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EXIT STRATEGIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN SIERRA LEONE AND LIBERIA

AUGUST 2015

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ABSTRACT

Exit strategy in peacekeeping missions, a process of either disengaging or terminating involvement in peacekeeping operations, is increasingly becoming a challenge to the international community. Past experiences in Somalia, Bosnia, Lebanon, and in recent times, Iraq, have shown that such an exercise is usually associated with structural problems. Previous studies on exit strategies in peacekeeping operations have been deeply ethnocentric and dominated by literature from the global north. To illustrate some African examples to the problem, this study examined the exit strategies adopted by the United Nations (UN) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone and Liberia by focusing on the institutional/policy frameworks, approaches, and their effects on the two post-war societies.

The study adopted a combination of descriptive, qualitative and case study research design. The purposive sampling technique was used to select past and current force commanders, government officials, and staff of the UN and ECOWAS based on mission experience and knowledge on exit strategies. A total of 30 unstructured in-depth interviews and six focus group discussions were conducted with military and civilian experts on exit strategy. Secondary data consisted of official documents from the UN, ECOWAS, bilateral institutions and the government of Sierra Leone and Liberia. Data were analysed using descriptive and constant comparative methods.

Prior to the commencement of peacekeeping operations in these two countries, both the UN and ECOWAS did not have any institutional or policy framework guiding peacekeeping exit, mainly because such operations were undertaken on *ad-hoc* basis and also because the planning process placed much emphasis on the attainment of sustainable peace as against the withdrawal of peacekeepers. Yet, mounting peacekeeping costs, vaguely-worded mandates, blurred rules of engagement and the reluctance of troop-contributing countries to commit to endless mission forced both organisations to establish working frameworks. While the ECOWAS approach was set out in the Concepts of Operation of the ECOWAS Standby force, that of the UN was pursued through the Integrated Mission Planning Process. Although the ECOWAS preferred to exit through re-hatting in both operations, the UN maintained a systematic level of transition from benchmarking, phased withdrawal and successor operations. The major drawbacks of these approaches include the fact that the organisations appeared not to include local authorities in the implementation of their various exit strategies. As such, the withdrawal of peacekeepers created a vacuum in several fronts, ranging from security to livelihoods, economic to competing doctrinal influences, housing to reconstruction work.

The exit strategies adopted by the United Nations and the Economic Community of West African States in Sierra Leone and Liberia have made significant contributions to how future peacekeeping operations should be terminated especially in Africa. The manifestation of the challenges that confronted both organisations has demonstrated the need to address the adjoining and structural causes of exit strategies in peacekeeping operations. Both organisations must partner local authorities in the implementation of their policy frameworks to serve as a buffer to contain the effects associated with exit strategy.

Keywords: Exit strategy, Peacekeeping operations, ECOWAS, United Nations
Word count: 494

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to my family: my mum, Prof. Dora F. Edu-Buandoh, my wife, Nana Afua, our beloved girls, Araba Kwegyirba, Ewuresi Kweiba and Kuukua Ansaa

CERTIFICATION BY SUPERVISORS

I certify that this work was carried out by Fiifi EDU-AFFUL of the Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan



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

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

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

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AAFC	Allied Armed Forces of the Community
ACOTA	Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance
ADW	Adjustment, Drawdown and Withdrawal
AFISMA	African-led International Support Mission to Mali
AFL	Armed Forces of Liberia
AFRC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC)
AMIB	African Mission in Burundi
APC	All People's Congress
ASC	American Colonisation Society
AU	African Union
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
CEAO	Communauté Économique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest
CCDS	Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff
CCM	Constant Comparative Method
CIM	Crises Information Management
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DDR	Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration
DFS	Department for Filed Support
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DPKRS	Department of Peace Keeping and Regional Security
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
DUF	Directive on the Use of Force
ECA	Economic Commission for Africa
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group
ECOMIL	ECOWAS mission in Liberia
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EO	Executive Outcomes
ESF	ECOWAS Stand-by force

EU	European Union
EUFOR	European Union Force
FGDs	Focus Group Discussions
FPU	Formed Police Unit
GAFCSC	Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College
GAO	General Accounting Office
HOSG	Heads of States and Government
IGNU	Interim Government of National Unity
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMPP	Integrated Mission Planning Process
IMTF	Integrated Mission Planning Team
INGOs	International Non-Governmental Organisations
INPFL	Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia
INTERFET	International Force for East Timor
IPSO	Integrated Peace Support Operations
ISA	Integrated Strategic Assessment
ISF	Integrated Strategic Framework
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
ITV	Independent Television
ITWP	Independent True Whig Party
JMG	Joint Monitoring Group
KAIPTC	Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre
LNTG	Liberian National Transitional Government
LURD	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
MILOBS	Military Observers
MINUSMA	United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Mali
MINURCAT	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad
MODEL	Movement for Democracy in Liberia
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSC	Mediation and Security Council

NATAG	Nigerian Army Technical Assistance Group
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NMG	Neutral Monitoring Group (NMG)
NPFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
NPRC	National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC)
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OAS	Organisation of American States
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
ONUB	United Nations Operation in Burundi
ONUMOZ	United Nations Operation in Mozambique
ONUSAL	United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador
PAPS	ECOWAS Departments of Political Affairs, Peace & Security
PBC	Peacebuilding Commission
PCC	Police Contributing Countries
PMAD	Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defense
PNA	Protocols on Non-Aggression
PSO	Peace Support Operations
PSOD	Peace Support Operations Division
PoC	Protection of Civilians
QIPs	Quick Impact Projects
RECs	Regional Economic Committees
RECAMP	Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities
ROE	Rules of Engagements
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
RwP	Responsibility while Protecting
SA	Strategic Assessment
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
SEA	Sexual Exploitation and Abuse

SFCG	Search for Common Ground
SLA	Sierra Leonean Army
SLPP	Sierra Leone People's Party
SMC	Standing Mediation Committee
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SOMA	Status of Mission Agreements
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
SSR	Security Sector Reforms
TAM	Technical Assessment Mission
TCC	Troop Contributing Countries
T/PCC	Troop and Police Contributing Countries
ULIMO	United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy
UN	United Nations
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UK	United Kingdom
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNAVEM	United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNMEE	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNOMIG	United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia
UNOMSIL	United Nations Observer mission in Sierra Leone
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in the Sudan
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNIOSL	United Nations Integrated Office for Sierra Leone
UNIPSIL	United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Mission in Sierra Leone
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia

UNMIH	United Nations Mission in Haiti
UNOMIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
USA	United States of America
WCED	World Commission on Environment and Development

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the study

From the inception of peacekeeping operations in the late 1940s, there have been series of international interventions from states and multilateral organisations towards bringing peace to the world's troubled regions. This has resulted in an increasing wave of peacekeeping operations with over 113,000 deployed personnel and about $7.33 billion cost to the United Nations (UN) as at May 2013 (UN doc A/C.5/66/18; DPI/1634/Rev.146). One feature of these international interventions that has received very little scholarly attention and empirical assessment is the concept of exit strategy. We are interested in the study of exit strategies, given the increasing worrying signs around the world that it is easier to begin a peace operation than to end it. Undeniably, the challenge has not been how to initiate the peacekeeping operation, but rather how to end the mission without leaving any possibility of a relapse of hostility in the "post-war society".

Although peacekeeping transition and exit strategy is not a new concept, it attracted renewed attention first in 2000 when the debate of the Security Council culminated in a Secretary General's report captioned *"No exit without strategy: Security Council decision-making and the closure or transition of United Nations peacekeeping operations"*(UN doc. S/2001/394). Subsequently, in February 2010, at the instance of French presidency of the Security Council, a debate ensued on transitions and exit strategies.[1] The ensuing debate thereafter proffered the need to create conditions for sustainable peace in the mission area before drawing down or withdrawing a mission completely. Consequently, several policy statements were issued by members of the council at their 6270th meeting (UN doc. S/PV.6270). The main thrust of most of the statements made at this meeting was the need to guarantee, right from the onset of peacekeeping, the capability of a

peacekeeping force to create the conditions needed for transition, withdrawal and exit without undermining efforts to achieve the longer goals of peace and stability.

In trying to find the actual meaning of "exit" within the context of peacekeeping operations, several definitions come to play. Considering "exit" purely as a 'withdrawal' from a peacekeeping operation appears inadequate (Caplan, 2012; Pearson, Lounsbery, and Costa 2005; Stambaugh, 2001; Rose, 1998). Exit strategy is not a single event but rather a process that encompasses a whole gamut of activities, including downsizing (drawdown), withdrawals, transitions and termination (Caplan, 2012; Zaum, 2009). Beyond the conceptual fuzziness of the true meaning of what constitutes exit, and for the purpose of this study, 'exit strategy' is defined as the *planned approach for disengaging, withdrawing transitioning and terminating a peacekeeping operation, ideally having attained the goals that inspired the international intervention in the first place. This planned approach can originate from one international intervener(s) to another intervener(s) or a legitimate local authority.* This definition mirrors the understanding of exit as expressed by the UN Secretary-General in his 2001 report on the issue (UN doc. S/2001/394).

There is no doubt that peacekeeping operations have become the singular most important instrument of the UN, regional and sub-regional organisations for maintaining international peace and security (United Nations, 2010:21). Similarly, peacekeeping operations have contributed to preventing and managing internal and external conflicts throughout the world (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2011; Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, 2010). Nevertheless, peacekeeping operations have gone through several phases and processes to meet the changing needs and challenges of contemporary conflict (Aning, Aubyn, Annan and Edu-Afful, 2013; Malone and Wermester, 2000; Diehl, Druckman and Wall, 1998). More changes are expected in this age of asymmetric warfare in which regular armies under the regime of the Just War Theory have to manage the "nuisance value" of civilian belligerents that are committed to no respect for due process in the conduct of war (Farrell, 2013).[2] Accompanying these changing phases and processes is a direct swing in the nature of traditional peacekeeping to the development of complex and robust "second-generation" and "third-generation" peacekeeping missions in which

peacekeepers were sent to intrastate conflicts and obligated to engage in extensive nation building activities (Aning et al, 2013; Hazen, 2007).

Increasingly, the focus of these international actions has been based on creating peacekeeping operations that have the capacity to meet the growing incidence of conflict, by maintaining a stable environment and reconstructing countries that have suffered periods of intermittent conflicts. Over the past decade, a body of research has attempted to study the conditions that necessitate the successful withdrawal of peacekeeping operations from post-conflict countries. In terms of decision-making, getting an exit strategy right from the onset is crucial in managing the aftershocks of any peacekeeping operations globally. Moreover, the United Nations on its own has admitted unequivocally that exit strategy in peacekeeping operation is crucial in ensuring successful transition and the attainment of lasting peace (United Nations, 2001).[3] However, past experiences in Somalia, Rwanda, Chad, Central African Republic and Bosnia have shown that peacekeeping operations often suffer particular challenges during their drawdown and exit phases (Caplan, 2012; Rose, 1998; Pearson, Lounsbery and Costa, 2005). Despite the overarching attention given to peacebuilding and post-conflict state-building, little attention has been placed on the challenges that confront peace consolidation in the event of a winding down or an outright exit of such international interventions.

In reality, the unpredictability of conflict situations has made the ideal position of defining an exit strategy right from the commencement of a peacekeeping mission nearly impossible. It has become pertinent for some level of clarity to be espoused right from the onset of the mission to allow the mission to create the needed conditions necessary for transitions, drawdown and eventual exit. More importantly, this must be done in such a way as not to undermine the ultimate aim of supporting the long term goals of the intervention, which is consolidating peace in the mission area. It is against this background that questions about appropriate exit strategies and the standard to gauge a mission's on-going performance need more thorough analysis.

Historically, the nature of conflict has changed from the periods of inter-community wars, national wars, secessionists' wars, ideological wars to modern-day internal armed

conflicts (Wimmer, 2013; Kaldor, 2012; Nhema, 2008). According to Lotta and Wallensteen (2014), as at 2013 there were 33 reported cases of active armed conflict in 25 locations worldwide. A figure that has gone up slightly by one as compared to the 32 cases reported in 2012. At present, nearly half of such armed conflicts (13 out of the reported 33) are generally, principally or even exclusively, internal armed conflicts and are mostly found on the African continent (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2014; Lotta and Wallensteen, 2014). The range of contemporary peacekeeping operations have evolved and encapsulates new norms such as Responsibility to Protect (R2P), human rights, democratisation, Protection of Civilians (PoC) and Responsibility while Protecting (RwP) to mitigate the origin of such conflicts (Braga, 2013; Pattison, 2012; Aning and Atuobi, 2012; Bellamy, 2009). From a solitary actor (United Nations-led peace operations) to others conducted jointly with regional bodies (hybrid operations) and others undertaken by regional and sub-regional bodies, with the tacit approval of the Security Council, peace operations have taken several shapes and forms. Within the past twenty five years, the number of non-United Nations peace operations has increased to absorb major peace operations initiated by regional and sub-regional groups such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), African Union (AU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). In most of these peace operations in Africa today, there is improved partnership that is basically built on an unprecedented involvement of local actors and a solid local ownership (Okumu and Jaye, 2010). Perhaps, the demand is as a result of the ability of peacekeeping missions to reduce the surging growth of armed conflict by about 80 per cent (Centre on International Cooperation, 2009; Fortna, 2008:125; Melander, 2009).

In contemporary times, peacekeeping activities have been pursued through preventive diplomacy, peacebuilding, enforcement missions and preventive deployment (Boutros-Ghali, 1992; Bercovitch, Kremenyuk and Zartman, 2009; Adebayo, 2011; Francis, 2013). Also, the variety of tasks allocated to peacekeeping operation(s), in general, have expanded considerably to absorb the changing patterns of international security environment and to concentrate mainly on emerging threats to global peace and security (Aning et al, 2013; Wiharta, Melvin and Avezov, 2012). It is explicitly argued by Bellamy, et al. (2010) that whenever peacekeepers[4] are deployed into conflict areas, their

presence reduces the possibility of war by about 85 per cent. However, this assertion does not address how long peacekeepers need to stay to achieve that and what happens when they downsize or withdraw entirely. Even though the complexities of peacekeeping operations are different and varied, mandates have changed, expanded considerably and have become somewhat responsive to the changing trends of conflict over the last two decades. This expansion apart from demonstrating the growing confidence in the capabilities of peacekeeping operations to establish stability also highlights a number of challenges that affect mission effectiveness. Key among these challenges include force generation, personnel recruitment, resources, competences, management, quality assurance, logistical support, oversight and the maintenance of the political engagement of member states (Gowan, 2008; Durch, 2006). Arguably, the pitfalls associated with the above challenges for missions is demonstrated in recent times by the much talked about struggles of the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) (Gowan, 2013).

Before there could be any intervention, be it humanitarian or developmental, Protection of civilians, responsibility to protect or peacebuilding intervention, the tasks that are assigned any intervening party to these types of intervention are clearly spelt out in the mandate (Campbell, 2008). Even though the UN Security Council has the foremost responsibility with respect to ensuring global peace, consistently sub-regional, regional and some individual countries have taken a lead role in some of these interventions. This has become necessary because in most situations the UN Security Council is either slow to act or prefer to adopt the "wait and see" approach. When it comes to peace operations, the authorisation to deploy is presented on the basis of the directive embedded in the mandate. Arguably, the multiplicity of peacekeeping mission mandates has broadened the UN's ability to deliver on almost all of its assigned tasks. Løj (2013) and McCandless (2008: 20) contend that mandates issued by the UN Security Council mostly contain peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities that are geared towards improving the local condition. As such, issues such as PoC, establishment of credible judiciary and penal systems, rebuilding institutions of state (such as the military and the police), completing disarmaments, demobilisation and reintegration programmes for instance are all captured

within the ambit of the mandate (Bellamy et al, 2010; Koko and Essis, 2012; Centre for International Cooperation, 2008).

Additionally, the mandate equally covers ancillary activities such as preparing and holding national elections as well as providing a platform for belligerents to find solutions to the causes of the conflict (Løj, 2013; Aboagye, 1999). Broadly speaking, many of such interventions are riddled with several arguments for and against and their outputs oftentimes have lots of mixed results, some very unpleasant. According to Gelot and Soderbaum (2012:132) "interventions have all too often been based on an insufficient understanding of the surrounding context, and on an external definition of the problem these interventions sets out to solve." As one contends with the question of "what problem" a peacekeeping operation is supposed to solve, we must equally work out indicators for determining the success of such an operation. The latter is essential for determining when the operation should end; it is also relevant for working out the "exit strategies" which is the main focus of the present research project. We are interested in the study of exit strategies given the increasing signs around the world that it is easier to begin a peace operation than to end it. The problem is often with what exit strategies would ensure that there is no relapse of hostility in the "post-war society".

1.2 Choice of Study Area

It is against this background that this study seeks to examine the exit strategies adopted in the cases of the initial ECOWAS and later UN interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone respectively. Three major assumptions underpinned the selection of the sites for this study. First, it was assumed that gaining access to the identified research site for data collection was not going to be 'herculean task' considering that the issue of exit strategy was at the heart of most of the statebuilding discussions within those selected countries at the time. Second, it was assumed that planners of peacekeeping operations, be it the UN or ECOWAS, would be involved in following some basic procedure of exit which would not necessarily be tied to a particular geographical area. Third, it was assumed that the two cases presented a basis for comparison since it appeared that different methods and approaches were adopted by the two organisations in those two countries. To empirically

investigate the research questions, the study will compare exit strategies in the two post-conflict West African states Liberia and Sierra Leone (as shown in Figure 1.1).

These countries illustrate a significant variation regarding exit strategies in peacekeeping operations. The two peacekeeping missions in each country are examined in greater detail to highlight the challenges that confronted the various exit approaches. The main reason for the choice of Liberia and Sierra Leone as the study area stems from the fact that comparatively, both countries have been exposed to years of peacekeeping activities and have gone through different stages of exit strategies from the period when ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) were deployed to when the UN took over from the ECOMOG peacekeeping missions. Also, the two cases present different approaches to exit in peace operations. Whilst ECOMOG adopted a multiplicity of approaches in terminating its operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the UN adopted a flexible approach to terminating the operation in both countries. The ECOWAS case in both Liberia and Sierra Leone were selected on the premise that when it comes to the involvement of Regional Economic Committees (RECs) in peacekeeping, the ECOWAS case in both countries is par excellence whereas the UN example also provides the best option of a sub-regional peacekeeping operations being successfully integrated into a full United Nations Security Council (UNSC) mandated missions. Above all, the two cases present the best options of interrogating the various approaches of exit which ultimately will provide the avenue for comparing and analysing the many different forms of exit strategies being applied and how they impact on the success of peacekeeping operations.

Figure 1.1: The Geographic Map of Africa showing Sierra Leone and Liberia



Source: British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), 2014

The rationale behind the selection of the two case studies is also to examine in greater detail the extent to which the concept of exit strategies and sustainable peace was integrated in the case of Sierra Leone and is currently on-going in the case of Liberia. Additionally, the proximity of the Liberian and the Sierra Leonean cases affords the researcher an invaluable deep understanding of the issue of exit as it relates to past and exiting peacekeeping operations. Also, in lieu of the institutional capacity required to manage and implement effective exit strategies, the two cases present a basis for comparison. These two Anglophone West African countries have been ravaged by a series of conflicts in the past three decades. Starting with the Liberian civil war in 1989 to its official conclusion in 1997, it is estimated that over 200, 000 lives were lost and nearly 1.2 million people were displaced (Tuck, 2000; Aboagye, 1999). Equally striking, was the severe human rights abuses and large influx of refugees into other West African countries (Francis, 2009). The evolution of the conflict, together with the reckless destruction of properties, an increase in the loss of civilian lives and the seeming indifference of the

international community pushed the ECOWAS to establish the Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) to deal with the crises. When all efforts, both political and diplomatic, were lost, the SMC, operating under the 1981 ECOWAS Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence (PMAD), established the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to find an endogenous sub-regional driven solution to the Liberian crises (Aboagye, 1999; Adebajo and Rashid 2004; Mustapha and Bangura, 2010). Subsequently, the first ECOMOG troops comprising Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Gambia deployed to Liberia with just about 3500 troops on August 23, 1990 to enforce the peace and afterwards to protect civilians, mediate between the warring factions, safeguard the storage and distribution of humanitarian aid and finally, and disarm the warring factions (Adebajo, 2002; Aboagye, 1999; Sesay, 1996; Howe, 1996; Aning, 1994).

Similarly, in the case of Sierra Leone, between the periods 1999 to 2002, the civil war claimed over 70,000 lives and displaced over 2.6 million people (Kaldor and Vincent, 2006). Unlike the Liberian conflict, the Sierra Leonean conflict received massive interest from the international community especially Britain. Right from the onset of the conflict on March 23, 1991 the international community showed great interest in the growth of the Sierra Leone crises which eventually culminated in the intervention of first the British under Operation Palliser on May 7, 2000. Later within a broader framework of the UN Security Council response to the crises, Britain began to provide support through planning, intelligence and airlift support to strengthen the ongoing UN and ECOWAS operations. This collaborative effort was undertaken mainly to curtail or better still eliminate the senseless brutalities such as rape, cutting of limbs, looting and murder that the general population had experienced.[5] Besides, the Sierra Leonean case presents an exclusive example of how several external military interveners (ECOWAS, United Nations, western power (Britain) and Private Security) took special interest in a civil war in sub-Saharan Africa.

In the Liberian case, for instance, countries such as Côte d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso and Togo initially questioned the basis for which ECOWAS intervened in that country citing issues that borders on legitimacy, neutrality, effectiveness and the capability of the sub-regional body to handle the intervention (Ero, 2000). Others such as Wippman (1993), Aning

(1994), Weller (1994) and Ofuatey- Kodjo (1994) maintained that at the time, the best option available to the sub-regional group was what was pursued. Equally important are the other critical questions surrounding transitions and exit strategies. Some critics argue that, especially in the case of ECOMOG in Sierra Leone, there was no planned exit or transition of the peacekeeping force deployed to that country (Bah, 2012). There are still unanswered questions hovering around the intervention and the haste within which ECOMOG, for example, exited in both countries. The inability of planners and policy makers within the UN and ECOWAS to carefully define the exit strategy for its interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone poses a great challenge to the collective resolution and management of future conflict internationally. Moreover, the experience of both countries, with respect to exit strategies, raises fundamental questions about the rationale and impact of multilateral interventions in closing down a mission. Consequently, this thesis seeks answers to how exit strategies in peacekeeping operations could be pursued at both the regional and global levels.

1.3 The Statement of the Problem

The processes through which peacekeeping drawdown and exit strategies have been implemented or executed in post-conflict states have been the subject of debate in recent peacekeeping discourses. Exit strategy in peacekeeping operations is a very complex issue. Concerns have been raised about the timing of peacekeeping mission drawdown and the exit criteria thereof. Available empirical evidence suggests that exit strategies are a major challenge for all interventions (Caplan, 2012). Both the UN and ECOWAS have struggled to formulate successful exit strategies because the framework that seeks to guide the planning of peacekeeping operations does not place much emphasis on exit strategies in the initial planning phase of any mission. The legal and policy frameworks regulating the process of drawdown and eventual exit from peacekeeping operations have been largely *ad hoc*. Besides, the arguments have always been raised that right from the onset of any peacekeeping mission, conditions necessary for transition, withdrawal and eventual exit must be created without undermining efforts towards achieving the lasting goals of peace and security. But the reality is that most interventions hardly consider exit from the

onset of the intervention. Perhaps, the exigencies of the situation in most of these conflict areas drive planners of such interventions to focus primarily on brokering peace and restoring law and order. Likewise, emphasis is most often devoted to the causes and outcomes of such interventions. Although there is a generic thought to the issue of exit in most peacekeeping operations right from its inception, the coherence in the Integrated Strategic Assessment (ISA) and planning process hardly places exit strategy top on the agenda. ECOWAS' intervention in Liberia and Sierra Leone exposed the lack of an exit strategy to catalogue how the regional body was to pull out from its engagements in those countries. Perhaps, the special circumstances of the two countries already highlighted in the previous paragraphs made ECOWAS concern with exit strategy peripheral in the planning process. Nevertheless, the importance of exit strategy in peacekeeping operation regardless of the circumstance at the time cannot be underestimated.

Finding an appropriate exit strategy for each peacekeeping operation represents a key challenge for planners and authorities of peacekeeping operations globally. The concerns have been about the vagueness of what, in principle should constitute the indicators or benchmarks necessary for withdrawal or an outright exit from any peacekeeping mission. Over the years, exit strategies have been initiated on ill-founded assumptions. Some have been vaguely worded while others have not been clear on the rules of engagement. In some situations the holding of free and fair elections has been used as a yardstick for a possible withdrawal, while in other situations, successful security sector reforms (SSR), restoration of state authority and resumption of basic services have become the gauge for exiting from some of these missions. It is a widely held perception that elections, for instance, provide the basis for which a new leadership can lay claims to legitimacy and exercise the mandate needed to govern a post-conflict state (Hirschmann, 2012; Jett, 1999; Lyons, 1999). In other words, elections provide the opportunity or are seen as the culmination to the peacekeeping process; a position that allows peacekeepers to pull-out without worrying about the conflicting state relapsing into conflict. However, as demonstrated in most missions, benchmarking and indicators alone are not enough to measure the components necessary to elicit withdrawal or an outright exit. The elections in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire clearly exposed the deficiency in relying solely on the benchmark of elections as a prerequisite for withdrawal. Rightly so, the concept

exit strategy remains largely ill-defined and has been an entry point for confusion in many peacekeeping planning units. This lack of clarity and specificity has made it considerably difficult to fashion out a politically coherent approach to address the issue of exit strategies in peacekeeping missions. Also, the vagueness in the execution of an exit strategy in peacekeeping operations has raised certain uncertainty among troop and police contributing countries (T/PCC), host communities and international interveners.

A number of critical issues emerge from this uncertainty. First, is the objective of the intervention; second, is the difficult decision of "end date" as against the achievement of stated or specific goals and most importantly priorities of the mission. It is not known whether the reason for the non-existence of an "exit strategy" in the formulation of most mission mandates is as a result of improper planning or lack of effective leadership or a combination of the two. The mere fixation with withdrawing a peacekeeping mission from an operation site without a well-intended plan to disengage from the mission is likely to present the errors associated with the peacekeeping missions in Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although the UN exit strategies particularly in Sierra Leone has been described widely by the international community as a success story (Allouche, 2013; UNDPI/2412A, 2005; OECD, 2010), some serious questions have been raised in several quarters regarding the way ECOMOG exited from both countries. This invariably questions the exit strategy that is largely adopted by regional bodies such as ECOWAS as against those employed by an international organisation such as the United Nations.

A number of noticeable challenges are evident in all major interventions. The first major challenge to most international interventions has to do with establishing the appropriate time within which external actors on peace operations decide that it is time to scale down one's involvement or withdraw entirely. The second challenge has to do with identifying the appropriate benchmarks or indicators to necessitate an exit. The third challenge relates to being able to establish whether one's achievement in a peacekeeping mission is enough to bring about sustainable peace in an event of an exit. Mostly, the challenge is not about how to gather the resources for a smooth intervention, but rather the difficulties associated with closing or ending that intervention.

Yet another challenge associated with exit strategies is the mounting cost of peacekeeping operations in the midst of global economic meltdown and the availability of personnel. The global financial crises have affected negatively the major financial contributors to peacekeeping globally which has indirectly forced these financiers to tighten the purse strings. Moving forward, financiers of global peacekeeping cannot on their own continue to shoulder the burden of funding peacekeeping activities as the cost keep on mounting. Gradual withdrawal and eventual exit in situation where a semblance of peace and the mission objectives have been achieved remains the only sustainable option for accumulating resources for future peacekeeping operations. There are many uncertainties about what should constitute the elements of an exit strategy in both regional and UN mandated peacekeeping operations. This highlights the extensive research gaps on the contemporary reality of transitions, drawdown, and exit of peacekeeping missions. Based on the identified challenges associated with exit strategies in peacekeeping operations, this research seeks to investigate the critical issues surrounding exit strategies in peace operation by comparing the Liberian case to that of Sierra Leone.

1.4 Objectives of the study

The general objective of the study was to interrogate the exit strategies adopted by the UN and ECOWAS peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone and Liberia.

The specific objectives of the study would be to:

- Explore the significance of exit strategies in peacekeeping operations;
- Examine the institutional and policy frameworks within which ECOWAS and UN exit from peacekeeping operations;
- Evaluate ECOWAS and the UN exit approaches in Liberia and Sierra Leone, focusing particularly on similarities and differences;
- Analyse the consequences and effects of the exit approaches adopted in the two countries; and
- Make recommendations on the appropriate mechanisms to mitigate the negative effects of peacekeeping exit strategies on the two post-conflict countries.

1.5 Research Questions

The research questions that informed the study include:

- What is the need for exit strategy in peacekeeping operations?
- What are the institutional and policy frameworks within which ECOWAS and UN exit from peacekeeping operations?
- What similarities and differences exist within ECOWAS and the UN peacekeeping exit approaches in Liberia and Sierra Leone?
- What were the consequences and effects of the exit strategies adapted in the two countries?
- Which mechanism is appropriate for mitigating the negative effects of peacekeeping exit strategies on the two post-conflict countries?

1.6 Scope of the study

The study focuses on the peacekeeping activities initiated by both ECOWAS and the UN in Liberia and Sierra Leone, particularly the exit strategies adopted between the periods 1993 to date. The study does not cover any other exit strategy undertaken by any unilateral organisation in the two cases identified. As such, the intervention of the United Kingdom under Operation Palliser, Operation Barras and Operation Khukri in Sierra Leone is outside the ambit of this study. Most studies of this kind focus on financial and logistical constraints in advancing for a generic approach in dealing with the issue of transition and exit strategies. The study would go beyond the logistical and financial constrains to focus on some of the mitigating factors that influence the challenges encountered in the process of withdrawing peacekeepers and the impact that the two selected countries have been exposed to as a result of periods of conflict and peace operations. Table 1.1 shows the period under consideration for the study.

Table 1.1: Periodisation of Various Missions in Sierra Leone and Liberia

Liberia		**Sierra Leone**	
Mission	Period of Operations	Mission	Period of Operations
ECOMOG	1990-1997	ECOMOG	1996-1999
UNOMIL	1993-1997	UNOMSIL	1998-1999
ECOMIL	2003-2003	UNAMSIL	1999-2005
UNMIL	2003-Date	UNIOSL	2005-2008
		UNIPSIL	2008-2014

Source: Author's Compilation, 2014

Furthermore, the study would widen the exit net to incorporate policy frameworks that guide the formulation of mission mandate and the exit strategies that emanate from such a document. Without a holistic appraisal of the UN and the ECOWAS peacekeeping initiatives in Liberia and Sierra Leone, these international and regional actors stand the risk of repeating past mistakes in the design and implementation of similar peacekeeping operations in the near future. The missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone are of special interest for two important reasons. First, both countries are at different stages of their post-conflict state building and as such provide an excellent basis to comparatively evaluate the exit strategies implemented by both ECOWAS and the UN. Second, both missions have posed challenges to both the UN and ECOWAS because of the proximity of both countries to each other, the historical and sociological similarities, ethnic and religious affinity of their population, the political culture, and the socio-political structures of their economies. Further than the similarities in both conflicts, each one of them was overwhelmingly nourished by the other. The high unpredictability in the dynamics of the conflicts in the countries listed, the challenges they each posed and the responses of ECOWAS and the UN to exiting from those countries make both cases appropriate to study.

1.7 Significance of the study

Previous studies on exit strategies in peacekeeping operations have been largely ethnocentric and dominated by literature from the global north. To illustrate some African dimension to the problem, the study will enable policy makers and bureaucrats within the UN and ECOWAS systems to ascertain appropriate exit strategies to deal with countries that are emerging from conflict. Also, with the increasing involvement of regional and sub-regional groups in peace operations, such a study provides accurate indicators for launching a successful withdrawal in an event of any future intervention. Lately, demands for information on peacekeeping exit strategies has been ranked among priority areas by planners and policy makers at the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), Department of Field Support (DFS) and the Political Affairs, Peace and Security Department (PAPS) of ECOWAS, higher than the quest for mission start-up (Caplan, 2012; Elowson and MacDermott, 2010; UN doc. S/2001/394, 2001). If policy makers and mission planners are made aware of the importance of exit strategies in peacekeeping operations and the purpose it serves, they may consider integrating exit strategies in mission start-up and improve the overall execution of the peacekeeping project. Literature on exit strategy and transitions in third party interventions clearly exists. Yet, there is no substantial in-depth study on the specific exit strategies in peace operations for regional economic communities (RECs) such as the African Union (AU) and ECOWAS. Presently, a great deal of available literature on exit strategy is largely general. Thus, it is expected that this study will contribute to the growing stock of knowledge on the specificity of exit in peacekeeping operations and its contribution to the whole discourse of peace operations. Also, it will serve as a guideline for policy formulation regarding planning and executing international intervention within the ECOWAS sub-region in particular and globally. A healthy balance between entry and exit strategies is essential for achieving a successful peacekeeping operation.

The study will therefore inform and assist planners of peacekeeping missions, regional and sub-regional groupings, international non-governmental agencies, and policy think tanks to improve their competencies in handling the effect that the drawdown,

transition and eventual exit of peacekeepers bring on the reconstruction process of the post-conflict country.

1.8 Organisation of the study

The study is organised into six main chapters. Chapter One provides an introduction of the study. It examines the background to the study, the statement of the problem, objectives of the study, the research questions, scope and limitation of the study, significance and organisation of the study.

Chapter Two provides a nuanced analysis of related literature linked with the theories, empirical evidence and concepts underlying the study. Additionally, Chapter Two provides a conceptual framework within which the major discussions of the study are organised. The theoretical and conceptual issues bordering on interventions, peacekeeping operations, third party interventions and exit strategies are discussed.

Chapter Three discusses the methodology of the study. It captures a description of the study area, research design, study population, sample size, sampling procedures and techniques, instruments for data collection, and the methods for data analysis.

Chapter Four examines peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone and Liberia. This chapter discusses the root causes of the crises that eventually led to the collapse of the Sierra Leonean and Liberian states, and how the conduct of peacekeeping operations fared in the resolution of both conflicts.

Chapter Five illustrates the significance, consequences and effects of peacekeeping exit strategies through the analysis of Liberia and Sierra Leone. This chapter critically analyses the findings, outcomes of the fieldwork, narratives and discussions of the significance and the effects of exit strategy interlaced with the related literature and identified theories. The chapter further discusses the UN and ECOWAS exit approaches to peacekeeping operations with particular emphasis on how it was implemented in both Liberia and Sierra Leone.

Chapter Six, which happens to be the concluding chapter, takes a panoramic view of exit strategies and does an overall assessment of how it was executed in the two case studies. It enumerates a number of findings from the research and suggests some

recommendations that would be beneficial to policy makers in the event of an establishment and the termination of peacekeeping operations in the future. The concluding section also calls for an enhanced collaboration between international interveners in managing the effects mostly associated with peacekeeping exit strategies.

Notes

[1] See Security Council Commits Itself to Improving Transition, Exit Strategies for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, SC/9860 at http://www.un.org/press/en/2010/sc9860.doc.htm

[2] To buttress this point, the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon on 31 October 2014 established a High-level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations to conduct a full appraisal of the state of UN peace operations today, and the emerging needs of the future. The 17-member panel has Mr. Jose Ramos-Horta of Timor-Leste as its chair and they are expected to consider a wide variety of issues facing peace operations, including the changing nature of conflict, evolving mandates, good offices and peacebuilding challenges, managerial and administrative arrangements, planning, partnerships, human rights and protection of civilians.

[3] See Security Council Endorses Importance of 'Multidimensional' Approach to Peacekeeping Aimed at Facilitating Peacebuilding, Preventing Relapse into Conflict, SC/10888, 21 January 2013.

[4] Throughout this thesis the term 'peacekeepers' is used to refer to all categories of peacekeeping personnel associated with peace support operations including military, police, humanitarian workers and private security contractors.

[5] For a succinct account of the brutalities committed during the war, See Human Rights Watch Report Entitled: "We'll kill You if You Cry": Sexual Violence in the Sierra Leone Conflict, Vol. 15, No. 1 (A)

CHAPTER TWO
REVIEW OF LITERATURE, THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS

2.1 Introduction

The review of relevant literature in scholarly work provides the thrust to situate the research in an already existing body of knowledge. According to Sarantakos (2005), the conduct of literature review provides the needed information about the structures, processes and relationships of the research object in question. This invariably increases the knowledge base of the researcher and also strengthens the integrity of the research project. This chapter, therefore, examines theories, perspectives, conceptions and models on peacekeeping, transitions and exit strategies, interventions and the conflict resolution frameworks of ECOWAS and the UN, by looking at ways by which other scholars have approached the subject. The chapter tries to clarify the major concepts as they pertain to this study by linking the literature to the identified case study and a meaning made out of the emerging arguments. Different scholarly works pertaining to exit strategies are visibly present in the literature reviewed; especially those that have to do with interventions initiated by world great powers such as the United States of America, France and the United Kingdom, and Organisations such as Non-Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in conflict countries. This thesis attempts to juxtapose the observable facts of peacekeeping exits to the study area by evaluating its suitability and effectiveness. It ends with a discussion of a conceptually ideal model of peacekeeping exit strategies and state building for future third party interventions.

2.2 Conceptualising and Contextualising Interventions

Over the past decade, discussions on interventions on the international stage have generated some heated but useful exchanges between practitioners and international relations theorist. Key among the disagreements are the dilemmas surrounding the

principle of state sovereignty, the use of force, the growing international interest on human rights and the significance of multilateral and regional organisation such as the UN and ECOWAS, within the broader framework of international law (Welsh, 2006). Haass (1999) posits that all international interventions differ in terms of their composition, scale, duration, authority, intensity, and, most importantly the objective. While the post-cold war era presents many examples of international interventions, different forms of interventions initiated by different actors and for many different purposes have altered the normative meaning of international intervention. Current forms of interventions have been justified on the premise of protecting civilians and ensuring wider global safety (Gelot and Soderbaum, 2012; Weiss, 2012). Although the discussion of interventions have dominated global political discourses in the post-cold war era, the vague nature of the concept, coupled with the plethora of qualitative and quantitative inquiry into the meaning of intervention, have engendered several disagreements over how the concept, should be defined and pursued (Annan and Mousavizadeh, 2012). Indeed the concept is not only ambiguous and 'slippery' but also controversial in many regards, as often times results are mixed. Perhaps, that was what led James Rosenau to state in his earlier works on the scientific study of foreign policy that "the concept of intervention suffers from a lack of definitional clarity" (Rosenau, 1980: 347). Others such as Annan and Mousavizadeh (2012), Latawski and Smith (2003) and Evans and Newnham (1990) have captioned the concept as a "portmanteau term" because of the number of forms it can take. However, for the purpose of this study, narrowing the discussion of intervention to fit the objectives has proven to be essential in establishing the direct relevance to the case study.

2.2.1 Defining Interventions

To be able to contextualize and place the concept in a broader theoretical and empirical perspective, there is the need to trace the historical usage of the word and also to provide an operational definition. Rosenau (1980) suggested in his work that any discussion on intervention must purely be based on principles of authority-targeted and convention-breaking policies. In his view, interventions are undertaken to either influence the authority structure by ousting the ruling class or, in a more subtle way, support the *status quo ante*. Likewise, the convention–breaking principle explicitly alludes to the fact that interventions of interest are clearly different from ordinary

interactions. Beloff (1968:198) as cited in Rosenau (1980) defines intervention as "the attempt by one state to effect the internal structure and external behavior of other states, through various degrees of coercion". Much as Macfarlane's (1983) definition concurs with that of Beloff, he introduces a new variable of military involvement to qualify the use of the word coercion. He defines "intervention as coercive military involvement in civil and regional conflict, involvement of which is intended to, or does, affect internal political outcomes" (Macfarlane, 1983).

Falk (1993) drums home the military argument by stating that intervention relies exclusively on the following: military muscle of the intervening states, restructuring of the politics of the target society and most crucially, it occurs with or without the consent of the target society to the intrusion. He goes ahead to conclude that based on the political situation in a targeted society, interventions can take place with the full complement of the parties to the conflict, be it with the host government or rebel groups. Implicit in the above definitions are two main issues. First is the emphasis on the widely held notion that international intervention must ride on the use of force to achieve its needed outcomes And second, interventions are mostly designed to affect the political authority structures of a target state especially when there are multiple centres of authority as it is always the case in civil wars. Emphasising the point of targeting authority structures, Regan (2010) maintains that when it comes to intervention, what really excites policy makers and practitioners is whether to overthrow the ruling class or support the *status quo ante*.

Falk (1993) took a different track in understanding intervention, focusing primarily on the types of intervention. He identified five types of intervention; namely, unilateral intervention, counter-intervention, collective intervention, regional intervention and universal intervention. Esman and Telhani (1995: 13-14), like Falk (1993) and Vincent (1974), discuss a variety of intervention alternatives available to international organisations in cases of ethnic conflict. According to them, diplomatic pressure, humanitarian relief, peacekeeping operations, fact-finding missions, peace enforcement missions, development interventions and economic sanctions are the possible options available to international interveners. Similar to the first set of definitions, this particular set of definitions places more emphasis on types of

intervention rather than a more robust definition that is analytical and can place the concept in a proper perspective.

However, Finnemore (2004), although admitting that much of the literature on the conceptualisation of intervention was undertaken in the 1960s, maintains that the definitions only serve to support cold war style of interventions where the focus was mainly on changing political authority. She contends that all those earlier definitions were much less useful outside that historical period. To her, so flawed are the earlier definitions that could not capture, for example, interventions that were geared toward debt collection even though all those who were involved in such activities at the time considered their actions as falling under interventions. She argues that interventions lie within the grey area of war and peace; as such instead of observing an event and asking whether it is intervention, she would rather prefer to interrogate the practice at different times and access how its delineation has changed. Even though she succeeded in her arguments with intervention for debt collection, humanitarian, multilateral military intervention and intervention because of threats to international peace and security, the scope within which she considered the threats to international peace and security was limiting. Perhaps, she could have juxtaposed these indicators to the African context to rally home the point, considering that most of these military interventions have taken place on the African soil.

For the purposes of this study, the most apt definition which is useful for the exercise is the one proposed by R. J. Vincent, which apart from the definition identified three types of interventions: namely, economic, military and political. He posits that:

> Intervention is an activity undertaken by a state, a group within a state, a group of states or an international organisation which interferes coercively in the domestic affairs of another state. It is a discrete event having a beginning and an end, and it is aimed at the authority structure of the target state. It is not necessarily lawful or unlawful, but it does break a conventional pattern of international relations. (Vincent 1974:3)

Three issues clearly stand out from the definition. First, is the principle that intervention can be undertaken only by a state, group of states or international organisation. Second, and most important, is the assumption within the definition that

all interventions are separate events that must have a beginning and an end. Third is the assumption that an intervention, even though it may contradict conservative arrangements within the international arena, could be described as legal or illegal. While accepting that interventions must have a beginning and an end, in terms of the activity itself, Walzer (1992) posits that interventions threaten the territorial integrity and the political independence of a legitimate state. But Thomas Jaye disagrees on this score. He argues that intervention does not always threaten the territorial integrity of a legitimate state, but rather, in circumstances where conflict have ravaged the state, intervention could be used as a conflict resolution mechanism to mediate and restore the disagreement between disputants (Jaye, 2003). At the center of all forms of intervention is the issue of legitimacy and sovereignty. Interveners require the formal or informal consent of the parties to the conflict to make any meaningful impact.

In trying to bring some further clarity to the concept, Regan (2011: 456) discusses the conditions of successful third party intervention into ongoing civil war. He suggests that interventions are "International policies that sometimes violate norms, sometimes support the continued oppression of people and sometimes can bring the armed violence to an end and provide peace and security". The problem with this definition is that the use of the word "sometimes" in the definition is not appropriately contextualised in terms of meaning and when its use is appropriate. Carment and James (1996) used game theory to discuss the conditions necessary for third party intervention in civil wars. This discussion highlighted the reason behind state intervention indicating clearly the theoretical arguments around the appropriate time to expect state intervention in civil wars and when such interventions are more likely to be effective. Similarly, in his article on civil war and collective intervention, Max Sesay reiterates that intervention can only be considered as legitimate once it is established that first, it is based on humanitarian grounds; second, it is being undertaken to prevent any form of external aggression that has the propensity to cause international stability and third, where there is an obvious state collapse (Sesay, 1996).

More often than not, intervening powers, as a result of their interest, capabilities and intentions may deliberately impose a "benign solution" on the host country (Jaye, 2003). But as it is in most cases, many varied reasons are espoused as the bases for the illicit and legitimate interference and intervention by both state and non-state actors.

Contrary to widely held view on third party interventions in civil conflict, it is estimated that averagely, external interventions push the expected duration of a civil conflict beyond its natural cycle (Regan, 2002; Regan and Aydin, 2006; Akcinaroglu and Raddziszewski, 2005; Balch-Lindsay and Enterline, 2000). At best, Afghanistan and Iraq have taught us that intervention does not end with the removal of the threat it profess to target but rather it only serves to activate it (Mamdani, 2011). However, there are some exemptions and this could be debatable. The case of the French forces' intervention first, in the political stalemate in Cote d'Ivoire; second, in the terrorist insurgency in Mali and ECOMOG intervention in Sierra Leone in support of ousted president Tejan Kabbah have shown that interventions that support certain target groups within the conflict situation have the tendency to reduce the period under which the conflict lasts.

Besides, Collier, Hoeffler and Soderbom (2004) argue along the same line to the effect that external interventions that support rebel groups can reduce the duration of the civil conflict. However, biased interventions have serious implication for the length of conflict (Mason, Weingarten and Fett, 1999). The circumstance resulting from NATO forces intervention in Libya in March 2011, supposedly in support of the rebel forces during the Libyan civil war (or Revolution) and the corresponding continuous violence in Libya even after the death of Muammur Gaddafi, is a clear example of how biased intervention can complicate growing conflict and prolong the period of the conflict.

Albert (2001) addresses some of the basic issues relating to another kind of intervention captioned "third party interventions" in community conflicts. Third party interventions, according to Lave (1990:260 as cited in Albert 2001:27) takes place "when an outside or semi-outside party self-consciously enters into a conflict situation with the objective of influencing the conflict in a direction the intervener defines as desirable." Albert contends that one of the basic mechanisms for resolving conflict situations is through third party interventions. At the same time, he posits that given the effect of community conflict on the socio-economic environment of the conflict state, third party intervention can either be planned by an individual or an organisation. In his analysis of the role of resources, culture, psychological needs and information managements in community conflict, Albert provides a roadmap of how to evaluate

both internal and external interveners. Additionally, he identifies seven actors who play key roles in third party intervention. They include:

- Government (local, state, federal and foreign);
- Non-governmental Organisation;
- Corporate Organisation;
- Religious Organisation;
- Academic institutions;
- Media houses; and
- Private Citizens.

However, what Albert fails to do with his analysis was to state unequivocally the circumstances under which third parties complement each other to promote durable peace in cases of local communal conflicts. Furthermore, in the process of identifying the key actors in third party intervention, he missed a very important group: traditional authorities. Many reports have documented successful cases of local conflict resolution based on customary/indigenous mechanisms initiated by chiefs, queen mothers, elders and spiritual leaders (Edu-Afful, 2014). And especially in the case of Sierra Leone where chiefdoms play an influential role in the resolution of conflict their absence from the list is a serious oversight.

In the specific case of Africa, Aning, Aubyn, Annan and Edu-Afful (2013) identified two new forms of interventions in contemporary peacekeeping setting on the African continent. The initial being what they described as "western interventionism", one that is pursued by powerful western countries such as the US, France and Britain, and the other more recent phenomenon being the increasing role of regional and sub-regional organisations such as AU, ECOWAS and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in peacekeeping operations (Schmidt and Minter, 2013; Kabia, 2009). Furthermore, they argue that in the case of western interventions, humanitarian motives are espoused as the grounds for these interventions although empirical evidence on the ground suggest that natural resources, regime change and the desire to impose western norms and ideologies push such motives (Everill and Kaplan, 2013).

In the last twenty years, regional organisations such as AU, ECOWAS and SADC have become actors in resolving conflicts and have developed their own peacekeeping capabilities for crisis management on the continent. Yet, the UN Charter, recognising the importance of regional organisations in the maintenance of peace and security has prescribed under Chapter VIII that regional organisations can deal with matters relating to regional maintenance of peace and security provided such organisations and their activities are in tandem with the principle and norms of the UN (U.N. Charter Art. 52, Para. 1., Jaye, 2003). Sometimes referred to as 'the new generation of interventionism', regional organisations focus mainly on saving human lives, protecting property, cantonment, mediation and peace enforcement (Chomsky, 2012). However, Alagappa (1997) contends that the contribution of regional organisations in the resolution of regional conflicts has its own advantages and disadvantages. In his view, much as the utmost interest of intervention may come from the regional organisations because of a number of reasons such as the close proximity of the conflict to its member nations and the shared ethnic affiliation, there is always the possibility that they can also become actors in prolonging the conflict (ibid.). Then again, institutional weakness, coupled with lack of financial resources to engage in such an enterprise and the difficulties associated with dealing with some regional hegemonic powers, impedes the capacity of the regional organisations to function (Ero, 2000; Adebajo 2002; McCandless, 2008). Besides, Ocran (2002) contends that even in this period of increased involvement of regional organisations in peace operations, multilateral interventions on the continent is still shaped by western interest. Ocran's argument could be alluded to considering the fact that many of these regional organisations lack the requisite training, equipment and logistic capability to effectively undertake and sustain such peace operations either alone or as part of a wider multinational mission. Oftentimes they depend on developed nations mostly in the West for support.

This presumed gap has become the entry point for western influence at both the political, strategic and operational levels. The United States, for instance, through its Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program have been training and providing equipment for selected African partner countries and regional institutions for multinational peace support operations. The intention of this program is to develop African capacities in the fight against terrorism and also to prevent and

manage conflict within the continent (Walsingham Group, 2010). Similarly, the European Union (EU) through its Amani Africa–Euro RECAMP initiative supports the AU African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) through capacity building. The intent of this initiative is to "strengthen the politico-strategic capabilities" of APSA with specific attention to the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) of the AU (European Union, 2009).

One aspect of intervention that has generated controversy in the global setting in recent times is the one that is fashioned in the mode of protecting citizens whose rights are constantly being abused by their own governments or armed groups in the context of civil and/or armed conflict. Humanitarian intervention as a term, more often than not, has been used exclusively by relief agencies to describe any major humanitarian action in a complex environment (Welsh, 2006). Classical and Liberal theorists posit that humanitarian intervention is largely driven by the responsibility to protect civilians and to promote democracy. Generally, of all the six major interventions within the past two decades (Iraq in 1992, Somalia in 1992, Afghanistan in 2001, Iraq in 2003, Libya in 2011 and Mali in 2012) humanitarian motives were cited as the reason behind the various interventions (Bellamy and Williams, 2011; Bellamy and Wheeler, 2011; Al Jazeera Center for Studies, 2013). Perhaps, the determination to free the Iraqi people from Saddam Hussein's alleged brutalities, the protection of the Malian people from Tuareg fighters and jihadist groups, the eagerness to alleviate starvation and establish political order in Somalia and the instituting of a no-fly zone to protect civilians in Libya were all instances of military intervention whose primary objective was humanitarian.

Controversial as it might seem, humanitarian intervention, as we have discovered over the years, have gone beyond the actions of relief agencies to incorporate various actions by military forces. According to Cottey (2008), these military actions are defined by three basic characteristics. First, is the interference in the internal matters of a state often without the consent of that state's government; second, is the addition of humanitarian objectives to the intervention in question; and third, is the active use of military might to achieve the said objectives. Whereas all conflict societies have experienced some level of humanitarian intervention, it is clear that the rate of the intervention differs from one conflict situation to the other, and that there is no

universal path to humanitarian intervention. Increasingly, humanitarian intervention has been defined to include a gamut of wide ranging international activities from the distribution of humanitarian assistance to all forms of military interference (Pattison, 2010). According to Wheeler (2000:34), intervention as understood in just war can only count as humanitarian provided it meets four requirements namely:

- There must be a just cause or supreme emergency,
- The use of force must be the last resort,
- It must meet the requirement of proportionality, and
- There must be a high probability that the use of force will achieve a positive humanitarian outcome.

Inasmuch as the duty for saving suffering people have been established as the prerequisite and ethically acceptable premise for intervention, the attitude of states in that regard have been questionable. Although international laws, such as Article 2(4) and 2(7) of the UN Charter and Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act, exist to guide the way and manner in which states interact with other fellow states, especially when it concerns internal matters, consistently, states continue to flout the provisions espoused in the Charter and the Constitutive Act. Howorth (2013) suggests that since the end of the Cold War, there has been at least one intervention almost every single year. Table 2.1 itemises lucidly the number of post-cold war interventions and the intervening authority.

Table 2.1: Post Cold-War Interventions

Year	Host Country	Intervening Authority
1990	Liberia	ECOWAS
1991	Kurdistan	United States-led Allied forces
1992/1993	Somalia	United States
1992/1995	Bosnia	United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)

1994/1995	Haiti	United States
1998/1999	Kosovo	NATO
1999	Sierra Leone	ECOWAS
1999	East Timor	Australia-led International Forces for East Timor (INTERFET)
2001	Afghanistan	United States
2003	Iraq	
2003	Côte d'Ivoire	France
2003	Congo	United Nations
2004	Burundi	
2008	Tchad/Central African Republic	European Union Force (EUFOR)
2010	Côte d'Ivoire	French-led hybrid forces
2011	Libya	
2013	Mali	
2014	Central African Republic	
2014	Iraq and Syria	United States-led Coalition forces

Source: Author's Compilation, 2014.

All these cases of interventions took place either to resolve intra or interstate conflicts. Cottey (2008) reckons that the increasing spate of post-cold war intervention is as a result of 'substantive change in both international norms and state behaviour'. Interventions, whether humanitarian or military, could be considered as unilateral,

bilateral, regional or multilateral. Unilateral in the sense that it is being carried out by a sole intervener without any permission; bilateral because it involves some sort of mutual agreement between the intervener and the host country; regional because it is being carried by a regional group and finally multilateral because it is mostly UN originated and has the full backing of the international community (Hettne and Derbaum, 2000). Ideally, the common hurdle that any intervention must surmount has to do with the issue of legitimacy. Arguably, most multilateral and regional intervention enjoys the support of majority of states as compared to either unilateral or bilateral intervention. The argument is that such interventions undergo rigorous initiation processes at the highest level, that is, either the Security Council (in the case of the UN) or the Committee of Heads of States, in the case of regional and sub-regional organisations. However, the first SMC on Liberia defies the earlier arguments of support for regional interventions. ECOWAS intervention in Liberia drew sharp criticism from some of its own member states (including Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire) and the international community. The basis of their objection and criticism was founded on the issue of sovereignty, legitimacy, neutrality and its capacity to take on the challenge of peace operations (Ero, 2000). But Aning (2000:22) posits that the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia "overcame the overriding international perception of Africa, and especially the sub-region's status as the cradle of afro-pessimism and new nihilism."

Regan and Aydin (2006) concedes that most of the unilateral interventions are either initiated by the major powers of the world or connected to the geopolitics of the cold war. This opens such interventions to all forms of biases and raises the legality question, especially in circumstances where the intervening power is unable to clearly delineate what it seeks to achieve with that intervention. Meanwhile, the process adopted by states to intervene unilaterally differs from those subscribed to by the UN and other regional organisation. While accepting that major powers play vital roles in unilateral interventions, Khosla (1999) and Davis and Moore (1997) reiterate the fact that neighbours are one of the leading sources or originators of interventions in the world. This argument is defeated by ECOWAS intervention in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Even though Sierra Leone and Guinea joined the initial ECOWAS intervention in Liberia they were not the leading sources or originators of the intervention. It was Nigeria and Ghana who were the originators and leading sources of the intervention in

Liberia. Similarly, in the case of Sierra Leone, the main originator was Nigeria which was not a direct neighbor to Sierra Leone.

2.2.2 Who are the interveners and where do they intervene?

Peacekeeping operations are essential to the conflict management aspects of interventions. The underlining reservations in this perception are the assumptions that interventions are marginally only productive when they are structured as a form of conflict management technique to limit the effect/impact of conflict (Regan, 2010). Many at times interventions are initiated and executed in situations where the conflict has attracted the attention of the world as a result of worsening humanitarian conditions and the potential deterioration effect of the conflict to a particular region. As was clearly highlighted by Tony Blair (Former Prime Minister of Britain), Britain's decision to intervene in Sierra Leone was predicated on a "very powerful humanitarian reason" of preventing the senseless amputation of children's limbs and also to prevent the Sierra Leone fledgling democracy from falling in the hands of "a group of murderous thugs and gangsters" (ITV Report, 2012). Similarly, in the case of Mali the French Foreign Minister, Laurent Fabius, stated that the reason behind France's intervention in Mali was to prevent the Islamist militants from advancing any further. The reasoning behind the intervention was quoted in the minister's statements: "We need to stop the terrorists breakthrough; otherwise the whole of Mali will fall into their hands threatening all of Africa, and even Europe" (BBC, 2013). In any case when it comes to the UN Security Council, the five permanent members (P5) of the Security Council would only authorise an intervention when they are convinced that the security situation in a particular country threatens regional or global security and the rights of civilians are unjustly being abused.

Anecdotal evidences available suggest that many of the unilateral global interventions have been undertaken by great and powerful nations such as the United States, Britain, France and Russia who undertake these interventions for varied of reasons. Either they are intervening for humanitarian sake, to protect their citizens, guide their investments and halt a possible rippling effect on their home countries or it is for the general good. For example, the 2014 US intervention in Iraq was to prevent the Islamic State fighters (ISIS) from slaughtering and enslaving the ethnic minority (the Yazidis) and also to

halt the further capturing of cities in Iraq. But is this intervention justified? The answer might lie with the ruthless character of the group that they are engaged with. Possibly, future events would justify whether it was right for the intervention to have taken place or not.

Thus, the argument can be made that when it comes to interventions, regional hegemonic powers and the superpowers of the world are the principal interveners, and that the decision to intervene are mostly strategic in nature. Take for instance, the role played by Nigeria in resolving the conflict in Liberia (August 1990) and Sierra Leone (August 1997) and the role played by South Africa in Burundi (October 2000). The decision of these countries to intervene in those crises was mainly strategic to guide the security interest, protect its citizens, promote trade and development, and to avoid the spillover of those conflicts into their neighbourhood (Boulden, 2013; Adebajo, 2002).

The outcome of any intervention into a civil war is better served when one appreciates an understanding of who is intervening, where the intervention is taking place, and the level of intervention. It can be gleaned from the many examples within the last two decades that unilateral interventions are tied to the geopolitics of the Cold War period and are mostly undertaken by major powers of the West. But in most of these cases, who intervenes in the conflict is a subject that goes beyond the geopolitics of the Cold War, especially in circumstances where the theater of operations is mostly far away from the world greatest powers (Regan, 2010). What the Nigerian and the Southern African examples have demonstrated is that perhaps, other push factors such as social and religious ties, trans-border kin relationships and ethnic/group affinity can motivate such interventions (Carment, James and Taydas, 2006). The debate that has occasioned the goals behind any intervention have been many but varied. Whereas some have argued that the objective behind any intervention is to ensure that the ensuing conflict is immediately brought to an end (Regan, 2000), others are of the view that interveners only seek to extend the duration of the conflict by exploiting the resources of the conflict states (Ross, 2004) or control the outcome of the conflict for their own narrow interests (Gent, 2007).

2.3 Contextualising Peacekeeping

The peacekeeping concept, an off-spring of global peace operations, is designed to provide collective security and manage armed conflict. Over the years, peacekeeping has become central to the functions of the United Nations. Although there exists wide-ranging methods of conflict management globally, progressively, peacekeeping operations remain the most viable option. But ironically, the concept is ill-defined in the UN Charter (Goulding, 1993). Much as peacekeeping as a concept is not mentioned in the United Nations Charter, it was still initiated and developed by the UN. It embodies ways by which countries within the global political structure seek to bring sustainable peace to a troubled region or state (United Nations, 2008; Diehl, 1994; O'Neill, 2002; Fortna, 2004). Several interpretations have been brought to bear on the definition of the concept. While some scholars broadly perceive the term as the deployment of international personnel to help maintain peace and security, others like Gilligan and Sergenti (2007) restrict the concept to an act of containing and terminating hostilities. Better still, others, like Fortna (2008), limit the definition to efforts to prevent the recurrence of conflict once a ceasefire has been agreed. In terms of origin and use, peacekeeping, according to Bellamy, et al (2010) outlines two approaches to the issue of peace operations in global politics: the westphalian and the post-westphalian approaches. The westphalian approach focuses on the key function of peace operations, which is to provide support in the peaceful resolution of disputes between states, whereas the post-westphalian approach goes beyond the issue of maintaining order between states to include topical subjects such as ensuring peace, security, political, institutional and socio-economic reconstruction within states (Bellamy, et al., 2010).

Hitherto, the nature of conflict on the African continent was mostly inter-state (inter-community conflict, ideological conflict and secessionist conflict); but, cumulatively, the changing nature of global geopolitical interest has shifted the nature of conflict from inter-state to intra-state, with countless number of internal armed conflict (Annan, 1998). At the height of the Cold War period, the objective of UN peacekeeping was restricted mainly to the maintenance of ceasefire and the stabilisation of conflict situations with the intention of ultimately using political and peaceful means to address those challenges (Adebajo, 2011).

Post-cold war peacekeeping activities have become the singular most important mechanism in addressing the numerous conflict challenges that confront the quest to attain global peace. The UN has planned and initiated most peacekeeping operations commencing with the UN emergency force in Suez in 1956 to the recently deployed UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in 2013. Several theorists and proponents of peace operations have varied definitions for peacekeeping. While some define peacekeeping to include mainly the interposition of military and police force to ensure the adherence to ceasefire and peace agreements, others describe it fundamentally as the provision of humanitarian assistance (Brown, 1999; Heintze and Zwitter, 2011).

The United Nations, on its own, define peacekeeping in its capstone doctrine as a "technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers" (United Nations, 2008:18). Better still, a definition mooted by the International Peace Academy (1984:7) and cited by Diehl (1988) describes peacekeeping as "the prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or within states through the medium of third-party intervention organised and directed internationally, using multinational military, police and civilian personnel to restore and maintain peace". Inherent in these two definitions is the assumption that peacekeeping is a non-coercive method deliberately planned to bring peace to a troubled region, especially when fighting has seized and parties to the conflict have agreed for third parties to intervene. However, in practice, coercive force can be used in situations where the conflict defies all forms of logical sequence necessary for peacekeeping activities (Adeleke, 1995).

Boutros-Ghali's (1992:11) conceptualisation of peacekeeping provides a solid definition from which the concept is adapted for the study. According to Boutros-Ghali, peacekeeping entails the deployment of United Nations presence and by extension the presence of all other regional and sub-regional organisations, with the consent of the parties to the conflict concerned, normally involving the military, police and civilians. Boutros-Ghali asserts that peacekeeping as an activity that encompasses both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). It is deduced from the above definition that terms such as preventive diplomacy,

peacemaking and peacebuilding are closely interlinked with peacekeeping. As per Boutros-Ghali's disposition on peacekeeping operation, it could be inferred that peacekeeping operation architecture is not a single event but a broad spectrum from the preventive diplomacy phase up till the peacebuilding phase. All these phases, although specific, collectively make-up the peacekeeping operation. For the purposes of this work, peacekeeping operations are understood broadly to mean internationally mandated uniformed [and ununiformed] presence either under UN auspices or under the authority of a regional organisation like ECOWAS, AU or North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

Essentially when it comes to peacekeeping operations, the Charter, which is the legal embodiment of the UN, does not specify the Chapter where such activity should be considered. Neither Chapter VI which addresses "Pacific settlement of Disputes" nor Chapter VII which deals with "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression" captures peacekeeping. This uncertainty led to some scholars in the field refering to peacekeeping as a "Chapter six-and-a-half" activity, meaning it is situated between Chapter VI and Chapter VII (Roberts, 1996: 298). But in practical terms, the Security Council evokes Chapter VI for traditional peacekeeping operations, Chapter VII for peace enforcement missions and Chapter VIII when the assistance of a regional arrangement or agency is needed to maintain international peace and security. Notwithstanding these realities, associating any UN peacekeeping operations with specific chapters within the charter could be ambiguous especially when it comes to the issue of mandate formulation, mission planning and implementation (United Nations, 2008). Basically, three key principles, consent of parties to the conflict, impartiality and non-use of force except in self-defence or in the defence of the mandates, continue to guide the operation of the UN in their quest to maintain international peace and security. Besides, much as UN peacekeeping operations are supposed to be impartial, they are not neutral. If one of the parties to the conflict refuses to go along with the agreed peace process then the UN in certain circumstances could enforce its actions. Nevertheless, anytime the UN compromises on any of these three key principles the pillars of the mission begins to wobble.

In spite of these principles, several reasons may account for the decision of the UN to authorise the commencement of any peacekeeping operations. Notwithstanding the

different motivations that push the UN to initiate peacekeeping operations, the Security Council, over the years, has been consistent with the types of roles assigned to each particular mission. Depending on the mandate initiated by the Security Council, the main roles of peacekeeping missions as identified by United Nations (2008: 22) capstone doctrine include:

- The deployment of military, police and civilians to prevent the outbreak of conflict within countries and across borders;
- Stabilisation of conflict situations after a ceasefire or truce, to create an enabling environment for the parties to the conflict to reach a lasting peace agreement;
- Assist in the implementation of all comprehensive peace agreements (CPA); and
- Guiding states in conflict through a systematically planned conversion to stable government based on the strengthening of democratic ideals such as good governance and economic development.

Many of the peacekeeping proponents have different ways of classifying the types of peacekeeping operations. While some theorists classify peacekeeping into traditional and multidimensional categories (Doyle, Johnstone and Orr, 1997; Doyle and Sambanis, 2000; Thakur and Schnabel, 2001; Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, 2010) others classify them into generational blocs, namely "first generation" "second generation" and "third generation" (Pugh, 2004; Ryan, 2000; Schmidl, 1999). Better still, some other scholars have classified peacekeeping into "robust peacekeeping", "complex peacekeeping operations" "wider peacekeeping" and "integrated peacekeeping" (Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, 2011; Fortna and Howard, 2008; Tardy, 2011).

In the first place, traditional peacekeeping operations are deployed mainly as a provisional measure to assist in creating the conditions necessary for sustainable peace (Diehl, 1993; Goulding, 1993; Bellamy, Williams and Griffin 2010). Conventionally, traditional peacekeeping operations were fashioned in such a way that they were not supposed to participate "fully" in the political efforts geared towards the resolution of the conflict. But the end of the cold war period brought some significant changes within the broader strategic context where activities of peacekeeping operation went

beyond the stabilisation phase and dovetailed into aspects of peacebuilding which is akin to the consolidation phase. The resultant arguments were that at some point the peacekeeping operations will withdraw and their position would be taken over by other long-term missions which are usually spearheaded by either bilateral partners, regional organisations or other UN mandated agencies. The tasks assigned to traditional peacekeeping operations are essentially military in nature and encompasses the following three thematic elements.

- Observation, monitoring and reporting;
- Supervision of cease-fire and support to verification mechanisms; and
- Interposition as a buffer and confidence-building measure.

(United Nations, 2008: 21)

Described sometimes as a "third generation operation", missions that are multi-dimensional in nature have mandates that require them to address key issues of economic reconstruction and institutional transformation (Hegre, Hultman and Nygard, 2010). Structurally, the evolution from traditional to multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation have resulted in a renewed form of collaboration between the military, police and civilians components in addressing the multiple threats that confront a conflict country. In terms of organisation, the multidimensional peacekeeping operation seems better equipped than the traditional operations because of the modes of operations, internal relations, communication and coordination. Furthermore, multidimensional mission coalesce peacekeeping with peacebuilding through a holistic approach of civil-military relations and mission planning. According to the United Nations (2008:26) multidimensional peacekeeping operations undertake the following functions:

- Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants;
- Mine action;
- Security sector reform and other rule of law-related activities;
- Protection and promotion of human rights;
- Electoral assistance;
- Support for the restoration and extension of state authority; and
- Promotion of social and economic recovery and development.

Conceptual ambiguities surround the usage of the words "Peacekeeping operations", "peacekeeping missions" and "Peace support operations". The scope and difficulties associated with resolving complex conflicts throughout the world has generated a number of terms whose usage often creates some conceptual challenges. The use of the term "operation" instead of "mission" is only generic (Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006). Oftentimes operations are associated more with military activities while missions are seen as a combination of diplomatic, civilian and military activities (Zwanenburg, 2005). The varied and confusing connotations that these terms have created in peacekeeping discourse have necessitated the need to place them in proper contexts to avoid any misconception and also for the purposes of consistency and clarity. "Peacekeeping Missions" and "Peace Support Operations" are concepts that are frequently considered as being synonymous with "peacekeeping operations".

Olonisakin (2008) posits that peace support operations involve a number of activities spearheaded at three different fronts, namely diplomatic, civilian and military. In her view, these activities are undertaken to create the enabling environment for self-sustaining peace to be reestablished. However, Zwanenburg (2005) uses peace support operations only to describe military activities. He argues that peace support operations are multifunctional in nature and one which allows the military to safeguard the environment to allow for civilian component of the mission to create a self-sustaining peace. Yet both writers refer to peace support operations widely to cover both peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) model fits into this discussion since it expresses the step-by-step engagement of military and civilian agencies in peace support operations. As shown in Figure 2.1, ISS (1999) contends that PSO should not be seen as a distinctive activity but rather one that involves the participation of different agencies with overlapping roles. In searching for an appropriate exit strategy for PSO operations, the ISS model suggests that the landmarks towards the attainment of the political endstate must be based on the coordination between all the major stakeholders (military and civilian). Regardless of the conceptual distinction, and for the purposes of this work, the three terms peacekeeping operation, peacekeeping missions and peace support operations will be used interchangeably because the terms overlap each other.

Figure 2.1 Hypothetical Peace Support Operation Mission Plan



Source: Institute for Security Studies, 1999.

2.3.1 Hybrid Engagements

Yet another kind of peacekeeping operations that emerged in the early 1990s and attracted considerable attention is hybrid operations. The attention was necessitated by the cooperative activities that emerged in response to the complexity of conflict patterns, security threats and the vast requirements on regional and global organisations. Studies on hybrid operations have focused on anything from force structure, command structure to financing. In an attempt to go beyond the *sui generis* character of the concept, several definitions, labeling and categorisations comes to play. While some writers have focused only on the description of differences, other works have sought to show how the differences reflect in the categorisation of such operations. Aboagye (2007) in his struggle to find an apt definition for the term suggested that any discussion on the definition of hybrid operations must go beyond the dictionary definition to include the 'diagnostic' and 'experiential features' of the term. In his view, any attempt at defining the concept must capture the following considerations.

a) A hybrid operation must be a joint multinational and/or multidisciplinary operation in a specific area of operational responsibility;
b) It must be conducted by forces from different organisations and/or states, each with its own mandate (objectives, missions, tasks, end states and composition);
c) It must be under different Status of Forces or Missions Agreements (SOFA/SOMA) and host nation agreements;
d) It must have different rules of engagements, each under the command and control of its respective mandating authority with each retaining its organisation's identity throughout the operation;
e) Each undertaking different functional missions and tasks but with provision for the coordination of operations, including combat, combat support, combat service support, air support and transport, within that area of operational responsibility; and
f) For the purpose of achieving objectives or end states that may be common or whose achievement will contribute to the management and resolution of the conflict from different political-military perspectives.

(Aboagye, 2007:2)

While accepting that the above considerations are useful in the quest to find a working definition for the term, St-Pierre (2007) narrowly defines hybrid operations as the sharing of peacekeeping and peace enforcement responsibilities under some dissimilar frameworks. Further clarity in the concept is established by those who seek to categorize the terms into different genres. Jones and Cherif's (2004) pioneering work suggested that the non-identical nature of the initial 13 hybrid operations makes it impossible to describe and categorize hybrid operations. Yet they still went ahead to offer two possible sets of classification for the concept. However they caution that the classification confuses rather than clarify it. The first classification was based on the mode of operations (integrated, coordinated, parallel or sequential) (See Table 2.2) while the second classification was based on operational features (short-term military support, civil-military division of labour, linked peacekeeping-observer, handover and integrated hybrid operations) (See Table 2.3).

Table 2.2: Hybrid Operations: Classification One

Based on the Mode of Operations		
Types of Hybrid Frameworks	**Characteristics**	**Examples**
Integrated	UN and non-UN actors operate with single or joined chain of command	• Darfur (UN and AU, NATO, EU)
Coordinated	UN and non-UN actors are coordinated but operate under different chains of command	• Liberia (1993-1997) • Sierra Leone (1998-1999)
Parallel	UN deploys alongside other organisations; no formal coordination	• Afghanistan (UN, NATO, EU) • DRC (UN, EU)
Sequential	UN precedes or follows other forces	• Liberia (ECOMOG, UN) • Sierra Leone (ECOMOG, UK, UN)

Source: Based on Jones and Cherif (2004) Classifications[1]

While some critics such as Aboagye (2007) might have some problems with Jones and Cherif's classification, their analysis appears adequate because of the empirical dimension added to the classification. Sarjoh Bah and Jones (2008), St-Pierre (2008) and Bellamy et al (2012) have all followed the first set of classification by Jones and Cherif (2004), only that Bellamy et al (2012) prefer to refer to hybrid operations as partnership peacekeeping because of its cooperative activities. Even though Jones and Cherif's (2004) distinction is clearly a useful exercise, it also seems evident that the two classifications are not mutually exclusive. It is therefore imperative not to operate a simplistic version of the classification but rather consider all the 'diagnostic' and 'experiential features' underpinning such operations. Considering that these classifications affected the operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone, both Table 2.2 and 2.3 highlights the two possible sets of classification with specific examples.

Table 2.3: Hybrid Operations: Classification Two

Based on Operational Features		
Types of Hybrid Frameworks	**Characteristics**	**Examples**
Short-term military support,	A number of hybrid operations provide enhanced military support to an existing or newly-deploying UN operation, for a limited time period.	• The UK bilateral operation in Sierra Leone that bolstered UNAMSIL when it was under threat in 2000; • The US-supported ECOWAS force in Liberia in 2003, which paved the way for the arrival of UNMIL.
Civil-military division of labour,	The UN provides the civilian and police dimensions of an operation, under single command, while NATO provides the military arm of the operation, under separate (but coordinated) command	UNMIK and UNAMA
Linked peacekeeping-observer	The UN and another operation provide a combination of peacekeeping and observer capacities in separate but coordinated commands.	UNOMIG UNMEE
Handover and integrated hybrid operations	The UN precedes or follows a regional or multi-national force operation.	ECOWAS to UNOMSIL in Sierra Leone in 1998

Source: Based on Jones and Cherif (2004) Classifications

2.3.2 Devising Peacekeeping Operations

Peacekeeping operations within a broader framework of the United Nations are sanctioned by the Security Council under the auspices of the Secretary-General, with the support of United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS) (United Nations, 2008). The Charter has arrogated to the Security Council the most important responsibility of maintaining international peace and security. The responsibilities assigned to any UN-led peacekeeping operation, therefore, are clearly stated in the Security Council's mandate.

Basically, the mandate does not only provide legal and operational bases, but also the specific operational mandate upon which to initiate and maintain any intervention originating from the UN. Embedded in each mandate are the rules of engagement (ROE) and the directives on the Use of Force (DUF) for the purpose of implementing the strategic, tactical and operational parameters identified within the mandate (United Nations, 2008). Beside the persistent tussle to find resources, troops and equipment, peacekeeping missions can be constrained by poorly conceived mandates. Mandates epitomise an important part of the political haggling whose endstate leads to the formation of any peacekeeping mission. Away from its operational utility, mandates have become invaluable aspects of the entire peace process, especially the commitment on the part of the Security Council and regional organisation to seek an end to conflict. Perhaps Durch and England's (2009:4) assessment on mandates best explains the importance of such an instrument. They argue that:

> A regional or UN mandate can be reassuring both to the host state (as a political barrier to unlimited outside interference) and to the provider (as a tool to prevent mission creep or the growth of unrealistic local expectations regarding outside aid). If and when the going gets rough, an international mandate is also a license to canvass for additional international help.

However, over the years, quite debatably, mandates have failed to respond to the changing nature of conflicts, the elements within cease-fire agreements and the current global security environment.

Conventionally, the UN peacekeeping operation is modelled on Chapter VI of the UN Charter although practical evidence available demonstrates that not a single peacekeeping operation has been authorised under Chapter VI. Besides, contemporary peacekeeping missions are mostly deployed based on Chapter VII (where it is essentially volatile and States are unable to maintain security and public order) and Chapter VIII (where the UN solicits the help of regional organisation to the maintenance of international peace and security). Ever since the cold war ended in the 1990's, there has been a rising spike in the numbers of Security Council resolutions passed under Chapter VII. For instance, out of the 37 resolutions adopted in 1990, 27 percent were under Chapter VII, whereas 60.4 per cent and 51 per cent were recorded in 2012 and 2013 respectively (SCPCRB/SCAD/DPA/United Nations January 2014;

Securitycouncilreport.org, 2013). Previously, regional peacekeeping initiatives were uncommon although there were initiatives from the Organisation of American States (OAS) in the Dominican Republic in 1965 and OAU initiative in Chad in 1981(Adeleke, 1995). After a long hiatus, ECOWAS 1990 intervention in Liberia reinforced the role of sub-regional organisation in peacekeeping duties, especially on the African continent (Olonisakin, 1996).

2.4 A New and Emerging Framework for Peace Operations

Since the early 1990s, a new framework to represent the entire scope of peacekeeping operations seems to be emerging after the intervention of ECOMOG in Liberia. In other words, ECOMOG brought about a fundamental shift in the way the UN collaborated with regional organisations in undertaking peacekeeping operations. After the ECOMOG case, there were similar cases in Haiti and East Timor where influential regional organisations and lead nations conducted some initial peace enforcement missions before handing over to a UN peacekeeping operation. Oliver's (2002) model as depicted in Figure 2.2 fits into this study as it expresses the pertinence of peace enforcement to current peacekeeping discourse. What seems to be emerging in recent times with intra-state conflict is that, the regional organisation or lead nation first intervenes, stabilizes the situation and ensures that an operative peace agreement is in place before the UN takes over the mission. A number of reasons may account for this seemingly emerging trend.

First, is the inability of the regional organisation or lead nation(s) to be insouciant while thousands of people are being killed, properties are being destroyed and lots of abuses are being perpetrated against civilians (ECOWAS, Decision A/DEC.1/8/90, 1990). Second, is the inability of the regional or lead institution to wait endlessly while members of the Security Council deliberate and discuss the merits or demerits of any supposed intervention. Former UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar's words from 1988 have a contemporary cogency. He was emphatic that international cooperation was the way to go to overcome the growing global security problems. According to him the "compelling challenge to the community of nations would not respect nor wait upon the disputes and disagreement of nations" (de Cuéllar, 1989). Clearly, his statement was referring to the long drawn out debate usually associated

with the Security Council. Third, is the assumption that oftentimes regional organisations appreciate the issues and understand better the need to engage militarily in such missions rather than the Security Council. The ECOWAS example in Liberia and Sierra Leone demonstrates that regional organisations are more like grass-roots actors who are much closer to local realities (Francis, 2009; Ero, 2000; Sesay 1995).

However, the UN Charter is explicit on who has the prerogative to authorise either the lead country or a regional organisation from undertaking any such engagements. Article 53 of the Charter is emphatic that: "no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorisation of the Security Council" (UN Charter, 1945). However, Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act does not explicitly stipulate that the AU should refer to the UN in the matters of intervention even though it recognises in principle that when it comes to the management of intervention the UN has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Besides, the AU has always sought permission from the UN in all of its interventions. Once the Security Council authorises such peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations, it gives that intervention some level of legitimacy and credibility within which it could operate. However, there have been several instances where regional organisations or lead nations have ignored the Security Council and intervened and later requested the council to regularise their actions *ex post facto*. The examples of ECOMOG in Sierra Leone (1998) and Liberia (1990), NATO in Kosovo (1998) readily comes to mind. In such circumstances the excuse had always been linked to the humanitarian dimension.

Oliver's (2002) arguments best sum up the roles of the UN, regional organisations and lead countries in the peacekeeping operation spectrum as demonstrated in Figure 2.2. According to him, the UN would continue to engage in its conventional "low threat" peacekeeping operations while the enforcement aspects usually under Chapter VII of the Charter would be pursued by a competent regional organisation or a capable lead nation. However, Figure 2.2 raises some pertinent questions when it comes to transitions and exit strategy in the cycle of a peacekeeping operation. The most critical question is identifying the point at which a regional organisation or lead nation achieves the initial stabilisation, what should follow, and at what point UN should come in to allow for regional organisation or the lead nations peacekeepers to exit.

Figure 2.2: A New Model for Peace Operations



Source: Oliver, 2002

2.5 The Meaning of Exit Strategies

The concept of Exit Strategy borrowed from the business field has been a dominant feature in global peace operations following the withdrawal of United States military from Somalia in 1993 (Rose, 1998). The concept has changed from being wholly a business related concept to one that is regularly used in the military arena and most recently applied to humanitarian and development-oriented third party interventions (SFCG, 2005). The United States' interest in exit strategies followed agitations about bringing troops back home early after any international engagements. In the view of most of the Defence Secretaries, National Security Advisors and some Members of Congress, the fundamental principles to every international intervention is that before the United States decides to send troops outside into any foreign country, there must be an arrangement on when and how those troops will return home (Rose, 1998). The definition of exit strategies could be problematic considering that there are several divergent views over how the concept should be defined and approached.

The Merriam Webster Dictionary defines "exit" as an act of leaving a situation, completion etc. Similarly, the Advanced English Dictionary and Thesaurus defines "exit" as an opening that permits escape or release. Likewise the Macmillan Dictionary, on the other hand, defines "exit" as an occasion when someone stops being involved in a situation or activity, or is no longer in a particular position. Caplan (2012) whose work is one of the prominent in this area summed up the most striking definition of exit as a "process of transition". Kofi Annan also provided a useful insight into the definition of the concept. He defined "exit" as a "transition of political authority from international intervener(s) to a legitimate local institution(s)" (UN doc. S/2001/394, 2010). Collectively, the different definitions on "exit" bear some common resemblance of establishing clear objectives of departure, transition and termination.

Besides, when it comes to debating on the closure of a mission or devising a viable exit in peacekeeping operations, the concept of exit strategies as discussed in the United Nations non-paper S/2001/394 is modeled around three premises, namely: successful completion of mandate, partial success or failure. While it might be straightforward to attribute the

formulation of exit strategies to the three key indicators as indicated by the UN document, the process is not that simple. The UN on its own has not been able to map out a framework, doctrine or guidance with respect to devising workable exit strategies. Nonetheless, within the past two decades the United Nations has developed some form of a general strategy for peacekeeping transitions in complex emergencies. The three main elements, as identified by the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) in 2003, include:

- Establishing the conditions for sustainable peace, including security, rule of law, and economic and social reform;
- Coordinating and sustaining the efforts of international organisations and donor states; and
- Developing objectives and results-oriented measures of progress to manage the peace operation and make troop withdrawal decisions.

(GAO, 2003:7)

Although these elements overlap at certain points they do not automatically represent a linear sequence. The argument is that exit strategies are not a single event or occurrence in itself, but one that must be understood in the context as a process of transition (Caplan, 2012). In defining what constitutes transition, Richard Caplan posits that transition could be in many varied forms such as one primary operation metamorphosing into another kind of operation or one kind of mission (for example enforcement mission) changing to another kind of mission (multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation). He further argues that while exit strategies may lead to a withdrawal of some sort of international actors or interveners, it does not necessarily mark the end of the international intervention. Peace operations normally involve multiple but differentiated actors -such as the military, police and civilians - and their functions are equally different. Understandably, some of these actors exit earlier than others. The seminal case of ECOMOG missions in Liberia (ECOMIL) and Sierra Leone (ECOMOG) changing into UNMIL and UNAMSIL with some key actors exiting from those countries presents a good reference point. Caplan, therefore, defines exit strategies as "a plan for disengaging and ultimately withdrawing

from a state, ideally having attained the goals that inspired international involvement originally". Caplan's analysis underscores the fact that even in an event of a formal end to an operation, parties to the peacekeeping or humanitarian mission may continue to be engaged in other state building activities. Therefore to think of exit as merely a plan to "disengage" or "ultimately withdraw" without recourse to what the peacekeeping operation is disengaging or withdrawing from raises questions.

Durch (2012) does not necessarily share Caplan's view that exit strategy does not mark an end to international intervention. In his analysis, he likens exit strategy to exiting from a party. According to Durch, exit strategy is an arrangement for pulling together the means to arrive at goals whose achievement is essential to departing from a theater of operations, considering certain key constraining limitations. Inherent in this definition is the argument that before a peacekeeping mission exits from a mission area, first, there is the need to elicit the support from all stakeholders and secondly, there is the need to "locate and pay compliments" to the host country (Durch, 2012).

Rose (1998), one of the ardent critics of exit strategies, maintains that the current overwhelming interest in exit strategies is as a result of the political beliefs of post-cold war foreign policy which is modeled on the principles of setting timeframes for foreign adventures. Rose asserts that the mere existence of exit strategies in missions presents a potential threat that is capable of damaging the likelihood of a mission to achieve success. He further argues that instead of being fixated with the phenomenon of exit, the most important connection should be why we enter a country in the first place and not how we get out (Rose 1998:57). Subsequently, on how international interventions can be closed smoothly, Rose advocates for some sort of arrangement whereby a secured order is left behind once the mission closes (ibid.). This argument in a way compliments that of Caplan. Additionally, on the issue of demanding exit strategies on all missions, Rose suggests plausible options that are based on discarding exit strategy in support for what he calls transition strategies.

Similarly, in the view of Record (2001), formulating exit strategy for peace operations could be very deceptive. Record maintains that the arguments around the issue of exit strategy are ideologically based rather than being premised on reason. He opines that it is idealistic for anyone or institution to anticipate a comprehensible trajectory to an exit right from the launch of any peace operations. He argues further that an exit strategy must be accompanied by a political objective. His assumption is that exit strategy must be backed by the formulation of a desired political end-state. To him, even in an event of an unlikely formulation of such strategies, the situation on the ground coupled with long periods of intervention may alter the parameters of the exit. Eventually, for such parameters to be achieved there might be the need to involve all stakeholders and parties to the peace operations in reprioritising the pointers for the exit (Record, 2001). Some of these pointers could include successful creation of legitimate political institutions, return or resettlement and reintegration of displaced persons, successful SSR, holding of free and fair elections and the restoration of state authority.

Most of the publications on peacekeeping operations are deficient in addressing the issue of exit strategy. A conceptual void exists as to what should genuinely constitute the definition of exit strategy in peace operations. Regardless, of the definition that one subscribes to, it could be claimed that from the discussion on the meaning of exit strategy above, it has become apparent that the closure of any mission, be it an ECOWAS or a UN operation, does not automatically mean an end or conclusion to that particular mission. However, there could be a successive or a follow-up mission with a different mandate. This raises a topical question in the study area as to what accounts or accounted for ECOMOG and the UN mission exit in the cases of Liberia and Sierra Leone.

2.5.1 Mechanisms and approaches to exit

Wilde (2009) outlines two normative frameworks concerning exit strategies in peace operations: the trusteeship framework and the self-determination framework. The trusteeship framework focuses on the premise that international intervention could only be withdrawn or halted provided the local capacity to govern has reached a certain capability. This kind of argument is mostly associated with contemporary liberal state building

theorists. On the other hand, the self-determination framework lays particular emphasis on the right of the local people to govern themselves irrespective of the challenges on the ground. This framework posits that any unsolicited form of international intervention is illegal and that steps must be taken to ensure immediate exit. Feldman (2004) and Caplan (2012) draw on the notion that the formulation of exit strategies is most likely to be sandwiched between the two frameworks: the trusteeship framework whose ground rules hinge on establishing benchmarks and the self-determination framework that is focused solely on eliciting consent from the local people on the presence of international interveners

As already stated, depending on the institution or country in question, there are several approaches or mechanisms to the issue of exit strategies. In reference to peace operations processes, a variety of options are available for international organisations and local governments. Caplan (2012:9-11) identifies five main approaches and mechanisms that governments and international organisations involved in statebuilding adapt to exiting from peace operations, namely:

- Cut and Run;
- Phased withdrawal;
- Deadlines;
- Benchmarking;
- Elections; and
- Successor operations.

The listed approaches and mechanism of exit strategies are reviewed based on the scholarly works of Caplan (2012) and other writers in the field and adapted to suit the relevance of this work.

First, the cut-and-run approach is based on the success of the mission. When a mission fails to achieve its targets as set out in the mission's mandate and its sustained activities remain very expensive, the other viable alternative available is for it to review its

engagements and reduce drastically or withdraw entirely from the peacekeeping operations (Caplan, 2012; Alter, Shoemaker, Tuan and Emerson, 2001). However, this approach is often viewed in the negative light as it is seen as escaping from the peacekeeping environment when the operation becomes challenging. It could be said that in the case of ECOMOG in Liberia, countries that initially objected to the intervention, such as Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal, called for this kind of approach after there were heavy losses and ECOMOG's role in resolving the conflict was highly questioned.

The second, which is the phased withdrawal approach, is premised on the phenomenon of gradual withdrawal from a peacekeeping operation following the achievements of partial results (Caplan, 2006). The UN, Britain, France and the United States have been very successful in implementing this approach in a number of missions, including the UN mission in Eastern Slovenia (1996-1998), Operation Palliser (2000) involving the British forces in Sierra Leone, Operation UNICORN and Operation Serval involving the French forces in Côte d'Ivoire (2002-2011) and Mali (2012-date) respectively. In all these situations, there were some partial withdrawal and the transfer of responsibilities to some other established actor, in this case, the government of Croatia, ECOMOG and the UN respectively.

The deadline approach focuses on establishing a fixed time limit or a closing date for peacekeeping operations (Stambaugh, 2001; Lake 1996). The assumption is that the deadline approach provides an unconditional conclusion of contact between the parties in the peace operations (usually the parties to the conflict and the intervening third party). Normally, as part of the initial planning for the intervention, this approach originates either from the formulation of peace agreements or the drafting of the UN Security Council resolutions. Besides, this kind of approach has both positive and negative, intended and unintended consequences. The deadline approach could be overly dangerous and unpredictable as it provides room for "spoilers" to "gatecrash" the peace and secured environment that a peacekeeping mission presents to a post conflict country (Rose, 1998; Caplan, 2012,). Alternatively, this time limit helps mission planners to forecast as well as engender buy-in from all the major stakeholders in the peacekeeping enterprise (Ibid.).

The fourth is the benchmarking approach which appears to be one of the fundamentals of exit strategies that is increasingly being espoused as a measure for achieving mission exit. Benchmarks have been used by international interveners to establish the modalities for entrusting the security of a post-conflict country to national actors (ibid.). The approach entails establishing a point of reference whereby programmes and projects in mission areas are pegged against certain outputs, impacts or outcomes. Consequently, when these are achieved, then the success merits a withdrawal from a mission area (Caplan, 2012:10). For instance, in the case of Sierra Leone the benchmark could include the recruitment and training of X number of female police officers to assume security responsibilities or training Y number of justices in the justice sector to oversee the reformation and restructuring of that sector. The Sierra Leonean police as part of satisfying the benchmarks for exit introduced the gender mainstreaming policy termed the Accelerated Promotion Scheme (APS) to encourage more graduate women to join the police service to occupy high ranking positions (Edu-Afful, 2013). The scheme was in response to satisfying the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security which called for the representation of women at all levels of decision-making within the security sector.

The election approach, which is the fifth, has been used as a standard by the UN Security Council over the past two decades in its mandate formulation to provide the path in consolidating peace processes in post conflict countries. The holding of successful elections have often been used as a prerequisite for transition or in many cases regarded as an appropriate exit point in peace operations. A cursory evaluation of peace operations between the periods 1990 to 2012 reveals that nearly ten of such operations inherently had in their mandate the holding of successful elections as a point of exiting or withdrawing from such peace operations. Table 2.4 below shows missions where the holding of successful elections was set as the standard for downsizing, exit or withdrawal.

Table 2.4: Missions with Elections as Index for Withdrawal

Serial Number	Name of Operations	Year established
1	The United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II)	1991
2	The United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL)	1991
3	The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)	1992
4	The United nations operations in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)	1992
5	The United Nations Observer Mission In Liberia (UNOMIL)	1993
6	The United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH)	1993
7	The United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR)	1993
8	The United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT)	1994
9	The United Nations mission in Sudan (UNMIS)	2005
10	The United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire	2005

Source: www.un.org/Depts/dpko/index.asp, accessed 18 March 2013.

However, the disadvantage associated with this approach is based on the reality that holding successful election is not the panacea for peace consolidation. Events that followed the closure of the mission in Liberia, Angola and Cambodia exposed the gaps within this line of thinking that elections form the ultimate pinnacle or the last resort to engendering peace.

The sixth and final approach, referred to as successor operations, operates on the principle of exit being a transitional process rather than a single event, and as such, recommends a follow-on provision that would ensure that peace and security is secured. National, regional and sub- regional organisations, such as the AU and ECOWAS, have been identified as potential actors who are in a very good position to absorb such follow-on arrangements and push the agenda for the consolidation of peace and security. A current example is France's intervention (operation Serval) in Mali, whereby a follow-on arrangement allowed an African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) to assume the responsibility of protecting Mali against Islamic rebels. Subsequently, AFISMA has been succeeded by MINUSMA.

The Search for Common Ground (SFCG), an international organisation committed to conflict and peacebuilding issues globally, on their part, identified four common approaches to exit strategies namely success, deadlines, sustainability and funding (SFCG, 2005).The deadline approach similar to what Caplan has already discussed, focuses on assigning timelines or specific limits to specific peace projects. The success approach on the other hand is tied to accomplishing a specific programme. Here the success of such a programme is enough to merit a withdrawal or termination of a mission. For instance, the completion of programmes or projects like DDR, SSR or quick impact projects (QIP) could elicit a withdrawal or immediate termination of the mission. The funding approach thrives on allocating a lump sum of money to a particular programme; once the fund is exhausted a withdrawal or termination is initiated. The final approach sustainability, is closely linked to the capacity of the locals to exhibit the skills required to be self-sufficient. Once it is established that the locals have exhibited the much needed skills, the agency could consider leaving (SFCG, 2005). If you juxtapose this to peacekeeping operations, once a sizeable number of people have been trained to occupy various institutions of state and they in addition exhibit the skill showing their competence then the mission could contemplate leaving.

2.6 Re-hatting

Chapter Eight of the United Nations Charter, specifically, Article 52, recognises the importance of regional bodies in the maintenance of global peace and security. But the reality has been that the UN on its own is unable to cope with the increasing demand of peacekeeping forces globally. To cover this gap, regional bodies have been roped-in to offer the rapid services that the UN is unable to marshal at a short notice. Sometimes seen as a sequential or transition operation, the re-hatting process goes beyond the symbolic swapping of hats to include the change of responsibilities, mandate and direction in mission environment. For the purpose of this work, re-hatting is conceptualised as a total transfer of responsibilities from a regional or multinational peacekeeping force to a UN mandated peacekeeping force (Appiah-Mensah, 2006; Murithi, 2008). Once troops are re-hatted, the previous mission ceases to be in existence and its activities are terminated. Many at times, re-hatted forces are co-opted into the new UN mission but under different leadership command and direction. Although re-hatting is a common phenomenon with most peacekeeping deployment in Africa, and rightly so, because of the numerous conflicts on the African continent, peacekeeping missions in other countries such as Haiti and East Timor have equally experienced the re-hatting of troops. Within the past decade, there have been several examples in which regional or multinational force deploy into a conflict area prior to the eventual takeover by UN mandated mission. Key among these examples include ECOMOG to UNMIL in Liberia (October 2003), ECOMOG to UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone (October 1999), ECOMICI to UNOCI in Cote d'Ivoire (April 2004), AFISMA to MINUSMA in Mali (July 2013) and AMIB to ONUB in Burundi (May 2004).

Basically, re-hatting does not follow any standard template or laid down procedures. However, it is dependent on the complexities of the conflict in question, the exigencies at UN headquarters in New York, the capabilities and strength of the earlier regional or multinational mission and the forces being transitioned (Obi, 2013). The UN contends that the basic principle underpinning any re-hatting process is to "sustain a level of capability while transferring operational responsibility from one force to another, and to ensure continuity of operations" (United Nations, 2005) Yet the examples of ECOMOG to

UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone and ECOMOG to UNMIL in Liberia have shown that normally the principle behind such re-hatting processes cannot be harmonised by the capacity to generate the required capability. Oftentimes the issue has to do with the strict timelines associated with the transition process.

2.6.1 Challenges with Re-hatting

Quite a number of expected challenges do emerge with this kind of transition from one mission to the other. The first has to do with duality of mandates and rules of engagements (United Nations, 2005). The capacity of the original forces to shuttle between the initial mandate given by the regional body and that which is mandated later by the UN is the most difficult in the process. In the Sierra Leone case for instance, the ECOMOG troops had to shift from a regional mandate that was more of peace enforcement to a UNAMSIL mandate that operated at the time under Chapter VI where the use of force other than for self-defence was not allowed.

Second, has to do with command and control of forces. There are no common doctrinal guidelines to resolve the challenges related to command and control (Kabia, 2009). Countries that have more troops in the re-hatted operations are often reluctant to cede the command of such operations to a country contributing fewer troops. The friction that this situation normally generates is the lack of cooperation between the command structures. The "Jetley saga"[2] in Sierra Leone for instance caused the Nigerian Chief of Army Staff General Victor Malu to order for the immediate replacement of the Indian Force Commander Major General Vijay Kumar Jetlay or Nigerian troops would not cooperate with him. In a more recent mission, the appointment of Major General Jean Bosco Kazura of Rwanda as the new Force Commander of MINUSMA, sidelining Nigeria's Major General Shehu Adbulkadir who was the Force commander of AFISMA generated some disagreements which led to the withdrawal of Nigerian troops from MINUSMA.[3] The argument was that Nigeria was contributing more troops and more equipment and so deserves more recognition respect in terms of appointments.[4]

Third, has to do with the lack of equivalency or level of achievement set for both forces in the peacekeeping transition (United Nations, 2005). Usually the objectives set for the original force may be different from that which was set for the successive force and so one would realise that they are not planned and resourced in such a way to meet the all the obligations in the successive mission. The cases of different mandate and rules of engagement with ECOMIL and UNMIL in Liberian and ECOMOG and UNAMSIL IN Sierra Leone readily fit the bill. There is also the important issue of capacity gaps with most regional troops to take on UN missions, preparedness to be part of the UN mission and also inability to plan jointly for both the initial and successive mission. Irrespective of the challenges associated with the re-hatting process, the point is made that the contribution of the initial mission towards the long term success of the whole peacekeeping operations cannot be underestimated.

2.7 Summary of Existing Gaps in Literature

Several gaps in the literature on peacekeeping exit strategy were identified during the literature review exercise. Based on the literature reviewed, some deductions can be made with respect to the gaping hole in exit strategies of both peacekeeping operations initiated by the United Nations and regional organisations. Besides, a number of reasons may account for this seeming unavoidable gap. Key among the reasons could be the lack of interest in the past to focus on exit strategy while there were more pressing issues of state building and sustaining peace (Caplan, 2012). The discussion on exit strategies in peacekeeping operations is still in its nascent phase with several disagreements on how it should be defined and executed (Durch, 2012). In spite of the growing body of knowledge in this area, the arguments for and against the staging of exit strategy have not developed well enough to cover all the salient angles of peacekeeping operations. The concerns by donor countries on the rising cost of peacekeeping and the seeming apathy of some P/TCC to continue contributing peacekeepers to endless missions requires an in-depth analysis of the issues.

While existing literature routinely advanced our theoretical and empirical knowledge of interventions and transitions, methodologically they do not identify causal mechanisms

between the kind of intervention and exit strategies. Although most of the literature on peacekeeping exit strategies talks about setting benchmarks and indicators as a prerequisite for handing-over and withdrawing, the manner in which the process is to be approached is explicitly missing. Practically there is no clear guidance on the prioritisation and sequencing of exit activities (Caplan, 2006). Besides, most of these benchmarks, such as the holding of successful elections, ultimately, have been exposed as not being able to bring about sustainable peace in the long-term. Perhaps, the spotlight should be placed on planning, but what goes into the planning process remains the greatest challenge that this thesis intends to examine.

It is evident that there is a shortfall in the understanding of the appropriate evaluation procedures that can be used to plan, monitor and assess the effectiveness of a successful exit strategy in peacekeeping operations. If the current normative framework of consolidating peace after the exit is anything to go by, then there is the need to carefully understanding exit strategies in peacekeeping operations in particular and the roles performed by all the major actors in the entire intervention chain. Such consideration will help in the determination of the institutional capacity needed to manage and implement successful exit strategies in future peace operations.

Considering that a greater number of global peacekeeping operations have taken place on the African continent, discussions of peacekeeping exit strategy would naturally be dominated by examples from Africa. However, this is not the case. Literature on peacekeeping exit strategies is dominated by isolated case studies from the global north with very little focus on the global south (Caplan, 2009). Analysis of exit strategy on African countries seems to be particularly lacking. The lack of scholarly research on exit strategies particularly those involving regional bodies such as the AU and ECOWAS, and global bodies such as the UN, has exposed their inefficiencies in staging a successful exit from peacekeeping operations. There is also scanty information on how both the UN and RECs should manage their exit from peace operations in relation to the likely impact on the host country. Additionally, the literature is silent on how to harmonise the exit approaches adopted by RECs and the UN. Indeed more clarity is needed on the overlaps and inconsistencies between exit strategy as a concept and how it fits into the state-

building processes. None of the material of exit strategy reviewed mentioned the impact of exit strategy on gender (Pugh, 2012). The discussions on impact of exit strategies on the host community were all lumped together. There is the need to disaggregate the effect and consequences since both men and women interact differently with the mission. Despite the emphasis on ensuring local ownership in the discussion of exit strategy, very little is written about how to practically do this. This thesis will attempt to fill the following gaps with the empirical cases of Liberia and Sierra Leone.

2.8 Theoretical Framework

A theoretical framework provides a focal point within which the unknown can be evaluated. Additionally, it serves as a guide for research, shaping what would be measured and the relationship between the various variables. The theoretical argument in support of this study is built primarily by combining deductions from three theoretical perspectives. The theory and framework of analysis below represent the three major pillars for this study.

- Ripeness Theory – to interrogate the right moment within which a peacekeeping mission could be brought to an end;
- Liberal Peace Theory – to evaluate the 'wisdom' behind pursuing democratisation, economic development, freedoms and human rights as the most important prerequisite to justify the staging of an exit in peace operation; and
- Clausewitzean Framework of Analysis – to evaluate how exit from all major interventions globally are pursued.

2.8.1 Ripeness Theory

What kind of discussion is generated when we say a peacekeeping operation is ripe for an exit, or that the right time has come to start downsizing or drawing down a peacekeeping operation in a conflict environment? Why should a specific period be considered as the right period within which a mission could exit and what makes that period the best time?

Is "ripeness" a value neutral concept? In this case one is not hypothesising about the ripeness of a natural phenomenon say the ripeness of a fruit but rather human attitude and behaviors. Besides the factors that would make a fruit ripe are constant but that of human behavior can change. So who determines ripeness in this case? Is it the mission officials on the field? Or mission personnel who are benefitting immensely from the operation, or the political decision-makers at the strategic level who might be functioning in Africa yet responding to queries from the developed world? These are some of the critical questions that stimulate our desire to understand "ripeness" within the broader framework of peacekeeping exit strategies. This study adopts the Ripeness Theory as a framework of analysis for assessing the formulation and implementation of exit strategies in ECOWAS and UN peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone and Liberia. The greatest strength of this theory is the regulatory structure that it provides policy makers who desire to identify when and how to begin a peace process (Zartman, 2000). The argument made by proponents of this theory rests on the basic assumption that conflict has to be ripe before it can be viable for a resolution (Zartman and Council on Foreign Relations, 1989; Stedman, 1991; Haass, 1990). Consequently, Kleiboer (1994) contends that a ripe moment is created when a 'mutual hurting stalemate' exists as a result of an 'impending catastrophe' which in his words could be either a state of deadlock or deadline. However, identifying the ripe moment in any conflict is not that simple and does not necessarily follow a linear process (ibid.). According to Haass 1990, (as cited in Kleiboer 1994:110) a conflict is ripe when it meets the following four requirements.

- A shared perception of the desirability of a compromise;
- The ability of political leaders to agree to a desirable accord;
- Agreements must be based on sufficiently rich compromise; and
- Disputants must agree on an acceptable procedure to further deal with the conflict.

Situating these requirements within a peacekeeping exit, it becomes clear that before any mission decides to exit from the operating environment there must be some level of cooperation between the mission and the host country with regards to the exit process.

Ideally, the leadership of both the peacekeeping mission and the local political establishment must agree on a common course of action to limit the effect that the withdrawal is likely to create.

Meanwhile, Zartman (2000) argues that the answer to successful conflict resolution falls within the timing of efforts for resolution. Although the Ripeness Theory, over the years, have been applied by policy makers in international mediation and negotiation to determine the right moment, or better still the ripe moment to intervene in conflict, the theory, according to Stover (2002), seeks to identify the timing by highlighting the detailed initiatives needed to guide a successful peace negotiating in post-conflict environments. Zartman (2000) asserts that, there are three main elements of ripeness: a mutually hurting stalemate; an impending, recently experienced, or recently avoided catastrophe; and an alternative way out. A hurting stalemate is basically an agonizing deadlock, whereas an imminent catastrophe is similar to deadline which parties to the conflict are scared of missing for fear of the situation getting worse (ibid.).

Kleiboer (1994:110) refers to the ripeness of a conflict as "a particular moment in the course of a dispute when circumstances are most conducive to conflict management by an outside actor". Similarly, Haass (1990), in defining ripeness, compartmentalises the concept into time pressure, appropriate power relations, a way out and a reasonable process, whereas Stover (2002) conceptualises ripeness as a function of internal political changes. Building on this premise, Stover identified indicators for ripeness in a peacekeeping environment. In his view, these indicators include the sustainability of the peace process between all belligerents, the arrangement that documents the cooperation between the UN and all actors, the true level of cooperation between all actors (both national and local) and the immediate environment within which the peacekeeping mission operates.

Zartman (2000:227-232) asserts that there are five propositions to the issue of ripeness of conflict:

- Ripeness is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the initiation of negotiations, bilateral or mediated;
- If the (two) parties to a conflict (a) perceive themselves to be in a hurting stalemate and (b) perceive the possibility of a negotiated solution;
- A mutual hurting stalemate (MHS) contains objective and subjective elements, of which only the latter are necessary and sufficient to its existence;
- If the parties' subjective expressions of pain, impasse, and inability to bear the costs of further escalation, related to objective evidence of stalemate, data on numbers and nature of casualties and material costs, and/or other such indicators of an MHS can be found, along with expressions of a sense of a way out, ripeness exists; and
- (a) Once ripeness has been established, specific tactics by mediators can seize the ripe moment and turn it into negotiations; (b) If only objective elements of ripeness exist, specific tactics by mediators can bring the conflicting parties to feel/understand the pain of their mutual stalemate and turn to negotiations.

Embedded in these propositions are the strength and boundaries within which the significance and implication of ripeness can be stretched. The author contends that ripeness is only a situation which is either not 'self-fulfilling' or 'self-implementing'. In other words, ripeness is dependent on the parties to the conflict identifying the right moment for resolution. This is mainly influenced and directed by the mediator. Nonetheless, the reality is that not all mediation take off at the right moment. One key advantage of the Ripeness theory is its ability to extrapolate when the ripe moment will emerge in a given conflict situation. Additionally, it has the ability to identify all the necessary elements needed for negotiation to commence.

In his critique of the ripeness theory, Pruitt (1997) identified four key challenges in the approach of the theory. According to him, ripeness theory places so much emphasis on how to enter into negotiations neglecting all other essential elements such as making deep concession and taking significant risk. Secondly, Ripeness is seen as a static condition instead of it being viewed as changeable and unfixed. Once ripeness is viewed as

changeable and unfixed, it allows for some concession, assumptions and risks which eventually can result in a definite agreement. Again, the theory is very rigid and does not provide enough elasticity to help analyse separately the intentions and sensitivities of each contending party. Finally, according to Pruitt, ripeness theory is deficient especially when it comes to differentiating between the different categories of antecedents.

Priutt's work notwithstanding, the concept can be applicable and useful as an explanation for the successful initiation of an exit strategy in peacekeeping. Consequently, this work adapts ripeness theory based on its appropriateness in identifying the 'ripe' moment or the 'right' moment by which a peacekeeping operation can exit from an operational theater or a post-conflict country without exposing all the gains made in bringing sustainable peace to such countries. Sustainable peace in peacekeeping operations is crucial in preventing the post-conflict country from relapsing into conflict. Under-Secretary-General of the UN, Marrack Goulding, in 1997 suggested that not all peacekeeping operations, be it regional or global, are 'ripe' for an exit at the time they normally do. In general terms, the ripeness arguments seem to have considerably predicted the failure of ECOMOG's first exit strategy in Liberia which was based on the basic assumption that just holding democratic elections was good enough reason to pull out from the country. The responsibility of exiting lies with the planners of the mission to be selective and recommend exit only in situations where the mission has achieved its mandate of leaving behind sustainable peace. This cannot merely be based on benchmarks or deadlines, but it must be based on verifiable indicators necessary for sustainable peace such as strengthening the capacity of 'locals' and institutions of state to manage appropriately the effect of the exit.

2.8.2 Liberal Peace Theory

By far, the most dominant theory underpinning the whole peacekeeping and peacebuilding project is the liberal peace theory. This is so because leading states, international organisations such as the UN and its agencies, World bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) use Liberalism as the standard to justify their intervention in troubled states (Duffield, 2007). At the end of the Cold War, the sense of triumphalism that dominated

and shaped the discourse surrounding sustainable peace in fragile, transitional, conflict and post-conflict states and societies was the newfound interest in Liberalism. Besides, this renewed interest in Liberalism was based on the assumption that democracy, rule of law and market economies was what was needed to help establish sustainable peace in transitional and post-conflict countries. Moreso, globally the thinking around international interventions had gradually shifted from traditional peacekeeping to multidimensional peacekeeping, where the principles that encapsulate Liberalism are well embedded in multidimensional peacekeeping. By and large, peacekeeping operations have consistently tried to build a stable society in most of the countries to which they deploy by promoting principles such as democratic elections, respect of civil and political rights, liberal free market economies and constitutional control of government power (Parris, 2004).

However, Mac Ginty (2006:3-4) while critiquing the liberal peace project as implemented now stated that "peace" in recent times have been pursued as a "technocratic exercise of ticking boxes, counting heads and weapons, amending constitutions, and reconstructing housing units, while the more thorny affective and perceptual issues of reconciliation, exclusion and the restoration of dignity are left unaddressed". Apart from Mac Ginty's criticism, several critics have also raised other issues such as the inability of the liberal peace project to generate local ownership. The reasons assigned for this failure is indicative of the gap between the international objectives of peacekeeping and peacebuilding and the local circumstances that exist to ensure its realisation (Chesterman, 2004). Besides, some other critics have raised the issue of liberal peace being too "security-centric" focusing on order and security at the expense of liberation and offering power to people who are prepared to use the threats of force (Pugh, Cooper and Turner 2008; Barbara, 2008). Others are of the view that the theory promotes neoliberal economic principles with little or no focus on the implication of social cost (Duffield, 2007; Dillion and Reid 2009). Still, other critics have referred to the theory as too eurocentric and elitist with little emphasis on local expectation and local cultural preferences (Mac Ginty, 2010; Taylor, 2009).

Bellamy, et al (2010) in deconstructing the 'real' meaning of liberal peace as applied to peace operations categorised state complicity in the peace process into two levels: inter-

state and intra-state levels. They argue that at the interstate level, democratic states do not necessarily fight or 'wage war' against a fellow democratic state. In other words, democratic states do not fight each other. Their argument is basically premised on two salient points. First, democratic systems through its institutional mechanisms -legislature and the judiciary- regulate the actions of decision-makers to arbitrarily commit a democratic state to an unwarranted war (Doyle, 2011). As it has emerged in most circumstances, the actions of these democratic states are subject to the norms and values of the many international institutions of which most of these democratic countries are members and have also, in a way, ceded a portion of their sovereignty to. The second assumption to support the liberal peace arguments is the assertion that once states highly uphold the legitimacy of other states, the desire to attack a fellow democratic state is inherently removed.

Likewise, at the intra-state level, Bellamy, et al (2010) further argue that Liberal democracies are the less fancied to degenerate into either conflict or lawlessness. This is mainly because democracy inhibits the possibility of overthrowing an established order as well as reduces drastically the prospects of a democratic state ending-up in civil war. Invoking the work of classical liberal peace theorist like John Locke and Adam Smith, it would not be out of place to suggest that supporting liberal forms of government (based on the conduct of democratic elections, respect of civil and political rights, liberal free market economies and constitutional control of government power) may be a prerequisite for exiting a mission since that is a sign of some semblance of sustainable peace. But this is very misleading as the empirical case of holding quick elections and implementing economic reforms in both Liberia and Sierra Leone exposed the inefficiencies of that supposed peace. In the case of Liberia, immediately Charles Taylor, was sworn-in he began dismantling the very democratic framework that brought him into power with little or no opposition from the weak institutions of state, thereby activating a new round of fighting. The failure could be explained by the fixation of western powers on the holding of quick elections and the rapid reforms of state institutions. That is to say that the interventions failed to address properly the root causes and the 'drivers' of the conflict. Because the state of Liberia was still weak at the time it provided the space for the government of Charles Taylor to use their newly acquired authority to cause havoc. The

success of liberal peace theory within the framework of ECOWAS and the UN interventions is seriously limited because in most cases the basic assumptions needed to implement the liberal peace theory is virtually non-existent.

The overbearing emphasis on the holding of elections as a prerequisite for exiting from a mission has generated a lot of apprehension and debate from states within the global south who perceive democracy as a ploy to indoctrinate post-conflict countries with a 'foreign' ideology of western style governance. Also, the open-ended timeframe for peacebuilding purposes as espoused by liberal theorist defeats the idea of working towards an early exit in missions. Besides, the export of liberal peace frameworks such as 'good governance', democratic elections, human rights, rule of law, a vibrant civil society and market relations (Richmond, 2008) will not automatically guarantee the path to exiting from a peacekeeping mission. Using the inadequacies of past missions as a yardstick in his discussion of the transition from war to peace, Paris (2004:188) proffer these salient suggestions: "Wait until conditions are ripe for elections; design electoral systems that reward moderation; promote good civil society; control hate speech; adopt conflict-reducing economic policies; the common denominator: rebuild effective state institutions". In any case, unless the moment is ripe for peacekeeping operation to exit, the search for an agreed outcome which is sustainable peace cannot be achieved.

2.8.3 The Clausewitzean Framework

The Clausewitzean framework of analysis is widely used by the global powers of the West to evaluate their exit from all major interventions. From the Clausewitz standpoint, the endgame is first and foremost a political activity. Exponents of this framework consider "end-condition' as the most important feature of any military intervention or on the flipside what policymakers are desirous to achieve at the end of any intervention. To them, end-condition is a fraction of the entry decision since in their view, the end-condition conveys the optimal goals that the political objectives (strategic objectives) and the military deployments (operational goals) seek to achieve at the end of the intervention. Accordingly, proponents of this framework argue that this sort of structure helps to evaluate how the success of the mission will be measured, the logistical demands required,

the tactical objective to be pursued, and the threshold at which the mission should be terminated. According to Tellis, (1996:117) the Clausewitzean framework identifies three major components appropriate for exiting from any major intervention:

- A clear statement of the political objectives to be pursued;
- A derivative group of operational goals that must be secured; and
- A set of fallback options that must be anticipated if the original objectives and goals cannot be attained.

The very first component – a clear statement of the limited, stable and worthwhile political objectives to be pursued – is highly essential to any peacekeeping operations especially in incidences of intrastate conflicts. These political objectives are normally exemplified in the mandate given to the peacekeeping mission to operate in the mission area. Tellis (1996) posits that the desired objectives must be defined solely by the political authority after wider consultation with the military high command on the implication of their decisions. The leadership of the military must offer some guidance to the civilian policymakers and mission planners on the military cost associated with a particular choice of political objective after assessing all 'competing commitments and obligations' (Herberg-Rothe, 2014). In other words, a SWOT (strength, weakness, opportunities threats) analysis must be conducted with the help of the military top hierarchy to gauge the efficacy of the political objective on the field. Tellis (1996) contend that once the civilian and military leadership are unable to clearly define the political objective to be pursued, the intervention risks falling into an abyss of open, unrestricted set of fluctuating targets. This first component allows for a critical analysis into the political objective behind the decision by ECOWAS Heads of States and Government and the United Nations Security Council to deploy ECOMOG and UN contingents into Liberia and Sierra Leone respectively following the outbreak of the civil war and the eventual decision to disengage from the mission.

The second component – a derivative set of the discrete and attainable operational goals that must be secured if the political objectives are to be successfully obtained – delineate

the role of the military top brass to effectively execute the core mandate of translating the political objectives into tangible ends that can be implemented on the field. This component places an enormous responsibility on the military leadership to shepherd the targets to be achieved at the operational level with the view of securing the agreed political objective. This, the military normally fix through the issuances of mission statements which serve as guides for the various tactical task that such operations require. The second component is discussed later in detail to explain the merit of the operational goals set by both ECOWAS and the UN missions in both countries and how they were secured to elicit a desire of withdrawing/exiting from both countries.

The third and the most important component – a set of fallback options that must be anticipated if the original political objectives and operational goals cannot be secured. Tellis (1996), in identifying the possibilities that can be explored with respect to fallback options, pinpointed alternatives such as unilateral withdrawal, phased withdrawal, successor operations and mutual disengagement as likely options. But the argument is made that the nature of the fallback options will be dependent on the type/kind of intervention being pursued at the time. In considering the fall back options, emphasis is placed on the effect that such options have on or are likely to have on the overall existence of the mission. In both Liberia and Sierra Leone there were certain fallback options adopted by both the UN and ECOWAS when the decision was taken to disengage from the various missions. These fallback options are critically discussed in details in Chapter Five of this work. The usefulness of using the Clausewitz framework to understand particularly the ECOWAS exit approaches is limited because in the first place, the necessary requirements needed for the successful adaptation of the clausewitzian framework is absent.

2.9 Conceptual Framework of Peacekeeping Exit Strategy

From the foregoing literature review and theoretical framework above, it is clear that the importance of exit strategies in peacekeeping operations cannot be underestimated. The choice of the conceptual framework as depicted in Figure 2.3 below is informed by the UN Charter especially Chapters VII and VIII which enjoin both the global body and other

regional arrangements to deal with issues relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. The conceptual framework also seeks to establish the relationship between the type of mission and exit strategy stages and highlights the exit criteria and planning that come along with the process. Figure 2.3 shows the link between the two major peacekeeping actors (UN and Non-UN) and how individually or collectively they both can pursue a successful completion of a peacekeeping operation. The arrows show the linear direction and reflection between exit criteria and a successful peacekeeping operation.

Figure 2.3: Peacekeeping Exit Strategy Framework



Source: Authors own construct, 2014

Much as the UNSC echoes its primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security as stated in the UN Charter, it also recognises the critical role that regional and sub-regional organisations such as AU, ECOWAS and EU play in the prevention management and resolution of conflicts. Within the last two decades, it has become obvious that the UN on its own cannot handle the increasing international threats to peace and security and so has ceded quite a number of its global obligation to non-United

Nations actors such as AU, EU, ECOWAS, NATO among others. This burden-sharing has culminated in a number of UN mandated peacekeeping operations being carried out by regional bodies. Especially in the case of Africa, it has emerged that peacekeeping operations are no more an exclusive preserve of the UN (Okumu and Jaye 2010). Consequently, the growing affiliation between both the UN and non-UN actors towards responding to the collective security challenges confronting the globe has made significant progress.

The non-UN actors are shown as broken lines, an indication that the peacekeeping operations undertaken by these non-UN actors can be a standalone mission permissible either by the UN or any other regional or sub-regional organisation. This authorisation is mainly undertaken through the process of re-hatting where the peacekeeping force from the Non-UN actors are either absorbed or metamorphosed into a full blown UN mandated peacekeeping operations. Likewise, this permeability can also be an offspring of a hybrid mission where the UN does not necessarily absorb a non-UN actor mission but partners such a mission in the quest to attain the common goals of peace and security. This partnership is fashioned in such a way that the UN provides the enabling capacities, such as logistics, funding, equipment and sometimes leadership whiles the non-UN actor in most cases provides the troops, or in a worst case scenario leads the command structure of that mission. The hybrid UN-African Union peacekeeping force in Darfur (UNAMID) is a clear example.

As the UN and other non-UN Actors contend with the mounting cost of peacekeeping operations, fatigue among police and troop contributing countries (P/TCC) and paucity of financiers towards the whole peacekeeping project, it has become imperative to place exit strategy at the heart of intervention planning. What this means is that ideally, the best scenario would be for one to think of exit even before the mission is initiated. Once a mission is initiated, that mission must certainly come to an end within the cycle of the operation. But devising an exit strategy had always been an uphill task considering the uncertainties that come with the nature of conflict where conflicting parties and "spoilers" often renege on many of the decisions that seek to address the root causes of the conflict. The decision relating to mission planning must move beyond the mere political directives

that accompany the decision to intervene in conflict. Further, the political goals must be altered to incorporate workable operational plans which must tackle critical issues such as means to deploy, the determination to resolve the conflict, the realistic approach to resolving the conflict and the time span for the execution of the peace operations (Gilpin 1997). Planning must define the exit planning, the exit criteria and the stages that makeup the exit strategy.

From the model, exit criteria includes pointers such as benchmarking, legacy, timelines/deadlines, flexibility, end state, stable infrastructure, measure of effectiveness, mission accomplishment, force protection, and adequate logical support. The pointers under criteria can be considered individually or collectively since each pointer is strong and independent enough to elicit an exit in any peacekeeping operations. Benchmarking as a pointer is based on the recognition that it can be used to regulate the scope and the scheduling of "international presence" and when the transfer of authority to a legitimate national government is eminent (Caplan, 2012). Similarly, Legacy is viewed in the arena of what the peacekeeping operations is leaving behind; that is, the lasting impact of the entire peacekeeping operations. If it has to do with state building or the consolidation of peace, critical questions of efficiency, effectiveness and consistency with international standards and obligations must be addressed by the departure of the peacekeeping operations. This would include, but not be limited to, strong institutions of state, functional security sector, vibrant civil society, independent and well-functioning rule of law and judicial system, among others. The aim is for the impact of the operation to linger on even after the mission had ended. It appears that the UN now places much emphasis on the necessity of leaving a legacy in peacekeeping operations. For example, in closing the special court of Sierra Leone in December 2013, the UN Secretary General hailed the "*impressive legacy*" that the special court of Sierra Leone was bequeathing to the residual special court of Sierra Leone. Also, in his report on the rule of law and transitional justice the Secretary General stated that "it is essential that from the moment any future international or hybrid tribunal is established, consideration be given, as a priority, to the ultimate exit strategy and the intended *legacy* in the country concerned" (UN doc S/2004616, para. 46.)

Flexibility in any exit process is critical, moreso in peacekeeping operations where nature and dynamics of the conflict keeps on oscillating from one level to the other. As a pointer, it is important that peacekeeping exit strategies are flexible, agile, responsive and adjustable enough to respond to or better still accommodate the changing trends in the conflict resolution cycle. The planning for transitions should start with an assessment of future risk and probabilities. In relation to control, this aspect of the criteria does an assessment of who is in control of decision-making now and who takes over in the future, especially when exit is eminent. Here, the most important point is for the mission not to leave a vacuum. The national counterparts must show their capacity to handle the void that will be created as a result of the departure of the peacekeeping mission. Equally important is the issue of endstate. The endstate usually defined by political and military planners encapsulates the required situations whose achievement addresses the objectives of the intervention. Some indicators of endstate might include strong civil society, vibrant or open economy, good governance, political resolution, basic needs, public security and demilitarisation. Especially when the peacekeeping operation is multidimensional, ensuring that a stable infrastructure is built becomes one of the pointers of exit. In effect, there can be an exit strategy that is hooked unto the delivery of infrastructure such as bridges, roads, schools and hospitals. Permissibly, in order to avoid "mission creep", planners must define what constitute an endstate right at the onset of the mission and avoid the trap of being in an endless peacekeeping engagement. Mission accomplishment is the ideal aspiration of most planners (be it political or military) and is an essential component of any exit strategy. Irrespective of the fact that timelines and deadlines have their own peculiar challenges as pointers under the exit criteria, they provide some fixed timetables through which the exit process can be completed.

The pointers identified under the exit criteria paves way for the exit planning to be initiated. It is assumed that the planning is exposed to exit objectives, value drivers, transfer/control/ownership management, contingency planning, preservation, intermediate objectives, exit options and endpoints which feed into the exit strategy stages. Once the exit planning is properly done, a successful peacekeeping operation can be achieved. This is possible only when the mission planners systematically get through the various exit

stages and ensure that the mission is properly handed over to a local counterpart, most probably a legitimate local government.

In summary, what this chapter has done is to link all the available perspectives and conceptions on exit strategy to the peacekeeping frameworks of ECOWAS and UN. The chapter has managed to develop an ideal model that moving forward, exit strategy in peacekeeping operations can be pursued irrespective of the actor undertaking the intervention. The model presents a unique opportunity for consolidating and ensuring sustainable peace in a post-conflict country. In the ensuing section, I will evaluate the several different ways of addressing all the major questions that arose from this chapter on interventions peacekeeping operations and exit strategies by considering all the many different units and level of analysis. By employing a sound methodological approach, I present an understanding of the structures, actors and causal relationship between interventions, peacekeeping operations and exit strategies. It is imperative to interrogate the methods and the likely challenges presented by the theoretical assumptions made in this chapter and other related contention.

Notes

[1] The list of examples in the table is not exhaustive emphasis is on the selcted case studies.
[2] Major General Vijay Kumar Jetlay made some unsubstantiated allegations against two Nigerians, Oluyemi Adeniji Secretary-General Representative (SRSG) and Major General M. A. Garba (Deputy Force Commander) for being complicit in the diamond trade and for plotting with the rebels to make him fail. The resultant changes in the top hierarchy of the mission forced the Indian government to withdraw its troops from the Sierra Leone mission.
[3] See The Nigerian Voice, Jonathan orders Nigerian troops home from Mali, 18 July 2013, at: http://www.thenigerianvoice.com/news/119370/1/jonathan-orders-nigerian-troops-home-from-mali.html;The Nigerian Voice, Troops withdrawal from Mali: Nigeria petitions Ban Ki-Moon, UN Sec. Gen, 21 July 2013 at: http://www.thenigerianvoice.com/news/119662/1/troops-withdrawal-from-mali-nigeria-petitions-ban-.html
[4] Ibid.,

CHAPTER THREE
METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

The previous chapter suggested that exit strategy is essential to the success of peacekeeping operations. The review further suggested that exit must be part of the initial thinking of all peacekeeping operations. Besides it was also established from the three theoretical pillars that exit strategy is dictated by the economies of war and foreign intervention policy, and it has both intended and unintended consequences on the local populations and host communities. This chapter provides a detailed explanation of the nature of the research design and methodology adopted to explore the empirical arguments in the study area. Lather (1992) and Cook and Fonow (1990) assert that methodology occupies an essential position and it is critical to any research process. Essentially, methodology in research converts ontological (the nature of reality) and epistemological (the nature of knowledge) values into a guiding principle for the conduct of any scholarly exercise (Sarantakos, 2005). Devising an exit strategy in any peace support operation continues to be a major challenge for all major interventions. Wallensteen (2011:21) posits that peace research methodologies help to unearth documentation by facilitating the acquisition of information from archives as well as public sources. Following from the above arguments, this chapter starts by presenting the research design, data collection instruments and analytical framework adopted for the study. Next, the study population, sampling techniques, sources of data, data collection instruments, data processing and analysis are discussed. The chapter ends with a discussion on the limitation of the study and the ethical considerations for the data collection exercise.

3.2 Research design

A purely qualitative study of this kind should use mixed method design to study the situation. Merriam (2009) argues that qualitative survey facilitates the understanding

of complex issues by considering the actual experiences of the participants under study. The qualitative methods used for this study include a combination of descriptive, explorative and cross-sectional surveys. According to Berg (1995), the underlying principle of descriptive research is to describe social events by providing background information about the issue at stake, as well as eliciting explanations. In line with Berg's assertion, the descriptive nature of qualitative design was used to provide background information to the setting and other relevant parts of global peacekeeping operations. This study chronicled all the available ethnographic reports of exit activities undertaken in Liberia and Sierra Leone by ECOMOG and the UN. The study was also explorative in nature in that it provided the researcher the opportunity to analyse the relationship, values, standards and factors between the exit strategies adopted by both the UN and ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The essence of using explorative study is to be able to scope out the nature and extent of the problem of exit strategy in peacekeeping operations with the view to providing a comprehensive study in the area. As Morgan (1997) contends, explorative research helps to develop an accurate picture of the research topic and also the formulation and modification of theories.

Again, the study was partly cross-sectional in the sense that samples used for analysis were drawn from two different countries and two different missions. Cross-sectional design was used to establish whether there were any differences and/or similarities in the perception of respondents as to how the drawdown and exit of ECOMOG and the UN peacekeepers were pursued in those two different countries.

With the desire to have an in-depth understanding of exit strategy, as it applied to peace operations, the case study research model was also adopted to give the researcher some firsthand information of the practicality of exit strategy in peacekeeping operations, as exemplified by the Liberian and Sierra Leonean case. The closeness of the two cases gave the researcher some invaluable understanding of the real issues surrounding exit in peacekeeping operations. Yin (2012) posits that case studies help to better understand real world situations as it places the researcher at the center of the issue and allows information to be collected from its natural setting.

3.3 The study population and sampling procedure

Respondents for this research were drawn from officials who have been deeply involved in the peacekeeping activities in Liberia and Sierra Leone. This included former commanders of the ECOMOG and UN peacekeeping operations, top leadership and policy makers within the department of peacekeeping operations (DPKO) and the political affairs directorate at ECOWAS headquarters (past and present). Additionally, the study included high ranking officers of the various UN agencies, National government officials and the various sector commanders from both missions. Furthermore, expert and academicians who had extensive knowledge in the area were considered for the study. The research adopted mainly non-probability sampling approach to arrive at the critical mass of respondents needed for the study (Gupta and Gupta, 2011). Key respondents such as the DPKO staff, staff of the Department of Peacekeeping and Regional Security (DPKRS) of ECOWAS and former commanders and sector commanders from the two countries were purposively sampled. Purposive sampling, according to Sarantakos (2005) gives the researcher the opportunity to choose respondents who, in his opinion, are relevant to the research topic, the assumption is that with good judgment and appropriate strategy, one can select cases to be included in the sample that are satisfactory in relation to one's needs. Table 3.1 highlights the sampling and data collection methods.

Table 3.1: Sampling and Instrumentation

Category of Sample	Sampling Methods	Instrumentation	Type(s) of Interview
Former Commanders of ECOMOG	Purposive sampling	Unstructured Interviews	Individual Interviews
Former and Current Commanders of • UNMIL • UNAMSIL • UNOMIL • UNOMSIL	Purposive sampling Accidental sampling	Unstructured Interviews	Individual Interviews

Sector Commanders	Purposive sampling Accidental sampling	Unstructured Interviews	Individual Interviews
Staff of DPKO and Department of Political Affairs (DPA)	Purposive sampling Snowball sampling	Unstructured Interviews	Individual Interviews
Staff of Political Affairs Peace and Security Department (ECOWAS) • Department of Peacekeeping and Regional Security (DPKRS) • Political Affairs Directorate	Purposive sampling Snowball sampling	Unstructured Interviews	Individual Interviews Telephone Interviews
KAIPTC Course participants and facilitators	Purposive sampling	Unstructured Interviews Focus Group Discussions	Group Interviews Individual Interviews
National Government Officials • Liberia • Sierra Leone	Purposive sampling	Unstructured Interviews	Individual Interviews
Experts and Academicians	Purposive Sampling Snowball sampling	Unstructured Interviews	Individual Interviews

Source: Field survey, 2013

According to Kumar (2011) and Patton (1990), accidental sampling provides information about distinctive cases and helps to expose certain aspects of a situation. Besides, this type of sampling was convenient for the researcher because the time and expense needed to undertake a representative sampling such as the one employed for this study was totally avoided (Andersen & Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development, 2004). Finally, the snowballing sampling approach was also used to select a few respondents who originally were not part of the study but were recommended by others who felt they were privy to certain vital information which were unknown to the researcher. Through the assistance of the initial respondents, other potential respondents were contacted and interviewed as well. This sort of approach was pursued rigorously until there were no more respondents to be brought into the study.

3.4 Sources of data

Using these different sources of data helped the researcher to triangulate the data for effective analysis and reliability (Sarantakos, 2005). Data was sought from both primary and secondary sources. The primary source included firsthand testimony and direct official documentation from ECOWAS headquarters as well as UNAMSIL and UNMIL missions. Additionally, ECOWAS and UN officials who played various roles during the intervention of ECOMOG and the UN in Liberia and Sierra Leone respectively were interviewed. Autobiographies, personal narratives, memoirs and manuscripts from Government officials, experts and staff of international non-governmental organisation who have served in those two countries were equally consulted. Secondary sources included journal articles, periodicals, proceedings from workshops and conferences, the internet, as well as other related published work of scholars.

3.5 Data collection instruments

Data collection in a mixed method study usually involves techniques such as personal in-depth interviews, questionnaire, group interviews, observation and focus group discussion. A combination of instruments such as questionnaire, interviews guides, observations

guides and checklist provided the instrumentation for the study. To encourage frank and open discussions, individual interviews were the preferred option compared to the other techniques as it gave the researcher the opportunity to engage "one-on-one" with the respondents. In situations where the individual interviews were not possible, group interviews were held with a revised interview schedule. Similarly, there were some telephone interviews to complement individual face-to-face and group interviews. The focus of inquiry allowed the respondents of the study to eloquently express their views, perceptions and experiences about exit strategies in peace operations freely and spontaneously. Observing the ongoing drawdown of UNMIL in Liberia and the state of Sierra Leone as it is now provided the researcher firsthand information that enriched his understanding of some of the issues raised during the focus group discussions. For instance, during the field work in Sierra Leone it was possible to observe how the locals and the state were trying to recover and rebuild their society after the departure of peacekeepers and the winding down of the mission. Unstructured Interviews was adopted for collecting data from current and former force commanders, sector commanders, staff of DPKO, DPA and DPKRS, national government officials, experts and academicians (See Table 3.1).

The empirical analysis of this study centered on the information gathered from the 30 unstructured interviews conducted during the field research in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ghana and Nigeria. In Liberia, apart from the capital Monrovia, the researcher visited the capital of Bomi County (Tubmanburg). In Sierra Leone, the research was carried out mainly in Freetown. In Nigeria, the research was undertaken in Abuja (Abuja) and Jaji (Armed Forces Command and Staff College). The fieldwork in Ghana was centered on the premises of KAIPTC (Teshie, Accra), Burma Camp (headquarters of the Ghana Armed Forces) and the Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College (GAFCSC) at Teshie, Accra. The fieldwork which lasted for six months was undertaken between 2013 and 2014. The researcher is privileged to work at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) where a resourceful pool of the target audience for the study was selected. In addition to visiting the four countries the researcher also took advantage to interview and interact with many key resource persons who visited the KAIPTC to

participate in its courses and activities. As such, the researcher took advantage of the policy dialogues, expert workshops and lessons learnt workshop that was periodically organised at KAIPTC to tap into the rich experiences of the participants many of whom had served in various capacities either with the UN, AU and ECOWAS.

Furthermore, the researcher added to these interviews with additional participation in conferences and military exercises held in the United States of America (U.S.A), Pakistan, Canada, Mali and Senegal. These supporting conferences and military exercises outside the study areas enabled the researcher to gain access to other respondents who were unavailable in the study areas. Also, his status as a staff, course director and a facilitator on some of the courses (for example Integrated Peace Support Operations (IPSO), Peacekeeping Logistics, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), Crises Information Management (CIM) and Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) in Fragile, Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations) organised at the KAIPTC gave him stress-free access to majority of the course participants. Experts and course participants had a wealth of knowledge in the area under study; as such, they provided the researcher the needed information to fill the gaps that had already been identified. This approach of data collection was basically accidental since no systematic technique was used to select the respondents.

The unstructured interviews covered questions around ECOWAS and UN interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone as well as the exit strategies adopted in those peacekeeping operations (Appendix B). The unstructured interview schedule comprised five sections. Section A generally assessed the significance of exit strategy to peacekeeping operations. Section B considered the institutional and policy frameworks guiding exit strategy. While Section C examined the UN and ECOWAS exit approaches in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Section D explored the effects and consequences of UN and ECOWAS exit strategy in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Section E covered the lessons learnt and recommendations. The combination of all these different data sources provided the researcher the opportunity to triangulate the information gathered for validation and cross-checking purposes (Patton, 2002; Merriam, 2009). The use of several sources of information helps the researcher to

develop what Patton (2002) and Yin (2012) calls an "all-inclusive perspective".

3.6 Analytical Framework

Since this study rests on decision making, the study adapted two major analytical techniques (planning techniques) namely the problem tree analysis and the objective tree analysis as a means to manoeuvring through the fieldwork to collect the needed data for the study. These two analytical techniques were carried out in a focus group discussion organised with course participants on KAIPTC courses, who were deeply involved in peacekeeping and came from different fields (See Appendix C). According to Mikkelsen (2007) the problem tree analysis (also referred to as situational analysis) enables researchers to tackle existing problems by looking at their origins, cause and determinants up-stream as against the effects and consequences downstream. The problem tree analysis helped to break down real issues on exit strategies into determinable and manageable blocs by prioritising pertinent issues that needed effective and prompt attention. It involved identifying elements and arguments on the problem of exit strategies in peace operations, the political actors involved and who has which responsibility at every step of the intervention, and to suggest possible cause of action.

Similarly, the same participants used for the problem tree analysis were co-opted into the objective tree analysis to address the problems identified through the problem tree analysis. It helped in managing the conflicting interest associated with exit strategies. At the beginning of the exercise, all the participants in the focus group agreed that when it comes to the issue of exit strategy in peacekeeping operations there are potential differing interests which have the propensity to derail all the progress made in the drive for peace consolidation. These two participatory tools allowed the researcher to draw firm conclusions about the causes and effects of exit strategy on peacekeeping operations. Ultimately, these analytical tools were considered very appropriate for this study because, they enabled the researcher to examine the existing conditions of peacekeeping operations globally by looking at the effect of drawdown and withdrawal on the locals and host countries. In total, seven focus group discussion sessions were organised. Each focus group was made up of between six to eight participants from different backgrounds (Table

3.2). Participants for the focus group discussion were course participants who had come to KAIPTC for courses on Protection of Civilians; Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Fragile, Conflict and Post-conflict Situations, Integrated Peace Support Operations, and the Police Middle Management between the periods June 2013 to December 2013.

Table 3.2: Category of participants, total number and number of groups formed

Category	Total number	Number of groups formed
Military	12	2
Police	16	2
Civilians	18	3
Total	46	7

Source: Field survey, 2013.

3.7 Data processing and analysis

In a qualitative study of this nature data collection and analysis normally takes place together (Merriam, 2009). However, in this study, the analysis began the moment the researcher started making meaning out of the observations, interviews and the focus group discussions. The goal of the analysis was to uncover emerging themes, patterns concepts and insights for a better understanding (Patton, 2002). Narratives that emerged from interviews conducted on the field ware cleaned, edited and coded to ensure that all personal interviews and group interviews were completed and transcribed. As a response to the research questions, the researcher grouped similar experiences, recurring responses and events noticed into broad themes to draw meaning from the data and also to arrive at some logical conclusions.

The constant comparative method (CCM), a qualitative method of analysis which is based on grounded theory was adopted for the study to scrutinize the circumstances, occurrence and context within which exit was pursued in both missions. By constant comparative method we mean using inductive reasoning to analyse facts emerging from the various categories of meaning and relationship identified from the data (Yamagata-Lynch, 2010). The researcher in using this method concurrently coded and analysed the data from both

countries by continually comparing specific circumstances associated with the UN and ECOMOG approaches to exit and matching it with existing data (Taylor and Bogdan, 1998).

Lincoln and Guba (1985: 334-341), in describing the importance of using CCM to evaluate qualitative data, opines that "the process of constant comparison stimulates thoughts that leads to both descriptive and explanatory categories." Consequently, in this study I combined all the four stages identified by Glaser and Strauss (1967 p.105) by (1) comparing incidents of exit applicable to each category of our study area, (2) integrating the ECOMOG and UN exit approaches and their properties into our unit of analysis, (3) delimiting the concepts of exit strategy as applied to both ECOMOG and UN engagements in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and (4) writing how exit strategy should be pursed in peace operations. The parameters for the comparison include the following:

- Legal and policy frameworks
- The role of lead nations in the exit process;
- Security Sector Reforms (SSR); and
- Elections/ Democratic participation.

Besides the validity of using CCM to evaluate the qualitative data such as the ones received from both Liberia and Sierra Leone, this study cannot lay claim to generalisability, but rather the findings are contextual in nature and can be replicated depending on the context. On the issue of subjectivity, much as the researcher's biases and predispositions certainly had an influence in the way and manner the data was collected as well as how the analysis was conducted; the use of multiple data sources addressed the objectivity position of the study (Peshkin, 1988).

3.8 Limitations of the study

The main problem encountered in the data collection for this study was the unavailability of respondents especially those who played specific roles during the exit of both missions in the countries under study. For instance, it was very difficult to track down many of the

force commanders of ECOMOG and UN who superintended over the mission in Liberia and Sierra Leone either because they were indisposed or had resettled in their hometown which were practically impossible for the researcher to reach, considering the distance involved, limited time and the resources at the researcher's disposal. However, this challenge was resolved through the use of telephone interviews with the said former high ranking officers and also through other interviews conducted with some sector commanders at the time who are still in service. Closely associated with the unavailability of some respondents within Liberia and Sierra Leone was what appeared to be some level of research fatigue among the locals. Together, these two countries have played host to a huge number of research activities from organisations, institutions and individuals over the past decade. Some of the respondents stated categorically that they were tired from granting interviews and being part of all sorts of research projects since the war ended. It took the goodwill and benevolence of some contacts and networks within the peacekeeping training industry to help gain entry into the research area.

One other challenge was the refusal of some of the interviewees to be captured on tape or even to be quoted for some of the highly significant narratives they gave on the ECOWAS and UN interventions in those two countries. This, in a way took some shine, from the work as it limited the ability to quote real people who were in the middle of the action to add some authenticity to the work. Another challenge was securing appointments for interviews. It was very easy with officers who had retired from active service but for those in current service it was very hectic and laborious as the researcher had to endure long delays in securing approval from the top hierarchy of the various military and police high commands (See Appendix D). It was the same with officials of ECOWAS and DPKO. Additionally, the researcher had to endure several last minute cancellations of interview appointments; although some were rescheduled, others became impossible to reschedule. Either the timing was not right for the researcher because of the limited time he had to spend in the study area or the respondent's schedule made it impossible for the meeting to be rearranged. Such difficulties delayed and stretched the period for the data collection beyond the planned and blocked dates. Furthermore, request for some ECOWAS and UN documentation specific to peacekeeping entry planning and exit planning was not

provided to the researcher, including key reports of actual happenings in and outside the mission area. A study such as this would have benefited immensely from such historical reports considering that in the case of ECOWAS it was the first regional organisation south of the Sahara to have engaged in such an elaborate operation. Although some of the reports were provided later, they were either not for citation or their very nature made it unsuitable for the study. Much as these limitations might have impacted negatively on the entire study, it was not enough to technically affect the outcome of the findings.

3.9 Ethical Consideration

To maintain the confidence of respondents and the credibility of any research work, it is essential to maintain strict ethical standards at all times. The researcher, in seeking for informed consent explained to all respondents the objectives of the study, the expected outcomes and the possible risks associated with the study (Appendix E-F). At the individual level, prior to the conduct of the interviews and focus group discussions, sample questions were sent to all respondents who had agreed to be part of the study. To maintain anonymity and confidentiality respondents were asked about their willingness to have their details accompany some of the direct quotes. Some of the respondents preferred to remain anonymous because of their current positions in active service while others preferred pseudonyms.

There were still some respondents who did not have any problem being quoted directly. All these requirements were factored into the write-up of the final report. At the institutional level, the researcher sent a formal application to all institutions of interest for this study. The application served to introduce the researcher and also provided a brief background and objectives for the study. Some of the institutions wrote back to confirm while others contacted the researcher on the telephone to grant access. The approvals provided the enabling environment for the researcher to interact formally and informally with respondents especially those in active service.

CHAPTER FOUR
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

4.1 Introduction

Having established in Chapter Three that a combination of qualitative designs such as descriptive, explorative and cross-sectional surveys provide the best option for unearthing the challenges associated with exit strategies in peacekeeping operations, this chapter interrogates the circumstances surrounding the exit approaches adopted by ECOWAS and the UN in both countries which to some extent contributed positively or negatively to the success of the peace process. In order to situate the subsequent chapters which form the empirical basis of this work, this chapter sketches the peacekeeping operations as undertaken in both Liberia and Sierra Leone. It provides a brief historical overview of the formation of the state of Liberia and Sierra Leone, underscoring the genesis of the conflict, the root causes of the conflicts and the response mechanism to deal with the conflict. This chapter particularly focuses on peacekeeping operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone and the peace processes initiated by ECOWAS and the UN. The dynamics of both wars and the responsive roles of ECOMOG and the UN are thoroughly examined in this chapter.

4.2 The Genealogy of the Liberian Conflict

The various peacekeeping operations and the subsequent exit strategies that emerged to aid the mission to disengage from such operations cannot be comprehensively considered without first situating the entire narrative on the making of the Liberian state. The civil war that emerged in December 1989 traces its very roots to the alienating tendencies that characterised the creation and governance of Liberia right from its inception. The boundaries accepted as the borders of present-day Liberia can be located within the West Coast of Africa. It is bordered on the East by Cote d'Ivoire, West by Sierra Leone, North

by Guinea and the South by the Atlantic Ocean. The territorial boundary is divided into 15 administrative counties (see Figure 4.1) and 16 major ethnic groups many of whom migrated from different parts of Africa.[1]

Fig 4.1: Political Map of Liberia showing the 15 Counties



Source: Mapsofworld.com, 2012

Described widely as Africa's oldest republic and a country that was never formally colonised, Liberia emerged from the domestic political challenges of slavery and race issues in the United States (Ellis, 2007; Clapham, 1978; Dolo, 1996). As a response to the happenings within the United States following the banning of slavery, the American Colonisation Society (ACS) was established by a group of white anti-slavery activist in the United States in December 1816, basically to help provide a safe haven for the growing numbers of freed people of colour outside the United States (Tomek, 2011; Guannu, 1982).

As part of the scouting for the appropriate location to resettle the freed slaves, emissaries of ACS were sent to West Africa to explore the possibility of engaging the local people with the view to acquiring a piece of land for the freed slaves from America. However, the emissaries failed to secure any land for resettlement purposes as the local people were

unprepared to sell (Ellis, 2007;Shick, 1980). Nonetheless, in 1820 a shipload of free slaves on board the Elizabeth departed America for West Africa even though arrangements for their final destination had not been concluded. The freed slaves (or African-Americans) on board the Elizabeth during the voyage signed an agreement with the ACS under "the Elizabeth Compact" to allow the ACS to govern them in their new settlement under United States laws (Beyan, 2006; Guannu, 1982). Once they arrived on the West African coast the group found a makeshift shelter on Scherbo Island in Sierra Leone in March 1820. However, the harsh climatic conditions on the island coupled with the frequent outbreak of diseases such as malaria prevented the freed slaves from settling permanently on the island. Soon there was a renewed search for a permanent area of abode which ended on 15 December 1821 at Cape Montserrado following the signing of "Dukor Contract" between the ACS and some local traditional rulers (Guannu, 1989;Stewart, 1991).

Once the land in Cape Montserrado was secured, the earlier settlers in Scherbo Island together with other would-be settlers from the United States were moved to join their compatriots at this new location (Shick, 1980). Additionally, others who were rescued from slave ships by the British and the Americans after the abolition of the Trans-Atlantic slave trade were equally sent to this location (Shick, 1980). Even though the settlers built some defences against the persistent attacks from the indigenous people who were still against the takeover of their lands, it did not prevent the repeated attacks on the new colony. These attacks were rampant especially when the settlers began to increase in number and their activities began to spread to other areas along the West Coast. Arguably, the various conflicts that rocked Liberia since its formation could be traced to the heart of the ACS and their motivation for establishing settlements along the Liberian coast.

The relationship between the settlers and the indigenous people was the first entry point of conflict in Liberia. This has lingered on progressively as a destabilising trigger of conflict all through the history of Liberia. The second entry point of conflict in the history of Liberia could be traced to the reluctance of the settlers to integrate with the local people in their new found environment (Ellis, 2007; Tomek, 2011). Besides, they preferred to hold unto the culture they had exported from the United States; a situation that created a lot of

class struggles and sowed seeds of turmoiland mistrust (Kieh, 2008). Beyond the issue of land acquisition, the other entry point of conflict was the insatiable desire of the settlers to force "foreign" political, social and economic practices and systems on the indigenous people (Ellis, 2007; Olonisakin, 2000; Youboty, 1993). Perhaps the resultant effect of this indoctrination was seen in the number of fierce resistance put up by the various indigenous groups.

As anticipated, the freed slaves that had congregated at Cape Montserrado had no control on who was to govern them; rather the governments of these settlers were determined by the agents of the ACS. Not satisfied with this state of affairs, and perhaps realising that the activities of ACS was an extension of remnants of slavery, the various settler groupings started agitating for a higher stake in who governs them (Guannu, 1989). Once the settlers realised that their continued existence depended solely on a united front steps were taken to fend off the activities of the ACS, the British and French traders who operated in several locations along the West Coast as well as the natives (Beyan, 2006; Shick, 1980). The domino effect of these agitations led to the establishment of a commonwealth of settlers from Montserrado, Bassa Cove and Mississippi-in-Africa and Maryland in 1839 with greater autonomy and participation in their own governance (Guannu, 1983).

By July 1847, conditions had improved; the commonwealth progressed into an independent state and finally into a republic with an enhanced status and an enlarged population with additional numbers coming from the *Congoes*[2]. Although initially the United States supported the relocation of the freed slaves, ironically they refused to acknowledge the independence of the sovereign state Liberia even though at the time other major countries like Britain and France had immediately recognised their independence (Ellis, 2007; Guannu, 1989). It was not until 1867 that the United States formally acknowledged independent Liberia as a nation state (Ellis, 2007; Lowenkopf, 1979). The increasing numbers of *Congo-people* notwithstanding, the Americo-Liberians were still in the minority in a republic that had the indigenous people forming the majority. Above all, the creation of a settler state shaped the strategic importance of Liberia in global politics by first, developing its territories and later catapulting the independent state to a nation of

importance within the milieu of the international community (Tomek, 2011; Ellis, 2007; Guannu, 1989; Clapham, 1978).

But internally, there were still divisions between the Americo-Liberians and the indigenes. These divisions were consistently fueled by the demands of the French and the British colonialists for Liberia to properly demarcate the areas and territories under their control (Sawyer, 1992). These persistent demands came with some drastic decisions. The Americo-Liberian-led government, wanting to protect the areas under its control, introduced the interior administration system in which citizenship was granted to people living in the hinterlands. This system gave birth to the Barclay Plan of 1904 where communities within the interior were organised into villages, towns, chiefdoms and district with the traditional rulers serving as heads and reporting to the President through the Secretary General of the Interior (Kieh, 2008; Sawyer, 1992). Similar to the British indirect rule system practiced in Ghana, Nigeria and Uganda, the Barclay plan created a platform for the first time for a symbiotic relationship between Americo-Liberians and the indigenes. To the Americo-Liberian ruling elites, the Barclays Plan was a cheaper alternative for appeasing the periphery of Liberia who had been agitating for a long period over issues relating to domination and exploitation of their natural resources (Kieh, 2008). Their argument was further supported by the seeming indifference of settlers to develop the entire country. However, to the ruling elites it was a better approach of guaranteeing order and stability as well as collecting enough taxes for the state (Sawyer, 1992).

4.2.1 The disconnect between Americo-Liberian and Indigenous Liberians

Right at the formation of the Liberian state, there were two major competing levels of opposing social classes, the Americo-Liberian (settlers) and the indigenous (aboriginal) classes. Additionally, there were further divisions and segregation within the Americo-Liberian class with light skinned (mullatoes) and the dark skinned competing for control of political power (Boahen, 1990; Ellis 2007). Between the two classes, the Americo-Liberians were considered as the upper class and the dominant group while the indigenous people were considered as belonging to the lower class. This categorisation created an avenue for the settler group to subjugate the indigenes by grouping them into "subjects"

rather than "citizens" (Beyan, 2006; Olonisakin, 2000). In spite of the perceived disaggregation within the settler communities they still managed to dominate the natives in all aspects of the society from politics to economics, commerce to the labour (Kabia, 2009).

On the governance front, the Americo-Liberians grip on power and their occupation of major positions in government generated some heated political confrontations with the locals. For close to 133 years the Americo-Liberians ruled Liberia under one-party system. This number of years was achieved through a meticulous patronage system in which power was centralised among a privilege few and the entire political system was skewed in such a way that it became less reactive to the growing demands of people whose needs were considered periphery (Clapham, 1978). Specifically, state power was used to break the front of various independent indigenous political entities. The Independent True Whig Party (ITWP) which was a major party formed by the indigenes in 1951 was never allowed to operate freely (Dolo, 1996). Lands belonging to indigenous people were forcibly taken away from them, indigenous labour was exploited and locals were forced to pay huge taxes to the state (Ellis, 2007). The greatest injustice was the attempt to impose western civilisation on the indigenes. Even when measures were taken to unify the two classes, the Americo-Liberian used their strong-hold on state power to propagate their ideals and visions on what should constitute the economic, political, social and cultural structure of the Liberian state (Beyan, 2006; Kabia, 2009). These ideals generated several disagreements which led to a series of protest and unrest from the indigenes.

Cumulatively, the Americo-Liberian exclusive clinch to political power since the establishment of the state could explain the treacherous political path of Liberia. Besides political power, other issues which are equally important points and have continued to serve as a point of divergence. Key among them included the electoral systems, political representation, emblem and motto (Clapham, 1978; Guannu, 1989). The failure of the Americo-Liberians to address the raging disparity between the powerful ruling class (minority settlers) and the majority indigenes set the stage for future unconstitutional interventions by the military and rebel movements.

4.2.2The Tubman Era

Arguably, the factors that necessitated the regime change could be traced to President William Tubman's approach at fostering unity and promoting development (Wreh, 1976). His unification action was spurred on by the fact that his support base in the coastal regions which was largely populated by Americo-Liberians was dwindling. And so he needed to reach out to indigenous people in the hinterlands to help put his stranglehold on power. Infrastructure developments like roads, schools, hospitals and a promise of mainstreaming indigenous Liberians into the political and economic landscape of the country were some of his baits to attract the attention of the locals (Wreh, 1976; Lowenkopf, 1979). These social interventions were designed and introduced to bridge the gap between people living along the coast and those in the hinterlands to further the cause of national integration between the Americo-Liberians and the indigenous peoples. As Liberia's longest serving president, Tubman's quest to streamline the economic, political and social institutions saw an extension of the right of the indigenous people to vote albeit with some restrictive clauses (Wreh, 1976).

A number of administrative reforms in 1964 saw a complete change in the numbers of counties where provinces in the hinterlands and populated by indigenes were given county status. For instance, Bong, Lofa, Grand Gedeh and Nimba were elevated to county status to add up to the five original counties already existing along the coast (Clapham, 1978).President Tubman's 'Open Door policy' attracted and emboldened a number of foreign companies to locate and invest in Liberia (Ellis, 2007; Wreh, 1976). Major foreign companies, especially those in the extractive business like the Bong Mining Company, the Liberian American Swedish Mineral Company (LAMCO) and the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company took advantage of the initiative (Clower, Dalton & Harwitz, 1966:133).Tubman's regime demarcated concessions within the mining, agriculture and the forestry sectors to over 60 international companies (Ellis, 2007; Guannu, 1989). Liberia was able to draw external investment over and above $1 billion within a period of 25 years (Clower, Dalton & Harwitz, 1966:133).

The unintended consequence of such huge investments was the development of a dual economy which had foreign businesses on one side with little or no linkages to the

domestic or local economy on the other side. In essence Liberia became only a net producer and exporter of raw materials with little accruing to the country in terms of local content and high yielding revenues. During the last years of Tubman's presidency the economic outlook took a turn for the worse following the fiscal imbalances and the economic recession within the period 1968-1971(Dunn & Tarr, 1988).The rising opposition to the poor economic conditions and the continuous political control by the Tubman government outlived his death into the new administration of President William Tolbert (who incidentally happened to be the vice president under the Tubman regime).

But already, the process of self-actualisation was being pushed a notch higher in 1970 when the newly educated indigenous Liberians began to pile pressure on the ruling Americo-Liberians to restructure the repressive state system. Their actions were equally helped by the decolonisation wave that was blowing round the world at the time (Sawyer, 2005). The violent reaction of President Tolbert's government to the riots that was occasioned by the rising food prices provoked a *coup d'état* from some non-commissioned officers (NCOs) from the Liberian army on 12 April 1980. This action brought the 133 year rule of the Americo-Liberians or the *Congoes* in Liberia to an end.

4.2.3 Doe's Presidency and Matters Arising

The undercurrent of the Liberian civil war started with the *coup d'état* that brought Master Sergeant Samuel Doe to power and ended Americo-Liberian political dominance. The True Whig Party (TWP) that had been in power since independence and headed at the time by President William Tolbert succumbed to a military takeover that was instigated by a group of NCOs from the Liberian army with indigenous descent.[3] This was a *coup d'état* that had promised to build an all-inclusive national government. Rightly so, the first cabinet had representation from all the major political forces and opinions (Ellis, 2007; Sawyer, 2005; Olonisakin, 2000). Yet the regime could not build and sustain the momentum that characterised the coup mainly because the new group lacked the exposure and were politically naive to carry out the motivations behind the interventions (Kieh, 2008).The support that many Liberians, especially the indigenous groups, gave the Doe regime to unseat the Americo-Liberian oligarchy never materialised. Rather the regime

became ruthless in its dealing with opposition and dissenting views (Ellis, 2007). Pervasive corruption, which resulted in the sharp decline in revenues from the country's major export such as rubber, iron ore and timber couple with the termination of economic assistance from the United States dealt a great blow to the regime's economic scorecard (Adebajo, 2002).The ailing economy did not perform any better rather there was a sharp downturn in government spending and public employment programs (Sawyer, 2005; Osaghae, 1996).

Doe's regime committed serious human rights abuses with impunity, including subjecting citizens to arbitrary arrests, arbitrary detention, torture and in some cases unlawful killings.[4] Furthermore, ethnic sentiments underpinned Liberia politics under the Doe regime. The regime exploited the ethnic and tribal tensions necessitated by the regime's own policies and appointments in the country. For example, the Armed forces of Liberia (AFL) were deliberately populated by Doe's kinsmen from the Krahn ethnic group and their Mandingo collaborators (Youboty, 1993). This heightened the disaffection between the various ethnic groups. Also, Doe's rein stifled political opposition and so even when the ban on political activities was lifted for the general elections in 1985 elections were never free and fair (Ellis, 2007). There were allegations of widespread electoral fraud and other malpractices to the advantage of the ruling party. The manipulation of the electoral process manifested itself in gerrymandering (demarcation of senatorial areas), handling of the electoral roll and electoral laws, ballot box theft and intimidation. All these malpractices were either done to favour a particular ethnic group or the ruling party. Doe's National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL) won the 1985 elections with a slim majority of 50.9%. Yet there were serious objections from all the major political parties[5] who were either disqualified or had their leaders arrested and molested (Kieh, 2008).

There were also incidences of government censorship, intimidation and interference in the work of the press. Journalists who were considered as being against the government were harassed, intimidated, jailed and some were even killed. Some news outlets were either banned from operating or had their offices vandalised. The statement by Col. Gray D. Allison, Minister of Information, in September 1981 best described the situation at the time.He stated that:

> Government would begin to enforce a new directive giving the ministry the mandate to edit all releases and announcements by or about government or its agencies. (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2009)

This statement was followed by a number of incidences of attempt to curtail press freedom. The *Sun Times*, for example, was fined $3000 in 1986 by President Doe for being a threat to national security (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2009). This fine eventually collapsed the newspaper because they were unable to pay. Similarly, newspapers such as *Footprints Today* and the *Daily Observer* were banned on several occasions and had their editors sent to jail for publishing unfavourable stories about President Doe and his government. In November 1985, Charles Gbenyon, a broadcast journalist working for the Liberian Broadcasting Service (LBS) was executed for showing support through his publications for General Thomas Quiwonkpa's botched *coup* attempt in 1985 (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2009). *Coup d'états* were never countenanced within the republic under President Doe. Any attempted *coup* was crushed with a heavy-handed response. Even the regions where these alleged *coup* plotters originated from were not spared the impact of his response. For instance, in the case of Quinwonkpa and General Nicholas Podier attempted *coups*, the Gio and the Mano ethnic groups who were living in the Nimba County (where these two hailed from) suffered severely from Doe's ethnically motivated policies.

4.3 Root causes of the Liberian conflict

This section concentrates on the causes of the war, the various actors or warring factions, their motivation and how the conflict was executed. There is a substantial amount of literature on the history of the Liberian conflict and the subsequent decisions that were taken to resolve the crises. Most of the views explicitly expressed as being the root cause of this conflict are similar in reason with slight divergent opinions. Sawyer (1992) and Adeleke (1995) assert that ethnicity was the major underlining cause of the conflict in Liberia. Tracing the history of the crises, he contends that to preserve their positioning, the Americo-Liberian elite who were mainly the ruling class and an economically strong group exploited the ethnic formation of the less fancied indigenous population. They

stifled development and only sought to skew the distribution of public good on ethnic lines. But Howe's (1996) diagnoses of the genesis of the conflict differ, as he contends that the root cause of the conflict was not solely ethnic in nature but a combination of a bottomless ethnic resentment and economic decay. He argues thatthe Liberian conflict was characterised by the inability of a state to control the teeming youth who were being stimulated by "outsides" to pick arms against a legitimate state and interfere with its development trajectory.

Similarly, Aning (1999) describes the root cause of the Liberian conflict as being characterised by "the complex interconnectedness of ethnicity, resources and conflict". Significantly, he introduces the political governance argument and reiterates that the change within the political landscape which was occasioned by several non-state actors challenging the ability of the state to exercise its authority was what led to the conflict. According to him, the ensuing conflict did not only emanate from the national level; it had both local and regional undertones. However, Dolo (2007) maintains that when it comes to what necessitated the Liberian conflict it is very difficult to pinpoint the exact cause of the conflict. To him, those authors who use a single correlate like ethnicity to explain the conflict have missed the point. He posits that the Liberian conflict was as a result of a number of factors including economic inequality, ethnic feud and religious intolerance. He concludes by saying that all these factors were used as proxies to achieve political heights.

In recent times, one of the major publications that seek to portray western attitudes toward the cause of the Liberian conflict and other similar conflicts on the African continent is Mary Kaldor's *New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a GlobalEra.* Kaldor (2012) argues that new wars, such as the Liberian war, essentially have economic motivations and the internationalisation of the conflict as reasons behind the emergence of such crises. Similarly, Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Collier and Sambanis (2002) have also argued in their *Greed and Grievance in Civil War* thesisthat motivations for new conflict such as Liberia and Sierra Leone has so much to do with economics than ethnic, religious, or social grievances. But scholars and policy-makers in the field, such as Taydas, Enia and James (2011); Berdal and Malone (2000), Berdal (2003), have all argued against using material justification and incentives motivated by greed to explain the origin of conflicts

such as those of Liberia and Sierra Leone. Their argument is further amplified by Boås (2010) who sharply disagrees with Kaldor's assertion that the Liberian civil war fit within her thesis of new wars. He contends that the genealogy of the conflict was basically a function of identity, society and class. In his view, the biggest predicament with the Liberian state has been the composition of the state itself. To him, the Liberian state has been at war with itself ever since it became an independent state because of its inability to address how the state should be organised. He further posits that those who make the argument of ethnicity should not only look at it as a 'static factor in the civil war but as a social construction created by the administrative practice of the Liberian state'.

Given this opposing historical antecedents of the Liberian conflict, it is not surprising that there seem to be no consensus on the actual root cause of the Liberian conflict. However, six issues are common to all the arguments advanced by the various scholars who had published extensively in this area. They include ethnicity, what the researcher would describe as the 'Americo-Liberian/ Native phenomenon', economic decadence, rapacious elites who abused power, bad governance and a corrupt political system. These arguments are further strengthened by a recent survey conducted by Vinck, Pham and Kreutzer (2011) in about 260 enumerated areas and 4501 households in Liberia. In this study, respondents who were mainly adult Liberians were emphatic that greed and corruption were the major root causes of the Liberian conflict. Figure 4.2 shows that an overwhelming 63% referred to greed and corruption as the main root cause of the conflict while another 40% cited identity and tribal divisions; 30% mentioned poverty, 27% identified inequality with a paltry sum of 3% and 1% citing land access and food crises as being part of the root causes of the conflict. This is an indication that majority of the people still consider a myriad of issues as being the underlining cause of the conflict and not a single subject.

Figure 4.2: Root causes of the Liberian civil war



Source: Vinck, Pham and Kreutzer T (2011: 33).

Liberia had been very unfortunate with the kind of leadership that the country had enjoyed since its independence in the 1840s. The leadership offered by Samuel Doe, and William Tolbert before him, was characterised by a sustained period of brutality, massive economic decline, political intolerance or restriction and the assassination of political opponents (Ellis, 1995; Sesay, 1996; Howe, 1996; Aboagye, 1999). So bad was the leadership at the time that the *coup d'état* that characterised Doe's ascendency to the throne and Charles Taylor's invasion in 1989 was publicly hailed with pomp and pageantry (Sesay, 1996). However, this leadership conundrum is not any different from what pertains in other West African states except that in the case of Liberia, other dynamics such as ethnicity, greed and inequality were major issues.

4.4 The Liberian War and Taylor's March towards the Executive Mansion

Charles Taylor and his National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), in December of 1989, initiated an armed invasion into Liberia with the clear intention of toppling the then ruling government of President Samuel Doe. With a small group of fighters, dissidents and people living in exile trained mainly in Libya and Burkina Faso, Taylor and his men

entered Liberia from Côte d'Ivoire. Initially, the rebellion received little backing from inhabitants within the Nimba County because they were apprehensive of the real motives of Charles Taylor an Americo-Liberian and a former member of the Doe regime (Sesay, 1996; Ellis, 1995). Moreover, the people had experienced the ruthless reactions of the regime in the earlier *coup d'état* and were not prepared to subject themselves again to any such political disruptions. Taylor had worked as a Director of General Services previously under the Doe regime until he fled to the United States after being accused of embezzlement. He absconded from the Boston jail in the United States and fled to Libya where he received special training in guerrilla tactics for the impending onslaught (Ellis, 2007).

The Doe regime initially underestimated the strength of the insurgence. Their first reaction of sending a platoon of the AFL from Ganta to crush the rebellion failed woefully (Aboagye, 1999). The regime became jittery and resorted to the usual technique of using the armed forces to terrorise the local people within the catchment area of the rebellion. But this time round the technique backfired and the people rallied in support of the rebels and against a regime that had intimidated them for nearly a decade. The amateurish nature of the NPFL started showing in the first few months of the rebellion when the group appeared disorganised and not properly equipped (Ellis, 2007; Adebajo, 2002; Sesay 1996). However, as the fighting progressed the NPFL gained more experience and began to target areas that would hurt the regime the most. The resultant effect was that ethnic groups that were loyal and favoured by the Doe regime, especially Krahns and Mandingos were targeted. Consequently, the brutal retaliation of the regime drove many youth from the other ethnic groups to the ranks of the NPFL. Increasingly, the support base of the rebellion began to grow in strength spreading to other parts of the country (Sirleaf, 1991).

Significant defections within the rank and file of the AFL began to rock the regime. While the Gio and the Mano soldiers within the AFL were targeted, the NPFL in return also slaughtered Krahns, Mandingoes and sympathisers of the regime. Even when the rebel advance to the capital Monrovia progressed significantly, the Doe regime refused to engage with the leaders of the NPFL, especially Charles Taylor, who was considered a criminal and a fugitive (Ellis, 2007; Aboagye, 1999). Much as the Doe regime had several

problems containing the rebellion, the NPFL also had problems of their own. The push towards Monrovia was not smooth sailing for the NPFL as cracks started to develop within their ranks after some of their failures on the battlefield (Ellis, 2001; Reno, 1998). Taylor had ordered some executions of some of his own men following the defeat on the battle for Ganta. Subsequently, the summary executions of some of the NPFL rebels many of whom were Gio's pushed Prince Yormie Johnson (a Gio) to break away to form the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL).

A number of reasons were assigned by Charles Taylor and the NPFL as underling the quest to overthrow the Doe regime. Key among them was to address the series of injustices and abuse that the regime had perpetuated against the people. Taylor and Johnson had on several occasions rejected the conduct of election even when Doe's non-participation was assured (Adebajo, 2002; Ellis, 2007, Aboagye, 1999). Separately, Taylor and Johnson and their respective rebel movements continued their advancement towards Monrovia. Their activities resulted in the most violent period of the war; for example 562 civilians (mostly Gio and Mano) who were seeking refuge at St. Peter's Lutheran Church under a shelter of the International Committee of the Red Cross were murdered by forces loyal to the regime in July 1990 (Ruiz, 1990). Subsequently, other heinous massacres were perpetuated by the regime, NPFL and INPFL rebels which eventually culminated in the execution of President Doe in September 1990.

Taylor's push towards the executive mansion did not end with the killing of Doe. Rather the fighting continued unabated for the next seven years. With the help of ECOMOG, a transition government headed by Amos Sawyer was established to steer the affairs of the country in the interim until elections were held and a substantive leader elected. But the Sawyer-led transition was handicapped right at its formation because some parties to the conflict particularly the NPFL perceived the transitional team as the puppet of Nigeria and ECOMOG. Inasmuch as the transition government could not garner the much needed support to govern the entire country, it made some notable progress. The transitional government together with ECOMOG was able to disarm the Prince Johnson-led INPFL and also to resettle officers of the fragmented AFL (Ellis, 2007). In the meantime the

activities of the transition government were restricted to areas under the control of ECOMOG, which were mainly in the capital Monrovia.

Charles Taylor had established a parallel government in Gbanga in the Bong County, controlling the greater part of Liberia. Although Taylor's control of greater Liberia was not recognised internationally, he managed to plunder and control the export of some of the major commodities of Liberia to friendly countries (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2009). The proceeds from exporting commodities such as timber, rubber, metals and diamonds were used to fund the war through the payment of salaries of commanders and the purchase of weaponry (Aboagye, 1999). While the transition government was running a deficit and had a debt burden of nearly US$3 billion, Taylor's ill-gotten wealth was estimated at over US$100 million a year (Ellis, 2007). This wealth bolstered Taylor's actions in Sierra Leone where he meddled in that conflict by financing the RUF rebels to destabilise that country. The real motive behind Taylor's proxy support to the RUF rebel in Sierra Leone are three fold. First, was to gain access to the diamonds of Sierra Leone to help fund his own operations in Liberia.[6] Second, was to punish Sierra Leone for allowing ECOMOG to use the country as a staging post for their intervention in Liberia. Taylor in a statement had threatened that Sierra Leoneans too would 'taste the bitterness of war' for supporting ECOMOG (Ellis, 2007; Sesay 2003). Lastly, the motive was based more or less on strengthening friendship between like-minded individuals. Taylor had met most of the rebel leaders of RUF in Libya and Burkina Faso and had struck some relationship that needed to be deepened and respected (Ellis, 2007; Aboagye 1999).

Between 1993 to 1996, several attempts were initiated by internal and external actors, notably the UN and ECOWAS, to resolve the conflict. However, little progress was made because of the unwillingness of the warring factions to agree on the peace plan. Within the period, there were several rebellions and counter-rebellion to challenge Taylor and his NPFL in some of their strongholds.[7]A number of new rebel groups emerged to challenge the NPFL while there were some defections and splits in those that already existed. Details of the various warring factions and the peace accords are discussed in details in subsequent sub-sections. Through the efforts of the international community, in

September 1995 all the major warring parties came together to form the Liberian Council of State under an arrangement prescribed by the Abuja Peace Accord. This framework effectively ended the political and military struggle that was occasioned by Taylor's rebellion in 1989. In furtherance of the provisions of the Abuja Accord, a DDR programme was initiated by the international community and supervised by UNOMIL and ECOMOG as a prelude to democratic elections. Subsequently, after a number of objections to the inclusion of Taylor in the political process, general elections were held in July 1997. The Charles Taylor-led National Patriotic Party (NPP) emerged winners with 75% of the total number of votes (Harris, 1999). This event invariably signified the end of the first Liberian civil war.

4.4.1Taylor's Presidency and the Second Civil War

In spite of the Abuja Peace Accord, Taylor's hostility towards ECOMOG had grown exponentially during the passage of the war. Once elections were successfully conducted, the West African peacekeepers were asked to withdraw by the new government regardless of the training responsibility handed them by the Abuja Accord.[8]In the meantime, Taylor's government offered leaders of other rebel groups senior positions in the new administration as a way of enticing them to disband the various rebel groups (Jaye, 2003; Sawyer, 2005). Groups such as the United Liberation Movement (ULIMO) had their leaders occupying senior ranking positions in the new government. Taylor's quest to reconcile the nation, build institutions, establish the rule of law and ensure economic advancement never materialised. Rather, in just two years the country was saddled with the very issues that necessitated the initial conflict in the first place. Corruption had skyrocketed, tensions and suspicion within the ethnic groups had deepened, people were being persecuted because of their ethnic affiliations, dissenting views were repressed and the general economic situation had worsened (Jaye 2003; Sesay, 1996; Ellis, 2007).

The poor governance that rocked Liberia after the 1997 election resulted in the emergence of two new rebel groups the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and later the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL). Together with forces loyal to Charles Taylor these three groups became the main actors in the second phase of the

Liberian civil war. LURD had its support base from ex-combatants who had fled Liberia after the post-war election of 1997.[9] Similar to what happened with the NPFL in December 1989, LURD began its rebellion in 1999 from Northern Liberia with the tacit support from the government of neighbouring Guinea. Likewise the second group MODEL also emerged from Southeast Liberia in 2003 with the same desire of removing Taylor. Figure 4.3 shows the rebel positioning and the direction of their onslaught on the capital Monrovia.

Figure 4.3: Rebel positioning and direction of onslaught



Source: Reliefweb, 2003

In spite of the on-going peace talks, the two rebel groups attacked Monrovia in June 2003 with the aim of overthrowing the Taylor regime. The attack resulted in a number of civilian casualties and the situation was further worsened by the magnitude of atrocities committed by all the three groups.[10]The humanitarian catastrophe raised a lot of eyebrows within the international setting. Taylor, recognising the danger, requested for international assistance in the form of international peacekeeping mission to help contain the situation. ECOWAS sent in a vanguard force ECOMIL to help stabilise the situation. Together with

the United States Marine Unit, some calmness was established for the delivery of humanitarian aid to affected civilians in the capital (Aboagye, 1999). Also, as a response to the worsening security situation in Liberia, the UNSC by resolution 1497(2003) authorised the establishment of a multidimensional peacekeeping force to help stabilise and secure the environment for the smooth takeover by a much stronger United Nations Stabilisation Mission in October 2003.

Consequently, through the assistance of the international community, the warring factions together with all the eighteen political parties and major actors within the conflict endorsed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Accra on 18 August 2003. The CPA paved the way for the UN to deploy a much stronger peacekeeping mission with a Chapter VII mandate to support the National Transitional Government of Liberia to implement the provisions within the CPA. However, prior to the signing of the CPA, all the major actors in the conflict, especially the political parties, LURD and MODEL had argued that the best path for the peaceful resolution of the conflict was for Charles Taylor to exit the presidency (Adeleke, 2002; Addo, 2005). This demand among others formed the basis of most of the consensus reached at those bilateral meetings organized at the instance of both ECOWAS and the UN. As part of the peace process Nigeria had offered to host Taylor should he relinquish power. With the international community piling intense pressure on Charles Taylor, he resigned on August 11 2003 and handed over to his vice president Moses Blah to spearhead the transition process. Taylor's departure to Nigerian to commence his exile brought some finality to over a decade-long conflict.

4.5 The Warring Factions

The breakdown of law and order in Liberia resulted in the proliferation of a number of warring factions. The AFL which was fighting to defend the regime and to restore the *status quo* joined together with the NPFL formed the two main actors of the conflict at the initial stage. Once the main aggressor (NPFL) was not achieving the purpose for which the rebel movement was established, splinter groups and new rebel movements began to emerge with similar objectives (Aboagye, 1999). With the exception of the NPFL, not less than ten rebel movements of varying sizes emerged at different periods leading to the end

of the war in 2003. They included the INPFL, the Gedeh Defence Force (GDF), the Liberia United Defence Force (LUDF), the United Liberation Movement (ULIMO), the black berets, the Small Boys Units (SBU), the Liberia United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), the Liberia Peace Council (LPC) and the Lofa Defence Force (LDF).

Not all of these groups made real or noticeable impact on the outcome of the war. However, their entry at various stages either introduced a different dimension to the way the war was executed or affected the on-going peace process. There were a number of features common to the formation of all these groups. The first had to do with the philosophy behind their establishment. Almost all of the rebel groups had ethnic inclination (Adeleke, 1995). For instance, the AFL troops that took active part in the fighting all belonged to the Krahn tribe of President Doe. Likewise, the Prince Johnson-led INPFL were Gios while the ULIMO-K group were Mandingos as shown in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1: Warring Factions and Ethnic Inclination

Warring factions	Year of Formation	Ethnic Support Base
Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL)	1962	• Krahn • Mandingo
National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL)	December 1989	• Gio • Mano
Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL)	December 1990	• Gio
Liberia United Defence Force (LUDF)	March 1991	• Krahn
Gedeh Defence Force (GDF)	July 1991	• Krahn
United Liberation Movement (ULIMO) • ULIMO-K • ULIMO-J	May 1991 • March 1994	• Non-tribal • Mandingo • Krahn
The black berets,	November 1992	• Mano • Gio

		• Garu
Small Boys Units (SBU)	July 1990	• Membership of group cut across ethnic lines
Liberia Peace Council (LPC)	November 1993	• Lorma
Lofa Defence Force (LDF)	November 1993	• Lorma
Liberia United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD)	1999	• Mandingo
Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL)	March 2003	• Krahn

Source: Fieldwork, 2014

The second feature had to do with the motive behind the establishment of the groups. Although the common motive of the principal rebel groups was to unseat Doe, Subsequent rebel groups that emerged were either fighting to protect their tribal lineages or to get rid of Charles Taylor and his NPFL. Cumulatively, the common feature for all these groups was the desire to take power and control of the country. Aside these internal groups there were other international, regional and sub-regional actors. Some of these external actors were dissidents from some West African countries such as Gambia, Sierra Leone and Burkina Faso who infiltrated these internal groups to help fight the war (Ellis, 2007). Also, there were other foreign mercenaries who took part in the fighting; however, their combative role was minimal and mostly restricted to providing ammunitions, training, technical and operational support (Aboagye, 1999).

Consequently, the intransigence of the warring factions' coupled with the emergence and fragmentation of existing groups and the chaos that followed forced ECOWAS to initiate action towards ending the conflict and creating an environment of peaceful coexistence. For instance, within a period, as many as four armed groups had emerged, all claiming the right to lead Liberia. Key among them being the Krahn faction of the United Movement for Democracy and Liberation in Liberia (ULIMO-J) led by Prince Roosevelt Johnson, and the Mandingo faction (ULIMO-K) led by Alhaji Koromah (Aboagye, 1999).

Olonisakin (1996), Williams (2002) and Vogt (1992) admit that all these encounters together with the extensive killing, destruction of property and the growing refugee situation forced the regional body ECOWAS to set into motion its first major peace operation.

4.6 ECOWAS and Sub-regional Security Mechanism

In the thirty-nine years since the creation of ECOWAS, the commission has undergone several distinct phases. Before its emergence, the West African sub-region was inundated with numerous challenges ranging from the sub-region becoming the battle ground for proxy wars between countries within the global west, mainly – France, Russia and Anglo-Saxon axis – to challenges with political governance all over the sub-region (Musah, 2011). For instance, Nigeria's seeming hegemonic powers in the sub-region which was fuelled by its size and potential was a major threat to France and its relations with its colonies, especially those in West Africa. The years preceding the end to the Cold War did not help matters as many of the countries within the sub-region at the time had to contend with harsh economic conditions following the global economic recession of the 1970s and also the devastating periods of bad governance, stretching from dictatorship to civilian and military authorities (Jaye and Amadi, 2011; Obi, 1997). Regardless of the fact that states within the sub-region share similar ethnic groups, culture, history, ancestry, religion and experiences, collectively they have been exposed to years of external influence (Asante, 1985).

Arguably, the idea of a West African Community is not a new idea and certainly cannot be associated solely with the happening of the 1970s. The antecedents were there since the fifties and sixties and could be traced to the legacies of pan Africanistssuch as Kwame Nkrumah, Sekou Toure and Edward Wilmot Blyden (Nkrumah, 1965; Aluko, 1976). Prior to the formation of ECOWAS, there were several rivalries within the sub-region that hampered any attempt of regional integration. The first rivalry in the early part of the 1960s could be traced to the struggles between the vibrant and ambitious leadership of Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Tafawa Balewa of Nigeria (Frempong, 2006). While Nkrumah advocated for a broader unionisation of all African states, Balewa rather

preferred a functional cooperation of smaller sub-regional units (Aluko, 1976). This divergence coupled with other disagreements prevented states within the Anglophone bloc from engaging with their Francophone partners. Although the Francophone blocs had similar challenges of their own, especially between Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d'Ivoire and Léopold Sédar Senghor of Senegal, their rivalry was limited towards the restricted integration structure of the Francophone bloc (Bach, 1983). Nevertheless, the two leaders Houphouët-Boigny and Senghor succeeded in creating a joint group the *Communauté Économique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest* (CEAO), to match Nigeria's influence in the sub-region(Bach, 1983; Adebajo, 2002).

The second and the most significant rivalry relate to the battle for supremacy and control mainly between Francophone states and Anglophone states. This rivalry had its roots in the aftershocks following the exit of Nkrumah and Balewa and the Nigerian civil war of 1967(Adebajo, 2002; Adedeji, 2004; Frempong, 2006). Even though most of the original members of CEAO perceived the group as one for the deepening of trade and economic liberalisation, others like Cote d'Ivoire had the pressing motive of curtailing the ambitions of Nigeria within the sub-region (Bach, 1983). The aftermath of the Biafra war and the unification of the Nigerian state did not improve the relationship between Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire; rather the rivalry between the two was further deepened. Even when the Nigerian President Yakubu Gowon and the Liberian President William Tubman initiated steps to establish an all-inclusive sub-regional economic group, their efforts were thwarted by President Houphouët-Boigny (Adebajo, 2002; Frempong, 2006).

Remarkable progress was made in April 1972 when President Gowan and President Gnassingbé Eyadéma of Togo agreed in principle to form the base of the new and integrated sub-regional group (Aluko 1973; Bach, 1983). The decision by the two leaders to spearhead the formation of a sub-regional grouping was not a foregone conclusion, in spite of the fact that each of the leaders more or less represented one of the major blocs within the sub-region. While the Nigerian delegation's visit to solicit for support from other states especially those from the francophone states proved futile, President Eyadéma was equally unable to galvanise the support of his fellow Francophone states to join the group (Adebajo, 2002). However after several visits and discussions a meeting was held in

December 1973 to consider the draft treaty for the proposed regional group. The decision by the leaders of Nigerian and Togo to lead the process was symbolic in many respects in that it broke the linguistic barrier and opened the doors for the collaboration between two countries with varying interest and importance (Asante, 1985; Frempong, 2006).

Essentially, the proposed West African Community was actualised with the signing of the Treaty of Lagos in Nigeria.[11] ECOWAS was formally established on 28 May 1975 with an initial membership of 15 countries comprising five Anglophone, nine Francophone and one Lusophone.[12]Later Cape Verde acceded to the Treaty in 1977 while Mauritania pulled out of ECOWAS in December 2000, citing political and strategic reasons. ECOWAS came in with a real desire to promote economic integration and development of member states. The 1975 Treaty, while illuminating the formation of ECOWAS, maintained that the vision of the commission at its inauguration was basically to:

> "to promote co-operation and development in all fields of economic activity particularly in the fields of industry, transport, telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural resources, commerce, monetary and financial questions and in social and cultural matters for the purpose of raising the standard of living of its peoples, of increasing and maintaining economic stability, of fostering closer relations among its members and of contributing to the progress and development of the African continent."(Article 2, 1975 ECOWAS Treaty)

The legacy of diverse colonial features (be it Anglophone or Francophone) has impacted and continue to influence the politics and economics of the sub-region. Nonetheless, the vision of the founding fathers has not been negated by any of these challenges that confront the community.

The socio-economic focus that guided the formation of ECOWAS is spelt in the 65 articles of the 1975 Treaty and the five protocols approved at the Lomé summit of 1976. Inherent in these protocols are issues relating to the concepts of products emanating from member states, re-exportation within ECOWAS of goods imported from third countries, assessment of loss of revenue of member states, fund for the cooperation compensations and development of ECOWAS and the contribution of member states to the operations of

ECOWAS (Onwuka, 1982). Some have argued that neither the ECOWAS treaty of 1975 nor the five protocols of 1976 had any security dimension (Adebajo, 2002). Similarly, others have said that the rivalries at the time prevented the founding fathers from hammering on security and defence since it was likely to be misconstrued as an attempt to violate the sovereignty and internal security of member states (Aluko 1973; Bach, 1983).

These assertions are conceptually deficient considering that it is obvious and fundamental in most cases that regional economic integration has security as its ultimate goal. Even though the original focus was regional integration, certainly it was regional integration to meet the needs of economic cooperation which is part of a broader security agenda.[13] Perhaps the suspicion between member-states during the formation of ECOWAS presented a situation in which there was some disconnect between security and economic development. Nonetheless, the argument still remain that security cannot be separated from economic development; this position is strengthened by the traditional notion of security which is championed by neoliberal and neorealist international relations (Buzan, Waever, and De Wilde 1998; Buzan and Waever, 2003).

The implication is that states are the most important elements in international affairs and security most often, is their utmost concern. Considering that state security contains elements such as development as per the traditional theoretical perspective, there is no way that the founding fathers of ECOWAS could have economic development as their foundation stone without thinking about security.[14] Inasmuch as security was not explicitly amplified and discussed in the formation of ECOWAS in the narrow sense it was still implied. From the beginning, the link was established, albeit tacitly. If one approaches it from Buzan and Waever's (2003) securitisation classification, then Nigerian and Togo would be described as the securitising actors who tried to convince other states through the use of extraordinary measures to deal with the existential threats of (external influence, secessionism,harsh economic conditions) that were inimical to the very survival of individual states within the sub-region.

4.6.1 Protocols and Mechanisms for Defence and Security

Three years after its establishment, ECOWAS had to deal with the hard questions of non-aggression and mutual assistance. This, according to Jaye (2003:142), was prompted by the "shifting alliances within the region as a result of military intervention in politics". Moreover the argument is further strengthened by the examples of accusations and counter accusations of some sub-regional governments supporting and using dissidents and revolutionaries to overthrow governments and cause havoc in some other member states (Agyeman, 2003). Besides, Aning, Birikorang and Jaye, (2010), Musah (2011) and Olonisakin (2011) all conclude that the 'changing nature of the threats to regional stability'was as a result of bad governance, poverty, natural resource pillage, unemployment, ethno-religious conflict and political repression. Given the nature of peace and security at the time, ECOWAS initiated steps to deal totally with the security and defence issues confronting the sub-regional body. But this process was not smooth- sailing as member-states at each stage, for one reason or the other, objected to the common defence pact. For instance, at the 1980 ECOWAS summit in Togo, while Nigeria and Senegal supported strongly the introduction of a defence pact, countries such as Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau opposed strongly, citing reasons of possible abuse by larger and well-endowed states (Adebajo, 2002). Likewise, some Francophone states such as Cote d'Ivoire and Niger were still suspicious of the real motive of Nigeria, its influence and strength in becoming a regional hegemon (Adebajo, 2002). Nigeria on'the other hand saw the defence pact as the answer to weakening France's overbearing dominance on its former colonies (Asante, 1985).

Eventually, member states adopted the 1978 Protocol on Non-Aggression (PNA) and later the 1981 Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence (PMAD). These protocols hinged on the happenings at the time, considering that the Cold War was at its highest peak and member states were particularly obsessed about protecting their sovereignty and also resisting any unforeseen external aggression (Asante 1985; Aluko, 1967). Consequently, Agyeman-Duah and Ojo (1991) contend that all the discussions that preceded the signing of the two major protocols (PNA and PMAD) on defence and security were geared towards addressing the concerns highlighted by Aluko and Asante. Effectively, the PNA

was the first normative document of ECOWAS that touch on inter-state conflict prevention and regional security.

Article 1-4 of the protocol relating to non-aggression (PNA) directs all member states to avoid the threat and use of force or aggression against a fellow member state. Additionally, this protocol enjoins all member states to abstain from condoning or encouraging any acts of rebellion, violence or antagonism against a fellow state (Article 2 PNA 1978). Events and instances in the past that called for the PNA include the first Tuareg rebellion in northern Mali (1962–1964), the *coups d'état* and rebellions in Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone, civil unrest and rice riots in Togo and Liberia, the Nigerian civil war and the conflict between Togo and Benin (1975-1976).[15] There is no doubt that the security environment at the time was mainly concerned with inter-state conflict and regime protection. This protocol in a way provided some cover for political leaders to protect their regimes from external aggressors.[16] However, this protocol failed to address threats that were coming from outside the region and threats that were entirely internal (Asante 1985). The other deficiency of the PNA was the lack of in-built provision for compliance purposes by member states (Adeleke, 1995). Arguably, these inadequacies in the initial protocol were addressed with the promulgation of yet another protocol on mutual defence.

The protocol relating to mutual assistance on defence (PMAD) identified armed threat against a member state as a potential threat against the entire sub-region which required mutual assistance and aid to triumph over it. Article 4(b) specifically states that:

> "In case of internal armed conflict within any Member State engineered and supported actively from outside likely to endanger the security and peace in the entire community. In this case the Authority shall appreciate and decide on this situation in full collaboration with the Authority of the Member State or States concerned."(A/SP3/5/81)

Furthermore, Article 6, 9 and 18 of the PMAD have provided fitting measures that ECOWAS can adopt to resolve the cases of internal armed conflict. Significantly, the protocol also called for the creation of an Allied Armed Forces of the Community (AAFC) that would consist of standby forces of member-states to be deployed into conflict situation when the needs arise (Article 13, A/SP3/5/81). This standby force and its units

were expected to maintain some level of battle readiness and sharpness through the frequent holding of joint military exercises. The other important institutions created by the PMAD included the Defence Council which was responsible for strategic and political direction and Defence Commission which was in charge of the operational and technical direction (Article 7, A/SP3/5/81). Equally important was the role created for the Deputy-Executive Secretary in charge of Military Affairs, tasked with the administrative responsibility of overseeing the preparation and management of military budget, updating plans for the movement of troops and logistics and initiating joint exercises (Article 12, A/SP3/5/81). Specifically, Chapter V of the protocol provided the basis and modalities for any intervention and assistance. The protocol is emphatic that the AAFC shall be used to intervene in cases where:

a) An external armed threat or aggression is directed against a Member State of the Community (Article 16);
b) When there is a conflict between two Member States of the Community (Article 17); and
c) In the case where an internal conflict in a Member State of the Community is actively maintained and sustained from outside (Article 18).

Clearly, one major deficiency of these two protocols was the lack of institutional mechanism or structure to elicit compliance from member states (Adeleke, 1995; Aning 1999). Theoretically, the PMAD provided the initial blue print for ECOWAS's engagements in conflict management and resolution but the protocol suffered from non-implementation. As will be discussed later, the Liberian conflict exposed how the nonexistence of the AAFC and all the allied institutions contributed to the enormous challenges that confronted the *ad-hoc* sub-regional force sent into that particular country. Collectively, these two major security and defence protocols existed side-by-side with the *L'Accord de Non-agressionet d'Assistance en matière de Défense* (ANAD) a defence pact which was championed by some francophone countries within ECOWAS.[17] But as events in the 1980's would have it, Member States of ANAD experienced some deep divisions which began to emerge over the relationships between some of its members and the continued relationship with France, especially on matters bothering on military and

security (Adebayo, 2002). Whereas Mali and Mauritania objected to the continuing close military cooperation with France, Burkina Faso and Mali clashed over the mineral-rich and natural gas enclave in the Agacher region.[18]

The two protocols PNA and PMAD were significant to ECOWAS regional security interventions in two respects. First these protocols contributed to some extent to address the seeming challenges that confronted the sub-region in its quest to achieve stability, economic integration and advancement (Nwachukwu, 1991; Jaye, 2003). Second, it presented the best available option of amalgamating and integrating the entire defence policies and mechanism of member states (Nwachukwu, 1991). In spite of the significance of these ground-breaking protocols, it still lacked some cutting edge with regards to sub-regional crises response. At best, the case in Liberia exposed that clearly. In response to that anomaly, member states, in 1993, agreed in principle to amend the founding Treaty to address the lapses exposed by past events.

Essentially, the revised Treaty for the first time clearly highlighted the nexus between security and economic integration. Although that linkage had been there since the establishment of the community, the revised Treaty only sought to deepen the linkage that was already known. Specifically, Article 4(e) of the revised Treaty dealt with the maintenance of regional peace, stability and security while 4(g) dealt with the promotion and protection of human and people's rights. More importantly, Article 58(2) of the revised Treaty maintains that "In pursuit of these objectives [peace, stability and security], member states undertake to co-operate with the Community in establishing and strengthening appropriate mechanisms for the timely prevention and resolution of intra-state and inter-state conflicts".[19] For the purposes of this work, the emphasis is on Article 58(2) (f) which states among others that "regional peace and security observation system and peace-keeping forces where appropriate [must be established]".[20] In October 1998, the ECOWAS conflict prevention framework was adopted and introduced to help curb the rising spate of political instability in the region. This new framework under Section II introduced and reemphasised some pertinent areas such as mediation, facilitation, negotiation, reconciliation, quiet diplomacy, diplomatic pressure and fact-finding missions (A/Dec.11/10/98).

Finally the breakthrough came in 1999 when the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (herein referred to as the Mechanism) was promulgated.[21] This Mechanism was a marked departure from all the other protocols that had existed in the past. Rightly so, because it had the benefit of experience from especially the Liberian and the Sierra Leonean civil war of 1989 and 2003 and also some other past conflicts in the sub-region. One other significant feature of this protocol was that it was a merger between some protocols of the past specifically the PNA and the PMAD. The Mechanism holistically addresses all the gaps that were identified with the PNA and the PMAD. It does not only establish institutions to deal with security situations but, goes a step further to present guidelines for the identification and prevention of security challenges. Essentially, the Mechanism has provided the pathway for the sub-regional body to intervene in Members States confronted with challenges of conflict and armed incursions. Specifically, Article 25(a-e) of the Mechanism has outlined five major conditions that can trigger an intervention in any member state. These are:

a) Incidences of aggression or conflict in member state;
b) Conflict between two or several member states;
c) Internal conflict that threatens to trigger humanitarian disaster;
d) Internal conflict that poses a serious threat to peace and security in the sub-region; and
e) In the event of an overthrow or attempted overthrow of a democratically elected government.[22]

4.7 The Establishment of ECOMOG

The Liberia event of 1990 tested the resolve of signatory states to the two defence protocols on non-aggression and mutual assistance that had been in existence since the 1970s and the 1980s. Charles Taylor and his NPFL forces initiated an armed rebellion on the eve of Christmas in 1989 ostensibly to overthrow the government of President Doe. The resultant skirmishes had a rippling effect on the sub-region; there were many reported civilian deaths, displacement of thousands of locals and other nationals of West African origin and the destruction of property. The intensification and spread of this conflict called

into question the ability of ECOWAS to proceed with its integration drive in the midst of this turmoil. During the turmoil, it was obvious that the international community largely represented by the United Nations and to some extent the United States lacked the political will and the desire to initiate actions likely to resolve the raging conflict (Aboagye, 1999).

As fighting progressed with wanton destruction of properties and an increase in the loss of lives, coupled with the exhibition of marginal interest from the international community, ECOWAS Heads, in May 1990, at the 13th Annual Summit of Heads of States and Governments in Banjul, The Gambia, established the Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) to help find a solution to the conflict. The SMC was made up of three Anglophone states Gambia, Ghana and Nigeria and two Francophone states: Togo and Mali (Decision A/DEC.9/5/90). As part of the peace process, the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, Abass Bundu met with Charles Taylor on July 1, 1990, to solicit his support for the work of the SMC. President Doe, not too happy with the trajectory of the SMC and the motive of some members states called for the establishment of a sub-regional peacekeeping force. His seven-paragraph letter to the Chairman of the SMC stated categorically that:

> "...In order to avert the wanton destruction of lives and properties, and further forestall the reign of terror, I wish to call on your honourable Body to take note of my personal concerns and the collective wishes of the people of Liberia, and to assist in finding a constitutional and reasonable resolution of the crisis in our country as early as possible. Particularly, it would seem most expedient at this time, to introduce an ECOWAS Peace-Keeping Force into Liberia to forestall increasing terror and tension and to assure a peaceful transitional environment"(Weller, 1994:60).

Apart from Doe's letter inviting a sub-regional force, several overtures were made to bring the warring factions to dialogue as part of the peace process but no real progress was attained. Thus, the lack of progress in solving the conflict diplomatically compelled the SMC to establish the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to find an indigenous solution to the raging conflict (Aboagye, 1999; Cleaver and May, 1995:485). Even though the Government of Liberia and the INPFL accepted the ceasefire request that came with the establishment of ECOMOG, the Taylor-led NPFL refused to accept the terms of the ceasefire agreement. Nevertheless, the ECOMOG mission was deployed to

mediate, protect humanitarian aid, disarm warring factions and enforce peace (Decision A/DEC.2/11/90).

4.8 The Legality or otherwise of ECOMOG Intervention in Liberia

On the intent and plan for the impending intervention, several legal questions, disagreements and controversies were raised by experts and many ECOWAS member states (Adeleke, 1995). These disagreements that characterised the decision by ECOMOG to intervene in the Liberian conflict exposed the inconsistencies within the two major defence protocols. On the legitimacy of ECOWAS intervention, Ero and Long (1993) in their article on humanitarian intervention suggest that humanitarian reasons were not good enough legal basis for the intervention. Similarly, Ofodile (1994) argues that the humanitarian angle used by ECOWAS to intervene in Liberia was legally flawed because first, they failed to seek permission from the UN; second, they failed to secure the consent of all the warring factions; third they failed to justify beyond all reasonable doubt that they were operating under the PMAD; and finally it was done contrary to principles of international law.

Likewise, Tuck (2000) contends that the intervention could not have satisfied international legitimacy as the UN had not given ECOWAS the stamp of authority to intervene. The UN's perceived lack of interest in the ECOWAS efforts in Liberia is buoyed by the nervousness of some African nations as well as the unwillingness of the major powers to get involved (Berman and Sams, 2000; Kihunah, 2005). The first major political response from the UN only came in October 1992 when the organisation took a retroactive action of approving the actions of ECOMOG in Liberia under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Bundu (1997) also asserts that the mandate given to the ECOMOG fell outside the strict provisions of the 1981 protocol. However, Sesay (1996); Aning (1994); Adebayo (2002); Jaye (2003) and Addo (2005) all disagree with Tuck and Bundu. Collectively they argue that ECOWAS's intervention was justified on the grounds of the defence pact as highlighted in the PNA and the PMAD.

Specifically, Article 2 of the PNA is clear that member states shall not commit, encourage or condone any acts of subversion, hostility or aggression against the territorial integrity or political independence of another member state. Similarly, Article 4(b) of the PMAD forbids ECOWAS member states from either supporting or facilitating internal armed conflicts in other countries. The protocol clearly stipulates under Section II measures that can be undertaken to curtail such advances which include the formation of Defence Council (which include Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs of member states) and also the establishment of AAFC.In the case of Liberia, the mere fact that the NPFL rebels were being supported by either Libya or Burkina Faso was enough basis for ECOWAS to have intervened as per the provisions of the PMAD.But the reality, as has been aptly stated by Kufuor (1993), was that ECOWAS failed to meticulously execute the provisions as has been outlined in the PMAD. The Defence Commission was not in place likewise the AAFC and the Defence Commission.

The critics of the ECOWAS intervention have failed to recognise that given the complicity of some member states in the Liberian conflict, it was nearly impossible for ECOWAS to follow systematically the provisions of PMAD. Realistically, the regional body could only resort to specific provisions as outlined in the PMAD for the Liberian conflict. Even though the legal basis to intervene in Liberia might seem inadequate, ECOMOG intervention in Liberia facilitated and created a secured environment that made it possible for the commencement of humanitarian activities (Aning and Edu-Afful, 2013; Mortimer, 1996; Weller, 1994; Vogt, 1992). In any case, whereas some proponents have described ECOWAS intervention in many quarters as being strange, unusual and unwarranted (Sesay, 1995; Vogt, 1992) others such as Ofuatey-Kodjoe (1994) and Aning (1999) support the ECOWAS intervention. The argument by those who support the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia is further strengthened by the opinions of Evans (1994) and Alagappa (1997) who maintained that sub-regional groupings have both political and military advantages in resolving local conflicts, because more often than not they understand the conflict better, they benefit from political acceptance from the belligerent and also exhibit commitment to the peace process.

Jaye's (2003) argument on the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia places a seal on the legality or otherwise of the whole intervention. He posits that any discussion on the legality of the Liberian conflict intervention must be predicated on the specific historical background within which the intervention occurred. He further, argues that the traditional legal principle of sovereignty and non-intervention cannot be applicable in all cases [certainly not in Liberia] where the conditions for state collapse existed.

4.9 Peacekeeping in Liberia: From ECOMOG/UNOMIL to UNMIL

All peacekeeping Operations are unique in their formation and may not be equally effective in resolving the conflict for which the mission was established. Essentially, on the mandate to deploy, Addo (2005) posits that the mandate was moulded on Article 18 (2) of the protocol relating to mutual assistance on defence (PMAD) which some have argued was blurred, especially with regards to intervening in internal conflict of member states. But the SMC was clear on the protocol on which the mandate to intervene was based. Accordingly, in their statement of intent, the ECOWAS decision A/DEC.2/11/90 recalled the PMAD and also acted on behalf of the authority of Heads of States. Inherent in this decision was the peace plan of Liberia, or better still, the mandate for the intervention. The peace plan, as adopted, mandated ECOWAS to do the following:

- Observation of an immediate ceasefire by the warring parties;
- The setting up of an ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to keep the peace, restore law and order and ensure respect for the ceasefire; all member states able and willing to do so are invited to contribute forces to the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group in order to enlarge its peacekeeping capacity;
- The setting up of broad-based interim Government by a National Conference of Liberian political parties, warring parties and other interested groups;
- The holding of free and fair elections within six (6) to nine (9) months to establish a democratically-elected government of Liberia;
- The observation of elections by ECOWAS;

- The setting up of a Special Emergency Fund for ECOWAS as Operations in Liberia. The initial capital of the Fund is put at US$50 million to be generated through voluntary contributions and from ECOWAS member states and third parties, donor-government and agencies; and

- The appointment by the Executive Secretary of a Special Representative and other supporting staff for the ECOWAS operations in Liberia. The Special Representative shall work in close collaboration with the Forces Commander and assist in carrying out the ECOWAS operations in Liberia.

Decision A/DEC.2/11/90

The mandate, as stipulated was totally silent on the exit strategy for the ceasefire monitoring group. Nowhere in the seven point mandate was a timeline, indicator or deadline set as a prerequisite for exiting or termination of the mission, although there were talks of ceasefire and restoration of law and order. Possibly, the very nature of the conflict made any discussion of exit strategy premature. Perhaps, the holding of free and fair elections was seen as the avenue for exit, but that was not explicitly stated or expressed. Bah (2012) was emphatic that the ECOMOG deployment in Liberia did not have clear exit strategy. While critiquing the way and manner the mandate was couched, Stedman (2002), and Leonard (2006) concluded that the mandate did not match the sort of engagements they planned to undertake. In their view the mandate was vague, ambiguous and too open.

However, Abass Bundu, the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS at the time, rejects the idea that the mandate was either vague or too open. In his book *Democracy by force? A Study of International InterventioninWestAfrica*, he argues that the ECOMOG mandate had a "remit which was country specific and not a general mandate to apply force whenever or wherever in West Africa". Additionally, he maintains that the mandate could not be altered until and unless a collective decision had been taken by ECOWAS leaders (Bundu, 2001). Similarly, in comparing the ECOMOG mandate to that of other UN peacekeeping operations in Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda, Mackinlay and Alao (1995) contend that the criticism of ECOMOG's role and mandate is misplaced because just like other UN operations they all share similar traits in reference to the various mandate and role given.

Inherent in ECOMOG's intervention mission was the narrow military mandate of maintaining law and order, combat operations to protect non-combatants through the creations of safe-haven and providing a conducive atmosphere for peaceful negotiation (A/DEC.2/11/90; Aning, 1999; Aning and Salihu, 2011). ECOWAS's mandate, however, did not specify law enforcement or police responsibilities. The mission's operational arrangement had weak police and civilian components; the politics of decision-making was left to generals and force commanders on the field with little or no coordination (ECOWAS, 2010).Aboagye (1999) posits that apart from the operational challenges with the ECOMOG mission, the regional force was deficient in particular reference to tactical and logistical resources. The intelligence needed to execute the intervention was virtually non-existent (Aboagye, 1999).

The actual intervention commenced on 24August 1990 with the deployment of nearly 3000 officers from mainly West African countries, namely Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Gambia and Guinea. Later, as part of the ongoing peace process, soldiers from Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Senegal, and Benin joined the ECOMOG forces. At its peak, the combined force strength was over 10,000 troops with representation from over ten West African countries (Aboagye, 1999). Senegal and some other Francophone states joined in an effort to satisfy, especially, Charles Taylor who was consistently opposed to Nigeria dominance of the West African forces because of the suspicion he had over Nigeria's real motive in Liberia. However, Senegal adopted the Cut and Run approach to exit and unilaterally pull out of ECOMOG in January 1993, citing the impending elections in Senegal as the reason even though it was a well-known fact that Senegal was not happy with the conduct of some ECOMOG forces, particularly those from Nigeria (Mortimer, 1996).

Regardless of the troop strength ECOMOG still went ahead to deploy but were faced with stiff opposition from the Charles Taylor-led NPFL. The NPFL had followed through with their opposition to the ceasefire agreement and by extension, the work of the peacekeeping operation. A number of arguments were adduced for the rejection of the peace plan by the NPFL. Key among them included the neutrality of ECOMOG and the political will of ECOWAS to see to the exit of Samuel Doe (Sesay, 1996). Aside the objections from the

NPFL, fundamentally, there were other issues that inhibited the smooth intervention of ECOMOG in Liberia. First, was the lack of ceasefire between the warring factions which for all intent and purposes is crucial for any peacekeeping operation to engage. Whereas the AFL and the INPFL had given the green light for ECOMOG to enter, the NPFL as already stated was opposed to it. So in real sense there was no consensus on the part of the warring factions for ECOWAS to intervene. Second, was the controversial issue of consent from the host country. At least from Doe's letter to the SMC, it was quite clear that some form of request had come from the host country. As to whether Doe had the legitimacy to make that request cannot be contested, considering that at the time he was the only legitimate and globally recognised leader of Liberia.

The conduct of peacekeeping operations in Liberia against a hostile belligerent meant that the forces could not continue to engage in traditional peacekeeping, but rather they had to shift to peace enforcement.[23] Much as the changes held several repercussions for the peace process, ECOWAS still maintained their peace enforcement approach in spite of the difficulties and the fluid situation they encountered on the ground.[24] Aboagye (1999) asserts that some of the difficulties that ECOMOG encountered on the ground was as a result of the lack of political and military direction in the execution of the peacekeeping operations. He argues that on the military front the troops lacked command, control and communication structure. Politically, there was also a communication gap between the forces on the field and the ECOWAS secretariat which traditionally was expected to provide the strategic direction. Hostilities as well as the lack of preparedness to engage in Liberia prevented ECOMOG from pursuing its original mandate of evacuating civilians and securing the environment for the holding of peaceful elections (Sesay, 1996).

The difficulty that ECOMOG had to contend with in executing its assigned task was further compounded with the killing of Samuel Doe and the unconventional tactics adopted by the warring factions (Adebajo, 2002; Aning, 1999; Tarr, 1993). Consequently, the Mediation Committee of ECOWAS, after assessing the situation in Liberia realigned the objectives of the missions to enforce the cease-fire and maintain an effective buffer zone in the capital devoid of attacks from the warring factions. The reality of the change in methodology and tactics by the ECOMOG forces forced the "stubborn" Charles Taylor

and all the other warring factions to the Mali extraordinary summit of ECOWAS in November 1990.

4.10 The puzzle of ECOWAS Peace Agreements in Liberia

This summit culminated in the Bamako peace agreement which was mainly a rehash of all the decisions already taken by the SMC in Banjul in August of the same year (A/Dec.2/11/90, Aboagye, 1999). The Bamako Accord only succeeded in establishing the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) which was eventually headed by Dr. Amos Sawyarr.[25] But in terms of the political process to end the civil war, very little was achieved. Liberia at this period was effectively divided into two, with Taylor presiding over one side and the IGNU which was mainly protected my ECOMOG cocoonedon the other side. Subsequently, the SMC organised another meeting in Banjul in December 1990 this time with all the warring factions and the IGNU to deepen the provisions stipulated in the earlier Bamako Accord. Collectively, all the warring factions, including the IGNU, committed themselves to the ECOWAS Peace Plan by accepting to abide by the ceasefire and agreeing to convene a National Conference to reconstitute the IGNU.[26] This decision was in response to several objections raised by the various warring factions over the composition of the IGNU.

Thus, the Lomé agreement of February 1991 came in to provide the means by which the ceasefire could be implemented and also to build on the previous accords. Additionally, the Lomé agreement tasked ECOMOG to set up locations and supervise the disarmament of combatants.[27] As a marked departure from the way ECOMOG engaged with the warring factions in the earlier agreements, the Lomé agreement called for the establishment of a Technical Committee comprising ECOMOG and representatives of all the identified warring factions to supervise the disarmament process.[28] A lot of international pressure was brought to bear on Charles Taylor to sign the Lomé agreement given his lackadaisical attitude to earlier peace agreements. Irrespective of these pressures, the Lomé agreement broke down following the decision of Charles Taylor not to recognise the authority of the National Conference that was convened in March 1991 as part of the requirements stipulated in the Lomé peace agreement.[29] Perhaps one other reason that

could be assigned for the failure of the Lomé agreement was the inability of the agreement to address the seeming tensions, mistrust and suspicion between Taylor's NPFL, ECOMOG and some governments within the sub-region (Aboagye, 1999; Addo, 2005). Taylor's immediate action following his objections to the National Conference was to create an alternative government in Gbarnga. The creation of a reconstituted IGNU without the NPFL sparked further violence in parts of Liberia.

The failure of the Lomé peace agreement and the lack of progress in the peace process pushed ECOWAS to revive the stalled peace process with four back-to-back meetings in Yamoussoukro between June 1999 to October 1999. The Yamoussoukro agreements were unique in the sense that for the first time the Francophone bloc was heavily represented and together with the newly reconstituted SMC[30] the entire sub-region was seen to be presenting a common front in the resolution of the Liberian crises (Bekoe, 2008; Adebajo, 2002). Adebajo (2002) and Addo (2005) all contend that the Yamoussoukro I-III apart from helping to address the inconsistencies in the earlier peace agreements also helped to address the pertinent issues such as the mistrust within the sub-region on the handling of the Liberian crises, the lack of confidence in the peace process and the suspicion of the Francophone bloc on the real motives of Nigeria. The Yamoussoukro I meeting held between 29 and 30 June 1991 called for a truce between the leaders of the NPFL and IGNU as a preliminary step towards national reconciliation and the restoration of peace in Liberia. Additionally, the meeting set up a five member committee to work alongside the International Negotiating Network (INN) to monitor and help run the impending elections in Liberia.[31]

Yamoussoukro II convened on 29 July 1991 only succeeded in deepening the peace process started by the earlier meeting. However, significant progress was made with the Yamoussoukro III Accord. The IGNU and the NPFL agreed to the formation of the five-member Electoral Commission and a five-member *ad-hoc* Supreme Court to handle any dispute that might emerge from the electoral process.[32]Throughout the discussion, a number of major incidents were recorded. Senegal deployed nearly 1500 troops in the early part of 1992 to support ECOMOG efforts while the US provided US$15 million to support the logistical needs of some of the contingents (Adebajo, 2002). Finally, the

Yamoussoukro IV agreement which was signed on 24 October 1991 provided the blueprint for encampment and disarmament of the warring factions.[33] This event was expected to last for 60 days and under the supervision of ECOMOG. As part of the process leading to the elections, a buffer zone was expected to be created along Liberia's border with Sierra Leone to prevent arms and rebels from crisscrossing to destabilise the two countries.

In spite of the ambitious nature of the Yamoussoukro IV agreement, Taylor's actions and demands made the implementation impossible. Additionally, the agreement was too obsessed with the holding of elections instead of tackling the military, political and economic dynamics that had come to be associated with the conflict (Adebajo, 2002; Addo, 2005). As a result of these failures, one new major warring faction ULIMO emerged to counter the activities of the NPFL. ULIMO had strong lineage with the support base of the late President Samuel Doe and had the core of its membership in exile in Sierra Leone (Aboagye, 1999). The lead architects of the group General Roosevelt Johnson and Alhaji Kromah entered Liberia with their forces ostensibly to drive Taylor away from his stronghold. Taylor's suspicion of the ECOMOG reached a crescendo when he alleged that the group was supported by ECOMOG and refused to disarm as per the Yamoussoukro agreement. On October 15, 1992, Charles Taylor and his NPFL launched 'Operation Octopus,' and attacked ECOMOG forces at various locations in the capital. This effectively undermined the various Yamoussoukro agreements in its entirety and collapsed the fragile ceasefire that had been in place since the signing of these agreements (Adebajo, 2002; Bekoe, 2008).

These failures notwithstanding, further steps were taken in the peace process, eventually culminating in the signing of the Cotonou agreement in July 1993. This agreement marked the beginning of the international community's involvement in the entire peace process. The UN for instance, appointed Mr. Trevor Livingston Gordon-Somers as the Secretary-General's Representative for Liberia.[34]Likewise, the OAU (now African Union)also appointed Reverend Canaan Banana to spearhead the organisation's efforts towards the attainment of peace in Liberia (Adebajo, 2002). With regards to the OAU, their effort in the entire peace process was only politically significant and limited to ECOWAS's

diplomatic initiatives. The OAU served as a major catalyst in the symbiotic relationship between ECOWAS and the UN. This support eventually prompted the organisation itself to reassess its principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of OAU member states. On the part of the UN, their initial role was limited to humanitarian assistance, political reconciliation and electoral assistance.[35]

Closely following on the heels of the appointments and engagements of these two global bodies was a meeting in Geneva, Switzerland in early July 1993 as a prelude to the signing of the Cotonou agreement. Considerably, the Contonou agreement is by far the most comprehensive agreement in the entire Liberia peace process.[36] All the successive peace agreements that came after the signing of the Cotonou agreement (like the Akosombo, Accra and Abuja peace agreements) only sort to revise or explain the provisions within that agreement. The 19 Articles of the Cotonou peace agreement touched on salient issues such as disarmament, demobilization, encampment, peace enforcement powers, election modalities, humanitarian assistance and amnesty.[37] Furthermore, the Cotonou agreement facilitated the eventual formation of the Liberian National Transitional Government (LNTG) with David Kpomakpor as its head and representatives from the NPFL, ULIMO and IGNU. Other transitional arms of government such as the Council of State, the Supreme Court, the Legislative Assembly and the Elections Commission were all established.[38]

One major spinoff of the Cotonou agreement was the establishment of the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) to support the efforts of ECOWAS and LNTG to implement the provisions within the Cotonou peace agreement. UNOMIL was tasked under Security Council Resolution 866 (1993) to "investigate ceasefire violations; assist in maintenance of assembly sites and demobilisation of combatants; support humanitarian assistance; investigate human rights violations; assist local human rights groups; observe and verify elections" (S/RES/866). Under the agreement, it was expected that troops from East Africa mainly Tanzania and Uganda would join to increase the numbers of ECOMOG and also to help with the execution of the agreement. Yet again, this agreement was undermined by the warring factions and other major stakeholders in Liberia. Apart from the agreement suffering from logistical and financial constraints, observers under

UNOMIL and the expanded ECOMOG forces struggled to deploy (Aboagye, 1999; Olonisakin, 2000). The delay in the deployment of UNOMIL and the expanded ECOMOG forces prepared the grounds for fighting to continue and for new factions such as ULIMO-J, ULIMO-K and the Lofa Defense Force to emerge to complicate the peace process (Clayton, 1995; Tuck, 2000). All these connected distractions made it impossible for the Cotonou peace agreement to function. The eventual arrival of UNOMIL observers and peacekeepers from Tanzania and Uganda did very little to help with the disarmament of the warring factions.

Subsequently, the Akosombo agreement came on board after the failures of the Cotonou agreement. It was spearheaded by President Jerry John Rawlings of Ghana who was then the newly elected chairman of ECOWAS. Surprisingly, the Akosombo Agreement did not really introduce any new dimension to the peace process. Rather, it provided the avenue for further clarification and amendment to the Cotonou peace agreement. The snail-paced approach and the seeming gaps in the implementation roadmap of the Cotonou agreement occasioned the Akosombo agreement. Nevertheless, the Akosombo Agreement highlighted the concerns of the international community towards the prolonged suffering and the excessive adversity that the people of Liberia have been subjected to.[39] Jaye (2003) posits that the Akosombo peace agreement was a marked improvement over the Cotonou agreement because it went beyond merely providing an opportunity for accepting the warring faction in the peace process to providing the basis for them to engage. Jaye's argument is supported by the allocation of positions and slots to officials from the NPFL, ULIMO, AFL and the Liberian National Conference (LNC) to form the newly established five-member Council of State.[40] Hitherto, the powers for the implementation under the Cotonou agreement were mainly the responsibility of ECOMOG and UNOMIL. However, the Akosombo agreement seems to have given more powers and responsibilities to the LNGT to help ECOMOG and UNOMIL enforce the provisions in the agreement. In spite of this added responsibility for the LNTG, all three groups tasked to enforce the agreement failed to achieve the desired results. The Accra ratification on 21 December 1994 did very little to compel the warring factions to obey the provisions of the Akosombo agreement (Addo, 2005; Bekoe, 2008).

The process was moved to Abuja following the inability of the mediators to achieve the needed result with the Akosombo agreement and the Accra clarification. The Abuja accord made some amendments to the Cotonou and Akosombo agreements as well as the clarification from Accra. Within the milieu of insecurity and continuous fighting, the Abuja accord, like all the other agreements that preceded it, called for a ceasefire and cessation of hostilities.[41] Riley and Sesay (1996) assert that the Abuja accord was significantly different from the previous peace agreements because it brought all the warring factions together under one umbrella to govern in a transition government. Apart from the provisions for the Council of State, some slots within the ministries and some other public corporations were awarded to some warring factions to further encourage the attainment of the provisions of the Cotonou agreement. The accord also covered the modalities for the elections, the peace enforcement powers as well as the tenure and mandate of the transitional government.[42] Consequently, the Abuja II accord which heralded the elections of 1997 effectively became the only peace accord that was fully implemented in the Liberian peace process.

One of the most significant outcomes from the Liberian peace process is the number of peace agreements signed throughout the entire period. Most of the authors who have written on peace agreements are either concentrating on the economic aspects (Aning and Atuobi, 2011); political and military issues (Mehler, 2009) or implementation of the peace agreements (Bekoe, 2003). None of them focused on how exit would be pursued in case of a deployment of a peacekeeping operation. Aning and Atuobi (2011) wrote about the economic dimensions of the ECOWAS peace agreements in West Africa. To them, it was worrying that little attention was paid to the economic aspects of the peace agreements since most of the causes of conflict in the West African sub-region was as a result of the governance of natural resources, management and equitable distribution of resources. To interrogate the issue further, they used the empirical cases of Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire, and all the cases had negative response with respect to the peace agreements addressing the economic issues. They concluded that the failure of most of the Liberian peace agreements were as a result of the inability of those agreements to tackle the critical issues of natural resource governance, economic exploitation and resource management. But it is important to state that economic issues could not have been the only

reason why the peace agreements failed. There are many other equally important reasons - such as the issue of troop size, functions, drawdown and eventual exit strategy- that can cause a peace agreement to be ineffective. Table 4.2 illuminates the various peace agreements as signed for Liberia and the exit dimensions.

Table 4.2: Liberian Peace Agreements and their Exit Components

Month/Year	**Venue**	**Outcome**	**Exit Dimension**
August 2003	Accra, Ghana	Comprehensive Peace Agreement	None
August 1996	Abuja, Nigeria	Abuja Accord I	None
August 1995		Abuja Accord II	
December 1994	Accra, Ghana	Accra Acceptance and Accession Agreement	None
September 1994	Akosombo, Ghana	Akosombo Agreement	None
July1993	Cotonou, Benin	Cotonou Accord	None
July 1993	Geneva Switzerland	Geneva Ceasefire Agreement	None
October 1991	Yamoussoukro, Cote d'Ivoire	Yamoussoukro IV Accord	None
September 1991		Yamoussoukro III Accord	
July 1991		Yamoussoukro II Accord	
June 1991		Yamoussoukro I Accord	
February 1991	Lomé, Togo	Lomé Agreement	None
December 1990	Banjul, The Gambia	Banjul Joint Statement	None
November 1990	Bamako, Mali	Bamako Ceasefire Agreement	None
August 1990	Banjul, The Gambia	ECOWAS Peace Plan	None

Source: Authors Own Compilation, 2014

The Liberian example presents an innovative study of sub–regional engineered peacekeeping operation and conflict prevention mechanism. Ademola (1995), in his work extensively interrogated how the focus of ECOWAS shifted principally from an economic

development-oriented organisation to one that is solely committed to resolving conflict and establishing peace in West African trouble spots. His work, apart from scrutinising the undercurrents of the intra-regional politics and diplomatic efforts, also evaluated the peace process as was undertaken by ECOWAS. He claimed that ECOWAS lacked the institutional and procedural techniques to prosecute the operation in Liberia. Yet in his conclusion he acknowledges the prospects of using the ECOWAS operation in Liberia as a model for future conflict resolution on the African continent. Like many others, he failed to discuss in detail the important role played by the UN, through its diplomatic efforts and later with the deployment of the UN observer mission. He dwelled so much on ECOWAS and its peacekeeping efforts in Liberia.

Alao, Mackinlay and Olonisakin (1999) extend the discussion to examine the complex response mechanism that was needed to return a country that was devastated by conflict to some stability. The outcome of their empirical narratives is an inquiry into the entire peace process, the crucial role played by key actors such as the peacekeepers, politicians and the war lords and how their action affected the drive towards attaining sustainable peace. Together they contend that although the ECOWAS and ECOMOG actions brought some stability to Liberia, to them, a 'stronger intervening organisation [aside ECOMOG] was needed to move the peace process to the highest level. Alao, et al (1999) posited two measures to account for the graduation into the "supposed" stronger intervening organisation. First, they recommended a broader mediation foundation as a requisite to attaining peace. In their view, if ECOWAS had that capacity, they could have handled Charles Taylor's objection to the Nigerian-dominated ECOMOG forces that intervened in Liberia to bring peace. Second, they identified the lack of capacity of ECOWAS to seriously engage in activities such as disarmament and demobilisation which in their view was basic to finding a lasting solution to the crises. Even though they identified the UN as having the political capabilities to undertake some of these endeavors, what they failed to do was to mention whether the UN was that stronger intervention organisation they referred to in their narratives.

Adebajo (2003) analysed data on building peace in West Africa focusing specifically on Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau. His choice and interrogation of peacekeeping

operations especially those that happened in Liberia and Sierra Leone allowed him to postulate that the UN will be better served in its quest to achieve global security if it embraces regional approaches to solving interconnected conflicts in West Africa. Adebajo (2003) included contemporary issues in his analysis of the ECOWAS/ECOMOG and the UN peacekeeping operations in those two countries in question. In as much as he admits that ECOWAS's intervention in the Liberia was fraught with several challenges, he posits that local actors such as ECOWAS possess some advantages when it comes to dealing with complex dynamics in crises situations. He calls for the redirection of focus for regional and global organisations in peacekeeping operation. Considering that the UN and (O) AU are saddled with many contending issues. Adebajo (2003) advocates for a sub-regional actor like ECOWAS to take up the mantle 'extinguishing local bush fires'. But he is quick to add that the involvement of such sub-regional actors can fuel the pursuit of their individual goals. Though in his conclusion Adebajo (2003) suggests partnership between ECOWAS and the UN as a surest path to consolidation of peace in crises situations, later research has consistently found that the collaboration indeed yield results, but the effects are small.

Makinlay and Alao (1995); Olonisakin (1996); Adibe (1997) and Adebajo (2004) all discuss the issue of the ECOWAS/ECOMOG and UN/UNOMIL partnership in Liberia with respect to the peacekeeping operations. Although it was the first time that such cooperation was taking place it was fraught with many challenges. Makinlay and Alao (1995) admit that there was deep seated friction between ECOMOG and UNOMIL, especially in the pursuit of the various mandates. This invariably had negative implications on the mediation and peacekeeping efforts. According to Adebayo (2004), with the desire to bask in the success of its intervention in Liberia, ECOWAS was very reluctant to accept the UN observers in Liberia. To him, ECOWAS only accepted the UN observers because it presented an option of eliciting compliance from a "certain spoiler" Charles Taylor and his NPFL who were refusing to disarm to ECOMOG. Perhaps the issue of challenges that confronted ECOMOG and UNOMIL in their operation has been over flogged issue but Olonisakin (1996) and Adibe (1997) agreed that these were very legitimate concerns that needed attention. Even though UNOMIL was largely perceived as

not being in the front line, they were better resourced than ECOMOG in terms of finance, logistics and equipment.

In spite of the myriad of challenges that confronted the two organisations in their operations in Liberia, there is a general consensus among authors that collaboration between RECs and the UN is a feasible option to exploit for future peacekeeping engagements. In her conclusion, Olonisakin (1996) contends that if such synergy is to be effective in future then there is the need to develop a concept of collaboration where a strategy is devised in which the UN holds full political control over the operations. But this argument defeats the whole idea behind partnership as espoused by Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his agenda for peace. Such arguments only go to undermine the efforts that regional bodies like ECOWAS are making to establish peace and stability in the sub-region as stipulated under chapter VIII of the UN Charter.

It took almost a decade for ECOWAS and the international community to find some antidote to the Liberian Conflict. The signing of several peace agreements resulted in the election of Charles Taylor as president and the withdrawal of UNOMIL and ECOMOG missions (Aning, et al, 2010: 205-268). Regardless of the establishment of a UN Peace-building Support Office in Liberia, the country relapsed into civil war prompting the deployment in September 2003 of an ECOWAS mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) as a stabilisation force. The turnaround came through the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2003, which ushered the deployment of United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) with a Chapter VII mandate to assist in the implementation of the peace agreement (Adebajo, 2011). Many Liberians celebrate the CPA because it provided a practical framework for ending the conflict and ushering the country into post-conflict recovery and an attainment of lasting peace.

4.11 Political History of Sierra Leone

This section like the previous section, attempts to shed more light on the major issues that underpinned the Sierra Leonean conflict and the response mechanisms that followed to address all the thorny issues that necessitated the conflict in the first place. The civil war that began in Sierra Leone in March 1991 can trace its roots to the indigenous origins and

pro-independence exclusivist policies of the local rulers and the British colonialist (Zack-Williams and Riley 1993; Bangura, 2000; Bundu, 2001). Sierra Leone is bordered by Guinea on the north-east, Liberia to the south-east and Atlantic Ocean to the south-west. The Sierra Leonean state like Liberia also finds itself as an amalgamated state of indigenous tribes and settlers. The territorial boundary is divided into 14 administrative districts (see Figure 4.4), 149 chiefdoms and eight major ethnic groups many of whom migrated from different parts of Africa.[43]

Fig 4.4: Political Map of Sierra Leone showing the 14 districts



Source: WHO, 2014

The first settlers were the indigenous Bulom people who were later followed by the Mende, Temne and the Fulani (Sibthorpe, 1970). Historically, Sierra Leone was one of the preferred destinations for slave ships from Europe and America to West Africa mainly because of the location and accessibility of the country for transatlantic cargo trade. This was a site that was first selected by the Portuguese and later ceded to the British abolitionist in the late 1780 for the resettlement of freed slaves (Fyle, 1981; Sibthorpe, 1970). The place for the resettlement was secured from King Tom of the Temne tribe following negotiations with Granville Sharp, a British Philanthropist.

The United States through the ACS also used Sierra Leone as a transit hub for freed slaves from the United States in the 1820s. The British government secured the settlement in 1807 following the abolishing of the transatlantic slave trade (Pham, 2006). The settlement became the epicentre for the campaign against slave ships and also as a sanctuary for slaves freed from the Atlantic by the various naval activists (Zack-Williams and Riley 1993). The coastal region of Sierra Leone became a British colony in 1808 and later on in 1896 a British protectorate was extended to the hinterlands (Hirsch, 2001). The declaration of the hinterlands as a protectorate generated a lot of confusion between the traditional rulers and the British. The lack of consultations eventually culminated in the uprising of 1898 (Boahen, 1990). As a compromise, the traditional chiefdoms, as part of the indirect rule system, maintained control over their respective areas but under the overall administration of the British (Sibthorpe, 1970). Sierra Leone gained its independence on April 27, 1961 following some constitutional reforms initiated by a collective struggle of locals in 1951. McIntyre and Aning (2005) asserts that the collective struggle of an independent state suddenly evaporated and gave way to a rancorous political system which eventually ended in the civil war. Sierra Leonean political history has spanned three major distinctive periods. The slavery and freedom periods of the 17th and 19th century, the protectorate period of the 1896-1961 and the post-independence period from 1961 till date.

4.11.1 From Functional Democracy to Political Dictatorship

The post-independence period in Sierra Leone was characterised by a functional parliamentary system of democratic governance where institutions of state such as the Judiciary, the elected House of Representatives and the Executive arms of government operated independently (Collier, 1970). Perhaps, these institutional structures emerged from the democratic principles that Sierra Leoneans inherited from the British. Dr. Milton Margai and his brother Dr. Albert Margai collectively ruled Sierra Leone for a period of seven years under the ticket of the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) (Ero, 2003; Alie, 1990). However, the initial few years of a growing democracy was truncated following the election of the main opposition leader Dr. Siaka Stevens in the 1967 elections.[44] The period between the SLPP rule and the All People's Congress (APC) rule was marked by

some military takeovers. The APC for instance was prevented from assuming political power in 1967 following a military coup that distorted the entire political process (Turay and Abraham, 1987; Bangura and Mustapha, 2010). However sanity was restored a year later and Siaka Stevens was reinstated as the head of a civilian government in 1968. This did not in any way prevent the growing instability in the country. Several attempts were made by the military to overthrow the government of Siaka Stevens but these efforts were thwarted with the help of Guinean troops in March 1971(Adebajo, 2002; Bundu, 2001).

Following the changes in the constitution and the declaration of a one-party state rule in 1978, the country descended into a long period of repressive rule and bad governance (Alie, 1990). The APC under Siaka Stevens abandoned the democratic ethos that characterised the period of independence and instituted a regime of highly centralised and a corrupt system of governance where majority of the citizens were marginalised and deprived of their rights and freedoms. Several Ministers of the Siaka Stevens regime defected to other political parties because of the bad policies and intolerance of the president (Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle, 1999). The resignation statement of Mr. Bash-Taqi, the Minister of Development best sums up the environment at the time. He stated that:

> "It gives me greater pain to see that you have embarked on a road of rapid destruction of those ideals and fundamental principles for which we fought so vehemently over the last years."(Alie, 2006:18)

Political opposition was brutally suppressed by the regime. Leaders of political parties, especially the United Democratic Party (UDP) and the SLPP, were constantly harassed and sometimes jailed because they were perceived to be ethnic-based political parties with funding from foreign interests (Alie, 2006). The military was consistently used by the regime to curtail the rights and freedoms of the people especially, those in the opposition. In spite of the brutality of the regime and the frequent declaration of state of emergency, the ruling APC still managed to win the elections of 1982 under Siaka Stevens.

However, Stevens retired in 1985 and handed over power to the head of the army Major General Joseph Momoh. The political environment took a turn for the worse with rising public sector corruption, economic decay, ethnocentric patronage and maladministration

(Bundu, 2001). The implementation of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) and its associated harsh conditionalities increased the agitation within the country for a return to multiparty democracy (Bundu, 2001; Alie, 2006; Bangura and Mustapha, 2010). Perhaps at the time, the local people saw the one-party state system as the reason behind the decline in the economic fortunes of the country. This situation was similar to what pertained in Liberia under the Doe regime. The increasing pressure from the various opposition parties and the international community forced the regime to alter the constitution and subsequently initiated steps towards multiparty elections in May 1991.

4.12 Valentine Strasser *Coup* and RUF Invasion

The first dominant narrative holds that the invasion of rebels belonging to the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in March 1991 set the stage for the beginning of the Sierra Leonean civil war. The outbreak and escalation of the armed conflict in Liberia held numerous repercussions for Sierra Leone as it was the next country to feel the brunt of armed conflict (Abdullah, 2004; Malan, Rakate, & McIntyre, 2002). Aboagye (1999) for instance argues that the Sierra Leone conflict was an "offspring of the Liberian crises". According to him, the Liberian civil war spread to Sierra Leone in 1991 following periods of widespread cross border attacks and the arming of a group of dissident soldiers - Revolutionary United Front (RUF) - by Charles Taylor for the country's role in allowing the ECOWAS mission in Liberia to use their country as a base to launch the intervention in his country (Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2004; Sesay and Hughes, 2005; Keen, 2005). Figure 4.5 shows the rebel positioning and the direction of their onslaught on the capital Monrovia.

Fig 4.5: Rebel positioning in Sierra Leone and Liberia

Source: BBC, 2000

President Momoh had reneged on his promise to follow the electoral calendar that was expected to usher the country into multiparty rule, citing insecurity and a possible spill-over effect of the Liberian conflict on Sierra Leoneans. The rebellion of the RUF led by Foday Sankoh a former army corporal grew stronger with several towns close to the border with Liberia being annexed. With the assistance of troops from Nigeria and Guinea, government forces were able to temporarily drive away the RUF rebels from some of their positions in eastern and southern part of the country (Abdullah 1997; Riley and Sesay, 1995). In spite of this achievement, junior soldiers originating mainly from the eastern part of the country led by Captain Valentine Strasser took advantage of the indecision and the worsening economic, political and security situation to stage a *coup* in April 1992. The reasons assigned for the overthrow of President Momoh's government was the accusation that his government failed to bring the raging conflict along the border towns in the mining rich area under control. In a similar response like his predecessor Momoh requested for the support of Guineans to help quell the *coup* but this action resulted in bloodshed with over a 100 deaths recorded (Musah & Fayemi, 2000; Aboagye, 1999). The ensuing violence forced President Momoh into exile in Guinea and ushered the

National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) led by Captain Valentine Strasser into power.

In spite of the *coup d'état,* the NPRC could not halt the onslaught of the RUF rebels in the diamond-rich districts of Kailahun, Kono and Kenema. The RUF was successful in annexing most of the towns and villages along the major mining town. Although ECOMOG was already stationed in Lungi as part of the residual force for the Liberian mission, the force was not huge enough to make any substantial difference in Sierra Leone, considering the fire power of the RUF rebels.[45] The situation was further worsened by the activities of former AFL soldiers who had constituted themselves into ULIMO and were also waging a war on Liberia from their base in Sierra Leone.[46] In the midst of the worsening security situation steps were initiated by the Strasser regime with the support of the UN and OAU to engage the RUF rebels for peace talks (Bundu, 2001). However, the RUF rejected the offer of peace talks and rather intensified its attacks on government positions, threatening to overrun the capital Freetown in the "shortest possible time".[47] It was against the background of this threat that the Strasser regime was pushed to engage the services of Gurkha Security Guards, a Nepalese security company to train the Sierra Leonean Army (SLA) on jungle warfare (Vines, 1999). Osman Gbla was emphatic that the intervention of Gurkha security services was necessitated by the fact that the SLA was losing grounds against a bunch of RUF rebels who were successfully employing unconventional warfare tactics to achieve their aim of destabilising the country.[48]

However, the Gurkha group withdrew after they suffered severe casualties in the course of executing their assignment.[49]Consequently, the regime brought in Executive Outcomes (EO), a South African-based private security, in April 1995 to replace the departing Gurkha Security Guards. EO was tasked with a similar responsibility of training the SLA and also to help overcome the threat posed by the RUF (Kabbah, 2010). Although EO group was particularlyunpopular among a lot of international human rights and media organisations they were able to halt the major onslaught by fighters loyal to RUF when they attempted to take over the capital, Freetown (Vines, 1999). It took the involvement of Executive Outcomes, a South African security company made up of "well-trained and well-equipped mercenaries" and other auxiliary forces and some SLA forces to overcome

the RUF offensive. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah recounted how he was threatened by the international community just a month after taking power to abrogate the contract with the EO group. He stated that:

> "...within a month of my presidency, the international Monetary Fund (IMF) advised me to terminate the contract because the cost of maintaining their operations was prohibitive. I was told that if I did not terminate the contract, IMF loans to the country would be curtailed. I considered this veiled threat rather disturbing...upon careful reflection my government did not terminate the services of the EO group until after the signing of the Abidjan Peace Accord with the RUF in November 1996..."(Kabbah, 2010:41)

Under increasing local and international pressure, Strasser promised to continue with plans to organize the all-important first multiparty elections since 1967. However, the process was affected by several *coup* attempts and divisions within the government of Captain Strasser. Eventually in January 1996 Captain Julius Maada Bio who was the Deputy chair of the NPRC took power from Strasser in a palace *coup*. Regardless of the *coup*, the elections still went ahead in February 1996 and Ahmad Tejan Kabbah of the reconstituted SLPP secured the majority votes and was sworn in later that same month. Perhaps, it was the desire of the large majority of the Sierra Leonean people to see the back of the conflict that propelled the holding of the elections. But some commentators questioned the legitimacy of the 1996 elections mainly because large portions of the country were under the control of RUF and populations within this bracket were prevented from partaking in the elections (Bundu, 2001). Despite these criticisms, the Sierra Leonean masses, Britain, ECOWAS and the Security Council rejected that positioning and welcomed the elections (Kargbo, 2006; S/PRST/1996/7; S/PRST/1996/12). Obviously, these glitches were not strong enough to defeat the purpose for which the elections were organised.

4.13 Root Causes of the Sierra Leonean Conflict

There is a substantial body of knowledge on the root causes of the Sierra Leonean conflict with disparate views on the actual causes of the conflict. Described as one of the countries within the 'arc of conflict' in the Mano River Union (MRU), the Sierra Leonean conflict

has been described in many circles as a resource-based conflict, or better still, a war over diamonds (Gbla, 2013; Gberie, 2002). Brilliant Earth, a consortium of jewelry designers, sales associate and gemologists in the United States described the conflict in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Angola, Cote d'Ivoire, Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo as 'diamond-fueled wars'. The diamond argument as the causative factor of the conflict is amply supported by proponents such as Zack-Williams (1999), Smillie, Gberie and Hazleton (2000) and Castillo and Phelps (2008). Collectively they reject the argument that associate the Sierra Leonean conflict to patrimonialism and state collapse. To them "similar problems elsewhere have not led to years of brutality by forces devoid of ideology, political support and ethnic identity" (Simillie, et al 2000:3)

But Omeje (2013), Berewa (2011), Keen (2009) and Olonisakin (2000) do not share that position. In the view of Omeje (2013) such naïve inquiry into the Sierra Leone conflict is what accounted for the flawed diagnoses, attention and response given by the international community towards the resolution of the conflict. To him, the root causes were fundamentally political and socio-economic in nature and tied to issues of 'patrimonialism, clientelism, corruption and state failure. Similarly, Olonisakin (2000) observes that the Sierra Leonean crises was as a result of the political happenings of 1968 to 1991 which was largely characterised by patrimonial rule by the All People's Party (APC) in addition to the plethora of harsh economic conditions following the implementation of the IMF-led Structural Adjustment Programme. While re-echoing Omeje's argument, Berewa (2011) contends that the conflict stimulator could not have been solely diamonds as the Kailahum district where the conflict emanated was a known agriculture producing area and never a diamond producing area. While tracing the reasons behind the eruption of the conflict Adebajo (2002) introduces several pointers to the causes of the conflict. First, he identified the political maladministration of Siaka Stevens (1968-1989) and General Joseph Momoh (1985-1992) as the base of the conflict. Second, was the recognition that the worsening economic crises created by corrupt elites together with the falling revenue from the diamonds trade also played an important role. Additionally, the socio-economic inequalities resulting from the widening gap between the urban elite and the penurious jobless youth accounted for the number of youth that formed

the base of rebels belonging to the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). The group that was mainly responsible for executing the war.

For Joe Alie (2006), the war in Sierra Leone was as a result of a 'long term economic and social decline' and a protracted 'history of social injustice'. In cataloguing the background to the conflict Alie identifies five underlying causes responsible for the conflict. These include:

- Political injustice, manipulation of elections, ethnic politics, disruption of the rule of law, and the political corruption of the principal institutions of the state, notably the courts, the police and the military;
- Mismanagements of resources and economic corruption, misappropriation and embezzlement of state funds; these were compounded by lack of accountability and transparency in the management of state resources;
- Social injustice stemming partly from political injustice and partly from economic injustice; this led to the marginalisation of whole groups like the youth and the rural poor who were to become recruits of armed rebellion;
- Over centralisation of state powers and state resources led to the total neglect of the vast majority of the population, the total collapse of the local governance and the erosion of chieftain authority, deliberately engineered by Siaka Stevens; and
- Mass poverty and mass illiteracy, with a growing culture of violence.

(Alie, 2006:34-35)

Figure 4.6 captures graphically the causes of the conflict as highlighted by Alie and others. This diagram highlights the multiplicity of factors responsible for the Sierra Leonean conflict. Also, the diagram shows the linkages between factors such as corruption, mass unemployment, ethnicity, rebels and corruption. The factors with the greatest magnitude include mass unemployment, over centralisation of power and poor economic conditions. In spite of all these factors, the most essential issue at the heart of the entire conflict is the over-centralisation of power (Sillinger, 2003).

Figure 4.6: Causes of the conflict in Sierra Leone



Source: Sillinger 2003: 57

Gbla (2013) on the other hand introduces another dimension to the root cause discussion. According to him, apart from the internal dynamics of the war already identified by previous authors, there were other regional and international undercurrents. He pinpoints the influence of Charles Taylor and his NPFL together with the initial training and funding offered by Colonel Muammar Gaddafi of Libya to the RUF rebels as the most significant external development. Adebajo (2002) employs a similar line of argument in claiming that the root cause of the Sierra Leone conflict can be narrowed into three symbiotic stages namely domestic, sub-regional and extra-regional. Arguing from the 'greed verses grievance' theoretical positioning he identifies warlords, militias, incompetent politicians and a military that is overly dependent on foreign munificence as the reasons for the conflict. At the sub- regional stage, Adebajo contends that the lack of unity among ECOWAS member states provided the impetus for some of its members to covertly support either the rebel groups or successive governments. In conclusion, he identifies the lack of international support -in terms of resources and attention- from the powers that be towards efforts made by ECOWAS and Sierra Leone to achieve and consolidate peace. Perhaps, President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah's statement sums up best the underlying causes of the Sierra Leone conflict.

> "The intimidation of the general public by successive dictatorial regimes and high level of illiteracy ... high unemployment, poverty, lack of social programmes for the youth and the failure of the judicial system killed loyalty and any sense of belonging to the state. All these created a deep-seated cynical attitude towards government, politics politicians and the public administration apparatus." (Ayissi, 2000:34)

4.14 Kabbah-RUF Negotiations and Ensuing*coup d'état*

Before Tejan Kabbah took office in 1996 the OAU mission had organised some form of negotiations in Abidjan in November 1995 between the government of Sierra Leone represented by Captain Maada Bio and the RUF. This negotiation made little difference because of the entrenched demands of the RUF. The RUF had demanded as part of the negotiation the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Sierra Leone and the allocation of cabinet positions to RUF rebels (Keen, 2005; Gberie, 2005). Although Foday Sankoh objected to the election that brought President Kabbah to power, the RUF leader still went ahead to agree to a ceasefire in Yamoussokro in March 1996. This was done ostensibly to allow for the new government to settle down before the commencement of renewed talks. However, these objections became more pronounced at the maiden meeting between Kabbah and Sankoh where Sankoh called for some transitional administration pending the holding of fresh elections (Bundu, 2001; Gberie, 2005). The lack of progress in the political and military situation saw the proliferation of some other armed groups such as the *Kamajors*[50]. These were local traditional groups who were frustrated by the seeming lack of progress and the intransigence of the RUF rebels. Amidst the deteriorating security environment, the first agreement between the government of Sierra Leone and the RUF was signed in Abidjan in November 1996.

Arguably, the Abidjan peace Accord was the first major peace plan towards resolving the crises between the government of Sierra Leone and the RUF. This peace plan provided among others, the total cessation of hostilities among the warring factions, the disarmament of combatants, a well-planned national effort on encampment, demobilisation and resettlement and the withdrawal of Executive Outcomes.[51] The 28 Articles in the agreement also recommended for the restructuring, realignment and reorientation of the SLA.[52] Furthermore, Article 3 of the agreement called for the

establishment of a Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP) which was tasked with the responsibility of supervising and monitoring the implementation of provisions in the agreement. Likewise, Article 11 also called for the establishment of a Neutral Monitoring Group (NMG) with representation from the international community to monitor the breaches of the ceasefire and provisions in the agreement. The NMG was tasked to report all breaches to a Joint Monitoring Group (JMG) which comprised representatives of the government of Sierra Leone and the RUF rebels. Comparatively, the Abidjan peace Agreement shared some similarities as well as some difference with a number of agreement signed for the Liberian case. In terms of the similarities, the Abidjan agreement was signed on the pretext that all parties would abide by the provision of the ceasefire as it happened with all the peace agreement signed for the Liberian conflict.[53] With regards to the difference, the creation of the NMG and the JMG was a significant improvement over what happened in Liberia because of the composition of the group.

Regardless of this marked improvements, the implementation of the agreement was stalled in the course of the process when both the Kabbah government and RUF accused each other of contravening the provisions in the Abidjan agreement. Whereas the RUF accused the Kabbah government of shelling its positions in Jaama, Kpolu and Godama, the government in return accused the RUF of stalling the peace process by refusing to nominate persons to the JMG (Bundu, 2001; Gberie, 2005). The situation was further aggravated when the SLA intercepted a radio communication in January 1997 which indicted Foday Sankoh and questioned his true commitment to the peace process (Gberie, 2005). The communication had pointed out that Sankoh signed the Abidjan accord so as to get the international community "off the back of the RUF". These developments effectively ended the Abidjan peace agreement as hostilities between the two factions resumed. The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) led by Major Jonny Paul Koromah took advantage of the security situation and initiated a *coup d'état* that abruptly ended the reign of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah on the 27th of May 1997. The situation was further aggravated when the RUF teamed up with the AFRC to continue with the essence of the *coup d'état*.

4.15 ECOWAS to the fore

Perhaps the most significant player in the Sierra Leone peace process was the Nigerian-led ECOMOG. Following the *coup d'état*, the Nigerian contingent which was on the ground as part of the ECOMOG forces tried to intervene to restore the *status quo ante* but it failed (Olonisakin, 2004). This led to the signing of yet another peace agreement in Conakry, Guinea on October 23, 1997. The Conakry peace plan was adopted by ECOWAS Committee of five comprising foreign ministers from Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Nigeria and Liberia. Inherent in this peace plan was a six month implementation schedule in addition to provisions for the cessation of hostilities, return of refugees, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of combatants and immunities for the leaders of the *coup d'état*.[54] Significantly, the Conakry peace plan also called for the reinstatement of President Kabbah. Bangura,et al (2010) contend that even though the UN visibly condemned the *coup d'état* it showed little enthusiasm towards the use of military intervention to settle the standoff between the ousted president and the military junta; an attitude that was reminiscent of the global body towards the use of the military to overcome the emerging civil conflicts in West Africa at the time.

Even before the signing of the Conakry peace Agreement, ECOWAS in August 1997 had taken some drastic measures. First, it extended the scope of activities and mandate of ECOMOG forces to cover Sierra Leone (A/Dec.7/8/97). Second, ECOWAS impose sanctions (arms embargo and travel restrictions) on the coup-makers (A/Dec.8/8/97). The UN Security Council also complemented the effort of ECOWAS, with an emphatic resolution 1132 (S/RES/1132).[55] By February 1998, ECOMOG with the help of the United Kingdom government, had successfully recaptured the capital, Freetown from the rebel movements and caused the reinstatement of President Tejan Kabbah as president in March 1998.Even though the use of force in this situation appeared problematic, nevertheless it elicited the right response of restoring a legitimate government.. The UN and ECOWAS might not have explicitly approval the actions of the Nigerian-led ECOMOG forces to forcefully remove the AFRC but its actions did not negate in any way the positives of their interventions.[56]

In terms of the legitimacy and legality of the intervention, Olonisakin (2004) contends that the ECOMOG mission to Sierra Leone did not suffer much compared to the Liberian case, as the Nigerian-dominated regional force had the full backing of the international community to intervene and the recognised government welcomed their presence. Similarly, Clayton (1999) and Adebajo (2004) in evaluating the intervention of ECOWAS in Sierra Leone were emphatic that the action taken by ECOMOG was the best option at the time. But unlike Olonisakin, Adebajo and Clayton, critics such as Nowrot (1998), Mortimer (2000) Bundu (2001) and Bah (2012) argue that the actions of ECOMOG were beyond the parameters of peacekeeping. Collectively, they posit that the Nigerian-led ECOMOG peacekeeping mission was unilateral in nature, the approach was a total display of an overbearing regional hegemon, and it lacked the requisite mandate from the Security Council to engage in the Sierra Leonean crises.

Even before the arrival of ECOMOG's task force in Sierra Leone, there was an already established force on the ground comprising of Nigerians, Ghanaians and Guineans. Additionally, at the instance of President Momoh, a battalion of Nigerian troops was invited to assist the SLA in their campaign against the RUF rebels. However, Bundu (2001) argues that at the time, there was no defence pact between the two countries. He further stated that Nigerian intervention was premised on the personal relationship between two leaders (President Momoh and General Ibrahim Babangida). Pham (2005) contend that the role of Nigeria troops in Sierra Leone was properly formalised in 1994 following the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the two countries. The MOU gave birth to the Nigerian Army Technical Assistance Group (NATAG) which operated differently from the Nigerian ECOMOG forces. Both Bundu (2001) and Pham (2005) maintain that although theoretically NATAG and Nigerian-led ECOMOG were under the same field command, practically there was some distinctiveness with their operations. While NATAG was more of a "bilateral military assistance" force, Nigeria as part of ECOMOG operated under a multilateral peacekeeping framework (Bundu, 2001; Pham, 2005).

Also, per the Status-of-Forces Agreement (SOFA)[57] signed between Nigerian and government of Sierra Leone, under Tejan Kabbah in 1997, a battalion from Nigeria was stationed in Sierra Leone tasked with the responsibilities of helping to combat the rebels and training the national army (Bundu, 2001; Olonisakin 2004). Article 2 of the SOFA bind Nigeria to "make available the military and security assistance of the Nigerian Forces Assistance Group for the sustenance of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the republic of Sierra Leone".[58] Bah (2012), in discussing the operations of ECOMOG, could not conclude whether the bilateral arrangement between the two countries allowed Nigeria to intervene in an event such as a *coup d'état* or not. However, the provisions in the SOFA was clear; apart from the defence of their locality, Nigerian troops were barred from undertaking any offensive role in Sierra Leone (Article 21).

Once the government of Tejan Kabbah was reinstated, the Security Council renewed its commitment towards the peace process by increasing the level of international support towards resolving the conflict. A United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) was created and mandated, among others, to monitor the general security situation, ECOMOG's role in the disarmament and the demobilisation process, and also to ensure that all aspects of the international humanitarian laws are being respected (S/RES/1346). Consequently, the AFRC and the RUF took advantage of the ill-prepared ECOMOG troops and the UN Observers and continually exposed them to several attacks. But the intransigence of the rebels and the government coupled with the continuous fighting meant that a new peace agreement needed to be introduced to address the crises. Consequently, the Lomé peace accord which called for a much needed stronger mandate for both UNOMSIL and ECOMOG was signed.[59]

The Sierra Leone case was the second major conflict within the sub-region following the end of the Cold War. It was also the second conflict to attract the intervention of a sub-regional force, ECOMOG, following right after the crises in Liberia. The ECOMOG intervention in Sierra Leone bears some similarities and differences with the Liberian case. In terms of similarities the Sierra Leonean intervention did not secure consent from the warring factions just as it happened in Liberia.In contrast to the Liberian case,

ECOMOG's intervention in Sierra Leone had some experience to rely upon following their earlier intervention in Liberia. Olonisakin (2004) opines that the sub-regional approach to the conflict was remarkably different from the Liberian conflict in terms of the political roles played by the entire sub-region within the period of the intervention. However, she contends that the absence of a solid political structure in ECOWAS added to the initial failures of ECOMOG in Serra Leone. Bundu (2001), while comparing the two operations, argued that different political regimes governed the operations of both missions. In his view whereas the ECOMOG in Liberia was accountable and answerable to ECOWAS through the Executive Secretary, the Nigerian led-ECOMOG was accountable and answerable to its home government. That notwithstanding, it is clear that the ECOMOG intervention in Sierra Leone was a marked improvement over that of Liberia.

4.16 Exit Components of Sierra Leone Peace Agreements

In the case of Sierra Leone, not so many peace agreements were signed as compared to Liberia. What perhaps might have accounted for the reduction was the lack of ambiguities in the transfer of responsibilities and the standard set by the strong exit dimension in the first peace agreement signed in November 1996. To Aning and Atoubi (2011), the reduction in the number of peace agreements in the case of Sierra Leone was mainly because the two major peace agreements Abidjan (November 1996) and Lomé (July 1999) all addressed the economic angle of the conflict which was central to resolving the crises. The recognition of economic dimension was not the only novel departure; for the first time, at least, there were some hints of exit as the very first accord stressed the need for Executive Outcomes to withdraw after three months. Article 12 of the Abidjan Peace Agreement stated categorically that:

> "The Executive Outcome shall be withdrawn five weeks after the deployment of the Neutral Monitoring Group (NMG). As from the date of the deployment of the Neutral Monitoring Group, the Executive Outcome shall be confined to the barracks under the supervision of the Joint Monitoring Group and the Neutral Monitoring Group. Government shall use all endeavours, consistent with its treaty obligations, to repatriate other foreign troops no later than three months after the

> deployment of the Neutral Monitoring Group or Six months after the signing of the Peace agreement, whichever is earlier."(Aning, et al 2010:296)

Article 12 of the agreement gave recognition to some exit indicators. First, it was explicit on the deadline for the withdrawal of Executive Outcomes. Second, and most importantly, the article was clear on the transfer of responsibilities once Executive Outcomes exited. Table 4.3 highlights the various peace agreements as signed for Sierra Leone and the exit dimensions.

Table 4.3: Sierra Leone Peace Agreements and their Exit Components

Month/Year	**Venue**	**Outcome**	**Exit Dimension**
Nov 2000 May 2001	Abuja, Nigeria	Abuja Peace Agreement	None
July 1999	Lomé, Togo	Comprehensive Peace Agreement	None
October 1997	Conakry, Guinea	ECOWAS Six-Month Peace Plan	None
Nov 1996-October 1997	Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire	Abidjan Accord	Withdrawal of Executive Outcome

Source: Authors Own Compilation, 2014

Bah (2012), in evaluating the reasons behind ECOMOG's departure from Sierra Leone, was categorical that the ECOMOG intervention in Sierra Leone had no clear exit strategy just as was the case in Liberia. He contends that the reinstatement of Tejan Kabbah was at the centre of ECOMOG's mandate yet little or no attention was given to how the troops were going to withdraw once that objective was achieved "without leaving a security vacuum" (Bah, 2012). Nigeria which was providing nearly eighty per cent of ECOMOG troops (12,000 out of 16,000 in Liberia, and 12,000 out of 13,000 in Sierra Leone) and ninety per cent of the funding for the interventions in both Liberia and Sierra Leone began to feel the full brunt of the crises (Adebajo 2004:293). Presidential Candidate, Olusegun

Obasanjo, had promised prior to his election to withdraw Nigerian troops from Sierra Leone, citing the lack of support from the international community towards regional peacekeeping (Ekeator, 2007). But Bah (2012) thinks otherwise. He posits that two major reasons accounted for the decision by Nigeria to hastily withdraw from Sierra Leone; namely, change of political leadership and peacekeeping fatigue. Other writers have argued that the challenges associated with co-deployment, high operational cost, combat weariness, intense disapproval of the war from many Nigerians also accounted for the reasons behind Nigeria's decision to exit from their engagements with ECOMOG in Sierra Leone (Adebajo, 2013). Yet Meister (2013) opines that Nigeria's withdrawal which eventually culminated in an outright exit was not hastily done; rather it was a phased withdrawal which was precipitated by plethora of events, key among them being lack of logistics and financial constraints.

The UN authorised the deployment of a much bigger force to absorb the threats that were likely to be posed by the withdrawal of the Nigeria contingent. Prior to the drawdown and eventual exit of a greater number of ECOMOG II troops, the United Nations Security Council, by resolution 1270, had authorised the establishment of UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) with a Chapter VII mandate in October 1999 to replace the skeletal UNOMSIL mission that was assisting ECOMOG (Reno, 2001; Human Rights Watch, 1999; Curran and Woodhouse, 2007). This was in response to the inability of the UN observer mission as well as ECOMOG to halt the growing massive atrocities (such as rape, indiscriminate killings, kidnapping and random amputation) that were consistently being perpetrated against civilians. For the very first time, the Security Council mandated UNAMSIL peacekeeping operation to protect civilians. Consequently, between October 1997 and March 2013, not less than 27 UN Security Council resolutions followed to halt the worsening security situation in Sierra Leone.

However, the UNAMSIL's mission began on the wrong footing as the RUF rebels exploited and exposed the security vacuum created by the withdrawal of Nigerian troops in 2000 by taking nearly 500 UN peacekeepers hostage. This singular action occasioned the breakdown of the entire UN mission (Bah, 2012). Invariably, serious questions were

raised about the capabilities of the new UN mission to handle the crises in Sierra Leone. It took the unilateral intervention by United Kingdom to help restore some sanity and also to save the UN mission from having to go through some of the bad experiences in Somalia and Rwanda where the UN intervention failed miserably in addressing the crises. In order to address these challenges posed by ECOMOG's withdrawal, UNAMSIL increased its troop strength from 6000 to 17500 to cover that gap in order to deal with the security situation (S/2001/857).

Bah (2012) and UNDPKO (2003) in discussing the UN mission in Sierra Leone contends that UNAMSIL's exit strategy was based on benchmarking and was executed through phased withdrawal of troops. Similarly, the United Nations (2003:285) described the UNAMSIL exit strategy as an "innovative approach... based on a carefully calibrated drawdown of its military component in step with the fulfilment of specified benchmarks."After a series of diplomatic activities, some semblance of peace was achieved and the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL), a follow-on mission replaced UNAMSIL in January 2006 to assist the government in consolidating the achievements of UNAMSIL, and also to further address the post-conflict security, economic and political reconstruction (S/RES/1734). Once the peacekeepers had all departed, an integrated peacebuilding office (UNIPSIL) was established to help consolidate the peace that had eluded Sierra Leone all this while (S/RES/1829).

Consequently, this political mission addressed critical areas such as the strengthening of institutions of state and the promotion of human rights culminating in the final shut down of UN peacebuilding engagements in Sierra Leone in May 2014. The successful transfer of responsibilities from UNAMSIL to all the other successor missions and eventually to the government of Sierra Leone without creating any security vacuum could perhaps explain why the UN peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone is widely held as a success story.

In conclusion, this historical overview has sought to demonstrate that the causative factors in the conflict in Liberia and Sierra Leone predates the era of both Samuel Doe and Siaka Stephens. Regimes since the post-colonial period have all contributed significantly to the

carnage that was experienced in both countries. The overview showed that ECOWAS handling of the security situation in both countries contributed extensively to the resolution of both conflicts. Although a number of peace agreements were signed in both countries none of these agreements explicitly touched on the exit strategy for both the ECOWAS and the UN peacekeeping operations.

Notes

[1] The major indigenous ethnic groups are Bassa, Belle, Dei, Gbandi, Gola, Grebo, Gio (Dan), Kpelle, Kissi, Kru, Lorma(Buzzi), Mano (Mah), Mandingo, Mende, Vai

[2] The phrase *Congoes* or *"Congo people"* was used commonly to describe the non-native black settler's majority of whom originated from the Congo basin and arrived in Liberia after the abolition of slave trade. Later others who were rescued from captured slave ships by the British and the American naval ships were sent to Liberia.

[3] Out of the 16 indigenous NCOs that took part in the coup d'état four of the officers came from the Krahn tribe, two from Sarpo, four from Gio, One Kru, Three Lorma, two Krahn –Sarpo and One Grebo.

[4] For a detailed account of the numerous human rights abuses and atrocities committed under Doe's presidency see Amnesty International, International report (1985:59-61); Amnesty International, International report (1987:66-68); Michael Massing, Best Friends: Violations of human rights in Liberia, America's closest Ally in Africa (1986); Report of US Lawyers Committee for Human rights New York, November 1986

[5] The Liberian People's Party (LPP) which had a lot of student following had its leader Amos Sawyer disqualified, molested and thrown into jailed for what was described as an attempt to "burn down Monrovia and install a socialist government" (Massing, 1986:13). Similarly, Baccus Mathews (leader of the United People's Party (UPP) and Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf (an official of the Liberia Action Party (LAP) were both disqualified and Ellen was imprisoned accused of either championing socialist ideals or for sedition.

[6] Interview with Ambassador Abdul Karim Koroma, Former Sierra Leone Foreign Minister 1985-1992, Freetown Sierra Leone, 12 July 2013

[7] Interview with Dr. Abass Bundu, Former Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, Freetown Sierra Leone, 14 July 2013

[8] The Abuja Peace Accord as part of the rebuilding and reconstruction process made provision for ECOMOG stay for some time even after the elections to help with the training and restructuring of the new national army.

[9] Interview with Dr. Alimamy Paolo Bangura, Former Minister for Foreign Affairs under the AFRC Regime, Freetown Sierra Leone, 12 July 2013

[10] See Human Rights Watch (2002) Back to the brink war crimes by Liberian government and rebels , Vol. 14, No. 4 (A), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/liberia/Liberia0402.pdf

[11] See 1975 ECOWAS Treaty

[12] The Anglophone countries included The Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone while the Francophone countries included Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger Senegal, and Togo. The only Luxophone country at the time was Guinea Bissau.

[13] Interview with Thomas Jaye, Deputy Director, Faculty of Academic Affairs an Research, KAIPTC, Accra Ghana, 18 August 2014

[14] Interview with Dr. Abass Bundu, Former Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, Freetown Sierra Leone, 14 July 2013

[15] Interview with Col. Festus B. Aboagye (Rtd.), Executive Secretary African Peace Support Trainers Association (APSTA) and Former Commanding Officer, ECOMOG, Accra Ghana, 15 July 2013

[16] Interview with Dr. Remy Ajibewa, Head of Political Affairs and International Cooperation, ECOWAS Commission, Accra, Ghana, 16 September 2014

[17] ANAD was established in 1977 by seven Francophone countries namely Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Togo, ostensibly to protect their independence and ensure their security. Interestingly, Guinea did not join ANAD.

[18] Agacher region was a border area between the Burkina Faso (then Upper Volta) and Mali

[19] See Treaty of ECOWAS, adopted 24 July 1993, Cotonou in Aning, et al 2010:13-53

[20] Ibid.,p.42

[21] Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, December 10,1999, reproduced in *Official Journal of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)* English edition, vol.37, December 1999:12-27

[22] Ibid.,

[23]Interview with Brigadier General Francis Agyemfra (rtd), former Chief of Staff, Ghana Armed Forces and Ghana's Former Ambassador to the Republic of Liberia (1997-2001),Accra Ghana. 19 May 2014

[24] Ibid.,
[25] See Section 4, Banjul Joint Statement -21 December in Aning, et al 2010:214
[26] Ibid.,
[27] Lomé Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities and Peaceful Settlement of Conflict, Lomé , 13 February 1991 in Aning, et al 2010:215
[28] Ibid.,
[29] Interview with Dr. Abass Bundu, Former Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, Freetown Sierra Leone, 14 July 2013
[30] The reconstituted members of the SMC had Gambia as the only Anglophone country. The rest were Côte d'Ivoire (Chair), Senegal, Togo and Guinea-Bissau.
[31] *Yamoussoukro-I Agreement*: Outcome of Deliberations of the Meeting of Heads of state, Yamoussoukro, Côte d'Ivoire, June 30, 1991, reproduced in *Official Journal of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)* English edition, vol.19, July 1991:22-23.
[32] *Yamoussoukro-III Agreement*: ECOWAS Committee of Five, Final Communiqué of the Second Meeting on the Liberian Crisis , Yamoussoukro, Côte d'Ivoire, September 17,1991, reproduced in *Official Journal of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS),* English edition, vol.19 July 1991:24-25
[33] *Yamoussoukro-IV Agreement*: ECOWAS Committee of Five, Final Communiqué of the Second Meeting on the Liberian Crisis , Yamoussoukro, Côte d'Ivoire, September 17,1991, reproduced in *Official Journal of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS),* English edition, vol.19 July 1991:24-25
[34] See Security Council Res 788 supra Note 44 Para. 7;
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unomilFT.htm
[35] See United Nations Actions on Liberia at
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unomilFT.htm
[36] Interview with Thomas Jaye, Deputy Director, Faculty of Academic Affairs an Research, KAIPTC, Accra Ghana, 18 August 2014.
[37] See Cotonou Accord, Cotonou, 25 July 1993 in Aning, et al 2010:232
[38] Ibid., 241
[39] See Akosombo Agreement, Akosombo, 12 September 1994, in Aning, et al 2010:244
[40] Ibid.,
[41] See Abuja Agreement to Supplement the Cotonou and Akosombo Agreements as Subsequently Clarified by the Accra Agreement, Abuja, 19 September 1999, in Aning, et al 2010:260
[42] Ibid.,
[43] The Eight ethnic groups are Susu, Temne, Mende, Koranko, Kono, Limba, Sherbro and Creole
[44] The All People's Congress (APC) which was the main opposition party at the time, gained the parliamentary majority in the 1967 elections effectively allowing its leader Dr. Siaka Stevens to assume control of Sierra Leone.
[45] Interview with Dr. Alimamy Paolo Bangura, Lecturer, Fouray Bay College, University of Sierra Leone,and Former Minister for Foreign Affairs under the AFRC Regime, Freetown Sierra Leone,12 July 2013
[46] Interview with Dr. Bu-Buakei Jabbi, Lecturer, Former Sierra Leone Deputy Foreign Minister 1990-1992, Freetown Sierra Leone, 12 July 2013.
[47] Ibid.,
[48] Interview with Dr. Osman Blag, Lecturer, Fouray Bay College, University of Sierra Leone, 12 July 2013
[49] The head of the mission Major Bob MacKenzie and some five Gurkha members were executed by RUF on February 24, 1995. The government of Strasser in March 1995 withdrew all the cadets who were under the Gurkha programme.
[50] The Kamajors were a group of traditional hunters like the Dozos of Cote d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso and Mali who were mobilised by the local chiefs to counter the threats of RUF. The group was later officially christened as the Civil Defence Forces (CDF) with official support from the Tejan Kabbah government.
[51] See Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, Abidjan, 30 November 1999 in Aning, et al 2010:293.
[52] Ibid.,293-301
[53] Interview with Dr. Abass Bundu, Former Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, Freetown Sierra Leone, 14 July 2013.

[54]See ECOWAS Six-Month Peace Plan for Sierra Leone 23 October 1997-22April 1998), Conakry, 23 October 1997 in Aning, et al 2010:302.
[55]The UN sanctions include travel ban on the military junta and adult members of their families, embargoes on petroleum products and arms, and related material (including weapons and ammunitions, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment and spare parts for the aforementioned) (S/RES/1132, para 6).
[56] Interview with Ambassador Abdul Karim Koroma, Former Sierra Leone Foreign Minister 1985-1992, Freetown Sierra Leone, 12 July 2013.
[57] The Status of Forces Agreement between Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Republic of Sierra Leone concerning the Provision of Military and Security Assistance to the Republic of Sierra Leone, Lagos 7th March 1997.
[58]Ibid., Article 2.
[59] See Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, Lomé, 7 July 1999 in Aning, et al 2010:306.

CHAPTER FIVE
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

5.1 Introduction

A significant segment of research in the field of peacekeeping operations shows that exit strategy is an extremely contested and a fluid concept in peace operations. Notwithstanding this challenge, this chapter presents data gathered from the research survey on the nature of the institutional and policy frameworks that exist to guide the way sub-regional and global actors pursue exit in peacekeeping operations, with specific emphasis on ECOWAS and UN interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The narrative provided in this section stems from the responses gathered from each of the four sections of this chapter. The first sub-section analyses the importance of exit strategy in peacekeeping operations. The second sub-section scrutinises the institutional and policy frameworks within which ECOWAS and the UN exit from peacekeeping operations. The third sub-section appraises the approaches and challenges that characterised ECOWAS and UN exit from the study area. Finally, the last sub-section considers the effect and consequences of peacekeeping exit strategies on post-conflict countries.

5.2 Significance of exit strategies in peacekeeping operations

Soon after the Cold War, it became clear that peacekeeping operations as a form of intervention has become the singular most important tool for settling conflict the world over. Consequently, the new era brought in a myriad of peacekeeping activities never experienced since 1948. Consistently, the numbers of peacekeeping operations began to grow exponentially to meet the increasing spate of conflict globally. But then the strategic context for peacekeeping operations did not remain same; it changed considerably to meet the changing trends in conflict from the largely interstate conflict to a more pronounced intrastate conflict. In spite of the significant upsurge in numbers, scope and size, the UN

has since the 1990s had to struggle with championing the liberal peace agenda in troubled regions of the world as against coping with the huge financial and logistical shortfalls emanating from such engagements.

The words of the United States representative on the Security Council best sum up the state of peacekeeping at the time. He remarked that "the demand for peacekeeping was outpacing capacity and resources" (UN Doc S/PV.4223). Much as there were some successes with the earlier UN missions, there were equally some significant failures that threatened to derail the gains that the initial missions had achieved so far. Key among these failures were the missions of Somalia, Rwanda and the Balkans where the various UN missions were identified as lacking the requisite mandate in addition to the inadequate resources and political support to execute the goals of the mission. The UN's reputation was at an all-time low following the rise in civilian fatalities and the seeming unending conflicts. By the end of 1990, things had gotten worse and there were some anxieties and threats to the sustainability of future peacekeeping operations.

The UN Secretary-General at the time, Mr. Kofi Annan, appointed a high-level panel headed by Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi (a former Algerian Foreign Minister and an astute international diplomat) to conduct a post-mortem of the peacekeeping operations at the time and prescribe measures to mitigate the challenges that were boggling the launching, sustenance and withdrawal of peacekeeping missions. The Security Council had accepted the fact that several challenges prevented the successful completion of missions and as a way of curtailing the failures limited the number of new missions and subjecting itself to some form of reassessment. For the first time, the panel's report (also referred to as the Brahimi report) addressed, extensively, issues relating to mission start-up, transitions and exit strategies in UN peace operations. But even before the engagement of the panel, the United States had already been jostling with the idea of exit strategy in peace operations following the challenges they encountered in their operations in Somalia and Bosnia.

The Brahimi report identified major lapses with the way missions were initiated. The panel argued that to make peacekeeping operation a success, emphasis must be placed squarely on the commencement of the mission. In addressing ways by which a successful end could be achieved, the panel embraced the idea of placing special emphasis on good

entrance and good transitional policies as the only way to reach the target. Unfortunately, many of the earlier peacekeeping operations suffered from mission start-up hiccups. These hiccups centred on the inability of the mission mandates to clearly articulate when and how an international intervention could transfer responsibilities to local populations and exit when the targets for which the intervention was initiated in the first place had been achieved. However, even though these challenges were previously identified, very little was done to address the issue of exit in peacekeeping operations.

It was not until the 15th of November 2010 when the UN Security Council flagged the issue of exit strategy in peace operations and caused an open debate to commence in that regard. Consequently, the debate frantically diagnosed the reasons behind the decision to close any on-going peacekeeping operation. The debate and the report echoed the importance of exit strategy and also highlighted the complex challenges of transitioning from peacekeeping to peacebuilding and the quest to achieve the ultimate goal of sustainable peace in mission areas. As a way of deepening the understanding on the "how", "when" and "why" missions ended, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to provide a thorough analysis and recommendation on the issue of exit strategy in peacekeeping operations.

The resultant output was the commissioning of the report entitled: *No exit without strategy: Security Council decision-making and the closure or transition of United Nations peacekeeping operations*. This report, while interrogating the factors that cause a mission to be launched, closed or significantly altered, highlighted the significance of exit strategy in mission formation. Perhaps, the Argentine representative's statements during the debate best sums up the importance of exit strategy in peacekeeping operation. He was emphatic that "exit strategy was just as important as the establishment of a peacekeeping mission, since both affected the success of the operation" (UN Doc S/PV.4223). The discussion below highlights the benefits of exit strategy to both regional and global peacekeeping operations.

5.2.1 Exit strategy helps to connect mandates to mission tactic and resources

In any major intervention such as peacekeeping operations, the very first major mark has to do with the mandate, which is basically the directive on which that mission is supposed to function. These mandates emanate from the Security Council, in the case of the UN, and the Authority of Heads of States and Government, in the case of ECOWAS and are supposed to delineate the tasks, purpose and assign targets to be achieved. Irrespective of the type of operation, the mandate given will structure the performance of the operations and also pair resources to secure the desired outcome. There are a number of goals that these mandates seek to achieve. The goals may be simply, to set out to avert an outbreak of conflict or the spill-over of conflict into other territories. The goals could also include the stabilisation of conflict and the creation of a peaceful atmosphere for parties to the conflict to dialogue and to reach some form of durable peace agreement. Other goals may be to reinforce the implementation of peace agreements or support a state through the transformation into an established administration.

Theoretically, the principle behind mandate formulation is to help define the objectives, endstates and approach of a peacekeeping operation. Also expected to be in the mandate are strategies for exit. Unfortunately, oftentimes, mandates are verbose, vague and ambiguous and are unable to elicit the desired end result. The Brahimi report, for instance, clearly stated that the UN, in the past, had to contend with similar challenges in previous missions because the Security Council approved many ambiguous and unclear mandates. This situation arises mainly because in most instances, the analysis of the conflict situation by the Secretariat that precedes the Security Council authorisation is fraught with several loopholes and variations. As such the authorisation by the Security Council is subject to lots of interpretation. There is also the politics of the P-5 countries together with the blocking actions of other powerful states who through their specific interest in the conflict situation display certain consistencies and selectivity in the formulation of the mandate (Bercovitch, and Jackson, (2009). Sometimes the wordings of the mandate alone as well as the negotiations that kick-start its formulation are contributing factors to the output of these mandates. This invariably has serious implications on the sort of tactics to be employed and most importantly the required resources to back the achievement of the set

targets. The ECOWAS mission in Liberia and Sierra Leone suffered from the lack of clear mandate and so it became very difficult to marshal the needed resources to support the operations, and also for the troops on the ground to apply themselves to the right tactic to achieve the desired end.

Introducing an exit strategy into the mandate could address these challenges mainly because exit strategy introduces some meticulousness and thoroughness to the whole intervention process by assigning and prioritising task and benchmarks whose achievement could secure the desired endstate.[1] These tasks and benchmarks will then help the appropriate quarters to source for the requisite resources to meet the assigned task and by so doing adapt the required tactics to execute those tasks. Peacekeeping operations is a resource-intensive venture and so if the mission does not plan how it intends to exit and conducts all the fine calculations in terms of logistics and equipment there is a possibility that it may be faced with what is referred to in military parlance as "over insurance";[2] a situation where a mission is loaded with equipment that it does not necessarily need. In practical terms, all of these exigencies would require a detailed analysis of the realities on the ground. Once the exit strategy is in place, it becomes a check on the implementation of the mandate and also ensures that the right resources needed to ensure the smooth execution of the said mandate is provided. Any new or revised mandate requires the allocation of resources and in certain situations the change of tactics. But once the exit strategy is clearly defined from the onset, waste is reduced drastically and even in circumstances where a mandate is revised, resources are channelled to the right areas of the mission. Brigadier General Benjamin Kusi while commenting on exit strategy and mandates remarked that:

> ...Take for instance United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). This interim force was established in 1978. I don't know how an Interim Force can be in existence for over 37 years. For me, the word interim is for a short duration yet in the case of UNIFIL there is no end in sight...each and every time the mandate keeps on changing. This anomaly is the very reason why mandates must stipulate the exit strategy.[3]

What the above statement demonstrates is that mission without exit plan irrespective of its name or intentions might linger on indefinitely if the right plans and measures are not put

in place to guide the entire progress of that mission. For a peacekeeping operation to succeed, a good entrance should be envisaged but the focus should be on a clear exit strategy. The entrance strategy must be a direct correlation between a mandate that has a clearly defined endstate, an operational tactics that is spot-on and in tandem with the mandate and the necessary resources to support such an endeavour. This endstate would complement the search for the appropriate exit strategy which would invariably close the planning cycle and impact positively on the success of the operation. A vague and an unclear mandate will only serve to prolong and drag a mission unnecessarily, mainly because the resources available would not meet the desired endpoint and certainly those expected to implement the mandate will not have what it takes to apply the right strategy to reach the desired point.

5.2.2 Exit strategy helps missions to be pointed and purposive

Having an exit strategy in a peacekeeping operation compels mission planners and the peacekeepers to concentrate on achieving the real targets or endstate projections for which the mission was set up. An exit strategy aids in the timing and sequencing of priorities and make for better planning and allocation of the right resources to critical and the most important segments of the mission. In other words, having an exit strategy galvanises the efforts of the entire mission towards the attainment of the envisaged endpoint. As it emerged from the interviews conducted in Liberia, one peacekeeper argued that:

> "Having an exit strategy makes the peacekeeper and the entire mission more focused in the pursuit of the identified targets set out in the mandate. Staying focused as peacekeepers is the best way to get things done and to move forward with our jobs our lives and into the next assignment".[4]

Col. Alhaji Mohammed Mustapha also advanced a similar argument:

> ...If you look at Cyprus, the mission has been there since the late 1960s. The same with Kashmir...once a mission does not have a clear exit strategy you are likely to experience what the military term as "mission creep". Once you do not have an exit strategy mission creep is likely to set in and then in the process you may lose the focus for which you intervene in the first place.[5]

Being clear about mandates, endpoints and exit strategy helps missions to stay on track. Likewise, it motivates peacekeepers to carry on and persevere even in the face of numerous challenges. It is clear that more gets done and goals are quickly achieved when a peacekeeping operation has an exit strategy than when the mission has an open-ended mandate. In the words of Confucius "he who chases two rabbits catches none". As it turns out, working on a multiplicity of targets in a peacekeeping environment at a time will waste valuable time and is a productivity nightmare; a luxury that most of these peacekeeping operations do not have. This presupposes that a lot of time and energy must be churned towards focusing on a particular assignment at a time. A lot of time, energy and resources are needed to re-adjust and re-focus the direction of a mission every time when a mission switches from one task to the other.

This focus, drive and determination to succeed resonate at all levels of the peacekeeping hierarchy (strategic, operational or tactical levels of authority). Progressively, the determination and drive would mean that the mission focus is not arbitrarily changed at the least opportunity, but rather it remains resolute even in the face of changing contexts. The lack of focus would drive actors within the peacekeeping operation to engage in activities that will be hostile or injurious to the overall image of the operation. Besides, the noticeable inference from this is that the absence of an exit strategy would lead to peacekeepers being unable to establish what the end points are and therefore being more likely to get stuck in unproductive activities which would affect job completion. In military planning system, there is synchronisation matrix (synmat) where all activities are synchronised in terms of time and space for the duration of the mission so as to prevent the mission from becoming reactive to situations. Exit strategy provides a synmat that helps peacekeeping operations to become more proactive in their planning so that they do not become reactive at the least changes in the mission environment. For example, if a peacekeeping force is aware that the intervention period is one year, they will not at the ninth month still be moving heavy equipment into an operating environment, considering that the operations would only be ending in three months' time.[6] ECOMOG operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone were subjected to lots of controversy of corruption, human rights abuses and sexual exploitation and abuse. Perhaps the inability to clearly delineate what the mission strategy was, whether peacekeeping or peace enforcement, opened the

floodgates for peacekeepers to engage in some of these unproductive activities. Invariably, a peacekeeping operation with a clearly defined exit strategy is bound to attain better results than one without an exit strategy (Stambaugh, 2001).

5.2.3 Exit strategy stimulates participation

Participation in peacekeeping operations depends on political will. It is a function of the readiness of a state to become embroiled in the resolution of a particular conflict even when there are dangers of domestic disapproval, possible loss of lives and serious financial commitments. The generation and participation of forces for some specific peacekeeping missions has always been fraught with several challenges. Each of the member states reserves the right to pick and choose on a case by case basis whether it will participate in a particular mission. In the recent past, the UN and other regional organisations have been struggling to exact from countries the needed enthusiasm to participate in either ongoing or new peacekeeping operations. The situation is even more precarious when it comes to the participation of the five permanent members (P-5) of the Security Council and other influential countries in the global west. A cursory look at the top twenty troop and police contributors to global peacekeeping would reveal that most of the participating countries are from the global south.

A number of explanations have emerged as the reasons behind the inability of peacekeeping operations globally to generate the needed enthusiasm, especially from developed countries, to gladly commit to participating in either UN or any other regional peace operations. For many of these countries, the salient issue is whether there is a need for them to maintain a long-term commitment to a peacekeeping or a peacebuilding presence in a post-conflict country. Many of these states, for example the United States, have expressed their disapproval for open-ended "state-building" missions, because to them, such a mission lingers unnecessarily and lacks a clear timetable and an exit strategy. As it is emerging, many of these states will only commit to participating in peacekeeping operation when all the parties to the conflict support the intervention, the UN or a regional authority has approved it, resources are available to sustain the operations and most importantly where the mission has a clear mandate and an exit strategy. For most of these

developed countries, having a definite exit strategy with clear timelines in any proposed peace operation is a good enough reason to get them to commit troops and personnel to the mission.

5.2.4 Exit strategy engenders responsibility and accountability

Accountability and responsibility are essential in making peace operations effective. The authority assigned peacekeepers in an operating environment is done to match responsibility to tasks. Nonetheless, authority blends with responsibility and accountability. The understanding is that whoever is assigned some responsibility in a peacekeeping environment must be accountable for meeting accompanying obligations and must produce results. Naturally, having an exit strategy in a peacekeeping operation would require that timelines are matched to specific benchmarks and targets. The achievements of these benchmarks are vital to the overall completion of the mission. As argued by Stambaugh (2001), "having a timeline injects ability to measure progress throughout the mission". Once a mission is not meeting the set targets, questions would be asked and an evaluation would be conducted to assess the reasons behind the non-achievement of targets.

Having an exit strategy means that at some point in the mission's existence, it will finally come to an end and so logically, peacekeepers would have to be assessed periodically to gauge how they are working towards the ultimate goal. Exit strategy therefore serves as some form of yardstick to which mission personnel are made to explain and justify their actions, especially in circumstances where they are not meeting the endstate for which the mission was established. It also includes accomplishing objectives and achieving higher results in a timely and reasonable manner. However, accountability and responsibility does not only apply to peacekeepers alone, it also embraces decision makers (at the strategic level) and planners at the secretariat. In effect, exit strategy as a form of accountability check helps to monitor the progress or sustainability of mission outcomes.

5.2.5 Exit strategy controls the urge to overstay

There is always the temptation for peacekeeping missions to drag or linger for a long while especially in circumstances where the mission seems to make no headway in resolving the root cause of the conflict for which it was deployed. Overstaying here is used in the context of particular peace operations that have been given a specific timeframe, deadline or a fixed date. Peacekeeping operations in most of the operating environments usually appear to be at its wits end. A number of factors may account for the reason behind a never-ending or a long haul peacekeeping operation. Such factors are mostly dependent on the interest of the intervening power, the comparative merits behind the intervention and the price paid to advance different alternatives. Depending on the interest, these factors could be placed at the doorstep of the peacekeeping mission itself, the host country (here referring to the legitimate government, citizenry or belligerents) and troop and police-contributing countries. The continuous stay often threatens to cause disaffection among the local population, especially the local government, and hinder their capacity to be self-sufficient.

For instance, in 2006, after the Burundian elections, the government of Pierre Nkurunziza requested the UN to drawdown even when there were still concerns about the fragility of that country. Similarly, President Idriss Déby of Chad in 2009 labelled the UN mission (MINURCAT) "useless" and called for its immediate withdrawal even though the situation on the ground was far from ideal. Also, after the 1997 elections, Charles Taylor reportedly stated that ECOMOG had no mandate to restructure the Liberian army and therefore asked ECOMOG to leave Liberia, because to him Liberia was a sovereign state and therefore did not need a foreign army to protect it. In all these examples, as it emerged, the situation was not ripe for either the UN or ECOMOG to pull out of these countries.

However, to these countries and governments the peacekeeping operations had outlived their usefulness and their very presence was creating a nuisance that they needed to be dealt with. Perhaps, the decision to call for the UN exit was primarily induced by political motives. It is however clear that host countries are weary and averse to a mission prolonging its stay unnecessarily, especially in circumstances where their huge numbers

send the signals of instability. Having an exit strategy makes things easier and can help to clarify and define the role of either the UN or any other regional organisation to the host country. Additionally, exit strategies have the potential to help resolve tensions that may arise as a result of the withdrawal of certain programmes and projects that come along with the peacekeeping operation. This would greatly reduce the suspicions and potential misunderstanding that characterise the activities of peace operations.

It follows from the foregoing that once the indicators for the exit are set, peacekeepers would work towards its attainment and even in situations where it becomes impossible to achieve the set targets, an extension would take place after wide consultations with all major stakeholders. In other words, by carefully defining the mandate and setting the right exit strategy, notice is given that at a certain point in the mission's existence, it will come to an end. Mission personnel therefore become duty-bound to work towards the achievements of these agreed targets to resist the temptation of overstaying.

5.2.6 Exit strategy encourages the development of national capacities

Essentially, any peacekeeping exit strategy has as its intention the need to develop the local capacity because it is the only meaningful way of consolidating the peace process. Most often, local nationals are not part of the plans for the intervention; they mostly come in during the implementation phase which poses a lot of challenges with carrying them along the trajectory of the whole intervention. One major incentive attached to peacekeeping operation departure is the focus on the development of local or national capacities. Once the host country has developed the needed capabilities, a gradual drawdown or an eventual exit becomes appropriate to save some money. Closely associated with the issue of local capacity is local and national ownership. Emphasis on capacity building is vital to the sustainability and legacy of any peacekeeping operation, irrespective of the timing and context. As is largely supported by Mattelaer and Marijnen (2014), a mission that has capacity building as part of its mandate and exit strategy gets value for money, simply because it targets the very institutions and actors whose inefficiencies and ineptitude caused the conflict in the first place. Also, for a mission that

wants to disengage from an operation, having capacity building as part of the exit strategy portrays that the mission is committed to the long-term sustainability of its actions.

The United Nations system by itself has identified capacity-building for government and civil society as crucial to the success of any multidimensional peacekeeping or peacebuilding operations (S/2001/394). As an officer in the political affairs of ECOWAS asserted:

> "The inability of ECOMOG to build the capacity of the military, police and other agencies as part of its exit strategy after the 1997 elections contributed significantly to the relapse of the conflict".[7]

Another participant, being more specific about how exit strategy encourages the development of national capacities stated that:

> The UN was successful in Sierra Leone and will be probably successful in Liberia because they had as part of their mandate the training of the security sector and many other training programmes for the youth, women and young girls.[8]

All these were done with the view of building a strong national outfit to take care of the situation once the mission departs. Sierra Leone has dramatised that having an exit strategy encourages the development of national capacities because once the exit strategy was articulated, mechanism and measures were put in place to improve the capacity of the locals to takeover once the UN mission withdraws. The entire exit processes must always involve the local people mainly because it is when they are well versed in the various stages of the exit that they could prepare to support the implementation of the strategy if it wants to achieve any success.

5.3 Description of ECOWAS and UN Exit approaches in peacekeeping operations

This section outlines the prevailing exit approaches of ECOWAS and the UN. The purpose of this section is to evaluate the institutional and policy frameworks within which exit strategies in peacekeeping operation are articulated and to examine how both strategies are integrated into the peacekeeping and state building cycle to create the conditions necessary for sustainable peace.

5.4 ECOWAS approach to exit strategy

Alan Doss, Special Representative of the Secretary General and head of the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), during the debate on transition and exit strategy stated that "ideally, entry strategy [should] define the exit strategy and set out the benchmarks to guide the process". Similarly, the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon reiterated in the same meeting that for a peacekeeping operation to achieve some sustainable level of stability, "peacekeeping activities must pave the way for what comes next" and that "a peacekeeping mission requires a good entrance" to achieve that. Optimally, exit strategy must be planned before any force is deployed into any operation. If exit strategy is planned deep into the mission, then one would be committing the same mistakes that America committed when it went to Iraq without an exit plan and unexpectedly exited without dealing with the future threat of armed groups springing up to destabilise the country.[9] In contemporary times, the example of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) jihadist group in Iraq exposes an exit strategy gone badly. Broadly speaking, it is within this same context that the argument is made that peacekeeping operation exit strategy must be informed by the entry strategy.

ECOWAS approach to exit strategy in peacekeeping operations is largely informed by its experiences in Liberia and Sierra Leone. ECOWAS as previously highlighted was set up primarily for economic integration and advancement and so had very little to contend with in terms of security. In the meantime, the organisation found itself confronted with insecurity. It started with Liberia and there are a number of reasons for which ECOWAS took the lead in advocating for prompt action in Liberia. The magnitude of each reason differs depending on whom one interact with. Brigadier General Agyemfra sums up the views amongst some ECOWAS member states at the time:

> There were many West Africans, especially Ghanaians and Nigerians, living in Liberia at the time. Our people had made Liberia their home and were working in all sectors of the Liberian economy. They were in education, commerce, agriculture, industry or fishing sub-sectors. Fortunately, it was not difficult for the Ghanaians and the Nigerians, for instance, to work in Liberia because Liberia was an English speaking country and so it was easy for other nationals from English speaking countries to integrate and communicate within that environment.[10]

Invariably, this language opening attracted a large population of natives from especially Ghana, Nigerian and Sierra Leone to Liberia. Certainly, the stakes were higher for countries that had a lot of their citizens residing in that country especially when they became targets. The initial "realpolitik" on the Liberian conflict was not without some melodrama. As recounted by the Former Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, even the idea of having the Liberian crisis on the agenda of the first session of the Heads of State and Governments in August 1990 in Banjul, Gambia faced stiff opposition from some Heads of State and Governments from the region.[11] To emphasize his argument he stated that during the meeting:

> ...I posed the question of why the leaders were failing to address the issue of Liberia in a meeting involving West African leaders...At the meeting I questioned the leaders whether they could meet at a summit in West Africa and rise from that summit without commenting on a fellow neighbour whose country is raging under a brutal war. I went on to ask how they thought the rest of the world would look at them...something is happening in your backyard you are meeting in your backyard and you rise from that meeting without uttering a word. I posed that question because at the time it was quite obvious that just conducting a simple random survey of official attitudes that a greater number of them were unprepared to discuss the issue much less to talk about intervention.[12]

Clearly, that there was no consensus on even discussing the Liberian conflict at the Banjul meeting of HOSG. States such as Burkina Faso deemed the whole episode taking place in Liberia as an internal affair and therefore not the business of any other member state or even the sub-regional body ECOWAS.[13] That was the view held and strongly expressed by Burkina Faso; but, perhaps, there were few others who probably shared that view yet they could not come out as vociferously as Burkina Faso or were a little more guarded in their approach. Even though there was a serious split among the HOSG, in principle they agreed finally that Liberia should be on the agenda and then they went on to establish a five member Standing Mediation Committee comprising Gambia (Chair), Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Guinea. In the end, Liberia became part of the agenda, but there was no unanimity.

5.4.1 Initial operational glitches

Once the momentum kicked up at the level of the committee, the issue of putting together a peacekeeping force to assist the government of Liberia and help address the conflict was widely pursued. The meeting in Lomé took the decision that ECOWAS would send troops to Liberia essentially to stabilise the situation and to rescue their nationals. This account supports Olonisakin's (2008) arguments that processes leading to the decision to deploy a peacekeeping force into Liberia were predicated on two considerations: the worsening security situations in Liberia and the broader political climate within ECOWAS member states. After the meeting in Lomé, it became apparent that not all countries were willing to take part in the intervention. The Francophone West African countries mainly, started showing signs of withdrawal and inconsistency because of their apprehension towards the Liberian Conflict. Some of the loudest interventionist voices came from Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Guinea. Rightly so, because they had many of their nationals "trapped" in the ensuing violence in Liberia. Nigeria in particular was known to have economic interest and engagements with Liberia. Ambassador Abdul Karim Koroma, who served as Sierra Leone Foreign Minister 1985-1992, said that considering all the carnage happening at the time it would have been totally "irresponsible" on the part of ECOWAS leaders to have ruled out the use of the military ultimately to restore sanity.

While acknowledging the legal, procedural and political obstacles, some member states of ECOWAS, on humanitarian grounds, dismissed the initial objections of intervention and still went ahead to sanction the intervention in Liberia. Tesón (2003:95) contends that "if a situation is morally abhorrent, then neither the sanctity of national borders nor a general prohibition against war should by themselves preclude humanitarian intervention". The narrative has it that the Liberian situation was getting out of hand, innocent citizens were being massacred and there was massive destruction of property. From this perspective, ECOWAS authorised the intervention in Liberia to defend the helpless civilians. Clearly, ECOWAS intervention was initiated on the liberal understanding of a moral obligation to protect civilians and human rights. In this scenario, even though ECOWAS did not explicitly secure the requisite UNSC mandate to maintain peace and security, morally, events in Liberia weighed heavily on member states to act. "We went in before the chapter

VIII mandate was given to us by the UN Security Council... even though there was no peace to keep, we went in simply because our people were being killed...", said a Former ECOMOG Force Commander.

On the international front, there was no indication of the desire on the part of the international community to get involved and neither were regional hegemonic states like Nigeria prepared to allow the international community to come in and overshadow their capacity to resolve the issue. As explained by one diplomat, "candidly we did not see the desire on the part of ECOWAS countries to cede their responsibility to the international community headed by the UN simply because we did not have the resources or financial clout to undertake the necessary action to bring the situation under control".[14] Also, at the time, the Iraqi tremors were being heard; as such, the main preoccupation of the UN was in the Middle East. ECOWAS's desire to find a solution to the raging problem encouraged them to approach the United States as an alternative for support. As observed in one of the interviews:

> ...our initial focus was to visit the USA and to point out to them that we believe they had, if not a legal obligation at least a moral obligation, to help restore peace in Liberia for a simple reason that Liberia was a country that was best known to have some kind of "special relationship" with the USA, taking into account historical antecedents. But that impression was quickly rebuffed by the USA. The State Department was very quick to point out that the supposed relationship as characterised by the Liberians was not so but in many respect was a figment of their imagination.

Besides, ECOWAS had gone there in 1990 with the hope that the USA would intervene in a big way considering that at the time there was no effective government in place and so if they had taken ECOWAS's offer the issue of unilateral intervention would not have arisen. Perhaps, the USA refused to engage initially in Liberia because of their past experiences in situations such as Iraq in 1990. Because the US and the UN did not explicitly express interest in the entire venture, ECOWAS had to go it alone. The moral compulsion was getting unbearable and so ECOWAS started the process, put together its team without any assistance from the UN or any major international power and moved into Liberia.

Once the political decision was taken to deploy, each of the member states was required to start its own preparation towards sending troops to Liberia.[15] Brigadier General Agyemfra remarked that:

> ...The strategic decision to deploy was made simple because at the time all the major countries leading the charge had military governments in power. That was what hastened the process because they only had to give orders for actions to be taken rather than subjecting their decisions to a long winding, never-ending, acrimonious parliamentary debate. But, because majority of the countries pushing the intervention had military governments in power, when they got back home they just took the obvious decision of instructing their military chiefs to start the planning process for Liberia...

As recognised, analysis of motives driving political decision-makers is a problematic exercise and ECOWAS is no exception. It appears that the political decision-making process to deploy ECOMOG to Liberia was fraught with several inconsistencies. Even though theoretically the mandate as stipulated by the ECOWAS peace plan was clear on the political objectives to be pursued empirically it was unsuitable because political decision-making did not match the military response that followed. The situational review was unclear on the political endstate and the military strategy to employ. Perhaps the quest to galvanise international and probably domestic support for the intervention clouded the judgment of both political and military planners to face the obvious reality that peacekeeping at the time was not the probable option. Obviously, the mandate of ECOMOG to deploy into Liberia was problematic. The regional force was dispatched to keep peace even when there was no peace to keep. As a result, the force went in ill-prepared.

ECOMOG entry planning was fraught with several challenges. As observed by Major General Henry Anyidoho who was the Director-General of Logistics and also at one point commander in charge of Joint Operations and Plans at the General Headquarters of the Ghana Armed Forces:

> We knew we were going for a peacekeeping operation but because we did not know the situation in Liberia we decided to go with everything we had...That was the military decision we took. A thorough assessment of the situation was not conducted before the deployment.

> Even the ECOWAS team that was sent to conduct reconnaissance could not get into Liberia because of violence and insecurity. They stopped in Freetown, Sierra Leone to collect as much information as possible.[16]

According to General Arnold Quainoo, Ghana, for instance, had to rely on the analysis of its High Commissioner to Sierra Leone, who was a military officer to deploy. With his analysis of the situation from a neighbouring country, a report was prepared and based on this report deployment was effected.[17] Operationally, the deployment suffered many setbacks. For instance, the intelligence gathering failed; appointment of the first force commander did not go through any scientific process; and ECOMOG forces did not even have basic logistics like deployment maps and side arms for their operations. Commenting on the appointment of the first force commander of ECOMOG operations in Liberia, A senior Ghanaian Military officer stated that:

> ... There wasn't any advice from any quarters on the appointment of Force Commander. It happened that General Quainoo was with Flt. Lt. Jerry John Rawlings (the Ghanaian leader at the time) in Gambia when the decision was taken to establish ECOMOG in 1990... Naturally Nigeria should have taken the command position because they were going to contribute more troops, money and resources for the intervention. However, because of the geopolitics of the sub-region and Nigeria's perceived hegemony, they offered command to Ghana in 1990 and our leader in turn handed it over to General Quainoo with little or no consultation.

During interviews, some senior leadership at the time underlined the heavy dependence on the United States for graded maps (military maps) to aid their operation in Liberia.

5.4.2 The Dilemma of ECOMOG: From Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement

Initially, ECOMOG went there with the hope of undertaking a peacekeeping operation for a short period but Charles Taylor did not allow that to happen. In the words of Major General Henry Anyidoho, ECOMOG troops faced "opposed landing" from a well prepared and reasonably resourced rebels of the NPFL who tried earnestly to prevent ECOMOG from docking at Freeport in Monrovia. The political planners of the intervention lost sight of the fact that there was virtually no place for peacekeeping especially in armed conflict. ECOMOG eventual arrival in Monrovia was only facilitated

by an ally, Prince Johnson, who offered to help repel the firepower of the NPFL. Once the ECOMOG troops arrived, the intransigence of the warring factions particularly the NPFL compelled ECOMOG to change its approach swiftly from the supposed peacekeeping operations to peace enforcement operations. As was recounted by a Nigerian Colonel:

> We went there thinking our landing would be smooth and peacekeeping operations would start right away ... once we were fired upon we changed into second gear (peace enforcement)...it was then that we brought more troops and more armament to counter the situation.[18]

The impact of this swift change exposed the lack of proper assessment of the situation and threat levels by the mission planners. Brigadier General Agyemfra confirmed that the decision to change from peacekeeping to peace enforcement was taken by President Ibrahim Babangida (Nigeria), Abass Bundu (Executive Secretary of ECOWAS) and General Arnold Quainoo (Force Commander). This development raises a number of critical questions. First under whose authority did the three leaders take that all-important decision? Second, was there a clear statement of the political objectives to be achieved once the operation moved from peacekeeping to peace enforcement? Third, was the decision reflective of the wishes of all the TCC? Fourth, what sort of operational and tactical reasoning went into that sudden strategic shift to peace enforcement. Fifth, were there any alternative fallback options once the decision changed? At least from all the interviews and FGD conducted, almost all the participants (military and political leaders) were emphatic that it appears not much thinking went into the decision to switch from peacekeeping to peace enforcement; rather the decision was dictated and informed by circumstances on the ground.[19]

There was no thought of exit strategy in the mission planning. Several Officers interviewed commented on the reason why there was no exit strategy. Here are some of their comments:

> Exit strategy was not on the agenda of the intervention in Liberia simply because as long as the killings were taking place and West Africa was being painted badly in the foreign media the urge was only to intervene to stabilise the situation.[20]

> ...We thought it was going to be easy. Just go into Liberia, stabilise the situation and get our nationals out. There was nothing like exit

> strategy...We are going into this how are we going to get out, what shall we call an achievement, the milestone after which we shall leave...we did not set anything like that at all.[21]

Similar sentiments were expressed by the Sierra Leone Foreign Minister at the time who stated that

> The issue of exiting from the intervention in Liberia was never on the time table. The major preoccupation was how we were going to restore normalcy and bring the situation under control...Even the heads of states who were in favour of the intervention thought it was going to be an easy affair (a quick surgical operation) but as it turned out we all underestimated the nature of the warfare."[22]

It is indeed clear that at the time, awful killings were taking place in Liberia on a daily basis. The war had become not just a conventional war but guerrilla warfare. ECOWAS was therefore probably right in focusing its attention on the stabilisation and rescue of nationals instead of being fixated on an exit strategy. However, that does not address the need to have a solid entry strategy which would invariably impact on the kind of exit strategy to pursue, considering that the nature of civil war does not allow for anybody to think about an exit strategy because the situation becomes so fluid that one is not sure what turn or dimension it will take in future.[23] Clearly, from the discussion it is obvious that apart from the challenges with the initial mandate, there were other contending issues such as the lack of a clear political objective and directive for the military operatives on the ground. For example, even though the ECOMOG operations was situated within the broader context of humanitarian intervention, there was no clear directive on how to handle refugees, how to deal with friendlier warring factions (here referring to AFL and INPFL) without antagonizing other dissenting warring factions. This situation invariably affected the operations of ECOMOG. It was virtually impossible for ECOMOG to have had a smooth exit strategy considering that it did not satisfy any of the three component highlighted by the Clausewitzean framework for exiting from any major intervention (Tellis, 1996).

5.4.3 ECOMOG Intervenes in Sierra Leone

The Sierra Leone situation, in the case of ECOWAS, was not different. The process that led to the decision to deploy was as complicated as that of Liberia.[24] This view was shared by Olonisakin (2008) that the decision to deploy to Sierra Leone was also complex. The Nigerian-led ECOMOG did not have a clear exit strategy as part of its initial planning and entry strategy. Even the decision by Nigeria to intervene in Sierra Leone was not without some objections from countries like Ghana and Guinea who even though were stationed in Lungi, airport preferred subtle diplomatic approach to military intervention.[25] Besides, the crisis in Sierra Leone acted as a breather for ECOMOG operations in Liberia. But even before that, under some supposed mutual defence pact between Sierra Leone and Nigeria, Captain Valentine Strasser had requested training support from the Nigerian army so, Nigerian troops were already stationed in Sierra Leone offering training assistance and protecting strategic installations and locations such as the bridge over the Sewa River in Bo. Also, as part of the logistical and air support to the ECOMOG operations in Liberia, Nigerian troops were engaged in guard duties at the Lungi Airport in Sierra Leone. In reality, ECOMOG was already in Sierra Leone even before the *coup d'état* that removed President Tejan Kabbah. What is not clear is whether the presence of the ECOMOG troops in Sierra Leone was a good enough reason for the Nigerian forces to intervene in the military takeover (Bah, 2012).

Unlike the Liberian case, there was a general consensus right from the beginning on the actions to be taken to restore the situation in Sierra Leone. Collectively, the Heads of States envisaged that the overthrow of a democratically elected president was inimical to the growth and development of democracy in the sub-region and the continent as a whole. Buoyed by the experience in Liberia and perhaps because the situation in Sierra Leone was different, ECOWAS and the UN were all swift with their handling of the situation. The UN Security Council under Resolution 1131 authorised ECOWAS under its ceasefire monitoring group to intervene and restore the presidency of Tejan Kabbah. Boosted with the UN Security Council mandate, ECOWAS adopted a three-prong strategy to resolve the situation. These included the combination of open dialogue and negotiation with AFRC, the imposition and enforcement of economic sanctions and arms embargo and the use of

force when all the negotiations and sanctions failed to achieve the needed results. Similar to the SMC in the case of Liberia, a contact group on Sierra Leone comprising foreign ministers of five member countries, namely Ghana, Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea and later Liberia, initiated moves to dialogue with the junta.

While negotiations were on-going, Nigeria began to amass logistics for intervention at Lungi airport mainly because of the attitudes of the main protagonists (the AFRC and the RUF) which kept shifting their positions anytime some progress was being made to resolve the political situation. The intransigence of the rebel groups coupled with their defiance to ensure that the status quo remains resulted in the decision by the ECOWAS foreign ministers to recommend the establishment of ECOMOG to intervene and restore sanity in the situation in Sierra Leone. Subsequently, the scope of ECOMOG mission was broadened to use force to reinstate the government of Sierra Leone. ECOWAS' decision was based on intelligence gathered from its own sources and the team on the ground that the rebels were unwilling to relinquish power, an assertion that is heavily supported by Bah (2012).

The decision by ECOMOG to use force raised a lot of eyebrows because it was coming just on the heels of the Liberian conflict where a similar tactic had been applied with mixed results. Questions were also raised about the principle of non-interventionism and whether ECOWAS was not abusing its powers by sanctioning an illegality of an overly powerful intervening state. Generally, the perception was that things would have been done differently, but it appeared that ECOWAS had learnt very little from its experience in Liberia. ECOMOG had to grapple with the same issues of low troop levels, inadequate logistics, lack of strategic direction and difficult terrain.

This situation raises several questions on the kind of assessment and reconnaissance undertaken before the decision to deploy was arrived at. Intervening to restore the Tejan Kabbah government was stated clearly at the onset of the intervention, but what was to follow was never discussed. After the elections in Liberia, with the exception of the residual force that was left behind to help consolidate the peace in that country, the bulk of the troops in addition to equipment were relocated to Sierra Leone to commence yet another peace operation. Although Operation Sandstorm received some rejection from

some locals, it did receive some massive support from the sub-region and internationally, from the UN Security Council. It ushered ECOMOG's two-prone entry strategy into Sierra Leone to remove AFRC/RUF from power. This confirms Bah (2012) and Ekeator (2007) arguments that even in the face of the controversy ECOMOG's approach enjoyed wide support. The first stage of operation Sandstorm (codenamed Tigerhead) was very clear: capture Freetown from the rebels and reinstate President Tejan Kabbah, while the second stage (codenamed Tigertail) was basically to drive away the rebels from Sierra Leone. What is not clear is whether the operation made any provision for how the ECOMOG troops were going to pull out once they achieved those stated objectives. Naturally, the reinstatement of Tejan Kabbah and the driving out of AFRC/RUF from the capital were good enough reason for the mission to pull out but then peace had to be consolidated. Because there was no clear strategy of what was to follow, ECOMOG found itself being lodged into this long term operation.

All respondents agreed that ECOMOG did not have an exit strategy because at the time ECOWAS had not defined the components of its peacekeeping framework. As one former ECOMOG commander put it, "ECOMOG' operation in Liberia and Sierra Leone was a trail blazer...because at the time there wasn't any precedence to follow not even NATO had undertaken such an operation to warrant others to study".[26] It has emerged that for the initial ECOWAS Peacekeeping mission in Liberia and Sierra Leone, there was no normative framework for the intervention much less an approach or strategy for exit. At the time, there was nothing like the 1999 ECOWAS Mechanism for conflict prevention, management, resolution, peacekeeping and security. Neither did they have a supplementary protocol on democracy and good governance.

In practical terms there was no robust sub-regional instrument to support the deployment of the two missions. It was the particular role played by mainly Nigeria and its troops that accounted for the involvement of ECOWAS in those two initial conflicts, especially that of Sierra Leone. The issue still remains that it was after the missions were deployed, and according to some analyst became "trapped", that stakeholders started thinking of some sort of an exit strategy to disentangle ECOWAS from any future peacekeeping operations. It is clear that these missions were not planned with the intention that someday they would

have to exit or pull out. Just as in the case of the UN deployment in Liberia, that of Sierra Leone was no different. The UN's decision to deploy was multi-layered from an insignificant observer mission in 1998 to a full-size traditional peacekeeping operation in 1999 and a full-blown multidimensional peacekeeping in 2000.

5.5 Re-hatting as a form of Exit Strategy Approach

Realistically, ECOWAS as of now does not have a clear policy framework for exiting from peacekeeping operations. This limitation has its roots in the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter where the UN Security Council bears the primary responsibility of ensuring global peace and security. But because it cannot respond quickly to all security issue the Security Council has ceded some of its responsibilities to regional arrangements under Chapter VIII to intervene when necessary. The regional arrangement is only a stop-gap measure to fill the initial void created as the UN prepares to intervene. The process that the UN follows before deploying peacekeepers can be laborious. Oftentimes it involves making a request to TCC/PCC, signing MOU, undertaking reconnaissance visits to the conflict country, conducting pre-deployment training, among others. Besides, it takes not less than six months for the UN to go through all these process and marshal the needed resources and personnel for any operation. This places light responsibility on the regional arrangement to focus so much on exit strategy. The argument is such that regardless of the situation more often than not, the global body would eventually absorb or take over the regional peacekeeping operations as it happened with ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone. What this demonstrates in real sense is that when it comes to exit strategy in peacekeeping operations the onus is always on the global body to lay out a plan that would highlight the withdrawal and eventual exit of any Security Council sanctioned peacekeeping operations. The remarks by Brigadier General Charles Richter-Addo aptly describe the conditions that have resulted in the use of re-hatting as an exit strategy:

> In the case of ECOWAS and for that matter other regional bodies that undertake peacekeeping operations under chapter VIII, because of capacity one would think that re-hatting is a convenient exit strategy...Because first of all the resources are not there, capacities are not there and everybody know that the UN has these in abundance...[27]

Although the ECPF shows the desire and importance that ECOWAS attaches to peacebuilding, exit strategy still remains an illusion in ECOWAS' planning and engagements. The absence of such a blueprint from the initial planning phases of the intervention has reduced the capability of ECOWAS to withdraw absolutely from peacekeeping operations. The ECOWAS Stand-by force (ESF) which has succeeded the ECOMOG is still in the process of drafting a comprehensive framework, doctrine or guidance for exit in future peacekeeping operations.[28]What the ESF has now is a standby arrangement which is mainly on *ad-hoc* basis (rapid deployment capabilities). The assumption is that when there is a conflict situation the regional force goes in quickly to contain the situation and wait for the greater body (UN) to marshal all the needed resources and personnel to come and take over. This situation can be likened to a 'fire fighting approach' where if there is fire, a rapid response team goes in quickly to douse the fire. Likewise in the medical field it could be likened to first aid where the nurse stabilises the patient and wait till the specialist comes in. Perhaps, that is why when it comes to peacekeeping operations by regional arrangements emphasis on exit strategy turns to re-hatting. On the problems of regional organisation always re-hatting into a major UN operations, several officers have varied views. Below are some of their remarks:

> For any peacekeeping operation to be successful the UN should assist the AU and ECOWAS for instance to intervene and exit from such peacekeeping operation. That would be more lasting and durable instead of the UN always coming in to take over. The advantage that these regional arrangements have is that they are mostly closer to the issues and oftentimes they understand it better.[29]

> Sitting at either Abuja or Addis Ababa, ECOWAS and the AU are better placed to handle most of this peacekeeping operations and its attendant exit strategy than someone coming from New York. [30]

> When we go in first all the time and the UN comes in later to take over from us (AU or ECOWAS)... It gives us credibility problems. Re-hatting is not the ideal situation. There is no way that can be proper exit strategy.[31]

> The problem is often logistics. Africa lacks the logistics to see through any intervention...The UN personnel do not come in because they want to help but they see it as money making venture. When Mali was launched people in New York popped champagne celebrated...why?

> Because jobs were going to be created, business was going to come; money was going to be made. AFISMA was on the ground struggling all they needed was just some small support to execute the assignment and then to get out but people in New York thought otherwise.[32]
>
> It is mostly annoying especially when the regional arrangements have done all the dirty work and then the UN comes in when the difficult aspect of the work is done.[33]

Meanwhile, the ESF for the first time has provided some framework to guide how ECOWAS intervenes in conflict situations. This new framework is in response to the numerous challenges that confronted the initial ECOMOG operations in certain parts of West Africa. When it comes to the ECPF, the decision to intervene or deploy peacekeeping force into a conflict environment starts from the decisions of the Mediation and Security Council (MSC).[34]Once a decision is taken by MSC to deploy a peacekeeping operation, the president of the ECOWAS Commission would be tasked to develop a mandate and the necessary requirements[35] needed to execute the impending mission. The president would deal with this request with the support of the Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff (CCDS), the mission planning management cell (MPMC) and the peacekeeping department at the Commission. Subsequently, the agreed proposal from the CCDS is submitted to the MSC through the President of the Commission for approval and authorisation. As soon as approval is given, the special representative of the President of the Commission would be appointed in addition to the Force Commander and the Head of the Civilian Component. Essential steps such as the establishment of Force Headquarters, reconnaissance and force generation also commence in earnest. Away from these internal arrangements, ECOWAS also explores the opportunity of sourcing for external partners to support the intervention. Table 5.1 shows the various stages and activities under the ESF concepts of operations (CONOPS).

Table 5.1: The ESF Concepts of Operations

Phases	Activity	Duration (Days)
First Phase	Movement of ESF into the joint operational area	0-25
Second Phase	Movement of ESF into the joint operational area with specific emphasis on stabilisation	0-90

Third Phase	Consolidation of the stabilisation	0-180
Fourth Phase	Re-hatting or complete withdrawal	180

Source: Field Survey, 2014

Four phases underpin ESF concepts of operation (CONOPS). The first phase covers the movements of all the components of the ESF into the joint operational area. Usually this first phase is not expected to go beyond the first 25 days. Consequently, the second phase focuses on stabilisation after the intervention. This particular phase is expected to last for the initial 3 months of the intervention. The next phase which is the third in line focuses on consolidating the gains made following the intervention and the stabilisation of the situation. This stage is expected to last for six months from the day of the intervention. The last phase which comes immediately after the stabilisation phase is concerned with re-hatting or a complete withdrawal of the ESF. Per this new framework, ECOWAS intervention is not expected to last beyond six months. This whole process is linear in nature, meaning until one phase has been achieved, the mission cannot move into another phase. One clear indication from the ESF framework is the caveat that the ESF does not dabble in long-haul commitment but rather focuses on short term "fire brigade" kind of operations.[36] Considering the duration, it is nearly impossible to execute any meaningful intervention within a six-month period. This presupposes that the ESF is not fashioned to last for a longer period but rather it is established as an interim measure with the expectation that eventually a UN operation would take over the ECOWAS operation and then carry on for a longer period. Commenting on the likely possibilities should the UN fail to come in after six months, General Hassan Lai the former Chief of Staff of ESF was emphatic that:

> ...The whole issue borders on political will. There is a mandating authority the UN Security Council in the case of the UN and the Authority of Heads of State and Governments in the case of ECOWAS. If member states agree genuinely to support the peacekeeping operation, ECOWAS could deploy for over a year...we saw that cleverly executed in the case of ECOMOG in Liberia where Nigeria and Ghana sustained the mission with their resources and personnel for more than a year...once there is the political will there is always a way.

As it has emerged, when it comes to ECOWAS peacekeeping operations, two types of exit framework readily comes to mind; re-hatting and complete withdrawal. With the case of complete withdrawal, there has never been any situation where it has been used. In most cases, what ECOWAS considers as an exit strategy is when the sub-regional organisation goes in first as an interim force, stabilise the situation and then re-hat (transition) into a UN mission. By re-hatting, ECOMOG' operation ceases to exist and there is a total transfer of responsibilities, change in mission direction and mandate from the ECOWAS intervention to a UN mandated peacekeeping operation.[37] With ECOWAS, almost all the time, the UN has to come in because of the humanitarian, peacebuilding and civilian elements where the UN country teams (UNCT) normally come in to offer. ECOWAS has not got the capacity to take on the peacebuilding aspect of the operations as it stands since it is still in the process of developing the civilian doctrine of the ESF.[38] However, these constraints are not only peculiar to ECOWAS; INTERFERT and MIF also faced similar challenges with their operations in East Timor and Haiti which eventually culminated in the takeover by the UN. When it comes to the stabilisation and consolidation of peace in conflict areas, it is only the UN that has shown that it has the means and reach to solving the conflict situation up to the end of the stabilisation phase. Drawing parallels, it is not only ECOMOG that does not have a comprehensive framework for exit; NATO equally did not have a framework for exit when it intervened in Iraq. Unless it is an occupying power, it is difficult to come out with an exit strategy.[39]

When it comes to pure military operations like ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone, devising an exit strategy becomes problematic. Exit strategy has to do more with international operations such as peacekeeping operations where there are so many facets. Conventional military operations hardly have an exit strategy. What they normally have are withdrawal plans, evacuation plans, counter attack plans among other contingency plans. Instead of exit strategy, what these military operations have are "endstate" or what is referred to in peacekeeping parlance as "success criteria". Exit strategy is seen as a political decision at all levels when it comes to conventional military operations.

In the case of Liberia, following the relapse of conflict in 2003, ECOWAS yet again embarked on the mission to find solution to the ranging conflict. ECOWAS Chair at the

time, President John Agyekum Kuffor of Ghana, hosted several peace talks both in Ghana and in other parts of West Africa all with the aim of finding a lasting solution to the impasse. Subsequently, after a long-drawn-out negotiation, an Agreement on Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities (ACCH) was signed on 17 June 2003 between all the major conflicting parties namely, the Government of Liberia (with Charles Taylor as the president), MODEL and LURD. Collectively, all three parties agreed to:

a) Declare and observe a ceasefire…;
b) Refrain from committing any act that might constitute or facilitate a violation of the ceasefire…;
c) Establish an ECOWAS-led Joint Verification Team (JVT) comprised of two representatives from each of the parties plus representatives of the UN, AU, and International Contact Group on Liberia (lCGL);
d) Establish a Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC) to supervise and monitor the ceasefire…;
e) The need for the creation and deployment of an international stabilisation force (ISF) and commit themselves to cooperation with it.

United Nations, S/2003/657

This agreement which fed into the signing of the CPA on August 18 2003 also touched on several critical issues and a specific area of focus. Once the ceasefire agreement was signed, the UNSC by Resolution 1497 empowered ECOWAS to:

> establish a Multinational Force in Liberia to support the implementation of the 17 June 2003 ceasefire agreement, including establishing conditions for initial stages of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration activities, to help establish and maintain security in the period after the departure of the current President and the installation of a successor authority, taking into account the agreements to be reached by the Liberian parties, and to secure the environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and to prepare for the introduction of a longer-term United Nations stabilisation force to relieve the Multinational Force.
>
> United Nations, S/RES/1497 (2003)

The ECOWAS Monitoring Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) was established as a vanguard force to hold the fort while the UN prepared the grounds to deploy a larger multinational force to take over. ECOMIL's deployment was always regarded as the beginning of a long-term deployment by the UN mission, and as such received huge support from UNAMSIL. Unlike the previous ECOMOG operations, ECOMIL received overwhelming political, diplomatic and logistical support first from the UN and later from other influential countries such as the United States. Perhaps the reason for the overwhelming support from the UN and international partners could be the existence of a Security Council mandate. Furthermore, for the first time in Liberia, ECOWAS was able to achieve adequate consensus to deploy with eight out of fifteen member countries contributing troops. The remaining countries abstained either as a result of the conditions in their individual countries or mainly due to the perception that they support one of the conflicting parties. This general improvement could be as a result of the coming into effect of the 1999 Protocol Relating to the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security. More importantly, ECOMIL had a clear, unambiguous and coherent exit strategy built into the mandate (Aboagye and Bah, 2004). "There was no doubt that from the word go, there was that understanding that the mission would be re-hatted even though there were no clear modalities of how it was going to be done".[40] As part of the arrangement in Resolution 1497 (2003), the UN further adopted Resolution 1509 which authorised the establishment of an International Stabilisation Force (ISF), UNMIL to take over from ECOMIL Forces. Consequently, the nearly 3600 ECOMIL troops from Ghana, Gambia, Nigeria, Senegal, Benin, Mali and Guinea-Bissau were absorbed or re-hatted into the United Nations umbrella serving under the UNMIL.

Similarly, in the case of Sierra Leone the re-hatting process commenced almost when President Tejan Kabbah was reinstated. Once his government was back to power, the UN Security Council increased international support towards the peace process by creating a United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL). The observer mission was to complement the role of ECOMOG in monitoring the general security situation, disarmament and demobilisation of ex-combatants and to ensure that all parties to the peace process respect international humanitarian laws. This was coming on the heels of

several allegations against ECOMOG's high-handedness in dealing with combatants and 'spoilers' in the peace process. However, the increase in the international presence did little to prevent the RUF from continuing with their destabilising acts. After the May 1999 ceasefire was agreed, peace negotiations led to the signing of the Lomé peace agreement which gave further impetus to the role of ECOMOG and UNOMSIL in the peace process.

The Lomé peace agreement came with an enhanced mandate for ECOMOG and UNOMSIL. While contending with the precarious security situation, and the fact that Nigeria was getting overly fatigued with the prolonged peace process, the newly elected President of Nigeria, President Olusegun Obasanjo, gave hints of the desire of Nigeria (which formed the bulk of ECOMOG troops) to gradually disengage from Sierra Leone. The UN responded by offering to deploy 6000 strong troops of which nearly half were supposed to be drawn from ECOWAS member states, particularly those that were already deployed in Sierra Leone. The decision by ECOMOG to downsize and hand over the security of Sierra Leone to the UN culminated in the establishment of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) under resolution 1270 in October 1999. Initially, UNAMSIL was established to work together with ECOMOG, but once the Nigerian contingent of the ECOMOG decided to hasten their withdrawal, the Security Council, fearing a security vacuum, authorised the deployment of a much bigger force to inherit the tasks originally being performed by ECOMOG. While ECOMOG completed their withdrawal in May 2000, a greater number of their troops were integrated into the newly established UNAMSIL as a convenient way of carrying along the history of the old peacekeeping operation and retaining valued experience for the new mission. ECOMOG's exit from both Liberia and Sierra Leone had more to do with Nigeria's domestic politics than an ECOWAS strategy. Nigeria fiscal constraints and political paralysis set this course in motion long before even ECOWAS thought of withdrawing from both countries.

However, what is not clear in both situations is the use of re-hattting as a form of exit. Principally, the idea behind re-hatting is to ensure efficient transfer of responsibilities from one group to the other and continuity of operations and not necessarily ending an operation. The critical question that needs to be answered is whether after re-hatting the

sub-regional force/organisation can still be actively or passively engaged in a follow-on mission and yet still considers itself to have exited. From the two case studies it is evident that even though ECOMOG re-hatted into a UN mission, ECOMOG still continued to be engaged in the peacekeeping operation. Although the ECOMOG mission ceased to exist after the re-hatting, ECOWAS was still heavily involved with the peace process. For instance, it is still not clear what the exact role of the ECOWAS liaison officers was in the re-hatted mission in both countries considering that at the time ECOWAS had handed over all operations to the new UN mission.

It can be said that nothing much changed in terms of the active participation of the troops; the only changes were the mandate, command structure, leadership and outfit (different hat). The troops continued to be engaged in the peacekeeping operations, albeit under a different organisation. And so the question is where then lies the exit in such a situation? Technically that cannot be considered as an exit considering that ECOWAS was still actively participating in the new mission although in a limited capacity. If we go with Kofi Annan definition of exit, then re-hatting could not be considered as a form of exit, especially in the situation where the transfer of political and military authority is to another international intervener and not a legitimate local institution(s). Similarly, neither can one also use the Merriam Webster Dictionary definition to classify re-hatting as a form of exit because ECOWAS did not complete or leave the situation when it re-hatted; rather it only transformed into another mission in the same situation. Maybe the Thesaurus definition would best sum up re-hatting as a form of exit because it provides an opening that permits a regional organisation like ECOWAS to escape or walkout from a peacekeeping operation which it was responsible for to one under the UN where it had very little or no responsibility. Besides, re-hatting does not say it all because once you re-hat into a UN force, another fundamental question that pops up is how the UN force would also exit.

From the discussion, two forms of exit emerge. The first one is from the sub-regional/regional to the global while the second one which is the final exit is from the global to a stable country where sovereignty is reinforced, governance institutions are strong enough to carry on and then the root causes of the conflict in the first instance have

largely been addressed or continue to be addressed in a predictable manner owned and driven by local stakeholders.[41] In relation to the first form of exit, ECOWAS has been able to do it well although there are still some grey areas; for example, one of the issues that emerged from the intervention in Liberia and Sierra Leone was the recognition that even when you re-hat you must ensure that the follow-on mission is dominated by regional forces. This has been replicated in recent times in Mali. Considering the second exit, one cannot state that they have accomplished the process effectively until and unless they have gotten to the stage where they exit completely. Complete exit here is not being used in an absolute sense but in relative terms because the international community may still stay to continue engaging with the host country albeit in a reduced role where substantial leverage or initiative are left in the hands of the locals.

5.6 United Nations approach to exit strategy

In the past, UN missions were deployed without an exit plan. When most UN missions were launched oftentimes they had an end state but not an exit strategy. In most cases, the operation was launched before any discussions on exit strategy. The issue of exit strategy became only topical when some missions became long and drawn out and started to impact negatively on the ability of the UN to engage in new and pressing peacekeeping missions globally. The integrated approach emerged as the response to the many but varied challenges confronting contemporary peacekeeping operation, especially in the era of complicated mandates and lack of coordination between UN actors and non-UN actors. The Brahimi report, for instance, was emphatic that contemporary peace operation makes an integrated and coordinated approach a condition of coherence and success if it combines a wide range of interrelated civilian, police and military activities. Consequently, subsequent events pushed the organisation to progressively develop a framework to guide the way and manner in which missions terminate. Commenting on the importance of exit strategy in a UN peacekeeping operation, a Former Director of UNDPKO said:

> "We began to clamour for exit plans because we became well aware that peacekeeping missions could not exist forever".[42]

Following the Brahimi report, issues of transitions and exit were lifted and placed high on the agenda of all UN mandated peacekeeping operations. As an outcome of the Brahimi report, the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) was created to thoroughly outline how missions are planned to the period where they have to exit. The understanding behind this process was that missions must be planned from the beginning to the end. The initial discussion on exit in peacekeeping operation centred on peacekeeping transition from one which is heavily militarised to one which is police-heavy; eventually transforming to one which is civilian heavy.[43] However, this process was not thought to be a linear process but one that kept on overlapping at every stage of the operation. The understanding was that the moment the operation reaches the civilian heavy phase then, it means that technically, the peacekeeping operation has ended and has transitioned into a peacebuilding operation.[44] For many of the participants interviewed, the general exit strategy applicable to any UN intervention is when peacekeeping operations are followed by peacebuilding operations and then the peacebuilding operations is transformed into a "normal" development presence of all UN agencies. There are specificities for each of the phases already mentioned. What is missing from this model is the fact that missions differ and might not necessarily go through each and every one of these phases.

5.6.1 United Nations exit strategy framework

The process of developing a comprehensive exit strategy framework for UN operations began when the concept of integrated missions was embraced as a way of facilitating the long-term goals between the three components[45] of multidimensional peacekeeping operations. The IMPP requires that all the cells of the UN for example the military, police, political, logistics and security all come together to plan an exit strategy. The argument is that if exit strategy is not well coordinated and planned the UN may exit but there may be no peace in the host country. The East Timor case presents a clear example where the UN had to go in on several occasion because any time they left something went wrong and they had to go back. The integrated mission was considered as "one in which there is a shared vision among all UN actors as to the strategic objective of the UN presence at country level (United Nations, 2006:3). As part of a broader framework, the IMPP was

adopted to provide guidelines for the planning, designing and implementation of multidimensional peacekeeping operations in post-conflict environment. Thus, the IMPP has become the "authoritative basis" and the singular most important concept for planning and executing all UN integrated multidimensional peacekeeping operations from the mission start-up to revisions and transitions. Much as the IMPP tools are used purposively for mission start-up and also during transitional phases, it is equally useful for integrating the strategic framework of missions and establishing structures such as the headquarters-based Task Forces and field coordination cells.[46] This is done in order for the UN to take full advantage of the activities required to consolidate peace in troubled countries. Comparing the IMPP with other regional arrangements Brigadier General Michael Apatsu remarked that:

> ...With the coming into being of the IMPP, whenever the UN is involved in any peacekeeping operation exit strategies are much better planned...[47]

The decision to initiate the IMPP falls squarely on the shoulders of the Secretary General. Once the directive is given, an Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF) is established at the UN headquarters level to see to the implementation of the IMPP at the country level. The IMPP is pursed in three phases and six steps namely: advance planning, operational planning and review and transitional planning. The IMTF comprises representatives from all the major UN departments and agencies including branches dealing with the political, military, police, humanitarian, logistics, security, development and human rights. Additionally, representatives of UN country teams (UNCT) and the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), if already designated, are all roped into the planning process. The IMPP offers some period of time for each of the phases to be achieved. Table 5.2 shows the various stages and activities under the integration planning process.

Table 5.2: Stages and activities in the Integrated Planning Process

Stages	Level	Activity
Advance Planning	1	Developing strategic options for expanded UN engagements (Advance planning)
	2	Developing the concept of operations (CONOPS) (Foundation planning)
Operational Planning	3	Operationalises the draft mission plan
	4	Transition of responsibilities to the field
Review and transitional planning	5	Continuous review and updating of mission plan
	6	Drawdown of peacekeeping and transition

Source: Field Survey, 2014.

A number of factors may compel the desire of the Secretary General to set in motion the establishment of IMPP. These factors are dependent on the level of responses received from international, regional or national actors on a particular conflict situation. These factors include:

a) Debates at the UN Security Council on the options available for UNSC mandated peace support operations;
b) A recommendation by Peacebuilding Commission;
c) A request by a member state or regional organisation
d) The development of a strategy for peacebuilding support by either the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) or a Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO); and
e) The signing of peace agreement.

The IMTF at the stage of the advance planning develops the strategic assessment, the Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF), the initial results-based budgeting and the CONOPS or the Mission Concept. This is done with the view of analysing all the possible scenarios that exist should the UN decide to engage in the on-going crises. The results of the strategic assessment will compel the Secretary General to either issue a further directive for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to take charge in operationalising the IMPP or not. Once that is done, an operational planning directive

from the Under-Secretary General (USG) for peacekeeping is developed to provide detailed and succinct strategic objectives and benchmarks for the operations.

The output of the foundation planning will be the development of a draft mission plan which has at its core an integrated CONOPS. This CONOPS would highlight the endstate or success criteria as well as offer the benchmarks to be used when planning for transitions and exit. Although not UN specific, the strategic framework for stabilisation and reconstruction as depicted in Figure 5.1 shows the possible endstate and likely conditions for achieving those endstates. Key among these endstates or success criteria include safe and secure environment, stable governance, rule of law, social well-being and a sustainable environment. At the core of these endstates are essential cross-cutting principles such as security, host nation ownership and capacity, political primacy, legitimacy, unity of effort, conflict transformation and regional engagements. All things being equal, the achievement of each of these cross-cutting standards could be enough for any peacekeeping operation to come to an end.

Figure 5.1: Strategic frameworks for stabilisation and reconstruction



Source: United States Institute for Peace, 2009

Inherent in these endstates are benchmarks and indicators for transitions and exit. The capstone doctrine presents some likely benchmarks and indicators for the UN to transition and exit from missions. The establishment of these reliable benchmarks and indicators by the UN peacekeeping operations can be used to commence the process of drawdown and withdrawal. Examples of these indicators and benchmarks as advocated by the UN include:

1. The absence of violent conflict and large-scale human rights abuses, and respect for women's and minority rights;

2. Completion of the Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) of former combatants (male and female, adults and children) and progress in restoring or establishing responsible state institutions for security;

3. The ability of the national armed forces and the national police to provide security and maintain public order with civilian oversight and respect for human rights;

4. Progress towards the establishment of an independent and effective judiciary and corrections system;

5. The restoration of state authority and the resumption of basic services throughout the country;

6. The return or resettlement and reintegration of displaced persons with minimal internal disruption or conflict in the areas of return or resettlement; and

7. The successful formation of legitimate political institutions following the holding of free and fair elections where women and men have equal rights to vote and seek political office.

(United Nations, 2008: 88-89)

Commenting on the benchmarks and indicators of exit, Brigadier General Apatsu stated that:

> ... You want to leave a mission when there is a stable political environment, the government of the day is functioning well even when the institution of state are not so strong and there is a semblance of law

> and order...you want to make sure that you have gone through electoral process, rule of law has been established, police, judiciary, prisons and all other civil institutions are functioning well...Once all these are in place then the UN virtually becomes redundant and exit becomes inevitable...[48]

After the development of endstate and subsequently the benchmarks, the operation phase comes into effect with the draft CONOPS being presented to the Security Council for deliberation and onward issuance of a resolution. The resolution explains in simple terms the mandate that the mission is required to work with. Once the authorisation for the deployment is given, the IMTF will review the mission plan incorporating the provisions within the mandate. The revised mission plan, together with the directives issued by the USG, provides the framework for all the decisions taken by the SRSG and his/her deputies. As a follow-up to the process, the SRSG then establishes an Integrated Mission Planning Team (IMPT) to take over the responsibilities that the IMTF was performing prior to the deployment of the mission, but these responsibilities are only limited to the operations at the country level.

The final step in the IMPP, deals with the review and transition planning for mission drawdown and eventual exit. This process is not static as it involves continuous monitoring, constant revisions and updates of the mission plan. These revisions and updates are developed collectively by the IMTF, UNCT, PBC and national authorities paying particular attention to the overall strategic goals originally set in the Secretary General's planning directive. Immediately there are signs that the conditions are ripe for transitions or exit, the SRSG will recommend to the SG to set in motion the process of transition and exit planning. The planning phase as captured in level six of the integrated planning process would highlight the drawdown process and clearly indicate where there is the need for a successor arrangement. There are four possible scenarios for the successor arrangement and follow-on measures. These are:

- transfer of residual peace support operations responsibilities to the UNCT;
- establishment of a successor peace support operation
- establishment of another type of UN Mission such as a political mission; and

- establishment of a peace support operation under the authority of another international or regional organisation.

(United Nations, 2008 p: 16)

Besides, the establishment of a peace support operation under the authority of another international or regional organisation hardly happens. The belief is that only the UN has the capacity and reach to successfully execute any PSO globally.

The mission plan as already stated has in-built indicators and benchmarks whose achievement can trigger the initiation of transition and exit planning. As shown in Figure 5.2, once the mandate is adopted an Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) is drafted and reviewed consistently to meet the changing trends in the mission environment. This figure shows the operationalisation of the ISF in the planning cycle of the mission and by default shows where and how exit strategy emanate and are executed in an on-going mission.

Figure 5.2: Planning Cycle - Integrated Presence



Source: Field survey, 2014

As a result of the changes in the mission environment, UNDPKO would either initiate a Strategic Assessment (SA) or a Technical Assessment Mission (TAM). The SA is

introduced when the situation on the mission grounds has deteriorated to the extent that there is the need for a stronger mandate to contain the situation. In contrast, the TAM is initiated when the situation is ripe for either the mission to either transition or exit from the peacekeeping environment. But even before the TAM commences its activities; the DPKO would have received a number of situational reports from the SRSG, force commanders and other major UNCT on the ground. It is the nature of these situational reports that empowers the DPKO to establish the TAM to evaluate the mission report and also to conduct their own assessment of the situation on the ground. Regarding who authorises the TAM to begin its work, the framework has inbuilt mechanism that triggers the TAM to commerce its work. For instance, the framework could specify that after every six months or one year the TAM should go and access the mission environment.

When the TAM goes into the mission environment they conduct an independent assessment and analysis of all the components of the mission over and above all the reports that have emanated from the mission environment. In the case of Liberia, when the TAM was activated, the assessment mission consulted widely with a cross-section of Liberian and international stakeholders, including President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, ministers of state, members of the legislature and judiciary, representatives of political parties and civil society, the leadership of the national army, police and other security agencies, non-governmental organisations, members of the donor and diplomatic community, and representatives of private companies invested in Liberia.[49] Furthermore the TAM may visit local police stations, prisons or correctional services among others, to gain first-hand information on the local context.[50] In Liberia the TAM, apart from visiting the police station, courts, ministries and other agencies, also conducted an assessment of the border areas in Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia. Additionally the team also visited the Bong, Grand Bassa, Grand Gedeh, Lofa, Maryland and River Cess counties.

The summary report of the TAM comes to complement all the other quarterly and monthly mission reports such as the end of tour reports, end of mission report, reports from force commanders among others. These reports are sent to the UN headquarters periodically by all the major stakeholders on the field. Once the TAM report is ready it is added to the many other mission reports that have already been sent to DPKO to form the

consolidated report that the Secretary General sends to the Security Council. The Security Council will study the report, evaluate the recommendations from the Secretary General and then issue a new mandate either to renew, scale down or upgrade the mission.[51] When the new mandate is issued, a draft ISF is also prepared to complement the changes as stipulated in the new mandate.

If there is going to be an exit, the new mandate would call for the establishment of a committee to oversee the process. The Secretary General, through the support of the DPKO, would set-up a committee to consider how to execute the three major phases namely, Adjustment, Drawdown and Withdrawal (ADW). Consequently, the official correspondence of the exit process on the field emanates from the Secretary General to the DPKO and onward to the particular SRSG. The information is then circulated to the various Force Commanders, Police Commissioners and the UNCT. On the military and the police side, the Force Commander only notifies the TCCs and the PCCs of the political decision to exit. The first step of the ADW process which is the adjustment phase would see the rearrangement and re-demarcation of people's responsibilities, roles and area of operation. This leads into the second phase where the mission begins to scale down aspects of the operations by withdrawing certain aspects and personnel from the mission environment. As some of the mission personnel are withdrawn, others are reassigned, while in some cases some new personnel are brought on board to take over the realigned responsibilities and area of operations. In many instances, the military must always be the first to thin out and in some cases the police multiply to take full charge of the security situation.

In the case of the military, the leaders of the contingents may decide how the exit is going to be executed and which unit is going to be withdrawn first.[52] Because most of these countries contribute troops to different areas, their exit strategy may differ. Generally, there are ways in which contingents from various countries drawdown. For example in such circumstances, Ghana can decide to withdraw the less essential or critical staff such as technical experts, Military observers (MILOBS) or signals/communication. In the case of the police, oftentimes the Formed Police Unit (FPU) are mostly the last to withdraw because they are the ones that perform most of the critical duties such as the crowd

control, protection of law and order and key installations, escort duties, protection of very very important persons (VVIP) etc. [53]

All these exercises are highly linked to the indicators and benchmarks as spelt out in the mission CONOPS. The achievement of these endstates, indicators and benchmarks informs the speed at which the ADW process must be pursued. Sometimes in the course of the process the situation on the ground may require that the speed at which the process is progressing is reviewed and slowed down. However, these processes are heavily influenced by the international staff and some PCC and TCC present in the mission. While some international staff might not want to lose their jobs, because the end of the mission could elicit some retrenchment of a sort, some PCC and TCC also have vested interest in ensuring that the mission continues for a longer period. These inhibitions are usually exemplified in false reports that are sent to the UN Headquarters in New York. Such reports, most times, do not reflect the true picture of the situation on the ground. Even when the job has been done, some would send a report that still paints a picture of fragility which invariably slows down, or prevents the exit in the short to medium term basis. These challenges notwithstanding, once the draft ISF is reviewed and accepted, it closes the integrated planning loop for the exit strategy.

In spite of this comprehensive planning framework for transition and exit in UN multidimensional peacekeeping operations, since the inception of the IMPP, the planning process has never been fully implemented in any peacekeeping mission.[54] This makes it very difficult to truly assess the efficacy of the planning process and the UN framework on exit strategy. Successively, the focus has been on using solely indicators and benchmarks as a prerequisite for an exit strategy. As a result, the language used in recent mandates and Security Council Resolution clearly highlights the benchmarks needed to achieve the desired endstate or success criteria. The UN, in 2010, developed a technical non-policy-oriented guide for benchmarking in peacekeeping operations. This guideline is supposed to usher the activities of the UN field presence to achieve peace consolidation. Considering that the documentation highlighting the basic principles and guidelines on benchmarking is still evolving it is too early to assess the effectiveness of such a document to draw out the right exit strategy in peace operations.

5.7 Similarities and differences in ECOWAS and UN exit approaches

This section discusses the exit approaches adapted by both ECOWAS and the UN in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The purpose is to highlight the similarities and differences in the procedure, processes, peculiarities and style of their exit strategies.

5.8 UN approach to exit in Sierra Leone and Liberia

With regards to the UN's approach to exit in Sierra Leone and Liberia, it has almost certainly followed the same pattern. The finding confirmed a combination of approaches in both situations. The UN adapted a number of exit mechanisms ranging from elections to benchmarking, phased withdrawal and successor operations. For instance, in the case of UNAMSIL, the completion of a successful disarmament program coupled with the peaceful atmosphere following the holding of the general elections created an opportunity for adjusting the mandate of the UNAMSIL mission. In order to consolidate the gains achieved so far, the UN together with other stakeholders such as the government of Sierra Leone (including the army and the police) identified some specific benchmarks to guide the drawdown and exit pathway. The exit strategy had benchmarks that were tied to the very issues that ignited the conflict in the first place. Broadly speaking, these benchmarks included: (a) building the capacity of the army and police; (b) Reintegration of ex-combatants; (c) Restoration of Governmental control over diamond mining; (d) Consolidating of state authority; (e) Managing insecurity within the sub-region (here referring to the conflict in Liberia).[55] Essentially, UNAMSIL was the first ever field mission in the history of the UN to adapt the use of benchmarks as a framework for downsizing troops in a peacekeeping operation.

Thus, the mission drawdown in Sierra Leone was managed in a systematic, phased and deliberate manner to ensure that at every stage of the process the mission was in absolute control until it handed over to a legitimate and effective local representative. The drawdown was executed by all components (military, police and civilian). Before arriving at the benchmarks for the phased withdrawal, two possible scenarios were evaluated. The first scenario which was considered the worst-case was the situation where insufficient

progress was made in the desire to build the capacity of the local army and police and also in the event where the threat of Liberia became biting. The second scenario which was the most desirable considered an army and police which are highly trained with little or no challenge. In both instances the first scenario was expected to last for a longer period whereas the second scenario was expected to last for approximately two years, all things being equal. Table 5.3 shows the drawdown plan initiated by the Secretary General and approved by the Security Council for the military component OF UNAMSIL.

Table 5.3: Drawdown Plan for UNAMSIL Military Component

Phase	**Activity**	**Period**
First Phase	Withdrawal of 600 troops from Nigeria and Bangladesh as well as a recall of reconnaissance helicopters that were non-essential	November 2002
Second phase	Withdrawal of additional 3900 troops and a reduction of sectors from five to three	August 2003
Third Phase	A further reduction of 5000 troops	December 2003
Fourth Phase	Complete handover of UNAMSIL duties to the government of Sierra Leone	December 2004

Source: Field Survey, 2014.

Even though the mission met the deadline for the first phase, that of the second phase was seriously delayed. This invariably affected the commencement of the third and final phases of the drawdown. In response to this drawback, the Security Council amended the phase three of the drawdown plan under a "modified status quo drawdown option" where the third phase was expected to be conducted under a revised plan, but with the same deadline of December 2004. The striking feature of the drawdown of UNAMSIL was the flexibility which the UN attached to the process of disengaging from the mission. Based on their assessments, various components were dislodged as and when they became necessary allowing for a smooth transition from the mission to the government of Sierra Leone. To cap the whole transition process, the moment the bulk of the peacekeepers were withdrawn, the UN set up the Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) as a successor or a follow-on mission with a reduced capacity and strength. This office was established

with the sole mandate to help the government of Sierra Leone to consolidate the peace achieved. UNIOSIL together with the UN Development Programme (UNDP) as part of the consolidation process assisted the Government of Sierra Leone through the National Electoral Commission to conduct series of elections, established a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and a National Human Rights Commission all in a bid to help with the peace consolidation efforts.

Meanwhile, for UNMIL, the UN has devised an exit strategy that is linked closely to the one executed by UNAMSIL. The UN has made the argument that it is not going to just drawdown totally and exit rather it is going to transition. The rhetoric has evolved from the whole issue of drawdown and withdrawal to the issue of transition. Transitioning, meaning that perhaps, the UN might end up setting up or establishing an integrated support office like it did for UNIPSIL in Sierra Leone. As to which form it would take, the details currently are unclear. But according to interviews conducted with some members of the transitional team in Liberia it is clear that a similar roadmap like what was used in Sierra Leone is being conceived. This means that there will still be a UN presence but less of troops and perhaps, a bit downsize of the civilian component as well as the beefing up of the UN police.

The UN exit strategy in Liberia has been premised on the two successive post-conflict elections and the general improvement in the political and security situation in Liberia. For UNMIL the first stage of the exit strategy has been to inform the government of Liberia, international partners and all other stakeholders of the intention of the UN to eventually leave. As part of the broad transitional process, a joint transition group, comprising representatives of the government of Liberia and the UN has developed an exit strategy based on six benchmarks namely: (a) the completion and implementation of a strategy and plan for the handover of security responsibilities from UNMIL to national authorities; (b) the institutionalisation of the national security architecture in line with the national security strategy; (c) the effective maintenance of law and order by national security institutions; (d) enhanced national capacity to secure and control the borders; (e) the increased effectiveness of state authority throughout Liberia; and (f) the conduct of peaceful, credible and accepted national elections in 2011.[56] These benchmarks are

predicated on the root causes of the conflict. Aside these benchmarks, the mission has also adapted the phased withdrawal mode as some form of adjustment for all the three components of the mission.

Since 2007, a couple of things have happened. There has been some restructuring within the mission itself so that there is less of the military component or peacekeepers or less 'boots on the ground'. UNMIL military components have conducted phased drawdown, reducing the mission strength from the initial 15,250 military personnel to its current authorised strength of 5,869 troops. Currently the mission military component is undergoing a three-phase drawdown. Similarly, the police and the civilian components have also undertaken some phased withdrawal which is in tandem with the benchmarks set for exit. However, a number of issues have been raised with respect to the downsizing of particularly the police, component of UNMIL operation. Prosper Addo the AU Senior Political and Humanitarian Affairs officer in Liberia, while commenting on the issue stated that:

> Arguments have been advanced for the increase in the police component however not much has been done on the front. The thinking is that the Liberian Police Force has been facing a number of challenges in their quest to provide internal security and so it would be suicidal to downsize the police component... [57]

Table 5.4 shows the drawdown plan initiated by the Government of Liberia and UNMIL for the military component of UNMIL.

Table 5.4: Drawdown Plan for UNMIL Military Component

Phase	Activity	Estimated Period
Phase One	Withdrawing a total of 2,026 military personnel, comprising two infantry battalions an engineering company, two signals companies, a logistics company, a military police detachment, an aircraft unit and two staff officers. UNMIL has no military presence in Grand Bassa, Grand Kru, River Cess and Sinoe	30 June 2012

	Counties	
Phase Two	Repatriating a battalion, aviation unit, two MI-8 helicopters and two sector headquarters. UNMIL force has no fixed presence in Bomi, Gbarpolu or Grand Cape Mount Counties	June 2014
Phase Three	Complete handover of UNMIL duties to the government of Liberia	July 2015

Source: Field Survey, 2014.

For the military component, the major challenge has been letting go of some of the troops from the various parts of the world. A senior officer from the transition team reiterated that:

> Some of the Bangladeshi and Pakistani battalions would be disengaged...but they would keep the Nigerian and the Ghanaian contingents possibly towards the mid-term elections (senatorial elections) and also eventually towards the presidential elections in 2017.[58]

Just as in the case of UNAMSIL, UNMIL has also been very flexible in withdrawing parts of the various components from the mission. These withdrawals have been very meticulous with emphasis on the prevailing security situation. For instance, in 2008, UNMIL had to suspend the drawdown of the police component because of their inability to keep up the pace of building the capacity of the local police force.

5.9 Parameters for Comparison

In this section the researcher compares the exit strategies adopted by both the UN and ECOWAS in Sierra Leone and Liberia. The comparison is based on selected thematic parameters. These include policy/legal framework for exit, the role of lead nations in SSR, re-hatting and elections.

5.9.1 Policy/Legal Framework for Exit

The first similarity in the case of ECOWAS/ECOMOG exit approach in Liberia and Sierra Leone, as already stated, was that there was no legal or policy framework neither were there any exit plan in both peacekeeping operations. A former sector commander with ECOMOG, in emphasising the point about the non-availability of exit strategy in both Liberia and Sierra Leone, stated that:

> "if there was an exit strategy, ECOMOG could not have probably waited until it was exhausted logistically for either the UN or the United States government in the case of Liberia and the UN or the United Kingdom government in the case of Sierra Leone to come in to assist...If there was an exit strategy the mandates would have clearly stated or given a pointer as to how we should approach it...if there was an exit strategy, the strategy would have stated for instance that based on the mandate, ECOMOG is expected to be a quick intervention force to restore relative peace and order in major cities and also to serve as an interim measure pending the deployment of the UN."[59]

In both instances the exit strategy was mainly fuelled by the political happenings in Nigeria which was the major contributing nation both in terms of logistics and troops to the two missions. The above statement support Bah (2012) assertion that domestic considerations play a pivotal role in establishing the timeframe for exit.

In the case of Liberia, by 1995, the Nigerian leader Saani Abacha was very desirous to get the troops back home because to him the international community was not appreciative and supportive of the enormous sacrifices that Nigeria had committed to the whole Liberian affair. This was in response to the international isolation and condemnation of the Abacha regime, following the brutalities that ushered him to power. The regime was perceived as not helping the evolving democratic culture in Nigeria to grow. Further the killing of Ken Saro Wiwa did not help matters as it also contributed to the further isolation of Nigeria. Earlier Nigeria had opposed any thought of an early election as a form of exit for ECOMOG troops because the possibility existed that Charles Taylor would come into power. This was a person that ECOMOG had been fighting against for the past five years and so any arrangement that sought to create an opportunity for him and his NPFL to assume the reins of power was highly resisted by the Nigerians.

Even though initially Nigeria opposed the idea of the possibility of Charles Taylor taking power should an election be organised, between staying forever because they did not like Taylor and disentangling themselves from a mission that was costing them so much in terms of resources and human lives, the latter seemed the best option. In other words, once their opposition to Taylor had not prevented the latter from assuming power, the danger of being stuck in long-term operation was considered not desirable, compared to the likelihood of the NPFL assuming power. The desire to exit afforded Abacha the opportunity to consolidate his own unjustified position as the leader of Nigeria, following the growing discontent within the local populace over Nigerian's "over" commitment to the Liberian peace process.

The Sierra Leonean issue was not different. The continuous support and deployment of Nigerian troops to that peace process became a major campaign issue for the 1999 Nigerian general elections. There was a lot of hue and cry from the Nigerian populace following the impact that their involvement in the Sierra Leone conflict was having on their economy. By 1999, nearly 800 Nigerian forces had lost their lives and the frequent arrival of body bags from Freetown into the international airport in Lagos began to raise a lot of resentment towards the operations in Sierra Leone.[60] Additionally, the long engagement of Nigerian military officers in these peacekeeping operations was having enormous effect on many homes. Marriages were collapsing; there was low morale as a result of long duty tours, children were being denied of their fathers' care and many homes were reeling from the absence of husbands, children and grandchildren (Ekeator, 2007). Others had also accused the military leadership of the country in the past of siphoning money with the pretext of supporting the peacekeeping operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone (Bah, 2012).

The death of General Abacha brought some new lease of life into the desire to bring the troops back home. General Abdulsalami Abubakar who became the new Nigerian leader after the death of General Abacha was committed to hand over the reins of government to a civilian under a multiparty democratic rule. General Abubakar was also committed to reducing the role of Nigerian military both at home and abroad. As the election campaign heated up in 1999, almost all the candidates who stood for the election reiterated their

desire to withdraw the troops should they be elected. "While Mr Olu Falae the former Finance Minister had promised to withdraw the estimated 15,000 Nigerian troops from Sierra Leone within a year if elected, retired General Olusegun Obasanjo gave no time frame; however he said the Nigerian troops would not remain a day longer than necessary".[61] When Olusegun Obasanjo was elected president he kept to his words and informed the UN Security Council through the General Secretary that Nigeria intends to drawdown with the intention that eventually they will be exiting from the mission.

5.9.2 Re-hatting as a Mode of Exit

The second similarity in the case of ECOWAS/ECOMOG exit approaches in Liberia and Sierra Leone was the use of re-hatting as a mode of transition and a mechanism for exit. In both cases the regional body handed over their operations to the UN. ECOMOG exited in Sierra Leone and handed over to UNAMSIL whereas ECOMIL exited in Liberia and handed over to UNMIL. In the case of Liberia, ECOMOG troops were already out of Liberia in 1998, following the election of Charles Taylor but the renewed fighting in 2003 culminated in the deployment of yet another ECOWAS force; this time around, under the auspices of a UN mandate resolution 1497, Secretary General Kofi Annan in requesting for support for ECOMIL forces stated that it was crucial for the ECOMIL force to be given a "robust mandate... in order to ensure that it has a credible deterrence capability."[62]And so the UN Security Council authorised Member States to establish a Multinational Force in Liberia to help implement the ceasefire agreement that was signed in June 2003. The new multinational force ECOMIL was tasked with the responsibility of overseeing the DDR processes, establish and maintain security in the period after the departure of Charles Taylor and also to ensure the installation of a successor authority. Furthermore the vanguard force was also assigned the responsibility of preparing the grounds and securing the environment for a full takeover by a long term UN peacekeeping force.

Similarly, in the case of Sierra Leone, despite the fact that UNAMSIL was planned right from the onset with the intention to co-deploy with ECOMOG, the sudden withdrawal of ECOMOG forces forced the UN Security Council to review the original mandate given to

UNAMSIL to ensure that there was no security gap emanating from the departure of ECOMOG. Prior to the arrival of UNAMSIL, ECOMOG was already on the ground with a force strength of between 10,000-15,000. Although ECOMOG was able to contain the situation, it lacked the requisite resources to prosecute a peacekeeping operation required under the umbrella of the UN.[63] Consequently, the Nigerian-led ECOMOG forces began a phased withdrawal that was expected to last for a period of three month with 3000 troops withdrawn each month.[64] This view is supported by Meister (2013) summary that ECOMOG exit mechanism in Sierra Leone initially went through the phased withdrawal approach. The UN tried to replace the almost 12000 ECOMOG forces with 6000 UN troops, but the decision backfired as they were quickly overwhelmed by the RUF fighters. The resultant security vacuum forced Nigeria to suspend its scheduled phased withdrawal that had already seen the repatriation of the first batch of 3000 peacekeepers back home.[65] Consequently, two battalions of the Nigerian ECOMOG troops were co-opted into the expanded UNAMSIL to help curtail the advancement and growth of rebel forces.

5.9.3 Elections as a Mode of Exit

When it comes to elections as a point of exit, there are two critical aspects. First it could be a test of democracy if a particular post-conflict country successfully goes through the process without having any major issues with peace and stability. It gives an indication of a stable kind of country where institutions of state are functioning. Second it can be used as an indicator to test the strength of the institutions in place. Therefore, where government changes hands over two to three times without much problems then it is an indication of stability and strong institutions. But in cases where the challenges lead to violence, then it presupposes that the institutions are not strong enough and exit cannot be initiated. In terms of similarities between the UN approaches to exit and that of ECOWAS, the closest is elections. The 1997 elections which heralded the exit of ECOMOG from Liberia was reminiscent of most UN engagements in peacekeeping, where elections in certain circumstances marked the end of the UN peacekeeping operations. Subsequently, in the case of Sierra Leone, the holding of successive elections became one of the most important benchmarks for the eventual exit of the UN mission.

Likewise, in the case of Liberia, although the mission has not ended, UNMIL, after successfully superintending over two successive elections has laid out a comprehensive drawdown strategy which will ultimately result in the departure of the mission.

The first difference between ECOWAS and the UN exit strategy in Liberia was the use of elections. While ECOWAS' first peacekeeping operations ended with a conduct of a single election in 1997, that of the UN which is still on-going has already conducted two elections in addition to establishing benchmarks to address the root cause of the conflict. Commenting on the ECOMOG exit in Liberia Colonel Festus B. Aboagye stated that:

> A lot of things were done wrong. In certain cases the cat was put before the horse...For example we went into the elections without disarmament demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) which were all prerequisite for the elections. No wonder ECOWAS and the UN had to come back because of the mess created by Charles Taylor.[66]

Similar sentiments were expressed by Col. Samaila Dadinkowa:

> There wasn't any plan to ensure that the national army is reconstituted, reorganised, trained and well equipped before we left. We just left because we were tired of the whole episode and the operation was eaten into the budgets of countries like Ghana and Nigeria.[67]

The worsening security situation following the exit of ECOMOG from Liberia presupposes that elections alone are not good enough measure to elicit an outright exit. This contradicts arguments made by Durch (2006); Chesterman (2004) and Paris (2004) that successful conduct of elections may be defined as the appropriate measure to end a peace operation.

Dr. Abass Bundu and Brigadier General Michael Apatsu, reacting to the use of elections as an exit mode stated that:

> Election is a good benchmark for exit. But just one election is not as good a benchmark as the second or the third. Elections as a democratic expression should be allowed to take deep roots... may be one or two elections will do. Let the ethos of democracy be established, especially in countries that are not accustomed to free elections, they need to be taught like a child to understand what elections are all about...But that must be done in addition to all the other programmes such as the SSR, DDR and the various capacity building programmes. It is only when this

> is done that exit can be initiated, otherwise you risk exposing the post-conflict state to instability and renewed violence.[68]
>
> ...you cannot put a figure to the number of elections to organise to say that the situation is ripe for an exit. It may not be one or two elections but how free or fair the election are organised that should be the utmost concern... how do people react after the election? Do all sections of the society feel involved in the election process? How much freedoms are being observed, freedom of association, freedom speech, media is allowed space to operate, civil society is vibrant, schools are functioning among others. These are the questions that should occupy the minds of the planners and not the number of elections organised.[69]

The statements made by both Brigadier General Apatsu and Dr. Abass Bundu support Huntington (1991) arguments on 'two-turnover test' for fledgling democracy. Huntington (1991) argued that a country can be deemed to have consolidated democracy only when they have two peaceful transition of power. These statements probably explain why ECOMOG's one-time elections failed with its exit strategy in Liberia while the UN seems to be making a lot of progress with a number of elections. Why did the UN succeed in Sierra Leone and now Liberia where ECOMOG failed? Analyst of the two various missions have offered lots of answers, but the most common is that in the case of ECOMOG, apart from the elections which they supervised correctly all the other aspects such as the DDR and the restructuring of the Liberian army were not properly done. The resultant chaos that followed the deterioration in the security situation was a clear manifestation of the premature departure of ECOMOG.

The UN has shown that elections as an exit mode must be combined with other defined activities such as establishing benchmarks to tackle the root cause of the conflict and also pursuing the exit through a phased withdrawal. This notwithstanding, Dr. Memunatu Pratt commented on the UN over reliance on elections as a mode of exit. She stated that:

> The problem with UN initiated exit strategy is that oftentimes they think that going for elections and forming a new government virtually solves the problem...there are instances where battalions have been withdrawn only for them to return back after some few months. The case of East Timor and Côte d'Ivoire has shown that elections alone cannot do the trick.[70]

This statement supports Hirschmann (2012) arguments that Basing peacekeeping exit strategies on elections, had repercussions that were incompatible with the UN's rhetorical ambitions to promote peace.

Even in the UN case it appears that elections under UNAMSIL were more successful than what is currently prevailing in UNMIL. Brigadier General Benjamin Freeman Kusi suggest that UNAMSIL success and UNMIL seeming failures have little to do with the qualities of the elections than with the deep difference in those countries political environments.[71] In Liberia, even though the country have witnessed two elections after the signing of the comprehensive peace agreement, the country still continues to suffer from pervasive corruption, lack of accountability and transparency from political actors. These difficulties have nothing to do with the legal framework for accountability because a number of institutional arrangements have seen the creation of a number of bodies to fight corruption. Institutions such as the Public Procurement and Concessions Commission (PPCC), the Liberia Anti-Corruption Commission (LACC) and the General Auditing Commission (GAC) have all been established for this assignment but these bodies lack the mandate, powers and resources to combat these aberrations.[72]

One other critical deficiency of the Liberian process is the orientation of the state towards international organisations and businesses. Arguably, it appears that the democratically elected government of Liberia is more answerable to donors than its own people.[73] This has pushed a number of its domestic capacity from government and civil society which inherently has affected the exit process. According to Prosper Addo, the Sierra Leonean story was different mainly because Sierra Leone had the capacity, expertise and the government and people worked towards the consolidation of democracy than Liberia.[74] Sierra Leone had a more diverse civil society (strong professional groups, labour unions and civic associations) than Liberia. The government and people took ownership of the process and were more proactive in the handling of the electoral process and issues than what is being exhibited in Liberia. Dr. Istifanus Sonsare Zabadi asserts that the Sierra Leonean "bright story" could be that it presented an enabling environment for pluralism to thrive than what is currently pertaining in Liberia. The Sierra Leonean case could be further strengthened by the mere fact that there existed the balance of power between the

ruling political elite (government and opposition). Within the period of the peacekeeping operation the change of government between the SLPP and the APC only goes to confirm the strength of their democracy. Lippmann (2005) argument on the indispensable opposition might confirm the very reason why Sierra Leone appears to have taken the right path and not Liberia. According to Lippmann (2005:186-90), "The national unity of a free people depends upon a sufficiently even balance of political power to make it impracticable for the administration to be arbitrary and for the opposition to be revolutionary and irreconcilable. Where that balance no longer exists, democracy perishes".

5.9.4 Security Sector Reforms as a Mode of Exit

Security Sector Reforms (SSR) has become one of the most essential benchmarks for exit in many peacekeeping operations. It is seen as a vital sign for sustainable peace and development in a post-conflict country especially when the reforms lead local people to feel safe and secure and also trust in the ability of the state to protect them. In Sierra Leone, the role of SSR in the entire post-conflict reconstruction process has been widely presented as one of the most successful efforts towards the exit of the international intervention. Although there were various donor agencies[75] in Sierra Leone, the SSR process in Sierra Leone was spearheaded by a lead nation, Britain[76], in support of a broader UN peacekeeping mission. Even though Britain worked with UNAMSIL to fulfil the SSR component of the mission they were each on their own and not under the control of any unified body. This invariably facilitated the way and manner in which the reforms were executed.

The reforms were very comprehensive, tackling all aspects and major security institutions in Sierra Leone. Intensive training program, along with institutional building in the entire justice and defence sectors were the hallmark of Britain's role. The reforms were significant because for once, the rhetoric on the conception of security right from the highest political levels changed from regime protection to people-centred security. As such, the reforms made security the first pillar of the country's poverty reduction strategy. In terms of methodology, the reforms were more participatory, broad based and the focus

was on capacity building. Many ordinary Sierra Leoneans mainly from the religious groups, the press, serving and retired security personnel, traditional authorities and ex-combatants, were given the opportunity to contribute to the reforms. Also in terms of implementation, the process was decentralised, culminating in the formation of Provincial and District Security Committees (PROSECs and DISECs). Particularly, the involvement of civil society groups in the reform process was one significant feature of the process. Dr Osman Blag, while recounting the significance of the SSR process in the build-up to the eventual exit of the UN peacekeeping, stated that:

> The whole SSR process layered the bedrock for the exit of the international interveners. It was well done...If Sierra Leone can now afford to send peacekeepers to other trouble spots in the world such as Darfur and Somalia then it tells you how effective the SSR process has been.[77]

In Liberia, although the SSR process is still on-going, it is expected that by the time that the mission finally withdraws the very fundamentals of the provision of security would have been properly addressed. Security forces in Liberia were basically part of the political process that occasioned the war. Therefore it has become apparent that any activities that are undertaken by UNMIL as part of the preparation for an exit tackles SSR. The SSR programme in Liberia has been developed to tackle all the challenges that precipitated the war and also to create a secure and a peaceful environment for equitable growth and development. There has been some significant progress in the recruitment, restructuring, and institutional capacity-building for all sectors of the Liberian security sector. For instance, since 2004, Liberian National Police with the help of UNMIL have recruited and trained over 1000 police personnel of the Liberian National Police. Also the restructuring and refocusing has seen the creation of departments such as the Women and Children Protection Section, establishment of a Police Promotion Board and the establishment of the emergency response unit to deal with armed robbery and riots. Through the support of the United States government and other development partners, Liberia has trained over 2000 personnel of the army who have been deployed to various barracks within the country. Through this same support, new barracks and logistics have been provided for the army.

The difference here lies in the approach to the entire SSR process. While Sierra Leone had the benefit of a lead nation championing the entire SSR process Liberia does not have that luxury. On whether exit become seamless when you have a lead nation spearheading the entire SSR process; Brigadier General Kusi remarked:

> ...It depends on what kind of lead nation you are talking about. If the lead nation(s) are powerful nations who have the means to support financially the SSR process then it can lead to a seamless exit.[78]

Sierra Leone has always been cited as a good case study in the sense that the British were committed to the entire process, they invested a lot, understood what they wanted to achieve and worked very well with UNAMSIL to achieve their common target. According to Ambassador Abdul Karim Koroma:

> In the Sierra Leonean case one would say that it was possible because you see the British had a "special relationship" with Sierra Leone and the people equally responded to them because they knew what to expect. Apart from being colonised by the British, Prime Minister Tony Blair under whose government the support was initiated was known to have some strong ties with Sierra Leone because he spent part of his childhood in Freetown with his father who was then a lecturer at Fouray Bay College in Freetown...[79]

However, the Americans have quite a different approach to the whole issue of SSR. Even though ordinarily Liberians would prefer the Americans to lead the process, it has become very obvious that they are not prepared to offer that solid commitment to the process. Even though the Americans are paying for the restructuring in the security sector they are not very much involved in the SSR process. This has resulted in many other partners having to come in to redefine the approach to get Liberia on the right track. This certainly has taken some time off the Liberian process and slowed progress towards the achievement of revamping the security sector. There is also the difference of oversight of responsibility and local ownership of the process. While the government of Sierra Leone took special interest in the process and pushed for its immediate conclusion, it appears that the government of Liberia still wants UNMIL to be around for a long period. As remarked by one officer from the political affairs division of UNMIL:

> Liberians would tell you that they are not comfortable that the military and the police components of UNMIL are downsizing ...Madam President herself would tell you that she is not happy with the fact that the UN has started to leave... because it has serious implication for security.[80]

The above statement raises a lot of questions about trust in the Liberian case. The Nigerian and their Ghanaians counterparts have been pencilled down to lead the SSR process into the exit of the mission. Already the Nigerians are helping with the training and restructuring of the military and other paramilitary agencies. The question that has come up many times is do the Liberians trust the Nigerians and for that matter the Ghanaians to lead the SSR process until the mission folds up entirely? The Former Deputy Leader of the Joint Verification Team (JVT) for 2003 Liberian Peace Process for example expressed this view:

> ...I doubt it so much if Liberians would wholeheartedly embrace any African country especially the Nigerian to lead the process...coupled with the fact that Africans do not necessarily trust anything that is African it would be very difficult. Currently they have no option than to accept what is prevailing hoping that along the way the right thing [the Americans] would come in to lead the process.[81]

This argument only goes to re-emphasise the lack of commitment on the part of the locals and national authorities to own the SSR process which eventually could culminate in the exit of the UNMIL.

5.10 Consequence and effects of peacekeeping exit strategies

Although peacekeeping operations are supposed to ensure peace, security and bring the parties of the conflict to a negotiated settlement, no peacekeeping operation is intended to last forever (Caty & Smith 2009). The significant feature of any exit strategy is whether people who have solely depended on the presence of peacekeepers for their livelihood and security would be able to adjust to their absence. In probing the collection of unintended consequences of exit strategy on host country, there remains the legitimate argument that the scope and side-effects of peacekeeping exit strategies are not always essentially

negative, but can also be positive. It is the subject of the implementation of exit strategies and the effect and consequence that such strategies have on the people of Liberia and Sierra Leone that this section seeks to explore.

The withdrawal of a peacekeeping operation creates a vacuum in several fronts from security to livelihoods. The biggest impact of the exit strategy on a host country would be felt on the security front because security is at the core of most of the activities undertaken by peacekeeping missions. Whether it is linked to protection of civilians, facilitating the political process, supporting the organisation of elections, assisting in the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants or restoring the rule of law, peacekeepers (mainly the police and the military component) are deployed to ensure that the safety of the people and the process are guaranteed. These activities are exemplified in the number and size of personnel deployed on the field. It is apparent that the general security situation improves tremendously while the peacekeepers are around. Once they are withdrawn, the possibility of their absence creating a security vacuum for spoilers to exploit is very high. A respondent from Freetown, commenting on the security vacuum created as the result of the exit of peacekeepers stated that "even if they are not doing anything their very presence in a post-conflict country is a good deterrent to would be spoilers".[82] But one the positive effect of the exit strategy of both the UN and ECOMOG was that it forced the government of Liberia and Sierra Leone to shoulder its own security responsibilities. The longer the mission stayed, the more dependent the local governments were on the international community for their security needs. The departure of ECOMOG from both Liberia and Sierra Leone created some security vacuum which had serious impact on the peace process. In Liberia, the departure of ECOMOG created a vacuum that led to the deterioration in the security situation, allowing former warlords Prince Johnson, Alhaji Kromah, Charles Taylor and their supporters to renew their fighting. This incidence pushed Liberia into another round of conflict. As in the case of Liberia, ECOMOG's haste departure in Sierra Leone allowed the RUF to take advantage of the security void to launch an attack on Freetown killing several civilians and also taking hundreds of the newly deployed UN peacekeepers hostage.

The immediate effect of the peacekeeping exit strategy of ECOMOG and the UN in Liberia and Sierra Leone could be felt at the economic front. Generally, the missions' spending provides an effective environment for economic growth, thus making the mission a major contributor to the wellbeing of the local economy. The potential effects of the departure of these peacekeeping operations from the two countries are a two-edged sword which could be partly positive or negative depending on the size and behaviour of the particular mission. On the positive side, the employment opportunities, consumption and financial transfers that the various missions provided for the two countries helped them to jumpstart their economies which had been reeling from decades of mismanagement. Contrary to these gains, the exit of peacekeepers has had an enormous impact on the economic outlook of these two countries. In terms of what the exit of the peacekeeping mission would do to investor confidence and climate Dr. Istifanus Sonsare Zabadi stated that:

> The presence of the UN has brought goodwill and also given a lot of credibility to the host government of these countries...because people know that once the mission is there their investment are safe. But once withdrawal commences investors become jittery and might repatriate their investment back to their home countries because of the uncertainty the situation brings.[83]

As has already been discussed, the multitude of industries and services and its attendant labour supplies meant that the departure of peacekeepers would create serious labour crises for especially, the people that depended on it for their livelihood. The service industry has been the greatest beneficiary of the largesse of peacekeeping operation in both countries, especially areas such as restaurants, clubs, purchases and hotels. As mentioned by one of the participant from Sierra Leone in the focus group discussion, "Clearly, our livelihoods have been greatly affected. When the peacekeepers left they went with several employment opportunities that they were providing for the people in areas such as the entertainment industry, commerce and hoteling. Families who were depending on these employment avenues have had to live from 'hand to mouth' now. That is the nature of the situation".[84] The utmost losses are women, because often times they are the ones who are employed by individual mission personnel as house workers providing services like house cleaning, laundering and running errands. Additionally, the

missions also employ locals to offer secretarial and translation-based jobs, guard duties, cooking and driving.

Throughout the period of peacekeeping the quality of the housing improved and the overall housing stock generally increased beyond the reach of local inhabitants. The departure of peacekeepers presents a classic case of two sides to a coin. While their departure creates a whopping gap in the revenue generated from the high rents that received from their patronage of these facilities, it also provides opportunities for local people to access these facilities at a lower cost; something that did not exist when the peacekeepers were present in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Politically, the departure of peacekeepers does have an impact on the host country as the incidences in Liberia and Sierra Leone have shown. Members of the political class who were careful of their behaviour because of the very presence of peacekeepers and the international community started to exploit their absence.

The next consequence has to do with competing doctrine influence. When it comes to the military, police, immigration and all other security agencies, they have doctrines that underpin their work. When several doctrines are "imposed" on a host country as part of the security sector reforms and the outcomes are not properly handled, the possibility of confusing the beneficiaries becomes very high. In Sierra Leone, a police commissioner recounted how they had to endure different sets of doctrines from different countries such as the United Kingdom, Norway and Canada as part of building their capacity to handle the security situation in their absence. According to him, much as the many training programmes were good, the variety got them more confused than before, especially when they had different countries handling different aspects of the training. "We really felt the disconnect when the peacekeepers left." [85]

Yet another effect of exit strategy could be felt in the arena of reconstruction and development work. Any peacekeeping operation, apart from providing security, supervising cease-fires, maintaining law and order, also contributes to rebuilding of infrastructure. The departure of peacekeeping operations often creates a lot of difficulties for local authorities as they are unable to match up with the infrastructure development agenda that was pursued by the mission while it was in the operating environment. A

government official from Liberia, lamenting on the effect of the departure of UNMIL from Liberia, stated that:

> ...Our livelihood would be greatly affected when all the peacekeepers eventually leave because the number of road construction and rehabilitation projects being carried by UNMIL mission is likely to be with the mission...[86]

Similar concerns were expressed by Dr. Alimamy Paolo Bangura:

> ...Sometimes infrastructure development is affected. Some projects initiated by the mission are halted. It happened in Sierra Leone and might happen in Liberia...[87]

Notwithstanding all these challenges, it has become apparent that once exit is being considered there is the need to look at legacy. In both the UN and ECOWAS peacekeeping operations, exit cannot be pursued in vacuum rather it must be linked to the strategic goals underpinning the fundamentals of the intervention. It is when this is vigorously pursued that the effects of the exit would be minimised.

In this chapter, we have analysed the importance of exit strategy in peacekeeping operations. The study results revealed that having an exit strategy in any peacekeeping operation contributes significantly to connect mandates to mission tactic and resources, support missions to be pointed and purposive, control the urge to overstay and encourage the development of national capacities. There was a sharp contrast in the exit approaches adopted by both organisations in the two countries. While ECOWAS preferred to exit either through re-hatting or complete withdrawal as a result of the dearth in logistics, the UN, with a much improved resource base, had maintained a systematic level of transition from benchmarking to phased withdrawal into successor operations. Although the Integrated Mission Planning Process and the Concepts of Operations of the ECOWAS Standby force have emerged to provide some form of a framework for exit, the entire processes remain theoretical with major implementation deficiencies. Resources, time and the nervousness of the unknown remain continuing challenges for the peacekeeping exit strategy adopted in the two countries. There is also concern that mission planners at all levels still remain oblivious of the implication of the nonexistence of exit strategy in mission. Major shortcomings of exit strategy on the two post-war societies were felt

mainly on the security, economic and political fronts. The next chapter provides a summary of the findings conclusions and recommendation on how future exit strategy in both ECOWAS and UN peacekeeping operations should be pursued.

Notes

[1] Interview with Former Director of UNDPKO, Islamabad Pakistan, 23October 2013.
[2] Interview with Deputy Director for Ghana Armed Forces Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DAKOP), 14 March 2014.
[3] Interview with Brig. Gen. Benjamin Freeman Kusi (Rtd.) Former Deputy Force Commander of the United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI) and Leader of the Joint Verification Team (JVT) for 2003 Liberian Peace Process, Bamako Mali, 18 November 2014
[4] Interview with Respondent Two, Ghanaian Brig. Gen.
[5] Interview with Col. Alhaji Mohammed Mustapha Director OPINT, Department of Defence Intelligence, GAF Accra Ghana. 19 November 2014.
[6] Interview with a Nigerian Course Director, Accra Ghana, 25 November 2013.
[7] Interview with a Political Affairs Officer, ECOWAS Headquarters, Abuja Nigeria, 22 June 2014
[8] Interview with an Officer with the ECOWAS Standby Force, Abuja Nigeria, 22 June 2014
[9] Interview with Former Force Commander for United Nations Missions in Congo, Islamabad Pakistan, 24 October 2013
[10] Interview with Brigadier General Francis Agyemfra (Rtd.), former Chief of Staff, Ghana Armed Forces and Ghana's Former Ambassador to the Republic of Liberia (1997-2001), Accra Ghana. 19 May 2014
[11] Interview with Dr. Abass Bundu, Former Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, Freetown Sierra Leone, 14 July 2013
[12] Ibid.,
[13] Ibid.,
[14] Interview with former Nigerian Diplomat and Minister of State, Abuja Nigeria, 17 September 2013.
[15] Interview with Major General (Rtd.) Henry Kwami Ayidoho, Accra Ghana, 19 August 2013
[16] Interview with Major General (Rtd.) Henry Kwami Ayidoho, Accra Ghana, 19 August 2013
[17] Interview with General Arnold Quainoo, First Commander of ECOMOG, Accra Ghana, 20 January 2014
[18] Interview with a Former ECOMOG Sector Commander, National Defense College, Abuja Nigeria, 15 September 2013
[19] These circumstances were mainly the desire to get their nationals out of Liberia and to stop the killing and destruction of property.
[20] Interview with Brigadier General Francis Agyemfra (Rtd.), former Chief of Staff, Ghana Armed Forces and Ghana's Former Ambassador to the Republic of Liberia (1997-2001), Accra Ghana. 19 May 2014
[21] Interview with Major General (Rtd.) Henry Kwami Ayidoho, Accra Ghana, 19 August 2013
[22] Interview with Ambassador Abdul Karim Koroma, Former Sierra Leone Foreign Minister 1985-1992, Freetown Sierra Leone, 12 July 2013
[23] Interview with a Nigerian Colonel and former Aid-de-camp to Force Commander in Liberia, Accra Ghana, 22 February 2014
[24] Interview with Brigadier General Francis Agyemfra (Rtd.), former Chief of Staff, Ghana Armed Forces and Ghana's Former Ambassador to the Republic of Liberia (1997-2001), Accra Ghana. 19 May 2014
[25] Ibid.,
[26] Interview with Former ECOMOG Force Commander, Abuja Nigeria, 18 September 2013.
[27] Interview with Brig. Gen. Charles Richter-Addo, Former Principal Programme Officer Doctrine and Training, ECOWAS Standby Force, Accra Ghana. 04 March 2014.
[28] Interview with Chief of Staff, ECOWAS Standby Force, Thies Senegal, 24 June 2014.
[29] Interview with a Trainer at the National Defense College (NDC), Abuja Nigeria, 22 June 2014
[30] Interview with Respondent Four, Ghanaian Col.
[31] Interview with Respondent Five, Nigerian Lt. Col.
[32] Interview with Respondent Two, Ghanaian Brigadier General.
[33] Interview with Respondent Three, Nigerian Col.
[34] Under the Mechanism, the Mediation and Security Council is the most influential institutional body responsible for taking decisions on peacekeeping missions under the rubric of ESF. The MSC is an offshoot of the Authority of Heads of States and Government (the highest decision making body in ECOWAS). Its membership comprises of former and current heads of states, minsters and ambassadors. Furthermore, the MSC has three major organs operating under it namely: ESF, Defense and Security Commission (DSC) and the Council of Elders (CoE).

[35] These necessary requirements include the development of the strategic plan, force commanders directives, status of force agreement, rules of engagement, budgeting and logistics.
[36] Interview with a Political Affairs Officer, ECOWAS Headquarters, Abuja Nigeria, 22 June 2014.
[37] Interview with the Chief of Staff, ECOWAS Standby Force, Thies Senegal, 24 June 2014.
[38] Interview with Dr. Istifanus Sonsare Zabadi, Provost, Centre for Strategic Research and Studies (CSRS National Defence College, Thies Senegal, 24 June 2014.
[39] Interview with an Indian Former Force Commander, Islamabad Pakistan, 23 October 2013.
[40] Interview with a Political Affairs Officer, ECOWAS Headquarters, Abuja Nigeria, 22 June 2014
[41] Interview with an Officer with the ECOWAS Standby Force, Abuja Nigeria, 22 June 2014
[42] Interview with Former Director of UNDPKO, Islamabad Pakistan, 23October 2013.
[43] Ibid.,
[44] Interview with an Indian Former Force Commander, Islamabad Pakistan, 23 October 2013.
[45] These components include the military, police and civilian
[46] Interview with a Director from UNDPKO, Toronto Canada, 9 April 2014
[47]Interview with Brig. Gen. Michael Akpatsu (Jnr), Former Peacekeeping Affairs Officer, Office of Military Affairs. DPKO, UN Headquarters. Accra Ghana, 14 August 2014
[48] Interview with Brig. Gen. Michael Akpatsu (Jnr), Former Peacekeeping Affairs Officer, Office of Military Affairs. DPKO, UN Headquarters. Accra Ghana, 14 August 2014
[49] Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia, UN Doc S/2012/230, April 16, 2012.
[50] Interview with Deputy Director for Ghana Armed Forces Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DAKOP), 14 March 2014.
[51] Interview with a Director from UNDPKO, Toronto Canada, 9 April 2014
[52] Interview with a Trainer at the National Defence College (NDC), Abuja Nigeria, 22 June 2014
[53] ibid.,
[54] Interview with a Director from UNDPKO, Toronto Canada, 9 April 2014
[55] Fifteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, UN Doc S/2002/987, September 5, 2002.
[56] Twenty-second progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia, UN Doc S/2011/72, February 14, 2011; Special report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia, UN Doc S/2012/230, April 12, 2012
[57] Interview with Prosper Addo, AU Senior Political and Humanitarian Affairs officer in Liberia, Monrovia Liberia, 19 August 2013
[58] Interview with Respondent Five, Nigerian Lt. Col.
[59] Interview with a Former ECOMOG Sector Commander, Accra Ghana, 18 January 2014
[60] Interview with a Nigerian Army Officer, National Defence College (NDC), Abuja Nigeria, 22 June 2014
[61] Mark Doyle (1999) World: Africa Nigerian elections 'threatens' Sierra Leone, BBC News, Saturday, February 27, 1999
[62] UN Security Council Resolution 1497 (2003), press release SC/7836, August 01, 2003.
[63] Interview with Col. Alhaji Mohammed Mustapha Director OPINT, Department of Defence Intelligence, GAF Accra Ghana. 19 November 2014.
[64] Interview with Colonel Yusuf, Former officer with the ECOMOG mission in Liberia and Sierra Leone, Nigerian Army, Accra Ghana, 14 January 2014.
[65] Interview with Colonel Dadinkowa, Former officer with the ECOMOG mission in Liberia and Sierra Leone, Nigerian Army, Accra Ghana, 09 March 2013.
[66] Interview with Col. Festus B. Aboagye (Rtd.), Executive Secretary African Peace Support Trainers Association (APSTA) and Former Commanding Officer, ECOMOG, Accra Ghana, 15 July 2013
[67] Interview with Colonel Dadinkowa, Former officer with the ECOMOG mission in Liberia and Sierra Leone, Nigerian Army, Accra Ghana, 09 March 2013.
[68] Interview with Dr. Abass Bundu, Former Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, Freetown Sierra Leone, 14 July 2013
[69] Interview with Brig. Gen. Michael Akpatsu (Jnr), Former Peacekeeping Affairs Officer, Office of Military Affairs. DPKO, UN Headquarters. Accra Ghana, 14 August 2014
[70] Interview with Dr. Memunatu Pratt, Head of Department of Peace and Conflict Studies, Fourah Bay College, Freetown Sierra Leone, 15 July 2013

[71] Interview with Brig. Gen. Benjamin Freeman Kusi (Rtd.) Former Deputy Force Commander of the United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI) and Leader of the Joint Verification Team (JVT) for 2003 Liberian Peace Process, Bamako Mali, 18 November 2014

[72] Interview with Thomas Jaye, Deputy Director, Faculty of Academic Affairs an Research, KAIPTC, Accra Ghana, 18 August 2014

[73] Interview with Dr. Freedom Chukwuudi Onuoha, Research Fellow, Centre for Strategic Studies , National Defense College, Abuja Nigeria, 22 June 2014

[74] Interview with Prosper Addo, AU Senior Political and Humanitarian Affairs officer in Liberia, Monrovia Liberia, 19 August 2013

[75]Such as the World Bank, European Commission and the UNDP

[76] The UK initially became involved in the SSR process in Sierra Leone following the 1996 elections, and at the invitation of the President Tejan Kabbah. Their initial focus was on police reform but it later expanded to cover the military, justice and intelligence sectors.

[77] Interview with Dr. Osman Blag, Lecturer, Fouray Bay College, University of Sierra Leone, 12 July 2013

[78] Interview with Brig. Gen. Benjamin Freeman Kusi (Rtd.) Former Deputy Force Commander of the United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI) and Leader of the Joint Verification Team (JVT) for 2003 Liberian Peace Process, Bamako Mali, 18 November 2014

[79] Interview with Ambassador Abdul Karim Koroma, Former Sierra Leone Foreign Minister 1985-1992, Freetown Sierra Leone, 12 July 2013

[80] Interview with Respondent one, Political Affairs department, UNMIL, Monrovia Liberia, 19 August 2013

[81] Interview with Brig. Gen. Benjamin Freeman Kusi (Rtd.) Former Deputy Force Commander of the United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI) and Leader of the Joint Verification Team (JVT) for 2003 Liberian Peace Process, Bamako Mali, 18 November 2014

[82] Interview with Dr. Memunatu Pratt, Head of Department of Peace and Conflict Studies, Fourah Bay College, Freetown Sierra Leone, 15 July 2013

[83] Interview with Dr. Istifanus Sonsare Zabadi, Provost, Centre for Strategic Research and Studies (CSRS National Defence College, Thies Senegal, 24 June 2014.

[84] Interview with a Secretary, United Nations County Support Team, Monrovia Liberia, 13 February 2014

[85] Interview with a Police Commissioner, Freetown Sierra Leone, 15 July 2013.

[86] Information was provided through the Focus Group Discussion held at the KAIPTC

[87] Interview with Dr. Alimamy Paolo Bangura, Former Minister for Foreign Affairs under the AFRC Regime, Freetown Sierra Leone, 12 July 2013

CHAPTER SIX
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Introduction

The study set out to interrogate the exit strategies adopted by ECOWAS and the UN in their peacekeeping operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone and also the role those strategies played in contributing to the success or otherwise of those peacekeeping operations. The focus of the study was on the transition and the exit mechanisms embraced by both institutions and how those mechanisms guaranteed the long-term sustainability of peace in both countries. The purpose was to explore the increasing significance of exit strategy to peacekeeping operation globally and the recent institutional drive and innovations that are intended to help manage the consequences of transitions and exit in peace operations. This chapter presents the summary of findings, conclusions and recommendations.

6.2 Summary of findings

In total, the study used 76 respondents, including former commanders of ECOMOG, former and current commanders of UN missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone, sector commanders, staff of DPKO and DPA, staff of political affairs and security department of ECOWAS, course participants and facilitators at KAIPTC, national government officials, experts and academicians. Structured and unstructured interviews and focus group discussion were used to elicit information from the respondents. The sampling procedure was generally purposive for the former commander of ECOMOG, former and current commanders of UN missions, national government officials and experts, while snowball and accidental sampling technique were employed for staff of DPKO and DPA, academicians and sector commanders. Focus group discussions were organised for course participants and facilitators at KAIPTC. The qualitative research

design used for this study was partly a combination of descriptive, explorative and cross-sectional surveys. The study was generally informed by the Ripeness theory, the Liberal peace theory and the Clausewitzean framework of analysis.

In spite of the apparent accomplishments of peacekeeping operations, devising exit strategy has become a major challenge to all major interventions, be it transformative military occupation, integrated peace support operations or international territorial administration (Caplan, 2012). The inability to properly integrate an exit plan when planning a peacekeeping operation has created an immeasurable void in the peacekeeping cycle. This void, as identified in this study, can only be filled when mission planners and policy makers move beyond the *ad-hoc* way of planning exit in mission to a solid, comprehensive and a carefully thought out exit plan. As has been observed by Caplan (2012), peacekeeping operations must be conceived with the intention that someday it will come to an end; and that no peacekeeping operation is expected to last forever. Anthony Lake's (1996:2) argument best sums up the importance of exit strategy in any major intervention: "Before we send our troops into a foreign country we should know how and when we're going to get them out". Apart from a few weaknesses, there are aspects of exit strategies that can support the drive to the attainment of sustainable peace. As this study has revealed, there are more elements that stimulate the motivation to achieve a successful peacekeeping operation than those that limit its existence.

6.2.1 Significance of exit strategies in peacekeeping operations

A number of peacekeeping operations have failed due to the inability to recognise, right from the onset, the important role of exit strategy in the planning process. This challenge might continue if structures are not put in place to integrate an exit strategy in the mission planning process. The study established that there are enormous benefits of exit strategy not only for the mission but also for the host country into which these peacekeeping missions deploy. For any peacekeeping operations, just like any other major intervention, be it transformative military occupation or international territorial administration, the existence of an exit strategy helps the intervention to connect mandates to mission tactics and resources; helps missions to be pointed and purposive; stimulates

participation; engenders responsibility and accountability, overcomes the urge to overstay and encourages the development of national capacities. Furthermore, it was observed that introducing an exit strategy into the mandate guarantees some meticulousness and thoroughness in the whole intervention process. Additionally, exit strategy was identified to aid in the timing and sequencing of priorities as well as helping the entire peacekeeping operations to remain focused in pursuit of the identified objectives set out in the mandate. In terms of participation, it became evident that with current resistance towards deployment of troops by T/PCC, having a clear exit strategy with visibly delineated timelines in any proposed peace operation is a good enough reason to get countries to commit troops and personnel to the mission. This suggests the practical demonstration that once the moment is ripe, implementing the exit strategy only goes to complement the success of the mission and ensure that sustainable peace is achieved.

6.2.2 Exit Frameworks for ECOWAS and UN peacekeeping operations

The findings revealed that both ECOWAS and the UN in the past did not have any framework to guide their exit from peacekeeping operations. In terms of an exit plan, ECOMOG did not have any normative strategy for exit because ECOWAS by its very nature was supposed to be a regional grouping championing the integration of the various economies of its member states. ECOWAS at its formation had not had to contend with issues of security to warrant the development of a framework for peacekeeping. While ECOWAS approach to exit strategy in peacekeeping operations is largely informed by its experiences in Liberia and Sierra Leone, that of the UN is informed by the high numbers of existing peacekeeping operations at the turn of the new millennium. Subsequent to those experiences, ECOWAS, through the ECOWAS conflict prevention framework, has come out with the ECOWAS Standby Force to replace ECOMOG. Under the ESF concept of operations, what ECOWAS considers as their exit strategy is re-hatting into a UN mission which is normally expected to take place on the sixth month of any intervention. The UN, however, has developed the integrated mission planning process to guide its entry and exit from peacekeeping operations. This framework painstakingly outlines the exact process that any UN mission is expected to go through before it is terminated. It

highlights what should constitute the success criteria or endstate and how indicators and benchmarks could be set to help achieve this endstate. Despite the development of these frameworks for exit by both ECOWAS and UN, none of these institutions have gone strictly to the provisions in the various frameworks in any of the recent missions.

6.2.3 Similarities and Differences between ECOWAS and UN exit approaches in Liberia and Sierra Leone

The findings revealed that there were substantial differences in the way ECOWAS and the UN approached their exit in the two countries. In the case of Liberia while ECOMOG used the 1997 elections as the yardstick to pull out, the UN apart from holding two successive elections has resorted to the use of benchmarks and employed the systematic process of phased withdrawal to guide the exit. Although the UN process is still ongoing there are signs that there would be a successive operation; a peacebuilding mission to take over from the current peacekeeping operation once its drawdown is complete. In Sierra Leone, while the UN adopted a similar approach as is being done in Liberia currently, the Nigerian-led ECOMOG forces adopted the cut and run approach. A number of reasons influenced the decision of ECOMOG to leave in haste in Sierra Leone. Key among them was the political happening and the change of leadership back home in Nigeria, peacekeeping fatigue, and also the operational and logistical cost of the mission on the local economy of Nigeria (Bah, 2012). In terms of similarities between the two ECOMOG missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone, two major influences stand out. First, they both did not have any framework at the time to guide their exit; rather the decision to exit in both instances was influenced by Nigeria which was contributing nearly 70 percent of the troops and equipment to both missions. Second, in both countries ECOWAS adopted re-hatting as a way of pulling out of the mission and handing over the peace process to a major power, the UN, which is considered as having the capacity reach and resources for a long term operation.

6.2.4 Consequences and effects of the exit approaches

The decisive feature of an exit strategy is whether people who have solely depended on the presence of peacekeepers for their livelihood for a long period of time would be able to adjust to their absence. The consequence or effect of these exit approaches could be intended or unintended and can be largely positive or negative. Of all the activities that engaged the attention of the peacekeeping operation, four major sectors would feel the brunt of the exit strategy. These four sectors include security, the economy, housing and infrastructure development. Both Liberia and Sierra Leone exemplified the security vacuum created as a result of the withdrawal of peacekeepers and how that opened up for spoilers to exploit the situation to their advantage. Likewise, labour supplies and the economy in general were greatly affected in the two countries following the withdrawal of services, industries and business interests that was in the mission environment to support the operation of the mission. The findings also established that while the departure of peacekeepers would create a whopping gap in the revenue generated from the high rents that was received from their patronage of these facilities it will also provide opportunities for local people to access these facilities at a lower cost; something that did not exist when the peacekeepers were around. Paradoxically, the exit can be both positive and negative.

6.3 Conclusions and policy implications

In this work, we examined the role of exit strategies in peacekeeping operations. We have developed a definite option model in which a sub-regional or a regional body together with the UN can pursue exit in a peacekeeping operation. So many peacekeeping operations have become overdrawn due to failure to recognise the important role of exit strategy in the planning and entry process. This problem might continue if structures are not put in place to include exit strategy in the mandate formulation and the planning of the entry strategy. Studies have shown that interventions that encompass both an entry and exit strategy from the onset of the mission have the potential of being successful and leaving behind sustainable peace. Based on the findings of the study, the following conclusions were drawn:

- Exit strategy aids the intervention of any peacekeeping operations to connect mandates to mission tactics and resources; helps missions to be pointed and purposive; stimulates participation; engenders responsibility and accountability, overcomes the urge to overstay and encourages the development of national capacities. Additionally it guarantees some meticulousness and thoroughness as well as aid in the timing and sequencing of priorities in a mission environment;

- Although in the past both ECOWAS and the UN did not have any framework to guide their exit from peacekeeping operations, the coming into effect of the ESF under the broader ECPF as well as the IMPP provides some hope that efforts are being made to guide the way missions enter as well as exit. Whereas ECOWAS would need to review its tentative timeframe for its intervention because it is unrealistic, both ECOWAS and the UN must make a conscious effort to follow the planning process as highlighted in both the IMPP and ESF;

- Substantial differences exist in the way ECOWAS and the UN approached their exit in both Liberia and Sierra Leone. While ECOWAS adopted the holding of one election and the cut and run approach in Liberia and Sierra Leone respectively, the UN has employed a combination of mechanisms including the holding of successive elections, benchmarking, phased withdrawal and successor operations;

- In terms of similarities, ECOWAS in both countries, engaged the use of re-hatting as the optimal way of disengaging from the peacekeeping operations while the UN is treading on the same pathway of holding not just one election, but a series of elections in addition to benchmarking, phased withdrawal and the possibility of a successor operation in both countries;

- The principal lessons learnt in relation to exit strategy in peacekeeping operations are that the effect and consequences could have both a positive and negative impact on the host country. The greatest effect could be felt in the following sectors: economy, security, housing and infrastructure development; and

- A number of challenges were identified as having contributed to the inability of ECOWAS to have a clearly defined exit strategy in the past. Key among them being the lack of political direction, inability to clearly delineate what the endstate was and the lack of alternative options to guide the exit process.

6.4 Recommendations

Based on the findings and conclusions from the study, these recommendations are made:

- ECOWAS should commit to clear exit strategy right from the onset in any peacekeeping operation. Benchmarks and indicators of success must be built into the planning of peace support operations to enable progress to be assessed and transition or exit strategies established. When projecting any peacekeeping operation, ECOWAS must painstakingly examine in detail the mission's exit strategy to ensure that ECOWAS contribution to the peace process is part of a well-planned and structured approach to achieving the stated objectives. ECOWAS must clearly articulate its exit strategy when committing forces to an operation.

- ECOWAS and UN mission planners must make a conscious effort to clearly delineate what the exit strategy is in the mission mandate to enable peacekeepers to apply themselves to achieving the desired endstate or success criteria as spelt out by either the UN Security Council or the Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS.

- On the part of ECOWAS, before any intervention start, ECOWAS must insist that at least there is a framework for any military or multidimensional peacekeeping operation. This framework would be incomplete without an exit strategy. Also there must be political guidance. There must be a comprehensive engagement involving all the major stakeholders i.e. political affairs and the military. This plan must be debated by the ECOWAS Heads of State and Government and a protocol or a resolution passed to that effect. The formation of a technical committee made

up of representatives of T/PCC and all the other stakeholders to work out proper modalities for intervention including exit plans, should be done after the passing of the protocol.

- ECOWAS must develop a detailed implementation or action plan for exiting from a peacekeeping operation, factoring in the political, diplomatic, military and humanitarian elements. More importantly, ECOWAS must put in place a procedure, methodology or standards that it would put in place as indicators or benchmarks for an exit strategy. It should not be so rigid but an exit strategy that would give options or alternatives for a pullout from a peacekeeping mission. At the ECOWAS level, this can be factored into the planning process. It is very important that this roadmap is established so that at the political affairs level it could be factored into the initial thinking of the intervention.

- ECOWAS and the UN should prioritise the implementation of the exit framework and policies as spelt out in the ESF and the IMPP, to address the adjoining and structural causes of being overdrawn in long-term peacekeeping operations. Both institutions should design and develop a comprehensive framework for exit, aligning its policies with needs on the ground and in this regard to translate its objectives, Resolutions and Protocols into concrete initiatives on the ground. Additionally, both ECOWAS and the UN must amalgamate their experiences and all the lessons learnt from past missions, to enhance sustainable peace.

- ECOWAS should provide clear guidelines and a detailed plan for undertaking re-hatting as part of a proactive exit strategy in a peacekeeping environment. There is the need for some strategic partnership with external partners such as the UN, using its concepts of operations (CONOPS) and developing a better linkage and collaboration with this institution. Whatever would be done at the regional level must be coordinated with other partners such as the UN. The two organisations should establish some form of joint modalities, concepts of operations and rules for dealing with the re-hatting process separately from their individual organisation framework for exit. There is the need to establish a Memorandum of

Understanding (MOU) between ECOWAS and the UN on how such re-hatting process could be pursued. This is essential in dealing with all the major challenges that might crop up in future peacekeeping operations.

- A lead country in the exit strategy process is essential in enhancing the smooth transition from a peacekeeping operation to a host country. Part of the reason why the UN exit strategy in Sierra Leone succeeded was that they had a lead country in the nature of Britain overseeing every aspect and phase of the exit strategy. The two institutions, ECOWAS and the UN, must exploit the possibility of using lead countries to accomplish its exit strategy.

- The important role of the state is crucial in consolidating the social contract between the state and its citizenry in the face of the implementation of an exit strategy. The authority of the state exemplified in the provision of basic services and guaranteed employment opportunities through regulation is the most viable platform for dealing with the transition. The government, together with the international community, could affirm its role in the furtherance of the provision of basic services such as health, livelihood opportunities, skills training, education and private sector development as a buffer to contain the effect that the implementation of an exit strategy would bring.

6.5 Areas for Further Research

This section considers suggested areas of further research on the issues discussed in the preceding chapters. This study opens up several avenues for future research on exit strategies in peacekeeping operations. The arguments provided need to be tested with other peacekeeping operations involving both ECOWAS and the UN. The case of ECOMICI and UNOCI readily comes to mind. Further expansion of this study using similar parameters would enrich the discourse on peacekeeping exit strategy. Aside these multilateral interventions, it would be interesting to examine how exit strategy undertaken by a unilateral organisation in Africa exit and hands over to a multilateral organisation. As such, an evaluation of the intervention of the United Kingdom under Operation Palliser,

Operation Barras and Operation Khukri in Sierra Leone would be an added advantage. A final avenue for future research can look further at the linkages between the following parameters of exit.

- National Reconciliation as a mode of exit;
- Strength of Civil Society as a mode of exit;
- Economic and Social Development as a mode of exit; and
- Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) as a mode of exit.

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APPENDIX A

INTERVIEW LIST

No.	Name	Position	Place of Interview
1	Brig. Gen. Michael Akpatsu (Jnr)	Former Peacekeeping Affairs Officer, Office of Military Affairs. DPKO, UN Headquarters.	Accra, Ghana
2	Lt. Gen. Sikander Afzal (Rtd.)	Former Force Commander UNMIL	Islamabad, Pakistan
3	Maj. Gen. Anis Ahmed Bajwa (Rtd.)	First Director of Change Management, DPKO	Islamabad, Pakistan
4	Brig. Muhahid Alam (Rtd.)	Former Director and Principal Political Officer MONUC	Islamabad, Pakistan
5	Dr. Allison M. Frendak-Blume	Co-director, Peace Operations Policy, George Mason University, USA	Islamabad, Pakistan
6	Maj. Gen. Henry Kwami Anyidoho	Former Deputy Force Commander and Chief of Staff of UNAMIR	Accra, Ghana
7	Brig. Gen. Hassan Lai	Former Chief of Staff, ECOWAS Standby force (ESF)	Accra, Ghana
8	Dr. Remy Ajibewa	Head of Political Affairs and International Cooperation, ECOWAS Commission	Accra, Ghana
9	Lt. Col. Farouck M. Basher	Deputy Director, Army Peacekeeping Operations DAPKOP	Accra, Ghana
10	Dr. Freedom Chukwuudi Onuoha	Research Fellow, Centre for Strategic Studies , National Defense College	Abuja, Nigeria
11	Dr. Osman Blag	Lecturer, Fouray Bay College, University of Sierra Leone,	Freetown, Sierra Leone
12	Dr. Memunatu Pratt	Head Peace and Conflict Department, Fouray Bay College, University of Sierra Leone,	Freetown, Sierra Leone
13	Dr. Abass Chernor Bundu	Former Executive Secretary, ECOWAS	Freetown, Sierra Leone
14	Mr. Bolaji Kehinde	Programme Officer, Political Affairs, ECOWAS Commission	Abuja, Nigeria
15	Col. Ibrahim Manu Yusuf	Former Military Assistant to ECOMOG Force Commander	Accra, Ghana

16	Col. Samaila Dadinkowa (Late)	Former Aide to ECOMOG Force Commander in Sierra Leone	Accra , Ghana
17	Mr. Prosper Nii Nortey Addo	AU Senior Political and Humanitarian Affairs officer in Liberia	Accra, Ghana
18	Mr. Aku Danjuma Friday	Rostering and Training Officer, Civilian Component of ESF	Thies, Senegal
19	Dr. Istifanus Sonsare Zabadi	Provost, Centre for Strategic Studies , National Defense College	Thies, Senegal
20	Col. Festus B. Aboagye (Rtd.)	Executive Secretary African Peace Support Trainers Association (APSTA) and Former Commanding Officer, ECOMOG	Accra, Ghana
21	Brig. Gen. Francis Aseidu Agyemfra (Rtd.)	Former Chief of Staff and Defense Minister of Ghana	Accra, Ghana
22	Ambassador Abdul Karim Koroma	Former Sierra Leone Foreign Minister 1985-1992	Freetown, Sierra Leone
23	Brig. Gen. Benjamin Freeman Kusi (Rtd.)	Former Deputy Force Commander of the United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI) and Leader of the Joint Verification Team (JVT) for 2003 Liberian Peace Process	Bamako, Mali
24	Brig. Gen. Charles Richter-Addo	Former Principal Programme Officer Doctrine and Training ECOWAS Standby Force	Accra, Ghana
25	Dr. Alimamy Paolo Bangura	Lecturer Political Science and Former Minister for Foreign Affairs under the AFRC Regime	Freetown, Sierra Leone
26	Dr. Bu-Buakei Jabbi	Former Sierra Leone Deputy Foreign Minister 1990-1992	Freetown, Sierra Leone
27	Dr. Thomas Jaye	Deputy Director, Faculty of Academic Affairs, KAIPTC	Accra, Ghana
28	Dr. Ibrahim Bangura	Lecturer, Fouray Bay College, University of Sierra Leone,	Freetown, Sierra Leone
29	Col. (Dr.) Emmanuel Kotia	Chief Instructor, KAIPTC	Accra, Ghana
30	Col. Alhaji Mohammed Mustapha	Director, OPINT, Department of Defence Intelligence, GAF	Accra, Ghana

APPENDIX B

INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR SIERRA LEONE/LIBERIA

Dear Respondent,

I am a Doctor of Philosophy candidate in Peace and Conflict Studies with the Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan, Nigeria and also staff of the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC). As part of my thesis I am conducting a research on the topic: **"Exit Strategies of the United Nations and the Economic Community of West African States Peacekeeping Operations in Sierra Leone and Liberia"**

AIMS/OBJECTIVES

This research seeks to examine the exit strategies of the UN and ECOWAS peacekeeping operations or missions in Sierra Leone and Liberia with the view to focusing on the significance, the institutional and policy frameworks, consequences and effects of such exit strategies on post-war societies. I seek to solicit your views on the above subjects and assure you of the integrity, anonymity and confidentiality of your responses. Please be candid in expressing your views closest to the way you feel about any of the issues identified in this study. THANK YOU

SECTION A: SIGNIFICANCE OF EXIT STRATEGY TO PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

1. Why is it important to have an exit strategy in peacekeeping operations?
2. What are the reasons behind having such exit strategies?
3. What are the likely implications for a peacekeeping mission with or without an exit strategy?
4. Are there any possible values of exit strategy in peacekeeping operations?

SECTION B: INSTITUTIONAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS ON EXIT STRATEGY

5. Does ECOWAS have a notion of exit strategy in mind in their peacekeeping operations?
6. Does these notions/assessment influence their decisions about drawdowns, termination etc.
7. Does the UN have a notion of exit strategy in mind in their peacekeeping operations?
8. Does these notions/assessment influence their decisions about drawdowns, termination etc.
9. How are peacekeeping missions ended or terminated within ECOWAS and the UN?
10. How did ECOMOG terminate its operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone?



11. How did UN terminate its operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone?

SECTION C: UN AND ECOWAS EXIT APPROACHES IN LIBERIA AND SIERRA LEONE

12. Did ECOWAS/UN exit strategy have a clear statement of political objectives to be achieved in both Liberia and Sierra Leone?
13. Were there any secondary group of operational goals that were expected to be secured by both ECOWAS and the UN missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone?
14. What were the exit components of ECOMOG/UN mission mandate to Liberia and Sierra Leone?
15. How well were the components of these exit strategies articulated?
16. What benchmarks and indicators were set as a prerequisites for withdrawal at both the strategic (political), operational, and tactical levels?
17. Was there any fallback options that were anticipated by both ECOWAS and the UN should the original objectives of the exit strategies of the various missions fails?

SECTION D: FACTORS THAT ACCOUNTED FOR ECOWAS AND UN EXIT STRATEGIES IN LIBERIA AND SIERRA LEONE

18. What factors accounted for ECOMOG exit in Liberia and Sierra Leone?
19. What factors accounted for UN exit in Liberia and Sierra Leone?
20. What factors (domestic considerations) accounted for the establishing a timetable for exit?
21. How were these factors identified?
22. How were these factors evaluated?
23. What were the transitional modalities?

SECTION D: EFFECT AND CONSEQUENCES OF ECOWAS/UN EXIT STRATEGY ON LIBERIA

24. What were the security consequences of ECOMOG and the UN exit strategies on Liberia and Sierra Leone?
25. What were the socio-economic consequences of ECOMOG and the UN exit strategies on Liberia and Sierra Leone?
26. What were the political consequences of ECOMOG and the UN exit strategies on Liberia and Sierra Leone?
27. How did the ECOWAS/UN exit strategies impact on the reconstruction of Liberia and Sierra Leone?
28. What challenges confronted ECOMOG/UN withdrawal from Liberia and Sierra Leone?
29. How were these challenges and effects managed or resolved?

SECTION E: THE WAY FORWARD: LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATION

30. How best can future exit strategy in peacekeeping operations be pursed to reduce the effect on post-war societies?

APPENDIX C

FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION GUIDE

1. **Background to the Discussion:**

Thank you for joining the focus group discussion on peacekeeping exit strategies. In the next 45 minutes I want to find your opinion about the effects that exit strategies have on post-war societies globally. You are encouraged to share any experience from your participation in any peacekeeping operations organised by either a regional, sub-regional or multilateral organisations.

2. **Self-Introduction:** Dear Respondent,

I am a Doctor of Philosophy candidate in Peace and Conflict Studies with the Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan, Nigeria and also staff of the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC). As part of my thesis I am conducting a research on the topic: **"Exit Strategies of the United Nations and the Economic Community of West African States Peacekeeping Operations in Sierra Leone and Liberia"**

3. **Purpose of FGD:**

This research seeks to examine the exit strategies of the UN and ECOWAS peacekeeping operations or missions in Sierra Leone and Liberia with the view to focusing on the significance, the institutional and policy frameworks, consequences and effects of such exit strategies on post-war societies. I seek to solicit your views on the above subjects and assure you of the integrity, anonymity and confidentiality of your responses. Please be candid in expressing your views closest to the way you feel about any of the issues identified in this study. THANK YOU

4. **Participants introduce themselves and ground rules are established.**

QUESTIONS

1. Let's start the discussion by talking about what makes exit strategy essential for peacekeeping operations?

2. What are some of the positive features of having an exit strategy in peacekeeping operations?

3. What factors account for the disengagement of the UN/AU/ECOWAS/EU/NATO from any peacekeeping operations (Probe to establish the domestic, political and international considerations that affect such decisions)

4. What are the likely effects and consequences of exit strategies on post-war societies? (Probe to know the effect on the security, economic, political, socio-cultural, reconstruction, livelihoods etc.) Encourage participants to share examples and experiences from Liberia and Sierra Leone.

5. Any suggestions on how we can mitigate the negative effects of exit strategies on post-war societies? (Encourage participants those familiar with the Liberian and the Sierra Leone case to share their experiences and examples)

6. What has been some of the challenges associated with executing exit strategies in peacekeeping operations? (Encourage all participants to suggest at least one challenge associated with exit strategies)

7. What lessons on exit strategies can be learned from all the peacekeeping operations and other interventions that have taken place globally?

8. What recommendations can be offered as the best option for helping peacekeeping operations to disengage from any international intervention?

*One participant would be encouraged to summarize the effects and consequences of exit strategy on post-war societies with special emphasis on Liberia and Sierra Leone. Other participants would be asked to comments on the summary until there is some certainty on the discussion on the effects of exit strategies on post-war societies.

That concludes our focus group discussion. Thank you so much for your coming and sharing your thoughts and opinions with me. If you have additional information that you did not get to say in the focus group discussion, please feel free to share with me through the following email address. Fiifi.edu-afful@kaiptc.org; makea25@gmail.com

APPENDIX D

SAMPLE LETTER OF INTRODUCTION

KOFI ANNAN INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING TRAINING CENTRE (KAIPTC)
PMB CT 210, Cantonments, Accra – Ghana, West Africa

KAIPTC/448/G

19 July 2013

Major General Henry Kwami Anyidoho (Rtd)
Former Joint Deputy
SRSG, UNAMID
ACCRA

Dear Sir

DATA COLLECTION: "EXIT STRATEGIES OF THE UN AND ECOWAS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN SIERRA LEONE AND LIBERIA"

The Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) presents its compliments to you and wishes to respectfully inform you of the above-mentioned field study involving one of its faculty members, **Mr. Fiifi Edu-Afful**.

The officer is a doctoral candidate of the University of Ibadan, Nigeria and he is currently undertaking a field study entitled **"Exit Strategies of the UN and ECOWAS Peacekeeping Operations in Sierra Leone and Liberia"** as part of the requirement for his doctoral dissertation.

The survey examines the exit strategies of the UN and ECOWAS peacekeeping missions in Sierra Leone and Liberia, with the aim of suggesting practical ways by which future peacekeeping exit strategies could be pursued to mitigate the negative effect of such strategies on post-conflict countries. Please find attached synopsis of the research proposal for your kind attention.

The Centre would be grateful if you could kindly assist the officer with the needed information for the study. All data and information provided would be treated with the utmost confidentiality and will be used strictly for academic purposes.

The Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre avails itself of this opportunity to extend to you the assurances of its highest consideration.

Yours faithfully

JHK BUNTUGUH
Lieutenant Colonel
for Commandant

Direct Phone: 233(0) 302 718 200, Fax 233(0)302 718 201
Location: Off Teshie – Tema Road, Adjacent GAFCSC
Website: www.kaiptc.org

APPENDIX E

INFORMED CONSENT FORM FOR FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION

Project Title: Exit Strategies of the United Nations and the Economic Community of West African States Peacekeeping Operations in Sierra Leone and Liberia

Researcher: **Fiifi Edu-Afful**

All participants who were willing to participate in this focus Group discussion (FGD) are requested to notify the researcher of their desire to be part of the process by ticking yes or no to the consent form. Thank you for agreeing to participate in this research. I am very interested to hear your valuable opinion on how peacekeeping exit strategies impact local communities and post-conflict countries.

- The purpose of this study is to interrogate the exit strategies adopted by the UN and ECOWAS peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone and Liberia and how that impact on those post-war societies. It is my fervent hope that the issues that will be raised here would be captured in the final thesis which would go a long way to improve future peacekeeping exit strategies especially in operations in Africa and beyond.

- The information that you give to me is completely confidential, and I will not associate your name with anything you say in the focus group discussion.

- I would like to tape the focus group discussions so that I can make sure to capture the thoughts, opinions, and ideas we hear from this group.

- No names will be attached to the focus group discussion and the tapes will be destroyed as soon as they are transcribed.

- You may refuse to answer any question or withdraw from the study at anytime.

- We understand how important it is that this information is kept private and confidential. We will ask participants to respect each other's confidentiality.

Participation: Yes ☐ No ☐

I understand the purpose and methodology of this study and have agreed to be part of the study.

Name of Participant.....

Signature of Participant.....

Date.....

APPENDIX F

INFORMED CONSENT FORM FOR INTERVIEWS

Project Title: **Exit Strategies of the United Nations and the Economic Community of West African States Peacekeeping Operations in Sierra Leone and Liberia**

Researcher: **Fiifi Edu-Afful**

Purpose of the study: I am inviting you to be part of this research study because of your wealth of knowledge in the subject area. The objective of this research study is to

i. Explore the significance of exit strategies in peacekeeping operations;
ii. Examine the institutional and policy frameworks within which ECOWAS and UN exit from peacekeeping operations;
iii. Evaluate ECOWAS and the UN exit approaches in Liberia and Sierra Leone focusing particularly on similarities and differences;
iv. Analyse the consequences and effects of the exit approaches adapted in the two countries; and
v. Make recommendations on the appropriate mechanisms to mitigate the negative effects of peacekeeping exit strategies on the two post-conflict countries.

Proposed number of participants: In all an estimated number of 30 participants from all over the world would be part of this study. The study would last for approximately nine months.

Consent for recording of data: Kindly tick the box if you consent to being recorded during the interview. You can still be part of the study if your interviews cannot be recorded. Also in the course of the interviews if you wish to have certain statements of record you are allowed to do so.

Yes ☐ No ☐

Risk and benefit associated with this study: There are no known risks with this study. However, you are allowed to skip any questions that you are uncomfortable with during the process. I don't know if you would benefit directly from this study however, it is my hope that in future the finding of the study would benefit decision makers, planners and the various actors in peacekeeping operations both on the African continent and globally.

Confidentiality: I understand how important it is that this information is kept private and confidential. I will use pseudonyms for you where necessary. All recordings would be securely kept and the output of the work would ensure that you are not identified directly with any quotation that you are not comfortable with.

I understand the purpose and methodology of this study and have agreed to be part of the study.

Name of Participant .....

Signature of Participant .....

Date.....

APPENDIX G

DEPLOYMENT MAP OF UNMIL



APPENDIX H

DEPLOYMENT MAP OF UNAMSIL



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