



Dissertation

By

Kazah-Toure

**Department of History,
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences,
Ahmadu Bello University,
Zaria - Nigeria.**

**Socio-Economic And Cultural Factors
Affecting Women's Work, Health And
Nutritional Status**


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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT IN
ZARIA PROVINCE, 1902 - 1960.

By

Kazah-Toure'



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A Thesis Submitted to the Post-Graduate School,
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This thesis has been read and approved as meeting
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Degree of Masters of Arts in History.

Supervisor

Date:-----

Internal Examiner

Date:-----

External Examiner

Date:-----

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis has been written by me; and that it is both a record and product of my own independent academic research. It has not been presented in any previous application for a higher degree in any University or institution. All materials consulted and sources of information are adequately acknowledged by way of references. All quotations in the work are well indicated and acknowledged.

Kazah-Toure

1993

DEDICATION

This Thesis is dedicated to:

My teacher - a glorious, sacred, and unforgettable son of the Nigerian people - Dr. Mahmud Modibbo Tukur. He died on 15th November, 1988. Comrade M.M. Tukur was a profound revolutionary intellectual, on the side of the oppressed classes, and a man of immortal deeds. The years 1981-1988 were ones in which Mahmud served in various capacities as the National President of ASUU; Head of the ABU History Department; and Dean of the ABU Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences. Eternal peace, blessings, and glory to our Mahmud.

And my friends and Comrades:

Ya'u Musa Yar'adua and Gayus Obed. Ya'u was the President of ABU (Main Campus) Students' Union 1984-1985. During that period Gayus was the PRO. Both suffered from repression as they were thrown out of the university in 1985 for activism and siding with the struggle against injustice and oppression. They passed away so young in 1987. But they died having dreams for the Nigerian homeland that may yet be realized through popular struggles.

May their legacies be everlasting.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABU	-	Ahmadu Bello University.
ACSTWU	-	African Civil Servant Technical Workers' Union.
A.D.O.	-	Assistant District Officer.
AG	-	Action Group.
BCGA	-	British Cotton Growing Association.
BPU	-	Birom Progressive Union.
CMS	-	Church Missionary Society.
COLA	-	Cost of Living Allowance.
CSNRK	-	Civil Secretary Northern Region Kaduna.
CUP	-	Cambridge University Press.
DO	-	District Officer.
FTUN	-	Federated Trade Union of Nigeria.
FUNAS	-	Federal Union of Native Administration Staff.
ILO	-	The International Labour Organization.
JMA	-	Jam'iyyar Mutanen Arewa.
MBPP	-	Middle Belt People's Party.
MOH	-	Ministry of Health.
MZL	-	Middle Zone League.
NA	-	Native Administration or Native Authority.
NAK	-	National Archives Kaduna.
NCNC	-	National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons.

NCOS	-	Non-Commissioned Officers.
NEPA	-	Northern Elements Progressive Association.
NEPU	-	Northern Elements Progressive Union.
NHRS	-	Northern History Research Scheme.
NPC	-	Northern People's Congress.
NNDF	-	Nigerian National Democratic Party.
NTA	-	Northern Teachers Association.
NYM	-	Nigerian Youth Movement.
NYUP	-	New York University Press.
OUP	-	Oxford University Press.
PO	-	Premier's Office (Archival Files).
PUP	-	Princeton University Press.
RCM	-	Roman Catholic Mission.
RWU	-	Railway Workers Union.
SDO	-	Senior District Officer.
SIM	-	Sudan Interior Mission.
SUM	-	Sudan United Mission.
SNP	-	Secretary Northern Provinces.
TPU	-	Tiv Progressive Union.
TUCN	-	Trade Union Congress of Nigeria.
UAC	-	United African Company.
UCP	-	University of California Press.
UMBC	-	United Middle Belt Congress.
WAFF	-	West African Frontier Force.
ZAR PROF	-	Zaria Province Archival File Number.

GLOSSARY OF NON-ENGLISH WORDS

- Agwam (JJU) - Chief, secular ruler, Animist priest.
- Agwam Agworok (Gworok) - Chief of Kagero.
- Aljanun dare (Hausa) - Night devils.
- Alkali (Hausa) - (plural Alkalai) Learned judge in Islamic jurisprudence.
- Awwok Agai (Tyab) - Internal Collaborators, spies or secret agents who provided slave raiders with vital information about their own communities.
- Dogari (Hausa) - (plural Dogarai) Palace guards.
- Fadama (Hausa) - Fertile and alluvial land.
- Gandaye (Hausa) - Slave estates owned by feudal rulers and so on.
- Haraji (Hausa) - Tax.
- Hausawa (Hausa) - The Hausa people.
- Jakada (Hausa) - (Plural Jakadu) Messenger of the ruler or Chief's Special Envoy.
- Jangali (Hausa) - Cattle tax.
- Jam'iyyar Mahaukata (Hausa) - Party of mad people.
- Kabido (Hausa) - Woven rain coat made from raffia leaf-bast.
- Kpok Ham (Ham) - Chief of Ham.
- Kurɗin Kasa (Hausa) - Land tax, Land rent or tribute.
- Kurɗin Su (Hausa) - Fishermen tax.
- Ma'aji (Hausa) - Treasurer.
- Madawaki (Hausa) - Head of the Capital in the Emirate.
- Malami (Hausa) - (Plural Malamai) Learned Islamic teacher of any sort of school teacher.
- Mahaukata (Hausa) - Mad men.

Masu duhu (Hausa)	- "uncivilized" people - usually derogatory used by Christians on Animists.
Masu Wuyan Hali (Hausa)	- People of difficult character, difficult to deal or live with.
Mudu (Hausa)	- A dish used as measurement for foodstuff and so on at Market places.
Nasara (Hausa)	- Christians.
Nat kpat (Tyab)	- being sent to "Hausa" jails or prisons.
Sarauta (Hausa)	- Kingship.
Sarki (Hausa)	- (Plural Sarakuna) King, Emir, Chief, or any ruler.
Satirawa (Hausa)	- the people of Satiru Village.
Talakawa (Hausa)	- Commoners, non-nobility classes or social strata.
Tsafi (Hausa)	- Heathen, idol worshipping, occultism.
Tsirewa (Hausa)	- A form of execution by impaling on the stake.
Tyon Akpat (Tyab)	- Escaping or running away from Hausa.
Tyon Kwasau (Tyab)	- Escaping or running away from Kwasau raids.
Ulema (Hausa)	- Learned professional theologians and exponents of Islamic law.
Waziri (Hausa)	- Sort of Prime Minister in the Emirates.
Yandoka (Hausa)	- N.A Police.

ABSTRACT

This thesis is an academic research work on the history of the nationalist movement in Zaria Province, or Northern Nigeria, between 1902-1960. The study takes a critical look at the conceptual, theoretical, and methodological¹⁰ issues connected with the nationalist movement - especially how these have been used in existing studies pertaining to Africa and elsewhere. The thesis maintains that the dominant historiography, which is pro-imperialist, ignores the nature and essence of colonialism and the contradictions of the system.

Only by grasping the class conflicts between the colonizer and the colonized - and even between the African representatives of British colonialism and the African working people - can the nationalist struggles be analyzed scientifically.

The thesis analyzes the socio-economic and political relations in the area of study on the eve of British colonial aggression. In the analysis, the structures and operation of the colonial system is an important subject of focus. Also, there is an analysis of the process of class formation. The concept of class struggle as a historical process is central and important to the study. The concrete actions taken by the various colonized classes and social forces to challenge the system of foreign domination, exploitation, and oppression are central in the

analyses. This is more so precisely because empirical materials ranging from colonial records, books, field-interviews and other sources, are drawn for interpretation of the process of the development of the nationalist movement. The study sets out to analyze the bases, forms, content, direction, and phases of the nationalist movement in Zaria Province in colonial times. Of focus are the different forces involved and the various contradictory interests. The outcome of the process and its meaning in relation to the future of the people of Zaria Province is looked at.

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Finally, I strongly believe that this study is somehow the tip of an iceberg; but let this thesis be seen as a contribution to historical knowledge and be utilized as a source material for more study in order to transcend whatever limitations and weaknesses that may be found.

PREFACE

Zaria Province - as at the end of British Colonialism in 1960 - covers exactly the same area that presently constitutes Kaduna State of Nigeria. The province is created by the British in 1902 as an administrative Unit. However, it experiences some boundary adjustments throughout the period of study. These changes are taken into consideration in the analyses. However, the main focus, in terms of the scope of this study, is on the various political or administrative units that are found in Zaria Province by 1960.

Prior to British colonization the northern parts of the area of study are within the jurisdiction of Zazzau - which is an Emirate in the Sokoto Caliphate. In contrast with most of its immediate neighbours to the South-west, South-east, and South, Zazzau as a political entity is a sort of developed state. The population is largely Hausa with some Fulani groups. They are predominantly Muslims. The South-eastern, Southern and South-western parts of the area are inhabited by Animist peoples. They are of various ethnic groups and speak several languages and dialects. Found in these areas are smaller states (or polities) and communities that are "sovereign." There are ethnic groups such as the Adara (Kadara), Agworok (Kagoro), Angan (Kamanton), Anirango (Kahugu), Ashe (Koro), Asholio (Moroa), Astam (Chawai), Atyab (Katab), Ayu, Bakulu (Ikulu), Bajju (Kaje), Binawa, Bisi-

(Piti), Bukurmi (Kurama), Fantsam (Kafanchan), Gbagyi (Gwari), Gure, Gwong (Iagoma), Ham (Jaba), Janji, Kiballo, Kitimi, Kono, Kuturni, Kunkum, Mada, Ninkwop (Kaninkwom), Ninzam, Numana, Pungi, Raibi, Rishawa, Kuruma, Rumaya, Srubu (Surubu), Tacherak (Kacecere), and Takkad (Attakar).

With the turn of historical events, in connection with British colonialism, in the early years of the 20th century, a new process sets in. Both Zazzau and the smaller politics or ethnic communities neighbouring it, and the various peoples, are brought together under the same historical experience.

The boundaries of colonial Zaria Province keep changing; only between 1902-1908, 1926-1934, and 1957-1960, does the province have a second Administrative Division. That is, for most of the period of study Zaria Province is a single Division. Also, only small portions of the province fall outside the jurisdiction of the "Zaria Emirate" or Native Administration (N.A). In relation to boundary adjustment, for example, Birnin Gwari is part of Zaria Province from 1902 before being transferred to Nupe Province in March 1908; it remains there until 1924 when it is made part of Zaria Province once more. "Katsina Emirate" is transferred to Zaria Province on 1st July, 1926 and remains so until 1934 when it is detached.

From 1902 Jema'a and the so-called independent districts of Jaba, Kagoro, and Moroa, constitute

an Administrative Division in Nassarawa Province but is, later, transferred to Plateau Province in 1926. Except for Jema'a, these other 3 political units are detached from the latter and transferred to Zaria Province in 1934. Just as Birnin Gwari they are placed outside the jurisdiction of the Zaria N.A or "Emirate" (and thus the Emir of Zaria has no power over them). But financially they depend on the treasury of Zaria N.A. Also they do not constitute a separate Administrative Division. Kagoro, Moroa, Jaba, are merged with Jema'a (transferred from Plateau to Zaria in 1957) to become a second Administrative Division in 1957. In connection with the districts, boundaries keep on changing; some districts are abolished whilst others are created. For example, Chawai District is completely abolished and transferred to Zango Katab in 1934. Also, the homeland of the Bajju which is initially divided between Jema'a (in Nassarawa and later Plateau Provinces) and Zango Katab District (of Zaria Province) is entirely made part of the latter in 1934.

In the process of British colonialism - in Nigeria - the area of study occupies a central place in terms of social, political, and economic significance. For example, Kaduna (which is in Zaria Province) becomes the political capital of Northern Nigeria as from 1914. Zaria town itself (the Provincial capital) is the main

headquarters of a number of colonial institutions in Northern Nigeria. More than elsewhere in colonial Nigeria, Zaria Province has a concentration of railway lines running through it. These connect the province with the most vital economic zones of the country - as defined by British interests. Zaria is the headquarters of the railway in Northern Nigeria. At another level, there is an extension of the Jos Plateau Minefields into the Zaria area. Also, it is a main area for the production of agrarian raw materials such as ginger, cotton, tobacco, groundnuts, and so on - needed by the colonial power and the European capitalist firms. With all these, Zaria Province is crucial in terms of exaction of labour -- especially forced labour. There is a relative high presence of a working class and large peasantry.

On the whole, Zaria Province is a hot-bed in terms of the nationalist activities in colonial times. It is one of the areas where the initial resistance against the imposition of British colonialism is very high and lasting in the context of Northern Nigeria. It is the centre of trade union activities in the Northern Provinces. The co-ordination of the 1945 General Strike in the north, which sort of shakes the colonial system, was done at Zaria. Furthermore, a number of political associations, organizations, and parties, led by the

colonial educated elite spring up in Zaria. The rise of political parties such as the NPC is linked with Zaria Province. The area of study is the main educational centre of Northern Nigeria.

The high level of colonial exploitation and oppression of the peasantry in the area of study produces popular nationalist revolts. Throughout the colonial period, the Zaria peasantry remains restive in waging the anti-colonial struggles. Also, the British exploit ethno-cultural divisions among the peoples, as part of the colonizer's divide-and-rule tactics. Thus class contradictions which take the form of ethnic conflicts, in some contexts, do surface. There are anti-colonial struggles waged by peoples and communities directed at resolving secondary and tertiary contradictions.

Taking the years between 1902-1960 for this study is determined or dictated by the historical process of the nationalist movement. Between 1902 and 1960 the area remains a part of the British colony of Nigeria; 1960 marks the end of an epoch.

The research, in connection with this study, involves the collection, critical scrutiny, and analysis of the materials derived from primary and secondary sources. The study strives to penetrate, verify, corroborate, place within context, and to interpret information and data found in the sources - all towards a better grasp of the historical process of the

nationalist movement. The sources themselves are never treated as neutral. For either implicitly or explicitly, the sources are influenced by different world views and other factors. The class, racial, political, and ideological biases found in the records are some of the problematics.

In terms of secondary sources there are written ones in the form of books; published papers and articles in journals and magazines; unpublished seminar papers and lectures; and there are also theses and dissertations. Primary sources include books written by active participants in nationalist politics as well as colonial officials. Archival records are used in the study more than other sources. For they still remain the most dense, comprehensive, detailed, and valuable raw materials. What needs to be partly emphasized is the correct analytical tools to get something out of the colonial sources. Most existing studies - related to the anti-colonial struggles in Nigeria - appear to suffer from underutilization of the archival records. What has to be continuously done is to subject them to rigorous interpretation. Through this the distortions in the British sources can be exposed or turned on their head. By this, contradictions in the British claims of what the colonizer and colonized are supposed to do, and what was actually done, becomes glaring.

In the course of this study, the National Archives Kaduna is most useful. Primary materials are drawn from ethnographic studies on the various peoples; provincial annual reports; administrative reports dealing with economic, social, and political matters - as mainly recorded or written by British colonial officials; districts note books; intelligence reports on various subjects and activities of individuals and groups; records pertaining to political parties; court, police, and other related records; and records on colonial taxation, labour, health, education, and so on.

Primary sources also have to do with oral sources by use of informants; especially the field-work interviews with individuals of varying occupational backgrounds and experiences in the colonial conditions such as peasants, teachers, nationalists, nomads, and so on. With this, certain issues as regards the claims in the archival materials are corroborated or contradicted. The informants - in certain instances - provide fresh information of other dimensions, which leads to new interpretations and conclusions. But even in oral sources different perceptions, distortions, and biases, are found. Some of the field-interviews betrayed another present reality; certain sections suffer from some loss of memory of historical events of few decades ago. For example, an informant may just parrot the highly racist and discredited

educated petite bourgeoisie. The changing political, ideological, and world view of a class that plays a central role in nationalist politics is also looked at. It also examines the genesis of the nationality problem - and the dimension of this in the history of the nationalist movement in the area of study!

Chapter Three focuses on a major phase in the nationalist movement during the Great Depression years and the World War II. It examines how these phenomena affected the different classes and the various forms of anti-colonial struggle of the times and their content.

Chapter four contains an analysis of the rising role of political associations formed by the nationalist petite bourgeoisie, the workers' struggle in the General Strike of 1945, and the anti-colonial struggle waged by ethnic minorities, which galvanized the nationalist movement in the area of study.

Chapter Five focuses on the emergence of mass nationalist political parties. It examines the significance of that phase in the development of the nationalist movement. It looks at the British counter-strategy towards putting the foundation for a neo-colonial order. It examines the outcome of the entire historical process of the nationalist movement.

CHAPTER ONE

BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY OF THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT IN ZARIA PROVINCE

1.1 Introduction

The Nigerian nationalist movement, as a historical process, has attracted considerable scholarly and intellectual attention of historians, political scientists, sociologists, colonial administrators, and leaders of nationalist political parties.¹ Most of the emphasis has been on activities of political parties, and the roles of leading individuals in them, in the anti-colonial movement. The petite bourgeoisie has been portrayed as the main social class which took the lead in the struggle for national liberation which culminated in independence for Nigeria, from formal British colonialism, in 1960.² According to J.S. Coleman, the nationalist political leaders achieved this with some good-will of the British colonialists; thus, not because of the defeat of

1. The first major research on Nigerian nationalism was conducted in the period 1951-52. See J. Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, University of California, Los Angeles, 1971, vii.

2. See, for example, Richard L. Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties: Power in an Emergent African Nation, Nok Publishers, Enugu, 1983, xii.

colonialism by the people.³ However, there are studies that have focused on the roles and sacrifices made by the colonized working people, as the cornerstone of the struggle, to liberate the Nigerian homeland from the colonialists.⁴

In the broader context of Africa some leading nationalists have lamented that a free continent envisaged on the eve of independence has - in reality - failed to materialize..⁵ Kwame Nkrumah, who was full of optimism about the future of the continent if political independence was attained, later expressed disillusionment with mere political freedom because "its effectiveness is superficial unless economic and cultural independence is also achieved."⁶ In Nigeria socio-economic and political developments, from 1960, have shown that under a neo-colonial order conditions have not quite changed for the better for the majority of the people.⁷ The historical basis that led to this

3. J.S. Coleman, op.cit, p.6.

4. For example, Mokuwugo Okoye, Stories on the Niger: A Story of Nigeria's Struggle, Fourth Dimension, Enugu, 1991.

5. Oginga Odinga, Not Yet Uhuru, Heinemann, London, 1974, p.256; and Kwame Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism: the Highest Stage of Imperialism, International Press, New York, 1980, ix-xx.

6. See foreword by Kwame Nkrumah in O. Odinga, op.cit., xx.

7. Yusufu Bala Usman, For the Liberation of Nigeria, New Beacon, London, 1979, pp 9-198.

can be better understood through the study of the process of the nationalist movement.

This historical study shifts emphasis from the dominant trend of analyzing the phenomenon of the nationalist movement at the national and regional levels to a smaller unit - provincial - such as the area of study. A principal concern is to look at the place of the people who occupied Zaria Province - worked and lived in it - in the national liberation movement against British colonialists.

This chapter focuses on a critical examination of basic conceptual and theoretical issues which are crucial to the study at a general level of understanding what constitutes the nationalist movement and the problems it entails. Also, the chapter analyzes the nature of various relations between the peoples in Zazzau and the polities to its south, on the eve of the British aggression, so as to later see the transformation that came with colonialism. Finally, the early rise of the nationalist movement, as manifested in the anti-colonial primary resistance, in the various confrontations and military battles with the foreign invaders in the area of study will be examined.

1.2 A Critique of Key Conceptual and Theoretical Issues

This study - like all historical works - has to grapple with the examination of concepts. This is because concepts are products of history, even though they do not convey the same meaning to all historians and social scientists. Determining factors influence how individuals perceive concepts and the reconstruction of history itself. These include their world views, class positions, ideological orientations, national and family traditions, religious affiliations, sorts of associations and organizations they belong to, given social and political contexts, kinds of educational literature they read, and the totality of the relationship between the individual studying a historical process and the history that produces the concept.⁸

(a) Colonialism as a Concept

By the end of the 19th century, when the colonization of Africa by European imperialist powers reached a high-pitch, theorists and ideologists of

8.. Yusufu Bala Usman, "The Assessment of Primary Sources: Heinrich Barth in Katsina, 1851-1854", Seminar Paper, Department of History, ABU, Zaria, April 1977; and S.O. Osoba, "Consideration on Some Conceptual and Ideological Aspects of Nigerian Underdevelopment in Historical Perspective", Seminar paper, Department of History, University of Ife, Ile-Ife, 1980.

imperialism and European ruling circles had advanced arguments and justification for formal domination over Africa and its peoples. In Britain views were propagated by Cecil Rhodes, Joseph Chamberlain, and their likes in favour of colonial expansion in the interest of capitalism.⁹ In 1885 the sociologist John Fiske maintained that "it was for the Anglo-Saxons to rule the world"; and in 1890 a theory was advanced by John Burgess which centrally held that the "Aryan peoples were capable of creating the best political system and should therefore rule over all others."¹⁰

Kurt Buttner has stressed that it was in the footsteps of all these that colonial historiography, and its appendages, emerged to continuously provide ideological support for the domination and exploitation of Africa thereby justifying colonialism and neo-colonialism.¹¹ Africans were viewed as some sorts of primitive savages only to be lifted towards advancement by the Europeans. Theorists in support of colonialism

9. F. Polyansky, An Economic History: The age of Imperialism (1870-1917), Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1973, p.170.

10. Ibid., p.76.

11. Kurt Buttner, "Historicophilosophical Aspects of the Bourgeois concept of Colonialism", in The Journal, asia, africa, latin-america, Special Issues, Akademie-Verlag, Berlin, 1977, p.7.

such as P. Duignan and H.L. Gann have watered down, and even deformed, the nature and essence of the colonizers domination of Africa by presenting the continent as a beneficiary of the supposed interaction with Europe.¹²

With the decolonization stage of the anti-colonial movement, Africanist historiography began to expose the distortions and falsifications of the racist and pro-imperialist theorists and theories. According^{to} A. Temu and B. Swai, Africanist historiography took to the path of erasing colonial historiography by "way of counter-proposition with a view to exposing the inadequacies of imperial presuppositions."¹³ But by this, the dominant school of Africanist historiography did not see colonialism as the main problem; rather it focused on the policy matters and the supposedly wrong policies, abuses, and general lapses in the operation of the system.¹⁴ Some leading Africanist historians have, therefore, stressed that the colonized took advantage of

12. P. Duignan and H.L. Gann (eds.), Colonialism in Africa 1870-1960 Volume 4: The Economics of Colonialism, CUP, London, 1975, pp673-680.

13. A.Temu and B.Swai, Historians and Africanist History: A Critique, Zed Press, London, 1981, p.25.

14. For an accolade of colonialism and beneficial African participation see, for example, R.O. Ekundare, An Economic History of Nigeria 1860-1960, Methuen, London, 1973.

the colonial circumstances to make progress in history through utilization of opportunities provided by colonial institutions such as schools and by production of cash crops for monetary gains. According to J.F. Ade Ajayi and Michael Crowder colonialism gave the Africans a leverage while they were also taking "care to preserve their identities."¹⁵

A number of scholars who have done some study on the subject of Nigerian nationalism have perceived colonialism as a progressive western impact on hitherto backward communities. J.S. Coleman has viewed colonialism as a system that brought economic growth in the various sectors and led to an overall social and political enhancement for the Nigerian people.¹⁶ In the context of Northern Nigeria C.S. Whitaker Jr. has conceptualized colonialism as a mere system of government and a natural process which resulted in the replacement of the "alien Fulani rule", in the Emirates, with a similar "alien British rule".¹⁷ He has further credited colonialism for

15. J.F. Ade Ajayi and Michael Crowder (eds.), History of West Africa (Volume II), Longman, London, 1974, p.535.

16. J.S. Coleman, op.cit., p.6.

17. C.S. Whitaker Jr., The Politics of Tradition, Continuity and Change in Northern Nigeria 1946-1966, PUP, New Jersey, 1970, p.27.

introducing democracy and modern institutions of governance to co-exist side-by-side with the Native Administration (N.A.) structure - which Whitaker Jr. saw as a "traditional system" of government - in order to protect the rights and values of the people of Northern Nigeria.¹⁸

As argued by Harmut Schilling, bourgeois scholars have generally presented colonialism in this narrow, limited, and misleading way in order to reduce the concept to just its political form. They have hidden its true nature as a system with economic, social, and other essence.¹⁹ Coupled with this has been the attempt to miseducate or hoodwink the colonized peoples fighting for dignity, national freedom, and self-determination, as regards what the colonial system is all about. Scholars such as Whitaker Jr. have reduced colonialism to a mere form of British administration in Northern Nigeria. Y.B. Usman and Bala Mohammed have rightly stressed that this sort of perception has been promoted in order to obscure the content of the colonial system.²⁰

18. Ibid., p.23.

19. Harmut Schilling, "Colonial Downfall and Neo-Colonialism: An Approach from the view of Marxist-Leninist Political Economy," in The Journal asia, africa, latin america, Special Issue 3, Akademie-verlag, Berlin, 1979, p.20.

20. Yusufu Bala Usman, "History, Tradition and Reaction: The Perception of Nigerian History in the 19th and 20th Centuries", Public Lecture, ABU, Zaria, 27th April, 1977; and Bala Mohammed, Africa and Nonalignment: A Study in the Foreign Relations of New Nations, Triumph, Kano, 1982, p.29.

The concept of colonialism can also be looked at as perceived by some Nigerian petit-bourgeois leaders of nationalist political parties, that emerged after World War II, who eventually inherited political power from the British in 1960. Despite secondary variations or differences in political outlook and ideology, they were fundamentally subservient to the dominant pro-imperialist World view in their understanding of colonialism.

Ahmadu Bello²¹ was highly fatalistic in his general world view. This is very much glaring - and quite reflected - in his understanding of colonialism which he saw as a matter of fate and destiny. Ahmadu Bello, therefore, attributed the British colonization of Nigeria to the will of God and not as a process connected with historical developments in society.²²

21. Ahmadu Bello was born into the Sultanate aristocracy in 1909. He attended the famous Katsina College established for the scions of the ruling families of the Northern Nigeria "Emirates". He graduated in 1931. Ahmadu Bello worked as a school teacher and as a District Head; and later became a key member of the Sokoto Emirate Council. His first major public office came when he was appointed Minister of Local Government and Community Development in the Northern Regional Government (1953). He came to political limelight on the national scene as the leader of the "Northern Bloc" in the federal Legislative body; and was made leader of the Northern People's Congress (NPC) in 1954. Ahmadu Bello was the first Premier of the Northern Region. From independence to the time of his assassination on January 15, 1966, he was widely regarded as the most powerful political figure in Nigeria. For a detailed biography of Ahmadu Bello see: J.N. Paden, Ahmadu Bello Sardauna of Sokoto: Values and Leadership in Nigeria, Hudahuda, Zaria, 1986.

22. Ahmadu Bello, My Life, Gaskiya Corporation, Zaria, 1986, p.2.

Furthermore, he understood colonialism in the Northern Nigeria context as a system working in the interest of the colonized; because the British were not only polite but were obviously out to help the people "rather than themselves."²³

Abubakar Tafawa Balewa²⁴ has conceptualized colonialism as a healthy and harmonious interaction between the British colonialists and the Nigerian people. He has also idealized the role of the colonizer in the history of Nigeria by seriously concluding that the relations between the British and the colonized people were without conflicts, antagonism or contradictions because both parties worked as friends.²⁵

Obafemi Awolowo²⁶ has, to a large extent, viewed colonialism as Anglo-Nigerian relations.²⁷ He has

23. Ibid., p.19.

24. Abubakar Tafawa Balewa was the first Prime Minister of Nigeria. He was born in 1912 in the Lere District of Bauchi Province and was educated at Katsina College (1928-33). Balewa was the Deputy President of the Northern People's Congress (NPC). Abubakar Tafawa Balewa was assassinated during the 15th January, 1966 military coup. J.N. Paden, op.cit., footnote 9, pp141-142.

26. Born on 6th March, 1909 at Ikenne, Obafemi Awolowo was of very humble origin. He did most of his studies as an external candidate. Obafemi Awolowo was the main founder and leader of the Action Group (AG). He was the first Premier of Western Region and later moved to the Federal House of Representatives at Lagos as the leader of the opposition. For some of the details see: Obafemi Awolowo, Awo: The Autobiography of Chief Obafemi Awolowo, CUP, Cambridge, 1960.

27. Obafemi Awolowo, Path to Nigerian Freedom, Faber and Faber, London, 1947, p.18.

maintained a positive view about the colonial system but abhorred certain lapses obstructive to the smooth functioning of the system. O. Awolowo actually perceived colonialism as the motive force of modern Nigerian history - as has been clearly demonstrated in his assessment that:

Owing partly to the assiduity and courageous enterprise of the British people, a vast transformation has come over Nigeria. In every department of life - Government, Trade, Transport, Agriculture, Mining, Education, Health, Social Welfare, and Religion - the heart of the country throbs with a vitality and hope, never dreamt of even by our immediate ancestors who lived when Lord Lugard tightened British hold on Nigeria.²⁸

For his part Nnamdi Azikiwe²⁹ has perceived colonialism as a natural and universal phenomenon in which the

28. Ibid., p.17.

29. Nnamdi Azikiwe became a Nigerian politician of note in the 1930's. He studied in the United States of America. He worked as a journalist in Ghana from where he came back to Nigeria and began his political activities. Azikiwe's brand of nationalist agitation included the establishment of a press to champion the nationalist cause. In this regard his most popular Newspaper The West African Pilot played a vital role in propagating the ideals of the national liberation struggle. Azikiwe was a member of the Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM). He later became the President of the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC). Azikiwe was the first Premier of the Eastern Region, and the first indigenous Governor General of Nigeria at independence in 1960. When Nigeria attained the status of being a Republic in 1963 he took the position of the non-Executive President. For his autobiography see: Nnamdi Azikiwe, My Odyssey, Hurts and Company, London, 1970.

so-called superior races, such as the Anglo-Saxon and Aryan peoples, imposed themselves on the weaker ones and dictated their national lives or affairs.³⁰ Thus he imbibed the posture of the colonizer, with its heavy smug of social darwinism, of "stronger races" lording over the "weaker ones". His main quarrel was with what he depicted as the unequal treatment between the Europeans and the Africans within the colonial system; that is, a situation in which the colonized were not getting a fair deal. For Nnamdi Azikiwe one central issue was that the colonizers should be more concerned with creating better conditions, for the peoples of the colonies, while nurturing them towards the attainment of maturity after which the colonial system should be given up and political independence granted.³¹

Looking at the perceptions of colonialism by those four political leaders - both in their basic understanding of colonialism and all that it represents - it is obvious that they were infested or influenced by the Lugardian

30. Nnamdi Azikiwe, Renascent Africa, Frank Cass, London, 1969, pp7-9.

31. Ibid., pp7-9.

dual mandate thesis.³² Thus, they have seen colonialism as a beneficial inter-racial relations between the colonialists and the colonized and as simply a form of administration in which the Europeans were senior partners. But by this, some of them out-British the arch British colonialists in their endorsement of the dual mandate. It is a gross gloss-over of historical reality to present some level of growth, achieved through the exploitation of the colonized, as a fundamental development in colonial conditions.

This is more so precisely because even the principal exponent of the dual mandate thesis and architect of British colonialism in Nigeria, F.D. Lugard, stated in very clear terms that the colonial system was basically in the interest of Europe and capitalism. In F.D. Lugard's words;

... the partition of Africa was, as we all recognise, due primarily to the economic necessity of increasing the supplies of raw materials and food to meet the needs of the industrialised nations of Europe.³³

32. The dual mandate thesis also posits that colonialism is in the interest of both the colonizer and the colonized. The thesis thus presents colonialism as a progressive process for humanity. See Lord Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa, Frank Cass, London, 1965.

33. Ibid., p.613.

The point made by Obafemi Awolowo and others that colonialism led to a level of growth in terms of the productive forces can, of course, not be denied. As Ngugi Wa Thiong'o has noted the process of the colonial system brought about some level of new changes and innovations in the fields of education, medicine, religion, and so on.³⁴ But as Ngugi also observed, beyond all this the imperialist system seriously disrupted the political and economic structures of the colonized; for it stifled their initiative and capacity for advancing on their own.³⁵ As J.V. Stalin put it colonialism goes with a limited development of productive forces - which is essential to ensure maximum exploitation of both human and material resources to meet the dire needs of the imperialist powers and their ruling classes - but never with the slightest objective to advance the colonized.³⁶

Of course, there were Nigerian nationalist leaders with perception of colonialism somehow different from the dominant one already touched on.

34. Ngugi Wa Thiong'o, Homecoming, Heinemann, London, 1978, p.3.

35. Ibid., p.3.

36. J.V. Stalin, Problems of Leninism, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1976, p.5.

As a nationalist leader Aminu Kano³⁷ viewed colonialism as British imperialist domination of the peoples which was strengthened in the context of Northern Nigeria by an alliance with the Emirs and Chiefs.³⁸ He described colonialism as a system of enslavement of the colonized; and thus stressed on the need to sweep away the British colonialists.³⁹

Overall the main thrust is that the manner in which different nationalist leaders, social and political forces understood colonialism informed the nature of their response to it. Those who endorsed foreign domination simply agitated for some gradual reforms and co-optation into the system; or replacement of European political control with African control while the exploitative structures are left intact.

37. Aminu Kano was born at Kano city in 1920. He was educated at Katsina College. On graduation he taught at Bauchi Provincial Middle School. On his return from a year study in England in 1947, he was appointed acting education officer in charge of Maru Teacher Training College in Sokoto Province. Aminu Kano was the founder of the Northern Teachers Association (NTA). He resigned from teaching in 1950. Aminu Kano later emerged as the leader of the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU). On the biography of Aminu Kano see: Alan Feinstein, African Revolutionary: The Life and Times of Nigeria's Aminu Kano, Davidson Publishing, Wiltshire, 1973.

38. Aminu Kano, "Africa is a Sleeping Giant no More", Letter of resignation from the Bauchi N.A. in 1950. Reproduced in the Newspaper Sunday Triumph, of April 24, 1983, p.6.

39. See article by Aminu Kano published in the Newspaper Comet of September 20, 1951.

But others challenged the basis of the colonial system itself.

In the context of this critique of the concept of colonialism, the focus is on a specific and peculiar or distinctive colonialism. The concern is not with colonialism in the history of human societies at all times but at the epoch of monopoly capitalism; that is, the colonial system of imperialism.⁴⁰

The science of historical materialism has been deeply concerned with the study of the connection between the development of capitalism and the phenomenon of colonialism - especially in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.⁴¹ This stage of colonialism drew the political and scholarly attention of Marxists in their drive to comprehend the process in all aspects.⁴²

40. For a scientific definition of the colonial system of imperialism see M.I. Volkov (ed.), A Dictionary of Political Economy, Progress, Moscow, 1985, p.49.

41. Harmut Schilling, op.cit., p.7.

42. Founders of Marxist science - Karl Marx (1818-1883) and Frederick Engels (1820-1895) - began to analyze the process of colonialism when it was still at its infancy; and they did not live to see the colonial system of imperialism unfolding to a peak. This task in the early 20th century was carried on by leading Marxists including Vladimir I. Lenin, J.V. Stalin, Nikolai Bukharin, and so on, who saw capitalism at the stage of imperialism. They continued to study this process partly with the aim to enrich an understanding of it. For the early Marxian analysis see: Marx and Engels, On Colonialism, Progress, Moscow, 1981.

In their major studies on imperialism,⁴³ both N. Bukharin and V.I. Lenin picked the years between 1876 and 1914 as the summit of tremendous European expansion in terms of colonial division of the world.⁴⁴ As for the reason of choosing the starting point V.I. Lenin has explained thus:

I shall take the year 1876 - a year aptly selected, for it is precisely by that time that the pre-monopolist stage of development of West-European capitalism can be said to have been, in the main, completed....⁴⁵

In the period between 1876 and 1914 European imperialist powers were vigorously on their military offensive to subjugate Africa with the purpose of establishing domination and exploitation both in the political and socio-economic spheres. A feature of this was the heightened struggles and rivalries between capitalist powers such as Britain, France,

43. These two scientific studies on imperialism were done in the second decade of the 20th century: N. Bukharin, Imperialism and World Economy (1915); and V.I. Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism (1916).

44. N. Bukharin, Imperialism and World Economy, Merlin Press, London, 1976, p.87; and V.I. Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, Progress, Moscow, 1983, pp75-76.

45. V.I. Lenin, op.cit., pp75-76.

Germany, Belgium, Portugal, Spain, Italy, and so on. This competition for colonies in Africa took national form and character.⁴⁶

The process of the imposition of the colonial system of imperialism over hundreds of millions of people was mainly through foreign military aggressions which were accompanied by massive violence and the use of all kinds of dirty political tricks and even outright deceit such as in the signing of treaty with some African rulers.

In all its ramifications, colonialism has been seen as a violent process by Frantz Fanon.⁴⁷ This is more so for the fact that it entails the most crude and brutal forms of national oppression. Colonialism fundamentally involves contradictory relations between exploiting capitalist class and the exploited working class and the peasantry; and there are also contradictory relations between the dominating or oppressing nations and the dominated or oppressed nations.

46. N. Bukharin, op.cit., pp 104-107.

47. Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, Penguin, London, 1980, p.66.

Walter Rodney has partly explained colonialism as a negation of freedom.⁴⁸ This somehow simplistic conception has been transcended by Samora Machel who perceived the colonial phase of imperialism as being at variance with freedom and other fundamental ideals peoples cherish. Furthermore, Samora Machel observed that colonialism as "a system for the deprivation of an entire people's freedom is the greatest destroyer of culture that humanity has known."⁴⁹ In direct relation to Nigeria, Mahmud Modibbo Tukur has depicted colonialism as a process which by its nature is some kind of slavery which is imposed and maintained through the means of force by the foreign occupiers.⁵⁰ M.M. Tukur emphasized in more explicit terms that:

Colonialism in Nigeria was systematic, brutal and inhuman imposition, which while it lasted negated, for Nigerian, in the aggregate, the right to life, to work with reward, and to the dignity that is so basic to the very fact of being human.⁵¹

48. Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, Bogle - L'ouverture, London, 1973, p.244.

49. Samora Machel, "Knowledge and Science should be for the Total Liberation of Man in our Ahmadu Bello University", Full Text of Speech, at Convocation Ceremony, ABU, Zaria, 10th December, 1977.

50. Mahmud Modibbo Tukur, "A Critical Evaluation of Professor Ayandele's Book 'The Educated Elite in Nigerian Society'", Post-Graduate Seminar Paper, Department of History, ABU, Zaria, 10th December, 1977.

51. M.M. Tukur, "The Nature, Extent and Essence of British Social Policy in the Emirates 1900-1914", Post-Graduate Seminar Paper, Department of History, ABU, Zaria, 10th December, 1977.

The concept of colonialism is relevant to this study because it was the bane of colonialism, coupled with the contradictions in the system, that gave rise to the nationalist movement.

(b) The Lugardian Concept of Indirect-Rule

A critique of Indirect-Rule as a concept is desirable due to the fact that a dominant trend in existing studies has been to advance a thesis for the existence of two types of "colonial rule" in Zaria Province. Billy S. Bitiyong has maintained that the ethnic minorities in the area of study were faced with both British colonialism and the internal colonialism of the Zaria Hausa-Fulani feudalists.⁵² In the same vein Simon Yohanna has presented colonialism in the Zaria context as "Anglo/Hausa/Fulani rule."⁵³ Also, during the anti-colonial nationalist revolts by the Southern Zaria peoples, which escalated from the 1940s, some of the leaders claimed that the British were not really the problem because they were supposed mediators

52. Billy S. Bitiyong, "The Contradiction of "Colonial Civilization" and Feudal Oppression in Nigeria: The Case of the non-Islamic Areas of Zaria Emirate", Paper Presented at the Seminar on: Nigerian Economy and Society Since the Berlin Conference, held at ABU, Zaria, November 11-15, 1985.

53. Simon Yohanna, "The Colonial State and the Evolution of Social Stratification in Central Nigeria: The Case of Southern Zaria, 1902 to 1960", M.A. Thesis, Department of History, University of Jos, 1988, pp92-93.

but that it was the Hausa-Fulani who were the colonialists.⁵⁴ Thus they argued that British colonialism only existed through Indirect-Rule.

The concept of Indirect-Rule was coined by F.D. Lugard in the wake of the establishment of British colonial domination in Northern Nigeria.⁵⁵ In some way Indirect-Rule has been explained by contrasting British colonial practice with what was obtainable in French West Africa. By this the British were said to apply policies depending on the nature of the immediate environment - taking into consideration the local conditions - whereas the French operated the same policies of administration for all the colonies. Thomas Hodgkin has advanced that the British carried out their colonial operation in a sort of empiricist fashion "as a means of solving specific problems."⁵⁶

For Thea Buttner the policy of Indirect-Rule has been described as an experiment, introduced by F.D. Lugard, aimed at the "intergration and subjection" of the various states and polities in Northern Nigeria.

54. See, for example, "Ousuman Sokop (1942)", NAK: ZAR Prof No.C.6/1942.

55. See Lord Lugard, Political Memoranda, Frank Cass, London, 1970.

56. Thomas Hodgkin, Nationalism in Colonial Africa, NYUP, New York, 1969, p.23.

Thea Buttner went further to argue that the British established their domination:

... through methods of indirect rule which did not encroach upon essential socio-economic and political institutions as well as the conditions of rule and exploitation.⁵⁷

On the whole Indirect-Rule has been presented as the administrative form British colonialism took in Northern Nigeria - as stated by Chinweizu.⁵⁸

However, Bill Freund has argued that the concept of Indirect-Rule itself centered on a propagandist device which claimed that the objective of Colonialism partly involved enabling the colonized to make some progress, on their own, without much interference by the British colonizer.⁵⁹ Indirect-Rule was a deceptive ideological weapon, covered up by the existence of the N.A. structure (which was actually part of British colonial administration), to create the wrong impression that the colonized were shaping their own destiny by running their local affairs (based on their "traditions")

57. Thea Buttner, "Changes in Africa under colonial Rule. Some Aspects of the Economic, Social, and Political Position of the Aristocracy in Tropical Africa." Post-Graduate Seminar Paper, Department of History, ABU, Zaria, 1983.

58. Chinweizu, The West and the Rest of Us, Nok Publishers, Lagos, 1978, p.71.

59. Bill Freund, The Making of Contemporary Africa: The Development of African Society Since 1800, Macmillan Press, London, 1984, p.138.

with little intrusion by the colonialists. Indeed, it is in the context of this propaganda that F.D. Lugard's claim can be placed when he stated:

... that Europe is in Africa for the mutual benefit of her own industrial classes, and of the native races in their progress to a higher plain; that the benefit can be made reciprocal, and that it is the aim and desire of civilised administration to fulfil this dual mandate.⁶⁰

Some scholars have painted Indirect-Rule as a theory that was translated into a practical sense with some appreciable level of success. J.S. Coleman has maintained that this was so in the "Muslim areas" of Northern Nigeria.⁶¹ According to C.S. Whitaker Jr. British colonialism achieved this great height of success by leaving intact the pre-colonial political structures and utilized them for good government.⁶² Thea Buttner upheld the Indirect-Rule thesis and emphasized that British colonialism in

60. Lord Lugard, Dual Mandate in British p.61.

61. J.S. Coleman, op.cit., p.51.

62. C.S. Whitaker Jr., op.cit., p.28.

Northern Nigeria "was possible only by exerting influence through existing power structure and established tradition."⁶³ For his part Billy J. Dudley has attributed the supposed British reliance on the Indirect-Rule system to the threat of Mahuism which compelled the colonialists to minimize intervention in "Emirate" affairs.⁶⁴ He further argued that this was done to make the colonized masses have the impression of a continuity of the caliphate system; and to create the false picture that the Emirs were still having real authority in the land rather than the Europeans.⁶⁵

Overall the dominant position has been that the British colonizer established a two tier system of government in Northern Nigeria. That is, the colonial government representing the "modern structure" with British officers being in charge of affairs at the centre, regional, and provincial levels; while its N.A. arm supposedly represented the "traditional structure" through which Indirect-Rule was practicalized

63. Thea Buttner, "Imperialist Colonial Policy, 'indirect rule' and the anticolonial struggle. The Satiru Rising of 1906 in Northern Nigeria", in The Journal asia, africa, latin america, Special Issue 2, Akademie-Verlag, Berlin, 1977, p.25.

64. Billy J. Dudley, Parties and Politics in Northern Nigeria, Frank Cass, London, 1968, p.20.

65. Ibid., p.20.

by the participation of the colonized ruling classes in the running of local affairs.⁶⁶ It has been pointed out that the latter manifested itself in the powers the Emirs and Chiefs had in relation to their control of "Native Courts", Yandoka (N.A. Police), and the N.A. prisons; and all this provided prove for the existence of Indirect-Rule.⁶⁷

But the architect of the theory of Indirect-Rule himself, F.D. Lugard, made certain proclamations which in themselves have contradicted the possible validity of any claims about the existence - in reality - of this system. F.D. Lugard, spelt-out the power base of the Emirs, Chiefs, and other leading aristocrats, just after the British defeat of Sokoto in 1903 thus:

66. C.S. Whitaker Jr., op.cit., p.259; A.D. Yahaya, The Native Authority System in Northern Nigeria 1950-70: A Study in Political Relations with Particular Reference to the Zaria Native Authority, ABU Press, Zaria, 1980, p.3; and Yusufu Turaki, "Social-Political Role and Status of Non-Muslim Groups of Northern Nigeria: Analysis of a Colonial legacy," Ph.D. Thesis, Boston University, 1982, pp 100-101.

67. Chienweizu, op.cit., p.71.

Every Sultan and Emir and the principal officers of the state will be appointed by the High Commissioner. The High Commissioner will be guided by the usual laws of succession and the wishes of the people and chiefs, but will set them aside if he desires for good cause to do so. The Emirs and Chiefs who are appointed will rule over the people as of old times and take such taxes as are approved by the High Commissioner, but they will obey the laws of the Governor and will act in accordance with the advice of the Resident.⁶⁸

This quotation serves as some kind of irrefutable evidence that the Emirs and Chiefs were civil or public servants in the employ of the British colonial state. As British representatives they were to be appointed to work and carry out functions, under the imperial guidance of their European overlords, in accordance with the regulations and directives fashioned out for them by the European colonialists. There is another correlation to this pronouncement, made elsewhere by F.D. Lugard, which further proves that the ultimate authority of the British was not questionable and therefore negating any talk about Indirect-Rule.⁶⁹ This has further been re-affirmed in the Native Ordinance of Nigeria that:

68. Extract from Lugard's Speech to some principal figures among the conquered aristocrats of Sokoto on 21st March, 1903 in A.H.M. Kirk-Greene (ed.), The Principles of Native Administration in Nigeria: Selected Documents 1900-1947, OUP, London, 1965, p.43.

69. Lord Lugard, Dual Mandate in British... pp203-204.

There are no two kinds of authority, one British; the other native, working separately or in collaboration, but one single government in the interior, in which the native chiefs have been given well defined tasks to do; they enjoy a recognised status like officials.⁷⁰

As Mahmud Modibbo Tukur has rightly posited the fact that Emirs and Chiefs were recruited to owe allegiance to the British, as their ultimate source of authority, was a real transformation in terms of power relations; meaning the loss of sovereignty.⁷¹

With the victory by the British aggressors all polities in the Zaria area and elsewhere ceased to be independent, and so there was no internal colonialism. The powers and authority of Emirs and Chiefs, in the N.A., have to be placed in a historical context. Walter Rodney has rightly observed that in colonial Africa, it was most often the practice of the different colonizers to retain certain aspects of pre-colonial institutions like that of Chieftancy.⁷² However, the

70. As quoted in Jean Suret - Canale, French Colonialism in Tropical Africa, 1900-1945, Heinemann, London, 1976, p.348.

71. Mahmud Modibbo Tukur, "The Imposition of British Colonial Domination on the Sokoto Caliphate, Borno and Neighbouring States 1897-1914: A Re-interpretation of the Colonial Sources", Ph.D. Thesis, Department of History, ABU Zaria, 1979, p.334.

72. W. Rodney, op.cit., pp 246-247.

old institutions were transformed and subjected to serve the interest of the colonial system thereby removing their hitherto basis and content.

An important observation in point of fact of history is that in all colonial contexts the colonialists operate with the aid of some dominant social forces among the local population who are recruited, to play subservient roles, as marionettes, in the interest of the colonial system. Thus regardless as to whether the process of foreign domination takes the so-called indirect or direct forms the various colonizers have been recruiting subordinate rulers and officials among the colonized peoples.⁷³ Certainly, administrative forms of colonialism may differ from colony to colony or region to region - and it is important to grasp the form in each specific context - ^{but} the essence of the colonial system of imperialism remains the same all over the world.

Local rulers who had been hand-picked and appointed by the colonial authorities in Zaria Province were in no way representatives of the people. There was in

73. Both in Africa and elsewhere there are many examples of how the colonialists and other occupiers have colluded with local stooges. See, for example, Vo Nguyen Giap, The Military Art of People's War: Selected Writings of General Vo Nguyen Giap, Monthly Review, New York, 1970, p.198; Samora Machel, "Consolidating People's Power in Mozambique," in The African Communist, No.72, First Quarter 1978, p.34; and O. Odinga, op.cit., p.22.

reality nothing as the N.A. being a "traditional structure" of government. The N.A. system was a British creation as a component of the colonialist administrative set up. The nature of local ruling strata such as Emirs and Chiefs was such that the British imposed them and gave them powers to collect taxes from the working people, spy and gather intelligence information for the colonial state, recruit labour - especially forced labour - for colonial capitalist exploitation, and to ensure that the colonized people observe law and order as defined by the colonizer.⁷⁴ In fact the institutions they controlled were put at their disposal by the British to be used to suppress patriots and nationalists opposed to colonialism and not to preserve the values, dignity, and "traditions" of the people.

In new colonial conditions the Chiefs lacked any popular base among the masses of the colonized; as a class they stood in conflict with the interests of the colonized population.⁷⁵ That was why in the wake of establishment of colonial domination the Emirs and Chiefs were largely held in low esteem by the people.⁷⁶

74. Y.B. Usman, "History, Tradition and Reaction..."

75. O. Odinga, op.cit., p.21; and Thea Buttner, "Imperialist Colonial Policy..." p.27.

76. M.M. Tukur, "The Imposition of British Colonial Domination on the Sokoto Caliphate, Borno and Neighbouring States 1897-1914 ..." pp 309-320.

The concept of Indirect-Rule has been employed by those who used ^{it} to hide the true nature of colonialism. The use of it in some analyses has led to the false impression of the existence of internal colonialism.

(c) The Concept of Nationalism

More than ever before, the question of national self-determination and the national question have become very crucial in the 20th century. The concept of nationalism is at the core of this study. Thus there is need to take a critical look at the central issue raised in existing studies pertaining to the definition of nationalism.

Hans Kohn has seen nationalism as a sentiment.⁷⁷
According to him:

Nationalism is a state of mind, in which the supreme loyalty of the individual is felt to be due the nation-state. A deep attachment to one's native soil, to local traditions and to establish territorial authority has existed in varying strength throughout history.⁷⁸

J.S. Coleman has been in agreement with Hans Kohn's definition and also expanded on it. In the words of J.S. Coleman:

77. Hans Kohn, Nationalism: Its Meaning and History, D. Van Nostrand, London, 1965, p.4.

78. Ibid., p.9.

Broadly, a consciousness of belonging to a nation (existent or in the realm of aspiration) or a nationality, and a desire, as a manifest in sentiment and activity, to secure or maintain its welfare, prosperity, and integrity and to maximize political autonomy.

The reference group for "nationalism" can be a de facto nation or nationality, or territorially defined group in which members believe and advocate that it ought, or is destined, to become a nation. If the reference group is an existent nation (as in much of Europe), nationalism is directed towards the attainment, maintenance, or restoration of its political independence as a nation-state in the international states systems. If the reference group is an existence nationality, nationalism refers to sentiment and activity directed toward maximizing its political autonomy either as separate state, or as a constituent international state system. If the reference group is a territorial defined group which is neither a nation or nationality, nationalism refers to sentiment and activity directed toward the creation of a nation and attainment of independent statehood.⁷⁹

Specifically on colonial Nigeria, J.S. Coleman has conceptualized nationalism as "the movement to create new political nationalities (that is, Nigeria, Western Region, Eastern Region, Northern Region) as self-governing units in the modern world."⁸⁰

Some scholars have seen nationalism as "the psychology, ideology, world outlook and policy of preferring certain nations to others, of extolling

79. J.S. Coleman, op.cit., p.425.

80. Ibid., p.4.

one's own nation and fanning national strife and raw hatred."⁸¹ I. Frolov et al conceptualized nationalism as a principle of bourgeois ideology and politics which advocates national isolationism; fanning chauvinism, mistrust and enmity among nations.⁸² A basic criticism of all this is that it is a subjective definition which has employed a sociological and psychological approach; it is inadequate in capturing the contextual and historical essence of nationalism.

This is so due to the fact that not all nationalism is like that of the Nazis, the Zionists, the South African racists, or that of the chauvinistic ruling circles of the dominating imperialist nations of Europe that enslaved the colonized peoples.⁸³ The concept of nationalism needs to be approached historically, for a deeper understanding, because the

81. Dictionary of Scientific Communism, Progress, Moscow, 1984, p.147.

82. I. Frolov (ed.), Dictionary of Philosophy, Progress, Moscow, 1984, p.284.

83. S. Sergeyev, "Reactionary Theories of Political Zionism," in Zionism-Enemy of Peace and Social Progress Issue 2, Progress, Moscow, 1983, pp 5-35; and Brian Bunting, The Rise of the South African Reich, Penguin, London, 1964, pp 13-93.

content and direction of nationalism differs from place to place in the history of human society. As V.I. Lenin rightly observed there is a distinction between the nationalism of the oppressor nations and that of the oppressed nations. Nationalism of the dominated countries to free themselves from colonialism - all sorts of oppression - especially national oppression, is a progressive process in human history.⁸⁴ And this struggle for freedom, dignity, and self-determination transcends sentiments of attachment to a nation, nation state, nationality, country, region, province, district, or any group individuals belong to.

The French Revolution of 1789 has largely been considered as the turning point that made nationalism a reality.⁸⁵ H. Kohn has argued that nationalism is a product of the 18th century, but that it spread all over Europe later.⁸⁶ Reinforcing this, Elie Kedourie emphasized that the tremendous expansion of nationalism is traceable to the 19th century.⁸⁷ According to

84. V.I. Lenin, "Preliminary Draft Theses on the National and the Colonial Question," in Collected Works Vol.31, Progress, Moscow, 1977, pp 144-151; and V.I. Lenin, "The Question of Nationalities or "Autonomisation"", in Collected Works Vol.36, Progress, Moscow, 1977, pp 607-608.

85. Bala Mohammed, op.cit., p.34.

86. H. Kohn, op.cit., p.4.

87. Elie Kedourie, Nationalism, Hutchison, London, 1966, p.9.

H. Kohn the 20th century is the real summit during which nationalism became a global phenomenon as a "world-wide movement."⁸⁸ In this connection, he maintained, that it is precisely from 1945 which marks "the first period in which the whole of mankind has accepted one and the same political attitude, that of nationalism."⁸⁹

In relation to Africa, it has been argued that until after 1945 there was an absence of nationalism on the continent.⁹⁰ However, in reality nationalism emerged in Africa long before the colonial times. But even in the colonial context, nationalism manifested in the concrete anti-colonial primary resistance in the late 19th and early 20th centuries; that is, in the various military and other confrontations with the European invaders. As Eduardo Mondlane rightly asserted what actually happened as from 1945 was a shift to a new higher phase of nationalism with the emergence of mass based movements, and national political parties, which galvanized anti-colonial nationalism towards national independence.⁹¹

88. H. Kohn, op.cit, p.4.

89. Ibid., p.89.

90. Elie Kedourie (ed.), Nationalism in Asia and Africa, Frank Cass, London, 1970, p.107.

91. Eduardo Mondlane, "The Development of Nationalism in Mozambique," in Panaf, Eduardo Mondlane, Panaf, London, 1972, p.139.

The process of the rise of nationalism in Europe closely has a link with the formation of nation states, with the declining feudal system and the rise of capitalism. This came with the rise of movements championing the cause of national unification - which was a progressive historical development - led by the bourgeoisie.⁹² Nationalism became a powerful force in the struggle by the bourgeoisie to take over state power from the feudalists.⁹³ The conflict was eventually resolved decisively in favour of the new ruling class - the bourgeoisie - as feudalism was already obstructive to "the emergence of nations and national states."⁹⁴

Marxist scholars have traced the ascendancy of nationalism to the late Middle Ages (about the 15th and 16th centuries) with the rise of the national question.⁹⁵ Long before the French Revolution of 1789 the question of state formation, and the sorts of nationalism that were involved, was already a crucial historical process in the Middle-East area

92. W. Rodney, op.cit., p.89, and I. Frolov (ed.), op.cit., p.284.

93. P.N. Fedoseyev et al., Leninism and the National Question, Progress, Moscow, 1977, p.69.

94. Ibid., p.56.

95. Ibid., p.56.

and elsewhere. Thus, the position of scholars like H. Kohn and E. Kodourie to see Europe as the birth place of nationalism for the entire humanity is not tenable; the rise of nations and nation states did not start at the same time for all human societies.

There was a manifestation of American settler nationalism which attained a high level of success with the Declaration of Independence of 1776. That nationalism was aimed at liberating the settler colonies from British imperial control, so as to establish a strong independent country and develop the capitalist system in North America.⁹⁶ The process of American settler nationalism included the quest for self-determination; and had as a goal the expansion of national frontiers in one united socio-economic and political entity.⁹⁷ It was championed by peoples of different origins and nationalities, including the "members of the nascent capitalist class", sharing the same aspiration for human freedom and independence. However, in the course of this nationalism the indigenous Red Indians were further enslaved.⁹⁸

96. The Macmillan Family Encyclopedia, Arcete Publishing Company, Princeton, 1980, p.353.

97. V.G. Kiernan, America: The New Imperialism: From White Settlement to World Hegemony, Zed Press, London, 1978, pp 1-20.

98. Ibid., p.3.

J.V. Stalin has stressed that prior to the first two decades on the 20th century, the discussion on the national question was mainly restricted to the issue of self-determination for nationalities in Europe.⁹⁹ With the new development, of the imposition of colonialism over the Asian and African peoples:

The national question was thereby transformed from a particular and internal state problem into a general and international problem, into a world problem of the liberation of the oppressed peoples in the dependent countries and colonies from the yoke of imperialism.¹⁰⁰

This does not mean that all tendencies, currents, and forces of nationalism of the oppressed are progressive in character. The colonizer could go into alliance with some elements or sections of the colonized to prop-up some sort of nationalism, which is detrimental to the interest of the colonial people in all essence; moreso, if it is the sort that can undermine or even derail the struggles for genuine national liberation.¹⁰¹

A valid point that has been made by H. Kohn, as regards factors that shape nationalism, is the fact that nationalism is "determined by the political ideas and

99. J.V. Stalin, op.cit., p.67.

100. Ibid., p.68.

101. J.V. Stalin, op.cit., pp 72-73.

the social structure of the various lands where it takes roots."¹⁰² Thus Nigerian nationalism, in the context of British colonial times, has to be seen as a product of imperialist domination, exploitation, and oppression of the people - as Mokuwugo Okoye has stressed.¹⁰³

(d) The Meaning of the Nationalist Movement and Historiographical Problems.

The Nationalist Movement has to be discussed at conceptual and theoretical levels because it constitutes the subject matter of this study. For this study the nationalist movement is the key term; it is the focus of analyzing the anti-colonial struggles towards liberating the homeland¹⁰⁴ from British colonialism. In those studies rooted in a scientific approach the

102. H. Kohn, op.cit., p.9.

103. M. Okoye, op.cit., p.56.

104. "Homeland is the political, social, and cultural environment where a people lives and works. It is a complicated social phenomenon encompassing a totality of various aspects of the life and activities of society: social relations, the system of political relations and organisations, forms and types of culture prevalent in society and spiritual values shared by people. Homeland is described in terms of "eternal" elements such as people's territory and language." See: A Dictionary of Scientific... p.106.

terms national movement,¹⁰⁵ national liberation movement,¹⁰⁶ and nationalist movement,¹⁰⁷ have often been used synonymously in the context of the colonial period.

J.S. Coleman has conceptualized the nationalist movement in terms of the political activities of formally organized associations which have the ultimate objective of securing a participating role in the political affairs for the indigenous people.¹⁰⁸ Overall he defined the nationalist movement as:

An association organized to achieve self-government for the people whom its members claim to represent. Its aim is to obtain a fundamental change in the colonial relationship which terminates with complete African control of the government.¹⁰⁹

But this has come under the criticism of Thomas Hodgkin for being narrow and inadequate; the contention is that Coleman's perception suffers from restrictiveness because of limiting it to organizations that are intrinsically political to the exclusion of those that are not so.¹¹⁰ For T. Hodgkin a more adequate

105. V.I. Lenin, "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination," in Selected Works Vol.I, Progress, Moscow, 1977, p.572.

106. J.V. Stalin, op.cit., p.14.

107. John Saul, "Nationalism, Socialism, and Tanzania history," in P.C.W. Gutkind and P. Waterman (eds.), African Social Studies, Heinemann, London, 1977, p.146.

108. J.S. Coleman, op.cit., pp169-200.

109. Ibid., p.424.

110. T. Hodgkin, op.cit., p.23.

conceptualization of the nationalist movement is:

... any organisation of group that explicitly asserts the rights, claims and aspiration of a given African society (from the level of the language group to that of 'pan Africa') in opposition to European authority whatever its institutional form and objectives.¹¹¹

However, beyond "opposition to European authority" the nationalist movement has to be properly seen as a concrete process involving the totality of the anti-colonial struggles to challenge colonial domination, exploitation, and oppression.

V.I. Lenin has emphasized that in studying any social question there is need to examine the subject "within definite historical limits."¹¹² In each particular context, such as a country, its specific features should be distinguished "from others in the same historical epoch" that are found elsewhere.¹¹³ The end of the Middle Ages has been seen as a turning point in relation to the upsurge of movements struggling against national oppression

111. Ibid., p.23.

112. V.I. Lenin, "The Rights of Nations to Self..." p.572.

113. Ibid., p.572.

and for national self-determination.¹¹⁴ In Western Europe the "national movement and the creation of national states" gained much ground in the epoch of bourgeois-democratic revolution between 1789 and 1871.¹¹⁵

The African nationalist movement in the colonial context is a product of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. It is thus closely linked with colonialism as a historical process.¹¹⁶ A.M. Pegushev has noted that the nationalist movement is usually a long drawn-out and highly complex process.¹¹⁷ It involves various struggles waged on diversified fronts that are different in form and content, waged by various social classes - often with contradictory interests - and informed by diverse ideological and political currents.

The nationalist movement can be better defined as a concrete historical process which involves political parties, peasant struggles, students' movement, the

114. Kostislav Ulyanovsky, National Liberation, Progress, Moscow, 1978, p.8.

115. V.I. Lenin, The Rights of Nations to Self... p.576.

116. A.M. Pegushev, "The Leadership of the National Liberation Movement in Africa, General Consideration", in Thea Buttner (ed.), The Journal asia, africa, latin america, Special Issue 7, Akademie - Verlag, Berlin, 1980, p.7.

117. Ibid., p.7.

struggles by the working class, and all other forms of struggles - formal and informal, legal and illegal, covert and overt, struggles by ethnic groups for assertion, struggles against local representatives of the colonial state, economic struggle, political struggle, ideological struggle, armed struggle - all against the colonial system of imperialism.¹¹⁸

A theoretical problematic which has generated some controversy in African historiography concerns whether the nationalist movement preceded the complete establishment of colonialism. The central question is whether the very early resistance against the European colonial aggressors forms part of the nationalist movement. J.S. Coleman maintained that primary resistance was "traditional nationalism" in contrast with "modern nationalism" which came decades later in the 20th century.¹¹⁹ A leading Nigerian nationalist, Mkwugo Okoye, has held the same position; he advanced that Nigerian nationalist movement took-off from World War I (1914). M. Okoye argued that although the peoples resisted foreign aggression, their conception of the struggle never transcended dynastic interest; and only from 1914

118. Ibid., pp 7-12.

119. J.S. Coleman, op.cit., p.169.

was the struggle for freedom based on broader consciousness as it "affected the intellectuals and middle peasants."¹²⁰

The assertion by Coleman and M. Okoye conflicts with that advanced by the radical Bar-os-Salaam school, which gained prominence after the Arusha Declaration of 1967.¹²¹ It has traced the nationalist movement to the early resistance against the European colonial invaders. The later phases of mass struggle in the nationalist movement have been understood as maturation of the primary resistance, and thus a continuation of the same process.¹²² There, of course, exists a distinction in scope, form and content, and the general character, between early nationalist efforts and the subsequent struggles towards a complete overthrow of colonialism. But the significant historical fact is that in all the struggles waged by the colonized, at the different stages, the central element was anti-colonialism.¹²³

At another level the struggles of free and independent peoples (at the primary phase) were different, in a significant way, from those of a now colonized

120. M. Okoye, op.cit., p.61.

121. A.M. Pogushev, op.cit., p.11.

122. J. Saul, op.cit., pp 143-147.

123. Thea Buttner, "Imperialist Colonial Policy..." p.28.

peoples brought together by colonialism in a single state. The moment formerly independent peoples were brought together with the establishment of colonialism, a common historical set in and it somehow began to transform all hitherto "narrow" consciousness into a broader national consciousness of a colonized people.¹²⁴ Therein lies the organic linkage in relation to the development of the process of the nationalist movement from resistance by independent communities or peoples to a full national struggle to shake-off colonialism.¹²⁵

Part of the historiographical problem is that it is imperative to grasp the interconnection of various phases of the process of the nationalist movement. Pertaining to the dialectics of the stages involved, Gamal Abdel-Nasser has aptly described this scientifically:

The national struggle of any people generation after generation, resembles a structure rising one stone on top of the other. Just as every stone serves as the base for the one above it, in the history of a struggling nation every event is, the outcome of the one before it, serving in its turn the base for the one still to come.¹²⁶

124. Eduardo Mondlane, op.cit., pp 148-149.

125. A.N. Yakovlev et al, Fundamentals of Political Science, Progress, Moscow, 1980, p.443.

126. F.S. Farag (translated), NASSER SPEAKS: Basic Documents, Norsett Press, London, 1972, p.16.

Amilcar Cabral has premised an understanding of the different phases of the African nationalist movement on the historical fact that whatever their social class and the structure of a group, the colonized masses did pitch battle against the colonizer at each stage.¹²⁷ Cabral succinctly explained:

In the first phase - that of conquest, cynically called "pacification" - they resist, gun in hand, foreign occupation. In a second phase - that of golden age of triumphal colonialism - they offer the foreign domination passive resistance, almost silent, but blazoned with many revolts, usually individual and once in a while collectively. The revolt is particularly in the field of work and taxes, even in social contact with the representatives, foreign or indigenous of the colonial power. In a third phase - that of the liberation struggle - it is the masses who provide the main strength which employs political or armed resistance to challenge and to destroy foreign domination.¹²⁸

The question of the nature of the leadership of the nationalist movement is important as a historiographical issue. This is because just as theorists and propagandists of imperialism have constantly denied the leading role of the working class and the peasantry in the anti-colonial movement, the petit-bourgeois nationalist politicians have also glorified

127. Amilcar Cabral, Return to Source, Monthly Review, New York, 1973, p.68.

128. Ibid., pp 68-69.

their own roles and venerated themselves.¹²⁹ At the initial phase the nationalist movement was spearheaded by Chiefs, community leaders or gerontocrats - depending on the structure of a particular African society or group. The establishment of the colonial system brought about a new situation in which capitalist relations produced new classes. The leadership of the nationalist movement largely shifted to the petite bourgeoisie.¹³⁰ In this connection the new intelligentsia, produced by the colonial school system, took the leadership position; but the peasantry and other strata of the working people remained the leading forces in the anti-colonial movement. The petite bourgeoisie occupied a buffer or intermediate position between the colonizer and the African working people.¹³¹

The main class behaviour of the petite bourgeoisie in political struggles is that it vacillates and it is inconsistent. When the popular forces gained an upper hand in the anti-colonial struggle it came on

129. F.S. Farag (translated), op.cit., p.97.

130. In colonial Africa there was a very tiny indigenous incipient bourgeoisie in few areas - although mainly merchant businessmen rather than industrialists. Still, it was generally insignificant as compared with the petite bourgeoisie. In this study the concept of petite bourgeoisie is employed in the analysis precisely because overwhelmingly the bourgeoisie proper could hardly be found in colonial Africa.

131: Issa G. Shivji, Class Struggle in Tanzania, Tanzania Publishing House, Dar-es-Salaam, 1976, p.22.

their side, but when the struggle encountered difficulties the petite bourgeoisie developed nervousness or even crossed to the side of the enemy.¹³² In the course of the history of the African anti-colonial movement petit-bourgeois nationalist leaders were not just representatives of a class but were also at the head of political parties and mass movements that were composed of several class forces and interest groups. But the leaders usually spoke in the name of the people, no matter their political and ideological positions, and did not often isolate the masses openly.¹³³

The emergence of the petit-bourgeois elements has to be located in the consolidation of the colonial system which within few decades produced civil servants, teachers, people working in capitalist firms, contractors, traders, and so on.¹³⁴ They emerged as products of the worst form of capitalism - the colonial system - with both class contradictions and irreconcilable contradictions between the colonizer and the colonized.¹³⁵ Even though the petite bourgeoisie

132. V.I. Lenin, "The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky", in Selected Works Vol.3, Progress, Moscow, 1977, p.38.

133. Ngugi Wa Thiong'o, Detained: A Writer's Prison Diary, Heinemann, London, 1984, pp.89-91.

134. Amilcar Cabral, op.cit., p.61.

135. Ibid., pp 61-62; and Chinweizu, op.cit., p.141.

occupied higher position, and enjoyed better status - as compared with the colonized masses - it suffered from national and social oppression because it developed "in extremely hostile, racist, restrictive and oppressive situation."¹³⁶

The marginalization in terms of national oppression involved - for the petite bourgeoisie - the denial of basic rights, racial discrimination, and exclusion from the centre of policy formulation and decision making in the running of affairs in the colonial system.¹³⁷ Thus as a class and as a colonized it had every ground to hate the European occupiers; but paradoxically the petit-bourgeois elements also looked forward to occupy the place of the colonialists (even with the exploitative structures left intact) when colonialism is defeated by the forces of national liberation.¹³⁸ The moment the arrangement with the colonialists did guarantee its place, and survival, the petite bourgeoisie often adopted a reformist posture.¹³⁹

136. B. Swai, "Fanon, Contemporary Africa and Relevance of the Theory of Historical Expediency", paper presented at the International Seminar Towards a more Peaceful World in Commemoration of 1986 as the International Year of Peace, University of Sokoto, Nigeria, June 23 to 26, 1986.

137. Albert Memmi, The Colonizer and the Colonized, Souvenir Press, London, 1974, xii-xx and pp 1-45.

138. For an important analysis of the petite bourgeoisie in colonial Africa - especially in nationalist struggles against colonialism - see Frantz Fanon, op.cit., pp119-165.

139. B. Swai, "Towards an Explanation of the Under-development of Zuru History", Paper presented to the Third Workshop on the history of Zuru Emirate, sponsored by Zuru Emirate Development Society, held at the University of Sokoto from 21st to 22nd December, 1987.

Despite the general character of the petite bourgeoisie being dominated by vacillation and opportunism, as a colonized class it had diverse political and ideological inclinations among its ranks. Some sections did not share in the vacillation and opportunism associated with it in the nationalist movement. The history of the process of national liberation struggle in countries such as Algeria, Guinea Bissau, and so on, witnessed a demonstration of high level of principles, discipline, commitment, and utmost sacrifices made by revolutionary petit-bourgeois nationalist leaders.

A very significant theoretical issue relates to the question of which factors, whether internal or external, serve as stimuli in the development of the nationalist movement. In relation to historical processes in general, A. Temu and B. Swai have maintained that:

The issue of factors within factors is misleading because all factors are part of the same process. One set of factors for better or worse influences the other. Real history has to deal with dialectical interrelationship between the various factors, and in that way reveal the contradictions and complexities of society if it is to avoid serving a new set of exploiters.¹⁴⁰

This approach, somehow, entails the danger of treating the issue either mechanically or in complete abstraction.

140. A. Temu and B. Swai, op.cit., p.81.

Dialectical interrelationship of factors does in no way mean overlooking the question of primacy. In examining factors and their inter-connection, in any historical process, there is the need to identify and grapple with which factor (or set of factors) is most decisive at every point in determining the phenomenon and its direction.

Harmut Schilling has rightly observed that the development of any historical process largely depends on its internal characteristics in spite of the "dialectical unity with the efficacy of external factors" ~~have~~ on it.¹⁴¹ On the dialectics of the anti-colonial nationalist struggles in Africa and their relationship with similar struggles elsewhere, Amilcar Cabral has validly asserted:

... that however identical our enemies, unfortunately or fortunately, national liberation and social revolution are not exportable commodities. They are (and increasingly so every day) a local, national product - more or less influenced by (favourable and unfavourable) external factors, but essentially determined and conditioned by the historical reality of each people.¹⁴²

141. H. Schilling, op.cit., p.46.

142. Amilcar Cabral, Unity and Struggle, Heinemann, London, 1980, p.122.

The theoretical formulation of the Elite Theory has been the most dominant, and pervasive, in the reconstruction of the history of the nationalist movement in colonial Africa.¹⁴³ From its analytical perspective colonial society has been divided into three groups. That is the European colonialists, the African elite, and the African masses. The elite (petite bourgeoisie) has been portrayed as the group with the exceptional abilities and skills to counter the might of the colonialists.¹⁴⁴ The history of Nigerian nationalism has been largely presented as one in which the elite were the motive force in challenging the British.¹⁴⁵ Obafemi Awolowo endorsed this by saying that political progress was made possible by the elite; and that the masses remained docile and in political passivity in the nationalist struggles - especially at the decolonization phase.¹⁴⁶

In essence the Elite Theory is incompatible with the scientific methodology of analysis of historical

143. Issa G. Shivji, op.cit., p.26.

144. Ibid., p.26

145. J.S. Coleman, op.cit., pp 141-154.

146. O. Awolowo, Path to Nigerian... pp 14-15.

materialism, because it refutes the historical roots of inequality in society by presenting classes as institutionally given status and not as located in production relations.¹⁴⁷ The Elite Theory - in various analyses - uses concepts such as pressure groups, ethnicity, modern versus traditional, and religion, which it views as the most decisive influences or factors that determine the movement of society. Overall the Elite Theory introduces a sociological bias and uses this to refute the scientific concept of class struggle.¹⁴⁸

The scientific theory of historical materialism advances class struggle as the motive force of the development of society - including the struggles for national liberation - with the masses playing the most decisive role. Colonial Nigeria was a class society with contradictions between classes occupying different positions in the production system. The contradictions inherent in capitalist exploitation under colonialism also produced its grave diggers in the colonized peasantry, working class - and on the whole the colonized working masses. V.I. Lenin has put down a conception of classes which is scientific and precise:

147. I. Frolov (ed.), op.cit., pp 120 - 121.

148. P.C. Lloyd, Africa in Social Change, Middlesex, London, 1978, pp 177-145 and pp 204-257.

Classes are large groups of people differing from each other by the place they occupy in the historically determined system of social production, by their relation (in most cases fixed and formulated in law) to the means of production, by their role in the social organisation of labour, and, consequently, by the dimension of the share of social wealth of which can appropriate the labour of another owing to the different places they occupy in a definite system of social economy.¹⁴⁹

Class struggle is a concrete historical process; it is the motive force in the development of processes and the transformation of society.¹⁵⁰ It is waged on all fronts; that is, the political, economic, socio-cultural, ideological, and in the interrelationship between peoples.¹⁵¹

In this study it is through employing the concept of class struggle in the analysis that a more adequate understanding of the various contradictions will be brought out. Only by a scientific methodology of historical materialism would the overall form and content of the nationalist movement in Zaria Province be situated in subsequent analyses.

149. V.I. Lenin, "A Great Beginning: Heroism of the Workers in the Rear", Selected Works Vol.3, op.cit, p.172.

150. The founders of historical materialism upheld that the history of human societies - since the end of the primitive communal stage - through which society in constant motion is shaped has been that of class struggle. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, Progress, Moscow, 1977, pp15-16 and p.35.

151. Ramiz Alia, Our Enver, 8 Mentori, Tirana, 1988, p.407.

1.3 Socio-Economic and Political Relations in the Zaria Area at the End of the 19th Century

By the late 19th century Zazzau Emirate and the various polities to its South were at different stages of development. The main thrust, in this section of the study, is to make a survey of socio-economic and political relations in these polities on the eve of the British invasion.

Prior to the 20th century there were diverse polities and peoples in the area of study. There was Zazzau Emirate, which was a polity within the Sokoto Caliphate, with Zaria as its capital.¹⁵² There were small Hausa settler towns located along trading routes in territories belonging to peoples of different ethnic groups in the South, South-east, and South-west; in places such as Kauru, Jema'a Daroro, Zango Katab, Kagarko, Kachia, Jere, and Lere.¹⁵³ These Hausa settlements either owed allegiance to Zazzau or were its "vassal states."¹⁵⁴ The South and the South-east were predominantly territories of various autonomous peoples. The vast land laying in the South-west was

^{152.} C.W. Orr, "Zaria Province Annual Report for 1904", NAK: ZAR PROF No.2551.

^{153.} M.G. Smith, Government in Zazzau: A Study of Government in the Hausa Chiefdom of Zaria in Northern Nigeria from 1800 to 1950, OUP, London, 1960, p.2.

^{154.} Y. Turaki, op.cit., pp 83-84.

the homeland of the Gbagyi (Gwari) people; also found were several ethnic groups with their own independent political entities.¹⁵⁵

Birnin Gwari was a tributary of Katsina which revolted, broke away, and thereafter remained independent as from circa 1850.¹⁵⁶ The Zazzau Emirate was predominantly a state of the Hausa nationality with pockets of Fulani groups. Its population was predominantly Muslim but also found were Animist Hausa known as the Maguzawa.¹⁵⁷ To the South of Zazzau the lands belonged to ethnic groups with cultural similarities - but distinctive from their Hausa neighbours - and they were Animist.¹⁵⁸

Colonial studies and oral traditions, as given by local ruling forces, have advanced the thesis of migration in their accounts of historical origin and

155. C.W. Orr, op.cit.

156. "Zaria Province Annual Report for 1931", NAK: ZAR PROF No.125.

157. M.G. Smith, op.cit., p.2.

158. E.J. Arnett, Gazetteer of Zaria Province, Waterlow and Sons, London, 1920, p.16.

peopling of the area.¹⁵⁹ Among the Atyab (Katab)¹⁶⁰ there is one tradition promoted by local ruling elements which holds that the ethnic group moved into the area presently occupied through a process of migration from Karigi near Kauru.¹⁶¹ Also, some Bajju (Kaje) elements have a tradition of tracing their origin to migration from Miango in the Jos Plateau area. Among the Asholio (Moroa), Takkad (Attakar), Bakulu (Ikulu), Angan (Kamanton), and Agworok (Kagoro) these are elements that have traditions of movement

159. Some of the central colonial studies dealing with various subjects on Zaria Province were largely based on accounts of Oral traditions and other information as given to researchers by members of the ruling circles and their allies in the various localities with all the prejudice, distortions, and fabrications. This is found in the work by M.G. Smith, who himself admitted having relied on "Fulani informants". See M.G. Smith, *op.cit.*, vi; also corroborated in some field-work interviews such as in field-work interview with Ladi Saratu Kasam, daughter of a colonial Chief and housewife, age 62, at Mabuhu, in June 1987.

160. In this study peoples and ethnic groups are called by what they refer to themselves as and not as by what others called them. The name in bracket is to show what a nationality is generally called by others albeit the bastardized name. This practice of using names different from those by which peoples known themselves did pre-date colonialism in the area of study. This has been pointed out in some of the colonial sources. See, for example, "Katab Tribe Social Organisation of (1912-21)", NAK: ZAR PROF No.611.

161. *Ibid*; and Michael V. Spurway, "Zango Katab Notes on (1932)", NAK: ZAR PROF No.603.

from neighbouring areas to their present settlements.¹⁶²
According to Abdullahi Smith the Gbagyi people have
a tradition of migration from the far north.¹⁶³

Y. Kirkpatrick has traced the movement of the
Ham (Jaba) into their now homeland from "somewhere to
the North of Kachia."¹⁶⁴ In relation to the Adara
(Kadara) the colonial ethnographers and anthropologists
did not advance any tradition of migration. However,
R.C. Stanley pointed out the complexity of the Adara
language, with the almost impossibility of under-
standing each other between the various dialects
(except if they learned each dialect anew), as an
indicator that some sub-groups migrated into the
area.¹⁶⁵

162. Field-work interview with Kabawon Katuka,
peasant woman, age about 64, at Zonzon on 5th
February, 1987; informal discussions with Malam
Zaki, teacher, at Samaru Katab on March 15, 1988;
and Y. Kirkpatrick, "Kaje Tribe Anthropological
Notes on (1914-26)", NAK: SNP 17 File No. K2985.

163. Abdullahi Smith, "The early states of the
Central Sudan", in J.F. Ade Ajayi and Michael Crowder
(eds.), History of West Africa (Vol.I), Longman, London,
1974, p.157.

164. Y. Kirkpatrick, "Jaba District Assessment on
(1914)", NAK: ZAR PROF No.2102.

165. R.C.S. Stanley, "Kadara of Zaria: Intelligence
on (1935)", NAK: ZAR PROF No.2159.

No thesis of migration has been pushed for the Bisi (Piti), Srubu (Surubu), and Bukurmi (Kurama). However, C.K. Meek emphasized the identification of common cultural traits including festivals, linguistics, and ceremonies. From this a deduction was made that "it may be that all belonged originally to a common stock."¹⁶⁶

The history of origin for the Hausa and Fulani claimed migration from North Africa and the Middle East. This tradition falls within the already discredited racist Hamitic Hypothesis.¹⁶⁷ It traces and attributes ignuity and innovations by negroid peoples, in all scientific fields and the arts, to external roots especially the Middle East.¹⁶⁸

From the recent research findings of Zuwaqhu Abungwon Bonat the migration thesis in relation to the peoples in the South of the area of study is not in line with concrete historical evidence, from the groups themselves, and largely remains mythical.¹⁶⁹

166. C.K. Meek, "Anthropological Notes on Piti Tribe (1921)," NAK: ZAR PROF No.2159.

167. For a good example of the use of Hamitic Hypothesis in historical Studies see J.D. Fage and R. Oliver, A Short History of Africa, Penguin, London, 1962.

168. Robin Horton, "Stateless Societies in the History of West Africa", in J.F. Ade Ajayi and M. Crowder (eds.), History of West Africa (Vol.I)... pp104-113; A. Smith, op.cit., pp152-195.

169. Zuwaqhu Abungwon Bonat, "Colonialism and the Underdevelopment of Zaria Province 1902-1945", M.A. Thesis, Department of History, ABU, Zaria, 1985, pp81-182.

Z.A. Bonat analysis has shown that whilst there was movement of people into those parts, this was more true of later periods by small groups of families and did not form the basis of origin of the peoples. Their traditions do not have memories of movement from far places, and no such are held, except within their environment and the neighbouring Jos Plateau area.¹⁷⁰

Abdullahi Smith has expressed difficulty in establishing, with a degree of precision and certainty, the historical origin of Zazzau in time perspective unlike most other Hausa Kingdoms.¹⁷¹ Even the palace and other records do not throw light on the serious gap in relation to Zaria history about the middle 16th century - in spite of the evidence of a town settlement at Turunku which was deserted long time ago.¹⁷² The movement of population groups and the peopling of the Central Sudan (Zaria inclusive) has shown the migration process in southward directions, which intensified due to changes in climatic conditions

170. Ibid., pp 81-82.

171. A. Smith, op.cit., p.186.

172. Ibid., p.186.

that occurred about 20,000 years ago, especially with the desertification of the Sahara. A. Smith argued that this process led to movement of population over the centuries into areas - such as Zazzau or Zaria - with more fertile and watered lands which were more suitable for agricultural production and other economic activities.¹⁷³

In the Southern parts of the area of study the autonomy of groups and polities had already become clear as at the 19th century.¹⁷⁴ Those parts have a strong geographical, linguistic, socio-cultural, and historical links with the Jos Plateau area which experienced series of migration up to the 20th century as Monday Y. Mangvwat has stressed.¹⁷⁵ In terms of linguistic and socio-cultural relationship the Atyab, Agworok, Asholio, Tacherak (Kacecere), Bajju and Fantsam (Kafanchan) share some homogeneity with the Jarawa of the Jos Plateau area. Local migration was caused by the search for land, wars and slave raids, and widespread epidemics.¹⁷⁶ New migrants were

173. Ibid., p.152

174. M.Y. Mangvwat, "A Historical Synopsis of the Political Economy of the Jos-Plateau Region C.1800-1900 A.D.", Seminar Paper, Department of History, ABU, Zaria, 18th January, 1986.

175. Ibid.

176. In the Communal Societies in the Southern part of the area of study widespread epidemics caused panic. Such were attributed to evil spirits, individual's sins, offending the ancestors and the Gods. It was a common practice that whenever a natural disaster or a serious break-out of an epidemic occurred families or whole hamlets in the affected zone did often migrate to other areas. Field-work interview with Ladi Saratu Kasam, op.cit.

absorbed into the mainstream of the communities they settled in within a generation.

The colonial sources are in themselves clearly contradictory on the issue of origin of the various peoples. Whilst the ethnographers and anthropologists upheld the migration thesis, they were at the same time stressing that the ethnic groups were most likely autochtones of the area. In the case of the Ham, Y. Kirkpatrick who claimed that they possibly migrated from the north of Kachia also explicitly contradicted it by saying they "were all probably indigenous to the soil."¹⁷⁷ In connection with all the nationalities which Harold D. Gunn classified as the "Katab group of tribes"¹⁷⁸ there are prominent traits of cultural, political, and economic affinity, which indicate that they have been living together for hundreds of years.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁷. Y. Kirkpatrick, "Jaba District... on (1914)".

¹⁷⁸. According to the linguistic classification by Harold D. Gunn members of "the Katab group of tribes" are Bajju (Kaje), Takkad (Attakar), Bakulu (Ikulu), Ham (Jaba), Atyab (Katab), Agworok (Kagoro), Fantsam (Kafanchan), Gwong (Kagoma), Agan (Kamanto), Asholio (Morca), and Tacherak (Kacecere). See Harold D. Gunn, Pagan Peoples of the Central Area of Northern Nigeria, International African Institute, London, 1956, p.36.

¹⁷⁹. Despite the lack of political cohesion the various ethnic groups shared linguistic uniformity and some other cultural traits; between them strong social relations existed. But in the oral traditions of the ruling circles there is tracing of different origin from each others; but among the common folk there is stressing of historical links. See "Katab Tribe Social ... (1912-21)."

The "Katab group of tribes", and other peoples in the South and South-east of the area of study, are overwhelmingly of the semi-Bantu family of the Niger-Congo languages. This is in contrast with the Hausa language which is Afro-Asiatic. From the analysis a conclusion can be drawn that the peoples who occupied the several homelands in the Southern parts have deep origin and autochthony. But the lack of the "written word" (up to the 20th century), coupled with limited thorough studies and researches in the fields of archaeological and ethnographic sciences, tend to inhibit knowing the history of the development of these communities and politics beyond a narrow level of few centuries ago.

As at the 19th century the socio-economic formations in Zazzau and the various Southern neighbouring politics were diverse and also highly complex; all were pre-capitalist. Found in the Southern part were formations which were communal in nature.¹⁸⁰ In the northern part - that is, in the territory of Zazzau - the socio-economic system was feudal.

180. Zuwaqhu A. Bonat, "The Political Economy of the Atyab People in Historical Perspective: A Class Analysis", Revised Version of Paper presented at a Seminar on the Katab People: Past, Present and Future, held at the Tafawa Balewa Memorial College, Samaru-Katab, 28-30 December, 1981.

Walter Rodney has shown that in the context of Europe there was a systematic process from one mode to the other, from primitive communal/communal, slavery, feudal and then capitalist.¹⁸¹ This did contrast with Africa where the pattern did not develop exactly in that order. In Africa, as each mode of production evolved there were side-by-side with it elements of other modes.¹⁸² A common characteristic identified with communal societies was the non-separation of the producers from the ownership of the means of production. Meaning the producers retained substantial portions of whatever they produced. Even in feudal Zazzau the peasantry and other producing classes were, considerable, not alienated from the ownership of the means of production such as land.¹⁸³

To a certain extent it can be said that with the lineage, clan, and tribal ties, still very strong - even at the level of production activities - among the various societies in the Southern areas, there was

181. W. Rodney, op.cit., p.46.

182. Ibid., p.46.

183. M.M. Tukur, "The Nature, Extent and Essence of British Policy..."

in existence elements of a patriarchal economy¹⁸⁴ in which the gerontocrats such as clan elders and religious priests played leadership roles. However, the ruling stratum was involved in production.¹⁸⁵ Also, production and distribution of goods, land ownership, religious activities, and other activities in society were centered around kinship and thus emphasizing blood relationship. There was also a low level of the exploitation of man by man. But control of authority by elders gave them advantages over other members of society.

The basic production unit remained the family, lineage, and clan, and the division of labour was based on age groups and sex lines. Land was the major means of production, with household labour basically mobilized and employed in the process of cultivation.¹⁸⁶ Occasionally, members of a village or related group of families brought their labour force together to farm each other's plots turn-by-turn or to farm on plots of land that stood as collectivity

184. On a detailed definition of a patriarchal economy see M.I. Volkov (ed.), op.cit., p.136.

185. Z.A. Bonat, "The Political Economy of the Atiyab..."

186. W. Rodney, op.cit., p.43.

- that is the property of a given community as a whole.¹⁸⁷
 On the eve of British colonial invasion ownership of land by clans and lineages had largely broken down and household ownership was now central. For the Fulani pastoralists, who did not own land in the Southern area, household or family labour was employed ⁱⁿ / grazing their livestock in the fields. One basic characteristic of the patriarchal economy ~~is~~ limiting production at a highly localized level; the economy produces more for internal consumption than for exchange and, in essence, ^{is} ~~is~~ subsistent in nature.¹⁸⁸

In Zazzau and the communal politics in the South of the area of study, slavery as a mode of production did not exist in the classical sense of Europe.¹⁸⁹
 In Zazzau slavery or slave labour was exploited, in a dominantly feudal system, both for internal production and for export - as in other Emirates. Thus, the Zazzau society experienced some sort of serfdom.¹⁹⁰
 M.M. Tukur has seriously observed that the nature of the system existing in the Emirates, up to the end of the 19th century, has been subjected to misinterpretation

187. Ibid., pp.43-44; and M.Y. Mangvwat, "A Historical Synopsis of ... Jos - Plateau Region C.1800-1900 A.D."

188. The highly localized nature of production in such pre-capitalist economies elsewhere has been analyzed. See Ben Molapo, "Marxism, South Africa and the Colonial Question", in The African Community No.113, Second Quarter, 1988, p.61."

189. M.M. Tukur, "The Nature, Extent and Essence of British Policy..."

190. Ibid.

as having been slavery.¹⁹¹ Precisely, Yusufu Turaki has implied this by summing up that the economy of Zazzau relied on slave labour.¹⁹² By this the erroneous impression created is that the most active productive sections of the population such as the peasants, youth, artisans, and so on, were slaves. Certainly, this could not have been so because Zazzau was not mainly a society of slave masters and slaves.

As M.M. Tukur put it the question of slavery in the historiography of the Emirates has been dominantly viewed from the perspective of ethnic and religious factors as the motive force in the development of society; and this has negated the crucial issues of relations of production, classes, and class struggle in most of the analyses.¹⁹³ Some recent studies related to Zazzau and the politics to its immediate south have largely posed the issues of slavery, slave labour, and slave raids from ethnic and religious angles.¹⁹⁴ By this an important socio-economic phenomenon has been reduced to some sort of

191. Ibid.

192. Y. Turaki, op.cit., p.85.

193. M.M. Tukur, "The Nature, Extent and Essence of British Policy..."

194. The perception of the history of slave raids in ethnic-religious terms such as Muslims versus non-Muslims is found in Y. Turaki, op.cit., p.85; and S. Yohanna, op.cit., p.78.

mere racism or ethno-religious conflicts. But to these scholars the dominant form of contact and historical relations between the Emirate of Zazzau and the peoples in the South was slavery, in which the non-Hausa and Animist groups were raided and enslaved by Hausa and Muslims.¹⁹⁵

Zazzau played a central role in slave raiding and trading activities in the Sokoto Caliphate. Bryan Sharwood-Smith has alleged that Zazzau's initial prosperity was highly connected with slave trade.¹⁹⁶ E.J. Arnett said that slaves were bought at Zaria and exported to places such as Sokoto or even sent there as tribute to the leaders of the Caliphate.¹⁹⁷ In the organization of slave raids in various Southern areas the Zaria feudalists found formidable allies in the rulers of Keffi who carried slave raids mostly in the Ninzam and Mada territories. Keffi - as a vassal state - paid tribute to the rulers of Zaria partly in slaves. Even on the eve of British colonial invasion Dan Ya Musa of Keffi was still carrying on

195. See Billy S. Bitiyong, op.cit.

196. Bryan Sharwood-Smith, "But Always as Friends:" Northern Nigeria and the Cameroons, 1921-1957, George Allen and Unwin Limited, London, 1969, p.100.

197. E.J. Arnett, op.cit., p.16.

with slave raids in the communities which Zazzau neighboured to the north.¹⁹⁸

One aspect often neglected by scholars relates to the issue of local linkages or internal collaboration within the Southern communal societies which facilitated slave raiding operation. Informants maintained that Hausa settlers in places such as Zango Katab did not directly involve in slave raids against their host communities.¹⁹⁹ Obviously, the settlers did not have the military capacity to embark on such a tragic venture, given the fact of the encirclement of the small Hausa towns by the host communities and the possibility of swift reprisals that will inevitably follow. However, both among the Hausa and indigenous population there were secret agents who provided vital information to slave raiders. Among the Atyab they were known as the Awwok Agai. They were elements recruited by the external slave raiders as spies who carried espionage activities on movements of people and gave out information capable

198. Kole Omotoso, Just Before Dawn, Spectrum Books, Ibadan, 1988, p.78.

199. Field-work interview with Ladi Saratu Kasam, op.cit; and in Field-work interview with Bobai Akaiji, Peasant farmer, age 68, at Mabuhu, on February 6, 1987.

of facilitating positive results in the course of capturing slaves. Whenever an Iwwok Igai was uncovered the penalty was very severe - that is, execution.²⁰⁰

The colonial sources have referred to some of the slave raids in the Southern part as "punitive expeditions", - carried out by the rulers of Zaria - against the peoples for failure to pay tribute. Of course, there were slave raids but they were not related to tribute since the Southern peoples were neither defeated nor subjugated by Zazzau or any other external power. There were slave raids by Zazzau against the Bajju during the reign of Mohman Sani in circa 1849 and in circa 1858 by the ruler Audu.²⁰¹ The Ham were also attacked by Zaria slave raiders. The last was launched by the ruler of Zazzau, Audu Karimi, in the late 19th century, resulting in the infliction of heavy losses on the Ham and the taking away of many captives as slaves.²⁰² Communities in the South-east were attacked by both Zazzau and Ningi.²⁰³

200. Field-work interview with Bobai Akaiji, op.cit.

201. Y. Kirkpatrick, "Kaje Tribe Anthropological ... on (1914-26)".

202. Y. Kirkpatrick, "Jaba District... on (1914)".

203. Mary Smith, Baba of Koro: A Woman of the Muslim Hausa, Faber, London, 1965, pp1-25.

The Mada, Ayu, Numana, and Ninzam, experienced slave raids by Keffi which appeared to have connection with local spies within these ethnic groups as well as the collaboration of Jema'a Daroro. The Gwong (Kagoma) were raided quite a number of times by Zaria between 1859 and 1894 and so were the Adara and Gbagyi.²⁰⁴ On the whole there is a general consensus in the colonial sources, informants, and existing studies that these slave raiding activities devastated, destabilized and depopulated the polities in the Southern part of the area of study with serious economic consequences.²⁰⁵

It is necessary to understand that the demand for slaves was motivated by the sort of feudal socio-economic system in Zazzau (Zaria) which required such a labour force for exploitation. This, of course, stood in contrast with the communal economies of the South which by their very nature neither had the internal market for slaves nor the need for substantial slave labour. Ownership of slaves and

204. The role of Jema'a, in this regard, has been touched on in W.M. Hyno, "Kagoro District (Jema'a Division) Assessment Report on, May 1916," NAK: ZAR PROF No.2103; and on collaboration of elements among the indigenous peoples see S. Yohanna, op.cit., p.77.

205. C.W. Orr, op.cit.; K. Omotoso, op.cit., p.78; and Y. Turaki, op.cit., p.85; Corroborated in field-work interview with Ladi Saratu Kasam, op.cit.; and also field-work interview with Bobai Akaiji, op.cit.

the exploitation of their labour was a class issue because this was largely a preserve of the Emirate feudal aristocracy and shared by other dominant strata in society. In the Southern polities it was the ruling elders, as custodians of secular and spiritual authority, who attained some low level of owning slaves - mostly captives in wars. Poor peasants in all the societies did not own slaves.

The presentation of the question of slave raids from an ethno-religious analytical view point is not correct even as regards historical truth. In her account Baba of Koro maintained that most of the slaves in the Zaria territory were of non-Hausa origin; but she also added to the fact that there were slave raids in Zaria - leading to the enslavement of the people - carried out against the Hausa population by Hausa dominant forces from within the Emirate itself and from places such as Ningi.²⁰⁶

It can be argued that the entire process of slave raiding activities and the differences between the Zazzau polity and the Southern Animist peoples is better located in the differences which existed in terms of the level of development of the modes of production in the contrasting territories. In the

206. Mary Smith, op.cit., p.19 and p.25.

Southern polities few slaves could be found in dominant families, but not as a separate labour force working on gandaye (feudal owned slave estates) as found in Zazzau. In the territories of the Animist peoples in the South, slaves were more of captives taken during inter-communal wars over lands and hunting grounds or in the process of counter-attacks against Hausa feudal slave raiders.²⁰⁷ In those societies the communal nature - including the low level of the development of productive forces and contradictory classes - limited the scope for the exploitation of man by man; and so slavery and slave labour did not become a separate feature; and where element of this was found it was integral part of household labour.²⁰⁸

In those communal polities nobody was ever to be referred to in society as a slave - in normal situation - and such an individual had rights including that of inheritance in the family.²⁰⁹ Children or grand children of such a person might only come to know that their progenitor was a slave when there was a

207. Field-work interview with Ladi Saratu Kasam, op.cit.,

208. Field-work interview with Bobai Akaiji, op.cit.; Z.A. Banat, "Colonialism and the underdevelopment of Zaria Province...", p.108; and M.Y. Mangwat, "A Historical Synopsis of ... Jos-Plateau Region C.1800-1900 A.D."

209. Field-work interview Bobai Akaiji, op.cit.

family conflict over land or some other property.²¹⁰ This last feature did bear similarities with the Zazzau situation where children of slaves were integrated into families as free members.²¹¹ The Zaria slaves also had plots of farm allocated to them by their masters and they used their free time to produce for themselves - proceeds from this were not appropriated by the slave master but utilized by the slave producer.²¹² This goes further to confirm the validity of M.M. Tukur's contention that what operated in Zazzau was more of serfdom than classical slavery.

One important aspect of this analysis is to point to the fact that the struggles by the peoples occupying the various autonomous territories in the Southern part of the area of study against slave raids and other forms of external aggression have suffered from a lot of misrepresentation. This has been partly due to the arrogance, hatred, contempt, and crude attitude of racial and cultural superiority towards the Animist peoples by both the British colonialists and the Hausa-Fulani feudal aristocracy of

210. M.Y. Mangwat, "A Historical Synopsis of ... Jos-Plateau Region C.1800-1900 A.D."

211. Mary Smith, op.cit., p.21.

212. Ibid., p.19.

Zazzau in their employ. In colonial records are allegations, and even direct accusations, that the ethnic groups in the South were violent highway robbers and savages. In 1913 J.M. Fremantle described the Bajju, Adara, Atyab, and so on as "tribes in the South who till quite recently were terrors for highway robbery and stealing."²¹³ It was also alleged that the peoples had a tradition of carrying out acts of disrupting free flow of traffic, refusal to guarantee safety and smooth passage of caravans belonging to the Hausa traders - passing through their territories - thereby constantly launching attacks on them.²¹⁴ A top British officer stated that due to such attacks caravans could hardly use Zaria-Keffi road in the late 19th century.²¹⁵

This issue has to be examined critically. The Southern peoples were prior to the 20th century independent; in control of their territories; and had the duty to ensure their own territorial integrity and repulsion against hostile external forces, in defence of their homelands. Like any other human society - at any point in history - they had their

213. J.M. Fremantle, "Zaria Province Annual Report No.60 for 1913," NAK: ZAR PRO No.2560.

214. Ibid.

215. C.W. Orr, op.cit.

own share of rogues and dregs. But to reduce the Southern peoples to groups in which the order of the day, in the 19th century, was robbery and stealing is a falsification of history. What was actually the case had to do with the struggles waged by the Southern peoples in the context of putting a defence against slave raiders who were said to have often camouflaged as ordinary long distance merchants. Moreso, experience made the Southern communities to view most foreign traders, enroute those lands, as spies or collaborators with the slave raiders; often various polities organized joint action to check the caravan traffic.²¹⁶

At times the strategy was to block particular routes and make it almost impossible for foreign traders to pass ^{through} the Southern territories as was the practice by the Agworok and the Bajju.²¹⁷ The second option was to attack the weak-link of slave raiders whenever they suspected collaboration. That was partly why the Agworok launched some attacks on the Hausa

216. Field-work interview with Ladi Saratu Kasam, op.cit; also field-work interview with Bobai Akaiji, op.cit.

217. W. M. Hyne, op.cit.; and minutes dated 1st November, 1915 by Resident Nassarawa Province; Mr. Sciortino, in Lt. J.A. Bulger, "Nassarawa Province, Jema'a Division Kaje-Kagoma-Yeskwa District: Re-assessment Report on", NAK: SNP.17 No.40582.

settlers at Jema'a Daroro resulting in the killing of many as punishment for suspected collaboration with Keffi slave raiders in the last years of the 19th century.²¹⁸

Part of the distortion of the history of the southern groups involved the claims that they paid tribute, amounting to thousands of slaves, yearly to Zazzau. E.J. Arnett advanced that the Atyab paid 100 slaves to the rulers of Zazzau yearly, while the Gbagyi and the Ham also paid tribute in thousands of slaves to Zaria.²¹⁹ But the fact of the matter is that these ethnic groups have no historical traditions or accounts of being subjects of Zazzau; and no obligation to capture their own people and give them out in payment as tribute to any external power. This falsity is very obvious because the British did often contradict their own claims, as C.W. Orr did in 1902 in relation to the Gbagyi and other Southern peoples when he stated in clear terms that:

The South-western portion is inhabited by pagan tribes, mostly Gwaris, an independent and hardy people whom the Fulani never subdued, though they habitually raided them and frequently devastated their country, carrying off into slavery such of the inhabitants as they could capture.²²⁰

218. W.M. Hyne, op.cit.

219. E.J. Arnett, op.cit., p.16.

220. C.W. Orr, op.cit.

As at the late 19th century political formations in the Southern communal societies were not extensive in scale.²²¹ In those politics each group of related families formed the lineage; related sets of lineages - tracing the same ancestral origin - constituted the clan; and a collective of the clans composed the ethnic group with claims to a defined territory. Territories for the various ethnic groups were defined on the basis of claims, either due to long time occupation or being first settlers in the area. Within the Southern context the basis of territorial claims had nothing to do with conquest²²² - except in the case of Zazzau and Jema'a ruling circles in relation to those groups. The political formations were dominantly non-expansionist.

This does not mean or imply that the somehow acephalous southern societies were completely without contradictions. By the 19th century they had transformed beyond being tribes. This is due to the fact that different class forces had begun to emerge with a certain level of appropriation of surplus coupled with the accumulation of private property on a low scale. Contradictions gave rise to conflicts with internal and external dimensions.

221. M.Y. Mangwat, "A Historical Synopsis of Jos-Plateau Region C.1800-1900 A.D."

222. Ibid.

Disputes and conflicts between communities centered mainly on the ownership of farmlands as well as the control and use of fishing and hunting zones. Often there were conflicts over land within members of a family, lineage, and clan, sometimes creating bad-blood. Occasionally these led to a split of say a family into factions, at times with some members having to leave thereby migrating to new areas.²²³ Conflicts with internal magnitude were occasional occurrences among the communities based on disputes on farmlands between kinsmen as well as between different villages.²²⁴ There were some conflicts of inter-group or ethnic dimension as was the case between the Bajju and some of their neighbours such as the Ham and Agworok, based on the land question and ownership of other resources.²²⁵ In the ensued armed clashes the Bajju were reported as having recorded sounding victories over Ham but failed in their confrontations with the Agworok.²²⁶ Colonial historiography portrayed such wars over farmlands, fishing and hunting zones, and boundaries as "inter-tribal wars" - as if they were waged without any material base.

223. Field-work interview with Kabawon Katuka, op.cit.

224. J.M. Fremantle, op.cit.

225. Y. Kirkpatrick, "Kaje Tribe Anthropological... on (1914-26)",

226. Ibid.

A crucial issue concerning the political relations between the different peoples and polities in the entire area of study has to do with the territorial claims of Zazzau and Jema'a Daroro which the British reinforced. They were mainly advanced to justify certain colonial policies especially related to the creation of new administrative units, drawing new boundaries, and the imposition of Hausa-Fulani feudal rulers over non-Hausa peoples; as the local representatives of the colonial state in zones they did not control in the pre-colonial period. In 1905 C.W. Orr made the assertion that Kauru town, as a vassal of Zazzau, controlled lands, including the Atyab homeland.²²⁷ But he contradicted this in 1907. R.C.S. Stanley also claimed that Kajuru, which owed allegiance to Zaria, exercised political control over the Adara people.²²⁸ In 1933 H. Hale Middleton was of the view that all nationalities which the British placed under the jurisdiction of Jema'a N.A. were conquered and subjugated by Jema'a Daroro ruling elements in the pre-colonial days.²²⁹

227. C.W. Orr, "Zaria Province Annual Report for 1905", NAK: ZAR PROF No.2552.

228. R.C.S. Stanley, op.cit.

229. See 1933 Memorandum by Resident Plateau Province to the Secretary Northern Provinces (SNP) Kaduna, in H. Hale Middleton, "Jema'a Division Affairs", NAK: ZAR PROF No.C.28 Vol.I.

However, earlier in 1915, in the face of continuous primary ~~resistance~~ resistance by the Bajju, Ninkwop, Gwong, Fantsam, Numana, Ninzam, Mada, and Ayu against the European colonialists (which included opposition to the posting, for the first time, of Jema'a aristocrats to them as District Heads) the British officers had largely dismissed the territorial claims as false and emphasized that even if at all there was some level of Jema'a control over the peoples in the pre-colonial times it was in no way firm.²³⁰ It was partly due to the increasing hostility of these communities towards the rulers of Jema'a, in spite of their defeat by the British, that influenced the evacuation of the entire population and N.A. headquarters from Jema'a Daroro (which ceased to exist) to Madakiya in 1926 and later to Kafanchan (the historical town of the Fantsam people) in 1930.²³¹

In 1915 C.O. Migeod claimed that all nationalities in Zaria Province "had already come under Fulani rule before the advent of the British."²³² This went contrary to what the Resident of Zaria, C.W. Orr, stated in 1907 that the Chief of Kauru had no real control

230. Minutes by Resident of Nassarawa, Sciortino, dated November 1, 1915, in Lt. J.A. Bulger, op.cit.

231. Z.A. Bonat, "Colonialism and the Underdevelopment of Zaria Province..." pp147-182.

232. C.O. Migeod, "Zaria Province Annual Report No.67 for 1915", NAK: ZAR PROF No.2562.

over the peoples whose territories occupied the vast land laying between Kauru and Zango Katab in the pre-colonial times.²³³ Also important is a very revealing press statement issued by the Zaria N.A. in 1953 in which its ruling circles sort of undermined the claims they had maintained for decades that the non-Hausa in the South were part of Zazzau, and which confirmed the argument that only the British extended Zaria authority there:

In the Southern part of Zaria Province... the population is largely non-Moslem and is made up of a number of clans and tribes. Prior to the introduction of British administration in this area there were no cohesive administrative units and in fact each village was often hostile towards its neighbour. In the intervening years much has been done by the Government and the Zaria Native Authority to set up a cohesive administration in the area.²³⁴

The Hausa settlements in the Southern parts were not founded on the basis of war. In the Zango Katab area none of the nationalities who belonged to the land has a tradition of conquest.²³⁵ It was the Atyab

233. C.W. Orr, "Zaria Province Annual Report for 1907", NAK: ZAR PROF No.2554.

234. Text of Press Release by Zaria N.A. (1953) published by the Ministry of Local Government, in "Political Affairs (1958-65)", NAK: PO 3rd Collection ASI 919.

235. Field-work interview with Nakaka Tela, tailor and Imam, age about 80, at Bakin Kasuwa Zango Katab, on 19th February, 1987; Field-work interview with Bobai Akaiji, op.cit., and field-work interview with Dula Tukura, pastoralist, age 75, at unguwar Juju, on 8th February, 1987.

of Abuayap who willingly gave their land out for the creation of the Zango Katab Hausa settlement in circa 1750 along the trading route. This settlement was moved to a new site in 1915 by the colonial authorities, with the arrival of Ja'afaru Dan Ishiaku as District Head in that year.²³⁶ In the pre-colonial times it was only the Hausa settlement of Zango Katab and its population that owed allegiance to Kaura and thus Zazzau.²³⁷ In the context of the Southern polities it was only the Hausa and Fulani peoples who were paying taxes; they owed allegiance to Zazzau.

Taxation was absent in the communal polities of the Animist peoples. That was why - as will be shown later in the analysis - when the British imposed it later there was much struggle against it.

Towards the very last years of the 19th century Zazzau had intensified slave raids into the foreign territories to its South. The most outstanding one was in 1897 which was mainly directed at the Atyab; but which somehow affected the Srubu, Bakulu, and Angan. The event has been described by M.V. Spurway thus:

236. Field-work interview with Ndung Manman, Peasant, age about 87, at unguwar Tabo, on 7th February, 1987.

237. Field-work interview with Nakaka Tela, op.cit.

By far the most rigorous fighting ever seen in the South took place in the reign of Kwasau. Repeated attacks on fillani(sic) cattle, refusal to pay tax and finally open rebellion resulted in a carefully planned expedition. The order of the day was "slaves will be required" and story still tells of the river Kaduna running blood - over 1000 are reported to have been slain. All the Hausa towns were cleared in case of reprisals.²³⁸

It is significant to note that Muhammad Lawal (Kwasau) became the ruler of Zazzau in 1897. The question of attacks on Fulani cattle, and the non-payment of taxes, by the Atyab and other groups, can certainly not hold as reasons for the aggression; moreover that they were not subjects of Zazzau. That was why the Hausa settlements in the midst of these territories, such as Zango Katab, had to be cleared for fear of possible reprisals before the attack was launched. According to Ndung Manman Hausa settlers were not able to continue to live securely in the area, nor travel along the trading routes peacefully, until the arrival of the British.²³⁹ It is, however, difficult to accept

238. M.V. Spuvway, op.cit.

239. Field-work interview with Ndung Manman, op.cit.

the version of Ndung Mamman - a version that is held by many - that it was Kwasau himself who led the operation.²⁴⁰ This is in view of the enormous internal and external problems that Zazzau faced even during the reign of Usman Yero (1888-1897); and which accompanied the ascendancy of Kwasau to power in 1897 - including the threat by Kontagora.²⁴¹ It is more likely that due to the offensive having taken place at the point of Kwasau take-over as the ruler of Zazzau - and for the fact that before coming on the throne of Zazzau (1897) he was the Emirate's Military Commander - the raids and massacre of the Atyab came to be associated with his name as well as being synonymous with him in Atyabland and elsewhere.

From what has been gathered the massive "Kwasau attack" of 1897 was the culminative point in the course of a series of feudal and bandit organized raids for booty, looting, and to capture slaves. It seriously devastated the Atyab people. Several villages were left in ruins after the operation; it took place during a major Atyab festival involving the entire ethnic group. The Zazzau aggression of 1897 had severe impact on the Atyab because of the element of surprise involved, and due to the

240. Ibid.

241. R.A. Adeleye, Power and Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria 1804-1906, Longman, London, 1971, p.80; and S.J. Hogben and A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, The Emirates of Northern Nigeria, OUP, London, 1966, p.230.

central treasonable role of the Awwok Agai who provided the invaders with intelligence.²⁴²

According to informants the Atyab casualties were far more high by thousands beyond the figure of 1,000 given in the official sources.²⁴³ Thousands were also taken into slavery. In this connection they were moved to Zaria as captured slaves. Most of the returnee ex-slaves from Zonzon, Gora, Jankasa, and elsewhere (in Atyab area) who started coming back in the early years of the 20th century - after "buying their freedom" in the wake of British colonization - were actually taken into captivity during the Zazzau attack of 1897. They returned to their homes to live, once more, with their families and people. One of the ex-slave returnees was a woman called Yayockli Dabo of Zonzon.²⁴⁴

A phenomenon connected with the resistance against foreign aggression by Zazzau, such as the 1897 massive raid, is known among the Atyab as

242. Field-work interview with Ndung Mamman, op.cit; and field-work interview with Bobai Akaiji, op.cit.

243. Ibid.

244. Field-work interview with Ladi Saratu Kasam, op.cit.

Tyon Kwasau (escaping or running away from Kwasau).²⁴⁵

With the attack sections of the Atyab population began to migrate to Watyab (Kaura), Kagoro, and elsewhere in neighbouring polities to escape from the Hausa slave raiders.²⁴⁶ The hills in these areas provided them with more security and hiding places. This migration, as a form of Atyab resistance, continued up to the arrival of the British; some families returned, other remained in the new places, while some still migrated but due to new colonial pressures. Also, the Atyab fought back against the foreign invaders as the clashes between them continued.

It was circa 1900-1902, just as the British were arriving, that the core of the leadership of the Atyab nationalist resistance was crushed. Despite

245. Tyon Kwasau in Tyab language means people running away or escaping from the Kwasau's attacks. It is also referred to as Tyon Akpat still has a wider meaning to the extent that it refers to new migration due to new pressures in colonial conditions - especially when the area was placed under the jurisdiction of Zaria for the first time by the British. On the latter phase of Tyon Akpat see Z.A. Bonat, "Colonialism and the underdevelopment of Zaria Province...", p.196.

246. Field-work interview with Ndung Manman, op.cit.; field-work interview with Ladi Saratu Kasam, op.cit.; and field-work interview with Audu Gwanzuwang, peasant former, age about 76, at unguwar Tabo, on 7th February, 1987.

the continuous offensive by the Zaria feudal slave raiders, and the resultant devastation, they could not put down the resistance; but neither could the Atyab repulse the attacks completely. By circa 1900-1902 the Hausa invaders from Zazzau seemingly came up with a plan based on the premise that once the leaders or commanders of the Atyab forces were eliminated the resistance will collapse.²⁴⁷ No sooner had this been embarked upon that the leading warrior of the Atyab was captured by the enemy forces. One version is that the Commander, Marok Gandu, was captured by the Kwasau forces in the course of fighting.²⁴⁸ Another is that he was seized in an ambush, with the help of Atyab collaborators who provided the enemy with information.²⁴⁹

The place of Marok Gandu in the history of the struggles of the Atyab against external attacks by Zazzau has been totally neglected in existing

247. Field-work interview with Alhaji Ninyio Avong Fada, Village elder and Trader, age 73, at Ataknje on February 9, 1987.

248. Ibid.

249. Field-work interview with Audu Gwanzuwang, op.cit.

studies.²⁵⁰ Marok Gandu was a war leader and also a key figure in the council of elders of the Nje clan. He was from the family that held the most leading position in the Nje clan affairs and hailed from a village called Magata, which was then the main centre of the clan. When the enemy captured Marok Gandu it was not possible for the people to rescue their warrior in spite of fighting back to do so.²⁵¹

The method of execution which terminated Marok Gandu's life was what made the most psychological impact on the people and somehow informed their attitude towards the Hausa. The form of execution Marok faced is called tsirewa (that is, to be executed by impaling on the stake). The execution

250. No scholar has so far uncovered the place of Marok Gandu at that crucial stage in Atyab history. In the course of the research the author did recollect a childhood story told elsewhere by his mother. Then now went back for it and found that it was not legendary in mythology - as it sounded those years - but rather a legendary based on historical reality; but the history of which the dominant forces in society have constantly tried to either erase or hid from the people. Through the ideological and political influences of the church (which largely views such history as talking about the "evil and dark days") in Atyabland, and the role of the Zaria aristocracy and their local representatives among the Atyab themselves, there have been deliberate attempts to keep the figure of Marok Gandu from the Memory of the people. The author owes much to Ladi Saratu Kasam for the rekindled act; and also a big thank-you to Audu Gwanzuwang and Alhaji Ninyio Avong Fada for throwing more valuable light on the subject.

251. Field-work interview with Alhaji Ninyio Avong Fada, op.cit; also field-work interview with Ladi Saratu Kasam, op.cit.

of Marok Gandu, by his captors, took place at a place called Sahshan. A sharp and strong stick was pierced through the lower opening of the alimentary canal to the outer part of the mid-section of the head. Then the executioners used a spear to pierce the chest of Marok Gandu.²⁵²

The dead body of Marok Gandu was robbed in flowing gowns, the kind worn only by members of the Hausa aristocracy, and a turban was worn round it's head. A heavy guard was mounted at the execution ground and the body was left on the stake to decompose. In the whole event, Atyab captives were forcefully taken to the spot where the body was mockingly shown to them in a cruel fashion with these words: "come, see your chief."²⁵³

Audu Gwanzuwang claimed that the execution of Marok Gandu in itself, especially the way it was done, went a long way to create a deep hatred, indignation, and antipathy of the Atyab towards the Hausa people.²⁵⁴ Up to the 1940s a solemn but moving song was popularly sang during occasions, such as ceremonies and celebrations, in memory of

252. Field-work interview with Alhaji Ninyio Avong Fada, op.cit.

253. Field-work interview with Audu Gwanzuwang, op.cit.

254. Ibid.

Marok Gahdu and those hard times. It was pertaining to his heroism, brutal execution, and the turbulence of the times. The song was, ironically, composed in Hausa and old people did shed tears whenever it was sang.²⁵⁵ The lines went like this:²⁵⁶

Marok woo
 Duniya da wuya
 Marok duniya ba ta da dadi
 Lokacin wuya ba shi da dadi
 Marok maza sun fadi.
 Marok namijin duniya
 Wuyan duniya ba dadi
 Jarumin yaki an sha azaba
 Ranan wahala ba dadi.²⁵⁷

Economic relations between states or polities was very important. Those who controlled state power were concerned with the promotion of trade as a cardinal matter. Abdullahi Smith has pointed out that Zaria or Zazzau rulers did reap much from
255. Field-work interview with Ladi Saratu Kasam, op.cit.

256. The song reproduced as sang by Ladi Saratu Kasam. Both Audu Gwanzuwang and Alhaji Ninyio Avong Fada made some clarifications.

257. The translated English version:

Oh Marok
 The world has hardship
 Marok the world has no pleasure
 Times of hardship have no pleasure
 Marok the hero has fallen.
 Marok brave man of the World
 World of hardship has no pleasure
 Gallant warrior suffered extreme pains
 Day of difficulty has no pleasure.

external trade. Furthermore, A. Smith emphasized that Zaria was a prominent commercial centre; with long distance trading routes linking different areas northwards of it with the forest areas (in the far-south of the Nigerian area) passing through its territory.²⁵⁸ As stated earlier Hausa settlements in the Southern polities of the area of study such as Kachia, Kajuru, Zango Katab, and Kauru were important centres on the trading routes; and they did arise as a result of some sort of boom in "international trade" along the important routes.²⁵⁹ The various communities in the area of study were not just reservoirs for slave raids and conflict between two contrasting cultures as has been described by Bryan Shardwood-Smith.²⁶⁰ They were not watertight territories (with isolationist tendencies) without element of mutual co-existence and interrelationship.

The communal politics in the South were predominantly societies made-up of cultivators; they

258. Abdullahi Smith, "Some notes on the History of Zazzau under Hausa Kings", in M.J. Mortimore (ed.), Zaria and its Region: A Nigerian Savanna City and its Environs, Occasional Paper No.4, Department of Geography, ABU, Zaria, January 1970, p.89.

259. Y. Turaki, op.cit., p.84.

260. B. Shardwood-Smith, op.cit., p.100.

had not developed a significant level of different occupational groups and clear-cut division of labour or specialization. In commercial activities Hausa Merchants and traders recruited local agents in the various communities to facilitate the necessary trading activities. The trading agents moved into the villages in search for items of trade such as honey, grains, kabido (rain coat), livestock, and so on; which they purchased for onward export while they sold leather works, potash, kolanuts, and clothing.²⁶¹ The exchange was by means of cowries and by barter.

Quite a number of the trading agents in the south were the elements serving within external intelligence network. In the late 19th century those who acted as local representatives of Hausa traders stated the practice of taking titles from the Jakada of Kauru in places such as Zango Katab. They were not tax collectors operating on behalf of some Hausa rulers as suggested by P.F. Brandt.²⁶² Even P.F. Brandt who attributed some political power to them

261. Field-work interview with Ladi Saratu Kasam, op.cit.

262. P.F. Brandt, "Note by Mr. P.F. Brandt on the Social and Economic Organisation of the Tribes in Southern Zaria (1939)," NAK: ZAR PROF No.9.

contradicted this when he strongly argued that in the eyes of their own people they never had any recognition as Chiefs.²⁶³ Taking titles from the Hausa did not make them representatives of the people. The fact was that these elements were beginning to constitute themselves into a different social stratum in society due to accumulation of some wealth. Southern polities were, therefore, beginning to experience the emergence of a new class; and this was the situation when the British arrived on the scene.

The nature of the ruling classes and the structure of authority in the Southern societies and their northern neighbours in Zazzau is an important issue. The socio-economic structure goes a long way to determine the character of class stratification or social relations in society.²⁶⁴ First, there was a feudal order in Zazzau and its vassals with a clear class distinction between the aristocracy, rich peasants, wealthy artisans, and powerful merchants on the one hand - in spite of the class differentiation between them - and the ordinary commoners such as poor

263. Ibid.

264. Amilcar Cabral, Revolution in Guinea: An African People's Struggle, Stage I, London, 1974, pp 46-61.

peasants, wretched artisans, and petty traders on the other. Second, there were the communal polities in the South predominantly composed of cultivators and without a clear demarcated ruling class standing in sharp contrast with the majority in society.

In Zazzau the state had entrenched and established instruments of coercion such as the military, police force, courts, and prisons which were controlled by the feudal aristocracy. The Zazzau ruling class also lived on the appropriation of surplus from the peasants and other producing classes. The rulers exploited slave labour in their gandaye, construction of roads, building of houses for rulers, town walls, and other projects. The peasantry was not quite any better. It produced food commandeered by the dominant elements, supplied forced labour in relation to project construction for the state, paid harsh and heavy taxes to the state, and often their most fertile lands were expropriated by the ruling class. The pastoralists, especially the nomads, had to pay heavy jangali (cattle tax). The traders were faced with taxes and paid import and export duties to the state. Artisans produced weapons for the state and still paid taxes.

Zazzau or Zaria had more ruling dynasties than any other Emirate within the Sokoto caliphate. The four lineages were the Barchari, Katsinawa, Mallawa, and the Sullebawa.²⁶⁵ No dynasty could be sure of dominance for a long period. It was described as "one of the most extensive, if not the most extensive of the Fulani Emirates."²⁶⁶ In the face of defeat of the Habe rulers of Zaria (during the Sokoto Jihad which started in 1804) some of the dominant elements simply took a retreat in the various directions of the South and got hold on the Hausa settlements of Kaura, Kajuru, and Kagarko. They continued to owe allegiance to Zaria; but Y. Kirkpatrick maintained that they operated with a degree of independence.²⁶⁷ The relations existing between Kaura, Kajuru, Kagarko, Jema'a Daroro, and so on and Zazzau were some sorts of confederacy arrangement. They paid tribute to Zazzau in various forms - in horses, slaves, and cowries.²⁶⁸

265. A.D. Yahaya, op.cit., p.9.

266. C.W. Orr, "Zaria... Annual Report for 1904".

267. Y. Kirkpatrick, "Kajuru District Administrative Affairs (1921)", NAK: SAR PROF No.59/1921.

268. Ibid.

In the context of Zazzau the political structure was such that there was separation of powers in theory. But in reality the ruler had the judiciary and every other institution and organ of the state within the powers of the throne; as at the late 19th century the ruler of Zaria was more of a real autocrat.²⁶⁹ The ruler and key officials of the Emirate resided in the capital at Zaria. The ruler had fief-holders like the Magaji who liaised with the towns and villages in the domain. The rulers of the vassal towns kept in contact with the Zazzau throne through the fief-holder serving in the capacity of the link man.²⁷⁰ For their part the rulers of the vassals had their Jakadu operating at the very local level in their domains; carrying out functions such as collection of taxes and monitoring situation.²⁷¹ In some cases the Jakadu ran affairs in the most tyrannic fashion.

The high level of exploitation and oppression of the dominated classes in Zazzau led to intense

269. Letter from D.O. Zaria, Y. Kirkpatrick, to SNP dated 17th May, 1921, in "Zaria Province Political Situation in as to", NAK: SNP 8 No.72/1921.

270. P.F. Brand, op.cit.

271. M.M. Tukur, "The Imposition of British Colonial Domination on the Sokoto Caliphate, Borno and Neighbouring States 1897-1914..." pp337-338.

class struggle to resolve antagonistic contradictions. In the late 19th century the rulers of Zaria maintained heavy taxation.²⁷² All this triggered resistance by the peasantry and other dominated classes manifested in the Mahdi revolts which threatened the feudal aristocracy almost to its foundation as from the 1880s and into 1890s.²⁷³ The Mahdist revolts were only halted by the British colonial invasion.²⁷⁴

The Zaria ruling forces were also riddled with internal crisis mainly centered on dynastic rivalries. In this connection, during the struggle for succession following the death of Usman Yero in 1897, Muhammad Lawal (Kwasau) used putchist method in violation of all "legal methods." Kwasau forced Waziri Buhari to rescind on his choice to the throne, and seized power with the help of the regiment under his command and imposed himself as the ruler of Zazzau.²⁷⁵ In

272. S.J. Hogben and A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, op.cit., p.230.

273. Thomas Hodgkin, "Mahdism, Messianic and Marxism in the African Setting", in Peter C.W. Gutkind and Peter Waterman (eds.), op.cit., pp311-312.

274. Ibid., pp311-312.

275. M.G. Smith, op.cit., p.201.

addition to this were the attacks on Zazzau by Kontagora and the Mahdist impact; to some extent they distanced the leadership from the people on the eve of the British invasion.

State organizations and apparatuses, especially those pertaining to coercion such as a regimental or regular military force and the police force, were not developed in the Southern communal polities. R.C.S. Stanley has portrayed it thus in relation to the Adara:

The 'government' of an average pagan village is a queer combination of autocracy and communism. The controlling influences are essentially 'religious', and the police force is marginal.²⁷⁶

In Bajju society there was no single person who wielded power as the chief of the entire ethnic group.²⁷⁷ Although Bajju nationality, and the whole homeland, had eleven village groups structured along clan lines the "villages have always been independent of each other, owing no allegiance to the parent village" which was Dibyi (Kurmi Bi).²⁷⁸ Political power was controlled by clan elders and it was not quite separated from spiritual power

276. R.C.S. Stanley, op.cit.

277. "Ousuman Sokop Kaje (1942)..."

278. Ibid.

centered on the shrine priests. However, Dibyi served as the spiritual capital of the Bajju and the Chief priest for the whole people resided there. Baranzan was the most outstanding chief priest in Bajju history; although he had no executive function as such, but through the clan elders and the religious priests he had some limited authority in Bajjuland.²⁷⁹ Thus despite the independence of each segment of Bajju society, they had a convergence place in Dibyi where the clan and spiritual leaders discussed affairs of the land and collectively took decisions on behalf of the society.

Among the Atsam(Chawai) political units were divided according to the various villages with the overall head of the Tsam picked on the basis of the village that was first established as a settlement.²⁸⁰ For the Bisi ethnic group each segment of society, such as a clan, had a headman at its leadership. According to C.K. Meek the Bisi had a central Chief; but he was without any conferred power of control or intervention in the internal matters of the sub-groups. However, he was a kind of co-ordinator for

279. Y. Kirkpatrick, "Kaje Tribe Anthropological... on (1914-26)."

280. "Chawai Assessment Report. Tribe and Origin of", NAK: SNP 10No.451P/1917.

the whole Bisi polity.²⁸¹ Yusufu Turaki has stated that both the Gwong and the Ham had Chiefs. In each case the Chief was selected from the designated lineages. The chiefs of the Gwong and Ham were, however, without much powers because the council of elders constituted the highest body of authority.²⁸²

Political authority in the different polities in the South had an element of collective democracy, and this was in line with the structure of society. Citizens had rights and obligations. Religion as an institution was to an extent used to mobilize members in society. Also, it played a role in social control in terms of disciplinary measures against elements found violating norms or law and order in society. But another side of it is that religion was used to oppress women and somehow dictate to the youth. Gerontocrats and shrine priests appropriated surplus through the control of political and religious powers. A woman could be asked to pay a fine for disobeying her husband. During festivals and hunting periods the ruling strata had the best of food, drinks, and meat reserved for them. This, of course, led to some contradictions between the ruling elements and the rest of the society.

281. C.K. Meek, "Anthropological Notes on Piti Tribe..."

282. Y. Turaki, op.cit., pp196-197.

In the communal polities in the South of the area of study - in spite of the prevailing contradictions - there was no taxation, and there was absence of forced labour. Overall, the major forms of domination, exploitation, and oppression associated with feudal societies such as Zazzau were virtually non-existent. However, as seen earlier in the analysis, colonial historiography and its various brands of apologia have no regard for such societies. The peoples in the South were referred to as "raw pagans", "savages" and "uncivilized".²⁸³ Their culture was reduced to superstition and primitive - partly because they were Animists. But as B. Swai has noted in relation to a similar group elsewhere their so-called uncivilized, primitive, pagan way of life, and superstitious culture were neither "ridiculous nor undignified" until these societies made contact with either feudalism or capitalism. Thus much as these societies were called primitive "it is this very phenomenon which helped reduced the need for violence and brutality as means of control,

283. C.W. Orr, "Zaria ... Annual Report for 1904".

something which was very much pronounced in the so-called civilized societies."²⁸⁴ As will be shown in subsequent analysis the low level of domination, exploitation, and oppression in the Southern polities made nationalist resistance more fierce and lasting than in the Emirate of Zazzau.

1.4 Early Nationalist Resistance to the British in the Area of Study

The development of the nationalist movement has its roots in the early primary resistance of the peoples against the colonial invaders from 1902-1914. In this initial phase of the nationalist movement there were uprisings, protests, and other types of anti-colonial struggles. Most of these nationalistic efforts - in confronting the invaders - were highly restrictive to the various polities and localities; they were lacking in any large scale co-ordination. At this primary phase the forces leading the nationalist movement were "diverse and multifacated."²⁸⁵ In most areas in the Southern

284. B. Swai, "Towards an Explanation of the Underdevelopment of Zuru..."

285. Th. Buettner, "On the History of the National Liberation Movement in Africa: Problems of Leadership. Some Theoretical, Methodological and Historical Aspects," in Thea Buttner (ed.), op.cit., p.21.

part the communal structures enabled the rise of a collective leadership at the head of the nationalist resistance; the youth played an active and leading role. In the South there were few joint nationalist resistance, organized by different nationalities with a relatively high level of mobilization and popular participation. In Zazzau some sections of the ruling class resisted the British and were overthrown; while some collaborated and received reward.

On January 1, 1900 the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria was formally proclaimed by colonel F.D. Lugard at Ilokoja.²⁸⁶ This was made without consultation and consent of the peoples. Most of the communities in the area of study did not know that the British colonizer had taken steps that will influence and shape their future. Their level of consciousness about the world was relatively low; to the extent that they were not in position to know significantly about the complex development in connection with imperialism and its motives of aggression on their territories.²⁸⁷ Also, the legal declaration of

286. Obaro Ikime, The Fall of Nigeria: The British Conquest, Heinemann, Ibadan, 1977, p.77.

287. W. Rodney, op.cit., p.160.

British dominance and lordship over the peoples preceded the military offensive.

Once the Protectorate was formally declared every challenge to the British, questioning the legitimacy of their action, and any form of resistance to the colonizer's claims over territories and peoples, was tagged or considered as refusal to submit to "constituted authority" and thus brutally suppressed. For the British it was a question of might is right as the imperialist aggressors were also the arbiters. Typical of colonial historiography M.G. Smith has advanced that Lugard's formal declaration at Ikoja, and subsequent military action against communities or polities, was informed by the determination by the British to stop slave raids and slavery.²⁸⁸ But this issue was a propagandist smokescreen to cover or justify British aggression and colonialism itself.

Contrary to the position of Obaro Ikime that it is hard to say the exact time Zaria was conquered by the British soldiers, there is much evidence or documented information in this respect.²⁸⁹ M.M. Tukur identified Zazzau Emirate as one which fell to the

288. M.G. Smith, op.cit., p.199.

289. O. Ikime, op.cit., p.185.

colonialists with "little or no physical resistance."²⁹⁰ The real offensive by the Europeans began in January 1900 when colonel Kemball of the West African Frontier force (WAFF) encroached on some towns and villages within the jurisdiction of Zazzau and the homeland of the Bajju and other Southern polities. There was resistance to this violation by the peoples; and the British invaders responded by burning and destroying some towns and village. Kemball claimed that he was a crusader on a mission to stamp-out slavery.²⁹¹

After having started on a somehow cordial note the relationship between the ruler of Zazzau (Kwasau) and Kemball soon deteriorated when the former realized that the British military officer posed some real danger. Muhammad Lawal (Kwasau) sent a protest to Lugard at Lokoja and also briefed the capital of the Caliphate at Sokoto about Kemball's threatening activities. In his protest Kwasau stressed that the British military officer was demanding of him to denude all power over Zazzau. The ruler emphasized that he lacked the legal or

290. M.M. Tukur, "The Imposition of British Colonial Domination on the Sokoto Caliphate, Borno and Neighbouring States 1897-1914..." p.2.

291. R.A. Adeleye, op.cit., p.244.

constitutional basis and justification to go in line with such demand by a foreigner. Furthermore, Kwasau accused Kemball of going back on his given word to maintain mutual and friendly relationship.²⁹²

In February 1900 the British made more incursions into the area. Two columns of the WAFF embarked on what the British called an exploration of the valley of River Kaduna in search of a suitable site for establishing the headquarters of the Protectorate.²⁹³ The first column was led by Major Morland; and it started from the River Niger. The second column, under the command of Colonel Lowry-Cole, moved from River Benue. Both reached Wushishi where an outpost was established. However, the presence of the British soldiers was rejected by the people who put a slight armed resistance. The Europeans were also "subjected to considerable hostility - more or less covert - on the part of the natives" at Wushishi.²⁹⁴ The resistance was crushed. From Wushishi the troops proceeded in different directions but later met a Girku in Zazzau Emirate. E.J. Arnett has alleged that

292. Ibid., p.244.

293. C.W. Orr, "Zaria ... Annual Report for 1904."

294. Ibid.

when the soldiers arrived at the outskirts of Zaria, Kwasau went to meet them in salutation.²⁹⁵ This has been somehow contradicted by R.A. Adeleye who stressed that the year 1900 was not one of good relations between Kwasau and the British.²⁹⁶

The process of invasion by the foreign occupiers - and the defeat of Bida, Kontagora, and elsewhere in the Emirates in 1900 - led to a mass influx of population into Zazzau territory or enroute some other places. They included members of ruling circles from elsewhere who were on the run from the European invaders.²⁹⁷ In its wake, British colonial aggression brought chaos and other destabilization effects. There were also thousands of people including "liberated" slaves who found freedom and were on the move. Criminal elements took advantage of the new situation of disorder to unleash violent acts against people.²⁹⁸ All these

295. F.J. Arnett, op.cit., p.14.

296. R.A. Adeleye, op.cit., p.24.

297. The picture of the influx into Zazzau by ruling elements from elsewhere has been well depicted in Baba Karo's account. See Mary Smith, op.cit., pp47-48.

298. M.M. Tukur, "The Imposition of British Colonial Domination on the Sokoto Caliphate, Borno and Neighbouring States 1897-1914....." p.117.

posed a serious threat to the political situation. The seriousness of the magnitude of it all can be better appreciated in the light of the fact that the defeated ruler of Kontagora, Nagwamatse, who "escaped" from the British, camped at Maska (in Katsina Emirate but at the doorsteps of the territory of Zazzau) with about 20,000 followers.²⁹⁹ At that point the British were also advancing in the direction of Zaria; the propaganda was that they were in hot pursue of Nagwamatse for slave crimes and for continuous attacks on other territories.

In the later part of 1901 the British sent in a company of the WAFF - alledging that it was at the instant of a request by Kwasau for assistance to defend Zazzau against Nagwamatse - resulting in their establishing a military garrison at Zaria.³⁰⁰ With this the foreign occupiers embarked on a process of consolidating a hold on Zaria. All these developments reached a peak when the colonialists formally announced the creation of Zaria Province in March 1902, with Captain Abadie as Resident.³⁰¹ By implication Kwasau - albeit the entire Zaria ruling class - was

299. R.A. Adeleye, op.cit., p.244.

300. C.W. Orr, "Zaria... Annual Report for 1904."

301. E.J. Arnett, op.cit., p.14.

now to be subordinated to the British; and was, therefore, expected to accept being turned into a Marionette of the British. Partly due to being a nationalist, even as a feudal ruler, Muhammad Lawal (Kwasau) refused to give in to the invaders and did not accept the British as overlords nor succumb to taking their dictates.³⁰² In his own way Kwasau waged on an anti-British struggle; the relationship between Zazzau and the British became increasingly tense.

In his analysis R.A. Adeleye has argued that both the ruling circles of Zazzau (headed by Kwasau) and the people of Zaria were averse to the British military presence; thus the people were increasingly impatient with the situation.³⁰³ But there is no concrete evidence that the people translated this hostility towards the British into any practical support for the aristocracy; for there was no physical confrontation with the European invaders in Zaria. Apart from other factors already shown in this analysis, the Mahdist revolts directed against the Emirate rulers had sort of undermined the capacity of the Zaria rulers to mobilize the popular forces

302. R.A. Adeleye, op.cit., pp246-247.

303. Ibid., p.244.

solidly behind the throne.³⁰⁴ The British were also catching on or exploiting the internal contradictions and inter-dynastical rivalries between various sections of Zaria ruling class to their own advantage. Already, Aliyu dan Sidi (from the Mallawa dynasty) was working for the British as a collaborator at the time of their conflict with Kwasau - who was a member of the Bornuan dynasty.³⁰⁵ Also found were wavering ruling elements either secretly playing double cards or waiting in the wings and watching at the direction of the tide in the conflict, between Kwasau and the British, in order to side with the victorious party.

With the formation of Zaria Province (consisting of Zazzau and the Southern politics) in 1902, coupled with the continuous reinforcement of troops by the British, a culminative point in the process of colonial invasion was reached. In those conditions

304. The British assessed the tempo of the time, and the situation on the ground, and got the result that the generality of the people were quite indifferent to the fate of Kwasau before they moved to overthrow him. See Report by Captain Abadie to the High Commissioner of 11th September, 1902, in "Miscellaneous Historical Papers", NAK: ZAR PROF No.C.4004.

305. Ibid.

Kwasau hardly had any room to manoeuvre. As a ruler and a nationalist Kwasau had - in both political and military terms - lost the strategic initiative to the British at the decisive stage.³⁰⁶

Of course, Kwasau's nationalism was partly one in the defence of the feudal class interests. But it was largely because of his nationalistic stand against compromising the independence of Zazzau to the British that Captain Abadie charged Kwasau of subversion; by accusing Zaria of being involved in intrigues with Kano against the Europeans. After this the might of military force was employed in the overthrow of Muhammad Lawal (Kwasau) in September 1902.³⁰⁷ The stage was now set for Zaria to be used as a military base for British colonial aggressions elsewhere. In January 1903 the British assembled troops at Zaria and launched an offensive against Kano which fell on February 9, 1903.³⁰⁸

306. M.M. Tukur, "The Imposition of British Colonial Domination on the Sokoto Caliphate, Borno and Neighbouring States 1897-1914..." p.17.

307. When Kwasau was first "removed" he was taken to Zungeru in the Wushishi area. However, in March 1903, Kwasau was officially deposed and exiled at Lokoja. F.D. Lugard on his return from the military offensive against Sokoto made a stop over at Zaria in April 1903; Lugard told the Zaria public about Kwasau's fate. See E.J. Arnett, op.cit., p.14; and C.W. Orr, "Zaria... Annual Report for 1904."

308. C.W. Orr, "Zaria ... Annual Report for 1904".

As a British military base Zaria played an important role in the attack on Sokoto which the colonialists defeated - after a fierce nationalist resistance in battle - on 15th March, 1903.³⁰⁹ It was also in that month that Aliyu dan Sidi, who was an outstanding protege of the invaders, was appointed Emir of Zaria.³¹⁰

Unlike Kwasau the rulers of Jema'a Daroro and Birnin Gwari did not stand up to confront the British. In March 1903 the British forces marched to Jema'a Daroro where the ruling elements simply made a formal submission of loyalty to the British without the slightest opposition.³¹¹ To the extent that the head of Jema'a lacked any measure of demonstration of nationalistic feelings, on the arrival of the British, he was recruited by them to serve the new colonial order. In October 1904 Jema'a Daroro was made an administrative division in Nassarawa Province and a military base of the WAFB was established there from where the British launched the war of invasion on Southern communities who stood up in nationalistic opposition to the imperialist encroachment.³¹²

309. A.H.M. Kirk-Greene (ed.), op.cit., p.43.

310. E.J. Arnett, op.cit., p.14.

311. W.M. Hyne, op.cit.

312. Ibid.

Rulers of vassal towns of Zazzau such as Kauru and Kajuru went over to the side of the British with no resistance. At one level it can be posited that they offered no opposition to the British after having learnt the lesson of the implication of such a move from what happened to Kwasau. But at another level - and more important - it seems to be the reality that the ruling classes of Kauru and Kajuru towns lacked a strong political and territorial base to contemplate embarking on such an uphill task of confronting the Europeans. From another angle it can be argued that for the fact that the British were very willing to leave them in their exploitative positions - although in new conditions - there was no basis for them to attempt a fight with the Europeans which meant putting everything to risk. Thus, the rulers of Kauru and Kajuru did not demonstrate any element of nationalism.

In the course of British invasion the Chiefdom of Birnin Gwari offered no resistance of any sort.³¹³ The ruler, Abubakar, became a profound loyalist of the foreign occupiers and was part of the invasion.

313. "Zaria ... Annual Report for 1931."

machine on other territories.³¹⁴ During the attack on Sokoto in March 1903 the Chief of Birnin Gwari rendered efficient service to the British which facilitated the military operation against the core of the Caliphate.³¹⁵ Abubakar's yeoman service to Lugard attracted for him a reward of the staff of office as a Second Class Chief.³¹⁶ In a nut-shell with the transformation which came in the wake of colonial invasion the Emirs, Chiefs, and other ruling forces - appointed by the British - in Zaria Province became part of the colonial arsenal to fight against nationalist uprisings.

Although the Southern politics were lacking in the kind of military might of Zazzau, the level of violence and massive destruction the British unleashed against them was immense. In fact, in dealing with these smaller groups and politics the British were equally or even more violent and destructive both in terms of human life

314. Abubakar became Chief of Birnin Gwari in 1897 (at the age of 38), in the pre-colonial days. He reigned for another 38 years. He died at the age of 76 in 1935. H.F. Backwell, "Zaria Province Annual Report for 1935," NAK: ZAR PROF No.2282.

315. "Zaria... Province Annual Report for 1931."

316. Ibid.

and property as compared with the Emirates.³¹⁷ But the fact was that the higher the level of nationalism of the people, in waging anti-colonial resistance, the more vicious and intense the violence of the colonizer in their aggression against them. Also, the early nationalist struggle which was more prolonged in Southern part of the area of study was not due to military might; precisely because their military capacity was a no match to that of the British.

Z.A. Bonat has argued that this long term resistance against the Europeans, in the Southern polities, was somehow due to the peoples having a "tradition" of fighting against Emirate expansionism or aggression.³¹⁸ All the same, it is more appropriate to look at the nature of the socio-economic and political systems, which determined the place and role of individuals in society, as explanatory. The high level of popular participation by the people in every aspect of life in the Southern communal societies contributed to the heroic efforts of the

317. M.M. Tukur, "The Imposition of British Colonial Domination on the Sokoto Caliphate, Borno and Neighbouring States 1897-1914..." p.153.

318. Z.A. Bonat, "Colonialism and the Underdevelopment of Zaria Province..." pp191-192.

peoples in the face of foreign occupation. It should be noted that with the declaration of Zaria Province in 1902 most of the communities in the South now became known as Southern Zaria, while the rest were included in the Jema'a Division of Nassarawa Province.

In the drive to entrench the colonial system in the now Southern Zaria the British carried out acts of aggression. The violent activities of the colonialists spurred nationalist reaction. In March 1903 the British clearly stated that they were embarking on a military operation in Southern Zaria because the Gadas, Bajju, and so on, were blocking roads, raiding caravans, and carrying murder of traders passing through their territories.³¹⁹ The colonial aggressors had to invent reasons to cover-up their imperialist designs. The resistance to the colonialists in those areas was already on course. Highway traders and travelers were considered as potential collaborators with aggressive circles, viewed with suspicion, and thus often violently attacked.³²⁰ The nationalist resistance was now taking

319. Letter from Acting High Commissioner Northern Nigeria to the Secretary of States for the colonies in London dated September 7, 1903, NAK: SNP 7 No.2148/1903.

320. Field-work interview with Ladi Saratu Kasam, op.cit.

a higher anti-Hausa character partly because they formed the bulk of traders on the trading routes coupled with the factor of the history of the slave raids.

When the British troops - led by Major Eustace Crawley and Resident Lobb of Zaria - launched an offensive on Sherier (on March 19, 1903) the people refused to give them a confrontation in battle. Instead, they applied a form of passive nationalist resistance of non-cooperation. The Chief of Sherier turned down meeting with the British Officers and was subsequently taken as a prisoner.³²¹ However, the people of Karigi engaged the British in physical combat. In the absence of co-ordination with neighbours the battle was lost to the invaders. The British captured about 40 youth as prisoners and transported them to Zaria where their labour was to be exploited in colonial projects.³²²

After the encounter at Karigi most of the communities to be attacked established an intelligence network to share information and monitor the advancement of the British and communicate this to their

321. Major Eustace Crawley, "Report on Military Operations in the South-East of Zaria", - Report on," NAK. SNP7 No.2148/1903.

322. Ibid.

neighbours. It became a feature of the nationalist opposition to the British. That was why when the forces of invasion arrived Gadas on 21st March, 1903 "the town was virtually deserted."³²³ Right before the British got there, the population had evacuated themselves to neighbouring Tudun Wada (in Kano Province) where they took refuge; this was a form of rejection to submit to the British. But the foreign aggressors were not content with occupying Gadas as a ghost-town. They pursued the people to Tudun Wada, placed it under siege, engaged in battle and finally crushed the opposition.³²⁴ Lere, which was a Hausa settlement, offered no resistance to the British.

When the Amo community faced the colonial invaders on 30th March, 1903 the people employed guerilla tactics. A group of youth was shouldered with the responsibility of picketing. While this was in place, the rest of the Amo forces were laying ambush along the road in waiting for the British to approach. But things did not go according to plan precisely because a British reconnoiter squad, led by Lieutenant Maud, uncovered the Amo ambush; and

323. Ibid.

324. Ibid.

thus the latter lost the element of surprise.

Realizing the fact that they could no longer startle the aggressor in battle, the Amo nationalist resistance went on a retreat to the town's hills where they took cover as well as ^{to} rally for the inevitable confrontation. Eventually a major battle ensued in which the colonial forces opened superior fire power using machine guns. They killed 5 of the resistance men, took 30 prisoners, and burnt the entire town; the Amo forces wounded 2 invading soldiers.³²⁵

In the Southern part of the province the elders of the various communities were at the head of the leadership; but they operated from behind the battle fields because the youth constituted the main military force. During hostilities with the British, women, the aged, and children, were withdrawn from the settlements and hidden deep in the bush. Such camps served as the supply bases; and the women cooked the meals for the fighting men from there. Those wounded in battle were quickly taken back to the camps to be treated by medicine men. Dead bodies recovered were given immediate burial. There was no regular army; by "tradition" every youth was a soldier having

325. Ibid.

been trained in the art of warfare and hunting. Command positions went to persons who had distinguished themselves in the communities as warriors; with outstanding records of being gallant in hunting, wrestling, and other previous armed conflicts. The religious priest, had fighting men taking oath before them; the latter swore to be loyal to their land and not to betray the people even in the face of death. The medicine men prepared herbs, charms, and amulets for the protection of the soldiers against enemy fire. In those communities it was also a taboo for anyone going for battle to sleep with a woman - and this was strictly forbidden - more so due to the belief that such act brought disastrous consequences for the people in battle.³²⁶

The people of Rukuba demonstrated a high level of nationalism in primary resistance. Their area was then placed in the South-eastern districts of Zaria. The British made hostile incursion into Rukuba in March 1903. The colonial aggressors inflicted a heavy casualty on the Rukuba people and burnt some towns. For their part the Rukuba forces wounded 27

326. Field-work interview with Ndung Mamman, op.cit.

invaders.³²⁷ Despite the destruction, the Rukuba nationalist resistance continued and culminated in a revolt in 1910 - as will be seen later in the analysis.

When the British invaders entered Zango Katab in early April 1903 there was no physical opposition and they departed without having to fire a shot. For M.M. Tukur the reason for this non-resistance was:

Having learnt of the fate of their neighbours, the people of the next town, Zango Katab, refused to invite a fight which was only too readily offered by these "visitors". Instead the people gave the British submissive treatment they demanded.³²⁸

Factors that led to non-resistance by the people of Zango Katab were complex. It is important to recall the situation and impact of the Kwasau attacks discussed earlier. With the annihilation of the leadership of the resistance in connection with slave raids the organizational capacity of the Atyab experienced a serious crack; it was at its lowest when the British troops got to Zango Katab in April 1903.

327. Major E. Crawley, op.cit.

328. M.M. Tukur, "The Imposition of British Colonial Domination on the Sokoto Caliphate, Borno and Neighbouring states 1897-1914..." p.161.

The Atyab people were not in a position of strenght to take on another enemy force in battle. However, another explanation by Audu Gwanzuwang is that the British were initially seen as some sorts of liberators who came to save the Atyab from aggression by Zazzau "Hausa rulers and their exploits."³²⁹ Visibly, the British were well in advance having the picture of the political situation at Zango Katab and did not fail to exploit the opportunity it provided to their own advantage.

The colonial invaders put out feelers to spread propaganda that they had come to put a stop to the slave raids in Atyabland. It has been said that the news of the overthrow of Kwasau travelled fast and was well received with jubilations among the people of Zango Katab.³³⁰ Partly, though, the British met no resistance because it was the case of an enemy's foe being seen as a friend. However, the British policies and new colonial conditions were to soon develop their own contradictions; and Zango Katab was to become one of the most explosive spot of anti-colonial nationalist struggles in Zaria Province.

329. Field-work interview with Audu Gwanzuwang, op.cit.

330. Ibid.

Bajjulang rose in nationalist armed resistance in response to the British colonial invasion of that homeland in April 1903. This primary resistance involved the eleven clans and was well co-ordinated. The clan elders and the youth mobilized the population in the various parts of the land. The Bajju put up a stiff opposition; and even the British military officer who led the attack admitted that Bajju "showed considerable resistance."³³¹ In the process the people's first defence line was at Kankada, near the spiritual capital of Dibyi. Reinforcement kept coming into Kankada from the villages to the "South of the main ridge on which stands the principal part of the town."³³² The British forces uncovered where the defenceless people were hiding and opened fire killing 25 people and wounding several. Kankada town was razed to the ground.³³³ Accounts of what happened there was received in other parts of Bajjulang. So, the people of the next town the invaders attacked, Madakiya, knew they could not successfully confront the British. Realizing this, before the aggressors arrived, the people of Madakiya

331. Major E. Crawley, op.cit.

332. Ibid.

333. Ibid.

removed some of their property from the town and withdrew from the settlement. Only a small squad was left which startled the European forces and quickly made a retreat in guerilla style; the now ghost town of Madakiya was burnt down. In Bajju towns such as Kachit, Gida Suro, and Fadia the population just simply evacuated. When the British troops arrived Zenkwa "most of the inhabitants had fled."³³⁴ But the primary resistance was to continue in Bajju area into the 1910s, in spite of the fact that over 45 people were killed and several wounded by the British in early April 1903.

Despite the colonizer occupation of Jema'a Daroro, and the establishment of a military garrison there, the colonialists were offered nationalist resistance by neighbouring polities such as the Agworok who never agreed to pay tax or to recognize foreign authorities. Both in Kagoro town and in other parts of Agworokland the people were opposed to both the British and the Hausa and viewed all of them as enemies. In the course of the "Tilde Expedition" of November 1904 the British discovered that the Agworok towns and villages were highly organized in their primary resistance against the colonizer. Agworok fighters were taking cover in

334. Ibid.

the hills and engaging in guerilla attacks on foreigners.³³⁵

In 1905 the British established a military base at Kachia. They advanced the reason that there was need to check highway robbers.³³⁶ But in reality their motive was to secure the control of the roads linking the province with other areas due to strategic importance. The resistance in ^{the}now Southern Zaria kept on launching attacks on the colonial forces and thereby denying them passage for the continuous onslaught to subdue the peoples. The military base at Kachia was to be put to use to suppress the upsurge of nationalist activities in a situation whereby the Southern peoples were undaunted in challenging the colonizer's drive to impose foreign domination. The Adara, Gbagyi, Bajju, and so on, subjected the convoys of colonial invaders to continuous nationalist armed attacks. In that first year of its existence (1905) the Kachia Military base was utilized by the British troops to launch an attack on Kuta (then in Zaria Province) - the most influential of the Gbagyi towns.³³⁷

335. M.M. Tukur, "The Imposition of British Colonial Domination on the Sokoto Caliphate, Borno and Neighbouring States 1897-1914..." p.163.

336. C.W. Orr, "Zaria... Annual Report for 1905."

337. Ibid.

It is important to touch on the fact that primary nationalist revolts were crushed with the assistance of the Emirs and Chiefs. In the service of the occupiers the colonial "traditional rulers" - in the interest of their overlords and themselves in a class alliance - were naturally opposed to the anti-colonial movement. Some of them did not even wait for the British to formally ask them to be part of the machinery to crush the nationalist resistance. In February 1906 the people of Satiru village (near Sokoto), using the Mahdist ideology, waged primary resistance against British colonialism. The Satiru nationalist revolt was fundamentally against British domination - including the exploitation, oppression, and suppression that were involved - and at a secondary level directed at the feudal aristocrats who were now representatives of the foreign occupiers. The leader of the Satirawa was Mallam Maikcho. Emir of Zaria, Aliyu dan Sidi, was quick to realize the threat of such a nationalist call to his position; and moreover that the popular uprising could spring up in Zaria and elsewhere.

Aliyu dan Sidi did a fine job for the British when he rallied all subordinate officials at Zaria and warned them that the so-called Mahdi was an

impostor and was not to be assisted in any way."³³⁸

The Emir went all out to clampdown on elements suspected of being sympathetic towards the resistance of the Satirawa (and their potential allies) in his domain. The ruler of Zaria - like the Emirs of Bauchi, Bida, and Kano - quickly sent cavalry forces to fight against the Satiru nationalists without even waiting for the British to order or demand such.³³⁹ In the process of the 1906 Satiru uprising the rulers of Zaria and elsewhere assisted the British by playing a crucial role in the massacre and total suppression of the Satirawa people. Sultan Muhammadu Attahiru pulled everything in his arsenal to "help the British in Sokoto."³⁴⁰ The aristocrats, now in the employed of the British, contributed in the total extermination of the population at Satiru.³⁴¹

Another feature on the early nationalist resistance was the refusal by communities to be assessed in connection with colonial taxation. In 1906

338. C.W. Orr, "Zaria... Annual Report for 1906."

339. Paul M. Lubeck, Islam and Urban Labour in Northern Nigeria: The Making of a Muslim Working Class, CUP, London, 1989, p.27.

340. A. Bello, op.cit., p.19.

341. P.M. Lubeck, op.cit., p.27.

E.J. Arnett who embarked on the duty of tax assessment in the Southern districts of the province met with all sorts of formidable opposition by the peasantry. The Adara waged a violent resistance to this; the British carried reprisals in an attempt to subdue them.³⁴² At another level the invaders kept on using the pretext of conflict between certain communities to launch military offensive with the objective to subjugate the peoples. In January 1909 the British exploited the long standing historical conflict over land ownership involving the Gure, Rumaya, and Anirango (Kahugu) as the basis to attack these communities. The British said that they were invited to intervene by the communities. Yet, when the British troops arrived the peoples, who supposedly invited them, had vacated their own towns and villages.³⁴³

There was widespread resentment of the British and their local allies in Srubu homeland. It was not possible to assess the Srubu; they insisted that they were free and owed no obligation to foreigners. On January 25, 1909 the Srubu were up in a fierce armed resistance in their confrontation with the

342. C.W. Orr, "Zaria Province Annual Report for 1906," NAK: ZAR PROF No.2553.

343. C.W. Orr, "Zaria... Annual Report for 1907."

invaders. Srubu main towns of Ktisel and Kusheka were centres of the nationalist resistance; and fighting youth were reinforced from the various Srubu towns and villages. In a strong primary resistance to defend their sovereignty, rights, and dignity, the people profoundly fought the colonizer - even though they lost over 20 men to the superior fire power of the enemy.³⁴⁴ Eventually the resistance strongholds of Ktisel and Kusheka were lost to the occupiers because of the lack of more durable basis to sustain further confrontation in battle coupled with superior enemy fire. Different segments of Srubu society dropped their weapons in surrender. A leading elder pledged loyalty to the British invaders and congratulated them for "coming to stop slavery."³⁴⁵ But this was very temporal as trouble was to break out in the area within a short time.

One interesting aspect of the early anti-colonial nationalist struggles in the Southern part was that whenever the British made in-roads into a place - thereby forcing the people to turn in - the colonialists often got the wrong impression that the determination of the peoples to pose opposition to the establishment of the colonial order had been broken. In reality

344. Ibid.

345. Ibid.

subsequent developments often proved that the ethnic groups submitted temporarily in the face of total annihilation as a tactical move. Quite in **contrast** with northern Zaria there were no the kinds of structures which the British took over, and transformed to suppress nationalist resistance, in the Southern section of the province. The resilient nature of the latter to the British was admitted by Resident J. Wither Gills in 1910 when he observed that there was no year passing without a military contingent having to be sent to carry operation against Southern communities.³⁴⁶ It was in 1903 that the colonial forces devastated the Rukuba - as earlier seen in the analysis - but in January 1910 the people stood up in nationalist struggle to oppose the British policy of taxation and labour conscription. This time, the colonialists killed many people and burnt the town of Rishini.³⁴⁷

On 1st July, 1907 a British officer, M.P. Porch, moved with some soldiers from the military garrison at Jema'a Daroro to the Fatsam capital town of Kafanchan and demanded for tribute. The Fantsam responded in a manner of defiance of the British as

^{346.} J. Withers Gill, "Zaria Province Annual Report for 1910", NAK: ZAR PROF No.2557.

^{347.} Ibid.

people moved out of the town - leaving only three Kafanchan elders to meet with the Europeans.³⁴⁸ The people refused to reply positively as regards the demand for tribute. But M.P. Porch went about applying force to collect monies and livestock. On July 9, 1907 the British officials went to Jigya on the Kagoro hills. However, the people of this Agworok village mandated their community elders to send a message to the intruders that they were not receiving them. The entire inhabitants of Jigya withdrew from their settlement and concealed themselves in the rocks.³⁴⁹ In neighbouring Tafa the people confronted the aggressors on the 12th and 14th July and were temporally beaten back. M.P. Porch ordered the burning of a house belonging to a village elder "as a punishment for their unprovoked attack."³⁵⁰

One important aspect of this early nationalist resistance was that the two Agworok villages of Tafa and Jigya were co-ordinating their anti-colonial activities. For on their way back from Tafa the British troops fell into an ambush by a group of

348. "Kagoro Tribe - Assistant Resident Porch's Treatment of", NAK: SNP 6 No.119/1907.

349. Ibid.

350. Ibid.

fighting men from the two villages. In the process one soldier on the side of the invaders was killed while Lieutenant Croft and 3 other soldiers were wounded.³⁵¹ At Tafa 16 of the resistance men were killed, several wounded, and 2 persons were missing in action with the invaders. In relation to Jigya 23 nationalist fighters were killed in the confrontation, many were left in critical state with wounds from enemy's bullets, and 2 persons could not be found. Despite this the two communities refused to surrender to the invaders; due to their nationalism against imposition of colonialism it was still not possible for the British to assess the people for tax.³⁵²

As a subsequent product of the July 1907 mass killings at Tafa and Jigya by the colonial aggressors, there was an upsurge in the Agworok hostilities directed at people passing through their area. They were now increasingly suspicious of "strangers"; most of it was centered on Hausa and Fulani elements. This was informed by the history of the slave raids in pre-colonial times. Coupled with this was the fact that African mercenary soldiers the British employed in the military campaigns directed at peoples

351. Ibid.

352. Ibid.

such as the Agworok were largely former slaves and they were mainly Hausa. It is in this context that the hatred and attacks on Hausa and Fulani in the Kagoro area can better be understood rather than in purely ethnic terms. On September 15, 1907 a Fulani man, passing by, became a victim of the attack when he was killed by the people of Agban and Chanji. This was shortly followed by another killing of a Hausa messenger and a police constable who were sent by British officials.³⁵³ The political situation in the Agworok villages could not be controlled by any force as nationalist revolts and activities were growing by the day. Due to the high level of primary nationalist resistance (as at mid-1907) a top British official suggested to the highest authorities in the Northern Protectorate that the Agworok should be left alone, in connection with the colonizer military actions, until a later date when a well organized offensive would be carried out with the objective of crushing the resistance and subjugating them.³⁵⁴ The colonialists stayed off the area - for over two years - up to the last month of 1909.

353. Ibid.

354. Ibid. See specifically M.S. 516/1907: Confidential Report from the Resident Nassarawa Province to the High Commissioner Northern Nigeria dated 28th October, 1907.

Between 1st December, 1909 and 3rd March, 1910 the Agworok, Takkad, Har, Numano, Ninzam, Mada, and Gwong communities (who were then placed in the Jema'a Division of Nassarawa Province) waged **nationalist** struggles in response to colonial offensive on them. On December 6, 1909 a column of colonial troops left Jema'a Laroro for Jigya with "the object if possible of surprising (the) enemy." The expected element of surprise turned out to be a botch; apparently the Agworok of Jigya had night guards observing strange movements and were able to sight the British troops well in advance.³⁵⁵

The response of the Jigya people was to hasten in putting a defence to pre-empt a quick victory which the occupiers anticipated. Majority of the population took cover in the hills. Whilst the invading forces were "continually losing the road", thereby dwindling more their chances of a surprise attack, sections of the Jigya resistance forces further ascended the hills. By the tactical calculation of the resistance, the main settlement was not a chosen terrain to engage the British soldiers in battle. Thus, there was only a slight fighting there. The fire came from concealed points in the vicinity of the town with

355. "Patrol Attakad, Kagoro, Ninzam and Mada - Report on", NAK: SNP 7 No.2931/1910.

the Jigya forces pouring or shooting arrows at the colonial troops; the Jigya nationalist fighters were also hitting the invaders badly from the rear.³⁵⁶

Significantly, to add more to the battle set-back of the British troops, the resistance turned bees (which were common on Kagoro hills) into war weapons. The resistance had robbed the anti-bee sting cream on their bodies; and this was something the foreign occupiers had no knowledge of. The Jigya nationalist fighters cracked beehives and the bees attacked the colonial soldiers in swarms, with many of the invaders being badly stung.³⁵⁷ Stones were also hurled down at the British troops who were totally in disarray. In all this the medical officer who had the task of responsibility of treating the wounded on the side of the imperialist aggressors, Dr. Costello, was himself "very badly stung with bees."³⁵⁸ Also, the transport carriers abandoned the medical loads. In this confrontation the British troops, with all the superiority of their weaponry, suffered a crushing defeat and had to retreat.³⁵⁹ It was only after

356. Ibid.

357. Ibid.

358. Ibid.

359. Ibid. Two invading soldiers wounded were Private Sambo Dori (no.3540) and Private Bello(no.3713).

operations elsewhere that they came back to Jigya to crush the resistance - and this was only really achieved in 1915.

On December 10, 1909 the colonialists launched a vicious attack which covered Takkadland. The British troops first camped at a place near Zankam. Obviously the Takkad knew fully well that an enemy attack was eminent. There was mobilization of fighting men and the population to put a defence at Zangum - in readiness to repel the impending advancement by the invaders. Subsequently, the ensued battle was ferocious; Takkad nationalist resistance lost 10 persons and Zangum was completely burnt.³⁶⁰ With the collapse of the Takkad defence line at Zangum the population of the capital town of Fada Attakad embarked on some sort of passive resistance by withdrawing from the settlement before the arrival of the occupiers on December 12, 1909. However, the Takkad nationalist resistance regrouped at Zabuna and engaged the British in physical combat but victory was quick for the invaders and the town was set ablaze.³⁶¹ Up to December 18, 1909 the colonial soldier carried out violent and destructive acts in Takkad territory. The people of Su left the village

360. Ibid.

361. Ibid.

and the invaders found no one. Attacha was razed to the ground even though "the town was found to be deserted."³⁶² In the Bajju towns of Madakiya and Marsa there was an upsurge in the rejection of the occupiers but this was crushed.

On December 23, 1909 a British officer arrogantly demanded a surrender from the people of Nok. Of course, for the fact that the people owed the Europeans nothing of any sort they refused to turn themselves in to the invaders who violated their territory. Such an action on the part of the colonialists did stir nationalist resentment against the occupiers; and the Ham of Nok gave them a fight with the main resistance force operating from the hills.³⁶³ The first day of the battle saw the resistance suffering heavy casualties with 16 men dead and several other wounded; despite this they remained irrepressible. The Nok resistance was regrouping and mobilizing for some reinforcement from other parts of Hamland. A high number of nationalist fighters was committed in battle in the most bitter physical hostilities that broke out on December 27, 1909. The resistance wounded a mercenary, Jibril Kano, fighting for the

362. Ibid.

363. Ibid.

British; but the aggressors inflicted heavy losses on the Nok resistance as they left 21 men killed.³⁶⁴

In the Ninzom and Mada areas the primary nationalist resistance to the imposition of colonialism was intense. This took a dramatic turn on February 2, 1910 when the defenders of the town of Gwanje, with some hiding on trees armed with bows and arrows, virtually encircled a convoy of invading forces on their territory and killed the entire 114 transport carriers. Two of the colonial soldiers were also killed and another two severely wounded.³⁶⁵ The British troops were forced to retreat.

Between 1910 and 1915 the colonizer put every military might into use in the attempt to break strongholds of the primary resistance. By the year the communities in Southern Zaria were becoming more and more exhausted in the military battles with the foreign occupiers. Years of massive destruction by the invaders and the effect of all these were severely telling on the various peoples.³⁶⁶ As evidence of the weakening resistance the colonialists were able

364. Ibid.

365. Ibid.

366. M.P. Porch, "Zaria Province Annual Report No.65 for 1914", NAK: ZAR PROF No.2561.

to collect taxes in some parts of Kagoro in 1914. However, all was not finished as the youth protested against what they perceived as a submission to the Europeans by some elders; this liveliest section of society intensified the heroic nationalist struggle more vigorously. Tension among the Agworok increased as the youth felt they were obliged to stand in defence of their homeland and its people against the foreigners then making headway to entrench the new exploitative order.³⁶⁷ Their indignation was fundamentally directed at the British; and at a secondary level at those Agworok elders who were seen as compromising the general interests of their society.³⁶⁸

In this connection the nationalist struggle and the hostility of the Agworok youth took various dimensions. In the mid-1914 the British were investigating about those involved in the shooting of an arrow which killed a Fulani herdsman. In the process the leader of Kokum co-operated; he made investigations and the findings led to two young men being suspected. While one of the accused Audu was arrested, the second by name Kulau escaped. The youth viewed the role of the Kokum elder, in the affair, as an act of collaboration. Crisis engulfed the community as the youth turned against

367. "Kagoro State of Lawlessness in 1914", NAK: ZAR HQF No.2084.

368. Ibid.

the elders and called them sell-outs to Europeans.³⁶⁹ Some sons even threatened to deal with parents who paid taxes or got involved in what they perceived as anti-people activities. The youth also denounced suspected traitors including those who gave information to the enemy leading to arrest of persons. In the course of the 1914 nationalist revolt the Agworok youth asserted their place in society than at any other time; and they were now more vigorous in fighting any attempt at infraction on their place and rights in society.³⁷⁰

On the 24th October, 1914 the Agworok youth of the village of Kpak attacked two police constable, Ibrahim Buzu and Degari Usuman. They were in charge of two prisoners - Adam and Bili - who were being moved from Kagoro to Moroa. The constables were assaulted by a party of Kpak youth in the presence of a colonial officer, G. Kirkpatrick, who the policemen accompanied. This took place "on the road and the prisoners (were) released."³⁷¹ The outright nationalist revolt all over Agworok area so much frightened the British precisely because it was really threatening to the type of situation they would want to prevail.

369. Ibid.

370. Ibid.

371. Ibid.

In relation to this G. Kirkpatrick reported that "Kagoro is altogether out of hand, and that traders and strangers - unless in large parties - should when possible be warned against sleeping there."³⁷² Apparently, the colonialists had no immediate solution as regards the situation because of the popular nature of the revolts; and this informed the time-lag of about two months before they could react.

On December 9, 1914 an Assistant Commissioner of Police, A.K. Richards, led a squad of 40 police to Kpak. They went under the guise of recapturing the now "liberated" two accused persons - but beyond it to subdue the resistance by the youth.³⁷³ The movement of the force was detected by a resistance reconnoitre team. As the British officials got a gist later, once the advancing forces were detected by the people of Kpak there was a snappy word of alarm; a fast tactical move was immediately made and the population withdrew from the settlement. But one of the youth accused of earlier setting free the two prisoners (Adam and Bili), Audu, hid within the village and was found and arrested. Based on the instructions given by higher British authorities, A.K. Richards maintained that there should

372. Ibid.

373. Ibid.

no room to even pretend to be parleying with the Agworok nationalists.³⁷⁴ Initially, the Police burnt 30 buildings. Later, the rest of the village was set ablaze and razed to the ground. On the whole 282 buildings, constituting the entire village of Kpak, were burnt.³⁷⁵

All this was followed with the demand by the colonizer for a complete submission. The people were forced to hand in their bows and arrows and were compelled to watch them being burnt. Also, they were forced to apologize to the British and their local Agworok representatives that there was not going to be any act of rebellion again. With this early Agworok nationalist resistance was broken - paving way for the establishment of the colonial order in total. By 1916 a colonial officer could comfortably state that the Agworok people now knew that "trained troops armed with rifles" were not a joking matter.³⁷⁶

According to W.M. Hyne the assessment tour of 1916 was carried out in Kagoro District with an escort of only 4 policemen and there was no fiasco of any sort.³⁷⁷

374. Ibid.

375. Ibid.

376. Ibid.

377. W.M. Hyne, op.cit.

A weapon used against the nationalist resistance in the area of study was the imposition of collective punitive measures on intransigent towns and villages. In it everyone was punished regardless of whether "guilty" or not. There was an enforcement of the Collective Punishment Proclamation to back, justify, and give legal backing to the suppression of the nationalist resistance; and to repress communities by imposing harsh measures that were capable of making it impossible for them not to succumb to British domination.³⁷⁸

In 1915 the colonialists exploited intra-communal conflict over land between the Bajju towns of Dibyi and Zonkwa to deal with the people. An escort of 25 policemen severely penalized the Dibyi community on the grounds of an alleged attack on Zonkwa; it was fined £15 sterling and the British collected the money.³⁷⁹ But no penny was given to the Zonkwa people. Also, as part of the punishment the Dibyi people were forced to produce 100 bows and arrows which were collected by the British.³⁸⁰ At that time too - that is, 1915 - some Rumaya and Ruruma villages opposed to colonial exploitation were charged with refusal to pay taxes

378. C.O. Migeod, op.cit.

379. Ibid.

380. Ibid.

and for failing to explain as to why the non-payment to the Emir of Zaria. A fine of £15 sterling was imposed and collected from the Rumaya whilst the Ruruma had to pay a £20 fine.³⁸¹

After the 1910 military offensive against the Mada, Numana, Ayu, and Ninzam, they way was somehow cleared for the Emir of Jema'a to enter these areas with a kind of "British licence" for extortion and exploits. In 1914 the Emir was met with a profound violent nationalist resistance by the Ninzam. They physically attacked the ruler, now imposed on them for the first time, and it almost resulted in serious consequences for the Emir himself; some members of his entourage were killed.³⁸²

In June 1915 a new Emir of Jema'a, who had just ascended to the throne went on an official tour to some Bajju towns and villages placed under his jurisdiction in company with about 120 men.³⁸³ The reason given by the Resident of Nassarawa was that the Emir - going by "native custom" - had to tour

381. Ibid.

382. See comments and clarification by Lt. Governor and SNP dated 5th July, 1915 and 9th August, 1915 in "Kaje and Keninkwon - Rising Against Emir of Jema'a - Attack on Emir and Kaje Patrol, 1916", NAK: ZAR PROF No.2089.

383. Ibid.

the districts within his area of jurisdiction on ascendancy to the throne so that the people would recognize his leadership.³⁸⁴ Giving an account on the objective of the June 1915 tour, the Emir said that it was meant to look into the maladministration of the Bajju district by a deceased District Head who had earlier been dismissed in May 1915.³⁸⁵ Beyond the two conflicting versions, there is no doubt that the Emir was on a mission to collect taxes and to force the people to pledge their loyalty.³⁸⁶

The activities of the new Emir of Jema'a in the Bajju or "Kaje District" were viewed in the same light as those of the British officials and their escort. Bajju nationalism of the time was opposed to this. So, when the Emir of Jema'a set-out on "tour" on June 15, 1915 the real purpose and meaning of it was obvious to the Bajju. On their way the Emir and his party were attacked at Kachit by Bajju nationalists. In the process 7 of the Emir's men were killed and 13 others were wounded.³⁸⁷ The next day (16th June, 1915) a British

384. "Nassarawa Province - Kaje Pagan District Attack on Emir of Jema'a and Following." NAK: SNP.10 No.31/Bp 1915.

385. Ibid.

386. Comments conveyed by SNP to Resident Nassarawa of August 9, 1915, in "Kaje and Kaminkwon - Rising Against Emir of Jema'a..."

387. Report from Resident Nassarawa dated August 26, 1915 to SNP Zungeru, in "Nassarawa Province - Kaje Pagan District..."

military force was despatched in reprisals for the attack.³⁸⁸ Seemingly, the people knew what the colonizer's response was to be, and were thus prepared. One significant aspect of the physical opposition to the British and the Joma's rulers was that the Bajju established an alliance with their Ninkwop neighbours. They both mobilized and got prepared to go up in arms in the event of a counter-attack by the colonialists. Bajju villages of Farman, Kachit, and Afana in league with Ninkwop villages of Baki Kogi, and Kaninkwop Abidoko were "determined on a joint resistance."³⁸⁹ When the colonial soldiers launched a counter-offensive the joint resistance refused to make any move of surrender. However, some Bajju villages - who were not part of the resistance - complained that they had suffered much devastation in the past and therefore took side with the colonial forces.³⁹⁰ In the course of the ferocious reprisals many of the resistance fighters were killed and the villages were - in their entirety - razed to the ground. According to Resident Sciortino of Nassarawa, the violent action against the Bajju and Ninkwop nationalists was justifiable on the basis that the people refused to "make submission and offered armed resistance."³⁹¹

388. Ibid.

389. Ibid.

390. Ibid.

391. Ibid.

They early nationalist resistance of the peoples cannot be adequately looked at without recognizing the fact that the African communities, and the masses of the people, were making it difficult for the institutionalization of the system which will create conditions for capitalist exploitation.³⁹² Partly, the primary nationalist resistance was defeated because of the technological superiority of the Europeans. However, in resisting the imposition of colonial domination the various peoples were facing the whole force of capitalism which was a dominant system in the world whilst the indigenous communities were at different and often contradictory levels of development.³⁹³ The British aggressors were also able to exploit the existing contradictions between the different polities and even within them. But the defeat of the early nationalist resistance only enabled the colonizer to create new conditions which began to bring out new contradictions; and it was to those ones that the colonized masses in Zaria Province stood up to in another phase of the nationalist movement.

392. A. Tomu and B. Swai, op.cit., p.31.

393. Bill Freund, op.cit., p.104.

CHAPTER TWO

CREATION OF STRUCTURES AND OPERATION OF THE COLONIAL SYSTEM

2.1 Introduction

With the victory of the British forces of colonial aggression, and the defeat of early nationalist resistance, the colonialists began to intensify the process of creating institutions and administrative structures necessary for the operation of the colonial system in Zaria Province. One aspect of the new situation was the transformation of some pre-colonial political and other institutions to serve the new order, which included the recruitment of some sections of the overthrown Emirate ruling class as officials of the colonial state. Also, colonialism brought about new relations between the various colonized nationalities. Both at the level of class and nationality the colonialists through their racist ideology, policies, and practices, further created differences between the peoples which led to new contradictions that affected the direction of the nationalist movement. Connected with the establishment of colonial structures and the operation of the system was the process of class formation; there was the emergence of new social forces. Only by a thorough grasp of the kind of structures

established and class formation can the nature and essence of colonialism be understood. The question of colonial education is of importance in relation to class formation, especially the emergence of the educated section of the petite bourgeoisie. Individuals who provided leadership in the later phase of the nationalist movement, at the stage of the rise of political parties and so on, were products of the colonial school system.

2.2 The Colonial State, The Establishment of Administrative Structures, and the Transformation of the Emirate Aristocracy

There was no time demarcation between the process of colonial invasion and the creation of colonial structures and institutions. Thus side-by-side with the British offensive against polities or communities was the setting up of administrative structures. One important thing was the centrality of the colonial state and its coercive organs (such as the military, the police, prisons, the bureaucracy, and the judiciary) which were meant to enable the colonizer hold sway both in the political and economy spheres.¹

1. Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, Bogle - L'ouverture, London, 1973, p.180.

In history, the entire structure of the state is formed and imposed from within a given society; and the rise of the state is linked with the development of contradictory classes in society.² Samora Machel - an African revolutionary nationalist - has emphasized that the state is not synonymous with "bureaucratic machinery of civil servants, nor something abstract or a mere technical apparatus."³ In reality the state is a concrete political organization through which the ruling class controls power and strengthens its dominance in the socio-economic spheres.⁴ At any point in time the state is not neutral because it continues to serve the interests of the ruling class which controls it; the state does not remain constant.

The colonial state was an instrument of the imperialist bourgeoisie and its allies for the domination, exploitation, suppression, and oppression, of the colonized people - especially the working people.⁵

2. V.I. Lenin, The State, Progress, Moscow, 1980, pp 1-20;

3. Samora Machel, "A State Born out of our People's Struggle," in Ben Turok (ed.), Revolutionary Thought in 20th Century, Zed Press, London, 1980, p.130.

4. I. Frolov (ed.), Dictionary of Philosophy, Progress, Moscow, 1980, p.19.

5. S. Machel, op.cit., p.130.

It was made of the various administrative structures, institutions and instruments of coercion such as the army, police, para-military forces, prisons, and courts (the judiciary). The colonial state exploited differences between sections of the colonized population; and created divisions among the people by pitting groups against one another - especially through the manipulation of primordial ideological and political differences.⁶

In colonial Zaria Province and elsewhere in Nigeria the ruling class was composed of the European military and police officers; bureaucrats and other political officers in the civil or public service; employers of labour in the mines, railway, and so on; managers and directors of capitalist firms or companies; person occupying strategic positions in other sectors of the economy; and the Emirs and Chiefs.⁷

With the formation of Zaria Province in 1902, the British were more concerned with establishing military barracks, courts, prisons, and so on.

Colonial courts were fundamentally instruments of

6. A. Temu and B. Swai, Historians and Africanist History: A Critique, Zed Press, London, 1981, p.36.

7. Zuwaqhu A. Bonat, "Colonialism and Underdevelopment of Zaria Province 1902-1945", M.A. Thesis, Department of History, ABU, Zaria, pp522-525; and Uyilawa Usuanlele, "State and Class in Benin Division: A History of Colonial Domination and Class Formation", M.A. Thesis, Department of History, ABU, Zaria, 1987, p.123.

coercion against the colonized; in reality they had nothing that was semblance of justice. This was for the fact that colonialism in all respects and essence was - or is - an anathema to justice. As at 1904 the provincial court known as the "Native Court" was mainly for arraignment of persons considered as being subversive to the colonial order; that is, dealing with nationalists who resisted the British. Out of 98 cases (the nature of the majority of the offences charged for not mentioned) 6 were found guilty on the ground of "highway robbery" whilst 15 were for offences committed against the "Protection of Native Proclamation."⁸ The latter was specifically reserved for nationalists.

The "Native Courts" - as instruments of keeping the colonized in check - were supposedly based on indigenous laws, customs, and reckoning with Islamic Jurisprudence. The "Native Court" was headed by an Alkali (learned Judge in Islamic Jurisprudence). However, the so-called Native Courts had not the kind of safeguards of the judicial system operated in metropolitan Britain. The colonialists simply took over the oppressive courts of the Emirate feudal aristocracy and transformed them into weapons of colonial

8. C.W. Orr, "Zaria Province Annual Report for 1904," NAK: ZAR PROF No.2551.

tyranny and jungle justice against the ordinary people. The Alkalai were even empowered to evoke provisions and impose punishment on say a whole village under the Collective Punishment Ordinance.⁹

However, in carrying out their duties in the "Native Courts" some Alkalai turned them into channels for siphoning funds and other forms of personal enrichment. Even by the standards the British set, there was a high level of corrupt practices in the courts. The dominant trend was that "fines and fees" recorded a rise when a new Alkali was installed, and during tour by British officials, but experienced sharp slump thereafter.¹⁰ In the "Native Courts" records were hardly properly kept. The poor performance of these courts was often met with retribution by the colonialists who set them. In 1912 the Alkali of Nasari, in Kudaru District, by name Balarabe, was removed from office due to malpractices. Also in Kudaru District, the Alkali of Damo was dismissed due to the same offence.¹¹ In relation to the widespread improbity, deeply rooted as a structural problem, Brice Smith observed thus in 1925:

9. E.H.B. Laing, "Zaria Province Annual Report for 12 Months Ending 31st December, 1925", NAK: ZAR PROF No.2572.

10. E.H.B. Laing, "Provincial Annual Report for 1924", NAK: ZAR PROF No.2571.

11. "Zaria Province Reassessment Report on Kudaru District 1922", NAK: ZAR PROF No.327/1922.

The Native Courts continue to lack a high standard of integrity. During the year the alkalai of Kan Giwa and Katab have been imprisoned for misconduct and those of Kagarko, Kubau and Lere have been warned as to their methods of procedure.¹²

The lower classes in the Zaria districts knew too well that neither the legal basis of the "Native courts" nor their operators were for truth or justice. As reported in 1922 those who appeared before the "Native Courts" often swore to false oaths on the Qur'an. Apparently this was not because of ignorance, as the British maintained, but due to the fact that the people were aware of the injustice and fraudulent acts coupled with the general moral decadence of the Alkalai in the supposedly Muslim courts.¹³ There was strong collaboration of the Alkalai and District Heads against the common folk; especially in cases involving a commoner and a member of the ruling circle or a relation. Of course, in theory persons not satisfied with verdicts of say a district Alkali court could appeal for further hearing at the highest Zaria "Native Court" of appeal. But the commoners never lost sight of the issue of class forces at work in such matters.

12. E.H.B. Laing, "Zaria Province Annual Report... 1925".

13. "Intelligence Reports (1922-29)", NAK: ZAR PROF No.C. 4032 Vol.I.

Therefore, in practice they hardly appealed,¹⁴ more so that the court of appeal was attached to the Emir's throne. Thea Buttner has argued convincingly that the aristocracy really strengthened its class position through the use of the "Native Courts."¹⁵ The courts had wide powers and it was partly through them that the grip on the peasantry, and other commoners, was maintained.

Only a tiny section of the African population in Zaria Province was exempted from the jurisdiction of the "Native Courts" - but in certain matters. The exemption included those working in the colonial civil service, European firms, and agents of companies; a reason advanced was that such Africans were not subjects of the Emir. They could only be put on trial in the Magistrate court, which was based on English Law, and a defence counsel could make appearance for them. But the non-jurisdiction of the "Native Courts" over such people was restricted to civil cases; if they got involved in criminal cases

14. F.F.W. Byng-Hall, "Zaria Province Annual Report 1920-21," NAK: ZAR PROF No.694/1920.

15. Thea Buttner, "Imperialist Colonial Policy, 'Indirect-rule' and the anticolonial struggle. The Satiru Rising of 1906 in Northern Nigeria", in The Journal asia, africa, latin america, Special Issue 2, Akademie, Verlag, Berlin, 1977, p.27.

the "Native courts" had powers over them.¹⁶ British and Europeans in general, and other foreigners, were not to be charged in the "Native courts". Overwhelming majority of Zaria people did not fall within the exempted categories. Thus, in the colonial courts expatriates had more legal protection than indigenous people.

The police force the British created had the objective to serve the interest of the colonizer. It was a real crude instrument created for the purpose of unleashing brutal and other acts of terror against the colonized; and to suppress any struggle by the people against capitalist exploitation and the nationalist resistance by the people. It was in the early 1930s that a government police force was strongly established in the province. Prior to that time the police force was really marginal or insignificant; the few policemen were confined to duties such as providing escort to officers on tour, giving security cover to top government officials and property - including transporting money, and occasionally relieving the military of certain duties such as quelling nationalist revolts.¹⁷

16. Arthur V. Dhliwayo, "A History of Sabon Gari Zaria, 1911-1950: A Study of Colonial Administration," Ph.D. Thesis, Department of History, ABU, Zaria, July 1986, p.200.

17. C.W. Orr, op.cit.

For the early decades of the colonial times the main force which executed the functions of the police was the dogarai force. Its historical roots are traced to the days of the Emirate system. Then, its members "were executioners, watchmen, and personal guards of the ruler."¹⁸ Until 1912 it was the dogarai who performed the entire police duty in Zaria Province.¹⁹ Whilst the Resident of Zaria confessed knowing "of no force of police who command the same respect as the Dogarai of the Hausa Emirates," the people knew them for their cruel and barbaric acts of terrorizing the population.²⁰ Zaria had more dogarai than any other province in Northern Nigeria. C.W. Orr attributed this to the concentration in Zaria of large number of people supplying forced labour in the various sectors of the colonial economy - especially construction.²¹ The dogarai were used in the conscription of forced labour and supervision at project sites and labour camps. In addition they remained terribly vicious in dealings with the peasantry more so when collecting taxes. Also, the dogarai unleashed terror on ordinary people at market places.²²

18. Ahmadu Bello, My Life, Gaskiya Corporation, Zaria, 1986, pp104-105.

19. E.H.B. Laing, "Zaria Province Annual Report No.50 for 1911", NAK: ZAR PROF No.622/1912.

20. Ibid; and C.W. Orr, "Zaria Province Annual Report for 1905", NAK: ZAR PROF No.2552.

21. C.W. Orr, "Zaria... Annual Report for 1905".

22. George Ormsby, "Zaria Province Annual Report for 1909", NAK: ZAR PROF No.2556.

When the colonialists formed the Yandoka (N.A. Police) in the late 1920s, it was from among the dogarai that the "best ones were taken out" and converted. By the "best ones", in a deeper sense, meant the most brutal elements among them. They were given some training "in ordinary modern police methods" by British Police officers.²³ One aspect of the transformation was that in the pre-colonial times the dogarai force was drawn from slave elements; but when the scheme for training N.A. police officers was introduced in 1929 those picked were either scions of the aristocracy or related to it. The first two selected as N.A. Police officer cadets were Muhammad Lawal - son of then reigning Emir of Zaria Ibrahim and a grandson of Kwasau - and the Commander of the dogarai force. After the course at Kaduna Muhammad Lawal was to be appointed as the commander of the Zaria N.A. Police (the Yandoka) whilst the Commander of the dogarai was to go back on his job being more trained and equipped to handle his men.²⁴ Thus, the top hierarchy of the forces of coercion was a domain in which African Officers were mainly drawn from members of the aristocracy.

The Zaria N.A., as an administrative structure, was an appendage of the provincial administration, and

23. A. Bello, op.cit., p.105.

24. C.A. Woodhouse, "Annual Report 1929", NAK: ZAR PROF No.1783.

thus part of the colonial government. The N.A. officials such as the Emir and principal officers were subordinated to British officials; the former served as a buffer between the colonialists and the masses of the colonized. The aristocrats at the head of the N.A. had no power or authority over the lowest British official. Instead, they were accountable to, and supervised by, the British administrative officers. On the other hand the colonized peasantry, artisans, petty traders, workers, and other lower strata or classes, were placed at the mercy of the N.A. aristocrats. The Zaria N.A., which was headed by the Emir, was composed of districts which were further divided into village areas. The latter were further broken into smaller units of wards and hamlets. The Emir, members of the "Emirate Council", District Heads,²⁵ and other officials received salaries for working as servants of the colonial occupiers.²⁶

25. Before 1913 the District Heads were not paid a fixed salary. Rather, 20 to 25 percent of tax collected went to them. This meant that it was most likely that people were somehow squeezed more hard for tax by District Heads in order to earn more pay. E.J. Arnett, Gazetter of Zaria Province, Waterlow and Sons, London, 1920, p.22.

26. "The following are the Principal Office holders of the Zaria Native Administration with their salaries paid out of Native Administration Funds. Emir £2,000, Personal to present holder £400, Waziri £400, Majindadi £72, Liman Juma £84, Alkalin Zaria £240, Ma'aji £120, Head Teacher £60, Arabic Teacher £60. The 27 District Chiefs varying from £100 to £400 per annum." Ibid., p.7.

It was in 1904 that Resident C.W. Orr first mentioned about the creation of districts in the province; as at then Emir Aliyu dan Sidi viewed the scheme with scepticism for fear that it would reduce his powers. On this the British assured the Emir that the District Heads will be subordinated to the Zaria ruler. Seemingly, Aliyu knew the limits to which he could express opposition to the British policy; and so the Emir endorsed the plan. The Emir was instructed to work hand-in-hand with E.J. Arnett on the details. At first 32 districts were created in April 1907.²⁷ Subsequently, there was continuous adjustment in terms of their number and boundaries. The various District Heads were appointed from selected members of the different Zaria ruling dynasties. But for Kajuru, Kauru, Kagarko, Lere, and Chawai districts, they were picked from local Hausa dominant circles.²⁸ With the creation of the Emir's Council in 1912, the Emir's superiority of authority or power over District Heads was strengthened. The Emir's Council was composed of the Emir himself; the Waziri (a sort of Prime Minister); the Ma'aji (treasurer); and the Madawaki (head of Zaria town).²⁹

27. C.W. Orr, "Zaria Province Annual Report for 1907," NAK: ZAR PROF No.2554.

28. A.D. Yahaya, The Native Authority System in Northern Nigeria 1950-70: A Study in Political Relations with Particular Reference to Zaria Native Authority, ABU Press Zaria, 1980, p.15.

29. J.M. Fremantle, "Zaria Province Annual Report No.60 for 1913", NAK: ZAR PROF No.2560.

Among the new changes in colonial conditions was that District Heads were now to shift from the capital at Zaria, where their predecessors the fief holders stayed in pre-colonial days, to reside in the district headquarters and run local affairs from there.³⁰ For the ruling elements of Kaura, Lere, Kajuru, Chawai, and Kagarko, their powers were now extended to cover the various communities which they never lorded over before the arrival of the British. The District Heads moved to northern Zaria districts in 1907; this was not easy in the context of Southern Zaria because of the peoples' resistance against the British and the Hausa rulers. In the latter the District Heads could not operate beyond the principal Hausa settlements which were made the district capitals. As at 1907 the new District Head of Kachia was not able to operate among the Adara, Ham, and other ethnic groups in the area.³¹

The new district system gave Hausa-Fulani officials powers to recruit persons among the Southern

30. M.M. Tukur, "The Imposition of British Colonial Domination on the Sokoto Caliphate, Borno and Neighbouring States 1897-1914: A Re-interpretation of the Colonial Sources", Ph.D. Thesis, Department of History, ABU, Zaria, 1979, p.362.

31. C.W. Orr, "Zaria... Annual Report for 1907."

Zaria ethnic groups to subordinate positions such as village Heads. F.D. Lugard's proposal in relation to Animist groups was that individuals with "leadership potentials" be recruited and groomed as chiefs or be placed in lower positions as representatives of the colonialists.³² Those picked in Southern Zaria were largely agents of Hausa merchants who had already started taking titles from the Hausa in the late 19th century, local spies for feudal slave raiders, and those who had acquired some private property. In places such as Moroa, Kagoro, and Kwoi (initially placed in Jema'a Division of Nassarawa Province) which had no Hausa settlements and population - which could be used to advanced the argument ~~for~~ Caliphate conquest in its days - leading elements were appointed by the British and Chieftoms were created for the first time. A chief for the entire Agworok people was created by the British and Fadan Kagoro became the seat of power. According to Billy J. Dudley the appointment of a single Chieftancy for the Agworok ethnic group led to conflict in society.³³ That was why for over a decade the Agwam Agworok (Chief of Kagoro) could not collect

32. Lord Lugard, Political Memoranda, Frank Cass, London, 1970, p.11.

33. Billy J. Dudley, Parties and Politics in Northern Nigeria, Frank Cass, London, 1968, p.13.

taxes nor bring the various Agworok villages and clans under his control. Agworok nationalists fought against this British imposition - as shown in previous analysis.

In 1911 the Resident of Zaria, E.H.B. Laing, stated that for the District Heads to continue to hold office depended on unshaky allegiance to the colonial order, good performance as required by the office, and their ability and integrity.³⁴ The duties of N.A. officials - from Emirs to village Heads - included the conscription of force labour; supervision of labour in railway and other construction; assessment and collection of taxes; head count of people in the districts; ensuring market and road construction; commandeering food stuffs from peasants to meet the requirement of labour camps; maintenance of law and order; and keeping surveillance over the movement of strangers in their areas of jurisdictions.³⁵ The roles of the leading local representatives of colonialism brought out certain contradictions.

According to M.M. Tukur those N.A. Officials who executed duties more effectively - in the judgement of the colonialists - were obviously more unpopular with the ordinary folk. On the other hand demonstration

34. E.H.B. Laing, "Zaria Province Annual Report...1911".

35. C.W. Orr, "Zaria... Annual Report for 1907"; A. Bello, op.cit., p.41; and "Intelligence Reports (1922-29)..."

of attitude of sympathy for the peasantry and so on - and therefore being less harsh on them - attracted the wrath of the colonialists.³⁶ The more purposeful Emirs, Chiefs, District Heads, and so on, were in pursuance of the objectives of colonial exploitation the more harsh they were on the colonized people. But the more credit or reward they got from the British, due to positive performance of duty, the more the colonized masses viewed or confronted them with hostilities. In 1925 a newly appointed District Head of Lere, Umaru, who a British officer described as "somewhat harsh to the poor" (especially in relation to the collection of taxes) was seen as a good leader by the higher authorities but remained unpopular with the peasantry.³⁷

In the process of rendering service to the British the colonized aristocrats, in typical mercenary like manner, pursued their own class interests. They worked for the colonizer as paid hirelings and side-by-side exploiting the people and accumulating wealth for themselves. In March 1921 the Resident of Zaria, F.F.W. Byng-Hall admitted that in reality some of the feudal

36. M.M. Tukur, op.cit., pp368-369.

37. "Lere District Notes on (1932-34)", NAK: ZAR PROF No.907.

aristocrats still owned slaves and were still engaged in slave trade dealings; and this was in contravention of the "Slavery Ordinance" which they and their British masters had the responsibility to enforce on society.³⁸ The colonialists knew what was actually going on but allowed it to continue, and often pretended not to be aware. There were even instances of the aristocrats using personal slaves as terrorist gangs for criminal activities such as robbery; the former provided the thieves with cover or protection and benefited from the criminal activities.³⁹

The relationship between the British in Zaria and Emir Aliyu dan Sidi was one full of suspicion on both sides. Certainly, the colonialists reckoned with Aliyu's organizational ability, but were never at ease with his manipulation.⁴⁰ The Emir put those skills in carrying out his duties effectively; but behind the scene Aliyu dan Sidi carefully did everything to wield a great deal of power for himself beyond what the colonizer empowered him. As the ruler of Zaria N.A. Aliyu used subterranean tactics in the execution of administrative duties; he relied on a secret network

38. F.F.W. Byng-Hall, op.cit.

39. Ibid.

40. M.M. Tukur, op.cit., pp 368-369.

of slaves and Jakadu rather than on the District Heads.⁴¹ Among the latter only his own men were trusted and taken into confidence. In other words the Emir of Zaria undermined official channels in his domain.

Together with the District Head of Makarfi the Emir still kept slaves and continued to be involved in slave business.⁴² Aliyu dan Sidi diverted part of the labour force, drafted for forced labour camps, to work on his own private farms. However, in spite of the British blaming the Emir on this point, what Aliyu dan Sidi did was a practice encouraged by the British themselves to "teach" the peasantry how to submit to those in authority. The British also began to charge that the Emir and some principal N.A. Officials expropriated certain farmlands owned by peasants.⁴³ In 1920 Resident F.F. Byng-Hall noted:

On a minor scale his District heads and village heads followed in his footsteps and Native Administration of the country was reduced to such a condition that the life of the peasants became unbearable.⁴⁴

41. F.F.W. Byng-Hall, op.cit.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid.

In reality the British were now the principal enslavers of the Zaria peasantry and, so, any claim or talk by them about concern for the harsh conditions of the peasants could not have been genuine. The fact of the matter was that the colonialists were partly faced with a "wise" Emir who used them to consolidate his interests, but who in the process created an extreme situation of crude and rockless oppression of the peasantry which had potentials of sparking mass anti-colonial revolts that could put the colonizer's interests in serious jeopardy.

In 1920 the Zaria Provincial authorities supposedly suddenly realized and began to admit to the charge that the aristocrats were still retaining a form of labour conscription, of the Emirate times, on the basis of which peasants were drafted to produce on their private farms.⁴⁵ It was said that Emir Aliyu dan Sidi dispossessed peasants of a fadama (fertile and alluvial land) belonging to 24 different persons at Likoro. Furthermore, the Emir was accused of having engaged 550 forced labourers in 1919 and 300

45. Letter from Resident of Zaria to W.R. Miller dated April 29, 1920, in "Forced Labour and Gayya (1920-22)", NAK: ZAR, PROF No.C.4003.

others in 1920 to work on the fadama.⁴⁶ The British also stated that it had been established that the Emir was harbouring thieves who stored stolen goods for him; and that a younger son of the Emir, by name Aminu (popular called by the pet name Anini) had taken to stealing and this was even directed at ordinary folk living close to the palace.⁴⁷

As from 1920 Dr. W.R. Miller of the C.M.S. - whose Missionary enterprise and functions were viewed with much distrust and antagonized by Emir Aliyu dan Sidi - embarked on a purity crusade of exposing what he saw as illegal, corrupt, immoral, and clandestine oppressive activities of the Emir of Zaria to the highest authorities in the land. For Dr. W.R. Miller the problem was simply that of misrule by the Emir; the blame went to Aliyu dan Sidi in isolation from the British who employed him and for whom he worked. In reality colonialism was the bedrock of the bane of the Zaria peasantry; right from the Emir's misrule to the domination, exploitation, oppression, and other

46. W.R. Miller Communication with Resident of Zaria of 2nd May, 1920 and 10th May, 1920, in "Forced Labour and Gayya...."

47. See from Resident Zaria to W.R. Miller dated April 29, 1920, in "Forced Labour and Gayya...."

harsh realities or conditions, were located in the British system of enslavement of the colonized. Miller made himself "a friend" of the oppressed peasantry not at the level of their anti-colonial struggles but rather by calling on the British to put an end to the abuse of power or misrule by Emir Aliyu dan Sidi. Essentially, W.R. Miller was a supporter of colonialism because he did not see the British as the main problem of society.⁴⁸

When things got to a high-pitch the British authorities put every blame on Emir of Zaria Aliyu dan Sidi who they sacrificed to maintain the survival of the tyrannical colonial order. In no concrete way was Aliyu dan Sidi a nationalist; he stood by the British and fought against early Zaria nationalists. His tenure was full of exploitation, oppression, and dehumanization of the dominated classes. Furthermore, right from the arrival of the British in Zaria, and during his rule as Emir, Aliyu dan Sidi demonstrated loyalty to the foreign occupiers who kept on showering praises on him as a hard working and a dedicated

48. See the entire exchanges between the Resident of Zaria and W.R. Miller - especially the latter's, in "Forced Labour and Gayya..."

ruler⁴⁹ - until when he became a burden they could no longer afford to get along with. Aliyu dan Sidi was dethroned on 5th February, 1921; after the deposition of the Emir he was exiled at Lokoja where he later died in 1926.⁵⁰ When Aliyu dan Sidi was removed in 1921, Dalhatu was appointed; but Dalhatu's reign was short for he died on October 24, 1924. With this, the British made a swing to the Bornuan or Barebari dynasty and appointed Ibrahim (son of the last ruler of the Emirate, Kwasau) as the new Emir.⁵¹

Right from the time of their appointments, and in the process of carrying out British duties and instructions in earnest, some of the District Heads got involved in acts of abuse of office as spelt-out by their colonial masters. Of course, there were some cover-ups whilst some were never uncovered. The high level of fraudulent deeds is an indicator to how the colonized masses who produced the wealth were exploited. In 1915 the District Head of Soba, Saïdu - the oldest son of Emir Aliyu dan Sidi - was

49. The various Zaria Provincial Annual Reports from 1904-1920 are full of praises for Emir Aliyu by British political officers.

50. F.F.W. Byng-Hall, op.cit., and "Zaria Province Annual Report No.83 for the 12 Months ending 31st December, 1926", NAK: ZAR PROF No.2573.

51. E.H.B. Laing, "Provincial Annual...1924"

found guilty of having embezzled £587.⁵² This amount was over half of the Jangali (cattle tax) gathered from Soba nomads. The District Head was, subsequently, removed from office.⁵³ On January 1, 1931 the District Head of Chawai was dismissed, plus a sentence of 4 months imprisonment, on the basis of misappropriation of £77 from Jangali collection.⁵⁴ In 1925 the District Head of Lere, Haliru, embezzled an unspecified amount of money "provided for the construction of the Jos-Rigachikun Road" and was forced to resign.⁵⁵ In Kudara District the District Head misappropriated the sum of £200 "sent to him to pay for labour employed in building a new headquarters of the District" in 1931. Apart from being sacked from holding office he was sentenced to jail for one year.⁵⁶

The issue of corruption also had another dimension - which is the abuse of moral and cultural values by some aristocrats. In 1931 the provincial authorities stated that the District Head of Zango Aya,

52. E.J. Arnett, op.cit., p.35.

53. Ibid.

54. "Chawai District Administration (1931-32)", NAK: ZAR PROF No.290.

55. "Lere District Notes on (1932-34)..."

56. Report of March 13, 1931, in "Intelligence Reports Zaria (1929-32)", NAK: ZAR PROF No.C.4032 Vol.II.

a son of reigning Emir Ibrahim, was harbouring a gang of thieves at the head of which was his servant. When the man was arrested the District Head threatened "a member of the Native court warning him that his servants were above the law and he was an Emir's son." He stopped the servant from being charged in court and ordered a dogari to release the man.⁵⁷ In fact the British authorities even traced the protection and the refuge the thieves got at Zango Lya to the time Emir Ibrahim was District Head there (before 1924).⁵⁸ In 1932 an allegation of seduction was made against the Emir; he denied it before the Resident but confessed to sending gifts to some married women. The Emir was warned to desist from such and the Resident still reported to higher authorities that the Emir "had a bad reputation as a seducer of married women."⁵⁹ But such moral decadence by some aristocrats, in defiance or violation of basic morality of society which the rulers expected from the commoners, was a common practice in Northern Nigeria.⁶⁰

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid.

59. Ibid.

60. Lawan Danbazau says: "In those dark days, a district head would undertake a tour of selected villages during which he would lodge at the house of influential villagers. They would eat up their chicken, roast their livestock and cook their grains throughout their entire stay and in several cases make love to the women they found in such houses." See interview with Lawan Dabazau, in the Magazine African Concord, Vol.2 No.27, 03, October, 1988, pp 23-24.

Political intrigues in the context of both intra and inter dynastic rivalries in the Zaria ruling circles did at times culminate in either the downfall or public disgrace of some elements. Often, it took various dimensions such as mistrust among N.A. officials at all levels. In 1931 the provincial authorities reported that Emir Ibrahim "no longer consult his council but there is a secret council which meets at night consisting of dismissed officials."⁶¹ Right from 1922 (in the wake of Aliyu's fall) disunity, all sorts of intrigues, and rumour mongering, were common place among leading figures in the Zaria N.A. Many things were done to frustrate and intimidate Aliyu's loyalists; but some Aliyu's proteges were not prepared to obey or make things smooth for Dalhatu's leadership. There were occasions when "messengers had to be sent to District Heads before Emir's call was answered."⁶² This situation posed a threat to N.A. affairs and thus the British had to work out a compromise which included protecting the positions of some of Aliyu's loyalists.

61. Report of March 13, 1931, in "Intelligence Reports Zaria (1929-32)..."

62. E.H.B. Laing, "Zaria Provincial Annual Report No.79 for 1922", NAK: ZAR PROCF No.2569.

Some N.A. officials fell-out due to inter-dynastic conflicts. Emir Aliyu dan Sidi never trusted the District Heads of Kajuru, Kauru, Chawai, Kagarko, and Lero, who were recruited from the local Hausa population and thus not from the ruling dynasties of Zaria town. These District Heads were often portrayed by Zaria as full of maladministration, inept leadership, and lacking skills to handle the Southern Animist peoples. Just on the eve of his being thrown out, Emir Aliyu dan Sidi removed the District Head of Kajuru. Abdul was deposed on the alleged grounds of corruption, murder, and misrule, despite the fact that the higher authorities failed to establish the authenticity of the charges.⁶³

Overall the analytical thrust in this section has been to look at the process of imposition of colonialism in terms of the coercive arms of the state, and the new roles assigned to the feudal aristocrats. Thus, British colonialism produced a class which stood in sharp contrast with the working people.

63. Y. Kirkpatrick, "Kajuru District Administrative Affairs (1921)", NAK: ZAR PROF No.59/1921.

2.3 Genesis of the Nationality Problem

An analysis of the new relations brought about between the peoples, and within them, by colonialism is very important. Partly, the contradictions that emerged both within and between ethnic groups or nationalities influenced the direction of the various nationalist forces. However, an analysis of the nationality problem that is not premised on a perspective of class struggle will not be able to unearth the unequal relations between peoples, and will thus be unscientific and unprogressive.⁶⁴

Certain ideological perceptions informed British administrative policies towards the peoples. A racist ideology was employed by the colonizer in assessing the so-called different levels of civilization of the various linguistic and cultural groups. Y. Turaki has argued that whilst the colonialists viewed the Fulani ruling forces as being inferior to Europeans, they considered them as being superior to the so-called

64. B. Swai, "Towards an Explanation of the Under-development of Zuru History", Paper Presented to the Third Workshop on the History of Zuru Emirate, sponsored by Zuru Emirate Development Society, held at the University of Sukoto from 21st to 22nd December, 1987.

pure negroid.⁶⁵ But this kind of perception pre-dates colonialism. As the analysis by Y.B. Usman has shown, in the 19th century Heinrich Barth advanced that the Fulani rulers of the Emirates (in the Sokoto Caliphate) were higher species than other ethnic groups - except that they suffered racial contamination because of mixture of blood (through intermarriages) with inferior people such as the Hausa.⁶⁶

When the colonialists formed Zaria Province they began to depict the Hausa-Fulani rulers as the most ingenious, intelligent, cultured, and politically sophisticated. The Animist groups were also placed in categories, with some defined as being more backward than others. According to J.M. Fremantle, in 1913, the "Rukubas who inhabit the hills east of Piti are the most raw of all."⁶⁷ Differences were drawn even within linguistic groups. Hausa Animists,

65. Yusufu Turaki, "Social-Political Role and Status of Non-Muslim Groups of Northern Nigeria: Analysis of a Colonial Legacy", Ph.D. Thesis, Boston University, 1982, p.197.

66. Yusufu Bala Usman, "The Assessment of Primary Sources: Heinrich Barth in Katsina, 1851-1854", Seminar Paper, Department of History, A B U , Zaria, April, 1977.

67. J.M. Fremantle, op.cit.

the Maguzawa, were seen as being inferior to the Hausa Muslims.⁶⁸ But even this was extended to the local ruling circles. Those of the pre-jihad Hausa background (Habe) were said to be less intelligent in administrative matters than Hausa-Fulani rulers.⁶⁹ But the interesting thing was that anyone or group that opposed the British, whatever their origin, were presented as primitive. F.D. Lugard defined the Mahdist as fanatics, and savages, who were full of pagan superstition, inspite of the fact that they were Muslims and some of them Fulani.⁷⁰

The genesis of the nationality problem has to be traced to the establishment of colonial structures. It was in 1907-1908 that the British introduced the N.A. system in Zaria Province.⁷¹ Three forms of local authority were introduced. The first arrangement was one in which the British appointed feudal aristocrats that were also Muslims to lord over predominantly Muslim population.⁷² This was the kind of administrative measure implomented in northern Zaria districts.

68. Ibid.

69. Y. Kirkpatrick, op.cit.

70. Lord Lugard, op.cit., p.137

71. "Administrative Policy (1921-35)", NAK: ZAR PROF No.1554 Volume I.

72. Ibid.

The Hausa-Fulani aristocrats were of the same ethno-cultural background as most of the population; contradictions in those northern districts were mainly class and thus less complex. In the second instance Muslims who were also of Hausa-Fulani origin were imposed as District Heads and other main N.A. positions on Animist population that was also non-Hausa - and thus of a different culture from the rulers. This was the sort of administrative arrangement for the Southern Districts of Zaria N.A.⁷³ In that context only at the village and hamlet levels were the Animists appointed and completely subordinated to Hausa-Fulani rulers. But even there only Hausa Muslims were appointed as village Heads to be in charge of Hausa settlements. Thus in Southern Districts of Zaria N.A. the class question was closely linked with that of nationality making things more complex. Third, was the set-up in which Animist Chiefs were picked from the Animist communities; the Chiefs were also of the same ethnic groups as the people they did lord over. This was what the colonizer effected in relation to the 3 chiefdoms of Jaba, Kagoro and Moroa (transferred to Zaria Province in 1934). But their rulers did not have the degree of powers enjoyed

73. Ibid.

by the Emir of Zaria; in matters of finance, recruitment of staff, and provision of services, these chiefdoms were subordinated to Zaria N.A. which determined things.⁷⁴

In the urban areas such as Zaria the colonizer introduced segregation between the people. Those non-indigenous to Zaria, the so-called non-natives, were separated to live at Sabon Gari. In 1913 Emir Aliyu dan Sidi went ahead "to transfer to Sabon Gari all non-natives that had begun to be domicile in Zaria town..."⁷⁵ In the words of M.M. Tukur the colonizer did everything "to keep the communities apart physically, culturally and psychologically."⁷⁶ Igbo, Yoruba, Idoma, and so on, were isolated from the Hausa population of Zaria. Those Hausa not of Zaria origin were also affected as they were confined to Tudun Wada area of Zaria and Sabon Gari. This was a kind of device to ensure the silent policy and tactics of divide-and-rule by the colonialists.

Looking at things critically it can be argued that the fact that all key officials in the Southern

74. D.M.H. Beck, "Zaria Province Annual Report for 1934", NAK: ZAR PROF No.2152.

75. J.M. Fremantle, op.cit.

76. M.M. Tukur, "The Nature, Extent and Essence of British Policy in the Emirates 1900-1914", Post-Graduate Seminar Paper, Department of History, ABU, Zaria, 26th January, 1980.

districts of Zaria N.A. were Hausa elements somehow created the impression, in some quarters, that the ethnic minorities experienced "Hausa colonialism" whilst the British only played the role of mediators.⁷⁷ This false perception has to do with an empiricist understanding of the form British colonial domination took in the peculiarities or specifics of those districts. In terms of physical presence, the European officials were for decades not based in the southern districts of Zaria except while on tour. But British propaganda and stratagem also influenced this; whenever a crisis erupted the British told the peoples that there were mediators and that final decision was with the Emir and the N.A. As from the late 1930s most Southern Zaria nationalists swallowed this line and they began to appeal to the British officials to intervene between them and the Hausa-Fulani feudalists who they perceived as the main colonialists, oppressors, and enemies.⁷⁸ However, since the N.A. structure was dominated by Hausa officials it was quite logical that they became

77. Some of them insisted that it was the British who often "intervened" to "liberate" them from the tight-grip of the Hausa. This view was strongly expressed during field-work interview with Tonak Dabo, activist of Atiyab anti-colonial struggle of 1946, trader, politician, age about 70, at unguwar Wakili, on May 15, 1987.

78. See, for example, "Usman Sokop Kaje: Petition by (1940-49) Kaje Tribe - Petition by", NAK: ZAR PROF No.3465.

the principal targets of attack in the anti-colonial struggles; for Hausa-Fulani dominating elements were the main representatives of the colonial state in the domination, exploitation, oppression, and suppression of the peasantry and the ethnic minorities.

In the Southern districts of Zango Katab, Kachia, Chikun, Kajuru, Kagarko, Lere, Chawai, and Kaura N.A. officials - such as District Heads; Alkalai; scribes and other staff at the district headquarters; main tax collectors; prison warders; road overseers; dispensers; sanitary officers; ^{en} veterinary officers; forestry officers; agriculture officers; education officers; Yandoka; Jakadu; court clerks and scribes; district messengers; dogarai; toll collectors at market places; headmen in labour camps; and servants of district officials - were all (up to the late 1940s) people of Hausa nationality and were mainly Muslim by religion.⁷⁹

In 1929 a British official, Drummond Hay, noted that for the entire Lere District there was no single district official or employee in any department

79. J.A. Reynold, "Kaje Tribe Report on (1950-51)", NAK: ZAR PROF No.4846.

of the N.A. elsewhere in the province who was of either Bukurmi, Gure, or Kahugu background.⁸⁰ With this order of things in all Southern districts of Zaria N.A. the Animist and non-Hausa peasantry - and the tiny Christianized elite - waged struggles against colonialism that took anti-Hausa character. That is, with the major auxiliaries of colonialism being Hausa every instrument of coercion, oppression, repression - and all sorts of colonial bane - came to be associated with what Southern Zaria peoples largely saw as Hausa domination.

In Zango Katab District there were constant petitions, complaints, protests, and revolts, by the Bakulu, Atyab, Bajju, Angan, and Atsam, partly centered on the nationality problem. The peasantry was forced to supply forced labour on the private farms of the District Heads and other N.A. Officials.⁸¹ While the peasant men of these nationalities were also responsible for the construction and clearing of markets, their women were compelled to sweep them; but due to discriminatory practices the local Hausa

80. Drummond Hay, "Lere District-Assessment Report on (1929)", NAK: ZAR PROF No.1820.

81. See "Zango Katab District - Unrest in 1946", NAK: ZAR PROF No.C.81/1946.

peasants did not experience this. Furthermore, the peasants of these ethnic groups in Zango Katab District were forced to be supplying grains, and other foodstuffs, and livestock for the consumption of Hausa district officials (and their horses) - even during the times of poor harvest and famine.⁸²

They were also compelled to contribute bundles of grass for thatching roofs of houses belonging to district officials. Practices related to extortions by N.A. officials - outside official collection of taxes and so on - were common.⁸³ Non-Hausa were denied stall at markets; and non-Hausa market women were being subjected to molestation and beatings, which was **not** affecting their Hausa counterparts.⁸⁴ As a deliberate policy the Hausa commoners were physically separated from other peoples; people of ethnic groups such as Atyab, Bajju, Atsam, Bakulu, Angan, and so on, were barred from building houses or living in Hausa settlements in their midst especially Zango Katab town.⁸⁵

82. Ibid.

83. See document titled: Taron Shawarar Talakawa Kasar Kaje to SDO Zaria dated November 25, 1950, in J.A. Reynold, op.cit; and "Ousuman Sokop Kaje (1942)", NAK: ZAR PROF No.C.6/1942.

84. "Zango Katab District - Unrest ... 1946".

85. Ibid.

There were discriminatory practices in the colonial courts; this was moreso in connection with litigation involving say the Animist peoples and the local Hausa people. In 1922 the Resident of Zaria, E.H.B. Laing, admitted to the prevailance of a lot of injustice in the "Native courts" in the Southern districts.⁸⁶ That was partly why there was a general preference by people of Southern Zaria nationalities to settle matters among themselves - through "traditional" fora - than taking cases to the Alkalai courts.⁸⁷ In 1925 the Resident of Zaria suggested some solution to this by calling for the creation of "pagan courts" and noted that:

I am not altogether satisfied with the Native courts generally. In the pagan Areas little or no use is made of the Moslem Alkalai courts except by the minority Moslem population.⁸⁸

In this connection right from 1923 the Zaria authorities made a call for this issue to be looked at in relation to the Atyab of Zango Katab. The

86. E.H.B. Laing, "Zaria Provincial ... 1922".

87. E.H.B. Laing, "Zaria Province Annual Report for 1927", NAK: ZAR PROF No.2574.

88. Reply by Resident Zaria to SNP No.102/1925/ dated 29th July, 1925, in E.H.B. Laing, "Provincial Annual... 1924".

position was "to establish a pagan court... to deal with matrimonial cases which form the bulk of the local litigation."⁸⁹ But since a legal system should evolve from the culture of a people, the so-called pagan court was anathema to the ways of the Atyab. However, the 8 Atyab village Heads in the service of the colonialists and Zaria ruling circles accepted it; but they could not agree on which clan area should produce the president for the "pagan court" and instead they accepted that the District Head, Ja'afaru dan Ishiaku, should head the "Katab pagan court."⁹⁰ Things did not quite take shape until 1928 when the village Head of Zaman Dabo, a very loyal protege and favourite of Ja'afaru, was imposed to preside over it. In the Southern districts the various Animist village Heads of each ethnic group constituted its "tribal council"; and one of them presided over the "pagan court." But through the Hausa Jakadu, who sat as District Heads' representatives in the "pagan courts", procedures, operation, and decisions were influenced

89. Ibid.

90. Ibid.

by district Chiefs. In 1939 it was reported that the Chief of Birnin Gwari was interfering with the workings of the "Kamuku Tribal Council."⁹¹ It has to be observed that the ruling elements within the Zaria ethnic minorities, who were at the head of the "pagan courts", were equally corrupt, oppressive, and repressive like the Alkalai - relatively to the powers given to them. Thus, the "pagan court" as a form of "Native court" was part of the colonial coercive apparatus. In 1943 it was uncovered that Ham members of the Sabon Sarki "pagan court" in Kachia District were thoroughly corrupt and "have been far from impartial" in cases involving persons who were Ham.⁹² In the Bajju area by the 1940s parasitic village Heads used the "pagan court" to repress Bajju nationalists demanding for their ethnic assertion.⁹³ As J.A. Reynold observed those incharge of the "pagan courts" were Bajju ruling elements who were fundamentally interested in protecting their class interests, and maintaining their privilege positions, "more than the welfare of the tribe."⁹⁴

91. F.M. Noad, "Zaria Provincial Annual Report for 1939", NAK: ZAR PROF No.3306.

92. "Kachia District Affairs (1939-48)", NAK: ZAR PROF No.388.

93. Letter dated 14th June, 1946 signed by M. Saidu of SIM Kaje in "Zango Katab District unrest ... 1946".

94. J.A. Reynold, op.cit.

In the rare instances where the higher authorities found them sympathetic with the cause of the people they were instantly fired or imprisoned. In 1925 some Bajju village Heads, in Zango Katab District, committed class suicide; they joined the ranks of nationalists by organizing and giving leadership to a popular anti-colonial revolt by Bajju peasants directed against colonial policies, practices, and against Zaria Hausa-Fulani domination over the Bajju nationality.⁹⁵ The Bajju chiefs turned against the British and the Zaria aristocracy, who recruited them to be loyal proteges, as they refused to continue to be subservient to the exploiters and oppressors. The Bajju Chiefs who turned into nationalists were the S. Sakwat, S. Kankada, M. Marsa, and Magaji Gada Madakiya (of Bataden).⁹⁶ Their reasons included oppression of the Bajju people by the Hausa; harsh treatment meted to the Bajju and lack of respect to them as a people by Hausa rulers; constant and indiscriminate tyranny against Bajju elements by dogarai and palace hangers-on of Hausa district officials; and being forced to work

95. Field-work interview with M. Makaje, Overseer and later Superintendent of roads with FWD, age about 70, at Zenkwa, 17th January, 1987.

96. J.A. Reynold, op.cit.

on the District Head's farm at Zango Katab town against their wishes. One aspect of the nationalist revolt was that the Bajju peasantry went on open defiance of colonial authorities, refusal to supply forced labour, and non payment of taxes. The Bajju demanded that they "wished to have a Chief of their own as District Head."⁹⁷ The British authorities sent troops to quell the nationalist revolt. In the process the 4 Bajju chiefs were quickly rounded up, arrested, beaten and tortured, dragged to Zaria and charged for causing disturbances and rioting; subsequently they were imprisoned as well as dismissed from their positions.⁹⁸

The Hausa-Fulani aristocrats were in the lead in enjoying paid jobs, and were delegated by the colonizer to supervise over the domination, exploitation, and oppression of the peasantry (of all nationalities as a class) and also of the minority ethnic groups in the Southern districts. The Hausa-Fulani aristocracy had private property, retained slaves, servants, and hangers-on. The socio-economic and political system placed them above any other colonized strata in the province. Big farmers, those in commerce and trade,

97. Ibid.

98. Field-work interview with M. Makaje, op.cit.

and local buying agents for capitalist companies were mostly connected with the Zaria aristocracy; but such a property class was not created among the Southern Zaria nationalities.⁹⁹ Even the local ruling strata in the latter area were by far very wretched when compared with the Zaria rulers. The differentiations in the development of classes and inequality between the various peoples has led to the claims of the existence of internal ^{colonialism} ~~by Hausa~~ over Southern Zaria minorities - as has been advanced by B.S. Bitiyong and S. Yohanna.¹⁰⁰

In a more subtle analytical manner, Z.A. Bonat in looking at the history of the domination and oppression of the Atyab nationality of Zango Katab District Stated:

Thus, during the era of British colonial rule the Atyab suffered double external subjugation; the growing oppressiveness of the decadent emirate system imposed on them for the first time by the British, and increasing over bearing British authority.¹⁰¹

99. Uyilawa Usuanlele, "Preliminary Notes on the Socio-Economic Origins of Contemporary Religious Conflict in Nigeria", Paper presented at the 34th Annual Congress of the Historical Society of Nigeria, held at the University of Benin, Benin, May 15-19, 1989.

100. Billy S. Bitiyong, "The Contradiction of "Colonial Civilization" and Feudal Oppression in Nigeria: The Case of the non-Islamic Areas of Zaria Emirate", Paper Presented at the seminar on: Nigerian Economy and Society Since the Berlin Conference, held at the ABU, Zaria, Nov. 11-15, 1985; and Simon Yohanna, "The Colonial State and the Evolution of Social Stratification in Central Nigeria: The Case of Southern Zaria, 1902 to 1960", M.A. Thesis, Dept., of History, University of Jos, 1988, pp92-93.

101. Zuwaqdu A. Bonat, "Economy and Society Amongst the Atyab (Katab) in Historical Perspective," a revised version of "The Political Economy of the Atyab People in Historical perspective: A Class Analysis", Paper presented at a Seminar on: The Katab People: Past, Present and Future: held at Samaru Katab on 28-30 December, 1981.

Surely, the Emirate system came to an end with colonial conquest. It was replaced by the N.A. system which was an administrative arm of British colonialism where the colonized aristocracy played a dominant role. Thus, this negates the question of "double external subjugation". There was one subjugation but with its various linkages at all levels. All nationalities in the province were colonized - including the Hausa. With British colonialism the main ruling class was foreign. The British were in control of the colonial state with all its organs, instruments, and institutions. No matter the powers given to the Hausa-Fulani aristocracy, the reality was that it did not have an independent socio-economic and political base outside the colonial state; precisely because it derived its powers in the colonial context from the British. Also, the historical fact that Britain maintained total sovereignty over Zaria Province, and all the nationalities in it, meant the absence of a second type of colonialism or subjugation. The situation in Zaria Province went contrary to the ones in which the thesis of internal colonialism

has been associated with.¹⁰² British colonialism created enormous nationality problem between the different linguistic groups; however, as shown in this analysis the historical roots of this cannot be understood from ethno-religious perspective but in the process of class relations within and between peoples.

2.4 Colonial Exploitation, Oppression, and the Nationalist Movement Up to 1928

(a) Taxation

A main source of income for the [] state, in colonial conditions, was the collection of taxes. Taxation was also an instrument of exploitation. By this the colonized were faced with compulsory payment of often specified amounts - reviewed from time to time - in colonial currency, as levied by the British.

102. It is only in an independent and sovereign state with an internal ruling class, such as in the context of South Africa, can the thesis of Internal Colonialism be applicable. In South Africa - in spite of all the question of an independent state, sovereignty, and a South African white ruling class - the apartheid system perpetuates an extreme form of national oppression which is alien and European in character. There is the domination, oppression, exploitation, suppression, and repression of the majority of the population both as working people and as Blacks. It is in such a context that the thesis of internal colonialism has been advanced. But even in the case of South Africa, there has been a hot debate within the South African Liberation Movement on the issue. A strong and vigorous argument for the thesis of Internal Colonialism, in the context of South Africa, is found in Joe Slovo, "Reform and Revolution in South Africa", The first in the Series of Ruth First Memorial Lecture, Maputo, 1984, in SECHABA: Official Organ of the African National Congress South Africa, February, 1985, pp6-8.

It was partly through taxes that funds were provided for running colonial administration and paying the salaries of its officials.¹⁰³

It has been said that colonial taxation was more exploitative of the peasants, artisans, workers, and the poor in general, as compared with the rich.¹⁰⁴

In this connection as at 1922 in Ikara District the rich paid 25 shillings as tax - regardless of the huge private property one owned; those in the middle strata paid 15 shillings; whilst the peasants, no matter how wretched, paid a tax of 8 shillings.¹⁰⁵

Howard Mercer, who carried out tax re-assessment of Ikara District, stated that by just living a rich man no matter how wealthy to pay only 25 shillings and on the other hand compelling a poor man to pay only 8 shillings even without owning anything at all "the really wealthy... men with incomes from £20 upward were let off lightly and did not bear their full share."¹⁰⁶

The main forms of taxes in the first decade were kuridin kasa (Land tax, land rent or tribute), which

103. W. Rodney, op.cit., p.79.

104. Sule Bello, "State and Economy in Kano, 1894-1960: A Study of Colonial Domination", Ph.D. Thesis, Department of History, ABU, Zaria, 1982, p.107.

105. Howard Mercer, "Ikara District Re-assessment (1922)", NAK: ZAR PROF No.368/1922.

106. Ibid.

mainly composed of Haraji (hoe tax or poll tax); and the jangali (cattle tax). The British collected custom duties as caravan tolls. There were also taxes such as Native Liquor Licences; kurdin su (fishermen tax); industrial taxes (levied on blacksmith and other artisans); and taxes imposed on labourers - even forced labourers - in railway construction and in the tin mines. Some of these taxes were later abolished in 1912 leaving mainly the farmers and non-farmers taxes.¹⁰⁷ M.M. Tukur has argued that payment of taxes was viewed by the British as a mark of showing loyalty to them; and for the supposed benefits the colonized were getting from colonialism.¹⁰⁸ In 1907 the Resident of Zaria, C.W. Orr, reinforced this by stating that the Gbagyi and other Southern Zaria ethnic groups had to be assessed to pay taxes for it "in their case merely establishes the principle of an annual tax and serves as an acknowledgement of their submission to Government and its laws."¹⁰⁹ Initially, payment of Jangali was

107. M. P. Porch, "Zaria Province Annual Report No.55 for 1912", NAK: ZAR PROF No.2559.

108. M. M. Tukur, "The Imposition of British Colonial Domination on the Sokoto Caliphate, Borno and Neighbouring States 1897-1914..." p.531.

109. C.W. Orr, "Zaria ... Annual Report for 1907."

restricted to nomads; but by 1912 all pastoralists - whether nomadic or sedentarized - were included.¹¹⁰

At the early stages the British did not impose tax on Muslim women but Animist women had to pay. First, this was partly because the latter maintained a strong resistance to the imposition of colonialism. Second, the colonizer justified this policy on the basis that Animist women owned property in contrast with Muslim women - a reason that is not historically true.¹¹¹ In Kagoro chiefdom, as at 1916 each adult female was paying a poll tax of one shilling whilst a male paid 2 shillings.¹¹² The Ham women of Jaba District were paying a shilling tax per head in 1913 against 2 shillings for the men.¹¹³ But the point is nothing of that sort was paid by Muslim women.

One aspect of British taxes was the method of collection. Towards the end of the year District and Village Heads assembled at Zaria. In consultation with the Waziri the tax estimates were drawn based on the

110. M.M. Tukur, "The Imposition of British Colonial Domination on the Sokoto Caliphate, Borno and Neighbouring States 1897-1914..." p.531.

111. Ibid., p.575.

112. W.M. Hyne, "Kagoro District (Jema'a Division) May 1916," NAK: ZAR PROF No.2103.

113. Y. Kirkpatrick, "Jaba District Assessment on (1914)," NAK: ZAR PROF No.2102.

population of each district. The District and Village Chiefs were then "taken before the District Officer and these amounts read out to them."¹¹⁴ On their return to their areas of jurisdiction they conferred as to how the estimated amount will be distributed at the most basic level.¹¹⁵ But even the process and method of collection was subjected to abuse. This was uncovered in Ikara and Kudaru districts in 1922 when records were not up to date; receipts were not issued to the tax payers.¹¹⁶ Apart from making extortion and corruption possible, no proper keeping of records made it difficult for cases of such abuses to be established. Despite these limitations there were cases of tax embezzlement by colonial officials that were uncovered. In 1915 some village Heads, all over the districts in Zaria N.A., were found to have embezzled a total of £80, 17 shillings and 4 pence from amounts collected as taxes.¹¹⁷

114. D. Hay, op.cit.

115. Ibid.

116. "Zaria ... Report on Kudaru District 1922."

117. C.O. Migeod, "Zaria Province Annual Report No.67 for 1915," NAK: ZAR PROF No.2562.

Contrary to the British theory of limiting payment of tax to adults, district officials often counted or assessed children and the aged who were exempted. This was deliberately done to make the latter give out bribe so that their names would be dropped from the list - whereas they were not supposed to be there in the first place. Side-by-side with this some well grown up elements that were in every-way qualified to pay tax were asked by officials to buy their way so as not to be counted and thus be exempted. In Charra village of Ikara District in 1922 local officials resorted to taking bribe in order to exclude some of the qualified persons. According to H. Mercer the N.A. chiefs and other officials did this, and counted badly too, because "they were safe in their knowledge that they were not going to be checked."¹¹⁸

Factors such as drought, famine, locust invasion, poor harvest, and fall in prices of agrarian raw materials, never did influence the British to reduced

118. H. Mercer, op.cit.

the amount of money to be paid by the peasantry as tax. No matter how dire the straitened times the colonialists collected high taxes. On the other hand whenever the peasant producers had a bumper harvest or some rise in prices for the sell of export crops, the British increased the taxes. This was precisely what happened in 1920 when Resident E.H.B. Laing said that:

Owing to the extreme high prices of all agriculture produce and extra ordinary profits in trade in 1920, and also owing to the fact of general prosperity in the Province, it was possible or advisable to increase tax.¹¹⁹

But when the Zaria peasants encountered severe difficulties in paying tax in 1922, the provincial authorities made false claims to justify continuous collection of high tax. Thus, the Resident maintained that during a tour of the province he "found a contented peasantry throughout."¹²⁰ But as will be seen later in the analysis, this was contradicted in concrete terms by some sections of the peasantry that rose in revolt directed against British oppressive tax in 1922.¹²¹

119. F.F.W. Byng-Hall, op.cit.

120. E.H.B. Laing, "Zaria Provincial ... 1922."

121. Ibid.

Furthermore, in time of crisis - with already harsh conditions and high taxation - the colonizer's usual practice was to still shift the burden on the colonized labouring masses; during World War I the Zaria people were saddled with war levies - in essence a sort of additional tax. The British war machine, in the course of their confrontation with the Germans in the Cameroons, was somehow also financed by the colonized. The whole process involved the imposition of war levies; the conscription of some colonized elements as soldiers and carriers - the voluntary enlistment of others aside; seizure of foodstuffs from the peasantry to feed British troops; and compulsory pay cuts for workers in the form of the so-called contribution to the war fund. At the outbreak of the war in 1914, the British received £1,780 from the Zaria N.A. as war contribution. The Emir of Zaria, Aliyu dan Sidi, supplied 500 pairs of sandals for "carriers enlisted in Zaria Province for the Duala Expeditionary force."¹²² This was supplemented by another amount of £3,000 from the "Zaria Native Administration reserved fund" in 1915.¹²³ All these came from the sweat of the people.

122. M.P. Porch, "Zaria Province Annual Report No.65 for 1914", NAK: ZAR PROF No.2561.

123. C.O. Migeod, op.cit.

As a phenomenon of colonial exploitation and oppression, colonial taxation contributed to the rise of secondary nationalist resistance. Unlike the primary resistance when the struggle was by sovereign peoples or polities against the imposition of foreign domination, the secondary phase of the nationalist movement was marked by struggles by a now colonized people against domination, exploitation, and oppression; and coupled with these were the struggles against the daily policies of the colonizer as executed by their representatives or agents amongst the colonized. The nationalist struggles in relation to taxation also took both passive and active dimensions. The British demand for more Jangali led to volatile movements of Fulani nomads - as their own struggle against the exploitation itself and to escape extortions by officials that accompanied it. In the late 1920s nomadic groups in the Southern districts of Zaria N.A. were constantly migrating to Moroa, Kagoro, and elsewhere (then in Plateau Province) where Jangali and extortions were said to be relatively lower than in the former.¹²⁴ This was a form of passive nationalist struggle against colonial exploitation and oppression

124. "Chawai District Notes (1932)", NAK: ZAR PROF No.951.

especially during the period of collection of the Jangali, when tax collectors used all sorts of harrassment to extort money from nomadic groups.¹²⁵

But this form of anti-colonial resistance also extended to cultivators because some peasants migrated in opposition to colonial exploitation and oppression connected with taxation. There was the migration of some sections of the Adara community in Kajuru District; they deserted their villages in 1921 as a nationalistic measure or protest against the colonial policy of taxation.¹²⁶ In 1922 the provincial authorities said they had been informed by the new Emir of Zaria, Dalhatu, that 167 tax paying Hausa peasants "left Faiki and migrated to Kano without paying their taxes" amounting to £104 and 10 shillings.¹²⁷ In their own way the Faiki peasants waged an anti-colonial resistance to the British pressures.

Up to the late 1920s the struggles against the colonizer's taxes were more active and resolute in the Southern Zaria zone than in the northern districts.

125. C.W. Orr, "Zaria... Annual Report for 1905".

126. Y. Kirkpatrick, "Kajuru... Affairs (1922)".

127. E.H.B. Ising, "Zaria Provincial ... 1922."

One historical factor that contributed to this was that before the colonial times the ethnic groups in Southern Zaria were not "except in rare cases accustomed to paying any tax."¹²⁸ It was partly due to the active nature of their nationalism that the colonizer usually went with soldiers or police when collecting taxes; there was profound indignation against taxation.¹²⁹ In 1912 the Kitimi peasants, in Kaura District, demonstrated a high level of nationalism by incomppliance to the British demand on them to pay taxes.¹³⁰ They engaged the colonialists in arms confrontation. But after some days, the heroic nationalist armed resistance of the Kitimi peasants was crushed and thus defeated by the colonial forces.¹³¹

Such was the determination and nationalistic efforts of the Southern peoples to the struggle against the exploitative and oppressive colonial taxes that Atyab and Bajju peasants revolted in 1922.¹³² As touched on a bit elsewhere in the analysis, it is quite revealing to observe that it was at the time

128. C.W. Orr, "Zaria ... Annual Report for 1907."

129. Ibid.

130. M. P. Porch, "Zaria Province Annual ... for 1912."

131. Ibid.

132. Ibid.

Resident E.H.B. Laing was talking about a contented and prosperous peasantry that the District Heads of Zango Katab and Kachia made strong representation to the Emir of Zaria about the Atyab and Bajju peasants rebuffing attempts at collecting taxes and embarking on a nationalist uprising.¹³³ The situation deteriorated and worsened by the day, making it impossible for the colonial officials to enforce law and order or execute their functions.¹³⁴ Both the District Head of Kachia (where there was a minority Bajju population) and that of Zango Katab (with a predominantly Bajju and Atyab population) made a strong call to the provincial administration for a political officer to be sent plus the bringing in of troops to deal with the situation.¹³⁵

This nationalist revolt against taxation was jointly organized by the Atyab and Bajju peasants. The leadership was centred on community clan elders and the "execution" was by youth. Meetings were held secretly where decisions were taken and passed over.¹³⁶ The 1922 Bajju and Atyab peasant uprising involved

133. E.H.B. Laing, "Zaria Provincial..... 1922."

134. Ibid.

135. Ibid.

136. Field-work interview with M. Nakajo, op.cit.

refusal to pay tax; non-compliance with forced labour demand; and physical attacks on Hausa district officials. In spite of its nature as a joint secondary resistance by two ethnic groups, the centre of it was among the Atyab.¹³⁷ The British authorities responded by despatching soldiers to Zango Katab with the objective of breaking up the nerve of the resistance.

Demonstrating some level of being good tacticians, the Atyab nationalist leaders vanished from scene before the colonial troops arrived. One Gankon of Matagama - that is, unguwar Gayya - "who had wounded a follower of the District Head" escaped into a neighbouring province. It was reported that Gankon fled "to Bauchi or Nassarawa and could not be traced."¹³⁸ Some suspects were rounded up and taken to Zaria where they were sentenced to various jail terms. At that time the Atyab had started associating colonial repression and going to jail with Hausa-Fulani rulers of Zaria. The concept of Nat Kpat emerged; it simply meant "going to the Hausa" but deeply implied being sent to what the people perceived as "Hausa jails".¹³⁹

137. E.H.B. Laing, "Zaria Provincial... 1922".

138. Ibid.

139. Field-work interview with Ladi Saratu Kasam, daughter of a colonial Chief and housewife, age 62, at Mabuhu, in June 1987.

So, persons sent to jail at Zaria were said to Nat Kpat.

As some sort of victory to the Atyab and Bajju peasants, the colonialists gave some concession by reducing the amount paid as taxes in the area - which in reality was higher than other parts of the province. By the reduction, Atyab taxes were cut-down by 544 - pounds and 16 shillings in order "to bring the incidence more in line with those of their neighbours in Nassarawa and Zaria."¹⁴⁰ But even in 1922 some neighbours of the Atyab such as the Takkad (then in Nassarawa Province) waged struggle against the British taxes and forced was employed by the colonialists to crush it.¹⁴¹

(b) Peasant Commodity Production

The process of cultivation of export crops, by the Zaria peasantry, fell within the realm of the internalization of the division of labour between the colonial powers and the colonies.¹⁴² The British first reckoned with the creation of a transportation

140. E.H.B. Laing, "Zaria Provincial... 1922."

141. Ibid.

142. M.I. Velkov (ed.), A Dictionary of Political Economy, Progress, Moscow, 1985, pp133-134.

network to facilitate the production of cash crops; railway transportation was established as a vital link between the area and the coastal region of Nigeria from where agricultural products were shipped to Europe.¹⁴³ While stressing on the need for the Zaria authorities to make cotton production a flourishing industry in 1906 a top British official said: "When the railway reaches Zaria the transport difficulty will be solved and a great output looked for from here."¹⁴⁴

Within the province itself the various districts were somehow assigned different economic roles. Initially, the vast Gbagyi homeland was marked for cotton production. The determinant factors which influenced this decision were touched on in 1907 by Resident C.W. Orr:

The Soil is suitable, and the country well watered, and with a railway running through the center of the district there will be no difficult in transporting the cotton to the river whence it can be conveyed by water to the coast, and shipped to England.¹⁴⁵

143. R.K. Home, "Urban Growth and Urban Government: Contradiction in the Colonial Political Economy," in Gavin Williams (ed.), Nigeria: Economy and Society, Rex Collins, London, 1976, p.58.

144. See Comments by Secretary Northern Nigeria, in C.W. Orr, "Zaria Province Annual Report for 1906," NAK: ZAR PROF No.2553.

145. C.W. Orr, "Zaria... Annual Report for 1907".

Some amount of cotton production - on small scale experimental basis - was introduced among the Bukurmi and Adara of Lere and Kachia districts respectively.¹⁴⁶ The cultivation of ginger was to be concentrated in some Southern districts; especially among the Ham of Kachia District.¹⁴⁷ Z.A. Bonat has argued that the British distributed tobacco, ginger, cotton, and sugar cane seeds to the producers but this was "to Hausa farmers only, thus forcing non-Hausa farmers, onto the mines or the farms of the former to procure tax money."¹⁴⁸ Certainly, the distribution of ginger went to the non-Hausa peoples of Southern Zaria. The whole issue has to be appreciated in the context of division of labour rather than in terms of favouring one ethnic group and discriminating against others. The production of a single commodity was often assigned to a particular zone whilst labour, as a most crucial factor in the production process, was supplied from

146. E.H.B. Laing, "Zaria Provincial ... 1922."

147. Ibid.

148. Z.A. Bonat, "Colonialism and the Underdevelopment of Zaria Province..." p.291.

another area which would remain as a sort of labour reservoir.¹⁴⁹ All sections of the Zaria peasantry were compelled to engage in production activities in order to get currency for their taxes. This they did by growing cash-crop, working in the mines and construction sites, and by selling their labour power elsewhere.¹⁵⁰

A measure of control which the British introduced in connection with agrarian raw materials was aimed at wiping out indigenous seeds and replacing them with imported ones. The colonialists introduced new variety of seeds of tobacco, cotton, and ginger - with the exception of groundnut.¹⁵¹ The reason advanced was that indigenous seeds were inferior. In 1910 the British Cotton Growing Association (BCGA) introduced experimentation centre at Maigana, which was not quite successful, in an attempt to lure the peasant producers into switching over to the imported seeds. Also, the authorities took other steps to finally destroy the indigenous seeds. According to J. Whithers Gill in 1910;

149. Samir Amin, "The Dynamic and Limitation of Agrarian Capitalism in Black Africa," in C.W. Gutkind and Peter Waterman (eds.), African Social Studies, Heinemann; London, 1977, p.155.

150. W. Rodney, op.cit., p.181.

151. Z.A. Bonat, "Colonialism and the Underdevelopment of Zaria Province..." p.284.

By buying indigenous cotton largely the British Cotton Growing Association can secure and destroy inferior native seed and replace it with a higher quality by subsequently distribution. The more this is done the better able, I consider, we shall be to ensure a market supply that will exceed local demand.¹⁵²

There was a connection between peasant export commodity production, migrant labour, and payment of taxes. Collection of taxes from the population was scheduled for the harvest season. What the peasants sold from their harvest was somehow taken away by the state as taxes. In the event of say a disastrous harvest or extremely low prices the peasants were often mortgaged to money lenders who either went for their livestock or exploit the peasants' labour on the farms to get the usury back. Colonial conditions made foodstuffs and livestock to be at extremely low prices and they were not viable in terms of fetching money for payment of taxes. Labour time and land had to be utilized largely for export cash crop production which - to a certain extent - ruined the subsistence base of feeding the population.¹⁵³

152. J. Withers Gill, "Zaria Province Annual Report for 1910," NAK: ZAR PROF No.2557.

153. Field-work interview with Bobai Akaiji, peasant farmer, age 68, at Mabuhu, on 6th February, 1987; and P.M. Lubeck, Islam and Urban Labour in Northern Nigeria: The Making of a Muslim Working Class, CUP, London, 1982, p.32.

Albert Nzula et al have observed that while the producers and the whole economy were subjected to the interest of imperialism the process of exploitation was through a combined link of exploiters at various levels - including local agents called the Middlemen.¹⁵⁴ Intermediaries benefited a lot while the peasant producers remained a seriously exploited lot. In 1920 the price of groundnut was relatively low as the producers were paid just between £4 and £5 per ton; yet the middlemen still made their profit. During the previous year, 1919, the colonialists claimed they paid high prices to the groundnut producers. But it was also admitted that those who gained most were the agents because actual profit "found its way into their pockets and not those of the producers."¹⁵⁵

An entire colonial network ensured that the commodity producers were exploited to the maximum. The capitalists made super profits in the European market - from the exploitation of labour and resources

154. Albert T. Nzula et al., Forced Labour in Colonial Africa, Zed Press, London, 1979, pp36-40.

155. F.F.W. Byng-Hall, op.cit.

of the colonized.¹⁵⁶ On the other hand these forces in alliance with the state maintained a system in which the producers paid higher prices for the imported goods.¹⁵⁷ This high level of exploitation can be concretized in relation to ginger. For everything the Ham peasant put in the process of production in 1924, a ginger load of 50lbs fetched just one shilling at the Kachia market. The same quantity was taken to Zango Katab market and sold at 2 shillings 6 pence by the small or immediate local link man to the main buying agent. The big buying agent in turn took it to the trading firm at Zaria, where the 50lbs of ginger was purchased at 12 shillings and 6 pence.¹⁵⁸ As at 1924 the ginger price in the European market was £60 per ton.¹⁵⁹ This shows that a ton of ginger sold by the Ham producers at £2 and 5 shillings - which was the actual amount they made - did enable the trading company to make £60 in Europe.¹⁶⁰

156. A.T. Nzula et al, op.cit., p.47.

157. R.O. Ekundare, An Economic History of Nigeria 1860-1960, Methuen, London, 1973, p.123.

158. E.H.B. Laing, "Provincial Annual ... 1924."

159. Ibid.

160. All prices for the province and Europe are derived from Ibid.

(c) Forced Labour

The process of colonial exploitation and oppression also involved a metamorphosis of the Zaria population into suppliers of labour through coerced methods.

The demand made on the people to supply forced labour

- M.M. Tukur argued - was somehow an expression of the colonized subordination to the British.¹⁶¹ At the centre of imposing this form of labour exaction was the colonial state - including all its arms.

In various spheres of construction the dominant form of labour on which the British relied on was forced labour. Meaning that railway, roads, prisons, courts, military and police barracks, houses and rest houses for European officials, offices, and market stalls, were largely constructed by the labour of the colonized people through compulsion.¹⁶²

Same was production in the tin mines and several other sectors. The exaction of forced labour was carried out, as part of the duty, by European officials, Emirs and Chiefs, and other local rulers; in the process of exploiting forced labour

161. M.M. Tukur, "The Imposition of British Colonial Domination on the Sokoto Caliphate, Borno and Neighbouring States 1897-1914..." p.608.

162. Ibid., p.608.

the authorities made use of soldiers, police, and dogani.¹⁶³ Right from inception, the conscription of labour was one of the functions of the N.A. structure.¹⁶⁴ Between the creation of Zaria Province in 1902 and 1909, forced labour had become so central to the British; Resident George Ormsby reported in 1909 that British political officers had put so much time and energies to forced labour recruitment and supervision at work sites than on administrative duties.¹⁶⁵

It was solely forced labour which was employed in the construction of the Zungeru to Zaria road before it was "declared fit for wheeled traffic" on December 31, 1904.¹⁶⁶ This form of labour drafting, which the British also called political labour or labour levy, was also used in the construction of the Zaria to Kano road in the same year.¹⁶⁷ The building of the Zaria military barracks - and provision

163. Bob Shenton and Bill Freund, "The Incorporation of Northern Nigeria into the World Capitalist Economy," in Review of African Political Economy, Number 13, May-August 1978, London, p.15.

164. Bill Freund, The Making of Contemporary Africa: The Development of Africa Society Since 1800, Macmillan Press, London, 1984, p.121.

165. G. Ormsby, op.cit.

166. C.W. Orr, "Zaria... Annual Report for 1904."

167. Ibid.

of all its facilities - took quite a great amount of conscripted labour and the materials needed for the work were also supplied by the people.¹⁶⁸

Furthermore, the people of Zaria were compelled to provide labour for the construction of other roads, telegraph lines, all sorts of British buildings, and transporting the materials required in the various spheres of construction.¹⁶⁹ In the course of all this the colonialists did claim that everything done was necessary for the economic development of the colonized people.¹⁷⁰ In reality the colonizer did this to enable foreign capital to penetrate the districts and exploit both labour and resources.¹⁷¹

To understand the enormous forced labour requirement made on the people it is of vital importance to appreciate the fact that Zaria Province had a concentration of railway lines which passed through its territory - in different directions -

168. Ibid. The military barracks constructed by forced labour had full accommodation for 10 officers; 10 non-commissioned officers; stabling for 250 horses; a mess house; orderly room; a guardroom; a number of stores. All completed in 1904.

169. Ibid.

170. E.H.B. Laing, "Zaria Province Annual Report ... 1925".

171. A.T. Nzula et al., op.cit., p.34.

more than any other province in Nigeria.¹⁷² The province was neighbouring the Jos Plateau area which was the central mining zone; and some small scale mining activities extended into some of the Southern Zaria districts. Thus a high level of drafted labour in railway construction and in the tin mines. linked with this was the urbanized nature of Zaria town and the new capital of the Northern Provinces at Kaduna (as from 1914) which demanded a lot of labour. In 1925 the Gbagyi community had to supply forced labour for the construction of the Kaduna aerodrome.¹⁷³

For railway construction the total figures for three years - that is, 1909, 1910, and 1912 - indicate that a total of 23,091 people were engaged in providing forced

172. First railway line was from Baro to Kano. It reached Zaria Province (as it was then) in 1910 from Kogin Sarkin Pawa. The Zaria portion was constructed between 1909-1911; by 1912 the Kano end had been completed. Second railway line was the Bauchi Light Railway; the construction work got to Soba in 1911 - from Zaria town. It reached Rahama in 1912 and was opened at Bauchi in 1914. Work on the third line, the Eastern Railway line, commenced from Kaduna in January 1914 and reached mile 22 in the direction of Kafanchan in September. Work on this line was stopped at the outbreak of World War I: It finally reached Kafanchan in Jema'a. Fourth railway line was Zaria-Gusau which was still being constructed as at 1929. Sources: E.J. Arnett, op.cit., p.19; and C.A. Woodhouse, op.cit.

173. E.H.B. Laing, "Zaria Province Annual Report.... 1925".

labour.¹⁷⁴ This excludes forced labour in other sectors. But to a large extent the official figures given by the British were far less than the actual number of persons conscripted; but they still revealed a lot. Forced labourers were each given only 6 pence a day which could not even meet the minimum feeding requirement. In addition the meagre amount was subjected to fines under all sorts of excuses including being taxed at the rate of 3 to 4 shillings a year.¹⁷⁵ In 1914 the British conscripted 10,750 people from Southern Zaria for the construction of the Eastern Railway alone; excluding forced labour derived from that zone for other sectors.¹⁷⁶

By 1924 the British authorities in Zaria were advancing that there had been a reduction of forced labour requisition in railway construction "from the monthly total of 4500 to 1500" which among other things "afforded a large measure of relief to the peasantry."¹⁷⁷

174. By 1909 the number of those engaged in forced labour in connection with the railway officially stood at 7,291 (and the reality was always more). For the year 1910, in the months of January and February alone 5,580 men were conscripted from the "Hausa Division alone"; and by September there was an additional 7,000 people. In 1912 1,000 people were initially drafted for the construction of the Bauchi Light Railway with 2,220 forced labourers added later. Sources: G. Ormsby, op.cit. J. Withers Gill, op.cit.; and M.P. Porch, "Zaria Province Annual... for 1912."

175. J.M. Fremantle, op.cit.

176. M. P. Porch, "Zaria Province Annual... for 1914."

177. E.H.B. Laing, "Provincial Annual ... 1924."

This claim does not stand as true; the evidence in the same British sources contradict it and thus exposes it as another official propaganda. The official monthly average of force labour engaged in the railway stood at 4,000 in 1924. That number was still higher than the one of the previous year (1923) which was 3,702.¹⁷⁸ It shows that the peasantry experienced no relief in terms of forced labour drafting.

Another aspect of forced labour was in relation to the carriers of British goods. When World War I broke out in 1914 the colonizer increased demand on the population. In 1915 the colonialists conscripted 1,607 people as carriers. Out of this, 250 were recruited to join the Ikom column in the month of March. Two months later - in May 1915 - another batch was sent to the Cameroons; 500 carriers "were sent from Zaria to the expeditionary force at Duala;" another 500 carriers were sent from Zaria to Yola. In September 1915, 357 carriers were drafted to join the British military force elsewhere in the Cameroons.¹⁷⁹

Forced labour brought about serious hardship for the people; and this is better appreciated when the number officially engaged is compared with the total

178. Ibid.

179. C.O. Migeod, op.cit.

population of the province which stood at 318,643 as at 1920.¹⁸⁰ Forced labour was largely drawn from the most lively and productive segment of the society - the youth. Children and old people left out were not quite productive in society. Thus the phenomenon had serious multiple detrimental effects on the society.

In the larger context of tropical Africa the terrible effects of the exploitation of forced labour and other policies on the African peasantry included malnutrition, spread of diseases such as typhoid fever, tuberculosis, and the "frequent famines and epidemics in the colonies."¹⁸¹ The Zaria situation can be aptly concretized. In October 1923 Captain Mercer stated that sanitation was really bad. Also then, the District Officer in charge of construction labour, Newton, talked about the extremely poor huts; as the roofs were dripping with rain and the condition of shelter was generally deplorable.¹⁸² In 1924 a medical officer, Dr. Moiser, wrote that the "health of Europeans is fair" but:

180. E.J. Arnett, op.cit., p.18.

181. Ho Chi Minh, "Report on the National and Colonial Question at the Fifth Congress of the Communist International", held at Moscow from June 17 to July 8, 1924, in Ho Chi Minh, Selected Writings (1920-1969) Volume I, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Hanoi, 1977, pp33-34.

182. Notes on labour conditions (1923 and 1924) in the details sent by Resident Zaria to the SNP of November 3, 1926, in "Forced Labour (Policy and Instructions)," NAK: ZAR PROF No.C.10/1940.

As regards natives, one Engineer complained that there is too much sickness amongst the labourers, and this is not to be wondered at when so little is paid to the recommendations of the Medical Officer. On the other hand executive officers are anxious to get on with the work, and say they cannot spare labour for sanitary work.¹⁸³

The objective of exploiters of forced labourers was maximum exploitation without the minimum humane consideration of maintaining a level of their health.

In 1925 the Zaria authorities recorded that out of 13,530 forced labourers engaged in railway works throughout the province only 26 died during the year.¹⁸⁴ But a critical look shows that it was not an adequate disclosure of the harsh realities. For in the same year - according to Newton - on the average 68 men fell sick in just a day either through "accidents, fever pleurisy or dysentery"; and it was recorded that 13 persons died in the months of July and 4 in August.¹⁸⁵ Even these figures deserve being treated with caution; because a number of labourers who contracted diseases in the labour camps eventually went back to their towns and villages and there was

183. Ibid.

184. E.H.B. Laing, "Zaria Province Annual Report ... 1925".

185. Notes on labour conditions (1923 and 1924) in the details sent by Resident Zaria to the SNP of November 3, 1926...

a very high likelihood of some dying from the serious diseases on their return home. The colonizer did not pay anyone compensation in the event of accident, sickness, and death; there was no security or guarantees.

There was just one hour break, which was not enough to enable them finish preparing their meals, for labourers who had to start work from 6.00a.m to 6.00p.m. The working hours normally extended beyond that period.¹⁸⁶ For four consecutive months in 1924 (that is, June to September) the force labourers were fined, out of the so-called 6 pence a day pay for "4 to 6 days per month for work uncompleted."¹⁸⁷ The meagre amount was subjected to some other ways of retrieval including taxation. Accordingly taking "a month at 26 working days it means that fines to the extent of from 15% to 23% are regularly inflicted."¹⁸⁸ Despite this the British later claimed that public opinion was in support of forced labour.¹⁸⁹ The colonizer insisted that there was no need to scrap

186. Ibid.

187. Ibid.

188. Ibid.

189. Memorandum from the SNP to the Resident Zaria dated 19th December, 1934, in "Forced Labour (Policy and instructions)..."

forced labour; and that instead of scraping ~~it~~ what was needed was to ensure that "vigilance of the Administrative Staff provide and effective safeguard against abuses."¹⁹⁰

From the first decade of the colonial period the authorities were not only justifying forced labour but enumerating its supposed benefit as something which united the people. It was claimed that forced labour "brought together tribes formerly hostile or suspicious of each other to work together amicably side by side" and also teaching them "the advantages of organised labour."¹⁹¹ Specifically in relation to the so-called pagan nationalities it was reported that serving forced labour gave them confidence in "their dealing with their more civilized Hausa neighbours and encouraged them to lay complaints when unjustly treated."¹⁹² On the contrary the concrete nationalistic struggles against forced labour by the labouring masses, waged by both the so-called pagan ethnic groups and the "civilized Hausa", was in itself a clear defeat of the colonialist propaganda.

190. Ibid.

191. G. Ormsby, op.cit.

192. Ibid.

This is more so because as a form of nationalism there was a widespread anti-forced labour resistance which in essence was a struggle against colonial exploitation and oppression. The 1912 anti-colonial revolt by the Kitimi people - which has been analyzed earlier - was both directed in opposition to British taxes as well as against compulsory supply of labour for the construction of the Bauchi Light Railway Extension. Secondary nationalist struggles - which were in the context of new exploitative and oppressive conditions and policies - were springing up in some areas where the primary resistance was not strong. In 1910 a popular peasant revolt broke out among the Atyab of Zango Katab District directed at fighting against forced labour and other British policies. With the imposition of colonial domination a colonial officer, Francis, was assigned the task of massive exaction of forced labour among the Atyab () and also the Atsam of Chawai District.¹⁹³

For the Atyab this was at a point a Hausa-Fulani District Head was appointed from Zaria and imposed on them for the first time by the British, after about 6 years of being placed under Kauru ().

193. J. Wither Gills, op.cit; and M.P. Porch, "Zaria Province Annual ... for 1912."

as Katuka District. Now, the new District Head, in a new arrangement, was to reside at Zango Katab and have power over the people as a ruler. Thus, the Atyab waged an active resistance against forced labour, taxes, and the lordship of Hausa aristocrats which "led to an expression of open resentment against their District head."¹⁹⁴ An armed group was out to attack the Hausa District Head and the British who were forcing them to supply compulsory labour; a quick military intervention by the colonialists checked the situation. It is significant that the British who were initially met with no resistance at Zango Katab (in the course of the 1903 invasion) were in 1909 being challenged as exploiters together with the Zaria aristocrats in the colonizer's employ. As from that year the high level of forced labour the British were deriving from the district, and diverting to the mines and other sectors, resulted in a fall in subsistence production in society which led to food shortages.

As M.V. Spurway seriously noted, by 1913 the Atyab who used to produce food in abundance now experienced a severe famine.¹⁹⁵ One of the worst

194. Ibid.

195. M.V. Spurway, "Zango Katab Notes on (1932)", NAK: ZAR PROF No.603.

hit parts of Atyabland was the well watered and fertile Gora village area. The Gora village Head and hamlet leaders, in the employ of the colonialists, as immediate agents of the exploitation and oppression of their own people, went against their roles and the dictate of their colonial masters who they were expected to slavishly Kowtow to. In 1914 the Gora chiefs refused to recruit forced labour, and to collect taxes, for the colonialists. Due to their nationalistic position the Gora population got some impetus in the resistance. Subsequently, the Gora Chiefs were arrested, sacked from their positions, and eventually jailed, for leading their peasants in an anti-colonial struggle.¹⁹⁶

The nationalist struggle of the dominated classes in the northern Zaria districts against coerced form of labour involved defiance and passive resistance. In 1910 there was an upsurge of resistance against labour conscription. A feature of the nationalist struggle against exploitation and oppression was the phenomenon of mass migration by sections of

196. Field-work interview with Ndung Mamman, Peasant, age about 87, at Unguwar Tabo, on 7th February, 1987; and M.P. Porch, "Zaria Province Annual ... for 1914."

the working people; by the day this process of escaping forced labour was on the ascendancy in Zaria town itself.¹⁹⁷ By 1912 the British provincial officers and the Emir of Zaria were highly disturbed by this development of migration as a form of resistance, which was threatening and even increasingly depriving the colonial state the badly needed forced labour.

In a census conducted in Zaria city alone, the colonialists were shocked to discover the serious decline of population from 26,000 in 1910 to just 19,260 in 1912.¹⁹⁸ The reason was due to the migration of many families into areas in the neighbouring Kano Province as a resistance to forced labour demands; as at 1914 this trend was on the increase.¹⁹⁹

At the same time the women found colonial pressures unbearable. For them it was by no means an easy task to cope with the struggle for survival, other productive activities, as well as bringing up children. In 1912 Resident M.P. Porch noted how all this has affected the attitude of women in northern Zaria thus:

197. J. Withers Gill, op.cit.

198. M.P. Porch, "Zaria Province Annual ... for 1912."

199. M.P. Porch, "Zaria Province Annual .. for 1914."

... there is no doubt that among the women in Zaria and in towns near the Railway there is an increasing dislike to bearing children which I considered a very serious problem. The men would like children but the women in many cases will if possible procure their abortion.²⁰⁰

On the whole, therefore, right from the first decades of British colonialism forced labour had serious implications for the people. It deepened the contradictions between the interests of the European exploiters and oppressors and their local African surrogates on the one hand and the colonized on the other; and this influenced the strength of the nationalist movement.

(d) Wage Labour

To some certain extent the dominance of force labour contributed in no small way to the slow development of wage labour; that is, it retarded the emergence of a working class.²⁰¹ Migrant labour was next to forced labour. In terms of migrant labour the labour force was engaged on a temporal basis, and there

200. M.P. Porch, "Zaria Province Annual ... for 1912".

201. B. Freund, op.cit., p.121.

was the absence of any contract between the employer and the labourers - that is, migrant labourers had no job safeguards.²⁰² Colonialism with its limited growth of productive forces did not bring about the development of industries, and so on, which would have led to the dominance of the working class in numerical terms in the colonies.²⁰³ Thus, the working class was very small.

The process of organizing wage labour - its engagement, control, and exploitation - was a domain of the colonial authorities and the capitalist firms.²⁰⁴ Up to the late 1920s wage labour was concentrated in the various departments of the Northern Nigeria Civil Service, especially in the capital at Kaduna and the provincial headquarters at Zaria. There were workers in the N.A. employ; in the public service such as the railway corporation; the private companies

202. Major G. St. J-Orde Browne, Labour Condition in West Africa, Official Publication, 1939, p.12.

A copy found at NAK: Reg. No.6/4.

203. Thomas Hodgkin, Nationalism in Colonial Africa, NYUP, New York, 1969, p.119.

204. S.O. Osoba, "The Development of Trade Unionism in Colonial and Post-Colonial Nigeria", in I.A. Akinjogbi and S.O. Osoba (eds.), Topics on Nigerian Economy and Social History, University of Ife-Press, Ile-Ife, 1980, p.190.

or firms involved in mercantile; and the mining industry. As G. St. J-Orde Browne has shown, in the larger context of colonial Nigeria, the number of workers in proportion to the general population was very small.²⁰⁵ The colonized workers occupied the lowest positions in the hierarchical structure of all organizations. They included clerks, foremen, dispensers and dressers, road workers, railway clerks and workmen, forestry workers, and agricultural workers.

An initial problem the British faced was in relation to how to produce some technical workers. Since Zaria Province (and indeed the entire British colony of Nigeria) did not have a European settler population every European in the colonial service occupied a top position. But this also meant that unlike in settler colonies, where Europeans were found among the working class, the conditions in Zaria Province were such that the British had to produce technical workers among the colonized with limited skilled training and they will be placed under Europeans. A European with barely enough technical training and education was automatically

205. Major G. St. J. Orde Brown, op.cit., p.10.

recruited to a top post. Of course, there were few Africans who occupied middle cadre positions; but such elements were mostly non-indigenous to the province. It was in 1912 that the colonialists in Zaria began to consider the training of local artisans as skilled workers. They were also given technical instructions in the workshop, as regards the various crafts, relevant to the needs of the railway and the public works.²⁰⁶

According to F.D. Lugard in 1919 a "junior post" in the civil service required qualification including "at least some ability in reading and writing... English and in Arithmetic."²⁰⁷ For a senior post the qualification requirement included a "good knowledge of English and accountancy..."²⁰⁸ The opening of senior posts to the colonized was more in theory; in practice the British ensured that these were occupied by Europeans. But more important was the fact that the colonized in the province could not even go for the lower cadre jobs because the

206. E.H.B. Iaing, "Zaria Province Annual Report...1911".

207. Lord Lugard, op.cit., p.127

208. Ibid., p.127.

British did not offer the people the kind of education that would enable them to meet the requirement. The colonized workers earned extremely low wages and had nothing worth being called benefits. But the question of benefits should not be raised because of the super exploitation, the adverse racial discriminatory practices, and the absence of working rights.

Despite its being numerically small, the colonized working class had strength as a social force. Both in potential capacity, and in deeds, it played a leading role in the anti-colonial struggles. The colonizer knew the danger of any forged unity among the ranks of the workers. The British exploited and manipulated primordial prejudices and chauvinistic attitudes between the peoples. Ethno-cultural divisions of the colonized were exploited to segregate workers of different nationalities. In terms of working site, accommodation, and so on, workers, forced labourers, and migrant labourers were separately treated; artificial policy of segregation was introduced as regards "native Africans", "non-native Africans," Christians, Muslims, and "pagans." This policy was enforced in the tin mines where the so-called pagans of Southern

Zaria and similar communities were "despised by the more sophisticated Hausa, Yoruba, Fulanis etc; of the Christian and Mohammedan Communities."²⁰⁹

Despite this, it was in strike methods that the Zaria workers found a weapon to wage struggle for increase wages and better working conditions. At that time there were no organized trade unions.

In November 1921 a "strike of African Railway ^{Mechanics} and labourers occurred at Zaria."²¹⁰ In the process the workers made attempts at disrupting train services by "placing stones on rail etc."²¹¹ The colonial authorities - with all the legal and other coercive instruments at their disposal - moved in to break the strike and to crush the struggle against colonial exploitation and oppression. The first measure was the arrest of the leaders of the railway strikers. Second, there was the arrest of several workers and their ejection from the "Railway Native Location" quarters on the orders of the station Magistrate.²¹² The railway Management then fell back to exploit the situation of mass unemployment in Zaria which increased

209. Major G. St. J-Orde Browne, op.cit., p.54.

210. J.C. Sciortino, "Zaria Province Annual Report No.78 and Returns 1921," NAK: ZAR PROF No.455/1921.

211. Ibid.

212. Ibid.

to a higher plane since the end of World War I. That is, there was a snappy fall-back to recruit from the reserved army of the unemployed to replace the dismissed striking workers. Thus, "substitute labour was quickly engaged locally from among a large number of unemployed (ex-soldiers etc)." ²¹³

The point has already ~~been~~ made that the Zaria workers were yet to be organized in labour unions in the phase under study. However, the struggle of the workers in the various sectors grew in number by the day; and this was to subsequently contribute to the emergence of trade unions which were to play a central role in the anti-colonial movement at a later stage.

2.5 Colonial Education

Every society has its own kind of educational system. To a large extent an educational system is nurtured by the environment; with the needs of society and the challenges of the times influencing its direction. ²¹⁴ The ruling classes go a long way

213. Ibid.

214. W. Rodney, op.cit., p.263; and Uyilawa Usuanlele, "State and Education in Benin Division 1897-1952", post-graduate Seminar paper, Department of History, ABU, Zaria, 7th May, 1988.

in spelling out the sort of educational system needed, its purpose and content inclusive. Education covers all fields of human knowledge. Whether it is on the question of culture, economy, science and technology, combating illiteracy, and so on, society has to be armed with knowledge. In other words education is central in the development and progress of all human society.

The genesis of colonial education in Zaria Province is linked with the arrival of two Missionaries of the Church Missionary Society (CMS). In this regard Reverend Herbert Tugwell (CMS bishop of Nigeria 1894-1919) and Dr. Walter R. Miller got to Zaria town at the same time with the British colonial invaders.²¹⁵ E.P.T. Crampton has stated that the first task the two performed was they "took it upon themselves to explain the British occupation to the masses."²¹⁶ In essence Herbert Tugwell and W.R. Miller promoted British imperialist aggression and opposed nationalists who challenged the invaders. W.R. Miller also specifically advised

215. M.M. Tukur, "The Nature, Extent and Essence of British Policy..."

216. E.P.T. Crampton, "Christianity in Northern Nigeria," in Ogbu Kalu (ed.), Christianity in West Africa: The Nigerian Story, Daystar Press, Ibadan, 1978, p.43.

the ruler of Zazzau, Kwasau, "that his security depended upon his welcoming the British and he influenced the writing of the letter sent by the Emir to Lugard requesting British protection."²¹⁷

When H. Tugwell and W.R. Miller arrived Kano in 1901 the ruler of Kano soon issued them an **expulsion** order on the basis of suspicious activities.²¹⁸ On their return to Zaria Kwasau - who was now having problems with the colonialists - was not comfortable with the Missionaries and thus did not show them any welcoming signals. It was F.D. Lugard who now asked the Missionaries to leave Zaria and stay at "the military camp at Girku."²¹⁹ After the British conquest W.R. Miller moved the CMS headquarters to Zaria town in 1905 where he "superintends a small school, and keeps a dispensary where he welcomes natives who come for medical or surgical advise or assistance."²²⁰ By 1909 the CMS school was still limited to teaching its few pupils the rudiments of Reading, Writing, Arithmetic, and it had two adult converts.²²¹

217. Ibid., p.43.

218. Ibid., p.49.

219. Ibid., p.45.

220. C.W. Orr, "Zaria .. Annual Report for 1906."

221. G. Ormsby, op.cit.

In 1910 the CMS school implemented a slight shift in policy from a secular curricular to one which emphasized proselytization; spreading the Christian gospel was the cardinal point on the agenda of the Missionaries.²²² Proselytism started in practice on a gradual note from 1907. It led to a sharp fall in the number of pupils at the CMS school. There was a drop from 9 boys to 3 boys at the end of the year; hitherto the boys were "receiving secular instruction from Dr. Miller."²²³ With the widespread resentment against the CMS proselytization campaign the colonial authorities intervened by placing restriction on the activities of missionaries to Zaria; thus, barring them going further into other predominantly Muslim areas.

The colonialists were then faced with unbreakable resistance of the people against the entrenchment of colonialism and were not firmly in a position to tolerate any activities capable of worsening the shaky situation.²²⁴ For A. Babs Fafunwa, the process

222. J. Withers Gill, op.cit., and M.P. Porch, "Zaria Province Annual ... 1912."

223. C.W. Orr, "Zaria... Annual Report for 1907."

224. Ibid., and M.M. Tukur, "The Nature, Extent and Essence of British Policy..."

of conversion to Christianity was perceived by the people as a continuous European offensive on Islam.²²⁵

F.D. Lugard himself stated that the suspicious activities of the missionaries created a lot of tension among the people of Zaria town by 1912.²²⁶

In subsequent decades of colonial domination the Ordinary Muslims largely viewed the colonial schools (whether government or missionary) as synonymous with Christianity. The new school system was equated with Christianity since the British who conquered the Sokoto Caliphate - Zazzau inclusive - were nasara (that is, Christians).²²⁷ But as would be shown in the analysis if the British had wanted education for the people it would have happened in spite of the resentment.

Lugard himself initiated close working collaboration with W.R. Miller into the possibility of drawing an educational scheme for Zaria Province and indeed the whole of Northern Nigeria. The 1906 proposal by W.R. Miller involved the suggestion for

225. A. Babs Fafunwa, History of Education in Nigeria, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1974, p.100.

226. Lord Lugard, op.cit., p.127.

227. Dandatti Abdulkadir, The Poetry, Life and Opinions of Sa'adu Zungur, NNPC, Zaria, 1974, p.9; and Haroun al-Rashid Adamu, The North and Nigerian Unity: Some Reflection on the Political, Social and Educational Problems of Northern Nigeria, Daily Times, Lagos, 1973, p.43.

opening a school in which some Malamai (learned Islamic teachers), with their background of basic knowledge of the Qur'an and books on Islamic Jurisprudence and law, would be tutored to acquire the skill of Reading and Writing the Hausa language "in the Roman character."²²⁸ It was meant to train them to be translators of official communication that "could be read by Government officials, without as at present having to acquire a knowledge of Arabic character and language."²²⁹ The proposal added that if the Malamai wished to study beyond that level () they would be further taught "colloquial English" and the rudiments of subjects such as Arithmetic and Geography.²³⁰ The proposed ~~scheme~~ had as a target the subsequent putting an end to the practice of recruitment of clerks from Southern Nigeria and elsewhere in British West Africa.²³¹ That is, it would lead to production of individuals of Zaria, albeit Northern Nigeria, origin to occupy junior government posts such as

228. "Education of Native in Northern Nigeria", NAK: SNP7 No.4399/1906.

229. Ibid.

230. Ibid.

231. Ibid.

collectors of tolls and taxes, custom agents, scribes in the "native courts", and so on.²³²

The British colonialists envisaged the creation of an intelligentsia loyal to them through the proposed scheme. In the thinking of the British once they got the support of the Malamai, the Ulema (learned professional theologians and exponents of Islamic law), and other dominant elements in society, "the danger of fanatical outbreak" (such as the heroic anti-colonial resistance of using the Mahdist ideology) will cease; and the Muslim intelligentsia would work as staunch lackeys of British colonial domination as "they have always been in India."²³³ The proposal included the establishment of a school system for the sons of the aristocracy. The scions of the local ruling families were to have a school which would serve as a corner stone of teaching and indoctrinating them so that they grow as allies and defenders of British colonialism. Thus F.D. Lugard advanced:

232. Ibid.

233. Ibid.

If the future native rulers of Nigeria should acquire a knowledge of English and, above all, if they should acquire the standard of truth and honour which is taught in our public schools a sense of duty and responsibility in their dealing with their people and of loyalty to the Government and an understand of its methods and policy; the Fulani would with their natural ability and capacity for rule become invaluable co-operators with the British administration.²³⁴

W.R. Miller maintained that even though the education of Malamai should "be purely secular" it was "only a means to an end"; for ultimately he would use it to facilitate the objective of "breaking down the wall of prejudice and ignorance."²³⁵ Miller was consistent, emphatic, and unambiguous that provision of education was not the main task of the mission; instead, spreading the Christian gospel was the basic objective.²³⁶ That is why it remains contradictory for E.P.T. Grampton who has recognized this fact to have still advanced that the exclusion of Missionary activities from the predominantly Muslim areas - by the colonial authorities - restricted the spread of education in those parts.²³⁷ As Y. Turaki has aptly shown, even in the predominantly Animist

234. Ibid.

235. Ibid.

236. A.B. Fafunwa, op.cit., p.104.

237. E.P.T. Crampton, op.cit., p.102,

Scuthern Zaria, where the missions were allowed to operate more free, their main preoccupation was not to provide education to the colonized; they concentrated on spreading Christianity and established no single school in the first three decades of the colonial period.²³⁸ It should be emphasized that while the British authorities were still having discussions on the educational proposal they had for years been exploiting the resources, collecting taxes, drafting labour, and pursuing other objectives which were of primary interests to them; provision of education was not a central objective of the colonizer.

Most British officials were gripped with serious reservations about the proposed school scheme due to Miller's leanings towards conversion; only a minority, including F.D. Lugard, held a view in favour of implementing some aspects of it.²³⁹

A number of British officials and some aristocrats gave a verdict of near total rejection. On 4th February, 1907 the Resident of Zaria, C.W. Orr, expressed the view that himself and H.R. Palmer

238. Y.Turaki, op.cit., p.162.

239. "Education of Native... Northern Nigeria."

had looked at the question and were in accord "that a practical education in arts and crafts - a technical rather than mental education in fact - is far more beneficial."²⁴⁰ The Resident also met with H. Tugwell and W.R. Miller in April 1907 to discuss the proposed school for Malamai "and sons of chiefs."²⁴¹ But the crux of the matter was that the response on the part of Zaria ruling circles was negative; even those sections seen as the "most broad-minded" were opposed to it. They did not accept separation of Islam from any learning process "and they are therefore naturally inclined to look with suspicion on education conducted by a mission which is openly established for the purpose of proselytism."²⁴² The proposal came to a dead end.

Despite the prevailing circumstances there was no end to the CMS school itself. Certain elements including ex-slaves found refuge in the CMS as they took the lead in embracing the Christian faith; these

240. Ibid. Specifically see C.W. Orr to the acting High Commissioner Northern Nigeria dated 4th February, 1907.

241. C.W. Orr, "Zaria... Annual Report for 1907."

242. Ibid.

ex-slaves were among the first beneficiaries of missionary education, in Zaria Province, under the guidance of Miller.²⁴³ By 1915 the CMS school had a total of 26 pupils and lessons were then conducted in the Hausa language, before the eventual introduction of English.²⁴⁴ Generally, colonial education in the entire province - whether mission or government - was largely conducted in the Hausa language for most of the colonial period.²⁴⁵ This should not be misconstrued as being out of any desire to develop the Hausa language; rather, it was for paternalistic reasons. And yet a knowledge of English was a qualification required for employment into the Civil service and so on.

British educational policy was not directed at the common people. There was nothing close to a clarion call to the masses to have their children and wards sent to school. Neither was the limitation in the spread of colonial education due to restriction

243. A.B. Fafunwa, op.cit., p.102.

244. C.O. Migeod, op.cit.

245. Throughout the colonial period instructions were given only in Hausa language in all the government Elementary schools. Up to the 1940s the first SIM school at Kagoro - and other elementary schools it established in the province - only used Hausa as the medium of instructions. See Y. Turaki, op.cit., p.206.

of missionary activities in some areas nor the hostile attitude of some colonized aristocrats. Colonial education could have been forced on the colonized people - regardless of their attitude - if it was a principal objective as was the case with taxation, forced labour, and so on, which the people resisted and yet were imposed.²⁴⁶

The colonial authorities in the Northern Nigeria Provinces opened a school at Nassarawa in Kano February 1910. with the objective of providing education to the sons of "traditional rulers" and some Malamai. It took off with 5 pupils from Zaria Province in attendance, but their number soon rose to 18.²⁴⁷ Even in the early 1910s there was no single school established by the colonial authorities in Zaria Province.²⁴⁸ The first government school was the "Provincial Primary School" which "was opened in Zaria city" on May 8, 1914; it was modelled along the lines of the school at Nassarawa.²⁴⁹ The Zaria

246. M.M. Tukur, "The Nature, Extent and Essence of British Policy..."

247. E.J. Arnett, op.cit., p.24; and Lord Lugard, op.cit., p.130.

248. M.M. Tukur, "The Nature, Extent and Essence of British Policy..."

249. E.J. Arnett, op.cit., p.24.

Provincial School drew pupils from amongst the young members of the feudal families - as it was meant to be. It became operational with 59 pupils out of which 39 were of Zaria origin and the rest came from Bauchi and Kontagora; the total enrolment stood at 83 at the end of 1952.²⁵⁰ There was a British principal; 2 British education officers; and 6 African teachers (all products of Nassarawa).²⁵¹ In the school curricula there was Islamic Religious Instructions which remained compulsory to Muslim pupils. In relation to languages taught there were instructions "carried on in Arabic and Hausa, with English added in Standard IV, V and VI." Other subjects were Reading, Writing, Arithmetic, Geography, Drawing, Hygiene, and General Knowledge.²⁵²

The impression created in some Zaria sections, and which many people have held, has been that government schools practised discrimination purely on ethnic and religious grounds to the exclusion of other factors. A dominant view within Southern Zaria circles is that the N.A. only encouraged Hausa and

250. C.O. Migeod, op.cit.

251. E.F. Arnett, op.cit., p.24; M.M. Tukur, "The Nature, Extent and Essence of British Policy..."

252. C.O. Migeod, "Zaria Province Annual Report No.69 for 1946", NAK: ZAR PROF No.750/1946.

Muslims whilst leaving out Animist, Christians, and the non-Hausa ethnic minorities in the province.²⁵³ By this the class question which was fundamental has been obscured. Schools such as the Zaria Provincial School were never meant for the children of Hausa and Muslim peasants and other lower strata in society. The government schools were created for the scions of the aristocracy and its allies. These principal representatives of the colonizer such as Emirs and the key N.A. officials were Hausa-Fulani as well as being Muslims. Since the Central N.A. ruling circles did not involve elements of Southern Zaria nationalities the British did not extend education to them. However, this deeply class question took the form of ethnic discrimination in the South. It is important to concretized the class background of the pupils attending the Zaria Provincial School. As at 1915 there were 83 boys of which these:

...pupils, excepting 12 who are free scholars, are sons of well-to-do Zaria families, District Heads, certain village Heads and Alkali who are all able to afford school fees.²⁵⁴

253. For example, field-work interview with Bawa Bobai Gora, retired police Inspector, age 60, at Kaduna, on 6th May, 1987.

254. C.O. Migeod, "Zaria... Annual Report No.67 for 1915."

Z.A. Bonat has rightly observed that the possibility of the children of peasants and other commoners being admitted into government schools was somehow possible if they were aided by persons who were of the ruling circles.²⁵⁵ This was not easy and overall insignificant.²⁵⁶

The colonialists introduced the payment of fees to ensure that only dominant sections that were highly interested could send their sons to schools. Certainly, not even among the local rulers was anyone compelled to send their children to receive colonial education. In 1922 the Resident of Zaria noted that few of the Zaria "class which provides pupils for an industrial education can afford to send their sons to Kano" in connection with the "Kano Industrial School."²⁵⁷ One interesting thing was the argument advanced by the Zaria authorities that they could not afford to use public funds for sending pupils to the so-called Kano Industrial school because money was badly needed "for the general development

255. Z.A. Bonat, "Colonialism and the Underdevelopment of Zaria Province..." p.228.

256. Ibid., p.228.

257. E.H.B. Laing, "Zaria Provincial ... 1922."

of the province."²⁵⁸ As M.M. Tukur stated, the mere fact that school fees were introduced technically meant that even if the peasants²⁵⁹ and other commoners were allowed to send their sons to the British schools they would not have been able to afford it.²⁵⁹

However, the actual funding in terms of the total cost of maintaining the British schools was derived from the "Native Share" of the taxes; and the education officers and European teachers were paid salaries from what was called the British portion of the taxes.²⁶⁰

The historical fact that monies derived from taxes were collected from the working people goes to show that, in essence, it was the same dominated classes which had their children barred from the government schools that did finance the education of the scions of the parasitic colonized rulers.

Katsina College, as the first post primary school in Northern Nigeria, received its first set of students in 1921. It was officially opened by Governor Hugh Clifford in 1922. In the first set

258. Ibid.

259. M.M. Tukur, "The Nature, Extent and Essence of British Policy..."

260. Ibid.

were 4 students from Zaria Province.²⁶¹ According to Ahmadu Bello, Governor Clifford "had in mind the special college for princes... which they had in India."²⁶² From its inception the college attracted its students from the various ruling circles of the former Emirates and Borno. The admission policy was such that all the students were Muslims. Non-Muslims, regardless of class background and nationality, were kept away. Sons of Muslim peasants were also sort of locked out and thus did not have access to Katsina College. In fact P.M. Lubeck pointed out that the British strictly kept in line with this admission policy between 1921 and 1936.²⁶³ The elite produced at Katsina College later played a central role in Zaria nationalist politics as from the 1940s - as will be seen elsewhere in this study.

The Zaria government schools were producing teachers who would teach in their alma mater or go to do the same in some other schools. By the 1920s the schools were also supplying staff for the N.A. bureaucracy and for other colonial departments.²⁶⁴

261. J.C. Sciortino, op.cit.

262. A. Bello, op.cit., p.33.

263. P.M. Lubeck, op.cit., p.29.

264. J.C. Sciortino, op.cit.

Due to the fact that colonial education in government schools was largely for persons from the colonized ruling houses, it was them that got recruited and entrenched in the system. There were few exceptions in relation to recruitment of junior staff in the provincial and other government departments that were "outside" the N.A. As at 1925 products of the CMS school were not considered favourable for appointments (or rather being employed) in the Zaria N.A. The reason given was that their training was not suitable for N.A. jobs.²⁶⁵ Instead, the British preferred to allow the CMS school leavers to sit for competitive examination as a condition to secure appointments in the "junior clerical service under Government."²⁶⁶ In reality their largely humble origins, their Christian religious belief, their likely loyalty to the Missions that educated them, made them to be kept out of the N.A.

One more school was established in 1924 when the Craft school at Zaria town started real operation.²⁶⁷ The purpose was to teach the students the rudiments of some trade such as carpentry and handicraft and to

265. E.H.B. Laing, "Provincial Annual ... 1924".

266. Ibid.

267. E.H.B. Laing, "Provincial Annual ... 1924".

prepare them to take up jobs with the N.A.²⁶⁸ By 1924 the colonial authorities had a total of 6 schools. These were the Provincial Primary School Zaria; the Craft school; and four elementary schools located at Zaria town, Giwa, Soba, and Makarfi.²⁶⁹ All these schools had a total number of 141 pupils - excluding the craft school.²⁷⁰ The number of teaching staff was 19 plus 7 religious instructors. Only 8 of the boys who left the elementary schools in 1925 gained admission into the Provincial Primary school and they were either sons of District Heads or other N.A. officials.²⁷¹ The elementary schools were located at district headquarters - the local seat of power of the N.A. elite; and were created, in practical terms, to take care of their sons. All that time there was no single school of any sort - neither government nor voluntary agency - in the Southern districts.²⁷² The first school in the South was the elementary school opened at Zango Katab in 1928 to serve the sons of the N.A. district officials. It was not liberal in admission, and in terms of subjects taught, and was ran by what

268. Ibid.

269. Ibid.

270. Ibid.

271. Ibid.

272. Ibid.

the authorities described as "Moslem teachers." ²⁷³
 Only Hausa pupils were in attendance at the school;
 the Angan, Atyab, Bakulu, and Bajju were not having
 any access.

In the field of health-care dressers and dispensers
 were recruited among those who had finished elementary
 education. By 1926 plans were made to train persons
 of Northern Nigeria origin at Kaduna who would be
 employed to hold "subordinate posts in the Medical
 Department..."²⁷⁴ For the colonizer, Africans in
 Zaria Province were not trained as Medical doctors;
 and not even as qualified pharmacists and nurses by
 the standard obtainable in Britain. In line with a
 plan drawn, the colonialists created the "School of
 Pharmacy" at Kaduna in 1930.²⁷⁵ In reality the school
 was not for the training of pharmacists of any sort;
 rather it was "designed to provide a preliminary
 training to students of the Northern Provinces to
 enable them to pass the Dispensers' examination."²⁷⁶

273. E.H.B. Laing, "Zaria Province Annual Report No.85
 for the year ending 31st December, 1928", NAK: ZAR PROF
 No.2575.

274. E.H.B. Laing, "Zaria Province Annual Report
 No.83 for the 12 Months ending 31st December, 1926",
 NAK: ZAR PROF No.2573.

275. "Zaria Province Annual Report 1931", NAK:
 ZAR PROF No.125.

276. Ibid.

One English superintendent was appointed to be at the head of the school; and a qualified dispenser who was an indigene of Zaria - Mallam Audu - was made the "African Assistant."²⁷⁷ The school had a course of a three year duration. As at 1931 there were only 10 students (all in the second year of study) and English was the language of instruction.²⁷⁸

When the CMS moved its headquarters from Zaria city to Wusasa (at the outskirts of Zaria near Kufena hills) in 1929, it had then expanded its school to a full fledged primary school.²⁷⁹ Meanwhile, other missions such as the Roman Catholic Mission (RCM) had begun to operate schools at Kaduna and Zaria where there was a fairly large number of African employees from Southern Nigeria and elsewhere, who were members of the churches, with the pressing need to get schools provided for their children. In 1931 there were a total of 9 mission schools in the province - all located at Kaduna and Zaria.²⁸⁰

277. Ibid. "Mallam Audu was educated by the C.M.S. Zaria, and was trained as a Dispenser at the expense of Zaria Native Administration: He acts as demonstrator in Physics, Chemistry, and Dispensing, and it is intended that he should take charge of the school when the superintendent goes on leave."

278. Ibid.

279. C.A. Woodhouse, op.cit.

280. "Zaria Province... Report 1931."

It was in 1931 that the government upgraded the Zaria Provincial Primary School to a Middle School, in line with the new policy which was introduced in the entire Northern Provinces, and established a school at Kaduna.²⁸¹ Earlier in 1930 the colonial authorities opened the first elementary school in Jema'a N.A. (then in Plateau Province).²⁸² Meanwhile there was no single school in Jaba, Kagoro, and Moroa chiefdoms (then in Plateau Province); the only exception was the presence of a Sudan Interior Mission (SIM) Bible School "established at Kagoro in August, 1929..."²⁸³ But in that school nothing was taught outside the Bible and instructions were given solely in Hausa. Two more elementary schools, one each at Dutsen Wai and Kachia, were founded in 1931; the Zango Katab school was modified to be a proper elementary school.²⁸⁴ Then, the number of enrolment of pupils in the elementary schools stood at 163 in a province with a total population of 359,258.²⁸⁵

281. Ibid.

282. Y. Turaki, op.cit., p.207.

283. Ibid., p.206.

284. "Zaria Province... Report 1931."

285. Ibid.

Most of the districts were still without a single school of any sort. Drummond Hay lamented on this when he noted in 1929 that in Iere District only a European Missionary, McCullagh, principally operating a mission enterprise among the Bukurmi, was singularly running some adult literacy classes with a focus on religious instructions only.²⁸⁶ McCullagh's effort was a significant step as the only contribution that extended some literacy to the district.

The question to be asked is whether there was imbalance in the establishment of government schools in favour of northern areas as against the southern districts. From the preceding analysis an answer in the affirmative will be resorting to the empiricist fashion of simplifying a complex issue. The first schools were concentrated at Zaria town itself - which was Urban but more important the main base of the feudal aristocrats for whose children's training the schools were established in the first place. Then there was Kaduna town which was the capital of the Northern Provinces. The reality - in terms of the distribution of schools - was that most of the northern rural districts were no better than Southern Zaria up to

286. D. Hay, op.cit.

the 1930s. At the time elementary schools were established in some Southern Zaria districts such as Zango Katab (1928) and Kachia (1931), northern Zaria districts such as Zango Aya, Ikara, Igabi and Anchau, were without any elementary school.

Z.A. Bonat has argued that Emirs, District Heads, and other N.A. ruling forces, opposed the spread of schools to Southern Zaria on the basis of their having fear of secularism undermining Islamic education; and that the aristocrats wanted to even dictate the syllabuses where there was a school.²⁸⁷ But for S. Yohanna the Zaria aristocrats even went beyond that; they were at the root of the problem because:

This apathy by the ruling class towards education for Southern Zaria in addition to British zeal to please the ruling classes probably explains why the British lukewarm (sic) towards education in Southern Zaria.²⁸⁸

The wrong assumption is that the British on their own wanted to take schools to Southern Zaria but the opposition came from the Hausa-Fulani N.A. ruling circles. It also means that the aristocracy promoted

287. Z.A. Bonat, "Colonialism and the Underdevelopment of Zaria Province...." p.235.

288. S. Yohanna, op.cit., p.171.

the creation of schools or advancement of education elsewhere in the province; and that educational opportunities were available for the children of the dominated Hausa classes in say northern Zaria - which was not true. Whatever the negative views, ethnic oppression, arrogance, and chauvinistic attitude of the Zaria rulers towards Southern Zaria they were not a decisive factor in determining colonial education. If the provision of education for Southern Zaria were central on the agenda of the colonizer there was nothing the colonized ruling elements in their employ could do to frustrate or obstruct it.

When the colonial authorities began to introduce schools in Southern Zaria the targets were the children of the dominant elements within the various nationalities. In 1933 Resident W. Morgant stressed that except for the elementary schools at Zango Katab and Kachia there "has been no provision for education hitherto" in the South. Furthermore, that the schools were lacking in the "object of attracting as pupils relatives or dependents of the pagan Village Heads and Elders who would later form the nucleus of a local clerical staff."²⁸⁹ The new

289. W. Morgant, "Zaria Provincial Annual Report for 1933", NAK: ZAR PROF No.1693.

direction was now [] to pick adult pupils from the Southern Zaria ruling circles and impart to them some rudiments of Reading, Writing, and Arithmetic. Elementary schools were basically to produce scribes for Animist and non-Hausa Southern Village Heads; the latter had Hausa scribes attached to them.²⁹⁰ When recruited the duties of the products of the Southern schools were to be keeping registers related to village affairs, issue receipts in matters such as payment of taxes and fines, and taking care of correspondence between the village chiefs and the District Heads.²⁹¹ On completion of school the scions of southern agents of colonialism were [] employed and limited to such posts and were not allowed to the middle school as the scions of the Hausa-Fulani ruling circles.

The British took a decision in 1933 to start sending outstanding pupils from Southern Zaria schools to the Elementary Teachers Training Centre at Toro (in Bauchi Province), which had been established in 1928 for the children of Animist ruling circles of Northern Nigeria.²⁹² The Toro curricula limited

290. Ibid.

291. Ibid.

292. John N. Paden, Ahmadu Bello: Sardauna of Sokoto: Values and Leadership in Nigeria, Hudaib, Zaria, 1986, p.90.

teaching to rudiments of the various subjects and all instructions were in Hausa.²⁹³ In this connection the paternalism involved was profound. Whilst the students at Katsina College (who were predominantly from Muslim ruling background) were instructed in English, those at Toro (from Animist ruling origin) received instructions in the language of the supposedly more civilized Hausa. In Zaria products of Toro were employed in no any other sphere of the N.A. apart from the Education Department as elementary school teachers. They were not posted to teach in the predominantly Muslim districts. This policy also affected those teachers of Animist background who had converted to Islam. On the other hand Hausa teachers (trained separately at Katsina Elementary Teachers Training Centre and elsewhere) were not posted to schools in the South of the province - except in schools located at Hausa settlements meant for Muslim pupils.²⁹⁴ In all this the British segregated different sections of the petite bourgeoisie. That is, the colonizer resorted to a clear policy of ethno-religious polarization of

293. Field-Work interview with Suleiman Dodo Tudu, Toro trained retired teacher, age about 70, at unguwar Wakili, on 10th February, 1987.

294. Ibid.

the government schools to undermine the chances of forging some level of unity among the elite and to create basis of conflict in the future.

With the introduction of the Toro scheme in the South one Atyab young man, Dawa La'aki, was sent "to the Elementary Teachers Training centre at Toro" in 1933 where he was to be trained for a duration of 3 years.²⁹⁵ In the interim, that is before Dawa La'aki "comes into the field", the now boarding elementary school at Zango Katab was slightly altered in 1934; adult classes were now introduced for the youth of various ruling circles of different nationalities in Southern Zaria (with Kagoro, Jaba, and Moroa transferred to the province in 1934) but excluding Hausa, Fulani, and Muslims in general.²⁹⁶ During one year of existence there were 40 pupils from 20 different ethnic groups attending the school.²⁹⁷ In 1936 Dawa La'aki finished from Toro and became the first indigene of Southern Zaria to be employed by the Zaria N.A., in the Education Department. When the first set of "adult classes" at Zango Katab

295. W. Morgant, op.cit.

296. D.M.H. Beck, op.cit.

297. D.M.H. Beck, "Zaria Province Annual Report for 1935," NAK: ZAR PROF No.2282.

completed their elementary school in 1936, Resident D.M. Beck stated that they were "capable of assisting their community heads in clerical work and administration"; and the Zango Katab school was now "extremely valuable in providing an annual source of supply" of students to Toro "where it is gratifying to record that the three of the Zaria products are regarded as the most promising pupils in the Centre."²⁹⁸

Earlier the Zaria authorities did move to further enhance the drive of finding teachers for the Southern Zaria schools before Toro products started coming into the field. Thus the Resident explained in 1934:

One teacher in Training, Mallam Maina, has recently completed an intensive course of instructions at the C.M.S. Wusasa: he will be joined at the end of January 1935 by Mallam Othman, at present employed in the Northern Provinces secretariat, when both will proceed to Katab to form elementary classes...²⁹⁹

Subsequently, in May 1939 the "boarding school at Zango Katab was closed" and replaced by "an ordinary (non-Moslem) elementary school" for the Atyab, Bajju,

298. D.M.H. Beck, "Zaria Provincial Annual Report for 1936", NAK: ZAK PROF No.2665.

299. D.M.H. Beck, "Zaria Province.. for 1934."

Bakulu, Atsam, and Angan youth at Mabuhu - Zonzon.³⁰⁰ Maina was the first head of the school and he was there for many years; the school was the first cornerstone of the Atyab intelligentsia which emerged later. At the same time the Mabuhu-zonzon elementary school was opened in January 1939, three other elementary schools located at Kufena, Sabon Sarki, and Kwei, were established "under teachers trained at Toro."³⁰¹ With this there was growing pressure mounted on the colonial authorities for more schools in the Southern part of the province than elsewhere.³⁰²

Found were some British officers who suggested that the purpose of elementary schools in Southern Zaria should be to turn out "improved" peasants. The argument advanced by the racists was that Animist communities were too backward for pupils to be taught the rudiments of Reading, Writing, and Arithmetic; because their environment had little use for literacy. One education officer was of the view that what was of real value - and needed to be emphasized - were outdoor activities such as farming

300. F.M. Moad, op.cit.

301. Ibid.

302. F.M. Moad, "Zaria Province Annual Report 1943", NAK: ZAR PROF No.3810.

and sanitation towards improving "local condition of living in so far as they affect the supply of food and the health of the community."³⁰³

By the 1940s the question of more schools and a more liberal admission policy was an aspect of the nationalist struggle of the peoples in the South. Some first generation products of the government school system played active roles in the agitation for more schools. This could be seen in the Afogo village of Kajuru District in 1953. Afogo had a population of 3,041 but without a single school of any type. An indigene of Afogo - a professional teacher - M.A. Maiyashi, wrote a number of petitions to the authorities raising the issue of complete neglect and absence of school in the area; and also raised the question as to how people were expected to progress without education.³⁰⁴ The slight change to a more flexible admission policy into the British schools led to a relative expansion of educational

303. "Elementary School in Ayu District Jema'a Division", NAK: ZAR PROF No.32.

304. Letter by M.A. Maiyashi - dated August 17, 1953 - to D.O. Zaria, in R.L. Panyne, "Kajuru District Affairs (1952-56)", NAK: ZAR PROF No.389.

opportunities for Southern elements as from about 1946; when there was some shift in terms of the segregative restrictions as part of the reforms in the decolonization process. The 1946 peasant uprisings in some Southern districts contributed to the new policy of allowing elements from those areas to attend the Zaria Middle school. But because the peasants, who were the main force in the nationalist struggles, had no access to government schools for their children it was mainly the sons of local lackeys of colonial domination who were the immediate beneficiaries of the educational reforms. Between 1948 and 1951 there were 21 pupils from different Southern ethnic groups who went to the Zaria Middle School; they were largely sons of chiefs and village Heads. These Southern students of Animist origin were now converting to either Christianity or Islam.³⁰⁵

At the time the national liberation movement in the province had gathered momentum towards putting an end to colonialism, after the World War II in 1945, Zaria town itself was already occupying the most central position as the leading educational centre in

305. Chart titled (in Hausa): Yayan Arna da ke Middle School, Kabila Kasa Kasa, da Shekaru fita daga Middle, in "Zango Katab - unrest ... 1946."

Northern Nigeria. Katsina College was transferred from Katsina to Kaduna in 1938 with the new name of Kaduna College; in 1949 it was moved to Zaria and its name was changed to Government College Zaria.³⁰⁶ There was the Gaskiya Corporation - the centre of publishing - principally for publishing educational books and the then two newspapers in Northern Nigeria;^{and} it was owned by the government. Also found at Zaria were a women Training Centre; Agricultural College; Clerical School; and Dispensary Attendants Training School.³⁰⁷ These institutions were giving training to students for the entire Northern Provinces. There was also the railway school at Zaria - the only of its kind in Northern Nigeria. By 1945 the CMS was operating a secondary school at Wusasa Zaria although it did not have senior classes, and thus not complete.

It has been pointed out that the nationalities in Southern Zaria did not have a single university graduate for the whole period that British colonialism

306. J.N. Paden, op.cit, p.89.

307. G.D. Pitcairn, "Zaria Province Annual Report for 1945", NAK: ZAR PROF No.4032.

lasted.³⁰⁸ In northern Zaria there were very few individuals who acquired higher education; some of it was due to the CMS efforts as was the case of Dr. R.A.B. Dikko who was trained in Britain as a medical doctor by the mission.³⁰⁹ The Nigeria College of Arts, Science and Technology Zaria, which was to start in 1952, began to operate fully in November 1957.³¹⁰ It became the first leading higher institution in Northern Nigeria. Thus for nearly the entire colonial period the British did not provide tertiary education. Two of the three standard secondary schools in Northern Nigeria as at early 1950s were located in Zaria Province; they were the Government College Zaria and the RCM owned Saint John's College Kaduna.³¹¹ In 1954 the Zaria Middle School was transformed into a Secondary School.³¹² The second government senior primary school (the first being at Soba Zaria) was opened at Kachia in 1956; it became the first full fledged

308. First field-work interview with Shekarau Kau Lavyah, retired teacher, politician, age 63, at Samaru Katab, 13th January, 1987.

309. E.P.T. Crampton, op.cit., p.134.

310. A.B. Fafunwa, op.cit., p.177; and C.K. Wreford, "Zaria Province Annual Report 1957", NAK: ZAR PROF No.STA/30.

311. E.P.T. Crampton, op.cit., p.118.

312. C.V. Williams, "Zaria Province Annual Report 1954", NAK: ZAR PROF No.5404.

government primary school in the Southern districts.³¹³ This came at a time the Christian Missions² who started a school system in Southern Zaria in the 1940s, had overtaken the colonial governments by far in the number of junior and senior primary schools.

The analysis requires some focus on the role of Christian Missionaries in the domain of their brand of colonial education in the province. The dominant perception has been that Missionaries⁴ were promoters of education as opposed to the colonial authorities. The view has been endorsed by Simon Yohanna that except for the Missionaries' presence in Southern Zaria education would not have reached there because the colonial authorities "completely neglected education for the area."³¹⁴ In the same manner some "concerned citizens of Nerzit (Southern Zaria) origin" have idealized the Christian Missionaries and portrayed them as some sort of liberators as well as the prime movers of the development of colonial education in the South. According to them:

313. A.D. Yahaya, op.cit., p.79.

314. S. Yohanna, op.cit., p.157 and p.166.

Education did not come to the Nerzit area through government efforts. Rather Missionaries in their attempt to spread the Gospel brought in Western education. Missionaries found a fertile ground because their attempt to convert through the provision of services contrasted very sharply with the proponents of Islam who were associated with suppression and plunder. To gain converts, the missionary organizations established primary schools and post primary schools and carried most of the burden of running them.³¹⁵

In all this, therefore, the Missionaries have been praised - somehow like some Gods on-high - for collectively being the motive force that took colonial education to the South of the province. As shown elsewhere in previous analysis, in this study, this is a profound distortion of history; it is full of ethnic-religious subjectivism and chauvinism. Of course, proselytism was the fundamental focus of the missions in the province; that was why up to the early 1940s they did not create schools in the Southern districts despite the presence of some of them such as the SIM right from the 1910s. E.P.T. Crampton has shown that before the World War II years, [redacted] Missions such as the CMS

315. Bala Achi et al, "Memorandum submitted to the Administration Committee of Investigation into the March 1987 Crisis in Kaduna State by a Group of Concerned Citizens of Nerzit (Southern Zaria) Origin. Mimeo. pp 44-45.

and the RCM restricted their efforts in relation to operating a school system to the Urban centres.³¹⁶

As the pioneer mission in the Southern districts, the SIM started its activities from the second decade of the colonial period. The SIM held a puritan doctrine; its headquarters was at Jos with Dr. Rowland Bingham as its founder. The SIM set up its early stations in the province at Dama Kasuwa in Chawai District; Kurmin Musa in Kachia District; and at Kagoro town. George Haderson was in charge of the principal station at Dama Kasuwa which had 80 adherents by 1931. Membership was drawn from people brought from various places to work or be trained by the SIM; then it had no converts amongst the local Animist population.³¹⁷ On education both as a policy and in practice the SIM was "more interested in the direct preaching of the gospel than establishing schools"; and Dr. R. Bingham had strong suspicion of the motives of those missions which established schools.³¹⁸

Even when the SIM founded a Bible School at Kagoro in 1929 the purpose and objectives were well

316. E.P.T. Crampton, op.cit., p.108.

317. "Zaria Province... Report 1931".

318. E.P.T. Crampton, op.cit., p.104 and p.105.

spelt-out, by Dr. A.P. Strirett, that all instructions must start and finish with the Bible and the African pupils should be taught nothing else:

Don't lead them into English, Maths, Science etc. Keep the Bible as the text book and the only one...

Thus sending out successive relays of young men with the word of God in their hands and Christ God in their heart: Out not as agents of the mission, not in any way dependent upon the mission, not even dependent on any church, but quite independent to go wherever God may open their way to go.³¹⁹

Thus in both ideological and practical sense this type of education aimed at producing half-baked characters who will be very docile and subservient to a particular backward Judeo-Christian world view. Yusufu Turaki has shown that in concrete terms - and in spite of its low content - education provided in colonial government schools was by far more secular and superior in quality than the type obtainable in Southern Zaria mission schools before the 1950s.³²⁰ According to an informant, in the 1930s and 1940s those attending the SIM Bible school were constantly warned not to participate in the nationalist struggles of the Southern peoples; the mission held that such

319. As quoted in Y. Turaki, op.cit., p.206.

320. Ibid. p.213.

was in contradiction with its teaching^{and 269} any violation was met with expulsion from the school and possibly being thrown out of the Church.³²¹

In the South both the white missionaries and their local converts had contempt for Animists. They called them names such as Masa Guhu (uncivilized or people in darkness); and with monetheistic arrogance the religion of the Animists was called tsafi (heathen, idol worshipping, and occultism). The missionaries generally attacked polygamy; marking ceremonies in memory of deceased relatives; and other customs. The general response of the peoples towards the missions was one of distrust by different classes and sections of the population and for different reasons. The ordinary people viewed the missionaries as some kind of aggressors on their culture. Out of their own class interests Animist dominant circles in alliance with the Hausa-Fulani aristocrats saw the missions as rival forces out to wax influence on society, and thus capable of undermining their authority and control over the population. Animist elders perceived the Missionaries as people out to undermine their privileges and turning the youth away

321. One informant said he was expelled from the SIM Bible school Kagoro because of his participation in the Bajju anti-colonial struggles in the 1940s. Field-work interview with M. Nakaje, op.cit.

from the "traditional" ways; anyone who had crossed over to Christianity was tagged as having sold out to Banza (something or someone that is useless).³²²

Only when the Missions began to establish schools in Southern Zaria in the 1940s, as part of their own reforms to keep with the pace of decolonization, did their proselytism make serious impact. At that time the church was transforming into a viable channel to secure a place in the classroom towards advancement. Among the Southern ethnic groups the older generations had no direct personal business with the mission school system; most of them rejected Christianity and remained predominantly Animist.³²³ In the post World War II years the missions were already thinking about the place of their local converts in the future order that was approaching. They were now moving beyond proselytization; reforms in the educational policy involved establishing more schools.

322. First field-work interview with Shokarau Kau Layyah, op.cit.

323. As at 1952 "population statistics by religion groups" showed that in Zaria Province there were 494,000 Muslims constituting 61.4% of the total population. Animists stood at 248,000 or 30.8% of the total population. There were 63,000 Christians constituting 7.8% of the overall population. Source: E.P.T. Crampton, op.cit., p.209.

Rise in nationalist activities in the Southern districts of Zaria went side-by-side with the tremendous awakening among the youth for education. At that stage people were ready to accept schools from whoever was ready to offer one due to the burning desire.³²⁴ In the words of Walter Rodney - in the wider context of colonial Africa - the colonized saw their future in education and did much to take advantage of the minimal openings or opportunities.³²⁵

With the tremendous quest for schools in the South of the province any Missionary enterprise incapable of providing education became irrelevant to the people and was abandoned as people moved to Churches that established schools. In some cases Church members supplied building materials and gave monetary contributions so that their children have access to school.³²⁶ In the 1950s the colonial authorities began extending financial aid to certain missions in connection with the field of education.³²⁷ With the Missions expanding their schools by the year there were still problems including financial constraints.

324. Ibid., p.119.

325. W. Rodney, op.cit., p.277.

326. First field-work interview with Shekarau Kau Layyah, op.cit.

327. F.P.T. Crampton, op.cit., p.119.

There were 51 mission schools in Zaria Province by 1950.³²⁸ Compared with the demand the schools were inadequate and insignificant. Pupils in most of the Southern villages had to travel for many miles or to move from their homes to stay where the schools were located - if they were lucky to secure a place. Also, the issue of paying school fees made it quite impossible for children from very poor background to pursue even elementary education even if admitted.

Rivalry existed between some missionary organization in Southern Zaria. It often went beyond healthy competition and resulted in conflict; this was especially between the RCM and the protestants.³²⁹ This negative inter-mission rivalry affected the establishment of more schools, in some instances, towards the end of the period of study.³³⁰ In June 1951 the SIM establishment protested to the authorities in connection with the building of a RCM school at Zaman Dabo. ~~On the basis~~ The basis of the SIM position was a claim that Zaman Dabo was

328. C.V. Williams, "Zaria Provincial Annual Report 1950", NAK: ZAR PROOF No.4844.

329. Z.A. Bonat, "Colonialism and the Underdevelopment of Zaria Province..." p.241.

330. A.L. Yahaya, op.cit., pp111-112.

its sphere of influence and that the RCM was not welcome in the area by the people. Despite the clear popular wish for the RCM school by its local members, the authorities stopped the establishment of the school in September 1952.³³¹ It was almost on the eve of independence that the RCM was allowed to go ahead. All over Zango Katab District the rivalry between the SIM and the RCM reached a high point to the extent that it was more easy for a Muslim child to be admitted in their schools than a Christian child whose parents belonged to a rival domination.³³²

The total population of Zaria Province stood at 821,159 in 1957. Then, there were only 4,289 pupils in N.A. junior primary schools in all the Zaria N.A. districts; Jema'a Division (Moroa, Kagoro, Jaba, and Jema'a) had 376. In contrast the voluntary agencies - largely Mission - had 12,185 attending their schools, including 2,537 from Jema'a.³³³ For the senior primary schools the total enrolment figures in the N.A. schools stood at 272; there was no a single of such schools in the chiefdoms of Jaba,

331. Ibid., pp 111-112

332. First field-work interview with Shekarau Kau Layyah, op.cit.

333. C.K. Wreford, op.cit.

Kagoro, Birnin Gwari, and Moroa, as well as Jema'a. However, there were 1,652 pupils in the mission senior primary schools all over Zaria Province; 474 pupils out of the overall figures were found in Jema'a Division.³³⁴ By the 1950s, therefore, there were now more primary schools and pupils in mission schools than in government schools in the entire province; also Southern Zaria overtook northern Zaria in the number of schools and pupils attending them. But within the Southern Zone itself there were serious discrepancy between the various districts and nationalities in the distribution of mission schools and the spread of educational opportunities. Majority of the mission ^{schools} were located in Jema'a Division; Ham area of Kachia District; and Zango Katab District than elsewhere in Southern Zaria.

Educated sections of the Zaria petite bourgeoisie suffered from some forms of discrimination. Even the intelligentsia from aristocratic background were left out of decision making bodies at all levels of the colonial government. They were mostly confined to teaching careers which placed them in a weaker position than their less educated kinsmen such as the Emirs and District Heads who dominated the top posts

334. Ibid.

in the N.As. The forms of discrimination and marginilization permeated the various levels and sections; and thus became a basis of the increased nationalist agitations by the educated elements.

In the context of Southern Zaria Z.A. Bonat has advanced that Missionary trained educated elite joined the nationalist struggles, especially from 1945, partly due to their having been kept out of N.A. and other government jobs.³³⁵ A.D. Yahaya has shown that by the 1950s most of the Southern petit-bourgeois were people trained by the missionaries; but the kind of education they received in the 1940s was to a large extent restricted to Church related jobs such as evangelists or teachers of Christian religion in Hausa language. Those trained as teachers were not quite better. Although they were in majority, their level of educational attainment was generally lower than that of Southern Zaria elite educated by the colonialists.³³⁶ But even the latter were highly marginalized in government jobs.

Products of government elementary schools were largely left unemployed in the villages as peasants,

335. Z.A. Bonat, "Colonialism and the Underdevelopment of Zaria Province..." p.241.

336. A.D. Yahaya, op.cit., p.41.

and the few with jobs were limited to serving as scribes to Village Heads. Those who attended Toro college were given jobs but confined to being government elementary school teachers. The educated petit-bourgeois elements in the Southern Zone of Zaria Province - whether mission or government trained - were more marginalized than their counterparts from northern Zaria due to the British policies in relation to the various ethnic groups. This partly informed why the Southern Zaria elite came out to give leadership to the anti-colonial movement as from the late 1940s. On the whole the class nature, coupled with deliberate British policy on education and other fields, led to the emergence of a weak Southern Zaria petite bourgeoisie with no significant place in the state apparatus, private firms, and no capital for private business.³³⁷

It is important also to note that in the colonial context the Missionaries ran their schools in such a way that made teachers in their employ no more free than the pupils. A mission such as the SIM had a clause in the condition of service which every teacher in its employ must sign stating "that he was not a member of the Nigerian Union of Teachers and

337. U. Usualale, "Preliminary Notes on the Socio-Economic Origins of ..."

understood that if he joined his appointment would be terminated immediately."³³⁸ Such a measure was partly aimed at stifling the drive of mission teachers to participate in the daily struggle for better working conditions and to control them in a particular direction in all their activities.

Colonial education provided a very high limited space for women when compared with men. Britain itself which was the colonial power, and as a leading industrial power, entered the 20th century with a strong chauvinistic victorian attitude towards women.³³⁹ British women were not occupying any significant positions in the public and other sectors. In Zaria Province and elsewhere the colonial officials were men. As late as 1943 only 198 girls were in attendance at elementary school in the province. Also in that year 8 girls were for the first time allowed to enrol into the middle school on experimental basis.³⁴⁰ And this did not significantly change for the rest of the colonial period. Thus, there was a near total absence of women in the various governmental sectors and the private firms.

338. E.P.T. Crampton, op.cit., p.117.

339. W. Rodney, op.cit., p.276.

340. F.M. Noad, "Zaria Province ... Report 1943."

The kind of education envisaged and given by the colonialists and the missionaries, somehow aimed at producing docile and subservient characters among the colonized, gave rise to its own contradictions. Whilst some educated petit-bourgeois elements became conscious tools of the continuous domination of their people, others linked up with the nationalist aspirations of the colonized masses. Despite the rudimentary knowledge the colonialists and the missions dished out in their schools, it often quite turned into a weapon which they utilized to fight the system of national enslavement that produced them and which armed them to take part in the struggles to shape the future of their people.³⁴¹ This will be shown in more concrete situations in the context of the later phases of the nationalist movement in Zaria Province.

The analysis in this chapter has shown that the colonial state was established to control the life

341. W. Rodney, op.cit., p.289.

of the people of Zaria Province in all spheres; fundamentally in the interest of the British and at a tertiary level their local representatives. The colonial process led to the emergence of new classes among the colonized and the transformation of some with roots in pre-colonial society; new contradictions emerged both within and between various classes. Also, the secondary nationalist struggles were concrete actions directed against colonial exploitation, oppression, and policies by the working people not only as classes but as nationalities and so on. Colonial education produced an elite among the colonized which would later emerge at the head of the nationalist movement.

CHAPTER THREE

THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT 1929 - THE EARLY 1940s

3.1 Introduction

Both the Great Economic Depression and the World War II occupy a significant place in the history of colonial Zaria Province. These two historical events triggered to the fore all sorts of contradictions embedded in the colonial system. In the course of all these the grim struggle between the colonizer - for the survival of the system - and the determination of the colonized to liberate themselves, reached a high pitch. The capitalist economic crisis of 1929-1930s and the World War II of 1939-1945 led to drastic changes in the social, economic, political, and other spheres, in the larger context of the African colonies.¹ During that period the increased harsh realities of British colonialism in Zaria Province manifested in the anti-people policies, political repression, exploitative and oppressive taxes, forced labour, demand on the peasantry to produce export crops, the massive exploitation and oppression of workers, the racial discriminatory

1. Bill Freund, The Making of Contemporary Africa: The Development of African Society Since 1800, Macmillan Press, London, 1984, pp 192-193.

practices against African employees by Europeans, and the tyranny and brutalization of the peasantry and other lower classes by the Zaria aristocracy and the Southern Zaria chiefs. Colonial predators such as mass poverty among the population and social injustice still held sway. In the great economic depression and World War II the peasants put up nationalist protests and revolts. The workers employed strike tactics in their nationalist struggles against exploitation and oppression.

3.2 The Great Economic Depression and the Nationalist Movement

Profound severe effects of the Great Economic Depression years were felt all over Zaria Province between 1929 and the 1930s. The colonizer intensified the exploitation of mineral resources, agricultural produce and human labour. The province experienced galloping inflation, massive unemployment, retrenchment of workers, and the fall in the value of the currency. In the minefields of the Jos Plateau (where a substantial number of Zaria migrants went in search of jobs), and even in the mining areas of Southern Zaria, there was mass retrenchment of the labour force; those who retained jobs had drastic reductions of their wages.

Meanwhile, the Anglo-Oriental companies which enjoyed a high degree of monopoly in mining made super profits especially in the late 1930s.² In relation to the peasantry, the collapsed of prices of the agricultural produce was accompanied by the upwards movement of colonial taxes coupled with all sorts of exploitative policies and extortion. The colonial state ensured further control of the market during the depression; the people were sort of compelled to buy the highly expensive imported British goods during the depression.³

(a) The Peasantry

In the course of the Great Economic Depression the peasantry was compelled to produce more export agricultural commodities than previously. But the rise in the quantity of export crops did not go with any increase in the prices of the agrarian raw materials by the authorities and the private firms. The harsh conditions facing the producers exacerbated. Whilst groundnut production in Northern Nigeria rose by 30% between 1930 and 1932, the price at the local markets

2. Ibid., pp 120-121.

3. M. Okoye, Storms on the Niger: A Story of Nigeria's Struggle, Fourth Dimension, Enugu, 1981, pp 80-81.

took a downward trend.⁴ And with the rocketing inflation, the material conditions of the peasantry got worse by the day; and only by more and more production could the peasant producers of export crops try to cope with the terribly situation.⁵ In 1931 the Zaria authorities noted that the peasants actually produced more agrarian raw materials; but side-by-side with this was a sharp fall in terms of the prices of the export commodities.⁶ Groundnut purchased in 1931 increased by about 57% as compared with that of 1930, and in spite of this the price remained low.⁷ The problems of the peasant producers were also compounded by the fact that the companies and the colonial government were claiming that there was little money in circulation to pay them.⁸

The UAC enjoyed a monopoly in connection with the control of the market and the determination of the prices of export agrarian raw materials produced by the Zaria peasantry. In 1937 the UAC was buying groundnut

4. Albert T. Nzula et al, Forced Labour in Colonial Africa, Zed Press, London, p.93.

5. Ibid., 93.

6. "Zaria Province Annual Report 1931", NAK: ZAR PROF No.125.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

at £7 and 10 shillings per ton "at all stations on the railway."⁹ In 1932 the Resident of Zaria maintained that due "to the failure of the Senegal crop" - which was a leading world producing area - "the price rose rapidly until it" reached £11 and 10 shillings per ton in early March. In reality this was short-lived. The price fell to £8 per ton in May and further slumped to £6 and 10 shillings per ton in June 1932.¹⁰ That is to say, even in circumstances in which the price of groundnut was supposed to rise (following the trend of the international trading system) such as in 1932, it instead fell by £1 less in June than the corresponding period of the previous year.¹¹

As the economic crisis was biting harder on the colonized peasantry the British put in motion the N.A. machinery - using the Emirs and Chiefs for propaganda, and coercion - to ensure that the peasant farmers produce more export crops such as ginger. The focus on ginger production was on the Southern districts of Kachia, Kagarko, and Zango Katab. In the early 1920s the UAC had established a ginger buying station at Zonkwa (in Zango Katab District) on the eastern

9. Ibid.

10. "Zaria Provincial Annual Report 1932", NAK: ZAR PROF No.1258.

11. Ibid.

railway line. The growth in peasants production of ginger, and their exploitation by the capitalist firms, can be partly seen in the light of the purchase made in four consecutive years.

For the year 1929, the UAC purchased 6 tons of ginger. The quantity went up to 11 tons in 1930. It further rose to 15 tons in 1931. By 1932 the UAC bought 39 tons of the commodity from Southern peasant producers.¹² This was a quantitative rise of more than 150% in comparison with the total ginger purchase of 1931. But there was the other reality; the ginger producers were paid low prices. A comparison of ginger prices for two different slightly distant years illustrates this point. A ton of ginger produced in 1919 sold at £36.¹³ But the UAC paid £32, 13 shillings and 4 pence per ton in 1932 for the most qualitative variety of ginger (that is, grade one).¹⁴

A devastating impact of the policy of forcing the population to cultivate export crops, coupled with

12. Ibid.

13. "Zaria Province ... Report 1931."

14. "Zaria Provincial ... Report 1932."

forced labour, was the famine and food shortages. One calamity which contributed to more hunger and poverty was the locust - and other flying swarm - invasion of 1930 and 1931.¹⁵ Part of the severe impact of the locust invasion was the destruction of food crops.¹⁶ By mid-1931 many farmlands in some Southern districts were engulfed and destroyed by the invading pests. But there was neglect on the part of the British authorities in their failure to take any sort of appropriate measure to combat the disaster.

The colonialists did nothing significant about pests control and there was no food aid to the people affected. Ultimately what followed was mass hunger and the lack of food. People resorted to eating chaka - "a wild tuber resembling yam" - and other "wild products of no nutritive value."¹⁷ Famine and food shortages led to malnutrition among the people and the mortality rate increased. The deterioration in the general health of the people led to many diseases. There began to occur an out-break of

15. "Zaria Province ... Report 1931."

16. Hill rice, acha, Maize, guinea corn, and dauro (millet) were almost totally destroyed in the affected areas. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

epidemic (such as Jigger at Zango Katab in April 1931) as conditions of existence in the districts continued to become more and more unbearable. Also, an undefined epidemic at Kaura was attributed to lack of food for the people and malnutrition.¹⁸

The locust menace was still very much disturbing as at 1935, with serious implication for the people. In Zango Katab District hunger was reported as having been devastating among the Atyab, Bajju, and Atsam peoples.¹⁹ In the face of prevailing starvation, there was a migration of people from the worst hit districts to other zones that were least affected. In spite of all the difficulties and suffering the people were living in, the British maintained relatively higher taxes in Zaria than elsewhere in some neighbouring provinces.²⁰ All sorts of factors linked with the exploitative and oppressive pressures of the times led to migration of people and there was a sharp fall of the population. Whilst the total population of Zaria Province stood at 382,308 in 1930, it seriously dropped to 359,258 in 1931.²¹

18. Ibid.

19. H.F. Backwell, "Zaria Province Annual Report 1935", NAK: ZAR PROF No.2282.

20. "Zaria Province ... Report 1931."

21. Ibid.

There was also a terrible epidemic which destroyed livestock and the most hard hit section in society were the nomadic Fulani.²² In 1932 there was an outbreak of rinderpest and blackquartars (during the raining season) which killed thousands of cattle in Zango Katab, Lere, and Kachia districts.²³ These 3 Southern districts and the northern districts of Giwa and Soba experienced an epidemic of trypanosamia of cattle which seriously affected and destroyed many herds.²⁴

In the wake of all this it was the already wretched, hungry, starved, and over-taxed people who the colonialists turned to draft as forced labourers to fight the locust invasion and other epidemics. In 1934 it was reported that no less than 16% of the population in almost all the districts - except for Anchau District with an alarming 30% - were infected by sleeping sickness. It was the same suffering people that the British authorities conscripted to supply forced labour for the anti-tsetse campaign.²⁵

22.. "Zaria Provincial ... Report 1932".

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. From Resident Zaria to the SNP Kaduna of November 5, 1934 in "Forced Labour (Policy and Instruction)", NAK: ZAR. PROF No. C.10/1940.

During the years of the economic recession the "traditional rulers" continued to exact forced labour from the peasantry for productive activities on their private farms. In Kachia District the principal local officials coerced peasants of various ethnic groups and villages into supplying forced labour on their private farms.²⁶ It was the high level of oppression of the Kachia peasantry which led to complaints, protests, and a near uprising among the people in 1936.²⁷ Some sections of the Kachia peasantry were resisting to pay taxes, supply forced labour, and answer summons by the local N.A. officials - who were the immediate colonial exploiters and oppressors. According to L.C. Giles for three consecutive years (1934-1936) the District Head of Kachia and other main officials had continually engaged forced labour arbitrarily to the extent that the people were almost revolting. Furthermore:

The practice has been to order the villages to supply - 2, 5, 10 men or whatever it might be - each per week, for 2 or 3 weeks at the busy times of the season.²⁸

All this went side-by-side with the official exaction of forced labour by the colonial authorities in the different sectors. The sums of money provided by the

26. "Kachia District Confidential Affairs (1936)", NAK: ZAR PROF No.2484.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

higher authorities for the purpose of feeding of people serving forced labour in the district was converted by the Kachia District Head into personal use.²⁹

In 1935 50 Ham peasants were drafted per week to work in the private farms belonging to the District Head and his subordinates.³⁰ Also, the Adara peasants - especially of Ankuwa and Ika villages - were subjected to this form of exploitation and oppression for almost the whole months of the year.³¹ Hausa peasants in the district were compelled to supply forced labour which was diverted to the private farms of the Hausa-Fulani ruling elements and they also suffered from the tyranny of the latter.³² In the process of this "illegal" practice by the local agents of colonial exploitation and oppression, those who were forced to give their labour on private farms were not given sufficient food and there was no question of giving them any sum of money.³³ The high level of feudal oppression in Kachia District, and the anti-colonial upsurge it was breeding, made L.C. Giles (who was on tour of the Southern districts) to alert

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

the provincial authorities and to suggest that disciplinary measures be taken against the District Head of Kachia and other local officials. Nothing concrete was done apart from checking the outbreak of a total peasant revolt and L.C. Giles was reprimanded by the Zaria Resident for exposing the Kachia situation.³⁴

In the dire straitened circumstances of the depression years the British maintained and collected very high taxes coupled with other demands made on the people. It was noted in 1932 that the peasantry of Chawai and Zango Katab districts found it extremely difficult to cope with payment of the British taxes. This was partly because the plateau minefields which were some sorts of migrant labour markets for them - to work and procure cash to pay taxes - had cut-down on the employment of labour.³⁵ Despite this the British taxes were either raised or left to remain - but certainly not reduced. The Jangali was very high to the point of almost just being impossible to be paid by majority of the pastoralists. This led to a high rate of emigration by nomads from the province.³⁶ According to the provincial authorities by 1932 things

34. Ibid.

35. "Zaria Provincial ... Report 1932."

36. Ibid.

were so hard that it took "the wholesale slaughtering of cattle in order to pay the Jangali..."³⁷ But the other side of this was that there was no market to sell such meat because of the dire financial squeeze the people found themselves in. For as a colonial officer, on tour of Lere District, observed in 1932:

A cow killed in the morning had to be buried the next day (such as was not given away) only 4/6³⁸ was collected by the butchers! It is difficult to see how Jangali will be paid under these circumstances.³⁹

As at 1932 when butchers could not make 5 shillings on a slaughtered cow, the tax paid by a Hausa blacksmith in Zango Katab District was 8 shillings. At the same time a poor peasant at Rahama, in Chawai District, was paying between 7 shillings, 6 pence and 8 shillings as poll tax.⁴⁰

At another level peasant producers throughout the province were sort of compelled by the prevailing circumstances to resort to selling their meagre foodstuffs - despite difficulties including poor

37. Ibid.

38. 4/6 Means four shillings and six pence.

39. "Lere District Notes on (1932-34)", NAK: ZAR PROF No.907.

40. "Chawai District Notes (1932)", NAK: ZAR PROF No.951.

harvest and hunger - in order to secure money to pay tax. But the complexity of the situation was such that the market for foodstuffs was not viable. In this regard even in northern districts, where there was relatively better harvest than in the Southern districts, peasants could not dispose of their foodstuffs in the market as from 1931 because the generality of the people could not afford to buy anything.⁴¹

The harsh realities of the economic crisis led to the growing of nationalist activities directed against colonial exploitation and oppression. In 1934 the Gwong people revolted against paying poll tax and the issue of their oppression by the Jema'a Hausa-Fulani aristocrats.⁴² The form the Gwong nationalist struggle took was civil disobedience towards the Hausa-Fulani officials in Kagona District. The people demanded to be detached from Jema'a N.A. and for the creation of a Gwong Chiefdom which they saw as means towards self-assertion as a people. The leaders were rounded up and thrown in jail at Kafanchan. Also in 1934 there was a breakdown of law

41. "Zaria Province... Report 1934".

42. Yusufu Turaki, "Social-Political Role and Status of Non-Muslim Groups of Northern Nigeria: Analysis of a Colonial Legacy", Ph.D. Thesis, Boston University, 1982, p.194.

and order in the Bajju area of Zango Katab District; the people expressed themselves in concrete nationalistic struggle against the exploitation the British policies were meant to achieve. Some sections of the Bajju peasantry refused to pay tax and they resisted to serve forced labour.⁴³ In Moroa Chieftdom - where the people had an indigenous chief - the peasants revolted against colonial oppressors. Some sections of the peasantry refused to pay tax; others began to migrate from the area as a form of resistance but there was a crackdown and the leaders were subsequently thrown in prison.⁴⁴ All the peasant revolts of the times were crushed. However, this somehow contributed to some reforms the British introduced, although this was mainly restricted to boundary adjustments and bringing taxes to be the same for most of the communities.⁴⁵

(b) The Working Class

In a broader context of the entire country the impact of the Great Economic Depression, as it affected the Nigerian workers, was partly manifested in the sharp rise of retrenchment of the labour force by

43. H.E. Backwell, op.cit.

44. Ibid.

45. See preface for some of the significant boundaries adjustment of 1934.

employers in all sectors thereby compounding unemployment in society.⁴⁶ Apart from retrenchment there was another anti-workers measure in which many were being converted from employment on the so-called permanent basis to daily paid jobs.⁴⁷ Low wages were imposed in a situation of galloping inflation, which reduced workers purchasing power by the day; on the other hand was the hitch-up in the cost of living and a rise in prices of imported goods. The colonized workers also suffered from cuts in salaries and allowances. Quite a number of employers slashed the working days in a week, and went ahead to calculate wages on the basis of the number of working days instead of on monthly basis.⁴⁸ The retrenchment of colonized workers was very high in the tin mining industry of the Jos Plateau - where Zaria Province contributed much. On the eve of the depression (in 1928) the strength of the colonized labour force, both those engaged in "permanent employment" and migrant labourers, stood at 39,000. But when the

46. J.S. Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1971, p.145.

47. Jan J. Milewski, "The Great Depression of the Early 1930s in a Colonial Country: A Case Study of Nigeria," AFRICANA Bulletin, No.23 1975; Centre of African Studies, University of Warsaw, p.23.

48. S.O. Osoba, "The Development of Trade Unionism in Colonial and Post-Colonial Nigeria", in I.A. Akinjogbin and S.O. Osoba, Topics on Nigeria Economic and Social History, University of Ife Press, Ife-Ife, 1980, p.197.

economic crisis set in it was drastically reduced to about 10,000.⁴⁹

In the specifics of Zaria Province itself, all was gloominess in connection with retrenchment and unemployment. The situation in the main urban centres of Zaria, Kaduna, and elsewhere, as at September 1930, was described thus:

The curtailment of Public Works, the closing down of Railway construction, the depression of the mining industry and of trade generally have all contributed to throw many persons out of employment. At the present moment there are considerable number of unemployed at Zaria and Kaduna, Natives of Southern Provinces and of the clerks and Artisan class.⁵⁰

The colonial authorities employed propaganda to justify the retrenchment, unemployment, and all other steps they took in the course of the Great Depression. In this regard the Resident of Zaria stated in 1931 that a "vigorous policy of retrenchment has been necessary to prevent expenditure exceeding revenue. Expenditure on roads and buildings has to be reduced to the maximum."⁵¹ Colonized workers and other categories

49. J. Milewski, op.cit., - especially footnote 72, p.32.

50. "Intelligence Reports Zaria (1929-32)", NAK: ZAR Prof No.C. 4032 Volume II.

51. "Zaria Province... Report 1931."

of African wage earners in the province had their wages reduced. In this connection "salaries exceeding £48 per annum have been cut by 6 per cent, salaries of £100 and over have been cut by 10 per cent."⁵²

The main purpose of British propaganda in relation to the claim that retrenchment was carried out to stop expenditure going beyond the revenue of the state and to justify slashing of salaries was to hide some basic truth. At one level the impression has been wrongly created that it was the colonial state that was doing some good to workers and other wage earners. This was meant to cover up the reality of super exploitation and profits made in the process of capital accumulation in the ~~Course~~ of the economic crisis. First, the salaries paid to colonized workers were not in the slightest commensurate to their productivity. Second, the finances of the colonial state came from the exploitation and plunder of the material and human resources of the colonized, taxes paid by the working people, and other forms of accumulation. Also, the colonialists largely depended on forced labour and thus did not spend much in construction and other sectors. Only a tiny portion of capital went into the government treasury as the actual surplus was taken to capitalist Britain.

52. Ibid.

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52. Ibid.

The reduction or slashing of salaries of workers in a situation of spiralled inflation was partly in order to appropriate more surplus thereby making super profit. In the tin mining industry wages for the African workers were kept low while super profits were made. In 1937 which was "a year of maximum profit... the average weekly wage stood at three shillings and six pence (about 50 per cent or less 1928 levels"; that is, far less than on the eve of the economic crisis.⁵³ Despite concrete evidence to the contrary the British authorities tried to deny the enormous suffering and hardships the Zaria workers went through during the depression. This can be seen in the assessment of the situation given by the provincial authorities in 1932:

Labour conditions are much the same as they have been since the beginning of the depression. Retrenchment from both Government and Native Administration services has led to a certain amount of unemployment, but no case of actual hardship has come to notice.⁵⁴

But this was instantly contradicted by further saying that the "year 1932 has not been a happy one in the Sabon Gari where unemployment, owing to retrenchment

53. S.O. Osoba, op.cit., p.191

54. "Intelligence Reports Zaria (1929-32)"....

of staff, has been rife."⁵⁵

The contradictions of the years of the economic crisis in the entire context of Nigeria stimulated the growth of the trade union movement as the workers intensified getting themselves collectively organized to fight and protect their interest and to struggle against colonial exploitation and oppression.⁵⁶ In 1931 the Railway Workers Union (RWU) was founded. Its growth was somehow influenced by the personality, steeled conviction, militancy, and daring character of a young railway worker - Michael Athokhamien Imoudu. Initially operating from outside the leadership of the RWU, Imoudu mobilized the rank-and-file of workers to apply tactics of strike against mass retrenchment, transfer of workers from permanent basis to daily paid jobs, and the reduction of wages by the railway management.⁵⁷ In 1938 the RWU waged struggle for better conditions of service for railway workers, provision of medical care, annual leave with pay, and

55. "Zaria Provincial ... Report 1932."

56. M. Okoye, op.cit., p.77.

57. Wogu Ananaba, The Trade Union Movement in Nigeria, Ethiopia, Benin, 1969, p.17.

extra pay for work done during public holidays and weekends. Because the colonialists failed to corrupt and disorganized the leadership of the ~~the~~ RWU the president, Babington A. Macaulay, was transferred by the railway management to Zaria; the Secretary, E.T. Macaulay, was transferred to Kafanchan.⁵⁸ In 1940 the RWU was officially registered as a trade union; Michael Imoudu was elected as its president.⁵⁹

(c) Other Forms of Anti-Colonial Struggles

It was in the Great Economic Depression years that some urban based nationalist organizations sprang up; they were largely isolated from the rural colonized masses. In objective terms they were like some sorts of streams flowing into the nationalist movement together with the struggles waged by the peasantry and other working people; but in subjective terms there were no links between the former and the latter.

The London based West African Students Union (WASU) led by Ladipo Solanke made efforts to establish its presence at Zaria town. In April 1930 Ladipo

58. Ibid., p.22.

59. Ibid., p.22.

Solanke extended the WASU campaign "to collect funds for the establishment of hostel for West African Students in London."⁶⁰ During the visit WASU established a branch at Zaria. Educated elements based at Zaria were enthusiastic. They received literature and WASU began to advocate to the colonial authorities on more education for the people. But the British were not showing any sign of welcome in relation to WASU activities; the Resident of Zaria refused the request made by WASU for the Emir of Zaria to be its patron in the area.⁶¹

The Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM) was founded in 1936. Mokuwo Okoye stated that at its initial stage the NYM "was an active all-embracing movement" consisting of Nigerian intelligentsia of diverse ethnic and other socio-cultural backgrounds.⁶² The NYM made a drive nationwide to mobilize Nigerians to join. Its membership soon rose to 10,000 and it opened branches in about 20 provinces in Nigeria including Zaria.⁶³ A leading Zaria nationalist in

60. Reports on WASU, in "Intelligence Reports Zaria (1929-32)"...

61. Ibid.

62. See article by Mokuwo Okoye, in the Magazine African Concord, vol.2, No.27, 03 October, 1988, p.28.

63. Okwu'diba Nnoli, Ethnic Politics in Nigeria, Fourth Dimension, Enugu, 1980, pp 141-142.

the NYM was Malam Jumare. Educated at Katsina College, and of aristocratic background (a member of the Mallawa ruling dynasty), Jumare was a teacher at the Zaria Middle School. As a nationalist he had a pan-Nigerian outlook and did advocate for popular participation by the people in affairs affecting them.⁶⁴ With all sorts of antagonistic pressures from the N.A. aristocrats Jumare relinquished his job and went into journalism as a member of the editorial staff of the Daily Service -- an organ of the NYM. Also, looking at the reports on the NYM in Zaria Province it is clear that Zaria indigenes were few in it; it was elitist, mainly urban based (especially at Sabon Gari), and most of the membership were elements of Southern Nigeria origin.⁶⁵ The indigenous elite were then confined to working with the N.A. where political activities were not tolerated by the colonizer and the local feudalists in their employ.

Olusegun Osoba has shown how the direction of the NYM was not charted in a way capable of carrying along the working people; petit-bourgeois opportunism

64. See reports on WASU...; and A.D. Yahaya, The Native Authority System in Northern Nigeria 1950-70: A Study in Political Relations with Particular Reference to Zaria Native Authority, ABU Press, Zaria, 1980, pp 27-28.

65. Reports on WASU ..., and A.D. Yahaya, op.cit., pp 27-28.

seriously set in.⁶⁶ The politics of factionalization permeated its national leadership; and its principal characters such as Ernest Okoli, Samuel Akinsaya, Nnamdi Azikiwe, and Obafemi Awolowo, resorted to charging each other of ethnic discriminatory practices in the NYM. In reality the personal interests, and the fight for positions in the NYM, by its leading figures, were mostly at stake.⁶⁷

Right from the moment ^{the} Zaria branch of the NYM officially announced its presence to the authorities in November 1938, the local leadership clearly came out as being highly opportunistic as well as an apologia to the British. The NYM gave the colonialists an assurance of co-operation and went ahead to promote British propaganda as well as mobilizing for the support of the colonized for the colonial power in relation to the so-called World War II efforts.⁶⁸ In March 1945 the Zaria branch of the NYM dissociated itself from the nationalist struggles of the people.

66. Olusegun Osoba, "Ideological Trends in the Nigerian National Liberation Movement and the Problems of National Identity, Solidarity and Motivation, 1934-1965: A Preliminary Assessment", in IBADAN, a Journal Published at the University of Ibadan, No.27, October 1969, pp 28-29.

67. O. Nnoli, *op.cit.*, pp 142-143; and article by Mokuwe Okoye, in African Concord... p.28.

68. "Nigerian Youth Movement (1938-45)", NAK: ZAR PROF No.3160.

Its branch Secretary, J. Ola Olode, officially went on his knees begging the provincial authorities for the NYM to be given a seat on the Post-war Development Committee during which he emphasized: "we are in no way an Anti-Government Movement; this assurance will certainly strengthen your reliance on our help at all times."⁶⁹

The era of the economic crisis witnessed the emergence of the nationalist press (mainly based at Lagos) which made contribution by exposing the ills of the British and in the conscientization of the colonized all over the country. In 1937 Nnamdi Azikiwe arrived Nigeria from the Gold Coast, where he had been the editor-in-Chief of the Accra based African Morning Post since 1934, and founded the West African Pilot which became the leading nationalist Newspaper.⁷⁰ In June 1938 the NYM converted the party's weekly service into the Daily Service with E. Okoli in charge.⁷¹ The nationalist press was a kind of challenge to break

the monopoly of the press, as an organ of information and propaganda, by the colonialists. The impact of

69. See letter from the Secretary NYM Zaria to the Resident Zaria Province dated March 26, 1945, in Ibid.

70. J.J. Milewski, op.cit., pp 43-44; and "Zik: Salute to the Old Soldier of Nationalism", in the Newspaper The Guardian, Newspaper, Tuesday, October 1, 1985, p.7.

71. O. Nnoli, op.cit., p.142.

this in relation to the area of study was that the elite in towns such as Kaduna and Zaria benefited from the information and **continuous** education which the nationalist press provided.

3.3 Intensification of Exploitation and Oppression in the World War II Years and the Nationalist Struggles

The riddled contradictions between the British and the colonized working people in Zaria Province reached high proportions during the years of World War II. Of course, the colonialists took more firm grip of the main heights of the economy; the exploitation of human and material resources, in the process of accumulation, moved to a higher degree. The province was of strategic importance to the British.

From the onset of the World War II in 1939, the colonial authorities maintained policies which ensured more taxes were paid by the working people into the coffers of the colonial state.⁷² Resident F.N. Nosa stated that special levies were imposed on the peasantry; and the working class experienced further deductions from their salaries - as contribution to the British war efforts.⁷³ But the reality was that

72. F. M. Nosa, "Zaria Province Annual Report 1943", NAK: ZAR. PROF No.3810.

73. Ibid.

this was pursued by a strong arm of the colonial state. The Zaria peasantry and other commoners (like their counterparts in other parts of Northern Nigeria) were coerced into producing more foodstuffs to feed troops; to meet the food requirement of the hundreds of thousands labourers in the tin mines and elsewhere; and to be stored by the colonial occupiers in the grain reserves.⁷⁴ In addition the peasantry was compelled to grow more agrarian export commodities badly needed by industries in Britain.⁷⁵

All over the districts people were drafted to serve forced labour in the tin mines, military camps, railway, roads, airports, and other construction sites or camps, to meet with the British demand of the war period which was more enormous than hitherto.⁷⁶ All these demands on the people, coupled with other exploitative and oppressive measures and policies, led to food shortages and famine. There was an appeal made to the people, by the British and the colonial chiefs, to join the army. Alongside this was conscription.⁷⁷

74. B. Freund, op.cit., p.194; and Ahmadu Bello, My Life, Gaskiya Corporation, Zaria, 1986, pp.53-55.

75. F.M. Noor, op.cit.

76. Ibid.

77. Ibid.

At the onset of World War II, in 1939, the housing problem for the colonized people in the towns was compounded because of the conscription and movement of troops. At Kaduna and Zaria towns the authorities were taking over houses they could find in their bid to secure accommodation for British military officers and the NCOs.⁷⁸ However, African recruits and conscripts were stationed in highly concentrated military camps which lacked the most basic facilities such as was the case at Kaduna.⁷⁹ Colonial racism directed at the colonized soldiers remained a feature of the military establishment.

The British authorities used the Zaria N.A. structure for the purpose of recruitment and conscription into the army.⁸⁰ In the first year, the Resident was satisfied with the progress made:

The response to recruiting for the combatant services was also outstanding. The Divisional office and the central offices of the Native Administration in Zaria town were crowded with would-be soldiers and all available quotas were filled long before the specified time limit had expired.⁸¹

78. F.M. Noad, "Zaria Provincial Annual Report 1939", NAK: ZAR PROF No.3306.

79. Ibid.

80. F.M. Noad, "Zaria Provincial ... Report 1939".

81. Ibid.

The process of mobilization of the colonized to join the army was a continuous one. In 1943 it was reported that "some 300 recruits have joined the Army" and that every thing possible was being done by the authorities to fill the provincial quota.⁸² The fact that the colonialists could not get the number of volunteers required means the response was not much forthcoming from the colonized; and, therefore, it was logical that the authorities resorted to drafting.

Before 1939 Zaria Province - and indeed Northern Nigeria - did not have a single newspaper of any sort. In January 1939 the British founded the first Newspaper at Zaria; it was published in Hausa language with the name Gaskiya Ta Fi Kwabo. It had a central objective of being an organ of information and mobilization of the people for the British war efforts.⁸³ The Gaskiya Ta Fi Kwabo was fundamentally an organ for British colonial propaganda - especially in connection with the war. Abubakar Imam (a 1932 graduate of Katsina College) was appointed the

82.. The Annual Report on Labor Conditions 1943, in "Labour conditions - Annual Report (1943-50)", NAK: ZAR PROF No.2653A.

83.. F.M. Noad, "Zaria Provincial 1939."

newspaper's sub-editor and rose to the position of substantive editor in due course.⁸⁴ The articles and news items sent to the newspaper were of immense benefit to the British authorities; they used them in addition to the views, opinions, and articles, of the readers as a means to gather intelligence reports about the situation on the ground - most of ~~which were~~ not published. The emergent colonized intelligentsia sent articles to the Gaskiya Ta Fi Kwabo and articulated their views in connection with certain issues of the day in spite of the policy of censorship; to a large extent only those opinions that favoured the colonizer's line got published. However, the newspaper somehow served as a source of information and education to the colonized - despite the propaganda.

(a) Taxes and War Levies

The Zaria provincial authorities made serious attempts at hiding the true situation about the

84. Ibid.; and J.N. Paden, Ahmadu Bello Sardauna of Sokoto: Values and Leadership in Nigeria, Hudanuda. Zaria, 1986, footnote 17, p.143.

suffering and hardships the colonized working people went through due to taxes and levies in the course of the war. In 1939 they claimed that all the "districts were re-assessed for tax during the year to alleviate hardships."⁸⁵ but the fact of the matter is that whilst the total tax collected in 1938 was £26,000 the amount collected in 1939 went up to £32,000.⁸⁶ This negates the colonizer's claim of relief for the people because taxes were actually raised. But even the claim of reducing hardships was contradicted precisely on the admission by the authorities that 1939 tax "was collected with difficulty."⁸⁷ On the whole the superimposed severe pressures on the people, in world war II times, made the payment of all British taxes virtually impossible.⁸⁸ In 1941 the total amount collected in the province as tax stood at £50,000.⁸⁹ This was an increase of 56 per cent over the amount collected in 1939.

85. F.M. Noad, "Zaria Provincial ... Report 1939."

86. Ibid.

87. Ibid.

88. Ibid.

89. F.M. Noad, "Zaria Provincial Annual Report 1941," NAK: ZAR PROF No.3529.

War levies on the people of Zaria were in all essence additional taxes. In 1941 the colonialists forced every tax paying adult to pay a penny fund for the win-the-war fund.⁹⁰ On this particular levy no less than £1,674, 3 shillings and 6 pence was collected.⁹¹ Tax-gathering went along with all sorts of repressive methods. Poor peasants were often beaten up and their harvest or livestock were confiscated and auctioned by the local agents, in the various districts, to make for the tax they were not able to pay.⁹² The process of tax-gathering in the wider national context was one in which the Emirs, Chiefs, District Heads, and so on, came out with all the brutality in their arsenal and unleashed it on the working people - especially the rural poor.⁹³

A common practice by the authorities was taking punitive measures against communities and people that were incapable of paying the colonial taxes. The more the peasantry and other ordinary people were in difficulties, and thus unable to pay tax, the more

90. Ibid.

91. Ibid.

92. Field-work interview with Bawa Bobai Gora, retired Police Inspector, age 60, at Kaduna, on 6th May 1987.

93. Richard Umara et al, "LEADERS OR LOOTERS? Traditional Rulers in Nigeria, in the Magazine The Analyst, vol. 2 No 5, 1987, pp 7-13.

the colonialists and their lackeys unleashed the tyranny of their pack of hounds against them. The anti-pathies, deep hatred, and scorn for the local representatives of colonialism by the people were related to the flagrant abuse they suffered.⁹⁴

The local rulers who carried out acts of terror against the ordinary people, in the process of tax collection, were often at the centre of embezzling monies milked from the working population. In 1939 the amount embezzled as personal fortune from the tax proceeds by various village Heads was £119.⁹⁵ Only £50 from this amount was recovered from the persons involved by the authorities.⁹⁶ The tax money siphoned off in that year reached an embarrassing and scandalous height leading to either the imprisonment or dismissal of 29 village Heads.⁹⁷

At another level the British also imposed levy on foodstuffs. In 1942 the requisition of foodstuffs from the peasant producers was such that "a levy of so many pounds of corn per head of adult tax payer was the method adopted."⁹⁸ In spite of the failure

94. Field-work interview with Bawa Bobai Gora, op.cit.

95. F.M. Noad, "Zaria Provincial... Report 1939."

96. Ibid.

97. Ibid.

98. F.M. Noad, "Zaria Provincial Annual Report 1942," NAK: ZAR PRO F No.3662.

of the 1941 harvest the colonialists did expect "1,000 tons of guinea corn by requisition " from the peasantry in "the first part of 1942".⁹⁹ The quota demanded was from a poor harvest and the British were only able to get 780 tons of guinea corn - which was 220 tons short of their target.¹⁰⁰ Notable among this super requisition was the case of the District Head of Kagarko in 1943.¹⁰¹ In collaboration with some high district officials he coerced the Gbagyi and Ashe to supply corn beyond the Mandatory quota; the extra portions went to him.¹⁰² When the Gbagyi and Ashe peasants found out about this there were protests and complaints. This involved their refusal to supply grain as well as to transport this to Zonkwa railway station - a journey of 2-3 days. They also demanded for the removal of the District Head of Kagarko; the political situation was explosive.¹⁰³ A fact finding report was submitted by H.P. Elliot on the basis of which the authorities tactically found a pre-emptive solution.

99. Ibid.

100. Ibid.

101. "Kachia and Kagarko District - Affairs in (1943)", NAK: ZAR PROF No.C.4/1943.

102. Ibid.

103. Ibid.

by retiring the District Head.¹⁰⁴

Between 1943 and 1944 every tax paying adult in Kachia District was compelled to part with 30 Mudu of corn (equivalent of 40 lbs) as the so-called contribution to the war efforts.¹⁰⁵ In addition the Kachia peasantry had community tax raised from 7 shillings to 9 shillings per adult.¹⁰⁶ All this was done at a time 30 mudu (40 lbs) of rice fetched the peasant producer just about 5 shillings at the Kachia market.¹⁰⁷

The grain the Kachia peasants were compelled to contribute had to be transported by the people themselves. Women were the carriers of "corn quota."¹⁰⁸ Women from the various households in different villages carried loads of grain on their heads to the district headquarters at Kachia en route to the railway station at Kurmi Biri.¹⁰⁹ The journey normally took women from the farthest villages 2 days. But if there happened to be a delay in giving

104. "Kachia District Affairs (1939-48)", NAK: ZAR PROF No.388.


105. Ibid.

106. Ibid.

107. "Kachia District Affairs (1944-1954)", NAK: ZAR PROF No.C.34.

108. Ibid.

109. Ibid.

clearance at Kachia town, they made it to the final destination  in 3 or 4 days.¹¹⁰

One serious effect of this was that in the process of carrying the grain, for such a long distance, some of the women experienced premature birth, others risked abortion of pregnancy, and there were cases of women who received some injuries due to accidents.¹¹¹

(b) Export Agricultural Commodity Production and Food Shortages

An aspect of the World War II years was that through propaganda and effective use of the entire N.A. Machinery, the people of Zaria were forced to produce export agricultural commodities in greater quantity than ever before; because they were "of vital necessity to the Empire" at that crucial time.¹¹² One step taken by the occupiers was the creation of Marketing Boards for the purchase

110. Ibid.

111. Ibid.

112. F.M. Noad, "Zaria Provincial ... Report 1941".

of agricultural produce ¹¹³ In theory the objective was that peasant producers would be paid good prices for their produce - independent of the stability or otherwise of the World market - and to ensure that part of the profit made was pumped into facilitating more production. ¹¹⁴ But in reality the peasants were paid low prices whilst the prices of the agrarian raw materials kept on raising in the international market. Thus there was super exploitation of the colonized producers; the Marketing Boards and the capitalist firms made enormous profits. ¹¹⁵

In the conditions of the war capitalist companies such as the UAC, and the British American Tobacco Company... (which "encouraged" the peasants of Soba and other northern districts to grow more tobacco by the year), strengthened their positions in the process of the exploitation of cash crop producers. ¹¹⁶ In the entire province compulsion was applied in getting peasants to produce more and more

113. J.S. Coleman, op.cit, p.252.

114. Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, Bogle-L'ouverture, London, 1973, p.184.

115. Ibid., p.185.

116. F.M. Noad, "Zaria Provincial ... Report 1942."

export crops. A British official, R.L. Panyne, suggested to the provincial authorities in 1943 that every tax paying male in Kajuru District be made "to farm a sackful" of groundnut and "did not think it was beyond their capacity."¹¹⁷ This was at a time there was an increased demand for forced labour; and an increase of poll tax from 6 shillings to 8 shillings per peasant tax payer in Kajuru District.¹¹⁸

Also in 1943 the colonial authorities imposed certain quotas of groundnut to be produced by the various communities in Kachia District - including the Ham who were already over burdened with the task of producing the bulk of the ginger in the province.¹¹⁹ Even though Kachia District was not a major groundnut producing area, it officially produced 28 tons in 1943.¹²⁰ A break-down shows that the Adara and Kutarmi peasants produced a total of 20.5 tons of groundnut; 5 tons were produced by the Ham peasantry; and the Kachia Hausa peasants

117. R.L. Panyne, "Kajuru District Affairs (1932-56)"; NAK: ZAR PROF No.389.

118. Ibid.

119. "Kachia District Affairs (1944-1954)..."

120. Ibid.

produced a total of 25 tons of the commodity.¹²¹ Despite this the Kachia groundnut producers were paid low prices. In some instances the meagre sums were not readily paid.. Obviously, the capitalist firms often deliberately created such a market situation - by claiming that cash was not available to pay the peasants - in order to frustrate the producers and keep them in a desperate position so as to ensure that the prices are low. At one buying station, in the district, in 1943, after making a purchase of only 200 bags there was no more purchase "owing to the failure of John Holts to supply their clerks with sufficient bags and money."¹²²

Peasants in the northern districts as well as South-east districts (such as Kauru and Lere) were compelled to produce a higher quantity of guinea corn than elsewhere in the province.¹²³ Whilst this was imposed by the colonizer to achieve maximum results, the ordinary people were faced with

121. Ibid.

122. Ibid.

123. F. M. Noad, "Zaria Province... Report 1943."

severe hunger. From these districts, in 1943, 3,300 tons of corn were "requisitioned for the minesfields and military requirements" alone; that is excluding supplies that went to other sectors and the grain reserves.¹²⁴ One fundamental irony of all this was the rural areas which were the main centres of food production, and from where all sorts of grains were commandeered by the colonizer, experienced food shortages than elsewhere. The few salary earners in the rural areas could not even find food to buy. Employees of the N.A. in the rural areas had to be supplied with grains from the Urban centres. This was so in 1943, and acting Resident L.H. Goble stressed that: "Owing to the present food shortage in this province the Native Administration has found it necessary to arrange supplies for certain of its staff in rural areas..."¹²⁵

The food shortages were so severe and some leading British officials confessed that their policies and demands were responsible. In point of

124. The Annual Report on Labour conditions 1943...

125. Acting Resident Zaria to SNP of July 20, 1943, in "(1) Labour Appointment in Colonial Empire; (2) Labour Disputes - settlement of; (3) Cost of Living - Regulation for (1939-43)", NAK: ZAR PROF No. C.12/1939.

fact the acting Resident of Zaria made it clear in 1943 that there was prevalent famine partly because a large number of peasants were taken away from their farms into forced labour "just prior to the planting season"; they remained there for 4 months and only returned in June when the planting period was virtually over.¹²⁶ L.H. Goble suggested that due to extreme hardship and the alarming rate of hunger (connected with draft of labour and so on) there should be a reduction "of the work period to four weeks..."¹²⁷ There were succinct reasons given on the famine situation in the province thus:

The demand of war efforts are so severe including as they do, mines labour, recruiting, groundnut, cotton, sugar and ginger production, there is no surplus labour to meet the needs of the produce season...¹²⁸

(c) Forced Labour

With the advent of World War II the British kind of enlarged the number of colonized they drafted to supply labour in the tin mines (in the Jos

126. F.M. Noad, "Zaria Provincial... Report 1942."

127. Ibid.

128. The Annual Report on Labour Conditions 1943....

Plateau and within Zaria Province) and in other spheres. As at 1940 the authorities tried to shield the true nature and the extent of forced labour by claiming that:

Rates of pay were fair and the hours of work normal. There was no exploitation. Mines labour camp were inspected when possible and conditions found satisfactorily.¹²⁹

From the same British sources themselves the evidence are to the contrary. Merely the question of pay in relation to people conscripted, independent of their wish, does not arise.

The local chiefs played a vital role in the mobilization of forced labour in the World War II years.¹³⁰ From the Emirs down the line to the village Heads, they were involved in the supervision of people drafted to provide forced labour in the mines, construction sites, and elsewhere in their domain.¹³¹ The N.A. Police (Yandoka) and the dogarai accompanied the Zaria labourers to the mines and so on - and saw to it that they worked to the maximum.¹³² It should be borne in mind that along

129. F.M. Mead, "Zaria Provincial ... Report 1942."

130. Ibid.

131. Ibid.

132. Ibid.

with the male folk, women were also coerced to the tin mines and construction sites and other labour camps where they were exploited in certain works.¹³³ The duration of serving forced labour in the tin mines was 4 months.¹³⁴

The British also set a specific quota of forced labourers to be supplied by the various Zaria districts. In 1942 the number of labourers officially drafted from the province to the mines alone was between 3,200 to 4,000 men.¹³⁵ Giving the unreliability nature of official British figures in such matters, it should have been much more high in reality. In addition 600 men were also sent on forced labour "by private arrangement to mines in the province" (that is, in the Southern Zaria Mines).¹³⁶ Forced labour was extended to other spheres such as the 1,300 people conscripted in 1942 for the construction of an aerodrome at Kaura to be used for military purpose.¹³⁷ And this was "apart from all the labour required for roads and other works" in the urban and rural areas.¹³⁸

133. "Kachia District Affairs (1939-48):..."

134. Ibid.

135. F.E. Noad, "Zaria Provincial ... Report 1942."

136. Ibid.

137. Ibid.

138. Ibid.

In theory only tax paying adults were qualified to be engaged in forced labour. But in practice labour conscription was subjected to abuse precisely due to the fact that the colonialists often violated their own set standard in this respect by drafting children and thus exploiting child labour.¹³⁹

The labour conscription reached a crucial stage as from July 1942 and continued to be so up to 1944, and this was the most crucial period when the war had reached a peak.¹⁴⁰ This can be better concretized with the number of men and women in four districts - who were conscripted to the tin mines in just three different instances - between December 10, 1943 and January 6, 1944. In all the total number stood at 621 men and 57 women.¹⁴¹

On December 10, 1943, 130 men and 12 women were conscripted as forced labourers from Igabi District.¹⁴² On that same day 100 men and 10 women were drafted from Kajuru District.¹⁴³ All were to work at Rafi Jaki mines in the Jos Plateau.¹⁴⁴ Then,

139. Field-work interview with Bawa Bobai Gora, op.cit.

140. "Kachia District Affairs (1939-48)...."

141. "(1) Nigerian Tin Ore Production; (2) Mines conscript Labour Draft; (3) Condition of Employment in the Mines field", NAK: ZAR. PROF No.3525 Volume IV.

142. See letter from the Resident Zaria to the Administrative Director of Mineral Production Jos No.325/12/43 of December 10, 1943. Ibid.

143. Ibid.

144. Ibid.

on December 25, 1943 one draft of "191 mines labourers accompanied by 20 wives" from Kachia District were moved from the area to Kuru to work at Forum Mines for a period of 4 months.¹⁴⁵ On January 6, 1944, 200 men and 15 women from Makarfi District were drafted to supply forced labour at Pasakai mines near Kuru.¹⁴⁶ The very large number of Zaria forced labourers who served in the minefields can be seen from an angle of what was described as "unusually large movements of men by special train" in which a total of about 22,750 labourers were to depart the tin mines to Kafanchan, Kaduna Junction, and Zaria, railway stations between April 16 and May 10, 1944.¹⁴⁷ This movement largely involved just those forced labourers who had been at the mines for 4 months before the departure.

At the tin mines the working conditions were indeed extremely deplorable in terms of feeding, shelter, health care, and sanitation. Same was the

145. See No.3525/12 dated December 25, 1943 from the Resident Zaria to the Administrative Director of Mineral Production, Jos, in "(1) Nigerian Tin Ore Production ..."

146. No.3525/1/44 Resident Zaria to the Administrative Director of Mineral Production Jos of January 6, 1944, in "(1) Nigerian Tin Ore production..."

147. Communication from the Administrative Production Jos to the Resident Zaria dated March 31, 1944 No.D.M. 64/5.5/32, in "(1) Nigerian Tin Ore Production..."

situation in other labour camps where common sickness and diseases among the colonized forced labourers were due to the terrible conditions in which they worked.¹⁴⁸ Between 1943 and 1944 the Adara and Kutunli of Kachia District made several complaints to the colonial authorities about the diseases some of their people had been infected with, while serving forced labour in the mines, which resulted in some deaths.¹⁴⁹ The extreme hardships and the terrible conditions in the mines were also advanced as partly being responsible for the flight of labourers from the mining areas.¹⁵⁰

Zaria forced labourers in the tin mines and elsewhere deepened their struggle against this highly crude form of colonial exploitation. The dominant form the nationalist struggle took was desertion. In 1942 Resident F.M. Noad of Zaria described the rate at which peasants serving forced in the mines were absconding as "extremely high."¹⁵¹

148. Ibid.

149. "Kachia District Affairs (1939-48)..."

150. Ibid.

151. F.M. Noad, "Zaria Provincial ... Report 1942."

In one instance in December 1943, 6 persons from Kagoro deserted the Godogodo mines in the Southern part of the province. The Agwam Agworok (Chief of Kagoro), Biya, did everything to recapture them; on his orders the deserters were subsequently tracked down and taken back to continue serving forced labour - with their time extended for another 4 months despite the medical evidence that the 6 men were actually of ill-health.¹⁵² One of the limitations of the struggle waged in the mines was the lack of organized trade unions. The labourers were also segregated from each other on the basis of ethnic groups and so on.

The colonialists and the local rulers took all sorts of punitive measures against individuals who fought against forced labour by deserting the labour camps. They were usually arrested, had their duration for serving forced labour extended, paid some fine, and in some cases sentenced to jail. Another penalty was in cases where individuals who escaped from the mines were not found or traced; the authorities arrested some of the relatives of the deserters, and conscripted them as replacement.¹⁵³

152. No. 15/47A of December 30, 1943 from Chief of Kagoro to Do Zaria, in "(1) Nigerian Tin Ore Production..."

153. Ibid.


Apart from diverting labour to private farms some of the chiefs took bribes from mining companies and in return supplied them with forced labourers through illegal channels. This was the practice by Agwan Agworok Biya.¹⁵⁴ Even though British investigations proved this nothing was done. Elsewhere, district officials extorted money from peasants and other common folk in society in order to exempt them from participation in forced labour. This was uncovered in relation to some local officials at Bugau in Anchau District in January 1944. Subsequently, the Emir of Zaria, Ja'afaru dan Ishiaku, "sentenced Galadima Bugau to three years imprisonment, Madaki and Mai-unguwa to one year each."¹⁵⁵

(d) The Bajju Nationalist Movement

The nationalist struggles of the peasantry in Southern Zaria districts against colonialism had a more close interrelationship with the efforts of the ethnic minorities for self-assertion. Zango Katab

154. Extracts on findings in December 1943 by ~~ADD~~ H.P. Elliott in relation to Kagoro District Affairs, in "(1) Nigerian Tin Ore Production ..."

155. No. 3525/232 of January 3, 1944 from the Do Zaria Division to the Sub-Committee Anchau settlement scheme, in "(1) Nigerian Tin Ore Production..."

District was  a sort of microcosm in the overall context of the province, but it remained a hot-bed of enormous ethnic problems. In the course of World War II British colonialism was confronted with more challenges. Because of the composition of the N.A. officials and the form colonial domination took, class contradictions were compounded by the nationality question that was so much interlinked. The Bajju peasantry waged anti-colonial struggle against exploitation, oppression, and for N.A. reforms. This was directed against the role of the Zaria Hausa-Fulani aristocracy which was the principal representative of British colonialism in the area.¹⁵⁶

The Bajju anti-colonial movement which gathered momentum as from 1939 had a strong drive for detachment from Zaria N.A.; it was thus essentially anti-Hausa in character. Peasants and the youth were the leading forces. Those who emerged as its leaders were elements recognized by the community and not the Chiefs. Usman Sakwat was the leader of the Bajju nationalist movement; also prominent were Baye, Rikawan, and Awok.¹⁵⁷ Unlike the Bajju anti-colonial struggles before the World War II, in which the

156. "Usuman Sokop Kaje- Petition by (1940-49) Kaje Tribe", NAK: ZAR PRO No.3465.

157. Ibid.

"traditional" community elders or some local chiefs who rebelled against their masters to side with the people were at the leadership, the new leadership headed by Usman Sakwat as well as the core were largely elements who had converted to Christianity (especially the SIM which was the longest mission in the area).

In 1940 series of petitions were written, largely by Usman Sakwat, to the Zaria Provincial authorities calling for the creation of a Bajju chiefdom completely detached from Zaria N.A.¹⁵⁸ Usman emphasized the thorniest issues of tyranny, brutalization, and oppression, the Bajju as peasants and as a people suffered in the hands of the Hausa-Fulani rulers.¹⁵⁹ One of the basis of the nationalist agitation involved a resort to a point in argument of history to the fact that the Bajju, as a nationality, were not part of pre-colonial Zazzau and thus the caliphate.¹⁶⁰ The Bajju anti-colonial movement had the issue of reforms centered on the establishment of a Bajju chiefdom that would be modelled on the administrative

158. Ibid.

159. Ibid.

160. Ibid.

arrangement operated in the neighbouring "independent districts" of Moroa, Kagoro, and Jaba where indigenous chiefs ruled over their own peoples as lackeys of British colonialism.¹⁶¹ Part of the position advanced by the Bajju nationalists was the demand for Usman Sakwat to be appointed the Chief of the Bajju.¹⁶² In a strongly worded petition sent to the Resident of Zaria on November 4, 1940 Usman Sakwat himself stated: "... again I am not prepared to control any Hausa people but my countrymen... Let the Hausa control themselves and let me control my father's land."¹⁶³ Usman Sakwat was a scion of a family which produced leadership to one of the Bajju clans in pre-colonial times; but he was a peasant.

When the nationalist struggle of the Bajju peasantry in World War II conditions first started it was on the path of petitions, agitations, and civil disobedience devoid of violent acts. The colonized Bajju people rejected orders of the local agents of exploitation and oppression, they refused to obey the so-called pagan court, and showed open

161. Ibid.

162. Ibid.

163. Ibid.

resentment towards Hausa officials.¹⁶⁴ The Bajju nationalist campaign kept growing in strength and threatening the colonial order by the day. Due to this the Resident of Zaria sent a District officer, Captain H. Mercer, in February 1941, to do some investigations.¹⁶⁵ Part of the findings was that the Bajju people were not ready to flinch in their resolve to pursue their demands; and the anti-colonial struggle was with time gaining more momentum. Later in 1942, the Resident reported to higher authorities:

Osuman has succeeded in formenting local agitation in the Kaje area and has been strongly backed by clerks in Kafanchan and certain mission trained elements.¹⁶⁶

The colonialists set out to clamp down on the leadership of the Bajju nationalist movement; in their calculation if the struggle could not be crushed it should, at least, be stifled.¹⁶⁷ For

164. Field-work interview with M. Nakaje, overseer and later superintendent of roads with the PWD, age about 70, at Zonkwa on 17th February, 1987.

165. "Usuman Sokop Kaje-Petitions by (1940-49)...."

166. Resident Zaria to SNP dated September 12, 1942, in "Osuman Sokop Kaje (1942)", NAK: ZAR PROF No. C6/1942.

167. Ibid.

its part the Bajju peasant anti-colonial movement was influenced by the limited perception that the N.A. system was clearly distinctive from the British authority. Due to this deficiency in grasping the various administrative linkages Usman and other Bajju nationalists directed their anger at the colonized representatives of the system, especially the Zaria Hausa-Fulani rulers, whilst mistakenly viewing the British colonizer as a third party just playing the role of mediator.¹⁶⁸

On September 2, 1942 Usman Sakwat was arrested on the orders of the highest authorities in the province.¹⁶⁹ In the process Usman was chained like a dangerous criminal, severely beaten up, and tortured, on the orders of the District Head of Zango Katab.¹⁷⁰ He was then transported by train from Zonkwa to Zaria. Giving the account the Resident said:

168. "Usman Sokop Kaje - Petition by (1940-49)...."

169. Resident Zaria to SNP dated September 12, 1942....

1970. See account by Usman's lawyer, O.A. Alakija, in "Usman Sokop Kaje - petition by (1940-49)..."

On arrival in Zaria Ousuman was sent to the African Medical Officer for examination. The M.O. reports that he does show some sign of beating: Whether this occurred in an attempt to resist arrest is not yet clear.¹⁷¹

Despite the medical evidence the District Head of Zango Katab denied that his dogarai and other hangers-on beat up Usman; he pretended not to be in the slightest know about the whole tyrannical episode, and the British covered things up.

The Bajju peasants contributed money and provided a counsel, O.A. Alakija, for the defence of Usman. They also wanted the trial to be at the High Court rather than at the "Native Court". All this was opposed to by both the Resident and the Emir of Zaria, Ja'afaru, on the basis of a :

Native Court warrant on two charges...
for ... refusing to obey a lawful order from the Native Authority in whose area he resides and ... For conduct likely to cause a breach of the peace.¹⁷²

This meant the authorities were neither going to accept legal representation nor granting of bail for

171. Resident Zaria to SNP dated September 12, 1942....

172. Ibid.

Usman Sakwat; because the Alkali court had no such provision. However, beyond the official position, the actual motive^{for} refusal to grant bail was more political than legal. For according to Resident F.M. Noad:

The Emir and I both consider that to allow Osuman out of bail (a practise which, incidentally, is not recognised by Mohammedan courts) would be a serious political blunder, the accused will therefore be remanded in custody pending investigation.¹⁷³

Dominant forces in society were united in championing a campaign to smear Usman with slander and to discredit the nationalist struggle of the Bajju people by portraying it as a movement by few misguided and extremist elements.¹⁷⁴ Whilst the Bajju nationalists and the youth did stake their lot with the aspirations of their people, the Bajju ruling elements took a position typical of hunting dogs for the colonizer and demonstrated their slavish mentality towards the Zaria feudal aristocracy. As

173. Ibid.

174. Report of investigations submitted to the Resident Zaria on September 33, 1943 by Captain H. Mercer, in "Osuman Sokop Kaje (1942)..."

cronies of colonialism, and indeed in their capacity as the exploiters and oppressors within Bajju area, the village Heads told the British that the Bajju people did not desire for a Chiefdom.¹⁷⁵ Furthermore, the Bajju agents of colonial domination suggested to the higher authorities that Usman and other leading Bajju nationalists be seriously dealt with. In the course of another round of investigations by District Officer H. Mercer between 16th and 19th September, 1942, the Bajju Marionnettes did parrot what the Hausa-Fulani rulers of Zaria and indeed the British expected of them by holding that the anti-colonial movement led by Usman:

... is a dangerous thing undermining native authority and causing unrest in the tribe. They desire Government to take firm action and wish to have Usman remove(d) from the District. If the "movement" is allowed to go unchecked rioting may well occur.¹⁷⁶

The authorities were also quick to point out that the most vocal and active elements of the Bajju anti-colonial movement were members of the SIM, and that catholics did steer clear of the struggle.¹⁷⁷ But the fact is this, the emergent

175. Ibid.

176. Ibid.

177. Ibid.

Bajju elite were predominantly persons who had attended SIM adult classes; moreover as at 1942 Catholicism was relatively much in its infancy in the area. And so the question of Catholics non participation did not arise. However, in response to the charge the SIM field Director, A. Kirk, dissociated the mission from the anti-colonial campaign of the Bajju.¹⁷⁸ A. Kirk denounced Usman Sakwat and called him a bad influence on the Bajju SIM members.¹⁷⁹ A. Kirk reported to the Zaria authorities that due to Usman's personality and anti-colonial activities the SIM had earlier expelled him from the church.¹⁸⁰

According to M. Nakaje the SIM waged a dirty campaign against Usman in which it painted him as a kind of devil; for the SIM Usman's actions were a sort of challenge to God who put those in position of authority in place. The SIM put on pressure to talk Usman Sakwat and others of its followers out of the struggle but they refused to

178. Ibid.

179. Ibid.

180. Ibid.

mellow.¹⁸¹ Furthermore, A. Kirk advised the Zaria authorities in very clear terms that for peace to prevail in Bajjuland Usman and Baye should be deported and exiled from their own homeland.¹⁸² In essence the British colonialists, the Zaria aristocrats, the parasitic Bajju village chiefs, and the SIM establishment, all saw the Bajju anti-colonial movement as dangerous; and they agreed that Usman Sakwat be expelled from the Bajju area.

What the colonialists and their local African surrogates did was a clear fabrication of an entire web of slander around the nature of the Bajju nationalist struggle. They wanted to belittle it as an affair of few bad eggs among the Bajju population. H. Mercer insisted that there were just about 400 active members of the movement - representing just about 10 per cent "of tax paying males" in the Bajju area; and concluded that they were mere frustrated Christian elements in an estimated population of tens

181. Field-work interview M. Nakaje, op.cit.

182. Report submitted to the Resident Zaria on September 23, 1942 by Captain H. Mercer...

of thousands Animists.¹⁸³ However, this was just an attempt to becloud the real situation. The real issue is how could a tiny minority (supposedly without popular backing) move the people in a struggle that threatened the colonial order - as manifested in ~~the~~ opposition of the Bajju people to pay community tax in 1942. The unfounded nature of the argument by the oppressors can further be looked at from both logical and empirical perspectives. The Bajju peasants were in extreme difficulties of the World War II times. Yet, they made sacrifices and collected over £80 on what h. Mercer confirmed to have been willingly in defence of Usman and their cause. In his own words:

A lawyer (Mr. O.A. Alakija) has been briefed to support Usman's case. They have paid him £65, total fee is said to be £110. Some £80 has already been collected from the followers. I am satisfied that these gifts were voluntary and not collected under false pretences.¹⁸⁴

Certainly, this is an ample indicator of the popular base of the nationalist struggle of the times, the unity of the Bajju people, and the resolute determination

183. Ibid.

184. Ibid.

to fight the anti-colonial political battle of the times.

On 15th October, 1942 Usman Sakwat was found guilty by the Zaria Alkali and sentenced to two months imprisonment.¹⁸⁵ The sentence was on the first count of refusal to obey lawful orders of the N.A. but he was acquitted on the second charge of conduct liable to cause a breach of peace. However, the Resident was bitter; he blamed the Alkali for having given judgement on the second charge on the basis of a "naïve view that Osuman's followers were more to blame than Osuman." The Resident added that the Emir of Zaria was also "undoubtedly peturbed at the findings of the court but the conduct of the case shows plainly that no political pressure was exercised."¹⁸⁶ The political nature of the case is more obvious precisely because although there was an appeal by the defence counsel at the High court, it was not heard until after Usman had served the sentence and the appeal was dismissed.¹⁸⁷

185. Resident Zaria to the SNP dated October 15, 1942, in "Osuman Sokop Kaje (1942)..."

186. Ibid.

187. F.M. Noad, "Zaria Provincial ... Report 1942..."

With the sentence passed the authorities maintained that Usman should be exiled from the Bajju area under section 18(8) of the criminal court and that some measures be taken to intimidate the Bajju people against anti-colonial activities. The position of the District officer, the Emir of Zaria, and the Resident himself, was put by the latter:

Neither the Emir nor I nor the District Officer have any reason to modify our expressed opinion that Osuman's return to the area would be a major political blunder and I have ask therefore that the necessary action be expedited. If and when the deportation order is obtained I proposed that the District Officer should tour the Kaje area with a small escort of Government police and announced the terms of the order to the people.¹⁸⁸

The Bajju people were not ready to accept such and were determined to fight on. As long as Usman was away people demanded for his return and intensified their efforts. This forced the British not to carry out the deportation for fear of aggravating the situation.¹⁸⁹ As will be analyzed in chapter four the Bajju anti-colonial movement moved to greater height in the post war years.

188. Resident Zaria to the SNP dated October 15, 1942.

189. Field-work interview with M. Wakaje, op.cit.

(e) Workers and Anti-Colonial Struggles

The World War II years also witnessed widespread labour strife. There were problems such as spiralled inflation pertaining to goods and foodstuffs, general high cost of living, meagre allowances or none at all, and stagnation of wages confronting the Zaria workers. The thin Cost of Living Allowance (COLA) which the colonial authorities gave to workers in 1942 - which was insignificant in the first place - was rendered more worthless partly because of the galloping inflation. At that time prices of foodstuffs went up by 21%.¹⁹⁰ Prices of other kinds of goods, both local and imported goods, were skyrocketing. There was no price control device applied by the authorities. Coupled with this was the general scarcity of goods.¹⁹¹

It was the railway workers who took the lead in terms of strikes and protests in the province. In the course of the anti-colonial struggles by the working class some religious leaders and sects,

190. SNF Kaduna to Resident Zaria dated June 2, 1942, in "Labour Appointment in the Colonial Empire..."

191. Ibid.

together with some of their members, condemned and opposed the efforts of the workers and sided with the colonialists. When the workers under the leadership of the African civil Servant Technical Workers Union (ACSTWU) fought and got some limited COLA from the employers in 1942, they came under attack from within; from few workers belonging to a rabid conservative and pro-imperialist church called the First Century Gospel. Its headquarters in Nigeria was at Onitsha and G.M. Ikeazor was the Senior pastor. The total membership of the first Century Gospel at Zaria stood at 20. Three of its members were in the employ of the Agricultural Department at Samaru-Zaria and one was at the Public Works Department.¹⁹² These 4 workers refused to collect their COLA on the basis that it was not given freely by the colonial government but as a result of "some pressure by a section of its servants..."¹⁹³ They further argued that the Zaria Workers should instead let the British authorities to keep the money as "part of the country war efforts!"¹⁹⁴

192. Resident Zaria to the SNP Kaduna of October 1, 1942; and also see from Assistant Director, Agricultural Department Samaru-Zaria to the Resident Zaria Province October 28, 1942, in "Labour Appointment in the Colonial Empire..."

193. Report prepared by J.W. Pedder, Senior Agriculture Officer Samaru-Zaria, in "Labour Appointment in the Colonial Empire..."

194. Ibid.

By their action the gossellers came out as traitors of the Zaria workers as they also pledged to the colonialists that they will "never" opposed any action taken by Government unless such action is contrary to the teaching of the scripture."¹⁹⁵ Furthermore, the general position was that all gossellers in Nigeria "will not accept pension on retirement."¹⁹⁶

The months of August to December were marked by serious railway labour strife in the form of strikes centered on issues such as shortage of foodstuffs and lack of supplies; scarcity of goods; the general high prices of goods; low wages; galloping inflation; and all sorts of prevailing deteriorating conditions. The economic struggle by workers to improve their lot, in the context of the times, was indeed anti-colonial and thus nationalistic. An industrial action was embarked on by a section of the junior railway workers on August 17, 1943.¹⁹⁷

The acting Resident pointed out that:

195. Ibid.

196. Ibid.

197. Confidential Report by M.M. Lewis (District Engineer) Railway Zaria dated Augst 19, 1943, in "Labour Appointment in the Colonial Empire..."

... the entire labour force (but no headmen) employed in permanent way maintenance gangs between Zaria and Dangora refused to work and commenced to march into Zaria. Reports were received that the northern section between Dangora and Kano were also about to strike and March into Kano.¹⁹⁸

In the face of threats of repressive action against them - by the railway Management and the Zaria authorities - the striking workers did not shake in their resolve to fight for their rights. The fact of the matter presented by the strikers was that 9 pence per day pay and 2 pence COLA would not meet the basic daily feeding requirement of a family.¹⁹⁹ They also complained about the shortage of grain supplies at the rural railway stations for them to purchase. Tactically the authorities conceded to workers' main demand and promised to supply them with 40 tons of grain.²⁰⁰ This quantity was inadequate; and their earnings were very low to cope. Due to this the railway workers on the so-called permanent employment

198. L.H. Goble to the SNP dated August 20, 1943, in "Labour Appointment in the Colonial Empire..."

199. Confidential Report by M.M. Lewis (District Engineer Railway Zaria dated August 19, 1943...

200. L.H. Goble to the SNP dated August 20, 1943...

downed tools again on November 13, 1943. When they resumed strike the Zaria acting Resident, L.H. Goble, threatened to arrest and charge the striking workers under the General Defence Regulations. However, the workers took all this in their collective stride, and thus did not budge.²⁰¹ One of the leaders of the strike. Danjuma, told L.H.Goble that if imprisonment was the penalty "he wished to go to prison."²⁰² The intimidation and the lock-up of some strikers by the Police (on orders of the highest provincial authorities) did not work. The weapon was the fact that the striking workers remained united; and thus the colonizer was left with little option but to negotiate with them.

In the course of the negotiations that followed, the leader of the mainly rural based striking labourers, Dakau, put forward one of their main plight this way:

Our pay is insufficient. We do not refuse to work. For the last year and two months the money paid us has been inadequate to feed ourselves decently, and to provide food and clothing for our wives and children, who are in rags.²⁰³

201. Acting Resident Zaria to the SNP Kaduna dated November 10, 1943, in "Labour Appointment in the Colonial Empire..."

202. Ibid.

203. Ibid.

Furthermore, Dakau attacked the railway headmen for being strike breakers. He emphasized that because the headmen had some level of collaboration with the management, whilst getting some crumbs from the employers for their sell-out roles, they were ignoring complaints and protests from the labourers.²⁰⁴

The striking rural railway workers questioned the basis of the disparity of 4 shillings in salaries between them and their colleagues working at the Zaria and Kaduna railway stations. One interesting thing about this specific demand was that their urban colleagues supported and backed the strikers.²⁰⁵

The strikers argued that they too had to travel to Zaria and Kaduna towns - from their local station - to buy food and clothing because these could not be found at rural stations; and this made the life of the rural railway workers more difficult.²⁰⁶

As at November 1943 the monthly salary of the most lowest rural railway workers stood at £1, 7 shillings and 6 pence; and that of the urban workers was £1, 11 shillings and 6 pence.²⁰⁷

204. Ibid.

205. Ibid.

206. Ibid.

207. Ibid.

Generally in the World War II years the British employed the use of threat, intimidation, repression, other political and legal means in their attempt at crippling the struggle of the colonized workers. In 1941 the colonizer enforced the Defence Regulations which were similar to a war legislation in Britain. But the difference in the Zaria context or indeed Nigeria was that the Defence Regulations went with all the racism, crudity, and viciousness, against the colonized workers. One section of the regulations provided that "that to strike is to help the enemy."²⁰⁸ That is, any strike by workers was viewed as support for the Nazis and Fascists. In spite of this the Zaria workers put up struggle.

Apart from the series of strikes, the railway workers refused to accept the 1942 bonus as it was. They resisted attempts by the railway management to imposed working overtime on them in 1942.²⁰⁹ The British were - by the day-getting more and more set for a clampdown on the RWU and its

208. From the Chief Secretary to the Government, Lagos, to the Resident Zaria dated June 4, 1942, in "Labour Appointment in the Colonial Empire..."

209. Communication from the Chief Secretary to the Government Lagos, to the Resident Zaria of 6th June, 1942, in "Labour Appointments in the colonial Empire..."

national leader Michael Imoudu. On January 22, 1943 the Resident of Zaria was alerted by the authorities in the Nigeria capital of Lagos about the "possibility of a strike on railway in the near future which might spread to large cities..."²¹⁰ Barely two days later it was further reported that Imoudu, President of the RWU - and a "well known agitator" - was arrested at Lagos on January 24, 1943 and taken to Benin Province to be put in indefinite detention under the Defence Regulations of 1941 "by the Governor's order."²¹¹

In July 1943 the Federal Union of Native Administration Staff (FUNAS) was registered with A.S. Coker as its national leader. The FUNAS leader was at Zaria in July 1943 on what was supposed to be a drive to establish a branch of the trade union in the province. In an address to the Zaria N.A. officials, A.S. Coker emphasized that for FUNAS "the main objective was closer cooperation between the staff and the administration with a view to

210. Precis Code wire 2800/50A from the SNP to the Resident Zaria dated January 22, 1943 in "Labour Appointments in the Colonial Empire..."

211. Precis Code wire 200/24/1 from the SNP to the Resident Zaria, in "Labour Appointment in the colonial Empire..."

increase efficiency, etc."²¹² In concrete terms it turned out to be that A.S. Coker was at Zaria for the mobilization of the N.A. workers along pro-British lines for the war efforts.²¹³ It was not the interests of the Zaria N.A. workers that did matter to A.S. Coker at that stage. In fact the colonialists - known for their anti-workers policies and position in words and deeds - were quite satisfied with what the FUNAS leader accomplished at Zaria:

At Mr. Coker's suggestion a collection was made from Native Administration employees for the purchase of seed for a union groundnut farm to be worked by union members. When the crop is harvested, the profits, in toto will be handed over to Government as contribution by the union to the win the war fund.²¹⁴

Like the British officials Emir Ja'afaru was delighted by the FUNAS leader's apologia posture which compromised the interest of the Zaria N.A. workers. As the Resident noted:

212. FUNAS - from Acting Resident Zaria Province to the SNP Kaduna July 14, 1943, in "Labour Appointment in the Colonial Empire..."

213. Ibid.

214. Ibid.

The Emir appears to have been genuinely impressed and mention in conversation with Major Maddox that if all natives from the South were like Mr. Coker the country would progress and the mutual mistrust between the North and South would soon disappear.²¹⁵

On August, 1943 the Trade Union Congress of Nigeria (TUCN) was formed.²¹⁶ As at November 1943 about 56 Unions in Nigeria had affiliated to it and S.M.O. Shonekan became its acting Secretary-General.²¹⁷ Right from 1943 the TUCN started mapping out plans for certain projects including the establishment of a labour college in Nigeria; the training of Nigerians abroad for labour and social welfare work; and to provide schools for destitute children. Among the aims and objectives of the TUCN were to unite all trade unions in Nigeria in a single organized body; deal with labour problems affecting workers all over Nigeria; protect the legal status and rights of the labour unions; and to ensure proper organization of all the trade unions.²¹⁸

215. Ibid.

216. Bade Onimode, Imperialism and Underdevelopment, Macmillan, London, 1983, p.131.

217. See from the Commissioner of Labour, Labour Department Lagos, to the SNP Kaduna - November 19, 1943, in "Labour Appointment in the Colonial Empire..."

218. Ibid.

Contact was made with the Emir of Zaria, and other Emirs and Chiefs in Northern Nigeria, to make monetary contributions. In its call for financial aid made to the Emir on September 13, 1943 the TUCN stated that:

To help practicalise these aims, an appeal for 20 million pennies will be launched in the workers' week, and as one of our natural Rulers and leaders we look forward to your assistance. 219

But the general response of the British authorities in Northern Nigeria was that the Sultan, Emirs and Chiefs should not make financial contributions towards the fund raising by the TUCN.²²⁰ However on their own the local rulers were not known to be friends of the colonized working people.

What the analysis has shown in this chapter is that from the times of the Great Economic Depression of 1929 to the World War II, the colonized working people stood up to struggle against British colonialism. The nationalist movements had its ups and downs by the day, but, it equally grew in strength. As would be subsequently seen the anti-colonial struggles got to more crucial stages towards the end of World War II.

219. Letter from Acting Secretary-General of the TUCN to Sultan and Emirs dated September 13, 1943, in "Labour Appointments in the Colonial Empire..."

220. See, for example, H.B. Leonard to the SNP Kaduna of October 24, 1943; and see reply from SNP to all Residents in the Northern Provinces - for action by Emirs and the Sultan, in "Labour Appointments in the colonial Empire..."

CHAPTER FOUR

THE ACCELERATION OF THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT IN THE 1940s

4.1 Introduction

The analysis in this chapter does focus on the nationalist activities of various class forces partly in the course of World War II and in the immediate years that followed. The anti-colonial struggles took various forms and dimensions; waged by all sorts of social classes and forces, including the ethnic minorities in the southern districts. For the nationalist efforts were more sharp in those Southern areas under the jurisdiction of Zaria and Jema'a N.As than in the so-called independent districts of Kagero, Morca, and Jaba, where the chiefs were imposed from within the communities. One subject of analysis is the impact of the ex-servicemen on the nationalist movement. Also, the role of the educated elite has to be examined. And there is the very significant issue of the 1945 General Strike. The process of the struggle for national liberation was the most fundamental issue of those historic times. Throughout the process of colonialism the colonizer remained insensitive towards the aspirations of the colonized; and

thus only by waging struggle could the colonized win even the most minimum of concessions.¹

4.2 The Return of the Soldiers

It was as from the year 1944 that the colonized soldiers who fought for Britain during the World War II started to return. Some of them had real practical exposure in relation to world politics in the course of the war; and they acquired skills which could be useful in the struggle for national independence.² The colonialists embarked on demobilization of thousands of soldiers from the military service, without any concrete plan or implementation of resettlement scheme, and with no compensation. Generally, the discharged soldiers were left unemployed all over the towns such as Zaria and Kaduna.³ Some of the demobilized **soldiers** joined the most radical organizations in the national liberation movement.⁴

1. Albert Memmi, The Colonizer and the Colonized, Souvenir Press, London, 1974, pp 69-74.

2. Bade Onimode, Imperialism and Underdevelopment in Nigeria, Macmillan, London, 1983, p.144.

3. Annual Reports on Labour Conditions in Zaria Province for the years 1945-49, in "Labour Conditions - Annual Report (1943-50)", NAK: ZAR PROF No.2653A.

4. J.S. Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1971, p.254.

A Nigerian nationalist, Mokwugo Okoye, has reflected on the historical basis, the motivating force, and the source of inspiration, which influenced the decision he and his likes took when they pitched their tent in the struggle for national independence:

Frankly, I have really no personal ambition. Personally, I entered the struggle because it was the big thing of my time. Shortly after World War II, I was a soldier in World War II, there was this agitation for independence, it attracted me. You know youthful impulses, and we gave to this struggle all our enthusiasm that youths were capable of, ah but as I remember, many of my colleagues, we really didn't hope for anything for ourselves. We set after self-government in our lifetime, probably not all of us believed it but somehow we managed. There was this historic necessity to do what others had done elsewhere, not to accept the fact that the tallest of us was to bow to the shortest of the European masters. Having been in the army, we knew that there were cowards, and illiterates among the white men: there were crooks and so on, human beings are basically the same. We didn't see why we had to subject ourselves to those British merchants.⁵

Demobilized soldiers were neglected by the British authorities. It was stated in the Zaria Annual Report on Labour conditions of 1944 that:

5. Mokwugo Okoye in an interview with the Magazine Quality Weekly, June 15, 1989, p.26.

Extreme difficulty is already being experienced in finding employment for discharged soldiers as there are virtually no openings excepting for casual labour.⁶

By 1945 the number of the unemployed at Zaria and Kaduna towns went up, partly because of the influx of the returning soldiers.⁷ Also in 1945 the harsh treatment meted to them, the difficult conditions they found themselves in, and the insecurity due to the ongoing demobilization exercise, resulted in a mutiny at Kaduna "by troops of the Nigeria Regiment, but order was quickly restored."⁸ This was a sort of nationalistic act against the British who used them in fighting for the imperial power and dumped them thereafter.

The fact of the matter was even when the colonial authorities supposedly provided alternative jobs for some of the ex-servicemen, it was not in the public sector; neither were the jobs the normal regular ones on a permanent basis. The types of jobs ~~were more often the most insecure.~~ The British often hired the discharged soldiers to local contractors who were expected to engage them as cheap

6. Annual Report on Labour conditions 1944 in Zaria Province, in "Labour Conditions - Annual Report (1943-50)..."

7. G.D. Pitcairn, "Zaria Province Annual Report 1945", NAK: ZAR PROC No.4032.

8. Ibid.

labourers on daily basis. In December 1947, 88 per cent of the discharged soldiers at Zaria refused to accept "such work, as they state mode of payment is both uncertain and haphazard."⁹ One implication of the prevailing demobilization exercise was the rise in urban crime at Kaduna and Zaria towns. This was partly due to the factor of non-employment for the veterans and made more complex by the "floating of population of unemployed..."¹⁰ The British did not treat the ex-servicemen with any dignity; the colonizer failed to uphold the promises made in the course of the war. Some of the ex-servicemen were left worse-off as they joined the large army of the lumpen proletariat, and the unemployed, at Zaria, Kaduna, and elsewhere in the province.

Some of the discharged soldiers returned to their villages once more as peasants. But despite this their experiences and knowledge about the world, and the British in particular, were things the colonizer could not take away from them. And thus they become some sorts of educators to the rural...

9. Accountant Railway Zaria to ADO Zaria dated December 13, 1945, in "Labour conditions - Annual Report (1943-50)..."

10. C.V. Williams, "Zaria Province Annual Report 1947", NAK: ZAR PRCE No. 4367.

populace in connection with the situation and political developments in the outside world. In the Ham areas (of Jaba and Kachia districts) an ex-serviceman, Karmi Kwai, was a leading person who made contribution in enlightening people about world and local affairs. He was an active fellow in the ethnic minorities agitations for carving the Southern districts from Zaria N.A, in the campaign for rise of ginger price for the peasants in the 1950s (especially in Hamland), and later joined the Middle Zone League (MZL) as a staunch nationalist.¹¹

A number of Zaria ex-servicemen did stake their lot in fighting the colonial system which used them and left them off as wretched elements. As at 1948 there were over 800 demobilized soldiers registered as being unemployed at Zaria town alone.¹² At Zaria Muhammadu Alangade returned from the war and joined the stream of nationalist struggle; he became the local treasurer of the ex-servicemen Union. In that respect Muhammadu Alangade and other contributed a lot in searching for jobs for ex-servicemen, encouraging them to learn trade in order to earn a

11. Field-work interview with Ladi Saratu Kasam, daughter of a colonial Chief and housewife, age 62, at Mabuhu in June, 1987.

12. Annual Report on Labour conditions 1948, in "Labour conditions - Annual Report (1943-50)..."

new living. Also, during the 1945 General Strike Muhammadu Alangade took part in mobilizing some sections of workers to join strongly, at a time the British were spreading propaganda in an attempt to break the unity of workers in the industrial action by painting a picture that it was workers of Southern Nigeria origin who were out to cause trouble at Zaria.¹³

4.3 The Petite Bourgeoisie and Nationalist Agitations

The springing up of political organizations can be better grasped by an analysis of the political activities of the incipient Zaria intelligentsia as from 1939. Richard L. Sklar has shown that various organizations and associations, with varying and often contradictory political and ideological tendencies, formed by the educated elite, were the nucleus of the political parties that emerged later.¹⁴

There was conflict between the Emirs and Chiefs in the employ of the colonialists and the educated

13. Field-Work interview for the author (recorded on cassette) conducted by Habu Dauda with Mohammadu Alangade, ex-Serviceman and Zaria NEPU President, age 72, at Sabon Gari Zaria, on 21st October, 1989.

14. Richard L. Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties: Power in an Emergent African Nations, Nok Publishers, Enugu, 1980, pp 88-90.

section of the petite bourgeoisie. In the broader context of colonial Africa Chinweizu has viewed this sort of antagonism not only as that of rivalry - as to which group between the colonized rulers and the educated elements was qualified to be the actual representative or spokesman of the people - but that the so-called traditional rulers perceived the educated elite "as upstarts from traditionally lowly origin."¹⁵ However, this assertion is not quite in line with what the situation was like in the specifics of Zaria Province. For at a fundamental level, colonial education was for the scions of the aristocratic and other dominant circles. Certainly, the colonial Emirs and Chiefs came to view the new intelligentsia (produced by the colonial school system) as some kind of rival group; but the point of fact was that both were largely from the same noble origins of the ruling dynasties of Zaria, Jema'a, and elsewhere.¹⁶

15. Chinweizu, The West and the Rest of US, Nok Publishers, Lagos, 1978, pp 87-88.

16. C.S. Whitaker Jr., The Politics of Tradition, Continuity and Change in Northern Nigeria 1946-1966, PUP, New Jersey, 1970, pp.355.

A basis of the tussle between the colonized rulers and the petite bourgeoisie was the fact that in spite of largely being of the same class background, coupled with the latter having acquired the best form of colonial education in the circumstances of the times, the petit-bourgeois elements suffered from profound marginalization by the British in favour of the key N.A. officials.¹⁷ The new intelligentsia was mainly confined or restricted to positions as teachers in the N.A. Education Department which made it removed from any control of political power; and highly subordinated to Emirs and Chiefs who were mainly uneducated in terms of colonial education.¹⁸ According to Bello Ijumu, the members of the new intelligentsia were often victimized by the Emirs and Chiefs. They opposed the political activities of the educated elite, monitored other activities that petit-bourgeois elements were involved in, and passed the intelligence reports on to the British officials.¹⁹

17. Bryan Sharnwood-Smith, "But Always as Friends," Northern Nigeria and Cameroons, 1921-1957, George Allen and Unwin Limited, London, 1969, p.148.

18. John N. Paden, Ahmadu Bello: Sardauna of Sokoto: Values and Leadership in Nigeria, Hudahuda, Zaria, 1986, pp121-123.

19. Interview with Bello Ijumu, "Chief Bello Ijumu - a born radical founder of NEPU", in the newspaper SUNDAY VANGUARD, March 29, 1987, p.5 and p.13.

At the outbreak of World War II the leading section among the Zaria educated elite comprised of products of the Katsina college. Also significant was the presence of Sa'ad Zungur, who attended Yaba Higher College at Lagos, who started work with the Zaria Medical Department.²⁰ An important development in relation to the embryonic organizations of the educated elite was the formation of the Katsina College Old Boys Association in 1939 at Kaduna.²¹ In little time it became an umbrella for the educated elements to rally themselves, start underground discussions about colonialism, and to fight for reforms of the N.A system towards their playing central roles in its affairs. The British had banned them from participation in political activities, and so the Old Boys Association sort of served as a cover. But the colonialists viewed its activities with suspicion.²² A manifestation of conflict between the intelligentsia and the ruling aristocrats could be seen in the light of the intra-dynastic rivalry during, and after, the contest

20. Dandatti Abdulkadir, The Poetry, Life and Opinion of Sa'adu Zungur, NNPC, Zaria, 1974, especially introduction.

21. C.S. Whitaker Jr., op.cit., p.255.

22. J.N. Paden, op.cit, footnote 5, p.140.

of the Sultanate throne in 1038; in the process the Katsina College educated Ahmadu Bello (who the British had already seen as a rallying personality for the educated elite) lost out to his cousin Abubakar.²³

Subsequently, the rivalry continued as the Sultan's Council was affected by divisions. The conflict reached a climax in 1943 when Ahmadu Bello was charged before the Sultan's court - presided by Sultan Abubakar III himself - on the grounds of alleged embezzlement of Jangali and was convicted to one year imprisonment.²⁴ The appeal was heard at the Zaria High Court. Graduates of Katsina College and other educated elements mobilized themselves, came out openly, and threw their weight in support of Ahmadu Bello at Zaria.²⁵ The whole episode was seen by the educated elite as a clear case of their victimization. In the build-up, and during the proceedings of the appeal at Zaria High Court, the British observed at play the rift between

23. Ibid., pp 111-113.

24. Ahmadu Bello, My Life, Gaskiya, Zaria, 1986, pp48-49.

25. J.N. Paden, op.cit., pp122-123.

the petit-bourgeois elements and the N.A aristocrats.²⁶ Eventually, the earlier conviction was quashed and set aside as Ahmadu Bello was acquitted.²⁷ The educated elite saw this as a victory.

Political activities of the educated elite grew by the day in the province. It was in 1939 that Sa'ad Zungur founded the Zaria Improvement Union.²⁸ Later there were discussion circles springing up at Kaduna led by intellectuals such as Yahaya Gusau - then a teacher at Kaduna College. Overtly, the discussion groups focused on issues of the day in the form of enlightenment. But beyond the surface very serious political questions were raised. In various ways both the British and the Emir of Zaria were opposed to those organizations; some moves were made to frustrate the efforts of the educated elite.²⁹ Of course, membership of the somehow underground cells was elitist.

26. Ibid., pp 199-123.

27. A. Bello, op.cit., p.58.

28. D. Abdulkadir, op.cit., pp9-10.

29. A.D. Yahaya, The Native Authority System in Northern Nigeria 1950-70: A Study in Political Relations with Particular Reference to Zaria Native Authority, ABU Press, Zaria, 1980; and J.S. Coleman, op.cit., p.358.

It does not mean that the organizations by the educated elite were politically and ideologically homogenous. These sorts of differences among the intelligentsia came out in the open in the Zaria Literary Society. The radical Sa'ad Zungur consistently focused attacks on the colonial system and its harsh treatment of the commoner strata, against the concentration of powers on the Emirs in the N.A.C. set up, and the question of relegation of education to the background. Sa'ad Zungur also maintained a pan-Nigerian outlook within which he envisaged the solving of problems peculiar to Zaria and indeed Northern Nigeria. Standing in opposition to Sa'ad's position were individuals who never saw the British as the problem but the practices of the Emirs; they just wanted an integration of the educated elements into the N.A.C. Councils. Such elements did toe a more conservative line and lacked a national outlook. One of them was Abubakar Imam. The differences eventually led to the collapse of the Zaria Literacy Society.³⁰

In 1943 radical petit-bourgeois elements, of Northern Nigeria origin, who were collaborators of

30. R. L. Sklar, op.cit., footnote 7, p.88.

Sa'ad Zungur, such as Aminu Kano, started to articulate anti-British and anti-feudal views and touching on other political issues in articles published in the West African Pilot.³¹ Operating from his Zaria base Sa'ad Zungur established links with nationalist forces based in Southern Nigeria and their organizations. Right from the formation of the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) in 1944 Sa'ad joined it and was an active participant in its nationalist struggle. Sa'ad and his radical colleagues focused on anti-colonial struggles for political and economic reforms, education of youth, and advancing the cause of national liberation by strategically going into working co-operation with the NCNC and the militant Zikist Movement. Sa'ad Zungur was the General-Secretary of the NCNC. The British authorities kept on masterminding a campaign of slander to discredit the likes of Sa'ad Zungur. The official position was to portray such radicals, in the province and elsewhere, as self-appointed leaders who had no following among the people and as sell-outs to

31. D. Abdulkadir, op.cit., pp9-10; and R.L. Sklar, op.cit., footnote 7, p.89.

Southern Nigerians.³² The conservative wing of intelligentsia at Zaria, Kaduna, and elsewhere in Northern Nigeria, viewed the practical nationalist politics of Sa'ad Zungur and other radicals, to work towards unity in struggle with Nigerians from different socio-cultural and regional backgrounds, as something repugnant and also dangerous.³³ According to Segun O. Osoba petit-bourgeois elements such as Abubakar Imam were hook, line and sinker influenced by the Lugardian world view to the extent that their belief was that only the British could redeem the situation and uplift the colonized people.³⁴

An important moment for the dominant section of the petite bourgeoisie to carry their protests and agitation to London came in 1943, when Abubakar Imam (as editor of Gaskiya Ta Fi Kwabo) was invited on a West Africa Press delegation to visit war time Britain.³⁵ Abubakar Imam held some rounds of

32. SNP to the Resident Zaria dated 5, 1947, in "NCNC Delegates", NAK: ZAR PROF No.C.11/1946.

33. Kole Omotoso, Just Before Dawn, Spectrum, Ibadan, pp143-144.

34. S.O. Osoba, "Consideration on Some Conceptual and Ideological Aspects of Nigerian Underdevelopment in Historical Perspective," Seminar Paper, Department of History, University of Ife, Ile-Ife, 1980.

35. J.N. Paden, op.cit., pp143-144.

discussions at Zaria, Kaduna, and elsewhere, with members of the Katsina College Old Boys Association and other circles of the intelligentsia. They decided to use the opportunity provided by the tour to present their own grievances and position to Frederick D. Lugard. According to Bryan Shardwood-Smith when Abubakar Imam - as spokesperson of the dominant section of the Zaria and indeed Northern Nigeria intellectuals - eventually met with F.A. Lugard:

He claimed that the British administration as a whole had failed to adjust its thinking to the times, and he was critical of the apparent lack of sympathy of white officials, as a class, for the rising generation of educated Northerners.³⁶

Abubakar Imam also said much to F.D. Lugard about the ruling aristocrats discriminatory practices towards the educated elite. This was linked with the marginalization and alienation of the petite bourgeoisie, especially at the centre of the N.A structure, and the general victimization of the petit-bourgeois by the Emirs. Furthermore, in the course of the discussion with Lugard, Abubakar Imam requested and suggested

36. B. Shardwood-Smith, op.cit., p.155.

that membership of the Emirs' Council in Northern Nigeria should be extended to include the intelligentsia; in a nutshell a call was made for reformist measures to integrate the educated elite into more central roles in the scheme of things. For his part F.D. Lugard assured Abubakar Imam that he would do the best possible to see that something was done in the direction of the issues they discussed on.³⁷

F.D. Lugard apparently used his influence to push certain things to the British authorities. In 1944 the colonial authorities began to put the question of political reforms on the discussion agenda, in line with the complaints Abubakar Imam presented to F.D. Lugard. On May 22, 1944 the Governor of Nigeria, Arthur Frederick Richards, held a secret meeting at Kaduna with the Emirs and Chiefs in Zaria and other Northern Nigeria Provinces. The Governor of Nigeria elaborated on the British thinking about the N.A reforms and changes that would be introduced.³⁸ Beyond the protests and

37. S. Osoba, op.cit.; and K. Omotoso, op.cit., p.145.

38. Text of Speech by H.E. Sir Arthur Richards, Governor of Nigeria, at a Secret Meeting with Emirs and Chiefs of the Northern Provinces at Kaduna on 22nd May, 1944, NAK: ZAR PROF No.C.2/1940.

agitations by the educated elements, the proposed reforms should be placed in the context of the struggles waged by the generality of the colonized. One of the issues Governor A.F. Richards touched on, in an address to the "traditional rulers" was that the intelligentsia produced by the colonial school system "must not be ignored and left to disrupt our administration."³⁹ A.F. Richards further emphasized the basis of the intended reforms in connection with the District and Emir's Councils. *thus:*

Nevertheless, as you yourselves know and say "the eyes of the peasantry are being opened." Yes: and with the spread of education those eyes will open still wider. You must all see how interested your young educated men are in things of which I speak... But that sort of talk and that sort of thinking is, I want you to realise, inevitable: If you attempt to stop it you will drive it into secret channels.⁴⁰

The governor expressed worries about the rise of militant and radical currents in the nationalist movement which could threaten the colonial order. The solution to this was to promote the so-called moderate sections of the intelligentsia.⁴¹

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid.

In 1945 the Residents' Conference took place and further suggestions were made about the N.A. reforms.⁴² But, even then, there was very little implementation in terms of carving a place for the educated elite in Zaria Province. The British were saying one thing but on the ground both the colonialists and the Emir of Zaria ensured that only the less educated loyalists of the throne remained in key N.A. positions. That was why persons such as Aliyu Turakin Zazzau kept on calling for reforms.⁴³ The educated elite - mainly scions of the aristocratic circles - were left as a marginalized and discontented lot as they were increasing in their number.

In the Southern districts of Zaria Province, the emergent educated elite began to surface in the anti-colonial struggles in the early 1940s. When the Bajju peasantry led by Usman Sakwat waged its nationalist struggle, support was given by the educated elements who were still operating from the background. Also, the dominantly Christianized

42. J.S. Coleman, op.cit., pp356-357.

43. A.D. Yahaya, op.cit., p.41.

petite bourgeoisie started competing for power at the local level with the non-educated Animist Chiefs. In 1944 the Agwam Agworok (Chief of Kagoro), Biya, died. A tussle for succession ensued between the Animists and the minority educated Christian elements.⁴⁴ In the process the Agworok Animists held the position that the throne was their right. However, the Christian elements and the SIM establishment (then the principal or leading mission in the area) - which had just collaborated with the colonialists in opposition to Usman Sakwat and the Bajju nationalists - mounted pressure on the British for the rulership of Kagoro to go to one of their members; the SIM gave backing to Gwamna Awan - educated at Toro Teachers College - who was already influential in the Kagoro "Independent District" affairs.

By 1944 the SIM had begun to project about the place that would be occupied by its followers in the future. It played a crucial role in ensuring that Gwamna Awan stood against an Animist aspirant, Gwani, in the race for the vacant throne.⁴⁵ Some of the European Missionaries such as Thomas Archibald came out openly and vowed that there would be no

44. R. Logan, "Zaria Province Annual 1944", NAK: PROF. No.3930.

45. Field-work interview with Ladi Saratu Kasam, op.cit.

peace in Kagoro Chiefdom if Gwamna Awan was not appointed; the SIM used the Church to mobilize for support.⁴⁶ It was to a large extent the ensued rivalry between the petit-bourgeois elements, enjoying the strong backing of the SIM, and the Animists which contributed to the delay by the authorities in the appointment of a new Chief of Kagoro in 1944.⁴⁷ In 1945 the battle went in favour of the former as Gwamna Awan became the first Christian element to be appointed a colonial Chief, for any of the administrative units and nationalities, in the entire Zaria Province.⁴⁸

The emergent Southern Zaria petite bourgeoisie, and the Christian elements, saw the appointment of Gwamna Awan to the Kagoro throne as their victory; they viewed the new Agwam Agworok as their star. The Hausa-Fulani aristocrats of Jama'a and Zaria N.As saw the development in the so-called Kagoro Independent District as one which posed a threat to their own interest to hold on to rulership in the

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid.^{and} R. Logan, op.cit.

48. G.D. Pitcairn, op.cit.

neighbouring districts of Kagoma, Zango Katab, Kachia, and so on. At that time the aristocracy was more comfortable with the illiterate Animist⁴⁹ ruling circles than the educated Christianized elite in Southern Zaria. As from 1945 the Southern Zaria intelligentsia came on strongly to be in the forefront in pushing petitions, complaints, and protests, to the colonial authorities. The educated elite increased their agitations for N.A.C. reforms in which they saw themselves as the right persons to replace the Hausa-Fulani officials as agents of colonialism in the management of local affairs.⁵⁰

4.4 Peasant Revolts and Ethnic Minorities Nationalism

The Zaria peasantry which suffered greatly under the yoke of colonialism kept on with the tempo of the anti-colonial struggles (as seen earlier in connection with the Bajju and other nationalist efforts) even as the World War II years came to an end. J.S. Coleman has stated that the peasantry

49. Second field-work interview with Shekarau Kau Layyah, professional teacher and politician, age about 65, at Samaru Katab, on October 13, 1989.

50. For quite a number of instances see, "Zango Katab District Unrest in 1946", NAK: ZAR PROF No. C.8/1945.

in Northern Nigeria was politically inept in the nationalist politics until the early 1950s.⁵¹ Concretely, the analysis in this study has shown that the Zaria peasantry was not mute in the anti-colonial movement. Even in the general context of the African continent, Oginga Odinga has shown that the peasantry remained restive in struggling against the foreign occupiers.⁵² Moreso, the peasantry constituted the largest force in society and in the nationalist movement.⁵³

The peasants at Birnin Gwari waged anti-colonial struggle against oppression and extortion by the chief and other officials. This contributed to the dismissal, and the exile to Bida, of the Chief of Birnin Gwari in 1944.⁵⁴ In 1945 the Zaria authorities dismissed the District Head of Chikun from office in the midst of growing peasant protests.⁵⁵ In May 1946 the people of Taligan, in Magamiya village area, in Zango Katab District, led by Ataar

51. J.S. Coleman, op.cit., p.354.

52. Oginga Odinga, Not Yet Uhuru, Heinemann, London, 1974, p.64.

53. Bill Freund, The Making of Contemporary Africa: The Development of African Society since 1800, Macmillan Press, 1984, p.204.

54. R. Logan, op.cit.

55. G.D. Pitcairn, op.cit.

Kurama, refused to be assessed by the District Head in connection with poll tax.⁵⁶ This resulted in a physical fight between the Taligan youth and the entourage of the District Head. The District Head, Katuka Sulaiman, blamed the headmaster of the N.A. school at Mabuhu-Zonzon, Dawa La'aki, as having instigated Ataar Kurama and the youth to rebel against local authorities.⁵⁷

One basis of the popular revolts was that in the post World War II years the Southern Zaria peoples were now questioning the continued payment of taxes when there were no schools, dispensaries, jobs, and amenities, to show for this. Linked with this was the dominant role of the Hausa-Fulani aristocrats as the representatives of the colonial state in the Southern districts of Zaria N.A. There were now more and more complaints and protests against the Chauvinism, tyranny, oppression, and the discriminatory practices by the Hausa-Fulani rulers against the ethnic minorities.⁵⁸ All this led to a highly explosive

56. Letter from District Head of Zango Katab to Emir of Zaria dated May 7, 1946, in "Zango Katab District - Unrest in 1946..."

57. Ibid.

58. "Zango Katab - Unrest in 1946..."

situation by 1946 when the Bajju and Atyab peoples rose in mass revolts in anti-colonial struggles that brought together various class forces in society.⁵⁹ In the earlier decades only the peasants; the youth; some sections of community elders; and few village chiefs, who sort of committed class suicide, were participants in the nationalist struggles. In 1946 a new social force emerged on the scene of the Southern Zaria anti-colonial struggles; this was the educated elite. It was made up of government trained teachers, mission trained teachers, evangelists, products of elementary schools, products of adult literacy classes ran by the churches, and even adult pupils in schools. In the context of Southern Zaria (where the level of colonial education was relatively low) every literate person was seen as being educated.⁶⁰

The incipient elite in the Southern districts were fast moving from Animism to Christianity, with few converting to Islam. The British, the N.A. aristocrats, and the local village Heads, embarked on a campaign to distort the historical basis of the

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid.

Bajju and Atyab popular uprisings of 1946 by making allegations that they were products of instigations by "missionary adherents."⁶¹ Specifically the Atyab peasant revolt of 1946 was blamed on the influence of Kagoro ruling circles. Resident G.D. Pitcairn reported that the Emir of Zaria, Ja'afaru, "is very bitter about Sarkin Kagoro himself and seems at all times to blame the Chief of Kagoro for all Katab troubles."⁶² G.D. Pitcairn was reluctant in accepting all the accusations made by the Emir but he still maintained that:

The influence of Kagoro has been very powerful, certainly, and as much perhaps by its standing as an example of an independent tribe as by the propaganda of boys and youths trained by the S.I.M. there.⁶³

Subsequently, the Resident "warned the independent Chief of Kagoro", Gwanna Awan, to desist from any interference in the affairs of districts under the jurisdiction of Zaria N.A.⁶⁴ The campaign by the authorities was to deny the historical, socio-economic

61. No.8 1946/8 from Resident Zaria to the SNP of May 29, 1948, in Ibid.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid.

and political bases of the popular anti-colonial struggles by the peoples and to attempt at discrediting them. However, even some colonialists contradicted the official propaganda. As a British political officer, J.A. Reynold, later submitted - after investigations in connection with the Bajju revolts - the anti-colonial struggle, including the ethnic group's fight for a chiefdom, was a long historical problem and "is not recent development inspired by mission elements alone..."⁶⁵

One basic fact is that the colonialists, the Zaria aristocrats, and the Atyab and Bajju Animist village Heads, were for different reasons united in opposition and hostility towards the educated elite and their practical political activities. They partly saw the predominantly Christianized elite as an emergent force capable of undermining their influence and control in society; and for the fact that they could not easily control and direct them. A common practice by the district and village officials in Zango Katab was to use the Alkali and "pagan" courts to frame and deal with those amongst such elements who played active roles in nationalist struggles.⁶⁶

65. J.A. Reynolds, "Kaje Tribe - Report on (1950-51)", NAK: ZAR PROF No.4846.

66. "Zango Katab District - Unrest in 1946..."

The May and June 1946 popular uprisings in the Atyab and Bajju areas in challenging the colonizer, the Hausa-Fulani feudalists, and the Atyab and Bajju marionettes - who kowtowed to the Zaria rulers slavishly - manifested in several ways. It involved the refusal to pay taxes; boycott of the market at Zango Katab; the refusal to obey orders of the District Head, Village Heads, and other district officials; and the refusal to obey orders of the Alkali and "pagan" courts. In addition there was also the physical threat by some sections among the Atyab to physically attack and expell 5,000 Hausa inhabitants of Zango Katab town.⁶⁷ Above all there was a call for the creation of Atyab and Bajju chiefdoms or at least an indigenous District Head; the minority nationalities demanded for separation from the Zaria N.A.⁶⁸ A.D. Yahaya has observed that in the course of such struggles in the 1940s, the British gave backing to the Zaria ruling circles "but never to the genuine demand by the people for improved social and political conditions."⁶⁹ In

67. G.D. Pitcairn, "Zaria Province Annual Report 1946", NAK: ZAR PROF No.4182.

68. Ibid.

69. A.D. Yahaya, op.cit., p.8.

districts such as Zango Katab there was a dominant Hausa-Fulani ruling strata as the principal representative of colonial exploitation and oppression. Both the Atyab and Bajju had a low level of the development of classes and class contradictions within their communities; thus the peoples viewed the anti-colonial struggle as one between them and the Hausa.⁷⁰

It was in April 1946 that the Atyab revolt gathered momentum, but it reached its zenith in May. The immediate cause was linked with an incident in late March 1946 at Zango Katab market. Some Atyab women who were selling firewood, and foodstuffs, resisted sweeping the market; one of the women was Mamman Kanwai's wife. The practice over the years was subjecting Atyab women to forceful cleaning of the market even though they paid market tolls whilst the Hausa women were not compelled to sweep.⁷¹ When they refused the Atyab women were beaten up by Hausa market officials; in the process they were forced to abandon their goods. Mamman was

70. This is very clear from the complaints and petitions documented in "Zango Katab District - unrest in 1946..."

71. Ibid; and field-work interview with Ladi Saratu Kasan, op.cit.

a highly respected community leader. The clan or community elders, who had some spiritual authority, were viewed in high esteem unlike the village Heads who were seen as "yes men" of the Hausa and simply feared.⁷² After the Atyab women received some molestation including being beaten up, on April 3, 1946, Mamman [redacted] and some other Atyab elders wrote a protest letter to the Resident of Zaria in which they stated in very clear terms that it should be curtain time to what they called "Hausa/Muslim dominance" in Atyab affairs due to what they also described as years of "oppression at the hands of Hausawa."⁷³ The Zaria authorities did not respond positively. Mamman [redacted] was a peasant who emerged as the leader of the uprising.

On April 13, 1946 the Atyab SIM group (SIM Katab) led by La'ah Abui addressed a letter to the Mission's field-Director, A.Kirk, at Jos. In the highly confidential letter - which A. Kirk later handed over to the Resident of Zaria as a vital intelligence document - the Atyab SIM group (which was largely


72. Second field-work interview with Shekarau Kau Layyah, op.cit.

73. Letter from Mamman Zanzon et al to Resident Zaria dated 3rd April, 1946, in "Zango Katab District - Unrest in 1946..."

dominated by the emergent elite in the area) pointed out that political tension was high in Zango Katab and might soon explode. They claimed that as good followers of the Church their members were not involved. The Atyab SIM members raised issues which they all alleged had led to the fluid situation. The reasons they advanced included the charge that Atyab elements were not allocated stalls at Zango Katab market; exaction of forced labour was more hard on them than the Hausa; Atyab women were compelled to be sweeping the Zango Katab market; Atyab peasants were forced to supply grain for the feeding of Hausa district officials and even their horses; discriminatory practices against Atyab (whether Animists or Christians) at the Alkali court in favour of Hausa and Muslims; discrimination in relation to treatment of Atyab patients as compared with the Hausa at the dispensary; Christians not allowed to preach at Zango Katab town; and accused the British of not standing by their own words of having put an end to slavery by allowing the Hausa to treat the Atyab as such.⁷⁴

In May 1946 the state machinery was largely crippled or paralyzed by the anti-colonial actions

74. "Katab SIM" to A. Kirk of 13th April, 1946 in "Zango Katab District - Unrest in 1946...."

of the people. Colonial officials - including the local agents - could not execute their normal duties and they lost control. There were mass gathering in defiance of the authorities and the level of mobilization was high.⁷⁵ In the prevailing delicate situation attempts were made by the British authorities to pacify the Atyab nationalists led by Mamman  as the colonialists maintained that they needed time to look into the various complaints. But the Atyab agitators were of the view that nothing short of meeting their minimum demands would do. Apparently, the line taken by the colonial authorities was a tactical one intended to buy time. In reality Resident G.D. Pitcairn and other officials were not ready for any compromise; they did not mind to employ ruthless method to crush the uprising at the appropriate time.⁷⁶

The colonialists resorted to deal with those educated elements suspected of being behind the nationalist struggle. The first move came just hours before the crackdown. But it was not the "mission adherents" that the authorities first turned to.

75. Resident Zaria to SNP dated May 27, 1946 in "Zango Katab District - Unrest in 1946..."

76. "Zango Katab District - Unrest in 1946..."

Rather, the first targets were the only two Atyab government trained teachers the colonial system had then produced; they were in the employ of the Zaria N.A. On May 21, 1946 they were transferred out of Atyabland with immediate effect; the two teachers were also ordered to move by train on the same day to their new stations outside Zango Katab District.⁷⁷ Dawa La'aki (headmaster of N.A. Elementary School Mabubu-Zonzon) was transferred to Godani in Chikun District; and Kazah Yashim, the headmaster of the N.A. school Jankasa, was transferred to Gora in Kachia District. The two N.A. schools in the Atyab area were closed.⁷⁸ It has been pointed out that the teachers did not participate in the uprising but that they somehow had links with the agitation; for persons in the N.A. employ dared not openly identify with any anti-colonial effort.⁷⁹

The crackdown started in the afternoon of May 21, 1946. It was fundamentally directed at the leadership of the revolt. Squadrons of police were moved from

77. Telegram from sp-1143 (schools) Zaria to Resident at Zonkwa of May 21, 1946, in "Zango Katab-District - Unrest in 1946..."

78. Ibid.

79. Second field-work interview with Shekarau Kau Layyah, op.cit.

Kaduna and Jos to Zango Katab on an operation to quell the revolt.⁸⁰ Mamman [redacted] and over 100 people were placed under arrest. The suspected leaders were transported to Zaria by rail; those considered to be on the periphery were arraigned before the local Alkali Court at Zango Katab.⁸¹ Those taken to Zaria were arraigned and charged at the Zaria Alkali Court for various offences under the "Native Authority Ordinance."⁸² In the course of the popular Atyab nationalist uprising of 1946 for N.A reforms, dignity and freedom, and for ethnic assertion, there were ordinary people, youth, and community elders who made sacrifices which led to arrest and subsequent imprisonment. In the Zonzon village area there were outstanding individuals such as Mamman Kanwai, Ndung Mamman (Mamman's [redacted] eldest son), Sheyin Sak'anet (known as Mashayi), Boman Dabo, Tonak Dabo, and Usman Yashim.⁸³ Those from Nje or unguwar Gayya included Kude, Kato Tagama, Dogo, Makoshi, and Aley. There were also Gaba, Abui,


80. G.D. Pitcairn, "Zaria... Annual Report 1946."

81. Second field-work interview with Shekarau Kau Layyah, op.cit.

82. See document "Pagan Administration Policy" from Resident Zaria to SNP dated August 17, 1946, in "Zango Katab District - Unrest in 1946..."

83. Field-work interview with Ladi Scratu Kasam, op.cit.


Tatong, Jatau, and La'aki from Jankasa area, There was Tauna from Gora. From Mazaki and Zaman Dabo were Gado, Kato Yashim, and Ajeeye. Ataar Kurama of Taligan was a staunch Atyab nationalist of the times.⁸⁴

On August 17, 1946 Mamman  and "25 others were convicted of offence against the Taxation Ordinance" and sentenced to "3 months imprisonment with hard labour."⁸⁵ Sheyin Sak'anet (Mashayi) and 5 others were "convicted of ritous assembly, unlawfully assaulting police, and resisting authority" and their sentences were between "2-6 months imprisonment with hard labour."⁸⁶ The whole process was such that the same Zaria feudal rulers who the Atyab nationalists struggled against presided over their trial, passed the various jail sentences, and supervised them in the colonial prison. In the course of serving their jail terms the political prisoners were beaten up by the day, given crude treatment, and generally dehumanized.

84. Second field-work interview with Shekarau Kau Layyah, op.cit.

85. "Pagan Administration Policy..."

86. Ibid.

In point of fact one of them, Tonak Dabo, strongly maintained that it was the daily beating, the serving of hard labour, and other forms of cruelty and torture, which led to the death of the old man Mamman  at the Zaria main prison in September 1946.⁸⁷

The Bajju nationalist revolt of 1946 had its own spontaneity but it also ran parallel with the Atyab uprising. Equally, it was a product of the same environment and had the same basis. Somehow the Bajju nationalist struggle was a continuation of the 1942 protests and revolt - which has been discussed in the previous chapter. In 1946 Usman Sakwat was still at the front, as the leader of the Bajju anti-colonial movement. The crackdown on the Atyab nationalists did not deter their Bajju neighbours. In late May tension was high in the Bajju area. Meetings were openly held in the towns and villages, and there was a large demonstration at Zonkwa, led by Usman Sakwat, during which demands were ~~made~~ especially for a Bajju chiefdom.⁸⁸

87. Field-work interview with Tonak Dabo, activist of Atyab anti-colonial struggle of 1946, trader, politician, age about 70, at anguwar Wakili, on May 15, 1987.

88. Field-work interview with M. Nakaje, overseer and later superintendent of roads with the PWD, age about 70, at Zonkwa on 17th January, 1987.

On June 1, 1946 Resident G.D. Pitcairn moved to Bajjaland with a police force to suppress the popular uprising and to arrest the leading nationalists.⁸⁹ In the process of the repression Usman Sakwat and 12 others were arrested, taken to Zaria, and charged before the "Native court."⁹⁰ The arrest did not mellow the Bajju people. The intellectual section of the movement came out strongly in the wake of the crackdown. It protested against the way the colonial authorities were handling the situation. The Bajju intelligentsia was led by nationalists such as Aruwan Neyu and M. Saidu - who later founded the Southern Zaria Freedom Movement. They were trained by the SIM. On 14th June, 1946 the Bajju SIM (Kaje SIM) reiterated to the Resident of Zaria that the Bajju were tired of Hausa oppression.⁹¹ A demand was made for the area to be carved out of Zaria N.A. and be made a Chiefdom or for a district to be created for them under Zaria with Usman Sakwat as its head. However,

89. G.D. Pitcairn, "Zaria ... Annual Report 1946."

90. Telegram from Resident Zaria to SNP of June 14, 1946, in "Zango Katab District - Unrest in 1946..."

91. Letter from "Kaje SIM" (signed by M. Saidu) to the Resident Zaria dated 14th June, 1946, in "Zango Katab District - Unrest in 1946..."

they pointed out that in the alternative even a young Bajju girl should be appointed; they said her leadership would be acceptable to them than that of any Hausa ruler.⁹² The educated elite attributed the relative backwardness of the Bajju nationality to the fact that they were excluded from having jobs with the Zaria N.A.C. and ^{having} no dispensary nor single government school in their area. It was further stressed that all wealth produced in Bajjuland and taxes paid benefited Hausa officials who were the salary earners and everything was done to the detriment of the Bajju.⁹³ A British official concluded that the general feeling among the Bajju minority group was that "with their own chief their needs could be more vigorously pressed and a better return for their taxes assured."⁹⁴

On September 6, 1946 Usman Sakwat and 12 others were each sentenced by the Zaria Alkali Court "to 12 months imprisonment with hard labour on charges of riot."⁹⁵ But the nationalist forces kept on with

92. Ibid.

93. Ibid.

94. J.A. Reynold, op.cit.

95. Resident Zaria to the SNP dated September 6, 1946, in "Zango Katab District - Unrest in 1946..."

the struggle. However, the colonialists and their local surrogates (the Bajju village Heads) intensified propaganda that Usman Sakwat was pushing the Bajju people towards more trouble and hardship to satisfy a personal ambition for power. The Zaria ruling circles also began to spread rumour that the authorities had over the years held secret talks with Usman to find a solution to the Bajju political problem, but that he insisted that unless he himself was made the chief of the Bajju he would oppose any arrangement. Surely, the people were not taken in by the oppressors. But when Usman came out of prison he did not help the situation as such; he was by now placing more emphasis on personal claims for the Bajju rulership and carried this into the 1950s.⁹⁶ Coupled with this was the fact that by the late 1940s the petit-bourgeois elements in Bajju nationalist politics were moving into more prominence by the day. The SIM group was beginning to take the lead in Bajju agitations; the influence of the Church was increasing as both the SIM and the RCM opened more schools in the Bajju area for the youth. The Bajju elite had eyes on positions and class interest. Much was done

96. Field-work interview with M. Nakaje, op.cit.; and private discussions with Banake Sambo at ABU Zaria in 1990.

to substitute people such as Usman Sakwat with educated elements - mainly mission school teachers and evangelists who had great influence on their pupils and the population. Thus by early 1950s a combination of factors, including official slander and fast changing political and social developments, had led to Usman Sakwat being relegated to the background. In fact a British colonial official could even pronounce in 1952 that Usman was "now discredited in the eyes of most" even though the Bajju anti-colonial movement was not mellowing.⁹⁷ Slander, imprisonment and suffering, and so on, did damage to Usman. Thus when party politics sprang up, in the nationalist movement, Usman Sakwat was already highly marginalized and isolated as a political figure in the area.⁹⁸

An important aspect of the history of the Bajju and Atyab anti-colonial revolts of 1946 in Zango Katab District is connected with the role of the SIM establishment in the process. The role of the mission's

97. J.A. Reynold, op.cit.

98. Field-work interview with M. Kakaje, op.cit., and private discussions with Banke Sambo, op.cit.

Field-Director, A. Kirk, during the Bajju nationalist uprising of 1942 - including the expulsion of Usman Sakwat from the SIM - has already been touched on. It has also been mentioned that during the 1946 Atyab revolt he gave out a vital confidential letter to the Resident of Zaria which gave the provincial authorities some intelligence lead into the underground political activities of Atyab SIM group. By such deeds A. Kirk was in collusion with the colonialists. In May 1946 the provincial authorities questioned A. Kirk about the role of local SIM members in the Atyab nationalist uprising.⁹⁹ In response the missionary did somehow blame the Zaria rulers for misrule in Zango Katab District.¹⁰⁰ Furthermore, A. Kirk emphasized that the SIM had always taught its members to obey the authorities and stressed the fact that the mission had flushed out those not toeing the line such as Usman Sakwat.¹⁰¹ But the SIM Field-Director also made contemptuous remarks about Animists and the danger posed by those he called half-baked educated Christian elements in Zango Katab District.¹⁰²

99. See, for example, Resident Zaria to A. Kirk, in "Zango Katab District - Unrest in 1946..."

100. Detailed response from A. Kirk to the Resident of Zaria to which he attached the original copy of the "Katab SIM", in "Zango Katab District - Unrest in 1946..."

101. Ibid.

102. Ibid.

As seen elsewhere in this chapter there was a level of existing conflict between the colonized feudal aristocracy and the Missionaries. After the 1946 popular uprising in Zango Katab there were clashes, accusations and counter-accusations, between Thomas Archibald of the SIM station at Kagoro (who was in charge of the mission's enterprise in Zango Katab District) and the District Head of Zango Katab - Katuka Sulaiman. Although he was on leave in Britain at the time, the District Head of Zango Katab partly blamed Thomas Archibald for the 1946 uprising and for engineering the drive for the detachment from Zaria in the South. As a missionary, and as a person, Thomas Archibald was different from A. Kirk. Thomas Archibald was a strong and fearless personality; he was committed to the SIM followers. From the mid-1940s he pursued with zeal a policy of establishing schools for children of SIM members, adult literacy classes, and was sympathetic towards the Mission's followers coupled with personal warmth.¹⁰³ The quarrel between Thomas Archibald and the District Head of Zango Katab reached

103. Second field-work Interview with Shekarau Kau Layyah, op.cit.

a peak in 1951. The missionary accused Katuka Sulaiman of pursuing a deliberate but unofficial policy of persecuting Christians by using the "Native Courts" to deal with them. The clash blew up after Kato Yashim (a young Atyab nationalist jailed after the 1946 uprising), ^{a/s^o} a member of the SIM at Mazaki, was beaten up by agents of the District Head and subsequently fined (at the Alkali Court) for having got a young woman converted to Christianity.¹⁰⁴ Thomas Archibald went to Zango Katab from Kagoro and directly confronted the District Head on this - right in the latter's palace. The Missionary was very sensitive on matters affecting SIM members but he never bothered about the Animist majority. It was stated by District Officer Roundwaite that Archibald was also "intolerant of both Moslems and Roman Catholics."¹⁰⁵

The Zaria authorities were presented with various options, including ordering the SIM to transfer Thomas Archibald out of the area and deportation from Nigeria,

104. Report by D.O. Roundwaite to Resident Zaria of November 16, 1951, in "Zango Katab District - Unrest in 1946..."; and Katuka Sulaiman to Emir of Zaria of October 23, 1951, in "Zango Katab District - Unrest in 1946..."

105. Report by D.O. Roundwaite to Resident Zaria of November 16, 1951...

as alternative means of checking the Missionary.¹⁰⁶

In the final analysis - despite all accusations - the provincial authorities did reckon with the popularity of Thomas Archibald among SIM members and even gave him credit for being a progressive missionary who provided SIM schools and literacy classes in Zango Katab District and elsewhere in Southern Zaria.¹⁰⁷

Earlier, when confronted by District Officer Roundwaite, in the course of investigations, for inciting some sections to rise against authority, Thomas Archibald maintained that he was not the type to do anything that would be detrimental to the colonial order as alleged by the Emir of Zaria and the District Head of Zango Katab. The Missionary did not mince words in telling the provincial authorities that he was fundamentally a defender of the colonial system both in theory and in practice; Thomas Archibald emphasized that he had been teaching the SIM followers to be subservient to the authorities:

106. Ibid.

107. Ibid.

I told the D.O. that I would not be surprised if what I had said had been misquoted as I felt that neither Sarkin Zongo (sic) or the alkali liked me. I assured the D.O. however, that I was a patriotic Scotsman, who loved my King and country and the dear old flag and that from my entry into Zaria province in 1921 had always tried to get my people to give respect to the powers that be and to honour the Union jack and all it stands for.¹⁰⁸

Like the colonialists Thomas Archibald was also employing the divide-and-rule tactics. This missionary too resorted to putting the blame in relation to the nationalist struggle in Zango Katab and elsewhere in Southern Zaria, on people of Southern Nigeria origin. According to him "...there were Southerners about who might cause trouble but we missionaries wanted only peace and happiness for all."¹⁰⁹

4.5 The Workers and the General Strike of 1945

The colonized working class, in Zaria Province, became a major contingent in the nationalist movement during the General Strike of 1945. Generally on the African continent Thomas Hogkin has observed that the

108. From Thomas Archibald - SIM Kagoro - to Resident Zaria dated November 17, 1951, in "Zango Katab District - Unrest in 1946..."

109. Ibid.

trade unions put more energies in the struggle against inflation, for increase wages, as well as for the improvement of the working conditions in the post World War II period.¹¹⁰ Bill Freund has also emphasized that there "was virtually no African colony without a major strike phase."¹¹¹

Certainly, the formation of the TUCN in 1943 enabled the colonized workers in Nigeria to be able to resort to collective strike tactics on a national scale. By the TUCN strengthening concrete links with nationalist forces and organizations, there was a kind of leverage of political consciousness among the workers. These links sharpened the ideological struggle and radicalized them.¹¹² Like the case all over colonial Africa it was the workers in the public sector - the largest employer of labour - who took the lead in the workers' struggles which made the colonizer uncomfortable.¹¹³ The workers in the public sector in Zaria, and indeed Nigeria, had the African Civil Servants' Technical Workers Union (ACSTWU) as their broad union. On May 21, 1945 the ACSTWU did forward its resolution to the colonial government at Lagos in which there was a strong objection to increase of COLA for Europeans whilst the

110. Thomas Hodgkin, Nationalism in Colonial Africa, New York University Press, New York, 1969, p.120.

111. B. Freund, op.cit., p.203.

112. B. Onimode, op.cit., pp130-131.

113. Peter Worsley, The Third World, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1975, pp152-153.

colonized employees were left out. The ACSTWU demanded a 50 per cent COLA increase for the colonized workers and 2 shillings and 6 pence as minimum daily pay for labourers.¹¹⁴ A condition was given by the ACSTWU that if such increase was not granted to the Africans by June 21, then the workers will embark on an industrial action and "seek their own remedy with due regard to the law and order on the one hand and stravation on the other."¹¹⁵ Despite the one month notice the authorities and employers remained insensitive to the genuine demands of workers. It is significant to point out that on June 2, 1945 Michael Imoudu was released from prison at Auchi in Benin Province. The RWU President had a heroic welcome by a crowd of about 50,000 at Lagos; trade union leaders and leading nationalists were also there. Michael Imoudu quickly went on the mobilization of workers towards the impending General Strike; in the process he launched a campaign to expose and

114. J.S. Coleman, op.cit., pp258-259.

115. Memorandum on the strike of the ACSTWU of June - August 1945, in "General Strike (1945)", NAK: ZAR PROF No.C.4/1945.

counter the anti-workers activities of wavering or vacillating labour leaders.

The General Strike, which was well organized and formidable, started at mid-night on June 21, 1945. It was a real apex of the struggle waged by the working class in its determination towards freedom from exploitation, oppression, and national enslavement. The heroic 1945 General Strike was the most decisive process that galvanized the nationalist movement, to an unprecedented height, in the direction of independence.¹¹⁶ Throughout Nigeria 17 trade unions were involved in the industrial action; and a total of between 30,000 and 32,000 workers took part in the General Strike.¹¹⁷ The position of Kaduna (as Northern Nigeria capital) and Zaria town made Zaria Province to be of the most strategic importance in the process of the General Strike in the context of the entire Northern Nigeria. Zaria had the largest number of railway workers, and it was the headquarters of the RWU in Northern Nigeria.¹¹⁸

116. Alkasum Abba, "Some Remarks on the National Question and Radical Politics in Nigeria by Abdul Raufu Mustapha", July 1, 1985, Mimeo.

117. Memorandum on the Strike of the ACSTWU of June-August 1945...

118. Intelligence Report by Sergeant Okonkwo of "I" Branch Office Zaria dated June 29, 1945, in "General Strike (1945)..."

Five days into the strike, that is, by June 25, 1945, the operations of the Railway, Public Works Department, Electricity Power House, Water Works, Post and Telegraph, and Agricultural Department, at Zaria had been crippled or paralyzed.¹¹⁹ Attempts were made by the authorities to counter the impact of the strike by making contingency plans to operate skeletal services in some of these spheres - which were considered as essential services.¹²⁰ Those engaged were British political officers and their wives; European volunteers in the non-governmental sector; and British military personnel, especially the NCOs who served as dispatch riders in carrying messages. However, all this was inadequate and eventually not successful.¹²¹

Once the General Strike was on, the British authorities in the province employed various tactics aimed at defeating it. This included the launching of a massive propaganda campaign - through official circulars and leaflets - full of intimidation, and all sorts of threat, in an attempt to get the striking

119. Ibid.

120. Ibid.

121. Ibid.

workers to back down on the industrial action.¹²²

There was an intensification of repression by the colonizer against the colonized workers. Police and soldiers were brought in to beat up, detain, and arrest workers; some were taken to court and charged for sabotage.¹²³

There were also moves to break the unity of the striking workers by exploiting the socio-cultural and geo-political divisions. British officials made moves to distort the basis and indeed the entire nature of the General Strike by portraying it as the handiwork of workers of Southern Nigeria origin.¹²⁴ They were initially impressed by the seemingly success of their divisive tactics. For the Resident of Zaria noted that whilst all supervisors of Southern Nigeria origin (in all the various government departments at Zaria) had gone on strike by June 24, Hausa supervisors "had remained loyal."¹²⁵ The Resident thus concluded that

122. "Notice to Government Employees" by Resident, and "Government Notice: General Strike of Government Technical Workers" dated June 26, 1945, in "General Strike (1945) ..."

123. Memorandum on the Strike of the ACSTWU of June-August 1945...

124. Specifically see situation report on the General Strike of June 25, 1945 by Resident Zaria, in "General Strike (1945)..."

125. Ibid.

the authorities had the "situation in hand."¹²⁶
 As seen elsewhere in this chapter it was at this stage that Zaria nationalists such as Muhammadu Alangande did a lot of work on the Hausa workers. The workers gave a devastating defeat to the colonizer through unity in struggle; because the workers closed ranks and did overcome the enemy's ploy.

The colonial authorities encouraged strike breakers and traitors among the workers by way of promotion and increment of salaries.¹²⁷ Such was it in connection with a worker, Sule, who was in the employ of the Zaria Water Works. On July 11, 1945^{the} Provincial Engineer informed the higher authorities that all staff in the pumping section had gone on strike with the exception of Sule and recommended "that this deserves recognition." Thus that Sule be promoted from Junior Artisan Grade VI to Grade V and his salary be increased from £18 to £36 per annum "to commence on July 1, 1945."¹²⁸ On the other hand punitive measures were taken by the British against workers who were

126. Ibid.

127. P.E. Zaria to the Resident of July 11, 1945, in "General Strike (1945)..."

128. Ibid.

steadfast to the strike action. Two masons, Julius and Ifejioke, who were working at the Samaru-Zaria Agricultural Department were evicted from government quarters, under section 15B of the Defence Regulation, on the orders of the Resident of Zaria, due to their commitment to the workers' cause.¹²⁹

As the General Strike progressed the colonial government contemplated the possibility of replacing the strikers with new hands from the reserve army of the unemployed.¹³⁰ This partly failed because skilled workers were involved; it was not easy to replace them. The authorities admitted that in places such as the railway workshop almost 100% of the labour force was skilled, and the training of some of the workers took about five years.¹³¹ But more important was the high level of the resolve of the colonized workers to struggle on in the face of all difficulties. There were, of course, some labour leaders who tried

129. Order of eviction issued by the Resident of Zaria, in "General Strike (1945)..."

130. Memorandum on the Strike of the ACSTWU of June-August 1945...

131. Ibid.

to compromise the anti-colonial struggle of the workers through collusion with the authorities. They instructed workers to play down the industrial action as from July 6. This was an attempt to defeat the General Strike from within the leadership.¹³² But the workers dealt with the anti-workers coalition by identifying with the courageous leadership of E. Ukoma in Zaria.

The Zik's press gave the General Strike an impetus. The West African Pilot and the Comet sided with the workers and also exposed the activities of the renegade union leaders and other collaborators.¹³³ The colonialists re-acted by placing a ban on the two newspapers under the Defence Regulation 12 as from July 8; and it was not lifted until at the end of the General Strike.¹³⁴

The central role of the Zaria RWU leaders in the co-ordination of the General Strike went beyond the province's boundaries. Furthermore, it was not limited to railway workers but extended to the supervision of the strike action in other departments. From the Zaria

132. "General Strike (1945)..."

133. Memorandum on the Strike of the ACSTWU of June-August 1945....

134. "General Strike Nigeria and Labour Unrest (1945-49", NAK: ZAR PROF No.4028 Vol.I.

base RWU leaders ^{such as} ~~Z~~ E. Ukoma, Atakoro, and Olojo, did oversee the implementation and the monitoring of the 1945 workers struggle in the railway towns of Kaduna, Funtua, Gusau, and Kano.¹³⁵ One way of communication which they adopted was the use of bicycles - with a bicycle attached to two persons - to convey messages, pass instructions, give update on the General Strike, and to take money collected to aid strikers in these towns.¹³⁶ E. Ukoma and his team organized to go out to get monetary contributions from various quarters to sustain the strike. African Clerical Staff were initially deliberately left out of the industrial action partly to remain as a source of finance - because all those who embarked on strike had their salaries stopped. When they collected their June pay Zaria Clerical Staff contributed £200, as first instalment, and promised to continue to do so.¹³⁷

Zaria labour leaders also made contacts with patriotic Africans in the higher stratum of the civil service, petty traders, and businessmen, to make

135. Intelligence Report by Sergeant Okonkwo....

136. Ibid.

137. Intelligence Report by Corporal John Odiase of June 30, 1945, in "General Strike (1945)..."

financial contribution to aid their efforts. Dr. R.A.B. Dikko, in the Senior cadre of the civil service, contributed money to aid the strike and he gave the workers encouragement behind the scene. The money collected from various sympathetic sources was used both as a weapon to check strike breaking; so that workers would not go back to work due to financial difficulties, and for them to be able to maintain themselves by solving some basic needs.¹³⁸ In addition there was much pleading with African landlords and landladies not to collect rents from tenants that were involved in the industrial action as long as it lasted. There was very much positive response to the workers' call.¹³⁹ This in itself was a signal to the high level of solidarity the people extended to the Zaria workers.

The General Strike lasted 44 days in the Lagos area, but in Zaria Province it went on for 52 days.¹⁴⁰

138. Ibid.

139. Ibid.

140. Intelligence Report on the Mission of Delegates of Workers' Union Lagos, in "General Strike Nigeria and Labour Unrest (1945)..."

In fact the Zaria workers were more determined to continue with the struggle. The workers refused to call-off the General Strike even when the leadership agreed to do so, as from August 4, 1945, after negotiations with the authorities at Lagos.¹⁴¹ It was only with the arrival of Michael Imoudu himself at Zaria - and after he had addressed the workers about the progress made and the agreement reached - that the General Strike ended on August 11, 1945.¹⁴²

One political significance was the General Strike of 1945 raised the consciousness of the Zaria working class that only through a united and concerted struggle could they fight against colonial exploitation and oppression. It also stimulated workers participation in nationalist organizations and struggles towards independence. In the wake of the victory of the colonized workers in 1945, the strike tactics grew by the day. Series of strikes continued into the 1950s.¹⁴³

141. Ibid.

142. Ibid.

143. A. Abba, op.cit.

In 1947 Post and Telegraph linesmen went on strike at Zaria and Kaduna.¹⁴⁴ And, also, in that year workers on the Jos Plateau Mines carried out an industrial action.¹⁴⁵

Towards the end of the World War II and in the aftermath the Zaria nationalist movement grew to a higher level by the day. Meanwhile the colonialists employed ways to further divide the people. However, the general direction of the nationalist movement was towards the formation of political parties, and British colonialism was increasingly being challenged in the times.

144. Annual Report on Labour conditions in Zaria Province - 1945; in "Labour Conditions - Annual Report (1943-50)..."

145. Ibid.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE RISE OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND REPRESSION OF NATIONALIST FORCES

5.1 Introduction

The rise of political parties in the Zaria nationalist movement came in the last decade of British colonialism. Nationalist political parties sprang up on the pillars of other previous anti-colonial efforts by the colonized working people. The political parties which emerged represented various class interests, but each had its internal contradictions. This does not mean that the political parties were strictly formed, constituted, and polarized along class lines. All political parties had in their ranks a coalition of contradictory or even antagonistic classes and interests; but the ultimate direction of each party was largely determined by the dominant class in control of the organizational apparatus. Some of the political parties were in all essence anti-colonial in their goals. Others were by nature centrifugal; just focusing on local autonomy for some ethnic groups.

For their part the British launched a counter-offensive to influence the creation of parties that would remain along pro-imperialist lines and on course for a neo-colonial agenda for the future.

Certainly, the popular masses were the main architects of the nationalist struggles towards the elimination of the colonial system. However, as in most of Africa, the conception of the anti-colonial struggles by the dominant section of the petit-bourgeois nationalist leaders was mainly to put an end to formal colonialism without altering the exploitative and oppressive structures of the economy and even those political institutions the colonizer used to dominate the people.¹

In the broader context of Nigeria the national liberation struggle reached a decisive phase by 1947. It was then that the British authorities introduced some constitutional reforms. The Richards constitution came into effect in 1947. One significant aspect of it was the creation of three regions in Nigeria; that is, the Eastern, Northern, and Western regions. As part of the reforms

1. A.M. Babu, African Socialism or Socialist Africa? Zed Press, London, 1981, p.35.

a central legislative body was established at Lagos for the whole country; each region also had a Regional House of Assembly created. In Zaria Province and elsewhere representation to both the central and regional legislative bodies was dominated by nominees not popularly elected by the people; the representatives were N.A. officials such as Emirs, Chiefs, and other officials, hand-picked by the British.² The reforms introduced were not a gift from the colonizer. With the victory of the General Strike, and other subsequent strikes, the colonialists somehow suffered political defeat. It was already obvious to them that national independence was inevitable, but that it can be sort of compromised. The only option left to the foreign occupiers was to embark on political and economic reforms - in the drive to shape the process towards independence in a way favourable to the British.³

In the specifics of Zaria Province some major political parties in Nigeria were not prominent and

2. Okwudiba Nnoli, Ethnic Politics in Nigeria, Fourth Dimension, Enugu, 1980, p.86.

3. Bala Usman, "NIGERIA: Independence on A Gold Platter?", in the Magazine The Analyst, Vol.3. No.3, May-June, 1988, pp9-11.

only functioned at the level of alliance with those that had the area as a strong-hold. Thus the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), the militant Zikist Movement, and the Action Group (AG) are not central to the analysis. The main focus is on the principal political parties which dominated nationalist politics in the province. Mainly, the Zaria political parties were the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU); the Northern People's Congress (NPC); and the Middle Zone League (MZL) which - through an alliance with the Middle Belt People's Party (MBPP) - transformed into the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC). The NCNC was formed on August 20, 1944; it was in alliance with NEPU in the 1950s. In the course of its 1947 nationwide campaign the NCNC delegation was at Zaria and Kaduna to seek for support in its opposition to certain provisions of the Richards Constitution. It was principally opposed to the introduction of regionalization which the NCNC viewed as some kind of "balkanization" of Nigeria by the British.. The NCNC accused the British of divide-and-rule tactics. One objective of the tour was to

have a dialogue with the people on the issues involved and to raise funds to send a delegation ^{to London} to lodge protest against the constitution.⁴ Even the colonial authorities admitted that the NCNC campaign "to foment opposition against the 1947 constitution" was a success.⁵

In February 1946 the militant youth in the NCNC formed the Zikist Movement.⁶ As an ally of NEPU in Zaria, in the early 1950s, and as an independent nationalist organization, the distribution of anti-imperialist literature and political education in places such as Kaduna and Zaria towns was carried out by the Zikists. The Zikist Movement pursued the course of a socialist oriented nationalism and to fight against the process put in motion by the British

4. Olusegun Osoba, "Ideological Trends in the Nigerian National Liberation Movement and the Problems of National Identity, Solidarity and Motivation, 1934-1965: A Preliminary Assessment", in the Journal, IBADAN, No.27, October 1969, p.29.

5. See note on trends in the policies of the NCNC and its affiliated bodies dated 31st December, 1952, in "N.C.N.C. Delegates (1) Tour of Nigeria (2) Propaganda (3) N.E.P.U. (4) F.U.N.A.S. (1946-56)", NAK: ZAR PROF No.C.11/1946.

6. Uyilawa Usuanlele, "The Rise and Fall of the Zikist Movement 1946-1950", B.A. (Hons) History Essay, University of Ife, Ile-Ife, June 1983, pp16-29.

to establish a neo-colonial order for the future. In September 1948 the Zikists organized rallies at Kaduna to condemn the Lagos fratricidal clashes between Yoruba and Igbo due to the press war and bitter rivalry engaged in between the NCNC and the West African Pilot - on the one hand - and the NYM, its allies the Ebe Omo Oduduwa, and the Daily Service - on the other, which the Zikists saw as undermining public focus on the question of the future of Nigeria.⁷ Because of this, on October 27, 1948 the Zikists organized a public procession at Sabon Gari Zaria as a symbol of unity among Nigerians; but this was aborted by the authorities.⁸

On December 26-27, 1949, the Zikist Movement held its annual convention at Kaduna during which it took important decisions. One of these was that April 1, 1950 shall be the date for the declaration of independence for Nigeria by the nationalists - with the establishment of a people's government.⁹

7. "N.C.N.C. Matters Relative to (1) Zikist Movement (2) Political Parties (1948-52)", NAK: ZAR PRO No. 4410.

8. Ibid.

9. Mokwugo Okoye, Storms on the Niger: A Story of Nigeria's Struggle, Fourth Dimension, Enugu, 1981, p.145.

This was a direct challenge to the colonialists and equally an ultimatum to the colonial power. Higher circles of the NCNC led by Nnamdi Azikiwe opposed the line of the Zikists towards the declaration of independence. But the Zikists went ahead to distribute leaflets at Zaria, Kaduna, and elsewhere, calling for a total nationalist uprising against the British. This contributed to the crackdown of the organization and its leadership by the authorities in early 1950.¹⁰

The AG Officially became a political party in March 1951. Unlike the NCNC and the Zikist Movement, which practical anti-colonial activities were very much felt through their alliance with NEPU in the province, the AG did not carry significant weight in Zaria nationalist politics until in the late 1950s when it forged an alliance with the UMBC.¹¹ However, it was right from 1952 that the AG went about on a drive for possible alliance with other political parties in Zaria; this was in a way that has sort of portrayed the party's leadership as having been

10. Note on trends in the Policies of the N.C.N.C. and its affiliated bodies dated 31st December, 1952....

11. Richard L. Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties: Power in an Emergent African Nation, NOK Publishers, Enugu, 1983, p.322.

more concerned with practical political convenience and counting less on principles and convictions.

In a manner or fashion typical of sly characters in nationalist politics, the AG leaders whilst courting NEPU were at the same time making moves behind the scene to forge links with the NPC. The drive for an alliance with the ~~Latter~~ was partly with the objective to fight the influence of radical currents in the nationalist movement.¹²

In early October 1952 the leader of the AG - Obafemi Awolowo - met at Kano with Mudi Spikin and Mustapha Danbatta who were leaders of the Northern Askianist Movement (the militant youth wing of NEPU) and discussed the possibility of establishing an alliance with NEPU.¹³ Popular opinion in NEPU circles was opposed to any form of such links with the AG.¹⁴ Immediately he left Kano, Obafemi Awolowo was at Kaduna where he met with Ahmadu Bello of the NPC; he stressed the need for the AG and the NPC to unite forces against those nationalist forces that were

12. "How Awo Betrayed Socialism", in the Magazine The Analyst, Vol. I, No.5, December, 1986, p.20.

13. Political Party Summary No.3 (intelligence) on the Northern Askianist Movement p.4, in "Political Bodies in Nigeria", NAK: ZAR PROF No.C.45.

14. Ibid.

"communist" or "gangster" - an indirect reference to NEPU.¹⁵ At the end of it all even the NPC did not accept to work with the AG.

5.2 The Northern Elements Progressive Union

The Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) has its origin or genesis in the struggles by the popular masses over the decades against British domination. Linked with this was the formation of the nationalist organizations and professional associations, in the 1940s, which gave impetus to the emergence of NEPU. In connection with one of these earlier organizations, the Northern Elements Progressive Association (NEPA) - which was founded in 1946 - the colonial authorities admitted that it "attained a degree of success in arousing political consciousness among the Northern peoples."¹⁶

In 1947 Aminu Kano, who went for a year teaching course in Britain, founded the Northern Teachers' Association (NTA) at London.¹⁷ The NTA started-off

15. R.L. Sklar, op.cit., footnote 95, pp129-130.

16. Intelligence Report No.120 para. 1, in "NEPU-security", NAK: SNP.15 No.349.

17. Billy J. Dudley, Parties and Politics in Northern Nigeria, Frank Cass, London, 1968, pp77-79.

in Nigeria in the same year. Abubakar Tafawa Balewa stated in November 1948 that the British refused to recognize the NTA because their official policy was to "discourage Trade Unions."¹⁸ The motivators of the NTA and their activities in the anti-colonial movement were known to the colonialists. Moreso, the fact of the matter was that the bulk of the intellectuals in Zaria Province and elsewhere in Northern Nigeria were teachers. But the non-recognition of the NTA could not stop it from operating. The intelligentsia carried out their nationalist politics under the umbrella of the NTA. Partly through the efforts made by members of the NTA, the Jam'iyar Mutanen Arewa (JMA) was founded at Zaria on October 3, 1948 - bringing together different movements and associations - with Dr. R.A.B. Dikko as President.¹⁹ The JMA was opposed to the translation of its name into English as the Northern People's Congress (NPC) -

18. Ibid., Footnote 20, p.107.

19. John N. Paden, Ahmadu Bello Sardauna of Sokoto: Values and Leadership in Nigeria, Hudahuda, Zaria, 1986, pp139-140.

and did not accept being called so. The composition of the JMA included both radicals and conservatives; the educated elements who formed the elitist JMA were already somehow influential in shaping public opinion about colonialism from different ideological and political positions.

Between 1948 and 1951 the JMA did not present or declare itself as a political party. Operating and co-ordinating its activities from Zaria and Kaduna centres, the JMA claimed to be a cultural organization for all people of Northern Nigeria regardless of ethnic and religious backgrounds.²⁰ The JMA had branches established in the major towns of the Northern Region, Lagos, and elsewhere. However, the elite in the Southern part of Zaria did not participate in the JMA due to their relative marginalization. The organization was mainly composed of petit-bourgeois elements working in the colonial public service and its N.A. appendage. The British were initially sceptical about the activities of the JMA. They introduced the General order 40B which barred

20. "The Northerners of Today (Now "Northern Nigerian Congress")", NAK: ZAR PROF No.C.23/1948.

individuals in the employ of the Northern Nigeria Public Service from participating in political organizations - especially those holding executive positions.²¹ But tactically the JMA elite sort of beat this by maintaining the organization's declared status as a cultural one.

Several times the political and ideological differences among members of the JMA manifested in the various debates and discussions on issues. In the course of the June 1949 congress of the JMA at Kaduna the radicals, led by Sa'ad Zungur, called for curtailing of the powers of Emirs and Chiefs. A majority of delegates voted for the motion calling on the British authorities to either abolish the Northern House of Chiefs or make the Emirs and Chiefs to seat there as representatives of the colonial government.²² Increasingly the colonizer and the N.A. aristocrats became more worried, disturbed, and hostile to the positions taken by left-wing elements

21.. J. N. Paden, op.cit., p.140.

22. See the Newspaper Gaskiya Ta Fi Kwabo, 29 GA YUNI, 1949.

such as Sa'ad Zungur, Aminu Kano, Umaru Agaie, and so on, who galvanized the JMA. The colonialists blamed the s-called moderate elements in the JMA for allowing the radicals to be so influential in determining the direction of the organization.²³

In this connection, in December 1949, the Resident of Zaria, K.J. Bryant, complained bitterly about the failure of the conservatives to battle the waves the left-wingers in the JMA were making:

The leadership of Dr. R.A.B. Dikko and M. Abubakar Imam is thought feeble and seems little doubt that the influence of Sa'ad Zungur and other Lagos elements has had considerable effect on the younger members of the congress; M. Umaru Agaie and M. Aminu Kano are said to be principal agents of a policy to secure the omnipotence of the Lagos elements over the moderate and apparently uninspiring leaders in the North.²⁴

Those of the radicals in government employ were now faced with threats of sack from their jobs and other forms of intimidation. In a particular instance the colonial authorities issued warnings and threatened

23. A report dated 12th December, 1949 to the Resident Zaria, in "The Northerners of Today..."

24. Resident Zaria to the SNP of December 16, 1949, in "The Northern of Today..."

Aminu Kano with dismissal on the grounds of violation of General Order 40B. Apparently the way out for Aminu Kano was to tender his resignation to the authorities so as to be able to concentrate on nationalist politics. In the resignation letter Aminu Kano showed clearly what path he would continue to follow:

We want all the existing evils which go to make us look more degraded in the eyes of the modern world and our neighbours swept away with courage and determination without fear or favour. We are tired of marking time in the name of "fine traditions."²⁵

On August 8, 1950 the Kano Youth Association and some nationalists from other organizations such as the radical section of the JMA²⁶ - inspired by the lessons of decades of heroic struggles by the peasantry and other labouring classes, the preceding nationalistic efforts of the progressive forces in the national liberation movement, and the general popular climate of the national drive to do away with

25. "AFRICA is a SLEEPING GIANT NO MORE" - Letter of resignation by Aminu Kano (while on Secondment as Acting Education Officer at Maru Teachers Training College in Sokoto Province) to the Bauchi N.A. in 1950: Reproduced in the newspaper Sunday Triumph of April 24, 1983, p.5.

26. For an account of how the radical section of the JMA joined NEPU see R.L. Sklar, op.cit., pp91-96.

British colonialism - met at Kano and announced the inauguration of NEPU as the first nationalist political party with origin in Northern Nigeria.²⁷

Bello Ijumu was at the centre of the creation of the party; other founding members included Abba Maikwaru, Magaji Danbatta, Abdulkadir Na Adamu Danjaji, Musa Kaula, Samuel Jegede, Sani Darma, Salihu Garba, and Yahaya Ada.²⁸ Abba Maikwaru was the first President of NEPU. On August 15, 1950 Bello Ijumu declared that the main task before NEPU, as a nationalist party, was "to work for self-government"; he also emphasized that the party stood for the ordinary people in society.²⁹

From the onset the emergence of NEPU triggered opposition from the colonialists, the feudal aristocrats, and the dominant section of the petite bourgeoisie. British Officials immediately went on the offensive in a propaganda campaign to smear NEPU. The anti-imperialist and anti-feudal movement - including its leaders, members, supporters, and

27. Intelligence Report No./20 of 14th April, 1951, in "NEPU - Security..."

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

sympathizers - was depicted and slandered as riff-raff, extremist, and subversive.³⁰ But in reality the British knew what NEPU stood for. Spelling out its social basis, objectives and goals, and direction - especially in the Sawaba Declaration - NEPU stressed that it was a party of the talakawa (commoners or non-nobility classes or social strata).³¹ NEPU stated that its main task was to wage struggle against the colonialists and all the African social forces linked with it. Furthermore, the party maintained that the only way the talakawa could liberate themselves from colonialism, and its bane - including feudal tyranny - was through conscious political action.³² The NEPU was created as a vanguard nationalist party; it drew support from peasants, artisans, workers, teachers, civil servants, petty traders, tailors, ex-servicemen, and radical Islamic teachers.³³

30. See, for example, letter from Acting Secretary Northern Region to all Residents dated June 13, 1952, in "Political Bodies in Nigeria..."

31. Sawaba Declaration was a seven point document prepared and issued at Kano between 1950 and 1952 containing the central positions of NEPU principally pertaining to the issues of national liberation, control of political power, and the kind of society and social order NEPU stood for. The Sawaba Declaration was anti-imperialist and anti-feudalist. It was a sort of party manifesto: SAWABA DECLARATION (not dated) Mimeo.

32. Ibid.

33. Paul M. Lubeck, Islam and Urban Labour in Northern Nigeria: The Making of a Muslim Working Class, CUP, London, 1986, p.38.

The realities of the times, with strong regionalization and so on, contributed in making NEPU to principally focused on Northern Nigeria. But the party's whole outlook was that of a strong pan-Nigerian nationalism and it was neither a separatist nor a centrifugal movement.³⁴ Lawan Dambazau has drawn attention to the fact that leading nationalists in NEPU such as Sa'ad Zungar, S.G. Abubakar Zukogi, Bello Ijumu, Magaji Danbatta, Yahaya Ada, and so on, had acquired experiences in the process of their participation in the nationalist struggle of the NCNC and other movements.³⁵ However, by the late 1940s they had become disillusioned with the champions of the divisive ethnic and regional politics in the nationalist movement. Also, they were well in the known about the role the NCNC petit-bourgeois leaders played in the betrayal and suppression of the Zikists.³⁶ With a sight of history the leading NEPU nationalists did much to put into place an organization capable of transcending the divisive and cen-

34. J.S. Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1971, p.310.

35. Field-work interview for the author (recorded on cassette) conducted by Habu Dauda with Lawan Dambazau - Islamic Scholar, leading nationalist, and NEPU ideologue - age 65, at Kano on 8, 1989.

36. Ibid.

trifugal tendencies and practices - and the result of their efforts was the formation of the NEPU.³⁷

An important question is whether NEPU was a petit-bourgeois party. Peter Worsley has argued that the central thing to take into consideration is the nature of the social basis of a political party - which goes to show the class interests it represents; and this cannot be properly grasped by simply looking at the class nature of the leadership of a nationalist party.³⁸ For historically the leadership of the national liberation movements in Africa, whether right-wing or left-wing, was provided by the petite bourgeoisie - and NEPU was no exception.³⁹ Thus NEPU was not a petit-bourgeois nationalist party because it represented popular interests.

Paul M. Lubek has claimed that because the British checked "the ruthlessness of the N.A. police thugs" in the towns, NEPU enjoyed popularity among the Urban talakawa than in the rural areas where the

37. Ibid.

38. Peter Worsley, The Third World, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1975, pp145-148.

39. Ibid., pp147-148.

repression by the Chiefs was not curbed.⁴⁰ However, as shall be shown in the analysis the historical truth is that the common people of Zaria embraced NEPU, both in the towns and villages, in the face of British and local feudalists war of repression directed against it in urban and rural districts. In reality NEPU had a powerful, penetrative, and effective machinery for mobilization which it used to reach out to the working people in the towns and in the rural areas. All over the province the colonial apparatuses and instruments of coercion were employed by the British and their local representatives in an attempt to stifle the struggle by NEPU. Hostile attitudes, and practical repressive actions - by the colonizer and their Marionettes - were shown towards NEPU.

Alliance with some nationalist political groupings was of tactical importance to NEPU. This was partly informed by principles as well as problems confronting the party. NEPU itself did not have a high degree of educated cadres; funds and equipment such as a newspaper were lacking; the party somehow lacked the subjective capacity to operate effectively on a national scale; and

40. P.M. Lubeck, op.cit., p.38.

it sprang up at a time the British had been forced to start giving up their hold on Nigeria as a colony thereby their resorting to promoting anti-people forces and tendencies within the nationalist movement which NEPU had to challenge.⁴¹ All these were problematics and contributed to NEPU striking working co-operation with some organizations. Furthermore, the NEPU did not have lawyers to defend its members at the courts.⁴² It also had a weak financial base. There was the absence of a party organ to expose the victimization, repression, and atrocities, unleashed on the movement by the British and their African surrogates. Moreover the government newspapers were not reporting on violations against NEPU.⁴³ A combination of these was a contributory factor for the alliance NEPU was to establish with the NCNC whilst retaining its separate structures and independent identity.⁴⁴ Before any formal links were put in place between NEPU and the NCNC, they maintained some sorts of relationship. One of the Nnamdi Azikiwe's newspapers the Comet - edited by E.A. Anwana - was put at the disposal of NEPU as its

41. Field-work interview with Lawan Dambazau, op.cit.

42. As at the time NEPU was founded in 1950 British colonialism had produced only one lawyer in the entire Northern Nigeria, Abdul Razaq of Ilorin, and he was in the NPC. Ibid.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid.

organ for propaganda, conscientization, political education, and for dissemination of information.⁴⁵

From 1951 NEPU and NCNC had affiliation which Belle Ijumu was central to being supportive of.⁴⁶ A section of leading NEPU members - notably Sa'ad Zungur, Aminu Kano, S.G. Abubakar Zukogi, and Maitama Sule, were for various reasons^{opposed} to it. The position of Sa'ad Zungur (ex General-Secretary of NCNC) and other former members of the NCNC like Zukogi, was partly informed by lack of trust of the NCNC leadership.⁴⁷ Sa'ad Zungur had then resigned from the NCNC on the ground that it had moved away from its original course. Aminu Kano specifically wanted to counter pressure mounted by exponents of an alliance with the NCNC, within NEPU, by giving conditions he assumed would be unacceptable to the NCNC leaders.⁴⁸ Some of them were that the

45. It has been pointed out that one limitation of the Comet was that its distribution or circulation did not go beyond the Kano area. See A.D. Yahaya, The Native Authority System in Northern Nigeria 1950-70: A Study in Political Relations with Particular Reference to Zaria Native Authority, ABU Press, Zaria, 1980, p.30.

46. C.I.D.(S) No.129 dated June 27, 1951, in "NEPU-Security..."

47. Ibid.

48. J.N. Paden, op.cit., p.157.

NCNC shall provide NEPU with material force such as funds and equipment; and give electoral support to NEPU in Northern Nigeria - by not fielding candidates throughout the region - while NEPU was to do the same for the NCNC in the Eastern and Western regions.⁴⁹ As things turned out the NCNC accepted all the conditions - and Aminu Kano was astonished.⁵⁰ However, right from the formation of NEPU in 1950 the existing co-operation between it and the NCNC - before the formal alliance - frightened the British and their colonized lackeys. That was why from 1951 the foreign occupiers and local reactionaries increasingly slandered NEPU as a sell-out organization to peoples of Southern Nigeria. In July 1951 K.P. Maddock stated:

The most interesting development was the openly declared intention of N.E.P.U. to co-operate with the N.C.N.C. and Azikiwe's promise of his full support of N.E.P.U. activities in Kano. This will do much to discredit N.E.P.U. with a great majority of the Hausa population. 51

49. Ibid., p.159

50. Ibid., p.157.

51. K.P. Maddock - Resident of Kano - to the SNP Kaduna dated 13th June, 1951, in "NEPU - Security..."

The colonialists and their colonized collaborators were continually on the counter-offensive to influence public opinion that if NEPU was allowed to record electoral success in the decolonization process the people of Zaria, and indeed Northern Nigeria, would be dominated by Southerners. This also eventually became a central anti-NEPU campaign weapon of the NPC.⁵²

By 1953 Bello Ijumu insisted that unless NEPU identified with the aspirations of the nationalist forces in the lower north provinces of Nigeria (including Southern Zaria) it was going to be more difficult to stop the NPC.⁵³ Already, the petit-bourgeois nationalists in those parts were making the peoples become susceptible to propaganda by tagging NEPU as a Hausa political party in a campaign to undermine its radical nationalist influences.⁵⁴ To a certain extent because of this NEPU did strive to create some level of practical understanding in the anti-colonial struggles with some lower north movements "principally by supporting their demand for

52. B.J. Dudley, op.cit., p.181.

53. Interview with Bello Ijumu, "Chief Bello Ijumu - a born radical founder of NEPU," in the newspaper Sunday Vanguard, of April 12, 1987, p.5.

54. Ibid., p.5.

greater tribal autonomy and for their own region."⁵⁵

In 1953 some NEPU nationalists lifted the Middle Belt Region agitation high as Bello Ijumu became dedicated to the cause of ethnic minorities to assert themselves by forming the Middle Belt People's Party (MBPP) which allied with NEPU and the NCNC.

C.S. Whitaker Jr. has emphasized that one thing which contributed in making NEPU a success among the talakawa was its daily campaign against exploitative and oppressive policies such as forced labour. Whitaker Jr. stated that this "was typical of NEPU's approach to the peasantry - the direct advocacy and defense of their interests through informal campaign of enlightenment which informed the peasants of their rights and encouraged them to assert their rights."⁵⁶ This has been corroborated by Muhammadu Alangade who maintained that the success and popularity of NEPU in Zaria Province was due to the struggles the nationalist organization waged on issues and problems of the times affecting the masses

55. J.S. Coleman, op.cit., p.365.

56. C.S. Whitaker Jr., The Politics of Tradition, Continuity and Change in Northern Nigeria 1946-1966, PUP, New Jersey, 1970, p.380.

of the talakawa through political education.⁵⁷

In September 1951 elections were held into the legislative Councils. At Zaria and Kaduna towns, and in the rural districts of northern Zaria, NEPU won a majority in the primaries.⁵⁸ However, the elections were based on an indirect system; with an electoral college at the secondary and most vital stage where the candidates to proceed to the legislative bodies were finally determined. The N.A had a special 40 per cent of the seats reserved for it. Bill Freund has rightly observed that it was the electoral college system that was used by the British and the aristocrats in the N.A to deny NEPU the popular victory in 1951.⁵⁹ This was followed with a mass arrest of NEPU members. The Emir of Zaria was also continually refusing to grant the movement permit to hold rallies as from 1951. NEPU's performance in the 1951 elections - in spite of the rigging, the undemocratic nature of the

57. Field-work interview for the author (recorded on Cassete) conducted by Habu Dauda with Muhammadu Alangade, ex-serviceman and Zaria NEPU President, age 72, at Sabon Gari Zaria, on 21st October, 1989.

58. B.J. Dudley, op.cit., p.80.

59. Bill Freund, The Making of Contemporary Africa: The Development of African Society Since 1800, Macmillan, London, 1984, p.216.

elections, the repression, and other ploys to stifle it - shook the colonizer and sent a warning signal to the British authorities. The success of NEPU and its popularity among the African working people sort of influenced the colonialists to launched a more systematic counter-offensive directed against the party on all fronts. It is now apparent that this process was the brain child of powerful British officers such as Bryan Shardwood-Smith.⁶⁰

Visibly B. Shardwood-Smith was disturbed about the implication for the colonizer of NEPU's victorious trend in Zaria and elsewhere in Northern Nigeria.⁶¹ B. Shardwood-Smith himself admitted to the popularity of NEPU among the people as well as to its high level of organizational ability. But at the same time B. Shardwood-Smith suggested, in very explicit terms, that the British should do everything possible to counteract and repress NEPU while giving backing to the NPC on the other hand. Also, that the Zaria based government newspapers - especially the Gaskiya Ta Fi Kwabo - should be used as

60. Bryan Shardwood-Smith served in Northern Nigeria between 1927-1957 after being in the Cameroons for 6 years, At different times he was a D.O., Resident, and so on. He became President of the Northern House of Assembly in 1952. Later that year Shardwood-Smith was appointed Lieutenant-Governor of the Northern Region, the capacity in which he served between 1952-1957.

61. B.E. Shardwood-Smith, Resident of Kano, to the SNP Kaduna of October 29, 1951, in "NEPU-Security..."

organs of propaganda to influence public opinion against NEPU.⁶² In October 1951 Bryan Shardwood-Smith made a submission to the government on political developments connected with NEPU. He touched much on the gains NEPU made in the September 1951 elections and its possible victory in the elections to come in 1952. But ~~he~~ focused much more on the danger NEPU constituted to the colonial order, and the dominant African classes that were in league with the colonialists, if it was not checked:

It may well not represent the popular opinion of 1952 if N.E.P.U. is permitted to pursue its way uninterrupted. If in fact this well-organised minority movement, which has already succeeded in stampeding the Syrians into subscribing large sums of money, gains further impetus, the activities of the NPC will be of purely academic interest. To repeat what I have frequently said before, the executive of N.E.P.U. and its founder members are a worthless lot in terms both of mental calibre and experience. They do, however, possess drive, zeal and appreciable measure of organising ability. This thing can spread unless responsible Africans who have the real future of the North at heart get down to it once and organise a counter offensive.

It is my impression that in a number of Provinces it is not realised how considerable and how close this very unnecessary danger is and that this feeling of complacency is very prevalent among the N.As leading officials.

62. Ibid.

The fact that N.E.P.U. has secured control of Kano city does not particularly surprise me or appall me. The local moderates were warned for months that if they did nothing about it, this would occur. What does seriously perturb me is the impression that in other provinces, it is not realised that what has happened in Kano can easily happen elsewhere, and that once this quite worthless movement is permitted to gain adequate momentum it will effectively penetrate the rural areas after which the fat will be well and truly in the fire.⁶³

Going by history it remains true that any nationalist party seen as subversive and worthless by the colonialists must be among the best in standing for the interests and future of the colonized people. Certainly, there was no better judge of NEPU than the peasantry and other labouring people who made sacrifices in the process of rallying support for it. Following Bryan Shardwood-Smith's report the Zaria based Gaskiya Ta Fi Kwabo started a propaganda of smearing NEPU and warning people about the supposed danger of the movement. The NEPU responded by protesting to the British authorities; a delegation led by Aminu Kano went to Zaria to complain to the management of Gaskiya Ta Fi Kwabo.⁶⁴ When the NPC was formed in October 1957 it was pitted against

63. Ibid.

64. "NEPU - Security..."

NEPU by the colonizer. Some principal Officials of the NPC were doing intelligence work for the British by monitoring and reporting on the activities of NEPU and its members.⁶⁵

The anti-colonial campaign of the NEPU was also constantly directed at the Emirs and other N.A aristocrats. In this regard the party recognized the historical fact that there existed incompatibility of interests between the colonized aristocracy and the colonized working people.⁶⁶ For NEPU the match towards freedom could never be possible unless the tyrannical and dominating aristocrats were abolished - as Aminu Kano emphasized in 1951:

... no genuine democrat ... can tolerate, much less actively support, the indefinite retention of a privileged class of hereditary parasites, who stand by their very existence for the negation of every vital principle for which democracy stands. The Chiefs, supported by the British imperialists, have been a pillar of black reaction in this country.⁶⁷

Apart from British repression the NEPU suffered some set-backs due to internal problems and limitations.

Lawan Dambazau has amplified the reality of the party

65. Intelligence report extract of 15th October, 1952 sent by Isa Kaita, in "NEPU-Security..."

66. Extract of article by Aminu Kano published in the Comet as quoted in C.I.D.(s) No.139 dated September 21, 1951, in "NEPU-Security."

67. Ibid.

in which - at certain times - the practical commitment and the consistency of the rank-and-file moved faster than the pace set by some sections of the leadership.⁶⁸

As the live wire of the popular nationalist movement, the talakawa were the main financial source; NEPU waged struggle in severe poverty and lack of material resources. Whilst the ordinary people stood by this some of the leading petit-bourgeois elements wavered; indeed some were not committed to the cause to the extent that they could not stand the poverty and thus went astray after having been corrupted with appointments, and patronage, by the colonialists and the NPC.⁶⁹ By 1953 some hitherto NEPU members including Maitama Sule, Waziri Ibrahim, and Zanna Bukar Dipcharima, had crossed over to the NPC and later became federal Ministers.⁷⁰

In 1952 Abba Maikwaru was replaced as NEPU President-General by Aminu Kano who was elected. One of the main reasons given for the change was the low level of education of Abba Maikwaru; another was his

68. Field-work interview with Lawan Danbazau, op.cit.

69. Ibid.

70. B. J. Dudley, op.cit., p.142 and p.192.

limited knowledge of national and international affairs.⁷¹ But this idea to change the leadership was in NEPU circle since about 1951. By mid-1953 the corrupt influences, opportunism, and the question of personal ambition for power, appeared more in the party. A splinter group led by Abba Maikwaru later left NEPU and crossed over to the AG.⁷² The fact that NEPU in its first three years of existence allowed dual membership, with NEPU members being in other parties as well, opened the organization to infiltration by hostile forces. They permeated the party's structure at high levels; for even some meetings - and the details of discussions - held by the party's inner caucus clandestinely, were accurately reported on to the British authorities.⁷³ The NEPU was also trapped in the nexus of solely constitutional or legalistic nationalist struggle whereby reformism and negotiations began to take the lead with time. Moreso, in the 1950s the British were largely dictating the terms of the decolonization process through constitutional conferences and reforms.

71. C.I.D.(S) No.139 dated September 21, 1951...

72. M. Okoye, op.cit., p.157.

73. Many instances are found in "NEPU-Security..."; and also in "Political Bodies in Nigeria..."

The NEPU gained acceptability among the population of Zaria; the province was a central nerve of the party. Those at the head of the local branches were ordinary but heroic personalities such as Muhammadu Alangade; Bala Tela, Usman Paki, Usman Söba, Aliyu Adama, Shehu Mahiru, Gambo Sawaba, Gambo Amartey (later known as Hajiya Gambo Sawaba), and other nationalists.⁷⁴

Muhammadu Alangade was the Zaria Provincial President of the party and Baba Tela was the Secretary. Usman Paki was the Secretary of the Zaria town branch of NEPU. Bala Keffi and Aliyu Adama were President and Secretary of the Kaduna branch of NEPU respectively.⁷⁵ The party structure followed the pattern of colonial administrative structure in the province; there were the provincial, district, and ward or village branches of NEPU in that hierarchical order. Also, NEPU had a highly militant youth movement known as the Northern Askianist Movement which later changed to Rundunan Samari Sawaba; a women wing of the party had branches at the various levels.⁷⁶

74. Field-work interview with Muhammadu Alangade, op.cit.

75. Ibid.

76. Ibid.

The NEPU nationalists such as Muhammadu Alangade gave so much in the process of the struggle for the liberation of their Nigerian homeland from British colonial domination. These Zaria nationalists grew among the people; they were ordinary people without any material wealth; and most of the leading activists were of humble origin and had no high positions in society. They refused to live sedentary political life, remained inseparable with the colonized working people, and made great sacrifices and gave selfless service in the face of British repression and African feudal tyranny.⁷⁷ Right from the birth of NEPU its mobilization process in the province involved public lectures, meetings, and rallies. These were means of political galvanization of the talakawa in the direction of the struggle for national liberation. In northern Zaria the problem for the Hausa peasantry was a sharp class struggle against the colonizer and the Hausa-Fulani feudalists.

After the first congress of NEPU at Kaduna in December 1950 the party strove to establish "itself as

77. Ibid. Muhammadu Alangade paid glowing tribute to his comrades (most of them now deceased). He talked about their virtues and heroic deeds in challenging the British, the colonized aristocrats, and other African reactionary forces.

the champion of the people."⁷⁸ In October 1951 Bala Keffi and Aliyu Adama met with the local authorities at Kaduna and presented their complaints about issues affecting the African population such as the lack of amenities and facilities in the regional capital.⁷⁹ Linked with this was the demand by NEPU that Kaduna capital territory should have a seat in the Northern House of Assembly.⁸⁰

On 16th October, 1952, Aminu Kano launched a NEPU campaign for civil disobedience at Sabon Gari Zaria. At the rally held he condemned the Northern House of Assembly elections of 1951 because of the introduction of the indirect system of election, electoral malpractices, and the question of 40% of total seats reserved for the N.A through which the British and the aristocrats put their candidates in the name of the people.⁸¹ The NEPU leader also urged the Zaria people not to respect the ruling feudal aristocrats due to the fact that they were representatives of the colonial power, oppressive, and being of no use to the common people. Aminu Kano also called on the people to expell the British from

78. See extract from Zaria I.S. dated October 23, 1951, in "NEPU-Security", op.cit.

79. Ibid.

80. Ibid.

81. Speech by Aminu Kano at Moonshine Hotel Sabon Gari Zaria on October 10, 1952, in "N.C.N.C. Delegates (1) Tour of Nigeria (2) Propaganda (3) N.E.P.U. (4) F.U.N.A.S. (1946-56)..."

Nigeria.⁸² There was a call on the talakawa to refuse to supply forced labour, resist the various forms of extortions in matters such as oppressive taxes, and to fight against the abuse of power by officials at all levels in society.⁸³ Thus campaign and mobilization on the basis of civil disobedience was a strong weapon the NEPU put on its practical agenda. One immediate response to this was that on 20th October, 1952 the Emir of Zaria, Ja'afaru, refused two applications by Aminu Kano and Gambo Sawaba to hold ^{rallies} at Sabon Gari and Tudun Wada Zaria respectively due to what was called their previous "ill chosen remarks."⁸⁴

In the province it was NEPU that first brought women out - than ever before - in the open struggle to challenge their oppression and denial of opportunities. According to Ladi Shehu (National Secretary of the NEPU women wing) NEPU ~~female~~ nationalists went on house-to-house campaign to mobilize women - especially those in purdah - to give support to the cause of national liberation

82. Ibid.

83. Ibid.

84. Resident Zaria to the Secretary Northern Region Kaduna dated 21st October, 1952, in "N.C.N.C. Delegates (1) Tour of Nigeria (2) Propaganda (3) N.E.P.U. (4) F.U.N.A.S. (1946-56)..."

championed by the party.⁸⁵ She stressed that the denial of voting rights of any sort and the general denial of franchise to women, lack of educational opportunities for women when compared with men, and all sorts of discriminatory practices against women structurally located in the colonial system coupled with backward traditions in society, were taken up by the NEPU.⁸⁶ This vigorous line of action aided the growth of the nationalist party and contributed to its being fervently embraced by the people.⁸⁷

The nationalists in the NEPU deepened their understanding of the call of history and came to grips with an understanding of the plight of the talakawa, by being with the African working people in the highest anti-colonial political battles of the times against exploitation, oppression, and injustice. Despite all odds placed on their path by the British and the African lackeys such as the aristocrats, the local NEPU leaders were determined to aspire for social

85. Field-work interview for the author (recorded on cassette) conducted by Habu Dauda with Ladi Shehu, Journalist, educationist, Secretary of NEPU Women Wing, age 64, at Sokoto, on November 23, 1989.

86. Ibid.

87. Ibid.

change in society. With little or no formal education in the colonial school system for most of them, their main school was the practical political field in the course of the anti-colonial struggle. In the process of the struggle waged by NEPU for freedom of the Nigerian homeland and for the dignity of the talakawa, staunch nationalists in the NEPU gave in the best they could as the fellows went through deprivation of hardships in their daily lives. One of such ordinary but glorious and heroic nationalists, who gave everything to the struggle to break the fetters in which the talakawa were suffocating, was Sambon Barka. This outstanding figure hailed from Dandume in Maska Districts of Katsina Province (neighbouring the northern Zaria district of Giwa). Sambon Barka was a descendant of the pre-colonial Kontagora ruling house.

In Katsina areas such as Maska, Funtua, and elsewhere, Sambon Barka was relentless in the NEPU anti-colonial struggle. In this connection the District Officer of Zaria described Sambon Barka as a "very sharp thorn in the side of Katsina authorities."⁸⁸ However,

88. D.O. Zaria to Resident Zaria dated October 10, 1952, in "Political Bodies in Nigeria..."

it was at places in ~~the~~ northern Zaria such as Birnin Gwari, Giwa, Yakawada, Kaya, and elsewhere, that he made immense impact in mobilizing, politicizing, and educating the people to stand by NEPU.⁸⁹ On September 3, 1952 at Kaya, in Giwa District, Sambon Barka addressed a crowd estimated at about 500. He hammered home to them that only the talakawa could liberate themselves from the fetters of colonialism.⁹⁰ Sambon Barka emphasized that they should not be afraid of the colonialists and even the King of England; and told the people not to obey the orders of Emirs and other African rulers. The nationalist called for civil disobedience by appealing to the people to disobey the order which prevented the cutting of trees, refuse to pay the oppressive taxes, and to resist serving forced labour.⁹¹

On 27th September, 1952, Sambon Barka held a second rally at Kaya which was attended by about 700 people. Throughout the month of September Sambon Barka continued

89. Resident Zaria to Civil Secretary Northern Region Kaduna dated 20th October, 1952, in "Political Bodies in Nigeria..."

90. Ibid.

91. Ibid.

with the mobilization and politicization through rallies, lectures, and house-to-house contact with success.⁹² By the day, he got more and more people to join NEPU. Sambo Barka's efforts were aided by local NEPU activists. The Kaya branch of the party had Danjuma Kaya as President, the Secretary was Danjuma Sada, and Abdun Sabuwa was the Treasurer. Other leading NEPU activists at Kaya were Akawu, Ya'u Babale, Yusufu Mahauci, and Gashin Ladi.⁹³

It was on October 5, 1952, that the District Head of Giwa - Muhammadu - informed the Emir of Zaria that the political situation at Kaya was very unstable and had even gone out of control.⁹⁴ The District Head also reported that the collection of taxes and the drafting of forced labour in the area was proving impossible; and that when he went to Kaya, on October 5, 1952, to assess the situation, he was booed by NEPU supporters.⁹⁵ Finally, the District Head of Giwa alerted the Emir of Zaria about the likelihood of an outbreak of total revolt in the entire district due to

92. Ibid.

93. Ibid.

94. District Head of Giwa to Emir of Zaria of October 5, 1952, in "Political Bodies in Nigeria..."

95. Ibid.

the political activities of Sambon Barka - albeit NEPU.⁹⁶
 On October 10, 1952, the Zaria Provincial authorities reported that "Sambon Barka was accordingly arrested with the co-operation of the Emir of Katsina, and his trial commenced in the Giwa Native court on 16th of October."⁹⁷

On 15th October, 1952, Aminu Kano was at Giwa on what appears to be a solidarity visit to the local NEPU members and Sambon Barka; the District Head turned down the request by Aminu Kano to have a chat with him. The timing of the visit by a top national leader of NEPU was important - especially as the trial of the party's members was to start on October 16. Sambon Barka and seven others were charged on just one count of having held a meeting without permit. The Emir of Zaria wanted the trial to be held at Giwa, and not Zaria town, for the reason that it would demonstrate to the people that the district authorities were having powers to deal with dissent and were in control.⁹⁸ On the third day

96. Ibid.

97. Resident Zaria to Civil Secretary Northern Region Kaduna dated 20th October, 1952.

98. Ibid.

of the trial, October 18, 1952, Sambon Barka and 7 other members of NEPU were each sentenced to 6 months imprisonment.⁹⁹ After the jail terms were pronounced at Giwa, they were hauled to Zaria prison where the District Officer turned down the request by their lawyer to see them and rejected the move for an appeal to be heard at the Magistrate court. However, the sentences were later reduced to 3 months.¹⁰⁰ Three days after the end of the trial Resident K.J. Bryant and Emir Ja'afaru were at Giwa on 21st October, 1952. The people were ordered to be at a gathering at which the Emir gave an address with emphasis that NEPU was a political party of trouble makers "and the village heads should all warn the members in their district to be out of it."¹⁰¹ After Sambon Barka came out of prison he did not mellow in his political beliefs, convictions, principles, and the commitment to the nationalist struggle of NEPU - in spite of other subsequent imprisonments.

99. Ibid.

100. Ibid.

101. Ibid.

A part of the daily life in Zaria districts was the increase struggle by NEPU members which focused on the issues of liberation, freedom, exploitation, oppression, social justice, and so on. The official position of the colonialists on the attitude to be adopted towards NEPU was clearly spelt-out on 13th June, 1952. It stated that administrative officers should on no account allow private complaints. Thus moves "by NEPU to set itself up as an independent organisations, entitled to investigate grievances and to arrogate unto itself the duties of the local administration should not be tolerated."¹⁰² Furthermore, that if NEPU officials or delegation demand to have audience with British officers they should be asked to write down the subject and when it is not in line they should be ruled out.¹⁰³

The NEPU did not just preach civil disobedience it tried to enforce it. When the leadership of the party told the people to put an end to forced labour the response was positive.¹⁰⁴ Muhammadu Alangade said

¹⁰². Acting Civil Secretary Northern Region Kaduna to the Resident Zaria Province dated 13th June, 1952, in "Political Bodies in Nigeria..."

¹⁰³. Ibid.

¹⁰⁴. Speech by Aminu Kano at Moonshine Hotel Sabon Gari Zaria on October 10, 1952....

that as at then forced labour was exacted from the peasantry and lumpen elements in certain instances for 40 days continuously in the province.¹⁰⁵ When the party launched the campaign against forced labour on 16th October, 1952, Muhammadu Alangade and Usman Paki, accompanied by some NEPU members, stopped a group of forced labourers at the Sabon Gari Zaria cotton buying centre engaged by the N.A as they told them to disperse.¹⁰⁶ A confrontation ensued between the NEPU activists and the British officials. The police were called in to make arrest "but after taking statements decided that the facts and circumstances would not support a criminal charge and released them."¹⁰⁷ The District Officer of Zaria tried to cover-up the widespread practice by claiming that the N.A was paying all labourers. But the Zaria Provincial President of NEPU, Muhammadu Alangade, countered by telling Resident K.J. Bryant with solid and irrefutable evidence that at Sabon Gari, Kubau, Anchau, Shika, and elsewhere, there was labour exaction and the forced labourers were not paid.¹⁰⁸

105. Field-work interview with Muhammadu Alangade, op.cit.

106. Ibid.

107. Resident Zaria to Civil Secretary Northern Region Kaduna dated 20th October, 1952.

108. Field-work interview with Muhammadu Alangade, op.cit.

This somehow made the authorities, in the prevailing circumstances, not to take any action against the NEPU men.¹⁰⁹

In February 1953 three NEPU men were detained at Soba, on the orders of the Emir of Zaria, for having engineered the dispersal of people serving forced labour at a site.¹¹⁰ Some NEPU men were also arrested at Kudan for fighting against forced labour. In April 1953, 4 members of the party "demanded to know the rate of pay the labourers" repairing N.A buildings at Birnin Gwari were receiving. After confirming that the persons were forced labourers, the NEPU members ordered them to discontinue with the work.¹¹¹ As a response the authorities got the NEPU activists arrested. The provision in law was that charges against the accused persons could only be "heard in the magistrate court".¹¹² But in order to deal with them instantly, and to deny them any chance of having legal representation, the authorities arraigned them before the Birnin Gwari

109. Ibid.

110. From Aminu Kano, on tour Zaria, to the Resident Zaria dated February 20, 1953, in "N.C.N.C. Delegates (1) Tour of Nigeria (2) Propaganda (3) N.E.P.U. (4) F.U.N.A.S. (1945-56)..."

111. Intelligence Summary (Zaria Division) from D.O. Zaria to Resident Zaria dated April 20, 1953, in "Political Bodies in Nigeria..."

112. Ibid.

Alkali Court on some other framed charges. To achieve this the 4 NEPU men were dragged to the "Native Court" not on the basis of what they actually did, but on the fabricated charges that they held a public meeting and procession without permission.¹¹³ Subsequently, each of them was sentenced to 2 months in jail with hard labour.¹¹⁴

On the whole it was such concrete actions by NEPU in the defence of the working people which further attracted repression and victimization against its members and supporters. Some of them were tortured, some had their farms seized, others were forced to emigrate from their towns or villages, while some were killed.¹¹⁵ But on the other hand it was these practical anti-colonial struggles that endered NEPU to the people. That was why in spite of the use of the might of state apparatus to coerce people not to vote for NEPU, rigging in the various elections, the radical nationalist party enjoyed popular electoral support in the province. During the 1954 elections NEPU swept the polls in Zaria town, Kaduna capital territory, and

113. Ibid.

114. Ibid.

115. Field-work interview with Ladi Shehu, op.cit.

in most of the rural districts of northern Zaria.¹¹⁶ But its position on the electoral college and other factors contributed to its boycott of the second stage. For the 1955-1958 Zaria Town Council election (the town council had 55 seats) NEPU won 26 seats against 14 by the NPC, but then the N.A. enjoyed an automatic 40% representation. In the 1956 House of Assembly elections NEPU captured 3 constituencies out of a total of 8 for the entire province. It triumphed in Zaria town, Kaduna, and Zaria north constituencies.¹¹⁷ In comparison the NPC won 2 seats - that is, Zaria West (Birnin Gwari) and Zaria East (Kauru); and the Middle Zone League (MZL) won the 3 seats in Southern Zaria.¹¹⁸ In the 1959 federal elections - regarded as the first direct elections, but which still excluded Zaria (albeit Northern Nigeria) women and based on limited franchise - NEPU still won in Zaria, Kaduna, and Zaria north. By the late 1950s the repression against NEPU had been turned as part of the mop up operation against radical and patriotic nationalists. This will be the subject of analysis in the last section of this chapter.

116.. J.N. Paden, op.cit., p.171.

117. October 1956 Northern Region of Nigeria Election Results of the House of Assembly, in "Election Results (1956-57)", NAK: P.O. 2nd Collection AGNN No.1095.

118.. Ibid.

5.3 The Northern People's Congress

The reforms the British began to introduce as from 1947 involved the carving out a place for the marginalized petit-bourgeois intellectuals. Some of them, mostly products of Katsina College, were made unofficial members of the Northern House of Assembly.¹¹⁹ When the JMA was founded in October 1948 its so-called moderate section was under the patronage of Ahmadu Bello.¹²⁰ At that time, he was not visible in the activities of the organization because he operated in the background. Ahmadu Bello and the dominant section of the educated elite were now having the good-will of powerful and influential British officials such as Bryan Shardwood-Smith.¹²¹

The relationship between the JMA and the Emirs and Chiefs further got soured when majority of the 400 delegates endorsed the motion - during the June 1949 congress at Kaduna - for the abolition of the House of Chiefs in the Northern Region of Nigeria.

119. A.D. Yahaya, op.cit., pp26-27.

120. "The Northerners of Today..."

121. Ahmadu Bello, My Life, Gaskiya Corporation, Zaria, 1986, p.54.

With this, the Sultan of Sokoto who sent a message of solidarity through the Sokoto office of Ahmadu Bello retracted it.¹²² In November 1946 it was alleged that "the Sultan has closed existing branches and banned the formation of new branches of the" JMA.¹²³ Although this was found to be a rumour, the ongoing class antagonism between the organization and the N.A rulers was ^acontributory factor in fueling such speculations.

From the beginning the JMA was riddled with its own internal conflicts between the radicals and the conservatives on issues. The former were being slowly but surely schemed out from the leadership positions by the latter and the influence of the radicals being gradually neutralized. Umaru Agaie was replaced by Yahaya Gasau as Secretary of the JMA.¹²⁴ The radicals were somehow instrumental to the founding of NEPU; the final break was just a matter of time in the JMA. At the JMA meeting at Jos on December 24, 1950 the right-wingers were out to flush or expell

122. Gaskiya Ta Fi Kwabo, 6 Ga Yuli, 1949; and Gaskiya Ta Fi Kwabo, 9 Ga Yuli, 1949.

123. "The Northerners of Today..."

124. Ibid.

the left-wingers. Despite having joined NEPU, the latter were still striving for the ^{control of} JMA. Surely, the British thinking was to contain the anti-British segment in the JMA, but the establishment of NEPU in August 8, 1950, shattered it all. From then on the colonialists intensified their moves vigorously to counter the anti-imperialist section. Part of their plan at counteraction of NEPU was to form a pro-British party whilst also trying to close ranks between the ruling aristocrats and the so-called moderates in the JMA. As part of the reforms towards this, the British allowed the colonized feudal ruling elements and the N.A staff to contest for positions whilst those in the Northern Civil Service were still banned.¹²⁵ At the same time the compromising elements in the JMA were also being brought into more prominent positions; the British were getting them into the legislative Councils through the N.As. Those in the pro-British section of the JMA were given more and more representation at certain lower levels of decisions making bodies; on the other hand everything was being done to guarantee the colonized ruling strata their privileged and dominating positions.¹²⁶

125. A. Bello, op.cit., pp98-99

126. B.E. Shardwood Smith, Resident Kano, to the SNP Kaduna dated October 29, 1951...

It is important to note that the dominant elements in the JMA constituted a bloc. By 1950 Ahmadu Bello had emerged as the leader of the JMA legislators at both the regional and central legislative bodies. With British support the conservatives in the JMA and the Emirs formed a single united bloc at the early constitutional conferences. A ruler such as the Emir of Zaria, Ja'afaru, often stood as the spokesman for the so-called Northern Nigeria group.¹²⁷ At the Ibadan General Conference on the review of the constitution, in January 1950, Emir Ja'afaru speaking on behalf of the supposedly defenders of northern interests demanded that the region should have 50 per cent of the seats at the central legislature.¹²⁸ But this was not the end of all differences between the Emirs and the JMA elite operating largely from Zaria and Kaduna towns.

A most significant event took place at Zaria on October 1, 1951, when the JMA officially transformed itself and formally declared that it was henceforth to be a political party. The Zaria and Kaduna branches

127. J.N. Paden, op.cit., pp176-177 and p.740.

128. C.V. Williams, "Zaria Provincial Annual Report 1950", NAK: ZAR PROF No.4844.

played leading roles in the transformation of the JMA into a pan-Northern Nigerian political party. Immediately, the JMA changed its name to the Northern People's Congress (NPC) - that is, the same English translation of the JMA which it hitherto rejected being referred to. Also, at the inaugural meeting of the NPC on 1st October, 1951, Dr. R.A.B. Dikko relinquished his position as leader; the reason was that he was still an employee of the colonial government. This apart, he was just giving way to the real leaders. On the day of its founding Ahmadu Bello and Abubakar Tafawa Balewa declared their membership of the NPC; now they emerged openly as key leaders of the NPC. Messages of solidarity and support for the NPC were received from some "traditional" rulers. Sequel to this Zaria town became the headquarters of the NPC until 1954 - when it was moved to Kaduna.¹²⁹

The NPC did not pretend about its being pro-British; neither did it claim standing for self-government or national independence. In fact the party's main focus was for the dominant colonized classes and social strata in Zaria Province and elsewhere to participate in politics in the changing times and conditions which the anti-colonial struggles had forced the British to

129. A.D. Yahaya, op.cit., p.30.

bring about. In the national liberation movement the NPC maintained a line which was conservative. In reality the NPC ^{identified} nationalists forces such as NEPU as its enemies and not the British colonizer.¹³⁰

The NPC's main support base included the pro-imperialist educated elite, sections of the aristocracy, and the rich in society. The N.A largely served as a supportive structure at the disposal of the NPC - it relied on some sections of the aristocracy to secure a base. Also, information organs such as the Zaria based government press - the Gaskiya Ta Fi Kwabo and the Nigerian Citizen were used to promote the NPC. The party made its position quite explicit that it was a Northern Nigerian party, rather than a national one.¹³¹

The emergence of NEPU, which was followed by its trouncing of the African marionettes of British colonial domination in the September 1951 in Zaria and elsewhere, and the massive support it got from the popular masses, partly hastened the formation of the NPC as a counter-organization. When it formally came into

130. "Northern People's Congress and other Political Parties", NAK: MOH 2nd Collection GEN. No.81 Vol.II.

131. Ibid.

existence on 1st October, 1951; one hidden principal objective of the NPC was to confront NEPU and other ~~anti-imperialist~~ and anti-feudal nationalist currents.¹³² Its direction was just restricted to calls for limited reforms and constituted no challenge to the maintainance or continuation of colonialism. The colonizer had to do a lot of work to prepare grounds which would place the NPC on course, as an eventual successor of the British, and to ensure that the colonialists have allies in power at independence, so that the British would remain as beneficiaries of a neo-colonial system.¹³³

In the political calculation of the imperialist strategists there was need for combined efforts by the British, the ruling aristocracy, and the NPC to counter the popular nationalist forces. Certainly, one immediate concern was the threat to the colonialists a NEPU victory would pose in Zaria and elsewhere; frightened by the expanding influences of NEPU, the British set out to oppose it in total. Thus Bryan Shardwood-Smith stressed in the wake of the establishment of the NPC:

132. Thea Buttner, "Changes in Africa Under Colonial Rule: Some Aspects of the Economic, Social and Political Position of the Aristocracy in Tropical Africa," Post-Graduate Seminar Paper, Department of History, ABU, Zaria, 1983.

133. Ibid.

The fact which I wish to stress and which I earnestly suggest should be stressed as widely as possible over the Region is that, unless the adherents of the present regime, whether members of the N.P.C. or not abandon what I understand to be a general policy of saying "it cannot happen to us" in favour of an all-out drive to put their views and the facts before the public as a whole and so organise themselves that their candidates who after all are in general the best available in terms of both experience and integrity, are selected and elected by means of organisation, political disaster can very well, and quite unnecessarily, befall this regime.¹³⁴

Leading NPC elements in Zaria were the educated elite in the colonial service such as the N.A and so on. Among the key Zaria NPC men were Abubakar Imam, Nuhu Bamalli, Ahmadu Fatika, and Aliyu Turaki. Other leading personalities were Mohammed Sanusi, Sani Maigano, Alabi Melver, Abdulkadir Makama, Tanko Mama, and Mato () Zango Katab. Nuhu Bamalli was the first Provincial President of the NPC. In 1954 he became a national officer (Assistant Secretary) and later moved to the post of National Organizing Secretary. At that time the provincial leadership was taken over by Aliyu Turaki (the Head of Zaria N.A Works Department), as President, and Ahmadu Fatika (the Head of Zaria N.A Education Department) was now the Secretary. Also in

134. B.E. Shardwood-Smith, Resident Kano, to the SNP Kaduna dated October 29, 1951.

1954 Abubakar Imam became the National Treasurer of the NPC. In Southern Zaria the main NPC leaders were Mate Zango Katab (a businessman) and Sani Maigano (District Head of Kachia). The NPC had branches at the provincial, town, district, and ward levels; there was also a Hausa branch as well as another one for the so-called pagan groups.¹³⁵

There were secondary points of conflicts between the Emir of Zaria, Ja'afaru, and the NPC. He viewed the activities of the party with suspicion and saw it as a somehow rival political force with the potentials to undermine his authority and capable of encroaching on his powers. The Emir whilst not being explicitly hostile towards the NPC did all he could to control his base; Ja'afaru was very conscious in relation to retaining his authority and influences. The Emir was a highly intelligent aristocrat of the old type who was sceptical of the educated elements. From its inception the NPC had differences with Emir Ja'afaru on the question of separation of Kaduna from Zaria N.A; which would mean terminating the jurisdiction of the Emir and the Zaria aristocrats in connection with local affairs of the Northern Nigeria Capital.¹³⁶

135. "Political Bodies in Nigeria..."

136. J.N. Paden, op.cit., p.199; and A.D. Yahaya, op.cit., pp130-132.

On the other hand he remained an arch-opponent of NEPU which he abhorred both politically and ideologically.¹³⁷ In spite of everything, Emir Ja'afaru did at no time completely support the NPC; he continually pushed some of his aides to contest elections on the platform of the party and when not possible the Emir ensured that his loyalists stood on the independent candidate ticket.

Another important aspect was the question of support of the Zaria population as pertaining to the NPC. Overall, the colonized working people did not accept the NPC. The ethnic minorities in Southern Zaria viewed the NPC as a party of Hausa oppressors. Side-by-Side with this, the dominant forces and the policy of divide-and-rule ensured that the Hausa of Southern Zaria saw the NPC as a party capable of protecting them from being dislodged by the non-Hausa nationalities; but NEPU was perceived and painted by them as an enemy of the Hausa and Islam. That was why the Hausa population - which was a minority in the Southern Zaria context - was mainly supportive of the NPC although this could not make significant electoral impact because the other ethnic groups were massively behind the UMBC.¹³⁸

137. See, for example footnote 101 chapter 5 in this study.

138. Field-work interview with Muhammadu Alangade, op.cit.

In Northern Zaria the people were strongly behind NEPU. In spite of the repression, rigging, and the anti-democratic nature of the indirect electoral college system which worked in favour of the imperialist allies and against it, NEPU's electoral gains right from September 1951 proved that the people in the northern Zaria districts generally rejected the NPC. But the strength of the NPC lied in the support the British gave it by placing the state apparatuses at its disposal; coupled with the fact that 40% representation was given to N.A officials who were naturally either in the NPC or had sympathy for it. In addition to all this by 1953 the colonial authorities were using patronage in form of contracts, loans, the allocation of resources, and promoting people to positions, to induce the petite bourgeoisie to throw its weight behind the NPC.¹³⁹

The process of rapproachment between the ruling Emirs and the NPC continued with the aim of allignment of forces. With time NPC legislators such as Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, who had been vocal against the concentration of N.A powers in the Emirs and Chiefs, transformed themselves into defenders of the colonized rulers.¹⁴⁰ In July 1952 Ahmadu Bello, then Vice-

139. P.M. Lubeck, op.cit., p.37.

140. A.D. Yahaya, op.cit., pp26-27.

President of the NPC and its parliamentary leaders, told delegates attending the NPC Conference at Kaduna that the Emirs and Chiefs were much willing to support the NPC.¹⁴¹ But there was no total closing of ranks between the African rulers and the NPC elite. But with the appointment of Bryan Sharnwood-Smith as Lieutenant-Governor of the Northern Region in 1952 to put a more solid neo-colonial foundation and the transition, coupled with the ascendancy of Ahmadu Bello to the two powerful positions of the President of the NPC and Premier of Northern Nigeria in 1954, those Emirs and Chiefs who would not kowtow to the NPC line often found themselves out of favour and disgraced by the higher authorities.

The role of the NPC in the debates, negotiations, and constitutional conferences, is also a very vital subject. On April 1, 1953, an AG member of the Federal House of Representatives Lagos, Anthony Enahoro, moved a private motion calling for the granting of self-government for Nigeria by 1956. The NPC legislators opposed it vehemently. Ahmadu Bello

141. Text of speech (delivered in Hausa) by Ahmadu Bello, the leader of the NPC in the Northern House of Assembly and Vice-President of the Party, at the NPC Conference held at Kaduna on July 5, 1952, in "Northern People's Congress and other Political Parties..."

has stated that their rejection of the motion was partly informed by the fear of Southern Nigeria domination over ^{the} people of Northern Nigeria.¹⁴² Yahaya Ilorin expatiated on this stressing that by 1956 Northern Nigeria would not have qualified manpower "to fill the Executive Council."¹⁴³ And neither "will we have by 1956 enough of our men to have sufficient control of the Civil Service."¹⁴⁴ In the course of the debate on self-government the NPC members stated that they had not consulted with their constituencies and, therefore, "cannot agree to any fixed day for self-government..."¹⁴⁵ When the NPC legislators defeated the motion AG and NCNC supporters, and the nationalist press, directed attacks at the NPC members by calling them enemies of Nigeria and British stooges. On their return to Kaduna, the NPC leaders presented the entire development as a demonstration of contempt and arrogance by the NCNC and AG towards the people of Northern Nigeria.¹⁴⁶ This amounted to some sort of resorting to exploiting divisions and playing with

142. A. Bello, op.cit., p.119

143. Speech by Yahaya Ilorin, Minister of Health Northern Region, during a Conference at Ilorin May 30, 1953, in "Northern People's Congress and Other Political Parties..."

144. Ibid.

145. Ibid.

146. A. Bello, op.cit., pp110-134.

regional sentiments at Kaduna; the charge by NPC was not true because largely northern based parties such as NEPU and its MBPP allies had also demanded and struggle for total independence. To a certain extent it was the pride of the NPC leaders that was hurt; what occurred at Lagos was seen by the party as an act of humiliation and taking it lightly could have serious political implications capable of adversely affecting the NPC's fortunes.¹⁴⁷

The NPC responded to the whole development by taking positions that were essentially against national unity and in essence, secessionist. On 3rd May, 1953 the NPC dominated Northern House of Assembly at Kaduna voted for a motion demanding for a high level of autonomy for Northern Nigeria within a loose Nigeria confederation.¹⁴⁸ On the same day the NPC legislators passed a resolution against self-government for Nigeria by 1956.¹⁴⁹ In addition, on May 3, 1953, the Northern House of Chiefs, seating at Kaduna, passed a resolution rejecting the 1956 date for possible self-government.¹⁵⁰ Those positions stood in contrast with the stand of NEPU which fought

147. Ibid., pp110-134.

148. Motion on regional autonomy passed by Northern Regional House of Assembly on May 3, 1953, in "Northern People's Congress and other Political Parties..."

149. Yahaya Ilorin, op.cit.

150. Ibid.

for both self-government and total national independence for Nigeria.¹⁵¹ Meanwhile at the time of the controversy on the issue of self-government, the MZL and its leaders in Southern Zaria were not supportive of it but for a different reason. They alleged fear of Hausa domination over the ethnic minorities and even said that they preferred the British to remain. But the irony of it all was that the MZL went into alliance with the NPC.¹⁵²

Beyond all these the NPC engineered and fueled anti-Southern Nigeria sentiments at Zaria, Kaduna, and elsewhere. The NPC's campaign to create conflict among the peoples culminated in a crisis which broke out at Sabon Gari Kano on May 16, 1953; large number of lumpen elements and NPC sponsored thugs attacked Igbos, Yoruba, and other peoples of Southern Nigeria origin. NEPU members and supporters, who the NPC had been depicting as allies of Southerners, were also attacked by the dark forces. Official figures put the number of people killed between 31 and 36, and 341 wounded; but it is believed that they were much more high.¹⁵³ The colonial authorities did nothing worth it whilst

151. SAWABA DECLARATION

152. Interview with Bello Ijumu, op.cit., p.5.

153. A. Bello, op.cit., p.37.

the carnage and massacre lasted; of course, the signals were very much indicating an outbreak of crisis even before then. At Zaria town NCNC supporters, people of Southern Nigeria backgrounds, and NEPU followers came under constant and serious threats of attack by NPC thugs. On the whole the British did not put the blame on the NPC but reduced it to the so-called ethnic conflict and violence among Nigerians. For their part the NPC and some anti-people forces were out to gain some political advantage - even if it caused discord and bloody clashes among the peoples.

Sequel to the 1953 crisis leaders of political parties and the Chiefs were called to London, by the colonial office, for the Lancaster House constitutional conference. It lasted between July 30 and August 6, 1953.¹⁵⁴ The British used the constitutional conference to play another political triumph card by putting a neo-colonial arrangement on the agenda. Initially the NPC still pushed for the autonomy of the regions and went further to beg the British to delay granting self-government to Nigeria until 1971.¹⁵⁵

154. Kole Omotoso, Just Before Dawn, Spectrum, Ibadan, 1988, pp186-187.

155. Interview with Bello Ijumu, op.cit., p.5.

With this the British put some pressure on the NPC delegates and their allies to modify their position; the NPC was somehow satisfied with compromise concessions which gave more powers to the regions in many spheres than ever before.¹⁵⁶ The Northern Region was given 50% representation in the Federal House ^{of} Representatives; it was to have equal seats with the Western and Eastern regions, Southern Cameroons, and Lagos put together.¹⁵⁷ Later on, the colonialists worked out a formula to grant self-government to the Eastern and Western regions by 1958 and the Northern Region by 1959.

From 1952, some of the NPC leading figures were made Ministers in the Northern Nigeria government; the NPC was gradually having some political power as an apparent inheritor to the British. It began to discuss and initiate its Northernization Policy in connection with appointments in the civil service.¹⁵⁸ In theory the policy meant that indigenes of Northern Nigeria shall be given priority in terms of employment. Only when there was no qualified northerner for a job would an expatriate be employed - but on contract basis and

156. A. Bello, op.cit., p.150.

157. K. Omotoso, op.cit., pp186-187.

158. Policy of the NPC Regarding Northernization of the Regional Civil Service dated December 31, 1952, in "Northern People's Congress and Other Political Parties..."

subject to replacement when a qualified indigene was found. Since Nigerians from other regions could only be employed on permanent basis, then, that should only be done when there is no qualified northerner and in the absence of an expatriate to be employed on contract basis.¹⁵⁹ Really, the steps the NPC set out to take as a solution was directed at making fellow Nigerians victims of the imbalances the colonizer was guilty of creating in the first place.

The Northernization Policy in Zaria was a class policy in favour of the dominant aristocratic circles and the NPC, while being discriminatory against the ordinary people and those seen as opponents of the NPC. Right from the beginning NEPU members and supporters and people in other political opposition groupings did not benefit from the NPC policy of northernization - both in terms of job opportunities and even securing admission in schools for their children. The Zaria aristocracy and the NPC oppressed the Southern Zaria petit-bourgeois; they largely remained marginalized and discriminated against in terms of job recruitment at the levels of the N.A., the provincial, and the regional. This was partly because they largely identified

159. Ibid.

with the UMBC and also due to the fact that the survival of the Hausa-Fulani aristocrats included maintaining dominance over the peasantry and the ethnic minorities.¹⁶⁰ The NPC elite and other dominant classes used the Northernization policy to entrench themselves in the various departments of the N.A, provincial, and regional bureaucracy, and other sectors; thus consolidating their class privileges and exploitative positions.

One stark reality in the province was that petit-bourgeois opportunism, the lack of any serious and strong political commitment, as well as the lack of a clear direction, contributed to enable the NPC to fragment the Southern Zaria opposition. Whilst the NPC attempts to penetrate and split NEPU in the Province were mainly unsuccessful, the same cannot be said for the MZL faction of the UMBC in the 1950s. As the 1956 elections approached the NPC was able to form an alliance with the MZL, which had over the years been collaborating with the former.¹⁶¹ The Zaria MZL leaders, who also went with the name "UMBC independent", who specialized in parading themselves as champions of the ethnic minorities

160. Second field-work interview with Shekarau Kau Layyah, Professional teacher and politician, age about 65, at Samaru Katab, on October 13, 1989.

161. J.N. Paden, op.cit., footnote 72, p.168.

in Southern districts got the peasantry to vote for them.¹⁶² But the people were taken-in. ~~for~~ the MZL - in an opportunistic and treasonable fashion - had crossed over to the other side in political alliance with the NPC thereby negating the purpose of the struggle.

The last years of British colonial domination witnessed the emergence of the NPC in the nationalist movement, as a pro-imperialist organization, and as a counter-force to fight against genuine and popular efforts towards liberation.

5.4 The Middle Zone League, the Middle Belt People's Party and the United Middle Belt Congress

Political parties and organizations which occupied more prominence among the ethnic groups in Southern Zaria focused more on the nationality problem among the colonized. The Northern Nigeria Non-Muslim League was founded in 1949. It originated from Plateau Province and was led by David Let (a pastor with the Sudan United Mission - SUM). The Northern Nigeria Non-Muslim League said it was representing the interests of the predominantly Animist/Christian population

162. See notes in relation to the October 1956 Elections Results of the Northern House of Assembly, in "Election Results (1856-57)..."

of the nationalities in the lower north provinces. This was articulated by a Christianized petite bourgeoisie.¹⁶³ In the province the organization had its headquarters at Kagara; Bagayya Nwayya (SIM pastor) and the Agwan Agworek, Gwanna Awan, were leading members.¹⁶⁴ From the viewpoint of the Northern Nigeria Non-Muslim League the issue was not a struggle for termination of colonialism and towards national independence but directed against what it perceived as Hausa-Fulani and Muslim domination.¹⁶⁵

The rise of the Northern Nigeria Non-Muslim League has to be situated in the British reforms of the times. The petite bourgeoisie in Southern Zaria and elsewhere in the lower north provinces saw the colonialists granting concessions and creating more fertile opportunities for the predominantly Muslim petite bourgeoisie in the JMA, the Hausa-Fulani aristocrats, and so on, and began to strive for the same treatment. In their pursue of class interests of the dominant sections of some of the lower north nationalities, the Christian

163. Ogbana Okpu, Ethnic Minority Problems in Nigerian Politics: 1960-1965, Liber Tryckab, Stockholm, 1977, p.66 and pp127-128.

164. Field-work interview with Ladi Saratu Kasam, daughter of a colonial Chief and Housewife, age 62, at Mabuha, June 1987.

165. O. Okpu, op.cit., p.66 and pp127-128.

elite organized themselves under the umbrella of ethnicity and religion; they hid under the canopy of advancing the cause of the Animist/Christian masses. The leading ethnic organization in Southern Zaria was the Nzit movement led by Bagayya Nwayya. It was in working collaboration with similar ethnic or "tribal" unions elsewhere such as the Birom Progressive Union (BPU). These groups spearheaded the transformation of the Northern Nigeria Non-Muslim League into the Middle Zone League (MZL) in 1950.¹⁶⁶ The new political organization did not declare itself a political party. In reality the MZL was a conglomeration of ethnic unions that came together but with each defining its struggle within its local context. That is why Bryan Shardwood-Smith has described the MZL as "an untidy complex of non-Muslim communities and tribal unions."¹⁶⁷ The MZL headquarters was at Bukuru, in Plateau Province, and its national President was David Lot. Kagoro was the main centre of the MZL in Zaria Province.

From the onset the people of Southern Zaria embraced the MZL. Its leadership was largely from petit-bourgeois elements trained by the SIM; they were

166. J.S. Coleman, op.cit., p.366.

167. Bryan Shardwood-Smith, "But Always as Friends": Northern Nigeria and the Cameroons, 1921-1957, George Allen and Unwin Limited, London, 1969, p.217.

either evangelists or school teachers.¹⁶⁸ Apparently there were some behind the scene role and influences by the SIM establishment - the longest and dominant mission in the Southern Zaria districts. On the wider regional scale the SIM/SUM connection with the MZL was obvious.¹⁶⁹

In the province the organizational structure of the MZL was based on ethnic and clan groupings. The first main group in the MZL was the Nzit bloc with the headquarters at Kagoro; the other was the Nerber group with headquarters at Kwoi. Then for the whole districts in the province Dauda Kwoi (headmaster of the SIM primary school at Kwoi) was the MZL President; he was very popular among the various Southern Zaria peoples.¹⁷⁰ The Agwan Agworok, Gwamna Awan, was a major force in the MZL. At all levels - provincial, group, and subgroup - there were the 3 posts of President, Secretary, and Treasurer. Active or registered members of the MZL paid dues; then there were supporters who were not on the membership list.

It was from a combination of the wordings of the Nerber and Nzit branches that the MZL derived its local

168. Intelligence Report by A.D.D. to D.O. Zaria of June 29, 1951; and Report by J.A. Reynold on the MZL dated August 8, 1951, in "Political Bodies in Nigeria..."

169. Jan Harm Boer, Missionary Messengers of Liberation in Colonial Context: A Case of the Sudan United Mission, Rodopi, Amsterdam, 1979, p.336, p.392 and p.409.

170. Intelligence Report by A.D.O. to D.O. Zaria of June 29, 1951...

name in the province - that is, the Norzit Movement. The Nzit group, headed by Bagayya Nwanya, had various ethnic branches which were further broken into clan branches. There was the Asholio branch of Moroa "Independent district" or Chieftom with over 50 members; Agworok branch of Kagere chieftom with a membership put at over 100; the Atyab branch of Zango Katab District had more than 100 members; the Bajju branch of Zango Katab District had over 150 members; and there were also the Takkad, Fantsam, Angan, Bakulu, Ninzam, Ningkwop, Numana, and so on branches in the Nzit group.¹⁷¹ Ishaya Kwoi (SIM teacher at Katugal) was the leader of the Nerber group which had several ethnic branches. The prominent and most active ones were the Ham branch of Jaba district or chieftom with a membership of over 370; there was the Ham branch of Kachia District which had over 100 members; in the Ashe branch of Kagarko District there were more than 100 members; and among the Gwong of Kagoma District (in Jema'a N.A) there was a very high membership in hundreds coupled with mass support for the MZL. Also, among the non-Hausa peoples in other districts such as Lere, Kauru, Kajuru, and Chikun, there were MZL branches.

171. Ibid.

Furthermore, the MZL had appendage organizations such as the Southern Zaria Freedom Movement led by M. Saidu of Zonkwa which focused on a fight for detachment of the entire Southern districts from the jurisdiction of Zaria N.A and the creation of a Second Administrative Division in the province based on the entire Southern area.¹⁷²

The Agworok branch of the MZL was led by M. Nikaf Kagoro (a Toro trained N.A school teacher and SIM member). Leaders of the MZL in the Bajju area included Aruwan Neyu (SIM school teacher), M. Saidu (SIM school teacher), and D. Allahmagani (RCM school teacher). In the Atyab area the MZL was led by La'ah Abui (SIM evangelist), Kato Yashim (SIM member), Zamani Kazah (SIM Member), Gajore Dabo (SIM member and Toro trained N.A school teacher who operated from behind the Scene), and Shokarau Kau Layyah (SIM school teacher). The President of the Ham branch of Jaba District was Paul Kwoi (SIM pastor).¹⁷³

In 1951 a British political officer, Hodgson, observed that the main preoccupation of the MZL Zaria Provincial President, Dauda Kwoi, was "the future of the Pagans whether Christianised or not, and he desires

172. Ibid.

173. Ibid.

the promotion of the Middle Region idea" and "saving the Pagans from Hausa domination."¹⁷⁴ The MZL was a highly localized nationalist organization which emphasized unity among nationalities in Southern Zaria but to the exclusion of the Hausa and Fulani whether commoners or aristocrats. It mainly focused on championing agitation for reforms largely at the level of the N.A structure. The MZL called for the appointment of indigenes as District Heads in the Southern districts of Zaria N.A or the creation of Chiefdoms; and in connection with the 3 chiefdoms (or so-called independent districts) of Kwei, Kagoro, and Moroa, it called for the promotion of chiefs to second class status. The organization also demanded for the construction of more infrastructure such as roads; the provision of amenities such as health centres to take care of the sick; creation of opportunities for the people - including places in schools for the children of the poor; and jobs for indigenes of Southern Zaria.¹⁷⁵

In 1951 the Bajju of Zango Katab District sent a delegation to the Resident of Zaria demanding for detachment from Zaria N.A. It was led by leading members of the MZL namely; Aruwan Neyu, D. Allah Magani,

174. Ibid.

175. Report by J.A. Reynold on the MZL dated August 8, 1951.... J.A. Reynold, "Kaje Tribe - Report on (1950-51)", NAK: ZAR PROF No.4846.

and Bakan. The delegation did not get a positive response.¹⁷⁶ Despite efforts to suppress dissent the Ham of Kachia District under the leadership of Kure of Kurmin Musa and Maude Gyani - all of them MZL leading members - carried agitation for an indigenous District Head.¹⁷⁷ Also in 1951 the Gwong of Kagoma District went on an anti-colonial demonstration in their fight to be separated from Jomala N.A. The colonial authorities crackdown on the leaders of the agitation; subsequently the village Head of Fadan Kagoma was jailed at Kafanchan for bowing to the aspirations of his people in struggle. At the same time there was a protest by the Atyab over the local councils reforms introduced which did not address the issue of an indigenous District Head and the reforms were also seen as anti-democratic. In the wake of the protest Ndung Maman (jailed along with his father during the 1946 Atyab uprising) was sentenced to 6 months imprisonment at Zaria.¹⁷⁸

176. Ibid.

177. Ibid.

178. C.R. Niven, Resident of Plateau Province, to SNP Kaduna dated November 5, 1951, in "Zango Katab District Unrest in 1946", NAK: ZAR PROF C.8/1946.

Nationalist agitation by the MZL engulfed the 3 Southern Zaria Chiefdoms of Jaba, Moron, and Kagoro. The local Councils of these so-called independent districts were dominated by MZL members. Although their chiefs, as a dominant strata and as oppressors, were indigenous ~~and~~ they occupied a relatively weaker position when compared with the Emirs of Jema'a and Zaria largely because they never had ^{strong} N.As. Their areas were subordinated to the "Zaria Native Treasury" and thus never controlled finances to execute projects. From June 7-9, 1953, members of the 3 District Councils met with the regional Minister of Local Government, Ahmadu Bello, at Kagoro. The lack of financial control in the Chiefdoms was seen by the MZL as an extension of what they called Hausa domination. The MZL members complained of neglect by the Zaria Provincial authorities.¹⁷⁹ They urged that a solution to this problem was for a second Administrative Division to be created in the province with headquarter at Kafanchan; in which the 3 chiefdoms, Jema'a N.A, and the Southern districts of Zaria N.A, would be merged in this new arrangement.¹⁸⁰

179. Notes on the tour by Minister of Local Government Northern Nigeria, Ahmadu Bello, who was at Kagoro from June 7-9, 1953, in "Administration of Southern Zaria (1953-54)," NAK: ZAR PROF C.7/1953.

180. Ibid.

In 1954 the MZL members, in the various districts, participated in anti-colonial struggles which were widespread and taking a higher anti-Hausa character.

In early January 1954 the Senior District Officer Zaria, accompanied by the Waziri of Zaria, set out on tour of the Southern Districts. On the 4th January, 1954 they were confronted by representatives of the various non-Hausa ethnic groups or communities in Kauru District who complained of misrule by Zaria aristocrats and their local allies; and thus called for reforms so that they assert themselves in local affairs.¹⁸¹

When the British Officer and the Waziri arrived Zango Katab town on January 7, 1954, they were met by a large Bajju anti-colonial demonstration organized by MZL circles. It was led by Aruwan Noyu, Non Madakiya, and M. Akanot.¹⁸² Among the points the demonstrators raised was an end to all forms of misrule by the Hausa ruling circles of Zaria in the district, employment for indigenes in the locality, provision of schools and hospitals, and the creation of a Middle Belt Region.¹⁸³ The Bajju demonstrators repeated that they should have their own district based on the boundaries of the ethnic group with "a non-Moslem District Head." On this,

181. Notes on a tour of Southern Districts of Zaria Division - 4th-10th January, 1954, in "Administration of Southern Zaria (1953-1954)..."

182. Ibid.

183. Ibid.

they did not wait but presented Adamu Zonkwa (SIM pastor) on the spot; and wanted him to be appointed instantly.¹⁸⁴ Force was used to disperse the crowd. At Kachia the two officials were met on the 8th January, 1954, by a delegation representing the Ham in the district; it was led by key MZL members such as Kure of Kurmin Musa and Maude Gyani; they protested against continuation with a Hausa District Head and complained of neglect in terms of government projects.¹⁸⁵

The British wanted the Emir of Zaria to take a tour of the Southern districts that were under his jurisdiction to help calm the tension. But the situation worsened and was increasingly explosive. The Atsam, Bakulu, Angan, Bajju, and Atyab of Zango Katab were almost up in arms in a joint action.¹⁸⁶ Even though Emir Ja'afaru worked at Zango Katab for 22 years as District Head (1915-37) - from where he was appointed to the Zaria throne - going there was near impossible because law and order collapsed in the face of a threatening co-ordinated revolt. The Emir said he could

184. Ibid.

185. Ibid.

186. S.D.O. Zaria dated January 11, 1954, in "Administration of Southern Zaria (1953-1954)..."

only embark on the tour in the presence of the Resident of Zaria and an escort of a police force.¹⁸⁷ The struggle waged for local autonomy, and so on, by MZL leaders was taking a chauvinistic dimension of the worst type in Zango Katab District throughout January 1954. In spite of the historical basis and objective conditions MZL propaganda further fueled animosity and hatred in a negative direction; Hausa peasants and commoner strata were lumped together with the aristocrats - who equally dominated, exploited, and oppressed them - as the enemies. The MZL and some dark forces were out to physically attack, drive out, and expell the 7,000 Hausa population of Zango Katab. The colonialists moved police to the town from Jos and Kaduna to quell the revolting forces.¹⁸⁸

The Hausa-Fulani rulers of Zaria had chauvinistic and contemptous attitudes towards the predominantly Animist ethnic minorities; they were highly oppressive and their rule was tyrannical and remained insensitive to the popular agitations. However, beyond all this,

187. Ibid.

188. Field-work interview with Ladi Saratu Kasam, op.cit; and Political Intelligence Summary on Zaria Province of January 1954, in "Administration of Southern Zaria (1953-1954)..."

if their British overlords had wanted reforms in Southern Zaria the colonized feudalists could not have been able to obstruct a thing. By 1955 the growing struggle for reforms by the Dauda Kwoi led MZL - especially in connection with the questions of indigenous local officials and a separate administrative arrangement - somehow influenced some minor differences of positions between British officers in the province.¹⁸⁹ But even the most "sympathetic" ones, with the Southern demands, were pushing the blame from the colonizer to the Zaria N.A - as if it was not subjected to British dictates as an arm of the government. This was the kind of position Derick B. Wright took in January 1955 when he advanced that such agitation would continue to grow unless the Zaria N.A was ready to do "something to alter what appears to be their standard attitude towards southern Zaria."¹⁹⁰ In the private communication to Conrad V. Williams (then Resident of Zaria), D.B. Wright further stressed that unless the Zaria N.A changes its

189. Personal letter from D.B. Wright (S.D.O.) to C.V. Williams (Resident Zaria) of January 1955, in "Administration of Southern Zaria (1953-54)..."

190. Ibid.

position the Southern districts of Zaria N.A plus the 3 Southern "independent districts" should be carved out and merged with Jema'a to form a new Administrative Division because:

The N.A. has done nothing to help towards keeping Southern Zaria happy (in the Division) without prompting from the Administration. All aspirations of the vocal-people are labelled "Mission", "rebellion" or "Masu Wayan hali."¹⁹¹

Eventually a second Administrative Division was created in 1957 with the formal transfer of Jema'a N.A from Plateau Province to Zaria Province. Whilst the 3 "independent districts" were placed in it, the Southern districts of Zaria N.A did not get that concession as they were not included in the new administrative arrangement and neither were indigenous persons appointed as District Heads.¹⁹² Thus as colonialism was fast coming to an end, the secondary contradiction which the people largely based their anti-colonial struggles on were not resolved.

A very significant question is as to why the MZL leadership was able to win over the peasantry in

191. Ibid. "Masu Wuyan hali" (Hausa) means persons or people that are of difficult character or difficult to deal or interact with harmoniously.

192. C.K. Wreford, "Zaria Province Annual Report 1957", NAK; ZAR PROF No.STA/30.

Southern Zaria. At one level it can be argued that the organization rode on the back of some earlier struggles by the peoples. Also, most of the MZL leaders lived and worked among the population, in their own home areas, either as evangelists or school teachers - two important positions closed to the grassroots and highly influential in terms of educating the illiterate rural population, shaping political and public opinion, and preparing the minds of the youth. Colonial policies did not give room to the incipient Southern Zaria petite bourgeoisie to move out to urban areas and thus be somehow alienated from the people and their daily problems. Also, the MZL leaders in the province were a more marginalized lot when compared with the petite bourgeoisie in northern Zaria; they had no private property or wealth that could have drawn a sharp class distinction between them and the masses. Thus the low level of development of contradictory classes in Southern Zaria helped the MZL elite.

Apart from secondary and tertiary contradictions that hinged on the nationality issues which sort of came to the fore than primary ones in the context of Southern Zaria, the MZL ideologically and politically indoctrinated the peoples on the basis of ethnicity and religion. The organization followed in the

ideological "tradition" of the Northern Nigeria Non-Muslim League. It placed a lot of emphasis on a propaganda campaign of what it called Hausa domination over Southern Zaria peoples and Muslim domination over Animists/Christian. MZL nationalism did not have anti-British character; in fact the colonialists were continually presented as mediators that should liberate the people from the Hausa. The MZL in the Southern districts consciously fought against NEPU which linked every other aspect of the anti-colonial struggles with the issue of class. Shekarau Kau Layyah stated that the MZL carried out a deliberate ideological campaign to urge the peasantry and the peoples of Southern Zaria that since what they were suffering from was Hausa and Muslim domination it would just be consolidating it by supporting NEPU - which the MZL portrayed as a Hausa and Muslim party. Moreso, he stressed that they did not share the NEPU's concept of liberation.¹⁹³ This has been corroborated by Batung Jankasa (who joined NEPU at a young age). Religion was used as a tool to smear the few NEPU members of Southern Zaria origin by fabricating webs of slander

193. Second field-work interview with Shekarau Kau Layyah, op.cit.

and lies that they had converted to Islam and were thus sell-out to Hausa and Muslims.¹⁹⁴

In the context of Zaria Province the MZL concentrated on the administrative forms colonial domination took but failed to establish the organic linkages. Thus the vexed question of what the MZL simply saw as Hausa domination was put before every other thing else.¹⁹⁵ By this a major limitation of the organization was the conception of the nationalist struggle in ethno-religious terms largely to the exclusion of class; and was thus incapable of addressing the nationality problem in a progressive manner. The MZL resorted to ethnic or micro-nationalism as a life saver. Colonial oppression, including "Hausa-Fulani hegemony" (which the British entrenched as a component of colonial oppression in Southern Zaria), was also a class issue suffered by the working people of all nationalities. Due to its orientation the MZL failed to look at the central question of social change.

It was the collective efforts of the various community organizations which enabled the MZL candidates to sweep the pools at the primary stage of the September

194. Private discussions with Batung Jankasa by the author in August 1932.

195. Intelligence Report by A.D.O. to D.O. Zaria of June 29, 1951...

1951 elections in all the Southern districts. However, they lost out completely at the provincial electoral college due to the 40% N.A representation and the roles of the Zaria aristocrats in the whole process. The defeat of all the MZL candidates provoked an out cry by the peoples in the South. It was seen as a calculated Hausa machination to deny them representations.¹⁹⁶ They were moreso angered by the defeat of the MZL Provincial President, Dauda Kwoi, who was held in high esteem; there was popular protest against the elections. In response to this the British authorities appointed Dauda Kwoi as a special member of the Northern House of Assembly. The British did not see Dauda Kwoi as a threat; he was seen as someone who could closely work in collaboration with the NPC. He admired leading NPC members such as Abubakar Tafawa Balewa and Yahaya Gusau. Also, Dauda Kwoi had respect and admiration for the sarauta (Kingship) institution; and was not seen as a threat by the British.¹⁹⁷ However, Dauda Kwoi died in 1956 when the Zaria MZL was allied to the NPC.

It is significant to note that there were radical nationalists of lower provinces origins who had growing

196. Ibid.

197. Report by J.A. Reynold on the MZL dated August, 8, 1951...

disaffection with the politics and the brand of nationalism of the MZL. They were able to see the lack of a defined pro-people direction, absence of organizational cohesion, political parochialism, ideological bankruptcy, and the double standards by the MZL leadership. The founding member and General-Secretary of NEPU, Bello Ijumu (who was of lower Northern Nigeria origin), did not take lightly to the MZL political line of lumping together NEPU and NPC as Hausa organizations whilst its leadership was co-operating with the British and the NPC. The position of Bello Ijumu was that only by creating a more purposeful lower north provinces based party, with a clear direction and linked with other popular forces in the national liberation movement, could the NPC be confronted squarely in those areas.¹⁹⁸ Towards this Bello Ijumu summoned a meeting of some persons of lower north origins at Kano on March 3, 1953. In the course of the discussions Bello Ijumu stressed the need to wage vigorous struggle against the colonialists, the NPC, the local reactionary forces, and for assertion of the rights of the peoples in the lower Northern Nigeria areas.¹⁹⁹

A conference was held at Jos on July 3, 1953. Its major significance was the formation of the Middle Belt People's Party (MPPP). The principal leaders were

198. Interview with Bello Ijumu, op.cit., p.5.

199. Ibid.

Bello Ijumu and Moses Nyam Rwang. The MBPP set out to pursue its objectives such as to work for the progress of the peoples in the lower north provinces, wage agitation for the creation of a Middle Belt Region, forge alliance with the NEPU and the NCNC, to actively participate in the agitation to attain self-government before or by 1956, and to struggle for complete national independence for Nigeria.²⁰⁰ In spite of the mobilization tour the MBPP took in 1953, in pursuance of their party objectives, the MZL leaders in Southern Zaria still dominated the political scene. The tactical move the MBPP made was to recognize the differences between the various political organizations in the lower north provinces; it then worked towards the formation of a broad common front but within which each grouping shall still retain their identity. The result of this was that the MBPP, MZL, the Tiv Progressive Union (TPU), and other political and ethnic organizations merged to form the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC).²⁰¹ The earlier leadership of the UMBC included Bello Ijumu, David Lot, Moses Nyam Rwang, and Ado Ibrahim.

A.D. Yahaya has noted that because the political and ethnic organizations in the new formation did not do

200. J.S. Coleman, op.cit., p.366.

201. M. Okoye, op.cit., pp157-158.

away with their identities, the UMBC remained a loose party.²⁰² R.L. Sklar has pointed out that from its

inception in 1955 to 1959, the UMBC lacked co-ordination because there was "no effective central authority."²⁰³

The factions and ethnic unions in the UMBC stood as "autonomous local branches."²⁰⁴ The conflicting ideolo-

gical and political currents also meant that the seeds were sown for internal crisis from the beginning.²⁰⁵

Basically the right-wing MZL was opposed to the radical agenda of the left-wing MBPP. Once the British and the

NPC began to give the petit-bourgeois leaders in the

MZL faction of the UMBC opportunities for personal advancement in the system - including political appointments,

jobs, loans, and so on - they did mellow on the fight

for a Middle Belt Region and on the irredentist rhetoric of Hausa-Fulani domination, and started moving to ally

with the NPC in the most subservient manner whilst

attacking the line of MBPP leaders such as Moses Nyam

Rwang for being antagonistic towards the NPC.²⁰⁶ The MZL's

feeble agitation was more and more being reduced to a

weapon for bargaining with the British and the NPC;

202. A.D. Yahaya, op.cit., p.153.

203. R.L. Sklar, op.cit., p.372.

204. Ibid., p.372.

205. M. Okoye, op.cit., p.158.

206. "Birom Progressive Union (1956)", NAK: PO 3rd collection ASI No.420.

to gain concessions for a tiny Christianized and ethnic minorities petite bourgeoisie which was by the day advancing its class interests in the name of the peoples.²⁰⁷ The MZL called itself UMBC/independent, the other bloc became UMBC/AG sequel to an alliance with the AG.²⁰⁸

The AG pumped in some material support as it strove to establish links with the TPU, MBPP, and a break away faction of MZL in Southern Zaria led by younger and more educated men. Surely, it was not because the AG was fundamentally concerned with political aspirations of this bloc but due to its drive to penetrate the Northern Region for some electoral advantage. The 50% representation the Northern Region had in the national assembly was a sort of obstacle to the AG's dream to eventually control power at the centre in future because of the NFC use of the State machinery to emerge dominant; the AG somehow saw the break of that monopoly in the creation of a Middle Belt Region from the north - although it was opposed to the carving out of another region from the Western Region which was its main based.²⁰⁹

207. Of much benefit has been the analysis of the nationality question in Southern Sudan by Joseph U. Garang: Extracts reproduced in the Review of African Political Economy: Special Issue - Sudan No.26, July 1983, p.84.

208. A.D. Yahaya, op.cit., p.153.

209. U. Okpu, op.cit., p.85.

In places such as Southern Zaria the young men who broke away from MZL so as to fight on for more local autonomy, and for the creation of a Middle Belt Region - as the old guards were reneging on issues and thus compromising with the NPC - lacked a self-sustaining resources base. The AG by the late 1950s extended funds, cars, bicycles, propaganda and other campaign materials to those who went with the UMBC/AG.²¹⁰ The AG also provided its UMBC allies in Southern Zaria with lawyers to defend them in the wake of arrests and repression by the Emirs, Chiefs, and the NPC.²¹¹ But, then, by the late 1950s, even the most radical sections of the UMBC were increasingly infested by opportunism. Fundamental issues of principle were fast vanishing from the nationalist political arena as the focus largely turned elsewhere in an era of alliances of convenience in the quest for power and positions. The dominant practice of the times, in nationalist politics, was to resort to the line of "my enemy's enemy is a friend."

Between 1951 and 1958 the MZL won all the elections conducted in Southern Zaria. This was still demonstrated during the 1956 House of Assembly elections when the 3 seats for the Southern districts of the province were

210. Second field-work interview with Shekarau Kau Layyah, op.cit.

211. Ibid.

won by the members of the MZL. Didam Ndap of Kagoro won in the Zaria South-East constituency; for the Zaria South-West constituency Maude Gyani won; and Gwani Jatau was elected in the Jema'a constituency.²¹² The British and the NPC declared their being pleased with the outcome of the polls in relation to the victory of their MZL allies (the UMBC/independent) who beat the more radical UMBC candidates.²¹³ To the colonizer the Zaria MZL did not constitute a threat; moreso that it was incapable of perceiving and putting the struggle in the direction to alter the socio-economic and political structures which bred inequalities between the peoples.

In concrete terms whilst the peoples were seeing the election as some kind of battle for assertion, the MZL did not tell them about its links with the NPC. At the time mobilization towards the elections was going on in 1955, Maude Gyani (then a local MZL organizing Secretary) was secretly undermining and compromising their efforts by slavishly telling the Emir of Zaria, Ja'afaru, that the peoples of Southern Zaria were too weak and backward to stand on their own without the guidance of the British and the Zaria aristocrats.²¹⁴

212. October 1956 Northern Nigeria Election Results for the House of Assembly, in "Election Results (1956-57)..."

213. Ibid. See the comments made colonial officials on the result sheet.

214. Letter from Maude Gyani to the Emir of Zaria dated January 25, 1955, in "Administration of Southern Zaria (1953-54)..."

When Maude Gyani became a member of the Northern House of Assembly in 1956 he still paid lip service to the cause of progress for Southern Zaria; yet on the floor of the House he kowtowed slavishly to the dominant forces and continually thanked them for the so-called upliftment and civilizing influences on the Southern Zaria nationalities.²¹⁵ By 1960 the MZL faction of the UMBC in the province had completely veered; its leaders - including Maude Gyani - no longer hid as they crossed over to join the NPC.²¹⁶ Earlier in 1959 the MZL had been exposed and the peoples of Southern Zaria turned against it. In the 1959 federal elections the UMBC/AG won all the seats in the Southern Zaria constituencies.²¹⁷

5.5 Repression of Nationalist Forces

The point of focus is to empirically show how the British and their African allies executed their grand designs, mainly through repression, to side-track the popular anti-colonial struggles. Apart from the reforms and the constitutional conferences which favoured the pro-imperialist forces, the process of repression was

215. B.J. Dudley, op.cit., p.98.

216. A.D. Yahaya, op.cit., pp154-155.

217. Ibid., pp154-155.

part of the colonizer's strategy. In the province the NEPU - more than any other nationalist party - became a target of suppression with all the accompanied intimidation and victimization. The entire process involved the use of legal veneer in the courts, naked coercion, slanderous campaign and blackmail, stern measures directed against individuals, and all sorts of dirty and crude methods.

In the broader context of colonial Africa, the various colonizers did everything possible to isolate those nationalists not inclined to compromise the goals of the anti-colonial struggles. In this connection A.M. Babu has observed that "people with serious socialist orientation, or even Marxist orientation were either locked up or were not allowed to engage in open discussions."²¹⁸ For the British in Nigeria if national independence was to come - and since they could no longer stop it from materializing - then, it must not transcend the termination of formal imperialist domination.²¹⁹ Also, as a policy the colonialists were out to exclude individuals seen as socialist and communists from the

218. Interview with Abdurahman Mohammed Babu in the Journal of African Marxists, Issue 10, June, 1987, pp64-65.

219. S.O. Osoba, "Decolonization in Nigeria as Programmed Transition to Neo-colonial Dependence", Seminar Paper, Department of History, University of Ife, Ile-Ife, 9th March, 1977.

civil service, public corporations, private sector, and so on.²²⁰ In the early 1950s the British claimed that there were "200 communists" in Nigeria who should not be employed.²²¹ Anti-communism was at one level a cover to witch-hunt genuine nationalists and patriots and to justify the colonizer's suppressive and repressive counter-offensive. It also involved battling against the flow and spread of progressive ideas, knowledge, and literature. The incipient Nigerian neo-colonial ruling class played a central role in the implementation of the British anti-communist war. On June 28, 1955, the Central Council of Ministers issued an order-in-council by which books, periodicals, and publications "feared to carry propaganda materials which might be injurious to the people of Nigeria were banned."²²²

In the peculiarities of Zaria Province any literature or publication which contained an element of frontal attack on socialist and communist thought gained official support to be spread. Right from 1953 the British political officers outrightly promoted the sell of anti-communist literature to the African public - especially at the Sabon Gari Zaria CMS Bookshop - at a very low

220. Ibid.

221. M. Okoye, op.cit., p.173.

222. S.O. Osoba, op.cit.,

price.²²³ In 1958 Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, who became Prime Minister of Nigeria in 1957 as part of the transition towards formal independence, stressed the position of the emergent Nigerian ruling class that they shall use every means in their "power to prevent the infiltration of communist and communistic ideas into Nigeria."²²⁴

When NEPU was established in 1950 the British Intelligence service started reporting that it was a communist movement. In April 1951 they alleged that Aminu Kano had been in "communication with a communist organization in London." Bello Ijumu was reported as having been in touch with the Committee of World Congress of the Defenders of Peace in Paris. Furthermore, Mudi Spikin was said to have publicly expressed "his sympathy with communist aims." And "both Aminu and Bello have quite recently been contacted at Kano by a member of the British Communist Party who has promised them his support."²²⁵ The central issue is not the truth or otherwise of the allegations, but that they were partly advanced to serve as a basis to justify the ongoing war of repression against the NEPU.

223. Intelligence Summary (Zaria Division) from D.O. Zaria to Resident Zaria dated April 20, 1953...

224. Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Nigeria Speaks, Longmans, London, 1964, p.10.

225. Intelligence Report No.120 paragraph 13- by J.O. Sullivan - CID Kaduna dated April 14, 1951, in "NEPU - Security..."

According to Ladi Shehu, in Zaria and elsewhere members of NEPU were often framed and dismissed from jobs especially in the NAs and their children were often denied places in schools or expelled if they were already absorbed.²²⁶ There was widespread persecution of NEPU men and women in the Alkali Courts on trumped up charges, such as theft, for which they were subsequently imprisoned with hard labour. Coupled with this was the deportation of some NEPU activists from their home areas and others suffered from physical attacks. Women in the party were usually slandered as prostitutes and portrayed as outcast. In fact NEPU members and supporters were treated by the dominant forces as outlaws in society.²²⁷ Continually the electoral process was used by the authorities, through all sorts of malpractices, to stifle the efforts of the organization and to keep it out of the various legislative bodies.²²⁸ Coupled with this, whenever time was approaching for elections the "Native courts", the dogarai, the Yandoka, and other repressive state organs, were used to carry mass arrests and prosecution of NEPU members under all sorts of fabricated charges.

226. Field-work interview with Ladi Shehu, op.cit.

227. Ibid.

228. M. Okoye, op.cit., p.173.

Just days after Sambon Barka and 7 other NEPU members were sentenced to jail at the Giwa "Native court" on October 18; 1952 another clampdown followed. Usman Paki (the Zaria branch secretary of NEPU) and O. Nsuebo (a NEPU member who was also a Zikist) were arrested at Sabon Gari Zaria on October 24, 1952. Initially the authorities claimed that they were apprehended because of being unemployed and thus vagabonds.²²⁹ However, Aminu Kano quickly proved that each of them had a job; he exposed the episode as part of the crackdown on radical nationalists.²³⁰ The political activities of Usman Paki and O. Nsuebo were the motives behind their arrest. For after the strong protest by Aminu Kano to the authorities, with proved that they were having jobs, the British changed the reason and said it was because O. Nsuebo was found to be in possession of "seditious documents."²³¹ It was further reported that:

The N.A. police searched his house under a warrant granted by the mixed court and took away a number of letters... they prove that Nsuebo is a communist and is in touch with others of the same ilk in Lagos...²³²

229. D. O. Zaria to Resident Zaria dated October 25, 1952, in "Political Bodies in Nigeria..."

230. From Aminu Kano (on tour Zaria) to Resident Zaria dated October 24, 1952, in "N.C.N.C. Delegates (1) Tour of Nigeria (2) Propaganda (3) N.E.P.U. (4) F.U.N.A.S. (1946-56)..."

231. D.O. Zaria to Resident dated October 25, 1952...

232. Ibid.

Typical of the British style of dealing with steady ^{fast} patriots and nationalists the obvious reasons for dealing with O. Nsuebo were hidden in court. The Zaria authorities reverted to the fake charge of vagabondage and subsequently sentenced O. Nsuebo and Usman Paki to 3 months imprisonment²³³

The repressive measures directed against NEPU in the province as at 1952 were within the wider context of Northern Nigeria. In this connection Bello Ijumu has given some insight into the prevailing situation:

By 1952, over one thousand NEPU members were in different prison yards in the North. They arrested our members, prosecuted them and jailed them. And you know in Alkali's court no lawyer can defend anybody.²³⁴

One weapon the Zaria authorities employed to deal with radical nationalist forces was the British order that political parties shall obtain permit before holding rallies, campaigns, and meetings. The power to grant permit was given to the Emirs and chiefs - albeit the N.As. Political parties were required to forward names of speakers and the subjects they would speak on for approval. The rulers were to judge whether the speakers

233. List of NEPU members awarded "Prison matyrs' caps", in "N.C.N.C. Delegates (1) Tour of Nigeria (2) Propaganda (3) N.E.P.U. (4) F.U.N.A.S. (1946-56)..."

234. Interview with Bello Ijumu in the newspaper Sunday Vanguard, March 29, 1987, p.5.

had departed from the subject listed and approved. Where anyone was viewed as having not adhered to this they "may be presecuted and imprisoned..."²³⁵ As already shown elsewhere in this chapter the Emir of Zaria occasionally refused to grant NEPU permit - using the failure to meet one conditionality or the other. One reality was the predicament NEPU officials found themselves in. If they indicated all that they had to touch on, the permit would not be granted. Equally, if they dared to toe the line by confining themselves to the subjects approved they would be unable to pass their message to the people; thus the purpose of their conscientization and mobilization will suffer. That was why NEPU leaders, whenever they got a permit, often digressed from the subjects approved and even introduced non-listed speakers. The other side of the matter was that the authorities did at times frame NEPU leaders for violating what was entailed in the permit in order to arrest or even jail them.²³⁶

Throughout the colonial times this issue of permit was used to deny NEPU followers their privacy. Even a personal discussion between say two friends could be

235. R.L. Sklar, op.cit, p.361.

236. Ibid., Footnote 76, p.361.

tagged a political meeting without permit and treated as such using the law. On January 9, 1959 the General-Secretary of the NEPU, S.G. Abubakar Zukogi, protested to the Premier of the Northern Region on how the permit issue was used in the most crudest form to legitimize repression:

... ordinary meeting of the NEPU in private compounds belonging to members are treated as mass meeting without permit and, at present more than 50 members are in Zaria N.A. Prison convicted for holding meetings of the party members in private compound.²³⁷

There was an intensification of this repression as the 1959 elections were around the corner - partly to cripple the party and to deny it campaigning. On 26th February, 1959, the Acting General-Secretary of NEPU, Yahaya Abdullahi, gave a detailed account of the situation in connection with the war of repression in Zaria in a petition to the Governor-General of Nigeria:

In Zaria Division today regulations governing public meetings have (been) much more rigid with the result that any form of association could be interpreted as unlawful assembly and even for mere walk back home from a licensed public rally could if "someone" wished, be interpreted as unlawful meeting. Today my party organisers cannot go out for campaign in Zaria Division even with a licence because the mere

237. S.G. Abubakar Zukogi, General-Secretary of NEPU, to the Premier Northern Region dated 9th January, 1959, in "Northern Elements Progressive Union (1957-62)", NAK: PC 3rd Collection ASI/No.920.

"secing off" at a lorry station by a handful of supporters could easily be punishable by imprisonment.

What alarms us most is that whenever an organiser of NEPU is charged with an unlawful assembly the whole members of the local branch are picked one by one until the whole lot is jailed. This is the practice in Zaria and Kano contrary to what the law lays down.²³⁸

Hajiya Gambo Sawaba (National President of NEPU Women Wing) stressed that it was all due to this that NEPU also employed highly clandestine tactics of campaign; often it was disguised NEPU women members who operated on house-to-house campaign basis and also having the task of filing nomination papers on behalf of their organization's candidates.²³⁹

In 1954 Gambo Amartey (later Hajiya Gambo Sawaba), who left her Zaria home town to Kano on mobilization work for NEPU, was arrested on the orders of the Emir of Kano. On May 5, 1954, she was arraigned at the Kano Alkali Court and charged under "Muslim law" on the

238. Acting General-Secretary of NEPU, Yahaya Abdullahi, to Governor-General of Nigeria dated 26th February, 1950, in "Political Affairs (1958-65)", NAK: PO 3rd Collection ASI/NO.919.

239. Field-work interview for the author (recorded on cassette) conducted for the author by Habu Dauda with Hajiya Gambo Sawaba, activists and NEPU Women Wing President, age 56, at Sabon Gari Zaria, on October 21, 1989.

grounds of being an "unmarried woman consorting with men in public."²⁴⁰ The court found her guilty and sentenced her to 1 month imprisonment.²⁴¹ However, because stopping her political activities at Kano was the hidden motive of the action, the Emir of Kano ordered for her deportation. Some Kano N.A. officials took Gambo straight to the palace of the Emir of Zaria; Emir Ja'afaru then handed her over to Muhammadu Alangade with an order that Gambo must not return to Kano.²⁴²

On September 14, 1954, Muhammadu Alangade himself was sentenced to 4 months imprisonment on the basis of holding an "unlawful Assembly."²⁴³ Immediately the sentence was passed other fresh charges were brought against him and some other NEPU members. In this connection the accusation was that Muhammadu Alangade obtained a due permit for two political meetings at Tudun Wada Zaria on August 28, 1954 and August 30, 1954; but the crux of the matter was that whilst the holding of the political meetings was in order Muhammadu Alangade was said to have used the two fora to launch an attack

240. Record of Politicians and Demagogues, in "N.C.N.C. Delegates (1) Tour of Nigeria (2) Propaganda (3) N.E.P.U. (4) F.U.N.A.S. (1946-56)..."

241. Ibid.

242. Field-work interview with Muhammadu Alangade, op.cit.

243. Record of Politicians and Demagogues...

on the Governor of Nigeria as a big exploiter and oppressor, the British provincial administrators as tyrants, and called on the people not to listen to the Emir of Zaria and other N.A. officials.²⁴⁴ At the trial he was denied legal representation and at the end of the hearing was sentenced again to 3 months in jail "for speaking on topics not covered by his permit."²⁴⁵ Other NEPU activists sentenced along with the Zaria NEPU leader - also to 3 months in jail - were Hamisu Kura, Sule Gusau, Donjuma, and Baba Siringi.²⁴⁶ Muhammadu Alangado appealed against the judgement to a High Court; it set-aside the ruling of the Alkali Court thereby nullifying the sentence. But then he had already served part of the jail term in prison.²⁴⁷ In 1955 another leading nationalist, Usman Saba, was jailed for 3 months on such grounds.

From 1953 the Chief of Birnin was increasingly throwing NEPU members in his domain to prison on different framed charges. At the same time the chief was confiscating NEPU membership cards from the people.²⁴⁸ In 1954 NEPU stalwarts came under a serious threat of expulsion from the domain of the Emir of Zaria. Muhammadu Alangado,

244. From D.O. Zaria to Resident Zaria dated 20th September, 1954, in "Political Bodies in Nigeria..."

245. Ibid.

246. Ibid.

247. Record of Politicians and Demagogues...

248. From NEPU to D.O. Zaria on the role of the Chief of Birnin Gwari, in "Political Bodies in Nigeria..."; and Intelligence summary (Zaria Division) from D.O. Zaria to Resident Zaria dated April 20, 1953...

Usman Paki, Usman Saba, and Gambo Amartey (Hajiya Gambo Sawaba) were to be deported from Zaria on the direct orders of Emir Ja'afaru who gave them 6 months to leave.²⁴⁹

Ja'afaru went above the law drawn by his British masters, in this matter, by taking it upon himself to declare them non-indigenes of Zaria that were undesirable.²⁵⁰ For the Emir their crime was that they were the source of political turbulence in the area. The nationalists went to court; it was only the injunction of the magistrate court which overruled the Emir's order, on the grounds that it was illegal, which put a stop to their deportation.²⁵¹ All the four were indigenes of Zaria.

At the district levels N.A officials worked closely in encouraging NPC terror against NEPU. This was the situation at Sabon Gari Zaria in October 1954. The NPC branch in the district was under the leadership of Saidu Zango, Mohammad Jirgi, Ali, and Mohammed Gide. The District Head of Sabon Gari Zaria, in league with these NPC leaders, mobilized lumpen elements and thugs organized under the name of Jam'iyyar Mahaukuta (party of the mad ones). They were NPC thugs, mainly based at Muchia Dan Auta ward,

249. Field-work interview with Muhammadu Alangade...

250. Ibid.

251. Ibid.

and ready to carry acts of terror against opponents of the party at any time.²⁵² Members of the Jam'iyyar Mahaukata - who always went about with a red flag as their symbol - were armed with knives, swords, and other dangerous weapons, which they used in attacking NEPU supporters. They employed all sorts of violence to disrupt NEPU meetings, campaigns, and rallies. This sponsored violence was also directed at the NEPU allies in the NCNC.²⁵³ Several times the NEPU and its allies protested and petitioned about the violence of the Jam'iyyar Mahaukata but both the British and local African officials refused to act in any way; they usually replied that NEPU should provide evidence even when the facts and prove provided were irrefutable. The NEPU had to resort to organizing self-defence groups such as the Aljanun Dare (night devils). They were from the movement's militant youth secretly organized; and their targets were individuals and groups who carried repressive actions against NEPU members and supporters. At Zaria they employed counter-violence against the tyranny of Yandoka and the NPC sponsored hooligans; in one instance the Aljanun Dare attacked a police station at Sabon Gari.²⁵⁴

252. "N.C.N.C. Matters Relative to (1) Zikist Movement (2) Political Parties General (1948-52)..."

253. Ibid. See specifically Divisional Secretary NCNC to Resident of Zaria Province of October 23, 1954.

254. Field-work interview with Hajiya Gambo Sawaba, op.cit.

Due to the alarming rate of the anti-NEPU repression had reached right from its early stages, the party took a line of action to expose the violations and crimes of the British and their African hirelings to the international community. On October 14, 1952, Aminu Kano accompanied by Gambo Sawaba, Lawan Dabazau, and Shehu Shettima, told the party's supporters at a rally held at Zaria city market that when he went to England (early in the year) to lodge protest with the Secretary of the colonies on oppression and repression in Nigeria he received no positive response.²⁵⁵ In 1955 the NEPU sent Aminu Kano (now its President-General), and its legal adviser - C.A.J. Nwajeri - to the colonial office at London to "protest against the electoral law and the suppression of civil rights in the North..."²⁵⁶ Nothing came out of it; however, NEPU did reach out to the British public, humanitarian groups, and anti-imperialist organizations, and thus presented its case internationally.

In the rural areas the colonial authorities - including the NFC members in the N.A. service - waged repression directed against the NEPU youth wing the Runduna Samarin Sawaba (formerly called the Northern Askianist Movement). It was a strong force in the organization; the youth

255. Reported extracts of speech by Aminu Kano at a rally held at Zaria city on 14th October, 1952, in "Political Bodies in Nigeria..."

256. M. Okoye, op.cit., p.177.

constituted the most energetic section of this anti-colonial movement. The NEPU youth played a crucial historical role in the nationalist struggle; some of them just about 15 years of age. Due to the efforts and militancy of the Runduna Samarin Sawaba, and its impact in many aspects including confronting the British and African oppressors, the colonizer wanted to stamp it out. In 1953 the British authorities banned anyone under 18 years from being a member of the youth wing; there was resistance. The British then went ahead to place a ban on the youth wing. However, the youth went about in defiance as their organization, in concrete terms, still remained in the struggle. At Rigachikun in Igabi District the youth operated and waged struggle under the umbrella of the Runduna Samari Sawaba. In June 1954 they waged struggle against local oppressors at Rigachikun and posed a challenge to the NPC.²⁵⁷ Primary schools pupils joined in the youth rebellion; the district authorities lost control and their response to this successful civil disobedience was to attempt to stifle NEPU.²⁵⁸ Some school teachers as well as parents were intimidated and subjected to threats. Both were also accused of leading the youth astray.²⁵⁹ Because

257. Political Party Summary No.3 of June 9, 1954, in "Political Bodies in Nigeria..."

258. Ibid.

259. Ibid.

of the hostile relations between the NPC and the NEPU, a meeting aimed at ensuring mutual peace between the two opposing parties was held at Zaria from November 2 to 4, 1954.²⁶⁰ But the conflict continued; the NEPU youth at Rigachikun remained defiant. On 17th November, 1954, over 200 youth flying the NEPU flag held an anti-NPC demonstration and in support of NEPU.²⁶¹

Once the NPC had begun to gradually inherit political power it increased the tempo of repression. NPC leaders such as Ahmadu Bello were raised and treated as sacred personalities and some Alkalai could simply sentenced accused opponents to 6 months imprisonment just on the basis of allegation that they had made insulting remarks about the person of Ahmadu Bello during a rally by a rival party.²⁶² The NPC in collaboration with N.A officials was also forcing peasants to attend its rallies - where they were expected to dance and sing praises to the party and its leaders. On 11th September, 1954 the District officer, K. Lupton, uncovered such at Rigachikun. Some Gbagyi hunters had been forced, by Nuhu Bamalli and the

260. See the newspaper The Nigerian Citizen of 11th November, 1954.

261. "Political Bodies in Nigeria..."

262. Case No.1/59 of January 14, 1959, in "Political Affairs (1958-65)..."

District Head of Igabi, to go for a performance at a NPC rally at Kaduna. When K. Lupton found out that they were not going on a voluntary basis he told the dancers to go away; and reminded Nuhu Bamalli that the NPC had no right to do so because it was not the government. For his part Nuhu Bamalli accused K. Lupton of preventing the dancers from attending the rally, expressing views in favour of NEPU, and interfering in politics.²⁶³ However, this instance of a British official questioning the action of the NPC was an exception whilst the general order of the day was something else.

In October 1959 the N.A police, on the instructions of the Village Head of Kataruwa, in Chikun District, made arrest of 5 members of the UMBC/AG at Chuku village on the ground that they were in possession of the party membership cards.²⁶⁴ The Village Head had earlier "threatened the people that they must support the N.P.C."²⁶⁵ This occurred at a time elections were approaching and was thus done to pave way for an NPC victory at the polls.

While the NPC increased on the repression against NEPU on the eve of independence - with hundreds of its

263. Report by D.O. - K. Lupton - dated September 14, 1954, in "Political Bodies in Nigeria..."

264. Arrest of Kuroge and others at Chuku, in "Action Group (1956-61)," NAK: PO 3rd Collection ASI/No.917.

265. Ibid.

members and supporters being victimized and incarcerated and some of its leaders such as S.G. Abubakar Zukogi being in and out of prison continually - Aminu Kano constantly urged them to resist the colonialists and the NPC. But the other side of the matter was that the President-General of NEPU was stressing his personal respect for Ahmadu Bello and somehow reducing the sharp differences between the NEPU and the NPC to just personal opinions of the two leaders and even emphasizing the need for closer co-operation.²⁶⁶ This, in itself, is an indication that NEPU was probably compromised from within by some section of its leadership.

The preceding analysis has focused on the contexts, social bases, issues, and direction, in the rise of mass political parties in the nationalist movement in the final phase of British colonialism. It looked at the ideological and political differences between these parties and touched on their internal contradictions. The heroic and brave efforts of the ordinary working men and women who gave so much to the popular anti-colonial struggle and made many sacrifices, in spite of the repression by colonialists, has also been focused on in the analysis. It has also been

266. Letters exchanged between Aminu Kano and Ahmadu Bello from March 21, 1958 to April 19, 1958, in "Northern Political Parties Conference (1958)", NAK: PO 3rd Collection ASI/No.920.

seen that not all brands of anti-colonial nationalism was anti-imperialist. For as shown, once the British were forced to start relinquishing political control over Nigeria, those forces that were merely against certain practices in the system came to a dead end in their anti-colonialism. Typical or dominant petit-bourgeois anti-colonial nationalism ran into a cul-de-sac from the time the colonizer created ample opportunities for them in the political, commercial, professional, and other spheres.²⁶⁷ But not so for the popular nationalist forces who fought on concrete issues for a better future. But even these were faced with the problem of the colonizer's counter-offensive and creation of divisions between the peoples. The nationalist movement, in the colonial context, closed with pro-imperialist forces taking over from the British despite the historic struggles the colonized working people of Zaria waged.

267. O. Osoba, op.cit., pp29-26.

CONCLUSION

The development of the Zaria nationalist movement, as a concrete historical process, involved all sorts of anti-colonial struggles at various levels and stages. Different classes and social forces were part of it. There were political parties, peasant struggles, the nationalistic efforts by the colonized workers, and so on, waging anti-colonial struggles - formal and informal, legal and illegal, covert and overt, struggles by communities and peoples for assertion, struggles by the masses against the feudal aristocracy and other chiefs, economic, political, and ideological struggles - all against colonial domination, exploitation, and oppression.

The study has shown that the nationalist movement, in the area of study, has its roots in the primary resistance of the peoples (in various communities and polities) against the British colonial invaders and their African allies from 1902-1916. In this regard nationalism manifested itself in armed resistance or uprisings, protests, passive resistance, and other forms of opposition to the occupiers in Zaria Province. Overall the analysis has brought it out clearly that the nationalist resistance in confronting the colonizer, at the early phase, was highly restrictive to the various polities and ethnic communities thereby lacking significant large scale

co-ordination.

In the military battles against the British, some degree of guerilla tactics were employed. In most areas in the South of the area of study the communal structures in society did enable the rise of collective leadership at the head of the resistance. Also, the youth in places such as Kagoro played leading and crucial roles in challenging the imposition of colonialism. There was a relatively high level of mobilization and popular participation in the communal societies than in those parts where feudal relations and order was developed.

In spite of its mainly uncor-ordinated nature, the process of resistance had as a feature organized joint resistance by some ethnic groups such as demonstrated by the Bajju (Kaje) and the Ninkwop (Kaninkwom) in June 1915. Furthermore, in Zaria, Birnin Gwari, and Jema'a Daroro there was no physical or armed resistance to the British. Those sections of the ruling classes that opposed the colonialists were overthrown; but collaborators were appointed as local representatives of the colonial system. Apart from the military superiority, the Europeans exploited the contradictions in relations between the different polities - and even within them - to defeat the primary resistance.

Concretely, the analysis focused on the establishment of the colonial system which involved the creation of

structures and institutions. Linked with this was the process of class formation. With the imposition of colonialism new conflicts emerged in society between the colonial exploiters, oppressors, and their African Marionettes - on the one hand - and the exploited, and oppressed, colonized working people - on the other. This secondary phase of the nationalist movement was marked by peasant revolts and other forms of struggles against colonial policies connected with taxation, forced labour, and so on.

Between 1929 and the early 1940s the peasantry, the workers, and the emergent petite bourgeoisie intensified their anti-colonial activities. The Zaria railway workers took the lead in employing the Strike method as a form of struggle. Ethnic groups in Southern Zaria waged anti-colonial struggles directed against the dominance of the Hausa-Fulani aristocracy and for assertion.

In the course of World War II Zaria Province (especially Zaria town itself) became the most central place for some new nationalist forces springing up in Northern Nigeria. The colonized intelligentsia appeared more on the political scene as it struggled-on for reforms. One major event was the General Strike of 1945 in which the working class challenged colonial exploitation and oppression. It was the real apex of the struggle waged by the colonized workers towards

freedom and dignity. In the history of the nationalist movement in Zaria Province, the General Strike of 1945 galvanized the anti-colonial movement to an unprecedented height in the direction of independence. In the aftermath of the World War II there were many peasant revolts which were to a large extent connected with Secondary and tertiary contradictions in the area of study. Significantly, there was the May-June 1946 popular uprising in Zango Katab District which was related to the nationality problem.

In the decolonization process nationalist political parties emerged in Zaria Province. Political parties representing different classes, political and ideological interests, did rise. However, they had internal contradictions within them. The nationalistic efforts and sacrifices of the ordinary people in NEPU raised the tempo of the anti-imperialist segment of the nationalist movement. Radical nationalists in NEPU - and the party itself - became the major targets of repression by the British and the African aristocrats. The analysis has also maintained that the MZL and the UMBC climbed on the back of genuine nationalistic struggles by the ethnic minorities in Zaria Province; but they were mainly reformist and did not have anti-imperialist character. Both the MZL and the UMBC were not cohesive and had some centrifugal tendencies.

The NPC emerged as a counter-force to the radical NEPU in the terrain of nationalist politics; thus both in theory and in practice it was not anti-British nor did it stand for national liberation. It was the party of the dominant colonized classes and social strata.

On the whole the nationalist movement as a historical process, in the Zaria context and that of the period of study, came to an end with pro-imperialist forces inheriting power from the British despite the heroic struggles waged by the colonized working people over the decades.

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
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D. A SELECTED LIST OF INFORMANTS


NAME	AGE	OCCUPATION	DATE OF INTERVIEW	PLACE
Audu Gwanzuwang	76	Peasant farmer	7/2/87	Ungwar Tabo
Bawa Bobai Gora	60	Retired Police Inspector	6/5/87	Kaduna
Dula Tukura	75	Pastoralist	8/2/87	Ma Juju
Hajiya Gambo Sawaba	56	Politician (NEPU) Women Wing President.	21/10/89	Sabon Gari Zaria
Lawan Dambazau	65	Politician (Muslim Scholar and NEPU ideologue)	3/10/89	Kano
Ladi Saratu Kasam	62	House wife	Series of interview in June '87	Mabuhu
Ladi Shehu	64	Journalist, Educationist, and Politician (Secretary NEPU Women wing)	23/11/89	Sokoto
Malam Nakaje	70	Retired Superintendent of Works	17/1/87	Zonkwa
Muhammadu Alangade	72	Ex-serviceman (World War II) Tailor, Politician (Zaria NEPU Leader)	21/10/89	Sabon Gari Zaria.

NAME	AGE	OCCUPATION	DATE OF INTERVIEW	PLACE
Ninyio Avong Fada	73	Ward Head, Trader	9/2/87	Atankje
Shekarau Kau Layyah	65	Retired Teacher, politician (former UMBC/AG Member Federal Legislator and ex-Councillor Kachia - L.G.A.)	1st Interview 13/1/87 2nd interview 13/10/89	Samaru Kata
Tonak Dab	70	Ex-Local Buying Agent, Politician	15/5/87	Ung. Wakili Zang Kata

MAP 1. NIGERIA, SHOWING ZARIA PROVINCE
IN 1960



MAP 2. Zaria Province showing Districts in 1960



Provincial boundary



District Boundary

S/G. Sabon Gari

Z/C. Zaria City

K/G. Kagoro

MOR. Moroa

K D. Kaduna Regional Capital Territory

Kilometres 40 20 0 20 40 Kilometres
SCALE : —————

ABSTRACT

Kazah-Toure,

"The Development of the Nationalist Movement in Zaria Province, 1902-1960," M.A. Thesis, Department of History, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, 1993.

This historical study is on the development of the Nationalist Movement in Zaria Province of Northern Nigeria in the period 1902 - 1960. The thesis takes a critical look at the conceptual, theoretical, and methodological problematics in existing studies connected with the Nationalist Movement. In this regard, the dominant historiography largely ignores the nature and essence of colonialism and the contradictions that gave rise to the Nationalist Movement.

The study shows that only by grasping the class conflicts between the colonizer and the colonized, and even those antagonisms between the local or African representatives of the British and the working people, can the anti-colonial struggles be analyzed scientifically.

Found is an analysis of the socio-economic and political relations both within and between the Emirate of Zazzau and the neighbouring polities to its south on the eve of British colonial invasion. The structures and operation of the colonial system, the process of class formation, and the various nationalist struggles at different phases are focused on.

In relation to methodology, historical materialism is applied; the concept of class struggle as a concrete historical process is central to the study. This is moreso precisely because empirical materials ranging from

archival colonial records, books, field-interviews, and other sources, are drawn from for the interpretation of the concrete actions taken the various classes and social forces to challenge the system of foreign domination, exploitation, and oppression.

The thesis examines the bases, forms, contents, direction, levels and phases of the Nationalist Movement; from the early often isolated primary and secondary armed and passive resistance, to the British occupiers, to the stage of mass based struggles at the decolonization stage.

It has been concretely shown in the analyses that there were struggles waged by the peasantry; petit-bourgeois nationalists; workers; communities and nationalities for self-assertion; the talakawa (lower classes or commoners) against both the colonialists and the local feudalists - formal and informal, legal and illegal, covert and overt, political, and ideological - all against colonialism. In the course of all these, different forces and contradictory interest manifested. The outcome of the entire process of the development of the Nationalist Movement, in the area of study, and its implications for the neo-colonial future is also looked at.

