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THE POLITICS OF THE AFRICAN REFUSEE PROBLEM: THE CASE OF REFUGEES IN GHANA

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
THE POLITICS OF THE AFRICAN REFUGEE PROBLEM:

THE CASE OF REFUGEES IN GHANA

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A THESIS SUBMITTED IN FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT

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DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

UNIVERSITY OF GHANA

LEGON

NOVEMBER 1992

D E C L A R A T I O N

I do hereby declare that this thesis

with the exception of specified quotations

and ideas attributed to specified sources,

is entirely my own and that it is the genuine

record of the task I set myself.

(A. ESSUMAN-JOHNSON)

CANDIDATE

(PROF. K.A. NINSIN)   (PROF. YAW MANU)

SUPERVISOR   SUPERVISOR

D E D I C A T I O N

This work is dedicated to the late
Abraham K. Wetseh who dedicated his life
to assisting refugees, and all the Liberian
and Sahel refugees in Ghana

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A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S

Dolo a Malian interpreter and others too numerous to mention.

I have also benefited greatly from material gathered from various conferences on refugees and material sent to me from Dr. Harrell-Bond. I am particularly grateful for the consultation with African researchers on refugees held in Oxford in September 1988 which afforded me the opportunity to meet the small club of African academics researching the refugee problem. The consultation also enabled me to collect very useful material from the Documentation Center of the Refugee Studies Programme. I am equally grateful to Prof. Howard Adelman, Director of the Center for Refugee Studies at the University of York in Canada for enabling me to collect very useful literature from the documentation center of the CRS.

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comments and criticisms given me by Dr. E. Gyimah-Boadi my former supervisor and Professors K.A. Ninsin and Yaw Manu, my present advisors.

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I alone, however, remain responsible for all errors in judgement and interpretation which can be associated with this work.

A. ESSUMAN-JOHNSON

LEGON.

A B S T R A C T

For some years now, the African continent has seen a lot of refugees thrown up by various forces and this has affected nearly all the countries on the continent. Refugees have been forced to seek asylum in various countries across Africa. They have been received by African countries struggling to implement IMF\World Bank sponsored programmes of economic adjustment. Ghana has for sometime now hosted refugees from various countries.

This thesis attempts to find out the causes of the flight of three groups of refugees to Ghana, namely refugees from Southern Africa, Liberia and the Sahel Zone; how they have survived in the country, the kind of assistance they have received and official policy towards asylum and residence.

The results of the study show that the Southern African refugees were forced into exile by the apartheid system in South Africa and the system of apartheid and colonialism in Namibia. The refugees from Liberia have been forced to flee due to the struggle for the state started against the late President Samuel Doe and which has ended in a long drawn out civil war. The refugees from the Sahel have been forced to flee the drought and famine, which is the result of the decision of the governments of the zone, to follow a development strategy which tended to degrade the Sahel,

environment.

The three groups of refugees have received different levels of assistance. The refugees from Southern Africa have been relatively better assisted. The refugees from Liberia have not been accorded formal refugee status but are being treated as de facto refugees. They are the only group now in camp at Gomoa Buduburam. The refugees from the Sahel have no refugee status and only receive some humanitarian assistance from the Christian Council of Ghana.

The reason for this state of assistance to refugees in Ghana, is the lack of a clear policy on refugees. Policy towards refugees is therefore ad hoc and has led to undue suffering of refugees particularly those from the Sahel.

The thesis therefore draws attention to the political nature of the causes of the flight of refugees to Ghana. Solution lies in the government of the countries of origin of the refugees, negotiating a political settlement especially for South Africa and Liberia. For the Sahel Zone, the solution lies in the governments taking a second look at their development strategy and making changes that will relieve pressure on the environment.

On policy towards refugees, the thesis recommends to the Ghana Government, the need for a law on refugees which will streamline the various ad hoc measures that have been used by ministries, departments and NGOs to deal with refugees.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Refugees have existed in man's history, due to the existence of hostility; but the international community has never known refugee problems of the magnitude that the present century has seen. People have been uprooted by persecution, conflict and famine in all ages. What is unique in the present century is the massive scale of such movements. Over the last 30 years, an average of more than 700 people a day have been forced to leave their own country and to become refugees.[1] The world's refugee population is estimated at 16.6 million.[2] The number of people displaced within their own country is probably even greater. It has been estimated that the famine in Africa alone has forced almost 10 million people to abandon their houses in search of food and water.[3] One report points out that there is noting to suggest that this trend will be reversed in the near future, particularly in the developing countries. In these areas of the world the combination of population growth, economic stagnation and ecological deterioration is almost certain to lead to increased poverty and social tension. Add to this the burgeoning arms trade, increased militarism and intolerance, and the stage is set for a series of massive movements of population.[4]

Until the mid 1940s, the majority of the world's refugees were to be found in Europe, mainly the victims of fascist persecution and the Second World War. Starting with the first expulsions of Jews from the Iberian Peninsula in 1492 it was estimated that Europe had over a million refugees over the next two centuries.[5] Refugees expelled in Europe during this period were religious minorities, held to constitute some challenge to existing political authority. In addition to the Jews driven out of the Spanish Kingdom followed by the Mariscos, a short time later, Protestants from France and the Spanish Netherlands were similarly exiled along with Protestants or Catholics from states and principalities in Central Europe during the Reformation era. Other refugees included Serbs fleeing Ottoman rule from the seventeenth century on, crossing the Danube into Hungarian lands, English Irish and Scottish Catholics following their stuart monarch into exile after 1688; and later Protestant sects leaving Scandinavia and Central Europe in the 18th Century, seeking free religious expression. In addition, there were refugees caused by wars - populations displaced by the thirty years war, the campaigns of Louis XIV and the wars of the 18th century.

Crumbling empires in Europe also released a flood of refugees. These included the Ottoman, Romanov, Hapsburg and Wilhelminian empires. Before 1914, the slow retreat of the Ottoman Turks from the European continent and the

accompanying wars that disrupted the Balkans generated hundreds of thousands of refugees. To these refugees were added the former subjects of the tsar, fleeing revolution at home, the displaced civilians of the first world war and the victims of the great Armenian tragedy which continued into the 1920s. Following the First World War, European were faced with a refugee problem of vast proportions; great masses of people wandered about the waste lands of Trancaucasia, languished in the slums of Constantinople, or pressed their case on the embassies of Western European countries. In response, the League of Nations established a High Commission for Refugees under the direction of the Norwegian Polar explorer Fridtjof Nansen.

European refugees are back in the world press following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The move is now from Eastern Europe to the West. Population movements have occurred from East to West Germany, from Albania to Greece and Italy, from Yugoslavia into Hungary Austria and Italy. Following the civil war between the Serbs and Croatia some 557,000 have been internally displaced 10,000 deaths 58,000 have fled to neighbouring countries.[6] The disintegration of the Soviet Union itself in 1991 has raised problems concerning refugees, displaced people and "compelled migrants" on the territory of the fifteen republics that formerly constituted the U.S.S.R. Now various conflicts have arisen over attempts to secede and this is creating a

movement of refugees across the disintegrating U.S.S.R. The conflict areas include Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Moldovia.[7]

The problem of refugees has not been unique to Europe. No area of the world toady is immune from the problem of mass displacement. In the early 1970s, Central America was in international terms, a region of no refugees. But over the past decade it was a flash-point of political violence and armed conflict. More than 1.5 million people in the region became refugees with about one million displaced within their own countries.[8]

The Refugee Problem in Africa

The refugee problem has become one of the most serious problems of the contemporary world. The situation in Africa is particularly serious. As Harrell-Bond has pointed out "no one really knows how many people have been uprooted but one may be sure the problem in Africa is not going away.[9] Chambers had predicted that between 1985 and the year 2004, another twelve to 50 million "mass distress migrants" in Africa will require assistance, their movements caused by war, violence, civil disturbance, persecution, drought and famine.[10] Statistics however reveal that the number of refugees in Africa since the 1960s have been rising at an alarming rate of over 100% every five years. The African refugee population which was only half a million in 1963

increased to over five million in 1981, then representing half of the world's refugee population. Even though there has been some decline in the numbers of refugees since 1981 the number at the end of 1991 was 5.3 million, (See table 1 below) out of a world refugee population of 16.6 million.[11]

TABLE   1

African Refugee Statistics 1991

	Asylum Country	Country of Origin	Sub-Total	Total
1.	Algeria	W.Sahara	165,000	
		Mali	35,000	
		Others	4,000	204,000*
2.	Angola			
		Zaire	10,300	
		S. Africa	100	10,400
3.	Benin			
		Togo	15,000	
		Chad	100	15,100
4.	Botswana			
		S. Africa	1,000	
		Angola	300	
		Others	100	1,400
5.	Burkina Faso			
		Chad	200	
		Others	200	400
6.	Burundi			
		Rwanda	80,600	
		Zaire	25,900	
		Somalia	100	
		Others	400	107,000*
7.	Cameroun			
		Chad	6,500	
		Others	400	6,900
8.	Central African Rep.			
		Sudan	8,000	
		Chad	1,000	6,900
9.	Congo			
		Chad	2,300	
		Zaire	400	
		CAR	300	
		Others	400	3,400
10.	Cote d'Ivoire			
		Liberia	240,000	
		Others	400	240,000
11.	Djibouti			
		Somalia	105,000	
		Ethiopia	15,000	120,000
12.	Egypt			
		Palestinians	5,500	
		Somalia	1,300	
		Ethiopia	600	
		Others	350	
13.	Ethiopia	Somalia	519,000	

		Sudan	15,000	534,000*
14.	Gabon			800
15.	Gambia			
		Senegal	1,000	
		Liberia	500	6,550
16.	Ghana			
		Liberia	6,000	
		Others	150	6,150
17.	Guinea			
		Liberia	397,000*	
		Sierra Leone	169,000*	566,000
18.	Guinea Bissau			
		Senegal	4,600	4,600
19.	Kenya			
		Somalia	92,200	
		Ethiopia	11,800	
		Rwanda	2,000	
		Uganda	700	
		Others	450	107,150
20.	Lesotho			
		S. Africa	300	300
21.	Liberia			
		Sierra Leone	12,000	12,000
22.	Malawi			
		Mozambique	950,000	950,000
23.	Mali			
		Mauritania	13,000	
		Niger	500	13,500
24.	Mauritania			
		Senegal	22,000	
		Mali	18,000	40,000
25.	Morocco			800
26.	Namibia			
		Angola	30,000	
		Other	200	30,200
27.	Niger			
		Chad	1,400	1,400
28.	Nigeria			
		Chad	3,300	1,400
		Liberia	1,000	
		Others	300	4,600
29.	Rwanda			
		Burundi	32,500	32,500
30.	Senegal			
		Mauritania	53,000	
		Others	100	53,100
31.	Sierra Leone			
		Liberia	17,200	17,200
32.	Somalia			
		Ethiopia	35,000	35,000
33.	South Africa			
		Mozambique	200,000*	

		Lesotho	1,000	201,000*
34.	Sudan			
		Ethiopia/Eritrea	690,000[3]*	
		Chad	20,000*	
		Zaire	4,500	
		Uganda	2,700	717,200
35.	Swaziland			
		Mozambique	39,000*	
		South Africa	7,700	47,200*
36.	Tanzania			
		Burundi	131,000	
		Mozambique	72,000	
		Rwanda	22,300	
		Zaire	16,000	
		S.Africa	9,600	
		Others	200	251,100
37.	Togo			450
38.	Tunisia			50
39.	Uganda			
		Rwanda	87,000*	
		Sudan	75,500	
		S. Africa	2,000	
		Zaire	600	
		Others	350	165,450*
40.	Zaire			
		Angola	310,000	
		Sudan	104,000	
		Burundi	45,000	
		Rwanda	12,000	
		Uganda	10,000	
		Others	1,300	482,300
41.	Zambia			
		Angola	103,000	
		Mozambique	25,000	
		Zaire	9,000	
		S. Africa	2,000	
		Uganda	1,500	140,000
42.	Zimbabwe	Mozambique	197,000*	
		S. Africa	1,000	
		Others	500	198,500*

Total Africa   5,340,800

* Indicates sources vary significantly in number reported.
Source: World Refugee Survey - 1992 (1991 in Review).
        US Committee for refugees pp.32-33.

This is in addition to much larger numbers of internally displaced persons and other de-facto refugees.[12]

The refugee problem in Africa is caused by a variety of reasons, factors and forces.[13] These include massive violations of human rights, especially the practice of apartheid and colonialism, direct and structural violence, war, internal conflicts, external aggression, ethnic and religious strife, direct political persecution and national disasters. It is also pertinent to note that while five percent of the refugee population on the continent emanate from South Africa and Namibia, 95 per cent of the continent's refugee population emanate from independent Africa.[14] Examples of the above root causes of refugee flows abound in Africa. The past thirty years or so of post-colonial Africa offers striking examples of all these scenarios, often exacerbated by the still precarious political and economic situation of many African countries engaged in the process of nation-building. One of the main factors of particular importance for many large scale displacements and refugee movements in Africa appears to be the fact that many boundaries of modern African states have been drawn by the former colonial powers in a most arbitrary way without regard to ethnic units. Thus people belonging to the same ethnic unit find themselves living in different states which may result in political and even armed movements of an irredentist nature as the situation in the

Ogaden province of Ethiopia shows. Also the activities of ethnic groups which constitute a minority within their state of citizenship but represent the vast majority in a certain area of the state, striving for the establishment of an independent state or the acquisition of larger autonomy have often resulted in massive movements of asylum seekers. Examples that could be mentioned are the events in Biafra, Southern Sudan and the Ethiopian provinces of Eritrea and Tigre. Internal hostilities developing into situations of civil strife, usually aggravated by ethnic conflicts and foreign intervention have often given rise to large scale refugee flows. Events in the Congo (now Zaire) in the early 1960s, in Angola, Chad, Mozambique and Uganda in recent years are pertinent examples.

The refugee situation in Ethiopia has been particularly acute. First of all, civil conflicts in Ethiopia have gone on over the years. The crisis involved the secessionist movements in Eritrea and Ogaden regions. These conflicts have been the major causes of the refugee flows in the Horn of Africa which has been widely known as the land of refugees.[15] Its refugee population is currently (1991) put at 1.4 million. There is an estimated 35,000 Ethiopian refugees in Somalia, and 690,000 in the Sudan; 15,000 Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia, 15,000 Ethiopian refugees in Djibouti; and 519,000 Somali refugees in Ethiopia. There

are an additional 27,000 refugees in the Sudan from outside the Horn.

Refugee flows generated by the Chadian conflict are scattered in neighbouring countries namely Cameroon, Nigeria, and the Sudan. Thousands of Angolan refugees, due to the civil war, have been scattered in Zaire, Zambia and Namibia. From Zaire itself there are refugees emanating from the civil conflict there since 1960. It is estimated that thousands of Zairian refugees are still in exile in Angola, Uganda and the Sudan. As at 1991 there are some 482,300 refugees in Zaire. Similarly in North Africa the struggle over Western Sahara between the POLISARIO movement and Morocco has produced significant numbers of refugees. Algeria hosts, 165,000 refugees from Western Sahara.

The conflicts in Angola and Mozambique have given rise to massive refugee flights in Southern Africa. In Angola as a result of the conflict between the MPLA government and the US South African supported rebel UNITA forces, hundreds of thousands of Angolans have fled the rural areas. The civil war which has raged in Angola since 1975 was itself preceded by a 13-year guerrilla war for independence. Since 1986 the conflict widened further forcing additional thousands of Angolans to seek safety in the neighbouring countries of Zaire and Zambia. An estimated 827,000 people are displaced within Angola. [16]

In similar fashion, years of guerrilla warfare in Mozambique waged by the Mozambican National Resistance Movement (MNR or Renamo) has led to massive human rights violations and refugee flows. Estimates of the number of Mozambicans displaced by the war is put at 2 million.[17] Currently the number of refugees from Mozambique is put at 1.4 million distributed as follows Malawi 950,000; South Africa 200,000; Zimbabwe 197,000; Tanzania 12,000; Swaziland 39,500 and Zambia 25,000.[18]

Next to conflict, violence and wars, colonialism, apartheid and liberation struggles have caused massive refugee movements in Africa. The experience of Guinea-Bissau, Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia etc. illustrate this situation. In South Africa the Liberation struggle of the African National Congress (ANC) and others met with heavy repression by the apartheid regime. This made many young blacks to flee the country into exile.

Besides apartheid in South Africa, massive violations of human rights in many independent African states have generated large numbers of refugees. Notorious cases are Uganda under Idi Amin and Milton Obote, Equatorial Guinea under Marcia Nguema and Central African Repbulic under Jean Bedel Bokassa. Idi Amin's violations of human rights forced thousands of Ugandans and Ugandan Asians to go into exile. In Equatorial Guinea, during the reign of terror of Macias Nguema, it sent about a third of the population into

exile by the end of 1978.[19] There are other African countries such as Ethiopia, Zaire, Guinea, Liberia, Kenya, Sierra Leone and many others where serious violations of human rights have taken place. It is a well-known fact that most of those in power in African states feel impelled to oppress and suppress human rights in order to retain their hold on power indefinitely. These human rights violations cause desertions from or refusal to return to those countries by its own nationals who oppose the official policy or belong to a different ethnic group than that of the leader in power.

National disasters such as droughts, famine, floods and earthquakes have also created refugees in Africa. In the early 1970s political decision making on development strategy, caused serious drought in the Sahel, and thousands of people had to flee the environment. The famine in the Horn of Africa has triggered massive refugee flows. In the Sudan alone 4.75 million people are internally displaced and 1.5 million are out in search of food and safety.

A History of Forced Migration in Africa

Forced population movements and the emergence of vast numbers of uprooted people, have accounted for more than half of all international migrations since the early decades of this century. Millions of people throughout the world have been obliged to move against their will. Forced

migrations are nothing new. They have occurred throughout history and have molded our world. Refugee flows, as has been discussed above, have formed an important aspect of the total African population movement. Three distinct periods of involuntary migrations have been identified in Africa's history.[20] These are the pre-colonial, colonial and post colonial.

Pre-Colonial Movements

Prior to the colonial era recurrent natural disasters did play a significant role in mass population movements in several regions of Africa. External factors however were to play an important role in the generation of involuntary movements and mass displacements. CIMADE et al [21] point out that the Phoenicians and Assyrians opened the way. Their armies occupied the north-east of Africa (Egypt) and all the north, and systematically pillaged the population and the regions they discovered. From time to time the Egyptian population of the nile delta were obliged to take refuge in the South; the inhabitants of north Africa withdraw into the Atlas mountains or the oases of the sahara. The Phoenicians regularly plundered the east coast of Africa and sought to procure black slaves for the kingdoms of the Middle East.

In the 9th century all the societies in north and north - West Africa were thrown into disorder by the attacks of the Almoravids. The fall of the Ghana empire was due partly

to these attacks. It forced millions to emigrate from north west Africa (Mauritania, Senegal and Mali) to the coastal regions. A similar exodus took place from northern and eastern Africa. This was to become the source of many forced movements of the population and was responsible for the appearance of new trading centers controlled by African rulers and the merchants of North Africa and the Middle East. For nearly a thousand years, these merchants and their African associates levied a toll of slaves on the African people who were obliged to seek refuge elsewhere.

By the middle of the 15 century Spain and Portugal had taken over the African slave trade. They used slaves to provide manpower to their colonies in the Americas and the Carribean. This period followed the development of mercantilism in Europe. European mercantilism nourished itself on slave trade and trade in tropical products produced by slave labour. As Rodney[22] has pointed out, Africans were haunted down and transported by force to the Americas. The Trans Atlantic Slave trade from the 15th to the 17th centuries was one of the largest ever forced movements of populations. It is estimated that the Atlantic slave trade alone involved at least ten million Africans.[23] Apart from the forced migration of Africans to other continents, the slave trade itself spurred fights within the African continent itself as several small nations and

ethnic groups fled to new regions to avoid the raids and wars that slave raiders conducted during the period.

The Colonial Era

Mercantilism was to be replaced by colonialism as a major factor in population displacement. Colonialism caused refugee flows of varying size at various places in its history. First the conquest and partition of the continent among the colonial powers in itself led to population displacements as well as the fragmentation of social and ethnic structures. In the early period of the colonial conquest the conflict between the colonial armies and Africans caused refugee flows and exile of African chiefs in many parts of the continent. The Herero people of Namibia formerly possessed enormous pastoral wealth, but in the 19th century the Germans under Bismarck robbed and tried to exterminate them while most of them took refuge in Angola.

After the war of conquest, the colonial powers started to use forced labour for the production of commercial crops and minerals. This was particularly so in the French West African colonies and in British East Africa. Heavy taxation was levied as a means of enforcing the recruitment of labour for the mines and plantations especially in West Africa.[24] Resistance to forced labour and heavy taxation was often expressed by flight into remote regions within the colonies from one territory to another. This was especially true of

the Franchophone areas of West Africa where the flight was into the neighbouring Anglophone countries.[25]

There were also numerous uprisings in which Africans showed their resentment and desires to be rid of colonial domination. Nationalist or religious revolts led the colonial powers to transplant whole populations[26] eg. the Maholists in Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, the moslem sects known as the Tidianists and the Hamalists in French Sudan (Mali) and in Senegal, and the Kibanguists who represent a syncretism of African, moslem and catholic values in the Congo. The followers of these religions were persecuted by the colonial powers and they swelled the ranks of refugees. Seeking refuge was also used as a passive form of anti-colonial protest. Asiwaju[27] points out how emigration away from the area of jurisdiction of the resented colonial authority was an age -old and universal form of expression of revolt. In the former French West Africa as elsewhere in Africa under colonial rule, protest migration became more common probably due to the Africans' increasing awareness of the ultimate risk in confrontation with the vastly superior arms and military strategy of the colonial powers. The era of nationalist struggles for independence across the continent was to radically add to the numbers of Africans forced to seek refuge in neighbouring countries.

The Post Colonial Era

The problem of refugees and displaced persons in Africa since independence has been characterized as a problem of the state. Ibeanu et al [28] have argued that certain characteristics which give the African state its specificity have combined to produce a series of three mutually reinforcing crises of the state on the continent and these crises lead to the creation of refugees and displaced persons. The three reinforcing crisis are the crises of production, the crisis of democracy and the crisis of national identity.

The crisis of production in Africa is the crisis of the underdevelopment of productive forces:external indebtedness, weak national economies, dwindling levels of food production etc. all culminating in the economic crisis and the overall national poverty which many African countries have been experiencing for some time now. This crisis is related to the growing division of the world into the industrialized north and the under-developed south. The north maintains a near monopoly over the centers of industrial research, technology and production. The under-developed south relies on the importation of know-how, technology and finance all under the control of the North. The net effect of this lopsided development of the world is that the organic balance between the people in the underdeveloped south, with the natural environment is broken. The imposition of the

world market on the system of production in most under-
developed countries is such that it has altered the
traditional system of production and coping with the
environment. It has tended to make the people in these
countries lose that confidence necessary to harness their
resources creatively to their needs and interests.[29] The
impact of this type of production relations in the
underdeveloped countries of Africa is that most of the
countries have been vulnerable to drought, desert
encroachment and flood and the slight negative ecological
condition results in massive famines and refugees. There
has been the specific situation of drought and famine in
Ethiopia and the Sahel zone of West Africa. The point to
note is that rarely do these harsh ecological conditions
represent novel events in these parts of the continent they
have affected. However the processes that generated the
underdevelopment of the continent have not only broken down
the traditional strategies for coping with these natural
conditions without instituting viable alternatives, as the
Karamoja famines have shown.[30]

Apart from the crisis of production another factor that
has been generating refugee is the crisis of democracy.
This is not simply to be understood in terms of the failure
of Western liberal democracy in Africa whose death knell was
sounded in the early days of independence with a spate of
military take overs. The crisis of democracy in Africa is

much more far reaching: the conditions of increasing exploitation, inequality, poverty and discrimination under which most African people live, the denial of human rights, growing political repression and militarisation of social life; these are the deepest manifestation of the democratic crisis. However, the most frequent manifestation of the democratic crisis in Africa, which is germane to the growing number of refugees and displaced persons, is the untrammelled competition for state power which has become a hallmark of the African political landscape. . These struggles for power, in which the control of the state is reduced to a zero-sum game, have accounted for the displacement of millions of Africans. Uganda, Liberia and Somalia have been classic cases of this condition.

Civilian style politics, with regular elections and peaceful change of government, have not been the norm in post colonial Africa. Military led coup d'etat represent the typical way in which regimes are changed and rule by the military is as widespread as that by civilians. According to McGowan and Johnson [31] between 1956 when the Sudan became the first country to achieve independence from colonial rule and 1985, 126 plots to overthrow African governments were reported; 71 were attempted and 60 coups were carried out in 40 out of the 45 independent African countries. The worst example has been the situation in South Africa, where the Apartheid regime's policy of racial segregation, injustice,

prejudice and political repression have combined to displace millions of South Africans while thousands were forced out of the country into exile. The crisis of national identity is illustrated by the massive scale of politization of ethnicity ethnic conflicts and wars in Africa since independence. The spate of ethnic, racial and religious conflicts in Africa are all symptomatic of this crisis of national identity. Nigeria, Zaire, Burundi, Rwanda, Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia, are only a few of the countries where this crisis has led to the massive displacement of people and refugee hood. Most of Ethiopian's over one million refugees are products of the struggles between the Amhara controlled Ethiopian state and other national groupings like the Eritreans, Oromo, Sidama, Somali and Tigray.[32] In Burundi in 1972, massive Tutsi reprisals against the Hutu, led to the flight of 40,000 Hutu into Zaire, 40,000 into Tanzania and another 20,000 into Rwanda.[33] In Nigeria, the civil war of 1965-68 over the attempted secession of the predominantly Igbo Eastern region led to the displacement of over a million people. The Katangese impasse in Zaire, the war between northern and southern Sudan, the situation in Somalia are all well known manifestations of the crisis of national identity in Africa.

Objective of the Study

This is a study about forced migration of people from other African countries to Ghana. Since Ghana attained independence in 1957, she has played host to various groups of Africans who have been forced to leave their countries of origin to seek refuge. For a long time the West African sub-region has not been known to be a refugee producing region compared to other regions of the continent namely Southern Africa, the Horn, East and Central Africa. These regions have assumed center stage in Africa's refugee drama. However, even though West Africa comes nowhere near the numbers of refugees produced in other parts of the continent, the area has been producing its own small numbers of refugees. The first major wave of refugees in the sub-region came with the Nigerian civil war of 1965-68 which forced a number of Biafrans to seek refuge in neighbouring countries. The struggle for independence for Guinea Bissau led to a stream of refugees into Guinea Conakry. Guinea Conarky itself was to produce a lot of refugees, who were opponents of the regime of Sekou Toure who sought refuge in Senegal. Ghana has also produced a stream of refugees since independence. Opponents of the Nkrumah regime went into exile in Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire and Togo while various military interventions in the country's politics in 1966, 1972, 1979 and 1981 forced many Ghanaians into exile in Togo, Cote d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso and Nigeria. Some of such

Ghanaians have sought refuge in far away places like the U.K. and Western Europe and have become a prominent part of the African refugee community in Europe.

The refugee situations which has brought West Africa into the news has been the conflicts between Senegal and Mauritania and the Liberian civil war. The Senegal and Mauritania conflict saw a two way flow of refugees namely to Senegal from Mauritania and to Mauritania from Senegal. It is the Liberian conflict that has spread Liberian refugees into Sierra Leone, Guinea Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria. Other forced movements of people in West Africa has come from the Sahel Zone due to the drought and famine. It has forced people from Mali Burkina Faso, Chad and Niger to move Southwards in search of refuge. They are to be found in Nigeria, Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire and Cameroon. These mass flights are posing problems for the host countries and the refugees themselves. This work focuses on the causes of the flight into Ghana of refugees since independence and the policy towards their asylum and residence. The work would be divided into seven chapters. The first is an introduction and an overview of the refugee problem in Africa. Chapter two sets out the conceptual and methodological framework of the study and literature review. Chapter three focuses on the causes of the flight of refugees into Ghana and the obstacles faced along the way to Ghana of mainly the Liberian refugees are examined in

chapter four. Chapter five examines the kinds of assistance that refugees receive in Ghana and we examine government policy towards asylum and refugees in Chapter six. Chapter seven is conclusions of the study.

NOTES

1. I.C.I.H.I. <u>Refugees: The Dynamics of Displacement.</u> A report for the Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues. Zed Books London 1986. p.9.

2. U.S. Committee for Refugees. World Refugee Survey 1992 (1991 in Review) p.33.

3. I.C.I.H.I. op. cit p.9

4. Ibid.

5. Marrus M.R. <u>The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century</u> Oxford University Press New York, 1985. pp.5-6.

6. U.S. Committee for Refugees op. cit p.84.

7. Ibid. pp.78-79.

8. I.C.I.H.I. op. cit p.10

9. Harrell-Bond B.E. <u>Imposing Aid: Emergency Assistance to Refugees</u> Oxford University Press. London, 1986 p.xi.

10. Quoted in Harrell-Bond <u>ibid.</u>

11. U.S. Committee for Refugees op. cit pp.32-33.

12. The category "de facto" refugees originally emerged within the context of the European refugee situation. They are those persons who have been forced to flee their own countries but are unable to prove an individual "well-founded fear of persecution". The are refugees in fact but are not recognized as such in law. See Paul Weis "Convention Refugees and Defacto Refugees" in Goran Melander and Peter Nobel

(eds) <u>African Refugees and the Law</u> Scandinavian Institute of African Studies. Uppsala. 1978.

13. For details see <u>Refugees: Dynamics of Displacement</u>. A Report of the Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues. Zed Books Ltd. London, 1986 pp.10-15. Also see CIMADE et al <u>Africa's Refugee Crisis</u> Zed Books Ltd. London 1986 Chaps. 2 and 3.

14. See OAU: <u>African Refugees</u> No.10 July 1987 p.6.

15. See U.S. Committee for Refugees: <u>Beyond the Headlines in the Horn of Africa.</u> Issue paper January 1988 p.2.

16. <u>World Refugee Survey</u> -1992 op. cit p.34.

17. Ibid. 34.

18. Ibid. p.47.

19. See <u>Report of Amnesty International 1979.</u>

20. Bulcha, Mekuria <u>Flight and Integration</u> Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala. 1988.

21. CIMADE, et. al op.,cit pp.11-12.

22. Rodney W. <u>How Europe Underdeveloped Africa</u> Tanzania Publishing House, Dar-es-Salaam. 1972.

23. I.C.H.I. op. cit. pp.1

24. Walterstlein I.W. <u>Social Change: The Colonial Situation.</u> John Willey & Sons, New York, 1965 p. 151.

25. Asiwaju A.I. Migration as an expression of revolt: The example of French West Africa up to 1945" in <u>Tarikh</u> Vol.5 No.3 1977.

26. CIMADE et al op. cit. p.15.

27. Asiwaju A.I. op. cit.

28. Ibeanu, O. Karadawi, A. Mathews K. "Refugees and displaced persons in Africa" Paper presented at a Seminar at the Refugee Studies Programme, Q.E.H. Oxford University, 1988.

29. Nnoli, O. Ethnic Politics in Nigeria. Fourth Dimension Publishers. Enugu 1978 p.41.

30. Mamdani M. "Karamoja: Colonial roots of famine in North-East Uganda" Review of African Political Economy No.25, 1982.

31. McGowan, P. Johnson J.H. "Sixty Coups in Thirty years: Further evidence regarding African coups d'etat" The Journal of Modern African Studies Vol.24 No.3 1986 pp.539-546.

32. Bulcha M., op. cit.

33. U.S. Committee for Refugees Exile From Rwanda: Background to an Invasion Issue paper USCR,, February 1991.

CHAPTER TWO

CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

The chapter presents a theoretical framework for the analysis of the problem of refugees, define the central concepts, and describe the methods used in the data collection.

This is bound up closely with the paucity of theoretical literature on the subject matter. The problem of refugees has attracted limited interest from social scientists. Commenting on this lack of interest Kibreab points out that

> The state of refugee research in Africa is lamentably poor. Despite the fact that the number of African refugees and their plight and the strain they put on the inadequate resources of the poor African asylum countries has phenomenally increased since the 1960's, there have not been any serious attempts to investigate and theorize about their (refugees') experience during initial flight, asylum phases, integration process, repatriation, and after[1]

One explanation given for this state of scholarship on the subject of refugees is the very nature of refugee studies. The study of refugees is bound to be inter-disciplinary, i.e. it has to integrate insight gained from the different

social science disciplines. Even though many of the crucial questions about society cannot be pre-empted by any one social science discipline, the study of refugees is more anathema to compartmentalization. The academic silence has been broken in many fronts since the Arusha Conference of 1979.

Most studies on refugees movements have been fragmentary and have dealt mainly with problems of settlement and adjustment in host countries. Very few works have focused on causes of, or events preceding flight. Neither have these studies looked at government policy towards refugees. Much of the available works have looked at the practical problems concerning the provision of asylum and protection,[2] the allocation of resources within refugee communities[3] and the status of spontaneously settled refugees.[4] Some works have looked at the history of particular refugee movements and settlements. Christensen[5] has done a history of the Rwandan refugees in Tanzania. Others have examined international humanitarian organisations and their policies of assistance to refugees. Barbara Harrell-Bond[6] has done a revealing study of emergency assistance to Ugandan refugees in Southern Sudan.

Very few studies have been done on government policy towards refugees. The only work that looked at aspects of government policy towards refugees addressed itself to problems concerning the provision of asylum and protection.[7]

These studies have mainly been done in the Horn i.e. Ethiopia, the Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania. There is virtually no study of refugees in the West African sub region, let alone Ghana. This is due to the fact that for a long time, the region has not seen the kind of refugee movements as the Horn, East, Central and Southern African countries have seen. The region has been more a region of refugee resettlement and this study is an effort to examine government policy towards the resettlement of refugees from other African countries in Ghana. As no such work has been done on refugees in Ghana there is therefore no reference literature on the subject to aid this study not only in Ghana but also in the West African sub-region.

There is also a general lack of academic interest in refugee research. On the lack of interest and paucity of theory in refugee research I.P. Rose notes that:

> This most sociological subject has been largely ignored by those who coined the word anomie and have devoted much attention to exploring examining and explaining various forms of intergroup and interpersonal tensions. Even those who have studied the character and consequence of forced migration rarely have delved into the social and psychological reunification of those affected by it.[8]

The lack of theory in refugee research has been attributed mainly to the perception of the problem as a localized and non-recurrent phenomenon which does not fit neatly into distinct categories.[9] Others point out that different forces create different refugee movements in different parts of the

world. This lends a sense of uniqueness to each situation and clouds our ability to see the recurring elements in each situation.[10]

There is therefore a general lack of theory and also a problem of conceptual classification of refugee migration. However Stien and Tomasi [11] have pointed out that, notwithstanding the lack of theory, refugee movements are patterned events and there is what could be called a refugee experience which produces what may be termed a refugee behaviour. Therefore these behaviours can be generalized and scientifically conceptualized as distinctly consistent and predictable phenomena.

Who is a Refugee ?

Literature Review

The status of refugee has been defined in various ways, each according to the orientation and intentions of its authors. A number of works on refugees see the problem as part of the larger social problem of displaced populations. This is due to the unprecedented magnitude of the refugee problem since the second world war, around the world, and particularly in Africa since the 1970's. Attempts at articulating the refugee problem goes back to the League of Nations and the problem of ethnic minorities and stateless persons in the inter war years in Europe.[12] Much of the current thinking about refugees has however been laid out by

the United Nations. The 1951 UN Convention defines a refugee as a person who:

> owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, or political opinion, is outside the Country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear or for reasons other than personal Convenience, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country, or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear or for reasons other than personal convenience, is unwilling to return to it.[13]

This definition has seen a lot of criticism because it is seen as restrictive. Some critics have pointed to the UN definition's lack of concern for people who have not crossed the boundary of a state i.e. internally displaced persons.[14] Gordenker also argues that the UN definition of a refugee is narrow.[15] He points out that a person fitting the UN definition gets legal protection against refoulment. The definition, he points out effectively excluded attention to persecuted individuals who were still in their own country: they need to have escaped their tormentors in order to be of international concern under the convention and the statute. Usually a person who flees his homeland out of fear of persecution neither seeks nor is offered protection by his government. On the issue that the fear must be well-founded, Gordenker's position is that the answer has psychological, legal, political and administrative dimensions. The refugee who tries to demonstrate that his safety would be endangered if he were returned to his country of origin, has little

access to supporting information; it is only his word and the conviction of his claim that provide initial support. The test of a "well-founded fear" relates to the nature of the refugee's perception of danger. Such a perception may not be shared by those who have to decide on asylum. the political elements of decision on persecution are linked to the question of how openly a receiving state wishes to criticise the behavior of the refugee producing government. Such a decision also necessarily relates to international political settings, interest groups and social values. Thus the issue of "well-founded fear" of persecution is at best nebulous and not easy to say exactly what it entails.

Other scholars have defined refugees to include economically-motivated migrants. This is the position of Brooks and El-Ayouty. They argue that: [16]

> They are not refugees in the political sense. but that is their very real condition in terms of the cutting of old ties and building of new.

Ferris [17] defined refugees in terms of the distinction between those fleeing political persecution and those fleeing economic and other life threatening conditions.

Definitions of refugees have generally required that the person be displaced by a forceful agent such as war storms, famines or governments, while those who migrated for economic reasons are not considered to qualify for refugee status (called the push-pull factor whereby push factors

create refugees while pull factors create economic migrants.)

The most restrictive and explicit definitions are legal political and administrative. Such definitions attempt to precisely delimit refugee status in order to "establish dichotomous categories" of refugees and non-refugees.[18] Such limits and restrictions are used to discriminate between refugees and :

(a)   Migrants who cross interstate borders and should be handled by the usual immigration legislation procedures.

(b)   Victims of hostilities who may be fleeing the same sorts of foreign causes, but remain within their country of origin.[19]

Paul Weis[20] makes a distinction between Convention refugees and de-facto refugees. He argues that the drafters of the 1951 Convention tried to express in legal terms what is generally considered as a political refugee. The drafters thought mainly of the refugee from Eastern Europe. The difficulties which have arisen and which have led to the existence of de-facto refugees are a consequence of changed political circumstances and the emergence of new refugee problems outside Europe. De-facto refugees, according to Weis are the result of the application of the 1951 definition and therefore the rate of recognition. He defines

de-facto refugees as persons not recognised as Convention refugees who are nevertheless, for political reasons, unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin.

In 1969, the OAU adopted its own Convention on refugees. This definition incorporated the UN characteristics of a refugee with a broader definition that went beyond the individual and psychological (subjective) criteria used by the UN. The OAU Convention defined a refugee as follows:

> The term refugee shall also apply to every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality.[21]

The OAU and the UN have agreed that refugee status requires interstate movement and specific cause forcing that movement, but the OAU's list extends acceptable causes to include occupation and foreign domination, i.e colonialism and racism. This allows the OAU to treat freedom fighters as a category of refugees.

Observers like Shacknove[22] have argued that conceptually the OAU definition represents an improvement on the UN definition. Among others, he points out, the phrase "events seriously disturbing public order" has been broadly interpreted. Accepted usage in Africa include some people in mass distress situations who do not qualify as refugees under more restrictive definitions. Refugee status in Africa

has been extended through the years to include people who flee areas of famine, and the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for refugees (UNHCR) has become accustomed to responding to "refugee-like" situations. This broadened usage was articulated by President Nyerere of Tanzania in his speech to the First International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA I). He defined refugees as "people who are now or may in the future be forced to flee from their homelands and seek refuge in another country in order to escape persecution, or death, or starvation".[23] He noted that the 1967 OAU Convention on refugees had divided refugee into three categories, namely:

(a) Political refugees, who were often more educated and more urban.

(b) Freedom fighters whose flight was caused by external domination.

(c) The most numerous....men, women and children fleeing from war, from racial, religious or cultural persecution or conflict, and from famines or other natural disasters.

The OAU definition represents a pragmatic response to the realities of social, political and economic turmoil that have pervaded the independent states of Africa in the early 1950's and early 1960's: it makes a realistic extension of the definition of "refugees" beyond that of the 1951 UN Convention and the 1967 Protocol.

As Mathews [24] points out the OAU definition recognizes that within the African context, it was not only the individual's "...well-founded fear of persecution..." which created refugees, but that the exodus could be the result of factors of a more general nature, intrinsic to circumstances in the country in question. It recognizes persons seeking refuge from the wider ramifications of coup d'etat, civil strife and political unrest.

Despite the positive aspects of the OAU definition CIMADE et.al.[25] criticises the definition. They note that the shortcomings of the definition are to be found at two levels, namely, at the level of facts and the level of causes. After incorporating the usual criticisms levelled against the UN definition such as the crossing of international boundaries and the equivocal nature of reasonable or well-founded fear, they point out other flaws. At the factual level they point out that the OAU definition sees the tragedy of refugees as a problem of persons when in reality there are millions of victims. In addition they point out that the definition says nothing either of people who are "illegally expelled by the police or government of the country in question", or of populations which, having fled their country, are refused re-entry by the government. At the causal level, they point to the ideological overtones of the causal factors enumerated by the definition.

Ericksson, Melander and Nobel,[26] point out with more precision that eight different categories of people have qualified as refugees in Africa, with some categories predating the 1969 OAU Convention:

(1) Refugees fleeing from minority-rule regimes in Southern Africa. These included members of national liberation movements.

(2) Refugees fleeing from independent African states as a result of the "consequences of colonialism....the arbitrary way in which the African continent was carved up among the colonial powers".

(3) Refugees fleeing from border disputes that were a consequence of colonialism.

(4) Refugees, who were members of minority groups, fleeing from ethnic and tribal disputes.

(5) Refugees fleeing from civil wars and other disorders that resulted from wars of secession.

(6) Refugees fleeing from the Moroccan occupation of their Sahrawi homeland.

(7) Refugees fleeing from gross human rights violations (e.g from Idi Amin's regime in Uganda.)

(8) Refugees fleeing from natural disasters.

Conceptual Framework

Kunz has attempted to develop a comprehensive conceptual and theoretical framework which could be applied to the study of

involuntary migration. Based on the works of Kunz [27] Eisenstadt [28] Zucker [28] and Loescher and Scanlan [30] we divide the migratory process as follows

a) Events preceding exodus

b) Immediate factors and motives generating exodus

c) Policy towards refugees by host governments.

Events preceding exodus

Most research on involuntary migration are usually concerned with the flight and the situation faced by refugees in the host Country. Not much attention is focused on the Conflict situations that create the refugees. The approach in the present study would be based on the assumption of Ibeanu et al [31] that the African refugee problem is a function of the crises of the state; namely, the crisis of production, the crisis of democracy, and the crisis of national identity.

Immediate factors and motives generating exodus

Migration of humans is a concept denoting all types of changes of residence . These changes may range from movements undertaken "willingly and by choice" to movements caused by threatening circumstances. The former category are called migrants and the latter are referred to as refugees. Very often refugees have been called immigrants, or illegal aliens, or asylum seekers, by receiving countries.

Refugees are neither immigrants nor illegal migrants. Zucker and Zucker [32] argue that like migrants, refugees have forsaken their homelands for new countries and like illegal immigrants, they may enter the new Countries without permission. Both the immigrant and the illegal migrant are drawn to a country. The refugee is not drawn but driven; he seeks not to better his life but to build it, to regain some part of what he has lost.

The immigrant and illegal migrant are involved in voluntary migration and this occurs for a number of reasons which can be summed up as the "availability of opportunities" at his destination. The "pull" factor is important in his decision-making process. The migrant makes a choice between possible alternatives: to stay in the environment in which he feels relatively dissatisfied, or to move to an environment which he expects to offer him better opportunities for economic and personal advancement.

The refugee undertakes involuntary migration. He is forced to move from his country to another against his will. The "push" factor is very strong in his case. His situation is characterized by the immediacy of life threatening compulsion deliberately exercised by some agent, and his inability to rely on "his" government for even nominal protection. [33] The refugee has little choice but to flee. Victims of natural disasters also have little choice, but the compulsion to move is not the result of

being"...deliberately forced under life threatening
conditions, nor are they denied the protection of their
government" Hence they are usually called displaced
persons.

For the purpose of this work, the word "refugee" would
include all the categories of forcibly displaced persons as
the OAU definition encompasses, and those displaced by the
environment.

Categorizing Refugees[34]

Refugees are created essentially by conflict situations. As
Bulcha points out, in a particular Conflict situation it is
the interaction of subjective and objective factors i e. the
social psychological structure of the weak parties in the
conflict and the available opportunities for escape that
determines the outcome. It is often only a fraction of the
affected groups that choose to flee and are successful in
doing so. The weaker party often remain in the country of
origin where they may face death and repression, accept the
prevailing social order, organise resistance or become
"internally displaced persons". The numbers of such
displaced persons are difficult to ascertain, but are
estimated to run into several million persons in Africa with
Ethiopia topping the list. For this reason, the formal
refugee status as recognized by the international legal

regime involves only a small minority in a multitude of the Uprooted and dispossessed.

Involuntary population movements are made up of forced political migrants, oppressed ethnic and religious minorities, and displaced persons and, floating forced migrants. These can be broken down further into categories using such variables as motives/reason for flight, form of displacement, position in the social structure of the society of origin and the propensity to integrate in the country of asylum.

Revolutionary activists

These are men and women who aim to overthrow an existing regime. They may be influenced by progressive or Conservative social theory and ideology. There are also those political activists who believe that their social ideology is indispensable for mass liberation such people choose exile in order to carry out their plans. The Russian political emigres in Europe before 1917, the African refugees who have constituted the core of the liberation movements and most of the Latin American exile groups are examples of this category. The decision to leave is usually made not because of the nearness of danger but because of anticipated danger. They depart their countries of origin in a well planned and often orderly fashion and the country of destination is chosen deliberately and contacts are made

before departure. Their flight often is in trickles. Individuals and small groups leave first to be joined later by Compatriots and family members.

Coup makers

Another category of forced political migrants include those who flee because of their involvement in coups or revolutions. The coup or revolution may have been abortive, or successful, turning the coup makers the revolutionaries or the members of the fallen government into exiles.

Opponents of Change

There are also those persons who leave their country because they are not prepared to accept political conditions and changes that have occurred due to a revolution or political change. They tend to be of Conservative social persuasion and leave for what they hope would be a greater freedom.

The majority of refugees in the above three categories are generally relatively rich, educated male who come from the petty bourgeois classes and bourgeois classes. The revolutionary activists are often intellectuals who have committed class suicide to become leaders of the struggle of the oppressed masses.

Oppressed minorities

These consists of racial and religious minorities pushed out
by hostilities against them from members of the majority.
The flight of the Tutsi from Rwanda and the Hutu from
Burundi[35] and the departure of about twenty thousand
Fallachers - Black Jews'- from Ethiopia fall under this
category. Similarly the persecution of the Gigs and Manes
by the Khan led government of Samuel Doe in Liberia which
culminated in the civil war, also fall in this category.
The flight of such minorities often occurs at a point in
time when a national crisis occurs, eg. defeat in war or
attempted coups. During such times the minorities become
the scapegoats. The oppression and discrimination against
them becomes an "epidemic" as members of the dominant group
search for a vent for their frustration.

Floating student Refugees

These are made up of mostly student leaders - especially
University students - who fall foul with the government of
their Country because they have led the students in
demonstrations against the government's policies. The
governments usually close down the Universities and hound
these leaders who seek exile in neighbouring countries. The
problem for such student leaders is that they may find
themselves in a country of asylum whose government has a
similar axe to grind with its University student leaders who
have also taken refuge in another country. The various

governments often claim that the student leaders are in the pay of opponents of the government, but in the quest for national reconciliation, they ask that the student leaders could go back to their countries of origin. This makes it difficult for such refugees to get assistance in their country of asylum and often live a hard existence. A number of student leaders from Universities in the West African region namely Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Togo and Benin fall in this category dubbed "Floating refugees".

Displaced persons

This category makes up the majority of people in flight particularly in Africa. These are the people who Rose [36] has called "the human flotsam and jetsam which are caught in the cross currents of conflicts which are not of their direct concern. They are untargeted victims, bystanders sucked into the maelstrom then washed ashore... with other frightened, hungry and bewildered displaced persons". The flight of displaced persons in most cases is acute, often in panic and of mass proportions. In this type of refugee movement the "push" factors are prominent. The refugees in this group are often unprepared for their flight and have little information about their destination. Consequently their passage from their Country of origin to the country of asylum is filled with hazards. Large concentrations of such displaced persons are more common in Africa today than

before due to the use of modern technology in warfare. The scorched earth strategy of indiscriminate air bombardment of areas controlled or infiltrated by insurgent guerrilla fighters by Third World regimes and their superpower allies is widespread today. The case of Ethiopia, Afghanistan, South Africa, and Western Sahara, are clear examples.

Other displaced persons are often not the result of conflict situations as the case of Liberia, Ethiopia, Somalia, Mozambique and Western Sahara show, but the result of political decision making on development strategy that has affected the environment. They have been forced to flee because government strategy has affected the environment such that it can no longer support them the nomads. The people have become a victim of the path to development chosen for them by the international market. This is the case of the drought in the Sahel that has forced a lot of nomads in the region to seek refuge in the countries to the south of the sahel.

Refugee flows from a country can at a given time consist of one or more of the above categories. As we shall discuss in latter chapters, the refugees streaming into Ghana are characterized by a mix of these categories. In broad terms these refugees have been (a) those from Southern Africa — particularly students from South Africa and Namibia who have fled apartheid and are being sponsored by the liberation movements — ANC, PAC and SWAPO; (b) those

from Liberia who are fleeing the civil war in their Country;
(c) the environmental refugees from the sahel who have been
displaced by the sahel drought; and (d) floating refugees,
who are student leaders fleeing the wrought of their
governments.

For most refugees, exile is a strategic retreat either
for staging political activities or just a period to be
spent in waiting for the right opportunity to return home.
In general, Bulcha[37] argues, refugees consider their sojourn
in asylum to be short, and the problem that caused their
flight transient. However, this is often too optimistic
because in reality repatriation is generally remote or
impossible as the case of the Palestinians, the Eritreans
and Rwandese have shown. Exile thus often become a way of
life because the refugee remains an unwilling settler in the
country of asylum.

Policies towards refugees

Policy responses to the refugee problem can be viewed from
two broad angles namely the response of the government and
that of voluntary agencies. Two works have examined the U.S
response to the refugee problem. The work of Zucker and
Zucker[38] looks at the reality of American refugee policy.
It poses many questions about American's policy towards
refugees: Who gets in? Why? How are they resettled? They
point out that foreign policy is often a dominant factor in

refugee decisions. While foreign policy may determine who is eligible for admission, a combination of two other factors determines who is admitted. These include the numbers of those pressuring for admission and the likelihood of low-cost and domestically unopposed resettlement. The conclusion of the work is that when a particular group of refugees serves American Foreign policy goals, does not threaten to overwhelm America with its numbers, and can be resettled with little cost or domestic resistance, the members of that group are usually assured of admission. On the other hand, groups that do not meet any of these criteria may be certain that admission will be denied.

Loescher and Scanlan [39] look at refugees and America's Half-Open door policy. They examine the politics which has shaped the American response to refugees over the past forty years. They examine an ongoing struggle for supremacy among three groups to control policy towards refugees. The first group they call the restrictionist whose principal objective is to limit overall immigration to the U.S. Opposed to the restrictionist is the group which regards extreme misfortune -particularly if identifiable as political persecution - as a valid reason for carving out exceptions to America's restrictive immigration laws. This group advocates an "Open-door" policy believing that America is obliged to welcome every stranger. These two groups are engaged in a domestic struggle to shape policy towards refugees. The

third, and most powerful group which influences refugee admission policy are those inside the U.S. government who believe that refugees are not merely immigrants and not namely victims, but are also valuable "assets" in an ongoing struggle with communism. Members of this groups sit in the White House, the State Department and the CIA. Thus sine 1945, over 90% of those admitted to the U.S. have fled communist countries. Guided by the view that "each refugee from the soviet orbit represents a failure of the communist system" successive U.S. administrations have sought to induce more defections and have consistently sought to transform each new arrival into a symbolic or literal "freedom fighter".

Ghana's policy towards refugees is situated in similar circumstances but, has been influenced more by the famous speech of the first president- Kwame Nkrumah on the eve of independence that Ghana's independence would be meaningless unless it was linked up with the total liberation of the rest of Africa.

Apart from government policy, voluntary agencies play an important role in the policy response towards refugees. The voluntary sector has a unique and indispensable role in the development and implementation of governmental policy in refugee issues. It is unique because neither government nor isolated individuals can act for refugee relief or resettlement and yet remain free from bureaucratic rigidity

as can the voluntary agency. Without the participation of the voluntary sector, refugee programmes would be stalled in the conceptual stage, the majority of resettlement opportunities would be left unutilized and much potential goodwill and selfless service would remain dormant. Winkler [40] argues that the voluntary agency acts as an intermediary between government and individuals, enabling citizens to co-ordinate their efforts and achieve a goal. As a channel of good will and positive motivation, the voluntary agency helps to influence refugee policy, and the agency may also act as an instrument of implementation of that policy. The voluntary organisation is institutionalized to the extent of being able to plan and carry out a programme to achieve a purpose. The organisation is relatively non bureaucratic in nature when compared with government or intergovernmental agencies and therefore exhibits a certain flexibility unknown to highly bureaucratized structures.

The need for such an intermediary function in refugee work became evident after World War II, when hundreds of thousands of persons were left homeless. Neither the governments concerned nor the newly reorganised international bodies had the means or leverage to resolve the situation. Many voluntary agencies came into being in those post war years to help tackle the seemingly insurmountable problems of the displaced persons. The agencies themselves have endured, as refugee problems have

continues to multiply, but the locus of work has moved from Europe to the Third World where the majority of refugees are located.

Ghana has a number of these voluntary agencies that assist refugees. These include the Red Cross which is affiliated to the International Committee of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the Christian Council of Ghana which is affiliated to the World Council of Churches (WCC), the Catholic Secretariat which is the local wing of the International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC), the World Vision International (WVI) and the Lutheran Church. These agencies work essentially at influencing governments to promote humane, comprehensive refugee policies and then act to realize this policy through concrete means. To the extent that we can talk of a refugee policy in Ghana, it is the sum of the efforts of these voluntary agencies as intermediary between government policy and refugee assistance. This would be examined through the four facets of assistance: advocacy, education, programme initiatives and policy implementation in Ghana.

Methodology

This study is based on data from primary and secondary sources. The techniques used for data collection included face to face interviews, observations and documentary research. Data was collected from three main groups of

refugees in Ghana, namely refugees from southern Africa, refugee from the sahel and refugees from Liberia.

A questionnaire was prepared and administered over different periods of time. Refugees from southern Africa were interviewed in 1988 while those from the sahel were interviewed in 1987 and 1988. Liberian refugees were interview in 1991. The questionnaire was designed to generate data mainly on the demographic profile, the causes of flight, the dynamics of flight, social economic and Psychological adjustment in the country of asylum. In addition several others like administrators, health workers, policemen who have work contacts with refugees were interviewed. The latter were interviewed with open ended and unstructured interviews.

Secondary data was collected from various sources. The UNHCR local office in Accra, the Refugee Committee of the Christian Council of Ghana, the Ghana Red Cross, the National MobilizationProgramme, the Ministries of Interior and Mobilization and social welfare and various voluntary organisations were themain sources of secondary data. Available reports on therefugee problem and other related issues were examined. Documents and research reports were also obtained from the center for refugee studies at York University in Toronto andthe Refugee Studies Programme at Oxford University.

It was relatively easy to interview the Southern African refugees because most of them are students and mail questionnaires were used. The problem groups were the sahel refugees and the Liberian refugees at the Buduburam Camp. Most of the sahel refugees were illiterates and we had to use interpreters who could speak Fulani, Hausa and Bambara, and back translation proved quite a problem. For the Liberian refugees at the Buduburam Camp we had to use tent heads to distribute the questionnaires and we had to explain the interview procedures to them and now to take the sample among the tents. Interviewers were recruited from among the refugees at the Buduburam Camp with the help of the Camp Commandant and the Camp management committee. They were taken through the schedule and how to administer them. Possible problems which could arise regarding the Survey in general and the interview schedule and interview procedure were raised and discussed. Enumerators were then made to administer a questionnaire in the presence of the researcher and other enumerators and notes made and discussed after each interview.

Data Validity and Sources of Error

There has been issues raised by some social scientists about the reliability of data gathered in survey research in Africa. Some researchers doubt the validity of applying research methods and concepts that have been developed in

Western academic traditions in African situation. Ijomah[41] raises some basic questions put forth by Johan Galtung namely (1) To what extent can we determine a person's true position on any given issue from his verbal expression? (2) To what extent can we infer that a person thinks from what he says? (3) To what extent can we predict a person's behavior from his verbal expressions? Thus to vouch for the validity of the information collected, the researcher must first convince himself that the respondent is actually expressing what he wants to express.

Problems about data validity regarding survey methods in Africa abound, but it would be wrong to assume that survey methods are inapplicable in African environments. The problems lies not in the methods per se, but in its application. The survey method used for this work involved the questionnaire. As much as possible steps were taken to ensure that questions were simple and clear. Interviewers were from the same country as the respondents. In the case of the refugees from the Sahel the interviews were done in the presence of the researcher. Interpreters then translated the questions and there was back translation of the answers from the Bambara and Tamasheck language. We have to point out have that the data we have on the Sahel refugees might be prone to error due to this issue of interpretation of the questionnaire.

Another possible source of error we anticipate is with the data on the Liberian refugees at the Buduburam camp. This relates to their ethnic and political affiliations. The camp management had warned the refugees about carrying over their ethnic and political divisions from Liberia to Ghana on pain of being asked to leave the camp. For this reason most responses on political and ethnic affiliation are most prone to error. It was not easy therefore to establish the extent to which Krans (President Doe's co-ethnics) and Gios and Manos (Charles Taylors main supporters from Nimba county) are represented in the refugee population at the camp.

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CHAPTER THREE

THE FLIGHT OF REFUGEES TO GHANA

Since independence in 1957 Ghana has played host to three broad categories of refugees. These are (a) Refugees from Southern Africa; mainly from South Africa and Namibia (b) Refugees from the Sahel belt of West Africa and (c) Refugees from Liberia. This chapter discusses mainly the factors that led to the flight of these refugees to Ghana in the context of the push-pull factors.

Southern African Refugees

From the time of independence, Ghana has proved a haven for political refugees from apartheid South Africa and countries then under colonial rule. Ghana's attitude towards refugees was heavily influenced by Nkrumah's famous declaration on the eve of independence that "the independence of Ghana is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent".

Following the conference of independent African states in Accra in 1958, it was resolved to give every assistance to African freedom fighters struggling to achieve independence for their countries. Ghana, due to the pan-Africanist policy of Nkrumah, adopted an open policy towards

all Africans seeking refuge. Accra became a Mecca for African freedom fighters who came to Accra to look for financial assistance and inspiration. They were of two main types, namely freedom fighters from Southern Africa and Rhodesia and from territories still under colonial rule. There were also politicians from some independent African countries who were either guilty of crimes or feared unjust treatment at home. Some of the Southern African refugees were also training in local camps in their struggle against the racist regimes in Southern Africa. The political refugees from independent African countries cause a rumpus over the 1965 OAU Summit in Accra[1]. Some African governments condemned Ghana for harbouring subversive agents and organising training camps. Those countries whose exiles were then in Ghana (including Cote d' Ivoire, Niger, Burkina Faso and Benin) indicated that they would not attend the Accra Summit unless Ghana changed its African policies[2]. To save the conference Ghana had to give assurances and guarantees to send away from its territory before the conference, all those persons whose presence was considered undesirable, to countries of their choice that are prepared to receive them or in the event of difficulty, to send them away from Accra during the period of the conference.

This open welcome to refugees stemmed from Ghana's effort at championing the cause of the African in the cause of African liberation and African unity. In the early

stages of the Southern African refugee flow, it was Ghana which made the first concerted effort to help. Ghana issued to Southern African refugees, "Commonwealth passports" which was an ingenious device to suggest that they are Commonwealth citizens but in fact internationally regarded as a special version of a Ghana passport. They were issued in the name of the Ghana Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They were useful travel documents then to their holders since they were internationally regarded as a commitment by the Ghana government to receive their holders back to Ghana at any time.[3]

Refugee flows from South Africa has been caused mainly the policy of apartheid and the flows from Namibia has been the result of is due to South African colonialism. The policy of Apartheid was fashioned by the Afrikaaners in the late 1940's and it was intended to emphasize the separateness of the races. It has been the official policy of the ruling National Party and the literal meaning of the word Apartheid is "Separate development". It is a system of racial discrimination built on a foundation of economic exploitation, political repression, and cultural obliteration; established and maintained by organised and executed violence of European against African[4]. The system of apartheid is also a sophisticated economic, political and social system based on race, and buttressed by a complex legal structure, security system and theology that

consolidates South Africa's wealth, power and privileges in the hands of a white minority. The logic of the system allows four and a half million whites to totally control and dominate twenty-two million Africans to preserve "white western christian civilisation in South Africa". For its polar opposite, but essentially united elements, the Apartheid system spells reward and punishment, pleasure and pain, wealth and poverty, hope and despair, happiness and grief. What the African is not, the European is, and the European is what he is because the system of Apartheid denies the humanity and even the existence of the African[5].

These injustices led to the armed struggle and increased the mobilisation of blacks against the regime and the system of production. This struggle has been led by freedom movements like the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), and the South African Communist Party. The response of the South African government to black opposition to Apartheid has been repression. This repression by the led to the flight of many young South Africans to take refuge in neighbouring countries and distant places like Ghana.

Since the overthrow of the Nkrumah government in 1966, successive Ghanaian governments have shown less interest in political refugees even though government attitude has generally been supportive of those who have sought refuge and asylum in Ghana. The large majority of refugees from

Southern Africa are mainly from South Africa and Namibia and they have mostly been students. As at 1990 there were 52 Namibian students in second cycle schools and there are 25 South African students who are mainly in tertiary level educational institutions namely Universities, Polytechnics and the Ghana Institute of Journalism.

Interviews of these refugees from Southern Africa indicate that most of the South African students left South Africa in the aftermath of the Soweto uprising of 1976. They fled through Mozambique, Botswana and Zimbabwe on their way to Ghana. Most of them belong to the ANC and the PAC even though a good number are not committed to any of the liberation movements. All the Namibian students fled to Ghana through Angola where the SWAPO had a large refugee camp. Some screening was done before they were sent to countries willing to take them and educate them in their schools. Apart from Ghana, there are Namibian students in schools in Nigeria, Cote d' Ivoire and Cuba.

The refugee flow from Namibia was the result of South Africa's colonisation and apartheid in the territory. Namibia was a German territory but was given to South Africa in 1920 as a League of Nations "class C' mandate after its transfer from Germany in World War I.[6] After World War II and especially since the 1948 National Party victory in South Africa, the South Africa state tried to incorporate Namibia as its fifth province under the pretext that the

mandate had lapsed with the collapse of the League of
Nations. In 1951 the white inhabitants of Namibia were
given representation in the South African parliament; and in
1955 native affairs were put under the direct administration
of the Bantu Administration Department of South West Africa.
The introduction of apartheid at that time was complemented
a decade later by the Odendaal Commission Report, which
provided for the creation of separate homelands, in the
desert areas, for the ten native ethnic groups. South
Africa was moving towards a de facto annexation of the
territory for the while inhabitants white introducing
apartheid for the black indigenous population.[7]

The nationalist struggle against this system of
colonialism and apartheid in Namibia was led by the South
West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO). Organised
violence began in August 1966 when SWAPO after a period of
political organisation, turned to guerrilla warfare and
developed military bases in Angola, Botswana and Zambia for
its military wing — the Peoples Liberation Army of Namibia
(PLAN). Counter insurgency by South Africa and the will of
the Africans to join in the nationalist effort led to a
stream of Namibian refugees into Angola and Zambia as well
as Botswana. SWAPO's policy was to seek assistance for the
education of the young Namibians. Most of the Namibian
refugees in Ghana were aged between 12-21 years and were

absorbed in the secondary schools, vocational schools and the Ghana Institute of Journalism.

Refugees from the Sahel

The refugees from Southern Africa fled their countries due to political reasons namely apartheid and colonialism. They have left because the apartheid system degrades and persecutes them. But the refugees from the Sahel Zone of West Africa have not been victims of persecution, but are victims of drought famine, environmental disaster and Socio-economic decline.[8] These people have been forced to leave their country due to a threat posed by environmental change namely drought and famine. Such people have been called environmental refugees. Jodi Jacobson[9] estimates that there are some 10 million unrecognized environmental refugees world wide. These refugees from the Sahel have been mainly Malians, Burkinabes, Chadians and others from Niger. They started streaming into Ghana from 1984 due to environmental changes occurring in the Sahel.

The factors that have led to the flight from the Sahel are what we have indicated earlier in chapter one as due to the crisis of production in the Sahel zone. The path to development chosen by the Sahel countries have tended to destroy the traditional modes of production and opening the people bare to the ravages of the environment which their

forefathers have lived with for centuries without the need to flee.

In 1973 an international disaster was declared in the Sahelian countries of West Africa namely Mauritania, Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad. It was reported that since 1968 there had been six years of drought, that most of the livestock were dead and that the Sahelian population-numbering six million people - were in danger of starving to death. Various appeals for assistance was launched by relief organisations and international charities. One such appeal stated:

> "The situation in the drought stricken Sahel region of Africa is almost impossible to grasp ..... Most of the cattle are dead anyway, of thirst, starvation and disease. 100,000 human beings died of the same horrifying causes last year. Without help, God knows how many of the six million survivors will survive another year".[10]

The news of the famine caused a world wide alarm and in response various countries sent enormous quantities of food. The picture presented to the world at that time was a natural disaster affecting six very poor countries. A prolonged drought had led to the disappearance of almost all their livestock, destroyed their way of life and has resulted in mass famine. The cause was attributed to a change in climate. The traditionally self-sufficient nomadic peoples of the Sahel were permanently weakened. The situation described amounted to a sudden and complete collapse of living conditions in a vast area of the world.

It is this description of the causes of the famine in the Sahel that Marnham[11] takes issue with. He argues that "nomads possess the right to exercise some choice over their own future and the right not to die as a side effect of official development policies." The nomads of the Sahel, share a traditional economy which depend to a critical extent on nomadic pastoralism. It was the basis of all traditional land use in the Sahel. "Herd numbers (and so the number of people who could live off the pastoral economy) were limited by the quantities of dry season pasture within reach of the herdsman's base well. The animals would eat out all the vegetation in a circle of up to 30 km radius and only a certain number would survive the dry season".[12] The wells were widely spaced. At the end of the dry season, the Sahel, the grasses would start to grow and the herds would move away from the wells, allowing the pasture surrounding them to recover for the next dry season. Pasture and herd size would fluctuate. Animal disease and shortage of pasture kept human population and grazing pressure within bounds.

Despite these strategies, Marnham points out, famine occurred but nomadic pastoralism enabled them to survive a hostile environment. A dedicate ecological equilibrium had to be maintained to which the concepts of commercial cropping stock marketing and taxation were generally alien and destructive. Marnham argues that "the whole point of

this economy was that it could and should be able to withstand drought and avoid or minimize famine." This was to be affected by colonial development. The area around the elbow of the Niger was seen as a truly second Nile "lacking only management to cause it to fertilize a second Egypt. There is not another spot in the whole sahara where such financial possibilities are indicated"[13]

The inevitable result of this colonial development policy was to increase human pressure on the Sahelian environment. The consequences were noted even in the colonial era namely "The natural checks on population growth were removed with the introduction of medical and veterinary skills and political stability. There ensued deforestation, overgrazing and insufficient fallowing of crop land; the desert was not invading from without, the land was deteriorating from within."[14] The effects of development on the Sahel among others was the drought and famine of 1972 and 1973. The cause were the inappropriate and destructive programmes which had taken place in the area in the preceding ten years. In the words of an observer of Francophone West Africa, the Sahel

"is not a "disaster" with all the unpredictability and chance that this term suggests. It is the logical outcome of the policies of colonisation and development in the Sahel. The drought exposed and further precipitated the worsening crisis of the Sahel: over-exploitation and decreasing productivity of the land, the dismantling of rural social systems under the ruthless pressures of the money economy. An over-cultivated, over-grazed Sahel will always have droughts... The pastoral

and agricultural economies of this semi-avid zone were traditionally geared to survival throughout long- periods of drought as is testified by their livestock accumulation and grain-storage customs. However "modernisation of the land, largely nullified these survival techniques."[15]

This buttresses the position of this work and Marnham's report that it is not the Sahelian climate which caused the Sahelian crisis. Africa has always known drought and floods. But the famine of the Sahel was the result of unsuitable development scheme. These schemes destroy nomadic strategies for dealing with the climate and disturb the ecological balance of the area. Thereby they cause the very problem of decertification which they are purporting to solve.[16]

The effects of the drought and famine on the Sahel nomads was, among others, to flee the Sahel. They sought refuge throughout the countries to the South of the Sahel and they were to be found in coastal West African cities from Dakar to Lagos. Ghana thus plays host to a number of refugees from the Sahel.

Sahel Refugees in Ghana

The number of refugees from the Sahel who have taken refuge in Ghana has not been easy to determine because efforts at doing a head count in 1985 by the Department of Social Welfare proved difficult; since as nomads they feared they were going to be confined to a camp which then was being proposed. However the Christian Council's Refugee

Committee which provides assistance to them, estimates that there are around two thousand of them scattered all over the country. The survey for this work involved interviewing some 52 groups of refugees representing a population of 618 people. They were made up of nomads from Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. They however belonged to two broad ethnic groups namely Fulani and Tuareg. They are all muslim nomadic herdsmen and warriors.

The Tuareg

The Tuareg see themselves as mainly raiders while the Fulani who mainly keep cattle, are transhumants who from late June until early October, graze their herds in the bush and then from October to the end of the harvest in February, they bring their cattle on cultivated land to eat the stubble and manure the farms. Tuareg society is a feudal one with nobles controlling camels which indicates wealth; these camels serve as a means of transport and a source of milk, cheese, butter and occasionally meat. High status women did leather work and taught the children. Manual work like fetching wood and water and tending the goats was done by slaves, who also did the washing and cleaning in the house. The Tuareg dealt with the threat of drought by keeping mixed herds of camels, goats and cattle which have different water and pasture requirements. When conditions were poor, they moved to less badly affected areas, and

replenished their herds by raiding those of other nomads or those of settled people. The reality of the modern cash economy has meant that Tuareg society has had to adapt. Slaves have been allowed to settle because they are expensive to own. Increased cultivation of marginal land has meant a loss of pasture and restrictions in movements across national boundaries and settlement schemes have all meant that the Tuaregs are much more vulnerable in times of drought than they used to be.

The Fulani

The Fulani are much more settled than the Tuareg especially in Nigeria. They have been forced to turn to agriculture than they used to be. A Fulani family will either have a "home area" farm, a base for the seasonal grazing of smaller herds of cattle, or the family head will settle on a farm whilst the younger men move with the cattle. The most fully settled Fulani are despised because they have lost their herds with the exception of the high-status intelligentsia whose ancestors are aristocrats, administrators, holy men and muslim teachers in Hausa towns. They are viewed with distrust and seen as dirty and uncivilized, though they are seen also as sorcerers with great skill in medicine.

Composition of the Groups

Of the 25 groups interviewed four were made up of just
two men who had arrived to see how conditions were like
before deciding to bring over their families. The size of
the other groups ranged from families of five or six people
to groups of several families. The problem arising was that
often the interview was of a group of male heads of families
one of whom was a chief. It was not easy to isolate and
interview family heads individually because they felt the
chief was their spokesman. Also the term "family" was vague
to them as different groups understood it differently. For
some, it meant the whole ethnic group, while for a few
others it meant the nuclear unit of father, mother and
children. Some groups found it difficult to decide how many
children were with them.

Despite these problems the composition of some 15
families looked as follows: seven of the family heads had
two wives each and most wives had two or three children.
The range was wide, one woman had one child and another had
seven. For some two groups were only women; one was a
widow with her mother.
However when the families are together as a group, they
acted together as a large unit. Usually discussions about
the group involved a council of family heads who, in some
groups supported a single chief. In the larger groups,
people were frequently arriving or leaving. Some groups had

been in Ghana for less than two years. Others had been in the country for between two and three years. The Fulani groups had been in the country beyond four years and wanted to stay to graze their cattle.

Analysis

Interviews of the various Tuareg and Fulani groups indicated that they were living in abandoned or uncompleted houses in the urban areas like Accra, Kumasi, Tamale and Agona Swedru. Some also lived with their compatriots in the stranger quarters of the towns called Zongos. Of the 25 groups interviewed, 20 stated that lack of pasture to feed their herd and the accompanying deaths, forced them to move south into Ghana. The other five groups had come to Ghana for reasons that might be called economic eg. three of the groups had come to Ghana to "find a cheaper way of making the pilgrimage to Mecca." The other two groups were looking for better trading opportunities. No group cited political persecution as a reason for leaving their home countries. One group for example had come from the Agacher strip over which Mali and Burkina Faso were disputing sovereignty until January 1986, but they did not give the war as a reason for leaving. The cause of their flight was the inability of their environment to support their living. They found themselves in a refugee - like situation because they had a well founded fear that their crumbling environment cannot sustain their survival just as political persecution would

endanger their existence in a more direct manner. The drought and famine in the Sahel therefore constituted forces that pushed them into seeking refuge in Ghana. The economic reasons given by a minority of them would be regarded as pull factors because Ghana attracted them as a place where they can easily make the hajj and where they will find better trading opportunities other factors that had pulled them to Ghana were stories they had heard that Ghanaians treated strangers well and that since the time of Nkrumah traders especially from Mali and Niger had found their way into Ghana. Some of the groups claimed that they drifted into Ghana from neighbouring countries because they had problems with the authorities in those countries, but Ghanaian authorities gave them no problems eg. problems relating to residence permits and being allowed to cross Ghana's borders. Ghanaians immigration authorities were found to be very liberal regarding these. Some said that Ghana's pan-African policies dating back to the Nkrumah era has made the country attractive to most of them from the Sahel. Those from Burkina Faso had come to Ghana because it is the nearest place to find pasture for their cattle. Also, due to the over-use of land, the government of Burkina Faso had tried to restrict herd size but Ghana have no such laws.

Husbands of the women in one group had travelled to Mecca and they were working (begging for alms) - until they

can follow their husbands. From the interviews it seems that a father mother and their children made up distinct units within the larger groups, and the man could travel with his family alone and make decisions separately from the other families.

The Liberian Refugees in Ghana

Following the settlement of freed slaves from the US in Liberia by the American Colonisation Society (ACS), the politics of that country was dominated by the ex-slaves known in Liberia as Americo-Liberians. Even though they met an indigenous Liberian population, the indigines only appeared on the periphery of Liberian politics. They dominated the government of the country and set up the True Whig Party (TWP) which ruled Liberia from independence from the American Colonisation Society in 1847 to 1980 when Master Sergeant Samuel Doe, an indigenous Liberian, led a military coup which overthrew the Americo-Liberian dominated government headed by William Tolbert. The rule of the TWP was an era of monopoly of power by the Americo-Liberians and the indigenous people were treated as second class citizen.[17] The Americo-Liberian became a privileged group in the Liberian society. All opposition was stifled and dissidents chased into exile. The coup by Samuel Doe was therefore seen as a chance to bring the indigenous Liberians into the mainstream of Liberian politics.

There was great expectations on the part of the indigenous Liberians for a more democratic involvement in national politics. The Doe regime however did not prove very different from many other African governments. It exhibited a record of corruption, intolerance of dissent and presided over a very dismal economy. Despite this, the government of President Doe was not prepared to let go the reigns of power, and as often is the case in other African countries, a struggle for power in Liberia emerged. Doe legitimized himself by forming a political party and won a dubious election. Various attempts to get President Doe to step down from office failed. It was in one of the attempts to remove him from power that led Charles Taylor, a former member of Doe's government, to launch an attack on the Doe government in December 1989 from Nimba County that borders Cote d' Ivoire on the north east. This touched off a civil war in which the Charles Taylor forces of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPLF) won all but the capital Monrovia.

The Flight from Liberia

The campaign to oust President Doe did touch off a flow of refugees from Liberia. First it was the flight of just the opponents of the regime who left the country for the safety of other countries. Others were military men who had failed in attempts to stage coups against Doe. Ordinary people started to leave the country when Charles Taylor

began his attacks. The refugee flows from the attacks thus started from Nimba County into Cote d' Ivoire in December 1989. Initially Guinea reported an influx of 13,000 Liberians reaching an estimated 66,000 – 80,000 by March 1990. Cote d' Ivoire reported some 55,000 Liberians refugees in the last week of December. By the end of 1990 it was estimated that around 700,000 Liberians had left their country as a result of the conflict and another one million were displaced within Liberia.[18]

The conflict in Liberia became protracted as no faction, that is, government and Charles Taylor forces, could establish a government over the whole country. This worried the governments of the regional grouping – ECOWAS and they began diplomatic moves to bring peace to Liberia. The result was the setting up of an ECOWAS monitoring group (ECOMOG) to intervene militarily in Liberia to stop the carnage that was going on in the country. ECOMOG was made up of troops from Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone and the Gambia, with a strength of 2,000 men and officers. In August 1990, ECOMOG troops landed in Monrovia Port. As a show of concern for the safety of Ghanaians trapped by the conflict, the Ghana government dispatched a ship to evacuate the Ghanaians from Monrovia. Ghana had meanwhile started to receive Liberian refugees from May 1990. These were mainly Liberians who could afford the airfare. They had left Monrovia to avoid the impending attack on the city from the

NPFL of Charles Taylor. This earlier group of Liberian refugees arriving in Ghana settled on their own with friends and compatriots in Accra. It was the organised evacuation of Ghanaian from Liberia, that was to lead Ghana playing host to a large number of Liberians in Ghana. The ships that were dispatched to evacuate Ghanaians from Monrovia and Freetown ended up bringing along both Ghanaians and Liberians who were all stranded at the two ports.

Liberians in Ghana: Why they fled to Ghana

The first refugee camp to be set up in Ghana is at Gomoa Buduburam some 20 km west of Accra. It was the result of the evacuation of Ghanaians from Monrovia and Freetown. The ships were forced by circumstances to bring all those stranded at the two ports and desperate for a place of refuge. On arrival in Ghana the Ghanaians were despatched to their home towns and it was in an attempt to cater for the Liberians that led to the creation of the camp at Gomoa Buduburam about 20 km from Accra. The circumstances leading to some of the Liberians finding themselves in the camp is recounted by a group of them interviewed soon on arrival at the camp.

Most of them had left their homes in split seconds when they either saw people being executed around their houses or when bombs fell and destroyed part of their homes. Some had left because they had seen their neighbours being interrogated taken away and shot dead. In the circumstances

it was difficult to find food and so they decided to get away from it all, that is, from Monrovia. They started walking just walking, without anything except their clothes. As they got out of Monrovia, they joined others in flight towards their Sierra Leone border. They walked on the highway, days-on-end through various check points, where they were screened, and some taken away and shot. They crossed into Sierra Leone at the border town of Bo.

After crossing into Sierra Leone they cast their lot with the Ghanaians they had come along with because they had heard that a Ghanaian ship was in Freetown to take away the Ghanaians. On the Sierra Leone side of the border, officials from the Ghana High Commission in Freetown came along with a bus to pick the Ghanaians. They were compelled to introduce themselves as Ghanaians born in Liberia and were taken on board the bus together with the Ghanaians to Freetown, fed and taken to the airport. A Ghana air force plane brought them to Accra where they were screened. The Liberians among them were sent to form the nucleus of the Gomoa Buduburam camp. They numbered 150 at that time in August 1990.[19] The largest group of Liberians came with the Ghanaians evacuated from Monrovia and Freetown ports by the Ghanaian Vessel MV Tano River on September 2, 1990. By the end of September 1990 there were some 7,000 Liberian refugees at the camp with an estimated 2,000 settled on their own in Accra and elsewhere in the country.

The Dynamics of the Liberian Flight

The reasons and circumstances that influence the decision of a refugee to flee tend to be rather complex. A closer look was taken at the reasons given by those interviewed for their flight to Ghana from Liberia. When asked why they left Liberia respondents' gave various answers which are summarised in Tables 1 and 2.

Table 1

Reasons for Flight (Anticipatory

Reason	%
Fear of being killed	15.7
Fear of tribal war	68.6
Fear of hunger	13.7
Other	2.0
N =185	100.0

Table 2

Reasons for Flight (Actual)

Reasons	%
Persecution by government	7.8
Caught while on duty	5.9
Relatives and others killed	47.1
Starvation	19.6
Medical and other reasons	7.9
Other killings	9.9
Other	1.8
N = 185	100.0

From Table 1 we note that 15.7% of the respondents gave "fear of being killed" as one of the main reasons for their flight. Most of them i.e. 68.6% gave "fear of tribal war" as the main reason for their flight. While 13.7% mentioned hunger as the reason for their flight. This indicates that when the conflict started the factors most people feared most were "tribal war" and "being killed" which together constituted 84.3% of the anticipatory reasons for their flight. Compared to the actual reasons for the flight "starvation" was mentioned by 19.6% of the sample as the most important reason after those who fled due to their relatives and friends being killed. Actual persecution by government was mentioned by 7.8% of the sample as reasons for their flight. It is clear from these responses that the civil war unleashed as a result of the Taylor effort to overthrow Doe was the principal cause of the flight. The Charles Taylor forces over ran all the country except the capital Monrovia and the killings arising out of this generated the refugees. The war also disrupted agricultural production because farmers take to flight and leave their farms uncultivated. The attendant starvation also generated more refugees as both the farmers and the rest of the population moved to areas where they thought they could find food.

Table 3

Ethnic Composition

Ethnic Group	%
Bassa	7.8
Gbarndi	11.8
Americo-Liberian	21.6
Kru	8.1
Grebo	5.2
Mandingo	6.1
Loma	6.0
Kran	9.2
Gio	8.5
Mano	9.1
Other (non-Liberian)	6.6
N = 185	100.0

From table 2 we note that 7.8% of the sample gave persecution by government as the actual reason for their flight. We therefore examined the ethnic composition of the sample to see if any particular ethnic group bore the brunt of this persecution. From Table 3 the largest ethnic group was Americo-Liberians who formed 21.6% of the sample. This does not seem to be in accord with what we know of the ethnic background of the main combatants in the war. The ethnic backbone of the Doe regime were the Kran ethnic group who started the persecution of the Gigs and Manes who are

from Nimba County and form the backbone of Charles Taylors NPFL. One expected that a significant portion of the sample would be Krans and Gios and Manos. These three groups formed 9.2% (Kran) 8.5% (Gio) 9.1% (Mano) of the sample.

The reason for this rather low representation of the principal combatants in the sample seem to lie in the sensitive nature of the information. Respondents were not prepared to reveal their ethnic background and particularly to indicate they were from any of the three major ethnic groups. We have reason to believe that those from these ethnic groups gave other ethnic backgrounds for the simple reason that they wanted to hide their identity. This is more so given the fact that the camp management as a policy did not want the camp segregated along ethnic lines particularly into Charles Taylor and Doe camps.

Conclusions

The conclusions we draw from an examination of the reasons given for the flight to Ghana of the three broad categories of refugees is that they were due mainly to push factors. For those from Liberia it was for political and personal safety considerations. At the heart of the Liberian refugee flows is the civil war and it has pushed the people to seek refuge in Ghana. Compared to the Southern African refugees apartheid in South Africa and apartheid and colonialism in Namibia constituted factors

that pushed people in these countries to seek refuge in Ghana. Some of the South African refugees had been involved in the protest staged against apartheid education in the Soweto uprising of 1976. The persecution following that forced them to go into exile. The rest of the South African and Namibian refugees were forced into exile as a result of the liberation struggle that their organisations were waging in those countries. The flight from the Sahel was the result of both push and pull forces. The push forces were the drought and famine resulting from a degraded environment. This forced the nomads of the Sahel to seek refuge in Ghana. Some of these refugees from the Sahel had chosen to come to Ghana because the country attracted them as a place they could engage in trade and make the hajj. The pull factor was however not as strong as the push factor. It was when the drought and famine took its toll on their survival that they started looking for countries they could go to and Ghana appealed to them.

When refugees take to flight they face all manner of problems and a better understanding of the refugees' plight is provided by an examination of those problems. In the next chapter we would look further at flight dynamics by examining the obstacles faced by the Liberian refugees given the acute manner in which their flight took place.

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CHAPTER FOUR

THE FLIGHT AND OBSTACLES TO FLIGHT

In the previous chapter we have looked at the background to and the factors that have made refugees to move into Ghana from Southern Africa, the Sahel Zone of West Africa and Liberia. This chapter focuses on the flight from Liberia and it aims at taking a closer look at the process of the flight from Liberia to Ghana. The aim is to isolate the variables which in addition to the political struggle for the state, have influenced the refugee's decision to flee. We will also look at some of the obstacles encountered during flight and arrival in Ghana.

In the previous chapter we identified the main causes of the flight from Southern Africa as political-specifically Apartheid and colonialism; for the flight from the Sahel Zone we identified the cause of flight as environmental degradation due to development policy and for Liberia the cause is political, i.e. the civil war. These factors are seen to be detrimental to the security of the individual or group. It is however a fact that political and religious persecution, war and the denial of basic rights do not always result in refugee outflows. And even when social conflicts and political and religious oppression do generate refugees, not everyone chooses to leave. This raises the question as to why some people flee while others who are in

similar situations choose to stay put? Are there (1) other factors beside the threat to physical security which determine the movement of refugees? Some researchers have suggested psychological, social structural and cultural factors as the major factors accounting for the differences in response to threatening situations. We examine the Liberian refugees in Ghana in this frame work.

The Decision to Flee

The decision making process, the time taken and the factors taken into account vary between voluntary migration and refugee movements. Voluntary migrants make the decision to move after a long period of consideration and consultation, and after the advantages of migration have been objectively assessed. The assessment is based on information about the country of immigration. But when a decision is made to flee, these assessment, are often absent. Voluntary migrants are generally perceived to adapt successfully their previously learned skills and even innovate to improve their status and well-being in their new location. In contrast refugees are considered to be unique because of the circumstances under which they flee that require them to leave nearly everything behind and result in almost complete disorientation. Kunz[1] has argued that the absence of positive motivation to settle elsewhere and the

reluctance to uproot is the main characteristic of the refugee decision making process. Kunz argues therefore that

> "an inner self propelling force ... is singularly absent from the movement of refugees. Their progress more often than not resembles the movement of the billiard ball: devoid of inner direction, their path is governed by the kinetic factors of inertia, friction and vectors of outside forces applied to them"[2]

Hansen[3] has taken issue with Kunz's characterization of refugee movement as kinetic. He argues that such an interpretation tends to deny the importance of decision-making on the part of those who flee and instead suggests blind flight. He argues:

> "I believe on the contrary, that both refugees and regular migrants, make their moves because of decisions that compare alternatives even though the refugee is originally opposed to moving and is repelled or pushed by the negative or threatening changes in his or her place of origin rather than attracted by the inherent positive aspects of the destination.[4]

A look at responses from our interview suggest that most of the Liberians who came to Ghana through the evacuation of Ghanaians from Monrovia port, did not have the chance to assess the cost of flight or to choose their destination with deliberation. As we have discussed earlier most of them simply took to the highway towards the Sierra Leone border while others took refuge in Monrovia port with the Ghanaians. These were therefore carried in to exile in an acute refugee situation. Their movement fits Kunz's description as of the billiard ball: devoid of inner direction, their path governed by kinetic factors.

Table 4. 1

Distribution of Respondents by Information before Flight

Information	%
Had information before flight	13.7
Had no information	86.3
Total N = 185	100.0

Table 4. 2

Distribution of Respondents by Flight Plan

Flight Plan	%
Planned Flight	8.2
Spontaneous Flight	91.8
Total N = 185	100.0

People can only plan and compare alternatives if information about their destination is available to them. Table 1 indicates that the vast majority of those in the camp 86% did not have any information about where their flight would lead them. Only about 14% had information about the country they fled. This lack of knowledge about conditions in Ghana prior to the flight further indicates the lack of "pull" factors that has influenced their decision to flee. If some Liberian refugees had prior information about Ghana, then it is those who came to Accra in early May 1990 with their families. Theirs was anticipatory flight, and they are self settled and also staying with compatriots. Their numbers are estimated to be about two thousand[5] There are

also a small number of refugees at the camp who have relocated from Cote d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone with the reason that they heard that conditions in the camp in Ghana was better. For those who came earlier and those who had from Cote d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone, we could say they were attracted to Ghana i.e. by "pull" factors.

Looking at the respondents who had planned their flight only 8% had planned their flight (Table 2) compared to 92% who had left spontaneously. The usual pattern in most refugee movement is characterised by movements of people in acute danger and have made their flight in an unplanned manner. The majority of the respondents in the camp had left Liberia in a panicky fashion due to acute danger to themselves and their families. Most of them left with only the clothes they were wearing. The danger of the war and that of being picked up interrogated and shot constituted the major push factor behind the flight from Liberia.

Personality and Flight

The decision to leave ones country has been linked to individual personality traits. In every community people differ in their sense of identification with their surroundings. Therefore in any refugee wave, the individuals who constitute it are not equal in their social relationships, some feel more marginal than others towards the society they leave behind; Kunz[6] argues that regardless

of whether a refugee chooses to leave the country of birth by anticipatory flight, or is carried into exile in an acute refugee situation, refugees in their social relationship to the population of the home country which they leave behind appear to fall into three categories.

The first category is made up of those refugees who are firm in their conviction that their opposition to the events leading to their flight is shared by the majority of their compatriots. These refugees identify enthusiastically with the nation though not with the government. The Second Category comprise those who are ambivalent or embittered in their attitude toward their former compatriots. The ambivalence stems from their original desire to be identified with the nation and their subsequent realisation of their rejection by the nation as a whole or by a section of its citizens. The best known examples of such refugees in modern times were the German Jews, the Hindu and Moslems made homeless by the partition of India and Pakistan and the Asians in Uganda under Idi Amin. The Third Category of refugees are those who for varied individual reasons or philosophies, have no wish to identify themselves with the nation. These are self-alienated persons who might retain some attachments to the panoramic aspects of their homelands, but their attitudes overwhelmingly shaped by ideological result of their alienation.

Evidence from our study suggests that most of the
Liberian refugees fall into the first category, that is,
they are firm in their conviction that their opposition to
the events leading to their flight is shared by the majority
of their compatriots. When asked what would be a permanent
solution to the refugee problem (Table 4.3), most of them
indicated voluntary repatriation (62.7%). Only 6% of them
wished to settle in Ghana. This is an indication that most
of the Liberian refugees left their country reluctantly and
are anxious to get back if the factor that made them to
leave are resolved.

Table 4.3

What would be a Permanent solution to the refugee problem

Solution	%
Settlement in Ghana	5.9
Voluntary Repatriation	62.7
Resettlement in 3rd country	21.6
No Answer	9.8
Total N = 185	100.0

We can say that most of the Liberians do identify with
their country and are opposed to the forces that have
caused their flight. These forces are the killings, and the
war that have accompanied the struggle between the
government and the rebels.

Bulcha[7] places more emphasis on personality as a key element of migratory behavior. He points out that migrants and non-migrants (refugees) differ not only in their perceptions of adverse conditions, but also in their reaction to them. Migrants are known to have quicker reactions and have qualities which differentiates them from non-migrants (refugees). These qualities are the "sense of dislocation", as compared to non-migrant's (refugee's) "sense of belonging" and "aspiration" compared to non-migrant's (refugee's) "satisfaction" with their conditions. The personality approach according to Bulcha[8] assumes that the individual is the decision-making unit. However, in most flight situations particularly in rural Africa the decision to move is made by the group when faced with an outer threat. The collective responsibility minimizes the role of individuals in the decision making process. For example, in the case of the Sahel refugees in Ghana, respondents indicated that the decision to move was made at the group level within a village. For that reason they stuck together and always allowed one of them to speak on their behalf.

The decision to flee is however more individualized with urban refugees. This is the finding from our respondents from Liberia most of whom had come from the capital Monrovia. This is borne out by the fact that the decision to flee was taken on the spur of the moment and

most families have been separated. Nearly all the respondents from Liberia indicated they had left family members behind or that other family members might have left for another country or that they do not know what has happened to other family members. The manner in which the fight from Liberia occurred was acute in the sense that people had to make a move to avoid the killings which were occurring all around them especially during the unsuccessful flight to overrun Monrovia by the Charles Taylor NPFL. Most respondents argue that they had not anticipated that there would a fight for Monrovia which would force them to flee. They had thought that at worst the Charles Taylor NPFL would easily overrun Monrovia and establish a new administration. Therefore when it turned out to be a three cornered fight between the Charles Taylor forces, the breakaway forces of Prince Johnson and what was left of the Samuel Doe national army, the people of Monrovia were caught in an acute situation and their lives were in danger, therefore the decision to flee was personalised and it led to a good deal of family separations. Most of our respondents do not know where other members of their families are.

Reaching International Borders

One other factor that influences the rate of refugee flows from a given area is the distance from the border areas. One proposal[9] is that the volume of migration is

inversely proportional to the distance between the points of origin and destination. Lee[10] has added the concept of "intervening obstacles" which includes distance, costs of migration, institutional hindrances etc. With refugee movements such intervening obstacles in the form of hardships, illness and the danger of being detected by security forces increases with geographical distance. This relationship between distance and volume of migration is very much the case in most refugee movements in Africa. Various research reports[11] indicate that most African refugees flee only short distances as they both originate from and settle in, border areas. In the particular case of the Liberian refugees Ghana is not a neighbouring country and getting to Ghana was a function of getting into Monrovia port which was the shortest distance any of them walked. It was the journey to Accra that took time. Most

Table 4.4

Duration of flight

No of Days	%
Less than 3 days	90.2
4 - 7 days	7.8
More than 7 days	2.0
N - 185	100.00

(92.2%) of those in the camp (from Table 4.1) came on a ship from Monrovia and it took the ship less than three days to make the journey. The 7.8% who took between 4 and 7 days to reach Accra had come through Cote d'Ivoire. This small group had come by their own car. Only one respondent indicated he came on foot which is very much doubted.

Table 4.5

Means of transport to Ghana

Means of transport	%
On foot	2.0
By car	9.8
By ship	86.3
Other	2.0
Total N = 185	100.00

The discussion on accessibility to international borders indicates that the decision of the Ghana government to send a ship to pick up Ghanaians made it easy for most Liberians to flee to Ghana. This is not the usual pattern of flight that African refugees follow and in fact it is rare for a host country to provide refugees with a means of transport. This, as will be discussed later, has had its own implications for government policy towards the Liberian refugees.

Intervening Obstacles

Most refugees leave their countries without a passport. They leave in acute situations and their journey is full of acute problems. Refugees are therefore ignorant of what lies ahead and makes flight for many a group for safety in darkness. One respondent recounted their experience:

> "We started walking just walking, without anything except our clothes. As we got out of Monrovia, we joined others in flight towards the Sierra Leone border. We walked days on end on the highway through various check points, where we were screened and some were taken away and shot."

The statement gives an indication of the physical and psychological stress that some refugees have to go through during their flight.

Table 4.6

Major Problems Encountered in Flight

Type of Problem	%
Armed attack	29.6
No food	9.8
Sea Sickness	3.9
No problems	49.0
Other	7.7
Total N = 185	100.00

Table 4.3 shows that armed attack was a major threat for the Liberian refugees. About 30% of the respondents were

victims of armed attack from government forces and rebels both in Monrovia and at check points on the highway. The check points were mounted by both government forces i.e. President Doe's who were hunting for Gios and Manes who were the principal ethnic supporters of rebel Charles Taylor. On the other hand the rebel Charles Taylor forces were looking for Krans who were the backbone of the Doe forces

Arrival in host Country

One problem that refugees solve by their arrival in the host country is their safety from attack in the country of origin. But a whole lot of other problems exist for them. Their arrival in the host country did not necessarily guarantee them a haven of safety. One very common experience of refugees the world over is detention and expulsion. In some countries especially in Europe and America asylum seekers are detained and subjected to a long period of confinement.[12] In many cases detention is an expression of the refusal to grant asylum and is often followed by expulsion. Even though Melander[13] indicates that expulsions are on the increase, this is not the case in most of Africa.[14] Ghana has not expelled any known refugee. The problems that the Liberian refugees have faced since arriving in Ghana are not related to detentions and expulsions. Rather they are the problems of the new

environment.   The   problems   are   socio-cultural   and

psychological which most people face in a new environment.

<u>Table 4.7</u>

Problems faced by refugees on arrival in Ghana

Type of Problems	% Facing Problem
No means of Subsistence	17.7
Shelter	40.3
Language	10.8
Cultural	6.9
No problem	6.7
Other	6.7
Total N = 185	100.0

Table 4.4 indicates that the problems encountered by most of

the refugees interviewed were lack of shelter   (40.3%) and

lack of means of subsistence (17.7%).   The   problem of

shelter was rather acute at the camp because it took some

time for relief agencies to provide the refugees with enough

tents.   For that reason most of them had to live in make-

shift tents made of cardboard.   The problem of subsistence

is a more enduring one.   This is a problem that all refugees

face the world over but especially so in Africa at a time of

IMF led Structural Adjustment Programmes.   This has meant

that the host country already has an unemployment problem on

its hands due to retrenchment arising out of the structural

adjustment programme. Ghana has earned praise from the IMF/World Bank for her courage in going the full hog of implementing the IMF reforms and unemployment is a big problem. Therefore the Liberian refugees could not expect any means of subsistence from the formal sector. What was open to them was means of subsistence in the informal sector particularly agriculture. A few of them have taken to farming in and around the camp. But the majority of them have not and idle about in the camp. One reason for this is that most of the refugees at the camp are urban refugees as they came mostly from Monrovia. For this reason most of them are not used to farming.

The cultural problem that most of the refugees indicated were the Ghanaian practices of urinating in public and eating in leaves. Most of them could not believe that Ghanaians could do such things and they felt very uncomfortable when they encounter such acts. On food, most of our respondents said they did not receive adequate food. When asked whether the food given was adequate 39.2% said yes 51% said no and 9.8% had no answers. When asked the reasons for their answer most of them (39.2%) said the quantity was small. They were fed communally with food cooked at first by women volunteers from the Christian Council of Ghana and later by refugee women. The problem of assistance to the refugees would be discussed in the next chapter; but the point being made here is that adequate food

is one of the serious problems that African refugees face in the peculiar circumstances of the host country.

Among the problems indicated in the "other" category was the problem of education. The parents were very worried about the education of the children they came along with while a sizeable number of the youth were worried about their education at the second cycle and University level.

Solving the Problems

In the light of these problems faced by the refugees, the respondents were asked how and the extent they have solved these problems.

Table 4.8

Solution of Problems Encountered

Problem Solved	%
Yes Totally	9.8
Yes Partially	37.3
No	21.6
Don't know	10.8
No Answer	20.5
Total N = 185	100.0

From their answers in Table 4.8 only 9.8% of the respondents indicated that they have solved their problems totally, while 37.3% have solved their problems partially. Of the rest, 21.6% said they have found no solution to the problems

they have encountered, while 10.8% were not sure whether they have found any solution to their problems. These answers are an indication to the fact that the refugees are still grappling with the problems they encountered on their arrival. Most of those who have found solutions have found only partial solutions. For example a school has been set up at the camp for the primary children and a J.S.S. has been started but having a senior secondary school is posing its own problems due to lack of graduate teachers. This has been compounded by a Ministry of Education directive that the school at the camp must teach the Liberian syllabus. There was an attempt to have some Ghanaian graduate teachers to help but the directive raises issues about the suitability of Ghanaian teachers teaching the Liberian syllabus adequately.

The partial solution adopted by most Liberian parents is to send their children to Ghanaian schools — some even to private schools. The problem of fees is posing lots of problems to parents who have no means of subsistence and most are turning to individual Ghanaians[15], churches, the UNHCR, and the Christian Council of Ghana for assistance. For those looking for admission to the Universities only a limited number (about 15 a year) yet admitted. This compares with about one hundred and fifty refugee students who apply for admission into the Universities over the past two years.

Conclusion

Most refugee movements are sparked off by political problems of one sort or the other and the intensity often makes the flight from the area of conflict both haphazard and unplanned. What we have noted from our interviews of the Liberian refugees confirms the pattern of other movements in similar circumstances. The movement was panicky and acute rather than a calculated plan to flee to Ghana. It was also evident from the responses that no planning occurred at the family level and so some refugees do not know where other relatives have fled to. The study could not establish the extent to which personality was a contributory factor to the flight to Ghana of refugees from Liberia. Even though it could be a factor in the decision to flee in other refugee situations it did not stand out as a factor in the flight to Ghana. Simply put all those who were able to get into Monrovia port or managed to cross the Sierra Leone border to Freetown port benefited from the evacuation of Ghanaians stranded at these ports. For this reason, distance did not become a factor in the flight to Ghana. Not so many of the refugees walked all the way to Ghana. A few managed to drive through Cote d'Ivoire to Ghana.

On arrival most of the Liberian refugees faced the problem of food shelter and subsistence. The more enduring problem was the lack of a means of subsistence and this has

compounded their efforts at educating their children in Ghanaian schools. The problems encountered by the refugees during their flight and arrival are still there and they are only managing to eke out a living based on the assistance they have received from Ghanaians and the donor community. There is therefore the need to examine how assistance is provided for refugees in Ghana. The next chapter now looks at the provision of assistance to refugees in Ghana and government policy towards them.

Notes

1. Kunz Egon F.(1973) " The Refugee in Flight: Kinetic Models and Forms of Displacement" International Migration Review 7 (2) pp.130.

2. Ibid., p.131.

3. Hansen, Art & Oliver-Smith Anthony (ed) (1982) Involuntary Migration and Resettlement: The problems and Responses of Dislocated People. Boulder, Colorado Westview Press p.32.

4. Ibid.

5. Estimates from the Immigration Department.

6. Kunz, Egon F. "Exile and Resettlement: Refugee Theory" in International Migration Review Vol 15 No. 1.

7. Bulcha M.(1988) Flight and Integration Scandinavian Institute of African Affairs. Uppsala, p.132.

8. Ibid.

9. Revinstien cited in Lee, E. (1969) "A theory of Migration" in Jackson J.A. (ed) Migration Cambridge University Press.

10. Lee, E. (1969) Ibid. p.290.

11. Gould, W.T.S.(1974) " Refugees in Tropical Africa" International Migration Review Vol.13 No.3 p. 422. Rogge J.(1981) "African Resettlement Strategies " International Migration Review Vol.15 Nos 1-2 No.3 p.196.

12. Melander, Goran "Refugees in Orbit" in Melander Goran & Nobel Peter (ed) (1978). <u>African Refugees and the law</u> The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies. Uppsala.

13. Ibid.

14. The exception may be the expulsion of aliens from Nigeria, Ghana, Liberia at one point in time but aliens are viewed differently from refugees and no refugees have been so expelled.

15. One presidential candidate of the NIP (National Independence Party) Kwabena Darko, is using the fact of a number of Liberian refugees depending on his charity in his advertizing campaign to win the NIP nomination as the presidential candidate. <u>The Ghanaian Chronicle</u> September 7th - 13th 1992 p.9.

CHAPTER FIVE

ASSISTANCE TO THE REFUGEES IN GHANA

African Refugees have fled into some of the poorest countries on the continent and this puts a lot of pressure on the bureaucracy of the countries concerned. Where the refugee population is large it puts a strain on the local political and administrative structures. The host country's national and regional authorities have to divert resources from the pressing demands of their own development to the urgent task of keeping the refugees alive and alleviating their suffering. Responding to the needs of refugees poses problems to the bureaucracy because they are often not ready for such emergencies. Harrell-Bond[1] points out that

> "Normally no government bureaucracies, even in the industrialised countries, are organised to cope with such contingencies as an influx of refugees, any more than they are ready to respond to the aftermath of a flood, famine or an earthquake."

Under these circumstances, governments rely on ad-hoc arrangements. In some cases the responsibility for refugees is simply assigned to one Ministry or the other. For example refugees in Hong Kong are administered by the prisons department. In Ethiopia the government has established the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) to be in charge of all relief programmes, and all international relief agencies in the country have to work

within the RRC's guidelines. But as Harrell-Bond points[2] out most African governments have adopted a laissez faire approach, handing over responsibility for policy and implementation to the UNHCR, and/or to an International Voluntary agency.

The UNHCR and Assistance to Refugees

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was established primarily to protect the human rights of refugees and to serve as the channel for multilateral donations. Its funds come from governments, foundations or individuals. The growing crisis of mass movement of refugees in Africa, and elsewhere, has prompted the development of an ever increasing number of international humanitarian organisations which also get involved in refugee assistance. By its policy UNHCR does not itself implement assistance programmes; this is done by its partner non-governmental organisations (NGOS). Many NGOs rely heavily on funds from UNHCR for their overseas operations.

The UNHCR assists refugees under the terms of the mandate guiding its activities. The mandate describes those who are "refugees". According to the statute of the UNHCR a refugee is a person either already recognized as a refugee by earlier international agreements or

> "Any person owing to well founded fear of being
> persecuted for reasons of race, religion
> nationality or political opinion, is outside the
> country of his nationality and is unable, or,
> owing to such fear or for reasons other than
> personal convenience, is unwilling to avail
> himself of the protection of that country of his
> former habitual residence, is unable or owing to
> such fear or for reasons other than personal
> convenience, is unwilling to return to it."[3]

This definition of a refugee as provided under the 1951 convention did not make it easy for the High Commissioner to provide assistance to all refugees because of the clause "As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951" which made it difficult to provide assistance to refugees arising out of events after 1 January 1951. This was rectified in the "Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967) which removed the 1 January clause. But yet still the UN definition did not allow the High Commissioner to assist refugees arising out of the peculiar circumstances of the struggles for independence in Africa. To deal with the problem of providing assistance to refugees not falling wholly within the mandate of the 1951 Convention, the UN General Assembly adopted an easier way for the UNHCR to assist an ever increasing circle of people. A procedure known as "Good offices"[4] which allows the UNHCR to assist people who are considered not to be within the competence of the United Nations. In 1957 this "Good offices" resolution allowed the transfer of funds donated by Governments to Chinese refugees in Hong Kong who were considered not to be

of concern to the U.N. A further Resolution[5] extended the
use of good offices to all groups of refugees "who do not
come within the competence of the United Nations". When
refugees from Angola flooded into Zaire the General Assembly
requested the High Commissioner "to lend his good offices,
in seeking appropriate solutions" for these refugees who did
not fall within the competence of the UN, but for whom,
individual determination of refugee status could not be made
because of their vast number and the absence of the
necessary infrastructure.[6]

Even though the refugee problem is essentially a
humanitarian one there are a lot of legal considerations
when dealing with the issue of who is a refugee for the
purpose of providing assistance. A person has to meet
certain legal criteria before he/she could qualify to be
called a refugee. In the determination of refugee status,
there are quite often contradictory interpretations, both
restrictive and liberal, of the convention and international
instruments on the subject.[7]

In an effort to find a pragmatic response to the
realities of social, political and economic turmoil that
have pervaded the African continent since the 1950s and
early 1960s the OAU in 1969 adopted a convention which made
a realistic extension of the definition of "refugees" beyond
that of the 1951 UN Convention and the 1967 Protocol to
include

> "Every person who owing to external aggression occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality.[8]

This provision recognized that within the African context, it was not only the individual's ... "well-founded fear of persecution" which created refugees, but that the exodus could be the result of factors of a more general nature, intrinsic to circumstances in the country in question. More importantly it recognized persons seeking refuge from the wider ramifications of coups d'etat, civil strife and political unrest.

Due to this extension of the definition, persons who in Europe would be considered as merely _de facto_ refugees and thus outside the mandate of the UN Convention of 1951 and thus of the protection of the UNHCR, were recognized as refugees for the purpose of Article I. Furthermore, the Convention made no distinction between persons fleeing from independent African states and those coming from colonial dominions or those still under white minority rule as the case was with Rhodesia, the Portuguese Colonies and South Africa. Significantly, freedom fighters therefore fell within the ambit of the OAU Convention on refugees. The Convention stresses that granting asylum "shall not be regarded as an unfriendly act".[9] There are detailed provisions on asylum[10] and voluntary repatriation of

refugees.[11] It also has provisions on <u>non-refoulement</u>[12] one of the cardinal principles of international refugee protection. It is against this background of the definition of a refugee that we discuss the provision of assistance to the three broad categories of refugees in Ghana.

Assistance to Refugees in Ghana

Assistance to refugees in Ghana, has differed depending on the way their status has been perceived by both the UNHCR local office and the Government. This is in relation to the three groups of refugees in this country namely (a) Refugees from Southern Africa (b) Refugees from the Sahel and (c) Refugees from Liberia.

Refugees from Southern Africa

Assistance to refugees from Southern Africa goes back to the pan African policies of the Nkrumah government. Initially the problem of their status was taken care of by the decision of the Nkrumah government to issue refugees from Southern Africa with a "Commonwealth passport" which was another form of a Ghanaian passport. A bureau of African Affairs was set up in the office of the president which had special responsibility for these refugees from Southern Africa. The bureau arranged accommodation, education and employment for them. After the overthrow of the Nkrumah government successive governments have not been

as active supporters of political refugees from other
African countries as the Nkrumah government, but they have
generally been supportive of asylum seekers from Southern
Africa. Refugees from South Africa and Namibia have been
well taken care of. They are recognized as refugees under
the OAU Convention and assistance to them has been rather
generous. Most of them are students and are assisted by the
Ghana Government and various sponsoring agencies which
include the UNHCR who cater for Namibian refugees, the
African American Institute (AAI) which caters for South
African students, the Commonwealth Secretariat which also
caters for South African refugees. Other sponsors include
the United Nations Education Programme for training of South
Africans (UNEPSA), the World Council of Churches (WCC) the
United Nations Commission for Namibia (UNCN) and Otto
Benecke of West Germany. These sponsors pay the school fees
and provide a stipend for the upkeep of the students. The
Ghana Government has an office in the Ministry of Education
that takes care of the placement of these Southern African
refugees in educational institutions before the sponsors
take up their fees and upkeep. This explains the assertion
that the Southern African refugees are taken care of better
than other refugees. This compares with a small group of
former student leaders from the West African sub-region who
have sought asylum in Ghana. They have not been granted
refugee status and therefore they face considerable

difficulties in obtaining any form of assistance. In most cases they receive some assistance from the Christian refugee groups like the Christian Council of Ghana, and the National Catholic Secretariat. In comparative terms these student refugees from West Africa are worse off from the Southern African student refugees due to the differences in assistance that the two groups receive.

Refugees from the Sahel

Assistance to the refugees from the Sahel has been a function of their status. The Southern African students have received assistance from the UNHCR and other foreign sponsors because it has been easy under the terms of the UN and OAU Conventions to grant them refugee status. The reason is that the cause of their flight have been largely political and in some cases ethnic.[13] The framework of laws and organisations that provide protection and assistance to refugees is facing a lot of difficulties in keeping with other developments around the world which are forcing people to leave their home lands. One report [14] points out that

> "a growing proportion of the people who leave their own country cannot in legal terms, be recognized as refugees. They are not victims of persecution, as International legislation requires, but of drought, famine environmental disaster and socio economic decline."

The refugees from the Sahel are not victims of a "well founded fear of persecution" but are victims of drought, famine and environmental disaster. Due to the cause of their flight they have not been recognized as refugees by both the Ghana Government and the UNHCR and this has affected assistance to them.

Writing on rural refugees in Africa, Betts[15] points out that over the past two decades the UNHCR has tried to develop, in collaboration with the governments of countries of asylum, an increasingly efficient system of organised settlements. The aim has been to provide assistance, security, and a standard of living at least comparable to that of the local indigenous population until the refugees would be able to decide whether they wished to return to their country of origin or become permanent members of their host country. The majority of African rural refugees, according to Betts, have never come within the orbit of the system and many have deliberately evaded attempts at their inclusion. He points out however that there is a growing body of opinion that this form of "spontaneous" settlement which requires only a properly organised enhancement of local services, particularly in health and education, should be far less costly than the organised settlement system. He cited the 1979 Arusha Conference on Refugees to buttress the point. The Conference Report noted

"However, complications arise in such situations
(spontaneous settlement) since it is estimated
that well over 60% of rural refugees are in this
category and that the assistance provided for them
is nil or negligible. Spontaneous settlement is
often interpreted as spontaneous integration and
thus all is assumed to be well. Traditional
hospitality especially between next of kin, solves
the problem. This belief is convenient. It
absolves government and aid agencies from doing
something about this. If they are not causing any
political problems, the temptation is to leave
them alone. Spontaneous integration may mean
extreme poverty and insecurity, eking out
precarious and marginal existence through casual
labour and migration. Their deprivation may go
unnoticed. They are disorganised. They may not
present themselves to officials or visiting
missions. They may indeed constitute a rural
subploritariat, powerless, inarticulate and
unseen."[16]

Evidence from the survey of the refugees from the Sahel

seem to fit very well the situation that Betts describes and

the concerns of the Pan-African conference on the situation

of refugees in Africa. When the refugees were asked what

problems they had, they indicated food and clothing as the

main ones. For the refugees who were herders in the bush

their main problem was health care for themselves and their

animals. One group said that in Burkina, the government

checked water holes for contamination and wondered if Ghana

would do the same for them. Many complained about water.

They said their water was contaminated or that they had to

walk long distances for water in the dry season. One group

said that the nearest river for the cattle in the dry season

was fourteen miles away and they walked there and back each

day with their herd. This situation is the result of the

neglect that this group from the Sahel has suffered because they are not recognised as refugees.

Official Attitude and Assistance

When the refugees from the Sahel started arriving in the country, the government took a rather lukewarm attitude towards them. Prior to their arrival, the government had mounted a national programme in 1985 to deal with the arrival of a large number of Ghanaians who had been expelled from Nigeria. For that programme, the government asked the National Mobilisation Programme (NMP) to receive, screen and see to the transportation of the Ghanaian returnees back to their towns and villages. The NMP set up reception centers at Aflao and at the Trade Fair Center in Accra. The returnees were screened their luggage checked by customs officials and those who were sick given medical attention. It was after this screening that they were put aboard buses to be taken to their towns and villages without change. But no similar arrangements were made for the refugees from the Sahel. Their arrival seem to have caught the government and its agencies unawares and nobody seemed to know what to do.

Government action, when it did come, achieved next to nothing. A registration exercise was began by the Department of Social Welfare. This was at the instance of the National Consultative Committee on Disaster Relief, which was itself formed at the request of the PNDC Chairman

to rehabilitate these refugees from the Sahel. It was estimated to cost C108 million and it was to be co-financed

Flt. Lt. J.J. Rawlings in December 1984.[17] This effort however did not go beyond the registration stage. Officials claim that there was not much co-operation from the refugees.[18] The government also gave the NMP the responsibility of establishing relief camps. These were to be cited at Sege in the Greater Accra Region which has an on going pilot agricultural programme and Hiawa in the Western Region. But due to logistic problems, the camps were never set up. The main reason given by government officials was the lack of funds and co-operation from the refugees.[19] The Governmnent, in any case, does not regard these refugees from the Sahel as refugees. They are, rather, considered as indigent aliens and informal migrants worthy of the attention of the Department of Social Welfare. The official attitude seem to suggest that as long as they are not causing any political problems, they are to be left alone to fend for themselves. The government felt that charitable organisations and individuals should be able to help such refugees out of their needs rather than ask for international assistance for them.

Non Official Assistance

Due to this official neglect, assistance to these victims of the Sahel environment, has fallen on the shoulders of voluntary organisations and church groups. One group of the refugees who used to live at Nkrumah Circle had

assistance from the city council employee in charge of the area. He had tents set up for them and provided them with food, water, and a fairly good toilet facility. The Catholic Secretariat had tried to set up tents in an Accra suburb (Nima) but the camp was stopped in early 1985. World Vision International had also made visits to those who settled at Accra New Town to attend to their medical needs, but they also stopped after the initial emergency period was over. They did not want to be saddled with a permanent assistance programme to these Sahel refugees.

The main organisation which is providing assistance to these refugees is the Christian Council of Ghana, The Council's refugee committee, after observing the poor living conditions of the refugees, decided to provide them with a means to raise their standard of living and to arrest the possible outbreak of diseases which could easily be passed on to the Ghanaian community in which they live.[20] The Christian Council provides them with food items like millet, cassava, beans, maize, rice and sugar. These are provided twice a week. Nursing mothers are given food items thrice a week. The refugee committee has a medical team with a medical officer that goes to se to the medical needs of the refugees every week.

In 1988, the Christian Council proposed a pilot scheme to rehabilitate these refugees from the Sahel. It was estimated to cost C108 million and it was to be co-financed

by the All African Council of Churches (AACC). The problem that has stalled the project concerned the acquisition of a 40 acre land at Gbawe, off the Accra-Winneba road. The project was aimed at providing 100 housing units, schools, clinics and cottage industries for the Sahel refugees. The aim was to motivate the refugees to establish economic ventures and make them self-sufficient. The Christian Council is still working to find land for the project to take off. Apart from the provision of food items and medical care, the Christian Council has been encouraging the refugees to take to small scale ventures like leather work by providing them with the raw materials. The Council has generally encouraged them to use their skills to help them survive rather than to go on begging. The general impact of these efforts of the Christian Council has been a gradual reduction in the number of these refugees who are begging. Some of them now have more meaningful means of sustenance. The refugees are now far less conspicuous at street corners in Accra begging than they used to be. The majority of them have now taken to leather works, hairplaiting and looking after the cattle of Ghanaian cattle owners. Some of them have gone back to their countries of origin while others have found their way to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

Liberian Refugees

Assistance to the Liberian refugees has gone through a good deal of politicking. The politics stem from the novel nature of the problem. Before the Liberian Crisis, Ghana had had no experience with hosting refugees in a camp. The country had not hosted a large number of refugees before and refugee numbers in the country had not previously warranted a camp being set up. Hence there was no government agency with the expertise to handle such a situation. It was also not clear to various NGOs whether the Liberians could in fact be called refugees. This was due to the manner by which they arrived in Ghana. These problems notwithstanding, the response to the arrival of the Liberians was very positive.

When the first batch of Liberians arrived on their own in Ghana in May 1990 they settled on their own among Ghanaians friends and compatriots. They were assisted by the UNHCR which got the Adventist Development and Rehabilitation Agency (ADRA) to assist them with food parcels. At that time the UNHCR local office was due to be closed down in December 1990 and it was therefore not sure of its continued operation.

The government, however, set up an ad hoc Committee on Returnees/Refugees from Liberia. The Committee established a task force to set up a reception camp at the Afienya training school. The committee was made up of the National

Disaster Relief Committee (NADIREC) National Mobilisation
Programme (NMP), National Catholic Secretariat, UNHCR,
Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Ghana Civil Aviation
Authority, Ghana Red Cross, National Youth Organising
Committee (NYOC) Christian Council of Ghana, the Civil
Defence Organisation (CDO) Department of Social Welfare,
Ghana Ports and Harbours Authority, Immigration Service,
Ministry of Transport and Communications and the Ministry of
Interior. Problems of infrastructure at the Afienya Camp,
prompted a decision to use the abandoned church premises at
Gomoa Buduburam. The first batch of Liberian refugees to be
sent to the camp was 29 in August 1990. By December, 1990,
records at the office of the NMP at the camp put the refugee
population at 6,748. The breakdown was as follows:

Males	1,683
Females	2,034
Children	3,031
Total	6,748

However the population of the camp keep fluctuating. Some
of them have since 1991 voluntarily repatriated but more
refugees move into the camp from Accra and other West
African countries. The peculiar problem with the voluntary
repatriation of the Liberians at the camp is that since
January 1991 a group of Liberians refugees would join any

ship they hear is bound for Monrovia from Tema Port. These are usually supply vessels for the Ghanaian contingent in ECOMOG. About 234 refugees who left Ghana for Liberia on these ships have returned due to unbearable conditions at home.

The Camp Structure

The camp is run by a number of bodies with specified functions. The overall administration of the camp is under the NMP which provides the camp commandant with two assistants. They represent the Ghana government. There is a Camp Management Committee (CMC) which sees to the day to day running of the camp. The committee is made up of the camp commandant, the representative of the police, Ghana Red Cross, National Catholic Secretariat, the Christian Council of Ghana, World Vision International, the World Food Programme (WFP) the UNHCR and the Liberia Welfare Council (LWC). The LWC is the link between the CMC and the Liberian Refugee Community in the camp.

On 1st December, 1990 the UNHCR assumed full responsibility for the refugees at the camp. The UNHCR has signed agreements with four implementing partners, namely Ghana Red Cross, National Catholic Secretariat, Christian Council of Ghana and the Liberia Refugee Assistance Programme. Under the agreements the following tasks and responsibilities have been assigned.

1.   Ghana Red Cross Society

Refugee   shelter; the   construction   and maintenance   of more   permanent   refugee   shelter.   Sanitation;   the construction and   maintenance   of toilets and cleanliness of the camp. The   construction and   running of a   clinic, supply of drugs and   running of supplementary feeding.

2.   National Catholic Secretariat

Overall responsibility   for the   supply from the   WFP of basic   foodstuffs   and   complementary   foodstuffs   and their storage, inland transportation, preparation and distribution to refugees.

3.   Christian Council of Ghana

The construction and running of a school.   The provision of social services namely running counselling services and organisation of recreational activities.

4.   World Vision International

Has   responsibility   for   water   supply,   that   is   the transportation, storage and distribution of water for the camp.   Also WVI organises income generating   activities in the field of .   agriculture and programmes for   women.The UNHCR provides financial support for the budgets of each of the   implementing partners. According to the UNHCR in Accra out   of a total expenditure of ¢125.4 million on refugees in

Ghana ¢53 million was used to support the operational programmes of these implementing partners at the camp.

The responsibilities assigned to these four organisations has made the provision of assistance to the Liberian refugees at the camp easy. The Ghana Red Cross for example provided an initial $50,000 for the support of the Liberians in July 1990. This amount was used to purchase assorted drugs, 425 blankets and 105 bales of second hand clothes for the upkeep of the refugees. The Red Cross also provided bags of sorghum and wheat soya blend for the upkeep of the refugees. By the end of 1990 the Ghana Red Cross society had spent C100 million in the relief operation. The clinic at the camp is run by the GRCS. It is headed by a retired medical officer with the assistance of two nurses from Winneba Hospital. The refugees provide additional support staff for the clinic.[21]

Following a Ghana Government appeal for assistance to the refugees and returnees in October 1990, the National Catholic Secretariat was made responsible for implementing a three months European Economic Community Emergency Aid of C133.5 million. This was used in providing food, essential drugs and clothing for the refugees at the camp, urban refugees, and returnees living at Gomoa Nyanyanor, Senya Bereku, Winneba, Apam, Dego, Mumford, Dawurampong, Komenda, Dutch Komenda, Kafodzidzi, Abrobeano and Kissi. According to the office of the migrant Commission of the NCS, as at

31st December 1990., they had spent S60.5 million of the EEC-financed Emergency Aid.

With assistance from His Holiness, Pope John Paul II and Caritas, the NCS has constructed a unit of twenty bedrooms to accommodate vulnerable nursing mothers and the aged. It cost approximately C16.3 million. As at March 1991 the National Catholic Secretariat had spent C84,967,335.60 on the refugee assistance programme. This amount covered expenditure on feeding clothing, medical care, shelter, logistics, labour, repatriation and other miscellaneous items. In addition it has by September 1991 spent C193,164,412.57 on behalf of the World Food Programme'[22]

Educational Assistance[23]

Providing educational assistance to the Liberian refugees is the responsibility of the Christian Council of Ghana. The Council currently runs a school from kindergarten to Junior Secondary School level at the camp. It is known as the Buduburam Refugee School. The school began in October 1990 when children below five years were organised into a kindergarten. It was upgraded to a primary school later and raised to Junior Secondary level in January 1991. The school has an enrolment of 935 pupils and students broken down as follows Nursery - 120; Kindergarten - 283; Primary - 347; JSS - 136 and SSS - 49. The

teaching staff is all Liberian with one Ghanaian who helps with technical studies. Most of the staff were professional teachers in Liberia before the war. As a form of motivation the Christian Council gives the teachers an allowance of ¢7,000 per month.

Besides the camp school, the CCG also assist in the education of the Liberians at the tertiary level. Last academic year the CCG sponsored six students at the University of Ghana while the UNHCR assisted another six students at the University. Other students are being sponsored at the University of Science and Technology UST (2) the University of Cape Coast (1) and the National Academy of Music (1). Also the CCG assist twenty refugees in various second cycle institutions in the country. The Council at December 1991 spent some ¢10 million on education of Liberian refugees and plans to spend ¢24 million in the 1992 academic year. At the same time the Council's total expenditure on the Liberians assistance programme was put approximately at C40 million. This covered expenditure on food, education, counselling and recreational activities. The main source of finance of the Council has been the World Council of Churches and the UNHCR. As at December 1991, the Council had received ¢17 million from the UNHCR.

Other Assistance Programmes

The World Vision International (WVI) has installed three water tanks with not less than 12,000 liters storage capacity each. Two of the tanks were donated by the EEC and Britain's ODA with the UNHCR providing the third. The EEC and the ODA gave C10 million and C4 million respectively for the installation of the tanks. Due to problems of gravity of the water from the Kwaryarko water works the storage tanks have not been very helpful with water supply at the camp, and a tanker supplies water daily to the camp.

The WVI also assists the camp residents with income generating activities. It has ploughed 20 acres of land around the camp for the refugees to cultivate maize, groundnuts, cowpeas and vegetables. In the 1991 farming season about 46 acres was put under cultivation. WVI provides insecticides, Knapsack sprayers and other inputs for the farmers. The farmers buy the vegetable seeds themselves through a revolving fund they operate. By February 1992 WVI had spent about C40 million on the refugee assistance programme. Its sources of funding has been the EEC (C10 million), UNHCR (C19 million), and the ODA (C4 million).

Other sources of assistance to the Liberian refugees has been from the Catholic Relief Services (CRS). The CRS responded to the government's appeal for assistance to the Liberians by providing food, blankets and drugs. Between

August and October 1990, the CRS headquarters in Baltimore U.S.A. provided $50,000 to the CRS programme which was used to purchase drugs, disinfectants, clothing, blankets and other materials for the refugees. Further over 100 metric tons of title II food under the US PL480 food aid programme was used to feed the refugees at the camp and the returnees at Komenda, Kafodzidzi, Abrobeano and other places. The CRS normally channels its food donations through the National Catholic Secretariat whilst drugs, clothes and blankets are channeled through the Ghana Red Cross Society.

The Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA) also provides assistance to the Liberian refugees at the camp. In 1991 it presented 20 metric tons of food to the camp for the upkeep of the refugees. The food items included rice, wheat and oil. They also provided used clothes and blankets. ADRA also built two of the six Kumasi Ventilated Improved Pits (KVIPs) at the camp. The organisation has built a kitchen at a cost of C1.5 million for the camp.

The Salvation Army also provides a lot of assistance for the Liberian refugees. The organisation provides food as a supplement to the food supplied by the World Food Programme (WFP). According to the field staff of the Salvation Army, as at March 1992 their total expenditure on provision of food to the refugees at the camp amounted to C15 million. Apart from the food, the Army has donated other items through the NMP and the Red Cross. These

include 743 blankets valued at C1.6 million, bathroom sandals valued at C1.584 million, plastic plates and cups, firewood and fuel.

The Army also provides medical care for the refugees. Pregnant women at the camp are taken to the Salvation Army's Clinic at Begoro for antenatal care. They also provide medical care for Liberian refugee children who suffer from malnutrition. According to the Salvation Army 70 refugee women delivered in their clinic at Begoro and about 70 malnutrition cases have been treated between March 1991 and January 1992. The Army also provides drugs to the Red Cross Clinic at the camp. As at March 1992 the Salvation Army had spent over C19 million out of a targeted C25 million in aid to the Liberian refugees.

One other christian group that provides a lot of assistance to the Liberian refugees is the Kristo Asafo Mission of Ghana. As its contribution to the returnee and refugee rehabilitation and reception effort during the Liberian crisis, the church cooked food for the evacuees on arrival at Tema Port. According to the NMF[24] the Kristo Asafo Mission and the 31st December Women's Movement provided the largest share of the food fed to the thousands of starving people when they arrived at Tema Port. The Mission continues to assist the refugees at the camp with foodstuffs.

Conclusion

   The provision of assistance to refugees in Ghana has differed according to the refugee category. Assistance to refugees from Southern Africa has been very smooth and there is no problem with sponsors because they have been recognized as refugees by the UNHCR and the government. The refugees from the Sahel, due to their status, have not received much assistance. They have received some assistance from the Christian Council of Ghana but it is inadequate and for that reason they have to find their own strategies to survive. The interesting aspect of the assistance to the Liberian refugees is that even though the government has not granted them refugee status they are being treated as de - facto refugees and those at the Buduburam camp have received a good deal of assistance. What this has meant is that those Liberian refugees living in town look for the chance to move into the camp and so as soon as any group voluntarily repatriate to Liberia their places are quickly taken over by those living in town for the simple reason that in town they receive no assistance and have to depend on the charity of Ghanaian friends and compatriots, but at the camp food is assured from the various sources we have discussed above.

Notes

1. Harrel-Bond, B.E.(1986) Imposing Aid: Emergency Assistance to Refugees Oxford University Press. Oxford. p. 64.

2. Ibid.

3. Statute of UNHCR, Chap. II, 6B

4. UN Resolution 1167 (XII) of 26 November 1957

5. UN Resolution 1388 (XIV) of 20 November 1959

6. A detailed study of UN assistance to refugees is found in Yefime Zarjevski A future Preserved Pergamon Press, Oxford 1988. p. 16.

7. Melander Goran & Nobel Peter (eds) (1978) African Refugees and the Law The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies. Uppsala.

8. OAU Convention governing the specific aspects of refugee problems in Africa. 1969 Article 1 paragraph 2.

9. Article II (2) of the Convention.

10. Article II of the Convention.

11. Article V of the Convention.

12. Art (3) which states that "No person shall be subjected by a Member state to measures such as rejection at the frontier, return or expulsion, which would compel him to return to or remain in a territory where his life, physical integrity or liberty would be threatened for the reasons set out in Article I paragraphs 1 & 2.

13. The case of Burundi and Rwanda is a very good example of genocide as one ethnic group, the Hutu, tried to eliminate the Tutsi and which led to one of Africa's best known cases of refugee movements. See U.S. Committee for Refugees (1991) Exile from Rwanda: Background to an invasion Issue Paper, February .

14. ICIHI (1986) Refugees: Dynamics of displacement Zed Books, London p. XIV.

15. Betts T.F. "Rural Refugees in Africa" International Migration Review Vol.15 No.1

16. Ibid.

17. The Mirror, January 26, 1985.

18. The refugees, especially those in the urban areas, because they feared being sent to a camp.

19. The refugees unco-operative attitude was due to the fact that as nomads they were not interested in being settled in a camp where they would be asked to engage in agriculture.

20. The suburbs of Accra where they live are Medina, Accra New Town, Nima, New Fadama and Russia.

21. Interviews at the National Headquarters Ghana Red Cross Society, Accra.

22. Interviews at the Migrants Commission, National Catholic Secretariat. Accra.

23. Interviews at the Secretariat of the Refugee Committee, Christian Council of Ghana, Accra.

24. NMP Mobinews November 1990.

CHAPTER SIX

THE POLICY TOWARDS ASYLUM AND REFUGE IN GHANA

The African refugee problem has captured the attention of the world press and international opinion over the past decade. Of the estimated world refugee population of 15 million Africa is credited with about 5 million. As Harrell-Bond[1] points out, no one really knows how many people have been uprooted but one may be very sure the problem in Africa is not going away. The African refugee problem has been particularly bad in the Horn of Africa, the Sudan, Eastern, Central and Southern Africa. West Africa, until recently was not a major refugee producing region but it has played host to refugees and displaced persons from other parts of the continent and recently from Liberia.

The very nature of the refugee problem means that other countries have to provide assistance to such people. Furthermore it means that different countries in Africa have different policies towards asylum and refuge. Speaking on the burden that refugees put on their host countries Julius Nyerere concluded that

> "All refugees are individuals with a right to life
> in Africa ..... I do not believe that dealing with
> the problem of 3.5 million people and giving them
> a chance to rebuild their dignity and their lives,
> is an impossible task for 46 nations and their 350
> million inhabitants".[2]

Ghana has played an important role as a country of asylum and refuge for quite a time. From the time of her independence in 1957, Ghana has pursued a policy that has generally proved to be rather generous towards those seeking asylum and refuge. Ghana has since independence proved a haven for political refugees from countries then under colonial rule and other displaced persons.

The acceptance of refugees by any country is done within a certain policy framework. This framework stems from the country's ratification of the international conventions on refugees. These legislations are the UN Convention on refugees of 1951 and the protocol of 1967 on the status of refugees. There is also the 1969 OAU convention governing the specific aspects of refugee problems in Africa. Ghana has ratified these international conventions and her policy is to be guided by them. The UNHCR itself encourages countries that have ratified the UN conventions to enact national legislations incorporating the provisions of the conventions. Even though Ghana has ratified the conventions on refugees, the country has no laws that incorporates the provisions of the international conventions on refugees. In chapter five we examined the problem of providing assistance to refugees in Ghana. Our discussion led us to conclusion that assistance to Liberian and Sahel refugees has faced a lot of problems. The effect has been that the Liberian refugees are passing a lot of

headaches to aid officials who are not sure about their refugee status. The refugees from the Sahel have faced the most problems given the fact that they have no status and receive only some assistance from the Christian Council of Ghana. This situation has arisen because there is no law in the country that deals specifically with refugees. We will now examine how this has influenced government policy on refugees.

The foundations of Ghana's policy on refugees was laid under the government of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah in the First Republic. That policy was rather generous towards refugees especially those from Southern Africa and other African countries. That policy was greatly influenced by Nkrumah's famous declaration on the eve of independence that "the independence of Ghana is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.

Post Nkrumah Policy

After the overthrow of Nkrumah's government in 1966, succeeding governments have showed less interest in political refugees from independent African countries. Soon after the overthrow of the Nkrumah government, the National Liberation Council (NLC) which took power, dismantled the refugee camps that were being used by freedom fighters from Southern Africa and Zimbabwe, and all the political refugees from independent African countries were sent away. This was

in line with the efforts of the new regime to mend fences with neighbouring countries all of whom had their political opponents in exile in Accra.[3]

Despite this the NLC and succeeding governments have given asylum to Southern African students — mainly from South Africa and Namibia who attend secondary schools and tertiary level institutions in the country. Ghana acceded to the OAU Convention soon after it came into force. The OAU Convention's definition is broad and well suited to deal with the problem of refugees in Ghana. This broad definition includes in addition

> "persons who owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order are compelled to flee from their home countries."[4]

This has been used to cover the granting of asylum to the students from Southern Africa. The other category of refugees that Ghana has hosted include the displaced nomads from the Sahel region, refugees from neighbouring West African countries — who are mainly former University student leaders from Liberia, Sierra Leone, Togo and Benin. The largest group of refugees to be hosted by the country so far are the Liberian refugees arising out of the civil war. The policy towards these other refugee groups has posed problems due principally to the fact that there is no national legislation on refugees. The government is assumed to be adhering to the tenets of the UN and OAU Conventions on

refugees. The problem posed by the lack of national legislation is principally one of the non enforceability of the UN and OAU refugee conventions in Ghanaian courts. We now examine the present situation.

The Present Policy

The present policy on refugees is still without a legal framework incorporating the tenets of the UN and OAU conventions. The government however does everything to co-operate with the UNHRC by its procedure for admitting refugees. Ghana's asylum practice is based on the principles declared in the 1967 Declaration on Territorial Asylum adopted by the General Assembly.[5] The Declaration stresses the sovereign competence of the state as the sole judge of the grounds for granting asylum and protection. The 1969 OAU Convention further strengthens the institutions of asylum. Article II of the Convention states that

"member states of the OAU shall use their best endeavors ... to receive refugees and to secure the settlement of those refugees who for well-founded reasons, are unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin or nationality".[6]

The convention states without exception the cardinal principle of non-refoulement which states that

"No person shall be subjected by a member state to measures such as rejection at the frontier, return or expulsion, which would compel him to return to or remain in a territory where his life, physical integrity or liberty would be threatened".[7]

On the grant of asylum at large, the convention affirms that it is a peaceful and humanitarian act not to be regarded as unfriendly.[8] In the light of the above discussion on the granting of asylum[13] we would now examine international protection i.e. the granting of asylum in Ghana.

Refugee Protection in Ghana

On arrival at Ghana's borders, a would be refugee is expected to appear before an immigration officer and in addition he is expected to report his presence in Ghana to the nearest police station. The would be refugee then has to complete a questionnaire in the local office of the UNHCR in Accra. The completed forms are submitted simultaneously to the Board on Refugee Matters and the UNHCR regional office in Dakar, Senegal. The Board investigates the claims of the applicant with the assistance of state agencies including the Bureau for National Investigation (BNI) and the foreign missions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The UNHCR Regional Office in Dakar is expected to carry out further investigations into the claims of the refugee with the co-operation of other offices of the UNHCR in countries with which the applicant is connected.

A report on the investigations is submitted to the Board on Refugee Matters which is chaired by the Minister of Interior. The Board considers the reports and determines whether the refugee deserves to be accorded official

recognition by Ghana. If it is found necessary, the refugee is asked to appear before the Board to provide further information. The Board advises the Secretary for Interior who also informs the Committee of PNDC Secretaries where objections may be raised if necessary. The Board acts in a strictly advisory capacity to the Secretary of Interior and thus to the government. The final decision is conveyed to the refugee in a letter addressed to him through the UNHCR. If a refugee is granted asylum then he comes under the protection of the UNHCR and receives assistance from the organisation for his/her sustenance. If on the other hand a refugee fails to obtain the necessary recognition of the government and thus the protection of the UNHCR, he may apply to the government for permission to stay in the country as an immigrant for a limited period.

Refugees, when so recognised, are subject to the laws of the land. They are given every protection and are not detained, imprisoned or expelled without proper cause. Refugees are under obligation not to use their privileged position to subvert their country of origin or any other country while resident in Ghana. In other words they are not to engage in political activities against their government. Refugees are also given identity cards and Convention Travel Documents (CTDs). These are issued by the Legal and Consular Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the request of the UNHCR. The Identity cards are

the documentary evidence of the refugee's right to residence and work in Ghana and they do not need residence or work permits.

The government pursues a liberal arrangement regarding education for the refugees. There is an outfit in the Ministry of Education that arranges placement for refugees in educational institutions as has been discussed in the previous chapter.

On employment, the policy is that the refugees enjoy the same minimum standard as that of aliens in general. The applicable law is the Selective Aliens Employment Tax Decree.[10] The law gives the Secretary for Finance, the discretion, with the approval of the government to exempt any person from the tax. It may be argued that this discretion may be exercised in favour of refugees in order to accord them the same treatment as accorded to nationals in the fulfillment of individual obligations.

The foregoing discussions applies mainly to the refugees from South Africa and Namibia who are therefore relatively better assisted than other categories of refugees from the Sahel. It is the view of this work that refugees from Liberia and the Sahel have become victims of the lack of a law on refugees.

The "No Law" Policy on Refugees

As Ghana has no law on refugees, what has been described above are understandings reached with the UNHCR on the treatment of refugees and they are the governments expression of good faith in the UN and OAU conventions. In 1989, the Government promised to take action on a national law. Addressing the OAU Co-ordinating Committee on assistance to refugees in Africa, the then acting PNDC Secretary for Interior Nii Okaija Adamafio stated

> "We in Ghana are taking steps to put our house in order regarding refugees matters by implementing an understanding reached with the UNHCR in helping to resettle an initial modest number of refugees in Ghana, improving the educational, vocational and other facilities for refugees from Southern Africa and enacting out domestic refugee law and formulating the necessary procedures to give formal effect to the basic international legal instruments on refugees to which we have adhered."[11]

Since then there has not been any law incorporating the international conventions on refugees which Ghana has ratified. As a result these international instruments on refugees are not enforceable in Ghanaian courts. The result has been suffering on the part of some would-be refugees.

The first group of would-be refugees who have fallen victim to the absence of a national refugee law are a group of mainly former student leaders and other opponents of governments in the West African sub-region. These students have incurred the displeasure of their governments after leading demonstrations against them. They fled to Ghana for

fear of persecution at home. The governments of these former student leaders (Sierra Leone, Benin and Liberia under Doe) are claiming that the students can go back home because there is amnesty for them. Curiously, the Ghana government also used to have some Ghanaian student leaders in exile in the West African sub-region and the government also argued that they could come back because there is national reconciliation. For these reasons any investigations done by the Board on Refugee Matters proves negative and the application for refugee status is rejected. Such students have no means of redress and they stay on as immigrants. Some of them manage to get some NGOs to provide humanitarian assistance to pay for their fees in the Universities. But because they have no official status, they take advantage of the system's lack of co-ordination to get assistance from two or more NGOs.

This lack of a national law on refugees also created a good deal of confusion over the assistance organized for the Liberian refugees. A national law on refugees would usually streamline the processes and agencies responsible for refugee affairs. The government has for very strange reasons not conferred official refugee status on the Liberians who have sought refuge in the country. The paradox however is that the same government has granted de facto refugee status to the Liberians by asking for international assistance for the Liberian refugees. This

situation did create a confusion over who is responsible for
the Liberian when they arrived. On their arrival on the
Ghanaian ship MV. Tano River, they were sent to a reception
camp at Gomoa Buduburam. The confusion was over which
government ministry was responsible for what. The Ministry
of Interior has had responsibility for refugee matters over
the years and quite rightly assumed it was to be responsible
for the Liberians. That was not to be because the National
Mobilisation Programme (MNP) through the Minstry of
Mobilisation and Social Welfare felt they were responsible.
In the struggle over the issue, the Ministry of Mobilisation
and Social Welfare gained the upper hand and the NMP is in
charge of the camp. The Ministry of Interior has thus
remained aloof from the whole issue except that the police
provide security at the camp. The Ministry of Mobilisation
and Social Welfare even appointed a co-ordination for
Refugees but who has no job description. In the confusion
the NGOs were not sure which government Minstry to deal with
and when the public started to donate towards the upkeep of
the refugees, some went to the Minstry of Interior while
others went to the Ministry of Mobilisation and Social
Welfare.

Why the government has not granted refugee status to
the Liberian refugees is a little difficult to explain. The
explanation though seem to lie with the government's
involvement with the ECOMOG peace keeping operation in

Liberia. The government seem anxious not to give any impression that the Liberians are in Ghana for a long stay. It is the view of this author that the government believe that it could help in ECOMOG to bring peace to Liberia quick enough to enable the Liberians to go back to help with the country's reconstruction. For this reason those Liberians who express the wish to go back on departing ships from Tema are allowed on board by the NMP knowingly against protestation by the UNHCR on the grounds that it is against the known norms for repatriation. In the circumstances, the Liberians have been moving back and forth between Monrovia and Tema as and when Ghanaian troops are going to rotate their colleagues in ECOMOG.

The other problem is the case of the environmental refugees from the Sahel in the country. They are victims of the Sahel drought and do not come under the UNHCR's "well-founded fear of persecution" category. However these people are in a refugee-like situation and go through all the deprivations that conventional refugees go through. For this reason, they have no recognition and no assistance from the UNHCR. The government could however ask for assistance for them by invoking the "good offices" clause in the UNHCR's mandate. The UN General Assembly has developed the notion of the High Commissioner's "good offices" as an umbrella idea under which to bring refugees who did not come within the competence or immediate competence of the United

Nations.[12]   The   government   could   have   asked   the   UNHCR   to
find   ways of assisting these   victims of the   drought.   The
government however   regards   them as   indigent   aliens   even
though   they have not   applied for residence   permits.   They
just   walked across the border and   as long as they were not
harassed by Ghana immigration they have been left alone, and
some of them are eking out a hard existence.   They have been
squatting in uncompleted buildings in the urban areas and in
some   cases   they   have   taken   over   abandoned   government
buildings.

Ghanaian Attitudes as Host

This lack of a national law on refugees has had its own
effect on the way   Ghanaians have perceived refugees.   Due
to the lack of any assistance — except that of the Christian
Council of Ghana   — the   refugees from the   Sahel have   been
very visible to the Ghanaian   because for sometime they were
hanging around traffic intersections to ask for alms.   When
these refugees from the Sahel   arrived in the country around
1985   they were warmly received and   Ghanaians were at their
charitable best.   But after sometime,   the warm hospitality
began to cool. A survey of views on these refugees point to
a changing attitude towards them.

Initially Ghanaians were very   sympathetic towards
the   Sahel refugees.   People   were very   charitable towards
them   and   they gave   them food   and   clothing.   At traffic

intersections people readily gave out money to those who hanged around begging for alms. Others allowed them to squat on the uncompleted buildings. But after sometime the warm reception started to cool. Ghanaians were no longer eager to be charitable towards the Sahel refugees. Some Ghanaians interviewed felt that the refugees should stop begging and find legitimate means of earning a living. Others felt that they have known people from the Sahel who are hardworking and have operated as "water boys" and porters at the markets. Other Ghanaians pointed out that when Ghanaians were forced by difficult economic conditions to leave for neighbouring countries, they went to work, not to ask for alms, therefore these Chadians,[13] they argued should be forced to work on farms. Generally Ghanaians have not shown any hostility towards the refugees from the Sahel. People have not bothered about them as long as they have been of good behavior.

The Proposed Refugee Law

The absence of any law on refugees has meant that dealing with problems arising out of the frustrations of would be refugees has been confusing. Refugees and groups working with refugees are anxiously waiting to see the enactment of the National Refugee Law which has been in the pipe line for a long time.[14] The expectations are high. One expectation is that the law would set up relevant

institutions with clear cut procedures for granting asylum. Presently when an application for refugee status is rejected, there is no procedure for appeal. The present Board on Refugee Matters has no representation from the NGOs, but since they provide much of the relief in most refugee situations it is hoped that a provision would be made to get them representation or observer status on the Board. The experience with the Liberian refugees is that there was no funds from which government could have provided assistance to the refugees in the camp. A refugee fund with contributions from the government and NGOs would go a long way to alleviate the problems of feeding refugees until donors start assisting. It is also hoped that the new law would set out clearly which Ministry is responsible for what, in refugee matters, and lay to rest the confusion that arose with the arrival of a large group of Liberian refugees.

Conclusions

The discussions in this chapter has pointed out the awkward situation of the absence of a clear cut policy on refugees in Ghana. The government tries to deal with refugees in the spirit of the UN and the OAU Conventions on refugees. This situation has meant that ad hoc arrangements are used to deal with refugee problems as and when they crop up. Various government agencies and Ministries have decided

on what to do to assist refugees with no central direction which a refugee law would provide. An ambivalent situation therefore exist whereby Liberians who have not been granted refugee status are being treated as such by aid agencies and some Ghanaian educational institutions. The refugees from the Sahel have suffered the most from this "no-law" policy situation because officially they do not exist. It is only a refugee law that can streamline this rather awkward situation of refugee policy in the country.

NOTES

1. Harrell-Bond B.E.(1986) _Imposing Aid: Emergency Assistance to Refugees_ Oxford University Press London. p.ix.

2. Nyerere, Julius. Opening Address to the Arusha Conference on the Situation of Refugees in Africa, 7 May 1979. Quoted in CIMADE et al (1986) _Africa's Refugee Crisis_ Zed Books, London.

3. _West Africa,_ March 1966.

4. OAU _Convention Governing the specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa._ Article 1 para 2.

5. UN General Assembly Resolution 2312 (SSII) 14 December 1967.

6. OAU Convention (1969) Article II para. 1

7. Ibid para.3

8. Ibid para. 2

9. For good discussion of the concept of Asylum see Guy S. Godwin-Gill, (1985) _The Refugee in International Law,_ Clarendon Press, Oxford. See also G.K. Ofosu-Amaah "The legal position of Aliens in National and International law in Ghana: in _Beitragen Zum austandischen offen Hichen Rechtvolkervaecht_ 94 Springer-Verlag Berlin.

10. See _Selective Aliens Employment Tax Decree_ 1973 (Act 201) as amended by SMCD 248 and SMCD 268.

11. Adamafio, Nii Okaija "Statement to the 19th Ordinary Session of the OAU Co-ordinating Committee on Assistance to Refugees in Africa. Accra 8th - 12th May, 1989. .

12. See Godwin-Gill, Guy S. *Op. cit.* p.7

13. Most Ghanaians called the refugees from the Sahel "Chadians".

14. A draft Refugee Law is said to have been given to the government for consideration since 1991.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSIONS

This work set out to study the African refugee problem as it has manifested itself in Ghana. The African refugee problem has been very prominent in the Horn of Africa, East Central and Southern Africa. West Africa until recently had produced comparatively fewer refugees and the sub-region was more a region for resettling refugees. The Liberian political struggles has changed all that and now Liberian refugees are scattered all over the sub-region. The work therefore set out to examine the causes of the flight of refugees to seek asylum in Ghana since independence, how they have survived in the country and government policy towards them.

Refugee movements have been a function of push-pull factors. Refugees tend to be distinguished from migrants depending on whether their movements are the result of push or pull factors. Push factors arise when people move against their will and are forced to move for fear of losing their lives due to a well-founded fear of persecution. The push factors may also be environmental ones which are equally life threatening. Refugee movements are essentially forced migration when people are pushed into exile. People may have to flee in split seconds and many have no time to plan and take vital documents along with them. On the other hand, migrants are attracted to a country and they are out

to seek a means of improving their economic well-being. They are attracted or pulled to an environment which, by their calculations, is better than their own. They plan their move to that country and when they have improved their lot, they go back to their country of origin. While migrants can go back to their country of origin, refugees cannot until the factors that forced them into exile have changed. Zucker and Zucker[1] sums up the differences between refugees and migrants as follows:

> "Refugees are neither immigrants nor illegal migrants, although, like immigrants, they have forsaken their homelands for new countries without permission. But a refugee is in the end, unlike either. Both the immigrant and the illegal migrants are drawn to a country. The refugee is not drawn but driven; he seeks not to better his life but to rebuild it, to regain some part of what he has lost. The immigrant and the migrant are propelled by hope; for the refugee what ever hope there may be must arise from the ruins of tragedy."

We identified three broad groups of refugees in the country; namely, Southern African refugees, refugees from the Sahel region of West Africa, and refugees from Liberia. All of them have been forced by situations that would be called "a well-founded fear" of their lives in danger. The Southern African refugees had fled from the discrimination and persecution of the apartheid system of government; the refugees from the Sahel have fled from an environment degraded as a result of political decision making on development strategy and the Liberians have fled a political

struggle for the state that has culminated in the civil war. The three groups have all been victims of push forces even though the Sahel drought victims did not face the acute flight conditions that the Liberians and the Southern Africans went through.

On arrival in Ghana these three groups of refugees have had different levels of assistance. We have noted that due to the fact that Ghana has no law on refugees, assistance to refugees has been guided largely by the UN and OAU conventions on refugees. We have noted that Southern African refugees have a well laid out sponsorship system. The Ministry of Education has set up a unit whose responsibility is to place the student refugees from Southern Africa in Ghanaian Schools. This unit however does not cater for the Liberian and Sahel refugees. The latter two groups have no official refugee status and this has affected them in various ways. The Sahel refugees have no formal assistance programme and the Christian Council of Ghana only manages to provide some form of assistance to them. They have therefore taken to begging at street corners for alms as a means to survive. Despite the lack of official refugee status for the Liberians, they have been accorded de facto refugee status. A refugee camp has been set up for them and the UNHCR and other NGOs have an assistance programme in place for them at the camp. There is a camp school which caters for their educational needs

but there is no clear cut arrangement for tertiary level education for them. The UNHCR and the Christian Council of Ghana however manages to place and sponsor a few of them in the Universities.

The policy towards asylum and refuge in the country is therefore not clear cut. It is an evolving policy whose foundations were laid in the First Republic by the pan-Africanist policy of Dr. Nkrumah. The present government practices can be called a rather liberal and open policy towards refugees. It comes nowhere near the reality of American refugee policy which Zucker and Zucker[2] have characterized as the "Guarded Gate". This is a policy which has kept some people out and others in, depending on the forces that have greater influence in American domestic politics. Loescher and Scanlan[3] have described American policy on refugees as "calculated kindness" in which the government has overwhelmingly favoured those claiming to be oppressed by left-wing rather than right-wing regimes. Ghana's policy as it stands does not keep any particular group of refugees out. Even in cases where refugees have not been granted any status as the case of the Sahel refugees show, they have been left alone to fend for themselves. Equally the Liberian refugees are being treated as refugees even though they have no formal refugee status.

The Wider Refugee Question and Possible Solutions

This work has looked at the problem of refugees in Africa under the assumption that it is a function of the crisis of the state in other words we assume that the crisis of the state in Africa leads to the creation of refugees. This crisis of the state manifests itself in (a) the crisis of the underdevelopment of productive forces (b) the crisis of democracy and (c) the crisis of national identity. The flight from Southern Africa is essentially attributable to the crisis of democracy in which anti-democratic forces gained ascendancy and implemented the racist policy of apartheid whose attendant repression and discrimination forced many refugees to flee Southern Africa and Namibia. The Sahel drought victims are products of the crisis of underdevelopment. The path to development that the governments of the Sahel countries have pursued have culminated in a systematic disturbance of the natural balance that has existed between the environment and productive forces. This has culminated in the famous Sahel drought which killed off the means of livelihood of the inhabitants namely the cattle, camels, sheep and goats and which forced them to leave their countries to seek refuge in the countries to the South of the Sahel. The Liberia civil war is the combined function of the crisis of democracy in Africa, the crisis of underdevelopment and a crisis of national identity. The Doe government was a very typical

African government. It came to power through a coup d'etat, made a caricature of western democracy by refusing to give up power, used ethnicity to deal with opponents, and when one faction took up arms a civil war ensued that has created the largest group of refugees in West Africa.

Ghana has played host to the three groups of refugees to the best of her abilities. In providing assistance to these refugees Ghana has done so without a clear cut set of policy measures. Even though the government has reached some understandings with the UNHCR in which the broad principles of the UN and OAU conventions on refugees are applied, that leaves a grey area regarding the granting of asylum to some categories of refugees. This is the peculiar position of the Liberians who have not been granted refugee status but are being treated as such. On the other hand the Sahel refugees have been left out in the cold as far as official policy is concerned.

The government, as we have pointed out, is very much alive to the need for a law on refugees and there is one in the pipeline. The law has rather kept too long in the pipeline and it is creating its own problems for refugees, government Ministries and agencies and NGOs working with refugees.

Finding Solutions

Finding solutions to the refugee problem is first and foremost the problem of finding solutions to the political issues that led to the problem. Stein[4] puts it aptly thus

> "Refugees are caused by government action and achieving durable solutions is dependent on the political will, diplomacy, and statesmanship of government".

Writing on what is to be done about the refugee problem, Ibeanu et al[5] point out

> "that democracy, development, and human rights hold the key to solving the problem in the long run ... A concerted struggle for democracy development and human rights alone can provide a lasting solution to the problem of refugees and displaced persons in Africa."

Finding solutions to the refugee problem is therefore a highly political issue. The reason is that the root causes of refugee flights are political decision making. It is government action that causes refugees and a solution must begin with finding remedies to those government actions that ultimately lead to the creation of refugees. We would examine the solutions and possible solutions for the three categories of refugees we have discussed in this work, namely refugees from Southern Africa, Liberia and the Sahel.

In our examination of the causes of the refugee flow from Southern Africa, we concluded that it has been apartheid in South Africa and apartheid and colonialism in Namibia. The first step towards resolving the refugee question in Southern Africa was the resolution of the

Namibia question. The road to Namibian independence was long and difficult. The people, led by the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) had to fight a liberation war, against South African occupation. After a protracted war, Namibia achieved independence on 21 March 1990. The political negotiations that led to Namibian independence had involved the Western Contact Group – Canada, France, Federal Republic of Germany, United Kingdom and the U.S.A. – Angola and South Africa. The UN Secretary-General and his special representatives travelled extensively in Southern Africa, discussing problems and possible solutions with government and other leaders especially the Front-line states, the OAU and the South African Administrator – General of Namibia. Negotiations had to take place also between Angola, Cuba and South Africa. These negotiations culminated in the introduction into Namibia an assemblage of UN personnel – United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) and other organisations of the UN system supervising and monitoring a series of important developments: the formal cessation of hostilities; the return of 43,500 exiles, and the elections which was won by SWAPO to form the first independent Namibia government.[6] These negotiations removed the cause of the flight from Namibia and thus a solution to the refugee problem was found. Most of the Namibian students in

Ghanaian schools went back to vote in the elections and have come back to complete their education.

The more formidable problem is the removal of apartheid in South Africa. Since President de Klerk took over from Botha, South Africa has moved slowly along the road of democratisation. Nelson Mandela, has been released and the ANC and other opposition parties have been unbanned. Political prisoners have been released and there is a slow return of exiles. Democracy talks between the ANC, other opposition groups and the National government is in progress, even though it has been stalled on some occasions. The pillars of apartheid have been removed by the repeal of certain laws, and the removal of the political cause of the flight from South Africa is also in progress. That process should culminate in a multiracial democratic South Africa and that will have found a solution to one of Africa's nagging refugee problems.

It is only when the political side of the refugee equation has been solved that the UNHCR can come along with organising voluntary repatriation which is one of the durable solutions favoured by the UNHCR. For example the UNHCR has successfully organised the return of Namibian exiles following the political settlement of that problem. It has already organised the repatriation of some South African exiles but a total repatriation would have to await

the constitutional talks now stalled between the ANC and the National government.

Finding a solution to the Liberian crisis is proving intractable. ECOWAS leaders have been doing all they can to find the political solution to the civil war which has effectively divided the country into two; namely, the Charles Taylor territory which is about 90% of the country and the Amos Sawyer ruled area of mainly Monrovia. ECOWAS leaders first sent a peace keeping force called ECOMOG to put a stop to the carnage that was going on the country in 1990. ECOMOG has achieved limited success.

In September 1991[7] the Liberian rebels agreed to key demands laying the foundations for a negotiated end to the country's civil war. Central to an agreement signed in Cote d'Ivoire after a two day Summit of ECOWAS leaders and conflicting factions in the war, was a decision by the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) to disarm its troops and encamp its forces at designated sites. The disarmament and encampment of the rebel warring factions are to be supervised by the peace keeping force ECOMOG. The NPFL's leaders recognition of ECOMOG was a significant change of position. That recognition stems from the decision by Senegal to send troops to join ECOMOG. NPFL delegates at the Summit, which was chaired by President Felix Houphouet-Boigny, said they hoped the maximum size of each nation's contingent in ECOMOG would be 500 troops.

Nigeria, who the NPFL believes wants to prevent Mr. Taylor becoming President, has around 5,000 troops in the Force. The NPFL has been under increasing pressure following an invasion of its territory by forces loyal to the murdered Liberian President, Samuel Doe. The invaders known as the United Liberian Movement for Democracy (ULIMO) have declared their intention to prevent the NPFL taking power.

Another area of agreement was the decision to establish an electoral commission. The commission is to comprise five members: two each from the Liberian interim government of Amos Sawyer and the NPFL, and a fifth member nominated by these four. The elections are to be supervised by representatives from the International Negotiations Network established by the former U.S. President Jimmy Carter. The apparent success of the meeting — after two inconclusive earlier meetings in Yamoussoukro — has been attributed largely to US pressure on Cote d'Ivoire and the NPFL to come to a resolution. Senior West African diplomats believe that the U.S. signalled it was not prepared to see the regional rivalry between Nigeria and France and its allies in the region, placed above the need to find a resolution to the conflict.

One aspect of the problems in the way of the political solution was the Nigerian influence and its dominance of the West African peacekeeping force. This initially hampered a negotiated end to the war involving French-speaking

countries with which Nigeria has had traditionally strained relations. This situation altered when the U.S. which has strong historical ties with Liberia, tried to involve the francophone Cote d'Ivoire in discussions while confirming its commitment to the peace keeping force and Nigeria's role in it. The U.S. appealed to President Houphouet-Boigny, to convene a conference between Liberia's warring factions. His initial efforts were unsuccessful because by failing to stop the NPFL using Cote d'Ivoire as a supply route, Houphouet-Boigny was regarded by Mr. Taylor's enemies as being partisan.

In a speech to the U.S. congress in August 1991, the US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Herman Cohen made it clear that in the view of the US the NPFL should lay down its weapons. In a visit to Cote d'Ivoire in early September 1991, the U.S. vice President Dan Quayle said the U.S. supported a modified peace-keeping force which would include Senegalese troops.[8] This U.S. decision to assist Senegal, a French-speaking country with close ties to France, was a way of ending the animosity between the region's French and English speaking countries over the Liberian crisis. Despite these efforts at finding a political solution to the Liberia crisis, Charles Taylor continues to raise other problems such as refusing to allow his troops to be disarmed using the ULIMO incursions and clashes with Senegalese troops (which led to the murder of

six Senegalese troops), as an excuse. In September 1992 some five hundred ECOMOG troops were disarmed and taken hostage by NPFL forces. This has led ECOMOG to withdraw from Charles Taylor held territory. The implications of this is that a solution to the Liberia crisis would be long in coming and the refugees would be in Ghana for some time to come. The solution to the causes of the flight of refugees from the Sahel is not as straight forward as the causes of the flight from Southern Africa and Liberia. The cause of the flight from the Sahel is the political decision making regarding the choice of development strategy. This choice goes far back to the colonial era when the French chose to develop the Niger River basin around the elbow of the Niger into a Second Egypt. The effect of this choice was to increase human pressure on the Sahelian environment which gradually became hostile. The choice of development strategy was at variance with the way the people of the Sahel have used the environment over the centuries. The traditional choices that the people of the Sahel made in the use of the Sahel environment enabled them to deal with the effects of drought more effectively than now.

The solutions to the flight from the Sahel therefore lies in political choices over development strategy. Those choices are heavily influenced by outsiders. Development plans for the Sahel by the FAO's office for Sahelian Relief

Operation (OSRO) as early as May 1973 stressed high-growth

development and intensified agriculture. The aim was put as

follows:

> "To "develop" the Sahel, the rural economy must be
> monetized. And to begin with, the most reluctant
> of the nomad population must be forced to enter
> into the market economy. They must be obliged to
> sell their livestock, and to do this, the entire
> animal production of the countries concerned must
> be reorganized by supervising the "nomads" animal
> husbandry.[9]

Based on this thinking various development plans have been

signed between the Sahel countries and aid agencies. The

plans are all concerned with the financing of ranches and

fattening centers for slaughter houses. An OSRO report

advocated for "more fundamental economic and social changes

must be promoted if the people are to enjoy substantially

higher living standards. This applies particularly to the

nomadic population of the lower rainfall areas, where

transhumance is the normal way of life. So long as they are

tied to their traditional methods of livestock production,

involving long migrations, direct dependence on seasonal

pasture and water, and isolation from the rest of the

community, they have only limited scope for achieving higher

living standards and greater security."[10] This was the same

vision which had inspired the French development policy in

1928 when they spoke of 'the Nile of West Africa". Nothing

seem to have been learned by the Sahelian countries and the

aid agencies. The countries have followed development

strategies along the lines OSRO has prescribed above. The development plans of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso have been essentially the same namely "To enable the whole population to reach a standard of living which will provide for all its cultural and material needs".[11] The chief means to achieve this are intensive agricultural cultivation leading to the creation of surplus and monetary purchasing power: industrialization, firstly to produce goods for mass consumption and secondly to establish heavy industry; and the end of subsistence food production with a consequent "liberation of the economy from the annual effects of the climate.

The position of this author is that it is not the Sahel climate per se which is causing the Sahel crisis and the attendant refugee flows. Africa has always known drought, famine and floods. But the famine of the Sahel coincided with an intensification of completely unsuitable development schemes. These schemes destroy nomadic strategies for dealing with the climate and disturb the ecological balance of the area.

The responsibility for this situation rests partly with the national governments of the Sahel region, but also with the international relief and development agencies, and in particular, with the influential governments of the West Chiefly those of the US and France. The nomadic people of the Sahel countries, who are without any effective

representation at either national or international level continue to be the chief victims of these development schemes. The fundamental problem is how to maintain the Sahel as a viable area for human habitation. The answer lies with political choices on development strategies for the Sahel.

Some students of development are of the view that the Sahel and its people have reached the point of no return. They argue for a withdrawal from the Sahel with the reason that the traditional economy is so exhausted that the pastoralists are now reduced to selling their only capital, their livestock; their environment has been degraded beyond recovery; their governments which succeeded the French have insufficient resources to manage even their settled peoples, who take priority; and the only remaining option is to resettle the nomads in more accessible areas."[12] These proposals, apart from the fact that they take no account of the wishes of the people they affect would apparently require intensified food cropping, meat ranching and marketing and resettlement of the populations. Against this J. Swift [13] argues that nomadic transhumance is now suffering less political pressure than in the days of raiding; that the nomads do not favour agriculture; that withdrawal would leave a huge area of vacant land which might be of positive economic value to the Sahelian nations; and that resettlement is the recipe for disaster as before.

Others advocate for a flexible development strategy adapted to local conditions in the Sahel. A symposium held in Mauritania in 1973 [14] concluded that the conflict between sedentarisation and nomadism might be resolved by the expansion of "semi-nomadism" with the introduction of new plant species, range management and the substitution of marketing for population crashes. Another suggestion which was being experimented in Somalia, a country with similar climatic condition and nomadic people as the Sahel, is of nomadic co-operatives to govern the use of a grazing land which is under pressure. The strength of this scheme is the attention it pays to the preferences and capacities of the people who have to operate it.

But pending the discovery of a system of improvement or assistance for nomadic economies of the Sahel, which is not in itself overwhelmingly destructive, such in the Sahel can be expected both to increase the possibility of future crisis and to weaken people's capacity to withstand it.

The political nature of the cause of the flight from the Sahel is therefore tenuous as opposed to the more direct political causes of the flight from Southern Africa and Liberia. This situation has had implications for the recognition and assistance given to refugees from the Sahel. They have been seen as economic migrants fleeing from a harsh environment. The UNHCR would accord them refugee status if the cause of flight is "a well-founded fear of

persecution" while the OAU definition extends recognition to include those forced to flee as a result of wars of liberation and events disturbing the public peace. Both the UN and OAU Conventions on refugees fail to recognize that the cause of the drought and famine in the Sahel was ultimately the political decision making on development strategy. They both recognize the refugee to be the victim of events of more direct political nature.[15] The Sahel refugees have become victims of their governments development strategy and the definition of a refugee. Given the difficulties that they have gone through regarding the issue of assistance, this author recommends that the UNHCR should use its "good offices" clause to assist the refugees from the Sahel. The UNHCR should also encourage the Ghana government and other host governments to find some form of assistance from the international community for such refugees.

From a long term perspective, and given the often difficult negotiation process to find political solutions to conflicts and other situations leading to the creation of refugees, especially the Liberia and Sahel situations, host countries like Ghana must brace themselves to provide meaningful assistance to refugees in their borders. This calls for a streamlined policy framework for dealing with refugee matters. Specifically the government should expedite work on putting in place a national law on refugees

which will make it easy for all those who have to provide assistance to refugees to know exactly where they fit into a national framework. It will put to rest the present ad hoc measures that have been adopted to deal with refugees in the country.

NOTES

1. Zucker N.L. & Zucker N.F.(1987) *The Guarded Gate* Harcourt Brace Javanovich New York p. XIV.

2. Ibid.

3. Loescher Gil & Scanlan, J.A.(1986) *Calculated Kindness* The Free Press, New York.

4. Stein Barry N. "Durable Solution for Developing Country Refugees" *International Migration Review* Vol. XX No.2, p. 267.

5. Ibeanu, O., Karadawi A., Mathews, K. "Refugees and Displaced Persons in Africa". Unpublished paper presented at a Seminar at the Refugee Studies Programme, Queen Elizabeth House Oxford University. November, 1988.

6. For a fuller account of the Namibian move towards independence see *Refugees* No.75 May 1990.

7. See The Guardian, U.K. 18 September, 1991.

8. The US promised to provide financial assistance to Senegal due primarily to Senegal's participation in the Gulf war.

9. Quoted in Marnham Patrick (1979) *Nomads of the Sahel* Minority Rights Group Report No.33 p.9.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. Church H. The Times 10 September, 1974.

13. Swift J. "Development options for the Sahel." Seminar paper School of Oriental & African Studies, London 1974.

14. Quoted in Marnham Patrick op. cit. p.16.

15. For further discussion of who is a refugee see Jacques Vernant (1953) *The Refugee in the Post-War World* George Allen & Unwin, London.

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APPENDIX 1

EXTRACT FROM THE 1951 CONVENTION
RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES

Article 1

DEFINITION OF THE TERM "REFUGEE"

A. For the purposes of the present Convention, the term "refugee" shall apply to any person who:

(1) Has been considered a refugee under the Arrangements of 12 May 1926 and 30 June 1928 or under the Conventions of 28 October 1933 and 10 February 1938, the Protocol of 14 September 1939 or the Constitution of the International Refugee Organization;

Decisions of non-eligibility taken by the International Refugee Organization during the period of its activities shall not prevent the status of refugee being accorded to persons who fulfil the conditions of paragraph 2 of this section:

(2) As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.

In the case of a person who has more than one nationality the term "the country of his nationality" shall mean each of the countries of which he is a national, and a person shall not be deemed to be lacking the protection of the country of his nationality if, without any valid reason based on well-founded fear, he has not availed himself of the protection of one of the countries of which he is a national.

B. (1) For the purposes of this Convention, the words "events occurring before 1 January 1951" in Article 1, Section A, shall be understood to mean either

a. "events occurring in Europe before 1 January 1951"; or

b. "events occurring in Europe or elsewhere before 1 January 1951", and each Contracting State shall make a

declaration at the time of signature, ratification or accession, specifying which of these meanings it applies for the purpose of its obligations under this Convention.

(2) Any Contracting State which has adopted alternative (a) may at any time extend its obligations by adopting alternative (b) by means of a notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

C. This Convention shall cease to apply to any person falling under the terms of section A if":

(1) He has voluntarily re-availed himself of the protection of the country of his nationality; or

(2) Having lost his nationality, he has voluntarily re-acquired it; or

(3) He has acquired a new nationality, and enjoys the protection of the country of his new nationality;

(4) He has voluntarily re-established himself in the country which he left or outside which he remained owing to fear of persecution; or

(5) He can no longer, because the circumstances in connection with which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail himself of the protection of the country of his nationality;

Provided that this paragraph shall not apply to a refugee falling under Section A (1) of this Article who is able to invoke compelling reasons arising out of previous persecution for refusing to avail himself of the protection of the country of nationality;

(6) Being a person who has no nationality he is, because the circumstances in connexion with which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, able to return to the country of his former habitual residence.

Provided that this paragraph shall not apply to a refugee falling under section A (1) of this Article who is able to invoke compelling reasons arising out of previous persecution for refusing to return to the country of his former habitual residence.

D. This Convention shall not apply to persons who are at present receiving from organs or agencies of the United Nations other than the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees protection or assistance.

When such protection or assistance has ceased for any reason, without the position of such persons being definitively settled in accordance with the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, these persons shall ipso facto be entitled to the benefits of this Convention.

E. This Convention shall not apply to a person who is recognized by the competent authorities of the country in which he has taken residence as having the rights and obligations which are attached to the possession of the nationality of that country.

F. The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that:

a. he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes;

b. he has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee;

c. he has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
Article 2

GENERAL OBLIGATIONS

Every refugee has duties to the country in which he finds himself, which require in particular that he conform to its laws and regulations as well as to measures taken for the maintenance of public order.

Article 7

EXEMPTION FROM RECIPROCITY

1. Except where this Convention contains more favourable provisions, a Contracting State shall accord to refugees the same treatment as is accorded to aliens generally.

2. After a period of three years' residence, all refugees shall enjoy exception from legislative reciprocity in the territory of the Contracting States.

3. Each Contracting State shall continue to accord to refugees the rights and benefits to which they were already

entitled, in the absence of reciprocity, at the date of entry into force of this Convention for that State.

4. The Contracting States shall consider favourably the possibility of according to refugees, in the absence of reciprocity, rights and benefits beyond those to which they are entitled according to paragraphs 2 and 3, and to extend exemption from reciprocity to refugees who do not fulfil the conditions provided for in paragraphs 2 and 3.

5. The provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3 apply both to the rights and benefits referred to in articles 13, 18, 19, 21 and 22 of this Convention and to rights and benefits for which this Convention does not provide.

Article 26

FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

Each Contracting State shall accord to refugees lawfully in its territory the right to choose their place of residence and to move freely within its territory, subject to any regulations applicable to aliens generally in the same circumstances.

Article 27

IDENTITY PAPERS

The Contracting States shall issue identity papers to any refugee in their territory who does not possess a valid travel document.

Article 28

1. The Contracting States shall issue to refugees lawfully staying in their territory travel documents for the purpose of travel outside their territory unless compelling reasons of national security or public order otherwise require, and the provisions of the Schedule to this Convention shall apply with respect to such documents. The Contracting States may issue such a travel document to any other refugee in their territory; they shall in particularly give sympathetic consideration to the issue of such a travel document to refugees in their territory who are unable to obtain a travel document from the country of their lawful residence.

2. Travel documents issued to refugees under previous international agreements by parties thereto shall be recognized and treated by the Contracting States in the same way as if they had been issued pursuant to this article.

Article 31

REFUGEES UNLAWFULLY IN THE COUNTRY OF REFUGE

1. The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened in the sense of Article 1, enter or are present in their territory without authorization, provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence.

2. The Contracting States shall not apply to the movements of such refugees restrictions other than those which are necessary and such restrictions shall only be applied until their status in the country is regularized or they obtain admission into another country. The Contracting States shall allow such refugees a reasonable period and all the necessary facilities to obtain admission into another country.

Article 32

EXPULSION

1. The Contracting States shall not expel a refugee lawfully in their territory save on grounds of national security or public order.

2. The expulsion of such a refugee shall be only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with due process of law. Except where compelling reasons of national security otherwise require, the refugee shall be allowed to submit evidence to clear himself, and to appeal to and be represented for the purpose before competent authority or a person or persons specially designated by the competent authority.

3. The Contracting States shall allow such a refugee a reasonable period within which to seek legal admission into another country. The Contracting States reserve the right to apply during that period such internal measures as they may deem necessary.

Article 33

PROHIBITION OF EXPULSION OR RETURN

("REFOULEMENT")

1. No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers or territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.

2. The benefit or the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgement of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.

Article 34

NATURALIZATION

The contracting states shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees. They shall in particular make every effort to expedite naturalization proceedings and to reduce as far as possible the charges and costs of such proceedings.

Article 35

CO-OPERATION OF THE NATIONAL AUTHORITIES WITH THE UNITED NATIONS

1. The contracting states undertake to co-operate with the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees or any other agency of the United Nations which may succeed it, in the exercise of its functions, and shall in particular facilitate its duty of supervising the application of the provisions of this convention.

2. In order to enable the office of the High Commissioner or any other agency of the United Nations which may succeed it, to make reports to the competent organs of the United Nations, the contracting states undertake to provide them in the appropriate form with information and statistical data requested concerning:

(a) the condition of refugees,

(b) the implementation of this convention, and

(c) laws,regulations and decrees which are,or may hereafter
be,in force relating to refugees.

APPENDIX II

EXTRACT FROM THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING
TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES

Article 1

GENERAL PROVISIONS

1.The States Parties to the present Protocol undertake to apply articles 2 to 34 inclusive of the Convention to refugees as hereinafter defined.

2.For the purpose of the present Protocol, the term "refugee" shall, except as regards the application of paragraph 3 of this article,mean any person within the definition of article 1 of the Convention as if the words "As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and....."and the words "....as a result of such events", in article 1 A (2) were omitted.

3.The present Protocol shall be applied by the States Parties hereto without any geographic limitation, save that existing declarations made by States already Parties to the Convention in accordance with article 1 B (1) (a) of the Convention, shall, unless extended under article 1 B (2) thereof, apply also under the present Protocol.

APPENDIX III

OAU CONVENTION GOVERNING SPECIFIC ASPECTS
OF THE PROBLEM OF REFUGEES IN AFRICA

PREAMBLE

We the Heads of State and Government assembled in the city of Addis Ababa from 6 to 10 September 1969.

1.NOTING WITH CONCERN the constantly increasing numbers of refugees in Africa and desirous of finding ways and means of alleviating their misery and suffering as well as providing them with a better life and future.

2.RECOGNIZING the need for an essentially humanitarian approach towards solving the problem of refugees.

3.AWARE,however,that refugee problems are a source of friction among many Member States,and desirous of eliminating the source of such discord.

4.ANXIOUS to make a distinction a refugee who seeks a peaceful and normal life and a person fleeing his country for the sole purpose of fomenting subversion from outside.

5. DETERMINED that the activities of such subversive elements should be discouraged in accordance with the Declaration on the Problem of Subversion and Resolution on the Problem of Refugees adopted at Accra in 1965.

6. BEARING in mind that the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights have affirmed the principle that human beings shall enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms without discrimination.

7. RECALLING Resolution 2312 (XXII) of 14 December 1967 of the United Nations General Assembly, relating to the Declaration on Territorial Asylum.

8. CONVINCED that all the problems of our continent must be solved in the spirit of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity and in the African context.

9. RECOGNIZING that the United Nations Convention of 28 July 1951, as modified by the Protocol of 31 January 1967, constitutes the basic and universal instrument relating to the status of refugees and reflects the deep concern of States for refugees and their desire to establish common standards for their treatment.

10.   RECALLING Resolutions 26 and 104 of the OAU Assemblies of Heads of State and Government, calling upon Member States of the Organization who had not already done so to accede to the United Nations Convention of 1951 and to the Protocol of 1967 relating to the Status of Refugees, and meanwhile to apply their provisions to refugees in Africa.

11.   CONVINCED that the efficiency of the measures recommended by the present Convention to solve the problem of refugees in Africa necessitates close and continuous collaboration between the Organization of African Unity and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

HAVE AGREED as follows:

Article I

DEFINITION OF THE TERM "REFUGEES"

1.   For the purpose of this Convention, the term "refugee" shall mean every person who, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country, or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.

2.   The "refugee" shall also apply to every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality.

3.   In the case of a person who has several nationalities, the term "country of which he is a national" shall mean each of the countries of which he is a national, and a person shall not be deemed to be lacking the protection of the country of which he is a national if, without any valid reason based on well-founded fear, he has not availed himself of the protection of one of the countries of which he is a national.

4.   This Convention shall cease to apply to any refugee if:

a) he has voluntarily re-availed himself of the protection of the country of his nationality, or,

a) having lost his nationality, he voluntarily re-acquired it; or,

c) has acquired a new nationality, and enjoys the protection of the country of his new nationality, or,

d) he has voluntarily re-established himself in the country which he left or outside which he remained owing to fear of persecution, or,

e) he can no longer, because the circumstances in connection with which he was recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail himself of the protection of the country of his nationality, or,

g) he has seriously infringed the purposes and objectives of this Convention.

5. The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with respect to whom the country of Asylum has serious reasons for considering that;

a) he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect os such crimes;

b) he committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee;

c) he has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the Organization of African Unity;

d) he had been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations

6. For the purposes of this Convention, the Contracting State of Asylum shall determine whether an applicant is a refugee.

Article II

ASYLUM

1. Member States of the OAU shall use their best endeavours consistent with their respective legislations to

receive refugees and to secure the settlement of those refugees who, for well-founded reasons, are unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin or nationality.

2. The grant of asylum to refuges is a peaceful and humanitarian act and shall not be regarded as an unfriendly act by any Member State.

3. No person shall be subjected by a Member State to measures such as rejection at the frontier, return or expulsion, which would compel him to return to or remain in a territory where his life, physical integrity or liberty would be threatened for the reasons set out in Article I, paragraphs 1 and 2.

4. Where a Member State finds difficulty in continuing to grant asylum to refugees, such Member State may appeal directly to other Member States and through the OAU, and such other Member States shall in the spirit of African solidarity and international co-operation take appropriate measure to lighten the burden of the Member State granting asylum.

5. Where a refugee has not receive the right to reside in any country of asylum, he may be granted temporary residence in any country of asylum in which he first presented himself as a refugee pending arrangement for his resettlement in accordance with the preceding paragraph.

6. For reasons of security, countries of asylum shall, as far as possible, settle refugees at a reasonable distance from the frontier of their country of origin.

Article III

PROHIBITION OF SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

1. Every refugee has duties to the country in which he finds himself, which require in particular that he conforms with its laws and regulations as well as with measures taken for the maintenance of public order. He shall also abstain from any subversive activities against any Member States of the OAU.

2. Signatory States undertake to prohibit refugees residing in their respective territories from attacking any Member State of the OAU, by any activity likely to cause tension between Member States, and in particular by use of arms, through the press, or by radio.

Article IV

NON-DISCRIMINATION

Member States undertake to apply the provisions of the
Convention to all refugees without discrimination as to
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinions.

Article V

VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION

1. The essentially voluntary character of repatriation
shall be respected in all cases and no refugee shall be
repatriated against his will.

2. The country of asylum, in collaboration with the
country of origin, shall make adequate arrangements for the
safe return of refugees who request repatriation. The
country of origin, on receiving back refugees, shall
facilitate their resettlement and grant them the full rights
and privileges of nationals of the country, and subject them
to the same obligations.

3. The country of origin, on receiving back refugees,
shall facilitate their resettlement and grant them the full
rights and privileges of nationals of the country, and
subject them to the same obligations.

4. Refugees who voluntarily return to their country
shall in no way be penalized for having left it for any of
the reasons giving rise to refugee situations. Whenever
necessary, an appeal shall be made through national
information media and through the Administrative Secretary-
General of the OAU, inviting refugees to return home and
giving assurance that the new circumstances prevailing in
their country of origin will enable them to return without
risk and to take up a normal and peaceful life without fear
of being disturbed or punished, and that the text of such
appeal should be given to refugees and clearly explained to
them by their country of asylum.

5. Refugees who freely decide to return to their
homeland, as a result of such assurances or on their own
initiative, shall be given every possible assistance by the
country of asylum, the country of origin, voluntary agencies
and international and intergovernmental organizations, to
facilitate their return.

Article VI

TRAVEL DOCUMENTS

1. Subject to Article III, Members States shall issue to refugees lawfully staying in their territories travel documents in accordance with the United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the Schedule and Annex thereto, for the purpose of travel outside their territory, unless compelling reasons of national security or public order otherwise require. Member States may issue such a travel document to any other refugee in their territory.

2. Where an African country of second asylum accepts a refugee from a country of first asylum, the country of first asylum may be dispensed from issuing a document with a return clause.

3. Travel documents issued to refugees under previous international agreements by State Parties thereto shall be recognized and treated by Member States in the same way as if they had been issued to refugees pursuant to this Article.

Article VII

CO-OPERATION OF THE NATIONAL AUTHORITIES WITH THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

In order to enable the Administrative Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity to make reports to the competent organs of the Organization of African Unity, Member States undertake to provide the Secretariat in the appropriate form with information and statistical data requested concerning.

a)   the condition of refugees

b)   the implementation of this Convention, and

c)   laws, regulations and decrees which are, or may hereafter be, in force relating to refugees.

Article VIII

CO-OPERATION WITH THE OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES

1. Member States shall co-operate with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

2. The present Convention shall be the effective regional complement in Africa of the 1951 United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees.

Article IX

SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

Any dispute between States signatories to this Convention relating to its interpretation or application, which cannot be settled by other means, shall be referred to the Commission for Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration of the Organization of African Unity, at the request of any one of the Parties to the dispute.

Article X

SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION

1. This Convention is open for signature and accession by all Member States of the Organization of African Unity and shall be ratified by signatory States in accordance with their respective constitutional process. The instruments or ratification shall be deposited with the Administrative Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity.

2. The original instrument, done if possible in African languages, in English and French, all texts being equally authentic, should be deposited with the Administrative Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity.

3. Any independent African State, Member of the Organization of African Unity, may at any time notify the Administrative Secretary- General of the Organization of African Unity of its accession to the Convention.

Article XI

ENTRY INTO FORCE

This Convention shall come into force upon deposit of instruments of ratification by one-third of the Member States of the Organization of African Unity.

Article XII

AMENDMENT

The Convention may be amended or revised if any Member State makes a written request to the Administrative Secretary-General to that effect, provided however that the proposed amendment shall not be submitted to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government for consideration until all Member States have been duly notified of it and a period of one year has elapsed. Such an amendment shall not be effective unless approved by at least two-thirds of the Member States Parties to the present Convention.

Article XIII

DENUNCIATION

1. Any Member State Party to this convention may denounce its provisions by a written notification to the Administrative General-Secretary.

2. At the end of one year from the date of such notification, if not withdrawn, the Convention shall cease to apply with respect to the denouncing State.

Article XIV

Upon entry into force of this Convention, the Administrative Secretary-General of the OAU shall register it with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article XV

NOTIFICATIONS BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

The Administrative Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity shall inform all Members of the Organization:

a) of signatures, ratification and accessions in accordance with Article X;

b) of entry into force, in accordance with Article XI;

c) of requests for amendments submitted under the terms of Article XII;

d) of denunciations, in accordance with Article XII

IN WITNESS WHEREOF WE, the Heads of African State and Government, have signed this Convention.

1. Algeria. 2. Botswana. 3. Burundi. 4. Cameroon. 5. Central African Repbulic. 6. Chad. 7. Congo (Brazzaville). 8. Congo (Kinshasa). 9. Dahomey. 10. Equatorial Guinea. 11. Ethiopia. 12. Gabon. 13. Gambia. 14. Ghana 15. Guinea. 16. Ivory Coast. 17. Kenya. 18. Lesotho. 19. Liberia. 20. Libya. 21. Madagascar. 22. Malawi. 23. Mali. 24. Mauritania. 25. Mauritius. 26. Morocco. 27. Niger 28. Nigeria. 29. Rwanda. 30. Senegal. 31. Sierra Leone. 32. Somalia. 33. Sudan. 34. Swaziland. 35. Togo. 36. Tunisia. 37. Uganda. 38. United Arab Repbulic. 39. United Republic of Tanzania. 40 Upper Volta. 41. Zambia.

DONE in the City of Addis Ababa this 10th day of September 1969.

Appendix IV.
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
University of Ghana

SAHELIAN REFUGEES STUDY PROJECT

This is a research project from the Department of Political Science that seeks to understand the problems of people, who have been forced by circumstances in the Sahel area of West Africa, to come to Ghana. The questions are to help with understanding the problems facing such people with a view to making Ghanaians more aware. We are therefore kindly asking you to answer the following questions:

1. Sex .... 2. Age ....
3. Which country do you come from?.... ....
4. Which tribe/people do you belong to? ....
5. What work did you do in your country? ....
6. Why did you leave your country? ....
   ....
7. Why did you come to Ghana in particular?...............
   ....
8. How long have you been in Ghana?.....................
9. How did you travel to Ghana?.........................
10. Did you come straight here or you spent some time in
    other countries?.....................................
11. How long did it take to travel here?.................
12. How big was the group you came with?.................
13. Did other groups leave from your area? 1.Yes   2.No
14. If Yes do you know where they went?...................
15. How many people came from your family?...............
16. Where did you cross the border into Ghana?...........
17. Are any more of your people coming into Ghana now?.
    1.Yes 2.No
18. Before leaving your country did you know anyone in
    Ghana?   1.Yes 2.No
19. If yes did you stay with these people when you first
    arrived in Ghana? 1.Yes 2.No
20. If answer to Q19 is no give reasons..................
21. Where are you living now?...........................
22. How many rooms do you live in?......................
23. Who owns the building?.............................
24. Do you have the permission of the house owner to live
    in the house? 1.Yes 2.No
25. Do you pay rent? 1.Yes 2.No
26. If yes how much per month?..........................
27. How many people share the rooms?
    1.Children...................2.Adults..............
28. Are you all from the same family? 1.Yes 2.No
29. Have any children been born since you arrived?   1.Yes
    2.No
30. If yes how many?.............................

31. When you fall sick, where do you go for help?.........
32. Are you charged for the treatment you get? 1.Yes 2.No
33. If yes how much?.....................................
34. If there was a camp would you want to live in it?
    1.Yes 2.No
35. Give reasons for your answer......................
36. Can you read and write? 1.Yes 2.No
37. How do you make a living?
    1.By Begging 2.By Charity 3.Other Malians.
38. If you beg do you make enough to live on in a day?
    1.Yes 2.No
39. If yes, how much do you make?.........................
40. Is everyone in your family able to help with the
    begging? 1.Yes 2.No
41. What problems do you meet when
    begging?...
    ....
42. Is there any other way of making a living that you
    would consider? 1.Yes 2.No
43. Give reasons for your answer..........................
    ....
44. What kind of reception have you had from ordinary
    Ghanaians?..
45. Has this changed since you arrived? 1.Yes   2.No
46. If yes what change?..................................
47. What kind of help have you had from ordinary Ghanaians?

    ....
48. How have Ghanaian authorities treated you?..........
    ....
49. Have the authorities given you any help? 1.Yes 2.No
50. If yes what help?....................................
51. Have you got any help from your country's embassy in
    Accra? 1.Yes   2.No
53. If yes what help?....................................
54. Is there any other help you think your embassy can give
    you? 1.Yes 2.No
55. If yes what help?....................................
56. Is there anything in particular that you need which you
    haven't received? 1.Yes 2.No
57. If yes what?...
58. Do you want to live here permanently? 1.yes 2.No
59. Give reasons for your answer.........................
60. How do plan to make a living in the future and in which
    country?..
    ....

APPENDIX V

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR LIBERIAN REFUGEES IN GHANA

This is a study to get more information about the circumstances that led to your leaving your country for Ghana. It is to enable some analysis to be made on issues that will make your stay more meaningful. It will also help with planning for the camp in the future.

Respondent No........

1. BACKGROUND

1.1. Ethnicity/Nationality
1. Kran   2. Gio   3. Mano   4. Americo-Liberian
5. Kpelleh 6. Other...........

1.2. Sex: 1. Male   2. Female

1.3. Age 1. under 20   2. 21-30   3. 31-40   4. 41-50
5. 51-60   6. above 60.

1.4. Marital Status
1. Single   2. Married   3. Separated/divorced
4 Widow   5. Husband/wife missing
6. Other............

1.5. Total number of persons in the room/tent
1 Children .... 2. Wives.......
3. Other dependents:

1.6. Do you share the room/tent withanotherfamily/ individual not related to you by blood ? 1. Yes
2. No.

1.7. If yes who ?
1. Refugee family from my country.   2. Refugee family from my tribe   3. Other:.....................

1.8. Before you left your country, how many persons were in your family/household ? 1. I was living alone
2. .....persons.

1.9. What happened to those who are not here now
1 . Still living back home   2. Have fled to another country   3. Live elsewhere in Ghana
4. Killed in the war

1.10. How are they related to you?
1. Parents.   2. Grandparents.   3. Child/children

4. Spouse   5. Sisters/brothers   6. Other/specify

1.11.   Age of children in the household: Give age and
        number:
        1. 5yrs or below:...... 2. Between 6-10yrs......
        3. Between 11-16 yrs.

1.12.   Did you lose a member of your household since you
        arrived in Ghana? 1. Yes 2. No.

1.13:   (a). If Yes what was the age of the deceased?
        1. 1yr. or below. 2. 1-5yrs.   3. 6-15yrs   4.10-
        30yrs 5. Over 30yrs.
        b) What was the cause of death?.................

2.   HOUSING CONDITION IN GHANA

2.1.   What type of house do you live in?
       1. Housed in camp.   2. Tent in camp
       3. Housed outside camp 4. Other\specify:..........
2.2.   How sufficient is the housing space for your household
       members? 1. Sufficient 2. Crowded. 3. Very crowded
       4. Can't say.

2.3.   Do you/your family own the house
       1. Yes 2. Rent it 3. Staying with friends/relatives.
       4. Other specify...................................
2.4.   If you rent the house, how much do you pay per
       month? ....

2.5.   (a) From where do you get water?
       1. Pipe 2. River/spring. 3. Bore hole 4. Other
       Specify...................................
       (b) Does the water flow all the time? 1. Yes 2. No .
       (c) Distance of water source from house:
       1. ....km   2. ....hrs on foot.

2.6.   Does the household have a latrine? 1. Yes 2. No.

3.   CAUSE OF FLIGHT FROM COUNTRY OF ORIGIN

3.1 (a)   Anticipatory: flight caused by what respondent
          thought would happen to him/her
          1. Fear of persecution for political reasons
          2. Fear of religious persecution
          3. Fear military raids and war
          4. Other specify...........................

    (b)   Acute flight: flight caused by what has actually
          happened to respondent, members of his/her
          household, the households property etc.

1. Actual political persecution (respondent or member of household in prison; the police were after him/her or member of household.
2. Actual religious persecution.
3. Fighting in respondent's hometown or village.
4. Destruction of house.
5. Other actual cause:....................

3.2. Voluntary migration
   1. In search of job.   2. In search of education.
   3. Other/specify:............................

3.3. Was your flight planned?
   1. Yes, planned and preparation beforehand
   2. No. It was sudden but not in panic.
   3. Was in haste and panic.

3.4. Did you get information about the life of refugees in Ghana before you left your country?   1. Yes   2. No.

3.5. If Yes, what was the information?
   1. Positive (information was that refugee life in Ghana is not difficult   2. Negative (refugee life is difficult). 3. Other/specify:........................

3.6 What was the source of information?
   1. Mass media   2. Relative\friends who were or live in Ghana   3. No answer. 4.Other/specify.............

3.7. Did you find life in Ghana as you expected it?
   1. Yes, as I expected/heard about   2. No, it is better than I expected. 3. No, it is not as easy as I thought\was told. 4.No Answer.

3.8. Means of transport to Ghana?
   1. On foot.   2. By car.   3. By ship.   4 By air
   5. Other\specify: ....

3.9. Length of time the journey took in days:
   1. Less than 3 days.   2. Between 4 & 7 days.
   3. Between 8 & 14 days. 4. 15 & 21 days. 5. 22 & 28days.

3.10. What were the hazards (dangers) you encountered on your way to Ghana? 1. No hazards faced.   2. Attacked by military.   3. Attacked by wild animals.   4.Robbers.
   5. Other\specify..............

3.11 Other problem? 1. No problem.   2. Lack of food.
   3. Lack of water 4. Malaria.   5. Other infectious diseases. 6. Other\specify............

3.12   Did any in your family or among the people you fled
        with die on the way to Ghana? 1. Yes   2. No.

3.13.   If Yes, how many people: 1. ...Child(ren)
        2.....adult(s).

3.14.   What is the appropriate age of the deceased person(s)?
        1. 5yrs. or below   2. 7-16yrs. 17-25yrs 4. 26-45yrs
        5. Above 45.

3.15.   What was the cause of death?
        1.   Ambushed by Doe's soldiers 2. Ambushed by
             Taylor's soldiers 3. Lack of food.   4. Malaria.
        5. Other diseases 6.   Exhaustion from long journey.
        7. Do not know. 8.Other/specify.....................

4.   ARRIVAL AND SETTLEMENT IN GHANA

4.1.   Date of arrival in Ghana (i.e. date of crossing
        border):
        1. Month ....19... 2. Length of stay in
        Ghana.......

4.2.   Date of arrival at present site (Camp, Settlement,
        Town)................

4.3.   On arrival in Ghana what were the most difficult
        problem(s)\encountered?
        1. Faced no difficulties. 2. Lack of means of
        sustenance 3. Shelter.4. Language problem
        5. Cultural related problems. 6 Other\specify:

4.4   If answer to Q. 4.3. is cultural-related, Which?
        ....

4.5   Did you solve the problem?
        1. Yes totally   2. Yes partially. 3. No. 4. Don't
        know

4.6.   If Yes, (has solved problems) who helped you solve it?
        1. No one but myself   2. Relatives   3. Countrymen
        4. The local people (Ghanaians) 5. Ghana government
           authorities. 6. Humanitarian organisations.
        7. Other\specify:.....

4.7.   Number of times respondent changed place of residence
        in Ghana?   1. Not changed. 2. Changed one time.
        3 Changed two times 4.Changed more than two times

4.8   Reasons for changing residence:

1. To join relatives or family member.   2. In search of education 3. In search of cultivable land.
4. Because of health reasons.
5. Other\specify:..........................

4.9. How long do you intend to stay in the present residence?
1. No intention to stay here at all.   2. For a few years.3. Until I can return to country of origin.
4. Do not intend to move.   5. Depend on circumstances.

4.10 If respondent intend to move to another place, Why?
1. Due to health problems.   2. To join family
3. In search of education.   4. In search of job.
5. Other.......

5.   CONDITIONS IN THE CAMP

5.1. When you arrived at the camp, were you readily accommodated? 1. Yes.   2. No.

5.2.   If Yes, what type of accommodation?
1. A house   2. A tent.   3.Other\specify
:...........

5.3.   If No. Why ?
1.   No houses were ready.   2. No tents were ready
3.   Officials at camp not ready.
4 .Other/Specify:......

5.4.   How many times are you fed a day?
1. Once   2. Twice   3. Thrice

5.5.   Is the food adequate?   1. Yes   2. No.

5.6.   If No, why?
1. The quantity is small.   2. The meat is small. 3. There is no meat

5.7.   Who cooks the food?
1. Refugee women.   2. Women volunteers from Ghana
3.   Other:..........

5.8.   Would you prefer to cook for yourselves?
1. Yes.   2. No I prefer the existing arrangements.

5.9.   If Yes, give reasons?
1. I want variety.   2. I want to cook when I want to. 3.   I want to cook for myself and family.
4.Other:....

6. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS, EMPLOYMENT AND PROPERTY RELATIONS IN COUNTRY OF ORIGIN AND IN HOST COUNTRY.

6.1. Did you take your property (possessions) with you when you left your country?
1. Yes (all or most of it).   2. Yes (part of it)
3. No (left everything behind).   4. I had no property.

6.2   What happened to these possessions you took with you when you left home?
1. Have kept all of it.   2. Have kept part of it.
3. Sold and exchanged all of it.   4. Sold and exchanged part of it.   5. Other\specify:
....

6.4.   If you left property behind, what and how many?
1. House(s)..... 2. Shops(s) ..... 3. Others:
....

6.5   What happened to the property you left behind?
1. Do not know   2. Confiscated by government.
3. Confiscated by rebels.   4. Being used by relatives
5. Other\specify ....

6.6   Did you have an occupation in your country?
1. Yes.   2. No (I was unemployed).   3. Student
4. Housewife.

6.7. If Yes, were you....?
1. Self-employed.   2. Civil Servant (government employee 3. Employed by private person or Company.
4 Others:......

6.8   If Self-employed, were you .....?
1. Peasant farmer.   2. Nomad.   3. Handicraftsman.
4. Others:.....

6.9.   If government employee what job did you have?
1. Clerk (all office work).   2. Soldier\Policeman
3. Driver.   4. Other\specify:..............

6.10   If employed by private person\company were you:-
1. Agricultural wage-labourer.   2. Factory worker
3. Domestic Servant.   4. Driver
5. Construction worker
6. Other\specify:.........

6.11.   If other (see 7.1 above) what?
1. Housewife.   2. Student.   3. Dependent (not of employment age).   4. Pensioned.

5. Other\specify: ....

6.12.   If peasant farmer, did you own land? 1. Yes
        2. No.

6.13   Present employment status?
        1. Employed. 2. Unemployed.   3. Housewife.

6.14.   If employed by whom?
        1. Self-employed.   2. By Ghanaian State
        3. Ghanaian private company/ Businessman.
        4. By fellow countryman (refugee). 5. By Ghanaian
           family 6. Other\ specify.....................

6.15.   What is your occupation i.e. what kind of job do you
        have at present?.......................

6.16   What is your approximate household income in Liberia?
        L$..............

6.17   How many members of your family are working and
        earning income currently?...............................

6.18   Is your income sufficient to cover the cost of
        subsistence for you and your family?
        1.Yes   2.No

6.19   If no, how do you manage to live?
        1. With assistance from UNHCR & other humanitarian
           organisations.
        2.With assistance from relatives/friends.
        3.Savings.4.Other/specify:......................

6.20   If you are unemployed what is your source of

        subsistence?..
7.   EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND OF RESPONDENT & CHILDREN IN
        SCHOOL

7.1 Did you attend school in your home country? 1.Yes   2.No

7.2 If yes what type of school?...............
    ....

7.3 Which level did you
     complete?.........................

7.4 Are you following any education programme now? 1.Yes
     2.No

7.5 If yes, what
     type/level?.............................

7.6   If there are children of school age in your household
      are they attending school? 1.Yes 2.No

7.7   If yes what type of school?
      ....

7.8   If children do not attend school why not?
      ....

8.   HEALTH

8.1   Do you have health problems? 1.Yes 2.No

8.2 If yes,what?.............................

8.3   Did you have such an illness prior to your flight to
      Ghana? 1.Yes 2.No

8.4   Have you been to see a doctor? 1.Yes 2.No

8.5   If no why?...

9.   PROBLEMS OF ADJUSTMENT & CAUSES OF ANXIETY

9.1   Is there anything that is making your adjustment in
      Ghana still difficult? 1.Yes 2.No

9.2   (a) If yes what?.............................
      (b) What are the changes,if any,you have made in your
       life style (habits,customs etc) since you came to
       Ghana? ....
      (c) Why did you make the change?...................

9.3   Do you consider yourself as
      1. Temporary refugee
      2. Permanent refugee

9.4   Would you become a Ghanaian citizen if given the
      chance?   1.Yes   2. No

9.5   Do you ever fear or think something very bad could
      happen to you because you are a refugee? 1.Yes 2. No

9.6   If yes what for example could happen to you?
      ....

9.7 Do you feel bad that you left behind members of your
     family and other relatives when you fled? 1.Yes 2. No

9.8 Are you anxious/afraid that something very bad could
     happen or has already happened to them because of your
     flight? 1.Yes 2.No

9.9 If yes what?...........................

10 SOCIAL RELATIONS & MEMBERSHIP OF ASSOCIATIONS &
ORGANISATIONS

10.1 Do you belong to any association/organisation where
refugees are the only members? 1. Yes 2. No

10.2 If yes what type?
1. Cultural 2. Religious 3. Economic 4. Political
5. Other/specify.....................................

10.3 Were you a member of such an organisation before you
came to Ghana? 1.Yes 2. No

10.4 How does this organisation benefit you?
....

11 RELATIONS WITH THE LOCAL POPULATION

11.1 Do you have informal contacts with the local people?
1.Yes 2. No

11.2 If yes how and where do your contact take place?
1. Often invited to Ghanaian homes
2. Sometimes to Ghanaian festivals & holiday
celebrations.
3. Often invited by other Liberians living in Ghana.
4. Other/specify....................................

11.3 Do you or someone in your family have marriage
relations with a local family or families? 1.Yes
2. No

11.4 Have you made Ghanaian friends? 1. Yes 2. No

11.5 Are there open conflicts between the refugees and the
local people? 1. Yes almost always 2. Only
occasionally 3. No conflicts

11.6 What are the nature of the conflicts? 1. Verbal
fights 2. Fist fights 3. Fights with weapons
4. Other/specify.............................

11.7 How many people do such conflicts usually involve?
1. Only 2 people 2. Often more than 2 people
3. Sometimes groups on each side
4. Other/specify...........

11.8 What do you think are the cause of these conflicts?
1. Cultural differences 2. Religious differences

3. Economic factors (eg local people blame refugees for shortages and high prices of commodities
4. Do not know
5. Other/specify.................................

11.9 Do you think that these conflicts are increasing?
1. Yes they are increasing No they are decreasing
3. It has been the same 4. Do not know
5. Other/specify.......................

11.10 How are the conflicts resolved? 1. Intervention by the police 2.In court 3. Mediators (elders)
5. Other/specify..........

11.11 Are there conflicts between refugees themselves?
1. Yes 2.No

11.12 What are the causes? 1.Ethnic differences
2.Religious differences 3. Political differences
4.Do not know
5.Other...

11.13 Do the conflicts affect you directly?   1. Yes 2. No

11.14 If yes,which type? 1.conflicts between refugees and Ghanaians 2. Conflict among refugees themselves
3.Both types of conflicts

11.15 How do they affect you? 1.Affect my security
2.Affect my property   3. Affect me psychologically
4.Other.........................

12.   REFUGEE ATTITUDE ABOUT ORGANIZED SETTLEMENT

12.1 How do you consider this camp as a place to live?
1.Not suitable at all   2.Suitable as temporary home
3.Suitable as permanent home

12.2 If unsuitable why?.......................................

12.3 What do you think should be done to improve the situation in the camp?.................................
....

12.4 How are decisions affecting the camp and its inhabitants made? ie are refugees
1. Yes always. 2 Sometimes. 3. Not at all.

12.5 If refugees participate in decision making at what stage? 1. When planning & implementing camp activities
like schools, clinics etc. 2. Administration of camp.

3. Other\Specify: ....

12.6   How did you come to this camp?   1. Own choice
       2. Had no alternative and took the opportunity.
       3.   Was brought here by state authorities.
       4. Other:.....

12.7 If the situation in the camp is improved ie. if
     employed,land, social services and facilities are made
     available and security is granted, would you consider
     staying here for a long time?
     ....

13.   POLITICAL AWARENESS & PARTICIPATION

13.1 Before you left your country were you politically aware
     ie. were you dissatisfied with the Liberian regime, did
     you want some sort of political change ?
       1. Yes   2. No.

13.2 If Yes, how were you involved?
       1.   I was member of a Student Union
       2.   Was member of a liberation front.
       3.   Supported a liberation front.
       4.   Other\specify:...................................

13.3 Are you still as active or as involved as before?
       1.   Yes still active.   2. Less active.
       3. Not involved.

13.4 If response is either (2) or (3) why?

     ....

13.5 If answer to 1, 2, 3, is No, have you become
     politically aware and conscious during your stay in
     Ghana?
       1. Yes   2. No

13.6   Are you involved in political activities at present ?
       1. Yes   2. No.

13.7   If Yes, how are you involved?
       ....

14   VOLUNTARY   REPATRIATION: REFUGEES   OPINIONS   ABOUT
     RETURNING HOME
14.1 What do you think would be a permanent solution to the
     problem of refugees from your country?
       1. Permanent settlement in Ghana.

2. Voluntary repatriation
3. Resettlement in a 3rd Country

14.2 Under what circumstances would you be prepared to
     return to your home country
     ....
14.3 Do you get enough information about your home country
     and the situation there?   1. Yes   2. No.

14.4 What kind of assistance do you think you would need in
     order to start life again when you return to Liberia?

....
....

APPENDIX 6

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
University of Ghana

Questionnaire for foreign students in Ghana
REFUGEES STUDY PROJECT

Introduction

This is a study from the political science department aimed at a better understanding of the circumstances that led to the flight of students and other youth from the Southern African region. The data collected is for research purposes only and will be treated as confidential. Thank you very much for your co-operation.

1. Sex .... M\F   2. Age:................

3. Which Country do you come from?....................

4. Which ethnic group do you belong to?...................

5. What work did you do in your country?..................

6. If you were not working were you in school? ....

7. Why did you leave your country? ....

8. Why did you come to Ghana in particular?...............

9. How long have you been in Ghana?......................

10. What have you been doing in Ghana since you come here?
    ....

11. How did you travel to Ghana?........................

12. Did you come straight here from your country ?   Yes\No

13. If No where did you go before coming to
    Ghana?...........

14. Do you belong to any political party?   Yes\No

15. If Yes which party ? ....

16. What help did you get from the party? ....

17. How big was the group you come with?
    ....

18. Did other groups leave for other countries? Yes\No

19. If Yes do you know where they went?...................

20. How many of you came from your family? ....

21. Since you came to Ghana has others from your country also
    come to Ghana?...

22. Before leaving for Ghana, did you know anyone in Ghana?
    ....

23. Where are you living now?
    ....

24. Who owns the building?
    ....

25. Do you pay rent??
    ....

26. Who is sponsoring your stay in Ghana?
    ....

27. What does your sponsor do for you here in
    Ghana? ....

28. Does the Ghana Government give you any assistance?
    Yes\No

29. If Yes what help?
    ....

30. If No. Why?
    ....

31. Do you get any assistance from the UNHCR? Yes\No

32. If Yes, What help?
    ....

33. If No. why?
    ....

34. If you are a student what do you plan to do after your
    studies?
    ....

35. Can you go back to your Country? Yes\No

36.   If Yes how?
      ....

37.   If No who not?
      ....

38.   What problems have you met since you came to Ghana?

      ....

39.   Can you work if you want to?   Yes/No

40.   If No. why?
      ....

41.   If Yes can you do any work?
      ....

42. What kind of reception have you had from ordinary
    Ghanaians?...

43.   Has this changed since you first came here?
      ....

44.   Have you had any specific help from such ordinary
      Ghanaians? 1. Yes   2.No

45.   If Yes what help?
         ....

46.   How   have Ghanaian Government officials treated you?
      ....

47.   How have UNHCR officials treated you?
      ....

48. How have any other officials connected with your stay
    here treated you?
      ....

49.   Does your country have an embassy in Accra? 1. Yes 2.No

50.   If Yes can you get any help from them?
      ....

51.   If No. who gives you diplomatic help?
      ....

52. Is there any other help you think the protecting body
     can give you? 1. Yes   2. No

53. If Yes what help?

   ....

54. Is there anything in particular you need which you
   haven't received?

   ....

55. Do you want to live in Ghana permanently?

   ....

56. If Yes\No. Why?

   ....

57. How do you plan to make a living in the future and in
   which country?

   ....

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AACC	—	All African Council of Churches.
AAI	—	African American Institute
ADRA	—	Adventist Development and Rehabilitation Agency
ANC	—	African National Congress
BNI	—	Committee for the Defence of the Revolution
CDO	—	Civil Defence Organisation
CMC	—	Camp Management Committee
CCG	—	Christian Council of Ghana
CPP	—	Convention People's Party
CTD	—	Conventional Travel Document
ECOWAS	—	Economic Community of West African States
ECOMOG	—	ECOWAS Monitoring Group
EEC	—	European Economic Community
GRCS	—	Ghana Red Cross Society
ICMC	—	International Catholic Migration Commission
JSS	—	Junior Secondary School
KVIP	—	Kumasi Ventilated Improved Pit
LWC	—	Liberia Welfare Council
NPFL	—	National Liberation Council
NGO	—	Non Governmental Organisation
NMP	—	National Mobilisation Programme
NYOC	—	National Youth Organising
NADIREC	—	National Disaster Relief Committee
NCS	—	National Catholic Secretariat
PLAN	—	People Liberation Army of Namibia
PP	—	Progress Party
PNDC	—	Provisional National Defence Council

PDA   —   Prevention Detention Act

L480   —   Public Law 480

RRC   —   Relief and Rehabilitation Commission

SWAPO   —   South West Africa Peoples Organisation

ULIMO   —   United Liberation Movement for Democracy

UNHCR   —   United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNTAG   —   United Nations Transitional Assistance Group

UNEPSA   —   United Nations Educational Programme for
               Training of South Africans.

UNCN   —   United Nations Commission for Namibia

WCC   —   World Council of Churches

WVI   —   World Vision International

WFP   —   World Food Programme