman, also observed that 'ASUU and the government had opposing views on what is the best interest of the University and the country.' Throwing more light on these, one ASUU official argued that both ASUU and the government made the management of the conflict difficult. According to him, there was 'on ASUU side left-wing opportunism (extremism) while on government side, there was undue arrogance, and winner-takes-all mentality.'

From the views expressed by other ASUU leaders, the issue of arrogance, differences in ideological perspectives and what some called the fascist nature of the various regimes; were identified as contributory factors. On the whole, the views expressed by both ASUU rank and file and the leadership emphasize first, that the conflict was poorly managed and second, some factors played important role in the poor management of the conflict. We shall revisit these issues shortly but for now let us identify what constituted government's thinking with respect to the management of the conflict.

First, government through its Industrial Relations Department affirmed its belief in dialogue and collective bargaining, and then opined that:

If ASUU had followed the normal processes of dialogue, collective bargaining, and the laws of the land, as stipulated in the Trade Disputes Decree, the conflict would have been nipped in the bud (Extracts from personally administered interview).

In addition, this government department contended that:

ASUU's refusal to resort to dialogue and ... refusal to go to the IAP (Industrial Arbitration Panel)... are the major factors that impeded the settlement of the ASUU-Government conflict.

On the issue of why the government was hesitant to set up a collective bargaining machinery, the NUC said in an interview we conducted that:

Governments have not hesitated in any way. Please refer to the Cooksey Report on the subject as well as Government White Paper thereon. Government noted and accepted the demand in principle subject of course to whatever agreement reached by the Negotiating Committee or Council being passed to Government for consideration through the NUC. The prerequisite however is that the three Unions (namely, ASUU/NASU/SSA) should first come together and form one joint Industrial Committee that would ultimately lead to the formation of the National Body comprising representatives of each University already formed at the joint Negotiating Committee level.

The Chief Labour Officer of the government corroborated NUC's view when he said:

I am not aware that the Government was slow or had refused to set up a Collective Bargaining Machinery with ASUU. Collective Bargaining is always between two parties,... Either can give notice for Collective Bargaining. If ASUU did give such notice, the government's arm that is responsible for education and related matters, should have honoured such. There is no record of any refusal for Collective Bargaining. (Extracts from Interview).

Furthermore, the then Minister of Education also indicted ASUU on the management of the conflict. According to him,

when a matter is referred to a high court, the Industrial Arbitration Panel, they issue disparaging remarks about the IAP. They issue statements that they will not discuss with the Minister of Education because we are not their employers. They will not also discuss with the National Universities Commission. (See Aminu 1988(b):28-29).

As we can see from both the statements made by ASUU leaders and the government, each side to the conflict accused the other as being responsible for the poor management of the conflict. We shall therefore examine critically some of the contending issues raised in order to explain why the management of the conflict was intractable.

8.2: A Critical Anatomy of Contending Issues in the Management of ASUU-Government Conflict.

We will start by first recognizing the theoretical fact that when parties in an industrial conflict, perceive their differences in antagonistic and irreconcilable terms, the management of such conflict always proves intractable. As we noted earlier in chapters two and three, a class conflict under capitalism is not easily amenable to management because it assumes a zero-sum (or 'winner-takes-all') mentality. For instance arch-opponents of the capitalist system believe that the only panacea to

industrial conflict is the over-throw of the capitalist system and in its place the establishment of the socialist order. To such left-wing militants, strategies adopted under capitalism to manage industrial conflict, are mere palliatives, which totally ignore the underlying sources of conflict, while treating only the symptoms. Industrial conflict involving proponents of the two competing ideological systems, namely capitalism and socialism, normally assume the character of an ideological and political conflict. They are what Rapoport (1974:175-176) called asymmetric and structure-oriented conflict. Such a conflict is less amenable to management than ~~an~~ symmetric or issue-oriented conflict.

As we showed in chapter seven, ASUU-Government conflict, had ideological and political undertones. It is a good example of an asymmetric and structure-oriented conflict. For instance (borrowing from Rapoport's thesis) ASUU left-wing leadership saw itself 'as an instrument of social change or of bringing a new system into being', while on the other hand, the ruling class that was challenged, saw it as a duty to defend the prevailing social order. In such a situation, the conflict hardly gets resolved unless as Rapoport (1974) argues, 'the structure of either

system or of the super-system changes.' It is along this analytical framework that we will now discuss the management of ASUU-Government conflict.

From the data we presented earlier, we note that both ASUU and the government created the impression that they believed in the use of dialogue as a means of settling the conflict between them. This faith in dialogue we would argue existed only at the level of rhetorics. There was hardly any genuine effort on both sides to utilize dialogue in settling their differences. This is because, their dogged ideological stands, made the use of this conflict resolution instrumentality difficult. For example, if ASUU leadership believed that the resolution of the crisis in Nigerian higher education can only be achieved when Nigeria disengages from the global capitalist order, the question of establishing a collective bargaining machinery for negotiating on how to resolve the educational crisis, does not arise. This is because the disengagement of Nigeria's economy from world capitalist system, is not such an issue that a collective bargaining machinery could resolve. In spite of this, both parties to the conflict accused each other of not resorting to dialogue for settling the conflict. But as we argue, this was

mere rhetorics - for none of them was sincere in establishing a collective bargaining machinery. This is because for a collective bargaining system to work, both parties must have faith in the prevailing social order. Let us now examine this from a historical perspective.

As the Coockey Commission observed, after the restructuring of trade unions in 1978, there was no formal procedural framework established for collective bargaining in the Universities. In fact, no provision was made within the University system for the settlement of disputes which had defied negotiation with the Councils (See Coockey Report 1981:70). Consequently the Coockey Commission recommended that:

a body to be called the Association of University Governing Councils be formed to coordinate the views of all Universities as employers, for the purpose of collective bargaining, the settlement of trade disputes and consultation (Coockey Report, 1981:142).

Reacting to this recommendation, the Government merely noted it (See White Paper, 1981:6). As we know, experience shows that government did nothing to pursue the implementation of that recommendation. As the Minister of Education stated in 1988, government had no commitment to set up such a body or machinery because there was no where in the White Paper it was declared that a Joint Negotiation Committee would be set up (See Sabrinsa

et al 1988:18). But even if it had established the machinery as recommended by the Cookey Commission, it is doubtful whether ASUU would have had faith in the ability of University Councils to handle University crisis judging from the fact that in the opinion of ASUU, the powers of the Councils had already been eroded by the government. As the Cookey Commission observed:

practically, all the memoranda submitted to us contain observations about the inability of the Councils to control the management of the Universities due to the directives to them from the other arms of the Federal Government with which the Councils are compelled to comply. This state of affairs has made any meaningful collective Bargaining impossible since the staff now realise that the Councils can no longer determine their conditions of service (Cookey Report 1981:72).

It is against this background that among other reasons ASUU shunned negotiation with ineffective bodies. Also it was against this backdrop that the then Minister of Education accused ASUU of 'ignoring their Universities' Councils, the National Universities Commission, and for failing to exhaust all peaceful options before embarking on their protest' (See Usen, et al 1988:21). The fact is that ASUU considered such options ineffectual, for as Otobo (1987:264-265) observed, 'there was the tendency for main actors in industrial dispute to bypass supposedly conflict-regulating structures, making such bodies as the Federal Minister

of Employment, Labour and Productivity, the Industrial Arbitration Panel and the National Industrial Court, irrelevant.'

Now a closer look at the 1980 ASUU strike, as well as that of 1981 which lasted for over two months (for about 75 days) will reveal further, the poverty of management of ASUU-Government conflict. A step by step (or Chronological) record of what happened is attached to this research project as Appendix H. Even though the setting up of the Cooley Commission in 1980, was as a result of the declaration of a trade dispute by ASUU, the government hesitated in releasing a White Paper on the Report of the Commission. A critical look at the evidence in Appendix H, will reveal that there was no serious attempt to offer appropriate remedies to the causes of the conflict, not to talk of the roots.

On September 12, 1981, ASUU declared an industrial action following government's delay in releasing a White Paper on the Cooley Report that was submitted on the 31st of August 1981. Between October 16 - 22, 1981, the government hurriedly released the White Paper in which it announced new Salary Scales for University Staff. Consequently, ASUU reacted by saying that the government 'totally ignored the more fundamental and important issues affecting the entire University system'. (See Appendix H).

ASUU therefore decided to continue its strike action and observed that they are not a bunch of mercenaries who are interested in mere salaries, but patriots that are interested in the improvement of the totality of the University system. But reacting back, the government took ASUU to the IAP instead of perhaps exploring other ways of resolving the issue. For instance, the government could have explored the option of appointing an independent arbitrator after which the issue of IAP could then arise. As expected, the IAP - a government institution - ordered ASUU to go back to work even without taking evidence from ASUU. According to ASUU (1981(e):1) taking the matter to IAP, was like taking it back to the situation that existed prior to the setting up of the Cookey Commission in 1980, and such definitely had the potential of hampering efforts at resolving the conflict.

It was on the basis of the preceding observations that ASUU in its National Executive Council meeting held at Ibadan on the 24th of October 1981, condemned government action. It then decided not to obey the directive of the IAP. It consequently declared:

that the government White Paper, the Cookey Commission Report, and ASUU Memorandum are the basis for negotiations. And we invite the government to negotiate with us immediately if it is desirous of finding lasting solutions to the University problems (ASUU 1981(e):1).

Consequently on November 2nd 1981, Government finally decided to invite ASUU for a dialogue. As we observe in Appendix H, government agreed to withdraw the matter from the IAP, but unfortunately it did not keep to its promise. Then as accusations and counter-accusations continued to appear in the press, government branded ASUU as 'irresponsible, immature and selfish.' It was against this backdrop that the strike continued until December 7, 1981 when it was suspended. But even then, the issues raised during the strike continued to be subject of debate until July 29, 1983 when agreements were reached on certain crucial issues.

As history now instructs us, the 1983 agreement did not get to the roots of the conflict. It rather ended up suppressing some of the manifest agitations of ASUU. The underlying sources of the conflict continued to exist even after the overthrow of the civilian regime of President Shehu Shagari in December 1983.

They even assumed serious dimensions between 1984 and 1988 as we noted in the last two chapters. The persistence of the underlying sources (roots) of the conflict were actually a major factor that logically led to the proscription of ASUU in 1988 (vide Supra, Rapoport's thesis on the resolution of asymmetric and structure-oriented conflict). It is now germane to examine closely the management of ASUU strike of 1988.

Before the 1988 strike, ASUU experienced other near-strike situations. The issues raised between 1985 and 1988 bordered on the larger issue of the crisis in Nigerian higher education. ASUU as we noted in chapters six and seven, continued to emphasize that the crisis in Nigerian higher education, derived from the contradictions generated by the neo-colonial capitalist economy Nigeria operates. Such a view as we also showed, was anti-thetical to the one held by the ruling class which was represented by the government. This factor continued to form the underlying source of ASUU-Government conflict prior to the 1988 strike. It was therefore not surprising that the April 1988 workers strike (coordinated by Workers Joint Action Committee in the absence of the Nigerian Labour Congress earlier proscribed by the government), in protest against the withdrawal

of petroleum subsidy, was first started by University students whom government believed had adopted the radical posture of ASUU leadership. As we know, the aftermath of that April crisis, was the 'permanent' closure of four Universities, namely Calabar, Jos, OAU and BUK, the opening of which became the exclusive preserve of the President. As we shall observe later, ASUU made this closure one of its demands during the July 1988 strike action.

Prior to the April 1988 oil subsidy crisis, ASUU had already expressed its dissatisfaction to the government over the delay in the payment of the Elongated Salary Scale (ESS) announced by the government in January of that year. It complained that long after workers in other public service establishments had been paid, University staff were still deprived of it. Hence, during the later part of April, ASUU gave the government 21 days ultimatum. This was to expire at the end of May. During this period, government was expected to pay University staff the E.S.S. or face an industrial action. At the end of its National Executive Council Meeting in Ilorin, ASUU president declared:

Our patience, understanding and commitment to dialogue and negotiation have been taxed to the maximum and therefore the government should as a matter of urgency, implement the ESS including the 20 per cent differential between USS and UGSS agreed to in 1982 to the satisfaction of the Union by May 31, 1988. (See Sabrinsa, et al, 1988:16).

During this period, there was no effort to initiate a dialogue. While government was insisting that ASUU should follow 'approved' channel of communication, ASUU on the other hand, believed that only few top government officials like the Secretary to the government, were 'competent' to handle the issue, following its strained relationship with the then Minister of Education. However, ASUU did not embark on its proposed industrial action at the expiration of its ultimatum on May 31, 1988. It rather shifted the ultimatum to June 30, allowing more room for 'amicable' settlement. Within this period, ASUU added new demands on its list. It demanded that (i) the right of University Senates to re-open their Universities when closed down as a result of students' unrest, should be restored; (ii) the four Universities closed down following the April demonstration against the removal of oil subsidy, should be re-opened; and (iii) government should set up the National University Joint Negotiation Committee (JNC) for each University and the Joint Industrial Council.

Following the inability of the government to meet these demands, ASUU went on strike on July 1st 1988. Reacting first to this strike action, the government as usual referred the matter to the IAP, a move which as we earlier noted usually exacerbates labour-management conflict. Secondly the government ordered the

academics back to work within 48 hours. The government regretted that since the notice of the declaration of the industrial action, the striking workers failed to seek negotiations with the Federal Ministry of Education or the NUC (See Nnadi et al 1988:3). Regretting further, the Minister of Education declared:

We have only been receiving copies of their letters to other government agencies less concerned with the matter in hand. Even more surprising is the fact that the unions seemed to have also completely ignored their individual governing councils who, by law are their real employers (See Nnadi et al, 1988:3).

Then at the expiration of the 48 hour ultimatum, the Minister of Education announced the proscription of ASUU even though the matter was still with the IAF. So by Decree No. 26, of 7th July 1988, titled 'Academic Staff Union of Universities (Proscription and Prohibition from participation in Trade Union Activities) Decree 1988,' ASUU ceased to exist. The Decree dissolved the National Executive Council or any executive Council of the Union and removed all the officers from office. It ordered the officers to surrender any property or assets of the Union to the Federal Military Government. It demanded that any person who failed to comply with the provisions of the Decree:

Shall be triable by the Miscellaneous Offences Tribunal set up under the Miscellaneous Offences (Special Tribunal) Decree 1984 (as amended) and shall be liable on conviction to a fine of #10,000.00 or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years or to both such fine and imprisonment. (See Federal Republic of Nigeria Decree No. 26, 1988).

Announcing the proscription of ASUU, the Minister accused ASUU and Senior Staff Association (SSA) (which also participated in the strike) of intransigence and of not giving enough room for negotiation. He contended that the strike had nothing to do with scholarship, justice or the common good. In addition, he accused the unions of lawlessness, by embarking on a strike when the matter was already before the IAP (See Babrinsa et al 1988:18).

Government action raises certain crucial questions. For instance, why was the Senior Staff Association that also took part in the strike not proscribed? Secondly why couldn't ASUU and the government negotiate on a matter that was first raised in the early part of that year? Thirdly, was proscription a fair punishment for ASUU's strike? These questions suggest that there was more to the crisis on both sides than meets the eye, for after all according to the then Minister of Education, 'it is not the day the child breaks the soup pot that you spank him' (See Alegbe et al, 1988:33). One would then be tempted to ask: when did ASUU actually 'break the soup pot' and how delicious was the

soup that was poured away? Again, how precious was the pot that was broken? These are no doubt metaphorical questions which are very relevant to our understanding of the roots, character and dynamics of ASUU-Government conflict.

As we noted earlier, asymmetric and structure-oriented conflicts, are usually very intractable to resolve amicably. This is partly because in such conflicts, rules and procedures of conduct are often disregarded by the parties to the conflict in preference for expediency. This accounts for why both ASUU and the Government had no respect for the IAP and other existing channels of dialogue. This also explains why the punishment meted out for participating in the strike discriminated between ASUU and SSA, for after-all, the SSA like ASUU did not call-off the strike within the 48-hour ultimatum. Like ASUU, it decided to continue the strike because of government attitude (See Usen 1988:21). We believe that the major reason for the selective punishment, is that SSA, unlike ASUU had no history of radicalism and confrontational posture against the ruling class. It was in fact its first strike action in the history of its existence. The government perhaps did not consider its trade union activities a threat to the stability of the existing social order.

Going back to our metaphorical questions, the 'breaking of the soup pot' can be interpreted to mean ASUU's consistent radical, confrontational and uncompromising posture, which had as its purpose, the overthrow of the prevailing social order. On the other hand, the 'pot' refers to the totality of the prevailing social order, while the 'soup' is interpreted to mean the values, interests, and other cherished ideals of the prevailing social order. The bone of contention is that while both 'the pot and the soup,' were considered precious and delicious by the ruling class, ASUU on the other hand, felt that both should be thrown into the pit. This to us constitutes the crux of what logically led to the proscription of ASUU. As we pointed out before, one effective way of "resolving" serious ideological and asymmetric conflicts, is by liquidating one of the parties to the conflict. Looking at the management of the conflict, one important point needs to be emphasized. The point is that the management of the conflict was intractable because there was no attempt by the government to treat the roots of the conflict. As we noted in chapter six, (section 6.2.0), the causes of ASUU strikes were products of contradictions generated by the existing neo-colonial capitalist order. Hence the attempts made by successive regimes

to treat the causes of the strikes while neglecting their roots, proved highly ineffectual. The fact however is that the prevailing instrumentalities of conflict resolution, were structurally incapable of resolving the roots of the conflict. This largely explains why in spite of the 1983 agreement reached by the government and ASUU, the conflict continued to assume more serious dimensions. In fact between 1984 and 1988, it escalated highly following the escalation of the contradictions of the neo-colonial capitalist order. For instance, the forces behind the erosion of University autonomy and academic freedom, became even more active. This no doubt suggests that the roots of the conflict was not actually addressed to, by the government.

All government's attempts at treating the causes of the conflict, did not produce any efficacious result because it used a rigid approach to resolve issues. For example, in the case of the appointment of Vice-Chancellors, government stuck to its guns of determining the final outcome of the exercise. It always argued that the post of Vice-Chancellor is a political rather than a career one, hence it should have the constitutional power to appoint Vice-Chancellors. This was against the background of Cookey Commission's recommendation that Vice-Chancellors should

henceforth be appointed by the University Councils and ratified by the Chancellor as representative of the Visitor (See Cookey Report, 1981:143). Again, this was in the face of ASUU's repeated demand that the appointment of Vice-Chancellors should be left to the Universities to handle since the exercise falls within the purview of University's autonomous (or self-governing) powers. Secondly, with respect to under-funding of Universities, the government used the 'economic recession thesis' to rationalize its funding policy, while ASUU on the other hand, saw the whole thing in terms of the contradictions generated by the neo-colonial capitalist order, such as mismanagement and corruption. Thirdly, while government rationalized its interference in the internal management of the Universities on the grounds that it has constitutional powers to enforce responsibility and accountability of all public organizations, ASUU on the other hand, saw government actions as a way to 'frustrate and cow the Universities to subservience.' This dogged approach to issues was characteristic of both sides to the conflict. The point then is that ASUU and the Government never perceived the solutions to their conflict in a similar manner.

On the other hand, both of them had similar perception of the character of the conflict because they realised that the

struggle by ASUU leadership to 'break the soup pot' and government's dogged resistance, was an underlying source of their conflict. The data in chapter six section 6.1.5 and chapter seven give reasonable support to this thesis. Therefore, government's strong belief in the prevailing social order vis-a-vis ASUU's dogged reprobation, in our opinion, constituted the major factor responsible for the poor management of ASUU-Government conflict.

This thesis does not in any way deny the proposition that communication gap, pride and arrogance on both sides to the conflict, were contributory factors to the poor management of the conflict, as table 8.4 indicates. These factors are however products of the asymmetric and structure-oriented character of the conflict because in such conflict, communication gap, pride and arrogance, readily assume serious dimensions thereby making the issue of dialogue a difficult one. This explains why the establishment of a collective bargaining machinery was really not taken seriously by the government (See table 8.3). It is doubtful if ASUU leadership was totally committed to the issue of establishing a collective bargaining machinery, since radical unions believe that such a

machinery would be a conservative tool that would promote and preserve the capitalist system. But some ASUU leaders interviewed, were of the view that ASUU demanded for the setting up of the collective bargaining machinery mainly because it had to 'operate within the laws of the land which necessitate a collective bargaining machinery.' However, much as this can be accepted to some extent as a reason, one still wonders why ASUU did not consider it reasonable to obey the orders of IAP if it was committed always to operating within the laws governing the system. We can offer some explanations on ASUU's actions. First, in spite of the radical character of its leadership, ASUU was made up essentially of petty-bourgeois elements who as we noted in chapter three occasionally adopt a vacillating and inconsistent position on certain matters. ASUU's ambivalence draws largely from its petty-bourgeois character. Secondly and consequently, ASUU leadership had to be sensitive to the feelings of the rank and file which occasionally presurized the leadership to adopt realistic strategies. ASUU leadership therefore saw in collective bargaining one of the realistic ways of realizing the professional and economic needs of the rank and file that largely exhibits conservative preferences. And in the process, ASUU displayed one of the characteristics of a petty-bourgeoisie

namely leftist extremism along with rightist opportunism.

8.3: Conclusion

This chapter examined how ASUU-Government conflict was managed, and discussed the factors responsible for its poor management.

This study found that although both parties to the dispute affirmed their faith in dialogue through the Collective Bargaining Machinery, no appreciable degree of commitment was made by both sides to establish and use the machinery. The major reason for this was that the conflict was asymmetric, ideological, political, and structure-oriented, and conflicts of this nature do not easily get resolved through the instrumentality of collective bargaining.

The conclusion therefore is that government's strong belief and commitment to the prevailing social order, vis-a-vis ASUU's dogged opposition to this, constituted the major explanatory factor as to why the management of the conflict was intractable. It was this major factor that generated other problems such as communication gap, arrogance and pride which in turn compounded the problem of its management.

CHAPTER NINE
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND
IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY

9.1: Summary and Conclusions

Despite their significance, strikes in Nigeria have not received adequate research attention. But much more disturbing is the fact that only very few works have been done on the participation of professionals in trade unionism. The few works that exist, do not focus on the issue of the roots, character, perception and management of strikes by the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU). This present study is partly an attempt to fill this existing gap in literature. There were however other problems that necessitated this study. First, the question of whether the various reasons given by ASUU for embarking on strikes, are actually the roots of its conflict with the federal government, needs deeper and critical investigation. Second, it is of immense relevance to probe, identify and analyze, the motive behind the erosion of University autonomy and academic freedom and the under-funding of Universities. Third, the issue of whether the strikes represented

either a form of symmetric and issue-oriented conflict, or an asymmetric and structure-oriented one, requires an empirical investigation. Fourth, the perception of the character of ASUU-Government conflict by the parties to the conflict, needs a critical study. And finally, the reasons why the management of the conflict was intractable, require identification and explanation.

In order to examine all these, this study was divided into nine chapters (the present one inclusive). In chapter one, efforts were made to provide a comprehensive historical background to the study, and identify the major problems, objectives, significance, scope, limitations, and hypotheses, of the study.

The study had two broad objectives. The first was to identify and analyze the roots, character and perception of ASUU strikes, and the second was to explain why the settlement of ASUU-Government conflict was intractable. On these two broad objectives, rest six specific ones.

With respect to the scope of the study, the focus was on the totality of ASUU-Government conflict which resulted to three strikes by ASUU in 1980, 1981 and 1988 and culminated in the proscription of ASUU by the government in 1988.

The period covered by the study is 1978 (when ASUU was formed) to 1988 (when it was proscribed).

Four major hypotheses guided the study. These are:

First, the mismanagement of the Nigerian economy by the ruling class, and the concomitantly dogged reprobation by ASUU Leadership, constitute the roots of ASUU-Government conflict.

Second, the motive behind the erosion of University autonomy and academic freedom, and under-funding of Universities, was to curb the radical orientation of Universities and consequently make them supportive of the prevailing social order.

Third, the perception of the character of ASUU-Government conflict by the rank and file of ASUU, was different from the way both ASUU leadership and the government perceived it.

And finally, the asymmetric and structure-oriented character of ASUU-Government conflict, made its management intractable.

In chapter Two, the relevant literature on (a) the causes, roots and management of industrial conflict, and strike, (b) Unionism among academics, and (c) ASUU-Government conflict, were reviewed. Some of the factors that influence the Unionization of academics, and those that determine their attitude towards militant unionism, were identified. Concluding this chapter on

Literature Review, we identified the inadequacy of existing literature as a basis for justifying the present study.

Chapter Three focused on the theoretical framework. The political economy cum class framework of analysis, was adopted for guiding the analysis in the study. The framework helped the study to identify the different interests represented and advanced by ASUU and the government. The government for instance advanced bourgeois interest while ASUU leadership (separated from rank and file for analytical reasons) propagated working class interests regardless of its petty-bourgeois character. Adopting the framework, the study identified the clash of these two ideological positions, as an underlying source of ASUU-Government conflict.

In chapter Four, the methodology of the study was discussed. Three major data-gathering instruments were used, namely documents, questionnaire and interview. Three hundred academics were sampled from ten federal and state Universities. Selected former ASUU leaders and serving top government officials were interviewed. Three sampling procedures used are the multi-stage stratified sample, simple random sample, and purposive sample. In analyzing the data, percentages, mean and examination of relevant historical documents, were employed.

Chapter Five examined the evolution, formation and organization of ASUU. But before focusing on these, two sections of the chapter discussed the essence and character of the academic profession, as well as the models of Academics-Government relations. In this chapter we noted that one of the basic functions of academics is to 'promote inquiry and advance the sum of human knowledge.' This we noted entails the function of seeking, teaching and preserving the truth, the performance of which requires critical and independent thinking [or what is popularly called University Autonomy and Academic Freedom (UAAF)]. The study also identified three models of academics-government relations, namely the opposition model, the collaboration model, and the independence model. It was noted that the inherent critical nature of the academic profession, is an important source of conflict between academics and the government, and that when this is mixed with radicalism, the emergence of an asymmetric conflict, becomes inevitable. Furthermore, we noted that the objectives of ASUU were not mainly centred on the improvement of the economic well-being, and professional academic standards, of University staff, but were also seriously committed to the advancement of socio-economic and political interests of the nation.

This finding is contrary to the views in government circles that ASUU leadership dabbled into political activities at the expense of its constitutional functions.

In chapters six to eight, the major task of this study was executed. Chapter six treated the causes and roots of ASUU-Government conflict, as well as the motive behind under-funding, government's anti-intellectual posture, and the erosion of University autonomy and academic freedom. One of the major findings in this chapter, relates to the principal causes of ASUU strikes. The three major causes of ASUU strikes identified, are under-funding of Universities; poor physical working conditions in Universities; and the erosion of University autonomy and academic freedom (Vide Supra, table 6.1). It was specifically found (through both survey and documentary methods) that the erosion of University autonomy and academic freedom was rated the most important cause of ASUU strikes, in relation to other factors (See also table 6.1). On the other hand, the data showed that although poor remuneration/poor conditions of service, was a cause of the strike, it was considered the least factor relative to the other three factors. This finding through survey method was also confirmed by documentary evidence.

Furthermore, the study showed through the survey method, that the great majority of academics sampled, rejected the proposition that the radical, uncompromising and confrontational posture of ASUU leadership, was a source of ASUU-Government conflict. This finding however contradicted government's position on the issue. However, it was found that sufficient documentary data strongly supported government's position.

With regard to the motive behind under-funding, and the erosion of University autonomy and academic freedom, there were enough evidence to accept the proposition that government's actions were aimed at curbing the radical orientation of Universities, and consequently making them supportive of the prevailing social order.

The study also found out that the mismanagement of the economy by the ruling class, and the concomitantly dogged reprobation by ASUU leadership, constitute the roots of ASUU-Government conflict.

Other minor findings in this chapter include: First, majority of academics sampled, hold right-wing ideological opinion. It was found that although they advocate that the existing social system should be reformed, they however do not favour a total transformation of the system into a new social order.

Secondly, the study show that ASUU leadership was dominated by radical academics who successfully established a radical tradition for ASUU. Hence the conclusion that the radical posture usually associated with ASUU, was more an attribute of its leadership, than its rank and file.

Thirdly, majority of academics sampled were dissatisfied on their job and expressed willingness to leave the academic profession for a better job. While almost all the academics sampled expressed the view that Universities were under-funded, and that University autonomy and academic freedom were eroded; majority of them on the other hand felt dissatisfied with their salaries and facilities they work with.

In chapter seven, the character and perception of the conflict were identified and discussed. The data showed that ASUU-Government conflict, was an asymmetric and structure-oriented one. The conflict assumed an ideological and political character. This finding however contradicted the opinion of the rank and file sampled. It was found that as far as the rank and file was concerned, the conflict was perceived as a symmetric and an issue-oriented one, directed mainly at improving the professional academic standards and economic well-being of academics. On the

other hand, the study showed that both ASUU leadership and the Government perceived the asymmetric and structure-oriented character of the conflict in a similar manner.

Chapter Eight focused on the management of the conflict, and examined reasons why the management of the conflict was intractable. The findings in this chapter include: First, majority of the academics sampled, as well as the government, expressed faith in dialogue through the collective bargaining machinery as a means of settling industrial conflict. Secondly, great majority of the academics held the view that ASUU strikes would have been prevented if a good and effective collective bargaining machinery was in existence. Thirdly, majority of them upheld the proposition that the reluctance of the government to set up a collective bargaining machinery was because of its impression that ASUU leadership was confrontational and uncompromising. Fourthly, great majority of the academics, identified communication gap and the problem of dissimilar perception of the underlying source of the conflict as major factors responsible for the poor management of the conflict. However, a good number of others identified ideological differences, and pride on both sides to the conflict, as minor factors that made the management of the conflict difficult.

Finally the study showed that the underlying factor which made the management of the conflict intractable was the asymmetric and structure-oriented character of the conflict. This underlying factor the study argued generated other factors such as communication gap, pride and arrogance, which in turn made the establishment of the collective bargaining machinery impossible. Hence the study concluded that the proscription of ASUU was one of the most effective ways of suppressing an asymmetric and structure-oriented conflict.

9.2: Practical and Theoretical Implications of the Study

9.2.1: Practical Implications

This study has certain practical implications. All over the world, industrial conflict is an endemic phenomenon, for as Hyman (1975:202) rightly observed, no social system can provide perfect and permanent harmony, since whatever is the institutional arrangement work relations would generate some frustration and discontent. Then as Rapoport (1974:225) aptly said, the understanding of the causes of conflict, will provide us with the knowledge of how they can be prevented, alleviated or resolved, and secondly an understanding of the etiology of conflicts, will

give rise to a science of conflict resolution applicable to the restoration or further enhancement of cooperation among men.

The attempt in this study to identify what constitute the major and minor causes of ASUU-Government conflict, is a significant contribution towards any practical effort to evolve harmonious relations between academics and the government. It will for instance help policy makers know which of the causes of ASUU strikes, was the most important determinant. Managers of industrial relations in University system, will now know that academics are much more likely to go on strike when their institutional autonomy and academic freedom is eroded, than when the crucial factor at stake is poor remuneration. Also, such managers would recognize the importance academics attach to their physical working conditions such as laboratories, libraries, etc.

But much more importantly, industrial relations managers are provided with the knowledge that treating the causes of a conflict rather than their roots, would not produce significant positive results. The study also emphasizes the point that the efficacy of any therapeutic measure on labour-management conflict in Nigeria, is a function of the restructuring of socio-economic and political relations along lines that enhance democratization of work relations.

The study indicates that since majority of academics share right-wing ideological views, and have faith in the collective bargaining system (as a means of managing industrial conflict), efforts should be made to institutionalize this machinery in the University system.

Furthermore, given the way the government reacted to the radical, confrontational and uncompromising posture of ASUU leadership, future union leaders in the academic profession, should learn to be more circumspect, and shrewd in its relations with established authorities that are strongly committed to the existing social order. Future union leaders in the academic profession, should grasp the limits of radical or militant unionism among petty-bourgeois elements the bulk of whom share right-wing ideological view. In most cases of such situation, the union leaders bear the brunt of the consequences of union radicalism.

This study also has practical implications for government attitude and policy towards militant students' unionism. As the study indicated, government had the impression that militant students' unionism was a product of the influence of left-wing academics within ASUU. The crucial question before policy makers is, why do many students participate in certain popular violent demonstrations?

Was such participation a product of the influence of radical academics?

The crucial point which this study exposes, is that the causes and roots of ASUU-Government conflict, directly and indirectly determine the character of students unionism. For instance, poor laboratory and reading (or learning) facilities, unhealthy living environment etc, which inter alia are products of under-funding, do create frustration and discontent among the students' populace. Such a feeling of discontent often make many of them, vulnerable to mobilization gimmicks of left-wing students. Part of our findings (not reported in this study) shows that the major cause of students' unrest is 'perceived government's neglect of higher education and its insensitivity to students problems,' than other explanations bordering on (a) indoctrination of students by marxist (radical) lecturers, (b) youthful exuberance and immaturity, and (c) activities of self-seeking and politically ambitious students' leaders.

The implication of our study for government policy towards students, therefore is that incessant students' unrest would likely diminish when government pays adequate attention to the problems of higher education especially in the areas of inadequate funding, poor working facilities, and poor living conditions of students.

9.2.2: Theoretical Implications

One of the theoretical implications of the study is that labour-management conflict is bound to continue and may even assume serious dimensions, in organizations where causes rather than roots of conflict are treated. This implies that attempt made at the theoretical level to separate causes of conflict from their roots, is a useful one. Our study shows that ASUU-Government conflict, had immediate as well as underlying causes.

Secondly, the study supports Rapoport's (1974) thesis that asymmetric and structure-oriented conflicts, are difficult to resolve. The study specifically upholds his theoretical postulation that in asymmetric and structure-oriented conflict, the liquidation of one of the parties to the conflict, is a realistic way of suppressing the conflict. The proscription of ASUU was therefore a logical outcome of the asymmetric and structure-oriented character of the conflict.

Thirdly, part of the findings of this study confirms Hyman's (1979) proposition that strikes in Third World Countries, are a form of protest directed against the government and are

likely to possess an overt political dimension. The strikes Hyman posits, are explicit challenge to established authority. Our study shows that ASUU leadership used ASUU strikes to challenge the established order and for creating the necessary consciousness required for overthrowing the existing social order.

Fourthly, the study makes the theoretical contribution that the primary motive behind the erosion of University autonomy and academic freedom, and the under-funding of Universities, was to curb the radical orientation of Universities and consequently make them supportive of the prevailing social order.

Another theoretical contribution of the study, is that in asymmetric and structure-oriented conflict, there is the tendency for communication gap, pride and arrogance to assume serious dimensions that further complicate the resolution process.

Furthermore, the study confirms one of the characteristics of a petty-bourgeois class, namely vacillation on, or ambivalence towards, certain issues. The study indicates that due to the petty-bourgeois character of ASUU membership, ASUU radical leadership could not help vacillating on certain matters sensitive to the feelings of the rank and file. For example, it

persistently demanded for the setting up of a collective bargaining machinery, even though it knew that such machinery, is a conservative instrument that accepts and promotes the fundamental principles of the prevailing social order. In the process it exhibited one of the contradictory qualities of the petty-bourgeoisie, namely leftist extremism cum rightist opportunism.

The study also advances the theoretical propositions that (i) ASUU was not ideologically cohesive, (ii) ASUU was a union led by few powerful radical elements over a largely conservative followership, and (iii) the trade union outlook of ASUU was largely shaped by the few radical leaders.

Finally, the study enriches our knowledge on how the character of the conflict was perceived by the parties themselves. The study revealed that contrary to the view in some quarters, the perception of the character of the conflict by ASUU rank and file, was different from that of its leadership. This also confirms the proposition that there was lack of ideological cohesion between the leadership and rank and file of ASUU. It also confirms Bilton et al's (1981:491) thesis that strikes

'may have a wide range of causes, with not all the participants sharing the same motives for action.' The fact that ASUU leadership and the government, perceived the conflict in a similar way, goes to support the proposition that ASUU and the government were conscious of the fact that they were involved in an asymmetric and structure-oriented conflict the result of which logically culminated in the proscription of ASUU in 1988.

9.3: Agenda for Further Research

There is no doubt that this research has not exhausted all that needs to be studied about ASUU-Government conflict. As we observed in chapter one, this study is largely exploratory, hence we believe that there are still virgin areas that need to be explored. It is against this backdrop that the limitations of this study and the concomitant need for further research, have to be appreciated.

Since this study focused mainly on the activities of ASUU at the national level, there is need to study the specific contribution of the branches, towards the dynamics of ASUU-Government conflict. Secondly, there is need to study the internal dynamics of ASUU, so as to explore the power and ideological struggles within ASUU. Such a study no doubt would

help to unravel the strategies used by radical elements to dominate ASUU leadership. How for example did the various branches react to certain ideological decisions and statements by ASUU National Executive Council, in view of the fact that the bulk of ASUU membership was dominated by liberal academics?

This study recognizes the fact that students' unrest is a serious national problem. Government as we noted had on several occasions, accused radical academics of indoctrinating students in higher institutions (See Babangida 1989; Omotunde et al 1988, among others). We believe that this is an important issue that can be explored further than we did in this study. For example, a specific study on the correlates of students' militant unionism, would no doubt help to establish whether the alleged indoctrination by radical academics, is a major determinant. As we know, our study noted the fact that whether it was sheer coincidence or not, students radicalism or violent demonstrations, had been on the rapid increase since the formation of ASUU in 1978. We believe therefore that a study on whether ASUU actually influenced students' radicalism, would be a worthwhile enterprise that could help in shaping or reshaping government attitude to, and policy on, militant students' unionism, as well as on academic staff union in higher institutions.

Furthermore, a detailed comparative study on how the two major strikes by ASUU in 1981 and 1988, were specifically managed, would surely provide useful lessons on the success and failure of conflict management in Nigeria.

And finally, a comparative study of strikes by ASUU during the civilian and military regimes, would help to explain the influence of regime-types on the extent to which academics can effectively maintain a radical and confrontational posture against established authorities. In other words, one may ask: couldn't the proscription of ASUU be a product of the authoritarian and undemocratic character of the military than say the asymmetric and structure-oriented character of ASUU-Government conflict? These areas which were not fully unexplored by our study, may perhaps bring a new dimension to our conclusions.

NOTES

1. This quotation was Hyman's (1979) translation of Durand and Budois' work written in French and titled Lagre've (Paris: Armand Colin).
2. See Peter Waterman (1976): 'Third World Strikes: An Invitation to Discussion': Development and Change, Vol 7, No 3, from where I paraphrased Brecher's work.
3. Our classification of scholars into either the liberal or class conflict schools, is actually not very neat. We experienced difficulties in doing this especially when a particular author expresses views that can be placed in either of the schools. So any error in our clasification should be seen in this light.
4. We are using the 1963 edition of Hick's work.
5. See Inagham G. (1974): Strikes and Industrial conflict (British and Scandinavia). London: The Macmillan Press, from where these later comments were drawn. See also Ross and Hartment (1960:45) in Bibliography.
6. Published in French. See David Synder (1975) (in Bibliography) from where our facts were drawn.
7. Ibid.
8. As Synthesized by David Synder (1975:263).
9. This last sentence is an interpretation of Taft's views by Arthur Kornhauser et al (eds), in a summary of Taft's article in their book.

10. The on-going brain drain has been a national problem in the past few years. The matter became so serious in recent past that the Federal Government had to set up a Presidential Panel on the Problem of Brain Drain. The fact is that most departments in Nigeria Universities are seriously under-staffed due principally to the current brain drain.
11. We are using this 10,000 as a working figure because it reflects the 1985 NUC figure of 10,038. The 1987 figure on the other hand included staff of some Advanced Teachers Colleges (A.T.C.) affiliated to some Universities, whose staff we believe never took active interest in ASUU.
12. Adapted from Duncan Innes and Martin Plant: 'Class struggle and the state' Review of African Political Economy, No. 11, 1978, p. 55.
13. We are using the words 'ideological' and 'political' separately here to emphasize the different levels they occupy in the class struggle. Ideological issues for instance are at the lower level of the class struggle than political ones.
14. ASUU leadership tried to tie in the fight to improve Professional academic standards and economic well-being of its members, with the struggle against the prevailing social order dominated by domestic and imperialist capitalist forces.

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APPENDIX A
MISCELLANEOUS PERSONAL DATA

Table A.1: Respondents According to Faculty.

Faculty	Number of Respondents	Percentage (%)
Administration (Business & Public)	13	4
Agriculture	35	12
Arts	37	12
Education	28	9
Engineering	19	6
Environmental Design (Archetecture)	13	4
Law	11	4
Medicine	3	1
Pharmacy	16	5
Sciences (Physical & Biological)	41	14
Social Sciences	78	26
Veterinary Medicine	6	2
Total	300	100*

* Rounded up.

Table A.2: Respondents According to Academic Rank

Rank	Number of Respondents.	Percentage (%)
Lecturer I & below	174	58
Senior Lecturer	93	31
Reader/Professor	31	10
No Response	2	1
Total	300	100

Table A.3: Respondents According to Sex

Sex	Number of Respondents	Percentage (%)
Male	277	92
Female	23	8
Total	300	100

Table A.4: Respondents According to Years of Experience

Years of Experience	Number of Respondents	Percentage (%)
10 yrs & below	195	65
11 yrs to 14 yrs	55	18
15 yrs and above	49	16
No Response	1	0
Total	300	100*

* Rounded up.

Table A.5: Respondents According to Age.

Age	Number of Respondents	Percentage (%)
30yrs & below	32	11
31yrs to 40yrs	150	50
41yrs to 50yrs	92	31
51yrs and above	26	9
Total	300	101*

* Due to Rounding

Table A.6: Respondents According to Highest Qualification Possessed.

Qualification	Number of Respondents	Percentage (%)
First Degree	7	2
Masters Degree	112	37
Doctorate Degree	179	60
No Response	2	1
Total	300	100

Table A.7: Respondents According to Number of Publications

Number of Publications	Number of Respondents	Percentage (%)
Five and below	90	30
Six to Ten	72	24
Eleven and above	100	33
No Response	38	13
Total	300	100

Table A.8: Respondents According to Number of Unpublished Papers

Number of Unpublished Papers	Number of Respondents	Percentage (%)
Five and below	139	46
Six to Ten.	75	25
Eleven and above	45	15
No Response	41	14
Total	300	100

APPENDIX B

EXTENT OF PARTICIPATION IN ASUU AFFAIRS

Table B.1: Respondents that held Office in ASUU

Status	Number of Respondents	Percentage (%)
Officers	30	10
Non-Officers	268	89
No Response	2	1
Total	300	100

Table B.2: Respondents that were Active Members of ASUU

Active and Non-active members	Number of Respondents	Percentage (%)
Active	190	63
Non-Active	82	27
No Response	28	9
Total	300	100*

*Rounded up

Table B.3: Respondents that attended ASUU Meetings Regularly.

Attendance at ASUU Meetings	Number of Respondents	Percentage (%)
Very Regularly	91	30
Regularly	103	34
Not Regularly	56	19
Seldomly	48	16
No Response	2	1
Total	300	100

Table B.4: Respondents that Supported ASUU Strikes

Supporter of ASUU Strike	Number of Respondents	Percentage (%)
Supporters	246	82
Non-Supporters	16	5
Not Applicable	38	13
Total	300	100

Table B.5: Reasons Why Respondents did not support ASUU Strikes

Reasons for not supporting ASUU Strikes	Number of Respondents	Percentage (%)
The strikes were unnecessary	6	2
The strikes were merely confrontational.	5	2
ASUU should have explored more avenues of dialogue	32	11
ASUU leaders were too radically and politically minded.	3	1
Total	46	16

APPENDIX C

ATTITUDES TOWARD IDEOLOGICALLY RELATED ISSUES

Table C.1: Respondents' Opinion on the most fundamental Cause of Nigeria's Economic Problem.

Causes of Nigeria's Economic Problem	Number of Respondents	Percentage (%)
Mismanagement by inept and corrupt leaders	227	76
The dependent capitalist and imperialist character of the economy	51	17
World economic Recession	1	0
Tribalism	5	2
Political Instability	9	3
Lack of Skilled Manpower	1	0
Others	4	1
No Response	2	1
Total	300	100

Table C.2: Respondents' Opinion on the Solution to the
Fundamental Cause of Nigeria's Economic Problem.

Solutions to Nigeria's Economic Problem	Number of Respondents	Percentage (%)
Better Economic Management	189	63
Total Transformation of the Economy from the present form of private ownership of the means of production to a collective one.	54	18
By Economic Reforms such as SAP	11	4
Replacement of old and Corrupt Politicians with Newbreed.	6	2
More training of Public officials	4	1
Others	34	11
No Response	2	1
Total	300	100

Table C.3: Respondents' Opinion on the major Cause of
Mismanagement and Corruption

Causes of Mismanagement and Corruption	Number of Respondents	Percentage (%)
The Capitalist nature of the Economy	61	20
Greed	176	59
Lack of fear of God	31	10
Others	24	8
No Response	8	3
Total	300	100

Table C.4: Respondents' Opinion on whether Nigeria should
Continue with the present Capitalist System.

Opinion	Number of Respondents	Percentage (%)
Yes	152	51
No	130	43
No Response	18	6
Total	300	100

Table C.5: Opinion of Former ASUU Leaders on Whether Nigeria should continue with the present Capitalist System.

Opinion	Number of Respondents	Percentage (%)
Yes	12	40
No	17	57
Undecided	1	3
Total	30	100

APPENDIX D

ATTITUDES TOWARD TRADE UNION ISSUES

Table D.1: Respondents' Opinion on whether Trade Unionism is compatible with the ideals of the Academic Profession.

Opinion	Number of Respondents	Percentage (%)
Compatible	268	89
Incompatible	28	9
Undecided	4	1
Total	300	100*

*Rounded up.

Table D.2: Respondents' Opinion on whether University academics should have Trade Union.

Opinion	Number of Respondents	Percentage (%)
Yes	277	92
No	23	8
Total	300	100

Table D.3: Respondents' Opinion On whether they believe in the Legal Right of Academics to Strike.

Opinion	Number of Respondents	Percentage (%)
Yes	286	95
No	11	4
No Response	3	1
Total	300	100

Table D.4: Respondents' Opinion On whether it is necessary for academics to strike in order to achieve their collective goals.

Opinion	Number of Respondents	Percentage (%)
Yes	258	86
No	40	13
No Response	2	1
Total	300	100

APPENDIX E(I)

INSTRUMENTS OF DATA COLLECTION

Sub-Dept. of Public Admin. & L.G.
University of Nigeria
Nsukka

November 13, 1989

Dear Sir/Madam,

Ph.D DEGREE RESEARCH ON 'ASUU-GOVERNMENT CONFLICT:
AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE ROOTS, CHARACTER AND
MANAGEMENT OF ASUU STRIKES.'

I am working on a doctoral project on the above topic. As part of my data gathering requirements, the opinion of Nigerian University academics is solicited through the attached questionnaire.

I will be grateful if you spare part of your precious time to fill the questionnaire.

Thanks very much for your cooperation.

Yours faithfully,



Obasi Isaac Nnamdi.

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR ASUU MEMBERSBACKGROUND INFORMATION

1. Department _____ 2. Faculty _____
3. University _____ 4. Year of Employment _____
5. Sex: Male , Female 6. Age:
- (a) 30 years and below
- (b) 31 - 40 years
- (c) 41 - 50 years
- (d) 51 years and above
7. Highest educational Qualification _____
8. Academic Rank _____ 9. No. of Publications _____
10. No. of unpublished papers _____
11. Have you held an office in ASUU before? (a) Yes (b) No
12. If yes, what position(s) did you occupy? _____
13. Indicate the period during which you held office _____
14. If you never held an office, were you an active member of ASUU?
(a) Yes (b) No
15. How regular did you attend ASUU meetings? (a) Very regular
(b) Regularly (c) Not regularly (d) Seldom
16. What are your reading and listening hobbies? (Tick those appropriate)

- (a) Newspapers and periodicals (b) Novels
 (c) News from radio and television (d) All the above
 (e) None of the above

17. Do you enjoy discussing political and economic issues?

- (a) Yes (b) No

THE ACADEMIC'S GENERAL VIEW ON THE ECONOMY

18. Which of the following do you think is the most fundamental cause of Nigeria's economic problem? (Tick one).

- (a) Mismanagement by inept and Corrupt leaders
 (b) The dependent capitalist and imperialist (neo-colonial) character of the economy
 (c) World economic recession
 (d) Tribalism
 (e) Political instability
 (f) Lack of skilled manpower
 (g) Any other (specify) _____

19. Which of the following can best solve this fundamental problem? (Tick one)

- (a) Better economic management
 (b) Total transformation of the economy from the present form of private ownership of the means of production to a collective one

- (c) By economic reforms such as SAP
- (d) Change of old corrupt politicians with new breed
- (e) More training of public officials
- (f) Others (specify) _____

20. Which of the following do you think is the major cause of mismanagement and corruption in the Nigerian economy?

- (a) The capitalist nature of the economy
- (b) Greed (d) Others _____
- (c) Lack of fear of God

21. Given the present state of the economy, do you think Nigeria has prospects of developing fast through the system of the private ownership of the means of production.

- (a) Yes (b) No

ATTITUDES TOWARDS TRADE UNIONISM AND STRIKES

22. Do you share the view that the ideals of the academic profession are incompatible with trade Unionism?

- (a) Yes (b) No

23. Should University academics have a trade Union: (a) Yes

- (b) No

24. Do you believe in the legal right of academics to strike?

- (a) Yes (b) No

25. Do you support the view that academics should strike in order to achieve their collective goals?
 (a) Yes (b) No
26. If yes, did you support ASUU strikes? (a) Yes
 (b) No
27. If No, why? (Tick one)
 (a) Because the strikes were unnecessary
 (b) Because the strikes were merely confrontational
 (c) ASUU should have continued to explore avenues of dialogue
 (d) ASUU leaders were too radically and politically minded
28. Do you agree that Nigerian academics formed ASUU in order to secure more effective guarantee of status and privileges?
 (a) Yes (b) No

CAUSES, ROOTS, CHARACTER AND PERCEPTION OF ASUU STRIKES AND ASUU-GOVERNMENT CONFLICT

29. Rank the following reasons in terms of their influence as cause of ASUU strikes (Use 1 for the highest and 5 for the lowest).

Ranks	Item
(a) _____	Erosion of University autonomy and academic freedom

- | | | |
|-----|--------------------------|--|
| (b) | <input type="checkbox"/> | Under-funding of Universities |
| (c) | <input type="checkbox"/> | Poor remuneration and conditions of service |
| (d) | <input type="checkbox"/> | Radicalism of Union leaders |
| (e) | <input type="checkbox"/> | Poor working conditions such as poor laboratories, equipments, logistical support etc. |

30. Tick one of the following which you think is the root of all these causes.

- (a) The present dependent capitalist, exploitative and imperialist character of the economy
- (b) World economic recession and dwindling revenue from oil
- (c) Mismanagement of the economy by inept and corrupt political leadership

31. Do you share the view that University autonomy and academic freedom are progressively being eroded?

- (a) Yes (b) No

32. If yes, show the degree to which you agree or disagree with the statement that University autonomy and academic freedom are being eroded because: (Mark (✓) under Responses).

Reasons	Response				
	Strongly agree	Agree	Dis-agree	Strongly disagree	Undecided
(a) Lecturers are abusing them by frequently challenging government policies					
(b) Lecturers hide under them to indoctrinate students					
(c) Governments want to curb the radical orientation of Universities					

33. Do you share the view that Universities are under-funded?

(a) Yes (b) No

34. If yes, indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with the statement that Universities are under-funded because (Mark ✓() under Responses).

Reasons	Responses				
	Strongly Agree	Agree	Dis-agree	Strongly disagree	Undecided
(a) There is world economic recession					
(b) Mismanagement of the economy					
(c) Universities are considered irrelevant by government					

Reasons	Responses				
	Strongly Agree	Agree	Dis-agree	Strongly disagree	Undecided
(d) Universities criticize the governments alot and have become unduly radical					
(e) Governments want to make the Universities less radical					

35. Do you think that various Governments from 1978 have anti-intellectual posture because of the way they have been treating lecturers and the Universities?

(a) Yes (b) No

36. If yes, do you think such anti-intellectual posture is due to:
(Tick one)

(a) Government's aversion for radical scholarship and a feeling of being threatened by the incessant criticisms from the Universities

(b) Governments lack enough resources to support the Universities

37. Do you believe that one of the greatest divides separating ASUU and the government is the issue of ideology for Nigeria? (a) Yes (b) No

38. Show the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statement that ASUU strikes were primarily motivated by:
(Mark ✓).

Reasons	Responses				
	Strongly agree	Agree	Dis-agree	Strongly disagree	Undecided
(a) The desire to improve the economic well-being of its members					
(b) The desire to improve professional academic standards					
(c) The desire to challenge and in the process change the existing capitalist system					

OPINION ON JOB SATISFACTION, AND STUDENTS UNREST

39. How satisfied would you say you are on your job? (Tick one)
- (a) Very satisfied
- (b) Satisfied
- (c) Dis-satisfied
- (d) Very dissatisfied

40. If you are satisfied or dissatisfied on your job, indicate this with respect to the following reasons: (Mark under responses)

Reasons	Responses	
	Dissatisfied	Very dissatisfied
(a) Working equipments and logistical support		
(b) Salary		
(c) Autonomy and freedom		
(d) Government response to the plight of Universities		
(e) Promotional Prospects		
(f) Respect and prestige associated with Lecturing		

41. Would you like to leave the academic profession now if you secure a better job? (a) Yes (b) No
42. If yes, would your decision be made without hesitation?
(a) Yes (b) No
43. But would you still like to be in academics if you could secure it in an advanced country?
(a) Yes (b) No

44. Do you think students' unrest occur because: (Tick one)
- (a) of youthful exuberance and immaturity
 - (b) governments' neglect of higher education and insensitivity to students problems
 - (c) Marxist (or radical) lecturers indoctrinate students and encourage them to be militant
 - (d) of the activities of self-seeking and politically ambitious students' leaders

MANAGEMENT OF ASUU STRIKES

45. Based on your experience in Nigeria, do you have faith in dialogue (through the collective bargaining system) as a primary means of settling labour-management conflict ?
- (a) Yes (b) No
46. Do you share the view that ASUU strikes would have been prevented if a good and effective collective bargaining machinery was in existence?
- (a) Yes (b) No

47. The failure to manage ASUU-Government Conflict was due to:

(Mark ✓ under responses).

Reasons	Responses				
	Strongly agree	Agree	Dis-agree	Strongly disagree	Undecided
(a) The ideological differences between ASUU and the Government					
(b) Communication gap					
(c) Dissimilar perception as to what was the underlying source of the conflict					
(d) Pride on both sides to the conflict					
(e) The fact that the conflict was a class struggle					

48. Do you believe that the Federal government refused to set up collective bargaining machinery because it felt ASUU was too confrontational and uncompromising?

(a) Yes (b) No

49. If No, what do you think was (or were) the main reason(s)?

50. Recommend measures on how to settle ASUU-Government conflict

51. Make any other useful comment(s) on the conflict

I. H. Obasi
I. H. OBASI
Researcher.

APPENDIX E(2)

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE TO FORMER ASUU LEADERS

Sub-Dept. of Public Admin. & L.G.
University of Nigeria
Nsukka

November 13, 1989

Dear Sir/Madam

Ph.D DEGREE RESEARCH ON 'ASUU-GOVERNMENT CONFLICT:
AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE ROOTS, CHARACTER AND
MANAGEMENT OF ASUU STRIKES.'

I am working on a doctoral project on the above topic.
The accompanying interview schedule is meant to elicit the
opinion of former ASUU Leaders on some vital information.

Kindly therefore spare part of your precious time to
respond to the interview schedule.

Thanks and best wishes.

Yours faithfully,



Obasi Isaac Nnamdi.

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR SELECTED NATIONAL AND BRANCHASUU LEADERS

1. Department _____
2. Faculty _____
3. University _____
4. Year of Employment _____
5. Sex: Male , Female
6. Age: (a) 30 years & below (b) 31 to 40 yrs
(a) 41 to 50 yrs (d) 51 and above
7. Highest qualification _____ (8) Present Academic Rank _____
9. Academic rank when you first served as ASUU official _____
10. Position held in ASUU _____
11. Period during which you held office in ASUU _____

GENERAL VIEW OF THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY

12. What do you think is the most fundamental cause of Nigeria's economic problem?
13. What measure can best solve this fundamental problem?

OPINION ON THE ROOTS, CHARACTER AND PERCEPTION OF ASUU STRIKES

14. In the past, ASUU identified the erosion of University autonomy and academic freedom, under-funding of Universities, poor remuneration and conditions of service, and poor working conditions, as causes of ASUU strikes. In your opinion, do

you feel these causes are the roots of the strikes or are mere symptoms of ASUU conflict with the government.

Give reasons.

15. If you think these are symptoms, what do you then feel is the root of ASUU-Government conflict?
16. ASUU had over the years consistently accused the federal government of eroding University autonomy and academic freedom. What in your view constituted the main motive or reason why the government eroded such freedom?
17. ASUU also accused the government of under-funding the existing Universities while at the same time establishing new ones. What do you believe was the main reason for such government action?
18. Some people have accused the government of being anti-intellectual operationalized in terms of its insensitivity to the plight of Universities and its aversion for radical scholarship? Could you please explain the motive behind anti-intellectual posture of the government.
19. ASUU has been accused of being primarily interested in bread and butter affair for its members. For instance, some point to the fact that ASUU never joined any NLC strikes? What is your view on this matter?

20. What do you believe is the core or essence of ASUU struggle over the years?
21. It is believed in some quarters that the greatest divide between ASUU and the government, is the issue of ideology. Do you share this view? Give reasons.

VIEWS ON THE MANAGEMENT OF ASUU-GOVERNMENT CONFLICT

22. What are the factors that made the management (settlement) of ASUU-Government conflict intractable?
23. Over the years, ASUU repeatedly asked for the setting up of a collective Bargaining machinery but the government footdragged on the matter. Kindly explain what you feel is the reason behind government's reluctance to set up the machinery.
24. But why was ASUU - a supposedly radical and progressive Union repeatedly asking for the setting up of a collective Bargaining machinery when it is widely believed that a collective bargaining system, is a status-quo-oriented instrument of conflict resolution?
25. Some people have argued that ASUU-Government conflict was a form of class struggle and that because of this the settlement of the conflict became intractable? Do you share this view? Give reasons.

26. What do you think were the source of the internal problems of ASUU which among other things made the government to treat it the way it did?
27. What are your suggestions for resolving ASUU-Government Conflict?
28. Comment freely on any other issue relevant to this interview:



Isaac N. Obasi
Researcher.

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APPENDIX E(3)

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE TO GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHMENTS

Sub-Dept. of Public Admin. & L.G.
University of Nigeria
Nsukka

November 13, 1989

Dear Sir,

Ph.D DEGREE RESEARCH ON 'ASUU-GOVERNMENT
CONFLICT: AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE ROOTS,
CHARACTER AND MANAGEMENT OF ASUU STRIKES.

I am working on a doctoral project on the above topic. As part of my data-gathering requirements, the views of some selected top federal government officials are needed.

Kindly therefore spare part of your precious time to respond to the attached interview schedule.

Thanks and best wishes.

Yours faithfully,



Obasi Isaac Nnamdi.

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR SOME SELECTED
TOP FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

1. Organization _____
2. As a top federal government official, do you share the view that it is not proper for academics (as professionals) to have a trade Union. Give reasons for your view.
3. Since the formation of ASUU in 1978 to its proscription in 1988, ASUU remained at loggerheads with successive federal governments? What in your opinion as a top federal government official, is the root of ASUU's conflict with the government.
4. ASUU in its ten years of existence consistently accused the federal government of eroding University autonomy and academic freedom. To what extent do you think this allegation is true?
5. Some analysts have claimed that the erosion of University autonomy and academic freedom as well as the under-funding of conventional Universities, was all an attempt by the federal government to curb the radical orientation of academics thereby making them supportive of the existing social order. Kindly comment briefly on this.

6. Kindly comment on the assertion that the greatest divide between ASUU and the government is the issue of ideology.
7. It is believed in some quarters that ASUU was waging a class (ideological) struggle with the government rather than pursuing the economic and professional interests of its members. Do you think this assertion is correct. Elaborate.
8. What were the major factors that made the settlement of ASUU-Government conflict intractable?
9. ASUU had during its ten years of existence asked for the establishment of a collective bargaining machinery but the government was slow in responding to this demand. Could you please explain why you think the government hesitated on this.
10. Do you believe (as some people do) that ASUU-Government conflict would have been nipped in the bud, if there was in existence a collective bargaining machinery.
11. Suggest ways of finding a lasting solution to the conflict between academics and the government.

APPENDIX E(4)

Room 403 Nkrumah Hall
University of Nigeria
Nsukka

28 May, 1989

Dear Sir,

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

I am a doctoral student in the Sub-Department of Public Administration and Local Government, University of Nigeria, Nsukka. I am working on a research topic titled: 'ASUU-Government Conflict in Nigeria: An Investigation into the roots character and Management of ASUU Strikes.'

As part of my data-gathering endeavour, I am in need of statistics concerning your academic staff.

Kindly therefore let me have (by post) the total number of academic staff in your University. Kindly also provide a summary of their departmental or faculty distribution.

This information is needed to enable me select a representative sample of academics in all the Nigerian Universities.

Thanks for your cooperation.

Yours faithfully,



Isaac Nnamdi Obasi

APPENDIX F

ACADEMIC STAFF UNION OF UNIVERSITIES (ASUU)UNIVERSITY OF BENIN (BRANCH)BENIN CITY

13th January, 1986

NEWS BULLETINTHE RULE OF LAW IN THE UNIVERSITY OF BENIN

1. 19th November 1985: A new Channel of Communication between staff and Professor Grace Alele Williams is outlined. The new channel of communication requires that academic staff wishing to see Professor Grace Alele Williams must first apply in writing through their head of department and Dean and await a reply through the same channel.
2. 19th November, 1985: University wide circulars are issued requiring that all applications to use the Main Auditorium, Public Address Systems and other facilities of the University be made at the first instance to Professor Grace Alele Williams.
3. 22nd November, 1985: Another circular reaffirming those of 19 November 1985 is issued.

4. 22nd November, 1985: Professor Grace Alele Williams declares that request to attend conferences whether local or international must be made at least one year in advance.
5. Wednesday 27th November, 1985: The sitting arrangement in the University Senate is rearranged and formalized by the new Vice-Chancellor, Professor Grace Alele Williams, with Provosts and Deans coming first, Professors and Heads of Departments coming next, ordinary Professors, Acting Heads of departments, Senior Lecturers and ordinary lecturers coming in that descending order of rank.
6. Wednesday 27th November 1985: The University is the site of a student demonstration. The essence of the student complaint is the manner in which Professor Grace Alele Williams handled the students' grievances over housing and other conditions on campus i.e. dissolution of student union executive and congress and the setting up of a care-taker committee for the students.
7. 28th November, 1985: Professor Grace Alele Williams sets up an Ad Hoc Disciplinary Committee under Professor P.A. Igbafe to try staff and students charged with involvement in the students' demonstration.

8. Friday 29th November, 1985: Dr. Tunde Fatunde is charged with incitement and participation in the student demonstration and asked under escort to appear before the Ad Hoc Disciplinary Committee.
9. Friday 20th December 1985: Professor I.E. Sagay is led by Professor Grace Alele Williams from an ongoing meeting of Council to waiting policemen in her office for a "chat". Professor Grace Alele Williams leaves and Professor I.E. Sagay is asked to proceed to the police station without any explanation by Professor Grace Alele Williams.
10. From 4.00 a.m. to 9.30 a.m. December, 1985: The house of Dr. Festus Iyayi, Chairman, ASUU (Uniben) is searched by men of the Nigerian Police Force allegedly in connection with letters of threat to members of the Ad Hoc Committee emanating from an unknown organisation. A standing order is placed on Dr. Festus Iyayi to report regularly to the police station. Vital and confidential ASUU documents are removed by the police.
11. Around 23rd December, 1985: Professor Grace Alele Williams disconnects the supply of water to academic staff living in Ekosodin Village.

12. 27th December, 1985: Professor Grace Alele Williams takes the water disconnected from academic staff to other parts of Ekosodin Village. All academic staff living in the Village are excluded from the supply of water.
13. Early January 1986: Professor Grace Alele Williams declares that only Professors and Associate Professors can be external examiners to Uniben.
14. 2nd January 1986: Professor S.E. Oyovbaire, Head, Department of Political Science invited to meet with Professor Grace Alele Williams is turned back by the same Professor Grace Alele Williams. Mrs Dyokpite, Secretary to Professor Grace Alele Williams announces to Professor Oyovbaire that "she says she does not want to see you."
15. 2nd January 1986: Professor Grace Alele Williams writes to cancel the study leave granted to a member by the Appointments and Promotions Board on 11th September 1985. This is in spite of the fact that the University Appointments and Promotions Board and Governing Council had indeed already approved the study leave for the staff before the arrival of Professor Grace Alele William in Uniben.

Signed
Dr. Festus Iyayi
Chairman, ASUU (Uniben)

Signed
Osagie Obayuwana
Secretary, ASUU (Uniben)

APPENDIX G

ACADEMIC STAFF UNION OF UNIVERSITIES

MEMORANDUM AND LOG OF DEMANDS

ON

THE DECLARATION OF TRADE DISPUTE

BETWEEN

ASUU

AND

1. The Governing Councils of Universities
2. NUC
3. Federal Government of Nigeria

ACADEMIC STAFF UNION OF UNIVERSITIES (ASUU)
NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS

19th September, '87

Dear Colleague,

WE HAVE DECLARED A TRADE DISPUTE

Following the industrial dispute and subsequent industrial action undertaken by the Union in 1981 and 1982, ASUU reached an Agreement with Government on a number of specific measures aimed at arresting tottering morale among staff and deteriorating conditions in the universities. These measures covered conditions of service for university staff, adequate funding of the universities and university autonomy.

Since 1983, however, ASUU has made every effort to urge on Government not only to implement various aspects of the Agreement but indeed not to impose worse conditions on the Universities. Today, everybody familiar with the university system will attest to the fact that these efforts yielded virtually no fruits. Indeed the Universities are in a state of crisis more acute and worse than what existed in 1981 and

1982 when the Union was forced to declare a trade dispute and subsequently embark on industrial action.

In 1981, for example, the existing conditions of service guaranteed accommodation for staff including a take home pay for professors of about £10,000.00. In addition salaries were paid as and when due, laboratories and classrooms were relatively equipped and university funding was at a level just enough to meet basic and essential needs. There was greater autonomy and in university governance the rule of law was basically maintained.

Today, the picture is not only radically different but depressing. Existing conditions of service are constantly being eroded, accommodation for staff is under attack, the take home pay for professors is about £2,000.00 (at a time when it has increased from £14,000.00 to £29,000.00 in Britain). Salaries are no longer regular and worse still, the funding situation is such that a larger number of teachers are in danger of being retrenched. This year alone, (1987/88), funding has decreased over that of last year (1986/87) by about 35.0 per cent. The Government is poised to close down university procedures (e.g. Benin, Owerri, Calabar and Nsukka) while an atmosphere of fear, silence and arbitrariness

is being imposed with active government initiative and support on the universities. In the process, the very tenets of a university culture are being subverted and thrown to the dogs.

ASUU has consistently drawn the attention of Government to these very depressing conditions and hoped through dialogue and sound reasoning based on facts to persuade government to change its attitude to and hence, measures in the universities. Government has treated these efforts of ASUU not only with contempt but undertaken actions which have brought further hardship to the universities.

Today the situation is no longer acceptable. The conditions are no longer tolerable. We are determined to have an effectively functioning university system. It is in consideration of all the above, that our Union has now declared a trade dispute with Government and made the demands attached in the Log of Demands. ASUU is determined to pursue the trade dispute to its logical conclusion. We call on you to join other branches in ensuring that the present struggle is waged to a successful end. You are enjoined to study the Log of Demands so that you can explain the view-point and grievances of the Union to the public.

Yours fraternally,

Dr. Festus Iyayi
National President, ASUU

A. MEMORANDUM

1. The Academic Staff Union of Universities (hereinafter referred to as ASUU) very strongly protests the despicable and unacceptable conditions of all the Nigerian Universities which daily make nonsense of all the determined efforts of academic staff to make our universities desirable fountains of national development;
2. ASUU is particularly disappointed and concerned with the worsening of financial crisis which has engulfed the universities and which has virtually halted the normal functions of a university such as teaching and research;
3. ASUU notes that this crisis of the universities, and general crisis of education as a whole, found roots in, and is sustained by, deliberate neglect and misplacement of priorities by government. It is not based on any real and objective lack of resources;
4. ASUU believes that for peace and harmony of prevail in the universities and, in order that the universities be restored to their traditional role and glory, government must review and revoke all its past actions which systematically eroded the autonomy of universities, as well as, take measures to guide against future infringements on university autonomy;

5. ASUU is convinced that it is absolutely necessary to improve the conditions of service of academic staff in order to retain and attract staff, and to create a conducive atmosphere for research, profession of ideas, and intellectual nourishment;
6. ASUU therefore calls upon government to immediately initiate moves to resolve the crisis in the Nigerian Universities by providing effective and lasting solutions to the problems identified in this memorandum and the following log of demands.

B. LOG OF DEMANDS

In order to resolve the dispute and rescue our universities from total collapse, ASUU demands the following:-

1. University Funding

Adequate funding to the universities should be provided by:-

- (i) Provision of recurrent budgetary allocations on the basis of #5,500 per student, pegged to inflation;
- (ii) Guaranteed annual statutory allocation of 4% of GNP to the universities;
- (iii) Setting up a budget equalization trust fund for NUC of #5 billion;

- (iv) Setting up a Special Research and Laboratory fund to build and equip Science and Technology Laboratories as well as provide research grants to encourage inventions and new discoveries;
- (v) Levy Industries, especially MNCs, 3% of after tax profits for Universities;
- (vi) Provision of landed property and other valuable assets to the Universities;
- (vii) Giving property in Lagos to Universities;
- (viii) Awarding of Consultancies to Universities;
- (ix) Reflecting the financial implications of the review of salaries in any allocations to the Universities.

2. University Autonomy and Academic Freedom

In order to enhance and protect university autonomy and academic freedom, it is necessary to ensure that:-

- (i) The composition of University Councils is as follows:-

Prochancellor

Vice Chancellor

4 government appointees

4 elected representatives from Senate

2 elected representatives from Congregation

2 elected representatives from Convocation

- (ii) Vice Chancellors are appointed by Councils through an internal democratic process involving election of eligible candidates. Vice Chancellors appointed by Councils using the recommended procedure should not be subject to confirmation by any external body or person;
- (iii) Deputy Vice Chancellor, to be elected democratically, from Senate;
- (iv) Changes in University Laws are in accordance with the statute establishing each University;
- (v) No Law relating to universities should be passed by government which renders nugatory court proceedings or judgements;
- (vi) ASUU should be represented on the National Universities Commission;
- (vii) The National Universities Commission is placed under the executive office of the President;
- (viii) All illegal terminations of appointments of academic staff in university of Benin, either by the Council, the Visitor, or anybody else are rescinded;
- (ix) The termination of appointment of Dr. Alufoje Unuigboje of Federal University of Technology, Owerri is rescinded;

- (x) The decision purporting to retire Professor Itse Sagay, reprimand Dr. Tunde Fatunde and Professors Jackson Omene and L.I.L. Ndika, as well as the stripping of Professor Omene of all administrative responsibilities is rescinded;
- (xi) Mr. Henry Onwubiko of University of Nigeria, Nsukka, is released from arbitrary detention;
- (xii) Extra-ordinary order 39 of 3rd July, 1987, is revoked;
- (xiii) Professor Grace Alele-Williams is removed as Vice-Chancellor of University of Benin;
- (xiv) The Governing Council of University of Benin is dissolved;
- (xv) The Ministry of Education stops interfering in the decision making process of Universities, such as the one pertaining to Conference attendance abroad; and all circulars issued by the Ministry to this effect are revoked;
- (xvi) All retroactive Laws or order passed affecting the universities, as well as Decrees 16 of 1985, 17 of 1985 and 17 of 1986 are abrogated;

- (xvii) The Constitutional right of academic staff to participate in politics is recognized and protected;
- (xviii) Police and SSS harassment of academic staff on campuses is halted;
- (xix) Arbitrary and frequent closure of Universities is stopped;
- (xx) The issue of rationalization is left to individual universities, in collaboration with Professional accreditation bodies;
- (xxi) The order closing the Faculty of Law at the University of Ilorin is rescinded;
- (xxii) All reports and white papers on the Visitation Panels of University of Ibadan, University of Lagos, University of Benin, Ahmadu Bello University, and Obafemi Awolowo University, are set aside, and that future visitations be conducted in public;
- (xxiii) The decision making process in the Universities is democratized to ensure ASUU involvement in all university committees that deal with matters that affect the interest of University teachers;
- (xiv) The NDC pyramid structure and rationalization of academic positions is abrogated.

3. Conditions of Service

In order to attract qualified and competent staff, as well as retain available staff, in the interest of continued growth and relevant of the University System, ASUU demands:

- (i) Accelerated implementation of all agreements with government in 1983;
- (ii) The immediate provision of rent subsidy/allowance to academic staff of 25% of basic salary;
- (iii) That long Vacation allowance be given to all academic staff irrespective of marital status;
- (iv) A book and Journal allowance of #500.00 per annum be given to all academic staff;
- (v) A special budgetary allocation of 1% of recurrent expenditure (pegged to inflation) be provided to Universities for the procurement of drugs, as is done with books;
- (vi) The establishment of a Printing Press for every University or group of Universities with a student population of 10,000 and above, to be funded with a once and for all grant of #50 million from Government;

- (vii) That remuneration payable to academic staff on boards of Corporations be given as follows:
- (a) 50% to staff and 50% to the university if nominated by government on his personal capacity;
 - (b) 100% to the University, if the staff is nominated by the University.

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APPENDIX H

ACADEMIC STAFF UNION OF UNIVERSITIES

THE UNIVERSITY CRISIS - OUR CASE

INTRODUCTION

For over a year now ASUU has made serious efforts to draw Government's attention to the deplorable and worsening conditions in our Universities. These appalling conditions have tended to lower academic standards and the morale of both academic staff and students.

Government's nonchalant attitude forced ASUU to resume the Industrial Action it suspended on November 3, 1980. Since the resumption of the Industrial Action ASUU has acted with extreme restraint while Government has resorted to blackmailing ASUU and misinforming the public about the causes, objectives and history of the Industrial Action. ASUU feels bound to give a chronological and factual account of the events.

1. APRIL 18, 1980

After several unsuccessful attempts by ASUU to get Government to arrest and improve the deplorable and deteriorating situation in our Universities, ASUU declared a trade dispute with Government.

2. MAY 7, 1980 .

Federal Ministry of Labour and Productivity Intervened.

3. MAY 20, 1980

A meeting of University PRO-CHANCELLORS was held in Lagos to consider ASUU's demands.

4. JUNE 30, 1980

University PRO-CHANCELLORS held their second meeting in Lagos. The PRO-CHANCELLORS endorsed ALL THE DEMANDS OF ASUU.

5. AUGUST 13, 1980

The drafted terms of reference for resolving the dispute were agreed upon between ASUU and the Nigerian Universities Commission (N.U.C.).

6. AUGUST 13, - OCTOBER 13, 1980

For two whole months, Government made no efforts to effect the agreements reached with ASUU on August 13, 1980.

7. OCTOBER 14, 1980

As a result of 6 above, ASUU gave two weeks ultimatum to Government to implement earlier agreements.

8. OCTOBER 28, 1980

Government ignored the ultimatum and as a result, ASUU most reluctantly embarked on industrial action.

9. NOVEMBER 3, 1980

ASUU suspended the Industrial Action following agreement with Government to set up a Presidential Commission to review the general conditions of service of University staff and REPORT WITHIN THREE MONTHS from November 3, 1980.

The report was thus expected on FEBRUARY 2, 1981.

10. DECEMBER 22, 1980

SEVEN WEEKS after the agreement (of November 3 1980) with ASUU, Government announced the setting up of the Presidential Commission (THE COOKEY COMMISSION).

11. JANUARY 15, 1981

TEN WEEKS after the agreement (of November 3, 1980) with ASUU, the members of the Cookey Commission were FINALLY Sworn-in by Government.

12. FEBRUARY 3, 1981

The Cookey Commission Report was due but it was not submitted.

13. JULY 20, 1981

The Cookey Commission Report was already nearly SIX MONTHS late, and so ASUU wrote a letter of protest to President Shehu Shagari and the Cookey Commission complaining about the absence of information regarding the Report and urging Government to expedite action.

14. JULY 27, 1981

Cookey Commission wrote to ASUU promising to submit the Report "within a few weeks."

15. AUGUST 31, 1981

The Cookey Commission finally submitted its Report to Mr. President SEVEN MONTHS BEHIND AGREED SCHEDULE.

16. SEPTEMBER 12, 1981

ASUU noted that the delay in submitting the Report might be repeated in processing the White Paper. ASUU further noted that staff and students might start the new (1981/82) session under the same deplorable and worsening conditions in which they had always functioned. These conditions include:

- Provision of chalk and duster by staff and students.
- Indequate teaching and research facilities
- Taking of lectures in over-crowded and poorly ventilated lecture rooms.
- Poor and unattractive conditions of service for academic staff.
- Lack of materials for practicals and field work.
- E.t.c.

In the light of these facts ASUU decided that the 1981/82 session would not take off in all the Universities until some of these urgent problems have been satisfactorily resolved. In effect the industrial action suspended on November 3, 1980 was to be resumed at the beginning of the 1981/82 academic session if Government failed to resolve the most urgent problems facing the Universities.

17. OCTOBER 16 - 22, 1981

- Government rushed to announce new salary scales for University staff and totally ignored the more fundamental and important issues affecting the entire University system.
- Government took ASUU to the Industrial Arbitration Panel (I.A.P.).
- After taking ASUU to I.A.P., Government officially gave a copy of the White Paper to ASUU SIX WEEKS after the Cookey Report was submitted to Government.
- ASUU noted with deep regret that the Mass Media and the Administrative Staff of the Universities were given copies of the Cookey Report and the White Paper on it before ASUU - the substantive Party to the dispute, was given these documents.

18. OCTOBER 23, 1981

Without taking evidence from ASUU the Industrial Arbitration Panel (I.A.P.) ordered ASUU to go back to work.

19. NOVEMBER 2, 1981

Government finally decided to invite ASUU to a "dialogue" at very short notice.

20. NOVEMBER 3, 1981

ASUU met Government officials for the "well publicised dialogue." At this meeting:

- Government recognized its mistake in taking the matter to I.A.P. and agreed with ASUU to withdraw the matter from I.A.P. on November 4, 1981, so that issues can be resolved through negotiation.
- Government agreed that ASUU should prepare from its original log of demands, a minimum list of the most urgent and pressing issues and submit this to Government. Government further agreed with ASUU to conclude negotiations on these minimum demands to facilitate the immediate resumption of classes.
- In good faith, ASUU suggested that further negotiations should not be given under publicity. Government accepted.

21. NOVEMBER 4, 1981

Government flouted all agreements reached with ASUU the previous day by

- refusing to take the matter out of I.A.P. and even refusing to support ASUU's request for an adjournment of the case, with I.A.P.
- ordering ASUU back to work before any negotiations or dialogue could take place even on the minimum demands requested by Government.
- threatening ASUU with sanctions such as seizure of salaries, imprisonment, mass dismissals and indefinite closure of the Universities.
- misinforming the public that ASUU had made "new demands" (in obvious reference to the minimum list of demands requested by Government) and wanted the new demands negotiated secretly.

22. NOVEMBER 5 - 19, 1981

ASUU refuses to be intimidated and rejects Government claims that ASUU is irresponsible, immature and selfish.

WE ASK

Is it irresponsible, immature and selfish for ASUU to ask Government to provide money:

- to buy chalk, dusters, duplicating papers, stencils, typing sheets, black boards, slide projectors and over-head projectors to facilitate teaching?
- to provide chairs and desks in classrooms so that students will not take lectures standing?
- to provide more classroom/tutorial space so that students won't stand outside or hang on windows during lectures?
- to provide more laboratory space and equipment so that students won't share seats, microscopes, balances etc?
- to permit meaningful research into pressing national social, agricultural, engineering and medical problems?
- to pay staff reasonable salaries?
- to enable Universities organise industrial work experience and field trips for students?
- to enable Universities admit a greater number of deserving candidates?
- to arrest the ongoing mass exodus of highly qualified academic staff from the Universities to the private sector?
- to provide books and journals and other materials necessary for teaching and research?

APPENDIX I: STUDENTS ENROLMENT IN UNIVERSITIES 1962-87
 NATIONAL UNIVERSITIES COMMISSION: TOTAL ENROLMENT BY FACULTY AND BY ACADEMIC YEAR 1962/63 - 1986/87

Field of Study	1962/63	1963/64	1964/65	1965/66	1966/67	1967/68	1968/69	1969/70	1970/71	1971/72	1972/73	1973/74	1974/75
Administration	-	-	-	-	-	-	511	406	702	1008	1087	1269	1475
Arts	1255	1262	2236a	1725	1789	1615	1907	2059	2800	3148	3530	3744	4741
Education	-	-	-	731	779	796	1010	1265	1916	2724	2998	3612	4543
Law	-	-	-	366	440	358	438	488	712	910	1003	1092	1176
Natural Sciences	707	936	1078	1370	1632	1154	1357	1594	2512	2913	3465	4022	4248
Environ. Design	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Agric. & Forestry	224	389	591	668	872	525	685	744	1172	1297	2000	1669	1885
Vet. Med	INCLUDED IN AGRICULTURE												
Med. & Health Scs.	384	444	541	662	817	879	1022	1221	1729	2155	2598	2803	3496
Pharmacy & Nursing	INCLUDED IN MEDICAL AND HEALTH SCIENCES												
Eng. & Technology	312	435	514	660	783	479	609	675	1302	1594	2264	2702	2852
Social Sciences	764c	1538c	1747c	1527	1772	1252	1049	1243	1623	1844	1944	2315	2152
Unspecified	35	102	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	3681	5106	6707	7709	8888	7058*	8588*	9695*	14468	17091	20889	23228	26448

FIELD OF STUDY	1975/76	1976/77	1977/78	1978/79	1979/80	1980/81	1981/82	1982/83	1983/84	1984/85	1985/86	1986/87
Administration	1757	2058	2433	1335	2593	3963	4162	5259	7582	7614	8019	7236
Arts	5578	6576	7768	7260	8933	10774	12887	4113	16333	18155	18155	16046
Education	5839	7713	8406	8128	9578	11274	14170	15554	22126	23755	25400	21384
Law	1615	1781	2032	1842	2197	3865	4467	4935	6754	6950	8156	7052
Natural Sciences	4852	5041	6649	7633	8159	9503	11761	13432	14862	16969	18840	17467
Environ. Design	-	1007	1125	1517	1786	2116	3022	3447	4369	4585	4979	4251
Agric. & Forestry	2147	2397	2269	2177	2497	3196	3422	3712	7249	7555	8078	8502
Vet. Medicine	-	643	475	587	533	735	739	763	1030	994	1121	1338
Med. & Health Scs	4195	4156	4839	5060	5868	7828b	7481	7988	8739	8988	9353	9570
Pharmacy & Nursing	-	1221	785	833	1014	-	1636	1332	1730	1811	2043	1979
Eng. & Technology	3249	2761	3169	3439	3995	4929	5026	5911	8993	10026	11327	10461
Social Sciences	3053	4378	5444	7290	8822	9207	11640	13024	14661	16348	17254	14701
Unspecified	-	-	1310	1597	-	-	302	-	2394	2650	2945	2918
TOTAL	32286	40914	46684	48698	57742**	69725**	82952	92116c	116,822	126285	135670	122935

- NOTES:
1. a Figures include Education
 2. b Figures include Pharmacy and Nursing from 1962/63 to 1975/76
 3. c Figures include Law
 4. * Figures do not include enrolment from the University of Nigeria, due to its closure during the civil war
 5. d Figures include Vet. Science from 1962/63 to 1975/76 and for 1980/81
 6. c Figures include 56 students for Earth and Mineral Sciences and 2,149 students for Basic/Prelim Studies
 7. ** Figures include students enrolled for Basic/Prelim. Studies as follows: 1976/77 - 1,182
 8. f Figures include those for Earth and Mineral Sciences
 9. g Figures include estimated figures for Imo State University and Rivers State University of Sci. & Tech. Some of the figures for 1986/87 are still tentative.