



**Thesis
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
**REGIME INTEREST AND MECHANISMS
FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN WEST
AFRICA: THE CASE OF NIGERIA IN
ECOMOG**

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**REGIME INTEREST AND MECHANISMS FOR
CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN WEST AFRICA:
THE CASE OF NIGERIA IN ECOMOG**



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*A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL, AHMADU BELLO
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FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR. OF PHILOSOPHY IN
POLITICAL SCIENCE*

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
DEDICATION

Beloved Rahab Berakah and our children for their sacrifice of love.


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
This thesis entitled "Regime Interest and Mechanisms for Conflict Resolution in West Africa: The Case of Nigeria in ECOMOG" meets the regulations governing the award of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science of Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, and is approved for its literary contribution to knowledge.


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
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
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DECLARATION

I, **Joses Gani Yoroms** with Reg. No. Ph.D FASS/9631/1992 3, do hereby declare that this thesis has been prepared by me and it is a product of my research work. It has not been accepted in any previous application for a degree. All quotations are indicated by quotation marks, by indentation and acknowledged by means of notes and references.



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Finally, I take responsibility for all the errors of facts presented in the work.



José Gamí Yoroms
Zaria, December 2004

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In the samefold, Abacha's regime which emerged from the crisis of domestic legitimation found it credible to re-sponsor and supported ECOMOG to restore a democratic regime in Sierra Leone as a means to establish credibility for himself and regime in Nigeria. Though hailed by the international community on the interest shown in using ECOMOG restore democracy in Sierra Leone, he suffered domestic legitimacy. Invariably the intervention in Sierra Leone was intended to seek endorsement for his regime's engendered transition programme.

On the basis on the above, this thesis posits that when a regime begins to be conscious of its security and stability rather than national and regional security and stability, there is bound to be clashes of interest between the constituent values of national and regional objectives; and the interest of the regime in power. Thus, once the national interest of a country fails to be coterminous with the interest of the regime's leadership, conflict is bound to occur as the regime may seek legitimacy by use of force. This may generate protracted conflict that may not truly threaten international peace and security, but domestic and regional peace.

It is on the basis of this that the research developed a model of regime interest, using Nigeria under Babangida and Abacha to demonstrate how the quest for regime interest, security and stability by these leaders has affected Nigerian national security interest as well as regional security in West Africa. The implications of this include:

- (i) ill – feelings among member states of ECOWAS as to Nigeria's intention in the regime.
- (ii) weaken of domestic cohesiveness in Nigeria
- (iii) fear of an emerging authoritarian hegemony in West Africa.

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ACRONYMS

AAFC	-	Allied Armed Forces of the Community
ABN	-	Association of Better Nigeria
AFRC	-	Armed Forces Ruling Council
AFRC	-	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
ANAD	-	L'Accord de Non Aggression etd' Assistance Matirede Defence
ASU	-	Arab Socialist Union
ASUU	-	Academic Staff Union of Universities
BPC	-	Basic Peoples Congress
CEAO	-	Communaute Economique del'Afrique del'quest
CD	-	Campaign for Democracy
CDC	-	Constitution Drafting Committee
CDHR	-	Centre for Democracy and Human Rights
CMAG	-	Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group
CNC	-	Congress for National Consensus
COAS	-	Chief of Army Staff
DFRRI	-	Directorate of Food, Roads and Rural Infrastructure
DMA	-	Directorate of Military Agency
DMI	-	Directorate of Military Intelligence
DPN	-	Democratic Party of Nigeria
ECOMOG	-	ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	-	Economic Community of West African States.
GDM	-	Grassroots Democratic Movement
IMF	-	International Monetary fund
ING	-	Interim National Government
INPFL	-	Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia
JCMC	-	Joint Cease-fire and Monitoring committee
LNIG	-	Liberian National Transitional Government
LPC	-	Liberian Peace Council
MNCR	-	Movement National Congolaise
LDF	-	Lofa Défence Force
LNC	-	Liberian National Conference
LPC	-	Liberia Peace Council
NATO	-	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NAZI	-	National Sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter Parties
NDLEA	-	National Drug Law Enforcement Agency
NIA	-	National Intelligence Agency
NLC	-	Nigerian Labour Congress
NDSC	-	National Defence and Security council

NEC	-	National Electoral Commission
NADECO	-	National Democratic Coalition
NANS	-	National Association of Nigeria
NARD	-	National Association of Resident Doctors
NALICON	-	Nation Liberation Council of Nigeria
NECON	-	National Electoral Commission
NEPA	-	National Electric Power Authority
NEPU	-	Northern Element Peoples Union
NEMG	-	Nigerian Election Monitoring Group
NCPN	-	National Centre Party of Nigerian
NPFL	-	National Patriotic Front Liberia
NMA	-	Nigeria Medical Association
NRC	-	National Reconciliation Commission
OAS	-	Organisation of American States
OAU	-	organisation of African Unity
PRC	-	Provisional Ruling Council
PMAD	-	Protocol on Mutual Assistance for Defence
PNA	-	Protocol on Non-aggression
RCC	-	Revolutionary Command Council
RUF	-	Revolutionary United Front
SAP	-	Structural Adjustment Programme
SMC	-	Standing Mediation Committee
SDP	-	Social Democratic Party
SOFA	-	Status of forces Agreement
SSS	-	State Security Service
PMCPMRPKS	-	Mechanism for Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security
TIC	-	Transition Implementation Committee
TCPC	-	Technical Committee on Privatization and Commercialization
UAD	-	United Action for Democracy
UEMOA	-	Union Monetaire et economique Quest Africaines
UNOMIL	-	United Nations Observers Missions in Liberia
UNOMSIL	-	United Nations Observers Mission in Sierra Leone
ULIMO-J	-	United Liberia Movement for Democracy in Liberia – Khran Faction
ULIMO-K	-	United Liberian Movement for Democracy in Liberia – Madingo Faction
UN	-	United Nations

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CHAPTER ONE

1.0

INTRODUCTORY OVERVIEW

1.1 BACKGROUND

There has been a radical departure from the variables, which had hitherto characterised the pursuit of Nigerian defence and foreign policy issues since independence. This departure coincided with some encircled scenarios, which took place in Nigeria from three levels. The first was the political transition to democratic rule, which rendered and diversified political alliances without reinforcing dominant elite consciousness. Secondly, the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programme as packaged with severe austerity, though seen as the most sweeping macro-economic policy in Nigeria's post independent history, (Biersteker, 1993:180). The effect of the above two factors influenced the third factor, which is the reshaping of Nigeria's foreign policy to enhance regime-security interest under the guise of Nigeria's regional interest in West Africa. These scenarios informed the conception of the political transition as a gradual, measured and supervised learning process, meant to change elite behavioural and attitudinal dispositions from prebendal politics to consensual politics (Omoruyi, 1992 (a); 1992(b); and 1993).

As sound as this position may be, however, several doubts leading to sceptical thoughts faulted the transition process (see Osaghae, 1993; Gana, 1992; Osaghae, 1993; Ake, 1993; Akindele, 1994). The manipulations of the political process by the government set the political actors against each other. The political manipulation entrapped and scuffled the transition programme. Professor Claude Ake clarified this picture when he noted that

"military produced the politics and the politicians, cultivated a politics disassociated from issues, ideology and social forces. It created political parties abstracted from social realities, parties belonging to everyone in general and to no one in particular and thus constituted anarchy of ambition. It orchestrated a campaign against politics. It is difficult to think of anything that the

military can usefully do to promote democracy or development except to disengage from politics” (Ake, 1993: 32-33).

Hitherto, Alhaji Mohammed Gambo, the National Security Adviser to the President, General Ibrahim Babangida, in an exclusive policy orientation at the Centre for Democratic Studies, advises that given the trend in the transition programme if political power is limited to a particular dominant interest, be it an entrepreneurial elite, the military high-ranking officers or ethnic, religious or linguistic minority, it “can cause severe deterioration in the physiological quality of life and promote civil disorder” (Gambo, 1991;5). The inability of the regime to heed this advice resulted to various political threats to national security; as human rights activists and opponents of the regime began to protest calling for Sovereign National Conference (SNC) to resolve contentious political issues at stake.

The structural adjustment programme also created its own variant of threats to national security. The harsh economic measures led to the devaluation of national currency, trade liberalisation, de-regulation of interest rates, privatisation and commercialisation, elimination of subsidies, retrenchment of the working class, restraining of various physical and monetary activities in the economy among others. The privatisation and commercialisation other uses which were meant to enforce moral economy ended in the expansion of elite interest in Nigeria (Agbese; 1992). While the citizens were left to try their hands on multiple means of survival/livelihood, the situation got deteriorated and subsequently worsened the social relations in the families (Mustapha, 1992; 197). The economic restructuring process retarded growth, dislocated the fabric of the indigenous economic development, and promoted extreme inequalities in the distribution of wealth by marginalising the majority of the producing population who have to confront hyper-inflationary economic trends. Yet the Nigerian ruling classes wasted resources and mismanaged the economy to the extent that the World

Bank/IMF and external creditors relaxed their initial support for the Babangida's economic programme (Biersteker, 1993).

In the sphere of defence and foreign policy, the Babangida regime made attempts to stabilise the domestic terrain through an ambitious peace initiative under the guise of demonstrating Nigeria's regional hegemony in ECOWAS, for the maintenance of international peace and security. Equally too, the regime became disturbed when the main rebel leader of the Liberian conflict, Mr. Charles Taylor of the NPLF (National Patriotic Front of Liberia), announced that a revolution had started in West Africa, beginning from Liberia. Firstly, the regime felt threatened because of the potential danger such external threat would be internally perceived by the emerging domestic restless and radical forces opposed to the regime. Moreover, the 1990 aborted bloody **coup d'etat** did not only fundamentally shake the regime but made her to re-define its legitimacy, as some Nigerians who were sympathetic to the course of the 1990 abortive coup were found to be either in training camps of Taylor and fighting together with NPFL forces (Tell, 1992). The anticipation of these opposing forces was that when Liberia had been won over (to Taylor), attention would be turned elsewhere in the region, including Nigeria where Taylor's support would readily make this fighting forces available.

Secondly, given the economic and political crises that have bedevilled Nigeria, the regime cannot cope with the upsurge of the influx of refugees resulting from the Liberia crises and the possibility of fuelling the existing internal crisis and the tensed social disorder. Thirdly, it may seem the intimacy established between the Nigerian President, General Ibrahim Babangida and the Liberia Leader, President Samuel Doe, makes it possible for the security-interest of Babangida's regime to be coterminous with Doe's desire to stay-put in power. President Babangida became morally obligated to

protect and rescue Doe from the Liberian crisis. The lingering question is whether the regime used Nigeria's regional power as a means to enforce national interest in the light of its regime-security interest?

In a similar pattern General Sani Abacha assumed power at a critical moment of Nigeria's political development following the fallout of June 12, 1993 presidential election. The inconclusive nature of the election brought about political imbroglio and forced exit of General Ibrahim Babangida from power and the subsequent installation of Chief Ernest Shonekan-led Interim National Government (ING). The government of Chief Shonekan did not last long as General Abacha took-over the mantle of leadership in a palace coup; stage-managed by Abacha himself, which forced Shonekan to handover. However, within the short period of its existence, Shonekan's administration promised the nation to withdraw Nigeria's troops from Liberia. This promise was interjected by General Abacha's take-over of power and his subsequent decline to implement the decision taken by Shonekan. Shonekan's effort, however, was meant to create basis for domestic support for his government which had suffered serious crisis of legitimacy, as Nigerians wanted the actualisation of June 12 rather than an interim arrangement. Nigeria's troops under General Abacha's leadership did not only remain in ECOMOG but more than ever before he supported and sustained ECOMOG materially and financially in Liberia. The Abacha's regime even extended ECOMOG's mandate to intervene in the Sierra Leone civil war. Furthermore, General Abacha, unlike Babangida, took effective occupation of the Bakassi Peninsular and confronted Camerounian claim to the territory. This was done not only to recruit domestic support which was highly polarised as a result of the contradictions brought about by the June 12 political crisis but also over the effect of Nigeria's adventure in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

On assumption of power, General Abacha tried to mobilise support for his embryonic regime from human rights activists and opposition groups who were critical of the former regimes of General Ibrahim Babangida and Chief Ernest Shonekan. However, he fell out with the opposition groups, especially the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO) made up of prominent civilian statesmen and retired military generals. And with the detention of the leading figure of the opposition groups, Chief MKO Abiola; subsequent arrest and imprisonment of others, either under the guise of an alleged coup plot (General Olusegun Obasanjo, General Yara'dua, among others) or for acts subterranean to the survival of the regime, were made. This was to do away with strong and irresistible oppositions in order to pave way for Abacha's clandestine manoeuvre without a major and bold challenge which Obasanjo and Yar'adua would have provided fiercely. Though both had been accused for supporting the non-revisit of the annulled June 12 election, they never expected the outcome that brought Abacha to power. Increasingly, the human rights abuses of General Abacha's regime reached some intolerable measures, leading to wild imposition of sanctions by Western European nations and the USA. The attempt was to force the regime to open up Nigeria's democratic space and demilitarise the political terrain. However, the regime's human rights record was further worsened with the execution of the 'Ogoni Nine'. Ethno-environmental human rights activists, including Ken Saro Wiwa. In order to divert attention away from the domestic contradictions, the regime, like that of Babangida, became engrossed in regional security and peace-building in West Africa and elsewhere. It is on the strength of this that this research is conducted to ascertain the incompatibility or otherwise of the policies these regimes to national and regional interest.

1.2. STATEMENT OF RESEARCH PROBLEM

This study attempts to delineate and analyse the factors that led to Nigeria's intervention in Liberia and Sierra Leone and the impact it has on regional security and conflict resolution in West Africa. It also intends to understand the interconnectedness of Nigeria's national interest to regime security interest. If the national interest is equated with regime interest, is the Nigerian State not under siege of the regime in power?

The ability to delineate the above interconnectedness is relevant to our understanding of how regime perception vis-a-vis national security interest influence international events and situations. We are here confronted with the following problematics:

- (i) How is the Nigerian led ECOMOG intervention in Liberian and Sierra Leone based on the principles and objectives of her foreign policy?
- (ii) How does ECOWAS security regimes encourage or discourage the emergence of regime security in Nigeria?
- (iii) What lesson does the practice of personal rule elsewhere influence the emergence of regime interest in Nigeria?
- (iv) In what ways is the perception of national and regional interests encircled by regime interest in Nigeria?
- (v) What impact does the pursuit and defence of regime interest has on national and regional security interests?
- (vi) How did Nigeria's involvement and deployment of ECOMOG for peace enforcement turned out to enhance regime interest more than national and regional interest?
- (vii) What are the consequences for Nigeria in the future of conflict resolution in West Africa, if authoritarian maintain their regime interests under the cover of national and regional security interests?

1.3 PROPOSITION

It is on the basis of this problematic that the following research proposition is made; that:

1. Regime interest under authoritarian rule does inform the operational functions and direction of national and regional security interest.
2. West Africa regional security regimes are designed to perfect authoritarian regime interests rather than meeting national and regional security interests.
3. The practice of personal rule elsewhere may have informed the emergence of regime interest in Nigeria.
4. The regime interests of Babangida and Abacha leaderships encircled the perception of national and regional security interests in Nigerian foreign policy objectives.
5. The pursuit and defence of regime interest has tremendous impact on national and regional security interests.
6. The involvement of Nigeria in fashioning and deploying ECOMOG forces to Liberia and Sierra Leone was *ab initio*, towards enhancing regime interest than national and regional interests.
7. The pursuit of regime security interest has implications and consequences for Nigeria's ability to intervene and resolve future conflicts in the sub-region.

1.4 OBJECTIVE

- To examine how regime interest can affect national and regional security interest.
- To evaluate the contradictions in the West African security regime which likely influenced the emergence of regime security.
- To evaluate and analyse the practices of personal rule elsewhere which influence the rise of regime interest in Nigeria.
- To delineate how national and regional interests were encircled by regime interests.

- To understand how authoritarian regimes in Nigeria fashioned policies under the cover of national and regional security interests to enhance their regime survival strategies.
- To clarify whether Nigeria-led ECOMOG intervention in the West African regional conflicts was to serve national and regional interests or regime interest.
- To identify factors that may serve as obstacles to Nigeria's ability to effectively influence subsequent events in West Africa if regime interest overrides national and regional security interests.

1.5 METHOD OF RESEARCH

The research was conducted from two major means of data method: that is, primary and secondary sources. The secondary sources include library research, collation and analysis of policy documents, hard-outs, press releases, personal notes and other printed materials from individuals, libraries and organizations.

The second sources of materials were done through primary gathering of data. This includes interviews and focused group discussions with key personalities, groups and institutions. I was assisted by Research Assistants in Nigeria, West African Sub-region and in overseas who conducted interviews and discussions with policy players, force commanders, policy makers and other individuals connected to Nigeria's involvement in ECOMOG. I also personally had extensive interviews and discussions with Force Commanders and other researchers in ECOWAS. I attended ECOWAS Summit in 1993, 1994, 1996, 1997 and 1998 where I interacted frequently with diplomats, Defence Community and Officials of various countries from West Africa.

The important thing about these interviews is that they were weighed on three level of analyses:

- (i) Opinionated statements which are either based on value judgment probabilities or sentiments. Further interviews and discussions authenticated this, especially when statements raise contentious issues that affect policy.
- (ii) Hanging statements, which needs to be corroborated or verified from other sources in the course of further discussions and interview.
- (iii) Factual statements buttressed by facts and data in the course of the interview or discussion.

It was the course of this that the thesis arrived at the following analysis of the proposition:

- i. Conceptualizing the basis on which authoritarian regimes emerge as dominant factors, foreclosing the relevance of national and regional interest.
2. To ascertaining whether ECOWAS – security regimes are designed to enhance regime security.
3. Understanding the nature, character and practices of regime security interest in other authoritarian state other than Nigeria.
4. Assessing the perception of national and regional security interest, which informed or led to the emergence of regime interest.
5. Analysing how the pursuit and defence of regime interest may alter the principal objectives of national and regional interest.
6. Determining whether Nigeria's led ECOMOG intervention was to protect regime interest or national and regional security interest
7. Identifying the implications of regime interest for conflict resolution in West Africa and recommending future policy options.

1.6 RATIONALE/JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY

There are five major justifications for this study. The first is that since 1960s when African States emerged from the shackles of colonialism their marginalisation from effective participation in the sustenance of international peace and security have been peripheral. The superpower conflict overshadowed the significance of Africa in the international system. With the end of the cold war, regional powers are emerging to define their role within the context of the New World order. It is therefore, important to research into this new development as it affects African regional hegemons, which are emerging to test their capability as new peace managers in the changing world order. And to ascertain whether these hegemons are genuinely pursuing goals of regional

cooperation or creating basis through regional security organ to effect the survival and stability of their regimes.

Secondly, the outcome of the Liberian conflict, more than the initial position of the Babangida's regime, has expanded Nigeria's security space and empirically defines her capability in shaping West African Security system. The rationale is to inquire into the implications of this for Nigeria's national interest vis-a-vis the survival/stability of dictatorial regime in Nigeria.

Thirdly, research into the linkage between regime and security (national and/or regional) studies is relatively new in Africa. Previous research had only rehashed the weakness of O.A.U or African role in the maintenance of international peace and security. Much emphasis have been placed on the activities of the U.N, the superpowers, other great powers and the developed regional organisations like the European Union which has been involved in the creation of security, confidence-building and cooperation in Europe. This work examines how the contradictions that brought about ECOMOG have been able to bring Africa into limelight of conflict management and resolution. Thus, the research will not only complement existing literature on conflict resolution it will also provided a comparative research input for scholars within Africa and elsewhere to comprehend the nature and character of African regional security system and the impact on the new construction of world peace and security.

Fourthly, from the background of evolving a regional security regime in West Africa the research ascertains the regional instrumentalities and capabilities for conflict resolution, given the contradiction and lack of high level of confidence in one another's political intentions in the region.

Lastly, the research will fill a yawning gap by making useful inquiry, providing relevant data and information which will help to analyse the rationale of differentiating between the pursuit of national security interest from personal survival and stability of leaders and their regime.

1.7. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS

It is not easy to ascertain the overall framework of Nigeria's perception of national and regional security. Various regimes have different perceptions, and this can affect the nature of state policy in the direction of national and regional security interest. Regime interest is used here to explain and analyse the use of the apparatus of the state by a regime in authority to perpetuate itself in power.

A cursory insight into the operation of the Regime State will show that personality or personal rule is a predominant phenomenon. But personal rule cannot survive on its own without the apparatus (i.e. regime interest) around it. It is the apparatus that provides the fertility for the operational functions of personal rule. Both personal rule and regime interest is coterminous. Though personal rule is a dependent variable yet it is only formidable in sustaining the system. But because regime interest is an independent variable, it provides the channels for the operationalisation of personal rule. It is in the light of this, that the scope of the research will focus on regime interest rather than personal rule. However, the two concepts may be used interchangeably. Sometimes too, regime security interest is also taken to mean regime interest. This also applies to national and regional interest and national and regional security interests.

The study is being limited to Generals Ibrahim Babangida and Sani Abacha because it was within the period of their leadership that the crisis, which started in Liberia, extended to Sierra Leone in terms of ECOMOG mandate. And despite

Babangida's effort towards using the conflict to stabilise his regime he was subsequently eased out of office at the peak of the crisis with Abacha taking over after an interim Government of Chief Ernest Shonekan. However, the research is limited by lack of accessibility to some primary sources, especially interviews sought with key figures were not granted. Nevertheless, this was supplemented by content analyses of various reports and interviews such personalities had with editors of newspapers and magazines.

1.8. DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS

The following concepts are very central to the research. Their definitions are hereby made in order to provide meaningful understanding of the research.

- i. **National Interest:** means the irreducible minimum which holds the population, resources and territorial integrity of a nation-state together, and by guiding policy makers in their interactions with both domestic and external forces. It involves tangible and non-tangible factors depending on what the goals and orientation of such a given nation-state is constituted and the objectives intended to achieve.
- ii. **Regime Interest:** refers to the interest of the governing authority of a given country within a given space and time whose action and performance is not necessarily based on national interest but on its interest and the direction of its government.
- iii. **Personal interest:** refers to the individualistic interest of the regime – leader. In most cases it is coterminous with regime interest.

- iv. **Security Regime:** refers to the “principles, rules and norms that permitted nations to be restrained in their behaviour in the belief that others will reciprocate”(Jervis, 1982:357) ;
- v. **Regime Security:** refers to the security of the regime in power other than national interest.
- vi. **Military Interest:** means the corporate interest of the military as an institution, which is assumed to be maintaining the security and defence of a country at large.
- vii. **Security Community:** like security regime, this is referred, to as an integrated group of people and/or states which have assured themselves that none of them will resort to fighting each other physically when there are other ways or means of settling their disputes (see Deutsch et al, 1956:5).
- viii. **Regime Stability:** refers to the various measures taken and adopted by the governing authority to remain and consolidate its stay in power without much ado, against the interests and threats, whether real or imagined, of internal and external forces.
- ix. **Elite Interest:** refers to the various interest groups in the society whose actions and interactive activities decide the direction of government policies towards achieving their objectives and goals. Their interest at times may be at variant with the interest of the regime in power but the regime can hardly do without them. Elite interest hardly suffers erosion of power but instead it is transformed from one regime to another. It can outlive regimes.
- x. **Dominant Interest:** is the interest that is central to the survival & stability of the regime in power.

1.9. SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS

The research is presented in eight chapters. Chapter One introduces the research by bringing out the main research problem, identifying the direction towards a working theoretical model, outlining the research proposition, spelling out the objectives and rationality of the study, and explaining among others the method of data collation and analysis. Chapter two attempts two major issues. One is to review related literature, and two, is to develop a relevant theory of regime interest. This is to help us level the gaps found in the literature in order to validate the analysis of the data collated for the study. Chapter Three attempts an analysis of how security regimes in West Africa could serve the purpose, which the theoretical framework in Chapter Two attempts to build. Accordingly, Chapter Three argues that the contradictions in outlining regional security regimes provide the loopholes for the emergence of regime interest rather than national and/or regional interest. Chapter Four looks at some empirical experience in global perspective as a benchmark for understanding how the regimes of Babngida and Abacha fall in line with the perception in the case studies. In Chapters Five and Six efforts is made to look into encircled scenarios that led to the emergence and the pursuit as well as the defence of regime security interest in Nigeria. Chapter Seven identifies the nature of foreign policy administration under Babangida and Abacha, which was at variance to the norms as regime interest, superseded national interest. Chapter Eight, which concludes the study, gives a summary of the research, highlights its findings and makes recommendations.

CHAPTER TWO

2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. INTRODUCTION

With the increase of authoritarian regimes in the Third World, national and regional security systems have become effective instruments for maintaining regime-stability to the detriment of national and regional interest. This dimension has demystified the general and long-held views that regional integration and security provide the prospects for enhancing only regional peace, security and development (Abangwu, 1975:126-140; Edozien, 1982; Renninger 1982; Okolo, 1983:177-184; and Ezenwa, 1983). Thus, the highly contradictory nature of political systems in developing countries, particularly Africa, has made it difficult to accept the fact that interdependence and cooperation provide the bases for development, mutual gains and mutual sanctions (Keohane and Nye, 1981).

It also makes it more difficult to delineate the differences between regime interest and national interest. As much as this research does not concede to neo-functional thought, it would not likewise be drawn into the realist position that nation-states and their ability to use force helps to sustain international peace and security. Rather, the major factor involved in evolving regional integration and regional security is not just to bring about regional cooperation, peace and development but also to secure authoritarian regimes in power.

Before going further, it is important to, first of all, review the literature on the nature and character of regime security in Africa. The second segment of this chapter will focus on dominant theoretical models advanced to comprehend the operational

basis of foreign policy. The inadequacies of these models have left a very serious lacuna in the study of foreign policy. This lacuna will, however, be overcome, particularly in this Chapter, by building a functional theoretical construct to explain and analyse the nature and character of regime interest in Nigeria.

2.2 PROBLEMITIZING SECURITY REGIME INTEREST

Several scholarly works exist on Nigeria's defence and foreign policies. However, only very few of them have attempted to examine regime perception of national and regional security and its implications in the creation, management and resolution of conflict. Only very few of the authors also used linkage politics to understand how domestic contradictions affect the formulation of foreign policy (Phillips, 1964; Idang, 1973; Akinyemi, 1974; Gambari, 1980; Aluko, 1981; Ogwu, 1986; Izah, 1985). Others focussed on Nigeria's capability of playing leadership role in Africa (Aluko, 1973; Herskovits 1975, Herskovits 1997; Mazrui, 1975; Aluko, 1978; Ogunbadejo, 1980; Ogunsanwo, 1980; Wayas 1982). This has, indeed created a problem in the literature, especially in delineating the variance of security interests in Africa. Efforts by these authors lack rigorous analyses of how regime perception affect national security interest. Much more worrisome is the fact that the Adebayo Adedeji Committee on the Review of Nigeria's Foreign Policy in 1976 succeeded in providing *modus operandi* which did not adequately delineate the requirements of national interest (Nweke; 1985; 17b).

In the end, most of the literature on Nigeria's defence and security studies only maintain the realist or neo-realist position as espoused by Mongenthau (1978), E. H. Carr (1939); Inis Claude (1962), Hedley Bull (1978), Waltz (1959, 1979), Wolfers 1962, Barry Buzan (1991, 1993) among others. Even when attempts were made to apply functionalist approach to the understanding of economic, political and military aspect of

foreign policy, as demonstrated in the works of Zartman (1973); Deutsch (1975); Ezenwa (1985), Asante (1985), Okolo (1984), Oche (1994) and others, no concrete attention is made to discern the interests that characterised successive regimes in foreign policy formulation; namely, those interests that are basically aimed at supporting the survival of regimes in power. As such one is left with how to discern, deduce and delineate the perception and the interest of the regime in power from the way it manipulates and display the institutional mechanism of national interest in the pursuit of its interest in power.

Though a few of the authors attempted to a given extent, to focus some aspects of their works on the conceptualization of regime security interest but they rather end up analyzing the constituent variables of national interest in Third World countries. For instance Mohammed Ayoob (1986, 1989, 1991) explains that the concept of national security in the Third World is different from its understanding in the developed world. Accordingly, unlike the developed world where national security is part of national logic of statecraft, in the Third World on the other hand, it is intended to repulse threats pose, not only to the State boundaries and institutions but also to the maintenance of regime survival (Ayoob; 1991:259) Ayoob is of the view that a formation of strong State merging into membership of community of states is central to the common security of the states in question (Ayoob: 1989:262). However, Ayoob's analysis is not too rigorous as it failed to anchor a forceful argument in favour of the trends towards regime survival in the Third World.

In the light of this shortcoming, he seems to revise to a common position that national security in the third world is a process of state building. This position is not uncommon with the earlier position maintained by Deutsch et al (1975), Pentland (1975) among others. According to Deutsch and his colleagues, the creation of

security community is not only dependent on the outcome of the integration process but the integrative capabilities, which cannot be sustained in the case of Third World countries. Rather, it provides the springboards for the emergence of strong regimes seeking their survival through State apparatus and regional security organs. But the originality of the contents of the work done by Deutsch, Ayoob, Krause (1994) and others have no theoretical linkage with the conceptual understanding that, under authoritarian regimes or weak democracies of the Third World, the stability of the regime(s) supercedes national and regional security interests. Indeed, the literature on the linkage between national/regional security and regime interest is lacking. But if one is to consider related literature one would be able to discern what constitute national/regional interest in order to delineate the constituent variables of regime interest. It is within this perspectives that the literature review will be broken into two; namely, the nationalist/pan-Africanist school and the radical approach.

The nationalist/pan-Africanist position is reflected in the works of Nweke (1985 a & b), Imobighe, (1980); Oyovbaire, (1980); Vogt, (1986); Akinyemi, (1981); Aluko, (1978), Amoda, (1988); Adisa, (1988); Gambari, (1986); and Ogunṣanwo (1988). The school, in essence, maintains the realist trends in their analyses. It is also built on the conception that leadership transcends narrow interest of regime. However, the radical school as reflected in the works of Ihonvbere, (1991); Lancaster, 1992; Bangura, (1989); and Bala Usman, (1979) opposes the position of the nationalist school on the ground that regime's perception of security undermines the primary factor of Nigeria's existence as a nation-state. The deflation of the economy, corruption, injustice, flagrant floating of the rule of law and the expansion of private economy cannot create conclusive atmosphere for Nigeria to play the role expected of her in African international relations.

In a National Seminar on "Nigeria's National Interest and Values" organised in Nigeria by the Office of Joint Chief of Staff in 1988, most of the participants argue that economic interests primarily inform the pursuit of national security interests. Amoda (1988) argues that no country that is under the shadow of imperialism can maintain its sovereignty. He then posits that a state can only attain and maintain its sovereignty if the State wages war against imperialism. Ogunsanwo (1988) believes that one of the attributes of Nigeria's national interest is the defence and protection of the blackman in the world. This, he maintains, can be achieved through the consolidation of national power as a vital aspect of national interest. Adisa (1988). Further posits that the preservation of the political unit called Nigeria is imperative for national survival. Koinyan conceptualizes the state as a personality and argues that "like a human being, the distinct personality of a nation-state moulds the type of desires the nation-state would have and determines the quantity of power it would want to have as well as conscripts the actual power it can wield" (Koinyan: 1986:14).

In concretizing the concept of national personality, Nweke (1985(a)) sees foreign policy as action-goal of Nigerian State, which helps it to attain the irreducible minimum of Nigeria's national interest. It sustains national unity and security, provide the baseline capability for national integration, national preservation and territorial integrity when threatened from within and without through the application of the use of "military strength and economic power, and to influence the shaping of international political and economic relations within which this highly valued interest must be achieved" (Nweke, 1985a, 13). In this regard, he believes pan-Africanism provides the common ideological instrument for the advancement of Nigeria's national interest through African collective security. African security, according to pan-Africanist approach, is therefore coterminous with national security because threat to African security represents a direct

or indirect threat to the survival of the of Nigerian State (Nweke, 1985a: 20 See also Aluko, 1978).

Nweke (1985b) further expands the concept of African security. African security, accordingly, centres on and revolves around the protection, defence and development in Africa as specified in Article 2 of the OAU Charter. He characterises African security into three dimensions: (i) ability to perceive and utilise the foundations which provide support and shape the means to achieve African unity; (ii) ability to influence the shaping of the international system within which African security must be achieved; and (iii) the actual provision of African security through rational choice of appropriate socio-economic, political and military policies and strategies (Nweke, 1985b: 5). He, however, identifies economic and military dependence, internal conflict, inter-state antagonism and conflicts, and external intervention in African affairs as problems and threats to African security. these problems and threats places Africa in a weaker position to confront the nuclear superiority of the developed countries. Therefore, the involvement of Africa in the promotion of disarmament programme of the UN, the creation of pan-Africanist identity, and participation in non-aligned movement would help to reduce African isolation, marginalisation and weak position in the international system, and, therefore, promote African security.

Furthermore, Nweke maintains that for Africa to overcome the problems of, and threats to its security, then, it must first, organically link its security with its developmental objectives and goals as contained in the 1980 Lagos Plans of Action. He also identifies options that are available for African countries to adopt in the promotion of an inward oriented policy with strong economic nationalism and a neo-mercantilist diplomacy. first, pursue regionalism, that is, the development of multilateral and/or unilateral integration of African States where African Defence Force

is collectively utilized to defend external aggression and provide peacekeeping within Africa. Here, Africa is divided into five strategic regions for this purpose with the suggestion that the coordinating command Headquarters of the sub-regional defence force will be in Nigeria. These five regions are Central Africa, West Africa, East Africa, North Africa and Southern Africa. These sub-regional defence forces will serve as sub-committees of the envisaged African High Command. Second, ensure globalism, which refers to global interdependence and universal foreign policy coordination based on equality and justice, and on strong ecumenical and pan-African desirata (Ibid, 1985b: 89). Though these options have their peculiar dimension and limitations for Africa, he, nevertheless, advocates a combination of measures that will strengthen African political strategies and doctrines for collective defence and security. These measures are (i) integration of African military expenditures, (ii) establishment of African High Command, and (iii) development of a nuclear capacity, using the nuclear threshold States as main pillars for evolving African collective security network. Invariably, Nweke is hopeful that regional organisations like ECOWAS can, apart from achieving economic integration, coordinate policies and/or institute common bargaining position for mutual defence and security.

Mazuri (1995) went further to advocates that the current African conflict could be resolved through two measures: One, a Trusteeship System; "like that of the United Nations over the Congo in 1960, could be established that is more genuinely international and less Western than under the old guise" (Mazrui; 1995). And two, through the creation of regional hegemons in Africa. In the light of the later; each African sub-region should be led by a hegemon to regulate or control the evaporation of conflicts in the continent. He suggests that Nigeria should lead in West Africa, Ethiopia in East Africa, Egypt in North Africa and South Africa in Southern Africa. These hegemons will become permanent members of an envisaged African Security Council.

But for Aluko (1978:10), only Nigeria has the potential and enormous capability of wielding Africa together in the resolution of its internal and inter-states conflicts. With this projects, it is expected that the developed countries will only serve as facilitators in the resolution of African conflicts. (Rothchild, 1991).

Between the respective positions of various scholars, Okolo (1984) takes a step further to assess Nigeria's military capability as a regional hegemon. The dynamics of this growing responsibility revolves around first and foremost, Nigeria's national interest with her aggressive neighbours, two, the problem of engaging in military partnership with ECOWAS member states and lastly, the combat-readiness of Nigerian military in the face of threats. Okolo caution against the use of Nigeria's military force in any external venture and warns that "a nation in a state of deplorable military preparedness that plunges into an armed conflict where peaceful diplomacy still has even some minimal chances of succeeding, will not only endanger further the very national security it desires to protect but international peace and security as well" (Okolo: 1984: 82). He posits further that "it would be a tactical delusion to assume that because ECOWAS mutual defence pact has been created, Nigeria's partners would be readily drawn into every conflict in which she is involved militarily... (Hence) many ECOWAS states are worse off in military capabilities than Nigeria and their weight behind the latter may only make little difference in the outcome of a battle" (Okolo, 1984:82). Therefore, if Nigeria is to play any meaningful leadership role in African security and conflict resolution, he advises, she has to improve and expand its arms and ammunition, acquire sophisticated weaponry and electronic surveillance and detective devices. Above all, emphasis should be placed on military research and development. But Bassey (1987) and James (1991) foresee some problems here; namely, Nigeria's dependence on imperialism, its military ineffectiveness and weak economic bases. All the same, in comparative terms, Nigeria is generally believed to be more capable of

promoting an integral force of all the West African states under ECOWAS mutual defence pact than any member State in the Sub-region.

Okolo's position correlates with an earlier treatise by Akinyemi who strongly believes in Nigeria's military capability in the event of a the collective military agreement with Brazil and Angola under a zone of peace in the South Atlantic to check the excesses of the South Africa then under Apartheid regime. He maintains that we live in a World that is characterized by power. We live in the World of competing interests. Whatever interests triumph, are not determined alone by the goodness or otherwise of these policies, they must be backed up by a power capability that is sufficient to guarantee success" (Akinyemi: 1984: 24). Like others, he also believes that Nigeria has the capability to defend its security and that of Africa much more in the African collective security network. The first step is for Nigeria to improve on its military preparedness by being at "parity with French military forces as a condition of minimum deterrence" (Akinyemi: 1981:750).

Akinyemi's position came at a period when Libya and France intervene in the Civil War in Chad (see Joffe, 1981 and 1982). The implication of Libyan and French struggle over Chad received prompt attention and, indeed, created a new defence foreign policy consciousness in Nigeria among the political class; the intelligentsia, the press, interested public and policy makers. The issue that generated a heated public debates and drew significant intellectual discourse (Oyovbaire, 1980:16-21; and Imobighe, 1980:235). Oyovbaire, in his contribution to the debate, observed that in the Atlantic Ocean, apartheid South Africa had gone into a conceived alliance with NATO and Brazil to control the Atlantic trade routes. The Atlantic Ocean, he points out, is strategically important to Nigeria because through it Nigeria exports her crude oil to Europe, North America and Brazil. Hence, it will be naturally suicidal to openly allow

the surveillance of our regions and closed strategic locations to be accessed by NATO and Apartheid South Africa. The military intervention of Chad by France and Libya poses similar threat. Imobighe (1980) was, in fact, more emphatic than Oyovbaire on Libyan military adventurism in Africa. According to him Nigeria should treat the presence of Libya in Chad with all the seriousness it deserves and, in fact, be combat ready to repel Libya in the event of any eventual surprise attack.

It is in the light of the foregoing that Vogt (1981) assesses Nigeria's defence capability in comparative perspective. She concludes that Nigeria's military capabilities are not in doubt. But, like Akinyemi, she maintains that for Nigeria to maintain its leadership role in ECOWAS and in Africa, it has to be alert on keeping watch on French activities on the continent. (Also see, Otubanjo and Davies, 1987). Later Vogt (1986: 473 – 474) periscopes on how national interest can be influenced by the economy, military power, nature of neighborliness and relations with extra-territorial powers. She further calls for the prioritization of goals that will define and shape the thrust of Nigeria's defence and foreign policy interests. She favours a realistic concentric foreign policy that will enable Nigeria's national interest to dictate the fusion of interests of the African countries so that functionally integrated union may be created to serve the mutual interest of all states as a vehicle for the promotion of Nigeria's national interest.

Therefore, the creation of ECOWAS is seen principally as an effective national interest strategy to break foreign sphere of influence in Africa (Vogt: 1991). Apart from the economic significance, its security instruments can be used to strengthen internal security cohesion against subversion and external aggression (Imobighe, 1981:147-154; and Vogt, 1991a: 13-18). The end of the Cold War opened this floodgate for Nigeria to evolve a collective Rapid Deployment Force in which ECOMOG is seen as an experiment of Nigeria's regional hegemonic power (Vogt 1991A: 16; Ayam, 1992:3-32;

and Vogt and Ekoko, 1990). ECOMOG therefore seems to have fulfilled Nigeria's long sought ambition which in 1987 it attempted to create a global Concert of Medium (Regional) powers capable of intervening with credibility in crisis involving great and superpowers (see Akinyemi, 1986). The measure was to mitigate the problem of international peace and security, as the concert was to be a bridge builder (see Akinyemi, 1986; Nwosu 1987; and Yoroms, 1988; and 1993). In conformity with this zeal, ECOMOG is seen as indigenous peacekeeping instrument (see Vogt, 1990, and 1992).

The desire for Pan-Africanist approach to African security and conflict resolution has increasingly become a source of concern for African leaders and policy makers. In fact, their major concern is not really on how much human and economic destruction civil wars have caused Africa but the "inconclusive ends" of these wars. (Nyogoro, 1993:171). Similar views have been expressed in various ways by Africanists and African scholars (see Obasanjo and Mosha, 1993). At the end of a Conference in Kampala in 1991 on conflicts in Africa, scholars and policy makers, recognise that the security and stability of each African country inseparably linked with the security of all African countries and that "Africa cannot make any significant progress on any other front without creating collectively a lasting solution to its problems of security and stability" (The Kampala Document, 1991). The document later became a referral point at the O.A.U Summit in Abuja in 1991 and Dakar 1992. This finally culminated, for the first time, in the establishment of the "O.A.U Conflict Mechanism for Conflict Resolution", and a peace Fund to finance it. And since 1993, after the Cairo Declaration, OAU established a mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution at its Headquarters in Addis-Ababa.

Efforts have also been made to establish O.A.U "Early Warning System" in conflict management. This position is now finding acceptability in the Western World. This acceptability is informed by the fact that with

"...the assumption of responsibility, by Africans, for peace-keeping in Africa would have the advantage of granting Africans not only ownership of the problems but also of the solution. The exclusion of outside powers and the Africanisation of peace-keeping-forces might help to avert future instances where it could be inferred from the action of peace-keeping forces, that black Africans' lives were of less value than white European ones" (Cleaver & May 1995:485).

This partly inform the reason why the U.S. is now sponsoring African Crisis Response Initiatives in which only Africans are brought together with the support of US to manage their own conflicts.

The position of the Nationalist/pan-Africanist scholars can be summarised as follows, that:

- a) Nigeria's national interest, like the interest of other African States, consist of certain irreducible minimum that is non-negotiable,
- b) Pan-Africanism is an ideological concept for enhancing collective security and defence against internal insurrection and global threats,
- c) A strong and virile African security regime is dependent on the creation of five geopolitical zones in Africa to tame conflicts and to maintain peace. (While some suggested that Nigeria should be the coordinating Headquarters of the sub-regional security organs others prefer that each sub-regional security organ should be placed under a sub-regional hegemon. The sub-regional hegemons can meet together under the banner of African Collective Security Council),
- d) Nigeria has the military and economic capabilities to command the security and economic leadership of African States,

- e) Nigeria's effort towards the formation of ECOWAS as an economic and security integration instrument is also important for her national security and defence interest,
- f) Conflict Resolution is dependent on the capability of regional hegemons, and
- g) The end of the cold war has signaled that Africa should exclusively find inclusive solution to conflicts and wars in the continent.

Significant as the position advanced by the Pan Africanist school, particularly its advocating of an exclusively inclusive African solution to conflict prevention, management and resolution it has, nevertheless, come under severe criticism. Ihonvbere for instance, opines that Nigeria's capability as a regional hegemon is increasingly declining making it impossible for ECOWAS to attain its major objectives of integrating of West Africa. At the core of the declining status of Nigeria is the worsening crisis of its political economy. Ihonvbere did, in fact, points this out when he states that the "Nigerian state is still weak, unstable and enjoys limited legitimacy" (Ihonvbere: 1991). It lacks the political and economic wherewithal to influence and direct the New World Order towards African continental interest. Besides, within the continent itself, Nigeria's dominant position is increasingly being challenged. Countries like Egypt, Zaire, Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire, Zimbabwe and, now, South Africa will continue to assert influence and challenge Nigeria's claims to the leadership position in Africa (Ihonvbere, 1994:63-66).

Ihonvbere and Lancaster positions agree with Myers (1991) hypothesis of using threat perception to meet the strength of regional hegemons in the World. In the case of Nigeria, he concludes that it has ranked low behind other world

regional hegemons like India in South Asia and Brazil in Latin America. Adibe (1994), however, questions the rationale for testing the hypothesis without any consideration of time and space.

He points out that in the aftermath of the Liberian crisis which resulted in Nigeria led ECOWAS intervention, it cannot be possible for Nigeria to remain at the low level of rating (Ibid: 190 – 197) Notwithstanding this positivist view of Adibe, the fact remains that the sharpening political tension deepening economic, and worsening social relations in Nigeria is increasingly decreasing its status in world affairs, including the regional level (see Bangura, 1989 -: 130 – 152). The point here is that if African States are in tango over leadership it becomes difficult to accept the ideology of Pan-Africanism as a security octopus because it would suffer "lack of precision, resulting as is often the case, in abuse. Its mythicism, therefore derives from the fact that it has hardly ever been a clearly defined, precise or rational concept" (Adibe and Ofori-Yeboah, 1992:8).

Given the criticism against pan-Africanism it is equally doubtful whether the Trusteeship System and/or the creation of the sub-regional security organisation under regional hegemons would succeed. Indeed Mafeje (1995:17-20 and Bangura (1995:18-23) are critical of this position because of the way the perceived African regional hegemons are resented and treated with suspicion. Any attempt to give them relevance is in a way arming African dictators who "lacked the vision for and commitments towards a truly sustainable pan-African integration system" (Bangura, 1995:23). Similarly, the position has been resented because of the tendency of empowering African sub-imperialists as regional powers (see Cleaver and May, 1995:485-497).

The following positions are discernible from the scholarship of the radical school of thought:

- (i) The ideology of pan-Africanism cannot in a way help to resolve African conflict because African regimes are corrupt and authoritarian. And except they are eased out, conflicts will remain;
- (ii) the contradictions leading to the various conflict cannot be resolved by benign imperialist approach of the trusteeship system or the creation of sub-regional security organisation but by a fundamental restructuring of the economy from its neo-colonial orientation which will lead to mass production, creation of employment opportunity poverty alleviation and elimination, the redistribution of wealth and administration of rule of law; and
- (iii) Above all, the failure to recognise autonomous existence of ethnic groups will remain the tone of contention in African internal conflicts as leadership of African states survives on such conflicts.

Indeed, the criticisms against the Pan-Africanist school to some extent are credible. Hence Pan-Africanist thought fails to understand how the highly contradictory and antagonistic relations, whether on class, ethnic, regional and religious basis, generate and promote crisis and conflicts. For instance, while civil and democratic rule, no matter their limitations, subject policies and issues to debate, in the case of the military regimes, the affairs of the military regimes, the affairs of the State are personalised and privatised. The end result is authoritarian and commandist rule which is intended to maintain the dictators in power than to promote national security and development and, therefore, national interest.

Important as the criticisms of the radical school are, particularly their focus on the internal contradictions in Africa, it equally has its own limitations. For instance, no differentiation is made between the regime in power and the existence of dominant (elite) interest in the decision making process. Regime can rise and fall from power. The manner of its failure is much more destabilising; psychologically, to the leading figure in the regime than hangers-on, otherwise known as elites. While the leaders of the authoritarian regimes try by all means to sustain they in power elite interest may differ. The interest of either the ruling elite is not superior to the interest of the leader-elite. The elite could always co exist with the leader-elite when the optimal benefits are high. They may also abandon the leader when the benefits are diminishing. They can realign their interest. The elite collective interest is relative as it can be transformed but not eroded. Whereas the interest of the leading figure of the regime (leader-elite) could also be eroded without being transformed.

In the light of the above, most of the literature lack the vigorous and pungent analyses of how authoritarian and one-party state system sustain the crisis of governance in Africa. Under the guise of national interest authoritarian regimes attempt to maintain their regime interest. And this invariably leads to the dimensions which conflict occur and are equally resolved or sustained in Africa. As Laswell observes: "at the epi-centre of the regime is a psychopath which displaces his private motives into public object and actualizes it in the public interest" (cited in Ajene, 1987:8). On the basis of this, David (1991:239) advances the thesis of omnibalancing to explain the foreign policies of third World countries. According to him the State is only an arena of interest of "a group that holds power in the capital". Unlike Zartman (1966), Migdal (1974:519:520), Jackson and Rosberg (1982), Ayoob (1983:41-52), Gur (1991:153-189) among others, who

concentrate their analyses on the internal contradictions of the domestic policies of Third World States which influence foreign policy behaviours, David provides a further insight to the fact that: "it is the leadership of the state itself that is the proper unit of analysis for understanding third World foreign policy alignment" (David: 1991: 243).

David rejects the application and involvement of Third World countries in the balance of power politics because the theory is concerned with the anarchy that exists at the international system where there is lack of a central authority to maintain order. In this type of situation, "balance of power plays a central role in ensuring the survival of States against the aggressive designs of others. But it is less important in domestic politics where the central government ensures that the survival of losers in domestic struggle is not threatened..." (David: 1991:242). This position is applicable in developed World where central government regulates conflict by creating basis for consensus. But in the Third World countries

Instead of sharply differentiating what occurs on the international scene from what occurs within states, it is more accurate to consider Third World domestic politics as a microcosm of international politics. As a result, balancing to ensure survival is as critical for groups within states as it is between states (**Ibid**: 243).

Accordingly, because of the prevalence of threats, leaders place premium not on expanding their power base but on their personal survival. Leaders would prefer to align with external powers or States that would ensure their hold on power rather than allowing their State to increase its power at the risk of endangering their survival (**Ibid**: 244). So, by rational calculation Third World regimes either align with themselves or with external powers that is most likely to do what is necessary to keep them in power. Thus, order is common between

regimes in Third World countries than within social forces and individuals in various States where these regime are in power. Examples of this include the decisions of Ethiopia's Mengestus Haile Meriam to align with the Soviet Union while Egypt's Anwar Sadat aligned with the United States. Within West Africa, Samuel Doe aligned with Nigeria's Babangida to defend his regime against armed domestic forces. This argument is expanded from the lucid analysis provided by Jackson and Rosberg (1982). Though they use the concept of State instead of regime, their analysis is compatible with the focus in this work

It is as a result of survival strategy that third World regimes are appalled by the current world opinion that sovereignty is no longer sacrosanct (Boutrous Ghali, 1992; and Weiss and Chopra, 1992:95-117). The world opinion is based on the fact that to save humanity caught in the fire of conflicts is more sacrosanct than defending a regime or State. This position has been challenged by the leaders of the Third World countries in their non-aligned meeting in Jakarta, Indonesia in 1992, and also in various debates at the United Nations General Assembly (see Krause, 1994:17). This challenge, however, concretises the position that Third World regimes value their stability and survival than any efforts towards salvaging citizens from a conflict which may turn against the leaders. They prefer to survive at the peril of the very people they preside their leadership.

An empirical application of the concept (regime interest and security) to elaborate the policies of a specific country or region is still lacking in Nigerian scholarship. An attempt made by Ajene (1987:17-33) ended in using political economy approach to explain the character of Nigerian state in the international system. Regimes are treated on the basis of their neocolonial consolidation and not on the basis of regime-stability and interest. Other than that, no effort has been

made to exhume the factors that enhance the security of regimes in power. Other attempts by Hinjari (1984), Imobighe (1987), Ukpabi (1987), Okolo (1988), Asobie (1988) among others similarly failed to analyse the intent of regimes in power. They end up agreeing with Holsti's (1970:245-6) conception of national role performance, which is predominant in the perception of policy makers as determinants of Nigeria's external behaviour at anytime (Hinjari, 1984:426). They end their analyses mostly by concentrating on the influence and attitude or the idiosyncrasies of elites in order to understand the action of the state in foreign relations. They tend to focus on the manifest rather than the latent behaviour of the regime in power. And regime interest can best be understood by focusing on the latent idiosyncrasies of the leadership of the regime in power.

Given the above perspectives, this thesis provides a path-breaking approach in identifying the problem of regime security in Africa by demonstrating that it has little to do with its orthodox conception of what constitute national security interest of the state. Rather, the motivation of African State security action is to protect and sustain the regime in power. As Krause (1994:10) points out, "the maintenance of the regimes in power is the central value being protected rather than any larger image of core values that reflect the desire and aspiration of citizens" (1994:10). Before highlighting the theoretical construct of regime interest it is important to ascertain how existing models have equally failed to explain State policies on the basis of regime interest.

2.3. DOMINANT THEORETICAL MODELS IN FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSES

The application of several theoretical strands to the analysis and understanding of Nigerian defence and foreign policy issues have been critiqued

for lack of vigor because the authors have not been sufficiently exposed to vigorous theoretical training (Nweke, 1987; and Asobie, 1990:3-5). However, this is not only common to Nigeria. This phenomenon is already embedded in the analysis of world politics where various theories have been used and challenged. For instance, the dominance of the realist theory is increasingly being challenged by spurious penetration of behaviouralism into the scholarship of international relations and politics.

Realism itself is anchored on four main characteristics. One, that State as a political unit is the only dominant actor in the international system. Two, that the use of force itself or the threat to use it is central in international politics; statesmen use the means of coercion to control and regulate each other's behaviour. Three, that there exists a hierarchical order in the international system which is represented by 'high politics' with its primary focus on security and military issues, and 'low politics' which is mainly social and economic affairs. Four, that the stability of the international system is maintained only through balance of power/military capabilities (deterrence), arms control (strategic management) and balance of terror (nuclear deterrence). International organisations and international laws are merely seen as regulative mechanisms between states. They are not seen as forces standing above the State (see Morgenthau, 1978; and Watts, 1959). The merit of realism in explaining international relations lies in its emphasis on the role of the major actor, the State, in world affairs. This apart, it has serious limitations.

The decision making approach itself an outgrowth of behaviouralism attempts to overcome the limitations of realism. This approach maintains that if the iron curtain of the State, held so sacrosanct by the realists is not forced open, then, **those Human beings** who make and take decisions for the State cannot be seen;

talk less of discerning their interests.. Hence, it is highly necessary and extremely important to study decision-makers rather than merely focusing on an abstract entity called state. Thus, according to Synder, et.al (1967:202) state action is the action of those acting in the name of the state. Hence they advocate that to focus on the individual(s) who are the state's decision-makers, and to reconstruct the situation would require "that a central place be given to the analysis of the behaviour of these officials" (sic) (Ibid; 202). These decision-makers, without doubt, react to both internal and external settings on their attitudes, perception, judgment and their predispositions. Therefore, a proper grasp of the international system must be dependent on "process analysis" of the decision, which informed the basis for actions, and reactions, evaluation of interactive processes by which decisions are reached (Asobie, 1990:25).

Apart from the decision making approach, other similar paradigms have continued to emerge both at micro and macro-levels. For instance, Bureaucratic Politics (or Organisational Process Model) as propounded by Allison (1971) states that governmental policies are not actually carried out by only a rational calculating decision maker but a given conglomeration of a larger organisation and political actors who hold substantially different position about what their government should do on any particular issue. They do compete in attempting to influence governmental decision and the actions of their government. Foreign policy is thus seen as a bargaining process which at the end, the outcome of a State's policies might not be as a result of carefully planned effort; though it might be determined by it, to influence its external environment. Hence, "problems are cut up and parceled out to various organisations... each organisation perceives problems, processes information and performs a range of actions in quasi-independent (within the broad guidelines of National Policy)" (Ibid: 80). The

essence of this is to let factored problems be resolved through fractionated power structures within the organisation (Ibid: 32). But the question, in the final analysis, is whose interest do these bureaucratic institutions serve? In other words, **who stand to gain** from the policies and activities of these bureaucratic institutions?

In the light of the above the political economy approach seeks to answer the question who **stands to gain** from the policies and activities of the State, whether in national or international affairs. It posits that previous theories of International Relations have only treated social conflict in abstraction, independent of the dynamics of accumulation which provides the basis for (the) conflict in the first instance (Olusanya and Olukoshi, 1988:5-6). This model argues that a proper conceptualisation of foreign policy lies at the fabric of the economic structure of the society. Hence "men enter into definite relations of production (that are indispensable and independent of their will) which constitute the economic structure of the society: real foundation on which rises a legal and political superstructure" (Marx, 1972:5). It identifies correlation of forces and objectives on which contradictions exist in the capitalist society between the oppressors and the oppressed. From the political economy perspective, the state is said to mirror the interest of the dominant class and "what therefore, policy makers and state officials project as national interest is in actual fact the interest of the dominant class in the society" (Olukoshi, 1989:8). In this vein, the pattern of accumulation affects foreign policy as the State and the business class depend on the world market for the most important inputs in production viz. raw materials, spare parts and capital goods" (Bangura, 1989:132). The application of political economy to the development in the international system transcends Marxist political economy, dating from classical works of Adam Smith and David Ricardo. And the primary concern of the approach has been the cost of production in which labour is central

in terms of accumulation in either internal domination or imperialism in the world for the accumulation of capital from the periphery through the alliances between the multinational corporations, the local bourgeoisie, and state officials of both advanced and less developed countries (see Turner, 1981; Lenin, 1984; Beckman, 1984)

These theories (Realist, Decision making, Bureaucratic politics and political economy) are very important in foreign policy analyses but they suffer a major problem for their inability to be wholesale in application to the study of the Third World foreign policy issues. They are too sophisticated in providing independent variables in the interpretation of foreign policy actions that are germane to the course and direction of Third World politics. The meaning of the concepts or models exhibits different perception and application. The Third world environment exhibit instability and suffer some 'cultural fixation' because the environment lack regulatory mechanism for stability-enhancing measures as violent tradition has been implanted in the African state-craft. Violence has been and is increasingly been generalised in a manner that is unknown in human history. The "traditional role of the military is altered in Africa, the value of human life is downgraded to a level where death no longer "shocks" (Ekeh, 1985:15-17). Therefore, where political power is dictated by violence rather than by consent, the rule of law is flagrantly floated. Violence is held in high esteem, celebrated and glorified by those who control state power.

Further, the above theoretical positions were borne and took root in Western Europe and in the United States where practices and procedures are highly bureaucratized, democratic and complex. Decision-making is by incremental process through friction and mutually exclusive claims, sometimes tense and

explosive "without necessarily destabilizing the institutional structures of the society" (Otubanjo, 1989:226). It becomes difficult to transpose these models wholesale to Third World where the population is disenfranchised and alienated from decision making process. Decision making, whether in respect to domestic and foreign issues, are overwhelmingly coloured by psychological factors - the personality of the leaders and the self-interest of the ruling oligarchy rather than the rational calculation of the complex interest of the larger population (Ibid, 230). Thus under rigid regimes the component interests of the military and indeed the military leadership prevail in policy process and policy actions.

The interests of the vast majority of the people remain marginal and isolated. As long as the military remains in power governmental policies and activities would be informed, dictated and directed by its interest. Here, national interest becomes ambiguous as there is a shift from what the larger population view it (as social and economic welfare), to how the ruling oligarchy manipulate it as national security (see Wolfer 1962:150). National security thus becomes 'regime-security, and regime interest is equally equated and propagated as national interest. For the interest and the concern of the regime is to stay and remain in power by hook or crook. In this circumstance, therefore, the stability of the nation, the welfare of its people and the survival of the state becomes secondary to the interest, security and survival of the regime.

Based on the foregoing, therefore, this thesis attempts to explore regime perception as a means to understanding foreign policy issues in the Third World. In this case, foreign policy goals are conceptualized on the basis of "perception of events and interpretation of stimuli emanating from both the internal and external environments" (Asobie, 1990:35). However, the frequency and intensity with

which the State or its decision-makers respond and interpret the stimuli is dependent not only on their perception but majorly on the nature and character of the regime in power. Between the stimuli and responses, there is an interval, which is conditioned by the cognitive, effective and evaluative or ethical orientation of the regime interest. The belief system of the regime creates images which reorientate the perception of the decision process to establish goals and to order preferences "on strong predispositions for and against certain explanation" or behaviour (Taber, 1994:7).

Thus decision-makers are involved in selective perception and distortion of incoming information to conform to their preconceived view. This helps them to develop "rigid belief systems containing highly simplified images that restrict flexibility in the diagnosis of world events and in the choice among perceived alternatives" (Taber, 1992:889). This provides "basis for the emergence of 'dominant interest' (Taber, 1994:14), an interest which is central to the survival of the regime in power. Cognitive model, like other models, is applicable to the understanding of foreign policy in all types of political systems. However, as argued earlier, it also suffers some shortcomings when applied wholesale to Third World foreign policy issues. This is because African political environment is perverse with military dictatorship, this study is intended to unravel the nature and character of authoritarian state's perception and the pursuit of state policies where the general principles of the rule of law is rampantly defiled.

Here, the perception of leaders on international conflict situation is presented as mirror image to validate their conceptual disposition for explaining the behaviour of others in the international system: 'I am essentially good but I am occasionally forced by circumstances to behave badly, whereas you are bad but are

occasionally forced by circumstances to behave well” (Johnson: 1992:13). The perception of threats by a dictatorial-regime defines its conception of events differently from the perception of a given circumstance. Decision-making is not only centralised but militarized and towards measures of protecting the security interest of the leader. This is unlike a democratic society where “the underlying motivation for collective behaviour are found neither in the simple aggregation of the attributes of the individual members of the groups (decision makers) nor in the group as an autonomous entity but rather in the confluence of the two” (Vertzerberger, 1994:2). Thus, authoritarian leaders found commonality in alliance to reinforce their security.

The peculiar nature of alliance in Third World countries, according to David (1991:230) is not to reinforce a threat against the preponderant power of another State by means of balance power. Rather, such alignment results from the rational calculation of the leaders on the basis of power configuration and the pendulum of forces or contradiction in the international scene, which necessitate their influence or support as a means of enhancing their survival power. David’s model of ‘omnibalancing’ partly explains the attitudinal behaviours and disposition of Third World leaders who acquire power illegitimately or misuse power to the extent that they are faced with sharp domestic politics that threaten their political and physical survival this model is a departure from realism and behaviouralism. But as a neo-behaviouralism it argues that the leader rather than the actor-state (realism) or decision-maker (behaviouralism) is the high level of analysis. Hence, the major concern of the leader is how does policy or action affects the probability of him to remain in power? Or which outside power or foreign policy issue is most likely to protect him from the internal and/or a given external threats? The leader is not concerned with how does a policy or his action affects the power of the State? Or

which outside power is most likely to protect his State from the threats posed by other states (David, 1991:238). Decision making is not perceived on a regular pattern of input – output but on leadership survival. Therefore, all other processes of decision making are dictated, directed and executed according to the regime interest and not on the basis of national interest.

In summary the omni-balancing model posits that:

- a) the analysis of the policies and activities of Third World countries must begin, not with the actor-state or with its decision-makers but, most importantly, with the regime;
- b) the regime, in its relations with domestic opponents, only tries to appease and settle them but not addressing the fundamental issues that call these forces into existence;
- c) the regime go into all sorts of alliances as a power-survival strategy to balance and/or counter both domestic and external threats;
- d) domestic threat more than foreign threat constitute the most serious and most dangerous threat that must be eliminated by whatever means that challenge the regime survival; and
- e) The primary concern of the regime is to remain, stabilise and consolidate its power at whatever expenses, even at the expenses of “national security”, “national interest”, “national development” and the survival of the country.

Given the above, alliances or cooperation are formed to maintain the efforts of the regime to survive in power. The leader may address or appease less pressing threats in order to counter the more immediate and dangerous domestic threats. For instance, a regime faced with domestic instability would pursue adventurous

foreign policy that will draw the international attention away from domestic crisis and to make contradictions more pronounced. Indeed, in the international system all nation-states have a singular objective to maintain their national interest which majorly include, national sovereignty, territorial integrity and to deter threats to both internal and external aggression. To achieve this, they pursue policy of geo-strategic interest through alliances, bilateral agreements or collective security regimes to ensure that their national security interests are sustained against any threats. Morgenthau argues:

Alliances are a necessary function of the balance of power operating within a multiple-state system... Whether or not a nation shall pursue a policy of alliances is, then, a matter not of principles but of expediency. Nation will shun alliance if it believes that it is strong enough to hold its own unaided or that the burden of the commitments resulting from the alliance is likely to outweigh the advantages to be expected. It is for me or the other or both to reason that, throughout the better part of their history, Great Britain and the United States have refrained from entering into peace time alliance with other nations. (Morgenthau: 1978: 181).

On the basis of the foregoing, it is important to ascertain the nature and character of relationship and alliances that exist in the sub-region, which necessitates the pattern of the approach towards conflict resolution.

2.4 TOWARDS A THEORY OF REGIME INTEREST

Although social scientists are highly divided on the meaning of national interest, they, nevertheless, agree that there are three things, which constitute part of national interest of any nation. The first is the security of the nation, that is the defence of its territorial integrity, whether from internal or external forces. The second is the protection and development of the resources on which the country survives from external and internal threats. And the third is the socio-political

culture of the state including the protection of citizen and their properties. In fact, any value which a nation is prepare to defend, even if it means going to war constitute part of its national interest. (Wright: 1978:95)

The concept of national interest remains problematic especially in deeply divided plural societies. Various forces tend to define national interest from narrow perspectives and on the basis of group's background. It is difficult to have a perceive definition of national interest. All the same whenever national interest is mentioned it is assumed to be the set of goals, objectives and aspirations which form the bedrock that bakes the existence of a nation-state. However, the instrument that maintains the continuity of national interest is national security. National security is thus conceptualised as national security interest, which provides the cover on which national interest per se is defended. Therefore, national interest is the economic, social, political and military factors, which are essential for the maintenance of the corporate existence and survival of a nation-state as well as its people. In the words of Walter Lipman it is better defined as:

A nation is secured to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values if it wishes, to avoid war and is able if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war (in Buzan: 1991:16).

Though Lipman captures the meaning of national (security) interest, it remains an intellectual headache in a conglomerate society with an unstable political culture (Adisa: 1990: 25). In this society, individuals and groups as well as the state are competing for values, survival and self-preservation. Both the variables and irreducible elements of national interest are mixed up because nothing is concretely established to identify it. Thus national interest is reduced to minimal (micro) and maximal (macro) national interest. The minimal interest takes

care of individuals and groups within the state struggling to defend their personal or group interest. Whereas the maximal national interest is the interest which the state tries to appropriate and maximise admits competing interests in order to maintain its self-preservation. It is as a result of these competing interests that Waltz sets to examine causes of war based on contending interests (Waltz: 1959:).

In the light of this, Joseph Frankel sees national interest as "the sum total of all the national values" defines as the product of a nation's culture and the expression of its sense of cohesion through a defined national ideology (Frankel: 1979:92-94). However the authority of legitimacy superintends the determination and function of national interest. The basic issue involved is how legitimate is the regime entrusted with the power to determine the function of national interest. How can we ascertain its legitimacy? Legitimacy of a regime is determined by popular choice of the people in a participatory democratic system based on consensus, to rule. There are set rules governing the process of democratic succession and power transfer. Anything to the contrary is illegitimate. A regime that comes to power without the consent of the people is illegitimate and cannot be seen to determine the functional operation of national interest of a given nation-state. What it does is on the basis of its regime interest rather than national interest.

Therefore, any regime whose policy is at variant with national interest has taken the path of personal rule. By blending charisma with authoritarianism, it does not establish the basis of its legitimacy. Such a leader may even achieve certain national goals, but such goals are minimal compared to a regime established on legitimacy. In fact, personal rule uses the state apparatus to achieve personal interest rather than national interest. At the end of it either the state is

thrown into anarchy, leading to people's revolt, revolution or creating the dynamics that could reorder and reshape the process towards qualitative development of the state. Even if a regime ascends to power through constitutional means but strays out of its constitutional mandate, its legitimacy can be questioned and eroded. Therefore legitimacy is only conferred on a regime that comes to power not only by constitutional means but a regime that must be found functioning orderly according to the constitutional mandate based on the general will of the people that brought it to power.

In the course of defending one's national interest there is often the tendency to demonstrate one's power capability, which the realist school of thought believes that:

"International politics, like all politics is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aim, statesmen and people may ultimately seek freedom security, prosperity and power itself. They may define their goals in term of religious, philosophic, economic or social ideals. But whenever they strive to realise their goal by means of international politics they do by striving for power (Morgenthau: 1978:22).

In otherwords despite the weakness of a nation; when its vital interest is questioned it rises to its defence. Hence, power is necessary, though not sufficient condition for preserving territorial integrity and national independence, and a state which ignores this condition cannot only compete effectively in international politics, but also runs the risk of disintegration or complete extinction (Nweke: 1985: 12). There are two ways of understanding the use of power. It can either be seen, firstly, as a means of achieving prestige, eventhough its internal cohesion may be weak. Secondly, it could be a useful instrument for achieving national unity, survival and independence when properly utilised. But when power is used purely to control the minds and actions of others it is most likely to weaken

national cohesion. It is possible, however, for a nation with power to exhibit international prestige though plagued with domestic crisis and contradiction.

In most of the developed democracies of the West attempt is made to merge national prestige with national cohesion. In Africa, on the other hand, the focus is mainly on the search for international prestige of theirs especially their leaders while their domestic scene suffers social disorientation, economy disarticulation and political conflict. How then can a nation pursue, preserve, defend and sustain her national interest when national unity is disjointed, patriotism turns felonious and nationalism retreats back to segmental cleavages? How much sacrifice can the population make in terms of effecting vital national interest during wartime? These questions are important because affirmative answers will help our understanding of the delimitation that exists between national interest and regime interest.

However, in answering these questions one has to understand who defines national interest. As early argued, national interest in the advanced democratic countries is pursued as foreign policy with the intention to promote both international prestige and national cohesion. In the developing world, which is infested with repressive regimes, the pursuit of national interest is to promote the personal prestige of the leader. National interest is equated with regime interest. When the pursuit of national interest (policies) lack national character and acceptability, regime interest and personal actions of the leader is taken to be coterminous with national interest. Regime interest is built around national interest in such a way that it is difficult to delimit when the regime carries the people along. But when there is a structural disarticulation the interest of the regime is apparent.

The delimitation and distinction between national interest and regime interest can better be imagined through a highly sophisticated political microscope (logical reasoning) because it is not clear and specific under normal assumption. A critical examination of the national security politics of Third World states show that they portray external geopolitical events as threat to national security. This is so even when such events do not involve any threat of military expansion. This observation is well captured as thus:

“Regimes try and frequently succeed in presenting their own regime legitimacy problems as national and state security problems. In such cases, regime survival often dictates the official perception and definition of what constitutes a threat to national security. In the logic of national security, acts by neighbours or extra-regional power are deemed national security threats if such act raises the prospect of military attack.” (Acharya 1992:145 --146).

One basic point that flows from the above observation is that the formation of sub regional and regional bodies in most Third World countries, especially those of Africa, is informed and aimed at protecting and promoting the survival and interest of the regimes of member – States. This however, does not mean that the regimes are not interested in promoting human, economic and cultural integration of their countries. What it means is that these noble objectives and goals must not be achieved at the expense of the survival and interest of the regimes of member – States. Where the policies and programmes of such bodies threaten the survival and interest of any regime, such regime, in most cases, suspend or withdraw the membership of its country from such a body. Thus, viewed critically, most regimes maintain the membership of their respective countries in organisation, not primarily to promote the noble objectives and goals of such bodies, nor even to promote the national interest of their countries but, most importantly, to ensure their stability and survival. This, they do by ensuring that policies and programmes injurious to their security are not taken in the first instant. And where they are

considered, such policies and programmes are subverted by the regimes from within. Regime interests and security, and not national interest, national security and regional integration, greatly explain the slow growth and development of such bodies like ECOWAS and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and, in fact, in the collapse of the East African Economic Community (EAEC). Thus:

“Narrowly-based and insecure Third World regimes, particularly those under increasing challenge domestically and regionally, use the idea of regional security to form cooperative arrangements with similar regimes in their region to defend themselves as well as to justify their strategic and political links with external powers whose interests converge with the interest of these regimes” (Ayoob: 1986:20).

Convergence of interest could be at national regional or international levels. At the national level the leadership may work on the psychology of various interests or capitalize on the pull and push within the system to fashion out its own regime interest. Therefore; whether the political and socio-economic system is collapsing or not, it matters only when the interest and security of the regime is affected. Just like using interlocking forces at the national level to achieve regime interest, at the international (or regional) level various interests are mobilized, using regional defence and security as yard stick for cooperative arrangement. Leaders that succeed in this develop certain charismatic mechanism, which worsen and deepen prebendalism.

Max Weber identifies three types of leadership that affect policy orientation, namely (a) traditional leadership; (b) legal/rational leadership; and (c) charismatic leadership. In traditional authority the rights to exercise authority are recognized by customs and norms institutionalized overtime while the legal/rational authority depends on the legality of rules and in the rights of those who give command based on the authorities confer by constitution upon duly elected officers. In the case of charismatic leadership, the qualities of the leader are what counts and matters


most. Here, authority is easily prone to fascism as the ability and the “capacity of the leader to arouse and maintain belief in himself or herself as the only source of legitimacy” (Willner: 1984: 4). The charisma with some unusual qualities is distinct from other leadership style in four respects. The first respect is the *Leader-image*. The followers have high opinion about the leader and they also believe that he/she has the power skills, and qualities necessary to lead and achieve what the followers cherished. The leader is seen as an embodiment of their culture and struggle and, thus, having wisdom, foresight, firmness, benevolence, and strength of character. The second respect is the *idea-acceptance dimension* of the charismatic leader. The ideas of the leader form the belief for the followers who internalize the leader’s definition and ideas as sacrosanct. The leader would always tell them what would conform to their knowledge and their experiences, given the leader’s status and prestige. The third area of difference between the charismatic leader and the others is the *Compliance dimension*. The followers comply with the directives of the leader, either out of respect, persuasion, fear, threat or coercion or even a combination of some or all of these. The fourth aspect is the *emotional dimension*. This relates to the type and intensity of psychological attachment of the follower to the leader. The leader, in most cases raise fanatical the followers, often eliciting their affection, admiration, trust, and love of the followers. (Willner: 1984, 5 – 7). These qualities of the charismatic leader make it extremely very difficult for his authority and power to be challenged. And in a situation where there is no separation between the private and public sphere, the tendency, in most cases, is the personalization of State power and the privatization of public wealth (See Weber, 1978: 1023 – 24). A very good example of one of African most charismatic leader is Francisco Macias Nguema, President of Equatorial Guinea who, appointed himself as:

'President for life, Major-General of the Army, Chief Educator of the Nation, Supreme Scientist, Master of Traditional Culture, Chairman of Parti Unique National des Travailleurs, (and) the Only Miracle that Equatorial Guinea ever produced' (Cited in Yusuf, 1994: 251).

Thus, Charismatic leadership ends up promoting and consolidating patrimonialism. Patrimonialism it must be emphasised is characterised by personal power. And in the context of Africa, the distinctive institutional hallmark of African regime is (neo) patrimonialism, where the "chief executive maintains authority through personal patronage rather than through ideology or law... leaders occupy bureaucratic offices less to perform public service than to acquire personal wealth and status. The distinction between private and public interests is purposely blurred" (Bratton and Van de Walle 1994: 458, and Eistenstadt 1972). The patrimonial State does not see the need to promote the common good of all and though being prebendal in character it tries to reduce access of the people to power wielders (Joseph: 1986, and Ibrahim 1997).

In the light of the above, therefore political psychologists have raised some fundamental questions such as: what are the circumstances under which the actions of single individuals are likely to have a greater or lesser effect on the course of events (i.e. action dispensability)? How can we explain the action in terms of the actor's personal characteristics, that is actor indispensability? (Greenstein: 1987: 41 – 42). The actor's personal characteristics are therefore informed by the nature of the system as demonstrated in Figure 2.1. Where national interest is loose, the tendency for an authoritarian leadership to emerge becomes very high. But where various interests are overlapping and reinforcing each other the national interest could be stronger and defensible by the component interests.

Fig. 2.1 Emerging Authoritarian Regime Interest




- A. Represent the state with strong national interest (A1). The thick outer circle representing the state indicates the strength of the state to wield various interests together. There are overlapping domestic interests represented by A2 as the state maintains its national interest over them. These overlapping interests have some convergence values which are building on them.
- B. Represents the state with strong national interest (B1) however, various interests within (B2) tend to be stronger and independent of each other, with variant authorities over B1. The pluralities are sharp and make the state ungovernable and difficult for development to take place.
- C. Represents a state with loose national interest. Any interest can emerge from C2 to enforce itself on C1. The emerging process could either be democratic or authoritarian. This is the type where coups are common as contest for power is more pronounced than developing the society.

In a loose political environment like C above, authoritarian regimes could support a covert authoritarian populism. In Table 2.2 attempt is made to demonstrate how this is attained. Populism is the weapon use by some authoritarian leaders; and, to some extent, fascists to gain support of the people through populist policies, pronouncements, propaganda, commitment and promises. In the event of this the authoritarian populist draws enormous support and strength which enhances the process for authoritarian empowerment. This empowerment equally provides the enabling environment for authoritarian

regime-buildup. It is in this process that an authoritarian populist can become authoritarian despot and begin to live in fear of the civil society that it had initially drawn supports. Being threatened by the reactive strength of the civil society it tries to maintain its survivability and security. The Authoritarian Regime State (ARS) is hereby sandwiched between its security operatives. Given the fact that the ARS has withdrawn itself from the populace the society has also become reactive by taking any available means to express its resistance such as strikes, protest, riots, supporting coup plots, lockouts, demonstrations and revolutionary pressures.

In response to this, ARS also becomes repressive, creating its circular flow of power to weaken oppositions by institutionalizing despotism against the unarmed civil forces (Area boys, labour activists and proletariats). This is sustained through the theory of regime perpetuation by the elimination of opposition. Meanwhile both the authoritarian State and the civil populace, in desperate search for support seek International Support System (ISS). While the civil society may seek assistance from global democratic regimes, which may or may not be effective, the Authoritarian Regime State (ARS) seeks assistance from similar authoritarian regimes, which is always readily available. However, some democratic regimes may also give support to the Authoritarian State because of sheer economic benefits. Withdrawing any public condemnation, veto or opposition against the Authoritarian Regime State in international fora does this.

Figure 2.2 Emerging Nature of Authoritarian Regime State



Key

- CS - Civil Society - mass population, electorate, etc
- APS - Authoritarian populist state
- AE - Authoritarian Empowerment
- AD - Authoritarian Despotism/Dictatorship
- ARS - Authoritarian Regime State
- ISS - International Support System

Explanation

- A: populist policies initiated by the authoritarian regime are intended to gain support of the civil society (A1, A2), by Authoritarian Empowerment (AE). The policies become weakened when the authoritarian state becomes despotic (AD) and no longer require the support of the civil society as shown by the dotted lines i.e. broken relationship is strong (A3).
- B. The support given and received by the civil society for the regime's populist policies is strong (B1, B2) but is later weakened as shown by the dotted lines (B3); because of the regime's increasing repression.
- C. The civil society withdraws its support for the authoritarian regime and begins to seek alternative means to dethrone the ARS. This includes going along or seeking external support from ISS. The support from ISS could either be strong (C3) or weak (C4) just as the internal struggle could either be strong (C1) or weak (C2) with the support of ISS. The Authoritarian Regime State may seek external support from the ISS, which are also authoritarian by nature. Even some democratic states that stand to benefit by supporting such authoritarian regime (e.g. oil and other resources possess by such authoritarian state) in spite of the repressive nature of the regime.

CONCLUSION

The chapter has revisited dominant theoretical models of foreign policy analysis. In doing so, it found out that the existing models are inadequate in explaining the concept of regime interest and its contending issues. At the end, the chapter succeeded in establishing a useful model for explaining and validating the patterns and practices of regime interest that have emerged both in historical perspectives and in the case of Nigeria's experiment in ECOMOG. Before we look at the historical perspectives, let's first of all understand the dynamics of regional security regimes that might have necessitated the emergence of regime interest in the region

CHAPTER THREE

3.0 WEST African SECURITY REGIMES AND THE DILEMMAS OF REGIONAL SECURITY BUILDING

3.1. INTRODUCTION

At the signing of the treaty establishing ECOWAS on May 28 1975 the late Ghanaian Head of state, General Ignatius Achempong said:

“By this single act more than 120 million people of West Africa through their representatives, who assembled in Lagos put a seal on their determination to end the centuries of division or artificial barriers imposed on them from the outside to recreate together the kind of homogenous society which existed before colonialists invaded our shore” (cited in Adedeji: 1983; xxi-xxii)...

The formation of ECOWAS indeed was a watershed ushering in a new hope and aspiration, a bridge over barriers created by colonial divide and a new sense of political consciousness for an economic union intended to integrate discrete but weak instruments of integration in the region. The significance of ECOWAS is underscored by its main objective which is aimed at “promoting cooperation and development in all fields of economic activities, increase and maintain economic stability, foster closer relations among member states and contribute to the progress and development of the African continent (see ECOWAS Treaty 1975 and the revised Treaty 1993). Like other economic unions, the purpose of ECOWAS is primarily to evolve a functionalist approach towards promoting economic, social and political cooperations. On the onset it had ‘little or no regard for security factors’ (Bennett: 1995:236). However, in 1977 the Francophone led Communaute Economique de L’Afrique (CEAO) found it necessity to establish security enhancing regional economic integration: “*L’ Accord de Non Aggression ET d’Assistance Matiere de Défense*” (otherwise known as Agreement on Non-

Aggression and Assistance in Defence) ANAD. This motivated ECOWAS to in 1978 and 1981, equally establish the protocol on Non-Aggression (PONA) and the protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence (POMAD) respectively. This development further kept the sub-region far apart than closing up their ranks.

Our major concern in this chapter is first and foremost delineating security regime from regime security. Already we have analysed regime security in chapter two. Understanding the nature and character of evolving regional security regimes or security complexes will follow this. On the basis of this understanding, the chapter attempts to sort out their differences and impacts on regime security interest. The chapter concludes that such impact will create a dilemma in regional security building in West Africa, especially given the experience in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

3.2. TOWARDS REGIONAL SECURITY COMPLEXES

The search for global peace creating mechanisms started with the intensification of the cold war in 1970s. In a bid to resolve contending issues, regime-creating scenario became the basic canopy for security and confidence building. They are seen as acceptable middle grounds for reconciling the idealist and realist schools by maintaining that "certain pattern of state actions are influenced by norms and such norm governed behaviours are consistent with the pursuit of national interest" (Haggards and Simmon 1987:493). Therefore, trends towards regime formation become foremost at the time international orders, authorities and organisations were themselves becoming moribund and "the sharp contrast between the competitive, zero-sum anarchy of interstate relations and the authority of domestic politics seem overdrawn in explaining cooperation between and among the advanced industrial states" (Haggards & Simmon 1987: 493).

Moreso, the field of regional integration, though generated rich theoretical discourse in the 1960s, it remained tied to the study of international organizations. This made it possible for us to mistake certain state behaviours, which appear regular and regulated to mean institutionalising the international behaviour of states. It is given this position that Haggard and Simon attempt to fill the lacuna; by defining a focus that was neither as broad as international structure nor as narrow as the study of formal international organisations. (Ibid: 491)

The concept of regime has been given different intellectual approaches either as institution or norm governing system. Regimes are seen as frameworks concerned with principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures governing behaviours and interactions among individuals and states. Regimes can also be seen in the context of what Oran Young notes as "social institutions governing actions of those interested in specific activities (or acceptable sets of activities)" (Young: 1983:93). As social institutions, regimes are expected to evolve over time through practices and patterns of behaviour, which has been conventionalised and recognised as norms. They are, in the light of the foregoing discussion, not temporary measures of solving conflict or mere agreement of understanding. They are not instant creation but processes that nature overtime, longer period of time.

According to Keohane, agreement can be *ad hoc* and often one short arrangement but regimes are basic institutions, which help to facilitate agreement. (Keothane: 1983: 141 – 171). This point was strengthened by Jervis who added that the concept of regime implies not only "norms and expectations but a form of cooperation that is more than... short run self interest"(Jervis: 1983:173 – 194) We may add too, that regimes are more than imposition of sanctions on the belligerent

state or an ad hoc security arrangements because such do not, in the interim, provide regime creating measures.

In making a distinction between regimes and agreements (ad hoc types) it should be understood that principles and norms are inherent characteristics of regime creation. Once altered it may lead to the recreation or replacement of an existing regime. But rules and procedures of any given regime can be altered without a significant effect on its norms and principles. This is because rules and procedures are only actions and prevailing behaviours, which although under pine the basis of a given regime may not necessarily be weakened or replaced.

It is on the basis of above that Kraser spells out that regimes can be defined as “set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations” (Kraser: 1983:2). This definition finds acceptability among other scholars like Keohane and Nye (1977:19), Haas (1980:553) and Bull (1977:54).’

It is in this light also that Jervis’ application of the concept to security realm is very relevant here. According to Jervis, security régime, other than other usage of the concept, it involves principles, rules and norms that permit nations to be restrained in their behaviour in the belief that others will reciprocate (Jervis: 1983:173). Jervis modeled the concept of security regime on the theory of prisoner’s dilemma “in which the rational pursuit of self interest leads to a solution that is not pareto-optimal.... States will benefit by setting up rules and institutions to control the competition among them” (Jervis: 1983:174).

In presenting a pungent argument in favour of security regimes, Jervis notes that it is not only valuable but also difficult to achieve because individualistic actions are not only costly but also dangerously difficult to achieve. This is because the fear that the other is violating or will violate the common understanding is a potent incentive for each state to strike out on its own, even if it will prefer the regime to prosper. (Jervis: 1980:174). To this extent, he clearly delineates how security regime is seen different from others: (i) Security issues are too competitive. For instance, under security dilemma conflicts between states over security is more inherent and apparent than economic regimes where even if one state is better off does not make the others worse off; (ii) States in competition get involve in offensive and defensive security operatives. This is either to alter the status quo or change it to their favour. This is possible by seeking arms that would threaten others. Whereas in other security areas a state can take advantage of another state's restraint over a danger without automatically impinging on others; and (iii) the operation of the prisoners' dilemma is higher under security regime than non-security regime.

Therefore, under security, it is difficult to detect what others are doing as a means to measuring one's own security. It is easy and more apparent to detect non-security operatives like tariff increase, monetary manipulations and illegal fishing than are military laboratories for producing chemical weapons. The non-security operatives may not be clear at a point in time but it is more obsequies in the security area: In many cases the state does not know in advance who its allies and enemies will be. Even if it does not know this, it can rarely predict with confidence the out come of war" (Jervis: 1983:175).

In summary Jervis opines that “[T]he primacy of security, the competitive nature of the arena, and the uncertainty of how much security the state needs has, all compound the prisoners’ dilemma and makes it sharper than the problems that arise in most other areas” (Jervis 1983:175) In the light of this, Jervis gave three conditions for the formation and maintenance of security regime. These are:

- (i) All member states under a security regime must be reasonably satisfied with the status quo and whatever alterations can be gained without resort to the use or threat of war. For instance, it was impossible to form a security regime with Hitler’s Germany, a state that sought objectives incompatible with those of the other important states;
- (ii) The actors or members must also believe that others share the value they place on mutual security and cooperation. Where major actors prefer status quo, security regime cannot be possible if one or more actors believe that security is best provided for by expansion; and
- (iii) War and the individualistic pursuit of security must be seen as costly.

Given this set of orders provided by Jervis it will be expected that security regimes have successfully become pathfinders to resolution of conflicts in anarchic world. But there are issues of security dilemma which security regimes cannot be taken as wholistic, especially as it relates to the third world. Jervis conceptualised security dilemma as problematic of nation-states. States under condition of anarchy seek to advance their individual national securities through policies of arming, deterrence and alliance and creating sustainable international environment of decreased relative security threats (Job: 1992:17). The third world security environment suffers from some peculiar premises that make it difficult for security regime to operate; this includes: -

- (a) internal security is disoriented by variety of communal groups contending for their own securities, security space and supremacy over their competitors,
- (b) the regime in power lacks legitimacy and the support of significant population, as it represent only its interest, or narrow segmented interest,
- (c) the state lacks effective institutional capacities to provide peace and order as well as creating conditions for satisfactory physical existence,
- (d) More often the sense of threat that prevails is of internal threats to and from the regime in power, rather than externally motivated threats to the existence of the nation state unit. (Job: 1992:17).

Within the framework of security or insecurity dilemma, Buzan has stretched the spectrum to what he calls security complexes. According to Buzan security complexes are interlocked by amity and enmity among states: "By enmity I mean relationship set by suspicion and fear... patterns of amity/enmity arise from a variety of issues that could not be predicted from a simple consideration of the distribution of power." (Buzan 1992: 189 - 190). As defined by Buzan "security complex is a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another... Security complexes emphasis the interdependence both of rivalry and of shared interest" (Buzan 1992:189) But when applied to third world country rivalry of interests overshadow shared values and interest which Buzan himself noted that in practice, most security complexes are still found at the level of conflict formation. They are action-reaction phenomena process formations, which determine the basis of contractions in a given system.

3.3 CONTENDING ISSUES IN WEST AFRICAN REGIONAL SECURITY REGIMES

It is an accepted fact that West Africa is noted for being one of the most unstable regions in Africa, given the political crises and military upheavals experienced so far (Bennett 1995:236). Never the less, the creation of several economic organisations, bilateral and multilateral, with their security enhancing regimes is supposed to obfuscate the perception that the region thrive on political and military turmoil. However, whether threat to regional stability is exogenous or endogenous, the initial formation of purely Francophone West African economic integration, *Communaute Economique de l'Afrique de l'ouest (CEAO)* in 1971, signaled the difference that exist in the region. CEAO evolved from the Bamako protocol of May 1970, treatised in Abidjan on April 17, 1973 and made operational by January, 1974, mainly for the Francophone states in a region made up of other post colonial entities (Anglophone and Lusophone). In a reaction, the former Nigerian Head of State Yakubu Gowon (rtd) acknowledged that it was a signal for more competition between advocates of the rivalry schemes (Gowon: 1984:230). Even when ECOWAS was finally established in 1975, it was problematic defining geographical spread of what constitute West Africa. In order to accommodate both the interest of France and Francophone West African states, Francophone member states, like Senegal and Cote d'Ivoire, pressed for the inclusion of Zaire and Cameroon in ECOWAS (Welch: 1990). While Cameroon and Zaire (now The Democratic Republic of Congo) were rejected by various countries working for ECOWAS formations, a concession was made implicitly in the framing of the treaty which deliberately failed to define the geographical constituents of the West African sub-region. The treaty was not only blank in defining what constitute ECOWAS region but also merely listed contiguous countries that have endorsed

the instrument of ECOWAS that are members of the organisation. This gives room for possible enlargement in future.

The quest for enlargement was as a result of the perception and fear of Nigeria's hegemonic leadership and economic encirclement of other member states in the region. This tend to support an issue raised by Hurrell that the existence of powerful hegemon within a region may undermine efforts to construct inclusive regional arrangements involving all or most of the states within a region, even though hegemony can as well be powerful stimulus to regionalism (Hurrell: 1995:343). Hurrell gave reasons for the resurgence of regionalism such as:

- (i) a response to the existence of actual hegemonic power,
- (ii) an attempt to restrict the free exercise of hegemonic power, through the creation of regional institutions, and
- (iii) A result of the tendency of weak states to seek accommodation with the local hegemons in the hope of receiving special rewards (band wagoning), and regional hegemon may seek to become involved in the construction of common regional institutions (hegemonist stability).

In other words the presence or influence of a hegemon would direct the region towards pareto-optimality by producing public goods, a system of order for the society (Keohane 1980: 131 – 162, Keohane 984, Aning 1997). The fear and/or support by small states to hegemon(s) in the formation of regionalism is dependent on whether they were coerced or defer their support in the hope of a benevolent manifest of power by the hegemon(s). In the light of this we can categorise hegemony into coercive (malevolent) and benevolent hegemony. In the benevolent hegemony the “greater absolute size of the largest actor means it has a

greater interest in providing the (public) good “by assuming a selfless disposition within the group. Consequently the maintenance or growth of the largest actor is the key (stabilising) factor... absolute decline is the source of decay” (Adibe and Ofori-Yeboah; 1992:4; Snidal; 1985:589).

Coercive hegemony is determined by the ability and willingness of the hegemon to “force subordinating states to make contribution which mostly benefit the preponderant state actor” (Adibe and Ofori-Yeboah: 1992: 4). The exercise of power by the hegemonic state within the regional framework, therefore, determines whether the regional organisation is stabilised by benevolence or coercion. The benevolent hegemon acts as a facilitator in providing a multilateral consensus-based approach in a Gramscian consensual interpretation of hegemony. However, in contrast, the coercive hegemon opts for unilateral position to the use of force. In a manner referred to by Gramsci as domination (Howes, 1990:2,7). The use of force may not necessarily be militaristic but moral and economic sanctions or political withdrawal of supports. Whatever it means, to achieve the same purpose the use of force may be applied, in order to create a hegemonic dominance.

It might be argued that French economic interest in Nigeria is greater than her economic interest in Francophone West Africa put together, nevertheless the political ties with these Francophone countries cannot be severed because of French economic interest in Nigeria. Thus, it is easier for France to deal with Francophone West African states, both economically and politically than with Nigeria which an economic deal may be very precarious, given the undulating nature of economic policies and unstable political system. Therefore at any critical moment of achieving long term national interest, France would prefer to strengthen the political, economic and military base of the Francophone states.

It is in the light of this, that France nurtured CEAO. It started in 1971 in a new strange relationship that developed between two rivalry Francophone states, Senegal and Cote d' Ivoire, during an unprecedented visit by the Senegalese president Sedar Senghor to Houphuet-Boigny of Cote d' Ivoire in Abidjan. According to the position of the founding members of CEAO, it would be a stepping stone for all encompassing West African economic organisation. In this regard, the chairman of the organisation, Hamani Diori of Niger, began a state visit to Nigeria, Togo and Benin in 1973; exploring measures towards the enlargement of the organisation. If this was the case, why should Nigeria and Togo evolve a similar initiative like ECOWAS, which overlapped CEAO.

Similarly, just as an ECOWAS formation was inflicted by the intra-regional impossibilities, the formation of regional security regimes followed almost the same pattern. The member states of CEAO, meeting in Abidjan, Cote d' Ivoire in 1977 decided to establish a security framework, *Accord de Non Aggression et d' Assistance en Matiere de Defence* (ANAD). Surprisingly it was Togo, a traditionally pro-West African integration was instrumental (together with Nigeria) to the formation of ECOWAS. It teamed up with Senegal, an archy-type Francophone state, a skeptic of ECOWAS creation (and a proponent of Zaire and Cameroon inclusion in ECOWAS) to canvass for the formation of ANAD within the CEAO. Seven countries (Burkina Faso, Cote d' Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Togo) endorsed in 1977 the instrument establishing ANAD. At the end the Chairman, President Magouya Ould Sid Ahmed Taya of Mauritania noted

that:

This agreement is the consecration of the friendship and the cooperation existing between our countries, and of the responsibilities that are ours in order to maintain peace according to the principles of the charter of African Unity (cited in Gomis: 1997:6)

With such a security measure in ANAD, ECOWAS resolved also to endorse her own security instrument, protocol on Non Aggression pact, in Lagos, 1978. The protocol overlooked two fundamental security related issues: (i) incidence of external aggression and (ii) externally supported or sponsored domestic insurrection and revolt within ECOWAS. Togo and Senegal, independent of each other, made proposals for a well-structured regional security organ in view of increasing security dilemma in the region. At the summit of Heads of state and government held in Dakar 1979, president Eyadema of Togo, made the point that for ECOWAS to achieve economic integration and cooperation there was need for defence and security arrangement. President Senghor who concurred that agreed this upon:

There is hardly any need for me to demonstrate that the fact that development cannot be secured in a dilemma of insecurity. This being so, we must among ourselves, establish a genuine West African solidarity pact to guard against external aggression (Senghor 1979).

An eight nation ministerial committee backed by the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat was set up to formulate the modalities for a common security policy. In 1980 ECOWAS summit was convened in Lome, Togo, to consider the proposal which nearly set members divided. Senghor argued that member states that are not prepared to join the defence pact should be permitted to be excluded. This was further strengthened by Eyadema who noted that the proposed protocol on mutual defence was a "logical follow up to the signing of the non-aggression protocol" (African Research Bulletin: 17 February, 1980:5664).

Finally member states, except the Lusophone states (Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau, and one Francophone States, Mali), ratified the Protocol of Mutual Assistance on Defence (POMAD). Though the position of the Lusophone states was not clearly defined; Mali argued that ECOWAS inclusion of any security protocol was reopening the region to "colonial reconquest" (West Africa 9th June, 1980:103; see also Aning 1997). Mauritania on her part expressed reservation on the possibility of the institution to function according to expectation. One can understand the position of Mali and Mauritania for being mentors of ANAD where they can fall on, but for Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau; it is difficult to understand. There is no wonder therefore, that Cape Verde had to depend on Angola in 1985 when there was an internal insurrection leading to coup and counter coup in that country while Guinea Bissau had to fall back on ECOWAS for ECOMOG troops to intervene in the internal crises in 1998.

Critiques such as Aning have questioned the rationale for Francophone states (Togo and Senegal) raising issue for regional security pact: Whether Francophone West African countries intend to regulate and control Nigeria's supposed hegemony? (Aning: 1990). In any case how are member states of ECOWAS sure that the protocol will not be used by Nigerian authoritarian regime to achieve certain authoritarian ambitions? This was further concurred by a skeptical thought punctured by John Ravenhill who tries to dismiss the entire security mechanism as a complication which will at the end serve only the long standing interest of some ambitious heads of state. (Ravenhill: 1985:215-216).

Meanwhile ANAD has demonstrated its ability to intervene in resolving crisis among its member states. In 1985, Mali (which was initially resentful of

POMAD) was in a border dispute with Burkina Faso in the Agacher region as each side found themselves in armed conflict. ANAD intervened instead of ECOWAS. A cease-fire was proclaimed and member states of ANAD did not only send observer mission but was involved in supervising the freeing of all the prisoners. By February 1, 1986 ANAD had accomplished its mission in the Agacher zone and pulled out accordingly. At the initial stage of the crisis Nigeria and Libya offered to intervene in the resolution of the crisis but were rebuffed on the pretext that the conflict was an internal affairs of ANAD members.

Similarly in 1986, some mercenaries attacked the presidential palace in Lome. The president, Eyadema alleged complicity by Ghanaian authority. Both Togo and Ghana are members of the ECOWAS and have been signatories to POMAD. While realising the ineffectiveness of ECOWAS without an institutionalised POMAD, Eyadema decided to invoke its defence agreement with France. France sent in 200 troops to dismantle the siege. The third case was the Senegal and Mauritania conflict over water rights. Because the incumbent president of one of the parties in the conflict was the chairman of ANAD, ANAD was cautious in getting involve.

ANAD's success, however small, rendered POMAD impotent; except the skepticism that it may turn out to sustain self vested interest. This interest can only be built from within the institutional security framework. This framework will define the nature and character of such security complexes in the context of amity and enmity. The application of ECOWAS security network in the resolution of Liberian and Sierra Leonean crises brought out this connection. For instance, we have Nigeria versus Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso in the case of Liberian crisis; and Nigeria versus Liberia, Libya and Burkina Faso in the case of Sierra Leonean

crisis. Before we understand how this animosity and enmity was effected in building regime interest, let's understand the difficulties in the operability of POMAD vis a vis the modicum success of ANAD.

3.4. STRUCTURE AND NATURE OF WEST AFRICAN SECURITY REGIMES

The creation of security regimes in any region of the UN member states must fall in line with the articles of the UN Charter. According to the UN Charter:

Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such Matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. (Article 52: UN Charter).

On the strength of this, the superpowers during the cold war years established North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and Warsaw pact. The OAU Charter in article 3 also endorses the principle of the UN Charter. On the basis of this, some contradictions emerged in West Africa as member states of the sub-region duplicated their efforts in both economic and security establishment. This has implications for the poor level of organising economic and security networks. We have CEAO against ECOWAS and ANAD contending with PONA and POMAD.

(i) *The Accord on Non-Aggression and Defence*

ANAD was established in 1977 as a security organ of Francophone (CEAO). The possibility for ANAD arose after the 1974 border clashes between Mali and Burkina Faso when member states realised that their individual defence pact with France does not hinder them to cooperate at the regional level in the area of defence and security.

ANAD is a separate organ from CEAO now known as, *Union Monétaire ET Economique Ouest Africaines* (UEMOA). Its main objectives are to pursue Non-Aggression agreement and offer assistance in defence to member states. Under threat, ANAD is structured into

- The conference of Heads of state and Government
- The Minister's council, and
- The General Secretariat

The conference of the Heads of states and Government is the supreme decision making and approving authority in matters of security. The conference has a general and particular powers in case of threat against the security of a member states. It also deals with unresolved issues at the level of Council of ministers on all subjects regarding the documents of ANAD. It also defines the policy of Non Aggression and assistance in matter of defence, and decides on the measures to be taken including the use of armed forces to forestall peace among hostile member states (Massina: 1997:44) The council of ministers is next to the conference of Heads of state and government. It performs the rôle assigned to it by the conference. Its decision is subject to the conference of the Heads of states and government.

The General Secretariat is headed by the Secretary General who is responsible to follow-up decisions made by the conference of Head of state and government. The essential rôle of the General Secretariat is to ensure the implementation of the decision of the conference. The Secretary General does not have executive power. But he is incharge of the management and the administration of the secretariat in the area of the preparation and management of

the ANAD budget. The appointment of the Secretary-General is made by the conference of Heads of state and government for a period of three years and could be renewed. Under the general secretary office there are departmental units like administrative section, financial control section, Board of Legal Affairs and Board of general structures consisting of a logistics and operational Divisions, among others.

According to Jean Gomis, a one time Secretary- General of ANAD, the organisation is sustained by a number of forty personnel staff up of the secretary general supported by civilian and service men. The finances are allocated through a budget voted every year and financed by member states. The security mechanism for ANAD intervention in a conflict is set in motion by a given state under threats or a victim of aggression. The chairman of the conference is formally informed by such a state. The council of ministers is mandated to assess the situation and submit findings appropriately to the conference of Heads of state and government who decides on the measures to be taken (Massina 1997:44).

ii. ***Protocol relating to Non Aggression and protocol relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence. (PONA and POMAD)***

On April 22 1978, ECOWAS member states met in Lagos, Nigeria and adopted a protocol on Non-Aggression with the main objective of ensuring “an atmosphere, free of any fear of attack or aggression of state by another” (Aning: 1999). In the light of this Okolo sees the protocol equally as a demonstration of good will among the ECOWAS leaders and their “willingness and commitment to restrict their sovereignty in a new era” (Okolo: 1983).

Under the protocol on Non Aggression (PONA) member states resolved in Article I to refrain from threat or use of force or aggression in their relations with one another. In article 2, they also decided to refrain from committing, encouraging or condoning acts of subversion against the territorial integrity or political independence of other states. While articles 3&4 of the pact deny foreign residents the use of a member's territory as a launch pad for subversive or aggressive activities against another member state in region. In the spirit of regional cooperation member states under article 5, pledge to resort to all peaceful means in the settlement of disputes arising among themselves.


Three years later the protocol on Non Aggression was enhanced by ECOWAS' protocol relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence (POMAD) signed in Freetown Sierra Leone in May 1981. POMAD in its preamble reinforced the commitment of ECOWAS to PONA and declared in article 2 that "any armed threat or aggression directed against any member state shall constitute a threat or aggression against the community". The protocol further resolves in article 3 and 4 that members will give mutual assistance for defence against armed aggression, by committing themselves to place at the disposal of the community units from the existing national armed forces which shall be referred to as the Allied Armed Forces of the Community (AAFC).

The AAFC if properly placed is supposed to intervene in (i) external aggression against member state (ii) armed conflict between two or several member states where peaceful settlement has become difficult, and in an (iii) internal armed conflict within a member state which is either sponsored or supported from outside the region, especially where such conflict is likely to endanger security and peace of the community. Therefore, under article 17 where

two member states are in conflict the Authority shall meet urgently and take appropriate action for mediation” and if need be, the authority shall decide only to interpose the AAFC between the troops engaged in the conflicts.

Meanwhile to enhance the capability of the security regime under POMAD, the protocol made provision for a Defence Council made up of Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs of member states under the chairmanship of the Authority of the Heads of state and government. Whereas the Defence Commission is made up of Chiefs of Defence Staff of each member state. The Executive Secretary for military affairs is also required in the treaty to coordinate and control movement of troops and logistics, launching collective military manoeuvre, formulating and administering the military budget of the secretariat. The Allied Armed Forces of the community (AAFC) is placed under a community Force Commander who is responsible to the Deputy Executive Secretary, Military Affairs. The date of application of POMAD was 1986. As at 1986 no structure was put in place, before the outburst of the Liberian crisis. Table 3:1 is the structure of security cooperation in ECOWAS.

Table 3.1 STRUCTURE OF ECOWAS SECURITY COOPERATION



NOTES: 1-4 represent Units of contributed troops including those of the assisted country.

3.5 DILEMMAS OF REGIONAL SECURITY-BUILDING IN WEST AFRICA

The multiple security regimes ANAD, POND and POMAD have created some dilemmas in West Africa regional security building. As noted by Olu Adeniyi the instruments “unfortunately, are not uncoordinated, they have no contact whatsoever with each other. This conspiracy of silence and mutual contempt if not ratified, will continue to hamper the prospect of effective subregional action based on consensus and pulling together of subregional resources” (Adeniji 1997:3). It is worthy to note that ANAD had pride itself in resolving some of the crises among member states. Its structures are solidly on ground. Member states seem to trust themselves and are faithful to each other more than whatever role they play in ECOWAS. Abdul Diouf of Senegal who was doubtful of merger between CEAO and ECOWAS reflects this.

It is in every body's interest that if ECOWAS reaches its cruising speed the CEAO should normally melt into the structures of ECOWAS, if it reaches its cruising speed and overcomes its present difficulties. What we do not want, we members of CEAO is to be asked to eliminate something that works well, that produces brilliant results... while ECOWAS has not reached cruising speed (West Africa: October 1983)

At its summit meeting held in Nouakchott, the conference of Heads of state of ANAD in a communique expressed the desire to extend ANAD mandate to other states in the subregion. To this extent, the chairman at the Summit was mandated to undertake necessary steps. This desire by ANAD however genuine ignored the existence of ECOWAS which a planned working relationship or merger could have proceeded. From indication, ANAD is not interested to work towards fusion. Hence, given its exclusive linguistic identity, it finds cooperation and collaboration in the area of peace and security more comfortable than in a multilingual organisation like ECOWAS. Another worrying aspect is the clause in

POMAD, which kick against collaboration with foreign countries in the area of defence and security. They feared being tagged imperialist stooges. Their involvement in ECOWAS – POMAD is therefore weak as they find more reliability in ANAD. However, the revised ECOWAS treaty treated that ECOWAS will work towards harmonization of similar treaties within the region. It further called on members to remove all provisions from their prior treaties, which are incomparable with ECOWAS treaty. This might also informed the creation of a new ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention Management Resolution Peacekeeping and Security (MCPMRPS). But as credible as ECOWAS treaty is, it should not be expected that CEAO – ANAD might be erased easily without the right climate provided by ECOWAS to member states of CEAO; that it could be better in ECOWAS. It may rather meet John Ravenhill's position that the unnecessary complication by ECOWAS in adopting PONA and POMAD might serve and appease the long standing ambition of certain leader in the region (Ravenhill 1985:215-216).

This position was strengthened by the observation made by Olu Adeniji that the non implementation of POMAD in fact makes ANAD members in POMAD not to be seriously inclined towards any obligations order by POMAD, and are therefore, not always too willing to carry out the burden of ECOWAS. Thus, to an extent that it seems that any conflict in an English speaking country in West Africa is seen as ECOWAS problem while a conflict in Francophone sphere is seen as CEAO/ANAD problem. This is one of the contradictions in creating integration functional programme in Africa. The establishment of POMAD by ECOWAS was indeed based on the position maintained by Senegal and Togo. However, POMAD in its instrument did not make reference to ANAD, which existed before it. At least such a reference may provide a psychological contact and thus remove animity that

exist between the two regional organisations. ECOWAS case was worsened by the fact that non-of the instruments establishing POMAD were in operation before the start of the Liberian crisis. Therefore it is possible to believe Emmanuel Aning that “while Senegal and Togo saw the inclusion of security (organ) in the context of community goals and interests some countries saw this differently from the sum total of their national interest” (Aning: 1999). Though both ANAD and POMAD may be duplicating themselves, they equally have contradictory clause that makes a combined regional security difficult. For instance, ANAD makes provision for extra-regional defence pact by member states, probably for fear of Nigeria’s hegemonic influence in the region. Whereas POMAD totally forbids the presence of foreign intervention in the region. As much as the Francophone states will not oppose the exercise of hegemony by a strong regional power, however, the fear of it, paradoxically, is often cited as the reason for the reluctance by smaller countries to support any action taken by Nigerian in the event of any regional crisis. The Liberian situation has shown that hegemony works best in a situation of structural security vacuum. (Adeniyi 1997:36).

Therefore, the contradictions in the regional security administration provide the basis for the emergence of regime interest in the light of national and regional security interests. In the light of this, a renowned Nigerian critic, Dr. Yusuf Bala Usman warned that “we have to be very careful that no treaty is made to empower other countries army to intervene in the internal affairs of another country to preserve a government (Tribune :27 May; 1980 ;16). It is on the basis of this also that we might understand how the authoritarian leaderships in Nigeria interpret regional insecurity in the light of regime interests.

3.6 AUTHORITARIANISM, SECURITY AND REGIME INTEREST

The changing perception of Nigeria's regional security interest therefore, becomes paramount with the increasing influence and control of the political power by the military. Thus, the search for extra-territorial market for Nigeria's growing economic production in ECOWAS is being used in turn, covertly or otherwise, to work out a security-mechanism to protect the interest of the military in power. This, by implication secure Nigeria's sub-regional influence against threats from neighbouring countries. This is possible because as oil wealth swells up, the military finds it difficult to leave power. The wealth does not only help to strengthen military rule economically but create the means for active and effective policy towards Africa and the world to the advantage of the military as a revolutionary force. Increasingly too, the political class becomes too weak in the art of governance. When the military was forced to return power to civil rule in 1979 it found it difficult to immediately stay long out of power. By the end 1983 the military had returned to power through a coup. Again the deliberate refusal to hand over power to civil rule in 1993 following the annulment of the presidential election later swung the nation back to full military rule until May 1999. In the process, the military gradually perfected itself in the art of governance as it equally weakened the institutional bases for the political class to imbibe the art of democratic governance. (See Ake: 1993: 32 - 33).

Given this development, the concept of national security interest is becoming conterminous with regime-interest. The Nigerian ruling military regimes began to take special interest in the "internal affairs of her neighbours and the entire West African region after the civil war in order to ensure that hostile forces did not replace government friendly to it". (Aluko, 1977:165; Ojo, 1980). Though Nigeria has experienced only ten years of civilian rule since independence

the dominance of the military in the corridor of power has emphatically built the instruments of Nigerian national security into the process of maintaining Nigeria's hegemony in ECOWAS as a means to check internal subversion through extra-territorial influence in the region. Earlier while in office, Babangida states his concept of regional security thus:

...when certain events occur in this sub-region depending upon their intensity and magnitude, which are bound to affect Nigeria's politico-military and socioeconomic environment, we should not stand by as a helpless and hapless spectator. We believe that if the events are of such a level that has the potential of threatening the stability, peace and security of the sub-region, Nigeria in collaboration with others, in this sub-region is duty bound to react or respond in appropriate manner or take adequate measures to ensure peace and tranquillity and harmony (Babangida, 1991:272).

Indeed the defence of national interest means the need to create enabling environment to enhance collective security of all the state. In this direction, collective interest of states must transcend their sovereign territorial boundaries. And states that are vulnerable to threats become security conscious to protect their interest. Therefore, peripheral values (like regime-interest) relating to the internal affairs of such leaders that are insecure pursue a sovereign nation beyond a nation's boundary. Here we apply the concept of 'maximal theory of national interest' (Akinyemi and Ogwu, 1981:125) to indicate how regimes can go beyond any measures to protect their interest. In the developing world, national interest is first and foremost defined as regime-interest. And in the context of Nigeria, peripheral interest of the ruling military regime is transformed into national interest to the extent that regime-interest and national interest are hardly delineated. According to General Ibrahim Babangida enlivened the significance of regime-security as national interest. According to General Babangida "in government parlance, what security means is any measure, offensive or defensive, taken to

protect the state from acts ... to annoy the head of government. You can take any measure to stop the country from being subjected to acts of sabotage or terrorism. You can take any measure to make sure that the Head of Government or state or the President does not get annoyed. It is all part of security" (Tell, 1995:20).

This has raised the question as to whether if it were a democratic regime in power it will have pursue national interest more than regime-interest? To some extent the answer may be in affirmative because democratic regimes are less autocratic. (Schweller, 1992:238). This tends to support the hypothesis of Rummel that "the more freedom (democratic) a state the less its internal and foreign violence" sic (Rummel, 1983:34). Unlike a democratic regime, under an authoritarian rule national objectives, principles and policies are always in conflict with the interest of the authoritarian leadership. In the light of this, policy makers, actors and facilitators help to fashion policies that are intended to stabilise the interest of the regime in power rather than sustaining national interest. The bureaucrats, intellectuals and politicians who seek benefits from the regime establish patron-client relationship. Therefore, in the name of national security interest the regime is helped to its stability by state apparatus like the bureaucracy, the Judiciary, its intellectual gurus, the military institutions and political hangers on.

At the end national interest is abandoned for regime interest or the line between the two becomes hardly noticeable. The fact that majority of countries in West Africa have been at one time or the other autocratic confirms the direction in which regional security has been pursued to sustain regime-stability in the region. Therefore, the absence of contiguous democratic states and/or regimes in the region explains lack of peace in West Africa. Hence, democracies rarely clash

with one another and hardly fight one another in war (Levy, 1988:662; Rummel, 1995:3-26). In democracies there are several exhaustive channels before a nation resorts to war. Accordingly, "democracy leaves no room for conspiracy in the general matters of state" (and) "where political and military responsibility have not been clearly separated the great makers of war (Louis XIV, Fredrick the Great, Napoleon 1, Hitler (*Babangida and Abacha*) have been able to hold sway" (cited in Schweller, 1992:245) (- addition mine). And as in the words of King Louise XIV of France 1715-1774, the rigid regimes or leaders often believe that sovereign power exist in the person of the leader," "the rights and interest of the nation are necessarily one with mind and repose in my hands alone" (cited in Held, 1990:39).

Nigeria is singled out as a case study in the experimentation of ECOMOG because of its characteristic disposition exhibited by two strong reasons concerning her involvement in the conflict. The first was a general position that the Nigerian state has been influential in the formation of ECOWAS as a stable ground for accomplishing its hegemonic interest, not only within the region but in an eventual contention with France in the region. The second factor is emergent, and is concretely related to the short circuiting procedure which Babangida and Abacha got Nigeria involved in the Liberian and Sierra Leonean conflicts; as a means towards the stability of their regimes. The conflict in Liberia provided a coincidental approach for Nigeria's regional security interest to be smeared by the regime interest of Generals Babangida and Abacha. What helped them to record a momentary success is the post cold war context in which the super powers and the great powers relaxed from policing the world peace and security.

This relaxation created room for the emergence of regional hegemons whose authoritarian leaders have found an easy means to effect and anchor the stability of

their regimes, to avoid or confront any threat or conflict escalating at both national and regional levels. The relaxation of interest by world powers in regional conflict is an indication that peripheral states are no longer allies for security but liabilities. How did Babangida and Abacha utilise this opportunity? What effect did it have on Babangida's regime stability as well as national interest? What lessons can we draw from this? How can we assess the initial response of ECOWAS member states to Babangida's backed ECOMOG intervention in Liberia. How has the regime of General Sani Abacha built on the ground work of Babangida's regime? These and more of these issues would be explored and analysed in the subsequent chapter. The intention is to understand the perception of Babangida and Abacha regime vis-a- Vis national interest in the pursuit of regional security in West Africa.

It is on the basis of the above that the fundamental issue is, why and how the military regime of General Ibrahim Babangida decided to sponsor ECOMOG as a peace-building mechanism for the resolution of Liberian conflict. This is important because two scenarios are peculiar to understand emergence of regime interest in Nigeria. In the first scenario, what actually made Nigeria not to retaliate when her soldiers, five in number, were killed in 1981 by Cameroon Gendarmes over border dispute in the Bakassi Peninsula? The second scenario is: what changed the modality of the perception, which led to Nigerian's effective involvement in the resolution of Liberian conflict? The first scenario occurred under a civilian democratic regime while the second happened under military regime.

The applications of the same foreign policy principles and objectives in the two scenario have different goals, complete different approaches and explanations.

The responses to the stimuli differ, the regimes are different and the output has different outcome. The first scenarios received weak response even though Cameroon as one of Nigeria's immediate neighbour falls within the epicenter or the ring countries in Nigeria's concentric foreign policy circles, foreign policy principle and objectives, whereby any crisis or conflict likely to have a spill over effect on Nigeria's territorial integrity ought to be effectively checked. The border area in question is strategic and it falls within the core-value of Nigeria's National security interest. Whereas, Liberia, which falls into the third category of the West African sub-region in Nigeria's concentric foreign policy, circles, received quicker and immediate response. There must therefore, be a dominant interest involved in the second scenario that triggered the military regime to perceive the Liberian conflict equally as a threat to its security and survival.

Indeed, Nigeria has a long concern for regional security in West African. But what is the nature of these (Liberian and Sierra Leone) conflicts that is likely to threaten Nigeria's national security interest and the regional security? What type of threats to regional security that could make Nigeria to wave its foreign policy principles and objectives (concentric policy) in order to address a peripheral "regional conflict"? How could regional conflict be characterized? The regional conflict question might be relative and may be seen as an imagination of the military regimes for turning a given crisis-situation into a means of achieving regime interests and not necessarily national security interest of the Nigerian state and its people. In the same vein, one can also question, what are the constitutive instruments of regional security? How did Liberian conflict, within four months of its occurrence, turn out to be a threat to regional security? How have Liberians proved within these four months (December 1989 – April 1990) that the crisis was

beyond their capacity to handle to warrant regional enforcement of peace? These questions are also applicable to the crisis situation in Sierra Leone.

3.7 CONCLUSION

We have been able to establish that despite the relevance of security regimes in forging regional security cooperation, however, overtly this tends to serve the purpose of regime interest. This is more experienced in unstable societies where security alliances are actually intended to defend the interest of the leadership than the nation-state. Indeed whatever action a regime undertakes it is rationalized on national security interest and defence of regional security. So, overtly national interest and regional security are used as staging plank for sustaining regime interest. In the light of this ECOWAS treaty and its supporting security protocols provide the basic for Babangida and Abacha to link their security to regional security under the cover of administering national interest. This is empirically demonstrated in the process towards the formulation and execution of ECOMOG mandates in the Liberian and Sierra Leonean crisis. We realised that ECOWAS may not be a good starting point as there are empirical evidence in historical perspectives.

CHAPTER FOUR

4.0 PATTERNS AND PRACTICES OF PERSONAL RULE AND NATIONAL INTEREST IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The patterns and practices of personal rule vis-a-vis national interest in any given milieu are determined by the domestic interplay within the fabric of the society. In short, the type of a given society determines the nature of security interest that can be evolved and pursued. The indices for determining the nature of security interest in question are dependent on the dimension which a nation's foreign policy and security issues are formulated and handled. Starr raises a critical issue while looking at the idiosyncratic or psychological approach to the study of foreign policy: He tries to understand how individuals count, and the differences they make: Is there...actor indispensability (as opposed to action indispensability)? (Starr: 1989:182). Where actor's interest supercedes national interest there is the tendency for personal rule or regime interest to pre-occupy state policies. But where the action of the leader rather than his personality tends towards national interest, personal rule is de-emphasised. But the problem is delineating the thin line between actor and action indispensabilities. Constitutionally it is possible but the political reality makes it difficult to ascertain.

However, this chapter attempts to examine the empirical relevance of national interest in democratic settings and to find out whether any trace of regime interest or personal interest is coterminous with national interest. Secondly it focuses on how Adolph Hitler of Germany overturned democratic process and commandeered state apparatus to attain the personal objectives he set forth as

measures to sustain his regime and personal interest. The other case studies are first Mummer Ghadafi of Libya who metamorphosed from military rule to one party state where his personality became a central figure. His interest and personality are taken as laws governing national interest. The second and third are Stalin of the former Soviet Union and the late Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire respectively.

There are three factors for understanding the pattern of political behaviours of the leadership, such as; whether it pursues national security interest or personal interest. These are first, the aggravating indiosyncracies of the personality in question. Secondly, ideological disposition as a legitimizing process, and lastly, the political institutions available for actualising this. These provide the basis for policy actions or reactions that inform either the pattern of regime behaviour or national aspiration. In the course of the discourse in this chapter effort will be made to identify and isolate, where necessary, these factors and their relevance to the research focus. In short the chapter intends to give some empirical understanding of how policies are evolved in both democratic and authoritarian states. These comparative perspectives provide necessary tools for understanding how regime interest emerges.

4.2 NATIONAL INTEREST IN DEMOCRACIES

In democratic settings every arm of government has a constitutional role to play. Each role is played with the purpose of achieving national interest above all other interests and considerations. If one arm tends to abuse its power legislative

oversight or judicial counter weight either checks it. Though at discreet levels where policies are being formulated various interests tend to bear. But as these policies pass through many processes, the irreducible minimum becomes what is assumed as national interest. Each arm of government must be cautious in enforcing personality interest as against the emerging national interest. Therefore, "responsiveness to change circumstance, the perception of gradation and an ability to manage the conflict of values inherent in every foreign policy issue are crucial" (Rogers: 1981; 478).

In the United States where democracy has taken roots for over 200 years, it is a policy that every foreign policy issue is considered by the congress because of its democratic credentials, being "the most democratic and most representative of the three branches of government, to check the chief executive (Rogers: 1981:476). The US constitution promulgated in 1787 clearly delineated the power and authority to formulate foreign policy from the power and authority to make and or declare war; that is, foreign policy powers and war power. The constitution recognised the president as being the Commander-in-Chief where military officers are answerable to him, yet the congress has the powers to declare war. In spelling out this constitutional objective, one of the makers of the US constitution, James Madison wrote after the adoption of the constitution that the "Necessity of a rigid adherence to the simple.... Fundamental doctrine of the constitution that the power of judging the cause of war, is fully and exclusively rested in the legislature" (cited in Barret: 1990: 66).

In term of foreign policy the president appoints ambassadors and makes treaties with the consent of the congress especially the Senate. Indeed for most past of 19th and early 20th centuries the congress retained the power of war, to the

extent that President Thomas Jefferson (1801-1809) acknowledged his constitutional inappropriate action when Tripoli declared war on the United States by attacking US Naval vessels in the Bay of Tripolis. President Jefferson retaliated without seeking the consent of the senate. Jefferson however, admitted his inappropriate and impermissible action taken without congressional approval.

With developments in the international scene there have been growing challenges to this constitutional provisions by subsequent presidents of the United State. President Theodore Roosevelt (1901-1907) and Woodrow Wilson (1913-1921) represent the new thinking about America's government and foreign policy. As against previous advise of George Washington for America to avoid being entangled in alliances with other countries, President Wilson reacted "I declined to adopt the view that what was imperatively necessary for the action could not be done by the president unless he could find some specific authorisation to do so" (Barret: 68). President Wilson's reaction came at the wake of his hope that the presidency was uniquely endowed to represent the democratic values of the American people. His hope was betrayed when he could not persuade the necessary 2/3 of the senate to approve US membership of the League of Nations. After the World War I, the United States had pushed for the principle of isolationism from participating in World events as president Warren G Harding pledged to return America to the normal state of affairs without an interest in European affairs. In 1936 President Franklin Roosevelt reluctantly endorsed Congressional Neutrality Act which isolates US from any international issue. The Act also was an attempt to frustrate the president's effort to go into alliance with Britain against Germany at the time of hostility that was leading to the Second World War II.

However, with the attack on US Pacific Ocean Naval base at Pearl Harbour, December 1941; by Japan, the US Congress needed no pressure from the president to declare war on Japan and Germany. Thus, events after World War II, especially with the emergence of the cold war led to the transformation of the role of the president in declaring war. President Truman seized upon the new development to declare war on communist North Korea, without congressional authorisation. However, it is also constitutionally acceptable that at any critical situation a democratic government can declare war pending subsequent approval by the parliament.

This was strengthened when in the case of U.S., the Congress established the 1947 Act on National Security Council in coordinating foreign policy issues. The new challenge arose with the general conception of America's rise as a super power. As the Americans began to share this new thinking with their president it becomes imperative for the Congress to equally create a middle ground for reconciling constitutional misunderstanding. It is on this ground that one agrees that foreign policy behaviour and the independent factors are linked by various variables that shape the behaviour of the state and policy matters. This includes issues such as the international systematic environment, existing social context, state policy, individual characteristics of policy makers and factors relating to the roles performed by decision makers (Dumbrell; 1990:39).

The United States provides an example of a country that enforces democratic channels of decision making. Prior to 1947, the US President could exercise tremendous influence in national security decision making process. This changed following the enactment of the National Security Act of 1947. The Act spelt out personalities that the president should consult with, and the nature of the

consultation. In the light of this, inspite of the deft of political and diplomatic skills, President JF Kennedy had to work closely with, and entirely depended on, the council to work out options towards resolving the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, President JF Kennedy did not, inspite of his political skill, take a unilateral decision based on few select kitchen cabinet. Rather than flexing American nuclear superiority to counterbalance the Soviet nuclear power, the president brought to bear the US strategic superiority to demonstrate its determination for the removal of the missile; while Moscow had the time and room to retreat without humiliation (Allison: 1971:57). The first step was for the president to assemble the Executive Committee of the National Security Council charged to "set aside all other tasks to make a prompt and intensive survey of the dangers and all possible courses of action" (Allison; 1971 57). The Committee had a thorough, heated and rational discourse leading to different approaches to address the problem, without playing politics with an issue affecting national security interest. At the end, the following options were presented to the President (Nash; 1985:147):

- i. To do nothing and simply adapt to the presence of Soviet Missile in Cuba.
- ii. To initiate diplomatic action in the form of meeting with Soviet officials and appeals through the UN Security Council and the Organisation of American States (OAS).
- iii. To initiate secret approach to Castro, urging him to separate Cuba from Soviet communism.
- iv. To prevent shipment of Soviet Missile to Cuba by establishing a low level of military action in the form of a naval blockage.
- v. To initiate air strikes against military targets in Cuba.

vi. To initiate an airborne and amphibious invasion of Cuba.

Though at the end of the discussion Naval Blockage was favoured, each point was marshalled with its advantages and disadvantages which were equally powerful and convincing. The president's credibility and power was at stake as mishandling Cuba crisis could lead to: (Allison: 1971;194).

- undermining the confidence of the members of his administration, especially those who had so firmly defended his policy towards Cuba.
- convincing his cabinet members that the administration had no leader to cultivate their willingness to challenge all of his policies.
- destroying his reputation with all but a few members of congress.
- creating public distrust of his word and his will.
- encouraging friends and foes of the United States abroad to doubt his courage and commitments.
- inviting a 'second Bay of pigs; thereby sealing the fate of his administration; a short chapter in the history books entitled 'crucified over cuba', and
- feeding doubts in his own mind about himself.

Given these array of contradictions he did not place himself in a position of an authoritarian. Rather he saw his administration in mortal danger of how to deliver the US as a state and its people from nuclear holocaust and not the US being in mortal danger seeking to deliver it's President from being disgraced out of office. Authoritarian regimes in critical national crisis sacrifice national interest to their advantage, rather than using their disadvantage position at any critical

moment to the advantage of the nation. Hence being elected into office is also a call to service, sacrifice and the guarding of the rampart rather than creating personal cult and authoritarianism as a means to sustain regime interest.

In 1973, to further restrict the power of the President to act arbitrarily, the congress enacted the War Power Act to regulate the future use of the US Military forces by the President in a given war situation where the congress is yet to declare its intention:

This way, congress attempted to curb the power of the President to wage war on the basis of his power as commander-in-chief and his authority to conduct foreign affairs. The war power imposes a duty on the president to consult with the congress before American Military forces are introduced to hostile situations, and to continue this consultation as long as the president's use of American military forces by requiring that the President must send a written report to congress within forty-eight hours after American soldiers or sailors have been sent into threatened or actual war situations, in the absence of a declaration of war by congress (Zabadi: 1987:7).

In the light of the above, where any USA president acted contrary to the constitutional or congressional provision, support for his action will be determined by congressional budgetary approval or not by his unilateral deployment of troops and engaging in war campaign. But in most cases, except in rare ones the president must seek the consent of the senate. Thus Carter's dispatch of troops to Iran in 1980 on rescue mission, President Ronald Reagan's sending of the marines to Lebanon in 1982 and President Bill Clinton's deployment of troops to Bosnia in 1996 and Yugoslavia (1999) in support of NATO against Molesovic intransigent position over Kosovo, were all with congressional consent and approval.

In Nigeria, despite long periods of authoritarian rule, under democratic regimes cautious attempts have been made not to deploy troops beyond Nigeria's

territorial sovereignty without the approval of the National Assembly. The 1979 constitution in section 3 (a) and (b) as maintained by the 1999 constitution (section and) states that

- a. The President shall not declare a state of war between the Federation and another country except with the sanction of a resolution of both Houses of the National Assembly sitting in a joint session, and
- b. except with the prior approval of the senate, no member of the armed forces of the federation shall be deployed on combat duty outside Nigeria.

The 1999 constitution like the 1979 established two Councils, National Defence Council and National Security Council to address defence and security issues affecting Nigeria respectively. The National Defence Council is made up of military Service Chiefs with the purpose of advising the President on matters relating to the defence of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Nigeria. The National Security Council made up of mostly civilian office holders include the President, as the Chairman, Vice President as Deputy Chairman, the Chief of Defence Staff, the Minister of Internal Affairs, the Defence Minister, the Minister of External Affairs, the Head of Nigerian Security Agency(ies), the Inspector General of Police, and other persons the President might decide to be members of the Council at his own discretion.

The National Security Council advises the president on issues relating to public security, and any other organisation established by law to ensure the security of the federation. However, a major weakness of the constitution on security issue is the separation of defence from security operatives. In so doing it gives the military an upper-hand as the sole defender of Nigerian sovereign

integrity. Thereby it failed to provide an interactive model for mutual understanding and learning process on issues of defence and security between civil and military officeholders. This, on the surface, could explain the occurrence of military intervention in Nigerian polity and the tendency towards regime security interest.

4.3 HITLER, NAZISM AND REGIME INTEREST IN GERMANY

Hitler emerged into political limelight from the background of poverty and frustration. This background provided channels for him to develop a hatred for the bourgeoisie and non-Germans, especially the Jews. He joined the German army and fought in the First World War. At the end of the war he earned honours and respect. The military training and his involvement in the First World War made him to come out of solitary and aimless civil life as he found comradeship, discipline and participation in "conflict intensely satisfying" and "confirmed in his belief in authoritarianism, inequality and the heroic virtues of the war". (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1995:960) Hitler joined the German Workers Party in 1919 and by 1920 resigned from his military career having found out that he could achieve his ambition through political process. He personally built the party by fashioning an ideology of nationalist socialism, which drew dedicated members into the political party.

Hitler's success is based on his firm grasp of mass psychology. This is captured by his ability to acknowledge "that primitive emotions lie very close to the surface of ordinary people, and that these instincts can be most effectively manipulated at a mass meetings held in the evening when mental resistance is low (Carr: 1978:4). And indeed he found support among the lower middle class, some business men and minor officials. He was able to make them believe in faith

moving mountain. This is possible if they could reject the reality of external world and disregard the proof of their own eyes. They are to be engrossed in a dream world which would become a reality through their faith in Hitler and also in their own strong will to victory (Hitler 1935, Carr *Ibid*: 6). The middle class was convinced of fascism taking them to their dream home; They were fearful for their economic future and social status threatened powerful labour unions which have widespread workers membership and as well as growing strength of affluent upper middle class controlling strong industrial base. Thus the lower middle class succumb to fascism in Germany then any advanced industrial countries because of his anti-Marxist stand which had become the ideology of the proletariat, and anti-Semitic, because they control the industrial economy and above all Hitler expansionist ambition. He is seen as "a conning as fox, a willing intrigue of machiavellian proportion, extra ordinarily adapt at weaving and threatening his way through labyrinths; skilled at delaying difficult decisions and playing for time until he discovered an appropriate formula for avoiding unwelcome confrontation..." (Carr 1978:13).

Several factors combined to establish a favourable condition for Hitler and German workers party, which was renamed *National Sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterparties* that is National Socialism, (commonly known as NAZI). The First World War ended with Germany wounded as the victim. There were social tensions and economic crisis, which affected the fabric of the society. Thus, the political system became unstable as the rate of unemployment was on the increase. This was worsened by the term of the Versailles Treaty that did not favour Germany. There was mass discontent. The NAZI party seized the opportunity to fill the yawning gap provided by the discontentment. Disgruntled elements especially the ex-servicemen and members of the *Freikorps*, a group of German

army unwilling to return to civil life and others who were against the republic life, found comfort in the philosophy of national socialism.

Hitler became the rallying point of the NAZI, as members realised that the future of the party depended on him, when he threatened to resign over party frictions it was resisted. Hitler was not only allowed to assume control of the party, given his power to organised publicity and to raise funds but he had an unlimited power as the President of the party. He successfully developed effective propaganda mechanisms that magnetès the masses to himself and the party. The party newspaper *Volkischer Beobachter* (Realist Observer) was the organ of this propaganda. He was often organizing series of meetings in which, while interacting with the audience he was able to develop and enhance the advancement of his unique latent for magnetism and mass leadership.

However, his ambition to use the mass support and followership to seize power in November 1923 putschism was crushed. He had intended to use the mass opposition to the Wiener Republic to proclaim a national revolution for the defence of German interest. When the attempt failed Hitler was tried and sentenced to imprisonment for 5 years, but served for only 9 months. It was during the period of his imprisonment that he wrote *Mein Kampf* (My Struggle).

In *Mein Kampf* he was able to articulate NAZI ideology. Some of the key issues addressed include *Volk* Community. It holds the position that inequality between races and even among individuals is a natural phenomenon, however, the German race is seen as a superior race, the nucleus of mankind. Therefore, the National Socialism ideology was based not on nationalism and statism but on racism (Brooker: 1995:37). In the light of this he developed a worldview

(*Weltanschauung*) which set the German Aryan race in perpetual conflict with the parasitic but cunning race like the Jews. It also hated Marxism with its insistence on internationalism and class conflict.

Secondly, he developed a leadership principle **Fuhrerprinzip** which endowed the leader with absolute authority. Accordingly, he sought to end collective (committees and parliaments) rule and rule governing (bureaucratic) forms of authority by replacing them with individual leadership (Brooker; 1995:39). Under Hitler, effort was made to conform to the NAZI leadership principles. He never entrusted responsibility to one person while those responsible to him were made not to trust himself except him, Hitler.

The third aspect of NAZI ideology is the concept of *Lebensraum*; Germany's need for living space in the east, the territories inhabited by the Slavs. This ideology was not clearly presented to the German people as an official ideology but it was closed to Hitler's heart as he began a war of conquest against Eastern Europeans and the Soviet Union during the Second World War. To achieve his regime interest and personal rule he portrayed himself as seeking to use peaceful means to attain Germany's nationalist, not imperialist, foreign policy goals: "Even the rearmament policy that would culminate in the autarkic four year plan of 1936 was portrayed as helping to attain German's international goals peacefully, by allowing Germany to negotiate from a position of strength" (Brooker: 1995:3). However the *Volsgemeinschaft* ideology was played up to becloud the concept of *Lebensraum* with which Hitler sought to achieve his personal ambition. Of all the parties that existed in Germany the NAZI was the only Party that claimed to exhibit the yawning aspiration of the people: NAZI programme promised the realisation of the sentiments that were most vital and at

the same time threatened the least number of personal and social values held by the German people (Abel: 1972:287).

During his absence while in prison after the 1923 putschism, NAZI was placed under restriction and interest shown by the public to the party waned. The NAZI secret force, a fighting arm of the NAZI made up of ex-soldier called Sport Division or SA later became Sturmabteilung (Storm Battalion) without changing its SA initials. However Ernst Rohm, one of Hitler's henchmen, continued secretly the recruitment and training of armed men in the name of *Frontbann*. The force grew up to 30,000 from the initial 2,000. At the time Hitler was released he had no control over the SA. He detached from Rohm's SA and established *Stosstrup Adolf Hitler*. This second organ was loyal to Hitler and formed the core of SS (*Schutzstaffel*) or Guard Detachment. It gave the NAZI its indoctrination and at the time Hitler came to power it eventually took charge of state security.

Hitler painstakingly built the party after his release from prison, based on the principles stated in his autobiography, *Mein Kampf*. In the parliamentary elections of September 1930 and January 1933 no party emerged as a majority party. Though in the January 1933 elections the NAZI made a tremendous progress, making it possible for the party to form a coalition government with the conservative National Party headed by Franz Von Papen. Papen had decided to step down as Chancellor prior to the 1933 election to become Hitler's vice Chancellor while Hitler was to assume the position of German Chancellor without the endorsement of the President, Hindenberg. Though he (the President) initially hesitated ratifying the coalition between the NAZI and the National Party but later assented after due consultation, and especially with General Werner Von

Blomberg, then Chief of General Staff who later became the 'Defence' Minister under Hitler.

General Blomberg consented to the coalition, being also convinced that the Centre Party would join the coalition as a measure to check the excesses of the other two (NAZI and National Party). However, on assuming power Hitler and the NAZI celebrated with touch-light parade, and in order to concretize his hold on power, he sabotaged any negotiation that would allow the Center Party to join the coalition. At the end the Centre Party declined its interest from the coalition, and he immediately called for election which he had hoped would secure his party the majority in the parliament (*Reichtag*) on March 5, 1933. He disclaimed parliamentary control of the executive and together with his vice chancellor sought presidential approval to rule by emergency decree. This became possible after the fire incident that burnt the parliament. The burning of the parliament was blamed on the communist party.

He seized the opportunity to get the endorsement of the president to rule through emergency law. By this, Hitler was able to accomplish his clandestine design against Germany and fulfilled his ambition to turn Germany into a totalitarian state. The constitution was suspended and state of emergency was declared, leading to the arrest and detention of political opponents. The elections of March 5, 1933 were equally preceded by a brutal and violent campaign against opponents. After the elections, the parliament (*Reichstag*) was placed under pressure from the SA (Storm Troopers or Battalion) and Heinrich Himmler's SS (Schutzstaffel: that is Protective Echelon) to vote in favour of an enabling Act which gave Hitler power to ignore the constitution and to rule by decrees.

The power to rule by decrees became the pseudo-legal instruments with which Hitler implemented the NAZI objectives. Immediately he was given this power the federal states were brought under his authority and later abolished. The bureaucracy, universities and labour unions were purged of socialists, democrats and Jews. The regime set up secret political police (Gestapo) to implement the course of NAZI ideology. By June 30, 1934 that came to be known as the "Night of Long Knives," he confronted those that could challenge his authority. He ordered the murder of the SA leadership that he had used to endorse the Enabling Act to rule by decrees. His inability to control the SA, which had come solidly under Rohm, needed immediate pre-empting before a mastermind to overthrow him. To achieve this, Himmler and his SS (protective Echelon) were used to purge the SA of its top leaders including Ernst Rohm. Thus Himmler's SS became Hitler's personal instrument of oppression, the secret behind his domestic rule, foreign conquest and international genocide.

Hitler gained further in his political ambition when on August 2, 1934 the aging president Hindenburg died. Hitler appropriated for himself the power of the presidency alongside his position as a Chancellor. By this he assumed the commander of the German Armed Forces. Having acquired the office and powers of the Head of State as the *Fuhrer* and *Reich*, Chancellor; or as it was referred to as *Fuhrerstaat* (leader state or Hitler State). He established a degree of personal authority with strict control over the military arm of the state. The members of the armed forces were made to swear a personal oath of loyalty, allegiance and obedience to him instead of the constitution:

I swear by God this holy oath, that I will render to Adolf Hitler leader of the German nation and people's supreme commander of the armed forces, unconditional obedience, and I am ready as a brave soldier to risk my life at any time for this oath (Len: 1979:43).

In fact the military swore to carry out any action - criminal or otherwise - that Hitler ordered. While concerned with the broad policy of the state and programming the institution of terror to uphold the Hitler State, he "left detailed administration to his subordinates. Each of them exercised arbitrary power in his own sphere, but, he deliberately created offices and organisations with overlapping authority which effectively prevented any one of his subordinates "from ever becoming sufficiently strong to challenge his own absolute authority" (Encyclopedia Britannica; 1995: 626).

4.3.1 HITLER AND THE LIVING SPACE FOR GERMANS

Having taking grip of the domestic affairs in Germany, Hitler pursued a foreign policy to achieve his goals in the name of German nationalism, seeking for living space for Germans. He demanded the lifting of Versailles treaty which heavily weighed against Germany. While withdrawing from the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations in October 1933, he covered it up with the signing of a non-aggression treaty with Poland in January 1934, as an indication that he was a peace laureate. As it turned out, every repudiation of the Versailles Treaty was equally followed by an offer to negotiate a fresh agreement with insistence on pursuing Germany's ambition. Thus he negotiated a naval treaty with Britain in 1935 which allowed her to re-arm, re-militarise the Rhine land in 1936 on the pretext of the pact between the Soviet Union and France. He also went into alliance with Italy, and by 1937 signed the anti-commintern pact with Japan.

With this progress, he turned homeward to dispense with his military officers who have not supported his concept of living space. By 1938 he annexed Austria as part of German national self-determination without any repudiation

from France and Britain. He further triggered off a crisis with Czechoslovakia on the pretext that Czechoslovakia maltreated the German minority in Sudetenland. In a surprised reaction Britain, France and Italy caved in to Hitler's demand by appealing to Czechoslovakia to hand over Sudetenland to Hitler. Being assured of the behaviours of the three European powers he launched his attack towards the East in 1934, seizing what was meant for Germany despite the post war conditions following the Versailles Treaty which ended the First World War with strains on Germany.

He believed that engaging in war would end the humiliations German received at the Treaty of Versailles, especially, the payment of reparations, demilitarization of Rhineland and the embargo on German armaments. Above all, the concept of living space is important if German frontier was extended to the east to secure Ukraine at the expense of the USSR, which he considered the vanguard of the world Jewish conspiracy. The eastward expansion would also renew German's historic conflict with the Slav people whom he had considered an inferior and subordinate race. Britain and Italy were considered possible allies provided they respectively limit themselves to overseas and end the rivalry with German over Central Europe. Basically France was the natural enemy that should be subdued.

In order to facilitate this, Hitler posed as a champion of Europe against the spectre of Czechoslovakia and annexed the surrounding cities including Lithuania that Germany lost out as a result of the Versailles treaty. The attack against Poland, following the pact with the Soviet Union in August 1939, for dividing Eastern Europe between German and Soviet spheres of influence, drew Britain and France to declare war against German. Then the Second World War started with

Germany, Italy and Japan to face the overwhelming military might of France, Britain and the USSR, and that of the US which joined the war in 1944. Hitler, as at 1941 had taken control of Eastern Europe especially the Ukraine region, and his forces already stationed at the outskirts of Leningrad and Moscow to over-run USSR. Many Jews were killed in these areas to pave way for German settlements. He maintained control up to early 1943 until when the Allied powers began to overturn his pirate victories through bombings of German war frontiers. By 1945 he saw the impossibilities of winning the war and withdrew to his bunker in Berlin where he committed suicide on April 30, 1945; and died.

There is no doubt, Hitler may have the genuine interest of the Germans at heart, but the pursuit of those interests following the scheming and the contradictions that emerged tended towards actor indispensability rather than action indispensability, of German national interest. Actor-indispensability tends more toward regime interest than national interest. German national interest was smeared by Hitler's personal ambition.

4.4 GHADAFI AND THE REGIME SECURITY QUESTION

Col. (then Capt.) Muammar Ghadafi was the leading figure of the twelve young officers that overthrew the monarchical reign of Mohammed Idris Mahdi al-Sanusi who assumed power at independence in 1952 after the defeat of Italy in the Second World War. The territory came under the UN mandate after the war and 1951 granted it independence. Before oil was struck in 1951, Libya was a very poor country. Only 8% of the total landmass were irrigatable for farming, leaving a large portion to desertification. Libya was heavily dependent on western world especially US, Britain and France for her economic development. During the

Second World War, in 1943, Britain, France and US, stationed their forces in Libya as a strategic outpost to safeguard the Mediterranean Sea down to East Africa, Indian Ocean and to the Far East. The independence gained under the constitutional monarchy was a fragile product of bargains and compromises between internal and external interests. Hence the monarch was pro-west depending on the it for military and economic support. Ironically under the monarchy, Libya dealt with issues from a distance and kept away from the radicalism of Abdel Nasser of Egypt that was sweeping the Arab world. The discovery of oil provided enormous wealth that built up an economic class with strong pro-western ideals than the anti-western-pan Arab cause exhibited by Abdel Nasser. Nevertheless the oil wealth also bred a corrupt class of ruling and bureaucratic elite. In the end the poor people who had hoped the oil resources would elevate them from the rudimentary irrigation system, and poor desert economic life lost out. In spite of the oil economy, the country lacked any industrial base as there were no-chemical or petrochemical industries.

Therefore, any revolution that could rekindle hope was welcomed. Ghadafi and his young revolutionaries were armed with (i) the poverty of the mass of the population inspite of the oil wealth, (ii) growing range of corruption among the ruling and bureaucratic elites and (iii) gradual withdrawal of Libya from other Arab and Islamic revolution. These factors were enough to mobilize the masses to topple the Libyan monarchy.

When eventually the coup of September 1, 1969 occurred the twelve officers constituted a Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), under Ghadafi. The major task was the expulsion of British and American military bases at Tobruk and Al-Adam, and at Wheelus Field respectively. Equally, the government seized the

fertile farmland which had been under the control of the Italians since the colonial rule and expelled them from Libya. The government established Libyan Land Reclamation and Reform Organisation to regulate the ownership of land. One of the major projects embarked upon by the military leadership was the establishment of the petroleum industry which became the key to the recreation of national wealth. The government made it a deliberate policy for acquiring shares in all foreign oil companies based in Libya and through its National Oil Corporation it took over the imports, distributions and sales of all petroleum products, an activity that had before the revolution been under the control of a few foreign oil companies.

In addition, the government embarked upon the policy of indigenisation of the economy which, rather than eliminating or reducing foreign control over the economy, transferred economic power from the exploiting ruling classes in Libya to those who have been exploited and oppressed. Beginning from 1976 capital intensive Agricultural Projects were discouraged and such farmlands were distributed to peasants under cooperative schemes. Likewise private enterprise was not allowed as attention was paid to public ownership of enterprise. The people's committee was placed in charge of all public utilities. The committee was in turn made responsible to Basic People's Congresses (BPC) whose membership were mostly vocational associations, controlling large and medium public industries in the area of petroleum, gas, agricultural processing and construction industries.

From the political arena, the Revolutionary Council established the General People's Congress (GPC) where the masses participated in decision making, especially approving national budgets and setting national economic priorities. The

GPC is tasked with ensuring economic prudence and efficiency through economic policy formulation. In the light of improved economic situation the main focus was on the improvement of the exploited class under the ancient regime. Apart from increase in the earning of workers and reduction in rents, the rural dwellers, especially the farmers had access to free housing, extension services, financial assistance, purchase of surplus products to keep prices falling below costs (Asisibi 1998:102). The attention paid to human development was celebrated by government policies against illegal exploitation of labour of the underprivileged. The elimination of exploitation and inequality made one to believe that "there is probably more social equality in Libya than any where else in the world, including China" (Cited in Asisibi Ibid p. 102).

These developments in the economic sphere also transverse the political terrain as power became transferred to the lower class like farmers, labourers, artisans and professionals (Engineers, medical personnels teachers etc.). Along with these categories were solidarity alliance with the petite - bourgeoisie within the military, the bureaucracy and the intelligentsia as masterminded and ordered by the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC).

By 1973 the Libyan Arab Socialist Union (ASU) which the RCC relied on for most of its radical policies was rendered ineffective by other radical and popular professional committees such as Teachers, Farmer, engineers, medical personnel. However in order to evolve a mass participatory democracy government decided to proclaim in 1977 the era of *Jamahirrya* - the rule of the masses under direct democracy. By this proclamation governmental policy is determined by peoples fora or congresses such as the Basic People's Congress (BPC) and the General People's Congress (GPC).

These congresses are categorised in such a way that all citizens whatever their statuses, professional organisations and/or unions are members of BPC. Each municipal district has its BPC professional with a people's committee or working committee made up of ten members, serving as its Executive Council. The people's committees from the various BPCs constitute the Municipal Congress which form the local administration. Meanwhile the General People's Congress (GPC) is made up of the people's committee from all the Municipal Congress as well as representatives of professional organisation and vocational unions like farmers, Journalists, teachers, doctors etc. The General Peoples Committee (GPC) serves as the parliamentary forum within the GPC. Membership of General People's Committee (GPC) is elective and form what could be taken as national cabinet made up of secretaries (ministers) with each charged with supervising the bureaucracy and the activities of the popular committees at the municipal councils.

Indeed the emergence of the Revolutionary Command Council drew the country out of the corrupt, exploitative and the repressive monarchical regimes of the pre-1969. It nevertheless left the remnant of the ancient régime who had no option than to build up opposition. The classes of aristocracy, the landed gentry (foreign and indigenou) and the bourgeois (also foreign and indigenou) who had earlier wielded state power through the National Congress Party, the cabinet and parliament of the ancient regime had the tendency to react to wealth transfer. It could be recalled that these classes had even abandoned the National Congress Party and were building a power base around the military under the Army commander, Colonel Abdul Azziz Shalhi and, a few political elite led by Omar Shalhi, a relation of the Army Commander and other petit-bourgeoisie in the bureaucracy and intelligence. (Mazrui and Tidy: 1984:248-249).

The Ghadafi's revolution depended on the oil wealth. Through the oil wealth Libya embarked on an ambitious foreign policy. Ghadafi prided himself as founder a revolution designed for export. He was found to have sponsored terrorism around the world against U.S. and her western allies and had also supported not only revolutions and natural liberation movements but also opposition groups against legitimate governments in Africa. These governments are either opposed to his style of leadership or his singular attempt to institutionalise Islam or defend the Arab cause.

The root of Ghadafi's policies could be extracted from the series of his three volumes of book titled "The Green Book", which see Islam as the Third way, an alternative for Libya and the Moslem world. Though he had introduced the Islamic Sharia law in 1970s this was later played down after the launching of the Green Book. The Book sets aside the traditional interpretations of Islamic law and built up Ghadafi's personal ideological statement as the Third international Theory. By the philosophy recorded in the book, "The Libya Arab Republic became the Socialist Peoples Libya Arab Jamahiriya (Rule of the Masses) with Qaddafi's philosophy as its phospter-ideology guiding a decentralised populist government of revolutionary people's committees that control government offices, schools, the media and many corporations.

Qaddafi's radical socialist re-definition of Islam and its cultural revolution alienated landed and business-sectors as well as traditional religious authorities (Ulema), who have condemned his radical interpretation of Islam and its socialist policies (Esposito: 1986:55). The Green Book (and Concept of Third International Theory espoused therein) was published in 1972. It promotes Islamic socialism which allows for some private ownership of property proclaiming a cultural

revolution against foreign capitalist and communist ideas. In the light of this the regime combined rule by both decree and popular participation. Despite the transfer of wealth Ghadafi increasingly became concerned with maintaining his regime (security) interest. Hence the Jamahiriya system which is people oriented is not really the key policy making organ as Ghadafi noted: "The political reality in the Jamahiriya does not attach any significant to the existence of a government, a minister or a parliament. I am not a president.... In my own country... nor am I the head of state... I am the leader of the revolution and a true revolutionary" (Cited in Asobie: 1989:104). Contrary to this theoretical position the reality is that "the important decisions are made by Qadhafi and a close coterie of trusted aides" as the revolutionary committee "function as both political party and the eyes and ears of the regime" (George: 1987:30).

The political party system under the revolutionary committee had direct access to Ghadafi to ensure that no fifth column exist within the system. Thus as it is rightly noted "Qadhafi and his aides do indeed set the pace of and direct the revolution; they do not merely guide, instigate the masses; they lead in the act of governance" (Asobie 1987:104). The monopoly of the act of governance by Ghadafi and his closed aides without a tolerant attitude for opposing views tend to create problem within the system. For instance, six years after the revolution there was a crack among the groups that brought about the revolution. Major Muhaishi was dismissed in 1976. He escaped to Egypt but was later convicted of joining the 1975 coup plot to overthrow Ghadafi. In the process 22 officers including Major Muhaishi were executed in 1977. Since then the state of Libya came under siege and as from 1980 onwards there were reported covert cases of dissident tortures and executions.

In February and March 1980 2,000 political opponents were arrested and tried even though the government alleged corrupt practices. In late April of 1977 a funeral of a political opponent, in Tobruk, who died in police custody led to disturbances during which several people died. This wave of state repression triggered some unrest leading to continuous military mutinies and coup attempts as from the 1980s as it were in the previous decades. In 1984 a group identified itself with the exiled opposition, the National Front for the Salvation of Libya (NFSL) attempted to attack the barracks where Ghadafi was staying and by the spring of 1985 two attempts were made on Ghadafi's life. As a result of the failed attempt 75 military officers were executed. The opposition extended their attack against the regime defenders in the society by murdering and mutilating their bodies. It is expected that several of anti-Ghadafi opponents operate in exile but have been institutionally fragmented and ideologically divided competing for support among Ghadafi's foes (Anderson: 1987:65, Anderson: 1984). Ghadafi pursued them with hired assassins where many were murdered in Athens, Rome, Monni, Egypt and Colorado (USA). He threatened exiled opponents to return or else they could also be murdered. This action by the government makes it possible for the international community to accuse Ghadafi for sponsoring terrorism. For instance the hijacking of TWA passenger plane in Beirut June, 1985 where a U.S. citizen died and 39 others held hostages was attributed to Libya. The recent release of two Libyans, involved in the Lockerbie bombing where the 200 passengers died, for trials is an indication of Libya's terrorist actions in the world.

The growing opposition has made the original surviving comrades of Ghadafi to be marginalised, as Ghadafi's Kinsmen and supporters have taken over. He distrusts the military and in order to control the military he has fixed his ethnic Kinsmen in sensitive positions. His Cousin Khalifa Hnaish was placed in

charge of his personal security while two brothers, Said and Ahmad Ghadafdam, also his Cousins serve as his personal envoys in covert missions. Apart from his kinsmen Ghadafi successfully built revolutionary committee towards the late 1970's to provide domestic intelligence and security and to mobilise popular enthusiasm by force, where necessary, to appreciate the institutions of the Third International Theory. The revolutionary committees have become a para-military force of 4-5000 enthusiasts and thugs (Anderson 1987;67). The committees are responsible for the liquidation of the enemies of the revolution abroad. They have the advantage over internal security and over the regular military as they guard the ammunition in the army bases in Tripoli and Tabruk. This has provoked enmity with the regular army which led to the execution of over 60 military officers in 1985 who were not comfortable with the internal security arrangement. According to Aderson

The growing importance of the revolutionary committees disturbed the regular military and the Qadadfa, and it appears to have been Hasan Ishqali's willingness to voice their dismay directly to Qaddafi that led to his murder in November, 1985. (1987; 67).

4.4.1. GHADAFI, ISLAMIC CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND SECURITY IN AFRICA

Ghadafi's has not limited his quest for security within Libya. In order to facilitate the experimentation of his Green Book he embarked on Islamic internationalism. Ghadafi has intervened in virtually all internal politics of countries in Africa, and other parts of the world sponsoring or causing insurrection, rebellion, liberation, revolution, coup, subversion and anarchy either in support of a legitimate governments, liberation movements, political opponents of detested regimes or anti-imperialist confrontation. His ardent commitment to fight imperialism has remained a mere cover up as his major task instead, is to embark

on Islamic cultural revolution in Africa. For instance, while claiming to fight imperialism in Africa he contradicted himself by becoming closer to imperialist stooges like Emperor Bokassa of Central Africa Republic, Mobutu of Zaire and Idi Amin of Uganda.

In 1976 he celebrated the conversion of the self-proclaimed Emperor Bokassa into Islam as a watershed in Islamic cultural revolution in Africa. In other words Ghadafi hides under anti-colonial and anti-imperialist pronouncement to intervene or cause crisis in various countries in Africa. Like Hitler, Ghadafi has a consummate ambition of building a consciousness that would undermine and overturn the interest of western imperialism in Africa. At the initial stage he embarked on constructing Arab unity in the Arab world, beginning with the Maghreb and enlarging into the middle East as stepping ground for launching Islamic revolution in Africa. Unfortunately all his efforts failed to yield the expectation he desired. His planned federation of Arab Republic comprising Libya, Egypt and Syria in 1972 did not work while the merger with Egypt in 1973, Tunisia in 1974, Syria in 1980 and Chad 1981 were aborted as a result of Ghadafi's personal ambition to dictate and indoctrinate these countries with the theory espoused in his Green book.

In 1973 Libya forcefully took possession of the strategic ouzou strip in northern Chad as part Libyan territory where uranium deposits are claimed to be found there. Libya under Ghadafi has interest in developing nuclear capability as a basis for establishing political power in Africa and the World at large (Imobighe 1980:128). Ghadafi realised that the only way he could effectively flex muscles with the imperialist powers is to acquire similar nuclear reactors. It is therefore a weakness that he has resorted to "terror(ism) as a poor man's atomic bomb"

(Hunter: 1987:52). Though comparatively Libya might be more sophisticated in military equipment than any other country South of the Sahara except south Africa it “ lacks the fighting men to operate and make full use of her sophisticated military hardwares. It is not surprising that a lot of her military hardware are stored up. This might explained why Libya’s attack on Tunisia failed as a result of the inability of the Libyan military fighting force, which is limited” (Imobighe 1980:29).

However, the regime has trained and equipped the elite special *Jamhiriyah guard* more than the regular army. It becomes impossible for Libya to develop a strong regular military to confront any threats to the nation. Therefore, the concentration of security interest to maintaining the elite army was equally intended to sustain Ghadafi’s personal rule and regime interest. As such were acquisition of nuclear capability which could invariably be placed under the powerful presidential guards amounting to fortifying Ghadafi’s personal security and regime rather than Libya national interest. The need to weaken the regular military is based on the conception that the same instrument which made him to power should not be a means for anyone to take similar action against him.

However, Libya’s arm build and arm acquisition is to win new friends, retain old ones as well as equipping opposition against detested regimes. Libya has provided weapons and war equipment to the Arabs especially Palestinians but has never sent her soldiers to fight the Israelis. It has also provided training grounds for the rebels wishing to overthrow regimes he detested in Africa. For instance, recent example was Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and Fordeh Sanko’s Revolution United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone which have benefited immensely from the training and weapons supplied by Libya to fight

President Samuel Doe and the erstwhile military regimes of Sierra Leone as well as President Ahmed Kabah's government in Sierra Leone respectively.

The only war adventure Libya has undertaken in Africa was in Chad partly to control the Uranium rich Ouzou strip, partly to merge with Chad and acquire large frontier of expansion in Africa. Ghadafi sees Nigeria as an obstacle to her expansionist ambition in Africa which he intends to stretch from Chad to port Sudan. This would provide a decisive advantage over his enemies and rivals and also enhance the effective utilisation of Libya's power to achieve its goals (Imobighe: 1980:25) Equally, at one time, Nigerien Foreign Affairs Minister, Dawda Diallo had accused Libya for using the flag of Arabism and Islamism to destabilise Africa. Indeed Libya's approach to destabilisation in Africa are in three ways. These are Pan-Arabism, Pan-Islamism and Pan-Africanism. Through Pan Arabism he tries to forge a unity between the Maghreb and the Arab World in order to achieve Arab cause in Africa. The policy of pan-Islamism is an attempt to reach out to countries with a large population of Moslems or countries with Moslems as Head of state. In drawing their sympathy for the course of Islam and Islamisation of the continent they would equally be defending the course of the Arabs against western imperialism. Whereas Pan-Africanism is purposely focused on African states that do not have enough Moslems as a linkage. Libya attempts to capture their interest by the concept of "we are all African" suffering under neo-colonial rule and exploitation as experienced through economic stagnation, environmental degradation and political imbroglio. Libya is therefore championing the course of Pan Africanism through the support and sponsorship of revolutionary pressures in countries under dictatorial regimes or those he detests. As pointed out he has not only provided resources to countries in the region and trained also the liberation fighters in South Africa then under apartheid, as well as rebel groups in

the continent not merely for African liberation from neo-colonization but in order to attain the personal ambition of Ghadafi. Figure 4.1 clearly delineate the dimension of Ghadafi's interest in Africa.

Table 4.1

IMPACT OF GHADAFI'S REGIME POLICY IN AFRICA

Ideology	Instrument	Outcome
Arabism	Maghreb North African Region	Weak
Pan Africanism	Solidarity with Africa South of Sahara.	Strong influence on repressive regimes like Idi-Amin (Uganda), Bokassa (Central African Republic), Mobutu Seseseke (Zaire), Sani Abacha (NIGERIA).
Islamism	African states with Moslems predominant and Maghreb States	Internal threats to African solidarity, domestic destabilization in various countries
Third Worldism	Non-Aligned members countries.	Anti-imperialism

From the pursuit of his policy in Africa, Ghadafi's personality is seen as uncertain as the correct spelling of his name. And because of the different world view of most African countries it is even more difficult for African countries to team up against Ghadafi. As much as Africa is divided it is difficult for any given political configuration of Africa to become a staging ground against his interest. Thus he takes pride in seeing crisis in occurring in Africa. By proxy he causes unrest and instability in various countries through dissident elements within such countries as indicated in Table 4.2.

Recently Ghadafi drew attention of the world to himself when he drove by road to Lome, Togo, July 2000, to attend the OAU Summit. At the Summit, Ghadafi advocated for African Union and the abolishing of African States. The Summit was divided as Mbeki of South Africa leading a group believed that time was not yet ripe for African Union. However, in October 2000, several black African especially Nigerians, were expelled from Libya. Ghadafi was to blame this on Libyan nationals and not himself or the government. The question that is relevant here is, if Ghadafi could allow Libyans to send out Nigerians out of Libya without any reaction from himself or his government, how authentic is his pursuit of the concept African Union under his ideology of Pan-Africanism? Until Ghadafi provides an answer to this question his interest in black Africa can not be genuine. In fact the Maghreb nationals of Arab stock in North Africa had never seen themselves as African but only as Arabs. Only the leaders identify with Africa if only for achieving political motives.

Table 4.2.

GHADAFI'S INTERVENTION IN AFRICA

S/No (a)	Country (b)	Nature of Intervention (c)
1.	Central Africa Republic	Economic and military aid to Bokassa to spread Islam; later aided and abetted student disturbances against Bokassa's rule.
2.	Chad	Aided Muslim nationalist factions; occupation of Ouzou strip a border region in Chad; direct military intervention in the civil war.
3.	Egypt.	Training and aiding anti-Sadat elements.
4.	Gambia.	Military training to young Gambians and aiding subversive and clandestine groups within Gambia
5.	Mali	Military and financial aid to Malian dissidents based in Tripoli led by Didi Median Soumbounou.
6.	Morocco	Anti-monarchical pronouncements.
7.	Niger	Laying claims and occupying a border post (Uranium zone); anti-Niger government broadcasts, inciting the Toubou and Tuareg population in Niger.
8.	Senegal..	Encouraging the formation of Islamic fundamentalist political party called the Hizboulahi (God's party) aimed at turning Senegal into a Muslim state; training fundamental guerrillas.
9.	Tunisia	Training and arming of opposition elements for the overthrow of Bourguibba's government.
10.	Uganda.	Aided Idi Amin with arms and money and sent military personnel in the late period of the war in which Idi Amin was overthrown.
11.	Sudan	Training and arming of opposition elements to topple Nimmeiry's government.
12.	Liberia	Offered training and supply of arms to Charles Taylor's WPFC to fight against president Samuel Doe.
13.	Sierra Lone	Offering training and arms to Fodeh Sankoh's RUF to overthrow erstwhile military regimes as well as the democratic government of Ahmed Tejan Kabbah.
14.	Nigeria	Pronouncement in favour of balkanization of Nigeria. He maintains the position that Moslem north should break out of Nigeria.

Notes: (a). This table excludes Libyan intervention in liberation wars against forces of imperialism, colonialism and racism in Western Sahara and South Africa.

(b). Libya's intervention also include arms supply to IRA in Northern Ireland, Basque separatist guerrillas in Spain and to the Nation of Islam in the USA.

Source: Updated from those earlier provided by Imobighe TA (1980, p.33)

Ghadafi has always seen Nigeria as an obstacle to achieving his ambition in Africa. The first signal of confrontation with Libya was in 1981 when Nigeria felt threatened over the merger plan Libya had with Chad. Nigeria intervened against the merger, offering Chad whatever it required to back out of the merger with Libya. Ghadafi went ahead in another dimension without informing host countries where her embassies were established to rename them 'peoples Bureau. Nigerian government decided to close down the Libya embassy in Nigeria. The relationship was further strained in 1983 when the Shagari government accused Ghadafi of sponsoring eight Nigerians to topple his government. The eight persons were subsequently arraigned for a treasonable felony to mobilize trade unionists in Nigeria for mass overthrow of the Shagari regime. Earlier on in 1980 Libya infiltrated the state of Borno with her personnel to purchase large quantities of food without Nigeria's knowledge. In November of 1980 two Libyan fighter-aircrafts violated Nigeria's airspace. The Aircrafts were intercepted at Maiduguri and were only released when the Nigerian government was satisfied they were not carrying any offensive weapons (Briggs: 1988:38).

Ghadafi has shown great interest in the balkanization of Nigeria; to this extent he has sponsored and has been in support of moslem fundamentalists pressure for the entrenchment of Sharia criminal code and practices in the Nigerian constitution. Given the increasing isolation of Nigerian from the international community, General Sani Abacha got closer to similar dictators around the world. Thus, in May, 1999 Abacha invited Ghadafi to Nigeria. Ghadafi who was under UN sanction on air flight contravened the sanction and flew to Malam Aminu Kano International Airport, Kano with a fleet of aircrafts and more than 700 security agents. He was accompanied by Ibrahim Bare Mainasara, the military dictator of Niger. Ghadafi used the occasion to call on

Nigerian Moslems in the North to breakout from the Nigerian state and declare itself a moslem country. This was indeed a threat to Nigeria's sovereignty, and national security which the government did not bother to challenge. Infact Libya was used as a training ground for Abacha's security men.

4.5.0. STALIN, STALINISM AND REGIME INTEREST IN THE SOVIET UNION

4.5.1. The Rise of Stalin

Lenin, before his death had established a pattern of collective leadership. It was therefore, expected that any member of the politburo that emerge would take after Lenin. Despite rivalry over leadership it was expected that it would have no impact on collective leadership. Unfortunately the choice of Josef Stalin turned out to be the opposite of Lenin. Though least among the contending forces, he held the position of the party's administrative apparatus, serving as member of the organisational Bureau (Orgburo), the party's organisational or administrative equivalent of the politburo. As an unofficial head and expert in party organisation, he was known as its spokesman. By virtue of this, he was responsible for directing the work at the secretariat of the Central Committee.

By 1922 he became officially recognised as the General Secretary of the Central Committee and head of the Central Committee of the party's administrative apparatus. At this time the party structure had become very strong. Thus, party secretaries at the regional and district levels and party delegates to the annual party congress had equally become a force to be reckoned with. Because these secretaries could become delegate for the nomination of a successor to Lenin, Stalin was well placed above other contenders. In fact there were

informal agreements with these party secretaries to support Stalin in any eventual conflicts arising among the party leaders.

They were also to elect a central committee that would give support to Stalin. Accordingly, this process by which Stalin's administrative subordinates provided him with overwhelming support in the party congress and central committee has been described as a circular flow of power, "flowing down through the hierarchical administrative apparatus and back through the elected party congress and central committee" (Brooker: 1995 : 70, Hough and Fausod 1979: 144-6). With the monopoly of party hierarchy, the party officials had emotional attachment which warmed party members towards the personality of Stalin. Already Stalin's position on the debate on party ideology and style of leadership were made attractive. Given his strong position as General Secretary, Stalin succeeded in defeating and eliminating other prominent political contenders like Trotsky, the Commissar for War who founded the Red Army.

In 1925, a year after ascending power Stalin defeated the left opposition formed by Zinoviev and Kamenev in alliance with Trotsky by dropping them (Zinoviev, Kamenev and Trotsky) from the politburo. Other party leaders grouped under "Right opposition," who were against Stalin's left wing economic policy were equally eliminated politically. This shake up in the politburo succeeded in placing the politburo in the hands of Stalin and his cohorts like Molotov and General Voroshilov, beginning from 1930s.

4.5.2. **Stalinism and Regime Interest**

Stalin gradually neutralised the collective leadership of the politburo by first building his personal leadership as the party's *Vozhd* (leader). Though from the

public view the lineage of the collective leadership was overtly maintained, but covertly he was known as the boss or *Vozhd*. As the party's General Secretary he acquired enormous party *nomenklatura* power, that is power of personnel jurisdiction. At the national level, he had the power to make and veto appointments of over 5,000 to positions of leadership in the party, state apparatus and public organisations. Also at regional and district levels party secretaries had similar power to make or veto appointments. This *nomenklatura* power, enabled Stalin to build his personal power by recruiting new supports and maintaining existing ones. By this only, his cronies could be appointed into important posts in the farms, factories, schools among others by Stalin. He was henceforth called the Great and wise Teacher Comrade Stalin. Therefore, every initiative and policy were attributed to his wisdom especially press report of the unity that exist in the party and the country. By 1934 Stalin was acknowledged by the party congress not only as the Communist *Vozhd* but the greatest Leader of All Ages and All Land (Wolfe; 241 Brooks: 1995:73).

Stalin deliberately allowed this psychopancy as a means to cover up his weaknesses by generating mass popular support. This was to revive his popularity in the wake of forced collectivization programme in the countryside which caused famine that affected 3.5 ml. lives in the rural areas. Through his personality cult, Stalin withdrew from being reclusive to meeting with the people during ceremonies at the Kremlin. The picture of Stalinist cult was painted by Kruschev in 1956 when he succeeded Stalin. According Kruschev, while denouncing Stalin's personality cult in 1955, noted it was contrary to Marxism – Leninism philosophy which is based on class and party rather than on individual leaders.

Stalin established a small department, called secretariat's special section as the head of the party Secretariat to coordinate his operation. It turned out that this special secretariat was known informally as Stalin's special section or Comrade Stalin's secretariat or Stalin's cabinet. The secretariat monitor and keep watch over particular area of state policy or party department. Some of the Secretariat staff were also placed to assist Stalin in the exercise of *nomenklatura* powers and making contracts with the regional and district party secretariat. They also had links with the police on behalf of the party leader, Stalin and creating basis for power multipliers. In light of the above, by 1930s Stalin had built a Stalinist cult which was marked differently from Lenin cult. The Lenin cult had lived posthumously but was turned over to legitimised the Stalin cult and came to be known as Lenin – Stalin cult. The image of Lenin was shaped not only to fit the requirements but to give legitimacy and credibility to Stalin Cult. Thus the sixteen party congress of 1930 showered praises on Stalin and further named several villages after him. Stalin's leadership disposition by 1937 to 1938 had been transformed into an absolute personal rules through some violent measures, shake-up and purge in the party hierarchy. There was no opposition for fear that such reaction might not receive popular mass support. The purge turned the party into personal instrument for self perpetuation in power. Unlike the previous purge of the pre-1937 which maintained the party elite status, the aftermath of the 1937 – 38 purge strengthened Stalin's power and authority on the basis of the circular flow of power around him. After his death in 1953 Stalin's personality cult crumbled as Khrushchev his successor decided to revisit Lenin's collective leadership.

4.6. MOBUTU AND REGIME SECURITY INTEREST IN ZAIRE

The cold war provided some contradictory features for Africa politics. While African nationalities were struggling to join the global democratic societies, their struggles were confused and frustrated by the politics of the Cold war. Thus, even when the Euro-Americans saw the genuineness of the liberation struggle against decolonisation and for democratic rule, they could not afford to support a struggle that would eventually turn in favour of communism. So, between the struggle for democracy and the structure of repression and tyranny in Africa, the Euro-Americans preferred the later.

Like elsewhere in Africa, Zaire exhibited a clear and deep injury suffered in the course of independence through the influence and infiltration of the Euro-Americans in the decolonisation process towards democratic rule. The formation of the Belgium – sponsored Parti national du Progrès (PNP), according to Crawford Young was an effort with the unofficial blessing of colonial administration, “to create a “mandate” national movement, disposed toward close cooperation with Belgium after independence.” (Young 1993:200).

In deed, the American Ambassador in Leopoldville at the time of the struggle for decolonisation openly said

I don't believe there is a single Congolese who has more than a theoretical notion even of the most basic principles of democracy. They certainly cannot practice something that they cannot understand. This does not insult the many well intentioned Congolese, but rules out their ability to produce something resembling democratic government before they are taught (cited in Kalb 1982 and Wamba-dia-Wamba: 1998:46)

These sorts of statements succeeded in creating a basis for dysfunctional politics in the Congo-Leopoldville (later Zaire under Mobutu and now Democratic Republic of Congo). The fire brand nationalism led by Patrice Emery Lumumba's *Movement National Congolaise* (MNCR) was checkmated by various resistance with overlapping uprisings, insurgencies, fractionalisations and subsequent frustrations which attended the struggle for liberation and independence. The demand for democracy and human rights by the Congolese was set aside by the Euro-Americans on the pretext that the communists were absolutely seeking to establish a base in Central Africa. (Wamba-dia Wamba 1998:46; Schatzberg: 1991).

It was on the pretext of Soviet phobia that former Sergeant Joseph Desire Mobutu (later Sese seko Kuku Ngbendo wa Zabonga Mobutu) was sponsored to ensure that the Congo and the Central Africa region were kept within the ideological sphere of the Euro-Americans. Accordingly, Mobutu was first used by the Belgium police as an informer on the Congolese community in Belgium. Later he was recruited by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the financial conglomerates operating in the mining of diamonds among others in the region for various covert assignments:

Mobutu was therefore used to resist the rise of Patrice Lumumba as the Prime Minister of Congo. There were several sponsored subversive activities, insurgencies, rebellion and violence against Lumumba. Lumumba was seen by the CIA as a person like Castro or worse than him and should be eliminated. With the efforts made and sustained by the CIA it was left for Mobutu to create the necessary conditions for the assassination of Lumumba and his followers through a coup d'etat on September 14, 1960. In the wake of the crises in the

Congo the national army was demoralised as several white mercenaries were reinforced together with additional Belgian and US logistics support “which no longer left groups with the choice between collaboration and resistance on their own resources”. (Young 1983:210) The Binza group, a political mafia, was formed to usurp the sovereignty of the Congo. To effect this a lot of money was parcelled into Congo for the purpose of eliminating Lumumba and his colleagues. This was coordinated by Lawrence Delvin, the CIA agent among others. The assassination of Lumumba through the Binza group had Mobutu as a central and powerful figure, heading the Army. As the head of the Army, authorised by the Euro-American dominated UN Mission in Congo, Mobutu was properly placed to eliminate Lumumba. The arrival of the UN Mission and the subsequent death of Lumumba in the course of the operation served to cement the collective interest of the Binza group, Belgium mining companies and the CIA. The aftermath was the emergence of Joseph Mobutu as the President of the Congo which he later renamed Zaire.

4.6.1. **Mobutu and Personality Cult**

On assumption of power, Mobutu pursued a regime of a centralised state which is common to all personalised dictators. First he reduced the number of provinces from twenty-one to eight for easy management. Provincial Assemblies were abolished as the provinces became mere administrative creations. The president had his appointees in the provinces who were responsible to him. All other parties were dissolved as Zaire became a one party state, *movement populace de la Revolution*. The party and the state administration were fused with local administrative officials with serving ex – officio as local party heads. According to Young the first national election was only organised in 1970 with a nominee for each constituency, screened by local party branches but

approved by the national political Bureau. In 1968 ethnic associations were outlawed, thus eliminating all organisational structures through which ethnic mobilisation could occur. (Young 1983:211)

Political opponents with autonomous power bases were gradually isolated and eventually disgraced; Thus:

“(T)he personal patronage of the president was the *sine-qua-non* of ranking position, held at the pleasure of the presidency. Nothing was more risky than even the appearance of constituting a political network which did not emanate from the top. Organisations such as trade unions were unified and brought under the aegis of the party. Spheres of autonomy such as the universities and churches, were likewise brought to heel” (Young 1983 : 212).

With the elimination of ethnic associations and trade unions Mobutu could deal with elites on an individual basis, political opponents that remained powerful were eliminated through assassination by poisoning.

Meanwhile Mobutu equally, for the sake of regime security, ensured that sensitive security posts and appointments were occupied by his cronies either through ties or personal dependence. This was to the disadvantage of other ethnic and social forces in Zaire. Like colonial Congo which was governed as a private realm of King Leopold II, Mobutu saw himself in the same light in the neo-colonial Congo (Zaire). Any opposition against his rule and authority were eliminated with the venom of the vipers of Idjui Island (a slow poison) - assassination by slow poisoning. Another area of the authoritarian ideology is a strongly established propaganda. Mobutu himself as the supreme leader was rated by the Colby, one of the founding members of the Binza Group, as a middle

solution to the Congolese problems (Schatzberge 1991, Wamba-dia Wamba 1998:47). The Church (Catholic and Protestant leaders) and even intellectuals like Mabika Kalanda rated Mobutu as a strongman to resolve the Congolese crisis, an irreplaceable solution to chaos. As at 1962 a vigorous campaign had been put up by Frances Monheim in his writings emphasising that Mobutu was the only person capable of saving the country from chaos (which was a gold mine for communists) and balkanisation (Wamba – dia Wamba: 1998:47) The concept of the strongman as noted by Wamba-dia-Wamba is an American political theory conceptualised to maintain political stability in the Congo (Zaire) and thus keep it in the proper orbit of the US hegemony.

However by the 1980s the myth surrounding Mobutu began to shatter. The period witnessed rising opposition to his regime. Some 13 members of parliament sent a 52 page memorandum to him by December 1980 demanding political reforms. They were jailed, tortured and banished to a detention camp. On their release in 1982 they formed a party "*Union Pour la Democratie et le Progress Social*" (UDPS). As an illegal party it became the basis for political mobilisation. The marking of Patrice Lumumba memoria which was led by Bishop Etienne Tshisekedi launched a pro-democracy demonstrations in Kinshasa. This pressure got some external supports which forced Mobutu to establish a popular consultation to decide the future of the country. The consultation led to over 6,000 memorandum which blamed him for the problems of the country, and therefore demanded he should leave power in order to enable the establishment of multiparty system.

As Ntalaja-Nzongola noted:

Were Mobutu a patriot who loved his country and a dignified ruler who respected himself, he would have resigned. We are dealing here not with a normal type of political regime but a Kleptocracy bent on promoting its narrow group interest to the detriment of the general welfare... The nature of the system as a Kleptocracy based on state sponsored banditry was evident whenever Mobutu sent tanks to encircle the Central Bank, the Customs Headquarters and the general tax office to ensure that things remain his private cash boxes (Ntalaja - Nzongola:1999:306).

Subsequently pressures continued to mount so much that Mobutu was forced to initiate the convening of sovereign national conference however, with all its tricks. Despite this, the mass support demonstrations and external pressures led Mobutu to flee out of Kinshasa as Laurent Kabila led his revolutionary groups in pursuit to capture him. His exit led to the assumption of power by Kabila a one time associate of Patrice Lumumba. Thus ended almost four decades of the repressive regime of Mobutu.

4.7: CONCLUSION

The patterns and practices of personal and national security interest are not the same. This depends on the nature, structure and character of government in operation. A democratic regime would tend towards national interests in spite of intermittent puff up of regime interest. While in authoritarian regime, personnel and regime interest of the leaders would prevail in spite of some intermittent populist actions against it. Though in democracies regimes may find common ground for alliances certain economic interest would make them to concede to the interests of authoritarian regimes, especially when an authoritarian state is ready to spread its resources beyond its boundaries only to gain support of a

weak (or even strong) non-authoritarian states. Here, the concept “no permanent friend and permanent enemy”, applies.

It is possible, therefore, to posit here that the patterns and practices of personal rules might have provided the basis for the emergence of the rule of regime interest in Nigeria. In the subsequent chapters attempt would made to demonstrate how authoritarian regimes in Nigeria tried, inspite of sanctions, to maintain and enhance their relationship with other authoritarian states and as well created favourable situation to ensure that other democratic countries do not severe their diplomatic relationship abruptly.

CHAPTER FIVE

5.0 PERCEPTIONS OF NATIONAL/REGIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS IN NIGERIA AND THE ENCIRCLED SCENARIOS FOR REGIME INTEREST

5.1 INTRODUCTION

For us to comprehend the context of operationalising the concept of regime security interest it is also important to understand the perception of Nigeria's national interest in the pursuit of its regional security objectives. This will help us to closely assess the perception of Nigeria's regional security by the managers of the state system as well as ascertaining the permeation of this perception by regime interest in the cause of attaining Nigeria's national objectives. Here, attention will be principally focused on the regimes of General Ibrahim Babangida and General Sani Abacha.

5.2 PERCEPTION OF NATIONAL INTEREST AND REGIONAL SECURITY IN NIGERIA

The 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria clearly states that sovereignty belongs to the people of Nigeria from whom government derives all its powers and authority, "and that the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government" (Article: 14:2a-b). This Constitution, though repealed by the military, remains the most credible Constitution in terms of popular participation in its formulation and even in content despite other constitutions that have emerged in the process of fashioning new political development. Basically, certain clauses of the 1979 constitution are still retained in the later constitutions that have been fashioned especially the 1989, 1995 and the

1999 constitutions. For instance the functions of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria:

- “(a) defending Nigeria from external aggression;
- (b) maintaining its territorial integrity and securing its borders from violation on land, sea or air;
- (c) suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order when called upon to do so by the President, but subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly; and
- (d) performing such other functions as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly.

It is on the basis of the above that Nigeria has been pursuing ambitious foreign policy objectives which since independence in 1960 have remained to

- Defend and promote of Nigeria’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and national independence;
- Create necessary economic and political conditions to secure the government, territorial integrity and national independence of other African countries and their total liberation from the economic, political, social and cultural development of Africa;
- Promote of the rights of all black and oppressed peoples throughout the world;
- Promote of African unity;
- Promote of world peace built on freedom, mutual respect and equality of all peoples of the world;
- Respect for the territorial integrity of all nations; and

- Non participation in East-West ideological disputes and freedom of association and action in the international system.

These principles which were stated by the Prime Minister in 1960 have been restated by all regimes that have come to power. Though other aspects of the objectives like the liberation struggle, political independence and East-West cold war politics have been concluded, the essence of the principles remain as relevance as before which were refocussed by the Adedeji Foreign Policy Review Panel set up by the government of General Murtala Mohammed in 1976. Since independence, Africa maintained a central position in the pursuit of Nigeria's foreign policy. It became combative as the regime of Murtala Mohammed/Olusegun Obasanjo obviously declared that Africa was the 'Centre piece' of Nigeria's foreign policy. This was only restating the position maintained at independence that "Africa is Nigeria's natural sphere of confluence. To shrunk this manifest destiny is not to head to logic of history" (Stremlau: 1977).

According to Okolo, (1988), the Nigeria's foreign policy objectives is determined by the fact that the Nigerian State cannot feel secure if any part of Africa or, for that matter, any part of the international system is burning. By this measure, it shows that "unless a state is secure it cannot be sure that it will survive, and if it does not survive, it will not be able to fulfil any other goals favouring its citizens". (Okolo; Ibid.) On the basis of this Nigeria's foreign policy is wrapped up on the position of Africa beina the Centre Piece of Nigerian foreign policy.

Nigeria's assumption as the defender of Africa's interest is based on the strategic position she occupied in Africa. It has a population of about 120 million people. The importance of this is that out of six black person in the world, one is a

Nigerian (Young 1993). Nigeria equally has enormous resources that are yet to be tapped. It has been sustained since the late 1970s with oil revenue which is earned through foreign exchange. Despite the current economic crisis in Africa, Nigeria's economy is at least still buoyant enough to sustain various policy goals administrations of the foreign policy goals. In spite of Nigeria's strategic importance, its first and only Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa observes:

"We in Nigeria appreciate the advantages which the size of our country and its population give us. But we have absolutely no aggressive intentions. We shall never impose ourselves on any other country and shall treat every African territory big or small, as our equal because we honestly feel that it is only on that basis of equality that peace can be maintained in our continent" (cited in Otubanjo: 1989: 52).

This was expatiated by the First Republic Foreign Affairs Minister, Chief Jaja Wachukwu who says, "Nigeria is an African State and a member of the African Community", Nigeria must therefore, be "very closely and very intimately connected with all things pertaining to the African continent. Charity begins at home and therefore any Nigerian foreign policy that does not take into consideration the peculiar position of Africa is unrealistic". (cited in Gambari 1986). This was further reechoed by General Yakubu Gowon in 1970 at the OAU Summit in Addis Ababa that: "the survival, security and independence of Nigeria cannot be assured as long as any part of Africa remains under colonial rules or an apartheid regime" (cited in Bassey: 1987: 90). Through these broad policy objectives Nigeria has run from pillar to post in Africa, trying to solve one problem or the other either yielding diminishing or effective returns as resources are lavished without dictating the outcome. Though some Africa States have benefited from Nigeria generosity, Nigeria and, indeed Nigerians have never been respected. Nigeria is seen in the eyes of other African countries as a rich country which

could be milked and abandoned with scorn. In fact Stephen Wright rightly noted that it may be more "accurate however, to see the achievements in the sphere of foreign policy in the 1970s and early 1980s as separate and sporadic successes rather than as linked events in a constant chain of political power. These successes were also partially assisted by favourable external factors" (cited in Ihonvbere:1994;46).


It is under this favourable external environment that the concept of "Africa as the center piece" of Nigeria's Foreign policy found acceptability as the main tenor of Nigeria's international relations since independence. Though the concept was coined by the Adedeji Committee on Foreign Relations which was set up by the government of Murtala/Obasanjo, it further gave impetus to the struggle for the national liberation movement in Southern Africa, especially in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. Nevertheless, the concept is too broad, as supports have been given to various policy projects and interests in Africa without focus, coordination and direction as to what should be Nigeria's gain in the process. Even right in the First Republic the pursuit of the concept was criticised for lack of dynamism by the Acting Leader of Opposition, Chief Anthony Enahoro. However, whatever should constitute dynamism must be determined by what is clearly defined concretely as national interests and not necessarily by the pursuit of motion or shadow over substance in determining the nation's foreign policy. Nigeria hardly needs a foreign policy which is "full of sound and furry, signifying nothing...In general, our foreign policy was perceived as vague, poorly articulated and lacking vigour and direction" (Gambari 1986: 74 - 75).

There is the need for a new approach to Nigeria's foreign policy. The new concept may not necessarily discard the old approach but it should provide for the prioritisation of policy rather than a broad and adhoc (foreign) policy of diminishing returns (See Fig. 5.1). Therefore, in developing the new concept of concentric circles, it is argued that though Africa is to continue as an area of primary concern, Nigeria's national security and economic well-being should constitute the new axis around which revolves Nigeria's foreign policy. According to General Muhammadu Buhari, Nigeria's Head of State, (31st December, 1983 to 29th August, 1985), the:

Pattern of concentric circles may be discernible in our attitude and responses of foreign policy issues within the African continent and in the world at large. At the epicentre of these circles are the national economic and security interest of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, which are inextricably tied up with the security, stability and the economic and social well-being of our immediate neighbours. One of our principal priorities is to put on more constructive footing relations with our neighbours with whom we share identical goals of regional stability and peace (Buhari: 1984).


Figure 5.1. Trends in Nigeria's Foreign Policy Approach

A. Africa as Centre Piece from 1960 -



Nigeria operating a plain-field foreign policy without dynamism: (Foreign policy with a Diminishing Returns.)

B. Concentric Circle 1984 - 1995



Nigeria operating focused foreign policy but incoherent and contradictory in implementation.

Between Buhari and the Babangida regime which Abacha transformed himself out of, there are different interpretations and approaches to the concept of concentric circle. The regimes epicentre of the concentric circle starts from economic and security issues as agree that the defence of Nigerian sovereignty economic and security issues are Nigeria's vital interest. Babangida and Abacha place the immediate neighbours and ECOWAS as the second and third most vital interest concentric circle objectives Buhari failed to recognise them as such. And this explains how each regime handle the affairs in ECOWAS. As shown in Figure 5.1 the practice became incoherent and contradictory. For instance under Buhari regime ECOWAS was second most in the concentric circles yet ECOWAS member states suffered more in terms relating with Nigeria. Whereas ECOWAS which was a third in the cadre of the circles became fertile ground for nurturing regime security under Babangida and Abacha. It thus shows that though the prioritization of issues in the concentric circles are not strict but the approach to vital issues through the emotion of the leadership portents danger to the general administration of policy.

The concept of concentric circle was intellectualised in 1981 but found entry into the the tenplate of government policy in 1984 during the Buhari Regime. However, it was only applicable by the regimes of General Babangida and Abacha as it helps to perfect the concept of regime interest more than national interest. The concept can be clearly delineated from different perception. According to the Foreign Minister of General Mohammadu Buhari, Professor Ibrahim Gambari:

While Africa remains the centre piece of our foreign policy, we cannot but operate within a series of concentric circles which now effectively guides our behaviour on the African and world scene. The innermost of the circles of national interest involves Nigeria's security - territorial integrity and political independence - and that of the neighbours of Nigeria... The second circle involves our relations with the ECOWAS sub-region where we intend to take more active interests in development of social, economic and political nature. Nigeria is not a global power, therefore, our commitments, preoccupations and expenditure of our resolves must be made to reflect our capabilities and interests. It is for this reason that our primary focus is on the West African sub-region since an event occurring in this area has an impact directly on Nigeria's interests... The third circle of national interest involves supporting self-determination and dealing with larger African issues.. (cited in Akinrinade 1992: 51, See also *West Africa* October 22, 1984, p. 2118).

From a different approach General Babangida (1990) explains the concept to

- (i) include the defence and protection of Nigeria's territorial threshold, that is, the territorial integrity and sovereignty,
- (ii) The immediate neighbouring countries forming the contiguous boundaries round Nigeria as ring countries. This is because any crisis occurring in such countries do have spill over effects on the stability of the Nigerian state, and
- (iii) The West African Sub-region(ECOWAS) and Africa (OAU) formed the third cadre-in concentric circles.

The concentric circles model was originally conceptualised to explain and interpret the shape of Nigeria's defence and security postures in the critical decades of the late 1970s and 1980s, and the development of military capabilities to enhance regional security and collective defence. The sanctity of Nigeria's territorial boundaries against aggression, both from internal and external sources, reduces the efficacy of extra-regional interventionist policies in West Africa and Africa in general. And during the apartheid era, it prevented the expansion of a South African sphere of influence to the West Atlantic and limited it beyond the Southern African region. Nigeria has been supporting and sponsoring ECOWAS and O.A.U. initiatives to deter extra-territorial influence; it has also mediated between parties in conflicts; and has been pursuing a policy of security partnership and friendliness with member states of OAU to ensure that Africa is crisis-free. Nigeria has been involved in various mediations, peace-keeping and peace-enforcement mechanisms of the United Nations, the OAU and ECOWAS.

Nigeria's outright involvement and support for the formation of ECOWAS was within the parameter of creating regional integration to safeguard her economic interest in spite of the differences in colonial orientation. Nigeria had to embark on hectic regional "spray diplomacy" to win over Francophone West African States for the signing of ECOWAS treaty in 1975, (Ojo: 1980). Similarly, Nigeria has to embark on 'sway diplomacy' to cajole other ECOWAS member states to accept the formation of ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Groups (ECOMOG) (Yoroms and Aning: 1997). However, with the increasing level of political instability at both internal and external levels threatening the growth of ECOWAS economic integration, it becomes imperative for the leadership to envisage a linkage between integration, development and security. Two factors are relevant in this instance.

In the first instance, political and military instability do have impacts and tend to undermine the attainment of economic integration and the socio-economic development envisaged in the formation of ECOWAS. Secondly, it is acknowledged that these disabilities were not based on external threat perceptions but internal contradictions (Welch: 1990: and Weiss and Kessler; 1991: 13). This point is clarified by the fact that as at 1990, 15 years after the establishment of ECOWAS, it failed to achieve a common market. By 1990 the level of intra-ECOWAS trade was very low, accounting for less than 1% of total world export and imports. Similarly, despite optimism in intra-regional trade which rose from 4% to between 5 and 7-8% in 1990, it is argued that by 1995 "official intra-regional trade still represent an insignificant portion of total export, having grown from 3.9% to 4.9%" (Bacli: 1997:77, Diaby-Quarthara: 1995: 6; and Adibe: 1994: 187).

Given the fact that the purpose of regional economic integration has failed to materialise, and coupled with the worsening conditions of the vast majority of the people in West Africa, ECOWAS has moved into the political sphere. Therefore, it is in the face of such poor economic results which "makes the diversion and sustained security obsession worthy of analysis" (Aning: 1997, and Brown: 1997). However, the desire to achieve regional security has been arntwisted by the operatives of two networks of security regimes which are not only antagonistic but contradictory in terms of operation and applications. These three security protocols are the Francophone members states Agreement of Non Aggression and Assistance in Defence ANAD signed in 1977 and ECOWAS protocols on Non Aggression, signed in Lagos (1978), and the protocol on Mutual Assistance in defence Matters signed in Sierra Leone in 1981.

Indeed the concept of security regime has always been a problematic one among nations as

“It is possible for one or a few states to stand in opposition to the formation of a regional force. These states may see the establishment of a regional force as antithetical to their national interest, whether real or perceived. The act of overcoming the opposition of states towards the establishment of a military force, and building support is itself a political process. In this light, it can be recalled that not all member states of ECOWAS were supportive of the peace plan drawn up by the ECOWAS Mediation Committee which led to the establishment of ECOMOG in 1990” (Oche: 1998:23).

This problem has to do with different perceptions by member states as to what constitute regional economic integration vis-a-vis its linkage to regional security and the application for common good rather than patrimonial interest.

Across the sub-continent, apparatus of state-building are still weak. The legitimacy of those who hold state power has often been suspect. This has affected the nature of rule-enforcing mechanisms which are feared may not be observed. In the light of this, there is no laid down rules or principles of what constitute national goals and objectives. This has some effect on both domestic and regional policies. For instance at the regional level it is believed that the formation of ECOWAS as a regional economic integration would further Nigeria's economic interest in the region. However, after the formation, subsequent interest shown on ECOWAS by various regimes has been at variant with the original goal of Nigeria's interest in ECOWAS like:

- Maintaining good neighbourliness as a measure towards easing support to threats from among any hostile neighbouring state against Nigeria.

- Creating enabling environment for hostile and friendly neighbours not only to depend on Nigeria's economic and military strength but to enhance regional cooperation, as well as disinvesting foreign interest and threats that might lead to the destabilisation of Nigeria.
- Developing a sub-regional trade and promoting free movement within the region of goods, services and people.
- Above all, as a regional power, Nigeria's interest in ECOWAS is concomitant to her overall policy of taking Africa as the centre piece of her foreign policy.

In the light of the above factors, Nigeria has been "selling oil to African countries at concessionary prices, and going to a great extent to explain policies and actions which seemed to contradict the country's aspiration to regional leadership status such as it happened when it failed to condemn the American bombing of Tripoli in 1986" (Akinrinade: 1992: 80). However, to the contrary some major actions taken have run counter to the original goal of Nigeria's interest in either OAU or ECOWAS. For instance, in 1984, under the regime of General Mohammadu Buhari, Nigeria espoused, for the first time, the concept of concentric circles. Unfortunately, the regime pursued a foreign policy which undermined the basis on which the concentric circles were anchored. While the regime placed ECOWAS on the second circle it turned round to cause social disarticulation in achieving the objectives of ECOWAS. This was done through the restriction of free movements by ECOWAS citizens into Nigeria, to the extent that Nigeria closed her borders. This did not only affect free movement but trade relations. The neighbouring countries that Nigeria had hitherto feared might become threats if driven into the laps of extra-territorial powers, became the most vulnerable following the restriction of movement and closure of border for trades.

This came shortly after a similar exercise in 1983 under a civilian regime when the President, Alhaji Shehu Shagari, sent a death knell on the relevance of ECOWAS to Nigeria by expelling West African nationals. Indeed between 1983 and 1985, ECOWAS faced its baptism of fire as there was no regional hegemon to maintain the balance of cooperation. Buhari's government developed lurkwarm attitude towards ECOWAS and could not accept to host its summit being "conscious of the irony of a country which had closed its land borders hosting a summit to discuss the promotion of sub-regional integration" (Akinrinde 1992:52). Even when the summit was held in Togo in July 1985, and the second phase of ECOWAS protocol on free movement was being considered, Nigeria rather moved for postponement to a period of one year. Member states had no option than to workout a means by which Nigeria takes up the chairmanship of the organisation in order for her to appreciate the "burden of the community spirit." While Buhari reluctantly accepted the Chairmanship of ECOWAS, the contradictions within his junta regime provided the opening for General Babangida to emerge in the scene as the new Head of the Nigerian military junta.

While search of strength and support, ECOWAS turned out to be part of Babangida's agenda for the stability of his regime; in terms of creating alliances, diverting interest, and regrouping and dividing social forces in order to ensure their affective control and dominance over and above other considerations that may threaten the stability of his regime. This trend was perpetuated by General Sani Abacha who seized power, from an interim regime of which he was the second-in-command, on 18th November, 1993. The interim regime itself came to power on August 26, 1993 as result of the crisis that followed the annulment of the June 12, 1993 presidential election.

5.3 SCENARIOS OF REGIME (SECURITY) INTEREST IN NIGERIA

In Chapter Two we dealt with the concept of regime security interest. Here, the focus will be to show; the emergence of regime interest in Nigeria from two levels. One, is that from independence in 1960 to 1985 there were various interests competing to be identified as national interest. These interests are ethnic, religious, economic, political, regional and the like. The political leaders that came to power were not only interested in building authoritarian rule but also a personality cult. This was particularly the case under military rule. Whether these leaders came to power through election or by the barrel of the gun they were magnated by social forces existing in the society. They might have specific interests but such interests were larger than regime-interest though they may not necessarily attain the objectives of national interest. The military leadership either in the case of Aguyi Ironsi; Gowon; Murtala/Obasanjo and Buhari exhibited authoritarian traits but they did not succeed in building a personality cult, partly because of the level of discipline and professionalism in the army, as well as the circumstances and forces that brought them to power. Two, is that between 1985 and 1998, the authoritarian leadership was personality – specific and cult driven. The leadership was not collective but dependent on the personality cult of the regime as represented by the President (or Head of State as the case may be). To properly grasp the dialectics of collective authoritarian rule we must understand the nature of political competition in the society.

The political institutions left behind by colonial rule in Nigeria became part of the divisive mechanisms used by the emerging Nigerian social forces for political trade offs. The elites of the Northern Region in Nigeria maintained a

stronghold on politics, the military and the police while those of the southern regions (made up of Eastern and Western regions) dominated the bureaucracy, the economy, and the academia. While the former carefully planned towards political domination the latter was busy carried away by the newly acquired bureaucratic power at independence. In the end, the political institutions that were left over at independence became weak in mediating and moderating group political interest. A civil war had to be fought between 1967 to 1970 to address the imbalance in political power equation. But the end of the war did not help to neutralise the asymmetrical power in favour of the North which had used the advantage of the war to take grip of the top echelon of the bureaucracy. At the end of the civil war the South is not better (see William, 1992: 88-141).

In effect, a praetorian oligarchy was developed as represented by the northern ruling elites, mainly made up of Hausa-Fulani elites. In their quest for political dominance, they co-opted and relied on the military and political elites of the ethnic minorities in the Middle Belt and southern part of the country (Yoroms: 1999). As a result of their control of state power the military increasingly emerged from the background to become, not only as a power broker but a political power contender, exchanging power with the civilian political class only at the time and space defined by the military and at the interest of the Northern power elites.

The root causes of Nigeria's praetorian oligarchy, therefore, has to do with the colonial model of divide and rule. Those who took over from the British colonial rule at independence were so designed to decide the pattern of administration on the same model left over by the colonial overlords, by which means to maintain their power and authority. It has been argued that the north which has been at the centre of this praetorian oligarchy deserves this political

control as a counterweight to the economic power of the south. But, as Diamond (1988: 29) points out, the political and economic disparities between the north and the south respectively were indeed "a product of colonial penetration and rule". This imbalance gradually expanded to cover federal resources; power and institutions. This culminated into a series of crises leading to civil war. Even after thirty years of the end of the civil war, the bitter political contestation and competition has not only remained, but also intensified, with the north in the political ascension" (Diamond, 1988:29; and Forrest, 1994:39). In fact, the control of state power is increasingly being seen as a birthright of the north and a privilege to the other sections of the country.

The deliberate refusal of the colonial powers to create a national dominant (coalition) interest or class as a way of enhancing "trans-ethnic and regional consciousness makes it much more difficult for a meaningful conceptualisation of Nigerian politics on the basis of class analysis" (see Diamond 1988; and Political Bureau 1987). The point here is that class analysis alone cannot be wholistic in interpreting Nigerian politics. There is a fundamental effect on the deep regional and ethnic pluralities of the country as each of the political elite sought to control and consolidate its power largely within its socio-cultural base while seeking to break into the political domain of its opponents (Oyavbaire and Olagunju, p.9 nd). And because the Northern praetorian oligarchy has consolidated itself politically, only a northern political party (whether it was NPC (Northern Peoples Congress) of the First Republic or NPN (Northern Party of Nigeria) of the Second Republic and their military dictators) have dominated power since Nigerian independence. These elites have succeeded in breaking into other ethnic and regional domains, and yet it has never been effectively broken into by any other exogenous party from the southern part of the country.

Whenever it is anticipated that a civil authority is about to slip out of its control a military coup is staged and a northern military officer is placed in the helm of affairs. And whenever a ruling military leadership has outlived its usefulness and seems to be facing serious internal and external threats, a palace coup is organised in order to perpetuate northern praetorian oligarchy. This partly explain why the President of the Second Republic (1979 – 1983), Alhaji Shehu Shagari, himself a Hausa-Fulani posits that there are only two political parties in Nigeria, the ruling NPN and the Military. The Kaduna Mafia, an intelligentsia elite of the oligarchic rule, has been in the forefront of the masterstrokes of all the political changes in Nigeria (see Takaya and Tyoden: 1987).

They became very cohesive in the 1970s and consciously worked out the overthrow of General Yakubu Gowon when he was dispensed with. The civilian government of Alhaji Shagari which was a subset of the northern oligarchy was equally overthrown by General Mohammadu Buhari in 1983 in order to stop the planned rotation of the presidential ticket of the National Party of Nigerian (NPN) to the southern part of the country by 1987. Infact, during the Second Republic, Chief M.K.O Abiola had eyed the presidential ticket of the party based on the 1987 zoning arrangement of the party. Despite the internal squabbles that led to the palace coup that overthrew General Buhari, his successor, General Ibrahim Babangida effectively maintained the loyalties and allegiance of his regime to the northern oligarchy and establishment. This has become a political routine since 1966 which has subsequently effected the value system of the military (Paden, 1993).

The north is fetish with power and the northern elites, otherwise known as counter-elites, despite their education constitute the hard core reservoir of conservatism (Yoroms 1999). This concept (counter-elite) has been used in scholarly literature to explain the emergence of an educated elite as counterweight to the power of traditional institutions and colonial authorities in the north during colonial rule. But unfortunately it is this class of elites that have grown to become the intelligentsia of northern conservatism. The counter-elite has helped to sharpen primordial tension and regional politics in Nigeria. Originally known as *Niima* Club, the elite is now referred to as Kaduna Mafia. They do not give in to the rationality of the modernisation of the traditional institution and the liberation of the urban masses and rural poor and peasants. The elites believe their tradition and culture is more superior and superintends other cultural cleavages. They feel autonomous in cultural relevance and authentic in their divine occupation of political power. They are very officious and cautious of Western education.

Though majority of them may not be well-educated they are nevertheless, very conscious of their rights (not privileges) as power occupants. They are very collective; with a hierarchical obligation to the traditional structure of conservatism. Circumstances can make them to tolerate a non-Moslem Hausa-Fulani (Gowon and Obasanjo) in the leadership but the extent to which such a leader survives in power is dependent on the capacity which they can tolerate and the ability of such leaders to satisfy them. This childhood upbringing has a consequential effect on the nature and character of the emergent northern political elites toward Nigerian politics. The turncoat political elites among the northern ruling class seems too insignificant in effecting a change from within the system because of the large illiterate masses who are ready to defend the status quo. This

does not, however, underestimate the contending power of the radical groups in the north. But they have a tight rope to overcome. This argument is not an underestimation of the struggle put up by Mallam Aminu Kano- led Northern Element People Union (NEPU) and Peoples Redemption Party (PRP) of the First and Second Republics respectively in Nigeria but despite this struggle, the ignorance of the masses (Talakaƙa) have been exploited by the conservative class to carry out many of the political thuggeries and violence in the North. For instance, the killing of Dr. Bala Mohammed, the Political Adviser to the former Governor of Kano State in the Second Republic, Alhaji Abubakar Rimi; and several other religious crises in the north have been masterminded neatly by the elite/traditional institutions and executed by the ignorant and illiterate masses.

The Northern conservative class will hardly tolerate the education of the illiterate masses because it amounts to an invitation for revolution from below (mass consciousness) against the system which services their means of survival. (See Usman 1982). Similarly the political influence of northern minority ethnic groups have been reduced by a careful process of denial, subordination and co-optation (see Yoroms 1994; and Tyoden 1993). The interest of the northern elites is often defined in terms of how to capture, use and retain power. They are very serious with the game of power politics.

Comparatively, the south which comprises of such ethnic groups like the Igbos, Yorubas and other ethnic minorities is a penetrated society or region. The people have imbibed Western education with its deep individualistic and liberal content. Though some residues of traditional communalism persist in patches, they have been, to some extent weakened by strong liberalism of western Euro-American culture. To the extent that both African communalism and the

individualism of the Western European culture are in conflict when it comes to political choice. This type of conflict enables the northern praetorian oligarchy to penetrate the individualistic soul of the southern elites and separate them from their communal bonds. And given the capitalist principles of individual liberalism which allows an individual to strive alone, many of the southern elites and those living beneath poverty line have not only been co-opted but they have turned to the political apron string of the north.

By this means, the southern political class gain access to, and thereby increase their economic status rather than showing interest in only political power. It, therefore, becomes viable for the northern ruling class who control or have easier access to political power and authority to use state resources 'prebendally' to retain political power. While the southern elite tend to feel comfortable with their position they became gradually alienated from access to political power as the north consolidates its stronghold in political power. Any change to the contrary is repugnant to the Northern elite. It is in the light of this that the clouds of the June 12, 1993 presidential elections which would have shifted political base to the southern part of the country was aborted (Yoroms 1999).

In a situation where power is not allowed to shift and alternate in a deeply divided primordial society, the political system would certainly develop some democratic contradictions. Because of the political benefits and co-optation of the southern elites into the political appendages of the north, the Southern and Middle Belt elites have lost out and became politically inexperienced in acquiring political power (Yoroms 1999). As Richard Joseph rightly observes, "politically ambitious Igbos who saw it as axiomatic that no serious presidential candidate would be an Igbo, rushed to secure second place (as communal group) in the political formation

emerging under the leadership of northern elite" (Joseph, 1991 :94-95). The north has a psychological disposition that intimidates southern politicians into submission, partly due to the over-kill nature of the debt of their political calculation and partly too due to the "absence of a stable hegemony", which Joseph says of the Yoruba people as "living through their history in the present, often culturally magnificent but also politically catastrophic" (Joseph, 1991: 111).

Following from the above analyses, therefore, it is clear that the north has been a major obstacle to political liberalisation and democracy in Nigeria. Thus, in a given situation under the prevailing political circumstance, the north stands to benefit more because "the authoritarian proclivities of many contemporary African leaders may reinforce the tradition of authoritarian rule inherited from colonialism, which in itself was superimposed on the indigenous concept of the functional indivisibility of power and authority" (Decalo, 1989:2-3).

This has remained a major problem in Nigerian political development so that whenever there is a transition to democracy the only problem that is addressed is the "form of liberal democracy and not how to tackle the conditions for the realisation of liberal democracy talk less of the question of popular democracy" (Bangura, 1988:13). It is as a result of this that the first transition from the military government of Mohammed/Obasanjo to civilian rule of Alhaji Shehu Shagari, as well as that of General Babangida's transition failed to address the concrete issue in power-sharing.

This was so because political liberalisation and economic nationalism failed to proceed from democratisation. Rather, what Nigeria has experienced is economic liberalisation by means of structural adjustment tending to substitute

democratisation (Ake, 1991:43). Nigeria is too preoccupied with the question of planning transition to democracy which only ends up in "ushering into government the forces that would uphold the historic project of the post colonial state" (Bangura, 1988:13). This has established some doubts over chances of long-term success of the attempt by military regimes, especially with Babangida's elaborate effort, to facilitate return to civil rule (Welch: 1992).

The nature of state formation in Africa has some impact on the nature of governance. The state in Africa did not grow from within. It was imposed through colonial rule. Colonialism, therefore, undermined the appearances of democratic culture by (i) devaluing Africa's cultures and making them incapable of developing or picking up from its pre-slave-trade democratic appearances, (ii) encouraging the growth of kinship, which focuses on ethnic politics rather than individualism; which is the embodiment of liberal society, (iii) empowering African traditional institutions with authoritarian clays and forced the individual to locate his political-self within, and (iv) weakening the civil society from emerging as a vivid force for democracy.

What exists as political institutions like rule of law, constitutions, police and the military are what professor P.P.Ekeh called 'migrated social structures' (Ekeh; 1983:12). The state and society as colonial creations, created new values that are alien to the people, without hegemonic influence. The state is opened to competition between rival groups over the control of resources. Thus, political institutions and institutionalisation processes are weak because of deep communal diversity and conflicting allegiances, leading to community-exclusive authority structures (Kamrava;1993:3).

Under a circumstance like this, any person can emerge promising various groups the attainment of their goals, the outcome of which is to gain power. Thus, personal regime thrives in "societies where the development of organisations and institutions have been particularly mute. An absence of solid political institutions and of procedural methods facilitate the ascension of ambitious personalities to position of political power by enabling them to employ non-institutional means in order to attain power." (Kamrava;1993:15). Increasingly, with the expansion of client-patron relations, the individual can on the basis of his charisma create a niche for himself.

Thus, emerging from collective dictatorship of either a party system or military coup, he can transform into a personal ruler. In the course of this it would become fashionable for the leader to exercise a dominant influence within and above other interests (Brooker;1995:18). However, one may question, when exactly does he become more than just an agent of the party or the military, as showing concern to his personal rule? How secure or absolutist is the personal rulership? As from mid 1985's up to 1998, certain trends began to occur in the corridor of power, where the leadership became the centre of power, determine the distribution of resources and exercising repressive instruments arbitrarily. This may not be the first time in the history of exercising authoritarian rule in Nigeria but the tempo escalated during this period.

On the basis of the above, there are three factors for understanding the emergence of regime interest in Nigeria. The first which is very important is the emergence of military rule which replaced systemic and functional federalism with unitarism. This helped to redress the balance of power in favour of the central government. The military, as a result of their prolonged control of State power,

has emerged as a privilege stratum differentiated from the rest of the society in terms of power, position(s), new found wealth, connection(s), skill, prestige, and experiences possessed by members (Adekanye;1993;4-5). The military, in itself a highly repressive state institution, has for decades controlled the use of force as the *ultimo ratio* of State power places the military at a relative advantage over other competing social groups:

“For, given the zero-sum character of politics here, the control of the apparatus of state power entails the control of and access to public resources and their unfettered allocation. The combination of the monopoly of the coercive apparatus with the function of the government, and lasting for that long period at that, has been responsible for... skewed budgetary distribution in favour of the military.... The undeniable “forcible” element involved in such a distributive process plus the generally unproductive nature of military appropriations is a major consideration for the concept of military extractive ratio.... the processes by which a warrior stratum-turned-governing class gets transformed into an economically privileged group” (Adekanye 1993:5; see also Adekanye1978).

Secondly, which is foremost and forms the basis for the first factor, is the increasing wealth generated by oil. This has swelled up from N1 billion in 1973 to N7 billion in 1977 (Okolo:1984: 73, and Olukoshi: 1991: 29), and as at 1979 oil revenue reached N10.1 billion. Even though it collapsed to N5.161 billion in 1982 leading to economic crisis and the introduction of structural adjustment programmes, it was also clear that state resources are still intact for the leadership to spend at will, to the detriment of the masses who bear the impact of the crisis. It is therefore, difficult for any regime to ease itself out of power when there is a centrally controlled revenue at its disposal.

As a rentier state the central government is the main recipient of rent as production efficiency is relegated to the background (Ibrahim:1997:157). Thirdly, given the two factors above, the art of governance became sustainable by

repression. Thus, despite the sharp competition for power, office seekers tend to be fetish once they get to power. They often feel insecure and do employ repressive mechanisms to remain in power. But at the core of the coup and counter-coups, the rigging of elections, repression and authoritarianism is the oil money. As Professor Tam David West graphically puts it across:

Oil is being prospected from my state yet my people are suffering: no road, no water, no electricity, no school... **Let us face it, without oil there will be no federation, without oil there will be no coup. The centre is rich with oil wealth. That is why every body wants to stage a coup to control it.** (emphasis added), (*The News*: 8 November, 1998).

The masses of the people are denied access to state resources. They live in fear and have no political choice and therefore, do not participate in the political processes. This is, in fact, deliberate: to restrict the flow of state resource.

5.4 THE EMERGENCE OF THE BABANGIDA AND ABACHA LEADERSHIPS

General Ibrahim Babangida came into public life in the mid 1970's when he became member of the Supreme Military Council (SMC) under the regime of General Murtala Mohammed. Later he became a figure in the 1976 abortive coup when he was asked by the then Army Chief of Staff, Lt General T.Y. Danjuma, to lead a small group of soldiers to capture Lt. Col. B. S Dimka the announcer of the coup who was hiding in the Radio House, Lagos; alive or dead. Though Col. Dimka escaped, he successfully demobilized the coup plotters. This success made Babangida to become drunk with power and to start plotting on how he can become a Head of State. Like Babangida, Abacha came into national limelight through a military coup in 1993 when he announced the coup that terminated Nigeria's Second Republic. Both of them came into another limelight in August 1985 when they overthrew the regime of General Muhammadu Buhari.

Since then, the duo became 'siamese twins' in defining what should or should not constitute Nigeria's national interests between 1985 and 1998. General Babangida played a very prominent role not only in the termination of the Second Republic but also in the emergence of General Buhari as the Head of State. According to him:

We (the military) sat down and decided we were going to change the civilian government at the time. And we also agreed that we were going to make Major General Muhammadu Buhari, the new Head of State. I told Buhari what was happening. I was mandated to tell him, that he was going to be the Head of State (Cited in Umoden: 1992: 35).

This position is contrary to a highly privileged information that the initial person that was slated as head of state was Brigadier Abdullahi Bako, the most senior officer of the December 31, 1983 coup plotters, who was schemed out. Brigadier Bako and Col Abdulsalami Abubakar were mandated to arrest President Shagari in the presidential palace in Abuja, then Akinola Aguda House, and place him under house arrest. However, allegedly, Babangida had a secret pact with Abdulsalami Abubakar for the elimination of Brigadier Bako. In the course of arresting Shagari, Brigadier Bako was killed. Another version of the coup blames Bako's inability to realise or remember he had stationed a troop on the enemy exit, an escape route suspected to be exit passage for government officials and loyal troops in an event of confrontation.

While leaving the presidential villa Brigadier General Bako, and Lt Col Tunde Ogbeha who had accompanied him, mistakenly followed the enemy exit and, were fired on by the troops who suspected them to be loyal troops. Ogbeha escaped from the running vehicle while Bako and the driver were killed. This

version raises more dust and doubt. Why didn't Ogbeha remind Bako about the enemy exit? How is it possible for Ogbeha to escape from an on moving vehicle where he and Bako were sitting together? However, from the two versions there are indications that both Abdulsalami Abubakar and Tunde Ogbeha were detailed, independently or collectively, to kill Bako. Meanwhile, the death of Bako would have made Babangida to naturally step in as head of state but unfortunately the scheme by Babangida and his faction within the coup planners did not work out. Thus, the caucus brought in Buhari as a compromise candidate. Buhari was privileged to be informed of the impending coup but he was not part of the original planners. The decision to change the civilian regime through coup was against the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The decision, though said to have been in the interest of Nigeria, was indeed taken in the interest of few individuals within the military who became increasingly drunk with power. However, twenty months after the overthrow of the civilian regime, the Buhari's regime was equally overthrown by Babangida, Abacha and Brigadier Joshua Dongoyaro. The regime of Buhari was accused of tending towards despotism with serious implications for national survival as:

"The Supreme Military Council-the ruling organ which at its inception had provided collective leadership-got hijacked by the then Head of State, retired Major-General Buhari and his Chief of Staff, retired Major General Tunde Idiagbon. Decisions taken collectively were increasingly manipulated to suit the whims of the duo-rulers. Consequently, the esprit de corps within the military faced serious threat (Oyovbaire and Olagunju, p.12).

In his maiden broadcast to the nation General Babangida posits that the

"Principles of discussion, consultation, and cooperation which should have guided the decision making process of the Supreme Military Council was discarded soon after the government settled down in 1984... Regrettably, it turned out that Major-General Muhammed Buhari was too rigid and uncompromising in his attitude to issues of national significance. Efforts

to make him understand that a diverse polity like Nigeria required recognition and appreciation of differences in both cultural and individual perceptions only served to aggravate these attitudes. Major General Tunde Idiagbon was similarly inclined in that respect... He arrogated to himself absolute knowledge of problems and solutions" (Babangida: 1985).

Thus, Babangida and his group argued that their intervention in August 1985 became necessary to save the nation from a potential civil unrest and disintegration, as well as restore the confidence of Nigerians in themselves from the years of maladministration by the Shagari administration and the suffocating autocracy of the Buhari regime (Oyovbaire and Olagunju: p12). But Buhari emphatically disputed this position. Accordingly to him: "we all serve together in the Supreme Military Council for 20 months, took decision together, we came out with all the laws, and they turned round when it suited them to say Tunde and I arrogated to ourselves the knowledge of governance. **After eight years Nigerians know better.**" (The News 5 July, 1993:25; emphasis added). Buhari emphasised that "what ever we did in that regime was argued with the Executive council" (The News 5 July, 1993:15).

Buhari's regime came to power at the time the economic crisis was beginning to eat deeply into the Nigerian society and the attempt by the civilian government of Alhaji Shehu Shagari to borrow the sum of \$2.56 billion from the IMF was increasingly being resisted by workers, students and professional groups in the society. In addition, there was serious social tension manifested in workers' strikes, students protests, the Maitatsine uprisings and increasing waves of armed robbery (Bangura: 1989). These protests and resistance made the government to concede to IMF demand for 25% devaluation of the national currency, the naira, and liberalisation of imports.

The crisis became worse as the government of the Second Republic squandered the sum of N8 billion (reserve) and budget surplus of N1461.6 million inherited from the military regime of General Obasanjo, including the foreign exchange earnings from the sale of crude petroleum. These hard currency were spent on importing food and luxurious items or siphoned for the "corrupt enrichment of individuals and the political parties in power at the federal and state level" (Olagunju et al 1993; 61;). The politicians were also involved in frivolous political activities, turning politics into a warfare rather than game of power. Professor Omo Omoruyi, the Director-General of (the now defunct) Centre for Democratic Studies (CDS) argues that the failure of democratic politics has to do with four sources of antidemocratic attitude and behaviour which are:

- (i) lack of trust among political actors, which on further investigation is acquired in infancy and has roots in the child rearing practices;
- (ii) lack of faith in the regime. Citizens do not have faith in the regime and of course of its laws; they do not even believe that the system would last;
- (iii) low threshold of tolerance- what would make one laugh in one setting could prove violence in another; and
- (iv) people see politics as business proposition and see investing in politics as investing in business or in family venture (Omoruyi 1992:89).

These factors, argues Omoruyi are responsible for electoral malpractices; use of political office as avenue for personal aggrandisement, "thuggery, political intolerance, blatant manipulation of religion, ethnicity and geographical entity as spring board and means to personal political ambitions and disregard for constitutional rules of the game" and provide the basis for the rationalization of

military *coup d'état*. This was the case in the 1983. For General Buhari, in his address to the Diplomatic Corps on 4th January:

....the shameless rigging and the widespread provision of the electoral process could not; in all honesty, have been said to have produced a government of the people. What we had, through the manipulated results both at federal and state levels, were government imposed on the people by the scandalous use of mixture of political thuggery and wide-scale bribery.... However, it was clear to our people that the political leadership that emerged in 1979 showed that it had learnt nothing and forgotten nothing in the years between the first and second Republics.... The intervention of the armed forces, was to arrest the imminent catastrophe which would have been the inevitable result of the course being charted by the politicians (cited in Olagunju et al 1993:64).

It is in the light of this that the regime did not see political transition programme as a preoccupation which Buhari himself told foreign journalists that:

.... What we will put to Nigerians is to make Nigerians understand how much we are in trouble, economically. If we can get that message across then Nigerian will be prepared to work hard and allow the government to pull the country out of the economic mess. After that, if they like, resume their haggings and squabbles. But for now, we have no time to waste, only time to work hard. We have to see it through (Cited in Olagunju 1993: 67).

General Buhari was subsequently denied in an interview that he never had a political transition programme, for this was one of the major reasons advanced by Babangida and his cohorts for the termination of his regime.

According to him "we had a political programme but because I didn't mention it does not mean it does not exist or that it is not a credit to that administration. By June 1984, I took a paper to the Supreme Military Council on this issue. And the paper caused a lot of heat. So I had to withdraw the memo and I had to submit another one." (The News: 5 July 1983).

The Buhari regime, on coming to power, focused on tackling the economic crisis through repression and fiscal discipline. It introduced the War Against

Indiscipline (WAI) to bring about orderly behaviour in public life. It enacted Decree No. 3 to recover public funds from politicians, public officers and contractors who looted or failed to execute their contracts, and incarcerated politicians without trials through the promulgation of Decree No. 2 (State Security Detention of persons). This Decree could lead to arrest and detention of suspect for an indefinite period of time by the Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters. This involved politicians, "economic saboteurs", currency traffickers, "political saboteurs", among others. The Buhari regime also enacted Decree No. 4 (Public officers protection Against False Accusation) This Decree was promulgated to deal with journalists and media organizations.

There were massive retrenchments in both public and private sectors, freezing of wages, introduction of levies (educational and development) and taxes (poll and cattle). The government promoted alternative strategy to IMF Loans by introducing counter trade deals, designed to increase imports; shift trading partnership away from the pattern of trade links with Europe by focusing on special bilateral relationship, (Forrest: 1993: 301). Above all, the regime lacked consultation and was apparently bias in terms of promoting northern interest and thereby heightened ethnic, regional and religious tensions as federal character was undermined leading to the agitation for the confederation of the Nigerian State. The Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) was weakened by the retrenchment of workers and the harassment of labour unionists. The Nigerian Medical Association (NMA) and the National Association of Resident Doctors (NARD) which questioned the regime for neglecting her promise of equipping hospitals, were proscribed. The only umbrella students organisation in the country, the National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS), was banned for opposing the introduction of tuition fees in schools and the authoritarian rule of the regime.

From the surface of the above scenarios were factors that could bring about any counter-regime to power. Buhari objected to these claims as Babangida and his 1985 plotters were parts of all the decisions taken in the SMC. Rather there were suspected cracks in the government leading to the Coup of 1985. Buhari pointed out that "our administration was unlucky. There was a fifth columnist among us, and the success of that fifth columnist among us, is what we are now" (the Babangida's regime), (The News: 5 July 1993, p20). He added, "I was removed because certain members of my cabinet felt because they were in public office they were entitled to things other than what is specified in their terms and conditions of service". (The News 5 July, 1993: 26) On the basis of this Babangida was no longer in tune with policies of Buhari's regime, and was becoming a victim.

The Director-General of the National Security Organization (NSO) under General Buhari regime, Alhaji Muhammadu Lawal Rafindadi, substantiated General Buhari position, and even added another insight into the power play at that time. According to him, General Babangida's brother-in-law, Chief Sonny Okogwu, wanted to establish a multi-billion naira military hardware project called Blackgold in 1985. In view of the security implications, the then Military Governor of Kaduna state, Air Vice Marchall (AVM) Usman Muazu, informed the Supreme Military Council (SMC). The Council, in turn, directed the NSO to investigate the issue and advise the government.

However, before the completion of the investigation, Babangida brought a letter to the then Chief of Staff Supreme Headquarters, Major General Tunde Idiagbon, claiming that clearance had been secured for the project from the NSO.

This was found to be false. And “when we carried our investigation we discovered that the letter was a forgery. The name of the officer who purported to have signed the letter was fake”. (Newswatch, Nov 20, 2000:22). Rafindadi, also indicted General Aliyu Mohammed Gusau (rtd) the National Security Adviser to the President, Olusegun Obasanjo, for being a party to his incarceration because he was involved in the 1985 importation scandal for which he (Gusau) was detained and retired from the military under Buhari regime. According to Rafindadi the 1985 coup was to enable Babangida, Gusau and others cover up their tracks, and not because of Buhari regime’s inflexibility and draconian laws, as the Babangida’s regime itself promulgated more draconian laws than Buhari (Newswatch, November 20, 2000: 32).

Thus, General Babangida, as a person, was facing serious crisis in a regime in which he was the third in command. This crisis would have led not only to his suspension from the military but also his being court martialled and retired or totally dismissed from the military. This crisis, according to sources led him to contact a spiritualist – seer (Mallam) in Niger Republic to pray for the aversion of the crisis and a normalization of the relationship between him and the regime. The seer was said to have told him two things. One, that he could do what Babangida wanted him to do. And two, that Babangida can become Nigeria’s Head of State if he so wished; and that what was needed was prayers to make assurance doubly sure. But, he added, that should Babangida becomes the Head of State, Nigeria will be plunged into a serious crisis that would threaten its peace, stability and unity, during and after his regime. Babangida was said to have been elated by the second position and chose it. (interview – privileged information; June 1999).

General Babangida had longed nursed the ambition of becoming a military Head of State and had been scheming for it. In an interview with the press Babangida stated that he had aspired to be Head of State when he was Army Chief of Staff (ThisDay May 2, 2001: p 1 & 4). But Babangida had never expected to become a Head of State less than 18 month of Buhari's regime. All he had wanted was to save his life and career, having failed on the initial bid to rule instead of Buhari. The seer's revelation gave him serious confidence in his plotting and scheming of being a Head of State. And to avoid being caught in the waves of his contradiction, he (General Babangida) gathered round him ethnic minority officers, Brigadier-General Joshua Dogon Yaro, Col John Shagaya, Col Yohanna Madaki, Col Chris Garuba, Brig-Gen Jeremiah Useni and intellectuals (Omo Omoruyi, J.I. Elaigwu, Olagunju, Adele Jinaḍu, etc) and some radical core-northern military officers who have remained loyal to him (Col Umar Kangiwa, Col Abdulmumini Aminu, etc) to plan how to execute his coup. While the military officers did the planning and formulated tactical strategies of the coup, those from the academia did the intellectual work. However, even when Buhari was toppled the Nigerian populace was not too keen and enthusiastic about it. The Babangida regime found acceptability only in the press when it repealed decree 4 of 1984, opened up the *Gestapo* for the public through the press, to see how the regime had torture detainees. While Decree 4 was repealed, Decree 2 was left intact which the regime later used to detain all sort of opponents. It went further to set up various tribunals to hasten the trials of political detainees incarcerated without trial by the Buhari government.

After a successful overthrow of Buhari, Babangida expanded his intellectual scope by establishing an intellectual garage known as: "the Presidential Advisory Committee" headed by the late Professor Oyetunji Aboyade. Members of the

Committee include Professor Omo Omoruyi, Tunji Olagunju, Ikenna Uzimiro, Aforka Nweke and Adele Jinadu among others. They were either collectively or on their individual strength made members of Babangida's kitchen cabinet or were often consulted on critical national issue (see Awa, 1992: 27). The kitchen cabinet which started with Professor Jonah Isawa Elaigwu and the late Yaya Aliyu with Omo Omoruyi at the background later expanded with the establishment of the Political Bureau. Those subsequently brought on board include Eme Ewa, AD. Yahaya, O. Oyediran, Bala Takaya, Tunde Adeniran, S.E. Oyovbaire, J.A. Amoda, Tunji Olagunju, Haroun Adamu, Bala Usman, and many others. Being bitter with massive entrance of their senior colleagues, political scientists, into the Babangida Transition Programme (BTP) as consultants, Muazzam and Jibrin Ibrahim note that their involvement in BTP are to promote and in fact implement their personal views rather than to arbitrate in the political process. And this is likely to lead to "a more closed and exclusionary political system – the exact opposite of the legacy political science should give to the Nigerian polity". (Muazzam and Ibrahim: 1988: 21). They further observe that the entire gamut of Babangida's transition "has been consciously operating under the platonic concept of combining knowledge and power not only to survive but also to ensure that it reproduces itself". (Ibid. 9, see also Awa: 1992). In order to establish and increase the tempo of his acceptability he embarked on a political transition.

The first step in this direction was the establishment of a Political Bureau, made up of seventeen members, headed by Dr. S.J. Cooney and with this charge:

Our primary objective is to bequeath to posterity a new political order that can endure stresses as well as contain the competitive demands in our national life.... (T)he Bureau must ensure that Nigerians secure for themselves a more meaningful political future through open and free debate.... Those who will contribute and participate in the debate need not

be afraid to be both daring and cognitive.... We are committed to an order that will check the excesses of government and the abuse of power by the political leadership. We shall equally frown at a system in which a small group of individuals shall be allowed to misuse power to the detriment of our national aspiration. (Politbureau: 1987: 225 - 226).

On this ground the Bureau was given a blank term of reference; namely, to

- (i) review Nigeria's political history and identify the basic problems which have led to our failure in the past and suggest ways of resolving and coping with these problems,
- (ii) identify a basic philosophy of government which will determine goals and serve as a guide to the activities of governments,
- (iii) Collect government as well as identify other political problems that may arise from the debate,
- (iv) Gather, collate and evaluate the contributions of Nigerians to the search for a viable political future and provide guidelines for the attainment of the consensus objective,
- (v) Deliberate on other political problem as may be referred to it from time to time.

Members of the Bureau carried out the assignments with vigour and rigour, involving extensive consultation and co-ordinating national debates on varied issues of governance, like ideology, forms of representation, ethnicity, the military, women, labour, youths and student, traditional rulership, local government, corruption, and the media. At the end, the Bureau received a total of 27,324 contributions. The report of the Bureau remains the most "excellent prognosis of Nigeria's experience in all its complex dimensions and also a theory of politics. As a documentary source, it captures the essential elements that have, so far, shaped (Nigerian) political behaviour in Nigeria" (Akinola: 1988: 63). The

outcome of the report was a government white paper which led to the setting up of an implementation table to unfold the transition programme.

Hitherto the regime had gained the confidence of Nigerians when it first introduced a national debate on whether to or not to collect the IMF-World Bank loan. At the end of the debate President Babangida "tricked" Nigerians to accept Structural Adjustment Programme, having rejected IMF. According to Adekanye

"he opposed acceptance of the IMF loan together with its conditionalities. Babangida's seeming opposition to the IMF loan was even to be made one of the grounds for the alleged 'Vatsa coup plots' exposed in December 1985. By June 1986, however, the country was made to accept the implementation of SAP which Babangida explained was not only home-grown but a necessary sacrifice consequent upon the rejection of the loan. It was the first political goal to be scored by Nigeria's Maradona". (Adekanye: 1997:36). The concept of Maradona as applied to Babangida is derived from Diego Maradona, the Argentina footballer who specialise in dribbling and goal scoring. Therefore, like the football Maestro, Diego Maradona, in politics Babangida has also masterminded different strategies of scoring political points and gaining advantage over oppositions.

Biersteker has observe that one of the things that endeared the public towards Babangida's economic policies was the nationalistic rhetorics. In his December 31, 1985 budget speech, Babangida

"combined nationalist assertiveness with an acceptance of most of the IMF's original conditionalities which had prevented agreement in the past. The nationalist assertiveness was contained in Babangida's call for a reduction in external dependence, for the achievement of food self-sufficiency, for a shift in Nigerian attitude and tastes, and for a 30 percent cap on debt servicing for the year" (Biersteker: 1993: 145 – 146).

Though the regime accepted the public verdict for rejecting the IMF loan, the original components of IMF conditionalities found their ways vaguely into the

economic policies of the regime such as “realistic” exchange rate (devaluation of Naira), 80% reduction in petroleum subsidies, privatization and trade liberation which was later promoted. This was so because the effect of two – tier foreign exchange (devaluation) policy was not clearly understood by the public.

It was immediately after the budget speech, read in January 1986, that he glamorously set up a seventeen-man Cooky Political Burreau to design a viable political system for the country. In June 1986 General Babangida announced a two-year Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) spelling out the details as espoused in his budget speech. The impression among the public was that by 1989, the programme would have ended, ushering Nigeria into her prosperity. By September 19, 1986 Nigeria requested the IMF to endorse its SAP in order to enable her borrow, in principle, funds totaling \$785 million for an initial period ending December 1987. And by September 26, 1986 the first second-tier Foreign exchange auction was held with Naira falling to 68.6 percent to a level of 4.62 Naira to the dollar; stabilizing at 3.5 Naira to one dollar or an effective devaluation of about 75 percent (Biersteker: 1993: 148). Given this effort Nigeria by mid November 1986 became eligible for a \$540 million standby loan, and deadlock over the rescheduling of Nigeria’s external debt of N22 billion was broken. The London and Paris Clubs began the process of rescheduling the debt.

With the economic policies decided, the administration was able to create an enabling environment that would not hold his regime in suspect. At least the political programme served as a cover up and at most a diversion the event of any looming critical national issue. The implication of the economic policies, especially SAP, for the evolution of constitutional democracy include among others; creating socio-economic hardship, creation of political tension and increase

in political repression on the part of state officials and the ruling classes. This undermined the genuine course to democratic rule, creating lopsided effect with only few elites gaining and continuing to live on the sweat of the deprived millions of Nigerians. The government created some structures (two political parties, Directorate of Social Mobilization, Directorate of Food Roads and Rural Infrastructure, among others) which became avenues for primitive accumulation without any noteworthy impact on the economy. In order to contain oppositions to its economic and political policies, the government outrightly banned or emasculated the National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS), Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) the Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC) and other groups it termed ideological extremists, dictating the type of political associations and party which citizen should belong (Dunmoye: 1990:243).

It is within this context that Bangura (1988: 34) argues that the transition programme was more concerned about political order and laying a political foundation – a new authoritarianism – for successful implementation of Structural Adjustment Programme rather than with the development of democracy” (Bangura: 1988: 34). In fact, Ake (1993) argues that the Babangida transition to civil rule succeeded greatly in achieving one thing, namely: the “democratization of disempowerment”. Thus, the question is “whose democracy?” (Beckman, 1989) – was Babangida’s transition programme constructing?

5.5 CRISIS OF POLITICAL TRANSITION TO DEMOCRATIC RULE

With the established economic principles of the administration, democratization became the measure for an ideological manifestation of its political agenda. A type of democratic transition with ‘organized confusion’ was

designed with the regime setting the rules and changing them as it wishes (Joseph: 1997:14-20). The regime first of all banned certain groups of politicians called "old breeds", under decree 25 of 1987 from joining political parties, and contesting political positions. Those banned for life included those who were dismissed from office and found guilty of corruption, among others. The politicians of the first and second republics, as well as military and police officers who were also banned could participate in politics only after the period of the transition programme. In addition, religious and ideological extremists were not allowed to be involved in the transition.

The ban provided a new crop of politicians, the new breed, who contested the non-party elections into local government council in 1987 and the Constituent Assembly in 1988. Party formation is the basic ingredient of democratization. This was put in place by Decree 19 of 1987. The decree espoused measures, conditions and programs of the transition, which was surprisingly expected to terminate by the last quarter of 1992. The second and third quarters of the year 1989, according to the decree, were for the lifting of ban on party politics and announcement of two recognized and registered political parties.

When the National Electoral Commission (NEC) subsequently released guidelines for political party formation several political associations, over 30, emerged seeking registrations as political parties. Of these, only 13 associations applied for registration. But none was recognized as they were all rubbished by government. In doing so, government banned all the thirteen political association and decree into existence two official parties: namely, the National Republican Convention (NRC) and Social Democratic Party (SDP). These parties took off on as government regulated mechanisms, creating doubts as to the credibility of the

transition programme. It was in this light that the Nigerian Political Science Association (NPSA), in a press conference, criticised the two political parties; that, they have failed to develop their own identities and are more of a government outfits (NPSA: Jos Vol 2 No.1 1991/92).

While the official parties were being created, government surreptitiously supported an informal means that would undermine the credibility of the transition. Thus, the Association for Better Nigeria (ABN) established by Chief Arthur Nzeribe was allowed to serve as a spoiler in that direction. The Association was foremost for its national and international campaign for Babangida to remain indefinitely in office. The association maintains that it is only Babangida that can improve the economy and political stability. ABN grew to become a very powerful pro Babangida campaigner without being checked by government security forces. Unlike the press and human rights organisations that were threatened, intimidated and detained, ABN went about its propaganda for the perpetuation of military rule and for Babangida to stay-on in power unhurt. This convinced Nigerians that ABN not only had state security protection but also state resources, at its disposal. The seriousness of the ABN campaign became glaring when its national director, Chief Abimbola Davies, went to a lower court in Abuja seeking an injunction to restrain the National Electoral Commission (NEC) from conducting the June 12 presidential elections. This is in disregard of Decree 13 of 1993 which states that the election on June 12 cannot be challenged in court. Yet, the court went ahead to rule in favour of ABN. According to the judgement, on the 10th June, 1993, Justice Ikpeme rules that:

"I have the jurisdiction to hear this matter. NEC is not to determine a stable for democracy but only to conduct (election). NEC is hereby restrained from conducting the presidential election pending the

determination of the substantive suit before the court." (Cited in Emelifeonwu:1997:194); see details in African Concord; June 21, 1993: p. 12 – 18).

Another court, on June 11, 1993 ruled against Justice Ikpeme's judgement, pointing out that NEC is obliged under the law to carry out the election to its logical conclusion. This ruling, given by Justice Moshood Olugbemi, was in accordance to a motion filed by Sumbo Onitori and Richard Adejumo, in a Lagos High Court. Indeed Decree 13 had given NEC the power to ignore any court ruling against her role in conducting elections and in section 54(1) it also has the power to postpone the Presidential elections if it has suspicion that serious breach of the peace would occur. Despite these crisis, the election went ahead on June 12. But while the elections were going on smoothly, ABN, unknown to NEC, the two political parties and the electorates had secured an injunction from Justice Dahiru Saleh of the Abuja High Court upholding the earlier ruling by Justice Ikpeme of the Abuja lower (magistrate) court which restrained NEC to release the June 12 result. On 16 June 1993 NEC suspended the announcement of results. This was followed by government invalidating the transition to civil rule Decree No. 52 of 1992 and the presidential election Decree No. 13. This was counter-ruled in a judgement by Justice Moshood Olugbemi of Lagos High Court. Meanwhile, before now, on the April 21 1993 a Lagos High Court had earlier restrained ABN from parading itself as an organisation or engaging in political activities because it was never registered as an association.

The Abuja High Court precided by Justice Saleh did not take this into consideration. However, following the restraint from Justice Dahiru Saleh, NEC stopped the release of the June 12 results. This made various interested

parties to go to various courts seeking redress for either the release of the results or the need to sustain the restraint. At the end, on June 23, the NEC Chairman under pressure, signed for the suspension of the release of June 12 presidential elections. According to reports a senior military officer, Col. Mohammed Wase, prevailed on Justice Saleh to issue the injunction which compelled NEC to stop the release of the results as Professor Humphrey Nwosu was ordered by the presidency to obey the court order. The division within the rank and file of the political class strengthened the military manoeuvring. In short, lack of accommodative spirit among the politicians encouraged personality cult and dictatorship to thrive. According to Ake:

We have to remember that if the Nigeria military has any political ideology, it is the denigration of politics and politicians. This is because military intervention can only acquire a veneer of acceptability where politics has failed completely. So in power: The military arranges to remind us constantly of the failures of politics. Their democratic transitions are usually programmed to extend military rule as much as possible and if possible abort. Their transition programmes effectively select the politicians who will succeed them and as much as possible they select the worst kind of politician, politicians likely to cause systemic breakdowns (*Tempo*: 18 August 1994: 3).

The political parties were initially divided over the presidential primaries leading to the annulled June 12 presidential elections which Alhaji Basir Tofa and Chief MKO Abiola contested and won under NRC and SDP respectively. While some chieftains of NRC like Adamu Ciroma and the former Chairman of the party, Chief Tom Ikimi called for the cancellation of the results because of malpractices; Chief Arthur Nzeribe, another chieftain of SDP and the sponsor of the unregistered ABN had earlier protested over the malpractices in the SDP primaries in Jos. The paradox of Nzeribe's claim was that on April 9, 1993 he had placed an advert in a newspaper, Daily Times, congratulating Chief MKO Abiola, the SDP flagbearer for the June 12 presidential elections. At the same time he

went ahead to sponsor the campaign for Babangida's perpetuation in office. The irony of the June 12 presidential election saga was that if government was sincere it would have cancelled the presidential primaries based on security report that the party primaries were bazaars rather than conventions. The same security had recommended the disqualification of the two presidential candidates, dissolution of the two political parties and to allow politicians to form their political parties (*The African Guardian* April 26, 1993 pp.19-24). If Babangida was serious he could have heeded the advice of the security forces. This, however, could have affected the continuous planned stay in power would definitely, as domestic and international pressures were highly on him to conclude the transition programme to its logical end by installing a democratically elected president. Besides, all elections into key offices at the state and national levels had been concluded and the elected officers had taken control except the presidential election that remained controversial until it was annulled. According to Omoruyi, the then Sultan of Sokoto, Alhaji Ibrahim Dasuki, had told the Secretary General of the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs (SCIA), Alhaji Lateef Adegbite, who was accompanying him (Dasuki) to Mecca not to bother about coming back to vote on June 12 because "... even if you go on the 13th or 14th (June) you will still vote" (*Tell*: September 29, 1997). Dasuki who had earlier told Omoruyi to advise Babangida to cancel the June 12 elections apparently was working for Babangida's prolongation while Abacha was working on the shortest exit of Babangida from power to enable him step in. Thus, no sooner had Abacha assumed office than Dasuki was deposed as the Sultan of Sokoto.

The preparation for the annulment of June 12 presidential election started from the onset when Babangida came to power. An inside knowledge was provided by Edwin Madunagwu when as a member of the Political Bureau he led a three -

member delegation of the Bureau in March 1986 to one of states to discuss the transition programme and particularly the series of elections. A young military officer which the team met excused the press queried them on pushing for destions when a presidential election had taken place. According to Madunagu:

The military governor told me that the armed forces, a legitimate and patriotic segment of the Nigerian nation had held a presidential election for the country. The winner in that election was General Ibrahim Babangida... He said that the election of Babangida was conducted in the night, arguing that there was nothing against night election. He concluded by going into the offensive: "if soldiers can risk their lives for the nation, why should they not be considered worthy to produce a president for the country. (*The Guardian*: February 1, 2001: 49).

Thus, in the course of the transition programme Babangida had masterminded the scheme as early as January 1993 when new structures of military governance were created. The first was the National Defence and Security Council (NDSC) which replaced the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC), hitherto the highest ruling legislative and Executive body. The new body made up of only nine trusted military officers, four civilians and the Inspector-General of Police (Chief Ernest Shonekan, Chairman, Transition Council, Chief MT Mbu, Secretary Foreign Affairs; Clement Akpambó, Attorney General of the Federation and the Secretary of Justice; Alhaji Abdulraham Okene, Secretary of Internal Affairs and Alhaji Aliyu Attah, the Inspector General of Police). The military officers include the Vice President, Admiral Augusts Aikhomu (though retired), General Sani Abacha, (Chief of Defence Staff and Secretary of Defence), Admiral Murtala Nyako (Deputy Chief of Defence Staff), General Salihu Ibrahim (Chief of Army Staff,) Vice Admiral Preston Omatsola (Chief of Naval Staff) Air Marshall Akin Dada (Chief of Air Staff), Lt General Joshua Dogon - Yaro, (Commandant, Command and Staff College, Jaji), and Lt. General Aliyu Mohammed Gusau

(National Security Adviser) and Babangida himself. The Decree 53 establishing the NDSC states that "all bills passed into law by the National Assembly must be endorsed only by the President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, General Babangida before they become law.

The second structure was the establishment of the Transitional Council. The Council headed by Chief Ernest Shonekan, consisted of 27 members. Its functions include to present to NDSC any recommendation in form of memorandum on all matters requiring the decision and approval of the NDSC. The functions of the Council's Chairman were similar to that of the Vice President including routine supervision of members, departments and parastatals, chairing the meetings of National Revenue and Mobilisation Commission, attending the regular meetings of Council of State, National Defence and Security Council and advising the President on the options on issues requiring his decisions or approval, as well as performing any other functions that may be delegated to him. The major element of the function as stated by the President is the economy: "Our economy must be virile enough to support our democratic institutions. Democracy is expensive, and an economically weak system cannot sustain a polity such as Nigeria. This constitutes a cardinal area of importance for the transitional council" (Tell: 1993 :18). Yet, he operated an economic policy that was leading to the grounding of the economy through the Technical Committee on Privatization and Commercialization (TCPC). Many government owned parastatals and companies were deliberately grounded so that it could easily be privatized or paralyzed to the extent that they cannot compete effectively with the private sectors which Babangida and his cohorts have maintained an exclusive control.

One of the earliest critique of these structural changes was General Theophilus Yakubu Danjuma (rtd).¹ According to him:

My view is that the transition is finished. I think that we have a new republic in place now with Shonekan as the head of government. So through general acquisition, collaboration we now have a new republic, a new government. The only government in transition that we have today in Nigeria is Chief Shonekan's Council. I believe that at the end of August 27, Chief Shonekan's Council will be reconstituted and that will be the end of that transition. (*The African Guardian*: January 18, 1993:25).

He concludes his critique as thus: "the National Assembly had been pocketed by Babangida as by August 27, 1993 they will move a motion and approve a new tenure for Babangida so we will have a diarchy properly sanctioned by members of the National Assembly." (*The African Guardian*: January 8; 1993:25) Thus, it is either a diarchy is put in place or Shonekan-led council, a probational council, is made to take over the mantle of leadership; that is, if his self-succession bid did not work out.

Earlier Babangida had covertly sent Professor Sam Oyovbaire to request Professor Bayo Adekanye, equally a renowned professor of military science and civil-military relations to write a position paper on diarchy (Interview, September, 2000). Apparently this was to guide the administration in fashioning out its regimes perpetuation policy. Adekanye quietly declined and further refused to accept any inducement from the military. Thus, Danjuma was right when he observes that both Alhaji Bashir Tofa and Chief MKO Abiola, the two presidential aspirants, were "applying for a post that is not vacant and that will not be vacant in August. They are engaged in an assault course through a minefield. At the end of the day, they will all be blown off" (Ibid: 25). Truly, Danjuma was right as both the contestants and the nation were bluffed by Babangida after the conduct of

June 12 Presidential election .But Babangida knows the two Presidential Candidates too well to assume that none of them would constitute an obstacle to his regime perpetuation agenda.

General Danjuma and other sound critics like the Campaign for Democracy (CD) a human rights organisation, made their observations long before the presidential primaries in April 1993 and the June 12, 1993 presidential elections. For instance, a coalition of 32 civil organizations issued a release endorsed by Dr. Beko Ransom Kuti, the President, and Chima Ubani, the Secretary General. The release kicked against the new arrangement, arguing that :

“the latest adjustment to the structure including the dissolution of the Armed Forces Ruling council (AFRC) in January 1993 have merely concentrated more powers on Babangida, giving him powers which even elected president does not have under the Nigerian constitution, arrogating to himself powers to inaugurate the National Defence and Security Council which are the prerogative of an elected civilian president” (*The African Guardian*: November 30, 1992)

In the same manner the Association for Democracy and Good Governance in Nigeria (ADGGN) made up of retired military officers especially from the rank of General and some politicians, headed by General Olusegun Obasanjo met in Obasanjo's Otta Farm, Ogun State, and resolved against absolutist government, corruption and subversion of constitutional rule. The association called among other issues, for decentralisation of resource control and the serious determination to reduce corruption. (*Tell*: June 7, 1993).

As it turned out Babangida's transition was a classic case of regime perpetuation when the June 12 election was annuled. Davies Bimbola, a former ABN chieftain, denounced Babangida's transition as an “organised confusions.”

Babangida began another series of preparation for fresh presidential election after the annulment of the June 12 elections. The timetable was carefully planned to terminate by August 25, 1993, and the handover date remained August 27, 1993. According to some reports, General Olusegun Obasanjo, Adamu Ciroma, Shehu Musa Yar'Adua, Patrick Dele Cole and Olu Falae collaborated to put the time table together (Emelifeonwu: 1997, endnote no: 10: 213). The idea for another election was rejected by pro-democracy movements and a section of SDP stalwarts who stuck to the validity of June 12. The regime however issued a 72 hours ultimatum to the opposition to decide on another election or be proscribed. In rejecting another round of elections, some sections of the parties, NRC and SDP, preferred an interim government. This arrangement, though tentatively endorsed by NDSC, had to be reviewed by some senior military and police officers.

The Senior Military and police officers who met on July 12 on their part rejected the interim national government for fear that SDP may insist on Abiola heading the government. On this ground, a caucus of NRC decided for an election instead of an interim government. However, the two parties for fear of proscription met and resolved on July 28 for an interim arrangement. The report of the meeting of the two parties was submitted to the Aikhomu Tripartite Committee. The recommendation of the Committee led the NDSC to approve the establishment of an Interim National Government headed by Chief Ernest Shonekan. This development was not accepted by the pro-democracy movements as they protested any move that will lead to the subversion of the result of June 12 elections. During the division among the membership of NDSC, the Abacha-led group including Lt Gen Oladipo Diya, Major General Edward Unimma and others insisted that the military must leave office by August 27, 1993. This position by the Abacha group made Babangida and his corps of military officers

not to "carry through their plan to perpetuate Babangida's rule. Abacha was reported to have stayed away from a number of NDSC meetings at this period out of protest and exasperations". (Osuji:1993:21). Indeed a larger section of the nation and the international community were not only shocked but stunk that on the June 23, 1993, the annulment of the June 12 presidential election was announced. At the time of the annulment only the results from 14 states had been announced with the SDP presidential candidate, Chief Moshood Abiola, leading with 4.3 million and the NRC flag bearer, Alhaji Bashir Tofa, was behind with 2.3 million. The Nigerian Elections Monitoring Group (NEMG) which was established to monitor the elections, and the international observers that monitored the elections found it to be the freest, fairest and most credible in the history of elections in Nigeria.

In his usual game playing against the interest of Nigeria, on 26 June 1993 he confirmed the decision of the National Defence and Security Council (NDSC) for the annulment of the June 12 presidential election, banning Chief MKO Abiola and Alhaji Bashir Tofa from further participation in future presidential elections. The Government also unfolded new rules and regulations to guide the new presidential elections, namely that, presidential candidates must not be less than 50 years old, each must be registered member of one of the two political parties for at least one year, and their business interests must not be in conflict with national interest. These conditions notwithstanding, Nigerians were not told the reason for the annulment of June 12 presidential elections. Yet the regime wanted to conduct fresh elections. The annulment of June 12 presidential election led to the sporadic increase of civil society organizations which were pro-democracy in nature. These groups campaigned in their own way to actualize the June 12 presidential election. The effort of the campaign against another election by Civil Liberty Organization

(CLO), Campaign for Democracy (CD), amongst other human rights organizations made it impossible for another election to be conducted. Besides, Nigerians were fed up with the Babangida transition programme and wanted him out. Meanwhile there were tense situations around the country with riots and demonstration in the South West. Southerners started moving back to the South from the North and vice versa for fear of being attacked.

The attempt to conduct another presidential elections failed as Nigerians were not ready to take Babangida serious again. The aftermath of this failure led to the final endorsement of Aikhomu Committee report and the installation of the Interim Government headed by Chief Ernest Shonekan; as General Babangida had to step out of office on 26th August, 1993. Shonekan's Interim National Government attempted also to ensure that another election was conducted but failed in his effort because pro-democracy movements were campaigning for validation of June 12 presidential election results. Chief Abiola went abroad campaigning for his mandate. On November 10, 1993 the Interim National Government, headed by Chief Shonekan was declared illegal by a Lagos High Court Judge. On November 18, 1993, Chief Shonekan's Interim National Government was forced to resign in a military coup d'etat led by General Abacha. Abacha, who at the early period of Shonekan's regime, toured all military formations to ascertain his control over them, quickly took over power. On assuming office he dissolved all elected and appointed political structures. He appointed Military Administrators as against the initial announcement that civilian administrators would be appointed.

The setting of the Shonekan's Interim National Government was a strategy by Babangida to find an exit channel from the hot seat of power, which

has proved too difficult for him to control. For Abacha it was an easy means to capture power without difficulties. As for the political class the Interim National Government was a means to ease the military out of power as they reorganise themselves for another (transition) process. For some it was an opportunity to actualise June 12 while for others, it was an opportunity to recoup their losses. For instance, Professor Omo Omoruyi posits that the leaders of NRC and SDP signed their acceptance of the ING on a platter of naira. (Tell: September 29, 1997) In short they were bribed to accept ING. And yet for others in the military, the setting of an interim government provides them an easy opportunity to organize another coup.

Abacha was one of those military officers who saw the establishment of an interim government as a basis for coming to power. He gathered a small group of cronies like Lt General Joshua Dogoyaro, Lt. Gen. Oladipo Diya, Brigadier-General David Mark, among others to believe that there was no election on June 12. (Omoruyi, Tell: September 29, 1997:18). Lagos was relevant to Abacha where the pro-democracy groups were concentrated. While opposing Babangida and his group in Abuja, Abacha seems to have given signals to the pro-democracy movements that he was interested in actualising June 12. In the light of this, Professor Bolaji Akinyemi, a chieftain of National Democratic Coalition (NADECO) formed to actualise June 12, called on General Abacha to step in to ensure that democracy was installed. Abacha was encouraged by the support from the NADECO chieftains, including Chief MKO Abiola, to surreptitiously plan his steps to take over power from Shonekan. First the need for him to take over power was glaringly necessary because he had frightened the opposition groups into believing that some junior officers like Col Umar Kangiwa were planning a bloody coup. There was need to deal with this power thirsty junior officers before handing

power to Abiola. But, Abacha also sought the support of these junior officers and other opponents of June 12 to work together with him as a team to ease Babangida out of office, through the creation of Interim National Government. Apparently, some of the young officers were made to believe that the ING would create a conducive atmosphere for the transfer of power to Chief Abiola. Each group has interest in turning ING to whichever means to serve their interest. For Babangida the ING was not only a middleground for his exit but it also provide a face-saving legacy by conducting another presidential elections that would overwhelmed the spirit of June-12. While the Abacha group saw the installation of ING as the easiest means to ascend to power. Whereas the young military officers like Lt Col Umar saw it as a means to sort out the problems of June 12 and transfer power to Chief M.K.O Abiola. However, to Omoruyi, some other officers like Lt General Dogonyaro, John Shagaya, Aliyu Mohammad, Anthony Ukpo, Lawan Gwadabe, John Madaki, Halilu Akilu, Abdulnumuni Aminu and Brigadier General David Mark who were also scheming one way or the other for positions of personal advantage were against the actualisation of June 12.

Chief Abiola and his supporters, however, strongly believed that General Abacha was actually interested in actualizing the June 12 election. It was all a game of political deception, a dilemma that only the brightest schemer could gain. It happened that Abacha surpassed them all. Apparently Abacha had developed a characteristics which consistently maintained a stand for democratic rule in all the interactive military fora he found himself since 1990. Based on his public comments from 1990 to 1993; Abacha had been trying to convince the general public that he was a professional soldier and a military democrat. He consistently maintained that Babangida has no choice but to hand over power to a democratic regime by January 2, 1993. Even when this date was changed he was still

convinced of a democratic rule. Abacha's utterances for the professionalization of the armed forces and its subordination to civil authority reached its highest level immediately following the June 12 election. For instance, at the inauguration of a new class of participants at the National War College in July 1993, he raised a lone voice for democracy. This became a major headline news in almost all the Nigeria newspapers. The National War College speech gave inspiration to the pro-democracy groups and Abacha became the icon of democracy in the military. Yet, it was at this period that Abacha sent out soldiers to quell protest in seven states of the South West. This resulted in the death of many innocent protesters. While supporting Abacha's course to restore June 12, the pro-democracy movements also decided to take the legal option by going to court. On behalf of the pro-democracy group Senator Bola Tinubu went to court to challenge the legality of the Interim National Government (ING). In his ruling Justice Kolapo Akinsanya declared that the ING was illegal. But the court failed to provide an alternative in replacement of ING.

In order to ensure that June 12 pro-democracy forces did not take any independent position that will make them lose control of power, Abacha and his supporters, through General Oladipo Diya, conferred with Abiola's supporters that the judicial ruling needs to be backed up by military support. Abiola's supporters were made to be scared of an impending coup by the "17 Babangida Boys". Therefore, Abiola was assuaged from swearing himself into office. As the military would not only swear in Abiola but stand by him. Thus, according to Bola Tinubu:

When Abiola met with Abacha, they told us that Col (Abubakar) Umar was planning to topple Abiola. They listed about 17 officers including General Joshua Dogon yaro and the rest of them who they said, were involved in the coup plot. They told Abiola "you wont be able to stop

them, you wont last for days. They said they needed to get rid of these dangerous boys in the military. Abiola became a little jittery. (The News: 26 October, 1998.: 27).

As earlier noted, overtly or covertly, some of the Babangida officers and the GOCs were meeting with Abacha, on the issue of the June 12 election. According to Col Abubakar Umar the impression he had was that General Babangida would be forced out to make way for democratic rule. It was not as Brigadier-General David Mark later presented it to him that "General Abacha was going to take over power from Shonekan, so they (Umar, Mark etc) must begin to decide the type of appointment they would require in Abacha's regime". (Tell: August 10, 1998).

One thing was certain, that the pro-June 12 forces, including Chief Abiola, could not detect the burning ambition of Abacha to takeover power and use it to kill and bury June 12, once and for all. Infact, Abiola, on his return from exile, commended Abacha as thus: "I really commend General Abacha for his love for the country, he put his common sense, experience, tact and intellect to ease out General Ibrahim Babangida. I have no doubt that it is that common sense, that patriotism and that intellect that will enable him ease out Babangida's surrogate too" (Olurunyomi, 1994: 19). Thus, when General Abacha was left behind as Minister of Defence and next to Ernest Shonekan, in the ING, the game had concluded. As Minister of Defence and Second-in-Command to Ernest Shonekan, General Abacha was found to be working out how decisions affecting the Armed Forces should be taken with Shonekan acquiescing without much hesitation. The GOCs he was working with were carefully eased out of office and as he brought in his lackeys, this set the stage for the exit strategy for Shonekan. However, the court declaration hastened his moves to force Shonekan out of power. General Dongoyaro who was slated for Chief of Defence Staff

realised he could not cope with Abacha. He submitted a letter of retirement and added that "my decision is also based on my firm conviction not to be a party to any scheme or desire to perpetuate military rule under any guise" (Akin-Aina: 1993).

On assumption of office, General Abacha in his usual game retired the same Babangida boys that helped him to execute the plan to capture office. This was to give the impression among the pro-democracy groups that he had started to deal with the boys as steps to bring in Abiola. Recounting his active role in bringing Abacha to power, Brigadier General David Mark, who was retired together with other Babangida boys, said,

"the main beneficiary of the annulment is General Abacha... Abacha's regime qualifies for a space in the Guinness Book of Records as the greatest betrayal of the country. It is a betrayal of the military officers involved ... It is a betrayal because what the administration is doing now is the exact opposite of what we agreed and what we set out to do. It is a complete turn around". (Interview *Newswatch*: April 11, 1994:11).

The above statement confirms Professor Omoruyi's position (*Tell: Magazine* on September 29, 1997), that Babangida told him that David Mark said the day Abiola was sworn in he would end his life. And Halilu Akilu was also caught saying that "Abacha will be president over my dead body". (Suberu: 1997: 314). David Mark has denied the charges, instead affirming that he risked his life for the actualisation of June 12. But a superior argument puts it that it was when he lost out with Abacha that he began to make his revelations in press.

From the interview with the *Newswatch* magazine on April 11, 1994, David Mark pointed out three their initial series of meetings which Abacha had worked out. The first was to give Shonekan and his team the teeth to be able to

bite and conduct the presidential elections successfully as planned by Babangida before leaving office. Second, to go for a short but complete military regime for six months and conduct presidential elections there after. And third, establish a diarchy with the military at the apex for a period of one year before conducting presidential election and handing over to civil authority. Though the group favoured option one, Abacha and Diya favoured option three, with some modification for five years and a maximum of eight years. Obviously, at this point there was a fall out between Abacha-Diya and the young supporting officers. According to Mark, Diya who was able to mobilise Yoruba support for the regime assured the group of the support of the Civil Liberties Organisation (CLO), Campaign for Democracy (CD), Yoruba elders, and the Obas and Leaders of Thought for total military regime for no less than five years, to put the economy in proper shape (**NewsWatch**: April 11, 1994 : 12).

With the support of some of the pro-democracy movements, the group felt it was no longer necessary to actualise June 12. Because after Diya consulted with the Yoruba leaders of thought, they unanimously and equivocally agreed to forego June 12 and instead opted for a military government (**NewsWatch**: April 11, 1994: 13). With the June 12 issue discarded by the group of military officers, the public was only being deceived that June 12 would be actualised at an appropriate time.

At the same time most of Abiola supporters and SDP activist abandoned not only Abiola but the struggle for the actualisation of June 12. These include the June 12 Vice Presidential candidate, Alhaji Baba Kingibe who took up ministerial appointment in the Abacha government. Dr. J.S. Zwingina, the Campaign manager of Chief MKO Abiola, went back to his State, Adamawa, to take up appointment as a Commissioner in the State Cabinet. In fact most of the key supporters from the North and South East abandoned June 12 for the Yoruba ethnic group. Accordingly

the Yoruba have hijacked the struggle for June 12. It is within this context that it is alleged Dr. Chuba Okadigbo seized upon the invitation by Abiola to state categorically the feelings of some sections of the Nigerian population. On arriving NICON Hilton Hotel room of Abiola he met with several of Abiola's kinsmen, Yoruba, discussing hilariously in Yoruba. After a while he walked towards the window of the Hotel room and later beckoned to Abiola to join him. He gazed and pointed towards a building under a rock and asked Abiola the nature of the building which is tucked away under a rock. Abiola affirmed that it is the Aso Rock and the building under is the Presidential Villa. Okadigbo posed for a while and turned to Abiola: "Nigerians have brought you thus far. It is left for your people (Yoruba ethnic group) to take you to the Aso Rock from here" (interview anonymous; April 2000).

In course of being abandoned by other sections of the country, Abiola compounded the problem of the struggle for June 12, by procrastination. He procrastinated between the cost of losing his personal friendship with Babangida and claiming his June 12 mandate. He was struggling between his brain and soul as to which of the issues was dearer to him. This was when he wrote a secret letter to Babangida, soliciting for the retention of their friendship in spite of the June 12 debacle. At the time he overcame the forces of procrastination, he was actually left with his Yoruba ethnic group to carry on with the struggle for the actualisation of June 12.

Meanwhile, certain measures were deliberately put in place just as during Babangida's time, aimed at the perpetuation of the regime. Among these measures was the introduction of constitutional conference commission (to prepare ground for the constitutional conference), probe panels of key public sectors, reversal of deregulation and free market economy in order to create confusion in the foreign

exchange market, raising fathom coups, establishing failed banks decrees, creation of more states and local governments.

As revealing as David Mark's interview was, pro-democracy activists and Abacha's government officials were critical of him. The Minister of Justice and Attorney-General of the Federation, Dr. Olu Onaguruwa, accused David Mark of subversion, and for instigating mutiny against the regime of Abacha as he (Mark) was being probed for his tenure as communication minister. In addition, Onaguruwa observed that David Mark was not qualified to make the accusations because he was "one of the soldiers who said Abiola would be President over his dead body" (**African Concord**: 25 April, 1994). Even though CLO, CD and CDHR strongly denied the consultation David Mark claimed Abacha had with them (**African Concord**: 25 April 1994), the Mark's interview compelled the Abacha government to begin to unfold its transitions programme beginning with the inauguration on June 27, 1994 of the constitution conference. Government enacted decree No 3 of 1994 setting the National Constitutional Conference where the delegates were to work out a new constitution for the approval of the PRC which would be promulgated into law. According to the decree the conference was also to find solution to bad governance and establish a system of government reflecting the general consensus of Nigerians, especially with due regard to national expectations and aspirations as a united and indivisible entity. Unlike the promise made in his maiden address that the constitutional conference would be endowed with constituent powers, the power of the conference was curtailed as, according to Abacha "there cannot be two sovereign entities in the countries". However, the delegates to the conference were assured that no section of the society would be marginalised.

The 396 members (96 were government nominees) of the Constitutional Conference, spent one year in their deliberation and handed over the draft constitution to General Sani Abacha on the 27 June 1995. Some of the major radical provisions made in the draft constitution include the issue of power sharing, the rotation of the office of the president and other key offices between North and South. Section 229, subsection 142 made provisions for multiple Vice Presidents. After accepting the draft constitution, General Abacha presented the constitution to the nation for public debate under the Constitution Review Committee.

It should be pointed out that while the Constitutional Conference in progress, Abacha set up a covert machinery through his Minister of Education Alhaji Wada Nas, and two members of the conference, Chief Barnabas Gemade (Benue State) and Chief Paulinus Apkeki (Delta state), to work out the modalities of maintaining his stay in office. The Minister of Federal Capital Territory, Lt General Jeremiah Useni, was also involved in allocating plots of land to members of the conference to win their support for an extended Abacha rule. Wada Nas was in charge of distributing money through Chief Paulinus Apkeki to members to secure their loyalty for the campaign to extend the period for Abacha regime up to the year 2000. Chief Barnabas Gemade played a crucial role as Chairman of the Conference Transition Committee. On 5 December 1994 he tabled before the conference the decision of the committee to recommend June 1998 as the handing over date, and further added that the conference be turned to a parliament for the regime. The following day after consultation, members of various political persuasions and caucuses met in the conference hall, united in focus and purpose (except a few others led by Justice Mamman Nasir, Vice Chairman of the Constitutional Conference, Alhaji Tanko Yakassai, Barnabas Gemade, and Mazi

S. Ikoku) rejected the proposal to abandon their role of fashioning a constitution for the Federal Republic to become parliamentarians. To this extent, the conference turned the table against Abacha and resolved that January 1, 1996 becomes the handing over date for General Abacha to leave office.

The Abacha regime became jittery, and reacted sharply to the decision as the Chairman of the conference Justice Adolphus Karibi-Whyte and his deputy Justice Mamman Nasir were summoned to Aso Rock, the presidential palace. However, with pressure from the authoritarian regime, the conference had to relax its position on January 1 1996 and allowed the regime to decide when to hand over. Meanwhile Chief MKO Abiola who had earlier waited in vain for Abacha to "use his common sense, patriotism and intellect" to install him to power, decided in 1994 to single handedly proclaim himself the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, based on the June 12 mandate (Tell: July '20, 1998). While proclaiming his presidency, Chief MKO Abiola called on the Abacha government to vacate government office and the gallant armed forces to recognise the fact of 12 June 1993 elections. Abacha was threatened and quickly arrested Chief Moshood Abiola and detained him for treasonable felony. In spite of domestic and international pressure for the release of Abiola, the regime turned Abiola case into a legal issues, arguing that it had no political prisoners and detainees but detainees who have committed crimes against the State. Meanwhile the regime embarked on an ambiguous transition programme. Part of the plan was to allow five political parties to be formed that would create confused scenarios for self-perpetuation rule. Those parties were Democratic Party of Nigeria (DPN), Congress for National Consensus (CNC), National Centre Party of Nigeria (NCPN), United Nigeria Congress Party (UNCP) and Grass Roots Democratic Movement (GDM). The National Electoral Commission (NECON) was

established to organise and conduct elections into various offices. Amongst the parties UNCP was most favoured by government. Other parties accused some government officials for influencing supports and vote in favour of UNCP during the local government and state Assembly elections where the party won 637 seats, controlling 29 of the 36 states legislatures.

The other parties wanted government to cancel the elections amidst protest from UNCP. Nevertheless, the five parties, despite the wranglings over presidential nominees for election finally endorsed General Sani Abacha as their presidential candidate. The only party that was a little bit serious against the endorsement of Abacha was G.D.M. This was deliberate not only to give credibility to the Abacha Transition but also to build the party into an opposition block of the UNCP. However, to ensure unanimity, GDM finally endorsed the singular candidature of General Abacha together with the other four political parties. A NADECO Chieftain, Bola Ige described the parties as five fingers of the same leprous hand.

Indeed, encouragement for Abacha's candidacy first came from his Chief Press Secretary David Attah, after the March 1997 party elections for the local governments and councils. Attah, at a press conference, pleaded with Nigerians to appeal to General Abacha to contest for the presidency, given his record of success and the need for time to complete the programmes he had started. In adopting Abacha's candidacy, the parties would have to amend clauses stipulating the length a party member could be qualified for electoral contest. This would also affect NECON guidelines which forbade one person to belong to more than one political party. However, according to Ukeje Nwokeforo, a member of the Transition Implementation Committee (TIC) "it does not even matter if the

procedure was not part of this existing arrangement ... Any matter of fundamental national importance can be subjected to a national referendum and that takes precedence over the electoral procedures. It is an invocation of national will" (Newswatch: February 16, 1998:9). Apparently this position by TIC ran contrary to the 1995 constitution which provided in section 135 subsection 2 of the draft constitution that where there is only one candidate as a result of disqualification, disappearance or death, NECON had to extend the time for nomination of new candidates.

As a public servant in uniform, Abacha was not supposed to participate in partisan politics, talkless of contesting for public office. As a military officer, Abacha was supposed to retire from the military having put in the mandatory thirty-five years of office. Instead of resigning from the military, he decided to change the public service rule on mandatory 35 years of service for retirement to 60 years of age making it mandatory for any civil servant to retire from service at 60 or 65 years as the case may be. He also set up the vision 2010 committee to formulate and articulate a manifesto for his millennial reign. Godwin Dabo indeed confirmed that "Abacha wanted to be in power till the year 2010, that was why the year 2010 was articulated to cover his period of government" (The News, 25 January 1999). Arthur Nzeribe of the famous ABN which scuffled June 12, 1992 elections agreed that Vision 2010 was a programme which only Abacha could effectively execute as Head of State. Hence, he should be persuaded to implement it: "The best architect to supervise a building is the one that designed it" (Newswatch: June 28, 1998:12). To raise a crop of politicians of his choice for the millennial reign, Decree No 22 of 1997 was promulgated, banning all former civilian governors of his immediate predecessor from contesting gubernatorial seats.

A committee on transmutation was put in place. It was known as National Mobilisation and Persuasion Committee headed by Chief Sam. G. Ikoku. The intention was for Abacha to remain in power and without joining any party he could transform to a civilian President. Though this did not work out, Abacha preferred to remain in office as interests were mobilised to support his candidacy for presidency on the platform of the parties. On this ground, a coalition of pro-Abacha youth campaigners under the banner of National Council of Youths Associations (NACYAN) was formed. The most visible of the pro-Abacha organs within the coalition was Youths Earnestly Ask for Abacha (YEAA) under the chairmanship of Daniel Kanu. On the 3rd to 4th March 1998 YEAA organised a two million man march in Abuja where Godwin Dabo, an insider said "only 300,000 people attended and the sum of N6.3billion was spent" (*The News*: 25 January 1999:21). Though Kanu said N750 million was voted for the March, he got N500 million. Accordingly, YEAA used its position to solicit for more fund from individuals and government functionaries and companies which would not like to be blacklisted as being anti-Abacha. The companies and organisations that were contacted and offered financial assistance were NITEL, NEPA, NNPC, FHA, and Chagroui Chagouri, Boygues, Fougerolle, NICON among others. Apart from Abuja, the rally was also planned for the states. The state governments were expected to provide the resources to organize the march in their respective states. YEAA also went as far as providing "Abacha exercise books" free to schools and "Abacha rice" to drum up support for Abacha. There was Abacha Televisions and Abacha watches. Furthermore as alleged by Brigadier-General Sabo at the Oputa Commission, the multinational Corporations in Nigeria contributed \$40 million for the Abacha self-succession plan.

Despite this, the endorsement of Abacha by the five political parties was challenged in a law court in Lagos by Chief Gani Fawehinmi. In the same vain Alhaji MD Yusuf and Dr Tunji Braithwaite later filed similar suits at different courts challenging the nomination of Abacha which had foreclosed their ambition to become GDM presidential candidates. The suits were thrown out because of section 230 of the constitution (Suspension and Modification) decree No 107 of 1993 which ousted the courts in entertaining such cases. This did not stop the opposition from raising anti-Abacha campaign. Earlier, penultimate to the endorsement of Abacha by the parties, the G18 (Group of eighteen politicians), made up of some individuals from the North, mostly from Middle Belt states, under Chief Solomon Lar, wrote Abacha opposing his nomination as a consensus candidate by the parties. This was followed by a larger organ, G34 made up of G18, headed by Dr Alex Ekwueme, former vice president in the Second Republic, which sent a similar letter to Abacha not to endorse his candidature for the president of the five political parties. The United Action for Democracy, (UAD), a coalition of 26 pro-democracy movements, coordinated by Olisa Agbakoba organised a rally in Lagos to beat YEAA's two million-man march with a five million-man march. The police declared Yaba Lagos rally of 1998 illegal and dispersed the campaigners by force and the co-ordinator, Agbakoba, was badly injured. The UAD was insisting on validation of June 12 election rather than sponsoring Abacha for presidency, abolition of anti-people economic policies and protection of the environment against all forms of degradation. The NADECO and to some extent NALICON opposition group abroad also planned to set up government in exile with a 100 member parliament. The parliament would hold session in different European countries and also in the US.

Amidst protests against Abacha's candidacy and support from some sections of the country, Abacha in an interview with *Jenne Afrique Economic*, a French newspaper, in the late May 1998, gave tacit interest to run as a consensus candidate: "many Nigerians concerned about civil peace and stability have asked me with insistence to stand for the presidency. They are impressed with my modest achievements and believe I should remain at the helm". (Cited in *NewsWatch*: June 1, 1998). While Nigerians were waiting for his final decision for the August 1, 1998 Presidential election Abacha died on June 8, 1998. Thus ended the most repressive and most despotic regime in post-colonial Nigeria.

5.6 CONCLUSION

From the deduction made in this chapter it is possible to arrive at a conclusion that in a weak society statesmen or leaders think and act in terms of surviving in power. If they cannot survive many people would have to pay for it. Many despots have left office with several people suffering the consequences of their exit from office. The unfortunate part of it is that their actions, until it is ended, are interpreted as national interest. This is what can be discerned from the policies and attitude of Babangida and Abacha regimes. Many of their policies and activities have shown that they perceived their interests as national interest. This is possible because of some encircled scenarios which enabled them to do what they did. How did these perceptions and encircled scenarios affected the pursuit of regime security interest by Babangida and Abacha?

CHAPTER SIX

6.0 THE PURSUIT AND DEFENCE OF REGIME SECURITY UNDER BABANGIDA AND ABACHA

6.1 INTRODUCTION

In chapter 5 attempts were made to ascertain some enriched scenarios that created the bases for the perceived emergence of regime interests in Nigeria. In the light of this, this chapter will delineate clearly some of the issues and variables that made the authoritarian regimes of Generals Babangida and Abacha to pursue and defend their regime interests, rather than national and or regional interest in Nigeria and West Africa respectively.

The chapter, first of all, tries to understand the psychosis of policy process under authoritarian regimes and to ascertain how policies are made and pursued in order to satisfy regime interests rather than national interest. Moving from the first basic conceptual framework, the second section of the chapter discusses how the regimes used domestic coalitions as measures for sustaining their authorities. The third section focuses on repressive 'secucracy' built to maintain and enforce support and to weaken opposing domestic coalitions, overtly or covertly. In the fourth section, the chapter addresses the domestic and international responses (pressure and/or supports) to the measures of repressive security leashed out against the society. The chapter finally concludes by recaping the nature and character of regime interest under Babangida and Abacha.

6.2. THE STATE, POLICY PROCESS AND REGIME INTEREST

In Chapter Three, we made attempts to identify the constitutional provisions and conventional practices in democratic societies and compared this with how policies and laws in authoritarian societies are formulated. Under a democratic process the constitution provides for vertical and horizontal distribution of power in the making and formulation of policies. Vertically the constitution defines tiers of government such as Federal, state and local government (or central and regional as the case may be). Each of these tiers have an organised interactive policy making process either from the exclusive or residual lists.

Horizontally too, the power to formulate, execute and adjudicate are shared and separated between the three arms of government, namely, the Legislature, Executive and Judiciary. The legislature formulates laws, the executive implements the law and the judiciary adjudicates disputes relating to and arising from the laws. But the executive has the power to veto bills promulgated by the legislature. It can only become law if it is overridden by the majority or $2/3$ vote in the legislature. The fact that the executive has a measure of veto over legislative power to formulate policy is an indication of the interactive model in policy formulation.

In the same way, the legislature is empowered constitutionally to investigate all the activities of the executive. It also has the power to impeach the Executive, power to enact treaties, control public revenue, proclaim state of emergency and deploy or redeploy troops. In order to ensure that both the Executive and Legislature are functioning within the constitutional framework, the constitution

empowers the judiciary to declare as unconstitutional and void, any action by the Executive and the Legislature which violates the constitution. This process creates checks and balances, shared and separated policy making implementation and interactive balancing of power among all arms of government.

In summary;

The interface between arms of government in the discharge of their respective functions creates strife and conflict which have implications for the efficient and effective operations of government. Executive veto of bills already passed by the legislature on partisan political grounds impairs the Legislative process and invites Legislative retaliatory actions. Similarly the political ambush of the executive through the vindictive investigatory powers incapacitates the executive branch and causes executive paralysis. The courts in like manner could bring the two other arms of government to a halt through an unreasonable application of judicial review against them. The intention of the framers of our constitution is not to bring government to a halt. The conflict which inheres in the interplay of the three arms of government are apparent but not insurmountable. What is called for is sufficient restraint on the part of the actors including the non-elected officials whose role in the executive branch of government are at once political and decisive (Sambo:1992: 8).

The see-saw process in policy formulation provides the opportunity for public opinion to be served along, while these policies are being enacted into law. Nevertheless it has been argued that most of the time public opinions are the opinion or preferences of elites than the masses. Thus, it is pointed out that the executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie (Marx and Engels 1977: 38 - 39).

In support of this position, a renowned behaviouralist Professor, V.O. Key, posits that when determining the impact of popular preferences on public policy the missing piece of the puzzle (is) that the stratum of persons referred to variously as the political elite, the political activists, the leadership echelons, or the influential do have impact on policy making (Key : 1967:517). Indeed elite

interest and preferences are more directly reflected on public policy than the preferences of the masses. However, such interests are intended to serve the interests of the masses than conforming to the will of the masses which are equally varied. Before policies are arrived at, the opinion of the masses are moulded to support public policy. At least the opinion of the masses and elite interest would arrive at a congruence or a reconcilable point through their elected representatives. And where their representatives are at variance with public opinion which is favourable to the masses the constitution provides for the recall system. That is, an elected representative of the people may be recalled once his mandate is in doubt or no longer preferred. Unlike a democratic system in an authoritarian regime the interest of the regime, rather than the elite and masses is preferred. As argued in chapter 2, regime interest of a particular leadership can be overturned from the corridor of power (through coup, for instance). But elite interest may persist and percolate around the corridor of power inspite of the type of regime in power. Elite interest can be transformed or transferred into the new emerging regime interest as the old regime fizzles out.

Under Ibrahim Babangida and Sani Abacha, two ruling authorities were set up. Babangida had the Armed Forces Ruling Council AFRC (later National Defence and Security Council (NDSC) while Abacha had the Provisional Ruling Council (PRC). These were highest policy making and implementation controlled by Babangida and Abacha respectively. The judiciary under the two military regimes were made weak as several decrees were promulgated with ouster clauses and extra-judiciary powers. Because members of the ruling bodies were single-handedly appointed by the leader (either Babangida or Abacha) they owed their allegiance to the leadership rather than to protecting national interest. The constitution is outlawed and they ruled by decrees. Therefore, opposition views

were hardly raised and could not be accepted when raised, or where raised such descending voices became targets for elimination. For instance, in 1986 when Nigeria surreptitiously joined the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) the result was a hostile national debate that nearly break the country into religious camps. The Chief of General Staff Commodore Ubitu Ukiwe, was asked the position of the Armed Forces Ruling Council on the issue. He quickly expressed surprise and noted that the issue was never discussed by the highest decision making body of the land. He suffered the consequence and was not only removed as the number two citizen but retired prematurely from the military. Already his appointment as Chief of General Staff, being second-in-command to the President of the Federal Republic was questioned by General Sani Abacha, then Chief of Army Staff, and one of the architect of the coup that brought Babangida to power.

Babangida's unpredictability was not only a myth but a function of circumstance where having been involved in various military coups "stands a perenial risk of being dethroned if he leaves his flanks open even for brief moment. This reality dictates that political self preservation ought to be the primary instinct of any leader who has any sense of mission in Nigeria" (Amuta:1992:21-22). Whatever the mission, General Domkat Bali explained how the AFRC was merely rubber stamping Babangida's decision. According to him:

The AFRC essentially was the supreme body. But as time went on, more as a result of the weakness of the members of the AFRC, as well as the way it was established, over the period, that supremacy which ought to be with the AFRC got eroded. It started really with the whole idea of the President. Then it went on till the time we gave the President wide powers under the economic emergency. Then came Decree 17, when we gave him far reaching powers to hire and sack, leading gradually to the time he dissolved the AFRC; till the day we gradually virtually allowed our (AFRC's) power to be eroded over time. (African Concord: 22 January, 1990:29).

General Bali suffered as a consequence of Babangida's sense of mission. He was transferred from the Ministry of Internal Affairs from the prestigious position of the Minister of Defence. He rejected the appointment and subsequently retired from the military. He accused Babangida for usurping the powers of the AFRC, and running a one man government. Babangida was noted not to have rarely consulted the AFRC whenever decisions were taken. Therefore lack of consultation weakened the AFRC: "The powers which ought to be with AFRC have been usurped by the President... a situation of military dictatorship and what is emerging more like personal, a person using the military administration" (Newswatch: January 22, 1990:11). Bali further pointed out that the dissolution of the AFRC on February 6, 1989, took members unaware after a marathon meeting by the body. Members were not consulted as it: "was not discussed at all. He just came in and announced, and then we did not challenge it." (Newswatch January 22, 1990: 11).

Like Babangida and his AFRC or NSDC, the Provisional Ruling Council (PRC) members were entirely constituted by General Abacha. He changes them whenever he realizes that he no longer control the policy making body. Some times members of the body hardly knew exactly what the Head of State, General Abacha, would broadcast to the nation because their decision may be altered to suits the whims and caprices of the leadership (Agekameh 1995:10). The setting of the constitutional conference which the regime promised was later taken seriously only when Brigadier-General David Mark, who fell out with the regime, revealed that Abacha had become inconsistent as he had abandoned the initial plan and was operating by deceit. Though the regime wanted to stay in power up to the year 2000, it lacked the programmes to support it's long period of ambitious rule.

In a press conference to denounce a claim by the wife of the late General Abacha, Maryam, that certain functionaries in Abacha's administration were privy to the actions taken by the administration of her husband, a member of General Abacha's PRC who later became the Chief of General Staff under General Abdulsalami's regime after Abacha's death, Vice Admiral Okhai Mike Akhigbe, said that General Abacha usurped powers of the Provisional Ruling Council (PRC) and run a one man show by taking decisions and embarking on actions which only served his personal ambition. Akhigbe pointed out that Abacha rolled out certain decrees on which the PRC never sat to discuss, adding that the collective decisions of the highest decision making body on the participation of serving military officers in partisan politics was unilaterally subverted. Thus, "comments are made without foundation. It is not true to say that certain actions carried out by that regime (in which he served as chief of Naval Staff) had collective responsibility" (**The Guardian**: 26 May, 1999:2).

According to him some decisions taken by the PRC were later turned down in the course of implementation: "for example, we collectively accepted that we will return the nation to democracy but what developed thereof did not confirm to what was agreed. Some decrees were rolled out without the approval of the PRC" (**The Guardian** 26 May 1999: 2). According to him, the issue of single candidate was prompted to serve someone's (Abacha) personal interest as "the political parties were compelled to present single candidate. When some of us came against it, certain roles were ascribed to us in the 1997 coup for which the Gen Chris Garuba panel was set up. I can go on and on. So what is collective in all these" (**The Guardian**: 26 May, 1999). It was, therefore, not surprising that the Transition Programme of Generals Ibrahim Babangida and Sani Abacha "were

wrecked by their overt display of political ambition. Each of them designed schemes that were clearly intended to promote their perpetuation in office" (*The Guardian*: (editorial), June 8, 1999:20).

6.3 INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT AND/OR SANCTIONS AGAINST THE BABANGIDA AND ABACHA REGIMES

Here, we are interested in knowing how Babangida and Abacha got international supports or were sanctioned by the international community. As a flamboyant dictator Babangida made the international community to believe that his transition programme was genuine. In spite of some anti-human rights activities like the proscription of newspapers, arrest and detentions of human rights activists, the international community merely saw these as Nigeria's internal problem. The community was fascinated by the concept that Nigeria's transition to civil rule was a **learning process**, a process that was on course. At the graduation ceremony of the National War College on 17 May 1993, Babangida convincingly reiterated the determination of his regime to hand over power. His leadership style received satisfactory blessings from the international community. In fact the international community was carried away by concepts like "grassroots democratisation process" and "ption A4". By definition Option A4 is a process of stage by stage contest by elimination. The process recognizes 4 stages: The ward, the local government area, the state and the national levels with all winning aspirants proceeding progressively from one stage to the next one until every aspirant except one is eliminated. The Option A4 was proposed by the Centre for Democratic Studies for the selection of the Presidential Candidate which Chief MKO Abiola and Alhaji Bashir Tofa emerged as SDP and NRC Candidates respectively.


Within West Africa and Africa at large Babangida established a niche for himself. He had drawn himself closer to some leaders whom he could count on their support anytime. This was done through "spray or sway diplomacy" (Yoroms and Aning:1997). Those that proved difficult he intimidated them with Nigeria's military strength. For instance, in the early days of his regime, Ft. Lt JJ Rawling of Ghana was not ready to go along with him on issues raised at both sub-regional and continental level. Babangida brought the Ghanaian head of state, Ft. Lt JJ Rawling to Nigeria on a state visit. He took Rawlings to the Airforce Base, Makurdi. There, Nigerian Airforce pilots demonstrated to Rawling who is equally an Airforce flying officer, how Nigeria is battle ready in a real war situation to confront any country in the sub region. Before Rawlings left Nigeria he changed his attitude towards Babangida.

While Babangida was able to capture the interests of Joseph Momoh (a former classmate at the Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna) and Samuel Doe of Liberia, it was not so with Thomas Sankara of Burkina Faso. Sankara's radicalism was very frightening to any ambition Leader in the sub-region. This became threatening as the Nigerian populace cherished radical Leaders. Such leaders could serve as channels of mobilisation and opposition against the regime which was already tending towards repression. Therefore when the opportunity offered itself he was too willing to be involved in the coup that toppled and killed Thomas Sankara. (See *African Concord*: 2 May 1994:16).

In the meantime, the Centre for Democratic Studies in Abuja became a place of pilgrimage for those in advanced and weak democracies who visited to learn about the mysteries of Nigerian grassroots democratisation process. These included the US Vice President Dan Quale, delegates from South Africa, and

several intellectuals of international repute like Richard Sklar, Claude Welch (Jr), Richard Joseph, Larry Diamond among others who intellectually endorsed the Babangida's political programme. The Director General of Centre for Democratic Studies, Professor Omo Emory, was invited to some of these countries in Africa, Europe, Asia among others to explain and rationalise the logic of Nigeria's political transition. In fact in a bid to convince the international community the government deposited some money with UNESCO, coordinated by Ahmed Shuiabu Danfulani for an international conference to rationalize the credibility of Nigeria's transition programme. In view of this, the entire international community were keenly interested in the outcome of the June 12 presidential election. Several countries participated in observing and monitoring the election that never was.

The respected London *Economist* had in 1991 appraised Babangida's economic (and political) programme and endorsed the extension of Babangida's regime to the year 1995. (*The African Guardian*: August 13, 1993: 14 – 15). However, the same magazine later concluded that the Nigerian economy has become shambolic. Politically, the magazine pointed out that: "if there is a gist of democratic change blowing across Africa, Nigeria's leader, General Ibrahim Babangida, seems determined to wrap a muffler around his head and ignore it". General Babangida and his military cronies, the magazine continued, have made a mockery, not only of the general's professed commitment to democracy, but also of a country that badly wanted and needs to be taken seriously in the world. The price the General seemed prepared to pay for his string of broken promises was one Nigeria could not afford (*The Economist*, August 7, 1993).



The annulment of the June 12 presidential election had a disastrous political effect on the country. The international community began to turn against Babangida and began to support the opposition and the human rights organisations against the government, and subsequently against those of shonekan and Abacha. The winner of the aborted June 12 election Chief Moshood Abiola left Nigeria to the US and Europe soliciting support for his mandate. There was upsurge of human rights organisations which supported for Abiola with the hope that Abacha would handover to him (Abiola). Thus, on his return Abiola was hopeful that he would regain his mandate. The United States Ambassador to Nigeria, Dr. Walter Carrington, who was posted at the wake of Abacha's regime became an active protagonist of the government. The killing of the human rights and environmental campaigner, Ken Saro Wiwa, and eight other Ogoni activists by the government of General Sani Abacha, on the eve of the Commonwealth Summit at Auckland, New Zealand, on November 10, 1996 heightened and worsened the strained relationship between Nigeria and the international community.

Sanctions were imposed to force Nigeria back to the path of democratic rule. Apart from the Commonwealth, the United Nations sent a fact finding mission headed by Justice Atsu-Kofi Amega to Nigeria on both the execution of the Ogoni Nine and to ascertain government commitments to return the country to civil rule. At the end of its trip, the mission found out a flagrant miscarriage of justice as the special tribunal that tried the Ogoni Nine was not established according to law. Trial procedures were confirmed by the Provisional Ruling Council even before it had received records of the case, there was no provision for judicial appeal and therefore no opportunity to petition for clemency. Though some members of the defunct Provision Rulling Council (PRC), denied ever taking a decision on the killing. It called for international observer missions from

the UN and OAU to monitor the implementations remaining stages of of the transition programme among other

General Abacha reacted to the report through his Legal Advisers, Dr. Auwalu Yadudu. From indication he accepted some of the mistakes committed by his regime. Accordingly, he agreed that the decree that tried Ken Saro Wiwa would be amended to exclude members of Armed Forces from serving on the tribunal. In addition, the verdict and sentences by the tribunal would be subject to Judicial review at the appellate level before confirmation by the confirming authority. Furthermore, Abacha had directed immediate review of the cases of persons detained by the amended Decree 2 of 1984. While Decree 14 of 1994 which ousts the jurisdiction of courts was also being considered for repeal. This reaction was only to appeal to the conscience of the international community rather than meeting the realities. Hence despite pressures threats and sanctions from the international community, the Abacha regime was able to evolve her own international support system. First of all, the sanctions from the international community were not comprehensive, even though democratic countries, which should have enforced comprehensive sanctions were careful not to hurt their economic interests. For instance, the United States and Britain stopped short of comprehensive sanctions because they would not like to hurt the interest of their oil companies (e.g. Chevron, Mobil and Texaco) that have investments in Nigeria. The attempt by the US Congress to consider further punitive measures including a ban on new investments in Nigeria was resisted by Mobil Oil, Chevron, Texaco and others like Exxon, Amoco, and Conoco, arguing that sanctions could result in the expropriation of their assets and transfer of their rights to non-American competitors. They warned that the West may lose Nigeria for countries like China, Iran and Russia. (Sklar: 1997:16). When the US Secretary of State Warren Christopher visited some African countries he repeated

the called for additional sanctions to include the freezing of the personal accounts of Nigerian officials (especially military officers) abroad and bans on new investments and technology exports to Nigeria. This was mere diplomatic rhetoric as neither the US nor any European country took it seriously because none of the democratic countries would like to sacrifice their economic interests for democracy to thrive in Nigeria. Sklar in fact, observes this point when he says that “at the second meeting of CMAG in April 1996, three members – Canada, Jamaica and South Africa – advocated the adoption of stronger punitive actions, but Britain was reluctant to place its considerable investment and trading relationship with Nigeria in jeopardy” (Sklar: 1997:p8). In fact as confessed by Brigadier General Sabo during the sittings of the Oputa Human Rights Investigation Commission, the Multinational companies in Nigeria contributed up to \$40 million for to continue in office.

Within Africa, no member of the OAU supported sanctions against Abacha's regime even though in various international fora they decried the human rights abuses of the regime but fell short of recommending sanctions. The Gambia opposed Nigeria's suspension from the Commonwealth while others accepted its suspension but would oppose sanctions. Nelson Mandela's South Africa was the only lone voice in the continent that tried to use quiet diplomacy but failed to smoothen Abacha on the path of reason, respect for human rights and democracy. Mandela further took the initiative to urge western countries like Britain, France and the US to impose oil sanctions against Nigeria in order to hasten the end of military rule. However, according to the South African Foreign Minister, Alfred Nzo, President Mandela backed away from his hard-line posture when he realized the western powers have tuned Abacha to see Mandela's action as a threat. Moreover, Nigeria's West African neighbours, were strongly opposed to

sanctions that would harm the entire region (Reuters: June, 1996: Sklar:1997: 12) Within the Southern African Development Community (SADC), President Sam Nujoma of Namibia opposed the pressure for sanctions by South Africa against Nigeria. In the U.S. the struggle for June 12 was principally left for the Randal Robinson's Washington based Trans Africa and the Congressional Black Caucus who have consistently put pressure on the U.S to impose a comprehensive embargo on oil imports from Nigeria. Nigeria's foreign minister, Chief Tom Ikimi, reacted that Mandela is an irresponsible and ungrateful person, and further castigated him thus:

We in Nigeria have held president Nelson Mandela in high esteem. Nevertheless, our experience as a people and as a nation in world affairs, tells us that the successful struggle for liberation does not automatically endow a new comer to the international arena with all the perceptions and means to perform creditably. And also, whoever gave the South African President the song sheet to read has not done him honour (Newswatch: June 3, 1996).

In his desperation to create a conducive atmosphere within West Africa, Abacha overtly and covertly supported dictatorial military regimes in the region. These include Col. Ibrahim Bare Mainasara of Niger Republic, Yahya Jammeh of The Gambia and Idris Deby of the Republic of Chad. At the Auckland Commonwealth Summit, Captain Valentine Strasser, the Head of State of Sierra Leone, who voted against Nigeria was dissociated by his Deputy, Brigadier Julius Ma'ada Bio, who subsequently overthrown Strasser from power and took over as Head of State. On assumption of office, Nigeria was the first country Brig Bio visited. (Newswatch: June 3, 1999:16).

The overall interest in military dictatorial transformation to civilian dictatorship in West Africa was based on the experience of Jerry Rawlings in Ghana. Rawlings had set a precedence in June 1979 when he toppled the

government of President Hiller Liman. He did not only organize elections but contested and won such elections, transforming himself from military leadership to a civilian ruler. Therefore, in the course of sustaining International Support System, the Abacha regime shifted her interest to the Asian continent. Countries that opened their doors for the regime were China, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia and Turkey. While China was contracted to upgrade the Nigerian railway system, Korean (Daewoo Corporation), Malaysia, Turkey and others had one economic agreement or the other with the Abacha regime either in the field of oil, trade or industry. In fact Sklar concluded that:

...at the time of writing, a growing number of potential beneficiaries, partners, and supporters through out the world appear to have tipped the balance of power decisively in favour of Abacha and his domestic coalition.

6.4 BABANGIDA AND ABACHA REGIMES: THE POLITICS OF DOMESTIC COALITIONS

The tempo of self-succession was sustained by excessive corruption and the manipulation of domestic coalitions. As earlier noted, in the case of Babangida, corruption was pursued through settlements, appointments, contracts and co-optation. Corruption was spread and recycled but under Abacha it was restricted and concentrated in few hands. However, both regimes were all working towards weakening the strength of the Nigerian state so that only their leadership and their cronies could stand and rule without opposition. Nigeria was turned to what Jibrin Ibrahim calls a 'rogue state'. According to him, "central to evolution of rogue state was Abacha's plans for self-succession. Just like Babangida's regime, Justice Maifuman Nasir, Chairman of the Abacha's Transition Implementation Committee (TIC) openly declared that: "the five separated political parties are owned by the government and not their members.

The same government sets agenda for them in terms of manifesto and guidelines and also financed them” (Ibrahim:1999:18) . In the same vein the two parties created by Babangida were regulated, manipulated, controlled and financed by Babangida.

General Ibrahim Babangida’s transition was the most ambitious, elaborate and conceptually convincing. But in practice the process was not only ambiguous but ambivalent. In the light of this, every step taken by the regime was interpreted by critics as an inclination to a hidden agenda. Whether there was a hidden agenda or not the fact that the transition was aborted with the annulment of June 12, 1993 presidential election gives it a denomination of a hidden agenda. Thus the democratisation was seen as a process of either building interest, confusing the transition scenario and subsequently diverting attentions in such a way that personality cult was established and superintended by regime interest rather than national interest.

In the light of the above, just as the economic liberalisation was undertaken by the administration, the democratisation was also intended to prove Babangida’s wizardry which his predecessors equally lack. The regime stretched the nation through rigorous dictation and panel beating. Based on the Political Bureau Report the regime manipulated and twisted out of context the intention of the Bureau in order to subvert the transfer of power to elected civilians (Oyediran : 1997:180). The events that took place between 1985 - 1993 were linked to the personality and highly manipulative style of the Babangida leadership, the greed of the political generals and power elites, the unprecedented levels of official corruption and the deep-seated economic crisis which further raised the stakes of political contest and exacerbated the politics of anxiety.

Babangida's regulated transition or programmed transition was anchored on four pillars, namely:

- massive financial commitments in order to prevent the transition programme from being hijacked by the so called moneybags;
- deliberately nurturing of new breed of politicians who were said to be young, honest, patriotic and relatively exorbitant in the art of politics;
- establishing institutions on virtually all aspects of the transition processes to enable him maintain effective control on the formation of political parties, patterns of mobilisation, fund raising and alliances; and
- manipulation, harassment and domestication of popular and opposition forces through the control of the working class, incorporation of the left, and prohibition of certain interest groups from participating in the transition process. (Ihonvbere, 1994: 156).

Given the above factors, the regime unilaterally tinkered and tampered with the transition programme forty times, at times in direct contravention of its own decrees, to such an extent that Nigerians really had no idea as to what to expect the next day (Ihonvbere:1994:15). It was indeed, General Olusegun Obasanjo, who once said that if Babangida greets you good morning, you have to peep four times through your windows to ensure that it is actually morning before answering the greeting.

The cost of the aborted transition to democratic rule was enormous, it involved regulating any of the parties that were recommended by the National Electoral Commission (NEC) and decreeing into existence two political parties,

the National Republican Convention (NRC) and Social Democratic Party (SDP). In order to check the hijacking of the two parties, government decided to construct party offices in all the 500 local government headquarters at the cost of ₦1.3 million each. While ₦10.6 million was expended for each of the party headquarters in the 21 States. The Head offices of the two parties in Abuja cost ₦100 million each (Ihonvbere: 1994: 157). With the creation of more states and local governments, party offices were equally constructed in the new local governments and states at the same cost. Government equally embarked on sponsoring party delegates to national party conventions and spent up to ₦44million for the parties to register their members and further gave the sum of ₦269m to each of the political parties for campaigns and elections. Other areas where government spent resources included the 1991 census (where a total of ₦2.5bn was spent), Directorate for Mass Mobilisation and the Constitution Drafting Committee among others. It has been estimated that Babangida spent up to ₦40bn for the period of the transition programme.

The concept of new breed politicians was apparently thrown up as a measure to breed a crop of young politicians who would not only imbibe the ideas and philosophy of Babangida but could do his battle at any slightest opposition against the perpetuation of his regime. He raised his supporters within the military through appointments, settlements and contracts. With the newbreed politicians the circle of transforming or extending his regime could be without much resistance. The emergence of the newbreed politicians, began with the promulgation of Decree No 25 of 1987 which banned old politicians and some categories of people who might show interest in politics during the transition period. They were only to become politically active after the institutionalisation of the Third Republic.

To enhance the credibility of the transition in the public view the government decided to create political structures like the Political Bureau, National Electoral Commission, Constitutional Drafting Commission (CDC), Directorate of Food Roads and Rural Infrastructure (DFRRI), established the two political parties, Centre for Democratic Studies (CDS), Directorate of Social Mobilisation, Armed Forces Consultative Assembly, among others. These institutions were found to be in conflict over roles and access to the presidency. At the end they had no impact on the peoples as sceptical thoughts permeated the assessments of the regime's transition to democratic rule. This created initial apathy and cynicism because the transition was programmed guidedly. While the regime began with liberation processes such as respect for and promotion of human rights, it ended up limiting the political and democratic spaces. Decree No 25 of 1987 on participation in politics and elections (prohibition) was promulgated to identify and isolate those that would better promote the interest of the regime. The decree categorised the politicians that were to be disqualified from participation in politics. For instance schedule I of the decree listed those banned from politics as including those that have been convicted, removed or dismissed from office, or indicted and punished for one reason or the other for corruption or abused of public office between October 1st, 1960 and the end of Babangida's transition programmes.

Schedule 2, part I banned those who had held high offices in the First and Second Republics if they were not convicted. Part II of schedule 2 stipulated the categories of military and police officers disqualified for holding offices between January 15, 1966 to the end of the transition. By 1989 the decree was amended to include part III in schedule 2 banning those who had held positions as Chairmen

and members of government parastatals as from December 31, 1983 up to the end of the transition. To effect the power of the decree, the National Electoral Commission was given the mandate and power to ensure the eligibility of political contestants. The amended decree went on to posit that any person banned or disqualified under this decree shall not sponsor, canvass or campaign for or on behalf of himself or others or sponsor or fund any political party or any sponsored candidate for any election during the transition period (cited in Olagunju : **et'al.** 1993:20). With the banning system there were sporadic entrances of new breed politicians who were nurtured to defend the regime against any opposition from the old breed politicians. In November 1992 the regime banned 23 presidential aspirants from contesting further elections because of their role in the malpractice of the August/September 1992 presidential primaries.

Thus, it is not surprising that the two political parties (SDP and NRC) had accepted government political programmes, as well as the Structural Adjustment Programme, hook, line and sinker. The NRC recognized the importance of market forces operated by the state while the SDP accepted the need for private participation in the economy with government control of some key sectors. In its usual characteristics of surprises, government un-banned the old politicians after the gubernatorial and state legislative elections in December 1991. The remaining parts of 1992 and 1993 which were meant for the National Assembly and Presidential elections suffered constant revision of the transition time table. For instance the National Assembly elections scheduled for the first quarter of 1992 took time to be held. This had a "disruptive effects on the National Assembly elections...One immediate effect of the confusing signals was the initial lack of enthusiasm by politicians to participate in the elections, contrary to a belief at the

time that the National Electoral Commission (NEC) brought the election forward to attract quality politicians” (Osaghae 1997: 256).

This trend indeed provided the opportunity for critics to posit that General Babangida was working out his hidden Agenda within the framework of the transition and economic restructuring as the parties (SDP and NRC) remained fragile, shallow and weak. (Oyeleye and Adigun: 1990). This was further compounded by statement by General Babangida himself. For instance in an interview with a national newspaper, (**Sunday Times**: March 29, 1992: 1 & 9, **Daily Times**: March 30, 1992). General Babangida pointed out that he was surprised that the Nigeria economy had not collapsed. “Frankly, I have kept on asking my Economist why is it that the economy has not collapsed up till now? What is it that is keeping it up”. (**Sunday Times**: March 29, 1992: 1). Whatever that meant, the collapse of the economy, though may create national political instability, but would form the basis for regime stability and perpetuation.

In the political sphere the banning of old breed politicians which was to disinvest the political arena from the bourgeois class created another doubt as the guidelines for an association to be registered as a political party were scaring (Ihonbvere 1994: 157, and Badejo:1987:184). The guidelines included the payment of a non-refundable sum of N50, 000:00, establishing offices and appointing officials in all the wards and local governments of the federation which should reflect federal character, and providing memberships registers in all the wards of the federation. These guidelines required money, which made the new breed to fall back on the old politicians overtly for support and sponsorship. Thus at the end government refused to legislate any political party from the six (out of the 13) political associations because, according to Babangida, they all “failed to

meet the criteria laid down for registration as a political party". Hence, it would be inappropriate for the old political structure which failed us in the past be allowed to form the basis for our new electoral competition if we are serious about creating a new social order" (Babangida, *The Guardian*: 1989: 7).

Government, therefore, decided to imposed two political parties, Social Democratic Party (SDP) and National Republic Convetion (NRC) on the ground that it would be "wrong to defend a position that offers a prize to the two best candidates in an examination wherein all the candidates failed". (Babangida: 1989). This action by the government got a sweeping criticism as it could jeopardize the overall search for sustainable democracy during the transition and beyond (Ofeimun 1989:2091 -3, Uwazurike, 1990, 65 - 66). It is within this context that Joseph Richard observes:

The twists and turn that President Babangida has introduced during his five years in office have left most observers unwilling to affirm that the new two party system, fostered from above, has a realistic chance of succeeding. Extreme political engineering in Nigeria by a military Junta is beginning to raise doubts about whether it can eventually lead to the creation of a stabled democratic political system (Richard : 1990:18).

Indeed these skeptical thoughts remained till the exit of Babangida from office (Osaghae 1991: 88 - 89 and Gana: 1993) The government demonstrated its power over the parties in regulating their structures, functions and deciding their membership. This control mechanism led to the cancellation of the 1992 presidential primaries and the banning of the 23 presidential aspirants . This increased the level of cynicism as Doyin Okupe, NRC publicity Secretary, said the ban was "anti-democratic methods of weeding out aspirants. It reduces the quality of competition." (*Tell*: November 23, 1992). A Lagos constitutional lawyer, Olu Onagoruwa, and a seasoned critic, Chief Gani Fawehinmi, did not

see it as only anti-democratic but rather it presented the nature of regime that cannot be trusted. Says Onagoruwa: "I have always doubted very much that Babangida wants to go. I have always said the possibility of his leaving office is very remote. There is nothing in the (transition) programme and its execution, in particular that gives us assurance that he will leave on January 3. The man believes in manoeuvring of people in an indecent manner, and that is what he has been doing with Nigerians." (Tell: November 2, 1993). In Fawehinmi's view:

"Babangida has led us along the path of deception, untruth and half truths, inconsistencies hidden ideas... and generating a confused political atmosphere... He has shown he is not a man of his promise. All along, he was working towards his own answer, his own conclusion, his own desire, his own programme, his own ambition" (Tell: November 9, 1992).

As early as 1990 General Buahri whose regime was toppled by Babanigada told BBC "In 1990 I said what is going on called transition programme was pseudo-democracy, it would'nt work, or has it worked? It is not meant to work. The transition programme is not meant to work". (The News: 5 July, 1993:28).

These doubts and cynicism were basic as the regime had initially planned to hand over power to elected government by October 1, 1990 but this was rescheduled to October 1, 1992. Later it was shifted to January 1993 and without any choice terminated his ambition on the 26th August, 1993. At the end the transition programme suffered its own credibility as Babangida desiring to remain in office left only due to social pressures working against his regime interest. As noted by Ihonvbere Babangida unitaterally tinkered with the transition programme up to forty times (Ihonvbere: 1994: 156). Hence, it reached a point that the handing over date was no longer crucial to Babangida again. As he himself

noted "it would be catastrophic... to allow time consciousness to override the preservation of the unity of our pluralistic society". (*The African Guardian*: October 26, 1992). It also becomes absurd to believe that Nigeria's unity is dependent on his personality or regime. Thus, not until he was pressurised to step out of office only few, especially his cronies, believed that Babangida was sincere with the transition programme. This was compounded by the activities of sycophants, the foremost was the unregistered Association of Better Nigeria (ABN). Others were the Third Eye, Lion and Lioness, the Committee of Elders led by the Late Chief Sam G. Ikoku and Alhaji Tanko Yakasai. These organisations among others were behind the hidden agenda of Babangida, either overtly or covertly.

Under Abacha the process of corruption and reordering of domestic coalitions became effective and perfected. Thus, according to Jibrin Ibrahim, the rules for the practice of politics were reduced to terrorism and thurgery. The object of politics was reduced to mega-stealing of the nation's resources. The rate of corruption under Abacha was restricted to his families, Alhaji Ismaila Gwarzo and some key of his ministers. Apart from fixed accounts in Brazil, Britain, Lebanon and Switzerland worth \$1.8 billion there were different means which the wealth of the nation was siphoned. General Abdulsalami Abubakar who replaced General Sani Abacha informed the nation in a world press conference September 6, 1998, that investigations into the financial scandals of the former National Security Adviser Alhaji Ismaila Gwarzo falls into three categories. One, amounts advanced for contracts already executed. Two, amounts advanced for contracts whose prices were overinflated. And three, amount withdrawn from either purpose but were misapplied. At the end of the investigation the Chief Press Secretary to the government reported that Ismaila Gwarzo returned \$700 million

and was expected to return more. Also, Abacha's family was reported to have returned \$50 million.

The Ministers who were alleged to have been involved in the stolen wealth of the nation were Chief Anthony Ani, the Minister of Finance under Abacha, and his colleague in the Ministry of Power and Steel, Alhaji Bashir Dalhatu. They were accused of being involved in the Ajaokuta steel scam. While Ani was said to have returned N1.78 billion of the \$2 billion, Bashir Dalhatu gave a commitment to pay back \$5 million which he insisted was a gift from Abacha rather than from the Ajaokuta scam. Though both Ani and Dalhatu denied the level of their involvement in what the state officials called corruption, the government has gone further to gazette the monies and properties appropriated by the Federal government by Decree 4 of 1999. However, in subsequent protest made by Chief Anthony Ani the government has cleared him of any corrupt practice under General Abacha.

6.5 NATIONAL SECURITY QUESTION AND THE PURSUIT OF REGIME INTEREST

A regime that comes to power through the barrel of the gun would first and foremost create the parameter and recourse to personal rule, and to some extent in corporate interest of a given segment of the society to meet her expectation. As earlier pointed out, the August 27, 1985 coup was purely an attempt by Babangida to escape being a victim of the contradiction in General Mohammed Buhari's regime. To escape this, he succeeded in building a corporate entity around his personality. He made use of factors within the society that could facilitate and enhance his desire to capture, maintain and retain power. These factors include ethnic minority groups within the military and civil society, the

intellectuals, religion, economy, political process and foreign policy. In the course of this, the regime was able to establish a prebendal corporate entity around himself which drew strength from neopatrimonialism.

Two days after assuming office, Decree 17 of 1985 was promulgated which gave General Babangida the sole authority and power to appoint key officers that were relevant to the maintenance of state security. They are Chief of General Staff (hitherto, Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters), Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff (now chief of Defence Staff), all Service Chiefs (Army, Airforce and Navy) and the Inspector-General of Police. The composition of the Armed Force Ruling Council (AFRC), the highest military decision-making and legislative council for the nation (unlike the Supreme Military Council (SMC) which existed under previous military regimes of General Yakubu Gowon, Generals Muritala/Obasanjo and General Buhari) became a one-man affair of the President, General Babangida (Adekanye 1997:34).

Given the repressive economic policies under the administration of General Buhari, the regime of Babangida covertly began yet another draconian market economic policy that equally wrenched the lives of the people which his predecessor (Buhari) was accused of embarking on austerity measure without adjustment. It was expected that with the concept of adjustment the regime was throwing up economic reforms with human face. Babangida promulgated in October 1985 a National Economic Emergency Decree, giving himself sweeping discretionary powers to take measures to improve the economy over the next fifteen months (Bersteker and Lewis: 1997: 337). This was followed by a national debate on whether Nigeria should collect the IMF loan or not. At the end of the debate, Nigerians rejected the IMF loan. As a result of this, he invoked

nationalist sentiment in the 1986 budget speech. The speech was populist and nationalist in context. It received public acceptability as it denigrated IMF conditionalities. While inaugurating The Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in July 1986 he set out the following objectives: strengthening demand management policies, trade liberalisation and restructuring the tariff system, reducing administrative controls in order to enable effective performance of market mechanisms, adopting measures to stimulate domestic production, instituting market-determined pricing policies and encouraging privatisation. Following the usual nationalist/populist rhetorics, SAP was made to be seen as a home grown policy with a two year term which would terminate by June 1988. The impression Nigerians had was that SAP was only a temporary measure that required their support. And as General Babangida himself pointed out, the success of SAP is determined by the measure of "enduring political understanding and mass support". (West Africa 2 September 1985, p.1792).

The two programmes of the regime, SAP and the political Transition programme, became mutually reinforcing. Simultaneously launching the economic adjustment programme and the return to civil rule, the military government was able to distract public attention from the fact that it had agreed to the IMF conditions that had garnered so much opposition. As attention shifted from the nature of the economic order to the emerging political orientation, the government itself became increasingly concerned with mobilising support for the most controversial economic measures, temporarily and diffusing potential opposition to the economic reforms.

By 1987 while presenting his budget speech, General Babangida introduced some populist programmes to mitigate the social cost of structural adjustment.

These include The National Directorate of Employment (NDE) to facilitate job creation, Directorate of Food Roads and Rural Infrastructure (DFRRI) and the Better life for Rural Women (later dwellers) among others, while measures were subsequently concluded with the submission and the release of the Political Bureau report in 1987 the attention of government was shifted to the political reforms as mobilisation mechanism to trigger the support of the people for the economic reforms. Unfortunately SAP turned out to weaken the nerves of the struggle in the people. Rather than the people regaining their standard of living which was lost during the period SAP was introduced, it created instead "the conditions for the emergence of a new form of authoritarian political rule in which old methods of control were combined with... the new demands of an enfeebled social order based on market forces" (Olukoshi 1997: 458).

However, having gained significant support and legitimacy from some civil society organisations the regime at the same time enforced its programme of SAP to weaken and destroy the organised power of the popular social forces opposed to market reforms, "forces which are central to the vibrancy of civil society and the struggle for democracy" (Olukoshi 1997: 458). Decree 2 was utilised during the period of Babangida's regime to embrace and strengthen authoritarianism. Hence the decree was not only used to proscribe associations like the National Association of Nigerian of Nigerian Students (NANS), Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC), deportation of non Nigerian academics (e.g. Dr Patrick Wilmot, Patrick Henecke, etc) and banning of demonstration and strikes by Unions like Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU), and detention of union leaders.

The initial effort of the regime was to build a formidable human rights record that would catapult the interest of the general public closer to itself. This

was exactly what happened and it helped to sustain the regime in the attempt to carefully map out its authoritarian policies. As Babangida himself noted later, the change of government by any coup plotter, depends on his competence and ability to convince his would-be conspirators and the public. Initially on assuming power, Babangida endeared himself to the press and some social critics when Decree 4 was repealed. The Ban on NMA, NARD and NANS was also lifted as a means for seeking legitimacy. But obnoxious Decree 2 was deliberately left which later enabled him to fight the oppositions as shown in subsequent anti-democratic threats and intimidation over SAP protests. However, Decree 2 turned out to become the most important stimulus for the emergence of massive pro-democracy movements after government's reaction to the SAP riots and the detention of other human rights activists. Beginning from the 1989 SAP riot, a number of civil associations, with human rights bias, increased tremendously. The 1989 SAP riots engulfed most of the Nigerian universities, commercial cities and several other towns. This led to the official report of 22 fatalities whereas independent reports put the figure as twice as high (See Ibrahim 1993:133) Even the cushioning packages that were in place like job creation, transport services and food production were equally checked by continuous measures of repression with equal reactive protest from the civil society.

The failure of the cushioning package re-awakened mass protest and violence that ravaged the nation for two consecutive weeks in 1992. The latest violence was both based on economic hardship expressed by SAP and communal/religious which itself was a fall out of the effect of SAP. While the economic crisis rocked major cities like Lagos, Ibadan and Benin, the communally conditioned religious crisis which started in Zagon Kataf spread to Kaduna and Zaria, in Kaduna states and to Taraba, Adamawa, Bauchi and

Plateau states where serious violent communal and ethnic conflicts occurred. What was witnessed was a reconfiguration of old patterns and not really an economic transformation (Callaghy, 1994:24). The reaction to government policies by the general public has been to dislocate the economy whose wealth they create but do not enjoy, intensify religious fanaticism, created and instil in the mind of the authoritarian leadership its inability to govern a complex and deeply divided plural society like Nigeria. The intention is to replace the leadership with a democratic regime, given the facade transition programme being pursued. Between 1986 and 1994, there were covert and overt strikes, riots, demonstrations, urban violence, armed robberies, coups and attempts by workers, students, area boys (i.e lumpen proletariat), unemployed, religious fanatics, military men and officers and other organised civil rights activists and groups in the civil society.

Given the wide spread nature of the crisis, the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) met and deliberated on the impact and the threat to the internal security of the regime. General Babangida who was personally devastated by the crisis told reporters that his government was ready for a showdown with those who wanted to destabilise the regime and would be ready to "defend with the last drop of our blood, the integrity of the transition programme... the military are practitioners in the management of violence and will be able to do it and do it well." (Newswatch: June 8, 1992). At the onset of taking over power, Babangida vowed that "our major aim during the period of our rulership will be to maintain order and stability and crush with incisive professional skill the major forces of disunity and subversion that threaten the peace." (Cited in Yusuf 1991:122).

This development made the regime no longer interested in promising any package or providing any cushioning incentives for the disenchanting populace.

Rather it was interested in how to maintain regime security. The regime had on May 22, 1992 listed five measures with which it was going to deal with opposition forces. These measures are: (i) that all incidences of civil unrest will be dealt with using all means, including the use of emergency power. (ii) to achieve this, all commanders of military formations were given appropriate orders to deal effectively with occasions which could or may threaten the stability of the nation. (iii) the call up time for military intervention in civil unrest was shortened in order to tackle the problem with immediate effect and (iv) above all, the government established a National Guard, to supposedly reduce the visibility of the armed forces in the suppression of internal protest. The question of the role of National Guards in dictatorial regimes are well known. However, the decision to establish a Presidential National Guard was a new direction towards regime security building in Nigeria. Thus, as pointed out, SAP brought with it such destabilising effects that the regime had to:

“seek to buy more security through recourse to greater coercion and authoritarianism. This resulting militarisation was manifested in such measures as creation or expansion of para military bodies, the police force, as well as the intelligence and security apparatus, alongside the regular armed forces; higher salaries and other benefits for the military and other state security and intelligence personnel; and purchase of newer and more sophisticated equipment, including communications systems” (Adekanye 1997: 45, see also Bangura:1986:24 – 37).

Another new twist to the security impact of the 1989 SAP riot was the establishment of the Armed Forces Consultative Assembly (AFCA) as a measure to build a regime interest through the corporate military interest against threats from the civil society. In addressing the 265 members of AFCA on 5 June 1989, General Babangida pointed out that the SAP riots were only masterminded to destroy the creditability of the military institution. He oriented their perception

to ensure that the military as an institution must not be humiliated out of office as experienced in some African countries. This was a repetition of his reaction to the 1987 Kafanchan religious riots where he declared in a national broadcast on 17 March 1987 that "what we are dealing with is not just a religious crisis but rather the civilian counterpart of an attempted *coup d'état* organised against the Federal Military Government and the Nigerian nation" (*West Africa*: 23, March 1987:552). The interest of the regime leadership was not only to protect military interest or military regime but, using the military as an institution, to achieve regime interest. He believes that the military under his leadership as the President was capable of working out a relationship that can lead to some military supremacy and not the civilian political authority. "I believe that it is only the military that can successfully lead the armed forces to the barracks." (Babangida, 1988) Given this position, and the nature of the transition to civil rule programme which was later aborted with the annulment of June 12 1993 presidential election, was preceded by various handing over dates to civil rule.

By 1990 security and defence expenditure was in the increase. The sum of ₦1.11 billion and ₦1.50 billion were allocated to the police as recurrent expenses in 1990 and 1991 with the sum of ₦151.65million and ₦337.20 million for capital expenditure budgeted for the police in the same period. Whereas from 1987, for the first time after the civil war, defence expenditure increased to ₦2 billion, being 10% of the total federal spending (more than education and health), "and stayed more or less at that level for much of the remaining years of the Babangida regime" (Adekanye 1997:44). The Gideon Okar Coup was the greatest shocker to the regime. It arrested the regime in its craftiness. The coup failed but it changed entirely the orientation of the government. Infact the

President hurriedly moved the Federal Capital to Abuja city, as Lagos was no longer safe for the presidency.

Earlier on, at its inception, the regime had had a conception of the rising power of civil populace in the event of civil unrest. It therefore expanded security operatives by creating three security networks namely: the State Security Service (SSS), for the domestic operations; Nigerian Intelligence Agency (NIA), to take charge of foreign threats to the regime; and Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) for the military. These agencies, since their creation have been co-ordinated by the Office of National Security Adviser (NSA). The Defence Intelligence Agency operates outside the existing military security structure, the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI), and in most cases it has created some contradictions in the working operations of military intelligence.

However, the killing of a journalist, Dele Giwa, in 1986 by a parcel bomb which was supposedly linked to DMI and the SSS was the beginning of the speculation by the Babangida's regime was beginning to eliminate critical oppositions. The counsel to the deceased, Gani Fawehemi, accused the state security operations under Brigadier-General (then Lt.Col) Haliru Akilu, Director-General of DMI, and the Deputy Director of SSS, Lt. Col Kunle Togun, for the killing, given the fact that Giwa himself had accused the security operatives for intimidating and threatening his life on several occasions before his death.

According to reports Dele Giwa, a versatile journalist who had carried our critical news items against some policies of the regime, especially on SAP, was accused of planning to carry out a report on the plans to remove Commodore Ubitu Ukiwe, the second-in-command to the President, and was also working

towards investigating the involvement of the President, General Babangida Ibrahim's wife, Mariam's, connection with Gloria Okon in drug trafficking and other sensitive security issues for the subsequent editions of the **Newswatch** magazine (**The News**: 25 October 1993 and **Vanguard**, December 12, 2000: 9). Gani Fawehinmi in a submission to the Justice Oputa led Human Rights Violation Investigation Commission indicted Babangida of Dele Giwa's death.

In a presentation before the sitting of the Commission in Lagos, Fawehinmi narrated how Giwa had been trailed after and hunted by security operatives until he received a parcel bomb which finally killed him. Two days before his death he had made a written complaint to his solicitor, Gani Fawehinmi, confirming threats to his life from the Babangida Security Operatives (**Vanguard**: December 12, 2000). Further insight was provided by General Mohammadu Buhari himself: "It is a pity that this government (Babangida) allows those who deal in drugs to destroy the society for money". (**The News**: 5 July 1993: 25). In an earlier interview, Col Tony Nyiam ascertained that Babangida and Akilu should be tried for the murder of Dele Giwa. He pointed out that the packaging of the bomb was done at the Strategic Command Unit, Park Lane, Apapa. (**African Concord**: 2 May 1994:15).

To build a ring of support around the regime which would serve as a reservoir for consolidating personal rule, General Babangida embarked on the institutionalisation of corruption in the system otherwise known as policy of settlement; that is, by appointment, monetary gift or contract. First, the appointments of military officers, as military Governors and Taskforce commanders in charge of various parastatals among others was seen as a favour that could be reciprocated in term of defending the regime when the need arises.

These officers were usually eased out at an interval of time to give room to another sets of officers. This was the process of power circulation among the military officers. However, within the military circle this was seen as welfare. Those who were not given appointment were in most cases given contract awards by their colleagues who were holding various appointments. The President was in support as it was seen as a regime survival strategy, as the loyalty and support of military officers were bought through individual rewards, gifts and the general increase in pay package for the military. As for retired military officers, in July 1986 the office of the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) issued a circular requesting seven ministries and state governors to give consideration to retired officers in the award of contracts.

The president also announced in 1992 the allocations of N500 million to military officers to purchase cars while other ranks were given motorbikes. But Abacha as Minister of Defence and later Chief of Defense Staff block effort by Babangida to extend this gesture to include a pay rise for the Non-Commissioned officers. This was deliberate so that the Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO) do not further endear themselves to Babangida, than himself. However, after Abacha took over power, more promotions were done in favour of those who rose from the rank and file, that is the Non Commissioned Officers, than the officer cadre. Corruption was institutionalized in both regimes.

In defending himself on the issue of corruption Babangida only said "so anyway, these corruption, it rubs on all". (**The Source:** September 18, 2000: 19) He added stoutly that "my government may not be a collection of saints but we did very well. Of the lot of people in government may be as ministers, etc, there hasn't been anyone yet that has been pinpointed as corrupt. So, how have I

institutionalised corruption.” (The News: November 6, 2000, p18). Whatever explanation it is clear that under Babangida and Abacha the economy collapsed, Nigeria became more indebted, while the Nigerian Airways, petroleum (NNPC), iron and steel projects among others became draining pipelines of corruption and enrichment by the regime. As at 1985 when Babangida came to power Nigeria was among the middle income countries in the world. By the time Babangida and Abacha left office Nigeria dropped to 25th position as one of the poorest nations. Nigeria as a nation may be rich but the leadership has rendered the people the wretched of the earth.

Under Babangida still, military officers opposed to the regime were allegedly killed in mysterious manners. Major Debo Bashorun who escaped to the United States after two attempts on his life noted that he rejected his redeployment to 31 Airborne Brigade because several officers have been killed in mysterious circumstances there (The News: Lagos, 24, January, 1994). Furthermore, it was alleged the regime of Babangida further attempted to relocate military formations from Kaduna to Bauchi and Makurdi to Minna because these were Christian areas in order to perfect the reign of terror against the people. (See African Concord: 2 May 1994:16).

Meanwhile, the same security operations were experienced when General Sani Abacha took over on the 17th November, 1993 as the new head of state after shovelling the interim government Chief Ernest Shonekan aside. What it took General Ibrahim Babangida eight years to master, it only took Abacha five years to perfect. Having been original plotter of the coup that brought General Mohammadu Buhari and General Ibrahim Babangida respectively to power, his ascension to power was a demonstration of the manifestation of cumulative

security experiences. He successfully blocked the loopholes found in the Babangida's blend of authoritarian populism with outright despotism. He was aghast to opposition however constructive it might be, whether religious, ethnic or class oriented. What matters to him was his regime security. Probably he had realised how opposition elements had not been too favourable to Babangida in spite of his authoritarian populism, so he chose to hinge his security around personal interest and those who were only too willing to protect such interest. Thus Nigeria became a police state, held under siege.

The first public experience of General Abacha despotism in the society was when as Chief of Defence Staff, after the annulment June 12 1993 presidential election he rolled out military tanks to mow down pro-democracy protests in Lagos in the early period of July 1993. First of all he ordered the civilian Governor of Lagos state, Chief Michael Otedola, to declare a state of emergency or else he would call in the military. In his broadcast to the nation on 17 November 1993 he, like Babangida, pretended to be friendly to the press. He de-proscribed the media houses that were proscribed by Babangida when he (Babangida) was no longer a closed ally of the press. Abacha sought to seek the support of the press. In addition he promised the establishment of a constitutional conference with full constituent power. This gladdened some progressive groups especially of the ethnic minority nationalities of the south, to support the regime. This in turn helped the regime to cushion itself and perfect the mechanisms of its security operatives. He however, like Babangida warned: "Any attempt to test our will, will be decisively dealt with" (Obiozor: 1994: 1-6). To this and the government dismantled the presidential National Guard established by General Ibrahim Babangida and set up 17 security outfits under his Chief Security Officer, Major

Hanza EL-Mustapha, and the National Security Adviser, Alhaji Ismaila Gwarzo. The most effective of Abacha Security networks, first and foremost, was the Bodyguards (BGs) made up of special units that provided protection for the Head of State, and the Strike Force (SF). The purpose of the SF was to "ensure the personal safety of Abacha, at any cost, and to intimidate Nigerians to succumb to his despotic self-succession plan" (Tell: Lagos, May 3, 1999).

The SF had 250 well trained and armed young military officers who underwent military training in Libya and South Korea. The Strike Force was to ensure the security of Aso Rock, the presidential villa, Abuja and the systemic stability of the regime. It was commanded by Lt. Col Ibrahim Yakassi. Its main target was to eliminate opposition to the regime by organising arson, assassinations, bomb planting and settling personal scores with the perceived enemies of the regime. While Col Frank Omenka, Col John Olu and Assistant Police commissioner, Zakari Mohammed Bui were in charge of torture of detainees in the Gestapo, Military detention camps or rooms set up in various places like Gowon, Nasko and Abacha barracks, as well as police cells in Wuse, Garki, Asokoro and other places in Lagos. This reminded one of mini- auschwitz concentration camps in Germany during the World World II. Some other selected security officers who facilitated the arrest, detention and trials of people under Special Investigation Panel headed by the former FCT Commissioner of Police, Mohammed Yusuf included the following as members, CSP Abba, (ADC to Mrs Abacha), Shehu Abubakar Darima (SSS), Major Aminu (DMI) and Lawal, a police officer.

It is alleged that most of the killings that occurred between 1994 and 1998 were effected perfectly by the Strike Force with the collaboration of the

Presidential Task Force in Bomb Blasts headed by a police Commissioner Alhaji Zakari Mohammed Bui. Those allegedly killed include Pa Alfred Rewane, Kudirat Abiola, Bagauda Kaltho and many others. Others alleged to have been murdered through extra-judicial pressures were the Ogoni Nine including Ken Saro Wiwa the leader of ethno-environmental rights activists. Others like Chief Anthony Enahoro, Wole Soyinka, Bola Tinubu, had to escape into exile for safety where they met with Air Cdr Dan Suleman, Lt.Gen Alani Akinrinade and Bolaji Akinyemi to continue the campaign against the repressive leadership of General Abacha's regime. For Chief Alex Ibru, he was saved from being assassinated by divine intervention after his refusal to allow his newspaper, **The Guardian**, to be used to perpetuate the interest of the regime.

Within the military a security watch was set up against men and officers that worked against the regime. For instance, wearing of Abacha's badge or insignia, though it was not officially approved, was a must for all in the military. At one of the ceremonial occasions Abacha seen shakeinf only officers wearing his badges and by passing ythose without it. An officer who was ignorant of this was earlier saved the situation by a junior officer who noticed that he was not wearing the badge prior to Abacha's arrival. The junior officer gave him one and he had the privilege to receive Abacha's hand shake and be saved from being punished. Also, an officer Brigadier (now major) General Osahor was hand-cuffed and detained in the military garision, Lagos for interrogated a junior officer for using the Abacha's badge. The Nigerian military was under siege of the Abacha's regime.

Military administrators placed in charge of various states were personally instructed to arrest, detain or kill categories of politicians on the basis of the dreaded Decree 2. For instance, the former Administrator of Akwa Ibom State,

Colonel Yakubu Bako confessed that Abacha instructed him personally to arrest and/or kill some Akwa Ibom indigenes who were members of NADECO. His failure to accomplish the task which also involved the arrest of Chief Anthony Enahoro, who arrived Uyo sometimes early 1996, led to the beginning of his problem with Abacha. Colonel Bako graphically notes that:

I got a phone call from Abuja, and when I picked it up, Abacha was on the line. He said that he was aware that Enahoro was in Akwa Ibom, and that he came in with a bus. He instructed that I should make sure Chief Enahoro and the bus did not leave Akwa Ibom. And that since Enahoro checked into the hotel with a fake name it could easily be denied that he was not the one that got killed or burnt in Akwa Ibom State.... Enahoro checked out of Metro that same night.... I phoned General Abacha that night, telling him that while I was preparing to carry out his instructions, Chief Enahoro checked out. He just banged the phone on me. And he never forget that incident.... Abacha was such that if he trusted you and you failed him, he will never forgive you (Tell: August 28, 2000: 16).

There were other assignments which Bako was instructed to undertake after his removal as the Military Administrator of Akwa Ibom State if he still wanted to gain Abacha's favours. The new assignments included his appointment as Chief of Logistics in NECON where he was to carefully put up the logistics to ensure Abacha's civilian presidency. He first sought legal advice on the issue which General Abacha's Legal Adviser Dr. Auwalu Fadudu, who is privy to the original plan consented on the ground that election could hold even if there was only one contestant. Based on the nomination of Abacha's candidature by the five political parties, Colonel Bako contacted the Director-General, Nigeria Security and Minting Company to design voting cards for the lone candidature of the presidential election. Bako was also, in the course of his duty at the NECON, assigned together with one Sunaila Shuaibu to storm Yola prison, pretending to be armed robbers to release detainees, killing some while aiming at eliminating

Obasanjo. His failure to accomplish the last task finally led Abacha to frame him as being part of the coup plotters of the 1997 coup.

Like Babangida's AFRC, the highest military legislative body, the Provisional Ruling Council (PRC) under Abacha was only an empty shell as members were selected by Abacha himself. Abacha also inherited from Babangida and maintained the Israeli security machinery for the protection of Aso Rock Presidential Villa in addition to the security operations he set up. The Israeli Security operatives provided the intelligence and security gadgets. According to a report, a new \$12 million contract with Israel was initiated to achieve this. (**The News**: 29 August 1994:39). It should be pointed out that while serving as a Defence Minister under Babangida, Abacha masterminded the award of contracts for armour tanks from Britain. The arrival of these tanks at the time he assumed office was timely calculative. These tanks were to enhance his security operatives.

On the basis of the foregoing, therefore, it is important to emphasise that both Babangida and Abacha survived on the basis of pursuing "regime – perpetuation by elimination". The targets of elimination were the opponents. Under Babangida the oppositions, real potential or imagined, were either enticed, settled and coopted into the mainstream or periphery of power. Those that were not coopted, were silenced by assassins or rendered useless. The authority did everything possible to deprive, expose and publicly embarrass such opponents of the regime or those who fell out with the regime. In 1986 General Mamman Vatsa and nine other officers, especially Airforce officers, were killed for allegedly planning a coup. Initially, Babangida had raised the hope that coup planning must be differentiated from coup-executing. This

distinction provided a ray of hope that the coup planners would be fairly treated. However, later the Minister of Defence, General Sani Abacha disagreed with Babangida, pointing out that planning and executing a coup are the same. All pleas for leniency were turned down as Babangida decided to blame Abacha who refused to make the distinction and insisted on the killing of the coup plotters. In any case, as the President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, he had the power of prerogative of mercy, to grant the alleged coup planners mercy. He therefore, needed not to blame Abacha for the execution of the coup planners. Another area of potential elimination was the ill fated C-130 Hercules of the Nigerian airforce plane crash which killed over 140 military officers and staff of Command and Staff College, Jaji who were on study tour of Lagos. The plane which crashed at Oyingbo, near Lagos on the 26 September 1992 was suspected to be part of the state-sponsored elimination series of potential opposition group within the military against the perpetuation of the regime. Though Babangida denied this but for the fact that the families of the officers were not properly compensated and continued to live in fear of being ejected from the military barracks, the accusation is taken to be true in some circles.

As for Abacha, at the initial stage of planning to overthrow the Earnest Shonekan's ING, one of the strategies packaged was through fathom coup. As earlier noted, Abacha first lied to Abiola that Col Abubakar Umar and the other 'Babangida boys' in the military were planning a coup to forestall the actualisation of June 12. This endeared Abiola to support Abacha in his scheme to deal with and clear "Babangida Boys" from the military, before paving way to hand over power to him. Brigadier General Ahmed Abdullahi had, according to the initial plan by Abacha to topple Shonekan, listed the names of some business

executives to be circulated to the public with the claim that the junior officers had earmarked to kill than in a coup plan. The concept of a fathom coup was however, actualized by the regime in 1995 when all known critics of the regime like General Olusegun Obasanjo and General Shehu Musa Yar'adua were implicated in a coup plot against Abacha. They were sentenced to life imprisonment only after pleas from the international community. Obasanjo's offence was that he had told Abacha that he was not fit to rule Nigeria in the early period when he (Abacha) assumed power in Dodan Barracks, Lagos. While Yar'adua had used his influence during the Constitutional Conference to fix a terminal date for Abacha to handover power by January 1, 1996. These among other factors forced Abacha to eliminate his strongest opponents in preparation for his millennial reign. Equally too, according to Diya, the 1997 coup which implicated him, and others like General Abdulkarim Adisa and General Tajudeen Olarewaju was carefully planned out by Abacha security operatives led by the Chief of Army Staff, General Ishaya Bamiyi, to indict the victims. Having roped them in, the security operatives turned over their loyalty by reporting to Abacha all the plans made for the coup.

In defending himself before Justice Oputa's Commission, Diya pointed out that Bamayi, Magashi, and Idi Musa came to him with four point issues which they wanted to present to the Head of State General Abacha. He endorsed the decision because the points were based on national interest. Though Diya denied that there was no coup plot, those implicated with him like General Abdulkarem Adisa and Diya's ADC, Major Fadipe affirmed that there was actually a coup plan in place. General Victor Malu who tried the coup plotters affirmed also that if he was given another opportunity to re-try them, he would still convict General Diya and the rest. Before the latest revelation in the Oputa's

Commission the nation did not believe it was a coup, but a framed up coup. What is clear here is that the society would always find it difficult to believe a propaganda of threats by an authoritarian regime when the same regime is not only highly securitised but is itself become a threat and terror to the society. Therefore when such a regime comes up with allegations of coup plots it could be hardly believed by the public, especially when it had a reputation for framing previous phantom coups as a basis for 'regime perpetuation by elimination'. At the initial stage of the regime, both Abacha and Diya had planned to hold on to power up to the 2000. While Diya was thinking of the junta retiring and handing over to a democratic regime, Abacha had a longer ambition for self succession which he (Diya) opposed.

Diya had nearly lost his military career in the early days of the annulment of June 12 presidential election. Sometimes before June 12, 1993, Babangida was briefing the military and said the military would not be comfortable with Abiola's presidency. And Diya wanted to know which section of the military would not want Abiola's presidency. Babangida felt challenged and wanted to remove Diya from the military. It only took Gen Abacha's intervention to save Diya's career. (Un)fortunately Abacha only spared Diya's career for his self perpetuation programme. Diya was drawn in to defend a boss among his Yoruba kith and kin without knowing that Abacha had a larger plan on which Diya was not fully briefed.

Before the coup that implicated Diya, General Diya and his entourage were going to Makurdi for the condolence of Major Gen Lawrence Onoja, a Principal Staff Officer in the office of the General Staff, who lost his mother. Unknowingly bombs were planted in the plane. The delay in the journey led to

the explosion of the bombs leading to the immediate death of one of the security guards while the other died at the presidential Aso Clinic. Their names were Sumaila Shuibu and Usman Sumaila. After the incident, Abacha told Diya that his security personnel had been playing with grenades despite his (Abacha) warning to them. However, Diya in his memorandum to the Justice Oputa panel noted that even if they were playing with grenades despite presidential warning, the presence of Alhaji Ismaila Gwarzo, the National Security Adviser (NSA), Alhaji Arisekola Alao, FCT Commissioner of Police, Alhaji Mustapha, Gen Ishaya Bamaiyi and Major El-Mustapha, the Chief Security Officer (CSO) to the President - all die-heart fanatics of Abacha at the Nnamid Azikwe International Airport when the president was not travelling placed a question mark on the bomb blast around the plane that was to take him to Makurdi. It is possible therefore to conclude, without proper explanation that the officers were at the airport to collectively confirm his obituary. However, testifying at Oputa's panel General Bamaiyi, and others who later reacted, denied being at the airport at that time. However, according to Godwin Dabo, Major El-Mustapha, CSO, told him that though Abacha's plan to eliminate Diya and his entourage had failed, the next plan was through an arranged coup in which Diya would be involved (*The News*: 25 January 1999:21)

Meanwhile with the five political parties endorsing Abacha as a singular candidate for the presidential election, an organisation, Youth Earnestly Ask for Abacha (YEAA), led by Kanu and others began a campaign across the nation in support of Abacha's self-rule. YEAA organised a two million-man march in March 1998 in Abuja where people were paid to Abuja to demonstrate their support for Abacha's presidential ambition. In the light of the regime perpetuation, several radical opponents were targeted for attacks and bombing. In some cases

government buildings were bombed and the opposition was blamed for it, especially NADECO. The radical Lagos Lawyer, Gani Fawehinmi, raised an alarm in 1995 when two friendly security men informed him that government security operatives were planning to dump arms and ammunition in his new home at Mafoluku, Oshodi, in order to implicate him in the planning of a coup. (Afolabi, 1995:29). As early as 1994 the homes and offices of NADECO members were attacked and bombed. The Chamber of Gani Fawehinmi was attacked and his security guard killed. This was followed by petrol bombing of the office of CD where its Chairman, Beko Ransom-Kuti, escaped death. Other members whose homes were bombed were Air Cdre Dan Suleman (rtd), Cdre Ubitu Ukiwe (rtd), Abraham Adesanya, NADECO Chairman (after Adekunle Ajasin's death), Ayo Opadokun, NADECO Secretary, Godwin Ajayi, Lawyer to Abiola, and General Alani Akinrinade, among others. The glaring case was government's attempt to blame NADECO/NALICON over the bomb blast at the Murtala Mohammed Airport where the Airport Chief Security Officer, Dr Sola Omotsola, was blasted to death.

According to the government, Omotsola was fronting for NADECO. In a paper presented at the Nigerian Guild of Editors Forum on "Current Issues and New directions in National Security", the Inspector General of Police, Alhaji Ibrahim A. Coomasie, observes that:

On the question of terrorism in the form of bomb explosions and the like of them, we have made a lot of in-roads and are following several leads. We have established that the NADECO and NALICON are involved The airport incident has given the police a lot of leads. Besides linking that incidence with several others, all with NADECO/NALICON, the police has pieces of information to link these acts of terrorism with the establishment of Radio Kudirat (*The Guardian*: Lagos, July 16, 1997:13).

However Abubakar Tsav, the Commissioner of Police in Lagos state at the time of the episode refuted this allegation. He logically presented the facts on how the Inspector General of Police Alhaji Ibrahim Coomasie sent an Assistant Commissioner of Police, M.D. Abubakar to him without the knowledge of his Zonal Commissioner, Alhaji Alli-Jos, who was an Assistant Inspector General of Police. Alhaji M.D. Abubakar came with prepared press conference speech which he and Abubakar Tsav were to present to the press. Abubakar Tsav rejected the prepared speech because it did not reflect the investigation that was carried out during the airport bomb blast. Though MD. Abubakar went ahead to present the prepared speech to the press, accusing the NADECO/NALICON, the Lagos state Police Commissioner, Alhaji Tsav, later pointed out in an article "Facts of Omotsola's bombblast" :

I was so angry that at the end of the conference, I wrote a report to the Inspector General of Police, Mr Ibrahim Coomasie complaining against Mr M. D. Abubakar for making false press conference accusing NADECO of the bombblast. I stressed that the explosive allegedly recovered from the office of Dr. Omotsola were, in my view, planted there because they were recovered 11 days after the police had searched the same office and found nothing... Instead he (Ibrahim Coomasie) instructed me to withdraw my report... Based on this false press statement, Chief Olu Falae who was invited and interrogated and released by my detectives was re-arrested by the Presidential Task Force on Bomb Blast and detained *ad infinitum*. He was only released when General Abacha died (*Vanguard*: September 22:1999, 1999: p29 - 30).

The increase in state terrorism made most of the radical opponents of the regime to escape out of the country. Those who escape out of the country later formed a formidable opposition against the regime. Professor Wole Soyinka, for instance, used his status and his organisation, the National Liberation Council of Nigeria (NALICON), as a soliciting platform, for the support of the course of democracy. He was involved in conscientising the international community

through the establishment of Radio Kudirat as well as raising funds and undertaking strategies to topple the despotic regime of General Sanf Abacha. The extent to which the opposition in exile organised against Abacha was more than the time of Babangida. This was because under Abacha Nigeria reached the pinnacle of repression which was nurtured by Babangida himself.

Abacha in turn became hysterical as he sent Chief Odumegwu Ojukwu and Chief Ernest Shonekan to embark on a public relations campaign in overseas while foreign journalists, led by Bob Cohen of the CNN, were invited by the government to file in reports favourable to the regime of Abacha. However they were later declared *persona non grata* and deported because they were focusing their interest on the activities of the opposition, especially when they were billed to interview Chief Gani Fawehinmi. The regime of Abacha made incursions into the opposition camps, dividing them according to their strengths and weaknesses. This incursion however, made the opposition group more dynamic as they were hounded into exile. The regime succeeded as the weak ones among the opposition caved in, rationalizing either on patriotism by joining the regime with the hope of working from within the system to institutionalise June 12 and/or on the fact that June 12 has been regionalised and has become a Yoruba ethnic struggle rather than a national issue. Amongst these group are individuals like Alhaji Abubakar Rimi, Chief Solomon Lar, Jonathan Zwingina (the Campaign Manager of Chief MKO Abiola) Ebenezer Babatope, Dr Iyorchia Ayu, Olu Onagoruwa, Lateef Jakande, Alhaji Sule Lamido, among others.

Furthermore, the regime sponsored an undated publication titled "Nigeria: Why the International Conspiracy Against Nigeria" in which it castigated NADECO/NALICON activists. The publication gave the impression that the

opposition was sharply divided among themselves. The un-authored and unedited publication was indeed part of the efforts by the government to redeem its image before the international community which had been captured by the opposition groups.

“Area boys” in the western part of the country in protest and defence of pro-democracy activities equally attacked and destroyed the properties of those who had in one way or the other defended or were subtled in attacking the authoritarian regime. Those affected were Olusegun Obasanjo, Ernest Shonekan, Bola Kuforiji-Olubi, Samuel Ogbemudia, Ebenezer Babatope, among others. This was before the fahantom coup of 1995 which implicated Obasanjo. The radical constitutional lawyer, Dr Olu Onagoruwa, who joined Abacha’s regime on the basis of the understanding that June 12 would be actualized later felt marginalised. His presence was only a placard that could earn the regime credibility, but he suffered the consequence of identifying with the regime. He complained that his statutory functions as Attorney General and Minister of Justice were carried out by other faceless persons without his knowledge as the Chief Legal Officer of the Federation (Newswatch: 25 September 1996).

For instance, eight decrees were rolled out in a day after he made his complaint that decree No 107 section 10 of 1993 empowered the PRC to make laws for the country with the Ministry of Justice making the draft proposals and presenting such to the Head of State as Chairman of PRC. In the early period of the regime ten decrees were published, two of the decrees had ouster clauses. Onagoruwa protested and set up a committee to rewrite the decrees. His submissions based on the committee report was quietly put away by General Abacha. Onagoruwa’s effort to amend decree 17 of 1985 which Babangida

promulgated to enable him recruit and terminate the appointments of Service Chiefs at random was rejected by Abacha, who refused to endorse the amendment because it was an advantage to him. At the end Chief Olu Onagoruwa did not only lose out from the regime but had his son, Toyin, killed by assassins suspected to be State Security agents.

Between November 1993 and 1995, the PRC met only four or five times. The periods they met were to approve the appointments of military administrators for the states, and the list of government nominees for the constitutional conference. The Federal Executive Council also hardly met. Chief Michael Ani who was appointed minister of Finance functioned six months before he was sworn into the office. Abacha preferred to deal with the Ministers at an individual level rather than in a Federal Executive Council meeting where decisions would be collectively taken and policies debated and adequately formulated.

Unlike Babangida who used the frequent meetings of the AFRC (later NSDC) and the Federal Executive Council as a cover for collective responsibility to work out his regime interest, Abacha was the opposite. Babangida was a flamboyant dictatorship who carried himself as being in charge of State affair. Babangida could dribble the nation and could play on the understanding of the people even when he reneged on his promises and the decision of the AFRC. Abacha preferred solitary action. He worked at his own pace and would not like to be dictated to or agitated by any event or situation. At best he worked on the directives of his security operatives and spiritualists. As noted, "Abacha's dictum is say little, show little, keep them guessing" (Oladapo :1995:13). Richard Sklar puts it better, "By all accounts, Abacha is notoriously reclusive, he rarely

speaks in public and often fails to appear at scheduled events. His political stealth inspires fear and prudence, his machiavellian skills are unmistakable. With immense wealth in the form of Nigeria's oil revenue at his disposal, he cracks the whip of patronage with authority" (Sklar 1997:6).

The regime, in order to soften its repressive crack down on the populace, established the Petroleum Trust Fund (PTF) where the gains from the increase in the sales of petroleum were used to provide drugs, water, construct and/or maintain roads. Like Babangida, Abacha's settlement of his primary constituency, the military, was to establish the Armed Forces – Petroleum Trust Fund (AF-PTF). The AF-PTF as a special concession to the armed forces and the police provided the basis for serving and retired military/police officers and unit commanding officers to be awarded contracts to keep them financially buoyant and thereby maintain support for the regime. Meanwhile the main PTF headed by General Mohammadu Buhari became a place of pilgrimage for inducing support from the political class for the regime.

Its anti-corruption campaign was launched as War Against Indiscipline and Corruption (WAI-C). To this extent, to demonstrate a show case, some corrupt officers in the military, economic saboteurs, drug traffickers were either dismissed or brought under the Failed Banks Tribunal, Advance Fee Fraud (AFF), National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA). In order to strengthen its domestic supports, more states and local governments were created in 1997 bringing the total of local governments from 589 to 774 and states from 30 to 36. This helped to temporarily divert the attention of the general populace away from criticizing its repressive rule. The Abacha regime was indeed following

after the pattern put up by Babangida who had earlier seen State creation as one aspect of regime stability.

In order to enhance the repressive capacity of the regime, each state established a security operative with a mix of soldiers and police, ostensibly, to smash crime waves. The security squads operating in various State of the federation are well armed with the best weapons. Yet, the State governments that funded the squads had problem over which security arm to control the squad. The idea of confronting armed robbers with sophisticated operatives began in 1992 with the establishment Operation Zaki by Col Mohammed Marwa, then Governor of Borno State while serving under General Ibrahim Babangida. This idea was further espoused by Col Olagunsoye Oyinlola, Governor of Lagos State, December 1993 – 1996, to confront the rising waves of criminals in Lagos State. When Col Marwa was re-appointed to take over from Oyinlola he found Operation Sweep synonymous with Operation Zaki which he had established in Borno State where he earlier served as a Governor.

However, suddenly, given the increasingly opposition to the military regime of Abacha, the regime decided to operationalise the principle in all the states of the federation as a dress rehearsal for confronting opposition against Abacha's perpetuation strategy. Apparently, the records of the squad in Lagos where criminals were reprimed and liquidated tended to give precedence to the establishment of these other security outfit. Some of the squads established in some States of the Federation: Lagos Operation Sweep, Ondo Operation Gbale, Ogun Operation Wedge, Borno Operation Zaki, Imo Operation Storm, Edo operation Wipe, Ekiti Operation Checkmate, Kaduna Operation Smash, Rivers Swift Operation Squad, Abia Operation Ban

The Inspector General of Police, Alhaji Coomasie, rightly pointed out that the responsibility of containing the incident of armed robbery squarely rests on the federal government; and the agents established constitutionally to control the menace is the Nigerian police. Nevertheless, in defence of the security squads established by various states, the Inspector General noted:

.... though the federal government has tried to provide funds to enable the police force square up to the speed and sophistication of the society and its hoodlums, it is now clear that the federal government can't do it alone. The states had to come in, in terms of mobility and communication; and they seem to be picking up. Except that care must be taken to avoid establishing a parallel force in contravention of constitution." (Tell: Nov 3, 1992).

The issue is not the problem of establishing parallel force but that the squads were used to intimidate the opposition rather than the criminals they were purposely established for. Accordingly, there were some:

.... indications that the various parallel security outfits might have been established by various states so that they can be coopted into a repressive force to terrorize people and intimidate the opposition emerged when men of the Lagos state operation sweep dressed in battle fatigues complete with bullet proof vests, invaded the house of Nosa Igibor, editor-in-chief of TELL Magazine in the unholy hour (12:30am) of September 10, 1997, in search of Igiebor, claiming to have come from the presidency. After combing the house without success, they stormed his neighbour's house where they broke the door to a room under the impression that he was hiding their." (Agekameh: 1997:30).

It would be recalled that the same squads invaded the venue of a NADECO send-off ceremony organised for Ambassador Walter Carrington in utter disregard for diplomatic etiquette. They pursued the guests and hosts to an alternative venue of the send off at Ayo Adebajo residence where they snatched the microphone from the acting NADECO Chairman, Chief Abraham Adesanya. In addition, the same squad invaded Araromi street, Mushin, Lagos and sealed off

the office of Frederick Fasehun, a detained human rights activists, preventing family and friends from marking his birth day. As noted by Dele Agekameh:

“...the fear is that giving the hitherto hidden but now transparent agenda of self succession, there is every tendency for Abacha to get more desperate and ruthless against the opposition as his terminal date of October, 1998 draws near using the parallel security outfits to unleash terror on those who might stand in his way”. (Agekameh: 1997;30).

In his Independent day broadcast, October 1, 1997: Abacha commended the parallel security outfit. This was assented by the Chief of General Staff General Oladipo Diya, on October 13, 1997 at the Western States trade fair, adding that the security outfits was to create a safer society in Nigeria. (Teff: Nov 3, 1997). 6.7

CONCLUSION

Authoritarian regimes are very conscious of security. Therefore, resources for development are channeled towards the survival of the regime. Invariably the regime-leader is bestial with power and the defence of it is defined by the quality of 'secucracy' involved. Therefore, at all levels, whether economic, political, religion, socio-cultural and physiological, Babangida and Abacha had the capability, given the resources from oil money, to sway support towards the protection of their interests to the detriment of national interest. And it is based on their personal interests that the struggle towards the resolution of the Liberian and Sierra Leonean conflicts were effected. This was to divert attentions from domestic contradictions and thereby create credibility for themselves at the international scene. In subsequent, development they were able to intensify repression against opposition and work out measures towards self-perpetuation. It is in the light of this that Chapter seven would now focus on how the ECOWAS regional security like national interest had turned out to be the instrumentality for enhancing regime (security) interest.

CHAPTER SEVEN

NIGERIA AND MECHANISMS FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN WEST AFRICA: THE ECOMOG CASE STUDIES

7.1. INTRODUCTION

Nigeria's experience in conflict prevention, management, resolution and peace support operations since post independence has been adequately covered and documented (see Vogt and Ekoko 1993). However, it is contentious, given the critical analyses of the earlier chapters, whether the intervention in Liberia and Sierra Leone actually portrays the picture of Nigeria's previous involvement in conflict resolution and peace keeping mechanism. It is in this light that this chapter will first of all assess Nigeria's approach to conflict resolution. In doing so, the chapter will in the second part analyse the politics involved in the formation of ECOMOG. This is necessary for a proper understanding of recent developments in ECOWAS with respect to conflict resolution. The third and fourth part will focus on Liberia and Sierra Leone respectively. The effort in these sections is to demonstrate with empirical data the dimension with which Nigeria's intervention in Liberia and Sierra Leone was to cover up some regime interests. In conclusion, the chapter will in summary assert the position that regime interest tend to supersede national interest in any policy issues, whether domestic or foreign policies.

7.2. NIGERIA'S APPROACH TO AFRICAN CONFLICTS

Nigeria's population and resources represent what Africa stands for in the international system. Even if it does not gain from defending Africa, the fact remains that where the security of the continent is maintained, Nigeria is safer.

Hence, if Nigeria should equally break up today the entire West African subregion and indeed Africa will be in tumult. Therefore, Nigeria has effectively participated not only to ensure the formation of the OAU and ECOWAS but also provided necessary measures to enable these organizations address problems confronting Africa.

The need to build a continental organisation arose from the experience of handling the Congo Crisis. The Congo Crisis came at the peak of the Cold War. It did not only attract foreign influence and intervention but polarised Africa along the existing global ideological blocs. External influence was perpetuated in the continent through inter-state border conflicts and internal disorder. Therefore, there was the need for a common forum for African States to resolve their problems in order not to turn the continent "into another zone of persistent and generalised conflict which foreign powers could easily exploit". (Zabadi: 1997: 66).

Nigeria does not only abhor external influence in African affairs but is against unilateral intervention by a member state of the OAU in the internal affairs of another. For instance when Tanzania intervened in Uganda in 1978 to overthrow President Idi Amin, she expressed the concern that this trend might lead to the menace of extra-continental intrusion. And in 1977/78, Nigeria, though in vain, tried to "muster an African consensus for regional action in Shaba province to obviate the need for Zaire's recourse to outside focus" (Pekovjt: 1983:264 - 5). Given the discrete intervention in Africa, the then Head of State, General Olusegun Obasanjo called for African regional peace-keepers to intervene in African internal conflicts so as to deter the weaker, vulnerable States from being driven "into the laps of extra-African powers for defence and security" (*Ibid.*).

In the light of the above, Nigeria sees ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) as the ground swell for regulating conflicts from getting out of control. Nigeria has been noted to have used “spray diplomacy” and “sway diplomacy” to bring ECOWAS and ECOMOG respectively into existence. (Ojo: 1980; Yoroms and Aning: 1997) The rationale was not to create economic integration but also security related protocols, purposely to resolve conflicts (e.g. ECOWAS Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence 1981). These protocols were to become the mechanisms for providing the basis for the resolution of both Liberian and Sierra Leonean conflicts. In this regard Nigeria’s commitment to ECOMOG (ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group) has been seen as the “burden of community spirit” without which there would have been no ECOMOG.¹² (Adisa:1994; Mortimer: 1996: 161).

Nigeria has continued to see O.A.U. as the main organ of conflict resolution in the continent. She has often encouraged warring factions in the continent to always abide by the O.A.U mandate. She is one of the countries in Africa that believes in the principle of ‘Try O.A.U First’ instead of expecting that conflicts in Africa can be resolved through extra territorial influence of ‘imperial (global) hegemons’. And given the ideological impact of the cold war she joined the Non-Aligned Movement which was as a protest against the cold war politics between the East and West which had turned the third world countries into conflict theatres. Despite the end of the cold war the Non-aligned movement remains a platform for global contestation by the third world countries to press for economic development and sustained environmental condition.

There are three approaches adopted by Nigeria towards the resolution of conflicts occurring in Africa. These are through Mediation Conciliation and Arbitration; Peace-Keeping and Peace-Making; and Peace-Enforcement. In the area of mediation, conciliation and arbitration Nigeria has been in forefront providing mechanisms for resolving contentious problems in Africa. Though the commission on mediation, reconciliation and arbitration was created at the formative years of OAU it never took off with the expectation it deserved, and has been overshadowed by other diplomatic measures.

In the spirit of enforcing mediation, Nigeria's first task was to provide necessary support for the resolution of the Congo crisis. The Nigeria delegation, led by Alhaji Nuhu Baimali, to the extra-ordinary meeting of the OAU Council of Ministers in September 1964 suggested the establishment of an African military assistance to replace mercenaries from South Africa and the assistance being received from Belgium and USA. Though the suggestion was not accepted, Nigeria was made a member of the OAU Ministerial adhoc commission set up to look into the crisis. The commission by its mandate was to help and encourage the efforts of the government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to resolve the internal conflict; and by all means tried to restore normal relations between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the neighbouring states, especially the Kingdom of Burundi and the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville). Unfortunately the Commission failed to resolve the conflicts as the internal crisis within the OAU rendered it ineffective in finding a solution to the Congo crisis. This eventually led to the coup that brought Mobutu's to power in 1965.

At the height of the cold war Nigeria had some confrontations with the US and Britain over the conflicts in Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa. It

was a confrontation over the emancipation of Africa from the remaining vestiges of colonial rule and the apartheid regime in South Africa. Nigeria was in the forefront for the de-colonisation process in Africa. Her commitment to the liberation struggle in Africa was rationalised by a former military Head of State, General Olusegun Obasanjo, as thus: "we in Nigeria believe that so long as one inch of African territory is an occupied territory, we remain in bondage, and wherever any black or African is oppressed, we share the indignity". (Pekovitch: 1983). On the basis of this the Angola conflict brought to focus Nigeria's concern for peace on the continent. The sudden departure of the Portuguese had left a vacuum of leadership in Angola. The liberation fighters in Angola (MPLA, FNLA and UNITA) failed to accept a government of national unity. The situation was worsened with the interest shown by the United States and the apartheid South Africa to support UNITA and FNLA rather than a nationalist movement like MPLA. Nigeria reacted to this extra-regional solution to the Angola crisis, given the fact that President Gerald Ford of the United States embarked on a campaign to force African States and the OAU to support FNLA/UNITA alliance. The Nigerian military Head of State, General Murtala Muhammed, in his reaction stated thus:

It is in consideration of the unending role which the United States has played in African liberation struggle that the Nigerian Federal Military Government took very strong objection to the patronising interest which President Ford suddenly developed in the Angolan situation. It should be made clear that African memory is not as short as the American government thinks; we are intelligent enough to draw a distinction between foreign advice from friendly countries invited by patriotic forces to assist in maintaining national sovereignty and defend territorial integrity and those racist adventurers who take it upon themselves to invade African Countries in order to undermine their independence and exercise neo-colonialist control¹⁶ (see Wilmot:1980: 179).

Thus, in the face of US influence, Nigeria's diplomatic pursuit successfully convinced the member states of OAU to recognise MPLA. While Cuba sent troops to Angola to support MPLA, Nigeria provided resources to assist Angola in the face of US opposition to the presence of Cuban troops. As succinctly noted:

This action by Nigeria helped to stabilise the Angolan government and assisted the liberation struggles being waged by SWAPO in Namibia and ANC in South Africa. Even when peace talks began between the government and UNITA with the assistance of Portugal, the Soviet Union and the United States in the early 1990s, Nigeria still played a significant role in the process in 1997 with the inauguration of the government of national unity just as it had been with the liberation struggle in other parts of Africa. (Zabadi: 1997: 70).

Nigeria's support and commitment to the liberation struggle in Southern Africa made her an automatic member of the OAU Liberation Committee. This commitment was not only restricted at the level of government. The Nigerian public was mobilised and conscientised to see colonialism as evil and apartheid as a monster. While across the country the Nigerian public was made to raise money under Southern African Relief Fund (SARF) to raise support from Nigerians for the liberation struggles, The National Committee For Action Against Apartheid (NACAP) was equally set up to coordinate and provide financial and material supports for the liberation fighters, as well as academic training in Nigerian schools for black (South) Africans. Because of her commitment, Nigeria was often consulted by the OAU, UN and other countries outside Africa on any contentious issue in Africa. Nigeria has consistently lived up to this expectation and maintained a seat at the United Nations as, Chairman United Nations Action Against Apartheid until the end of apartheid.

In the case of the struggle for Zimbabwe independence, Nigeria provided both political and economic wherewithal to put pressure on Britain to facilitate the processes for the independence of Zimbabwe. These pressures included the nationalisation of British Petroleum and the withdrawal of the joint partnership from the British Barclays Bank, and changed its name to Union Bank. In Namibia, SWAPO was supported with all military, political, diplomatic and financial strength to ensure that it becomes a stable independent African nation after the liberation struggle. The former Nigerian Military President, General Babangida raised US 11\$million at a launching tagged Namibia Solidarity Fund and also made an official contribution of \$400,000 to the OAU to aid SWAPO's electoral campaign in 1989. In addition, the sum of \$162,674 was also contributed to the United Nations Transition Group (UNTAG) project on Namibia.

In the case of South Africa, Nigeria consistently stood against the minority regime in Pretoria. Nigeria struggled within the Commonwealth for the expulsion of apartheid South Africa in 1961, boycotted the Commonwealth games in Canada in 1976 in protest against Britain's support for South Africa, and disrupted the commonwealth games in Edinburgh, Scotland, 1986; by withdrawing at the last minute in protest against New Zealand's sport links with South Africa. In 1986 when South Africa bombed the ANC bases in Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Zinbabwe, Nigeria sent in ₦10 million for immediate capacity-building process. Nigeria joined other members of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group, set up by the Heads of State and Government of the Commonwealth to visit and assess the situation under apartheid South Africa, and to advise the Commonwealth appropriately. And before the collapse of apartheid in South Africa, Nigeria's Babangida invited the last bourbon of apartheid regime, President FW De clerk, to visit Nigeria " to appraise the progress in the process of de-

apartheidization". (Yoroms: 1992: 17). Like other diplomatic and mediation outreaches in the Continent, Nigeria followed and monitored closely the demise of the apartheid regime in South Africa as acknowledged in the record of her participation and support for the liberation movements (Ajala: 1989: 176 – 191).

Indeed, Nigeria has been a member of the OAU good offices committee involved in mediation in various conflicts in continent. The notable one was the Ethiopia and Somalia conflict over the Ogaden region. The region was claimed by Somalia on the ground that most of the inhabitants are Somali which Ethiopia disputed on the principle of the inviolability of inherited colonial boundaries enclosed in the OAU charter. In Chad, Nigeria played a significant role in restoring peace at the time the country was in crisis over leadership. The support given to one of the FROLINAT factions by Libya led the OAU to set up an Adhoc Committee of six member states, namely: Nigeria, Algeria, Cameroon, Gabon, Mozambique and Senegal, to examine the conflict critically for a possible solution.

Given the deepening nature of the conflict at that time and the inability of the OAU Adhoc Committee to address the conflict, Nigeria took up the challenges by sponsoring a series of conferences in Lagos and Kano, in 1979, which culminated in the formation of the Government of National Unity and Transition, made up of all the warring factions. (Joffe: 1981: 84 - 102). Nigeria also picked up the cost of OAU peacekeeping forces sent to create an enabling environment for holding free and fair elections in Chad. The cost totalled \$82 million. Nigeria has also played a leading role in ensuring the stability of the OAU. For instance the issue of recognising The Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) nearly broke up the organisation in 1983 when members states were divided on whether to admit the SADR as a member state or not. However when Nigeria rationally

decided to recognise the SADR, member states in turn favoured the SADR membership of the organisation; thus, preventing the disintegration of the organization. The persuasive speech of the then Nigerian Military Head of State, General Muhammadu Buhari at the OAU summit in Addis Ababa, 13 November 1984 clearly states that:

the western Sahara issue paralyzed our organisation for two years making it difficult for the regular 19th summit to meet as time due; it also prevented the celebration of our Twentieth Anniversary. For over eight years, we have tried to solve the conflicting claims of the parties to the disputes by establishing an Adhoc Committee which was subsequently converted into the Western Sahara Implementation Committee. The committee, since its inception, has been rendered impotent because of the un-cooperative attitude of one of the parties to the dispute. The overriding concern on our part is the survival of the Organisation African Unity. Nigeria is strongly committed to the objective just as we can never abandon our support for the principle of self determination. We are also concerned with the situation whereby political questions, such as the Western Sahara issue, have diverted the attention of our organisation from pressing socio-economic problems. It is for this reason that Nigeria has decided to recognise SADR and support its seating in this summit meeting. Let us now turn our attention to a more serious search for solutions to the Western Sahara issue and other pressing matters such as drought, hunger and economic development of our continent. (Buhari 1983).

Another conflict that became a major concern to Nigeria was the conflict in the Sudan. The conflict lingered for two decades with most African states being too reluctant to get involved because their objectivity may be questioned (Jonah: 1994: 11). In 1992 the OAU began to show interest in the resolution of the crisis. However, the task of negotiation, mediation and reconciliation fell on Nigeria when the Nigerian Military leader, General Ibrahim Babangida, became the OAU Chairman. Nigeria had several meetings with the Sudanese government and the leaders of the rebel groups, the SPLA (Sudan People's Liberation Army) led by Dr John Garang, to broker peace. Though the peace is yet to be brokered, it is a clear

case of Nigeria's interest in getting involved in the resolution of conflicts within the continent through the process of mediation, diplomacy, reconciliation and arbitration.

Nigeria's history of intervention in crisis has been through multilateral means, utilizing peace keeping operations. As earlier noted, the former Nigerian military Head of State General Olusegun Obasanjo had in the late 1970s enunciated the principles of Nigerian intervention policy. According to him, the intervention of African regional peacekeeping forces in internal conflict is a preferred measure to deter the weaker and vulnerable state from being driven into the laps of extra-African powers in search for defence and security. It is believed a regional collective defence intervention by African peacekeeping force is more justifiable as a countervailing force to foreign intervention. This formal declaration followed a predominant historical pattern of scepticism in Nigeria about unilateral intervention in the internal affairs of another country. Nigeria had hitherto preferred a collective regional or global intervention system. Hence, since independence, in 1960, Nigeria has been assuring her neighbours that one of its cardinal principles of foreign policy is non territorial ambition. Therefore when Tanzania intervened in Uganda in the late 1970 to uproot the bloody military dictator, Idi Amin, from power, General Olusegun Obasanjo denounced the intervention and argued that it would open a new wave of extra-continental encirclement of the continent. (Pelcovits 1983:256).

It was in regard of this traditional principle of foreign policy objectives that Babangida's hands were tied when the Liberian conflict became an issue. However in desperation to do something about Doe's security he decided to work on the psychology of the West African Heads of State and Governments who were at the

1990 Banjul ECOWAS Summit. The events which led Babangida to sponsor the Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) for the Liberian conflict was quite different from the usual process of Nigeria's perception of resolving conflicts on the continent. Babangida painstakingly convinced the authority of Heads of State and Government of the rising spectre of inter-state crises that was threatening the sub-regional regional security. The absence of an institutional mechanism for conflict resolution in ECOWAS was a major problem in resolving this spectre. Because his concern was the internal conflict in Liberia which if he had mentioned would cause more uproar he devised a strategy "to use the interstate conflict argument as a conscious smokescreen to manipulate the decision-making process; while tactically refraining from mentioning the major responsibility of the SMC; which was the resolution of the Liberian conflict" (Aning 1999 fn.1:208)

7.3 THE FORMATION AND POLITICS OF ECOMOG

ECOMOG stands for ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group. It was established by the Standing Mediation Committee which was set up in May 1990 at the 13th Summit meeting of the Authority of ECOWAS in Banjul whose origin could be traced to Babangida of Nigeria. (Agetua: 1992) Babangida's Nigeria was interested in intervening in the Liberian crisis to rescue a friend, President Samuel Doe, trapped by the crisis. The relationship between Babangida and Doe dates back to 1985 when Babangida came to power. Doe was one of the first world leaders who recognized Babangida's leadership after he had toppled General M. Buhari from power. Doe needed Nigeria's relationship which the civilian regime of Alhaji Shehu Shagari denied him because of the bloody coup by President William Tolbert. Buhari who tookover from Shagari was preoccupied with domestic affairs and had no time for external relationship with Doe or any other leader. Babangida's extension of friendship to Doe led Doe's

Liberia to establish the Babangida School of International Relations at the university of Liberia. Babangida responded by paying the Lecturers most of them recruited from Nigerian universities their salaries. In addition, Babangida used the Nigerian government money to buy over Liberian debt incurred by the government of Samuel Doe. The debt was worth \$30ml. He further sponsored the construction of the Liberian section of ECOWAS Trans-African Highway which Liberian was unable to meet.

When the Liberian crisis started, Doe visited Nigeria and later sent emissaries soliciting for arms and support. Babangida sympathized and sent arms and materials. These arms happened to fall into the hands of Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front rebels (*African Concord* 27 August 1990: 28). Though this enriched Charles Taylor's stock of arms but it, invariably, was the beginning of antagonism between Nigeria and Charles Taylor's NPFL, which did not only prolong the war but turned Nigerians out as target by the rebels. This informed the killing of Nigerians by NPFL rebels while raiding embassies and churches in Monrovia. Furthermore, two Nigeria journalists were killed by Charles Taylor's soldiers. Though Nigeria denied arming Doe, Taylor confirmed that documents recovered from the Nigerian Embassy indicated to the contrary. While Babangida was fraternising with Samuel Doe, Doe himself accused Felix Houphouet Boigny of Cote d'Ivoire of collaborating with the NPFL. Apart from the interest demonstrated by various regimes in the Liberian crisis, there were reported cases of humanitarian problems. The rate of refugees increased as there were no shelter, food and medical facilities. Realising that the NPFL had surrounded the presidential mansion where he was trapped, Doe sent a desperate dispatch to Babangida to do something for his safety.

Babangida exerted considerable influence on ECOWAS, and his desire to use the organisation as a foreign policy instrument was reflected in his proposal and intensive lobby for the setting up of a Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) (Agetua: 1992). About two weeks after the adoption of SMC, President Babangida in a meeting with the Sierra Leonean special envoy, Dr. Sheka, on June 24 1990, declared his intention that SMC would be used to deal with the Liberian situation. This revelation run contrary to the general impression at the Banjul summit which it was assumed would resolve the inter-state conflicts in the sub- region. There was no indications that the summit in Banjul was intended by Babangida to facilitate the attainment of his objectives in Liberia, using the subregional body as a cover up. At Banjul he covertly noted

“In view of the occasional clashes from political misunderstanding among some of our member states, I propose that the Summit should set up a Standing Mediation Committee of four members including the country that holds the chairmanship of the authority. Such committee should intervene in timely fashion, whenever such dispute arise. The membership of the committee could be reviewed every three years”. (Babangida 1990:14).

His proposal was accepted because most member states of the AHSG were concerned with resolving inter-state conflicts like the one between Senegal and Mauritania, and Guinea Bissau and Senegal among others which had remained problematic. Babangida's wizardry was masterminded by the fact that the outgoing ECOWAS Chairman, Blaise Compaore Burkina Faso, had deliberately overlooked the Liberian crisis in view of his support for the rebel groups NPFL, fighting to overthrow president Doe. Though Liberia was discussed at the Banjul meet but in parenthesis because it was only seen within the context of intra-state crisis which the OAU Charter Article 3 has spelt out within the context of non interference. It was seen as an internal affair of Liberia. The Decision establishing SMC states that the Committee would comprise of four member states namely:

Nigeria, Ghana, The Gambia, and Togo. Later Mali was included. The inclusion of Mali, according to Aning, is difficult to understand given its criticism of the ECOWAS collective security régime at the time POMAD was established (Aning 1999:209). However, it is not easy to understand the choice of SMC membership other than the fact that they could easily be coopted or manipulated by Nigeria.

According to the instrument setting up SMC, a member state involved in a dispute or conflict with one or more member states and would want regional intervention should inform the Executive Secretary in writing of its intention. The Executive Secretary is expected to refer the matter to the SMC. It is the duty of the ECOWAS Executive Secretary not only to facilitate the work of the committee but of the Authority and Government of the other member states of SMC whose knowledge of actual or impending dispute or conflict between two or more members would help resolve the conflict. However, the major function of the Committee as specified in article 4 is:

where there is a dispute, the chairman of the authority shall convene the other members of the committee as early as practicable and inform the members states involved in the dispute or conflict of the preparedness of the committee to initiate mediation procedures. **The chairman shall report to the Authority at its next session of the nature of the dispute or conflict, the parties involved, the mediation effort made by the committee and the outcome of such mediation.** (emphasise mine). (ECOWAS Journal: 1992, Vol 2)

However, in the case of Liberia, when the SMC got a report it the SMC went into action on behalf of AHSG calling on parties to the Liberian conflict, based on the letter sent to the Committee Chairman by President Samuel K. Doe of Liberia, to

- a. cease all activities of a military or para military nature, as well as all acts of violence;
- b. Surrender all arms and ammunition to the custody of the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) set up by the committee;
- c. refrain from importing or acquiring or assisting or encouraging the importation and acquisition of weapons or war materials;
- d. refrain from any act that might prejudice the establishment of Interim Government or the holding of elections;
- e. release all political prisoners and prisoners of war;
- f. respect, unless otherwise suspended to facilitate the administration of the country by the interim government, the constitution of the Republic of Liberia adopted on 6th January 1986; and
- g. fully cooperate with ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee, ECOWAS, Executive Secretary and ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) for the effective maintenance of the cease-fire and the restoration of law and order.

The committee established ECOMOG made up of the SMC member states incorporating forces from Guinea and Sierra Leone, the two Liberian neighbouring states. ECOMOG forces arrived Monrovia, Liberia in August 1990. The setting up of ECOMOG was met with opposition because its mandate of operation was not clear. The problem was whether it was a peacekeeping force or peace enforcement assignment. However, to reduce tensions ECOMOG was structured in such a way that Ghana was to produce the Force Commander, Guinea to produce Deputy Commander and Nigeria was to produce the Chief of Staff. The intervention in Liberia was not favoured by


Francophone member states because it contravened the articles setting up SMC. Nigeria also dominated the leadership structure of ECOMOG. The death of Doe, in the presence of ECOMOG soldiers, led Nigeria to take over the military command structure of ECOMOG (See Figure 7.1). General Joshua Dogonyaro was appointed the Force Commander to replace General Quano of Ghana. Dogonyaro's style of command of ECOMOG was beyond peacekeeping which his predecessor General Quano had maintained. ECOMOG was enforcing the peace with human lives. Nigeria increased her troops, at least up to 70% of the total troops were Nigerians. It also provided funds and logistics. Senior Ghanaian military experts felt that Nigerian attitude was inappropriate as it was too willing to resort to enforcement measures instead of dialogue and mediation: "there is Nigeria's passion to annihilate Charles Taylor" (West Africa 19-25 ...1992, and Cleaver & May 1995: 492-493). In reaction, Nigeria pointed out that the replacement was rather to provide for operational efficiency.


In an interview with General Quano, he sounded regrettable for that happened in Liberia. His regret was that he was not given the mandate to enforce peace yet every one would like to blame him for the initial problem ECOMOG faced. In fact, to him there was no clear mandate at the initial stage. The troops spent two weeks in Freetown waiting for a clear mandate that remained foggy. As at the time ECOMOG arrived Monrovia it had no strength to confront NPFL's sophisticated weapons. And he wondered how he could have led a fight where Taylor would have wasted their lives. He recounted a situation where some few Nigerians became a shield for him when Taylor's NPFL were tearing Monrovia with missiles. For missing the list containing the names of those soldiers who shielded him, he has decided to give honour to the Nigerian military whatever the grudges he ever had against it (interview, September, 2001).

The the confrontation with Ghana was going on, , Francophone states invariably took offence and began, under the sage Huopluet Boigny of Cote d'ivoire, to chart their course of conflict resolution in favour of Charles Taylor of NPFL. First of all the formation and intervention of ECOMOG into Liberia was without the consent of AHSG. Secondly, Nigeria was pursuing a bellicose war against Francophone interest in Liberia. According to a Diplomatic Dispatch to the State House Department, Washington DC, the former president of Benin Republic Nicephoros Soglo had thrown up his hand over Liberia, declaring that Nigeria had taken over ECOMOG and that ECOWAS was too divided to have a common policy for a peaceful resolution of the problem. And Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso was said to have questioned the competence of SMC by noting that: "as far as we are concerned the mediation committee of ECOWAS is not competent to intervene in a member state's internal conflict (Obasi 1992:172-203). The Francophone states became scathing of Anglophone peace initiatives and began another process through the Committee of Five (CF) as a counter poise to SMC in handling the Liberian crisis. The CF member states were Cote d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, the Gambia, Mali and Togo.

Figure 7. 1

ECOMOG ECOMMAND STRUCTURE





Legend

COO	-	Chief of Operations Officer
CMIO	-	Chief Military Information Officer
CAO	-	Chief of Air Officer
CNO	-	Chief Naval Officer
CCO	-	Chief Communication Officer
CLO	-	Chief Liaison Officer
COL	-	Chief of Logistic
CMPIO	-	Chief Military Press Information Office
CPO	-	Chief Personnel Officer
FMP	-	Force Provost Marshall
FSM	-	Force Sergeant Major

Note: GSOII (Operations) (GH), DCP The entire structure of all ECOMOG formations and staff elements were Nigerian less the FMP (GH), O (GH), SOI (Log) (SL), Camp Comdt (GAM), and FSM (GM), (The prefix 'D' represents a Deputy). See details in Bbagye:1999, op. cit

Babangida instead of the ECOWAS Chairman was issuing directives to the Force commanders. During General Joshua Dongoyaro's tenure as a field Commander and thereafter, the Chairman of ECOWAS was sidelined as General Babangida's decision held sway in the implementation of ECOMOG policies. General Abacha was to benefit from this. Even so, Nigeria continued to retain the topmost positions in the ECOMOG structure.

The Gambia, an Anglophone state, was made a member of CF because it was holding the ECOWAS chair. But when the Committee of Five (CF) was established, unfortunately it was not The Gambia that was chairing the meeting of CF as in SMC. It was instead Houphouet Boigny of Cote d'Ivoire that held the chair of CF. The Committee of Five was purely a Francophone affair intended to address the targeting of NPFL by ECOMOG and its deadly pursuit to annihilate Charles Taylor as designed by Operation Octopus of 1992. The position of the Francophone states and other member states of ECOWAS were to scale down outright attacks against Charles Taylor's NPFL, accept Taylor's call for a reduction in the number of forces and the need to merge SMC with CF to establish the Committee of Nine (CF); made up of Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, Togo, The Gambia and Senegal. This compromise which was supported by Jimmy Carter, one of the peace negotiators, led ECOWAS to conveniently present a common position to the UN on Liberia, as well as meeting under the Cotonou ACCORD where both ECOMOG and the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) were able to provide a Joint Cease-fire Monitoring Committee (JCMC) to ensure encampment, disarmament, and demobilisation. The relative peace provided equally created various multi-track channels of negotiation, mediations, and reconciliation through various meetings and accords. Despite a prolonged period of negotiation, peacemaking and peace enforcement, elections were organised ushering the NPFL rebel leader, Charles Taylor, as the elected President. The election in July 1997, finally ended almost eight years of protracted civil war.

The hangover from the Liberian crisis spread to Sierra Leone. Already the Fodeh Sankoh's Revolutionary United Front (RUF) which was fighting various governments of the Sierra Leone, since the regime of Joseph Momoh, Capt.

Valentine Strasser and Brigadier Maada Bio to the elected government of Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, had military and political alliance with Charles Taylor's NPFL. Both had training in Libya and by implication the Francophone states would prefer to identify with Sankoh, if only to maintain their relationship with Taylor. The crisis in Sierra Leone was compounded when Major Johnny Koromah overthrew the elected government of Alhaji Ahmed Tejan Kabbah on 25 May 1997. Major Koromah in trying to play safe, invited Sankoh's RUF to join his Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). The Koromah's AFRC-RUF administration was supported by leading opposition leaders in Sierra Leone like Dr Abbas Bundu and John Karefa-Smith who was the leader of opposition in the parliament.

The deposed regime of Kabbah however, led a mounted propaganda for ECOWAS to intervene and restore him back to office. Like Samuel Doe, Kabbah decided to make Nigeria his 'Mecca' where the Late Nigerian Military leader, General Sani Abacha, was pleaded with to sponsor and support any initiative to restore him back to office. General Abacha was too willing to do so. And being the Chairman of ECOWAS at the time of the Sierra Leonean crisis he paved way for ECOWAS intervention.

The first step was the establishment of ECOWAS Committee of Four at the level of Heads of State and Government and at the ministerial level from countries like Ghana, Nigeria, Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire. The ministerial meeting of the Committee of Four in Guinea on the 26th June 1997 resolved that: a) President Tejan Kabbah be speedily reinstated; b) immediate restoration of Peace and security in Sierra Leone; and c) the resolution of the problems of refugees and displaced persons.

Failure to implement this the Koromah-led AFRC-RUF administration would face imposition of sanctions/embargo and the use of force from member states. The refusal of Koromah's regime to accept the order from ECOWAS actually led to the intervention of ECOWAS-ECOMOG in Sierra Leone. The ECOWAS Chiefs of Staff met in Abuja 26-27 August 1997, recommended and as approved by the AHSG the extension of ECOMOG's field operation to Sierra Leone to enforce embargo for an initial period of four weeks. As usual Nigeria favoured a bellicose approach as against Ghana's dialogue with the Koromah leadership. The intervention to enforce peace by ECOMOG took the same pattern as it was done in Liberia. While AFRC-RUF were fighting to defend their power, ECOMOG launched a counter offensive with backup from the traditional Kamajor hunters (otherwise known as Civil Defence Force). With this, Tejan Kabbah was reinstated on the 10th March 1998, with Abacha in attendance at a ceremony in Freetown, Sierra Leone. However, Koromah and his AFRC-RUF rebel controlled the diamond-rich rural areas, Kabbah was only left with the capital, Freetown. ECOWAS got to know that AFRC-RUF had reinforced with arms and fighting forces in anticipation to enter Freetown to attack the government of Kabbah and citizens in the city. The attack which took place between December 1998 and January 1999 led to loss of lives and properties. Liberia's Charles Taylor was accused together with Libya for providing buffers, arms and ammunitions, and fighting forces for the rebels. Nigeria assumed the leading voice calling for the trial of Charles Taylor, the President of Liberia. While ECOMOG was reinforced to fight Koromah's AFRC-RUF, a significant figure in the peace process, Fodeh Sankoh, was being detained in Abuja by the Abacha's regime.

The question was rightly asked, "with the RUF in alliance with the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, AFRC, and its Vice President, an unwilling detainee of the Nigerian government, how will the NFPL react? (Yoroms and Aning 1997:18). This question was taken lightly by ECOWAS and it was to have a devastating effect on ECOWAS performance in Sierra Leone. Thus, it is assumed also that General Abacha of Nigeria saw the crisis as a means for diverting Nigeria's domestic interest from his intention to perpetuate himself in office. Abacha had learned from Babangida the art of holding hostage a key figure in a given conflict. For instance, at the death of President Doe in Liberia, President Babangida order his soldiers to captured Prince Yormie Johnson (who killed Doe) and ferried him to Nigeria under the pretext that his absence would lessen tension and could lead to quick resolution of the crisis. In spite of this the Liberian conflict lasted longer than it was anticipated.

The release of Fodeh Sankoh after Abacha's death, and also as part of demand by AFRC-RUF for peaceful negotiation, finally relaxed tensions and provided the overtone for negotiation. How long would the ECOWAS/ECOMOG continue to resort to 'hard peace' which has often been left behind with trails of cargoes of human deaths and uncountable damages? Whatever the case it has been suggested that ECOWAS needed to allow the goals of its transformation to be reconciled and harmonised with the organs of its security co-operation as a means for concrete establishment of a new security regime in ECOWAS (Yoroms and Aning: 1997:56). Despite this position, it is important to recast the events in the Liberian and Sierra Leonean crises in order to ascertain the level of support and alliances that counted against or favoured regime security interest. Hence the basis for the harmonisation of security cooperations must depend on how regional security is pursued without much focus on regime interest.

7.4 PROBLEMATISING THE MECHANISM OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN LIBERIA AND SIERRA LEONE

Elsewhere, we noted that ECOMOG was an indigenous regional effort to resolve the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone. But after eight years ECOWAS was forced to accept what it had been fighting against, that is, the installation of Charles Taylor as the Liberian President. Thus with Charles Taylor finally enthroned as the executive president of Liberia and Cpl Fondel Sankoh - Major Johnny Koromah working relationship in Sierra Leone, against Tejan Kabbah, ECOMOG had not really succeeded in achieving the purpose it was set out. Rather, certain regimes (including Babangida and Abacha) only used it as instrument for "regime - preserving" organs (Aning 1996). To what extent can we ascertain this in the case of the two conflicts in West Africa?

7.4.1. REGIME INTEREST, ECOMOG AND THE LIBERIAN CONFLICT: THE BABANGIDA AGENDA

At the Summit of ECOWAS Authority in Banjul in May 1990 to establish SMC was established with the intention to address conflicts that were occurring in the sub-region. It turned out that the intention became contradictory, given the multi dimensional interpretation by the interests involved. This had some impacts on the level of support for, or withdrawal, from ECOMOG. Within the context of Nigeria's domestic scene, Babangida's sponsorship of ECOMOG was, as pointed out in the earlier chapters, not generally accepted by Nigerians. Apart from noting that it might not have been discussed by the Armed Forces Ruling Council it might as well be discussed but in his usual characteristic which Amuta points out "... where the issue on hand is weighed policy implications, he does his

homework well enough to engineer the kind of consensus that would enable him to carry the day and his way" (Amuta, 1992;13)

In carrying the day and his way, national interest is jeopardized. For the whole gamut of national interest was not well articulated by Nigeria in the intervention in Liberia. Nigeria failed to determine her objective before launching troops into the Liberia imbroglio (Iweze 1994:11). According to Iweze, the failure by Nigeria had assessed the situation before participating in ECOMOG would have provided the basis to determine whether to effect aid support only or physical intervention was required. The assesment process could have taken into consideration Babangida's previous military assistance to Doe, the conferment of an honorary degree by the university of Liberia on President Babangida at the instance of Doe. In the light of this, it could have been noted that Nigeria's participation and intervention would favour Doe and was likely to draw hostility from the other two warring factions as well as injured Nigeria's national interest. A joint security Committee could have been set up to assess whether contribution of aid was a better option than direct intervention (Iweze 1994: 11).

Some reports from various newspapers in Nigeria shows that most Nigerians saw the intervention in Liberia as Babangida's personal agenda. A report in **Weekend Concord** newspaper after the election in Moronvia noted that

Although Nigerians backhome are also rejoicing with Liberians over the victory of the ballot over the bullet, they are also blaming the seven year carnage in Liberia on ex-president Babangida's intervention to save his close friend, late Sergeant Samuel Doe, from being ousted by a civilian, Charles Taylor (**Weekend Concord**: Lagos, August 2, 1997)

In the same vein, a social critical, Gani Fawehinmi, opines that:

By the time ECOMOG moved into Liberia, Taylor had enriched the whole of Moronvia and was almost at the presidential mansion. Babangida's unnecessary intervention in Liberia cost Nigeria a lot of our resources. He just wanted to keep a discredited friend in power by using a phony band called ECOMOG (**Weekend Concord** August 2, 1997 P.1).

In short, there is a general discerning opinion that Babangida was only interested in using ECOMOG to protect Doe since he (Babangida) too was interested in becoming life - president of Nigeria, "a selfish ambition that threw all of us to the problem we are today" (**Concord**: September 13, 1992). The problem according to Brigadier General Benjamin Adekunle (rtd), is not the keeping of peace by Nigeria troops in Liberia: "But what I quarrel with is the hidden Agenda of the evil genius. He lied to his fellow heads of State in ECOWAS about the need to intervene in Liberia. Whereas in his heart he just wanted a companion in his ambition to convert Nigeria to his personal estate. And because of this so many lives were lost" (**Weekend Concord**: September 13, 1992). The ways and manner ECOMOG engaged itself in the crisis also created the fear that Nigeria will suffer its own part of the Vietnam Saga. Ebenezer Babatope called for the immediate withdrawal of Nigerian troops because "it will be dangerous for Nigerian troops to be involved in a senseless war that has no relevant to our national aspiration" (**Daily Times**, November 6, 1990:15).

In the light of this, the **National Concord** newspaper in its editorial called for either sanctions or military action depending on which would create the immediate peace or else the troops should disengage with decency and dignity (**National Concord**: September 21, 1992:6) As for Akinola Aguda, ECOMOG's intervention is unjustifiable under international law. According to him, there is

nothing in the treaty creating the community which gives power to any of the members states to intervene in the domestic affairs of another members state, even if the states whose nationals were entrapped in Liberia were justified in attacking Liberia, such justification can hardly apply by the five ECOWAS countries who in effect could be seen will be colonising Liberia (**African Concord**: 21 January 1991 P.37). But Richard Akinjide, former Minister of Justice, had earlier argued to the contrary, by citing two Security Council documents which are crucial to a fair understanding of the international law aspect of Liberian situation as regard ECOMOG intervention (**West Africa**: 3828, December 24, 1990 - 6 Jan 1991, 3030 -3091).

Olu Onaguruwa, a constitutional lawyer, also said "Babangida is sending Nigerians to their graves in Liberia. We have no business in Liberia. He (Babangida) came to power here (in Nigeria) by force and Taylor wants to come to power by force in his own country..." (**Tell**: November 23, 1992:24). The issue is not that the use and rule of force should prevail in any region of the world but that in preventing the use and the rule of force, nations must take into consideration guiding principles of intervention in international law. This is why Nigeria's led intervention in Liberia and Sierra Leone is further faulted by other critics like Bolaji Akinyemi (**Guardian**: London, June 5, 1997), and the Editorial of the **New York Times** of June 6, 1997.

At the beginning of the conflict, the Military leader of Guinea, President Lansana Conte, pointed out that ECOMOG intervention in Liberia was necessary because West African leaders cannot afford to allow civilians to topple military regimes. This position was supported by Genral T.Y. Danjuma who says thus:

"I supported the mission to Liberia. If that contingent did not go, first Charles would taken over in Liberia. That would have sent signals to such countries as Togo, Cameroon, Republic of Benin and Ghana, where

there are many viable militant oppositions to the incumbent governments... Taylor nearly did it but for ECOMOG... That's too close for comfort " (**Newswatch**: November 2, 1992).

However, General Danjuma reacted that the delay in resolving the Liberian crisis was turning ECOMOG

"into Nigeria's bay of Pigs. We are losing a lot of men. But, what is more disturbing is that we appear to be losing them for no purpose. We don't seem to be succeeding in bringing law and order to that country. We should own up and pull out... that the job is beyond us" (**Newswatch**: November 2, 1992).

Earlier on, Babangida in a response to similar accusations noted that Liberia will not be a Nigerian Vietnam. ECOMOG forces are soldiers without enemies or favoured faction in the conflict, they can only open fire in self defence (**Daily Sketch**: November 1992 p.10). He further pointed out that ECOWAS cannot be disintegrated because of the Liberian crisis. With the death of President Doe it was expected that peace would return to Liberia as quickly as possible. This created distrust among the ECOMOG member states. Because of Doe's death, President Joseph Momoh of Sierra Leone sacked the Sierra Leone contingent Commander in ECOMOG, Lt. Col. Modu Hanciles for betraying the enviable pride of Sierra Leone's military and in the process nurture a culture of mistrust in ECOMOG. Lt. Col Hancile was present at the scene of the incident where President Doe was captured. This was followed by Guinea sacking ECOMOG deputy Chief, Lt. Col Lamina Megassouba for a similar offense. Efforts made by Togo to dispatch 800 contingents of the military to reinforce ECOMOG was later dropped because of the absence of a ceasefire (Interview, Abuja, July 1999). Togo was not prepared to send her soldiers for enforcement but peace keeping. This made Souleymoye Sore, the Charge d'Affairs at the

Burkina Faso Embassy in Lagos, to say that the continued presence of ECOMOG in Liberia might lead to the perpetuation of the crisis.

Margaret Vogt's argues against the position of Sore, pointing out that such a crisis may instead turn Compaore to be in conflict with the four member nations sponsoring ECOMOG. In such a conflict she believes that Compaore can never win (Newbreed: 22 October, 1990). She believes that with the round of offensive launched by ECOMOG, Charles Taylor and his external sponsors would soon give in. Charles Taylor has been doubtful of Babangida winning the Liberian war. According to him, "Babangida is trying to make Liberia his private estate. Because he has very selfish interest in Liberia, he has sent warships, aircraft and armoured Tanks to kill Liberians. No one in Liberia is going to compromise the sovereignty of Liberia to Babangida" (Tell: Lagos November 23, 1992).

The then Executive Secretary of ECOWAS Dr. Abbas Bundu reacted that "ECOMOG is not the creation of Nigeria. It is the creation of ECOWAS. So all Taylor's accusations and other people are false" (Tell: November 23, 1992). He posited that Nigeria was only playing its leadership role in ECOMOG which is a neutral force. Charles Taylor's emphasis on Babangida as the main force behind ECOMOG shows how regime-leader could be foremost as a causal factor in the escalation of conflict. To him "Babangida has prevented every discussion between and among Liberians. Babangida has done nothing to bring peace to this country. All this he brought is blood and mayhem on the Liberian people" (Weller: 1994:296).

In spite of this pessimism, the "bold attempt at regional peacekeeping" took seven (7) years to be concluded, with the main rebel leader Charles Taylor installed as a democratic leader of Liberia. ECOMOG rather militated the earlier

search for peace in Liberia and it became difficult to vindicate it in view of the long period it took to resolve the conflict. What worried Nigerians most was the deliberate refusal of Babangida's government to evacuate Nigerians trapped in Moronvia during the war. "Charles Taylor's forces attacked the Nigeria Embassy in Liberia and held Nigerians and nationals of the other countries hostages. While the American marines cruised in to evacuate the Americans, British and other European nationals, Babangida was not bothered inspite of pressure to evacuate Nigerians out of Liberia.

Any nation willing to intervene in a foreign campaign either for peace or for war should first protect its citizens trapped in the conflict zone. This is a foremost national interest. The failure of Babangida to do this raises the question of what paramount interest did his regime have in Liberia other than subordinating the safety of Nigerians for regional interest. However, Babangida only found the excuse that "Liberians are our brothers and Nigerians over there lived together with them and see them as part of the society. I dont think it is right for any government to create any dislocation between fellow Africans over the evacuation exercise" (*African Concord*: 27 August 1990: 30). This was too escapist argument and a clear demonstration that regime interest superceded national interest. Indeed, Funso Akingbade, one of the lecturers at the Ibrahim Babangida Graduate school of International Relations, Moronvia, disagreed with his employer (Babangida): "Nigeria has no excuse for failing to evacuate her citizens when things got our of hand" (*Ibid*: 30). According to him a Nigerian woman running to the Nigerian Embassy for safety accused the Embassy staff (as representing Babangida) "it is you people who make friends with Doe who will be first to leave so that we will be abandoned in this place" (*Ibid*: 30). They were actually abandoned.

The reason for the non evacuation of Nigerian citizens at the height of the war was clearly brought out by a source in the Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to this source, evacuating Nigerians at the on set of the war would have embarrassed Samuel Doe the more, and would have heightened the fear that the situation was indeed precarious. Why was this precarious situation not applied when the US, a long time friend of Liberia, was evacuating her nationals and other European citizens? Why must Nigeria's evacuation hurt Doe? Should Nigerians be sacrificed to save Doe? Surprisingly, Guinea which was equally penciled down for reprisals by Charles Taylor provided an airline to evacuate her nationals, where a Nigerian, Funso Akingbade, found a safe valve for escape out of Moronvia. Indeed, not only in Nigeria, but in Ghana there were public pressures mounted for the soldiers to come back home as they could not understand "what are we fighting for" (**West Africa**: 1 - 7 July 1991, No 3851, and Aboagye: 1999:98). As a result, Nigerians began to accept the position of Blaise Compoare of Burkina Faso against ECOMOG's intervention. According to Femi Aribisala,

"it is wrong for member states to set up permanent mediation group. What should have happened should have been ECOWAS setting up a mediation committee on a case by case approach since relevant parties to the dispute might not like the face of some countries chosen to serve on the committee if they are made permanent member" (**African Concord**: 27 August 1990 3).

Therefore, the SMC was a contravention of the 1978 non-aggression protocols. And as pointed out by Adisa... "the Nigerian initiative to intervene in Liberia was a function of selfish interest - the desire to protect Doe" (Adisa: 1992 : 222). Therefore, some six non-governmental organizations (Nigerian Union of Journalist, Civil Liberties Organisations, Committee for Defence of

Human Rights, Gani Fawehinmi Solidarity Association, the National Association of Nigerian Students, and Women In Nigeria issued a joint press statement pressing for Nigeria's withdrawal from ECOMOG (Adisa: 1992: 222-223).

There was a lot of pressure from the public, the press and the diplomatic circle for the evacuation of Nigerians out of Liberia but Babangida refused. Thus, Adekanye notes that certain developments in the sub-region might have defined that Babangida's interest was quite different from Nigeria's national interest. Judging from press reports, letters to the Editor and columns of various newspapers, magazines and academic research, the mood of these critical opinions tended to be against Nigeria's intervention in the Liberian crisis. (Interview: Sept. 1999). These opinions were based on the fact that, first Babangida had a personal relationship with Samuel Doe of Liberia who remained unpopular in Liberia. Secondly, fortuitous circumstance facing President Babangida at that time had impacted on his interest in the Liberia crisis. In view of this the intervention was more of regime than national interest because there was no proof of the decision being seriously debated in the Armed Forces Ruling Council (Interview, March 2000).

Professor Ibrahim Gambari, one of the finest intellectual diplomat of the regimes of both Babangida and Abacha, observes that:

"there were some hard-liners who did not really care what the position of the international community is. Their interest was in the survival of the regime and they would do whatever it takes for the regime to survive ... the regime(s) underestimated the international response to both the annulment and the execution of Saro -Wiwa" (Newswatch: November 15, 1999:38).

Earlier on in his assessment of the whole foreign policies scenarios, another intellectual diplomat Professor-Gabriel Ojúsanya, notes that the (Abacha) regime operated an 'Area Boys' diplomacy:

... the foreign policy has become personalised. It should cater for national interest not for the personal interest... The Liberian thing became personalised and we did not quite solve the problem. After seven years, Taylor came back there, so what really have we achieved? Taylor, had already captured virtually the whole place before we came in. And it was because of Doe, and because of friendship – that is all. You do not personalize foreign policy, that is not the reason for foreign policies. (Sunday Vanguard: September 7, 1997).

Indeed, Adisa has in his work carefully delineated the politics of military cooperation in the region which might have enabled Babangida to do what he did. This relationship was to influence the personalisation of Nigeria Foreign policy (Adisa: 1992: 205 – 231). And as it is rightly noted:

The bestialities in Liberia, triggered by the fractricidal nature of the of the Liberian conflict...propelled a new thrust in Nigeria's foreign policy.The initiative was that of restoring security and political balance to a crisis-ridden neighbouring state in need of peace.However, the initial thrust in such a gigantic foreign policy movement was couched in confused policy formulation without substantive understanding of its long-term imperative. Thus , the initial objective of ECOMOG ...was in contradiction with the progenitors of the idea of regional stability (The Africa Guardian:April 29,1991:16 .Emphasise mine).

7.4.2. ECOMOG FIELD COMMANDERS AND THE POLITICS OF THE PEACE KEEPING AND ENFORCEMENT PROCESS: THE DIMENSION OF REGIME INTEREST

The effectiveness of any peace support operation is dependent on the dialectical relationship between the political authority that convened the mission

and the Force Commander who is entrusted with the task of theatre management (Adisa: 1992 : 237). The nature of political undercurrent that informed the formation of ECOMOG equally affected its operation. This is especially so as the mandate of ECOMOG were not clearly spelt out from the on set. The first Force Commander General Arnold Quainoo belonged to the Cease-fire school and was careful in responding to the desire of the major sponsor of ECOMOG, Nigeria (Yoroms 1992:89). Thus he was replaced by Nigeria's General Joshua Dongoyaro. Gen. Dongoyaro pursued peace enforcement as against General Quainoo peace keeping. Later pressure has to be put on General Dongoyaro to stop the offensive shelling of NPFL.

After the exit of Lt General Joshua Dongoyaro, subsequent Nigerian ECOMOG Force Commanders found it difficult to actualize the aims of ECOMOG in Liberia. They were entangled by the competing interests within Nigeria and in ECOWAS. This was clearly manifested after the death of Doe when Babangida dispatched General Dongoyaro for immediate cleaning up of Liberia (See Agetua : 1990). Joshua Dongoyaro's offensive Operation Liberty opened up new wounds and left several scares to the extent that the international community became scathing of ECOMOG. Like Lt Gen A. Quainoo, Major General Rufus M. Kupolati who took over from General Dongoyaro was equally cautious to avoid raising another dust of crisis. With the order to Dongoyaro to stop the routing of Charles Taylor, his successor, General Kupolati (February – September 1999) began a confidence-building measure with the task to build and not to destroy.

In fact, Ambassador Ayo Ajakaiye, the Nigerian Ambassador in Liberia at that time, pointed out that he and General Kupolati laid a sound footing for confidence building which was neglected by the Nigerian government.

Accordingly, before he presented his credential of accreditation to Amos Sawyer, he first of all decided on confidence building by visiting Gbarnga amidst warning from Gen.Kupolati, fear of arrest and the danger involved. After an unimaginable welcome granted by Charles Taylor he was convinced that Taylor ready for peace. And he convinced and encouraged Gen. Kupolati to take the path of confidence building by also visiting Gbarnga. This effort by Ambassador Ajakaiye and General Kupolati paved way for Taylor to agree for a meeting with Amos Sawyer in a neutral ground for a mutual dialogue. While it was agreed that Ambassador Ajakaiye should work towards convening the dialogue, the Nigerian government which he sought approval failed to endorse it. Whereas he thought he was working on Babangida's briefing to him while being appointed, to ensure that the Liberian crisis end on time because it was costing money. He left Monrovia to Abuja to properly brief Babangida and to stress the need for dialogue and reconciliations if Nigeria was to safe cost. After the briefing Babangida asked whether he had lived or studied in Liberia. At the end he directed him to see Admiral Augustus Aikhomu, the Chief General Staff who was the Vice President. His meeting with Aikhomu was a disappointment as he plunkly rejected the reconciliation efforts and concluded that Taylor was a bloody rebel who should be dislocated.

Meanwhile, Amos Sawyer who had earlier requested a change in the role of ECOMOG from peace enforcement to peace- and -confidence building, with the hope that Taylor had learnt enough lesson to force him to submission (**West Africa**: July 1 – 7, 1991 and Aboagye 1999 : 98), later regretted his actions when he realised that Taylor had been toughened rather than weakened. This motivated Sawyer to arrive Abuja on the 14th September 1992 worried of the preparedness and readiness of Charles Taylor to launch an offensive operation in Moronvia. It was then Babangida assured him of change of the Force Commander. In Abuja,

Babangida introduced General Olurin to Amos Sawyer ... "this is your new field Commander, he will not let you down". (Interview, 1997). The position of Amos Sawyer and Babangida was that General Bakut was too close to Charles Taylor for comfort. Beginning from the 15th Summit of Heads of State and Government held in Dakar, where Bakut failed to produce a typology of military options against NPFL in case of non compliance until he was replaced, Bakut was no longer trusted (Aning : 1999: 242 – 243).

While Bakut was seen as "a dubious man of the finest quality" (**West Africa**: 23 – 29 August, 1993), Rufus Kupolati, who took over from Joshua Dogonyaro, was equally accused of being contemptuous of the interim government as he was more sympathetic to NPFL and saw the interim government as a bunch of Monrovia based politicians (**Africa Confidential**: 24th January 1992). In short both Kupolati and Bakut betrayed the trust reposed in them by Babangida for failing to root out, Charles Taylor and his NPFL. In view of this, there was pressure for a new Field commander who would, like Gen Joshua Dogonyaro, enforce peace rather than keep a turbulent peace.

Thus Ajakaiye agreed with the view that the Nigerian government had made up her position to route out Taylor. This involved not only changing the Field Commander but himself as the Nigerian Ambassador in Monrovia. He noticed the strange behaviour of Sawyer when he refused Ajakaiye to accompany him when a plane arrived from and to take him to Abuja. Sawyer only told him that he should not bother as he was going to Abuja to meet his brother Babangida to eat *eba*. But the information that filtered to him after the visit was Sawyer's bitter complaint to Babangida that he was not comfortable with him Ajakaiye. It was then that the Foreign Affairs Minister, General Ike Nwachukwu decided to nominate some one to replace him. Prior to this time he had written a diplomatic

report on the situation in Liberia to the Nigerian government against the uncompromising attitude of Sawyer. And surprisingly Taylor's Interim Government got the report that was officially sent to the Nigerian government. At a point Mathew Bacchus, the Liberian Interim Foreign Minister, called him to show his disappointment over the report which he did not deny because it was in the interest of the Liberia and her people.

Therefore, General Tunji Olurin was found to be the weapon club fashioned against Charles Taylor and NPFL. Tunji's tenure was seen more as salvaging the pride of the Nigerian authoritarian leadership rather than a community effort at repelling the NPFL (Aning : 1997: 244). Thus, according to General Olurin, his command policy in ECOMOG was not to partake "in double dealing and talking lies. Because the moment you lose genuine credibility, you lose credibility of being a peace keeper" (Africa Watch: 1993 : 26 Aning 1997 : 244).

General Bakut debunked the accusation of his romancing with Charles Taylor. According to him what Kupolati did which he built on was to create a conducive atmosphere for both enemies to freely move into each others territories, ease suspicion and tension, as well as build peace between hostile forces. This involved organising football marches between the rebels under the command of Col. Yohanna Dickson of Nigeria (Interview, 28 December 1998). Bakut blamed the interim government of Amos Sawyer and the double-standard character of ECOWAS leaders, especially Nigeria, for not ensuring the safety of the peace keeping forces in Liberia. According to him, Amos Sawyer was the one sabotaging every step of the peace process. First, Sawyer was not comfortable that rebels from the NPFL territory from the country side were coming into Monrovia, with their arms. Because of this fear he (Bakut) and the foreign

ministers of Cote d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, and Togo took permission from president Sawyer to visit Taylor and to convince him to cooperate with ECOMOG. At Gbarnga, the emissaries confronted Taylor and the Foreign Minister of Cote d'Ivoire was very critical of Taylor and the damaging reputation Cote d'Ivoire had suffered. Though Taylor claimed he was cooperating already, he was told that his cooperation was not enough. While discussing with Taylor, one of his aides walked in with a new Liberian currency which Amos Sawyer had introduced without even the knowledge of the ECOMOG Field Commander. When Taylor showed the visiting team the new currency, their ability to discuss from the position of strength deflated. Charles Taylor became enraged and turned the table discussion against them. He would rather retain his arms than disarm for Sawyer to encircle him. When he confronted Sawyer, he said he did as a government. He was enraged how a government without authority change the currency without ascertaining the security implications. The second accusation against Amos Sawyer was the less support he gave to ECOMOG operations, as he was equally training his secret army, the Black Beret in Guinea without the knowledge of ECOMOG Field Commander. Taylor reported this initially to Bakut who dismissed the allegation until it was later discovered. Bowen brought some hard currency, dollars, to him that they were for Sawyer in respect of the training of Black Beret. Sawyer only explained after being confronted that ECOMOG would not be in Liberia forever, so there was need for early training of a force for the replacement. These factors accounted for the reasons why Amos Sawyer visited Nigeria to press for the change of ECOMOG Commander and the Nigerian Ambassador, to someone who is menable to him.

Bakut further noted that African leaders do not trust themselves. Because of this, the tendency for war to perpetuate is certain. He rejects the position that

the truce created by Kupolati provided an opportunity for Charles Taylor to rearm. Rather the attitude of the Heads of State of ECOWAS made Taylor to rearm. Bakut pointed out that he had cause to report Sawyer to the Heads of State, yet none of them rebuked him. However, only Blaise Campoare reacted by asking member Heads of State to also listen to Taylor and stop seeing him as a rebel. Another problem he had was the morale of his troops. They were already demoralised given the fact that they were not paid their \$5 daily stipend regularly. He could not afford to take his demoralized troops to confront Charles Taylor's NPFL. At the Geneva Summit, he was mandated to proceed to Liberia to implement demobilisation and disarmament programmes which Charles Taylor had endorsed. He deliberately declined and rather requested for one month to enable Charles Taylor to go back to his territory to brief his men on the need to demobilize and disarm. At a private meeting in Geneva with the Nigerian Vice-President, Vice Admiral A. Aikhomu, who led the Nigerian delegation, Bakut told him that the one month he requested was not really for Charles Taylor, but for Nigeria to reorganize its troops. According to him, Aikhomu was shocked to hear that troops were not paid their stipends for 4 month. Bakut was not ready to lead them into disarmament and demobilisation that may be hard to enforce. Bakut was summoned to Abuja where he explained details to Babangida. Henceforth ECOMOG budgets was being provided from the presidency instead of the Ministry of Defence or Defence Headquarters which has been personalized by the Minister, General Sani Abacha.

General Sani Abacha accordingly was opposed to Nigeria's adventure in Liberia. He saw Babangida's success in Liberia as tantamount to his failure to ascend to power in Nigeria, especially if eventually he stays on. Therefore, he had a tacit support for Charles Taylor throughout the time Babangida was in power.

According to General Tunji Olurin in a piece writing in **ThisDay** newspaper "My encounter with Abacha's terror Gang", the decision to draw money for ECOMOG from the presidency was because "funds passed through General Abacha as the Minister of Defence in the past ended in his pocket and troops went for months without money. This affected their morale. Abacha was a demigod that could not be dealt with and had to be by passed" (Olurin: 1998: 16). Olurin added that "under Bakut the money meant for ECOMOG were embezzled by Abacha, that was why the presidency had to fund ECOMOG directly" (Interview, 15 Feb, 2000). In fact, given this development which angered Abacha when Olurin was sent to replace Bakut he (Abacha) used the opportunity to request Olurin to submit a report indicting Bakut. According to Olurin when he declined; Abacha framed him up. The charges against him included the fact that, first, Olurin by passed Abacha to collect fund directly from the presidency for ECOMOG. Secondly, that Olurin went to France with the sum of \$15ml given to him by Babangida to buy arms for ECOMOG. And lastly, there was a \$500ml fuel deal between ECOMOG and NNPC which could not be accounted for during the tenure of Olurin (Olurin 1998). Olurin denied these facts and noted that ECOMOG sourcing from presidency started from the tenure of Bakut. Two, the purchase of arms and ammunition was done by the Ministry of Defence as a government institution which Abacha personalized as Defence Minister. And, lastly, according Col. Umar Kangiwa, the NNPC file on oil contracts was on General Abacha's table when he (Umar) visited him at the time he (Abacha) was scheming to take over power after the June 12 debacle (see **Tell**: August 10, 1998:23). Thus, as Olurin pointed out "Abacha was out for his own agenda to perpetuate himself in power. He will stop at nothing to achieve that. He believes so much in the use of force and had plans to change the face of the military to support his strategy." (Olurin 1998:17).

Bakut, however, felt that the decision to replace him may be in order but he was not happy that the support he was denied were given with dispatch to his successor. Immediately he left, Nigerian troops were increased to 10,000 and with equipments required to prosecute the war. He felt there was a conspiracy to make him fail. This conspiracy was possible because he didn't fit into their orchestrated plans. He was not provided any weapon, ship or aircraft. Attempts to get arms failed (interview March 2000). Olurin however, denied ever receiving arms without difficulty. According to him, at the heat of Operation Octopus, he needed arms and made contact to Abuja. He got promises of arms within few hours. The C130 aircraft that landed in Moronvia was loaded with rotten onions instead of arms. Out of anger and desperation he left with the same plane back to Lagos. At the Ikeja tarmac, he saw stockpiles of arms which he loaded in the plane and flew back to Moronvia. Later he was made to know that the remaining arms which left in the airport were loaded into a truck by someone and ferried out of the airport for fear that he might return to pick them again (Interview 15 February 2000). Bakut offered a counterfactual argument that Olurin could afford to get those arms was itself a privilege which he (Bakut) did not have to utilize (interview, March 2000). The support Olurin got could be as a result of the mandate given to him to kill Yormie Johnson. He said he warned Olurin against this, as it would escalate the war, as none of the belligerent would trust ECOMOG. He noted that "a peace keeper is supposed to be neutral, he is subjected to all kind of intimidation and threats which he must not react or retaliate. No matter the justification, once a belligerent is killed by the peace keeping force an enmity to peace keeping forces is already established. This would escalate the war" (Interview, 28 December 1998). He added that he could not react when 500 ECOMOG soldiers were arrested as shield by NPFL. But he

undertook a diplomatic visit to Houphouët Boigny. Unfortunately the sage was furious on what Nigeria want in the sub-region after she has taken over the economy of Benin, Togo and Cote d'Ivoire. Bakut said Boigny wondered Why Nigeria want to take up the remaining part of West Africa, which probably he (Boigny) hopes to control (interview: August 2001).

Olurin agreed that there were specific mandates from ECOWAS to him especially when ECOMOG soldiers were taken hostages. Though with the good office of former president Jimmy Carter of US the troops were released by Taylor, but the equipments were lost. Therefore, after his initial survey of the situation in Liberia, he briefed ECOWAS member states of the Committee of Nine and presented superior argument for enforcement: "The situation was bad that there were already criticism of Bakut as he was not giving leadership" (Interview 15 February, 2000). Olurin pointed out that Bakut believed much on peace keeping when Charles Taylor was not converted to it. Therefore, Babangida believed in his command style, that Olurin will do the job without humiliation. However, according to insiders view, Operation Octopus conducted by Olurin was an attempt to redèem the dignity of the Nigerian military and save the regime of Babangida rather than defending regional security as at that time ECOMOG had suffered credibility with tremendous impact on Babangida's regime. During the meeting of the Committee of Nine held in Abuja, November 9, 1992, Olurin said he publicly accused some member states present at the meeting for supporting Charles Taylor. The Guinean Head of State, Lansana Conte said they were tired of such accusations and insisted that Olurin should mention names of such heads of state. It was an opportunity for him to point directly to president Houphouët Bogney of Cote d'Ivoire and Blaise Compoare of Bourkina Faso. At this juncture Babangida felt Olurin had contravened diplomatic protocol and

decided to bury his face inside his arms. However, Lansana Conte and Jerry Rawlings were happy with the development and decided that the meeting must take a final decision on Liberia. Ghana and Guinea stood by Olurin.

It was at this point that the sage, Bogley, stood up and spoke for two hours, on how he spent his life-time to ensure peace in the continent and wondered how he could be accused of sponsoring rebels. At the end he turned to Compoare: Blaise, the last time you sent your troops through my country to Liberia, "what did I say?" "Did I not stop you from doing so?" (Interview, 15 February 2000). According to Olurin, it was after this time that he got the full support of ECOWAS to enforce peace. Olurin however, denied that the mandate included the assassination of Yomie Johnson. According to him, Taylor and Johnson, though were suspicious of each other, agreed to attack ECOMOG, with each hoping covertly that in process one would eliminate the other and at the end whoever succeeded would take over the leadership of the organisation. Thus Taylor's NPFL arrived Cadwell base of Johnson and started to eliminate Johnson's soldier. This made ECOMOG, having read the situation to offer support for Johnson against Taylor. It was then Johnson surrendered and was offered protection and taken to Nigeria. Here, Bakut disagreed and pointed out that he was the one that initiated Johnson's escape to safety in Nigeria against the planned order given to Olurin to kill him. Yormie himself in an interview said when he was taken to ECOMOG Headquarters

We went to ECOMOG Headquarters and they spoke... The next thing was that Gen Bakut (then ECOMOG Field Commander) issued a directive. They there took me to the Free Port, Moronvia. I shouted "where are you taking me to, officer, you're supposed to take me to my villa? He said Sir your villa is under heavy attack by Taylor's men. What happened to my people? I asked immediately and he said that they had evacuated them and that they would join me later when Taylor's ferocious attack aimed at taking over Moronvia at all cost subsided... and told me I was proceeding to Nigeria right away... One

ECOMOG soldier brought out a pistol and pointed it at my head... And I barked 'you want to kill me because I supported you in order to bring about peace? Then the military intelligence Officer for ECOMOG informed the Field Commander who informed Aso Rock and they were given strong instructions not to harm me, but to bring me straight to Nigeria. (Telescope: 1 July, 1999:20 - 21).

Why should a soldier point a gun at Johnson who was supposed to be taken into safety, if there was no initial construction to kill him? What was the purpose of killing him? Though Bakut saw the creation of ECOMOG in the light of Nigerian national interest, he was surprised that as a ECOMOG Field Commander he was not trusted by his Head of State. Instead Babangida chose to believe Amos Sawyer than him. In the course of divergent interests Nigeria lost a substantial number of soldiers and equipments. But whether his deportation to Nigeria for safety or the order to kill him as rationalised by Bakut and Olurin was true or not, Yormie Johnson said his exit from the scene in Liberia was the handwork of Amos Sawyer who collaborated with the Field Commander and some key elements who believed that it was better he was out of sight. Could it be that Olurin's mandate to eliminate both Taylor and Yormie made the outgoing Field Commander (Ishaya Bakut) to work out Yormie's exit to safety in Nigeria? This was because when Sawyer accused Yormie for the bombardment of ECOMOG in a radio broadcast, it took Brigadier Victor Malu who was then serving under General Bakut as the head of Nigerian Contingent to deny Amos Sawyer's propanganda (Telescope: 1 July 1999:21).

According to Gen Bakut and Ambassador Ajakaiye the fact that Charles Taylor still became the president through the ballot is an indication that the Liberian war was uncalled for. Therefore, only Babangida and Abacha knew the truth about their interest in Liberia. As for Olurin he believes Babangida may

not have any interest in the Liberia conflict. This was because when he captured Buchanan Port where there were tones load of iron ore and rubber products which he reported to Babangida but he (Babandiga) did not show any interest (interview February's 2000). But Babangida's interest was longer than securing tones of iron ore. He needs to keep his office as Nigerian Preident. Thus, a critical insight by an insider at the National War College shows that Olurin, like all Babangida Boys (IBB Boys) never disown Babangida and would do every thing to defend him rightly or wrongly (Interview, February 20, 2000).

7.5 GENERAL ABACHA'S REGIME INTEREST, ECOMOG AND THE REGIONAL CONFLICTS IN LIBERIA AND SIERRA LEONE

Under General Babangida's leadership, Abacha was the Chief of Army Staff. Later he became the Chief of Defence Staff and Minister of Defence. For the period he occupied these positions Abacha operated an alternative policy to the regime. We have earlier pointed out how the Defence Headquarters failed to send the allowance of the soldiers in Liberia. Abacha also was surreptitiously supporting Charles Taylor. When the discussion on the process of disarmament started in 1992 Abacha was opposed to it as it was intended to target Charles Taylor (Anonymous interview : 1998). Immediately he came to power, he began to court friendship across the region. Abacha began to create a confidence in Charles Taylor. To Babangida, he could not afford to be in office while Charles Taylor takes over as president of Liberia. But, as for Abacha, Taylor's Presidency would work on his favour, having been relatively isolated by the international community. In June 1995 for the first time since 1989 when the Liberia crisis started, Charles Taylor was warmly embraced by General Sani Abacha in Abuja. The visit afforded him to know that Nigeria's General Sani Abacha had no

private agenda in the sub-regional collective efforts to bring about peace, except treating all sides on an equal footing and preparing the way for the celebrated Abuja Accord (**West Africa**: 18 – 24 September 1995 and **The Economist**: 9 September 1995). Taylor further pointed out that if president Babangida had sat down to “discuss with me the way Abacha did, the crisis would have ended four years ago” (Olatoye, August 1, 1997). But was Babangida prepared to discuss with someone like Charles Taylor who was fighting to topple his friend, Doe? Even when Doe died, was it fair to relate with someone who wants to sponsor revolution in the sub-region to overturn military rule?

Abacha supported the Liberian elections with more fund, logistics and ECOMOG soldiers. At the end, Charles Taylor won the election. Nigeria's foreign Affairs Minister, Chief Tom Ikimi, became the architect of Abacha's rapprochement with Taylor. What General Bakut was accused of, that is, being too close to Charles Taylor, Tom Ikimi perfected. Ikimi was, in fact, close enough that he led the Nigerian government delegations to Charles Taylor's marriage ceremony in Moronvia. Charles Taylor was no longer seen as a rebel but a saint. Yormie Johnson reacted against this:

A government that is intervening in a crisis cannot send an official delegation to attend a rebel leader's wedding. Government accords official recognition to a country's government or its leader and not a rebel leader. If for instance Foday Sankoh or John Garang or Jonas Savimbi, are having wedding now will Nigeria send official delegation to attend? That particular development actually weakened other rebel leaders and brought to question the extent of General Abacha's neutrality in Liberian Quagmire. (**Telescope**: 1 July 1999:20 emphasise mine)

Johnson joined others to condemn the election. He alleged that it was rigged by ECOMOG in favour of Taylor. It could be recalled that Babngida had earlier “scuttled Charles Taylor's move to unseat Doe by sponsoring splinter groups led

by Yormie Johnson, Alhaji Kiromah and others in order to Checkmate Taylor” from capturing power (Tell: 4 August, 1997:27). The same Babangida equally found Yormie Johnson too noisy, a spoiler of some sort. He decided to put him up under house arrest in Nigeria until he (Babangida) left office. Abacha allegedly funded Taylor’s campaign with the hope that military officers with business interests in Liberia would reap the benefit. In addition a support for Taylor was an opportunity to snub the US which was supporting Taylor’s strong opponent, Johnson – Sirleaf. In the light of this, it was an opportunity to flex muscles with the US over sanctions. But as for Nigerians there is no justifiable reason for the colossal spending in Liberia “when all is not financially well at home”. (Tell: 4 August 1997: 27).

Just before the Liberian debacle ended with the election of Charles Taylor, on 25 May 1997, the 14 month old democratic regime of Alhaji Ahmed Tejan Kabbah was toppled by the military. Major Johnny Paul koromah who was in detention over a previous coup was brought out from prison by the coup plotters to head the new military regime. The soldiers complained against Kabbah’s government, especially corruption among government officials, poor payment of salaries and allowances for the soldiers, while Kabbah’s government spent \$1.2 million monthly to maintain Executive Outcomes Inc. and a U.S war service firm, involved in the training of the Kamajors in 1996. In the meantime Nigeria also sent soldiers and arms to support Kabbah to re-professionalise the Sierra Leonean soldiers who have become unruly in their behaviour (Tell: June 29, 1997).

Kabbah denied the high rate of corruption, poor payment for the military and the accusation for poor representation in the appointment (Kabbah 1997). In order to expand the scope of his government against a major opposition Major

Koromah invited the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) to join his government. Tejan Kabbah fled into exile, mobilizing international support against Koromah. With the assistance of ECOMOG and the Kamajor the fierce traditional Sierra Leonean hunters, Kabbah had a formidable force to confront Major Koromah's government. Under Kabbah's government the Kamajors were recognised as an auxiliary Civil Defence Force (CDF). The recognition emerged under a confused political situation and presumably out of the frustration engendered by the rebel activities of the RUF on one hand and the disloyal tendencies of the Armed Forces on the other. Therefore, hope was found on the employment of the fierce traditional hunter sect by Kabbah's government (see **Details in Africa Development** – Special issue Vol.xx11, 3-4, 1997). Thus, when he was toppled the Kamajors became his defenders.

Prior to the coup that brought Koromah to power, General Sani Abacha had put the RUF leader under detention in Nigeria for allegedly possessing armaments during a visit in Nigeria. His detention in Nigeria had made it impossible for the workability of the peace accord, through the National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (NCCP) that was set up by the Kabbah government and the RUF before the coup. Thus when the May 25, 1997 coup occurred Fondeh Sankoh in his detention room in Abuja had no alternative than to announce to call on his supporters to join arms with the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council regime of Koromah. Thereby RUF was made a security force of the new government and became part of the Armed Forces of Sierra Leone.

The development became a major problem for ECOWAS which had to deploy its ECOMOG troops to Sierra Leone. The situation was worsened by the

speculation that Charles Taylor forces were supporting the Junta regime in Freetown with arms. This opened another cankerworm between Nigeria and Liberia. Charles Taylor ordered ECOMOG soldiers, which were majorly Nigerian, out of Liberia, thereby severing the Memorandum of Force Agreement (MOFA) between ECOWAS and Liberia which authorised ECOMOG soldiers to remain in Liberia to train and build the Liberian military. Some member states of ECOMOG withdrew their troops while the remaining, mainly Nigerians and few other countries, relocated to Sierra Leone, leaving one or two battalions behind. The relocation to Sierra Leone was also to enable ECOMOG prepare for confrontation with the junta regime. The junta had promised to handover government to a democratic regime in three months time but reneged on the ground that Nigeria hijacked the Abidjan meeting of 17 - 18 July 1997 for peaceful negotiation. According to Major Koromah he was informed that Nigeria's Tom Ikimi was bribing members at the meeting to adopt Nigeria's agenda. He decided to change his handing over date to 2001. He did so to stop the meeting but later offered to resume dialogue (*The News*: 17 January 2000: 5). To Koromah the Abidjan meeting had taken a different dimension from the Conakry meeting of 26th June 1997.

The basis for the Conakry Committee of Four meeting on June 26th 1997 was to find a solution to the crisis in Sierra Leone after Nigeria's first attempt to dislodge the junta on the 2 June 1997 was met with stiff resistance in Sierra Leone. After the tortuous military adventure in Liberia most member states in ECOWAS had become weary of the use of military force in member states. Though Ghana and few other countries sent troops to Sierra Leone it was thought of as a peace keeping operation and to safeguard their nationals in Sierra Leone. In defending ECOWAS intervention in Sierra Leone at the OAU Summit in Harare,

Zimbabwe, on 4 June 1997, Nigeria's Tom Ikimi was challenged by the Ghanaian representative at the conference. The Ghanaian representative informed the Summit that the June 2 shelling of Freetown by Nigerian warships was never based on consultation and consensus. Ghana among other members states preferred peaceful resolution of the crisis than the military options. Nigeria was accused of sending her troops to Sierra Leone on June 2 without consultation and consensus from member states of ECOWAS.

Nigeria was sharply criticized for her action in Sierra Leone. Abbas Bundu was in the lead. He gave reasons why Nigeria's action was entirely different from that of ECOWAS. According to him, in the first instance, President Kabbah's invitation from exile in Conakry had been addressed to Nigeria and not to ECOWAS. Secondly, Nigeria's initial response seems to have been unilateral and not one taken under aegis of ECOWAS, having failed to utilise the organisations, consultation procedure to galvanize a collective regional response. Thirdly ECOMOG has never had a general mandate to be applied in any member state of ECOWAS, rather its mandate had been country-specific as it was in the case of Liberia (Bundu: 1997: 146). Therefore, prior to 29 August, ECOWAS had no mandate in Sierra Leone. Nigerian troops were there as Nigerian troops. Their presence in Sierra Leone from 1991 to May 1997 was purely on friendly and bilateral terms, authorised neither by ECOWAS nor by any organisation: "From 2 June, however their status and relations changed: They assumed a belligerent position, and they could be likened to a military occupation force aiding the deposed government" (Bundu 1997:146). Though the UN Security Council imposed a travel ban on the Junta by Council Resolution 1132 of January 1998, it sent Francis Okelo's team to assess the modalities for restoring civil rule. However, the junta further reneged on the

handing over date, demanding the release of the RUF leader, Fodeh Sankoh, held in detention in Nigeria; as a precondition for negotiation.

The betrayal by the junta following media report of Charles Taylor's support made Nigeria to be critical of Taylor. Nigeria began a strong propaganda for the international community to place Charles Taylor on trial. Earlier on, ECOWAS was advised to note that:

the rationale behind the struggles of RUF are not particularly different from those of (Taylor's) NPFL. With the RUF in alliance with the present power holders in the AFRC and its vice president an unwilling detainee of the Nigerian government, how will the NPFL react? Of course, a possible scenario can be that Charles Taylor will defend his regime, personal and national interests in a much narrower realist perspective, reasoning that my friends' (Nigerian/ECOWAS?) enemies (RUF/AFRC) are my (Taylor/NPP/Liberia) enemies" (Yoroms and Aning 1997: 18 – 19).

This position was not accepted by Bundu who argued that there was no evidence that the coup had been supported or organised by any foreign government and were only joined by RUF which had detailed that the rebellion was over (Bundu: 1997:145).

Whether the coup was externally sponsored or not, Nigeria turned out against Charles Taylor whom it helped to power in the hope that he will support Nigeria's position in the region. But after the death of Abacha his successor, Gen Abdulsalami Abubakar was to face Charles Taylor's true personality when he supported the AFRC/RUF junta against ECOWAS. Charles Taylor by his action could only be grateful to Abacha and not Nigeria. Yormie Johnson was sarcastic about this when he said "... they rigged (election) to put Taylor there believing that he would bring about peace and highly appreciate Nigeria's effort

in this regard. Instead, he is slapping you in the face. He has betrayed Nigeria".
(Telescope: 1 July 1999:20).

Meanwhile General Abacha who played a major role in restoring Kabbah to power had initially maligned Koromah inspite of the initial promise he gave him (Koromah). Koromah expressed his bitterness thus:

when we took over... a day or two, I spoke to Abacha. He was very friendly. Infact, he was congratulating me. He was saying that he's happy I'm a military man like himself we can work together. After two or three days, we saw a different man. He made a complete U-turn. Maybe there were promises from different quarters, that they will do this and that. **May be he had wanted to use that to project his own image.** (The News: 17 January 2000:5 emphasise mine).

Indeed with the global tide changing towards democracy, Abacha cannot afford to support a military régime. If he had done so, it would have given the international community an impression that his transition programme was a façade. This, to a greater extent, explains Abacha's support for Tejan Kabbah. And using his position as the Chairman of ECOWAS, series of meetings were held at various levels of ECOWAS decisions making to garner support for the restoration of Kabbah to power. At the Abuja Summit of August 1997 the Heads of State and Government decided to place sanctions on the Koromah's Junta regime in Sierra Leone by imposing an embargo on all supplies of petroleum products, arms and military equipments and by struggling to stop the country's transaction of business with that country. The processes towards restoring democracy were to be pursued in sequence through dialogue, imposition of sanctions, and enforcement of embargo including the use of force. It was only after the August 1997 Summit that ECOMOG was granted the mandate to use force only as a last resort.

Though ECOWAS accepted the use of force as a last resort, Nigeria was too willing to pursue the use of force quickly rather than dialogue; and Nigerian was ready to evoke its military treaty with the government of Sierra Leone under the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) under the pretext of ECOWAS mandate to intervene in Sierra Leone. Blaise Campoare of Burkina Faso noted in an interview with the French Magazine, *L'autre Equipe*, that :

“we know that there are agreements between Nigeria and Sierra Leone. There are no problems in as much as the framework of these accords are well defined. **What we are opposed to is the fact that the Nigerian intervention was carried out within the framework of ECOMOG without informing us**” (Cited in *Vanguard*: Lagos August 10, 1998; emphasis added).

As earlier noted Ghana and Guinea, like Burkina Faso, were already weary of another military operation in Sierra Leone when the Liberian experience was still fresh.

Like Liberia, the Sierra Leonean crisis nearly divided ECOWAS. Though Ghana and Guinea sent troops to Sierra Leone they were non-committal. As usual, Burkina Faso and Cote d'ivoire were accused of unspecific support for the rebels. Burkina Faso allegedly trained thousands of the RUF rebels in urban guerrilla fighting. Charles Taylor's Liberia adequately provided arms and combatants in support of the rebels. Earlier on, in December 1997, Charles Taylor had warned ECOMOG to desist from its plan to use Liberia as a launching pad in the sub-region to reverse the coup in Sierra Leone. He described the initiative as lopsided as his government policy was not in support of any interference in the internal affairs of member states in the subregion. Charles Taylor further ordered ECOMOG to leave Moronvia because he needed nobody's consent to build the

Armed Forces of Liberia. As against the Revised Abuja peace plans, Taylor recruited 1,000 men to beef up Liberian security and further went ahead to deploy soldiers to the Liberian border with Sierra Leone under the pretext that it was the responsibility of his democratic government to police the Liberian borders.

In spite of internal crisis within ECOWAS member states, ECOMOG soldiers were deployed to Freetown. With heavy bombardment and confrontation they dislodged the junta from the capital city after seven days of fighting in mid week of February 1998. The forces of the ousted regime fled to the Northern town of Makeni as they were pursued by ECOMOG forces. Having secured the corridor of power in Freetown, Tijan Kabbah was reinstalled on the 10 March 1998. But the problem with this success is the fact "that even though the RUF was ousted with the junta in February 1998, it was not crushed and had the capacity to operate effectively, even without Foday Sankoh as it had done in the past" (Aboagye. 1999:242). With its possession of the mineral rich area of the North under its control, AFRC/RUF established a lucrative network of trading diamonds and gold for weapons and fuel with Liberia, Burkinafaso and so many countries outside the sub-region. This enable them to later launch a heavy attack on the Kabbah regime. About 6,3000 people were allegedly killed, bringing the total death toll in the crisis to 20,000. While half of the population of about 4.5 million people became displaced as refugees. This forced Tijah Kabbah to compromise by recognizing Foday Sankoh as the leader of RUF, admitting that the detention, trial and sentencing of Sankoh to death were null and void and declaring the willingness of his Government to negotiate with RUF. To Kabbah, this comprise was necessary as military option was no longer a viable one for pursuing peace.

The committee of five on Sierra Leone which had abandoned its activities since March 10, 1998 decided to reconvene and Togo joining, making it a six member committee on Sierra Leone. Liberia had earlier joined as the fifth member. The extra ordinary meeting of the committee condemned the supporters of the rebels in violation of the decision of the authorities of ECOWAS and the UN (West Africa: 18 – 31 January 1999: 21). However, as for Abacha the restoration of Tejan Kabbah accomplished the task of seeking international recognition by his regime. In spite of the suspension and sanctions which Abacha faced, the Sierra Leone crisis provided some recognition for him. Major Koromah, the leader of the ousted junta pointed out that General Abacha had all the chances of solving the problem of Sierra Leone peacefully but he took to fighting. Thus ECOWAS intervention was not purposely to restore peace in Sierra Leone and the subregion but to draw international attention to the commitment of Abacha's regime, create a basis for dealing with it, and, in so doing, to secure international recognition. All these, in turn, was designed to provide a basis for the perpetuation of his regime. In a speech delivered at the graduation ceremony of National War College, 1997, Abacha reiterated his commitment to regional peace, security and stability in West Africa and wondered why the international community had not endorsed his political transition programme.

Thus, it was not surprising that Nigerians did not support the regime's adventurism in Sierra Leone. Nigerians interviewed did not believe government position for pursuing democracy in Sierra Leone when in Nigeria itself democracy was being subverted. Thus to most Nigerians, Abacha lacked the moral right to send Nigerian troops to restore Tejan Kabbah back to power. Sierra Leone, like Liberia was seen as an attempt by the Abacha regime to divert attention from the

crisis at home, especially that of democracy and the economy. (see **Tell**: June 23, 1997).

Indeed further research is required to identify the actual number of deaths in the ECOMOG operations in both Liberia and Sierra Leone. The authorities especially in Nigeria have been refuting any figure published in the press regarding the killings of ECOMOG soldiers (**African Concord** 21 January 1991:31). Though Babagana Kingibe, Abacha's Foreign Affairs Minister and his successor, Tom Ikimi, lamented the effects of the war on Nigeria, the exact figures of the death toll were not released. Gen. Victor Malu, the ECOMOG Field Commander said that the seven year war led to the lose of only 500 troops while Tom Ikimi mentioned 400.

Whereas the record at the Atan Cementary, Yaba - Lagos shows that between 1990 and 1993 a total of 344 Nigerian Soldiers were interred. This figure, without doubt, is highly conservative. For instance, between 1993 to the end of the war more deaths were recorded which were not buried in mass graves in Liberia or in Lagos. Some were taken away by relations for burial and others abandoned. (see **The Source**: August 4, 1997: 28). Also according to a report, apart from the 750 ECOMOG soldiers killed at the wake of the 1990 intervention, which was denied by Nigerian government, 950 deaths were recorded in the first week of Operation Octopus by November 1992. It is estimated that Nigeria lost 2,000 soldiers (Ellis; 1999:315- 316). This could be more as government deliberately refused to give the names of those who died for national honours. While it is estimated that 30,000 to 50,000 total death were recorded during the war, other sources note that 40,000 to 50,000 were recorded in the early period of the war while 20,000 to 30,000 were recorded between 1993 and 1997. If we

add these figures together it gives a sum total of 60,000 to 80,000 death recorded during the war for the period between 1989 and 1997 when the war ended. This figure is not of any magnitude when compared with the figure of 150,000 to 200,000 commonly used for the period of the war, probably because of the misunderstanding of a causality figure first used by the United Nations. (Ellis :1999:316).

The death tolls of Nigerian soldiers in Sierra Leone equally remains very problematic. However, the deaths in Sierra Leone occurred in three ways. The first are those killed as a result of lack of knowledge about the terrain. The second are those soldiers that were killed by the rebel forces while engaging in illegal diamond minning and trading on the orders of their superior officers. The rebel forces normally lay ambush to kill them during the compulsory illegal mining. This was confirmed by Aboagye (1999:240) who notes that Nigerian troops in Sierra Leone were likely to lose their concentration in fighting the war due to illegal mining. This was further confirmed by Nigerian soldiers who returned from Sierra Leone. The third were those killed in real combat. By this observation Nigeria's ECOMOG was fighting an offensive war in defending the economic interest of their elite officers rather than defending democracy in Sierra Leone. Thus, by December 1999 Nigeria had lost 700 soldiers as revealed by the British Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, *on BBC Radio 4 programme*, (January 17, 1999).

7.6 NIGERIA, ECOMOG AND WEST AFRICAN REGIONAL SECURITY

The intervention of ECOMOG forces in Liberia has raised a lot of questions from within the West Africa region and in the larger context of international norm

of intervention. Some of the reactions have been presented elsewhere in this work. Most of the political leaders, it was pointed out, had a dividing line in either supporting or refusing to support the intervention in Liberia. Those who supported the intervention were seen as defending Doe while others that refused to support ECOMOG intervention were either seen as supporting the rebels, especially Charles Taylors or outrightly against an intervention that was not realistically based on international norms.

As to whether the West African Regional security is dependent on ECOMOG is clearly based on what becomes of its future. The creation of ECOMOG and its intervention in Liberia and Sierra Leone was based on an authoritarian presumption rather than consensus which is why:

“the weight of public opinion throughout the sub-region in the early days of the crisis was in favour of Mr Taylor while most political leaders seemed to oppose his insurgency as a method of challenging the authority of an elected government. Had the decision for intervention been put to vote in a democratic parliament in either Nigeria, Ghana or even the Gambia or Sierra Leone at that time it is very possible that the legislative bodies would have voted against intervention in so far as this was conceived as being likely to shore up Doe's regime, which was being defended by the Armed forces of Liberia (AFL) His own democratic credentials had never been seriously accepted as genuine by the civilian masses in the sub-region”. (Barret: 1997: 129).

Nigerians saw ECOMOG as defending Babangida's friend, Doe, and his economic interest in Liberia because there was no tangible reason for the intervention. Ghana and Sierra Leone only supported ECOMOG, most probably to please the Nigerian regime and to evacuate their national on humanitarian ground. Even when as Charles Taylor began his xenophobic attack on Nigerians, Ghanaians and Guineans to drive home his vexation against their leaders, the support for Charles Taylor did not suffer much. This was even so when two

Nigerian journalists were killed on the directives of Charles Taylor. Nigerian public opinion grudgingly turned in favour of intervention, if only for the purpose of saving the lives of those Nigerians and other West African who remained in the war-torn country” (Barret: 1997; **Ibid**: 132).

The premise of ECOMOG was faulty both structurally and morally. Nigeria's dominance made it more difficult for the warring factions to believe that it was a sub-regional force. According Bundu it took a long time for Charles Taylor to accept ECOWAS mediation through ECOMOG because of the unfortunate shipments of arms by Babangida to Doe. Taylor's NPFL became suspicious of the neutrality and credibility of ECOWAS and SMC (Interview London 1 September 1998). This was further compounded when ECOMOG began to support warring factions against each other. Yormie Johnson was sponsored by Babangida to form INPFL. He was abandoned as ECOMOG shifted its support to ULIMO. According Johnson:

“ECOMOG betrayed me! This is because I was told that after disarming other rebel factions, I would be given the opportunity to return home to establish a political party.... But that did not happen.... Everything promised me by ECOMOG has not seen daylight yet.... my only crime was supporting a peace keeping force led by Nigeria” (**Telescope**: July 1999 : 21 – 22).

The intervention of ECOMOG in Sierra Leone receive serious criticism because of the weight of the moral dilemma of Nigeria's upholding democracy in Sierra Leone when it was being suppressed at home. Within ECOWAS and ECOMOG – II Ghana and Guinea did not appear too willing to embrace another full – scale peace keeping mission in Sierra Leone when the cost of the Liberian operations was still fresh on the social, economic and political minds of these countries (Abaogye: 1999: 241). Even as the Nigeria led ECOMOG – II

intervened in Sierra Leone the Force Commander made scathing criticisms against the role of the Sierra Leone press for publishing garbage and equally castigated the general population for not being appreciative of the ECOMOG effort and contribution (Barret: 1997; **Ibid**: 249).

Some opinion sampling across the subregion through unstructured interview were careful to discuss Nigeria's domestic affairs in relation to its role in ECOMOG but they acknowledge the role of a hegemon in any regional security arrangement. According to Toure A. Kader, charge de Mission, the Presidency, Republic of Mali, no single country may send troops without being accused of occupying another country or trying to establish hegemony. The intervention by ECOMOG in Liberia which was borne by Nigeria is a demonstration of its regional power as "no individual country could have borne the huge material sacrifices it took to reinforce ECOMOG and ECOWAS (interview, August 1998). Kader added that regional hegemony is important because in any given situation someone will take the lead within any grouping.

Therefore, a stronger and more democratic Nigeria is qualified to lead West Africa as a hegemon. Similar opinions were re-echoed by Yakuba Kassama, of the Gamabia, Captain E.D. Angkah, Ghanaian Army and Abubakar Jatta also from the Gambian Army, among others that were interviewed believe that Nigeria with its economic resources and manpower is capable to be recognised as sub-regional power, and has a duty to ensure sub-regional stability. They agreed that though the resources for ECOMOG could have been utilized for national development but given the fact that each conflict could destabilize the sub-region there was need to assist the needy and weaker members of the community. This position was forcefully reinforced by Yusuf Bangura when he says thus:

In West Africa, whether we like it or not, it is Nigeria that can and will, provide the leadership for regional security. And support for Nigeria's progressive role in Sierra Leone should not mean that the former's assault on democratic process in Nigeria should be condemned. Indeed if the restoration of democratic constitutional rule in Sierra Leone succeeds through Nigerians effort, the case for democratic governance is likely to be enhanced in Nigeria itself. (Cited in **Daily Times**: March, 1997).

Bangura thus raised the moral relevance of ECOMOG intervention on the basis of humanitarianism but the question which has not been answered is, how could a military regime could provide the premise for democratic stability without being embroiled in hostile confrontation that may increase the tempo of the initial conflict? Given this, certain factors could be deducted from the intervention. First, there is a significant general opinion that ECOMOG intervention in Liberia (and to some extent in Sierra Leone) was a success story of regional security arrangement. Second, it is believed that the success of such arrangement has been possible with regional powers, maintaining a benevolent hegemonic characteristics. Third, military intervention must be based on consensus rather than coercive hegemonic approach. Four, there is nothing offensive in a military regime pursuing a democratic goal in another country, its act of militarism itself which is unlawful is condemnable. Five, in counterfactual to the fourth point, it is morally wrong for military regimes to pursue democracy in another country through military intervention. Lastly, whether a country pursues regime interest or national interest as far as the interest succeeds in maintaining national and regional security it is acceptable.

Given this deduction, Abass Bundu, former ECOWAS Executive Secretary, observes that the threat or use of force to bring about political change is unacceptable as much as military juntas everywhere deserve the strongest

condemnation. By implicating Nigeria implicitly, Bundu posits that "...any unlawful military intervention aimed at effecting a political change in the internal affairs of a state ... must be strongly condemned. By failing to condemn the latter, both OAU and the UN run the risk of eroding respect for themselves and for their Charter" (Bundu 1997:163 - 4). In the light of this, Bundu found cover under Schachters incisive postulation that :

No state today would deny the basic principle that the people of a nation have the right, under international law, to decide for themselves, what kind of government they want and that this include the right to revolt and to carry an armed conflict between competing groups. For a foreign state to support, force, one side or the other in an internal conflict, is to deprive the people in some measure of the right to decide the issue themselves. It is in terms of article 2(4), a use of force against the political independence of the state engaged in civil war (cited in Bundu *Ibid*: 148, see details in Schachler 1984 and Falk 1966:1127) Sic.

This view had earlier been presented by Falk when he says that:

traditional international law permits military assistance to the incumbent regime during the early stages of an international challenge. However, once the challenging faction demonstrates its capacity to gain control and administrate a substantial portion of the society, most authorities hold a duty of neutrality or non discrimination governs the relations of the factions to outside states (Cited in Bundu *Ibid*: 164; and see details in Falk 1966:1127).

It could be on the basis of these intellectual positions that ECOMOG intervention in both the Liberian and Sierra Leonean conflicts have been critiqued. But it could be recalled at the beginning of Liberian conflict, Abbas Bundu, the ECOWAS Executive Secretary was in pursuance of intervention in the conflict. Thus in both cases there were pressures towards an expanded ECOMOG. In Liberia the UN had to raise a United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) and in Sierra Leone, the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) was equally established. The mode of operation in some

cases was to bring ECOMOG and UNIMOL and/or UNOMSIL as the case may be, into conflict. This fundamentally affected the peace process as complementarity was undermined in favour of competition.

7.6.1 THE NEW ECOWAS PROTOCOLS

Given several scathing criticism levelled against ECOMOG, ECOWAS Heads of State and Government at an extra-ordinary summit in Lome, Togo, in December 1997, decided on the need to reconcile existing differences on regional security and mechanisms for conflict resolution and peace keeping. By July 1998 at Banjul, The Gambia, the ministerial and experts meeting produced a draft proposal from an earlier meeting of the Ministers of Defence, Internal and Foreign Affairs held on 1 March 1998 at Yamoussoukro. This document was finally accepted at the Summit of the Authority of Heads of State and Government (AHSG) Abuja, in August 1998. And by 1999, the Lome Summit of the AHSG had set up the modalities for the structures of a new protocol of ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security. The new mechanism draws its strength from Article 58 of the Revised ECOWAS Treaty, the 1991 ECOWAS Declaration of political principles and from the weaknesses it suffered from implementing POMAD, PONA and various decisions taken by SMC to enforce ECOMOG.

The new ECOWAS protocol is comprehensive considering all the lapses experienced in the previous protocols. There are 58 articles in the 8 (eight) chapters of the protocols incorporating relevant provisions of PONA, POMAD and others like Free Movement of Persons and the Right of Residence and Establishment, except ANAD. The objectives of the protocol among others are :

- (i) to prevent, manage and resolve internal and inter-state conflicts;

Council. The elected members (Article 8(2)) serve for a period of two (2) years renewable.

The Mediation and Security Council (MSC) unlike the problem encountered by SMC, now has power to take decisions on issues of peace and security in the sub-region on behalf of the authority. Decisions in the Council is taken by a two-third majority vote of members present. The functions of SMC include:

- (a) decide on all matters relating to peace and security;
- (b) decide and implement all policies for conflict prevention, management and resolution, peace keeping and security;
- (c) authorize all forms of intervention and decide particularly on the deployment of political and military missions;
- (d) approve mandates and terms of reference for such missions;
- (e) review the mandates and terms of reference periodically, on the basis of evolving situations; and
- (f) on the recommendation of the Executive Secretary, appoint the Special Representative of the Executive secretary and the Force Command.

Accordingly, the Council's deliberations are held at three (3) levels, such as Heads of State and Government, Ministerial, and Ambassadorial. Article 15 spells out the role and functions of the Executive Secretary in relations to initiating actions for conflict prevention, management resolution, peacekeeping and security in the region. Such actions according to Article 15 (1) include facts finding, mediation, facilitation, negotiation and reconciliation of parties in conflict. This time too, article 16 of the new protocol has properly structured the office of the Deputy Executive Secretary who would take charge of Political Affairs, Humanitarian Affairs, Defence and Security, Observation and Monitoring Centre and any other

departments that are established by MSC. And in Articles 17 new developments were made with the establishment of supporting organs of the institutions of the mechanism such as (a) The Defence and Security Commission, (b) The Council of Elders and (c) ECOWAS ECOMOG.

One of the new innovations in the protocol is the establishment of the Council of Elders in, Article 20. This is like introducing African traditional model of conflict resolution into the modern method. It is the duty of the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS to compile annually lists of eminent personalities who on behalf of ECOWAS can use their good offices and experiences to play the role of mandates as defined by the role of mediators, conciliators and facilitators. Their mandates are defined by the Executive Secretary on the basis of the mission to be carried out. Another important organ is the sub-regional peace and security observation system (otherwise known as Early Warning). The system, as it is also call, according to Chapter IV articles 23 – 24, consist of (a) an observation and monitoring centre. It is responsible for data collection and analysis, and preparation for the use of the Executive Secretariat based on information and data from the zones.

In view of this, the sub region has been broken into four (4) zones, comprising of countries like Cape Verde, The Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Mauritania and Senegal Banjul. The Gambia would serve as zonal headquarters. Zone II has Burkina Faso Cote d'Ivoire, Mali and Niger. Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso serves as the headquarters. Zone III is made up of Ghana, Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. Moronvia, Liberia, would serve as the zonal Head Office. Lastly, zone IV has Benin, Nigeria and Togo. Cotonou, Benin, would be the headquarters. The zonal bureaux expected to have a working relation with the host country, collect

data on indicators that impact on peace and security of the zone and the sub-region. Their reports are processed to zonal Headquarters from where they are collated and later sent to observation and Monitoring Centre at the Executive Secretariat.

To avoid criticism, the new protocol now has the mandate to now apply itself in (a) aggression or conflict in any member state or threat thereof, (b) conflicts between two or several member states, and (c) internal conflict that may threaten a humanitarian disaster or pose a serious threat to peace and security in the subregion. There are now basic criteria to be followed in enforcing conflict management (Chapter IV), provide humanitarian assistance (Chapter VIII), and peace building (Chapter IX).

Furthermore, the provision for a sub-regional security on the control of trans-border crime and the preventive measures against the illegal circulation of small arms are some of the major developments in the new protocol. This includes efforts to check the proliferation of small arms which have led to the variegation of conflict in the subregion. Similarly too, ECOMOG is retained and restructured, composing of several stand-by multi-purpose modules (civilian and military) in their countries of origin and ready for immediate deployment. It has a clearly spelt out mandate like (a) observation and monitoring; (b) peacekeeping and restoration of peace; (c) humanitarian intervention in support of humanitarian disaster; (d) enforcement of sanction, including embargo; (e) preventive deployment; (f) peace-building, disarmament and demobilization; (g) policing activities, including the control of fraud and organised crime; and (h) any other operations as may be mandated by the Mediation and Security Council.


In summary the new protocol has succeeded in coding every aspect of defence and security to avoid loopholes experienced in implementing previous

agreements in the sub-region. In so doing, it threw up (a) Mediation and Security Council; (b) Council of Elders; (c) Observation and Monitoring Centre; (d) humanitarian question; and (e) transborder crime and proliferation of illegal small arms. By this new protocol ECOWAS affirmed that it replaces all other provisions especially the protocol relating to Mutual Assistance in Defence of 29th May 1981 and the protocol on Non-aggression of 22 April 1978 which are in conflict and/or incompatible with the present protocol. Details of the new protocol are tabulated in figure 7.2.

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Figure 7.2

ECOWAS MECHANISM FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT, RESOLUTION AND SECURITY



The drive towards the new mechanism was based on the fact that ECOMOG did not only escaped from a lot of scathing but has been bastardized by the use of force in the peace keeping process. The old ECOMOG model was critiqued on the basis of

- i) mode of deployment of the forces without due respect to rule of engagement;
- ii) composition of the force was lopsided in favour of Nigeria;
- iii) command and control was effected from Nigeria, rendering the Executive Secretariat impotent; and
- iv) creating the fear of emerging regional hegemony which may subsequently swallow up other nations, in the sub-region.

7.7 FINANCING ECOMOG

The sourcing and financing of ECOMOG remain a controversy in Nigeria just as the politics of the formation of ECOMOG itself. The first time the issue was brought into limelight was through William Keeling, a British journalist with the **London Financial Time**, (June 27, 1991) This led to the deportation of Keeling as The Nigerian government denied the substance of the story. According Keeling, Nigeria was spending between \$250 - \$500ml from its Gulf war windfall to finance ECOMOG. Government denied the story and said for security reasons it could only explain that 10% of her resource was being spent on ECOMOG (**West Africa**: 5 – 11 August, 1991). Since the revelation by Keeling, Nigerians have continued to question the financial implication of ECOMOG (see **The African Guardian**, Lagos, September 28, 1992). However, the politics of financing ECOMOG goes beyond knowing the actual figure expended.

At a UN conference on assistance to ECOMOG in May 1995, Tom Ikimi said Nigeria had spent up to N3 billion in the Liberian crisis. This amount is said to be very conservative. A military source instead estimated that Nigeria had spent at least \$4 billion (**The News**: 29 April 1995). However, another source actually confirmed that Tom Ikimi put the figure at \$4 billion but the Director of Defence information, Brig Gen Fred Chijuka, said Ikimi's figure was too outrageous as Nigeria was spending \$30,000 per day in Liberia (**The Source**: Lagos August 4, 1997:26).

Whatever the amount spent on ECOMOG and the differences thereof, the most important point of departure is that for various regimes in Nigeria from Babangida to General Abdulsalami, ECOMOG became a conduct pipe for primitive accumulation. Nigerian soldiers in ECOMOG were denied their allowances while a lot of money was still spent in the name of ECOMOG. In a revelation made by Campaign for Democracy (CD), ECOMOG was seen as a channel for the military to siphon government money into private hands. Their allowances, of \$3 (later \$5), after an initial payment of \$270 ml when the war started was subsequently stopped on the pretext of conserving the money to buy food for the soldiers. However, the food was not forthcoming and the soldiers lost moral to fight. Soldiers were forced to search for food and subsequently were easily ambushed randomly and killed, or poisoned to death. But in order to keep the fighting spirit inside the soldiers they were drugged (by their officers) with marijuana and an amphetamine known as bubbles (**The Source**: August 4, 1997:31).

Beginning from the Babangida era, the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) had a presidential order to borrow the sum of \$100ml from

Citibank of London in August 1992 to pay for the supplies for ECOMOG operations. The money was taken through overdraft on the NNPC's Liquefied Natural Gas, account with Citibank repayable on an interest rate of 4.25% per annum (*The News*: 29 April 1996:10). Similarly, during the same period Unipetroleum Plc, a Nigerian oil firm, was also ordered by the NNPC through another presidential directive to supply petroleum products to the Nigerian contingent in ECOMOG.

Keeling, the British journalist, underestimated or even misreported the diversion of the Nigerian 1989 Gulf war windfall to the financing of ECOMOG. According to the panel set in 1994 by Abacha's regime under the chairmanship of Pius Okigbo, the amount of \$124bn was recorded during the gulf war as a windfall from sales of crude oil by Nigeria. However, in the Okigbo report, there was no record to show by the Babangida's regime how the money was used. Government argued that the money was spent on financing ECOMOG and general development of the country. The credibility of this argument was punctured by Professor Bayo Adeganye who confirmed from the World Bank/IMF Head Office in Washington that there was no trace that the money was used at the international capital market for the purchase of arms, ammunition and equipments for ECOMOG activities in Liberia (interview March 2000). But Babangida in his usual way dismissed this:

Nobody listened when Okigbo was handing over that report to Abacha. The arithmetic of the media on what is now famously tagged "the Gulf Oil windfall" is jaundiced. At whatever matter price you may want to sell the oil, there is no way any country in the world could make \$12.4 bn in 91 days. Simple arithmetic. So, we could not have made \$12.4 bn in 91 days during which the Gulf war raged. Okigbo's statement said during the period of six years this amount was made... He was an economist who had his own hang-ups on how this money could be better utilised. But we used it for non-generating investments... I think there is a difference on matter what he considered non priorities. I was in government, I should consider what was a

priority, I should respect his views, he should also respect my decision (**The News**: 6 November, 1999:21).

Nevertheless, Babangida in his explanation may only be finding some escape routes because if money was pumped into the economy and yet it failed to generate development it means it only corrupted the system. The breakdown of social security, poor economic infrastructure and the privatisation, and personalisation of government resources makes it possible for the regime to be accused of corruption.

As at 1992, Babangida's regime stopped financing ECOMOG from the presidency. The Ministry of Defence was mandated to carry out the financial implications emanating from ECOMOG. General Abacha who was in charge as Minister of Defence deliberately refused to remit monies meant for ECOMOG operations. In spite of the huge sum of money pumped into ECOMOG it was not translated into the well being of Nigerian troops in ECOMOG. Thus the morale of Nigerian soldiers deflated. Nigerian soldiers began a survival strategy through looting of properties in Liberia. Accordingly, the September 1994 issue of the **BBC focus on Africa** magazine recorded properties stolen by Nigerian soldiers to include video, motorcycles and air-conditioners among other bigger things like stripping bare the Liberian Iron-ore Refinery (LIMCO) in Buchanan and looted items worth \$500ml. According to Allen Cyril, Managing Director of the Liberian National Petroleum Refinery, in a press briefing during the 1994 ECOWAS Summit in Abuja noted that Nigerian soldiers in ECOMOG had not shown sincerity in their tour of duty: According to him:

"The biggest problem we have is the fact that we have military units that are not sincere with ECOWAS objectives. Most of them are involved in business and we have been complaining about this. They are using ECOWAS and ECOMOG as

an alibi to carry out their own private business. Go to the ports in Lagos and see ECOMOG vessels when they arrive here you see somethings military people are not supposed, to take from where they are deployed for peace keeping" (*The News*: 29 April, 1996:11).

Though the soldiers may merely be reflecting the military leadership attribute in Nigeria. But General Isaya Bakut dismissed the fact of ECOMOG soldiers being in involved in stealing. He quipped "what is there in Moronvia for Nigeria ECOMOG soldiers to take away Moronvia is not more than Badagry. What do they have? Nigerian soldiers are very patient, getting US\$5 daily as stipen and were very contended" (sic interview). Even as in September 1992 a Captain serving with ECOMOG disappeared with \$179,016 meant for the payment of compulsory savings and operational allowances for the Nigerian contingent in ECOMOG. It is however, being speculated within the military circle that the officer might have been allegedly killed by one Brigadier-General Okalagwu who collected the money after all. Brigadier Okalagwu has an unusual character which should have earned him early retirement or dismissal from service but for his connections with top military brass. He went to Pakistan for his Staff Course and got into problems. He was deported back to Nigeria and was court-marshalled. He is currently serving some jail terms. Equally, the sum of \$27 million aid from the US in support of Nigeria's effort in ECOMOG disappeared in the last days of General Babangida's regime. Chief Shonekan's interim government made frantic efforts to locate the money but met a **cul-de-sac** (*The News*: 29 April 1996: 13).

The failure of the Ministry of Defence to fund ECOMOG was the greatest problem that confronted the Force Commander, General Bakut. This affected the moral of his soldiers and was interpreted to mean weakness on the side of the

Force Commander. However, when Bakut was replaced by Gen. Olurin, the presidency resumed direct funding of ECOMOG. And yet Abacha requested Olurin to investigate Bakut's account so that the whole blame of the failing moral in ECOMOG would be shifted to him (Bakut). It was clear that the Ministry of Defence under Abacha was in charge of ECOMOG funding including the purchase of arms and ammunition. As at the time General Abacha became the Head of State ECOMOG still formed the drain pipe for raising money for his self-perpetuation rule. Therefore ECOMOG contracts were given to Alhaji Arisekola as a means to channel foreign exchange towards generating funds to counter political opposition against General Abacha's self-succession bid.

As regard Sierra Leone, Abacha was bent on using force against Major Paul Komorah when he realised the financial outcome that is derivable from it. According to *African Confidential* (Vol 39 No. V 6 March 1998) Abacha and a London based security outfit by name Sandline International and one Rupert Bone (a former British High Commissioner to Sierra Leone) together with Peter Pentold (the servicing British High commissioner to Sierra Leone) worked out an arrangement which was financed by a Vancouver based Bencher Rakesh Saxena. The agreement made promises for diamond concessions in payment for the effort and contribution of the interested parties (see also Aboagye: 1999: 239). With this financial arrangements and benefits, Nigeria's ECOMOG operation in Sierra Leone under Col (later Brig Gen) Maxwell Khobe advanced effectively to force out the Koromah's Junta by February 1996. Abacha was said to have business interest in oil refinery in Sierra Leone, among other oil deals in the Gambia with the Gambian leader, Yaya Jaliweh (**This Day**: January 13, 2000).

The wrecking of ECOMOG Funds was not limited to Babangida and Abacha regimes. When Abdulsalami took over he replaced Abacha's contractors with his own "kinsmen and kingsmen". For instance, Abacha's crony in the award of ECOMOG contract Alhaji Arisekola's company, M/S Jubal Ltd was replaced with Dynamite Integrated Ltd owned by Abusalami's in-law for the supply of foodstuff to the ECOMOG soldiers. The amount was put at N105,720,514 based on the strength of 11,913 soldiers of all ranks. This amount was later raised to N261,968,175.00 based on market survey which made the earlier prices unrealistic. Dynamite Integrated Ltd was paid N90,000,000 as advanced payment even before the Permanent Secretary received the authorization. The Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence was only informed later in a letter to "pay the balance of N171,968,175 to the supplier in order to ensure the success of ECOMOG food supply for the period" between September – November 1998 (*Telescope*: September 1999:17). If the allegations raised at the Oputa Human Rights Commission by Brigadier-General AI Sabo were true, then the Abdulsalami's short stay in office was more scandalous in terms financing ECOMOG. General Abdulsalami's government was said to have imported civilian motorcycle helmets which were repainted as military helmet. These were sent to the ECOMOG soldiers. As a result many Nigerian soldiers died in the war in Sierra Leone.

The total amount Nigeria committed to the ECOMOG operations in terms of human lives and financial resources has been an issue of extreme controversy. Earlier on the President Obasanjo puts the financial cost at 8 billion dollars and later 12 billion dollars (*The Guardian*, 26 October 1999) However, President Bill Clinton of the United States while on a state visit to Nigeria in the year 2000 estimated the cost to be 10 billion dollars But later on Alhaji Sule Lamido, Nigeria Foreign Affairs Minister, puts the figure at 11 billion dollars.

It is significant to note that the financial implications of Nigeria's involvement has been on the increase as long as the region is still insecure. As at the early part of the year 2001 the bill stood at \$13 billion. The inability to ascertain the exact figure Nigeria spent in ECOMOG was as result of the unusual ways the operations were financed during the regimes of Babangida and Abacha. If we collapse all the expenses incurred by other member states of ECOWAS, the United Nations, the United States among others it is possible that over 30 billion dollars might have been spent in both Liberia and Sierra Leone. These sum could have been diverted to development or used to significantly pay off Nigeria's external debt if the wars were not fought.

However, the most disturbing aspect of the wars has been the lack of record keeping on the number of armed and civil population killed. Nigerian government has consistently maintained that only 500 soldiers died in Liberia but it is silent on the Sierra Leone conflict. There are also quite a number of those whose death bodies are not discovered while others deserted the battle field. Nigeria's decision not to give details of death is captured by the official position that it will be negating the logic of warfare if the actual figures are made public. The then Director of Defence Information Brigadier-General Fred Chijuka notes that "Nigeria does not want to play into the hands of Charles Taylor to declare the number of death as he will jump up for joy". (*The News*: 29 April, 1996: 13).

With the huge amount expended, Nigeria, became weary of financing ECOMOG under a civilian regime. In fact President Obasanjo, partially withdrew Nigerian troops from Sierra Leone. Meanwhile at the meeting of the ECOWAS Ministers of Defence Staff held in Abuja Nigeria's Defence Minister, General Theophilus Danjuma (rtd) pointed out that as much as Nigeria owes it a duty to

place the security of the region on priority “practical realities dictates that we (Nigeria) should be cautious not to over commit ourselves again”. (**This Day:** May 18, 2000 pp.1 – 2). Nigeria’s final withdrawal paved way for UNOMSIL to take control of the peacekeeping force in Sierra Leone as the rebels are not comfortable with Nigeria’s interest in ECOMOG. Nevertheless, according to the Minister of Defence, Lt-Gen T.Y. Danjuma, Nigeria is still spending \$1 million a day for ECOMOG in Sierra Leone as the United Nations is yet to demonstrates its wholesome financial commitment to UNAMSIL.

7.8 CONCLUSION

What the chapter has done is to show the level of personalization of state power and the ability of the personalities to use their position to defend their personal as well as regime interest. This transcends to the management of regional security through ECOMOG. And as the study reveals all the military heads of state from Babangida, Abacha to Abubakar turned ECOMOG into goldmine and a stabilizing plain for either the perpetuation of their regimes or face-saving measures. A cursory reading between the lines as shown in this chapter indicates that the regimes were much more inclined toward regime interest than national interest.

CHAPTER EIGHT

ECOMOG, REGIME INTEREST AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN WEST AFRICA:

8.1. INTRODUCTION

The thrust of this thesis is to problematise the linkage between regime interest and authoritarian rule which has implications for conflict resolution. Using Nigeria in ECOWAS – ECOMOG, as a case study, the thesis identifies some structural components of regime interest that influence the resolution of conflict in Liberia and Sierra Leone. This concluding chapter provides the summary of findings, conclusions and recommendations.

8.2. SUMMARY

Contrary to the position of the dominant theoretical models in foreign policy analysis the conceptual framework employed in the thesis is that in a weak political system crowded with competing models of policies, national interest is hard to define. As much as elite interest defines the fundamentals of national interests, beyond that, regime and personal interests become foremost. Regime interest, and to some extent personal rule run counter to elite interest and thereby dousing what remains of national interest. What is national interest therefore, is not actually the collective interest of the governing elite but a clique of neopatrimonialists occupying the power of the state. The pursuit of regime interest is perpetuated more under authoritarian rule; whether civilian or military. Authoritarian regimes emerge under a severe shortage of coherent

national interest, claiming, as it is emerging, to defend, promote and enforce national interest. In the light of this, the authoritarian regime seeks support from various yearning interest groups. In the process it is seeking also avenue for political control. The authoritarian regime advocates sound populist policies and programmes but are quick to demonstrate their real nature after consolidating power. Their success in power depends on pursuing their regime interests and security rather than common goods for maintaining national interest through alliances of interests within and outside the system.

The purpose of such authoritarian regimes going into alliance therefore, is not to defend and promote national interest but regime interest and security. Such alliances are made with similar authoritarian regimes within the region or elsewhere to sustain themselves in power. Attempts to be involved in the resolution of conflict, ideally is to save humanity from the scourge of war, but the eternal motives of authoritarian regimes are to maintain their interests and security while in power with such conflicts invariably enhancing their interest. They have the phobia to contain a conflict far away before it spills over to their domestic arena; the damage of which they may not withstand. As it is pointed out alliance making by authoritarian regimes is not to reinforce a threat against the state but rather to enhance their survival in power. Thus the overall decision-making processes are based on the dictates and direction of what the leader decides.

In summary regime interest and security is foremost where

- (a) the regime rather than the actor-state and/or decision maker is the main focus of deciding state policy;

- (b) the leader of the regime could go into alliance to contain both domestic and external threats as a power survival strategy;
- (c) the regime has a foremost interest in regime security than national security interest; and
- (d) forms the basis for the reproduction of violence and creating the culture of silencing oppositions in order to maintain its power interest.

It is in the light of this that this research was conducted to ascertain how Nigerian's intervention in Liberia and Sierra Leone was based on regime interest instead of national interest. Though the methods of approach in the thesis are based on content analysis, much attention was also paid to interviews, unstructured interviews, focus group discussions and interactions at policy group meetings, seminars and workshops. The outcome of which provided a verification of the variables and correlation of facts.

Two regimes, Babangida and Abacha, were foremost in the resolution of conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The two regimes emerged at some critical moment of Nigeria's political development and began to rule with an iron hand. They started on populist level plainfield and having grasped power turned the sword against the people. Their actions and policies affected the economy, politics, national and regional security.

The strength of the economy was destroyed as Structural Adjustment Programme was introduced, reordering the economic policies more towards primitive accumulation as the base for sustaining elite exploitation of the society. Poverty became the means of keeping the populace perpetually under control of exploitative class. In the light of this, corruption became the means by which elite

survival approach was imbibed across various sectors of the society. Under Babangida it was widespread but under Abacha it was restricted to his family and same clique which was notorious in servicing the security and political interests of the regime. Above all, corruption was a means of initiation and recruitment for the defence of the regimes. Politically the two regimes succeeded in setting agenda's that created domestic coalitions; a coalition process which disorientated the political scenario in order to enhance the perpetuation of their stay-in power. In doing so, national security was tightened to ensure that the society is kept under the siege of the authoritarian leaderships. There were several security outfits purposely to deal with specific issues that the military regimes felt threatened by.

Furthermore, the two authoritarian regimes found the basis of strengthening their regime interest and security by building regional security alliances through ECOWAS to address security issues. Because of the contentious characters of member states of ECOWAS it was difficult for Babangida and Abacha to build a formidable regional security coalition to satisfy their regime interest. The division within ECOWAS notwithstanding, the two regimes were able to form an alliance of authoritarian states within ECOWAS in order to maintain their individual domestic security, as well as influence the direction of regional security. The major problem that polarized member states of ECOWAS was that ECOWAS security regimes were not properly established. Therefore, the basis for the regional organisation to intervene in Liberia and Sierra Leone conflicts became problematic. Yet under Babangida and later Abacha, ECOWAS became the thrust to build a regional support for the interest of their regimes respectively in the region. This by implication served as a cover for the pursuit of their personalised rule.

The pattern and practice of regime interest and security is not new in the global terrain. The Babangida and Abacha regimes were only strengthening what they have learnt from similar operations in Hitler's German, Ghadafi's Libya, Mobutu's Zaire, and Stalin's USSR, among others. These notorious authoritarian leaders have some common traits. They were power-seeking, and were security conscious and fearful of threats. They were also very ambitious and pursue secucracy rather than democracy. They had an unshakable belief in the infallibility of their will. They hardly tolerated opposing views. They were equally surrounded by sycophants who sung their praises than tell them the truth. These sycophants easily surrendered to the views of the leaders and zealously translate them into action unscrupulously. The authoritarian rulers are critical to intellectual disputation. Babangida for instance who surrounded himself with academics only merely listened to them but never took their advice. Abacha on his part was anti intellectual outrightly.

To enhance the prospect of their regime survival they built an alliance and coalition with states in the ECOWAS, the divide between the Francophone and Anglophone, notwithstanding. ECOMOG was established after a hectic meeting of Standing Mediation Committee (SMC). The SMC which was established by ECOWAS was supposed to report back to the authority of Heads of State and Government but it rather went ahead to create ECOMOG on its own and raising a peace keeping force to (under ECOMOG) to intervene in Liberia. Unfortunately before the Liberian conflict came into existence the region had experienced inter-state conflicts between Mali and Mauritania and Senegal and Mauritania. ECOWAS did not take a serious concern in resolving them. The question that was being asked is , what was so special in the intra -state conflict

in Liberia that could lead to regional intervention? Nigeria under Babangida was very committed to the regional intervention in Liberia. This made some critics to believe that Babangida's regime's interest was tied to the resolution of the Liberian conflict. His personal friendship with the Liberian dictator, Samuel Doe, and given some investments in Liberia it became difficult to leave Doe alone. Nigeria raised fighting men and spent surplus resources in kind and cash to prosecute the war. The ECOMOG forces suffered a lot of criticism internationally as at a point it became a fighting force rather than a peacekeeping force.

While using ECOMOG to retain international support at a point, Babangida's regime suffered domestic criticism. His political transition programme suffered especially as he annulled the June 12, 1993 presidential election in order to perpetuate himself in power, as well as to hold on to power to ensure that Charles Taylor never took over state power in Liberia. Though he left office after some pressures he left behind General Sani Abacha who manouvered himself and took over power from an interim government set up by him (Babangida). When Abacha took over, he began, like Babangida, to build a similar regional security operation as a way to draw international support. He succeeded by drawing Charles Taylor closer and in elections that took place Taylor turned from being a rebel to an elected President. Later Abacha turned his attention to Sierra Leone where the democratically elected government of Alhaji Tijan Ahmed Kabbah was overthrown by Major Paul J. Koromah. Initially Abacha had wanted to support Major Koromah, but given the increasing international sanctions against his authoritarian regime he threw his support behind the restoration of Kabbah to office. This was intended to let the international community understand that if he could pursue democracy in Sierra Leone he was likely to return Nigerian to democracy soonest.

As much as the international community could support Abacha for "restoring" democracy in Sierra Leone, Nigerians saw it as mockery because his domestic policies toward democratisation were not only authoritarian but left Nigerians in the most dreaded repressive environment ever known in the history of post-colonial Nigeria. The opposition camps were not only kept divided but were pursued and persecuted to any part of the world where they were found.

In summary, both the Babangida and Abacha regimes were characterised by:

- i) creating severe poverty and deprivation to ensure the submissiveness of the populace to their regime dictates;
- ii) monetisation of politics as a way of isolating mass involvement, and making it inclusive for the privileged few. Those who would be taken on board would be those that were ready to be submissive and dependant on the regime. Corruption became a means for political recruitment;
- iii) creating a false ideology of nationhood to promote the interest of the regimes rather than national interest. Appeals were constantly made to religious injunction for the people to see the leadership as the will of God;
- iv) creating an intimidating security environment to distance opposition by providing a reign of terror; and
- v) creating counter-balancing coalitions of conflicts which are complex but fluctuating among the segmented cleavages in order to be seen as credible arbiter.

8.3 FINDING

Given these characteristics of the two regimes, their regional security approaches to conflict resolution were not actually based on genuine regional security interest or on the basis of establishing mechanism for regional security. The processes and basis for resolving the conflicts in both Liberia and Sierra Leone were too incoherent, porous and superficial. Thus at a point when it was assumed that solutions have been found, the two countries (Liberia and Sierra Leone) continued to boil. What Babangida and Abacha did in ECOWAS - ECOMOG was to submerge rather than resolve any conflict in Liberia and Sierra Leone. These were for their personal and regime interests and security rather than for the resolution of regional security conflict. The process of conflict submergence helps to stabilise their regimes for the period they were in office. Immediately they left office the crises, one way or the other, resurrected and escalated. It temporarily stabilised in Liberia, but has remerged. Rebel groups have continue to engage the Taylor government in combat at the border with Guinea. These actions have impacts or implications for future peace-making procedures in West Africa.

Given the syntheses provided, regime interest and security are real. It is not easy to delineate regime and personal interest from national interest but once there is an abuse of the constitution by the governing authority there is abnormality. Then regime and personal interest have occurred. These have several implications for conflict resolution as much as they do also have for the types of contradictions and conflicts that occur in domestic arena. Here, there are six factors involved. First, regime interest and security have the tendency for undermining domestic political development. What have been experienced in Nigeria under the regimes of Babangida and Abacha was an attempt to create the

basis for authoritarian perpetuation. They began with the process of transition to democratic rule. However, it turned out that the democratic institutions were built on "autocratic foundation." The commitment they put into political development is betrayed by their self-succession agendas. Because they were pursuing personal and regime interest they created political systems to regulate elite competition for political power. In the regulating process the elites fall back on primordial cleavages to establish their political stronghold. Politics is played on the basis of inclusion and exclusion. The authoritarian regimes create the basis for dealing with each ethnic and/or individual groups or elite; and not as a collective. Where the contesting elites have no common ground for expressing their collective grievances they resorted to remodeling their interest on ethnic, religious and primordial cleavages. More than ever before, political interest was based on cleavages with a narrower perspective on politics. In additions the ruling military regimes established their constituencies separate from recognized constitutional constituencies. Because they are not democratic they have to identify with anti-democratic and repressive institutions in the society to operate effectively. Also they militarised state institutions to achieve this same purpose. The regimes depended on traditional institutions and ethnic groups that are receptive to authoritarian rule. While using military institutions and the police to exercise control they found a stable ground in militarising the bureaucracy. Those excluded from these militarised constituencies were turned into oppositions.

Thus, when the June 12 presidential elections results were annulled, effective opposition to it came from the civil society, particularly from the Yoruba ethnic group and from non-governmental organisations. While the Yoruba and other ethnic groups felt aggrieved of the ruling military establishments for

denying their kins the political leadership other ethnic groups joined in protesting the annulment because it portended the fact that such opportunity would also be denied them in future. As for the civil society and non-governmental organisations, it was a rape on democracy and an attempt to perpetuate military authoritarian rule. Most of the northern states, where the two authoritarian leaders came from, on the other hand, supported the annulment and called for the actual perpetuation of military authoritarian rule.

Secondly, apart from the domestic political instability, regime interest and security have also caused a sharp division within ECOWAS. What ECOMOG was intended to accomplish within the shortest practicable time took a longer period, lasting upto seven (7) years in Liberia. As a result, many men and officers died, a lot of resources were expended on swords rather, than plowshares. Nigeria and Nigerians became targets of attack across the region. Moreover, the ill feelings concerning Nigeria became intensified as most countries in West Africa were treading consciously with Nigeria, for fear that the authoritarian regime in Nigeria may be supporting some internal factions in their countries to cause a major crisis like that of Liberia, and Sierra Leone. Nigeria's involvement in Sierra Leone also created animosity between member countries in the subregion. For instance, Ghana and Nigeria initially had the problem of resolving the conflict in Liberia and Sierra Leone. With Nigeria under Abacha insisting on ECOMOG intervening in Sierra Leone, Ghana was very skeptical about Nigeria's overwhelming interest in making a recourse to war than peace in resolving existing conflicts.

Thirdly, the lesson from ECOMOG shows that it is a difficult task to effectively deploy a peace keeping force or carry out enforcement operation in

intra-state conflicts. Rather, it is easier done in inter-state conflict where contending leaders of respective countries are equal. However, it is not quite likely to occur in intra-state where there is an asymmetrical relationship between contending forces. The incumbent President finds it difficult to condescend low to negotiate with the rebels who are leading arms against the state. Therefore any external support by random intervention on the basis of regime or personal interest without farming out the ethics of intervention in the conflict, will escalate than resolve the conflict.

Fourthly, the Liberian conflict has also shown that belligerents that proved formidable in the pursuit of its goal would inevitably have a *de facto* recognition. And with the political economy of war where rebels hold up to economic and strategic points they cannot be dispensed with, without furthering the conflicts. The *de facto* recognition given to rebel leaders would not have been possible if the mode of intervention were based on the international ethics of intervention. Therefore, it is wrong to assume that any intervention at all may produce similar result. As shown in the case of West Africa, the intervention based on regime and personal interest only succeeded in producing relevance out of a rebel leader like Charles Taylor.

Fifthly, when the authority of the leader is put to question by a formidable force, it shows that leadership is itself transient and not sacrosanct. And those who must rule must function within the context of the mandate granted them by the constitution. Therefore, any regime that perpetuate self-rule stands confronted by the people. When regimes face formidable oppositions that are politically unhealthy the right of the leadership is no more acceptable. Regime and personal interest may hold a nation under siege but it can not successfully stop the people

from fighting. Most turbulent countries are deeply embedded in regime security interest.

Lastly, whatever criticism is made against authoritarian regimes over their interest and security at both national and regional security operations, they successfully turned their weakness into strength. The hegemonic pursuit later led to the commendation that without Nigerian involvement there would have been no ECOMOG. The hegemonic leadership (coercive or benevolent) provided by Nigeria led to both 'spray and sway diplomacy'. In other words, Nigeria embarked on moves based on persuasion and the spraying of resources, money and facilities like oil to purchase the interest of ECOWAS to support ECOMOG operation in Liberia and Sierra Leone. In pursuing both regime and hegemonic interests in the region, Babangida-Abacha regimes, overtly or covertly, led member states ECOWAS to transform an exclusively regional economic organisation into a security organisation.

Even though ECOWAS had some security arrangements they were adhoc, porous and lacked legal strength to bite. The bold attempt by Babangida to use regime interest in handling the crises in the region, whether to stabilize the interest of the authoritarian domestic regimes or not, turned out to be a pathbreaking approach to conflict resolution in the sub-region which has been applied in some other conflict areas of the world like Yugoslavia and Kosovo. As pointed out, the Liberian experience provided a path breaking approach under Nigeria's hegemonic leadership, whereby an attempt towards conflict resolution might not necessarily be based on the legal institutional framework but the exigencies of the moment.

At one of the briefings at the U.S congress, James L. Wood, US State Department observed that:

The Nigerian contribution has been absolutely critical to the success of ECOMOG. Nigeria's manpower and logistics contribution are critical to the operational capabilities of the force... Nigeria's ability to plan and confidently coordinated air, land and sea operations and to conduct insurgence campaign has been impressive. If we ever want to enagage in PKO (Peace Keeping Operations) using African troops we should keep Nigeria's potential very much in mind (**The News**: November 18 1993).

The argument went further that rather than see Nigeria's hegemonic and regime power play as coercive, creating splinter action within ECOWAS, Nigeria rather displayed an epistemic leadership control whereby the "SMC emerged consciously or not as a security alliance within ECOWAS collective security system. It threw up ECOMOG as a collective defence force to address an uncontrollable threat to regional security arrangement which would have been impossible to achieve" (Yoroms and Aning 1997).

The question that remains is how long can ECOWAS rely on exigence of the moment to resolve its problem? How do we avoid another country using the weaknesses of ECOWAS security arrangement to achieve its own national and regional security interest? It is in the light of these questions that ECOWAS has put in place a comprehensive regional security regime to checkmate similar occurrence in future. Thus ECOWAS Heads of State and Government set up in November 1997 at Lome, Togo, a study group on the proposed ECOWAS mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution for peace keeping and regional security. The guideline of the mechanism as produced by experts in meetings held in Yamoussoukro and Banjul in 1998 produced a draft protocol on

mechanism for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts and peace keeping. The draft proposal was approved at the ECOWAS Summit in Lome, Togo, 1999. The new protocol now known as Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace keeping and Security make provision for mediation and a security council under the authority of Heads of States and Government with 9 members being elected after three years. Decisions taken at the Mediation and Security council is binding. The mini member council replaces the SMC which heralded ECOMOG.

8.3.4 CONCLUSION

From the synthesis provided and further analysis of the implications of authoritarian rule on conflict resolution in West Africa, can it still be argued that Babangida and Abacha pursued foreign policies based on regime interest security and stability in the sub-region? There is no straight forward answer to this question. This is because it is a basic fact that ECOMOG suffered a crisis of legitimacy from the onset. And in tracing the root cause and causes of these crises, the two authoritarian leaders had their motives which gradually got perfected and internalised into national and regional security framework. Thus ECOMOG which received some spate of criticisms suddenly became a watershed in the development of security regime in West Africa and in the world. Consequent on the foregoing, two contradictory assumptions are possible here. First, it is possible to assume that the two Nigerian authoritarian rulers were more nationalistic in the implementation of foreign policy objectives of the Nigerian national interest. The second assumption is that the authoritarian regimes, whether at the domestic or external environment, pursued interest which incidentally turned out to be interest transformation.

The first proposition or assumption is very critical because no leader would pursue a policy that would entirely run contrary to the interest of his nation. They were able to effect regime interest from national interest. What they were therefore pursuing was regime interest, security and stability under the guise of national interest. Even if the regimes were nationalistic, their nationalism was only intended to lubricate the perpetuation of personalistic interest which they exhibited. But regime interest itself is fluid and cannot be concretely established when a leader is deriving its course. Even if his acts are inherently regime driven he can explain them away as national interest.

The second proposition brings us to a new development altogether. In a situation whereby the pursuit of regime interest turns out to be too pronounced as to make the authoritarian leader feel guilty of cheating the system in the process of resolving the conflicts, they could quickly adjust either by design or coincidence to what we may term "regime interest transformation". Regime (interest) transformation, therefore, means the process of negating regime interest and security following some social forces and law of nature operating in the society which are resistant to the emergence of narrow interest as against collective interest.

There are two levels of understanding regime interest transformation. Firstly, the regime is forced by circumstance to transform its interest from personal rule to collective interest. The continued reactions of the domestic forces and the responses of the international community against the regime may force it to transform its interest from narrower perspectives to tolerate national and/or sub-regional pressures and interests. Secondly, in the course of pursuing its regime interest and stability it may suddenly realise that it can no longer

pursue such interest again. It becomes a lesser security threat to its regime, so it can resign to regime interest transformation. For instance, as at the time Babangida was to leave office after a desperate effort at self-succession, his interest in ECOMOG became more relaxed than it used to be. Then ECOMOG became a mere regional security effort at conflict resolution. Taylor was no longer a threat to him. And if he were to continue in office he would have explored the concept no permanent friend no permanent enemy in international relations. In any case, he was battling for self-succession and survival instead of confronting himself with the Liberia. When Abacha picked up the leadership and saw the regional conflicts (in Liberia and Sierra Leone) as a means to seek international support for his regime he pursued it with zeal. He did not see the regional conflicts as a threat but as a means towards gaining the support of the international community.

Therefore, regime interest transformation, though acting under a negation process towards collective interest, could also be seen as a conscious manipulation of national and foreign policy not only to suit but also to entrench the limited interest of the regime in power. It could be a face-serving measure by a discredited regime to gain or regain recognition and credibility. It could be based on the negating process of the force of nature operating in the society or it could also be a manipulative device of the authoritarian regime to build credibility for their repressive regimes.

What this thesis has done is to provide an analytical insight into the use and manipulation of power by regimes as represented by the leaders. The basic point is how the regimes engineer conflicts and turn round to resolve such conflicts in a pattern that would perpetuate their stay in power. From Nigeria's case study,

under Babangida and Abacha, in the Liberian and Sierra Leonean crises, it can be seen that no authoritarian regime can gain its way in resolving conflicts except it gains the support of other authoritarian leaders. Babangida and Abacha gained such support respectively by spray diplomacy and sponsoring dictatorial regime and military coups in some West African countries to bring similar authoritarian leaders to power in order to build a circle of dictators in the regime. Together they were able to decide patterns of security operation in the region. However, given the dynamics of security development at domestic, regional and international levels, the regime interests of these authoritarian leaders got transformed to meet the challenge of evolving new regional security instruments in ECOWAS. This transformation has also affected and led to the emergence of civil rule in Nigeria after another stretch of military authoritarian rule.


8.4. ⁵ RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, it is important to point out that conflict is germane in society where personal regime interest superintend that of the people. Therefore, it is here recommended that human security must be properly placed in any attempt to resolve conflict. Where Human Security is neglected in any effort to resolve conflict the resolution process is rather based on personal regime interest rather than national interest.

We have noted that since the rise of and the sophistication of the state system sovereignty is no longer seen and based on social contract between the governed and the governor. Security is found inside the state. Those outside are insecure. Security is regime centric rather than human-centric. (see, Figure :8:2).

FIGURE: 8:2

THE CONCEPT OF REGIME-CENTRIC SECURITY




Source: Re- Configured from original figure by Center for Defence and Security Management, Wits University, 2000

It is therefore imperative to recommend first a shift in the paradigm from regime security interest to human-centric security. the concept of human security is the expansion of security space away from regime security to focusing on the people and moving from inter-state to in-state where the people become the value rather than victim of security. Security is about the survival and progress of the people and not the militarisation of the society which weakens cooperation, democracy and development.

To ensure the evolvement of human security African States must work towards implementating to its fullest the 1980 Lagos plan of Action. Either by

revolutionary pressure or evolutionary approach. Lagos plan of Action has elaborate clauses that can launch Africa into the realm of human-centric security in terms of integrating African social, environmental, military, and political system.

FIGURE: 8:3
HUMAN-CENTRIC SECURITY



Source: Adopted from the training of manual of the Centre for Defence and Security Management, Wits University, 2000

The Lagos plan of Action makes provisions for regional economic integration. The creation of regional economic organisations in various geographical zones is supposed to establish interactivities for African people to relate with each other with minimal state intervention. The economic integration is supposed to create borderless states with free movement of people and trading in goods and services. These processes if adhered to will reduce the concentration of power on the state and a reduction of sovereign pressure which has been personalised. Unfortunately, of all the sub-regional economic organisations in Africa only ECOWAS and SADC are trying to find their footing and focus. Indeed, sovereignty and state-centric security exploited by regimes have done damages to human security in Africa globalisation will not in any way mitigate this. However, globalisation is a necessary step only if Africa understands its dynamics and be part of it rather than being held captive by it.

Secondly, another important focus is for the restructuring of state-society relations. Many states in Africa are colonial creation. People were forced together against their will. It is only important that most of the intra-state conflicts occurring in Africa are conflicts intended to determine or resolve contending issues between the state and society. Therefore, external intervention must be done carefully to avoid denying the people their right to determine their sovereignty and sovereign right. Therefore the sanctity of colonial territory should be revisited. Ethiopia has set an example in Africa by institutionalising an open-ended constitutional framework for self-determination. This has led to the independence of Eritrea. This is something that conflict-ridden countries like Nigeria and regional hotspots in Africa should copy as measures towards resolving contending domestic issues and conflicts generally in Africa.

Lastly, leaders that have mismanaged the resources of their countries should be held accountable after leaving office. It is not only the abuse of human rights but also the plundering of resources that affects security, democracy and development in Africa. Hence it is hard for one to abuse human rights without also being involved in corruption and mismanagement of resources. Increasingly leaders that have left offices are now being tried all over the world. Africa should begin to open trial files for all its leaders that have corruptly enriched themselves as well as abused human rights. This will deter the emergence of dictators in the sub-region and the continent as a whole. Nigeria and indeed West Africa has suffered the trauma of corruption, mismanagement of resources and abuse of human rights under the regimes of Babangida and Abacha. It is as a result of the pursuit of regime-interest in Nigeria that the West African Sub-region was drawn into series of conflicts. These conflicts have created some social problems across the sub-region involving human rights abuses, violation against children, rape, large scale massacres, crime, cannibalism and ritualism. About 80% of families in West Africa have been affected one way or the other by regional conflicts. To avoid the occurrence of the regime-types experienced under Babangida and Abacha a proper legislation should be enacted to try those involved. This can only be done under a mass (not elite) democratic regimes. It may take time but all the same it will happen.

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
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