



Thesis
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GHANA, LEGON,
ACCRA**

**The military and democracy in Ghana : a
case study of the PNDC (with special
reference to defence committees and
district assemblies)
31 December 1981-1990**

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
THE MILITARY AND DEMOCRACY IN GHANA

A CASE STUDY OF THE PNDC

(WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO DEFENCE COMMITTEES

AND DISTRICT ASSEMBLIES)

31 DECEMBER 1981 - 1990



MIKE OGLAWE

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE,
UNIVERSITY OF GHANA, LEGON, ACCRA, FOR THE DEGREE
OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE.

12 APRIL, 1992.

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DEDICATION


This work is dedicated to my loyal and devoted wife Mrs ALBERTA OQUAYE for her cooperation, tolerance, love and encouragement which gave me the peace of mind to pursue the painstaking research which has yielded this fruit.


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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that apart from references to the works of authors and other acknowledged sources and references, this work is the result of my own original research and that this thesis has neither in whole nor in part been presented for another degree anywhere.


.....
MIKE OLUAYE


.....
PROF. K.G. FOLSON
(Supervisor)


.....
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(Supervisor)

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ABSTRACT

This study reviews the role of the military in Ghanaian politics from 31 December 1981 - 1990. It examines the process of democratisation with particular reference to Defence Committees and District Assemblies, the pillars of the PNDC's "democratic" edifice. It is observed that despite populist enthusiasm engendered by the Peoples/Workers Defence Committees (PDCs/WDCs) - later to be known as Committees for Defence of the Revolution (CDRs) - these Committees could not be translated into viable and permanent institutions of political representation and participation. In the same vein, despite the developmental role that some District Assemblies have played and the innovations introduced into the system which have brought simplicity and encouraged mass participation, the Assemblies have not provided the ultimate mechanism for a people's right to self-government at all levels. Corruption has also plagued some Assemblies.

It is noted that the PNDC did not become an open government and even though some gains have been made in the sphere of social and economic development, revolutionary justice and abuse of human rights by the regime have detracted from the claims of the PNDC that it has established democracy in Ghana. The PNDC has stifled political pluralism and allowed the operation of only those interest groups which are supportive of its policies. The regime may be described as having been more populist than democratic.

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This work was embarked upon as part of my study of military intervention in politics which has become the bane of politics in my country. My previous study had encompassed the period 1972-1979 (vide Politics In Ghana 1972 - 1979). With the advent of the PNDC on 31 December 1981, revolutionary politics was launched, geared towards participatory democracy. The PNDC military government claimed that it was not just another military junta but that under the auspices of the military, the entire populace was taking its destiny into its own hands towards the establishment of grassroots democracy.

In the process, as the revolutionaries claimed, all injustices would be redressed, corruption would be eradicated and a new era of social and economic prosperity would dawn as "true democracy" was manifested.

It became necessary to examine critically, whether the Defence Committees, District Assemblies, political and legal institutions, as well as the social and economic policies of the PNDC were leading to a true democracy. In the end, the work is seen as a contribution towards answering the question: has the PNDC brought democracy to Ghana?

I wish to express my profound gratitude to my supervisors, Prof. K.G. Folson (Professor, Department of Political Science and Director of ISSER, Legon) and F.K. Drah (Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science, Legon) for the immense trouble

they took to meticulously supervise my thesis. My supervisors, thoroughbred academics, had both taught me and guided me in my undergraduate days in the sixties; and their continued association with me during the course of this study proved invaluable.

I must record my appreciation for the encouragement that Prof. K.A. Ninsin, Head of Political Science Department, Legon, gave me throughout the period of the research. There were times when this work could have backslided seriously but for his determination and urge that it should be concluded. Speaking of encouragement, I cannot skip mentioning my good friend Prof. Bob Manley who visited the Department of Political Science as a Fulbright Professor in 1990. His words continued to echo, "Mike, wrap it up".

I am also indebted to Codeeria for the funds made available through their annual award for doctoral thesis. This work would have been adversely affected if I had not won a Codeeria award to help its conclusion.

In the same vein, I cannot forget the numerous individuals, organisations and institutions who granted me interviews and provided material which are duly acknowledged in the body of this work. Finally, my appreciation is extended to Mrs Millicent Tonyigah of the Registry, University of Ghana, Legon, for painstakingly typing the manuscript.

As usual, my family have been part of the effort and I extend my warmest gratitude to my father, E.G.N. Oquaye Snr, my

wife Alberta and our children as well as my age-long bosom friend Yeboa Amoa, as the milieu in which I live and operate and get things done. Above all, I thank the Almighty God for his guidance and protection through travels and several difficult situations.

While appreciating the help of others in making this work possible, I accept full responsibility for the total content of, and all views expressed in, this work as well as any lapses which would be found.

Mike Oquaye
Legon

12 April, 1992

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AASU	All African Student's Union
AATUF	All African Trades Union Federation
ACP	Action Congress Party
AEC	Alternative Economic Committee
AFL	Allied Foods Limited
AFDC	Armed Forces Defence Committee
AFRC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
AGC	Ashanti Goldfields Corporation
ALU	Association of Local Unions
AMA	Accra Metropolitan Authority
AYC	African Youth Command
BNI	Bureau of National Investigations
CDR	Committee for the Defence of the Revolution
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIB	Castle Information Bureau
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CIP	Community Initiative Project
COCOBOD	Cocoa Marketing Board
CBC	Catholic Bishops' Conference
CCDB	Central Clearance Data Base
CCG	Christian Council of Ghana
CDH	Consolidated Discount House
CPP	Convention Peoples Party
CSA	Civil Servants Association
CVC	Citizens Vetting Committee

CYD	Committee of Youth Organisations
DA	District Assembly
DAG	Democratic Alliance of Ghana
DAD	District Administrative Officer
DCL	District Council of Labour
DEC	District Election Committee
DYLG	Democratic Youth League of Ghana
ECOWAS	Economic Committee of West African States
ECOMOG	Economic Committee Monitoring Group
ERP	Economic Recovery Programme
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FFCL	First Finance Company Ltd
FPIB	Forest Product Inspection on Bureau
FRB	Forces Reserve Battalion
GAWU	Ghana Agricultural Workers Union
GBA	Ghana Bar Association
GBC	Ghana Broadcasting Corporation
GCP	Ghana Congress Party
GDM	Ghana Democratic Movement
GEDC	Ghanaian Enterprise Development Commission
GHAIP	Ghana-Italian Petroleum Company
GIFEX	Ghana International Furniture and Woodworking Industry Exhibition
GIHOC	Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation
GIMPA	Ghana Institute of Public Administration
GMU	Ghana Mineworkers Union

GNAT Ghana National Association of Teachers

GNYC Ghana National Youth Council

GSC Ghana Stock Exchange

GTMP Ghana Timber Marketing Board

GTP Ghana Textiles Printing Company

ICC Interim Coordinating Committee

ICU Industrial & Commercial Workers Union

IDA Irrigation Development Authority

IMC Interim Management Committees

IMF International Monetary Fund

INCC Interim National Coordinating Committee

IZCWDC Interim Zonal Coordinating Workers Defence
Committee

JCC Joint Consultative Committees

JFM June Four Movement

JSS Junior Secondary School

KMA Kumasi Metropolitan Authority

KNRG Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary Guards

KNUGFRED Kwame Nkrumah United Ghana for Revolution
Democracy

KVIP Kumasi Ventilated Improvement Project

MAC Military Advisory Committee

MDU Maritime and Dockworkers Union

MFJ Movement for Freedom and Justice

MI Military Intelligence

MIGA Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency

MONAS Movement on National Affairs

MOPAD Movement for Peace & Democracy

MTADP Medium Term Agricultural Development Programme

MWF Militant Workers Front

NATCAP National Technical Cooperation Assessment and
Programming

NBSSI national Board for Small Scale Industries

NDC National Defence Committee (formerly INCC)

NDM New Democratic Movement

NERC National Economic Recovery Committee

NIC National Investigations Committee

NLC National Liberation Council

NLM National Liberation Movement

NPART Non Performing Assets Recovery Trust

NRC National Redemption Council

NCD National Commission for Democracy

NCWD National Council on Women and Development

NYC National Youth Council

NYQC National Youth Organising Commission

OFY Operation Feed Yourself

OFYI Operation Feed Your Industries

ORC Office of the Revenue Commissioners

PAMSCAD Programme of Action to Mitigate the
Social Costs of Adjustments

PANYMO Pan African Youth Movement

PDA Preventive Detention Act

PDYLG Peoples Democratic Youth League of Ghana
 PDC Peoples Defence Committee
 PEDF Primary Education Development Fund
 PELIMO Peoples Liberation Movement
 PFC Pioneer Food Cannery
 PFP Popular Front Party
 PIP Public Investment Programme
 PJRA Police Junior Ranks Association
 PMMC Precious Minerals Marketing Board
 PNDC Provisional National Defence Council
 PNDCL Provisional National Defence Council Law
 PNP Peoples National Party
 PP Progress Party
 PPAG Planned Parenthood Association of Ghana
 PPP Peoples Popular Party
 PRLG Peoples Revolutionary League of Ghana (merger
 with JFM in 1982, renamed UF)
 PRP Peoples Revolutionary Party
 RCC Regional Coordinating Council
 RCD Rural Development Corporation
 REPACCO Regional PAMSCAD Creditline Committee
 REU Railway Engineer Union
 RNA Registered Nurses Association
 RPWU Railway & Ports Workers Union
 RWAFF Royal West African Frontier Force
 SAP Structural Adjustment Programme

SDF	Special Democratic Front
SGMC	State Gold Mining Corporation
SIB	Special Investigations Board
SNC	Supreme Military Council (SMC 1 1972-78, SMC 2 1978-79)
SRB	Special Reserve Battalion
SRC	Students Representative Council
SRYLOG	Socialist Revolutionary Youth League of Ghana
SSE	Small Scale Enterprise
TBAe	Traditional Birth Attendants
TCPPF	Technical Cooperation Policy Framework
TEDB	Timber Export Development Board
TDA	Tema District Assembly
TDC	Tema District Council
TDC	Tema Development Corporation
TEWU	Teachers & Educational Workers Union
TFP	Third Force Party
TQLIMO	Togoland Liberation Movement
TUC	Trades Union Congress
UAC	United Africa Company
UF	United Front (merger of JFM and PRLG in 1982; renamed URF in 1984)
UGCC	United Gold Coast Convention
UNC	United National Convention
UNIGOV	Union Government
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

UP	United Party
UTAG	University Teachers Association of Ghana
VALCO	Volta Aluminium Company
VHWS	Village Health Workers
VIT	Vetting, Investigations and Tribunals
WDC	Workers Defence Committee
YSTF	Youth & Students Task Force

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THE MILITARY AND DEMOCRACY IN GHANA

A CASE STUDY OF THE PNDC (with special reference to
Defence Committees and District Assemblies)

31 DECEMBER 1981 - 1990

BY MIKE OQUAYE

SUMMARY

This study aimed at examining the role of the military in the quest for democracy in Ghana with reference to the PNDC era. It sought to find an answer to the question: has the PNDC succeeded in establishing a democracy in Ghana?

Theoretically, the work examined various views on the role of the military in the politics of the developing world. Four main schools of thought were considered. The first view was that the military constitute an apolitical, institutionally conservative force incapable of leading modernising states to advancement. Such summary dismissal of the military is, of course, unjustified. The second major consideration was the Marxist contention that the military left behind by the colonial masters is an anti-revolutionary force incapable of leading a truly Marxist revolution. The third consideration opined that military training, values, skills and ideologies make the military ~~the best and most~~ reliable managers of social change in the developing world. The argument is advanced that there is not enough empirical evidence to support the contention in real terms. The fourth view saw coups as

a modern interpretation of the people's right to rebel and destool the chief in the traditional society.

The methodology included primary and secondary collection of data. The interview schedule and library research were employed. Documents, speeches, newspapers and magazines were consulted.

The institutional structures of the PNDC were studied, particularly the Defence Committees and District Assemblies. It was observed that despite the populist enthusiasm that the Defence Committees aroused at the initial stages, they could not be translated into viable, permanent institutions of political representation and participation. Despite the developmental role that some District Assemblies have played and the innovations introduced into the system which have brought simplicity and encouraged mass participation, the Assemblies could not provide the ultimate mechanism for a people's right to self-government.

The work noted that the PNDC did not become an open government and even though several gains were made in the sphere of economic and social development, revolutionary justice and abuse of human rights by the regime detracted from the claims of the PNDC that it had established democracy in Ghana. The regime could be described as having been more populist than democratic.

CHAPTER ONE

1.1 INTRODUCTION

The military in politics is the study of the politics of the third world. In Africa, militarism has encapsulated politics in nearly every corner of the continent. (see Appendix A). This trend, which has been the hallmark of Latin American politics has transcended all barriers in Africa - from Francophone to Anglophone and from Portuguese to Belgian. Military intervention does not appreciate past colonial experience. It therefore ignores the language of indirect rule and assimilation in the same way as it does paternalism. It has no regard for size, having plagued the big and mighty - such as Nigeria and Sudan - in the same vein as it has mutilated the small and tiny, such as Burundi. Nor have the tanks been respecters of any regime or ideology. Leftists such Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Ben Bella of Algeria have stooped to the same fate as pro-Western Rightists like Tafawa Balewa of Nigeria and Kofi Busia of Ghana.

A review of regimes in Ghana shows a high element of militarism in politics with attendant political destabilisation and the tumbling of political power from civilian into military hands. The complete list of regimes is as follows:

- 1957 - 1966: The CPP Civilian government with Dr. Kwame Nkrumah as first Prime Minister and later first President.
- 1966 - 1969: The military regime of the National Liberation Council (NLC) headed

initially by Lt. General Ankrah and later by Lt. General Afrifa.

1969 - 1972: The Progress Party (PP) civilian government with Prof. Busia as Prime Minister.

1972 - 1979: The military regime of National Redemption Council/Supreme Military Council (NRC/SMC) led by General Acheampong and later by General F.W.K. Akuffo.

June - Sept.

1979: The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) military regime led by Flt. Lt. J.J. Rawlings.

1979 -1981: The People's National Party (PNP) civilian government of Dr. Hilla Limann as Executive President.

31 Dec 1981

- 1990: The military regime of the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) led by Flt. Lt. J.J. Rawlings.

Every conceivable argument has been advanced to justify the forcible overthrow of civilian governments. General Ankrah emphasized the liberation function of military intervention in his first broadcast to the nation on radio and television on 24

February 1966. He described Nkrumah as a dictator who had reduced Ghanaians to 'slaves'. Military action, according to the broadcast, had to be used to remove the President who could not be removed by constitutional means. Acheampong justified his 13 January, 1972 coup thus: "The Ghana Armed Forces believed that the principle of one man, one vote is meaningless unless it is linked up with the principle of one man, one bread. A government which operates on the basis of ten men, one bread for the broad masses of the people is unjust and unjust rulers do not deserve to be sustained by any theoretical conceptions of democracy. As you all know, dead men have the use of only one type of box - not the ballot box. And let those who judge us by their theoretical misconceptions remember that nothing kills with more devastating effect than hunger. So that when people are exposed to the dangers of destruction through massive hunger and pain, when a Government deliberately embarks upon a programme of removing the bread from the mouth of the people through arbitrary dismissals and policies aimed at widening the circle of poverty, and when it becomes clear that these dangers can be removed by quick, decisive action, it is, I maintain, unethical to demand that they wait for five years or so before the source of danger is removed." ¹ Rawlings shares this view as we shall see in this work.

Not only was Acheampong exaggerative in describing the economic conditions of the time but also his conception is necessarily misleading in the promotion of democracy. This is

because, within the period that a government had been mandated to rule by the population and while there was an opportunity to remove that government by the ballot box, a clique of soldiers, dissatisfied with the economic performance of the government, took up arms to forcibly remove it. As Adu Boahen has said, "on no account whatsoever should the military intervene to overthrow any civilian administration that cannot be shown to have violated the terms of the constitution or the state, especially those terms governing its stated period of office. It is only if that government refuses to hold fresh elections in accordance with the terms of the constitution or flagrantly and brazenly prevents the citizenry from passing judgement on it by registering their vote, that the military may intervene and even then only to enforce but not to overthrow the constitution"²

As Awoonor³ perceived it, military action was profitable on 31 December 1981, because the Limann civilian government which had been sworn into office on 24 September 1979 had broken faith with the people, undermined political liberty, the rule of law, fundamental human rights and fostered sheer arbitrariness in determining and disposing of the rights of individuals.

Awoonor recounted the harassment of Flt. Lt Jerry John Rawlings and Captain Kojo Tsikata by the security agents during the Limann era. Awoonor noted that "Limann behaved like a punch drunk boxer who cannot see his opponent in the ring, and starts throwing blows at everyone in sight including those who were in the ring to help him to his corner where he could regain his vision and

his senses. He (Limann) launched a programme to eliminate any soldier who was vaguely suspected of being a Rawlings loyalist. Hundreds of soldiers were dismissed from the army without cause; tens were bundled into jeeps at night and after severe torture sessions dumped into Nsawam Prison where their trials were organised. A so - called 'democratic' government was conducting trials in prisons... the 'democratic' government set up an elaborate network of armed agents who spent their day harassing a selected number of citizens".⁴ Awoonor's words have been cast in appropriate hyperbolic terms for the desired effect. However, as will be shown in this work, the government of the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) has been grossly guilty of what Awoonor saw as undemocratic.

On Thursday December 31, 1981 a military exercise forcibly overthrew the civilian government of the People's National Party (PNP) led by President Hilla Limann. The voice which was heard on the radio that morning was not an unfamiliar one, being the voice of Flt Lt. Jerry John Rawlings, Chairman of the erstwhile AFRC which had put Ghana under a sharp, nerve-racking spell from June 4, 1979 to September 24, 1979. In his radio broadcast, Rawlings said the events of the morning did not constitute a coup d'etat and that he was launching a revolution "that would transform the social and economic order of this country".⁵

Rawlings said that human rights were realized only during the June 4 era because "for once, the masses of this country felt that they could become part of the decision - making process of

this country. We are asking nothing more than the right to assert the dignity of humanity to organize this country in such a way that nothing will be done from the council, whether by God or the Devil, without the consent and the authority of the people to be part of the decision making process".⁶ He called for a participatory democracy, economic development and social justice which were essential ingredients of this new democratic order.

The PNDC which Rawlings formed to rule the country introduced People's Defence Committees (PDCs), encouraged organisations and movements that in its view would enhance the people's participation in public affairs, and also put in place various investigative and adjudicating bodies to ensure strict, instant popular justice. The PNDC has passed laws to bring about social transformation especially relating to family law, introduced an economic recovery programme in cooperation with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and established the District Assemblies.

In the process, however, casualties have occurred in several areas, for example, the pursuit of the rule of law, freedom and justice, the protection of fundamental human rights and the freedom to elect one's own rulers.

The PNDC has claimed that it has pursued the path of democracy better than any other government since independence, having given power to the people and improved their lot. The antagonists of the regime assert that the PNDC has betrayed the cause of democracy in Ghana in an unprecedented manner. This

work sets out to find out the truth of the matter.

1.2 THE PROBLEM/HYPOTHESIS

The central problem in this study is that of identifying the essence of democracy and its application in Ghana and the actions taken by the PNDC during the period under review towards achieving democracy. Have these actions been democratic or undemocratic? The work entails the problem of bringing into clear focus, the conflict between legal power and popular power and the dynamics of popular participation in the light of the new structures, systems and policies of the PNDC towards the attainment of democracy. The study proceeds on the hypothesis that the military does not come to power in order to ensure democracy and that it is not the most appropriate institution for the attainment of democracy in Ghana.

1.3 THE RESEARCH OBJECTIVE

The major purpose of this work is to test generally, the relationship between military regimes and democracy and specifically, the claims of the PNDC that it was establishing a participatory democracy in Ghana, particularly through Defence Committees and District Assemblies.

In this connection, we shall find out, inter alia, (i) what are the necessary requirements for the establishment of democracy in Ghana and whether PNDC rule has met the test. (ii) the nature of participatory democracy as presented by the PNDC and the structures devised to achieve the aims of the government. (iii) spanning from Defence Committees to District Assemblies, find out

to what extent democracy has been attained. (iv) what are the socio-economic dimensions emphasised in the new democratic order as opposed to conventional protection of human rights and the rule of law.

It is also hoped that this work will contribute to the existing body of knowledge about the military in politics in Ghana generally and with particular reference to the FNDC.

1.4 LITERATURE REVIEW OF SOME WORKS ON THE MILITARY IN GHANAIAN POLITICS

There is considerable literature on the military in politics in Ghana.

Colonel A.A. Afrifa in his book on the 24 February, 1966 coup, The Ghana Coup⁷ gave an account of the political and economic situation in Ghana prior to 24 February 1966 and his personal identification with those who suffered hardship under Nkrumah. He held certain strong views on democracy, showing a clear preference for the multiparty system and contempt for Nkrumah's brand of socialism. In this connection, his conclusion was very instructive: "Our fathers' generation, during Nkrumah's rule, sold their souls and consciences for money. They paid lip-service to the great institutions under which they were brought up. They mismanaged the affairs of our Ghana, dissipated our heritage and abused our land. As a result, our God given freedom was lost. The aim of the unconstitutional military action we took is to regain this freedom and to create the conditions and atmosphere in which true democracy can thrive. This is our

defence".⁸

To Afrifa, therefore, the military could be a tool of democratisation in removing an undemocratic government. He stated that "the army was made to identify itself with the Convention People's Party and its ideology, it was bound to lose its self-respect and independence of outlook."⁹ Afrifa singled out the abuse of the democratic process for attack, thereby justifying military intervention. He decried the abuse of the electoral process thus: "in circumstances such as these, elections have been reduced to a farce, the choice of members of the National Assembly is in fact made by the Central Committee of the CPP when they approve nominations. The powers of the government to deal with political opponents - and the use made of these powers in the past are so intimidating that he would be a bold man indeed who came forward to stand as an independent candidate..."¹⁰ Afrifa's admiration for Britain and appreciation for the British legacy may give credence to the view that the military intervene in politics as part of group identification and ideological orientation, and for those very reasons they cannot be instruments of real modernisation and change.

General Ocran expressed views similar to Afrifa's in his work A Myth is Broken¹¹. He referred to the Ghana Army as a body whose members died as loyal soldiers having answered the call to defend the Commonwealth, their country and Africa as a whole" (Chapter one). In an unconscious demonstration of the widely held view that the military act to protect their corporate

interest, Ocran wrote that their clothes were virtually in tatters. They had no ammunition. The burden of taxation was heavy. The cost of living for the ordinary soldier was high. Soldiers were virtually at the mercy of politicians who treated them with arrogance and open contempt". Apart from justifying the 1966 coup, the book did not analyse the possible constructive role of the military in bringing about a new democratic order. This work sets out to fill this gap.

In his subsequent work Politics of the Sword¹² General Ocran, as the sub-title made clear, compiled a personal memoir on military involvement in politics in Ghana and of the problems of military government. He was of the view that military regimes always disintegrate. A military regime never survives unless it has somehow "civilianised" itself, for example, as in Egypt or South Korea. His chapter on "Military Government and Political leadership" is very instructive. He said unequivocally that "military rule is not the answer to Africa's perennial political and economic problems... military governments have seldom provided the answer to any country's political, economic or social problems."¹³ He added: "military uniforms do not make soldiers any better qualified than their civilian counterparts, who, in the majority of cases, have been specially selected and trained for their jobs. The soldiers can bring little or no fresh experience or know-how to their jobs, except that one might suggest that favouritism and corruption may possibly be eradicated. But will they?"¹⁴

Ocran identified certain specific problems encountered by a military junta; i. Lack of faith in the job. Most officers get involved in government rather by chance than by choice. ii. Absence of a political base; they lack a political platform. iii. Absence of political leadership qualities. Whereas disagreements, for example, are normal in politics, in a junta, they can easily lead to disaster. iv. Although rank, hierarchy and command work well in barracks and war conditions, they tend to break down when applied to civil administration by the military. v. Dislike of military rule per se.

Those who see the military as an instrument of development do not share Ocran's views. The points he raised however, are helpful in identifying and analysing the difficulties the military face as they attempt to democratise the polity.

Eboe Hutchful made an interesting study of the military in Ghanaian politics in his thesis entitled "Military Rule and the politics of demilitarisation in Ghana 1966 - 1969,"¹⁵ Hutchful was concerned with the process of withdrawal of the military from politics after an initial intervention. He examined the issues that face the military in such circumstances. First was the question of whether the military should restore power to civilians and withdraw or to perpetuate and constitutionalise military rule. The second was who should succeed the military government.

The study is useful in that it brings out the factionalism in the army. In the struggle for succession, the military

regime was split into three military - civilian factions, the basis of which were primarily ethnic. It will be useful to find out if this problem remains with the PNDC and whether it has arrested the process of the military as a developmental agency. Third, this factionalism and disunity within the NLC and the armed forces as a whole made the issue of succession - control controversial and nearly frustrated the elaborate efforts to prevent the return to power of CPP elements. The gravamen of his work is that the military are not the melting pot or safe haven for all national maladies as some would believe. On the contrary, they succumb to all the problems of tribalism, factionalism and greed as other sections of the society.

In a subsequent writing "The Political Economy of Military Intervention in Ghana"¹⁶, Hutchful held the view that the military intervened in 1972 as an agent of the bourgeois elements in society in order to reassert its direct control over the state system that had been lavish in its treatment of the military and bureaucratic bourgeoisie in general. 31 December is supposed to take the opposite stand. The military NRC/SMC regime, though it had committed itself to "revolution" and "self-reliance", quite clearly had little intention of undertaking structural changes in Ghanaian economy and society. In true Marxist style, Hutchful saw this in ideological terms and concluded that the failure was the result of the choice of Acheampong to opt for a capitalist line of development, We shall see if this ideological issue will plague the PNDC also. In the present work, we see the

revolutionary military regime as an instrument of Western-model economic reform.

In an article written before the ascendancy of Rawlings on the political scene entitled "A Tale of Two Regimes: Imperialism, the Military and Class in Ghana"¹⁷ but which provides a basic understanding of the social, economic and political circumstances that created fertile grounds for the June 4 Uprising in Ghana and the December 31 Revolution, Hutchful provided a deep insight into existing social cleavages and roots of discontent. The article examined the close-knit relationship between imperialism and the local petty bourgeoisie that led to a politics of confrontation.

The socio-economic transformation by the PNDC constitutes the latter's answer to the problems raised by Hutchful.

Hutchful analysed the interventionist role of the state in the economy to protect private Ghanaian services and the accumulation of property in Ghana, and noted that the truly significant development under the SMC, was the extent to which both active and retired military and bureaucratic officials came into possession of capital which they invested typically in agriculture, bulk haulage, luxury transport systems, real estate and the acquisition of company shares. These are some of the problems in the Ghanaian society which the 31 December Revolution claimed it had come to redress. The present work may be seen as an attempt to continue from where Hutchful's study left off.

Hutchful further explored the impact of the military on politics in an article on militarism in Ethiopia, Ghana and

Burkina.¹⁸ Here, he wrote on the change in the attitude of the military towards politics which is "the most important development in the character of militarism brought about by the current crisis in Africa"¹⁹ Tracing this development from the Ethiopian Revolution in 1974, he perceived strands of a novel situation apparent in the Libyan coup of 1969. As a result of this trend which gathered momentum from 1979, "a new genre of military regime has emerged which differs in important ways from the typical 'corrective' regime of the 1960s and 1970s".²⁰ Examples of this novelty are the 31 December 1981 coup in Ghana, the Burkina coup of August 1983, the attempted coup in Kenya in August 1982 as well as the attempted coups in Nigeria in 1983 and 1985. It is worthy of note that Hutchful admitted that the radical military regime is not an entirely new phenomenon, and cited self-proclaimed revolutionary regimes in Brazaville, Benin, Somalia and Sudan. Furthermore, he acknowledged that certain corrective and transformational regimes continue to arise here and there such as the Buhari government in Nigeria and the Transitional Military Council of Abdel Rahman Swan el Dahab in Sudan.

The basic characteristics of the corrective military regime include the following: (i) the regime views all politics as sterile and disruptive; this attitude leads to an attempt to ban politics and/or restrict the "space" politics occupies in national life; (ii) the status and meaning of politics are determined on the basis of class; (iii) since bourgeois and

petty-bourgeois politics are meaningless while the masses possess creativity and liberating power the solution to the problem is not the total abolition of politics but the evolution of what Hutchful described as "genuinely popular democracy" (p.804); (iv) it implies a new (political) framework in which correct solutions may be evolved and applied,. "It implies exclusively the conviction that without the mobilisation of the masses the crisis cannot be surmounted".²¹ (v) the regime is concerned with the establishment of a new form of justice within the society and "in spite of an intuitive awareness that democratisation cannot be realized without the achievement of social justice, there is resistance to defining, ideologically, the new form of the labour process or even to understanding fully the form of the old".²² (vi) there is a high element of "popular self direction"²³ which Hutchful saw as more pronounced in Ghana and Burkina than in Ethiopia, where the "authoritarian conception of politics precluded the possibility of popular self-direction, even while effecting a technically revolutionary reorganisation of the conditions of production. Thus while Jerry Rawlings and Thomas Sankara may be regarded as 'democrats' (or 'populists'), Haile Marian Mengistu and the Provisional Military Administration Council (the Derg) may be seen as 'collectivists'".²⁴ (vii) the belief that the military stand apart from the rest of the country and they are the embodiment of national unity and the best institution to come in as a corrective, transitional authority - a "self proclaimed impermanence (which may or may not be

realized) because of the firm belief in the separation of the military and political functions."²⁵ Its corrective role is translated into actions of 'economic recovery, the introduction of 'accountability' or 'discipline'; (viii) the pragmatic approach to politics towards the realisation of national goals, instillation of discipline, economic recovery leads to the rejection of ideology; (ix) politics must lead to productive, positive and manifest results. Hence, according to Hutchful, "the demobilisation and depoliticisation that occur under a corrective regime are neither whimsical nor naive, but the product of an elaborate, if not always fully conscious, construction of social reality".²⁶

In his view, the Popular Progressive Military Regime has unique features including the following:- (i) It goes further than the corrective regime being its anti-thesis. Such a regime seeks to transform the very mode of political discourse. Its primary belief is in the mobilisation and politicisation of the masses. Glorification of the people replaces the uncritical belief in bureaucrats. It declares not class neutrality but partisanship with the workers and peasants. It demands the abolition of the distinction between the nation and the military, between the military and politics and between the soldier and the citizen. Soldiers are citizens in uniform and to quote Thomas Sankara "militants in uniform".²⁷ (ii) The progressive regime in which soldiers participate, rejects a description of itself as a military regime. It has abandoned the corrective regime's view

of the military as a separate group. (iii) It rejects any notion of itself as a transitional government "even though it may dub itself provisional as in Ghana and Ethiopia".²⁸ (iv) The fertile ground for the emergence of such regimes include protracted economic crisis, the emergence of an increasingly radical but politically and ideologically fractured opposition among the urban petty bourgeoisie and its organisation (p. 810). (v) In the process of instant change from coup to Revolution, "the progressive military regime inserts itself into complex and unstable conjecture of class forces... the regimes in Ethiopia, Ghana and Burkina all came to power through a conventional coup d'etat. In a matter of weeks or months, however, each had been transformed into a popular revolution."²⁹ (vi) For the reason that these coups had been carried out by small military bands which lacked a broad base, and had no links with civilian groups, certain developments have taken place. In Ghana, this accounted for the initial 'leftward' and 'popular' direction of the regime.³⁰ Hutchful gave an account of PDCs and attempted an assessment of how they fared. He explained the initial successes of the PDCs in terms of the popularity and spontaneous generation of these committees which showed the yearning for popular self-expression of the grass-roots; their existence gave expression to the social and class struggles which were endemic in the society but had been repressed by years of authoritarian rule." The obvious weaknesses in the system included lack of direction, opportunism, lack of definition in the socio-political character

and functions of the PDC as well as lack of express directives as to who should be a cadre.

Indeed, Hutchful saw a basic problem with progressive civilian forces in these words: "as revolutionary regimes, the central problem for the military regimes has not been the relationship with reactionary forces but rather with the civilian forces also committed to revolutionary change, in particular with the Marxist left".³¹ The fact that the revolutionaries had no cadres of their own, resulted in problems with the left and all the other absurdities proceeded from this circumstance. My study takes a more detailed look at Defence Committees and also District Assemblies which were not in existence when Hutchful wrote Matters relating to human rights are other gaps to be filled. Oquaye in his work on politics in Ghana during 1972-79,³² saw the problem from the viewpoint that military rule is inimical to the interest of society. He made a study of economic mismanagement and national decadence under the military between 1972-1979. The attempt of the military to legitimise their rule by the Union Government Referendum is exposed with meticulous care. Oquaye saw the military nevertheless, as useful in the house-cleaning exercise of June 4 1979. After a study of some of the factors that foster military intervention in politics, he advocated a separation between the military and politics. One presupposition of that work was that the military could not play any useful role in politics. The present study explores new dimensions of the role of the military in this very area.

Yaw Saffu in his study³³ tackled the problem of the military and explained their presence in politics in praetorian terms. In his view, the 1966 coup against Nkrumah symbolised the failure of the CPP to overcome the praetorian conditions of the Ghanaian society. He is often criticised for not considering the bourgeois forces at play and the alliance of the military elite and other forces of elitism in society which militated against progress. Saffu reviewed the process of political change in Ghana and noted that only once, since Ghana's independence in 1957, has change of government been effected through the ballot box. On the two other occasions of government change, in February 1966 and January 1972, force employed by a section of the Ghana Army was the medium - "The military now constitute not only the supreme arbiters of political power in Ghana, they are also the supreme political actors"³⁴ What Saffu said in 1976, is most relevant to contemporary Ghanaian politics. In identifying the source of instability, Saffu explained that "the concept of praetorianism provides a key to an adequate understanding and summary of the basic features of the Ghanaian polity. Military interventionism is a pronounced facet of praetorianism; there is a marked tendency, a disposition and an opportunity, for the military to intervene in praetorian conditions".³⁵

Saffu's examination of the praetorian society showed that the military have merely taken advantage of the weaknesses of the praetorian society and has been helpful in shaping the theoretical focus of this work. My view is that if the military

merely take advantage of cracks within the political system, then they can hardly be instruments of real modernisation and democratisation. This work is an attempt to present the evidence to support this contention.

The contribution of Barbara Okeke³⁶ to the study of the military in Ghanaian politics is very significant. In her study of the June 4 Uprising, she reviewed the state of discontent prevailing in Ghana and how Rawlings ascended to power, riding on the tide of a national mess. She placed great emphasis on Rawlings' views on the role of the people in the house cleaning exercise and the exhortation of Rawlings that the people should be involved. She quoted him as follows: "Stay behind us. Don't let us down because if we do not do it now, it cannot be done again".³⁷ "At the moment, you are in power, not Flt. Lt. Rawlings because it is you who have the destiny of this country in your hands".³⁸ She highlighted Rawlings' attack on the Ghanaian characteristic traits of tolerance and passivity and concluded that Rawlings re-awakened the spirit of the nation.

Okeke saw traces of tolerance in Rawlings in that when Elizabeth Ohene, Editor of the Daily Graphic queried the executions and called upon professionals and other organisations to express their views, Rawlings allowed her to say on notwithstanding the call of students for her removal. She concluded that Rawlings deeply admired the editor for her courage in writing that famous editorial "for whom the bell tolls". In the end, however, Okeke is not able to answer the question: Has

democracy come to Ghana? This work will go further in an attempt to give an answer in the context of the second coming of Rawlings. It will help us see the reality of the Rawlings phenomenon and why Elizabeth Ohene, for example, has been in exile for the duration of PNDC rule.

Odetola³⁹ in his comparative study of the military in Africa, examined the role of the military in national development. After a panoramic survey of the continent, including some comments on Ghana, he shifted to the school of thought that the military is capable of, has been and will continue to be a tool in national reconstruction and development. His models have been useful in shaping the theoretical framework of this essay, which goes further to test the various hypotheses Odetola raised and others posited by this research in the context of the 31 December Revolution in Ghana.

Having considered the organizational skills, attributes and values of the military and the concept of modernisation, Odetola argued that one vital variable in the evocation and application of these values and skills is leadership - its character, attitudes, degree of professional training, proximity to and its ability to effectively relate to civilian society. In this connection, Odetola investigated the relationship between the ruling military and the existing social classes so as to determine how effective the military leader could be in terms of his response to the existing classes.

Odetola examined the ability of the military to build state

power and argued that their ability to do so, was a factor of the distance which could be established between political power on the one hand and socio - economic and African ethnic structures on the other. He wrote that "most of the African military regimes have espoused nationalist rhetoric but the evidence provided by their action and performances gives a mixed picture".⁴⁰ He observed, however, that the state in Africa performs more than the mere functions of integrating various groups and group interests and providing the basis for national cohesion. It also allocates revenue to state and local governments as well as allocating imported goods as milk, rice, fish, meat and so on, to national or sub - national groups. State capitalism performs these functions where the market forces have not established their own networks of sales distribution and allocation. Thus the military in Africa guarantee a place for the state which would have been difficult to establish through the liberal - democratic system. In general, therefore, in spite of its weakness in many other directions, the role of the military has been mainly geared towards strengthening national claims on the one hand and checking the claims of imperialism on the other hand... we cannot claim that political democracy is superior to military rule in gaining the desired end in development and change".⁴¹

Odetola continued that "military rule can establish nationalism which in turn can strengthen state power over the claims of other national and sub-national groups in creating the

preconditions for development. Even though the military may not succeed in achieving visible and measurable development, or indeed may show evidence of economic decline in real terms, it must be clear that it has made efforts in several African countries to achieve the precondition for development. The unfortunate thing is that the body of the literature has confused military rule with totalitarianism in the effort to show that it is inferior to political democracy".⁴²

Odetola reviewed the role of the military in political and economic development, examining the ability of the military to make the right kind of social and public policy decisions. In relation to the economy, he looked at the soldier in terms of a dog who has been given a bad name and hanged, based on the old notion that military officers have not been trained as economic managers. Odetola added that more often than not, soldiers in Africa have assumed power to handle crisis situations in the economy and in the polity. "One should not therefore, expect overnight miracles".⁴³ We should be concerned not with economic results attained but mechanisms and processes adopted to institute change. Politically, he said, one of the major problems facing political development in the Third World nations is lack of national integration. He identified this in terms of ethnic rivalry, primordial sentiments and regional parochialism.

Odetola was very affirmative that the military could build political institutions when the need arose and referred to certain socialist, military governments, such as in Ethiopia,

which had attempted to build mass political institutions. Organs of political participation could thus be effectively established by the military. Odetola therefore wrote that "perhaps the establishment of political institutions would necessitate also the building of another mass organisation to embrace the minor political institutions. Such organisation can be a political party."⁴⁴ He noted that the level of participation encouraged by military governments is high and that civilians have been allowed to participate in the top decision - making levels of most military - run governments in Africa (p. 148). The critic may, however, ask: where does real and ultimate power rest? Having examined areas of social development, health care, housing etc, Odetola saw the military as real agents of social democracy. In this work, I examine the institutions and policies of the PNDC and conclude that although the PNDC has initiated vital policy reforms especially in the socio-economic sphere, it has failed to establish viable democratic institutions.

Chazan in her study of Ghanaian politics⁴⁵ dealt with various aspects of Ghanaian politics including the military. In an analysis of political structures, she dealt with the social foundations of political action including group basis of politics, class and ethnicity as social linkage structures. She threw a searchlight on state structures and political institutions including patterns of institutionalisation, state and social relations as well as the structures of authority which she identified as leaders, patrons and ruling coalitions.

Having treated the fragility of ethnic elitism in the second Republic, she linked the same with the emergence of the military on the political scene in 1972. After initially tantalising the people, Acheampong's popularity waned, hence he had to resort to repressive measures. Chazan took us through a systematic disintegration of coercion and the failure of the military to legitimise itself through Union Government. The lack of institutionalisation ultimately led to the breakdown of the regime. The Akuffo inter-regnum could hardly find its feet before it was swept off by the Rawlings coup of June 4, 1979. She considered the June 4 era as one of turmoil, experimentation and restructuring.

Chazan recounted the failure of competitive politics and the ultimate return of Rawlings. She saw the return as the result of the deflation of state power. In the circumstances, military rule was as inevitable as it was natural. Chazan covered two civilian regimes and three military regimes. In fact, however, she dealt with only the genesis of the PNDC era. Nor did she embark on a general study of the factors that influence the presence of the military in politics. Furthermore, the book does not delve into the military as an instrument of development, which this work will attempt to do.

In another significant work which dealt with planning democracy in Africa⁴⁶, Chazan embarked upon a comparative study of Nigeria and Ghana with detailed information on Ghana. She considered, among others, governance and democratic policy, the

emergence of democracy as a policy issue, how democratic policy is designed and implemented, the dynamics of democratic policy implementation and the outcomes and implications of democratisation of policy.

In this work, Chazan took us through the development of democracy in Ghana. She handled briskly Nkrumah's departure from Westminster - style democracy in 1960, the introduction of a Republican/Socialist government, the NLC coup of February 1966 and the Second Republic under Busia which "although undoubtedly committed to democratic norms, possessed an elitist aura and proved incapable of either significantly ameliorating economic conditions or of reducing growing regional and social disparities."⁴⁷ This led to the coup of General I.K. Acheampong and his era which stretched from 1972 - 1978 under the NRC and the SMC. The elusive search for democracy led to the Akuffo Regime otherwise known as SMC II. General Akuffo, having ousted Acheampong in a palace coup, set up a time-table for the return of the Armed Forces to barracks. This however, did not prevent the AFRC led by Jerry John Rawlings from taking over power and calling for "greater probity in public life, underscoring the need to establish mechanisms to assure integrity and accountability in official circles."⁴⁸ After Rawlings had handed over power in 1979, the People's National Party (PNP) led by President Limann was handicapped in its quest for democracy " by an economic morass of monumental proportions, governmental institutions in disrepair and a public suspicious of all

government but also by the threatening presence of Jerry Rawlings who continued to monitor the government even more from the political sidelines... the reasons for the breakdown of the Third Republic cannot be dissociated from the processes of political enfeeblement, social fragmentation and economic decline."⁴⁹

The second - coming of Rawlings on 31 December 1981 saw the establishment of the PNDC led by Rawlings which set out to redefine democracy in the Ghanaian context, rejecting liberal notions of democracy as neo-colonialist and unsuited to Ghanaian conditions. Chazan saw a weakness in PNDC policy because even "though it highlighted certain principles - reciprocity, accountability, productivity and community - it did not actually provide a coherent democratic alternative to liberal democracy."⁵⁰

Regarding Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (CDRs) and District Assemblies, she observed that having failed to do democracy, the PNDC decided to legislate it into existence. Having reviewed the dimensions of the social democracy of the PNDC in depth, Chazan came to the conclusion that "although the PNDC has assumed an aura of permanency, becoming the longest serving military government in Ghanaian history, it has not succeeded in taking advantage of its longevity in order to refine a clear concept of democracy or otherwise promote democratic practices"⁵¹ This development is not surprising, in her view, because the search is not genuine but geared towards the PNDC government's "ability to skillfully maintain itself in

power".⁵²

Chazan finally perceived the outcome and implications of the democratisation policies of the PNDC in these words: "The PNDC have evolved a system of maintaining stability but its policies have, if anything, hampered the quest for remolding the direction of political change in the country... The democratisation exercise, together with other policy moves, may have unleashed previously quiescent social forces as they further expanded the gap between State and society."⁵³ This work fills relevant gaps Chazan's study with particular reference to Defence Committees and District Assemblies.

Another vital addition to the relevant literature is Donald Ray's book Ghana Politics: Economics and Society⁵⁴ He explained the coming to power of Rawlings and the PNDC and reviewed the regime's policies between 1981 and 1986. Ray saw the PNDC as a vehicle for various civilian organisations, dominated initially by the New Democratic Movement (NDM). According to Ray, the NDM had ousted the June Four Movement (JFM) and the People's Revolutionary League of Ghana (PRLG) which called for instant socialism. Ray did not fully appreciate the role of the JFM which is still being used for propaganda purposes by the PNDC. Nor did he assess the role of the 31 December Womens Movement which has become the inheritor of virtually every fortune that can be bestowed upon any group in society.

Ray saw everything through a Marxist spectacle and he considered Rawlings a socialist. He was of the view that even

though a Marxist, Rawlings was willing to bide his time towards the establishment of a socialist state in Ghana and was willing to adopt a go-slow, systematic approach - a strategy akin to the New Economic Policy (NEP) of Lenin in 1921. This entailed a tactical acquiescence in relation to IMF/World Bank policies and loans, internal capitalists, private agriculture etc. In effect, the true revolutionary policies of the PNDC have been held in abeyance until the economy is resuscitated. Hence Ray advocated two main postulates: - (i) the regime is pursuing a "moderate" or "pragmatic" Marxist state. (ii) there is a tendency to temporarily trim revolutionary goals, which has been compelled by economic realities.

There is an inherent contradiction in his work. In one vein Ray saw 31 December as a direct continuation of June 4 when "Marxism... gained ideological ascendancy... the possibility of state power thus dangled like a tempting apple before the left..."⁵⁵ On the other hand, he said that when the revolution took place on 31 December, the Marxists were ill-prepared to exploit the situation. The premise that 31 December is a continuum of 4 June is false.

In my observation, in 1979 Rawlings came as a reformer. In an interview with the Aluta published in 1979, Rawlings said: "You see, we have got laws, rules and regulations in this country. As far as I am concerned, there is nothing wrong with the old regime or laws had they been implemented to the proper letter. The trouble with this country is that we have not

implemented what the book says, what is required of us and that was why things got out of gear."⁵⁶ But Rawlings had shifted position by 31 December 1981. He attacked all existing structures and institutions vehemently and called for a complete metamorphosis as the answer to our problems, as was manifest, for example, in his maiden address to the nation on 31 December 1981.

Whatever Rawlings called for, there was no commitment to socialism. Rawlings sought a broad based popular coalition to attract support. Furthermore, it would be a wrong assessment to suppose that the preconditions that Marxists consider requisite for a socialist revolution were present. The class distinctions that some seek to invoke were simply absent. There was no socialist tradition worthy of note. There was an absence of links with peasants and labour apart from a few workers in Accra led by Amartey Kwei.

Ray failed to appreciate the real dynamics of people's participation and why the PDCs and WDCs and their centralised power house - the National Defence Committee (NDC) - were abolished and replaced with CDRs. There were two main causative factors, namely (a) the PNDC was jealous of its power and was reluctant to share same and (b) the socialist orientation of the NDC had become detestable. Our present study looks at this crucial change from an analytical perspective concluding that the change to CDRs sounded the death knell of any purported grass roots participation in the decision-making process, and that in reality power does not belong to the people through the CDRs who

at best are to produce, organise and mobilise.

Ray saw the PNDC - or at least wished to see it - as a socialist regime, broadly civilian with solid support bases, including the NDM and the CDRs. The view is taken in this work that the CDRs have become cosmetic and the NDM have been at loggerheads with the government. The truth is that the PNDC remains a military regime with the armed forces as its real base.

John Kraus, in his article "Ghana's Radical Populist Regime"⁵⁷ wrote specifically on the PNDC and posed the problem whether it is possible for a radical populist regime in a poor country to pursue equitable and egalitarian economic development policies in a world capitalist system where the search for foreign aid and capital often require the adoption of market-oriented policies and the promotion of local class forces with the resources to profit from the market.

Kraus reviewed of the problems the PNDC encountered as a government, including the regime's own radicalism, collapsing public institutions (particularly the military), recessionary world economy, and internal political opposition. He explained the PNDC's collaboration with foreign capital thus: "in the absence of alternative sources of external funds, in 1983, the PNDC regime undertook a variety of profound economic reforms in line with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditions for loans and IMF support of efforts to increase foreign aid inflows."⁵⁸ According to Kraus, in the populist drive, the PNDC "wanted to see the direct participation of workers and farmers in

government and other institutions in contrast to the 'sham' democracy overthrown by Rawlings."⁵⁹ (p.164) In pursuit of this goal, a class struggle was required against those who were exploiting the masses, denying the vast majority access to state resources and equitable apportionment of economic opportunities. As a result, there was a drastic change in the social location of power resulting in the establishment of People's and Workers' Defence Committees who unleashed a sustained attack to control prices and rents and demand accountability from managers and officials. The support base of the PNDC was described by Kraus as initially "narrow" (p. 166) and was seriously jolted within one year particularly after the murder of the three judges and a retired Army Officer. This base was subsequently expanded, however, as Rawlings appealed for broad support.

There is obviously a gap in Kraus' work in relation to the actual development of democratic institutions and practices including the challenge posed by the National Defence Committee (NDC) which this study seeks to fill.

Maxwell Owusu⁶⁰ has made a very useful contribution to the literature on the military and politics in Ghana. In his article "Custom and Coups: a Juridical Interpretation of Civil Order and Disorder in Ghana", Owusu conducted an in-depth study of the cultural explanation of political instability. This has enriched the theoretical explanation of military involvement in politics in my research. Owusu wrote that "for many ordinary Africans a number of successful military interventions in post-colonial

politics resemble 'destoolments' that is the formal removal of chiefs in Ghana" ⁴¹ To him, ideological contradictions also have a role to play. These arise from the conflict created by the attempt to marry the political system imposed by colonialism with the traditional African political system. The result is invariably chaotic.

He referred to Kofi Awoonor who described his tribe as 'notorious coup-makers' who express 'the most democratic tendencies within the national structure' because they spring from 'traditions of fierce democracies'.⁴²

Coups in the Ghanaian experience, according to Owusu, can have diverse uses - (i) to remove a regime adjudged to be radical, arbitrary, oppressive and undemocratic (the 1966 coup); (ii) to seize power from a government regarded as reactionary and insensitive to the economic plight of the people, including the armed forces (the 1972 coup); or (iii) to change an irresponsible, corrupt and ineffective government (the 1978 coup by Akuffo); or (iv) to remove a government adjudged too corrupt and weak to initiate or establish a radical populist government (the 31 December coup). Even though Owusu did not include the June 4 Revolution, the events of the time will justify an inclusion of the era within the third category. In all the various cases that Owusu mentioned, he saw in operation the exercise of the "right to rebel" by the people.⁴³

The usefulness of coups, according to the study under review may be seen in the fact that the people generally, at least in

the initial stages, accept coups as a means of political change. This is shown by the messages, jubilation, the pouring of libation, dancing and drumming that greet coups in Ghana. Such popular support endow coup makers with "moral justification for short-circuiting, by means of a military take-over, the long alien electoral process for governmental change".⁶⁴ To Owusu, the setting up of juridical institutions such as public tribunals and social institutions such as PDCs and WDCs (now CDRs) significantly presuppose the existence of persons who have abused their high office or some public office either alone or in collaboration with others and who deserve to be punished. The present work proceeds to show how juridical institutions were abused. It further debunks the view that coups are culturally compatible with Ghanaian politics.

In the book, The Search for Democracy in Ghana,⁶⁵ a number of scholars from the University of Ghana, Legon, made a contribution to the study of the development of democracy in Ghana. Drah enumerated certain specific institutions and principles that are imperative in a democracy. Drah's views have formed part of the criteria used in the study to test the claim of the PNDC that it is a democratic government. He is cautious to list some criticisms of liberal democracy which should be useful guidelines in attempts to perfect our system of democracy in Ghana. Drah's analysis of the Akan system of government, provides a useful clue in the appreciation of two important issues:-(a) whether the traditional political system in Ghana was

democratic. Whereas Drah answered the question in the affirmative though cautious, Ansa-Koi said that the system was not democratic and that the system of succession was chaotic, giving rise to rebellion in the replacement and removal of chiefs. To Drah, the traditional system had plenty to its credit.

Ninsin reviewed the crisis of formal democracy in Ghana which has meant that "Governments have only too easily fallen on the command of the gun."⁶⁶ The crisis has led to a protracted yet elusive search from the time of the constitutional commission of 1968 which produced the 1969 Constitution, running through the 1978 Constituent Assembly which delivered the 1979 Constitution. Ninsin emphasised the welfare of the individual socially and economically as a pre-requisite to democracy and noted that the Directive Principle of State Policy in both the 1969 and 1979 Constitutions, address this issue.

Jonah opined that social and economic conditions must be given serious consideration and well catered for in any search for a stable democracy. He reviewed the economic system of liberal democracy and came to the conclusion that our dependent economy and abysmal economic performance have in turn hindered the proper development of democracy. Jonah provided adequate statistics to establish the life of squalor and misery led by the average Ghanaian and saw the need for an improvement in that direction in order to establish a stable democracy.

Ayee brought to attention, the overweening arm of central government which has dwarfed local government in a bid to

centralise power. Having advocated a decentralised administration, he delved into some of the problems likely to be faced and made some suggestions. Oquaye made a study of the theoretical explanations and the factors that have led to the military's intervention in politics. Whereas he blamed political instability partly on poor civilian regime performance, he did not nevertheless, perceive military rule as a satisfactory answer to the problem of democracy. Quaidoo's contribution was on the mass media and the democratic process. He was concerned with media - government relations and regretted that under the symbiotic media paradigm, the media is "compelled to conform (to the government) in the interpretation of the several social interests through the use of state power"⁶⁷

This work proceeds to provide empirical data that would prove or disprove some of the major contentions in the book under review.

Kpakol, in his work The Political Economy of the International Monetary Fund Conditionality Programs in Africa (IMF), Ghana⁶⁸ provided a useful insight into the impact of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Conditionality programmes on developing countries. Despite the flow of credit by the IMF, African governments and other scholars have argued that the policies prescribed by the IMF have not improved economic conditions but have rather placed too much hardship on the people, thus contributing to social and political instability. The Ghana case-study, according to Kpakol, reveals that even

though on the basis of the behaviour of key macro-economic variables, the policies may have been successful, yet there is the implication that Ghana's debt burden has increased alarmingly. Evidence of the hardship brought on Ghanaians by the ERP is provided in the present work.

Abasa-Nyarkoh's work, "The Economic Performance of Civilian and Military Regimes: Ghana 1957 - 1985,"⁶⁹ basically compared the economic policies of civilian and military regimes to ascertain whether the two types of regimes pursued basically the same or different policies. Descriptive statistical data were used to evaluate the performance of each type of regime. I have found the data most illuminating. But the limited period of 1985 in that work is considered further in this work up to 1990.

A very recent study by Richard Jeffries, "Ghana: the political economy of personal rule"⁷⁰ recounted the initial radical nature of the 31 December Revolution and its support by the neo-Marxist intelligentsia which was strongly opposed to any dealing with such imperialist agencies as the IMF and the World Bank. Yet sooner than later, agreements had been reached with the IMF on an economic recovery programme the implementation of which was done with "quite remarkable consistency and determination."⁷¹

Jeffries took the position that the economic achievement has been made "without resort to any very great degree of political authoritarianism" (p.76). Having made a review of the economic malaise and the attempted Union Government proposals under

Acheampong cum Akuffo regime and the AFRC, he concluded that the AFRC's condemnation of high commodity prices without doing more was very naive and its attempts to produce immediate economic benefits for the man-on-the-street simply backfired."⁷²

Jeffries covered the period of the Third Republic under President Limann which he saw as "based on the old CPP networks" despite the "large number of young new faces that emerged"⁷³. Having reviewed the various political parties involved in the 1979 elections, Jeffries came to the conclusion that the elections were fair. The Limann government was, however, plagued with a catalogue of problems - internal squabbles, failure to recognise the structural causes of the nation's problems, self enrichment by leaders, attempts to buy off and then disparage Rawlings and the use of the intelligence operations to harass him and his friends. These events drew Rawling close to a group of young neo - Marxist intellectuals.

Jeffries examined and explained the composition of the PNDC and accounted for the initial domination by Chris Atim, Sergeant Alojga Akata - Pore of the Interim National Co-ordinating Committee (INCC) of the Peoples Defence Committees. The influence of these characters accounted for the exclusion of certain categories of persons from the PDCs. The present work complements Jeffries by the scope of PDC participation in the democratic process plus other details.

The book, The State, Development and Politics,⁷⁴ edited by Hansen and Ninsin, is an invaluable addition to the literature on

contemporary Ghanaian politics. The book surveys the growth of the state from independence to 1988. Depicting the plight of African nationhood and the dismal political and socio-economic performance of our system, Ninsin said that the root of this betrayal lay in the character of the social forces that dominated the national movement and successive governing conditions. This was because according to him, "the petty bourgeoisie that led the independence struggle into victory did not have the necessary economic base to ensure their own political autonomy as a class as well as the autonomy of the state from external political and economic forces".⁷⁵

Ninsin and Graham wrote on labour relations vis-a-vis the bourgeoisie, the government and local and foreign agents. While Ninsin looked at the problem generally, Graham made a micro-study with particular reference to the PNDC era. Ninsin identified the weaknesses in the ruling classes whom he described as the product of British merchant capital. Ninsin came to the conclusion that by 1982, labour had become a significant political force which the PNDC had to deal with for good or evil. He discussed the growth of Ghanaian capital and its confrontation with labour and added that the PNDC government on its part first tried to use the Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (CDRs) to bolster its rule; but later came to rely more heavily on the coercive arms of the State. Labour displayed initial strength under the PNDC. Hence, "under the leadership of the CDR and radical political organisations like the June Four

Movement (JFM), the National Democratic Movement (NDM), the Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary Guards (KNRG) and the People's Revolutionary Youth League of Ghana (PRYLQ), the working people, through spokesmen, attacked the imperialists and their internal collaborators; they assailed the capitalists for their anti-labour practices; and exposed and attacked what they regarded as negative management practices which in their view accounted in part for the economic and social malaise into which the country had been plunged".⁷⁶ In this process, the workers were ideologically conscious and opposed to "decadent capitalist culture". They went as far as setting up "People's Courts" which tried various cases, their main guidance being "revolutionary morality". The establishment of the Citizens' Vetting Committee, (CVC) the National Investigation Committee (NIC), Rent and Public Tribunals were to placate labour. Largely, however, the PNDC and labour fell apart as the demands of workers were disregarded and the PNDC resorted to the application of force to maintain its authority.

Graham reviewed several aspects of the industrial working class struggles in Ghana from 1982 -1986 and described the first year of the PNDC rule as a period of free ranging class struggles. The tragedy of this era was the lack of concrete overall programmatic framework of government policy. With time, the latent conflicts in the "ruling coalition" began to show. These centered on the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) and attendant reforms. As a result, "quietly, the patriotic and

democratic elements of the 1982 period were abandoned."⁷⁷

Drawing instances from the confrontations between labour and management at Ghana Textile Printing (GTP), Allied Foods Ltd., (AFL) the Pioneer Food Factory and the Assene Case, Graham depicted what he described as the aim of his study: "to expose the changing character of the relationship between the working class and the state under the government of the PNDC" and bring out clearly "the determinate role of capital in shifting the balance against the working class".⁷⁸

Edzodzianam Tsikata traced the history of women and society throughout the post - colonial period, and perceived the period 1966 -1981 as the apolitical phase. The era 1982 -1987 was seen as the resurgence of political women's organisation. In her view, the PNDC hijacked existing Women's organisation and engaged in a politicisation of the women through the formation of the 31 December Women's Movement.

Jonah wrote on the changing relations between the IMF and successive Ghanaian governments between 1960-1987. In Jonah's view, the determination of the PNDC government to facilitate the implementation of the prescriptions of the IMF resulted in marked changes and depoliticisation of its political structures whose roles had to be recast "to ensure that they did not become an impediment to its economic policies".⁷⁹

The above - mentioned contributions and others including Hansen's analysis of the changing ideological and structural patterns within the PNDC as well as other essays on Financial

Intermediation, Economic Development, the Land question, Agriculture and the Health Care Delivery System, have furthered my research for this work. There are, however, obvious gaps to be filled particularly regarding the details on Defence Committees and District Assemblies as well as Justice and Human Rights.

1.5 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The process of decolonization in Africa which was accelerated in the 1950s and early 1960s sharply increased the coup phenomenon in the world. The result is that scholars have advanced a number of theories to explain the coup syndrome and to define the role of the military in the developmental and democratisation process of Third World countries. Generally, this theorising has reflected the main ideological divisions of the period. It should, however, be mentioned that the various factors discussed below are not mutually exclusive and that the multi-factor approach appears the best way to appreciate the problem. In this aspect of the study, heavy reliance is placed on the work of Odetola⁹⁰ who has conveniently arranged the main schools of thought in three categories. These are reviewed and expanded upon.

The first view Odetola presented was that the military constituted an apolitical, institutionally conservative force, untrained in the art and strategies of civilian rule and political management. Furthermore, because the military have sought to serve their corporate interest, they have been

incapable of leading those modernising nations to advancement.⁸¹ This has been the position of scholars such as Lieuwen, Price,⁸³ Huntington⁸⁴ and Nun⁸⁵. They shared the common view that generally, the military was not a force for change. The second approach was the Marxist view point that the military left behind by the former colonial masters is an anti-revolutionary force, reactionary in outlook, impervious to change and progress, and incapable of leading a truly Marxist revolution. Since revolution is the only mechanism whereby actual development and reform can be brought about, the conservative military is of no use. In fact it constitutes the principal obstacle to the revolutionary process in developing countries.⁸⁶ Nun,⁸⁷ Murray,⁸⁸ and Gutteridge,⁸⁹ have made contributions regarding this school of thought. The third view was that military training, values, skills and ideologies make the military the best, the most thorough-going and perhaps the only reliable managers of social change in the developing world.⁹⁰ Scholars such as Horowitz,⁹¹ Halpern⁹², Pye,⁹³ Shils,⁹⁴ Mc Alister,⁹⁵ Johnson,⁹⁶ Horowitz⁹⁷ and Janowitz⁹⁸ have written on this standpoint which Odetola summarised excellently.

A further dimension is considered in this work in explaining the presence of the military in politics in terms of the social life and custom of the African traditional system. This cultural explanation sees the coup as a modern interpretation of the people's right to rebel and destool the chief in the traditional society. The military, therefore, becomes the instrument of the

popular will in effecting social and political change as well as determining the course of political succession. Writing in this direction, Owusu came to the conclusion that "a systematic inquiry into customary law principles and ideas could provide invaluable insights into the circumstances of the contemporary crisis of political legitimacy. Indeed to the extent that the broad masses of Africans, most of them still having fairly traditional outlooks, readily hail coups and exhibit spontaneous public admiration for the heroism displayed by the 'rebel' leaders, such an inquiry is inescapable."⁹⁹

1.5 (a) The Conservative School

The conservative school sees the military as supporter of the status quo because of its "military professional character".¹⁰⁰ As Abrahamson asserted, military men as a professional group seem to be conservative partly because many of the values and attitudes that are part of the conservative syndrome appear to facilitate, and tend to support, an adjustment to the professional code. Also, military values of order, hierarchy and stability as frequent explanations for military conservatism derive from its characteristic association with the ruling class.¹⁰¹ Mosca in his studies of civil-military relations with regard to Europe and the United States of America, came to the same conclusion.¹⁰²

Drawing from the works of Vagt¹⁰³ and Abrahamson,¹⁰⁴ Odetola brought out clearly the conservative viewpoint that many historical examples have shown that the ruling elite and the

military usually come to an agreement on the status quo and also on their mutual suspicion of and hostility towards rapid social change. Great modern revolutions have been foreign to and remote from armies. On the contrary, armies have been closely associated with suppressions, reactions and counter-revolutions. This stems from the basic values of the military profession, developed from its feudal heritage and the historical role it has played as the guardian of the status quo and its association with the ruling groups who were bent on preserving the existing order. History shows that a large number of the old French army left to join forces with the first coalition to fight the revolution from outside. In Russia, the officers were found to prefer the ranks of the White rather than the Red Army.¹⁰⁵

Odetola¹⁰⁶ wrote that the history of military coups in Latin America reveals that only a small percentage of coups are reformist, and that the majority of them support the status quo. Support is found from Lieuwen who had written that "on balance, the armed forces have been a force for the preservation of the status-quo; their political intervention has generally signified, as it does today, a conservative action".¹⁰⁷ Buttressing the point, Needler¹⁰⁸ asked: If the military coup is frequently called into play by the workings of the political system, what is its function in relation to social and economic change? Needler answered the question himself by concluding that its purpose was to thwart any serious form of change. This is somehow paradoxical. But it is pertinent to point out that the Euhari

coups of 1983 in Nigeria is generally seen as an action by senior military officers to avoid the likelihood of a coup by junior officers and other ranks as had happened in Ghana in 1981. It is also worthy of note that in Ethiopia, Ghana and Burkina Faso, we have seen a new radicalism in military intervention in politics that has not sought to maintain the status quo by a military subterfuge but to fundamentally and radically transform the entire society. This is what Hutchful described as a "popular", "progressive" or "revolutionary" regime which generally denies that it is a military regime and is "characterised both by the emergence to power of new strata within the military itself and by the military's fundamentally different relationships with the civilian mass sectors and with the political/ideological realm."¹⁰⁹ In this work, we are concerned with a case study of the revolutionary military government which had denied an identification with the status quo.

Delving further into the conservative school, we find that, Lieuwen, writing from the Latin American perspective, adopted the view that the military cannot be an instrument of change. He agreed that the younger officers may make attempts that might change existing conditions slightly but these, in the final analysis, will not be far-reaching. The military, therefore, cannot make fundamental changes.¹¹⁰ In my view, this could be seen in the gradual shift of the PNDC from "populist nonsense" to "popular sense" as Rawlings himself observed.¹¹¹

The growth of the officer as a professional has had great

influence on the views held by the conservative school. The professionalism of the officer has necessitated an insulation from politics, building a corporate interest in the process. This military corporatism which stemmed from professionalism had made the military apolitical. Writing on this, Parsons¹¹² viewed the professions as systems of learning and of status. The military profession might be said to belong to the category of "applied" professions which he said are represented by law and medicine, even though Parsons did not identify the military as a modern profession. In fact Parsons was not fully aware, himself, of the importance of the military as a modern corporate profession and political bureaucracy. Barber¹¹³ identified the military as a profession but put it very low on the ladder of modern professions. Professional behaviour, according to Barber is defined in terms of:- (i) a high degree of generalised and systematic knowledge (ii) primary orientation towards community interest (iii) a high degree of self-control and internationalised ethic, and (iv) a system of rewards. Barber did not consider such factors as lifestyle, corporate solidarity and socialisation structures which must be very crucial. From Barber's study, we observe that the public ranks the professionals at the top of the occupational prestige hierarchy and that professionals themselves are more satisfied with their work - rewards than are other occupational groups. If the military are thus content, they are not likely to perturb the status quo. Furthermore, regarding the professionalism of the military, Peter Blau and

Richard Scott¹¹⁴ have made a useful study, showing that the structure of the military profession is such that it is essentially bureaucratic in orientation. Its decisions, actions, specificity of expertness, patron-client relationship and decisional procedures are collegial, hierarchical and directed by self-imposed standards of peer-group surveillance. These help to explain the military's conservatism.

Huntington,¹¹⁵ the pioneer researcher in civil-military relations, actually introduced the concept of the modern officer as a professional. He saw the modern officer corps as a professional body and the modern military officer as a professional man. The professionalism of the soldier of today distinguished him from the warriors of history. The officer corps constituted the hub around which this professionalism revolved. Its members have been specially trained in specific areas in the management of violence - whether by air, land or sea. In Huntington's view, by dint of their corporatism, military personnel shared a sense of organic unity as a group vis-a-vis all others, who, in contrast to them, remained laymen. This stemmed from their lengthy period of training, similar experiences, the common bond of working together and the sharing of certain unique social responsibilities, privileges and amusements - all culminating in a model situation of comradeship. The officer, in his relationship with the rest of society, could also be seen in a patron-client context like other professionals. He has been motivated by a love for his calling

and a sense of social obligation that could make him react sharply in relation to any feeling of injustice within his profession. This has further been reinforced by the fact that his corporate structure involved societies, associations, schools, customs and traditions. Rank has always been crucial and reflected professional achievement which has been measured in terms of experience, performance, seniority and education. Appointments and promotions have usually been made according to established professional regulations and interference with them has led to much destabilisation.

The rest of Huntington's argument might be paraphrased as follows: (i) Modern warfare demanded a highly specialised military; the military could not master the new skills needed to carry out their tasks while at the same time remaining competent in many other fields as well. (ii) As a result of their specialisation, the vocation of officership absorbed all their energies and furnished them with all their occupational satisfaction. (iii) The high specialisation of the military function brought about a new scope of military concern. There was a clear distinction in role and function between military and civilian leaders. Huntington believed that professionalisation of the military which implied specialisation would reduce the military's interest in politics. The specialised officer would have less time to concern himself with politics because "officership, in short, is an exclusive role, incompatible with any other significant social or political role".¹¹⁶ (iv) The

impact of professionalism on civil-military relations is seen in this way: the one prime essential for any system of civil control should be the minimising of military power. Objective civilian control has achieved this reduction by professionalising the military and by confining it to a restricted sphere and rendering it politically sterile and neutral on all issues outside that sphere. (v) The military has been incapable of building political institutions though in some respects they have been adroit modernisers. Whereas younger officers tended to be reformist in their strategies, the innovations they have initiated have not had far-reaching and permanent consequences towards nation building. True development should be capable of establishing permanent or long-lasting political institutions capable of outliving military rule.¹⁷

Jose Nun¹⁸ followed this tradition. The military, in his view was not capable of being a force for change, development or even national unity in any form.

Price,¹⁹ writing with an African context in view, expressed grave doubts about the ability of the military to foster political and economic development. He considered the military as incapable of maintaining sheer stability. Price in formulating his useful hypothesis known as the "Group Identification Theory", traced the source of the problem to the fact that leading officers of the developing nations continued to be sent to the ex-metropolitan countries for professional training. This has been applicable to Ghana, for example, where

Seton Hall and Sandhurst have been famous for the basic military officers' course while Imperial Defence College and Mons Officer Cadet School have been notable staff colleges. In these institutions, the military have inculcated ideological and psychological orientation, adopting foreign symbols and values.

This strong British attachment which have made the military apolitical - and which has been the essence of their training - pervade the writings of both Afrifa and Ocran. The latter proudly referred to the Ghana Army as a body whose "members died as loyal soldiers who answered the call to defend the Commonwealth, their country and Africa as a whole".¹²⁰ The Commonwealth clearly came first. Afrifa, condemning Nkrumah's attitude towards Britain in relation to Rhodesia wrote that "I personally know that Her Majesty's Government of the U.K. was quite capable of dealing with the situation. Our severing of diplomatic relations with Her Majesty's Government of the U.K. over the Rhodesian issue was a rash and foolish step". He added, "I am a great admirer of the British way of life, its legal system, the magna carta, the petition of rights and the bill of rights. These are the institutions in which the civil liberties of the people are founded. One of the reasons for my bitterness against Nkrumah's rule was that he paid only lip service to our membership of the Commonwealth of Nations and proceeded to undermine the bonds that bind us in this great union of people of all races, colours and creeds... I have toured the U.K. as a soldier and I am ever prepared to fight alongside my friends in

the U.K.". ¹²¹

Lest we are tempted to dismiss the military in toto, it is important to point out that in Nigeria the military governments of General Yakubu Gowon and Murtala Muhammed played a significant role in rebuilding a nation dissipated by civil war. As Chazan wrote, "the surrender of Biafra in January 1970 re-affirmed the territorial integrity of Nigeria. More to the point, the state apparatus emerged from the war fortified and, as a result of its control of rapidly rising oil revenues, even more in control than in the past."¹²² It is, however, very instructive to note that Chazan added that "the termination of the war was followed by a period of economic expansion and bureaucratic growth unaccompanied by either institutional efficiency or political reform."¹²³ I do not support the view that soldiers advanced the state of Nigeria in essence. It should be pointed out that the military caused a civil war by their intervention in politics. Colonel Ojukwu's secession was largely a decision based on the military tradition and his unwillingness to submit to Gowon who Ojukwu regarded as his junior. The soldiers cannot gain any credit for ending a war which they started, nor for utilising the bounty of a booming oil trade. Notwithstanding the above argument, it must be conceded that soldier-statesmen such as Eisenhower, de Gaulle, Franco and Nasser do not fall into the straight jacket of professionalism. The political scientist may therefore ask two pertinent questions: why have such military giants had such a profound effect on politics? Is there not

something in the military mind that has implications for politics?

One weakness in the theory of the conservative school is that it is too global in its generalisations. It is not in every relationship of the military that it tends to be conservative. Military conservatism, does not necessarily, for example, imply an aversion to technological change. In several Third World countries, the military have often been initiators of, or at least strong supporters of, technological research, particularly if such research favoured its interests. For example, Nigeria's federal military governments of Gowon and Murtala encouraged the establishment and development of an iron and steel industry. The achievements of the military may therefore be said to often go unrecognised, leading to a serious theoretical weakness. Huntington and others clearly carried professionalism too far.

Abrahamson¹²⁴ pointed out that it was empirically impossible to establish the relationship between the degree of professionalism and the degree of political neutrality. To Abrahamson, Huntington's thesis therefore became a covert definitional truth; that is, professional officers never intervene because if they do, they are not true professionals. This makes us see how Huntington fell into the trap of a myopic analysis of the Wehrmacht of the Third Reich in Germany in concluding that those professional soldiers who refused to obey civilian authorities abandoned professionalism for politics.¹²⁵ Abrahamson challenged Huntington by asking whether the German

state of 1870-1914 was one in which civilian control of the military was maximised simply because military professionalism was at a peak and because, while civilian power was concentrated in the Kaiser and Chancellor, military power was divided among several officers.

Barnett¹²⁶ also criticised Huntington and pointed out that if one listened to political analysts holding forth the marvels of Parliamentary democracy, one would not be mindful of the fact that the same was a civilisation born out of wars, and devoted to them. She further emphasised that preparations for war had molded social organisation in the twentieth century and determined technical and industrial progress. According to Barnett, many of the civilian institutions were evolved first in armies or during wars.

It appears that the real truth of the matter is that no matter the degree of professionalism within the officer corps, the organisational format of a particular military, the military would be a potential political factor because it can exert some strength in what is essentially a domestic power vacuum.¹²⁷

Huntington himself appeared to have taken a revisionist stand that made his consistency doubtful.¹²⁸ He wrote that frequent reform coups were actually a sign of political health since they were mechanisms of gradual change and that, in any case, virtually all reforms have been produced by coups. The obvious implication is that democratic consent must include the consent of the military since it is a significant expression of

the political climate. Hence, the modified view is that liberal neutrality may not be appropriate everywhere. McAlister appreciated this changing concept¹²⁹ and Azikiwe urged that Nigerians should consider including the military permanently in government.¹³⁰

There is another theoretical weakness in the conservative school of thought as pointed out by Odetola¹³¹ - the theoretical link between military professionalism and the acquisition of an apolitical attitude was not applicable to African countries. As Odetola perceived it, this was because, the age, historical development, type of training, quality of organisation and level of experience of the African military have not been anywhere near those of industrialised Western nations. While African armies might possess the same code of ethics as many Western militaries whom they looked up to, the historical circumstances under which militaries have developed have not allowed for the quality or mature growth characteristic of Western militaries. As part of the nationalist drive, upon the attainment of independence, "the military as a symbol of national consciousness was expanded too rapidly in such a way that the product of the rapid training could not have matched those that were brought up under longer, more settled conditions".¹³²

1.5(b) The Military as an anti-revolutionary force

This school of thought rejects the view that the military are capable of leading a nation towards achieving any real development since the military in the developing world is largely

dependent on the super-powers (and in this connection, the West) for their training and equipment. This dependence makes the military in the developing world unable to develop the requisite ideological orientation for revolutionary transformation.¹³³ This is precisely because of the "character of international dependence" that has been generated.¹³⁴

As Odetola pointed out, the aid programme offer have included the secondment of training and advisory personnel from the metropolis to the less-developed nations. He wrote that in 1964 there were nearly 3,000 french officers and NCOs seconded or contracted to the armed forces of the independent African States, while 1,500 Africans were undergoing training in France. During the same period about 600 British Officers and NCOs were on secondment in Africa and more than 700 Africans were training in Britain.¹³⁵ Such officers have always striven to maintain the capitalist status quo.

Hoovey stated emphatically that foreign aid have tended to induce a definite orientation of the military leadership concerned towards the donor countries' control.¹³⁶ According to Butteridge¹³⁷, as paraphrased by Odetola¹³⁸, the influence of the tradition of the donor country, suitably fed into the armed forces, might be actually formative of national consciousness in a unique fashion. In the same vein, Murray¹³⁹ wrote that the military in Africa had been reactionary. In his view, only the military of Congo-Brazzaville because of its Marxist orientation at the time was truly developmental. In this connection, the

military rulers of revolutionary Ethiopia also qualified in Murray's judgement, because of the regime's Marxist orientation. To Murray the expression "revolutionary" represented a totally nationalistic change in the social, political and economic structures in the State. To him, the 1966 coup in Ghana was a typical military action that aimed at returning a new nation into the full grip of world capitalism. This trend was of benefit to the local bourgeoisie and not the people as a whole and Murray saw the sale of the State Corporations as a negation of the long-term Socialist programme of Nkrumah. In the process, the economic future of Ghana was sold to international financiers and their local collaborators.

Price,¹⁴⁰ famous for his analysis on reference group theory, made a careful application of his theory to the attitudes of military officers in the Third World and came to the conclusion that the military training undertaken by such officers abroad (and by this he meant the Western countries), constituted a process of socialisation during which these officers imbibed Western concepts, ideas, beliefs and values. These influenced the officers' actions and decisions in subsequent times. During this process, according to Price, every identification with other civilian reference groups was totally dismantled and the officer emerged with a new ego and attitudes pivoted around the military establishment. Vivid illustrations of this group conformity and their effects have been ably documented in works on social psychology including those of Lewin and Crabbe, Festinger and

Siegel.¹⁴¹

In applying this principle to the African situation, Odetola said that "it is to be expected that the military recruits from Third World nations will be particularly motivated to adopt the values, also to identify with the traditions, of the military school in which they now fortunately happen to find themselves."¹⁴² Odetola used Afrifa of Ghana to nail his point home and to this, we shall now turn. The Sandhurst-trained Afrifa wrote: "I was thrilled by Sandhurst, the beauty of its countryside and the calm Wish Stream which separated Sandhurst from the rest of the world. Sandhurst so far was the best part of my life... It is one of the greatest institutions in the world. Through its doors have passed famous generals, kings, rulers.... I left Sandhurst, crossed the Wish Stream, looked back at my old school, and was filled with boundless gratitude."¹⁴³ It is obvious that Afrifa as a leader, would view issues from a British perspective.

But the question is asked: What about officers who did not have the privilege to train in such Western military academies as Sandhurst? And what about the non-commissioned officers? Would their perspectives be different? Odetola suggested that these personnel have been influenced on the local scene by the advisory and training personnel seconded from the western countries.¹⁴⁴ He provided a second explanation by stating that for the non-commissioned officers (NCOs) whose promotion was not dependent on training in the metropolis, the process of socialisation, though

different, has had the same result. The NCOs saw the need to pursue European military standards in order to advance in their chosen career.¹⁴⁵ Thus, they had to undergo what Merton has called "anticipatory socialisation - identification with and concomitant adoption of the values of the group to which the recruit aspires but does not belong."¹⁴⁶

It is important to mention two propositions that go to qualify this negative perception of the military. Horowitz acknowledged that military assistance to the Third World has become a focal point in maintaining exclusive relations with the former colonial masters. Despite this relationship, the military has been an important agent of development, he believed.¹⁴⁷

Gutteridge added his voice to this contention by saying that he was highly optimistic that the military in Africa would be more effective than political parties in the process of modernisation.¹⁴⁸ Of course, it should be a different proposition to say that the military, despite its training and orientation, is capable of the total transformation that Marxist revolutions envisage.

1.5(c) The Military as the best-organised Institution for Modernisation

The third view asserts that military values, skills and ideologies ensure that military politicians in the Third World make the best, the most thorough - going and perhaps the only reliable managers of social change.¹⁴⁹

Odetola traced the development of this concept in terms of

American politics in the 1960s. During this period, American officials held the view that major assistance to military elites in developing nations could yield mutual benefits. During the Kennedy administration a major impetus was given for "reconceptualising the utilisation of foreign military elites in 'modernising' and 'stabilising' roles in the developing countries".¹⁵⁰ This was the Kennedy reaction to the Congo crisis and the Cuban problem. The aim was to contain communism at all cost and the native military was considered the ideal institution to be employed. This was how new guidelines in dealing with insurgency, novel possibilities for the utilisation of the indigenous military elite in developing nations began to be articulated, as Lovell saw it.¹⁵¹

It was in this connection, as Odetola wrote, that the Rand Corporation sponsored the first intellectual conference on the role of military elites in underdeveloped countries. The Chairman of the Rand Research Council at the time, Hans Speier wrote in the preface to the published version of the papers that "in any of the new States that have emerged in the recent era of decolonisation the military play a vital role"¹⁵² Speier argued further that "as a revolutionary force, they (the military) have contributed to the disintegration of traditional political order; as a stabilising force they have prevented some countries from falling prey to communist rule; as a modernising force they have become champions of middle-class aspirations or of popular demands for social change and have provided administrative and

technological skills to the civilian sector of the countries in which such skills are scarce." ¹⁵³

Odetola referred to other scholarly conferences held about the same time. For example, the conference at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Boston produced a report for the US Senate which contended that the military had great potential for leadership towards modernisation in the developing countries. Another conference on 'The Role of the military in society and government in the Middle East' resulted in a published book which "elaborated the thesis of the modernising potential of military elites within a common geographic region". ¹⁵⁴ These developments were not only crucial in stimulating research on the role of the military in the developing world but also in fashioning the thesis that the military was the best instrument for modernisation in the developing world.

Johnson took the cue and wrote bluntly that "the military establishment are now and will continue to be symbols of national sovereignty" ¹⁵⁵ In Halpern's ¹⁵⁶ view, the more the army was modernised, the more its composition, organisation, spirit, capabilities and purpose constituted a radical criticism of the existing political system. ¹⁵⁷ Fye argued that in the new states the military organisation represented the most effective public institution available for modernisation, but as Odetola pointed out, the empirical case studies do not always support this view. ¹⁵⁸

McAlister wrote that because the military is an isolated

institution, not affected by sectional loyalties in the society as a whole, it is singularly best suited to act as a nation-building, modernising, bureaucratic force.¹⁵⁹ He was strengthened in his argument by the view that the military was "an alien and demonic force which does not interact with other social groups but simply against them."¹⁶⁰ Nevertheless, McAlister¹⁶¹ was also compelled to admit that there is lack of evidence to back the claims of the military as moderniser, saying that in terms of content and substance, the most noticeable feature of recent literature has been, with the exception of very few items, the absence of firm data and of empirical support for the conclusions offered. What had really emerged was a set of propositions and counter-propositions about the role of the Latin American military - which were theoretically testable, and about what their role ought to be - which were not¹⁶²

In Ghana and in Nigeria the military have not been able to stay clear of tribalism, for example.¹⁶³ From the literature we have cited, we may, however, summarise the modernising role the military has generally been credited with as follows:- (i) economic modernisation; (ii) building of infrastructure such as roads and bridges; (iii) political institution building; (iv) the performance of managerial duties for and in place of civilians from its manpower pool; (v) the alteration of social structure by recruiting officers from the lower classes of society; (vi) identification with the broad middle class towards the building of a democratic society. This summary appears too

colourful, considering the gloomy record of the military in Ghana under Acheampong for example, ¹⁶⁴ as well as various aspects of FNDC rule brought out in this study.

Shils must have appreciated the limited capabilities of the military when he limited the role of the military regime to "suppressing attempted putsches, clearing up streets, removing beggars from the centre of the main towns, prosecuting the beneficiaries of previous regimes, and preventing the spread of rumours of corruption about its own regime". This has happened because in the view of Shils, the military leadership "suffer from the disadvantage that once they have succeeded in these undertakings, there is not much more that they can do to impress themselves on the public mind. This is why, inevitably, military regimes will come to feel suspended in a void of clean government and clean streets." ¹⁶⁵ Horowitz held the view that it was doubtful whether the military was capable of ruling with democratic norms. He even doubted if the military could rule for a long time and ensure political stability, emphasising the negative influence of the military budget on national development. ¹⁶⁶

1.5(d) Traditionalist Viewpoint

In this regard, military intervention in politics may be seen as a modern reinterpretation of the people's right to rebel and destool a chief and of the traditional Asafo companies in particular. It is a ritualised rebellion. Owusu wrote on the traditional attitudes, beliefs and practices which constituted "jural postulates" ¹⁶⁷ which endowed the commoners with various

rights including the right to rebel against, destool or overthrow an unwanted chief. This provided a constitutional check against the abuse or misuse of power ¹⁶⁸. This phenomenon was appreciated by Goody who wrote that "chiefship was (is) subject to such a possibility, even (notably) during the most centralised phases of the regime's history. For the electorate is not only active at the time of installation, but may make its power felt throughout the whole reign, in regular council, at annual ceremonies... or at critical junctures, as in Ashanti."¹⁶⁹

Owusu added that in the inter-war years, a period of much wide-spread economic hardship in the Gold Coast, the power of the 'electorate' was increasingly exerted through the populist action of the re-organised asafo, that is, the youngmen's or commoner's group.¹⁷⁰ Dwelling on the theme of the role of asafo companies in Society, Owusu wrote that certain types of military coups might be viewed as re-adaptations of asafo type action for national political reform. In this connection, the "function" of coups might be to express publicly the endemic structural tensions or clashes of interest and contradictions in society, as well as to serve as a catalyst for reconstruction in order to establish the conditions for social and economic justice. In this respect, these jural postulates, and the rules of law reflecting or based on them, might again paradoxically serve both as instruments of reform and as techniques of social or political reform.¹⁷¹

Owusu laid great emphasis on this cultural reinterpretation of the coup syndrome because "any general theory of coups that

systematically ignores the influence of legal culture or ideology as do most existing accounts not only obscure their distinctive historical and cultural features within the same country at different periods, but also confuses the necessary and sufficient conditions, the structural and circumstantial, causes of military intervention in Black Africa".¹⁷²

This positive function of conflict has featured in the work of Gluckman who pointed out that "African (traditional) rituals are frequently organised to exhibit rebellion and protest and to emphasise the conflicts which exist between those who participate in the rituals."¹⁷³ Gluckman even stated that "civil war can keep a nation united",¹⁷⁴ and that customary conflict in certain ranges of social relationships could establish cohesion in the wider society or over a longer period of time.¹⁷⁵ Gluckman added that ritualised conflict could reinforce existing political and other institutions. Nevertheless, "when a kingdom becomes integrated by a complex economy and rapid communication system (in colonial and post-colonial conditions)... palace intrigues may continue, but the comparatively simple process of segmentation and rebellion are complicated by class struggles and tendencies to revolution. The ritual of rebellion ceases, to be appropriate as possible."¹⁷⁶

As Danquah wrote, "a chief may be destooled if in the absence of definite offences his general policy brings discontent, unrest and general unhappiness on his people. That is to say, if he is disliked in his general management of affairs

of his people."¹⁷⁷

Olienu also added that "the chief pledges to lead his people righteously and faithfully to achieve prosperity, to answer all of their legitimate calls by day or night in prosperity or happiness and in sorrow and joy, in danger and in adversity, all these and more; upon pain, upon violation of any of them, of forfeiting the stool, suffering extreme disgrace, and in ancient times, even suffering loss of life. Upon violation of his oath, the chief will be removed from office by destoolment, or will be forced to abdicate".¹⁷⁸

Using this formulation as a tool of analysis Owusu stated that the Ghanaian experience clearly showed that the coup could have diverse uses. In 1966, it was used to wrestle power from Nkrumah's government which was considered to be radical, arbitrary, oppressive, corrupt and dictatorial and to establish a more democratic conservative and responsible government. In 1972, the coup against Busia was employed to seize power from a government popularly considered too reactionary and insensitive to the economic plight of the common people or the armed forces. In 1981, the coup makers considered Limann's government too corrupt and weak to initiate or establish a radical populist government.¹⁷⁹ This phenomenon, to Owusu,¹⁸⁰ explained the statement of Lieutenant - General J.A. Ankrah, Chairman of the NLC in a nation-wide broadcast on 28 February 1966, soon after Nkrumah's overthrow: "In taking this bold step, the Ghana Armed Forces and the Ghana Police Service acted in accord with the

oldest and most treasured tradition of the people of Ghana, the tradition that a leader who loses the confidence and support of his people and resorts to the arbitrary use of power should be deposed. No one can doubt that Kwame Nkrumah has completely lost the trust and confidence of the people of this country through his capricious use of power and the draconian measures he resorted to at the expense of our national institutions".¹⁸¹ (emphasis added). This symbiotic relationship between coups and destoolments was sealed in Owusu's observation thus: "successful destoolments/coups are always accompanied by popular reactions ranging from fear, cynicism and cautious acceptance of the new leadership to elation and spontaneous wild jubilation. These are usually followed by the ritual drama of symbolic mutual exchanges and pledges of support and cooperation at local durbars between the military rulers, on the one hand, and the chiefs, local communities, and local notables, on the other, amidst drumming, the pouring of libations and sacrifices to ancestors for their protection and blessings.... such ready demonstrations of popular support endow their makers with moral justification for short-circuiting, by means of a military take-over, the long alien electoral process for governmental change."¹⁸²

It will be seen in this study, that Rawlings saw the military action he led on 31 December 1981 as a social revolution that would transform the society and reverse the "widespread anger and disillusionment among the mass of Ghanaians".¹⁸³ Furthermore, Rawlings stated that the PDC concept was rooted in

the tradition of Asafo companies; the two perform similar functions and must necessarily cooperate with one another in one national goal.¹⁸⁴

The view discussed above, if stretched too far, may blur the personal ambitions, jealousies and other sectional interests that motivate coups d'etat. Nun made a distinction between the structural and circumstantial factors of military intervention in politics which contained this misgiving.¹⁸⁵ Austin has also pointed out that even though coup leaders "may mask their demands by a cloak of reform or behind an ideology of salvation", the coups were merely the action of "armed malcontents", taking advantage of the times.¹⁸⁶ However, Austin still made the crucial concession that most Ghanaians were favourably disposed to each change of regime, with their expectations rising higher and higher with each such change.¹⁸⁷

From Owusu's point of view, the syndrome could regrettably be regarded as an innate part of the Ghanaian customary practice. This view must be vigorously challenged in that in most cases, chiefs were, in the past, destooled by constitutional, and not, violent, means for breaking specific law or custom. But even if Owusu is right, the abysmal history of coups in Ghana (particularly under Acheampong and Rawlings) and taking special cognisance of the populist mass actions, murders, harassment, suppression of independent organizations, arbitrary arrest and detention, undermining of human rights of the citizen etc. which have characterised PNDC rule as amplified in this work, should

justify the abandonment of an anachronistic custom which is manifestly not consistent with the tenets of modern democracy.

1.6 EXPLANATION OF CONCEPTS AND EXPRESSIONS

(i) Committees for Defence of the Revolution (CDRs)

This is a nomenclature introduced by the PNDC. An agency for mass participation in national affairs, the CDR was preceded by the People's Defence Committee (PDC) and the Workers' Defence Committee (WDC) which connoted a twin system of community participation and work-place participation respectively in every decision-making process.

An underlying assumption of the CDR concept is that it enables every Ghanaian, regardless of his education, status or occupation to play a part in making decisions that touch and concern all citizens. Its philosophy is that power belongs to the people (ie masses, workers, farmers, artisans et al) and should not be the preserve of the privileged in society (ie intellectuals, lawyers and other professionals). The CDRs constitute an agency for the systematic institutionalisation of the people's participation in government and the attainment of people's power.

(ii) Grassroots Democracy

It is a democratic form of government where decision-making springs from bottom to the top as opposed to the system whereby a few privileged people are glued to the top and take all decisions for and on behalf of the ordinary man. It is a form of government that ensures the active participation of the ordinary

people in society, including workers, artisans, farmers and market women.

The mobilisation content of the concept presupposes the limitations and weaknesses of the underprivileged who have to be organised, educated and directed in order that they can govern themselves.

(iii) Democracy

This is understood in terms of Lincoln's famous epigram, as a government of the people, by the people for the people. As Mac Pherson noted, it means "a rule by the people or in accordance with the will of the bulk of the people".

The Greeks who were the first to have actually practised a 'democratic' form of government, saw democracy in terms of "people's power" by conjunction of the two Greek words "demos" (people) and "Krates" (power). In its purest form, all citizens actively took part in decisions of the "polis" (Greek city state) - a situation rendered impossible by the sheer numerical strength and complexity of the modern state.

The various forms of emphasis placed on what is democratic have rendered the concept dubious and problematic - a problem reflected in this work. Busia emphasised the liberal - democratic viewpoint and saw democracy in terms of human rights, independence of the Judiciary, checks and balances and constitutionalism generally. Nkrumah perceived the need for a strong, monolithic government to combat divisiveness. Democracy, to Nkrumah, should not be seen in the light of a multi-party

system, strong opposition and fundamental human rights but in terms of progress, improvement in health, education, water and electricity.

Qudhafi, whose thoughts influenced the 31 December Revolution (at least initially), said that "a parliamentary system is a misrepresentation of the people, and parliamentary governments are misleading a solution to the problem of democracy".¹⁸⁸ Rawlings shared this view and saw social and economic transformation as the quintessence of democracy: "it means power to the people - it demands the recognition of the responsibility of each of us all over the country in both political and economic activities."¹⁸⁹

In this work, the view is taken that notwithstanding the stage of development - socially and economically - in the life of a nation, it cannot count itself among the family of democracies unless the government is duly elected by the ballot box in free and fair elections and a full range of fundamental human rights are guaranteed; where there is government by a constitutional order and the rule of law is prevails.

(iv) Popular Participation

The process whereby the broad masses of the people - ie the working class and farmers etc - who constitute the 'popular' elements in society, are actively involved in taking decisions that affect their lives is known as popular participation. In terms of the 31 December Revolution, it means participation of the ordinary men and women in decisions that affect their lives

in the community in which they live (geographical popular participation) as well as participation of the same category of people in decisions in the factory, corporation, industry or office (occupational popular participation).

(iv) People

This does not mean all Ghanaians within the context of PNDC revolutionary parlance. The word refers to the downtrodden, the underprivileged, the masses, the exploited et al. They are the vast majority of the people who, according to the tenets of the 31 December Revolution, have been deprived of a meaningful role in political leadership and decision - making but who now form the bedrock of the search for participatory democracy.

The expression "people's defence committee" is self-explanatory. They are defence committees composed of the ordinary people to ensure their active participation in the decision - making process. This explains why defence committees of the people excluded from their membership, managers, doctors, lawyers and allied persons. These were described as "citizens".

The class system in Ghana conjectured by the Revolution, therefore, divided the populace into "people" and "citizen". A citizen was in fact an enemy of the people and a target that had to be eliminated or suppressed in order to ensure the liberation of the people. It is worthy of note that this dichotomy was blurred as the PNDC regime embraced the IMF and adopted a *laissez faire* economic policy.

(iv) Development and Modernization

This connotes growth and necessarily implies a process of construction - building the structures, systems and institutions that could bring about progress. The scope of development stretches from the political to the socio-economic as well as improvement in any aspect of the national endeavour that would enhance the well-being of the populace. It will be seen in this work that socio-economic development is hammered upon by Rawlings as the hallmark of the democracy which he has achieved through the development of the rural areas, hospitals, water, electricity etc.

In terms of political development the concept is understood in relation to the new institutions that have been put in place as a direct result of the 31 December Revolution - CDRs, District Assemblies, Public Tribunals, 31 December Women's Movement, Citizens Vetting Committee (CVC), National Investigating Committee (NIC) etc. It is not surprising that these specific 'developments' are also described generally as the "gains of the revolution".

The whole process of changing the old order towards a new and "better" order is also seen as modernization. This is because the old institutions are being restructured and rebuilt in order to achieve a revolutionalised and new state of "justice and equality". It involves the building of structures and institutions to respond to new demands and needs in society.

(vii) Mobilisation

It means the rallying of people, whipping up their

enthusiasm, influencing and directing them towards a course of action or towards the achievement of certain specific goals.

Mobilisation became particularly crucial in relation to the 31 December Revolution because it was a Revolution launched without its own cadres. The building-up of cadres for the revolution to support its structures and propagate its ideas required the massive bringing together of people in terms of national mobilisation. The national mobilisation effort has been linked with the recruitment and training of cadres, relief and resettlement operations for Ghanaian returnees from Nigeria, farming etc.

(viii) Political Socialisation

This is a conscientising process. In our context it implies the process of orientation, education and possibly brainwashing to inculcate into the people certain views, ideas, beliefs and values which would promote the revolutionary process. It is also a teaching process that would enable its students to discard old habits and systems that would impede the revolutionary process.

(ix) Traditional Organs of Government

These are seen in terms of the conventional division of the arms of government into the executive, legislature and judiciary. In this connection, we distinguish specially between the traditional Courts (the conventional court structure of Magistrate's Courts, Circuit Courts, High Courts, Court of Appeal and Supreme Court) and Public Tribunals (Community Tribunals, District Tribunals, Regional Tribunals, the National Public

Tribunal and the National Appeals Tribunal). We realize that under the FNDC, the traditional organs of government have lost the independence that existed under the 1979 Constitution.

(x) Pressure/Interest Groups

They are understood in terms of the various bodies, associations, institutions and organisations who have some common interests and basic identity and who seek to influence policy within the State. The members of such groups may be brought together by their vocational or other pursuits (eg the Ghana Bar Association (GBA) and the National Union of Ghana Students - NUGS; their common denominator may be gender (eg the 31 December Womens Movement); or they may be motivated by community interests (such as the various community development associations in the towns and villages). In all cases, they wish to promote some interest and influence policy makers. This study identifies various interest/pressure groups in this country before the advent of the 31 December Revolution and how they have been affected by the revolutionary process. The emergence of new groups is also discussed.

(xi) Revolutionary Organs

These are the various bodies, institutions, organisations, movements, agencies which have become instruments for the translation of the aims of the Revolution into reality. They include those whose birth predated the Revolution itself but who have been drafted into the process, for example, the June Four Movement, the Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary Guards (KNRG) the

African Youth Command (AYC) as well as those which sprang up after 31 December 1981, including the PDCs/WDCs later turned into CDRs, the Militia, 31 December Women's Movement etc.

In order to promote and coordinate the activities of these revolutionary organs, a Coordinating Committee of Revolutionary Organs (CCRO) has been established. It is often heard of during anniversaries and celebrations. Its main function is to organise all groups to turn up at various functions in their numbers. Generally, the organs are to promote the aims of the Revolution and act as agencies of recruitment and training.

(xii) Rural Development:

By development is meant the process of improving the socio-economic conditions of the people whereby they are removed from poverty, misery and disease. The term rural is defined as any settlement in the hinterland of approximately a few people, usually not exceeding 5,000 people mainly engaged in primary economic activities and lack basic social amenities. Rural development encompasses the definitions of "rural" and "development". The expression embraces the process of improving the hinterland in terms of potable water, electricity, schools, health, housing, feeder roads, cottage industries, improved farming etc. There is a nexus between democracy and rural development in the developing countries because rural development is a means of improving the lot of poverty stricken people and broadening their horizons to effectively participate in public affairs.

(xiii) Popular Justice

This is an expression used interchangeably with revolutionary justice. It presupposes the participation of the ordinary citizen - workers especially - in the process of adjudication. Hence laymen have featured prominently in, and actually comprised the majority on, the panels of all public tribunals. Popular justice goes beyond personnel requirements and advocates the abandonment of rigid rules of procedure and evidence which are branded as "technicalities". It is a fluid system of hearing any evidence no matter how it is obtained and the circumstances surrounding same and making deductions from all the facts in a speedy and instant adjudication and punishment.

It is a people's justice which purports to uproot a system whereby there is in effect one law for the rich and another for the poor.

(xiv) Systemic Corruption

This is an expression used in the course of this study. Conventionally, corruption has been identified in terms of abuse of a public office for private advantage. Accusations of corruption in this context have been levelled by all coup makers in Ghana from the NLC, NRC, SMC, AFRC, to the PNDC. It is my argument in this work that corruption should not be confined to such deviant conduct but stretched to cover such corrupt political systems as Union Government, the suppression of existing political groupings based on freedom of association and their replacement by CDRs, 31 December Womens Movement etc. It

is the major thrust of this thesis that the deprivation of the people of their right to elect their own leaders or vote them out if necessary ; the seizure of political power by the gun instead of a valid system of political succession; the trampling on human rights etc - all constitute a corruption of the whole political system - hence systemic corruption. Systemic corruption is deep-rooted and other forms of corruption which may be seen as peripheral are mere reflections of the decay in the political system itself.

1.7 Methodology

In order to gather information and test the validity of various views and conceptions on the ground, the survey research and library research methods were used in collecting the data. Material was therefore both primary and secondary. Due consideration was given to authenticity, reliability and relevance. In the survey, the interview schedule was employed, both in a formal and informal manner. Both closed and open - ended questions were used. The former was employed to pin persons down to specific answers and to avoid unnecessary generalisations and deviations, while the latter method was utilised to give respondents room to manoeuvre on various issues. By the latter approach, certain facts were elicited that had not been specifically envisaged by the questioner. The informal discussions proved useful in that people who had assumed tight postures opened up as the discussions livened up.

The data collected were analysed in order to prove or

disprove certain postulates and to draw relevant conclusions. Theories were drawn from the relevant analysis.

A crucial analytical tool was the frequency distribution method to show the percentages of respondents who gave responses to certain questions. This helped to gain insight into various areas of the investigation. Generally, descriptive analysis was used in the write-up. In order to arrive at a conclusion, deductive reasoning was employed.

Finally, in testing the hypotheses, the chi-square was used to locate the relationship between the variables; and the phi-coefficient was applied to measure the degree of association between the variables in the hypothesis. For the Library research, the Balme Library as well as the libraries of various departments, schools and institutes of the University of Ghana were utilised. The Armed Forces Staff College Library, The Research Library on African Affairs and the National Archives, supplied some background information on the study area. In addition, relevant documents of various departments, institutions, bodies and organisations were also a source of useful data. Several magazines and newspapers were also consulted.

1.8 Problems of the Study

This work has not been without hindrances and therefore limitations. A security lid appears to have been slapped on much information as part of the culture of silence under the PNDC. Many interviewees merely retorted. "I am not interested in

politics." Current information on the military is regarded as secret. Various governmental bodies and revolutionary organs are of the view that their activities border on national security and they should therefore not open up. There is the need to mention, however, that the CDR Secretariat, the CDD headquarters, the National Commission on Democracy, the National Mobilisation Headquarters and other agencies and bodies were quite cooperative. Several interviewees chose to remain anonymous. Information on the tribunals was often incomplete as persons interviewed were either unwilling or unable to give details of trials. Information was mainly obtained from personal attendances and from persons who had appeared before the tribunals and other adjudicating bodies, apart from newspaper and other published reports.

Official interference was felt during the elections for District Assemblies. I had arrived in Kumasi with questionnaire forms, leading a team of students as part of a national exercise being carried out by the Department of Political Science, Legon and also in furtherance of this research, when a national radio announcement was made asking all District Secretaries, Cadres and the public not to allow us to cover the elections or seek answers from the public. We were to be arrested if we proceeded with our task.

The public did not appear anxious to answer questions about the on-going process. Some viewed the interviewer with suspicion, while others merely preferred silence. On the whole,

however, the reception was quite satisfactory in all the circumstances.

1.9 Synopsis of Chapters

Chapter one introduces the study, defines its aims and examines its methods and difficulties. It includes literature review, theoretical framework and explanation of concepts/expressions. In chapter two, we consider the meaning of democracy, conceptions of democracy generally, democratic ideas in Ghana and the development of these views and practices. The third chapter considers the structure of the PNDC and the Defence Committees, the main instruments of participatory democracy. Chapter four deals with District Assemblies - the PNDC's method of legislating grassroots democracy.

In Chapter five, we consider Law Justice and Human Rights. Chapter six deals with Economic and Social Democracy. Chapter seven contains the conclusion.

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CHAPTER TWO

DEMOCRACY, ITS MEANING AND DEVELOPMENT

IN GHANA

2.1 Meaning and Origin

The term 'democracy' has become largely prescriptive. It stretches from the boundaries of a goal, a reality to an illusion. Its illusory perspective though intangible has often been invoked as a direct government of the masses in whatever form. Hence, the defender of any kind of regime, ranging from Nazism, Fascism, the Russian OGPU, Communism, Liberalism, etc., claims that his regime or system, is democratic. T.S. Eliot was right when he wrote that "when a term has become so universally sanctified as 'democracy' now is, I begin to wonder whether it means anything, in meaning too many things."¹ The use of the word democracy during the period under study has not been insulated from the conceptual problems surrounding it. In contemporary Ghana, therefore, we speak of "grassroot democracy", "participatory democracy", "people's democracy", the national democratic revolution" and "economic democracy". These expressions posit a new system where people are supposedly really free from the shackles of exploitation, inequality and domination; where the ordinary man can take part in the decision making process; where government is not the preserve of a few privileged people. It is generally regarded as the anti-thesis of dictatorship, oppression and tyranny.

To understand a phenomenon like democracy which is so com-

plex, and of which all are so enamoured yet so varied in its application, it is useful to trace its origin and examine its application in the two universal postulates - radical democracy and liberal democracy. Thereafter we shall view its development in Ghana culminating in revolutionary democracy under the PNDC.

Democracy is derived from the Greek word "demokratia"; "demos" meaning "people", and "Kratia" "power" or "strength". In its Greek derivation, democracy meant the actual and direct participation of the citizens in public affairs. This was effected through the assembly of the Athenian community; the ekklesia. The system excluded women, children, slaves and foreigners and was made possible by the small population of the Greek "polis" or city - state. It was a physical gathering in which the citizens took decisions, made laws and delegated day-to-day management to officials who reported or accounted to the assembly.

Currently, we cannot speak of the "people" without considerable difficulty as "demos" may itself mean the entire body, the many, the majority or in a derogatory sense, the mob. In considering its scope, "people" may stretch from (a) the great many (b) everybody (c) the people as organic whole (d) an absolute majority (e) a limited majority. It is worthy of note that the Greek writer Aristotle² himself saw democracy as a corrupt form of government where power did not only reside in a section of the populace but also exercised for the benefit of that section (albeit the large majority) and to the exclusion of

another section (however small). In a democracy, the group that possessed and exercised power to its benefit was the group known as "the people" or "the poor majority" or "the populace", the original meaning of the word "demos". Aristotle believed that democracy as practiced in his time, was not the rule of all but the rule of a section of the people, even if that section was the wide majority. Therefore, democracy fell short of the ideal and Aristotle therefore preferred a "polity" which was a mixed form of government embracing every majority and every minority and ensuring the protection of every group interest.

This aspect of democracy is of particular significance in analysing democracy in the revolutionary situation in Ghana where "the people" has come to mean a section of the populace to the exclusion of another group dubbed "citizens".

In Aristotle's model which is succinctly summarized by Drah³, democracy was not the rule of all, or as is the modern expression, government of the people, by the people and for the people. Instead, it was the rule of a section of the population, even if that section was the majority. "Polity", however, combined two cardinal principles, namely, the 'aristocratic' and the 'democratic'. The Aristocratic principle consisted in good government which meant government in the interest of all the people and which required experience, skill and knowledge. But good government, Aristotle argued, needed to be subject to the democratic principle of the consent and advice of the governed as a whole.

Hence, in order to have the desired result which is currently described as democracy, there is the need for not only mass participation which may become an easy breeding ground for demagogues but also qualitative government which guarantees the active participation of the skilled and experienced. This has formed the basis of liberal democracy which is discussed later.

In an attempt to appreciate the meaning of democracy, it is appropriate to consider Lincoln's famous epigram that democracy is "government of the people, by the people and for the people" which has gained so much currency. This definition itself is fraught with difficulties. Perhaps only the expression "government for the people" does not beg for clarification as it may be taken to mean a government in the people's interest, for their benefit. The expression "by the people" poses a problem when we consider the claims of military adventurers. It is enigmatic to observe a government which has come to power by the barrel of the gun insisting that it is government by the people.

That leaves us with "government of the people". This could have several meanings:- (i) it may connote a self-governing as opposed to a colonised people (ii) direct democracy (iii) that the people are the object of government, that they are governed (iv) that the government belongs to the people (v) that the government is chosen and guided by the people (vi) that the government is responsible to the people (vii) that the government emanates from the people in the sense that it derives its legitimacy from the people's consent.

Lincoln's conception invokes every idealistic situation imaginable. A democratic government connotes freedom to elect one's own representatives, directly and without hindrance. It is a legitimate government based on consent. The government must also rule in the interest of the people. Thus, it must ensure their social and economic advancement in terms of housing, education, health etc. The radical, the socialist and the liberal have taken hold of one conception or the other and formulated doctrines and demands thereon. If we consider the idealism and varied interpretations attendant on the concept, we might as well agree with Rousseau that "if there were a people of gods, they would govern themselves democratically; so perfect a government is not suited to man."⁴ We will now discuss the concept under two main headings for the sake of convenience - radical and liberal democracy.

2.2 Radical Democracy

Radical democracy, starting from Rousseau, erupted in Europe in the eighteenth century and found its translation into reality in the French Revolution of 1789 - the "source of all sovereignty is essentially in the nation; no body, no individual can exercise authority that does not proceed from it in plain terms."⁵ Jean-Jacques Rousseau⁶ (1717-1778) wrote that the concept of the 'general will' was the central message in political philosophy. Sovereignty was total, indivisible, inalienable, unlimited, infallible and it should be identified and tapped to realise the "common good" which meant justice and freedom for all. In his

Social Contract, the people created the contract and retained all power. The governors were mere agents. The people decided what should be the general will and whatever they decided upon in the general assembly must be obeyed to the letter by every individual. The dissenting individual must be compelled to conform, for in his being coerced, he is being "forced to be free". The government only put into effect the decision of the General Assembly of the people. Freedom meant obedience to a self-imposed law. The law was self-imposed because every person was part of the assembly. Servitude and slavery implied externally - imposed laws. Here, the emphasis was on actual participation in the law-making process.

Rousseau had no place for independent political groupings, interest groups, pressure groups or political parties within the state because they are sources of conflict; they represent particular wills and not the general will, which they tend to distort. Rousseau appeared to make a slight concession by granting that if such groups should exist at all, they should be so large that they are easily identifiable with the general will.

In actuality, Rousseau was in favour of direct participation in the political process as a way of ensuring freedom and justice for the people.

Rousseau was concerned with a basic problem of democracy - how one can be represented and yet be free. This accounted for Rousseaus' aversion to representation. He, therefore, devised a democracy that elected its magistrates, but did not give them the

chiasm of representatives - autonomy. To Rousseau, the people did not delegate their power and could give up the exercise of power. Rousseau perceived the source of the problem - as soon as power was transferred to a representative assembly, the latter became sovereign and power could elude the nominal holder - the people. Direct participation was advocated by Rousseau. However, Rousseau himself had to concede that this system could be operated only by small republics.

It might be rightly argued that Rousseau's radical political philosophy could lead to democratic despotism. Since there was no room for dissent, the individual lost any recognition and became part of a "mass", sharing one common destiny with an amalgam of people who were all supposedly equal, when in actual fact, power rested firmly in the hands of a few. In France, Robespierre, the leader of the French Revolution (July 1793 - July 1794) unleashed his "reign of terror" of murder, death, rancour, pillage, arson and wanton destruction under the auspices of radical democracy.

However, the concept has its usefulness. Firstly, it stated that government must operate in the interest of the entire populace. Secondly, that no group should enjoy undeserved privileges to the exclusion of the other members of society. Thirdly, that as much as possible, government should consist of representative of the entire community including the various groups, bodies etc, that comprise the citizenry. These concepts became part of the revolutionary rhetoric in Ghana after 31

December, 1981.

Karl Marx and Engeles - also radicals - were not impressed with Western democracy and advocated a radical departure therefrom. In their Communist Manifesto,⁷ a new science of society unfolded whereby Communism was offered as an alternative that would lead to the attainment of the avowed objectives of the Great French Revolution - Liberty, Equality, Fraternity. It was pointed out that the real beneficiaries of the Revolution of '1789 had been the middle classes - the property owners and their hangers-on ie the bourgeoisie whose exploitation made all talk of liberty and fraternity a mockery.

With the realisation of economic equality, to which communism furnished the key, real liberty and real brotherhood would be automatically attained. The peasantry who had for long been defrauded by their social superiors would be freed from the bonds of exploitation.

The vivid insight into the appalling degradation which unbridled capitalism unleashed in the middle of the nineteenth century, portrayed by Marx and Engels, should not be ignored in any study of economic and social democracy. We may cite the following: "In Nottingham, for example, 14 to 40 children huddled together in a small room of not more than 12 feet square. Child labour was a social shame as children of nine or ten years were dragged from their squalid beds at two, three or four o'clock in the morning and compelled to work for bare subsistence until ten, eleven or twelve at night, their limbs weaning away, their frames

dwindling, their faces whitening and their humanity absolutely sinking into a stone - like stupor, utterly horrible to contemplate ... in sixteen of the registration districts into which England is divided, there are, for every 100,000 children alive under the age of one year, only 9,000 deaths in the year on an average ... (but) in 22 districts (it is) over 20,000... in 11 over 23,000; in Wisbech, 26,000; and in Manchester, 26,125... The high death rates are ... principally due to the employment of the mothers away from their homes, and to the neglect and maltreatment consequent on her absence, such as, among others, insufficient nourishment, unsuitable food, and dosing opiates; beside this, there arises an unnatural estrangement between mother and child, and as a consequence intentional starving and poisoning of the children".⁶ This social injustice has been the focal point of radical democracy throughout the ages. In the theory of surplus value derived from these solid facts, Marx perceived the profits of capitalists in terms of the wide difference between the meagre wages paid to the worker and the actual wages the worker should have been paid as a result of the high prices of goods which the entrepreneur exacted in the market.

The Communist Manifesto, the catechism of Marxism, which attacked liberal democracy dealt with: (i) the materialist conception of history (ii) the closely related idea of class struggle (iii) the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the imminent disappearance of the state and

(iv) the prophecy of the future classless society in which perfect equality would prevail.

These may, however, be explained "en bloc", as one flows from the other, as follows: The materialist conception of history stated that the forces of production in their aggregation constituted the economic structure of society on which everything else was structured - politics, legal system, morality, religion, metaphysics, social relations etc. From this postulate and by the confrontation of opposites in a series of theses, anti-theses and syntheses, inevitable struggles ensued. Hence, "the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles."⁹ The injustices in the economic order continued to worsen, reaching the feudal stage and ultimately full blown capitalism where hostilities were sharpened by the very ferocity of exploitation under the capitalist system.

The inevitable clash occurred between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat whereby the former lost their hold on the state, which was the tool of the dominant class in society and which was used as instrument of oppression. The state has shown that "the executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie"¹⁰ Its 'democratic' form was a sham; its essential nature was that of an instrument of class rule. "Democracy means equality. The great significance of the struggle of the proletariat for equality as a slogan, are apparent, if we correctly interpret it as meaning the abolition of classes. But democracy is a form of the state - one of its

varieties. Consequently, like every state, it consists in organized, systematic application of force against human beings"¹¹ Democracy could thus be a deceptive veil.

Since, according to Marx and Engels, the proletariat consisted of the workers who were the vast majority in every bourgeois society, one would suppose that the dictatorship of the proletariat would be majoritarian democracy. Indeed the Communist Manifesto stated that "the first step in the working class revolution is the raising of the proletariat to the position of the ruling class, the victory of democracy... The proletarian movement is the conscious movement of the immense majority in the interests of the immense majority".¹²

But the dialectic must move on because even though there was "equal right", it was still a "bourgeois right" which like every right pre-supposed inequality. The state would finally "wither away" when every source of social inequality had disappeared. By this time, society would have realised this rule: "From each according to his ability to each according to his needs."¹³ The classless society was realised once the dictatorship of the proletariat had succeeded in creating the situation where the working class was the only class. Once there was no other person to be oppressed, the state, which was by definition the organ of a class, would disappear.

Marx and Engels have, of course, attracted a lot of criticism. Firstly, it might be argued that the Marxist conception of history was too narrow and that the dialectical movement could

not be used to explain the diversity of phenomena that influence history and events. Secondly, the sudden stoppage of the law of dialectics upon the attainment of the Marxist ideal could be seen as a mere fantasy since the forces of mutation never cease. Thirdly, it is not correct to say that change only comes by force and revolution. Marx and Engels, however, continued to elaborate upon their idea until their death and came to appreciate that change could come by other means apart from force. Fourthly, the final government of things envisaged by Marxism is to say the least, Utopian. However, it is a truism that Marxism laid naked the ugly face of Capitalism, and paved the way for a more humane system and the emergence of the welfare state in the West which have enabled democracy to survive. Hence the Marxist school has contributed to the development of democracy. This is relevant to the search for democracy in Ghana.

2.3 Liberal Democracy

Western democracy which represents what is generally described as "Liberal Democracy" has not always been "liberal" nor "democratic". The concept of divine right of Kings resulted in royal absolutism with considerable arbitrariness in determining or disposing of the rights of individuals. Government was despotic and popular representation was unknown. Successive monarchs ruled by dint of ancestry and not by choice. Government was not perceived as having a primary responsibility to promote economic and social development. It is worth noting that a series of

political struggles led to the culture of Liberal Democracy.

Drah identified the nineteenth century quest for democracy which culminated in the present system in the following manner:- (i) "greater representation of the working class in Parliament (ii) increased powers for the emergent trade union movement (iii) more enquiries into and information on all aspects of the public administrative machinery (iv) increased educational opportunity for the working class and (v) reduction of the powers of the House of the Lords and of the landed aristocracy."¹⁴

J.S. Mill and Alexis de Tocqueville had considerable influence on the development of liberal democracy in its modern form. Mill demanded a thorough democratisation of the British system of government both in Parliament and outside it, as well as the protection of human rights.¹⁵ Mill also concerned himself specially with the issue of liberty.¹⁶ He was particularly concerned with the tyranny of the majority. Popular government had one danger - it threatened to establish the tyranny of the majority. There was a possibility that the majority in power might not be at one with those whom it represented. This is an argument used to advance the cause of "participatory democracy" in Ghana. Mill reviewed the measures taken to limit the powers of rulers as follows:(a) compelling rulers to recognise certain popular liberties. If these are violated, the people will have a right to rebel. (b) the consent of a representative body of the people was needed for the actual rulers to take certain important steps. Mill observed that if the rulers were effectually

responsible to the people, promptly removable, then their power was but the nation's own power and operating in the interest of all. The right to re-call representatives has been introduced in Ghana's new Local Government system. Mill was highly individualistic in his thoughts and he attacked what he described as the growing tendency of the "public" to impose its own standards of thought and conduct upon those rash enough to insist on managing their own lives. He opined that pressure on men for conformity and standardization did not promote liberty. Legislators were exceptions to this rule and might use their power to advance personal or class interests.

Mill defended non-interference and original expression of the self. He said that "he who lets the world choose his plan for him, has no need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation."¹⁶ In this connection, Mill was particularly concerned with freedom of thought and expression. "The peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion," he said "is that it is the robbing of the human race - posterity as well as the existing generation... If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth. If wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by the collision with error."¹⁷

Freedom of expression should not be compromised in a democracy. As Mill argued to support non-suppression of views because: (a) the opinion that was sought to be suppressed might be

true. Those who sought to suppress that view would deny its truth. But even they themselves were not infallible; (b) no matter how true a proposition was, if it was not fully, frequently and fearlessly discussed, it would degenerate into a dead dogma and not a living truth.¹⁸

This school of democratic thought advocated that the worth of a State, in the long run, was the worth of the individuals. A state which oppressed its men in order that they might be mere instruments in its hands - no matter how beneficial the purpose might appear to be - would find that with small men, no great things could be accomplished.

In a liberal democracy, there should be an assembly of representatives which, firstly, had the duty to control those who actually govern, compel them to account for their actions at all times and censure them when necessary. The opposite can be seen in the military regimes of contemporary Africa who are their own controllers, account to no one but themselves, who cannot be expelled save by the barrel of the gun and to whom the question of succession is raised by only nation - wreckers. Secondly, an assembly - a glaring omission in military politics - performs the function of debilitation, which an elected body can do better than an individual or a junta or a group of hand - picked men. Thirdly, an assembly is the nation's "Committee of Grievances and its Congress of Opinions" - a place where every interest and shade of opinion in the country can have its cause passionately

pleaded. It is this free function of legislative bodies that enable the benefits of popular control to be enjoyed together with skilled legislation and administration.¹⁹

de Tocqueville was, however, not impressed with representative bodies and wrote that the people of Britain were free only when they were electing the members of Parliament and that the moment these were elected, the people were slaves, they were nothing.²⁰

The protection of minority rights is essential to liberty and the democratic process. Mill sought to modify majority rule by suggesting special provisions to strengthen the position of the minority. Even though in the normal course of deliberation the minority should be overruled, does it mean that the minority should not have any representation at all? In a Marxist sense, the dictatorship of the proletariat cannot accommodate the minority. To the Mill school of thought, in a true democracy where there is equality, every section of the community must be represented, not disproportionately, but proportionately.

We may discuss the salient aspects of liberal democracy further as follows:

(i) Representation: A prescribed and viable system of representative government, leadership selection by universal adult suffrage and control mechanism to ensure participation and accountability, form part of liberal democracy. How to be free and be represented has remained a thorny problem for democracy. Busia wrote that "the best kind of democracy is the one which

enables as many people as possible to share in the making of decisions and the actual function of government"²¹

The advocates of participatory democracy might be gratified to hear that to Aristotle, the formula of Greek liberty was "to govern and to be governed alternately... to be under no command whatsoever to anyone."²² Bruno Leoni spoke on similar lines: "The more numerous the people are whom one tries to 'represent' through the legislative process and the more numerous the matters in which one tries to represent them, the less the word 'representation' has a meaning referable to the actual will of actual people, other than the persons named as their 'representative'....The inescapable conclusion is that in order to restore to the word 'representation' its original, reasonable meaning, there should be a drastic reduction either in the number of those 'represented' or in the number of matters in which they are allegedly represented, or both."²³

Ideally, democracy may be seen as equal power for all. In practical terms, however, democracy is seen in the liberal democratic sense as the power of the active demos. This means in effect, that power resides in the bosom of those who avail themselves of it - a few, not the majority or the whole. As Laswell observed, "government is always government by the few....

But this fact does not settle the question of the degree of democracy. To confuse the percentage of leaders ... with the test of democracy is to make an elementary mistake, since society may be democratic and express itself through a small leadership.

The key question turns on accountability."²⁴

Since democracy is not anarchy, there is an element of a command structure. The principle does not connote a cancellation of leadership and any illusions in that direction can only lead to chaos and confusion. Haiman settled the question in this way: "since civilisation began, it has been observed that a leaderless society is not a society at all, for wherever two or more form a society and live together there is no such thing as uncontrolled, unrestricted, uninfluenced behaviour."²⁵ Hence even democracy is in a sense, a minority system in which the few lead and the many are led.

The liberal democratic model is different, however, from Plato's conception of a philosopher king who is an all-knowing demi-god selected through a complex system of education and to whom leadership is limited.²⁶ The true difference with the modern conception of democracy is that the ruling class should be more open to all sections of the society at all times and not a closed shop of a privileged minority. In view of the imperfections within the system, however, there is the need for checks and balances. Jefferson and Madison had this problem in mind when they spoke of an "elective despotism", that is, of the possibility of the 'legislature' becoming autocratic - hence, they believed that if the elective body is not checked by the separation of powers, it will concentrate in its own hands an unrestricted, and therefore tyrannical power.²⁷

The method of selecting rulers by free choice has neces-

sitated a viable electoral system with a number of political parties from which the electorate can make a choice. Accepting that the purpose of elections is to select leadership, then the best electoral system will be the most selective, the one which best provides for the qualitative choice of leaders. This means that where fraud and other malpractices prevail; or where "money politics" dictate who the leaders should be, choking out the less wealthy and polluting the elective principle, then democracy is in real danger. This problem has bedevilled several developing countries in recent times, Nigeria and Ghana not excepted.

(ii) Constitutionalism: This means that there should be a set of rules and institutional arrangements which serve as a check on legislative and governmental power. Whether it is in the form of a document (as in the United States of America) or is embodied in Constitutional conventions (as in Britain), constitutionalism connotes a higher law to which all other laws or actions must conform in order to derive legitimacy. This serves as a check on every exercise of power that affects the citizen. Constitutionalism therefore insists on limited government.²⁰ It means authority to govern is not license and cannot be exercised with absolute discretion but rather that such authority is governed by rules and that public officials are limited.

Constitutionalism ensures the entrenchment of freedoms the society holds dear. In Western constitutional practice it has been used as a device to guarantee separation of powers, the independence of the judiciary, judicial review of legislative and

administrative action, bill of rights, popular representation, the rule of law and an entrenched amendment procedure regarding the constitution itself.

(iii) Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence

Montesquieu observed that political liberty can be found only when there is no abuse of power but constant experience has shown that any man vested with power is liable to abuse it and to extend his authority as far as it would go. In order to prevent this abuse, the executive, legislative and judicial powers must be in separate hands.²⁹

The United States constitution made a clear distinction between the legislature, executive and judiciary. In the U.K., the distinction is blurred so far as the executive and the legislature are concerned. However, the Judiciary jealously keeps its distance and independence. Indeed judicial independence has become the essence of the notion of separation of powers in the U.K. This independence of the judiciary is a very cardinal requirement of democratic government. It is accepted that in the discharge of their responsibility of interpreting the laws, the judges of the land should not be subjected to any form of pressures whatsoever so as to distort the law to satisfy their patrons. A judge should not be influenced by extraneous considerations in judging any particular case. This is the way to ensure objectivity, impartiality, predictability and stability of the laws.

(iv) The Rule of Law: The concept of the Rule of Law demands

that all laws by which the rights of individuals may be determined or disposed of, must be clearly laid down, promulgated and known in advance. By this all officials of State - legislative, executive, administrative or judicial - will have to take decisions directed by law and the absence of arbitrariness, in dealing with the rights of the citizen. It means that the law once properly and duly passed is supreme and its consequence must be felt equally and in the same vein by all and sundry. Therefore, the law is no respecter of persons.

The Rule of Law also lays down certain rules of procedure which must be followed by whoever pronounce on the rights of the citizen. This is to prevent a Kangaroo Court system (eg. trial by night and in secret places without counsel) - the existence of which precludes a regime from claiming to be democratic. The laid down rules under the Rule of Law include the following:-

(i) every adjudicator must hear both sides before arriving at a verdict relating to any controversy or accusation; (ii) every side in a controversy is entitled to have its case duly considered before a decision is taken. This includes all relevant factors in an issue; (iii) no man can be a judge in his own cause; (iv) reasons must always be given for a decision reached; (v) justice should not only be done but it must manifestly be seen to be done.

These are rules meant for judicial bodies, arbitrators, conciliators, administrators, security personnel, customs and excise officials, tax officers, legislators and everyone who

takes some decision that affects the citizen.

The Rule of Law extends further in the provision of safeguards against arbitrary arrest and detention pending trial as well as securing speedy trial of accused persons as a means of preventing enforced incarceration by officials. It provides further that no person shall be found guilty of an offence which is not specifically laid down in some criminal prohibition established prior to the time when he is alleged to have committed an offence.

The concept means that not everything is lawful to the authorities, and it provides for a limitation on both how the authorities may reach a decision and on what they may or may not do. Expressed in its broad sense in terms of such principles as justice, freedom, fairness and humanity, it becomes a standard and a guide to action. Its tenets become legal and political barometers, even if not rigid rules, in terms of which the substance of legislation is examined and the decisions taken by the authorities are assessed.

(v) Fundamental Human Rights: Liberal democracy takes the view that the purpose of government is to protect the rights of man. A Bill of Rights is placed in a Constitution to entrench the rights of the citizen so that these rights are made justiciable and enforceable by the courts. By such provisions, rights are detailed in extents and any citizen who feels his civil or political right has been infringed by any person, body, power or authority, can take the matter to Court.

The 1979 Constitution of Ghana, borrowing from the Liberal Democratic system provided a model which may be summed up as follows: (i) protection of the right of life whereby life is recognised as sacrosanct and no person can therefore be deprived of his life except by due process of law - ie. he has been tried by a court of competent jurisdiction for a specified offence under the laws of Ghana and, accordingly, convicted; (ii) protection of the right to personal liberty whereby no one can be deprived of his liberty unless this is specifically authorised by law and in circumstances laid down, such as in the execution of a sentence of a Court of competent jurisdiction for a criminal offence; (iii) protection from slavery and forced labour; (iv) protection from inhuman treatment; (v) protection from deprivation of property. No person's property should be compulsorily acquired by the state except well-laid down conditions have been fulfilled and due compensation paid; (vi) protection for privacy of home and property; (vii) freedom of conscience, which includes freedom of thought and of religion, including the freedom to practise and promote one's religion in private or in public, singly or in the company of others; (viii) freedom of expression - this includes the absence of censorship, freedom in circulating information, to air one's views either singly or in concert with others; (ix) freedom of assembly and association which guarantees the right to meet with and associate with others in any organisation whatsoever for any lawful purpose; (x) freedom of movement which includes the right to

move about freely in one's country, reside in any part therein, leave or enter one's country freely and immunity from expulsion from one's country.

It has been argued that liberal democracy has not provided enough guarantees for economic and social welfare. This is why such rights are provided for, however, in ways such as the Directive Principles of State Policy in Chapter 4 of the 1979 Constitution of Ghana. Certainly, it is important that in a developing country that seeks democracy, a national commission should be established to promote and protect the special interests of the underprivileged, the unemployed, the disabled, women and children.

(vi) Local Government: An efficient local government system is considered a basic ingredient of self government and democracy in that it enhances the citizen's participation in government.

The extent of the requisite autonomy has remained varied, however. The current trend is that an effective local government system is necessary for democracy to thrive; and that local self government is the cornerstone of any form of self government. Furthermore, it is believed that an effective local government would generate the necessary economic development at the local level that would make for a better life. Central government, it is feared, is becoming too powerful as a result of the increasing role of government in the welfare state and new dimensions in international politics whereby relations are carried on by summit conferences. Effective local government is the positive method

of keeping government close to the people and making possible meaningful participation.

(vii) The Economic System of Liberal Democracy

It can hardly be gainsaid that the political system cannot be approached in isolation and must be viewed in a socio-economic milieu. Indeed, liberal democracy may be described as the brain-child of Western capitalism whereby everything is affected by economic circumstances. Macpherson noted that "a fact which some people find admirable and some people would prefer not to have mentioned, is that liberal democracy and capitalism go together. Liberal democracy is found only in centres whose economic system is wholly or predominantly that of capitalist enterprises. And with a few and mostly temporary exceptions systems. It would be surprising if this close correspondence were merely coincidental."³⁰

In this connection, it might therefore appear that liberal democracy is not capable of universal application. Lipset³¹ saw liberal democracy as the political system of a developed capitalist economy and capitalist development as the sine qua non and a necessary condition for the development of liberal democracy. In short, the richer a nation was, the greater were the chances that it would sustain democracy.

In terms of the social system, it is established that wide social inequalities and cleavages in social distinction do not sanction liberal democracy. de Tocqueville observed that social equality helped to preserve liberal democracy in America. He

observed that God Himself has given Americans "the means of remaining equal and free by placing them upon a boundless continent. General equality is favourable to the stability of all Government but more particularly of a democratic one"³² In a more recent study, Dahl confirmed the observations of de Tocqueville thus: "the world had never before witnessed so much equality of conditions as existed in America."³³

The opposite of wealth is poverty, and just as it has been observed that advanced social prosperity promotes democracy, so has the warning been sounded that social stagnation militates against democracy. The Bi-Partisan Commission on Central America appointed by President Ronald Reagan in 1984 to study the political process and particularly political instability in the area, observed that "hunger and malnutrition, illiteracy, poor educational and training opportunities, poor health conditions and inadequate housing are unstable conditions on which to encourage the growth of viable democratic institutions".³⁴

In 1983, the Brandt Commission report nailed the issue on the head when it said that "widely shared development is a condition for national and international stability"³⁵. Though it appreciated that many causes underlie the rise in the pendulum of conflict and political instability, the Commission observed that, "failure of development often provides the conditions on which they (ie. destabilising forces) can originate and flourish."³⁶ It would appear that the African experience has lent some weight to this school of thought and has partly explained our failure to

develop a democratic system. It is obvious that imperialism has kept us down economically. As Offiong observed, "as part of the strategy of keeping Africans perpetually underdeveloped the colonial imperialists... monopolised economic activities thus preventing the rise of an indigenous entrepreneurial class".³⁷ Due to dependent development after independence, indigenous capitalism had been unable to develop to viable levels leading to persistent economic decline with adverse consequences for the development of democracy.

The World Bank Report (The Berg Report) on the economic conditions of Africa noted that for most African countries and for the majority of the African population the situation is grim, and it is no exaggeration to talk of crisis. The crisis reveals itself in "slow overall economic growth, sluggish agricultural performance coupled with rapid rates of population increases and balance of payments and fiscal crisis - these are dramatic indicators of economic trouble... Between 1960 and 1979 per capita income in 19 countries grew by less than one per cent per year while during the last decade 15 countries recorded a negative rate growth in income per capita"³⁸

Ewusi has observed that income distribution in Ghana has been highly unequal. 12.9% of the total incomes went to 6% of wage and salary earners by 1957. In 1962 5.1% of wages and salary earners received 20.3% of all income. By 1968, 4% received 24.7%. As shown by Ewusi's reference to the UN Statistical Yearbook 1981, the per capita income comparison

between Ghana and a few liberal democratic countries revealed the following:-

Ghana	\$ 438
USA	9,407
Canada	9,147
Switzerland	14,893
W. Germany	11,759
U.K.	8,222

Ghana had a high birth rate of 48.4% per 1,000 during the period and an infant mortality rate of 156 per 1,000. The life expectancy was 46.7 years for males and 50.00 years for females. There were 2.7 doctors to every 10,000 Ghanaians and 0.2 pharmacists, 6.9 midwives and 18.6 nurses compared to the USA during the same period where they had a birth rate of 26.5 per 1000; infant mortality of 31.5 per 1000; average life expectancy of 69.5 for males; average life expectancy of 77.2 for females.³⁹

It is against this background that it may be argued that a certain level of socio economic advancement is necessary for the emergence and survival of liberal democracy in any state and that the hungry man has no regard for free speech, constitutional limitation of power, freedom from detention and allied rights. The view is that material prosperity must precede democracy.

Several academics including Drah have argued that the contrary is correct. Drah made the point that material prosperity as a pre-condition for democracy "is a dangerous half-truth. Material well - being may be a necessary condition of

liberal democracy. But it does increase the opportunity for dictators to control people's minds through mass communication, and people's bodies through highly organised police and military services, which all show that material prosperity can result in despotism."⁴⁰ Drah concluded therefore that " a free or constitutional democracy is possible only if and when at least a certain number of social forces want it and value it. Therefore, it follows logically that it is not possible if and when a substantial portion of the population does not want and value it. We are here then talking of the element of human will. True, this element of will is itself conditioned by, is not independent of, circumstances; but it may often turn, and it has often turned, the scale either way. What the histories of those countries where liberal democracy eventually triumphed clearly show is this: - material advancement and the will to create a free democratic system - rather than live with a despotic rule - emerged together and reinforced each other. So that, it is, after all, possible for a hungry man to claim his freedom to say that he is hungry - if he so wills. He will not leave it to someone else to tell him when he is, or should be, hungry".⁴¹

As the former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere once said at an African Leadership Forum held in Kampala, "Africa can afford foreign currency deficit, food deficits, and any other types of deficits, but not the lack of democracy."⁴²

2.4 Democracy in Ghana:

The concept, its application and development in Ghana, may

be studied in three broad categories - (i) the pre-colonial era (ii) the colonial era and (iii) the post -independence era.

2.4(i) The Pre-Colonial Era

Several scholars such as Arhin,⁴³ Busia,⁴⁴ Danquah,⁴⁵ De Graft Johnson,⁴⁶ Drah,⁴⁷ Sekyi,⁴⁸ and Casely Hayford⁴⁹ have observed that the pre-colonial society in Ghana was democratic. Kumi Ansah-Koi who disagreed with this contention argued that in the pre-colonial society in Ghana, the 'demos' or 'masses' necessarily played second fiddle to the aged, to the sanctity of customs, traditions and superstition and to royalty. "There was no genuine democracy as the masses were subjected to various types of oligarchies. Even though the vast majority of the population could be said to have a say in government and governments were probably geared towards their several interests, the majority certainly did not exercise rule in society. This was the preserve of an oligarchy of royalists, the aged and particular office-holders who were themselves hemmed in by tradition, superstition and various customary practices... The misconception that they were democratic is based on false assumption that the opposite of democracy is autocracy; and that since the government in those communities was certainly not autocratic, it must have been democratic."⁵⁰

As Ansa-Koi explained, we have come to this error because of two main factors:- (i) earlier writers tried to glorify the African by identifying his system with the rudiments of the now-universal norm of democratic rule; (ii) the desire to demonstrate

that democracy - the ideal form of rule - was not peculiar to Europe and that traditional African societies had also aspired towards that ideal."⁵¹

In Ansah-Koi's view even if a traditional system made for good government or responsible government what actually did not exist was the rule by the 'demos'. It is my view that the 'demos' has always been represented and its basic interest is to ensure responsibility and accountability. These are enshrined in our traditional system. Our traditional system, particularly as exemplified by the Akan model, had the basic ingredient of democracy similar to those of British Parliamentary democracy, and a fusion of the two could produce meaningful democracy in our part of the world.

Casely Hayford⁵² and J.W. de Graft-Johnson⁵³ in analysing the democratic state system, used the expression 'native state system' and 'African state government' respectively. As Casely Hayford observed, the traditional system had an element of representation. He felt that this was widely diffused. Every adult member of the community had to be represented in the State councils - a right which was fully recognised and guaranteed. In the process of selection of political heads, the composition of councils, decision making by consultation, the control and removal of those vested with authority, the democratic process was in play. There was a well defined hierarchy of authority with defined perimeters of power ensuring appropriate checks and balances:- (i) heads of the families - lineages (abusuapayin)

(ii) head of the village comprising several lineages (odikro)
(iii) head of a group of villages that formed semi-independent division (ohene) (iv) head of the several divisions that is called the state also known as the paramount chief or king and the omanhene.

Each of these had a ruling council. The head did not rule alone; nor did he choose members of the Council. They came by right. (This system should be contrasted with the various secretaries/commissioners/ministers chosen by military rulers of today who are mere appointees and hold office at the pleasure of the ruler.) All the various units were represented. Hence we had the family, village, divisional and state councils. The family was powerful and possessed lands over which only members of the family had control. Such land was a source of power. The families elected the members of the village council.

There was a hereditary element in the selection of political heads, and the concept of the royal family prevailed. The village head, chief or paramount chief, whether patrilineal or matrilineal, had an element of oligarchy - the institution was limited to the royal family. But the elective principle was emphasised by Busia in this way:- "each royal family presented a number of possible candidates and a careful selection was made from among all the eligible candidates in which the queenmother played an important role."⁵⁴ It could be said that the hereditary element was balanced by the elective principle. Within the State, there was the Council of elders who sat in

their own right, whose advice the chief had to obey and with whose consent the machinery of State was run. They were the body to whom every official accounted and from whom legislation emanated. Kobina Sekyi wrote that the "Akan-Fanti traditional idea of kinship was different from that of Europe or Japan which saw Kings as absolute rulers over the lives and properties of their subjects. The Akan-Fanti idea, on the other hand, was that the king was the highest public servant in the State. He was an elected constitutional official. He was not a legislator in his own right and he had to govern in accordance with the customary law. In English law the King is not a subject and neither is he sovereign; for the Parliament is sovereign. In our law, the ruler himself is subject because the people are sovereign. Hence the formula which is used in Elmina states: 'ehin no ni man' (the king has no state). The ruler is merely a representative of the sovereignty of the group."⁵⁵

Because the king in our system was a subject, a creature of the State and servant, the people could depose him without necessarily resorting to high handed and revolutionary action.

Other checks and balances prevailed in the traditional system. The chief was not only bound to take every action in consultation with or on the advice of the elders but he swore an oath to that effect. If he failed to do so, he ran the risk of imminent destoolment - the final sanction against the chief. Grounds regarding destoolment included unjustified disposal of stool property, serious infringement of custom, physical

infirmity, disregard for the elders and/or the people, mismanagement, immorality or general misconduct. The representative assembly comprising the elders, political heads, commoners, divisional chiefs, the council of elders together with the chief constituted the supreme Parliament of the people and every decision of this body was binding on all and sundry.

The commoners also acted as a check. These were known as the "nkwaakwa" among the Akans. This group comprised the wider majority of the people, particularly the youth. They were not of royal blood and were not represented as a group on the Council. They elected their own spokesman called "nkwaakwaahene" - a position that was not hereditary. During Council meetings, he stood outside the meeting place waiting to be called, and when summoned, presented the views of the commoners. Much opposition, dissent, counter-argument emanated from the "Nkwaakwa" who were also the backbone of communal labour. They were a ready source of destoolment so far as the wayward chief was concerned. The "nkwaakwaahene" could be described as the leader of the chief's loyal opposition. The "oman" or citizenry as a whole through the established hierarchy - lineage, village, town and divisional councils acted as a check on the chief. The latter could not pass a law without reference to the citizenry as a whole.

The system of land ownership was itself a check. Land was the centre of everything. Anyone who controlled the land wielded tremendous power. Land was the property of the community. If it belonged to the "stool", then in fact it meant the community.

Under the Akan customary land law, no portion of these stool lands could become part of a chief's private property. Indeed no one had a monopolistic control of this commodity which by custom belonged to the dead, the living and those yet to be born.

An element of decentralisation prevailed which promoted local autonomy and local self-government, thus enhancing freedom and development. Each political unit had its own area of operation regarding which others could not interfere. Every unit had its own sub-chief who was generally in control of his area. Even though a paramount chief had authority over the whole state he could not send orders to the bottom part of the pyramid except through divisional chiefs, lineage heads and eventually to the individual members.

Equality prevailed in the system. According to Danquah, "everyone except the slave or the stranger was considered a person of dignity or rank, a person, be he young or old, man or woman, of poor or rich parents being considered the equal of every one else."⁵⁶

2.4 (ii) The Colonial Era

The colonial system was generally autocratic and the people were generally dissatisfied with it. Colonialism undermined the position of the chief as well as other constitutional arrangements and introduced an element of recognition into the concept of a chief which has plagued us to this day. Whereas before the advent of colonization, a chief was a person who had been nominated, elected and installed as such, colonialism added

a further dimension - the chief had to be recognised by the central government to give credence to his position. The cumulative effect of a number of ordinances passed by the colonialists was such that the governor had considerable powers of suspending or deposing a chief to the extent that the public functions of the chief were subjected to the control of the British authorities. The chief in due course became less dependent on the will of the people and the constant consultation between the chief and his people collapsed. The chiefs had become agents of the colonial government who sat on gazettes and no longer on stools or skins.

With regard to local administration, the chiefs and their councillors were appointed as "Native Authorities" - the commoners and the educated people having been excluded from participating in the decision making process at the local level. The Watson Commission (1948) noted in its Report that "the government continued to concern itself with the details of pre-eminently local affairs. The District Commissioner still controlled matters of local concern. Africans thus at lower levels were still deprived of the school of political experience to be found in local management".⁹⁷ These and allied matters constituted the concern of the nationalist agitators who sought true democracy for the Gold Coast. They included J.B. Danquah, George Alfred Grant ('Pa' Grant), E. Akuffo - Addo and William Ofori Atta who were very critical of the role the chiefs were playing in the Joint Provincial Council of chiefs (JPC). This

group, also known as "the intelligentsia", wanted constitutionalism (limitation of powers) and greater representation in their quest for democracy, which, they argued, was not new to even the traditional system.

In 1940, the executive committee of the Gold Coast Youth Conference dominated by the intelligentsia, wrote a memorandum in which a constitution for the country was spelt out. It provided, inter alia, that the Gold Coast should have a bi-cameral legislature whereby the JFC would become a House of Chiefs while the Legislative Council would become an expanded legislative assembly of popularly elected members.

The attempts by the British colonial authority to permit African representation and involvement in the Gold Coast even on a limited scale, brought into focus a conflict between the chiefs and the intelligentsia as to which of these two groups should represent the "demos". While the chiefs considered themselves as the natural rulers of the people, the intelligentsia perceived themselves as better qualified. Despite the serious limitations of the form of government at the time - it was paternalistic and undemocratic with property limitations for membership of the legislative council - yet, the system helped the notion of representative democracy to take roots in the Gold Coast.

What constituted the proto-nationalist movement with limited reformist demands towards more effective democratization turned into full-fledged nationalism which demanded independence in the name of the people. It was a quest for democracy, claiming that

government had to be made up of the indigenes. Government should be the rule of the sons and daughters of the soil no matter the cost. Hence Nkrumah intoned: "we prefer self-government with danger to servitude in tranquility" during the political campaigns of the period.

The colonial system, though not democratic in its earlier application in the Gold Coast, systematically yielded to nationalist demands for participation and representation culminating in independence. But even more, colonisation exposed the educated native to the basic concepts of Western democracy which have become an inherent part of the political struggles in Ghana since independence.

2.4(iii) The Post-Independence Era

The independence Constitution of Ghana (1957) was decried by Nkrumah and his followers as divisive, foreign and undemocratic. It was ultimately abandoned in 1960. Nkrumah regarded the Constitution as too weak to cater for the emergency measures of a totalitarian kind which were necessary for building new states. Nkrumah pursued a policy that led to the breakdown of democracy which may be summarised as follows: (i) While Nkrumah repeatedly said the opposition in Ghana was obstructive and did not behave democratically, it might be argued that Nkrumah could not exercise the tolerance required for the operation of democracy, nor was he willing to share power and tolerate dissent. For example, it is noted that the "Ga Shifimo Kpee" (Ga Standfast Association) which clashed with Nkrumah in 1957, was actually

composed of loyalists of the CPP who had in 1956 sent a strong resolution to Nkrumah protesting against discrimination in housing, employment etc. but who were prepared to shelve their protest in the face of elections in 1956. Nevertheless, Nkrumah did not take past loyalty into account and he proceeded to deal ruthlessly with the organisation and subsequently detained many of its members.⁵⁶ (ii) The CPP government passed the Deportation (Osman Larden and Amadu Baba) Act on 23 August 1957 empowering the Minister of Interior to deport two persons mentioned therein to Nigeria despite a writ they had issued and which was pending in the High Court. (iii) By the Stool Lands (Validation of Legislation) Bills, passed in June 1957, all stool lands, formerly entrusted in the chiefs were placed in the hands of the government. (iv) The Regional Assemblies which had been established as a concession to the opposition were abolished. (v) The Preventive Detention Act (PDA) was used to stifle every dissent in the land. (vi) The Constitution (Amendment) Act 1959 gave the Prime Minister power over appointment of various public officers that he did not previously have. (vii) The 1958 Industrial Relations Act imposed a compulsory levy on all wages and salaries which were deducted by the Trade Union Congress (TUC) - which was a wing of the CPP - for the benefit of the CPP. (viii) By 1960, by the combined effect of threats and detention, the opposition in Ghana had not only been reduced to nothing but the 1957 Constitution itself was dead and Nkrumah was ready to introduce a Republican Constitution which concentrated all powers

in his hands. Particularly, Article 55 of the 1960 Constitution provided that " (a) The President could, whenever he considered it to be in the national interest, rule by legislative instrument; (b) Any such law made by the President may alter (whether expressly or by implication), any enactment other than the Constitution." By this provision, the legislative power of the people's representatives in Parliament was usurped and Nkrumah could ignore Parliament and rule by decree. It is pertinent to note that the powers under Article 55 were provided for Nkrumah alone as the first President of Ghana.

Regarding fundamental human rights, what amounted to a shadow of protecting them was Article 13 of the 1960 Constitution which required the President to make a "solemn declaration" of "fundamental principles". In 1960, J.B. Danquah issued a writ in the high court on behalf of Baafour Akoto and other detainees, asking for their release from detention. Danquah first brought the action under the Habeas Corpus Act in the High Court which he promptly lost. On appeal to the Supreme Court, it was held that although the Habeas Corpus Act of 1816 applied to Ghana, the Court could not interfere with a detention based on the Preventive Detention Act (PDA) of 1958 on the grounds that once Parliament had specifically legislated on the matter, that was the end of it.

Danquah then took it upon himself to test the constitutionality of the law itself (ie. the PDA) and its application by the President. Danquah referred to Article 13(1)

of the 1960 constitution and argued that the president, having sworn that "no person should be deprived of freedom of religion or speech, of the right to move and assemble without hindrance or of the rights of access to courts of law", could not turn round and detain people without the Courts having the right to enquire into it. To Danquah, the solemn declaration of the President under Article 13 was not put into the Constitution for sheer decoration but constituted a Bill of Rights. Once more, the Supreme Court ruled that it had no power to enquire into the detention because the solemn declaration was akin to the Coronation Oath sworn by the British monarch, which was not justiciable, and that only political sanctions could be taken against the President if he was adjudged to be in breach of his oath. In that case, voters could refuse to vote for him at a subsequent election.

As we have seen already under our traditional system, if the chief was found to be in breach of his oath, it was a ground for instant deposition. Nkrumah's followers often said that the traditional system did not have an opposition as in the British model, and so the opposition should be scrapped. It was, then right, to uphold the oath as being akin not to that of the British monarch, but to that of the Ghanaian chief and to conclude that the oath had a legal effect.

Further amendment to the 1960 Constitution made in 1964 through a referendum gave the President power in his discretion to dismiss a judge of the High Court at any time for reasons

which appeared to him sufficient. Furthermore, one national party was provided for - the Convention People's Party (CPP).

The results of the 1964 Referendum were a farce as in the villages there was nothing like a place to put a 'No' vote.⁵⁹ The 'Yes' votes were 2,773,920. The 'No' votes were 2,452. The registered voters were 2,877,464. Therefore 92.8 per cent of the people went to the polls. In the whole of Ashanti, Brong Ahafo and Western Regions, not a single person voted 'No'. The total number of 'No' votes came from only the Upper, Northern, Volta and Accra Regions.⁶⁰

Among the interviewees, two schools of thought emerged regarding Nkrumah's government. To one group, the dismal human rights record of the Nkrumah regime, the clamping down on the Courts and the introduction of the one-party system etc., show that the regime was undemocratic. Another section was of the opinion that Nkrumah chalked great achievements in establishing economic and social prosperity which served as a base for democracy in Ghana. The achievements most frequently mentioned throughout the interviews are - Tema Harbour and township, Tema Motorway, Akosombo Dam and Adomi bridge, Universities at Kumasi and Cape Coast, various housing estates in Accra and all Regions, several secondary/technical schools and free education. As one respondent said, "if Nkrumah had not provided schools most of his critics would not have had the education that enabled them to criticise Nkrumah, nor could they have appreciated the rudiments of democracy."⁶¹ Nkrumah's government built several trunk roads,

hospitals in all Regions, the former Black Star Square (now Independence Square), founded the Black Star Shipping Line, Ghana Airways and Ghana Medical School. It also launched a programme for work and happiness under socialism.

Nkrumah's critics were quick to point out to me that by 1965, Socialism had eaten up whatsoever Nkrumah had established and almost all the 47 State Corporations Nkrumah had established were running at huge losses, the economy had ground to a halt and queues were being formed in order to purchase soap and sugar. This had turned the Accra Sports Stadium into a commodities rationing centre.

On 24 February 1966, Nkrumah was overthrown by the combined effort of the Police and Army in the name of the 'demos'. This saw the formation of the National Liberation Council (NLC) chaired by Lt. General J.A. Ankrah and later by Lt. General A. A. Afrifa. The NLC, which ruled Ghana from 1966 to 1969, was criticised by some respondents for the following:- towing the line of the imperialists; removing a government elected by the people; establishing a Centre for Civic Education which was in fact the reverse of the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute at Winneba; selling State Corporations to individuals for private gain and introducing into Ghanaian politics the military factor which is ipso facto the anti-thesis of democracy.

On the contrary, I gathered that even under the military regime the press, particularly the private press could criticise the government and even though some editors of the state-owned

Press were dismissed during the famous Abbot controversy (when the NLC was attacked for attempting to undersell the now Gihoc Pharmaceutical to Abbot International); the Press had hitherto not tasted such freedom in independent Ghana. The NLC is also credited with not only halting the steady descent to dictatorship but presiding over the drafting and promulgation of the 1969 Constitution which provided Ghana with a charter of liberty, enshrining rights which were justiciable in the Courts.

The liberal democratic trend which was restored by the NLC in 1969 has tragically been allowed to operate for only five years since 1969 as a result of further military intervention in politics. The five years span the Busia and Limann governments.

Both the Busia and the Limann administrations pursued a laissez-faire economic policy and upheld fundamental human rights and liberties. They remain the only regimes in Ghana's political history in which no one was detained for political reasons. Freedom of the press flourished and the opposition spoke freely both in Parliament and through several newspapers.

In Busia's time The Spokesman was most vocal and the The Legon Observer was highly critical of both governments as a means of keeping them on their toes. The two governments rightly saw rural development as essential in a quest for economic growth, and took steps in that direction. Both Busia and Limann voted large sums of money for rural development and towards the provision of pipe-borne water, electricity and roads - all in serious attempts towards fulfilment of the governments'

commitment to develop the rural areas to bridge the social and economic disparity between urban and rural areas. Busia's government was labelled by a respondent as Ghana's rural development government. It was pointed out to me that the Busia budget of 1971 backed by a 44 percent devaluation had merely been picked up by the PNDC and applied to the extreme at a time when General Acheampong had upset the real advantages that could have been obtained as early as 1972.

Limann's hesitation about devaluation was a direct result of the precarious military presence that Rawlings posed, thus implying the imminence of a coup. Rawlings put the FNF government on probation on the occasion of handing over power. The contribution of a lady respondent from Tema is a tribute to the eras of Busia and Limann: "we have had democracy in Ghana for only five years out of thirty years of independence and these were the Busia and Limann periods."⁶² This respondent added that she was pleased that these two regimes were from different political parties in Ghana, and that she believed if they had been left alone by the Army a viable democracy would have developed.

Busia's government is often accused of arbitrariness by reference to the "Apollo 568" episode whereby 568 civil servants were dismissed under the Transitional Provisions of the 1969 Constitution; and Prime Minister Busia shouted "No Court", "No Court" when he had the occasion to comment on the verdict of the Supreme Court on the issue. Our lady respondent from Tema

commented thus "if The Spokesman could air its view, Busia too could say his. But Busia did not attempt to reverse the verdict or dismiss any judge. That is democracy."⁶³

The Acheampong coup of 1972 resulted in the dominance of the military in Ghanaian politics. After the initial NRC Junta had been toppled in a palace coup the military hierarchy established an institutionalised military government whereby one's membership of the ruling Supreme Military Council (SMC) was directly the result of one's position in the military. After SMC I had been overthrown in another palace coup led by General Akuffo, SMC II was formed on the same pattern as SMC I until SMC II itself was also removed by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC).

General Acheampong and his soldiers ruled by Decree from Burma Camp, repudiated party politics, freedom of the Press, freedom of association, fundamental human rights and the liberty of the subject. The period did not only witness abysmal economic mismanagement and national decadence as well as trade malpractices dubbed 'kalabule' but also saw the introduction of 'Union Government' and a farcical referendum to force it down the throats of Ghanaians. The proposed tripartite system under which soldiers, policemen and civilians would be elected to take part in government while political parties remained banned, was quickly discredited as bogus and undemocratic.⁶⁴

As though heralding Rawlings' distaste for political parties, Acheampong argued that parties merely fanned ethnic animosities, acrimony and corruption. What was needed in Ghana

was Union Government, involving a partnership between all sections of the community. It was a system of government that would translate into reality, the national charter - one Nation, One People, One Destiny. If return to our roots has gained currency in revolutionary Ghana, so was it under Acheampong who perceived Union Government in terms of a meeting of the village elders presided over by the Chief, where affairs of the village were discussed and decisions arrived at by means of consensus and implemented by the chief and his officials.⁶⁵

Acheampong further heralded other aspects of Rawlings' dislike for liberal democracy - a system which Acheampong felt was not only unrealistic but could not be supported in the face of the poverty of the great mass of the people. Military action was the means of liberating the people from such a mess. According to Acheampong it was the conviction of the Armed Forces of Ghana that "the principle of one man one vote is meaningless unless it is linked with the principle of one man one bread. A government which operates on the basis of ten men, one bread for the broad masses of the people is unjust and unjust rulers do not deserve to be sustained by any theoretical conceptions of democracy. As you all know, dead men have use for only one type of box - not the ballot box".⁶⁶

Acheampong could see no justification for allowing a government to run its term of four or five years in the face of economic hardship just because of its mandate. Such a government deserved to be removed by military action to enable prompt action

to be taken to redress the malaise. He said: "when a people are exposed to the dangers of destruction through massive hunger and pain, when a Government deliberately embarks upon a programme of removing bread from the mouths of the people through arbitrary dismissals and policies aimed at widening the circle of poverty, and when it becomes clear that these dangers can be removed by quick, decisive action, it is, I maintain unethical to demand that they wait for five years or so before the danger is removed."⁶⁷

The AFRC remains a sordid tale of murder and pillage under the banner of Revolution. While some viewed the high-handedness as a way of ensuring revolutionary justice in the future,⁶⁸ others have seen it as blind fury that could not have constituted a 'moral revolution' of a whole nation.⁶⁹ In short, the AFRC did not contribute positively towards the attainment of democracy.

The period 1982 -1990 which is the period under study has been seen by its principal actors as part of the search for true democracy in Ghana. The rhetoric of the season is that past democracies were not democracies at all but attempts by the elite to perpetuate their rule in a situation where the masses could not control the elected in any meaningful manner; where the people were manipulated during elections; hence the need for a participatory, grassroots, people's power - a people's democracy.

Rawlings believed that past governments had not allowed the people of Ghana to take their destiny into their own hands, as they were entitled to do as a free 'demos'. He said:

"fundamental to our present intentions is the desire to become masters of our own destiny. That is a right which some will want to rob us of for their own ends. We will keep our guard, especially, against these unpatriotic and selfish persons who have lost the chance to take the people of this country for ride."⁷⁰ Rawlings called for active political participation by all the people, saying: "we are asking for nothing more than to organise this country in such a way that nothing will be done from the Council, whether by God or the Devil, without the consent and authority of the people."⁷¹

To Rawlings, there could be no democracy in the face of injustice. He vowed that himself and fellow revolutionaries were prepared to die for their freedom. "There is no justice in this country and so long as there is no justice, I would dare say that LET THERE BE NO PEACE"⁷²

In setting up the National Commission for Democracy (NCD) to take over the functions of the Electoral Commission, Rawlings said that "democracy is not realised merely by having a machinery for registering voters and getting them to vote every four years, but also by there being a machinery for identifying the needs of those voters in between the election periods, and monitoring the realisation of these needs"⁷³

Rawlings conveyed the message that sovereign power lay with the people; and unless mechanisms were devised to enable them participate effectively in the day-to-day governing of this country, there could be no democracy. He brought out his own

concept of legitimacy in a democracy and distinguished between constitutional legitimacy and political legitimacy. Rawlings said: "I have a great deal of faith in the democratic process and that was why we insisted on elections and the handing over in 1979. But somehow, our expectations were belied. There are certain people who think that an elected government has legitimacy, no matter what. An elected government has only constitutional legitimacy, but its political legitimacy depends on its effectiveness and conduct... The PNF over the last two years, put itself in such a position that it acted outside the bounds of normal democratic norms. Not only did it block all ways of redress, but it also sought to undermine completely, the gains which the people made in 1979"⁷⁴

According to Rawlings, as I understand him, even though a government may have been elected according to the constitution and even though its actions may be described as perfectly "constitutional", yet democracy is better served if, when in the opinion of a section of the military, the government is not performing well enough, that section of the military declares the government as having lost political legitimacy, and dismisses it from office by the barrel of the gun. This is not democracy from the viewpoint of this work.

Rawlings has expressed the view that democracy cannot be found in the arsenal of political parties, parliaments and allied institutions. In a Radio and Television Broadcast to the nation to mark 26 years of Ghana's independence on Sunday, March 6,

1983, Rawlings, after recounting the events of the independence movement, continued that "rivalries and animosities among political parties sharpened as the country grew older. These were not in the form of healthy competition in which one party in power strove to do its best so that the electorate might re-elect it. Rather, while building its own funds by some dubious means, a political party also bought support by providing opportunities for bribery, theft, embezzlement and trade malpractices. Gradually, these were becoming the vogue in any political and social life, while the rewards for honesty turned out to be a self-inflicted punishment."⁷⁵

He continued that the process of going to the polls is not the quintessence of democracy: "Some regard democracy as the process of choosing between a restricted group of people by means of the ballot box. The process of this kind of democracy ends when the voter puts his piece of paper inside the box. The winners are then free to manage or mismanage the nation's wealth, and we are all witnesses to the callous mismanagement which has resulted from this type of democracy. At present, when consultations and debates go on at grassroot levels and every individual has a greater opportunity than ever before to participate in the formulation of policies, the participants must be aware of all the issues involved. Asking people to take decisions when they do not know all the factors which should be weighed is to invite superficial and dangerous decisions."⁷⁶

The economic aspect of democracy has been foremost in the

political thought of Rawlings. He said:- "we do not see a 'democracy' with hollow 'political' content but one rooted in our economic realities".⁷⁷ In a speech on 31 December 1987 titled "True Democracy built on strong and efficient economic foundation", Rawlings revealed his perception of democracy in great detail. "Democracy is only real when ordinary people know the stakes they have in it and are prepared to fight for its realisation. That is why we will continue to insist that each and every citizen must not shirk his responsibilities in this exercise (ie the registration of eligible voters)...it is from the depth of involvement of all our people, as workers and farmers, intellectuals and professionals, soldiers and policemen that we can draw the collective wisdom which will safeguard the future of our nation... For the first time... we accorded primacy to the local level in the evolution of democracy. Of course when we say that, we do not imply that democracy begins and ends at the local level. Far from it. The local structure is only the foundation upon which the other structures of the democratic process will be erected."⁷⁸

Rawlings was thus convinced that the economic base is crucial in achieving democracy and that this must begin at the local level. To him the host of constitutional rights advocated by liberal democrats are empty cymbals without first obtaining economic liberty. Rawlings said:- "nothing that we set in motion today will endure for any time unless it is supported by a sound and healthy economy. We should know that from our own history

and from the experience of other countries. The greatest enemy of democracy is a weak and chaotic economy. Thus, we delude ourselves if we think that without securing the foundations of our economy, without tackling and correcting its weaknesses, we can build democracy for ourselves. No. Democracy can be secured only on the foundations of a strong, viable, efficient economy. It should not be lost on you that the worst enemies of the revolution offer no alternative to the efforts of economic recovery that we have set in motion.... They are totally devoid of any idea except repetitive, empty slogans about their myopic brand of democracy. And yet, they have been the biggest enemies of democracy in our country, and they want to destroy the real democratic openings we are initiating."⁷⁹

Emphasising that the quest for democracy as practised in 1969 and 1979 under Busia and Limann must necessarily wait, Rawlings has stated that "it is unrealistic for any society to aim at genuine political freedom without a sound economic base. It is for this reason that the PNDC has initiated bold and sometimes stringent measures under the Economic Recovery Programme to improve our production capacity and to arrest the high rate of inflation."⁸⁰

Just as the economy must improve as a condition precedent to attaining democracy, so should we emphasise the right to shelter, the right to education and the right to security. Rawlings said this explains "the achievement of certain basic objectives for the people of Ghana and our determination to extend and give

meaning to Democracy for the mass of the people."⁸¹ You cannot make any social and economic advancement towards achieving democracy, according to Rawlings, unless you appreciate that this would involve a revolutionary transformation of the social and economic structure in the country. Accordingly, "it is on the basis of that transformation that the government decided to proceed with the programme for the development of the Volta Lake Transport System and saw to its implementation."⁸²

To Rawlings, the real challenges remain social and economic in the search for democracy and should not be seen in terms of political liberty, constitutionalism and competitive politics.

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CHAPTER THREE

THE PNDC AND DEFENCE COMMITTEES

3.1 STRUCTURE OF THE PNDC

The governmental machinery set up after the 31 December Revolution may be summarised as follows:

The Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC)

The PNDC was established as the supreme legislative-cum-executive authority in Ghana on 31 December, 1981 after a military coup. All other bodies or persons including the Committee of Secretaries, Regional and District Secretaries exercised only delegated authority and were responsible to the PNDC.

In January 1982, the Council comprised seven members as follows:- Flt. Lt. Jerry John Rawlings (Chairman), Brigadier Nunoo-Mensah, Rev. Dr. V. Kwabena Damuah, WO I.J. Adjei Boadi, Mr Joachim Amartey Kwei, Sergeant Allolga Akata-Pore and Mr Chris Atim. Membership of the PNDC continued to fluctuate. By December 1985, the Council had been enlarged from seven to ten. Only Rawlings retained his position on the Council. The new faces were Mr Justice D.F. Annan, Mr. P.V. Obeng, Captain Kojo Tsikata (formerly Special Adviser), Mr Ebo Tawiah, Alhaji Mahama Iddrissu, Major General Arnold Quainoo, Brigadier W. Mensah-Wood, Mrs Aanaa Ennin and Mrs Susanna Alhassan.

The PNDC met weekly to consider and take decisions on national issues. Furthermore, members were assigned the task of

supervising the work of the Secretaries of State. It is generally believed, however, that Rawlings and Kojo Tsikata form the "inner PNDC" whose decisions have often superceded those of the Council as a whole.

Committee of Secretaries

Apart from the PNDC, the Committee of PNDC Secretaries is the highest body in the State and it meets regularly on Thursdays. Mr P.V. Obeng has served as Chairman of the Committee since 1982. The Committee comprises all Secretaries of State who are responsible for the various Ministries and a number of other officers who have the status of Secretaries of State and are attached to the Office of the PNDC at the Castle, Osu. Others are: the PNDC Secretary responsible for CDRs, the Secretary for the National Revenue Secretariat, and the Coordinator of the Board of Public Tribunals and Office of the Revenue Commissioners. PNDC Secretaries have Deputies known as Under-Secretaries.

The Committee of Secretaries serves as the research and policy examination and implementation wing of the PNDC. Most of its members are highly qualified technocrats. The Committee serves as a Cabinet but its decisions are subject to the approval of the PNDC.

The standard of debate at Committee meetings, as a matter of common knowledge, is very high. Major decisions which have been taken at meetings of the Committee include:

- i. the establishment of public tribunals;

- ii. the economic recovery programme;
- iii. divestiture of State enterprises;
- iv. rural development programme;
- v. establishment of District Assemblies;
- vi. establishment of the decentralised departments;
- vii. petitions on detentions, dismissals, interdictions, seizure of property etc.

Regional Secretaries

Next in order to PNDC Secretaries and Under-Secretaries are Regional Secretaries, responsible for the ten Regions in Ghana. The District Secretaries are responsible to the Regional Secretaries who in turn report to the Committee of Secretaries. Regional Secretaries have held annual Conferences moving from one Region to the other to consider matters of common interest to the Regions, share ideas and make recommendations to the PNDC. In the past, discussions had been held on various issues including decentralisation/district elections, rural development, educational reforms - Junior and Senior Secondary Schools (JSS/SS), - chieftaincy, land matters, Defence Committees and smuggling.

District Secretaries

They are responsible for the various Districts in the country and work in close cooperation with the Defence Committees and cadres of the Revolution in the various Districts. They also hold annual conferences similar to those held by Regional Secretaries.

3.2. Emergence of Defence Committees

Peoples Defence Committees (PDCs) and Workers Defence Committees (WDCs) - later to be renamed Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (CDRS) - were earmarked by the PNDC to be the principal vehicles for the realisation of people's power in Ghana. In terms of a twin-concept of participatory democracy, the WDCs were basically responsible for the promotion of industrial and occupational democracy whereas the PDCs were to foster geographical participation by involving the average Ghanaian in the decision - making process in his community and nation as a whole. The Defence Committees were the means whereby the coup of 31 December 1981 would result in a concrete change - restructuring of attitudes and concepts and a redefinition and implementation of the norms and goals of society. This was the philosophical foundation for the formation of Defence Committees. Huntington spoke of revolution as "the ultimate expression of the modernising attitude, the belief that it is within the power of man to control and to change his environment and that he has not only the ability but the right to do so."

What the ordinary man had the right and ability to do, the Defence Committees became the means of doing so. The *raison d'etre* was to effect actual change beyond a mere military take-over of government. This is because, as Arendt also observed, "neither violence nor change are adequate words for describing revolution; only when change results from a new beginning can we speak of a revolution... When violence is used to achieve a

different form of government, it is accurate to say that a revolution has occurred."² The Defence Committees were to bring about that new form of government. They were the means of attaining what Captain Kojo Tsikata saw as a dramatic process of equalisation in welfare terms in that "it means that everyone can say I have my house, I have my small belongings, I have my co-operative, I have food and medical attention... a change in which we no longer have small groups of people in the country who have more opportunities than others."³ Rawlings said that the aim of the revolutionary leadership was the attainment of the reality of popular participation in the decision-making process; and in this connection he observed that "the development of Defence Committees as organisations of revolutionary popular power is the only way this can be assured."⁴

Defence Committees were "designed to make the people take their own destinies into their own hands and feel they are part of the government."⁵ Political power was to be taken by the people through the Defence Committees; Yeebo captured this conception vividly when he wrote that the basic motivating factor that propelled the formation of the FDCs/WDCs was that "the question of whether there will be adequate food for all the people or not cannot be determined merely by working harder or going back to the land... It will be decided principally by who effectively wielded State power"⁶ It is in this connection that when at a later stage of the Revolution, Rawlings began to re-define the Defence Committees basically in economic terms,

considerable conflict arose within the PNDC itself and among its followers.

The actual genesis of Defence Committees in Ghana may be seen in terms of external influences and internal developments commencing from the AFRC period. Defence Committees have been associated with revolutionary governments in the Soviet Union, Cuba, Libya and Ethiopia before the 31st December Revolution. Burkina Faso was later to join these ranks after Ghana. Colonel Qathafi, looking at political participation in The Green Book, observed that the system whereby people elect a person or persons from among themselves to represent them in a Parliament, was ineffective. It enabled a few people in Parliament to make decisions on behalf of the majority of the populace. The representative after the elections, became alienated from the people, "for immediately after winning their votes he himself usurps their sovereignty and acts instead of them."

Parliaments, to Qathafi, are plunderers and usurpers and the people, therefore, have to struggle through popular revolution to destroy instruments which usurp their power, their sovereignty and their democratic rights. Defence Committees are the alternative solution to the problem of political participation. From this standpoint, political parties represent a section of the community and not the people as a whole as Defence Committees do. The political party system operates as if the sovereignty of the people is divisible, which is fallacious. Party politics enable the party in power to usurp the role of the people and

violate the principle that the people cannot be represented. Hence Defence Committees are based on the presumed authority of the people without representatives or deputies.⁹

Cuba, unlike Libya, in operating Defence Committees, sees the need for an organisational approach to politics under the auspices of the one party - the Communist Party - which plays a leading role in the organisation and mobilisation of the people in the revolutionary process. Organisations in Cuba are all geared towards the centre and in effect, "their capacity to adapt on their own in the absence of directives from the political centre is subject to serious question and at times has been actively prevented by the political centre."⁹

In Libya, it is noteworthy that the Defence Committees wield absolute political power - at least theoretically - and considerable power in fact, as organs of popular power. They are "the controlling forces in each town and hamlet, in government agencies, State-run utilities, factories, farms, hospitals, schools, universities, departments and foreign oil companies".¹⁰ The exercise of this power touches and concerns every aspect of human endeavour. So that, "the Committees in exercising their power, dismissed, demoted or transferred thousands of officials in an effort to shatter bureaucratic complacency and purge the ideologically unreliable. The most useful groups of the people's committees have been those that were formed in the foreign oil companies at the time when delicate negotiations were taking place surrounding nationalisation."¹¹ Farhart observed that the

Defence Committee "represents the structure by which the masses express and compare their opinions. It therefore allows the implementation of collective sound judgement when the decision regarding the general policy of the people's committees is made and later report on these activities." 12

But the power of these committees in Libya is obviously subject to control. Bennet said that "like other revolutionary military regimes, the Libyan Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) has been unable to share political power on a sustaining basis or create institutions to function as pressure groups or parties".¹³ He observed that the people's committees in Libya do not wield absolute power as expressed in official writings. Basically, they are regarded as local government institutions.

Even though the Defence Committees in Cuba are controlled by the party, they also play a vital role in the Cuban system. The Defence Committees performed many political functions for the party in the early 1960s before the party was ready to establish its control completely. Dominques wrote that "they engaged in large scale political recruitment to support the revolution; they made an effort to aggregate and articulate support for the policies of the revolutionary government; they provided the symbolism of partisan struggle; they performed partisan social services too; they were a demonstration of government coercive capacity and an effective instrument to implement that capacity."¹⁴ According to Dominques, in Cuba Defence Committees have been actually effective in nation building. They had

mobilised people in defence of the revolution, promoted voluntary work, developed revolutionary consciousness of the people, and repaired school buildings, houses, bridges and the Latin American stadium. They had helped in the harvesting of sugar cane over the years. In 1976 alone, they cleared over 160,000 hectares of land to support mechanisation of the sugar industry.¹⁵ They have helped mobilise the people in defence of the Revolution and for productive ventures. Under the direction and guidance of the Communist Party, they have promoted voluntary work, rebuilt broken down schools, houses and bridges. In the field of education, they had endeavoured to eradicate mass illiteracy and to help train the aged and illiterates to read and write.

The Defence Committees in Cuba had actually been made part of the party machinery that lays out policy and controlled political participation. They have had some limited autonomy even though this could be taken away by the party. Their capacity to adapt on their own in absence of directives from the political centre has been subject to serious question and at times has been entirely prevented by the political centre.¹⁶ As Dominques said, in Cuba, the Defence Committees have been "militant, enthusiastic, versatile and irreplaceable instruments for which the Revolution will always seek their support in carrying out its activities".¹⁷

During the AFRC period, Rawlings made a historic trip to Cuba which changed his perspective drastically. In fact according to Boakye-Gyan, Rawlings had changed his views about

handing over power to civilians. He wanted to set up Defence Committees and launch a full scale Revolution in the process. This was apparently thwarted by Captain Boakye-Gyan, who presented Rawlings with a fait accompli on his return.¹⁸ The days after the AFRC hand-over saw closer development of ties between Rawlings and Qathafi. The latter is reported to have actually financed the 31 December coup. Qathafi's influence was patent in the immediate post - coup days in Ghana.

In Nicaragua also where there were Defence Committees, the Sandanista Defence Committee (CDS) played a similar revolutionary role. They constituted a para-military force, loyal, patriotic, endowed with selfless devotion and ready to die in defence of the Revolution. As the Nicaraguan Foreign Minister, Father Miguel d' Escoto who visited Ghana in April 1987 explained on Ghana T.V., the CDS are "the eyes and ears of the Nicaraguan Revolution."¹⁹

Internally, Defence Committees could be traced to the Limann era when Popular Committees (apparently borrowing from the Cuban model) were formed by junior officers of the Police Service in June 1981. The Popular Committees of the Police Service aimed at mobilising their members to spread and promote the objectives of the June 4 Uprising. A foundation member, now an inspector of police, spoke of the zeal with which these cadres proceeded to inaugurate branches of the popular committees, adding that the Limann government instructed the Inspector General of Police to ban them. Even though this ban was carried out, the committees operated underground in several barracks, condemned all incidents

of corruption under the Limann government and cooperated with the June Four Movement to prepare a cadre of revolutionaries for the use of the 31 December Revolution.²⁰

During the second anniversary celebrations of the June 4 Uprising, Rawlings gave credit to the Police Junior Ranks Association (PJRA) which sprang from the Popular Committees of the Police Service, and urged that similar "revolutionary committees" should be formed as the PJRA. In due course, serious attempts were made to set up similar organisations in all establishments to protect the interest of the ordinary man and fight corruption.

In defining the role of revolutionary committees as early as 1981, the Workers Banner wrote that they would be committees of the ordinary people who "will hold mass meetings - as durbars of the 'other ranks' in the barracks ; or people's congresses in the towns, villages, on the farms, in the factories, mines, shop floors, everywhere, to debate national issues and take decisions affecting the lives of the ordinary people. That is why peoples committees represent the highest form of democracy (grassroots democracy) because through them all the people will participate in taking vital decisions and in running the country. This way, power will not be concentrated at the top, and nobody at the top can enslave us because there is no way anybody at the top, whether he is a saint or a devil, can do what he likes. Budget proposals will be debated by the farmers in their sheds, workers in their factories, mines and on shop floors, the soldiers in

their barracks, and their collective decisions will become the decisions of the day."²¹

The article under reference articulated the role of these committees, exhorting the underprivileged to engage in some form of organisation to free themselves from exploitation and establish a true democracy in Ghana. This could be achieved through "revolutionary institutions of the (civil and uniformed) poor people- revolutionary committees of workers, soldiers, policemen, farmers etc, can enable all of us to take active part in the utilisation of our wealth, to demand which fishing net or cutlasses should be imported.."²²

Another article in the same edition of the Workers Banner (incidentally Rawlings and Atim were actively involved in writing lead articles and in full agreement with the views expressed in the newspaper which were aimed at preparing the grounds for the impending coup), advocated that "Democracy must be given a new meaning."²³ The essence of this new dimension of democracy is that the "working man should be involved in every aspect of government in terms of " popular participation based on respect for the working man and a recognition of his right to equality and a dignified place on earth."²⁴ The perimeters of democracy should also be widened "to include not only parliamentary elections, but the work places as well... this will lay the class basis for the struggle for democracy."²⁵

Rawlings himself acknowledged that the concept of Defence Committees could be traced to the AFRC period and the popular

committees formed by the junior officers of the Ghana Police Service to pursue the aims of June 4 and protect its gains. He said: "the possibility of grassroots democracy was demonstrated during the June 4 era by the Committees that emerged from within various working places".²⁶

After 31 December 1981, it was generally agreed among the revolutionaries that some form of committees or Assemblies as discussed above should be formed as organs of grassroots democracy. But what they should be called became a bone of contention. One school of thought - whose members included some Senior Army Officers, Rawlings himself and the leadership of the New Democratic Movement (NDM) - preferred "People's Defence Assemblies" (PDAs). The radical group, led by Chris Atim and Akata-Pore, preferred the name "People's Defence Committees" (PDCs). Atim claimed that this name had been agreed upon already before 31 December, 1981, under the auspices of the JFM, and that the name emphasised the class struggle the revolution was poised to engage in - a battle between the bourgeoisie (labelled "citizens") and the proletariat (labelled "people"). In the final analysis, it became clear that the name PDA was not likely to go down well with Ghanaians as it would remind them of Nkrumah's obnoxious Preventive Detention Act. Finally the name People's Defence Committee was agreed upon.²⁷ This development was, however, subsequent to Rawlings' first broadcast to the nation when he simply called for a spontaneous people's organisation as follows: "I will take this opportunity to

announce that there will be People's Defence Organisation (PDO) next to the National Defence Organisation (NDO)."²⁸ The PDOs quickly became the PDCs.

Rawlings' announcement constituted the source of authority for the formation of Defence Committees at the initial stages. The brevity and ambiguity of this call to action was responsible for the mobocracy that characterised the early stages of the revolution. Rawlings said: "we have seen enough of a traditional form of leadership which abandons the people once it is in power. The alternative that now lies open before us is for you the people to take over the destiny of this country... That is why apart from the Provisional National Defence Council, we are asking for local Defence Committees at all levels of our national life - in the towns, in the villages, in all our factories, offices and work places and in the barracks."²⁹

Certain basic tasks were given to the Defence Committees:

- (i) to defend the revolution and ensure the exposure of saboteurs;
- (ii) in the border areas, they were to assist the Border Guards and the Police to guard our borders;
- (iii) to defend the democratic rights of the people and expose corruption and any tendencies to undermine in the Revolution.

The government press articulated the objectives of the Defence Committees as follows: "to defend the rights of ordinary

people, expose and deal with corruption and other counter-revolutionary activities at the various work places and communities, to maintain collective national discipline and supervision over national resources and finally afford everyone the opportunity to participate in decision making in the country." ³⁰ Regarding a national organisation network, Rawlings stated that a co-ordinating committee of the local defence committees would be established later.

The response to the call for the formation of Defence Committees was spontaneous. In every town, village or workplace, some group of people constituted themselves into the embryo Committees of the new order. If massive participation was absent, it was partly because the majority of people who were not even opposed to the concept adopted the Ghanaian "wait-and-see" attitude; they were reluctant to identify themselves with the new regime lest they should become disappointed if Rawlings did not come to stay. With time, however, the Defence Committees came to be justified in terms of the Asafo Companies in our traditional system whereby the youth engaged in community work and deliberated on issues that were being discussed at the Chief's Council, thus influencing decisions with their considered opinion through their leader, known in the Akan areas as Nkwaakwaahene.³¹

The youth, the urban unemployed, labourers, petty traders, teachers and radical intellectuals propagated the new system. The first Defence Committee that was reported to have been formed was the WDC at the Ghana Cargo Handling Company Limited (GCHC)

Tema, where the Managing Director himself took the initiative and formed the WDC by inviting three representatives from three categories of employees - the junior staff, the senior staff and management. The Managing Director was made the Chairman of this 10 - man WDC at GCHC.³² Other organisations took the cue and formed WDCs on similar basis. But the senior officers were chased out of Defence Committee membership and the junior staff constituted the WDCs. Occasionally, a particular senior officer with special attachment to the working "class" was invited into the executive.³³

In the villages and towns, certain political activists, chiefs and businessmen attempted to get involved. In Apam, the chief Nana Nyan V supervised the formation of the initial PDC with himself as Chairman. The other members were the senior "supi" (elder) and three other representatives drawn from identifiable groups.³⁴ In Akropong, Akwapim, when the youth formed a PDC without reference to the Chief who is the Omanhene of the whole Akwapim sub-region in the Eastern Region of Ghana, the Omanhene counteracted by forming a PDC comprising members of the Council of Elders.³⁵ These "royal" Defence Committees were however, short-lived. Their demise signified a departure from previous legal structures in terms of a hierarchical system. This departure underscored the desire of the PNDC to establish new power relations.

The Defence Committees were meant for the ordinary man; and so certain categories of people were expressly excluded from

membership. These included "absentee landlords, money lenders, transport owners, chiefs, members of management and nursing sisters".³⁶ It was understood that the "big men" could not be members of Defence Committees. They were part of the problem and they could not be part of the solution. As Rawlings said, "the history of corruption in this country has always been the monopoly, in fact the privilege of high political office holders in the government... so naturally the people will begin to get angry and hoping someday, something different will happen. When the people themselves will punish these corrupt big men... so the events of 1979 was a period of re-awakening on the one hand for the people and their realisation of their power, but on the other hand, it was also a period of the re-awakening for the bad big men, politicians and businessmen".³⁷

This trend sharpened what some might regard as class antagonisms,³⁸ in terms of escalation of conflict between established legal authority and the neo-authority under the auspices of the Defence Committees. Management in various establishments were suspicious of an organisation that specifically excluded a section of the populace from participation while claiming to promote the interest of all. In Accra, the acting chief executive of the National Sports Council (NSC) was reported to have stated that no Defence Committee could be established at the NSC until the modalities for the formation of the Defence Committees had been published by the FNDC. Management explained that this was to avoid chaos and disorder.³⁹

Within the Ghana Police Force, the authorities felt they should be wary of an organisation that could seriously undermine discipline within the Force and throw the whole command system into jeopardy. The Inspector General of Police (IGP) gave instructions that the proposed Defence Committees within the Ghana Police Force should be brought up for consideration and coordination. The Defence Committee of the Ghana Police Force Armoured Squadron promptly warned the IGP and his henchmen "to keep their hands off the Committee in its effort to make life worth living for the ranks and the ordinary Ghanaian as a whole".⁴⁰ In the ensuing chaos, the PNDC issued a statement warning "top officials of some establishments and state institutions not to put themselves in the way of the current revolution by frustrating the formation of the PDCs in the various workplaces... the revolution is meant to transfer power from the group of power brokers to the ordinary people of this country."⁴¹

In no time, Defence Committees were dotted all over Ghana. No village considered itself safe until it had erected a signboard indicating the existence of a Defence Committee. In Accra, with the help of the PDC at Osu, R.E. I compiled a list of 1200 PDCs by 31 December 1982 covering the Accra - Tema area.⁴² On the national front, no specific statistics were available since headquarters never kept up-to-date records. Miss Doris Ocansey, then legal adviser at the National Headquarters located in Parliament House, informed me in 1988 however, that there were

over 10,000 PDCs throughout Ghana.⁴³ Autonomy, self direction, personal initiative and spontaneity were watchwords that made the Defence Committees blossom. They engaged in mobilisation activities, propagated the revolution and performed various tasks, including environmental cleaning. However, PDC meetings became ideological battle grounds for a wide array of political factions and fights broke loose among comrades. A lot of the confusion, according to Konings, could be attributed to the youthful, literate people, such as junior teachers, civil servants and students.⁴⁴ In my observations I found this group pushy, ideologically - bugged and fatalistically committed to instant transformation of the status quo. But the worst group was the unemployed who appeared to be anxious to pull down a state which lacked the capacity to keep them employed. Mr Noye of Osu, unemployed but certainly aware of a couple of Marxist maxims told me early in 1982: "we shall destroy; we have nothing to lose but our chains."⁴⁵ Some of the leaders found a means of upkeep by establishing ad hoc kangaroo courts and fining people illegally for real or imagined offences or seizing the wares of innocent traders or market women who were bringing foodstuffs from the hinterland. The PDC men sold these goods and pocketed the proceeds or distributed them among themselves.⁴⁶

With the dichotomisation of the society into friends and enemies, a pantheon of saints (PDCs and people) and devils (citizens) was established in which the former claimed exclusive power - a collectivist power based on ad hoc power exercised by

anonymous firebrands. It was a classic example of informal and hostile politics in which the 'citizen' was not only physically molested but also was made to suffer a nagging psychotic fear: he was constantly torn between whether he might have done something wrong in terms of a misfeasance or left something undone and thereby be guilty of a non-feasance. Fellow described a PDC demonstration in Accra in early 1982 as follows: "like the military, PDCs were not innocent of excessive behaviour. Like the military, they helped enforce government programmes. They reported people to the authorities... Most city-dwellers were conscious of the power of the PDCs and their members. While the PDC activists did not carry guns, many feared them because they went on the rampage as a group, acting on vague rumours that those in power had stolen from them in times past."⁴⁷

3.3 Guidelines for the Formation of Defence Committees and the Interim National Coordinating Committee (INCC)

The first attempt to give form and structure to the Defence Committees, coordinate their activities and provide some meaningful framework for their operation was made by the establishment of a 16 member Interim National Co-ordinating Committee of PDCs (INCC). The first chief official of the INCC was Mr Chris Bukari Atim, member of the PNDC. His designation was National Coordinator. Atim's influence on Defence Committees was to have far reaching consequences as will be seen in due course. The INCC was to have its counterparts in the Regions and Districts. The National Secretariat of the INCC comprised five

departments-administration; projects and programmes; monitoring and coordination; education; press and information; and complaints and investigations.

In order to facilitate its training programme, the INCC was allowed to take over the Afienya Youth Training Centre and use it as a Cadre Training Centre. Its graduates were expected to be the torch bearers of the Revolution, for whom no heights were too high to jump to and no depths too low to descend into. In the end, it produced the ultra-revolutionaries who were to join the ranks of Atim and Akata-Pore to challenge the power of Rawlings and Tsikata. The training operations of the INCC extended to the military and the police with a view to "conscientising" the People's Army, the People's Navy, the People's Air Force and the People's Police towards the attainment of revolutionary goals. This is how Napoleon Abdulai and Nicholas Atampugre became known on the political scene, acting as national liaison officers for the Military and Police Defence Committees.

For the promotion of the revolutionary work, the PNDC presented the INCC with a press house which had been seized by the PNDC from Chris Asher, publisher of the Falaver newspaper during the Third Republic. The INCC published a weekly newspaper called Nsamankow from this press house, re-named Nsamankow Press. The editor was Mustapha Kutana who was also known to belong to the Akata-Pore/Chris Atim faction.

The INCC was not able to operate effectively as it was plagued ab initio with divisions within the PNDC. In the first

place, Kojo Tsikata was careful not to create an alternative power - block that could challenge the authority of Rawlings. Tsikata has always preferred loose organisations and institutions, operating on ad hoc basis, treading along with directives from Rawlings or himself and not having any well-laid down rules, systems, hierarchies or constitutions by which checks and balances could be secured. A PNDC appointee said to me: "he (Tsikata) is a master tactician; he wants no systems; he wants no commitments. He is not pre-committed to any policy. But he expects you to be committed to a cause - which means you should be committed personally to Rawlings and himself".⁴⁸ Secondly, while Atim, Akata-Pore and others were pushing the INCC to become a mass movement with national, regional and district headquarters resulting in People's assemblies at the District, Regional and National levels, the Rawlings faction was advocating a more gradualistic approach. The obvious fear was that the revolution could be hi-jacked. Thirdly, the INCC was plagued by the struggle for power among the New Democratic Movement (NDM), the June Four Movement (JFM) and the People's Revolutionary League of Ghana (PRLG).

These difficulties were fueled by organisational problems, ideological differences, personality clashes, political ambition and suspicion generated by ethnic loyalties. Akata-Pore who was supposed to be a representative of the PNDC on the NDC had apparently created a communication gap between himself and the PNDC Chairman, and taken personal control over the INCC which

became what cadres described as the "real power house" while they called the Castle "the power house".⁴⁹ This crisis assumed such proportions that at one stage Rawlings reportedly ordered the seizure of all INCC vehicles.⁵⁰ In the circumstances, the stage was set for a new phase in the evolution of the Defence Committees - the National Defence Committee (NDC).

3.4 The National Defence Committee (NDC)

In July 1982, the name of the INCC was changed to National Defence Committee (NDC). Rawlings appointed himself Chairman of the NDC and the Secretary to the PNDC, the late Dr. Emmanuel Hansen, was appointed Secretary to the NDC. This was a clear move to make the NDC directly coterminous with the PNDC. It is reported, however, that Chairman Rawlings attended only one meeting of the NDC where he advocated the inclusion of other classes of Ghanaians into the Defence Committees. Rawlings was out-voted and he found other means of attaining his objectives as he never attended any further meetings.⁵¹

The important development during this period is that the PNDC issued a useful document entitled "National Defence Committee (NDC) Guidelines for the formation and functioning of the Peoples Defence Committees"⁵² (See Appendix B)

Throwing further light on the NDC system, Rawlings said that "very soon, steps will be taken to organise co-ordinating committees at the local, district and regional levels. These bodies will elect the leadership of the defence committees. A National Congress will be organized which will elect the NDC

which in turn will be answerable to the National Congress. The National Conference will bring together all identifiable groups of patriotics and democratic-minded individuals and organisations in the country." ⁵³

The NDC itself was a 27 member committee headed by the Chairman of the PNDC himself and with four other members of the PNDC as members. Chairman Rawlings was represented by the Secretary to the NDC on the few occasions that the NDC actually met; and the fact still remained that Defence Committees operated according to the ideological and emotional inclinations of individual operators. The Defence Committees under the NDC restructuring began to experience cracks for several reasons.

In the first place, the Defence Committees still lacked the capacity to provide direction for both workers and citizens. These factors together with that arbitrary actions and failure to make productivity gains in industry embarrassed the PNDC. Secondly, there was suspicion between the NDC and the PNDC. In December 1982, a government statement charged that "preliminary investigations into the attempted coup of 23 November had confirmed the involvement of sections of the NDC Secretariat, particularly its leaders." ⁵⁴

Thirdly, the PNDC; was establishing a closer linkage with the IMF and World Bank by late 1984 and it was clear that these donor institutions had misgivings about the Defence Committees. The World Bank spoke of the Defence Committees and required "an improvement in the present climate for private economic activity

through the reduction in uncertainties and perceived or real threats of coercion and interference in their economic pursuits which are mandatory for eliciting a quick response from the private sector... The general political and social milieu (must be) favourable. While the People's Defence Committees (PDCs) and Workers Defence Committees (WDCs) can play useful roles in increasing production and productivity, their exuberance and misplaced enthusiasm may have the potential of causing unintended harm in the economy and interfering with the efforts the "Government is making towards economic recovery".⁵⁵

Fourthly, the leadership of the NDC was unstable. Rawlings could not lead the Defence Committees as he sought to do under the re-structured set-up. After the crisis that faced the government in October/November 1982 arising mainly from the fracas between Rawlings and Akata-Pore most of the leftists made their exit from the government creating a vacuum that led to the dissolution and subsequent reconstitution of the NDC in March 1983. This reorganisation brought in chiefs, senior members of the security agencies and businessmen. Professor Mawuse Dake was also appointed PNDC Secretary responsible for the Defence Committees. The aim was to ensure the government's control over the NDC. Incidentally, Mawuse Dake found himself torn between the expectations of the workers and the determination of the PNDC leadership to monopolise power at the centre. When Mawuse Dake resigned his post out of frustration, the stage was set for dissolution of the NDC and demise of the WDCs and PDCs in 1984.

Fifthly, the 19 June 1983 jailbreak and events flowing therefrom played in the crackdown on the NDC. This bold action was led by soldiers who had once been loyal to Rawlings and some of whom had even taken active part in the 31 December coup. They had, however, defected in subsequent years and been arrested after the coup attempt of 23 November 1982 and several other coup attempts thereafter. When disloyal soldiers struck on 19 June 1983, the Usher Fort and Nsawam Prisons were thrown open and several prisoners fled. Simultaneously, the guardroom of the Tema naval base was also broken into and soldiers who were being held prisoners for dissent against the PNDC were freed. At this juncture, as one refugee explained later, "the jailbreak turned into a coup d'etat"⁵⁶ because the freed men were tempted to stretch their arms further and wrestle power from Rawlings. The operation was led by Corporal Halidu Gyiwah with the active support of Colonel Ekow Dennis and others. The Ghana Broadcasting Corporation (GBC) was captured; and the overthrow of Rawlings was announced amidst wide-spread jubilation throughout the country which lasted for several hours. Even though Captain Quarshigah later appeared at the GBC to announce that the coup had been foiled, the attempted coup actually fizzled out for lack of ammunition and actual preparation.⁵⁷

This coup attempt had serious consequences for the WDCs/PDCs and the NDC for several reasons. First, even though the PDCs erected road blocks and physically arrested some of the dissidents who were in track suits (and in the process some

cadres lost their lives) the PNDC saw, by the molestation, hooting upon and jeering of PDC members by the entire populace, that the system had made little impact on Ghanaians as a whole. Secondly, it was manifest that several soldiers at the barracks were unwilling to rise to the defence of the PNDC. This was attributed to the activities of NDC officials who were "polluting the soldiers with stupid ideology."⁵⁸ Thirdly, it was suspected that certain elements within the NCD were ready and waiting to capitalise upon the crisis and seize power. Fourthly, as one cadre pointed out, the PNDC was frightened by the spontaneous outflow of the peoples power on 19 June 1983 and feared that this could be used in due course against the PNDC itself; hence Rawlings thereafter instructed that the NDC should leave politics and the defence of the country to him.⁵⁹ Fifthly, it was suggested to Rawlings at this time that his real power base remained the military and unless he strengthened his hold therein, his fall was imminent. This consolidation, however, was not consistent with the influence that NDC revolutionaries and Marxists had on the military. The Armed Forces Defence Committee had to be curbed and the NCD influence neutralised. In effect, from this period to 1 December 1984 when the PDCs and WDCs were dissolved by a press statement they existed only in name and hardly wielded any political power.

3.4 Emergence of Committees for Defence of the Revolution (CDRs)

If coming events do cast their shadows, the demise of the

WDCs/PDCs and their overlord the NDC, could be seen in the famous dawn broadcast by Rawlings on 6 March 1983 when he accused the PDCs and WDCs of "exercising power without authority."⁶⁰ In a mood of reconciliation Rawlings invited "the professionals, men and women of religion, chiefs, the lodges and everyone to break out of their insulating walls and shells and give the national effort a push.... the character and commitment of the individual is more important than the class from which he or she comes or the position one holds."⁶¹ Justifying the 1 January 1984 dissolution of PDCs/WDCs, Rawlings subsequently said the "the gap between theory and grassroots practices has become too great and the tensions caused by the NDC regarding itself as a parallel or alternative power structure has wasted too much energy."⁶² The Guidelines for CDRs published by the PNDC redefined the role and functions of the CDRs.⁶³

MEMBERSHIP

Membership of the CDRs is open to all persons or citizens of Ghana who are prepared to abide by and defend the basic objectives of the revolution and who have ample record of patriotism, integrity and democratic practice. There are only two categories of people who are not qualified to be members of the CDRs. The first group consists of those who opt out because they do not wish to participate. The second group consists of those who are rejected by the majority as lacking integrity, patriotism and genuine concern for their countrymen and women. In other words, no one has automatic and perpetual right to

membership. It depends on continued revolutionary discipline and hard work.

All CDRs up to the Area Level are to elect their own people for the various offices. The offices include the Chairman, Secretary, Treasurer and not more than four members. The elections of the executives are conducted every other year and no officer is eligible to hold the same position for two consecutive terms. CDRs up to the Area Level are to elect Sub-Committees for particular purposes such as Health and Sanitation, Development Projects, Education and other functions depending upon the needs of the area.

The Unit Executives as explained in the "CDR Guidelines" are to work up to Area Executives. All Area Officers are supposed to work up to the Zonal CDR. Zonal Officers are to work up to their District Organizing Assistants. All CDR Organising Assistants in the District and Regions are to work through their respective District and Regional Secretaries to the Office of the Political Counsellor, who was placed in charge of the activities of the CDRs in Ghana.

It was further provided that all CDR Secretaries from Zonal to Regional levels are to submit quarterly reports pertaining to their activities. Zonal reports are to be sent to the District Organising Assistants at the District and Regional levels for onward submission to the Office of the Political Counsellor.

FUNCTIONS:

The roles of the cadres include the following:-

- i) To serve as vehicle for spreading the ideas, principles and objectives of the 31st December Revolution in the implementation of its aims;
- ii) To encourage the people to defend their democratic rights through responsible and positive means;
- iii) To inform the people of their responsibilities and rights as citizens;
- iv) To ensure the democratic participation of all Ghanaians, especially farmers, fishermen and other working people in the decision making process at both the National and local levels and encourage them to get meaningfully involved in the running of affairs of their villages, towns and cities, their offices, factories and workplaces as a whole;
- v) To help expose activities directed against the interest of the people and the state;
- vi) To organise the people to achieve a permanent state of readiness in defence of the Revolution;
- vii) To mobilise the human and material resources of the nation for the rapid all round development of our country and people, to ensure that our developmental efforts are primarily based on our lives;
- viii) To foster fraternal co-operation and solidarity between the struggling peoples of Africa and other parts of the world.

The Cadres of the CDR perform various functions at the Community, Work-place, District, Regional and National levels.

At the community level, they are expected to liaise with appropriate agencies and other members of the community to collect basic data on population, economic activities, infrastructural services and other data which assist in planning so as to improve living standards in the community. Their other functions are summarised under the broad headings of Production and Storage; Community Shops; Education and Training; Health and Sanitation; Layout and Housing; Afforestation; Defence and Security.

At the work-place, the main function of Workers' and Forces CDRs is to assist Managing Directors, Chief Executives and Commanders in carrying out administrative and operational duties. They are also supposed to carry out social education as well as acting as the link between the organisations and the National Secretariat of the CDRs, in order to ensure the achievement of the aims and objectives of the revolution. CDR representatives at work-places serve on the Joint Consultative Committees (JCC).

At the District and Regional levels, officials of the Secretariat are expected to visit CDRs at the lower levels to deliver and explain Government plans and policies to the community. They are also to encourage discussions and provide feedback to the appropriate authorities. Officials at this level are also to arrange talks, durbars, courses, seminars, etc. to raise the political awareness of the people and their vigilance in the defence of the National Democratic Revolution.

The National Secretariat is the highest organ of the CDRs.

The Political Counsellor (now PNDC Secretary for CDRs) who heads the Secretariat, participates in the formulation and evaluation of Government policies and political programmes and ensures that the flow of information to the Government is not suppressed.


STRUCTURE

At the Community level up to five hundred (500) people constitute a unit CDR. At work-place level, CDRs are formed at any establishment which has five or more employees. The CDRs at this level relate to the Zonal, District Regional or National CDR Secretariat with District Departments. Each department forms its own CDR where the establishment has several branches, within a District, Regional or National Co-ordinating Committee. At the National level the CDR consists of various departments, namely, Administration and Services, Education, Culture, Information and Religion, Complaints and Arbitration, Legal, Monitoring and Co-ordination, Projects and Mobilization, Training and Research.

Tables 3:1, 3:2, 3:3, 3:4, and 3:5 following illustrate the organisational, structural and functional position of the CDRs and a comparison with the PDCs.

TABLE 3A


AN ORGANISATION CHART OF THE CDRs IN GHANA
SHOWING THE VARIOUS DEPARTMENTS AT VARIOUS LEVELS



SOURCE: THE CDR EAGLE FLIES, THE NATIONAL SECRETARIAT OF CDRs
NSAMANKOW PRESS 1986

Table 3B


STRUCTURE OF THE CDR AT
THE NATIONAL LEVEL



Source: C.D.R. GUIDELINES, 1986

Table 3C


DEPARTMENTS OF THE NATIONAL
SECRETARIAT OF THE CDRs



Source: CDR GUIDELINES, 1986

Table 3D

STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS AT
COMMUNITY LEVEL



Source: CDR. GUIDELINES, 1986

Table 3E

COMPARATIVE CHART OF PDC
CDR CONCEPT




TABLE 5 above shows that the structural difference has been minimal, save that under the new system, the gap between the Unit and the Area levels has been widened. The departments in fact are the same in the CDRs as in the PDCs. The essence of the new system is the incorporation of the system at the National, Regional and District levels the formal PNDC Machinery through the PNDC Secretary for CDRs, the Regional and District

Secretaries. An important change to be noted is that membership of Defence Committees has been opened to every Ghanaian who has integrity, is patriotic, possesses a genuine concern for fellow Ghanaians and is committed to the aims of the 31 December Revolution.

The CDRs were placed under a National Secretariat for CDRs headed by an official initially designated "Political Counsellor for the Economic Development of the CDRs"⁶⁴ This long title was carefully contrived to underscore the new motto of the Defence Committees - "Mobilise, Defend and Produce", instead of "Power to the People" and the replacement of the clenched fist which symbolised the people's struggle for power with the emblem of the flying eagle. The CDRs were to concern themselves with how to help attain economic goals and leave politics alone. The change therefore reflected an ideological departure and concrete redefinition of the role of defence committees whereby they were stripped of the actual power that they had striven for from the inception of the Revolution.

This was certainly the case even if the government was slow to admit it. As Colonel (rtd) J.Y. Asassie, the first political counsellor, himself said at the inaugural ceremony for CDRs, "the main reason for the redesignation was the desire of the revolutionary leadership to bring about a qualitative change in the operations of the Defence Committees. The era of the CDRs can be seen as qualitative advancement of the Defence Committee concept... There has been a definite shift in the centre of

gravity to economic consideration. This is not to negate the political work we are involved in but rather to lay emphasis on pressing problems"⁶⁵

Pessey expressed the view that "given a critical look, the name CDR should have been the first and right name for the Defence Committee" because the word "people" attached to the PDCs led to a "hatred of the concept by those who wrongly thought they were excluded"⁶⁶ He argued further, the preamble to the Guidelines for CDRs (See Appendix B) explained the change and must be accepted in good faith. This stated that "A Revolution is a process which develops in stages. What is true for one stage may not necessarily be true for another stage. Therefore, the tactics of the revolutionary forces must also change to reflect the changing phases or historical circumstances. These must be qualitative changes and must consolidate and advance the interest and aspirations of all our people... from the practice of Defence Committees so far, it has been possible to find out the areas needing modification and those needing further explanation"⁶⁷

The reactions, however, of Defence Committee members gathered especially from Osu (Accra), Hatso (rural Accra), Nsawam (Eastern Region) and other sources may be summarised as follows:

(i) " we have been used by Rawlings to achieve power. Now he does not need us anymore. We feel bad". (ii) "Rawlings never believed in mass exercise of power. He has got all the power now. It is too late for us". (iii) " The people have been sacrificed

on the altar of the IMF. The imperialists hated the Defence Committees". (iv) "Rawlings has destroyed the PDCs but he has also destroyed himself. Without the PDCs he will realise in the long run that he has no political base." (v) "Rawlings now rules only with the control of the army. We see clearly there is no Revolution. There is only a coup".

Definitely, a cross-section of my interviewees, particularly the elderly (from ages 45-70) had no tears to shed for the PDCs and WDCs. Some remarks may be recapped as follows:-

(i) "The PDCs cannot complain that they were used and abandoned. They should have known better. They were prostitutes and when they had been used, what happened to them? They were discarded."

(ii) "The small boys have burnt their fingers. Let this be a lesson for all. They did not respect their elders." (iii) "The lesson must be learnt. The PDC people were dangerous".

One thing is certain - the change dealt a devastating blow to the morale of Defence Committees from which they never recovered.

3.5 Organisation of the Local Defence Committee

Every PDC had a name. The names of the zonal PDCs were given according to the date of formation. In Osu, Accra, for example, a PDC selected as a case study which covered an area popularly known as "Oxford Street," and a wide residential area with about 10,000 inhabitants, was named East X'Borg Zone B PDC because there already existed a Zone B PDC. The name of a PDC,

when agreed upon, was sent to the Headquarters (initially INCC) where it was verified, confirmed and registered.

A list of members was then compiled and membership cards issued. These cards were purchased and membership dues were paid. The public was compelled to obtain these cards between 1982-1984 in order to have access to food items. Throughout the country, people registered their entire households as members - including minors whose ages were inflated for the purpose - because it was the only means of obtaining "essential commodities" - milk, sugar, soap - and sometimes even kenkey and bread to feed a family. This opportunistic approach to recruitment created a structural weakness for the PDCs. The public only came round with their cards when there was something to purchase.

After members had been gathered, a PDC proceeded to elect an executive. Prior to this, the spadework had invariably been done by an interim executive committee. At the East X'borg Zone B PDC which typified what happened at other places, at the first formal meeting of the PDC, the interim executive was dissolved and a new executive was elected. The elected officers were as follows:
Chairman: S.Y. Oquaye, Secretary: S.A. Nortey, Organising Secretary: J. Nii Armah, Porter: Mahamadu Allassan, Treasurer: Florence Martei, Asst. Treasurer: Afi Bediako, Matron: Mrs. C. Lartey, Field Assistant: Miss Florence Martei

From what happened at Osu, certain observations were made and conclusions drawn which had general application. In the

first place, PDC positions were actually contested for, at least in the initial stages. In some cases, there were three or more nominees for one position. After the first two years the positions were filled by acclamation by the handful of members present who merely echoed: "unopposed, unopposed". This happened for two main reasons - the PDC leaders sought to entrench themselves in office usually for personal gain, love for power or because of the fact that having thrown their weight about so much they felt it was embarrassing to be out of office. A few, however, were committed to live and die for the Revolution. In any case, others were not interested in serving as PDC executives and be closely identified with the revolution. Several interviewees looked forward to the day when the PDC leaders would "live to regret". By this they meant two things - either the Revolution would eat its own children or it would collapse and its children would be prosecuted.

Secondly, there was the tendency of electing certain persons in absentia especially if it was felt they could be used in a specialised area. These offers were often rejected. In East X'Borg, for example, Mrs Lartey, a nursing sister, who was elected in absentia as Matron, proceeded to protest her election and demanded that her name should be deleted. She claimed that she was too old for the post, was due to retire soon, and would be leaving the country. It became apparent that this 48 year old lady did not want to get involved. This stand was typical of her age group throughout the country. In the end, Miss Martei, a

younger nurse/midwife who had been elected field assistant whose duties included "going round with the 'people' whenever they want to work so that she could nurse and care for those who might get injured while working" ended up as Treasurer, Field Assistant and Matron.⁶⁰ Obviously, there were not enough qualified and willing people to serve the PDCs.

Tables 4:6 & 4:7 below give us the picture of the personnel in X'Borg, Accra and Nanumba in the Northern Region. They are typical of PDC personnel nationally.

TABLE 3F

Personnel Position in terms of 40 relatively active members in East X'Borg Zone B PDC - a first class urban residential area.

Qualifications	Number	Average Age	Occupation/Employment
Graduates	1	40	Manager in a State Corporation
Diploma holders	NIL	NIL	-
Nursing/Professional	3	32	Two female nurses and one male psychiatric nurse
Advance level (GCE)	NIL	NIL	-
Ordinary level (GCE)	1	21	Clerk
Commercial School	1	19	Typist
Middle School *	10	18	Clerks (5) Bus Conductor (1) Unemployed (4)
Artisan Training	6	24	Plumbers (4) Electricians (2)
Semi Literate	12	25	Self employed (4) Unemployed (8)
Students	6	17	O' Level and Commercial

* This group included one 70 year - old man who was a pensioner.

Source: My analysis of available records and information.

Table 3.6

PERSONNEL POSITION IN NANUMBA DISTRICT
ZONAL SECRETARIAT OF THE C.D.R.s

Zone	Qualification or quality of Cadres	Occupation before joining the C.D.R.s
1	Two (2) Cert. 'A' Teachers One (1) GCE 'O' Level Holder Three (3) MSLC Three (3) illiterates	Two (2) employed Seven unemployed
3	Five (5) MSLC Two (2) GCE 'O' Level Two (2) illiterates	Seven (7) unemployed Two employed
6	One (1) MSLC Eight (8) illiterates	All unemployed
9	One (1) Cert. "A" Holder Eight (8) illiterates	One (1) employed Eight (8) unemployed
12	Nine (9) illiterates	All unemployed

Source: Mahamadu-Atta. The CDR Concept A Rural/Urban analysis. A Dissertation presented to the Political Science Department, Legon, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the B.A. (Hons) Degree, 1987.

Sub-Committees were also established on the ground as the actual directing forces to draw up plans for consideration of the executive and members regarding specific areas and assist the executive in their implementation. The East X' Borg PDC stated that, in appointing sub-committees, they had eyes firstly on effective implementation of all decisions; and, secondly, enable

each member to take active part in the PDC generally and in particular areas. As they put it, "the work of the PDC is not one man's work; neither is it the work of only the executive. It involves every Kofi, Ama and Yaw of the PDC. Decisions are not taken by only one person but by the entire membership of the PDC working first through the committees"⁶⁹ The Committees included Task Force, Farming, Finance, Investigations, Education, Entertainment, Welfare, Sports and Culture.⁷⁰

After members of the executive and various committees had been elected, the PDC decided on its dues. Problems always arose in this connection. For example, at a meeting at the East X'Borg Zone B PDC on 19 February, 1983, several disagreements as to how PDCs should obtain money emerged. A member suggested that monthly dues should be introduced for members to contribute towards the upkeep of the PDC. Out of these dues the PDC would be able to carry out its projects for the community. Some members were of the view that "silver collection" should be taken at meetings as a way of raising revenue because "among us are unemployed, students, etc. who cannot afford monthly dues".⁷¹ Those who felt their obligations should be limited to this "silver collection" expected that the FNDC itself would take financial care of the PDCs. After what the minutes describe as a "heated and prolonged debate", the matter was put to the vote and the issue was decided as follows:- Those who wanted to pay c5.00 monthly dues = 17 Those who preferred to pay c2.00 = 15, Total 32. The losers continued to protest that they could not

afford the c5.00 a month. There was so much confusion that the matter had to be reconsidered. The minutes say that as a result, "the voting was reversed and C2.00 carried the day".⁷² Notwithstanding this reduction, the c2.00 were generally not paid by members and the PDC remained financially handicapped. It was suggested that monies should be raised by cultural activities, film shows and a system whereby once every month, all members would come and make special donations according to their days of birth. This failed in Osu as it failed in other parts of the country. One organisational weakness of the PDC was that people were not prepared to commit their money to it. Nor was a national mechanism provided to sustain the fledgling system until it could stand on its feet.

The PDC organized times of meeting to ensure effective participation. Saturday were declared PDC "working days" throughout the country since Saturdays enabled active participation by most people. In some places meetings started with prayers and ended with prayers (such as the East X'Borg PDC). In some areas members resorted to pouring libation, while in others the chairman merely declared the meeting open.

Low attendance plagued PDC meetings. On 29 October, 1983, the low attendance at a regular meeting at the East X'Borg PDC - several meetings had been postponed for lack of quorum - led to a discussion on "ways and means to attract people to our meetings"⁷³ It was suggested that non-regular members should be starved of food items. The Chairman advised the faithful few "to

be regular at our meetings and try to bring at least one person more when coming. This could raise our numbers at meetings...we should not use food as the bait"⁷⁴ In any case, there was so little business to do with so few members that the meeting started at 6.50 pm and ended at 8.15 pm.⁷⁵

When everything was set with the Defence Committee, a vetting process was undertaken, followed by formal inauguration. In the case of East X'Borg PDC, these were done on Saturday, 22nd March and Saturday 29 March, 1982, respectively, at Edinburgh International School, Osu. On the vetting day, Mr Kwabena Kodua, an INCC representative, came to perform the vetting in this manner: all executive members were asked to stand facing the people who were then questioned as follows by Mr. Kodua:

Q. Who are these?

A. They are the elected executive.

Q. Let them give their names and positions

A. (The various executive members gave their names and positions to the hearing of the people.)

Q. Are they your free representative freely elected by you?

A. Yes.

Q. In the name of the community, do you certify to their honesty, integrity and revolutionary zeal?

A. Yes

After this, the INCC representative declared the executive duly elected and charged them as follows: listen to the voice of the people. You are their servants. Do what the people say they

want done. Let hard work, honesty and cooperation be your motto". As a demonstration of revolutionary solidarity, Mr. Kodua shouted revolutionary PDC slogans and the people responded.

Kodua: "People"; Response: "Revolution"

Kodua: "Action" Response: "Now"

Kodua: "Aluta" Response: "Continua"

Kodua: "Aluta Continua", Response: "The struggle continues".⁷⁶

On the inauguration day, Mr Kodua re-appeared as INCC representative. After a formal declaration of the inauguration, he proceeded with a revolutionary speech characteristic of all such inaugurations during the era under review. Mr Kodua said that the PDC members should "unite and uproot once and for all, the corrupt attitude of the so-called 'big shots' in the country.... the Revolution is a battle between the rich and the poor, the latter being in the large majority... power is now in the hands of the people and this power must be used judiciously. The PDC is a means by which the people should decide what is good for themselves"⁷⁷ Violence was advocated as follows: "before conditions would improve in the country, the Krobo Eduseis, Okutwer Bekoes and the rest should be sprayed for their blood to pacify the gods of our land"⁷⁸ Attack was launched on imperialists and multi-national corporations, revealing the ideological leaning of the leadership at the time. Mr Kodua asked the PDC to "educate the people on the nature of imperialism ie who our real friends are. Valco and all the big foreign investors are cheating the country...some good friends from the

East have expressed their genuine desire to help us out of our economic mess and so very soon, the foreign exploiters will be given the sack."⁷⁹ Incidentally, silver collection for the inauguration day yielded only c228.40.⁸⁰

The spontaneity with which Defence Committees were formed had certain conspicuous results on the ground. For example, the struggle for power among certain revolutionary leaders meant that areas of jurisdiction often overlapped even in the face of paucity of numbers which undermined the viability of these committees. The East X'Borg Local PDC was faced with such a problem when a rival R.E. Central PDC was formed. In the ensuing confusion, it was arranged that the RE Central PDC should send representatives led by their Interim Secretary, to a special meeting. During the said meeting, the R.E. Central PDC, which was regarded as the breakaway faction, complained that the East X'Borg PDC had grown too big and hence a break was needed for effective administration. But this was at a time in August 1963 when both PDCs lacked sufficient membership. In the East X'Borg PDC, attendance was less than 30 people on the average, and three meetings had to be post-poned during that period for lack of quorum. The East X'Borg PDC leaders replied that it was negative for cadres to cover the same area. Secondly, the group which was breaking off had not been attending meetings. Thirdly, it was manifest that they only wanted a separate people's shop and to form what was described as a "food PDC".⁸¹ In the end, the split occurred because the cadres who numbered less than ten were bent

on having their way and there was no means of restraining them. The group promptly established a people's shop and began collecting items for sale.

Various struggles for power created problems. For example, at a meeting of the East X'Borg Local PDC in Accra on 10 April 1982, some PDC members on 18th Lane, Osu, Accra, who incidentally were very well organized, but technically fell within the zone of the East X'Borg Local PDC, demanded that the executive of the East X'Borg PDC elected on the 27 March 1982 should be dissolved for fresh elections to be held including themselves. After heated exchanges, it was discovered that the group concerned who were bent on seizing power or forming a rival PDC within the area, had not formally elected an executive. After tempers had cooled down, the new group was persuaded to work with the elected executive "for the time being" until fresh elections were due.⁸²

3.6 Work of Defence Committees

Defence Committees have attempted to perform various functions towards improvement of the quality of life in Ghana and the equitable distribution of available resources which are essential to the development of democracy. We may study these under various headings:-

3.6 (1) Distribution of goods

Scarcity of various goods which have been labelled "essential commodities" (including milk, sugar, rice, flour, soap, canned fish etc.) has become a thorny issue since the Nkrumah regime when queues were formed at the Accra Sports

Stadium and other public places for distribution. These scarce commodities constituted the hub around which Kalabule (cut throat profiteering) revolved in the Acheampong era⁸³. Under Limann, the problem reared its ugly head again as scarcity bred exploitation. On the advent of the 31 December Revolution, Defence Committees either took over the distribution of essential commodities directly or monitored their distribution by commercial houses closely. In their monitoring role, we note, for example, that the East X'Borg PDC closely checked the Ringway GNTC and Afridom Ltd., the leading supermarkets in the area, during the early years of the Revolution. The PDC compiled a list of members and gave priority to nursing mothers, pregnant women and the aged in the distribution. When reports were received that these shops were engaged in secret sales and diversions, a sharp intervention was made to check such practices.⁸⁴ In some cases, the PDCs received supplies of goods directly and distributed them. This led to the development of people's shops which were to serve "not only as channels for distribution of commodities, but also multi-purpose cooperatives for the production and marketing of local produce, as well as means of obtaining inputs for farming and other occupations."⁸⁵

Throughout the country, goods were obtained from commercial houses and factories, and sold to the PDC members which on such occasions included almost everyone in the community. In East X'Borg, a committee of five was set up to see to the establishment and operation of a People's Shop which would

operate in the form of a co-operative. Every member was to deposit C70.00. Of this amount c50.00 would be the share capital of a member while c20.00 was used for administrative expenses - including membership cards, rationing books, letterheads, rubber stamps, forms etc. This was the system adopted by the PDCs generally. In Hatso (rural Accra) the Hatso People's Shop⁸⁸ officers included Chairman, Vice Chairman, Secretary, Treasurer and three Procurement Officers. A Bank account was to be opened at the Ghana Commercial Bank, Legon, with three signatories - according to a resolution passed at a general meeting. The account was, however, never opened and the haphazard manner in which the committee members and the PDC executive handled both commodities and monies contributed to the collapse of the system. At Hatso, the People's Shop faced other problems including poor warehousing, lack of capital and credit facilities as well as favouritism in the distribution of goods stemming mainly from nepotism. When the system collapsed the PDC Chairman told me that the system was crippled by officials at the sources of supply who refused to give them goods which were diverted to other sources. What I observed is that on various occasions, the local Hatso PDC took a very long time to raise monies for their supplies. When they ultimately got to the depots, the goods had already been re-allocated. Furthermore, shopkeeping is a specialised vocation. The myth that anyone could do anything at anytime including even the government of the nation was exploded by the incompetence of the PDCs in shop

management.

On some occasions, the goods supplied were in such small quantities that distribution created headaches. For example, on 25 June 1983, 24 bags of rice were received by the East X'Borg PDC. Since about 15 "olonka" (American tin) make a bag of rice, the total came to 360 "olonka". The total number of registered members at that time was 680. In the face of the difficulty, the distribution was done by margarine tins and each member got three margarine tins by way of a quarterly supply at twenty one cedis. The situation created a problem as some members suggested that food should be distributed only on meeting days and to the regular members. But the other argument was that all the other persons had registered with the people's shop and, secondly if food was tied so closely to meetings, no one would attend them when there was no food.⁸⁷ The PDCs, nevertheless, became people's commodities associations throughout the country. People attended meetings only when there was something to distribute. On 23 April 1983, the minutes book of the East X'Borg PDC minutes book read: "the meeting opened as usual with a prayer. It was only the executive and some ten members who were present. So after thirty minutes when nobody else was showing his face, it was agreed by the members present that the meeting should be called off"⁸⁸. The Chairman was so frustrated by this attitude of non-attendance save there was a commodity linkage that he gave notice of his intention to seek re-election.⁸⁹ When in June 1983, sugar, flour and rice were received, the numbers increased

instantly at meetings leading to accusations of opportunism that marred the spirit of conviviality among the PDC members.

Indeed, people had become so charged about food that on 16 April 1983, one Mr. T. Chameleon, member of the East X'Borg PDC, complained that one Madam Osabutey was distributing the "people's Kenkey" to her children before sales to the people. Mr. Chameleon charged: "you have no right to give any kenkey to anybody - not even your dying child.". When ultimately the East X'Borg PDC took over the direct cooking of kenkey by some of their members, they failed miserably to satisfy their members and the public.⁹⁰

Other factors accounted for the collapse of the people's chops. In the rural areas, peoples shop monies were locked up in the Ghana Co-operative Bank - the only Bank that was operating in certain areas in the hinterland. This happened in Nanumba, for example. Mahamadu in a case study of this area observed that attempts made by the District and Regional CDR Secretariats to retrieve such monies proved futile. Subsequently, most people's shops which were established refused to open accounts with the Bank and therefore handled their monies. This in turn led to misappropriation of these funds.⁹¹ The table below reveals the amounts locked up in the Ghana Co-operative Bank and the total share capital of the shops in their respective zones.

TABLE 3H

SAMPLE OF PEOPLE'S SHOP MONIES LOCKED
UP IN GHANA CO-OPERATIVE BANK

ZONE	NO. OF PEOPLES SHOP	AMOUNT LOCKED UP	TOTAL AMOUNT	AMOUNT LEFT
1	9	C65,305	C109,400	C44,091
2	10	17,161	86,200	56,199
3	4	28,400	39,900	11,500--

Source: Mahamadu, Atta op.cit

In addition, there was lack of proper accounting and some officials were guilty of embezzlement. The conditional sales adopted by PDCs were very unpopular, especially in the rural areas.⁹²

In some cases, monies were borrowed from the people's shop funds by the PDC but which could not be refunded. In Nima (Accra District), for example, the people's shop financed the toilet rehabilitation project. When the project was completed the PDC was not able to collect tolls to replenish the coffers. Since goods could not be collected on credit, the people's shop suffered therefrom.⁹³

The PNDC trade liberalization policy also dealt a blow to the People's shops. When goods became plentiful on the market, the PDCs lost their attraction and control over people. If any hope lingered that they could operate vis-a-vis other shops, kiosks etc., my observation at Mamprobi, Accra, showed that the people avoided PDC goods like the plague even at reasonable prices once there was an alternative source of supply. This

underscored the fact that the FDC as an institution, could not carve a good image for itself in the eyes of the populace.

3.6 (ii) Clean ups and Conservancy

The early FDCs in both urban and rural areas were highly involved in clean-up campaigns, conservancy issues and the filling of pot-holes. In the process, gutters were cleaned and bushy areas weeded. Saturdays were earmarked for community labour in most areas and residents had to come out and work in the streets, clean gutters and weed their surroundings or face revolutionary action from the FDCs. In the rural areas, the system held on longer than in the cities. In Accra, residents argued that they had to be left alone to go about their specialised duties once they paid their taxes and rates and that it was the obligation of the Accra City Council (ACC) to clean up the city. In some areas, shoddy jobs were done by non-experts who worked on the streets of Accra with the result that despite the bitumen provided, a single rain washed away the efforts of the volunteer workers.

It was also a misapplication of labour, for example, to call out doctors and nurses in our hospitals and make them weed and fill pot-holes when they should be in their wards and theatres. As one respondent argued, this aspect of the revolution was merely a play to the gallery. He said that the system had to fade out because in this era of specialization, a government's duty was to ensure that those departments which should clean the towns and cities actually did their jobs as in the colonial days.

off for lack of finance.

If this situation arose at Osu, Accra, the seat of government and one of the most sophisticated residential areas in Ghana, it underscores how financial problems and lack of effective planning plagued the PDCs and rendered them empty cymbals. The PNDC never considered modalities towards the financial viability of the PDCs. To illustrate the financial problem, it was noted that when the East X'Borg PDC executive formally took over on 27 March 1982, the finances were as follows:

Income	=	c1158.00
Expenditure	=	<u>526.00</u>
Balance		<u>632.00</u>

The poor financial situation persisted, despite genuine efforts to correct it by thrift and selflessness. For example, the minutes of 5 June, 1982, show that of the 2 crates of minerals bought for the inauguration of the PDC, one crate was left unconsumed. Instead of distributing the drinks among themselves, the executive decided to auction the drinks to members present and pay the proceeds into coffers. 13 members bought a bottle for c3.00, 5 bought at c5.00 and 3 bought at c6.00. In spite of this noble gesture, the amount of money that stood to the credit of the PDC was c733.40 after the payment of a few expenses.

3.6 (iii) Defenders of the Revolution

The Defence Committees have defended the 31 December Revolution in word and deed, some even unto death. The early

clashes of PDC members with other members of the public centred on the cadres' defence of the revolution. Despite their high-handedness and over-zealousness, they remained behind the revolution. Without them, the Revolution could probably not have withstood its earlier onslaughts from various sections of the population. On the occasion of the Halidu Gyiwa coup the PDCs erected roadblocks and actually captured certain dissidents.

The PDCs acted as agents in of reaction to the pressure groups that attacked the PNDC. At the East X'Borg PDC a meeting was held on 8 December 1982 to react to a pastoral letter from the Christian Council of Ghana. The letter called on the PNDC to dissolve the PDCs and hand over power to civilians. This letter had considerable influence on the people of Christiansborg who are seventy per cent Presbyterians. The PDC reacted and passed a resolution in the following terms which received wide distribution in the area: (i) The PNDC should not give audience to the Christian Council because the latter had already done their worst by their pastoral letter; (ii) the allegations against the PNDC members were false, especially those that related to corruption within the PNDC corruption; (iii) the authors of the letter were reactionaries hiding behind the Christian Council to cause confusion and derail the Revolution; (iv) the letter had not been fair to the PDCs/WDCs because the latter were doing a yeoman's job by exposing crime and people of dubious character, checking smuggling, keeping the communities clean etc., to make life worth living for the ordinary man and

hence the majority of the people; (v) concerning the matter of handing over power, the PDC quoted Brigadier Nunoo-Mensah and asked; "Hand over to whom? "; (vi) the PNDC should be left alone to continue the good job it was doing in securing justice for all; (vii) the church leaders should stop causing confusion otherwise "the wrath of the people would be on them if they venture the next time"; (viii) the PDC protest letter should be distributed to as many people as possible, and also read to the congregations and copies sent to all press houses.⁹⁵

Methods employed in defending and propagating the Revolution included lectures, symposia and public education. These generally took two forms - firstly, civic and general education in various areas including lectures on health issues which made people see some use of the Revolution. Secondly, political education to inculcate certain tenets of the Revolution into the people. We shall give an example of each, drawn from our experiences at X'borg, Accra. On 29 October, 1983, a special speaker Mr Laud N. Dowuona spoke on the theme the "Good Health and Cleanliness". The topic for that day was "epilepsy". The speaker spoke on how common the illness was within the age of 5 years and that it was related to a rise in temperature. Indeed, the causes generally, symptoms and treatment of the disease were adequately treated in terms of public education under the auspices of the PDC. The lecturer pointed out how dangerous it was for an epileptic to go near fire (such as cooking). He advised that epileptics should not be shunned since the illness

is not contagious.⁹⁶ In other parts of the country lectures were given on guinea worm disease, aids, hypertension etc. under the auspices of PDC.

Within the sphere of political education itself, the PDCs were instruments of political agitation regarding, populist and extremist ideas. On vetting day at the X'Borg PDC for example, Mr Kodua of the INCC Headquarters spoke on various political issues. Regarding mass participation in politics, he said that the time when "only a handful of people go to Parliament and take decisions which are most of the time not in people's interest but in the interest of they themselves are gone forever"⁹⁷ He spoke on corruption and the nexus between this syndrome and politicians in these terms: "corruption would be ruthlessly uprooted so that the suffering of the people would end forever. Criminals and rogues are given birth to by the very corrupt activities of the so-called big shots - the Krobo Edusei's, Okutwer Bekoe's and the others"⁹⁸ The class struggle which had become an issue in the early part of the Revolution was commented upon as follows: "revolution is not a child's play. It is war between the rich and the poor, the latter being in the vast majority"⁹⁹

This rallying cry which permeated all PDC gatherings engendered hatred, and charged the people to action in attacking the rich and privileged in society. Mr. Kodua said further that revolution cuts through tribalism and that anti-revolutionaries were those who used the weapon of tribalism to infiltrate the

united ranks of the people. He said: "if anything at all, there are only two tribes in Ghana - the rich and the poor. The latter should fight hard for the ultimate end to come ie the success of the 31 December Revolution. There should be no tribalism. Ghana is for all of us - one nation, one people, one destiny."¹⁰⁰ The PDC leader spoke on education and described the prevailing system as an instrument of cheating and exploitation: "the sort of education the white man gave only taught us how to become big thieves. We use it to cheat those who, fortunately or unfortunately, do not go to school... what the revolution is demanding is a fair share for all, equal rights for everybody".¹⁰¹

Mr Kodua explained that the letters PDC stood for definite words which should serve as guiding principles to all PDCs. He said "P" represented "produce" "D" stood for "defend" and "C" signified "cooperate" - "we should produce to feed the nation, defend what we produce and cooperate with our brothers and friends who fight our fight".¹⁰² On the economic front, "PDCs should be seen as disciplined bodies who are deeply involved in nation - building. They should particularly watch and deal ruthlessly with multinationals who are cheats, exploiters and blood suckers, engaged in nefarious activities which shattered our economy".¹⁰³

The above is a classic example of the speeches that provoked action throughout the country, for example, against multinationals.¹⁰⁴ The attacks against the educational system - which was not perfect, of course - were not justified. It was

wrong to engender hatred when the system was basically fair and allowed the bright child from the remotest hamlet to attend such famous schools as Mfantshipim, Achimota, Pressec etc as of right by dint of his performance in the common entrance. One further criticism against the PNDC was that it did not check tribalism but rather promoted it. Mr Kodua's analysis was wrong in that the PDCs were helpless if they intended to check this cancer. Adu Boahen wrote that a "major criticism of Rawlings and his PNDC is that wittingly or unwittingly, consciously or unconsciously, they have been fanning ethnicity, or as it is more popularly though wrongly termed, tribalism. So it is not strange and rather unfortunate that the Head of State, the Head of National Security, the Head of Police, the Head of the Army, the acting Governor of the Bank of Ghana, the Head of the National Investment Bank, and I am sure there are others - all happen to belong to a single ethnic group...?"¹⁰⁵ Adu Boahen added that "whether Rawlings is aware of this or not, this situation is giving the unfortunate impression that the country is being dominated and ruled by that single ethnic group (Ewes), and this impression is causing such anger and irritation that in the interest of national reconciliation and peace, measures should be taken to rectify the situation. What is happening at the Bank of Ghana is particularly provoking."¹⁰⁶

If the PDCs were supposed to constitute a national movement that would serve as a melting pot for tribal differences, they failed woefully. Non-Ewes associated with the Revolution spoke

of the "Dzelokope Mafia" in reference to Ewe dominance in PNDC politics. Dzelokope is the hometown of Rawling's mother, the Tsikata family and several leading Ewe advisers and functionaries of the regime. If the PDCs had not come under the strong influence of men such as Chris Atim and Akata-Pore who were northerners, the relationship between Defence Committees and the PNDC could have been very different. The difference between Rawlings and Tsikata on the one hand, and Akata-Pore and Chris Atim on the other, actually had not only ideological but also tribal connotations.

The PDCs were guilty of un-called for violence. If in defending the revolution, violence was used, one cadre from X'Borg, Accra, justified it in these terms: "You know, the Defence Committees are in the working class. The people we have to check have no respect at all. So we have to apply force to put the fear of God in them - then we can deal with them. If you are down and someone is high, before you can deal with him, you have to bring him down first."¹⁰⁷ This constituted a serious tactical approach by Defence Committees in dealing with the populace. It is my view that you cannot in any nation help those who are down by whacking down those who are standing. This is destructive of society as a whole. What should be done is to find legitimate means for bringing up those who are down. The basic negative philosophy of Defence Committees constituted catastrophic nihilism that hindered them from making constructive and positive impact on the socio-political development in Ghana.

As defenders of the Revolution, Rawlings spoke of the Defence Committees as having "brought to light some of the most sordid cases of public corruption. They have brought public attention to criminal wastage and destruction of public property which have been going on in our offices. They have highlighted the incredibly conspicuous absence of interest shown by certain members of management in the economic performance of units under their control."¹⁰⁸ In performing this defence function, the Defence Committees became involved in matters relating to the administration of justice, arbitration and adjudication generally, detection and punishment of crime and preventive services such as anti-smuggling exercises. During the initial stages of the Revolution, for example, the Defence Committees supervised the implementation of the Rent Control Law 1982, PNDCL 5. The Community tribunals which were established, dispensed instant justice, blending revolutionary "ad-hocism" with certain principles of customary arbitration in determining cases.

3.6 (iv) Defence Committees and Development

The Defence Committees have been viewed as agents of development in both the urban and rural areas. This is the general view. Specifically, however, they have been conceived as a solution to the rural urban disparity in Ghana, in terms of development and amenities. Abban has described a rural area as "an area where the majority of the people are engaged in primary economic activities such as farming, fishing, hunting etc. ... where the population lack basic drinking water, electricity,

health and sanitary facilities, good roads and entertainment centres." ¹⁰⁹ Dickson and Bennet have stated that "there are two kinds of settlements in which the population of Ghana lives - rural and urban. In popular language, a rural settlement is loosely referred to as a village, and the urban settlement as a town. In Ghana, every settlement with a population of 5,000 or more is officially regarded as a town. However, the distinction between rural and urban settlements should not be based on size alone, because town as defined by the geographer is not always larger than a village. Geographers usually distinguish between the two by considering the functions and the principal occupations of their inhabitants. If the majority of the inhabitants are engaged in occupations like farming, animal rearing, fishing or timber, then the settlement is rural; but if the predominant occupations are industrial, commercial, administrative and cultural ie. if they are not directly related to the land, then the settlement is urban." ¹¹⁰

This disparity accounts for the difference in Workers Defence Committee activities in the rural and urban areas and the very difference in popular struggles in rural and urban areas - the latter showing a clash between management and workers and the former making desperate efforts to improve their environment. The disparity itself has been identified as a problem by Nkrumah who wrote that "centralisation of administration in Ghana has been anti-rural development; to the extent that it has denied the rural people, the resources and capability to provide for their

needs. The reliance on central government to develop rural areas has proved misplaced as governments have rather concentrated on the satisfaction of the needs of the urban dwellers. Part of the problem is the absence of a well-thought concept of rural development and the failure to articulate the achievement of the goals of rural development so conceived."¹¹¹ Ewusi expressed the depth of the problem in these words: "In Ghana, the complete lack of social and economic infrastructure is the most obvious and pressing problem for rural development and it in fact underlies the problems of rural - urban income disparity and lower productivity in the rural areas".¹¹²

The plight of the rural people has manifested itself in poor health, housing, water etc. Busia as Prime Minister observed: "I know I can sit in Accra and the water I use in my toilet is cleaner than the water my fellow countrymen are drinking. I have a conscience, I have a heart, So I said, let us help them."¹¹³ In the past, several approaches had been adopted to correct the above-mentioned anomaly. These, include firstly, the Community Development Approach which aimed at helping the local people to achieve desirable goals through self-help projects. The aim is to provide stimulation and development of local initiative.

Secondly, we have the Social Amenity Approach which aims at providing the rural communities with certain basic modern amenities and social services such as electricity, pipe-borne water, roads, hospitals, clinics, better housing and toilet facilities. This is to bridge the gap between facilities in the

rural and urban areas, and encourage people to live and work in the rural areas. Thirdly, there is the Agricultural Development Approach which aims at enabling the rural populace improve upon their basic occupation which is farming, through agricultural extension services, improved feeder roads, demonstration farms, seed nursing and distribution, farm machinery, better storage facilities, access to capital and finance, marketing and processing. Fourthly, we have the Accelerated Project Implementation Approach, which, according to Kudiabor, was first adopted in Ghana in 1968 when Regional Planning Committees were set up to work as "the framework with which the execution of development projects could be effectively monitored in each Region".¹¹⁴ The underlying assumption here is that an effective machinery should be established at district and regional levels to facilitate specific projects and development generally. It is also to remove one obstacle to development - lack of effective mechanism to ensure the monitoring of projects at the local and grassroot levels. This was the reason for the establishment of Regional Development Corporations by the Acheampong regime, for example. Fifthly, we have the Agrarian Reform Approach which the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) has defined as embracing development of rural institutions generally. Such reform must affect customs, traditions and the land tenure system generally. Sixthly, there is the Rural Crafts and Small Undertakings Approach through which rural efforts and crafts are encouraged to promote economic and social development of the rural areas,

particularly as an alternative source of income during non-farming seasons. It is also a means of developing the capabilities of the artisan class - masons, blacksmiths, carpenters etc.

The seventh method is the Rural Resettlement Schemes Approach. By this method, land may be given to a group of people, probably because they are landless and steps taken to ensure that the community becomes economically viable. This was adopted in resettling over 80,000 inhabitants who were dislodged by the Volta River Project. The affected persons were introduced to new methods of farming, industry and fishing as part of a national development plan.¹¹⁵ Under Nkrumah, some unemployed persons were resettled on the land by the State Farms. Finally, we have the Integrated Approach whereby rural programmes are planned and implemented at the local, district and regional levels within the framework of an overall national development plan.

These basic approaches have been listed in order see accurately in which areas of rural development the Defence Committees have made an impact and meaningfully their contribution. The Defence Committees have been quite active in terms of the Social Amenity Approach, the Increased Agricultural Productivity Approach and the Community Development Approach. In FDC terms, these were often intertwined and we shall compare their activities generally from a rural-urban perspective, and compare developments in Accra, with special reference to Osu, and

Ga Rural generally, Effiduase in Ashanti and the Nanumba District in the Northern Region. From my studies generally, these give us a good idea of the developmental role of the Defence Committees. (See Tables 4.7 - 4.10 following).

The Defence Committees saw their developmental role particularly in terms of the Social Amenity Approach by mobilising the people to build and repair roads, provide housing, pipe borne water and health facilities. In X'Borg, Accra, efforts were made to renovate primary school buildings including the famous St. Thomas Primary School and X'Borg (Osu) Salem, the local library and provide some public places of convenience. Estimates were made for the provision of KVIPs at moderate prices. In the Effiduasi area, the PDCs drew up a comprehensive development plan for the town. Ofori¹¹⁶ has given us details of the maintenance and rehabilitation work that the Defence Committees did in terms of various social amenities. The cadres inter alia organised themselves to renovate the Local Council building which subsequently served as the offices of the District Administration. Their efforts spanned improving places of public convenience, the community centre, utility services, street lights health and transportation. The cadres at Effiduasi, in particular, helped in a scheme aimed at integrating traditional healers and medical practitioners to promote medical care generally. In 1986, according to Ofori, the Defence Committee of the Government Health Centre teamed up with the Zonal CDR and went to various villages within the zone to immunize the people.

The Zonal CDR also arranged for experts from Mampong to handle an outbreak of bilharzia at Ntumkumso and Seniagyee respectively. Furthermore, the CDR worked to make motorable, the Effiduasi - Nsutam and Effiduasi - Mmotokurodua roads. The cadres further monitored lorry fares to ensure that approved rates were charged so that foodstuffs vendors could convey their wares at reasonable costs. The Ghana Private Road Transport Union (GPTRU) at Effiduasi was reportedly very cooperative in this connection.¹¹⁷

In the Nanumba District, according to Mahamadu,¹¹⁸ the building of dams, boreholes, farms, health posts, road habilitation etc. were undertaken in the same way as in the Accra District generally. People's shops offices were constructed, public toilets rehabilitated, KVIPS built, bus stops repaired, and general rehabilitation works carried on bridges, roads, schools, public bathrooms etc.

In the Dangme/Shai area some work was done by the Defence Committees in terms of certain developments, according to Tetteh-Wayo.¹¹⁹ As he saw it, the CDRs in the Dangme/Shai District aimed at mobilising the local people to use local resources at their disposal to carry out development projects beneficial to the local people. Their aim was to make the District self-sufficient and economically viable. In this connection, in February 1982, the executive committee at the Area Secretariat set aside every Friday for communal labour, and sanctions were imposed on defaulters. A 50-acre farm was started at Dodowa, and other towns were enjoined to follow suit. The proceeds of

these farms were to be brought to the People's Shop for sale to the public and the profits in turn pumped into development projects to be decided upon. Tetteh-Wayo concluded, however, that it was rather unfortunate that this aim could not see the light of day because conflicts developed which resulted in the dissolution of the CDR executive and the subsequent collapse of the farm.¹²⁰ The CDR executive, however, mobilised the Ghana Highway Authority (GHA) in weeding along the Dodowa - Afienya road. By means of communal labour, they wiped out mosquitoes by draining and spraying all stagnant waters. Toilets were rehabilitated, and to maintain them all users were charged a toll of c1.00 per head.

Further details given by Tetteh-Wayo show that at Doryumu, a special levy was instituted to generate funds for the construction of two KVIP places of convenience and a sanitary committee was set up to maintain cleanliness. In October 1983 the rehabilitation of the District Defence Committee office was started. The District C.D.R. financed the project and in March 1984 it was completed and is now housing the Area Secretariat office. The people of Abonya-Dodowa, a small village near Dodowa, together with the village Development Committee and the local CDR started drilling bore holes to provide clean water for the people. Technical men from the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) were consulted for technical advice. At Ayikuma, an elaborate electrification project of the town was initiated. The C.D.R. educated the people on the need for the

effective implementation of the project. The project, however, could not take off because of feet dragging and too much red tape on the part of the electricity corporation to conduct a survey to estimate the total cost. The people of Ayikuma started work on a rural housing project scheme, which was financed by the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development under its rural housing scheme. The project involved the building of one hundred three bedroom low cost houses. By 1986, twenty houses had been built under the scheme.

At Doryumu, the road linking Tema and Kordiabeh was renovated to make it motorable. This was to enable the Omnibus Services Authority to re-start the provision of the bus services which were suspended as a result of the poor condition of the road. The people together with the C.D.R. and the Town Development Committee have also undertaken the rehabilitation of the only Continuation School in the town. Every Friday was set aside by the C.D.R. for communal labour on the project. The T.D.C. and the C.D.R. jointly sponsored the project which was at the roofing stage in 1986.¹²¹

At Prampram, a gigantic electrification project was started. Tuesdays and Saturdays were set aside for communal labour on the project. The project which was estimated to cost c3.5 million was at the final stages of completion in 1986. To meet the cost of the project, the Prampram Traditional Council at the initial stages provided cement and Liron rods to the Electricity Corporation for the construction of the electricity poles. A

special levy of c200.00 was imposed on all citizens of Frampram. Pupils of the local D/C Middle School under the direction of the local C.D.R. and the supervision of their leaders moulded 3,000 bricks to be used to construct a new school building. The school project estimated at c150,000 was financed through contribution from the parents and communal labour. From the sale of their community fishing and produce from their community farm, the people realised c75,000 which was used to purchase drugs for the Health Post. The C.D.R. at the Health Post also in appreciation of this gesture resolved to check the stealing of drugs and to see to their effective use for the benefit of all. It also started clean-up campaigns to ensure good environmental sanitation.¹²²

At Ningo, the C.D.R., the Town Development Committee and the chiefs initiated an electrification project estimated at c7.0 million. It was expected to be completed by the end of the year 1986. To finance it non-residents contributed c1,000.00 while resident citizens paid c500.00. Another major project was the construction of a 200 metre bridge over the Djange lagoon between the two sister towns. A joint committee for this purpose was formed to work out the details for the effective implementation of the project. This self-help spirit encouraged the National Fishermen Council branch at Ayetepa to construct two classroom blocks for the local primary school to serve the six fishing villages. The branch together with the C.D.R. also set out to erect sheds for first aid centres to cater for the primary

medical needs of fishermen along the coast. Funds for the project were to be generated from a community farm and two fishing canoes acquired by the Council.¹²³

At Dodowa, plans were commenced to house the offices of the proposed Dangme/Shai District Council Headquarters. To this end, the C.D.R. the Town Development Committee and the Chiefs levied c200 on each citizen. At New Town, a suburb of Dodowa, the T.D.C. and the C.D.R., constructed a school block for the local primary school. Two bus stops were constructed in the town. During communal labour time, clean-up exercises were undertaken to keep the town clean. The C.D.Rs at Dodowa with the help of the T.D.C. also constructed a local Day Nursery School. This was financed solely with funds from the local C.D.R. coffers. The self-help spirit at Agomeda area saw the chiefs directly involved in C.D.R. activities. In this way, the people felt the government was with them. The people together with the C.D.Rs. within a short time were able to complete the construction of a community clinic in april 1984. The people went further to sponsor selected people to undergo further training in health management to man the clinic.¹²⁴ It is my observation that these projects started with enthusiasm but like all others, soon fizzled out.

Under the Increased Agricultural Productivity approach, Defence Committees were expected to contribute towards the "green revolution". In this connection, even the PDC at X'Borg, Accra, acquired a tract of land at Hatso near the Atomic Energy, Accra,

for the purpose of farming. Saturdays were conveniently set aside for work on this farm. By July 1983, however, interest had waned in the people's farm, and on 23 July, 1983, the meeting of the PDC noted with regret that when they decided to gather together to go to work on the farm land, nobody turned up except the executives. Prior to this, there had been heated debates as to whether only people who took active part in work on the farm were to be considered in the distribution of commodities. Some members were of the view that those members who had registered but did not take active part in the PDC should not be given anything. The other school of thought was that there should be equal distribution, and food should not be used to force people to work. The system obviously collapsed partly because nobody was willing to work "according to his ability" while others droned on and yet expected to share the proceeds "according to needs" in the long run. Reality had overshadowed socialist jargon in the process.

In the Effiduasi - Ashanti area, Ofori noted that farms were established under cadre initiative. At Koboampon, a suburb in the town, the Defence Committee established a four hectare farm and planted maize, cowpea and cassava. During a bushfire in 1983, the PDCs and WDCs were seen in active cooperation assisting the farmers with cocoa seedlings and participating in the planting exercises. They also engaged in mass spraying of cocoa trees. Similar help was given at Akrofoso and Banko. The schools in Effiduasi were encouraged by the PDC to engage in

agriculture, handicrafts and poultry farming. The Zonal PDC established a five hectare farm with crops such as plantain and cocoyam.¹²⁵

Under the Community Development Approach, there occurred a broad spectrum of action including education, adult literacy, home management etc towards development. At X'Borg Osu, the Education Committee was seen as the hub around which development revolved. The Committee taught citizens their rights and duties which they saw as the genesis of any developmental action. They showed kenkey makers, for example, how to keep their surroundings more hygienic. At a meeting on 12 June, 1982, the X'Borg PDC decided that the 56 members who were present should be divided into four groups. Each group was earmarked to visit a certain number of homes, carrying the message of the revolution and particularly on the following lines: (i) in view of the scarcity of goods, the little available should be rationed so that everyone should get "a little bit of that little"; (ii) advise residents to buy and sell at the government - approved prices; and (iii) inform residents of the existence of the local PDC, the meeting time and places, the work on hand and how individuals could contribute.¹²⁶

In the Nanumba, area because of the high rate of illiteracy, the PDCs went further than those in Accra by establishing night schools to educate the people and equip them for development. This aimed at teaching the illiterate population how to read and write.¹²⁷ In Effiduasi, the level of political education was so

high that according to Ofori "even old women and men have become politically conscious."¹²⁸ The PDCs resolved land controversies that would impede development to the satisfaction of the people to the extent that, when making her plea before the CDR in Effiduasi, a woman had this to say: "the land in dispute which is my bona fide property is lying at a place popularly known as Mmotokurodua on Effiduasi stool land. The defendants have trespassed the said land and I am petitioning to you for your action."¹²⁹ In the various villages including Awaham, Booya, Mmotokurodua and other areas where there were no police stations, the PDCs helped to maintain law and order for business to proceed and monitored the levy collectors in discharging their duties. In this connection, the role of the rural PDC was more elaborate. (See tables 3.9 - 3.12).

TABLE 31

CDR DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN THE DANGBE/SHAI
AREA (1983-1985)

Location	Project	Labour	Finance	Time Started	Time Completed
1. Dodowa 1984	Rehabilitation of CDR Office	Communal Labour	District CDR Offices	Oct. '83	March 1984
2. Prampram	Electrification project	Communal labour	Contribution by Inhabitants/ World Vision	-	Yet to be completed
3. Agormenda	Construction of School Block and clinic	Communal labour Inhabitants and World Vision	Contribution by Inhabitants	June 1983	April, 1984
Location	Project	Labour	Finance	Time Started	Time Completed
4. Ayikuma	Rural Housing Project	Manual labour by Inhabitants	Min of Local Gov't.	1st phase completed	2nd phase yet to be completed
5. Doryumu	Continuation School	Communal labour	Contribution by the Inhabitants	Aug. 1983	May '85

Source: Tetteh-Wayo, E.A. "The Performance of the CDRs. A Study of the Dangme-Shai District. Department of Political Science, Legon. BA Long Essay, May 1986 p. 52.

TABLE 3J

**CDRs DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN EFFIDUASI- ASHANTI
(1982 -1987)**

PROJECTS	YEAR COMMENCED	YEAR COMPLETED	ESTIMATE COST IN CEDIS
1. Renovation of District Council Building	1982	1983	20,000.00
2. L/A 2 Primary and Middle Schools	This project was started before the revolution	Not yet completed	40,000.00
3. Renovation of places of Convenience	1984	1985	25,000.00
4. Rehabilitation of Drinking Wells	1985	1985	2,000.00
5. Rehabilitation of Street Lights	1985	1986	25,000.00
6. Rehabilitation of Roads	1986	Not yet completed	30,000.00
7. Community Farm	1983/84	-	40,000.00
8. Rehabilitation of Cocoa Farms and other Extension Services	1983	Not yet completed	30,000.00
Total			212,000.00

Source: CDR ZONAL SECRETARIAT, EFFIDUASI-ASHANTI
from Ofori, Edward Kwame. The Impact of CDR in Rural Development
Op cit p.63.

Table 3.K

SAMPLE OF CDR PROJECTS IN NANUMBA DISTRICT

ZONE	PROJECT	COST IN C	REMARKS
2	Two (2) Dams	450,000	Completed, but scarcely do contain water during the dry season
2	One (1) bore hole	50,000	Completed operates well
2	Demolished three (3) refuse dumps	35,000	Completed
	1 Thirty (30) acre maize farm	-	80 bags
4	Health Post	20,000	Completed
4	A 40 acre Maize Farm	-	90 bags
4	A Farmers Service Centre	40,000	Completed but only motorable in dry season
4	Rehabilitation of a School	20,000	Completed
4	Two (2) boreholes	100,000	Completed
6	Carried out Projects, but detail was not available at the of conducting the Research	-	-
8	Constructed a School block	15,000	Completed
8	20 acre Maize Farm	-	65 Bags
8	Two (2) Farmers Service Centres	40,000	Completed

ZONE	PROJECT	COST IN C	REMARKS
8	Three (3) boreholes	150,000	Completed
10	Constructed Five (5) Schools	206,000	Completed
10	15 acre Maize Farm	-	45 Bags
10	Four (4) boreholes	200,000	Completed

N.B. This did not include uncompleted projects.

Source: Mahamadu, Atta op cit. pp 61, 62

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TABLE 3.1

SAMPLE OF CDR PROJECTS IN ACCRA DISTRICT

ZONE	PROJECT	REMARKS
2	Three (3) Peoples' Shop Offices	Completed
2	Eight (8) Rehabilitated Public Toilets	"
2	A Bus Stop	"
4	Two (2) Bridges and A Bus Stop	Two Bridges Completed and the Bus stop uncompleted
6	A K.V.I.P. Toilet	Completed
	Road Rehabilitation	"
	A School building	Uncompleted
8	Six (6) Rehabilitated Public Toilets	Completed
10	Five (5) Rehabilitated Public Toilets	Completed
10	Two (2) Rehabilitated bath-rooms	Uncompleted
12	Two (2) Rehabilitated Toilets	Completed
12	Road Rehabilitation	Uncompleted

Source: Mahamadu Atta op cit p. 63

3.6(v) Rural/Urban Disparity

In general, the Defence Committees in the rural areas have made greater strides in terms of development, compared with their urban counterparts. Defence Committees in the Northern Region were reported to have spearheaded communities to complete 500 development projects by 1987. In Ashanti, during the same period, the Defence Committees embarked upon 240 projects. These

developmental projects were to make better the quality of life of the people, especially those in the rural areas.¹³⁰

It is to be noted, however, that prior to the establishment of PDCs, Town Development Committees (TDCs) and Village Development Committees (VDCs) were undertaking rural projects. In the revolutionary years there have been clashes between CDRs on the one hand and the TDCs and VDC on the other. Mahamadu in his work decried the misplaced jealousies. He stated furthermore that various projects commenced by TDCs and VDCs in cooperation with the Nanumba District Council had ground to a halt because the requisite support expected from the Central government was not forthcoming. In this connection, the District Secretary for Nanumba reported in 1985 that "it is common knowledge that this District is the least developed in so far as infrastructure is concerned. Most district offices are squeezed up in not more than two rooms with no residential accommodation for workers. It is pathetic to note that development projects started between 1975 and 1978 remain uncompleted".¹³¹ Observing the inability of the TDCs/VDCs to complete projects in cooperation with the District Administration, Mahamadu stated this should be "contrasted with what the CDR have been able to do in the District within their five years in office. The CDRs in Nanumba District have completed many projects, dispersed throughout the villages".¹³²

A further credit due to the CDRs in rural development in particular is that whereas in the past the development that took

place in rural Ghana were spillover effects of sectoral planning on the national level, the CDRs brought in more direct local initiative and effort at least at the initial stages. They conceived their own ideas and became direct planning instruments in various localities. Mahamadu therefore concluded that the CDRs are indispensable tools in Rural/Urban Development. He gives details are given by Mahamadu to support his conclusion. From 1982 to 1986, the Defence Committees in the Nanumba District put up a total of 75 projects at a total cost of c3,229,200.00. Out of these, 18 schools were constructed; 5 schools were rehabilitated; 6 dams, 5 wells and 21 boreholes were constructed, plus rehabilitation of roads, farm service centres and project farms."¹³³ However, Mahamadu's conclusion is too sweeping as the CDRs actually lost steam on the way.

Speaking only in terms of Defence Committee projects the success story in Accra is less favourable, even though relying on reports in the Daily Graphic, we learn that "thirty-eight of the projects are in the Accra District..., the projects in the Accra District include a poultry at the District Secretariat, a community shop, an Area Office, a public bath, and incinerator all in La. All broken down pipes in the area and places of convenience have also been rehabilitated. The same has been done for Osu and Teshie."¹³⁴ My observation shows that the development picture in Accra is not as bright at all as portrayed here. In Osu, Accra, for example, the poultry farm established by the East X'borg collapsed quickly and there was hardly

anything to show by the end of 1987. In La, the La Mansaamo Kpee, a powerful organisation of the local people which did not spring from the PDC, was and continues to be the real source of various types of improvement in the town. Equipped with its own refuse and tipper trucks, material for construction and an exemplary organisational network, La (the adjoining town to Osu, Accra) has been kept clean and development activities have flourished.¹³⁵

The explanation for the disparity is that the city workers would prefer to pay their bills and rates, which expecting to the relevant work to be done by the City Councils. The urban worker has fixed working hours which cannot be easily varied to suit community work. On Saturdays, according to interviewees, they have the only break to wash their clothing, maintain their cars, attend parties, lodge meetings, club meetings and funerals; they also do their shopping, play tennis and have some rest. Sundays, of course, are for church services and rest. On the other hand was observed that the villages on the other hand have more time on their hands to do communal labour and attend to their needs. In any case, TDCs and VDCs have evolved established a tradition for communal labour in the rural areas that is non-existent in the cities. Furthermore, I noticed that the projects in the rural areas still remain marginal. Unless an integrated development approach is adopted and comprehensive plans formulated and implemented, the reports of self-help projects in contemporary terms cannot effectively bridge the gap urban-rural in terms of

CDR efforts.

Despite their willingness to perform some manual labour, the rural community could not become the vanguard of the revolution, and effective agents of change in real terms. They lacked the requisite capacity and socialisation to perform such role. The ideological orientation of the rural Defence Committees differed considerably from that of their urban counterparts because organisations such as the June Four Movement (JFM), Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary Guards (KNRG) and African Youth Command (AYC) did not have enough time to penetrate the hinterland before the 31 December 1981 coup; nor could they do so effectively during the first year of the coup when these and allied organisations operated with considerable freedom. The checks that were placed on revolutionary organisation in subsequent years by the PNDC meant the isolation of the rural areas so far as revolutionary, Marxist, Maoist and Castroist ideas were concerned. The usual communities comprise about 65 per cent of Ghana's total population and their members are generally suspicious of government. They often ask the question: "what has any government actually done for us?" In order to groom and tap the peasantry as a revolutionary force, far greater work had to be done on them than the PNDC was willing to do.

Nkrumah considered the peasantry in Africa as the "largest contingent of the working class and potentially the main force for social revolution. But it is dispersed, unorganised, and for the most part unrevolutionary. It must be led by its natural

class allies - the proletariat and the revolutionary intelligentsia." ¹³⁶ Nkrumah spoke of the revolutionary potential of the rural strata of peasants and agricultural labourers which must be developed to provide the revolution with the required impetus. In this connection "it is the task of revolutionary cadres in the first place to awaken them to the realities of their economic potential and to win them and the petty farmers over to the socialist forms of organisation of agricultural production and distribution". ¹³⁷

The PNDC certainly did not have a programme whereby the NDC would effectively "conscientise" the peasantry with the ideology of the 31 December Revolution. In fact, the differences which arose between the Akata Pore/Atim camp and the Rawlings/Taikata faction in the early days of the Revolution compelled Rawlings to ensure that those Defence Committee leaders, whom incidentally he regarded as enemies, did not reach the hinterland ahead of him while he consolidated his power at Accra. Nor were agricultural types of cooperatives developed as Nkrumah suggested as essential "if the transition from private agriculture based on small-scale production to modern, mechanised socialist agriculture is to be accomplished." ¹³⁸ In subsequent years, Rawlings was to embark on his own paternalistic plan of action particularly in the area of rural electrification to woo the rural dwellers. In my estimation, this has gained considerable personal support for him but the areas still suffer from the lack of the fruits that would have been harvested from a

well-planned rural development scheme with active local participation under the auspices of the Defence Committees.

Furthermore, the Defence Committees failed to make much impact in the rural areas because they did not appreciate the extensive power and influence wielded by the chiefs and landowners who could not be treated with easy contempt as in Accra, for example. The rowdiness that characterised PDC activities alienated this group and all their extended family and economic dependants. As one chief told me: "these people have a bad head; (ie the PDCs have bad intentions - this is the very literal translation from the Ga expression "yitso fon") if not, they would not disqualify chiefs of all people from an organisation they want to build here in Ghana. It will come to nothing. This land here belongs to my ancestors and I sit on their stool. Rawlings can never sit on it."¹³⁹ In several areas, the PDCs became ineffective as agricultural labourers were discouraged by their landowners from joining the Defence Committees. What is more, the migrant labourers/farmers from Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Togo who form a sizeable number of the peasant labour force, felt their loyalty should remain with the chiefs and landowners who had shown them goodwill over several generations. It should be noted that to these migrant farmers it was wrong for PDCs to harass money lenders who have been a part and parcel of agricultural production in Ghana since particularly the advent of the cocoa industry. These money lenders are actually the pre-financiers of the cocoa farmers.

The former advance money for school fees, cloth and actual farm inputs, to be repaid with interest after the cocoa harvest. The rhetorics of the PNDC unaccompanied by alternative means of providing for the patent economic requirements of the peasant farmer carried no attraction at all in the rural areas.

In the urban areas, the workers had been prepared for revolutionary activity by the numerous strikes that occurred during the Limann administration. On 5 June 1980, Amartey Kwei rocked Parliament House with his band of GIHOC workers. There were similar strike actions and protests from the Railway workers in Takoradi, the seamen, and the Ghana Cargo Handling Company (GCHC) in Tema. The demonstrations of the period also involved inter alia included students and the unemployed. There was a whole amalgam of urban malcontents, the unemployed, pickpockets and even armed robbers. The urban PDCs and WDCs had their ranks infiltrated by these groups of men. This accounted for the extremism and vociferousness of the early days of the urban Defence Committees and the distance that decent men strove to keep between themselves and the PDCs. In the circumstances, the rural PDCs, though less articulate and vociferous, could have engaged in some constructive work which would have yielded better results if they had enjoyed the cooperation of chiefs and if they had been supported with more directional plans and modi operandi.

3.7 Defence Committees and Labour Issues

The essence of the Workers Defence Committee (WDC) was to exercise people's power at the work place level. This is

analysed in in two broad categories. (i) the Defence Committees and the control of industries/establishments. (ii) the Defence Committees and industrial disputes.

4.6(i) The Defence Committees and the Control of Industries/Establishments

WDCs or workplace CDRs (we shall use the term WDC for convenience) differed from PDCs or community CDRs both by way of physical membership and primary objectives. WDCs comprised workers in industries, commercial houses, private business, state corporations and the civil service. The exclusion of management and senior officers from WDCs undercores an ideological position originally taken by such WDCs with far-reaching consequences. The radical, Marxist oriented section of labour perceived the Revolution in terms of the taking - over of management of all establishments either totally or substantially by the working people. Indeed, this perspectives was a source of disagreement within the PNDC itself - a point which illustrates the polarities within the PNDC in terms of ideological conceptions. Chris Bukari Atim a radical populist, while a member of the PNDC, addressing a seminar organised by the INCC of PDCs in March 1982 justified the spontaneous overflow of people's power and the use of force by the people in taking over management in industrial, land and chieftaincy affairs. To Atim, such actions were justifiable if perceived in "a historical and socio-economic context. It is only by transforming the socio-economic structures of the country - abolishing the true basis of the

conflict - that these problems could be fully and definitely resolved."¹⁴⁰

In this connection, Atim was echoing the popular revolutionary view point - the working class should challenge the existing patterns of control at work places and take over the management of factories and other economic establishments - commercial, industrial and agricultural - so as to effect that change which is necessary to "guarantee more profound reformation of the social and economic structure; for that active participation of the workers is necessary in the political, ideological and, of course, economic life of the society."¹⁴¹

On the other hand, the moderates within the revolutionary leadership (whose viewpoint, though disregarded at the inception of the revolution, gained currency with time), perceived the WDC as watchdogs who should use legitimate means to protect the interest of workers but not to supplant management. As Brigadier Joseph Nunoo-Mensah said, "the newly acquired power in decision-making must be used responsibly since the PNDC would not tolerate any indiscriminate molestation and assault of management... no worker irrespective of his position, has the right to give instant judgement outright to any management staff, rather all cases must be reported to the appropriate authority."¹⁴²

The Akata-Pore/Chris Atim viewpoint stated above, was translated into a spontaneous over-flow of people's power. Managers in various establishments were locked in their offices or locked out completely as workers took over their functions.

In several cases physical assaults were committed and property damaged. Incidentally, some of such property belonged to the very establishments which the workers sought to control. I will use as illustration, three cases involving persons personally well-known to me and whose cases I have personal details of.

An early casualty (whose wounds and scars still bear testimony to events of the times) was Mr. Aban Okunor. He was senior manager of personnel at the Lever Brothers Factory at Tema on the advent of the Revolution. The WDC perceived Mr. Okunor as the embodiment of management and unleashed every wrath on him in the second week of January 1982. The brutal assault and battery resulted in the loss of several teeth, broken jaw, fractured head and other multiple injuries that rendered the victim totally unconscious. After treatment in Ghana had yielded little results, Mr. Okunor was flown to Britain where he stayed for several months. Mr. Okunor is permanently deformed.

In the case of Mr. K. Ayisi-Okyere who was the Managing Director of the Eastern Region Development Corporation (EREDEC). WDC - led workers, laid an ambush and pounced into action as Mr. Ayisi-Okyere was driving into the yard of the corporation. Luckily for the victim, he succeeded in rolling the windows of his car before he could be dragged out. The angry workers who were shouting and chanting songs declared a "take over from today", "no more managers, we are all managers.", "M.D., go home" as they dented the car and finally broke some glasses. Luckily, the police who were not too far away had been contacted by a

concerned citizen, and Mr. Ayisi-Okyere was rescued in the nick of time. While Mr. Ayisi-Okyere was at the police station, his office and residence were attacked and ransacked. This man abandoned his post for dear life and has since been a private business consultant.

The third illustration is the case of a top-level banker who is still at post occupying a sensitive position. Before he was attacked and forcibly removed from his office, he had been subjected to harassment of a different kind-telephone calls asking him to quit his job otherwise his house would be burnt, his children would be kidnapped from school, he would return from work one day to find his wife raped etc. The entire family suffered from depression as the wife and children had to leave Accra for the mother's hometown while the man abandoned not only his home but his car as well, sleeping for several months with friends and acquaintances and taking rides in taxis and "tro-tros" to conceal his identity. Luckily, the workplace had police guards and it was too open for clandestine attack.

In several cases reported by the PNDC controlled media, the WDCs actually took over the control of management either collectively or by instating their own nominees.

The first case to be reported of a WDC take-over was at the Ghana Tobacco Company (GTP) which occurred on January 27, 1982. The WDC of the company declared that the Interim Management Committee (IMC) of the company which took over from the pre-31 December 1981 Managing Director had been dissolved and in its place they

had appointed someone of their choice, one Mr. E.G.K. Abossey as Managing Director. The workers charged that the previous management was not progressive and could not promote the cause of the work force since it "did not have the interest of workers at heart."¹⁴³

At the Ghana Institute of Journalism (GIJ), the workers accused the director, Mr. J.K. Quartey and the bursar Mr. S.Y.K. Sackey of corruption and forcibly removed them from their offices. The workers proceeded to appoint a triumvirate to manage the institute.¹⁴⁴ No charges were formally laid before the action was taken. The affected officials were not given a chance to defend themselves.

A similar incident was reported concerning workers of the Ghana Ports and Harbour Authority (GHAPCHA) at Tema. In a dramatic action, the entire top management of the corporation numbering twelve men, were paraded through the principal streets of Tema amid jeers, catcalls, bodily manhandling; they were ultimately handed over to military personnel at the Michel Camp where they were placed in the military guardroom. The workers claimed that these officials were corrupt and that they (the workers) were capable of managing their own affairs and proceeded to appoint a five member Interim Management Committee to manage the corporation.¹⁴⁵

At Subin, WDC-led workers of the Subin Timber Company Limited (STC) declared the management of the company dismissed. The workers did not bother to give any elaborate reasons for

their action which they simply saw as an expression of their newly-acquired people's power. The workers set up a 12-member Interim management committee to run the factory.¹⁴⁶

As I found out later in this connection, the new management comprised the WDC executive and leading, vocal members of the WDC. This situation is an illustration of the several instances where WDC action undermined their role as watchdogs since they themselves took over direct management. It also underscored the fact that several of these workers perceived their roles more in terms of actual take-over than acting as watchmen.

A similar incident was reported concerning the managing director of the New Times Corporation Mr. Yaw Kankan-Nantwi. The workers issued an ultimatum on March 4, 1982 to the Managing Director to proceed on a short leave "with immediate effect" (a popular parlance in the early days of the revolution, the expression meant instant action with accompanying revolutionary zeal). When Mr. Kankan-Nantwi showed up for work on March 5, 1982, he was locked out and chased away by angry workers. The two female secretaries of the Managing Director were also forced out of the Corporation.¹⁴⁷

In taking these actions, the WDCs - whether in private or public enterprises - acted in blatant violation of the laws of the land. In the first place, their actions constituted assault, battery, damage to property and false imprisonment. Secondly, they were contrary to the laws regulating companies. The Companies Code 1963 (Act 179) provides that the authority for the

formulation of policy, appointment and removal of directors shall be the shareholders at an annual general meeting.¹⁴⁸ The Management of the company rests in the hands of officers duly appointed by the Board of Directors. Subject to the Annual General Meeting, the Board of Directors is responsible for the over-all management of a company and it is an offence for any person not duly authorised to take over the functions of a Director - "if any person who not being duly appointed director holds himself out or knowingly suffers himself to be held as director he is liable to a fine".¹⁴⁹

Furthermore, it should be noted that by provision of law, a person who removed a director from office in the fashion of the WDCs necessarily broke the law since the Companies Code laid down procedure for the removal of directors. Not only should a circulation have made for at least 21 days prior to a meeting to discuss the removal of the director, but also the director should be given an opportunity to answer any charge that might be levelled against him, before a decision is taken.¹⁵⁰ This provision of law is a codification of a cardinal principle of natural justice known as the audi alteram partem (hear the other person) rule.

With regard to public corporations, they are governed by The Statutory Corporations Act 1964 (Act 232) as well as the instruments establishing individual corporate bodies.¹⁵¹

Such instruments should make and have always made provision for the establishment of a Board of Directors and the appointment and

removal of principal officers such as the Managing Director and the Deputy Managing Director.

In view of the aforementioned events at the New Times Corporation, it is pertinent to review the New Times Corporation Act, 1971 (Act 363) as a case study. Act 363 provided that "the governing body of the corporation shall be a chairman and not less than 4 or more than 10 persons appointed by the President, acting in consultation with the Council of State and the person appointed managing director"¹⁵² The Managing Director is appointed by the President acting in consultation with the Council of State subject to the terms and conditions of his instrument of appointment.¹⁵³

The WDCs wielded de facto power by dint of the fact that they were in the position to exercise greater force against their victims than the latter could muster. Secondly, government was unable or unwilling to restrain the WDCs. Thirdly, the new revolutionary order had not come out with its own laws and regulations on the issue.

What the WDCs had commenced by the establishment of IMCs, the PNDC adopted, formalised and regularised by the Interim Management Committee (Public Boards and Corporations) Law, 1982. (PNDC Law 6). This law established the IMC as "the governing body of certain boards and corporations." The membership of the IMC was as follows:-

1. Chief Executive of the Board
2. Financial Controller or Chief Accountant

- 3 The Heads of the various operation divisions of the body
4. One representative of middle level management of the body.
5. A representative of the workers union of the body nominated by workers.
6. 2 representatives of the PDC of that body.¹⁵⁴

The period that spanned between the passing of PNDC Law 6 in 1982 and December 1984 may be described as "the reign of terror of the worker". IMCs were monarchs over all they could survey in establishments. They were dominated and directed in effect by WDC leaders whose will prevailed over all established practices of business management. With their lawlessness now legitimised, the workers had become uncontrollable and more of revolutionaries than the revolutionary leadership itself. As Rawlings himself observed in his famous Dawn Broadcast of 6 March 1983, there was the need to take a closer look at workers and allied extremists. Rawlings accused PDCs and WDCs to be "running faster than the revolution", and attributed this to the "over - enthusiasm by people who had regained their freedom after long years of suppression and deprivation."¹⁵⁵

Rawlings held brief for the workers by adding that "some might have experienced in their own lives or that of their families the nefarious effects of oppressive structures; farm lands taken away from their parents, forced migration experiences, a decay in tribal and social relations etc. For

these any excuse or demand for understanding and tact worked like oil or fuel on fire. It infuriated and enraged them and they might have felt deceived. They are not ready for compromise"¹⁵⁶

Rawlings nevertheless proceeded to launch his policy of reconciliation by his famous statement aforementioned that "the character and commitment of the individual is more important than the class from which he or she comes or the position one holds"¹⁵⁷ He came to this position in the face of certain realities. In the first place, he was disappointed by the free use of people's power. Secondly, it was manifest that the establishment had suffered tremendously and the economy had ground to a halt. Thirdly, Rawlings could not perceive the realisation of the golden promises he had made to the nation in the face of the economic mess that populism had generated. Fourthly, the radicals in the regime had lost out completely as he saw no hope of fulfilling his messianic vision within the framework of the Socialist rhetorics of the leftist elements in his government. Fifthly, negotiations with the IMF had advanced by this time, which called for a return to normalcy within our industries.

It was against this background that on Monday, 3 November, 1984, a PNDC release directed that "with immediate effect", the INCs of public boards and statutory corporations, excluding banks and financial institutions be replaced by Joint Consultative Committees (JCCs). The release stated the JCCs were to act as mere advisory bodies to the managing directors. Furthermore, the release stated that the clear aim of the new directive was to

ensure that management of corporations remained the full and direct responsibility of the management of such bodies. By making such personnel personally responsible for the day-to-day-management of the corporation, a reversion was made to old management structure and principles.¹⁵⁰

The question may thus be asked: Is worker participation in management decision-making a possibility? There is no doubt that worker participation in management decision-making did not succeed under the FNDC populist model. But is the concept which has gained some considerable global currency of any significance at all? It is our view that this question should be answered in the positive so that the relevant lessons may be learnt for posterity. There are two broad schools of thought about the appropriate relationship that should exist between workers and the Taylor Scientific Management School and the Mayo Human Relations School. The former is of the opinion that workers should not be involved in decision making since they are incapable of understanding the issues at stake and the principles underlying them. That latter holds that the worker is simply concerned with the size of his pay packet. This view may be described as unduly simplistic but it has had tremendous impact on management for decades. The Mayo School sees man as a social being and not a mere appendage to a machine. Hence, man desires meaningful interaction with others and derives satisfaction in participation in managing affairs that affect his well being. Management must promote the worker's quest for group

identity by the invitation of participation rather than the exaction of obedience.¹⁵⁹

It is my view that in Ghana we could have moved towards industrial democracy in a more rational manner. In the Economic Community (EC), what has been popularly described as the democratic imperative has been adopted with satisfactory results, upon recognising that the job is in many ways the essence of man, the source of his greatest satisfaction apart from being a means of income. Apart from this social argument, it is also a truism that the worker's involvement in decision making makes him more committed to decision implementation resulting in higher efficiency of labour.

Suggestions may, therefore, be made as to more constructive ways of achieving the desired result. Three approaches may be presented as follows: (a) The consultation approach workers are consulted in advance by management and their views taken into account in making decisions. (b) The Joint decision approach which both management and workers are jointly responsible for decisions made. (c) The worker's control approach which sees management as ultimately responsible to the workers. But experience has shown that such a situation succeeds only with producers' cooperatives where the workers are both employees and owners. These approaches could have been studied carefully and a viable model adopted and systematically developed to obtain the right results.

In the same way, the actual practical methods that have been

employed in other parts of the world could have been examined by government, and realistic strategies adopted that would have promoted and not destroyed our industries. The established methods include: (a) Collective Bargaining - This is the commonest device in worker - management negotiations but it is erroneously often associated with high wages. In reality, however, this method encompasses issues that touch and concern workers generally, including the rules relating to employment and dismissal of workers and in fact the handling of grievances generally. The system, when properly developed, has been described as "the most effective means of giving working lives, the right which is or should be the prerogative of every worker in a democratic society."¹⁶⁰ (b) Joint Consultation - While the process of collective bargaining is basically an indirect means of participation, that of joint consultation provides a more involved and direct approach through committees or councils comprising the representatives of both workers and management. Bargaining presupposes conflict and divergent interests, joint consultation promotes cooperation in resolving issues of common interest between workers and management. It should, however, be noted that such committees are basically advisory and do not affect managerial control. For this reason, the system is criticised by the uninitiated. But in Scandinavian and other countries where the system has been practised, it has been observed that as the representatives of workers gained more experience and confidence they achieved tremendous results by

this method. The essence of the system is the building of trust, which acts as an anticipatory check against industrial misunderstanding. (c) Job Enrichment - This is a more intricate system that requires considerable effort and practise but has been very successful in the United States of America. The essential question is: how do you motivate your workers towards higher productivity in the interest of all concerned? In this connection the control mechanisms are removed while accountability is retained and the work made more challenging to tap the inner capabilities of the worker. The job is redesigned and enriched so as to improve the worker psychologically and make his work more satisfying. In Japan, this system known as Quality Work Circles has been practised successfully. However, for job enrichment to be successful, there must be patient and systematic planning. For example, it is imperative that workers should be thoroughly conversant with their jobs and be ready and able to accept responsibility - qualities which the average Ghanaian worker currently lacks but which can be developed. When such problems have been properly dealt with, then and only then can we expect participatory democracy in our industries.

(d) Worker Directors - This system which is common in the European Community (EC) particularly in Germany operates on the basis of a workers' quota on the Board of Directors. It could be fifty-fifty or one third worker representation. The Board takes all major decisions; and the cardinal advantage of the system is that after a Board decision, both workers and management are jointly

responsible for, and committed to, the implementation of policies. The system has a further advantage in that it ensures cooperation and the development of mutual confidence. The experience of the shop - floor is readily available for the formulation of policy. However, the system has been criticised because "worker directors have generally had little effect on anything and consequently they have certainly had no catastrophic effect on anything or anybody."¹⁴¹

It is my view that workers should have a greater say in the management of factories, companies and establishments which touch and concern their lives. In fact when the issue is well studied, experience drawn from other places and formulas developed for practice in Ghana, we would make great strides not only towards industrial democracy but higher productivity and industrial harmony. The WDC approach could certainly not have the answer to the problem.

3.7(ii) Defence Committees and Industrial Disputes

Since the era of the National Liberation Council (NLC) successive governments have resorted to laying off workers in the public sector in the face of economic decline, and the private sector have taken the cue accordingly. The situation worsened in the 1970s until by 1981, the total manufacturing labour force, for example, which stood at 88,947 workers in 1977, had reduced to 77,600. This suffered a further reduction to 65,600 in 1982.¹⁴² The Limann government had been under serious pressure from labour in this connection, culminating in the march on

Parliament House by GIHOC workers led by Amartey Kwei. After the 31 December Revolution, industrial disputes heightened in terms of workers demand to dictate the pace in terms of their relationship with management under the auspices of the WDCs. The confrontations of the PNDC era may be studied in developments at (a) the Ghana Textile Printing Co. Ltd. (b) the Allied Foods Ltd, (AFL), (c) the Pioneer Food Cannery Ltd (PFL) and (d) the Assene case.

3.7 (ii) (a) The GTP Case

The struggle of GTP workers, even though it subsequently ended up as a take-over exercise, began as a protest against workers being laid off. The company located in the Industrial Area, Tema in 1963 by the Nkrumah government was known as National Textile Company (NTC). The company, which Nkrumah perceived as a vital part of Ghana's industrialisation strategy, went through a process of divestiture under the NLC. The latter invited the United Africa Company (UAC), which had a long history in the textile retail industry in Ghana, to purchase 30 per cent of the equity shares. This proposal was accepted by UAC subject to certain conditions - Vlisco, a Dutch company, should also be given 7 1/2 per cent equity shares. UAC should be given absolute control over management and the retail network of wax and java prints which included those printed by the company as well as those imported into the country by the government.¹⁶⁵ Vlisco were the technical consultants. The conclusion of this agreement saw the reincorporation of NTC into GTP Company Limited with the

equity shares being held as follows: - the Ghana Government 55 percent, UAC 30 percent and Vlisco, 7 1/2 percent.¹⁶⁴ At the time when conflict erupted at GTP, the company had a total labour force of 1,080 workers who operated in seven main sections - production, marketing, personnel, accounts maintenance, wax, designing studio and security. The background to the crisis is as follows: In February 1982, the management of GTP applied to the Ministry of Labour - the third application since 31 December 1981 - to lay off some workers because of acute shortage in raw material required for production. The Ministry asked GTP to submit for its consideration, a comprehensive plan for redeployment. In its plan, GTP proposed to lay off 565 workers - more than half of its labour force. The affected workers were to be redeployed into the agriculture sector under a scheme whereby they would be given loans for vegetable farming.

The workers countered with a number of arguments that make interesting study. Firstly, they challenged the very status of UAC to manage the company, arguing that the agreement that the Ghana Government had with the UAC expired in 1977. Since this contract had not been renewed, UAC had no locus standi at GTP. All attempts I made to obtain evidence of a valid contract at the Ministry of Labour, GTP or UAC proved futile and I came to the conclusion that upon the expiration of the original contract, UAC simply carried on without a formal renewal of the contract. It would appear, however, that the Ghana Government had given a tacit consent to UAC's continuation by deriving benefits from

UAC's operation in terms of dividends. In their revolutionary zeal, however, the workers were not in the mood for legal niceties.

Secondly, in reply to the management's argument that GTP had no foreign exchange to import raw materials and other tools required for production and that the company had huge debts to pay, the WDC-led workers stated that UAC had never attempted to cultivate cotton in Ghana upon the lame excuse that the soil throughout Ghana was not conducive to cotton production; but in reality UAC was using cotton importation as a ploy to siphon scarce foreign exchange out of Ghana. To solve the problem, the WDC suggested that the sum of 41 million dollars that would be used to pay for their entitlements should be channelled into cotton production, and that they were prepared to be redeployed to work in the Northern and Upper Regions of Ghana as well as other areas where the company could produce its raw cotton. The workers were therefore challenging the established practice of importation of raw materials by foreign firms in Ghana.

Thirdly, the workers argued that the GTP management's action was ill-motivated in that it was a reaction which stemmed from the management's resentment against the fact that workers had become part of management since 31 December 1981. It was alleged that UAC was laying off workers as part of a conspiracy by multi-nationals to "derail" the revolution. The strategy, it was alleged, was that once UAC succeeded, other companies would follow suit so as to create labour unrest that would stir up

disaffection of workers against the PNDC. The fact that VALCO had earlier threatened to lay off certain workers was cited to support this argument.

During the ensuing impasse, the WDC of GTP appealed to the PNDC, the NDC and the Interim Co-ordinating Committee of Tema Workers Defence Committees (ICC/WDCs)¹⁴⁵ for support. Verbal assurances of support came from some PNDC members and the NDC while the ICC/WDCs organised a mass rally attended by workers from almost all the factories in Tema. On 17 November 1982, when further attempts to resolve the impasse by dialogue had failed, the WDC of GTP with the backing of the ICC/WDCs declared a take-over of the GTP company and occupied the factory.

The events immediately following the take-over revealed the ideological cleavage within the PNDC itself at this stage. The right wing section of the PNDC backed by Rawlings himself approved of police intervention at the invitation of the management and upon the direct orders of the Inspector General of Police (IGP). The anti-riot squad, well equipped with armoured cars, moved into action to halt the action of the workers. The police, of course, succeeded in doing so in a brutal confrontation that left several WDC, NDC and ICC/WDC activists seriously injured. Some workers sustained gunshot injuries and others were arrested. If the police had wanted to evacuate all workers from the premises on that occasion, they could have done so. Why did they not do so? The answer lies in the fact that revolutionary, anti-imperialist rhetoric still had considerable

attraction at that stage of the Revolution. The NDC which was left-wing oriented re-echoed the reformulated goals of the workers' action as follows:

- . Liberation of workers and the emancipation of the economy from foreign domination. The UAC was described as the "Oldest foreign exploiter on Ghanaian soil"
- . ending the exploitation by multi-nationals through concerted workers' action as the circumstances would dictate.
- . working hard to achieve higher production targets.
- . ensuring the production of raw materials which would be the long term solution to raw materials shortage, production problems and lay-off of workers.¹⁶⁶

The Tema workers re-echoed these ideals in a joint statement and expressed their solidarity. The workers actually called for the instant dismissal of the IGP, the PNDC Secretaries for Industries as well as Labour and Social Welfare, and the top officials of these ministries. The IGP felt obliged to issue a statement claiming that he had received information from the GTP management that the workers were actually in the process of burning down the factory and that explained the action he had taken. Although the PNDC ordered the release of the arrested workers, it did not give any formal approval to the action taken by them. The PNDC was torn between the interplay of popular and legal power. The explanation for this attitude was not far fetched. The PNDC was advised that international capital would

not be forthcoming into a country where workers seized factories without due process of law, particularly, as provided by the prevailing laws of the country itself. In this connection, it is worthy of mention that the Investment Code 1981 (Act 437) protected foreign investors against the expropriation of their investment by the government of Ghana¹⁶⁷ Furthermore, Act 437 prescribed a well-defined procedure in settling disputes between foreign investors and the government by way of arbitration and reconciliation by employing an international mechanism for settlement of industrial disputes. This had to be agreed upon by both parties.¹⁶⁸

In the interim, the People's Daily Graphic asked for endorsement by the government of the take-over and declared that the whole mass of workers in Ghana were in support of the principles underlying the action taken by the WDC at GTP backed by the ICC/WDC. The government, having been advised on what the Peoples Daily Graphic was coming out with, populist response generally, and obviously aware that the first anniversary of the Revolution was close by, declared its recognition of the take-over "with immediate effect" and pronounced that the assets and accounts of the GTP would be held by the workers "in the name of the people of Ghana"¹⁶⁹ In a hurriedly-organised TUC rally, the PNDC chairman praised the workers for their initiative and saluted the "tolerance" and "maturity" of the workers of the GTP and the entire working people of Ghana.¹⁷⁰

Fursuant to the takeover, a broad-based IMC was set up


composed of WDC members of the GTP, trade union leaders, "patriotic" managers and government nominees. Below the INC were three main committees - management, central production and disciplinary.

Next in the hierarchy were departmental committees, followed by section committees. The Management Structure of the GTP under the WDC take-over is illustrated in table 3M below:

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TABLE 3M

IMC STRUCTURE OF GTP



As Eshun observed, these committees "became the basis of popular workers participation in the administrative management, corporate planning and monitoring of production targets in the company. They also became the vehicles through which recommendations in respect of promotion, probations and transfers were effected.¹⁷¹ Matters affecting junior workers were deliberated upon by them in various sections and the decisions were passed on to the Departmental Committees for their views, and then to the Central Production Committee which took necessary action in consultation with the IMC. Administrative decisions were taken by the IMC upon the advice of the various committees

(management, production and disciplinary). Decisions taken by the IMC were sent down through the same channel.

For the first three months after the take over, every afternoon was used by the WDC for education in political economy. Workers were taught the evil practices of multinational corporations, the revolutionary process (its aims and strategies), the rights and duties of workers in a revolutionary situation, the role of the people in national defence and the need to ensure external vigilance. Weekly lectures were also held which were crowned with monthly grand durbars. NDC officials gave lectures at these gatherings and printed literature was distributed. The workers claimed great successes following the take-over. As Moerkamp observed, "machine repairs which used to take European mechanics six weeks to complete are now done by themselves (the workers) in two weeks' time."¹⁷²

But various lapses and financial malpractices soon occurred that undermined any confidence that could be reposed in the new order at GTP. Pursuant to these, the PNDC appointed a special NIC Task Force to carry out investigations. The report of the Task Force was published on 12 September, 1988 and was subsequently accepted by the PNDC in a White Paper issued on it. The GTP workers were found liable by the Task Force for stealing, fraudulent practices, carelessness in handling State property and conniving with private individuals and companies to evade payment of duties and penalties. The workers had been found liable for dishonesty and abuse of trust

The system of management forcibly instituted by the workers had proved corrupt, inefficient and detestable. For example with regard to the allocation of company products to workers, the NIC report revealed that, contrary to existing regulations, management, together with the CDR and the local Union made periodic cloth allocations to workers between February 1983 and June 1988. There was no attempt to comply with the provisions of PNDC Law 45 or to control the operation of the allocations.

It was found that between February 1983 and June 1988, the value of cloth allocated to workers was c846,117,436.70 out of which a total c823,744,379.69 was recovered leaving an outstanding balance of c22,272,057.01 unaccounted for. Two cashiers Mr. J.K. Prah and Mr. George Ofori misappropriated c5,160,325.40 out of this outstanding balance which was paid by five distributors.

Between September 1987 and June 1988, the Tema General Hospital and GNTC paid cheques of c2.9 million and c1.8 million respectively to GTP. Instead of these payments being treated as payment by a debtor, the cheques were banked as if they were cash sales and the account of the two organisations were not credited. The amount of c4.7 million was embezzled. Mr. C.G. Anamang, acting chief accountant, checked and signed the cash sheets entries as correct in respect of the c1.8 million. Mr. Asare Koranteng, audit assistant also checked and passed the entries by the cashier. Messrs. J.K. Prah, D.D. Tamakloe (Senior Accountant) and Asare Koranteng (audit assistant) checked and

signed the entries made by Mr. J.K. Prah in respect of c2.9 million. In both cases they failed to detect the embezzlement.

In 1986 the company was given approval to accept foreign currency for the sale of its products as a means of meeting part of their import needs. But regrettably, management failed to institute effective financial control and guidelines, thus paving the way for unmitigated embezzlements. Between 19 June 1987 and 8 July 1988 an amount of 90,000 U. S. dollars realised from sales was not lodged at the Bank for Credit and Commerce into the accounts of GTP even though vouchers were prepared by Mr. J. K. Prah, the cashier and checked by Mr. C.G. Anaman to give the impression that the amount has been paid to the bank. Mr. Asare Koranteng, Audit Assistant also examined the vouchers and certified them to be correct.

Similarly, between November and December, 1989, Mr. George Ofori (Cashier) received the total of 27,816 US dollars from customers in respect of "Commission Printing". The money was never paid to the Bank but he prepared fictitious accounting records which were checked and signed by Messrs. C.G. Anaman and Asare Koranteng to create the impression that payment to the Bank had been made. When Bank records were checked, no trace could be found.

In December 1986, an amount of DM 16,400 forming part of cash in hand was taken out of the cash composition by the use of a journal voucher prepared and signed by Mr. George Ofori for lodgement into the bank. The voucher was authorised by Mr. C.G.

Anaman and passed by Mr. Asare Koranteng. Investigation at the Bank for Credit and Commerce revealed that the money was never paid into the bank. Between 1985 and 1986, the IMC headed by Mr. N.S. Appiah as chairman purchased a used articulator truck and eight other vehicles at the cost of c19,150,000. Purchasing of vehicles was the direct responsibility of the IMC with the transport committee headed by Mr. E. Adu-Gyamfi as advisor. The IMC in most cases failed to obtain valuation reports from the appropriate government agency in line with government regulations. In a number of cases, transfers of ownerships were either not made or were delayed. It was found that some of the vehicles were prohibited by customs regulations from being transferred to another person within a two year period.

It was also observed that, as a result of carelessness and poor supervision, there were frequent breakdowns of vehicles leading to heavy repair costs. Through failure on the part of importers to supply invoices for correct duty and tax assessment, duty and taxes were assessed on the "Commissioner's Values". The motive behind this failure was to underdeclare the values for customs purposes. The failure to obtain valuation from the appropriate government agency before purchasing the used cars led to the Company over - paying c12.256 million on six out of the eight of vehicles acquired. This was arrived at as follows:-

Total amounts paid for imported second vehicles =	c18,050,000.
Less valuation as per State Transport Corporation Report =	c5,794,000.
Excess payment =	c12,256,000.

Clearance of goods

was used as opportunity for fraud. Between January and July 1988, a total amount of c605,548.52 was advanced to Mr. B.C. Anokye, shipping officer, on the authority of Mr. S.A. Tetteh, Purchasing Manager, for the purpose of clearing goods from the Tema Port. However, a statement of account submitted accounted for only c55,749.92, leaving a balance of c47,799.92.¹⁷³

In the light of what appeared to the PNDC to be ample evidence of the failure of the WDC of GTP, the PNDC decided on 18 September 1988 that the GTP should be closed down. The PNDC Secretary for Mobilization and Social Welfare said in this connection that the action was aimed at halting the rot because among other things, the GTP workers were "exploiting the State."¹⁷⁴ A new Board of Directors was appointed and after re-negotiations with UAC, Brigadier Tehn-Addy was appointed Chairman of a new five-member management committee. Several workers ended up being dismissed and others were employed in their place. Seven GTP WDC leaders were actually put on trial and jailed for a total of 19 1/2 months for assault and wrongful imprisonment.¹⁷⁵

Some respondents argued that the WDC at GTP failed because the PNDC was anxious to please the IMF and its free - economy programme. Furthermore the divestiture programme that sought to sell all State - owned enterprises to private entrepreneurs was incompatible with the continued take over of GTP by workers. These, however, do not fully answer the charges of corruption and the query that the workers had turned the GTP canteen, for example, into a holiday resort; that the GTP had made huge

financial losses; that no cotton plantations were cultivated by the WDC of GTP, nor was the foreign exchange problem solved. In all these, we have a locus classicus of abysmal failure of mob rule under the auspices of WDCs.

3.7(ii)b The Take-Over of Allied Foods Limited (AFL)

On 19 June 1983, there was a bold attempt by dissident soldiers led by Cpl. Halidu Gyiwa to seize power (a coup attempt which became known as the Gyiwa Coup). The WDCs were highly instrumental in efforts to bring down the coup. They erected roadblocks etc to check the movements of the dissidents and actually arrested a few. The WDC victory of 19 June, 1983, and the ensuing euphoria was on 21 June, 1983 translated into an industrial take-over by workers of Allied Foods Limited (AFL). Located in Accra, AFL was the offspring of Cadbury and Fry (Ghana) Limited and subsidiary of the multinational food company Cadbury Schweppes Ltd.

Prior to the take-over which lasted six weeks, a struggle had loomed for about three months between the WDC - led workers of AFL and management over a proposed lay-off of 165 workers out of a total labour force of 212. It would appear that but for the events of 19 June 1983, the AFL affair might have fizzled out as it became manifest later that some workers (15 out of 105) had actually collected their redundancy benefits at the time of the occupation and others were ready to do so.

The workers justified their action as follows: (a) management had shown absolute lack of good faith and had

attempted to divide and rule the workers. Under the pretext of shortage of raw materials, all workers had been sent home initially on the understanding that they would be recalled the moment raw materials arrived. Once the workers were at home, however, management began to contact them on an individual basis to apply for voluntary redundancy. (b) Management gave the following reasons for their decision which were untenable - shortage of raw materials, lack of import licence and cancellation of a huge export order by Cadbury (Nigeria) Ltd. The workers argued that these problems could be dealt with in ways other than lay-offs. (c) The failure of management to favourably consider the viable alternative of redeploying the workers into farming. They argued that their contention was backed by a PNDC directive to this effect to all employers. (d) The management of AFL was in breach of the collective bargaining agreement whereby the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU) to which the AFL workers belonged, should be notified of all redundancies. (e) It was in the national interest that the NDC should investigate the matter comprehensively because among other things, even though at a meeting at the Ministry of Labour, the AFL management had been compelled to admit that ICU should have discussed the issue with the Ministry and AFL before the lay-offs, the PNDC Secretary did not order the recall of the workers but simply made a finding that the workers had a case against the AFL.

If the AFL workers were slow to act, it is partly because in

Accra they lacked the solidarity that GTP workers had in Tema. There were several reasons for this - firstly, the workers in Accra were more sparsely distributed; secondly, Accra being the seat of government, movement of workers was under closer scrutiny by security forces; thirdly, the ideological left-wing solidarity was higher in Tema than in Accra; fourthly, historically, the workers in Tema, were in terms of organisation and dynamism second to only their Harbour-city counterparts in Sekondi-Takoradi; fifthly, there was no WDC counterpart in Accra of the ICC - WDCs of Tema; sixthly, since the 29 October, 1982, incident when it was announced that Sgt. Abolga Akata Fore had taken over from Rawlings as Chairman of the PNDC, the WDCs and PDCs had become objects of suspicion - a misfortune which only changed for the better momentarily after 19 June, 1983.

From the position of apparent strength, acquired after 19 June 1983, the workers demanded that: (i) the top management of AFL should be dismissed; (ii) the government should come out with a firm policy on redundancy to protect workers; (iii) a probe into AFL with special reference to over-invoicing, under-invoicing and utilisation of foreign exchange; (iv) a probe into the assets of the top management; (v) the rights of the AFL Union and WDC should be fully recognised and an office provided for their operations; (vi) the government should acquire majority shares in the company.¹⁷⁶

During the ensuing negotiations, the workers produced various documents which they claimed they had captured during the

take-over and which they published widely. The documents revealed the following, according to the workers: (i) a conspiracy whereby international pressure would be brought to bear on the FNDC should the government support the workers; (ii) the alleged shortage of raw materials was not the real reason for the lay-offs but a planned restructuring of production; (iii) the company was making huge profits and the alleged financial difficulties were false signals; (iv) the management disapproved of WDC participation in management as a matter of policy; (v) there was evidence of a plan to dismiss WDC and other radical leaders under the cover of redundancy; (vi) management was ideologically opposed to the WDC. (vii) AFL was guilty of tax evasion and economic crime generally and its action was an attempt to pre-empt possible investigation at the instance of the revolutionary WDC leadership; (viii) the management had been engaged in a comprehensive deception ploy to mislead and buy support from public servants and the leaders of the workers.¹⁷⁷

After protracted discussions the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare announced at the end of August 1983 the following decisions that fell short of the expectations of militant workers: (i) re-call of all AFL workers; (ii) those who accepted the redundancy payments should have these sums of money deducted from their wages for April - August. The balance should be charged against future entitlements; (iii) any allegations about illegalities committed by AFL were to be referred to the

Attorney-General; (iv) all workers were to be given a 10-day grace period within which to report.

The workers were allowed back to work but as was manifest at the tail end of the GTP episode, the PNDC leadership was parting ways with radical populism. This trend became more manifest in the Pioneer Food Cannery case and the Assene incident discussed below.

3.7(ii)c The Pioneer Food Cannery (PFC) Case

Pioneer Food Cannery (PFC) is a private company owned by a Ghanaian industrialist Mr Robert Ocran (who also owns the Mankoadze Fisheries and is known to have a very close association with the PNDC leadership) and foreign partners. In 1984 when trouble erupted, the company which had a labour force of 373 workers, most of whom were women, had operated for eight years.

On 18 April, 1984, the management of PFC locked out the entire workers dismissed 254 of them. Management alleged that the workers had embarked on an illegal strike contrary to Act 299 on 17 April, 1984, by a go-slow decision taken by them plus an illegal work to-rule that culminated in workers abandoning fish to rot on the processing line. The point of the management was that, the workers having embarked on an illegal strike, the only matter left to be settled was severance payment to them.

The workers, in their defence, stated that: (i) on April 17, 1984, while negotiations of service conditions were taking place between the Maritime and Dock Workers Union (MDU) and the management of PFC, Mr. Ocran walked into the meeting room and

insulted the workers. When Mr Ocran repeated this treatment at about 5.00 pm the workers walked out; hence their inability to work overtime;¹⁷⁸ (ii) PFC was anti-worker and had frustrated attempts by workers to unionise themselves; (iii) PFC failed to pay bonuses when the company was financially capable of doing so; (iv) there was outstanding back-pay due to workers since 1980; (v) there was lack of protective gear such as gloves, whereby workers (including women) used their bare hands to work on frozen fish; (vi) compulsory overtime whereby workers toiled for about twelve hours a day upon the demand that until the last fish was canned, no worker could leave; (vii) total insensitivity towards women who went on maternity leave. They had to re-apply for their jobs, and they were almost invariably not re-employed; (viii) workers could only visit the doctor on Mondays and Tuesdays no matter the circumstances.¹⁷⁹

The above mentioned arguments indicate the issues at stake and help in assessing the gains the workers made at the end of the episode. This is particularly noteworthy because the PFC issue brought workers more closely together than in previous struggles; yet they made the least gains because of the ideological shift that had occurred in the PNDC.

A Solidarity Committee comprising the MDU, ICC/WDC and Tema Interim District Co-ordinating Committee (IDCC) of PDCs was formed and was called the PFC Solidarity Committee (PFCSC). On 21 June, 1984, the PFCSC organised a mammoth rally attended by over 5,000 workers from Accra and Tema and resolved that: "(1)

the illegally locked out and dismissed 259 workers of PFC be immediately and unconditionally reinstated; (2) steps be taken immediately after reinstatement to ensure that PFC workers labour under a legitimate Collective Bargaining Agreement; (3) the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, the NDC and the PNDC should ensure that the management of PFC respect international labour conventions and the labour laws of our land; (4) the united working class of Accra and Tema shall impose sanctions on PFC and the Mankoadze Group of Companies if the PFC management should prove difficult in the matter of unconditional reinstatement of the 259 workers".¹⁸⁰

The immediate reaction to this unique stand by WDC-led workers came from the PNDC which in the words of one interviewee "had begun to see the consequences of raising an unruly child".¹⁸¹ One day after the workers' rally, the PNDC issued a statement dissolving the ICC/WDCs, accusing the leadership of "terrorising residents of Tema" and of being "demagogues" "manipulated by imperialist agents". As a banned WDC entity, "no organ with similar function was to be constituted in its place until elections are held to constitute a new body."¹⁸² This statement is pertinent in that it revealed clearly that the PNDC was ruling from top to bottom and its brand of 'democracy' was nothing like bottom-to-top, since the PNDC had de facto power to pronounce any WDC or PDC out of existence. Secondly, it revealed that the PNDC was not operating in close collaboration with the people but rather as the workers trod one path, the PNDC went the other way.

This contention was underscored by the sharp reaction to the FNDC statement by Tema ICC/WDCs stating that "the important question at stake (is) that 259 PFC workers were dismissed arbitrarily. No 'demagogue' is required to whip up workers to fight the people who are responsible for these terrible conditions. We, the dissolved ICC and WDCs of Tema who have till our dissolution only played our active part in the workers' struggle, cannot be said to be playing upon these struggles to create division in the revolutionary process... in the history of this process no issue had been used to mobilize such a broad unity of workers as had been done with the PFC issue. This is one issue where the Trade Unions, the WDC and the PDCs were seen to have been united. More workers expressed solidarity by their generous financial contributions to the solidarity fund and the massive rally and demonstration of Wednesday, June, 20. These were the result of the PFC struggle. These achievements did not come by themselves. Workers had to work round the clock not as as sacrifice but as a duty they owe to themselves for being part of the working class which has the most consistent interest in Ghana's revolution. We mention these to drive home the point that we have never and can never be agent of imperialist forces. Nor can it be justifiably said that our activities have subverted the government and the revolutionary process. If there is anyone who is subverting in this case, it is the management of PFC. They have not only violated the Labour Laws of the land but have openly disobeyed the government's directives... To us it is even

more important that attention is not diverted from the main issue, that is the legitimate case of PFC workers is not denied by these wild allegations against us. For the issue is a straight forward individual case of workers who have been illegally dismissed".¹⁸³

The gap between the PNDC and the WDCs widened as workers of GHAIP, in pursuance of the resolution of WDCs that the PNDC had condemned, stopped the supply of fuel to the Mankoadze Group of Companies in an obvious muscle-flexing encounter. They urged all oil companies to follow in their trail, and suspend all supplies to any shipping vessels, vehicle or equipment belonging to Mankoadze either by pipeline, tanker or other means.¹⁸⁴

Operations of Mankoadze were brought to a halt and the PNDC had to come to the rescue. On July 13, the operations officer at PNDC headquarters ordered GHAIP workers to resume the supply of fuel to Mankoadze.¹⁸⁵ The Deputy Operations Officer at the PNDC Headquarters led a group of soldiers to the plant to threaten the workers, and ordered them to restore the supplies to the company.¹⁸⁶ The PNDC had begun to use military might against the workers - a significant development in the exercise of people's power via WDCs.

On 16 July, 1984, the Chairman of the PNDC made a "personal intervention in the dispute on behalf of the dismissed workers of the company."¹⁸⁷ It was reported that after a series of meetings held between the Chairman of the PNDC, the Secretary-General of the TUC and the management of PFC, it was agreed that the 250

locked -out workers of PFC be recalled to work. The report added that the PNDC Chairman had stated that, the facts of the case, "there was no way the striking workers could win in any legal resolution of the issues in any civil tribunal"¹⁰⁸ Chairman Rawlings took the trouble to distinguish Mankoadze Fisheries, which is a separate legal entity, from PFC and declared "the immediate withdrawal of the illegal sanctions imposed on the Mankoadze Group of Companies".¹⁰⁹

Rawlings had made it clear to the workers that they were being recalled on the basis of charity. This was cold comfort to workers whom Rawlings had taught to say: "we no go sit down" (a colloquial expression which meant the workers should not sit back and be cheated but should stand up and fight. In the event, when the final negotiation under the auspices of the PNDC Chairman himself took place, the only group that was conspicuously absent was the WDC. The WDC men had been replaced by TUC representatives.

3:7(ii)d. The Assene Household Enamelware Limited Case

The Assene affair sounded the death knell of any gains WDCs had made in their populist approach to resolving industrial problems. This company owned by a Chinese who hailed from Hong Kong had been a producer of enamel ware since 1978 and employed 220 workers by early October 1986 when the crisis erupted. The process of production generated considerable heat and involved the use of chemicals and power presses. It would appear that an

issue of principle was manifest in this struggle - the supply of protective clothing and equipment to the workers. The method employed by the WDC to achieve its aim was, however, bizarre and reveals that by 1986, the PNDC has not established viable institutions and systems to protect the working people of Ghana.

Assene had a high accident rate. Between 1978 and 1986 twenty - one workers suffered injuries in the machine section where the power presses were used. One worker lost an arm and eight lost fingers. Out of the twenty-one only four were paid any compensation.¹⁹⁰ Indeed, it had become necessary for the Inspectorate Division of the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare to investigate Assene to ensure that minimum safety standards required by the Factories, Offices and Shops Act, 1970 (Act 238) were kept. The investigations showed that: (a) some of the workers were exposed to excessive heat; (b) workers lacked the requisite protective gear for their specific work; and (c) dangerous machines were not adequately guarded.¹⁹¹ The Inspectorate Division sent many letters to Assene which stated, inter alia, that "the tools of power presses are recognised as being among the most dangerous parts of machinery and knowledge of sheet metal industry should point to the fact that a high proportion of power press accidents in these industries result in permanent injury and severe mutilation. This is evidenced by the accidents in your factory ... and which result in permanent injuries, crushed fingers, amputation of hands, fingers, multiple injuries , etc, to your employees."¹⁹²

It was against this background that in 1985 Assene agreed to supply the workers with protective footwear twice every year. In July, 1986 the management decided that only the workers in one out of the six departments in the Company would be supplied. When the workers protested, management only agreed to supply three more departments, leaving out workers in two departments who refused to work outside their departments because the production process resulted in pieces of metal being scattered throughout the compound - a danger to all unprotected feet. For this, the protesting workers were summarily dismissed. The entire labour force laid down their tools in sympathy with their colleagues, and management agreed to supply all workers with boots. But hostilities re-surfaced when the workers realised that for laying down their tools for two hours they were to lose half a day's pay. A strike action began in earnest.

From this point on, the workers faced the might of the PNDC. On 24, September 1986, two PNDC officials, the Press Secretary to the PNDC and Mr Dan Abodakpui, Special Assistant to the Political Counsellor for the Economic Development of CDRs, stormed the factory, and in an address to the work force denounced them as economic saboteurs and threatened to lock them up.¹⁹³ On Friday 3 October, 1986, three police armoured tanks and two jeeps drove into the factory and arrested five TUC and CDR leaders. The police presence was repeated on 6 October, 1986 and one worker was arrested.

The workers were silenced. They had failed partly because

the PNDC had turned its back on workers as a whole and partly because their struggle did not arouse any visible working class solidarity, the workers' power having been dissipated by earlier encounters with the authorities. The struggle further revealed that the workers were woefully ill-prepared in making even legitimate claims and pursuing their rights within the rules of the game. The ICU subjected the demands of the Assene workers to an arbitrator under the IRA of 1965 and laid emphasis on the assertion that the dismissals constituted an illegal lockout contrary to the Industrial Relations Act (IRA). The ICU lost the case; the arbitrator dismissed their claim as unmeritorious. Because the case had not been properly presented ab initio, it was also dismissed on appeal. My view of the proceedings is that the right issues were not raised and the workers played to the gallery, while ignoring the legitimate course in the pursuit of their rights.

3.8 The Armed Forces Defence Committees (AFDCs)

The June 4 Uprising had tremendous effect on the military as an institution. It was a coup in which the other ranks played a leading role. Senior military officers were humiliated. Notably, the AFRC comprised five junior officers and nine men of other ranks. The other ranks were dissatisfied with certain events after June 4 1979. They felt their representatives did not have enough influence on vital matters including the hand-over to civilians and that the return to power by civilians had pushed them prematurely to the background.

After 31 December, 1981, the soldiers were quick to form Defence Committees in the hope that they would regain their influence in national affairs and also "democratise" the military chain of command. Armed Forces Defence Committees (AFDCs) were promptly formed in all military barracks throughout the country. One may ask what the AFDCs were supposed to do. In this connection, it is important to note that during the Limann period, and under the auspices of the JFM, Rawlings had called for a new army, democratised and liberated, by dismantling of the colonial - type command structure. Rawlings further opined that the military, including the lower ranks, should take active part in politics and that it was an act of injustice to relegate the military to the background in national affairs by insulating them from politics.

Articles in the Workers Banner¹⁹⁴ were directed at soldiers in propagation of these ideas. The first edition of the Workers Banner decried the exploitation of soldiers which allegedly included mental enslavement and demanded justification for the monopoly of military durbars by officers. The newspaper called for a revolutionary transformation of such decadent practices and related the struggle of the soldiers to the struggle of the working people. In an obvious call to action, it asked: "Must Ghanaian soldiers stand and watch their colleagues arrested, tortured and booted out by false charges while they have power and constitutional right to resist such injustice?"¹⁹⁵ After all, Ghanaian soldiers, policemen and others working in the security

force should "realise that the worker's struggle is their struggle,"¹⁹⁶

The newspaper called for an identification of soldiers with the workers and urged the former to refuse to go on colonial - type errands whereby they were called upon to shoot down striking workers, because in doing so they would be serving the interest of the enemy ruling class. It finally intoned: "a revolutionary situation exists in our country today and if we seize the opportunity which history has thrust upon us, then the workers, soldiers and farmers will once more be placed on top of the Kilimanjaro of the African revolution".¹⁹⁷

The AFDC membership was basically open to all non-commissioned officers. In the early days of the Revolution, it was made clear that officers could not join AFDCs. In due course, however, it was agreed that junior officers (ie officers up to the rank of Captain in the Army, Flight Lieutenant in the Air Force and Naval Lieutenant in the Navy) could also join as ordinary members and take part in their activities. They were nevertheless disqualified from holding executive positions in AFDCs.

Every military unit had the power to start a branch of the AFDCs and elect its executive officers who would work in close cooperation with the National Secretariat of AFDCs. The National Chairman of the AFDCs was Warrant Officer Class II Adjei Eoadi and the National Secretary was Sgt. Allolga Akata-Pore, who were both members of the PNDC. The latter was also the official

representative of the other ranks on the FNDC.

The immediate reaction of the AFDCs, and particularly the extremist wing, was to turn against officers. Within the first month of the Revolution in particular, the atmosphere was charged with the fear that every officer from the rank of Major and above was going to be liquidated. Senior officers abandoned their official bungalows and went into hiding. When certain assurances were given by the FNDC leadership and threats of court-martialing these officers for AWOL (Absent Without Leave) were made, some officers showed up but continued to live with their families outside barracks. Others were ready to forfeit all entitlements after several years' service and seek refuge overseas.

Radical AFDC men arbitrarily arrested officers, shaved them and placed them in guardrooms. There were threats of rape against women officers who were serving in the Military Hospital, Accra. These officers abandoned their bungalows instantly. Officers were slapped, humiliated, drilled and manhandled together with their families. Several officers who were killed during the period and buried en masse were not killed in actual action but were grabbed from their homes and shot in cold blood - after the manner of Colonel Enniful who was slain during the June 4 Uprising for the simple reason that he was the President of the Court Martial which was trying Rawlings.

The pettiness of these armed thugs was such that a group of soldiers, who had failed a medical examination and had thereby been disqualified from going to serve in the Middle East, stormed

the house of Lt Col (Dr) Julius Sarkodie - then Chief Physician - Specialist of the Military Hospital - armed to the teeth to liquidate him. It was by sheer stroke of luck that the doctor happened to be outside his home at the material time. After causing as much havoc as they could in the house the soldiers left. The doctor, of course, took cover thereafter. The AFDC, however, never stopped hunting Dr Sarkodie until he was ultimately retired prematurely from the Military Hospital upon the insistence of elements within the AFDC and with the acquiescence of the PNDC.¹⁹⁸ A typical example of the brutality of the radical wing of the AFDCs was the organised attack on Squadron Leader Yarley at the Air Force Mess, Accra. On the day in question a group of airmen stormed the Mess and asked for the officer whom they had a personal grudge against. As the officer, who was then having a meal moved from the dining room into the Mess itself, and in the presence of several officers, the leader of the gang opened fire point blank at Squadron Leader Yarley. The scene was a tragedy, as some officers fled, while others pleaded and a few others dashed out for an ambulance. According to the vivid account I had on this incident, no one dared to disarm the attacker who had his men in waiting; and no disciplinary action was known to have been taken against the attacker and his collaborators who left the scene not as fleeing bandits but as heroic executors of the popular will of the ranks. Squadron Leader Yarley was taken to the 37 Military Hospital where a team of doctors including Colonel (Dr) Korley and Major

(Dr) Akpalu operated him; his life hanged on a thread for several weeks. The complicated operations included cutting off parts of the intestine of the victim. The Squadron leader stayed in hospital for about six months and after his discharge, he reportedly told a friend: "I dont know how much intestines I have left".¹⁹⁹

The AFDCs embarked on massive political education throughout the barracks to forge an effective alliance with the rest of the working class against the oppressor class generally - managers, officers, professionals, businessmen etc. It is worthy of note that the first formal demands the AFDCs made on the PNDC concerned the structure and organisation of the military itself. These demands may be summarized as follows: (i) all commanding officers in the Ghana Armed Forces should be elected by popular vote by the rank and file including officers and men; (ii) all military personnel in any position of authority whatsoever must be accountable to the lower ranks to whom in effect they owe their positions; (iii) if a commanding officer lost the confidence of his men, he should be removed by the same process that he was appointed; (iv) the colonial authoritarian command structure should be replaced with a system which might be described as military participatory democracy; (v) various tasks performed by ordinary ranks for officers which were described as "slavish" should be abolished. (Different and wide interpretations were put on this demand and in the process batsmen refused to serve officers any longer; cooks refused to

cook for officers and demanded that officers and men eat the same food from the same mess. In the military hospital, the AFDC ruled that officers should be served with the same food as other ranks, irrespective of the fact that officers paid higher charges upon admission. Others advocated that the military band should not entertain officers at their annual dances and/or other formal occasions); (vi) The ranks should be consulted as a matter of right on all matters that would affect their professional welfare.²⁰⁰

If this demand was implemented to its logical conclusion, then military programmes, strategies, development, recruitment and training, military intelligence, supplies and logistics etc, and even policy formulation, should be debated upon at durbars and decisions taken by the rank and file.

The careful observer would not be surprised by this demand. In the first place, they formed part of the expectations of it soldiers as far back as June 4, and this accounted for the very composition of the AFRC as stated above. Secondly, the pre - 31 December 1981 pronouncements of Rawlings had given completely false signals to the soldiers whom he hoped to use for his coup. Thirdly, some soldiers had actually participated in the 31 December coup on the understanding that these expectations would be fulfilled.

In line with the new conception of a People's Army the AFDCs cooperated with the INCC Secretariat (which later became the NDC Secretariat); and military cadres attended courses organised for

the AFDC vanguards. These men and sometimes women, were recruited from military units all over Ghana. Three batches of soldiers actually benefited from this course which was attended by 100 cadres in each batch. Revolutionary thought, Marxism and allied extremist philosophy were taught.

It is reported that the cadre - training programme for soldiers was curtailed because of an incident which happened at the third cadre graduation ceremony. A cadre walked to Rawlings who had arrived in the company of Brigadier Quainoo and told him: "Mr Chairman, now we know all about imperialism in this country; we want to join the workers and fight these imperialists." The cadres applauded in agreement but Rawlings was obviously displeased. When Brigadier Quainoo spoke, he suggested that Ghanaians should stop blaming Western imperialism for our woes. The soldiers booed Quainoo and he quickly earned the title "reactionary Buffalo soldier"²⁰¹ During question time, the soldiers questioned the ideological "pathway of the Revolution", complained about the failure to restructure the military as they before 31 December called for the hastening of the pace for participatory democracy which was understood in terms of a Parliament of cadres -civilians, soldiers, policemen, warders etc. They further requested that firmer action should be taken against foreign and local imperialist agents in Ghana.²⁰²

The immediate reaction of the PNDC leadership was to change the course of "conscientisation" of the military by inviting men like Kofi Awoonor to address AFDC organised durbars at Burma

Camp. Since INCC personnel could not be easily kept away, nasty confrontations soon occurred involving in particular Napoleon Abdulai and Nicholas Atampure, special cadres for the INCC attached to the AFDC for political education. Abdulai and Atampure were removed from the INCC and the latter was arrested on 24 November, 1982, and detained for one year without trial.²⁰³

Instructions were given to all Commanders of the Armed Forces Regiments and Battalions throughout the country not to allow civilian cadres to enter the barracks to provide political education to the soldiers. When two junior officers addressed an NDC seminar in Takoradi, they were promptly put in the guardroom and sanctioned.²⁰⁴ The PNDC had apparently come to realise that the military could not be run through AFDCs and that populism was undermining and not promoting the efficiency and discipline of the military.

In 1983, Brigadier Quainoo issued new guidelines for the operations of AFDCs which simply re-emphasised the old command structure whereby every action of the AFDCs should be channeled through the regular command. After all, Rawlings could not afford to democratise the military as the AFDCs were demanding, lest they would nullify his coup and vote him out of office. By this time the bulk of the military had been disarmed; and it was common knowledge that access to arms and ammunition remained the privilege of trusted Ewe soldiers. This was also the period when Rawlings brought to the forefront the Forces Reserve Battalion (FRB) also known as "commandos" - a para-military force trained

in Libya and Cuba and well equipped.

3.9. DEFENCE COMMITTEES, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND OTHER GROUPS

An interesting development in revolutionary Ghana was that political groups which could co-exist with the Defence Committees thrived whereas those who were disapproved of by the Defence Committees sank into oblivion. The various revolutionary organs including the African Youth Command (AYC), New Democratic Movement (NDM), the Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary Guards (KNRG) and the June Four Movement (JFM) either had Defence Committee members as the majority of their membership or they represented the leaders of the Defence Committee membership.

Generally speaking, these organisations, with the support of Defence Committees, provided the mass organisational base which upheld the radical concept of government which had resulted in the Revolution.

They provided the linkage between the Defence Committees and other institutions, for example, the Public Tribunals, by providing panel members and other personnel. The Workers Banner, the revolutionary mouth-piece of the JFM, dominated by Defence Committee members, became the ideological mouthpiece of the Left after the Revolution. When the Defence Committees lost favour with the PNDC, the organs of the revolutionary political participation and their mouthpiece, The Workers Banner, were also marginalised.

The 31st December Women's Movement (DWM) which has ousted

the National Council on Women and Development (NCWD) started with the women members of the Defence Committees. In fact, initially, Nana Konadu Agyeman-Rawlings, President of DWM saw the Movement as a way of whipping up the enthusiasm of women to participate in the activities of Defence Committees at the workplace level and also the community level.

DWM, however, expanded in scope, having used the Women Defence Committee members as a launching pad. DWM had over 1.5 million members by 1990 who also belonged to the Defence Committees. Its aims and objectives included the following: (i) to arrest apathy, ignorance and prejudices against women; (ii) to mobilise women to participate in nation-building and the revolutionary process; (iii) to help in areas special to women, including health, sanitation, promotion of child facilities including nurseries, literacy campaigns, political education and literacy education; (iv) to strive for the enactment of laws to protect women and their children.

With the cooperation of the women members of Defence Committees, DWM has achieved a lot including the following: (i) political education which have raised the consciousness of Ghanaian womanhood. During the District Assembly elections, the DWM together with the Defence Committees, encouraged women to take active part in the process. The joint effort succeeded not only in getting a number of women to stand for elections but also encouraged women to go to the polls and exercise their franchise.²⁰⁵ (ii) Together with Defence Committee members in the

rural areas in particular, DWM has engaged women in several income - generating activities including day care centres, bakeries, gari-processing, palm and kernel oil processing, soap making, tile and brick making, food preservation, charcoal production, tie and dye, pottery, art and needle work etc. These activities have helped women, particularly those who were very active in Defence Committee activities, to be gainfully employed. (iii) The Primary Health Care activities of DWM and other social activities have been very useful in promoting the welfare of women. ¹²⁰⁶

It is necessary to note, however, that DWM, exploiting the membership of Defence Committee women and other resources at its disposal has side-stepped other women's organisations such as the NCWD and has become the "official" women's organisation thus undermining the principle of freedom of association.

Groups which did not cooperate with Defence Committees suffered. Whereas the National Union of Ghana Students (NUGS) had excellent relationship with Defence Committees on the inception of the Revolution and actually conducted various PDC elections and installed the Executives, the moment students began to criticise the PNDC the relationship changed. When students from the University of Ghana engaged in demonstrations in 1983 and called on the PNDC to hand over power, PDC-led workers occupied the University in the evening of 6 May, 1983 having violently turned out the students who were supposed to have allowed themselves to be misled by "reactionary elements in society".

In the same vein, attacks by Defence Committee members on the Supreme Court, Accra, the offices of lawyers and Lodge Houses were calculated to silence the Association of Recognised Professional Bodies (ARPB) and allied opposition groups. In effect, Defence Committees were used as an instrument to destroy competitive politics by promoting groups which favoured the PNDC and silencing groups which aired dissent.

3.9 Assessment - Problems and Critique

It is pertinent to ask what impact Defence Committees have made in the social, political and economic development in the country as a whole: Have they paved the way towards the realization of democratic ideals? What are the concrete achievements? How has power been used or misused and to whose advantage?

According to Rawlings, the PDCs have promoted democracy because "the PDCs and WDCs are part of a structure which allows participation in the making of decisions affecting the every day lives of people. Our people are learning how to use this structure. Mistakes have been made, but increasingly they are being corrected..."²⁰⁷ As a direct instrument for attaining a people's democracy, Rawlings said that through the PDCs, the PNDC had "in a bold manner discarded the empty shell of parliamentary democracy and pointed the way in which meaningful participatory democracy can be established; democracy which allows the people to take their destinies into their own hands. By the establishment of the People's Defence Committees and the

coordinating body the INCC, we have been able to reverse the trend of apathy and cynicism, and aroused popular energies in the direction of meaningful and fundamental change in the structure of this society".²⁰⁸

All this is farther from the truth. The Defence Committees have not established any meaningful form of participatory democracy. The Defence Committees have not participated in taking any major decision that concerned the lives of Ghanaians whether in the realm of national or foreign affairs. The projected bottom-up approach to politics was carefully manipulated into a one-way top-to-bottom, command and obedience system. The Defence Committees heard all major decisions through radio announcements as other citizens, including matters directly affecting the Defence Committees themselves - the change from INCC to the NDC, the dissolution of PDCs/WDCs and their replacement with CDRs etc.

The PNDC government is pathologically opposed to sharing power with any group whatsoever. Furthermore, it has no confidence in the mental capacity of its own Defence Committees to make any meaningful contribution in national affairs. The alliance with Cuba and Libya and the detailed national commitments thereof were never discussed, and decisions taken on them were not considered at Defence Committee level. The overall economic policy of the government - the policy of trade liberalisation, negotiations with commitments made with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank etc - have

been decided upon without reference to Defence Committees. Defence Committee do not know how much Ghana owes currently and when and how the loans will be repaid. Ideological commitments have been made and directions changed at the discretion of the PNDC leadership in a manner that has caught the most adroit cadre totally flatfooted. Fifty cedi notes were seized from workers and other citizens without reference to Defence Committees. PDC members continued to complain about this matter, and they were entirely at sea as to what was actually happening. At a meeting at East X'borg PDC on 20 November, 1982, tempers were so high on the issue of seized c50 notes that the chairman pleaded with members to wait patiently to know government policy and plans on the issue before saying anything further on it. There was no forum or system whereby the PDCs could openly question the PNDC. There was a complete lack of knowledge on the part of the Defence Committee leadership about the direction of State at any particular time. In effect, the Defence Committees were merely expected to defend the PNDC and wait patiently for directives as and when necessary.

In all the budgets of the PNDC, the Defence Committees have merely been expected to trust the good judgement of the PNDC and not to aspire to be part of the decision-making itself. Only one attempt was made in 1984 to debate a budget after it had been read. The exercise was duly abandoned.

When the government cancelled leave allowances and took other far-reaching decisions that affected workers in 1982, the

Defence Committees and their leadership heard the announcement from the Castle on the radio as an unpleasant surprise. When he was compelled by rising disenchantment to reverse the government's decision, Rawlings said: "we (ie the PNDC leadership) have lifted the suspension on the payment of leave allowances although we had hoped that workers would voluntarily make such a sacrifice".²⁰⁹ The PNDC did not believe the decision-process should emanate from the people nor that the people should even be consulted at some stage. Such action was tantamount to taking power from the people, not giving power to the people. The PNDC brand of military paternalism meant the people had to look up to the Castle, keep mute and trust that everything would be done in their interest.

Lt Col. J.Y. Assaessie, in his assessment of Defence Committees, said that "cadres had engaged in various activities to improve the lot of the people. Among these are health posts, schools, roads, rehabilitation of cocoa, rubber and oil, palm plantation and well as picking sheanuts".²¹⁰ In the same vein, Kester Kenn Kloega said that "Ghana's Glorious Revolution has made steady progress towards the realisation of its aims and objectives, since the numerical strengths of the CDRs reflected on the numerous projects initiated to improve the living standards of our estimated eight million rural inhabitants within their respective areas of operation ... major areas in which CDRs engage themselves included agriculture, cottage industries, road construction, markets and school block

rehabilitation, health and environmental sanitation, literacy, campaign/programmes, electrification projects, anti-smuggling activities along the borders and arbitrations of cases."²¹¹

The simple answer to this argument is that production does not mean political power - the aspiration of the Defence Committees on the inception of the Revolution. The productive impact has itself been highly negligible. The Defence Committees could not have made much impact anyway, for two main reasons. Firstly the typical PDC constituted a house divided against itself. Secondly, it was an institution at war against traditional authorities and every segment of society that did not fall within its ranks.

Disputes among PDCs consumed much time and dissipated energies. A document entitled "Final Report. The Dispute at Osu Ashanti Area PDC"²¹² illustrates the point. On 6 May, 1983, the members of the Osu, Accra, Central Committee held an emergency meeting where it was agreed that the Osu Ashanti Area PDC "had become a trouble area with grave concern to the Central Committee". A three-man committee was set up to identify the problems in the area, proceed promptly to institute solutions and report to the Central Committee as was necessary. The Committee held formal meetings and found that the area was "split into two factions with two clear leaders - Miss Amina on one side and 'Chicken' on the other side."²¹³

The grievances of the "Chicken" group were that:-

(i) The Amina faction were anti-revolutionaries and engaged in

anti-social activities under the cover of the PDC; (ii) while they were regular members of the PDC, certain monies fell into their hands which must have been squandered because they could not render accounts; (iii) they secured the NDC and the Police to aid them without justification because they had interested parties in these institutions particularly the police WDC; (iv) they had formed their own executive illegally, poised for confrontation and got certain 'big' NDC men to back them; (v) they had created divisions in the formation of kenkey factories; (vi) they resorted to rough tactics, physical attacks, and abusive language against the Amina group.

The Amina faction also argued as follows:

(i) The "Chicken" faction who originally formed the interim PDC executive in the area had become insolent to all the people in the area and insulted them openly; (ii) they were impervious to advice and suggestions from others and ruled arbitrarily; (iii) they were mismanaging the distribution of food items; (iv) they were partial in distributing corn for the kenkey factories, showing their vested interest; and (v) they registered their nominees, relatives and friends only for the People's Shop and neglected others - the list of people entitled to commodities was therefore shorter than it should have been and some goods were diverted as a result.²¹⁴

A rally was held to patch up things but the basic differences persisted until the PDCs were abolished. These schisms and overweening attitudes which PDCs members accused

each other of in the Osu Area PDC were typical of the organisational and attitudinal weaknesses that characterised Defence Committees throughout the country.

In their dealings with traditional authority, the PDCs attacked chieftaincy as an institution and were proud in their disregard for chiefs. Such conduct was an anathema in Ghanaian society. As Kofi Baako, one-time Minister of Defence in Nkrumah's government once remarked, if you leave two Ghanaians on an island you would return to see that one has installed the other as a chief. This the PDCs disregarded. Throughout the country, PDCs clashed with chiefs but in the end the PDCs alienated themselves from the rest of the society as a result.

The examples of events in Prampram and Osudoku cited below do not only portray PDC attacks on chieftaincy but also show that the Defence Committees were not prepared to adopt laid down procedures in any issue except extra - legal methods that suited their whims, and thus revealing the Defence Committee as an institution at war with society.

On September 28, 1982, the PDC of Prampram in a resolution declared a unilateral take-over of the Prampram traditional Council and dissolved the existing 4 - member caretaker committee. They accused the committee of having embezzled the sum of c1.2 million paid by the NRC government as compensation for the acquisition of land for the Dahwenya Irrigation Project.²¹⁵ The PDC set up an 11 - member Interim Management Committee (IMC) which was inaugurated by Mrs Aanaa Ennin, PNDC member, on October

11, 1982. The charges were never pursued nor proved. Following the fashion of dissolving traditional councils throughout the country by PDCs, the PDC at Osudoku, for example, also dissolved the Osudoku Traditional Council on December 14, 1982, and dismissed the Acting President, Nene Guamatis II, and his elders from office. In their place, the PDC set up a 7 - member IMC.²¹⁶

These actions which were replicated all over the country were in flagrant violation of law. The Local Administration Act 1971 (Act 359) regulated the organisation of District and Traditional Councils. For example, the Act provided that two-thirds of the membership of a District Council should be elected in accordance with regulations made by the Electoral Commissioner, and one-third to be chosen by the traditional authorities in District as tradition and custom demanded. The Chairman of the Council was to be elected by the government.²¹⁷ By an amendment made to the law in 1975, a member of the District Council could be removed for good cause and in the public interest by the government.²¹⁸ It is therefore clear that in their acts of interference the PDCs were violating the law. They were exercising coercive authority by dint of their ability to enforce whatever decision they arrived at.

In due course, it became clear that this exercise of people's power by PDCs had to be regularised. The PNDC did this by the Local Administration (Interim Administration) Law 1982. (PNDC Law 14) under which all existing councils were dissolved, all chairmen dismissed, the councils placed under the direct

control of IMCs and the PNDC itself. PNDC Law 14 provided, inter alia, that "the PNDC Secretary for Local Government shall after consultation with the PNDC Regional Secretary in whose Region falls the area of authority of the relevant District Council and with the approval of the PNDC, appoint in place of members of each of the said District Council an Interim Management Committee comprising such number of persons as the first mentioned secretary may with such approval determine. The Chairman of the Council shall be a person approved by the Council",²¹⁹

Besides the attacks on chiefs, there were attacks on the aged generally. People around the age of 40 upwards were particularly loathed by the PDCs. A 70 year old man, who happened to be the oddman out in the East X'Borg PDC, once said at a meeting: "the aged people are not cooperating. Though I am one of them, I am fully involved because I will not sit down for others to cheat me anymore. If they don't come now, then they should know that they would not be welcome when it is harvest time."²²⁰ What this old man did not remember was that his PDC young men had, by acts of disrespect which they infused into Ghanaian society, undermined our national values; little wonder the elderly people were alienated. Unfortunately for this misguided old man, the harvest time he was anticipating never saw the light of day, nor did its faintest prospect lure other aged people into the ranks of an organisation which they held in contempt.

The lawless attitude of Defence Committees motivated and

activated the take-over of Lodges, and private businesses and farms as well as attacks by urban PDCs on poor farmers and foodstuffs vendors who brought food items from the hinterland to sell in the cities. These food items were seized by PDCs and sold at arbitrary prices. Sometimes the foodstuffs were confiscated altogether and the poor victims had to beg lorry drivers to convey them back to their villages as they did not even have money to pay their fares back. These farmers, of course, were discouraged; and food production was affected.

On the whole I found that people I interviewed disliked the PDC men - particularly the executives who constituted themselves into permanent local overseers and would not leave office for others. Several PDCs did nothing apart from receiving allocation of goods and distributing them, supervising the cooking of kenkey and the baking and distribution of bread. These functions were made redundant by the trade liberalisation policy under the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP). PDCs lacked realism in their actions. When they decided to attack chiefs, for example, they forgot that land still is in the hands of chiefs; and better strategies were required for meaningful results.

I also found that the Defence Committees who were supposed to infuse discipline and check indiscipline and malpractices generally proved more indisciplined and prone to malpractices than those they sought to dislodge. After all, several of them were unemployed youth, seeking to make it under the auspices of the Defence Committees. They saw their newly acquired position

as a means of attaining wealth. Examples abound. In a typical case, Valco workers collected cloth from textile factories in Tema under the auspices of the WDC. They promptly resold these large quantities of cloth at 'kalabule' prices. In the process, a worker - to- worker deal had been made whereby those companies which produced aluminium products made allocations to the workers in textile manufacturing companies and vice-versa. Under the guise that co-workers needed the goods for themselves, the WDCs collected these goods and resold them at cut-throat prices. At Akasanoma where refrigerators are assembled and sold, the workers were buying a refrigerator at c2,000 each according to a WDC demand. At one instance, the WDC leaders collected as many as 50 refrigerators and sold them at between c8,000 and c10,000 each. ²²¹

Furthermore, the confrontational attitudes of Defence Committees generally produced negative results in the long run both at the local level and at the work place, even when they possessed some good plans. Nor was their cause helped by constituting themselves into Kangaroo Courts and also arbitrarily effecting rent control, ejection and reinstatement of tenants without proper legal basis and procedures. (See chapter five).

Some members also equated themselves personally with the PDC. They did as they pleased personally, all in the name of the PDC. In one instance, a PDC executive member "arrested" a stray goat, butchered it and promptly distributed the meat among the "people". On this occasion, half of the "people" were his close

friends and relatives and the other half his own household. I n
the end, we can say that the Defence Committees did not succeed
in helping to bring about a revolution in terms of the actual and
qualitative change that both Huntington and Brendt had perceived
as stated at the beginning of this chapter.

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41. Ghanaian Times Jan. 20, 1982

42. It should be noted that in some areas, there was duplication of PDCs because of overlapping of jurisdictions created by themselves, power struggles etc.

43. Interview with Miss Doris Ocansey, CDR National Secretariat, Parliament House, Accra, Miss Ocansey later moved on to the National Commission for Democracy (NCD) Accra.

44. Konings, P. "The State and Defence Committees in the Ghanaian Revolution, 1981 - 1984". Mimeo, n/d, p.10.

45. Interview with Mr Noye, March 1982. An avowed Marxist, he quoted freely from the popular jargons of Marxism and was certain at the time that the Defence Committees would establish a full Socialist Republic before the First Anniversary of the Revolution on 31 December 1982.

46. For a fuller account, see Hutchful, Eboe: "New Elements in Militarism: Ethiopia, Ghana and Burkina" in

Jacques Levesque eds.

14. Dominiques, J.I. op.cit.
15. ibid
16. ibid
17. The Workers Banner Friday 15 - 22 October 1982
18. Interview with Major Boakye-Gyan before the AFRC handed over power on Monday, 24 September 1979.
19. d'Escot Miguel on the Sandinista Defence Committees (SDCs) in Nicaragua. Accra. April 1987.
20. Interview with founding member of the Popular Committees of the Police Service which gave birth to the Police Junior Ranks Association (PJRA). He did not wish to be named for "professional reasons" and his wish has been respected as others who helped with valuable information and made similar demands.
21. Workers Banner, Vol. 1 no.1, October 1981
22. ibid
23. ibid
24. ibid
25. ibid
26. Okeke, Babara A. June 4: A Revolution Betrayed, (Ikenga Publishers, Enugu, 1982). p. 184
27. Interview with Mr Silas Nortey (Accra Regional Secretariat of PDCs).
28. A Revolutionary Journey opp cit. p. 12
29. ibid pp. 5,6

30. People's Daily Graphic, Jan. 20, 1982
31. The Asafo Companies as a youth brigade, engaging in communal labour and forming the bulk of the chief's army in time of war is a general phenomenon in Ghanaian society.
32. People's Daily Graphic, Jan. 28, 1982.
33. Interview with Mr. Siama former WDC Chairman, State Insurance Corporation, Accra.
34. People's Daily Graphic, Jan. 26, 1982.
35. Graham, Yao: "Politics of Crisis in Ghana and Class Struggle and Organisation, 1981 -84" Review of African Political Economy, No. 34, December, 1985.
36. PNDC Press Release, Jan 29, 1982 reproduced in Ghanaian Times, Jan. 30, 1982 pp 1,2. Nursing sisters were included in this strange list, apparently because of the attitude of the Armed Forces Defence Committee (AFDC) towards nursing sisters in the Military Hospital who had officer status.
37. The New Direction. Selected Speeches of Flt. Lt. J.J. Rawlings Jan 1, 1986 -Dec 31, 1986 Volume Five (Accra: Information Services Department).
38. Incidentally, it is my view that there is no class system in Ghana. What we see is differentiation and categorisation by achievement. It is noteworthy that while Brigadier Nonoo - Mensah was the highest soldier in the Ghana Armed Forces he had a brother who was a

- International Journal 41, 4 (Autumn 1986) p. 819.
47. Pellow, D. "Coping responses to revolution in Ghana" in Cultures and Development, 1 (1983), p. 15.
 48. Interview with PNDC appointee.
 49. Interview with Mr Silas Nortey. This was confirmed by several cadres.
 50. Interview with Nii Abbey of the Coordinating Committee of PDCs Accra.
 51. *ibid.*
 52. National Defence Committee (NDC) Guidelines for the Formation and Functioning of the People's Defence Committees. (Nsamankow Press, 1983).
 53. A Revolutionary Journey *op cit* pp. 46-47.
 54. PNDC statement issued on 14 December, 1982.
 55. World Bank, Ghana, Policies and Program for Adjustment. (Washington DC, World Bank, 1983), p. 51
 56. Corporal Issaka Braimah - interview with Brian McGuire, University of Denmark published in a report on Ghanaian Refugees in Europe. Dr McGuire compiled the report for the Danish Refugee Council. Nov. 1987.
 57. *Ibid*
 58. Interview with a military cadre
 59. *ibid*
 60. Ghanaian Times 8 March, 1983.
 61. *ibid*
 62. The Process of Consolidation. Selected Speeches and

Interviews of Flt. Lt. J.J. Rawlings Chairman of the
PNDC January 1984 - 31 December, 1984, Vol. 3 p. 87.

63. Guidelines for CDRs - The CDR Eagle Flies. (Nsamankow Press, 1986.
64. This was later changed to PNDC Secretary for the CDRs.
65. Aassie J.Y, Speech on inauguration of CDRs Accra, 1986.
66. Pessy, David, Head of Project and Mobilisation of Department of the CDR Secretariat in an article "Who are the People?" in The CDR Eagle Flies Vol. 1 No. 5 7-21 April, 1986.
67. *ibid.*
68. Minutes of East X'Borg Zone B PDC, 27 March, 1982.
69. Minutes of East X'Borg Zone B PDC, 10 April, 1982.
70. *ibid.*
71. Minutes of East X'Borg Zone B PDC, 19 February, 1983.
72. *ibid*
73. Minutes of East X'Borg Zone B PDC, 29 October, 1983.
74. *ibid.*
75. *ibid.*
76. Minutes of East X'Borg Zone B PDC, 22 March, 1982
77. Minutes of East X'Borg Zone B PDC, 29 March, 1982
78. *ibid.*
79. *ibid.*
80. *ibid.*
81. Minutes of East X'Borg Zone B PDC, 13 August, 1983

82. Minutes of East X'Borg Zone B PDC, 10 April, 1982
83. See Oquaye, Mike (1980) op. cit
84. Minutes of East X'Borg Zone B PDC, 5 May, 1982.
85. CDR Guidelines 1986 (Nsamakow Press, Accra).
86. Information was obtained from personal observation and attendance at some meetings as well as sponsorship of the Peoples Shop in Hatso, Accra, where I live.
87. Minutes of East X'Borg Zone B PDC, 25 June, 1983
88. Minutes of East X'Borg Zone B PDC, 23 April, 1983
89. Minutes of East X'Borg Zone B PDC, 30 April, 1983
90. Minutes of East X'Borg Zone B PDC, 16 April, 1983
91. Mahamadu, Attah N. The CDR Concept, A Rural/Urban Analysis. A Comparative Case-Study of Nanumba District and Accra District. A Dissertation presented to the Political Science Department, University of Ghana, Legon. June 1987 p. 67.
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93. Information from Nima PDC
94. Minutes of East X'Borg Zone B PDC, 29 October, 1983
95. Minutes of East X'Borg Zone B PDC, 8 December, 1983
96. Minutes of East X'Borg Zone B PDC, 29 October, 1983
97. Minutes of East X'Borg Zone B PDC, 22 February, 1982
98. ibid
99. ibid
100. ibid
101. ibid

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103. *ibid*
104. see CDRs and Labour Issues, page... herein
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123. *ibid* p.51
124. *ibid* p.52
125. Ofori *op cit* pp. 57, 58
126. Minutes of East X'Borg PDC 12 June 1982
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128. Ofori *op cit* p.60
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132. ibid
133. ibid pp. 44,45. Quoted from Report of the First Conference of CDRs, Northern Region Secretariat of CDRs 17-22 June 1986 Vol. 1.
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- Limited: Aspects of Industrial Working Class Struggle in Ghana, 1982 - 1985". Paper presented at seminar on The Post Colonial State and National Development. April, 1987. Now published in Hanse, E. and Ninsin, KA. eds. The State, Development and Politics in Ghana. (Codesria Book Series, 1989). p.52.
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166. Statement of NDC on take over of GTP Company by Workers. 18 November 1982.
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169. Peoples Daily Graphic, 20 November 1982
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171. Eshun Lidie *op cit.*
172. Moerkamp, Jos., "The end of Workers Rule: Demise of the GTP" in Ghana Newsletter, Vol. 7, March 1989

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178. Ghanaian Times June 12, 1984.
179. The further details were obtained from interviews at Tema.
180. "Resolution on the Pioneer Food Cannery Ltd. by the solidarity Committee of Trade Union Congress (TUC), Tema Interim District Coordinating Committee of PDCs, Tema Interim Coordinating Committee of WDCs and Maritime and Dockworkers Union of TUC" issued by the Solidarity Committee on PFC on 20 June, 1984.
181. Interview with a 70 year old man who described himself as a "veteran". This age group hardly saw anything good about the PNDC.
182. Peoples Daily Graphic 21 June, 1984.
183. Tema ICC/WDCs statement on dissolution of the ICC/WDCs and the PFC struggle. See Ghanaian Times 29 June, 1984.
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187. People's Daily Graphic 17 July, 1984.

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196. *ibid*
197. *ibid*
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199. Miss Rose Danquah, a family friend of the victim, cooperated with details.
200. Demands of AFDCs on PNDC as summarised by an interviewee still serving in the Army.
201. *ibid.*
202. *ibid.*
203. *ibid.*
204. *ibid.*
205. People's Daily Graphic, 3 December, 1988.
206. Ghanaian Times, 7 May, 1983.
207. Forging Ahead. Selected Speeches of Flt. Lt. J.J.

- Rawlings, Chairman of the PNDC (Information Services Department, Accra, 1983). p. 69.
208. A Revolutionary Journey opp cit p. 45
209. A Revolutionary Journey p 32. 1982 May Day Speech
210. Ghanaian Times 1 December, 1986
211. Ghanaian Times 2 January, 1987
212. The "Final Report. The Dispute at Osu Ashanti Area PDC" was issued after a team had been set up to investigate the crisis within the PDC in the area. The open hostility among PDC members had brought the image of the organisation to a low ebb in Osu, the home of the Castle.
213. *ibid.*
214. *ibid.*
215. Ghanaian Times 29 September, 1982.
216. Ghanaian Times 15 December, 1982.
217. Local Administration Act 1971 Section 8 (1) and (2).
218. Local Administration (Amendment) Decree 1975. NRCD 353 section 1.
219. Local Administration (Interim Administration) Law Sections 2 (1) and 2 (2)
220. Minutes of East X'borg PDC 27 November 1982.
221. People's Daily Graphic 25 February, 1985.

CHAPTER FOUR

DISTRICT ASSEMBLIES

4.1 The concept and its justification

The establishment of District Assemblies may be seen as a logical sequence in the PNDC's search for a participatory form of democracy. In January 1982, the PNDC stated that "it is necessary that machinery should be established for proper administration... and for the due establishment of a true democracy".¹ The PNDC was of the view that previous governments had failed the people because the system of representation resulted in governments that were "remote and distant" from the electorate and numerically, placed power in the hands of a few rich and influential people.²

Its aim, then, was to end the system of "democracy by remote control".³ The envisaged system of mass participation would also "break the recurrent cycle of political confusion" in Ghana - a reference to the political instability which had plagued the country.⁴ P.V. Obeng saw District Assemblies as a logical sequence in the PNDC's search for democracy when he said that "the District Assembly concept seeks to fulfil two promises the PNDC made when it first came to power: to bring the government to the doorstep of the people and to ensure participatory democracy".⁵

The basic aim of the PNDC was to create a viable and autonomous local government system that would illustrate that

power stems from and belongs to the people. This is in line with Owusu-Ansah's definition of local government as a "sub-state political assembly which is organically separate from the command hierarchy of the central government, which has the boundaries of its units established on an area rather than on a functional basis."⁶

The idea of the vast majority of representatives being elected directly by their people accords with Appadorai's well known definition of local government as "a government by popularly elected bodies charged with administrative and executive duties in matters concerning the inhabitants of a particular place".⁷ From the perception of the PNDC, the District Assemblies should be a practical demonstration and manifestation of its policy of participatory democracy and collective decision-making by the people. This participation, according to Rawlings, is "the voluntary act which allows people to join in decision-making pertaining to the development process and to assure the responsibility process".⁸ In this connection, the system is one whereby people are trained to exercise political power and develop themselves. In the words of Amoako, "it ensures involvement of people in decision-making and formulation of government policies and strategies. As an end it becomes a condition for social development in the sense that good government is no substitution for self-government. People's right to express consent for action taken on their behalf is a continuous process".⁹

As early as 1982, the PNDC felt the need for a decentralization plan in order to effect popular participation in politics and the development of Ghana. The plan which was launched on 2 December, 1982, aimed at a fundamental reorganization of the machinery of government in order "to create a new kind of democracy that would bring about greater efficiency and productivity in the state machinery through the involvement of the people at all levels".¹⁰ The plan was, however, left unimplemented as the PNDC concentrated on the PDCs as organs of popular participation in politics. Rather, the PNDC amended PNDC Law 6 which brought about the formation of Interim Management Committees (IMCs) to be responsible for District Councils throughout the country. Under PNDC Law 14, District Secretaries were appointed as Chairmen of all District Councils to be responsible for their day to day management.

The PNDC was, however, to push the issue a step further in due course because as Rawlings said, "it is the view of the government that true democracy will continue to be a sham in any society that deprives the majority of the people of their right to participate in decisions that concern or affect them. In this connection, the focus of the 31 December Revolution, once we have gone through the initial phases of identifying the exact structures we require, is to ensure grassroots participation without any delay. Hence, the introduction of the proposed District Assemblies, and closely linked with this is the decentralization of the entire administrative machinery of the

public service. We are convinced beyond doubt that this approach is the most effective strategy for the rapid and accelerated development of our rural areas."¹¹

Rawlings elaborated on the structural and other arrangements which justified the new system thus: "Under the new system, structures of Town/Village Area and District Councils will be the basic units of public administration at the grassroots level with the District Assemblies as the highest political authority at the District level. When this is implemented, decisions will no longer be taken from a remote control point but will rather start from the people concerned and who are to be affected by the decision at the grassroot level. This approach has the unique and singular advantage of entrusting the people's destiny and progress into their hands within the framework of central policies. It is a challenge and a great opportunity for all the people to participate in government."¹²

Speaking of "all the people" - and impliedly not the urban dwellers only was consistent with Rawlings' inclination towards the rural dwellers from 1984. As Ninsin rightly observed, between 1982 and 1984, the PNDC had derived much of its support from the urban based working class who had been organised and led by the Defence Committees. The disaffection with the Defence Committees, the subsequent redefinition of the goals of the Revolution and changes in the strategies of mass mobilization implied a direct shift from the urban-based masses to the rural areas of the country - "that shift was expressed at the

ideological level in the government's criticism of its former allies as parasitic while the rural dwellers were described as the actual producers of the nation's wealth and the real and exploited workers."¹³ The new system was to promote the development of the rural areas in particular.

Secondly, there is the clear probability that the PNDC fell on the idea of district elections as a way of prolonging and/or managing the politics of transition as it faced the central problem of coups which Oquaye described as follows: "political power once seized by a soldier, hangs like an albatross around his neck. If the usurper should finally hand over power to civilians, how does he ensure that he does not hand over to those very persons he overthrew? Even when he is out of office, how does he ensure that his opponents would never come back to office, try him for treason and punish him?"¹⁴

By the time the District Assemblies were introduced, it was clear the PNDC was running in circles looking for political arrangements that would justify the protracted nature of a provisional government and the clamour for true democracy. The dilemma the government faced was in line with Hansen's view that "there are two main problems a military government faces when it comes to power. The first is the question of legitimacy and the second is the question of disengagement. A civilian government comes into office with legitimacy so long as it is elected within the prescribed law of the land and the support of the people. A military government has not got such initial legitimacy. It can

only legitimise itself, paradoxically by affirming its own legitimacy and arguing that its position is only a temporary one which it was forced to adopt as there was no other way to avert a major national crisis of one sort or the other."¹⁵

Ironically, not only were the Western donors who had provided the economic support for the PNDC pressing for representative government, but also, as the people felt the harsh realities of the PNDC's Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) in terms of redundancies, unemployment and rising cost of living, the call for the PNDC to hand over power had become more proliferate and intensive by 1987.

The voice of opposition came from a number of groups including the Ghana Bar Association (GBA), the Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary Guards (KNRG), the New Democratic Movement (NDM), the Ghana Democratic Movement (GDM), the Democratic Alliance of Ghana (DAG), the Trade Union Congress (TUC), the Christian Council of Ghana, The National Union of Ghana Students (NUGS), the Ghana National Association of Teachers (GNAT), and the United Revolutionary Front (URF), as well as individuals and splinter opposition groups in Ghana and abroad including the lone but weighty voice of Professor Adu Boahen for example.¹⁶

These, among others, were factors which necessitated the presentation of some arrangements and options to buy time for the PNDC. For example, the KNRG had demanded that the PNDC should take steps towards "rounding up its affairs and bringing its programmes to their logical conclusion, by fixing a tentative

date and announcing a new programme for returning the country to civil rule."¹⁷ The several measures the PNDC was asked by the KNRG to take included the lifting of the ban on party politics. This was justified on the ground that it would enable the people to exercise their "fundamental right to associate freely in defence of their political beliefs"¹⁸ If the ban on party politics was not to be lifted, the PNDC had to provide an alternative system of representation and participation that would keep out party politics. This was done through the District Assemblies.

What Rawlings had hinted at, he now justified with greater ferocity as the stakes became higher in terms of the challenge to his political power. He spoke of the new system underway as follows: "even though we have tried in the past to plant and nurture the tree of local administration, we have to be sincere and admit that so far it has failed to take root. There have been Local, District and Urban Councils in the past which were designed to be pillars of decentralization programmes and intended to usher in self-rule at the grassroots. All these experiments failed to achieve anything of lasting value for the effective development and progress of their respective areas. They were frustrated, I think, partly because there were people at the centre in Accra who were reluctant to give power to the district. They also failed because we did not insist on getting the right calibre of people elected to those councils, many of those who managed to get themselves elected were either corrupt

of outright thieves."¹⁹ As part of the process of transforming every aspect of our national life, the PNDC, according to Rawlings, was "embarking on another attempt to decentralise the national administration. Our aim is to take the mystery out of government by making each and every Ghanaian part of the business of government right from his small village through the district and even to the national level. No part of the government is being reserved for anyone or for any special group of people".²⁰

The PNDC presented the District Elections as part of a bigger national pledge towards achieving the higher national democratic goal which was described as "the PNDC's programme of evolving national political authority through democratic processes".²¹ Rawlings linked the system with our roots and traditions to justify, especially in the eyes of foreign observers, his claim that Ghana was still in search of a genuine democracy. Hence he opined that we need to evolve a system deeply rooted in our traditional and communal way of life as the basis.

The District Assemblies which would ensure this, would be the cornerstone of a new form of participatory democracy that would work from bottom to top not top to bottom. Rawlings said: "I feel confident that the District Authorities that will emerge from the current election process will provide a firm basis for the establishment, countrywide of a new democracy, as was manifested in the election campaign where common people asked basic and direct questions of those seeking their votes.

National political power must be nurtured very carefully. If a sturdy tree of democracy is to grow we must make haste slowly and deliberately to bring into being institutions which will become the pillars upon which the peoples' power will be erected."²²

District Assemblies constituted the essence of Rawlings' neo-populism. He assured the people generally that "anyone who is contemplating standing before his neighbour to offer himself as a candidate in these coming elections must know that he or she will stand naked before the scrutiny of the rest of the community. It is our responsibility, the men and women of this country, to look well at the candidates who will eventually present themselves to us and to accept only those who are clean, upright and committed in deeds as well as in words to the transformation of our nation."²³

Rural development was directly linked with the District Assemblies to lend the concept credibility and support. Rawlings said that "the PNDC government believes that the best way to accelerate the pace of development and to ensure grassroot participation in decision-making is by decentralising the machinery of government. The decentralization programme will provide more avenues for popular participation and local leadership in the development of all parts of the country."²⁴

The system was envisaged to remove the dependence of the rural folk on the urban dwellers, which, according to Rawlings, breeds corruption. Rawlings said that "sometimes the excuse that is given for embezzling state funds is that individuals have to

provide for their families including dependants in the rural areas. But if the profits were used to re-invest and expand employment opportunities, especially in the rural areas, there will be no need for such handouts. These rural folks will not have to depend on some relatives in the city; they could defend their own freedom to be, as human beings working to look after themselves, exercising their own skills and living in dignity instead of being dependent on someone's ill-gotten generosity."²⁵

Decentralization was also necessary to check the exodus from the rural to the urban areas. Hence Rawlings emphasized the need to remove decision-making from the centre. "When all decisions are taken at the centre, they are likely, to benefit those who live and work at the centre. The unequal concentration of amenities at the centre attracts more people to leave the rural areas and crowd the cities. The cities have become malignant parasitic growth, eating up more and more of the nation's resources and yet contributing little while the rest of the country struggles to feed and support them... the disease has grown unchecked. Centralised bureaucracy has thrived and multiplied whilst the productive countryside has decayed."²⁶

Explaining the concept further Alhaji Iddrisu Mahama, also a member of the PNDC, said that the District Assembly concept was proof of the PNDC's commitment to evolve a democratic system with the active and maximum participation of the grassroots in the deliberation and formulation of national policy, enabling "Ghanaians to elect their own leaders on the basis of the

candidate's proven qualities and commitment to community development."²⁷

Mr Kwamena Ahwoi, PNDC Secretary for Local Government resounded the same theme when he said that "decentralization seeks to give the people the responsibilities for managing their own affairs, with particular reference to planning, implementation and evaluation of programmes. In another dimension, it seeks to strike a balance in the exercise of actual power between the state and local communities".²⁸ To the above, Mr Justice Annan, PNDC member and Chairman of the NCD and his colleagues on the NCD added that "this local government will be the basic functioning political and autonomous unit of people's power and authority reflecting not only the people's right in decision-making, but also their responsibility as producers of the national wealth and its ultimate consumers."²⁹

4.2 Historical Review

A historical review is necessary to fully appreciate the new system since it is part of the argument that the District Assembly concept was imperative because all previous attempts to establish a viable local government system had failed. In the words of Rawlings, "all these experiments have failed to achieve anything of lasting value".³⁰ In the colonial days, the system of indirect rule meant that local government was channelled through the chiefs. It is worthy of note, however, that as early as 1858, the British provided for municipal councils in Accra and Cape Coast with elected mayors and representatives.³¹

For the rest of the country the people had little participation in local politics; and this constituted one of the main grounds for dissatisfaction that escalated the momentum of nationalism after 1945. As Austin observed, the rise in elementary education and commercial activity generally, raised the political consciousness of the group he described as the "commoners" who demanded a voice in local and national affairs and the dismantling of the alliance between the colonial rulers and the chiefs.³² The "commoners" made considerable gains when in 1951 two-thirds of the seats on local councils were given to popularly elected representatives, and one-third to the chiefs or their representatives. The local Government Ordinance (1951) following the Coussey Committee Report had seen the need for sound local government.³³

Nkrumah's government intended to remove the influence of the privileged class, particularly the chiefs, in local government; and so steps were taken to ensure that the chiefs lost their representation on the councils. Under the Local Government Act of 1961, chiefs were given legal recognition whereby they performed certain traditional and ceremonial functions. They were, however, banned from actual participation in local government. This was condemned by the elite in society but the Nkrumah Government saw it as a victory for the ordinary man in local affairs.

It should be noted further that the Convention People's Party (CPP) considered local administration as part of the

several appendages of the CPP, particularly after 1964 when the one-party system was formally adopted. The attendant corruption that pervaded local administration under the auspices of the one-party led to abuse of the system and dilution of local government functions by CPP leaders.³⁴ It is also worth noting that soon after independence, Nkrumah had taken steps to abolish the Regional Assemblies which had been provided for under the 1957 Constitution as a compromise between the federalist demand of the NLM and the centralist stand of the CPP. By this, all power converged at the centre at Nkrumah's disposal. The NLC government, made every effort to restore the chiefs to their glory followed by the PP government led by Busia. The trend continued even under the NRC military government of Acheampong which removed Busia from office. NRCD 138 reserved half of the seats in all Local Councils to chiefs. The crisis of local government led to the setting up of various Committees and Commissions on the issue. The most significant of these commissions and committees of enquiry include:-

- i) The Watson Commission (1948)
- ii) The Coussey Committee (1949)
- iii) Sir Sydney Phillipson Commission (1954)
- iv) The Select Committee of the Legislative Assembly on Federal Systems of Government and a Second Chamber for the Gold Coast (1955).
- v) Sir Frederick Bourne Committee (1955)
- vi) The Greenwood Committee (1957)

- vii) The Regional Constitutional Commission (1980)
- viii) The Mills-Odoi Commission (1967)
- ix) The Siriboe Commission (1968)
- x) The Akuffo-Addo Commission (1969)
- xi) The Constituent Assembly (1979)
- xii) The National Commission for Democracy (NCD) on District Political Authority and Modalities for District Level Elections (1987).

The Mills-Odoi Commission set up in 1967 was charged with the responsibility of examining the problems of our local government system which was "on the verge of complete collapse".³⁵ In 1968, the Siriboe Commission recommended the merger of local government departments with the civil service so as to strengthen the local bureaucracy. The Local Administration Act 1971 which came pursuant to the Akuffo-Addo Commission of 1969 as well as chapter 16 of the 1969 Constitution, and the NRC Decree (Amendment) on Local Government, 1972 provided a form of fusion between devolution and decentralization with the scales tilted towards the latter. But the ultimate effect was that local government councils remained ineffective and mere talking shops.

The aim of the National Redemption Council (NRC) Decree on Local Government of 1972 was to remedy the problems of local government which included inefficiency, ineffectiveness and corruption. In 1974 a new local government machinery was

established to remove the bottlenecks. This was a four-tier system comprising - (i) Regional Councils, (ii) District Councils, (iii) Municipal Urban, Local and Area Councils and (iv) Town and Village Development Committees. The system was also designed to bring the decision-making function closer to the point of actual implementation and vesting the local unit of administration with authority to take decision in a number of clearly specified areas for which a number of agencies were responsible in the past.³⁶

But, as Nsarkoh wrote, this new structure could not face the challenges that confronted it and was plagued with organizational weaknesses, apathy, inaction, ineffectiveness, short-sightedness, corruption and excessive control by central government³⁷. As a result the situation that prevailed before the PNDC came into office in terms of the relationship between local authorities and their clients - the public - was highly unsatisfactory. There was both ignorance of and indifference to local government on the part of the public.³⁸ The PNDC aimed at correcting the anomalies and setting up a viable local government system - hence PNDC Law 207.

4.3 The National Commission for Democracy

The National Commission for Democracy (NCD) which was subsequently given the task of re-defining District Political Authority and drawing up modalities for District level elections, was originally set up by a PNDC announcement in the wake of resentment against the PNDC.³⁹

PNDC law 42 Section 32 which established the Commission provided, inter alia, that the NCD would: -

- i) perform all functions relating to elections in this country;
- (ii) embark on a form of civic education and thereby disseminate within the society awareness of the revolutionary transformation of society which has been set in motion by the PNDC in the interest of real democracy;
- (iii) perform a public relations role by identifying regularly as it came into close contact with the people, particularly in the hinterland, among the deprived sections of the community, the real needs of the people and keep the PNDC constantly informed of these needs so that appropriate action could be taken;
- (iv) identify and assess the forces/factors that militate against the achievement of a true democracy arising from the existing inequalities between various groups/categories/classes in Ghana and make recommendations to redress these inequalities;
- (v) monitor the implementation of government policies designed to meet the urgent needs of

the Ghanaian population and report to the government regularly its observations concerning such implementation;

- (vi) formulate a comprehensive programme for the achievement of a true democracy in Ghana;
- (vii) supervise the winding-up of all political parties which were in operation before 31 December 1981, recover all assets of such parties for disposal or use by such body as the PNDC may prescribe.

The membership of the NCD was as follows:-

- (i) Mr. Justice D.F. Annan PNDC member and unofficial Vice-Chairman of the PNDC - Chairman
- (ii) Mr. E.A. Haizel - Member/Secretary
- (iii) Professor Nana Kobina Nketsiah
- (iv) Dr. Ayirebi Acquah
- (v) Mr. S. Barbar
- (vi) Lt. Col. (rtd) Assasie (deceased)
- (vii) Lt. Col. (rtd) Christiana Debrah
- (viii) Mr. J. A. Jantuah
- (ix) Mrs. Getrude Zakaria

Mr. Jantuah and Mrs. Zakaria were PNDC Secretary and Under-Secretary respectively of the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development who were ex-officio members. It was expected that the work of the NCD would help to evolve a new democratic

order springing from the views to be collected by the NCD. The expected result was the emergence of new political structures for representation of the people.

While being guided by Ghana's political history, it was expected that the NCD would come out with a new form of Representative National Assembly which would be the true repository of the people's will and power - an Assembly truly responsible and accountable to the people, closely allied with the people and translating their hopes and aspirations into reality.

In December 1985, members of the PNDC toured the ten regions in a "meet the people - tour" with the aim of promoting the work of the NCD and adding to its weight. In effect, the PNDC used the umbrella of the NCD to do its own public relations and sell its views to the populace. In my opinion the PNDC was side-stepping the Defence Committees and finding a new way of getting to the people. From the several reports publicised by the press during the period, the PNDC got acquainted with the problems, needs, deprivation, and obstacles towards the attainment of the good life by the rural people.⁴⁰

It is worthy of note that immediately after this tour, the Chairman of the NCD, Mr. Justice D.F. Annan, quickly appointed several persons from the Trade Unions, Ghana National Association of Teachers (GNAT), the Ministries of Local Government and Rural Development, Labour and Social Welfare, to form sub-committees to assist the NCD and its committees in touring the 10 regions to

collect and collate views from the people as a whole that would form the basis of the future political system of Ghana.

Mid 1987, in a document popularly known as the "Blue Book" the PNDC released its plans for District Assemblies to unveil a further stage in the evolving democratic process.⁴¹ The Blue Book sought to grant "power to the people" (Sec 1:1) It stated that in order to democratise state power and advance participatory democracy and collective decision-making at the grassroots, there was need to set up decentralised political and administrative authorities with elected representatives of the people. The decentralised authorities would be the bodies exercising state power as the people's local government (Sec 1:4). These political and administrative authorities would make and implement decisions and perform tasks related to the development and management of agriculture, transport, industry, construction, communal services, trade and tourism etc. (Sect 1:5,6)

The Blue Book formed the basis for the subsequent Local Government Law (PNDC Law 207) and dealt with the number of District Assemblies, their structure, functions, nomination and election of members, their tenure and conditions of office as well as duties. Other provisions dealt with the modalities for the conduct of elections.

It is worthy of mention, however, that the final document submitted by the NDC was rejected by the TUC, the Ghana Bar Association (GBA) the National Union of Ghana Students (NUGS) and the KNRG. They argued that the process was calculated to buy

time for the PNDC and that a piecemeal time-table towards democratisation was unacceptable. The NUGS insisted that the political programme submitted fell short of the democratic aspirations of Ghanaians. They opposed the elections on what they considered to be a fundamental issue- whether or not the District Assemblies would fulfil their proclaimed role of democratisation. The TUC was of the view that District Assemblies could only be seen as the basic structures of a new democratic order if the total shape of that order is democratically formulated and the place of the District Assemblies put therein. In short, they were suspicious of the government and doubted its sincerity. The TUC could not see how Ghana could proceed towards any form of democracy in the absence of free speech. Furthermore the TUC proposed a two-year comprehensive time-table for the making of Constitution and establishment of full representative and democratic government at all levels.

The KNRG demanded that the PNDC should rather wind up its rule and seriously consider "bringing its programmes to their logical conclusion, by fixing a tentative date and announcing a new programme for returning the country to civil rule".⁴² They demanded that the ban on party politics should be lifted to enable the people exercise their "fundamental right to associate freely in defence of their political beliefs".⁴³

As a registration body, the NCD registered 5,923,015 potential voters who constituted 89.21% of all potential voters

in Ghana. 15,000 voting centres were also established. The NCD ultimately conducted the ensuing District elections.

4.4 PNDC Law 207

PNDC Law 207 (The Local Government Law 1988) describes the District Assembly as the highest political authority in the District and introduces certain basic changes which may be summarised as follows:

(i) The creation of 45 political/administrative districts in addition to the existing 65, bringing the total to 110. The issue of delimitation of council areas has been thorny for several years, starting from the Coussey Committee.⁴⁴

The basic element that influenced the demarcation of local government areas in the 1951 report was not the size of the population, area or economic viability but the number of traditional authorities that existed in Ghana. This happened because the Committee paid undue attention to local attachment saying that "local sympathies and interest must be maintained. At the present time, this may be fostered by basing local authorities on existing state organisations or groups of them"⁴⁵

In line with this recommendation, the 1951 Ordinance provided for 22 local and urban councils, 4 Municipal Councils and 26 District Councils. The aim was to give every traditional area its own authority.⁴⁶ The Coussey System based on traditionalism collapsed because thirty one of the local urban councils had populations under 5,000, and seventy-five had populations between 5,000 and 10,000 and many of those small councils survived only

because of government or Ceesa Marketing Board grants.⁴⁷

The Greenwood Commission, having observed that such local councils that survived on mere generosity were not worthy of their names, recommended a structure based on large populations in order to make the Councils more viable. Hence 59 local/urban councils replaced the 252 councils under the 1951 ordinance.

The problem with large councils is that they move local government further from the people. Furthermore, even though the Greenwood model made savings in the local administration, the financial position of councils did not improve much, showing there were other fundamental problems. The colonial government anticipated the problem of bigger Councils that would cause the people to be less involved in local government and development and therefore suggested that town, village and area committees corresponding to the existing local and urban council areas should be established so that whilst the larger units undertook local government functions of larger magnitude, the town, village and area committees would initiate and carry through purely local projects.

Unfortunately, this was shelved by the Nkrumah government. In effect, the Greenwood recommendations were never given a chance to work. The CPP government, anxious to please various traditional areas who pleaded for their "own local council", resorted to balkanisation of the Councils, resulting in over 180 local authorities by the time Nkrumah was overthrown in 1966. While the NLC reduced the Councils to 140 under Management

Committees, the Siriboe Commission of 1968 recommended 55 larger councils.

PNDC Law 207 provides for 110 District Assemblies. It is important to note that during the exercise pressures again mounted whereby various ethnic groups asked for their own local Councils". It is my view, (and I am certain this is borne out by the problems of financial viability facing several Assemblies) that the Siriboe recommendation of 55 councils (which number could have been increased to 70) married with Greenwood's concept of town, village and area committees would have been most appropriate.

The demarcation of the 110 districts by the NDC was not without difficulties. According to Mr Ahwoi, the PNDC had by 1989 received so many petitions that it had established a Joint Committee comprising the NCD, the Chieftaincy Secretariat and the Ministry of Local Government to review outstanding petitions after all assemblies had been inaugurated. One notable case was the assembly sited at Bechem where the people of Duayaw Nkwanta had taken part in the elections on protest as a result of "earlier unauthorised promises" by certain NCD officials. Another source of problem was the overlap between traditional chieftaincy jurisdictions and new administrative demarcations, the traditional lines tending to undermine the criteria of population size and economic viability.⁴⁸ It is notable, however, that the new system has broadened the scope of participation. Every District Assembly encompassed a population of between 75,000 and

100,000 people. 265 town councils were established to cater for the more populous areas within the cities of Accra, Kumasi and Sekondi-Takoradi. Furthermore 841 area councils, 5,000 zonal councils and 15,798 unit committees became possible. 4,840 electoral areas were also established within the 110 districts plus 265 town councils which would serve as more minute bases of representation.

Under the arrangements initiated by the PNDC, 7,260 representatives had been elected by universal adult suffrage by the end of the District Assembly elections. One the whole, some 273,260 ordinary people have been brought into the mainstream of the decision-making process. These included the 7,260 assemblymen 33,000 Town/Area Council and 233,000 Unit Committee members.

The Local Government (Amendment) (No.2) Law 1990, made some vital structural changes. The Amendment Law redesignated Cape Coast, New Juaben and West Dagomba District Assemblies as Municipal Assemblies. Section 20 added urban and zonal councils to the local government structures and allowed for the establishment of Municipal Assemblies in addition to Metropolitan Assemblies.

While Sec 20 of PNDC Law 207 deals with the establishment of town or area councils, it allows the establishment of only "area or town councils or unit committees within the area of jurisdiction of the assembly". The amended text of sub-section 1 of Section 20 of PNDC Law 207 lists " (a) urban councils, (b)

zonal councils, (c) town or area councils and (d) unit committees" as the sub-structures permitted to be established. In sub-section (2) of the amended law, the instrument referred to in sub-section (1) is to specify the membership, functions and powers as well as all other matters concerned with "urban councils, zonal councils, town or area councils or unit committees".

Furthermore, Sub-section 1 of section 87 has been divided into two parts, (a) and (b). Sub-section 1(a) caters for the establishment of "metropolitan assemblies, metropolitan authorities, and sub-metropolitan district councils." Sub-section 1 (b) adds municipal assemblies and zonal councils, to the district referred to in the seventh schedule to the law. The seventh schedule adds Cape Coast, New Juaben, West Dagomba and Tema Municipal Assemblies to Metropolitan Assemblies of Accra, Kumasi and Shama Ahanta-East. Sub-section 2 has also been substituted to read. "The instrument referred to in sub-section 1) of this section shall specify the membership, jurisdiction, functions, powers and responsibilities of the Metropolitan Assemblies and Municipal Assemblies and the levels below them".

ii) Replacement of District Councils with District Assemblies. The new terminology was manifestly more appealing and gave a psychological booster to Assemblymen. Furthermore, we have the establishment of Executive Committees charged with the actual implementation of programmes and decisions and which would report regularly to the Assemblies. A complete mini-government was

thereby established at the District Level.

iii) Adoption of a three-tier system of local government comprising the District Assembly, Town/Area Councils and Unit Committees, picking some good ideas from the Greenwood model.

iv) The provision that the two-third members of the Assembly should be directly elected throughout the country and one-third to be appointed by the Central Government.

v) Introduction of the concept of revocation of mandate. The law provides that the mandate of an elected member of a District Assembly could be revoked by the electorate if they should lose confidence in such a member on the following grounds:

a. the member has abandoned the ideas and programmes for which he was elected; b. he has systematically neglected his duties; c. he has committed acts incompatible with his office as a member of the District Assembly.⁴⁹

The procedure for recall is as follows:-

Where the electorate loses confidence in an elected member of the District Assembly on any of the grounds above-stated, one-quarter of the registered voters in the electoral area may petition the District Election Committee (DEC) for revocation of that member's mandate and his recall from the Assembly. When the DEC receives such petition it shall determine whether a prima facie case has been made for the recall of such member from the Assembly. If the DEC is satisfied that a prima facie case for recall has been made, it shall organise a referendum to decide the issue whether or not such member should be recalled. If at

the referendum forty percent of the electorate vote in favour of the revocation of mandate, the member shall be recalled. In such a case a bye-election will be held to replace the member who has been recalled.⁵⁰

The principle behind the concept of revocation of mandate is to ensure that once elected, Assemblymen do not alienate themselves from the people and cease to serve the interest of the electorate. It is to remove any notion of secured tenure during the lifetime of the Assembly. This is to make Assemblymen discharge their duty to the people as trustees not overlords, and solve the perennial problem that elected representatives present themselves as servants of the people only when they are seeking elective office but once they are voted into office, they tend to disregard the people. The provision, however, gives some room for concern. For example, once one quarter of the electorate in an area have presented a petition, it should not lie within the power of the DEC to determine whether it is appropriate to put the matter before the electorate. The issue must be automatically tested since the DEC cannot substitute its judgement for that of twenty-five per centum of the populace.

The FNDC may also recall an appointed member upon the recommendation of three-fourths of the members of the District Assembly provided there are stated and proven grounds to do so. Such complaints shall first be made to the DEC which shall investigate the complaints and make recommendations to the FNDC.

One argument that may be recorded in this regard is that, in

view of the fact that one-third of the Assembly members are appointed members, then if they should decide collectively to block the recommendation for the removal of an appointed member the elected representatives of the people shall be frustrated leading to tension within the Assembly. The argument of an Assemblyman from Accra was that if 60 percentum of Assemblymen request the recall of an appointed member upon stated grounds, it should be sufficient for the DEC to investigate and make appropriate recommendations to the FNDC.⁵¹

Furthermore, it is obvious that in effect if the FNDC refuses to act on complaints against an appointed member, the entire Assembly, together with the whole electorate in the area, cannot do anything about the matter. This adds insult to injury because the appointment of one-third of Assemblymen is itself frowned upon.⁵²

vi) Membership of the District Assembly consists of the District Secretary, two-thirds elected representatives and one-third appointed members. The membership of the District Secretary who is a FNDC appointee was considered unsatisfactory by a majority of interviewees. It was pointed out to me that since the Assemblies would be electing presiding members, (and by a two-third majority), such a member who would not wield executive power, may tend to pitch himself against the District Secretary who is the Chairman of the Executive Committee which is the implementation and coordination arm of the District Assembly. Particularly, if the two persons happen to be strong

personalities, or do not share basic ideas and beliefs, a battle could ensue between the elected part-time Chairman and the unelected, full-time chief executive who owes his appointment to the government. After all, the presiding member should normally enjoy considerable influence in his community. Furthermore, if a FNDC appointee with connections at the Castle should be appointed Chairman, there is the real possibility of conflict between him and the District Secretary.

With regard to the one-third appointed members, the argument against them is that it was just an attempt by the FNDC to load the Assemblies with its favourites and in effect control the Assemblies through them; secondly, the system undermines the right of the people to choose their own representatives; and thirdly, there is the possibility of friction between elected and appointed members. The counter-argument is that historically, all District Councils in this country have had some form of appointed members or the other. As far back as 1951 the Local Government Ordinance, 1951, reserved one-third of the number of seats on local councils to chiefs or their representatives. Since independence, whenever this one-third had not been appointed by chiefs, they had been appointed by government. This was the situation under the Local Government Act of 1971 (Act 357) where the Chairman of the District Council was to be selected by the Prime Minister. Two-thirds of the members were to be elected and one-thirds to be chosen by the traditional authorities in accordance with traditional and customary usage.

Under the N.R.C. Decree (Amendment) on Local Government, 1972 the two-thirds elected members were to be appointed by the Central government.

vii) PNDC Law 207 does not debar a member for lack of proficiency in the English language since the District Assembly may conduct its business in English or in any Ghanaian language common to the communities in the District.⁵³

viii) PNDC Law 207 consciously provides for Assembly Members who will not be full-time, paid members and who would not make politics their vocation. But while engaged in other areas of human endeavour, they would contribute meaningfully towards local administration and development. Very regular meetings are therefore not contemplated by PNDC Law 207 which provides that the District Assembly shall meet at least four times in a year (section 5.1).

It may be argued that this would render the Assemblies less effective. On the other hand it could be argued that under the English system which we inherited, public officers were discriminated against and the obstacles which stood in their way have now been removed.

ix) In order to underscore the importance of the ordinary man, the new system provides that there should be no requirement that a candidate should pay any deposit upon standing for election to the District Assembly. Neither should candidates finance their public campaign nor should there be a requirement that a candidate must own property in the district or in the electoral

area. Political parties are not allowed under the system; and all candidates should campaign by means of a common platform mounted by the District Electoral Committee (DEC) - a system which was very defective as will be discussed in due course.

x) In order to facilitate its work and benefit from the knowledge and experience of any public officer at any given time, PNDC Law 207 provides that an Assembly may summon any public officer in the District to provide any information or assistance as the Assembly may require. (Section 5(2))

xi) The District Assemblies are to operate within the general guidance and direction of the Central Government in terms of national policy and the National Democratic Revolution. This is a severe limitation which is discussed further under control of District Assemblies by the central government.

xii) PNDC Law 207 has brought about a fusion of Central Government departments and local authorities. Below is the list of the twenty-two central government agencies which have been decentralised to give meaning to the integrated system of administration:-

1. Ghana Education Service
2. Ghana Library Board
3. Information Services Department
4. Department of Social Welfare
5. Department of Community Development
6. Department of Town and Country Planning
7. Ghana Highway Authority

8. Public Works Department
9. Department of Parks and Gardens
10. Department of Rural Housing and Cottage Industries
11. Statistical Service
12. Births and Deaths Registry
13. Department of Forestry
14. Controller and Accountant General's Department
15. Office of the District Medical Officer of Health
16. Department of Feeder Roads
17. Fire Service Department
18. Department of Animal Health Production
19. Department of Fisheries
20. Department of Agricultural Extension Services
21. Department of Crop Services
22. Department of Agricultural Engineering

In addition, there is a list of 18 proposed departments and agencies to be further decentralized as follows:


1. Immigration Department
2. Geological Survey Department
3. Survey Department
4. Department of Cooperatives
5. Labour Department
6. Mines Department
7. Department of Internal Trade
8. National Archives
9. Rent Control Department

10. Ghana Museum and Monument Board
11. Sports Council
12. Centre for National Culture
13. National Youth Organising Commission
14. Lands Commission
15. Valuation Board
16. Ghana Water & Sewerage Corporation
17. Electricity Corporation of Ghana
18. P & T Corporation.

District Assemblies are to operate within the milieu of general national decentralization policy involving the PNDC Committee of Secretaries, the Ministries, Offices of the CDRs, National Revenue Secretariat, Tribunals, Courts, Ombudsman, Statutory bodies, planning and budgeting departments. These are illustrated by Tables 4A to 4D following:

TABLE 4A


NATIONAL DECENTRALISATION STRUCTURE



Source: 'Decentralization in Ghana' produced by Information Services Department, Accra.


TABLE 4B

ADMINISTRATIVE DECENTRALISATION STRUCTURE



Source: 'Decentralization in Ghana' produced by Information Services Department, Accra.

TABLE 4C


REGIONAL COUNCIL STRUCTURE

District Councils will have the same structure with the PNDC District Secretaries as Chairmen.

Source" 'Decentralization in Ghana' produced by
Information Services Department, Accra.

TABLE 4D

ADMINISTRATION STRUCTURE BELOW THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT



Source: 'Decentralization in Ghana' Produced by Information Services Department, Accra.

4.5 Coordination

As a result of the fusion of the various government agencies with local administration, it was necessary to institute a coordination machinery. It should be noted, for example, that in several cases, one civil servant serves two or three Districts at the same time. This has required that steps be taken to prepare composite budgets in order to ensure effective coordination of efforts at the District level. Hence the reforms in budgetary affairs in local administration constitute one of the improvements introduced by PNDC Law 207.

This will be better appreciated by an analysis of the pre-PNDC Law 207 situation. The previous situation was regulated by Section 65 of the Local Administration Act, 1971 Act 359 which provided that:

- " 1) Every District Council shall submit to the Regional Council at such time and in such manner as the Regional Council may direct, detailed estimates of its revenue and expenditure for the next financial year.
- 2) The Regional Council shall consider the estimates submitted and may either approve or disapprove the estimates as a whole or in part and shall notify the District Council accordingly.
- 3) If the estimates are not approved or disapproved by the Regional Council before the commencement of the financial year for which the estimates are prepared,

the District Council may by resolution authorise recurrent expenditure at the levels in force at the end of the previous financial year unless contrary directions are issued by the Regional Council and may collect any revenue, the collection of which is authorised by or under the provisions of any enactment.

The Regional Councils were, however, not established." Therefore it became the duty of Regional Administration officers to effect the necessary approvals. The estimates were vetted by the Chief Local Government Inspectors who were seconded to the Regional Administrations. The system, however, continued to be based on the financial memoranda for Local and Urban Councils issued by the Ministry of Local Government under Section 81 of the Local Government Act (54 of 1961).

District Council Estimates have two main parts, the Revenue Estimates and the Expenditure Estimates.

The Revenue Estimates are made up of eight (8) heads:

1. Rates
2. Lands
3. Licences
4. Interest on Investments
5. Rent from government properties
6. Trading services
7. Grant-in-Aid
8. Miscellaneous

The Expenditure Estimates have five (5) heads:

1. Personal Emoluments
 2. Travelling and Transport
 3. General Expenditure
 4. Maintenance/Repairs/Renewals
 5. Capital Expenditure.
- In the preparation of estimates, officials have over the decades merely added some amounts to previous figures and nothing realistic was done, apart from the lack of

coordination.

The composite budgeting system under PNDC Law 207 aims at improving the situation. It will be a synthesised estimate of both revenue and expenditure of all the decentralised departments and agencies in the District. This is based on Sec 63 of PNDC Law 207 which provides that:

1. Every District Assembly shall before the end of each financial year submit to the Regional Co-ordinating Council a detailed budget for the District stating the revenue and expenditure of the District for the ensuing year.
2. Regional Co-ordinating Council shall collate and co-ordinate the budgets of the Districts in the region before submission to the Councils.
3. The budget for a District shall include the aggregate revenue and expenditure of all departments and organisations under the District Assembly, the office of the District Administration, including the development plans and programmes of the departments and organisations under the Assembly.

Budgeting and budgeting process represent another major point of departure in PNDC Law 207. The District budget now consists of the aggregate of the budgets of the decentralised departments, including their development plans, as well as those of the District Assembly and the District Administration.

The novel way of budgeting is a departure from past practice

and is one of the principal ways of ensuring effective decentralization. Section 57 (3) deals with what has come to be known as "ceded revenue". It states that certain revenue sources which were previously being tapped by both the central government through the Inland Revenue Service (IRS) and Local Governments would now be tapped exclusively by the District Assemblies. The system, however, allows for other agencies to collect these on behalf of the Assemblies. In practice, the Ministry of Local Government has an arrangement with the IRS whereby the latter collects the monies and pays them into a special account for the benefit of the District Assemblies. Between January and August 1989, about c202 million accumulated in this account awaiting sharing formulae to be finalised and distribution effected.⁵⁴

Sub section 4 of Section 57 allows for the listed sources to be added to from time to time.

Some of the problems I identified with the composite budget system by the latter part of 1990 are as follows:

- i) some of the departments involved have failed to forward their estimates to be included in the composite budget.
- ii) some District Secretaries, District Assembly Chairmen and leading personalities have shown reluctance to allow officials responsible for composite budgets enough access to financial and other records in their offices to enable the preparation of the budget of the particular Assembly, and to be included in the composite budget for the District;

- iii) sometimes there is a preference for the budget being prepared by officials who were previously in charge of the relevant budgets;
- iv) some officials have also failed to appreciate their specific roles in the budgetary process. The difference in the schedule of a budget officer and an accounts officer must be duly appreciated with specific job descriptions to avoid some of the misunderstanding on the ground;
- v) qualified personnel have not always been available in the right numbers throughout the Districts;
- vi) the problem also arises as to the relationship between the decentralised agencies and their Regional and National headquarters;
- vii) it is also observed that it would be difficult for certain organisations which are outside the civil service to fit into a civil service structure. These include the Library Board, the Ghana Education Service, the Highway Authority, the Fire Service and the Statistical Service.

Another vital area of coordination under PNDC Law 207 is the establishment of Regional Coordinating Councils (RCCs) which shall monitor, coordinate and evaluate the functions of the District Assemblies in the various Regions. The functions of the RCCs include the following:

- (a) co-ordinate and formulate the integrated plans and

programmes of the District Assemblies in the Region and harmonise these plans and programmes with national development policies and priorities for approval by the PNDC;

(b) monitor the implementation of programmes and projects within the Region and evaluate the performance of such programmes and projects;

(c) plan at the regional level and integrate all departmental programmes in the Region;

(d) allocate to the Districts in the Region, public funds that may be considered appropriate and as approved by the PNDC and grants - in-aid made to the Districts in the Region;

(e) review and co-ordinate public services generally in the Region, (section 113 of PNDC Law 207).

The Regional Secretary is the convener of all meetings of the RCC and presides over them. Furthermore, he has a right to vote at all such meetings. He also has the power to co-opt any official in the Region to participate in any meeting save that such official shall have no vote. In this connection, it is worthy of note that the RCC, headed by the political appointee - the Regional Secretary - who represents the PNDC in the Region and who is expected to direct the machinery of government in the Region and exercise such powers as the PNDC may delegate to him from time to time could dwarf the District Assemblies themselves and subject them to the will of the PNDC.

4.6 Developmental And Other Functions

The democratic character of the District Assemblies is found in the functions assigned to them. In the past, District Councils were assigned essentially municipal functions as providers of services. Now they are designated the highest political authority at the District level and they are called upon to perform substantial functions. These are mainly developmental, budgetary, productive and municipal. They have responsibility for the formulation of plans, programmes and strategies for the effective mobilization and utilization of resources in their districts.

The main functions may be considered as follows:

1. According to PNDC Law 207, by virtue of its over-all responsibility for a District, the District Assembly shall exercise "political and administrative authority in the District and shall provide guidance, and give direction to, as well as supervise all other political and administrative authorities in the District. The Assembly has power to deliberate (discuss, debate and consider) any matter, legislate (make any laws pursuant to their discussions) and execute (put into effect any laws that they might pass - Section 6(2).
2. Specifically, every Assembly is expected to perform a developmental role. In this connection the Assembly should:-
 - (a) be responsible for the overall development of its

- District and it is obligatory it should prepare and submit to the PNDC for approval the development plan and budget for the District;
- (b) pursuant to the above, consider and formulate strategies for the effective implementation of its development plan. This should include effective mobilization and utilisation of all resources in the District - human, physical, financial etc;
 - (c) find ways and means to promote and support productive activity and social development in the District. In the process, the Assembly should identify and remove any obstacles to development and the exercise of local initiative;
 - (d) see to the development of basic infrastructure to enable citizens enhance their economic performance and provide municipal works and services such as sanitation generally, refuse collection etc;
 - (e) be responsible for the development of human settlements and the environment;
 - (f) be responsible for the maintenance of security and public safety in its areas, in cooperation with other agencies such as the police, courts etc;
 - (g) be responsible for the promotion of justice. As a result it shall ensure that courtrooms and other facilities are made available for use by the Courts and Tribunals; and

(h) conduct research into ways and means of discharging its functions better. (Section 3).

Apart from the above functions which are more deliberative in nature, the District Assemblies have executive functions in promotion of development as follows:

- (a) execute approved development plans for the District;
- (b) ensure that various bodies, agencies etc play their expected roles in the execution of development plans. In this connection, the Assembly may provide guidance, encouragement and support;
- (c) initiate and encourage other persons or bodies to undertake development projects;
- (d) initiate and encourage joint participation with other persons or bodies to execute approved development plans; and
- (e) monitor the due execution of development plans, assess and evaluate their impact on the populace, the economy and the environment (section 14).

In the performance of the functions mentioned above, the District Assembly should not act in isolation but shall co-ordinate, integrate and harmonise the execution of programmes and projects under approved development plans made by the Central Government either for the District specifically or for the nation generally but which affect the District in question. (section 5).

Furthermore, it is provided that in the discharge of its functions, the Assembly shall be subject to the general guidance


and direction of the Council (ie the FNDC) on matters of national policy" (Section 6(a)) (emphasis added). Under this provision, the Central Government has extensive control over District Assemblies.

In order to render the Assemblies operational and particularly enable them to pursue their developmental role effectively, they are given further ancillary powers whereby they could cause entry into any land or building for any purpose reasonably connected with their functions (section 32(1)). This is a very extensive power which is not properly controlled under FNDC Law 207 and may easily lead to high-handedness and over-zealousness. The control of the Courts over such actions should have been provided for in great detail particularly because the 1979 Constitution has been suspended by the FNDC. Furthermore, the Assembly may request any information reasonably required for its functioning or give any person directions to act towards the discharge of the Assembly's functions. (section 32 (1)) It is an offence punishable by a fine not exceeding c50,000 or to imprisonment not exceeding 12 months or to both for any person to wilfully obstruct any officer of the Assembly, in the carrying out of the functions of the District Assembly, or to fail without reasonable excuse to furnish any information requested, or deliberately give information he knows to be false or which he has no reasonable ground to believe to be true. If the offender should continue with his offence, he shall be liable to pay a fine of c2,000 for every day on which the offence continues

(section 32 (2)).

Mr Ahwoi has explained that the District Assemblies, while performing their development functions, will have to work within the framework of "approved development plans."⁵⁵ As to where the discussions will take place and who will give the necessary approval, Mr. Ahwoi has explained the process as follows: A District Development and Planning Unit (DDPU) would submit projects to the District Assembly for approval. Technical coordination at the Regional level would come from a Regional Development Planning Unit (RDPU). The Regional Coordinating Committee (RCC) would then give political approval after which there would be scrutiny by the National Development Planning Commission (NDPC). The FNDC itself will then give the final approval.⁵⁶

The structural positions, therefore, is as follows:-



By mid-December 1989, the NDPC - which is the fruit of a 1986 study by a team of Hungarian consultants to the FNDC - had been approved by the Committee of Secretaries and had been placed before the FNDC.⁵⁷ The proposals were slow to be made public and effected. It does not appear as if the FNDC itself takes the work of the NDPC seriously, its business having been left in the

part-time hands of Lt General Arnold Quainoo, PNDC member.

In order to ensure mass participation in the development process, Mr Ahwoi has explained that an Assembly's plans and projects would be subject to open and public hearings in the District before implementation.⁵⁸ A plan would have to be displayed in public places for two weeks before the open meeting, in which time memoranda and opinions from the public would have been submitted.⁵⁹ It is expected that during this period, the CDRs, mobisquads etc. will seize the opportunity to submit memoranda for the consideration of the Assemblies. Furthermore, the CDRs, mobisquads etc themselves would be among "the implementing bodies".⁶⁰

It would appear that this is another example of populism at work. The system has so far appeared impracticable. Not a single District Assembly had effected the process by the end of 1990. It is pertinent to ask, for example, whether any meaningful public hearing can be made after a project has been approved by the PNDC. Indeed, the pattern is for Assemblies to await the pleasure of the PNDC before taking any steps.

With regard to the provision that the District Assembly should take steps to remove (local) obstacles to initiative and development, one would have expected that this would have gone together with extensive improvements in the land tenure system. As Mr. Ahwoi himself admitted, "the land tenure system is the biggest problem"⁶¹

Mr Ahwoi opined that District Assemblies would have to look

how best to reform land tenure, working with local consultation.⁴² In the meantime, the Assemblies are empowered to acquire and develop land by agreement or acquisition. A practical way of removing obstacles to development, as Mr Ahwoi said, is by block farming in terms of cooperative ventures to which the Ministry of Agriculture, the Agricultural Development Bank (ADB) and the Pamscad programme are linked. In this connection, the Assemblies would provide services and allocate the land for public and private development.⁴³ Land Tenure in Ghana, however, is a complicated national issue which should be effectively resolved by the Central Government in consultation with chiefs and other bodies to ensure meaningful action by District Councils.

In order to appreciate how the PNDC intended to tackle certain vital issues relating to development which are not specifically provided for, a few answers from Mr Ahwoi's interview with Nii K. Bentsi-Enchill are reproduced hereunder:

Q How would the Assemblies pay for land compulsorily acquired?

A Provision has been made for central government to lend such money and be repaid in time.

Q Certain Districts have high revenue potential from gold, timber, diamonds, cocoa, coffee and sheanuts while others have not. What problems are anticipated?

A The 1979 Constitution provided for local retention of 15 percent of revenue, a provision repeated in the

PNDC's May 1982 guidelines. This has never worked as rich areas became richer and other areas remained heavily subsidised by the national economy. The government has been exploring a formula for revenue generation and revenue sharing for balanced national development.

Q Would salaries paid to District Assembly employees not hamper development in some areas?

A The government has ruled that salaries of revenue collectors should never exceed half of revenue collected locally.

Q How would the Assemblymen come to appreciate their role?

A Special seminars would be organised for them. Local CDR organising assistants would be part of the seminar training teams touring the Districts. Seminar subjects would include local government law and structures, budgeting, revenue generation and relations between Assemblies and the civil service. The seminar training teams would spend two days in each District and 10 days in each Region. There would also be "mobile planning squads" especially for the new Districts in view of the lack of competent staff for the technical units of the Assemblies.

Q What about foreign investors?

A In the case of foreign investors interested in the

mining industry, for example, it might well be that the NDPC will liaise with the District Assembly. If there is disagreement, the PNDC would have to make the final decision. Any law requiring the disposition of local land in this connection, will be passed by the Assembly as the NDPC has no power. The PNDC will then have 21 days in which to make its own over-riding ruling.⁶⁰

Apart from the sharp emphasis on development, PNDC Law 207 makes provision for the performance of the usual functions of local government as follows:

- i) Health generally, particularly the promotion of public health including appropriate drainage and sanitation, immunisation etc.
- ii) Town and Country planning - the control of the construction of buildings, streets, boardings, fences and signboards, the execution of work on and in relation to existing buildings, structures and streets and the removal or abatement of obstructions and nuisance.
- iii) The grant of licences - including licence for every vehicle in the District (which is a novelty), entertainment licences etc.
- iv) Making bye-laws to fulfil any purpose or function granted by PNDC Law 207. The law expands the scope of bye-laws by the provision relating to model bye-laws by providing that where the PNDC Secretary for Local

Government is of the opinion that uniform provision may be reasonably made in respect of any matter for which bye-laws may be made, he may, by legislative instrument, make model bye-laws which may apply throughout the country or to a specified area (Section 53).

Some Assemblymen I encountered expressed the fear that the FNDC Secretary for Local Government may usurp the functions of the Assemblies and legislate for them. However, in connection with the approval of bye-laws in general, we see an improvement in FNDC Law 207 by providing that "any bye-law made by a District Assembly shall have effect when the District Assembly notifies the Council of the making and contents thereof and if within twenty-one days after such notification the Council does not object to the bye-law or any other provision thereof" (section 52 (1)). The previous situation was that bye-laws had no effect until they had been specifically approved by the government. The position now is that unless the FNDC specifically objects to the Law, then it shall become law after 21 days of its having been delivered at the office of the FNDC.

v) District Assemblies may also collect rates and levies as sources of finance. A rate may be "general" or "special". A general rate is levied over the whole District for the general purposes of the District, while a special rate is levied over a special area in the District for the purpose of a specified project

approved by the District Assembly for that area.

4.7 District Assembly Elections

For the purpose of conducting the elections, the country was divided into three zones and voting took place on different dates in the respective zones - an unprecedented occurrence in our electoral history. Zone One comprising Ashanti, Eastern, Central and Western Regions voted on 6 December 1988. Zone Two comprising Upper East, Upper West and Northern Regions went to the polls on 31 January 1989. Zone three which was made up of Greater Accra, Volta and Brong-Ahafo Regions voted on 28 February 1989.

The NCD argued that this system would enable its scarce facilities to be utilised effectively from one zone to the other. But some respondents argued that the PNDC was afraid to face the nation en bloc since a boycott or poor turn-out could be construed as unpopularity of the PNDC. The piecemeal approach was to test the waters as the PNDC trod cautiously along. Secondly, the PNDC apparently wanted to transport its zealous cadres (who had diminished numerically over the years) from one zone to the other to whip up enthusiasm and ensure by all means possible that the rural people especially turned out at the polls.

Meanwhile, a very successful registration of voters had been undertaken by the NCD. 5,881,110 people registered for the elections, which was 87% of the total 6.7 million adult population of Ghana.⁶⁵ It is noted that in Nigeria 65% of the

eligible persons registered and this was considered very successful. In Britain, the figure is only 50%.⁶⁶ The Brong-Ahafo Region topped the registration by registering 650,262 eligible voters whereas the anticipated figure was 646,719.⁶⁷ Hence there was 101% registration.

4.8 The Process and Platforms

Subject to the overall superintendence of the NCD, the District elections were conducted directly under District Election Committees (DECs) which were established in all Districts. They were actually responsible for receiving nominations, having candidates vetted (with the help of the local CDRs and other persons/bodies including the police), the mounting of platforms and the conduct of the elections generally.

In order to secure a candidature, a person had to be nominated by 25 registered voters in the District. After vetting, the DEC had the power to prune down the candidates to 2 or 3. The process of pruning was bizarre since the DECs had absolute discretion to accept or reject a candidate. Furthermore, the criteria used to reject some candidates and accept others were not clear.

Several persons complained that they were simply brushed aside when they were nominated as candidates, and persons favoured by District Secretaries and the local CDRs were presented. In Accra, Tema and Kumasi, reports I received indicated that in several cases it was virtually impossible to become one of the two or three candidates unless a person had

official approval from the District Secretaries and local CDAs. In some cases, candidates from among the revolutionary organs were quickly pushed forward to block certain unwanted candidates. I was informed that this accounted for the harassment of one Mr Thompson, an accountant when he managed to push his nomination through and mount a platform in the Korle Wokon electoral area, Accra.

The vetting process was to ensure that the qualifications of an Assemblyman as provided for under section 16 of PNDC Law 207 were complied with, and these are as follows:

- (a) he is of sound mind;
- (b) he has not been sentenced to death or imprisoned for an offence involving fraud, dishonesty, violence or convicted for an offence relating to an election;
- (c) no adverse findings have been made against him by a competent authority nor has an offer of reparation been accepted from him by the PNDC since June 4, 1979;
- (d) he is not disqualified from practising his profession on the ground of malpractice, fraud or dishonesty by a competent professional body, if he is a professional; and
- (e) he is exempted from the payment of basic rate because he is attending an educational institution and is not receiving any emolument apart from an allowance or grant for his studies.

In practice, however, other general criteria of acceptability as

construed by DECs, District Secretaries and revolutionary organs, influenced the vetting process.

The DECs then had the responsibility to mount platforms for candidates to campaign and to answer questions from the electorate. The purpose was to verify the qualifications of the candidates in public and the accuracy of the life history declared by each candidate. Secondly, it was a process whereby a candidate was introduced to the electorate. Thirdly, it enabled the electorate to know the manifesto of every candidate, what he planned to do and what his expectations were. The system was justified by some interviewees who insisted that the manner of campaign was a victory for grassroots participatory democracy in that by the single platform system, no candidate had an edge over the other because of financial and other considerations.

During the process the DECs received various reports from the public and conducted some form of enquiries on these reports and invited the candidates to answer relevant charges. These were used to disqualify some candidates outright; others were invited to appear in public, mount the platforms and face their accusers. In some cases, the candidates failed to turn up. Three candidates for the District Assembly election in the Nzema East District - Mr Ben Matthew Baidoo of Gwira Eshiem in the Ankobra River State electoral area, Mr Ehimah Ebi of Gwira Baso electoral area and Mr Thaddeus Lemane of Dominase electoral area all in the Gwira traditional area - were reportedly disqualified "for various electoral offences including forgery and

dishonesty." ⁶⁷ The Chairman of the Nzema East DEC, Mr Joseph Mochiah said that Mr Baidoo for example, failed to report on the day a platform was mounted for him to meet the people. Mr Baidoo allegedly forged signatures and thumbprints of a number of his nominees while Mr Ebi confessed on being confronted, that he had served a three-month jail term for theft while he was an employee of the Prestea Goldfields Ltd. Mr. Lamene allegedly forged a thumbprint of one Ndele Ebba as one of his nominees. ⁶⁸

In some cases, wild allegations were made which could not be substantiated. At a platform at Akrofuom near Obuasi, the Adansi West DEC faced a situation where some of the electorate called for the disqualification of three candidates whom they accused of "bad behaviour" over the years. Nothing concrete was advanced to support this statement and the members of the DEC reminded the people that disqualification of candidates was the responsibility of the DEC who would act only upon concrete evidence and thorough investigations into allegations. On this occasion, the DEC schooled the public on the laws of libel and slander and cautioned them to be careful about their utterances so that their newly-won right in participatory democracy could be appropriately exercised. ⁶⁹

The platforms sometimes became very dramatic as local people showed their enthusiasm. For example, in Mankessim, in the Central Region of Ghana, a candidate was arrested just as he stepped down from the platform after presentation of his manifesto. The candidate, who was also a chief in the area, was

Mana Appah Kurankye VI, who was seeking to be elected to represent Edmadze-Twafo-Akyinin electoral area. He was alleged to have failed to repay a loan of c57,245 .00 which he had taken from the Aburam Rural Bank. It was alleged that in February 1988, the chief used his influence to obtain the loan which he promised to repay in five days' time. He had not repaid the loan by November 1988.⁷⁰

In the Asutifi District in the Brong-Ahafo Region, Mr Evans Oppong, a 38 year old candidate was accused of stealing a clock belonging to a local postal agency when he was a postal agent several years earlier. After a hectic public quizzing by his accusers, Mr Oppong said he handed the clock over to the Town Development Committee (TDC) before leaving for Nigeria. This response attracted the attention of the Chairman of the TDC who instantly mounted the platform and on behalf of the TDC denied that Oppong ever returned the clock. Oppong reportedly disappeared from the scene. Earlier on, Oppong who had promised to work towards the betterment of the people, was asked by one questioner, how he could be trusted when he fled the country when the going was tough, to seek greener pastures in Nigeria.⁷¹

In the Jasikan District in the Volta Region, one Mr Emmanuel Kumado, was winning applause as the most outstanding public speaker among a number of candidates until he was exposed for being in the habit of harvesting fish from other people's nets in the Volta Lake. Other people appeared to give on-the-spot evidence to establish, inter alia, that Mr Kumado was caught in

one such act in 1983. He had to admit in public that he paid a fine of 10 bottles of akpeteshie (local gin) at a traditional court presided over by Amega Xatsawotsope.⁷²

In some cases, the system was apparently manipulated by some members of the public who manufactured allegations to discredit certain candidates. On Saturday, 11 February 1989, a platform was mounted in Accra Central by the DEC to introduce three candidates to the electorate. The rally, chaired by Mr H.E. Golightly, Chairman of the Ashiedu-Keteke DEC at Kokompe (a suburb in Accra noted for its car spare parts dealers) had to be called off at one stage. The problem arose after a candidate, Mr Jerry Nii Akwei Thompson, a 43 year old accountant, had pledged to promote health, education and sanitation in the area. Suddenly, a section of the public who were not asking questions in an orderly manner that would invite answers, started shouting and hooting that the candidate was corrupt and a man of dubious character. There were wild allegations that the candidate had embezzled funds belonging to "Eshee Nyomo Feemo Kpee", a benevolent society in Accra, in 1984.

Mr. Thompson was meticulous in answering his accusers factually when he had the chance, showing that he had used his time and skill sacrificially for the society and had only left the society because of "certain anomalies". However, when the time allotted to Mr Thompson was up, a section of the crowd raised a commotion and refused to allow other candidates to present their manifestoes. It is noteworthy that subsequently Mr

Thompson won the seat with 3,578 votes against 1,356 votes polled by Jonathan Jeff Adote, a 50 year old pensioner, and Mr Daniel Nii Okai a 38 year old poultry farmer who came a miserable third.⁷³ It had become apparent that certain persons had been procured to harass Mr Thompson, an accountant, who stood his grounds.

Because of shortness of time, sometimes certain matters could not be dealt with effectively by a DEC resulting in some candidates being put at a disadvantage. In the Osu Klottey/Asylum Down area a candidate was embarrassed over an allegation that he had been dismissed from his employment and convicted. The matter was so poorly handled that after the election the candidate issued a writ in the High Court, Accra (suit No. 454 in Court 6). But apparently, the High Court had no jurisdiction over the matter; my monitoring of that case showed that it died a natural death to the bitterness of the candidate who felt he had been unjustly accused and unnecessarily embarrassed.

Apart from questions relating to the personal lives and backgrounds of the candidates, candidates were also asked questions relating to the problems in the localities to test whether they had identified those problems and how best they thought they could be solved.

In general, however, it appeared to me that in questioning candidates, the public expected them to have some packages as panacea to their maladies. Hence questions were asked on,

development, agriculture, agro-industrialisation, housing, education, health, good sanitation, health centres and clinics, good water, electricity, child welfare etc. Sweeping promises were made by several candidates throughout the country. In the Asutifi District in the Brong-Ahafo Region, for example, Mr Yaw Amankwah, a 30 year old farmer, promised to ensure adequate sanitation by providing incinerators and KVIP systems if he was elected. Mrs Cecilia Antwi, a 31 year old teacher, noted that female education in the area was discouraging and she would take steps to correct this anomaly if elected.⁷⁴

Mr Yaw Mensah Abarampah, a 28 year old teacher, said he would work for the supply of electricity in the whole area. Mr. Kofi Nsiah, a 30 year old farmer, assured the electorate that he would ensure that levies paid by the people were used for development projects. Mr Kwabena Amponsah Manu, a 42 year old farmer, said he would liaise with the people to provide themselves with basic amenities such as treated water, a health centre and KVIP system. Mr A.W. Berko, 49 and Maxwell Anane 32 - both teachers - promised to provide the town with water, toilet and other facilities.⁷⁵ When a questioner asked one candidate how he proposed to finance his catalogue of promises, the answer was: "with your help and that of 'aban' (meaning the central government) we shall do it."⁷⁶

4.9 Voting and Participation

The voting process itself took place in the following manner. The voter was given a ballot paper on which the

photographs and names of two or three candidates had been placed. The voter then made a thumbprint or mark against the candidate of his choice and placed the ballot paper in the ballot box that stood outside. After the counting of votes, the candidate with the highest number of votes won in accordance with the simple majority system.

Under the auspices of the NCD, ballot papers and other material were dispatched to the various centres. Voting normally started at 6.00 am and ended at 5pm. Voting throughout the country was on the whole peaceful and orderly.

A few incidents were recorded, however, including lateness in opening polling stations, late arrival of ballot papers and officials, difficulty in identifying certain persons, non-appearance of names on the register (for which matter those who produced their registration slips were promptly allowed to vote), mix-ups in the voters' registration list where lists were sent to the wrong polling stations and a few cases of impersonation.

In some cases, the NCD was responsible for the problem. A number of people at Fiahor in the Kodzi Electoral Area in the Anlo District could not vote because part of the voters' register for the village was missing. Mr A.K. Tehoda, Chairman of the Anlo DEC said that the register available had the names of only 48 voters, adding that only 32 people had been able to present their registration slips for the compilation of on-the-spot register. He said efforts to trace the missing register from the office of the NDC, Accra, had failed. The situation created by

this mishap was so chaotic on election day that several voters left in protest. Madam Rose Adikah, one of the candidates withdrew in disgust leaving Mr M.K. Dzirakor, a farmer, in the area alone in the contest. The latter was declared elected unopposed.⁷⁷ At Tegbi- Ashiate electoral area, there was confusion when Mr C.K. Aglahs' name could not be found in the register though he had a registered slip. The officials insisted that he could not vote.⁷⁸

Official figures gave the turnout at the elections as 58.9%.⁷⁹ This compared most favourably with the District elections held in November 1978, when only 18.4% of the eligible voters actually went to the polls.⁸⁰

The table below gives the details of the 1978 elections.

TABLE 4E

1978 DISTRICT COUNCIL ELECTIONS

No. of District Councils	Total Registered Voters	Total Votes Cast	% Poll based on All Registered Voters	% Unopposed
Ashanti	10 814,620	203,171	24.9	19.4
Brong-Ahafo	8 549,138	102,955	18.7	38.0
Central	8 528,609	117,324	22.2	19.4
Eastern	9 626,503	103,837	16.6	35.5
Greater Accra	5 525,834	53,416	10.2	25.0
Northern	7 445,538	80,939	18.2	42.7
Upper	7 487,614	78,669	16.1	51.1
Volta*	7 465,811	71,050	15.3	55.3
Western+	5 367,834	75,929	20.6	27.4
TOTAL	64 4,811,501	 887,290	 18.4	 34.9

* The results did not include one ward of Tongu District Council.

+ Eleven wards in the Western Region refused to take part in the elections for not being given a separate District Council.

Source: Oquaye, Mike Politics In Ghana 1972-79 (Accra: Tornado Publications, 1980) p.82.

The details released by the NCD regarding the 1988/89 District Level Elections on a comparative basis are as follows:

TABLE 4F

PERCENTAGE OF VOTES AGAINST REGISTERED VOTERS
IN THREE ELECTIONS

REGION	1978 DISTRICT COUNCIL	1979 PARLIAMEN- TARY ELECTIONS	1988/89 DISTRICT LEVEL
	%	%	%
WESTERN	20.6	34.04	55.3
CENTRAL	22.2	33.34	59.3
EASTERN	16.6	35.95	60.8
VOLTA	15.3	33.65	59.4
ASHANTI	24.9	41.99	60.8
BRONG AHAFO	18.7	33.16	60.2
NORTHERN	18.2	32.09	60.6
UPPER	16.8	32.82	64.4 (AVG)
GREATER ACCRA	10.2	35.59	44.3
NATION AVERAGE	18.4%	35.25%	59%

Source: NCD, Accra.

The Ministry of Local Government published interesting details about the high turn-out in the Ashanti, Central, Eastern and Western Regions which give us the following picture: In Ashanti, the turn-out was as high as 69% in Amansie East, Bosomtwi/Atwima/Kwanwuoma. It is notable that in 14 of the 18 electoral districts, 60% and above turnout was recorded. However, in Kumasi proper, the turnout was as low as 45%. This was the lowest followed by Ejura-Sekyere-Dumase (47%), Asante Akim south (53%) and Afigya Sekyere (58%).

In the Central Region, Upper Denkyiura topped with 70%. The lowest recorded was in Cape Coast with 50%. Six out of 12 Districts in the Central Region had a turnout of 60% and above.

In the Eastern Region, the East Akim District topped with

71.6%. The lowest turn-out was in Manya-Krobo with 49.5% out of 15 Districts had a turnout of 60% and above.

In the Western Region, the highest turnout was in Shama Ahanta East with 50.12%. Only three Districts recorded a turnout of 60% and above.²¹

Major disparities were noted between the turn-out in rural and urban centres. In the capital, Accra (and including Tema), the percentage turn-out ranged from 34.4% to 46.29% except in two rural districts where the pattern was different. In Dangbe East the turnout was 61.4% and in Dangbe West, 50%. This contrasts sharply with the turnout in Ablekuma (37%) and Kpeshie (34%) in Accra.

This pattern pervaded the southern part of the country which is generally more developed than the northern part. For example, apart from Ho (Volta Region) and Koforidua (Eastern Region) all the districts surrounding the Regional capitals in the Greater Accra, Central, Western and Ashanti Regions, had comparatively lower turn-out. Even in the Northern, Upper West, Upper East and Brong Ahafo Regions, voters turnout diminished as you approached the capital, though the turn out on the whole was higher in these areas.

In the Upper West Region, for example, the rural districts of Nudule and Sisala had 70% and 79% respectively - far higher than the recorded figures in the capital, Wa. However, there was relatively low turnout in certain districts of the Northern Region where conditions were similar but there was far lower

turnout as follows:- East-Mamprudi (93.5%) Tolon/Kumbugu (83.0) and West Gonja (51.5%).

In the Brong Ahafo Region, the capital Sunyani recorded 58% in the district while in the Kintampo district (a fairly developed area) the turnout was 53% despite the very high turnout in other areas.

Several factors account for the rural-urban disparity. In the first place, as explained earlier in this work, by 1984 the PNDC had lost favour with the urban working class and had shifted attention to the rural people who were being wooed consistently. With the sharp emphasis on rural development, and the PNDC's presentation of the District Assemblies as organs for local development the rural people saw the process as a unique opportunity to breach the gap between rural - urban development.

Secondly, the PNDC which had been against chiefs in the past, began to court them, in a new policy of reconciliation. This policy worked more effectively in the rural areas for two reasons - the rural chiefs were more gullible whereas the urban chiefs were more wary of the PNDC; furthermore, even where the chiefs were willing to embrace the new alliance, the influence of chiefs in mobilising their people for the purpose of voting in any election has always been more effective in the rural than in the urban areas. In the capital, Accra, for example, the influence of chiefs in this direction is virtually nil.

Thirdly, the urban dwellers could not conceive the possible impact of the District Assemblies and how they could withstand

the dominance of the PNDC at the centre.

Fourthly, the lower turn out in the urban areas could be seen in terms of a protest vote against the PNDC's refusal to return the country to constitutional rule. This protest movement - spearheaded by the NUGS, GBA, TUC, KNRG etc - was more urban than rural.

The newly created Districts which were more rural than urban had high turn-outs not necessarily because of the people's interest in that particular election as such but the voters in these areas wanted to vote to show their appreciation for being given their "own" Districts and also to justify the creation of the Districts. This was the case in Sissala, for example. In Krachi, the PNDC had given back a rich area ceded from the District upon a personal petition made by the Krachi Wura (Chief) to Rawlings. The Krachi Wura made it his business to organise public rallies and beat his "gong gong" to mobilise support for the elections.

In speaking of the high turnout on the national scale, the first point to note is the unique role of the revolutionary organs including the Defence Committees. They helped in vetting candidates and gave credibility to the public platforms many of which would have been empty without them. It is worthy of note, however, that most of these cadres were unemployed young men, virtually drafted as paid ad hoc political agitators by District Secretaries.

Secondly, government personnel from the NCD to the PNDC

members and Secretaries, Regional and District Secretaries, took upon themselves to tour the various Districts and influence a good turn-out with promises that the elections were going to ensure the devolution of power to the people. In some cases, people were coerced to vote. In Accra, Mr. E.T. Mensah, Chairman of the City Council, closed all markets including the famous Makola Market and posted homeguards there. The impression was given that if you did not go to vote, you would be noted down and penalised.

Thirdly, the 31 December Women's Movement made a great impact. The Movement has established a wide network embracing every town and village in Ghana and helped in the establishment of nurseries, bakeries, gari factories, garments, dyeing and processing factories, farms etc throughout the country. To many women, it has been a source of inputs for their vocations and means of livelihood. The Movement did not only encourage women to vote massively to ensure that the right people were elected to protect the gains that women had made under the auspices of the Movement, but also insisted that as many women candidates as possible should actually stand for election to the Assemblies. During the period, 'T' shirts, caps, cloths and other attractions were generously dished out by the Movement to win support and ensure women's participation.

Fourthly, the Ghana Private Road Transport Union (GPRTU) was roped in by the government in an unprecedented alliance whereby voters were transported free of charge from their towns

and villages and abodes to polling stations. With the hooting vehicles standing by and the invitation by cadres and officials to get on board, this proved a mighty attraction. Other transport organisations chipped in. In Berekum for example, the Berekum Branch of the Progressive Transport Owners Association (PROTOA) released 30 vehicles to the Berekum DEC to help in the District Assembly elections. The vehicles also conveyed polling officers and ballot boxes to the various polling stations.

In the absence of political parties (they are essential to stimulate political activity and their absence contributed to the low turn-out in the Local Council elections in 1978)⁸² the factors enumerated above were in effect responsible for the exceptional high turn-out that occurred in the 1988/89 District Level elections.

4.10 Background of Assemblymen

With regard to the social background of the candidates who were victorious, it is noted that they did not belong to the professional, businessmen, intellectual group in society. In the Western Region, a conservancy labourer won a seat against a legal practitioner. Almost 65 percent of all the Assembly members are farmers (even though some unemployed persons described themselves as farmers) and the other 35 percent comprised public servants (mainly clerical), elementary school teachers, farmers, fishermen, traditional rulers (of lower status), health workers (mainly of the lower and middle levels), religious leaders (mainly of the spiritual and syncretic following), some

traditional rulers and a few lawyers.

See tables 4G and 4H below for occupational distribution of Assembly members. This includes members nominated by government which improved the qualitative character of the Assemblies to a large extent.

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TABLE 4G

OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF ASSEMBLY MEMBERS

REGION	AGRI- CUL- TURE	MEDI- CAL & PARA STAFF	TEACH- ING	ACCOUNT- ING & BANKING	DEVELO- PMENT	CIVIL & PUBLIC SERVICE	SELF EM- PLOYED	RELI- GIOUS LEADER	LEGAL PRAC- TITIONER	OTHERS	TOTAL
G/ACCRA	61	7	77	18	14	82	44	6	4	26	339
A/REGION	459	25	360	13	15	94	112	11	4	87	1180
W/REGION	165	5	180	5	10	38	42	-	-	7	452
E/REGION	346	19	241	14	1	129	116	14	3	77	960
V/REGION	209	7	281	7	17	95	78	7	3	36	740
C/REGIO	208	18	183	26	7	82	92	4	13	49	682
U/E REG.	108	20	118	7	7	79	13	6	5	17	380
B/REGION	277	22	301	3	9	86	73	1	3	6	781
U/W REG.	59	17	115	8	1	18	12	1	2	26	283
N/REGION	295	20	273	8	0	106	42	10	3	35	792
TOTAL	2181	160	2120	109	81	839	624	60	40	360	6589
%	33.2	2.4	32.2	1.7	1.2	12.7	9.5	0.9	0.6	1.9	100

Source: Information Digest - Local Government No 7, 1989, p.19.

TABLE 4H

OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF ASSEMBLY MEMBERS
(& BREAKDOWN)

REGION	AGRI- CUL- URE	MEDI- CAL & PARA STAFF	TEACH- ING	ACCOUNT- ING & BANKING	DEVELO- PMENT	CIVIL & PUBLIC SERVICE	SELF EM- PLOYED	RELI- GIOUS LEADER	LEGAL PRAC- TITIONER	OTHERS
G/ACCRA	17.2	2.0	22.7	5.3	4.1	24.1	12.9	1.7	1.1	7.6
W/REGION	36.4	1.1	39.7	1.1	2.2	8.3	9.2	-	-	1.5
CENTRAL	29.7	2.5	26.1	3.7	1	11.7	13.1	1.8	0.7	9.2
B/AHAFD.	33.4	2.7	36.3	0.3	1.1	10.4	8.8	0.5	0.3	4.8
U/WEST	20.8	6	40.6	2.8	0.3	16.9	4.2	0.3	0.7	7
U/ EAST	28.4	5.2	31	1.8	1.8	20.7	3.4	1.5	1.3	4.4
NORTHERN	38.9	2.6	36.0	1.05	0	13.9	5.5	1.3	0.3	4.5
VOLTA	28.2	0.9	37.9	0.9	2.2	12.3	10.5	0.9	0.4	1.4
EASTERN	36	1.9	25.1	1.4	0.1	13.4	12	1.4	0.3	7.9
ASHANTI	38.	2.1	30.5	1.1	1.2	7.9	9.4	0.9	0.3	7.3

Source: Information Digest-Local Government No.7, 1989 p.21.

Sampling of the results shows that in the Upper East Region, an illiterate farmer won against a businessman. Other victors in the area included small scale farmers, 2 blacksmiths, and nurses including one male nurse. In the Volta Region, the Akatsi District figures showed that out of the 18 seats in the District, teachers won 8, farmers won 9 and a driver won one. Mrs Eugenia Abia Kumasa a female teacher won the Torve Electoral Area seat. In the Jasikan District, another female teacher Miss Edith Mensah won the Baika - Somanya Electoral Area seat against two male contenders. In the Hohoe District where 108 candidates vied for 48 seats, 9 were women 48 were teachers and 40 were farmers. 2 were priests while the rest were civil servants, pensioners and members of other vocations. In the Golokuati Electoral Area, four of the eight seats were won by teachers, one by a pensioner, one by a Civil Defence Organisation (CDO) man and one by a woman farmer, Mrs Elizabeth Avege. In the Western Region, a conservancy labourer beat a lawyer.

In Accra, the following sampling was picked up out of the results announced regarding victorious candidates:-

<u>NAME</u>	<u>ELECTORAL AREA</u>	<u>OCCUPATION</u>
Nii Akwei Thompson	Korle Workon	Accountant
Abudulai Rashid	La Kpanaa	Public Servant
Stephen Ashitey	Ado Betor	-
Abdul Larley	New Mantasee	Plumber
E. Essuman	Awudome	Civil Servant
Isaac Kwame Ampiako Atta	Gon-Ten	Civil Servant

Teiko Tettey	Mukose	-
Nathaniel Adjei	Akromadikpo	CDR
E.A. Amartey	Tsui Bleoo	Auditor
Albert Adinortey	Kasseh	Civil Servant
Charles Segbedje	Aflive	Fisherman
Christian Mensah	Zongo	Teacher
Erasmus Quao	Ashiboi	Petty Trader
W.R. Vanden-Bossche	Padmore	Retired Clerk
D.K. Diabene	Kwesi Plange	Driver
Emmanuel Tamakloe	Ohuru	Apprentice Tailor
John K. Arthur	Union	Business Executive
J.P. Freeman	"A" Road	Teacher
Daniel Okusu	Sahara	Social Worker
S.C. Mensah	Black-Cat	Public Servant
J.E. Aggrey-Fry	Low-cost	Agriculturist

The Secretary for Local Government, Mr. Kwamena Ahwoi, proclaimed that the results constituted a great victory for the ordinary man and a chance to prove his worth. The PNDC must have felt the inadequacy of the elected members because, as Mr Ahwoi himself explained, in selecting the nominated members, care was taken to include:-

- i) a wide array of people with knowledge and competence in diverse areas who were shy to stand for elections;
- ii) an infusion of technical know-how to enable Assemblies perform their functions effectively and be guided by experts in such fields as agriculture, health,

accounting etc.

Of the nominated members a large number were professionals including doctors, economists, lawyers, accountants, engineers and priests. In the Aburi District, Rev. Kwansa, an eminent retired Synod Clerk of the Presbyterian Church of Ghana, then the President of the Bible Society of Ghana, was nominated for Aburi. Professor Yaw Manu of the Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, was nominated for the Nii Boi area in Accra. It is, however, a truism that a large number of cadres of the Revolution and friends of the regime were included to give the Assemblies what one District Secretary described as "the requisite political direction and balance" in deliberations.⁸³

4.11 District Assemblies in Action - Development

Decentralisation in contemporary times is generally geared towards development by maximum mobilisation and active participation of the ordinary people in the planning and execution of development projects. In the words of the United Nations, "governments are increasingly recognising that they can accelerate social and economic development by associating the people with what they are trying to do and stimulating and supporting the efforts of the people themselves to improve their living conditions."⁸⁴ This development aspect of decentralisation has rural development as its key objective. Lele observed that "improving the living standards of the mass of the low income population residing in the rural areas and making the process of their development self-sustaining constitute the essence of

decentralisation.

Rural development primarily implies generalised increases in (i) rural labour productivity resulting in growing incomes and (ii) rural employment opportunities sufficient to absorb the large number of entrants into the rural labour force for continually rising levels of living.⁸⁶ The World Bank viewed rural development as "a strategy designed to improve the economic and social life of a specific group of people - the rural poor. It involves extending the benefits of development to the poorest among those who seek a livelihood in the rural areas".⁸⁷

The common denominator that pervades these conceptions may be seen in terms of the existence of a large rural population; they are poor; they have a low standard of living; they need to be helped out of their predicament. The linkage with decentralisation is local development through local self-government.

Rawlings emphasised the developmental role of the District Assemblies before their formation. He said "we recognise the potential for the decentralisation programme for ensuring nation-wide resources mobilisation and at the same time providing the base for genuine national democracy.... This new momentum will lead to nation-wide district level elections and the creation of district political authorities as steps forward in our quest for grassroots participation in decision-making."⁸⁸

This role would affect every area of the life of the citizen. Hence, according to Rawlings, "the social welfare role

of the former Ministry of Labour will be added to the responsibilities of the Ministry of Local Government. Our earlier decision to phase out a separate Ministry of Rural Development was based on a clear recognition that Rural Development will be achieved only if all Ministries orient their activities towards the rural areas, where the majority of our population live. It is in the context of rural development that agriculture, industries, education, health finance and other ministries should be tested."⁸⁹

District Assemblies have shown keen interest in agricultural development. They have taken steps to hire tractors for farmers, helped in the acquisition of land, provided improved seed, engaged in public education regarding better crop management and facilitated the initiation of pilot projects in areas such as poultry, vegetable and pineapple farming.

In the Zazugu- Tatale District, the Assembly obtained a credit facility with the help of the Ministry of Local Government to purchase a tractor for the use of farmers in the locality in 1989. The Assembly made a down payment of c1 million out of the total cost of c3.2 million. The balance was spread over a two-year period for repayment. A committee was established to control the operation of the tractor which would prepare the land for the farmers in the area for a fee. This single tractor led to the instant establishment of mobisquads who took to finding some land and commencing agricultural operations.⁹⁰

In the Accra Plains, the Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA)

has begun pilot projects including a four-hectare community farm cultivated by the people. These farms are cropped with cassava, cocoyam, plantain, vegetables (including okro, garden eggs and tomatoes) and groundnuts. In the Yilo Krobo District, a zealous Boti Mobisquad has been formed whereby a gang of 25 works for farmers at reasonable fees. This is a kind of "nnoboa" (mutual help in farm cultivation) by hire.

By the District Assembly system, it is expected that the productive potentials of the rural people would be channelled into viable co-operative groups. The redeployment of excess labour in various establishments, corporations, the civil and public services in general has been linked with the agricultural development efforts of the District Assemblies. In the Tamale District, for example, 145 redeployees were in June 1989 helped to go into rice farming through the joint effort of the District Assembly and PAMSCAD. Under the scheme, each person was allotted one hectare of land to cultivate under a block farming system.⁹¹

Under the PAMSCAD Credit Line Scheme, credit in the form of farm inputs was channelled through the Agricultural Development Bank (ADB) to the redeployed through the Ministry of Agriculture which provides technical assistance. Currently, the Ministry of Local Government has been roped into the system to ensure that the District Assemblies become the hub around which the system will revolve. The programme envisaged that, apart from agricultural activities including vegetable farming and animal husbandry, the local people would be trained to acquire

vocational skills. After their training, they would benefit from the PAMSCAD Credit Line Scheme to help resettle them in their localities, not in the cities.

In this connection, it is worthy of note that the Assemblies are not only cooperating with PAMSCAD but also with the 31 December Women's Movement, the National Council on Women and Development (NCWD) the Canadian University Service Overseas (CUSO) and Women In Development (WID) to help women not only in agriculture but in other small scale areas under the auspices of the District Assemblies. As a result of the self-help spirit generated by the Assemblies, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) have presented several tools and implements for agricultural development and promotion of cottage industries in rural Accra.

A related aim is not only to improve the utilisation of skills such as weaving and carving so as to advance the quality of local products for local and foreign markets, but also to encourage the development of non-traditional export products. Under this arrangement, the tools provided will remain the property of UNDP/ILO and the Department of Rural Housing and Cottage Industries until they are fully paid for with minimum interest. The District Assemblies have rekindled the concept of Community Development Corporations (CDCs) in Ghana. In Kumasi, for example, the Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly (KMA) has set aside c10 million as initial capital for its newly established development corporation. This would serve as a catalyst in

speeding up the development plans for the Region through the various Assemblies, help diversify the sources of revenue and generally generate funds to finance development. As part of its developmental effort, KMA Spent c97 million on bulldozers and graders in 1990.

In the Anlo-Fante New Town in Kumasi, the Assembly member for the areas Miss Theresa Akyaa Boakye in an interview in February 1989, stated that a major street rehabilitation programme estimated at c3.6 million had been started by the new Assembly, and that a three-and-a-half kilometre road would be constructed to link the area to the Stadium-Asokwa main road. Culverts would also be reconstructed or desilted. Development levies of c1,000 per houseowner and 200.00 per adult were instituted to finance the projects.⁹²

In Aboabo near Gyereaso in Atwima District the Assembly has launched a c3.5 million development programme to build a six-classroom block with an office, store and a health post. Levies were imposed - c2000 a man and c1000 a woman. In Bawku area in the Upper East Region, the Bawku East District Assembly made provision for a total expenditure of c26.7 million on development projects during the 1989-90 fiscal year. Details included c5 million on a new lorry park and market complex, c4 million on a library complex, c2 million to complete a brick and tile factory to accelerate housing projects in the area, c4 million on new market stalls and c4.8 million for the provision of KVIP systems.⁹³

The Bawku East District Assembly also appointed a committee to study the possibility of establishing an irrigation scheme in the Tamne river basin near Garu. It was resolved that in conjunction with the Ministry of Agriculture, the Assembly should encourage and help farmers to plant early maturing varieties of millet and maize. This had become imperative because of the short rainy seasons being experienced in the area resulting in perennial food shortages.⁹⁴

In this connection, the Assembly called on the Ministry of Education to consider adjusting the holidays periods of first and second cycle institutions to coincide with the farming season. This was a classic case of an Assembly taking steps to adjust established arrangements to achieve developmental goals. In addition, the Assembly decided that every family should take steps to plant ten trees as its contribution towards the national re-afforestation effort. Adult literacy classes were also to be intensified to help reduce the illiteracy rate in the area in order to promote development. In order to ensure that the projections of the Assembly were carried out, a 9 member Projects Implementation Committee (PIC) was established to oversee the execution of projects for the 1989 fiscal year.⁹⁵

Throughout the country, the Assemblies have announced plans and efforts towards development. For example, in Accra, under the auspices of the Accra Metropolitan Authority (AMA), the Accra Planning and Development Programme (APDP) was engaged in the preparation of a five-year Strategic Development Plan to address

the serious planning and development problems facing the metropolis.

The plan area for the programme covers the three Assemblies of Accra, Tema and Ga Rural. It involves a comprehensive set of aims which relate to issues of land use, transportation, engineering services, environmental protection, management of development and economic activities. The plan aims at ensuring that development at all levels is properly co-ordinated to avoid ad-hoc decision-making which had often resulted in disruptive urban development practices. An important implementation objective of the programme is to identify and formulate projects which will lead to the improvement of depressed areas in the city. The envisaged projects include housing re-development schemes, urban improvement projects, development of local markets and small-scale industrial development.⁹⁶

AMA has proved busy over development projects generally and has issued guidelines for the development of shops in the AMA area. Under these guidelines, the indiscriminate and uncontrolled development of shops is to cease; and all future development should take note of sanitation, ventilation, toilets and traffic requirements. It was observed that when the AMA engaged in demolition exercises which had become rampant in the days before the District Assemblies, the representative role of the new Assemblymen had some effect. The Assemblymen received complaints about arbitrariness, raised the issue during debates and secured the suspension of the demolition exercise while

meaningful modalities were worked out to streamline the system.

Some details of this matter underscore the importance of the Assemblies and the representative system as a whole. In June 1990, a Special Task Force began to pull down certain houses around Asylum Down, Accra, particularly around the main drain along Osofo Street. Pursuant to various complaints lodged by residents, Mr. James Amoakohene, Assemblyman for the area, appealed to the AMA to suspend the exercise pending inspection and authentication of title deeds and building permits.

It was observed, inter alia, that some owners developed their lands long before the gutter which had become the centre of controversy was developed into the drains. In the end, Captain Felix Okine, Co-ordinator of the Task Force, suspended action and the problem was referred to a committee for more rational determination.⁹⁷

The AMA's activities have included the construction and improvement of slaughter houses, provision of KVIPs, construction of Junior Secondary Schools and road construction. In Accra, the AMA has set up a construction brigade of carpenters, masons, electricians, plumbers and other artisans to help Ga Rural communities in development projects.

In the Pedu Electoral Area near Cape Coast in the Central Region, an estimated expenditure of c2 million was projected to rehabilitate electricity poles and fittings which were over 10 years old and in very poor condition. As part of the measure, all scantling poles were to be replaced with concrete ones. More

poles were to be erected to reach a greater number of the populace. In addition, a general two-year development plan was instituted estimated at c9 million. The Assembly was also to undertake completion of JSS workshops with PAMSCAD assistance as well as public stand pipes and bath houses. In order to raise the funds required, contributions were levied as follows:- c500 a man and c300 a woman for all residents. Non residents were to pay c1,000 a man and c600 a woman.⁹⁸

In Berekum in the Brong-Ahafo Region, the District Planning Budgeting Division of the Berekum District Assembly presented a preliminary report on the mineral potentials of the District to the District Administration after a successful survey conducted mainly in 1990. Gold and diamond deposits in parts of the District were some of the findings of the report. These could be found in economic quantities around the valley of River Awasu at Twebabi, Nkwantanka, Kutre No.2, Benkase, Nkuyenkyemanu, Ayiman and Kata. Subsequent approval was given to the Executive Committee of the District Administration to contact interested small scale licensed prospectors to exploit the minerals after the necessary statutory requirements have been satisfied.⁹⁹ At Akrofuom, the inhabitants have constructed a 10-seater KVIP place of convenience at a cost of c1.05 million. The Presiding Member for the Adansi-West District Assembly, Dr Maxwell Kusi-Mensah, commissioned the project and urged the people to work together with the District Assembly to provide the area with other amenities such as good roads, potable water and electricity.¹⁰⁰

At Brahabebome, near Obuasi, the people led by the Assembly completed an electricity project at the cost of c400,000. The project was financed through KVIP toilet tolls and contributions by philanthropists in the area. A c1.5 million KVIP place of convenience and a permanent block for the local day-care centre had also been tackled.¹⁰¹

In the Western Region, the Ahanta West Assembly, for example, built a multi-purpose workshop for the Baidoo Bonsoe Secondary - Technical School at Agona Ahanta. This cost c13.9 million. The Ahanta District Assembly provided c3.9 million out of the total cost. The rest of the money came from foreign donors. In addition, the Assembly managed to provide furniture worth c900,000 and acquired residential accommodation for the teaching staff of the school. In order to raise money for the purpose, the executive committee of the Assembly approved c1,000 educational levy per every rateable person in the District. Simultaneously, the Sub-Committee on Education was working out a scholarship scheme to be instituted in the District.¹⁰²

A further development in our local government system is the emphasis on the integrated rural development approach. It could be argued that previous attempts at rural development have not been very successful because of the sectoral approach adopted whereby various government agencies operated independently of each other. The integrated system aims at making various sectors/agencies work as a team. It is also a system which allows balanced development in various areas, thus preventing the

neglect of any one area or community in the provision of basic services.

The merits of the decentralised Integrated Rural Development approach include the following:

- i) the government departments/agencies would work closely with the local people and have first hand knowledge of a their needs, problems, attitudes and capabilities;
- ii) the communities would be involved in the initiation and preparation of development plans as well as their implementation;
- iii) there would be more effective co-ordination to avoid wasteful duplication;
- iv) Projects would be systematically implemented;
- v) priorities would be more effectively balanced so that no community or sector is neglected;
- vi) development carried out in a vacuum would be avoided and there would be available information on neighbouring communities;
- vii) as more viable projects are undertaken, more employment avenues would be open to the people particularly the rural youth;
- viii) human and material resources would be more efficaciously exploited to improve the rural areas.

There are certain problems noted, however, which need to be taken care of in order to achieve the desired results. They include:

- i) the resistance of officials from various government departments who might be unwilling to cooperate. Appropriate inducements could be found to resolve this problem;
- ii) the absence of an adequate information base that would support an integrated system;
- iii) financial constraints which could delay the formulation and implementation of integrated rural development programmes;
- iv) inevitable delays arising from the system of procurement;
- v) increased corruption and misapplication of resources as the base of operation is broadened;
- vi) possible conflicts between officials and local people.

In the circumstances there is the need for considerable education and formulation of policies to overcome the constraints which could plague the system.

4.12 Education

Assemblies have shown keen interest in educational development in all areas throughout Ghana, particularly with regard to Junior Secondary School (JSS) development. For example, in the Adansi West District, a Basic Educational Policy Implementation Committee was formed to see to the immediate establishment of a JSS. Mr Solomon Boadi, Assemblyman for Samsu electoral area, released his building for use as a JSS workshop. The citizens were levied and communal work done towards

establishing the JSS. In the East Akim District in the Eastern Region, resources were similarly pulled together to complete a JSS workshop at Sankubenase. This has been a national pattern. Public libraries, day care centres and day secondary schools have been established as a result of the efforts of District Assemblies in many parts of the nation as part of the national development effort from the local level.

In the quest to provide education for their people, Assemblies have left no stone unturned. In very poor areas, there have been coordinating efforts of non-viable towns and villages as well as coordinating efforts of non-viable Assemblies. In the Wa District, for example, the Busa, Dodigin, Bihee and Tangadzu areas constructed a JSS and a workshop by their joint effort through collective community labour in 1990. The project, estimated at c7.1 million, received assistance from the Canadian Government.¹⁰³

The Mpohor-Wassa East District Assembly approved the institution of an educational fund to improve the quality of education in the District. The value of the fund was c10 million for the first two years. In this connection every primary school child would pay c300, Junior Secondary School (JSS) children - c500, and Senior Secondary School (SSS) children -c600. It was clear, however, that the Assembly was not certain how the required amount could be raised. An appeal was therefore made to timber companies and other business enterprises in the area to donate generously to the fund.¹⁰⁴

In Ashaiman, near Accra, the Assembly mobilised the people in the construction of a four - school class block, office, store and a workshop for the local JSS. It also renovated a health post nearby to serve the pupils and the community. PAMSCAD was helping with the project.

Local authorities should seriously consider assuming a more meaningful role in education generally. In the United Kingdom, local authority scholarships have sustained the educational system. The Asanteman Council Scholarship Scheme operated effectively in two decades (1950-1970) to provide the nation with well trained personnel. It may be noted that a few Assemblies have given consideration to the issue. The Komenda District Council, for example, has instituted a scholarship scheme for the youth which covers forms 1-5 in a secondary or technical school. The scheme is, however, so limited that only the best two students from the area can benefit from the scheme in any given year. A further improvement could be made by forging a closer relation between teachers and schools, involving the parents and creating a sense of pride and achievement in relation to these community schools.

District Assemblies have been closely associated with the functional literacy programme. Indeed, the Department of Community Development (DCD) which has overall coordinating responsibility for the programme can only chalk success through the active collaboration of District Assemblies. In Accra, over 13,000 people have been registered plus a further 6,000 in rural

Accra. 40 percent of these persons are female, which is very encouraging. Whereas considerable teaching aid have been received from Western donors, there is still the need to cater for the shortage of teachers and provide for the needs of available teachers (including housing and transportation which are more acute in the rural areas).

In a visit to Ashiaman, near Accra, it was realised that whereas it was easy to arouse the enthusiasm of the adult learners, strategies had not been effectively developed to sustain their interest. There is the need therefore, for the Assemblies, through their Education Committees, to devise means not only to train more literacy facilitators but to find ways of means of using such trained personnel to sustain the requisite interest. By 1990, there were 100 facilitators in Accra whereas in my estimation at least 1,000 are required for any meaningful impact. In some cases, it was observed that there was lack of suitably graded books.

Observations throughout the country reveal that the high level of illiteracy among adult Ghanaians is a major obstacle to development and that functional literacy is an agent for socio-economic transformation of the country which could best begin at the local level. The ineffective use of language, numeracy and drawing has impeded local development. The ill-effects of child abuse, teenage pregnancies, poor health and declining productivity in the Districts can be addressed by effective functional literacy programmes by the District Assemblies.

4.13 Co-operatives

Cooperatives have been established in Ghana to promote economic development but with little success. Fraud, embezzlement and corruption have characterised their activities. The novel idea now is to take another plunge under the auspices of the District Assemblies. This restructuring will have small cooperative units with effective local participation and monitoring.

In this connection, the Dangbe East District Assembly, for example, has decided to restructure salt cooperative mining societies operating in the Songor Lagoon to enable genuine salt miners to benefit from their labour and help raise the living standard of the people in that area. Once the project is off the ground, revenue from the lagoon would be used to improve the road network to enable heavy trucks gain access to the lagoon area during the rainy season.

It is worthy of note that the mere storage of salt is a problem to the people of this area where the District Administration collects c74 million cedis out of its c91 million revenue from the salt industry. It is not surprising that the Assembly has resolved to build a warehouse once the cooperative effort gets underway to store salt from the lagoon.

4.14 Vigilantes

The District Assemblies have also undertaken to play the role of vigilantes in the Districts. They have undertaken to monitor all government financed projects in their areas as well

as community initiated projects generally. Their aim is to check fraudulent contractors, prevent shoddy works and ensure that contracts are carried out on time and in accordance with specifications. In one case, the Lawra District Assembly, having discovered that shoddy work was being done on the Basebille - Hamile road by Alhaji Mahama Sencou Contract Works, recommended that the c50 million contract should be terminated. The Assembly observed that the road had turned into a death trap as a result of the activities of the contractor.¹⁰⁵

In the mining areas the Assemblies in Obuasi, Tarkwa, Prestea, Abooso, Juaso and Akwatia have decided to fight and eradicate illegal mining in their areas, popularly called "galamsey". This has been done through arrests, fines and public education. The local people have themselves been constituted into vigilante groups to arrest offenders.

4.15 Environmental Issues

The District Assemblies have been concerned with environmental management in line with Section 6 subsection 3 (e) of PNDC Law 207 which provides that "each Assembly shall be responsible for the development, improvement and management of human settlements and the environment". The management of the environment on the national level was deemed so important that an Environmental Protection Council (EPC) was established in 1974 to handle and coordinate environmental issues in Ghana. The EPC has been particularly involved with issues such as an oil spill contingency plan, national plan of action to combat

desertification, national conservation strategy to sustain development and review of the impact of development projects on the environment.

By 1988, the EPC had made plans to decentralise to all the Regional capitals in order to make greater national impact. The EPC plan, since the introduction of the District Assemblies, is to work in close collaboration with the Assemblies to achieve common goals. In particular, the EPC plans to help the District Assemblies in the implementation of the Bush Fire Law of 1990 which charges the District Assemblies with some responsibilities for the prevention and control of bush fires.

The law stipulates that within three months of its coming into effect, each Assembly should form a Bushfire Control Subcommittee charged with drawing up bye-laws that ensure prevention, control and monitoring of bushfires. In this connection, the District Assembly is required to take into account the ecological characteristics of the particular District in question. This requires cooperation with the EPC, and to enhance the monitoring role of the EPC, the Bushfire Subcommittees are charged by the Bushfire law to furnish the EPC with quarterly reports. Since environmental degradation is due to the activities of man, most of which spring from ignorance, the District Assemblies could become a useful machinery whereby the EPC could reach the people more effectively.

Other areas of cooperation between the EPC and District Assemblies are poor environmental sanitation, deforestation, soil

erosion, coastal erosion, water pollution by industrial and household waste, noise pollution, dumping of toxic water, air pollution and pollution of beaches and lake shores.

The Assemblies have apparently found environmental issues very hard to grapple with. In Accra, some locations of environmental interest may be identified as follows- the defence wall at James Town, the water pollution problem created by the Korle Lagoon, the unsightly urban slum at Chorkor, the waste disposal stagnation at Mamprobi, the problem of solid waste management at Kokompe, Accra (where fitters and dealers in second-hand vehicle parts are congregated), the effects of stone-quarry operations on the people of Mallam and noisy environment throughout the city typified by the 31 December Market.

The AMA has obviously not been able, so far, to identify and control areas of environmental pollution. Noise is a hazard, constant exposure to which affects health, including blood pressure vessels and the nervous system. It affects the quality of life generally and children reared in such atmosphere cannot easily focus their attention on the teacher in class.

In some cases, streams have become dumping grounds for both domestic and industrial waste. Human excrement is dumped into rivers and the beaches are used as toilets. Run-off water from garbage heaps contaminate rivers which flow into reservoirs from which water is obtained for domestic use. The AMA has so far not showed signs of its ability to solve the problem. Several residents in Accra are unhappy about the general insanitary

conditions in the city. The views gathered indicate that the Waste Management Department (WMD) of the AMA has abandoned its responsibility of keeping the city free of filth. The AMA has also done little about the accumulated mounds of refuse scattered over the city.

In reality, however, running an efficient and effective waste management system is a very expensive business. Despite a cooperation agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany's Waste Management Department whereby Accra had been equipped with 21 refuse trucks and 7 cess pit emptiers and other accessories to enhance its operation, this is enough to cover only half of the city. This is an example of how the Assemblies have been prevented from meaningful operation because of lack of funds.

The AMA is, however, still faced with the problem of instilling environmental discipline into the public and change attitudes towards environmental hygiene. It is tragic that civic education in this regard has been poor because disregard for the environment, as already observed, is partly attributable to ignorance and lack of education. The AMA has so far not been able to create the requisite awareness and make people conscious of their responsibilities to the environment, rid the capital of filth, insanitary conditions, unauthorised development and create a healthy environment.

This is not to suggest, however, that the AMA has gone to sleep. It has established a disciplinary sub-committee and also passed a bye-law on solid waste management. Under the solid

waste management bye-law, residents who dump solid waste in open spaces, drains, gutters and other unauthorised places would be prosecuted. Upon conviction such persons would be liable to a fine not exceeding c20,000.00 or a term of imprisonment not exceeding six months in default of payment.

In order to ensure that wholesome meat was sold to the public, the AMA took steps to rehabilitate the old James Town Slaughter House which serves the city of Accra, at the cost of c32 million. In addition, new slaughter houses have been planned for Nungua (a suburb of Accra) and six other places.

Some projects undertaken by the AMA to help improve the quality of life in the city of Accra include the following:

- i) construction of mini stores as part of the market renovation programme;
- ii) rehabilitation of some school buildings and provision of amenities including toilets;
- iii) face-lift programme; and
- iv) provision of health posts and hand dug wells in Ga Rural with the assistance of PAMSCAD.

Pest control has attracted the attention of District Assemblies. Pests have been a cancer both in homes and on the farms in Ghana. With the cooperation of the Ministry of Agriculture, District Assemblies have taken steps to establish a system whereby farmers would not only be helped with preventive devices against pests but also would appropriately report all outbreaks of pests and disease on the farms to the Assembly pest

control officers who would work in cooperation with the FIAT Protection and Regulatory Services Division (PPRSD) of the Ministry of Agriculture.

During the period under study the AMA announced the formation of a Task Force to perform various functions including the following:

- i) to recover government plots illegally acquired by individuals;
- ii) to enforce planning regulations;
- iii) to remove unauthorised structures;
- iv) to ensure decongestion of traffic;
- v) to see to fencing of workshops and garages; and
- vi) to check the creation of slums and disorderly development.

However, as an interviewee observed, the AMA has concentrated on destruction of property and harassment of people. He pointed out that the emphasis should be on prevention of disease and checking flies and mosquitoes.

Mr. E.C. Quaye, first Mayor of Accra, has deplored the insanitary conditions in Accra, noting that the state of degeneration is unpardonable. He said that his administration took over from the British with confidence; and Accra had a system whereby water tanks washed the principal streets and sanitary sites in the night, starting from 6 pm till midnight. Furthermore, sanitary squads "cleansed the market, market streets, and drains."¹⁰⁶

4.16 Social Issues

District Assemblies have tackled several social problems in their respective areas in order to promote the welfare of the people as a whole.

The Accra Metropolitan Authority (AMA), for example, has taken several steps to deal with social development. The AMA has set up a committee known as the Sub-committee on Women and Children to effectively deal with issues affecting these categories of people. The committee is expected to act as a point of contact between the AMA and various women groups engaged in development and commercial activities, and also serve as a data base for information on women and children. The committee will also address issues of exploitation of children by irresponsible parents and big-time shopkeepers who push children into the streets to sell various wares and to engage in other commercial activities to fend for themselves."¹⁰⁷

In the Upper East Region, the Kassena Nankana District Assembly set up a committee to enquire into the abuse of children and how parents and traders could be prevented from using children to make money. The committee came to the conclusion that the prevailing Child Labour Act in Ghana was not effective. It advocated a "revolutionary law" capable of dealing severely with those engaged in the anti-social act of offering, procuring or accepting under age children who are shamefully exploited as domestic and farm labour. In some cases, children as old as eight years, both boys and girls, were recruited under dubious

circumstances and carted away to be used as farm roads. It was further resolved that in cooperation with the National Commission on Children (NCC) the Assembly, in collaboration with other Assemblies in the area, should mount educational campaigns to make people aware of the adverse effects of those undesirable activities on the children, the Districts and the country as a whole.¹⁰⁸

In the Twifo-Heman-Lower Denkyira District, the Assembly had to take steps to arrest the rampant cases of pupils absenting themselves from school on market days. It had been noted in a visit to schools, at the instance of the Assembly, that as many as 35 pupils from one school were carrying headloads of foodstuffs to markets. As an official from the Ministry of Education in Accra observed, "this is pathetic but it underscores the depth of an economic malaise. The paradox is that most of these pupils will not be able to go to school at all, except they engage in those very economic activities. So the ERP has not got to the people, after all."¹⁰⁹

Assemblies have shown concern over moral laxity in their areas. In the Asuogyaman District, for example, children under 18 were banned from attending concerts, videos and magic shows without being accompanied by their parents.¹¹⁰ The Afigya-Sekyere District Assembly has banned children under 18 years from trading and from attending discos, concert shows and dances. It was decided that the parents of any child who broke the ban would pay a fine of c1000. Video operators who helped in flouting the order

would have their equipment seized and fined c2,000.00. In mid-1990, it was clear in an interview with a student that these bans have not operated effectively. The youth have not only openly defied the order, but parents have neither been willing nor able to control their wards. In some cases, the ages of parties involved have been difficult to determine. Video operators in these areas have conveniently turned a blind eye to the main source of their patronage.¹¹¹

The District Assemblies have also concerned themselves with obsolete customs. In the Dangme West District, for example, the Assembly, after debating puberty rites and allied issues in the area, took certain decisions - and obtained the cooperation of the traditional authorities in the area - to put them into effect. Thus young girls going through the Dipo (puberty rites) in the Shai area of the Greater Accra Region now have only two weeks instead of the previous three months to undergo the ritual. The measure is to protect young girls who were sometimes kept away from school and suffered other inconvenience because of the long duration of these rituals. Furthermore, it reduced the cost of the ritual from about c100,000 to c20,000.00.

The District Assemblies have generally cooperated with the 31 December Women's Movement towards improving the lot of women generally. While this is a general development in many parts of Ghana, I had the opportunity to observe the developments in Asamankese in the Eastern Region in great detail. Several fora were held to find ways and means of utilising the facilities of

the 31 December Women's Movement in cooperation with the Assembly to achieve common objectives. The aim was to mobilise women to play a leading role in development generally and to supplement the efforts of their male counterparts in rebuilding the nation. The Assembly members, Mr Isaac Nti-Ababio (District CDR organising assistant), Nana Barima Kwaku Amoah III (Asamankese), the Queenmother of the town and other leading personalities - men and women - have joined in the crusade.

The impact of women is revealed in a recorded interview involving Madam Mary Kwaw Anyanda, Assemblywoman for Half Assini Adonwoze Electoral Area. Madam Nyanda who is 50 years old and a mother, indicated that age is not a barrier to service nor is sex. She said that, in view of the fact that she only spoke the local Nzema language, she was initially irritated by the fact that English was used during proceedings. After intense deliberation in the Assembly on the issue, her point of view was defeated for practical reasons and she had no choice but to allow the majority decision to prevail. Arrangements were however, made to translate proceedings into the local dialects for the benefit of people like her.

Madam Nyanda was confident that she was making an impact in the Assembly and that the episode had proved beyond doubt that a woman could be as effective in the Assembly as a man. She had also been instrumental in the provision of a market for Half Assini, in the improvement of sanitary conditions in her community, and served on a number of committees including the

Social Services and Arbitration Sub-Committees.

Incidentally, Madam Nyanda is closely associated with the 31 December Women's Movement. She indicated that she was a founding member of the Movement in her area. She was emphatic that the active involvement of women would help fight social problems such as teenage pregnancies, truancy in school children and the removal of apathy in women in relation to public affairs.¹¹²

In performing social functions, Assemblies have had dealings with churches in several ways. The operation of certain churches have become a nuisance in recent times. Towards the maintenance of peace and harmony, the Ablekuma Sub-Metropolitan Assembly in Accra, for example, directed that churches in the area should start services after 6 am and close latest by 10 pm.

But the relationship between District Assemblies and Churches goes even further. Under the Religious Bodies (Registration) Law 1989 - PNDC Law 221 - District Assemblies have been given an important role to perform in the process of registering religious bodies. The directives of the PNDC indicate that the various Metropolitan and District authorities should verify the authenticity of all information given by religious bodies who propose to register, and make recommendations to the National Commission for Culture (NCC). Among other things, the Assemblies have reported on membership of these churches/religious bodies, their hours of meeting, their activities within the community, whether they have any political or inimical foreign connections, and in short, have been granted

security clearance.

4.17 Difficulties in Planning and Implementation

Development planning at the grassroots, though laudable as an objective, is fraught with several difficulties. If the system operates effectively, it should facilitate local participation in the decision-making process as well as the implementation of decisions at the local level. In addition, it would place administrators close to the area of operation. Furthermore, it would promote efficiency, thereby avoid delays and cut down cost. Apart from these, it would also ensure quick identification and exploitation of the resources of the community for development.

It was noted that the cost element in the art of planning has hampered planning, both in terms of finance and in logistic support. In terms of personnel, it was noted that there are not enough Development Planners in the country to feed the Development Planning and Budgeting Units. In some cases, available personnel have been reluctant to move to the Districts because of the lack of amenities such as potable water, electricity, accommodation, transportation and in some cases the very material to work with.

It should have been obvious that certain incentives would be required to induce qualified personnel into the Districts and to keep them on the job. In some cases it was noted that officials who were compelled to work in certain areas, left their families

behind, proceeded to post, and never actually settled down to do any meaningful work.

The problems are many. In the first place, in service training has been minimal. In November 1990, the Department of Planning of the University of Science and Technology (UST), Kumasi, mounted a course for District Planners but this is a tip of the iceberg and much more is required.

Secondly, a solid data base is required in the planning process. Planning must be based on factual premises in terms of various variables such as the percentage of women in the community, the school age population, available resources etc. Such information is non-existent for planning purposes. Equipment such as maps of most Districts are not available. The problem is so prevalent that an initial joint effort of all Ministries, Departments, the District Assemblies and research institutions is imperative to give the programme the necessary take-off to obtain the reliable inputs that will serve local and national planning needs.

Thirdly, in terms of logistics, it was noted that data collection, the preparation of projects, appraisal and evaluation as well as the monitoring processes involve constant mobility and on-the-spot operations which require an effective logistic support. The Development Planning and Budgeting Units (DPBU) have not made much headway in their work because of problems of transportation affecting all Districts throughout the country. Nor do the planners have access to computers which have become

basic in modern planning.

Fourthly, lack of political and administrative support for development planning has taken its toll. Very often, budgeting and planning have been treated in separate compartments. But they should be seen as complementary, one providing the money, the other furnishing the modalities for implementation.

In the implementation process itself several problems have been identified relating to rural development under the present system. In the first place, it has not always been easy to clearly define the specific task ahead while several broad objectives have been articulated. Secondly, it should be necessary to find ways and means of making the community appreciate the task on hand. Thirdly, the ability to motivate has sometimes been lacking despite rhetorics from governmental quarters. Fourthly, there had often been a lack of a sense of direction even when certain broad objectives had been articulated. Fifthly, it was observed during this research that there was palpable lack of required materials to translate development plans and objectives into concrete reality.

In several cases, it was not clear who should determine what should be done. Several respondents felt that the government rather than the community should identify the needs of the community and initiate development so that the people also "would use their strength to help". But even where communities had identified certain needs there was the problem of motivating and sustaining the requisite self-help spirit, particularly in the

face of inadequate resources from local sources. It is obvious that the vast number of community projects have their life-blood from various forms of external assistance (NGOs). But there is weak coordination and poor direction from the Department of Community Development.

Admittedly, a Rural Planning Unit exists under the Ministry of Local Government whose responsibility includes the planning, implementation and monitoring of development programmes and the activities of the various agencies involved in rural development. The unit, however, lacks adequate personnel, it is glued to Accra, and its mobile team lacks logistic support. The lack of coordination and direction has led to a haphazard approach to the task of rural development. In Ga Rural, the World Vision International (WVI) is operating a pilot project at Agbogba, while neighbouring Haatso and Ashongman are left completely out of the picture. In Wassa Nkrang in the Western Region, both the Ghana Organisation of Volunteer Assistance (GOVA) and the World Vision International are engaged in development projects while only two kilometres away in Essaman nothing is taking place. This has been a source of frustration to several rural people.

In order to redress these problems, it is necessary to formulate a national framework for rural development. In this connection, the Planning Unit of the Ministry of Local Government should provide the requisite leadership.

There is also the need for effective education to aid development to remove one of the factors which hinder

agricultural development in Ghana- the lack of education in the very areas that the farmers are involved in.

It is noted that some District Assemblies have turned their attention to this and a system of "farmer's rallies" has been introduced which has gained roots particularly in the Eastern, Ashanti and Brong-Ahafo Regions. This is a programme to update the knowledge of farmers in modern techniques of food production and preservation. Under the auspices of the District Assemblies, the rallies provide a platform for small-scale farmers and field officers of the Ministry of Agriculture to share ideas and find solutions to the farmers' problems. Though this is a recognition of the role of the small-scale farmer in feeding the community, several problems have been identified. These include finance, labour, lack of inputs and equipment as well as how to obtain and properly apply them.

There is the need to introduce and inculcate at the District level, new, better and fast yielding crops to the farmers and persuade them to accept and use them. The Assemblies have not succeeded in doing so and I do not perceive any meaningful breakthrough in the foreseeable future.

In the area of afforestation, however, it may be noted that very few Assemblies have seriously taken steps to ensure that the programme is carried out to its logical conclusion. By 1989, Anloga District was leading in this direction throughout the country by planting 3,000 trees during the June 4 celebrations with the joint cooperation of Assemblymen, chiefs, 31 December

Women's Movement, cadres and people.¹¹³ While the reafforestation policy emanates from the Centre, it can hardly be carried out effectively without active local participation.

In the same vein, the requisite understanding of the people in backing government development projects in wild-life preservation, for example, can be obtained with the cooperation of District Assemblies through public education. This is lacking. Very often such policies have failed because the local people have not been involved and have resented "governmental interference" in the way they slaughtered game for their living.

The Zambian government, for example, realised this problem and secured the support of the local populace in wild-life conservation by involving them in management decision making and implementation and making clear to them the benefit they could obtain. Community development training centres were established and the people were taught wild-life preservation. In the final analysis the people perceived all wildlife resources as their personal property. We may describe this as a popular participation model in wildlife preservation through public education.

In this connection, the Department of Community Development in Ghana should organise simple seminars and workshops for the local people in collaboration with all District Assemblies to make meaningful the objectives of development. This will enable experts to help at the local level in development strategy formation as well as the mobilisation and involvement of the

masses in the whole process.

Community newspapers should also be developed as a matter of urgency to highlight the needs of specific communities, arouse the requisite enthusiasm, and examine alternative means of development. The language used in such newspapers should relate directly to the level of the people to have the right impact upon them. It will enable the use of illustrations which are directly relevant to the developmental goals of the specific areas. It will also provide a means of providing the newly-literate with material to read. Unless printing material are made available at the local level, it is apparent that much of the efforts towards educating the people for rural development will be rather ineffective.

4.18 Financial Constraints and Mismanagement

The history of local authorities may be seen largely in terms of severe financial constraints. These have militated against raising the revenue requisite for the provision of services. District Assemblies cannot in the present circumstances mobilise the resources necessary for efficient functioning. To close this fiscal gap, central government should assign more taxes to the District Assemblies. It is noted that PNDC Law 207 recognises this in the sixth schedule (paragraphs 1-5) but the implementation has been too slow. Furthermore, a proportion of the central government revenue which originate from the Districts should be assigned to the District Assemblies.

The main sources of revenue identified are the following:

Basic Rate; Property Rate; Market Rate; Charges on lorry park users; hawkers; slaughter houses; conservancy; cemetery; land allocation/demarcation; marriages; cattle ponds; wines and spirits; hotels and bars; palm wine, pito; akpeteshie sellers/tappers and distillers; hawkers; hand carts; chop bars; charcoal export levy; kiosk operators; herbalists, shrines, fetish priests/priestesses; entertainment including concerts, film shows, video; sand and stone collectors; self employed artisans, carpenters, plumbers, electricians, masons and painters; stores rentals; ground rent on demised premises; bicycle hiring; mills; dog licenses; timber operators; banker to banker/district lotto.

The Assemblies have had a difficult time collecting revenue. On the average, only one-third of the estimated revenues could be collected throughout the country in 1989 and 1990. When Mr Ahwei met the East Gonja District Assembly at Salaga an Assemblyman explained the fact that only 23% of the estimated revenue had been collected in these words: "firstly, in most parts of the District, particularly the rural areas, the people argue that from time immemorial, they have not seen anything that the Government has actually done for them to pay tax. Secondly, in the past there were no nominal rolls for the collection of taxes. Thirdly, there is a problem with public education. The people do not realise why they should pay tax."¹¹⁴

In Accra, protests have occurred in several areas including Makola and Madina markets. In Madina, I observed a scuffle

between market women and rate collectors on a Saturday market day. Amidst insults, a collector held a woman's cloth only to be slapped in the face. The collector retaliated and a fight ensued. A male passer-by who could not stand a man assaulting a woman joined in the affray and gave the collector a severe beating before enquiring into the matter. It was noted that the collector wore no uniform, was not properly identified and there was no education or publicity concerning his work. The method is demeaning, lacks rationality and is not geared towards public cooperation. In the circumstances the best of citizens remain passive while others reveal their positivism in the form of naked aggression against levy collectors.

This refusal to cooperate with collectors is not a new phenomenon. Kpenge wrote that in June 1984 the youth and PDC of Dzemeni, a brick market centre, drove away the Council's toll collectors and took over the market and refused to bank monies collected into the Council's accounts because they alleged the council was doing nothing to develop the community. They also alleged that the toll collection was fraught with fraud. The PNDC District Secretary for the area had to intervene before the Council's toll collectors were allowed to perform their duties again.¹¹⁵

Rate collection has become such a problem that several suggestions were made that District Assemblies would have to look beyond the traditional sources of finance to implement their medium and long term plans. In the Builsa District Assembly in

Sandema, for example, it was reported that the rate collectors of the District Assembly had performed very poorly. This led to the suggestion that the CDRs should become the tax collectors. The result was a heated debate whereby it was decided that CDRs could not become permanent tax collectors.¹¹⁶ In the Afigya-Sekyere District Assembly, the District Secretary said: "the district's financial position is precarious. As at May 1989, only c4.2 million representing 9% of an estimated c42.8 million for the year had been collected as revenue."¹¹⁷

In Asamankese, the Finance and Administration Sub-Committee chaired by S. Sallas-Mensah, an Assistant Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), reported that the Assembly collected c37.6 million within the first three quarters as against the expected revenue of c73.8 million.¹¹⁸ In the circumstances the Assembly immediately raised the yearly registration fees of banker-to-banker operators from c50,000.00 to c200,000.00 and weekly operational fees from c5,000 to c10,000 to generate more revenue for the Assembly.¹¹⁹

The District Assemblies have virtually ground to a halt in their operations because of lack of finance. All Assemblies have had problems meeting development targets for this reason. In the Agona District, for example, Assembly members were told to mobilise their people and resources to achieve the desired developmental targets since the District budget was not enough to complete any single project in the District. IN 1989, while reading the District Council budget for the year, the District

Secretary, Mr Kwaku Hopna Jenu Appiah, stated that only c1.3 million would be available for developmental projects that year.¹²⁰ Since this constituted just ten percent of the estimated amount, a real problem existed. In order to avoid the arbitrary imposition of levies as had been experienced in some areas, the presiding member, Mr B.A.K. Griffen, warned against this, adding that it was the responsibility of the Assembly as a whole. The question of voluntary contributions was also raised. The necessary cooperation from the community however, was not forthcoming. This meeting showed that frustration had already begun to set in because the presiding officer had to comment on the turn-out, saying there was "the need for Assembly members to be properly dressed and be punctual at such meetings."¹²¹

The basic rate has generally been of little use. In the Nzema East District Assembly a suggestion was made that it should be abolished altogether in the District. The proposer, Mr Kwarteng, said that the payment of c200 per adult for development, and running of the District Administration has outlived its usefulness. He pointed out that if 10 adults paid their levy, it could only buy a bag of cement. He suggested that as an alternative various communities should determine their needs which would be costed by the Assembly's technical men and borne by the communities themselves.¹²²

An innovation in the sources of revenue for District Assemblies has been the District Weekly Lotto. The National Weekly Lotto (Amendment) Law of 1989 which amended the National

Weekly Lotto Act of 1961 Act 94) empowers District Assemblies to issue licenses to individuals and unincorporated associations of individuals to operate a District Weekly Lotto. The licence shall attract such fees as the Assembly may determine.

In accordance with the provisions of the law, an application for a licence to operate a District Weekly Lotto shall be made to the District Assembly of the area in which the applicant intends to operate. An applicant should be aged 18 years and a Ghanaian citizen. A deposit is required to meet liabilities for the payment of prize monies arising from the weekly lotto. All operators should submit quarterly returns on coupons collected and sold within their area of operation to their respective Assemblies. An operator should pay such quarterly sums as may be determined by the Commissioner for the Internal Revenue Services within the areas of his operation in the District. The Commissioner, shall, at the end of every six months, pay 57% of the taxes collected from the operators of the district weekly lotto to the Secretary for Local Government who shall be responsible for allocation of such monies to the District Assemblies based on a formula approved by the PNDC.

Several criticisms have been levelled against this source of revenue. It was pointed out to me that it would encourage gambling and idleness in the Districts. Within the Assemblies themselves the Banker-to-Banker as a source of revenue has become a subject of controversy. In Jasikan, varying views were expressed on the system at the Assembly. Instead of following

the trends in other Districts where individuals have been allowed to register officially, the Assembly came out with an innovative concept. They suspended the idea of giving approval for operation, but recommended that the Assembly should itself apply to be an agent of the National Lotteries. The reason was revealing. It had been discovered that some Assembly members themselves were the operators of the illegal banker-to-banker business and they had turned round to monopolise and manipulate the new system to their personal advantage.¹²³

Whilst PNDC law 207 requires the budgets of the decentralised departments to be consolidated with the District budgets, by 1990 all budgets were prepared at the Regional level. In answering a query in this direction Mr Ahwoi, PNDC Secretary for Local Government, replied that this was one of the problems facing the transitional phase of decentralisation. The fact was that the Financial Administration Decree of 1979 was still in force and the regulations made thereunder allow little room for decentralisation. Furthermore, the technical staff to prepare the composite District budget, ie the budget officers, were not at post in many Districts.

Several reasons were given for the financial plight of District Assemblies:-

- i) Some interviewees claimed that the system of taxation was harsh and was tantamount to one person being taxed twice - one by the Assembly and the other by the IRS. It should be explained to the people that the two

collecting agencies have separate purposes and they cannot be merged. The registration "tax" collected by the IRS on behalf of the District Assemblies is essentially to facilitate tax-payer identification, while the licence "tax" collected by the District Assembly is the fee payable to enable the Assemblies provide an effective local authority system;

- ii) the cooperation required of the people was not forthcoming;
 - iii) unnecessary expectations from Central Government;
 - iv) low opinion of the District Assembly;
 - v) some people simply did not see the need to pay basic rates etc;
 - vi) lack of awareness of the usefulness of the system;
 - vii) several pointed out that they did not know what monies collected were used for;
 - viii) development projects ended up as proclamations;
 - ix) there were no incentives to pay rates;
 - x) personnel problems have also hit the Assemblies.
- Unless adequate qualified personnel are available, the requirement that Assemblies should keep proper books shall be of no effect.

The Central Government has a supervisory role in local government finance. The Council may after consultation with the Secretary responsible for Finance issue written instructions consistent with the provisions of PNDC Law 207 for the better control and

efficient management of the financial affairs of District Assemblies. The instructions may be issued either generally or with respect to any particular District Assembly and any Assembly concerned shall be compelled to oblige.

All these, however, depend upon the appropriate personnel to work with. The Assemblies lack the personnel. For example, the Nkwanta District Assembly in the Volta Region appealed persistently to the Controller and Accountant-General's Department to post a qualified accountant to the Assembly by the end of 1990. In their demands copied to the Ministry of Local Government, Accra, the Assembly stated that the absence of a qualified accountant had resulted in a backlog of trial balances, making it impossible for the Assembly to know its true financial position. It was manifest that people with the requisite qualifications were unwilling to go to the area and this had compounded the problem.¹²⁴

xi) In some cases, the Assemblies have been hampered by fraud and embezzlement. In one instance, the Executive Committee of the West Akyem District Assembly recommended the prosecution of two members of staff of the District Administration for their part in an alleged embezzlement of c2,088,230.00 belonging to the District. They were Mr Owusu Poku, a District Revenue Collector and Kweku Sogbodzi, a labourer. A striking aspect of the alleged malpractice is that it was not clear whether Mr R.E. Amoh, the treasurer of the District Assembly was involved. It appeared that others merely took advantage of his incompetence.

It was, therefore, recommended that Mr Amoh should be punished for negligence of duty.¹²⁵

In Asamankese, two employees of the District Assembly connived with a clerk of the Ghana Commercial Bank (GCB), Asamankese branch, whereby monies being payment for cement purchased from the District Administration were paid into private pockets. In Accra, the allocation of stalls led to corruption involving some officials of the Accra Metropolitan Authority (AMA) who collected large sums of money from a number of traders totalling c10 million which went into private pockets.¹²⁶

The much publicised scandal at Techiman - a centrally located town in Brong-Ahafo Region with a very prosperous market as an enviable source of income is an illustration of the extent of the incidence of corruption. A letter addressed to the PNDC Chairman by the Brong-Ahafo Students Union in Legon put the matter vividly citing blatant misuse of the Assembly's funds, disregard for proper accounting procedures and abuse of power by the District Secretary (See Appendix c).

The Techiman case reveals the depth of misappropriation and misapplication of funds which do occur in our Assemblies once funds are available. It is necessary to take steps to ensure financial discipline. In the first place, the following records must not only exist, but they should be examined, from time to time: revenue collectors' cash books; treasury cash books; stock registers; revenue register; imprest cash books; ledgers; payment vouchers; loans repayment registers; contract registers and

annual accounts and financial statements. Secondly, account must be taken of certain issues: financial results of the District during every quarter and every year; wasteful and improper expenditure - even in the face of a correct account; financial statements not in conformity with financial regulations and other directives; transactions which are not in accordance with the financial policies of the Assembly or the approved budgetary provision; deviation of a material nature from generally accepted accounting principles and practices to the extent that the true position regarding revenue and expenditure as well as assets and liabilities is either distorted or not shown; frauds, losses and serious irregularities.

In the process, it is important to identify some of the most common lapses in financial administration of local authorities which include the following: embezzlement of revenue; misappropriation of funds; suppression of value books by revenue collectors; inordinate delays in accounting for revenue collected; belated payment of unclaimed salaries; over spending of approved votes; poor collection of revenue; payment for items not supplied; inadequate control over vehicles; poor performance of accounting duties.

The PNDC has been in the process of finding solutions to the problem. Among other things, the PNDC has commissioned a World Bank study of the whole problem of fiscal decentralisation; it is hoped that in the long run the problem will be solved. The study has already produced an "Aide Memoir" which was under study by

the Government. The following have been identified as some of the key issues that would need to guide the Government in its future deliberations and decision making:

- i) ensuring fiscal and macroeconomic stability is of paramount importance and must be the key consideration in the design of a decentralised fiscal system. Systems must be in-built and tested to ensure that revenue are stable and that expenditures can be monitored regularly and controlled strictly. To achieve this, the various tiers of government must not only have the responsibility and authority to carry out their tasks, but must also be held fully accountable for their budget performance;
- ii) actual expenditures should conform as closely as possible to the priorities expressed in budget allocations at the beginning of the year, unless mid-course corrections are applied according to set procedures;
- iii) mechanisms to promote equity across regions and districts must be included as one of the features of a decentralised fiscal system;
- iv) the allocation of responsibilities assigned to the different tiers of Government should take into account the capacity of human resources at each level and the institutional and physical infrastructure available;
- v) District Assemblies should be involved in the budgetary

- process if the pattern of public expenditures is going to be informed by local needs and requirements;
- vi) any fiscal system would need to be flexible enough to accommodate external and internal shocks to resource availability which would require rapid expenditure adjustment if fiscal balance is to be retained;
 - vii) the primary aim of resource mobilisation at both the central and local levels should be to finance a given level of public expenditures consistent with the macroeconomic framework. Given economies of scales, central Government is likely to be more efficient at collecting the bulk of revenues. A transfer of resources to the local level would therefore be necessary and would need to be based on such criteria as need, equity, simplicity, objectivity, and encouragement to local initiative.¹²⁷

The award of contracts has been identified as the biggest source of abuse of office and dissipation of public funds. In this connection, the Local Government (District Tender Boards Establishment) Instrument, 1990 was made on 3 September, 1990 by the PNDC Secretary for Local Government in exercise of the powers conferred on him by section 23 of PNDC Law 207 to address the problem. All tenders must conform strictly with the law in order to avoid corruption. (See details in Appendix D).

4.19 Problems of Staffing

Staffing problems should occupy our attention. PNDC Law 207

makes the District Secretary the political head, and the District Administrative Officer (DAO) the administrative head, of the District Assembly. It is imperative that owing to the wide variety of issues to be determined at the local level, the DAO should be a very senior and highly experienced civil servant. What is more, the staff of the decentralised departments should work under the supervision and direction of the DAO. Nevertheless, for the purposes of technical guidance, training, transfers, promotion and posting, these officers should still belong to their original departments. Unless there is fluid consultation and co-ordination between the heads of the departments and the DAOs and the Regional Administrative Officers (RAOs), problems are bound to arise.

There should be a scheme whereby it would be possible, firstly, to tap the skills of local experts outside the Assembly and, secondly, for the local bureaucracy to participate in the determination of specific issues. A system whereby co-optation could be done at the Committee and other levels, would enrich the quality of decision making and implementation.

Under the old system, there were local authority staff and staff of the central government institutions. Under the present system, most of the staff in the Districts, particularly those functioning within the decentralised departments under PNDC Law 207, come under the District Assemblies. These personnel are now deemed to be staff of the District Assemblies. Issues regarding their promotion, daily supervision and discipline rest with the

District Assemblies. The distinction between local government staff and the central government departments, therefore, should be extinct.

Section 29 of PNDC Law 207 identifies 22 implementing Departments of the District Assemblies. Section 30 makes the staff of these Departments, staff of the District Assemblies, with the responsibility for their appointment ultimately vesting in the District Assemblies. However, as a transitional measure, under section 133 (2), the staff would continue to be appointed by the central government, probably until all relevant arrangements have been completed. Throughout 1990, all expectations that this system would come to fruition, proved abortive.

4.20 Other Problems Encountered

Some Assemblymen assumed the posture of local overlords and identified themselves personally with the Assembly, assuming personal powers in the process. As the PNDC Secretary for Local Government, Mr Kwamena Ahwoi observed, "according to reports reaching us, some individual Assemblymen have printed their own letter heads ... and are using these to intimidate public officers and also claim undeserved favours."¹²⁸

The zeal to assume a new posture of self-importance led some Assemblymen to act ultra-vires. For example, the District Secretary for Afigya Sekyere, Agona-Ashanti, Mr. Yaw Oppong Kyekyeku addressing the second meeting of the Afigya-Sekyere District Assembly, revealed that some members of the District

Assembly Town Development Committees (TDCS) and CDRs have entered into unilateral agreements with timber contractors to fell trees in the area without reference to the District Assembly. It had become apparent that an Assembly member had signed a whole agreement unilaterally.¹²⁹

Some Assembly members have understood the District and Local Tribunals system to mean that they could set up their own Courts. Perhaps they wanted to continue with the People's Courts set up by some Defence Committee chairmen at their pleasure. In Kade, for example, the District Secretary for Kade, speaking for the Justice and Security Sub-Committee of the Kwaebibirem District Assembly, warned that no District Assemblyman could constitute his or her own Court to try cases. He advised that if there should be the need for any Tribunal, the Assembly could take a decision on it and the PNDC Secretary responsible for Tribunals would be contacted for necessary action to be taken.¹³⁰

There was the report of an Assemblyman who had employed the service of body-guards. Another report was made on a Presiding Member who insisted he should be allocated an official bungalow in accordance with his new status.¹³¹ As the Information Digest put it, "such unnecessary show of power and unwarranted power struggle divert attention from the real issues of development for which the Assemblies have been set up."¹³²

In no time some Assemblymen had caused the Assemblies to issue them with special identity cards and at least in one instance an Assemblyman had put a flag on the bonnet of his car.

The Ministry of Local Government had to issue a directive stopping these practices.¹³³

A confrontational attitude was also adopted in some cases towards other government officials and PNDC appointee. Clashes occurred and unauthorised letters were written. An example is the sordid confrontation between the Assin District Assembly and Mr. Ato Austin, PNDC Secretary for the Central Region. Mr. Kwamena Ahwoi had to be sent down from Accra to intervene. Then at the 2nd ordinary meeting of the Assembly, members adopted a motion to apologise to Mr. Austin for "misconducting themselves before him". The Assembly also adopted a motion to withdraw a resolution calling for the removal of the District Secretary. It further proceeded to withdraw the whole minutes of the previous meeting - which was the first meeting of the Assembly and in which several vituperations had been recorded - as "full of errors and omissions".¹³⁴ It was also common for Assembly members to get themselves entangled in various disputes which lowered the estimation of members in the eyes of the populace. These disputes spilled over into the Assemblies creating problems among members. In the Kwaebibirem District, two members of the Assembly got actively involved in a land dispute between the traditional authorities of Akyem Akwanta and settler farmers in the area, thus siding with one faction in the crisis. When the crisis escalated, the Security Sub-Committee of the Assembly which investigated the matter castigated the Assemblymen for encouraging factionalism which tended to "worsen the already

volatile situation in the area."¹³⁵ The Assemblymen named as Messrs. Sowah and Ayidah, according to the Committee, encouraged the settler farmers to stay away from a meeting summoned by the Committee at Kade to strike a compromise between the two parties.

According to the Committee, the Assemblymen ill-advised the farmers to engage in a fruitless litigation, thus dissipating monies accruing from the sale of their cocoa. After the services of a surveyor had been engaged with the cooperation of the High Court, Koforidua, to carry out a survey, it became manifest that the settler farmers had actually encroached upon land belonging to the Akwanta stool by cultivating 75 hectares in excess of what their ancestors had bought in 1927. The security sub-committee proceeded to settle the matter amicably.¹³⁶

A struggle for power seemed to have characterised the activities of the Assemblies. In August, 1989, Chairman Rawlings himself had the occasion to deplore this tendency which he described as "unnecessary and irresponsible."¹³⁷ He lamented that the "negative and rather disturbing" actions of some Assemblymen were not only destroying the good image of other Assembly members but also "the virtues of a novel democratic system."¹³⁸ In the words of the Chairman, there had been reports of Assemblymen dissolving CDRs, conflicts between presiding members and District Secretaries and some Assemblymen behaving like "tin gods" when entrusted with power.¹³⁹

There had been so much misunderstanding within the system that, for example, at a rally held at Saltpond to introduce the

Assemblymen for the area to the chiefs and people, the Central Regional Organising Assistant for CDRs, Mr. E.K.T. Addo, told the Assemblymen that they could not perform their duties properly if they did not understand the spirit which motivated the 31 December Revolution. He decried reports that some Assemblymen had started to "question, challenge and even undermine some of the political structures and concepts of the Revolution."¹⁴⁰

The Assemblies have had considerable problems with CDRs. The latter had always considered themselves the local overlords in the revolutionary process and saw their power and influence being whittled away on the advent of the former. As institutions of popular participation at the grassroots level, it was not always easy for CDRs and Assemblies to avoid jealousies and clashes. At the very initial stages, the CDRs had expected that their members would automatically be nominated from among themselves, who would constitute District, Regional and National Assemblies.

In the performance of certain functions inevitable clashes occurred. In Alajo, Accra, for example, the CDRs were controlling the public toilets and it had become apparent that this control had become a lucrative source of income for some CDR men who were accounting for c20,000.00 per quarter for tolls collected. When the Assembly took over, c200,000.00 was collected the ensuing quarter, to the embarrassment of the CDRs who continued to find avenues to reassert their influence.¹⁴¹

As this unhealthy competition proceeded, Mr. Ahwoi declared

that "Assemblies have by legislative instruments, powers to pass bye-laws ... CDRs, on the other hand, are charged with the role of defending the Revolution and mobilising human resources with funds generated by the Town Development Committees (TDCs).¹⁴²

The establishment of Unit Committees became a thorny issue mainly because of CDR jealousies. Section 20 of PNDC Law 207 provides that "the Secretary may by legislative instrument, on the recommendation of a District Assembly and with the prior approval of the Council, establish Area or Town Councils or Unit Committees within the area of jurisdiction of the District Assembly". In Accra, for example, the structure envisaged, therefore could be presented as follows:-

ACCRA METROPOLITAN ASSEMBLY

Town Councils

(in the various towns that make the city of Accra, for example, Osu, Labadi Nima, Mamprobi, etc.)

Unit Committees

(smaller committees equivalent to smaller units within each town. For example, 10 unit committees were established in Osu.)

The first Unit Committees to be inaugurated, were in Osu, Accra, on Monday, 22nd April 1989. All these Unit Committees were to fall within the Osu Town Council. The unit structures

were considered very necessary in the establishment of grass roots democracy. In Osu, they comprised Assembly members, nominated persons (including certain experienced people) and CDRs. The idea was to enable as many citizens as possible to participate actively in the political life of the various communities while learning about the desirability of community decisions as well as their implementation. It appeared that the establishment of Unit Committees at Osu proceeded smoothly. It was notable that at that level, not an official from the Ministry of Local Government came to perform the inauguration but rather the Deputy Secretary for CDRs, Mr Dan Abodakpi.

Mr Abodakpi gave some insight into what was expected of the Unit Committees:

- i) they are to work in close cooperation with the local CDRs (ie at the unit level) in self help projects;
- ii) they should identify various areas of importance to the unit and forward these to the Assembly for deliberation;
- iii) regarding (ii) above, they should be able to make their own recommendations after discussions and consultations with various groups and persons in the areas;
- iv) they should be truly functional officers who would perform a wide range of functions including registration of births and deaths

in their areas.

If the Osu inauguration went well, it did not regrettably become the pattern. Problems soon arose when attempts were made to inaugurate unit committees at other places; in some cases Assembly members began to form unit committees by themselves. In the Eastern Region, especially, unit committees were formed and declared dissolved in such a rapid succession that Mr. Fred Ohene-Kena, PNDC Secretary for the Eastern Region, issued a statement that all Assembly members who had formed unit committees had to dissolve them immediately. As Mr Ohene-Kena explained, such committees were to be formed by District Assemblies on permission granted by the Ministry of Local government. In all these cases, local CDR men had protested against the "usurpation of power" by individual Assemblymen.¹⁴³

Mr Kwame Ahwei reiterated this position adding that by June 1989, only 35 applications had been received from District Assemblies for permission to form unit committees. He said these applications were pending because the framework for the establishment of the unit committees had not been signed by the PNDC.¹⁴⁴

In the end, the PNDC came out to reconcile the unit committees and the CDRs and to fuse the functional role of CDRs and District Assemblies. The Assemblies were to be allowed to operate freely while the CDRs continued with their monitoring role. This is because whether District Assemblies have come into being or not; whether there is a new democratic system or not,

the physical defence of the Revolution, is the responsibility of the CDRs.¹⁴⁵

Another group who exercise authority in their areas and whose relationship with the Assemblies have posed some problems are chiefs. Some Assemblymen "have purported to have the power to destool chiefs, and some have actually gone ahead and physically attempted to remove chiefs from their stools.

Others claim that as a result of the uncooperative attitude of chiefs, they have had to purchase their own gong-gong to rival that of the chiefs, so they can reach the people directly".¹⁴⁶

The suspicion that had mounted is illustrated by the fact that in mid-June 1989, Mr Ohene-Kena, Eastern Regional Secretary, ordered the Kwahu - South District Assembly to investigate reports that some chiefs in the area were sabotaging the work of some Assemblymen. This followed reports that some chiefs were trying to use their influence to frustrate the Assemblies because their favourites had lost in the District Assembly elections. He cited an Assemblyman who had reportedly made seven approaches to his chief for the release of a gong-gong but to no avail.¹⁴⁷

Several chiefs have, however, cooperated with the District Assemblies in many respects. Togbe Adeladze II, Awoamefia of Anlo, for example, led a group of 31 December Women's Movement members, Assemblymen, cadres and other chiefs to plant 3,000 trees in Anologa to round off the June 4 Anniversary activities in 1989.¹⁴⁸

Some Assembly members have faced several frustrations which

have even made them feel like resigning. As one Assemblyman said, "some time ago, I felt like resigning; the reasons being that most of the people in this District, East Gonja District Assembly, Salaga), do not reside in Salaga so I find myself on almost all the committees. My work as a teacher was suffering, and I was once called and told that since the District Education Office pays me to teach, I have to make sure I do that so now, even though I am still an Assembly member, I don't work like I used to."¹⁴⁹

Another Assembly member from Salaga said he stayed 45 miles away from Salaga. He encountered problems of lodging whenever he came to Salaga and he also had to look for a bicycle in order to make the journey. He lamented: "the 'there' is not there"; whereas "meanwhile, with the immunisation programme I have to be there; bush fire, I have to be there; JSS, I have to be there. I have to meet the people to explain policies. When I have to go and see a chief or a big man, I have to provide drinks with my own money...so I am still considering withdrawing."¹⁵⁰

Another member insisted that it was time the Assembly work was made full-time. However, as Mr Ahwoi explained, all over the world, local government legislative work is not full-time. "It is because some of you do not want to restrict yourselves to your essential work of legislation, but want to involve yourselves in day-to-day administration in the Districts that you appear to be overstretched."¹⁵¹ In the words of a third member, "we have been elected to take up the running of the District. Much as we like

the work, I think we do not have to drain our pockets. The sacrifice is too much".¹⁵²

It should be mentioned that the Assemblymen do not perceive their role in mere deliberative and decision-making terms but see themselves as implementors of decisions as well. In expressing this, an Assemblyman stated that they would like to take part in the implementation because "sometimes we do not understand the explanations they (administrators) give us. On the part of the administration, they would have people to help and understand them. If the Assembly is only a policy making body and we are to leave the administration to do the work, it makes the Assembly powerless."¹⁵³ This quest for power and misconception of the basic role of the Assembly have continued to plague the work of District Assemblies in contemporary Ghana.

By 1990, the question of paying Assemblymen their stipends on a regular basis had not been resolved. As the presiding member of the Tolon-Kumbungu District Assembly, Tolon, observed in an interview with Mr Ahwoi, "we are not here to work for money; but in the beginning, many Assembly members noticed that our Assembly's finances were not viable so we forfeited our allowances. We cannot continue to sacrifice because we need money to do a lot of things".¹⁵⁴

The remuneration of Assemblymen were not forthcoming. Several complaints were made throughout the country. For example, in relation to the Kassena Nankana District - Navrongo, the PNDC Secretary for Local Government was quizzed about the

lack of proper remuneration which as early as July 1989 had begun to affect the morale of Assemblymen. All the PNDC Secretary could say was that "the matter was on the agenda of the PNDC."¹⁵⁵

The Kassena Nankana encounter brought out other issues. It became clear that the Assemblies could not meet the payment of 50% salaries of employees. The PNDC Secretary explained that this was an unfortunate legacy inherited from the erstwhile District Councils. Among other things, nepotism had plagued the old system and the new method of asking the Assemblies to pay 50% salaries was a way of introducing sanity into the system. The proposal, according to the Secretary, was worth trying for two years. But that was cold comfort for the empty-coffered Assemblies. As an Assemblyman of Savelugu-Nanton District Assembly said, "we have been elected to take up the running of the district. Much as we like the work, I think we do not have to drain our pockets. The sacrifice is too much."¹⁵⁶

In my view, Assemblies have virtually come to a halt because the Central Government which has become the promoter of the system, has failed to ensure that allowances are paid. All over the world, local government work is generally not a full time job; but reasonable allowances are paid. The absence of logistic support including transportation compels the Assemblyman who wants to do his work efficiently to spend too much money from his own resources. As the presiding member from Savelugu-Nanton said, "you get invited to functions almost now and then. How do you go since it involves cost? Again, for Assembly sessions,

only T & T is paid. How do you defray the other expenses? An Assembly member must be paid as high as the highest paid civil servant. If you (government) have been able to pay the DOAs (District Organising Assistants), then you must be able to fix that of Assembly members".¹⁵⁷

It was noted that enthusiasm has waned very fast and in many cases, it has been difficult for a quorum to be formed at meetings throughout the country. In this connection, the presiding member of the Tolon-Kumbungu District Assembly, Tolon, suggested to Mr Ahwoi that the provision that two-thirds of the Assembly must be present to elect a presiding member should be changed and construed in terms of a two-third simple majority "because according to what we read from the dailies, most Assemblies do not find it easy to get a quorum for voting."¹⁵⁸

The question of how to cope with the illiterate members of the District Assemblies has often been raised when a team from the Ministry of Local Government met the East Gonja District Assembly on a "Meet the Assemblies tour" on 14 May, 1990. A literate respondent told the team that "illiteracy does not mean one is not intelligent. Most of them are even better than us. At first one Assembly member was doing the interpretation, but he has left to pursue a course in Legon, and since then the Court interpreter has done it for us. The illiterates participate actively in debates."¹⁵⁹ An illiterate Assembly member concurred.¹⁶⁰ Incidentally, the presiding member stated that "our illiterate brothers complain that we leave them out of the

deliberations, and we also complain that they draw us back, so next time this should also be considered."¹⁶¹

With the government's commitment to provide all District capitals with electricity by 1992, it is hoped that some cottage as well as light industries would be opened in the Districts to create employment avenues to the people and also to forestall the rural-urban migration of the people.

The Assemblies appear to be scraping along. But the enthusiasm may wane further as already noted, unless realistic policies are pursued and implemented. The extent to which many people will care to accept the Assemblies will depend on, firstly, their fulfilling the development and other functions for which they have been established and, secondly, their being seen as a true mechanism for participatory democracy as enshrined in PNDC 207.

The future of the District Assemblies is a matter of great uncertainty. There have been more questions than answers. Are the Assemblies anything more than rural development committees? Are they merely a stop-gap for the PNDC as pressure mounts on it to democratise? When and how will the District Assemblies evolve to the national level? How do we ensure that the power of the Assemblies are not abused, especially in relation to human rights and in the absence of a Constitution? How can the Assemblymen with such different backgrounds and ideological viewpoints operate harmoniously?

Should the "unelected" PNDC continue to superintend

"elected" District Assemblies? These and the various problems discussed underscore the fact that all is far from well with the District Assemblies as pillars of a new democratic order.

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CHAPTER FIVE

LAW, JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

5.1 Introduction

In this chapter, we consider the PNDC's conception of revolutionary law and justice, its approach towards the administration of justice, the organs of popular justice (including the National Investigations Committee, Citizens Vetting Committee and Public Tribunals) as well as the regime's record on human rights.

Laws are the rules which emanate from the sovereign body in the state, prescribing or forbidding certain actions with penalty of punishment. In Ghana, the main sources of law are (i) customary law, being the traditional law that governed society before the advent of the white man; (ii) case law - the written decisions of judges from colonial times and (iii) statutes and other enactments made by the legislative or other law-making bodies including bye-laws and legislative instruments. The view had been expressed by some nationalists, including Kwame Nkrumah, that in the African revolutionary struggle there was the need to redefine the concept of justice and the rule of the law in society. Nkrumah eschewed the bourgeois conception of the law and freedom. He wrote that "the bourgeois conception of freedom as the absence of restraint, of laissez-faire, free enterprise and of every man for himself" was a typical expression of bourgeois ideology. His basic thesis was that the purpose of government from the capitalist viewpoint was to protect private

property and the private ownership of the means of production and distribution¹ Nkrumah perceived a drastic change in existing law in the context of an African revolutionary situation because "coupled with the bourgeois conception of freedom is the bourgeois worship of 'law and order' regardless of who make the law, or whether it serves the interest of the people, a class or of a narrow elite".²

Revolutionaries are always interested in legal and constitutional structures which must be changed by force for the superimposition of a revolutionary legal machinery. Modern revolutions have been propelled by the perceptions of their leaders as to what constitute freedom, justice, fairness, equality and the general welfare of the populace. A basic postulate, therefore, of revolutionary action is the eradication of supposed injustices within the society.

Rawlings who saw himself as a revolutionary identified injustice in Ghanaian society in these words: "there is no justice in this society and so long as there is no justice, I would dare say that 'LET THERE BE NO PEACE'".³ Early in 1982, Rawlings had stated that the law must be used to correct injustice in the society in favour of the toiling masses, soldiers and policemen who had been humiliated under the Third Republic because the course of social justice pursued by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) had been jolted upon the handing-over to the PNF government on September 24, 1979. To Rawlings, a new constitution of slavery (ie. the constitution of

1979) had been imposed. A new form of justice with a new punitive system was necessary, so that those who had committed crimes against the people would be punished and corruption eradicated.⁴ Rawlings added that "the people's tribunals, which will conduct the investigations and trials, will only act on basis of investigations scrupulously conducted and evidence properly assembled. Their trials will be public but the tribunals will not be fettered in their procedures by technical rules which in the past have perverted justice and enabled criminals to go free". He added that these tribunals were not meant as replacements for the regular courts; but the regular courts would not superintend the operations of the people's tribunals either. In his words: "Let each respect the boundaries of the other, and there will be peaceful co-existence. But even though each will be acting within its own confines, we believe that ultimately it is for the people to decide the correctness or otherwise of the judgement of the two systems. This is one way in which the dispensation of justice itself will be democratised."⁵ This was the way to ensure a new legal order. According to Rawlings, "a Revolution's most difficult tasks are the exposure and movement away from old and unproductive ways that we have been used to, and putting in its place new ways, new attitudes and new structures".⁶

This revolutionary approach to law and justice had long been the standpoint of some leftist intellectuals in Ghana as will be clear in recapping a debate in 1980 between Mr. Kwamena Ahwoi,

then a lecturer in Law at the University of Ghana and who was to become the Coordinator of Vetting, Investigations and Tribunals under the PNDC soon after the 31 December Revolution and Professor Kwaku Folson, a liberal scholar of the University of Ghana.⁷ In discussing the Transitional provisions under the 1979 constitution, Professor Folson adopted a liberal-democratic approach by arguing that the law should be used to protect the rights of those who were victims of the revolutionary justice of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). In his view, certain transitional provisions had already been put into the constitution by the Constituent Assembly which dealt with a wide range of matters relating to the coming into force of the constitution and the handing over to an elected, civilian government, continuity of legal matters pending before the courts, indemnity for coup makers and the continued existence of public corporations. Folson described part iv of the Transitional provisions inserted by the AFRC as "draconian" and violation of liberty. He pointed out that whereas Section 9(3) of the Draft Constitution only indemnified the coup makers and the people who helped them to overthrow the preceding government, the AFRC used the fundamental law to indemnify "any person acting under the authority of the government of Ghana". To him this meant the individual members of AFRC and their agents were immune to any legal processes for any number of illegalities and injustices committed by them, for example, acts of extortion. To Professor Folson, the law should not be used to justify what

would normally be illegal; and he condemned Section 15(3) of the Transitional Provisions, in particular, which provided that any action taken by a person in the name of the AFRC was legal even if it "was not taken in accordance with any procedure prescribed by any law". This made "jungle law" part of the basic law of Ghana and a threat to liberty.

Mr Ahwoi took a position of "reason of state" as a vital consideration in the role of law in society and said that Folsom was arguing "in vacuo". The vital question to ask in considering the function of law according to Mr Ahwoi was: what kind of society allowed such a holocaust which Ghanaians had experienced during 1972-1979? He demanded an in-depth social analysis that would seek answers to the exploitation in society, and why academics and professionals had degenerated into men who "could not make it"; why absentee farmers had continued to exploit the peasants; and why thieves and rogues had thrived. He suggested that legal minds should address themselves to the issue of social justice by examining the institutional support and legal framework that had made the malevolent dictatorship of Acheampong/Akuffo to last for so long. Mr Ahwoi opined that law must reflect the mood of the time. To Ahwoi the law as a revolutionary tool should be so used to protect what had been accomplished by extra-legal means under the AFRC. Giving a good insight into revolutionary law and the use of law under emergency situations, Mr. Ahwoi saw Section 15(2) of the Transitional Provisions as a near perfect example of an "ouster clause" in

law.⁹ He evinced a populist approach to law and administration of justice when he concluded that he wished to see the courts of Ghana, in handling the Transitional Provisions, become an embodiment of the "Popular Will" and approve of all acts of the AFRC which to Mr Ahwoi constituted "the popular will of the total populace at a given time". The public tribunals established in the PNDC era were doubtlessly influenced by this philosophy. Indeed, the essence of Mr. Ahwoi's arguments provided the rationale for popular justice in revolutionary Ghana. We review the operation of this conception of justice and law in the PNDC's Ghana.

5.2 Revolution and the Courts

If Revolution is "a drastic, sudden substitution of one group in charge of the running of terminal political entity for another group",⁹ this was seen in the sudden attempt by the revolutionary organs to control the regular Courts in the name of popular justice.

Taking a cue from the People' Courts established by the AFRC, even before the scope and functions of the revolutionary groups could be formally established, the revolutionary organs assumed a function of adjudication, far in excess of the scope of arbitration known to our customary law. Every conceivable aspect of human activity came under juridical jurisdiction of the revolutionary bodies. Rent cases became their preoccupation, particularly in the urban centres in the belief that Shylock landlords who were out to exploit the ordinary people (for whom

the Revolution was initiated), should be ruthlessly dealt with. Land cases also came before the revolutionary as many ordinary people complained of having been cheated out of their possessions by people of substance.

The rationale behind the intervention of the "revolutionary arbitrators" was that the poor and underprivileged were being denied justice by the ordinary courts. In this connection, such arbitrators sometimes sought expert advice from the Lands Departments as well as the Deeds Registry. Evidence was called and evaluated and judgement expeditiously handed out. Other cases they handled included debt collection, property and fraud cases, family disputes, matrimonial cases, paternity cases, custody and maintenance of children and offenses against parents and elders such as using abusive language. In a true revolutionary spirit of protecting the worker against the employer, several cases of wrongful dismissal were dealt with and most workers were invariably reinstated, especially in the period 1982-1985. The protagonists of the system of revolutionary arbitration justified it as being devoid of bourgeois influences, legalisms and winding legal processes. Furthermore, it was said to be less expensive. However its detractors attacked the personnel involved as unreliable never-to-wells, corrupt and wont to prejudge issues. One other defect was that a complainant often chose his own forum for redress. Our study in Greater Accra revealed that people by-passed Revolutionary organs in their own immediate vicinities and summoned their opponents where

the former's favourites presided over cases. This lapse allowed several complainants to choose their own judges and therefore becomes judges in their own cause.

The revolutionaries also influenced the legal arrangements affecting the ordinary courts as part of their "popular struggle". In 1983, in Accra and Tema, an amalgam of revolutionary bodies declared that they had dissolved the Judicial Council and abolished the post of Chief Justice. The Supreme Court building was attacked and an occupation force took over the building for days.¹¹ This action raised several issues pertinent to the exercise of people's power and whether the judiciary should be insulated from the on-going process. It also raised the question as to whether local revolutionaries in one Region could abolish the national post of Chief Justice and in effect issue orders that affected the administration of justice in Ghana as a whole.

Even though the PNDC government did not formally yield to mass control of the regular courts, controls were to be systematically placed on the courts as a result of the demands of the revolutionary mob, culminating in the amendment of PNDC Law 42 in October 1988 whereby the government established a Judicial Council to be responsible for the functioning of the Judiciary. The council, under the Chairmanship of the Chief Justice, included the Attorney General, a judge each of a Supreme Court, Court of Appeal, High Court, Circuit court and the Magistracy, the Judge Advocate General of the Armed Forces and CDR representatives of

the Judicial Service and Board of Public Tribunals. There was also provision for three PNDC appointees and two members of the Ghana Bar Association. This body was designed to ensure adequate representation of revolutionary organs like the CDRs and the Public Tribunals and make recommendations to the PNDC for the appointment of Justices of the Superior Courts. The Law further provided that judges and magistrates may also be removed or dismissed if it was determined by the PNDC in consultation with the Judicial Council that it was in the public interest to do so. This development undermined the independence of the Judiciary thus offending the age-long rule that judges should hold their positions so long as they conducted themselves properly. However, it is also arguable that the PNDC, the repository of People's Power, needed this power to exercise control over the Judiciary on behalf of the mass of the people as a whole to ensure that justice served the people's interest.

Other reforms which were attempted by the PNDC were largely cosmetic, and appeared to be aimed at pleasing the vociferous populists of the time. They did not tackle the fundamental problems facing the Judiciary in administering justice which included: (i) inadequate courtrooms; (ii) lack of judges and magistrates in quantitative and qualitative terms to handle the wide array of cases; (iii) the breakdown of the magistracy system, as the magistrate courts in Accra for example, became centrally located in the former Ministry of Cocoa Affairs; (iv) poor salaries paid to judges. (It is worthy of note that a high

court judge was paid some c50,000 net per month i.e about \$110,000 in 1988); (v) primitive system of recording court proceedings (causing unnecessary strain on judges and inevitable delays; (vi) poor record-keeping and data protection - (lack of computer, inadequate cabinets, files and record books etc); (vii) lack of manpower training programmes to update the administrative staff and also appraise judges of global developments in the administration of justice; (viii) inadequacy of housing and transportation for judicial personnel; (ix) failure to provide for the security of tenure of judges and therefore the lowering of the morale of the Bench; and (x) neglect of actual and substantive law reform.

By failing to redress the existing lapses the Judicial system got worse under the PNDC and provided the regime with further excuse to establish its alternative system of "revolutionary" Justice.

5.3 The Organs of Popular Justice

As part of the machinery to ensure revolutionary justice and deal with persons whose activities were considered repugnant to the new order, a number of institutions were established - The Citizens Vetting Committee (CVC), later to be named Office of the Revenue Commissioners (ORC), the National Investigations Committee (NIC) and the Public Tribunals. These organs which were to operate alongside existing structures, were designed to detect, investigate, try and punish perpetrators of "anti-people" activities, deal with culprits of economic crimes and to ensure that the rich and powerful who had committed offenses against the

people did not escape the full rigours of the law. The underlying assumption here was that the social forces which were opposed to the liberation and advancement of the ordinary Ghanaian should be checked and rendered harmless. Furthermore, it was strongly believed that the regular courts could not be trusted to deal swiftly and ruthlessly with the elite offenders who would employ procedural and technical rules to their advantage.

4.3.1 The National Investigations Committee (NIC)

The NIC was established by the National Investigations Committee Law 1982 (PNDC Law 2) to investigate cases of corruption. Initially, any person whose bank account had a credit of 50,000 cedis (worth about 16,000 US dollars at that time but worth about 200 US dollars in 1988) or more had to explain the source of his income and justify its genuineness or forfeit it to the state. The system had a dual objective - to stamp out corruption and to mop up the excess liquidity in the system supposedly located in the hands of a privileged few. The target group comprised mainly importers/exporters, manufacturers, entrepreneurs, businessmen/traders, managers (particularly in the State Corporations and more specifically in the retail sector, Levantine businessmen and contractors and suppliers as well as their collaborators in the civil and public services.

The Committee sat from eight o'clock in the morning and worked deep into the night. With the help of accountants, auditors and financial experts as well as crack detectives and

military personnel, it uncovered the depth of corruption in both the private and public sectors. Identified offenders, were put before the public Tribunals for trial.

The NIC gained a reputation for scrupulous investigation into and the uncovering of fraud and embezzlement in the Ghana Education Services (GES); for example. This led to the dismissal of several top personnel including Directors, Headmasters, Bursars, etc. and the trial and imprisonment of many others. The Timber Industry was similarly overhauled when the extent of over-invoicing, under-invoicing, log misdescription, bribery and corruption were uncovered by the NIC.

5.3.2 The Citizens Vetting Committee

The citizens Vetting Committee was established in 1982 by PNDC Law 1. Whereas the NIC was only investigative and did not punish and its sittings were in private, the CVC sat in public, made investigations, and demanded explanations and in its capacity as a judicial body as well, meted out punishment. The CVC investigated anyone whose lifestyle compared to his supposed income gave cause for suspicion. It concerned itself with tax evasion, in particular, as well as over-invoicing, fraudulent bank loans, offenses relating to customs and excise, currency, etc. The primary target, of course, was the "bourgeoisie".

This law was considered so vital in the realization of revolutionary justice that it was soon amended to give it a stronger trust. The Citizens Vetting Committee (Amendment) Law 1982 (PNDC 18) created a new section 7 which enhanced the

Committee's powers to include the following: (a) order the forfeiture to the state of any property; (b) order the vesting in the state of any property subject to the payment of such compensation as the PNDC will determine; (c) order payment to the state of any tax, customs or excise duty; (d) recommend to the appropriate authority, the dismissal, removal, retirement from the public service on grounds of misconduct or negligence in performance of duty; (e) recommend to an appropriate professional body to take disciplinary action against a member for professional misconduct or negligence; (f) commit any persons investigated by it to stand trial at a public tribunal.

The net of the CVC was so wide that virtually every professional or businessman known to the public appeared before it in Accra or its Regional Offices. It brought about a greater degree of tax consciousness and fed the tribunals with cases.

Later on the office of the Revenue Commissioners (ORC) took over matters relating to taxation while the NIC concentrated on investigations. The punitive aspects of the functions of the NIC were left entirely to the public tribunals. However in the wake of the Economic Recovery Programme the CVC adopted a lower profile, apparently in an effort to encourage investors to stimulate economic activity generally.

5.3.3 The Public Tribunals

The Public Tribunals were set up to translate into reality, the ideals of popular justice and to placate the cadres of the Revolution, who wanted to see the concretization of the gains of

the Revolution. The system was seen as an opportunity for the ordinary people to act as judges (panel members) thus institutionalising the belief that the adjudicating function should not be the exclusive preserve of trained lawyers. However the PNDC would probably not have heeded the call for Public Tribunals but for the fact that it saw the Tribunals as a certain way of sending to the gallows several soldiers and civilians who were bent on forcibly removing the PNDC from office.

Whereas special tribunals were not novel to the judicial system of Ghana,¹² the PNDC system was unique in many ways: (i) it was the first time that tribunals had been set up in response to the demands of working class justice; they were the fruit of persistent demands by the working class for a different judicial system; (ii) the tribunals were empowered to try people in absentia. Absentees could have their properties confiscated to the state if found guilty, even if they could not be personally incarcerated; (iii) there was no right of appeal against judgement of the public tribunals, at the initial states; (iv) the rules of procedure were fluid and any evidence considered "relevant" could be admitted at any stage of the proceedings without any inhibitions regarding the rules of admissibility or hearsay; (v) the tribunals could themselves assume investigative roles and become inquisitorial; they did not have to confine themselves to the role of assessors of the evidence produced by the prosecution and defence; (This was to correct what was regarded as an anomaly in the regular Judiciary

in which some rich and powerful people in the society were alleged to have influenced the investigation and prosecution of cases against them; (vi) there was high level of lay involvement; and only the presiding member needed to be a lawyer; (The panel was usually five, comprising one lawyer and four laymen); (vii) unlike the special courts in the past which had specific areas of operation, the jurisdiction of the tribunals remained unlimited; and (viii) they could impose fines, death and prison sentences without limitations and without any appellate or supervisory control by the ordinary courts. (They were immune from the Prerogative Writs of Prohibition, Certiorari and Mandamus by which the High Court supervised inferior courts.

In their operations, the tribunals aroused considerable public interest as highly-placed public officers and businessmen were tried, sentenced and hauled into jail. The ordinary man visibly rejoiced as the privileged were drilled, exposed and made to confess in public various "crimes against the state". But the harsh sentences, including instant death sentences, ultimately aroused mixed feelings. Various bodies including the Ghana Bar Association and the Christian Council of Ghana, decried in particular, the initial absence of a right of appeal as well as the expedited executions that followed various death sentences. Mr. Justice F.K. Apaloo (then Chief Justice) was ultimately to add his voice to the demands that the system be improved by allowing appeals and re-trials.

The appeals system remained abysmal. Whereas cases moved

with expedition at the initial trial stages, the absence of a permanent Appeal Tribunal resulted in backlog of appeals. Furthermore, the practice of bringing in the panel members of one tribunal to act as appellate judges in other cases, detracted from a healthy appeals system and created an unwritten arrangement whereby panels refused to upset the judgements of the others in the expectation of reciprocity.

Other problems were evident in the operation of the tribunals. The Board of Public Tribunals was reconstituted on a yearly basis and this often created uncertainty, lapses, confusion and embarrassment in the operation of the system. Secondly, for several years, there had been no chairman of the Board as required by PNDC 78 which established the tribunals system. This absence created confusion and blurred the lines of authority thus impeding the free and smooth development of the law and legal processes connected with the tribunals, as Mr. Kwaku Gyan, former Member Secretary and Registrar of the Board admitted.¹³ Thirdly, there was lack of qualified personnel, particularly in the administrative wing, called the "Registry". This checked their efficiency and effectiveness. Fourthly, buildings, equipment, vehicles and other logistical facilities requisite for the smooth administration of the system were lacking. After the initially cosmetic provisions, the tribunals also appeared to have been neglected; and fifthly, sudden dismissals of chairmen and panel members, usually for alleged corruption and other inexplicable reasons, caused much

frustration and tended to destabilize the tribunals.

Despite the problems they faced, the public tribunals succeeded somewhat in broadening certain areas of jurisprudence and the administration of justice. They seemed to have sharpened the concept of punishment in the maintenance of stability, peace, law and order. On the whole, the tribunals expanded and applied the concept of retributive justice to promote popular justice and to defend the "Revolution." They punished the enemies of the Revolution with exemplary high-handedness. Those who could not be arrested were tried in absentia, sentenced and instantly executed whenever they were captured. These happened to Halidu Gyiwah, an avowed PNDC opponent.

The national crisis of armed robbery was also resolved to some extent through the tribunals system. The coup had led to an escalation of armed robbery after 31 December, 1981. The crime of robbery had been established under Section 149 of Act 29 - the Criminal Code. In the original criminal code it had been only a second degree felony, punishable by a prison sentence of not more than ten years. ¹⁴ The Criminal Code Amendment Decree 1969 (NLCD 398) amended the punishment and made it a first degree felony punishable by life imprisonment. In March 1972, the National Redemption Council (NRC) passed the Suppression of Robbery Decree (NRCD 11), making the offence punishable by death or life imprisonment. With the Subversion Decree (NRCD 90) of July 1972 robbery was placed under the category of offenses which were committed in "very grave circumstances" and attracted a mandatory

sentence of death by shooting by firing squad on conviction.

The Public Tribunals which had been given original jurisdiction under PNDC 78 to try certain offenses including robbery, generally took the act of robbery as connoting very "grave circumstances". Mr Kwesi Aggrey, presiding over the appeal of Osmanu Mohammed v. The People said in the judgement that "in confirming the death sentence, the Appeals Tribunal took note of the grave nature of the offence committed - the accused had entered the house of the victim with highly offensive weapons; they had fired warning shots and used blocks to open the door of the victim. It is true that no life was lost in the course of the commission of these offences but armed robbery in whatever form it takes is too dangerous and terrifying; one need not wait till a life is lost before coming to the conclusion that very grave circumstances meriting the death penalty have been revealed".¹⁵

Thus in 1983 alone, about 10 people were reported to have been executed by firing squad after conviction by the tribunals for robbery. Out of 57 persons tried for armed robbery in Accra at the National Public Tribunal in 1987, 51 were found guilty and 6 were acquitted and discharged; 48 were sentenced to death by firing squad and 3 were sentenced to 18 years imprisonment each with hard labour.¹⁶ In the Osmanu case cited above, Mr. Aggrey said that "society will not be in peace till drastic measures were instituted to curb such a social menace".¹⁷

As a result of the tough stand taken by the public tribunals

in dealing with these notorious cases, the number of armed robbery cases before the tribunals had dramatically fallen by seventy per centum of the 1987 figures in 1989.¹⁸

Another novelty introduced by the tribunals was in the sphere of reparation. The idea was to impose severe monetary penalties on people found guilty of economic crimes and to have them make amends several-fold to replenish state coffers. For example, 4 Greek nationals who appeared before the National Public Tribunals in Accra, for illegal fishing in our territorial waters were made to pay \$650,000.00 reparation to the State. This was apparently agreed upon by the accused and the prosecution and approved by the tribunal. The offenders had pleaded guilty to a charge of doing an act with intent "to sabotage the economy of Ghana". In another case, a Lebanese wood merchant advanced in age was allowed to make reparation both in local and in foreign currency having pleaded guilty to a charge of operating his timber business in such a manner as to sabotage the economy.¹⁹

The tribunals also employed a combination of confiscation of property and the award of compensation in a manner unprecedented in Ghana's legal history, to enhance the scope of deterrent and retributive justice. In the widely publicized Sefwi Bekwai murder case,²⁰ after the accused persons had been sentenced to death by firing squad by the tribunal, the leading culprit was singled out for further punishment. His house and pajero vehicle were confiscated to the State on the ground that the conspiracy

had taken in the house and the vehicle had been used to further the crime. The rationale behind this was to deprive the accused and even his estate of the ill-gotten gains, since it had been part of the evidence that Nana Adjei, the chief, had acquired his fortune through ritual murders. By depriving the convicts and their successors of the fruits of such heinous acts the tribunal sought the ends of justice. The tribunal further ordered that the family of a small boy who had been offered to Nana Adjei for sale, and then murdered, should be compensated with one million cedis. On appeal the judgement was confirmed and the compensation increased to two million cedis. It was further pronounced that the execution by firing squad should take place at Sefwi-Bekwai where the brutal murder had been committed.

The question is often asked whether the tribunals have justified their existence and also whether they should be kept or scrapped. Nana Kwasi Obuadum II, the PNDC's Attorney-General answered this in the positive. He said that but for the tribunal system, some people who committed heinous economic and inhuman crimes detrimental to the national development might have been set free, given the technicality and rigidity of criminal procedures at the traditional courts. He further observed that the Chairmen and other members of the tribunals had shown the highest sense of duty, integrity and courage and had maintained the highest possible standard by their personal conduct and commitment to the cause of justice. He claimed that another benefit the tribunal system had brought to the administration of

justice as a whole was that it relieved the traditional courts of a heavy chunk of judicial load. Nana Obuadum noted also that the tribunals were moving more than twice the pace of the traditional courts.²¹

But the tribunal system was also fraught with problems. There were several allegations of improper conduct against tribunal personnel. One instance came out in the case of *The People V. Ellison Owusu Fordwuh and Seven others*. In this case, eight persons, including two private legal practitioners, Ellison Owusu Fordwuh (also a retired Commissioner of Police and former Commissioner of Education under the SMC) and his partner Emmanuel Arthur-Mensah as well as Solomon Quandzie and Victor Ofoe also lawyers and both legal officers at the office of Coordinator, Revenue Commissioners and Investigations, were charged with various counts of conspiracy, corruption, accepting and giving bribe to corrupt public officers so as to pervert the course of justice in a timber case involving certain Lebanese businessmen. All accused were convicted and sentence to various terms of imprisonment. The officers that the accused had sought to corrupt included Mr Boakye-Danquah (Tribunal Chairman) and Alhaji Staff Sergeant Abdul Tonka (panelist of the same tribunal) who had been trying the Lebanese and who came to give evidence in the Owusu Fordwuh case. In the course of the trial, however, very embarrassing evidence was led by the defence to show that Mr Boakye-Danquah had sought and received various sums of money and other favours from the lawyers. He had allegedly been given

financial help to enable him marry, after he had laid bare all his matrimonial, family and financial burdens to counsel. Apparently, Mr Boakye-Danquah had not distanced himself in a way that was expected of a judge.

The allegations that Mr. Boakye Danquah actually begged for money raised serious issues of impropriety and put into question, the integrity as well as the conditions of service, including the salaries of tribunal personnel. The tribunal chairman seemed so desperate that he had visited the homes and offices of lawyers in the case as well as the persons being tried before him. It did not come as a surprise, therefore, that the government announced that Mr Boakye-Danquah had been asked to proceed on leave pending an enquiry into allegations of misconduct incompatible with his status.

On the whole, it can be argued that tribunals had failed to contribute effectively to Ghanaian case law and have become corrupt themselves. Moreover, they had adopted basically the same rules of procedure of ordinary courts in a polluted form, having failed to rationalise their departures in earlier times. With regard to the future of the tribunals, it was doubtful that it could co-exist with the regular courts. However, they had been largely useful to the PNDC regime as instruments of revolutionary terror (used to liquidate and silence political opponents) and for satisfying the initial demands of its urban populist supporters.

5.4 HUMAN RIGHTS

The PNDC has got the worst human rights record in Ghana, compared with all other regimes. During the period under review, there was no guarantee against false arrest nor imprisonment without trial. Freedom of expression, movement and association were stultified. Not only was freedom of assembly withdrawn but the regime had the power to detain the citizen and other residents as long as it felt it was in the interest of national security to do so. In the process, detainees were subjected to inhuman treatment.

We shall study discuss abuse of human rights under these headings: wanton abuse; the use of repressive legislation; political trials which were used to suppress individuals; detention for alleged coup attempts; torture and inhuman treatment; clampdown on press and religious freedom.

5.4.1 WANTON ABUSE

Official murder by way of liquidation was so common that after the killers of the 3 High Court Judges and the retired Army officer had been arrested and put on trial, Lance Corporal Michael Senya, one of the accused, continued to wonder why the PNDC should allow their trial at all. The men believed they had official sanction to kill.

Numerous people became victims of the "Rawlings Disappearance act" - a description for the sudden disappearance of certain persons. Information I gathered include one Captain Asiedu, a former Air Force pilot who reportedly gave a lift from Larteh to Accra to a lady who happened to be a Rawlings

informant. Captain Asiedu made several condemnatory remarks during this trip. The following day security personnel picked him in broad daylight and in the presence of his family. He has not been seen since then. It is believed that he has been killed and dumped in the sea.

United Front members also revealed that after the 19 June 1983 attempt to overthrow Rawlings, one Kwame Adjima a leading member of the United Front and Sgt Awaar who were arrested in the Volta Region were taken to the Border Guards Headquarters and executed by a team of soldiers allegedly led by W.O. Adjei-Boadi, then a PNDC member. Sgt. Awaar's execution was allegedly more dramatic - he was ordered to open his mouth wide and keep it open. A pistol was fired into it, blowing up his head.²² In Osu, Accra, a man named only as "Master" became a self-appointed superintendent at all petrol filling stations around Osu and brutalised people who came his way.²³

Revolutionary violence culminated the abduction and murder of three High Court Judges and a retired Army officer in the night of Wednesday, 30 June 1982. The victims were Mr Justice K.A. Adjepong, Mr Justice F.P. Sarkodie, Mrs Justice Cecilia Koranteng-Addow who was then nursing a four-months old baby and Major (Rtd) Sam Acquah, then Director of Personnel of GIHOC.

The victims were kidnapped from their homes during curfew time by soldiers in mufti, driven to a Military shooting range at Bundase on the Accra Plains, shot dead and set alight with petrol. The victims had apparently been subjected to severe torture before

being killed. It was rumoured that Mrs Koranteng-Addow's breasts had been cut off and the pathologist's report signed by Dr E.S. Boye confirmed that the left leg of Justice Agyepong was "amputated 11 inches below the knee. The cut ends of the tibia and fibula are charred."²⁴ Apparently, the victim was amputated, shot and burnt.

Critics of the regime were picked up at random and detained. On Wednesday, 16 April, 1986, Mr Kwesi Pratt, Public Relations Officer of the Ministry of Fuel and Power and Secretary-General of the Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary Guards (KNRG), was arrested in his office by officers of the Bureau of National Investigations (BNI). On the same day, Akoto-Ampaw, former Secretary-General of the All African Students Union (AASU) and a leading member of the NDM was picked up from his home by BNI officers. The previous day, Mr Ralph Kugbe of the Accra District Secretariat of the CDRs and Mr Kweku Baako, a staff of the Free Press newspaper had been picked up by BNI officers in their workplaces.

One result of PNDC repression has been the rise in the number of Ghanaians who have sought asylum in Europe, Canada, the United States and other Western countries. The Home Office in London released the following figures on Ghanaian refugees in England in 1989 showing an escalation since December, 1981:

1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
29	13	407	689	337	175	220	153	155

Source: Home Office Release, London, 1989.

5.4.2. Repressive Legislation

What the PNDC unfolded in terms of populist revolutionary attack on human rights, it formalised in concrete legislation such as The Preventive Custody Law (PNDC 4), The Habeas Corpus Amendment Law (PNDC 91), the Newspaper Licensing Law (PNDC 211), sections of the Public Tribunal Law (PNDC 78) which dealt with political offences imposing the penalty of death by firing squad and which precluded the Superior Courts of Judicature from exercising supervisory jurisdiction over the Tribunals which are inferior courts. By specifically providing against the Writs of Habeas Corpus, Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus and Quo Warranto by which unlawful interference with the rights and liberty of the individual are protected by the High Court (using its inherent and supervisory powers) - the liberty of the individual was reduced to naught.

Under PNDC 4, the PNDC had power to "authorise the arrest and detention of any person in respect of whom they are satisfied that it is in the interest of national security to do so."²⁹ Under 2(2) of PNDC 91, where a person is detained under the Preventive Custody Law, 1982 (PNDC 4) it should be sufficient to state in the report to any Court, the grounds stated in the executive instrument by which the detention of that person was authorised. By that, the High Court or the Judge thereof did not have the power to enquire into the grounds of detention. The legal effect was that whenever a citizen brought an action to secure his freedom under the Habeas Corpus Act, it was enough for the State to argue that the grounds for the detention were the

grounds stated in the PNDC's executive instrument authorising the detention of the applicant. In that case, under section 2(2), the High Court "shall not have the power to enquire into such grounds".

The people who were detained in such circumstances are legion. No one took count. Some began as detainees and ended up as missing persons. Others were supposed to have "escaped" during jail breaks and were never heard of again, but were actually known to have been murdered by the regime.

Amnesty International gives prominence to some peculiar incidents as follows:-

a. Geoffrey Kumfo, a trade unionist, was detained without charge or trial from July 1987 until April 1988 after involvement in a strike at a factory in Accra. James Hansen was reportedly also held without charge for nearly a year, from July 1987 to June 1988, apparently having been confused with a trade union leader involved in the same dispute.

b. In May and July 1987 seven leading members of two opposition groups, the New Democratic Movement and the Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary Guards, were arrested, apparently because of their criticism of the government's economic policies.

c. Lieutenant-Colonel Dr Owusu Agyekum, a medical officer at the Military Hospital in Accra, was arrested in mid-1988 after a visit to the United States, apparently because he was suspected of having met exiled dissidents while he was there.²⁶

5.4.3. Political Trials

As Amnesty International confirmed, "political motivations appear to be behind the prosecution of some cases before the Public Tribunals, where trials are summary even for capital offences... in recent cases, businessmen including foreigners have been detained and made the object of criminal prosecutions apparently because they have been perceived to be politically active or critical of the government, or in order to allow the confiscation of their business to the government".²⁷ In this connection, alleged fiscal or export control violations were interpreted as "sabotaging the Economy of Ghana". In the same way, any vague action whatsoever on the part of a wanted person could be interpreted in terms of an act or omission which is shown to be detrimental to the economy of Ghana or the welfare of the sovereign people of Ghana. Victims have included Dr Kwame Safo-Adu and Mr. B.A. Mensah, leading industrialists.

The persecution of businessmen affected several foreigners. In the case of Joseph Moukarzel, a British citizen who was born in Ghana, he got into trouble when the PNDC decided to take over his business unlawfully. Following a series of interferences with his business by the Ghana Tourist Development Corporation (GTDC) with the backing of the PNDC, Moukarzel took civil action in the High Court and obtained an injunction against further interference with his Casino business while he contested an order to eject him. This order was made by the Court on 11 July 1989. On 12 July 1989 about 30 BNI and immigration officers arrested

Moukarzel and took him into detention. Two days later, Nii Okaidja Adamafio, Acting PNDC Secretary for the Interior, ordered the seizure of the casino and other property on the premises in gross violation of the Court order and in utter contempt. Meanwhile, trial by newspaper began in the government controlled newspapers - People's Daily Graphic and Ghanaian Times throughout July and August 1989.

Moukarzel was maltreated in police cells in Accra where he slept on the floor for three months. When he became ill, he was transferred to hospital where he was held in chains and under guard. He was questioned twice by BNI officers during this time, and reportedly beaten and threatened in an attempt to make him withdraw his legal action. In October 1989 he was apparently told by Nii Okaidja Adamafio, that he would be released if he did not pursue his action. He was subsequently transferred, in October 1989, to another police station in Accra where he was apparently held in even worse conditions. By December 1989 he was ill and severely lost weight; but his request to see a doctor had been ignored so he went on hunger-strike. He was released on 17 December 1989 on condition that he reported to the police three times a day, and in July 1990 he was given one month to leave the country.²⁰

5.4.4 Detention for Alleged Coup Plots

The spate of alleged attempted coups, plots and conspiracies led to the arrest and detention of several military personnel and civilians including foreigners particularly from Togo regarding

whom no official details were released. Various cases of arrests, detentions and executions which came to light and were confirmed by Amnesty International included the following:

- a) For the coup attempt, November 1982 - Bombardier Mustapha Mohammed and several others (including Togolese).
- b) For the alleged conspiracy, February 1983 regarding which the PNDC announced that government opponents based in neighbouring Togo were the main architects, backed by the US government. The victims included Corporal Adama Alhassan, Lance Corporal Aninakwa, Corporals Dzane and Okyere, Private Samuel Twumhene and several others.
- c) For alleged jail-break and coup attempt, June 1983 two trials took place in August 1983 and 19 persons sentenced to death. Executions were subsequently carried out. Among those still detained by 1990 were Sergeant Nicholas Osei, Corporal Samuel Abrokwa, Lance Corporals Paul Akora, Samuel Dadzie, Nyame-Bekyere. Others were kept detained without any charge at all- they included Warrant Officer Mensah and Private Ohemeng.
- d) For the alleged coup attempt, March 1984 which allegedly involved conspirations from Cote d'Ivoire and Togo by way of a two-pronged African invasion, several soldiers and civilians (including nationals from Cote d'Ivoire and Togo) were detained; some were tried; others were executed.
- e) For the alleged assassination plot against Rawlings in

Kumasi in 1985 various arrests were made in Kumasi and other parts of the country. The victims included Sergeants George Adongo and Akolgo; Corporals Atipoe, Botwe and Bukari; Lance Corporal Sawundi; Private Wegudi and several civilians. The victims had been tortured and ill-treated.

- f) For the alleged Goka conspiracy in October 1985, several arrests were made and young Goka (son of a Finance Minister under Nkrumah, F.K.D. Goka) was executed together with others.
- g) For the alleged conspiracy of May 1986, several soldiers, politicians and businessmen were arrested, detained and tortured. They included Captain Ampofo, Kojo Brempong (businessman) and Mr Victor Owusu (Presidential Candidate for the Popular Front Party in the 1979 elections).
- h) In connection with the alleged Quarshigah conspiracy in September 1989, security forces detained Major Courage Quarshigah, Flt-Lt. Donia and several others without trial.
- i) For the alleged plot by members of Forces Reserve Unit January 1986, at least two members of the Forces Reserve Unit, an elite commando corps, were detained without charge after their arrest in January 1986. They were Sergeant William Asiedu and Sergeant Eric Ossei Yaw. Four other commandos also arrested at that time were released without charge in late 1988. The authorities have claimed that the two detainees have committed criminal offences, but appeals from the detainees themselves to be brought to trial to

answer any charges against them have met with no response.

Other members of the security forces have been similarly detained, including five employees of the BNI arrested in July 1987 on suspicion of aiding the escape from BNI custody of a possible prisoner of conscience. They have apparently denied the accusation and requested that they be charged and tried rather than detained indefinitely on the basis of unsubstantiated accusations. Another member of the Forces Reserve Unit, Benjamin Nii Yemokwei Tetteyfiio, was reportedly detained without charge from July 1989 and allowed family visits only briefly at Christmas holidays, the reasons for his detention, trials being unclear.²⁹

(See Appendix E for details of arrests, detentions and executions etc.)

5.4.5. Torture and Inhuman Treatment

Torture was regularly used as part of the regime's control mechanism. Methods employed included solitary confinement, detention in a brightly-lit room in a manner whereby the culprit lost his sense of time as well as night and day, cigarette burns applied on the male organs, mock executions, and severe assault and battery. One Corporal Adongo lived and documented the ordeal he went through upon his arrest in 1985. He had been arrested upon suspicion that he was plotting to assassinate Chairman Rawlings in Kumasi. In the process of his arrest, Adongo's house was demolished and he was wounded. While he was in hospital, Captain Patterington, Iddrisu and Kusi and three other soldiers

forcibly removed him from the hospital upon 'orders from Accra' and sent him to an unknown destination. Adongo was asked to confess to crimes he claimed he did not know about. In his words, "One of them used the AK 47 rifle bayonet to pluck one toe of mine and showed it to me. He was in the course of plucking off the second toe when the other started removing my wound's stitches, by tearing off the stitching threads, using the blunt bayonet. I could not stand the pains, so I had a blackout."³⁰

When Adongo later regained consciousness he saw he had been transferred to the Air Force base in Accra. He identified his interrogators as Bureau of National Investigations (BNI) officials such as Assassie Gyimah and Tinganaboon. He was injected with all kinds of drugs which gave him diverse sensations and hilarations. In his own words, "they placed a tube into which my penis and testicles were inserted. When switched on generates heat, pulls and squeezes my sexual organs..."³¹

The following cases which are common knowledge have been confirmed by Amnesty International:

a) Torture Allegations

There are no safeguards against the torture or ill-treatment of detainees. Many political detainees in the early and mid-1980s were alleged to have been ill-treated or tortured, mostly by members of the armed forces. However, the authorities have never investigated such reports or brought to justice those responsible. The majority of victims were detainees who were

held incommunicado and who were not charged with any offence or brought before any court. Detainees had no right to be visited by any independent person while in detention and there was therefore no protection for them against ill-treatment. This is illustrated by the death of a detainee in 1989 in suspicious circumstances which have never been opened up to public scrutiny. The details are as follows:

i. The death in detention of Flight-Lieutenant W.K. Domie

In September 1989 a detainee died in security police custody amid rumours that he had been tortured. Flight-Lieutenant William Kofie Domie, an airforce officer, was reportedly found hanging from bars on the door of his cell in the BNI's Counter-Espionage and Statistics Section on 29 September 1989, a few days after his arrest in connection with an alleged conspiracy to overthrow the government. Reports later suggested that he had been subjected to torture or ill-treatment to coerce him to make statements incriminating himself and other detainees. According to one report, he was tortured by officers of the Forces Reserve Unit and the BNI at a Forces Reserve Unit building in Accra.

However, no independent assessment has been possible in this case because there has been no formal inquest to inquire into the circumstances of his death. In fact, although his detention was announced on 6 October 1989, no mention was made of his death until the government-owned press published a summary of the findings of an internal board of inquiry into the whole case on 11 November 1989. According to the summary, a pathologist's

report and an internal inquiry by airforce and security police officers apparently confirmed that he had taken his life after breaking down on the second day of his interrogation and confessing to taking an active part in the alleged conspiracy.

ii. Torture allegations made in court

Even when torture allegations were made in court as in one case in 1986, there was no official investigation and those who had allegedly been tortured were quickly executed, thereby preventing further investigation.

In a trial of alleged conspirators in the first half of 1986, clear evidence of torture was brought before the Public Tribunal but, while accepting that ill-treatment had taken place, the court ruled that the torture had not affected the defendants' statements made during interrogations when they were detained incommunicado. Following their arrest in October 1985, the suspects were reportedly tortured by a special team within the Forces Reserve Unit. Some of the defendants claimed to have been hooded, beaten and cut with knives. Godwin Mawuli Kofi Dra Soka told the court that he had heard another suspect, Kyeremeh Djan, claiming that his back was being cut, and that he had then felt some flesh being put in his mouth. Despite evidence before the court - including physical scars on the accused - that their statements had been made after torture, the presiding Chairman, George Kwaku Agyekum, then Chairman of the Board of Public Tribunals, ruled the statements admissible on the grounds that, although there was evidence that the accused had been ill-

treated by the soldiers detaining them, there was no evidence that the BNI officers who took their statements had been responsible for any ill-treatment. From this, he reached the bizarre conclusion that the defendants were not under duress or any improper pressure to make false statements.

Corporal Moses Harley, another detainee held in connection with the same case, was reportedly threatened with death and cut with a knife on his back and chest in an attempt to coerce him to give evidence. The court apparently did not inquire into the circumstances in which prosecution witnesses gave evidence nor whether they were under any duress to do so. Detained before and during the trial, Corporal Moses Harley was reportedly still held without charge or trial five years later. Seven of the defendants before the court, including those who had alleged torture, were subsequently convicted, sentenced to death and executed after a hasty appeal. The National Public Tribunal appeals panel apparently had no objection to the first court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence.

b) Harsh conditions of imprisonment

Political detainees have been held in security police cells, ordinary police cells and in civilian prisons, as well as in military camps and at the seat of government, Osu Castle in Accra. Conditions vary from place to place and according to the status of the detainee, but Amnesty International has received reports of conditions threatening the life and health of several detainees. This has been common knowledge in Ghana. Victims

have included foreigners.

In May 1988 a United States citizen, Alton D. Sawyer, died after being held incommunicado and without charge following his arrest in November 1987. His detention was apparently in connection with a business dispute and he was reported to have died from malaria. Dr Issa Egala, Commanding Officer at the Police Hospital, Accra, who was detained without charge from mid-1988 until 1989, was reportedly held because he had refused to certify that Alton Sawyer's death resulted from natural causes. In an apparent attempt to discredit him, Dr. Egala was publicly accused by the government of embezzlement, but was never charged with any offence or brought to trial.

1. Police cells

Detainees have experienced harsh conditions in police cells, where they have sometimes spent considerable periods of time. One cell at police headquarters in Accra was described to Amnesty International as measuring four by seven metres, yet at one period in 1989, it was holding some 30 uncharged detainees, most of whom had been there for several months, some for over a year. It had only a hole in the floor for a toilet and window in the door for light and ventilation. Although detainees' families were allowed to deliver food, they were not allowed to bring bedding or clothes, and detainees slept on the bare floor. At Nima police station in Accra, also in 1989, over 60 prisoners were reportedly held in four small unit cells and an adjoining corridor, with buckets in the corridor for toilets and the cells

unlit except by the permanent neon light in the corridor. Detainees had to fight for space to sleep on the floor, and the constant noise made sleep almost impossible. Among the prisoners were two elderly women, separated from the others only at night.

ii. Security police cells

Detainees held by the BNI in Accra have been held at the BNI headquarters at a building known as the "Annex", and at the Counter-Espionage and Statistics (CES) Section, as well as in various other BNI buildings. Former detainees have sometimes been reluctant to publicize information about their particular conditions of detention for fear of losing their jobs. Although conditions vary, sometimes depending on the status of the detainee, Amnesty International received information that some detainees had been held in harsh conditions.

Detainees at the "Annex" have reportedly been held in dark, unlit cells for days, stripped to their underwear, with only mats to sleep on and with small holes high in the wall providing the only light and ventilation. Alternatively, some have reported having been being held in windowless cells with the light kept on the whole time. Conditions at the CES Section are also said to be harsh; cells are reported to be dark, cold and damp, causing health problems to detainees.

Most detainees held by the BNI are reportedly held incommunicado and denied all access with the outside world. Some have occasionally been allowed family visits, for example during Christmas. Families have sometimes been allowed to deliver food

for detainees, but this appears to have been generally discouraged with the result that families may not even know where their relatives are detained. One former detainee, a foreigner, reported that he was not allowed to make contact with his country's diplomatic representative or with anybody in his home country.

iii. The detention may be effectively secret and incommunicado

There is no obligation on the authorities, under the Preventive Custody Law, to issue a detention order authorizing an individual's detention, whether in the government gazette or by notice to detainees' families or lawyers. Detainees' families have complained that the authorities have sometimes denied that detainees have been arrested at all. The authorities also determine all detainees' conditions of detention, including whether they are held incommunicado - denied access to family, lawyer or other visitor - their place of detention and whether they are held in harsh conditions. A retired Staff Sergeant in the army, Ibrahim Achaab, was arrested in mid-1987 apparently on suspicion of meeting dissidents in the neighbouring Republic of Togo, and was detained without charge until June 1990. He was moved around various prisons in southern Ghana during this time. A northerner from Bolgatanga, his family could apparently only very occasionally afford to travel from the north to visit him and could not provide food regularly for him while he was in prison.³²

2.5 Clampdown on Press and Religious Freedom

The PNDC has employed the Newspaper Licensing Law (PNDC Law 211) and other unbridled powers at its disposal to silence the press. The independent publications which freely operated on the eve of the 31 December Revolution included the Free Press, Catholic Standard, Pioneer, Palaver, Punch, Echo, Direction and Workers Banner. A systematic attack was launched on these newspapers by subtle methods such as withdrawal of newsprint and refusal to issue licences as well as direct assault such as the incident in 1983 when cadres of the revolution stormed offices of the Echo newspaper, assaulted the staff, destroyed equipment and set the premises on fire. Victims of PNDC attacks on journalists included Kabral Blay Amihere, editor of the Independent newspaper. In due course, the Catholic Standard was banned.

In July 1983, Mr John Kugblenu, a newspaper editor, Mr Tommy Thompson, publisher of the Free Press and Mike Adjei, a public relations expert and journalist were detained without any reasons being assigned. When they were released in July 1984, they had become demaciated, dissipated and confused as a result of torture for unspecified offences. Mr Kugblenu died within a few days of his release. Mr Thompson suffered from a stroke.

In similar manner, Kwesi Pratt, a journalist was detained for daring to ask Dr Kwesi Botchwey "impertinent" questions during a public discussion on a budget presentation. Mr Pratt became a regular detainee thereafter as he continued to voice dissent. No reason was ever given for the several detention

orders placed on him nor was he ever tried for any offence.

Through the Castle Information Bureau (CIB), headed by Mrs Valerie Sackey, a British national in cooperation with Mrs Shirley Ababio, another British national, the PNDC has sustained a stronghold over the public-owned press and information-flow in and out of Ghana generally. Through the CIB, propaganda have been subtly sifted through the mass media, editorials have been written from the Castle and articles have been published under pseudonyms and per "special correspondents".

With regard to the Church, we note that the PNDC has persecuted the Church in several ways. In the first place, several Christian programmes, including the popular "Hour of Visitation" were removed from the Radio. Other programmes were also scrapped from both Radio and TV or disallowed even when their promoters including Rev Dr Ottobill and Rev. Duncan-Williams were prepared to pay for the time allotted. By cunning device, the Sunday evening religious service on TV was replaced with the programme "Contemplation" which was a general discussion on Religion including Atheism hosted by Vicent Assissseh. A Nigerian resident in Ghana who is a born-again Baptist commented: "These things make life difficult for my family over here".³³

In February 1986, a Catholic priest, Father Kukah met his untimely death in mysterious circumstances. He had been shot dead and his body deposited at the beach to give the impression that he had been drowned. It was believed that he had been kidnapped and killed by soldiers who mistook him for the Editor

of the Catholic Standard whom the regime wanted to wreak vengeance upon for the criticisms levelled against the government by the Catholic Standard. Father Kukah died because he bore a close resemblance to a wanted man in terms of physical appearance and the cassock he wore.

PNDC men brought havoc on the Church in Ghana, held the Church in contempt and terrorised worshippers whenever they could. The locus classicus was an incident in Kumasi which stunned all. On Sunday, 7 February 1982, the members of "The Lord is My Shepherd Church" - a church in Kumasi whose membership included several West African nationals - were in the middle of a service, singing, clapping, dancing and praising the Lord when proceedings were rudely interrupted by a revolver-wielding soldier - Major Joe Darko. Major Darko, drunk and wild, stood in the middle of the Church and ordered the congregation to "stop the noise" - his interpretation of the worship. Major Darko ordered the leader of the church, Odiyifo (prophet) Samuel Aare to kneel before him. The prophet obliged and the Major taunted and threatened to blow off the head of the prophet while a gun was placed on the prophet's ears. The Major then ordered the congregation to go out and fill pot-holes.

When the Major left, the elders of the church went to complain of the former's conduct to the commanding officer at 4 BN, the local military headquarters. The military authorities failed to protect the harmless worshippers. Rather, the infuriated Major came back, marched the church elders at gunpoint

to the guardroom and left them there. Thereafter, the persecutor returned, got hold of Prophet Asare, kicked him in the groin, hit his head against the floor and brutalised him in several other ways. Blood flowed from the head, nose and mouth of the prophet. At this stage a policewoman Constable, known in the church as Sister Joannah who was pregnant and who was reportedly related to Major Darko came forward, knelt before Major Darko and begged him. Major Darko shot at the pregnant woman and broke her jaw. Two other persons were hit in the process. Some people charged on Major Darko to disarm him. As a result of a push, Darko hit his head against the concrete and fell dead.

The result of Darko's death was that the soldiers in Kumasi went on a rampage, mounted road blocks, set cars on fire, ransacked homes and burnt down the house of Odiyifo Asare when they could not trace him in his house. The soldiers went to Odiyifo's sister's house and when they could not get him there, they set her house also on fire. Next, they pursued Constable (Sister) Joana to the Komfo Anokye Teaching Hospital, where she had been admitted and shot her dead in the hospital bed in the presence of a doctor, nurses and several patients. Elders of the church including the Chairman of the Committee of Elders, ex-sergeant Nyamekye (who had retired from the Army) were rounded up and later executed. The victims reportedly included one person of Nigerian extraction who had lived in Kumasi for over thirty years. Finally, the prophet was arrested. On Monday, 8 February 1982, the soldiers decided to make a public show of the prophet

at the Kejetia round-about. The weak man was led to the slaughter, hardly able to walk. After a tedious public drill, he was asked to run and was then shot at the back. The soldiers poured petrol on the Odiyifo, set him ablaze and danced round the bonfire as horrified citizens looked on helplessly. The soldiers had triumphed over the church. About 500 members of the church were rounded up and subjected to drills, bayonet punches, peeling off of the flesh, extraction of fingernails and other physical and sexual assault. A woman was punched in the abdomen and she had instant miscarriage. In the process, one Robert Owusu Adu lost his right eye. Other victims singled out for special punishment included M.H. Frempong, Yaw Asare, Kofi Badu, Richard Boateng and Kwaku Manu. The Church was finally closed down.³⁴

In addition to the above, the Religious Bodies (Registration) Law, (PNDC Law 221) has decreed that all religious bodies should apply for official approval in order to operate. The National Commission for Culture has been established as the final authority in this connection. Section 3 of PNDC Law 221 requires that "every religious body in Ghana shall be registered under this Law and no religious body in existence in Ghana shall after three months from the commencement of the Law operate as such unless it is registered under this Law". Under Section 20, a religious body is "any association of persons or body or organisation which professes adherence to or belief in a system of faith or worship". Every such body was required to register within a prescribed period initially fixed at 19 October 1989 and

later extended for a further three months. Applicants should furnish exhaustive information including name, constitution, objects, rules and regulations, particulars of trustees and principal officers and their emoluments, location, numerical strength, places of worship and financial statement as well as sources of funds. A registration fee of c50,000 is required for each registration. The Law also vests in the "Religious Affairs Committee" appointed by the PNDC power to supervise the implementation of the Law and power to grant or refuse certificates to religious organisations.

Under Section 13(1) a religious body may be prohibited where the Commission is satisfied that:

- a. the activities of the body may lead to civil disobedience;
- b. the activities of the body constitute a nuisance to the general public;
- c. the activities and practices of the body are contrary to public order, public interest or morality;
- d. the activities and practices of the body are contrary to the promotion of the good health of the members of the community as a whole;
- e. acceptable standards of decency are not observed at the meeting of the body;
- f. the place of worship has become unsafe for the members of the general public;
- g. the body has failed to comply with the conditions of its registration;

h. the body has contravened any of the provisions of FNDCL 221 or any other enactment;

i. there are any other reasonable grounds for doing so.

Section 13(2) provides that the decision of the Commission under subsection (1) of Section 13 shall be final. Under Section 14, the assets and properties of a proscribed religious body may be forfeited to the state.

In assuring the public of the good intentions of the government, Chairman Rawlings said that the government was committed to religious freedom but cautioned that this would not be allowed to degenerate into license for people to indulge in activities that run counter to the purity of religious teaching. The Chairman said it would be irresponsible on the part of a government committed to democracy to want to dictate how God or Allah should be worshipped. But this was not the motive behind the Religious Bodies Registration Law. He emphasised that it was important for all groups to declare their identity openly to enable the government to adequately protect the interest of all citizens.³⁵ Meanwhile, the Jehovah Witness and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints had been banned and their foreign representatives sent out of the country.

The Christian Council of Ghana and the Catholic Bishops' Conference as well as other religious leaders condemned the law as the greatest affront to religious freedom in Ghana and stated that the law was un-called for since there was adequate legal provision to deal with any organisation that would foster acts

such as civil disobedience, nuisance, immorality, indecency, etc. The Catholic Church issued a 17-point statement which stated, inter alia, that:

- * The PNDC's action would endanger the independence of all religious groups;
- * The Law was setting a precedent which might be used to proscribe all forms of religious expression in the future.
- * The Law was a continuum of the PNDC's intolerance of religious and other freedoms, exhibited earlier in diverse ways including the banning of the Catholic Standard.
- * The power given the Religious Affairs Committee to ban a religious body on "any reasonable grounds" without a right of appeal was draconian.³⁶

The Christian Council of Ghana which comprises the Presbyterian, the Evangelical Presbyterian, the Methodist, the Anglican and other major churches reacted by a pastoral letter in these words: "having thoroughly studied this law, and having sought legal advice on its meaning and implications, we have reached the conclusion that this law as it now stands... constitutes an infringement of the fundamental human right of the freedom to worship. For this reason, we are of the view that our churches would be surrendering, both for our present membership and for future generations a fundamental and inalienable human right, if we registered in accordance with this law.

Consequently, we cannot in conscience register under PNDC Law 221 as it stands".³⁷

The churches were poised for a confrontation since they could not succumb to deriving their existence and legitimacy from what they considered a dubious PNDC law. The PNDC nominated Mr Justice D.F. Annan to mediate. These efforts failed and the government decided to be silent and bide its time as it could obviously not proceed to attack all the churches at their places of worship.

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NOTES AND REFERENCES ON CHAPTER FIVE

1. Nkrumah, Kwame: Class Struggle in Africa (London: Panaf Books Ltd., 1970), p. 24.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Rawlings, J.J. A Revolutionary Journey: Selected Speeches of Flt Lt. Jerry John Rawlings, Dec. 31 1981-Dec 31, (Accra: Information Services Department, 1981) Volume I, p.3.
 4. Rawlings, J.J.: T.V. and Radio broadcast to the nation on Tuesday, January 5, 1982.
 5. Ibid.
 6. Ibid.
 7. The Legon Observer Vol. XII, No. 6, 11-14 April, 1980, p. 153ff and Vol. XII, No, 10, 19 September - 2 October, 1980, p. 222ff.
 8. Ouster clauses are used in the common law world to put a tight lid on certain issues which are thought best not to be reopened. Mr. Ahwoi referred to an English case where the House of Lords approved an ouster clause which had the effect of detaining without trial, an individual who was believed to be of German extraction. This was during the Second World War when extraordinary measures were required to aid the war effort.
 9. Gould, J. and Kolb, W (eds.) Dictionary of Social Sciences. (London: Tavistock Publications Ltd., 1959, p. 604.
- iv -The writer was physically present and had to run for dear life together with others.

12. Nkrumah set up the Special Courts to try special offenses including treason. Special Courts also featured prominently under the National Redemption Council (NRC) and Supreme Military Council (SMC) government as well as under the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). Under the AFRC, as People's Courts, they attained notoriety by virtue of nocturnal trials of blindfolded accused persons who were expeditiously led to execution or goal.
13. Address delivered by Mr Kwaku Gyan, member-secretary and national registrar of the Board of Public Tribunals at the Conference of Chairmen and Legal officers of Public Tribunals held in Accra on 10 July, 1987. Incidentally, within months of this address, Mr Gyan was made a Regional Public Tribunal Chairman and had to vacate his national post.
14. See Section 296 of the Criminal Procedure Code (1960), Act 30.
15. Per Aggrey, Kwesi, in Osmanu Mohammed & Others vr. The People, 1987, National Appeals Tribunal.
16. Information from National Public Tribunal, State House, Accra.
17. Aggrey, Kwesi, op cit.
18. Information from National Public Tribunal, State House, Accra.
19. The People vrs. Henri Hage, National Public Tribunal, Accra, 1989.

20. Vide the People vrs. Nana Agyei and others, National Public Tribunal, 1989 and Nana Agyei & others vrs. The People, National Appeals Tribunal, 1989.
21. Speech by the Acting Attorney-General Mr. Tandoh, alias Nana Obuadum XI in addressing the closing section of the Ghana Bar Association's annual conference on Thursday, January, 1990.
22. Interview with Mr Nortey of Osu, Accra.
23. *ibid.*
24. Special Investigation Board (SIB) Final Report, March 1983, p. 75.
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26. Amnesty International Report on Ghana, London, 1991. pp.8,9.
27. *ibid.*
28. *ibid* p.19.
29. *ibid* pp 33-40.
30. Corporal Adongo, "My Experience as a Guest of Rawlings' Security", Talking Drums, 23 December, 1985.
31. *ibid.*
32. Amnesty Report, *op cit.* pp 21-24.
33. Interview with A. Adelekan, Accra, 1986.
34. Interview in Kumasi with members of "The Lord is My Shepherd Church".
35. People's Daily Graphic, 23 March, 1990 p.1.
36. Statement by Catholic Bishops' Conference on Religious Bodies Registration Law, Accra, March, 1990.

37. Christian Council of Ghana. Pastoral letter on
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CHAPTER SIX

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICIES

6.1 The Road to ERP

The Ghanaian economy in January 1982 was characterized by budgetary deficits, declining real output, hyper-inflation, contortions in fiscal policy, over-bloated currency which nurtured a booming currency black market, empty shelves, smuggling and corruption. There was decline in production of all commodities and goods, including export products. Vehicles were parked because of lack of basic spare parts including mere contact sets, plugs and tyres. We may sum up the crisis of the period immediately preceding 31 December 1981 by saying that everything was in short supply except poverty, misery and disease.

In April 1983, the PNDC government introduced a World Bank/IMF sponsored Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) with the primary aim of reversing the decline in the Ghanaian economy. The programme was structured into various phases as follows:- ERP I, 1984-1986; ERP II/SAP I, 1987-1989; ERP III/SAP II, 1990-1992.

The objectives of ERP I were as follows:-

- a. the arrest and reversal of over a decade of precipitous decline in production in all sectors of the economy, particularly agriculture including cocoa;
- b. the control over the factors fuelling the fires to hyper-

- inflation in the economy (reaching 116% in 1977 and 1981) through the restoration of financial discipline;
- c. the rationalisation of the exchange rate in order to stimulate export and to curb the consumption of luxuries and make the scarcity of foreign exchange a factor in its official pricing;
 - d. improvement of the tarnished image of Ghana in international financial circles through effective external debt and foreign exchange reserve management, and thus restoring confidence in the economy with overseas banking and suppliers' establishments;
 - e. rehabilitation of the ruined productive and social infrastructure and above all;
 - f. mobilisation of the necessary domestic and external resources to restore the living levels of Ghanaians including over a million of our people expelled from Nigeria, from the depths to which they had sunk as a result of our disastrous economic performance, and unprecedented drought and raging bush fires.¹

The objectives of ERP II/SAP I were as follows:-

- a. sustain economic growth at between 5 to 5.5 per cent a year over the medium term;
- b. increase the level of public investment from about 10 percent of national income to about 25 per cent by the end of this decade;
- c. increase domestic savings from about 7 percent at the end of

ERP I to about 15 per cent by the end of the decade;

- d. further improve the management of resources in the public sector;
- f. effectively mobilise the resources thus generated to improve the social and overall well-being of the people of Ghana, particularly the under-privileged, deprived and the vulnerable.²

The goals of ERP III/SAP II were as follows:

- a. attain an average annual growth of GDP of 5 percent per annum;
- b. a reduction in inflation rates from 27% in 1988 to 5% per annum in 1992;
- c. generation of overall balance of payments surpluses of about \$85 million per annum on average; and
- d. the acceleration of the Program to Mitigate the Social Cost of Adjustment (PAMSCAD).³

The facilities which the IMF has made available to Ghana since 1983 may be seen in the following categories:

1. Standby Agreement (SA) The interest rate of the loan which provided financing over 3-5 year period was based on the market rate. It had no conditionalities. Ghana has utilised 3 facilities, namely; SDR 238.5m on August 3, 1983; SDR180m on August 27, 1984 and SDR 81.8m on October 15, 1986.
2. Extended Fund Facility (EFF) This was a financing over 7-10 years with market interest rate and had a number of policy conditionalities and performance requirements. The

facilities utilized under EFF included SDR97.6m on November 6, 1987.

3. Compensatory Financing of Export Fluctuations (CFF) This facility was available to countries which could demonstrate that they had suffered shortfall of earnings from major export products from which they derived their foreign exchange resources. The facilities enjoyed under CFF included SDR120.5m on August 3, 1983 and SDR58.3m on December 4, 1984.

4. Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) This was a mechanism to provide special assistance to countries pursuing structural adjustment programmes. The interest rate was one-half of one percent. Ghana had access to SAF of SDR40.9 on November 6, 1987.

5. Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) The ESAF differed from the SAF in terms of the amount of funding available though the terms of both were more generous than the other facilities. The funding available under ESAF was considerably greater than under SAF. Ghana enjoyed SDR368.1m on November 3, 1988 under ESAF.

The World Bank and the IMF constituted the backbone of Ghana's ERP/SAP until 1986 when bilateral donors started showing keen interest. These multilateral agencies have helped in terms of financial support while through some conditionalities they have also shaped policies of the programme. For instance, when in liberalizing the foreign exchange market the plan was to

integrate consumer goods imports and invisible transactions into the auction by January 1988, this integration was made a condition for the second tranche of the World Bank's Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL). The multilateral donors financed 75% of additional inflows between 1983 and 1986. Bilateral donors picked up from 1986 with increased commitments from Canada, Germany, Japan and the UK. Between 1986 and 1988, total bilateral commitments came to US\$768m while that for multilaterals was US\$962m. Grant element as per cent of total aid was however greater for the bilaterals averaging 57% than for multilaterals which averaged 13%. In 1988-1990, bilateral donor commitment totalled US\$1184m, while that for multilaterals came to US\$1237m. The grant element averaged 48% for bilaterals and 12% for multilaterals.⁴

The initial aid commitment was as follows:

Table 6A

AID COMMITMENTS BY DONORS, 1983-1985 (US \$ MILLION)

	1983	1984	1985
Members of the CG for Ghana			
Canada	12.3	44.9	28.0
France	n.a	0.6	12.4
Germany	24.6	17.7	13.4
Italy	n.a	1.0	15.8
Japan	34.5	2.8	36.1
Switzerland	n.a	6.3	9.1
U.K.	n.a	9.5	11.3
U.S.A.	5.0	17.1	10.0
African Development Bank	n.a	31.0	79.0
Arab Bank for Eco. Dev. in Africa	n.a	n.a	9.0
European Economic Community	8.3	56.7	25.5
European Investment Bank	n.a.	n.a	n.a
IFAD	n.a.	n.a.	n.a
UNDP	5.0	5.0	4.0

	1983	1984	1985
WFP	13.0	79.1	7.9
World Bank	73.3	125.0	198.9
Observers at the CG for Ghana			
Bulgaria	10.00	n.a	n.a
Australia	n.a	n.a	n.a
Brazil	n.a	n.a	n.a
CFTC	n.a	n.a	0.9
China	2.5	n.a	n.a
Denmark	n.a	n.a	n.a
India	n.a	n.a	n.a
Korea	n.a	n.a	n.a
Kuwait Fund	n.a	n.a	n.a
Netherlands	n.a	9.3	5.5
OPEC	1.50	n.a	6.0
Spain	n.a	n.a	n.a
Saudia Fund for Dev.	n.a	n.a	n.a
TOTAL	190.0	415.8	477.8

- Source: 1. Economic Recovery Programme 1984-86
2. Progress of the Economic Recovery Programme 1984-86 & Policy Framework, 1986-1988.
3. Ewusi, Kodwo Structural Adjustment and Stabilisation Policies in Developing Countries. A Case Study of Ghana's Experience, 1983-1986. p.52

6.2 The Policy of the ERP

The policy of the ERP may be studied under six main headings:-

- i) Exchange Rate Policy;
- ii) Prices and Incomes Policy;
- iii) Monetary Policy;
- iv) Fiscal Policy;
- v) Prioritisation of Public Expenditure
- vi) Other policy reforms.

6.2 (i) Exchange Rate Policy

Prior to ERP, the exchange rate of the cedi had been pegged

at c2.75. Devaluation of the cedi stood in October 1983 at c30 to a dollar. By January 1986, as a result of a series of adjustments, the cedi had fallen to c90 to a dollar - an exchange rate adjustment of over 3,000 per cent within a period of three years. By 1990, the level had reached c326.33 to a dollar.

A principal goal of the flexible exchange rate policy under ERP has been to ensure that the value of the cedi was in alignment with the world currency value levels. Devaluation was also necessary to provide attractive prices for cocoa farmers so as to encourage their participation in the sector which had been the mainstay of our economy. By the readjustment of the cedi, the CMB was enabled to obtain more cedis for every unit of foreign currency it earned so that the CMB, for example, could realistically pay higher prices to the farmers. Other sectors of the economy such as mining, timber and the non-traditional export industries were to benefit in the same vein.

The criticism which may be levelled against devaluation under ERP is that it lacked gradualism and operated with facelessness. Some other side effects included stress on several local industries which were not adequately catered for.

6.2 (ii) Prices and Incomes Policy

The ERP aimed at a new policy regarding pricing in the country. The artificial price levels at which goods had been pegged by a system of controlled prices constituted the essence of "Kalabule" in the country. These artificial and low prices, particularly as they affected the so-called "essential

commodities" - sugar, soap, milk, sardines etc - created avenues for profiteering and corruption in the system. The new incomes policy had the objective of making all incomes - salaries and wages - commensurate with the level of productivity.

By the time the FNDC announced a new minimum wage of c90.00 per day with effect from 1 January, 1986, the minimum wage had seen three previous increases commencing from April, 1983. As a result of the 1986 reforms, for example, there were increases in selected allowances including leave and car maintenance allowances. With the new adjustments in income, the minimum paid worker in the civil service took home c3,722,24 per month instead of c2,140.62. A clerical officer received a take-home pay of c5,673.53 instead of c2,290.69 and an executive officer had c7,729.68 instead of c2560.24. A chief director in the civil service received c10,009.75 instead of c3,137.29. The new tax system granted a relief for emoluments up to c10,000 instead of c5,000.00. Under the new tax schedule, a worker earning c180,000 or more paid 55 per cent tax on his salary.⁵

6.2 (iii) Monetary Policy

Monetary policy basically concerns the handling of the Banking system with particular regard to (a) interest rates and (b) credit.

Interest Rates The ERP aimed at interest rates which would serve as incentive to depositors. This would enable the mobilisation of domestic funds in terms of savings for development. The higher the savings deposit rate, the more

people are encouraged to save. With regard to the lending rate, we realise that it determines the actual cost of money borrowed from the bank. The lower the lending rate, the cheaper is money borrowed for investment.

The measures taken after 1983 under the ERP included abandoning the low interest rates paid to depositors which discouraged saving and thrift. The previous system had also encouraged brief-case businessmen to obtain quick "loans" for "kalabule" business. Under ERP, therefore, in October 1983, interest rates were reviewed. The Savings Rate was increased from 8 per cent to 13 percent and the maximum lending rate from 14 per cent to 22.5 per cent. A flexible system was adopted regarding interest rate, to reflect actual economic conditions at any given time.

Credit In this connection, the aim of the ERP was to expand the domestic credit system with regard to the productive sectors of the economy. With a view to reviving the cocoa industry, special credit was geared towards the industry to ensure that money was available to farmers quantitatively and timeously for their operations.

6.2 (iv) Fiscal Policy

Weakness in fiscal policy in the past had resulted in a wide gap between government revenue and expenditure. This had resulted in continuing budget deficits. Attempts to cater for this defect through the banking system had escalated inflation. The fiscal policy under the ERP was calculated towards removing

this contortion. One important aspect of this system was to have a tight control over government expenditure. Areas of waste have been identified and undue expenditure halted. In the same way, non-viable development projects as well as certain prestige projects have been suspended.

The fiscal policy under the ERP was also geared towards strengthening the revenue base of the economy. Measures have not only been taken to ensure effective collection of taxes, including the setting up of an autonomous better paid Internal Revenue Service (IRS) but tax education has proceeded on an unprecedented scale in Ghana.

6.2(v) Prioritisation of public expenditure

Prioritisation is the essence of good planning. Whereas conflicting demands are always made on the scarce resources of any economy, our inability to identify our priorities right (expecially in the period 1960-1966 and 1972-1979) have cost the national economy tremendously.

The ERP has identified four main priority sectors - agriculture, energy, industry and education. The rationale underlying these priorities was three - fold.

- (i) generation of additional resources to provide for a major increase in public expenditure within the context of continued fiscal and monetary prudence;
- (ii) increased levels of recurrent expenditure aimed at substantially increased real wages in a restructured civil service, improved maintenance and supplies across all sectors,

with particular attention to increasing the quality and access in the health and education sectors;

(iii) increased levels of development expenditure within the context of a core programme of rehabilitation expenditure based upon incremental economic returns and inter-sectoral linkages.⁶

6.2 (vi) Other Policy Reforms

One principal area of reform was the public sector which had been characterised by over-staffing and low salaries. The aim of the ERP was to prune down staff, raise the level of salaries and motivate workers towards the attainment of higher productivity. A five per cent re-deployment of the Civil service per annum was targeted accordingly. In this connection, the problem of State-owned corporations which continued to make losses was considered. Under ERP a restructuring of this sector was undertaken to raise efficiency and profitability.

6.3 Sectoral Reforms and Performance under ERP

The economy as a whole received a new lease of life under the ERP. We may study some relevant areas as follows:-

6.3 (i) Cocoa

There have been indications that Ghana's cocoa production has started to increase after several years of steady decline. Cumulative purchases for the 1985/86 season to January, 1986 was 166,264 tonnes as against 136,955 tonnes for the same period in the previous season.⁷

The most important measure has been the four-fold increase in the producer price of cocoa. In 1986, farmers were being paid

c1,698 per head-load of 30 kilos as compared to c360 in 1982. Also the government increased the provision of insecticides and sprayers to farmers. In addition, there has been an improvement of cocoa storage facilities in the cocoa growing areas. A new fleet of vehicles has been made available to the Cocoa Board which is the sole dealer in Ghana's cocoa trade.

In order to inject greater efficiency into the system, it became necessary to introduce a reduction in Cocobod overheads particularly in the field of Cocobod employees. It was revealed that as at 1983 Cocobod had 100% over-employment and that the producer price of cocoa could be raised by 16% if this over-employment was eliminated.⁹ By elimination process adopted, 25,000 "ghost workers" were dropped, 29,000 workers being 39% of Cocobod's total staff, had been laid off by May 1987.⁹

6.3 (ii) Agriculture

Ghana is an agricultural country and a growth in agriculture is very crucial to the economy including the attainment of higher employment and checking of inflation. In February 1984 the PNDC issued a document aimed at:

- a. self-sufficiency in the production of cereals, starchy staples and animal protein;
- b. maintenance of adequate levels of buffer stocks of grains;
- c. self-sufficiency in the production of industrial raw materials;
- d. increased production of exportable agricultural crops;
- e. promotion and provision of improved storage, processing and

distribution systems to minimise post-harvest losses.¹⁰

The quest for self-sufficiency in food was good attraction for donor countries' support. Pursuant to this, a more comprehensive programme was launched. In collaboration with the World Bank, the FNDC formulated a Medium - Term Agricultural Development Programme (MTADP). The Plan aimed at:

- a. providing an environment conducive to the promotion of agricultural growth and development;
- b. stimulating the response of the private sector towards agricultural development;
- c. producing more efficiently essential agricultural products for both the domestic and export markets;
- d. ensuring that agricultural production is consistent with the objectives of poverty alleviation and sound ecological management;
- e. ensuring food security;
- f. creating rural employment opportunities in the agricultural sector;
- g. improving the balance of payments situation;
- h. enhancing agriculture generally, particularly through industry linkages and balanced regional development."

Irrigation

Official sources indicated that the utilisation of irrigation potential had been constrained by the limited capacity to identify, formulate and implement projects that were adapted

in an optimum way to the land and water resource base. To help remedy this situation, a twinning arrangement was organised between Ghana's Irrigation Development Authority (IDA) and Rural Development Corporation (RDC) of South Korea. The twinning partner had studied and advised the reorganisation of the Irrigation Development Authority to improve its effectiveness.

Food Crops

The objective has been increase in production of food crops and the improvement of marketing methods to provide Ghanaians with good food at competitive prices. Areas of strategic operation included adaptive varieties of plantains, roots and tubers, maize and rice. The system of crop rotation has been encouraged to reduce the reliance on chemical fertilizers.

In launching a three year Medium-Term Agricultural Development Programme (MTADP) in June 1990, the Ministry of Agriculture stated that "in spite of the positive response to the policy reforms initiated in 1983, agriculture, which accounts for about half of GDP, still faces a formidable task in maintaining the momentum of the recovery in view of the still poor state of the economic, social and administrative infrastructure and the depleted manpower base... in order to consolidate the very impressive gains so far achieved in the production of cereals, roots and tubers... and to develop other new crops such as soyabeans, the government, in collaboration with the World Bank, has initiated the preparation of a three year medium-term agricultural development programme (MTADP)." ¹²

Fisheries and Livestock

In the fisheries sub-sector, ERP placed emphasis on inland fisheries both in the Volta Lake and in aquaculture. Efforts have been made to rehabilitate marine facilities in support of tuna and shrimp fisheries. With regard to livestock, the programme has emphasised effective vaccination to control contagious diseases and teach livestock producers, particularly in the Northern part of Ghana, the development and maintenance of dry season water supplies, dry season feeding of oxen for animal traction and fattening programmes generally.

Forestry

Under the ERP, the PNDC has worked on increasing the local value added to the worth of our timber instead of exporting it as logs. The PNDC proceeded further from the ban on the export of 14 species of logs including mahogany, teak, sapele and walnut which had been imposed in 1979. Furthermore under ERP, a Forest Product Inspection Bureau (FPIB) has been established in place of the Ghana Timber Marketing Board (GTMB). FIPB has the role of supervising local sawmills and the total development of the sawmills in Ghana, supervising the observance of quality control regulations and the development of the wood-work industry generally. For the facilitation of exportation of processed timber to earn the required foreign exchange, a Timber Export Development Board (TEDB) has also been established.

6.3 (3) Manufacturing

As Ewusi has observed, Ghana's industrial capacity has been

seriously under-utilised over the years. The problem which had been endemic since the 1960's increased to alarming proportions with an average capacity utilisation in large and medium - scale factories falling from 25 per cent in 1981 to 18 per cent in 1984. In this connection ERP, during the 1983-86 period in particular, aimed at export sector improvement to generate foreign exchange. In this connection greater emphasis was placed on production as against consumption. The objective was to increase capacity utilization from the level of 30 per cent in 1983 to 50 per cent in 1984 and 75 per cent in 1986. "13

A four-criteria approach was adopted in selection of priority areas. The priority areas had to include industries which:

1. Produce essential consumer goods for domestic use,
2. Generate Government revenue.
3. Earn or save foreign exchange, and
4. Are labour - intensive and thus promote employment. "14

In explaining the source of industries' problems, a government document accused Ghanaian manufacturing enterprises of having "developed behind high protective barriers" and therefore "finding it difficult to cope with the liberalized and more competitive market environment."15 However, it cannot be gainsaid that the economic miracles of Japan, Korea, Taiwan etc. have been achieved by extensive protection of indigenous industries from foreign invasion until they could stand effectively on their feet.

It is very necessary that under ERP more attention should be paid to the small-scale manufacturing sector which, although responsible for only about 25% of manufacturing value added, accounts for 80% of manufacturing employment.¹⁶ It is noted that the Ghanaian Enterprise Development Commission (GEDC) and the National Board for Small-Scale Industries (NBSI) have been merged to attain better results. Nevertheless, the entire programme is plagued with difficulties. There is lack of funds for disbursement; the national body itself lacks staff, logistics and requisite facilities to provide meaningful help to small-scale industrialists.¹⁷

6.4 (4) Mining

The mining industry - comprising gold, diamonds, manganese and bauxite - constitutes the second largest foreign exchange earner, second only to cocoa. The industry has, however, suffered in recent times. The mining industry accounted for 25% of the export earnings in 1981 but only 14% in 1982.¹⁸

Under the ERP, the plan to resuscitate the mining industry included:-

- a. the provision of finance for spare parts and materials;
- b. assistance for rehabilitation of supporting infrastructure essential for the running of the industry;
- c. the 35% export retention programme.

According to official reports, a 298 million-dollar action programme had been prepared to revamp Ghana's mining sector during 1987-1990. Under the action plan, particular attention

was to be paid to the Oppon Manse iron ore deposits. Concerning gold, Ashanti Goldfields Corporation (AGC) was expected to increase gold output from 260,000 fine ounces to 343,000 fine ounces in 1988 and 400,000 fine ounces in the early 1990s. The State Gold Mining Corporation (SGMC) was expected to undertake a 67 million-dollar rehabilitation programme of which US \$37 million would be for replacement and rehabilitation of mines equipment and infrastructure. For manganese, it was found necessary to develop the country's large carbonate reserve and improve the mine planning and commissioning of carbonate nodulation plant. Export earnings of the sector were expected to reach US \$150.3 million in 1986 increasing to US \$172.9 million and US \$195.2 million in 1987 and 1988 respectively. Furthermore, the Minerals Commission with technical assistance was to establish a mineral data bank from which investors would draw vital information.¹⁹

6.4 (5) Transport and Communication

Under the ERP, a positive effort has been made to improve on the infrastructure of the nation in terms of transport and communication. Apart from the availability of vehicles and spare parts, improvements have been made in the road network in the country. Besides the rehabilitation of the railway, work had been done on the two harbours to improve, inter alia, their loading capacity, remove sunken wreckage and make provision for the berthing of larger vessels.

6.4 (6) Financial Sector Reforms

Since the middle of 1987, the Government has been implementing a comprehensive programme of restructuring the financial sector to strengthen institutions in the sector and enhance their effectiveness. Considerable progress has already been made in a number of critical areas. A new Banking Law has been passed which has established clearer and more effective prudential guidelines and given the Bank of Ghana the enforcement authority to ensure compliance with prudential and supervisory requirements.

6.4 (7) Rise in Money Supply

Total money supply rose from c22,014.4 million in October, 1984 to c30,534.6 million in October, 1985. This showed an annual increase of 38.7 per cent as against 43.4 per cent in September, 1985. The average growth rate of money supply for the first 10 months of 1985 was 33.3 per cent as against 37.3 per cent for the same period in 1984.²⁰

6.4 (8) INFLATION RATE

Ghana under the ERP recorded her lowest inflation rate for several years. The national consumer Price Index has shown that the inflation rate for 1985 was 10.4 per cent as against 40.2 per cent and 121.9 per cent in 1984 and 1983 respectively. The urban consumer price index also indicated a low rate of 12.5 per cent as against 40.8 per cent in 1984 and 115.1 per cent in 1983. The rural consumer price index was even lower at 8.8 per cent as

compared to 38.4 per cent and 129.6 per cent in 1984 and 1983 respectively.²¹ Up to 1990, the rate of inflation continued to reduce. The rate has decreased from 166% in 1981 and 123% in 1981 and 123% in 1983 to a yearly average rate of 30% for 1984-90.²²

This is illustrated by Table 6B below:

Table 6B

RATE OF INFLATION

YEAR	RATE	YEAR	RATE
1961	6	1976	55
1962	6	1977	116
1963	5	1978	73
1964	16	1979	55
1965	23	1980	50
1966	15	1981	116
1967	10	1982	22
1968	11	1983	123
1969	6	1984	40
1970	3	1985	10
1971	9	1986	24
1972	11	1987	40
1973	17	1988	31
1974	19	1989	25
1975	30	1990	37

Source: Rate calculated from CPI, Quarterly Digest of Statistics, 1980, 1989. Economic Survey, 1969. Tutu, Kwadwo op cit, 1991, p.13.

6.4 (a) Stock Exchange

The introduction of the Stock Exchange in Ghana should be seen as a feather in the cap of the PNDC. Whereas the idea had been mooted several years before the PNDC came into office, and even though various feasibility reports had been written thereon, it took the PNDC to bring the programme into fruition.

The function of the newly established Stock Exchange is to mobilise such available funds and channel them through the purchase of equity shares for productive purposes. It is also envisaged that the Stock Exchange would relieve considerable pressure on the banks for loans. The money would be raised by way of an organised market for the buying and selling of all forms of securities such as stocks, shares and debentures.

The Stock Exchange would also gather information on various types of business available, their performance, profitability, prospects etc, to enable the public to have accurate data on companies. This would not only enable the public to know where and how to invest, but it would also bring industries and speculators together. Furthermore, it would make companies and industries conscious of the need to maintain high standards to attract speculators on the open, competitive market.

6.4 (10) Mobisquads

Mobisquads have been employed to great advantage throughout the country. They have cultivated several hectares of land to aid the national economic recovery programme. For example, in the Hohoe District, mobisquads have since 1984, rehabilitated 4,000 hectares of abandoned cocoa farms. Another 36 hectares have been rehabilitated and given to old and incapacitated farmers who could not maintain the farms on their own because the combined effect of the swollen shoot infection and the high cost of labour had rendered several aged farmers helpless.²⁵

6.4 (11) FAMSCAD

In recognition of the social cost of adjustment, the PNDC made the proposals which came to be known as Programme of Action to Mitigate the Social Cost of Adjustment (FAMSCAD) in December, 1987. It was envisaged that about \$60 m - \$70 m would be spent over a two year period.

The scope of FAMSCAD included employment generation, health, drugs, infrastructure, housing, communication, re-training of redeployees, improvement of physical infrastructure, schools, nutrition, literacy programmes, financing of education, provision of small loans and equipment/tool for settlement of redeployees as well as enhancing opportunities for women.

Community Initiative Projects (CIPS) have been introduced under FAMSCAD. Of the first 20 CIPS financed with an amount of c24.6 million from the Public Investment Programme (PIF), 15 had been completed and commissioned by 1990. These are set out in

Table 6C

COMMUNITY INITIATIVE PROJECTS UNDER PAMSCAD

REGION	DISTRICT	TOWN	TYPE PROJECT
Central	Komenda-Edina Eguafo-Abirem	Ntranco	JSS Block
-do-	Cape Coast	Esuekyir	-do-
Ashanti	Atwima	Nerebehi	KVIP
-do-	Ahafo-Ano South	Mankranso	-do-
Eastern	East Akyem	Kukurantumi	-do-
-do-	Akuapem North	Akropong	JSS Block
Brong Ahafo	Sene	Bantama	JSS Block
-do-	Dormaa	Amasu	KVIP
Western	Asankragua	Asankra-Saa	Clinic
-do-	Jomoro	Jewi Wharf	KVIP
Northern	Yendi	Sang	Health Post
-do-	Tolon	Gbullung	PHC Centre
Gt. Accra	Ga	Akutiaku	Community
			Clinic
Upper West	Sisala	Serbelle	JSS
-do-	Jirapa	Jirapa	KVIP

Five (5) projects had been roofed and plastered and doors with windows being fixed in 1990. These were:

REGION	DISTRICT	TOWN	TYPE OF PROJECT
Gt. Accra	Ga	Danfa	JSS
Upper East	Builsa	Gbedema	JSS
"	Bolgatanga	Sekoti	Clinic
Volta	Keta	Fiahor	JSS
-do-	Kete Krachi	Chenderi	JSS

Source: Local Government Information Digest, Vol.3 No.1, 1990
p.13.

Under PAMSCAD help has been extended to the areas of non-formal education, deworming of school children, small-scale mining, paper commodity aid to support primary education as well as the promotion of labour-intensive feeder roads construction and repair.

6.4 CRITIQUE

An evaluation of ERP shows that some modest achievements have been made including infrastructure rehabilitation, increased production in traditional and non-traditional exports, increased economic growth rate, increased availability of consumable goods, including spare parts etc. On the whole, the PNDC has shown unique boldness in economic policy implementation. Donors have generally been satisfied that monies have not been diverted in large quantities into private bank accounts - even though in Africa such matters are difficult to determine until regimes (especially military regimes) are out of office.

ERP is, however, far from providing a perfect panacea to Ghana's economic maladies. Some of the pertinent criticisms may be listed as follows:

6.4.1 Lack of Fundamental Change

It may be argued that there has been no fundamental change in the basic structure of the economy as a result of ERP. As Folson observed, ERP had been so concerned with the traditional mono-crop, cocoa, that the section on "incentives to production" in the National Programme, for example, dealt only with cocoa (later extended to agriculture in general) and showed no direct interest in industry generally or the export industry in particular.²⁴ On industry, as such, the National Programme aimed at maximizing industrial growth with a view to industry playing a significant role in the generation of development. But it showed no awareness of the need to re-orientate industry towards export.²⁵

Folson concluded that if the basic aim of the 31 December Revolution was "to break the monotony of underdevelopment and launch a fresh start in the task of national reconstruction and if the ultimate vision was that of revolutionalising the productive base of the economy, then the measures and policies set out in the various policy documents of the PNDC, from The PNDC Programme for Reconstruction and Development of 1982 to the National Programme for Economic Development of 1987, made little contribution, if any, to their realisation.²⁶

The view, therefore, was expressed by Folson that if the

PNDC regime was revolutionary, it might be so only in a political, pre-1917 Rousseauist sense, not in the post 1917 twentieth century Third World sense. Folson borrowed Rothchild's words and added that the Rawlings model might be seen as a reformist, pragmatic one, with a penchant for revolutionary rhetoric.²⁷ However, Rawlings did not share with Lenin and other Post-Lenin left-wingers and revolutionaries such as Fanon, Mao Tse-Tung, Che Guevera, Samora Machel and Ho Chi Minh, a basic rejection of contemporary inequalities and oppression and a willingness to engage in a militant action to change the world.²⁸

The PNDC was, however, working according to its own philosophy, as Dr Obed Asamoah, PNDC Secretary for Foreign Affairs, said of the regime. According to Asamoah, the PNDC was not concerned with ideological doctrines that would tie its hands to any "straight-jacket political system. What we want is good ideas that will take into account our circumstances and make good what we have... we are sort of practising pragmatism with a populist content."²⁹

The household expenditure of Ghanaians has gone up since ERP.

Table 6D below shows household expenditure of junior officers in the civil services at the Ministries, Accra, in 1990.

Table 6D

HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURE OF JUNIOR OFFICERS,MINISTRIES, ACCRA, IN 1990

Items	Monthly Expenditure in cedis	% of Total Monthly Income of c25,000.00
Food (c 500 per day for a family, of man, wife and 4 children	15,000	60%
Drinks(c200 per day)	6,000	24%
Rent	4,000	16%
Electricity and Water	1,000	4%
Transport (c200 per day for worker c100 per day for 4 children).. ..	9,000	36%
Clothing	6,000*	24%
Durable goods	- **	
Health	6,000 ***	24%
Education	10,000	40%
Recreation	1,000	4%
Miscellaneous	1,000	4%
Total	59,000	236%

Net Monthly Earnings 25,000

Source: Survey conducted by M. Oquaye in mid 1990

* Clothing was calculated upon the conservative estimate of 2 shirts per year for father (total c10,000) two trousers per year (total c12,000) shoe (total c12,000) ignoring pants, socks, singlets etc. For the wife, calculation was based on 1 half-piece cloth per year only at c14,000. The clothing for children was worked upon an average of 4 children a family giving every child c6,000 per year totalling c24,000 per year. The total was c72,000 giving a monthly average at c6,000.

** The general impression was that the worker could not make calculations on furniture, electronic equipment etc. even though most workers had several varieties of such equipment. The view was that these were purchased when you had a bonanza or "tsobo" (unexpected good fortune) or a big dash from somewhere. These were real indications of corrupting influences. The high cost of the equipment which the workers generally have shows the unhealthy disequilibrium between actual wages and the living standards which workers inevitably adopt.

*** This estimation is woefully inadequate. From my interview at the Ministries, I was shown receipts of drugs bought, as well as old prescriptions produced from pockets and drawers. The drugs regarding these had not been purchased because of lack of funds despite the urgency. Documents shown covering 1990 indicated that in one instance a worker at the Ministry of Trade paid a total of c1000 for the purchase of Vitamin C (100mg), Tab. Aspirin (10) and Tab Camoquine for one child who was having fever. Four fever incidents per child per year times 4 children = c17,600.00.00, not considering other ailments and nutritional needs. The same worker had paid c2,500 for Caps Amoxycillin 500 mg for 5 days and vitamins. Additional c3,000 went into blood tonic. This related to one visit by himself to the hospital for an infection he had caught. The total bill was c3,500 for that visit - 14% of his monthly salary.

The rise in the cost of living between 1982-1990 is shown by Table 6E below which compares 1982 and 1990 prices generally.

Table 6E

Commodity Price List Comparison between 1982-1990

Commodity	Price in 1982	Price in 1990
Key Soap	13.00	460.00
Omo	16.00	215.00
Guardian Soap	7.50	60.00
Rice (1 Bag)	660.00	9,100.00
Milo	11.00	900.00
Cerelac	14.50	750.00
Fish (1 carton)	75.00	6,000.00
Fish (1 kilo)	15.00	800.00
Meat (1 kilo)	20.00	850.00
Sugar (1 Bag)	300.00	10,100.00
Marmalade (1 bottle)	15.00	880.00
Mackarel	12.00	120.00
Cooking Oil (1 bottle)	13.50	500.00

Commodity	Price in 1982	Price in 1990
Izal (1 gallon)	44.00	3,120.00
Tuna Flakes	4.00	110.00
Drinking Chocolate	100.00	900.00
Nido (1 tin)	100.00	850.00
Rexona	3.00	100.00
Guardian soap	7.50	60.00
Toilet Roll	8.50	90.00
Milk (1 tin)	3.00	160.00
Eggs (1 crate)	60.00	900.00
Flour (1 bag)	138.00	8,608.00
Chicken	60.00	1,500.00
Margarine (1 tin)	16.00	495.00
Beer (carton)	120.00	2,700.00
Minerals (crate)	100.00	2,400.00
Mini-Beer (carton)	150.00	3,000.00
Whisky (bottle)	125.00	2,420.00
Wine-White (bottle)	20.00	1,644.00
Wine-Red (bottle)	18.00	1,560.00
Sherry (bottle)	188.00	3,848.00
Campari (bottle)	155.00	3,016.00
Guinness (carton)	7.00	360.00
Petrol (Premium) gallon	105.00	900.00
Gas Oil (gallon)	75.00	750.00
Engine Oil (Gallon)	450.00	3,000.00
Car Battery	500.00	17,000.00
Cigarettes (packet)	20.00	400.00
Domestic Gas	200.00	1,500.00
Matches	0.30	20.00
Matchets	8.00	1,000.00
Kerosine (gallon)	5.00	700.00
Kenkey	5.00	50.00
Real Wax (Holand)	1,400.00	25,000.00
Real Wax Print	400.00	15,000.00
Java Wax Print	300.00	12,000.00
Sewing Machine	950.00	30,000.00

Source: Market survey conducted by M. Oquaye in mid 1990.
Information from Manciple, Legon, December 1990.

6.5.2. Inflation, Investment and political climate

Inflation has continued to rise and eat up projected ERF benefits. Notwithstanding tight credit controls and elimination

of the budget deficit, inflation has averaged between 25-30% in recent years. A combination of factors has ensured this including excess liquidity in the banking sector and the rise in production costs in Ghana as result of the devaluation of the cedi from 2.75 to the dollar in 1983 to 340 at the forex bureau in 1990. Private investment was bound to suffer in the circumstances. One of the challenges facing the ERP, therefore is how to stimulate and sustain private investment.

It is also pertinent to note that the PNDC government has continued to send wrong signals regarding foreign investors. For example, at a recent investment promotion conference held in Accra by the Ghana Investment Centre and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) which aimed at encouraging new local and foreign investment, Chairman Rawlings, in his keynote address, launched an attack on multinational corporations whom he described as cheats, arrogant and corrupt.³⁰

6.5.3. Food production

While paying great attention to export crop production (for which matter pineapples and non-traditional export crops have done very well), the ERP has neglected actual food crop production. The nation is still woefully unable to feed itself. Rice production, for example, which received a big boost under Busia and yielded so much fruit under Achemapong's early years reached a peak in the 1974-75 season. 405, 528 bags of rice were purchased from farmers by the Government Rice Mills. Nearly 100,000 bags were recorded by private sources and Mencillo

recorded 60,654 bags.³¹

Since this period Ghana has experienced a downward trend, and the ERP has not corrected the problem. There is over-reliance on imported rice and imported food, generally often attached to one form of aid or the other.

This is not an improvement in the economy in real terms. ERP has, in fact, not qualitatively changed the essence of agricultural production in Ghana nor cured its maladies. In 1984, post-harvest losses in Ghana totalled 30-40 % of total production. The situation remained the same in 1990.³²

Sowa has shown that the main causes of inflation during the ERP period was increase in food prices and to a lesser extent increased cost of production and the withdrawal of subsidies on agricultural inputs in particular.³³

6.5.4 Unemployment

The SAP has resulted in serious unemployment as a result of the redeployment exercise. It is important to point out, however, that the public service had long been plagued with over-employment. A study conducted in 1986 in the Civil Service and the Ghana Education Service (GES) showed that the services were seriously over-staffed, particularly at the lower levels. At that time the Civil Service and the GES had a total labour force of 305,000 which reflected an increase of 14% between 1975 and 1983. By 1983, 58.9% of this labour force was employed in the civil service.³⁴

The redeployment exercise had the following objectives:

- i. to trim off excess labour in various establishments;
- ii. to ensure effective utilisation of manpower at all levels;
- iii. to move labour from areas of surplus value to more productive areas;
- iv. to ensure efficiency of labour;
- v. to enable government to pay meaningful wages to employees;
- vi. to relocate surplus labour within the informal sector of the economy and thereby strengthen the informal sector;
- vii. to retrain and tap the potentials of otherwise surplus labour;
- viii. to remove disguised unemployment from the system;
- ix. to enable the recruitment and retention of better qualified personnel in the public service, thus sharpening efficiency.³⁹

Generally, the following criteria were used in deciding upon who should be redeployed, including the following:-

- i. officers who were willing to retire voluntarily - however, the establishment should be willing to dispense with such officers;
- ii. officers whose work and conduct had been persistently negative;
- iii. officers who were physically handicapped and whose effectiveness had been affected thereby;
- iv. officers engaged in areas outside approved established schedules;
- v. officers who were on secondment outside the Civil Service

and GES and who could be dispensed with;

- vi. officers whose qualifications were proven to be false;
- vii. if the above criteria did not yield the target figures, the last-to-come first-to-go rule was to be applied.³⁶

The details of redeployees showed that in the Greater Accra Region 25% of the work force was redeployed. Other figures are - Ashanti, 19%; Eastern, 14%; Central, 9.2%; Brong Ahafo, 8.3% Northern, 7.2% Volta, 5.2%; Western, 4%; Upper East, 3.7%.³⁷

The general observations made from interviews at the Ministries, Accra, indicate that the exercise has led to a reduction of staff in a manner which has increased certain work loads drastically. The number of typists has sometimes been so inadequate in some departments that when one typist had to go on leave, work suffered tremendously. Areas of security and cleanliness were also affected as cleaners and security men suffered from mass dismissal. A similar observation was made with regard to the GES. The situation was so critical in Presbyterian Secondary School (Presec), Legon, for example, that the school had to do without an electrician for several months. Not only was the labour force seriously affected but also security in the school was endangered. The same could be said about plumbers and carpenters in the ministries and educational institutions.

Redeployment also created social dislocations including loss of accommodation with resultant family problems. Several children had to be moved from their schools and transported

elsewhere when parents lost their jobs.

6.5.5 Population

The FNDC has not applied its populist appeal effectively to entrench the social framework within which sound economic development aimed at poverty alleviation could take place. A notable area in this connection, is the population problem. Sound macro-economic policies and more efficient infrastructure constitute an enabling environment for the efficient use of the country's natural resources. But these are not sufficient to transform the structure of the economy to achieve significant improvements in the quality of life of the Ghanaian as envisaged under ERP unless we keep within optimum population levels.

6.5.6 Legacy

There is a legacy from ERP which should be considered critically. By the end of 1990, the estimation was that the economic legacy that ERP had endowed Ghana with included \$4 billion external debt, unemployment rate of 30%, inflation rate of 40% and high interest rate on commercial loans at 23%. The debt service was about 40% of our foreign exchange earnings. The obvious inference was that only 60% of foreign exchange earnings accruing from all sources would be available in future for development and consumption.

Finally, to the ordinary Ghanaian, life has simply simply unbearable. He has not seen amelioration of his poverty nor physical improvement in his life. ERP has failed, in his eyes, to provide employment opportunities and a better life. It

is worthy of note that the Report Prepared by the Government of Ghana for the Sixth Meeting of the Consultative Group for Ghana in Paris 1991, had to admit that "we are conscious of the fact, that much remains to be done. Life for some of our people is still very difficult."³⁸ This comment should encompass the vast majority of Ghanaians.

6.6 Social

Social justice is a very crucial aspect of democracy. In a democratic state, there is the need for the development of the citizenry which involves the total well-being of the society. Society must provide for the deprived and protect the weak and disadvantaged towards the achievement of a just equilibrium. The Rural Electrification Project, for example, has been aimed at achieving social justice. As Rawlings said at the inauguration of the Kpong Hydro-Electric Dam, it was particularly necessary to generate more electricity from hydro-power to cater for the needs of the rural folk because "it is intolerable that 70 percent of our population located in the rural areas, should go without the benefits of electricity... we are committed to appraising the remaining hydro-potential of the country, with a view to harnessing this potential to satisfy our new, revolutionary and democratic goals."³⁹

In this connection, we shall discuss the following:-

1. provisions for better health facilities for all;
2. attempts to improve the educational system;
3. protection for the child;

4. certain legal reforms aimed at establishing social justice.

6.6.1 Health

The well-being of a society includes the health of the community since a healthy populace provides the basic resource for progress. In Ghana, over 70 percent of the population do not benefit from the health services available. Malnutrition, preventable disease and child mortality continue to plague us.

The PNDC Guidelines for Ministries and Government Departments issued in 1982 deplored the "absence of a well-conceived national health policy geared towards the satisfaction of the total basic health care needs of all the people."⁴⁰

The problem with the pre-1982 programme, according to the PNDC, was that it was so "highly centralised, undemocratic and unimaginative, resulting in a denial of the greatest majority of the people, mostly rural folk, of basic health care needs".⁴¹

The PNDC has adopted the primary health care system of the World Health Assembly. The idea was to ensure that everybody had access to health care, especially in the rural areas and with particular reference to the less privileged people in society. The year 2000 was targeted as "health for all". By this, the PNDC adopted the programme commenced in 1977 and gave it a new lease of life.

As part of the package Village Health Workers (VHWs) and Traditional Birth Attendants (TBAs) have been trained in the villages. Other programmes include immunisation of children, control of diarrhoea and malaria, provision of good drinking

water, effective collection and disposal of refuse and night soil and provision of KVIP. The health workers are emphasising the preventive aspect of health through education.

6.6.2 Education

Chairman Rawlings has held the view that the old system of education was not very useful. He saw the old system as a narrow conception of education which had become "increasingly obsessed with academic speculations to the virtual exclusion of serious practical skills. The aim was to obtain a paper certificate as a passport to secure a job. Those who did not do so, fell by the wayside- failures even before their adult lives had begun... instead of this broad educational programme being available only to a privilege few, we are extending the JSS programme to all children, to ensure that whatever their particular talents and abilities may be, the way is open for development."⁴²

The PNDC intended that its new educational system should be geared towards the realization of the developmental goals of the nation. Rawlings expressed the view that "there is no doubt that a country's economic prosperity is largely determined by the structure and quality of its educational system. It is this realisation which has compelled government to undertake a comprehensive restructuring of basic and secondary education. An essential component of this is curriculum reform which will offer among other things a wide range of skills to prepare our young people to cope with the demands of national economic and social development."⁴³ This is the foundation for the Junior Secondary

School (JSS) and Senior Secondary School (SSS) system.

By the end of 1990, the JSS programme had not proceeded as envisaged by the PNDC. Several problems have been identified:

- i. the programme was commenced without adequate preparation and hurriedly executed;
- ii. there has been shortage of school accommodation, furniture, textbooks and science laboratories/technical workshops;
- iii. a dearth of teachers, particularly science teachers, has plagued the system;
- iv. the assumption that communities would provide buildings and basic requirements for JSS in their areas has been proved wrong. In many cases considerable enthusiasm had been shown by the rural people but their meagre resources have proved unequal to the task. Several communities have felt overtaxed in terms of contributions towards JSS infrastructure;
- v. the Ministry of Education has been rather inept in handling several sensitive issues concerning the system.

6.6.3 Protection for the Child

Under the leadership of the PNDC Ghana was the first nation to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. The Convention provided against the neglect, exploitation and abuse of the child. It also provided for the survival, protection and development of the children of the world. In line with the principle of caring for the child, UNICEF's concept of "Adjustment with a Human Face" has been

adopted and PAMSCAD has considered the rights and plight of children.

The Ghana National Commission on Children (GNCC) which was set up in 1979 on the occasion of the International Year of the child, has been reconstituted by the PNDC under the able Chairpersonship of Mrs Alberta Quartey, a specialist child educationist and preparatory school proprietress.

The projects GNCC has embarked upon in recent times include advising government on matters affecting children, development of children's libraries, child health, child nutrition and the setting up of a child education fund. It is observed, however, that GNCC has not penetrated the rural areas and so long as it has not made an impact on the disadvantaged rural child who constitute 65% of the child population, a serious gap remains to be filled.

6.6.4 Legal Reforms Aimed At Social Justice

This may be discussed under two main categories:

- i. a legal aid scheme aimed at helping the poor to obtain justice;
- ii. reforms in family law aimed at protecting women in general and particularly the wives and children of deceased persons who die intestate. The problems in this area had in the past affected the uneducated and rural dwellers mostly.

i. Legal Aid Scheme

In order to assist ordinary Ghanaians and particularly the poor in the pursuit of their legal rights, the Legal Aid Board

was established in 1988, charged, inter alia, with developing a comprehensive legal aid programme and policy to be carried out throughout Ghana. The scheme was to benefit people who earned less than the government minimum wage and who desired legal representation in any criminal or civil matter. The scheme embraced landlord and tenant cases, insurance, maintenance of children and such other matters as the Legal Aid Board would consider appropriate.

Regarding the performance of the Board, Mr Steven Kuada, assistant to the Executive Secretary to the Legal Aid Board, reported that 300 Ghanaians received assistance from the Board in 1989. 139 people were given legal assistance in the Greater Accra Region between January and April 1990. He indicated that 62% of the cases disposed of were related to inheritance, maintenance of children, and landlord and tenant matters. 36% were criminal matters.⁴⁴ It was noted from the report that several persons who had sought assistance did not qualify because they earned the minimum wage. Nevertheless, the minimum wage did not remove a worker from the poverty zone and modalities should be worked out to widen the scope of qualified persons. It is not surprising that in some cases, the Board used its "discretion" to consider some applicants outside the scope of the scheme.⁴⁵ The scheme has also suffered from poor publicity, lack of public understanding and confidence, limited resources for its operation, lack of very active cooperation of the Ghana Bar Association, and the failure of judges to effectively draw the

attention of accused persons to the scheme.

ii. Family Law Reforms

In this connection, we consider the Head of the Family (Accountability) Law, (PNDC 114), the Intestate Succession Law, 1985 (PNDC 111) and the Customary Marriage and Divorce (Registration) Law 1985 (PNDC 112) which were designed to regulate family relationships and obligations, to protect the weak against injustice and wanton dissipation of family property. The Laws aimed at protecting mostly women (especially widows) and children in particular.

A sad commentary on our customary law has been the inability of the courts to hold heads of family accountable to ordinary members of the family who might be cheated of due portions of family property or the proceeds therefrom. Heads of families have had near absolute discretion in the management and distribution of resources. The Head of Family Accountability Law made accountability mandatory and enforceable by any interested or aggrieved family member. The quintessence of the Intestate Succession Law is that it identified more unambiguously what should belong to a deceased's children and surviving spouse. The law provided that the surviving spouse and children were "entitled absolutely to the household chattels of the intestate."⁴⁶ If a father should die leaving only one house, the surviving wife and the children should be entitled to the property as tenants in common or jointly and they cannot be evicted by the family.⁴⁷ This applies to widowers as well. Where

there was more than one house, the wife (surviving spouse) might select one of the houses, whereafter the others should be divided as follows:

(a) Three-sixteenth to the surviving spouse. (b) Nine-sixteenth to the surviving child. (c) One-eighth to the surviving parent (c) One-eight in accordance with customary law. Where there was no surviving parent, one fourth of the residue should be distributed in accordance with customary law.⁴⁸ Where the deceased was not survived by a child one-half of the residual estate should go to the surviving spouse.⁴⁹

The Customary Marriage and Divorce (Registration) Law requires registration of all customary marriages in Ghana. Marriages contracted after the coming into force of the law should be registered within three months of contracting the marriage. Those who had contracted customary marriages before the law was passed were required to apply to have their marriages registered "within three months of such commencement." It is the duty of the registrar of marriages to notify the public of the registration of such marriages.⁵⁰

A problem clearly arises; since the registration of customary marriage is a condition precedent to having any benefits under the law on intestacy, it is possible that several persons who have not registered their marriages would be deprived of protection under the law.

In assessing the effect of these laws, it was noted that they had made very little impact on the ordinary Ghanaian. They

remain unknown to a majority of married women and their children who are the primary beneficiaries. While the District Assemblies are required to undertake registration, only the Accra Metropolitan Authority (AMA) is known to have issued certificates for customary marriages. Even the implementation agencies are not aware of the actual role they are to play, despite the fact that failure to register a marriage is also an offence that attracts a penalty of c10,000 fine or a term of imprisonment not exceeding three years, or both. Indeed, by failing to make provision for the registration of customary marriages or divorce, many District Assemblies have been abetting crime. The PNDC had apparently picked a leaf from the 1979 Constitution but has failed to give the relevant impetus to the law to achieve the desired result.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

7.1 This work set out to examine whether the PNDC succeeded in establishing a democratic system of government in Ghana during the period under review. Evidence was found that the PNDC government was largely the personal rule of Flt. Lt. J.J. Rawlings. By 1990, only Rawlings out of the seven original members of the PNDC remained in office. In effect, the PNDC became government by invitation whereby membership of the PNDC, Committee of Secretaries etc. was at the beckoning, and was held at the pleasure, of the Chairman of the PNDC.

In considering the actual dynamics of popular participation under the PNDC, we observed that the Defence Committees failed to evolve into permanent, viable and respectable institutions of representation of the people at the local, district, regional and national levels, as envisaged.

The transformation of the PDCs/WDCs into CDRs which sounded the de facto death knell of the Defence Committees could be seen as an admission by the revolutionaries themselves that the Defence Committees had become deadly and detestable. It could also be argued that the PDCs/WDCs were only useful at the initial stages of the Revolution, because the 31 December Revolution was not a popular insurrection; nor was it born out of a long, sustained struggle to overthrow an ancien regime. Being the product of a conspiracy of a small clique of soldiers (serving and retired), the Revolution lacked its own cadres. The use of

the PDCs/WDCs was, therefore, basically opportunistic. By 1990, Defence Committees existed only in name. They had become demoralised and disillusioned, seen only on formal occasions and at celebrations. The populism engendered by the Defence Committees, however, has whipped up greater national consciousness and political activity among the working people in Ghana. The District Assemblies were examined as a means of legislating democracy into Ghana. The innovations in the sphere of local government introduced by PNDC Law 207 including the simplicity of the new system, the reduction in electioneering expenses, the common platform, the removal of the illiteracy bar and payment of deposits, the elimination of political parties and the right to recall Assemblymen when necessary, have been duly appreciated as useful contributions.

It was noted, however, that the Assemblies are not only rigidly controlled by the PNDC, but they also lack the means to operate as viable entities.

Since pluralism constitutes a basic ingredient of a democracy, the suppression of various interest groups, bodies and institutions (including the NUGS, GBA, Church, Press etc) and the promotion of other approved bodies (including the 31st December Women's Movement) under the PNDC were seen as deviations from the democratic path.

In considering the effect of the Revolution on Law and Justice, it was noted that the revolutionary spill-over scarred the legal system. Furthermore, the NIC, CVC and Public Tribunals

were not only high-handed in dealing with persons they considered as "enemies of the Revolution" but they also succumbed to corrupt influences in due course.

Nevertheless, not only have the activities of these institutions generated a new tax consciousness among the people, for example, but also, there has been some clear demonstration that no one is above the law.

With regard to human rights, the view was taken that upon the available evidence, the PNDC's human rights record is indefensible.

The PNDC has acted boldly to check Ghana's economic malaise and laid some foundations for economic recovery. Not only has financial discipline been introduced into various sectors of the economy, but also positive measures such as the forex bureau system, the Stock Exchange, attractive cocoa prices, the removal of subsidies on petrol to check smuggling etc, have been put place. Observers have generally commended the PNDC's economic policy.

If the expected development has not taken place, it is partly because laissez-faire economic policies also require a liberal political climate to yield good fruits. This the PNDC failed to provide. Not only have foreign investors been scared away by arbitrary seizure of property and detention, but there is evidence that the indigenous entrepreneurial class were victimised lest they turned their economic power into a claim for sharing political power, which the PNDC detested.

The military way of doing politics, as exemplified by the PNDC, hinges on violence. Under PNDC rule, the spate of attempted coups brought undue violence into the society. When finally, the PNDC succeeded in clamping down its opponents who challenged its monopoly of power by execution and detention, a "culture of silence" emerged. Rawlings himself admitted the cost in human lives when he said: "... I would like to take this opportunity to address a few words to our detractors. The cost in human lives of these reckless escapades cannot be justified. It cannot be justified that these young men, invariably young soldiers, with whom we have worked and lived, should be sent again and again to their deaths to satisfy the ambitions of a few dishonest and discredited politicians".¹ The truth of the matter was that what Rawlings was complaining about was a direct result of the politics of violence introduced by military rule.

The government of the PNDC was neither constitutional nor representative. It is the viewpoint of this work that the PNDC could not satisfy the requirements of a representative, constitutional government which Eckstein defined as a "government in which leaders are recruited through open and regular competitive process (and) the scope and proceedings of decision-making are defined by formal-legal rules - rules that serve at once as sources of and limitations upon official power".² This, to Eckstein, was the essence of democracy.

If the 31 December Revolution was a moral revolution, Rawlings had begun to doubt the moral content of the Revolution

by 1986. The PNDC had apparently failed to reach and convert the people with its message. Rawlings said: "... we have a government that is suffering under the weight of a corrupted people. Don't get away from it, let's face the truth. And I can assure you this government will suffer until you decide to change some of your bad ways and decide to rededicate yourselves to our collective salvation in a very dignified way."³ These words of frustration were delivered four years after the Revolution when it had become manifest that the Ghana Education Service and other institutions in the public sector had become more corrupt under the PNDC than ever before.

In our view, while the PNDC was busily probing peripheral corruption, the systemic corruption generated by its rule was fueling further corruption into the system. A political system which lacks legitimacy because the government has not been duly elected by the people is systemically corrupt. Under the PNDC there was no system of legitimate regeneration, whereby new blood could be infused into the political system without violence; nor was there a system of peaceful and orderly succession without resorting to arms. Such systemic corruption might be seen also in the abuse of fundamental human rights. A political system which lacks the capability of protecting the citizen against arbitrary arrest, false imprisonment, detention without trial, confiscation of property etc at the pleasure of the government, is a corrupt form of government.

It is legitimate to argue that a government which suppresses

its citizens has no moral right to expect high standards of patriotism from them. The citizen who lacks proper avenue to canvass his rights is more likely to yield to the corrupt demands of public officials, thus infesting the entire body politic with corruption.

The politics of Revolution failed in Ghana after the initial euphoria. Our experiences fit into what Tocqueville wrote about the French Revolution: "during Revolutions of long duration, it is easy to mistake the signs indicating the approach of great turning points; for these signs vary with the different periods. They even change their character as the Revolution advances. In the beginning, public opinion is excited, lively, intolerant, presumptuous and mobile; at the end, it is stolid and sad. After having tolerated nothing, there seems to be nothing it will not endure. But submission is accompanied by resentment, irritation increases, suspicion becomes more inveterate and hatred grows in the midst of obedience. The nation has no longer, as in the beginning of the Revolution, sufficient energy to push a government towards the precipice yet everyone enjoys the spectacle of its fall".⁴

Giving us the tell tale warnings of the dangers of Revolution, Edwards said that "Revolutions have a characteristic syndrome. There is, first, public restlessness, a generalised kind of striving not easily satisfied. Second, vice, immorality and moral malaise bite deep into society. Third, frustration becomes pervasive. Life is now repressed, unsatisfying and

increasingly intolerable".⁵

The revolutionary, authoritarian system in Ghana under the PNDC, in my view, could not have promoted the liberty of the individual since revolutionary legalism and the promotion of human rights constitute a contradiction in terms. This is because, as Popper observed, authoritarianism and rationalism are antithetical to each other since, "reason, like science, grows by way of mutual criticism; the only reasonable way of 'planning' its growth is to develop those institutions that safeguard the freedom of this criticism, that is to say, the freedom of thought".⁶ Indeed, attempts by the PNDC to advance areas of economic and social justice and the achievements made in those directions, were negated by authoritarianism and abuse of fundamental human rights.

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APPENDIX A

Explaining African Military Coups d'Etat

Rank Order of 45 Sub Saharan African States
by Their Total Military Involvement
Score(TMIS), 1960-1982

		Jackman's Coups Index	Total Military Involvement Score	Coups N	Attempted Coups N	Plots N
1	Ghana	32	48	5	4	11
2	Benin	46	2	6	3	3
3	Uganda	22	37	3	6	4
4	Congo	31	33	3	5	3
5	C.A.R.	7	26	3	3	2
6	Sudan	35	26	1	4	4
7	Upper Volta	12	20	4	-	-
8	Burundi	20	20	3	1	2
9	Zaire	35	20	2	1	7
10	Ethiopia	13	20	1	2	9
11	Nigeria	20	19	3	1	1
12	Madagascar		18	2	2	2
13.5	Mauritania	1	16	2	1	3
13.5	Sierra Leone	19	16	2	1	1
16	Equatorial Guinea		15	1	3	1
16	Niger	9	15	1	3	4
16	Somalia	10	15	1	2	4
18	Togo	26	14	2	-	7
19	Liberia	6	12	1	-	7
20	Guinea	19	10	-	1	1
22	Chad	12	9	1	1	1
22	Guinea-Bissau		9	1	1	4
22	Mali	8	9	1	-	-
24	Rwanda	10	8	1	1	1

	Jackman's Coup Index	Total Military Involvement Score	Coups N	Attempted Coups N	Plots N
25	Zambia	3	7	-	2
26.5	Comoros		6	1	-
26.5	Seychelles		6	1	-
28	Kenya	1	5	1	1
30	Gambia	0	4	1	1
30	Tanzania	3	4	1	1
30	Zimbabwe		4	1	-
34	Angola		3	1	-
34	Gabon	3	3	-	3
34	Ivory Coast	3	3	1	-
34	Mozambique		3	1	-
34	Senegal	8	3		1
37.5	Malawi	3	1		1
37.5	Sao Tome & Principe		1		
42	Botswana		0		
42	Cameroon	2	0		
42	Cape Verde		0		
42	Djibouti		0		
42	Lesotho		0		
42	Mauritius		0		
42	Swaziland		0		
			52	56	102

Source: Johnson, Thomas et al, "Explaining African Military Coups d'etat, 1960-1982" in The Political Science Review, Vol. 78, p. 627.

APPENDIX B

DEFENCE COMMITTEE GUIDELINES

Section One

A. PREAMBLE

Ghana is a potentially rich country. The people of Ghana are fully aware of the immense potentialities of this country in terms of material and human resources and their ability to utilize and apply these resources to satisfy their needs and basic requirements. The wealth of this country has been produced by the peasant farmers, fishermen and other working people, but the broad majority of the people have been denied the opportunity of using this wealth for the satisfaction of their requirements. The real producers of this wealth have for a long time been condemned to suffer severe deprivation and poverty while the country remained under-developed, the initiative of her people killed and the massive human and material resources still remained untapped. Ghanaians have been confronted with the riddle of how a nation, so endowed with such resources, could be entangled in an ever deepening economic crisis. This crisis expresses itself in general shortages in all basic goods, diminishing agricultural and industrial production, trade malpractices, waste of resources, indiscipline, lawlessness and general mismanagement in all sectors of our national life.

2. The historical roots of our present state of under-development, stem from colonialism which bequeathed a set pattern of economic development, social structures, attitudes and an oppressive and parasitic state machinery. The retention of the structures of colonialism has assured the continued domination of our economy by foreign financial interests and their local agents, with the attendant losses of the country's resources and hard earned wealth in a new phase of colonialism, which has been aptly described as neo-colonialism.

3. The 31st December Revolution stands determined to break the

monotony of under-development and neo-colonialist status. The Revolution stands for economic self-sufficiency, self-dependency and freedom and justice for all. In short, 31st December stands for a National Democratic Revolution.

4. The denial of the opportunity to participate in the making of the decisions which govern our lives stifled the creativity and dignity of the mass of our people. This calls for a democratic struggle to enable the people to take their rightful place in the decision-making process.

5. In order to carry forward the National Democratic Revolution, every patriotic Ghanaian must be mobilised to play a useful role in the struggle. Acting and working together, we can transform the nation.

6. Hence the PNDC's call upon Ghanaians to form PEOPLES DEFENCE COMMITTEES as the foundation of the Revolution.

7. A revolution is a process, and it develops in stages. What is true for one stage may not be true for another stage. Therefore, to be correct, the tactics of the revolutionary forces must also change to reflect the changing phases or historical circumstances. These must be qualitative changes.

9. From the practice of the Defence Committees so far it has been possible to find out the areas needing modification and those needing further explanation. The Revolution must advance. A revolutionary process cannot stand still for long, it moves forward, and it must have broad consequences. It is more vital that the nation as a whole advances one inch than that a few individuals should advance one foot.

10. Membership of a Defence Committee is a declaration to defend the Revolution, die for it if necessary, and submit oneself to the discipline of the Revolution.

B. AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

1. To guarantee that the masses of the people of this country form the basis of power to carry out the 31st December Revolution under the leadership of the Provisional Defence Council (PNDC).

2. To mobilise the people to know and defend their democratic

rights, and to be able to organise the affairs of the nation as to clothing, shelter, health, education etc.

3. To guarantee the democratic participation of the people - especially the farmers, fishermen and other working people - in the decision making process of this country, and in the running of the affairs of their villages, towns and cities; their offices, factories and workplaces; and in the nation generally.

4. To help expose the internal enemies of the people, both in business and in the bureaucratic state machinery, for it is through such internal collaborators that foreigners can dominate our lives and plunder our human and material resources.

5. To educate and mobilise the people to combat any form of domination and exploitation.

6. To mobilise the human and material resources of the nation for the rapid all-round development of our country and people, and to ensure that efforts for our development are based primarily on ourselves.

7. To organise the people to achieve a perpetual state of readiness for immediate political response to any political attacks on them and the revolutionary process.

8. To foster brotherly co-operation and unity between our struggling people, and those of our continent Africa and other parts of the world.

SECTION TWO

A. MEMBERSHIP OF DEFENCE COMMITTEES

1. Membership of the Defence Committees is open to all persons who are prepared to uphold and defend the basic objectives of the ongoing revolutionary process and who have a proven record of patriotism, integrity and democratic practice.

2. No one has automatic and perpetual right to membership of a Defence Committee. Membership depends upon continued revolutionary discipline and hard work.

B. OFFICERS OF DEFENCE COMMITTEES

1. All PDCs are expected to elect four officers - Chairman, Secretary, Organising Secretary and Treasurer.

2. Beyond these four officers, PDCs up to and including Area Level are expected to work through SUB COMMITTEES on specialised issues. Each Sub-Committee shall have an Organising Secretary.

C. TENURE OF OFFICERS

All officers and Sub-Committees shall hold office for not more than one year, after which new elections shall be held. Officers and Sub-Committee members may be re-elected for a second term of office only.

D. REMOVAL OF OFFICERS

1. Where an officer or a Sub-Committee member loses the confidence of the people, and after discussing the issue the majority of PDC members have approved a non-confidence resolution, the officer or Sub-Committee member shall be removed from office.

2. Where the National Defence Committee has determined, after investigation and consultation with the members of the PDC that there is justifiable cause to declare an officer unfit to hold office, the officer shall be removed from office.

SECTION THREE

Functions and Activities of PDCs:

A. AT COMMUNITY LEVEL

1. Data Collection

The officers of the PDC, together with teachers, pupils and students from the community shall periodically collect basic data on:

- (a) Population and number of households.
- (b) Economic activities, eg. number of farms, canoes, carpentry shops, etc.
- (c) Infrastructural services available
- (d) Main staple foodstuffs and their sources and storage facilities.
- (e) Any other data which will assist in planning and implementing improved living standards in the community.

Production and Storage

- (a) Ensure maximum production of food and other items produced in the community to make it as self-sufficient as possible.
2. (b) Ensure that production which is surplus to immediate requirements is either properly stored or preserved, or is efficiently marketed.

3. People's Shops

- (a) Ensure that a People's shop is established on a co-operative basis and properly registered.
- (b) Ensure that all households are registered with the People's Shop.
- (c) Operate the Shop not only as a channel for the distribution of commodities, but as a multi-purpose co-operative for the production and marketing of local produce and a means of obtaining inputs for farming and other occupations.

4. Education and Training

- (a) Mass literacy campaigns should be organized, as far as possible in conjunction with the appropriate agencies, at which the rudiments of writing and reading at least in the local languages should be taught. The same classes could also undertake political, social and economic education in matters of local interest.
- (b) PDCs should organise discussions, seminars, etc. to broaden the political awareness of the people.
- (c) PDCs should ensure that all children of First Cycle age attend school, and should help to improve the educational facilities in the community.

5. Health and Sanitation

- (a) Where the community has no safe and reliable water supply, efforts should be made to provide one.
- (b) PDCs should provide proper facilities for the disposal of human and other wastes.
- (c) PDCs should participate fully in Primary Health Care activities and ensure that their members are educated about hygiene, nutrition, child care, etc., and encourage the participation of traditional herbal practitioners in community health programmes.

6. Layout and Housing

- (a) Each rural community should identify and encourage the use of local building materials in the construction of houses. Plans and layouts should be in accordance with an approved physical plan to ensure orderly growth of the community.
- (b) PDCs in urban communities should help to enforce the planning regulation of their area. To do this, they should obtain from the Department of Town and Country Planning the plans for their area.

7. Afforestation

- (a) Shade, fruit and firewood trees should be planted in and around the community.
- (b) In rural areas, crop trees should be encouraged.

8. Defence and Security

- (a) Patrols may be organized in co-operation with the relevant official agencies to combat theft, smuggling, etc.

B. AT WORKPLACE LEVEL

1. PDCs at workplace shall be known as Workers Defence

Committees. A primary function of WDCs is the political education of workers through seminars, rallies and lectures, to give them a clear understanding of the political and economic situation to enable them to participate fully in the National Democratic Revolution. WDCs shall at their meetings study and discuss all new proposals and policies from Government and other organs of the Revolution, so as to achieve greater understanding of such policies and proposals, to be able to make their views known.

2. WDCs shall ensure maximum efficiency and productivity within their workplaces.

3. WDCs shall seek to root out all corruption, mismanagement and other counter-revolutionary activities in their workplaces.

4. WDCs shall participate in the decision-making process in the factories, workshops and offices, to ensure that such decisions are in the national interest. WDC representation on Management Committees, investigation committees etc. shall not necessarily be assigned to officers of the WDC.

5. WDCs shall work in co-operation with their local Trade Unions, and should not seek to take over the functions of the unions.

6. WDCs shall ensure that the products of their workplaces are distributed according to the national interest as defined by the appropriate bodies.

7. WDCs shall complement the efforts of, and co-operate with the PDCs of the communities in which their workplaces are situated.

C. AT DISTRICT

1. Mobilisation and Education

(a) The Defence Committee personnel at District Level shall regularly visit every community within the District.

(b) They shall arrange talks, courses, seminars, etc. to increase the political awareness of

the people and their vigilance in defence of the Revolution.

- (c) They shall inform the people of Government plans and policies, explain to them and encourage discussions.

2. Planning

- (a) Data on available human and natural resources should be compiled.
- (b) Resources centres should be set up at strategic places.
- (c) Plans and project requests should be collected from the communities to assist the appropriate authorities to draw up the District plan.

3. Monitoring and Evaluation

In co-operation with the official agencies concerned, monitor and evaluate projects going on in the District. Where performance does not meet the targets set, the cause of the shortcomings should be identified and discussed.

4. Co-ordination of the activities of the PDCs within the District.

5. Maintaining discipline in the PDCs within the District, and Co-operating with the law enforcing agencies in matters of defence and security.

D. AT REGIONAL LEVEL

The functions of Defence Committee personnel at Regional Level in relation to the Districts within the Region shall be as in C above.

E. AT NATIONAL LEVEL

1. The National Defence Committee is the highest co-ordinating organ of the PDCs. It seeks to give meaning and recognition to the abilities and capabilities of the people to build a truly democratic society.

2. Ultimately, these capabilities will enable the people's own elected representatives to take over the Defence Committees

structure up to the National Level. When this stage in the revolutionary process is reached, the NDC and the FNDC will merge to become the National Defence Council. (emphasis mine).

3. At the present stage of the revolutionary process, however, the NDC is expected to help the FNDC formulate policies and work out political programmes. It shall, together with the FNDC and Ministerial representatives, evaluate programmes submitted by FNDC Secretaries. These shall then be transmitted through the PDC structure to the people.

4. Through the same channel, the people will transmit their reactions up to the NDC, which can then reflect on and evaluate their response. This will lead to the need to assess and modify policies or to suggest alternatives.

5. In consultation with the FNDC, the NDC may evaluate and monitor all political, social and economic activities in the nation.

6. To ensure that the aspirations of the people are attained, the NDC shall, through the PDCs, educate the people and promote revolutionary discipline.

SECTION FOUR

Organisation of PDCs: (It should be noted that Community Defence Committees operate at the community level and Workers Defence Committees operate in workplaces, but both are Peoples Defence Committees. It should also be noted that the organisational structures described below may be modified according to the special circumstances of particular localities.)

A. AT COMMUNITY LEVEL

1. The UNIT PDC, which shall consist of between 40 and 100 people, is the basic structure of the DCs
2. Between 3 and 5 Unit PDCs shall constitute a BLOCK PDC.
3. Between 3 and 5 Block PDCs shall constitute a NEIGHBOURHOOD PDC.
4. Between 3 and 5 Neighbourhood PDCs shall constitute an AREA PDC.

5. The various functions of the PDCs from Unit up to Area Level shall be carried out by elected Sub-Committees. The number and functions of the Sub-Committees may vary according to the needs of the Community.

6. Between 3 and 5 PDCs shall constitute a ZONAL PDC.

7. A Zonal PDC shall carry out its function through the following NDC Departments:

- (a) Complaints and Investigations
- (b) Monitoring and Co-ordination
- (c) Education, Information and Press
- (d) Administration
- (e) Projects and Programmes.

The personnel of these Departments shall be appointed by the NDC.

8. At every level from Block PDCs to Zonal PDCs the officers shall be so elected that at least one of them shall come from each of the PDCs at the level immediately below.

9. AT WORKPLACE LEVEL

1. A workplace shall be any establishment which has 5 or more paid employees.

2. In small workplaces with no other branches, the WDC shall be responsible to the Block PDC of the community in which it is located.

3. In larger workplaces with distinct departments, any department with 10 or more workers may form its own WDC, and a Co-ordinating committee shall be set up to co-ordinate the departmental WDCs within the establishment.

4. Where such an establishment has no other branches, but has under 500 workers, it shall be responsible to the Neighbourhood PDC of the community in which it is located.

5. Where such an establishment has over 500 workers, it shall be responsible to the Area PDC of the community in which it is located.

6. Where an establishment has several branches within a District, Region or in the country, it may set up District,

Regional or National Co-ordinating Committees.

7. In these cases, the highest Co-ordinating Committee shall be responsible to the next highest Defence Committee organ.

8. In all cases, WDCs shall co-operate and liaise with the PDCs of the community in which they are located.

C. AT DISTRICT LEVEL

1. Districts shall have at least the same PDC Departments as at Zonal Level (See A. 7 above).

2. There shall be a District Defence Committee. The District Defence Committee Co-ordinator shall be the Chairman. A representative of the District Secretary shall be Secretary to the Committee and the five Department heads shall be members.

D. AT REGIONAL LEVEL

1. Regions shall have at least the following Departments:

Education

Information and Press

Monitoring and Co-ordination

Administration

Complaints and Investigations

Projects and Programmes

2. The Regional Defence Committee Steering Committee shall have the Regional Defence Committee Co-ordinator as Chairman, and a representative of the Regional Secretary as Secretary and the six Department heads as members.

E. NATIONAL LEVEL

1. The NDC SECRETARIAT shall consist of the following Departments: (a) Education and Research

(b) Information and Press

(c) Monitoring and Co-ordination

(d) Administration

(e) Complaints and Investigations

(f) Projects and Programmes

2. The NDC Secretariat shall be responsible to the Interdepartmental Committee consisting of the heads of the six Departments. The Chairman of the Committee shall be the

Secretary to the NDC.

3. The National Defence Committee shall consist of:

- (a) NDC Chairman - PNDC Chairman or his delegate
 - (a) PNDC Co-ordinating Secretary
 - (b) National Armed Forces Defence Committee Co-ordinator/Secretary
 - (c) National Police Defence Committee Co-ordinator/Secretary.
 - (e) A representative of the National Security Agencies
 - (f) The Secretary of Information
 - (g) The Secretary-General of the TUC
 - (h) The Co-ordinator of Investigations, Vetting and Tribunals
 - (i) 10 elected Regional Councillors
 - (j) 10 Regional DC Co-ordinators
 - (k) 10 elected Regional Councillors
 - (l) Not more than 20 other members who shall be selected for their proven political commitment and their expertise.

4. In addition to the above membership, the NDC may co-opt any other person as the need arise.

5. The NDC shall, from among its members, elect a Standing Committee not exceeding 9 members.

SECTION FIVE

A. MEETINGS, CONFERENCES, CONGRESSES

1. FDCs shall endeavour, at any level, to meet once a week, or as frequently as may suit them.

2. WDCs shall hold meetings fortnightly.

3. As an aspect of total mobilisation for the construction of a genuinely democratic society, the convening of Conferences and Congresses shall be institutionalised as crucial features in the operation of the NDC. Congresses shall be annual events and shall be convened at District and Regional levels.

4. District Congresses

(a) Prior to the holding of the Congress, District level officers, liaising with the officers of the various PDCs shall draw up a comprehensive working programme for study, analysis and subsequent adoption by Congress.

(b) The composition of a District Congress shall be made up of delegates as follows:

(i) All officers of Neighbourhood, Area, and Zonal PDCs within the District.

(ii) In addition there shall be 5 other delegates nominated from each of the PDCs indicated above.

(iii) All District Councillors.

(iv) The District Secretary

5. Conferences

(a) Conferences are to be convened from Block to Zonal levels, and should normally precede the District Congress. These conferences shall review work, assess achievements as well as failures, identify reasons for lack of progress, work out remedial strategies, and plan for the work ahead.

(b) A summary of the Block Conference proceedings shall be passed to the Neighbourhood conference. A summary of the Neighbourhood Conference shall be passed to the Area Conference, and a summary of the Area Conference proceedings shall be passed to the Zonal Conference.

(c) A summary report of the Zonal Conference proceedings together with suggestions and recommendations shall be submitted to the District Congress and will constitute one of the major working papers of the congress.

(d) Delegates to a Conference shall include all officers of all PDCs within the Block/Neighbourhood/Area/Zone and two other members nominated by each PDC at a full meeting summoned for this purpose with wide publicity.

6. Regional Congress

(a) Regional congress shall take place annually.

(b) All officers plus 5 other delegates from Neighbourhood, Area, Zonal and District Committees, the Regional Secretary and his Deputy and all Regional Councillors shall constitute the Regional Congress.

(c) The Regional Steering Committee, prior to the convening of the Congress, shall be responsible for preparing and drawing up an agenda based upon the reports and recommendations from the District Congresses.

7. National Congress

(a) A National Congress shall be convened once every year, and shall be held in the various Regions in rotation.

(b) An Emergency Congress can be summoned when necessary.

(c) The National Inter-departmental Committee in collaboration with the Regional Steering Committees, shall prepare a Programme for discussion and adoption at the National Congress.

(d) A National Congress shall be composed of;

Members of the FNDC

Members of the NDC

The National inter-departmental Committee

The Regional Steering Committees

The District Steering Committees, and

Two delegates from each Zone within the NDC structure of the country.

B. REPORTS

All Defence Committees shall submit monthly reports on their activities to their immediate higher level.

SECTION SIX

ELECTIONS AND APPOINTMENTS

1. All officers up to and including area level are by election.

2. At Zonal level, the officers are elected but the Department personnel are appointed.

SECTION SEVEN

A. 1. Defence Committees are expected to be self-financing.

2. The members of the Defence Committee shall determine how much each member should pay as dues. But membership dues shall not exceed a c5.00 per month.

3. Fund raising activities may also be embarked upon but only for specific projects.

4. Defence Committees should not raise funds by levying tax on goods and services that pass through their hands to the people. For instance, when defence committees arrange for maize for kenkey sellers, they should not levy a tax on the maize.

5. Defence Committees may raise funds from sales of farm produce, etc. from their People's Farm, and from voluntary work.

CODESRIA - LIBRARY

APPENDIX C

PETITION OF BRONG-AHAFO STUDENTS UNION ON CORRUPTION
AT TECHIMAN DISTRICT ASSEMBLY

BRONG AHAFO STUDENTS UNION (BASU)

Techiman Sub-Unit
University of Ghana
c/o S& Legon Hall,
Legon.

9th May, 1990

The Chairman
PNDC
The Castle
Accra.

Dear Chairman,

TECHIMAN DISTRICT ASSEMBLY - A CLASSIC
CASE OF MISMANAGEMENT AND ABUSE
OF POWER

We are bringing to your notice the sense of helplessness and disillusionment of the people of Techiman District over the blatant mismanagement and abuse of power being exhibited by the incumbent PNDC District Secretary.

We are aware of the untiring though unsuccessful effort of some strong holds like the June 4 Movement of which some of us were among the founders and still staunch members, and some individuals who have attempted to break the dreadful culture of silence, so as to draw the attention of the authorities to the Rot in Techiman District. Some have done so through the major newspapers and also through the official channels.

In the first place we very much commend the PNDC government for having the political will to bring up into reality, the District Assembly system. We acknowledge that the District Assembly concept as an aspect of local government system is a

machinery by which the PNDC Government hopes to achieve democracy, efficiency and National Unity for our country. The past governments knew the importance of Decentralisation through reports of several committees, among them were the Mills Odoi and Siriboe Committees. Sadly enough none could muster the necessary political will to implement the recommendations in respect of reforming the archaic Local Government System. The PNDC Government, therefore deserves every commendation for the bold decision in promulgating PNDC Law 207 to govern the affairs of District Assemblies in this country.

Amongst the several purposes underlying the Assembly concept is that, development programmes will be extended to the Rural Areas. Endorsing this most important objective, we have been following developments in our district with keen interest. But to our chagrin all is not well at all in Techiman District Assembly; that if care is not taken many of the likes of Seglas (the disgraced Regional Secretary of Volta Region) are out to wreck the ship of grassroots democracy, and thereby undermine the Revolution.

EXPENDITURE PATTERNS

The Expenditure patterns of the Assembly is to say the least unreasonable and therefore raises the question as to whether the expenditure pattern is not unconscionable. The Entertainment Bill of the Assembly for the year ending 31st December 1989 for a young District like ours at c9,173,985.00 is simply outrageous and unjustifiable. Such a huge figure, we contend should be the envy of even a Regional Administration. It is a misplacement of priority.

Another mind-blowing figure is c19.7m purportedly spent on travelling and transport (T&T) (People's Daily Graphic of Friday, 23/3/90). Adding the two together, is the colossal sum of c28.8m (Interestingly bigger than the Revenue of Asutifi District

Assembly, estimated at c28.M for this fiscal year (Weekly Spectator of 24/3/90 - page 11).

Expressed in terms of percentage, the two items cost the people of Techiman District about 41% of their annual revenue of c68.5m (GRAPHIC of 23/3/90). We submit, this is unreasonable and also a misplacement of priority.

We attach herewith a few relevant pages of Trial Balance for the months of July and December 1989, and that of February, 1990. The figures tell a tall story. Our investigations have established that the 'approved' expenditure in the July Trial Balance dated from April and held valid until November ending. Suddenly December, the last month, showed new 'approved' figures and all tailored in such a way as to create that impression that in most, or all cases, the Assembly spent less than what was really budgeted for, credit indeed! The obvious implication is that, somewhere between April and November, the Assembly came up with revised figures. But our investigations have established that neither the Assembly nor its Finance Administration committee ever approved a new expenditure by the District Administrative Officer. When peeved Assembly members questioned how come that some authority somewhere could 'approve' a budget they had no idea about the D.A.O. apologised on behalf of the administration for the serious lapse. The fact that no new budget was presented to the house for debate and approval was an information which the Presiding Member confirmed when we confronted him with this evidence during the Easter Holidays. He infact confirmed also that when the figures were revised in April 1989, the Administration never informed the house and the Assembly protested against such tactics - but this same frog-jumping to get the budget approved was repeated in grand style in December, 1989.

THE IMPLICATIONS ARE:

- a. The Assembly was on two occasions elighted with impunity;
- b. We submit that the FNDC Secretary and the DAO, in bad faith, submitted the figures to the approving authority because they knew the house would never have approved of their unreasonable expenditure under such items like entertainment and travelling and transport inter alia.
- c. That the District Secretary and his DAO might falsely have represented to the Regional Co-ordinating Council a resolution on a supplementary budget purported to have been approved by the Assembly.
- d. That the Presiding Member is member of the Regional Co-ordinating Council which according to S.63 of Law 207 collates and co-ordinates the budgets of the Districts in the Region before submission to the Council (PNDC) for approval. Therefore, it is inconceivable for the Administration to have submitted any such budget to the Regional Co-ordinating Council without the knowledge of the Presiding Member as claimed by the Presiding member himself.
- e. We submit that the so-called apology rendered by the DAO couldn't have been lawfully accepted by the Assembly because Law 207 does not anticipate retrospective approval of budgets. S.63(i) provides "Every District Assembly shall, before the end of each financial year, submit to the Regional Co-ordinating Council, detailed budget for the District for the ensuing year".

On the expenditure pattern, we will want to state that we are not against the need to provide for the entertainment expenditure. We are genuine stop-over of many an important government official. Notwithstanding such a unique position, we

feel strongly that our hospitality is being abused and that it has unfortunately been turned into a conduit pipe whereof the tax payer's money is being callously siphoned in the name of Entertainment. To have spent c19.7m on T&T is to say the least extremely unreasonable. Techiman District is, if not smallest, one of the smallest in the Region and nowhere does it stretch beyond 20 miles. For all we know, the official vehicles are being misused and as has become the mark of the incumbent Secretary. At least we are aware that The DOA (District Organising Assistant of CDRs) has in official circulars warned departmental heads against the misuse of official vehicles. Lastly, the Trial Balance of February, ex-facie, shows that the Assembly's 1990 budget has not been approved but life must continue. But it is really continuing at a neck-breaking pace. For only the months of January and February, the Assembly has spent a total of almost c1.5m on running cost of official vehicles maintenance of official vehicles and other travelling and transport. A so-called travelling allowance (for whom?) for the 2 months stood at c186,000.00. Again under entertainment (5m) almost c1.3m has been spent within 2 months. Under item 5, Residency entertainment, an unspecified amount was spent but for only God-knows, the figures were rubbed off on the stencil, but the 'ghost' lingers on the Trial Balance (as shown on the attached). Obviously having spent so much unreasonably in the last fiscal year, the Administration is out to repeat the does this year, and they are doing it without the slightest sense of inhibition or restraint. The philosophy is, to spend as much as was realised; developments can go to hell!

ABUSE OF POWER

We maintain that the PNDC District Secretary has always sought to cover up the malpractices of his officials, apparently because he has no moral justification to reprimand them, he having set such an unprecedented spending pace as has never been witnessed in the life of the Council.

(1) The case against the Works Superintendent who conspired with his wife to enable the wife collect salary for two years is predictably dormant. Some of us were witnesses when on various occasions the Secretary obstructed justice by refusing to allow the Police to take the Works Superintendent away to Sunyani. This, to say the least, is unbecoming of a PNDC District Secretary.

(2) One of Tuobodom Assembly members reported a scandal in the Administration whereby some workers had the number of years they had worked inflated and were paid pari-passu the number of years added. By this process, huge sums of Government money were stolen. This was a case which involved the D.S., his Accountant (now on transfer to Obuasi) and the D.A. O. The District Environmental Health Officer and other officials of the Council were all involved. In order to stultify justice, the PNDC D.S. threatened the Police Officer investigating the case with immediate transfer from 'his' District. (More facts are available).

We submit that the case was 'poorly' investigated as a result of the duress under which the officer collected his information and that the outcome of the case as adjudicated by Brong Ahafo Regional Tribunal fell far short of what would have been the real outcome had the investigation not been tampered with. How could the DS, DAO and the Accountant sign cheques which enabled this fraud to be perpetrated escape with a mere reprimand for negligence of duty?

We again submit that their hands are not clean. This habit of threatening people with his post as the PNDC DS is unbecoming and clearly an abuse of power.

CHEAP PUBLICITY

In his calculated attempt to cover up his wilful activities,

he has been indulging in what we may call cheap publicity as a way of throwing dust into the eyes of the public. And in this direction, he has excelled all the District Secretaries in the Region, no wonder his entertainment bill appears ridiculously so high. However, in the process he has exposed the hollowness in his publicity.

ILLUSTRATIONS

(a) In the People's Daily Graphic of 16 September 1989, the DS announced construction of market stalls and culverts estimated to cost c1.5m and that the constructions would be completed by the end of 1989. The truth is that the market stalls are being completely financed by tenants who had been allocated plots by the IMC before the Assembly even took over. As yet, no construction of culverts could be found anywhere in Techiman. The Ds also appeared on the GBC T.V. and made a lot of fuss about the market stalls. Apart from clearing the plots of land where the market stalls are being constructed, the tenants paid c10,000.00 each to the Council before a bull-dozer was brought in to clear the place.

(b) February 13, 1989 Graphic reported the Secretary as saying that c38.5m would be spent on projects in 1989 fiscal year. In the Graphic of Jan 30, 1990. Mr A.E. Aboa reported that Techniman Market was capable of monthly revenue of only c1m. When one of us challenged Mr Aboa at his Graphic office, he affirmed that the ridiculously low figure was given him by the DS. The question is why did the DS give such a low figure to the public knowing very well it was false, and that in fact the market is more than capable of bringing in c2m a week? The main source of revenue of Techiman Assembly is the market. Infact, without exaggeration, almost 98% of the council's revenue comes from the market. If the market were to bring in only c1m a month then the year would be c12m. How could the Assembly finance c38.5m project as announced in the Graphic of 13 February?

By deliberately giving a picture of a low revenue potential of the Assembly, the Secretary sought a cheap way of finding pretext for the non-performance of his administration. The DS ate his own words when he caused the publication in the People's Daily Graphic of March 23, 1990, to the effect that the Assembly spent c63.1m on a number of projects in the District. Where else could the c68.1m have come from apart from the market which he had valued at c1m a month? In any case, we submit that we have so far not been able to locate the projects he talked about in the District as having consumed c68.1m.

The breakdown of 'his' c68.1m in the Daily Graphic read as follows:

- a. c14.3m on current expenditure?
 - b. c19.7m on Travelling & Transport?
 - c. 12.0m on construction works?
 - d. c5.6m on Maintenance, renewals and repairs?
 - e. c4.9m on general expenditure?
 - f. c2.2m on equipment?
- i. There are question marks on all the figures but for purposes of argument, we will want to know where in the District to locate the c12m construction work?
 - ii. Where are the equipment worth c2.2m?
 - iii. Whether it is reasonable to spend c19.7 m T&T running around non-existing projects.

No wonder that when we met the Presiding Member he admitted that 1989 performance was a fiasco; at any rate having begun 1990 without approved budget we do not have any reason to be hopeful of positive developments in the District.

Finally, therefore, we are adding our voice to that of the JUNE 4 Movement, the CDRs and its masses who openly showed their disapproval and anger after learning about the unbridled expenditure of the Assembly as published in the Daily Graphic of

March 23, 1990. His excellency's attention is therefore being drawn to the plight of the people of Techiman, a plight which accounts for disillusionment and hopelessness. We have had enough of this entertainment and refreshment nonsense that is being institutionalised in Techiman District Administration.

In conclusion, we pose this pertinent question: "Is it not irritating that, despite all the millions realised and spent, NOT a single JSS workshop or classroom was built by the Assembly anywhere in the District?"

LONG LIVE GHANA, LONG LIVE THE REVOLUTION.

Yours faithfully,

Signed

(GEORGE KWAME GYAN KONTOH)

Source: This letter was made available by a member of the Committee.

APPENDIX D

LOCAL GOVERNMENT (DISTRICT TENDER BOARDS ESTABLISHMENT)

INSTRUMENT, 1990

1. There is hereby established a District Tender Board (hereinafter referred to as "the Board") for each District Assembly.

Functions of Board

2. The Board shall advise the relevant district assembly on the award of contracts in the district which are to be exclusively financed from the district's own resources or which have been approved by the Provisional National Defence Council and are not in excess of such limits as may be set by the Secretary for Finance and Economic Planning.

Composition of Board

3. (1) The Board shall consist of:-

- (a) the District Secretary for the relevant district who shall be chairman;
- (b) the chairman (convener) of the Finance and Administration Sub-Committee of the Executive Committee of the Assembly;
- (c) the Chairman (convener) of the Technical Infrastructure Sub-Committee of the Executive Committee of the Assembly;
- (e) the District Treasury Officer;
- (f) the head of the District Development Planning and Budgeting Unit;
- (g) a representative of the department or project;
- (h) the District Labour Officer; and;
- (i) the District Organizing Assistant of the Committee for the Defence of the Revolution.

(2) The District Administrative Officer shall be the Secretary to the Board but shall not vote on any matter for decision by the Board.

Meetings of the Board

4. (1) The Board shall meet for the despatch of its business at such time and place at the Chairman may determine.

(2) The quorum for every meeting of the Board which shall include the persons referred to in sub-paragraphs (i) (f) and (g) of paragraph 3, shall be four.

(3) Subject to the provisions of this instrument the Board shall regulate its own procedure.

Secretary to issue guidelines

5. The Secretary may from time to time issue to any district assembly such guidelines as he deems necessary for the efficient performance of the functions of the Board.

Board and Assemblies guidelines

6. Subject to paragraph 5 of this Instrument, the Board shall, in the discharge of its functions, be subject to such guidelines as the relevant assembly may deem fit to give.

Guidelines for District Tender Boards

All Tenders should be processed in accordance with the following guidelines which are issued in pursuance of paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Local Government (District Tender Boards) Establishment) Instrument 1990:-

ADVERTISEMENT OF TENDERS: Tenders must be advertised in the newspapers (and local relay and FM Radio where available). The advertisement shall be prepared and inserted by the project implementation agency involved. Tenders may also be published on public notice boards in the principal towns of the district town in which the project is located. An example of a preferred typical newspaper advertisement is attached.

Submission of Tenders: The Tenders should be submitted by tenderers and received under the following rules:-

- a. by a supervising officer appointed for receipt of specific tenders;
- b. by deposit in a tender box located where stated in the advertisement;
- c. the tender box located in public view in the office of the district assembly during working hours;

d. tenders should be submitted and received or deposited during the hours of 8.30 am and 4.30pm on each day during receiving period.

THE ENGINEER'S ESTIMATE: (Department Estimate) should be provided in a sealed envelope by the consultant of the agency or the agency and sent to the office of the district assembly where it will be placed in the tender box alongside other tenders during the receiving period of time until the time of opening of the tenders. Sealed envelopes containing the "ENGINEER'S ESTIMATE" shall not be read at the public opening of the bids. In other words, bidders' representatives must not be made aware of or told the "ENGINEER'S ESTIMATE".

PROCEDURE FOR OPENING TENDERS: The opening should be public and at the exact time and location as contained in the tender advertisement. It should comply with the following procedures:-

- a. opening will be presided over by the Chairman, District Tender Board, or his representative;
- b. a quorum of the District Tender Board to be present;
- c. each tender will be opened and:
 - i) the name of the tenderer read out;
 - ii) the total amount of tender read out;
 - iii) confirm whether the tender has been properly signed;
 - iv) confirm, if required, that security is provided;
 - v) confirm that copy of certification of registration by authorised organisation is attached;
 - vi) confirm that labour certificate is provided.
- d) Tender documents will be signed by members of the District Tender Board and given to the Technical Evaluation Team. The Technical Evaluation Team will present an evaluation report to the District Tender Board for further consideration.

RECOMMENDATION FOR CONTRACT AWARD: The District Tender Board in formal meeting will study the evaluation report from the Technical Evaluation Team of tenders under the following

conditions:

- a. Meeting require a quorum of the District Tender Board.
- b. Meetings require a representative of the awarding agency to be in attendance.
- c. Meetings to be minuted.
- d. Copies of minutes should be forwarded to the Regional Co-ordinating Council.

The functions of the District Tender Board is to analyse, evaluate and recommend the award of the best evaluated tender for the consideration of the District Assembly.

The awarding authority is the District Assembly.

COMPOSITION OF THE TECHNICAL EVALUATION TEAM: There shall be established a Technical Evaluation Team to evaluate all tenders.

The team shall consist of:-

- i) Chairman of technical infrastructure sub-committee, chairman;
- ii) Chairman of finance and administration sub-committee, member;
- iii) metropolitan/district engineer, member/secretary;
- iv) Metropolitan/district engineer (metropolitan/District Roads unit), Member; and
- v) District Engineer (Department of Feeder Roads/Ghana Highways Authority), member.

The team shall co-opt a representative of the department/organization responsible for the project.

FUNCTIONS OF THE TECHNICAL EVALUATION TEAM:

- i) Evaluate the responsiveness of each tender in the context of conditions prescribed for each tender.
- ii) Evaluate the technical feasibility of each tender.
- iii) Evaluate the financial competitiveness of each tender.
- iv) Make summary recommendation, accompanied with detailed evaluation report, to the district tender board.

PROCEDURE FOR TENDER EVALUATION FIRST STAGE: (Basic test for a responsive tender) Confirm the following:-

- (a) Tenderer possesses required classification.

- (b) Tender documents are all properly executed.
- (c) All bid items have been priced.
- (d) Tender security, if required, is provided.
- (e) Labour Certificate is provided.

Failure of the tender to satisfy any one of the above mandatory conditions should result in first stage rejection. Such tenders will be declared as nonresponsive.

SECOND STAGE: (Detailed analysis and ranking of responsive and capable tenders)

- (a) Check the tender extensions and adjust (mathematical) arithmetical errors on the basis that the quoted unit prices govern. This will provide the adjusted value of the tender.
- (b) Rank the remaining second stage tenders in order of financial competitiveness.
- (c) Notwithstanding appropriate rating in the Classification Register, the committee should examine the contractor's current status and satisfy themselves after a current review of the contractor, that he can execute the work satisfactorily with regard to:
 - (i) current work load of uncompleted contracts;
 - (ii) availability of plan to perform the contract.
- (d) compare the ranked tenders with the Engineer's Estimate. Should all the bids be outside the 20% envelope the steps described below apply:
 - (i) **LOW TENDERS BELOW THE ENVELOPE:**

Board should discuss the tender with the contractor and satisfy themselves after the contractor's explanation that the tender value in the contractor's particular circumstance is reasonable.
 - (ii) **HIGH TENDER ABOVE THE ENVELOPE:**

The Engineer's Estimate should be re-assessed and adjusted if appropriate. A determination

should be made that the contract package is suitable and has been competitively bid. The Board may recommend re-advertising, change in scope of work; etc. In the case of a tender recommended for award that is outside the envelope, the agency responsible for the project should be consulted before an award is recommended.

FINAL STAGE: (Recommendation for award of best evaluated tender which is responsive, and capable of meeting legal requirements)

- (a) Rank the tenders that have passed second stage, all of which are responsive and are considered capable of performing the contract.
- (b) Consider alternatives, if permitted and if proposed, only if a totally responsive tender has passed second stage. Summarize the ranked tenders, step 1 above and rank including alternatives in financial competitiveness.
- (c) Invite the apparent best evaluated bid for an interview at which time he would be required to provide:
 - (a) Income Tax Clearance Certificate and
 - (b) SSNIT Clearance Certificate.
- (d) Should the apparent best evaluated bid not be able to provide the documentation required in step 3 above, repeat the procedure with the lowest bidder and again if necessary until reaching a fully qualified bidder.
- (e) Forward the record of evaluation with a recommendation to award to the district tender board.

APPENDIX E

POLITICAL TRIALS UNDER THE PNDC

DEFENDANTS	IN COURT OR IN ABSENTIA	VERDICT	SENTENCE	EXECUTED
November 1982 coup attempt: trial March-August 1983	Public Tribunal	August 1983	Prison	
Major Seidu Musah, 1st accused	in absentia	convicted	life	
Lt Kenneth Alidu Korah 6th accused	in absentia	convicted	life	
Capt Ampomah-Nketia 4th accused	in absentia	convicted	life	
Capt Kwabena Appiagyeyi	in absentia	convicted	life	
Major Emmanuel Awudu Mahama, 3rd accused	in absentia	convicted	18 years	
Andrews Asare Kwame Pianim, 2nd accused	in court	convicted	18 yrs-still in prison	
L/Cpl Apana Abongo 4th accused	in absentia (es- caped June 1983)	convicted	10 years	
Cpl Martin Amangaya Adjongba, 8th accused	in absentia	convicted	10 years	

DEFENDANTS	IN COURT OR IN ABSENTIA	VERDICT	SENTENCE	EXECUTED
Cpl Oliver Akadima	in absentia escaped June 1983	convicted	10 years	
L/Bdr Thomas Ahenkorah	in absentia	convicted	10 years	
Bdr Peter Nti Aning, 9th accused	in absentia	convicted	10 years	
L/Bdr Atalia	in absentia	convicted	10 years	
L/Bdr William Baisie	in absentia	convicted	10 years	
L/Cpl Ibrahim Fuseini Batule	in absentia(pos- sibly escaped '83)	convicted	10 years	
Sgt Abdul Iddirau Malik 7th accused	in absentia	convicted	10 years	(24.3.84 see June 1983 below)
Pte Sylvester Tanti Adamagire, 13th accused	in absentia(re- portedly recaptu- red after escape June 1983)	no verdict given	10 years? judgement unclear	reportedly extra- judicially executed
Sgt Matthew Aawaar(pos- sibly 19th accused	in absentia (reportedly re- captured after escape June 1983)	no verdict given	10 years? judgement unclear	Reportedly extra judi- cially executed

DEFENDANTS	IN COURT OR IN ABSENTIA	VERDICT	SENTENCE	EXECUTED
Pte Abudai Gamel (pos- sibly 20th accused	in absentia (reportedly re- captured after escape June 1983)	no verdict given	10 years? Judgement unclear	Reportedly extra judi- cially executed
Pte Joseph Kwaku Baah 21st accused	in court	acquitted	-	
Pte Joseph Kofi Tawiah 22nd accused	in court	acquitted	-	
Cpl Yusifu Tanko, 16th accused	in court	acquitted	-	
Cpl Cletus Calvine Addae, 17th accused	in absentia (es- caped June 1983)	acquitted		
November 1982 coup attempt: assisting escape of Lt Korah	Public Tribunal	August 1983	Prison	
Chief Supt of Police Jacob Jabuni Yidana	in court	convicted	18 years re- detained	
Alhaji Mumuni Amadu Baba	in court	convicted	7 years	
Veronica Yidana	in absentia	convicted	7 years	

June 1982 murder of 3 judges and retired Army Officer	Public Tribunal	August 1983	Death	August 1983
Yahaya Seidu	in court	convicted	6 years	
L/Cpl Kwaku Samuel Amedeka	in absentia	convicted	death	
L/Cpl Ransford Johnny Dzandu	in court	convicted	death	18.8.83
Joachim Amartey Kwei	in court	convicted	death	18.8.83
L/Cpl Michael Komla Senyah	in court	convicted	death	31.8.83
Cpl Evans Hekli Tekpor	in court	convicted	death	13.8.83 See June 1983 below
June 1983 jail-break	Public Tribunal	August 1983	Death	August 1983
Cpl Evans Hekli Tekpor	in court	convicted	death	13.8.83
Pte Henry Obeng	in court	convicted	death	13.8.83
Cpl Edward Offei	in court	convicted	death	13.8.83
Cpl Matthew Adabuga	in court	convicted	death	-
Cpl Charles Adam- Sackey	in court	convicted	death	-

June 1983 jail-break	Public Tribunal	August 1983	Death	August 1983
Cpl Cletus Calvine Addae	in court	convicted	death	-
Cpl Martin Amangaya Adjongba	in court	convicted	death	24.3.84 - after recapture
Cpl David A. Ataburu	in absentia	convicted	death	-
Major Abu Braimah	in absentia	convicted	death	-
L/Cpl Carlos Halidu Giwa	in absentia	convicted	death	24.3.84 after recapture
Cpl A.O.Baba Kankani	in court	convicted	death	-
Lt Kenneth Alidu Korah	in absentia	convicted	death	-
Sgt Abdul Iddrisu Malik	in absentia	convicted	death	24.3.84 after recapture
Cpl Anobil Moro	in absentia	convicted	death	-
Pte Nimoh	in absentia	convicted	death	-

DEFENDANTS	IN COURT OR IN ABSENTIA	VERDICT	SENTENCE	EXECUTED
June 1983 coup attempt	Public Tribunal	August 1983	death/prison	
Maj Samuel Boateng Okyere	in court	convicted	death	13.8.83
WO II Joseph Osae-Kwaku	in court	convicted	death	commuted life
Capt (Rtd) Adjei Edward Ampofo	in absentia	convicted	death	recaptured but not executed
Lt-Col Solomon Ekow Dennis	in absentia	convicted	death	-
Cpl Quarshie Debrah	in court	convicted	18 years	-
Sgt Charles Fofie	in court	convicted	18 years	-
L/Cpl Sampson Darkwa	in court	convicted	6 years	-
L/Cpl S. K. Amponsa- Dadzie	in court	acquitted (re-detained)		-
Cpl Sampson Nyame- Bekyere	in court	acquitted (re-detained)		-
June 1983 Coup Attempt escape of Pte Tanti- Adamogire	Public Tribunal	August 1983	death/prison	
L/Cpl Samuel Senna	in court	convicted	life	-

March 1984 invasion: trial in camera	Special Military Tribunal	April 1984	death	
Lt.Col J.L. Abito	in absentia	convicted	death	
Major Oppong Addae	in absentia	convicted	death	
Capt Kwabena Appiagyeyi	in absentia	convicted	death	
S/Sgt Thomas Boateng	in absentia	convicted	death	
Lt Gamor	in absentia	convicted	death	
Lt Coffie	in absentia	convicted	death	
Col W. Annor Odjidja	in absentia	convicted	death	
Maj Abubakar Suleimana	in absentia	convicted	death	
Lt Col Mohadini Yahaya	in absentia	convicted	death	
S/Sgt Thomas Boateng	in absentia	convicted	death	
December 1984 coup plot: trail in camera	Public Tribunal	April 1985	death/upheld on appeal	appeal/ execution May 1985
Maj Hamlet Nana Akwasi	in courtt	convicted	death	executed

December 1984 coup plot: trail in camera	Public Tribunal	April 1985	death/upheld on appeal	appeal/ execution May 1985
Sgt Francis Y. Anku	in court	convicted	death	executed
Maj Twumasi Anto	in court	convicted	death	executed
Sgt Oduro Frimpong	in court	convicted	death to be confirmed	not known
Baba Shaibu Ibrahim	in court	convicted	death	executed
Sgt Joseph Issaka	in court	convicted	death	executed
Maj John Abdul Ocran	in court	convicted	death	executed
October 1983 alleged coup plot: trial March 1986	Public Tribunal	March 1986	Death/ Prison	Appeal June 1986
Abudula	in absentia	convicted	death	
Ambrose K.T. Afriyie	in court	convicted	15 years	reduced to 2 years on appeal
October 1985 alleged Goka coup plot: trial March-May 1986	Public Tribunal	March 1986	Death/ Upheld on appeal June 1986	22 June 1986
WO II S. Charles Lartey				

October 1985 alleged Goka coup plot: trial March-May 1986	Public Tribunal	March 1986	Death/ Upheld on appeal June 1986	22 June 1986
Aforo	in court	convicted	death	executed
Yaw Brefo Berko	in court	convicted	death	executed
Kyeremeh Djan	in court	convicted	death	executed
Godwin Mawuli K. Dra- Goka	in court	convicted	death	executed
October 1985 alleged Goka coup plot: trial March-May 1986	Public Tribunal	March 1986	Death/ Upheld on appeal June 1986	22 June 1986
Ahmed Denteh Braimah Kankani	in court	convicted	death	executed
Pte Charles Koomson	in court	convicted	death	executed
Samuel Boamah Panyin	in court	convicted	death	executed
Mohammed Ibrahim Abdul Alanko	in absentia	convicted	death	-
Eric Goka	in absentia	convicted	death	-
Frank Yao Goka	in absentia	acquitted	-	-

October 1985 alleged Goka coup plot: trial March-May 1986	Public Tribunal	March 1986	Death/ Upheld on appeal June 1986	22 June 1986
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Christian Goka	in absentia	acquitted	-	-
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Papa Yaw Krobo Edusei	in absentia	acquitted	-	-
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Kwame Agyeman-Badu	not in court	acquitted		
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October 85 Goka Coup plot: assisting escape of M.I.A. Alanko	Public Tribunal	June 1986	Prison	
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Evelyn Esi Goka	in court	convicted	5 years	
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Geneviva Esinam Adjei	in court	convicted	3 years	
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December 1984 coup plot: abetting endea- vour to overthrow government	Public Tribunal	July 1986	Prison	-
Ernest Sampong Mireku	in court	acquitted	-	-
June 1983 jail break: charge of abetting escape of prisoners	Public Tribunal	July 1987	Prison	
L/Cpl Emmanuel Arhin	in court	convicted	25 years	
L/pl L. Jackson Duodo	in court	convicted	25 years	
TOTALS: 91 INDIVIDUALS	49 ABSENTIA	79	50 DEATH	AT LEAST
		CONVICTED		23 EXECUTED

(Details of these trials have been derived from incomplete and some times contradictory information, and therefore may not be accurate in all respects.)

Source: Ghana Political Imprisonment and the Death Penalty,
(London: Amnesty International) 1991., pp.29-32.

APPENDIX F

SAMPLE INTERVIEW SCHEDULE ADMINISTERED TO
LOCAL PEOPLE ON DEFENCE COMMITTEES

1. Name
2. Age
3. Sex
4. Marital Status
5. Occupation
6. Town/Village
7. Education -
 - a) Illiterate
 - b) Semi-literate
 - c) Middle School
 - d) Secondary/Commercial/Vocational/Technical
 - e) Post Secondary/Polytechnic/Teacher Training College/Professional Institute/University.
8.
 - i) Is there a CDR in your area/village/town? Yes or No.
 - ii) If No, Why not?
 - iii) If yes, how was it established?
 - iv) When was it established?
 - v) How many members does it have?
9. Which categories of people constitute the CDR in your area in terms of:
 - i) Age: 18-30 ; 31-40; 41-50; 51 and above.
 - ii) Sex: Male, Female
 - iii) Educational background;
 - iv) Occupational background;
 - v) Social standing in the community;
 - vi) Traditional rulers;
 - vii) Priests and Spiritual leaders;
 - viii) Others.
10. Are you a CDR member? Yes or No.
11. Give reasons why you decided to join or not to join the CDR.
12. Are you an active member of the CDR?
13. How often do you attend meetings personally?
14. Do you serve on the Executive or any committee of the CDR?

15. What service can you say that you have rendered the community or nation personally as a result of your membership of the CDR?
16. i) Who constitute the Executive of your local CDR?
 - ii) How was the local executive put into office?
 - iii) Discuss its composition in terms of
 - a) age
 - b) sex
 - c) education
 - d) occupation
 - iv) How active is your local executive?
 - v) How influential is the CDR executive in local affairs generally?
17. How are meetings conducted by the executive?
18. How many sets of executive have you had?
19. What have been the main functions of the CDRs in your area?
20. What development projects have been undertaken in your village/town by the CDR? Give details.
21. Has the CDR covered all areas of development?
22. What remains to be done?
23. Assess the developmental role of the CDR in your town/village?
24. How have development projects been financed by the CDR in your town or village?
25. What has been the greatest achievement of the CDR in your town or village?
26. What are the problems faced?
27. What suggestions do you have to solve these problems?
28. What is the relationship between your Unit CD10 R and other CDRs on the local, district, regional and national levels?
29. Has your CDR been involved in civic and political education? How have these been organised? How often?
30. i) Is your local CDR controlled by the PNDC?
 - ii) How are government policies relayed to you?

- iii) Do you think you have received adequate help from the FNDC?
31. Have any workshops been organised by your CDR to train local people to attain appropriate skills for local development?
 32. What problems are faced by your local CDR?
 33. What suggestions do you have to solve these problems?
 34. Do you feel part of the national decision-making process by dint of your CDR membership?
 35. How do you see the future of your local CDR?
 36. How do you see the future of the CDR in Ghana?
 37. Any other views on CDRs.

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APPENDIX G

SAMPLE OF INTERVIEW SCHEDULE ADMINISTERED TO LOCAL PEOPLE ON DISTRICT ASSEMBLIES

1. Name
2. Age
3. Sex
4. Marital Status
5. Occupation
6. Town/Village
7. Education -
 - a) Illiterate
 - b) Semi-literate
 - c) Middle School
 - d) Secondary/Commercial/Vocational/Technical
 - e) Post Secondary/Polytechnic/Teacher Training
College/Professional Institute/University.
8. What District Assembly does your town/village fall under?
9. What is the name of your District Assembly?
10. What is its composition in terms of
 - i) Age: 18-30 ; 31-40; 41-50; 51 and above.
 - ii) Sex: Male, Female
 - iii) Educational background;
 - iv) Occupational background;
 - v) Social standing in the community;
 - vi) Traditional rulers;
 - vii) Priests and Spiritual leaders;
 - viii) Others.
11. Are you an Assemblyman or woman? Yes or No
12. If yes please give the following details:-
 - i) political experience
 - ii) CDR membership
 - iii) membership of political party in the past.
 - iv) How did you get elected to the Assembly?
 - v) What questions were you asked during the public fora?
 - vi) What do you consider the role of the Assembly you belong to?

- vii) What problems are facing the Assembly?
 - viii) What part have you played personally in the deliberations and functions of the Assembly?
 - ix) How do you see the future of the District Assembly in (a) your area (b) Ghana?
13. Did you attend the
- i) public fora before the elections?
 - ii) How many public fora were organised in your area?
 - iii) What questions were the candidates asked?
 - iv) Did you ask any questions?
 - v) What are your views on the public fora as a whole?
 - vi) How many candidates stood for election in your area?
14. Did you vote at the elections? Yes or No.
15. If you voted,
- i) What factors did you take into consideration in making your choice?
 - ii) Was your participation or choice influenced in any way by the:
 - a) District Secretary (b) CDR
 - c) 31 December Women's Movement
 - d) Any other political group or organisation?
16. If you did not vote, why?
17. Were you a member of any proscribed political party?
18. Do you think District Assembly elections should be held on the basis of party politics?
19. What are your views on the innovations recently introduced with regard to District Assemblies particularly in relation to:
- i) provisions regarding illiteracy
 - ii) right of re-call
 - iii) no political parties
 - iv) public fora and common platform
 - v) functions of local government
 - vi) finance
 - vii) control by Central Government

viii) the role of the District Secretary

ix) the role of the members nominated by the FNDC.

20. Do you think an unelected FNDC should supervise and control democratically elected District Assemblies?
21. What do you see as the functions and role of your Assembly?
22. How have these functions been performed so far?
23. What impact has the Assembly made so far in terms of socio-economic development?
24. What projects have been undertaken by the Assembly in your area?
25. Do you know of any conflicts within your District Assembly?
26. If there have been conflicts, please identify the main sources of conflict
27. What is the relationship between your District Assembly and
 - a) the local CDR and other revolutionary organs.
 - b) the local traditional authority.
 - c) the Town Development Corporation or Village Development Corporation.
 - d) the local churches.
 - e) traditional rulers.
 - f) other identifiable groups?
28. So you know of any actions of any person or body outside the Assembly which have contributed towards (a) hindering or (b) promoting the work of the Assembly?
29. What have been the areas of cooperation between your Assembly and (a) the FNDC (b) the Regional Coordinating Council (RCC)?
30.
 - a) How is revenue generated?
 - b) What levies have been imposed by your Assembly?
31.
 - a) Has revenue been effectively collected?
 - b) Are people willing to pay?
 - c) What difficulties have arisen?
 - d) What suggestions will you make?
32. What limitations have you identified in the functioning of the District Assembly?

33. What have been the achievements?
34. What have been the failures so far?
35. Have there been any incidents of corruption?
36. Are you satisfied with the system as a whole?
37. What do you consider the shortcomings?
38. What recommendations would you make?
39. Any other views on District Assemblies?

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APPENDIX H

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR N.C.D

1.
 - a. What is the N.C.D.?
 - b. How, Why was it established?
 - c. What are its functions and what level of success has it attained?
 - d. Give few facts about its organisational structure.
2.
 - a. What is the history of the call for District Assemblies?
 - b. What are District Assemblies for?
 - c. How do they differ from the District Councils of old?
3.
 - a. How was the demarcation of District Assemblies/Authorities done?
 - b. What were the grounds of demarcation?
 - c. What problems were faced and what petitions were lodged?
 - d. What are people complaining about?
 - e. Are the basis of complaints economic, tribal, allegiance to a chief or what?
 - f. What problems relate to the Nandom area crisis?
 - g. How are any problems relating to above being dealt with and with what success?
4.
 - a. How exactly was the registration of voters done?
 - b. Which personnel were employed and how were they organised?
 - c. What methods were employed?
 - d. What was the level of success?
 - e. What accounts for the success in the registration exercise?
 - f. What time was spent in the registration?
 - g. Were other organised bodies/institutions involved?
5.
 - a. How were platforms generally organised?
 - b. How many platforms were mounted in the various electoral areas?

- c. What were the main concerns of candidates and what variations were seen in different parts of the country?
 - d. What questions were generally asked by the electorate and what were the indicators as to their expectations?
 - e. What generalisations can be made from the above?
 - g. What was the level of attendance at the platforms mounted? The public had registered massively as voters; was attendance proportionately heavy at platform gatherings?
6.
 - a. Why did we have three zones for the elections?
 - b. Why were all the elections not held on the same day?
 - c. Did this have effect on the results?
 7.
 - a. Why were parties not allowed?
 - b. Did this make any difference in participation?
 8.
 - a. What categories of people stood as candidates? What were their backgrounds educationally, occupationally, socially etc?
 - b. Are there any conclusions to be drawn from above?
 9.
 - a. What was the role and effect of the 31 December Womens Movement?
 - b. What was the level of women participation as candidates?
 - c. How many women actually won seats?
 - d. How do you evaluate the role of women generally, both present and future?
 10.
 - a. How were presiding members elected?
 - b. What link exists between government appointees and elected members?
 - c. How many government appointees are there? What is their political background?
 - d. Are they experts? Are they expected to play a special role?
 - e. Why did these people not stand for election?
 - f. Did some stand and lose?
 11. After district assemblies what is the next stage? Are we

- moving to the regional and national levels?
12. Should we have only district and national assemblies?
 13. With regard to District Election Committees,
 - a. what were they?
 - b. Who were the personnel involved and how were they paid?
 - c. How successful were they?
 - d. How does this differ from the position of District Election Officer?
 14. What role did the CDRs play in registration, mounting of platforms and the elections generally?
 15. How was the vetting of candidates done?
 16. What methods of publicity were used and how effective were they?
 17.
 - a. Are there some teething problems relating to the Assemblies?
 - b. How would these be solved?
 18. What lessons have we learnt from the District Level Elections; what mistakes have been made if any and how are they going to be taken care of in the future?
 19. What have been the achievements and what are the hopes and prospects of the Assemblies?
 20. Are there some lurking problems/issues that the NCD is still trying to resolve relating to demarcation of district and other matters?

APPENDIX I

SAMPLE OF INTERVIEW SCHEDULE ADMINISTERED
TO A CROSS SECTION OF THE PUBLIC ON POLITICAL GROUPS

1. Name
2. Age
3. Sex
4. Marital Status
5. Occupation
6. Town/Village
7. Education -
 - a) Illiterate
 - b) Semi-literate
 - c) Middle School
 - d) Secondary/Commercial/Vocational/Technical
 - e) Post Secondary/Polytechnic/Teacher Training
College/Professional Institute/University.
8. Which influential groups have you identified (a) within your locality? (b) nationally?
9. What do you know of this groups:
ARPB, Lodges, NUGS, GBA, AYC, NCWD, DWM, NDM, GNAT, CCG,
CBC, MFJ, NDM, JFM, PANYMO, PDYLG, TUC and CDRS?
10. Do you know of any other group or body which has some political influence?
11. Do you belong to any of the groups listed above?
12. Do they operate within your locality?
13. Do their activities on the local or national level affect you in any way?
14. Have you taken part in political demonstration?
15. What are your views on their activities?
16. Give reasons for your answer.
17. If you belong to any of these groups;
 - a) how did you become a member?
 - b) how often do you meet?
 - c) what are your activities?
 - d) what kind of interactions do you have with the PNDC and/or its functionaries?

- e) who are the executive members on the i) national and ii) local levels?
- f) Are you an executive member? If Yes, how did you come to hold that position?
18. What are your views on the role of independent groups in politics?
19. Should the government control interest in groups the State?
20. How independent are interest groups in Ghana today?
21. What are your views on multi-party politics?
22. What are your views on free press as a pressure group in the society?
23. Do you belong to the TUC?
- (b) What should be the role of the TUC in national politics?
- (c) Is the TUC playing the proper role?
24. a) Do you belong to a Christian Organisation or other religious group?
- b) What do you think should be the role of the Church in politics?
- c) What should be the relationship between Church and State?
- d) Do we have the proper relationship under the PNDC?
25. a) Do you belong to the DWM?
- b) What do you see as the aims and objectives of DWM?
- c) Is it an independent body?
- d) What are your views on the role being played? by DWM today (i) politically (ii) socially (iii) economically?
26. What do you know of other Women's Organisations?
27. State your views on
- a) pro-PNDC groups you know of
- b) anti-PNDC groups you know of
28. Has the PNDC allowed the free operation of groups with interests that affect politics?
29. Should identifiable groups be given the freedom to operate

independently?

30. Any other views on groups and political participation?

APPENDIX J

SAMPLE OF INTERVIEW SCHEDULE ADMINISTERED TO A CROSS SECTION OF THE PUBLIC ON LAW AND JUSTICE

1. Name
2. Age
3. Sex
4. Marital Status
5. Occupation
6. Town/Village
7. Education -
 - a) Illiterate
 - b) Semi-literate
 - c) Middle School
 - d) Secondary/Commercial/Vocational/Technical
 - e) Post Secondary/Polytechnic/Teacher Training
College/Professional Institute/University.
8. What are your views on the legal system which existed before the 31 December Revolution?
9. In your view did the pre-Revolution legal system encourage:
 - a) delays
 - b) discriminatory justice
 - c) unnecessary expense
 - d) technicalities
 - e) injustice to the ordinary man
 - f) any other malpractices:
10. Do you think the problems of the Judiciary were caused by:
 - a) Poor conditions of service for judges
 - b) the fact that judges still took notes by hand?
 - c) corruption?
11. What other problems have you identified with the traditional Courts?
12. In your view how can these be corrected?
13. Do you agree with some CDRs that the post of Chief Justice

- should be abolished?
14. Do you think the ordinary Courts should be abolished?
 15. What are your views on the exercise of judicial powers by CDRs?
 16. Should the CDRs have jurisdiction over (a) Rent Cases (b) Arbitration generally (c) Criminal matters?
 17. Should the CDRs have power to detain citizens under any circumstances?
 18. Have you ever been arrested, detained or made to appear before any CDR panel exercising judicial powers?
 19. Do you know of any person who has so appeared?
 20. Give details about any case or incident you know of.
 21. Do you think the CDRs have help in any way to bring about law and justice in the society?
 22. What are your views on
 - a) CVC
 - b) NIC
 - c) Public Tribunals?
 23. Have you appeared before any of these bodies?
 24. Do you know of anyone who has appeared before any of these bodies?
 25. Give details of any experiences you have had or incidents you know of.
 26. What impact do you think the CVC has made on the Ghanaian society?
 27. In your view, what has the NIC achieved?
 28. Do you think the Public Tribunals have brought about popular justice in Ghana?
 29. Have you made a personal appearance at a public tribunal?
 30. If yes, in what capacity?
 - a) an accused
 - b) a witness
 - c) counsel
 - d) panelist
 - e) observer

31. What were your personal impressions?
32. In your opinion are the Tribunals doing justice?
33. Do you approve of the Tribunals?
34. Give detailed reasons for your answers to questions 33 and 34 above.
35. Do you think the Tribunals are independent of the PNDC?
36. What are your views on:
 - a) appeals at the Tribunals
 - b) fines and sentences generally
 - c) death sentence
 - d) composition of the Tribunals
 - e) the Tribunal system of punishment as a whole?
37. Do you know of the Special Military Tribunal (SMT)?
 - b) Do you think it should have power to try civilians?
38. What general measures in your view have been taken under the PNDC to bring about justice in the society?
39. Have they succeeded?
40. What are the problems created, if any?
41. Any other views and comments?

APPENDIX K

SAMPLE OF INTERVIEW SCHEDULE ADMINISTERED TO A CROSS
SECTION OF THE PUBLIC ON HUMAN RIGHTS

1. Name
2. Age
3. Sex
4. Marital Status
5. Occupation
6. Town/Village
7. Education -
 - a) Illiterate
 - b) Semi-literate
 - c) Middle School
 - d) Secondary/Commercial/Vocational/Technical
 - e) Post Secondary/Polytechnic/Teacher Training
College/Professional Institute/University.
8. What do you consider to be fundamental human rights?
9. Do you think these should be guaranteed?
10. How, to your knowledge, have human rights been protected in the past?
11. Compare the human rights record of the PNDC and that of
 - a) the Nkrumah Regime
 - b) the NLC
 - c) the Busia Regime
 - d) the Acheampong Era.
12. In your view, has the PNDC protected or abused human rights?
13. Can you give details of any areas of human rights abuse?
14. Have you had a personal experience of abuse of human rights?
15. Do you know of any abuse of human rights regarding
 - a) a member of your family
 - b) a friend
 - c) a co-worker
 - d) a neighbour
 - e) any other person?
16. What were the circumstances surrounding the abuse ?

17. Give details of the nature and extent of the abuse?
18. Do you know of any instance of wanton abuse?
 - a) where?
 - b) when?
 - c) what were the circumstances surrounding the abuse?
 - e) state the exact nature of such abuse?
19. Do you know of any abuse of human rights in terms of
 - a) killing
 - b) disappearance
 - c) detention
 - d) political trials?
20. Give details of instances stating
 - a) the nature of the abuse
 - b) the victim
 - c) the perpetrators indicating whether they were
 - (i) soldiers (ii) militia (iii) commandoes (iv) CDR (v) any other?
21. Have you heard of political trials before the Tribunals such as the Safo Adu Case, the Apiah-Menka case and the J.H. Mensah case?
22. Do you consider the trials justified?
23. Several persons such as Kwesi Pratt have been detained for criticising the PNDC. Do you have information on any victims?
24. What are your views on these detentions?
25. The PNDC has been accused of torture and inhuman treatment. What are your views on the allegations made? Do you have any personal knowledge or information of any alleged abuses?
26. What are your views on freedom of the press under the PNDC?
27. What are your views on religious freedom under the PNDC?
28. Comment on the Religious Bodies Registration Law
29. Any other comments or views?

APPENDIX L

SAMPLE OF INTERVIEW SCHEDULE ADMINISTERED TO A CROSS SECTION OF THE PUBLIC ON ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ISSUES

1. Name
2. Age
3. Sex
4. Marital Status
5. Occupation
6. Town/Village
7. Education -
 - a) Illiterate
 - b) Semi-literate
 - c) Middle School
 - d) Secondary/Commercial/Vocational/Technical
 - e) Post Secondary/Polytechnic/Teacher Training College/Professional Institute/University.
8. Number of Children
9. Number of Other Dependants
10. Type of accommodation
11. Number of Rooms
12. How long have you served in your present employment?
13. When did you last change jobs?
14. Do you think the economic issues are relevant when we talk of democracy?
15. What was the state of the economy and how were you personally affected by the state of the economy:
 - a) before the Revolution?
 - b) after the Revolution?
16. What areas of the economic reforms of the PNDC do you understand?
17. How do they affect
 - a) yourself
 - b) your family
 - c) others you know of?
18. Has the cost of living risen in proportion to your income?
19. What are some of the basic commodities you purchase

- regularly and what changes have occurred in their prices?
20. Are you a wage earner or self employed?
 21. Are you able to live solely on your wages?
 22. If you are self employed do you employ others in your work?
Have you increased or decreased the number of your employees, if any, after 31 December 1981?
 23. Has the standard of living of your family risen or fallen since 31 December 1981?
 24. Can you assign any reasons for the change, if any?
 25. Has your family relationship been affected in any way by the recent economic changes
 26. Kindly answer 25 above in terms of
 - a) marital relations with your spouse
 - b) your relationship with your children
 - c) your relationship with other members of your family?
 27. Do you approve of the ERP?
Give reasons for your answer.
 28. What effects do you think the ERP has had on
 - a) industry
 - b) agriculture
 - c) trade and business
 - d) banking and insurance
 - e) imports and exports?
 29. What are your views generally on the redeployment exercise?
 30. Have you been affected by the exercise? Yes/No
 31. If yes, when were you redeployed?
 32. Were you given adequate notice before redeployment?
 33. State the type of redeployment which relates to you eg. compulsory, voluntary or other?
 34. Regarding your redeployment benefits, did you receive them
 - a) at all
 - b) fully
 - c) in part
 - d) promptly?
 35. If you experienced any problems in receiving your benefits

- did those problems create any difficulties for you?
36. Was the payment adequate?
 37. How did you utilise the money?
 38. Have you gained any real security as a result?
 39. Has redeployment in any way affected:
 - a) yourself
 - b) your family?
 40. State what problems you have faced, if any, since redeployment?
 41. Has redeployment been a curse or a blessing to (a) yourself and (b) your family?
 42. What, to your knowledge are some of the effects of redeployment on
 - (a) the various establishments affected;
 - (b) staff who have remained at post?
 43. What are your views on PAMSCAD?
 44. Have you benefited in any way from PAMSCAD?
 45. Have the social circumstances of yourself and your family changed in recent times?
 46. What are your views on JSS/SSS?
 47. Do you think children and women have been well catered for by the PNDC?
 48. What are your views on PNDC laws regarding:
 - a) accountability of the head of family?
 - b) distribution of the property of a person who dies intestate?
 - c) registration of customary marriages?
 - d) registration of land?
 - e) legal aid?
 49. Do you think these laws have protected the ordinary man?
 50. What problems are encountered, if any?
 51. Do you think family planning has received a boost?
 52. What are your observations on the Primary Health Care system?
 53. Do you think there has been socio-economic development:

- a) generally in Ghana?
- b) to you personally?

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