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The Bounds of Security Theorising: Envisioning Discursive Inputs for the Rectification of a Post-colonial Situation

Philip Ogo Ujomu

In Place of an Introduction: Of Epigraphs and Transitions to Discourse

There can be no security in traditions that failed us, there is no black market in truth. (Nelson Goodman 1972)

The United States spends \$30 billion a year gathering intelligence. But the inability of the government to even guess that nineteen suicidal terrorists might turn four jetliners into guided missiles aimed at national icons was more than a failure of intelligence. It was a failure of imagination. (*Newsweek International Magazine*, 1 October 2001)

Yield to Nothing. (Motto of the School of Infantry, Jaji, Nigeria)

This is a critical moment in the history of African peoples. If I had to suggest one word to characterize their current status, it would be 'insecurity'. (Richard Joseph 2002)

I cannot but use this occasion to draw upon some lessons from the epigraphs and the fact that there is a need to rethink some of them. This is significant insofar as we must struggle to understand the fundamental nature of security and the need to exploit all resources for its comprehension and application in the personal and social realms of life. The philosopher Anthony Quinton (1993: 102) has put it that 'security is the fundamental consideration without which the other things that it provides are barely worth having' (Quinton 1993: 102). Still on epigraphs: in my opinion, one of the most fascinating epigraphs (not included above) configured in the form of a motto has always been that of the Boy Scouts; it states categorically 'Be Prepared'. It has such a demanding perhaps

ominous tone of appeal, warning or finality, depending on the circumstance or condition in which you find yourself. But how or in what way can we be prepared in order to be secure? How many means of preparation are imaginable and how many are realisable within the limits of human history, knowledge, culture and biology? Another question is: what should one be prepared for?

With respect to security we must be prepared to see things in a new light and to work assiduously towards change in human, personal and social life. This change is now needed more than at any other time with reference to the issue of security. To start with, the first epigraph, 'there can be no security in traditions that have failed us, there is no black market in truth', is an important assertion suggesting that we are in need of a courageous and concerted attitude towards changing those very ways and ideas that have guided us wrongly. Yet we have the mission to move humanity forward. It is a statement encouraging self-criticism and systematic interrogation of our principles and visions as created or inherited by us. It is a call to transit from old to newer or better values. It is a call for humanity to take fuller control of its own situation and to come to a realisation of the dialectics of auto-interrogation and auto-rectification.

The second epigraph, 'The United States spends \$30 billion a year gathering intelligence. But the inability of the government even to guess ... was a failure of imagination', is indeed the clearest possible testimony to the fact that it is ideas and imagination that rule the world. It is ideas and imagination that give security. This failure of imagination is further underscored by Zehfuss (2003: 513, 516) who says that 'September 11 has been etched on our memories, the superpower caught off-guard, humiliated, devastated; people's basic trust in security within the state is severely threatened'. The philosopher, as one of the professionals better placed to generate and appropriate ideas, must work in combination with other professionals desiring the same mission and the means of attaining it. Such cooperation will ensure that the opportunities for the expansion of the horizons of theory and practice become brighter.

The last one, 'Yield to nothing', compels us to raise some issues: is this a statement of rigid deterministic doggedness that smacks of militaristic demagoguery, nationalistic isolationism or febrile fanatical fervour? Or is the statement merely an attempt to bring to light the imperative of a requisite moral and physical courage considered as a necessary and sufficient condition for the vocation in question? Does 'yield to nothing' mean that one should not yield to superior ideas, arguments, strategy, tactics or fighting capability? Does the statement represent the termination of all knowledge or endeavour? This point is significant because it goes to the very root of the problem of traditionalism and realism in security theorising which has perhaps put greater emphasis on brawn, demagoguery, ideology and force and thus less emphasis on the fruits of profound intellects.

The epigraphs are inevitably a perpetual reminder of the fact that we are faced with the multifarious struggles between a rigid, hegemonic and restrictive mono-perspective view of things and the expedient and unyielding demand for the recognition and toleration of alternatives at the levels of theory and practice. In the quest for security and the development of humanity there can be no monopoly of knowledge or of methodology. I refuse to throw away the opportunity to inform ourselves about the visible difficulties that militarism can encounter in the face of a wider internal and external conspiracy or ignorance. The reality of collusion, ineptitude, inefficiency and ignorance places a certification on the crisis confronting Nigeria's security agencies in the quest for true national and human security in Nigeria. Thus we can understand the statement of the citizen's forum for constitutional reform (C.F.C.R.2001: 3) that 'the transitions to democracy have presented African countries with the challenge of establishing effective and accountable security agencies'. Let us move to the opportunities for continuous and further discussions offered by the above quotations.

Reinventing the Humanities in the Modern Quest for Security

The American philosopher John Dewey instructively tells us that 'insecurity generates the quest for certainty' (Dewey 1977: 153). How can the humanities contribute to the quest for certainty in social, cultural and economic life in a post-colonial society? Are we certain about concepts, methods, values or practices that impact on security? What are the things that we must be certain about in the search for security? To engage the linkages between the arts and security we must once again fall back onto the question of roles, social order and social responsibility. For example, Plato in his *Republic* insists that the supreme craft of security is the art of the legislator and educator. He emphasises the power and role of the guardian class and the value of education for the security of the ideal state. Security comes from better enlightenment, training and lawmaking. This is then the project of security through human formation. A humanities or an arts focus on security essentially provides us with the aesthetic tools of critical thinking and evaluation (within a disciplinary framework) that remain the indisputable prerequisites for creative new solutions. It prides itself on the ability to think outside the traditional parameters. The arts focus on the investigation of fundamental issues around human involvement in the community, the appreciation of culture, active citizenship and the desire to better it by providing innovative strategies for meeting future challenges in the economic, ethical, cultural and social realms. The truth is that 'we are faced with great decisions about what future we want. What do we prefer? For what reasons do we prefer it?' (Bell 1994: 17). These are obviously matters of ethical and aesthetic choice and the phenomenological bases of values, which any substantial examination of security must confront. Thus, in the search for security the humanities vocation is concerned about human relations

and conduct. There is a central concern with humanity, what it does, the way in which it does it, and so forth. How do these things impact on other realms of existence? The central concern of the humanities is to build a society in which people can live according to higher principles.

One of the main concerns of the humanities or arts is to focus on the cultural life of the people. The education and control of the citizens are attempts to strike at the heart of the security problem. These efforts provide some conceptions of 'order and security within which men can turn their attention more and more to the positive enrichment of life' (Lamont 1945: 57-58). This view of security stresses that the role of human agents is to perform social actions. Thus, the concern of the arts is to guarantee the indispensable and proper character formation of humans. The emphasis on character and institutional practices for virtuous conduct inevitably underscores the need for morality and humane attitudes that define a secure environment. Thus, philosophical and aesthetic security seeks to build a conception of social responsibility, which makes all concerned groups act in ways that are conducive to the common good. Thus, the quest for the common good and total structural integrity and efficiency of things is the irrefutable province of security.

Typological Configurations of the Idea and Scope of Security: A Conceptual Clarification

The idea of security suggests so many different things to different people. Every meaning carries its own deeper connotations. According to Makinda (1998: 282), 'security is generally regarded as a "contested concept" because it does not have a clinical definition'. It is not solely this but also the idea that security is fundamental to human existence and is a carrier of value, culture and prestige. It is a battlefield of ideological contention. According to Sandler (1997: 5), given that 'modern threats to security are complex and assume myriad forms: thus, the notion of security needs to be rethought'. As such, there is a sense of complexity and controversy underlying the idea of security. However, despite this flexibility in the definition of the idea, Ochoche (1998: 105) maintains that 'security for all entities, organizations and especially nations is a first-order concern'.

It is thus beneficial to sort out these meanings on a more consistent and systematic basis in order to escape from the preliminary conceptual muddle that can arise from the problem of the contested character of the idea of security and the theoretical and methodological equivocations and ambiguity embedded in this situation. This typological account we seek to embark on also has the significant advantage of illuminating the concrete trajectories of the discourse and hence sets the template for the distinctive contribution of this essay.

The classical idea of security

Security can be seen from a classical viewpoint. The classical idea of security is linked to the Latin word 'securitas'. This refers to 'tranquillity and freedom from care or the absence of anxiety upon which the fulfilled life depends' (Liotta 2002: 477). This suggests a lack of hindrance or restriction and a sense of harmony and a stable undisturbed sense of purpose and attainments.

The realist or state-centric realist perspective

The state-centric view of security is explained by Ayoob (1984: 41) as follows: 'the term security has traditionally been defined to mean immunity (to varying degrees) of a state or nation to threats emanating from outside its boundaries. A nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values. By security we mean the protection and preservation of the minimum core values of any nation: political independence and territorial integrity'. This is the most common and prevalent view of security. However, Hoogensen and Rottem (2004: 158) have offered the clearest possible reason why we must move away from the realist view of security. They observe that 'state security is essential but does not necessarily ensure the safety of individuals and communities'. We have to look elsewhere for further inspiration and clarification of the concept of security.

The international security approach or system oriented perspective to security

International security is a concern for the security of the world insofar as it is immanently conducted on the basis of states. Hence, Ayoob (1984: 41) observes that a broader view of the idea of security depends on the recognition of the state, or better still, states, as the objects of security. Thus, 'if there is an international society, then there is an order of some kind to be maintained. The security of the parts of the system is inextricably intertwined with that of the whole'.

The idea of a security dilemma

This is a form of security that depends on the consequential fluidity of the power balance among competing and contending states in the international arena. To put it more clearly Messari (2002: 416-417) describes a security dilemma as that process by which 'as a consequence of this condition of international anarchy, states are permanently arming themselves in order to protect their borders. Through this process, states aim at self-protection. However, the unintended consequence of pursuing such a policy is to create a feeling of insecurity among one's neighbours. Thus, one state's effort to ensure its own security becomes a source of insecurity for other states'. The security dilemma is a complicated dialectical process that can lead to convolution and instability in international affairs. According to Roe (2001: 103), 'the security dilemma has the capacity to say some-

thing important about the responsibility of those actors involved'. Therefore, Roe (2001: 104) proposes a qualifying classification, namely, 'a categorization of the security dilemma into three types: "tight", "regular" and "loose"'. This is as far as we require for this essay.

The idea of a security community

The idea of a security community can be understood analytically or politically. However, the essential feature of a security community is, according to Moller (2003: 317), 'the belief in and the expectation of a peaceful resolution of conflicts among populations and policy makers, as well as the renunciation not only of the resort to large scale physical force but also of significant preparations for it. Within a security community, individuals in a group believe that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of peaceful exchange'.

The idea of non-traditional security

Non-traditional security is a concern for both human and environmental security. This concern stands in antithesis to the traditional (realist) security. According to Liotta (2002: 475), 'security is about more than protecting a country from external threats; security may well include critical infrastructure protection, economic security, social security, environmental security, and human security'.

The idea of human security

Human security seems to be a new concept. According to Bellamy and McDonald (2002: 373), 'human security marks a much needed departure from the statist and militarist approach to security that dominated the field of international relations. The approach should prioritize the security of the individual and that security is achieved only when basic material needs are met and meaningful participation in the life of the community and human dignity are realized'. In the view of Hoogensen and Rottem (2004: 157) 'human security embodies a positive image of security'. This image of human security is embodied in what Suhrke (1999: 269) refers to as 'part of a vision for a "people-oriented" economic development'. Human security means 'safety for people from both violent and non-violent threats'. This seems to be the more recently embraced paradigm of security analysis and planning in some parts of the world. In our view, the forms of ontological security and aesthetic security are included herein.

The idea of transnational human security

Transnational human security as an idea supports the guiding tenets of human security but adds a major qualifier to it. When trying to understand the problem of human security Thomas and Tow (2002: 179-180) insist that 'the problem of threat is not necessarily constrained within the confines of state conflict. Specialized basis of measurement tends to omit critical referents of transnational human security - such as political prisoners, refugees and victims of environmental and

pandemic tragedies - that transcend individual sovereign boundaries and agendas'. In the case of Nigeria, the human and geopolitical contexts of the Niger Delta crisis seem to fall into this category.

The idea of societal security

The idea of societal security is also placed in contradistinction to the notion of state security. Hoogensen and Rottem (2004: 162) hold that 'societal security is about identity, the self conception of communities, and those individuals who identify themselves as members of a particular community. Societal security is recognized as a security sector independent of state security but important to the dynamic of state legitimacy'.

The idea of comprehensive security

Comprehensive security is more specific in its claims. This idea, according to Biscop (2003: 185), is 'a broad and integrated approach that will address all dimensions of security: not just military, but also political, socio-economic, demographic, cultural, ecological, etc. Security is the sum of several interrelated factors and therefore requires an approach that encompasses more than just traditional "hard" security'. For Liotta (2002: 477), 'comprehensive security demands a multifaceted recognition of multiple levels of interaction'.

The idea of cooperative security

For its part, the notion of cooperative security is different from the crude state-centric view in other significant ways. According to Knudsen (2001: 357) the concept of cooperative security 'essentially represents the policy, demonstrated in practice, of dealing peacefully with conflicts, not merely by abstention from violence or threats, but by active engagement in negotiation and a search for practical solutions, and by a commitment to preventive measures'.

The idea of securitisation

The Copenhagen school uses the idea of 'securitisation' to represent a wider range of visions in relation to security analysis. Central to its concern is what Knudsen (2001: 357) refers to as the stress on the broad security concept. Specifically, 'the concept of securitization was in part a move along the path of the wideners. But its innovative value was to shift the attention away from a mere widening of the security concept to spotlighting of the way in which issues do or do not end up on the political agenda. Securitization gave a name to the process of raising security issues above politics and making them something one would never question. In securitization, the focus was on how some problems come to be considered as security matters while others are not'.

The idea of women's security

The idea of women's security has been identified as a distinct area of security investigation. Caprioli (2004: 412) holds that 'feminist theory in which security can only be fully understood by examining gendered structures of inequality facilitates an analysis of security differences by sex'. So in a way we can talk about women's security as a domain of security theorising.

The idea of gender identity and security

The idea of identity is crucial if we are to have a viable comprehension of security. For Hoogensen and Rottem (2004: 156), 'recognizing gender as a significant dimension of identity and security opens the door to the non-state based views of security and aptly illustrates how identity shapes individual and collective security needs. Gender analyses reveal the structures that neutralize identity through assumptions of the Universal Man'. This trend seems to confront the security problem as an index of gender with all that it connotes.

Mythical and symbolic representations of security

Security can be viewed as a myth or symbol. Thus security is taken in this context to represent an idea that receives its connotations and certification through the instrumentality of language. The idea of security carries little or no force outside the trappings of the linguistic couching of its possibilities, limitations and emotive appeal. In the words of Edelman (1975: 14), 'political language can evoke a set of mythic beliefs in subtle and powerful ways. Security is very likely the primal political symbol. National security, Social security and similar terms are therefore potent symbols'. The reason for the above is simple. Edelman (1975: 14) insists that 'given the setting of anxiety and ambiguity characteristic of the dilemmas in which people look to government for protection, susceptibility to social cues is strong. The cues come largely from language emanating from sources that people want to believe are authoritative and competent enough to cope with threats'. Thus, security and all it entails is tied to the problem of language and meanings.

The idea of security as production and provision

This view holds that we cannot understand the notion of security except when it is interpreted in terms of the concepts of production and provision. According to Kolderie (1987: 47), 'providing is a distinct function involving policy making, deciding, buying, requiring, regulating, franchising, or subsidizing. Producing implies operation, delivering, doing, selling, or administering. The production of service can be divided into direct service and support service. Provision of a service is more complicated'. Kolderie (1987: 47) further suggests that 'a service can be publicly, socially or privately provided'. It is obvious here that the concepts of provision and production elicit numerous and intricate conceptual matters with respect to security analysis, which are best left for another time.

The Third World perspective on security

There is a third world perspective on security. This view of security, as Ayoob (1984) has rightly observed, can be summarised in the statement that ‘Despite the rhetoric of many Third World leaders, the sense of insecurity from which these states suffer, emanates, to a substantial extent, from within their boundaries’. Since it is these regimes, and their bureaucratic and intellectual hangers-on, who define the threats to the security of their respective states, it is no wonder that they define it primarily in terms of regime security rather than the security of the society as a whole’ (Ayoob 1984: 42, 46).

The philosophical idea of security

Philosophy offers to security analysis a critical examination of the central fundamental concepts of life and existence that are inextricably tied to security. These include the notions of vision, values, imagination, human nature, inner states of consciousness, justice, etc. An analysis of the relevant ideas offers a valuable insight into the fundamental workings of the worldview and beliefs underlying human life. The function of philosophy is, and remains, to examine the intellectual foundations of our life, in order to facilitate our understanding of the nature of man and social order. Philosophical ability, as evidenced in the powers of imagination and extrapolation, constitute the hallmark of human existence as a future-oriented venture. Thus, philosophy focuses on the question of security as basically a concern about the possibility of life and the guarantee of the future.

Repudiating Methodological Conservatism and Disciplinary Ethnocentrism

We cannot but agree with Eggerman (1975: 211) that ‘the proper task of the philosopher is precisely to transcend the particular by uncovering principles or models by which to make sense intellectually of the domain in question’. This essay seeks to contribute to theorising on security from a philosophical perspective. It employs some valuable philosophical, conceptual and historical approaches, and then sets the trajectory for the concrete interrogation of national security. It seeks to identify the potential of current theorising for liberation and transformation in Africa. This study thus aims to facilitate better insight into security analysis, and to provide a new theoretical basis for the understanding of the security problem. The study can make a significant contribution to national development by redefining the multi-disciplinary basis of a genuine search for security. Its potential is to generate new conceptual and methodological trajectories in tackling the issues arising from the subject. The method of this work is mainly philosophical, analytical and conceptual. It must be stated that recalcitrant conservatism, in any form that it appears on the intellectual and socio-political landscape, must be repudiated because it cannot be allowed to block the development of

new knowledge, creative theorising and the alternative futures that it might encourage.

Any discourse that tends to view security in a predominantly military or defence light will pose a problem for the proper definition and conceptualisation of security. We need to jettison the view that national security dictates a discourse which is mystified in a cult of technical expertise and public information characterised by selective disclosure. The clarification of the issue of values is important in the question of security. The maintenance of security implies the protection and preservation of certain values. It is the assurance against threats to core values as they affect the lives of persons and groups. It is our view that the reconsideration of key ethical values guiding the entire gamut of personal, social and national life can make the much-desired difference in the area of security. The focus in the quest for security can either be the narrow concern for survival or the wider focus on the attainment of peace and progress of individuals, groups and society. It is possible for a person to be capable of surviving, but this will not indicate that the person enjoys peace or progress. It seems reasonable to suggest that the quest for peace and progress will contribute to the happiness of people. Yet the philosophical statement by Cuffel (1966: 323), that 'no man can be accounted happy until death has given him security from the perils of life', is striking here. This is to the extent that it underscores the futility of man's search for security while alive. Despite the metaphysical strength of Cuffel's view, we cannot refuse but to try our best.

Hence, there is a need for a more thorough analysis of security that does not merely discuss broader issues of security, but also engages in a conceptual analysis of the issues involved. With reference to Nigeria, the problem of national security is seen mainly in the inability of the various governments and state agencies to consistently and institutionally guarantee the adequate protection, peace and well-being of the citizens. It is seen in the serious tendency towards fear, chaos and conflict as these arise from situations of violence and instability. This study is a response to the hitherto restrictive analysis of the nature of national security and it places the failure of existing approaches to national security within the real context of the spectral insecurity that has continually plagued the Nigerian state and other societies. Let us engage the main conceptual and theoretical issues.

The Mythological Allure of Realism and the Elusiveness of Liberalism

The mythical allure of security theorising, which has been compellingly, yet dubiously, certified by heightened feelings of professional possessiveness and expertise has been perforated. The real contexts of the failure of conceited realism and elusive liberalism have paved the way for an alternative theorising on the security problematic. Our quest for a political philosophy is understood as the need for a new basis of secure human social life and the quest for a new set of strategies that can ensure the liberation, redemption, emancipation and transformation of the

order of things. Thus, it is true that there can be no security in traditions that have failed us, whether these are intellectual, cultural or socio-historical. There can be no security if there is a closure of space, whether conceptual or theoretical. Experience regarding security dilemmas all over the world, and all through human history, shows that mere militaristic or economic strength, though vital, will never be, and has never been, enough as a long-term guarantee of viable security.

Merely appropriating the traditional or liberal accounts of security will never stop the potency of vulnerabilities, threats or actual attacks. The reality of the shortfall of the realist approach has been glaringly obvious in the situation of many states and societies all over the world. No amount of military power, intelligence-gathering ability or even economic strength will be sufficient to maintain security where basic ideas such as appropriate imagination and ethical character are lacking. The appeal of the liberal approach has been to widen the scope of issues that can be discussed under the umbrellas of security to include gender, environment, social, medical and allied ideas. But also, this approach is not enough, due to the problem of articulation of the historical, cultural specificity of the problematic. More so, where the liberal position has been taken into account, the specific contexts of the interventions have revealed a more surreptitious deficit in the power, critically and imaginatively, to conceptualise and apply notions which, if well appropriated, are foundational to security. Both realism and liberalism have omitted an analysis of the core ideas of imagination, ethics, vision and action among others. This, then, serves as the reason for asserting that a philosophical intervention can be a linchpin in security theorising that can promote liberation and transformation.

From the above analysis, we share the idea of Dandeker (2001: 16) that 'changed perceptions of risks and threats have encouraged new conceptions of national security'. In fact, we may say that these changes will continue to yield new ideas for the management of human and national security problems and dilemmas. As things stand, our study can take the form of either an analytical, conceptual or historical perspective, or a combination of these. We can defend our approach by agreeing with Bush (Bush 1997: 12-13) that 'we will confront the hard issues - threats to our national security - before the challenges of our time become crisis for our children'. In other words, we are engaged in the struggle for the future as we know or imagine it. This futuristic pursuit assumes a comprehending and preemptive stance in respect of negotiating and navigating the security challenges in a post-colonial setting.

The Value of Philosophy and the Quest for an Ethical and Aesthetic Perspective on Security

What, if anything, does philosophy have to offer to security theorising? Philosophy is essentially a critical examination of fundamental problems of life and existence such as security, justice, truth, God, man, etc. Thus, the philosopher is

capable of discussing security but then how must he discuss this idea? In relation to security analysis, Hare (1973: 71), one of the leading lights of contemporary philosophy, has insisted that 'the nature of the philosopher's contribution and interest will become clear if we consider the main forces in the world which endanger peace ... these forces are ideas'. Ideas can be good or bad even as ideas. But they begin to be dangerous or beneficial when individuals or groups begin to modify and apply them to other persons or objects. Ideas in themselves are the things that philosophy engages. Philosophy is an intellectual enquiry or search for truth through rational inquiry and analysis. It is a critical reflection on the world views and beliefs underlying human life. The quest for the development of new knowledge, creative theorising and the options for the future that this might encourage, particularly when far-reaching questions of human and planetary security are at stake, is all the more significant when we realise that there have been, and always will be, threats to security. The challenge is whether human beings will always be able to meet with these threats and the present and future consequences that they will impose. According to Clinton (USIA document 1997: 12), 'many of these new threats are as old as civilization itself. They are the struggles between the forces of order and disorder, freedom and tyranny, tolerance and repression, hope and fear. They threaten not just peoples and nations but values and ideas'. It is not surprising that ideas can threaten ideas and values can threaten values. One way out of this conflict is to examine the ultimate ends of some of these things.

The function of philosophy is, and remains, to examine the intellectual foundations of our life so as to facilitate our understanding of the nature of man, justice, social order, security and freedom. Human beings cannot live without philosophy because it leads us to consider new possibilities, deepens our understanding of things and exercises our intellectual and investigative abilities. There is a need for a new philosophy for Africa, which must be aimed at clarifying and consolidating the ideas of justice, truth, security and positive modernity. This philosophy must be critical, reconstructive and capable of making a difference in human personal and social life. The powers of imagination and extrapolation deriving from philosophy, which constitute the hallmark of its normative character, are important for human existence as a future-oriented enterprise. Human beings cannot adequately make sense of life if they do not consider the future. This point illustrates the importance of the philosophers' input into security that deals with individuals' or society's chances of survival, peace and progress. Thus, the question of security is basically about the possibility of life and the guarantee of the future. The significance of philosophy is best seen in its generation of new ideas and discourses through the process of internal criticism, responding to changes in the existing social and intellectual environment, and above all by encouraging the independent exploration of novel possibilities of thought. This point is all the more important because, despite the meticulous efforts of men to

plan, control and predict certain realities, things are not certain and there is always the possibility of error, mutation, deviation or change. Let us examine some philosophical and conceptual interventions in security issues.

Jeremy Bentham's Philosophical Analysis of the Idea of Security: A Conceptual Point of Entry

The ideas of the English philosopher Jeremy Bentham most aptly picture the character and trajectory of a philosophical interest in security. Bentham's theory of security seeks to make a connection between property and security by weaving a theory around the concepts of community, law, punishment and evil. The primary concern of Bentham was to 'establish a code of laws - a social system - which would automatically make men virtuous' (Russell 1995: 741). But this concern was situated against the backdrop of a thorough devotion to intellectually benefiting humanity by introducing 'into morals and politics, habits of thought and modes of investigation, essential to the idea of science. Bentham's method may be shortly described as the method of detail, hence his interminable classifications, his elaborate demonstrations of the most acknowledged truths' (Mill 1974: 85).

In his security theorising, Bentham is clear on the following presuppositions. Security can only come from the principle of utility, which serves to promote the interest of the community. The interest of the community can also be understood in terms of the principle of ascetism. Thus, for Bentham, utility and ascetism taken together 'may be considered as having been a measure of security' (Bentham 1971: 264). The task of security is the more important when juxtaposed with the overwhelming role of law to obstruct the stocking of the 'body politic with the breed of highway men, housebreakers, or incendiaries, swarms of idle pensioners, useless placemen, robbery' (Bentham 1971: 264, 270). Thus, Bentham insists that security can be maintained if those concerned know and play their parts effectively. As such, 'the business of government is to promote the happiness of the society, by punishing and rewarding' (Bentham 1971: 267).

For Bentham a security problem can be encountered knowingly or unknowingly. Hence, 'when a man suffers, it is not always that he knows what he suffers by' (Bentham 1971: 266). But Bentham makes it clear that an act violating security can be a mischief. This can be classified as primary, where it affects specific or assignable individuals, or secondary, where its outcomes extend to the community. At the secondary level, a mischief can be construed as a pain, where people worry about the insecurity they may face or a danger, and the actual risks open to those that are most vulnerable to the threat (Bentham 1971: 268-269). Thus Bentham came to the strong conclusion that insecurity can be said to be an evil that has both immediate and remote consequences. There are different kinds of evil. We have 'evil of the offence and evil of the law; every law is evil for every

law is an infraction of liberty. An evil seldom comes alone. A portion of evil can hardly fall upon an individual, without spreading on every side, as from a centre' (Bentham 1972: 204-205).

Thus Bentham insists that insecurity was to be seen as an evil that had the strong potential for dispersal and projection. Insecurity of the first order impacts on assignable persons. Primitive insecurity impacts directly on the victim. Derivative insecurity impacts on the well wishers and beneficiaries of the victim. Divided insecurity is defined by a loss that is not exclusively the victim's burden, but rather a shared liability. Consequential insecurity can be the further losses incurred by a victim after the primary loss. Insecurity can be permanent where the loss incurred by the victim is final or irreparable. Insecurity can also be evanescent where it is capable of being forgotten by restoration or obliteration. Insecurity of the second order permeates the entire society. Second order insecurity can be based on alarm or the fear and anxiety of falling victim. At another level, second order insecurity can be based on danger or the fear that such threats will proliferate and mutate into other sundry evils. Furthermore, insecurity of the second order can be extended where it embraces a large class of affected persons (Bentham 1972: 206-207).

Bentham therefore insists that the law has a key part to play in the provision and maintenance of security. In his view, 'the general object which all laws have, or ought to have, in common, is to augment the total happiness of the community; and therefore, in the first place, to exclude, as far as may be, everything that tends to subtract from that happiness' (Bentham 1971: 270). Put more directly, Bentham was of the view that 'civil law should have four aims: subsistence, abundance, security, and equality' (Russell 1995: 742). According to Bentham, security is a dominant end of civil law, thus 'acts injurious to security, branded by prohibition of law, receive the quality of offences' (Bentham 1978: 42). Therefore security is an object of law insofar as it necessarily embraces the future. Insecurity is capable of overturning social order. Without security, nothing is attainable, that is why the law must engage security matters. Thus 'in legislation, the most important object is security, laws are directly made for security' (Bentham 1978: 43).

Bentham emphasises the powers of laws as guarantors of subsistence; understood as existing, remaining alive or surviving, either as individuals or groups. He argues that laws are effective to the extent that they 'provide for subsistence indirectly, by protecting men while they labour, and by making them sure of the fruits of their labour' (Bentham 1978: 44). The connection between laws and security is profound and valuable when we realise that existence and survival can be threatened by variable factors such as 'bad seasons, wars, and accidents of all kinds' (Bentham 1978: 45). It is for these reasons that laws are also made so as to serve as buffers for periods of vulnerability and insecurity. Therefore the work of law is to enhance the prospects of man, not only 'to secure him from actual

loss, but also to guarantee him, as far as possible, against future loss' (Bentham 1978: 50). It becomes clear that the law is central to security for the reason that everything that is of value centres on man and his possessions. A human-centred conception of security must be conceived in combination with other vital notions such as values, vision, human nature, cosmology and genealogy.

Security remains an imperative of humanity and is a good, insofar as insecurity is seen as an evil. Bentham further holds that poverty, exploitation and stupefaction are signs of insecurity. Therefore, non-possession or the loss of a good, knowingly or otherwise, is insecurity. If my possessions are part of my expectations, then insecurity comes from either dispossession or the pain of losing my possessions. Also, where dispossession is so strong as to vitiate existing supplies of materials, then the results can be that 'the fear of losing prevents us from enjoying what we already possess, besides, I am unwilling to give myself cares which will only be profitable to my enemies' (Bentham 1978: 54). Thus it is security that has turned 'frightful solitude, impenetrable forests, or sterile plains, stagnant waters and impure vapours' (Bentham 1978: 56) into cultivated fields, pastures, habitations, rising cities, roads, harbours, and other abundances of human imaginative ability. Thus from the above analysis, Bentham is right to say that man has a definite picture of the progress of security and it is necessary to prolong his idea of security 'through all the perspectives which his imagination is capable of measuring. This presentiment is called expectation, the power of forming a general plan of conduct' (Bentham 1978: 50-51).

Imagination and the Quest for Security

The discussion of the possibility of an original security theorising or conceptual discourse cannot be separated from a review of the concept of imagination. According to Thatcher (1997: 51), 'the power of reason and imagination is undeniable. By man's ability to think, science is possible; by the sheer power of the creative mind, men have travelled to the moon and released the enormous power of the atom'. By man's ability to think and rethink some level of security is possible. On the issue of imagination, Russow (1978: 57) states that 'imagination is part of the mental life of most people, and, as such deserves to be considered as a legitimate topic in philosophy of mind'. We also insist that imagination is a legitimate topic in the discussion of security. In confronting this problem we cannot avoid some level of theorising such as is available within metaphysics and modality, as well as philosophy of mind, etc. That thing or being which is necessary for conceiving a viable idea of security is the power of imagination.

Given that there are basic data or impressions of the world around us, and the nature of such data is varied, then every one may not have the same capability for processing these data in the same way, at the same time, and even with the same level of imagination. In discussing the idea of imagination and its linkage to

security, we can appeal to Ryle (1973: 117-119) who holds that imagining is linked to the concept of 'seeing' or picturing. People are capable of 'picturing' or 'visualising' things. The operations of imagining are exercises of mental powers. However, Ryle's view raises the problem of whether there is only one univocal idea of picturing or visualising. Shorter (1973: 155-156) holds that the notion of 'imagining' can be clarified by distinguishing visualising or picturing from the sort of imagining that a drunkard engages in. A perfectly healthy woman, who casts her mind back to some experience, is engaged in an experience that is different from that of a person suffering from 'delirium tremens' or hallucinations occasioned by high fever. Although Shorter (1973: 157, 163) holds that to visualise is to do something, he notes that a man's excellence at visualising may not count at all in favour of saying that he is imaginative. Indeed, the fact that a person can visualise complicated diagrams, solve problems in her head or have a good visual memory does not mean that one is imaginative. Rather, the notion of imagination is close to that of originality.

In discussing the idea of imagination and its linkages with the futuristic realms of real and possible worlds, we can still appeal mildly to the view that imagining is linked to the concept of 'seeing' or 'picturing'. What do we see? What can we picture? A range of things can be pictured; simple or complex ideas, mental or physical images, logical or factual possibilities, fictional or actual existents, spiritual or abstract categories, micro- or macro-life forms, ontological or cosmological entities. Given whatever it is that we see, Rabb (1975: 76) has insisted that 'this imaging or imagining consciousness is necessarily intentional. That is, it must be a consciousness of something'. This point is shared by Russow (1978: 57) who says that 'when we imagine we always imagine something, but the object imagined is usually not present, and may not really exist at all'. People are capable of 'picturing' or 'visualizing' things. The operations of imagining are exercises of mental powers.

However, there is the problem of whether there is only one univocal idea, procedure or result of picturing or visualising. Rabb (1975: 77) has observed that 'there is a distinction between visualizing and imagining in the sense between thinking in images and imageless thought'. To escape from this conceptual confusion there is a need to disaggregate the idea of imagination from imagination-induced forms of consciousness such as hallucination, delirium, neurosis, psychosis, delusions of persecution, delusion of grandeur, illusion, phobia, monomania, and megalomania. Hence, we cannot depend solely on imagination for security because 'imagination alone cannot be trusted. Unaided imagination cannot differentiate fact from fancy. Indeed, it can breed illusions and delusions' (Perlman 1995: 17).

To escape from some of these problems we may hold that imagination must include a cocktail of experience among which are: the power to visualise, to

extrapolate, to configure original or novel ideas, to solve real and anticipated problems, and generally to exhibit a methodical, meticulous and holistic perspective on things. The ultimate aim of imagination is, in the words of McLean (2000: 73), to 'enable one to take into account ever greater dimensions of reality and creativity and to imagine responses which are more rich in purpose, more adapted to present circumstances and more creative in promise for the future'. Imagination makes sense only if it effectively and efficiently ties action with vision, which together then tilt towards strategies for the good of humanity. Palma (1983: 31) makes it clear that there is some connection between imagination and action. For Palma, 'one's imagination can of course be guided by reason. But one's imagination, as a source of action is not necessarily governed by reason. In this context, by "imagination" I do not mean the wherewithal by which we postulate possibilities (sometimes fantasies). I mean the ability to seize and act upon a certain course of behaviour'. Imagination, if it is to enhance or guarantee security, must link up with action, values and visions.

Vision, Action and the Security Imperative

Security depends on imagination, and both are inevitably linked to the ideas of vision and action. The point must be made that without imagination, vision and action, no amount of information, prowess and resources can make a difference in the determination of things. The question of human action is significant when we note that the philosopher is interested in, and makes his or her contributions through ideas. The philosopher must seek to understand ideas and how they come to exert so much influence on the lives of humans. Ideas make more sense when they are defined as visions. And visions are attainable if they can be translated into action. This is why the analysis of the interface between vision and action is significant.

To escape from the quagmire of defective and purposeless action such as is inimical to security we are definitely in need of rethinking the value of vision for action. According to Locke (1991: 49), the idea of vision can be referred to as an 'overarching goal, mission, agenda, central purpose; an ideal and unique image of the future'. A vision is an instrument or a means by which an individual or group integrates and guides his or her efforts. Without a vision, other qualities such as motives, knowledge, traits, skills and abilities will not amount to much. They cannot be appropriated, channelled or diverted in an innovative and systematic way for security-inclined designs and goals. More than that, a vision is valuable since it is an idea and unique image of the future as elicited from a combination of current facts, dreams, dangers and opportunities.

A vision retains ethical propensities that impute into it some normative and prescriptive value. In this way, a vision is a mental image of a possible and desirable future state of affairs. In the course of establishing a vision, there is a corresponding sharpening of the power of choice, and the discernment of alternate

forms and a trajectory or direction. There can be no security without action and vision. This point is reinforced by Alaya (1977: 262) who says that vision could be contained within the simple principle that 'bad external circumstances inhibit human development, and good ones foster it'. Hence, there is a need for a clear, distinct and positive vision if we are to have security. Furthermore, security can be a vision that an individual or a group possesses. It may be an outcome of the possession of certain gifts, talents, resources and abilities. Such a vision may be a positive or negative one and it will have the consequence of promoting the survival or annihilation of a person or a group at any level (cultural, physical, social, political, etc).

But then vision without action is vacuous creative instinct. What do we mean by action especially in relation to the notion and operation of security? Grimm (1980: 235) holds that 'actions are purposive, every action is performed by an agent with some purpose'. Grimm argues that if every action has a purpose then every action is performed by an agent with a purpose, it is performed in order to achieve some goals, either the performance of another action, the bringing about of some state of affairs, event or condition or the obtaining of some thing or some experience. There is another dimension, which suggests that an action may have no purpose or that an action is its own goal. Some actions can be performed for their own sakes. Doing something for its own sake is doing it just because one wants to. It is doing that thing for a reason and not doing it for a purpose. Thus, the issues of intention, intentionality, purpose, reasons, results, consequences, causes, performance, and so on are key concepts necessary for the clarification of the meaning of security. However, we must transit to a discussion of the idea of values.

Axiological Imperatives in the Quest for Security

For vision and action to make sense and yield results, we must retain values that define the basis of our actions. The maintenance of security implies the protection and preservation of certain values. The significance of values for security can be drawn from the analysis of Appadurai (2002: 97) who says that in the context of terrorism, 'the attack on the World Trade Towers was not merely an effort to kill civilians. It was an effort to end the idea of civilians. And surely values are part of the carnage of the battles that have taken place since then'. However, we can understand the nature of values better when we realise that every society sets for itself 'an ideal form of life or an image which it seeks to attain and to which it constantly refers in the process of going through life' (Sogolo 1993: 119). These ideal forms of life refer to the standards that guide the society. These standards are known as the values of that society.

Given the variation existing in human social systems and its effect on the diverse values people uphold, it has been argued that 'the issue of the nature of value is one of the central and most persistent problems of human existence'

(Titus 1970: 331). It is clear from the above that the existence of values is a generally admitted fact and, more importantly, values form the basis of all cultural life. They are in fact the 'foundation of all cognition and they constitute the category structure of the human consciousness' (Brunner and Raemers 1937: 87-88). To capture the essence of the notion of value, Perry affirms that a thing or anything has value when it is the object of an interest, which is a train of events determined by an expectation of its outcome (Perry 1968: 336). Thus Titus (1970: 331) affirms that when people make value judgements regarding the function of their values, their efforts are to be seen as an appraisal of the worth of objects. And so he suggests that value can be found in terms of the positive property of having worth or being valuable.

Singer adds an extra dimension to the conceptual analysis of values when he suggests that a 'person's values are what the person regards as or thinks important' (Singer 1989: 145). The same is applicable to the society insofar as a society's values are what it considers important. According to Ackermann (1981: 451), 'values must, then, be considered in intimate connection with what could be called the collective interests of the very social groups that hold them'. By way of analysis, if value is that which is desirable, important or interesting, then something can be desirable but not necessarily important. Something can be interesting but not important. Something can be important but neither desirable nor interesting. Something can be both important and desirable but not interesting. We have utility value, instrumental value, intrinsic value, ethical value and aesthetic value among others. Kupperman (1972: 259) has made the important point that 'the aesthetic value depends on ethical values, and we become aware of the aesthetic value by means of awareness of ethical value'. For these reasons, we must analyse our ideas of value and security further. A value is a belief about what is good or what ought to be. The link between values and security has been captured by Nietzsche (1986: 104) who wrote, 'A society in which the members continually work hard will have more security'. This suggests that the value of hard work or diligence and commitment can enhance security for a person or a group. But then the truth is that not every society or person shares the same values with others, especially when these affect the conceptualisation of security. For instance, in most post-colonial African societies there cannot be security because of inefficiency, carelessness, lawlessness, ineptitude, laxity and levity on the part of the leaders and followers.

This is why we can agree with a passage in the work of the popular novelist Clancy (1994: 542) that says, 'Don't forget, that their culture is fundamentally different from ours. Their religion is different. Their view of man's place in nature is different. The value they place on human life is different'. In short, when the lines are drawn, we are forced to reconcile security with ways of life which are most visibly seen in pre-existing values. We can examine the character of

existing values as opposed to how they ought to be. If the individual accepts a value for himself, then it becomes a goal for him. Many of the attitudes of the individual reflect his values or his conception of what is 'good' or desirable. Shared values express our preferences for goods or things that are considered worth striving for. We are supposed to be interested in those values that can make life in society more peaceful, secure and progressive. We need to distinguish between individual values and shared values. We face the challenge of reconciling our values with the demands of modern change. We seek new values that can effectively provide identity and security for the individual and the group.

The study of values is an inescapable imperative for rational and meaningful security theorising, human edification and national development. But our vision, actions and values are clouded by human nature, especially its negative manifestation, which, though a central part of life, is yet a major cause of the deliberate and accidental man-made problems facing humanity. What has human nature got to do with security? Before we answer that question, we need to establish a nexus between security, the value of human life and consciousness as a prelude to appreciating human nature.

Security and Consciousness

Why is security difficult to conceive and achieve? Why do men all over the world persistently fail in the most vital task of defining and assuring security? It seems that part of this problem lies also with consciousness (just as well as human nature). Security requires the development of a consciousness related to it. Consciousness at the human level connotes a kind of awareness of phenomena. According to Holme (1972: 723), 'consciousness is the totality of a person's mental experiences; the self; that part of the self that is aware of its own ideas, acts or surrounding'. Also Scott (1972: 626-627) adds that 'there are external conditions of consciousness such as the things of which I am aware. There are general physical conditions of human consciousness as well as general cultural conditions'. However, how many people or even societies are aware of the full import and value of security and then consciously aspire to this? Or what level and quality of awareness do people have as individuals or as a group, which can lead to the conscious quest for security? What, if any, is the level of commitment of the people to security either at the individual or national levels? We talk about security consciousness in the sense that it is recognised cognitively as knowledge, or rather, a state of natural and reflexive consciousness.

In this context, the human consciousness is aware of the security dimensions of the self, the family, community, society and the nation. Security consciousness is the awareness of those qualities that make up the different stages or strata of the national consciousness or socio-polity. The constituting elements of national consciousness include a nation's history, language(s), cultural values, political system, geographical territory, religion, economy, etc. All of these have a lot to do

with the search for security. Why is this so? From the above, it is clear that national consciousness has implications for national security. The concern for the security of a nation receives greater significance in the light of questions of national cohesion and social integration. National security cannot come about unless there is, in the society, some degree of consciousness of shared features. The various aspects of human, personal and social consciousness such as the economy, science, geography, education, etc., all form critical factors in the security equation which retains a fluidity or volatility. Thence arises the difficulty of estimating or maintaining security.

Security and Human Nature

Traditional security, which places so much emphasis on militaristic structures – tactical weapons platforms, elaborate war-game strategies as well as the cutting edge products of advanced science and technology – cannot not meet some core security challenges. The reason is simple. It overlooks a critical aspect of human existence in the security factor; human nature. But the reason in this case is not supernaturalistic. It is linked to the problem of the person and society in philosophy. We must share the view of Berry (1986: xiii) who insists that ‘social and political organization has to accommodate itself to the human nature and not vice versa’. In other words, human nature is a primal symbol in the quest for security in human existence. The question that is crucial here then is what is human nature? This is a conceptual question, which has far-reaching empirical consequences. According to Dewey (1974), human nature can be defined by the innate needs of human beings. Dewey (1974: 116) says that ‘I do not think it can be shown that the innate needs of men have changed since man became man or that there is any evidence that they will change as long as man is on the earth. Needs for food and drink and for moving about, need for bringing one’s power to bear upon surrounding conditions, the need for some sort of aesthetic expression and satisfaction, are so much part of our being’.

Furthermore, Dewey (1974: 118) points out that ‘pugnacity and fear are native elements of human nature. But so are pity and sympathy’. The quest for security and the context of human nature is tied to what Mill (1962) refers to as the natural sentiment of justice, which is defined by the interplay of the ideas of punishment, self-defence and sympathy. What is this idea and how does it connect with the conceptual clarification of security? Mill (1962: 306) states that ‘two essential ingredients in the sentiment of justice are the desire to punish a person who has done harm, and the knowledge or belief that there is some definite individual or individuals to whom harm has been done. The desire to punish ... is a spontaneous outgrowth from two sentiments, both in the highest degree natural, and which either are or resemble instincts; the impulse of self-defence, and the feeling of sympathy’. Mill (1962: 307) further argues that a ‘human being is

capable of apprehending a community of interest between himself and the human society of which he forms a part such that any conduct which threatens the security of the society generally is threatening to his own and calls forth his instinct of self-defence’.

From the above analysis, there is a natural dimension of security as embodied in human nature and its operations. These natural feelings and instincts of humanity are themselves again constrained by other natural factors. According to McShea (1979: 389), ‘men need what other animals do not, a method for the restoration of the functionality of feelings. Their freedom to imagine all possible things cannot, consistently with survival, entail enslavement to the necessity of action on the basis of an emotional reaction to each imagination’. The analysis of human nature takes a different dimension when Bacon (1972) sets the pedestals of the operations of human nature at two distinct but important levels. This he does through the theory of idols.

According to Bacon (1972: 92), human nature is captured by the idols. ‘The idols of the Tribe have their foundation in human nature itself, and in the tribe or race of men. The idols of the Cave are the idols of the individual man. For everyone (besides the errors common to human nature in general) has a cave or den of his own, which refracts or discolours the light of nature; owing to his own proper and peculiar nature’. Human nature and its significance for security make further sense only in the context of the social nature of man. According to Mackenzie (1963: 35), ‘human association, societies are first formed for the sake of life; though it is for the sake of good life that they are subsequently maintained. The care of the young, the preservation of food and drink, the provision of adequate shelter and protection would suffice to account for the existence of human societies’.

This implies that society is necessary for some level of security for the human being. But we also know from history that human associations have been the core sources of security crises or problems. For example, there is the crisis of women’s security as seen in the operations of the family. There is the problem of tyranny and man’s inhumanity to man, as seen in the internal operations of human actions in a society. There is the wider social insecurity generated by human intercultural conflict among human associations. We can connect the human factor in cosmological security by illuminating what Grayling (2003: 131) says is the ‘murderous grip of humanity’s various immemorial belief systems, intolerance, bigotry, zealotry and hatred’. All of these forms of security problems can be predicated upon the workings of human nature and human actions as clearly motivated by psychological, cultural or economic factors among others. Another implication of the above analysis is that we confront the general problem of human nature as seen in the problems of our finitude and limitations described by philosophers as our ethical, human and metaphysical imperfections. We also con-

front the restrictive limitations of our peculiar human natures as individual men. All of these taken together pose a stumbling block to our search for perfect security. As an example, the truly uncommon human inability to foresee the future of things is a hindrance to personal and social security on a long-term basis.

Behaviourism and the Defeat of Morality and Security

Traditional security also suffers a shortfall by failing to take into adequate consideration the issue of human nature especially as it further relates to mentalist and non-observable aspects of human conduct, such as intentions, motives, and levels of moral judgment in the determination of how far anyone or set of persons could go in making a point using terrorist action. In short, there is the problem of inner states of consciousness and other minds. Ayer (1973: 346-347) has captured this problem of other minds in the statement that ‘the only ground that I can have for believing that other people have experiences, and that some at least of their experiences are of the same character as my own is that their overt behaviour is similar to mine’. But the problem with this kind of position is an irreconcilable binarism that has been aptly put by Malcolm (1973: 373), when he writes that ‘when I say “I am in pain”, by “pain” I mean a certain inward state. When I say, “He is in pain”, I mean behaviour. I cannot attribute pain to others in the same sense that I attribute it to myself’.

The particular problem of finding out whether we can know things concerning the self in the same way we can know things concerning the other is significant in itself. It is also significant for the determination of those features that truly make up the human agent or human being. The person is generally perceived to be made up of two parts, the physical and mental dimensions. These parts do interact. But the problem arises because the way by which I can know myself as a self, subject or I, is different from the way that I can know other persons or others. I seem to know my experience directly without any intermediary. I know myself because I have inner states that essentially constitute my being or myself or my nature. These inner states that I have are exclusive to me. No two inner states are the same. And no other person has access to my inner states except by my consent and through my disclosure. This is one of the essential defining features of a human being; the almost intrinsic inaccessibility of the inner states.

The ability of other persons to know my inner states depends significantly on whether I reveal certain experiences that define myself. Thus, the details of my consciousness, experiences, plans, inclinations, desires and thoughts are virtually hidden from others. This is the reason why criminals, looters of state treasuries, tyrants, terrorists, and so on, succeed. Sometimes, even aspects of the inner states of a person can be inaccessible or incomprehensible to oneself. We can appreciate this point by recalling the examples of actions tied to amnesia, hypnosis, subconscious streams of experiences, beliefs, dream states, trances, dual personality, psychosis, mysterious experiences, hallucinations, etc. And these unknown factors

or qualities can be called up and utilised for specific ends. This can explain the emphasis on the psychological aspect of man in the attainment of projects.

There is a more serious problem of knowing the inner states of other persons whose experiences are not directly available or accessible to us. To escape from this contradiction, the theory of behaviourism emerges as the idea that we can know the other by watching his or her behaviour or overt activities. But the pitfall of behaviorism has been that there is a logical possibility of error. I can pretend or deceive others, if the only thing people use to know that I am human is my overt behaviour. I can appear to be what I am not; I can hide my inner feelings or situation. This is one of the key features of humans that poses a grave problem for security. We can therefore understand the ways by which individuals, groups and institutions are often hoodwinked by strategies of impersonation, espionage, subversion, deception, and manipulation. In effect, the shortfall of behaviourism has paved the way for insecurity since one does not know the actual experience existing within the mind of the other and thus external behaviour cannot be a reliable or conclusive way of discerning that the other person is really or fully human.

It is this possibility of error that paves the way for insecurity, especially man-made. Also, our limitations or our finitude as humans can be linked to cultural, historical and biological shortfalls. These constraints pave the way for errors of judgment with respect to externally induced insecurity. This is called fallibility. This behaviourist challenge can be used as an explanation of terrorism and the problem of human nature as it relates to security. The challenge of behaviourism is itself an emphasis on the character of physicalism. For the physicalist, the things that we do and the things that are in this world are inevitably connected to the material or physical form of things. The only real things are physical things and the only influential things are material categories of consciousness and understanding. One of the strongest material causes of human action is the economic foundation of life. There is also the operation of the (normal or pervert) psychological framework of the human mind. Security can be threatened by greater ethno-cultural intolerance, religious irredentism, ideological demagoguery, political manipulation, economic deprivation and social anomie - all of which operate on the mentalist and physicalist planes.

Supernaturalism, the Thin Crust of Civilisation and Causal Security

The shortfalls in the theory and practice of security cannot be separated from the reality of human nature and the contexts of the linkages between metaphysics and physicalism. This point is significant in an increasingly complex and modern world where there is a struggle between tentativeness and permanence, good and evil, civility and savagery. The question, then, is; where do our ideas and institutions stand or lead us in the quest for security and civilisation? What roles do

our conceptions of ethics, epistemology and metaphysics play in the quest for security? It must be stated that the struggle between good and evil has been fundamental to the history of human beings. This struggle has been viewed in some ways as the competition between security and insecurity.

The reason for good and evil, security and insecurity, can be traced both to the world of the physical and to the supernatural. Let us quickly recognise that most Africans have a cosmological belief that entertains the possibility of the visible and invisible worlds having ontological contacts. And these affect their lives. Some fundamental causes and expressions of the crisis of security in indigenous and modern Africa remain the problems of ethnic and political inequalities and social disorder arising from systematic and dominant trends of institutionalised ontological closure and an inter-generational traditionalistic anachronism. As Davidson observes, 'the ancient inequalities of African societies were severe' (Davidson 1978: 54). This is a significant point in the conceptualisation of the axiological operations of a hierarchical, inward-looking community that exemplified full-blooded authoritarianism and gerontocracy. Therefore, it must be emphasised that 'within this tightly knit corporate society where personal relationships are so intense and so wide, one finds paradoxically the heart of security and insecurity, of building and destroying the individual and community' (Mbiti 1969: 209). Security, distribution and other constructive tasks are inextricably tied to matters of the dual realms of 'this-worldly' and the 'other-worldly' involvement. In Africa, this dual connection in security is tilted in favour of the supernatural, which exerts greater control over the physical realm. There has been a great struggle for the control of the explanation of the ontological and cosmological planes. The ideas of physicalism and supernaturalism have been at the heart of this dispute. The supernaturalistic account of reality as seen in Africa insists that there is a connection between the physical world and the supernatural or non-physical world and that this connection is tilted in favour of the supernatural, which exerts greater control over the physical realm. It draws upon the strengths of ontologism, which defines and sustains a hierarchy of beings and postulates a stratified and hegemonic relation between the beings above and the beings below. It is instructive that man is placed somewhere in the middle of the hierarchy of beings. Supernaturalism is thus an irrevocable belief in the causal powers of unobservable or non-physical categories over the physical plane of life.

In the clarification of the scope and bounds of security there has been an argument that humans suffer a problem of security due to certain contradictions descending from the supernatural. In one view, security problems arise from metaphysical evil or that metaphysical imperfection seen in human nature which has a transcendent origin and which man has no control over. The philosopher, Leibnitz, was of this inclination. Metaphysical evil is the source of many human failings, and of the dire consequences of these for security either of the individual

or collective. The idea, then, has been to identify the visible and tangible shortfalls of humanity with a set of supernaturally defined imperfections or transcendently imposed predicaments.

These predicaments or imperfections are temporally associated with the historical, biological and cultural contingent traits or situation of humanity. These contingent features deny human beings the full capacity to articulate and sustain the security imperatives. The problems of security are therefore things that derive from the supernatural delimitations of a physically constrained human endeavour. In a sense, virtually anything can be defeated by the nature of man, which yields on a consistent basis a privation of the good and the fact that with humanity there can be no guarantee of the effectiveness or success of a programme, however ingenious or laudable.

From the above account, which ties the security dilemma to the struggle between transcendentalism and temporalism, we are necessarily faced with the reality that man is himself as fragile as the very institutions and structures that he has installed to sustain, protect and uphold him. We are faced with our physically and non-physically induced finitude and limitations as humans. Our imperfections that limit the capability to conceive and assure security are intrinsic to us as humans. We share the view that a large part of this fragility and corruptibility or 'thinness' dwells within us. We all know how easy it is to relinquish our sense of kindness, justice and confidence. It must however not be forgotten that humans come into the world with capabilities, beginning with small capital and having the propensity to improve. We are thus bound to the struggle to acquire a genuinely humane and progressive society where 'all participate more or less in the pleasures, the advantages, and the resources of civilized society' (Bentham 1978: 53).

How does security connect to civilisation? What are the gains of civilisation? Civilisation is the systematic use, improvement and combination of those characteristics that comprise humans. Samuels (1991) offers a normative definition of civilisation as a constantly evolving amalgamation of parts that together provide an 'interpretative vision about man and society' (Samuels 1991: 23). For Newman (1979: 475), civilisation is a 'state of mental cultivation and discipline'. This is important when we realise that civilisations may have been defined by scholars in terms of a tripartite conception. The three dominant features of civilisation are obedience to the rules of civil intercourse, the scientific and intelligent exploitation of nature, and the pursuit of peaceful relations with members of other communities. Also, the idea of civilisation implies three distinctive features; the power of conceptual thought, the substitution of moral and civil laws, considerable scope for initiative and the acquisition of a conscience (Murphy 1942: 251). Civilisation implies law and acts of justice. Three features are crucial to civilisation, 'freedom from barbarity, politeness, and rule of decency' (McKeon 1981: 422).

Other values that are conducive to civilisation include 'honesty, modesty, intellectual integrity, self-criticism and self-control' (Kolnai 1971: 204). All of these values of civilisation are crucial for peace, well-being and security at the human, personal and social levels. The power of civilisation highlights the main aim of human society as 'a positive one of providing a social environment, a set of institutions, in which and through which men and women can grow to their full stature' (Wilson 1977: 318). The human person and the powers that derive from his or her ideas and actions are central to the phenomenology of liberation and transformation. We are in need of a conception of the human person 'with a conscious mind that perceives, remembers, imagines, and then reflects, chooses and acts' (Samuel 1956: 207).

In our view, this is where security and civilisation, as well as the linkages between them, come to bear on the challenge of our humanity. Societies are confronted by new challenges on all levels. We are in need of upgrading our quality of perception and living as central to the rectification of the human situation. The character of our world today is seen in the extremely tentative character of things. There are major shifts in power and influence. There are demands for the redefinition of priorities; there are major convulsions of thought and identity. The reality of turbulence and contradictions in the world today suggests that the threats facing humanity are daunting. There have been insinuations that these threats are not merely operative in the physical world.

From Transcendentalism to Temporalism, From Possible Causes to Possible Effects

The challenge of security as deriving from a supernaturalistic origin can be further reconstructed through an analysis of the exclusive struggle for security in the celestial or transcendental worlds. The film titled *Megiddo* (directed by Brian Trenchard-Smith) is a captivating account of this trans-world nexus in the security dilemma. In the same way, Augustine's masterpiece, *The City of God*, is an appealing and unassailable account of the transcendent and immanent struggle for values and the consequences for security. In any case, following *Megiddo* and *The City of God*, the ordinance and ordering of the celestial planes were configured under the auspices of the virtues of obedience and humility, but contained by strict hegemonic or hierarchic stratification.

The security of the transcendent and its constituents were premised on the juridical concepts of obedience, perpetual order, faithfulness and love for the Divine Creator. This transcendent order would be vitiated and eventually fragmented into two large groups that would wage perpetual war, not just upon one another, but also on humanity in the context of the struggle for the control of the souls of men (individually and collectively). Indeed, the spirit and the body of man had become a battleground. If the supernatural account of security is endorsed, then the reality of the resulting wars, genocide, racism, cruelty and inhu-

manity among humans cannot be overlooked. The world of men as it exists in an abandoned form is left the worse, due to the internal contradictions that were ushered in by the quest to entrench the alternative visions and values of unhealthy destabilising competition, disobedience, factionalism, hate, acrimony and wars in the celestial places.

Thus the challenge posed by Lucifer's ordinance or Luciferism was essentially a conceptual challenge and struggle for the core ideas, visions and values that would guide the individual and collective operations of the heavenly places. The attending struggle for control of physical and non-physical spaces would demonstrate the concern for power, influence and follower-ship that were needed for the entrenchment of visions and actions. The acquisition and retention of power could then be seen as central to the quest for security. But then power would itself be ephemeral when employed for dubious motives and inclinations. The multiple impacts of antinomies, anomie and perversion remain obstructive to the proper realisation of the benefits of power. The value of power would be seen as positive if it was devoted to the promotion of peace, goodness and order.

But the relativistic problem of the perception of power and the goods that it can provide can be seen in the fact of divergent visions and ideas. By this means we see that values (those desirable, important or interesting things) are crucial to the quest for security. In the process, security problems would ultimately be narrowed down to the effects of phenomena such as hate, lack of peace, division, wars and acrimony, even among humans in the world. We shall see that the major vectors of the security dilemma would be realities such as religion, politics and ethnicity among others, especially if negatively used or appropriated - a very prevalent trend.

From Insecurity to Inhumanity: Of Terrorism and Civilisation

Even the more conciliatory of theoreticians have admitted the need to review the attitude of humanity and states to threats and affronts, especially terrorist ones. For instance, Dewey (1972: 293), the American philosopher and a certified optimist, makes the strong point that 'the fundamental beliefs and practices of democracy are now challenged as they never have been before. In some nations they are more than challenged. Everywhere there are waves of criticisms and doubt as to whether democracy can meet pressing problems of order and security'. This statement implies that something should be done about it. According to Teichman (1989: 513), terrorism is typified by violent acts that have social and or political undertones and which are perpetrated against innocent or randomly selected peoples using atrocious means such as killings, mutilations and torture. In the view of Wellman (1979: 253), every act of terrorism must be a threat that some great harm will be inflicted if the coercion is resisted. 'Every act of terror-

ism is by its very nature an act of communication. Only in this way can it sow the terror created as a means of intimidation' (Wellman 1979: 253). Wellman insists also that we must repudiate the phenomenon, and affirm the wrongness of terrorism because 'one reason that terrorism is prima facie wrong is that the terrifying act is almost inevitably harmful. The right to liberty reminds us that there are other human rights typically infringed or denied by terrorism. Worse still, terrorism necessarily violates the most fundamental of all human rights, the right to be treated as a human being' (Wellman 1979: 254, 257).

Related to the foregoing, Hughes states that 'the aim of policy for a government faced with terrorism should then be to consider plans for victory. There is surely a moral obligation to reconsider these immutable security needs' (Hughes 1982: 22-23). Sandler (1997: 5) holds that terrorism has become more dangerous in its transnational form, in which 'a terrorist attack in one country involves victims, targets, institutions, governments or citizens of another country'. Former US president Clinton argued in the USIA document (1997: 12) that 'as long as there are human beings struggling for power and resources there will be conflict. Ideas, information, technology and people across borders of open societies make us more vulnerable to the forces of destruction [such as] an increasingly tangled and dangerous web of international terrorism. These threats are struggles between the forces of order and disorder, freedom and tyranny, tolerance and repression, hope and fear. They threaten not just peoples and nations but values and ideas'. This is a very important and sensitive issue for the survival of humanity and human institutions. In fact it is the question of whether we are in need of a redefinition of civilisation, security and its associated values.

Security is a form of power, and the quest for security is the quest for power. If humanity refuses to take security theory and practice to higher levels or if humanity is situated out of context with the realities of the security challenge, then it will eventually lose out in the struggle for survival and control when challenged by terrorist forces which employ conventional, chemical and biological weapons. Even the more conciliatory and pacifist theoreticians have admitted the need to review the attitude of peace-loving regimes and societies to such threats as terrorist action. Given the failure of existing notions of morality and security as strategies for confronting terrorism, we must move on to examine the issue of modality and its concerns with the possibilities and actualities as a strategy for the redefinition of the problematic of terrorism. The phenomenon of terrorism compels us to review some of the cardinal problems of philosophy such as the problem of other minds, freedom and determinism, punishment, the 'is-ought' distinction, technology and the value of human life, violence and social change, the fact-fiction dichotomy, possible worlds analysis, the issue of causality, the problem of the person and personal identity, and the crisis of values. Our point is to show that the challenge of terrorism brings to light and refreshes some of

our traditional problems of philosophy, and seems to lead some of these problems and their solutions in other directions. Terrorism is more than anything else an attack on our sense of trust and feeling of confidence as humans in our selves and in the institutions that we have built to protect us and ensure our safety. It is a challenge to our values and the idea of being human. It is an attempt to place a different price on our individual and collective humanity. It is a demand that the idea of security be redefined without fear or favour.

Prolegomenon to the National Security Problem in Post-colonial Nigeria

Nigeria's national security is threatened by the problem of inefficiency, collusion and despondency of its major institutions and structures as instruments of social action and rectification. This has ensured that the various governments and the state agencies have been unable consistently and institutionally to guarantee the adequate protection, peace and well-being of their citizens. This lapse has occasioned serious conflicts, situations of uncertainty, helplessness and instability that have compromised the very territorial and national integrity of this nation and exposed the bulk of the citizens to unnecessary fear, deprivation and chaos. Thus in setting up a framework for the critical and discursive analysis of the national security problem in Nigeria, we are in need of a new idea or vision of security that can effectively ensure the redemption and rectification of the Nigerian situation. At the heart of the study of national security in Nigeria is the urgent and persistent search for the rules and patterns of action that will guarantee human survival and national integration in the Nigerian nation. This reconstructive task is the more significant owing to the failure of existing approaches to national security employed within the country. The failures of these approaches have led to insecurity. The real context of the spectral insecurity that has continually plagued the Nigerian state is an indication of the urgent need for a conceptual and theoretical examination of the core visions and values embedded in the idea of national security in Nigeria. As an example, there is a need to determine the unique approaches to security such as are relevant to the needs of a particular country.

The greater threat to Nigeria's security arises from the inefficiency of its institutions and structures as instruments of social action at the individual and collective levels. It has bred a cadre of individuals in almost every sensitive sector of national life who share the same general quality of engaging in negligent and insensitive conduct as it affects their fellows. The inability to guarantee trust and obedience to laws has made human life most unmanageable. The problem of national security in Nigeria is seen in the serious conflicts arising from situations of uncertainty, helplessness, hopelessness, violence and instability in the society. Most African countries suffer a similar fate.

Central to the crisis of security confronting the nation has been the general trend towards the misconception of the foundations of security. This has led to

difficulties. The most pronounced is the deterioration of the quality of human, personal and social life in Nigeria. The view of Peters (1983: 115) is illustrative of the nation's security policy. According to Peters, the ultimate aim of Nigeria's national security effort is to protect it from attack, whether direct or indirect. But to get to the stage where it is possible to adequately determine the structure of the armed forces, there must be, one, a policy that reflects stated national objectives, and two, a national security management capacity that can cope. It is not enough to provide the armed forces with long-range military capability, without a clear-cut strategy as to how these forces are to be deployed and used. Such a restrictive militaristic conception of security cannot lead to the desired form or level of social and economic advancement required by a country confronted by diverse socio-cultural challenges. This policy is not only limited in its scope and method, but is also prone to perversion.

At the heart of the problem of security in the Nigerian nation-state is the fact that the idea of security was reduced to the personal security of the ruler and that of his immediate supporters. Thus, the country's rulers failed in their attempts to maintain stability in the Nigerian society due to their ill-conceived notions of security. The security calculus of the Nigerian state failed because it did not include vital aspects of social and national development such as the provision of basic social amenities. Thus, the Nigerian state could not meet the social, economic, as well as even the military conditions of national security. The failure of the state and security organs to maintain national security in the country can be seen in the inefficiency of the police force. Its abysmal failure to maintain law and order and provide security for the citizens continues to create a vacuum that is being filled by auxiliary ethnic militia, vigilante groups and militant civil society vanguards. The state has employed its repressive instruments, especially the army and the police, in order to regulate and regiment the political, social and economic freedoms and space of the other subordinate groups in the society, and not to promote the general well-being.

Alienated Consciousness, Post-coloniality and Marginality

The reality of alienated consciousness and the threats to national security arising from it indicate that Nigeria, as it exists, may not have fully articulated the conditions for establishing a truly humane and progressive society. The reality of a system lacking in enduring principles of social justice and moral action, which can promote genuine social reconciliation, suggests that Nigeria remains a terrain of conflicting identities after decades of independence. The state is a battleground where individuals fight for whatever resources or power they can capture. This situation is worrying because the long period of co-existence among various groupings has not yielded genuine mutual respect, understanding and common purpose. This is a significant pointer to the potential continuation of insecurity in the country.

The Nigerian state is post-colonial in its form. Post-coloniality is tied to marginality. In turn, marginality can be said to be central to experiences in a post-colonial life-world or discourse. Over the years, different governments, individuals and institutions in Nigeria have systematically entrenched a culture of marginalisation within the social order. The modern social system has produced widespread violence, arbitrary hierarchies and avoidable deprivation. The central feature of marginalisation is the capacity to render regions structurally irrelevant. Evidence shows that structural irrelevance is fuelled by the realities and consequences of the notions of difference and dichotomies. What are the immanent consequences of this marginality? One repercussion is that ethnic and other minorities are under-represented and oppressed by those with power in the social, political, economic and education system. At the heart of marginalisation are the real consequences of differences in language, values and beliefs, and the tensions arising from them when we merge with the different interests and aspirations of the groups. Groups attempt to ensure their dominance over others by controlling the key institutions, while the minority groups struggle for recognition and a fair deal in the distribution of resources. Political life is organised around the desire by the various ethnic groups to further and protect their own interests. These interests are culturally defined and have to do with what groups possess as distinct communities and what they can get from others in a competitive situation. Instability, over-centralisation of power, intense ethnic and elite competition for resources and power, and the diverse forms of repression will affect security at all levels of life. We should note that certain levels of marginality are now beyond the merely ethnic factor. These include the travails of the destitute, the unemployed, the rank-and-file of the different social institutions, the rural peoples, the handicapped, the aged, the abused youth and children, and so forth.

In Nigeria, the military, which appeared most constitutionally and professionally suited to fulfil the task of providing security, has played a particularly negative role in the maintenance of national security. Thus, this large body of security personnel cannot guarantee Nigeria's quest for national security since much of the insecurity, conflicts and crisis that happened in the country from 1960s were in fact due to the actions and omissions of these same security forces (Ujomu 2000: 38). Those who have controlled the state have used the brutality of the security forces and the silent violence of the law in order to browbeat and coerce the oppressed and subordinate classes into psychological insecurity, political submission and material deprivation. The national security problem can be construed as a situation of threat faced by all marginal peoples who have been unable to protect themselves from the violence unleashed on them by the state and other forces within society. The insecurity of the ordinary people is seen in their marginality, which makes them highly vulnerable to various forms of insecurity. The marginal peoples include the aged and neglected pensioners, the handicapped

persons and poor people who have no hope of justice, the unemployed educated and uneducated youth, some of the ethnic minority groups, especially of the southern Niger Delta, and even in the north of the country. The fact is that these peoples are usually disadvantaged, exploited and oppressed and their lives are associated with hardship. Our point is simply that even the military approach to security that the government clearly cherishes lacks viable ethical and structural foundations so that its defeat is ensured.

Consequently, the dangerous trend has emerged whereby violent, and ill-trained militia and militants have cashed in on these institutional flaws. Furthermore, the general lack of commitment to the common good has ensured that most military personnel seek only to satisfy their avarice and narcissism. Such people lack the intellectual and moral basis for the proper utilisation of knowledge and power for the good of all (Ujomu 2000: 39). Thus, they ultimately create conditions of insecurity, deprivation and instability in the polity. Conscious manipulations (of a negative kind) can lead to the loss of unity and cohesion. To understand fully the consequences of alienation for national consciousness we need to conceptualise the deplorable state of our national experience as typified by institutional and moral problems. According to Temlong (2003: 13), 'the parlous state of the economy has also reduced the majority of the citizenry to abject poverty and increased unemployment'. We add that the objectionable state of our infrastructure, the moral decay in our society, the pervasive corruption, social discontent, lawlessness, selfishness and cynicism that have taken over all areas of national life are irrefutable manifestations of the security crisis in the land. The security problem is bigger than any group or institution and is a matter of a challenged national consciousness. These are evidence that national consciousness is on the decline. National consciousness has implications for national security, which itself is an important concern in the life of a person, group or society. The central feature in the quest for national security is the concern for national survival, which cannot come about unless there is some degree of joint action and purpose for the common good.

Evidence of the defeat of national consciousness is seen in the increasing attacks on national leaders and citizens by violent mobs, armed robbers, assassins and kidnappers, ethnic militia groups, as well as the invading rebel forces from neighbouring countries to the north of Nigeria. It is ironic that the Nigerian state and its military system have not been able to perfect the art and craft of upholding institutional and regime security. We may recall the various national security problems that have led to the death of top government officials at the hands of assassins and other criminals. We also recall the problems that have led to the predation of infrastructure (civil and military) in which the negligence, laxity and incompetence within certain institutions have been revealed. All of these have had

negative effects on the development of national consciousness, both for men and for women.

The Niger Delta Crisis and Some Implications for Nigeria's National Security

The Niger Delta problem, as we construe it, is profoundly a conceptual problem bordering on the tripartite hermeneutics of cosmology, genealogy and geopolitics of the territory in question. Conceptually, the crisis in the Niger Delta is a problem of the definition of the meanings of security, trust, power, recognition, fairness, value of life, justice and human dignity of the indigenous peoples, against the backdrop of the real repercussions of localised insecurity, trans-nationalised conflict, internationalised exploitation, genocidal violence and state-centric marginalisation. This conceptual muddle has compelled a convoluted social disruption of most of the vital economic activities associated with this oil-producing region. The obstreperous processes of marginalisation, discontent, resentment and the vitiation of the dignity of the Niger Delta communities have been linked to many debilitating factors. The Niger Delta variant of the general trend of national insecurity, social injustice and existential discontentment seems a visible index of the state of (in)security in Nigeria. The ensuing spectral conflicts have compelled the continual destruction of oil pipelines and installations, killing or abducting of local and expatriate oil workers and security personnel, hijacking of helicopters, ships, etc. The crisis vividly illustrates the inability of the Nigerian state to properly manage fundamental ethnic and nationality questions and to meet the challenges of development and nation building. The problems of environmental degradation, pauperisation of the people and resource control remain central to the problems confronting the Niger Delta. The demands of the different ethnic groups and communities in the Niger Delta region are essentially for those socio-political conditions which will make their lives more meaningful. Hence, it has become clear that the Niger Delta situation raises irrefutable conceptual and empirical issues and questions about the character and context of political morality in Nigeria and the search for a viable social philosophy in a post-colonial framework.

Stockpiling as a Strategy for National Security: The Nigerian Situation

Furthermore, when we talk about national security we can also examine the impact of the stockpiling of critical goods such as fuel, food, drugs, etc. The point needs to be made that stockpiling is the favoured security strategy of the USA, and it has worked well for them. The United States is far less dependent on imports and devotes a great deal of time, energy, and money to stockpiling and to developing alternative sources of supply. According to Rensburg and Anaejionu (1986: 70-73), there are crucial distinctions between economic and defence stockpiles as well as critical and strategic economic materials. All this evidence shows

that the USA has a well-developed theory of stockpiling as a security concept. The point, then, is what security strategy or principle can we say that Nigeria has fully articulated and applied? This question is relevant and is a justification for this essay, given the multifarious crisis of national security that confronts Nigeria.

However, the idea of stockpiling has been criticised as economically unviable insofar as it ties down scarce and valuable financial resources by way of purchasing materials that may not be useful in the immediate term. This raises the question of whether a country that is relatively poor in the areas of human, social, institutional and technological capital can, and should, apply the principle of stockpiling. Granted this critique, the more important issue is: what is the attitude of Nigerian society to the stockpiling of essential goods? This is an important question because the capacity of the Nigerian state or agencies for stockpiling is very limited owing to poor technology or technical ability, financial mismanagement, corruption, lack of proper planning, sabotage, conflicts and other ethno-cultural manipulations. Is it not possible that Nigerian rulers and saboteur citizens will ensure that this strategy does not work through theft, importing fake or expired goods, refusing to deliver the goods, importing and re-selling the goods at outrageous costs, destroying, undermining or sabotaging the installations during industrial disputes or ethno-religious conflicts, and so on? The point that we are making is that there is a need for the country to be industrialised and disciplined before the principle of stockpiling can work effectively. Nigeria may not be effective in using this strategy of security.

The University and National Security in Nigeria

The university as a key social institution has often played a prominent role in national security by serving as a symbol of national pride and by providing high-level personnel to serve the vital needs of government and society. However, the modern role of the Nigerian university is best situated against the backdrop of the problem of national security. The reason for this point is the continual ethnic, political, religious and socioeconomic crises besetting the universities and the country. These struggles centre on the distribution and the management of wealth and resources. The problem of national security in Nigeria has been aggravated by the situation of intolerance existing among the various ethno-cultural and religious groups in the universities and the country due to manipulation, relative deprivation and frustration. Unfortunately, the roles of some intellectuals in the development of the nation have not been very positive. Some scholars have contributed negatively to the issue of social responsibility in the quest for knowledge. This situation, as we clearly see, has adverse effects on the sustenance of national security in the country and it raises questions about the effectiveness of scholars in the determination of social conduct. The university in Nigeria has been inextricably woven into the crisis-ridden character of the society.

The university is affected by the problem of national insecurity and also generates its own problem of insecurity. The universities often breed and harbour criminals, armed robbers, necrophiliacs, cultists, prostitutes and other perpetrators of insecurity, who may have brought these traits from the larger society or have seized opportunistic control of the civil nature of the institution. The crisis of university involvement in national security problems is not unconnected to the pervasive social context of the problem. The university in Nigeria has faced problems of chronic under-funding, bad leadership and administration, a loss of autonomy and the denial of the academic freedom of intellectuals. Let us examine the financial context of the crisis of security facing the education sector and especially the universities. For instance, data so far available on the issue of educational funding show that the Nigerian government has consistently spent less than 13 per cent of the annual budget on education between 1994 and 2001. In 1994, the vote was 7.83 per cent of N 110.5 billion Naira. In 1995, it was 12.96 per cent of N 98.2 billion Naira. In 1996, it was 12.32 per cent of N 124.2 billion Naira. In 1997, it was 11.59 per cent of N 188.0 billion Naira. In 1998, it was 10.27 per cent of N 260 billion Naira. In 1999, it was 11.12 per cent of N 2490 billion Naira. In 2000, it was 8.36 per cent of N 677.51 billion Naira. In 2001, it was 7 per cent of N 894.2 billion Naira (See *The Punch*, 2 April 2001: 46). Furthermore, the statistical account of the Federal Budgetary allocation to education in the years after 2001 showed a continued drop in percentage relative to the year 2000 figure of 8.36 per cent. The education budget seen as a percentage of the total annual budget was 5 per cent in 2002, 4.7 per cent in 2003 and 5.6 per cent in 2004 (Fashina 2005: 11). It can be seen that there has been a progressive decline in the percentage of funds allocated to education generally.

The dwindling funding and diminishing recognition of the role of the Nigerian university in society have adversely affected the inputs of the university to national security, human security and nation building. Thus, there is clear evidence that all is not well in the nation's higher education system. There have been national industrial actions by the Academic Staff Union of Universities in order to negotiate better funding, facilities and conditions of work for the universities and their staff. There have also been demands for significant and increased autonomy and greater academic freedom for the universities and their academics. These are all indispensable conditions for the guarantee of university inputs to the national security and development of the country as things stand.

The crisis in the university vis-à-vis government or university administrations has led to the situation where students spend more than half of an academic year at home due to disruptions in the university system. This situation cannot enhance nation-building and national security. Rather, it has led to moral decadence, an increase in criminality, delinquency, armed robbery and prostitution, human trafficking, and a tendency to desperation as seen in protracted examination mal-

practices. All of these taken together suggest depreciation in the quantity and quality of manpower development in the country. These are clearly issues that border on the security of the country and its universities. Thus the university in Nigeria needs to be empowered to make its contribution in the urgent and pressing areas. It must seek to create strategies for national reconciliation among the various ethnic groups. It must also seek to apply its resources to the struggle for national development, and the amelioration of poverty and ignorance in the country. It must aim at the deployment of its human and material resources to the achievement of Nigeria's quest for national security and the maintenance of infrastructure.

But there are positive dimensions of the contribution of the university to national security. In the last few years, the University of Lagos in the south-western part of Nigeria has attempted to make significant inputs into the task of nation building and also to national security. It has aggressively sought to diversify its income-generating base and to provide employment for a wide group of citizens under its various employment programmes. The university has established labour schemes such as part-time jobs for students, jobs for people in the informal sector of the economy, service-oriented industries, and a wide range of consultancy projects. It has also involved itself in a variety of distant learning programmes and other capacity building projects in skills, knowledge and motivation. All these have contributed to the mitigation of illiteracy, unemployment and criminality.

More recently, the concept of the university, especially in Nigeria, has undergone some evolution and it has gained greater significance not only as a centre of freedom and truth, but also as a place of refuge and protection. To this effect, the university in Nigeria has widened its concern for the peace, security and well-being of the citizens by redefining itself as a crucial centre of refuge for the protection and safety of distressed and endangered individuals and groups in the society. In one of the most instructive cases, the incidence of ethnic conflict between the Ife and Modakeke communities in the south-western Osun-State transformed our regular understanding of the university. The conflict compelled one of the first-rate federal universities in the country - the Obafemi Awolowo University at Ile-Ife - to offer protection to thousands of people displaced by the fierce communal fighting going on in the area.

This communal conflict between the Ife and Modakeke tribes has been mentioned as a prominent watershed in ethno-cultural conflict (See CDHR, *1999 Annual Report on The Human Rights Situation in Nigeria*, 2000: 210; CDHR, *2000 Annual Report on The Human Rights Situation in Nigeria*, 2001: 261). But we are more concerned with its implications for the nature of the university. The war arose due to largely unconfirmed historical claims to the ownership of land (native-settler crisis), resources (farmlands, gold deposits) and privileges (status and loca-

tion of local governments, chiefdoms, etc.) in the area. Hitherto, the two warring groups had been long-standing neighbours, living together in peace, and even engaging in intermarriage for centuries. During this crisis the university provided accommodation, water, electricity, medical care as well as psychological and spiritual comfort to many distressed persons. The university made extensive use of its own resources and of assistance from the government and other humanitarian agencies in assisting the displaced people of the area. Fortunately, the federal government sent its military forces to protect the university and to restore some order in the area. However, this situation did not deter some well-armed assailants who realised that individuals were taking refuge in the university community. The attackers decided to launch an attack on the university and were eventually repelled by the security forces detailed to guard the institution. Whatever may have been the reasons for this situation, the experiences of the university at Ile-Ife have set the pace for the redefinition of the role of the university as a crucial factor in the quest for national security and human protection in the context of a federal Nigeria.

In other parts of the country, the role of the university has compelled the expansion and revision of the definition of national and social security interventions. The university provides a fairly constant source of water, wood fuel, formal and informal employment and other materials necessary for human preservation for the people existing in their immediate environs. Again, the roles of the University of Lagos and University of Ibadan are instructive here. These experiences show that the university has the task of making a contribution to the security, peace, stability and progress of the society. For the university to be capable of this task it must itself be capable of nurturing and sustaining humane, just and progressive values among its members. The request by the universities in Nigeria for more funding and better infrastructure must be complemented by a display of individual and institutional probity, accountability and expertise.

Sectoral Political and Economic Concerns in Nigeria's Problem of National Security

This crisis of national security in the nation can be seen in the political and economic difficulties arising from both the struggle for state power among the national elite, as well as in the distribution and management of the society's wealth and resources. It has been noted that the problem of national security in Nigeria has been aggravated by the intolerance among the various ethno-cultural and religious groups. This situation has led to the engendering of mistrust and divisive tendencies in the society. Consequently, there have been communal and intertribal clashes and violence. Politics and the economy have a part to play in the quest for security. However, evidence shows that political action may not often lead to social and economic transformation. The social and economic development and hence the security of the various interests and segments of the Nigerian

society are hindered by social ills like corruption, poor planning, nepotism, tyranny and selfishness in the society. National security is threatened by the absence of proper principles and values that determine harmonious and productive human personal and social behaviour.

The problem of national security in Nigeria construed in a historical perspective has always centred on the crisis arising from the nature of the relations existing among the various ethnic and interest groups. The problem of security in Nigeria and the consequential conflict situation centres on tension, injustice and marginalisation. The bone of contention is partly that while some segments of the country are carrying the burden that sustains the entire nation, other segments are enjoying the paradise that has resulted from this inequality. This problem has been linked to the character of the state and the actions of the dominant interests of the ruling class.

One important realm of the manifestation of the problem of national security has been the generally overlooked, but extremely important, aspect of values. It is interesting to note that insecurity in Nigeria manifests itself in the form of competing values, beliefs and attitudes.

Thus, central to the problem of national security in Nigeria has been that situation in which there existed a fundamental conflict of personal and social values among various interests and groups with regard to the proper meaning and approach to national security, national integration, peace and stability within the polity. This conflict of values and the various abuses and injustices arising from it ensured that there were no clearly defined and established rules for harmonising the diverse interests, needs and values of the different groups and sectors in the society in view of achieving the urgent task of national development. In short, the lack of shared beliefs, attitudes and values among the rulers and the ruled, as well as between the various segments of Nigerian society, ensured that conflict remained endemic in the nation.

At another level, religion is a powerful tool for fostering peace and corporate existence among the members of the society. But with reference to most parts of Africa, the influx of different religions has created fertile ground for conflict and instability. The abuse of religion in order to serve ethnic or political purposes has often led to severe consequences for the society and its members. This point is the more significant in a multi-religious society such as Nigeria. The perversion and exploitation of the religious sentiments of the people can eventually lead to malice, disarray and violence. The reality on the ground is that the problems of religious and social tolerance facing the society have been worsened by the elite-motivated, often violent struggles for benefits, power and influence within the society. This situation has led to the vitiation of the Nigerian state in the social, political and economic realms of life. The mistrust and hatred emanating among groups, and the heightened intolerance, have led to the proliferation of religiously

conscious militia groupings that ostensibly claim to be social liberators. In actual fact, these militia committed to religious violence have opened the opportunity for individuals to foment tension in the society and to violate the vital laws necessary for the sustenance of order, peace and stability.

Thus, to put it bluntly, the lack of trust between the rulers and the ruled in Nigeria ensured that there was an obstruction of national development at all levels of social existence. Furthermore, we can say that the absence or lack of operation of some core social values such as trust, cooperation, compassion, justice, and tolerance among the different interests and segments in the society contributed to the lack of sustainable development. The absence of a sense of responsibility has assumed the form of an institutionalised and sinister abdication of responsibility.

There has been a pattern that things are not always the way they seem to be in the country. This is what Ake (2001: 14) means when he says that 'the state in Africa has been a maze of antinomies of form and content: the person who holds office may not exercise its powers, the person who exercises the powers of a given office may not be its holder'. Ake's point is better understood in the light of the tragedy and crisis of our national consciousness and infrastructure. The physical and social infrastructure that has been put in place to serve the people and make their lives comfortable can now turn against them, becoming sources of insecurity and life threatening danger. This situation has created fear and apathy within the society. This point is relevant to the issue of national consciousness and the phenomenon of infrastructural predation. This situation has emerged out of decades of mismanagement of strategic national infrastructure such as the roads, bridges, oil universities, refineries, telecommunications, railways, airports and seaports in the nation. It is characterised by the neglect, under-utilisation and disregard for infrastructure and its roles in national development. Most of these structures have moved from decay to dereliction. Criminals and hoodlums; the human products of decades of social injustice, neglect, institutional deficiencies in law and education, have now found it easy to capitalise on any social instability however minor.

Apathy to government and the belief that public property ought to be destroyed is regularly seen in the destructive action of even the supposedly more educated people in society such as rampaging university students and mobs. In the case of those involved in the failure of the electricity supply on a national scale, the actors did not consider the effects on national security. They did not consider the chance (however remote?) that the country's enemies could seize the opportunity created by that action. More often, the Nigerian nation has experienced attacks by armed rebel groups and bands of soldiers from neighbouring countries to the north of Nigeria. In all of these actions, the different groups of citizens show a deep-rooted hatred and lack of understanding for a society that

has ignored and maltreated them. In the case of the sabotage of the crude oil processing facilities, the country is still importing fuel because of the singular act of sabotage that occurred in the 1990s.

The Mismanagement of National Emergencies: The FGSI Project of 1994 as an Example of Conceptual and Institutional Limitations in Security Planning

The institutional laxity and ineffectiveness of government and its institutions can be seen more vividly with regard to emergencies. In 1994, the government was unable to confront the security threat posed by the oil workers' disruption of a regular supply of petroleum products across the country. And even when the Federal Government Strategic Intervention, or FGSI Project, took off, involving the use of oil ferrying articulated lorries (tankers) provided directly by the federal government, it could not effectively fill the gap left by the actions of the oil workers. The FGSI project was quantitatively and qualitatively defective. Though the nomenclature was good, the design and implementation were defective. The vehicles were in short supply, and the buyers and military escorts diverted their products. There were other technical and human problems.

Worst of all, the programme was just a reaction to the grave situation of the collapse of all semblance of national life. Thus it did not have the smack of creativity and purpose, such as was needed to rectify a national security threat of that magnitude. This was one of the clearest indications of the failure of that government, of preceding governments, and of the FGSI as an example of institutional intervention in national emergencies. It was evident that government had never been prepared for any serious national security crisis. The failures of the national institutions demonstrated the helplessness of a society that had refused to 'make hay while the sun shines'. This problem was seen in the fact that all the highways were turned into football pitches where youth expended their dejection and frustration with an incompetent society ruled by visionless, unimaginative and incapable individuals.

As a further critique of the FGSI project we may point out that if the railway system had been in good shape, it would have been easier to acquire, transport and distribute the different grades of fuel needed. A simple logical and mathematical analysis demonstrates this fact. If it is the case that the biggest tanker that can travel on the type of road available in the country will contain 33,000 litres of fuel, let us assume for the sake of argument that there were 1000 FGSI vehicles (which is most likely to be unattainable given the character of national planning and leadership), then by multiplication, the total payload of fuel (assuming that it is only one type of fuel that will be transported) will be 33,000,000 litres for a country of this size. Of course there are at least three kinds of fuel widely needed by the citizens - petrol, cooking kerosene and diesel - which automatically dimin-

ishes the quantity of each fuel that can be lifted at any one time to serve the needs of the teeming population.

Then when we consider that the distance between some parts of the nation can amount to two or three days' journey by road in a heavily loaded and highly inflammable tanker, then the ineffectiveness of an FGSI principle modelled on the use of road transport becomes glaringly obvious. These questions then arise: How long will it take for the fuel to be off-loaded from the seaport in the first place? How many ports in the country are capable of offloading these ships? How many FGSI road tankers will load in a day? How many loading stations exist? How many of these tankers can each station load in twelve or twenty-four hours? The truth is that if there is a transport system predicated on the dual or single railway system as a key machinery for the institutional movement of strategic and industrial goods, one or two good 21 Class trains can move up to twenty-five or more tankers. This would have been a better platform for the FGSI project. The practical implication of this is that one single train can convey up to 825,000 litres or more of fuel. This means that about forty trains can move the amount of fuel that 1000 tankers will move. The train or rail freight option is obviously a better strategy for confronting such threats to national security.

Security and the Evolving Aesthetics of Social Control

The aesthetics of control are tied to the tripartite analysis of values, social order and morality. The clarification of these ingredients of society is the more valuable 'in times of insecurity, and uncertainty, when personal survival is threatened' (Willie 1975: 10). We need a more solid conception of axiological and aesthetic inputs in social order for human and national security. This requires us to pursue a tripartite process of the 'reconsideration of the role of values and individual responsibility' (Duesterberg 1998: 44) in the search for alternative principles of aesthetic control and societal security. It cannot be overstated that the diverse institutions created by man simply aim, in one way or another, at society's efficient operation and continuation. A good society aims at its own notion of the common good through the provision of greater opportunities for participation and responsibility among citizens. Underlying this feeling of mutual responsibility is presumably the attitude of trust or faith in a unique pattern of political administration and social conduct that seeks the inclusion of as many as possible in the management of its affairs. The question is then how we can establish and sustain rules and values that can propel human actions for positive ends. This issue is the more significant in the context of organisations that undertake cultural, educational and expressive functions.

The concept of social order here becomes particularly instructive for evolving the systems and rules for security and social control in society. Social order simply refers to the social systems and schemes of social relations that define the political, economic and social roles, rights and duties of people in a society. Social

order is therefore a set of arrangements put in place by man in order to attain certain important ends of all in a social system (Ujomu 2001: 247; Ujomu 2004: 12). Central to the operation of social order is the idea of social roles allocated to each member and group of the society. Social roles delineate the political, economic, religious and administrative functions of people in a society. The idea of social roles as identifiable and allocated political, economic, religious and administrative functions in fact depend upon some ethical and institutional foundations. Within the social order, roles are demarcated by established rules and conventions that guide human conduct and association within social practices and institutions. Hence, the mechanisms of social control are operative in sectors of society (Cohen and Short 1971: 94) such as the criminal justice system, clubs, universities, trade unions, and so on. Social control is a key feature of aesthetic social order. There are fundamental questions about the conditions for entrenching actions directed at the collective good in society in order to achieve 'an especially high level of welfare and security' (Kaufmann 2000: 309). This point is most significant in relation to the leaders and followers who must now be guided by the dual dictates of morality and law for the good of all in society.

Conclusion: The Way Forward in Security and Attitude Change

The need for security demands an interrogation of the core idea of the value of life as it operates on at least other central principles and practices. We place a value on human life when we define a set of operative principles that determine our estimation of the human being as constitutive of certain features that earn him a particular treatment or consideration. The value of life is also related to our axiological premises for considering the human person to be deserving of certain goods. Security is aimed at affirming and upholding the value of life. The quest for security may in fact be the essential quest to place a positive value on human life. In seeking a conception of fuller human social participation in security there is a presupposition of the rights that individuals retain to effect the rational pursuit of their well-being and happiness in a constructive and non-hostile manner. The attainment of security implies the creation of a social arena imbued with greater public trust and collective adherence to the rule of law for the assurance of peace and progress. Above all, the idea of security presupposes the establishment of a nation of people oriented to the common good on the premises of fraternity, equality and liberty. Security can be most effectively established and sustained through an idea of society which upholds the values of increased human participation, responsibility and wider input to social well-being. This view of society promotes security by recognising that values such as cooperation, consolidation and continuity are themselves usually uppermost in the minds of people when they form or participate in commonwealths.

The promotion of national and human security through cooperation, consolidation and continuity is possible only through the conceptualisation of the

idea of excellence as a directing principle of social and institutional life in Africa. The ideology of excellence requires the theoretical and practical confrontation between our current human and social attitudes, values and cultural institutions in relation to how things ought to be. On the one hand, this is an ideological task, and on the other hand, it is an axiological commitment. Ideologically, we are in the quest for social order or social systems whose values are expressed mainly in a set of closely related beliefs, preferences, ideas, values or even attitudes (Macridis 1989: 2, 3; Toyo 2001: 23) and characteristic of a group or community. What, if at all, will be the content and context of ideology vis-à-vis the search for excellence?

The search for a multifaceted personal, social and institutional excellence is equally an ethical, aesthetical and phenomenological task. For Hogendorn (1996: 66) it is the demand that we overcome difficulties emanating from unsustainable practices. Indeed, Becker (1974: 111, 112) has informed us that excellence is suggestive of moral character. For its part, moral character can be discerned from human behaviour, especially when we move from behaviour to form conclusions about character on the basis of what is acceptable or ideal. The idea of human excellence suggests an emphasis on a combination of concepts that include virtue, good person, good society, ideals, and values. The critical justification for pressing home the argument from excellence in human conduct is that 'our attitude can change' (Schultz 1982: 108). Kiesler, Collins and Miller (1969: 82) are right to hold that behaviour is modified as a result of experience that can guide or influence later behaviour. As individuals go through life, they strive to attain certain goals and avoid some situations. They develop positive attitudes to objects that serve their purpose, while showing negative attitudes to objects that thwart their needs. (Kiesler et al., 1969: 305, 316). This question of the possibilities of attitude change for excellence can be designed and installed as a 'distinct new area of policy intervention' (Reddock 2004: 25).

Therefore, we can agree with Burns (1928) that 'social life is amenable to human control. Human character, emotion and intelligence can be made by human acts different from what they now are. The indications by which we steer our course in such a control over institutions and personalities are called values' (Burns 1928: 483). If the above is true, then we must understand the quest for excellence as the reconstruction of 'a new self-image, conferring a sense of worth' (Goulet 1983: 617) on a people that have been plagued by historical, cultural, moral and spiritual weaknesses. These peoples have seen themselves and their institutions as unable to perform efficiently and effectively, their youth have been unable to achieve higher goods through the exercise of vigour and genius, and the rulers and elites have been unable to live according to decency, civility, fairness and humane principles that can serve as role models to others. It is such shortfalls that the quest for excellence seeks to overcome.

The challenge of excellence is indubitably a call for the engendering of social values such as diligence, civility, sincerity, discipline and industry, as well as the fruits of these so that the body politic can achieve progress. However, this calls for trust, a feeling of accommodation and other social capital for development. According to Fairbanks (2000: 270), social capital involves a combination of human and institutional capital. Together, these factors ensure the operation of legally sound, efficient and optimally performing organisations and firms and knowledge resources, including universities. Simply put the demand for excellence calls for 'better social arrangements and better conduct on all our parts' (Hartshorne 1974: 147).

One important social arrangement is the economic approach to security, which emphasises the appropriation of the capabilities, talents and strengths of every sector of the society with a view to income and wealth generation and distribution for national development. Indeed, 'economic security and wealth have a vital bearing on the larger problems of individual and social well-being, which are the concern of ethics' (Tsanoff 1951: 11). This approach emphasises the proper and careful management of scarce national resources meant for enduring social and economic development. Adopting the economic approach to security requires that Africans and African countries must tackle problems of corruption, lack of vision and mismanagement of resources by politicians, soldiers and bureaucrats. Proper resource management is therefore a central means to the maintenance of economic security. Economic strength can be squandered by reckless financial speculation and material profligacy. The degree of material well-being (security, peace and progress) generated by any economy depends not only on its ability to fully employ the productive resources (labour, capital, materials, energy), available to it, but also on its ability to employ them in ways that contribute to the heightening of the societal standard of living.

The dividends or advantages in cost and investment which the economic approach to security yields are to be measured not only in terms of increase in monetary or financial revenue, but also in terms of the production of economically and socially useful goods and services. It is also to be seen in terms of the psychological and material enhancements of human productivity given the nation's labour, capital and natural resources. The economic security and development of a nation can be measured using core indices. Such indices include its economic growth, the quality or standard of life of the citizens, the availability of basic infrastructure, efficiency of social amenities and productivity of industrial manufacturing systems, capacity for wealth generation and consolidation, an enabling financial environment and a viable system of human resources development.

Beyond the economy, there is the chance to utilise general and specialised education and formal and informal education as principles of guaranteeing secu-

ity. But then the question of education and security takes us back to the realm of values, things that are desirable, important or interesting. The clarification of the issue of values is important in the question of security. It is our view that the reconsideration of key ethical values guiding the entire gamut of personal, social national life can make some of the much-desired difference in the area of security theorising. Education is a cardinal way of instilling these desired ethical values. Education as a basic means of social progress and reform contributes to the establishment of human and national security in various ways. It provides opportunities for individual and social growth, it gives culture to the individual and society, and it develops human abilities and trains useful citizens. Education contributes to the establishment and sustenance of human and national security by enhancing the people's understanding of themselves, their society and environment. It improves living skills, fosters creative capacity, imposes core visions, values and character, and increases productivity and social mobility.

Access to relevant knowledge, that is, to scientific and technological knowledge, is an imperative and the cornerstone of any security development strategy. However, knowledge without values or virtues cannot yield any enduring fruits. One must be certain to ensure that one seeks or produces the knowledge that one needs, and that this knowledge is capable of yielding result-oriented action and promotes human survival both in the short and in the long term. It is painful but true that security is tied to a scientific culture. A scientific culture is tied to a strong, practical and effective system of education. To find out the truth of this claim, one must picture one's own society as facing a similar crisis that other more scientifically developed societies have faced. Imagine that Nigeria, for example, is beset by a tragedy of the magnitude of the September 11 terrorist attacks or an earthquake that destroys a whole city and kills thousands and displaces tens of thousands. There is no doubt that the story will be different for Nigeria because at present not only is the society largely unprepared, but also it does not have the requisite scientific and technological capacity to overcome such challenges. Thus, there can be no security without the development and dividends of a scientific culture. From all that has been said above, our aim has been to search for those core values that can make human life more secure, stable and harmonious. We face the challenge of reconciling our values with the demands of modern change. Moore (1973: 409) makes a valuable point that 'national security decisions must consider a range of component issues. Legal considerations like political, military and economic considerations are relevant to each of these issues'. We are in need of a more 'vigorous and imaginative implementation' (Moore 1973: 411) of the principles of security to the fundamental areas of human life. We must return to our visions and values which guide actions. Many of the attitudes of the individual reflect his values or his conception of what is desirable. As members of a human community, we must preserve the values essential to the security and

redemption of life. These are ideas that raise the level of human dignity. Human dignity begins in the minds of human beings. There is a need to reconsider the moral basis of social existence, and enhance the more qualitative aspects of development such as humaneness, justice, etc. The point about the connections between values and security has been fully made. In any case, we can agree with Munkner (1998: 87) on some of the values that he mentions: 'self-help, self responsibility, solidarity, social responsibility'. O'Keefe (1985: 56, 58) agrees on the fact that security must emanate from 'an individual sense of responsibility among citizens' that can guarantee 'taking preventative actions'. Human beings can survive only because there are shared or public values and interests, which ultimately foster the good of all. We are in need of specific behaviour for security; joint action for the common good. According to Jeter (2003: 8), 'if we are deceived into concentrating on our differences and not common interests then enmity and rivalry will trespass where hope and cooperation should prevail'.

This essay has attempted a theoretical and conceptual interrogation of the idea of national security using the typological, philosophical and prolegomenon approaches. It situated the problem in the context of a post-colonial setting and has tried to engage the core ideas and values required for a proper methodological conceptualisation of security.

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