



**Thesis
By
TATA SIMON NGENGE**

**THE
UNIVERSITY OF
LAGOS - NIGERIA**

**THE EVOLUTION OF THE
RE-UNIFIED CAMEROON
1961 - 1982**


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THE EVOLUTION OF THE RE-UNIFIED
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
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1992

CERTIFICATION

I certify that this study was carried out by Tata S. N. under my supervision.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'A. Osuntokun', is written over a horizontal line.

Professor Akinjide Osuntokun

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CERTIFICATION

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT THE THESIS --

THE EVOLUTION OF THE RE-UNIFIED CAMEROON 1961 - 1982.

SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF POSTGRADUATE STUDIES
UNIVERSITY OF LAGOS FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY.

IS A RECORD OF ORIGINAL RESEARCH CARRIED OUT BY
TATA SIMON NGENGE

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DEDICATION

Dedicated to PAPA M. H. NTUNE, Divisional Commissioner of Police
(Rtd). My late Great Grandfather Largharm Langhee

and

those patriotic Cameroonians who are struggling to build a
Genuine Cameroon Nation.

GLOSSARY

"Kamerun" is the German Version denoting the German ruled 1884 - 1916.

"Cameroon" is the Anglicised Version designating the country generally.

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"Southern Cameroons" denotes the Southern sector of British Cameroons, also known as the Cameroons Province that was administered as part of the Eastern Region and became a full region within the Federation of Nigeria in 1954.

"East Cameroon" refers to the Francophone Sector of the nation when the Federal System was instituted on October 1, 1961, after the February 11, 1961 plebiscite and Fomuban Accord.

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
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ABSTRACT

The reunited Cameroon came into being on October 1, 1961, the day former British Southern Cameroons reunited in a federation with French Cameroun, after 45 years of Anglo-French partition of German Kamerun. The study traces the historical background of the idea of reunification in British and French Cameroons; the role the partitioned ethnic groups played and their reaction to colonial rule that promoted their wishes for independence and reunification.

As both sectors evolved, differences emerged among the nationalists of each camp in the 1950s. In Southern British Cameroons Dr. E. M. L. Endeley who initiated the idea of reunification backed out of the idea supporting thereafter integration into Nigeria as a separate region. Most of his followers, particularly Dr. J. N. Foncha and Bobe A. N. Jua disagreed with him and thus broke away from his Kamerun National Congress (KNC) and formed the Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP) in 1955, that piloted Southern Cameroons into union with French Cameroon on October 1, 1961. On the other hand in French Cameroun early nationalists were neither enthusiastic about independence nor reunification. The political parties and political groups that emerged before 1948 were organised by France to promote her colonial interest. The union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC) formed in 1948 became the first

indigenous political party in French Cameroun that stood for independence and immediate reunification of the partitioned Trust Territory. Unfortunately the French did not like the UPC radical approach to attain these goals and it was banned in 1955. Its leaders Dr. Felix Moumie (President) and Reuben Um Nyombe (Secretary General) were murdered by the French. French Cameroun finally became independent in 1960 with Ahmadou Ahidjo as President. Ahmadou Ahidjo unlike his predecessor Andre-Marie Mbida favoured reunification. Preliminary talks were held between him and Dr. J. N. Foncha before the February 11, 1961 plebiscite. When Southern Cameroon voted "yes" for the reunification option, talks continued between the two men that culminated in the Foumban Constitutional Conference in July, 1961. At Foumban, the Federal system of government was adopted very much to Ahidjo's dislike. Ahmadou Ahidjo became president of the reunited Cameroon and Dr. J. N. Foncha the vice president. Ahidjo after succeeding in causing division in the KNDP camp, was able to institute the one party system in 1966. This gave him direct control over West Cameroon. Perceiving that Foncha would not accept the idea of a unitary system he brought in S. T. Muna and dropped Foncha in 1970. With Muna the unitary system was realised in 1972, that marked the end of Western Cameroon's autonomy.

The unitary system in the name of "we are one" brought the minority anglophone linguistic group untold misery. They lost their constitutional rights, political position in the union, all development concentrated in the French sector and they became

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treated as a conquered people. In misery, anglophones point to the February 11, 1961 plebiscite and accuse their leaders of being weak and self centred. The economic development and power sharing propagated by the reunificationists during the plebiscite campaign became a dream. Co-existence in the union, therefore, is on the moral basis that the constituent units were once indivisible. The francophone being in a majority are bent on assimilating and absorption of anglophones rather than building a harmonised unique bicultural nation.

This therefore has put reunification in strain and to a serious question whether the Cameroon Union of two different colonial legacies can serve as an example of state integration to form a united Africa.

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INTRODUCTION

In this era of striving for an economically and politically united Africa, an Africa that would cast away neo-imperialism and build a united front to lessen Africa's dependence on aid from the advanced world as envisaged in the OAU Lagos Plan of Action 1980¹, it has become imperative to carry out studies on the already integrated groups such as typical of British Southern Cameroons and French Cameroon from where relevant lessons can be drawn. The unification of the Cameroon is of political, social and economic interest both to its indigenes and scholars. This study is the first to tackle this issue from a serious academic point of view and it hopes to contribute in a major way to theories of integration in Africa. Thirty years of union is long enough to evaluate how well reunification of the Cameroons has fared.

Literature Review:

The reunification of former German Kamerun has attracted a measure of attention from scholars of various orientations and disciplines. But due to the sensitivity of the Ahidjo Administration to the subject, no penetrating study of the event could be undertaken. The literature that exist on the subject has been written haphazardly and mostly by foreigners who either based their account on government point of view or official documents that reveal little of the truth. Nonetheless, some of the existing works have been found useful, although their discussion ends in 1970. To this category belong the two books

of Victor Le Vine: The Cameroon: From Mandate to Independence, (California: University of California Press, 1964). and The Cameroon Federal Republic, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971). In the books Le Vine analysed the factors that made reunification a positive option and clearly brings out the weak position of the anglophone in the union. Jean Francois Bayart, L'Etat Au Cameroon, (Paris: Press de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1985) examines political evolution in French Cameroon. It shows the connection between the policy of repression pursued by Ahidjo and the political marginalization of the leaders of West Cameroon. Willard R. Johnson, The Cameroon Federation: Political Integration in a Fragmented Society, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970) offers the most comprehensive account of the dynamics of the Unification, the odd situation in West Cameroon, the effect of this on the outcome of the Foumban Constitution Conference and future inter-group relations in Cameroon. Wilfred A. Ndongko, Planning for Economic Development in a Federal State. (Munich: Westforum verlag, 1975) vividly elucidates the weakness inherent in the Foumban Constitution from an economic point of view. These shortcomings invariably manifested themselves in the lopsided development and the marginalization of West Cameroon. Within the reunified Cameroon, the early 1960s writers notably David E. Gardinier, Cameroon: United Nations Challenge to French Policy, (London: Oxford University Press, 1963).

P.M. Kale, Political Evolution in the Cameroons, (Buea, Government Printers, 1966) would definitely confess that the grim hope they had expressed had no better base than Foncha's thesis that Southern Cameroons was moving East to meet their "brothers" and that milk and honey would flow for the common good. Here one agrees with the political scientist Nfor N.N., Cameroon Patriots, (Zaria: Pamsel Pub. Co., 1985) that the Anglophone leaders miscalculated.

It is worth noting that the Kamerun, originally a German colony annexed in 1884, was partitioned in 1916 as a result of the British and French condominium arising from the German defeat in the First World War. The imperialist action was confirmed by the Versailles Peace Treaty of 1919.

The partitioned sectors of German Kamerun remained under the different colonial tutelage until 1961 when the Southern part of British Southern Cameroons, following the U.N. organised plebiscite of February 11, 1961, reintegrated with the French Cameroun³ which had become independent a year before after 45 years of separation.

Cameroon, Somalia and Tanzania present us with practical examples of federalist theory of integration which was strongly advocated in the continent by nationalist leaders like Dr. Kwame Nkrumah; whose thesis centered on a political federation that will eventually be followed by socio-economic and cultural integration - as against functionalist theories which postulate that only economic integration would ultimately lead to political

union⁴. Somalia and Tanzania have some advantages in their efforts toward national integration. For example Somalia owes her very existence to the sense of common identity and destiny that all Somalis exhibit as a people. The sense of fraternity among the Somalis is anchored in the possession of a "broadly homogenous and largely pastoral culture, a common language and a fervent and deep-rooted devotion to Islam which reached the shores more than a thousand years ago"⁵

Tanzania, on the other hand, has Swahili as an official language and had from the beginning a national leader whose popularity by and large transcended ethnic identities in the person of President Julius Nyerere, who was indeed successful in avoiding identification with a specific ethnic group⁶ in his union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar that gave birth to the United Republic of Tanzania. Unfortunately, Cameroon lacks all of the above that install in the people a sense of belonging. The essential ingredient of communication, that is, common language is absent, and like most African countries, Cameroon lacks a President whose love for the nation transcends ethnic identities. The Cameroon case, therefore, was a brave venture on the part of the pro-unificationists who opted for integration simply on the basis that they were once in a "Great German Kamerun".

The study is aimed at examining the coming together of the anglophones and the francophones following the plebiscite of February 11, 1961. First the study will look at her past historical evolution, the present and future adjustments of this

historical phenomenon. Secondly, the study shall proffer some policy guidelines for the future. Using this political framework the study has the following specific objectives: It examines the contribution of pioneer nationalists to the reconstruction of the "German Kamerun" from the fragments of the British and French rule, showing how faithful or not the leaders have kept to this noble task. To elucidate the fact that whether considering the Plebiscite of February 11, 1961 or the May 20, 1972, Referendum, the resultant effect had more to do with anglophones than the Francophones. It examines the problems of adjustment emanating from the different colonial policies inherited by the two sections and the rival forces within the federation and later in the Unitary system. The study will also examine the problems of the anglophone minority within the wider context of political emasculation of the entire Cameroonian people.

It looks into the issue that the idea of independence and reunification were more popular in the British Cameroons than in the French Cameroon. The French did not favour this radical wind of change as their prime concern was to entrust the leadership of French Cameroon at independence to a stooge of theirs. This clearly explains why the French in 1955 could not contain the UPC which had as its main objective immediate Reunification and Independence.

The study will equally examine the creation of a one party system within the federation which killed democracy, thereby marking the beginning of a one man rule in the name of unity.

It will also focus on Ahidjo's unilateral creation of the Unitary System in 1972 that marked the end of former Southern British Cameroons autonomy and identity as a political entity in the union.

As an exploratory and analytical study, the use of empirical data will be included as a valid means for comparison. In this way objective conclusions can be reached, free from sentiments and generalisations. Thus the objectives enumerated above provide the basis for assessing the following specific hypotheses:

- (i) that the reunified Cameroon became a reality and not a myth because the pro-re-unificationists led by Dr. J. N. Foncha based their logical argument for the union too much on the morale of fraternity in the name of Kamerunian Personality.
- (ii) that there has been by far more assimilation than harmonization due to the fact that Southern Cameroons leaders took things for granted and did not bargain for their rightful place in the reunified Cameroon.
- (iii) that when Dr. E.M.L. Endeley turned his back to the idea of independence and reunification he had set the ball rolling; but the apostles of the idea led by Dr. J. N. Foncha who continued the struggle to a successful end lacked both the political will and experience in the game of modern politics.

- (iv) that the period under study reveals that with the establishment of the Unitary System in 1972 the anglophones and their sector experienced back wash effects instead of the spread efforts of rapid and balanced economic development as preached by its creator (Ahidjo).
- (v) that the union has not brought the desirable expectations of those who opted for it and hence there is scepticism of the minorities in the process of African integration based on the federal approach (as the Cameroon case) just in the name of creating larger units, instead of the functionary approach as is the case with the integration of Europe emanating from the E.E.C.

In the light of the analysis, it is concluded that it is only adopting this approach that reveals the truth about Cameroon integration dilemma. This approach examines the situation which superficially seems so obvious and thus telescoped the true minds of the two linguistic groups in the integration process and particularly the anglophone mal-integration into an already established system. If therefore, the question of national integration is viewed from both sides of the prism one could eventually get lost within the glories of generalisations.

This thesis, examining the efforts of Cameroon to build a political community from the fragments of British and French

Cameroons is made up of seven chapters. Chapter One is entitled "Background Study" analysis of the events that took place during the colonial era which gave impetus to anti Anglo-French imperialism and a call for the unification of Kamerun so as to reunite the partitioned ethnic groups.

Chapter two is a thematic study of the genesis of British Cameroons nationalism particularly the Southern Cameroons, force that worked in favour of re-unification, the formation of political parties and the struggle for British Cameroons autonomy.

Chapter three, on the other hand, deals with political changes that took place in French Cameroon from the rise of Adolf Hitler to power to the Brazzaville Conference of 1944. It equally examines the various approaches political parties in this sector adopted towards decolonisation and reunification.

Chapter Four: This chapter draws all shades of opinions from all the schools of thought as regards the destiny of British Cameroons. The effect of the disagreement between the pro-unificationists and pro-integrationists, the loss of the third option i.e. independence, the plebiscite results and the ultimate integration of North Cameroons into Nigeria and the reunification of Southern Cameroons with French Cameroon.

Chapter Five: October 1, 1961 marked the point of departure of the newly created state machinery. Foncha and Ahidjo had finally adopted a federal system instead of a confederation which Foncha argued for in the hope of retaining the autonomy of

Southern Cameroons which the people had desperately fought for. Politics in the federation saw the alliance of Ahidjo's UC and Foncha's KNDP with the opposition left in isolation. This date equally marked the beginning of the systematic assimilation of the anglophones and finally the creation of the one party system that killed and buried democracy in the one time pluralistic society. This gave Ahidjo direct rule over West Cameroonans thus ending its autonomy.

Chapter Six: This chapter examines the changing political scenes in the federation that paved the way for the creation of the unitary system in 1972 when Ahidjo unilaterally abrogated the Fouban Accord. It highlights the changing values of the "Constitution Octroyee" i.e. imposed constitution from above, that put the destiny of the Cameroon people in the hands of an individual (The president) who ruled by decrees and who was able to amend the constitution at will. The backwash effect of this monarchical structure bounced on the anglophones in the "name of we are one".

Chapter Seven: This chapter critically examines those governmental policies that were propagated by the Yaounde authorities that will guarantee national unity, social justice, and balanced development, thus a measure to avoid the domination of one linguistic group over the other. It unveils the glaring imbalance vis-a-vis the two sectors and concludes that the anglophones were better in the federal system than in the unitary system.

The thesis per se ends with a general conclusion in which an examination is made of how Ahidjo succeeded in maintaining the deleterious structures he set up. It equally deals with the problems raised in the hypothesis and some proffered guidelines for the future.

Method of Inquiry:

The area under study embraces former British Southern Cameroons and French Cameroon. The nature and study of this thesis draw inspiration from empirical data available which is enhanced by a theoretical and analytical approach. The historical method employed follow the conventional use of available resources and information that is, the primary and secondary sources, archival material and oral sources (interviews and traditions) books, aggregate data, theses, command journals, newspapers and magazines.

The intensive use of oral tradition gave a new dimension to the discovery of more evidence, although most informants were sceptical as regards the researcher's sincerity that the information being sought was purely for academic purpose.

Oral tradition emerged a vital source because some of the major actors are still alive and strong. To have a balanced version of each side in the union after years of collecting data I divided my informants into four groups.

- (i) Anglophones in English Cameroon
- (ii) Anglophones in French Cameroon
- (iii) Francophones in English Cameroon

(iv) Francophones in French Cameroon

I employed the sampling survey which enabled me to have a fair representation of the country's population the universal questions of what unification has brought to each group; the anglophones from top to bottom speak bitterly that in all circumstances they have been cheated and the francophones who do not feel the negative impact in course of my investigation will express, although with reservation, that the anglophones have not been fairly treated inspite of their goodwill and honesty. They point an accusing finger at anglophones leaders who did not realize the Machiavellian and philosopher king political style Ahidjo was using.

Aggregate data of available statistics are used for comparative analysis between the two linguistic groups to determine what each sector has with regard to the establishment of industries and the number of anglophones in key positions of government institutions.

Generally when I started collecting data in 1987 people were quite ready to contribute to this study, an opportunity they hoped that facts should be put in writing for their children not to commit the same blunders, for the Cameroonians of tomorrow to know their point of departure and have a sense of direction in nation building. With the political upheavals in African countries inspired by changes in Russia and Eastern Europe, the political minded Cameroons led by Ni John Fru Ndi and Professor

Siga Asanga from the North West Province formed the Social Democratic Front (SDF) March 16, 1990, in accordance with article 3 (11 and 111) of the June 6, 1972 Constitution authorising the formation of Political Associations and Political Parties. This seemed an end to the monopoly of power by the single party, the Cameroon People Democratic Movement (CPDM) whose leaders have turned the wealth of the nation into a triumph of personal victory. Following these developments people became sceptical, particularly those serving the regime, to discuss political issues of any sort for the fear of arrest and torture by the dreaded secret police service (CENER) and Brigade Mixte mobile (BMM). The author in March 1990 was picked by secret police for discussing in a lesson to form three students of Bilingual High School Yaounde the origin of multiparty politics in French Cameroun⁷. The letter from the presidency to the Head of the secret police service stipulated among other things that the author an indigene of North West Province was the promoter of Multi Party Politics. The tensed atmosphere in the country prevented most independent and reunification actors to furnish me with eye witness accounts. One resourceful source that appeared and was of assistance, was the private press that went into reporting the events, recounting Cameroon's colonial and post colonial politics such as: Le Messenger, Le Combattant, L'Effort Cameroonians, La Detente, La Gazzette, Cameroon Post and Sunday Post. As the papers wrote or journalist spoke over radio or television so they were picked straight to either CENER or BMM.

Newspapers were banned and journalists suspended as the regime charged them for intoxication and disstabilisation.

The study commences from 1961 when reunification was effected although its causes go as far back as to 1916 when German Kamerun was partitioned by the British and the French. The thesis ends in 1982 that marks two decades of reunification and coincides with the resignation of Ahmadou Ahidjo. The thesis contains events after 1982 because of their relevance to the outstanding issues raised in the study.

The author hopes that this humble attempt to evaluate the political, economic and socio-cultural co-existence of the anglophones, and francophones in a reunified Cameroon since 1961 would inspire further researches into more details aspects of the union. It is also believed that this work in a wider scope will stimulate more scholarly works on other African countries in this third decade of African independence based on the present day reality. It is only when we learn to stand on our legs and accept criticisms and take advice that progress and unity can be attained. There is no credit in effacing a people's history no matter how small they are, as their reactions become catalysts of disintegration since there is no sense of belonging. The examination of integration ills and the proffer of policy guidelines, if encouraged, could contribute substantially towards the achievement of continental unity. The essential point is that the process should be in motion, hoping, that African Countries would have a breed of new leaders that would pay attention to their masses and the idea of creating a United Africa.

NOTES

1. The OAU and ECA meeting in Lagos in 1980 drew up a plan for Regional Economic Groupings and to encourage the existing ones as a prelude to an African Economic Union by the year 2000 - usually referred to as the OAU Lagos Plan of Action.
2. The Kamerun, this is the German orthography of the present day Cameroon. The German annexed the Kamerun in 1884 and the Kamerun remained under her control from 1884-1914
3. French Cameroon here refers to the Cameroon Republic which became independent 1st January 1960. The British Cameroons refers to the Northern and Southern Sectors of the British divided territory.
4. J. S. Nye, "Patterns and catalysts in Regional Integration" in International Organisation Vol. 19, 1965 p. 872.
5. William V. Neher and John C. Condom "The Mass Media and Nation Building in Kenya and Tanzania" in The Search for National Integration in Africa (Eds) David R. Smock and Kwamena Bentsi - Enchill, (London: Macmillan Publishers, 1976) p. 285.
6. Ibid p221
7. Convocation note No. 0086/CN/JP/90 of March 10, 1990.

CHAPTER ONE

BACKGROUND STUDY

1.1 Early Contacts with Europeans and German Annexation

This chapter deals with the history of the coming into contact of the Coastal peoples of Cameroon with Europeans; its eventual annexation by the Germans in 1884 and the consequences of the German defeat in World War I 1914 - 1918.

The year 1961 marked a turning point in the history of the Cameroons at the twilight of colonial era. By 1961 the Cameroons had undergone, in varied form, administrative and political "Unions" under the tutelage of three different colonial imperialists; and invariably was unfolding another historical process of going back to much of the geographical boundaries imposed by Imperial Germany. The historic event was the re-integration of the partitioned German Kamerun after forty-five years of British and French imperialistic domination.

The country, triangular in shape, is roughly 770 miles long and before 1961 had a total area of 195,881 square miles of which four-fifths or eighty percent was within the French Cameroon and one-fifth or twenty percent under the British. As from 1st October 1961, the year of the re-unification, the Federal Republic of Cameroon was left with 178,381 square miles because the result of the plebiscite of February 1961 had the Northern British Cameroons voting to remain an integral part of Northern Nigeria. The Cameroon territory made up of Bantu, Semi Bantu and Sudanic ethnic groups, stretches from the littoral region of the


Atlantic Ocean to the lacustrine lands of the Lake Chad. Historically the land mass has undergone varied strokes in name and form in the hands of the Germans, the British and the French.

European Contacts and German Annexation

Narrating this aspect of Cameroonian history is like going through the charade of a dramatic episode. Historically, Hanno, a Carthaginian, is said to have been the first explorer to visit the Cameroon coast. He had referred to the Cameroon Mountain² apparently struck with delight for the mountain's lights, as "Chariot of the Gods", a structure "at night full of fire". His analysis definitely would appear to have been referring to an eruption on the mountain, since from geological evidence the Cameroon Mountain is the only peak of such remarkable nature along the length of the Western Coast of Africa.

There is, however, no proper streak of any activity by the Carthaginian adventurer, but solid sources reveal that the Portuguese were the first Europeans to land on the coast of Cameroon in 1472,³ in their early exploratory journeys along the Gulf of Guinea. Commercial prospects were the loving bait, a development that graduated into the chief transactions in slaves, described with a touch of incisive analysis by P.M. Kale as "the most inhuman and nefarious and fanned by European powers either directly or indirectly".⁴ The main indigenous contacts in the initial European trade were the inhabitants of the Islands of Amba Bay and those of the mainland opposite the tiny islands of Fernando Po and Sao Tome.⁵

GERMAN KAMERUN



SOURCE: EYONGETAH, T. AND BRAIN, R.
A HISTORY OF CAMEROON,
(London: Longman Group Ltd; 1974 Page 68)

As European competition in trade raged on the Dutch replaced the Portuguese as the main external influence with trade links along the Cameroonian coast witnessing increased boost in volume and dimensional intensity in the 1700s. However, British traders began to build commercial bridgeheads into the Cameroonian Coast, eventually eclipsing the Dutch.

Remarkable changes were witnessed in the 19th century. At the turn of that century, Cameroon, as some sections of Africa, was not only in close contact with European but also with West Indies and Americas - a contact that was mostly linked to the trade in slaves. However, the abolition of the slave trade gave birth to the "new civilizing missions" by Europeans that took more or less a revolutionary nature. The evangelical crusade to Cameroon championed by the Baptist Missionaries such as Alfred Saker and Joseph Marrick⁶ began the new phase of veritably different approach in European contacts.

Interwoven with the missionary aspect was the basic interest in trade. The dominance of trade by the British through-out the first half of the 19th century was gradually and steadily challenged by merchants of other European nations, especially the steady growth of German enterprise in Douala by the 1880s,⁷ and the rise of two strong companies, R. H. Thormacehlen and Wœermann, expanding faster than most British concerns. The competition among European companies had invariably some political implications. Along the entire coast of West Africa rival expatriate interests were pressing their home governments

to take some kind of formal control in the trading areas. S. G. Ardener maintains that Cameroon chiefs themselves, possibly realising the trend of events and obviously to hold the trump cards began to seek formal association with Britain. It was on this premise that on August 7, 1879 King Acqua, Prince Bide Acqua, Prince Joe Gamer and Prince Lawton, addressed a letter to Queen Victoria pledging to place the Cameroon under Her Majesty's protection.⁸

The reluctance of Her Majesty's Government to reply to the numerous letters addressed to the imperial power gave the Germans the opportunity to manipulate the situation in their favour. The temporising attitude of the British was a cause for concern to the German traders, who like their counterparts were scared by the influence of the French moving northward from Gabon. The Germans in Cameroon bribed⁹ the Douala chiefs who changed side and transferred their allegiance from the British to the Germans. In July 1884, before Eugene Nachtigal arrived the Cameroon, the Germans on the spot had negotiated secretly with the chiefs for German annexation of the territory.¹⁰

As if destined, Nachtigal emerged in Douala on July 11, 1884 from Togoland where he had signed several treaties by which Togo became a German Protectorate. On July 12, 1884, Kings Acqua and Bell signed the treaty establishing German Protectorate. The annexation treaty with the Germans was signed just a day before the arrival of Her Majesty's envoy Consul Hewett, who had the mandate from his government to annex Cameroon. On July 14, 1884,

Nachtigal hoisted the German imperial flag in Douala near a German factor's station on the right bank of river Wouri and ceremonial salutes were fired in nearby towns.¹⁴ Thus the Cameroon became the German Kamerun in spite of the fact that other kings and ordinary people vigorously opposed kings Acqua and Bell for signing the treaty. The local opposition was to no avail as the German imperial rule was subsequently confirmed by the Berlin Agreement of 1884-1885, a particular historical decision that sanctioned the partition of the African continent amongst the European powers. The Berlin Act therefore confirmed the German occupation and gave greater impetus to her rule over the territory which lasted till 1916, when she was defeated during the World War I. That defeat deprived Germany of Kamerun with the colonial authority transferred to two other principal powers - Britain and France.

The First World War in Kamerun

The German hegemony over the Kamerun lasted for three decades (1884 - 1914), when she was called upon to stand the challenge of the Great War in August 1914. The First World War which caused the Germans to be ousted from Kamerun was fought in Africa, in the German colonies of Togo, Kamerun, South-West Africa and Tanganyika. As the war in Europe was going on, the allied powers marshalled their forces against German colonies in Africa. The war against Kamerun began late in the month of August after an allied forces' successful campaign in Togo. The British West African Frontier Force (WAFF) attacked Kamerun from

the Nigerian border and from the sea at Ambas Bay and Douala. The combined French forces of Equatorial Africa launched their assault from their Equatorial African bases and were supported by Belgian colonial troops from the Congo.¹²

The Kamerun campaign led by British General Debell and his French counterpart General Aymerick lasted eighteen months. The British forces were the first to enter Yaounde in January 1, 1916 and a week later were joined by the French forces. In spite of the allied superiority in men and material, the highly trained and disciplined shutztruppe i.e. German troops fought in serious defence of the territory. They gave the Allied Forces hard times during the campaign and escaped almost intact to Spanish Rio Muni (new Bata). An estimated number of 6,000 troops and 14,000 friendly civilians reached the safety of neutral interment.¹³

As the allied powers emerged victorious in Kamerun, Britain and France agreed in the interest of continued co-operation and amity,¹⁴ to partition the territory provisionally. The Anglo-French provisional boundary agreement was arrived at following a series of consultations between General Dobell representing Britain and General Aymerich representing France on March 6, 1916.¹⁵

1.2 Defeat of the German in Kamerun. The Anglo-French Condominium and Partition.

At the end of hostilities in 1916 British Forces had occupied mostly regions of the West, North and Central Kamerun.¹⁶

The French and Belgian occupied the remaining four-fifths (4/5) of the territory. Douala was jointly occupied by the British and French Forces. The condominium that existed in principle was established after an understanding between M. Delcasse, Sir Francis Bertie and Sir Edward Grey in September 1915. It was agreed that until the enemy had been completely vanquished in Kamerun, Britain and France would jointly provide an interim government. When the Germans were finally defeated in early 1916 Britain and France decided to end the condominium and partition the Kamerun against maintaining a status quo in the agreement of March 4, 1916.¹⁷ Before partition was effected the entire territory consisting neu-Kamerun which Germany had forced the French to cede in 1911, in recognition of her position in Morocco was re-annexed to their equatorial possessions.

The British and French generals Debell and Aymerich were charged with the execution of the March 4, agreement. Pere Englbert Mveng described this sordid event in these words:

"On March 6, 1918, General Dobell came and met General Aymerick in his office in Douala. He laid a map in front of him, and drew a line on it East of Nigeria separating from German Kamerun a zone of 80 to 60 kilometres, running from North to South from the hills of Yola. This zone he stated was the area his government wishes to be occupied by the British. The rest to be taken by France. Of the 750,000 square kilometres of Neu-Kamerun, the English took only an area of 53,000 square kilometre."¹⁹

It was because of this arbitrary division that the forces of nationalism that emerged in the late 1940s to 1950s in both trust territories equivocally advocated unification of Kamerun. It was the divided people who bore the ever lasting effects. While the French maintained their own sector intact with an independent administration although associated with French Equatorial Africa, the British again partitioned its narrow zone into Northern and Southern Cameroons and was administered as parts of Eastern and Northern regions of Nigeria. The people of Kamerun who have lived under the German protectorate for thirty years were now subjected to two different types of colonial experiences, yet with no say and participation in the administration of their father-land. The Anglo-French decision to partition Kamerun was carried out without the consent and knowledge of its people. Though the partition was said to be provisional pending the end of the war for a final verdict, there was absolutely no reserve clause that gave guarantee for a future re-unification.

V. G. Fanso points out that, the Anglo-French partition of Kamerun emanated from the fact that the imperial powers failed to come to a consensus to let one single power take control of the former German territory.²⁰ The traditional feud and colonial rivalries between the two powers dating back to the beginning of the 1880s' apparently made it impossible for them to co-operate in matters concerning territorial acquisitions in the colonies.

The long standing colonial antagonism was not the only single reason that can be advanced for the Anglo-French partition

of Kamerun.²¹ The economic potentials of the German protectorates attracted the rivalry of the two powers. Apart from the production and export of bananas, cocoa, ivory, palm produce, rubber and timber, there were promising signs of abundance of mineral wealth (which the post colonial era has proved to be true.) More to that there was considerable German capital already invested in Kamerun which appealed to both powers. Neither Britain nor France wanted all the property and wealth of the territory to go solely to the other. Consequently partition became the only acceptable solution to satisfy their ambitions. Moreover the British and French saw this as an occasion to revenge the coup Germany staged to annex the Cameroons on July 12, 1884, which humiliated both powers, especially Britain since the Douala chiefs wanted the territory to be under Her Majesty's Government protectorate. Thus the First World War, provided a unique opportunity for these powers to achieve their ambitions. Thus for these various reasons Kamerun could not escape partition.

The provisional line of partition, subsequently referred to as the "Picot" line finally allocated German Born and the triangular strip of territory having its base on the coast from the Rio del Rey to the Mungo River and its apex south of Yola to Britain. The rest of the territory east of this line went to France. Full negotiations to delimit and demarcate the boundary did not commence until after the armistice and the German surrender in 1918.

The talks to concretise the Anglo-French frontier brought up some standing issues in 1918 as negotiations resumed. The French in keeping with the terms of the treaty of Berlin wanted Garoua on the River Benue to enable her export and import goods through it without paying duty. The German part was vital to her because it would serve her landlocked possession of Ubangi-Shari and Chad. Britain on the other hand wanted Garoua in order to exclude the French from the navigable portion of the Benue and equally to prevent the possibility of the French railway line from Garoua northward to lake Chad, which Britain perceived would threaten the trade of northeastern Nigeria.²³ Britain also wanted to tidy up Nigeria's eastern frontier and to reunite within her sphere all the ethnic groups which they now believed had been split by the Anglo-German boundary. The British wanted the Mungo River to form the southern boundary.²⁴ Other areas that fell in British hands provisionally in 1916 included the Sultanate of Dikwa, part of Garoua and Bayo in the north. In the south her areas of jurisdiction embodied the districts of Dschang, Bamenda, Nkambe, Mamfe, Kumba, Victoria, Tiko and Rio del Rey. In this provisional deal France took the greater part of the territory, which was considered purely as temporary.

The British colonial administrator Lord Lugard was instructed to carry out on the spot negotiations and set up British administration in the British Cameroons. He felt disappointed, when he was instructed to allow the French control a greater part of the territory. He expressed his disappointment

to his wife in a letter stating that:

I have been able to locate the boundary of the Cameroons on the map. We are giving the whole to the French with the reservation of such an insignificant little strip, that it was hardly worth reserving at all ... The port of Douala is very important matter. It is the finest on the coast.

... For the rest, as you knew, I am not sorry except for the disappointment of the natives who have so loyally helped us - especially the Emir of Yola who has no doubt been led to expect that he would get at least some of his old territory back.²⁵

Professor Osuntokun further argues that Britain took so little a part of Cameroon owing to the fact that Lewis Harcourt, the Colonial Secretary, felt that the territory was expendable and could only be used to get concession elsewhere.²⁶ Although the arrangements were said to be purely provisional the French were determined to maintain what she had acquired in the final settlement while Britain that had never learnt from its hesitance over Cameroon matters wanted a new arrangement that would offer her more territory. In the final adjustment however, the British allowed the French to control the entire Banyo and part of Kotscha and the whole of Dschang. The French in turn surrendered the Mungo River to the British.²⁷

The final phase of the Anglo-French arrangement to delineate and delimit boundary over Cameroon was signed on July 10, 1919 by Alfred Milner for Britain and Henry Simon for France. The Milner-Simon Agreement established a new international boundary between the British and French Cameroon, since British Cameroons was integrated into Nigeria. The Anglo-German boundary in South-Eastern Nigeria, became an inter-provincial border between the Cameroons Province and the Nigerian Provinces of Calabar and Ogoja. In North-Eastern Nigeria, the border became inter-divisional in the provinces of Adamawa, Dikwa, Yola and Borno²⁸ to which the different sections of Northern Cameroons were incorporated. Those internal new arrangements did not alter the international status of the Anglo-German arrangement because Cameroon was a mandated Territory whose boundaries had international status.

The Anglo-French International Border in Cameroon 1919 - 1961

In accordance with the Milner-Simon Agreement signed July 10, 1919, the international boundary between British and French Cameroons in the north began from a point around Lake Chad.

It started from latitude $13^{\circ} 05'$ north and approximately $14^{\circ} 05'$ longitude east of Greenwich and stretched south-wards in a zig-zag form and entered the Atlantic Ocean in the South at a point 35° south-east.²⁹

The work to implement the Milner-Simon accord on the ground began in 1930, and it advanced to such an extent that the British and French officials were able to agree upon a protocol

describing almost the entire length of the partition territory thus provisionally defined.³⁰ In 1931, the protocol was ratified by the British and French Governments as a "preliminary study". This formed the basis for a final delimitation by a joint French and British Boundary Commission which began work in December 1937. The joint Commission continued to work until August 1939 when it was stopped by the outbreak of the Second World War. By this date demarcation had reached the vicinity of Mount Manenguba from the Coast.³¹ The Commission again began its work only after the cessation of hostilities in 1946. The Anglo-French new boundary like the Anglo-German boundary affected ethnic groups.

1.3 The Partitioned Ethnic Groups

The allied powers de facto partition of the Kamerun into what became known as British Cameroons and French Cameroon, affected a good number of ethnic groups. The Anglo-French Declaration, signed in Paris on 10 July, 1919 by Viscount Milner and M. Simon, legally sealed the delineation of the border dividing the former German Protectorate into two parts.³² This arbitrary partition was, as usual, without the consent of the nationals and like the 1884 Berlin Act partitioning Africa, it did not take into consideration the cultural and political units along the divided line. This artificial boundary running from the mouth of River Mungo in the south to the tip of Lake Chad in the north fragmented consolidated families and political units.

The two entities therefore, had certain ethnic continuities between them. In Southern British Cameroons, some tribal groups

that were affected by superimposed artificial boundary as the Mungo, Balong, Bakossi, Basossi in Victoria and Kumba Divisions respectively³³ straddle the boundary while in Mungo Valley, the Bangwa peoples farther to the north in Mangu Division were separated from their kinsmen of the East.³⁴ At the Coast were other groups with close affinities that were balkanised. The most important are the Bakolle, Bamboko and Bakweri - all offshoots of the Douala.

The Colonial authorities especially the French did not permit interaction among the groups and strictly controlled emigration from the French sector to the British Sector. The emergence of the re-unification idea was perceived by some groups as likely to exacerbate the local cleavages by altering the balance of power which had been achieved between the groups. The doctrine of ethnic affinity between the two territories championed by many apostles of the reunification idea had far reaching consequences. The multiplier effects of this doctrine extended far beyond the frontier tribes. Other groups, while not divided by the new frontier, nevertheless have close kinship ties with people in the other state as between Bamoun and the Nso. The ruling family of the Bamoun Sultanate is said to be a "brother" of the Fon of Nso, and also that the Nso are derived from the Bankini, one of the three branches of the Bamoun. They both emigrated from Rifum as confirmed by V. G. Fanso but separated at a river-crossing.³⁵ The "brother" of the Fon of Nso went west and established the Nso Fondom while the Bamoun brother

in the east established the Bamoun dynasty. The cultures of the two groups have changed as the Bamoun embraced the Islamic faith as its tradition. This is confirmed by the Bamoun transformation of the traditional designation of "chief" or "Fon" to the Muslim application of "Sultan". It was on tribal ties across frontiers that Sultan Njoya Arouna, a non-northern ally of Ahidjo, was the first to influence him to support reunification because he, the Sultan, favoured it.

The officials of British and French administrations set up new border customs posts on both side of the demarcation line. Border guards were also stationed by both imperial powers to patrol the borders in an attempt to impose duties on people and goods passing from one side to the other. Some of these stations which served at the same time as customs posts were Bel, Santa, Tombel and Tiko in British Cameroons. Prominent customs posts in French Cameroon included Douala, Mbanga, Loum, Nkongsamba, Dschang and Balatchi (to be indicated in a map). These controls were practical measures to hamper interaction in trade and family visits and were greatly resisted by the partitioned people.³⁶

EFFECTS OF NEW FRONTIERS

The problems that arose from the arbitrary separation of a once-united people were many and complicated. As said earlier, families that belonged to the same cultural groups of societies were indiscriminately separated and usually given different names in order to justify their separation. In the north the new border demarcated the Gude people into two and to justify that

action those of the French side were called Djimi.³⁷ The Emir of Yola expressed his indignation that the European had cut off the body and left him with only the head of his Kingdom.³⁸ Because of the kingship ties it was difficult for due respect to be given to the newly created artificial boundaries. As on the Anglo-German border, cultural and economic links between the border people were so strong that the restriction on the Anglo-French boarder were hardly effective. In certain areas the border was even unknown to the partitioned people. Thus in June 1938 two villages in Adamawa went into open quarrel over farmland, each laying claims that the land in question was on their side of the border. The British and French officials stepped in fast to rescue the situation.³⁹

The French administrative system was relatively harsh and led to frequent crossings of the border either to escape from the Corvee, indigenat or taxation. Both Administrations were confronted with a common problem, that of increased crime wave in the border areas. Since the partitioned sectors had no formal trade agreements smuggling and the buying of smuggled or stolen goods became very profitable trade.⁴⁰

The artificial boundary that divided the people invariably gave rise to several "national" loyalties.⁴¹ It is perhaps for this reason that the forerunners of active nationalism were mostly the inhabitants of the border region. These flag-bearers led the way in efforts to convince the traditional rulers and the elite of the areas to rally against the partition and the two-

power policies, and also in the campaign for re-unification and self-government.⁴² These earliest nationalists, particularly those who emerged from the French Cameroon, sincerely detested French imperialism. The leaders of the Union of the Populations of Cameroon (UPC) Felix Moumie from the Bamileke region and Um Nyobe from the Littoral (Douala) region perceived that immediate reunification and independence, neutral of foreign influence or domination would be the only bulwark against French and British imperialism. The permanent feature of the situation was that the present Anglo-French Frontier did not only partition ethnic groups but, in some places, areas which were natural economic entities. The inconveniences cause were, in fact, deep-rooted in the minds of the people by the fact that they were new difficulties produced by an arbitrary act of the Western Powers at the end of the 1914-18 War. In the Southern Cameroons the clans that were actually partitioned by the frontier championed the reunification question in the south on a wider scale. Most of the peoples who provided such educated opinion in the Southern Cameroons had ethnic affinities with peoples in the French Cameroon and a natural fear and dislike of the dominant tribes, particularly the Igbo, of Eastern Nigeria. Moreover, while physical contact with the French Cameroun was naturally easy, there were extreme natural difficulties in the way of contact between Southern Cameroons and Eastern Nigeria. This was aggravated by the paucity of shipping facilities between Victoria and Calabar and Port Harcourt. Hence, in the absence of good


alternative communications with the British ports of Victoria and Tiko, people such as the Balong and Bakossi of Kumba Division saw their economic development lag sadly behind that of their neighbours in Mungo and Wouri Divisions in French Cameroun and were fully aware that their unfortunate condition was due to the establishment of the frontier.

Dissatisfaction in the British Cameroons with the Frontier arrangements was first ventilated when the United Nations Visiting Mission arrived in the territory in 1949. Out of sixty-six petitions and supplementary petitions to the Trusteeship Council submitted by the people of British Cameroons and Nigeria at that epoch, eleven raised the frontier question in some form or the other, and twelve of the petitions from the French Cameroun did the same.⁴³ These petitions laid less emphasis on concrete proposals for unification but dwelt extensively upon the inconveniences arising from the frontier control. The educated class in Southern Cameroons in June 1949, was anxious for close union with Northern Cameroons in order to jointly achieve regional status. The prospect of union with the French Cameroon was mentioned but not seriously considered. When the United Nations Visiting Mission arrived in November 1949 the Northern Cameroonian elites were still asking for a regional status rather than secession from Nigeria. The unification with the French Cameroon was put forward as an ultimate, but not an immediate aim. By 1950, the demands for regional status was more vigorous in the Southern Cameroons, since the Northern Trust Territory was

more comfortable in the Union with the Northern Region and saw no need of a separate status. The trend of events in the Eastern Region pushed Southern Cameroons to think more seriously about Secession, independence and unification with French Cameroun as an aim to be actively pursued.

In the British Cameroons, the Kamerun National Democratic Party (K.N.D.P) Leader J. N. Foncha who became the torch-bearer of independence and reunification, after the architects of the idea, Dr. E. M. L. Endeley and N. N. Mbile backed out, received the mass support of the partitioned peoples of both sectors in Southern Cameroons. The wealthy Bamileke people based in French Cameroun assisted the KNDP financially in a bid to secede from Nigeria and effect reunification. Both imperial powers were unnerved by the activities of these frontline nationalists and became very sceptical of their future in the trust territory. The militant UPC was banned in French Cameroun and other pro-colonial parties were encouraged to come to the limelight. In French Cameroun by independence these frontline nationalists were off the scene and the Colons installed puppets in their places to protect their interests. This is perhaps why Andre Mbida who became the first prime minister and his successors who were neither reunificationists nor forerunners of the idea had nonchalant attitude towards the whole deal and some described it today as "marriage without divorce". (Marriage sans divorce).

CAMEROON UNDER BRITISH / FRENCH RULE 1916-61



SOURCE: EYONGETAH, T. AND BRAIN, R.
A HISTORY OF CAMEROON,
(London: Longman Group Ltd; 1974 Page 96)

PART 1

1953 Estimates TABLE 1

Principal Ethnic Groups Groups	In the East CAMEROUN	Cameroons BRITISH TRUST Territory	Their Distribution And Estimated Strength Notes.
I. Southern Nigeria		155,000	Igbo (25,8000) Ekoi - Anyang - Boki, etc. Mainly now in West Cameroon.
II. North Western and Coastal Bantu.			
Douala	45,000	2,000	Group with first European contacts Ca 70,000 now in West Cameroon
Bakwiri - Mboka	-	18,600	
Mbo (Bakundu)	25,000	44,410	
Bassa-Bakoko	195,000	-	
Other	2,000	4,000	
III Cameroon Highlander			
Bamilike	549,000	51,800	Bamileke in East Cameroon living in de'partments of Dschang, Bafoussam, Mbouda, Bafang, and Banganfe, Emigres live outside these five departments; Ca 427,800 of this group now in West Cameroon
Emigre Bamilike	100,000		
Tikar and affiliates	12,500	260,000	
Widekum and other Bamenda	-	114,000	
Bamoun	80,000	2,000	
Banen	26,721	-	
Yambasa	796,221	427,800	
IV Plateau Nigerians			
Mambilla	12,500	36,000	
Tigon	-	15,000	
Jukun	-	10,000	
Ndoro and Jibu	-	10,000	
V Equatorial Bantu			
Betii-Pahouin	655,000	-	Beti-Pahouin includes: Ewondo 459,000
Maka	64,000	-	Bulu 128,000
Djem	41,000	-	Fang 48,000
Other	13,000	-	


Table 1b

VI Eastern Nigritic			
Baya	84,000	-	Mostly pagans. Those in East Cameroon often include as Kirdi, Ca, 20.000 of this Group now in West Cameroon Chamba includes Bali
Mbum	74,000	-	
Duru-verre	43,000	-	
Vule (Bute)	16,000	-	
Namchi	10,000	30,000	
T. Chamba	4,000	20,000	
Other			
VII Islamized Pagan			
Mandara	40,000	50,000	
Kotoko	<u>25,000</u>		
	65,000		
VIII Chadic			
Shuwa (Choa) Arabs	45,000	52,000	Islamised Negroes of the Sahara fringe. Aprox. 15,000 of this group now in West
Kanuri	5,000		
Hausa	5,000		
XI Fulani (Peul, Fulbe, Poulah etc.)	395,000	72,400	Approx. 15.000 Fulanis now in West Cameroon

Sources: Victor T. Le Vine. Cameroon from Mandate to Independence, (Connection: Greenwood Press Pub. West Port, 1977) P.12-14

This table shows the population of those groups that were effected by the Anglo-French Partition of 1916 and those that were not affected.

NIGERIA FRENCH CAMEROON CUSTOMS POSTS 1955



1.4 British Cameroons Under the Mandatory and Trusteeship Systems 1916 - 1961.

At the end of the Great War in 1918, most Cameroonians were of the opinion that the Germans would come back. To their greatest dismay this was not the case. The struggle over who should re-annex the ex-German colonies between Britain, France and Japan became a stormy issue.

On May 7, 1919, the Supreme Allied Council of five, the USA, UK, France, Italy and Japan, called on Britain and France to make a joint statement to the council on the future political status of the Kamerun and Togo. None was prepared to define overtly under what terms they were to administer the Kamerun just as none was prepared to accept that the former German protectorate should be turned into mandated territories. When the French representative appeared before the Council he did not mince words. France considered its occupation of the ex-German territories as "annexation pure and simple", arguing that she had won both territories by force of arms (Cameroun and Togo) and that she saw her partition of the Kamerun as a sort of Alsace-Lorraine that would return to "the full sovereignty" of France.⁴³ France quite aware of the reverses she had suffered in the hands of Germany, during the Franco-Prussian War and First World War, blatantly objected to the idea of administering any German ex-Colonies as mandates because the Germans would lay claims to it once peace was restored.⁴⁴ The French feared particularly the strategic position which Kamerun occupied and believed that

should the maritime base be given back to the Germans, they would resume their expansionist policy. P. M. Kale points out that the German drive was to link the Cameroons with their East and Central African Colonies, thus cutting into two the African Continent.

The British on their part, initially refused to hand over their sectors of the Kamerun and Togo to the Mandate's Commission. The British held that the areas they were holding were small and that for convenience it would be advisable to administer them as parts of the adjacent territory (Nigeria) to which they were unified by ethnicity.

President Woodrow Wilson, a humanist, was not of this opinion and propounded that the colonies should be "Internationalized". General Smuts, the South African delegate proposed that the colonies should be put under the Permanent Mandate Commission (PMC) of the League of Nations, but assigned to Great Powers, that should rule the territory under supervisions of the International Body.

This formula was adopted but problems cropped up not only because they had different economic levels of development but also because they were all not German colonies.⁴⁶ Negotiations dragged on for a long time before the Kamerun and Togo were placed under the mandate system. Generally the League of Nations arrived at a consensus and three mandated categories were created: Mandate "A" consisted of more advanced countries made up of Syria, Lebanon and Palestine; Mandate "B" grouped averagely

advanced colonies viz Burundi, Ruanda, Cameroons, Tangayika and Togo, and Mandate "C" peopled mostly by backward people such as those in South-West Africa, New Guinea and the Islands of Samoa.⁴⁷

It was on this premise that a "mandate Territory" in articles 22 of the covenant of the League of Nations was defined as territory which, as a result of the Great War, had ceased to be under the government of the state which formerly ruled it and whose peoples were not yet about to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world. The new colonial masters were entrusted with the task of ensuring the well-being and development of the people under their tutelage and yearly reports on their progress was to be sent to the League of Nations.⁴⁸ What was astonishing is that the mandate system undermined the main principle underlying the creation of the League of Nations which evoked a guarantee of independence of all states both big and small. The principal articles that governed the Mandatory System did not make mention of the political emancipation of the peoples of the mandated territories as regards self-determination.

The outbreak of the Second World War in September 1939, put an end to the League of Nations and its Mandate System. The Germans had hopes of recovering their lost colonies. But unfortunately she was defeated and with the creation of a new world organisation - the United Nations Organisation, the League of Nations' "Mandate System" was transformed into the "United

Nations Trusteeship". The United Nations Trusteeship set in motion new impetus in favour of the colonised territories for eventual attainment of self-determination. Invariably British and French Cameroons continued to develop differently under the principle of the Trusteeship Council. The Trusteeship system brought a lot of changes and made Cameroonians to become more politically awakened.

British Administration in the Cameroons

The British hegemony over what she carved out as British Cameroons in the Anglo-French arrangement of 1916, was formally approved by the League of Nations on July 20, 1922 as a fait accompli. The British administered its sector of the partitioned territory as part of Nigeria. For what they termed administrative convenience the territory was fragmented and infused into the various regional administrative units of Eastern and Northern Nigeria. Southern Cameroons was administered as part of the Eastern region and Northern Cameroon was administered as part of the provinces of the Northern region.

Article 9 of the British mandate for Cameroon confirmed Britain's right to administer the territory as an integral part of Nigeria and to constitute the territory into a customs, fiscal or administrative union or federation with Nigeria provided that the measures adopted to that end did not infringe on the provision of the Mandate.⁴⁹ British Cameroons was therefore an integral part of Nigeria in the same way as other constituent parts of the Country.

British Administrative Structure

The Southern Cameroons Province had Buea as its capital. The Resident was based in Buea. He was assisted in his administrative task in the Province by four Divisional officers who were in charge of Victoria, Kumba, Mamfe and Bamenda Divisions. The Resident in Buea was responsible to the Lieutenant Governor at Enugu, the capital of the Eastern Region.

Administrative Ordinances

The Nigerian Government legislated for the British Cameroons by Ordinances. The British Order in Council, 1923 reads:

It shall be lawful for the Governor and Commander-in-Chief for the time being of the Protectorate (herein after called the Governor) from time to time by ordinance to provide for the administration of justice, the raising of revenue, and generally for the peace, order and good government of the said portions.⁵⁰

The ordinance of February 28, 1924, enforced the application of a bulk of Nigerian laws in Cameroon except where local circumstances did not permit. By this date also all German laws ceased to operate in the territory. Some ordinances were specified only for the Cameroons such as ordinance No. 27 of 1930 which provided that "the Cameroons under British Mandate" shall substitute the words "British Cameroons" wherever they occur in Nigerian Legislature.⁵¹

The Nigerian Legal System was also extended to British Cameroons by Ordinance No. 3 of 1924. Native Courts were set up

in the British Cameroons after the pattern of those that existed in Nigeria.⁵² The courts were grouped in four categories A, B, C and D. The grade "A" court had powers in civil and criminal cases but could not pass death sentences unless it was sanctioned by the Governor after consultation with the Executive Council. Grade "B" had the jurisdiction to handle civil actions, debts or damages not exceeding 50 pounds. It could impose imprisonment of not more than two years for criminal offenses; Grade "C" courts were empowered to handle cases involving debts, civil actions or damages not more than 20 pounds, it could sentence the offender to a maximum of six months imprisonment for criminal offences. Grade "D" courts handled civil matters, debts and damages not exceeding 10 pounds and could impose three months imprisonment. The local rulers were appointed judges. By the end of 1924, the British Cameroons had twenty eight native courts.⁵³

Ordinance No. 3 of 1924 also instituted Provincial Courts in the British Cameroons like those that existed in Nigeria.⁵⁴ The courts were established at Provincial and Divisional levels. The Resident of the Province was its Chief Judge who presided over all Civil and Criminal matters at Provincial levels. The Divisional Courts were presided over by District Officers whose powers were limited to fines not exceeding 50 pounds in either claims or damages, it could not sentence a criminal for more than two years. The Provincial and Division courts unlike the local courts tried both local and non local people. In Northern Cameroon the Muslim Law were enforced as in northern Nigeria.

There was the Supreme Court of Nigeria which with the consent of the Chief Justice of Nigeria, criminal cases from the Provincial courts could be referred to on the application of the accused or of the Provincial Court itself. The Supreme Court of Nigeria held its first Assize in Buea Southern Cameroon in December 1928.⁵⁵

The Nigerian Educational System modeled on that of Britain was introduced in Southern Cameroons on September 1, 1927. Education fostered a closer union between Nigeria and the Cameroons. It was in the Nigerian institutions of secondary and higher education that Cameroon nationalist leaders like Dr. E. M.L. Endeley, J. N. Foncha, N. N. Mbile, P. M. Kale, S. T. Muna, Peter Nsakwa and Bernard Fonlon received their Western Education. In Northern Cameroons efforts were made to introduce Western Education in the area alongside Muslim schools. The slow evolution of Western Education in this sector accounts for the slow political awareness that manifested itself during the independence and re-unification struggle.

Indirect Rule Policy

Following the ordinance enacted, extending Nigerian Laws into the British Cameroons, the administering authority on their part introduced in 1921,⁵⁶ the "indirect rule" system that was prevailing in Nigeria. The Indirect Rule System was first introduced in Northern Nigeria by Lord Lugard when he conquered the Fulanis and discovered that the system was convenient, leading to its application to parts of Nigeria.⁵⁷ This system

involving the establishment of Native Authorities in which the local chiefs were employed and encouraged to manage their affairs and yet answerable to the colonial authority by implementing its policy. The Indirect Rule as a "policy" was implemented in British Cameroon by Cadman, an administrative officer who was transferred from Northern Nigeria for that purpose. Sherwood Smith, a colonial District Officer in Southern Cameroons commenting on Cadman and his mission had this to say:

... Cadman had been posted to the Cameroon from the Northern Provinces to instruct us in the Northern system of administration. Guided by him we began to inquire into the history of the local people. We hope that by winning their confidence we could persuade the traditional leaders of the various communities to emerge from the obscurity into which the Germans had driven them and help us to revive the old village councils and to establish clan councils. From these beginnings we hoped to evolve eventually, larger units which could be given control over their own markets, roads, schools, and internal affairs generally and the money with which to administer them.⁵⁸

The Emirs and traditional rulers in British Cameroons became agents of the Administration. In Northern Cameroons the Indirect Rule system confirmed the authority of the Muslim princes over

their subjects as a fait accompli. The non-Muslim minority communities vigorously resented the system on the basis that it subjected them to the hegemony of the Muslims with whom they had lived in antagonism.

The Native Authorities had, in addition to the local courts and councils they presided over, maintained order, collected taxes and organised community works.

The Indirect Rule policy came under severe criticism from various spectrums of the society. Lord Raglan remarked that it was bad in principle and practice and that Africans were essentially democratic in their political institutions. He observed that:

Many African tribes have no chiefs; many chiefs have religious functions. The most despotic were not irresponsible since their powers were limited by tribal customs and their vagaries checked by fear of deposition ... He further stated that "If we have faith in our civilization, our science and our abilities, it is our duty to administer the Africans as we should wish to administer ourselves, if we were in their position."⁵⁹

Advocates of Indirect Rule held that it was educative. It rested on the belief that every system of government, if it is to be permanent and progressive, must have its roots embedded deeply in the framework of indigenous society. The policy of Indirect

Rule, therefore, enables the people to maintain self-respect in preparing them, as Direct Rule does not, for complete self-government in the days when they would be capable of being independent.⁶⁰ The system did not usher in political awareness, as the Native Authorities became conservative tools in the hands of imperialists who were out to suppress the aspiration of the more rapidly growing societies.

This was the system of administration the British transplanted from Nigeria to the Cameroons for a period of forty-five years, which was seen as beneficial and suited to her needs at the early stages of the British rule. With all these supposedly good intentions it was, however, apparent that there was palpable lack of interest on the part of Britain from the onset, such as could be described as haphazard and full of misgivings. Given the fragmentation and incorporation of British Cameroons as part of the various provinces and regions of Nigeria and understanding and cause for many criticism, one question Britain's sincerity that Indirect Rule was aimed at preparing the people of the Cameroons for self-rule. Some have argued in the face of consequent event, that the British lack of interest in piloting the territory as a unit to eventual self-determination is attributed to the fact that British like France was afraid that Germany would one day demand the return of her former colonies, the Cameroons being one. Thus the territory made very insignificant economic and social progress. This issue led to anti-British feeling in the post Second World War.

1.5 FRENCH ADMINISTRATION IN FRENCH CAMEROUN

France like Great Britain, assumed limited sovereignty over her part of Kamerun, later called French Cameroun, under Article 9 of the Mandate Agreement, an international treaty which was legally binding. The French colonial administration commenced officially in July 20, 1922, under the French constitution of 1875 which remained in effect until 1940. Like British Cameroons that was linked with British Nigeria, the French Cameroun was associated with French Equatorial Africa (L'Afrique orientale Francaise (L'AOF). The French Government set up administrative structures in Cameroun based on "Direct Rule" similar to those prevailing in her Equatorial African possessions. France that emerged, controlling about four-fifths of the former German colony of Kamerun, had similar terms like Britain over French Cameroun. Like Britain she had the right to set up a new administration in Cameroun similar to that in her neighbouring African possessions. She naturally then had the legal right to administer her sector as an integral part of French Equatorial Africa as the British in Nigeria did to their Cameroon Sector.

However, France did not do so, but instead decided to rule Cameroun as an entity separate from her Equatorial African possessions,⁶⁰ although as part of French Colonial Empire. As Victor T. Le Vine points out, until the starting course of events after 1944 forced recognition of the increasing political ferment in its colonial empire, France never for one moment doubted the fact that the metropolis and the colonies would develop into a

single, integrated political and economic entity.⁶¹

Administrative Organisation

The administrative set up the French introduced in Cameroun differed from that which existed in her Equatorial Africa Colonies.⁶² The territory's chief administrator was a "Commissaire de la République" i.e. a Civil Commissioner of the Republic answerable to the Minister of Colonies. He was the repository of the powers of the French Republic equivalent to those of the French Colonial governors. With such powers covering both administrative and military matters, the Commissioner of the Republic appointed regional administrators, district officers (chefs de Circonscription). He presided over the Administrative Council (conseil d' d'Administration) and also (conseil du Contentieux administratif) responsible for judicial organisation. These administrative organs were consultative bodies, made up of administrative personnel and resident European notables. The Commissioner consulted them on important matters viz budgetary matters, land taxes, and public works. It was not until 1927 that the indigenous notables started being members of the various advisory bodies.

Though some few Cameroonians became members of the advisory councils, the French administrators in Cameroun in actual practice like those in other French colonial territories in Africa did not consult their indigenous administrators (subjects) for they claimed to know far better what they considered best in administrative dispensation.

The policy of assimilation and the policy of paternalism which characterised the entire French Colonial system perpetuated by French administrators in the field led to the establishment of "Direct Rule". By these policies France hoped to transform the colonised people into French citizens and their territories would become overseas provinces of France. (France d'outre Mer). Neither paternalism nor assimilation in theory contemplated the maintenance or utilisation of African political institutions. To the French, under the assimilation policy direct rule was to prevail until the Africans had attained a point whereby they would be also to manage their own affairs within the framework of the new political and administrative regime that France had established. On the other hand by the policy of paternalism direct rule would be a permanent feature of French administration.⁶³

The French administrators made judicious use of the traditional rulers, not very much because they needed their collaboration like the British, but because they lacked money to deploy French officials all over the territory especially in the distant areas of the Northern, central and Western regions of Cameroun. The Chiefs in these three regions who retained much authority and influences among their people became the agents of French colons. The chiefs were not permitted to exercise their functions according to their traditional laws and customs. The French administrators used these traditional rulers to achieve their exploitative aims and thus antagonised them with their

subjects. Chiefs who refused to carry out their orders were frequently dethroned and the people of the chiefdom or Fondom forced to accept the arbitrarily enthroned ones who were subservient to French will. One of the prominent "artificial" chiefs the French appointed was Charles Atangana,⁶⁴ whose loyalty to France was avowedly so pronounced after the German defeat that he was reinstated not only in his former position as chief in Yaounde but his authority was extended to include the Bane tribe. He died in 1943 but because of his sincere loyalty to the French colons, a statue was erected in his honour in Yaounde in May 1959.

One prominent traditional ruler who suffered the fate of French policy of appointing artificial chiefs was Sultan Njoya of Bamoun. He ran into conflict with the French administration when the French created a number of chieftancies in Bamoun directly responsible to the administration than to the Sultan. The Sultan responded by trying to engineer a rebellion against the new imperial regime. The French retaliated by depriving him of his traditional tributes and placing him on an annual stipend. The squabble within Sultan Njoya led to his deposition in 1931 by Commissioner Marchand and he was exiled to the capital Yaounde where he lived until his death in 1933.⁶⁵ The various oppositions the French administrators met as regards the installation of artificial chiefs made them in the 1930s to consider some public opinion before appointing any type of chief.

In Southern Regions where chiefdom did not exist, the French created them and district chiefs were appointed (chef de Canton). The district chiefs were directly under the authority of the colonial administration, and concerned with fulfilling the will of the colonial administrators.

In spite of encroachment of French colonial administration most of the traditional rulers in the West and North regions of French Cameroun continued to wield considerable authority in the management of affairs in their jurisdictions at the local level.

Paternalism, as practised in Camerouns during the mandate period, gave the Camerounians neither the rights of French citizens nor protection under the French legal code.⁶⁶

The League of Nations attempted to control French Colonial rule through the hearings at the Permanent Mandates Commission (PMC) Geneva in which the annual reports on the French Administration were examined and French delegate often accompanied by the High Commissioner was subject to questions.⁶⁷ Such assessment were based on the reports submitted each year by the French. Requirements stipulated that the reports so submitted was to contain full information concerning the measures taken to implement the provision of the mandate. Yet this was ineffective to control French imperialism and exploitation in Cameroun. In spite of the Mandate Commission's control, the French government insisted, contrary to Article 3 of the Mandate for Cameroon, "Upon the right of recruiting natives to serve in

Europe; -- and of maintaining entire liberty in regard to public works."⁶⁸

One aspect of the French administration which impinged on the daily lives of Camerounians was the indigenat. In Cameroun, like other French territories in Africa, a distinction was made between persons subject to native custom (sujets) and those covered by European law (citoyens). The group of people classified as "SUJETS" were those subjected to the indigenat, which as Thomas Hodgkin, puts it "deprived them of the liberties of criticism, association and movement, and gave to the French administrator power to inflict disciplinary penalties, without trial, for a wide range of minor offences"⁶⁹. The French Colons used the indigenat to punish workers who abandoned their jobs and farmers who failed to produce the foodstuffs demanded of them.

Those who were exempted from the indigenat alongside with the assimilated citizens (citoyens) included:-

1. Indigenes who served in the (FRENCH) colonial forces, including their wives and children.
2. Regional chiefs (chefs de Region)
3. Indigenous members of the administration receiving fixed salaries.
4. Indigenous members of deliberative assemblies
5. Assessors serving on Native Tribunals
6. Indigenes who have been decorated either with the Legion of Honor or the Medaille Militaire.⁷⁰

The above exempted category of people were however not put on the same level with the citoyens, the former could still be subjected to the penalties if the Commissioner thought it proper. One serious consequence of this system was the emigration of numerous Camerounians to British Cameroons or away from Cameroon to neighbouring territories viz Nigeria, Bata, Fernando Po during the inter-war period. People of Southern Cameroun suffered greatly from being conscripted to work against their will. The Colons used this labour force not only for the extension of the railway and the construction of roads, but it was employed illegally to work for an indefinite period on private European plantations without payment. This oppressive policy further intensified emigration to Rio Muni and British Cameroons.⁷¹ These emigrants were later to constitute a core of activists advocating unification of the two Cameroons as a means of freeing the French Sector from French imperialist domination.

The policy and its application generated discontent not only among the Camerounians but also among the Colons. The indigenat policy was generally condemned by the French administrators attending the Brazzaville conference in 1944. The general attack on it all over French Africa led to its abolition in 1946 in all French colonial territories in Afrique Noire.

The French constitution promulgated on October 27, 1946, established the French Union. The Union was made up of Metropolitan France and the Overseas Departments and Territories. It also embodied the Associated Territories and Associated

States. French Cameroun and Togo, with the provisions of the constitution were administered as Associated Territories of the French Union.⁷²

The French Government signed the Trusteeship Agreement concerning the Mandate in the Cameroons but her rule was however not similar to those of the British with regard to British Cameroons, but was considered by the French Government to be in harmony with the place assigned to French Cameroun as an Associated Territory within the French Union. The new status of Cameroun as an Associated Territory within the French Union constantly came under attack in the United Nations Trusteeship Council and Cameroun's political circles.⁷³ What angered Camerounians was that Cameroun was not only associated with "Afrigue Equatoriale Francaise (AEF) in terms of similar colonial administrative policies, but was directly linked with the French metropolitan government as a French Colony.

The contention was therefore that neither the United Nations Charter nor the Trusteeship Agreement for French Cameroun made any mention of such a concept as the French Union. There was no legal justification for the inclusion of the trust territory in that Union. This criticism did not change very much the French decision to include Cameroun and Togo as associated members of the French Union. The French Cameroun however benefited from the absence of compulsory military service, custom levies, control of alcohol and the rights of foreign missionary establishment during the French colonial rule.

The economic developments of the two Cameroons was slow particularly in British Cameroons. Apart from the German created plantations, roads, infrastructures and buildings in British Cameroons, little development was experienced during this period (1916 - 1960). In French Cameroun the French effected developments since they never thought of leaving. Their colonial policy led to an influx of white settlers who controlled the economy; a development that later was to be a strong force that influenced political decisions in French Cameroun.

The dualistic political arrangement in the Cameroons was diametrically opposed to each other; the British colonial administration was characterised by apparent lack of interest but France had high zeal for assimilating her portion into the French Union in defiance of the international agreements governing Cameroon's status. The colonial power became more alert when in the 1930s Adolf Hitler began advocating for the return of all Germany's former African possessions and it led consequently to a change of attitude by both imperial powers in the Cameroons. Political activities were encouraged to denounce Nazi propoganda. The more oppressed people of French Cameroun were more receptive to Hitler's call than their fellow countrymen of British Cameroons. The French Cameroonians earnestly disliked the French for their harsh policies, especially the indigenat and the corvee (force labour).

The White Settler Community in French Cameroun
Its Impact on the Political and Economic Sphere.

The partitioned territory in its later years attracted white emigrants. This was mainly in French Cameroun. The French white settler community became a vital force to be reckoned with, in directing the political and socio-economic affairs of French Cameroun and its influence has been deep-rooted in the veins of society from then to the present day. With the French policy of making the territory one of its overseas provinces, "Les petits blancs"⁷⁴ poured into Cameroun. This was in contrast to British Cameroons, which did not attract white settlers probably because of her laissez-faire attitude.

In French Cameroon the total number of white settlers increased in their geometrical ratio; from 3210 in 1944 it grew to 5,800 in 1948, the number then jumped to 13,173 in 1952 and by 1956 it stood at 17,000.⁷⁵ These petits blancs were labourers or petit bourgeoisie who had come to Cameroun in search of fortune and sometimes had difficulty earning a living⁷⁶ as France was just coming out of the disastrous World War II. The phenomenon brought along with it two basic consequences at all levels of the economy. Whites were employed in positions for which Camerounians could have easily been engaged or trained. It was now revealed to Camerounians how much their future job prospects were hindered by French immigration policies and for the first time Camerounians came into contact with whites who held onto cultural superiority on which French colonialism rested.

The white settlers feared that the "wind of change" blowing through French Colonial Africa seriously since the Brazzaville conference, would blow away many of the benefits the war had brought to them. In September 1945, the colons hosted a meeting in Douala⁷⁶ rallying their colleagues from all over French colonial Africa; a conference aimed at instituting their political demands in anticipation of reforms from Paris. The Colons in Cameroun particularly were those who had developed a habit of spending their vacation in racist South Africa and return to Cameroun with the aim of institutionalizing racism in Cameroun but the French government put an end to the obnoxious idea. The French cadres dominated both sectors of French colonialism. Thus in the industrial sector, during the early 1950s, over a thousand whites were salaried employees. In the Civil Service their number became even more apparent at each level of the administrative hierarchy. Hence in 1955, at the top level (le cadres generaux) general staff, there were 1,379 Frenchmen to 85 Camerounians.⁷⁸

When the double electoral college was introduced, the French Community successfully achieved political representation in the local Assembly as well as in the metropolitan Assemblies. The French colons used their powers to hinder the political evolution of the territory even involving changes considered necessary and moderate by the colonial administration. The colons did a lot to shape the trend of events in Cameroun. They had invested in the colony in agro-industrial sectors, and a good majority formed the

auxiliary staff of the administration. They were bent on directing the future of the territory so as to safe-guard their gains. To this effect therefore, they were opposed to trade unions, and political parties that did not protect their interests. This is why U.C. Union Camerounise formed in 1937 and (UPC) Union des populations du Cameroon, were banned in Cameroun. Election malpractices and molestation of political opponents were employed by the colons, in collaboration with the French colonial administrators. These very colons, influenced the British Colonial Secretary via the French minister for Colonies to put pressure on Dr. E. M. L. Endeley, premier of Southern Cameroons to dislodge the UPC nationalists that took refuge in British Cameroons and the white settlers were at the root of the riots in French Cameroon after the Second World War.

The colons who were planters, were found mostly in the Mungo region, particularly in small towns of Nkongsamba, Lomé and Melong. Their plantations differed greatly from those of the Camerounians. Like their counterparts in the Ivory Coast, they engaged in large scale farming geared essentially for export market. They exploited the cheap black labour force to promote their large scale plantations. The statistical analysis of the black labour force, employed in this capitalist orientated agricultural sector increased from 17,348 in 1932, to 51,983 in 1936. This alarmed the Permanent Mandate Commission (P.M.C) members who began to question the difference between the Cameroun Labour force and the supposed French Policy of constituting a

"native peasantry".⁷⁹

The colons produced principally cocoa, palm produce, banana, Robusta coffee and Arabica coffee and their economic prosperity only ran parallel with the impoverishment and increased misery of rural Camerounians.

One major effect of the Second World War on Cameroun was that it led to the prosperity of the Colons, who, using the slogan "L'effort de guerre", produire, c'est Combattre"⁸⁰ intensified the use of forced labour. Under this pretext the colons got cheap and free labour to work on their plantations, a cruel rhythm, of employing labour under the pretext of war. Like in Kenya where the Kikuyu were prohibited from cultivating some cash crops as sisal and cotton, the colons carefully kept Camerounians off the production of the main cash crop as bananas for export until 1946. It led to social unrest in the Mungo region, involving the Camerounians, the colons and the colonial administration.

At the end of French imperialism, the colons and the French colonial administrators continued to exercise influence in post-independent Cameroon. The colons therefore became agents of French commercial concerns and the colonial administrators as "consciller technique" (technical adviser). On the economic sphere the colons suffered great losses from the UPC guerrilla activities, a movement which they, the French, caused as a result of the ban they influenced through their home government. The colons and their property became targets of attack in towns and

the country side where they had their plantations. The response from metropolitan France was swift and prompt. French troops were dispatched to Cameroon to put an end to the menace. The guerrilla activities were concentrated in the Bassa region, Douala, Mungo and the Bamilike areas.

The colons having succeeded in putting a pro-French government in power, proceeded to set up colonial structure to maintain their standards of living. There were schools and clubs exclusively for them as if it was in racist South Africa. One remarkable achievement the French accomplished for the Francophones was the tactful and dynamic manner in which they directly or indirectly piloted the political trends of the Cameroun in their favour. The ease with which the southern Cameroons delegates at the Fouban Constitutional Conference naively accepted the reunification terms was due to adroitness of the French colonial legal advisors. One colonial legacy left in place by the colons is the CFA currency introduced in British Cameroons in April 1964. The two shift system of work introduced by the French colonial administration left much to be desired. It has a negative effect on the work force as regards out-put in all sectors, but for 29 years of independences the Francophones have been blind to realize its consequences. As shall be seen under the critical analysis of harmonisation and assimilation, this system of work schedule which is not even practiced in metropolitan France has been operating in Cameroun since 1916. Perhaps this is still a relic of French "superior culture" and

civilization necessary for the people as propounded during colonisation.

In the conservative British sector, the few white administrators and businessmen packed their luggage and left following the declaration of Southern Cameroon's independence and reunification. While it was normal that with the ending of the Trusteeship Mandate, the colonial office in London had to withdraw its administrative staff, the question remains as to why Britain closed down the subsidiaries of its multi-national corporations in Southern Cameroons: United Trading Company (UTC) John-Holt, Elders and Fyffes and Leventis were British business concerns operating in Southern Cameroons. It became logical that the total withdrawal of Britain from the territory she had ruled for forty-five years was in blatant protests as to why Southern Cameroons opted to re-integrate with French Cameroon. By behaving in this manner Britain hoped to see Southern Cameroons crumble as soon as possible to justify her objection that Southern Cameroons should not re-integrate into French Cameroun, not to be independent, but remain part of Nigeria.

NOTES

1. The Germans called the Territory Kamerun when it was annexed in 1884. When the combined forces of Britain and France defeated the Germans in 1916 Kamerun was partitioned and the English sectors was called British Cameroons and the French sectors Cameroun.
2. The Bakwerian who are the natives of the region call the Cameroon Mountain, the highest peak in West Africa as Mount Fako.
3. E. Ardener, Coastal Bantu of the Cameroons (London: International African Institute, 1961) p.6.
4. P.M. Kale Political Evolution in the Cameroons, (Buea: Government printers. 1966) P.4.
5. Ibid.
6. As a sign of appreciation for the marvellous work these missionaries did in Cameroon, Alfred Saker's status was erected in Victoria and a girl's secondary school opened in that named after him. There is also a secondary school in Ndu-Nkambe named after Joseph Marrick (J.M.B.C.) Joseph Marrick Baptist College. The two missionaries were British.
7. S.G. Ardener, Eye - Witnesses to the Annexation of Cameroon 1883 - 1887, (Buea: Government Printers, 1968), pp 19-22
8. Ibid
9. Ibid
10. G.P. Murdock, Africa: Its Peoples and their Cultural History (New York Mc Graw - Hill Book Co. 1959) p.45

11. V.G. Fanso. Trans Frontier Relations And Resistance To Cameroon - Nigeria Colonial Boundaries 1916 - 1945.
(Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis University of Yaounde) 1982.
12. V.T. le Vine, The Cameroons from Mandate to Independence
(California: University of California Press, 1964) p.31
13. Kirk Green Adamawa Past and Present (London: Longmans Gp. Ltd. 1968) pp70-78.
14. A. Osuntokun, "Great Britain and the Final Partition of the Cameroons 1916 - 1922" in Afrika Zamani, Reviews of African History. No. 6 (December 1977) P.53
15. Ibid
16. V.T. Le Vine, Op.Cit P.32
17. R.H. Rudin, Germans in the Cameroons 1884-1914 (New Haven; Yale University Press 1938) PP. 97-95. Also see Jean Surete Canal, French Colonialism in Tropical Africa 1900 - 1945 (London: C. Hurst and Co. Ltd, 1971) PP. 122-123
18. Ibid.
19. Engelbert Mveng, L'Historie du Cameroun. Tome II (Yaounde: CEPER, 1985) P.117. (My translation.
20. V.G. Fanso, Op.Cit P 122
21. R. Robinson, J. Gallangher and A. Denny, Africa and the Victorians (London: Macmillan, 1961) PP 330-331.
22. M. Picot was the chief French delegate to the London Anglo-French Kamerun Frontier talks.
23. Waladji, "Cameroon-Nigeria Boundaries" in Abbia Yaounde, 1968, Vol. 7 P; 192.

24. Lugard to his wife Flora, March 14, 1916, cited in Margery Perham, Lugard, Years of Authority 1898-1945 (London: Longman Group Ltd. 1946) p.544.
25. V.G. Fanso, Op.Cit PP 127-128
26. Ibid
27. Engelbert Mveng. Op.Cit P.119
28. A. Osuntokun, Nigeria in the First World War (London: Longman Group Ltd, 1979) P.231
29. British Cameroons Annual Report, 1949. P. 12
30. George Atem. Cameroon - Nigeria Relations 1884-1960. Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, (University of Calabar, 1982) P. 367.
31. Treaty Series, No. 34,1931, London, Boundary between British and French Cameroons.
32. H.N.A. Enonchong, Cameroon Constitutional Law, Federalism in a mixed Common - law and Civil-Law System (Yaounde: UNESCO Press, 1967) P.53
33. Following the creation of the United Republic of Cameroon in May 1972, Ahidjo's government changed all the Divisional Names in former West Cameroon: Victoria division named after Queen Victoria by Alfred Saker to Faka Division, Kumba to Meme, Mamfe to Manyu Bamenda to Mezam, Nso to Bui; Wum to Menchum and Nkambe to Donga-Mantung.
34. Alembong NOL Tanyi, "An Analytical Survey of Nweh Rites of Passage Songs, (Unpublished Doctoral de Troisieme Cycle, Thesis, University of Yaounde, 1986) P.39

35. V.G. Fanso, Cameroon History for Secondary Schools and Colleges, Vol. I (London: Macmillan, 1989) PP. 34-43.
36. Ibid
37. Bawuru, M Barkindo "The Mandara Astride the Nigeria-Cameroon Boundary" in Partitioned Africans (ED.) A. I. Asiwaju, (Lagos University Press, 1984) P. 38.
38. Ibid.
39. British Cameroons Annual Report 1938. P 12.
40. Bawuru. M. Barkindo, Op.Cit P. 43
41. British Cameroon Annual Report 1939 P. 13
42. V.G. Fanso, Trans-Frontier Relations and Resistance to Cameroun - Nigeria Boundaries Op.Cit PP. 430-441.
43. Raymond Leslie Buell, The Native Problem in Africa, Vol. II (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd. Edition, 1965) P.279. Also see Edwin Ardener "The Kamerun Idea" Part I & II, West Africa, June 7, 1958, P.537.
44. The fears the French expressed had grounds. When Hitler came to power in Germany in the 1930s he began agitating for the return of all Germans lands including its African colonies.
45. P.M. kale, Op.Cit. P. 14
46. Engelbert Mveng. Op.Cit. P.125.
47. Ibid.
48. Interview with Professor Ayissi Bruno, (50) Yaounde 20 May 1988.

49. The League of Nations Official Journal: Twelfth Session of the Council, February March 1921, Also in the booklet of the nineteenth session of the Council, 1922 P. 170.
50. P.G (1920) I. File No. 200/1920 Cameroon Law Administration (N A B) National Archives Buea)
51. British Cameroons Annual Report, 1930. P:5
52. British Cameroons Annual Report, 1925. P:27
53. British Cameroons Annual Report, 1924. P:19-20
54. British Cameroons Annual Report, 1925. P:23
55. British Cameroons Annual Report, 1928. P:34
56. Annual Report on the Social and Economic Progress of the People of Nigeria, 1933. (Lagos Government Press, 1933) P:6.
57. Sir Alan Burns, History of Nigeria, (London: George Allen & Unwin 1963) PP. 46 - 50.
58. Sherwood Smith, Recollection of British Administration in the Cameroons and Northern Nigeria 1921-1957. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1969) P:20
59. Lord Reglan cited in P.M. Kale's book, Political Evolution in the Cameroons, PP 9-10.
60. Ibid
- 60b. Journal official de la Re publique Francaise, Annexe, 7, September 1972, PP. 416 - 422.
61. V.T. Le Vine, Op.Cit P.88.
62. French Equatorial Africa was made up of middle Congo, Congo, Oubangui - Chari and Chad Each territory had a lieutenant Governor who was later on called the Governor of the

colonies but Cameroon had a Civil High Commissioner of the Republic because of her status as a Mandated Territory.

63. David E. Gardinier, Cameroon United Nations Challenge to French Policy. (London: Oxford University Press, 1963) PP. 11 - 12.
64. Charles Atangana, an Ewondou was an interpreter who first served in the German administration. In 1912 in recognition of his services, the Germans made him chief of the Ewondou people. He became a second Lieutenant during the First World War. When the Germans were defeated he escaped with the Germans to Rio Muni and later asked the French to permit his return and they did.
65. League of Nations Permanent Commission, minutes and Reports of the Twenty-second meeting, 1932. Geneva, VI 205 Report du Cameroun, 1931, P.24
66. David E. Gardinier, Op.Cit P.16
67. Richard A. Joseph, Radical Nationalism in Cameroun, Social Origins of the U.P.C (Oxford University Press, 1977) PP 24 - 25.
68. Raymond L. Buell, The Native Problem in Africa, Vol. II (New York: MacMillan Company, 1928) P: 278
69. Thomas Hodgkin, Nationalism in Colonial Africa, (New York, 1951) P.35.
70. V.T. Le Vine Op.Cit P.100
71. Richard A. Joseph, Op.Cit PP 26 - 29
72. Article 60 of the 1946 French Constitution.

73. FN/UN. Visiting Mission Report on Cameroon Under French Administration 1950, Yaounde, P.51.
74. " Les Petits blancs" Meaning Ordinary whites (My translation) were French citizens who come to the colonies to seek for a fortune either as government officials of businessmen. Most of these ordinary whites were usually less qualified academically, deficient and were dominantly from the peasant background.
75. Joseph a. Richard Op.Cit P. 149
76. Ibid
77. Jean-Surete Canal, French Colonialism in Tropical Africa 1900 - 1945 (London: C. Hurst Co. Ltd., 1971) P.45
78. B. Porcher, L' Africanisation des cadres au Cameroun En form, No. 23, 1955) PP 13 - 14
79. The League of Nations P.M.C/03/1937 Session P.14.
80. "Efforts of the war, to produce is also fighting the battle" My translation.
81. E.A. Brett, Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa, The Politics of Economic Change 1919-939, (New York: Nok Publishers, 1977) pp.201-206

CHAPTER II

BIRTH OF NATIONALISM IN BRITISH CAMEROONS

II.1 The Impact on Cameroons of Nationalism in Nigeria from 1940-1950.

Nationalist Movement in its serious sense did not exist in British Cameroon before the 1940s. From 1916, when the Kamerun was partitioned, to the outbreak of the Second World War, British Cameroons gradually underwent administrative integration as part of the Nigerian protectorate. Neither the Germans nor their successors, the British, did encourage nationalist movements in the territory.

Nationalist movements that emerged later in the territory owed much to the turn of events following the two World Wars and subsequent integration of British Cameroons into the main-stream of Nigerian politics. One remarkable advantage derived from this union was the way Nigerian politics influenced the thoughts of Cameroonians, particularly those in South Cameroons.¹ This equally broadened their outlook to international issues and perspective. Like a backwash effect western educated Cameroonians inter alia began to question British Colonial policies, agitating for autonomy within Nigeria and equally intending to seek for self-rule and independence on a broader perspective.

The educated elite in British Cameroons invariably based their presumptions on the analysis of the fact that all things being equal, the clauses embodied in the declaration of the

Atlantic Charter² of August 1941, by the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill and the United States President F.D. Roosevelt, should apply to the Cameroons. The substance of the Atlantic Charter forcibly re-echoed the old Wilsonian ideas in its declaration of "the rights of all peoples to choose the forms of government under which they will live".³

The western educated British Cameroonians, like their politically conscious counterparts in other colonial territories of Africa and Asia were set to use the very ingredients that western education imparted in political ideas, techniques and consciousness to fight the colonial masters and their policies to seek self-rule. In some cases the methods so employed were either constitutional or aggressively unconstitutional. In this regard, the fall outs of the World War, in either the fighting or avowed statement by western states, inspired an era that generated serious political thinking in British Cameroons, as events began to unfold, it affected their peoples over the decades that followed; a development that continued into present era as will be revealed in this study.

Being administered as integral parts of the Eastern Region and Northern Region of Nigeria respectively, Southern and Northern Cameroons were invariably drawn into the mainstream of Nigerian politics. The development came through participation in the Nigerian legislative council and then, in political movements in Nigeria, a participation that was not actuated in definite sense until 1942. That was when the Cameroon Province got

representation in the Legislative body in Lagos, although the legislative council legislated for the Cameroons before then.

The Nigerian Youth Movement⁴ was the first political organisation to attract the attention of Cameroonian elite. Such political associations in inter-war years in African political developments sprang up in the new metropolis of African territories. They catered almost exclusively for the interest of urban dwellers and were, in that concept, parochial in orientation. By mid-thirties, Herbert Macaulay's Nigerian National Democratic Party (which dominated Lagos politics since the Clifford Constitution of 1922) began to lose its popularity as a new political organisation, the Lagos Youth Movement founded in 1934, was turned into a national organisation and rechristened the Nigerian Youth Movement. The new body had the cream of young Nigerian intellectuals among whom were Dr. Vaughan, H.O. Davies, Nnamdi Azikiwe, Dr. Kofo Abayomi and Obafemi Awolowo.⁵ The clauses contained in its ambitious charter, included the developing of a united nations out of the diverse elements to be found in Nigeria. The achievement of autonomy within the British Empire, advocating mass compulsory and free education, better conditions of service and greater African participation in the higher executive cadre of the civil service,⁶ were some very thoughtful essentials in political awareness that were bound to generate some measure of agitation among Cameroonians that came in contact with. A host of western educated Cameroonian resident in Lagos were impressed with the movement's objectives

and so directly or indirectly took part. Names that could readily be recalled on this roll were P. E. N. Malafa, and P. M. Kale.⁷

There were two articles in the charter and constitution of the Nigerian Youth Movement that were particularly appealing to Cameroonians: one was that which stressed on "developing a United Nations" out of the conglomeration of the peoples who inhabit the territory and the other opposing the process of land alienation by foreigners. The inception of capitalist plantation system threatened to upset the local agrarian arrangement of the peasantry. At the time, in Benin, Warri, Calabar and Cameroon Province, large plantation were already in existence and the peasant population was being converted into regimented labour force, some even in labour camps.⁸ The idea that the political movement could retrieve, for the indigenous inhabitants, their traditional land; to check the growth of plantations and to liquidate existing ones were of instructive relevance to the Cameroonian situation where the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC)⁹ occupied almost all the Bakweri land.

In 1940 the Nigerian Youth Movement was "paralysed" by internal crisis; a crisis due primarily to the introduction of tribal politics and some element of class distinction within the rank and file of the party. That unfavourable climate had its own pay-offs in further political resurgence. Some patriots of Cameroon and Nigeria found it necessary to create another forum where problems confronting the populace could be tackled. With

the political experience acquired from the Nigeria Youth Movement, P.M. Kale founded the Cameroons Youth League in Lagos on March 27, 1940. Leading personalities of the League included Dr. E.M.L. Endeley, John Ngu Foncha, Nirius N. Mbile, Lifio Carr and P.E.N. Malafa.¹⁰ The Cameroons Youth League thus turned out to be a forum for Cameroonians to effectively formulate their policies and press for their realisation.

The political awareness imbibed by the Cameroons people from the Nigerian Youth Movement, was bound to continue in a more vigorous and dynamic way because there was no other political arena within which Cameroonian leaders could participate effectively. It is worth knowing that neither the Mandate Commission nor the Trusteeship Council provided any worthwhile medium for the Cameroonians to air their views on public and social affairs. The people undergoing a second colonial tutelage were simply dominated by the administering authorities. However, one visible setback in the formation and operation of this organisation was that it had no members from Northern Cameroons. This probably might have been due to their absorption in Northern Nigerian affairs and less attention paid to the political advancement of British Cameroons as a separate entity.

The Cameroon Youth League had as its motto "Unity and Co-operation". It was the first effective movement to articulate the feelings and aspirations of the British Southern Cameroonians. A forceful impact of the League began to be felt in the Cameroons Province as from 1945. The League established

branches in almost all the divisions of the province. A significant political integration equally began to take shape. Members of the Cameroon Youth League became prominent members of "Zik's" party (NCNC) National Council of Nigeria and Cameroons. the NCNC founded August 21, 1944, had as its main objective the hastening of political development in Nigeria and Cameroons but at the inaugural meeting held at the Glover Memorial Hall, no Cameroonian was elected into the first executive council made up of the following provincial officials: Herbert Macaulay, president; Rev. J.O. Lucas, M.A. Jino Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, General Secretary and L. P. Ojukwu, Treasurer.¹¹

In French Cameroons the wave of Youth Movements in Africa in the inter-war years gave birth to the "Jeunesse Camerounaise" (JC) in 1933, as a cultural and social improvement society. When Hitler came to power and began to agitate for the return of German former colonies it came under the pressure from France to transform that political organisation into the "Jeunesse Camerounaise-Francaise", (Jeucafra) with considerable French membership and influence.¹² Like the Cameroon Youth League in British Cameroons, "Jeunesse Camerounaise Francaise" was the genesis of political parties in French Cameroun.

While Southern Cameroons was instructively gaining political consciousness, Northern Cameroons remained politically dormant as far as political awareness was concerned, an issue that could have been also due to slow development of western education in the part of the trust territory. The NCNC as a well established

political party was introduced in the Cameroons province in 1946, with its prominent personalities in the Cameroon Province including P.M. Kale, N.N. Mbile, L.M. Namme, Motomby-Woleta, R.N. Charles and other noble associates including Dr. E.M.L. Endeley, J.N. Foncha, Sampson A. George, Solomon T. Muna, Martin Foju, V.T. Lainjo and J.C. Kangsen¹³. In addition to its appealing objectives, the NCNC was very popular because of the attack it launched on the Richard Constitution, between 1945 and 1950 a very factor of political awareness that made it top attraction to the Cameroonians between 1944 to 1952. The group of young Cameroonian politicians that took lesson from such developments in Nigeria formed the crust of Southern Cameroons political figures who were in the fore-front of the Cameroons' independence and reunification struggle.¹⁴ Dr. E.M.L. Endeley and Dr. John Ngu Foncha became Premiers of Southern Cameroons respectively before the 1961 reunification. Foncha later became the first anglophone Vice President of the Union and was latter succeeded by S.T. Muna. These were all political figures who worked closely with the NCNC before Southern Cameroons became autonomous and some of them dissociated themselves from Nigerian politics.

The Southern Cameroons' Political parties that emerged in the 1950s had much in common with Nigerian major political parties as did those of French Cameroun with party affiliation in metropolitan France. Mr. N.M. Mbile, leader of the Kamerun peoples party (KPP), was greatly influenced by the NCNC leadership. A testimony to such embracing impact is contained in

his unpublished memoire where he wrote that:

In Lagos I got caught up in this raging political storm, and found myself not only a fervent disciple of Zik's teaching and ideas but for the Zik's press a chain of seven newspapers spread all over Nigeria at the time.¹⁵

N.M.Mbile's admiration for Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe re-orientated his political thinking. The sound organisation of the NCNC and the attack it launched on the Richard Constitution between 1945 and 1947 made Mr. N.M. Mbile believe that South Cameroons could have a better future in association with the Eastern Region. He therefore drifted from the strong unification current that was raving in Southern Cameroons. The KPP ideology of integration with Nigeria, as part and parcel of the Eastern Region, attracted the concern of Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe. To spur this idea and win the confidence of the peoples of Southern Cameroons Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe initiated the creation of the Cameroon development agency and the Santa Coffee Estate in Bamenda Province.

The KPP was not alone to drift away from the unification idea due to the impact of the Nigerian politics; Dr. E.M.L. Endeley leader of the Kamerun National Congress (KNC) and pioneer reunificationist attracted by Action Group political programme also turned his back to the idea of reunification. He was greatly influenced by Chief Obafemi Awolowo's Socialist ideology and believed that in alliance with the Action Group Southern

Cameroons would benefit immensely in union with Nigeria as a separate region than with French Cameroun.¹⁷ It was on this premise that Dr. E.M.L. Endeley, with a new concise notion of the Southern Cameroons status within a federated Nigeria and posing as a social democrat, won the elections of 1955. The Action Group (AG) that emerged in 1950, an offshoot from the Egbe Omo Oduduwa, founded in 1948, had "begun to play a dominant role in constitution making"¹⁸. Dr. E.M.L. Endeley was impressed with the proposed constitutional changes voiced by the AG and Chief Obafemi Awolowo's statement in his book Path to Nigerian Freedom captivated Endeley's interest. He propounded that; "the educated minority in each ethnical group are the people who are qualified by natural rights to lead their fellow nationals into higher political development." Chief Obafemi Awolowo's Action Group therefore supported the KNC politically and financially in its struggle for an autonomous region within the Nigerian Federation.¹⁹

The NCNC did not wilt in its support to her allied party the KPP to become part of the Eastern Region in the Nigerian Federation. The NCNC to arouse political awareness in the Cameroons started a long tour of Nigeria and the Cameroons from April 22 to December 21, 1946. The delegation, led by Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe included Dr. Olorun Nimbe, Oyeshile Omage and M. A. O. Jinou. When it arrived the Cameroons Province in September 1946, P.M.Kale was among the delegation. The NCNC delegation entered the Cameroons through Mamfe and was warmly received by the people

of that administrative unit. Zik and his entourage proceeded to Bamenda where he addressed NCNC militants in Bamenda and Nso before visiting Kumba, Buea and Victoria in the South of British Cameroons.²⁰ All along Zik explained to the people why the NCNC was much against the Richards Constitution and the "obnoxious Bills". He told the people that the constitution fell short of meeting the aspirations of the peoples of Nigeria and the Cameroons. Zik outlined the inconsistencies of the imperial administration; inter alia, he told the people the imperial administration represented Britain and not the people. The Richard's constitution was therefore undemocratic hence unacceptable to the NCNC. On land bills, Zik pointed out that all lands in the Trust and Protectorate territories of Cameroons and Nigeria were occupied by the population and consequently the government could not declare any land to be "vacant". Zik equally attacked the British policy of deposition of traditional rulers and the enthronement of those they wished. Perhaps it was based on the defence of the rights of the traditional rulers that in Bamenda the red-carpet reception accorded Zik embarrassed the District Officer and his administration. The District Officer, in his report to the Resident in Buea, had this to say:

... Zik was allowed to sit on a chair reserved for visiting Europeans when calling on the Fon and Council - it was draped with ceremonial blankets and a ceremonial umbrella was fixed nearby. No one other than a chief has ever

been given such privileges - in fact those draperies are usually reserved for the Resident's visit. The mere D.O. just gets a bare chair. I took the Council to task about this. They said that they had done it because of the ex-soldiers' story that Zik was the most important African in Nigeria and therefore to be received as a very big chief. They realized from my explanation that this was not so, and expressed regret at having been responsible for condoning a grave breach of native custom.²¹

Wherever Zik and his entourage went a large crowd was on hand to welcome them and listen to their message.

Through these political activities nationalist ideas in Nigeria spread to the Cameroons. It marked a turning point in the political evolution of the territory for it was the first organised effort to educate the British Cameroonian masses, politically. It would not be exaggerating to say that Zik's tour was the genesis of political emancipation in the Cameroon Province. Before 1946 the people of British Cameroons were more concerned with how to respond to the exploitative demands of the British Administration on the one hand, and on the other, how to cope with integration into the Nigerian society which Britain deliberately imposed on them. These issues attracted and occupied more of their time and consequently less attention was

given to politics per se.

As Southern Cameroons struggled to win political influence in the union with Nigeria, Northern Cameroons was quite dormant in its political orientation at the time; they remained more united and comfortable with their Northern Nigerian brethren.

The NCNC tour of Nigeria and Cameroons, yielded financial dividends, to enable the NCNC delegation present its grievances in London as the population responded favourably and the sum of 13,500 pounds was raised for the delegation to go to London.²² The delegation's aim was to iron out the burning issue of the Richards constitution with the Secretary of State for Colonies. The powerful seven-man delegation that piloted the destiny of the peoples of Nigeria and Cameroons was received in London on August 13, 1947 by the Rt. Hon. Arthur Creech Jones, British Secretary of State for Colonies. The delegation was made up of Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, Nyong Essien, Adeleke Adedoyin, A.B. Olorun Nimbe Funmilayo Ransome-Kuti (Mrs), and Bukar Dipcharima from Nigeria²³ and P.M. Kale from the British Cameroons. The delegation though, remarkable, came back without concrete achievements.

The constitution, however, had a partial positive effect on the political development of the Cameroons. The Cameroons Province was now allowed two Native Authority members to represent its interests in the Eastern Legislative Assembly. The two Cameroonian representatives were Chief Manga Williams for Victoria and Galega II, Fon of Bali, Bamenda. Northern Cameroons which was as yet not a separate province as the Southern

Cameroons was not represented in the Northern Legislative Assembly. There was however the Emir of Dikwa who was a member of the House of Chiefs by right, as a first class chief, not necessarily representing the Northern Cameroonians. Since the Richards Constitution sanctioned the British Cameroons as integral parts of Nigeria, the Cameroons therefore did not have any separate representation in the Central Legislative Council in Lagos. To this effect the Richards Constitution was not a progressive step on Cameroonian political advancement.

The absence of Cameroons' representatives in the Central Legislative Council generated discontent among the political leaders of the Cameroons Province. The Lagos administration came under severe criticism. Mr. H. Cooper, the Government Public Relations Officer, in a lecture delivered at Kumba on May 9, 1948, gave reasons why the Cameroons Province lost its seat in the Central Legislative Council in Lagos. He pointed out that the Cameroon Province could never achieve economic independence hence its destiny ought to be linked with that of Nigeria. He maintained that the loss of direct representation was part and parcel of the overall plan of imperial Government to promote unity between Nigeria and Cameroons.²⁴ Today in retrospect, Mr. Cooper and the British Government could be seen to have committed a serious political miscalculation as it is this Cameroons province that is the economic life-line of the United Cameroons Republic. The Richards Constitution ignored the wind-of-change that was blowing across the continent in Post-World War II years

Nationalists not only in Nigeria and Cameroons, but all over Africa were very determined to put an end to colonial rule; nothing was to bar them from this march to freedom.

II.2 Movement Towards British and French Cameroons

Reunification 1950-1960

The road to unity that was achieved on October 1, 1961 started on the grounds that Kamerun had once been an entity under the German. As the British Authority was effecting socio-economic and political integration with Nigeria there were underground forces that were aimed at a wider Cameroonian nationalism.²⁵ In the whole struggle, as seen earlier under partitioned ethnic groups, the people of Southern Cameroons as "a whole" were more committed to the struggle than their counterparts in French Cameroun. The idealization of a "Kamerun Nation" was based on socio-cultural, political, and economic grievances that made Southern Cameroons' political leaders determine to detach "their territory from Nigeria and reunite with the French Cameroun."²⁶ The nationalist struggle took a more wider and committed dimension in British Cameroons from the period of the Macpherson constitution in 1951 to the epoch of the plebiscite in 1961 in Britain Cameroons.

The nationalist struggle for a Kamerun nation had several factors that buttressed the unification idea. The Cameroonians were dissatisfied with the British administration of the territory as part of Nigeria and because the Cameroons was only about one-twenty-eighth (1/28) of the protectorate of Nigeria its

representative were dominated by Nigerians in the legislative assemblies. It was also evident that as a part of larger Nigeria, the British Cameroons was not receiving enough revenue from the central government for its development. These grievances coupled with other local issues led to the development of the concept of "Kamerun personality" among the elite in both British and French Cameroons, a projection of the evolving philosophy of Pan-Africanism.

The Concept of Kamerun Personality

The concept of Kamerun Personality primarily was based on the assumption that the people of the territory had existed in the past as a single "Kamerun Nation," and in spite of the arbitrary fragmentation into two separate colonial administrations, the nation persisted as an entity.²⁷ Cameroonian nationalists held that the German rule, despite its harshness, had forged or fostered some degree of unity among the diverse people of Kamerun in spite of the differences in socio-cultural affinities and ethnic diversity.

The Cameroonians, conscious of this fact, came to a conclusion that the divided Kamerun could unite as in the pre-1914 era to draw on concerted strength to solve the numerous problems confronting her. The ideas that surrounded the concept of "Kamerun Personality" went far beyond Edwin Ardener's "Kamerun idea" which emphasised the separate colonial history of Cameroon away from that of Nigerian politics.²⁸

The desire of the militant Southern Cameroons' politicians for a "Kamerun Nation" was expressed in the names given to their political parties that were founded in the Trust Territory in the 1950s. The names of all the political parties in the region began with "KAMERUN" symbolizing the darling wish for a re-united Kamerun as had existed under the Germans from 1884-1916. Thus there were in Southern Cameroons, the Kamerun United National Congress (K.U.N.C). Kamerun National Congress (K.N.C.), Kamerun People Party (K.P.P.), Kamerun National Democratic Party (K.N.D.P.), Kamerun Unity Party (K.U.P) and One Kamerun (O.K). The word "KAMERUN" therefore occupied an important place on the Southern Cameroons political spectrum. In this connection it became an important touchstone for Cameroonian nationalists, a potent and evocative symbol of a mythical "golden age" when the Kamerun was one and undivided.²⁹

In French Cameroun the forces of unification were not universal nor enthusiastic as in the British Cameroons. The Union of the Population of Cameroun (UPC) was the earliest single political party that fully embraced the idea of unification as a cardinal point in its programme but it did not use "KAMERUN" in its name. The trade union movements and political parties that emerged in French Cameroun were affiliated organs of metropolitan French movements in Paris as shall be discussed in chapter three. What occupied French Cameroun political leaders and the local elite was getting themselves assimilated, a process that would gain them French citizenship. The questionable and rather

obnoxious policy of assimilation and paternalism erased nationalistic feelings in French Cameroun. The French Camerounians unlike their compatriots in British Cameroons were busily concerned with thinking in terms of becoming French citizens rather than thinking of the glory of a one time German Kamerun. Unification appealed to the UPC leaders and was cherished by the people of the littoral and the Bamilekes of Western region because they suffered the fate of partition during the Anglo-French condominium. The bulk of French Cameroun that was not affected by this inhuman and arbitrary action of the imperialists perceived unification as an ambitious political venture and were encouraged in this respect by the French Colonial authority who saw unification as an end to their exploitation of Kamerun. This assertion supports the fact that the leadership of the reunited Kamerun that fell into the hands of non-unificationists made them treat the Southern Cameroonians, who had opted for the idea of a Kamerun Nation, as an annexed people and not as compatriots. If Ahidjo's Union Camerounaise (UC) conceded to the idea of unification following the fall of his boss Mbida, it was purely to canvass for votes from among the dynamic Bassa and Bamileke people of French Cameroun who had championed the causes of unification.

Many factors emerged to promote the concept of a "Kamerun Nation" based on the notion of a Kamerun personality in the minds of British Cameroonians, consequently whipping up anti-British and anti-Nigerian sentiments. Elders in British Cameroons

recounted their contributions, under German rule, to the development of roads, railways and Douala sea port which fell within the French sphere after the partition of the Kamerun in 1916. They felt cheated and wished for unification which would restore their legitimate access to these facilities that their brothers in the French sector were enjoying. In 1949, the Bangwa people in a petition to the U.N.O. Visiting Mission to British Cameroons requested that the UNO should effect Bangwa unification with the French Cameroun or ratification of the Anglo-French border in Cameroon.²⁰ If such a ratification were effected, most ethnic units along the Anglo-French border viz the Mbo, Bakossi, Bossossi, and Bangwa might have preferred the French Sector to which they had more ethnic relations and the second fact was admiration for its overall development.³¹ The partition gave occasion to individuals and interest groups to test the sincerity of Wilsonian doctrine³² and their disappointments stimulated the formation of a variety of groups which were fathers to the later nationalist parties in Kamerun. Traditional rulers and the local elite bitterly resented the parties.

When pressed by the British imperial authority to sign in favour of the British sphere of influence over the Cameroons, shortly after the provisional partition, the Fon of Bafut objected arguing that the Germans might come back to govern the territory as it was in 1914 before their departure.³³ The British failed in all their endeavours to convince elders and local chiefs that it was impossible for the Germans to return.

This was a commitment on the part of the people that worked in favour of secession. As V.G. Fanso has perceptively pointed out, the Germans are known to have told the people before leaving their stations that "they would come back before long and would reward their supporters".³⁴ While out of Kamerun, they wrote to their former stations from their interment camps at Fernando Po assuring the people that they were returning. This elucidated why the Fon of Babungo and those of the Dschang districts were very sceptical about the partition.

Another local factor that encouraged reunification was the presence of many French Camerounians in the British Cameroons. They had come to towns like Kumba, Tiko, Muyuka and Victoria during the German administration, as either plantation workers, or to open their own cocoa and coffee farms. When the act of partition was sanctioned they found themselves separated from their fellow relatives, placed under French authority and they, in British Cameroons, subjected to Nigeria laws. These French Camerounians were later joined by their relatives fleeing from French harsh rule and taxes into British Southern Cameroons. They saw unification as the only way to reverse partition and restore the broken links between their separated peoples.

These people formed the French Cameroons' Welfare Union (FCWU) that promoted the cause of unification in British Cameroons. R.J. Dibongue was one of the most important political spokesman for the community of French Camerounians living in British Cameroons. He played a key role in initiating the re-

unification movement in British Cameroons, and was a great champion of British Cameroons secession from Nigeria. He became the Honorary General President of the French Cameroons' Welfare Union (F.C.W.U) in early 1951 and tried to give the movement a greater frame-work than that which had been offered by the Cameroon Federal Union (CFU).³⁵

Political leaders in British Cameroons argued that the Central Authority in Lagos did not pay adequate attention to the development of the Trust Territory. What existed so far was the relics of the German era viz old roads, narrow bridges and old German buildings.³⁶ It was in this light that the Cameroonians argued for secession. In this case one could rightly say that Nigeria on its own should not be held to bear the burden of developing the Cameroons. This attack should have been directed at British that was fully responsible for developing the territory in all its ramifications. In reply to the Cameroons' petition, the Secretary of State for Colonies in defending why Britain could not invest in the Cameroons, told the House of Commons in 1944 that:

It came about for very simple reasons, first of all, no private capital would go into an area whose future was uncertain. Secondly, when the Government had money to spend on capital development, on the building of schools and roads, it was not un-natural inclination to put that money into the part of

the territory they were administering (Nigeria) which they know as remaining permanently.³⁷

The above statement gives a logical conclusion in support of the argument that it was Britain, and not Nigeria, that should be blamed for the non-development of the Cameroons. One recurring question that easily comes to mind is why Britain advocated for the partition of Kamerun when she nursed the withdrawal tendency that its future was uncertain. In revenue allocation Cameroonians felt that the Cameroons was grossly under funded, leading to perennial shortages of development fund. An objective perception would not fail to see the helplessness of the situation and the bleakness of the future political atmosphere. This made Cameroonians to think seriously of secession and reunification as the only way to restore their indigenous authority over their destiny.

The attitude and activities of Nigerians also worked to the advantage of secessionist force. Nigerians dominated both the public and private sectors in the Cameroons and this dominance of Nigerians especially in the public service and commercial sector, angered Cameroonians who felt that being in their own home-land they ought to dominate those sectors. This led to anti-Nigerian sentiments in Cameroons and consequently initiated forces in favour of secession of the territory from Nigeria and ultimate unification with the French Cameroun.

The anti-Nigerian feelings were publicly expressed by both politicians and the populace in the territory. Chief Manga Williams, a Cameroonian representative in the Eastern House of Assembly on August 1, 1942, expressing his Anti-Nigerian feelings said:

Although we are natives attached to Nigeria and parcel of the British rule, we count all people crossing the boundary from Nigeria to the Cameroons as aliens and I wish that to be especially known to this House - that we do not count ourselves as Nigerians.³⁸

Of all peoples of Nigerian origin the Igbo were those in the majority in British Cameroons. Their dominating attitude in the Cameroons worked against unity between the Cameroons and Nigeria. Igbo traders dominated the retail trade in the Cameroons and illegally introduced a system referred to as "price and Buy System". Following its operation, any person who priced a good from an Igbo trader was obliged to pay for it. Any refusal to pay for the priced article led to detaining the intended purchaser in a market stall. The prevailing situation was highly resisted and in some rural areas it led to jacqueries. It was on this premise that on January 20, 1948 Cameroonian market women rioted against their Igbo counterparts in Victoria.³⁹ Manifesting its anti-Igbo feelings in March, 1948, the local community in Tiko issued a public notice which prohibited Igbo from renting houses, occupying land, fishing in Cameroonian

waters, having commercial transactions with Cameroonians or using Cameroonian forest resources.⁴⁰ In Bamenda the Igbo ignored the local tradition and used the "gong" during their festival ceremonies. The use of the "gong" was a great challenge to culture in Bamenda because the "gong" was uniquely reserved for Kwi'fo or Ngwarong as symbols of sovereignty: there is no independent and sovereign chiefdom without it, with its musical instruments - the famous double iron gongs, drums and "bag" of bells and other paraphernalia.⁴¹ The local people ran into conflict with the Igbo over such breach of tradition. As the atmosphere became insecure, the Igbo Federal Union in Cameroons petitioned the Resident of the Cameroons Province, declaring that they were in the territory purposely for commerce and had no intention to claim Cameroonian lands or its numerous natural resources. In the petition they further pledged to be law abiding and respectful to the Cameroonian customs and local cause.⁴⁰

Alarmed by the general state of insecurity of the Igbo, the Government Public Relations Officer, H. Cooper, on May 9, 1948, gave a public lecture at Kumba in which he warned the people of Cameroons about their anti-Igbo attitude. H. Cooper pointed out that Cameroonians needed the assistance or help of the Igbo in the economic sector and reiterated that the political destiny of the Cameroons was linked to that of Nigeria. On the other hand he told the Igbo to bear in mind that they were merely settlers who must make efforts to live in peace with the Cameroonians,

with whom they were to work together for the establishment of an independent Nigerian Nation.⁴³

H. Cooper's timely intervention illustrated the colonial administration's concern for harmony within and among the peoples of Cameroons and Nigeria.

Two political pressure-groups appeared in the Southern Cameroons between 1947 and 1948. The Kamerun United National Congress (K.U.N.C) led by R. J. K. Dibongue and the Cameroons National Federation (C.N.F) led by Dr. E. M. L. Endeley. The C. N. F. did make clear its objectives and policy and thus did not attract a large following like the KUNC. On the other hand the KUNC had as its motto "Towards self-government or independence for a United Kamerun". Its programme was based on:- (a) immediate unification of the territories of Cameroon; (b) setting a time limit on the Trusteeship Agreements; (c) elimination of the provision for "integral part" (administrative union) and (d) opposition to any inclusion of British Cameroons in Nigeria.⁴⁴ Its programme became very attractive and was a good propaganda for secessionists. The C.N.F. however, in its elaborate programme, included the demand for reunification and a joint constituent Assembly for the Cameroons, but it did not explicitly advance a claim for a pan-Kamerun organisation.

The Cameroonian Association in Lagos in March 1949 petitioned the Nigerian Governor asking for a separate Cameroon Region with a House of Assembly. The petitioners advocated that the new region would be under a chief Commissioner, directly

responsible to the Trusteeship Council.⁴⁵

Efforts at Pan-Kamerun(ism) were not only limited to the Southern Cameroons. Those of Northern Cameroons and French Cameroun did not spare any effort to realize this objective. In the Northern House of Assembly in 1949, the Emir of Dikwa and his Secretary, were said to have demanded the separation of Northern Cameroons from Northern Nigeria and placed it directly under the Trusteeship administration.⁴⁶ The United Nations Visiting Mission in the British Cameroons in 1948 received several petitions that complained against integration of the British Cameroons with Nigeria, and expressed the desire that unification be effected among all the sections of the Cameroons.⁴⁷ These petitions came from political pressure-groups such as the KUNC and prominent unions viz Bungwa Improvement Union and Balondo Cultural Association. The British Government on its part argued that it would not be very beneficial for people of the Trust Territory to press for secession from Nigeria, or even demand a separate Cameroons Region. The authority pointed to the United Nations Visiting Mission that Cameroonians were benefiting enormously from Nigerian funds and any autonomous Cameroons Region would deprive them of those funds.⁴⁸

Dr. E. M. L. Endeley reiterated Cameroonians stand at the Nigerian Constitutional Review Conference held at Ibadan in January 1950. At the Conference he made an important statement that reflected the opinion of the majority of British Cameroonians. The Cameroonian leader among other things said;

Our country has suffered untold miseries - due principally to the arbitrary and uncalled for Anglo-French Frontier - since the partition of the Kamerun between France and Great Britain after World War I. The Kamerun people had waged no war with the Allied and Associated Powers in 1914-18, nor was the Kamerun territory really a German territory and my people fail to see why the Kamerun should be divided as war spoils between victor powers instead of Germany who was actually at war with the Allied and Associated powers. My people consider that the only solution of the difficulties confronting the Kamerun territory as a whole is the unification of both spheres of the Kamerun under the tutelage of a government of the people's own choice.⁴⁹

Dr. E.M.L. Endeley's speech further demonstrated that the peoples of British Cameroons stood in favour of an autonomous Kamerun state which was their ultimate goal.

Nationalist leaders in French Cameroun were not left out of the struggle to achieve a United Kamerun. The unification current was transmitted through the K.U.N.C leader R. J. K. Dibongue, who was the leader of the large French-Speaking Camerounians Community in Southern Cameroons. Before Dibongue summoned the 1957 Kumba Conference, the Jeunesse Camerounaise

(JC), a cultural and social improvement society established in 1933 had nursed the unification idea. The leaders of J.C. in 1936 considered the advisability of demanding a re-union of the Territories. They were of the belief that the more progressive British policies regarding African political and civil rights might attenuate the French system and put an end to the harsh indigenat penal procedure and forced labour practices. The J.C. leadership finally rejected the scheme on the account that two masters would probably be worse than one. The spirit was revived in 1957 when Dibongue, N. N. Mbile and Dr. E.M.L. Endeley hosted a general conference in Kumba to consider the question of reunification. At the multi-party conference at Kumba, the UPC, the Ngondo, the Kumzse, and the Esocam⁵⁰ were invited. The two vice-presidents of the UPC, Abel Kingue and Ernest Ouandie attended. The participants endorsed unification but failed to spell out a specific programme for the achievement of reunification or the constitutional mechanisms that might affect the operation of such a Union in question.⁵¹ The delegates however pledged to work for the elimination of the customs barriers and for political advancement of the two sectors of the Cameroons. Although the merger of Dibongue's KUNC and Dr. Endeley's C.N.F. in 1953, to form the Kamerun National Union K.N.C., diminished the contacts between the KUNC and UPC, the UPC continued to emphasize the community of interest between the two territories, keeping alive the unification issue. At its second congress, held at Eseka in the Sanga-Maritime on 30 September

1952, the UPC placed great importance on the resolutions relating to "Re-Unification Idea". As Richard A. Joseph points out, "Re-unification and Independence" became the slogan.⁵²

Um Nyobe, the Secretary General of UPC addressing the U.N. Trusteeship Council in 1952 demanded for reunification of the Cameroons. His allies in the British Cameroons R.J.K. Dibongue and N.N. Mbile both of the KUNC dispatched a telegram to the UNO Secretary General, supporting the UPC idea for reunification.

Obstacles to Unification Forces

The unification forces started dwindling when pioneer inspirators like Dr. E.M.L. Endeley began to disassociate themselves from the idea. When Dibongue discovered that other political organisations were faltering or insincere to the cause of unification, something to which he was highly committed he became discouraged, and tried to form a coalition with N. N. Mbile but later discovered that Mbile⁵³ was even less in favour of reunification than Dr. Endeley. Dibongue himself was said to have been disenchanted with the UPC leadership later, because of their connection with communist organisations abroad and marxist ideology.⁵⁴

The French Cameroun officials made it difficult for Southern Cameroonians to attend Congress meetings in French Cameroun; as seen during the UPC second congress at Eseka whereby no party official from British Cameroons was present. The UPC was often harassed on borders controlled by the French. During the multi-party conference of 1951 held at Kumba, the French officials

becoming worried about the impact of British Cameroonian politics in the French sphere, dispatched three policemen, Koumb Gustane, Etata Elice and Youmbi Andre to spy at the conference.⁵⁵ The spy network by the French security agents at the KUNC conference in Kumba, in which the UPC delegates were in attendance was an indication that the French authorities did not favour reunification. This is further confirmed by the subsequent hostilities directed against the UPC by the French officials, leading to its final proscription in 1955. The French administration had encouraged the formation of the ESOCAM "Evolution Sociale du Cameroun" on June 20, 1949 among the Bassa nobles led by Pierre Dimalia to promote anti-UPC sentiments amongst the Bassas in Sanaga-Maritime.⁵⁶

The activities of some French Camerounian politicians who were allies of the imperialists illustrated that they were anti-unificationists. When Um Nyobe was to address the UNO Trusteeship Council, on transit in Paris, the French officials deliberately made it difficult for him to obtain his exit visa. At the U.N., just after Um Nyobe had finished addressing U.N. Trusteeship Council, Senator Charles Okala of the French Cameroun Socialist Party appeared before the same Committee and denounced Um Nyobe. He accused Um Nyobe of following a communist philosophy.⁵⁷ The imperialist agent (Okala) told the Council that in Cameroons only very few people were interested in unification. He lauded the efforts of the French Government for promoting political advancement in the French sector. He further

told the Council that only the UPC alone was opposed to the French policy of reserving all important political decisions to the Central organs of the French Republic in Paris.⁵⁸

Also it is to be noted that the greatest impediment to Cameroons unification was the obscure status of British Cameroons. The British by their administrative arrangements attached the British Cameroons to various regions of Nigeria. The first genuine step towards unification lay in the reunification of the Northern and Southern Cameroons.

The golden opportunity for Southern Cameroonian people as a team to stage a come-out from Nigeria occurred in 1953 during the crisis in the Eastern Nigerian House of Assembly, where there was a serious rift between the more radical and progressive elements and reactionaries within the N.C.N.C. party. Cameroonians thought it wise to remain neutral in Nigerian politics and thus intensified the quest for their own separate region and Assembly which came into being in 1957.

II.3 More Solid Approaches to the Formation of Political Parties

As stated above the end of the 2nd World War saw the rise of political parties in the British Cameroons as well as in the French Cameroun. The founding in March, 1940 of the Cameroon Youth League (CLY), by British Cameroons intellectuals, in Lagos, brought in the very first "pressure" organisation that aroused political consciousness. As mentioned earlier the organisation's founding fathers included Dr. E.M.L. Endeley, Paul M. Kale, and John Ngu Foncha. The motto of the CYL was "Unity and Co-

operation" and its set goal was to fight against economic, political, educational and social ills prevalent in British Cameroons.

The League tabled several memoranda before International Commissions which visited Nigeria or Cameroons, appealing for the advancement of the Cameroonian people in all fields. Branches were established in all divisional headquarters in Southern Cameroons, and through its monthly bulletin the CYL newsletter, the organisation disseminated information to all its members and branches.⁵⁹

The CLY, however faded out of existence in the 1950s mainly due to management crisis and differences that cropped up among its Cameroonian militants in Lagos.⁶⁰

Subsequent political development manifested in the founding of the Cameroons Federal Union (CFU) in 1947. The CFU demanded at the time a separate autonomous province from Nigeria. Such orientation in thought saw the organisation opting in favour of "Unifications" of the two Cameroons in 1948. By this stance, Dr. E.M.L. Endeley had hoped that this support for Unification would win him an alliance with the French Cameroons Welfare Union, but the CFU, like its predecessor, the CYL, was ripped by internal crisis in 1950 with N.N. Mbile and R.K. Dibongue breaking away to found the Kamerun United National Congress (KUNC). Interestingly R.K. Dibongue had emigrated to Buea from Douala due to French high-handedness, and became an ardent champion of pro-unification policies. The party and its leaders wished to see the

establishment of a United Kamerun as in the days of the Germans.⁶¹ At the Mamfe Conference it was resolved that a petition be dispatched to the Secretary of State for the colonies, requesting the establishment of a separate Cameroon region.⁶² The petition did not yield immediate dividends.

The Birth of the Kamerun National Congress (KNC)

Dr. E.M.L. Endeley went back home to consolidate his position for the struggle and to achieve this goal he facilitated the amalgamation of the Cameroon National Federation (CNF) and the Kamerun United National Congress (KUNC) Dr. E.M.L. Endeley became the leader of the new party, KNC. The KNC team was now constituted of conservative, moderate and radical elements, advocating a separate region for Southern Cameroons within the Nigerian Federation rather than being part of the Eastern Region.⁶⁴ Endeley at the head of the amalgamated parties completely dropped the idea of Unification. He was probably influenced by the Action Group (AG) and Chief Obafemi Awolowo's Socialist ideology, which very much caught his imagination. The KNC became the first broad-base indigenous political party in British Cameroons.

It is pertinent to highlight that the KNC emerged as a result of a compromise between three different school of thoughts, the autonomists, reunificationists and secessionists. The autonomists held that Southern Cameroons should be an autonomous region within the Nigerian Federation led by Endeley; the reunificationists led by R.K. Dibongue and Ntumazah later

wanted secession from Nigeria and eventual reunification of the British and French Cameroun. The secessionists led by P.M.Kale stood for complete secession from Nigeria and to ask for independence. There were other KNC militants like J. N. Foncha who did not take side and were waiting for the option that appealed to the people most.

The Birth of the Kamerun Peoples Party (KPP)

The acute political differences that existed in the KNC from its creation should have been a sound warning to the actors that the party was heading towards disintegration sooner or later. In creating a common front the constituted elements that formed the KNC did not come to a consensus. Perhaps the only objective was to fight, first for Southern Cameroons autonomous status.

Barely three years after the creation of the KNC, P.N.Motomby-Woleta and N. N. Mbile went into the opposition and formed the Kamerun People's Party (KPP). P.M. Kale an indigene of Buea resident in Lagos was invited to head the new party. The KPP was in favour of the creation of a Cameroons Region and differed with the KNC, that it should be autonomous of the Eastern Region. It therefore wanted the Cameroon Province to evolve as part of the Eastern Region. The KPP seemed to have been heavily influenced by Dr. Nkrumah's federalist concept that African countries should unite after independence, irrespective of their different colonial legacies. This is evident as seen in one of the releases to the nation in which inter alia, the KPP advocated that while fighting for the Cameroon's financial and

legislative autonomy, it is the party's prime duty to preserve the identity of the Cameroons within a united states of West Africa and Africa as a whole.⁶⁵

The party leaders therefore pledged to work in harmony with the NCNC of Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, even at Federal level in Nigerian politics as far as Nigerian attitude promoted the healthy growth of such a Union.⁶⁶ The KPP conception of a United and strong Africa influenced its leaders to abandon the idea of secession and independence of the Trust Territory, which its leader P.M.Kale particularly championed. At this juncture the only point of contention between KNC and KPP was how Southern Cameroons was to evolve as an integral part of Nigeria. The KPP surprisingly attracted into its fold many intellectuals. Prominent among these personalities were: N.N. Mbile, S.E.Ncha, Motomby-Woleta, P.I.Eno, Lifio Carr, Chief R.N. Charley, Prince Sama Ndi and P. Ewusi. In spite of its lofty ideas the KPP did not create a ferment in the minds and hearts of the masses who held the trump-cards of voting. The KPP became closely identified with the forest region and the people of the grassfields did not share their ideology.

The Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP)

In 1955 J. N. Foncha and A. N. Jua, faithful disciples of the KNC brokeaway and founded the Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP) These leaders and their supporters withdrew their support from the KNC because of Endeley's deviation from the idea of secession and unification of all the partitioned Kamerun. The

sudden pro-Nigerian attitude by Endeley astonished many Cameroonians given the harsh treatment he received from the Nigerian public and press when he opted for secession and unification in the KUNC alliance.⁶⁷ Researchers have been digging into what led Dr. E.M.L Endeley to deviate from an idea which gained him firm support amongst his people. Some reasons given for Endeley's pro-Nigerian stance states that he was bribed by Chief Obafemi Awolowo, leader of the Action Group (AG). Others alleged that Endeley was influenced by his Yoruba wife to go into alliance with AG, the Yoruba dominated political party.⁶⁸

The KNDP set forth to redress the rift the KNC leader had created and to restore confidence in the Cameroonian people within its fold. The KNDP in a policy statement issued at Mamfe January 1958 outlined its plan of action. At that plenary session in Mamfe from 3rd to 7th January the KNDP resolved that the British Government and the United Nations Trusteeship Council should as a matter of urgency re-examine the Trusteeship Agreement to enable the Cameroons secede from Nigeria before she achieves her sovereignty.

After arriving at this concensus, the KNDP in its fourteen point programme carefully pointed out what the Cameroons would gain by seceding. The fourteen points being

1. We shall avoid to be under independent Nigeria
2. Opening the door of direct negotiation for foreign enterprise

3. Creating opportunities for Cameroonians to give their best in developing themselves and their countries.
4. It will make Cameroons an identified nation.
5. It will enable Her Majesty's Government to shoulder her responsibilities.
6. It will save the Cameroons from being placed in the anomalous position now experienced by Togo.
7. It will accelerate the political and economic advancement of the territory, promote social progress and raise better standards of living at our own pace.
8. We shall maintain our culture without external interference.
9. It will give us scope to work out a principle by which we shall unite all sections of our country arbitrarily torn off by foreign powers.
10. It will help us to see into the whole financial structure of the territory and make it possible for the government to work out financial policies.
11. It will enable us to accelerate the Cameroons to increase productivity through self-sacrifice build up their country and work speedily towards independence.
12. It will psychologically inspire the people of the Cameroons.
13. The current political advancement of Nigeria has made it imperative for Southern Cameroons to take a definite stand - secession.

14. It is our cherished plan to secede from the Federation of Nigeria.⁶⁹

The KNDP programme attracted the traditional rulers of Grassfields who, although were not politicians could change the course of events with the voting population they commanded. The KNDP programme was also welcomed by the Union of the Population of Cameroun (UPC) that advocated the independence and the reunification of the two Cameroons. It did not take long for the KNDP, which was perceived as the party of the grassland to penetrate into the Forest Zone securing its first stronghold in Mamfe.⁷⁰

The KNDP initially began as an obscure party that was unpopular, but by its affirmation on the question of independence and re-unification it secured a firm platform for lively operation. The party leader J. N. Foncha, a simple man by nature,⁷¹ worked hard to put his message across. He made an extensive tour of Southern Cameroons travelling on a Raleigh-bicycle and in certain areas on foot for weeks. His party's programme sunk deep into the minds and hearts of Cameroonians, with the KNDP eventually emerging into prominence as the unification option won for the party and its leader J.N. Foncha, a large number of supporters and adherents.

With the good harvest of supporters the KNDP opened branches in several strategic places in the territory. The party sent Sam Mofor to learn party organisation and propaganda techniques in the Convention People's Party School set up by Dr. Kwame Nkrumah

in Accra, Ghana to re-enforce the KNDP capability. Events overtook the KNDP and it had to drop its primary objective of immediate secession from the Nigerian Federation and was contemplating reunification only after it has achieved independence. The British government and the anti-colonialist states viz Ghana and Guinea were totally against this option because they did not favour the creation of economically small and weak states. The KNDP was left with no choice but to campaign for immediate reunification, since the only alternative offered by the United Nations was a permanent integration in the Nigerian Federation.

The One Kamerun (OK)

The last political party that appeared in Southern Cameroons before the 1961 plebiscite was the One Kamerun. It emerged in late 1957 when the exiled UPC was banned in the territory. The pro-Upecists founded the OK as a successor of banned UPC. It was led by Ntumazah and widely perceived as the old UPC under a new guise.⁷² The OK, like its predecessor the UPC, stood for independence and immediate re-unification but the KNDP counted very little on the OK because to them, the party was made up of extreme radicals like Albert Mukong whose open hatred for French neo-imperialism in Cameroon and lack of democratic institutions in Cameroons had earned him decades in various political prisons and torture from the dreaded Cameroon secret police SENDOC -CENER.⁷³

In its outlook the OK party was more a Convocation of educated elites made up principally of Cameroonian students from Nigerian universities. In its plan of action, the OK understood the ideological implications involved in the issues of integration and secession more than any other Cameroonian political party.⁷⁴ Its defect was simply in that, like most of the intellectual movements, the party failed to speak the language of the populace.

Though the OK stood for immediate secession of British Cameroons from Nigeria and Unification its doctrine did not penetrate deep in the minds of many Cameroonians. Its young leaders like Albert Mukong were not vested with the tactics of dealing with the rural population and their traditional institutions. They, therefore, could not master the grass-root campaign strategies that was to make an impact on the electorate. Conversely its contribution to the reunification struggle was insignificant. Thus, the OK, was not considered by most southern Cameroonians as well as the colonial authorities as a major party to seek its opinion.⁷⁵

The UPC in British Cameroons After 1955.

The Union of the Population of Cameroun (UPC) as treated in chapter three, was the only political party that had reunification as one of its cardinal objectives. The desired approach here is to deal with its relationship to the Southern Cameroons politics.

When the UPC was banned by France in French Cameroun in 1955 some of its militants escaped and took refuge in Southern Cameroons. They regrouped and became politically active in the camp of pro-unificationists, and branch-offices were opened in Tiko, Misselele, Kumba and Bamenda. Given the run of political events and their probable marginalisation they petitioned the Governor General in Lagos, alleging that they were being neglected in Southern Cameroons. A particular situation they readily used as evidence was their non-participation at the Bamenda Conference of May 1956. One glaring problem they inevitably ran into was their bitter criticism of the traditional rulers.⁷⁶ Their refusal to support the creation of the House of Chiefs in Southern Cameroons made the UPC very unpopular in the grassland region. The group was also hated because of its guerrilla activities against the Frenchmen and their supporters in French Cameroun. Owing to such apparently unappealing method, the KNC severed its links with the UPC, Anti-Upecite elements burnt down its office in Bamenda on August 4, 1956 and that of Santa on December 12, 1956. On December 15, 1956 the Conference of Southern Cameroons chiefs holding in Bamenda dispatched a strongly worded message to the Commissioner of Southern Cameroons in which the UPC was accused of "mischievous activities" which as they put it "threatened to undermine the long existing traditional institutions if not their very existence of the Southern Cameroons as a cohesive political entity."⁷⁸

In early 1957, the police searched the UPC headquarters in Kumba, a raid aimed at recovering type-writers that were reported stolen from French Cameroun. During the search none was found but prohibited literature was found and taken for verification. With all these harassments the UPC accused British agents as working in collaboration with the French Government to extirpate the UPC from its Kumba⁷⁹ base which was a few kilometres from French Cameroun. The coming into power of a pro-integrationist government led by Dr. E.M.L. Endeley in 1957 facilitated the banning of the UPC. However, before it was outlawed it worked in collaboration with the KNDP in spreading the message of unification to the British Cameroonians. Though the two parties were pro-unificationists their approach was at variance; the KNDP was highly traditionalist and conservative in its image and did not cherish the radical activism and ideological stance of the UPC.⁸⁰ The KNC leadership equally felt threatened by the new political force and was relieved, when by Order-in-Council on June 3, 1957, the Governor General of Nigeria banned the UPC. The UPC was declared to be a society dangerous to the good government of Nigeria.⁸¹ By the time the UPC was outlawed in Southern Cameroons, its links with the KNDP had become permanently estranged.

Professor Asanga pointed out that the banning of the UPC in Southern Cameroons was instigated by France for obvious fears of an independent Cameroon free from colonial influence of any sort as spelt out in the UPC programme of action.⁸² It was also of

great interest for Britain to ban the UPC for she (Britain) intended to see the integration of Southern Cameroons into the Federation of Nigeria and therefore it was not of her benefit to tolerate any secessionists or unificationists movements in the trust territory.⁸³

The dynamic and anti-imperialist Nigerian press commented on this action of the Governor General. The Daily Times of Nigeria's commentary is worth quoting:

The news of the dissolution of the UPC should be received with mixed feelings in as much as it represents a denial of this kind is only justified if, peace, public order and a country's constitution are menaced and unhappily in the last few years even the phrase "menace to peace and public order" has become notoriously suspects.⁸⁴

To attain their goals the KNC and KPP were unifiers merely by their names and election manifestos, in spite of the fact that they were for integration. The letter "K" is pervasively symbolical here and the abbreviation stands for the Kamerun. The four parties claimed to be for unification and to prove their sincerity to the people they attached "KAMERUN" to signify they were fighting for the unification of the Kamerun. That was Southern Cameroons style, in politics. The preliminary exercises in the politics of the trust territory were to learn how to crosscarpets with spite, getting into the course as

unificationists and ruling as integrationists, or as a KNDP and come out as a KNC or as a nationalist and become the stooge of imperialists;⁸⁶ even worse some emerged as socialists only to serve as capitalists to the core. The manner in which these political leaders toyed with the destiny of their people would appear that the pride of race and national honour seemed to be completely absent even in those who by their position in society ought to liberate the people from modern slavery - the colonial policy.

II.4 Political Changes Arising From Constitutional Conferences, 1949-1960.

Articles 75 and 77 of United Nations charter, placed the cameroons under the UN Trusteeship Agreement. The new status altered the constitutional relationship between the Cameroons and Nigeria but not the operation of Nigerian political, economic and judicial systems in the Cameroons, under the United Kingdom Trusteeship.

The administrative structure of the Cameroon Province, however, under went some changes. The Governor-General of Nigeria became officially known as the Governor-General of Nigeria and the Cameroons under the United Kingdom Trusteeship. The post of the Resident was replaced by that of the Commissioner of the Cameroons, with Brigadier E.J. Gibbons becoming the first Commissioner. He was however, still answerable to the Chief Commissioner at Enugu. The arrangement came into operation under Sir Arthur Richards whose constitution of 1947 had struck quite

baleful load of discontent in the territory. He was replaced in 1948 by Sir John Macpherson as Governor-General.⁸⁷

Taking cue from the political climate of the time, and in full appreciation of image cut by the NCNC delegation to London in 1947, the new Governor-General saw it imperative to revise the Arthur Richards constitution. There was also, at the time in the Colonial Office Arthur Creech Jones who was sympathetic towards the aspirations of dependent people. A process of consultation that sought the people's opinion at all levels was established and it promoted a progress towards a new constitution. There were supposedly a wide measure of consultations at village and district levels and proposals brought up at provincial and regional conferences. In June 1949, at Mamfe, the Cameroons Province held its Provincial Conference. At the Mamfe Conference participants unanimously agreed that the Cameroons be granted complete regional status under the United Kingdom Trusteeship.

At the Regional Conference held at Enugu in July 1949, was a four man delegation of the Cameroons Province led by Dr. E.M.L. Endeley. The Regional Conference turned down the Cameroonian request for a separate region but the Regional Consultative body however worked out a compromise. It suggested that the Cameroons should be given representation in the Regional House of Assembly, in the Executive Council and in the new central Executive Council and legislature.⁸⁸

The 1950 Ibadan Conference

The General conference for a new constitution, commonly referred to as the "Macpherson Constitution" opened at Ibadan in January 1950 with Dr. E.M.L. Endeley representing the Cameroons. The conference endorsed the Regional proposals that the Cameroons be represented at the various arms of the Nigerian Regional and Central Legislative bodies. Southern Cameroons was granted the right to elect representatives into the two Nigerian Legislatures - the House of Representatives in Lagos and the Eastern House of Assembly in Enugu. As regards the Northern Cameroons, the Northern Regional Conference, recommended that the trust territory would remain part of Northern Nigeria and that the Trusteeship Agreement be abolished. This, however, was not the genuine wishes of the Northern Cameroonians. At the Regional Conference of the North, the two representatives of the Trust Territory bitterly opposed their being part of Nigeria, but they were outvoted by the Nigerian majority.⁸⁹

The Macpherson Constitution, after much discussion, came into effect in 1952 and Southern Cameroons continued to be administered as part of the Eastern Region of Nigeria. The Trusteeship over Northern Cameroons was not abolished as demanded in the recommendation from Northern Nigeria. The new constitution established a central House of Representatives for the Federation. The North and West had Houses of Assemblies and Houses of Chiefs while the Eastern Region was granted only a Regional House of Assembly. Each legislative body was to have an

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Executive Council with ministers. The new constitution stipulated that Southern Cameroons was to have thirteen members in the eighty-member Eastern House of Assembly and one senior regional officer with no vote. The trust territory was also granted six Deputies in the Federal House of Representative and to have one of the four ministers zoned to the East in the Council of Ministers.⁹⁰

Under the existing electoral law, the Provinces of the Northern Region containing Northern Cameroons were allotted a total of twenty-one seats in the ninety seats Northern House of Assembly. The people of the trust territory in the north were to have three members in the Northern House of Assembly and one chief in the Northern House of Chiefs. One seat was allotted to them in the Federal House of Representative but no representation in the Northern Executive Council.

A general survey of the arrangement which was a step ahead shows that, although regional status was refused the trust territories, the new changes were a great improvement compared to the Richards Constitutions which did not accord the British Cameroons any representation. The new constitution made the Regional Executive Councils the principal instrument of policy making within the Regions; permitting their legislatures to make laws. In the Eastern Region, it was imperative by the provisions of the Macpherson Constitution, that a representative of Southern Cameroons be appointed a Minister on the Executive Council.

The new electoral regulations stated that elections were to be conducted based on the electoral college system. An Electoral college, therefore, was a body of persons that were elected in order to choose people to proceed either to another electoral college or directly to the House of Assembly. On this premise the body met only for this purpose and could only elect from its own members. The 1951 Macpherson Constitution allowed ample opportunity for the principle of elections to be applied widely for the first time. Due to the high level of illiteracy of the average voter and the vast extent of the territory, elections through an electoral colleges were deemed necessary. Chosen members of each Native Authority area constituted the smallest unit and those elected from the various Native Authority areas in each division constituted the Divisional electoral college, which elected representatives to the provincial electoral college, who elected members of the House of Assembly and the members of the House of Assembly finally elected from amongst themselves the unofficial members to represent the Region in the Federal House of Representatives.⁹¹

The electoral regulations permitted only British subjects or British protected persons to vote. On this premise resident French Cameroonians were barred from taking part in the elections. In reaction, the French Cameroons Welfare Union (FCWU) petitioned the Governor-General of Nigeria requesting political equality in British Cameroons, arguing that Cameroon had once been one and, secondly that they paid their taxes and

contributed to the development of the territory.⁹² The Governor General turned down their request because they were neither British subjects nor protected persons. Thus only Nigerians resident in the trusteeship territory were qualified to vote and they they did exercise their suffrage rights.⁹³

To elect its 13 members, Southern Cameroons was divided into six political units. These 6 units corresponded to the six administrative Divisions of Bamenda, Nkambe, Wum, Mamfe Kumba and Victoria. Apart form Bamenda that was allotted three members, the rest were to be represented by two elected members in the Eastern House of Assembly. Six of the thirteen members were to be further elected into the Federal Legislature. The 1951 elections produced the following results:-

<u>Political Units</u>	<u>Names of Elected Members</u>
Bamenda	J.N. Foncha, S.T. Muna and V.T.Lianjo
Nkambe	N.T. Ndze and A. J. Ngala
Wum	J.C. Kangsen and S.C. Ndi
Mamfe	S.A. George and M.N. Foju
Kumba	N.N.Mbile and R.N.Charley
Victoria	E.M.L.Endeley and P.N.Motoby-Woleta.

Source: P.M.Kale, Political Evolution in the Cameroons,

(Government Printers, Buea 1966) P.37.

From the Eastern House of Assembly, Dr. E. M. L. Endeley, N. N. Mbile, S. A. George, V. T. Lainjo, J.C. Kangsen and J. T. Ndze were elected, from the Cameroons' Camp, into the Federal House of Representatives. In keeping with the new constitution

Dr. E. M. L. Endeley was appointed Minister without Portfolio and later as a Minister of Labour in the Central Executive Council. In the Regional Executive Council Mr. S. T. Muna was appointed Minister of Works.⁹⁴

In Northern Cameroons, at the end of the elections exercise, three Cameroonians were elected into the Northern Nigeria Regional House of Assembly. Among them was Abba Habib who emerged as the leader of the Northern Cameroons, and Emir Bukar, of Dikwa was elected into the Northern House of Chiefs. In compliance with the constitution the trust territory as an integral part of the Northern Region had no representative in the Central Executive Council.

The British Representative at the eleventh session of the Trusteeship Council elucidated on how the elections were conducted in the British Cameroons and that those who were elected actually reflected the popular wishes of the people. The council seemingly accepted that with satisfaction and urged the British administrative authority to step up political education of the inhabitants and encourage their full participation in Government.⁹⁵ The constitution indeed did encourage a degree of political awareness in the Cameroons and Nigeria; it inculcated into the citizens more experience in democratic methods of government.

Political Crisis in the Eastern Region

The NCNC emerged victorious in the first elections conducted under the Macpherson constitution in the Eastern Region. The

Action Group (AG) was victorious in the West and the Northern People's Congress (NPC) in the Northern Region. As seen earlier, Cameroonians had close ties with the NCNC. In the Eastern House of Assembly, they declared their support for the NCNC, although they were not commissioned by their constituents to affiliate with the NCNC.⁹⁶ The election of thirteen members into the Eastern Assembly was unsatisfactory to Cameroonians and they remained determined to secure an autonomous region for the Southern Cameroons.

A multiplicity of reasons accounted for this dissatisfaction. The Governor General of the colony and protectorate of Nigeria, also Governor and Commander-in-chief for British Cameroons was resident in Lagos. The responsibility of the trust territory was divided between two Lieutenant Governors based outside the two sectors of trust territory. Consequently there was no administrator on the spot for the trust territory as a whole. Worse still Cameroon within the Nigerian constitutional framework, did not constitute a single administrative subunit of Nigeria. The trust territory remained fragmented and incorporated into the Northern and Eastern Regions of Nigeria. Nor did any organ of Government exist in the trust territory above the level of the ordinary Native Authorities. It was evident therefore, that the obvious organic vacuum created by the ambiguous situation could not be filled by the representative devices created in the central, and in the Eastern and Northern Legislatures of Nigeria.⁹⁷

The golden opportunity to ask for a separate region for the Cameroons and Bamenda Province came over the Eastern Nigerian Crisis of January - May 1953. The immediate cause of the crisis stemmed from the fact that the more radical and progressive elements within the NCNC, in Zik's camp, felt Eyo Ita's government was rather too reluctant to carry out radical constitutional changes that the party advocated. Consequently the party demanded the resignation of Professor Eyo-Ita's Government. Accordingly the ministers sent in their resignations. Six of the nine ministers later withdrew their resignation secretly overnight on grounds that they had been forced to resign. S. T. Muna of the Cameroons in conjunction with M. I. Okpara and M. C. Agwu upheld their resignations.⁹⁸ The NCNC and the Government were therefore divided into two camps, Zik's loyalists and those who supported Professor Eyo-Ita and his minority Government. As the crisis intensified the thirteen southern Cameroon elected representatives in the Eastern House of Assembly under the Leadership of Dr. E.M.L. Endeley formed the "Cameroon Bloc". Their unanimous declaration was to steer clear of Nigerian politics which found expression in Benevolent Neutrality in Nigerian politics. The policy of non-interference with Nigerian politics, however did not find favour with all elected members, as P. N. Motomby-Woleta, Mr. R. N. Charley, Mr. S. C. Ndi and Mr. N. N. Mbile, were not in favour of it.⁹⁹

As the crisis took a wider dimension and political atmosphere became tense the advocate of the policy of benevolent neutrality did not take their seats in the Assembly on May 6, 1953 but sat in the public gallery. This group was led by Dr. E.M.L. Endeley and S.A. George. It became definitely clear that there was a split among the Cameroonian members. The Mbile camp of four supported continued associating with the NCNC thus dissociating itself from the policy of neutrality. Pro-neutralists, S. T. Muna, J. N. Foncha, S. A. George, N.N. Foju, V. T. Lainjo, J. C. Kangsen, J. T. Ndze, A. J. Ngala led by Dr. E. M. L. Endeley supported "Benevolent Neutrality" and immediate separation from Eastern Nigeria and the establishment of a separate Cameroon Region. The Mbile camp was not against the idea of a separate region; the difference between the two protagonists lay mainly with the degree of association with the NCNC. To attain their objectives Endeley and his supporters launched a campaign for a separate Cameroon region and eventual reunification and independence for a unified Kamerun.

The stormy political atmosphere in the Eastern Region soon became a cause celebre.¹⁰⁰ for Southern Cameroons as two of the most influential Nigerian parties the Action Group (AG) led by Chief Obafemi Awolowo and Zik's NCNC issued policy statements in quick succession supporting the political aspirations of Southern Cameroons although for different purposes. The NCNC leader Dr. Azikiwe issued a statement on April 14, 1953 at Glover Memorial Hall, Lagos part of which stated that:

1. The NCNC recognises the peculiar position of a trust Territory and supports the Cameroons peoples' demand for a separate Regional status including a separate legislative assembly for the Cameroons with full budgetary autonomy.
2. The National Council also recognises and supports the desire and aspirations of the peoples of the Cameroons for unification of the two sections of the territory under the British and the French, into a single political entity as existed before 1914.
3. The National Council desires to state categorically that it recognises and supports the right of the Cameroons people to aspire towards full self-governing status and shall work with its Cameroons members and supporters in a spirit of fraternal alliance within a United Front aimed at securing African Freedom as a whole from foreign rule and domination.¹⁰¹

Zik's statement was followed by that of the Action Group (AG) Leader, Chief Obafemi Awolowo at Ibadan on April 25, 1953 in which he reiterated that the Action Group regarded themselves as allies of the Cameroonian nationalists. The statement read in part that:

We are not indifferent to the aspirations of the people of the Cameroons. The Action Group supports the demand of Cameroons people for separate legislature and a right of self-determination to remain in or outside Nigeria. It is an insult for a country like the Cameroons to remain permanently against her will a Trust Territory. ... The wisest policy which the people of the Cameroons should adopt is to ally themselves actively with the forces of liberation being unleashed in Nigeria ...¹⁰²

The month of May 1953, saw no venue of compromise as the Eastern Nigerian crisis took a wider dimension. Dr. E. M. L. Endeley addressing members of the Eastern house told them that as a minority, Southern Cameroons had no future in the Eastern House of Assembly. At this point, he concluded, that the people of the Southern Cameroons wanted their own Region. In the parliamentary debate B.C. Okwu opposed Endeley and accused him and other secessionists of feeding the people of the Cameroons with "a diet of falsehood" He argued that should Cameroonians be made to know the issue at stake, Endeley and his group would be crucified.¹⁰³

Faced with this dilemma on May 6, 1953 the Lieutenant Governor of the Eastern Region, Sir Clement Pleass, dissolved the Eastern House of Assembly. The Southern Cameroons representatives before the dissolution of the House had failed in

their attempt to have Mr. S. T. Muna reinstated in his Ministerial portfolio. The rejection of their demand by a vote of 45-32, angered the nine members who formed the benevolent Neutrality bloc and in effect they severed their connections with the Eastern Region.¹⁰⁴

Dr. E. M. L. Endeley's secessionist group excluding Mbile's group addressed a message to the Cameroons people alerting them that they have broken relations with the Eastern Region and were bent on achieving a separate Cameroon region. As a minority they further explained it was difficult if not impossible for their wishes to be respected in the Eastern House of Assembly. The message called on the people to stand firm in their struggle for the fatherland and have hopes for the future. The representatives summoned a meeting at Mamfe from May, 22nd - 24th 1953. Two delegates each were expected from all Native Authorities, ethnic associations, Chiefs and people of every village and town at the conference. The message was signed by the nine members of the Benevolent Neutrality Bloc; Dr. E. M. L. Endeley - Victoria, Messrs J. T. Ndze and A. J. Ngala-Nkambe, J. N. Foncha and S. T. Muna - Bamenda, S. A. George and M. N. Folu-Mamfe and Mr. J.C. Kangsen from Wum. J. N. Foncha who then appeared as the Protem Secretary of the "bloc" explained why he personally supported benevolent neutrality in a letter to P.M.Kale who was at that time in Eket, Calabar Province as thus:

You must have been watching silently the situation of things in the Eastern House of Assembly till the dissolution of the House today.

... I stand by the policy of Benevolent Neutrality not because our support of the NCNC was not beneficial but because I feel that the Cameroons should begin to manage its own affairs without undue outside influence. I feel that the NCNC and the others have "shown the light" and Cameroonians must "find the way". Any Cameroonian who will stand by any Nigerian political party in order to be led to find the way is false to his own conscience and to the Cameroons at large. ... We are prepared for a new election. The Cameroons bloc had split and there seemed to be no medium of reconciling soon till the next elections shall have been held. We are nine who stand by the decision of the KUNC against four who adhere to the NCNC.

... We do not consider whatever took place in Lagos but we are merely believing in the ideology involved ...¹⁰⁵

It should be noted that the informal affiliation of the 13 members incurred hatred for the bloc before the crisis. The

Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) of Sir Ahmadou Bello, the Sarduna of Sokoto and the Action Group (AG) of Chief Obafemi Awolowo were not pleased with the members of the "Bloc" because they had saved the NCNC from obvious collapse. Governor Sir Clement Pleass on the other hand appeared not to be happy with the political support the "Bloc" gave to Zik's NCNC a party whose nationalistic policies were unappealing to the colonial administration.

The Mamfe Conference

The secessionist bloc returned to Southern Cameroons and before the Mamfe proposed conference, undertook an intensive tour of the Trust Territory to explain to the people the question at stake and to urge them to send delegates to the Mamfe Conference. The rendezvous was honoured and on May 22, 1953 the Mamfe Conference started its deliberations. The participants unanimously agreed, as the conference wound up its deliberations, that a petition should be sent to the Secretary of State for Colonies, Lord Oliver Lyttleton. In the petition, inter alia, they requested that the British should create a separate and autonomous Cameroons Region. Dr. E.M.L. Endeley, Leader of the bloc and Federal Minister of Labour, took the petition to London where on May 28, 1953, he submitted it to Lord Oliver Lyttleton.¹⁰⁶ The Secretary received the Cameroon petition but did not respond immediately to the demands. As already seen, new parties were created and new political alliances solicited in Southern Cameroons in preparation for an eventual new constitution.

As the Eastern Nigerian crisis dragged on, the Macpherson Constitution came under severe criticism all the more. Matters came to a peak when crisis again erupted in the Central House of Representatives in Lagos. At Lagos, the central figures were the Action Group Ministers and leaders who tabled a motion of independence in 1956 or within the shortest time possible and the Governor General, Sir John Macpherson, who felt the motion was irresponsible and was supported by Northerners.

This culminated in the resignation of the AG Ministers from the Cabinet. The Governor General failed in his attempts to reconcile with the Action Group leaders who at that moment had teamed up with the NCNC leaders.

The Eastern Nigerian crisis and the Lagos Crisis had one common cause, that on the ineffective provisions of the Macpherson constitution to satisfy nationalist demands. Political leaders in Nigeria and the Cameroons were unanimous that the MacPherson Constitution did not satisfy nationalist demands. They were therefore unanimous that the MacPherson Constitution be withdrawn for a new one, which should grant Nigeria and the Cameroons Dominion status or complete sovereignty. The issue was referred to the Secretary of State for Colonies, who gave directive that a constitutional Conference be held in London.¹⁰⁷

The London Constitutional Conference 1953

It was in August 1953 that Lord Oliver Lyttleton summoned a Constitutional Conference on Nigeria at Lancaster House London at

which all political parties representing all the regions in Nigeria, including the British Cameroons were fully represented. With regard to the question of the Trust Territory of the British Cameroons, the Cameroonian delegation met the Secretary of State for Colonies separately. The Southern Cameroons delegation included the Kamerun National Congress Leader (KNC) Dr. E. M. L. Endeley S.A. George, J. C. Kangsen and Mr. N.N. Mbile, leader of the Kamerun People's Party (KPP). Mallam Abba Habib represented the Northern Cameroons.

The KNC and KPP leaders told the British Government that it was the popular wish of British Cameroonians that the two sections should be brought together so as to form one separate regional unit, within the Federation of Nigeria, the region, they maintained should have its legislature and an Executive Council, but with suitable representation in the Central Nigerian Legislature and Council of Ministers.¹⁰⁸ Mallam Abba Habib the Northern Representative had a contrary view. He rejected the idea and made it crystal clear that Northern Cameroons wished to continue existing as an integral part of Northern Nigeria even if his sector would cease to have her share of revenues that accrued to Southern Cameroons.¹⁰⁹

The colonial office was then faced only with the Southern Cameroons' quest for a separate region. Advocating for the Region the Southern Nationalists at the Conference led by Endeley, wished that if North Cameroons was to be excluded from the deal the Bamenda and Cameroons Province should be constituted

in a single and separate region. The KPP leader, N. N. Mbile on the other hand argued that investigations should be made to determine if it was really a popular demand of the Southern Cameroons people. The Secretary took note of these views and made his Government's stand abundantly clear, that if Endeley's KNC party won the forthcoming elections in the Trust Territory following the dissolution of the Eastern House of Assembly then a separate Southern Cameroons Region would be established.¹¹⁰ The idea of British Cameroons seceding from Nigeria at the time was still remote. The crucial problem of the day was to achieve a Regional Status for British Cameroons rather than demand for complete secession of the territory from Nigeria.

The 1953 Elections Campaign

The KNC and the KPP were the two contestants in the crucial 1954 elections. From late 1953 to September 1954, the two parties launched vigorous campaigns throughout the Territory. During the campaigns the KNC capitalized on the Igbo domination in the Territory. The KPP alliance with the NCNC scared most of its supporters and it was branded as an Igbo sponsored party. This indicated that too close a tie with Nigeria may jeopardize the chances of Southern Cameroonians advancement. The fears were re-inforced by the tour of Dr. Azikiwe and other NCNC leaders in the territory to campaign for the KPP during the elections. The French Camerounians based in the Territory, particularly the Bamilekes who were rivals to the Igbo in local commerce gave

enormous assistance to the KNC for its anti-Igbo campaign.

The KPP on the other hand leveled accusations against the KNC for forging an alliance with Chief Obafemi Awolowo's Action Group Party (AG), a Yoruba dominated party. In a public statement on the KNC - AG alliance, the KPP National Secretariat in Victoria on May 22, 1954, among other things said that:

... Those who yesterday preached neutrality in Nigerian politics, are today Allies to the Action Group. Those who yesterday preached Ibo domination, have today accepted Action Group domination. Those who plan less efforts to unify the two Cameroons are today preaching unification of the Cameroons and Yorubaland.¹¹¹

The people did not see the Yoruba alliance as a threat to them as the prevailing Igbo domination and hostile behaviour towards them. Besides Western Region was not contiguous within Cameroons. When finally the elections were conducted, the KNC had a landslide victory over the KPP. The KNC won twelve of the thirteen seats while the KPP won one. Mr. S. E. Ncha from Akwaya, in Mamfe Division, was the KPP elected member. Two factors were largely responsible for the KNC victory in 1953 elections; the anti-Igbo feelings set in motion by Dr. Endeley's activities, petitions and speeches¹¹² secondly the KNC became associated with the idea of the Kamerun personality. This made the KNC a popular party not only among the Kamerun intellectuals

but also among the a-fon or traditional rulers of the Grassland, who wielded enormous power on the local electorate. It was certain that the KNC victory was a fait accompli on the issue of a separate southern Cameroons region as agreed upon at the London Conference. Southern Cameroons became a quasi-Federal Territory and ceased to be part of the Eastern Region of Nigeria, but remained part of the Federation of Nigeria. This came into effect on October 1, under the Nigerian constitution order-in-council of 1954. The new constitution stipulated that the new region was to be represented in the Federal Assembly by six elected members, one of whom would be a minister.

Dr. Endeley, leader of the KNC was appointed leader of Government Business and on October 29, 1954 the Southern Cameroons House of Assembly met in Buea. At its first meeting the Governor-General of the Federation of Nigeria on this august occasion sent a message to the Assembly:

I send warm congratulations to you and your Executive Council on the assumption of your new status and responsibilities. It is our confident hope that all of you will truly serve the people of the Southern Cameroons and that you will work earnestly for the peaceful progress of the Federation of Nigeria of which you form a part.¹¹³

Details of the 1954 Constitution

1. The Regional House was made up of the Governor-General who had the authority to assent to Bills on Her Majesty's behalf.
2. The Commissioner of the Cameroons H. J. Gibbons was its President.
3. The thirteen members who were elected to the Eastern Regional House of Assembly automatically became the first elected members of the Southern Cameroons Regional House of Assembly, Buea.
4. Six representatives of the Native Authorities.
5. Two representatives of Special interests or communities not otherwise represented; and
6. Three ex-officio members; the Deputy Commissioner, the Financial and Development Secretary, and the Legal Secretary.¹¹⁴

The Regional House, was vested with powers to make law for the Territory and on residual matters. It was empowered to raise revenue from those sources open to a (Nigerian) Regional Legislature. It could consider an annual budget and pass an Appropriation Bill based on that Budget, but the Bill, like any other Bill, went to the Governor-General for assent.

The Region Executive Council consisted of the Commissioner, three ex-officio members of the legislature, and four member nominated by the Governor-General, after consultation with the Commissioner. These members were selected from among the twenty-one unofficial members of the House by the Commissioner in consultation with the House majority leader before submitting for

approval to the Governor-General.¹¹⁵

This was the genesis of parliamentary government in Southern Cameroons. There were checks and balances, a practice which was carried into the Federal Republic of Cameroon but died with the creation of the Cameroon National Union (CNU) party on September 1, 1966. The Commissioner of Cameroons, was under legal obligation to consult the Executive Council, except in certain specified circumstances, but was also given a mandate to act against the Council's advice, if he had a cause for his action.

The KNC was at the zenith of its glory. It was popular and enjoyed the confidence of a cross-section of the population including the various "Native Authorities" and the Chiefs. During the December 1954 elections to the House of Representatives it won all the eight seats allotted to Southern Cameroons. These Representatives were;

J. Mbonyam	Nkambe
L. A. Ning	Wum
S. L. Fonka	Bamenda
P. Ayule	Mamfe
V. E. Mukete	Kumba
F. Nganle	Victoria

Mr. Victor Mukete was appointed Federal Minister without portfolio.¹¹⁶

The 1954 elections brought no change in Northern Cameroons' political status, since at the London Conference their leader Mallam Abba Habib, had told the Colonial Secretary, that Northern

Cameroonians wished to remain part of Northern Nigeria. The militants and associates of the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) were elected into the Northern and Federal Legislatures. A Consultative Committee on Northern Cameroons was set up in April 1955, charged with the responsibility of informing the Government of their people's opinions on regional legislation. This Committee was chaired by Mallam Abba Habib who was appointed Minister of Northern Cameroons Affairs in Northern Nigerian Government.¹¹⁷

The Commissioner of the Cameroons Mr. E. J. Gibbons in 1955 reported to the UN Trusteeship Council the outcome of the 1954 elections, but the Syrian Representative Muhammed H. El. Farra criticised British plan bitterly for keeping the Trust Territory divided and pointed out that "it would prejudice the peoples' choice on their status".¹¹⁸

In the Federal Legislature the KNC developed close ties with the Action Group, which was in the opposition. Its leader Dr. Endeley began to perceive Southern Cameroons developing into a self-governing region within an independent Federation of Nigeria and to accept the integration of Northern Cameroons with Northern Nigeria as inevitable. This angered pro-secessionists and unificationists resulting in J.N. Foncha, who did not share these ideas, severing connections with the KNC and founding the Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP) in March 1955. The KNC alliance with the Action Group (AG) in the Federal Legislature was in violation of the 1953 pledge of "Benevolent Neutrality" of the

Cameroons in Nigerian politics. Foncha's stand for unification was gaining grounds both in Southern Cameroons and amongst French Cameroun pro-unificationists led by the UPC leaders. Because of the idea of secession and unification the KNDP gained credibility before Cameroonians among the educated elite and the traditional rulers. Meanwhile the KNC government became determined more than ever before to forge ahead with more political changes in Southern Cameroons in favour of effective Union with Nigeria.

The 1957 Elections Campaign

The March 1957 parliamentary elections in Southern Cameroons was an event for political parties to define their positions. Associating UPC with communism and French Camerouns with violence as well as attracting the attention of traditional rulers, who formed the basis of political parties, influenced political campaigns during the elections. The KNC and KPP campaigned intensively for a separate autonomous region for Southern Cameroons within Nigeria. The KNDP campaign programme embodied the following - benevolent Neutrality towards Nigeria, secession from Nigeria and the unification of Northern and Southern Cameroons, for Britain to assume her responsibility of direct administration in the trust territory, and a future reunification of the divided Kamerun on the basis of mutual respect.¹¹⁹ Following the election results of March 1957, KNC won 6 seats, KNDP won 5 seats and KPP won 2 seats. Dr. E.M.L. Endeley won the support of the Native Authority members and the KNC was asked to form a government. The KNDP gained prominence in parliament

because of its anti-Nigerian attitude. The anti-Igbo campaign that Dr. Endeley had launched against the KPP during the 1954 elections was used by J. N. Foncha against him in the 1957 elections.¹²⁰

The London Constitutional Conference of 1957

In May and June 1957, the British Colonial Secretary in London, organised another constitutional conference to review the Nigerian Constitution. Southern Cameroons was represented at the Conference by the leaders of KNC, KPP and KNDP. The Secretary of State held series of separate talks with the Cameroonian delegation. Dr. Endeley, leader of the KNC and P.M. Kale, leader of the KPP opted for a separate and full regional status within the Nigerian Federation with a ministerial government for the Southern Cameroons. The leader of the KNDP, J. N. Foncha put forward his case of complete secession of British Cameroons from the Federation of Nigeria.

The 1957 constitutional conference however brought constitutional advancements to Southern Cameroons. The term "quasi-federal Territory" was dropped and Southern Cameroons became an autonomous region within Nigeria. The regional government was to be headed by a premier. The number of elected members of the House of Assembly was to be increased from thirteen to twenty-six. The Commissioner was empowered to appoint a speaker of the House of Assembly in consultation with the Premier. The number of Southern Cameroons representative to the Senate in Lagos was increased to twelve.

The Secretary of State for Colonies before submitting the Southern Cameroons Constitution of the general conference for adoption had this to say on behalf of Her Majesty's Government:

Her Majesty's Government fully recognises its obligations to the Cameroons under the Trusteeship Agreement. One of these obligations has been to administer the Territory as an integral part of Nigeria. This, has, of course, been on the assumption that Nigeria was a dependent territory. When Nigeria becomes an independent country this arrangement will no longer be possible so the Trusteeship Agreement will in any case have to be reviewed at that stage. When Nigeria becomes independent one possibility would be that the Cameroons should remain part of it. This would involve the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement and would require consultation with the United Nations. I can state categorically that there can be no question of obliging the Cameroons to remain part of an independent Nigeria contrary to her own wishes. Before Nigeria becomes independent the people of the Northern and Southern Sectors of the Cameroons would have to say freely what their wishes were as to their

future. Among the options opened to them would be to continue under the Trust Administration of the United Kingdom. I must in fairness add the warning that you would not thereby be given the golden key to the Bank of England: But many of the best friends of the Cameroons do not foresee a destiny more likely to promote her happiness and prosperity than continued association with Nigeria. Her Majesty's Government will of course, pay the very greatest regard to their views, whatever form they may take.¹²¹

From this policy statement political parties drew statements that formed the basis of their party programmes. Northern Cameroons proposed nothing new during the London 1957 constitutional Conference. Mallam Abba Habib as in 1953 reaffirmed that the northern sector prefers being an integral part of the Northern Region. He however, praised the people of Southern Cameroons for achieving an autonomous status.

On the issue of a ministerial system of government party participants at the London constitutional congress agreed with the Secretary of State for Colonies that, the ministerial system should not be introduced before the 1959 elections. The KNC-KPP motion to effect it was contested by A. N. Jua, deputy leader of the KNDP, who strongly argued that fresh elections were a pre-requisite condition for the introduction of the ministerial

system of government. Mua and S. T. Muna who had cross-carpeted to the fold of the KNDP, allied with Jua in opposing the motion. J. N. Foncha leader of the KNDP also opposed the motion, and the Traditional Rulers were equally averse to the motion in a statement issued at the end of the Mankon Conference attended by both E. M. L. Endeley and J. K. Foncha. But when it was put to vote in the Assembly the KNDP motion was defeated.¹²²

Dr. E.M.L. Endeley was installed Premier of Southern Cameroons on May 15, 1958 in accordance with the provisions of the London constitutional conference of 1957. Sir Abubakar T. Balewa, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe and Chief Obafemi Awolowo sent congratulatory messages to the new Cameroonian leader. The Southern Cameroons Executive Council had five unofficial members namely (E.M.L. Endeley as Premier, Minister of Local Government, Lands and Surveys; Reverend Ando Seh, Minister of State; F. N. Ajebe-Sone, Minister of Natural Resources; N. N. Mbile,¹²⁰ Minister of Works and Transport and V. T. Lainjo.¹²²) and four ex-officio members.

Premier E. M. L. Endeley in an important policy statement at a state banquet held in Buea Mountain Hotel on May 29, 1958, to mark the introduction of this Ministerial Government, told his fellow countrymen that his government had removed the question of unification out of the realm of urgent priority in which it had earlier been placed. He pointed out that with Northern Cameroons totally absorbed into Nigeria and the French Cameroun assimilated into the French Union, the desire to see a United Cameroon as in

the pre-1914 was impossible. The Premier maintained that unification as he perceived it could only materialize when an independent French Cameroon outside the French Union and an independent Nigerian Federation with Southern Cameroons as part would be in an unfettered position to explore the possibilities of a Union as part of the movement towards the creation of a United State of West Africa. He told the people his administration would preserve the Fondoms with the role of the a-fon "as a valuable traditional institution."¹²³ He however warned them to desist from party politics. Here he ran into conflict with the Traditional Rulers on two fronts because warning them not to participate in party politics and the introduction of the ministerial system of government against their wishes was an outright challenge to their opinion. The chiefs replied that while accepting their role as traditional and their chiefdoms as "traditional Institutions" they reserved the right to interfere with and correct the affairs of the country when it is realized that things were going radically wrong.¹²⁴ The chiefs demanded secession from Nigeria and opted for independence and the idea of unification and re-unification kept aside. Their main objective was to work harder and achieve self-government and independence outside the Federation of Nigeria.¹²⁵ The Premier having taken an integrationist position contrary to secession from Nigeria, caused a drift of most of his supporters into the KNDP camp. It became clear that Dr. E.M.L. Endeley was all out for continued association with Nigeria inspite of the

declaration of benevolent neutrality in Nigerian politics by Southern Cameroonians in 1953.

The London 1958 Constitutional Conference

The rendezvous for another round of talks on the Nigerian Constitution was honoured, and in September 1958, the conference opened in London under the Chairmanship of the Secretary of State for colonies. The three political parties in Southern Cameroons KNC, KPP and KNDP were represented. The KNC and KPP leaders reaffirmed that all things being equal, their main objective was that Southern Cameroons should attain full regional status with equal respects within the Federation of Nigeria. The KNDP on the other hand while accepting full regional status for the Trust Territory did not want it to be part of an independent Nigeria. Their main target was the reunification of Northern and Southern sectors and immediate secession from Nigeria.¹²⁶ Thus the KNC-KPP alliance was anti-secession or reunification because they were out to encourage Cameroons' integration into Nigeria. In the midst of the reigning confusion it was agreed upon that no further constitutional changes be effected until the January 1959 elections. The elections were to be conducted on the basis of universal adult suffrage. It was again arrived at that Northern Cameroons which had expressed its desire to continue in association with the Northern Region of Nigeria was to become a self-governing Region in March 1959 within the Federation of Nigeria.¹²⁷

The January 24, 1959 elections was a decisive factor in determining the fate of Southern Cameroons' "secession from Nigeria or integration into Nigeria". The people of the Trust Territory were to elect 26 members into the House of Assembly. Political parties adopted various strategies to win votes. Apparently, during the campaigns no party offered the electorate the exact content of its programme. The KNC-KPP alliance that stood for integration with Nigeria, campaigned for "association" with Nigeria. The KNDP on its part offered different things to different sections of the society depending on who they were addressing, the varied strokes being interpreted that to some they offered self-government, to others it was secession and a period of trusteeship and independence and to others their offer was integration versus secession a fundamental issue at the elections. The OK party formed after the UPC was banned in British Cameroons, campaigned for the KNDP which had already precipitated confusion among its supporters. This confusion gave Endeley more votes than he was to receive in the January 1959 elections.¹²⁸ Thus, by the January 1959 elections KNDP won 14 seats, KNC 8 seats and KPP won 4 seats. Since the alliance of KNC-KPP could give only 12 seats, J. N. Foncha, leader of the KNDP became the Prime Minister of the Southern Cameroons.

Through the various Nigerian constitutional conferences, Southern Cameroons evolved from a province attached to the Eastern Region to an autonomous region by 1959, having its own House of Assembly, and other organs of government within the

Trusteeship Agreement. The victory of J. N. Foncha's KNDP in 1959 January elections was a major step forward towards the secession of the Trust Territory from the Federation of Nigeria.

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Notes

1. Southern Cameroonians benefited from the Nigerian institutions and needed not to go abroad to acquire the much need education. Most of her leaders viz: Dr. E.M.L. Endeley, Dr. J.N. Foncha, N.N. Mbile Egbe. Peter N. Nsakwa and P.M. kale studied in Nigerian Schools and Colleges.
2. H.L. Peacock, European History 1789 - 1970. (London, Heinemann Educational Books 1970). P.380.
3. Ibid.
4. The Nigerian Youth Movement chronologically was not the first political movement in Nigeria. The Nigerian National Democratic Party was the first party to appear in 1922 founded by Herbert Macaulay.
5. Obaro Ikeme (ed). Groundwork of Nigeria History, (Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books, 1980). PP. 545-569.
6. Ibid.
7. George Atem, Cameroon-Nigerian Relations from 1884-1960 (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Calabar, 1982). P.108.
8. Ibid.
9. C.D.C. Common-Wealth Development corporation became Cameroon Development Corporation when Cameroon became independent. The C.D.C is a large agro-industrial complex model on capitalist model of plantation farming. Growing Rubber, Pslams, Banana and tea originally created by the Germans.

10. P.M. Kale, Political Evolution in the Cameroons, Op.cit. P.26.
11. Ibid. P. 28.
12. Willard Johnson, The Cameroon Federation: Political Integration in a Fragmentary Society (Princeton University Press, New Jersey USA 1970) P.119.
13. Interview with V.T. Lainjo, (60) Buea 20 March, 1989.
14. Ibid.
15. N.N. Mbile's personal, political file.
16. Interview with Professor Asanga, (46) Yaounde, 26 February 1989.
17. Ibid.
18. Jide Osuntokun "The Historical Background of Nigeria Federation" in Akinyemi A.B, et (eds) Reading in Federation, (NIIA Lagos Ibadan University Press, 1979) P. 110.
19. Interview with Professor Asanga Yaounde, 26 February 1989.
20. George Atem Cameroon-Nigeria Relations, Op.Cit P. 199
21. S.I/1946/IDO Bamenda to Residence Buea
22. VB/b/1954/3 Cameroons Peoples National Convention (CPNC) Party (NAB)
23. Ibid.
24. Ea/1948/5 H. Cooper's Lecture in Kumba (NAB)
25. George Atem, Cameroon-Nigerian Relation 1884-1984 Op. Cit. P.270
26. Ibid.
27. Willard Johnson, Op.Cit P.39

28. Edwin Ardener "The Political History of Cameroon" in The World Today, Vol. 18 No. 1 (January 1962) P.345.
29. Victor le Vine, The Cameroon Federal Republic, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971) P.6
30. TD/1950/12 Petition to the U.N. Visiting Mission, 30/10/49 (NAB).
31. Interview with Epie Micheal, (36) Bamenda 26 May 1989.
32. H.E. Peacock, Europe in the twentieth Century, (London, 1976), P.249
33. As/1918/24, Secret Correspondence District Officer Bamenda to Resident Buea 10/6/1918. (NAB).
34. V. G. Fanson, Trans-frontier Relations and Resistance to Cameroon-Nigerian Boundaries, 1916-1945, (Unpublished Ph. D Thesis, University of Yaounde, 1982). P. 429.
35. C.E. Welch, Dream of Unity, Pan Africanism and Political Unification in West Africa, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1966) P. 177.
36. T/Pet 4/52-5/65 Petition from Bamenda Improvement Association to the United Nations Trusteeship Council 1952.
37. Oje Oriere "The Secession of the Southern Cameroons" in Headlines, No (99 May 1981), Printer Daily Times of Nigeria Ltd. Lagos.
38. Debate in the Eastern House of Assembly, August 1, 1947. (NAB).
39. S.I./1948/2, Ibo Federal Union Petition 10/1/48.
40. Ibid.

41. Nkwi and Warnier, Elements for a History of the Western Grass fields, (Yaounde: CEPER, 1982) P.58
42. S.I./1948/2 Petition by Ibo Federal Union to Resident. 15/3/48
43. P. 614/oc/1945/1 File, Public Lecture, Kumba 09/05/1948 (NAB).
44. Willard R. Johnson op.cit P.125.
45. O. Eme. Federal Government in Nigeria, (California: University of California Press, 1964) P.58.
46. Eyong Etah & R. Brain, History of Cameroons, second Edition (London: Longman Group Ltd., 1980) P.129.
47. TD./1950/12 Petitions to United Nations Visiting Mission 1949. (NAB) for details see, T/Pet.4/47-5/63 Petition from the Bamgwa Native authority.
48. United Nations Documents Supplement No. 2/T798 U.N. Visiting Mission Report, New York 1951, P. 15.
49. I/1951/10, Endeley's speech at Ibadan, January 1950, (NAB).
50. Ngondo, Kumze, and Esocam were powerful ethnic Associations that heavily influenced the political events in French Cameroon.
51. United Nations D.t./pet/4/29, 30/10/51 Supp. of November 26, 1951.
52. Richard a. Joseph, Radical Nationalism in Cameroon, op.cit P.190

53. N.N Mbile became pro-NCNC and supported the idea of Association with Nigeria, unlike Dr. Endeley who wanted Cameroons' Association as a separate Region, N.N. Mbile advocated Cameroons' Association with Nigeria as part of the Eastern Region.
54. Dibongue in the 1950s ironically dropped the reunification idea and became a pro-integrationist in Dr. Endeley's camp.
55. TD./1952/1 KUNC Meeting in Kumba, December 1951. (NB).
56. Interview with Zock Paul Eseka 10/09/1987.
57. Charles Okala was senator in the French Assembly and his party French Cameroun socialist Party was an ally of the French socialist party. His negative altitude towards the UPC reflects French hostility towards the Movement.
58. D.E. Gardinier, op.cit P.65
59. P.M. Kale, op.cit P.50.
60. Ibid.
61. vb/b/ (1951) File No V Cameroons Unification Movement (KUNC)
(NAB)
62. Ibid.
63. Eyong T. Etah and R.Brain, op.cit P.115
64. Ibid.
65. Ea/1951/ File No. IV V 1752 Kamerun People's Party 1954.
(NAB)
66. Jean Francois Bayart, L' Etat Au Cameroun, (Paris 1st edition, 1976) P.111


67. Vb/b/ 1951/1 File No. V 1957 Cameroons Unification Movement (KUNC) NAB.
68. Interview with S.N. Tita, (60) Limbe 29 May 1989
69. Peter Ngi Nsakwa's Political File, the KNDP. Party.
70. S.A. George was a strong political figure who was from Mamfe. His mother was a Douala and this may account for his strong support for unification.
71. J.N. Foncha's simplicity won the admiration of the conservative Grassland traditional rulers and their subjects as well as those in the Forest Zone. They preferred him to Dr. Endeley who was very arrogant and uncompromising with their functions.
72. Albert Mukong A Criminal without a Crime, (Limbe: Alfrsco books, 1985), PP 5-15.
73. Ibid.
74. George Atem, op.cit P.303.
75. Ibid.
76. Vc/1959/2 P.M.'s office confidential File No. V. (NAB)
77. Vb/b 1956/1 I file No. 6168. Letter by the chiefs to the Resident in Buea.
78. Ibid.
79. Victor Le Vine, From Mandate to Independence, op.cit P.206
80. Laws of Nigeria. No. 66/09/1957, Criminal code chapter 42.
81. Interview with Professor Asanga, Yaounde, 20 February 1989
82. Ibid.
83. Daily Times of Nigeria 5/6/1957.

84. VB/b/1956/I file No. 6168 (NAB).
85. Aloys J. Tallen, The Kamerun Beside Book. (Ibadan, 1958), P.31.
86. A.N.A. Enonchong op.cit P. 58.
87. Interview with Stephen N. Nfor, (60) Limbe, 16 June 1989.
88. Ibid.
89. The two Representatives from Northern Cameroons were the Emir of Dikwa and his Chief scribe.
90. Va/a 1950/1 File No. 1227 Elections in Cameroons Province 1950.
91. Interview with L.N.Lainjo, Buea, 20 March, 1989.
92. T./Pet.4/19-5/8 Petition From French Camerouns Welfare Union.
93. British Cameroons Annual Report, 1952 P.85
94. British Cameroons Annual Report 1953, P.19.
95. United Nations Report on T/C. December 18, 1951-July 1952, New York 1952, P.144.
96. Eyong T.Etah and R. Brain, Op.cit. PP 115-116
97. H.N.A. Enonchong, op.cit PP. 61-62
98. Interview with Peter Ngie Nsakwa, (60) Nkambe 24 April 1989.
99. Ibid.
100. Victor Julius Ngoh Op.Cit P. 192 "cause celebre" "celebrated cause" (My translation).
101. P.M. Kale Op.Cit P.39.
102. Daily Times of Nigeria 25/4/1953.
103. George Atem, Op.Cit P.289

104. Ibid.
105. Ibid. P. 40.
106. Interview with S.N. Tita, Limbe 10 June 1989
107. P.M. Kemcha, Cameroon in Transition, Unpublished manuscript, PP. 4-6
108. Report of the conference on the Nigerian constitution, Annex VI. 1953, P. 22.
109. British Cameroon Annual Report, 1953, P. 105
110. Ibid.
111. The K.P.P. National Secretariat Publication Victoria May 25, 1953.
112. T./Pet. 4/14 - 5 7, to the U.N. T/C (NAB).
113. Debates in the Southern Cameroons House of Assembly 29-10-54 (NAB).
114. Va/a - 1959/ I File No. P.678 Legislative councils of Nigeria and Cameroons.
115. Ibid.
116. P.M. Kemcha, Op.Cit. PP. 24 - 26.
117. British Cameroons Annual Report 1955 PP. 14 - 16
118. African Digest Vol. III. No. I May - June 1955.
119. Interview with L.V Lainjo, Buea, 19 March 1989.
120. Ibid.
121. British Cameroons Annual Report 1957, P. 127
122. Debate in the Southern Cameroons House of Assembly December, 1957

123. V.T. Lainjo Op.Cit N.N. Mbile deputy leader of K.P.P. came into the Executive because of the alliance between the KNC and K.P.P.
124. Dr. Endeley's Policy statement May 29, 1958. Federal Information service Publication 1958. P.8.
125. Bongfen Chem-Langhee" The Cameroon Plebiscite 1959 - 1961 Perceptions and Strategies, (unpublished Ph.D Thesis, University of British Columbia, August, 1976) P. 108.
126. Ibid. P. 43
127. Interview with the Major of Nkambe L.Y. Ngala, (62) 20 April 1987.
128. Ibid.
129. Chem Langhee Op.Cit P. 125.

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SOURCE: EYONGETAH, T. AND BRAIN, R.
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CHAPTER III

RISE OF POLITICAL MOVEMENTS IN FRENCH CAMEROUN

III.1 The Genesis of Nationalist Movements

The organisation of real nationalist movements in the French Cameroun during the inter-war period faced more difficulties than in Nigeria and British Cameroons. The major difficulty was the French official restriction in Cameroun on any political organisation through which the people could express nation-wide opinion and raise their concerns publicly over issues affecting them as a people and as a nation.¹

The French felt insecure in Cameroun because of the German colonial claims and this hindered at the initial stage, the early organisation of full fledged nationalist movement in French Cameroun. One advantage Camerounians had in this "tug-of war" between France and Germany over the territory was that France came to realise, as Hitler came to power, that it would be to their interest for Camerounians to organise and speak out as a people against the return of the Germans to Kamerun. By this, France was placating the Camerounians for their anti-French feelings in Cameroun, which made notables express their wish that they were ready to welcome the Germans. The French thus initiated changes that later contributed to Camerounians gaining the weapons which they could use to achieve their personal goals.

Before the lifting of the ban on political activities in the territory, Camerounians in Paris had set up organisations such as the Comité de defense des Interets du Cameroun to compensate for and combat the restriction on all political activity by the indigenous people in the territory. As the French authorities trampled on the organisation, it collapsed and in its place the Union Camerounaise² was formed in 1937 to continue the struggle. It was led by Jean Mandessi Bell and Leopold Moume-Etia all from Douala. The new organisation fought against the economic restrictions on Camerounians from France and for transfer of Cameroun from Mandate "B" to "A" and that the territory should not be returned to Germany. Through this medium these Paris based Camerounians made their views known to many world leaders as regards the future of Cameroun.

Between 1937/8 when the French decided to allow the formation of a Camerounian "Public Opinion" against German propaganda they were careful about who was chosen to spearhead the campaign. One group that was highly suspected was the Paris-based intellectuals. Consequently the French were wary of the Union Camerounaise because some of its members had connections with more radical groups in Paris. The French authorities regarded the members of the Union Camerounaise as being possibly pro-German despite all their protestations to the contrary³. The French then needed a new breed of Camerounians unwedded to the German past and thoroughly imbued with French "Civilisation and Culture".

This found expression among the civil servants (fonctionnaires) trained by the French, and committed by reason of their careers in the Civil Service to opposing the German return to the territory. These young civil servants were given the green-light and the first popular quasi-nationalist party was founded in 1938, the Jeunesse Camerounaise Francaise (Jeucafra). It was pro-French as can be seen from its name and was formed to support the maintenance of French occupation in Cameroun. Its president was Soppo Priso, Vice-President, Andre Fouda and Secretary General Louis-Marie Pouka⁴. Jeucafra guided by the leaders of the local Comite' pour le Maintien de L'Integrite' de L'Empire Francais worked to rally the assimilated young Camerounians to the French cause. Jeucafra in September 1939, publicly declared their association with the French War efforts. The leaders of the movement hoped the post-war era would effect a new relationship between Cameroun and France. They favoured the policy of assimilation as a means to attain this objective. They opted for the abolition of the mandate system (which luckily ended with the creation of the United Nations) and the civic rights of Camerounians to elect their own representatives. Under the canopy of Jeucafra, its leaders, while supporting the French presence in Cameroun used it as a forum to air their views against French rule from within.

From the manifestoes of the U.C. and Jeucafra, it is clear that these early political movements did not envisage reunification nor any plan of self-determination for French

Cameroun. Jeucafra with French support was therefore a tool for the realisation of French imperialism. Its leaders as at the time were therefore dancing to the tune of the French. French domination and control of Jeucafra exarcebated its radical members who wanted loose ties as distinct from the conservatives who wanted closer links with France, such as the four communes of Senegal with their political rights. In this light Jeucafra has been perceived by many people as a symbol of collaboration with the forces of French imperialism⁵. Jeucafra leaders Paul Soppo Priso and L. Marie Pouka, except Ruben Um Nyobe revealed their loyalty and earnest wish to become French subordinate as shown by their declarations on the occasion of a five-man Parliamentary Mission to Cameroun in early 1939 led by Geston Monnerville from French Guiana. Inter alia they had this to say:

Paul Soppo Priso:

All of Cameroun, which has for twenty years enjoyed freedom of conscience, the equality of human rights, and fraternal relations under the soft and gracious folds of the tri-coloured flag, lifts its voice and affirms its choice - to the whole world that it became a province of great France.

L. Marie Pouka:

At the time that I, along with Soppo Priso and other enlightened Camerounians founded the first political movement called - 'Jeucafra',

we were treated as traitors and sell-outs, whereas our desire was only the suppression of the "Mandate". Camerounians from all quarters followed us. It is France which refused to integrate us into the French Empire.

Ruben Um Nyobe:

In 1938, under the initiative of Governor-General Richard Brunot, the famous "Jeunesse Camerounaise Francaise" was born which they were careful to confide to the leadership of Soppo Priso. This movement, to which the Cameroun masses adhered with enthusiasm, had for us a different significance from that expected by the colonialists. For us it represented the best opportunity to affirm publicly that we were for freedom and against totalitarianism, consequently we voiced our attachment to France and our opposition to the return of a Hitlerian German Administration. But that did not mean that we were asking to become a French colony as was abusively declared by Soppo Priso⁶.

The declarations above show clearly the position of pro-French political groups and their early negative attitude toward independence let alone reunification. Only Um Nyobe singled out himself against the French rule. The enthusiasm of reunification

was therefore solely a Southern Cameroons affair and other nationalists like those of the UPC later saw it as a weapon to do away with French imperialism in French Cameroun.

However, the end of the Second World War saw the rise of workers' movements which laid the foundation of the post-war political parties in the territory. The decree of August 7, 1944, enacted by the Free French Government granted the right to organise unions and to strike. The formal legalisation of Trade Unions in the territory saw the establishment of the local branches of the French Labour Movements in Cameroun after the Brazzaville Conference of 1944. The activities of French Communist and the Confederation General du Travail (CGT) was a contributory factor to the rapid development of Trade Unions in Cameroun. The Communist backed Union des Syndicates Confederes du Cameroun (USCC) was established in Cameroun. Other trade Unions included the Roman Catholic Confederation Francaise des Travailleux Chretiens (CFTC)⁷, the Confederation Camerounaise des Sydicats Croyant (CCSC), the Union de Syndicates Autonomes du Cameroun (USAC). The advantages Camerounians got from these trade unions were that it provided them with a broad radical perspective in which to understand, and combat, the economic and political features of colonialism; and the Unions provided elites with the opportunity of meeting and working openly with whites on an equal basis⁸.

III.2 The Brazzaville Conference 1944: Its impact on Nationalist Forces

The effects of the Second World War added impetus to anti colonial rule in various colonial territories around the globe. The Frenchmen realising the growth of anti-colonialism, decided that they had to undertake reforms in their policy over Black Africa (Afrique Noire). The Africans support for the Free French cause and their contributions to the war effort produced a feeling of gratitude among the Frenchmen. Following the changes caused by the wars and the spirit of nationalism burning in the colonised people, France concluded that it was imperative to promote the political and socio-economic advancement of the indigenes if she was to maintain her rule in Afrique Noire.

The French therefore summoned the Brazzaville Conference of January - February 1944 attended by Free French officials. The conference put aside the idea of autonomy and any possibility of evolution outside the French bloc. On the other hand, they wished to promote the political advancement of Afrique Noire. The conference endorsed the formation of trade unionism which was a step forward.

The trade unions became the main agencies of anti-colonial activity. The French had abolished all practices related to the policy of paternalism. But the trade unionist intensified the fight against the inadequacies of the labour code decreed by the

French Government in June 1944 as well as the primitive labour conditions maintained by the colons in the territory⁹. With the zeal of political advancement in the colonies and trust territories, the constitution of the Fourth Republic stipulated that they were to elect representatives to parliamentary institutions in Paris. The 1946 constitution also set up Representative Assemblies in the French African territories. In Cameroun, the Assemble Representative Camerounaise (ARCAM) was created¹⁰. The candidates into ARCAM presented themselves as individuals rather than as members of political parties. Two political tendencies appeared when Camerounians understood the exact status of the territory as an Associated Territory of the French Union and as a United Nations trust territory under French administration. There were, the "evolutionary" tendency which embodied those Camerounians who, though not satisfied with the political advancement through the policy of assimilation, were willing to work with it for a while and to seek reforms later as the territory advanced. On the other hand was the "revolutionary" tendency led by Camerounians who were dissatisfied with the frame-work to the degree that they were determined to have French policy altered in order to permit a political evolution towards self-government and independence¹¹.

The evolutionary camp made up of chiefs, employees of the administration and notables won the elections to the ARCAM in December 1946. The revolutionary camp made up of some employees of the administration, members of labour unions in particular -

failed to be elected as deputies to Yaounde and Paris. They failed in all these elections because of their anti-colonial radical approach which they believed , to solve the territory's socio-economic problems they must be the masters of their country's destiny¹². The trade unionists failed to push reform demands through Union Camerounaise Francaise the only political medium of expressing grievances. The trade unionists came to a conclusion that to confront the French Colonial administration for political and socio-economic advancement direct action was imperative. The Union Camerounaise Francaise (Unicafra) like the UC and Jeucafra was a French propaganda organisation devoted to the consolidation of French Colonial rule. Its future programmes included neither the plan for self-determination nor reunification.

III.3 Political Groups and Their Approach To Decolonisation

In April 1947, Camerounian moderates who were members of Union Camerounaise Francaise (Unicafra) withdrew from the party and led by Soppo Priso and a new political party was formed the Rassemblement Camerounaise (RACAM). The nationalist party was to be short-lived. Its name significantly without the word "francaise" was seen as tantamount to a revolt against French rule.

The political platform of RACAM was to secure the independence of Cameroun conforming to the United Nations Charter, for which Article 4 of the Trusteeship Agreement did not seem to make allowance, at least at that early epoch owing to the fact that by that article France administered Cameroun as an integral part of French territory. RACAM was against assimilation and equally against the integration of Cameroun in the French Union¹³. Because of its link with French Socialist Party, RACAM was termed revolutionary in character and was judged undesirable the same year by the administration, and was banned without other form of action by Commissioner Robert Delavignette¹⁴. RACAM provided an occasion for Camerounian nationalists to fight against colonial rule. Unfortunately only a few people were willing to articulate and fight. Referring to RACAM's date of formation Ruben Um Nyobe had this to say : "It is therefore on 1 April 1947 that one can place the point of departure of the new movement no longer opposing, as in 1939 just Hitlerism, but colonialism tout court"¹⁵ (in short). RACAM therefore openly set as its principal goal self-government and the idea of reunification was never mentioned.

The Formation of the UPC

The RACAM episode indicated that the French Colonial administration would not tolerate the existence of any political groups which sought complete independence from metropolitan

France. In spite of the considerable constitutional reforms of 1945-6 and the eventual political and workers union unrest at the beginning of 1948, Cameroun had no indigenous workable political party. French Camerounians faced with this dilemma came to a conclusion that only a coherent political organisation would enable them pursue vigorously their collective objectives.

On April 10, 1948, in Douala Bassa quarters, the Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC) was founded¹⁶. Its founding fathers were Ruben Um Nyobe (Bassa), Ernest Ouandie (Bamileke), Abel Kingue (Douala), and Dr. Felix Roland Moumie (Foumban)¹⁷. The UPC emerged as the first dynamic indigenous political party in French Cameroun. Its leaders were heavily influenced by Communist ideology. Analysing its goals in the premier article of its statute, in broad terms, it reads; " to group and unite the inhabitants of the territory in order to permit the most rapid evolution of the peoples and the raising of their standard of living"¹⁸.

The party leaders were very careful not to run into conflict with the administration by avoiding any allegations that their goals contrasted with those of the administration in any fundamental way. But the French were very suspicious of the party and recognised the fact that the new party would rise to prominence. The administration however granted the UPC recognition.

The UPC was structurally well organised. It had a Central Executive Committee, political bureau, Secretariat and Treasury.

It had auxiliary organs viz the Comite Femini de L'UPC, the "Amis des Nations Unies, the Jeunesse Democratique Camerounaise" and the Comite' de Defense de la paix". These sub-organs propagated the doctrine of the party. When the UPC gained grounds, it came out with an elaborate programme which obviously ran into conflict with the French. The programme embodied three key political objectives (1) the suppression of artificial boundaries created in 1916 between the two Cameroons (11) Abandonment by France of its policy of assimilation (111) Schedule of time limit for trusteeship, after which Cameroon would achieve independence¹⁹. The UPC anti-colonial programme aimed at the political emancipation of Cameroonians drew support from various quarters. In French Cameroun the new party strength laid among government employees throughout the country and among proletariat in the urban centres of the Southern Region. It was deeply rooted among the Bassa, Douala and Bamileke ethnic groups from where its leaders emanated and it had little support among the Boulou, Ewondou and Bete people. The UPC quickly won the support of traditional societies that emerged in the late 1940s such as the Ngondo or Traditional Assembly of the Doualas, the Kumsze, a Bamileke Tribal Association headed by Chief Mathais Djoumessi and the Bantou Tribal Union (Union Tribale Bantou)²⁰.

The UPC being the first indigenous party to adopt the idea of unification won the admiration of the traditional rulers in the French Cameroons Welfare Union (FCWU) and the Cameroons Federal Union (CFU) who were pro-unificationists in Southern

Cameroons. The UPC propaganda department established a strong press media to propagate its programme. It had a weekly newspaper L'Etoile, a bimonthly Lumiere, a monthly newspaper, the Voix du Peuple du Cameroun and a youth bulletin called La Verite. Um Nyobe in particular worked hard to win the support of plantation workers who were ignorant about the destiny of their nation²¹.

At the United Nations' Fourth Commission of 1952 political parties were invited to the U.N. Headquarters in New York to air their views on the political destiny of the Trust Territory. The three delegates from Cameroun; Um Nyobe of the UPC, Charles Okala of the Socialists Party and Douala Manga Bell of the BCD appeared before the Fourth Commission. Ruben Um Nyobe told the Commission that the UPC programme envisaged reunification of the two sectors and a set time limit for the independence of the territory²². While Um Nyobe advocated these two options his two colleagues were in favour of continued French Trusteeship over the territory.

The UPC's popularity at the U.N. coupled with its external ties and sources of support as the Cameroun section of the Rassemblement Democratique Africain (RDA)²³ kept the French in an uneasy position. The French representative at the U.N. Pignon was particularly perturbed as to the consequences of the warm reception accorded Um Nyobe.

Hostility towards the UPC

The idea of reunification and immediate independence with no foreign interference in the internal affairs of a reunified Cameroun placed the UPC in the darkest books of the French Colonial administration. The UPC was viewed as a party of agitators geared at igniting revolutions and thus hindering the peace and tranquillity of the administration. The arrival of Roland Pre in 1954 as the territory's new High Commissioner marked a turning point in the existence of UPC. Roland Pre was a conservative who unlike his immediate moderate predecessors did not favour nationalist movements of any kind in French Cameroun and he limited the jurisdiction of the Territorial Assembly. His energies were directed particularly towards the UPC for allegedly campaigning against the administration like the anti-vaccination campaign in the Bamileke region. Roland Pre adopted various strategies to deal squarely with the UPC. All government civil servants who were known to be Upecistes were transferred to remote areas of the trust territory²⁴. The UPC was refused the use of public facilities for meetings and rallies. Pre enforced rigidly all regulations to obstruct UPC activities.

The administration also adopted a policy of containment against the UPC by launching a campaign among the various ethnic groups to isolate the UPC. The ethnic diversity of the territory worked in favour of the administration. In the Muslim North, the Fulani nobility who were in alliance with the administration did everything to halt the penetration of the UPC that was critical

of their semi-feudal rule²⁵. The Catholic Church was also alienated from the UPC for what it termed its alleged atheistic doctrine. This led to the Catholic Bishops preaching against UPC and its adherents.

The colonial administration in its final attempt before banning the UPC in July, 1955 had encouraged and sponsored the formation of parties that would be less anti-colonial rule and thus counteract the influence of the UPC. These scores of parties that appeared between 1949 and 1953 existed only in name²⁶. One classical example of such colonial oriented anti-UPC party was the **"Evolution Sociale Camerounaise"** (ESOCAM) formed July 20, 1949, by Bassa nobles the kinsmen of Um Nyobe in the Sanaga-Maritime. It was headed by a former prominent UPC member Pierre Dimalia. The ESOCAM political platform enunciated opposition to unification and to independence in the near future. It thus endorsed Cameroun's union with France which the UPC was fighting against. The pro-colonial ESOCAM lacked dynamic leadership and its successes were few as it remained principally an organisation of the Bassa²⁷. The ESOCAM was even unable to win the Bassa populace. The failure of ESOCAM led to the formation of **Coordination des Independants Camerounaise** (Indecam) in 1952 at Edea. Like its predecessor, it was anti-UPC and was dominantly Bassa based and weak in its national scope.

Within this first period of 1945 - 1957²⁸ that saw the rise of national political parties in French Cameroun, after the UPC, two other political parties were formed which were not ethnically

inspired. These parties were the Block Democratic Camerounais (BDC) and the Union Sociale Camerounaise (USC). The BDC was founded by a Catholic medical doctor Louis-Paul Aujoulant, a frenchman. He was a very influential politician in Cameroun and was elected by the indigenes as their Deputy in 1951 to the National Assembly²⁹. The BDC under his able leadership was a serious threat to the UPC existence. Being a social reformer, his party political programme did not simply depict anti-UPC, although fervently he and his party remained staunch opponents of the UPC. The BDC programme demanded for a common electoral college and the instituting of legislative powers in the Territorial Assembly. One of its objective was to forge national unity of the North and the South rather than the "fallacious unification of the two Camerouns"³⁰. The BDC consolidated its base among those Camerounians who were both against French hostility to African advancement and to the radicalism of the UPC. Apart from its Catholic base of support, the BDC won the support of important traditional chiefs and high functionaries. Among its members was Ahmadou Ahidjo whom the French owing to his modernity piloted to the supreme magistracy of the Cameroons when she successfully de-railed the UPC that advocated for reunification and independence. The BDC remained an influential party in the Yaounde region and never succeeded in having a large following outside the region. Like the other parties that emerged through the blessings of the French colonial administration, BDC did not interest the Camerounian populace because BDC according

to Cameroun de demain has "never shown the dynamism and scope that were expected of it"³¹. The BDC, like the other political parties that were to emerge recognised the vitality of the goals advocated by the UPC - independence and unification. Hence the BDC to survive later came to adopt the political goals of the UPC which reflected the realities of the day i.e. independence and unification. The BDC however disappeared from the political scene with the defeat of Dr. Louis-Paul Aujoulat in the election of January 2, 1956.

The Union Sociale Camerounaise (USC) was formed in 1953 from among the earlier socialist group. Its leader Senator Charles Okala was Cameroun's representative in the Council of the Republic in Paris. He was an ally of the French Socialist Party (S.F.I.O). The USC unlike the other parties appreciated the UPC programme principally the opposition to French policy of assimilation, independence for Cameroun and greater political advancement of Cameroun people at national and local levels, but not in a militant manner³². Because of its anti-French policy, the French Colonial administration made it difficult for it to survive but ironically attributed its collapse to "lack of financial resources and cadres to direct it"³³.

The election malpractices by the colonial administration made it impossible for any UPC candidates to win. In May, 1955, clashes between the UPC and the administration led to destruction and loss of lives. The revolt (20 - 30 May, 1955) was a complete failure because there was no universal uprising against the

French as the UPC expected. The number of casualties was 26 killed and 189 wounded. Several hundreds of Upecistes were arrested by the administration. Um Nyobe disappeared in the thick equatorial forest of the Sanaga Maritime while Moumie Felix crossed into Southern Cameroons³⁴. By decree of July 13, 1955 the UPC and its affiliated trade unions were outrightly banned in French Cameroun. The May 1955 riots gave the French Colonial administration the golden opportunity to put an end to the nationalist movement they had all along feared as being radical. The UPC undertook underground activities and continued its struggle in French Cameroun and it operated legally in Southern Cameroons until 1957 when the nationalist movement was also banned by the British authority from the territory at the request of the French Government.

1114 Loi-cadre (Enabling Act)

The banning of the UPC was not a solution to the rising demands for constitutional reforms in French Cameroun as was elsewhere in Afrique noire under the French Colonial control. Although the revolutionaries were off from the scene the evolutionaries continued to push forward their reforms. The developments in Togoland had the greatest impact on the French policy in Cameroun. The measures taken by the United Nations against the French policy of assimilation in Togoland was a great challenge to its practice. Consequently it led to the French

eventual abandonment of the policy in Cameroun³⁵.

Faced with political unrest in most of its colonial possessions, the French government elaborated a series of constitutional reforms known as the Loi-cadre in June 23, 1956, which gave the French overseas territories a genuine self-government at the territorial level. The French Parliament, to speed reforms through the Loi-cadre device authorised the Government to assume the legislative tasks ordinarily undertaken by the Committee of the Assembly. The French government therefore enacted laws providing for administrative decentralisation which consequently increased the powers of the overseas local assemblies. Paris established territorial executives under the direction of an appointed colonial administrator³⁶.

In French Cameroun, which was an associated territory the Loi-cadre gave Cameroun a single electoral college and full universal suffrage. To this effect the Territorial Assembly that was elected in 1952 was dissolved in November 1956 and fresh elections were held in December 23, 1956. Thus a new legislative Assembly with a membership of seventy was elected. The post of the Prime Minister was created and ministers to run the executive. Andre-Marie Mbida on May 10, 1957 became the first Prime Minister. The pro-unificationists did not participate in the elections. The French government in carrying out these reforms did not think of independence for Cameroun let alone reunification. The Territorial Assembly was without powers of its own in constitutional matters. The French Parliament exercised

control over the local Assembly and all decisions were subjected to the approval of the French Parliament. The French Government was empowered by decree No. 57-495 Article 7 of April 1957 to dissolve African Assemblies and equally annul their decisions³⁷ if found undesirable to French colonial rule.

The UPC had opened the way for the demand for constitutional reforms that would eventually lead to independence and reunification. The other political parties condemned the UPC's recourse to violence but refused to condemn its programme, which by 1956 grew popular among its rank and file. It was on this scenario that most groups sought to secure amnesty for the UPC and its legality following the May 1955 ban. One of such groups was the Mouvement d'Union Nationale (MUN) formed by "Soppo Priso, Charles Okala and some UPC sympathisers"³⁸. The movement's mission was to rally under its canopy Camerounians of all shades of political ideas. The front forged by Soppo Priso was aimed at seeking reforms that would lead Cameroun toward an autonomous government at the local level, that would eventually pilot her to independence. Mr. Soppo Priso outlined a three-point programme behind which all parties could rally. He unequivocally called for:

- (I) an amnesty to the participants in the revolt of May 1955
- (II) an election of a new territorial Assembly which would work out in collaboration with the French authorities the conditions on which independence could be achieved or a popular referendum on this subject, and

(III) unity of Kamerun.

The "Mouvement d'Union Nationale" (MUN) was short-lived as it failed to attract the followers of Andre-Marie Mbida in the Central South or the political groups from the Muslim North. The movement was plagued by dissensions between the UPC and the evolutionary elements. The political platform did not appeal to the French local authorities and the French home government. In the summer of 1956 it went out of existence³⁹.

The 1957 Constitutional Development

The French Government in 1956 acted under the Loi-cadre and in consultation with Cameroun deputies in French Assemblies a draft statute was prepared granting the associated territories greater constitutional autonomy. The evolutionary group Union Camerounaise (Cameroun Union), led by Ahmadou Ahidjo, Arouna Njoya and Ninine; the Democrates Camerounaise (Cameroun Democrats) led by Mbida, The Paysans Independants (Independent Citizens) a Bamileke bloc, voted for the adoption of the new statute⁴⁰. In the evolutionary camp, opposition emerged from Action Nationale (National Action) led by Soppo Priso and Charles Assale, who refused to vote in favour of a statute along the lines France suggested. They like the banned UPC, considered the impending constitutional reforms too inadequate and less than far-reaching. The reforms did not embody a framework towards self-government. They wanted to negotiate a statute with France that would lead Cameroun to eventual independence, which was

their most desired goal within the existing constitutional spectrum. The motion of the Action Nationale party was defeated by a vote of 59 - 8 in the new elected Legislative Assembly⁴¹.

By decree No. 57 - 501 of April 16, 1957, the novel constitutional structure was instituted in French Cameroun entitled "Statute du Cameroun" (Statute of Cameroun) defined clearly Cameroun as a "trust state". It was by this law granting the territory a new statute that for the first time Camerounians of this sector were designated as "Cameroun Citizens", although this was simply declaratory of the status quo ante. The April 16, 1957 statute adroitly provided for clear-cut division of responsibility between the indigenous Cameroun Government and the French Republican Government in Paris. The Central Organs of the French Republic thus retained control over the following matters, The system of public liberties; external affairs and defence; currency and exchange; secondary and high education; the organisation and management of credit; the penal code; administrative disputes; the legislation and regulations relating to commerce and criminal procedure; the public services of the French Republic and certain matters specifically reserved in Article II of the statute; the embodied rules governing persons subject to the ordinary civil law of France, the organisation of jurisdictions applying French laws in the administrative courts⁴¹. The French colonial services in the "trust state" included inter-alia, courts applying French law, the security

forces and police under the auspices of the High Commissioner, the labour inspectorate, aviation, meteorological services and radio stations. The High Commissioner was quite determined to preserve the rubric of the vanishing constitutional regime, with the powers of maintaining public order at his disposal.

Article 4 of the statute at that time provided for the continued representation of Camerounians in the Central organs of the French Republic. The French Government Ordinance of October 17, 1958, stipulated that Cameroun members in French Assemblies could continue to participate if the Cameroun Government gave its consent. The Government of Cameroun acted upon the ordinance and informed the President of the French Assembly and Council of the Republic that in the national interest Cameroun would cease to be represented in the Central Organs of the French Republic in Paris.

The Cameroun Legislative Assembly was vested with powers to deal with those matters which were not expressly reserved to the central organs of the French Republic. The Cameroun Executive, responsible to the Legislative Assembly, ensured the enforcement of Law, the organisation and direction of Cameroun public services. The executive was to be headed by a Prime Minister and Ministers designated by him. The Premier was to be designated by the Imperial French High Commissioner and confirmed in office by the Cameroun Legislative Assembly. These Constitutional developments in the "trust state" constituted new and welcome features in the statute⁴³. The statute was designated to last

until the end of the Trusteeship Agreement. Although the adoption of the statute was solely in the hands of the French Parliament, the Constitutional body was flexible as it accepted suggestions of the Cameroun Legislative Assembly and consequently amended certain portions of the statute which strengthened the indigenous control over internal affairs. In accordance with the United Nations Charter and the Trusteeship Agreement, the High Commissioner possessed reserved powers in regard to the proper functioning of Cameroun institutions. By this clause he or his second-in command deputised over the Council of Ministers. If any law passed by the Legislative Assembly conflicted with international convention or obstructed the judicious discharge of trusteeship obligations, such a law could be simply declared as null and void by a decree of the French Government⁴⁴.

Under the provision for the ministerial system embodied in the constitutional framework, Andre-Marie Mbida was named the Prime Minister of the Cameroun "trust state" on May 15, 1957. He headed a coalition government which included all parties except the "Action Nationale". The eight elected deputies of the **Action Nationale** in the Legislative Assembly constituted the official opposition. Ahmadou Ahidjo who later became the leader of the country for almost a quarter of a century (1958 - 1982) was named Mbida's Vice-Prime Minister and Minister of Interior. The Territorial Assembly (AFCAM) took over the name of the Legislative Assembly (ALCAM) on May 9, 1957. The acquired new statute was formally inaugurated in June, 1957 and French

Cameroun became an autonomous state of the French Union. The only direct link between the trust territory and the metropolis after the implementation of constitutional framework was Cameroun's continuous representation in French Parliament like Togo⁴⁵.

11.5 The Issues of Independence And Reunification 1956 - 1960

Internal and external forces had relegated the UPC, the best organised, dynamic, nationalistic and vociferous party from the political arena. The protagonists were now left with two realities to accomplish "independence and reunification" which they had transmitted deeply into people's minds. Progressive elements in French Cameroun never forgot to stress the complementary motives of independence and reunification as symbiosis. In consequence independence was the first "objective and reunification was the indispensable corollary"⁴⁶.

Contrary to the popular wishes of the people, Andre-Marie Mbida, the first premier was anti-independence and reunification. Mbida's views on these crucial matters appeared rather ambivalent and in most cases negative to the extreme. The new Prime Minister had no sense of balanced judgment. He was impatient with democratic procedures and equally impulsive and intransigent. He continued to pursue an independent course aimed at the total elimination of the UPC through a military campaign. The non-diplomatic approach to the UPC revolt made the premier to lose the support of non-Upecites militants among whom "the UPC's slogan reunification and independence enjoyed great currency

especially among the more sophisticated southern peoples"⁴⁷. On January 26, 1958, Mbida's party Democrates Camerounaise set forth a programme of action which inter alia stated that, although the independence of Cameroun was a genuine necessity the territory was not mature to attain independence. His party tabled a legislation to retard the achievement of independence for ten years, a period within which the trust territory would have been sufficiently developed economically, politically and socially to consider the independence issue. The Premier felt that the two sectors of Cameroun should evolve within its own framework and that the issue of unification could in future be looked into with any possible plan for a united states of tropical Africa. His programme was very unpopular, especially with Mbida's personal clashes with nearly every other important politician, including several government ministers from his own party. A constitutional crisis ensued and the High Commissioner Ramadier refused to confirm the new ministers Mbida had nominated, and he honourably resigned. Barely seven months in office, Mbida fell from the pinnacle of political power. Principally accounting for his fall was his ruthlessness against the UPC and his nonchalant attitude towards the desire of the Cameroonians in their quest for independence and reunification of the partitioned territory.

When Andre-Marie Mbida fell from power he was succeeded by his vice, Ahmadou Ahidjo. The French High Commissioner Ramadier explained that he chose Ahidjo because he was a moderate and his person was to restore confidence in the northerner who feared

Mbida's proposals, that if Southern civil-servants were transferred to the region it would culminate "to the de-feudalisation and modernisation of their semi-feudal society which would erode their authority"⁴⁸. French Cameroun under Mbida was characterised by internal strifes that secession was imminent as the north threatened by Premier Mbida's plan of action preferred to secede from the trust territory and seek integration with Chad and be administered by Imperial France. They were simply against Southern domination and were not keen about independence and reunification. Being less nationalistic they favoured continuous French role, which they believed would preserve Northern values. Mbida's policies for his seven months in office was unpatriotic. The nationalist in French Cameroun spent useful energy trying to consolidate the division between the various regions rather than fighting for independence and reunification which was the aspiration of the day.

The wind of change sweeping across the African Continent did not spare French Cameroun in spite of the French policy of assimilation to turn them into Frenchmen. All political parties in French Cameroun except that of Mbida in 1958, supported the idea of independence and reunification. The Ahidjo government that was put in power rallied support from the pro-independence and reunification parties to achieve the said goals as a matter of urgency and to put an end to the UPC ultra-nationalist and violent tendencies that led to terrorist activities. The nationalists, east of the Mungo⁴⁹ in particular, feared the approaching independence of Nigeria with which the British Cameroons was economically and administratively integrated.

The new Prime Minister who was witty and openhearted learnt

from the blunders of his predecessor. He left no stone unturned and scrupulously utilized every ounce of political ingenuity at his disposal to put into motion the new order. He capitalised on the idea of independence and reunification that the UPC had made popular hence endorsing the aspirations of his southern supporters in the coalition government and that of moderate Upecites whose original goal was reunification and immediate independence. Ahmadou Ahidjo attached great importance to the idea of independence and reunification of the two sectors of Kamerun. This policy of Ahidjo's received the support of anti-colonialists in the United Nations Trusteeship Council. He called on France to grant the "trust state" greater power by modifying the law instituting the 1957 statute to enable the Cameroon take its place in the international arena. In an effort to realise this objective the following government-sponsored resolution, inter alia was enacted in the Legislative Assembly May, 1958 in Yaounde:

(The Legislative Assembly) in accordance with the provisions of Article 59 of Decree No. 57-501 setting forth the statute of Cameroon so as to recognise the option of Cameroon State for independence upon the termination of the Trusteeship - (and) confirming the statements of Prime Minister, Head of the Government of Cameroon, concerning the desire of the

Cameroon peoples to see the two Cameroons reunified⁵⁰.

As earlier seen, the new Cameroun statute stipulated by Decree No. 57-501 of April 16, 1957, needed further constitutional changes. The Legislative Assembly and the Executive were conferred with little powers. The French Metropolitan Government still retained most of the powers, consequently the indigenous institutions which were put into place were powerless. The Imperial French High Commissioner as the President of the Executive Council exercised enormous influence over council decisions.

Ahmadou Ahidjo opened talks in Paris with France in June 1958, on the question of independence of the trust territory. The negotiations ended up not amending the 1957 statute as the Ahidjo Government demanded but resulted in the drafting of a new statute for Cameroun which embodied self-determination of the territory out of the French Union. The new statute came into being in Cameroun on January 1, 1959⁵¹. The Legislative Assembly and the Executive Council under the new constitutional reform were granted much wider powers. The French Metropolitan Government following the new statute turned over control of other matters to Cameroun except foreign affairs, defence, monetary and foreign exchange policy. This was followed by the signing of co-operation agreements that provided for French financial assistance and technical aid. Under this protocol France endorsed the request of the United Nations Assembly to terminate the

Trusteeship Agreement if Cameroun so desired. Based on the discussion with the French Colonial Authority, the Legislative Assembly (ALCAM) voted a resolution on October 24, 1958 with four key provisions:

- (I) It endorsed the internal self-government embodied in the new statute.
- (II) It expressed Cameroun's desire for independence on January 1, 1960.
- (III) It affirmed its support for reunification with British Camerouns and requested measures be taken to consult the people concerned before January 1, 1960.
- (IV) It called on the Cameroun government to ask France to request the General Assembly to abrogate trusteeship concurrently with independence⁵².

Ahidjo, therefore was the last disciple to accept the idea of reunification, having learnt from the "thunderstorm" that threw Premier Mbida from the helm of power⁵³. The reunification option became one of the central themes in his political campaigns. This move was to be in line with the UPC wishes and consequently was aimed at attracting moderate UPC into his pro-French camp which the revolutionary wing of the UPC detested. The popular wish for independence and vocal condemnation of anti-French colonial policies especially the policy of assimilation was a signal warning to General De Gaulle's Government. In view of the surrounding circumstances France was facing in her colonial territories the De Gaulle's government did not offer

Cameroun a seat in the French Community in 1958 after the referendum of September 30, 1958. A new statute was instead drawn for the trust territory that would lead her to independence out or within the French Community⁵⁵. While the anti-colonialists in the UN General Assembly heartily supported the idea of terminating French imperialism, they very much wish to see the UPC problem resolved. The Soviet bloc and the newly independent African States championed by Ghana and Guinea were of the strong opinion that the UPC should be restored to legality and free and fair elections be conducted under the auspices of the United Nations supervision before independence on January 1, 1960 as previewed by the French and tabled before the United Nations General Assembly. The United Nations dispatched a commission to French Cameroun to sample opinion on the issue. The United Nations team composed of delegates from New Zealand, Haiti, India and the United States made on spot assessments of the impending situation and its report was tabled before the Trusteeship Council in January 1959. In its report the mission stipulated that majority of the people overwhelmingly expressed their desire for independence on January 1, 1960 and consequently saw no need to consult the electorate on the matter in question before the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement.⁵⁶

The independence schedule for French Cameroun was set. Although the UPC was off from the scene when the liberation candle was lighted, its wishes for Cameroun's independence and reunification were maintained. France and Muslim Northern Cameroun came to be associated with the idea although with some reluctance.

NOTES

1. V. G. Fanso, Trans-Frontier Relations and Resistance to Cameroun Nigerian Colonial Boundaries 1916 - 1945 Op. Cit. p. 451.
2. The Union Camerounaise that was formed in 1937 in Paris has no link with the Union Camerounaise of Ahmadou Ahidjo formed later in the 1958.
3. Richard A. Joseph, Radical Nationalism in Cameroun Op. Cit. p. 39.
4. Ibid. p. 41.
5. Zang-Atangana, J. M. "Les Partis Politique Camerounais" "Recueil Penant", December 1960 P. 63 D. E. Gardinier Op. Cit. pp. 35 - 37. A Owona "The Political Evolution of Cameroun from 1884 to 1970; (Yaounde, 1970) p. 224.
6. Richard A. Joseph Op. Cit. pp. 41 - 42
7. D. E. Gardinier, Op. Cit. pp. 38 - 39
8. A. Eyinga "Democratique de Yaounde", p. 41.
9. Ibid. p. 64.
10. Parliament in Cameroun Past and Present 1946 - 1971 (Yaounde, 1971), p. 10.
11. Interview with Pascal Toulou, (42) Yaounde, 10 October 1988
12. Ibid.
13. J. M. Zang-Atangana, Op. Cit. p. 683.
14. I.A.C. 6377 Report sur les partis politiques au Cameroun 1952. (N.A.Y.)

15. Um Nyobe, Cahiers Internationaux, p. 82.
16. Richard A. Joseph, Op. Cit. 90 - 192
17. Dr. Felix Moumie and Abel Kinkue were eliminated through the French secret organisation Main Rouge the "Red Hand" to frustrate the UPC insurgents at home against the French installed puppet government under Ahmadou Ahidjo. Ernest Ouandie continued with the struggle at home until his arrest in 1970 in Mbanga. He was tried and summarily executed.
18. La Pensee de Um Nyobe, Publication du Bureau National Provisoire de L'UPC Yaounde', Cameroun 1961. p. 19.
19. Ibid.
20. I.A.C. 6377, Rapport sur les partis politiques au Cameroun 1951, (N.A.Y.)
21. Ibid.
22. U.N.G.A. Fourth Committee, 7th Session, 309th Meeting, 17th December 1952, p. 427.
23. The French colonial administration hated the UPC links with the Rassemblement Democratique Africain (R.D.A.) because from its creation in October 1946, its main objective was to combat the resurgence of colonialist influence in French Black Africa (Afrique Noire). The R.D.A. embodied the political parties from the French territories of West and Central Africa and from the trust territories. In January 1949, Um Nyobe was elected Vice President of the R.D.A.. Its links with the communists was a source of constant friction with the administration in the colonised territories of

black Africa.

24. The frequent transfers of the Upecites did not serve the interest of the colonial administration in most cases. One of those transfers led to the transfer of Dr. Felix-Roland Moumie to Douala, and this gave him the golden opportunity to propagate the UPC goals and win more converts. He was later posted to the Northern city of Maroua and the North began to absorb the Upeciste doctrine.
25. Richard A. Joseph, Op. Cit. pp. 173 - 175.
26. Ibid.
27. Le statut de Cameroun Recueil penant, Juin - July 1958, p. 92.
28. The second period of political activities dates after the banning of the UPC from 1957 to 1960 when the French Sector achieved its independence.
29. Interview with Jean Mounkam, Yaounde, 10/2/89. Aujoulat was one of the most successful colons in Cameroun's local politics. In spite of being a French citizen he won continuous elections to the Cameroun Assembly and the National Assembly in Paris from 1946 - 1956.
30. Ibid.
31. Cameroun de demain, No. 16, February 1953. p. 4.
32. Richard A. Joseph, Op. Cit. p. 179.
33. Ibid.

34. VB/6/1957 File No. V. Cameroons Unification Movement
(N.A.B.)
35. Vc/C/1956/ No. VI N/149/5. (N.A.B.)
36. Ibid.
37. Ruth Schacter Morgenthau, Political Parties in French - speaking West Africa. (London: Clarendon Press, 1964). p. 223.
38. Victor Julius Ngoh, Cameroon, 1884 - 1985, A Hundred Years of History; (Yaounde: Navi-Group Publications, 1987), p. 149.
39. David E. Gardinier, Op. Cit. p. 81.
40. El Hadji Moussa Yaya, Qu'est-ce-que Union Camerounaise? Premier stage de formation de Responsable de L'Union Camerounaise. Yaounde, August 1, 1961.
41. In the 1957 elections seats won were as follows: "Union Camerounaise" (UC) grouped 50 deputies from the central and Northern regions. The "Democratie Camerounaise" (DC) grouped 20 deputies from the Yaounde area. The "Paysans Independants" had 8 deputies from Bamileke West and the "Action Nationale" was made up of 8 deputies from some economically and politically advanced areas of South-Douala, the Mungo Valley, Kribi and Ebolowa; these deputies were non-Upesite remnants of the Mouvement d'Union Nationale.
42. H.N.A.Enowchong, Op. Cit. pp. 74 - 75.
43. Ibid.

44. Marshall Bruce D. The French Colonial Myth, and Constitution - Making in the Fourth Republic. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), p. 246.
45. Parliament in Cameroun, Past and Present 1946 - 1971, op. cit. p. 51.
46. Willard R. Johnson. Op. Cit. p. 139.
47. The very socialist administration that in February 18, 1958 masterminded the resignation of Mbida was again the one that did the same to Ahidjo in November 2, 1982 during the tenure of Francois Mitterand a socialist in France. The socialist party in France all along did not cherish the manner Ahidjo and the previous French Governments handled the UPC affairs.
48. The "Mungo River" marked the new Anglo-French Frontier since the 1916 partition changed the Anglo-German boundary. The people of British Cameroon were referred to as those west of the Mungo and those of the French Cameroun as those East of the Mungo.
49. United Nations Visiting Mission 1958 pp. 41 - 44.
50. The "Statute of Cameroun" Instituted by Ordinance No. 58 - 1375 of December 1958.
51. Rapport sur le Cameroun 1958 - 59, pp. 112 - 114.
52. Interviews with Nfor Nfor, (43) MINAT, Yaounde 21 June 1989.
53. Ibid.
54. Interview with Emani Bonaventure, (40) Yaounde, 10 October 1988.
55. Fourth Commission United Nations DT/144, 1954. p. 26.

CHAPTER IV

THE RE-UNIFICATION STRUGGLE: PEOPLE AND IDEAS

The political atmosphere as from the 1950's in British Cameroons revealed that nationalist activities had successfully reawakened the aspirations of the people of the Trusteeship Territory to challenge the de facto arbitrary partition and its annexation to Nigeria and come up with a unique identity outside the Colonial arrangement. With the rise of political groups, and the achievement of an autonomous status in Southern Cameroons, the idea of Pan-Kamerun became dominant in the minds of Kamerunians. In an effort to achieve this objective leaders of the partitioned sectors began personal contacts to facilitate the task of a future reunion.

IV.1 Contacts Between Cameroon's Political Leaders 1955-1960

As the British Cameroons nursed the idea of its unification and separation from Nigeria that would pave the way for future reunification with French Cameroun, the main obstacle was how to form a united front in an effort to achieve this set objective. To this effect the leaders of Southern and Northern Cameroons set up a coordinating Committee in Lagos in 1958 to promote first the unification of the British Cameroons. Southern Cameroons' political leaders saw this move as the first step either towards independence of British Cameroons or separation from Nigeria and reunification with French Cameroun in the future. The leaders of Southern Cameroons enlisted the assistance of Ahmadou Ahidjo who, in spite of the fact that his mother was from Mubi, was not

enthusiastic about it. Perhaps his lukewarm attitude was a tactical approach to deal with the two sectors separately should they join the proposed union.

The British administration in Cameroons as earlier seen, did not make it completely impossible for two sub-divided groups to co-ordinate any action or take joint approach to key national issues. The Sardauna of Sokoto, Alhaji Sir Ahmadou Bello, from the initial stage when this idea was hatched did not oppose the Union of Northern and Southern Cameroons. He was of the firm conviction that the British Cameroons would vote at any given time in favour of integration into the Federation of Nigeria. The Sardauna as events manifested was riled by the heightened tempo of pro-unificationist forces in Southern Cameroons and called Mallam Abba Habib and warned him of the danger of going to French Cameroun which was becoming part and parcel of the French Union and consequently to be assimilated. The fears of Northern Cameroonians was further aggravated by the UPC illegal or unauthorized campaign in the region calling for "reunification immediate" with French Cameroun.² Mallam Abba Habib yielded to restrain further talks with Southern Cameroons leaders on the issue of unification and secession from Nigeria. To win the hearts of Northern Cameroonians Alhaji Sir Ahmadou Bello made Mallam Abba Habib a minister in the Northern Region. The Emir of Dikwa overtly opposed the idea of integration into Nigeria. The British administrators in the region, to distract international attention of what was happening in Northern Cameroons, quickly

set up a twelve-man consultative committee to which any inquiry should be addressed. The British constituted committee did not reflect a broad representation of all the Emirates of the Trust Territory, but were simply hand-picked fellows with an assigned duty dictated by the British in connivance with the Northern Political authorities to affirm Northern Cameroons' desire to integrate as part of the Northern Region of Nigeria.⁴

It was from this unconstitutional body that the 1955 United Nations Visiting Mission based its findings and like the 1952 U.N. Visiting Mission it made no mention of the aspirations of the people of North Cameroons vis-a-vis unification with Southern Cameroons and future reunification with French Cameroun. In its report to the U.N. General Assembly on the burning issues of unification and reunification following its findings in the territory, the Mission's report among other things stated that "the request emanated only from the Southern Cameroons".⁵

The pro-unification forces continued to strive in the Northern in spite of all odds. The fourth and last United Nations Missions to the British Cameroons arrived in the Trust Territory in 1958 to round up its final report to the World Body. The Mission, led by Benjamin Gerig, spent two weeks in Southern Cameroons. The pro-unificationists in Northern Cameroons led by the Chief of Mambila handed a strong petition to the leader of visiting mission in the border town of Nkambe. The petition among other things stated that:

If Northern Cameroons could not be separated from Northern Nigeria and made part of Southern Cameroons, then the Mambila alone should be separated from both Northern Nigeria and Northern Cameroons and be made part of Southern Cameroons.⁶

This declaration led to the mass arrest of Mambila notables by the British official in the Gembu region. Chief Bang and one of his sons Joseph Noubum had to seek refuge in Southern Cameroons. As a cover up, the Mambilla traditional rulers were forced to sign a declaration stating that they had no desire to be part of Southern Cameroons, let alone opting for separate independence or reunification with French Cameroun. Those Chiefs who refused signing the renunciation were dethroned.⁷ This was the fate of the petitioners on Gerig Benjamin's revelation to the Anglo-Nigerian authorities in the North perhaps to save them from embarrassment should such a declaration be made open in the U.N. General Assembly contrary to the previous reports.

The ground work to assimilate the Northern Cameroons people into Northern Nigeria was technically worked out through the popular campaign of the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC). The party deployed its able militants in Northern Cameroons to win the hearts of the people. They appealed to the people that it was their desire and sincere wish that the people of the Trust Territory should remain part of Adamawa within the Northern Region as they were before the European occupation.

The fourth United Nations Visiting Mission while in the North also sounded the opinion of the Saradauna of Sokoto Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello on the future of the Trust Territory. The NPC leader's perception of the problem was seemingly moderate but his idea and inclination were substantially alike. He added:

...It is difficult for any one who knows the territory to conceive of any political future... taking into account the factors of history, geography, and economics ... which could bring greater benefits to its inhabitants than they should throw in their lot with an independent Nigeria and within the Northern Region. However that is for them - and for them alone - freely to decide for themselves.⁹

To resolve the Northern Cameroons issue it was unanimously agreed at the U.N. General Assembly of March 13. 1959 that Britain should, under the auspices of the United Nations, organise separate plebiscites in Northern and Southern Cameroons to seek the opinion of its inhabitants as regard their future.¹⁰ The Northern Cameroons plebiscite scheduled to take place in mid-November 1959 had the following questions for them to choose;

- (1) Do you wish the Northern Cameroons to be part of the Northern Region of Nigeria when the Federation becomes independent on 1st October 1960?

- (2) Are you in favour of deciding the future of the Northern Cameroons at a later date?

In the plebiscite of November 7, 1959 the people of Northern Cameroons voted 70,546 to 47,788 in favour of deciding their future later.¹¹

While North Cameroons was ear-marked for a plebiscite in 1959, the imbroglio in Southern Cameroons remained unresolved. As P.M. Kemcha pointed out, the question of independence for Cameroons was not as controversial as the question of unification: Southern Cameroons political leaders as from 1951, the days of the KUNC all agreed on the question of unification of Cameroons.¹² As realized it was only at different stages that politicians split camps. Political figures in different camps were convinced of the course they were taking and felt their course was the best for the people of the Southern Cameroons. From the start some of the actors were pessimistic while others were optimistic - an experience which has been described by some as "unique". This emerged because some fellow Cameroonians felt the pangs of Anglo-French arbitrary division more than others.

The atmosphere in Southern Cameroons was still cloudy even after the KNDP which emerged champions of pro-reunification had secured a comfortable majority in the 1960 elections, winning 26 out of 37 seats. This state of affairs appeared because the traditional rulers in Southern Cameroons who were the pillars of the KNDP, hated integration into French Cameroun just as their counterparts in Northern Cameroons hated integration into

Nigeria. Their stand was that if Northern Cameroons refused to unite with Southern Cameroons to form an independent country, Southern Cameroons should secede from Nigeria and become a sovereign state of its own. Fon Achiri-Mbi 11 of Bafut is quoted as saying "integration with Nigeria is like water falling into an ocean and unification with French Cameroun is fire"¹³ At Kumba in April 1958, an all-chiefs' conference of Southern Cameroons was held to decide on the re-unification issue which was becoming paramount instead of southern Cameroons self-determination. At the end of the conference the traditional rulers summarised their findings, apparently as refutation that the territory could not stand on its own thus:

Reminiscences by man in the street, and anybody who says the Territory is poor is crazy, for there is no country in the world richer than Southern Cameroons.¹⁴

The chiefs maintained that the United Nations "Mandated Territory" being administered is flowing with milk and honey, where every Dick and Harry lives in plenty. Their position was clear - Southern Cameroons should secede from Nigeria and become an independent Nation of its own. They pointed out that politics had made their children "crazy" "foolish" owing to quest for money and power; then concluded that since they were deaf to the advice of their fathers, "we will teach them to do so". The chiefs accused the KNC of setting the ball of secession rolling and backing out. It was observed that Nigeria would not regret

if Southern Cameroons' Secession came through. They had a firm conviction that with their support and the enticing and sugar-coated words of Dr. Foncha and Bobe Jua it would be a surprise if KNC would not be voted out of office at the 1959 general elections.¹⁵

Like a veritable war, unification was fought by many in Southern Cameroons, though at different stages and according to circumstances with varying degrees of ability of the individuals or groups. It should be borne in mind that the Southern Cameroons debacle was mixed up with problems which gave birth to four schools of thoughts.

(1) the Unificationists (2) Separatist (3) Integrationist and (4) Partitionist.

The KNDP led by Dr. Foncha headed the Unification Camp. This group advocated secession from Nigeria and future reunification with French Cameroun on acceptable terms. The separatist advocated the abrogation of the Trusteeship Agreement and to seek independence for Southern Cameroons. This group was headed by P.M. Kale leader of the Kamerun United Party (KUP) in alliance with the Independent Party (IP) and Cameroon Indigenous Party (CIP). This group detested the two alternatives the United Nations had imposed and advised their supporters to take a middle course that is ripping their ballot papers in halves so as to indicate their desire for a middle way. When critics of this school of thought talked of Southern Cameroons being small both in population and area, they in turn pointed to the other small

countries which at the time were independent, such as Luxembourg in Europe with a population of 300,000 and land surface of about 1000 square miles, Iceland with a population of 2,000, Barbados 30,000 and in Africa they pointed to the Gambia, Togo, Burundi, Rwanda and Gabon that were to become independent states.¹⁶ The Southern Cameroons case did not survive the logic because the UNO at the time did not favour the creation of small states. The world as a whole seemed to be against the creation of "Balkanised" states.

Airing his views against such states, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah the pioneer Ghanaian leader in his "Axioms" said:

Africa is clearly fragmented into too many small uneconomical and non viable states many of which are having a very hard struggle to survive.¹⁷

I speak of freedom he maintained that:

The political situation in Africa today is disheartening to see so many new flags hoisted in place of the "old"; it is disturbing to see so many countries of varying sizes and at different levels of development; weak and in some cases, almost helpless. If this terrible state of fragmentation is allowed to continue it may be disastrous to us all...¹⁸

In Africa Must Unite he again echoes that:

... so long as we remain balkanised, regionally or territorially we shall be at the mercy of colonialism and imperialism.¹⁹

It was against this background that Dr. Kwame Nkrumah who personally visited Southern Cameroons in 1958 to discuss the issue of reunification with Dr. E.M.L. Endeley and his cabinet in Buea and other anti-imperialist leaders at the UN did not support Dr. Foncha's call for the prolongation of the trusteeship period or secession from Nigeria and Independence; an option that the traditional rulers and the separatists cherished, which unfortunately was not one of the UNO alternatives.

The Integrationists were made up of two divergent groups; the KPP - led by N.N. Mbile that wanted Southern Cameroons to integrate into Nigeria as an integral part of the Eastern

Region and the KNC led by Dr. E.M.L. Endeley on the other hand wanted the integration of Southern Cameroons into Nigeria as a separate region with a status equal to that of the other regions in the Federation.

Debonque the leader of the KUNC advocated the fourth alternative: "Partition" - that the Southern Cameroons should as a last resort be carved out into different districts, those districts that would vote for integration should join Nigeria because they, the KUNC, were ready to accept a solution that will allow each tribe or division to choose freely where it would desire to be, either in Nigeria or French Cameroun.²⁰ The group maintained that they were not ready to jump into precipice with

tribes of Bamenda, Wum and parts of Mamfe merely because they have more tribesmen to cast blind votes.²¹

Just as the KNC and KPP came together and formed the Cameroon Peoples National Congress (CPNC) to fight for their common course of integration, logically one would have expected such a manifestation from the KNDP and the O.K. to join forces and fight for the (re)unification but this was not the case. Differences arose on grounds that, while the O.K. advocated "Unification immediate"²² the KNDP on its part wanted Independence for Southern Cameroons first of all before a gradual process toward reunification by negotiating with Ahidjo on acceptable terms. Another factor that made alliance impossible was that O.K. was considered to be the offspring of the UPC and the terrorist activities in French Cameroun were fresh in many minds. This scared the KNDP leaders considered as men who, apart from their Christian beliefs, hated violence naturally.

TALKS BETWEEN J.N. FONCHA AND AHMADOU AHIDJO

The political contacts between leaders of Southern Cameroons and French Cameroun had a temporary break when the UPC that was the touch-bearer of reunification in French Cameroun was banned in 1955. No efforts were further made by the Southern Cameroonian political leaders. Since Endeley's Government that was in power no longer cherished the idea of reunification which it had conceived and pursued from the on set. As a coincidence his colleague Andre-Maire Mbida who became the first Premier of French Cameroun did not have reunification on his priority list.

These two leaders were of the conviction that each sector should evolve in any manner and that the rendezvous was to meet in a union of a West African State which at the epoch was being perceived.²³

It was not until February 1958 when Mbida's government collapsed and his Vice Prime Minister Ahmadou Ahidjo became the Premier, that the spirit of reunification was revived in French Cameroun political circles. The new premier while addressing the Legislative Assembly in October 1958, said, that the problem of reunification "must be solved before the proclamation of French Cameroun independence". He therefore called for talks immediately with British Cameroons to lay groundwork for the realization of the envisaged union.²³ It was on this premise that Ahidjo wrote to Dr. E.M.L. Endeley the Premier of Southern Cameroons in 1958 on how the reunification issue could be tackled by their two Governments but Premier Endeley did not reply to the letter.²⁴

The reunification issue came to the limelight again when Foncha's KNDP Party won the January 24, 1959 general elections in Southern Cameroons. As a pro-unificationist he entered into dialogue with Ahmadou Ahidjo on how the said objective could be obtained. In a joint Communique issued at the end of their first contact in Buea July 1960 both leaders reaffirmed their commitment to work for the reunification of the Cameroons.²⁵ The KNDP spelt out Southern Cameroons' constitutional position in the event of a 'yes' vote in favour of reunification. Dr. J.N.Foncha

maintained that in such an event the realization of such a union would be on federal basis to be negotiated gradually and not hurriedly. Ministers from both territories were to meet in Yaounde to iron out details and set up a committee of experts to study the economic arrangements and the external trade of a unified Cameroons not tied to the sterling or the Franc Zone²⁶.

On October 11 - 18, 1960, Foncha and Ahidjo met for the third time. Foncha was anxious to reach a logical agreement with Ahidjo to show the Southern Cameroons electorate in his plebiscite campaign against Dr. Endeley.²⁷ The two Heads of Government decided to adopt the broad outlines of the constitution which they would adopt in the event of a plebiscite vote being favourable. A communique issued at the end of the meeting stated that:

- (1) the two Governments wish to use every available means to bring to a successful conclusion the task of national reunification which they have set themselves;
- (11) that in no case will the United Cameroon be part either of French community or British Commonwealth;
- (111) that they wish to create a Federal State whose institutions could be broadly outlined as follows:

The federal United Cameroon was to be a democratic state, with a motto, an anthem and its flag. The nationals of the federated states in the first stage were to have powers to deal with matters listed below as a minimum: Public Freedom, Nationality, Foreign Affairs, Higher Education, Immigration and

Emigration, Federal Budget and Post and Telecommunication.²⁸ It was agreed that a list of powers which would fall within the competence of the Federal Government in the second stage would be set out in the constitution. The Federal authorities on the other hand were to be composed of; a Federal Executive headed by the President of the Federal Republic, and the Federal Legislature consisting of a Federal Senate. It was made clear that certain Federal Laws will only be enacted in such a way that no measures contrary to the interest of one state will be imposed upon it by the majority. (A system of second reading with a qualified majority was envisaged). In the event of a conflict of laws between the Federal State and the Federated states the Federal law will prevail.²⁹

In non-Federal matters, the authorities of each of the Federated States was to exercise exclusive competence. The Federated States were to be ruled by a government and were to have each a Legislative Assembly. On justice it was arrived at that the Federal Court of Justice will have as its purpose the task to unify the judicial systems and to act as the Highest Court of Appeal of the Federal State. Federal Services were to be established to carry out Federal administration and were to remain valid until the enactment of the Federal Constitution.³⁰

On defence, each party supported the view that each component of the proposed federation must have its army and police in view of the peculiar circumstances and background against which the union is being set. Both parties came to a

conclusion that experience had painfully taught people the world over the dangers of armies of occupation. The two men expressed their wish that the Federation which they were forging would be joined by British Northern Cameroons either as a separate state or as part of the British Southern Cameroons.

The last high level contact between Foncha and Ahidjo before the plebiscite of February 11, 1961 was held in Douala, December 20 - 21st, 1960, when Foncha returned from the United Kingdom, where he had talks with the Minister of colonies on the future of the territory following the U.N. decision on the plebiscite questions (to integrate into Nigeria or (b) independence by unification with French Cameroun). Foncha and Ahidjo while in agreement with the interpretation of the second question regretted the fact that the representatives of Northern Cameroons were not present and advocated that after the plebiscite a general conference should be held involving the three parties and if possible UN representatives to iron out the basis of reunification.³¹ At the end of the Douala rendezvous of December 1960, what was uniquely agreed upon, as in previous meetings was that reunification would be in form of a federation. Though full agreement was not reached on most matters, Foncha came back home with a document titled "United Cameroons Federal Constitution". Its contents embodied the essential elements of the type of federation discussed all along with Ahidjo.

The Government of Southern Cameroons reported that the contents of the document which by all indication showed that it

was a confederation have been agreed upon. The opposition leader Endeley raised an alarm against the report maintaining that it was only discussed and not agreed upon. The criticism of the opposition led to the alteration of paragraph 111 which made this assertion: "... it is at this juncture, therefore, only to indicate in broad outline what the Southern Cameroons and the Republic of Cameroun have agreed upon, are the basic provision of a federal constitution" and the title of the document was given a new framing which now read "United Cameroons Federal Constitutional proposal by KNDP" and the criticised article 3 now read "proposed outline indicating what the KNDP considers are the basic provisions of the Federal constitution".³²

Foncha's seeking for a confederation was the nearest alternative to secession and independence which the Traditional Rulers and the populace had strongly advocated and he was in this wise avoiding the act of committing his people too much to Ahidjo and the French. The option of a confederation stemmed from the fact that the UN had rejected his request that Southern Cameroons become independent first of all before future negotiations for a reunification with French Cameroun. The Constitutional provisions the KNDP arrived at were aimed at what Foncha had earlier told Ahidjo in one of their meetings namely, that he was seeking a Cameroons Federation in which the Southern Cameroons would remain much the same as it was, with very few powers invested in the hands of the Federal authorities. This was categorically an arrangement which Ahidjo did not favour.³³ At

most he wanted a federation and not a confederation as Foncha advocated.

IV.2 THE PLEBISCITE QUESTION

In 1959 when the British government and the UN announced the dates of granting Nigeria and the French Cameroun Independence, the leaders of British Cameroons were faced with urgent task of the constitutional destiny of their peoples. The UN was by law to seek the opinion of the people of the Trust Territory through a plebiscite. The crucial problem was the questions to be put before the British Cameroonians that would determine their future status.

The impending January 24, 1959 elections in Southern Cameroons did not permit the contesting groups to move to the UN. After the elections which the pro-unificationist camp led by Dr. J.N. Foncha defeated the pro-integrationists led by Dr. E.M.L. Endeley, the protagonists moved to the U.N. General Assembly in February 1960 to present their respective views vis-a-vis the British Cameroons - Nigeria political relations. The leaders agreed that a plebiscite should be conducted in this regard but sharply disagreed on the questions to be put to the people.³⁴

Dr. J.N. Foncha held that the questions to be put to the people should be whether they wish to remain as part of Nigeria or out of it, pure and simple. Dr. E.M.L. Endeley argued that if secession was the option, the Southern Cameroons should immediately unify with French Cameroun. The leader of the O.K., Ndeh Ntumazah supported Dr. Endeley's stand on immediate

unification, which like the banned UPC was highly cherished. Dr. J.N.Foncha advanced reasons why he objected to immediate reunification as an alternative to secession. Among his major reasons was the fact that, for reunification to be effected it needed time so as to consult the political leaders of French Cameroun. For the main time he called on the British authority to modify the Trusteeship Agreement by prolonging it to enable him have time to work out details with French Cameroun. In the face of events Dr. Endeley and Ndeh Ntumazah favoured reunification like Ahidjo who copied it from the UPC programme "reunification immediate" without knowing its implications.³⁵

The divergent opinions expressed by the Cameroons political leaders became irreconcilable and the U.N. General Assembly came to a conclusion that they should go back home and come to a concensus on the questions to put to the people at the plebiscite. The Northern Cameroons issue was less complicated. It was easily arrived at with Mallam Abba Habib that a plebiscite be held in the territory in mid November 1959 and the people were to choose between these two alternatives: whether to join Nigeria when she becomes independent or would decide their future on a later date.³⁶

The Mamfe Conference

Back at home from the UN, on August 10 and 11 1959, a conference of all shades of political opinions in Southern Cameroons was held in Mamfe chaired by Sir Sydney Phillipson.³⁷

The main objective was to strike a compromise on the questions that should be put to the people of Southern Cameroons to decide in the coming plebiscite, since Endeley and Foncha could not come to a consensus on either integration with Nigeria or unification with French Cameroon.³⁸ The participation did not arrive at any acceptable questions either which would ascertain the popular will of the people but three alternatives were identified by the Chairman as being;

- 1) Separation from Nigeria with a short period of trusteeship;
or
- 2) Integration within independent Nigeria as an autonomous region in the Federation; or
- 3) Separation from Nigeria to be followed by early negotiations with the future Republic of Cameroun with a view of reunification on acceptable terms.²⁹

At the end of the conference the chairman in his closing remarks noted that the conference had failed to reach a consensus on the questions to be put at the plebiscite and who should or should not vote. He reiterated that this being the situation, the UN would resolve the problem in New York in a meeting to be attended by the Premier and the opposition leader.

In September that year the leaders were back in New York still undecided on the questions their people should be asked to vote for. Since no conclusion could be arrived at Foncha and Endeley presented a joint statement to the Fourth Committee of the UN, that in face of the present conflicting positions the

plebiscite should be deferred until 1962 and they were unanimous that Southern Cameroons should be separated from Nigeria once it become independent on October 1960.

The position of Foncha and Endeley which, probably, was just the most appropriate at the time was rejected by the African Group at the UN led by Ghana arguing that it would lead to delay in Cameroon's independence. They persuaded the leaders to accept that the plebiscite be held in Southern Cameroons before March 1961 and it was imposed by the UN that the two questions to be put at the plebiscite should be:

- i) Do you wish to achieve independence by joining the independent Federation of Nigeria?
- ii) Do you wish to achieve independence by joining the independent Republic of Cameroons?⁴⁰

The two alternative questions were a defeat to the KNDP leadership, for, though, it had reunification on its programme, its weight was more on separation and independence. The opposition on the other hand saw the choice of two question as a sign of hope for the integrationist forces in the belief that with terrorism in French Cameroun it would scare voters from casting their votes in favour of independence and reunification. Consequently independence by joining the independent Federation of Nigeria should triumph. Discontent reigned within the KNDP and among their loyal allies the Traditional Rulers who did not see anything good in the two alternatives. What they wanted was secession and independence of Southern Cameroons. When Foncha

returned home he was able to convince his party colleagues and he equally revived his relationship with the Traditional Rulers. To assure the chiefs of their place in his government he used the prerogatives of the Premier and created a House of Chiefs where legislative matters could be discussed and they were put on monthly salaries.⁴¹

Why Only Two Questions

The question that occupies the minds of most English Speaking Cameroonians today is why the questions were so limited. They very much favoured a third alternative which should have read, "Separation from Nigeria and Independence for Southern Cameroons" even if the Northern Cameroons was to vote in favour of integration into the independent Federation of Nigeria as it did happen. Many reasons have been advanced as to why this third option was not possible at the time.

The United Nations as mentioned earlier was against the creation of balkanised states. The efforts of Foncha to push this alternative through further suffered a serious set back, because the African group at the UN (Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia and the United Arab Republic) equally did not cherish the creation of small states in Africa.⁴²

Britain was accused of being the root-cause of the disappearance of the third alternative which had featured prominently at the Mamfe Conference. The United Kingdom did not foresee that the Trust Territory would one day opt to separate from Nigeria. Consequently, Britain did everything to frustrate the

separationist forces. Perhaps Britain influenced the alternatives as a strategy to scare Southern and Northern Cameroonians from voting in favour of reunification with French Cameroun. The report of the British Financial and Economic Adviser in Southern Cameroons, Sir Sydney Phillipson did not surprise anybody. He sat in Buea and wrote in his report at the end of 1959 that the Trust Territory at its present stage could not survive as a sovereign state.⁴³ Britain that already had a bias against Southern Cameroons' advocating for independence made it crystal clear that the Bank of England would not come to the assistance of Southern Cameroons if it became independent nor was she ready to shoulder any further period of trusteeship.⁴⁴

At home the so-called emerging elite, who were short sighted as most of the emerging political leaders at the time kicked against secession and independence. They based their arguments on the grounds that "Southern Cameroons would become either a British dependency or a small unstable state which will serve as a fertile spot for communist infiltration in Africa." Thus they supported the fact that the alternatives of the plebiscite should be integration with Nigeria versus secession and ultimate reunification with the French Cameroun.

These local elites therefore forced the architects of the reunification to go into immediate reunification, which they, like Ahidjo, had not fully grasped its implications. The politicians as well as their elders warned that practical politics on the ground was quite different from the theoretical

politics they the young men had read in the universities. But they were short sighted, ignorant of who a Camerounian, born and breed in a French culture was, by and large. It was barely a few years after reunification that things came out not to be a paradise as these elites had thought. They were the very first to cry and complain "where are we going to?" Thus frustrated with the situation in the union Professor Bernard Fonlon began expressing his views in his writings and one of such

works that caught public attention was entitled Shall we make or mar?.

I. North Cameroons' First Plebiscite

The Northern Cameroons plebiscite was far less complicated than that of Southern Cameroons. Since the United Nations visiting mission of 1958 found very little sentiments in Northern Cameroons for reunification with French Cameroun or secession from Nigeria,⁴⁶ the problem the UN had was to seek the voters' opinion whether they wished to become an integral part of the Northern Region of Nigeria or a continuous rule under the British Trusteeship?

To this effect the UN General Assembly on March 13, 1959, adopted Resolution 1950 (xiii) which stipulated that a plebiscite be conducted in British Northern Cameroons. The two questions the UN put before the people were:

- 1) Do you wish the Northern Cameroons to be part of the Northern Region of Nigeria, when the Federation becomes independent on 1st October 1960? or
- 2) Are you in favour of deciding the future of Northern Cameroons at a later date?⁴⁷

The result of the November 7, 1959 plebiscite in the Trust Territory showed 70,546 votes cast in favour of the second alternative and 47,788 for merger with Northern Region of Nigeria.⁴⁸ The result indicated the activeness of reunification forces in Northern Cameroons. The choice of the second alternative stemmed from the fact that the KNDP and the NKDP campaigned vigorously for secession from Nigeria arguing that an autonomous Northern Cameroons would foster rapid socio-economic development. Sir Ahmadu Bello was terribly shocked at the outcome of the plebiscite result. He reacted violently to the outcome of the plebiscite and attributed the voting pattern to "subversive activities on the part of the British officers who organised the plebiscite"⁴⁹

ii) **The 1961 Plebiscites**

After the Northern Cameroons plebiscite of 1959 the UN again decided that the North be subjected to another plebiscite alongside with the Southern Cameroons. Both territories were to go to the polls before March 1961. The UN General Assembly concluded that the administration of British Cameroons be separated from Nigeria when Nigeria becomes independence on October 1, 1960. These historic events dominated the political

atmosphere in British Cameroons.

The pro-unificationists in Northern/Southern Cameroons were busy campaigning for reunification with French Cameroun and the integrationists on their part were campaigning for integration into the Federation of Nigeria. In Northern Cameroons the prominent Nigeria political parties the NCNC, NEPU and the UMBC joined forces with the NPC to campaign for Nigerian connection. The NKDP and the KFP in Northern Cameroons campaigned for reunification. These indigenous political parties were not given the fair treatment that the administration gave to the intergrationists. The Nigerian parties campaigning in Northern Cameroons had the support of both the political and administrative authorities that eased their campaign. The NKDP and KPP were not oportuned to have such advantages thus their campaign did not reach the grassroots level.⁵⁰ The British Administrator Sir John Dring initially permitted the operation of vehicles from French Cameroun that came into boost the NKDP and KFP campaign but later complicated it when he ordered that the vehicles must be dually registered at Yola or Maiduguri before they could enter the Trust Territory. Ironically the Nigerian vehicles were allowed by Dring to operate freely for the purpose in the Trust Territory.⁵¹

The plebiscite campaign in the South while very serious was not marked by harassment and intimidation as in Northern Cameroons. As George Atem pointed out "the seriousness was because the society was more politically conscious and so the

issues involved in plebiscite were more understood than they were in Northern Cameroons where illiteracy was widespread".⁵² Through a publication entitled The Two Alternative the public was informed of the constitutional future of the Trust Territory as part of Nigeria or Cameroun Republic. The reunificationists as well as integrationists had equal opportunities to interact with the population.

The integrationists camp led by N.N. Mbile (KPP) and Dr. E.M.L. Endeley (KNC) merged in May 1960. The new party styled the Cameroon People's National Congress (CPNC)⁵³ in their campaign strategy emphasised on the terrorist activities in French Cameroun, the learning of the French Language and going into a union with a partner who had no experience of federalism and a very different political and administrative system.⁵⁴ The pre-unification camp led by Dr.J.N.Foncha (KNDP) on their part warned against Igbo domination in the territory and accused CPNC leaders of selling British Cameroons to Nigeria. This statement was based on the fact that the CPNC had requested the Nigerian government for logistics during the campaign.⁵⁵

On January 22, 1961 a few weeks to the "D" day, the Nigerian Federal Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa addressed the Cameroon population by Radio in his speech titled "A Choice for Cameroon". He catalogued capitulated the political, economic and socio-cultural developments that have accrued to the British Cameroons from her association with Nigeria. He categorically refuted the claims emanating from Southern Cameroons political

leaders that Nigerians had exploited their territory. He promised more benefits that the Trust Territory would enjoy if the vote favoured integration. He then cautioned that:

If you vote against Nigeria, I cannot see how you can avoid living a life of poverty and hardship, and under the constant shadow of violence which the government cannot control. You will be putting yourselves under a country which has different laws and a complete different attitude towards life.⁵⁶

iii) The Plebiscite Results and Reactions

On February 11 and 12, 1961 the peoples of Southern and Northern Cameroons went to the polls to decide the fate of their future between the two questions put to them; which read:

- (i) Do you wish to achieve independence by joining the independent federation of Nigeria? or
- (ii) Do you wish to achieve independence by joining the independent Federation of Cameroon?

Though agreed upon that the plebiscite be conducted on 11th February, simultaneously in both sectors of the Trust Territory, for other reasons best known to Britain in Northern Cameroons voting lasted for two consecutive days from 11 - 12 February. In Southern Cameroon's the result was a landslide victory for the reunificationist forces under the canopy of the KNDP, having in its favour 233,571 votes out of the 331,312 votes cast, while 97,741 voters cast their votes in favour of integration. In

Northern Cameroons the story was the opposite, the integrationist forces had a sweeping victory over the reunificationists with 146,296 votes out of the 243,955 total vote cast while 97,659 voters cast their votes in favour of reunification.⁵⁷

George Atem observed that "a combined result (count) could have brought victory to the unificationists, but this was not done despite the fact that there was one Cameroon under the British Trusteeship".⁵⁸ See the plebiscite results below.

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TABLE:2 RESULTS OF FEBRUARY 11, 1961 PLEBISCITE IN SOUTHERN CAMEROUNS

Plebiscite District	Nigeria	Cameroun
<u>VICTORIA</u>		
South West	2552	3756
South East	1329	4870
North West	4744	4205
North East	3291	9251
<u>KUMBA</u>		
North East	9466	11991
North West	14738	555
South East	6105	12827
South West	2424	2227
<u>MAMFE -</u>		
West	2039	8505
North	5432	6410
South	685	8175
East	1894	10177
<u>BAMENDA</u>		
North	8073	18839
East	1822	17839
Central West	1230	18027
Central East	529	18193
West	467	16142
South	220	19426
<u>WUM</u>		
North	1485	7322
Central	3644	3211
East	1518	1113
West	2139	3449
<u>NKAMBE</u>		
North	5962	1917
Central	3846	5896
East	5059	4288
West	7051	2921
TOTAL	97741	233571

TABLE 3 1961 FEBRUARY 11 - 12 PLEBISCITE RESULT IN NORTHERN CAMEROONS

District	Nigeria	Cameroon
Dikwa North	22,765	10,562
Dikwa Central	28,697	24,203
Gwoza	18,115	2,554
Gubanawa/Modagali	16,904	13,299
Mubi	23,798	11,132
Gashaka-ioungue	4,999	3,108
Mambila	13,523	7,462
United Mills	7,791	152
TOTAL	146,296	92,659

Source: UN Document T/1556, Report of the United Nations Commisioner for the supervision of the plebiscites in the Southern and Northern Part of the Trust Territory of the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, April 3, 1961 p.140.

The Northern Cameroons' result that came as a shock to the political leaders of French Cameroon revealed that the "Cameroon idea" was not deep rooted. The out-come of the plebiscite result reflected the will of the people of British Cameroons in the light of the course of events. There were two types of fears

that greatly influenced voters in both sectors of the trust Territory. In the South the fear of Igbo domination and in the North the fear of going into the unknown French Cameroun.

In reaction to the outcome of the plebiscite results, the Cameroun Republic lodged a protest at the United Nations on the conduct of the plebiscite and a suit against Britain at the International Court of Justice at the Hague. Ahidjo's Government accused the British of falsifying the results of the plebiscite and of debarring the people in the North from expressing their wishes freely. In the case file, the charges levelled against Britain were, inter alia, that Britain all along did not separate the administration of Northern Cameroons from Nigeria, as decided by the UN General Assembly on December 13, 1946.⁵⁹

It was also revealed that armed police entered Northern Cameroons shortly before the vote to intimidate the voters; that the counting of votes and guarding of ballot boxes was not carried out under ideal conditions; and that there was harassment of unification supporters.⁶⁰ The Cameroon students in Nigeria also registered a protest to the UN on the dubious conduct of the plebiscites. V.T. Lainjo revealed that, Ahidjo enlisted the assistance of the Southern Cameroons' political leaders in his struggle to redress the situation and prevent the loss of Northern Cameroons but no co-operation was given him because he had refused to support the Southern Cameroons political leaders when they requested his assistance in their desperate struggle that Northern and Southern Cameroons be united before

reunification is negotiated.⁶¹

The plebiscite commissioner Dr. Djala Abboh on April 9, 1961, reported to the UN General Assembly that the plebiscite was properly organised and conducted by the Administering Authority in line with the legislation promulgated for the purpose. Based on this report, the UN outrightly rejected the project filed by the Cameroun Government. The UN General Assembly by Resolution 1608 (XV) of April 21, 1961 endorsed the results of the two plebiscites as reflecting the wishes of the voters. It was then agreed that with effect from June 1, 1961 Northern Cameroons should become part of the Federation of Nigeria and that Southern Cameroons on October 1, 1961, should become part of the Cameroun Republic.⁶²

Ahidjo became very disappointed with the loss of Northern Cameroons which he had expected would increase his weight in the politics of the Republic. Ahidjo himself has no option but to continue with the reunification immediate which Dr. J.N. Foncha had cautioned in vain. Ahidjo's hopes were finally dashed to the ground when in 1963 the International Court of Justice at the Hague issued its final decision on the matter maintaining that Cameroun's case was baseless and endorsed the February 11 and 12 plebiscites. Ahidjo who felt more touched with the decision of Northern Cameroons to stay in Nigeria than with Foncha's victory declared that, henceforth June 1, would be observed as a day of national mourning in Cameroon.⁶³

The unificationists led by Dr. J.N. Foncha in power in Southern Cameroons were not having it easy in spite of their landslide victory in the February 11, plebiscite. Six weeks after the plebiscite exercise, much bitterness was still expressed by the CPNC leaders who were in the opposition and had favoured integration with Nigeria. When the Southern Cameroons House of Assembly met for its budget session in late March 1961, a member of the CPNC likened the policy of the KNDP to "an insane and self-seeking programme aimed at suppressing natural law, justice and oppressing those minority tribes who dare to vote according to their convictions" and further added that the KNDP Government had deteriorated to an "instrument of oppression in the hands of primitive, arrogant and power-drunk ministers".⁶⁴ Following this statement the CPNC members staged a walk-out from the Assembly promising to return only when the UNO and world opinion should have secured a peaceful partitioning of the territory into districts according to their wishes.⁶⁵

The CPNC leaders therefore became victims of the situations they had created. They were the initiators of the (re)unification idea,⁶⁶ but later backed out of it when their people were already completely absorbed into it.

Their counter reaction was therefore meaningless as they were swept away by the very unification current that they had set in motion.

IV.3. The Re-unification Negotiations: Constitutional Problems

When Foncha's party the KNDP won the plebiscite in Southern Cameroons, it was the final stage to put into reality the Federal Union for which he had campaigned. As both sides prepared for the signing of the reunification Act, on October 1, 1961, they were not unanimous on its form. Foncha had all along wanted a loose federation while Ahidjo and the French,⁶⁷ wanted a unitary state or a centralized federation; which at most a temporary federation could be accepted and not a loose federation. The lack of sincerity to negotiate the union constitution on acceptable terms by both sides emanated from the loss of Northern Cameroons to Nigeria which both camps had needed before this final exercise, particularly Ahidjo. Thus, the genesis of the existing distrust, suspicion and lukewarm attitude of French speaking Camerounians towards English speaking Cameroonians which began since 1961 in spite of the goodwill and honesty with which Foncha and his supporters embraced it.

The West African Magazine pointed out that, "the dreams of President Ahidjo of the Cameroun Republic to build the Cameroon motherland have rebounded on him with the decision of North Cameroons in the plebiscite in February to join the Northern Region of the Federation of Nigeria."⁶⁸ This accounted for Ahidjo's reluctance to discuss certain crucial points with Foncha in course of their formal reunion to prepare for the form of the union constitution.

(i) The Bamenda Conference June 26-30, 1961

The Southern Cameroons leaders in a bid to strike a comprehensive deal with the French Cameroun Republic, organised an all party constitutional conference in Bamenda from 26th - 28th June 1961. This conference was held barely after 10 days of Ahidjo's first visit to Buea following Foncha's victory in the February 11 plebiscite. During this visit the three parties involved in the transitional process; Her Majesty's Government, the Southern Cameroons Government and the Cameroun Republic Government delegations held informal rounds of talks, obviously to pave the way for the envisaged unification. But nothing was made known to the general public.⁶⁷

The Bamenda Conference was attended by party delegates, members of the House of Chiefs, and Native Authorities to prepare a comprehensive set of proposals as a basis for negotiation with representatives of the Cameroun Republic. The Conference was chaired by J.H. Beeley, and B.G. Smith sat in as the legal adviser and J. Dixon as the Conference's Secretary. In his opening speech the Prime Minister Dr. J.N. Foncha told the delegates among other things that:

You are called upon to express your views on the form of constitution that will shortly unite the Southern Cameroons and the French Cameroun into a Federation. The expression of our views is valued by all citizens and the opportunity has been created for it. It is

the means by which western democracy thrives. It is the greatest civic responsibility each one of us owes to the Southern Cameroons and I can assure you that you have the opportunity to exercise it before this conference ends.⁷⁰

The Prime Minister later told participants that his party, the KNDP, had got the Government of Cameroun Republic to commit itself to the fact that the Union will be achieved on a federal basis. In sincerity to all citizens of both states he maintained that was the proper form of government to adopt under the varying circumstances in which they had been brought up. The conference was therefore charged with the task of working out a constitutional proposal that would make possible for the Federation of the two states to be formed on October 1, 1961. Participants were to indicate in broad outlines what in their views was the suitable constitution Southern Cameroons should recommend at the Fouban Conference between the two sides. The ruling party (KNDP) presented to delegates its own constitutional proposal and the session was adjourned to enable delegates study the document and make their observation.⁷¹

At the next session, the CPNC represented by N.N. Mbile, Motomby-Woleta and Ando-Seh took the floor. The CPNC in its proposals strongly maintained that the UNION should be a loose Federation that would enable both parties to negotiate gradually through constitutionally elected Assembly for a number of years to arrive at a suitable conclusion, since Southern Cameroons was

virtually a minority.⁷² The party leaders insisted that it must be entrenched in the constitution that any party that does not want the Union or finds it undesirable should secede.

Mr. Ndez Ntumazah and Albert W. Mukong who sat in for the O.K. took the podium next. The O.K. pointed out that the Southern Cameroons and its people cannot in any way be handed over as a sop of ceberus. In order to seriously expedite the work of the historic conference, the OK suggested that in all good faith a select committee representing all shades of opinion be appointed to study all proposals before the Foumban Conference and report to the General House.⁷³

On its list of proposals the OK among other things stated that: the state shall be called the United Kamerun Republic; the Head of State shall be a president elected by popular vote for a period of five years, and his function was to be mainly ceremonial. He could be re-elected for another term of office. The OK then proposed here that executive powers should be invested in the Prime Minister appointed by the President; and that Parliament should be composed of elected representatives from single member constitutencies based on population. The judiciary the OK maintained should be independent of the government. The OK leader Mr. Ntumazah reiterated that Southern Cameroons had enjoyed the British system of justice and their rule of law, a thing which he and other Southern Cameroonians would like to see preserved in the constitution of the United Kamerun.⁷⁴

Apart from the points raised by the CPNC and the OK, other proposals included the creation of liaison offices between the states and the Federal Government; the centralization of the Federal Capital; autonomy of states with legislative powers; the retention of the House of Chiefs; a bi-cameral federal legislature with English and French as its official languages and that English remains the official language of Southern Cameroons.⁷⁵ The participants however were not unanimous on the terms of office the President-elect should exercise.

The conference was a deliberative and not a decision making body. Thus government was to listen to its responsible opinion before it embarks upon the final consultation with the government of French Cameroun. There was no voting to points raised but government was to take note of all opinion expressed.

At the end of the conference the KNDP and the CPNC tabled two memoranda on the security of Southern Cameroons. They were accepted by the other delegations. The first called on Her Majesty's Government to train an indigenous security force to take over from the British Forces scheduled to be withdrawn on October 1, 1961. It viewed with deep regret the withdrawal of the forces from Southern Cameroons without any arrangement for other security measures. The second memo stated that Southern Cameroons in the face of the withdrawal of the British troops had no alternative but to fall back on any resources at its disposal and set up a task force to monitor the state security. The KNDP-CPNC accordingly advised that Southern Cameroons government

should immediately procure funds by effecting savings from the existing budget or seek external financial assistance; to approach the Nigerian government to repatriate all willing Cameroonians in the Nigerian army for service in the Southern Cameroons and that a Ministry of Defence be created forthwith in the territory. The two memoranda were signed by Dr.J.N. Foncha the Premier and by N.N. Mbile who signed for the CPNC.⁷⁶

The points raised at the Bamenda Conference obviously helped their political leaders to know what the people wanted from them. Looking at the proceedings of the Conference what one admires was the spirit of co-operation that prevailed between the opposition and the government which previously had been on parallel lines.

ii) The Foumban Conference July 1961

All eyes were set on the outcome of the Foumban constitutional talks, after the Bamenda conference. The two sides had much to iron out. Ahidjo while committed to the formation of a Federal Union, had pressure upon him to make it as unitary as possible. Foncha on the other hand, had advocated for a loose federation from the onset. The conference for which a lot of time and energy was put to prepare was not held on equal basis, since Southern Cameroons had no alternative but to follow Ahidjo. Legally Ahidjo did not have to accept a federal system at all since Southern Cameroons was obliged to form part of the Republic in any event. This situation was not clear in the Southern Cameroons. Frank M. Stark points out that "the KNDP leader, Premier J.N. Foncha himself, with only the Nigeria

federal experience behind him and operating virtually alone without British advisers, was no doubt also confused."⁷⁷ Foncha was still committed to the loose and decentralized federation in spite of the implications of his October 11 - 13 1960 agreement with Ahidjo. He was buried in the belief that going into a "unified Cameroon" it will be like that of divided brothers who have regained their liberty and returned home to their fatherland".⁷⁸ He was short-sighted and took political opponents as brothers and equally did not realize that he was but dealing with France indirectly. It was on this premise of false brotherhood that Premier Foncha led the Southern Cameroons delegation to the Foumban Conference like "Lambs to the Slaughter."⁷⁹


It was on July 17, 1961 that delegates from both Southern Cameroons and Cameroun Republic converged in the Foumban Sultanate to consider the constitutional proposals for a Federal Unified Cameroons. The Southern Cameroons delegates to the so-called Joint All-Party Conference totaled twenty-four. The composition of the delegates was as follows: the Government Representatives were four led by Premier J.N. Foncha. He was also the leader of the Southern Cameroons delegation; the KNDP had six delegates, the CPNC four, the O.K. two and the House of Chiefs eight. The Honourable Attorney-General, Mr.J. Dixon was the conference Secretary, Dr. Bernard N.Fonlon was the Conference Interpreter, Mr. T. Abanda Publicity Officer. There were three Secretary Typists and an official photographer. The delegation

arrived Foumban on Sunday July 16, 1961 and was given a red-carpet reception.

The Cameroun Republic delegation was led by President Ahmadou Ahidjo.⁸⁰ Prominent in his delegation was his Prime Minister Charles Asale and his Foreign Minister, Okala. Since by 1961 Ahidjo had successfully suppressed both the violent and non-violent opposition to his regime, only he and his U.C. devoted apostles, supported technically by France were at Foumban during what many English-speaking Cameroonians today have termed the "handing over ceremony" of Southern Cameroons to Ahidjo - French command with the complicity of Britain.

In his opening speech Ahidjo told the delegates that in three months the union envisaged shall be an accomplished fact and its coming should be prepared with the seriousness that such a task requires. Among other things he told the delegates in these words why the Federal frame work was chosen during his meetings with Premier J.N. Foncha.

It was because linguistic, administrative and economic differences do not permit us to envisage seriously and reasonably, a state of the unitary and centralized type. It was because a confederal system on the other hand being too loose, would not favour the close coming together and the intimate connection we desire. A federal structure, therefore, would be the only one which suits our particular



situation ... it is not our purpose to build, in the absolute an ideal state cut off from its roots, neither is it to prepare a constitution based on abstract theories.⁸¹

In reply to the speech the Southern Cameroons chief delegate Premier J.N. Foncha, told the French speaking Camerounians that it was a historic day after 44 years of separation under the tutelage of two different colonial masters, that they are together to consider the method of coming into a Union. Among other things he emphasised that:

It is hope that we can overcome all other obstacles that might present themselves in our task to produce a workable constitution which will satisfy the wishes of the people who voted for it. Not only are the whole Cameroon people looking to us to lead the way. In previous discussions with His Excellency Ahmadou Ahidjo we have kept in mind our desire to re-build the Kamerun nation. We must not however forget the existence of the two cultures. We have therefore proposed a form of government which will keep the two cultures in areas where they now operate and to blend them in the centre. The Centre is therefore deliberately given only very limited subjects,

while the states are left to continue largely as they are now.⁸²

The Southern Cameroons' opposition leader speaking at the conference told delegates that the constitution was an instrument for guiding the rights and privileges of the people, the making of the constitution he went on, was not the exclusive right of the government of the day. He emphasised that the opposition members of the Southern Cameroons delegation had come with open minds and were prepared to work for the good of the conference. Dr. Endeley however expressed regret that the new document containing the draft revision of the Cameroun Republican Constitution had reached them only that morning (27-8-61) and consequently time was needed for it to be studied for any discussion.⁸³

It should be noted that Ahidjo embarrassed the Southern Cameroons delegation with Cameroun Republican constitution at Foumban, which had no connection with what he had previously discussed with Dr. Foncha and proposals circulated. With such embarrassment perhaps the best solution could have been for Foncha to submit his own proposed document after the Bamenda Conference to Ahidjo and his delegation. This could have given time for the two sides to study the documents. The Southern Cameroons delegations, with the determination of making the conference a success in the spirit of fraternity, laboured one-half day to look at the document and make proposals. They had all come back to square one. What Foncha and Ahidjo had

discussed and arrived at some conclusions appeared never to have existed.

Though no definite solution was found to the problems that hindered the unification of the two Cameroons, an indication was given by the Southern Cameroons' delegation as to how progress could be achieved. The indication emanated from suggestions arrived at in the emergency private session they held immediately the embarrassing document was distributed. Dr. Endeley addressing the joint session before reading out the amendments proposals told Ahidjo that:

All we request is that you should receive our proposals as an indication of our good intentions and good will for a union. It is like a young brother who is anxious to live with an elder brother, if the elder brother receives him very coldly and does not give encouragement he may feel very discouraged. Much of the desire for the people of the Southern Cameroons to unify with their "brother" will depend on the attitude of the Republic of Cameroun and the manner in which they treat the proposals.⁸⁴

Finding themselves in the embarrassing situation the delegation concentrated its studies only on those urgent aspects of the Cameroun Republican constitution that would make the Union on October 1, 1961 possible. The proposals submitted in turn to

Ahidjo were not made public and surfaced only when Ahidjo was replying to them after he had closely looked at them with his technical advisers. The principal amendments which the Southern Cameroons delegation proposed as revealed by President Ahidjo could be divided or classified into two categories: (1) those which concern questions of detail of which Ahidjo did not think it necessary to insist on and (11) those which concerned questions of principle.⁸⁵

As regards the latter the Cameroun Republic delegation agreed with the Southern Cameroons proposals as follows;

- (1) The Cameroun Republic delegation agreed that an Article of the constitution should indicate the country's adhesion to the UN charter and to the Universal Declaration of the Rights of man. They deemed this reference to be largely sufficient.
- (2) In order to avoid a certain confusion that might arise from the word "INDIVISIBLE" they admitted that it should be purely and simply omitted.
- (3) With regards to Nationality they were of the opinion that the Federal Republic can give one nationality to its citizens and on this condition all subjects of the federated state are citizens of the Federal Republic and possess Cameroon nationality.
- (4) In constitutional practice, a federal law was to lay down the conditions for the exercise of the vote, the

organisation of elections and whatever had a bearing on them.

- (5) For the bi-camera legislative system in the Federation, the Cameroun Republic delegation observed that it was without doubt, classic, but they were of the opinion that in the immediate future it was necessary to lighten as much as possible the parliamentary apparatus in relation to available finance to make it as effective as possible.
- (6) They endorsed the proposal that the president of the Federal Republic of Cameroon and his vice should be elected by universal suffrage after the transitional period and that both should not be subjects of the same state.
- (7) The exercise of the Federal powers fell to the president of the Republic of Cameroun as from October 1, 1961. He was empowered to nominate Federal Ministers from the subjects of the two federated states.
- (8) The Cameroun Republic delegation agreed that Southern Cameroons should maintain the House of Chiefs and did not see any objection to this provision being inserted in the body of the constitution. They also agreed that the number of Southern Cameroons Deputies in the Legislative Assembly be increased from 26 to 37.
- (9) The amendment of Article 45 as regards the transmission of Laws voted by parliament to the President of the Federal Republic was equally accepted.

As regards the transitional period the Southern Cameroons proposal that the President of the Republic of Cameroun should, during his present term of office, be President of the Federal Republic and the Prime Minister of Southern Cameroons should exercise the functions of the Vice President, were accepted.⁸⁶

Ahidjo after accepting the above points proposed by the Southern Cameroons delegation commented that the value of a constitution was not measured by the length of its articles, but by its well thoughtout and reasonable application by men animated by the same patriotic spirit and by the same desire to build a national community in which all strive to work for common good, prosperity and peace and putting aside all partisan politics. Dr. Foncha on his part advocated that a further meeting would be necessary to iron out a few words that were not understood by either side and to add in the document some of the things, that were not properly inserted.⁸⁷

The Fouban episode marked the first major set-back for the Southern Cameroons to secure constitutional rights in the federation as a political and linguistic minority group. Although a few of their suggestions were accepted the majority were simply not looked at as outlined by various parties at the Bamenda preparatory meeting of June 1961. The few that were added to the modified 1960 republican constitution were erased off by the 1972 constitution that established president's absolute supremacy in the unitary state. This constitution shall be fully discussed in chapter VI.

The Hidden Truth Behind the Proposed 1960 Constitution

The Cameroun Republican constitution of 1960, proposed to the Southern Cameroons' delegation sought to establish clear preponderance of federal authority over state institutions, which was in line with non-power sharing. Ahidjo who had in no time neutralized the opposition groups and his Union Camerounaise (UC) emerged as the sole political party in French Cameroun did not just envisage any diminution of the authority and power which he enjoyed. In order to maintain this central control a wide range of matters in the new arrangement fell under the competence of the Federal Government which he (in the typical French style) single-handedly carried out. Thus, reunification as hoped by the KNDP did not result in a significant degree of decentralization. Had the UN and Britain allowed Southern Cameroons to be independent before negotiating with Ahidjo's French installed government, they could have had grounds to strike a deal from a position of strength.

It is imperative to bear in mind that most of the provisions of the Cameroun Republican Constitution of February 21, 1960, granted the president enormous executive powers as the guarantor of judicial independence (grant de l'ndependance de L'autorite' judiciaire) and proclaimer of the State of emergency (L'etat de exception)⁸⁸ in addition to the acquisition of the emergency powers to rule by decree conferred on the President in 1959. Basically the provisions of the 1960 French Cameroun constitution were derived from the Fifth French Republican constitution of

October 4, 1958 and were remarkably reflected in its reformed version that came into existence on October 1, 1961 as the Cameroon Federal constitution. This is best explained by article 59 of the then Federal constitution which declared that "the present provisions, by which the constitution of the Republic, adopted on 21st February, 1960 by Camerounian people is revised, shall enter into force on 1st October 1961. The revised constitution shall be published in French and English - the FRENCH text being AUTHENTIC"⁸⁹.

The word "revised" was intended to be a warning to the interpreters of the Federal Constitution not to isolate the existence of the 1960 instruments that formed the basis of the 1961 Federal Constitution. What article 59 does not purport to mean is that the 1961 Federal instrument is merely an amended form of the 1960 Republican Constitution. Thus, the Foumban Constituent Assembly proceedings are proof positive of this assertion.⁹⁰

iii THE YAOUNDE TRIPARTITE TALKS, AUGUST 1961

In August 1961, the Southern Cameroons delegation led by Dr. J.N.Foncha was in Yaounde where talks between him, the representatives of Her Majesty's Government and the Republic of Cameroun took place, to put in its initial frame the constitution of the Federal Republic.⁹¹

On the agenda of the talks to be discussed were: the situation and position of Cameroonians who at that moment were serving in the Nigeria armed forces and police; certain services

that were considered to be federal such as customs, ports, meteorological stations, posts and telegraphs, and federal works which were under the authority of the Commissioner of Southern Cameroons; the Nigerian currency which was a legal tender in Southern Cameroons; the National defence and security arrangements and the procedure to be decided and adopted for the transfer of sovereignty to be ironed out by the three parties.⁹²

On defence and security matters, the delegates agreed that a mission be dispatched to Lagos to contact the Nigerian government on the transfer of Cameroon personnel in Nigeria to Southern Cameroons. Honourable S.T. Muna and Mr. N.Black, a Senior Personnel in the French Cameroun Foreign Office left for Lagos via Tiko for talks with the Nigerian authorities.⁹³

The services that were placed under the Commissioner of Southern Cameroons were to become federal services. The conference examined the reunification arrangements according to the UN General Assembly Resolution 1608 XV of April 21, 1961. Accordingly, after the talks, the Southern Camerouns delegation was to inform the British Government of all detailed arrangements.⁹⁴ The Yaounde tripartite talks therefore were essentially held to finalise the taking-over of Southern Cameroons. The constitution remained as amended at Foumban, nothing was added to it nor were the minor details reserved for future discussion as advocated by Dr. Foncha ever talked of again.

On the rejection of many Southern Cameroons proposals and not accepting that a new constitution be drawn up for the United State, Ahidjo argued that the problem was to provide reunification with institutions. Therefore, according to Ahidjo a federal regime which was necessary at the start would have been accepted because it was necessary to consecrate unification legally by giving it a character, in other words by giving it a constitution.⁹⁵

At this juncture the President was confronted with two problems. (1) Was it necessary to draw up a constitution for the Federal Republic of Cameroon? or (11) Was it preferable to amend the constitution of the then Cameroun REpublic which had been approved by the people in the consultation of February 21, 1960⁹⁶

Defending his course Ahidjo pointed out that the Cameroun Republic and the territory previously under British Trusteeship constituted a single historic unit, the Cameroun nation; a moral unit of the Cameroon fatherland. The two sectors were perceived as two distinct political entities. On the one hand an independent sovereign state possessing an international legal personality and on the other a territory without a political international status.⁹⁷

In this agony there was no option for Southern Cameroons. Had the British not for selfish reasons allowed Southern Cameroons to become independent as Foncha had advocated before negotiating with independent French Cameroun its image could have been saved and this retrogressive impersonification of its

identify would not have appeared. In reaffirming his stance Ahidjo reiterated that:

It was unthinkable to tamper with the Republican form of the regime, it was the Republic which had to transform itself into a federation; taking into account the return to it of a part of its territory, a part possessing certain special characteristics. The question therefore was not that of the birth of a new republic with a federal form.

Bowing to this logic, we have, therefore to amend the constitution of the 21st February 1960. Since language and cultural differences needed to be given legal consideration. Thus it was that, at the historic Foumban conference, after a couple of days of work in atmosphere marked on either side by cordiality, we announced the main outlines of the modifications by which the constitution of the 21st February 1960, should become the constitution of the Federal Republic of Cameroon.⁹⁸

Based on this analysis by Ahidjo it is clear that the people of Southern Cameroons had to come into the Union on conditions set by French Cameroun. One of such conditions was the adoption and approval of the constitution that should govern them. As the

Yaounde tripartite talks ended the Southern Cameroons delegation was left with no choice but to accept the fate of their own alternative they had freely chosen.

VI.4 Re-Unification and the Adaptation of the Federalist System

October 1, 1961

September 30 1961, midnight was scheduled for the ceremonial transfer of Southern Cameroons' sovereignty to the Cameroun Republic. Ahidjo was on hand in Buea for the occasion which in every sense was a victory he had won in dispensing little or no energy.

On October 1, 1961, Southern Cameroons was proclaimed an independent country and reunified with French Cameroun to form what is today the Republic of Cameroon. The ceremony was heralded with 21 gunshots and ringing of bells to salute the birth of the new nation. Three speeches were made, Mr.M.N.H. Milne read a message from the Colonial Secretary to Dr.J.N. Foncha, Vice President of the Federal Republic the second message from Her majesty the Queen of United Kingdom to Ahidjo President of the Federal Republic was read by His Excellency C.K. King the British Ambassador to the Republic of Cameroun.

Ahidjo in his maiden speech as the first president of Union among other things said:

... this unity, henceforth does not depend on foreign forces; it behoves us, therefore, to forge it ourselves in one patriotic up-surge.

It is no longer the hard-line of any party

programme; it is a profound determination which remains ever present in the heart of everyone of the sons of this soil whenever be their ethnic group. What sort, indeed will be a union accompanied by divisions more deeply set than frontiers, a union accompanied by dissensions in which brother is pitted against brother, father against son?... Bring together today, people of French and English expression the Cameroon promises to be a very important laboratory for an African Union which shall assemble together states speaking these two languages. It shall constitute a bridge between those two Africans and its role cannot but increase in future African gatherings.⁹⁹

Dr. J. N. Foncha in his speech, following that of Ahmadou Ahidjo, reiterated that:

... The time has come to show proof of valour. Having overcome one obstacle after another, we acquired experience which we will find useful in getting our new federation under way - having thus acquired Independence and Re-unification; we shall have to give proof of more and more of these qualities.¹⁰⁰

In conclusion Dr. Foncha recalled that "Order is the first law of the "Heavens" with order he pointed out, "comes peace,

with peace comes progress, with progress comes happiness".¹⁰¹

The Federal constitution came into effect on October 1, 1961. According to the constitution Southern Cameroons became the state of West Cameroon with its Headquarters in Buea. The Cameroun Republic became the State of East Cameroon with Headquarters in Yaounde. Yaounde remained the seat of the Federal Government. The states had their legislative Assemblies and constitutions. East state had a Prime Minister and an Executive. The President of the Republic was confirmed by the document as the Head of State and Head of Government. The Secretary of States were appointed by the State Prime Ministers with the endorsement of the Head of State.¹⁰²

A few days following the proclamation of the Federal Republic were not happy ones for many West Cameroonians. It was not long when they saw the inevitability of many of the proposals and realized that the constitutional situation of Cameroon was based on historical circumstances.¹⁰³ The West Africa magazine later echoed this view; the magazine observed that the constitutional conference rejected many West Cameroon proposals. It pointed out that the conference failed to limit the number of terms a President may serve and that the document did not entrench any "State" rights' clause. The constitution consequently adhered more closely to the centralized French tradition than to the relatively decentralized British one.¹⁰⁴

NOTES

1. Interview with V.T. Lainjo, Buea, Op.Cit.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Interview with Thomas Ngi (60), Gembu, 20 March 1987.
5. U.N. General Assembly Hearing From Cameroons Petitioners AC/4/SR/ 775, January 1959, pp. 154-155.
6. U.N. General Assembly Petition from Mambila 25/2/1959. A/L 4/399 February 26, 1959. p.1-4.
7. Bongfen Cham-Langhee. The Kamerun Plebiscites 1959-1961, Op.cit. p.73.
8. Ibid.
9. U.N. General Assembly Hearing from Cameroons petitioners, A/C 4/SR 848, May 1959 pp. 561 - 564.
10. Trusteeship Council Resolution 1926 (XX111) endorsed by the UN General Assembly 13/3/59 and adopted 8/2/59, p.4.
11. UNO Document T/ 1491 Report of Northern Cameroons Plebiscite, November 25; 1959.
12. P.M. Kemcha Cameroon in Transition, op.cit. pp.11 - 111.
13. Ibid. p.47
14. West African Pilot, April 12, 1958.
15. Ibid.
16. Interview with Joseph Mbunwe, (50) Douala, 8 August 1989.

17. Kwame Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism, (London:Pan Africa Books, 1971) p.25 also see Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite (New York, International Publishers 1974) pp. 173 - 193.
18. Kwame Nkrumah, I Speak of Freedom, (London; Pan African, 1969) p.xm.
19. Kwame Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite, op.cit.p.21q..
20. NAB. A/C 4/40B CPNC Petition to UNO Secretary General, undated.
21. Ibid.
22. The OK inherited the idea reunification immediate from the UPC programme, they, like Ahidjo did not foresee its implications.
23. Nigerian Daily Times, 21 October 1958, p.16.
24. George Atem, Cameroon - Nigeria Relations 1984 - 1961, p.306.
25. NABS.R. No. 19 File Oe (1961) 2 M.P.s Office BUEA.
26. Southern Cameroons Press Release, No. 0965, 25 August, 1960.
27. Frank M.Stark "Federalism in Cameroon: The Shadow and the Reality" in An Africa Experiment in Nation Building: The Bilingual Cameroon Republic Since Reunification, (ed.) Ndiva Kofele-Kale, (Westview Press/Boulder Colorado, 1980), p.108.
28. Southern Cameroons Press Release, 20 October 1960.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Southern Cameroons Press Release, December 1960.


51. Ibid.
52. George Atem, op.cit, p.319.
53. T.Eyongetah & R.Brain op.cit., p.156.
54. Ibid.
55. Dibongue to Endeley 29/2/1960.
56. Radio Broad Cast cited in Sam Epelle, Nigeria Speaks, Speeches of Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, (London: Longmans 1964) pp.86 - 89.
57. UN Document T/15556, Report on Cameroons Plebiscite. April 3, 1961.
58. G.Atem Op.Cit, p.322.
59. E.Lauterpacht (ed.) International Law Report. (London:Butterworth, 1967), p.353.
60. Southern Cameroons Press Release, No. 1293, April 14, 1961.
61. Interview with V.T. Lainjo op.cit.
62. Southern Cameroons Press Release, March 1961.
63. T.Eyongetah & R. Brain op.cit. p.158.
64. Southern Cameroon Information Service Press Release, No. 1275, April 15, 1961.
65. Ibid.
66. P.M. Kale Political Evolution in the Cameroons, op.cit. p.43.
67. Though independent, French Cameroun was effectively being controlled by France that paved the way for Ahidjo to come to Power. He signed many pacts with France on matters such as military economic and cultural. Vide. Guy Devernois

"Cameroons 1958-1959" Civilizations, Vol. 9-10, (1959 - 1960) p.234.

68. West Africa July 22, 1961.
69. Southern Cameroons Press Release, No. 1397, 16 June 1961.
70. Southern Cameroons Press Release, No. 1414, 27 June 1961.
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid.
73. NAB Vc-b 1961/1 Bamenda Conference 26 - 28 June 1961.
74. Records of the All Party Conference on the Constitutional Future of the Southern Cameroons held at the Community Hall Bamenda, 26 - 28 June 1961. pp.65-66.
75. Ibid
76. Southern Cameroon Press Release No. 1428 1 July, 1961.
77. Frank M.Stark op.cit p.110.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid.
80. Southern Cameroons Press Release, No. 1458, 14 July 1961.
81. Southern Cameroons Press Release, No. 1467 20 July 1961.
82. Ibid
83. Ibid
84. Southern Cameroons Press Release, No. 1468 24 July 1961.
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid.

88. Articles 20 et 40 de la Constitution de la Republique du Cameroun, Yaounde le 4 Mars 1960, here in after referred to as "the 1960 Republican Constitution".
89. The Institutions and the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Cameroon, 1961 p.28.
90. Dr.Foncha's delegation included A.N. Jua, S.T.Muna, and Dr. B.N.Fonlon as the official interpreter.
Ahidjo led the French Cameroun Delegation.
92. Southern Cameroons Press Release, No. 1488 5 August 1961.
93. NAB Vc/6/1961/3, Tripartite Conference, Yaounde August 1961.
94. Ibid.
95. Ahmadou Ahidjo Contribution to National Construction, (Presence Africaine Paris Ve, 1964) p.23.
96. Ibid
97. Ibid
98. Ibid
99. Southern Cameroons Press Release, No. 1562, 7 October 1961.
100. Ibid.
101. Ibid
102. The States Ministers were called Secretary of States in the Federal System.
103. T.Eyongetah & R.Brain, op.cit., p.160.
104. West Africa, 19 October 1963.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON 1961-72



SOURCE: EYONGETAH, T. AND BRAIN, R.
A HISTORY OF CAMEROON,

(London: Longman Group Ltd; 1974 Page 161.)

CHAPTER V

THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC: PROBLEMS OF ADJUSTMENT FROM POLITICAL

DIVERSITY TO UNITED PARTY

PROBLEM OF ADJUSTMENT

The Federalist system arrived at in Founban in July came into being on October 1, 1961, the day reunification was pronounced. The Federal Republic of Cameroon thus assumed absolute legal sovereignty which was formerly lodged in the United Kingdom and the French Cameroun Republic. The Federation that came into being and not a Confederation as Foncha advocated was uniquely of Ahidjo's creation and the related institutions that followed suit¹. It was based on cultural, social, juristic and linguistic divergences that developed between the two sectors over the years. On partition of the territory after World War I neither the League of Nations nor the UN made reunification of the Trust Territory obligatory on the occupying imperial powers Britain and France. These bodies might have under-estimated the political, social and cultural affinity that had developed among the Kamerunians during the decades of German rule. The 1884-1914 effect was that these territories experienced two different contrasting political and socio-cultural systems.

V.1 The Federal Constitution and Division of Power

The Constitution the two leaders and their elites arrived at was to bridge the gap which in Dr. J.N. Foncha's words was the rebuilding of the one time "Great Kamerun Family" which was

"maliciously and arbitrarily sundered by the colonialist powers".² The West Cameroonian leaders hoped that with gradual evolution both sides would heal the wounds created by the imperialists and form a union of mutual co-existence, but French Cameroun leaders that had committed themselves deeply to the French were not of the same thought.³ The initial conflicting interests since then have put to test, the vision of rebuilding a "great Kamerun family" that had reigned during the German epoch⁴ and the sincerity in the union towards each other naively believed to have been "brothers".

The Federal Constitution provided for the creation of a federal executive that was to be the nucleus that would magnetically pull the halves forming its base, together. The centre controlled by the President of the federal republic was to pilot the affairs of the federal Government as well as co-ordinate the activities of the affiliated organs of the government. It also provided for the federal legislature, state Assemblies and a House of Chiefs for West Cameroon. The constitutional system that the federation inaugurated for Cameroon grew out of interaction of political elites in each state, but the West Cameroonians bore the heavier burden of the adjustment because of its pro-French republican orientation. The tracheotomy presupposes that the legislative, executive and the judicial branches shall remain separate and independent of one another. This was not a characteristic of the Cameroon

federalism. What made it facially federal was that some sovereign power were apportioned between the national federal Assembly on the one hand and the federated state Assemblies on the other.⁵

Since Ahidjo outrightly refused the proposal by West Cameroon leaders that the president as Head of State should not be Head of Government, in an attempt to weaken the strong presidency he proposed, the powers that the document allotted to the executive became the additional powers of the Head of the State. By the said constitution the powers of the president were synonymous to that of the Federal Authorities to a great extent as expressly enumerated under article 5 and 6, while the federated states had reserved powers under article 38 (1). Hence any subject not in articles 5 and 6 of the federal constitution whose regulation was not specifically entrusted by this constitution to a federal law was to be of exclusive jurisdiction of the federated states, which, within those limits, may adopt their own state constitution⁶.

The term "Federation" was a misnomer following the allocations of authority and the functioning of political life style in the country. The powers Ahidjo reserved under his supreme authority were so wide in scope that little or nothing was left in the hands of the federated state authorities. The Cameroon's federation was therefore one with a very strong central government from where power radiated with very weak

federated state governments. This was a sharp contrast with the federation of Nigeria, Cameroons next door neighbour.

The power distribution hampered the capacities of the two states to define and pursue their interests as collectivities vis-a-vis the federal government. What was worse still was the fact that the president had the right to dissolve the State Assemblies, appoint and dismiss the prime ministers, in a multi-party system in which the premier had to come to power through elections in the state. The constitution was blind to this fact.

As a whole the constitutional arrangement that Ahidjo modeled for the Union had no theoretical approach that could be arrived at, other than that the federation was of Ahidjo's creation.⁷ The immense dominance of the central authority on the state of West Cameroon was not what the apostles of "reunification immediate" who use Southern Cameroons' elite had expected. Had it been, generally, that the reunificationists had their ears open to the criticism of the UPC, they could have been saved by a signal warning.

The militant UPC leaders in exile had long launched a bitter attack on the 1960 republican constitution which Ahidjo put to the Southern Cameroons' leaders for proposed modifications, as lacking effective guarantees of public and individual liberties and denounced the centralization of power by the president.⁸ The Paris-based student leadership did come out with the same cry that it was the Fifth French Republican Constitution imposed on Cameroun. The leftists marshaled the most vehement criticism

at the constitution as being purely and simply the product of Frenchmen, and maintained that it was "merchandise that was not tropicalized."⁹

Abel Eyinga¹⁰ argued out before the Cameroon Student Congress in Paris that the constitution was product of French technicians who yesterday were the zealous defenders of colonial regime, but (who are) today the builder of our independence (Something) which they never desired"¹¹. The political situation Ahidjo and the French set in motion in Cameroon was not a system wherein the citizens controlled at all times those to whom they have confided the exercise of sovereignty. The framers of the constitution attributed immense prerogatives to the president, parliament had no control over him and his government, and the absence of defined formula for popular election to fill his post¹². In the light of the existing situation Abel Eyinga pointed out that:

Here we have a man, provided with complete power, who escapes any control by those who conferred it on him, those to whose profit this power is supposed to be exercised. It is from this that the paradox of this regime springs: a president of the Republic who can do anything in the name of a people who did not elect him and who cannot demand of him the least accounting, who have no means to make him change policies or force him out, if he

refused to submit himself to (the will of) the sovereign people.¹³

Cameroon since then took this path of authoritarianism perpetuated by France to have in power always one who was answerable to her as opposed to nationalist leaders like those of the UPC whom they called radicals. Though Ahidjo eloquently, in the course of his rule defended his monarchical presidency that there is no universal standard of democracy and "every people is perfectly entitled to conceive its form" to suit its realities,¹⁴ one fact stands out clear, that since 1961, Cameroon had never had a democratically elected president in popular elections of two or more contesting candidates. From a critical nationalistic point of view, apart from the upecites, to most French Camerounians independence meant simply a change of flag; which to Southern Cameroonians was not perceived in this manner¹⁵.

The Federal Jurisdiction

The federal government that was instituted following reunification had much powers concentrated in the centre that the political position of the states in the federation was a mere decoration. This ran contrary to what Foncha had advocated. He wanted a loose union whereby the centre was to have limited powers and the federated states remain as strong as they were before reunification¹⁶. Since the federal constitution of September 1, 1961, was fashioned on that of the Cameroun Republican constitution of January 1960 the idea of power separation was never mentioned. In this regard, there was a

strong central government with weak federated state governments bearing testimony to the superior position of Ahidjo over Foncha¹⁷. This was in contrast to the Canadian constitution where much powers was allotted to the provinces¹⁸.

Areas of federal jurisdictional competence were to a large extent, expressly enumerated under articles 5 and 6 of the federal constitution while the state governments had reserved powers under article 38 (1).

The areas of federal jurisdiction embraced the following matters: nationality; status of aliens; rules governing the conflict of law; national defence; foreign affairs; internal and external security of the federal state, emigration and immigration; development planning, guidance of the economy, statistics, the control and organisation of credit, external economic relations (including trade agreement); currency, the federal budget and the establishment of taxes and revenues of all kinds to meet federal expenditure; higher education and foreign technical and financial assistance; posts and telecommunications; aviation and meteorology mines and geological research, geographical survey; rules governing the Federal Civil Service and the Judiciary; Organisation and functioning of the Federal Court of Justice and territorial boundaries of federated states¹⁹.

The constitution therefore attributed extensive powers to the federal authorities that consequently placed the state governments under the strong supervisory arm of the centre. Article vi (1) of the constitution stipulated that states were

allowed to retain sovereignty over public liberties, law of person and administration; penitential administration; legislation to state lands; Labour laws; public health; secondary and technical education; weights and measures. But according to Article vi (2) of the constitution the state jurisdictions to legislate over these areas of public life were temporary and will cease at any moment the federal authorities decide to usurp control. Section 3 of the same Article (vi) concludes that "powers of the executive and authorities, as the case may be of the federated states in respect of any such matters shall cease when the federated Authorities have assumed responsibility"²⁰. This meant that the immediate entry of the federal authorities on these fields ended all federated state authority. The constitution designates the Federal Authorities in article iv i.e the Federal National Assembly and the president of the Republic. Any other powers not listed above accrued to the president whose powers were already overwhelming as embodied in articles 8 - 15. Nfor Nfor, points out that what emerged after the Foumban Constitutional Conference was not a federation as such, but a "Unitary state enveloped in a federal system"²¹. His views call to mind that it was not a general concensus among members at Foumban to accord such extensive powers to the centre; but if one argues it well, there would have arisen no need for a call for constitutional review in September 1964. Based on this reality, it is absolutely regrettable with Enonchong's naive comments on the Foumban conference that the overriding intention of the

statesmen at the Fouban Conference was to build a strong reunited Cameroon with a stable government to make it economically viable and internationally respectable. The question of what powers were to be allocated to the federated state authorities was a collateral and secondary objective²². This is out of context with what really took place at Fouban. The views expressed in the two statements above are purely those of Ahidjo and contradict the proposal submitted by Foncha²³. If the situation in the federation was that of co-equal status of states in relation to the centre as Foncha advocated, the issue of a constitutional review could not have been called for. But the subject of a constitutional review became imperative in 1964 when it became crystal clear to West Cameroonians that the federal system was working against them, that their hopes were not being realized, that there were already manifest signs of absorption and as such they were not enjoying the anticipated equality with East Camerounians listed by Johnson as: "equality of freedom to rule themselves; and (ii) a sense of moral equality of the two states as the dual embodiment of the Cameroon nation"²⁴.

The Buea regime re-opening of the constitutional issue was to seek equality between the two states because they were now aware of how much of their lives and fortune would be affected by decisions taken at the federal level. Thus arose a need to be in the centre and have a say in the implementation of government policy. The constitution put the junior partner (West Cameroon)

permanently in a subjugating position as if she were a war captive²⁵.

Presidential Bureaucracy

The Federal Constitution did state directly that the "executive powers" are vested in the president, but it was clear from its provisions that he occupied this position as head of the federal government. This accumulation of functions closely modeled along the lines of the presidency of the Fifth French Republic was what worried Foncha and his people.²⁶ Foncha could not achieve anything after the Foumban Conference because he proved too soft throughout the negotiations and this was to Ahidjo's advantage. This only serves as lesson to future generations that political decisions to a very large extent require more of foresight and strong political will than moral sanctions.

It is of no doubt that the French who are said to be the framers of the constitution had to consolidate powers in the hands of Ahidjo to safeguard their interest in Cameroon and weaken opposition to his rule²⁷. The pro-French constitution ensured the president his principal powers by definite constitutional grant instead of leaving them contingent upon legislation. The president was one of the designated federal authorities, the main objective being to make the presidency equal and independent of the legislature and to avoid bringing it under the domination of the federal legislature²⁸. Thus the 1961 constitution, effectively installed a monarchical presidential

dictatorship. The president by the constitution had a vice President elected on a single list by Universal suffrage and direct and secret ballot. But no functions were attributed to the vice president by the constitution. Foncha was the first to occupy this ceremonial position.

The constitution lacked the basic ingredients of a federal system, namely checks and balances. Instead of the president being responsible to the legislature and limited by the judiciary it was vice versa. The president reserved all the rights to dissolve the federal legislature as well as the state Assemblies. The constitution made the president the incarnation of power and from him power radiated. The president by this set up in Cameroon is the light and the way. Nobody thinks but the president, an old concept likened to that of Louis XVI who maintained that "L'Etat C'est moi" (I am the state). Article 8(1) of the constitution confirms his dominant position, "the president shall uphold the federal constitution and shall ensure the unity of the federation". He is not under any obligation to consult his executive council before taking any decision. The creation of the Cameroon National Union single party (CNU) increased Ahidjo's powers over West Cameroon and the Unitary state he created in May 1972 formally established his hegemony over West Cameroon.

Thus, the most striking feature of the presidency is its tremendous powers. The "Africannes" of the imperial presidency refers to the fact that it is largely free from limiting

constitutional devices, particularly those of the rigid separation of powers. The legislature was subordinated to the executive and the judiciary as regards appointment and dismissals. The ultimate aim of this was to lay a foundation for the emergence of the political monolith, the one party state, which itself finally consummated the personalization of the rule.²⁹

With the concept of checks and balances largely abandoned, politics in Cameroon since then, has tended like in most African countries, to be pre-occupied with how to win and retain power overriding the need for a due sense of balance and restraint, the constitution encouraged this perpetuity. Article 10 (i) of the federal constitution and later Article 7 (i) of the constitution of the United Republic provides that "The president of the Republic shall be elected for five years and may be re-elected," and thus encouraged this perpetuity.

This flaw "unequivocally reflects a desire to perpetuate the rule of the president indefinitely"³⁰. The fact is that most Africans seek the high office of president not to be the first servant of the state but the first master through illegal riches; once there, these individuals find it inconceivable that they can thereafter be anything else but a president. Ahidjo was in power for a quarter of a century and his successor Paul Biya he groomed for the throne may exceed his predecessor's record as presidential "power is so intoxicating, the adulation so flattering, and the prestige and grandeur of the office so

dazzling as to be almost irreconcilable with a new life as an ordinary citizen"³¹. Through the manipulation of the party, the Assembly, the judiciary and the civil service, the president was seen as the only source of salvation. The favoured ones are the praise singers, hence the president clings to the office for life, a break to his rule being only death.

The States

The federal constitution vested residual powers in the hands of the state authorities of West and East Cameroon. According to article 38 (i) "matters other than those specified in articles 5 and 6 and other than those which under the present constitution are to be the subject of a federal law shall lie exclusively within the competence of the federated states"³².

The president supervised the administration of the two states, with two different colonial legacies, having legal systems and institutions which reflected those existing in Britain and France. With powers concentrated in the centre the governments of West and East Cameroon enjoyed almost none of the prerogatives of state governments in federal systems, such as seen in Canada,³³ the United States, Switzerland and Nigeria.

The States became too dependent on the federal government, particularly the federated state of West Cameroon since the state of East Cameroon was synonymous to the federal government. The wide jurisdiction of the federal government greatly hindered the activities that could be carried out in the name of the autonomous states. This was a well calculated policy by Ahidjo

to have a close watch over political, economic and socio-cultural activities developments in West Cameroon that he feared its leaders could work-out a deal with the East Cameroon leaders to undo his de facto imperial rule. It is on this premise that Johnson pointed out that "the jurisdictional structure realised in the transformation to federalism provided an adequate basis for exercising control over the political life of the state from the central level"³⁴.

The states government was headed by the Prime Minister. Each state had a legislative Assembly elected for a five year term³⁵. The East Cameroon State Assembly had a hundred deputies while that of West Cameroon had thirty-seven³⁶. The federal constitution endorsed the continuation of the House of Chiefs in West Cameroon³⁷.

It was an advisory body to the state government.

(i) **Liaison Between the Federal and State Governments**

The federal government apart from over-seeing the functioning of its services in the federated states, equally had a strong control over the state authorities. The lofty presence of a governmental structure, the Prime Minister; the state executive; the State Assembly; the state civil service corp and the state constitution may lead unsuspecting onlooker to conclude that the state authorities had real legal powers to wield as reserved under article 39 of the federal constitution. But a careful examination of the constitution reveals that the structures were powerless and their presence was merely to

qualify the word "Federation".

The Head of State appointed the Prime Minister and confirmed the cabinet he proposed. The services that were under the jurisdiction of the federated states were all regulated by federal laws³⁸. What actually was effectively under control by the state authorities was the local government. The federal control over financial sources of the federated states left them in a helpless position particularly West Cameroon which was a minority. The aim of this tight control over financial sources was a strategy adopted by Ahidjo to strangulate West Cameroon financially to accept the Unitary system of government in which assimilating her would be much easier³⁹.

The president had the sole prerogatives to dissolve any state Assembly in an event of persistent squabble between the Assembly and the state government. This, however, could be at the initiative of the president or on the proposal of the Prime Minister of the state⁴⁰.

The speaker of the State Assembly was under legal obligation to table the bills passed by the state Assembly before the president for promulgation within fifteen days. The president of the federation, may request the state Assembly in question to give such a bill a second reading or may apply article 14 of the federal constitution; which reads that "the president of the federal Republic shall refer to the Federal Court of Justice, constituted as provided in article 34, any federal law which he considers to be contrary to the present constitution or any law

of either of the federated state which he regards as having been adopted in violation of the provisions of the constitution or of a federal law"⁴¹

V.2. Transformation of West Cameroon

The 1961 constitution determining the organs of the Federal Republic of Cameroon pointed to the urgent need of administrative transformation with particular reference to the state of West Cameroon. This was imperative because the government and administration as they functioned were virtually those of French Cameroon Republic; which they "transformed into the government and administration of the new federation, the only real difference in the early years being the addition of a small number of West Cameroon Ministers and members of parliament"⁴². Nfor, observes that the French Cameroon assimilative tendency shows that "what emerged on October 1, 1961, was a Unitary system of government inappropriately styled federalism"⁴³.

The lopsided federal system created a situation in which the "Centre" and the state of East Cameroon, as associated partner in an enterprise acted to socialize and absorb West Cameroon⁴⁴.

The machinery by which Ahidjo attained this objective was by the institutionalization of administrative identification of the young federation with purely that of East Cameroon. Thus, decree No. 61-D F-75 promulgated on October 20, 1961 became the code for the transformation of the state of West Cameroon. The decree federalised territorial administration in accordance with the powers vested in the federal authorities to regulate "Territorial

Administration"⁴⁵. The federal republic, by this decree was divided into six administrative regions with West Cameroon constitution a single administrative region. Thus a ratio of 1:5 pointing to its minority status. The administrative regions were headed by the Federal Inspectors of Administration. The said decree changed as well the designations of administrative personnels and local administrative units. Based on the new French Cameroon invading pattern, instead of divisions, subdivisions and Districts, they were now called "prefectures", "sousprefectures" and Arrondissements. Each administrative region had the above administrative units. The "prefet" of each division was responsible to the Federal Inspector of his region and the "sous-prefet" and chef de District were each directly responsible to the "prefet".

The Federal Inspectors of Administration were direct representatives of the federal authorities in their regions. Their functions consisted of representating the federal government in the Civil and Judicial life of the region, providing for the execution of public order, and the coordination and control of federal services within the federated states⁴⁶. They may with the benediction and blessings of the president delegate some of their functions to the "pre'fets, sous-prefets and chefs de district"⁴⁷. The creation of administrative regions manned by Federal Inspectors and not the Prime Ministers of the federated states, increased the ability of the president (Ahidjo) to supervise the political life, at local

level closely⁴⁸ especially in West Cameroon. Significant enough, the president, the minister of territorial administration and the six Federal Inspectors were all from East Cameroon trained by colonial France during the federal system.

TABLE 4 **THE SIX ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC**
AND FIRST APPOINTED FEDERAL INSPECTORS 1961 - 1972

REGION	CAPITAL	FEDERAL INSPECTOR
West Cameroon	Buea	Mamio (1961-1964) & J.G.Ngoh 1964 - 1977
Western	Bafoussam	Mouafo
Littoral	Douala	Nsehe Giullume
Central South		
Mid-Centre	Yaounde	Enam Mbala
North	Garoua	Osunmane Mey


Source: Journal Officiel du 30 Octobre 1961 (NAY)

The appointment of six federal inspectors all being francophones was appropriate to Ahidjo and his French Adviser since their main objective was to assimilate anglophones as fast as possible, irrespective of any tacit agreement ever reached with Foncha before the plebiscite and not entrenched in the Federal Constitution. The East Cameroon officials, who were the

local agents of the federal administration were unwilling to go gradually in forcing West Cameroon's adjustment to its new minority status as a part of a centralist federation⁴⁸. The people of Southern Cameroons were therefore just changing one colonial power with another, contrary to Foncha's ignorant assertion that reunifying with French Cameroon "will be like that of divided brothers who have regained their liberty and returned home to their fatherland"⁴⁹.

The presence of a Federal Inspector in West Cameroon with prescribed powers overlapping those of the state Prime Minister was an opposite of what West Cameroon leaders advocated. They had told Ahidjo that there would be liaison offices in each others capital with a liaison officer to facilitate the business between the state of West Cameroon in particular and the federal government⁵⁰. The first Federal Inspector Mr. Mamid working with Dr.J.N. Foncha had relatively less opposition to his mission than J.C.Ngoh, who succeeded him when West Cameroon Premier-ship changed hands i.e. when A.N. Jua succeeded Dr.J.N. Foncha⁵¹. The Federal Inspector was told that although he represented the federal interest, particularly that of president Ahidjo, above all he was in West Cameroon under the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister. The war as to who effectively commands the state had begun. The Federal Inspector was refused the privilege of staying in the presidential palace which was of the same magnitude with the Prime Minister's Lodge and he was never to fly the Cameroon flag on his car, a symbol of supreme authority

WEST CAMEROON 1961-72



SOURCE : EYONGETAH, T. AND BRAIN, R.
A HISTORY OF CAMEROON
(London; Longman Group Ltd; 1974 Page 176)

that was reserved only to the Prime Minister of the state. Premier J.N.Jua, was one reunificationist who, learning from the out-come of the Fouban conference, came to a conclusion that East Cameroonians were political opponents and not brothers as Southern Cameroonians had thought⁵².

The functions of the Federal Inspector caused much confusion in West Cameroon. It was but normal to the federal authorities that the premier of West Cameroon should as any ordinary citizen in the state, learn of the transfers of prefets and appointments of official in his state over Radio Yaounde, by a presidential decree. The overlapping powers of the Federal Inspector engulfed states affairs so much that local officials unfamiliar with its interpretation dispatched their communications on matters within the jurisdiction of the state first through federal offices. In effect this deprived the state progressively of its autonomous status. The general public was confused as to the status of the two administrators i.e. the Prime Minister and Federal Inspector in the administration of the state: whether they were of co-equal status or was one higher than the other? This was a deliberate confusing situation set in by Ahidjo based on the French political philosophy of Divide et Imperia Ahidjo intentionally perpetuated the existing antagonism and conflict of command. It was not a surprise that the Prime Minister should but be informed by the Federal Inspector that President Ahidjo was to visit West Cameroon.

The fierce fight which premier A.N. Jua launched against Ahidjo's domination in West Cameroon was short lived. Ahidjo got an upper hand in the political struggle in 1966 when the Cameroon National Union (C.N.C) was created in place of the multi-party system that endorsed his imperial presidency. In the absence of political parties Ahidjo single handedly appointed the Prime Ministers of the federated states as the president of the federation, coupled with his prerogatives as the party chairman. One undesirable element, J.C.Ngoh, the West Cameroon Federal Inspector and Ahmadou Ahidjo wished to see quit the political scene, was the prime minister of West Cameroon A.N. Jua who was seen as an obstructionist to their assimilative principles. The golden opportunity to toss him off came in 1968 when A.N. Jua's term of office as Premier came to an end and a new premier was to be appointed in West Cameroon. Ahidjo's regime made no mistake in replacing him with S.T Muna, Ahidjo's favourite whose mission, unlike that of Jua, was to make the process of assimilating anglophones simpler. With Muna in West Cameroon the transformation process moved quite rapidly and on May 20, 1972 when he endorsed Ahidjo's Unitary system it ended the legal existence of the state of West Cameroon and it formally disappeared as a political entity from the world map.

(i) The Gendarme Occupation of West Cameroon

As mentioned earlier in chapter four, one crucial point on the October 13, 1960 constitutional proposal discussed by Foncha and Ahidjo was the arrangement of security matters. Foncha had

expressed the view that each federated state, owing to the peculiar circumstances and background against which the union was being formed, should have its army. This was a warning against the armies of occupation. What made this wish a dream was that the trust territory had no police or security forces. The British forces serving in Southern Cameroons were to be withdrawn immediately on the day of reunification. The Southern authority's appeal to Her majesty to retain her forces and train a local force before its departure was in vain. The absence of a security force in Southern Cameroons resulted into the passing of security matters or maintenance of law and order into the hands of French Cameroun before the federation took off, contrary to Foncha's plan.

In spite of the caution about the "armies of occupation", the fear of UPC armed rebellion in French Cameroun generated uneasiness in Southern Cameroons and obliged the Southern Cameroons leaders to call in French Cameroun troops to prevent the eventual spread of terrorism and violence. However, the option of calling in the republican gendarmes from the sister state was received with mixed feelings. From their activities the gendarmes were perceived as brutal as the terrorists. Their brutality to the populace was evidence of the fears expressed.

The composition of the gendarme force sent to West Cameroon was made up of elements recruited from Chad and Niger Republics to sustain Ahidjo's regime. They were brutal towards the masses, an unknown experience to the people, as compared to the newly

created West Cameroon Police Force (W C P F) under the command of Commissioner M.H. Ntune. The brutality of this quasi-military force was greatly attributed to their low level of education. Most of them had no formal education and spoke neither French nor English.⁵³ Within few months of reunification, gendarme Brigades were set up in all Divisional and Subdivisional headquarters of West Cameroon.

What made the gendarmes presence more dreaded was the introduction of security checks viz "CALLER - CALLER" and "RAFLE", queer methods used to spot-out terrorists in East Cameroon.

A people who were used to peace and order, their tranquillity was now at jeopardy. National identity cards were introduced and all adults were obliged by law to possess them. To avoid embarrassment and harassment people had to move with their identification papers viz identity card, tax receipt and voter's card, hitherto an unknown phenomenon in West Cameroon.⁵⁴

Possessing these papers was not enough to give one the freedom of movement, if travelling from one administrative unit to another, one had had to procure a "laisser passer". Travellers had to trek long distances to the divisional headquarters and spend days to obtain this paper. There was a general outcry from the public and protests asking Foncha whether these were the type of brothers he carried them to unite with, and called on him to ask Ahidjo to withdraw his men. At night, town-quarters homes and bars were constantly raided and those unfortunate citizens

without documents (pieces) were carried to their camp, tortured and kept under surveillance until the following day for interrogation. Just the simple circulation of the gendarmerie vehicle called sans paye was enough scare of people who ran into the bush or locked themselves in their houses until it disappeared.

By the constitution, the state governments were to control the police for maintaining internal security of the federated state but were required to collaborate with the federal security officials when called upon to act in security matters. The police force was therefore one effective instrument of power under the authority of the State Prime Minister.

Commissioner M.H. Ntune gave the West Cameroon police force sound training and organisation. He also set up a para-military police force commonly referred to as the mobile-wing. The effectiveness of this force and its operations caused an alarm in the federal political circles. Though smaller in number as compared to the occupational force, its military activities terrified Ahidjo and J.C.Ngoh. By training, discipline and intelligence they were quite superior to the gendarmes.⁵⁵

Once the overzealous gendarmes exceeded their jurisdiction they came into conflict with the West Cameroon police. An incident occurred in Buea in March 1967 that brought the gendarmes whose activities often went beyond the narrow reading of the constitution or the security laws and regulations, arrested Mr.Munjoh and Police Inspector Niba for alleged illegal

arms deal. This led to deterioration of relations between the Prime Minister and the President. The situation became politically tense and militarily dangerous, and the detainees were released forthwith and the culprit gendarmes were punished.

Mr. J.C. Ngoh came to love and admire the West Cameroon police particularly the mobile-wing for its discipline and efficiency. Accordingly, he dismissed his gendarme guards, describing them as a gang of undisciplined fellows that had no respect for senior authorities.

Though Mr. J.C. Ngoh was in Buea to promote assimilation he as an individual became inclined to the anglophone ways of life. In a conversation with Commissioner of Police M.H. Ntune, he pointed out that the West Cameroon Society was one in which order reigned and people had respect for each other particularly to their superiors, and not like in East Cameroon that was characterized by *laissez-faire* attitude.⁵⁶

Ahidjo's need for tight security measures in West Cameroon was obviously not unconnected with his fresh memories of the UPC's government in exile headquartered in Kumba, after it was banned in East Cameroon by the French in 1955. As stated earlier, though the UPC was again banned in Southern Cameroon by Endeley's Government in 1957, it rejuvenated as the One Kamerun Party (O.K.) in the territory under the leadership of Ndeh Ntumazah. Nfor, analysed that "the fear that the U.P.C. could find fertile soil in West Cameroon if Foncha's proposal for state autonomy and control of its own internal and external security were granted

might have influenced Ahidjo's insistence to place security matters on the federal executive list."⁵⁷

Because of the UPC containment, barely one month after reunification West Cameroonians began experiencing what was a State of emergency. The continuous disruption of peace in the highlands of Bamileke Country bordering West Cameroon led to the declaration of emergency in four administrative divisions of West Cameroon.⁵⁸

The manner in which security matters were handled advertently affected the behaviour and perspectives of many ordinary citizens as well as the state government of West Cameroon. In general West cameroonian enthusiasm for the Federation was seriously strained not only as a result of the federal jurisdictional powers but the demeanour of the army and gendarmes permanently stationed in the territory as "armies of occupation".

ii) Financial Allocation

Finance was one domain that was greatly dominated by the federal government and consequently states had to look upon the centre for subsidies. The federal government controlled all major revenue resources of the Republic. The federal constitution empowered the federal government "to regulate currency, the taxation and other sources of revenue to meet federal expenditure"⁵⁹. The states therefore, became very dependent on the federal government that had to collect all revenue in the states. Thus, states had to receive part of the

revenue collected. What is interesting, is that the federal government did not define what amount each state would be given at the end of each financial year. The money that federal government allocated to the states again was not based on derivation and population which are salient ingredients of federal allocation of revenue. The federal government, therefore, had no systematic arrangement for revenue allocation rather an "ad hoc" procedure did characterize the process of inter-governmental revenue sharing. Thus, the idea of subsidy was a misnomer as it was but normal that having the financial prerogative the federal government should finance state projects⁶⁰.

One of the flaws in the 1961 constitution was its silence over revenue allocation, which must not be seen as an uncalculated development. It was aimed at strangulating West Cameroon in particular to speed up the process towards a unitary system, because East Cameroon which did not contribute as much to Gross National Income (G.N.I.) was never in financial crisis as to require federal subsidy. This elucidates the distorted federalism of the Cameroon state. The absence of a formula to allocate specific amounts to state was never explained nor was it understood. As one writer puts it "the federated states of East and, in particular West Cameroon depended exclusively on "ad hoc" subvention from the Federal Government to Balance their Budgets"⁶¹. A glance at the table below shows that the West Cameroon financial dependency on the Federal Government was

greater than that of East Cameroon.

TABLE 5 Federal Government Subventions to State Budgets

1962/63 - 1970/71 in Million Franc CFA.

YEAR	W.CAMEROON	% OF STATE BUDGET	E.CAMEROON	% OF STATE BUDGET
1962/63	1,150	67	283	3.9
1963/64	1,270	68.5	890	23.5
1964/65	1,440	55	1,371	19
1966/66	1,350	51.5	1,285	14
1966/67	1,950	70	1,280	10
1967/68	1,800	64	1,000	9.9
1968/69	1,640	69	650	6.4
1969/70	1,400	50	NONE	0
1970/71	1,700	63	NONE	0

Source: Federal Republic of Cameroon Estimates, 1962-63 to 1970-71

Many factors were responsible for the above situation. The State of East Cameroon was synonymous with the federal government in most of its governmental functions; especially in the pressure to force West Cameroon to the unitary systems and to end its autonomous status. Generally the West Cameroon economy was backward, characterized by low level of per capital income, limited capacity and limited size of private business vis-a-vis East Cameroon. But then, the economy as a whole had been growing since 1956 when Southern Cameroons became an autonomous region⁶².

The West Cameroon Government, despite the meagre sum from the federal government, forged ahead with useful development. One East Cameroon federal minister commenting on the situation inter-alia said: "the English gave Africans responsibility, but helped them less. Britain was good because she gave real independence to her colonies but bad because development to her meant private capital seeking its own interest and did not believe in direct government aid". He continued that "the extent of French aid to Cameroon is indeed phenomenal. The East Cameroonian knows that Nkrumah calls it neo-colonialism I still think it necessary"⁶³.

The administrative, financial, security and socio-cultural burden West Cameroon bore never meant that the federal government had exceeded its constitutional powers but, interpreted them fully - much to the surprise of many West Cameroonians and British officials who were late in grasping the full implication of the French modeled constitution. The new constitution which was "unitary enveloped in federalism" gave president Ahidjo, who operated from the richer and more populated East, immense powers on a De Gaulle pattern. He ruled by decrees, ordinance, and often by mere letters and verbal directives.

One of such enactments was the presidential decree of October 1962, introducing the metric system, six months grace was given to West Cameroon government and business firms to comply. Posters announcing the change to the metric system were printed in the East and dispatched to Buea but up to April 1, 1962 Buea ignored the day of reckoning. On April 2, Ahidjo signed another decree

giving the West three months grace to comply. Further "gallicisation" in the West immediately after reunification included the change from pound sterling to Francs CFA in April 1962, tied to the "Banque de France" in Paris under the Franco-Cameroonian agreement of November 13, 1960⁶⁴. Cameroon was therefore bound to consult France in drawing up her annual important programme⁶⁵. Price table in shops, in franc and the importation of more French goods were imposed. Driving on the "Right" was introduced in January 1963.

These changes which Ahidjo instituted by decrees immediately he became president of the federation were matters that were put aside at Foumban for details to be worked out in constituted commissions. But Ahidjo decided to put them into force by decrees since his actions could not be questioned by the National Assembly nor the judiciary.

Monsieur F.Njike an Easterner and Cuvelier, a French technical adviser came over to the West to control federal finances. Since Ahidjo and the French were highly suspicious of the English culture and the tradition of English officials, the Chief Colon in West Cameroon, the Federal Inspector of Administration began working hard to get the English education system changed immediately.

Yet if anything provides a real obstruction to gallicisation it is the English language seen today as an error to have allowed its entrenchment in the federal constitution⁶⁶ and later in the Unitary Constitution of May 1972⁶⁷. In this crusade of

transforming the West Cameroon society into a francophone one, the ministry of information was taken over by the Federal government. The East Cameroon administrators who replaced the British administrators embarked on the promotion of the French language, a symbol of French Civilization which France had made her African proud of.⁶⁸ To foster this goal, an audio-visual centre was installed in Buea to train Civil Servants how to speak French. The French Government set up pilot centres all over West Cameroon, staffed with francophones who were given large sophisticated radio sets to follow up French classes transmitted from Radio Buea, the programme called "French by Radio" sponsored by the French government. Two Bilingual secondary schools were also opened in Yaounde and Man-of-War Bay in Victoria, to produce assimilated West Cameroonians by the French government. The West successfully resisted the federal government desperate attempt to close up the West Cameroon Regional news paper "THE CAMEROON TIMES". The problem of adjustment that confronted the new Republic was not of harmonising the two inherited colonial legacies but the imposition of a third colonial experience on West Cameroonians after that of imperialist Germany and Britain⁶⁸.

The super-imposition of the French culture on the West guaranteed by Ahidjo's "forces of occupation" caused general panic and fear in the minds of West Cameroonians, who though knew that article 1 (1) of the federal constitution says the Republic has a duality, at any moment French might become the official language with the populace speaking 'pidgin' English.

One of the regime's critique Albert Mukong, speaking to the Research Brigade officer "enqueteur" from Mantoum, one of Ahidjo's political prisons, regretted that "it was not for such a regime (Ahidjo's) that I had urged my people to vote and if this was unification then I had all cause to regret and blame myself for being one of the strongest advocates of it and even the greatest of its architects" and concluded that he prefers to die than "live in a feartorn society (where) everyone was afraid from top to bottom and fear was no good as a cementing cord for a nation"⁶⁹. These were some of the realities of "reunification immediate", the politically short-sighted West Cameroon elites forced Foncha into, without knowing its implications simply because it was popular on the banned U.P.C. political platform to win votes. A clearer picture is again given by Mukong on how Ahidjo succeeded in extending his hegemony into West Cameroon, when he was confronted by the chief of Brigade Mixete Mobile (B.M.M) in Bafoussam for calling the president of National Assembly Solomon Tandeng Muna a disappointment. He opened up by declaring that:

Ahidjo was the disappointment who had betrayed the Cameroonian Reunification. Not finding Foncha a very willing tool to be used in this work, and finding Jua a definite obstacle to his cause, he had sought and obtained the willingness of others whom he used to replace these two. Using others as the spokesmen of anglophone Cameroon, Ahidjo had betrayed the

cause of Cameroon Unification in general, and the anglophone Cameroonian in particular.⁷⁰

Neither the ten West Cameroon federal Deputies nor the one minister and three vice ministers could influence the decisions of the federal government vis-a-vis West Cameroon. The post-reunification changes experienced was that of "a push" by the stronger and well established system to weaken that which was just evolving. The inability by West Cameroon to resist assimilation and devaluation of its powers was because this system was still in its embryonic stage at the time of reunification coupled with a compromising leadership⁷¹. The federated state executive and legislature were powerless. None could either initiate nor influence major decisions affecting the life of the state nor that of the nation, since power radiated from the president who in summary was the state ("L'Etat C'est moi"). The president may consult the prime minister when taking a major decision affecting his state but it was not an obligation. Finally the state authority centred around undefined residual responsibilities.

The integration of West Cameroonians into a predominantly french-speaking community therefore plunged the territory into a serious crisis of identity. The "hormonisation" between the two federated states turned out to mean purely and simply the eradication of Western particularism. Ahidjo's success in blending the structures is "thanks" to Foncha who took a softer stand and accepted many things Ahidjo said or did, without which

it could not have worked, at least not so fast, for it is seen today as a Sell-out.

V.3 Multi-party Politics in the Federation 1961-1966

The post reunification politics in the federation was based on a multi-party system until September 1, 1966, when Ahidjo's drive for a single party was realized. Shortly after reunification Foncha and Ahidjo agreed that neither the U.C. nor the K.N.D.P. should be active in each other's territory. Ahidjo desperately needed this assurance from the K.N.D.P. leadership for fear that it would go into alliance with the opposition in East Cameroon to upset the status quo he had established between the Muslim North and Christian South in this sector. The West Cameroon political system was more flexible and competitive, affording adequate opportunities for party formation and expression. Political activities in East Cameroon were less dynamic. The U.C. as mentioned earlier had assumed a de facto single party rule in French Cameroon⁷³ before reunification and consequently the Eastern society was less open to political activities. One single advantage the Francophones had was that its elite stirred politics in the federation as a united front, unlike the anglophones elite that was bitterly divided and lacked a sense of collective responsibility. Thus, reunification found Ahidjo's northern-born party firmly planted in the south. Politics at the federal level was the compromise between the styles of the two systems prevailing in West and East Cameroon.

(i) Politics in East Cameroon

The political parties that appeared in French Cameroon, after the banning of the U.P.C. that piloted the trust territory to independence on January 1, 1960, were pro-French. Within the interlude of independence and reunification Ahidjo's party, Union Camerounaise (U.C), had either absorbed or allied with all the legal political parties in French Cameroon. The southern parties that were in the opposition when Ahidjo took over from Mbida lacked cohesion, were divided in idea and approach to national issues, a favourable atmosphere which Ahidjo did not hesitate to exploit. The U.C., therefore, established an irresistible dominance in East Cameroon political arena and consolidation of power through the steady attribution of the leaders and members of other parties and their adhesion to the Union Cameroonaise⁷⁴. This opened up the way for Ahidjo to call for a "Parti Unique". The idea of a "Parti unique" was kicked against by many, since it meant that power in all its forms rests in the hands of the leader of the party. On the face, the U.C. laid the claim that it was the only broad-based political party endowing East Cameroon with veritable national character⁷⁵ and its leaders obviously believed that dominating the political scene they should offer the framework for the unified national party.

The Union Cameroonaise leadership perceived the need for political unity to enable it tackle the complex problems confronting the young nation viz economic, socio-cultural and ethnic tensions which could not be accomplished in the multi-

system inherited from the colonial masters. The U.C. maintained that continued existence of parties which were above all regionally and ethnically, rather than ideological, based made it difficult for government to function and above all hindered the growth of national unity. The U.C. leadership therefore, alerted the East Cameroonians that with the additional burden which reunification had placed on the government, political unity was indispensable and urgent⁷⁶.

The opposition leaders Andre-Marie Mbida, Mayi Matip, Charles Okala and Beybey Eyinga in order to counteract the U.C.'s influence went into a political alliance and formed a new party "parti des Travailleurs Camerounais", May 1962. The opposition leaders cherished the union of political powers but not as envisaged by Ahidjo to be known as parti unique. They rather preferred Parti Unifie where each party in the union would preserve its identity. Their proposal was rejected by Ahidjo outright. As Ahidjo continued to exert pressure on the opposition to declare for a Parti Unique, the opposition leaders on June 15, 1962 published jointly an open letter (lettre Ouverte) to the Union Camerounaise, in which they accused Ahidjo of seeking to institute a one party system that would lead to the end of democracy and the beginning of dictatorship. In this 'lettre Ouverte' they further pointed that:

what good does national independence solve,
if it is to create a neo-totalitarianism with
a view to replacing foreign colonialism from

within___. For the undersigned, national unity calls for the establishment of a new situation where there will be neither conquerors nor conquered, but rather where the majority will unite with the minority to find concrete solutions to the problems of the nation___⁷⁷.

Ironically in reaction to the "open letter" Ahidjo denounced the opposition's rejection of his moves towards national unity describing them as "ambitious and outmoded petty politicians who have been drugged by the Fourth French Republic"⁷⁸, the very republic from whose constitution, he himself had inherited and adopted the centralized monarchical presidential dictatorship.

It was a dramatic moment in post-reunification political history of East Cameroon, as the protagonists made use of the liberty of the expression and the press. In reply to Ahidjo's remarks, the opposition leaders published an eight page manifesto entitled "Manifeste du Front National Unifie". Inter-alia they accused Ahidjo of forcing opposition supporters to resignation from their parties and join to the Union Camerounaise, of confiscating newspapers that carry contrary views to that of the U.C. and depriving the opposition of public liberty. After pointing out these crucial issues, the leaders concluded that the authoritarianism that characterised the Union Camerounaise had its origins in the Muslim background of many of the party leaders, and called upon President Ahidjo to comport himself as an impartial

arbiter and not as a partisan chief⁷⁹.

In response Ahidjo ordered the arrest of the signatories of the letter and manifesto on June 29, 1962. They were charged for subversive and unlawful acts against public authorities⁸⁰. They were convicted and sentenced to jail term of two and half years each with heavy fines and loss of all political rights. The leaders appealed their case and hearing was in December that year. The Appeal Court after its hearing, increased the jail term to three years. This instilled fear and terror in lesser politicians who rushed to declare for Union Camerounaise to save themselves from embarrassments. The beginning of 1963 saw barely seven deputies in the opposition i.e. six democrats and one U.P.C. During the 1965 elections opposition groups were on their knees seeking compromise with Ahidjo. The "list system" he instituted deprived the opposition to win seats in the Assembly since he had the powers to legislate by decree.

The Banned UPC and Ahidjo's Government

The U.P.C. underground activities in form of terrorism had become very serious in the Bamileke region, the Sanaga-Maritime region and in the cities of the South in 1959 following the assassination of Ruben Um Nyobe by French mercenaries in his home village of Boum Nyebel on 13, September 1958. The anti-colonialists at the U.N. including Ghana and Guinea had strongly argued that before French Cameroun attained independence, the U.P.C. should be restored to legality and fresh elections held under the U.N. supervision. Dr.Nkrumah and Sekou Toure opted to

reconcile the political groups in Cameroun and to establish a truly representative and democratic government before the territory's accession to independence⁸⁰. The two leaders therefore called on Ahidjo and the French to grant unconditional amnesty for condemned politicians, to abrogate the decree dissolving the U.P.C, and the holding of general elections prior to independence. When Nkrumah and Toure failed to influence Ahidjo, they decided to permit the use of their territory as bases for the exiled Upecistes from where weapons and supplies were smuggled to the U.P.C. Maquisards (terrorists) in Cameroun⁸¹.

The U.P.C. in exile under Dr. Felix Moumie moved its headquarters from Cairo to Accra and Conakry. These two capitals experienced the influx of U.P.C. militants in exile from where, in their writings, they attacked Ahidjo's regime.

In April 1959, Ahidjo recognized the internal wing of the U.P.C. led by Mayi Matip, who during a by-election won a seat for the first time in the Cameroun Assembly. This splitted the U.P.C into a "legal" and an "illegal" section with Felix-Coland Moumie leading the "illegal" and Mayi Matip the "legal"⁸². Mayi Matip, crossing the carpet was a great victory for Ahidjo. He urged the Upecites to put an end to the revolutionary activities and to rally to Ahidjo's Government. He succeeded in disarming U.P.C. combatants who could no longer express their dissatisfaction and fury after the assassination of their chief Um Nyobe. Thousands of revolutionary fighters abandoned the struggle and gave their arms to "the enemies of the people"⁸³.

From abroad Moumie and his colleagues launched an appeal for the pursuit of the revolution. With the supplies of modern weapons from the Soviet bloc via Guinea they succeeded in organising the combatants in the following regions: Wouri, Nkam, Mungo, Bamileke region and Mbam. The U.P.C. fighters became known as the Kamerun National Liberation Army (A.L.N.K.) commonly referred to in official circles as the Maquis⁸⁴. Their activities generated panic and fear as they attacked and destroyed military barracks, roads, and railways, burning homes, shops and store houses.

The explosive situation obliged Ahidjo in October 1959 to request the Legislative Assembly to grant him emergency powers to rule by decree until March 1960 when new elections were to be held. Southern political leaders in the House including Mayi Matip seriously protested that this would lead to dictatorship but the Assembly dominated by Pro-U.C. granted Ahidjo the powers he requested. Ahidjo needed forces and finances to survive. Immediately after independence he called in French troops⁸⁵ to deal with the U.P.C. fighters. He also took some local measures to deal with the situation; Mathais Djoumessi, the one time Kumsze head, was named Resident Minister at Dschang to deal politically with the Bamileke problem. The chiefdoms were democratised, and the region divided into departments, 'arrondissements' and 'communes' for effective governmental control with gendarmes and soldiers stationed in each administrative unit⁸⁶.

Another strategy the regime employed to deal with the U.P.C. armed struggle effectively was by eliminating its leaders abroad. The combined efforts of the Cameroon secret police S.E.D.O.C. and the French Right-Wing terrorists the "Red Hand", Ahidjo succeeded in killing Felix Moumie in a hotel in Geneva using thallium poison in 1960⁸⁷. The successive eliminations of Tankeu Nol (1962), Mallam Defence (1965), Osende Afana (1965), and Ernest Ouandie (1971) immensely increased Ahidjo's chances of pacifying the Bamileke region. Reflecting on the existing chaos in French Cameroun the Southern Cameroons opposition leader, Dr. E.M.L. Endeley at the Foumban Conference told Ahidjo in his address that:

If as an opposition Leader, I and my colleagues can reconcile with Mr. Foncha, I cannot see why those who are in the opposition and have gone wild in the bush cannot reconcile with your government. I have had great reason to feel that Mr. Foncha is an enemy to me and I would not work together with him, as the terrorists have felt against president Ahidjo. ____ . And therefore, Mr. President I am appealing to those brothers who have gone wild to cease-fire and cooperate with us and come back and help make Cameroon a peaceful country. We shall not use arms against our brothers, we should not use them against our enemies⁸⁸.

In reply to Dr. E.M.L. Endeley's speech Ahidjo did not make any allusion to the armed struggle ravishing French Cameroun which the delegation viewed with great concern. Ahidjo adopted a policy of appeasement and violence to put an end to the U.P.C. armed opposition. The U.P.C. members that declared for Ahidjo and his government were absorbed into the government circles like Um Nyobe's Lieutenant Mayi Matip who was believed to have betrayed Nyobe and assisted the French troops to assassinate him. After his death Mayi Matip launched a campaign to woo Upecites into Ahidjo's camp. In this campaign drive "he abused the credulity of the masses, saying that Um Nyobe was not dead and that he was acting on his mandate"⁸⁹. He therefore urged U.P.C. fighters to put an end to the revolutionary activities and rally to Ahidjo's government. He seditiously applied tribal sentiments to disintegrate the movement when he claimed that "the Bassa tribe was the only one to support the whole burden of the repression"⁹⁰. His deviation did a lot to help Ahidjo consolidate his power. He however, did not condemn those who were pitilessly repressing the masses but only the revolutionaries. Those who did not yield to the call of surrender, or their sympathizers were in most cases when arrested, immediately executed without trial.

The introduction of identity cards and laissez-passez was additional checks on movements of the U.P.C. Maquis. In the late sixties the movement's activities were becoming very insignificant and came to an end when its home based leader Ernest Ouandie in August 1970, surrendered himself to the gendarmes at Mbanga, East

Cameroon⁹¹. His surrender sparked a wave of arrests of people alleged to have assisted the U.P.C. leader to overthrow Ahidjo's government. Among those arrested were Bishop Ndongmo of the Catholic diocese of Nkongsamba, Takala Celestine, Wambo le Courant, Tiencheu Christophe and Lingo Celestine (all Bamileke). The U.P.C. leader's trial attracted a lot of international attention. Bodies such as Amnesty International were represented at the trial. Ouandie was given the option to name any lawyer of his choice to defend him. He accordingly appealed to the French Socialist Party led by Francois Mitterand for a lawyer. The socialist hired lawyer arrived Yaounde and went directly to the B.M.M. (Bridgarde Mixte Mobile) where Ouandie was in detention to the greatest surprise of the B.M.M. authorities. The B.M.M. commissaire contacted the National Security Headquarters and the presidency. "Orders came that the man should be put on the plane that night for Douala with someone who would ensure that he got out of Cameroon immediately even if it meant someone had to be taken out of the plane to make room for him"⁹². The government however permitted only the use of Cameroonian lawyers, and the U.P.C. leader requested the service of a West Cameroon lawyer Fongum Goriji-Dinka who appeared in the Military tribunal Yaounde to defend him. The sensational trial ended up with Ouandie, Ndongmo, Wambo le Courant and Takala sentenced to death while Tiencheu and Lingo were discharged and acquitted. When the verdict was passed many appeals from world Leaders and International organisations were addressed to Ahidjo to spare the

lives of the convicted people. The pressure on Ahidjo yielded some fruits. He commuted the death sentence of Bishop Ndongmo and Takala to life imprisonment and Ouandie and Wambo le Courant were executed by firing squad on January 15, 1971⁹³. The Bishop spent very uncomfortable years in Tchollire political prison before he was finally released in 1974.

(ii) West Cameroon Politics

In West Cameroon by October 1, 1961 political life was still marked by a multiplicity of political parties, unlike, in East Cameroon that political life was virtually coalesced into Ahidjo's monolithic Union Camerounaise (U.C.) party. The ruling political elite in West Cameroon was bitterly divided and as it was made up principally of self-seeking individuals. The divergent characteristics of the reunification movement continued after the creation of the federation. In the federation, political parties West of the Mungo became increasingly parochial in orientation and localised in support. Because of these inclinations, party system progressively became fragmented. In the political struggle the K.N.D.P. remained firm at the pinnacle of power and dominated the state single-handedly and only its members featured in the federal cabinet and Federal National Assembly until 1965 when S.T. Muna broke off from the party and formed the Cameroon Union Congress with E.T. Egbe.

At the federal level, the K.N.D.P. had one minister and three vice ministers and the ten parliamentarians in the Federal National Assembly were all K.N.D.P. adherents. The opposition

party, the C.P.N.C. was neither represented in the state government, the federal executive nor the federal legislature, until 1965 when A.N. Jua became prime minister of West Cameroon. Then the C.P.N.C. was drawn into his government as shall be seen later in this discussion. The monopolisation of political power by the K.N.D.P. in West Cameroon and the U.C. in East Cameroon, particularly at the federal level exacerbated the minority parties in both states. This manifested itself during the legislative and presidential election of 1964 and 1965 respectively when a list system was openly used by the U.C. and K.N.D.P. thus, excluding the opposition parties. This tactically excluded all other shades of political opinions and competence at the federal level, except those of the U.C. and the K.N.D.P.⁹⁴.

In the light of events Dr. E.M.L. Endeley leader of the C.P.N.C. called for a discussion on the West Cameroon party merger, but at the K.N.D.P. annual congress of 1962 the proposal was said to have been rejected. Foncha instead emphasized that the K.N.D.P. should receive in its ranks those of the opposition who "had grasped the truth" and were willing to join the K.N.D.P.⁹⁵. Foncha's approach to assimilate the opposition differed greatly from that of Ahidjo in East Cameroon, in that force brutality and intimidation was not used. Left in isolation the opposition leader Dr. E.M.L. Endeley appealed that president Ahidjo should absorb all the existing political parties into Union Camerounaise⁹⁶. The Foncha regime was embarrassed at this option of the C.P.N.C. leader, Endeley, as it did not want the K.N.D.P.

to be absorbed by the U.C. but rather that the two parties should amalgamate.

The root-causes of the KNDP-CPNC feud dates as far back to the 1959 and 1960 elections campaigns. When the K.N.D.P. emerged victorious in those crucial elections, barely one year to the February 11, 1961 U.N. programmed plebiscite, the C.P.N.C. leadership marked the K.N.D.P. government that came to power as an illiterate government made up of inexperienced deputies doomed to fail. As the C.P.N.C. styled the K.N.D.P. regime a "government of mediocrities," the K.N.D.P. became suspicious of the intellectuals from the C.P.N.C. dominated areas (Victoria, Kumba and Mamfe) and to what could be termed the K.N.D.P. anti C.P.N.C. intellectuals led to its mass discrimination in the state and federal civil service that was monopolized by the UC-KNDP informal alliance. To scale the intellectual imbalance the K.N.D.P. government gave scholarships en masse to children who came from its dominated areas to study abroad. In a series of measures to strengthen and give its government credibility the K.N.D.P. recruited its militants who were teachers serving with the missionary schools⁹⁷ into the public civil service. These new recruits were given in-service training and most of them were appointed civil administrators and diplomats after the reunification.

The opposition formed to re-inforce its anti-K.N.D.P. founded a political pressure group called "VIKUMA"⁹⁸ to cripple the K.N.D.P. led government whose leaders came mostly from grassland region. The VIKUMA sowed seeds of discontent and antagonised the

K.N.D.P. leadership and the forest zone elites. The opposition excluded from the state and federal, government saw salvation only in the creation of a single party, through the absorption of all existing parties⁹⁹. As differences widened the gap between the K.N.D.P and the C.P.N.C., the K.N.D.P. dropped the idea of a union with the C.P.N.C. and was busy exploring conditions that would permit it to safely merge with the U.C. rather than those that would govern any affiliation with the KNDP.

The Crisis in the KNDP Ruling Party

The K.N.D.P. soon after the reunification developed internal crisis originating from personal ambitions, clashes of personalities, resentment over the influence of tribal and regional loyalties in civil service and political appointments, a growing malaise about the changes occasioned by reunification and disappointment with Foncha's defense of West Cameroonian interests at the federal level¹⁰⁰. What unveiled the division was the crisis over who would eventually succeed Dr. J.N.Foncha, as prime minister of West Cameroon, following the constitutional clause separating that office from that of the vice-president. The K.N.D.P. got split into two camps: the Progressives led by A.N.Jua, P.M.Kemcha and Nzo Ekah-Nghaky and the Conservatives led by Dr.J.N.Foncha, S.T. Muna and E.T.Egbe. According to the party constitution A.N.Jua who was the first vice-president of the party was to succeed the party's life-president Foncha as the Prime Minister of West Cameroon. But unfortunately S.T. Muna a "new comer"¹⁰¹ into the K.N.D.P. desperately wanted the premiership.

Though a new comer, S.T.Muna became the closest associate of Foncha rather than Jua and his group with whom he founded the K.N.D.P. party in 1955. This angered the progressives and things became aggravated when his candidature for the premiership was seemingly favoured by Foncha and Ahidjo¹⁰² in spite of the fact that A.N. Jua was the first vice president of the party. As the struggle for the premiership erupted Jua found his support among the majority of the party elements and the traditional rulers. At the Bamenda K.N.D.P. congress of 1964 the story became clear after the party's executive elections. During the election exercise; A.N.Jua defeated S.T.Muna by a wide margin and secured the First Vice President with P.M. Kemcha as his second vice president; his ally Nzo Ekhah Nghaky ousted E.T. Egbe from the post of the secretary general of the party.

When Foncha was to move finally to Yaounde in early 1965 he convened a joint K.N.D.P. parliamentary delegation (state and federal) at which Jua and Muna were present as candidates for the premiership. In an open vote Jua had the support of 23 of the party's 30 Representative. Muna was asked to step-down. Muna in anger quited the K.N.D.P. followed by Egbe, both men were federal ministers and members of the Federal National Assembly on the K.N.D.P. tickets. Muna, to better prepare for the future battle of the West Cameroon premiership and undercut Jua and later Foncha, formed the Cameroon United Congress (C.U.C) with the tacit political and financial support of Ahidjo. This led to an end of the bi-partisan federal coalition that had existed up to 1965.

The UC-KNDP monopoly was thus broken because three parties were now represented at the federal level UC-KNDP and CUC.¹⁰³

This was an act of rebellion against the K.N.D.P leadership and one would have expected the K.N.D.P to withdraw the federal ministership Muna and Egbe were holding on its ticket and replace them with other K.N.D.P. faithfuls.

Ahidjo obviously could have yielded in compliance with the West Cameroon parliamentary system in the wake of the political crisis. No action was taken to weaken the rebel faction other than that Muna and Egbe were formerly dismissed from the K.N.D.P. party.

On March 1965 A.N.Jua became the Prime Minister of West Cameroon after Ahidjo himself had consulted West Cameroonian parliamentarians, members of the House of Chiefs, cooperative leaders and it was evident that his favoured candidate was not the man West Cameroonians wanted¹⁰⁴. As Jua became the premier he set out to consolidate his position in West Cameroon. He immediately extended a hand of fellowship to the opposition when in his speech in the House of Assembly he called for reconciliation and unity. Among other things he pointed out that:

We have made blunders in the past and now we must plan and execute together. We have a duty to this nation --- In this wise we are called upon to forget our past wounds and team together in this different field of national building¹⁰⁵.

Dr. Endeley, the opposition leader, accepted the offer and said, if it had become clear to the K.N.D.P. to work in collaboration with the C.P.N.C. it was but a welcome¹⁰⁶. The Prime Minister on July 3, 1965 carried out a major cabinet reshuffle that brought in five members of the opposition party the C.P.N.C. (see Table below).

TABLE 6

P.M. JUA'S RECONCILED CABINET

<u>NAME</u>	<u>PARTY</u>	<u>PORTFOLIO</u>
P.M. Kemcha	KNDP	Secretary of State for finance
J.H. Nganji	KNDP	Secretary of state co-operative & Comm. Development
J.N. Lafon	KNDP	Secretary of state local government
L.M. Ndamukong	KNDP	Sec. of state pry. educ. & soc. welfare
P. Mua	KNDP	Sec. of state Interior.
F.N. Ajebe Sone	KNDP	Sec. of state Agriculture.
S.E. Ncha		Sec. of state Prime Ministers' Office
J. Nsame	CPNC	Sec. of state Forestry & Stock Farming
S.N. Tamfu	CPNC	Sec. of state Prime Ministers' Office & Economic Affairs.
N.N. Mbile	CPNC	Sec. of state Works & Transport
E.M.L. Endeley	CPNC	Leader of the House with a cabinet rank Charged with the Business of the House.

Source: Federal Information Service, West Cameroon Press
Release No. 4244, 29/8/65 (NAB).

There was joy all over West Cameroon at this gesture of the Prime Minister that brought unity in the state without the destruction of the CPNC. A crowd of about 1500 C.P.N.C. supporters in Nkambe met at Honourable Samuel Tamfu's residence

to congratulate him on his appointment as secretary of state at the prime minister's office in charge of Economic Affairs¹⁰⁸. The people expressed their gratitude to the government for giving the C.P.N.C., formerly the main party in the opposition, ministerial portfolios of which Nkambe had two ministers (Tamfu and Nsame). The delegation also expressed happiness for the eradication of political and tribal discrimination in West Cameroon political arena. Honourable S.N. Tamfu in replying expressed joy over the political unity achieved by the K.N.D.P and C.P.N.C. He praised the premier A.N. Jua, whom he described as an "Honest Leader"¹⁰⁹. A few days after the announcement of the unity Government, Prime Minister Jua and Dr. Endeley jointly addressed the Victoria public in Buea. In reply to their address, Mr.F.Ngale on behalf of the people of Victoria, thanked the two leaders and described prime minister A.N. Jua, as the "light that came to dispel darkness" and praised him for his public statements which have encouraged and strengthened the hearts of all Cameroonians¹¹⁰.

Jua's administration as the Prime Minister of West Cameroon was to be short-lived following the creation of Ahidjo's one party system, the Cameroon Nation Union (C.N.U) barely a term after Jua came to power. Ahidjo carefully exploited the political division among West Cameroonian politicians to institute the One Party system he had long advocated to consolidate his supremacy. Following the creation of the C.N.U. the West Cameroon 1967 December parliamentary elections were

conducted on a single list basis. The list was approved by voters on December 31, 1967 and on January 11, 1968 and to the surprise of most West Cameroonians, Ahidjo unilaterally, this time appointed S.T. Muna as Prime Minister of West Cameroon¹¹¹. It was the Federal Inspector Mr.J.C.Ngoh who announced the president's nominee at the plenary session of the West Cameroon House of Assembly. It was one of the saddest moments around the Assembly building as Jua was refused the use of the state Limousine that had brought him to the Assembly. The new prime minister whom Ahidjo had brought from Yaounde and kept in hiding appeared and took a triumphant ride to the Buea presidency to meet Ahidjo. The surprised West Cameroonians forgot that by signing in for the C.N.U. they had lost their birth rights of determining who should govern them. It could have as well been a francophone as they exist today governing the territory in various capacities. Ahidjo as the head of the party, head of state and head of government reserved all the rights to appoint who he wanted.

It was at the end of the exercise that the Buea inhabitants in particular came to realize why Ahidjo had ordered more tanks and troops to reinforce his Buea based occupational forces for fear of an uprising since Jua was very popular. There was fear and panic in Buea, soldier and gendarmes patrolling the streets of the town and the population that was caught unaware in the dilemma remained calm. Dr.J.N. Foncha was also in Buea and he obviously endorsed the appointment of Muna to replace Jua who was

becoming strong and more popular. This was however, worked out by J.C. Ngoh and Ahmadou Ahidjo who needed a soft man like S.T.Muna¹¹² to facilitate their task of pacification, absorption and assimilation of West Cameroonians, instead of A.N.Jua, who was more forceful, direct, shrewd and more dynamic and complicated than Foncha and was always hitting hard at the federal government to preserve the autonomous status of the state of West Cameroon. S.T. Muna, the man Ahidjo had in confidence remained premier of West Cameroon until 1970 when Ahidjo in another surprise move announced S.T.Muna as his running mate in that year's presidential elections. The two obstacles Ahidjo had on his way were now cleared off. Foncha retired to his little home town Nkwen in Bamenda surrounded by a security network. There were spies who took note of those who visited him. This made it difficult for people to mix freely with him until December 1979 when he was appointed the Grand Chancellor of the Cameroon National Orders¹¹³.

The two candidates were presented to voters to confirm i.e. Ahidjo and Muna on March 28, 1970 and the usually, "one list system" percentage of 99.9 percent "yes" vote was registered in their favour. Ahidjo feared that another prime minister appointed in West Cameroon might be as daring as A.N. Jua to jeopardize his future plans, so curiously enough, he amended the constitution to allow Muna to combine the offices of Prime Minister with that of vice-president, a platform earlier denied Foncha in 1965. L'Effort Camerounais in its editorial elucidated

that the two men had very similar perceptions on the future of federation and that Ahidjo and Muna above all were very close friends¹¹⁴. Henry Namata Elangwe who was supposed to have succeeded Muna as the prime minister of West Cameroon was deprived of the prestigious position since the constitution no longer guaranteed separation. It then appeared that Muna was the only possible uniting factor¹¹⁵.

This co-operation policy of Ahidjo, on individual basis, has since 1970 served as a precedent to modify the constitution by a mere decree because of an individual. Ahidjo manipulated West Cameroon politics using Muna as his agent. Some of Muna's former party goals calling on West Cameroonians to support the federal constitution, a document which had rendered West Cameroon politically and financially powerless in the federation to appease Ahidjo, made his people to refer to him as a sell-out of the West Cameroon autonomy which Foncha, Jua and Kemcha were fighting to preserve. Muna was only answerable to the president who appointed him and consequently a super-imposed authority on West Cameroonians which they were to accept as such. No other force be it political or social could take him to task since his nomination came from above and not from those whom he was ruling.

With a pro-Ahidjo prime minister in West Cameroon, supported by the Federal Inspector of administration and the C.N.U. party, it was clear that the virtual end of the status of West Cameroon as a political unit from the world map was imminent as Ahidjo had echoed at Foumban that a federal system was only a first step

toward a unitary state¹¹⁶. Foncha, Jua and other K.N.D.P. reunificationists tactfully liquidated from the centre of power and from a distance with no voice, saw Southern Cameroons they had relentlessly fought for to secede from Nigeria being neutralized and assimilated into French Cameroun. The president was now dealing with a breed of new West Cameroonian politicians who owed so much to him than to the people they were said to represent. Consequently the president's attention was never drawn to certain agreements reached before reunification was made possible.

The UC - KNDP Alliance

The U.C. and K.N.D.P. on April 27, 1962 signed an accord forming a common united front aimed at working together towards progress of the Cameroon nation. The ruling parties alliance monopolised the federal political scene-until 1965 that Muna's C.U.C. was formed. The U.C. alone formed the backbone of the federal Assembly. It had 40 of the fifty selected members elected on a single list while the K.N.D.P. had ten members elected in the same manner.

The charter of the informal alliance did not indicate the possibility of a fusion, but the desire for co-operation towards the smooth running of the National Assembly and the maintenance of "the Unity of the Nation" for which both parties claimed to have dedicated their sole energies to achieve¹¹⁷. To this effect they agreed on the necessity to create a single parliamentary group at the Federal National Assembly to be known as the

"National Unity Group" and a "co-ordination committee" between the two political parties with the duty of harmonising their relations and co-ordinating their actions¹¹⁸. The ten K.N.D.P. Federal Deputies greatly protected the interest of West Cameroon in the Federal Assembly, since bills were passed based on group majority and not absolute majority. This was an important weapon for West Cameroon at the federal level, an option which Ahidjo who dislike opposition in any form did not cherish. He thus continued to call for the creation of a single party. The opposition left in the cold also expressed the need for unity by calling on the U.C. - K.N.D.P. alliance to include opposition other parties outside the orbit of the federal Assembly for the realization of National Unity¹¹⁹. The president was pleased with the isolation of the opposition, a force which was to facilitate the creation of a single party. The K.N.D.P., however, did not foresee the dangers of excluding the opposition from participating in government. With the isolation of the opposition parties, there was a tendency towards looking up to the U.C, for action, because it emerged as a natural arbiter of local disputes. The result was the creation of a unifying party that was to ensure national cohesion.¹²⁰

V.4. Movement Towards Political Unity

The consolidation of national unity was of paramount importance, particularly to the Foncha's K.N.D.P. that led Southern Cameroons to reunification with French Cameroon after the plebiscite of February 11, 1961. Difference emerged from the

method of achieving the said goal. Within the K.N.D.P., there existed two schools of thought regarding the best way to achieve this unity. Some party members wanted the K.N.D.P. to become part of the U.C. as many East Cameroon parties had done. The progressive did not cherish a simple sub-ordination of the K.N.D.P. to the U.C., rather they preferred the merging of the two parties by establishing a new party with a different name. The crucial problem confronting the progressives was not the principle of a united party that was to emerge, but its structure. President Ahidjo, commenting on the issue at the 1962 U.C. congress, observed that:

The idea would have been, clearly, the fusion of the two political parties but practical consideration militate, for the moment in favour of the formation of a co-ordination committee within which the two parties shall learn to understand one another and shall elaborate common methods and ways¹²¹.

The K.N.D.P. in its annual congress meetings in 1962 and 1963, approved the party's policy of seeking unity through the work of the Co-ordination Committee. Dr. J.N.Foncha, the Prime Minister of West Cameroon and life president of the K.N.D.P., at the 1963 annual congress pointed out that "the continued separate existence of the K.N.D.P. and the U.C. was an unnecessary duplication". The establishment of the national unity groups and the Co-ordination Committee followed the long standing policy of

the U.C. that was pre-eminently said to be dedicated to the unity of Cameroon's cultural, ethnic, economic and political diversity.

The architects of this unity faced the difficulty of determining whether to include West Cameroon's opposition party - the C.P.N.C.- in the perceived single party. The West Cameroon's majority party, the K.N.D.P., however, did insist that the C.P.N.C. should dissolve itself and that its members should join the K.N.D.P. On the eve of a joint meeting in August 1962, the K.N.D.P. issued a statement saying that, since the plebiscite, parties previously opposed to reunification "lost their source of life and their ideology". This statement went on to indicate that the K.N.D.P. was "open", ready, and willing to accept or consider accepting into its fold, all West Cameroonians who were willing to join them and work for peace, progress of the Cameroon father-land through the formation of the Co-ordination Committee¹²³. In other words K.N.D.P. membership was sine qua non for participation. In short the K.N.D.P. leadership was hoping to employ the tactics used by Ahidjo in French Cameroon from 1959 - 1962.

The C.P.N.C. did not hide its desire to form a national party by fusing all political parties not only the U.C. and K.N.D.P. In this light the C.P.N.C. in February, 1963 introduced a motion in the West Cameroon House of Assembly which commended "the noble efforts of the leaders of the main political parties in the country towards the promotion of peace and unity "and" appealed for the fullest possible support to their repeated call

for national unity through the adoption of a single party system. It also urged immediate steps to be taken towards the inauguration of a single party by the absorption of all existing parties therein"¹²⁴.

The K.N.D.P. was thus faced with the amendment which encouraged the adoption of a national unity party, and had appreciated such moves, which were initiated by the U.C. in this direction. By identical 20-7 votes with 4 abstentions, the C.P.N.C. motion was defeated and the K.N.D.P. amendment adopted in its place¹²⁵.

The political squabbles in East Cameroon was very minimal by the date of reunification. Though the federal constitution provided for political parties and groups to operate, in East Cameroon, by 1962, the once thriving pluralism of political parties and groups had effectively come to an end by this date. In that part of the federation some 117 political parties and groups did exist as against 20 in British Cameroons. By the time the Federation came being on October 1961, those numbers had been reduced to a more handful - three in West Cameroon and five in East Cameroon. Their reduction, particularly in East Cameroon was through a complex process, including disintegration, attribution, and proscription on the one hand, and amalgamation and absorption on the other. The republican constitution of 1960 and the federal constitution of 1961 gave Ahidjo much powers which he used to the fullest. Throughout the 1960's he

consolidated his political power under the banner of his Union Camerounaise party.

During his maiden six-day visit in June 1962 to West Cameroon, Ahidjo while emphasizing the creation of one party, stated clearly that the process should commence with the amalgamation of all parties in each of the states¹²⁶. The amalgamation process had reached an advanced stage in East Cameroon. The two West Cameroon parties met in an attempt to unite, following Ahidjo's call, but could not arrive at a concensus. The failure to merge led the K.N.D.P. leadership to become more sceptical of the opposition and was outrightly backing out of the idea of a single party¹²⁷. Redefining their position the K.N.D.P. leadership pointed out that rather than refer to their collaboration with the U.C. as directed toward either a single or a unified party, it should be styled a quest for a "national party"¹²⁸. The K.N.D.P.'s approach was too slow and Ahidjo was becoming very impatient with its evolution and he made his views known to them at the ninth annual convention of the K.N.D.P. in August 1963. However, the U.C. disagreed with Ahidjo's idea that the creation of the national party should wait until the states had achieved a single party system. The U.C. held that in order to ensure the realization of national unity, there had to be a national party consisting all shades of opinion in the country. The U.C., therefore, convened the Co-ordination Committee set up on April 27, 1962, to produce a formula for a quick merger of the existing political parties. The delegates

that honoured the rendezvous in June 1963 did arrive at conclusions that were transmitted to the two executive committees of the U.C. and the K.N.D.P.

The K.N.D.P. executive examined the recommendations and did not arrive at a concensus and the matter was thrown back to the Co-ordination Committee and discussion on the matter was postponed till the next annual convention. Things took a rapid turn when S.T.Muna caused the intergration of the K.N.D.P. by forming the C.U.C. party, a move described by Willard Johnson as "a poorly disguised attempt to bring into being "U.C" in West Cameroon"¹²⁹. This hastened the K.N.D.P.'s wish for the creation of a single national party. Ahidjo was happy with these developments which he encouraged. Muna's personal ambition led to a more harmful political division in West Cameroon than that of Endeley and Foncha. While Endeley and Foncha had the interest of West Cameroon, particularly its autonomy at heart, Muna was in favour of Ahidjo's assimilation of West Cameroon in return for his "kickbacks". J.F. Bayart points out that during the K.N.D.P. crisis, Ahidjo:

Played skillfully on the confrontation between Muna and Jua letting the former know he was the favoured one, yet accepting the temporarily eclipsed aspirant continued access to federal resources. He therefore kept Muna in reserve for the opportuned moment when he would pull the rug from under Jua. "In this

wise he "had therefore mentalised Jua in the same way he had mentalised many of his other opponents: Charles Assale, Muyi Matip, Kamdem-Ninyim and Foncha, i.e. by accepting them as temporary expedient until their power base had been eroded¹³⁰.

1) The Creation of the Cameroon National Union (CNU) in the Federation

In June 1966 Ahidjo, having expertly exploited the political differences among West Cameroon politicians, convoked the leader of the three parties (K.N.D.P., C.P.N.C. and C.U.C.) in the West and the Prime Ministers of the federated states to Yaounde to endorse his plan on the creation of a single national party. At the summit the U.C. had eight delegates, K.N.D.P. four and the C.P.N.C. and C.U.C. one each. Ahidjo told them in few words that it was time to form a national unity party in view of the strife, conflict and bitterness which the multi-party system had orchestrated in the Federation¹³¹. At the end of the two day discussion, the leaders agreed to form a great political party at national level. They came to an understanding that the new party would be called the Cameroon National Union (C.N.U). For details the party leaders set up a 30 member provisional steering Committee charged with the setting up of the Organs of the new party. It unanimously agreed that before August 31st, 1966 the four existing parties should convene their congresses with a view of adopting the decisions taken¹³². The steering

committee charged with the task of drafting the new party's status, reflected the domineering leadership of the C.U. and to a little extent that of the weakened K.N.D.P. The U.C. had 22 delegates, the K.N.D.P. 4, the C.P.N.C. and C.U.C. had two delegates each. The draft charter and constitution of the said federal party was overwhelmingly approved by the steering committee on July 23, 1966.

The adoption of the status of the new party opened the way for existing parties to dissolve themselves. Muna's C.U.C. party, the brain child behind the creation of the single party, was the very first to demonstrate its loyalty. At an extraordinary congress of the C.U.C. in Bamenda from August 5-6, 1966, the draft constitution was unanimously adopted. The C.U.C. at the end of that meeting declared its dissolution and adherence of its members to the C.N.U and the transfer of its property to the new party. This position was also adopted by the K.N.D.P. on August 13, and by the U.C. on August 21, as well as the C.P.N.C. on August 28. At their various extraordinary congresses they declared their dissolution in favour of the C.N.U. This paved the way for the creation of the C.N.U. on September 1 1966, marking the end of political pluralism.

Through treachery, selfishness, and personal ambition, West Cameroon political leaders once more demonstrated that they were not the right persons to lead Southern Cameroons to salvation. No lesson was learnt from the Foncha - Endeley disagreement of 1959 at the U.N., which, as earlier mentioned, led to Southern

Cameroons not adopting the third option of being an independent state. Also in 1965 was the Jua-Muna disagreement over the premiership of West Cameroon which led to the unconditional absorption of the state by Ahidjo on his own terms as the U.N. did in 1959. Ahidjo a young Fulani with maternal background in Mubi with basic elementary education, by September 1, 1966 had out-witted the so-called Southern elites of both French and British Cameroons to establish northern supremacy and for thirty-two years the South looked onto the north for salvation. With the creation of the C.N.U., West Cameroon, the last autonomous zone from where legal opposition could be made to his authority within the federation was neutralised as lost her constitutional rights and autonomy.

With the exception of religious bodies all major associations such as the Workers' Trade Unions came under the canopy of the C.N.U. What remained in the opposition was the remnants of the exiled wing of the U.P.C. which had virtually no influence in Cameroon.

The new party executive was made up of Ahmadou Ahidjo-President; John Ngu Foncha and Simon Pierie Tehoungui-First and Second Vice Presidents; Kame Samuel-Political Secretary; Nzo Ekahah Nghaky-Press and information Secretary; El Hadj Moussa Yaya Secretary of Women, Syndicate and Social Affairs; E.T.Egbe Secretary of Youth Affairs; Ekwabi Ewame-Administrative Secretary and Ndounokon-Organising Secretary ¹³³.

L'U.N.C. dans la nation described Ahidjo after the formation of the CNU party as the "guarantor of National Unity, the embodiment of the C.N.U. doctrine and the uncontested hero of the new Cameroon"³⁴

The Party Organisation

The C.N.U. ruling bodies were: the National Congress, the National Council, the National Political Bureau and the Central Committee. The National Congress met once every five years unless exigencies called for an extraordinary session. In this case, such meetings had to be summoned either by the national president or through a votes of 2/3 of its members, as stipulated by article 31, of the party constitution. The National Congress defined the general programme and the political, economic and social lines of policy of the party. It elected the National President and the Vice Presidents as well as the members of the Political Bureau. The following constituted the National Congress: members of the National Political Bureau, Ministers and Secretaries of state; members of the Assemblies, the members of Economic and Social Council; Section Presidents and their delegates whose number was fixed by the National Political Bureau¹³⁵. The National Council was responsible for the strict implementation of the decisions of Congress. The National president convened it once a year. Its members were drawn from the Political Bureau and the Sectional Presidents. The National Political Bureau was charged with the task of directing the party's affairs. It was answerable to the National Council and

Congress. It was this body that was empowered to nominate candidates for popular elections¹³⁶. The central Committee met once a year and if the need arose, it held an extraordinary session. It was responsible for supervising the day to day running of the party. It also kept the National President informed of daily activities of the party.

The C.N.U. had the following auxiliary bodies, namely the Youth Wing (Y.C.N.U), which inter alia, was charged with the mobilization of all youths between the ages of 10-30 towards national reconstruction; the Women's Wing (W.C.N.U) which was responsible for mobilising women to perform the social activities of the party, etc. The National Union of Cameroon Workers (N.U.C.W) in 1972 became another annexed subsidiary organ of the C.N.U. The cell was the basic structure of the party at the quarter or village level, the Branch comprised all the cells in the village, each of the sub-sections, comprised all the Branches in the same administrative District or sub-Division, while the Sections embodied all the sub-Sections in each administrative division. Each Administrative Division (Department) corresponded to a section and at its birth in September 1, 1966, it had 41 sections¹³⁷ and at its demise in 1985 March¹³⁸, it had 51 sections among which were the Paris and London sections. Each basic structure had an executive organ, as defined by the C.N.U. Constitution.

CNU in the Federation

The C.N.U. was created purely through the initiative of Ahidjo. The advent of the single party served a dual purpose to the president. It guaranteed Ahidjo's continuous rule in the absence of democratic elections since he came from an obscure background and could not count on northern support. It also safeguarded the interest of imperialist France that brought him to power in 1958. French neo-imperialism was a danger the U.P.C. had seen and fought against in vain and equally Foncha's reunification clause that France and Britain were to be put out of Cameroon affairs yielded no fruits as far as France was concerned. The realization of the one party system Ahidjo had long dreamt of was achieved through his combination of coercion, intimidation, repression, persuasion, dialogue, elimination of political opponents and the application of the French political weapon of divide et Imperia in West Cameroon political circles. When he finally created the C.N.U. he styled it the "Unified National Party" and maintained that the C.N.U. came about as; "the result of the people's unflinching will and the strong determination of politicians who are convinced of their common aspirations towards the future of the country and are aware of the dangers inherent in centrifugal political leaning at a time when our institutions should be strengthened and when all around us notice the distressing consequences of unjustified division".¹³⁹

But its subsequent orientation in practice, progressively became more than anything else identified with one man "Ahidjo" and his immediate circle and not all sections of the federation as to give it a character of a Unified National Party as such. The mayor of Garoua in his speech during Paul Biya's maiden visit in April 1985, i.e (nineteen years after the C.N.U. was formed) did not fail to remind Biya and other Cameroonians of the prime position of the U.C. in Cameroon when he said the president was welcomed to Garoua "the birth place of the Union Camerounaise Party which later became the C.N.U."¹⁴⁰

The leadership position of the U.C. in the C.N.U. reflected itself right from the setting up of the committees to work out the transition from the multi-to single party system. In the twelve man working committee charged with drafting the status of the new party (C.N.U), the U.C. had eight delegates and twenty-two in the thirty man steering committee, charged with the task of arranging details and overseeing the transition, while the K.N.D.P., C.P.N.C. and C.U.C. had four in the party's constitutional committee and eight in the transitional committee. The U.C. therefore had thirty seats in the Committees out of forty-two.

The creation of the C.N.U. did not in anyway change the anglophones status as a minority or second-class citizens in the Union but gave Ahidjo the opportunity to intimidate and victimise them under the canopy of the unified one party system. The U.C. apostles dominated the political Bureau and the Central Committee

of the C.N.U. and whatever views they expressed were endorsed without objective examination. It is on this basis that the C.N.U. was perceived by radical political minded Cameroonians within and without as the transformation of the ruling Union Camerounaise to a parti Unique. The fear that the C.N.U. symbolises more than anything else the reincarnation of the U.C. and not in actual fact a new "Unified National Party" was soon proven to be genuine. When the C.N.U. was created after a year or two it became anathema to think or worse still to mention that more than one person was at the origin of the formation of the C.N.U. The K.N.D.P. headquarters building in Buea became the office of the Federal Inspector and its documents destroyed. It became a taboo for music shops and Radio Stations to play popular song-records which praised the leadership of the four parties from where the C.N.U. emerged. New song-records emerged which praised the leader of the C.N.U. as the sole architect of the formation of the C or U and the father of National Unity. Whatever the leader said became a party slogan heard repeatedly over the National Radio net work, by ministers in their speeches and he felt "free to change the party constitution with a snap of the fingers"¹⁴¹. The other founding fathers and other patriotic Cameroonians were competent, but not in a position to advise, correct and criticise the functioning of the party and were consequently simply intimidated and pushed into oblivion. To exist in the C.N.U. society where democracy had been steadily emptied of its content, most of them felt that instead of

appointments or other high government positions. This was quite apart from the fact that they retained their party posts. For example, Mr. Ayissi Mvodo, who was Senior Minister of Territorial Administration, was also the Secretary general of the party and a member of the Central Committee.

Elections were based on the list system prepared and presented to the electorate by the Central Committee of which the president was the chairman. The list system was a major development to the credit of Ahidjo dating from when Cameroon became a de facto one party state. The "list system" coupled with the silence of the constitution over how many years someone could be re-elected president of the Republic all worked absolutely to Ahidjo's advantage. Whatever chances remained for the opposition, to contest for the presidency were all eroded away. Since the C.N.U. was formed, therefore, Cameroon had never experienced democratic elections neither presidential or parliamentary. The people were never allowed to exercise their right to choose their presidential candidate. Most candidates on the list never reflected the wishes of the majority of the people. Thus the Central Committee was accused of nepotism, favouritism and misjudgment. In fact, this Committee's major criterion for selecting a candidate was possession of dynamic and militant leadership qualities coupled with loyalty to the party. Factors, such as popular support by the people, did not play any major role. However, the electorates as the masses or the people voted in order to avoid intimidation by the police, who at check

points, normally asked travellers for their voting cards. Consequently those who were in the various arms of government and para-statal, in order to retain their appointments, usually sought to be ex-officio members of the Central committee, Political Bureau or local party officials, especially amongst section or sub-section presidents. The C.N.U. from its creation appears to have been everything, including the executive, of the government, the legislative and even the judiciary. Lack of a defined spheres of influence between the government and the party during the short period between 1982 and 1984 when Ahidjo was party chairman and Biya the president of the republic, led to a conflict of authority. Ahidjo as the party chairman sent bills directly to the Assembly without passing them through "his brother" President of the Republic.

TABLE 7 **ATTRIBUTION IN THE "GOVERNMENT" OF THE PARTY**
POSTS

	B.P.N. (1969)	C.C. 1975	C.C. 1980
- Vice President	Foncha Tchounqui Kwayeb Effiom	Foncha Tchounqui Kwayeb Lecco	Foncha Biya Tchounqui
- Political Sec. - Assistants	Ayissi Mohaman	Ayissi Elangwe Bouba-Bello	Sabal Lecco Bouba Bello Nsakwa Ngi
-Organising Sec. - Assistants	Kame Hayatou Malouma	Amindu Malouma Nchouwat	Amindu Malouma Abondo
- Youth Sec. - Assistants	Egbe Tabi Sadou Njiensi	Touomdu Bahounoui Ngu Anomal	Bwele Ngu Anomal Boi Alima
- Sec.for Social - Affairs/Women - Assistants	Moussa Yaya Mrs.Keutcha Ndounokon	Moussa Yaya Mrs.Keutcha Emah	Moussa Yaya Mrs.Keutcha Ngang Mbile
- Sec.Press & - Information. - Assistants	Nzo-Ekhah Sengat-Kuo Mpouma	Egbe Tabi Mayi Matip Nsakwa Ngi	Touomdu Mayi Matip Vroumsia
- Treasurer - Assistants	Sanda Fouda Endeley	Fouda Ayatou Nwalipenja	Emah Hayatou Nwalipenja
- Auditors	Djuimo Abobubakar	Yondo Djuimo	Yondo Djuimo
- Disp.Officers	Njoya Atangana	Ngang.M. Bouba Danki	Ngang Mbile Bouba Danki
- Advisers	Marigo, Assale Ngom Jua	Assale, Aboubakar Mrs. Akwe	Assale, Aboubakar Ekwabi

B.P.N. = National Political Bureau, C.C = Central Committee.
 Source: J.F. Ngayap; Cameroun Qui Gouverne? (L'Harmattan Paris 1983) p. 306.

The inequitable geo-political distribution of political power in the C.N.U. was all calculated to ensure the political perpetuity of the rule of one man surrounded by a few. Thus over

the years Ahidjo produced a party marked by lethargy within its ranks and files, and a sense of alienation within the population¹⁴⁵. Often, people were intimidated and even victimized rather than educated to secure membership cards. Senior party officials took cover under the banner of the party to swindle state funds and commit other atrocities for personal aggrandizement. The party officials devoted more time to party propaganda and less time on national issues. Much energy was allotted to issues affecting the party and not those crucial things that affected the people and their communities. Whenever local party meetings were called, the few items on the agenda embodied the sale of party cards and the listing of subversive elements. At the end of each meeting a strongly worded motion of support was sent to the National president, Comrade Ahidjo. Sending motions of support indicated popularity of the president and the Central Committee made sure it induced groups to send motions of support or endorsed simply those it had prepared on their behalf to be read over the National Radio.

While the single party was seen as the guarantor of national Unity, national integration and political order it should not reflect the rule of an individual and his few disciples. If it must be a source of hope there must constitutionally be checks and balances and total involvement of all segments of the society. The chairman was to be a primus inter pares in the executive council and congressional conventions of the party, he

was not to have any veto powers. The freedom of choice, thought and expression, being the most salient ingredients of integration, unity and progress of people of different political groups, should be watered and cared for.

V.5 Representation in the Federal Bureaucracy

When Southern Cameroons voted overwhelmingly on February 11, 1961 for reunification, they were indeed voting for a federal system of government in which there was to be power-sharing between the two contracting states that gave birth to the federation¹⁴⁶. What was therefore the lot of West Cameroonians in the Central Bureaucracy of the Federal Republic of Cameroon?

The bureaucracy that emerged on October 1, 1961, when the federation was born, was inherited from the Cameroun Republic as groomed by the French colonisers. The French type of administration assumed the function of administering the more than two thousand diverse ethnic groups of the federation and above all charged with the task of administering and forging the integration of West and East Cameroon which had emerged after 45 years under the tutelage of British and French imperialism. West Cameroon that was a mandate and later trust territory, governed as part of the Eastern Region of Nigeria until it became an autonomous region in 1957 lacked the skilled manpower to inject effectively into the bureaucracy, those who were experienced and who possessed technical skills in the running of modern government were few as compared with their Eastern counter part.

should be given. This further accounted for the lack of many West Cameroonians in the central bureaucracy for many years since the reunification. The few who came into the central bureaucracy by October 1, 1961 were all appointed "subordinate(s) to their francophone counter parts"¹⁴⁹. While it was obvious that if integration was chosen they could have lacked a fair representation at the Lagos bureaucracy, it would not have been an imposition from disparity in the inherited system; language and the overwhelming powers of the chief executive who alone appointed the bureaucrats¹⁵⁰.

West Cameroonian representation in the bureaucracy however was on the increase with the graduation of Westerners mostly from the University of Yaounde and from professional schools, especially the French established school of public administration and Magistracy (E.N.A.M) in Yaounde. Those anglophones who graduated from these federal institutions did not have it easy. Most anglophones were faced with language problems coupled with the difference in syllabus and their instructors being either francophones or Frenchmen.

This reveals the crisis of the lopsided bilingualism as practiced in Cameroon and the fact that in every circumstance, the anglophone must be the one to sacrifice one thing or the other. However the transformation of the first federal republic into a unitary state in 1972 saw an increase in the number of anglophones in the bureaucracy. They were seen as a burden and

West Cameroon was further paralysed by the withdrawal en masse of British expatriate Civil Servants serving under Southern Cameroons government shortly the results of the plebiscite were announced in favour of reunification. This mass exodus was not expected by Foncha's government. West Cameroon was therefore in an "ironical position of being the first "liberated" British territory without a continuity of expatriate staff despite the insistent desire of the local government to keep them"¹⁴⁷. The departure of the British administrators and later the closing up of the branches of their multi-national companies in the territory was a manifestation against Southern Cameroons' overwhelming 'yes' vote to reunite with French Cameroon¹⁴⁸ which they naively called their brethren."

The experimental young republic had serious hurdles to overcome. The two states had inherited different administrative systems; the West, a devolution system, and the East, a centralized system. To strike a balance would have been an appropriate measure but the federal constitution of 1961 did favour the French Cameroun inherited system to be adopted. Moreover, the constitution had given the president the powers to appoint people to policy-making positions and his powers could not be checked by either the National Assembly or the judiciary. In spite of the fact that the two ruling parties, the U.C. and the K.N.D.P. were in some sort of coalition, Foncha could not dictate to Ahidjo the post of responsibility his Lieutenants

should be given. This further accounted for the lack of many West Cameroonians in the central bureaucracy for many years since the reunification. The few who came into the central bureaucracy by October 1, 1961 were all appointed "subordinate(s) to their francophone counter parts"¹⁴⁹. While it was obvious that if integration was chosen they could have lacked a fair representation at the Lagos bureaucracy, it would not have been an imposition from disparity in the inherited system; language and the overwhelming powers of the chief executive who alone appointed the bureaucrats¹⁵⁰.

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were seriously discriminated against by the francophone in the allocation of posts. In this light the continued limited anglophone representation at the higher level of policy-making bodies had greatly contributed to the tardy socio-economic and cultural developments of the West Cameroon.

(i) The Federal Legislature Representation

The Federal National Assembly had 50 members. It had a five year mandate and its deputies were to be "elected by Universal suffrage and direct and secret ballot in each of the federated states-in the ration of one deputy to 80,000 inhabitants"¹⁵¹. Based on this formula the state of East Cameroon had 40 Deputies while West Cameroon had 10 Deputies, a ratio of 4:1¹⁵².

On April 24, 1962, the Federal National Assembly was convened for the first time. There had been no elections after reunification and its member were merely chose from Ahidjo's U.C. party and Foncha's K.N.D.P. The oppositions parties in the federation were not given any seat. Mr.Marcel Marigoh Mboua, a member of parliament from the east electoral constituency became its first president¹⁵³. The state of West Cameroon maintained its ten members until the second republic came into being in 1972. Though the anglophone bloc faced acute difficulties with the committee system which the Federal Assembly inherited from the French, they enjoyed the right that a law could only be passed based on the majority votes from the blocs¹⁵⁴. Unlike in the British tradition where the business of the House is

conducted during plenary sessions, the Federal National Assembly fashioned on French tradition already indicated that work was done in committee and sub-committee. The Assembly therefore had four committees which focused on constitutional laws; finance; Foreign Affairs; and social and cultural affairs. It was therefore impossible for the west cameroon bloc to have three delegates as required to represent it on each of the four committees. What again hampered the effectiveness of the bloc was that four of its members held ministerial portfolios and were most of the time pre-occupied with discharging their duties. These deputies, Bernard Fonlon, Nzo Ekah-Ngahky, Muna and Egbe were the most Educated and most experienced politicians in parliamentary business. The absence of these four leaders therefore left the west cameroon bloc with a regular six inexperienced deputies who were over taxed as they tried in vain to secure representation of the West Cameroon in all committee meetings. The representation of the West cameroon in the National assembly was therefore emasculated and was similar to the situation in the central bureaucracy which has already been stated above.

Numerically the anglophone representation was proportionate to their numerical strength but this was under cut by the committee system ¹⁵⁵. Their absence from committees deprived them of the opportunity to raise the state problems that should have been embodied in the Assembly's general report as

recommendations made to the government with due regards to the wishes of the population. Thus they were deprived of the opportunity to struggle for quantitative integration for their voice could not be heard in the commissions due to the working of the system .

This situation was however redressed in the second Republic of 1972, when the anglophone representation moved from 10 to 24 in the Unitary Assembly of 120 members in 1973.

TABLE - 8

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY REPRESENTATION

WEST			EAST		
Period	No	Population	Period	No	Population
1961-1965	10	80,000	1961-1965	40	3,200,000
1965-1970	10	80,000	1965-1970	40	3,200,000
1970-1972	10	80,000	1970-1972	40	3,200,000
1973-1978	24	1,611,046	1973-1978	94	6,051,100

Parliament extended its term from June 1972 - May 1973 the President ruled by Decree.

North-Southern regionalism in East Cameroon was absent in the Federal National Assembly as northern deputies did not group

themselves into a bloc as was the case in the Eastern House of Assembly. Since they were members of the Union Camerounaise (U.C.) party they worked as a team. Ahidjo however observed scrupulously, the rules of balance between north and south in allocating federal seats. Northern or Muslim constituencies had 19 of the 40 eastern deputies while six of the ten West Cameroon deputies in 1961 were from the north of West Cameroon.

(ii) Representation in the Federal Executive

West Cameroon was strongly represented in the federal executive where real power to initiate and command rested. The population criterion was absent in the allocation of ministerial posts. The federal executive like the Federal National Assembly was uniquely composed of U.C. and K.N.D.P. elements. The opposition was again silent since the constitution gave the president the right to appoint ministers who were solely responsible to him¹⁵⁶. Out of the ten federal ministers named after the reunification West Cameroon had one minister plus two Deputy ministers. Their share later increased when the post of Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs was created and a West Cameroonian Nzo Ekah-Nghaky was assigned to the post on April 23, 1963. This was perhaps a reward to the K.N.D.P. for her reunification struggle and encouragement towards the creation of the "Unified Party". President Ahidjo's policy of complementary rewards of political activities also reflected the giant share Southern Deputies of French Cameroon received in the federal

government for deserting opposition parties. The southern hub of French Cameroon, therefore, in the twelve man cabinet of the Federal Republic had seven ministers, West Cameroon five while Muslim north had one¹⁵⁸.

The anglophone ministers' immediate task was to bring about urgent harmonization. Through these federal ministers it was possible for the president to bring those services they controlled in West Cameroon under the orbit of federal authority. There existed neither the council of ministers or cabinet rendezvous, and consequently the president interacted with the ministers on individual basis.

While the Deputy minister of Justice was pre-occupied with the most difficult task of harmonizing the two different inherited British and French legal systems, his colleague of Health was essentially concerned with health services in West Cameroon and the Foreign Affairs Deputy Minister was concerned with external issues initially, concerning mostly those affecting West Cameroon(s). One of his immediate diplomatic shuttle was the negotiation with the British Government over the question of continuing Commonwealth preferences for important West Cameroon exports and the restoration of normal relations between Lagos and Yaounde over cameroon's dispute with Nigeria on the conduct of the plebiscite in North Cameroons. The full ministry, held by S.T. Muna, was responsible for integrating postal services in the federation. The number of West Cameroon full ministers rose to

two in 1965 when the Labour ministry was created and Nzo Ekha Nghaky was given the post. It also saw the coming in of Dr. Bernard Fonlon to the federal executive as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.

These ministers were agents of the federal government and thus could not collectively or individually improve the lot of their kinsmen back in West Cameroon. This was demoralizing and frustrating. Their numerical representation did not reflect the degree to which their problems were given the desired attention.

The coming into being of the second republic in 1972, saw the increase of West Cameroon ministers from four to seven out of the twenty-eight ministerial positions in the central cabinet. For the twenty-one years that Ahmadou Ahidjo ruled as president of the Federal Republic and later the United Republic he (re) shuffled his cabinet fourteen times. The table below gives, the dates, effective number, the number of Anglophones and Francophones in each Cabinet.

TABLE: 9

THE EVOLUTION OF THE FEDERAL CABINET

	GOVERNMENT OF	EFFECTIVE NUMBER	NO.OF ANGLO PHONES	NO.OF FRANCO-PHONES
Republic of Cameroon 1961-1972	20 October 1961	12	4	08
	23 April 1963	13	4	09
	1 July 1964	12	4	08
	25 May 1965	16	4	12
	20 May 1967	16	4	12
	15 January 1968	15	4	11
	16 August 1968	17	4	13
	12 June 1970	20	3	17
25 January 1971	20	3	17	
United Republic 1972	3 July 1972	28	7	21
	30 June 1975	30	6	24
	8 November 1979	29	7	22
	17 July 1980	30	7	23
	7 January 1982	31	7	24
PAUL BIYA'S Government	6 November 1982	31	7	24

Source: Compiled from Files of the National Archives.

The anglophone had all along the greatest number of Vice Ministers. How long one stayed in Government depended on the cordial relationship with the president. Since reunification there were certain ministries that have never been headed by an anglophone viz, Defence, Internal Security, Finance, Education, Economic Planning, Public Service, Foreign Affairs and Territorial Administration. Anglophones were traditionally restricted to certain ministries such that when one asked a francophone about an anglophone in Yaounde city he/she would angrily tell you "va au ministere des anglophones" (go to the anglophone ministry) which was either ministry of Post and

Telecommunications or ministry of Transport.

Socio-Cultural Impact on West Cameroonians

The proclamation of reunification on October 1, 1961, gave the greenlight for mass interaction between British and French Cameroon which prior to this date was restrictive. There was reunion of separated families, including those who were separated by the frontier of 1916 partition and those who escaped force labour and tyrannical rule of the French administration to Southern Cameroons. There was equally, movement of British or French made goods in form of presents to relatives on both sides of the new federation.

This interaction led to the penetration of francophones influence in West Cameroon. A scene of social and cultural awareness gripped the West Cameroon, with special reference to the French style of dressing, tailoring and hair-cut patterns became fashionable among the anglophone youths. The West Cameroon markets became flooded with French and East Cameroon made goods, which within a short-time, displaced most British or Nigerian made goods.

This was facilitated by the removal of custom posts between West and East Cameroon in 1961 and the downward trend of trade with Britain emanating from the loss of British preferential treatment for West Cameroon exports¹⁵⁹.

Entertainments at public places soon became fashioned on the patterns of East Cameroon¹⁶⁰. The Douala popular Makossa music

soon began displacing the hitherto more often heard Nigerian and Ghanaian version of high life music. In Bars and Hotels, drinks such as Beaufort, Special, 33 Export biere from East Cameroon gradually displaced Heinekein, Becks, and Star Beer from those melieux. The West Cameroon elites soon developed common appetites for East Cameroon foods and table wine which now "features prominently among the 'menu items' of anglophone elite, including those who have never been to the Francophone sector"¹⁶¹. Two factors accounted for the fast promotion of these assimilative tendencies in West Cameroon: the West Cameroonians who were recruited in the gendarmerie or the army acquired those appetites during their training or services in East Cameroon; secondly, the National Radio in Yaounde and the state Radio Station in Buea through their bilingual propagated programmes aided at achieving this social and cultural integration process.

Other identical symbols in the federation included, the national anthem, the coat of arms, the flag (Green Red Yellow with two golden stars representing the two states); national motto: Peace-Work-Fatherland; common currency the C.F.A. postage stamps, army uniform, etc.

A simple look at all these national symbols and changes that were effected in West Cameroon viz, the change from left to right hand driving (January 1963), and the introduction of the metric system among others, were basically an importation from Cameroon

Republic geared towards uniformity than towards the development of new ones to suit the status of the new nation. All these and many others composed the body of the national culture of the evolving Cameroon nation and in all cases it was the West Cameroonian who had to adjust. One French colonial practice which the West Cameroonians had resisted right to this moment is the two shift-system whereby their francophone counterparts went on break at 12 noon on working days, to enable them go home for lunch served with French or Spanish wine, have siesta, before going back to work at 2.30 p.m., a deliberate attempt to promote the French so-called superior culture, and a tradition instituted by the French Colons in Africa, who definitely had nothing to lose if the Colonies were developed or not. The irony is that France does not practice this wasteful system that francophone Cameroon and other French-speaking countries, economically crawling, practice. This system of work is a big burden on the common man though simply maintained to appease the French technical advisers who direct and maintain the fragile governments in power.

NOTES

1. When Northern Cameroons voted for integration into Nigeria, Ahidjo became unenthusiastic about reunification. However, the the French authorities, in order to maintain the honour of their "puppet", advised Ahidjo to go ahead with the reunification process assuring him that within 25 years they would ensure that Southern Cameroons got assimilated to the extent that there would be no threat to his rule.
2. West Africa, March 4, 1961 p.236.
Ahidjo to protect and maintain his stand, opted for a federal system, not a confederal structure as advocated by Foncha.
4. Ndiva Kotele-Kale, : "Reconciling the Dual Heritage: Reflections on the Kamerun Idea" in An African Experiment in Nation Building: The Bilingual Cameroon Republic Since Reunification, Op.Cit. pp.11 - 17.
5. Federal Constitution (F.C.) 1961 Article 1 (1)
6. Federal Constitution (F.C.) 1961 Article 38 (1).
7. Interview with Professor Omar Yembe, - (50) Yaounde, 27 January 1989
8. The Declaration of the Bureau du Committee Directeur of the U.P.C. Accra, March 1960.
9. Debat Contradictoire Sur la Constitution Cahier d'Education Civique, (No.1, 1961) p.17.

10. Dr. Abel Eyinga, a lawyer and a leftist Critic of Ahidjo's regime was a prominent upeciste. He was greatly hunted like any other upeciste by Ahidjo's government in collaboration with France and he died a mysterious death in 1965, off allegedly eliminated by the French Secret Police (Red Hand).
11. Debat Contradictioire , Ibid.
12. The absence of popular will made it possible for the president to choose his successor with the consent of France that will protect the interest of both parties. This came true when on 6/11/82 Ahidjo chose Paul Biya to succeed him as the French had chose him in 1958 to succeed Mbida.
13. Albert Eyinga, "L'Espoire de la Democratie en Afrique", typescript of paper presented to the French International Congress on French speaking Africa, Washington, DC, (August 1964).
14. The Political Philosophy of Ahmadou Ahidjo, 1958 - 1968 (Paris Paul Bory Publishing Ltd., 1968) p.50. Also See President Ahidjo's speech to party meeting, opening of the U.C. building in yaounde September 1963.
15. Interview with David Bup, Nkambe, 18 July 1989.
16. N.A.B Vc b/1961/2 Foumban Conference July 17 - 21, 1961.
17. Nfor N.N. Cameroon Reunification Costs and Problems of National Integration, (M.Sc unpublished thesis A.B.U. Zaria October 1980) p.90.

18. Akinjide Osuntokun "The Canadian Federal Experience"
Richard A.Olaniyan (ed) Federation in a Changing in World,
(Ikoyi-Lagos; OAU Press Ltd., 1988) p.24.
19. Federal Constitution (F.C.) 1961 Article 5.
20. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Cameroon,
Yaounde September, 1961.
21. Nfor, op.cit p.96.
22. Enonchong Cameroon Constitutional Law, op.cit Page 167.
23. South Cameroons Press Release No. 1468 24 July 1961.
24. Johnson op.cit p.312.
25. Interview with Noal Moukong Limbe, Victoria, (38) 10 March
1989 - 10/3/89.
26. Foncha's delegation advocated that the Head of State should
not be the Head of Government and that all decisions
discussed in the executive council be implemented.
27. Debat Contraditoire sur la Constitution, in An African
Experiment in Nation Building: The Bilingual Cameroon
Republic, op.cit. page 139.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid. p.143.
32. Federal Constitution (F.C.) 1961 Article 38 (1).
33. Akinjide Osuntokun, op.cit pp.4 - 5.
34. Johnson, Op.cit p.201.
35. Federal Constitution (F.C.) 1961 Article 40 (1)
36. Federal Constitution (F.C.) 1961 Article 20 (2)

37. Federal Constitution (F.C.) 1961 Article 38 (2)
38. Federal Constitution (F.C.) 1961 Article 24
39. Interview with S.N. Tita op.cit.
40. Federal Constitution (F.C.) Article 44 (2)
41. The Federal Constitution of Cameroon, September 1961.
42. West Africa, April 2, 1966, p.371.
43. Nfor, op.cit p.98.
44. J.O. de Octobre 20, 1961 Decree No. 61 -DF-75. Also see Article 6 (1) Federal Constitution.
45. Article 4 of Decree No. 61 -DF-75. Also see Article 6 (1) Federal Constitution.
45. Article 4 of Decree No. 61-DF-75 of 20 October 1961.
46. Article 12 of Decree No. 61-DF-75 of 20 October 1961.
47. Ibid.
48. Johnson op.cit Page 209.
49. Southern Cameroon Press Release No.909 18 July 1960(NAB).
50. Interview with Andy Ndofor M, (35) Yaounde 18/10/88.
51. Foncha moved to Yaounde in 1965 as the Vice President of the Federal Republic in accordance with Article 9 (3) of the Federal Constitution and was succeeded by Augustine Ngum Jua as Prime Minister of West Cameroon.
52. A.N.Jua, was the most patriotic and dynamic politician, in West Cameroon. Born in 1924 in Kom menchum Division, he was the Secretary of State for Health and later Finance in West Cameroon before he became Premier in 1965-1968. He later on

became a Deputy in the National Assembly when the Unitary state was created in 1972. He was greatly loved by his people. He died in 1977.

53. Their common language was fulfude, with time even those who spoke some bad French began speaking pidgin English.
54. When the C.N.U. party was formed in 1966, the party card was also added to the list of papers.
55. The West Cameroon Police Force (W.C.P.F) was made up of those Southern Cameroonians that were with-drawn from Nigerian Police Force (N.P.F.) It was headed by Commissioner M.H. Ntune also a product of the N.P.F. He gave the W.C.P.F. sound training with his experience drawn from Nigeria, Britain and Israel.
56. Buea 1967.
57. Nfor, op cit p. 104
58. Decree 61-DF-23 of November 6, 1961.
59. Cameroon Times, 23 April 1962.
60. Sources of Revenue at the disposal of the state included: fees from courts, income tax, real estate tax and earnings of government departments.
61. Ndongko W.A. Planning for Economic Development in a federal state. The case of Cameroon 1960 - 1971 (Welforum Verlag, Munchen Germany 1975) p.175.
62. Southern Cameroons as of 13/12/1960 had 1800,000,000 CFA reserves abroad. This money was used in establishing

Cameroon Air Transport (C.A.T), Power Camp, CAMBANK, another Cameroon Development Agency mean while French Cameroon budgetarily depended on France up to 1968 - 1969 financial year.

63. Africa No. 10 May 17, 1963.
64. Jean-Philippe Guffo Mopo, Constitutions Du Cameroon, Document Politiques et Diplomatiques, (Editions stella, YAOUNDE, 1977) pp. 323 - 335.
65. France guarantees Cameroon the availability of foreign exchange reserves.
66. Federal Constitution (F.C.) 1961, Article 1(3).
67. From the advent of reunification Eastern administrators assigned to West Cameroon assume the air of Colon i.e. new colonial masters and in the early 1960s were actually assisted by French Colons.
68. The betrayal of reunification agreements by Ahidjo a few days after the federation came into being, has left many historians to question the "Pan Kamerun Idea" Vide Bongfen Chem-Langhee and Martin Z. Njeuma" The Pan-Kamerun Movement 1949-1961: in /An African Experiment in Nation Building: The Bilingual Cameroon Republic since Reunification, op. cit pp. 25-64.
69. Albert Mukong, Prisoner without A Crime, (Limbe Alfresco Books 1985) p. 76.
70. Ibid pp. 80 - 81.

71. Nfor, op. cit P. 136.
72. This was the practice of the 1789 French monarch Louis XVI, L'Etat C'est moi, post-independent Francophone African presidents have ruled based on this principle and here one can rightly refer to them as monarchical presidents.
73. Gardiner, op. cit pp. 124 - 125.
74. U.C. Carried out this operation through coercion, and rewards to political opponents.
75. The U.C. was very unpopular in the banned U.P.C. populated areas of Sanaga-Martime and the Bamileke region.
76. The Political philosophy of Ahmadu Ahidjo, op. cit pp. 55 - 59.
77. Lettre Ouverte le 15 Juin 1962. p. 9.
78. Afrique Nouvelle, June 21, 1962 p.6.
79. Gardiner, op. cit Page 125.
80. West Africa, May 23, 1959 p. 49.
81. The U.P.C. received its arms from Socialist bloc countries via Guinea and Ghana.
82. Richard Joseph, Radical Nationalism in Cameroon Social Origin of the U.P.C. rebellion, op. cit. p. 344.
83. The Pan-Africanist, No. 4, July 1972 p.11
84. Ibid.
85. Accord Franco-Camerounaise de Co-operation et d'assistance technique du 12 Novembre 1960, Article 1(f).
86. Gardinier, Op.cit p. 103.

87. The Economist, November 12, 1960.
88. South Cameroons Press Release No. 1468, 24 July 1961.
89. Pan-Africanist No. 4, July 1972 p.10.
90. Ibid.
91. Albert Mukong op. cit. p. 25.
92. Ibid p. 40.
93. Ibid pp. 85 - 90.
94. S.N. Ejedepang-Koge, Change in Cameroon, (Alexandria: Virginia A.R.C. Publication, 1985) p.11
95. Cameroon Times, June 11, 1962.
96. Africa No. 10, May 17, 1963.
97. Most of the teachers were Grade IIs and most of them were Catholics. Its leader J.N. Foncha is a strong Catholic Christian.
98. VIKUMA i.e. Victoria Kumba Mamfe was formed by Walter Willson of Kumba in 1959. Its aim was to rally the South against the north in Southern Cameroons and it succeeded in dividing the territory into two blocs, a practice which is still going on to date.
99. Motion introduced by Honourable S.N. Tamfu; member of the opposition party. West Cameroon House of Assembly Debate February 1963.
100. Johnson, op. cit 267.
101. Muna was vice premier to Endeley and joined the K.N.D.P. when he left the K.N.C. as a result of disagreement with his

116. N.A.B Vc b\1961\2 Foumban conference, July 17 - 21, 1961.
117. Cameroon Champion, May 28, 1962
118. Ibid.
119. Cameroon Times, May 28. 1962.
120. Interview with Nkeng Ivo, (35) Limbe, 13 October, 1988.
121. N.A.B. De \1961\2 W.K.P.M'S office Buea Vide. Jean Fancois Bayart, L, Etate Au Cameroun, (paris: press de la foundation Nationale des sciences politiques 1985) PP. 122-124.
122. West Africa, no 1271 November 9, 1963.
123. K.N.D.P. "The path to a National party : steps and principles" August 11, 1962.
124. West Africa, No 1271 November 9, 1963.
125. Ibid.
126. Cameroon Times, June 1, 1962.
127. Jean -Francois Bayart Op.Cit. page 122.
128. Johnson Op.cit P. 281.
129. ibid. P.274.
130. Jean-Francois Bayart, "The Neutralization of Anglophone cameroon" in Richard Joseph's (E.D).
Gaullist Africa: cameroon under Ahmadou Ahidjo, (Enugu)
Fourth Dimension publishers 1978) PP.86-87.
- Rental : Rentalised =Neutralized of less locative value Mental :
Mentalised= to become defective or deficient
131. L'U.N.C dans la Nation publication du comite'
central du L'Union National camerounaise (Douala
pubi-Expansion 1980) P.13.

132. Ibid.
133. The first national council of the U.N.C 5th -8th November, 1962. (National printing press yaounde 1967) O. 22.
134. L'UNC dans la Nation: Op. cit p. 27.
135. The C.N.U constitution, Article 33 PP.5-7.
136. The C.N.U. constitution and charter (yaounde 23 july 1966) article 31.PP 7-9
137. The first National council of the C.N.U. OP. Cit PP.24.
138. C.N.U. was dissolved in Bamenda in march 1985 during its national congress when crisis erupted between Paul Biya and Ahmadou Ahidjo and Biya replaced it with the cameroon people's Democratic Movement (C.P.D.M.)
139. Inaugural speech at the 1st national council of the C.N.U. Yaounde 5 November, 1967.
140. Cameroon Tribune, April 17, 1985. P.4.
141. V.G. Fanso, "The C.N.U. Retrospection and posterity", seminar paper presented in Yaounde (march 20, 1985) P.3.
142. Ibid page 4.
143. "General policy statement" in a mimeographies edition of the 3rd congress of the U.C. political party (maroua 1960) P. 26.
144. Olusegun Obasanjo, Constitution for National integration and development,. (Lagos ,first foundation publishers Ltd. 1989) PP, 78080.
145. Cameroon Tribune. April 17, 1985.P.
146. U.N resolution 1608 (xv) 994 on cameroon April 21, 1961.

147. West Africa, August 12.2961 Pp. 874-878.
148. Interview with S.B Foncha, (54) Douala, 16 April, 1989
149. Nfor, Op. cit Page 170
150. Ibid.
151. Federal constitution (F.C.) 1961 Article 16.
152. The population estimate of october 1 1961 was as follows:
East cameroon 3, 200,000 and west cameroon 800,000.
153. parliament in cameroon past and present, Op cit, P.63.
154. Federal constitution (F.C.) 1961 Article 18.
155. Interview with Joseph Mbunwe, (50) Douala 8 August, 1989.
156. Federal constitution (F.C.) 1961 Article 11 (1).
157. Pierie Flambeau Ngayap, Cameroun qui Gouverne? De Ahidjo a Biya L'heritage et L'enjeu (paris: Edition L'Harmattan 1983) P.23.
158. J.O. Decret no. 61-DF-14 Du 20 october, 1961.
159. Ejedepang-koge OP. cit. P.15.
160. The effect is the habit of excessive drinking. This has made brewery industry in cameroon the most lucrative sector as Cameroon produces over 500,000 hecto litres of beer annually but ironically only 10,000km of cloth. Vide, Cameroon in Brief. (Yaounde, 1977) PP. 16-17, with excessive drinking has grown laziness ,embezzlement of public funds and moral decadence.
161. Nfor, OP.cit . P. 140.

CHAPTER VI

COLONIAL TO NATIONAL POLICY:

ABOLITION OF THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1972

VI.1. The Political Arena Ahidjo Prepared for the Creation of the United Republic in May 1972

The creation of "parti unife" Cameroon National Union by Ahmadou Ahidjo on September 1, 1966 was a clear signal indicating the end of the Foumban Constitution, which brought Southern Cameroons and the Cameroon Republic into a federal structure on October 1, 1961. From all indications the introduction of the single party structure marked the end of an official opposition to his "monarchical" rule from West Cameroon. He now became not only the Head of State but also the Chairman of the "Great National Party" CNU. Nothing constitutional could have been better for the West Cameroonians than their minority rights guaranteed by the Foumban Constitution. By this set-up, the Constitution shared powers between: (i) the executive, the judiciary and legislature; (ii) the State and the Centre. Executive power in essence, was shared by the president and the State Prime Ministers while legislative powers was shared by the State Deputies and Federal Deputies. In this manner the guarantee of security for the individual was institutionalised. While the individual's rights were defined by the constitution, the President's rights to stay in power indefinitely were not.

The president having imposed the one party system on the country on September 1, 1966, the only obstacle he had was the

opposition which came from the reactionary members of the dissolved KNDP, who were in key positions, including Dr. J.N. Foncha, as the vice-president of the Federal Republic. To dislodge these elements and their entrenched positions, he appointed in May 1968, S.T. Muna, his favourite, to the post of Prime Minister of West Cameroon, replacing A.N. Jua, formerly KNDP Vice President¹. Barely two years after Ahidjo surprised West Cameroonians with his appointment of Muna as their Prime Minister, he tranquilized Dr. J.N. Foncha in 1970 by choosing Muna as his running mate in that year's presidential election. Muna thus became vice president of the Federal Republic. West Cameroonians waited impatiently for "Great Comrade" Ahidjo to appoint a new Prime Minister for West Cameroon Ahidjo in another manipulation changed the constitution by decree and appointed Muna Prime Minister of West Cameroon².

Thus Ahidjo decided to clear all obstacles from his path in his quest for a unitary state. He firmly believed and rightly too, that Muna being the sole representative of West Cameroonian people both at the federal and state levels would not say no to his vicious projects. Since he owned the gratitude of being in those key positions to him³. However, while Ahidjo was busy setting the stage for the creation of the unitary system to take-off, Dr. J.N. Foncha was canvassing for internal and external support to launch a new political party, the Christian Democratic Alliance (CDA)⁴. The institutionalisation of the unitary state in May 1972 cut him short.

The creation of the CNU in September 1, 1966, the tactful deployment of Muna to undercut Jua as Prime Minister of West Cameroon in 1968, and Foncha as Vice-President of the Federal Republic in 1970 and Ahidjo's illegal manipulation of article 9 (iii), of the Federal Constitution that granted Muna the accumulation of functions, opened the gate way for him to create the United Republic of Cameroon (URC).

VI. 2. The May 6, 1972, President Ahidjo's Announcement

On May 6, 1972, President Ahidjo addressing a special session of the Federal Assembly, announced an impending change-over from the federal structure to a Unitary system. He informed them of his plans to submit a new draft constitution to the people to be endorsed by way of a referendum on Saturday May 20, 1972. The Federal Deputies were the first to be informed of the decision, because in his own words;

... It is only natural that I should wish the National Assembly to be the first to hear this decision and that it is through you, the Representatives of the people, that I should inform the Nation of this decision which is so important for the future of the Cameroon father-land⁵.

Ironically, the people's representatives instead of taking down a deep breath to think over the crucial event that was to affect the lives of generations to come and ask certain questions such as why he should present the draft constitution to the

people through a referendum and not through the Federal legislature as provided for by the Federal Constitution⁶, (thereby calling Mr. President to order of procedure) they got up as if possessed by the devil and sang the National Anthem. By this escapist and conformist act of seeking favouritism they were tacitly giving an advanced endorsement of the one man show of deciding the destiny of a people. After the singing of the Anthem Mr. President continued his informative speech which, inter-alia, explained why the unitary state was preferred to a federal one. He pointed to the fact that the idea of a federation had only been adhered to because it assured the West Cameroon people the multiculturalism and bilingualism which characterised the two sectors of the country would not be suppressed within a reunified Cameroon. The president further elucidated that the cumbersome nature of federal structures were affecting the entire development of the nation as the existence of three governments and four assemblies involved huge expenditure which otherwise would have been invested in providing economic, and socio-cultural facilities for the peoples.

Being aware of the reaction that could crop-up from West Cameroon, particular reference was made regarding the budgetary position of West Cameroon when he said;

It will also be seen that although most services have been federalised the budget of the State of West Cameroon is still experiencing difficulties in spite of a

balancing subsidy from the federation totaling more than 200 million (Francs CFA), that is to say an amount equivalent to approximately three-quarters of the budget⁷.

According to the president the advantages that would accrue from the unitary structure were enormous. It would clearly define its objectives of rational allocation of responsibilities. It would enhance rapid dispatch of public affairs and facilitate administrative procedures. As a matter of fact, it would eliminate duplication of state services and remove bottlenecks from the administration. The president, however emphasised that the unitary state would result in substantial savings in consequence of the abolition of numerous administrative structures⁸.

Since the Federal Parliament operated purely on the French tradition, whereby no questions were asked on the general floor for clarification or debate, the special session rose after listening to the president as prescribed by tradition. As the president's speech indicated the Federal Parliamentarians were the first leaders privileged to be informed. He did seek their opinion as stipulated by the constitution⁹, and no debate was envisaged on the matter either in the Federal House or across the nation. On that maiden occasion of Ahidjo's "launching" of his unitary state, the Federal Deputies who were present the House and the guests at that august occasion did no more than hand clapping and singing his praises. The Federal House at this

point implicitly ceased to exist as its power and authority had undermined by the president's actions which could be describe as a coup d'etat against parliament.

The President's Decrees

As people throughout the Republic were pondering over the cause of event as revealed by the President during the Special Session of the Assembly, on May 6, 1972, he signed decree No. 72 of 238 of May 9, 1972 relating to the publication of the draft constitution and its submission to a referendum. The decree read thus: The president of the Federal Republic of Cameroon, hereby decrees as follows:

1. The draft constitution annexed to this Decree shall be submitted to a referendum on 20 May, 1972.
2. Voters shall have to answer "Yes" of "No" to the following question:

"Do you approve, with a view to consolidating National Unity and accelerating economic, social and cultural development of the nation, the draft constitution submitted to the people of Cameroon by the president of the Federal Republic of Cameroon and instituting a Republic, one and indivisible to be styled the United Republic of Cameroon¹⁰"?

(i) The May 20, 1972 Referendum Campaign

The campaign for a "Yes" vote for the creation of the unitary state kicked-off on May 10, (at 00 hours) and was to end on May 19, at 24.00 hours throughout the country¹¹.

The president opened the campaign on the national radio, appealing to the people to approve his "realistic" constitutional change and vote massively for the creation of the Unitary State that would foster, inter-alia National Unity, social justice and balanced development¹². Powerful campaign teams constituted by the Central committee of the Cameroon National Union (CNU) left Yaounde to the six regions of the Federation to convince militants as well as others to endorse the president's proposal¹³. The population was confronted by the various CNU Central Committee delegations barely three days when the unitary state proposal was announced. The people neither had the draft constitution nor the proposed structure the new republic would take in case of the success of a "YES" vote. Many learnt of it for the first time from the privilege delegations from Yaounde and many equally spent much time admiring the colourful atmosphere than listening to what they were saying. To politically conscious ones, particularly those in West Cameroon, it all sounded as a dream that in two weeks, that is, from May 6 to May 20, the Federal Republic would be changed into a unitary state without the people debating its form and structure, let alone the safeguards of their regional identity. Old people who were living witnesses to the independent and reunification struggle, posed the question in West Cameroon, whether Foncha who "took" them to French Cameroon had sufficient evidence that for the experimental period of ten years they could co-habit with the Francophone? This question came up because it was believed by

most people both literate and illiterates alike that a final clause of reunification with French Cameroon was to be signed after ten years of co-existence. During campaign rallies the delegations were confronted with crucial questions to which vague answers were given. Here no serious blame could be levelled on the various campaign delegates since they were, like the electorates uninformed about the whole idea.

In each of the Regional Headquarters and Divisional Headquarters that the central committee delegations visited, the message was short and clear, a "YES" for "Great Comrade Ahidjo's proposed draft constitution by voting massively". These apostles of the President continued to echo their master's wish and aspiration. Their campaign slogans were: National Unity, social justice, balanced development, economic and cultural prosperity in a unitary state. These future benefits were contrasted sharply with the "evils" of the federal system viz the cumbersome nature of its structures that weighed heavily on the national budget.

The vice-president and Prime Minister of West Cameroon S.T. Muna, who led this political campaign in the West Cameroon area indicated that the post of Vice President in the Federal system of Cameroon was maintained or operated at the cost of 70 million Francs CFA annually. The adoption of the unitary system would led to the abolition of this post and those of Prime Ministers and Secretaries of States in the two federated states. This would, indeed, help to lessen the burden on the national

treasury. The surplus that the government would realize would be ploughed into development projects. West Cameroonians in particular were further told that among the advantages which the unitary state would bring were: increase of salaries equal to that of their brothers in East Cameroon; allocation of family allowance, rents and duty post allowances. So lofty were the goals of the unitary state projected that the future appeared bright. During the campaign rally held in Mamfe Grammar School auditorium, the electorate put some pertinent questions to the head of the campaign team who happened to be their Honourable Prime Minister at the time. Among these questions were:

1. Now that the posts of the Prime Minister and Vice President would be abolished, what would happen to you who represent our people?
2. Is it only the unitary system that can enable us enjoy what East Cameroonians are enjoying and we call them our brothers?
3. What guarantees our minority status now that West Cameroon as a political unit would be abolished?

These questions may have appeared childish and funny at the time but the consequences are emerging. Answering them, the team leader merely said that in the United Republic there would be no discrimination. He behaved like Foncha who took a rather naive position when he was signing the reunification pact with Ahidjo in October 1, 1961 and only realised its dangers when he was thrown out of office nine years after (1961-1970). In spite of

all these outlined advantages, politically minded Western Cameroonians were still sceptical even more than ever before. On the idea of balanced development, they wanted to know if by this, West Cameroon which was lagging behind East Cameroon could be developed to meet up with East Cameroon in key areas such as communication infrastructure, industrial development, the building of Cape Limbo deep sea port in Victoria and (the) less concentration on the Douala riverport where millions of Francs CFA were spent each year to make it passable for ships berthing 50kms away from the Atlantic. They doubted the truth that balanced development would endow Tiko and Victoria with industries as on the Wouri riverport in Douala. The people in the middle of these doubts however promised a massive turnout cautioning that it must be a give and take process.

Before the conclusion of the election campaigns, and indeed prior to the end of the polls, local party leaders had begun sending messages of support to comrade Ahidjo on behalf of their constituencies¹⁴. The numerous messages and resolutions of approval and support emerged as evidence that the president's appeal of May 6 answered the profound aspirations and expectations of the Cameroonians people. How true this reflected the wishes of the people is a different story. The messages endorsing the CNU leadership plan was nothing less than intimidation of those who wanted to stay aloof.

In the evening of May 19, 1972, as the various campaign teams returned to their bases, the President went on the air

again, appealing to the people to give him a massive "YES" vote. Among other things he said:

I have already said, ... that, knowing the loyalty of the great majority of the Cameroonian people towards the Cameroon National Union as well as the trust and active support that they have always accorded me in carrying out the policy of our great national party, I have no doubt about the outcome of tomorrow's referendum¹⁵.

(ii) Voting and Result of the Referendum

On May 20, 1972, Cameroonians went to the polls en masse to endorse Ahidjo's draft constitution to create a unitary state which the president himself described as "indeed in keeping with the CNU abiding aim of building one Nation, one fatherland in a single state"¹⁶. Each polling station had two boxes, a white box for "YES" votes and a black box for "NO" votes. There were supposed to be white and black ballot papers corresponding to the boxes. What made the voting in most polling stations undemocratic was the fact that the black papers were not put at the disposal of the voters as the white papers were. Determined voters who asked for the black ballot papers were styled subversive elements. The number of black votes were not all made public. In most polling stations, the officials simply enveloped all the white ballot papers and registered voters on presenting

themselves were merely given the envelope to put into the white box.

The overwhelming "Yes" vote in such voting circumstances was no surprise to any one. In such a monolithic political system with the absence of an opposition or international observers voting in any event was a mere ritual. Most polling stations emerged with a 100% and the least being 99.90% as Ministers, President Director Generals (PDG), Parliamentarians, local party officials worked hard to portray to president Ahidjo their loyalties as reflected in the massive affirmative vote in the places of their birth. It also showed their attachment to the goals of the President, the symbol of national unity and social justice. These people had to do this because Ahidjo's system of appointing people either to political posts or in the civil service was based on favouritism rather than merit.

Following the overwhelming "YES" vote, on May 23, in Yaounde, the outgoing members of the Federal government, the members of the political Bureau of the CNU, as well as members of the governments of the federated states present in Yaounde that day, called on El Hadji Ahmadou Ahidjo to congratulate him on the success of the constitutional referendum of May 20, 1972¹⁷. The presidency of the republic issued a statement following the "YES" vote after the May 20, referendum to avoid any confusion. The communique stated that for the new constitution to come into force, it was necessary to comply with certain regulations.

First of all, that the referendum results must be officially proclaimed by the counting committees provided for in article 6 of Law No. 69/LF/15 of 10 November 1969 fixing the conditions and the procedure of the referendum. The official proclamation of results, the communique continued, must take place ten days after the date of the referendum after which the new constitution must be promulgated according to article 10 of the above mentioned law. The article reads:

The President of the Federal Republic promulgates by decree the law adopted by the people - mention of the promulgation of results must be made in the decree promulgating it¹⁸.

In conformity with this clarification, therefore, the constitution of the unitary state had to come in force only after the date of its promulgation. The federal structure was therefore maintained provisionally to ensure the dispatch of current affairs of state governed by the Federal constitution until the unitary constitution came into force¹⁹.

On May 29, 1972, the commission of general Census chaired by the Minister of Territorial Administration published the results of the referendum as follows:

Registered voters	3,236,280
"YES" Votes	3,177,846
"NO" votes	176
Ballot papers declared Null and Void	1,612

In terms of the states the results were as follows:

East Cameroon: YES	99.97%
West Cameroon: YES	99.84%
The entire country: YES	99.90%

Source: CAM-NEWS MAY 30, 1972.

The figure above clearly illustrates that the people said "YES" to the new draft constitution. The highest number of "NO" votes, although very insignificant as to influence the adoption of the unitary system, came from West Cameroon. According to official result, 16% of the total number of registered voters in West Cameroon said "No" meanwhile .03% in East Cameroon said NO to the question.

The May 20, referendum described by politically minded Cameroonians as "Ahidjo's coup d'etat" was described by the President as a "peaceful revolution" marking a turning point in Cameroon political history. The peoples of both states were not given room to discuss the project. The speed with which Ahidjo took to implement the unitary state became suspicious to many. Ahidjo's unilateral decision to effect this major change of the constitution that reunified Southern Cameroons and Cameroon Republic marked the beginning of "Monarchical/Presidential" rule in Cameroon. Parliament now became a rubber stamp since the president at any time could simply change the constitution by decree and may or may not formally inform them. Just as the consensus to create a "parti unifie" (CNU) marked the end of democracy in Cameroon in 1966, the unitary system began another

new chapter, that of presidential dictatorship and abuses of constitutional arms of government, particularly the legislature and judiciary. Before the statement issued by the presidency mentioned above,²⁰ on the 23 May 1972, people expected the president according to article 47 (III) of the federal constitution, to table the draft constitution before the Federal House for debate in conformity with the above amendment act. The president obviously feared his proposed constitution would be rejected by the Federal National Assembly. To bail himself out of embarrassment, he issued the famous decree No DE-72-270 of 2/6/1972 by which he abrogated the Founban Accord, abolished the federal constitution and in effect instituted the constitution styled the "Constitution of the United Republic of Cameroon" which he, without consulting the people or their representatives, drew up secretly²¹.

From May 1972 - May 1973 as president Ahidjo ruled by decree, he dissolved East Cameroon House of Assembly and Government, the West Cameroon Assembly, House of Chiefs and Government as well as the Federal House. He equally by decree instituted articles 50 - 60 of the Cameroon penal code by decree. As Fongum Gorji - Dinka observed;

He "Ahidjo then installed his so-called United Republic of Cameroon and the system of government by which Cameroon, its people and resources became forfeited to whoever becomes the Head of State. He also setup institution

and men to operate the system. And that is the system which we have today and which is now disintergrating our people. Instead of government by dialogue, we have government by terror. Instead of law and order by persuasion we have law and order by banditry and piracy. He Ahidjo himself has since been referring to it as "peaceful Revolution"... Thus from 2nd June 1972, our country passed from the era of constitutional government to that of a junta. Today's government, today's institutions, today's system and today's style of leadership were installed by the junta. And that is the junta system we must destroy otherwise it will destroy us.²²

VI.3 The Birth of the Unitary State

The unitary state came into legality on June 2, 1972 when President Ahidjo promulgated by decree the constitution governing its existence. Though the constitution was promulgated on the above date, the working machinery of the Unitary State were not yet in place and thus Cameroon momentarily experienced a one-man rule headed by Ahidjo from June 1972 to June 1973. During this interval there existed no executive, no federal parliament and no state legislature. The president took time to re-oriented the Federal and State Agencies to conform with the unitary state structure. During this transitional period all work in the

Republic came virtually to a stand still, while people were being appointed to man the newly designed structures. Appointed officials were busy moving to Yaounde to take up their new functions. Buea, the former headquarters of West Cameroon, was emptied of its top personnels as almost all of them were appointed to the various ministries in Yaounde²³. Files of West Cameroon civil servants were equally transferred to Yaounde. It was quite an exciting wave of new movement eastward as if to Eldorado. The anglophone population which during the Federal structure was very small suddenly increased because many francophone people whose parents settled in Southern Cameroon and who had escaped either French colonial tyrannic rule or terrorism from French Cameroon rediscovered their family members. It was from among this group of people that the Ahidjo government exploited to discover really who an anglophone was.

The "Constitution Octroyée" of the United Republic

The 1961 Foumban Constitution évoluée and the 1972 Ahidjo's Constitution Octroyée,²⁴ bears interesting reflections of Cameroon's changing political realities as formulated by the political leaders of those two dates. As discussed in Chapter IV: 3, the Foumban Accord emerged after a long struggle and compromise between the centralists-type-of-government adherents led by Ahmadou Ahidjo from Cameroon Republic and Dr. J.N. Foncha, leading the Southern Cameroons politicians, who believed in power sharing. The outcome was that he retained as much political identity as possible for the West Cameroonians he had reluctantly

carried into the federal union following the UN imposed two options in the plebiscite of February 11, 1961. In all respect Ahidjo's Constitution octroyee was an illegal abrogation of the Foumban Constitution approved by the UN for the Trusteeship Territory of Southern Cameroons and the former Cameroon Republic²⁵.

It made away with provisions guaranteeing the minority rights of the West Cameroonian people in power sharing: territorially, institutionally and personality wise. The one clause president Ahidjo entrenched in the new constitution that appealed to the anglophones was that of bilingualism²⁶, a unique pluricultural aspect of the two cultural groups. By creating the United Republic the president carefully shifted the opposition against his rule in East Cameroon to the national problem of Anglophones and Francophones whereby the two culturally diverse groups looked upon him as the umpire. The imposed "Constitution Octroyee" as Victor T. Le Vine rightly observed; "To all intents and purposes there was no national debate on its provisions: the pre-referendum campaign was designed to secure an overwhelming turnout in its favour rather than to provoke discussion on its contents"²⁷.

The 1972 "Constitution Octroyee", eliminated by intent the office of the Vice President which it considered superfluous²⁸. In line with those institutions that disappeared were: the Prime Ministers and cabinets of the Federated States, the State Legislatures and the West Cameroon House of Chiefs. The

"Constitution Octroyee" which was a mockery democratic principles stated that "the state authority shall be exercised by: the president of the Republic and the National Assembly"²⁹. But in essence, most if not all, the effective powers resided in the president, who in addition to the state functional machinery peculiar of a one party system, embodied all powers that were formerly exercised by the state governments, the Federal Executive the Federal legislature and the State Assemblies. He was empowered to appoint and dismiss all ministers³⁰. He alone could declare a State of Emergency³¹ and a State of Siege³² by decree, and "he shall inform the nation by message of his decision"³³.

As it is traditional with the one party system the president as Chairman was to draw up a single list of faithful militants, in consultation with the Central Committee, to become members of the National Assembly. The president of the Unicameral National Assembly was equally to be chosen by the Party Chairman and presented to the Assembly men as the party's candidate. His candidature was to be endorsed by fellow party parliamentarians by acclamation. The institution has legislative powers accredited to it. Following this provision therefore, the Assembly President by all implication is a principal source of legislation. He could enact ordinances that have force of law and execute provisions of the Constitution not otherwise spelt out therein. The National Assembly was to meet twice every year with a duration of 30 days for each session. The opening date of

each session was to be decided by the Assembly's Steering Committee after consultation with the President of the Republic. Owing to the fact that the Legislative House was composed of members of a single party, it seems unlikely that it could be anything more than a periodic convention assembled to shape and endorse the government's proposals. In the unicameral Assembly among the members was selected group known as the party's parliamentary bureau. It is this group that was to meet shortly before the solemn opening of the parliamentary year to elect Deputies into the various post of responsibility in the Assembly for a term of one year. Because of the Deputies being members of the same party with the president, there were no disagreement, between the Assembly and the President.

The 1972 constitution formerly marked the last days of once flourishing political pluralism in the Federal Republic of Cameroon. It was the president who appointed councilors in municipalities, and their chairmen, as well as the judges of the supreme court, by decree. He reserves the sole right to dismiss any of them³⁴. Elections into public institutions became a mere ritual as the electorate had no alternative but to endorse the list submitted to it by the party. After each ritual exercise the air was full of messages of support and congratulations to president for the success of his list and reaffirmation of attachment to his ideology and the institution he represented.

One important clause of the 1972 "Constitution Octroyee" which seemed to have featured by accident, that Cameroonians of

good will consoled themselves with is Article 3(I and II) being the 1967 Bill (Law) that was entrenched in the Constitution³⁵.

The 1967 Law dealing with right to form Political Parties or Associations was adopted into law by Federal National Assembly at its plenary session on May 23, 1967 presided over by its First Vice President Honourable Lifio Carr. This law was adopted barely seven months after all the existing political parties dissolved themselves on September 1, 1966 and form the Cameroon National Union. The purpose of this law was to guarantee multi-party democracy since in the CNU, parties that formed it were not allowed to maintain their individual identities within. It therefore became imperative that this law be enacted so that those who became dissatisfied with the "partie Unifie" CNU can break away and form their own parties. This law graciously became Article 3(I & II) of the 1972 Constitution.

The articles read thus:

- (I) Political parties and groups may take part in elections. They shall be formed and shall exercise activities in accordance with the law.
- (II) Such parties shall be bound to respect the principle of democracy and of national sovereignty and unity³⁶.

The president and chairman of the party perhaps inserted this clause in his 1972 constitution to give it a democratic character in the eyes of the free world. The effects of this famous Article 3(I & II) was not perceived at the time, as it is the case today (1990) almost two decades since its initiation.

The fact that this document built power around an individual, his family members and friends, marked the commencement of an era whereby - "Cameroonians continue to be misinformed, abused, deceived, improverished, treated as immature and taken for granted by a callous and rapacious one party political oligarchy³⁷". Following the abrogation of the Federal Constitution in 1972, the Constitution that followed became the personal document of the president, he could at anytime manipulate it in any form, by issuing decree to effect a change without the endorsement of his own named Assembly. This act of manipulation first surfaced about three years after its enactment, when at the Douala CNU "congress of Maturity", President Ahidjo announced his plan to modify the constitution so as to introduce the post of Prime Minister. The Prime Minister, he emphasised, was to be the president's constitutional successor³⁹. It is rather ironic that Ahidjo once again recognised the need for a prime minister whose function he had earlier criticised and described as superfluous under the 1961 constitution that led to the reunified Cameroon. This game clearly indicated that his ultimate task was to eliminate the anglophone who by the 1961 Constitution, was his constitutional assistant and successor⁴⁰. In the name of "National Unity" the West Cameroon people lost this constitutional right which clearly indicated that, in the new arrangement an anglophone can never become the president of Cameroon. Still in the name of "national Unity" Ahidjo's constitutional successor (Paul Biya), after

succeeding him, carried out in the same manner, the following unilateral amendments of the constitution. On February 4, 1984, the United Republic of Cameroon became the Republic of Cameroon as it was in January 1, 1960 when it became a sovereign state before reunification on October 1, 1961⁴¹. This was nothing short of an endorsement that the assimilation process of the anglophones was complete. The initiator of the project held as a defence that the world "United" still indicates that the two cultural entities were still divided. The era of a Cameroon Republic tout court (simply), marked an advancement in Cameroon history in terms of national integration. The question asked at this juncture by politically minded citizens is; who is integrating who, and was it not to be national harmonisation of the two inherited cultural values?

By the same modification, the post of Prime Minister which, Biya held under Ahidjo was abolished by the constitution⁴². Apparently this change had no national justification since it was not viewed as superfluous, but for the fear of conflict of authority. The amendment conferred the succession to the presidency in case of death or resignation to the President to the National Assembly, who must organise fresh elections between 20 and 40 days⁴³. The president of the Assembly, according to the amendment, should neither amend the constitution, organise a referendum, nor run for the presidency of the republic⁴⁴.

The new president was perhaps just modest (due to the economic crisis) not to have called another referendum to endorse

a "New Deal" Constitution that would suit the going back to the Republic of Cameroon. The eight amendments effected between 1984 and 1985 rendered the "Constitution Octroyee" of 1972 a worthless document in many areas.

Owing to these changing face of the constitution therefore, it is no wonder that the elite of the anglophone provinces resident in Douala addressed a powerful memorandum to President Paul Biya lamenting, amongst other things, that:

We have over the years watched with increasing alarm the various unilateral manipulation of the Constitution to the extent that the English-speaking region of Cameroon is now being treated by the administration either as a conquered territory or as a buffer zone, and its citizens as foreigners. Because of this colonial status which has been imposed on us both dictatorially and through political chicanery, we now find ourselves almost completely stripped off that cherished British cultural heritage to which some of us were born and nurtured. And while actively engaged in this cultural deprivation process our francophone brothers have not only jealously preserved their French culture (our francophone brothers regard - France as their home), but have mobilised and unleashed a

force for the total assimilation of their English-speaking "brothers". This force has been christened "INTEGRATION"⁴⁵.

The Political and Administrative Set Up of the Unitary System

The new political set up was made known following a presidential decree outlining the general organisation and responsibilities of the unitary government on June 8, 1972. By this date the three governments had disappeared in favour of the unitary executive. The four Legislative Assemblies wound up to form the National Assembly with a total of 120 members⁴⁶. The state protocol was altered at the top echelon following the elimination of the post of the Vice President from the political arrangement. In a hierarchical order the President of the United Republic was followed by the President of the National Assembly and third in the order was the President of the activated Economic and Social Council. When the post of Premier was created in 1975 the protocol order changed as he became the No. 2 man. The ministers of state "Ministre D'Etat" were the fifth in order of seniority followed by minister and vice ministers.

The creation of the unitary state provided impetus for finishing the job of centralisation Ahidjo all along was yearning for. With respect to local and regional institutions the presidential decree of July 24, 1972, carved out the former federated states of West and East Cameroon into seven provinces. West Cameroon became divided into two provinces:

South West Province Headquarters Buea

North West Province Headquarters Bamenda and

the former East Cameroon was carved into five provinces:

Northern Province Headquarters Garoua

Western Province Headquarters Bafoussam

South Central Province Headquarters Yaounde

Eastern Province Headquarters Bertoua

Littoral Province Headquarters Douala

Governors were appointed to man the provinces and the posts of the Federal Inspectors of Administration was hence forth abolished. The Governors appointed by presidential decree were answerable to the Minister of Territorial Administration. The divisions, sub-divisions and districts were still under the command of a prefect, sub-prefect and district head. They in turn were subjected to the orders of the Governor in his area of jurisdiction. The unitary system saw the creation of new divisions, sub-divisions and districts with the aim of bringing the administration nearer to the people which, as the president indicated, "... will enable us in the course of the day-to-day administration of the State, to take into account local peculiarities". It is hoped, he added, "that such measures would remedy some of the problems associated with centralization"⁴⁷. In East Cameroon the advent of the unitary state ended a variant of the classic French Prefectorial system she had maintained from colonial era to 1972. The classic French Prefectorial System she adopted after independence, operated jointly with another

involving urban and rural communes and an array of major and minor chieftancies; the latter being legacies from the colonial period. In this sector again the relationship between the chiefs and the government's agents became one in which the chiefs became subordinate to the administration. The administrative set up after May 20, 1972 preserved some older structures in the new arrangement; thus former West Cameroon local councils continued to enjoy limited autonomy while in former East Cameroon, the Communes also continued to function in the same manner. In the whole exercise the reality was that power did change. The francophone system became prevalent throughout the nation. Public and local administration fell under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Territorial Administration as during the Federal system.

(1) The Functioning Mechanism of the Centralised Bureaucracy

The first government of the United Republic was named on July 3, 1972 by a presidential decree⁴⁸. It has a total of 28 members of government drawn from the 7 provinces as follows: Central South 7, East 1, Littoral 1, North 6, North West 4, West 6 and South West 3⁴⁹. The provincial Governors had no right to initiate and take any decision on any matter without authority from Yaounde. This equally applied to Provincial Delegates representing their various ministers at provincial level. Appointments, even those of primary school Headmasters, clerks in offices, promotions and even transfers of clerical staff, emanated only from Yaounde. All workers in the public sector

received their salaries directly from the Ministry of Finance which became known as the "super Market". All government servants having a problem for example with their salary advancement, be it non-payment or an error on their pay vouchers, had to go to Yaounde to resolve it.

Apart from this rigid centralised bureaucracy with concentration of power in Yaounde, the civil service also became abysmally corrupt, inefficient, while appointments to public offices and parastatals were based on ethnic favouritism. An African Magazine commentator noted that these were being encouraged by the President⁵⁰. In administrative procedures, the bottle-necks are so numerous that it is difficult getting a job or having one's dossier gone through even after one had secured employment for reward purposes. Because of the awkward bureaucratic structures established under the pretexts of national unity, those charged with the task of processing dossiers, preferred to wait until those affected left the extreme ends of the republic to chase the dossier in Yaounde. The national daily Cameroon Tribune viewed with regret that "going to Yaounde for this purpose you must be armed with 'dash' to tip at every table the dossier is to be processed"⁵¹. Owing to bureaucratic bottle-necks and the irresponsible behaviour of the workers of the ministries in Yaounde, duly employed citizens go for months, some even for years, without salaries. This of course sowed seeds of discontent and revenge on others when such an affected individual happens one day to find himself working in

the central administration also. Thus the chain of evil and hatred continues, disguised in the name of national unity, which in reality is to guarantee the external rule of a group of individuals over the masses.

The obnoxious system is generally strange to the anglophones and indeed alien even to the educated elite. In this system the civil service core is divided into two categories - "functionaries and contracteurs". Unless an employer had been confirmed (popularly referred to as integration) he can never receive fringe benefits viz: family allowance, duty allowance and rent allowance, which contributes substantially to worker's pay. Once those handling and processing the dossier had had their share in advance it will go through but if the individual involved does not cooperate, the dossier submitted will always go missing at one point or the other which means a lot of money as each attached document must bear a five hundred CFA fiscal stamp⁵². The system therefore, has "made some ministries to be the most busy and the most congested in Yaounde like the ministries of public service and finance"⁵³. Civil servants go on retirement without prepared decision for their pension benefits. They have to start compiling a long list of dossier before the benefits are paid.

The sufferings and frustrations created by the bottle-necks of this system are many and painful. To survive and breathe everyone must visit Yaounde. The brainwashing psychology is creating the most unhealth atmosphere in the minds of victims.

These victims "cry no salary yet" in frustration everywhere and go borrowing either to live or make journeys to Yaounde to chase dossiers for salary payments. This of course means the suspension of work for an indefinite number of weeks or months the worker is in Yaounde running up and down from the tutelage ministry to the public service and finally to finance for codification and payment.

The bottle-necks and slowness of the bureaucratic system as elucidated above is further worsened by the two shift system imposed by the ruling class. This two shift work-system keeps government workers busy struggling on bad city roads to get to their jobs. By the time they got to their respective destinations they are so exhausted that they are not able to do effective work. The two shift system entails a lot of expenditure and poorly paid workers are forced to take bribe to survive within the system. The two shift system accounts for the existing corruption in government offices, (bureaux), perpetuated by the less privileged ones who do not control any government budget to steal from. The agents need money to survive in Yaounde in particular, and owners of dossier need their documents to move, hence without bribing, nothing works and this is illegal but has become an established way of life. The picture painted above is that of an exploiting system. A social scientist, Mr N. Nfor, in the Political Directorate of the Ministry of Territorial Administration, maintains that "the citizens are forced to accept bribery and corruption as a norm of the society as one after the

other comes to realize that, that is the only means by which one can survive, as each comes to realize that in the society there are no rights left for those at the bottom"⁵⁴. The general cries of the masses about these ills instituted by the deleterious structures fall just on deaf ears and no efforts are made to redress the anomalies. The evil "corruption", says Huntington, "Obviously exists in all societies but it is also obviously more common at times in the evolution of a society than at other times"⁵⁵.

The institutionalisation of corruption and the legalisation of favouritism and tribalism put Ahidjo's post-referendum Cameroon established on the platform of "National Unity and Society Justice"⁵⁶ in question more so as it concerns the anglophones. In the Cameroonian, context, it is obviously a misrepresentation of the real situation. According to Huntington, corruption is a product of social and economic modernisation. If this be the case therefore social modernisation is a negative phenomenon for it ushers decay into the body polity. Corruption from all empirical evidence is a capitalist tendency. It is a dishumanised means of exploiting the masses without mercy or redress. Capitalism, says Walter Rodney "did bring social services to European workers (in Africa) - firstly, as a by-product of providing such services for the bourgeoisie and the middle class, and later as a deliberate act of policy"⁵⁷. In the Ahidjo regime public servants, who were the privilege recipients of the patronage indulged in corruption

thereby becoming parasites⁵⁸. In such circumstances the masses have lost confidence in the existing political institutions, which the well placed people used without pity in exploiting them. The masses in retaliation to these acts of inhumanity, have become agitated, apathetic and frustrated and thus became disloyal to the regime.

The cries against corruption, embezzlement, swindling, syphoning of public funds, tribalism, nepotism, favouritism, inefficiency, political blackmail and state terrorism are in effect demonstrating the absence of an authentic democratic political system. These anomalies simply illustrate that the 1972 set up was a fraudulent political system operated through a cumbersome bureaucracy. The Unitary state because of this structure became very wasteful, expensive and more difficult to manage than the Federal Republic that had three Governments and four Assemblies. The system has no public service commission that objectively examined the dossiers of workers for appointments. Nor are presidential appointments to government corporations⁵⁹ subjected to parliamentary scrutiny. The end result is that the system offers no security and reward for hard work. Those fortunate ones who happened to have entered the club of the ruling class do so through the proposal of a member of government or one who is in one way or the other close to the president. When these favoured ones who, in most cases junior staff in the civil service, become service chiefs it generates discontent and hence it paralyses the system.

Since the system has instilled social insecurity what would likely happen in future will be for each ethnic group or region to fight and install its own faithful man in power. The daily exhortation of militants to be vigilant more than ever before is a sign that a new social order should be sought, to avoid total disintegration of the Nation.

VI.4 The Implications of the Unitary System for the Minority

The unitary system, has not brought the West Cameroonians and its region the good tidings as propagated by Ahidjo in May 20, 1972. The ethnocentric system only succeeded in integrating the institutions of the Federal Republic and not the minds of the people. The people of West Cameroon from May 20, 1972 lost their autonomy which they had fought for and kept jealously since 1955. As discussed in detail in Chapter II, the nationalist struggle for an identity for Southern Cameroons began in the 1940s. She became a quasi-region in 1955 and a full region in 1957. The nationalist fight to secede from the eastern Region and later to endorse a "yes" vote during the UN organised plebiscite of February 11, 1961, was all desperate attempts to secure a unique identification for the people and region known as Southern Cameroons after the Franco-British partition of 1916. After the plebiscite, following the UN endorsement of the Foumban Constitutional Accord, Southern Cameroons which became West Cameroon in Federation with the Cameroon Republic became an autonomous state guaranteed by that constitution.

By the 1972 arrangement West Cameroon, divided into two provinces, became obligatorily subjected to the East Cameroon system of administration. The region became open to the policy of assimilation and humiliating provocations. This was also as a result of the fact that the 1972 project encouraged egoism by the majority group, and this completely ignored the feelings of the minority and their problems. The francophone's negative reactions towards the anglophone shows that the "yes" vote of 99.87% cast on May 20, 1972 by them, was rigged or ingenuine.⁶⁰

The antipathy between the English and French speaking is Cameroonians is exemplified by the fact that the average francophone do not believe he shares the same nationality as his English-speaking counterpart. The francophones addresses the Anglophones:

"les anglo - fools", "Les biafrains", "Les nigerians",

"Les assimilés", "Les Outres - mungos", "Les entranger"

(Fools, Biafrains, Nigerians, the assimilated those over

the mango, foreigners). When anglophone runs into a bitter

quarrel with a francophone the first angry words to be thrown on him are,

"Est-ce-que C'est nous qui vous avez invite?"

(Is it us who invited you?)

C'est vous meme qui etes venus nous joindre:

(You people opted to join us)

Vous n'avez qu'a supporter tout".

(You have no option but to endure)

This gives a vivid picture of the mind of the francophone. The anglophones in turn do not take this as a fate from God. While regretting their being in this awful situation which they could not help, they put forward some form of resistance. They refer to francophones as, "frogs (maintaining that a good one is only that which is dead) franco-fools, and people who refer to France as their Home".

Even at official circles anglophones are not openly accepted but privately francophone barons appreciate them for their honesty and hard work. They would use them as tools by appointing them to certain offices to correct situations when they go worse and when the situation has been redressed and money started flowing they will quietly take the anglophone away and a francophone is appointed to replace them. A critical and objective investigation into this state of affairs reveals that: these anglophones are dropped from positions of favour because they have for decades refused to learn the rules and regulations of the game of the day which is "Mange et je mange aussi" or Eat and let me also eat". They refuse to "pinch" and thus no other person can pinch. Being there as a stone that blocks illegal "milk and honey" from flowing into foreign accounts of his patrons, he is quietly removed to allow its flow. Their inadaptability explains partly why they have never been appointed to head certain ministries and public corporations including even those which are situated in their own area such as the SONARA i.e. the oil Refinery Corporation.(see chapter VII). This

assertion has, today, been justified by the fact that there has been no anglophone political leader since reunification accused for syphoning public funds as their numerous francophones colleagues, who have milliads of Francs CFA in their foreign accounts.⁶¹ To calm down temperament the cream of the francophone society that knows the gains of the deal led by the president usually emerge with reconciliatory political rhetoric "that there are no first class and second class citizens in Cameroon". Co-existence in the union had been characterised by friction and in-security since 1972 as the anglophones infused with a sense of British freedom cannot accept that independence means submission to arrogance and contempt from people whom they thought wee "brothers".⁶²

Through state security brutality and political intimidation, the regime had, to some extent, been able to mute, although it had not entirely, dispel the fear of anglophones who had been oppressively dominated by their francophone so-called "brothers". To avoid any strong opposition by the anglophones, the regime adopted a policy of divide and rule. Because of this divisive method the two anglophone provinces spent more of their time quarreling and fighting within themselves over political issues. This gave the "new master" greenlight to continue the exploitation of its human and natural resources without a corresponding development. ✓ What becomes visible is evidence of colonisation as is seen in many domains. The unilateral abrogation of the 1961 Foumban constitution that guaranteed the

rights of the West Cameroonians as a political entity and cultural group. The Yoke hydro-electricity Dam in Muyuka was closed down for no reasons other than political to make Anglophones dependent on electricity from Edea hundred of kilometres away. Defending the ethnocentric system, Ministry of Mines and Powers advanced vague reasons that it was closed down due to constant light failure. Anyone who had lived in Buea or Victoria would bear testimony that this excuse is a fallacy. When Honourable Tabong Kema, Minister of Mines and Power in 1985 asked for an estimate to enable him revive the dam, he was given a bill that could build a new Dam. Asked the question why it was closed at all and why the millions of francs CFA used in bringing light from Edea could not be used to increase the capacity of the Dam? At this point the sincere answer that emerged was that it was all political⁶³. A conclusion can then be drawn that the reason is that should there be any protest against the regime in this region a total blackout could easily be effected and this would cause panic and fear and would equally ease the advancement of troops. The importance of controlling a power source need not be emphasised here. Water supplies that were realised through community effort and some foreign aids were taken over by the Water Corporation SNEC - without compensation but high consumption rates were imposed⁶⁴. When a francophone security agent commits murder in the anglophone provinces he is never known to have been punished in accordance with the law. In some of such cases, to please the people on the spot, the criminal

was arrested and sent to French Cameroon. On May 16, 1982, on the verge of President Ahidjo's official visit to Britain, he by decree changed the name of Victoria named after Queen Victoria of England in 1958 to Limbe. The name of a small stream in the town named after a German engineer who built the bridge over it called Limberg⁶⁵.

From 1972, to promote what is regarded by a cross section of anglophones as attempt at ensuring assimilation, government started the building of francophone schools in ex-West Cameroon. On the other hand, government action was not reciprocal where an anglophone school was approved, the parents of the pupils in most cases had to provide the buildings and in some case employed private teachers. Government intervention when it did come was insignificant. In anglophone's technical schools mostly french-speaking teachers are posted there to teach. Lectures are delivered to anglophone students with no former knowledge of French language in either French or pidgin English. This by all indications being a deliberate attempt to undermine the standard of English education and culture. Worst still, the technical examination set for these schools for the end of course examination are badly translated.

Reforms on issues affecting anglophones are never carefully thought over or opened up to debates so as to arrive at a meaningful conclusion. One of such reforms was the reorganisation of the General Certificate of Education GCE announced by the Education Minister September 27, 1983. By this

order introducing group certificate schemes for the Cameroon G.C.E. examination was to begin in June 1985 for the Ordinary Level and in June 1987 for the Advanced Level⁶⁶. Because the proposed change was not given a careful thought it back-fired. The anglophone students in Yaounde University and secondary school students in the anglophone provinces took to the streets in protest. Anglophone groups addressed Memoranda to the Minister condemning the proposed change. The argument of the anglophones was not very much that of the introduction of a group certificate but the syllabus which the minister, using some anglophone mediocre educationists privately and unilaterally drew up. The central themes of criticism revolved around two points: (i) while accepting a broad-base examination at the Ordinary level, the petitioners disagreed with the minister on the shallowness of the syllabus of the Advanced level. The syllabus, in fact laid more emphasis on auxiliary subjects, (ii) the anglophones rejected the classification of successful candidates into Divisions, such as Division one, Division Two, Division Three and the fact that it was the minister who had the discretion to award such certificates⁶⁷ (see appendix I). From a global perspective even if the two points which these petitioners had raised were considered, realistically, the programme could not have worked following those dates the minister stipulated. The minister ought to have realised that such a programme needed 14 years: 7 years primary schooling, 5 years secondary and 2 years for the Advanced level, to succeed.

Secondly, it could have been unworkable because the system as prevailing now is that, courses are taught following the pattern of examination setting rather than examinations set following the programmes taught. It is clear from the above that this system was end at slowing down the progress of Western Education in the Anglophone area.

In spite of the numerous protests and the anglophone university students mot, while their francophone compatriots were in class the government cared little. Things took a turning point mid November 1983 when in the Central Committee meeting of the sole party (CNU) Professor Bernard Fonlon expressed his indignation over the fact that one part of the country was on "fire" and the government was silent about it⁶⁹. He addressed the bureau for four hours on the matter. Owing to his pressure an ad-hoc committee was set up headed by Premier Ayang Luc to listen to all parties and report to government as a matter of urgency. To put an end to the University student's strike a delegation led by the President of the National Assembly which included Prof. Bernard Fonlon and E.T. Egbe, addressed the anglophone students and called on them to resume classes that government was looking with deep concern into the matter. Following the report of the Prime Minister, government found itself in an embarrassing situation and a circular letter was issued withdrawing the reform project on December 5, 1983. To enable government have a better understanding of the matter and effect acceptable reforms, a permanent commission was set up

under the auspices of Professor Mbouï Joseph. The commission's chairman was not only a sociologist but also a francophone with no sound background knowledge about the G.C.E. education and examinations. Since Professor Mbouï's commission was set up in December 1983 it has never published its findings.

In retrospect it should be mentioned that since independence and reunification the Cameroon educational systems inherited from Britain and France have never succeeded in undergoing a form of restructuring to reflect the needs of independent Cameroon, let alone the harmonisation of the two systems. Cameroonian Educationists viz: Professor Omar Yembe, Prof. Maxcelle Towa and Dr. A.D. Mengot have on several occasions submitted educational reform projects to government on its request and none has ever been implemented.

On January 8, 1976 when the Cameroon government signed an agreement with the British for the creation of the Cameroon General Certificate of Education (G.C.E.) Examination, it was clearly stated that the following subjects will no longer be offered after September 1977:

- I. British Commonwealth and Empire History
- II. British Constitution
- III. British Government and Political systems
- IV History (British Economic)
- V Religious knowledge⁷⁰.

The government gave concrete reasons why the above subjects were to be excluded. Among these reasons were that there were no

teachers to teach and correct student's scripts in addition to being irrelevant and of no importance to the country. The Anglophone church leaders agreed with government that item I - IV above could be dropped but viewed with "utter dismay that Religious knowledge should be considered as irrelevant or dropped from the Cameroonian G.C.E. along with other four subjects listed above".⁷¹ The clergy men appealed to government without success to include religious knowledge in the G.C.E. list of subjects. They stressed the importance of Religious knowledge in the context of West Cameroon educational heritage and its synthesis in the overall national life;⁷² as religious instruction is very vital in building a healthy and honest society. Political options such as National Unity, social justice, rigour and moralisation could only be realised if the nation had cultivated supportive citizens to have faith in God, share God's love and fear the Lord.

The anglophones therefore have been having numerous problems of various sorts resulting from abuse of the constitution and direct deprivatation of their civic rights. In a radio interview co-ordinated by George Ngwa entitled "Tribute to Ahmadou Ahidjo", soon after his resignation in mid-November 1982, prominent Western politicians were confronted with the questions of the domination and humiliation of the anglophones. Those interviewed included Dr. J.N. Foncha, S.T. Muna, E.T. Egbe, Professor Bernard Fonlon and Chief V. Mukete. Honourable S.T. Muna who was President of the Assembly and second in command to

Ahidjo was asked why he had not been frank to tell Ahidjo the feeling of anglophones? He replied in anger "did you want me to sign my own death warrant"? Dr. Foncha was confronted with the question whether reunification has been a fruitful venture as they had envisaged and campaigned vigorously for. The answer was that, it has been very disappointing because when he carried Southern Cameroons to French Cameroun in good faith, he thought he was coming to meet his brothers and not political opponents. Dr. Foncha's views were shared by E.T. Egbe with emphasis on the fact that Southern Cameroons had been cheated very badly in the whole deal. From the time West Cameroon "surrendered" to Ahidjo (by forming the CNU) instead of building a united Cameroon based on balanced development and social justice as he hypocritically propagated, it was rather a war of assimilating, neutralising and absorbing the anglophones to lose their district identity⁷³. Those anglophone journalists who confronted the reunificationist advocates with the pertinent questions concerning the problems of the anglophones were of course severely punished. Some of them were told never to walk close to the broadcasting house again let alone enter into it.

When Paul Biya came to the supreme office of the state and proclaimed the New Deal era based on rigour and moralisation, the anglophones thought their saviour had come but to their greatest dismay "the system of government established by Ahidjo is still practiced".⁷⁴

It is on this account that the anglophone elite based in the economic capital Douala in a ten page memorandum told Ahidjo's successor in black and white, among other things, that:

When he had the Federal Structure of government, we managed our affairs in our own way: the ways we were taught; the ways we understood and the ways we were convinced were right. In the name of "peaceful revolution" the federal structure was discarded and a united Republic imposed. The United Republic led to further loss of our historical past as outlined above. Then came the coup de grace or the final blow, namely the removal of the word "United", and the retention of what the French Cameroon was known after independence from France on 1st January 1960 and at reunification as the Republic of Cameroon. This latest stage has been effected in the name of "national integration"... Since the substitution and elimination of political heritage have even been contrived through decrees, we wish, like the respectable commentators of "LE MESSAGER" to ask the question, "CAN INTEGRATION BE REALISED BY DECREES"?⁷⁵.

5.VI The Spread and Backwash Effects of the Unitary System

(i) The Effects on Former West Cameroon

The advent of the unitary system on the contrary had not brought the glories West Cameroonians in particular were told its creation would. Ahidjo in his campaign for this vicious project that placed the people's destiny in the hands of an individual, propagated it using the political rhetoric "National Unity, Social Justice and Balanced Development". In the creation of this deleterious structure he had reiterated "we are better equipped, FELLOW COUNTRYMEN, to face the future. A nation ever more united; a strong and democratic state; a party carrying out its role ever more effective; a plan clearly defining our objectives in the economic, social and cultural fields..."⁷⁶

While in reality the French sector had been reaping more and more the overall fruits of the creation of the unitary system, the English sector has become more desperate than it was during the federal system. During the federal structure as mentioned earlier West Cameroon had her little share of the national cake by right, and had determined what to do with it. With the unitary system it was Ahidjo (personified by his fans and the favoured few in key positions as "Father of National Unity") in Yaounde, who by his benevolent good will dished out what he wants and to whom he wanted. The survival of this sector and its people all depended on the Ahidjo consequently he was looked upon as a tin-god.

When immediately the functioning of the unitary system came into effect, ex-West Cameroon began experiencing the worse moments of her history. She had by this agreement endorsed the legality of assimilation by coercion and absorption in the main stream of French Cameroon. Ni S. N. Tita sadly recounts that since Ahidjo and the French failed to strangulate West Cameroon financially to surrender, being a separate political entity in the Federation, they brought the unitary system to engulf West Cameroon completely under the francophone hegemony without any constitutional rights as provided for by the Federal Constitution⁷⁸.

The post-referendum era clearly showed a deliberate move to reduce the English Sector into a mere economic periphery supplying raw materials and cheap labour. The two sea-ports in West Cameroon which, prior to reunification, ranked close to Nigeria's sea-ports (as regards foreign trade) were paralysed and neglected (see the table 10 below).

TABLE 10

TONNAGE OF CARGO UNLOADED AT EACH PORT IN 1959 AND 1960 AT
NIGERIA'S PORTS

	UNLOADED		LOADED	
	1959	1960	1959	1960
LAGOS	1,795,179	2,171,749	1,142,181	955,164
SAPELE	64,023	104,316	293,477	345,025
WARRI	57,283	66,434	52,850	51,303
BURUTU	61,819	58,863	64,522	81,429
DEGEMA	4,739	4,973	75,982	60,793
PORT HARCOURT	574,051	652,000	1,004,482	1,190,327
CALABAR	43,089	35,601	127,130	95,302
VICTORIA	31,908	40,177	42,380	159,676
TIKO	15,074	14,544	193,401	154,812
KOKO	-	69	-	563
	<u>2,647,165</u>	<u>3,148,726</u>	<u>2,996,435</u>	<u>3,094,394</u>

Source: Federation of Nigeria Office of Statistics: Trade Report for the year 1960. Federal Ministry of Information, Printing Division, Lagos - Table No.3 p.8

The above statistics show that the Victoria and Tiko Seaports contributed to the development of Southern Cameroons. In 1960 these Seaports came 4th and 5th respectively in the tonnage of cargo loaded out of Nigeria ports. All imports and exports to West Cameroon passed through these two ports. But when the United Cameroon was created in 1972, the two ports were neglected as the government made it a policy that all transactions should be through the river port of Douala. Imports and exports became concentrated in the Douala river port, which started to account for 92% of all the maritime traffic. All customs clearing agencies in Tiko and Victoria ports had to move to Douala. While attention was paid to the seaports of Kiribi, Campo and Garoua River-port, those of West Cameroon, including the Mamfe river-port were abandoned. The move to reduce the ports of Tiko and Victoria into disuse or third class was made open in the 1976 - 1981 Development Plan. In this Five Year Development Plan, 18,426 million francs CFA of which 14,926 million francs CFA was obtained from external sources was allocated to the development of the Douala riverport. The seaports of Kiribi and Campo had 536 million francs CFA and 168 million francs CFA respectively for their development⁷⁹.

The abandoned Tiko and Victoria seaports and the Mamfe riverport on the Cross River prior to this period played a vital role in the evacuation of produce from the hinterlands of the English sector to overseas countries. Export crops viz: cocoa, palm oil, palm kernel, timber, rubber and arabica coffees from

individual holdings were exported through these ports by the Produce Marketing Boards (PMB) to overseas markets. The Tiko and Victoria ports were of vital importance to the CDC for the export of her produce such as tea, banana, rubber, palm oil, and palm kernel⁸⁰.

The CDC's narrow gauge railway system linking the factories with the ports of Tiko and Victoria is now useless. A bulk of their produce had to pass through the Douala congested riverport. Owing to government pressure CDC produce had to be exported through Douala which is over a hundred kilometres from the ports of Tiko and Victoria around where the CDC factories and plantations are located. All these additional cost are incurred merely for political strategy of never having anything that the nation can rely on in the English speaking area. Instead of developing Victoria Cape Limbo deep seaport, government preferred to spend millions annually to dredge the Douala Riverport. The riverport located 50 kilometers away from the Atlantic Ocean has spots along its waterway that must be dredged always to enable big merchant ships to reach Douala⁸¹ in addition to daily removal of sand from the ship terminus. It had always been the wish of the Anglophones that the deep water seaport be constructed in Victoria to boost the economy of the zone and save government from spending millions of francs deredging sand annually from the Douala riverport on the Wouri. Dr. E.M.L. Endeley in his address at the installation of the Limbe Senior Divisional Officer (SDO) lamented that "...we have the Atlantic Ocean here, right behind

us, behind your backs and we lack a Wharf... Instead of using the Wharf nature has given us we are trying to use artificial means to live. Instead of using the Wharf at our disposal, we want to change the Wouri river into a sea. Those incongruencies are before us ; the ordinary people see them and they talk and I hear them"⁸².

In line with the policy of Francophonising the Anglophone Institutions, the National Produce Marketing Board (NPMB) headquarters was moved from Victoria to Douala. The motive was not only to give it a national outlook but also to apply the anglophone system of organising the farmers under one authority to improve their earnings from their labour. But instead of keeping the top management in the hands of the Anglophones who knew the system, it was a Francophone who was put at the helm of affairs. This clearly justifies the views expressed by many anglophones that an anglophone is never put in a position where he can make binding decisions. The transfer of the Board's headquarters from Victoria to Douala and not Yaounde the nations capital posed the question as to why Victoria could not be the headquarters of NPMB ? They concluded that the francophone do not for heaven's sake want any important establishment to be located in the former West Cameroon.

The general decline in the economy of the Anglophone sector particularly in the industrial towns of Tiko and Victoria led to many businesses in these localities to be moved to Douala where the economy is booming and there is a big population. As the big

businesses move to Douala, the survival of petty traders was hampered by the crushing effects of "Patents" (a business tax levied by government). Victoria in particular became almost a ghost town as its one time buoyant economy in the days of West Cameroon, with ships landing in Victoria were now diverted to Douala riverport. The following companies were therefore moved out of Victoria either to Douala or Yaounde.

1. CAMBANK: Its headquarters was simply moved to Yaounde
2. R & W King
3. Printania
4. Glamour
5. Emens Textiles
6. Cameroon Commercial Corporation
7. UTC
8. Socopsa
9. PMO nationalised and its headquarters moved to Douala

Companies and Banks closed down in Victoria

1. Power Cam
2. SONAC
3. Standard Bank of West Africa Limited
4. Alliance Company
5. Renault Motors

In Tiko, prominent among the companies that folded up were : the Peugeot, Volkswagen and Opel Motor companies. While in the Bamenda region the Santa coffee industry was closed down.

The after effect of the collapse of West Cameroon economic system in general was the exodus to French Cameroon of the youths because of the search for economic opportunities.

The Anglophone Dilemma in the Oil Exploitation Industry in Limbe

When the announcement of the discovery of oil along the Victoria Coast was made public after the referendum, the people of anglophone Cameroon were happy that the oil industry would bring life back particularly to Victoria that had become dead economically. The French Company ELF Serepca located deposits of off-shore oil in Roi de Rey and Ndian Division near the border with Cross River State of Nigeria. ELF Serepca spotted 21 areas and the company's preliminary estimates suggested that the largest oil fields could be as high as 1.5 million tonnes a year which was sufficient for the country's internal consumption by then⁸³.

When the main companies concerned at the time ELF Serepca and Tecom started extracting oil, the atmosphere became saturated or pregnant with rumours that the refinery would be built in Douala and crude oil would be channeled by pipe line from the Victoria coast to Douala. Cameroon by this date was a United Republic with the sole party the CNU (no legal opposition)

and it was only Ahmadou Ahidjo who had the trump cards. He could do and undo. Those who spoke against the regime disappeared and some were never seen again. These inhuman acts were carried out by the Secret Police Organisation (SEDOC) Service d'Etude Documentaire du Cameroun and the (BMM) Brigade Mixte Mobile⁸⁴. The rumours⁸⁵ did not end at the building of the refinery at Douala, it was also rumoured that the United Republic of Cameroon with seven provinces would be compressed into five provinces. The compression was to see the merger of the Littoral Province and South-West Province with its headquarters in Buea and the Western Province and the North West Province with its headquarters in Bafoussam. The reason for this merger being that when the refinery is built in Douala and crude oil pipelined to Douala, there would be no indignations because the two towns would be in one province. Following these rumours the people of the North West Province in Bamenda unveiled the secret arrangements, when in a provincial meeting with the CNU central committee delegation in Mankon, headed by the political secretary, Minister of Territorial Administration Mr. Ayissi Mvodo, the elders and local party officials took him to task to make a statement on the matter. The people of this province who are so politically conscious and outspoken asked Mr. Ayissi Mvodo as the political secretary and Minister of Territorial Administration why Ahidjo's government wanted to merge the provinces to five and why the government intention to build the oil refinery in Douala and not Victoria? Mr. Ayissi Mvodo expressed surprise and refuted the

allegations. To buttress his point he rehearsed the usual political rhetoric that the aim of the government is to bring the government nearer the people and that it was even government wish to create more provinces in the future.

What equally promoted the building of the refinery in Victoria was the serious protest Dr. E.M.L. Endeley launched calling for the building of the refinery and the commencement of the tapping of the oil immediately. Dr. E.M.L. Endeley had just survived the hotly contested CNU section president elections in Fako against Mr. Luma Martin. As CNU section president he was in a better position to criticise from within. Had he been beaten in the CNU reorganisation exercise which was aimed at flushing out radicals from the sections of the party, the story could have been different today. For no one other than him in the South West could have stood firmly and opposed Ahidjo's vicious secret plans openly without being subjected to intimidation and torture. With the violent reactions from the North West and the appeal from the Fako Section President Dr. Endeley, it definitely became clear to the Yaounde Authorities that the construction of the refinery in Douala would meet with resistance of all sorts. Faced with these circumstances Ahidjo had to act in 1975 in his preparation for the presidential elections. He, like his able lieutenant Ayissi Mvodo, had to come to the public by refuting all allegations and maintained that work on the refinery was soon to take off.

The construction of the refinery became more visible in May, 1977 when the president on tour of the provinces revealed that the National Refinery Corporation will "have an initial investment of 25,000 million francs CFA and its headquarters will be in Victoria and in effect will generate subsidiary industries"⁸⁶. On December 7, 1976, the National Refinery Corporation known by its acronym SONARA was incorporated and on January 11, 1978 an established convention was signed between the government and SONARA. Feasibility studies stood at 4000 million francs CFA by November 1977. The construction of the refinery began in October 1978 and continued to the handing over of the refinery in 1981⁸⁷. The refinery has a capacity of producing 2,000,000 tonnes of crude oil annually and covers a total land surface of 54 hectares⁸⁸. The state has 60% of the shares while related financial institutions that financed the project have 40%.

It has been impossible for most Cameroonians to know exactly the amount of crude oil exported in a particular year. For any official of the tutelage ministry - Mines and Power, refinery official or hydro-carbon company who talked to any researcher or anyone about Cameroon oil production must have authorization from the presidency. It is common place to see the SONARA Manager feign complete ignorance as to the total crude oil production and giving the impression that he is not even interested in knowing how much his plant was producing. Government policy perhaps had always been to keep the oil

production secret so as not to distract Cameroonians from the agricultural sector. But this does not sound convincing to the average and ordinary Cameroonian who believes that the government unaccountability is simply for those who matter to swell their foreign bank accounts with the petrol money. Worst still the account is not managed by the tutelage minister but by the president which raises the question of who checks the other ? If the minister is controlling the account the president could at anytime check him but now that it is the president the minister cannot have a word let alone auditing the account in this monolithic system.

However from foreign papers conservative estimates in 1984 put the yearly production at 10,000,000 tonnes and that when converted into barrels at a price of \$28.00 per barrel net government foreign exchange receipts total some \$700,000,000 per year⁸⁹. Public speculations about the oil made President Ahidjo to admit that there was a Special Account where the money is kept and is injected into the budget when it runs into difficulties⁹⁰. The question asked always is, since it does not constitute part of the Gross National Income (GNI) what amount is injected into the budget when it is in crisis and where has the rest of the money been going to ? Many officials involved in the secret oil management even know very little how much is in the oil accounts or what exactly the money has been used to finance. Ministers and officials who never commented on this delicate subject now cite the president's magic phrase.

With the commencement of the exploitation of crude oil and later the refining of crude oil in SONARA Victoria, the town became known as OPEC City. The people thought their dreams for economic recovery had come true. It was hoped that the one time weekend jamboree town will be rejuvenated. With the tapping of oil in Victoria it was also believed that to a large extent unemployment will be reduced and the exodus of job seekers to the industrial and agro-industrial towns of the francophone Cameroon. Unfortunately the location of the National Oil Refinery in Victoria neither solved the unemployment of the area nor has it generated subsidiary industries as perceived. The refinery is staffed mostly by francophones from the gatemen to the manager. The anglophones are relatively very few. The General Manager Mr. Bernard Eding and Chairman of the Board of Directors Mr. Bootos A. Ngon are all francophones. When the General Manager was asked why is it that the refinery has been located in the anglophone zone and yet few anglophones were employed by SONARA, he replied that the anglophones had not acquired the technological skill required to work in SONARA⁹¹. The royalties the oil companies were supposed to be paying to the Victoria Urban Council were all being paid to the Douala Council under the pretext that the companies had their headquarters in Douala. The Victoria Council had to fight for years until 1989 when SONARA began paying the council some revenue accruing from oil exploitation⁹². The Councils of Victoria and Ndian equally do not benefit from the council tax levy on workers because their salaries are

computerised in Douala. Consequently payment went to the Douala Council because the computer was installed in Douala and not Victoria where the workers stay and work. Lamenting on the anglophone absence in the ranks of the oil refinery workers a reporter of the government owned national daily, the Cameroon Tribune commented that; "... admiring the beauty of the SONARA Satellite Village which I saw on the television last Saturday evening. It is within the periphery of Limbe, but it looks like a world of its own. The inhabitants of the shanties of Church Street, Mbende, Mile one, name the rest, admire it, from a distance. What impresses me most is the homogeneity of the workers". He ended with the consolation that "Its 'National integration' and work"⁹³.

The Fako leader, Dr. Endeley in his address to the Governor of the South West Province, Nguimba Magloire on the occasion of the installation of the Fako Senior Divisional Officer (SDO) in Limbe told the administrators as the watch eyes of the government that; SONARA had no impact on the people of Limbe the so-called OPEC City and its structures were a decoration of a foreign organisation among the people. He ended up by lamenting that:

I gave the inaugural speech on behalf of the people when we were installing SONARA, a few years ago. And those of you who were here will remember that I quoted everything that the Head of State had promised SONARA would bring

to us - Hotels, Night Clubs, small industries - where are they now? And SONARA still lives, standing silent from the South West and this is a great conflict. The country will say these people are really fortunate and they will not know how unfortunate we are until they get here...⁹⁴

The oil issue being such a delicate affair and because none of those in position of authority would want to lose his lucrative appointment, no one uttered a word about it. Consequently what it is and what it does continue to remain a secret to the common man. Those appointed to head oil related industries are all francophones, being the regime's people of trust, accountable only to the president. The Director-General of this oil corporation is popularly known as the president's personal friend. On the other hand one was likely to be picked up by the secret police or an end put to one's existence if you continue to reveal the misallocation of revenue from the products moreso in relation to the anglophone zone. It is commonplace that at one given period oil is under the tutelage of the Minister of Mines and Power or the Minister of Economic Planning or directly under the Presidency. The tutelage ministry or directorate cannot issue a statement about the oil production without the endorsement of the presidency.

The Collapse of Diplomatic Mission in Buea

The last of the diplomatic missions accredited to Buea, West Cameroon is the Nigeria Consul-General. After the signing of the union between Southern Cameroons and Cameroon Republic into a federation on October 1, 1961, the governments of Nigeria, Great Britain and later France accredited Consul-Generals to Buea. But when the United Republic of Cameroon was created France closed its consulate and Britain transferred hers to Douala. France in particular had a consulate in Douala before one was opened in Buea after the reunification. When the closure of these diplomatic missions is explained by the vague fact that Buea is nearer to Douala, the question then is: when these missions were opened in Buea, did they not know that Douala and Buea (47 km) were close to each other? Again why was it that Britain and France could not abandon the opening of the missions in Douala and maintain those of Buea since the towns are close. If one looked critically at the attitude of these imperial powers it becomes apparent that they want to reduce further the autonomous status of West Cameroon.

Of these three missions, the Nigerian Council in Buea survived the eastward movement with a consulate opened in Douala rather than closing that of Buea. The consulate in Buea ran the risk of being closed down in July 1988 in favour of that of Douala. While a new consulate was to be opened in Garoua. The facial reason being as usual that Buea was nearer Douala. The

anglophones protested that it was purely political and not economical. The argument was that :

- (i) there are more Nigerians in anglophone sector than the francophone sector;
- (ii) that it was easier for Nigerians to go to Buea and transact their business than in complicated francophone zone with language problem to worry about;
- (iii) that the consulate in Douala should be closed down and moved to Garoua since Douala is nearer Buea, those in Douala should come to Buea as well.

Following the above arguments, the charge de mission who was the special adviser to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Professor Jide Osuntokun who was making the assessment of the Nigerian Missions in the Central African sub-region promised that the Federal Government would give a second thought to the idea of moving the Buea consulate⁹⁵. It is obviously his understanding of the delicate political implications that the Buea mission is still existing. Of course the French while closing down their consulate to water down the anglophone personality strongly maintained their cultural service to foster assimilation through French film shows and concerts in French to the anglophone. They gave french language in the region a local status of an elite language which made the ignorant fight to associate with it, not

for the sake of knowing many languages but as a sign of importance.

What the ex-West Cameroon has so far benefited from the unitary system is the government policy of mass education. Accordingly government secondary grammar schools are located in all sub-Divisions (Arrondissements) and Districts. In Divisional headquarters (Departments) there are High Schools in most cases both grammar and technical schools popularly known as the Lycees. Other than this government feature which is universally seen in most places, the anglophone major towns still remain backward in their outlook as they were during the colonial period.

(ii) The Effects on Francophone Cameroon

The effects of the unitary system in various forms are great for the francophones and their sector. As mentioned earlier the industries, business concerns and government financial institutions continued to move east in the name of a United Cameroon. The unitary constitution being run by a single party the Cameroon National Union (CNU) and later Cameroon People's Democratic Movement (CPDM) gave the francophone the guarantee that an anglophone can never be the president of the Republic since they have been allocated to the dormant seat of the "third citizen", that of the president of the National Assembly. In this wise therefore unless the monopoly of a single party is abolished it is impossible to contest for the presidency of the republic¹⁰¹

Since oil started flowing in the 1970's in viable quantities the government can genuinely point to the completion of many important projects, which it is understood were being paid for by oil. One can cite :

- (i) the magnificent presidential palace at Etoudi is one of the most impressive in the world. The construction of the first phase stood at 450 billion francs CFA in 1980, more than the national budget a few years before then;
- (ii) the impressive extension of Douala decks;
- (iii) the equally impressive though perhaps less justifiable international airport at Garoua;
- (iv) the only Cameroon's synthetic stadium at Garoua;
- (v) the imposing hydro-electricity dams of the Noun (Songlolo) and the Benoue;
- (vi) the magnificent Ngoundere University centres and those of Dschang and Douala and the extension of the Yaounde University. It is too sad to know that while these University centres were constructed the one in Buea the regional headquarters of where the oil comes has no foundation stone laid. When Paul Biya succeeded Ahidjo in November 6, 1982, Dr. Endeley took him to task as to why other university centres were built and Buea was never been mentioned, then did the work on Buea University Centre begin;

- (vii) the shooting skyscrapers on the 20 May Boulevard, Yaounde to give the town a new look, the project Ahidjo's government entitled Yaounde by the year two thousand;
- (viii) the multi-billion francs CFA Television complex at Bala II Yaounde and its nation wide relay stations;
- (ix) the government's own share in realising its road projects also came mostly from oil proceeds; the Kousseri - Mora - Maroua - Garoua and Ngoundere in North Cameroon, the Douala - Yaounde - Bafoussam - Bamenda road in the south and Bertoua - Belabo in the east and the interroad network in the West Province.

The two reference hospitals as well as the three international airports are in the francophone zone. Here lies the paradox of the Ahidjo's May 20, 1972 revolution based on national unity, balanced development and social justice. The anglophone zone remains the only zone where the provincial headquarters are not linked by tarred roads as discussed in Chapter VII.

The back-wash effect the francophones are experiencing is that duty posts in government are allocated to both peoples. To this effect some offices which they could have controlled are handled by anglophones. This is a perpetual source of conflict between the two cultural groups. The francophones who by all their indications do not recognise the anglophones as being part

of the republic feel bad that these fellows are depriving them of what they consider their natural rights. Here the analysis is that what is known as National Unity in this case study (of national integration) is just the integration of institutions and not the integration of the people. Only the well-placed who know what gracious benefits they reap sincerely cherish it as a means to exploit the anglophone zone in the name of one Cameroon.

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NOTES

1. Ahmadou Ahidjo as Chairman of the Cameroon National Union (CNU) reserved the sole right to appoint the Prime Ministers of the two Federated States as well as draw up the list of the members of the Federal and State Legislative Assemblies.
2. Loi No. 70-LF-1 de Mai 1970 modifie le troisieme alinea L'article 9 de la constitution de 1^{er} Septembre 1961 (NAY).
3. Albert Mukong op. cit. pp. 72 - 75.
4. Jeune Afrique No.1510 de 11 Decembre 1989 p. 9.
5. President Ahmadou Ahidjo; Address to the Federal National Assembly 6th May 1972.
6. Article 47 (III) of the Federal Constitution of 1st September 1961.
7. President Ahmadou Ahidjo: Address to the National Assembly 6 May 1972.
8. Ibid.
9. Article 47 (II) (III) of the Federal Constitution of 1st September 1961.
10. Official Gazette of the Federal Republic of Cameroon 9th May 1972. p. 2.
11. Ibid.
12. Cameroon News Agency A.C.A.P., May 11, 1972, p. 2.

13. The campaign team in West Cameroon was led by Honourable Solomon Tandeng Muna, Prime Minister of West Cameroon and Vice President of the Federal Republic.
14. Cameroon News Agency A.C.A.P. May 11, 1972.
15. Ibid. pp. 8 - 9.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid. pp. 9 - 10.
18. Jean-Philippe Guiffo Mopo op. cit. p. 93.
19. CAM NEWS, May 23, 1972.
20. Article 47 (III) of the Federal Constitution of September 1, 1961.
21. Fongum Gorji-Dinka - "The New Social Order" (Bamenda, 20/3/85) p. 1.
22. Ibid. p. 2.
23. Interview with Mr. Awudu Cybrien, (40) Douala 7 June, 1988.
24. Constitution Octroyee - that Constitution which is imposed on the people from above while Constitution Evoluee - comes about through some sort of Political arrangement or development.
25. The U.N. Resolution 1688 (XV) 994 of the Plenary Session of April 21, 1961.
26. Article 1 (IV) of the Unitary Constitution of 2/6/1972.
27. Victor Le Vine, "Political Integration and the United Republic of Cameroon" in The search for National Integration in Africa, (eds.) David R. Smock et. (London: MacMillan Publishers, 1976). p. 276.

28. This was by intent i.e. (intentional), see its implication in article 9(I) of the Federal Constitution of 1/9/61.
29. Article 4 of the Unitary Constitution of 2/6/72.
30. Article 8(V) of the Unitary Constitution of 2/6/72.
31. Article II (I) of the Unitary Constitution of 2/6/72.
32. Article II (II) of the Unitary Constitution of 2/6/72.
33. Article II (III) of the Unitary Constitution of 2/6/72.
34. An example is drawn from Ahidjo's dismissal of Musa Yaya who was the 2nd Vice President of the National Assembly, member of the CNU Central Committee in charge of Women Affairs from the CNU Party (and consequently he lost his seat in the parliament) for opposing his handing over power to Paul Biya.
35. Bill No. -153-PJI-ANF of 23/5/1967 promulgated by law No. 67/LF/19 of 12/6/67 (Related sections 1,3,5, and 7 of that law).
36. Article 3(I) and (II) of the Unitary Constitution of 2/6/72.
37. Ni John Fru Ndi and Dr. Siga Asanga, the Social Democratic Front Party (SDF) Manifesto The Social Democratic Option: Launching Cameroon into a bright and democratic future (Bamenda, 25/5/90) p. 11.
38. Loi No. 75-1 du 9 Mai 1975 portant modification l'article 5 de la constitution du 2/6/72.
39. Law No. -79-2 of 29/6/1970 amending article 5 and 7 of the Unitary Constitution (1972).
40. Article 9(I) of the Federal Constitution (1961).

41. Law No. 84-1 du 4/2/84 National Year Book of the Republic of Cameroon (Yaounde:1956) p. 26.
42. Article 5 of the Unitary Constitution of 1972.
43. Article 7(iib) and (iv) of the Unitary Constitution modified on 4/2/1984.
44. Article 7 (iii) of the Unitary Constitution of 1972.
45. North West and South West elite in Douala's Memorandum Presented to the Head of State and Chairman of the Cameroon People's Democratic Movement. (Douala: 7/5/85). Op. Cit. pp. 2 - 3.
46. The two Anglophone Provinces North West and South West Provinces.
47. President Ahidjo's speech to the Special Session of the Federal Assembly of 6/5/1972.
48. Pierre Flambeau Ngaya op. cit., p. 71.
49. Ibid.
50. Africa August - September Issue No. 89 1984 p. 29.
51. Quoted in Africa No. 51 November, 1975 p. 70.
52. A dossier for employment or for sitting a public examination (concour) are: an application, birth certificate, copies of diplomas, presentation certificates of the original diplomas, certificate of fitness and each must bear a 500 francs CFA fiscal stamp and should be certified by a judicial officer. Other repulsive identification papers include non-conviction, height, place of birth, marital status and individuality.

53. Interview with Nfor N. Nfor, Yaounde.
54. Ibid.
55. S. P. Huntington - Political Order in changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press 1968) p. 59.
56. L'UNC Dans La Nation op. cit. pp. 23 - 24.
57. Walter Rodney How Europe Under Developed Africa (London: Bogle-L'Ouverture Publication, 1972) p. 244.
58. President Ahidjo also called the referendum of 20/5/72 creating the United Republic as "Peaceful Revolution". And it was immediately after this exercise that Cameroon went into the tapping of its crude oil. This is one of the hidden causes that precipitated the creation of the United Republic since this essential product is found at the coast of West Cameroon.
59. Head of Government Corporation known as President Director General (PDG) a group of favoured ones by the president squarely based on ethnic, tribal or linguistic basis. They are answerable only to the president of the republic.
60. It is today believed in many circles that Ahidjo designed the May 20, 1972 project because petrol was discovered in the West Cameroon coast of Roi Del Rey. The creating of the United Cameroon was the only strategy for him to single handedly control the tapping of the petrol. With the absence of West Cameroon as a political entity, no one would question the president's use of the petrol money which is kept in the president's special account.

61. Anglophone leaders are the leading advocates of the return of ill gotten wealth to the country to solve the country's economic crisis stemming from moral crisis of fraud and stealing.
62. Fongum Gorji-Dinka, op. cit. p. 7.
63. An interview with an official of the Ministry of Mines and Power 2/10/87.
64. The Kumbo giant water supply in Bui Division realised through community efforts and aid from Canada is an example.
65. Interview with the Lord Mayor of Limbe Urban Council Dan L. Matute, (40) 5 June. Ahidjo' change exhibits his ignorance of Cameroon's historical past.
66. Circular No. 61/c/43/MINEDUC/DEVC of 27/9/83.
67. For the award of any certificate the student was expected to pass in three compulsory subjects : Maths, English and French. Even then the award was not automatic as the final decision laid on the minister's hand.
63. Broadcasted by the Yaounde Central-South Province Station 22/11/83 at 2.15pm.
69. At the meeting of the Central Committee the highest ruling body of the party (CNU) the affair was not included on the agenda. Professor Bernard Fonlon had to insert it on the agenda under "Other matters arising" yet the party's ideology stood for "National Unity and Social Justice".

70. Report on the meeting between British and Cameroon Experts on the creation of a Cameroon General Certificate of Education 5th - 8th January 1976. p. 5.
71. A Memorandum by the West Cameroon Church leaders on Religious Knowledge as a G.C.E. subject addressed to the President through the Minister of National Education 10/2/1977. pp. 3 - 4. (Signatories of the memorandum were, Rt. Rev. J. O. Kangsen, Moderator of the Presbyterian Church in Cameroon , Rev. Samuel Ngum, Executive Secretary of Cameroon Baptist Convention, His Lordship Bishop Awah of Buea and His Lordship Paul Verdzekou Bishop of Bamenda).
72. Basis of augment see: Education Code Nigeria: Colony and Southern Cameroons Province No. 15 of 1926. Sections 42 and 43.
73. Interview titled ("Paying tribute to Ahmadou Ahidjo" Co-ordinated by George Ngwa, Chief of Service English Programmes on Cameroon Report November 14, 1982.
74. Fongum Gorji-Dinka, op. cit. p. 6.
75. The Anglophone elite in Douala: memorandum to President Paul Biya op. cit. pp. 5 - 6.
76. Cameroon News Agency A.C.A.P Publication May 23, 1972, p. 3.
77. Interview with Ni S. N. Tita op. cit.
79. The Fourth Five Year Development Plan 1976 - 1981 (Yaounde: 1976) p. 140.

80. Tata S. N., The Socio-Economic History of the Ndu Tea Estate 1956 - 1982, (Unpublished Maitrise Thesis, Department of History, University of Yaounde 1983) p. 72.
81. Monsieur Priso, Director of General Administration (DAG) of the National Ports Authority Douala CTV, interview Douala 11/1/90.
82. DAY DAWN, Limbe, 6/11/85.
83. Africa-Europe Publication, 1975 - 1976 pp 444 - 445.
84. Abel Eyinga, "Government By State of Emergency" in Gaullist Africa: Cameroon under Ahmadou Ahidjo, Richard Joseph;(Ed.) (Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishing Co. Ltd., 1987) p. 107.
85. Rumour is a vital source of information in the Monarchical Presidential systems in Africa today. As in Cameroon, research has proved in most cases the source of information is the regime itself. It injects the rumour into the society through the Secret Police Service (SEDOC) as "hearsay" to measure the reaction of the people before implementing a given vicious project. At times what is called or referred to as "rumours" is true information but sabotaged by those who have seen that the implementation would jeopardise their ethnic or personal interest.
86. Cameroon Information, (Yaounde: March 1977) p. 17.
87. SONARA Magazine, (France: October 10, 1984).
88. SONARA Magazine (France: Imprimerie SIRA/ASNIERES October 10, 1984) p. 6.
89. West Africa July 23, 1984 p. 1485.

90. Cameroon Tribune May 10, 1981 p. 6.
91. CRTV Interview Limbe, April 10, 1989.
92. Akintola Williams and Co. Correspondence No. 158 of April 10, 1986 to Lord Mayor of Limbe Urban Council.
93. Cameroon Tribune June 23, 1989 p. 11.
94. Quoted in DAY DAWN November 6, 1985 p. 8.
95. The author in a discussion with Professor Osuntokun in his office, Department of History, Unilag, June 27, 1989.
96. Article 7, (iiib) and (c) of the Unitary Constitution of June 2, 1972.

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CHAPTER VII

THE FUNCTIONING OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC INTEGRATION POLICIES IN THE
UNION

VII.1: ECONOMIC POTENTIALS AND BALANCED DEVELOPMENTS

When the KNDP campaigned vigorously during the 1961 plebiscite in favour of reunification with French Cameroun Republic the people of Southern Cameroons were told that the territory would experience rapid economic development, an aspect Nigeria was seriously accused of neglecting. When the Federation came into being on October 1, 1961, the federal government adopted the policy of regional planification¹, with an aim of attaining a balanced development to reflect the process of national integration of a people of the same destiny. The British and French colonial policies laid the foundation of economic disparities between the two federated states. During the trusteeship period France through the Fond d'Investissements pour le Development Economique et Sociales des Territoires d'Autre Mer (FIDES) (Investment Fund for Economic and Social Development of French Overseas Territories) injected money into its colonies. This fund therefore put the public and private sectors of French Cameroon economy far ahead of that of Southern Cameroons which had only the plantation industries dominated by the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC). Much of its natural resources was

not exploited by the British at the time as the French did in their sector. To realise her dream of socio-economic development in the federal government, she met with a serious set-back during the first years of reunification. Prior to the reunification day, the Cameroun Republic had launched their first Five Year Economic and Social Development Plan. West Cameroon after reunification was asked to stand by until East Cameroon exhausted the first plan 1960 - 1965. In the light of the prevailing circumstances one would have thought that the new comer should have been integrated into the plan or a new plan should have been drawn up. But this was not the case. While she could not enjoy the financing of any project by the federal government within this period, her taxes were still being collected by the federal government to finance projects in the 1960 - 1965 plan drawn purely for East Cameroon. Thus in West Cameroon federal projects received no consideration in the 1960 - 1965 plan².

The decree instituting the policy of Balanced Development had stated that equal attention should be paid to the different sectors of the economy, the region, towns, country side, men, women, adults and youths³. The state of West Cameroon effectively came into consideration in the second Five Year Plan 1966 - 1971 not as a state as such but as one of the six regions of the federation since West Cameroon as mentioned earlier, was considered simultaneously as an economic and administrative unit. She came late into the development and social plan and since then her achievements in this vital domains have remained lagging

behind those of the already advanced East Cameroon.

(1) Imbalance in Development in the Union

From October 1, 1961 that West Cameroon came into Union with East Cameroon, she had experienced very little development in spite of her agricultural potentials and production of petrol. The East that formulated the Development Plans discriminated against the West complaining that resources were being wasted on a small, dependent, and backward latecomer to the country, particularly as it was the expectations of greater economic gains that encouraged West Cameroonians to go into union with East Cameroon. This assertion was with a lot of bias if one looks at the volume of export trade statistics of the two states. The Southern Cameroons economy from when it became an autonomous region in 1955 experienced an upward trend up to October 1, 1961.

Despite Southern Cameroon's small size, (43,500 sq. kms) about 10% of East Cameroon (432,000 sq. kms), the trade figures compared with those of East Cameroon point to great agricultural prospects for Southern Cameroons. (See table 11 below)


**TABLE 11: PRINCIPAL AGRICULTURAL EXPORT CROPS PRIOR
TO REUNIFICATION 1960. (VOLUME IN METRIC TONS
AND VALUE IN MILLION CFA Frs.)**

Main Export Crop	East	% Share	West South (Cameroons)	% Share	Total	Value
Cocoa	68,000	92	6,000	8	74,000	8,781
Coffee	40,000	35	82,200	65	42,200	5,018
Bananas	52,000	37	82,000	55	137,000	2,425
Rubber	3,600	55	2,900	45	6,500	1,179
Palm Oil	1,100	20	4,200	80	5,300	2,581
Palm Kernels	13,800	86	2,200	14	16,000	617
Tobacco	1,300	100	-	0	1,300	823
Tea	-	0	34	100	34	n.a
Pepper	-	0	18	100	18	n.a
Timber	208,000	62	125,000	38	333,000	2,107
Cotton	11,000	100	-	0	11,000	1,047
Ground nuts	10,000	100	-	0	10,000	135

SOURCE: Magazine de Chembre de Commerce, D'Industrie Et Des
Mines Du Cameroun Federal publication du 1963 - 1964,

p.83.

UNITED REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON 1972-82



SOURCE: EYONGETAH, T. AND BRAIN, R.
 A HISTORY OF CAMEROON
 London: Longman Group Ltd; 1974 Page 182

A glance through the table above shows clearly that although the two states produced complementary cash crops, each of the states had an upper hand in the production of some crops which could further be developed. West Cameroon's predominance is seen in Coffee, tea, pepper, bananas, and palm oil production which could be developed to expand the agro-industrial sector. The federated state of East Cameroon was predominant in the production of tobacco, cotton, Groundnuts, and cocoa, the bedrock for an industrial growth. This data shows that although they grew complementary crops, there were prospects for each state to develop independent of the other. Thus Southern Cameroons coming into the Union had quite enough from the onset to contribute to the economic development of the union.

Evidence to buttress and add credence to this view is the Balance of Trade between the two states. Interesting enough both sectors had preferential treatment of some kind and a ready and major buyer of its agricultural crops. Britain was the major Southern Cameroons trade partner. The United Kingdom in 1958 absorbed some 75% of her total exports and the rest was bought by other Commonwealth Countries.⁵ Southern Cameroons external Trade Statistics 1956 - 61 therefore show a healthy picture indicating a prosperous future. The situation is as presented in the table below.

TABLE 12: WEST CAMEROON EXTERNAL TRADE BALANCE 1956 - 61
(Value in thousand Pounds Sterling)

Item	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961
Exports	4,237	5,321	6,913	7,298	8,619	8,844
Imports	2,011	2,370	2,961	2,543	3,442	5,500
Balance	+2,226	+2,951	3,952	4,755	5,177	3,344

SOURCE: W. A. Ndongko., Planning For Economic Development in a Federal State: The Case of Cameroon, 1960 - 1971
 (Welforum Verlag. Munchen, 1975) p.67.

It should be recalled that it was this vague argument of Southern Cameroons' financial weakness that led to the plebiscite's only two alternative of either "association" with Nigeria or "reunification" with French Cameroun instead of independence which many people cherished. History has today proven beyond all doubts that the strong economic base was only under developed and unexploited. This blurred picture of Southern Cameroons was inherited by French Cameroun as if she was forced by "armed soldiers" to accept reunification by the UN in 1959, that she has consistently levelled blames on the federal government for spending large sums on the newcomer who contributed very little to the Federal treasury.

A careful and detailed examination of the East Cameroon financial superiority over West Cameroon was exaggerated. In 1959 East Cameroon major trading partner, France imported her produce worth 14,000 million Frans CFA out of a 19,000 million frans cfa.⁶ The rest was absorbed by Western European countries particularly the Netherlands, West Germany and Italy. With these potential buyers there was the prospect for expansion of these cash crops. East Cameroon's external trade balance in the pre-reunification years was equally healthy but it was not waxing strong as compared with that of West Cameroon. The situation at the time is presented below.

TABLE:13 EAST CAMEROON EXTERNAL TRADE BALANCE 1959 - 61

(Values in Million Francs CFA)

	' 1958 '		' 1959 '		1960		1961	
	Tonnage Value		Tonnage Value		Tonnage Value		Tonnage Value	
Exports	395,474	24,321	407,735	26,767	382,400	23,951	432,050	24,202
Imports	432,616	22,444	429,329	20,153	303,566	20,849	488,805	23,760
Balance		+1.877		+6.614		+3,102		+442

SOURCE: Chambre De Commerce, D'Industrie Et Des Minies Du

Cameroun Federal 1963 - 1964 p.85.

The policy of Balanced Development which could have consolidated the bond of national unity, became lopsided and West Cameroon became more and more a peripheral dependency of East Cameroon. It became a pool of supplying cheap labour and raw materials to her industries particularly in Douala and at the same time it serves as a ready market for consuming East Cameroon made goods.

(11) Industrial Location.

By the date of reunification southern cameroons had no manufacturing industries, consequently her major economic activity center around the inherited German plantation in victoria. The people of southern cameroons who among other things thought reunification would speed up economic development of the territory, as propogated by the reunificationists during the plebiscite campaign, found themselves, after the exercise, neglected. The issue of lack of economic development, for which Britain and Nigeria were accused of, became a heated arguments between the integrationists and the reunificationists during the 1961 plebiscite campaign. The end results by February 11, 1961 when southern cameroonians had cast their ballots, confirmed that the reunificationists had a genuine case against Britain and Nigeria as they won the plebiscite.

It was barely eight months after the plebiscite i.e. on october 1, 1961, when the federation hurriedly negotiated at Fouban came into legal existence, that it was discovered that

the new political structure had no new investment code drawn to reflect the aspirations of the two partners in the union. Since it was southern cameroons that opted to unify with french cameroun, therefore the latest post-independence investment code adopted on June 27, 1960 by its legislative assembly following her independence from france was extended by law to cover the state of west cameroon. The drawing of the new investment code failed under what Ahidjo termed matters of details to be worked out after the reunification, but imposed the cameroun Republic code on west cameroon by decree without any examination to include the views of the newcomer. The investment code had these lofty provisions:

... to create investment incentives which would attract the require domestic and foreign private investments within the framework of the major objectives of the five year development plans- namely, the maintenance of equilibrium or balance between the various sectors and regions of the national economy.⁹

This code theoretically, placed greater emphasis on the spatial dimension of economic activities in the country in order to redress the adverse effect of the socio-economic disparities and uneven economic development. Through the implementation of the cameroun republic draw investment code was aimed at absorbing west cameroon , it in itself did not reflect the objectives of

balanced regional development.

Lopsided Industrial Location.

The federated state of west cameroon had no manufacturing industries like East cameroon. The economic giant of west cameroon remained the cameroon development corporation (CDC) with processing industries of palm oil, Tea and Rubber. This was seconded by the PAMOL growing uniquely palms in Ndiain division and the santa coffee Estate in Bamenda region. While the CDC and PAMOL are still in operation the santa coffee Estate was abandoned when Ahidjo instituted the unitary state, in may 1977 in cameroon.

The location of industries since reunification has been lopsided, favouring only the francophone sector. Following the implementation of the first five year development plan, some thirty-eight companies¹⁰ were added to what the state of East cameroon inherited at independence; meanwhile west cameroon within that period had no investment for industrial development. While it may be argued that this was due to west cameroon coming in while the plan had been in operation, such an argument would not be ten able explanations with regard to other post unification plans since there has been no change in the attitude towards industrial location which has been usually out-side western cameroons. In the 1965-66 fiscal year fifteen new firms which provided investments to the value of 4,180 million CFA frs were approved under the National Investment Corporation and were

all located in East cameroon. At the end of the first decade of reunification, a total of 133 firms were established in East cameroon. These firms had (investment value) capital investment of 53.891 million francs CFA and provided jobs for 32.753 people¹¹. Thus the "economic planning over the entire period 1960- 71 did not deal with the problems of growing disparities between the two states."¹²

TABLE 14

MAJOR INDUSTRIAL COMPANIES AND COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISES

	<u>location</u>	<u>No. of Workers</u>
1. Les Brasseries du cameroun, (SABC)	Douala	3200
2. SCOA-Cameroun	Douala	334
3. Ste' Industrielle Camerounaise du Cacao (sic)	Douala	343
4. S.A. des Ets Kritikos (AEK)	Douala	785
5. SONEL	Douala	2100
6. CFAO- Cameroun	Douala	13000
7. SHO - Cameroun	Yaounde	647
8. Cameroon Motors industries (CMI)	Douala	280
9. Cameroon Airlines	Douala	820
10. ALUCAM	Edea	736
11. UCCAO	Yaounde	700

12. SOCATRAL	Edea	199
13. Railway Corporation	Douala	5004
14. CICAM	Douala-Bassa	1479
15. ToTal- Cameroun	Douala	161
16. CHOCOCAM	Douala	303
17. SODECOTON	Garoua	1657
18. CACEP	Douala	432
19. Ste' Commerciale Africaine (SCA)	Yaounde	71
20. CIMENCAM	Douala	377
21. Ste Portuaire du Cameroun (SOPOCAM)	Yaounde	555
22. SEAC	Yaounde	343
23. Shell-Cameroun	Douala	94
24. Bastos	Yaounde	426
25. CDC	Victoria	15381
26. Renault - Cameroun	Douala	474
27. DEFCAM	Douala	47
28. Guinness Cameroun	Douala	680
29. BP Cameroun	Douala	83
30. SOCOPAO Cameroun	Yaounde	1273
31. Complexe Chimique Cameroun ecc	Douala	468
32. R. W. King	Douala	181
33. Commerciale M. Gatche et cie	Douala	54
34. COGEFAR Transcam S.A.	Yaounde	531
35. TEXACO Afrique Cameroun	Douala	51
36. Grands Travaux de L'Est (GRE)	Bertoua	1478

37. CIACAM	Douala	259
38. Ste' Camerounaise de Minoteries (SCMI)	Douala	78
39. AGIP - Cameroun	Douala	96
40. Dragages Cameroun	Yaounde	1081
41. Compagnie Soudanaise	Yaounde	164
42. SOSUCAM	Mbanjoch	2920
43. Union Cam. de Brasseries (UBC)	Douala	426
44. DACAM	Douala	235
45. Hollando - Cameroun	Douala	211
46. Paterson Zoch. Cam.	Douala	221
47. Bata Cameroun	Douala	811
48. COGEFAE Construction Gen.	Yaounde	219
49. SONARA	Victoria	454
50. CAMSUCD	Mbanjoch	2052
51. HEVEACAM	Kiribi	1500

Source: CAMEROON TRIBUNE Edition Speciale Bilingue Mai 20, 1980
pp. 56 - 57 cf. Annuaire National de la Republique Unie
du Cameroun 1982 pp. 349-468.

This lopsided development as made explicit by the location of industries in the first decade (1961 - 1971) continued in the second decade (1972 - 1982) in spite of President Ahidjo's rationalization of the Unitary System on May 20, 1972, as a necessary revolution to expedite rapid socio-economic developments.¹³ But this was not the case as the English Sector experienced more of backwash effects than spread effects of the

Unitary System. The Fourth Five Year Plan approved the establishment and expansion of twenty industries with an investment capacity of 46,045,200 million francs CFA. Out of this amount only 2,006,400 Francs CFA, representing 4.36% was invested in Victoria in the anglophone province of South-West.¹⁴ The anglophone Cameroon situation grows worst in the Unitary System, whereby the provincial governors were charged with the task of executing development projects. The two anglophone provinces of North West and South-West unfortunately had at one time or the other been ruled by francophones governors who after receiving the little for the development of any of these provinces would swindle the funds. Mr Abouem a Tchoui (francophone) Governor of the North West province was quoted as saying that the inhabitants of that province were always advocating secession to Nigeria and thus there was no need carrying out development programs in the region.¹⁵ The only major industry located in the anglophone Cameroon is the National Oil Refinery known by its French acronym as SONARA, at Cape-Limbo Victoria. The building of the refinery was not at the wish of the government, it was because of the political pressure mounted by Dr. E. M. L. Endeley that the government located the refinery in Cape-Limbo as mentioned earlier.

With the final establishment of the National Oil Refinery (SONARA) in Victoria in 1976, it was hoped as already analysed in detail in chapter 6 that to a large extent it will reduce

unemployment and the exodus of job seekers to the industrial towns of the Francophone Sector. It was also believed that the oil industry would surely encourage the growth of by-industries and business enterprises. Victoria, the one-time holiday resort and weekend jamboree town was hoped would rejuvenate but the opposite was the case. The people of the South West have not in anyway benefited from the mining and refining of the crude oil in Victoria as expected.

The imbalance in location of industries in the Republic since reunification clearly shows that the government policy of "Balanced Development" and "Social Justice "as instruments of National unity, were phrases coined simply to blindfold the anglophone community in the union. These lofty policies only perpetuated the anglophones low standard of living and a loss of hope for the rapid economic development of their sector. The mass exodus of anglophones into French Cameroon confirms this assertion. The table below elucidates the lopsided location of industries in favour of the Francophone provinces.

TABLE 15

DISTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRIES BY PROVINCES - 1980

S/n	Province	Capital	No. of Industries	Percentage
1	Centre-South	Yaounde	109	24
2	East	Bertoua	3	0.6
3	Littoral	Douala	262	58
4	West	Bafoussam	20	4.4
5	North	Garoua	36	9.9
6	*North West	Bamenda	4	0.9
7	*South West	Buea	19	4.2
Total			452	100

*North West and South West are two anglophone provinces that make-up the former Federated State of West Cameroon. These two provinces have 23 industries as against 429 in the five provinces of the former federated State of East Cameroon.

SOURCE: Annuaire National de la Republique Unie du Cameroun 1982
pp. 443 - 465.

(iii) Communication Infrastructures

The roads, ports and railway infrastructural developments as essential means of the movement of people and goods, which foster and consolidate national unity were equally neglected in West Cameroon. Since politicians never learn from history, it never occurred to Ahidjo that the absence of an all-season network of good roads in Southern Cameroons during the colonial era in no small measure "contributed to the rejection of Union with Nigeria".¹⁶ The KNDP during the plebiscite campaign made the non-provision of infrastructure a strong point of contest and since this was glaring, the reunificationists received the support needed. Therefore, after the reunification the voters as a matter of urgency wanted to see this wish materialize.

But unfortunately for the expectants, the presidential decree of November 23, 1962, granting funds for the building of inter-state routes completely excluded West Cameroon. The sixty million Francs CFA was purely destined for East Cameroon for the equipment and improvement of her inter-State highways.¹⁷ Article 2, of the said decree technically excluded West Cameroon, since it stipulated "details of this programme and operations will be the subject of an order-in-Council from the East Cameroon Parliament".¹⁸ This was where West Cameroon could have benefited since she was excluded from the First Five Year Plan 1960 - 1965, because it was drawn before reunification was effected. But the contrary was the case. The government of West

Cameroon demanded for her share of the road maintenance funds for the improvement of her network roads.¹⁹ The Federal government for political and strategic reasons, instead of granting West Cameroon her own share to embark on the development of her inter-state road network, launched the intra-state network programme. Even when roads were constructed to link the Francophone and Anglophone parts of the country, they were done with a ludden motive of assimilation. Consequently in 1963 surveys were made to link Douala both by road and rail to some important towns of West Cameroon. The survey findings revealed that Douala and Tiko would be linked by road while the branch of the Douala Nkongsamba railway would branch from Mbanga to Kumba. The two projects were completed in 1969. The highway between Kumba - Buea - Tiko and Victoria was resurfaced. The Douala - Tiko road known as the "reunification road" was inaugurated by President Ahidjo in April 1969 together with the Douala - Kumba railway extension. The Douala - Tiko road constituted the first direct and permanent link between the East and the West (a distance of 45 km. which driving through takes 35 - 40 minutes). With the creation of the unitary state Bamenda became a provincial capital and a desperate need arose to link it with Bafoussam, the provincial capital of the West province.

The construction of the Douala - Tiko and Bafoussam - Bamenda highways had hidden political goals than the mere development of intra-state infrastructures. These linkages were

socially and psychologically accelerators of the assimilation process of West Cameroonians. The West Cameroonians needed to learn French as a matter of urgency because the Francophones demanded that they be spoken to in French at petrol stations, hotels and super markets.²⁰ It also made West Cameroon not to be so remote from the control of the Federal authorities. Prior to 1968 West Cameroon could only be reached easily by air through the State International Airport of Tiko. By road it had to take days through Kumba from Loum, hundreds of kilometres on bad roads. As an encouragement the toll gate on the Wouri bridge was suppressed to facilitate the easy movement of anglophones in and out of the city of Douala. The federal government's only concern on the development of intra-State roads led to the abandonment of the inter-provincial road of Buea and Bamenda through Mamfe. Due to inter-state bad roads the people of Buea, Tiko, Victoria, Ndian and Kumba in South West now depend on the usage of East Cameroon roads to reach Bamenda and vice versa. The road particularly between Kumba - Mamfe and Mamfe - Bamenda during the rainy season is so bad that it takes days to ply the road. Yet the Bamenda - Mamfe axis of this highway falls within the trans-African Highway from Mombasa to Lagos.²¹ It should be noted that for twenty-one years of reunification the anglophone sector counted 312 km of tarred roads (south West 282 km and N.W. 30 km) out of a 2558 km tarred roads.²² In actual fact the 30 km of tarred roads in the North West province is primarily the portion

of the Bafoussam - Bamenda Road which the north-westerners do not see as a road serving their interest. Of the total km road length of the North-West Province 63.37%²³ are feeder roads. Except for the Central and South provinces the anglophone provinces top the list in the percentage of feeder roads over the total km road length in each of the seven provinces. Yet some areas like Mamfe Akwanya and Fura-wah are still cut off from the rest of the country.

The poor road network linking the anglophone sector has led to the provinces of South West and North-West growing in isolation from each other. In effect they have become politically, socially and economically divided, (a one time political and socio-economic unit) and have become dependencies of the francophone provinces of Littoral (Douala) West (Bafoussam).²⁴ This has made politically minded anglophones to believe that apart from linking the anglophone provincial capitals only to those of francophone Cameroon to facilitate and accelerate assimilation measures taken to promote bilingualism and national integration, the linkage had other strategic importance to Ahidjo. This group therefore strongly believe that; apart from the above mentioned motive; the roads were equally aimed at (i) easy troop movement incase of any rebellion in these provinces, (ii) to ease the exploitation of the regions by francophones and (iii) to effect a permanent division between the people of South West and North West so that they cannot unite

to rally forces against the francophone domination and supremacy. Generally the lack of all seasonal roads has greatly slowed down the economic activities of the two provinces.

Looking at the railway development it can be seen that apart from the short branch from Mbanga to Kumba (29 km) the two anglophone provinces do not enjoy the facilities offered by the railway corporation, that of the evacuation of their produce from the hinterlands for export and vice versa by this relatively cheap means of bulk transportation.

TABLE: RAILWAY INFRASTRUCTURE

NATIONAL TOTAL	1172 km of track
<u>The West Line:</u>	
Douala - Nkongsamba	172 km
A short Branch: Mbanga-Kumba	92 km
<u>The Trans Cameroon Line:</u>	
Douala-Yaounde-Ngaoundare	925 km
A shorts Branch Line Otele - Mbalmayo	37 km
Narrow Gauge Railways Totaling	147 km within the CDC Plantation to the Ports of Tiko and Victoria.

Source: Africa South of the Sahara 1978/1979. p.237.

The Mbanga-Kumba railway extension completed in 1969, had more of political reasons than economic. The federal governments reorganisation of the economic channels implied that West Cameroon's trade with the outside world should pass through Douala rather than through Nigerian ports as has been the case for many years. Thus Jacques Benjamin observed that:

To centralize the new communication thoroughfares with Douala, as had been done in the past, was to put West Cameroon's economy at the mercy of East Cameroon. To open them to the sea, on the other hand, was to grant West Cameroon a greater political and economic autonomy ... Therefore the railway and highway networks deserve to be studied from this view point in particular.²⁵

Based on the above assumption it is no wonder that in the fourth, five-year Economic and Social Development Plan 1976 - 1981 of the 28,000 milliards francs CFA allocated for the development of the railway system,²⁶ all these money was spent in the francophone zone.

The two natural ports of Tiko and Victoria in particular on the Atlantic Coast lay wasted as the government spend millions of CFA francs each year to turn the Douala river port into deep water seaport. When Ahidjo superimposed the unitary state structure, he neglected the two ports. The people of anglophone

zone had to export or import through the river port of Douala. This was when many anglophones realized why the railway line from Kumba did not go on to the ports of Tiko and Victoria located barely a few kilometers from there, but linked Douala port.

An investigation into why the anglophones made so much demands for industrial and infrastructural developments in their zone, from available data, indicate that they had a genuine case. When we examine the sources of the national income it is realized that it contributed substantially to it right from when Cameroon was predominantly an agricultural exporting country. The discovery and exploitation of petroleum in the anglophone sector that accounted for over 40% of Cameroon's foreign earnings in the 1970s further backed their demands. Despite its healthy contribution to the national economy Ahidjo was bent on making it a dependency of East Cameroon through neglecting development of the West Cameroons.²⁷

A simple glance at table 16 below showing anglophone Cameroon's contribution to National Income and table 17 shows the allocation of funds for development project: it is seen that there was no "Social Justice" and "Balanced Development".

TABLE 16

ANGLOPHONE CAMEROON'S CONTRIBUTION TO NATIONAL-INCOME BASED ON PRINCIPAL AGRIC EXPORT CROPS							NATIONAL TOTAL VALUE (IN MILLION CFA FRANCS)						ANGLOPHONE-CAMEROON'S %					
CONTRIBUTION																		
PRODUCES	1963	1966	1967	1970	1975	1976	1963	1966	1967	1970	1975	1976						
Cocoa	10349	7935	11098	19494	24383	24435	9.09	8.10	5.33	7.30	11.88	n.a.						
Coffee	6461	11073	11834	14737	23191	34704	10.13	13.38	11.40	15.24	21.3	20.25						
Rubber	1384	n.a	n.a	1361	2220	3028	62.64	n.a	66.67	80.20	76.60	76.60						
Palm P Produce	1242	n.a	n.a	908	844	452	61.27	n.a	n.a	34.78	97.40	98.30						
Bananas	1875	n.a	n.a	736	4362	1290	59.69	n.a	n.a	40.00	n.a	n.a						
Timber	2365	2312	2589	5873	10157	n.a	13.74	n.a	n.a	10.52	n.a	n.a						

This statistics excludes money accruing from the sale of crude oil in the 1970s which accounted for 28.4% of the foreign exchange earnings and a domestic annual turnover of petroleum products of 120,000 million Francs CFA all from the anglophone sector.

Sources: 1. Africa Contemporary Records 1973 - 74 pp. 562; 1975 - 76, pp. 448 & 1976 - 77, p.470.

2. Africa South of the Sahara 1972 pp.197 and 1978 - 79 p.227.

3. Note Annuaire de Statistique Minister de L'Economie et du Plan, Yaounde, 1976, pp.5. 15 & 16.

TABLE 17

Provincial Investment by Sector: 1976 - 1981 Economic Plan Compared (in Million CFA frs).

DEVELOPMENT SECTORS	Central South	Littoral	*North West	*South West	Western	Eastern	North	Total Provincial share by Sector
Rural Development	6,259.28	5,132.00	1,297.40	507.05	2,330.60	1,035.40	2,393.00	18,554,730
Industry, Mines & Energy	3,235.00	3,456.00	83.50	337.00	248.30	361.05	37.00	7,757,850
Commerce & Transport	269.62	188.20	296.00	780.00	4.00	850.00	50.00	2,438,620
Tourism - Hotels	30.00	123.00	22.00	131.50	165.00	16.50	-	1,488,000
Education & Training	-	148.00	414.10	257.10	1,659.35	172.00	550.00	3,200,450
Health & Social Services	325.00	74.00	90.70	35.00	254.00	176.00	50.00	1,004,700
Urbanization & Housing	-	3,095.00	3.00	7.00	538.00	64.00	-	3,705,000
Territorial Development	9,484.25	88.95	80.00	45.15	365.00	205.50	118.00	1,851,025
Information & Culture	-	-	-	-	25.50	-	16.00	41,000
Administrative Equipment	-	-	-	160.0	-	390.25	240.00	790,825
TOTAL	11,067.325	12,303.15	2,286.60	2,259.80	5,589.2	3,272.75	3,454.00	40,232,200

* The Anglophone provinces of North West and South West % 11.30 inspite the fact that this sector is relatively und. the francophone sector their share of the national cake is far below their proportional share of the population. B "Social Justice" and "balance development" they should have received more than their population proportional share as a necessary means to bridge the existing wide gap.

VII.2. SELF-RELIANT DEVELOPMENT

Self-Reliant development as espoused by the CNU and implemented by the government had economic and political goals. The government emphasised the objective of self-reliant development as work production based on the creative efforts of the people. The CNU Chairman President Ahidjo maintained that "there is no genuine development except that whose motive force is the people themselves."²⁸

To this end the party and government embarked on the task of mobilizing, coordinating and guiding the efforts of Cameroonians to develop their resources and free themselves from perennial ills such as disease, hunger and illiteracy.

In a crusade to attain food self-sufficiency under the guided principle of self-reliance, the president at the first pastoral show in Buea 1973 launched the "Green Revolution" campaign. As a bond of national unity the farmers festival is held every four years. This rendezvous reunited farmers from all regions and this provided a forum for them to share their common experience, as they rotate from one Provincial Headquarters to another. The self-reliance development strategy made Cameroon to a large extent to be self-sufficient in foodstuff production as well as increase substantially its agricultural exports.²⁹ In order to promote the agricultural sector in particular the government encouraged the production of goods by local industries to replace import of basic goods. Some agro-industrial complexes

include, SOSUCAM at Mbanjock producing sugar; chococam industry in Douala, Tea in Ndu, Njutesia and Tole and Coffee industry in Douala. Active participation in self-reliance development led the government to set-up development missions viz MIDEVIV, WADA, ZAPI, and MIDENO. These rural integrated development programmes are aimed at providing an additional balance to the various developments infrastructures in rural areas. To dynamise this rural milieu government assist young entrepreneurs through the National Fund for the Development of small and medium sized Enterprises (FOGAPE) to small business concerns in the rural areas. Individual farmers also received assistance from the State through the National Fund for Rural Development. (FONADER) now transformed into Credit Agricole.

The integrative policy of self-reliance development led to an increase in food self sufficiency, cash crop production, rural infrastructural development, research extension, marketing and credit facilities. The policy in 1982 was further expanded to encompass communal liberalism. This has given a new dimension to self-reliance developments at grassroot level which embodies: the freedom of undertaking; the regulatory role of a democratic state; and the duty of solidarity.³⁰ The policy had been generally successful. Since it demanded individual efforts there had been no way others could sit and rip its fruits without working.

VII.3. GOVERNMENT APPOINTMENTS ON REGIONAL BASIS

Appointments in Government, particularly in the Public Service, Foreign Affairs and Government Corporations were based on regional planification which Ahidjo said would promote national unity. Dr. J. N. Foncha did not succeed in getting Ahidjo accept the personnel quote each state would contribute to the Federal Government. At the Foumban conference the appointment of people to the various organs of government came, by the constitution, under the prerogatives of the president.³¹ But it was agreed that the President and his Vice President should not come from the same federated State.³² In the government of the Federal Republic no matter how competent an anglophone was, there were certain ministries, diplomatic missions, posts in civil service and Government corporations that none of them could ever head. For example an anglophone never became a minister of any of these ministries: Foreign Affairs, Defence, Finance, Public Service, Education, Economic and Plan, Territorial Administration and Information and Culture let alone being either Secretary General or Chief of Cabinet at the Presidency to reflect Cameroon's biculturalism.

Looking at the evolution of Ahidjo's cabinet in this light one glaring case of discriminatory appointment was evident in the 1964 Cabinet. In this cabinet the first Cameroonian Ph.D holder, Bernard Fonlon, whose bilingualism (as an ex-student of Sorbonne University) won the admiration of President Ahidjo during the Foumban Conference became a member of government. Despite these

distinguished features, he was simply named Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. He later became a full Minister in Post and Telecommunications and Public Health Ministries popularly reserved for the anglophones. He was advised to resign in 1970, when France could not bear his actions influencing national policies of the ministerial departments he headed.³³

It was believed that the creation of the United Republic of Cameroon on May 20, 1972, would erase this discrimination which portrayed the anglophones as a minority or second class citizens. But this was not the case in this new arrangement where in theory there was no majority and minority, no West and East Cameroon, but Cameroonians irrespective of regions, ethnic groups or religious creeds. With the creation of the unitary state anglophones instead lost more and since reunification in October 1, 1961 no anglophone had ever been minister in the ministries mentioned above. West Cameroon by this arrangement lost instead the chance of any West Cameroonians being President or Vice President of the Republic. The federal constitution state that the President and Vice most not be from the same Federated State and if Ahidjo did not rob the anglophone of this clause, his constitutional successor when he resigned November 2, 1982 could have been an anglophone and not the Premier Paul Biya a francophone. One case illustrating that the unitary system did not change the position of anglophones in the Union with regards to discriminatory appointments was evident in the June 30, 1975 ministerial appointments. The President in this exercise

appointed Dr. (Mrs.) Dorothy Njeuma, Associate Professor, University of Yaounde Vice Minister under Mr. Rene Ze Nguele Assistant Lecturer (a francophone) University of Yaounde as her boss.

With the centralized bureaucracy which Ahidjo instituted, at the presidency and its related services through the Federal Republic³⁴ to the United Republic,³⁵ anglophones did not feature in prominent places. Dr. Bernard Fonlon was the first West Cameroonian to be appointed Charge de Mission at the presidency in 1962. When he became Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1964 he was replaced by another Westerner Mr. Muchia. One person to be seen at the presidency in the second decade of reunification was Dr. J. N. Foncha whom Ahidjo rehabilitated into public life by appointing him the Grand Chancellor of National Orders,³⁶ though with residence at his home town Nkwen Bamenda. Since then he is the highest ranking westerner at the presidency.

This arrogant discrimination against anglophones in appointments to State and private corporation is enforced even when these establishments are operating in anglophone sector viz SONARA, ELFSERPCA, CNPS, and TEPCAM. Of the forty-nine major business enterprises as seen on table 14 only the CDC was headed by an anglophone Mr. John Ngu Niba.

This policy was no doubt an agent of National Unity and integration, but from all empirical evidence this policy like others supposedly designed to promote national unity were not formulated to include West Cameroonians who by the plebiscite of

February 11, 1961 opted to join French Cameroun. This policy was aimed at reconciling the Moslem North and Christian South of French Cameroun in general and the appeasement of the worrying groups in the South in particular. In the South Ahidjo did much to appease the Boulu, Ewoundu and Beti of the Central-South, the Bassa in Littoral and the Bamileke of the West. He had to appease the people of Centre-South to make up for the premier-ship which the French robbed Andre Marie Mbida of and gave to him and the Bassa and Bamileke for losses incurred during the UPC terrorism against his regime.

Faced with this frustrating situation the anglophones have asked the question as to whether they are considered as partners in the Union or whether they were a conquered people? They also held that to uphold social justice, taking into account the bicultural nature of the society, the anglophone community must have its rightful place in the Union and not always be treated with suspicion.

VII.4. CAMEROON'S BILINGUALISM

The leaders of Southern Cameroons and French Cameroun Republic meeting at Foumban July 17 - 24, 1961, agreed that the Federal Republic of Cameroon to come into being October 1, 1961 would be a bilingual nation with English and French as its official languages.³⁷ Bilingualism therefore became instituted in the bicultural society by law and was entrenched in the Federal Constitution.³⁸ Bilingualism is one unique option agreed upon during reunification that "fortunately" did not disappear

with the abolition of the federal system May 20, 1972 when the United republic was created. The May 20, 1972 political maneouver which its author Ahidjo described as "a peaceful revolution" abolished the federated States³⁹. Though bilingualism was perceived by the majority more as a liability than an asset, it was inserted in the Unitary State Constitution.⁴⁰ Cameroon therefore became a bilingual nation like Canada where out of some ten federated States, one in French (Quebec) and the rest are English. It was unfortunate that by independence and reunification Cameroon with its over 200 ethnic groups and languages did not have one common to all. This ethnic background paved the way for the adoption of the two colonial languages for transacting government business and as a medium of communication within the diversified ethnic groups. This was different with other Unions that appeared in Africa after independence. In Somalia for instance Italian gave way to English when Italian and British Somaliland reunited in 1960 and the Tanganyika and Zanzibar Union created in 1964 that gave birth to Tanzania, though former British Colonies, their unity was further strengthened by the use of Swahili as a common language above other ethnic tongues.

The Take Off Point Of Bilingualism

Professor Bernard Fonlon writing barely three years after reunification in the Cultural magazine Abbia said, "The target to aim at, for us, should be, not merely states bilingualism, but individual bilingualism: that every child that passes through our

education system shall be able to speak and write both English and French."⁴¹ For this objectives to be realized it needed that the inherited structures of colonial education should be scrapped off and a new one put in place to suit the realities of the new society. Since bilingualism was a national issue it became politicised and like any other thing that involved politics, it was not handled with the seriousness it deserved. Consequently Bernard Fonlon's idea were not implemented by government until 1973 when English and French speaking teachers were sent to schools in parts of the nation to teach either English to French speaking children or French to English speaking children at the primary school level. This idea of bilingual education as a constitutional follow-up was further strengthened with the opening of bilingual primary schools. As Cameroon clocked the second decade of reunification there were eight of them in the country.⁴² At the secondary school level the French Government to foster the speaking of the French language in Cameroon, opened a bilingual grammar school at Man-O-War Bay 1963 in Victoria and a college bilingue at Yaounde in the year 1965. Most secondary grammar schools both official and private during the first decade of reunification in both states added the teaching of English and French to their curricula. Both languages in the mid 1970s became compulsory subjects in all secondary schools and all institutions of higher learning including the University of Yaounde.⁴³

In the drive to bring bilingualism to the majority of Cameroonians foreign countries decided to join the crusade; the French and USA Embassies and their consulates opened cultural centres whereby English and French were taught respectively free to the general public. The French Ministry of co-operation sent a team of Frenchmen to Cameroon to supervise the teaching of French to anglophone primary school pupils in class V, VI, VII. The team while in Cameroon adopted a strategy of first training anglophone teachers who had at least the grade II teachers' certificate for a nine month period. At the end of the crash programme they were sent to teach French in anglophone schools.⁴⁴ The project styled "Operation Bilingualism en passant le Moungo" failed. The anglophone teachers trained by French Technical Advisers for "Operation Bilinguisme" for a few months could neither understand nor speak french properly. The obvious cause being that the training was inadequate and the procedure of training anglophone teachers to teach french to anglophone children was neither linguistically nor psychologically oriented.

In Francophone Cameroon the British and the Americans undertook the study to explore ways of teaching English to francophones in the last three classes. The experts came out with a written text "Living Together" now being used in most Francophone primary schools. The American peace Corps Movement also stepped in to reinforce the learning of English in this sector by organising classes "Cours de Vacances" during long

vacation in Yaounde, Douala and other urban centres in this region.⁴⁵

VII. A. BILINGUALISM IN OFFICIAL CIRCLES

Bilingualism believed to be a factor of national unity at the official circles for two decades and more became squarely an anglophone affairs. This was because as a minority they became faced with the problem of language pressure partly due to their own making and the nonchalant attitude of the Francophones towards English. In the new milieu created by reunification October 1, 1961 it was the anglophones who had to learn French to fit into the wider circle of the community both officially and privately.

The burden of the French language was not very much the problem of the West Cameroon populace during the Federal system. Those who had something to do with French were those who were serving in Federal Government departments and businessmen who had one thing or the other to do with their Francophone counterparts. But when the Unitary system emerged on May 20, 1972 the anglophones at all level tasted the bitter truth of not knowing French. The pressure was because administration became highly centralized in Yaounde. The complicated bureaucratic structure Ahidjo put in place necessitated the regular movements of workers as well as businessmen to Yaounde to "chase" files popularly known as "dossier". The new structure was staffed mostly by francophone in key places. Those anglophones who had no knowledge of French actually suffered because they could not get

anything through. Evidently most of the francophones did not know the English language, but what made things worse was that they made no effort to know and all the time minimised the English language, a practice that is still in practice.⁴⁰

One can rightly affirm from empirical data that the government tacitly endorsed this situation. The presidency of the republic that was and is supposed to show the "first example" did not put in practice government commitment to bilingualism. Hardly did a text come from the presidency already translated for newscasters to announce over the National Radio. It is a common place to hear or see on the TV a newsreader telling the public "we have just received an important communique in our newsroom from the presidency about this or that; the text is in French and details will be yours during our French news". President Ahidjo made his first public phrase in English in May 1975, when he was taking the Oath of Office, and amidst cheers from his Assembly men and invitees. But on the contrary S. T. Muna, the president of the National Assembly on several occasions made speeches in the National Assembly in French. It was only the National Assembly under the leadership of S. T. Muna that sent out Communiques in English and French.

At the level of the Ministers and Directors and Managers Of State Corporations, the situation was very much the same as at the presidency. Bilingualism as a factor of national unity was only made mockery of. One lamentable reality was and is that while the Francophone saw nothing they had to benefit from

bilingualism, and have in certain quarters advocated that it should be abolished. The English speaking elite are increasingly becoming identified with the majority French culture. These "assimilated" anglophones sent out all their circulars in French even those going to West Cameroon. Their secretariats are staffed with "copyright" typists of french expression. The question one asks, therefore, is who should by right and law promote bilingualism, if once an anglophone became a member of the government he no longer identified himself with English as being his first official language? If these people took bilingualism as a national option as stipulated by constitution their subordinates who are of french expression in rank and file would have been forced to be bilingual. But when an anglophone Minister, Permanent Secretary, Director, Sub-Director, Manager of a Corporation or Chief Service sent out circulars in French, what do s one expect of the francophones? They will normally sit back and admire the officer in question being francophonised and his actions in itself endorses the fact that learning of English is not important. Since in the senior ranks both anglophones and francophones work only in French, in the final analysis it is only the anglophone masses that in all circumstances are obliged to be bilingual. The word "bilingual" in a Cameroon's context does not explain the real situation as the anglophones are concerned. It is infact making them to be francophones for the English he knows would help him very little to obtain what he wants or pass his message across in the system. At most if he

works in the anglophone sector of the country his English may be used to transact government business in most cases. Cameroon's bilingualism is therefore lopsided because; (I) it is for the anglophone to know French so that he can understand what his anglophone boss or francophone boss writes to him in French, (II) he has to know French to follow up lectures in the Yaounde University where the francophone lecturers are not only in majority but are those teaching the compulsory courses; (III) he has to know French to follow up his dossier, (IV) he has to know French so as to do shopping in the major cities where most supermarkets are owned by Frenchmen and Lebanese. These are some basic realities of Cameroon's Bilingualism. When there are English programme on the air most francophones will turn and tune their radio sets to foreign french radio stations like Africa number one, France International etc.

Bilingualism In Institutions of Learning

Where one would have expected to see bilingualism triumph was in the University. But the university policy towards bilingualism is equally very optional. A lecturer lectures in the language he knows best and the students in turn will answer his question in any of the official languages. It is the lecturer who becomes more bilingual than the students because he has to mark scripts in English and French. The teaching of general English and French "formation bilingue" is however taught to all students in the various faculties who are not doing bilingual degrees. The University of Yaounde in the past offered

a two months course of intensive English and French from July - August each year to Advance Level GCE holders and Baccalaureate before enrollment into the University. But this has long been abolished. Bilingualism as far as English is concerned is not given a strong push by most anglophone lecturers. Some of them like their counterparts in government and Directors in the central administration tend to teach in French instead of English (their official language of expression) but there is no francophone who will even summarise his lecture in English for the students of English expression; even if asked, for his reply is "le pays est bilingue" But many things in the University do not reflect the bilingualism which is often referred to. In the university amphitheatre 1001 for example there are twelve placards alerting students of what to do. But of these twelve placards non is translated into English. If an international conference was holding in such amphitheatre, what would immediately remind a foreigner that Cameroon is a bilingual nation? Yet this is what happens in the University of Yaounde which is supposed to be the breeding ground of bilingual citizens.⁴⁷

The Bilingual Grammar Schools that sprang up after the creation of the Unitary State both officially and privately tended to be running the two colonial inherited systems in one compound in the name of bilingualism. There are no bilingual programmes that can enable the children of the two sectors to speak both language fluently let alone writing the certificate examination of each other (GCE or BEPC).

At most these schools enable the children of the two cultural groups to interact during games and other collective activities. Consequently francophone parents who are ignorant of the way bilingualism is implemented in our schools and think that in bilingual grammar schools children would come out being able to speak and write both English and French are usually disappointed with the end results, after they have struggled to get their children a place in the bilingual grammar school instead of a purely francophone grammar school. English and French by law must be taught in secondary schools. This is the enactment side of it which has already been done, but the enforcement side of it is with a big question mark. Apparently the way bilingualism is handled in the secondary schools depicts that inspite of the existing guidelines in the way of syllabuses these guidelines are not meticulously adhered to. The seriousness with which the teaching and learning of these official languages is done is yet to be evaluated.

Bilingualism in primary education is simply that English and French are taught as subjects to children during the last three years of their primary education. The first English primary school was opened in Yaounde 1965 and it later on became known as the bilingual primary school. By the end of the second decade of reunification their number had increased in Francophone Cameroon to enable the anglophone children continue with the educational system obtainable in West Cameroon. The main language of instruction for all other subjects remained English. In West

Cameroon there are francophone primary schools for gendarmerie children in provincial and divisional headquarters. In these schools french was and is the main language and English is taught as a subject. As the English primary schools in the french sector the "Ecole Francophone" were equally created for the gendarmerie children to complete their francophone education.

With all these hurdles bilingualism falls back to be an anglophone affairs, the learning of French to survive. This again has constantly made anglophones to ask the question "why they should be treated as a conquered people", when the Bilingual Republic of Cameroon was brought into existence by the deep and fervent will of the Cameroon people? Cameroon Bilingualism, therefore is unlike that of Canada, where the atmosphere for growth is engendered. But this is not the case as from all empirical evidence in this discussion the lack of interest by the francophone majority bars the road to smooth and peaceful bilingualism. From this point Cameroon's bilingualism is likened to that of Canada where the two language state came into co-existence as a result of war and conquest. Where more often than not, Professor Bernard Fonlon said:

We witness, on the part of the conquerors, that dim-sighted folly, that over-whelming insolence, which strive to impose on the vanquished the victor's culture in addition to his rule. That arouses in the conquered that resolute rejection which, in French Canada,

let to resentful isolationism.⁴⁸

In Cameroon, therefore, the handling of the issue in the union has lent credence to English speaking Cameroonians who like French Canadians complained of discrimination. The Government has not set about the task vigorously and Cameroon Bilingualism has remained, may be forever, an empty expression. Yet it is precisely this Cameroon Bilingual option that gave her a distinctive seal among the States of Africa. In this enterprise, all expect from the citizens of the Bilingual Republic a more than normal effort.⁴⁹ But unfortunately such an important national enterprise has been handled half-heartedly and haphazardly not very much because it would involve huge expenditure in terms of personnel and logistics but because there is no national commitment to it is principle.







Notes

1. The Political Philosophy of Ahmadou Ahidjo 1958 - 1968;
Edited and published on behalf of the Political
Bureau of the CNU by Paul Bory Publishers.
pp. 79-82.
2. Wilfred A. Ndongko, Planning for Economic Development in a
Federal State, op. cit., p. 131.
3. Decree No. 62/DF/90 du Mars 18, 1962 (NAY).
4. Wilfred A. Ndongko, op.cit p. 133.
5. Nfor Nfor, op.cit p. 164
6. Wilfred A. Ndongko, op.cit p.67.
7. Decree No. 64/LF/ du Avril 6, 1964.
8. VC-b /1961/2 Founmban Conference July 17 - 21, 1961
(N.A.B), Also see Southern Cameroons Press Release
No. 1468 of July 24, 1961.
9. African Research Bulletin: Economic Financial and Technical
Series, Vol. 19. No. 7, 1982. p. 6491A
10. Second Annual Report of the National Credit Council
1964 - 1966; p.107.
11. Nfor Nfor Op. Cit p.183.
12. Wilfred A. Ndongko, Op.Cit p. 134.
13. The Fifth Five-Years Economic, Social and Cultural
Development Plan 1981 - 1986, pp. 172 - 173.


14. The Fourth Five-Years Economic Social and Cultural Development Plan 1976 - 1981, pp. 293 - 355.
15. Interview with Bup. Nfor David Op.Cit.
16. Va/a/1957/Z Cameroon Republic in Legislative Council of Nigeria in 1957 (NAB).
17. Decre No. 6Z/DF/409 du Novembre 23, 1962 (NAY).
18. Journal Official du Decembre 1, 1967 pp. 1333 - 1334.
19. Cameroon Times, July 9, 1965 p.3.
20. Jacque Benjamin, "The Impact of Federal Institutions on West Cameroon's Economic activity in Ndiva-Kofele-Kale (ed.) An African Experiment in National Building, Op.Cit. p.208
21. Nigeria has completed its own section of the trans-African road right to the border at Mfum but the Cameroon section is still untouched i.e. Mfum-Ikom-Mamfe to Bamenda or Kumba.
22. Road infranstructure by province, Cameroon budget 1978/1979 Yaounde.
23. Ibid.
24. The eight francophone provinces are linked by either tarred road or railway line except the two anglophone provinces that are not linked by tarred road.
25. Jacque Benjamin, Op.Cit., p. 206.
26. The Fifth Five-Year Economic, Social and Cultural Development Plan 1961 - 1986; pp. 140. 141.
27. Interview with S.N. Tita, Limbe Op.Cit.
28. L'UNC dans la Nation, Op.Cit., p. 47.

29. Wilfred A. Ndongko, Economic Management in Cameroon: Policies and Performances, (Yaounde: undated) p.44.
30. Paul Biya, Commual Liberalism, (London: MacMillan Publishers 1986), p.115.
31. Article II (I) of the Federal Constitution.
32. Article 9(I) of the Federal Constitution.
33. Professor Bernard Folon as Minister of Post-Tele Communication awarded the installation of telephone in north Cameroon to an American Company and when he was moved to the Ministry of Public Health he replaced the French medical doctors heading the General Hospitals of Douala and Buea with Cameroonian Medical doctors to the discomfiture of President Ahidjo. These two events sparked friction between Ahidjo and France and he was advised to resign.
34. Decret No. 62/DF/I/du 1^{er} Janvier 1962 portant organisation de la Republique Federale du Cameroun. (NAY)
35. Decret No. 72/282/0 du 8 Juin 1972 portant organisation de la presidence de la Republique. (NAY)
36. National Year Book of the United Republic of Cameroon 1982, pp. 67 - 70.
37. Article 1 (3) of the Federal Constitution.
38. Ibid.
39. Agence Camerounaise de Press (ACAP), Magazine (Mai 23, 1972), p.2.
40. Article 1(4) of the United Republic of Cameroon Constituion.

41. Benard Fonlon "A Case of Early Bilingualism in Cameroon" in Abbia, No 4, (1964), p.67.
42. Cameroun Information Speciale Xe Anniversaire de L'Etat Unitaire (Mai 1982). p.55.
43. The study of French (formation Bilingue) is compulsory to all student of the Yaounde University except those doing biligual degrees.
44. Andrew Mosongo, "The Present State of Bilingualism in Cameroon" in Contact Bulletin of the Ministry of National Education, (January 1985), p.19.
45. Ibid.
46. It was a common place to hear a francophone answering an anglophone after exposing a problem "Je n'est comprendre par votre anglais la."
47. Cameroun Information Speciale Xe Anniversaire de L'Etat (Mai 1982) p.55.
48. Bernard Fonlon. op.cit., p.91.
49. Ibid p. 94.

	International B
	Provincial B
	Divisional B
	Capital
	Provincial Capital
	Divisional Capital

SOURCE: Macmillan School Atlas
for Cameroon Page: 11



CONCLUSION

Before summing up the discussion and the issues raised in the study, I will attempt an explanatory survey, of how Ahidjo succeeded in maintaining the system he put in place perfectly until November 2, 1982 when he resigned.

President Ahidjo adopted the divide and rule policy when the union was created by dramatising the problem of accommodating the new comers. Because of what was put out as threats from the new comers it helped to bridge the gap between the warring factions in French Cameroun to face the common enemy (the anglophones). Thus the ethnic problems and political apposition to his regime spearheaded by the banned UPC militants in the Bassa and Bamileke regions gradually fettered out and became transformed into a struggle between the two cultural groups: the anglophones and the francophones as regards the allocation of power, economic development, cultural accommodation, social infrastructural development and resource allocation. The groups in a bid to survive in the new melieu looked upon Ahidjo as the umpire and overlord. He strengthened himself by appointing those who owed allegiance to him irrespective of whether or not they had the support of the people they were supposed to represent. The masses had no say in the selection of the people who governed at any level of the system. On the other hand members of the ruling

oligarchy nominated candidates for all "elective" posts and no one in the periphery of this clique was permitted to question, let alone, to alter the choices imposed from above. Since the creation of the one party system in September 1, 1966, Cameroon's electoral history "can be succinctly described as the progressive dispossession of the people of their legal and political sovereignty to the benefit of the neo-colonial ruling group":¹ In the ruling group itself he played one leader against the other, like in the case of Mayi-Matip and Um Nyobe of the UPC and Foncha and Muna of the KNDP using them as tools to attain his objectives. Once his goal was attained he simply dropped them from prominence as he did to Muna after he had successfully undercut Foncha.² // This popular sovereignty the people conferred on the young Fulani-French made politician was exploited to the full and transformed into a personal diktat. ✓

The regime also proceeded to what can be termed the militarization of justice though the enactment or issuance of 47 legislative texts (Decrees, ordinances, laws and decisions "arretes") between 1959 and 1970.³ Judges of the public courts or military tribunals have long lost the function of impartially administering the laws and have emerged instead as agents and justifiers of the repression. In most cases judgment was dictated to them before the court started sitting. The most notorious of these oppressive laws were the organic law on the State of Emergency⁴ and the famous ordinance for repressing

subversive activities.⁵ Using these legislative texts in various forms the regime was able to silence the opposition.

The regime also established specialised services which took charge of "intelligence" operations, torture, intimidation, and secret accusations. These agents are: Service de documentation (SEDOC) and Brigades Mixtes Mobiles (BMM). The SEDOC was established in the years 1959-1960 by two secret agents seconded to the Ahidjo regime from the French-Service de documentation exterieure et de Contre espionnage (SDECE).⁶ The BMM developed as a consequence of the enactment of the law of Emergency in 1960. BMM first stations were opened at Yaounde, Edea, Douala, Nkongsamba and Kumba. Today all provincial headquarters have this unit which carries out torture of suspects to induce information and indefinite detention without trial.⁷ The personnel of the two organisations are drawn from all wings of the armed forces and police. It also includes civilians who are informants. These agents enjoy special privileges and financial bonuses in addition to presidential favours for sustaining the regime. The SEDOC, new CENER is directly attached to the presidency and carries out its activities independently of the police command. Once the authorities have substantial evidence that an individual had committed a crime against the state, it becomes the task of SEDOC to investigate the plot and assemble the facts establishing the complicity of the person in question. It becomes more serious if the president himself indicated you

were a wanted person. This was more than enough "to guarantee arrest, imprisonment, and even execution of the accused".⁸ Following this reign of terror the Catholic newspaper L'Effort du Cameroun had the gut to publish in January, 1968 an unusual editorial statement which best reflected the garroting of the country and people by the Ahidjo regime. Inter-alia it stated that:

Fear is a bad thing. It empties man of all he is and all he has. It inhibits intelligence, annihilates the will, and chases away what it is that makes him man: freedom. What was once a man now becomes a robot, an automaton with conditioned reflexes. The reasoning animal becomes an animal tout court, even less than a normal animal because, in a man subjected to fear, the only instinct is that of self-preservation; and, as his intelligence hardly still functions, the action which this man undertakes just to preserve his life can sometimes achieve the opposite result ...⁹

This summarises the effects of the police state which the regime deplored to eliminate opposition and maintain itself in power as well. This fear has been denounced by the people for years, yet it has persisted and became entrenched in various insidious forms. Now it has become an established phenomenon

even in the era of technocrats. Ironically, it seems even if there is a feeling that this state of terror should be abolished, the will is not there. "Fear has done its work: it has paralysed Cameroonian society".¹⁰ This Cameroonians only striving to survive, accept things as they are and not what they ought to be.

My task in this work has been to see to what extent the expectations and high hopes preached by the pro-unificationists and endorsed by Ahidjo during preliminary talks prior to the Fouban Constitutional Conference are being realized. This has been carried out through the examination of a wide spectrum of the role of the government in effecting genuine integration of the two cultural groups by, power allocation, economic development, cultural accommodation, social infrastructural development and resource allocation. Since the Southern Cameroons voted "YES" for reunification it was now left for the Yaounde authorities to translate this made-belief-structure of Foncha that was only theoretical into action that would bring real effects and instill a sense of belonging to the new comer. Claude Ake holds the view that the "problem of political integration is one of developing a political culture and of inducing commitment to it."¹² Analysing political culture, Sidney Verba concludes that it, "consists of the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols and values which define the situation in which political action takes place."¹³ Writing on the same theme Lucian Pye views political culture as playing a

even in the era of technocrats. Ironically, it seems even if there is a feeling that this state of terror should be abolished, the will is not there. "Fear has done its work: it has paralysed Cameroonian society".¹⁰ This Cameroonians only striving to survive, accept things as they are and not what they ought to be.

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dual functional role; providing "guidelines of political behaviour for individual and for the system as a whole, it provides a systematic structure of values and rational considerations which ensure coherence in the performance of institutions and organisation"¹⁴. The relevance of culture or an interest lies in its value to the members of the community and what they cherish that satisfies their wants and expectations.

It is rather unfortunate that when reunification was effected on October 1, 1961, instead of deploying efforts to realize the promises Foncha made during the plebiscite campaign, Ahidjo introduced coercive approach through assimilation and intimidation to neutralize the anglophones as a means of integration as if they were conquered in a war. Thus, rather than independence and unification for the West Cameroonians coming with dignity and promise for a brighter future, it came on the wings of terror and naked repression with an army of occupation as instrument of force visible everywhere as a logical symbol of the extension of French Cameroun hegemony in West Cameroon.

When Ahidjo adopted independence and reunification as a political option, it was based on the advice of his mentor as a tactical weapon to gain support from pro-unificationists on both sides of the Trust Territory that assured his stay in power. Following British total withdrawal when unification came on October 1, 1961, France stood as the unquestionable grand patron of the Federal Republic of Cameroon. With the army of

occupation, West Cameroon began under-going another form of colonisation as British colonial institutions were replaced by French oriented ones - and not harmonisation in building a new Kamerun as the Anglophones the undisputed architects of modern Cameroon had postulated. Thus "in the history of man a peaceful revolution-plebiscite-which decided the people's will was proclaimed by battle-ready dark-helmetted 400 strong-man gendarmes rather than by a dove bearing good tidings with an olive branch".¹⁵

Here again the question is asked "CAN INTEGRATION BE REALISED BY FORCE AND DECREES?" The mess stemmed from the fact that the KNDP leadership which piloted the ship of reunification had, little or no experience in the game of modern politics. They adopted the morale that it was a union of "brothers" not knowing they were dealing with political opponents telequided by France. The populace who had given their votes in the hope of speedy political and socio-economic developments which they could not secure from the union with Nigeria stood confused as nothing was forth coming except the presence of an occupation force (the gendarmes). They could not clearly define who was the ruler of their state, the Federal Inspector of Administration (Ahidjo's representative) or their elected Prime Minister? They became more helpless as their spineless leaders with fever-stroke chicken-political wills were preoccupied with shutting to Yaounde and lobbying for identification, recognition and acceptability. Thus

Ahidjo used the occasion to sow seeds of division amongst them leading to chaos and confusion. Thus began the race of winning Ahidjo's confidence-culminating in treachery and lack of statemanship. Consequently the loss of the sense of direction for reunified Cameroon became so glaring among the West Cameroon leaders. By their teacherous act they had abandoned both the people and their coveted mission of liberating French Cameroon from French neo colonial claws¹⁶ and to build a new Great Kamerun family, independent of British and French influence.

We now see that although integration of the two sectors was optional (as no force was used) in the bid of institute rigid centralization it became clear to Ahidjo and his mentor, France, that the faster approach to it was to reject outright the question of local autonomy, diversity and freedom. In this light the federal structure agreed upon in Foumban was just a prelude to the creation of a unitary system (unilaterally instituted by Ahidjo in 1972). Based on this coercive approach instead of preserving state identity and letting the sense of belonging grow and fraternity develop; West Cameroon became a dependency of East Cameroon so profoundly that its leaders are forced to look up to the centre for survival. The process of strangulating West Cameroon had started with financial deprivation when her share of the national cake was termed subsidy. When this failed Ahidjo worked hard to introduce the one party system in September 1, 1966, thus marking the end of democracy and freedom. The

referendum on May 20, 1972 instituted the unitary system marking the end of West Cameroon's autonomy.

This form of integration can be rightly described as Mal-integration. Claude Ake holds that "a minimally integrated political system is potentially unstable" and concludes that "so long as obedience is not transformed into duty, rebellion is endemic".¹⁷

In the Cameroon society from the inception of the one party system, the supreme ruler of the state plays the role of a benevolent despot or philosopher-king who alone knows what his citizenry want. In line with Machiavelli's philosophy he perceives politics as an instrument to acquire power and power presupposes violence. Based on this principle the tranquillity of the state can only be maintained either through the direct use of violence or threat of it. This brings us back to the declaration of the political activist, Albert Mukong that Ahidjo achieved reunification by fraud.¹⁸ His inference is supported by this abstract of Ahidjo's policy speech at his party Congress barely ten months after reunification (July 1962) at Ebolowa, which distorted what reunification and the federal system agreed upon at Foumban stood for. Inter-alia he said:

The Cameroon Republic and the territory previously under British trusteeship constituted a single historic unit; the Cameroon nation; a single moral unit: the

Cameroon Fatherland. But on the other hand, they were two distinct political entities: on one side, an independent sovereign state possessing an international, legal personality; on the other, a territory without a political, international status.

It being unthinkable to tamper with the republican form of the regime, it was the Republic which had to transform itself into a federation, taking into account the return to it of a part of its territory, a part possessing certain special characteristics. The question therefore was not one of the birth of a new republic with a federal form¹⁹

He further stated that it was only bowing to the above logic that they amended the constitution of February 21, 1960, since language and cultural differences needed to be given legal considerations.²⁰ It is therefore not surprising that the president after reunification was pre-occupied with the creation of institutions that would project his identity and protect his continuance in power rather than harmonising structures that are necessitated by the historical circumstances. The end result was the integration of institutions and not the people as the deleterious structures have not created in the people an

awareness and a consciousness that they are one and share in one hope and destiny. It is absurd to think that the best way to induce loyalty is by rendering one sector helpless through coercion, economic exploitation, cultural assimilation, suppression and discriminatory allocation of power.

The negative effects are so glaring as the anglophone zone lies undeveloped while the Francophone sector is flourishing with petrol wealth from Victoria. After the May 20, 1972 referendum creating the unitary state, in the name of "we are one", which Fongum Gorji-Dinka described as Ahidjo's coup D'Etat that abrogated the Fouban Accord of 1961 all resources including oil from the West became common property. The zone having only one new industry since 1961, SONARA - the oil refinery, stands aloof from the people as it is run entirely by the francophones. No inter-state roads, no railways, yoke electricity dam closed for political reasons, no seaport developed as the Victoria Cape Limbo deep water port lies wasted and millions of francs are annually spend on a French Company dredging sand from the Douala river-port on the Wouri River 50km from the Atlantic ocean.

The ultimate out come is that minority politics come cracking at the walls of unity as there is disaffection because of injustice. This injustice is sustained by the created institutions and manifested daily by the decision-making process and the sharing of the nation's wealth. If the system had provided for equality, equity and justice there would have been

no minority agitation. Minority revolutionary reaction is against the existing unjust society.

As the situation stands, despite growing disenchantment and alienation secessionist tendencies are minimal. The anglophones have developed the spirit to fight from within and with the formation of the Social Democratic Front (SDF) Anglophone dissent will find a legal expression it is of course likely that the francophone is asked whether the union with anglophone should continue, a majority will answer in the negative.²¹ The minister of Territory Administration Mbounbou Njoya after a visit to Bamenda, where on May 26, 1990, the gendarmes shot 9 people dead after the launching of the SDF declared that "if some people did not want to stay in the union, they can go where they want".²² These are the provocative government declarations that may fan secessionist movements if a Forum is not found where all shade of opinions can be expressed and a frame-work that guarantees minority rights is provided. The society has so evolved that there is a new breed of anglophones (post unification youths) who by their determination, would not for anything accept francophone insults and domination which their parents had condoned in the past.²³

Some Policy Guideline Recommendations

To end disaffection, we must examine the institutions that govern the present system and demolish those that work against national unity. This will obviously lead to the building of a

healthy union (by the two cultural groups) wherein each group will have a sense of belonging and commitment to the nation I. A new constitution should be drawn up by elected delegates representing all shades of opinion. A constitution that will protect the rights of the two linguistic groups and provide equal guarantee of their cultural identity. The amendment clause should be such that no person nor group of persons will ever again be capable of violating it. A constitution wherein matters affecting either English speaking or French speaking Cameroonians shall be decided only by the will of the majority of those concerned. The "British North America Act of 1867" which is the Constitution of Canada, whose bilingual character is often appropriately compared to Cameroon, has stood the test of time because of checks and balances as well as the fundamental constitutional guarantees entrenched therein have been respected over years by both the majority and the minority in the federation.

II. Decentralization: From experience centralization has failed. It has since 1972 legalised autocratic rule, tribalism, favouritism, corruption and syphoning of public funds among others. Thus the federal system is the best workable political arrangement.

III. Establishment of Authentic Democracy: Multi-party politics should be allowed as provided for by the 1972 Constitution (article 3 (II and II)). Beginning at least with two political

parties, with well defined objectives - not based on ethnic or linguistic affiliation. The one party system has outlived its usefulness as Dr. Julius Nyerere, observes "it over sleeps"²⁴ on the other hand His Eminence Cardinal Christine Tumi, the Head of the Cameroon Catholic Church pointed out that there is no democracy in a single party system for it has one ideology and all its members have to toe the line or else be dismissed. The ruling party the CPDM must stand the test of time by allowing free and fair competition from other political parties.

IV. A National Assembly with Jurisdiction to Check the Government: Once authentic democracy has been established the people should elect their representatives that are responsible to them. It should be a check to government actions and not merely existing to carry the formalities of shaping and endorsing government actions as is the case with the one party system witnessed from CNU to CPDM.

V. Appointments: Appointments into high offices of the nation should take into account the two linguistic groups and should be submitted to the National Assembly for thorough screening. The appointees should be subjected to taking the oath of office and public declaration of their assets on entry and exit from office. A public, service commission should also be set up to appoint officers of the civil service - rather than each minister appointing those whom she/he likes as is the case today, an act highly influenced by ethnicism and favouritism, the end result


here is that seniority and merit is not taken into account and this has resulted into indignation and loss of faith in the system.

VI. Public Accountability: The government should be accountable to the people. This could be realized through the establishment of an Auditor General of the Republic, the Auditor General or any person assigned by him should have access to Public Accounts of the Nation including that of the presidency. His reports should be submitted to the president of the National Assembly who shall cause them to be published and laid before the National Assembly Finance Committee and the Economic and social council. His functions should be guaranteed by the constitution to avoid his being subjected to the direction or control of any other person or authority.

VII. Education: The two inherited colonial educational system should be harmonised and Biligualism should be put into practice.

VIII. Government should introduce a compulsory one year national service for all the graduates before employment into the public or private sectors.

Southern Cameroons' leaders want a better future for their people. But in agony now, all fingers point to the vote of February 11, 1961, and the aftermath. The vote of February 11, 1961, should be borne in mind as an investment which was expected to pay some dividends. Although the reverse could of course be the case, all average anglophones believe better days are ahead.



This is with the conviction that the aspiration for a true Cameroonian nationalism would be based on mutual trust and respect for each other's basic freedom, justice, peace and dignity. The bicultural character of the nation must also be preserved and allowed to develop side by side in a spirit of complementarity, not competition. Because trying to build a unique Cameroonian culture, from the two inherited colonial legacies is Utopia "except God is using Cameroon to work a miracle".²⁶ Cameroonian leaders in management of the State should learn from the lessons of History. The cameroonians should also understand that below the facade of Francophony and Anglophony exists their primordial and authentic Africannes which is what is really fundamental. If the cameroonians realise their unique experience, they may blaze the trail of unity in Africa, a unity which is to triumph over its division and march forward into greater economic glory which can only be realised in a wider political frame work which certainly would be greater than present colonial frontiers of present African States.

NOTES

1. Abel Eyinga, "Government by State of Emergency" in Gaullist Africa: Cameroon Under Ahmadou Ahidjo
Richard A. Joseph (ed.) Op.Cit. P. 105.
2. S.T. Muna was the right handman of Ahidjo, after Ahidjo has used him to endorse the unitary system in 1972 as an anglophone leader, barely three years after (1975) Ahidjo dropped him as his constitutional successor and brought in Paul Biya as Prime Minister. When he resigned November 2, 1972 Muna also head the news on the radio as the rest of the masses. This clearly illustrates the distrust Ahidjo had for the Anglophone which has become a common phenomenon.
3. Jean-Phillippe Guiffo Mopo, op.cit. pp. 101-253.
4. Presidential decree No. 52 of 7 May 1960 - the Organic Law on the State of Emergency.
5. Ordinance No. 62/OF/18 of 12 March, 1962 for Repressing Subversive activities.
6. For details on organisation and functioning of SEDOC see Decrees No. 55 of 10 December, 1961, and NO. 313 of 14 July 1964.
7. For more on the BMM: cf. Albert Mukong, Prisonal Without a Crime. (Limbe: Alfresco Books, 1985). Decrees Nos. 37 of February 1962, 122 of July, 1962 and 6th of June, 1963 regulates BMM organisation and functions.
8. Le Monde, 4 December, 1970.

9. Quoted in Gaullist Africa: Cameroon under Ahmadou Ahidjo op.cit p. 109.
10. Ibid. p. 110.
11. Richard A. Joseph Radical Nationalism in Cameroun op.cit pp. 26-30.
12. Claude Ake, A Theory of political Integration, (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1967) P.1.
13. Lucian Pye & Verbra S., The Political Culture (Princeton: Princeton Uni. Press, 1965) p. 513.
14. Ibid. p. 7.
15. Nfor Ngala N., To Cameroon Patriots, (Zaria Ramsel pub. Co, Ltd. 1985) p. 40.
16. Ibid. p. 41
17. Claude Ake, op.cit p. 3-4
18. Albert Mukong, op.cit p. 74.
19. Statement on General Policy to the Ebolowa Congress of the Union Camerounaise, by the President General H.E. Ahmadou Ahidjo, President of the F.R.C. (Ebolowa: 4-8 July 1962) pp. 4-5.
20. Ibid. The Cameroun Republican Constitution was adopted February 20, 1960 when she gained her independence from France January 1, 1960.
21. Cameroon Tribune May 29, 1990. p.3.
22. Ibid.

23. Post-reunification Youths are those who were born after February 11, 1961. Before 1972 when the unitary state was created most of them have had contacts with francophone children in primary schools and finally in the Yaounde University. They are quite bilingual. Their francophone friends who have received English education are quite anti-French and the way their francophone brothers reason.
24. African Concord, May 7, 1990. p. 40.
25. His Eminence Cardinal Christine Tumi's Press Conference in Yaounde June 6, 1990, following the publication of the 36 page Pastoral letter on the crisis in Cameroon addressed to the President and all Churches on pentecost Sunday June 3, 1990.
26. North West and South West Provinces Elite in Douala Memorandum op.cit. p.6.

APPENDIX I

A MEMORANDUM PRESENTED BY ANGLOPHONE
TEACHERS OF THE BILINGUAL HIGH SCHOOL,
YAOUNDE ON "THE INTRODUCTION OF GROUP
CERTIFICATE SCHEMES FOR THE CAMEROON
G. C. E. EXAMINATION.

THE HONOURABLE MINISTER OF
NATIONAL EDUCATION

Your Excellency,

With reference to circular No, 61/C/43/MINEDUC/DEXC of 2th September 1983 as regards the introduction of Group Certificate schemes for the Cameroon G.C.E. examination scheduled to began in June 1985 for the Ordinary Level and June 1987 for the Advanced Level, and the Ministerial Announcement of 23rd November 1983, Radio Cameroon News at 8p.m., we would like to draw your attention to some important points.

We are unanimous that a broad-based education at the early stage i.e. at the Ordinary Level is of primordial importance to the students but the very system at the Advanced Level is incompatible for the simple reason that we would be sacrificing content, quality and excellence for shallowness, vagueness and mediocrity, as a broad-based education cannot go hand in hand

with the required content of depth. We shall sooner or later come up with a new breed of educated Cameroonians who are "Jacks of all Trades and Masters of None."

Furthermore, the intended syllabus lays too much emphasis on subsidiary subjects. It should be the contrary. The success or failure of a candidate should rather depend on his major subjects.

Perhaps the most exasperating point is the attempt to classify successful candidates into Divisions, One, Two, and Three. This appears a deliberate attempt to eliminate the Anglophone candidate or frustrate his efforts for further studies as, sooner or later, the University doors would be shut to him. The present system of grading A.B.C.D.E.F. which guarantees for a pass or a fail should be maintained.

Your Excellency, we presume we do not intend to make the certificates to be awarded lose their credibility. We would kindly refer you to paragraph 10(ten) of your circular AWARD OF CERTIFICATES, and we will not hesitate to say that certificates are awarded for academic performance or excellence and not on the discretion of any body, not even the Minister.

At the Advanced Level a course load of six or Seven subjects is not judicious or equitable. We would be asking our students too much, if not to do the impossible.

Permit us, Your Excellency, to make a few remarks about your speech alluded to earlier. The speech clearly revealed that you

are grossly misinformed about the existing situation, thus far removed from the realities of the Anglophone students.

1. Anglophone students do not go to Polytechnic and such other higher institutions not because they are mediocre but because they pursue quite different syllabuses and schemes of work from their francophone counterpart. They are far from inferior as far as the sciences are concerned. We have examples of Anglophone students who every year come up with brilliant performances in Mathematics, Further Maths, Applied Maths, Physics, Chemistry etc.
2. It is not true that Anglophones have neglected important or compulsory subjects as English, French and Maths. It is rather the Minister who in some of these subjects has not provided the students with necessary facilities and personnel.
3. The Honourable Minister seems to think that Francophones are more bilingual than Anglophones. If being bilingual means speaking French and knowing Maths, we would not hesitate to agree with him.
4. We do consider that the Minister's attempt at trying to justify his circular, and moreso to the Francophone audience was most untimely and has rather developed illfeeling between two sleeping dogs.

5. The Minister seems to think that because the present document has taken a long time to be studied it must therefore appeal to the people and is therefore authentic. We are not surprised that studying the wrong thing for a long time would not make right, and who are those experts, by the way, who gave their approval? Perhaps not Nigeria and Britain, for Nigeria is going back to the single subject examination system and Britain is not changing to the group certificate scheme either.

6. The Anglophone exam has undergone too many changes and although we are only 23 years old as an independent nation the examination has undergone so far three phases and this is the fourth. May be a fifth and a sixth are envisaged. By 1961 at Reunification it was the West African School Certificate.

By 1964 it was the London G.C.E.

By 1977 it was the Cameroon G.C.E.

By 1985 ? ?

By 1987 ? ?

There is no gainsaying that the present dualism in the cameroonian system of education has many short-comings. Many of these could be discarded with if a harmonisation of syllabuses and examinations at National Level were brought about. This is especially true as far as secondary General Education goes.

We therefore suggest that:

1. The syllabuses and examinations should be harmonised for the whole nation, taking into consideration the best aspects from the Francophone and Anglophone educational systems.
2. An examination should then be organised to fit in with these harmonised syllabuses and be titled CAMEROON SCHOOL CERTIFICATE EXAMINATION.
3. That the conduct of examination: setting, invigilating, marking and publication of results should be homogeneous for the whole country.
4. That harmonisation should be revived and speeded up since we are more than ripe for a national authentic educational system after 23 years of Independence.

The advantages that should accrue from such a stance are numerous and should be acceptable to all cameroonians irrespective of cultural background (Francophone or Anglophone) based on the following premises.

1. National Unity and Social Cohesion shall be strengthened since cameroonians shall be united under one national examination system.
2. The examination shall be held in both French and English or Certificates which shall have forever been valid in both languages.
3. The examination shall be held at the primary, secondary and tertiary levels shall be harmonised.

4. The conflict of alleged superiority of certificates shall come to an end.
5. No Cameroonian of the future generation shall have anything to lose or complain about in terms of examination facilities into the University and its affiliated schools.

In conclusion, we strongly recommend that the Honourable Minister leaves the Cameroon G.C.E. as it is and works towards a harmonised syllabus for the whole country for the nearest future, taking into consideration the suggestions in this memorandum. We do earnestly pray the Honourable Minister to give this matter his immediate attention and hope that he takes these suggestions in good faith.

1. YISA Joseph
2. PONJU Martin
3. Mrs. TEH
4. Mrs. JOE
5. Mrs. KAMANYI
6. Mrs. NGEN
7. Mrs. AGBORSANGAYA
8. Mrs. YEMBE
9. Mr. ALEMBONG
10. Mr. LEBAGA
11. Mr. TAMUTAN
12. Mr. ASOBO
13. Mrs. BESSONG
14. Mr. ITA

15. Mrs. NDINTEH
16. Mr. ABONGNIFOR
17. Mr. NCHONG
18. Mr. UKUM
19. Mrs. ANDJONGO
20. Mrs. EBASSY
21. Mr. TAMBE
22. Miss CHINDO
23. Mrs. OFON
24. Mr. CHEMUANGUH
25. Mr. AZOBI
26. Mr. SUH-NJIBAMUM

CC

- The President of the United Republic of Cameroon
- The President of the National Assembly
- The Prime Minister
- The Grand Chancellor of National Orders
- The Vice Minister of National Education
- The Department of Examinations
- The National Security
- The Delegate of National Education.

APPENDIX II

The Anglophone Students

Gov't Bilingual High School

Yaounde, 29th November 1989

YACUNDE

To the Honourable Minister of National Education,

Through - The Provincial Delegate of Education,

- The Principal,

- The Vice Principal of G.B.H.S. Yaounde

Dear Sir,

A RECAPITULATION OF OUR PROTEST

We, the anglophone students acknowledge the Administration of the school and we are strongly abiding to the rules and regulations of the school. But Sir, we have these problems to put forward before you:

1. Considering the protest pre-filled, was it given a halt because it was not so important? If they know that it was understand that we students are not conducive and for studies. So we need to our problems.
2. We ne-anglophone that when some certificates to office to sign

their G.C.E. forms, he, the mayor, refused that he did not recognize their certificates, that they were fake papers, which implies there isn't any harmonization in the system of documentation in the country, because documents should not vary when they cross the Mungo. For these reasons, Sir, we wish strongly that the school takes the responsibility in signing these documents next time.

3. Lastly, Sir, we wish to know if the francophones regret the reunification of October 1961, or else, all these torments must come to an end.

Considering all these our few points, we highly expect a reply from you as soon as possible, or else

Thanks for your cooperation.

Association of Anglophone Students
(A.A.S.)

APPENDIX III

ASSEMBLEMENT DEMOCRATIQUE
DU PEUPLE CAMEROUNAIS
CAMEROON PEOPLE'S
DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT

Yaounde le 9th June, 1990
the
No _____ /RDPC/CC/PN
CPDM/CC/NP

COMITE CENTRAL
CENTRAL COMMITTEE

LE VICE PRESIDENT NATIONAL
The National Vice President

VICE - PRESIDENT NATIONALE
NATIONAL VICE PRESIDENCY

A M His Excellency Paul Biya,
to National President of the CPDM
The Presidential Palace,
Yaounde.

Your Excellency,

RESIGNATION FROM THE CPDM

I have the honour to inform your Excellency that after careful consideration and careful thought, I have decided to address to you my resignation from the Cameroon People's Democratic Movement and my reasons for resigning are as follows:-

- the CPDM which elected me its first National Vice President is the party which forms the government of Cameroon and has been responsible for shaping government policies.
- As the national Vice President of the Party, I have found it impossible to use my exalted position to help in any way shape or influence the policies of the party because
- Demands by me for audience with the Chairman of the party to discuss issues have been systematically turned down.
- Several memos and presentations I have made it writing on several important national issues have been ignored.

During my political career which spans over forty years, I headed the group that campaigned for and got the people of the then Southern Cameroons to vote for unification, after which I went from village to village in the then East Cameroon at the risk of my life to calm terrorism which existed at the time, I even housed some Cameroonians wanted in East Cameroon until I successfully had them reconciled with the Ahidjo government. I missed being shot down on my way from Bafang on peace making mission.

After unification a lot of Cameroonians had confidence in me and when the first Presidential elections were coming up, many people urged me to stand against President Ahidjo. I decided to go in for the Vice Presidency instead in order to avoid unnecessary conflict and further bloodshed, in Cameroon counted to me more than any post I could occupy.

When President Ahidjo decided to get rid of me as the Vice President a lot of Cameroonians sympathised with me and urged me to make an issue of it but for love of peace, I came back quietly to live in my village Bamenda as a private citizen.

After settling in my village I was occasionally consulted on some national issues and I accepted to serve two people of Cameroon in whatever capacity it pleased the powers that be to put me.

When the leadership of Cameroon changed hands and Your Excellency became the President of the Republic and eventually head of the CNU, I assured Your Excellency that I was at your

disposal and ready from my vast experience to give you any advice you may need on national issues.

Unfortunately this was not to be as it became clear to me that I had become an irrelevant nuisance that had to be ignored and ridiculed.

- I was to be used now only as window dressing and not listened to. I am most of the time summoned to meetings by radio without any courtesy of my being consulted on the agenda.
- All projects of the former West Cameroon I had either initiated or held very dear to my heart had to be taken over, mismanaged and ruined eg Board, WADA in Wum, West Cameroon Co-operative Movement.
- Whereas I spent all my life fighting to have the deep sea port in Limbe developed, this project had to be shelved and instead an expensive pipeline is to be built from SONARA in Limbe to Douala in order to pipe the oil to Douala.
- All the roads in West Cameroon my government had either built, improved or maintained were allowed to deteriorate making Kumba-Mamfe, Mamfe-Bamenda, Bamenda-Wum-Nkambe, Bamenda-Momo inaccessible by road at certain times of the year. These important road projects were shelved even after petrol produced enough money for building them and the Limbe sea port.

- All programs of employment appointments etc. meant to promote adequate regional representation in government and its services have been revised or changed at the expense of those who stood for truth and justice. They are identified as "Foncha-men" and put aside.
- The Anglophone Cameroonian whom I brought into the union have been ridiculed and referred to as "les Biafraes" "les enemies dans la maison" "les traitez" etc. etc, and the constitutional provisions which protected this Anglophone minority have been suppressed, their voice drowned while the rule of the gun has replaced the dialogue which the Anglophones cherish very much.
- the national media has been used by the government through people who never voted for unification to misinform the citizens about Bamenda and deliberate lies have been told over the mass media all in an attempt to isolate the Anglophone Cameroonians who voted for unification and subject them to hatred and more discrimination and harassment from other Cameroonians.
- Embezzlement of public funds in all forms and illegal exportation of our currency by the privileged class seems to go without reprimand but is rather condoned.
- The constitution which I have held and preached as the supreme law of the land is in many respect being ignored or manipulated. People are encouraged to support a flagrant violation of the constitution by going out on marches

against the existence of multiparties.

- In order to completely disgrace me and show my irrelevance, troops were deployed in Bamanda in large numbers to harass everyone in Bamenda of Bamenda origin, myself not excluded, and prevent the launching of a new political party. This was done in spite of my protestations and advice in order to completely ridicule me in my own constituency and destroy all I have stood for all my life ie democracy, respect of human rights, avoidance of violence and respect of the constitution, in order to allow peace and progress which God has bestowed in Cameroon on a platter of gold.

If as the National Vice President of the CPDM, no one is prepared to listen to me in spite of the fact that the CPDM is the party running the government, I find myself completely at a loss as to what the CPDM has become.

Mindful of my patriotic love for Cameroon and the sacrifices I have personally made to ensure that Cameroon remains united as a nation, while resigning from the CPDM, I wish to ensure your Excellency and other militants of the CPDM that I shall not join any other political party. I shall still be even ready if consulted to give any advice sincerely to the government if ever such advice is asked for. I hope and pray that the CPDM will change its attitude towards the demand for multi-parties otherwise it might soon find itself an irrelevant anachronism. The people who are sincere should encourage the CPDM in this direction because without criticism and competition the CPDM will

never improve and cultivate genuine support from its citizenry. Let the CPDM not move towards the direction where it will find itself collapsing faster than many of the "strong" governments that have collapsed in recent memory. My resignation is effective from today the 9th June, 1990.

Thank you.

I have the Honour to be

Yours Respectfully

Dr. J.N. Foncha

cc

1. The Political Secretary,
CPDM Secretariat,
Yaounde.
2. The Section President,
CPDM Mezam.
3. The Press.

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II ORAL INTERVIEWS

Informants are arranged according to linguistic groups :
Anglophones and Francophones.

i ANGLOPHONES IN ENGLISH CAMEROON.

	NAME	AGE	SOCIAL STATUS	PLACE	DATE
1.	Pa M.H.Ntune	69	Commissioner of Police(rtd)	Babanki	1987
2.	Fai Nditunga	70	Sub-Chief	Binjeng	1988
3.	Hon Peter N.Nsakwa	60	Politician (KNDP)	Nkambe	1988
4.	L.Y.Ngala	55	Lord Mayor	Nkambe	1988/89
5.	Leonard Shey	52	Educationist	Nkambe	1988
6.	David Bup	56	Accountant	Mbot	1989/90
7.	Pa Ngenge Mbunwe	70	Farmer	Binshua	1987
8.	Dr.Omar Yembe	50	Dean ENS	Bamenda	1988
9.	Daniel Nfor	53	Educationist	Sabongari	1987
10.	Bathson N.	52	Trade Unionist	Ndu	1988
11.	Hon.Albert Waingeh	43	Member of Parliament	Fudong	1989

12.	Francis Nkwatu	42	PLEG	Kumbo-Nso	1988
13.	Ernest Nkwalar	41	PLEG	Bamenda	1988
14.	Fon Clement Nfor	50	Traditional Ruler	Binshua	1987
15.	Fon Polycarp Ngwayi	55	Traditional Ruler	Tabenken	1987
16.	L.N. Lainjo	53	Administrator	Buea	1989
17.	Ni S.N. Tita	60	Printer	Victoria	1988/89
18.	Stephen N. Nfor	60	Pharmacist	Limbe	1988
19.	Dr. Atem George	51	MINEDUC	Buea	1989
20.	Dan L. Matute	40	Lord Mayor	Limbe	1989
21.	Maurice Nchangi	38	Manager (CDC)	Tole	1989
22.	Epie Michael	36	NPMB	Kumba	1990
23.	Nkeng Ivo	35	PLEG	Limbe	1988

24.	Bate Besong	36	Writer	Buea	1989
25.	Tabang David	56	Police Officer	Nkambe	1990
26.	Fon Nformi Nfor II	35	Traditional Ruler	Ndu	1990
27.	Epart	37	Tutor	Kumba	1989
28.	Wkum s.	38	Tutor	Mbengwi	1989
29.	Chief Nformi Kongor	48	PLEG	Mbengwi	1988

ii ANGLOPHONES IN FRENCH CAMEROUN

	NAME	AGE	SOCIAL STATUS	PLACE	DATE
1.	Stephen B. Forc	54	Accountant	Douala	1987
2.	Dr. Siga Asang	50	Professor UNI - Yao	Yaounde	1989
3.	Dr. Ayissi Br		Professor IRIC	Yaounde	1987
4.	Nchangi Gern		Administrator	Yaounde	1989

5.	Ejedepang-Koge S.N.	48	Director MINEDUC	Yaounde	1988
6.	Nbaya Cybrien Awudu	40	President WACUDA	Douala	1988
7.	Joseph Nkerbu	45	CENER	Yaounde	1988
8.	Nfor Nfor N.	43	DPA MINAT	Yaounde	1988
9.	Joseph Sembe Nibunwe	50	Pecten Oil Co. Ltd.	Douala	1987
10.	Gabriel Tum-Ngong	45	NIE MINEDUC	Yaounde	1988
11.	John Nyako	48	Judicial Police	Douala	1989
12.	Ndofor M. Andy	35	Inspector Taxation	Yaounde	1988
13.	Jaff Shey Edward	45	Businessman	Obala	1987
14.	Tata Emmanuel	50	Businessman	Bafoussam	1987

15.	Dr. Alembong Nol T.	34	Lecturer UNI - Yao	Yaounde	1987/88
16.	Tubias Wiyeh	37	Inspector Taxation	Yaounde	1989
17.	Meh-zang Augustine	35	Chief of Service MINEDUC	Yaounde	1988
18.	Dr. Sarlah	45	Researcher	Yaounde	1990
19.	Ntune Bruno	30	Public Service (AR)	Yaounde	1988/89
20.	Shu Isaac	38	Lycee Bilingue (DM)	Yaounde	1988
21.	Nforniwe Johnson	36	Mayor de Police	Yaounde	1987
22.	Leba Christopher	39	Commissioner of Police	Bafia	1986
23.	Endali Solomon C.	36	USA Embassy	Yaounde	1989

24.	Yembe Gregory	38	PLEG	Bafia	1988
25.	Mme. Yembe	42	PLEG	Yaounde	1989
26.	Ndikotar Maurice	36	Lecturer	Yaounde	1988
27.	Pa David Ngeh	65	Teacher (rtd)	Ndu	1987
28.	Mbah-Ndam Joseph	40	Lawyer	Yaounde	1988
29.	Obi Okpun	38	Administrator	Yaounde	1989
30.	Oben Akem	38	Administrator (CNPS)	Maroua	1987
31.	Mbi Charles	37	Judicial Officer	Yaounde	1989
32.	Mbah-Ndam	38	Lawyer	Yaounde	1998
33.	Pa. Robert Weyih	70	Farmer	Yaounde	1988

iii FRANCOPHONES IN FRENCH CAMEROUN

	NAME	AGE	SOCIAL STATUS	PLACE	DATE
1.	Kouo Felix	43	Administrator	Yaounde	1987
2.	Emani Bonaventure	40	PLEG	Essoss	1989
3.	Moukama Jean	42	Adviser MINEDUC	Yaounde	1988
4.	Jacquiline Chuba	35	Administrator	Yaounde	1988
5.	Asimizille Victor	45	PLEG	Banyo	1986
6.	Njumayi John	37	PLEG	Bafoussam	1987
7.	El Hadji Mamouda	52	Administrator	Bafoussam	1987
8.	Zock Paul	56	Civil Servant	Edea	1988
9.	Tchakute P.	41	PLEG	Yaounde	1989
10.	Raphael Deboue	38	PLEG	Bafia	1987

11.	Okala	38	Language Tutor P.C.	Yaounde	1990
12.	Babark Prosper	39	Agriculturist	Bafia	1988
13.	Mukong Jean	45	Farmer	Mbalmayou	1989
14.	Ngo Patric	50	Gendarme	Bafang	1989
15.	Pa Ayance	60	Farmer	Messamena	1986
16.	Saedou Mamadou	60	Businessman	Bertoua	1986
17.	Mbanga Martin	37	PLEG	Ndiki	1988
18.	Lima Anatole	30	Civil Servant	Yaounde	1989
19.	Nemong E.	35	Teacher	Bafia	1988
20.	Ngancham Roger	39	Accountant	Douala	1990
21.	Tchuenkam Boniface	35	Banker/BICIC	Yaounde	1988
22.	Mebanga F.	60	Farmer	Messamena	1986

23.	Ankutita Salome	32	Nurse	Abong -Mbang	1986
24.	Kamga Jean-P	45	Businessman	Nkong Samba	1989
25.	Ebobissi Salonge	30	PLEG	Yaounde	1988
26.	Mme. Monthe	37	PLEG	Yaounde	1988

iv FRANCOPHONES IN ENGLISH CAMEROON

	NAME	AGE	SOCIAL STATUS	PLACE	DATE
1.	Pa Abashi Mamadou	75	Businessman	Nkambe	1987
2.	Nana Phillip Njotange	36	Medical Doctor	Bamenda	1987
3.	Ngalem Jean	35	Teacher	Foumban	1988
4.	Mebanga Francois	40	Businessman	Ndop	1989
5.	Takem Pierre	45	Farmer	Santa	1987
6.	Madeng Joseph	36	Transporter	Bamenda	1988

7.	Ngoh P. Martin	34	Gendarme	Kumbo	1989
8.	Pascal Toulou	42	Teacher	Kumba	1988
9.	Mbarga Didier	38	Civil Servant	Bamenda	1989
10.	Besong Dieudonne	35	Teacher	Nwah	1989
11.	Nana Bernard	37	PLEG	Nbengwi	1988
12.	Ndukong Fedelist	42	Businessman	Mamfe	1989
13.	Bobill Jean-Claude	40	Teacher	Kumba	1989
14.	Bello Ahmadou	56	Farmer	Binshua	1988
15.	Tchechue Samuel	45	Agriculturist	Bamisseng	1987

NOTES:

PLEG :Professeur des Lycees D'Enseignement General

NPMB :National Produce Marketing Board

MINEDU :Ministere de L'Education Nationale

PJ :Police Judiciare

CDC :Cameroon Development Corporation

WACUDA :Warr Cultural Development Association

CENER :Centre Nationale D'Etude et Recherche

DAP-MINAT :Directorate of Political Affairs - Minister
D'Administration Territoriale

NIE :National Inspector of Education

DM :Discipline Master

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
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