



Thesis
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**National Security in Nigeria's
Relations with its Neighbours**

2009


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National Security in Nigeria's Relations with its Neighbours

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
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2009

Certification

I certify that this work was carried out by Funso ADESOLA under my supervision in the
Department of International Relations, Faculty of Administration, Obafemi Awolowo
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Professor Bamitale Omole 18-02-2009

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Dedication

This work is dedicated to my children Opeloluwa, Boluwatife, wife Adejoke and parents Modupe and Adesokan.

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Acknowledgements

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In addition to the foregoing, I would like to state at this juncture that I take full responsibility for all the perspectives, interpretation and errors of omission, commission or that of original entry that might be found in this work.

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Abbreviations

AU	-	African Union
AG	-	Action Group
AIDS	-	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
ANC	-	African National Congress
AOPIG	-	African Oil Policy Initiative Group
AGOA	-	African Growth and Opportunity Act
AFTA	-	European Free Trade Area
CSIS	-	Centre for Strategic and International Studies
CEMAC	-	Central African Monetary and Economic Community
CIA	-	Central Intelligence Agency
CKD	-	Completely Knocked Down
CEAO	-	Communaute Economique de l'Afrique de l'Quest
CAR	-	Central Africa Republic
CFAO	-	Compagnie Francaise de l'Afrique Occidentale
CLB	-	Credit Lyonnais Bank
CFA	-	Communaute Francaise d' Afrique
DRC	-	Democratic Republic of Congo
EEC	-	European Economic Community
ENP	-	European Neighbourhood Policy
EU	-	European Union
ECOWAS	-	Economic Community of West African States
ECOMOG	-	ECOWAS Monitoring Group
FU	-	French Union
FRC	-	Federal Republic of Cameroon

GNP	-	Gross National Product
GUNT	-	Government of National Unity
G7	-	Group of Seven most Industrialised Nations
G8	-	Group of Eight most Industrialised Nations
HIPC-I	-	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries – Initiative
HIV	-	Human Immuno Virus
ICJ	-	International Court of Justice
IRC	-	International Red Cross
IMF	-	International Monetary Fund
IBRD	-	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
LURD	-	Liberian United for Reconciliation and Democracy
LNG	-	Liquefied Natural Gas
MBC	-	Merchant Banking Corporation
NATO	-	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NNPC	-	Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation
NIIA	-	Nigerian Institute of International Affairs
NSC	-	National Security Council
NPFL	-	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
NGOs	-	Non Government Organisations
NEMA	-	National Emergency Management Agency
NACCIMA	-	Nigerian Association of Chambers of Commerce, Industries, Mines and Agriculture
OECD	-	Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development
ODE	-	Officially Designated Enemies
OPEC	-	Organisation of Africa Unity

PAC	-	Pan African Congress
PAN	-	Peugeot Automobile of Nigeria
PSA	-	Peugeot Societe Autonome
PAN	-	Peugeot Automobile of Nigeria
PAC	-	Pan African Congress
RFDG	-	Rassemblemt des force Democratique de Guinea
SAN	-	Senior Advocate of Nigeria
SCOA	-	Societe Commerciale de l'Quest Africaine
SGB	-	Societe Generale Bank
SMC	-	Standing Mediation Committee
SPDC	-	Shell Producing and Development Company
TAC	-	Technical Aid Corps
US	-	United States
UN	-	United Nations
USSR	-	Union of Soviet Socialist Republic
UDEAC	-	Union Donaier d'Etas d'Afrique Central
UBA	-	United Bank for Africa
UTB	-	Universal Trust Bank
UAC	-	United African Company
UNIPOM	-	United Nations India-Pakistan Observer Mission
UNFIL	-	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNO	-	United Nations Organisation
UNHCR	-	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UK	-	United Kingdom
UNGA	-	United Nations General Assembly

UNSC - United Nations Security Council
UNICEF - United Nations Children Fund
WHO - World Health Organisation
WTO - World Trade Organisation

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Abstract

The study addressed the challenges and burden of leadership facing Nigeria by virtue of its quest for promoting and sustaining good neighbourliness as well as the situation of its national security in West and Central Africa. It also captured the emerging issues and challenges facing Nigeria's national security in relations with its neighbours.

Primary and secondary data were employed for the study. The Primary data were obtained through the administration of in-depth interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs). The in-depth interviews were conducted among officials of government ranging from desk officers of the Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to staff of the Nigerian National Boundary Commission, law enforcement agents at the border posts and academics who are specialists on the subject. The FGDs were carried out mainly among the border communities i.e. traders, artisans, students and civil servants. The officials interviewed were purposively selected because of their involvement in policy formulation and implementation on the subject. While the choice of people in the border areas between Nigeria and the neighbouring countries is because they have a nuanced and first-hand feel of what transpires in the border areas, such as the nature of security threats/cooperation as well as the dynamics of cross-border interactions in the areas. The Primary data were complemented with Secondary data – involving extensive and thorough desk research. The data collected were analysed using descriptive method.

The study revealed that there are no consistent programmes on Nigeria's national security in relations with its West and Central African neighbours. It was also discovered that Nigeria's security agenda is still foreign-driven (i.e. driven mainly by the major players in the international system, especially the United States of America). Furthermore, the findings showed that apart from scholarly analysis of Nigeria's national security in relations with its neighbours, the Nigerian government did not give it the much

needed attention. It was also found that most Nigerians and the law enforcement agents, in particular, are not properly mobilised towards the promotion of national security. This has been worsened by the people's informed self-interest, corruption and warped notion of success/achievement.

The study concluded that Nigeria's hegemonic sway in West and Central Africa demands that the nature and character of its national security concerns become more expansive, Africanised and highly prioritised.

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Chapter One

1.1 Introduction

Unlike individuals, nations find themselves in an inevitable web of relationship. While the former can relocate, the latter cannot. If this is accepted as a given, Nigeria's geostrategic location within West and Central Africa has not been given a deserved and adequate scholarly attention. There is also a dearth of analysis on the nature and dynamics of the geopolitics that the circumstance of Nigeria's location generates, especially as it relates to its national security with its West and Central Africa neighbours. It is these missing gaps that this study seeks to fill. The variables that would be used briefly in this introduction include the dynamics of Nigeria's relations with its West and Central Africa neighbours; the increasing emphasis on human security today; the exigencies of the post Cold War international relations, the demands of security in today's international relations and the French factor in West and Central African international relations.

Extant literature is replete with arguments that since independence in October 1960, Nigeria's relations with its immediate neighbours – which incidentally are all Francophone countries, have oscillated between outright cold relations, to open distrust, suspicion and conflict. It is further argued that this development has brought into focus the threat perceptions between Nigeria and its immediate neighbours. This position has been strengthened with reported cases of clashes between security agents and innocent citizens in the border areas, a phenomenon that could be traced to hostile trans-border incidents in the 1980s¹.

This study, however, posits that it is not always irritants and hostilities that characterised Nigeria's relations with its neighbours. For instance, since independence, it is one of Nigeria's cardinal principles to play the role of a "big brother" to its neighbours as reflected in its "good neighbourliness" policy. To be sure, good neighbourliness is

primarily anchored on the fact of territorial contiguity and more often than not, on socio-cultural similarities which transcend international boundaries. In fact, most proximate states and those that are not neighbours enter into it as the basis of their official relationships. In public international law, good neighbourliness includes respect for the sovereignty and independence of neighbouring states, non resort to the use of force, non interference in the internal affairs of neighbouring states, pacific settlement of disputes between neighbouring states and co-operation between neighbouring states². Be that as it may, most of Nigeria's neighbours see the country as a potential source of threat – as clearly demonstrated in the numerous disputations over the maritime and land border areas. In the long run, these neighbours became keenly sensitive about how vulnerable they are, in their relations with Nigeria. Thus, it could be said that the border incidents as well as the establishment of defence alliances between these neighbours and France (their erstwhile colonial master) could be seen as means to bolster their national self-confidence and increase their psychological margin of security³. This explains why these neighbours often undermine the gesture of generosity shown to them by successive Nigerian governments.

In respect of this, Bolaji Akinyemi, a former Nigerian Minister of Foreign Affairs, once argued that a stable, prosperous and secure Nigeria can translate to a stable, prosperous and secure West Africa. Therefore, the policy of 'good neighbourliness' towards these neighbours is perhaps predicated on the need to allay their fears and reassure them that Nigeria will not be a bully⁴. It is the reflection on this national security interest that made the country to resort to a policy of rapprochement with its neighbours in the post Civil War period and years after⁵.

Beside the foregoing, the issues of shared ethno-linguistic and historical background impinge on the nature and character of the relationship that Nigeria has with

its neighbours. Whereas, colonialism made us believe that sovereign boundaries delineating one country from the other are mutually exclusive, what Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the first Nigerian Prime Minister said on this is relevant:

The colonising powers of the last century partitioned Africa in a haphazard and artificial manner and drew boundaries which often cut right across the former groupings. Yet, however artificial those boundaries were at first, the countries they created have come to regard themselves as units, independent of one another⁶.

Therefore, if ethnic groups are divided across several countries, a time may come when they may yearn to unite. Indeed political exigencies and politicians in many plural societies have often stoked the idea of re-uniting with their kiths and kins to form a grand ethno-cultural group across the frontiers. This is the case with the Hausas in Niger Republic and Nigeria, the Yorubas in Benin Republic and Nigeria, and Ewes of Ghana and Togo. But as will be shown later in the study, attempting to reconstruct these boundaries is more problematic than leaving them as they are currently defined and constituted.

There is no gainsaying the fact that, in defending a nation's frontiers, the citizens living in such areas form the first line of defence⁷. Thus, general mobilization of the people for the nation's security and defence is a major argument that will be developed in this work. By this we mean security of the nation is no longer a solely military matter, but an issue that involves the mobilization of the population. This, we believe is one of the options that is opened to Nigeria in its post Cold War international relations. It is this that takes us to the issue of human security. It should be mentioned that internal instability poses greater threat to national security than external aggression. In 1979, Lieutenant General Olusegun Obasanjo, the then Military Head of State said:

For as long as we neglect the true interests of the generality of our people, so long will other powers find it easy to interfere in our internal affairs and divide our peoples. There is no better defence against external forces than the government which endeavours to

*carry the majority of the population with it and treats its peoples fairly decently*⁸.

He further emphasized that:

*In times of crises, the first responsibility is defence of any country. For that defence to be very meaningful and to really have what you want, total commitment to that defence must be made by the nationals of that country*⁹.

This important subject matter will be addressed fully in the study.

Another issue that is germane to this study, apart from human security, is the post Cold War international relations. It would be recalled that the defunct Soviet Union led the defunct Socialist Eastern bloc and Warsaw Pact, while the US led the Capitalist/Western bloc in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Throughout the Cold War, there were hostilities and rivalries between the two contending power blocs. For as long as the intense rivalry lasted, there was no direct military confrontation between them. It was this situation of 'cut-throat' competition and waging of surrogate wars between the two blocs/super powers that was termed the "Cold War". Shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, super power rivalry and competition for spheres of influence in the globe disappeared. Now that the Cold War pressure has abated, there is a global trend towards promotion of regional cohesion and *entente* among nations, hence, an understanding of Nigeria's national security goes beyond the country's relationship with its immediate neighbours alone but to other countries in the sub-region and far beyond.

Towards the end of the Cold War, the defunct Soviet Union not only became wary of its commitments to the war torn countries of Africa, but it also cut down on its support in terms of arm deliveries and in-country military assistance. For instance, Moscow gradually withdrew its involvement in the Leftist governments of Republic of Benin, Libya, Ethiopia, and also in the liberation struggles in Mozambique, Angola,

Guinea Bissau, Namibia and South Africa¹⁰. By 1991, there were about 95,000 African students in colleges all over the Soviet Union¹¹, but today the number has declined considerably. Also, the Soviet Union redirected its involvement in technological transfer in many capital projects in Africa. Equally, many Russian institutions symbolising its interests in Africa were either downgraded or reorganised after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. An example is the Patrice Lumumba Friendship University that was renamed Russian Friendship University. Also the Moscow Institute of African Studies was distressed and lost central funding¹². Worse still, the Russian public have negative view on issues bordering on Africa. Thus since 1992, Russia had closed up to sixteen of its embassies in Africa, while maintaining skeletal services in many others. Russia trade relations with Africa had also declined¹³.

Furthermore, the end of the Cold War made US policy makers to re-strategise and re-design a new policy to deal with Africa. Instead of its former anti-communist posture and opposition to Soviet influence in some African states, it is now pursuing issues on conflict resolution, democratization and good governance. For good measure, the US has consistently tried to co-opt Russia in achieving this objective. This development translates to the fact that after 1989, regional crisis perpetrated in Africa through external support for the warring factions took a different dimension¹⁴ – as they were no longer based on keenly contested Cold War considerations. Coupled with this was that the US policy in the 1990s emphasized less of the US third party intervention that had been the case before 1989 and more support for Africa's own initiatives. For instance, after the Cold War and following the failure of the US to quell the Somalian crisis in 1993, the US became weary in intervening in African conflicts. What ensued was 'regionalisation' of peace operations – such that African solutions were sought for African problems¹⁵.

Evidently, Nigeria has a lot of security responsibilities with respect to its neighbours in the sub-region. More pertinent is the fact that most times, governments facing insurgency readily get access to weapons and logistics in the international market place. However, insurgents cannot successfully operate without the active support of neighbouring governments. Beyond that, we should not forget that insurgents sometimes have sympathetic relatives living across the border who could provide arms and safe havens to the insurgents. To turn a blind eye to this type of cross-border activities is a national security risk for governments¹⁶. Therefore, the issues this study would be addressing are the implications of the above-mentioned type of development for Nigeria's national security; the leverages or constraints that Nigeria has in tackling this kind of national security challenge; as well as the nature and character of interactions or responses that the development could generate from Nigeria's neighbours both far and near.

Our concern will be to review the position which exclusively construes security in Cold War terms, as that which meant fortification of a nation with armed forces and stockpiling of arms for defence of the nation's territorial integrity. The point is that the proliferation of internal crises, which threatens the essence of many nations, has called for a redefinition of security to include economic and social development.

The effect of France's presence in West Africa is also central to the study of Nigeria's relations with its neighbours. Nigeria being a former colony of Britain has always had close ties with the Commonwealth. But Francophone countries, which surround the country, have strong linkages both with each other and with France in many spheres i.e. economic, judicial, administrative, cultural, etc. This peculiar geostrategic situation has made Nigeria to always nurture the fear of encirclement and vulnerability of its territorial security to violation, if not by the contiguous states, possibly by their former

colonial power (France) that could exploit the advantages of its relations with these countries¹⁷. Indeed, France's moral, diplomatic and financial support to Biafra during the Nigerian Civil War was with the hope of dismembering Nigeria, which France has always seen, because of its size and wealth, as a threat to its Francophone neighbours. This particular theme is addressed extensively later in this work.

The work is divided into seven parts. Chapter one which is the introduction addresses the following themes: research problematic, research questions, objectives, scope and significance of the study, and methodology. Chapter two is devoted to review of literature and theoretical framework for analysis. The third chapter examines Nigeria and its neighbours in geo-strategic context. Chapter four is on the nature of threat that is posed to Nigeria's national security. The fifth focuses on Nigeria's national security and its neighbours in a contemporary context. Chapter six is on the issues and challenges facing Nigeria's national security in relation to its neighbours, and chapter seven contains the conclusion, prospects and suggestions.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Successive Nigerian governments at no point pursued policies bordering on aggressive territorial acquisition in its relationship with neighbours. This is perhaps due to its lack of aggressive or expansionist intentions towards these neighbours, modesty on the part of its leadership or lack of attempt to unduly appropriate the advantage derivable from keeping a friendly neighbour. But the country's experience during the Civil War years (1967 – 1970) marked a turning point – as it became clear that it is beneficial for the country to have friendly neighbours not only in wartime but also during peacetime. This led the nation's foreign policy makers to evolve what was then called a policy of "good neighbourliness". The policy was meant to endear and cultivate friendship based on trust and affection with these immediate neighbours. In pursuing this new policy thrust, many

options were considered – which include granting them financial assistance and outright undertaking or underwriting the cost of some infrastructures like construction of roads e.g. in 1979, Nigeria jointly established with the People's Republic of Benin a cement factory at Onigolo (in the latter's territory) costing 59 million pound sterling¹⁸. Also in 1978, in a bid to facilitate the transportation links with Republic of Benin, Nigeria constructed the Lagos – Badagry – Seme – Kpodji highway. The project cost Nigeria 40 million pound sterling. After the ill-fated (three-hour) January 1977 invasion of Cotonou by an unknown band of mercenaries¹⁹, Nigeria signed a military cooperation agreement with the Republic of Benin. The agreement commits Nigeria into offering training facilities to Beninise armed forces and provide for the free movement of aircrafts and ships between the two countries²⁰. Not only that, Ilela - Birni - N'koni highway and the double carriage bridge built at the cost of 280 million CFA francs were commissioned to ease transportation between Nigeria and Niger Republic. Apart from that, in Save, a Sugar factory was established that was jointly owned by Nigeria and Niger. There is also a mining industrial co-operation between the two countries: e.g. Uranium at Afasto estuary, Iron-Ore at Say and Phosphates at Tahoua – all in the Republic of Niger²¹. Additionally, the two countries co-operate on developing their water resources e.g. Kanji and Makalam dams as well as Yobe Basin Scheme. In 1972, a pact was signed in which Nigeria was to supply about 30,000 kilowatts of electricity annually to Niger²². In fact, Benin and Niger Republics inundated the Nigerian authorities with request for assistance to build local roads and highways, within their domains, during Nigeria's oil boom era. Within the same period, Republic of Cameroon was keen on enlisting Nigeria's assistance for the construction of its local road christened 'Unity Roads'²³. It need be stressed here that industrial co-operation between Nigeria, Niger and Benin is more intense than that of

Chad and Cameroon because the latter two see themselves as belonging to the central African sub-system where Cameroon is strongly laying claim to its leadership.

As a result of this policy of good neighbourliness, Nigerian leaders expected that these neighbours will reciprocate this friendly gesture, but the reverse was the case. Most times, this standoff position taken by many of its Francophone neighbours recurs despite the fact that Nigeria is not subversive to the regimes there. For instance, when it became obvious that certain political groups in Nigeria were aiding Djibo Bakary in Niger Republic – steps that were clearly embarrassing to the Federal Government of Nigeria, the SAWABA party which Bakary led was formally proscribed in Nigeria²⁴. Apart from this, the Civil War situation was a great deal of eye opener to the Nigerian leadership. This was because Emile Zinsou – the then Beninoise President made his territory available to the International Committee of the Red Cross and some other relief agencies to use Cotonou for the airlift of relief materials to the Biafran secessionist group. This act was considered to be inimical to Nigeria's war effort – as some of the relief agencies like the Catholic Relief Agency – CARITAS Internationalis was caught with stockpile of arms in its aircraft that was Biafran bound²⁵. Thus in 1984, the former Nigerian External Affairs Minister (Ibrahim Gambari) lamented that Nigeria has for too long over-estimated the love between it and its adjoining neighbours²⁶. Indeed, threats to the security and stability of the neighbouring Francophone countries have not come from Nigeria, but from the acrimonies and petty jealousies between Francophone states and their leaders themselves²⁷; from the Russians and Cubans as the Dakar Franco- African summit of April 1977 acknowledged and from Libya whose sometimes abrasive thrusts and meddlesomeness into Francophone fold have raised eyebrows as was the case in the Chadian crises during the regime of former President Hissen Habre²⁸.

Regrettably too, there were many instances of border incidences between Nigeria and Chad, Fernando Po Island, Republic of Benin, Niger Republic and Cameroon from the 1970s to date – which could have been resolved amicably but got out of control and led to bloodshed²⁹. For instance, in 1976 and 1980, Nigerians were killed by Chadian gendarmes following disturbances in the Lake Chad islands of Gubi, Doro and Boga over fishing rights between the fishermen of the two countries³⁰. The discovery of petroleum in Lake Chad is another source of deterioration in Nigerian-Chadian relations. Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) started oil exploration in the Lake Chad basin since 1977 and by 1981 CONOCO – an American oil company was doing the same for Chad Republic in the same basin³¹.

In April 1983, hostilities broke out between Nigeria and Chad over Kanisara, Gundara, Kofiya, Koloram and other adjoining islands – because of economic and territorial reasons³². In fact, when Nigeria opened its land borders in March 1, 1986, which was closed in April 1984, the borders on the Chadian end were not opened for security reasons³³. Not only that, there was an invasion/occupation of Nigerian villages of Tungan-Goge, Gulma and Tung-Chadi in the Illo district of Sokoto state of Nigeria by troops from Benin Republic in March 1981³⁴. Besides all the foregoing, the May 1981 incidence when five members of Nigerian naval patrol vessel were killed by the Cameroonian gendarmes in Ikang – along their common maritime borders was initially considered by the Cameroonian authorities as an action against ‘smugglers’³⁵. But in actual sense, it was the discovery and exploitation of petroleum by Elf-Serepca – a Franco-Cameroonian oil firm, within the Akpayafe estuary that was considered by the Nigerian authorities as hazards to both its shipping and strategic naval manoeuvres. – This is because the estuary serves as maritime boundary between the two countries and it is there that Elf-Serepca began to install its oil rigs. Indeed, the status of Bakassi – the oil

rich peninsula led to a major diplomatic row between Nigeria and Cameroon. The reason for the rift is about the status of Nigerians that live there. Though by convention, Nigeria recognizes Cameroonian sovereignty over the islands, but Nigerians living there have dominance in artisanal fishing and 90 per cent of those affected by occasional skirmishes in the area are Nigerian fishermen³⁶. The issue somewhat came to a head in 2002, when Bakassi which was a major cause of an enduring diplomatic row between Nigeria and Cameroon was declared to be the latter's, in a judgment passed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Hague, the Netherlands. It should be said that three years after the ICJ's judgment and even after the signing of the 2006 Green Tree Accord, the Bakassi issue still remain messy – the details of which shall be discussed fully in chapter six.

Within the context of border incidences are Nigeria's relations with Equatorial Guinea – which have also not been always cordial. In order to induce some measure of understanding between the two countries, Nigeria approved a N5 billion loan for Equatorial Guinea in December 1989 at 3 per cent interest payable in ten years. It also approved the building of an English-speaking school in Malabo (Equatorial Guinea's state capital). Nigeria within the same period also donated a naval boat to Malabo with Nigerian instructors to teach the Equatorial Guineans the technical aspects of its use. Also, in 1980 N20 million and 40 pick-up vans were given to Equatorial Guinea in order to help her host the conference of Union Douaniere des Etats d'Afrique Centrale (UDEAC)³⁷. In spite of all of these material and security assistance, the country has remained a major threat to Nigeria's security over the years. For instance, part of its territory was used as staging post by gun running aircrafts that supplied arms and munitions to the Biafran secessionist group. Two, Equatorial Guinea had incessantly maltreated, expelled and killed Nigerian workers in the Cocoa plantations all over the country. Three and technically, though Equatorial Guinea was a Spanish colony, its entry

into Francophone orbit through its membership of the Communauté Française d'Afrique (CFA) on January 1, 1985 and the UDEAC in December 1983, was another step that was not in the interest of Nigeria, security wise³⁸ – as it completes the total encirclement of Nigeria in all fronts by Francophone neighbours and thus makes the country to be more vulnerable to France. To this should be added the fact that before 1990, Equatorial Guinea was flirting with apartheid South Africa. For instance, in 1985, \$2.8 million was given to Malabo by South Africa and South African military aircrafts enjoyed unbridled access to the airfields in Malabo at a time when Nigeria was an arch-enemy of the apartheid regime in South Africa³⁹. There is no doubt that these incidences had rendered Nigeria more vulnerable off the Bight of Benin border as it has untoward implications for Nigeria's security concerns – like the oil installations in Calabar, Port Harcourt, etc. – areas in Nigeria which are within the striking and jamming distance from Malabo. Indeed, Equatorial Guinea's government allowed South Africans to build a satellite tracking station whose giant antennae was proposed to be sited on Pico de Malabo, the highest of the volcanic mountains that is facing Nigerian shores⁴⁰.

These developments in the context of Nigeria's security in relation with its neighbours point to the fact that Nigeria's attitude to its national security issues in the region has to change given the imperatives of today's occurrences in West and Central Africa regions, especially with the rising cases of state collapse in the area and the accompanying humanitarian and security problems that had arisen in its wake⁴¹. A post Cold War characteristic of international institutions that has become evident in international organizations like the UN and in the attitude of Western nations, in general, is the unwillingness to intervene in conflict situations in the sub-regions either because of legal wrangling, resources constraints, worries about loss of life of their combatants with untoward domestic political implications e.g. the US involvement in the Somalian civil

war where its soldiers were killed and dragged on the roads of Mogadishu, diversion of attention to some other regions of the world like the Balkans (Kosovo), and the Persian Gulf region (Afghanistan and Iraq), lack of consensus and certain level of crisis fatigue⁴².

In this work, Nigeria's neighbours are defined not only in terms of those countries sharing contiguous borders with it, but also those in the region whose activities, policies, internal convulsion, crisis or collapse impinge on Nigeria's national security. This explains why Nigeria could not just stand aloof and watch the decaying states of Liberia, Sierra-Leone⁴³ and Guinea in the 1990s in spite of its own internal crisis and economic problems. So, Nigeria's national security interests extend beyond its immediate neighbours.

It should be said that Nigeria's national security in relations with its neighbours could only be properly understood when the French factor is brought in. The literature⁴⁴ is replete with France's conscious effort towards preventing Nigeria's hegemony and leadership in West Africa in particular. It should be reiterated at this juncture that Nigeria is surrounded by Francophone neighbours – in the North-East by Chad, North West by Niger Republic, Western border by Republic of Benin, Eastern border by Cameroon and South East Seaboard by Equatorial Guinea. All of these contiguous neighbours except the latter are erstwhile colonies of France who apart from strong political and economic ties, have signed military and defence pact with France⁴⁵. It is against this backdrop that Nigeria's apprehension and caution, in its relations with its neighbours, can be understood.

This point should also be underscored by the fact that security issues have psychological dimensions as well as perceptual implications. For instance, in the West African sub-region, over 55 per cent of the people are Nigerians, which means that one out of every three West Africans is a Nigerian⁴⁶. With this intimidating demography and

abundant natural and human resource endowment, the fear of these smaller neighbours are not misplaced after all. Not only that, this preponderance of the country's size has a telling effect on its national security, since the small and weak countries surrounding it as well as the extra-African powers are apprehensive of the nation's demographic enormity.

Another problem area is the arbitrary nature of delineation of states and territory in Africa by the European colonisers that have adverse effects on the international relations of these states. Whereas, boundaries of modern European states evolved through due and prolong process of revision after wars and conquests, African states boundaries were delineated by imperial fiat in less than two years. African population was constantly migrating, subject to war, conquest, trade, and revision of boundaries. There was no formal delineation of boundary. Therefore, the culture of exclusive state jurisdiction and boundary autonomy was alien to African tradition⁴⁷. We can also say that nations would prefer natural boundaries such as mountains and rivers that can easily be distinguished and which, as obstacles, could facilitate the defence of homeland. While this is true of many boundaries in Europe, Africa's international boundaries were drawn and agreed upon by the Europeans during the colonial era for their administrative conveniences – as evident in Nigeria's boundaries with its neighbours that were shared between Britain and France⁴⁸. In fact, Lord Salisbury – the British Minister in 1890, during an Anglo/French convention captured this problematic graphically by saying that: "We have been engaged in drawing lines upon maps where no White man's foot ever trod"⁴⁹. It is this ambiguity and naked disregard for local peculiarities of the Africans by the colonial masters that explain why there are several cases of border incidences – simply because kiths and kins have been arbitrarily separated and estranged.

Added to this boundary problem is the nagging issue of trans-border crimes that are on the increase. For instance, as a result of infiltration from Chad and Niger republics, there were bloody religious crises in the Northern parts of Nigeria – especially the notorious 1981 ‘Maitasine Riot’ in Kano. Criminal activities are also going on unabated from the same Nigerian neighbours (Chad and Niger), not to talk of the one on the Nigerian/Beninoise border that has become the easiest channel for criminals to smuggle arms and ammunitions to Nigeria. The estuary that is bordering Nigeria and Cameroon is violated with impunity and this has implications for Nigerian oil installations sited in this area. To be sure, all of these have grave implications for Nigeria’s national security.

The last but not the least is the prolonged military rule in the country and high level of corruption cum leadership failure, which have further aggravated the national security problem and have led to all sorts of social dislocations ranging from joblessness, highly corrupt security agents which have made the borders more porous, militarization of the civil society, religious fanaticism, rising ethnic agitations, rise of private armies, to all forms of social anomie which have made the citizens not to be properly motivated for patriotic and national security feelings. This shows a total lack of concern for the nation’s security. It is, therefore, pertinent to reiterate here that internal instability is one of the greatest threats to national security and this is even greater and more worrisome than the fear of external aggression.

All these are the complex and nagging national security problems facing Nigeria in its international relations and they are the issues that this study seeks to examine and analyse in detail.

1.3 Objectives of the Study

This study has both broad and specific objectives. The broad objective of the study is to evaluate national security in Nigeria's relations, not only with its contiguous neighbours, but also with others countries in West and Central Africa – with a view to understanding the issues and challenges facing Nigeria's security and how they can be resolved.

The specific objectives are to:

- examine the nature and dynamics of Nigeria's national security in relations with its neighbours;
- identify the challenges that Nigeria's geopolitical peculiarities pose to its national security;
- evaluate Nigeria's responses to perceived national security challenges within the context of its relations with West and Central African sub-regions.
- make suggestions on how Nigeria's national security policy with its neighbours can be improved upon.

It is against this backdrop that the study will provide answers to the following pertinent research questions:

1.4 Research Questions

Basically, this study will attempt to address the following questions:

- Do the Nigerian demographic strength and resource endowment, relative to its neighbours; have any national security implication for it and its neighbours?
- Should the contiguous French-speaking neighbours be a source of concern for Nigeria's national security calculation and/or policy planning?

- Is France, by virtue of its erstwhile colonies surrounding Nigeria, a real or imagined national security threat, as demonstrated in many crises situations?
- What are the emerging security issues and challenges that are facing Nigeria's national security in relation with its neighbours?
- What are the overall strategies that Nigeria could adopt to enhance its national security in relation with its neighbours?

1.5 Research Hypotheses

This study seeks to test the following hypotheses:

- That Nigeria's national security is dependent on the nature and dynamics of the relationship it has with its neighbours.
- That internal instability is a threat to national security.
- That the post Cold War international relations i.e. the divestment of the super powers from their African interests, the US policy emphasis on less of third party intervention, the lateness of the UN intervention in African crisis and regionalisation of peace have placed enormous responsibilities on Nigeria (especially as it concerns its national security with its neighbours) and its status as a regional power.

1.6 Scope and Limitation of the Study

The study takes a bird-view of the nature and dynamics of relationship that borders on Nigeria's national security with its neighbours from independence in 1960. However, it places emphasis on what characterises the relationship in the 1990s to date. It focuses on neighbouring countries like Republics of Chad, Niger, Benin, Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea and other countries in West and Central Africa. Hence, the study does not limit 'neighbours' to the contiguous ones alone but to those countries in West and

Central Africa whose relations impinge on Nigeria's national security. This translates into discussing Nigeria's neighbours in a political sense, not in the context of geographical propinquity alone.

In the course of the study, access to information and many officials of government became highly restricted to the researcher for so many reasons. The researcher also found it difficult to come by official documents for obvious reason of 'strict confidentiality' – given by the bureaucrats. Those that were made available were facilitated by personal and informal contacts. Many of the information provided were also generated from the interactions that the researcher had at this 'informal sector'.

Another limitation is that the current volatile and unsettled situation in the Bakassi peninsula. The disputed oil-rich, land and maritime boundary between Nigeria and Cameroon did not permit the researcher to conduct a field study there.

1.7 Significance of the Study

No doubt, there is a large volume of work on Nigeria's relations with its neighbours. The debate in the extant literature centres on trade, economic integration, bilateral relations, border issues, peacekeeping, and colonial experience, to mention just a few. The missing gap that this study seeks to fill is the issue of national security as a parameter for evaluating the relations between Nigeria and its West and Central African neighbours since the end of the Cold War.

Beside this, the nature and character of Nigerian population is another factor that is worthy of attention. It should be recalled that, one out of every three West Africans is a Nigerian – this is one of the factors that makes Nigeria the most populous Black state in the world⁵⁰. Its demography is also ranked among the top ten in the world⁵¹. This could be translated to mean that, more than 55 per cent of all the people in West Africa live in

Nigeria⁵². Also, apart from Nigeria, no other country in the sub-region has a population in excess of 15 million. Aside from this demographic strength, Nigeria's economic future is critical to the fate of many of its neighbours⁵³. Thus, we should note that a nation's power is not only measured by what power it thinks it has, but also what other nations think it has⁵⁴. Arising from this, it is evident that any issue that borders on Nigeria's national security has a telling effect on its neighbours and as such should be taken seriously.

It is, therefore, an amalgam of these reasons and the fact that security matters, like human rights and environmental issues occupy the front burner in interstate relations, especially in today's international relations, that have made an enquiry of this nature worthwhile. Hence, the study will analyse the various dimensions of the subject matter under consideration and make some modest contributions to knowledge on the nature and dynamics of Nigeria's national security with its immediate and remote neighbours. Additionally, it will also discuss how Nigeria's national security in relation with its neighbours could be improved upon, especially in this age of collective and an all-embracing national security culture between and among nations.

1.8 Research Methodology

Primary and Secondary data will be used for the study. Primary data will be collected through in-depth interviews as follows:

- In-depth interviews with desk officers of the Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs who have served in the countries covered by the study.
- The staff of the Nigerian National Boundary Commission will be interviewed.
- In-depth interviews and focus group discussion (FGD) with border communities of Nigeria and its neighbours.

- In-depth interviews with Experts (Academics) i.e. experts on the subject. (Attached are the research instruments or interview guides – as appendixes 1 – 4).

The officials interviewed were purposively selected because of their involvement in policy formulation and implementation on the subject. While the choice of people in the border areas between Nigeria and the neighbouring countries is because they have a nuanced and first-hand feel of what transpires in the border areas; such as the nature of security threats/cooperation as well as the dynamics of cross-border interactions in the areas.

To complement the Primary data, Secondary data will be collected from textbooks, academic journals, government gazettes, publications, documents and press releases, newspaper clippings as well as periodicals. Also, excerpts from the addresses or national broadcasts of heads of state and top government officials will be used.

Data collected will be analyzed using descriptive method of analysis.

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Chapter Two

2.1 Literature Review

Scholars, political analysts, policy experts, historians and strategists have done extensive works within the broad framework of Nigeria's relations with its neighbours. The theme that is, therefore, prominent in the literature on the subject has either been a lengthy or casual examination of the French factor in Nigeria's relations with its Francophone neighbours; the commercial and trading between and among Nigeria and these neighbours; boundary issues; sub-regional security and/or peacekeeping arrangements.

However, this literature has not critically examined the dynamics and contents of Nigeria's national security in relations with its neighbours especially within the last two decades. There is also a dearth of analysis on how the dynamics of geopolitical and strategic peculiarities of Nigeria impinge on its national security with specific reference to its West and Central African neighbours. It is these missing gaps that this work seeks to fill.

On the French factor in Nigeria's relations with its neighbours, there is a plethora of works, especially done by S. B. Peters, Basseý Ate, Bola Akinterinwa, Margaret Vogt, Abubakar Momoh, Oscar Ede, Tale Omole, Emeka Nwokedi, Bruce Arlinghaus, Onyekwere Nwanko, L. S. Aminu, Ali Mazrui, J. Chipman, William Zartman, Gilbert Comte and Winrich Kiihne. According to S. B. Peters, Nigeria is strategically located between West and Central Africa. It is in the middle of the French 'empire' in Africa. All its immediate neighbours are Francophone countries. This French presence, no doubt, affects Nigeria's national security and its emergence as a sub-regional power – because of the various measures deliberately put in place by France to prevent Anglophone hegemony in West Africa¹.

Also writing on "The Presence of France in West Central Africa as a Fundamental Problem to Nigeria" Bassey Ate's² position is that France's status as a world power is maintained as a result of its influence in its erstwhile colonies or in regarding them as integral part of France. Furthermore, Ate and Bola Akinterinwa³ wrote that in spite of a very substantial heavy French investment in Nigeria, (taking the advantage of its demography and market), France's presence in the sub-region, constitutes immense national security threat to Nigeria. Furthermore, that the coming into Nigerian market by France is perceived to be the long run calculation of France to neutralise the Nigerian factor, as a substantive threat to both its continuing hegemonic domination of West Africa generally and the preservation of the autonomy of key Francophone West African states such as Cote d'Ivoire and Senegal, in particular. This is perceived to be as a result of France not only penetrating the sensitive areas of Nigeria's economic sector, but also the military. They argued that since French multinationals operating in Nigeria have stronger roots in its Francophone neighbours, it will be very easy for French business enterprises to dominate an Economic Community of West African (ECOWAS) common market, to the detriment of African indigenous manufacturing or trading companies. In order to cut this intrusive French activity and neutralise France's security and strategic advantage in the sub-region, they proposed a strategy of a more aggressive economic integration in the sub-region⁴, to be led by Nigeria, with a bid to bolstering Nigeria's national security in the sub-region.

Contributing on the same issue, Abubakar Momoh, in a monograph aligned his thoughts with that of Ate, Akinterinwa and Margaret Vogt by saying that:

The Francophone neighbours of Nigeria do not themselves pose any direct threat to Nigeria as they are generally weaker even if their total resources are put together. They only pose threats indirectly, thanks to the powerful presence of the French in the neighbourhood⁵.

He points out that France was always handy to reinforce the military capacity of Nigerian's Francophone neighbours, in the event of any crisis between them. Since, Nigeria is surrounded by Francophone neighbours, its leadership role in West Africa and its foreign policy challenges emanate, first and foremost, from these Francophone states. In fact, some analysts have concluded that the observable low profile of Nigeria's foreign policy towards these neighbours is sometimes attributable to a real or imagined France's response in support of these neighbours in case of any aggressive policy against any of them. There is no gainsaying the fact that there is a strong presence of French intelligence as well as administrative and diplomatic personnel in most Francophone states⁶. Beyond that, throughout the tenure of Charles de Gaulle and Georges Pompidou, Nigeria was seen as a potential source of threat to France's interest in sub-Saharan Africa. This apprehension made de Gaulle to desire to dismember Nigeria during the Nigerian Civil War⁷. Indeed, during the Nigerian Civil War, Niger, Chad, Cameroon, and Togo were resolutely behind Nigeria while Senegal via its activities and supposed humanitarian efforts in the International Red Cross was sympathetic to the Biafran secessionist side. This may be because President Leopold Cedar Senghor of Senegal believed also the French President's aversion for the size and demography of Nigeria, which were considered too large and inimical to France's interest in Africa. In addition, Senegal was not supportive of Nigeria during the war because it felt that the latter was becoming a pole of attraction to the neighbouring Francophone states of West Africa, thereby detracting from it the pretensions it was making to the leadership of the Francophone states. This finds expression in the fact that the enormous wealth and size of Nigeria are seen as the major factors that are drawing away countries like Chad, Niger, Benin, and Togo from the Francophone orbit⁸.

Further on the French influence in Africa, it has been observed that France did not place high premium in developing the colonial armies. Rather than developing effective local military forces in its former colonies, France strengthened its own defence system and yet ensured that it preserved its African empire⁹. As a deliberate French policy meant to underscore the aforementioned, long after independence, most of these Francophone West African countries do not have armies that are capable of meeting their internal and external security needs; hence they still depend on the French military arms and technology. Due to this weakness, many Francophone West African countries signed numerous bilateral defence agreements with France. Indeed except Guinea, Mali, and Burkina Faso, all other twelve countries that emerged out of the French Union signed the defence treaties, under which France, being the senior partner, dictates internal and external security terms to these countries. One striking portion of the term is that France could militarily intervene in any of these countries. The implication of this is that French troops could be invited to join the local military forces of a contracting party, to suppress opposition and dissent all in the name of preserving internal order. Of course, France maintained priority status in terms of organizing, instructing and equipping the national forces of the contracting parties. Thus, it is not surprising that 160, 000 out of 700, 000 colonial troops that fought on the side of France in the World War II, came from Africa.¹⁰

Since independence in these Francophone states of West Africa, France has traditional military bases and has continually maintained its troops there for strategic reasons. Either to maintain internal order or support the incumbent against rebellious opponents or to overthrow a government or protect its nationals, France had intervened militarily in many West and Central African countries i.e. Chad, Cameroon, Gabon, Niger, Mauritania etc, although these interventions have been loudly condemned by many

other African countries¹¹. In this regard, the involvement of France in West African politics is partly attributed to fulfilling part of its colonial obligation. In the Gaullist parlance, it is pursuant of the 'civilizing mission' of the French empire. In fact, in 1977, when France intervened militarily in the Shaba province in the then Zaire, President Giscard d'Estaing justified the action by saying that it was meant to maintain European solidarity with Africa. He was quoted to have said that: "I don't want African states to feel abandoned where their security is threatened... Europe cannot disregard what happens on the African continent"¹². But today many of the French troops in its former dependencies have been withdrawn either because it has become anachronistic or because France is concentrating its efforts in developing nuclear strike capability in Europe.

Emphasis has to be laid on the fact that France's interest or investment in the West African sub-region is mainly economic as its interests are found majorly in the Uranium and Oil in Niger, Gabon, Chad and Cameroon. There is no doubt that it has also penetrated the West/Central Africa financial, cultural and technical networks with French functionaries, hence France is *de facto* extra-African regional hegemonic power in Africa. It will rather be an understatement to say that without a prohibitive cost, France can make or mar regimes especially in most of its ex-colonies in West and Central Africa. This is one of the reasons that Ali Mazrui argued that the natural rival that Nigeria has in West Africa is France¹³. In order to appreciate this fully, Nigeria is the single largest economy in sub-Saharan Africa, apart from South Africa. She is strategically located as a meeting point between West and Central Africa. Clearly, the basic position of Nigeria as an underdeveloped and dependent economy in the context of world capitalism poses a foremost constraint to its leadership in pursuing an expansive and autonomous regional policy.

Starting from the late 1970s, Nigeria had emerged as France's leading market in Africa, superseding South Africa and Cote d'Ivoire. France had successfully penetrated the Nigerian banking, automobile, public works/construction, oil exploration as well as marketing and distribution sectors¹⁴. In the banking sector alone, there is the United Bank for Africa (UBA) – which was established in 1949, Societe Generale Bank (1977), Merchant Banking Corporation (1982), The Credit Lyonnais Bank (1984) and Universal Trust Bank (UTB) (1985). The assets of these French banks total 25 per cent of the combined assets of all commercial and merchant banks in Nigeria – as far back as 1985¹⁵.

The French Peugeot Societe Autonome (PSA) which established the Peugeot Automobile of Nigeria (PAN) in 1972 began production in 1974. Nigerian automobile market represents 8 per cent of (France PSA's) total market in the world¹⁶. In public works and construction there are about 60 French companies in Nigeria with Fougerolle, Dumez and Spie-Batignolles = as the leading ones. In this sector, French companies have competed favourably with other foreign contractors. In the oil industry, French firms like ELF-Aquitaine and TOTAL are very prominent. ELF came into Nigeria as Safrap Nig. Ltd. in 1962; it became ELF-Aquitaine in 1974. Not only that, the leading French companies in the distribution sector are Compagnie Francaise de l'Afrique Occidentale (CFAO) and Societe Commerciale de l'Quest Africaine (SCOA), they have earned second and third places respectively, after the British United Africa Company (UAC), in terms of their operational capacities in the Nigerian economy¹⁷. It is said that:

About 180 French companies have settled in Nigeria, some of them even before Independence Day and their investments cover a very broad spectrum. Many of the joint ventures they have gone into with Nigerian partners ranks among the largest firms in the local market and their names have become household words here as they are in France. This is quite a valuable achievement, in view of the fact that on the whole, we were comparatively late comers to Nigeria¹⁸.

However, France's export to Francophone countries is over 50 per cent of its export products and it gives substantial financial aid to meet balance of payment deficits of many of these countries¹⁹.

The story is different today, indeed France's economic presence in Nigeria dates back to more than one hundred years – when the Compagnie de l'Afrique Occidentale (CFAO) opened a trading post in Lagos in 1902. However, as it currently stands, the totality of French investments in Nigeria are estimated to be equal to those of the other West African countries. There are French in the oil and sector i.e. Total, Technip, etc; the industrial sector i.e. Lafarge, Peugeot, Michelin and Air Liquide, etc; services i.e. SDV-Bolloré, Accor, Sodexo and Air France, etc; and infrastructures i.e. Bouygues, Eiffage, Alstom, Areva and Schneider.

In 2006, trade between France and Nigeria exceeded the 3 billion pound sterling mark. In 2007, France's exports to Nigeria fell to 1.1 billion pound sterling and imports from Nigeria to France dropped to 1.3 billion pound sterling. Part of the explanation for the fall is the depreciation of the Euro and the drop in production and export of Nigeria oil²⁰.

Total concentrates 10 per cent of its world production and 15 per cent of its proved reserves in Nigeria. Its production of hydrocarbon in the country is growing very strongly, doubling between 1999 and 2006. The French group is planning to double it again within the next five years. In January 2007, Peugeot, which is the largest French auto assembly plant in sub-Saharan Africa, decreased its holdings in automobile (Peugeot Automobile Nigeria (PAN) from 40 to 10 per cent. The Kaduna assembly line factory is deemed to be unprofitable. It is now controlled by a local dealer – which will continue to produce under licence. Also in January 2007, Michelin decided to close its

factory in Port Harcourt for reasons of industrial energy. However, the Clermand-Ferrand based group is continuing its commercial and hevea culture activities²¹.

Michelin began with the production of unprocessed rubber from its rubber plantation in Port Harcourt. Air Liquide operates facilities all over the country, supplies hospitals with industrial gas and oxygen. Lafarge is one of the two largest cement producers in Nigeria²². Bouygues is one of the French main construction companies which built Abuja – the seat of Federal Government of Nigeria. Alstom, Shneider, Areva, Clemessy, SDMO among others are large French electrical companies that boost Nigeria's energy capacity. Alcatel and Sagem were respectively involved in developing Global System of Communication (GSM) telephony and the production of secured identity cards in Nigeria. Accor is expanding in its hotel services, Air France – KLM is a first-rate international airline operating in Nigeria; while SDV Bolloré ranks among the leaders in freighting and logistics²³. Over the years, these French companies have invested heavily in Nigeria to the tune of \$4 billion stock; a sum larger than investments in all of the rest of West Africa. This financial commitments place France just behind the US, and ahead of Great Britain. France exports to Nigeria refined petroleum products, electrical and electronic equipment, transportation equipment (automotive industry), engines and turbines, chemicals and pharmaceuticals as well as processed food products. According to Nigerian statistics, France ranks fifth among Nigeria's suppliers²⁴.

France traditionally purchases from Nigeria the following items: hydrocarbons – crude oil, natural gas and refined petroleum products. Nigeria also purchase from Nigeria agricultural, silvicultural and piscicultural products as well as food-and-beverage-industry products. Overall, France is considered to be Nigeria's fourth largest export destination. In fact, since 2006, Nigeria is France's main partner in sub-saharan Africa, becoming its largest supplier and second largest client respectively ahead of South Africa.

On a global scale, Nigeria is France's 44th largest client and 28th largest supplier²⁵. France has about 10 per cent of Nigeria's internal market²⁶.

The nature of French involvement in the defence of Francophone states has taken the form of provision of military training facilities in France for their officers, military co-operation and defence agreements, as well as the establishment of well equipped bases manned by French personnel in some African countries to counter revolutionary movements. In fact, at a time, Article 5 of the Defence Accord between France and its Francophone ex-colonies states that utilization of all raw materials and strategic products located in the newly independent states (except Guinea and Mali) were to be priority reserve for France. The signatories to this accord undertook that they will stock-pile these strategic minerals to the benefit of France and to suit the demand of French Defence interest, they also agreed to limit or ban their exploitation by other countries²⁷. As mentioned earlier, why France invests so much of Francs in a continent that is so far away from its boundaries is partially because they are used as a 'world power status symbol' – for France²⁸.

It is, therefore, apposite to sum up this consideration of the French factor in Nigeria relations with its neighbours with William Zartman's evident comment that: France's commitment to its erstwhile African colonies is hinged on the following four factors i.e. : (i) a cultural element that emphasizes the common heritage of French speaking societies; (ii) a moral element that translates the experiences gained during the colonial years into a sense of on-going responsibility; (iii) an economic element that seeks sure sources for crucial raw materials and growing markets for goods and investments; and (iv) a power element that recognizes that a large following within the Third World makes France a more important state²⁹.

In spite of the foregoing analyses, this study has the following observations to make. In the first instance, by January 5, 1961 (three months after its independence), Nigeria broke diplomatic relations with France following the latter's testing of its third atomic explosion in the Sahara desert, precisely in Reggane – Algeria. The Nigerian government issued a 48-hour ultimatum to the French Ambassador in Lagos, Raymond Offroy, and his embassy staff, to leave the country. In addition, the Nigeria government barred French aircraft and ships from Nigerian airfields and sea-ports and withdrew all French transit rights³⁰. The relationship was not restored until October 26, 1965. It is instructive to note that for as long as the severance of diplomatic relations between Nigeria and France lasted and throughout the Nigerian Civil War years, “the economic link between them remained not only almost unhurt but actually prospered”³¹. Hence William Zartman argued that the absence of diplomatic relations between Nigeria and France, from 1961 to 1965, was never an explicit obstacle for the commercial activities going on between them³². In the same token, Nwokedi concludes that the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries smoothen all other rough edges along the negotiations process.

But then, the pro-Biafran stance of the Gaullist government was premised on a French attempt to cut Nigeria down to size because the French President had not forgotten, nor forgiven Nigeria – the humiliation which France suffered as a result of Nigeria's break in diplomatic relations with it. It must however be stressed that no doubt, France was really uncomfortable with Nigeria's standing as a counter-weight to its influence in the West African sub-region and thus explained why it supplied arms to the secessionists through Gabon and Cote d'Ivoire – that recognized Biafra. But there is inconsistency in this France's policy as it concerns arms deals especially in 1968 when France supplied 13 Panhard AML- 60/90 armoured fighting vehicles to the Nigerian

Federal government³³. The point that is being made is that it appears in Nigeria's case, as it also was in the Libyan and South African cases, that economic considerations take precedence over political factors as far as the French arms deals with other countries are concerned.

Another reason for caution is that over the years, several Nigerian government officials have had to go to Paris on both official and unofficial visits without the fear of being molested, the same for France. In fact, General Ibrahim Babangida visited France to receive medical treatment, when he was in government. Also, the visit of the then French President Jacques Chirac in July 1999 is also a pointer to an intimate relationship between Nigeria and France – because that visit was the only one by a French Head of State since Nigeria's independence in 1960. In return, President Olusegun Obasanjo made the first state visit to France in February 2000³⁴. Ngozi Okonjo Iweala, the Nigerian Finance Minister during Obasanjo's administration also went to Paris in January and April 2005 on the issue of Nigeria's debt in particular³⁵. As a result, France played an active role in the \$31 billion debt forgiveness granted to Nigeria by the Paris Club. It also got involved and committed to assisting Nigeria in its anti-corruption crusade. In this regard, Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), the body set up by the Nigerian government to prosecute the war-on corruption benefits from European Union's assistance to the tune of 24.7 million Euros. It is instructive to note that France contributes 24 per cent of the European Development Fund through which the assistance given to EFCC is bankrolled³⁶. From May 24 through 26, 2005, President Olusegun Obasanjo made another official visit to France. Interestingly, President Obasanjo was not only an acquaintance of President Chirac alone, France is reported to be keen on political development and democratic progression of Nigeria. In this regard, its contingent was included in the European Union's 100-member Observer Mission of the Nigerian April

2007 general elections that ushered in the regime of President Umaru Yar' Adua. The Mission made 40 million Euros available to the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and other Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOS) that are involved in the process³⁷. Dimeji Bankole, the current Nigerian Speaker of House of representatives visited France between March 26 and 27, 2008 and met high-ranking French officials including Bernard Accoyer, the President of the Assemblée Nationale as well as the President of the Friendship Group in the national assembly³⁸.

Since then there have been high level contacts between the French officials and their Nigerian counterparts. For instance, Ojo Maduekwe and Bernard Koucher, the Nigerian and French Ministers of Foreign Affairs respectively also held discussions in Paris on May 19, 2008, ahead of President Umaru Yar' Adua's official visit to Paris on June 12, 2008³⁹. Overall, it is discernable that political relations between Nigeria and France are quite low. It is the level of economic relations that is much higher⁴⁰.

A lot of French investors and multinational corporations maintain their presence in Nigeria because the country is the largest African market and France acknowledges and respects this fact, as mentioned earlier. Furthermore, the Nigerian/Cameroonian border clashes, especially, the Bakassi peninsula's issue on which the two dragged each other to International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the late 1990s and was decided in 2002, did not degenerate into full-scale war. On the strength of these, we can safely say that the Nigeria/France divide is not as precarious as it is amplified in the literature. More so, it is no longer in France's interest to subvert Nigeria.

S. B. Peters vividly captures this by saying that in spite of close cultural, economic, and political linkages between France and its Francophone dependencies in West Africa and in spite of an attempt to dismember Nigeria by supporting the

secessionists, as well as other irritants in Nigeria/France relations, France acknowledges the economic benefit it could derive from Nigeria. To quote him:

*France nevertheless recognised the importance of Nigeria for French economic expansion. As early as 1965, the French government had tried to encourage its industrialists to invest in Nigeria because it offered extensive economic rewards to be reaped in full, in the future*⁴¹.

To underscore this, from 1973, France had increased its commercial relationship with Nigeria by encouraging French companies to invest in the country, especially in the area of automobiles, pneumatic tyre, oil exploration, distribution, banking, agro-allied and construction. According to Peters, this French penetration of Nigeria's economic sector is to secure a presence in sub-Saharan African's largest economy. He concludes that while Nigeria could not oppose France's considerable influence in its ex-colonies, both now and in future, France itself cannot afford to underestimate Nigeria's economic and political potentials in West and Central Africa⁴². Oscar Ede corroborated this with the hint that in the French Africanist circles, Nigeria has been seen as a threat to France's influence in the neighbouring Francophone states simply because of its enormous population and wealth. He also rightly maintained that Nigeria's political relations with France during its first decade of nationhood were stormy, but "their economic relations went ahead largely undisturbed"⁴³. Besides, French corporate interest in Nigeria would appear not to have sought, either by commission or omission, to incur the displeasure of the Nigerian authorities. From 1972 onwards, Nigeria was to become one of the principal suppliers of petroleum to France. The 1973 Yom Kippur war in the Middle East intensified this possibility. Starting from 1976, Nigeria became France's most important customer in Black Africa and its third customer in Africa (behind Algeria and Morocco) in overall commercial interactions. Nigeria's major export product is crude oil - amounting to about 95 per cent of Nigeria's total exports to France.

In terms of the volume of French oil supplies from other countries, Nigeria ranks third after Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Cocoa, fruits, and leather are items that France imports from Nigeria. France on the other hand exports myriad of commercial and industrial products to Nigeria starting from vehicles; including completely knocked down (CKD) parts 30 – 40 per cent, to sugar 14 per cent, heavy equipments and materials 12 per cent and petroleum products about 6 per cent. There is also the Michelin; a Nigerian based French tyre manufacturing company which covers 60 per cent of the local market needs. In the oil sector, ELF-Aquitaine is involved in research and production, while TOTAL is the leading petroleum distributor in the country⁴⁴.

As it stands today, the Michelin plant in Port Harcourt has just been closed down. The reason given for the closure is that the plant is not internationally competitive any more, as compared with the other sites of the group. However, the company intends to focus on sales and gum trees planting in Nigeria⁴⁵. Also the shares owned by the Nigerian government and Peugeot France have been sold to a Nigerian private sector⁴⁶. Today, the French oil giant – Total is into a huge investment in the Nigerian oil and gas sector. For instance, its output at Amenam field reached 120,000 million barrels per day in January 2005. The Amenam field contains reserves of around one billion barrels of oil equivalent. Total's Akpo field is expected to come online in 2008, with estimated output capacity 225,000 million barrels per day⁴⁷.

In sum, to France, Africa accounts for 100 per cent supply of uranium and cobalt, 75 per cent of manganese, 56 per cent of chrome, 33 per cent of iron ore, 25 per cent of lead. So France's frantic efforts at maintaining foreign troops, military bases, sales of arms and military technical assistance to countries in West and Central Africa are to perpetrate France's influence in the area for the purposes of various forms of economic exploitation. Precisely, France has extensive economic investments in Nigeria, it means

that its economic linkage with Nigeria is very important to the health of its national economy, even if it is indirect; therefore, it has a stake in ensuring that Nigerian economy remains viable and its polity stable⁴⁸.

Again, the link between France and its ex-colonies is not always as firm as the literature suggests; going by the submission of Richard Joseph and Omotayo Olaniyan⁴⁹. In the same vein, Margaret Vogt reminds us that it is not all the Francophone countries that may be willing to allow France to use their territories against Nigeria's interests – like the Republic of Benin did during the Nigerian Civil War. Furthermore, she is of the view that most Francophone states in the sub-region have only returned to France after an unstable relationship, simply because there is no credible alternative – using Matthew Kerekou's Beninoise Marxist government's declaration and Republic of Niger's Seyni Kountche and the Chadian Government of National Unity's (GUNT) declarations, as examples⁵⁰. Put differently, it could be said that the Francophone countries are not entirely homogenous in their political leaning and reaction. For example, there were the radical and anti-French groups that have allowed East European and other West European and North American countries to penetrate their economies. Those in this group include Republic of Guinea under Sekou Toure, Mali under Mousa Traore, Benin Republic under Mathieu Kerekou, and Burkina Faso under Thomas Sankara etc. Be that as it may, French influence in these countries is still noticeable in the areas of import and export⁵¹. It is worth noting that among Nigeria's immediate neighbours at some point in time, Benin Republic was radical; Chad Republic pro-French; while Niger Republic and Cameroon were moderates. Economic, geo-strategic and ethnic factors have made Benin and Niger to be areas of the least threat to Nigeria, but because of the resource potentials in Bakassi and Enung peninsulas, Cameroonian borders with Nigeria are now explosive.

On boundary issue, the literature is replete with records of boundary disputes and border incidences between Nigeria and its neighbours. As mentioned earlier, the arbitrary boundary delineation of Africa has worked in a manner that has distorted the ethno-political features of the continent – hence members of the same ethnic group find themselves under different political sovereignties⁵². The summary of the causes of these conflicts in the boundaries shared by Nigeria and its Francophone neighbours are: imprecision of the boundaries; the presence of vital economic, and mainly, mineral resources within the frontier zone and trans-border activities of the border communities⁵³.

It has been observed, therefore, that the boundaries between Nigeria and its neighbours are frontiers of contact rather than that of separation. Indeed, the volume of unrecorded cross-border commerce between Nigeria and each of its neighbours exceed that of official (recorded) transactions⁵⁴. These cross-border activities are either to collect taxes or arrest criminals as well as crossing of border by people who exploit currency disparities and ethnic affinities – to deal illegally in currencies and goods. Indeed, S. Ukpabi and Aforika Nweke catalogue the cross-border incidences that have occurred between Nigeria and its neighbours in the past three decades. For instance in 1970, many of the 60, 000 Nigerian workers in Fernando Po Island were killed before the Nigerian government evacuated the rest. In the 1970s, the Chadian and Nigerien governments became very hostile to Nigerians living there such that by May 1976, the Chadian gendarmes killed some Nigerian Policemen in a border clash, apart from the fact that there was an incursion into Nigeria through Chad during the Nigerian Civil War years. In March 1981, Beninose military unit violated Nigeria's western border. Also in May 1981 and in the 1990s border incidence occurred along Nigeria/Cameroon border⁵⁵.

S. B. Peters also shed more light on the series of these border incidences. He wrote that in 1983 Chad occupied some Nigerian Islands that separate it from Chad. It took some military actions to recover them. Also Equatorial Guinea's border with Nigeria in the Bight of Benin off Nigeria's South Eastern flank made it a very strategic beachhead for any maritime or air invasion of Nigeria. In 1988, a diplomatic row occurred between Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea because South Africans were invited to help develop the runaway in the state capital – Malabo and build communication facilities there. This was when South Africa was still the bastion of apartheid and racism – that which Nigeria vehemently fought at international fora and as such became an archenemy of the apartheid government. Some Nigerians thought that Equatorial Guinea should have been annexed in 1973 when Nigerian contract labourers working on the cocoa plantations there – under a labour agreement between the two countries, were summarily expelled without justification⁵⁶.

Bolaji Akinyemi reasoned that some of the problems which Nigeria has with many of its neighbours are, perhaps, derivable from their perception that the military option is not regarded as a vital instrument for the implementation of Nigerian foreign policy. He, therefore, suggested that the armed forces should be properly funded and maintained, in order to be mobilized for national security⁵⁷. But even if Akinyemi's argument on underfunding of the military could be sustained at that time, an alternative position is that Nigeria does not employ force in its international relations, except on very rare cases. Apart from that, Akinyemi is of the view that the nation's military spending is not enough or that the kind of attention "needed to devote to the armed forces" is deficient, but in today's international relations, a militant and active foreign policy is not mainly predicated on outright exercise of military might to reinforce a foreign policy position, but on a wide range of other important factors like the status of the economy, the

nation's global image and credibility, quality of the leadership and morale of the domestic population, and other such like factors.

However, more fundamental is the arbitrary nature of states' and territorial delineation in Africa by colonialists that clearly has adverse effects on their international relations. J. F. Ade-Ajayi, A. I. Asiwaju, Akin Mabogunje and Michael Crowder speak to this. Again, whereas boundaries of modern European states evolved over centuries as a result of revisions after wars and conquests; the states' boundaries in Africa were delineated by imperial fiat in less than two years. Subsequently, national sovereignty was enforced by the colonisers, whereas, this idea of exclusive state jurisdiction and boundary autonomy, especially with characteristic restriction on people's movement was alien to African culture and tradition because African population was constantly migrating. So, there was no formal definition or delineation of boundaries as done by the colonial masters. What obtained then was that territories traditionally contracted or expanded based on whether rulers lost or gained territories after wars or as result of substantial migration⁵⁸.

This type of scenario is what K. J. Holsti called 'inadequate stateness' of these states – which in turn gave rise to intractable problems of state making because of their arbitrary creation⁵⁹. Unfortunately, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) (now, African Union (AU) emphasizes the retention and sanctity or inviolability of boundaries that were arbitrarily delineated by the colonial powers, and this is what is generating the various border skirmishes such as the ones mentioned⁶⁰. In a recent book published in his honour, Oluyemi Adeniji, the immediate past (Nigerian) Federal Minister of External Affairs touched on the said principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states by making reference to how it was pointed out by the immediate past Secretary General of the United Nations (Kofi Annan) in his 'Agenda for Peace' that there is a need for a more

flexible interpretation of article 2, paragraph 7 on non-interference by the organization in the affairs of its members. Also that the Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) equally queried the sanctity of Article 3 paragraph 3 of the OAU Charter which forbade interference in the internal affairs of members. Adeniji is of the opinion that one should not be indifferent when there is a crisis 'next door' only on the excuse of non-interference in the affairs of neighbours – which is consonant with Owolabi's position that the principle is now dysfunctional as it is obsolete due to the contemporary realities in the international arena⁶¹.

According to Bassey Ate, T. A. Imobighe⁶², Abubakar Tafawa Balewa and Jaja Wachukwu, Nigeria has no regional expansionist ambition. It was said that through a United Nations (UN) plebiscite in 1961, Northern Cameroon willingly decided to remain in Cameroon. But in the thinking of Nigeria's immediate neighbours, it seems Nigeria has sub-imperial potentials – given its demographic, military and economic strength. Indeed to capture the non-expansionists policy of Nigeria, Sir Abubakar Balewa – the then Nigerian Prime Minister said in a speech:

On the problem of boundaries, our view is that although in the past some of these were created artificially... nevertheless those boundaries should be respected and in the interest of peace, must remain the recognised boundaries until such times as the peoples concerned of their own free will to merge into one, not by force or through undue pressure to change, since such interference could only result in unrest and in harm to the overall plan for the future of this great continent⁶³.

The first Nigerian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations also echoed this position:

We have in Africa to-day some artificial boundaries that have been established most un-realistically; widely scattered tribal groups; family relations broken... That the normal urge, after independence, is to seek to bring together these people who have been separated for so long. But there is the question of linguistic, cultural and political differences...; and any attempt to adopt such a policy (merger) now

*will result in chaos... Therefore, existing boundaries must be recognised unless the people or the states concerned decide on their own free will to merge or remove such boundaries*⁶⁴.

The significance of the citations lies in the fact that successive Nigerian governments have kept the spirit and letters of the declaration. For instance, the diplomatic row between Nigeria and Cameroon on the border areas between the two countries on Bakassi Peninsula was taken to International Court of Justice (ICJ) in March 1994. On the issue, Cameroon alleged that "it could not sit down with Nigeria in the same room without third parties being present – to see fair play". To Richard Akinjide, this claim is unfounded because, for instance, in one of the world's largest joint development zones shared between Nigeria and Sao Tome and Principe, it was agreed that 60 per cent will go to Nigeria (with a population of 120 million, at least), and 40 per cent will go to Sao Tome and Principe (which has a population of approximately 120, 000). The same goes for the Nigeria's maritime boundary treaty with Republic of Benin. In all of these, no attempt was made by Nigeria to pressurize its much smaller neighbours into an unfair bargain. More so, Nigeria, Republics of Benin and Niger have a Joint Boundary Commission which meets regularly to resolve issues on their common boundary. With the engagement of modern technology like satellite imagery, issues are resolved amicably without fear or favour, in spite of the disparity in the population sizes of the respective countries⁶⁵.

Lastly, on sub-regional security and Nigeria, it is obvious that the country has in its neighbourhood some of the world's poorest countries with substantially untapped mineral resources, yet it has the potential of leading these surrounding countries and even far beyond. Regrettably, the West African sub-region, until recently, was relatively more stable than other parts of Africa. One of the reasons for the recent volatility of the sub-region, according to the report of Econ Centre for Economic Analysis on "Economic

Driving Forces of Violent Conflicts and War” – commissioned by Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is that, most of the violent and seemingly intractable wars in Africa (and West Africa: Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea and now, Cote d’Ivoire, etc, in particular) have economic agenda. In other words, these wars are driven by greed not grievances. It was also reported that in the world today, more than 90 per cent of armed conflicts take place within rather than between states. Again, out of the 101 conflicts between 1989 (when the Cold War ended) and 1996, 95 of them were internal and most were in developing and transition countries⁶⁶. In the light of this, if Nigeria wants to tackle the issue of its national security frontally, it cannot but be concerned in distant lands, especially at its West and Central African ‘backyard’.

Going by Abubakar Momoh’s account, the West African sub-region is currently in a flux of conflicts: Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea and so forth. The conflicts are said to be hydra-headed ranging from dispute over governance to boundary dispute⁶⁷. Christopher Tuck attributes the declining state of security in the sub-region to state collapse, political fragmentation, and ‘war-lordism’ and late cum inadequate intervention from the UN. All these are the manifestation of post Cold War conflict which is accompanied with the problem of grossly displaced people and other forms of humanitarian disasters⁶⁸.

In this event, Nigeria could not afford to be indifferent; hence, it provided the bulk of the forces in the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) peacekeeping operations when Liberia went through the spasm of Civil War in the 1990s. Out of 8,430 troops, Nigeria had 4,908, Ghana 1,028, Guinea 609, Tanzania 747, Uganda 760, Sierra-Leone 359, The Gambia 10, and Mali 10⁶⁹.

In concluding this section, the words of the former Nigerian Head of State Rtd. General Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida are very relevant:

In a sub-region of sixteen countries where out of three West Africans is a Nigerian, it is imperative that any regime in this country should relentlessly strive towards the prevention or avoidance of the deterioration of any crisis which threatens to jeopardise or compromise the stability, prosperity and security of the sub-region⁷⁰.

2.2 Theoretical Framework for Analysis

Traditionally, security has been a subject of various interpretations by scholars and analysts. Arnold Wolfers posits that “security rises and falls with the ability of a nation to deter an attack or to defeat it⁷¹”. Morton Berkowitz and P. G. Bock see it as “... the ability of a nation to protect its internal values from external threats⁷²”. To Mohammed Ayoob, the term security is “that which threatens or have the potential to bring down or weaken state structures, both territorial and institutional and governing regimes⁷³”. So in the Third World, state security is also synonymous to regime survival; because any threat that can hamper state’s and regime’s effective performance of its duties, both at domestic level and at the level of international politics, is considered to be a national security risk. He is also of the opinion that security must impact mainly and firmly rooted within the realm of political consequences, though other societal variables may filter into the security calculus⁷⁴.

What we can deduce from these orthodox definitions or conceptualizations of security is that they are state-centric and speak mainly of military capability to ward-off external aggression or subdue an aggressor. But the meaning and scope of security, as employed in this study, transcends this traditional usage. It occupies a predominant position as a concept within International Relations and is central to the understanding of interstate relations. Security was used as an instrument by the super powers in their Cold War rivalry. It was focused at either rolling back Communism or at containing domino and cascading effects of Capitalism. In a way, the French involvement in Africa during the Cold War era was actually complimentary to larger North Atlantic Treaty

Organization's (NATO's) design – which was salient during the rivalry between the East and the West⁷⁵. In fact, United States of America – the leading NATO power has cultivated the habit of deferring to metropolitan initiatives in African continent, except in critical cases such as Zaire (Shaba), Southern Africa and an important state like Nigeria. This US/NATO position on African issues at that time was borne out of the fact that it is cost effective for NATO as well as the US. Also colonial ties between the imperial powers and their colonies makes it possible to utilize specialist experience [of the colonialists) in working with Africans rather than a generalised Western response. It is this same design that made the US to condone France to use its limited military resources for interventionist endeavours in Africa because it is not antithetical to NATO's/West's strategic design in that continent⁷⁶. France through this means had legitimized its (and NATO's) involvement in Africa. The US and Britain could not freely do this without provoking or risking series of reactions among Africans and without risking some kind of counter-action by the Soviet Union and its allies. But in the guise of bilateral agreement or a pretext of legitimate invitation, France had dispatched troops to many of its erstwhile colonies.

Again, in the traditional sense, security as seen by the Realists and Idealists is pre-occupied by a particular type of state and how it is to be peacefully maintained. According to Barry Buzan, security was seen as that which mainly concerns the great powers. While saying this, he employed the Realist viewpoint – that eventually dominates security debate in International Relations⁷⁷. This development was what led to Strategic Studies because super powers rivalry requires that they keep abreast of the latest developments in weaponry, warning systems and similar issues. Thus, the need to change the concept of security became unnecessary and dangerous in order not to rupture the

delicate balance that had prevented nuclear conflict. Obviously, from this Realist template, Third World security hardly features.

Going by Lloyd Pettiford's account, this Realist paradigm makes regime survival the essence of Third World security. Governments' preoccupation was to mainly keep 'minimum values' which they use to justify keeping internal order at any cost. This in turn led to repression and expenditure to satisfy certain narrow interests. Therefore, as defined by the Realists school, security is negligent of the imperatives of many people in world's poorer states. It is only the Pluralists and Structuralists paradigms of security that challenged the Realists paradigm. While the Realists use a "billiard ball" model of International Relations, the Pluralists see the world as a "cobweb" – where many actors are in interactive sessions. To them, security is less about self help, but more on the idea of well being. They emphasize wars, but glorify international stability. The Structuralists are of the Dependency school. They have 'Marxian' persuasion – where copious explanation of international relations and mode of production and contradictions generated there-from is attributed to 'class struggle'⁷⁸.

According to K. Booth, in view of the contemporary development in interstate interactions, security is no longer on military matters alone, because many Third World problems could no longer be understood using only the traditional doctrine of security⁷⁹. In line with Booth, Tony Blair – immediate past British Prime Minister appropriately remarked on the occasion of NATO's 50th anniversary, that:

... We cannot ignore new political ideas in other countries if we want to innovate. we cannot turn our backs on conflicts and the violation of human rights in other countries if we still want to be secure⁸⁰.

K. Booth and Tony Blair are not alone, Lloyd Pettiford and Melissa Curley, Sola Akinrinade, J. A. Tickner and Caroline Thomas also strongly believe on the need for re-conceptualisation or re-examination of security. Pettiford and Curley are of the view

that security has a fixed meaning in International Relations, but this meaning is undergoing some modifications in recent years⁸¹. J. A. Tickner pointed out that since 1983 when Barry Buzan's book – "People, States and Fear" came out, the concept has been redefined, re-theorized, reconceptualised or refigured⁸². Barry Buzan himself has this to say: "Security, in its prevailing usage, the concept is so weakly developed as to be inadequate⁸³" – this is what dominated his thought and analysis in the above mentioned book.

In the same vein, Sola Akinrinade construes that the concept and issues of security, as contained in the literature, are largely of Western origin and cannot be automatically applied to Africa and Third World situations. Citing Mohammed Ayoob, Arnold Wolfers and Walter Lippman, Akinrinade pointed out that security, according to them, is based on the notion that most threats are externally generated and that these threats are military in nature; which require military response, if the security of the state is to be preserved⁸⁴.

Akinrinade further reasoned that one interesting development after the recession of nuclear threat and perceived decline of military power, an enlargement or broader concepts of security in Western discourse emerged. At this point discussion on threats of terrorism, drugs and environment began to appear. But in Africa, various threats of secession, irredentism, and border dispute as well as legitimacy crisis have continued to perturb the security of regimes – hence using the orthodox definition of security for Africa is problematic and inadequate. In this event, we should be speaking of endogenous African security concerns rather than the ones that are externally conditioned.

Caroline Thomas' seminal work on expanding the definition of security to suit the Third World countries situations is apposite for reference here:

*Security does not simply refer to the military dimension, as it is often assumed in Western discussions of the concept, but to the whole range of dimensions of a state's existence which are already taken care of in the more developed states*⁸⁵.

Horace Campbell aligns with the position of Pettiford, Curley, Akinrinade, Tickner and Thomas on the need to expand the definition of security. He employs Afrocentric intellectual tool, in the tradition of Amilcar Cabral, Cheikh Anta Diop and Frantz Fanon in challenging the unsuitability of the conventional Eurocentric notion of peace and security, which, according to him, is either ahistorical or selectively historical and ideologises the African situations. He concluded by saying that this conventional notion is not only peripheral in treating the African situation, but also could not wholly explain the main issues surrounding conflicts in Africa⁸⁶.

Also on the expansion or reconceptualisation of security, Mary Kaldor is of the view that after the Cold War, hopes are that global security concept will expand and encompass wider range of other issues; which are meant to supplant the narrow, defence oriented concepts aimed mainly on security of nations and blocs. Military spending was expected to drop dramatically and thus many wars prevented. But these hopes were dashed even almost two decades after the Cold War; when rhetoric pervaded the globe on the need for respect and promotion of human rights, democratization, and activation of the civil society. This rhetoric is at odds with continuing violence, insecurity and militarism; couple with the fact that there are more wars and the attendant refugees' crisis and displaced persons⁸⁷.

Kaldor continues by saying that military spending has only dropped with respect to the defunct Soviet Union, but not with Western Europe and the US. To her, all these are a product of misdiagnosis of the sources of insecurity and meant to allow the fantasies of technologists, military industrial institutions, military planners, the spin of instant television coverage and traditional assumptions of diplomats to dominate our

definitions of security issues. By extension, this explains the unwillingness of advanced countries to engage their armed forces to take responsibility in enforcing global security in areas outside 'home' as the need arises, no matter how imperative and expedient such could be. To these advanced countries and their security planners, new wars are merely described as 'military operations other than war' or 'low intensity conflicts' or 'internal conflicts'. Retired military officers, unemployed military specialists, mercenary groups and unpaid or spatially paid regular armies are the major characters in the new wars. They make light weapons available or sell them at the black market. They are the ones that contribute to the unending series of new wars, especially in Africa⁸⁸.

In order to properly locate Nigeria's national security in relation with its neighbours within the context of security debate, it is fruitful to refer to D. Deudney and S. Watt whose submission is that: today, security encompasses numerous actors and issues. Furthermore, there is no gainsaying the fact that security of many of the actors is closely linked; hence, it is not profitable to study any type of actor in isolation (atomistically), but rather as a part of a whole (holistically). But we must be careful not to consider all threats to human well-being as threats to security⁸⁹. What is clear now is that, there is a change in paradigm. This paradigm shift should not be seen as if the world is on a cutting-edge of profound historical change. Again, there is no doubting the fact that expansion or re-conceptualization of security is desirable and justifiable, but the rapidity of this change does not guarantee or readily present a finished theory.

Strategic Studies leapfrog the Realists paradigm of focusing security debates only on state actors and military affairs alone. But the end of the Cold War and the threat of nuclear war (on which Strategic Studies were based) did not mean disappearance of threats of nuclear war, but gave way to other actors and issues that impact on security debate. It is within this new process that the security needs and realities of the Third

World countries are appreciated and given vent. This explains why Mohammed Ayooopined that:

The orthodox definition of security is ethnocentric and statist. It was not value neutral and perhaps a Western ahistorical and acultural generalization. (Then), its redefinition or reconceptualization, expansion or re-theorization is somewhat more historical and culturally specific⁹⁰.

Having said the foregoing, it is, therefore, within this prism that we would be able to locate Nigeria, in the security debate. By so doing, we would be able to situate Nigeria's national security *vis-à-vis* its neighbours. It should be added also that, to the detriment of human security, most Third World leaders' making and implementing foreign and domestic policies are preoccupied (if not obsessed), by state and regime security and they shape their policies accordingly. This explains why security vote accounts for about 19 per cent of most Third World countries total annual budget⁹¹. In fact, some states in the Third World normally understate military expenditures and hide security expenditures under different budget headings; hence, the actual percentage of it in the national budget is often higher than those presented to the public⁹². Regime security in the Third World are mostly guaranteed by the armed forces (military and para-military alike), hence, defence, security and/or military budgetary allocations are heavy. It is on the strength of the paradigm shift, as evident in the foregoing narrative that we seek to correct the anomaly evident in the focus and coverage of the term security, doing so especially by critically appraising national security in Nigeria's relations with its neighbours today.

We want to add, for emphasis, that national security is not the same thing as the defence and survival of the state; because it is within the context of erroneous impression of national security that the military arrogates security responsibilities of the state only to itself⁹³. Apart from that, civilian statesmen have also fraudulently used national security

as a political rhetoric merely to rally the citizens in face of internal or external threats to the government in power, whereas, national security is not synonymous with regime survival⁹⁴. National security embodies the state's sovereignty, inviolability of its territorial integrity and the rights of the individual and collective self defence against internal/external attacks or threats⁹⁵. In fact, the state is secure to the extent that the entire people under it has a consciousness of belonging to a common sovereign political community, enjoy equal political freedom, human rights, economic opportunities and when the state itself is able to ensure independence in its development and foreign policy.

In other words, "security relations... must be understood in a wider and subtler term than the crude employment of violence... It requires the integration of military, economic and political factors, not an approach that presumes the independence of these factors in shaping the exterior behaviour of other states⁹⁶". The advantage of 'expanded agenda' of national security is that it presents security problem as a synthesis of political, economic, socio-psychological, military and geo-strategies for meeting the challenges or threats to the survival of new states in international politics⁹⁷.

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Chapter Three

Nigeria and its Neighbours in Geo-political Context

This chapter on Nigeria and its neighbours in geo-political context attempts a definition of the concept of neighbourliness/neighbourhood in all ramifications. It goes further in its second part to situate Nigeria in its neighbourhood – focusing on its peculiar endowments and its global engagements. The third section explores the peoples, cultures and countries sharing borders with Nigeria in West and Central Africa. It discusses the impact of colonialism on the peoples and countries in the Nigeria neighbourhood – both categorized as ‘contiguous’ and ‘political’ neighbours. The former is so characterized as a result of proximity while the latter do not share contiguous boundary with it and perhaps are not within its West African strategic zone, they are far apart, yet their internal spasm or incidence have critical implications for Nigeria’s national security and status.

3.1 The Concept of Neighbourliness in International Relations

Basically, a neighbourhood is a small physical area embedded within a larger area in which people inhabit dwellings. Thus, it is a geographic and social subset of a larger unit. In the process, there is a collective life that emerges from the social networks that have arisen among the residents and the set of institutional arrangements that overlap these networks. That means that the neighbourhood is inhabited by people who perceive themselves to have a common interest in that area and to whom a common life is available. Neighbourhood also has some tradition of identity and continuity over time¹.

Most neighbourhoods have been characterized by heterogeneity of population simply because of increase in the number of immigrants². The following could easily be used to determine the boundaries of a neighbourhood; settlement, growth and history of

the area, local identification with the area, the local presence of natural and artificial barriers, such as rivers and highways³.

Neighbourhood symbolises that image that we call 'home' and serves as a haven of safety and belonging⁴. Complementary to the doctrine which treated the Western hemisphere as the exclusive preserve of US, the Good Neighbourhood policy embodies the idea that US-Latin American relations should be conducted on the basis of sovereign equality and mutual cooperation⁵. Good neighbourhood therefore is anchored primarily on the fact of territorial contiguity and more often than not, on socio-cultural similarities which transcend international boundaries⁶.

It must be stated at this stage that urban decay in many major metropolitan areas of the world have implications for neighbouring states. Part of which is the fact that crime represents an intense threat to neighbourhood life. This also underlines the fact that the sources of threat to neighbourhood life are internal and external⁷. Furthermore, the higher the rate of crime the higher the tendency of disrupting the capacity for maintaining control in the neighbourhood. For instance, residents may withdraw from participation in community affairs because of the heightened fear and anxiety. If such withdrawal from local networks becomes widespread, the sense of mutual responsibility among the residents is undermined, and those who are able to do so may attempt to physically abandon the neighbourhood at the earliest possibility⁸. This is the nature of national security that this thesis seeks to examine.

In this study, we will be seeing a definition of neighbourhood in the following senses – a limited number of states linked together by a geographic relationship and by a degree of mutual interdependence; geographical proximity, common bonds (ethnic, linguistic, cultural, historical and social), economic interdependence, regular and intense relationships among the constituent units, and common perceptions of the regional sub-

system – as well as a ‘we-feeling’⁹. A shared neighbourhood implies burden-sharing and joint responsibility in addressing regional problems among all partners¹⁰.

One of the cardinal principles to ensure good neighbourliness as shown in the experience of India with its neighbours like Pakistan, Maldives, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka, include:

- The ‘senior’ neighbour does not ask for reciprocity but gives all that it can, in good faith and trust.
- None of the countries in the neighbourhood should allow its territory to be used against the interest of another country of the region.
- None will interfere in the internal affairs of another¹¹.
- All the countries in the neighbourhood must respect each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.
- Enhancing that all their disputes are settled through peaceful bilateral negotiations¹².

No doubt, these tenets have over the years yielded rich dividends. The same goes for Indian/China style of developing a relationship of friendship, co-operation and good neighbourliness, exploiting the potential for favourable growth wherever it exists, and seeking to find a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable solution to the outstanding border issue. The facilities to achieving the desired results have manifested in the following:

- a series of high-level visitation;
- growing bilateral trade and economic co-operation;
- an agreement on confidence-building measures and
- the signing of wider dialogue on security¹³.

Each state within international society, being a cluster of systems organized by an administrative system responding to and behaving within an environment, seeks to influence other states which comprise its environment. The means of influence vary with circumstances and capabilities. It could be said that the role of each state in international society is determined by its capabilities, its cultural traditions and its environment. In which case, short-term conditions, e.g., the personality of leaderships, do not determine state behaviour ultimately, especially if there is a change from the known tradition and such changes are always short-lived. What this boils down to is that role behaviour is a continuing phenomenon. It is the behaviour other states expect by reason of traditional behaviour patterns¹⁴.

However, unacceptable roles create response that can be controlled by threat and force, but only in the short term. For instance, attempts by the defunct Soviet Union to integrate Eastern European economies led to increased demands for independence; US attempts to control Latin American politics have given power to the factions it seeks to curb, alliance domination leads to alliance disintegration, aid offered on unacceptable condition promotes responses the aid was designed to avoid, attempts by outgoing colonial powers to leave behind a government favourable to them promote hostile political movement¹⁵.

By extension, if an attempt is made to defend or enact unacceptable role, the result will rather be destructive. To illustrate this, the systematic motivation of states in seeking to influence others is not that vague and alleged primitive urge to have more power and to dominate more people. Rather it is the systemic need to influence or control decisions affecting relevant wider system. For instance, a state need may require it to manipulate the environment (i. e., other states) so as to reduce required responses to those that are within the adjustment capability of the state. Thus in the thirties, Japan at first

made passive attempts to persuade other states in its neighbourhood to alter their trading policies; and when these were frustrated, it embarked upon what appeared to be a classic case of aggression. Nowadays, these states that are Japan's neighbours (as it is elsewhere) have been struggling to be free to determine their own responses in an environment that does not discriminate against them¹⁶.

It has been made clear from experience that no regional power can fulfil its aspirations without addressing its problems in the neighbourhood. This means that no matter how frustrating, there is no alternative diplomacy available to an aspiring regional power (like Nigeria as India, South Africa and Egypt) other than a substantive, patient and constructive engagement of its neighbours. Accompanying this for the regional power is a huge stake in the rapid economic development of the neighbourhood, without which it cannot prosper or secure. In this regard, it can work at resolving long-standing conflict between and among the neighbouring countries, integrate their markets or find ways of co-operating with other great power. This will no doubt enhance co-operative security, and former adversaries or potential adversaries will begin to shift their confrontational policies¹⁷.

In saying this, we do not intend that the countries in the neighbourhood should merely abstain from violence and threats, but there should be an active engagement in a search for political solution and a commitment to preventive measures. It also requires a conversion of the various countries within the neighbourhood to an attitude of good faith to one another, as well as the process of building confidence and trust.

The basic guiding principles and objectives of Nigeria's foreign policy find expression in its multilateral and bilateral relations especially with its neighbours and Africa in its entirety. Over the years Nigeria has placed a high premium on the maintenance and developing of closer relations with its neighbours. The desire was

encouraged by its experiences of the civil war. The promotion of good-neighbourly relations with its sister states in the region is in Nigeria's enlightened interest since any event occurring in this area has direct impact on Nigeria's security and economic interests. One demonstration of such commitment is the leading role that Nigeria played in the establishment of ECOWAS – aiming at not only promoting agricultural, natural resources, commerce, monetary and financial matters, as well as social and cultural matters; it also intended on raising the standard of living of their peoples; increase and maintain economic stability, fostering closer relations among members and countries to the progress and development of the African continent¹⁸.

One of the primary sovereign responsibilities of a state is the extent to which it controls its borders (migration) especially in this globalising age – when finance and goods cross borders with relative ease. States are becoming weaker and their boundaries are becoming increasingly porous. In this process, a number of issues are already being noted as potential threats to global and regional security especially in many years to come¹⁹. Within a few years, oil reserve will have reached their limit²⁰. A more valuable commodity, water, has already prompted wars and international conflict and is likely to be a major source of insecurity in the twenty-first century²¹. As a result of this and other resource problems, migration is likely to continue in scale and scope. So, migration will continue to be viewed as a threat to human issues of the twenty-first century.

As a footnote to the foregoing, we also need to understand the nature and character of global neighbourhood. It is really a divided neighbourhood, where enormous disparities abound. There are eco-disparities, disparities in terms of access to resources, to basic human rights, not just political and civil rights, but economic, social and cultural rights as well. In the global neighbourhood, there is really a tiny cabal of the wealthiest neighbours in the neighbourhood, who are well to do and have all the facilities. They

represent a minority in the larger or global neighbourhood. These are the G7 countries – the wealthiest, most industrialized and the richest of the world. They represent a global minority. They also represent one-seventh of the world's population, but they consume 70 per cent of the world's resources. They live large and well and they are powerful. It is this little clique of neighbours that tends to control the institution of global governance. They sort to run the Security Council of the United Nations. They run the neighbourhood Chamber of Commerce, that is, the World Trade Organization. They really control the neighbourhood banks, that is, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It is this G7 that is the little clique in the rich neighbourhood – representing the ruling minority that are directing the affairs of the other 6 billion people in the world who do not live in the G7 countries. The latter category represents the seven-eighths of the world population²².

The two categories in the neighbourhood have different definitions of priorities for international stability. The G7 clique in the neighbourhood says it is terrorism, weapon of mass destruction and nuclear proliferation – that are greatest threats to the neighbourhood. But the others outside the G7 countries says that the threats to the neighbourhood are principally found in poverty, HIV-AIDS and myriad of local conflicts within their 'homes'²³.

This explains why Nelson Mandela – former South African president opined that the emergence and currency of such concept of “the common neighbourhood” in a globalized world, is a ruse. This is because this concept hides the reality of the continuous process of the unequal distribution of power and influence within this global village or common neighbourhood. They disguise the fact that countries lose their sovereignty in an unequal manner. This results in the situation that while the whole human universe, made up of different countries, indeed becomes more inter-dependent, some countries within

this universe assume dominant positions, while others are pushed into dependent positions. For instance, what emerges is the ideological promotion of what could be called “Washington consensus” which focuses mainly on “market fundamentalism” and deification of the free market system or the subjection of human evolution to the dictates of the free market system²⁴.

Therefore, many leading countries in the continent (e.g. Nigeria and South Africa) strive, no matter how limited, to contribute to the determination of outcome of international discussion that will inevitably impact on their future as a country and as a people. Accompanying this are the desires of these countries to build a human universe that truly addresses the interests of the poor and marginalized of our common world. So, all nations of the world whether rich or poor, whether from the North or the South, must consider it a duty to build a humane and people-centred society. This is the basis for the quest to redirect the definition of national security from orthodox military worldview to that of promoting an expansive human-focused or people-oriented definition.

In the contemporary international system, a global good neighbour ethic carries along the following principles:

- A good neighbour is to stop being a bad neighbour.
- Both the domestic and foreign policies of a good neighbour must be directed to improving security, quality of life and basic rights at home and abroad.
- The foreign policy of a good neighbour must be based on the principle of reciprocity rather than domination, mutual well-being rather than cut-throat competition and cooperation than confrontation.
- For the nations that are so endowed, a good neighbour will exercise responsible global leadership and partnership rather than seeking global dominance²⁵.

Some corollaries to these is a well prepared military that is capable of repelling attacks as well as proactive commitment to improving national and personal security through non-military measures and international cooperation, government supporting sustainable development at home and abroad, and a peaceful and prosperous global neighbourhood depends on effective governance at national, regional and international levels. An effective government is accountable, transparent and representative.

The principles enumerated above are not a detailed blueprint for improved international relations but are ethics to guide effective international policy and action in confusing and complex times. They are principles simply meant to guide global engagement in order to ensure peaceful neighbourhood and international environment. They reinforced the standpoint that everyday good neighbourly practice of self-respect, mutual respect and a spirit of co-operation are the proper starting points for mutually beneficial international relations²⁶. What is more, the wellbeing of one nation depends in large measure upon the well-being of its neighbours. Good neighbourliness requires that peace be promoted and war deglorified²⁷.

For instance a good neighbour will always repudiate imperialism, cultural and racial stereotyping and military intervention, rather it will be a leader not a bully (if the nation is so endowed) and actively sought to build multilateral co-operation instead of assert global dominance. It will also seek to build (new) international relations that are socially, politically and environmentally sustainable²⁸.

Following the collapse of the iron curtain and demise of the Soviet Union, new concept has emerged in the European integration strategy. The former Eastern European countries that were Socialists were integrated into the EU under what is known as European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). This ENP or wider Europe provides the framework for closer cooperation with the neighbouring countries in the newly enlarged

Union (EU). The Neighbourhood policy asks for continued commitment to common values, that is, to implement jointly agreed priorities to effective bilateral cooperation and co-ordination²⁹. For sure, this policy would be a model to be copied by many countries of the world, though not former Socialist but those already invigorating their own economic integrative efforts too.

Among other things, this European neighbourhood policy asks for:

- A democratic and reform-oriented polity, especially from among the European that formerly have a socialist bent;
- Exploration of possibilities for closer co-operation in the area of foreign and security policy, including European security defence policy;
- Alignment with EU positions on regional and international issues;
- Expansion of trade and economic relations and quickening agreement that will provide access to EU markets;
- Intensification of ongoing contacts to facilitate the granting of 'market economy' status;
- Intensification of negotiations regarding visa facilitation;
- Enhancement of co-operation in key sector, including energy, transport, the environment, as well as private sector development;
- Provision of democratic values, rule of law and strengthening of the civil society groups;
- Facilitation of cross-border contacts and small border traffic as well as establish general cross-border co-operation³⁰.

What this boils down to is that Nigeria or the African continent needs to be proactive, if the EU had increased the tempo of its neighbourhood agenda by appreciating that it is not an island. It is surrounded by very close neighbours like Russia in the North

East to Morocco in the South West. It shows an appreciation that Europe is keen on working out a smooth neighbour of multinational characters, that is, Russian world, Africa and Arab world³¹. This behoves other continents around the globe to begin to initiate similar initiative or invigorate their existing neighbourhood policies.

3.2 Understanding Nigeria in its Neighbourhood

The country has often been referred to as the giant of Africa. Its area of 373,250 square miles and estimated mid-1959 population of 35,284,000 respectively make it four times and six times that of Ghana³². The country's demography has changed considerably over the years. Today, its population is 138, 283, 240 people – going by July 2008 estimate³³. Hence, the country is easily the most populous country on the African continent and the biggest Black country in the world. It has been playing a most important role in world affairs since independence. Nigeria comprises at least 300 tribes and most of them have their own distinctive languages³⁴. Nigerian leaders since independence have been so ambitious on issues that have to do with African and global development and peace³⁵. For instance, the then Prime Minister, Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa emphasized this point in his historic independence motion in the Nigerian House of Representatives in January 1960 when he said: "The greatest single contribution we can make to Africa and to world peace generally will be to show how a country containing so many diverse elements can find a peaceful solution to its internal difficulties³⁶".

Nigeria's nearest English-speaking neighbour, Ghana is much better known but not very popular. Most Nigerians are jealous of the publicity that Ghana gained when she became independent. Arising from this perhaps, they resent what they see as a Ghanaian attempt to establish Ghana as the leading country in West Africa and to run a Pan-African movement from Accra. It is not as if Nigerians are averse to the idea of African or united

Africa. In 1958, Nigeria refused to send observers to the Accra Conference of Free African States and Nkrumah characterized the Nigerian's boycott of the conference as being highly unfortunate, to say the least. In fact, the Lagos Daily Service, an Action Group (AG) newspaper, commented that 'it is an egregious insult for the Prime Minister of a small country, like Ghana, to essay to be Nigeria's spokesman'³⁷.

Also in the past, before many Francophone West African countries became independent, news on the French Union in Africa are well published in Nigeria but they are also often misinterpreted. French African leaders are often looked on as French dupes. Added to this, Nigeria's ignorance of their French Africans neighbours is that few Anglophone Africans can speak French and also few French Africans, English³⁸.

With a population of 56 million in 1963, increasing to about 70 million in 1973 and about 140 million in 2008, Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa. This population is distributed most unevenly over its area of 922,280 square kilometre (356,000 square miles) such that a few districts have more than 308 persons per square kilometre (800 persons per square mile) while vast areas are virtually uninhabited, having less than 4 persons per square kilometre. For a long period since 1900, this general pattern of population distribution in Nigeria has remained the same³⁹. As shown in 1952/53 census there is major concentration of population in the country. This pattern is similar to what obtained in 1963 and subsists till today⁴⁰.

Shortly after its independence, Nigeria was glowingly and obviously regarded on print as the "largest of the new African states"⁴¹. During the civil war years, federal spokesmen argued in support of the war effort that "if Nigeria breaks up, it will be the end of Africa"⁴². Nigeria was described as the "biggest and potentially the richest state in Africa"⁴³ and elsewhere as "one of the more prosperous and contended nations in Africa"⁴⁴.

Nigeria lies on the west coast of Africa. Its borders are contiguous with the Republic of Benin to the west, Niger Republic and Chad to the north and the Republic of Cameroon to the east. Nigeria today is thickly populated and arguably the wealthiest and leading country in Africa. In 2008, its population stands at about 140,000 people. The 1991 census puts country's population at over 88 million. Way back in 1953 the country's population was 55, 558, 168. When it comes to diversity, Nigeria is probably second to none in the whole world. It is peopled by innumerable ethnic groups speaking various languages and dialects. The country is almost practically self-sufficient in mineral resources which include petroleum, limestone, tin, columbite, kaolin, gold, silver, coal, lead-zinc, gypsum, clay, shale marble graphite, iron-ore, stone zircon, wolfram, molybdenite and tantalite. With the vastness, diversity, fertility and resourcefulness of its land, Nigeria can sufficiently and comfortably survive on agriculture and tourism alone⁴⁵.

In colonial days, the early agitators saw themselves as Africans rather than Nigerians. Later, when independence became a real prospect, they became West Africans, dreaming of a West African federation. Though that, too, seemed an improbable basis for statehood. It need be said that the size and even the diversity of the country bred its own pride. It was the largest country in Africa, many times bigger than the famed Ghana of Nkrumah, three times as populous as the Congo, and the tenth most populous state on earth. Its federal institutions, the corporations, foreign service, the armed forces – provided a melting pot of nationalism⁴⁶.

As regards social life, and in its assertive Africanness, Nigeria contrasts with its ex-French neighbours (like Cote d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast) and Dahomey (Republic of Benin)). There, the French with their zeal for exporting French civilization left an isolated elite, more French than African, living by French subsidies, largely divorced from a populace scarcely affected by independence. In those countries, much of the

administration and most of the big business is still in French hands, hotels, small butchers' shops and even cafes are French-owned and French-run. Nigerian life is African in all departments and at all levels. Literature, both in English and in the Nigerian languages, has flourished here (Nigeria) as in no other African country; so has the drama, music and sculpture. Government at the local level, which is the level that matters to the people, is shaped by chiefly and traditional conciliar institutions. Though it is a changing pattern; the power of the chiefs and the emirs is being eroded by the politicians, while the business tycoons are emerging as a new aristocracy. But, even in change, it remains Nigerian.⁴⁷ Schwarz stressed that; "Nature is kind. If malnutrition still keeps infant mortality at about 50 per cent in the village; this is the result of ignorance rather than lack of good food. It is not easy to starve in Nigeria"⁴⁸.

Within West Africa, Nigeria status is spectacular. For instance, Harrison Church came up with the following when he was giving a description of the political geography of the sub-region:

The Francophone republics occupy three-quarters of the areas; yet largely because some of these republics include vast tracts of the Sahara, they have under one-third of the total population. Nigeria one of the largest and most densely populated countries of the Commonwealth has a population of about 65 million (1963 census) in an area four times that of the United Kingdom. Moreover, Nigeria has well over one-half the population of West Africa and about twice that of the four times larger area of the francophone republics⁴⁹.

The 1985 population of West and some Central African countries is 177,946,000,⁵⁰ and as would be expected, the situation is different in 2008⁵¹ – as evident in the following:

Countries	Population Figures	Population Figures
	1995	2008
Benin	4,300,000	8,294,941
Burkina Faso	8,000,000	15,264,735
Cameroon	11,500,000	18,467,692
Cape Verde	340,000	426,998
Cote d'Ivoire	11,500,000	18,373,060
Equatorial Guinea	370,000	616,459
The Gambia	800,000	1,735,464
Ghana	13,588,000	23,382,848
Guinea Bissau	950,000	1,503,182
Liberia	2,191,000	3,334,587
Mali	885,000	12,324,029
Mauritania	1,371,000	3,364,940
Niger	7,728,000	13,272,679
Nigeria	88,500,000	138,283,240
Sao Tome and Principe	Not available	206,178
Senegal	7,000,000	12,853,259
Sierra Leone	3,602,000	6,294,774
Togo	3,000,000	5,858,673

Apart from population, the rivers in Nigeria also distinguish the country and link it up with many countries in its neighbourhood. For instance, the Niger is Africa's third longest river. It rises in the mountains to the north-east of Sierra Leone and runs through Nigeria on the last 1227 kilometres of its journey to the sea. The Benue enters Nigeria from Cameroon Republic. It flows into the Niger at Lokoja about 544 kilometres from the sea, from where the Niger continues southward and empties itself into the Gulf of Guinea through a welter of creeks and rivers forming the great Niger delta. The other important tributaries of the Niger within Nigeria are Sokoto, Kaduna and Anambra, while Benue also has a number of tributaries including Katsina-Ala, Gongola, Taraba, Kudu and Donga rivers. The other important rivers are the Ogun, Escarvos, Sombero, New Calabar, Bonny, Antonio, Opobo, Qualboe, Cross, Old Calabar and Yobe with its tributary Bunga. The Yobe flows into Lake Chad in the extreme north-east of the federation⁵².

Since independence, the principles guiding Nigeria foreign policy have remained consistent over the years and include:

- The safeguarding and protection of national sovereignty and territory integrity.
- Commitment to the right of peoples under colonial domination to self-determination.
- Support for the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) (now African Union (AU)) and absolute dedication to its charter.
- Respect for the independent sovereignty and territorial integrity of sovereign states and non-interference in the internal affairs of one another.
- Commitment to functional cooperation as a means of enhancing development; and
- Support for the United Nations as an instrument of international peace and security⁵³.

In this respect, successive Nigerian administrations have proclaimed and irrevocably committed to the following objectives:

- Eradication of apartheid and all vestiges of racism and colonialism.
- Development of institutions for sub-regional and regional co-operation and integration such as the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
- Development of close and mutually beneficial relations with all friendly countries.
- Promotion of international co-operation conducive to the consolidation of world peace and security, mutual respect and friendship among all people and countries.
- A re-ordering of the current equitable international economic system to take account of the needs and aspirations of developing countries.
- Fostering of closer economic co-operation among developing countries⁵⁴.

Nigeria has at least 25 per cent of the African population and 55 per cent of the West African population; it also aspires to continental leadership as clearly stated in the objectives of Nigeria foreign policy thus:

- The defence and promotion of Nigerian sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity and national independence.
- The creation of the necessary political and economic conditions in Africa that will secure the sovereignty, territorial integrity and national independence of all African countries and their total liberation from imperialism and all other forms of foreign domination⁵⁵.

Just like France of the Gaullist years, Nigeria since independence has designated for itself in Africa, a big-power role. It defines African international relations and the role to be played by weaker or smaller states, worked at determining and assuming basic security arrangements and regulated economic and diplomatic processes by which relations are conducted. As a great African power, Nigeria's actions are an example and its policies a guide for other states in the continent. In fact, Nigeria enjoys the grandeur that emanates from its ambitious international role. By defining the conditions of international political life for other West and Central African states, Nigeria necessarily enjoys higher status than those states. These other states in the Nigerian 'neighbourhood' are "lesser bodies" because their security, solvency and status are ultimately consigned to the policies and preferences of other states⁵⁶.

Nigeria is not only committed to sub-regional and continental peace, security and development; it is also committed to global peace and security. A pointer to this is in its maintenance of diplomatic missions in all the major capitals of the world. It fully supports the UN systems and its ideals. In recognition of its commitment, the country was bestowed with the Chairmanship of the Special Committee against Apartheid – which coordinates world-wide efforts to eliminate apartheid in South Africa. It actively participates in the activities of the specialized agencies of the UN to promote and complement developmental efforts.

Within the Commonwealth organisation, Nigeria spearheaded campaign to expel South Africa in 1961. In 1979 it forced resolution of the then Rhodesian crisis (Zimbabwe); it later spearheaded the boycott of the thirteenth Commonwealth Game because of the British government's insensitivity to the call for the imposition of sanctions against the apartheid regime. Nigeria also actively supports the Non-Aligned Movement principally to preserve the independence of new states from the two ideologically opposing blocs. Despite the limitations of this organisation then, it remained the strong moral voice for its members in world politics at that time⁵⁷.

Nigeria is a country of considerable mineral wealth and potential for diversified development. It is a major oil producer. There are also vast reserves of natural gas, though little is being exploited. Crops produce accounts for about 30 per cent of GDP and provide employment for over half the labour force. In the 1970s, manufacturing produce increased rapidly. But due to tariff-distorted incentives much of the expansion was in import-dependent, assembly-type activities that contributed little to local value-added and employment. Services which accounts for over 25 per cent of total GDP are dominated by wholesale and retail trade. The current civilian administration is introducing all sorts of reforms to correct the distortions⁵⁸.

Prior to the oil boom, Nigeria was one of the world's poorest countries, but in the 1970s, the sharply rising oil revenues boosted the value of exports and per capital GNP. This trend was reversed in the 1980s as a result of the decline in oil prices at the international market. The effect of the Gulf crisis on the prices of oil has generated another series of windfalls that has increased the fortune of Nigeria since 1991⁵⁹.

In terms of many socio-economic indicators, Nigeria is close to the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. The growth rate of its population is among the highest in the world. It was speculated that by 2010 the population would have reached 200 million and by 2032,

400 million. In the country, there is high infant mortality rate, population per physician is 12,000 to one physician and life expectancy is 53 years⁶⁰.

Nigeria is one of the most endowed countries in the world. It has abundant land, water and human resources, and enjoys warm temperatures capable of supporting agricultural products all the years round. Although 70 per cent of the land is cultivable, only half of this is put under cultivation. Nigerian agriculture declined considerably during the early 70s as a result of the country's reliance on the oil boom. Nigeria is one of the world's leading producers of cocoa. Other agriculture products that Nigeria is blessed with include oil palm, rice, cassava, cotton, rubber, coconut, tobacco, plantain, sweet potatoes, etc. The major export crops are cocoa, groundnut, rubber, coffee and cotton. Nigeria is the sixth largest producer of crude oil in the world and the second in Africa. Other minerals mined in Nigeria include iron, tin, columbite, limestone and coal. The coal is of importance as no other larger reserves are known in West Africa⁶¹.

To ensure compliance with the normative order in the complex and highly chaotic international system, there is an inevitable need for a great power or hegemon that is able and willing to pay up, bribe or bully others. This is the role that Nigeria has been playing and conveniently so, in its relations with its neighbours⁶². Nigeria is the central pillar to which efforts at the maintenance of peace and security in West Africa are always being anchored. It is a regional heavyweight and had the capacity to provide effective leadership for conflict management in the West African sub-region and indeed in the entire African continent⁶³. In the sub-region of sixteen countries where one out of every three West African citizens is a Nigerian, Nigeria relentlessly strives towards the prevention or avoidance of the deterioration of any crisis which threatens the stability and security of the sub-region⁶⁴.

When discussing West African military interventions in the 1990s; the case of ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone, Amadu Sesay characterizes Nigeria as 'West Africa's super power'. Furthermore, he summarises that General Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida (IBB) – Nigeria's Head of State during the Liberian civil war who was also a close friend of the embattled Liberian President Samuel Doe, used his right standing in West Africa to skilfully manipulate ECOWAS into putting in place, first, a Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) and later ECOMOG, which was deployed in August 1990, ostensibly on a 'humanitarian' mission. He maintains that the adventure was unpopular at 'home' – where the exercise was seen as an unnecessary drain on the country's thin resources. General Sani Abacha – the late Nigerian maximum ruler said the project cost Nigeria some \$7 billion⁶⁵. In May 1997, Abacha almost single-handedly sent Nigerian troops to Freetown under the auspices of ECOWAS/ECOMOG, to topple the regime of Major Johnny Paul Koromah who had ousted the democratically elected government of Ahmed Tejan Kabbah on May 25, 1997⁶⁶.

Sesay also characterizes Nigeria as the sub-regional giant; for it turned out to be the unofficial spokesperson for ECOWAS. Thus, presenting the country as a selfless and globalist nation, of a sort – by contributing seventy per cent of the ninety per cent of men and finance in the Liberian/Sierra Leonean interventions⁶⁷. Since independence in 1960 and during the oil boom of the 1970s, Nigeria had been playing the role of 'big brother' to protect the interest of all black peoples whether in Africa or in the diasporas. Successive Nigeria governments loaded many resources into prosecuting this agenda⁶⁸.

Nigeria became a protagonist in the fight against apartheid. For many years it was unanimously chosen to chair the UN Committee against Apartheid (1972 – 1991) when Apartheid collapsed. Furthermore, it became honorary frontline state in recognition of its prominent role in liberation struggles in South Africa, Angola, Zimbabwe and

Mozambique. With the entry of Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso into the ECOWAS peace keeping, the Francophone states and the rest of the sub-region unwittingly also conceded to Nigeria's hegemony in the sub-region. Even at great human and financial costs, Nigeria made the ECOMOG project a success, which accentuates the sacrifices that the most pre-eminent nations and regional hegemon, all over the world, are expected to make⁶⁹.

Over the years, Nigeria has consistently maintained a high profile in the world affairs. The country has not only meritoriously contributed to global peace-keeping operations, it has also to its credit the record of being Africa's longest and most distinguished participant in the United Nations Peacekeeping operations. Nigeria dispatched two infantry divisions under UN command to Congo in early 1960s, and a battalion to Tanzania after the 1964 mutiny. It also contributed to the UN India-Pakistan Observer Mission (UNIPOM) in 1965. That translates to the fact that within five years of Nigeria's independence, it had valiantly participated in three successful UN peacekeeping missions. Furthermore, Nigeria participated in the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNFIL) in 1978, and the UN observer mission to oversee the Iraq-Iran ceasefire and the Angola/Namibia accords in 1988. Due to the concern for internal politics and security, however, Nigeria did not send troop to participate in the 1990 Persian Gulf War. With all these, therefore, Nigeria has contributed about 16,000 troops to UN peacekeeping functions⁷⁰.

Nigeria in 1987 initiated a Concert of Medium Powers among Non-aligned states – hosting more than twenty countries. Regrettably, the effort did not yield the desired result. It also hosted the 23-nation Zone of Peace and Co-operation of the South Atlantic in July 1990. It is a signatory and committed to Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. In 1988

it signed a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency to ensure peaceful uses of nuclear reactor project⁷¹.

Its nationals have been prominent judges at the International Court of Justice – some rose to the presidency of the Court. Nigeria had been a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council and it held presidency of the UN Security Council. It is worthy of note too that the country is not only noted for participating in the UN peace-keeping operations, but also in similar operations under the auspices of the OAU (now African Union (AU) and ECOWAS. The country is also a founding member of the OAU⁷². The establishment of ECOWAS owes much to the joint initiatives of Nigeria and Togo. Some have argued that the initiative was essentially taken in Nigeria's enlightened self-interest. The country had used the Commonwealth of Nation's platform to propagate African cause – especially as it affects liberation struggle in Southern Africa. Both the Nigerian oil industry and the economy at large have benefited from Nigeria's membership of Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). From the mid-1980s to the beginning of 1990, Nigeria was repeatedly elected OPEC's President, and at another, the Secretary General of the organisation. The country also institutes Technical Aid Corps Scheme – a similitude of American Peace Corps Scheme or the French 'Cooperants'. The scheme is in the spirit of South-South Cooperation and meant to recruit Nigerian professionals in all walk of life to provide assistance to sister countries⁷³.

All black population in the world looks up to Nigeria for leadership simply because it has the highest population of black peoples in the world. Evidently too, it has a landmass that is highly endowed with human and natural resources and capable of making it an emergent world power. In the 1960s Nigeria was described as “the giant of Africa; the hope of the black race”. In the 1970s, it came to be regarded as “a black power⁷⁴”.

In a manner which smacks of 'blow-it-yourself', Bolaji Akinyemi – a former Director General of Nigerian Institute of International Affairs and Foreign Minister said:

Nigeria is the largest African country⁷⁵. Our population of 100 million is double that of any other country and it ensures that one out of every five Africans is a Nigerian. Our GDP, currently estimated at 71 billion dollars surpasses that of every African country and is equal to that of South Africa. In ECOWAS sub-region, for example, Nigeria's GDP is greater than that of all other countries combined. We have 15.5 million pupils enrolled in primary schools, equal to the entire population of many African countries. Our extensive highway network, estimated at over 108,000 kilometres, is second to none in black Africa. Moreover, Nigeria is the 25th most powerful country in the world in terms of GDP. It is world's 23rd largest exporting country and it is the 22nd largest importer. Most important of all, Nigeria is endowed with an aggressive, energetic and enterprising population⁷⁶.

No doubt Nigeria is a colossus in the African continent; territorial size, human and natural resources combined. Nigeria is three times the size of Cote d'Ivoire, the size of France and the Benelux countries put together, one tenth the size of the United States of America, and four times the size of Britain. It has the largest area of arable land in Africa and the largest concentration of black people in the world outside the United States. Before emphasis was placed on crude oil production in the 1970s, Nigeria was the world's largest producer of palm oil and groundnut. It was also then the third largest producer of cocoa, following Ghana and Brazil. It was the only producer of coal in the whole of West Africa. Sports constitute a source of psychological pride for Nigeria – with its nationals winning medals in regional and global sporting competitions. In fact, Nigeria believes it is a giant, and does not only want to be seen as such, but also wants to be reckoned with in African matters⁷⁷.

The oil-rich Nigeria, long disturbed by political instability, corruption, inadequate infrastructure, and poor macroeconomic management, is undertaking some reforms under the civilian administration of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo. This is owing to the fact that

former military rulers failed to diversify the economy away from overdependence on the capital-intensive oil sector, which provides 20 per cent of GDP, 95 per cent of foreign exchange earnings, and about 65 per cent of budgetary revenues. The largely subsistence agricultural sector has failed to keep up with rapid population growth. The country which was once a large net exporter of food, now imports food. In the 1999 estimate, there is 60 million labour force and labour force by occupation is as follows: Agriculture 70 per cent, industry 10 per cent, services 20 per cent. Unemployment rate is 4.9 per cent – going by July 2008 estimate⁷⁸.

Active duty personnel in the three Nigerian armed services total approximately 76,000. The Nigerian army, the largest of the services, has about 60,000 personnel. The army has demonstrated its capability to mobilize, deploy and sustain battalions in support of peace keeping operations in Liberia, the defunct Yugoslavia, Angola, Rwanda, Somalia and Sierra Leone⁷⁹.

As a footnote to the nation's greatness and the much avowed claim of being positioned for continental leadership with over a quarter of the continent's population – hence the nomenclature 'giant of Africa', Nigeria has plummeted into a rather clay-footed giant. The Nigerian society is stagnating and unable to break new ground or incapable of sustaining the initiatives that emerge. Nigerians are poorer than they were two decades ago. The World Development Report, published by a United Nations agency, ranked Nigeria among the poorest countries on the globe. Poverty has brought pain, hunger, dislocation and assault on the dignity of its peoples. Already there is a widening rich-poor gap worsened by a culture of corruption in a manner that tightens the poverty noose. The Transparency International once declared Nigeria as the most corrupt country on the globe. The thieving elites have transformed corruption into a general malaise and due process has been subverted⁸⁰.

What ensued are a crisis of citizenship and the absence of a sense of belonging. Thus, the state is unable to command affection because it has not guaranteed a society that can be trusted to promote the well-being of its members. Furthermore, the state has not been able to offer adequate security. Crime is a huge problem. Armed robbery, assassinations and the traffic in children pose a severe challenge now. Yet the law enforcement agency is not keeping pace with the increasing sophistication and brutality of the criminal underworld. There are weaknesses in the implementation of education policies and provision of adequate social infrastructure. The health institutions have merely become consulting clinics, the road network is bad and supply of electricity comatose, to say the least⁸¹. Even the World Bank has reported that nothing positive had happened in Nigeria for the past three decades. In spite of its bountiful harvest from oil, its economic performance is terribly poor. The nation's per capital income had witnessed erosion since early 1980s⁸².

Nigeria is the 10th largest oil producer in the world and an important oil producer in sub-Saharan Africa. It currently produces 90 million tonnes of crude oil per year (2 million barrels per day). Oil commerce is the Nigeria's most important sector in the economy. Yet, up till today, the government and foreign investors, especially in the oil sector are engaged in a running battle with the restive youths in the Niger Delta, the oil-bearing region. The restive youths attack the multinational oil installations demanding that the oil companies and government should provide them with schools, better roads, and enlarge their political representation. Closely linked with the above security problem in the Niger Delta are the nationwide issues of irregularity of salaries by some government agencies, looming threats of retrenchment, poor quality of life, high crime rate as well as grave transportation, health and educational problems⁸³.

Evidently, Nigeria's size, demography, economic strength and military capabilities set it apart as the dominant regional power with a growing sense of self-assurance and a developing capability to demonstrate it. It is surrounded by smaller and weaker states, whose vulnerability to external influence and pressure could adversely affect its security. The lack of regional rivals made large-scale conflicts unlikely but did not spare Nigeria border clashes with neighbouring Cameroon and Chad, peacekeeping deployment to Chad and Liberia, a leadership role in ECOWAS peacekeeping force in Liberia as well as strategic manoeuvring against France and South Africa in Equatorial Guinea⁸⁴.

3.3 The Nature and Character of States that are Nigeria's Neighbours

The area traditionally known as West Africa can be described simply as the land lying between Sahara desert and the Gulf of Guinea. It is bounded in the North by Rio de Oro, Algeria, Libya and the Chad Republic; on the West by the Atlantic Ocean; on the South by the Gulf of Guinea; and the East by the Republic of Gabon, Congo (Brazzaville) and the Central Africa Republic (CAR). Its greatest length (east to west) from Cape Verde to Mount Cameroon is 2,500 km. It lies within longitudes 20° West and 15° E, and latitudes 17° North and 10° South of the Equator. The surface of West Africa consists of a number of plateaux standing at different levels. The most important of these are the Futa Jallon Plateau from which rises the Niger, the Senegal, and the Gambian rivers; the Jos Plateau from which rises the Yobe river flowing into Lake Chad; as well as other rivers emptying themselves into the Niger and the Benue; and the Adamawa plateau, whose highest point is Mount Cameroon, and from which the Benue rises. Most of West Africa's rivers are not navigable for ocean-going vessels; the most navigable is the Gambia. The longest river is the Niger whose total length is 4,160 km, rising near the Sierra Leone

boundary 240 km from the Atlantic and passing through Mali Republic and Burkina Faso to the Nigerian coast, where it forms delta⁸⁵. It could, therefore, be seen that the countries in West and Central Africa are interlocked by a network of natural endowments of rivers and plateau.

There are five climatic regions in West Africa. One, the equatorial climatic region of the Cameroon and southern Nigeria where the rain falls all the year round and temperatures and humidity are constantly high throughout the years. Average temperature is 80°F. Two, there is the west tropical region of the coastlands from Guinea Bissau to the south-western Ghana. There, rainfall is heavy but seasonal. There is also a dry season which alternates with the rainy season, and during January and February, the influence of the harmattan is felt. Three, there is the coastlands of south-eastern Ghana. This is a dry region sandwiched between the two regions mentioned above. The atmosphere is humid and rainfall is very low. There are two periods of heaviest rainfall which occur just before and after the dry season in July and August. Four, there is the tropical climatic region where the dry and rainy season alternate. In the north of this region, the dry season is longer, the rainy season shorter and the average rainfall less than they are in the south of the region. The rainy season generally begins in May and lasts until September or October. The dry season begins in November and continues until April. Five, the semi-arid climatic region bears resemblance to the further region (mentioned above) but lies far north so that the rainy season is extremely short and rainfall totals low⁸⁶.

The power resources of West Africa as a whole consists of coal and firewood (which are locally produced), imported petroleum products and electricity. A number of countries have hydro-electric power. Gold, diamond, tin, bauxite, iron ores, chromites, asbestos, limestone, marble oil, bitumen, clay, mica, lead, zinc, wolfram, tantalite, monazite, pyrolone, thorite, zircon, fergusonite, silver, feldspar, xenotime, talc, beryl, crude

oil, ilmentine are the mineral resources that West and Central African countries are endowed with. West Africa is the land of Sudanic Negroes. Very little is known of the early history of the West African Negroes before they came under the influence of the Arabs and Berbers from North Africa and later the Europeans. The trajectories of the peoples who have lived in West Africa are as follows. North of the forest in the west were the Tucolor, Serer and Woloff peoples. In the east was the Songhai. Between the Tucolor and the Songhai, the Mande speaking peoples inhabit a vast area between the upper Senegal in the west, the Niger lakes in the east, and the forest in the south. East of Mande-speaking peoples were the ancestors of the peoples who today speak Voltaic or Gur languages – the Mossi, the Dagomba, the Gurma, the Senufo, the Bobo, the Konkomba and others. Not much is known of the peoples east of Songhai and in the forest from the Gambia to the Niger Delta. But most of them – the Akan-speaking people, the Ewe-speaking people, the Yorubas and other coastal peoples of present day West Africa claim to have migrated from the Western Sudan or from North Africa⁸⁷.

Between the 4th and the 19th centuries was a succession of great territorial empires in West Africa, which were established either by invaders from the north or by Negro or semi Negro peoples. Some of them are the Ghana, Sosso, Mali, Songhai, and Kanem Bornu empires. In the forestlands of West Africa, several states were established by various nationalities migrating from the north; the Akans of the Ghana Republic and the Cote d'Ivoire entered from the north-west between the 14th century and the 17th century, and established highly developed democratic forms of government before the Europeans arrived. The Ga and Ewe-speaking people of Ghana, Togo, Dahomey (now Republic of Benin) probably migrated from the south-western part of Nigeria now inhabited by the Yorubas. The Yorubas probably arrived in south-western Nigeria about the 11th century. They established a kingdom which extended from the country they now

occupy to Accra on the West and to the banks of the Niger on the East. By 1810, the Kingdom began to disintegrate until Europeans stepped in. Other states which were established in West Africa between 4th century and the 19th century included Yatenga and Ouagadougou, Dahomey, Port Novo and Benin⁸⁸.

Economically, the West African sub-region is poor. The countries in the sub-region range from very small countries like the Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, Togo, and Benin with small populations, small land masses and poor economies; to medium size countries like Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia, Guinea, Senegal with barely surviving economies; to countries like Mauritania, Mali and Niger with fairly sizeable land mass, tiny population and very poor economies; and to Nigeria with a good size land mass, big population and an economy that is comatose. In general, the sub-region is an agriculture-based economy with very little or no industrial capability⁸⁹. It must be stressed that Nigeria's perception of its role in Africa as one providing leadership places its security boundaries far beyond the contiguous states⁹⁰.

Coupled with that, the sub-region is regarded as a single unit for a number of reasons, one of which is that the states there cannot afford to narrow their perspectives to believing that once their national security is assured, they need not worry about what happens in other countries in that sub region, in particular, and the African continent, in general⁹¹. Second, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has always pointed out that instability in any of the countries in West Africa sub-region necessarily affects the stability of the sub-region and the people as well. Three, the experiences of other regions of the world have proved that economic development can only be promoted in a stable and secure political environment⁹².

Unlike other parts of Africa, the divide between the Anglophone and the Francophone worlds is most sharply defined in West Africa. In spite of the divide, and

because of the pre-colonial ethnic and cultural linkages among the peoples of the sub-region, there exists in West Africa a different set of relationships among the peoples of this region which is largely in contradiction to; and different from the official, European and neo-colonially defined relationships among the governments. Thus, among the indigenous population, there is an insistence on the freedom to move, trade, settle and marry anywhere in the sub-region, over and above what is provided for in the official inter-government protocols⁹³. Evidently, an inter-state relation in West Africa is influenced by its geography and its history. Therefore, understanding the nature and character of the states within the sub-region would be a function of understanding the size, population and the economy of Nigeria within the context of the smaller economies and less densely populated countries of West Africa in one hand. At another, it will be based on the pervasive influence of France in their domestic politics as well as military dependency on France – a tie that is stronger than the relationship which Britain had with the Anglo-phone countries⁹⁴.

Part of the area of Central Africa, which we will be looking at is a fertile area, rich in mineral deposits. For instance, Chad, Cameroon came under the French colonial influence, and Zimbabwe, Angola and part of the Democratic Republic of Congo under the Portuguese colonial influence⁹⁵.

The early history of European contact with West Africa revealed that the West African coastal peoples encountered by the early European traders represented only a small part of the richness and complexity of the region in general. Before the European contact, the region had witnessed the emergence and solidification of a series of ancient African empires and states. These pre-colonial states, Islamic expansion and a strong pre-colonial trade network all contributed to a diverse and complex social environment into which European traders, explorers and missionaries entered, perhaps naively.

The French had established a trade port on the West African coast as early as 1659 at St. Louis (present day Senegal), their participation in West Africa only increased substantially later in the 19th century. Although the French had contact in other areas of coastal West Africa, they were most clearly focussed on the Senegal river area and its hinterland. It was in St. Louis that the French began their colonial project. Throughout that 19th century, the British and the French were at work making contacts and consolidating their interests throughout the interior. At this time, great diversity of political, social, economic and ideological organization existed in West Africa. But the French were then keenly interested in carving for themselves a niche which they hoped would result in economic benefits; hence they sought to bring more and more land in West Africa under their control⁹⁶.

The French 'civilizing mission' in Africa was partly hinged on filling a vacuum created in France since 1890 which was an epoch that France entered into the era of negative population growth rate. So colonization played a significant role in French population politics as well as enhanced commercial exchanges for France. The French colonial policy went beyond idealism to that of utilitarianism with the existence of the 'French family'. Through this arrangement, the French colonies have a feeling of belonging to a family. Indeed, Charles de Gaulle, the erstwhile French President, had since his famous Brazzaville speech of 1940, established a strong father image for countries in the Francophone zone. To countries that were considered to be recalcitrant to the French government then like Reuben of Cameroon, Bakary of Niger Republic, Toure of Guinea, Mba of Gabon, and Keita of Mali, the punishment was loss of power or destabilization of the regimes or even death. The rewards obtained by the states that cooperated with France were French military and political support to remain in power. The French colonial government established a wide network in its former West African

colonies; either through catering for all the requirements of the new African leaders – from security and the military sector to school for their children; thereby establishing a close rapport between the French government and these African colonies⁹⁷.

Since many of these countries are Nigeria's immediate neighbours, this sort of understanding and intimacy creates a lot of concern in Nigeria and the country became worried especially by the French policy in Africa. This becomes more pronounced with the realization that France had developed a reputation as the 'gendarme' or 'police' in these Francophone states of NATO. Coupled with that, France nursed the ambition to be a middle level power with relative autonomy in the international system⁹⁸. In the words of Daniel Bach, "Africa remains the only area of the world where France retains sufficient influence as to guarantee its claims to middle power status in the international system⁹⁹".

France kept its ex-colonies as integral parts of the French nation – this was to Nigeria's chagrin and many Anglophone countries of Africa in general. France had not only succeeded in keeping its empire almost completely intact, it also expanded it elsewhere in Africa. France did not only fuel the Nigerian Civil War aimed at dismembering Nigeria; it also reaped the greatest benefit of the post war oil boom. It is instructive to state here; however, that while some have argued that France was apprehensive of the enormity of Nigeria's size and wealth relative to its former dependencies – that are mainly Francophone West Africa; hence it supported the Biafran secessionists during the Civil War. In this, it was further argued that the French leadership projected that a broken-up Nigeria would balance up West African power configuration in favour of Nigeria's small Francophone neighbours¹⁰⁰. Others have written about France's double standard in the Civil War – where it was stated that France not only gave discrete support for the Biafran secessionist group from the onset of the war, but it also supplied arms to the Federal authorities in Nigeria for more than eleven months. Implicitly, France

switched from purported humanitarian reason (for which it supported the Biafrans) to economic reason (for which it supplied arms to the federal authorities)¹⁰¹.

Furthermore, to maintain a close relationship with the colonies, France secured a special dispensation which involved preferential treatment for them within the EEC framework. It established a special ministry to cater for the former colonies and integrated their financial policies via a tie through the France zone. *Ipsa facto*, France controlled the process of political transition in these ex-colonies. For instance, in Cameroon, it facilitated bringing a more amenable Ahmadu Ahidjo into power in the 1950s and when Ahidjo was no longer co-operating, by doing the biddings of France, he was also eased out of power by the French authority¹⁰². Also in the Republic of Niger, Djibo Bakari was denied his electoral victory in the 1956 elections simply because he was communist inclined and this was not comfortable to France. He was replaced by Diori Hanami. For instance, Senator Bong, special French envoy to Niger in 1958 explained why Djibo Bakari must not be allowed to lead Niger to independence. The Senator was quoted thus:

One must be mad to think that we, the French, shall let Niger go (renaum or opting out of the French Community). In losing Guinea, we lost its wealth. That could be replaced. But if we lose Niger, we lose Algeria and we would open possibilities for Nasser. We would allow the creation of a great Islamic state from Lagos to Algeria's border... Djibo Bakari is not only an agent of international communism; he is also a fanatic Muslim of the Samussiya brotherhood. He is in connivance with Nasser and the English-instigated Nigerian leadership¹⁰³.

France was noted also for its intrusive intervention in the Chadian politics just as it is in many of its former West African colonies, Nigeria's attendance in the annual Franco-African Summit as an observer notwithstanding. France established military co-operation agreements with most of its former colonies. The agreements covered the provision of arms and technical experts, the supply of strategic minerals such as uranium, lithium, hydrocarbons and the establishment of military bases. In Nigeria's neighbourhood

the countries that France had military bases include: CAR, Chad, Cote d' Ivoire, Gabon, among others. Apart from this military presence, France runs the civil and military intelligence – the telex, radio, telephone systems of these countries – this places France at a strategic or vantage point to determine the course of events in these countries. Coupled with that, the French rapid response force – 'Force d' Action Rapide' liaises with French military bases on the African continent and are capable of intervening in any African country just on four or five hours notification¹⁰⁴

It has also been said, however, that in recent years the strictures in most of these agreements and control have been relaxed. For instance, African countries in the 'French family' now have easier access to credit facilities, there are permission to hold a part of their reserves in other foreign currencies, the military agreements have been redrafted to reduce the French control, and the senior echelons of the civil service have been Africanized, yet, Paris influence on these erstwhile colonies is still enormous¹⁰⁵.

At this juncture, it is pertinent to overview the history of the countries that are Nigeria's neighbours in the west and central African flanks. The essence of this is to deepen our understanding of these countries and how they impinge on the Nigerian state in terms of national security.

Benin

The history of Benin was dominated by the kingdom of Abomey. Then known as Dahomey, was administered as part of French West Africa and administratively attached to Senegal from 1886 to 1889. In 1889, it was separated from Senegal along with other French-speaking territories in West Africa. They were constituted into the 'Establishment of Benin' later known as 'Dahomey and its dependencies'. They were administered as part of French colonial administration. In 1946, Dahomey became one of the Overseas Territories of the French Community. On August 1, 1960, she was granted

independence and assumed the status of a sovereign state. Among others, Benin is blessed with minerals resources such as oil and limestone – on which the two cement factories established in the country operate¹⁰⁶.

Cameroon

Cameroon is bordered by some of the countries that share border with Nigeria like the Chad, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea as well as the Atlantic Ocean. Many European countries had a field day exploring Cameroon. The first set of European explorers there were the Portuguese. As far back as 1640, they set up some trading posts at Doula, but they later gave up, then the Germans came. In 1918, as a result of the Versailles Treaty, Cameroon was placed under the mandate of the League of Nations and was divided into two parts; three-fourth of it was under French administration and the rest under British. This was acceptable to the British because the areas which fell to its lot included the developed lands in the southern Cameroon at Bueau and Victoria, where European planters were operating prosperous plantations – flourishing in the nice volcanic soil¹⁰⁷.

After the Second World War, the UN set up the system of trusteeship, taking the place of the old mandate system. On December 13, 1946, the Cameroon Trusteeship Agreement was signed. France administered the part of Cameroon under its mandate as French territory under the control of the UN General Assembly and in conformity with UN charter. In 1946, the French constitution of that date gave the Cameroon a place in the French Union as an Associated Territory. The Cameroon people had the status of French administered persons. Laws applicable to the Cameroon were made by the National Assembly in Paris¹⁰⁸.

The Cameroon was represented in the French parliament by four deputies in the National Assembly, three senators in the Council of the Republic, five advisers in the

Assembly of the French Union, one adviser on the Economic Council. The Representative Assembly of Cameroon was elected by 38,507 voters. It included 24 Cameroonians and 16 French. The assembly dealt with financial, economic and social matters in the country. The Cameroon became a state by the decree of April 16, 1957. It lost its status as an associated territory of the French Union. Its nationals became Cameroon citizens. However, the state of the Cameroon remained under French trusteeship. On June 12, 1958, the Cameroonian legislative assembly requested the French government to grant sovereign independence to the country by January 1, 1960 as well as unification of the two Cameroons (i. e. the British and French portions). This request was granted by the French government and Cameroon became independent on January 1, 1960 and by February 21, 1960, through popular referendum, the first Cameroon constitution was adopted¹⁰⁹.

The southern Cameroon under the British mandate, which is now the western province of the Cameroon Republic, was administered as part of Nigeria by Great Britain until Cameroon became independent. It is also instructive to note that the British government divided the mandate territories into two. The southern portions, with an area of 16,581 square miles, was administered with the southern provinces of Nigeria, while the rest 17,500 square miles in areas, was incorporated with the northern provinces of Nigeria. When Regional Legislative Houses were established in 1947 by the Nigeria (Legislative Council) Order-in-Council 1946, the southern and northern Cameroon became parts of the eastern and northern regions respectively. In fact, in April 1949, a commissioner was appointed for the southern Cameroon who was responsible to the Lieutenant - Governor, eastern region. In 1953, following a constitutional crisis, the southern Cameroon was separated from the eastern region and was constituted into a federal territory with its own legislature. In 1954, the territory became a separate region

within the Nigerian federation with E. M. L. Endeley as Premier. In January 1959, John Foncha won the regional elections on a platform of complete secession of the territory from Nigeria and reunification with the French Cameroon, defeating Endeley's party which favoured continued association with the Nigerian federation¹¹⁰. This historical overlap of the territories and peoples of Nigeria and Cameroon is to have critical implications for the relationship between the two countries. We shall delve into this as this study progresses – especially as it affects the debacle of Bakassi Peninsula.

Cameroon also has oil as the main stay of its economy, accounting for about 60 per cent of foreign exchange earnings. It is also planning to become a gas supplier to Europe through a major pipeline crossing the Sahara and the Straits of Gibraltar – linking with the proposed Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) plant. It also has limestone which supplies a major cement plant servicing northern Nigeria, *inter alia*. It is also mainly an agrarian society – livestock and forestry production¹¹¹.

Equatorial Guinea

Equatorial Guinea comprises the volcanic island of Fernando Po, the Island of Annobon, and adjacent islands (consisting the territory of Fernando Po) and Rio Muni on the mainland which, with the island of Corsico, Elobey Grande and Elobey Chico (constitutes the territory of Rio Muni). The area of Fernando Po is 1241 square kilometres situated in the Bay of Biafra and surrounded by the Atlantic Oceans, it is within 160 kilometres of the ports of Victoria, Douala (in Cameroon) and Calabar (in Nigeria), and 219.2 kilometres from Bata Rio Muni. Rio Muni is bounded in the north by Cameroon, on the east and south by Gabon and the west by the Atlantic Ocean¹¹².

Very little is known of Equatorial Guinea before the advent of the Europeans in the 15th century. It was the Portuguese that first discovered the country followed by Spain. In 1827, Britain occupied Fernando Po but later withdrew when Spain asserted its

claim to the Island. Between 1846 and 1986, there was a conflicting claim to Santa Clara Cape and Rio Muni by Spain, France and Germany which was only settled in 1900 by the Franco-Spanish Treaty of June 27, 1900. Just like the French colonial system, by July 1959 a law was put in place which ensured that the two parts of Spanish Equatorial Guinea ceased to be colonies and became integral parts of Spain, being designated province and having representations in the Spanish parliament. By this, Equatorial Guinea came under the same footing as other provinces of Spain and their inhabitants as other Spaniards. This was on until the Republic Equatorial Guinea was proclaimed an independent state on October 12, 1968¹¹³. Its population then was 60,065¹¹⁴. Today, Equatorial Guinea has a population of 616, 459 people, July 2008 estimate¹¹⁵.

The relations between Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea strained in the early 1970s during the maximum rule of Macias Nguema who brutally suppressed Nigerian migrant workers that were in Equatorial Guinea's cocoa plantation for demanding higher wages¹¹⁶. Following the unfortunate incidence, the Nigerian government recalled the remaining workers from the plantation. Equatorial Guinea has oil explored by French and Spanish companies holding licences to explore it. The economy emerges as one of world's fastest-growing because of oil exploration. Economic development in the country is also based on fishing. Cocoa and coffee which used to be the mainstay of the country's economy have slumped considerably in production after independence in 1968. Agriculture was neglected and the Nigerians and other foreigners who had been aiding development of agriculture were forced to leave the country¹¹⁷.

Niger Republic

It has eight countries surrounding its 5,697 kilometres borders. The longest border is the Nigeria to the south at 1,497 kilometres, followed by Chad to the east (1,175 kilometres), Algeria to the northwest (956 kilometres) and Mali at 821 kilometres. It also

has short borders in its south-western frontier, Burkina Faso at 628 kilometres and Benin Republic at 266 kilometres and to the north-north-east – Libya. The river Niger traverses the territory of the Niger Republic for a distance of 300 kilometres, between the frontier of Mali and that of Nigeria. In addition, part of Lake Chad is situated in the Republic of Niger, in the east¹¹⁸.

Historical knowledge about Niger Republic is relatively scanty due to the absence of written documents. However, Niger of the empires was documented i.e. the Songhai empire of Gao, the Kanem empire, Peul empire and Bornu empire. The kingdom of Sokoto established by Uthman Dan Fodio subjugated the middle Niger and overran the Hausas. These Fodio's successors maintained only relative control and later left the country in disarray until the advent of the European explorers in 1854. The first set of the European explorer that visited Niger were the Germans, followed by the English and the French. As applicable in other colonies, there were conflicting claims by the European explorers to different parts of the Niger. In fact, the Anglo-French agreement which dated back to August 5, 1890 hindered French expansion by establishing Nigeria's northern frontier along Say-Baroua boundary line. But by 1898, the establishment of French authority was organised. By 1906, a new Anglo-French agreement was signed – establishing the frontier between Nigeria and the French authority until 1919. By August 3, 1960, the Republic of Niger became independent from French colonial rule¹¹⁹.

Niger's major mineral resource is uranium. It also has two major deposits of phosphates, substantial coal deposit and limestone and salt. It is a landlocked country and its closest access to the sea is 600 kilometres from its southern border. Nearly 90 per cent of the population is concentrated along the southern border. 12 per cent of the land is arable. Rainfall is limited and irregular. The economy has traditionally been dominated by subsistence agriculture with millet and sorghum taking up 80 per cent of the cultivated

area. Livestock also provide an important source of income and export receipts. Except during the Sahelian drought periods, the country has been self-sufficient in staple food production, despite its limited agriculture resource base. Since the discovery of large uranium deposits in the late 1960s, it has become the country's principal foreign exchange earner and a major source of government revenues. This was the situation until the uranium boom ended in the early 1980s¹²⁰.

Strong trade links exist between Niger, France and neighbouring African countries, especially Nigeria, which exert considerable economic influence through its traditional trading and cultural links. The past economic performance of Niger exhibited all the features of a typical resources-poor Sahelian country until discovery of uranium¹²¹.

Liberia

It has an area of 43,000 squares with an unbroken coastline of 350 miles. It is bounded in the west by Sierra Leone, in the east by Cote d' Ivoire, in the north by Republic Guinea, and on the south by the Atlantic Ocean. It has three geographical regions: the coastland, the plateau region, and the highlands. The coastlands are low areas constantly watered by lagoons and numerous tidal creeks full with a variety of fishes. Liberia was actually established as an asylum in West Africa for oppressed Negroes from the US, who had been freed from slavery. The band of American pioneers looking for a suitable place of settlement for the Negroes in West Africa sited the Mesurado bay (now called the Mesurado river), and were attracted by the serene of verdant scenery there, they then anchored offshore on December 11, 1821. On January 7, 1822 they occupied the little island at the mouth of the river and after three months and eighteen days on this island, they moved to the mainland on April 25, 1822. The settlement on the mainland was first called 'Christopolis' or 'City of Christ', but the name was changed by February

1824 to 'Monrovia' in honour of James Monroe, the fifth American President – who gave his protection and assistance to their efforts¹²².

By treaties and purchases, as early as 1838, the colonists had acquired political rights to all that portion of land in addition to territories some forty miles interior-ward. As they acquired new territories, they formed new settlements along the coast and in the interiors. Governor J. J. Roberts was elected in October 1847 as the first president on the Republic and thus became the father of the nation¹²³. Although the country is endowed with diamond, rubber, timber, and gold, over dependence on iron-ore exports for revenue is the root cause of Liberia's economic crisis just as did the increase of oil prices at the world market, military seizure of power in 1980 and mounting debt burden¹²⁴.

Sierra Leone

It is bounded in the west and north by the Republic of Guinea and in the east by Liberia. In area, it is 27,925 square miles. The country is well watered by a network of rivers and streams, the name Sierra Leone – the 'Lion Mountains' was given to the huge bay on the west coast of Africa by Pedro da Contra – a Portuguese who sailed into it in 1460. In 1787, Granville Sharp, a leader in the campaign against slaves trading planned a new settlement in Sierra Leone as a home for slaves freed in England. In 1788, the African Temne King Naimbaba and his subordinate chiefs sold and ceded a portion of land of the north Sierra Leone peninsula to Captain John Taylor of his Britannic majesty's Brigadier Miro, on behalf of the "free community of settlers, the heirs and successors, lately arrived from England and the protection of the British Government¹²⁵".

One hundred and fifty-one of the 1,500 freed slaves then in England sailed from Portsmouth in 1787. In 1792, Lieutenant John Clarkson, who was appointed the first Governor of Freetown, brought from Nova Scotia, 1,131 Africans who had fought for the British government in the American War of Independence. Governor Clarkson persuaded

the original settlers to join the newcomers "to found Freetown"¹²⁶. In 1794, the new town was sacked by the French and raided by people from the interior, though it eventually recovered from the attacks of the French and the interior. In 1808 the settlement was taken over by the British government as a crown colony. Most of the slaves freed from England and other parts of Europe chose to remain in Sierra Leone. The liberated Africans – 'Creoles' as they were later called – came from all parts of Africa. By 1861, through treaties of cession, the colony had been extended to include the whole of the Sierra Leone peninsula, Sherbo island and various other small islands. In 1896, the surrounding territory was declared a British protectorate and the boundaries with the French territories were defined. Sierra Leone became an independent sovereign nation on April 27, 1961 with Sir Maurice Henry Dorman as governor-general and Sir Milton Margai as prime minister¹²⁷.

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Chapter Four

The Nature of Threat to Nigeria's National Security

This chapter is divided into three parts. The first attempts a definition of national security, its geo-strategic context, and its expansive nature in today's world. The nature of governance and the issue of national security in Nigeria are also examined. The second part analyses borders, the nature and character of African communities prior to colonialism, the arbitrary boundary demarcation by the colonisers and the dynamics of security problems arising from the arbitrary nature of these boundaries. The third part focuses on France and why it is characterized as an 'extra-neighbour'. It also explores the national security implications of the large looming French factor in Nigeria's relations with its neighbours.

4.1 National Security – Towards an Understanding

The term national security has been used by politicians as a rhetorical phrase and often in a manner that is lacking in depth. It has been used by military leaders to describe a policy objective. It has been adopted by social scientists to refer to both an analytical concept and a field of study. Modern social scientists talk of the concept in terms of 'the ability of a nation to protect its internal values from external threats'. The field of study therefore encompasses attempts to analyze the manner in which nations plan, make and evaluate the decisions and policies designed to increase this ability¹. At least in the United States of America (US), the origin of the concept could be found in different historical formulations of national interest. Walter Lippman was the first to define national security explicitly to mean that a nation is secure to the extent that "it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by war². In behavioural study and system analysis, Morton Kaplan showed that national security is one important aspect of the problem of system maintenance³.

To the US in the post war years, it became clear that military matters could no longer be dealt with in a vacuum but had to be closely tied to political and economic considerations. This was at a time when technological advancement and advent of atomic weapons came to threaten international relations. It was also a time when it became clear that there were some obvious administrative deficiencies which adversely affected the war efforts and the plan for post war years. That was the time when national security developed as a distinct academic field of study. The 1947 National Security Act was passed by the US Congress to put in place procedures, departments, agencies and functions that speak to national security. The Act established National Security Council and Office of Special Assistant to the President on National Security Affairs.

The maintenance of international system becomes a legitimate goal of national security policy i.e. national security focuses on the underlying unity of the internal and external activities of states – by explicitly recognizing that external behaviour is an integral part of total behaviour pattern of national security. Therefore, national security as a field of study should incorporate the ideas of researchers in other countries working on similar problem. That way, the discipline will not be rigidly tied to immediate American security needs.

Thus, national security is the measure taken by a state to ensure its survival and safety. It includes the deterrence of attack, from within and without, as well as the protection and well being of citizens. The measures taken to ensure national security include the following:

- the maintenance of armed forces
- civil defence measures and emergency preparedness
- attempts to create resilience and redundancy in national infrastructure
- the maintenance of intelligence services to detect threats

- the protection of classified information⁴

After the September 11, 2001 attack on some US targets by the Islamic fundamentalists, the impression that the US was free from any national security threat was shattered. Thus, national security as an issue in strategic thinking came to receive more deserving attention not only in the US, but also in the world at large. For instance, the US administration sees Acquired Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) crisis in Africa as a threat to its national security simply because it can lead to economic collapse, political instability and civil wars that might require its intervention. The then US Vice President Al Gore has raised similar fears and that of global warming in what he called 'new security agenda'⁵.

This kind of paradigm shift especially from a key player in the international system facilitates a change from the Cold War mindset when national security was seen only in the most conventional sense. What is now so prominent in Africa is the evident paradigm shift on the meaning of national security away from its traditional conception as highlighted above. There is a focus on 'human security' – which includes protection from threats such as hunger, disease and repression and against sudden and violent disturbances in the way of life. Security now pertains to people rather than territories and development rather than military alone. Indeed, security could be characterized to include the preservation of all that the society considers to be important and valuable. The safety of individuals and groups from physical harm, guarantee for conditions of life that is peaceful and satisfying, preservation of the economic and environmental values and protection of individuals or groups from arbitrary and coercive rule – all of which are considerable departure from narrow definition of security – which focus solely on the use and control of military force by the state⁶.

A growing threat to national security comes from the failure of nations – the nature of which this paper addresses. This threat emerges from the persistence of destabilizing conditions and weak governance. For instance, if there is no more threat of Communism, nations fall to home-grown warlords; our markets vanish as a result of civil wars and as such our economic potentials have been endangered; ethnic cleansing goes on unabated in different parts of the world with consequent violation of international law and a threat to global and national security. Furthermore, tribal machetes take a million lives in Rwanda which is no less a defeat for human spirit than million deaths from artillery and starvation on the frontlines of the civil war in Afghanistan. Coupled with that are the accumulated effluents from burning rainforests and teeming urban centres in the developing world, hordes of refugees, as well as subversion carried out by international mafias and drug cartels that push aside weak and failing governments⁷. What this boils down to is that national security could be threatened even in the absence of missiles and bombers. At this juncture, it is apposite to quote what Brian Alwood the US Agency for International Development administrator said:

If people in Africa are forced from their homes by conflict, Americans become less secure. We have to feed them or turn our backs. We have to try to restore order or stand aside while chaos spreads. If millions live in poverty, we who live in this global economy are the poorer for their suffering. If rural migrants overwhelm the cities by the tens of millions, we must breathe the air they pollute and drink the water they foul. Their disease will find us. Their miseries will envelope us⁸.

It is instructive to note that today the international community is spending over \$4 billion a year on 42 million refugees and displaced persons. This is twice what was spent in 1980. Furthermore, \$5.4 billion was spent in 1993 alone on peacekeeping –which is more than the forty-five previous years combined. Several acres of forest have also been lost as a result of human activities. The world's population grows by 90 million people

every year. By 2015 we will be attempting to manage a world with 2 to 2.5 billion people⁹.

The summary of the foregoing is that one essence of a nation's national security is to safeguard its national values. Most fundamental of this value is survival and self preservation. In this, the state and military power is the basic focus. But this notion has to change in view of daily economic imbalances, environmental degradation, terrorism and weapon proliferation, international health concerns, international migration and shifting demography. Yet some countries still stick to tired models of national security. Therefore, a redefinition of national security not only requires a mere military projection, but also requires environmental security, economic well being, international health and demography and the totality of good governance¹⁰.

However, the following observation is pertinent on the expanded definition of security. First, the concept of security becomes all-inclusive and is thereby emptied of content. Second, there is lack of explicit attention on other spheres of what security should connote which in turn makes its expansion appropriate. Third, there is a lack of political effort on 'security' as traditionally defined¹¹.

But all these were faulted because it was argued elsewhere that it is quite fallacious to view threats to human security simply in terms of protection from military violence. It is a statement of fact that security of the state is not necessarily synonymous with the security of everybody living within the state. In international politics, sometimes one country or group's national security can be another country or group's insecurity. The apartheid system, which dominated South African politics for nearly 50 years, is a case in point. In this case, nationhood there and then was racially defined. The state legally validated the white inhabitants of South Africa as sovereign right-bearing subjects who

experienced their liberty and the protection of their rights by the state, whereas, the blacks were sidelined¹².

The redefinition of security does not mean that one is denying or ignoring the continuing importance of military security. However, the redefinition places the poor, the disadvantaged, the voiceless, the under-represented, and the powerless at the core of security. Economic security is by far more real and an immediate threat to national security than interstate wars. This broader conception of security focuses variously or indeed interchangeably, on the individual, on security, on civil society, on community, on the continuing integrity of ethnic or cultural groups and on global society. This way, the course and practice of security are primarily concerned with the struggle for human emancipation¹³.

This could be illustrated with the fact that for global citizens to enjoy stability and security there must be an enforceable legal order, an open and inclusive economic order and global welfare in all its aspects (such as access to health, a clean environment, education, etc). These are global public goods to which everybody should have access. Irrespective of the country of the world, whether developed or developing, the different global public goods are inherently related; they can only be fully enjoyed if one has access to all of them¹⁴. In the globalized world, too large a gap exists between the 'haves' and the 'have-nots' in terms of access to global public goods. Undoubtedly, this poses an ultimate systemic threat to Europe's security and those of other Western countries because a certain level of inequality in the polity, the resulting political instability, extremism, economic unpredictability and massive migration flows will become uncontrollable¹⁵.

It is increasingly becoming clear in this age of globalization that one of the best protections for security in the world today is a world of well-governed democratic states. In this event, spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing

with corruption and abuse of power establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are best means of strengthening the international order. There is no gainsaying the fact that, even if indirectly, chronic tension, the long standing disputes and conflicts, failed states and civil wars, proliferation of weapon of mass destruction, excessive militarization and terrorism affect global security, and this time, the Western world too¹⁶.

What is required in this context is to improve the mechanism and institutions of global governance and alleviate specific conflict or humanitarian situation by supporting the UN and the associated multilateral bodies. In the process, there would be an early warning or attention co-ordinated by the Security Council as soon as a state or groups of states refuse to live up to their commitments towards their neighbours and the international community either by violating non-proliferation agreement, or by actively supporting terrorists groups or illegal use of force. The action co-ordinated by the Security Council should include coercive measure, that is, as a last resort, the legitimate authorization of military intervention – this strategy is known as effective multilateralism¹⁷. As a corollary to this, there is need for strategic partnership between developed West and developing countries which should focus on governance, conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction, with particular attention to countries that emerged from conflict. This partnership could begin the series of partnership with UN agencies¹⁸.

After the end of the Cold War and the decline in the threat of a conventional military attack on the West, what the West conceives as security threats to their peoples and national security are drug trafficking, organised crime, terrorism, trans-border crime, illegal immigration, asylum seekers and minority ethnic groups. But this kind of conception has its own pitfalls, namely, it is too emphatic, it links very too many activities, it involves undue profiling of groups and criminalisation of illegal immigrants. Others have criticized this elastic usage of security for being unable to specify a clear

criterion for security. Without such specificity it becomes difficult to prevent everything from being defined as security¹⁹.

Robert S. McNamara, a former US Secretary of Defence and former West Bank President, argued that:

In modernising social, security means development. Security is not military hardware though it may include it; security is not military force, though it may involve it; security is no traditional military activity, though it may encompass it. Security is development, and without development, there can be no security²⁰.

This underlines an attempt at de-emphasizing the overriding importance attached to state security. It looks beyond force towards the creation of enabling environment that will allow the citizenry achieve maximum satisfaction from the society that expects them to contribute to its development. It should be stressed that there is a linkage between disarmament and development. For instance, an increase in defence expenditure, especially in modernising societies would not only affect the flow of money spent on socio-economic development activities but also affect massive weapon procurement and production activities for both conventional and nuclear weapons from the developed countries. Same way an increase in defence spending would seriously affect the flow of funds meant as aid and development assistance to the developing countries²¹.

In Nigeria, for example, part of the problem of insecurity is that vast majority of its citizens live in the rural areas where the impact of government is either nil or very minimal. Consequently, there are unemployment or under-employment, lack of adequate educational and healthcare facilities, lack of descent housing, clean portable water and inadequate and inefficient public utilities. This problem has been compounded by inefficient management and co-ordination of resources and efforts, misplaced priorities, over-centralization of the decision making process, political instability and corruption. As a result of the foregoing, there is a high level of cynicism people feel towards

government, its functionaries and policies. What is needed therefore is the need to improve on the psychological security so as to enhance Nigeria's security environment²².

A person alienated is less motivated to get involved in the development process and will likely distrust the outcome of any programme²³. This then becomes a security problem. National security must be conceived as a dynamic and practical instrument for national integration and the creation of a favourable domestic environment for rapid development and transformation and ultimately protection against external threats. National security, in this context, is trying to create national and international conditions favourable to the protection of vital national values against existing and potential adversaries²⁴.

Experience has shown in Nigeria that many military regimes have tended to always explain away most of their actions on the grounds of national security, such that they safely tuck their illogical actions under the guise of national security²⁵. In a state-centric security system, what features prominently, for example, is a heavy reliance on decrees and special tribunals to regulate public life and punish offenders. This was what obtained in Nigeria during the military rule of Generals Muhammadu Buhari and Ibrahim Babangida. Buhari took over the reign of government through military coup d'état in December 31, 1983, and by July 1984, he had issued twenty-two decrees, including two retroactive ones – prescribing death penalty for arson, drug trafficking, oil smuggling and currency counterfeiting²⁶.

Ibrahim Babangida's regime took many measures to mitigate Buhari's draconian rule, including abolition (in July 1986) of the death sentence under Decree number 20 of 1984 for illegal ship bunkering and drug trafficking. He also set up an appeal tribunal for persons convicted under decrees 2 and 3 of 1984. However, he continued the Armed Robbery and Firearms Tribunal under which most of the death

sentences were carried out without appeal. By early 1987, more than 300 people had been executed after conviction by these tribunals, and in 1988 another 85 executions were known to have been carried out under their sentences²⁷. Between 1983 and 1987, Nigeria imported military materials valued at US \$ 1.5 billion from about ten major suppliers – more than any other African states²⁸.

For so many years, the following have stood out as threats to Nigeria's national security:

- Depressing state of economy and the consequent erosion of morale and standard of living.
- Manipulation of trade unionism in a manner that can subvert national objectives and aspirations.
- Armies of hungry citizens.
- High inflation rate at a time of low earning.
- Acute unemployment that could be manipulated by internal and external forces.
- Criminal acts, for example, fake invoicing, smuggling, hoarding, foreign exchange racketeering, bunkering, advance free fraud (a.k.a 419)
- Local terrorism – assassination of political opponents, arson and other form of violence.
- Socio-cultural problems; tribalism, corruption, high crime rate, communal strife, boundary disputes, chieftaincy disputes, urbanization, religious fanaticism, and organized youth unrest.
- Lack of cohesion between/among the national elites cum leadership crisis²⁹.

It is fruitful, therefore, to sum up this section by alluding to Aforika Nweke's definition of national security:

The national security question is a complex of political, legal, social, economic, ideological and military problems. It is not just defence

*against internal and external threats, but the strengthening of the foundation of the political, economic, abolition of all forms of internal injustices and ethno-social inequality... all round development based on freedom and self reliance and ... self-sufficiency in food, industrial and military production*³⁰.

4.2 Boundaries and Territories in Nigeria's Relations with its Neighbours

"Could nations be forged out of the artificial units left over from colonialism, the results of historical accidents, with unnatural boundaries drawn by European powers in their scramble for land?"³¹

The above poser by Walter Schwarz is quite germane to our understanding of the nature and character of boundaries in Nigeria's relations with its neighbours. This is why sufficient attempt will be made to examine this theme. But before then, we shall briefly examine what borders are in the context of national security.

Borders are artificially constructed, geographic or astronomic lines that form the boundary of a nation. Within this delimited boundary, a nation exercises power and jurisdiction and carries out its activities. Also in exercising its sovereign right within this boundary, the central government can control, restrict and totally ban the unauthorised movement of goods and people across such lines³².

African tribes enjoyed relative peace/coherence before the advent of the Europeans. Most African trading communities did not have lines separating them as boundaries, tribes existed as distinct cultural and political groups and they were living side by side. What could be characterized as 'frontiers of contact'. The Yoruba states and Dahomey in West Africa, Buganda and its East African neighbours are perfect examples³³. The other types of trading frontiers are those of "separation". Here, communities are separated by a buffer zone over which neither side claimed or exercise any authority - examples of such buffer zones are unhealthy forest and deserts. The states of Central Sudan, Bornu, Maradi and the Fulani empires are examples. The third type is where we could concretely talk of 'enclaves' rather than frontiers as seen in regions

where there are overlapping diverse groups – the Masais, the Tuaregs and similar nomadic groups. In this type of categorization, frontiers are not static. Territories that were not traditionally theirs were acquired in quick succession³⁴.

In Africa, the conventional European definition does not fit, because there were instances of diverse and interlocking of diverse tribes. The migration of segments of one tribe and their mingling with or absorption by other ethnic groups produced considerable complexity. In the process, new communities and new languages have emerged³⁵.

*Tribes roll one upon another like the waves of the sea, and these human currents intermingle to form fresh combinations discernible*³⁶.

In fact, in the 19th century there were hardly any neighbouring groups which did not indulge in either small or large scale warfare. Hence, in Africa there is no uniform political, linguistic and cultural pattern. It was a continent of a constant changing variety. The diplomats in London, Paris and Berlin merely relied on the information they got from treaties with native states, the accounts of European travellers and the personal reports of local European agents, or in colonial parlance, ‘the-men-on-the-spot’ to demarcate African boundaries. What obtains in this mix-up is that some of the native rulers have not been accurate while some of their accounts are doubtful or confused; this is akin to the accounts given by those categorised as ‘the-men-on-the-spot’. Furthermore, some European travellers who claimed to have visited various parts of the continent provided neither objective nor accurate scientific report of the boundary situations there³⁷.

Another major factor that influenced the imperialists was the ‘theory of hinterland’ and ‘effective occupation’. The British and the French were in bitter competition to acquire territories in Africa, as much as possible and each of them were doing all to out-compete each other. They were keen not to lose their faces or their national honour, irrespective of the structure of the indigenous communities. On the

hinterland theory, since the conquest of different parts of African by the European imperialists was done from the coast, they were preoccupied with securing the hinterland as well – an exercise that will put paid to their hold on the coast. Further more, stringent tariff policy, put in place by the French authorities in their areas of influence (in the colonies) called for apprehension on the part of British traders and it is this fiscal consideration that led to the insistence of the British traders that their government should also be seriously involved in claiming for them the hinterland in its existing area of influence in the colonies. Hence, during the subsequent negotiations, Britain made securing an access to navigable portions of the River Niger a serious factor. In the final analysis, no European power was willing to sacrifice or upset European peace simply to preserve the territorial integrity or the political structure of an African state – as was made obvious in their boundary negotiations/demarcations in Africa. Coupled with that, African indigenous boundaries/frontiers were characterized by unspeakable fluidity³⁸.

At independence, African states cannot, in the strictest sense, be called nation states, because they do not embrace one people with common language, a common past, and a common culture. They were arbitrary creations of alien diplomats. What obtained was a heritage of artificially contrived borderline. As a result, there were unstoppable stirring of irredentist claims especially by groups whose traditional frontiers have been impinged upon and those that are dissatisfied by the 'new' international boundaries³⁹.

No doubt, all political boundaries are artificial because they are demarcated by man. The accidents of history, the vagaries of geography and exigencies of economies have all played a part in determining the emergence of African boundaries thereby making them truly artificial. This is because unlike European boundaries, African boundaries did not evolve out of age-long efforts of the local peoples. The European colonizers were not only arbitrary in demarcating African boundaries, they were also

arranged precipitately. They were keen on selfish gains rather than weighing the consequences of disrupting ethnic groups and undermining the indigenous political order⁴⁰.

The arbitrariness and artificiality of African boundaries can even be underlined by a statement made by Lord Salisbury, the erstwhile British Prime Minister, who remarked after signing the Anglo-French convention of 1890 which foreshadowed the international boundary between Nigeria, Dahomey (now Republic of Benin), Niger and the Chad Republic that:

We have been engaged in drawing lines upon maps where no white man's foot ever trod: we have been giving away mountains and rivers and lakes to each other, only hindered by the small impediment that we never knew exactly where the mountains and rivers and lakes were⁴¹.

Another could be seen in the words of a British former Commissioner and Consul-General who played an active part in the drawing of the boundary between Nigeria and what is today Western Cameroon. In his speech to the Royal Empire Society, he said:

In those days we just took a blue pencil and a ruler, and we put it down just at old Calabar, and drew that blue line to Yola... I recollect thinking when I was sitting having an audience with the Emir (of Yola), surrounded by his tribe, that it was a very good thing that he did not know that I, with a blue pencil, had drawn a line through his territory⁴².

For these reasons, even European writers on African Affairs did not spare European diplomats and soldiers that were involved in demarcating African boundaries for their arbitrariness. For instance, the Hilton Young's Commission on Closer Union in Eastern and Central Africa concluded that:

The boundaries separating the territories are the effect of historical accident and not of any reasoned plan. They have grown up piecemeal as a result of the labours of the early traveller, who wandered at large, and of international diplomacy in search of rough-and-ready compromises. ... and with little knowledge of geographical conditions and less of ethnographical⁴³.

Boundaries dispute have arisen in many instances in Europe because 'too much history is remembered'. The precarious contrast in Africa is, if too much true history is remembered, it is certainly safer and better than fictitious history based on generalizations or on popular traditions of conquest, unity and greatness in the past which is no longer politically significant or relevant even long before the Europeans appeared on the African scene⁴⁴.

Evidently the international boundaries separating Nigeria from its neighbours were the creation of alien diplomats. Within the boundaries are large ethnic groups speaking innumerable and mutually unintelligible languages and distinct history and culture. The idea of unity within Nigeria and the awareness that the country shall eventually evolve to be a corporate national entity are concepts of recent growth which up till now is yet to take deeper roots. Hence, boundaries which demarcate an artificial state are in themselves arbitrary – because ethnic groups were in many places disrupted. Today, there are Bokin and Ekoi groups in Nigeria and in the Cameroon Republic; there are Yoruba speaking peoples in Dahomey (Republic of Benin) and in Nigeria; Hausa speaking peoples predominate in the Republic of Niger and in northern Nigeria⁴⁵. These were predicated on the fact that the European explorers that eventually partitioned Africa were mainly concerned with acquisition of territories for profitable economic exploitations. Hence the control of trade routes and collection of custom duties were of paramount importance to the Europeans then. Also acquisition of territories with little or no reference to physical, political and ethnological facts was also of utmost importance to the Europeans⁴⁶. Whereas, while referring to boundary relations in Europe, it was pinpointed that war could never settle a boundary problem because there:

A frontier is a compromise – it has to be a compromise. When the many tribes of Europe settled down, they did so indiscriminately – they had no thought of modern political conditions⁴⁷.

Therefore, African boundaries need a calm and dispassionate consideration of the past and present factors involved. For instance, Nigeria lies between latitudes four degree north and fourteen degree north. It is bounded in the north by the Sahara desert and in the south by the Gulf of Guinea – an arm of the Atlantic Ocean. The history of the region is featured with many waves of human movements from across the Sahara. In the course of these types of migration, there have been displacement and intermingling of peoples. Outside the delta and the coastal swamps and creeks, the Nigerian landmass consists essentially of a low plateau of about 600 metres (2,000 feet) above sea level. Except in the rugged range of hills along the Nigerian-Cameroon borders, there is no major physical barrier to the easy movement of people⁴⁸.

Pre-colonial movements of population across the Cameroon-Adamawa ranges were very restricted, and both the people of Oron and the Ekoi groups of the Cross River basin, who claim to have come from the Cameroons, appear to have entered Nigeria from the sea and from the Cross River gap respectively. By contrast, the western and northern borderlands of Nigeria which consist of open plains have presented no obstacles to large scale movements of people and armies. These plains have permitted easy passage on foot and horseback. It is largely due to the absence of major physiographic barriers and the consequent ready spread of people that the political boundaries of Nigeria (as indeed most African countries) have come to be regarded as 'artificial'. Extensive plains dotted with numerous hills characterised the plateau surfaces of Nigeria. Therefore, movement between the peoples of the northern and western borderlands of Nigeria has been relatively easy and regular – simply because of the absence of physical barriers. Movement across national boundaries in West Africa has been equally easy due to cultural ties. This explains why contacts and movements between the Hausas of Nigeria

and Niger Republic may be greater than contacts between the Hausa of Nigeria and the Jukuns of Nigeria⁴⁹.

The exploration of West Africa by Europeans was begun by the Portuguese in the 15th century. They were joined in the 16th century by the English and the French and later by the Dutch and the Germany. From that time until the 19th century, the four European countries engaged in a keen competition for trade in West Africa. The nature of the trade was in human beings as well as in mineral and agricultural products. It was the trade that led to colonization, the conclusion of treaties with chiefs and the conquest of hostile African states, resulting in regrouping of the people of West Africa into new geographical boundaries. The 19th century saw the European scramble for colonies in West Africa, and by the beginning of the 20th century the whole of West Africa except Liberia was under the rule or protection of European powers. Then France was controlling 2,850,000 square kilometre of West Africa – this was nine times the size of France itself, Britain – 780,000 square kilometre, Germany 52,800 square kilometre – (Togoland) and 320,000 square kilometre – (Cameroon); and Portugal 22,400 square kilometre. At the end of the First World War, Germany's possessions were ceded to Britain and France as mandated territories⁵⁰.

Africa was badly partitioned because, as earlier mentioned, African boundaries were arbitrarily drawn with little or no regard for pre-existing socio-economic patterns and networks and are, therefore, artificial. These boundaries have led to erratic separation of unified cultural areas and a fragmentation of coherent natural planning regions and ecosystems; such that a great deal of Africa's current economic problems have stemmed from the division of territories into a large number of competitive, rather than complementary, national economies. Consequently, much of the continent's current political problems have originated from the arbitrary nature of the colonial boundaries.

Most modern state formation processes in Africa have thus given rise to territorial absurdities such as partitioned seas, lakes, rivers, mountains, valleys, forest, and deserts. As a result, there is the emergence of ethnic or national minorities, with the attendant problem of irredentism and the more alarming practice of 'ethnic cleansing'. In fact, state frontiers have aggravated existing disputes and conflicts within and between states⁵¹.

In fact, Daniel Bach is of the view that, in Africa, more than elsewhere in the globe, the imposition of boundary lines has clearly had disastrous economic, social and human consequences. It has not only imposed severe physical impediments to the unification of some territories, it has also placed resources constraints on some regions due to an unfavourable ecological and human environment. Worse still, some have had to face the inextricable problem of being landlocked⁵².

For instance, France ruled two enormous territories in West and Equatorial Africa but chose to disengage from them having created them merely into eleven independent territories in spite of their enormity before the disengagement. Some of these territories are not viable because their boundaries cut across lines that were frequented by migrants. These boundaries, fixed at the whims and caprices of colonial powers, have produced the phenomenon in which the founding President of Zambia, lost election after ruling for twelve years only to discover that his right to Zambian citizenship is being questioned. Also the opposition leader in Cote d'Ivoire was denied the right to contest for the presidency of Cote d'Ivoire on the ground that he did not qualify as a citizen⁵³. The same goes for some political figures of northern extraction in Nigeria. For example, Alhaji Shugaba Darman, a member of the Borno State House of Assembly was accused of constituting a nuisance to the Government of the day and was deported to Chad Republic as a prohibited immigrant⁵⁴.

Before the emergence of modern states in Africa in the late 19th century, following the European partition of the continent, much of the continental landscape was dominated by either city-state, free republic or empires whose fortune, like their boundaries, fluctuated with ease. The dominant pattern of interaction among the several and disparate political entities which occupied the geographical zone of the present day Nigeria and its neighbours was one of internecine warfare as these groups jostled for territorial and political supremacy⁵⁵. In short, the endemic instability which arose as a result of this complex mix of inter and intra-ethnic warfare and inter-state rivalries was to unleash successive waves of immigrants upon the sub-region – thus rendering superfluous any permanent claims to territorial allegiance by these groups of peoples⁵⁶.

Within the framework of systematic behaviour of states, self protection, even by means of force, is one of the cardinal roles of the state. The protection of boundaries and of territorial integrity, of territorial waters, of ships at sea, and of citizens travelling or engaged in commerce in other states are the traditionally recognised function of a state. It is within the systemic behaviour of a state, and so governed by widely accepted conventions that serious problems do not usually arise. Reciprocity and co-ordination are widespread in connection with defence of territorial interests. Preservation of states interests by action within territorial boundaries is basically the function of protection of society against undesirable change, especially change initiated from outside. A stable international society, in which each unit is in a condition of peace with all other units, becomes unstable or potentially unstable immediately any change occurs, at least until adjustments are made⁵⁷.

For instance, in an event of conflict, the roles of citizens whose activities are into export and import of goods become altered, and probably altered in ways that are unacceptable to some units within the system. Usually, retaliation and cumulative self-

enforcing trends becomes established leading to escalation of the conflict, and to accumulation of adjustments required in the structure of international society. In such times of conflict, the protection of state interest acquired an aggressive characteristic. It must be said that the protection of state interests by action within territory boundaries now extends beyond economic interest; it includes protection of the state's structure, cultural, and its philosophies⁵⁸.

Nigeria's land neighbours (Republic of Benin, Niger, Chad and Cameroon) are Francophone countries with substantial French presence and control. The borders between Nigeria and these countries were drawn arbitrarily during the colonial conquest and at borderline; the ethnic groups have been arbitrarily cut into two. The border communities have however become mindless of this colonial division and separation – such that cousins, spouses and friends alike on either side continue to have their normal social and economic exchanges, irrespective of the juridical line of division. The porous nature and the ethnic composition of the borders pose a number of potential problems for Nigeria, namely:

- Ethnic irredentism.
- Refugee influx and arms traffic in case of civil wars in neighbouring countries like Chad Republic.
- Subversion with the use of neighbouring countries as bases.

Since some extra-African powers like France maintain their presence and control in these countries that are sharing borders with Nigeria, French support for any of these possibilities could have serious national security implications for Nigeria⁵⁹.

Nigeria southern limit is set by the Gulf of Guinea (Bights of Benin and Biafra); its inland frontiers are shared with Cameroon (east); Chad (north-east); Niger (north); and Benin (west). There is no demarcation reached regarding Nigeria-Chad-

Niger-Cameroon boundary in Lake Chad, hence the series of disputes⁶⁰. It should be said that Nigeria has cordial relationship with all its neighbours – Benin, Niger, Chad, Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea – as well as with other countries in West African sub-region, with most of which it had bilateral agreements. There have been occasional border disputes with Chad and Cameroon, and military action against these neighbours was contemplated by the civilian government in 1982 and 1983. Another problem arose in the early 1980s when Nigeria decided to expel many illegal immigrants, mainly Ghanaians, but this dispute also was resolved amicably. The guiding principle of good neighbourliness and friendship has helped to resolve conflicts between Liberia and Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso and Mali, and Togo and Ghana. Nigeria tries to make its neighbours 'safe' friends, partly to reinforce boundary claims and to protect human rights of Nigerian citizens who are migrant workers and partly to stabilize relations between the immediate neighbouring countries. For example, it has established a strong presence in Equatorial Guinea since 1988⁶¹.

Nigeria's relative wealth and particularly the oil wealth of the 1970s was a magnet for alien migrant labourers, many of whom entered illegally from the neighbouring states. Relations with these workers were tense and marked by two large-scale expulsions. The first was in 1983 – when all foreigners illegally residing and working in the country were ordered to leave within a matter of weeks. Most of them had entered under the ECOWAS protocol on free movement of people and goods but had overstayed. At least 1.3 million West Africans – mainly from Niger, Chad, Cameroon and Ghana were expelled despite international protests. A second campaign to expel 70,000 illegal aliens took place in 1985, but it was not clear how many were actually repatriated⁶².

In sum, Nigeria's experience of incursion from its neighbours, coupled with fears of foreign influence or of subversion of neighbours by such potential adversaries as France, Libya and South Africa have combined to heighten Nigeria's sensitivities about border security. Border security with each of its neighbours is a constant source of problem for Nigeria. The Nigeria-Benin Joint Border Commission was reactivated in 1981 to deal with minor incursion by Benin troops and with increased smuggling into Nigeria. In 1986, in response to increasing clashes between communities along the Benin border, Nigeria decided to establish about 100 additional border posts staffed by customs and immigration officials. It has been noted that proper border demarcation would help control smuggling, illegal aliens, and harassment of people. In April 1989, Nigeria surveyed the 773 kilometre border with Benin⁶³.

Illegal immigrants and smuggling from Niger Republic, with which Nigeria shared 1,497 kilometre border equally poses perennial problems. For instance, in April 1984, Nigeria recalled all its existing currency notes in exchange for new notes. It was meant to pre-empt the return of the old currency, much of which had been smuggled out of the country, and also meant to establish a new baseline for Nigeria's financial system that could be easily monitored. In order to prevent the re-entry of the smuggled currency, Nigeria closed all its borders. Though gasoline and meat, on which landlocked Niger depended, were exempted. As a result, large chunk of Nigerian customs revenue were lost⁶⁴.

The approximately 85 kilometre border with Chad through Lake Chad witnessed more serious hostilities. For instance, on April 18, 1983, Nigerian soldiers were sent to Kinsara Island in the disputed Lake Chad area to protect Nigeria fishers. This was seen as an affront by the Chadian authorities and led to outbreak of a violent clash between Nigeria and Chad which lasted for six days. The Chadian troops recaptured

Kinsara Island, while Nigeria responded with retaliatory raids. The ensuing intermittent clashes on the Island continued till Nigerian and Chadian Presidents met on July 11 that year to sign an agreement which laid the crisis to an end. An estimated 75 Chadian soldiers and 9 Nigerians were feared dead⁶⁵. Thereafter, there was the revival of a joint border patrols (now defunct) and the establishment of a four-nation Lake Chad Basin Commission to take up border security issues and demarcate their common borders⁶⁶.

Again, in the 2000s, there were frequencies of incursion into Nigeria of bandits that are of Chadian origin. This is a serious threat to Nigerian security and has put the Nigerian law enforcement agencies on a red-alert in order to ensure safety at the border area⁶⁷.

Nigeria's longest frontier of about 1690 kilometres with Cameroon also witnessed several clashes. It should be stressed here that neither Cameroon nor Chad was a signatory of the ECOWAS protocols on the free movement of community citizens and hence greater border tensions existed between these countries and Nigeria. There was a crisis between Nigeria and Cameroon in 1981 which led to the death of five Nigerian soldiers and three wounded – when a Cameroonian patrol team fired on a Nigerian vessel off the contested Rio del Rey area. The area was thought to be rich in oil, gas and uranium deposits. This border clash was amicably settled, though it generated a lot of heat. So also is the heat generated by the 1987 Cameroonian gendarmes who occupied 16 border villages in Borno state in Nigeria. Not only that, in October 1989, Cameroonian gendarmes allegedly abducted four Nigerian customs officials on routine border patrol duties. Minor border clashes still persist between border residents and transients to date⁶⁸. A major one is the 2001 crisis at the Bakassi peninsula. The oil-rich peninsula has been a source of rift between the two countries since 1975. This would be discussed in detail later in this study.

Nigeria took several measures during the 1980s to improve and strengthen its border management. After the 1981 clash with Cameroon, Nigeria decided to fence its entire international boundary, to enclose each border beacon, and to augment its immigration staff by 1,000. Weapon training of immigration officers was intensified, modern border patrol and surveillance equipments were procured and new border posts established. Couple with that, National Boundaries Commission was established in 1988. The Commission was mandated to:

- co-ordinate the activities of all agencies involved in internal and international borders;
- inquire into and resolve any boundary problem or issue between Nigeria and its neighbours and between states within the federation⁶⁹.

As mentioned earlier in this study, African boundaries are a legacy of colonialism and as such ill-defined. Of particular interest are the ill-defined portions of Nigerian maritime boundaries. Given the fluidity of ethnic composition in these frontiers, Nigeria has recorded intense and consistent unofficial trans-border activities with the nationals of its neighbours. Therefore, various causes of border conflict between Nigeria and its neighbours have combined in the imprecision of the boundaries, the presence of vital mineral resources within the frontier zone and intense and lucrative trans-border activities of nationals of all the states concerned⁷⁰.

For example, the Nigerian-Cameroon border is noted for valuable presence of oil especially at Akpayafe estuary which serves as the maritime boundary between the two countries. In the estuary there have been conflicting claims bothering on the issue of threat to each other's national security and economic interest. The same goes for Bakassi peninsula that is noted for heavy presence/habitation of Nigerian fishermen. Such that the recurrent clashes in this border zone have often resulted in heavy casualties of the

Nigerians in artisanal fishing. The Cameroon/Nigerian illustration of border conflict above is also a replica of Nigeria/Chad border intercourse. The Lake Chad islands of Gubi, Doro and Baga are equally a sour point in Nigeria-Chad relations and Nigerian fishermen there have had to contend with hostility. The discovery of oil in the Lake has further exacerbated the situation⁷¹.

The trans-border activities in Nigeria frontier with its neighbours is often characterised by the people who exploit currency disparities and ethnic affinities across the international frontiers to deal illegally in currencies and goods. Others are the overture of some (overzealous) government officials crossing the borders either to exact taxes or arrest or punish suspected criminals. There have been reports of arbitrary arrests of Nigerians by the gendarmes of the neighbouring francophone states as well as Nigeria law enforcement agents in relations to nationals of its francophone neighbours – particularly to check smuggling and other nefarious activities across the borders. To correct this anomaly, the governments within the neighbourhood have employed bilateral negotiations, military confrontation, multilateral negotiations or unilateral action to resolve boundary conflict. The bilateral negotiations have brought about the establishment of joint patrol teams along the border zones and conclusion as well as ratification of various 'memorandum of understanding', correction of ill-demarcated borders, signing of accords, and reaching agreements on creating a 'neutral zone' along the borders – where all human activity will be excluded⁷².

At another level, Nigeria contemplated a military option to address the gruesome killing of its nationals by the Cameroon gendarmes in May 1981, but it jettisoned it after all – attributing the need to do so to adhering strictly to its principle of good neighbourliness and appurtenances of being a regional power. This is what President Shehu Shagari the then Nigerian Head of State specifically said:

*I understand the feelings ... of those who are in favour of Nigeria adopting an aggressive posture towards those who provoke us ... our reactions to these events should, rather, be judged against the background of the principles of our foreign policy ... Our whole foreign policy has been meticulously geared towards promoting good neighbourliness and a healthy respect, for we firmly believe in the OAU principle of the inviolability of the international boundaries inherited by states at the time of their national independence ... I am conscious that Nigeria, like most other regional powers, must learn to contend with leadership and the attendant responsibility ...*⁷³

However, in what eventually became a low scale battle, Nigeria employed the military option over the Lake Chad Islands border dispute in 1983. Although the experience generated from it is that military option cannot resolve border disputes – because it can escalate or be internationalized⁷⁴.

Part of the multilateral endeavour Nigeria undertook with its neighbours is the initiation of Lake Chad Basin Commission. It should be recalled that Nigeria and all its neighbours except Republic of Benin share the Lake and so they all belong to the Lake Chad Basin Commission. In fact, the international boundaries of all the Lake Chad Basin countries converge on the Lake. Therefore, the Lake Chad Basin Commission and the Niger Basin Authority are multilateral initiatives at ensuring a peaceful international cross-border relationship in the Niger River and Lake Chad area. Nigeria, Cameroon and Chad have all initiated petroleum exploration, fishing and irrigation activities around the Lake. Niger Republic which perhaps has a low-profile stance on the Lake is also the country whose border is most stable among the entire international boundary with Nigeria⁷⁵. It is also Niger that is Nigeria's best trading partner within the immediate neighbourhood⁷⁶.

First, at a unilateral level, Nigeria, like most of its neighbours, has increased its border outposts and at times stepped-up the military patrol of its border posts. Second, in April 1984, Nigeria unilaterally shut all its international borders in order to effect a smooth currency switch exercise. Even more than a year after the exercise, the borders

remained closed. Three, the country is contemplating erecting fences or walls along Nigeria's international boundaries. All of these could not eliminate the boundary problems⁷⁷.

Towards a stable boundary policy is the need for dogged mutual cooperation between Nigeria and its neighbours in order to ensure effective boundary administration. As a corollary to this is the imperative to ensure that border communities should be given orientations that will make them avoid activities which are likely to restrain the relations between their different states. Delimiting these boundaries requires some measures of direct negotiation between and among these neighbours but demarcation may unduly overstretch the resources of these states. A safer leeway for African states is to show some willingness to make reciprocal concessions. This could be facilitated with intense economic, industrial, social and political co-operation⁷⁸.

One of the ferocious border clashes in the 1980s was the one between Nigeria and Chad, on their Lake Chad border. The following are the factors that accounted for the devastating clash:

- The internal socio-economic dynamics of the Lake itself.
- Lack of precise demarcation of the boundary.
- The non-challenge of Nigeria in relation to the activities in the boundary area (Lake Chad) since independence in 1960.
- The degeneration of Chadian internal crisis (Goukinni Weddeye's Gunt and Hissene Habre's rebellion).
- The failure of the Lake Chad Basin Commission to address the potentiality of this friction – which was one of the reasons for its establishment in 1964.

- Disagreement over fishing rights in the Islands of Lake Chad as well as opposition by Nigerian fishermen and traders to collection of taxes by Chadian authorities in "Nigeria's territory" leading to harassment and brutalization.
- The crisis reached a head when a contingent of Nigerian Mobile Police sent to protect Nigerian citizens in the border towns were shot at by Chadian gendarmes – killing three of them and wounding three others⁷⁹.

Rather than pursue a bellicose foreign policy that will intimidate neighbouring countries, successive Nigeria leaders have consistently pursued a policy of conciliation and dialogue. In this context, peaceful solutions have been preferred by Nigeria in its relations with border disputes with Republic of Chad, Benin, Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea – Nigeria's immediate neighbours. Even in the face of provocative incursions, Nigeria has always opted for dialogue. It is also clear from this interaction that Nigeria at no time had expansionist ambition⁸⁰.

The frequency with which people move across national boundaries in West Africa, without official sanction has been very high and has been a source of worries. This is so because several hundred unofficial routes exist. This becomes more pronounced if we appreciate again that in the sub-region, neighbouring countries share one or more ethnic groups. For instance, the Hausas are found in Nigeria and Niger Republic, Yorubas in Benin Republic and Nigeria, Ewes in Ghana and Togo, and the Brongs in Cote d' Ivoire and Ghana. In essence international borders in West Africa are reputed to cut across the territories of 100 different ethnic groups⁸¹.

Migration in the sub-region is no respecter of ideological difference, membership of financial communities and even conflict between states. The cohesion and solidarity among the people across these boundaries and the movements are still going on in spite of the arbitrary international boundaries drawn by the Europeans in 1885 in

Berlin. Hundreds of peasants move across international borders several times a day to farm or visit relations. For instance, the Emir of Maradi in Niger Republic is addressed as 'Sarkin Katsina (that is, Emir of Katsina) due to the historical connection between Maradi (in Niger Republic) and Katsina (in Nigeria). In the same vein, traditional and modern border markets such as the ones at Jibia, Badagry, Idi-Iroko and Seme have attracted merchants from diverse regions who flock to these markets regardless of government restrictions and regulations. Borders have, therefore, largely remained imaginary, with too few officials to control the movement of people. Many immigration officials especially when newly posted to border areas have found it difficult in differentiating between 'travellers' from neighbouring states and their own countrymen. This is due to the fact that most times, both the countrymen and the travellers are of same ethnic origin. This has implications for taxation, health, education, military service, household statistics and other aspects of public administration⁸².

The experience of the structural adjustment programme that Nigeria embarked upon in the 1980s showed that there is an intricate network of thriving cross-border trade between Nigeria and its neighbours. It also underscored the fact that the informal cross-border trade has been working against industrialization in Nigeria – because cheaper manufactured products like batteries and soap are smuggled into Nigeria from the neighbouring countries, thereby displacing the demand for locally manufactured goods. Another example is the Nigerian tobacco industry that has had to face serious competition with a flood of cheap tobacco from the neighbouring country through the unofficial cross-border trade⁸³.

Indeed, big time unofficial cross-border traders have found it more lucrative to engage in informal trade because of the price differential across border, of such commodities like petroleum and other petroleum products, fertilizer and other agricultural

inputs, and so on. For instance, a tanker full of petroleum which official cost is N75, 000.00 before 1994 in Nigeria could fetch a profit of more than N700, 000.00 after crossing the border to Chad Republic. The informal cross-border trade still thrives in spite of shifts in economic and monetary policies in Nigeria and its neighbours. One of the ways by which these policies are rendered ineffective is that some Nigerian businessmen still persist in cross-border commerce into places such as Chad, Cameroon and Republic of Benin to purchase goods after carrying out their monetary transactions in the parallel market⁸⁴. This is why Daniel Bach is of the opinion that "large population groups (and at times, the whole states) owe their capacity to survive to semi-official or clandestine flows which thrive across boundaries⁸⁵" in West and Central Africa.

Hence, it is estimated that the value of unrecorded cross-border commerce between Nigeria and each of its neighbours exceeds by about tenfold that of official recorded transactions⁸⁶. Put differently, the volume and value of smuggling activities between Nigeria and all its neighbours are estimated to be by far greater than those of official transactions. Smuggling, here, is used as a generic term covering currency and drug trafficking, the illegal importation or exportation of essential good items, petroleum products and other manufactured goods. Consequently several thousands of nationals of neighbouring states reside legally or illegally in Nigeria and several hundreds of thousands of Nigerians live under the same conditions in the neighbouring states⁸⁷. The smuggling activities have flourished to the extent that in all Nigeria's neighbours, the Nigerian currency (naira) is virtually a legal tender. In 1992 alone, the equivalent of \$856 million left West Africa for Europe in form of 'hot cash' assumed to be laundered drug money⁸⁸.

Another nature of cross-border activities between Nigeria and its neighbours, apart from smuggling and all sorts of trans-border trade, is car theft. Most times, cars of

all brands have been stolen from oil-rich Nigeria and taken across the border. Some of these stolen cars are either 'recycled' in West Africa or taken across the Sahara desert into North Africa and occasionally as far as central Europe. The trails used by car thieves are the same favoured by narcotics and arms dealers as well as traffickers of women and children. Nigeria's entire border areas with Benin, Niger, Chad, Cameroon Republics and even the over 500 km of Atlantic coast, are all fair game to these criminals⁸⁹.

The Nigeria Customs Service was reported to have intercepted small arms and ammunition worth more than 4.3 billion naira (US \$ 34.1 million) on their way to the country in the first six months of 2002. In its April 10, 2006 report the Nigeria Customs Service stated that between January and April 2005 alone, the Nigeria Customs Service recorded seizures totalling 745 smuggled goods. Apart from used vehicles, textiles, juices, used refrigerators, tyres, drugs and scrap metals, turkey, chicken, 16 guns and 1,666 rounds of ammunition were items impounded. The report valued the goods at N1.293 billion⁹⁰.

A lot had come through the border with Benin, the northern borders with Niger, Chad and Cameroon brought into Nigeria either overland or by sea – in small boats. One of the reasons attributed for this upsurge is the recent rise in the creation of private armies by politicians especially as the nation (Nigeria) recently returned to civil rule after long years of military rule. Regrettably however, the weapons more often than not end up in the hands of criminals. In parts of north-eastern Nigeria, the movement of people and arms across borders has created severe problems in recent years. Large bands of gunmen, remnants of rebel wars in Niger and Chad Republics in the last decade, have slipped into Nigeria where they have become bandits, making major highways and many isolated towns and villages unsafe⁹¹. To be sure, report has it that some of these gunmen from neighbouring countries have become recruits or mercenaries in an ethno-religious crisis

rocking certain states in Nigeria – like Plateau. In fact, a number of them have been captured fighting on the side of herdsmen against local farming communities elsewhere in Nigeria and in some Plateau districts⁹².

Some United Nations Children's Fund studies have indicated that coastal and border towns in the south-eastern states of Nigeria; Cross River, Akwa Ibom and Rivers are frequently used as staging posts by children trafficking rings for moving children, mostly by sea to Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon. There are also many cases of children and young women taken from Togo, Benin and other West African countries into Nigeria through coastal and border towns of Obolo, Eket, Ibeno, Ikom, and Oron for onward transmission by sea to the recipient countries of North Africa and Europe. No doubt these cross-border criminal activities pose serious danger to Nigeria's national security. Shortly after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the US, it has been widely speculated that the terrorists could easily exploit these manner of cross-border criminal activities. In fact, the US sponsored a workshop for Nigerian law enforcement agents: the police, customs and immigration in the northern town of Katsina in September 2002 to address the issue⁹³.

With Benin's untoward development climaxed by the 2003 indefinite closure of Nigeria's border, Asoke, Benin was alleged:

- To be a new centre for smuggling of arms and ammunition to Nigeria.
- That some of the Nigerians are the brain behind trafficking of Nigerians to some European countries.
- That around 75 per cent of vehicles stolen from Nigeria is smuggled to Benin via the porous border.
- That Nigerian cheap fuel is massively smuggled into Benin, and above all,

- For uncooperative attitude of Benin's government to crack down on smuggling – pointing to the fact that since Benin did not sign an international customs convention, official co-operation in customs matters became practically impossible⁹⁴.

Indeed, experience in neighbouring Liberia and Sierra Leone have shown that shared borders continue to be perceived much more as areas of discord and confrontation than zones of peace and collaboration, but then the following is clear:

- There seems to be a strong understanding of a shared security fate among neighbouring states – as evident in the regional efforts within ECOWAS as well as bilateral diplomatic endeavours between many West African countries.
- It is also noticeable that there is strongly shared suspicion and mistrust among decision-makers in the sub-region⁹⁵.

The foregoing speaks to the fact that there is a complex nature of trans-boundary security in the sub-region. This is reinforced by the aphorism that no neighbour would be at peace when the house in its neighbourhood is on 'fire'. Be that as it may, there is an unfortunate visionary rhetoric on a collectively shared security destiny. What obtains instead is a perception of one's neighbour as "the face of evil" with whom dialogue and collaboration are compromisingly impossible and this has led to an endless spread of violence in the sub-region. For instance, in December 25, 1989, Charles Taylor's led rebel National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) was able to launch an attack on Liberia, using Ivorian territory as a safe haven. Also in March 1991, a group of armed men, called Revolutionary United Front (RUF), attacked Sierra Leone from the border with Liberia – using the Liberian territory as safe haven and with ostensible support of Charles Taylor – Liberian rebel leader. Also after Charles Taylor became the Liberian President following the July 1997 elections, the Liberian rebel movement ULIMO-K

withdrew from the jungle and established a safe haven somewhere at the 60 kilometres borders between Liberia and Guinea. For so long, ULIMO-K used this haven to harass the government and perpetrated hit-and-run assault⁹⁶.

As a chain reaction, by September 2000, a Guinean rebel movement – the Rassemblement des Forces Democratique de Guinea (RFDG) attacked Guinea from the border between Guinea and Liberia – using Liberia as a safe haven – and allegedly benefited from Charles Taylor. Apart from that, a coalition of Liberian rebel movements called the Liberian United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) also fought the Liberian government using Guinea territory as a safe haven⁹⁷. In September 2002, the Ivorian government alleged that insurgents or rebels attacking the country were benefiting from the support, complicity or sympathy of neighbouring Burkina Faso and Liberia⁹⁸.

From the foregoing, one is bound to summarise that the stubborn perception of one's neighbours as a deadly enemy is the most powerful obstacle to genuine peace in West Africa. This is underscored by the contemporary reality where sovereign or national security needs to be extended beyond purely national boundaries. Therefore, the standpoint that "my neighbours are the devil at my border" can only exacerbate violence and generate greater spate of insecurity for the West or Central African peoples⁹⁹.

Another problem is that most African leaders/states are not effectively in control of their borders. But instead of admitting this incontrovertible fact, they persuade their domestic audience that deliberately hostile intentions from 'evil' neighbours, and not their own fragile or ineffective state's institutions are the main causes of their insecurity or violence. The fact is that borders are not only porous, they are also indefensible with cross-border flow of refugees, smugglers, rebel movement and organised crime. In the face of this porosity and seemingly intractable conflicts spilling over territorial boundaries, then officially consecrated frontiers become meaningless and sacrosanct state

sovereignty and extra-territoriality – where states were assumed to be in full control of their legal territory – come to nullity. To correct this anomaly, a shared sense of security threats and hopes are needed. In which case, peace effort in one country requires a consideration of its close neighbourhood. For instance, peace is not conceivable in a post war Liberia, without considering its neighbouring Sierra Leone; or in Cote d'Ivoire without its neighbouring Burkina Faso; or in Guinea without its neighbouring Liberia¹⁰⁰.

With some considerable increase in state implosion in West Africa, it is becoming clear that the states in the sub-region are increasingly becoming borderless, this time not by reason of globalisation but because of murderous frenzy of war. During the civil wars that ravaged the West African countries of Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea in the 1990s, we found that the number of refugees and internally displaced peoples that have crossed the boundaries of these countries into another – places considered somewhat secure and far beyond, are colossal. But for European traveller, crossing these West African borders is as tasking as crossing the Atlantic Sea due to the corruption of immigration officers and such other agencies¹⁰¹.

In fact, Ali A. Mazrui who is now the Director of the Institute of Global Cultural Studies in New York is of the opinion that West Africa, indeed the whole of Africa is at the verge of large scale border upheaval. His argument is based on the premise that in the 21st century, France is likely to be withdrawing from West Africa to technically get more involved in European affairs. He, therefore, reasoned that France's West African spheres of influence would be taken over by Nigeria – a more natural hegemonic power. By implication Nigeria's own boundaries are likely to expand to incorporate the Republic of Niger, seen to be so because of the Hausa link, the Republic of Benin, because of the Yoruba link and conceivably Cameroon¹⁰².

This forecast of French withdrawal from West Africa is predicated on the standpoint that France is not only likely to withdraw in order to divert its attention to the new challenges in Europe and Russia, but also because the younger generation of Frenchmen are deemed to lack the type of emotional ties that the older generations had or still have to the ex-colonies¹⁰³. But this position may be an oversimplification. France's crop of leaders would not abdicate their West African 'empire' that easily, this time, certainly not with the economic 'empire' that the French had established in the sub-region and the multiplier advantage this has for metropolitan France.

4.3 The Nature and Dynamics of France's Threat as an 'Extra-Neighbour' to Nigeria's National Security

In order to avoid any ambiguity, France is conceptualised as an 'extra-neighbour'. This section will examine the historical basis of French involvement in West and Central African international relations; with a view to establishing the kind of threat that it poses to Nigeria's national security.

Shortly after the collapse of the third republic and successive national crises, France passed through a period of declining birth rate and demographic stagnation, especially in the 20th century – which symbolized a deep seated national malaise. In fact, in 1850, France which was still one of the dominant powers in Europe and a torchbearer of revolutionary and emancipating ideas had by 1940 come to look more like "the sick man of Europe" and a nation obsessed with anxieties about security and stability. This dramatic transformation of spirit and image, no doubt, became one of the inescapable themes of history of France in the years to come. The country began to repeat or re-enacted its own past. After 1815, France repeated, in the same sequence, the cycle of its political experiment i.e. the sequence of Monarchy-Republic-Empire. Each monarch had ended with raising of barricades in the streets of Paris; each republic, with a military coup

d'état by a Bonaparte; each empire, with defeat in a foreign war, at Waterloo at Sedan. However, France, which from the 1920s until the 1950s, could be regarded as "the sick man of Europe", by the 1960s, became one of the most dynamic, purposeful, and successful states in Western Europe¹⁰⁴.

Some analysts have argued that French leaders often act in unexpected ways. Sometimes their preference for nonconformity has been intentional and has enabled a strong leader like General de Gaulle or Pierre Mendes France to achieve tactical advantages for nation. Some of these erratic actions were reflected in the failure of the French colonial policy to deal appropriately with the rising force of colonialism which led to many colonial wars and final wreck of the fourth republic. It explains why the French found the end of the empire so difficult to contemplate. It explains why it desperately clung to overseas possessions in spite of the obvious unpopularity of such position. It explains why many Frenchmen were willing to sacrifice in order to preserve an imperial political system – a memory of the past rather than a possibility for the future. Decolonisation, to France, was seen as a national indignity¹⁰⁵.

Though relatively little study has been given to the short period of de Gaulle's presidency between 1944 and 1946, yet it could be seen that this period was not a great departure from the fourth and fifth republics – the years of foreign policy grandeur. During his reign, de Gaulle spoke, for France, not as a refugee organisation subsists largely on the largesse of its great allies, but as the leader of a great although, enfeebled but nevertheless independent state which aspired in all its acts to establish its security and regain its status as a great power. This was the time when he resigned and went to twelve years exile. De Gaulle's exercise of power during this time, strove hard after goals that finally remained unattainable and ended in disappointment, but not without some legacy to those that succeeded him¹⁰⁶.

As the leader of Free France and of the Provisional French Government in 1944, de Gaulle thought of this unique role for France in the world, in the following terms:

All my life I have had a certain idea of France. Feeling has inspired me as well as reason. What is emotional in me readily imagines France, like the princess in the fairy tales or the madonna of the frescoes, consecrated to an eminent and exceptional destiny. I have the instinctive impression that Providence has created her for perfect successes or model misfortunes... Further, the positive side of my mind convinces me that France is really herself only in the first rank; that only great enterprises can compensate for the ferments of dispersion which her people carry in themselves; that our country ... must under threat of mortal danger aim high and hold firm. In short, to me France cannot be France without grandeur¹⁰⁷.

What eventually became evident during de Gaulle's seventeen months rule are the following:

- The inadequacy of the nation's military establishment.
- The decline of its diplomatic position.
- The industrial and demographic weakness which had made France of second rank to Germany on the continent since 1870.
- The crumbling of the artificial hegemony established by the 1919 Peace Treaties¹⁰⁸.

One of the major turning points in the history of France was the emergence of General Charles de Gaulle who revived France from the brink of collapse and civil war plaguing the fourth republic. After returning from a twelve-year self exile, de Gaulle gave the French fifth republic (1958 – 1974) a strong and formidable presidential leadership. Under him, he championed the principle of self-determination especially after the challenging Algerian Revolution which tasked the resolve of France. He proclaimed that France would not pitch its tent against the tide of the Third World history; with a bid to transforming the bipolarity inherited from the Second World War into a multi-polar international order in which France would find itself in the first rank. France under de

Gaule was no longer going to conform to the bloc politics of the superpowers and specifically, to the hegemonic dictates of the US. This time, France was mainly committed to the assertion of its own national interests¹⁰⁹.

President Charles de Gaulle ruled from 1958 to 1969 and Georges Pompidou from 1969 to 1974. The duo worked toward the revival of France's international relations and vigorously attempted to change the alignment patterns and configuration of power between and among states in the international system. They also put in place a global policy that was responsive to the particular needs of France. By extension, this epoch marked an opening of way for important and salutary development in world politics. 'Nationalism' and 'national interest' diluted many of the inflexible demands of competing superpower ideologies, relaxed the restraints of bloc politics and created new avenues for East and West negotiation beyond the Cold War. These shifts facilitated a process of *détente* between the superpowers in global scale¹¹⁰.

It need be mentioned that Gaullist aspiration for a multi-polar world was not achieved and particularly too, France's status, influence or independence *vis-à-vis* the superpowers did not increase. Rather, France remained dependent on the US for its security in spite of the French criticism of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). France's economic and social wellbeing are also greatly a function of the policies of the US and its European collaborators. So, France's capacity to shape Europe's political future lies more on its ties with the US, the defunct Soviet Union and its European allies, especially Germany, than its own hands. This is due to France's limited resources and constraints posed by other states. This constraint is particularly evident when a middle range power attempt to make basic changes in international relations through its own separate effort¹¹¹.

This type of dynamics, constraints and perhaps frustration, which France experienced, accounted for the way it responded to what transpired between it, Nigeria and its West and Central African neighbours. No doubt, the Gaullist policies aided beneficial systemic change but gradually weakened France's global posture and its regional positions in Europe and the Mediterranean. It was observed that if the nationalist cause of the de Gaulle's government prompted other states to assert themselves before the superpowers, it is by the same token encouraged them to do likewise in their dealings with France.

Consequently, the task of fashioning global and regional strategies in keeping with the modesty of France's means and opportunities fell on President Georges Pompidou – de Gaulle's successor. Interestingly, the two are so fused in French thinking and practice. This explains why it was rightly observed that:

... States shape the international environment and their role within it through their unilateral initiatives and through the alignments (or dealignments) they pursue with other states, implicitly and explicitly, in working toward their goals. The patterns of co-operation, competition, conflict and conciliation characterising interstate relations at any point in time influence profoundly how a nation will participate in the international arena, what it can expect from its efforts, and whether it will achieve its objectives. These patterns form an international system of relations whether the leadership of a state perceives the effect of its state's action or not¹¹².

Furthermore,

Analysis of the structural elements of interstate behaviour suggests that over time they form a grammar of power relations, rules and expectation through which are mediated the nation's policies and actions abroad. In the very pursuit of narrow political aims, each national actor, through its words and deeds, contributes its idiom to the evolving international grammar of power¹¹³.

So, the foregoing study of the French fifth republic is a testimony to Gaullism that shed light on France's foreign policy and on its role in shaping the international system to suit policy objectives. De Gaulle really brought his personality to bear on the French

foreign policy. In fact, after his resignation from the presidency, Gaullism existed without de Gaulle¹¹⁴.

Having given this background, we can now say that Nigeria and France are two special neighbours; this is regardless of territorial contiguity but by Francophone propinquity. For instance, Nigeria is surrounded by French speaking countries – where French presence is very active and strong. Since Nigeria was considered a frontline state during the struggle for liberation against apartheid South Africa – without being territorially contiguous to the actual frontline states in Southern Africa, so, France too can be called a frontline state/neighbour of Nigeria because of its roles in Benin, Niger, Chad, Cameroon and even Equatorial Guinea (which is not French speaking). Going by that, France can thus be classified as Nigeria's sixth neighbour. Arising from this, it is not illogical for Nigerian policy makers to begin to live under the fear that the neighbourhood can be potentially hostile and inimical to Nigeria's interests. As alluded to earlier, Africa is the centrepiece of Nigeria's foreign policy, and France sees the continent as the instrument of its foreign policy. As a result, there cannot but be a clash of interests between the two – in a manner that will affect national prestige/ego and security¹¹⁵.

Part of the lost prestige that France seeks to gain is the fact that, before the 19th century, France used to be the most populous in Europe and it saw itself as a leading light in the continent. France was the model feudal state in the Middle Ages and later the model of absolute monarchy, as well as the first largest republic in Europe. It is said that, even when France did not dominate European politics, its civilization was widely admired and imitated in Europe and *ipso facto*, elsewhere in the globe. French was the language of diplomacy and 'high culture' for centuries before World War II. The Second World War was so devastating to France not only politically but economically and technologically. This was on, until Charles de Gaulle came to power and tried to redeem France's image

internationally with the introduction of the policy of 'la grandeur' – meant to enable France rise up to the challenges of a great power and be at par with other European powers again. In order to achieve this, Africa was considered as paramount in this venture¹¹⁶.

Thus, Africa became a means of French foreign policy and was conceptualised not only to help cover France's weaknesses, but to also enable France to escape Anglo-Saxon prejudices and domination in Europe. This explains why, for instance, while American and British companies complied with the United Nations economic sanctions against Rhodesia the French did not. The same goes for the April 1986 public refusal of Jacques Chirac's administration to grant permission to American plane to fly over French territory in the course of US's bombing raid against Libya. France is rather more keenly interested in economic gains in Nigeria and therefore gives little or no attention to political questions, until early 1990s when France began to show increased interest in bridging the political gap between the two countries¹¹⁷.

Following the third test of atomic bomb in the Reaggan in Western Sahara in January 1961, the diplomatic relationship between Nigeria and France was ruptured leading to the expulsion of the French ambassador, Mr. Raymond Offroy (as mentioned elsewhere in this study)¹¹⁸.

The effect of this sour relationship between France and Nigeria spelt doom for Nigeria's neighbours. One, as the embassy of France in Lagos was responsible for the issuance of visas for many African states, Dahomey (now Republic of Benin), Togo, etc, the closure of the embassy implied that visa facilities would have to be routed through a non-member of the French community – the Netherlands. Two, France was using Nigeria as a transit country for its exports to Niger and Chad – which were denied after January 5, 1961¹¹⁹.

The immediate recognition of these difficulties compelled Dahomey and Niger to plead with Nigeria to soften its measures and reconcile with France. The point that Nigeria was scoring at this time was political – it was meant to be seen as the country is effectively leading (Africa) by example and a measure of boosting national ego of an emergent and perhaps undisputable African power that France (in Nigeria's thinking) has no choice to reckon with. No doubt, this action has not only embarrassed France, it also felt morally aggrieved and insulted¹²⁰.

France saw that Nigeria, because of its clout, size and wherewithal in West Africa, is likely to stand in-between France's dream of having and maintaining its West African empire, it then decided to work at dismembering Nigeria, as soon as the opportunity was opened. Certainly, the opportunity came during the Nigerian civil war. Thus, by the start of the war, the French were ready. In July 1967, the French army dispatched a B-26 bomber to Enugu (Nigeria). In October 1967, Maurice Delaney, the French ambassador to Gabon, sent four secret service advisers under the command of Col. Fournier to General Odumegwu Ojukwu – the Biafran secessionist leader. On July 1968, the first French plane loaded with arms and ammunition landed at Uli air strip via Gabon, and this continued for months at a daily rate of about 20 tons. In fact, the Red Cross was mobilised to participate in the arms shipment. Worse still, Col. Merle – the French military attaché in Gabon was also made president of the Red Cross. At the international level, the French government openly campaigned for Biafran 'self-determination' and sponsored organisations to do the same. They also sponsored mercenaries to fight in Biafra. This opportunity that France had to break the Nigerian federation was cut short, because even some of its ex-colonies like Lamizana of Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) and Diiori of Niger refused to support the desire of Paris to see that Nigeria was fragmented. In 1982, five Nigerian soldiers were killed by Cameroonian

troops, in the ensuing conflict between the two countries, France was said to have sent two planes filled with arms, including ground to ground missile, to Cameroon to enable it face Nigeria¹²¹.

At the bilateral level, Nigeria's relations with France are one of a dilemma. At the political and economic levels in West and Central Africa, there is mutual suspicion and there is rivalry at the level of African politics. At the bilateral level, political relations have not been allowed to develop and have been uneasy. But economic relations have gradually developed and perhaps uninhibited by political difference. This creates an impression that in West and Central Africa the two countries are not likely to reach any political compromise. For example, Nigeria perceives France as an active neo-colonialist and obstacle in Africa, at the same time sees Francophone Africans as stooges of France. Worse still, the Francophones equally look at Nigeria as another colonialist and imperialist in the making. They are of the opinion that Nigeria should be prevented from being an alternative to France so that they will be assertive and ward off Nigeria's hegemonic clout. They choose to shape their own destiny by themselves not by Nigeria's say-so. So they prefer to reinforce their Francophone affiliations. This position, no doubt is in tandem with France whose international stature is largely sustained by its presence in Africa. Thus, France does not hesitate to assist the Francophones in their efforts to protect their identity¹²².

France and Nigeria have not only been suspicious of each other in West and Central African politics, they are also rivals at the African wide level. Coupled with that, France has consolidated its interests in Africa even after colonial independence. Since British interest had waned, especially after the independence of most of its colonies, Nigeria clout as a regional power with the potentials of challenging France in Africa had increased. This had certainly placed both Nigeria and France at cross purposes.

Consequently, Nigeria sees France as a threat to its interests and vice versa. France had demonstrated, therefore, at sundry occasions that Nigeria could not and should not be a challenger. On the reverse, Nigeria had also suggested and demonstrated that it could not be ignored in Africa affairs¹²³.

In essence, the nature and dynamics of threats to Nigeria's national security are in direct reflection of the difference in the self-perceived national, regional and international stature of both Nigeria and France. The fall out of this has been a sour-type of political relationship cushioned with accommodating and tolerant economic and technical/cultural interactions between the two countries. The clash in the Nigeria-France relations is euphemistically described as follows:

Nigeria – an over slept giant... desiring to assume major responsibilities in international affairs with little preparation and means, as against France, an acknowledged world power, which was once great, which once lost her glory and now wants it back, and which is richer, more politically stable and technologically more advanced than Nigeria¹²⁴.

Guy Georgy, former Director of African Affairs in the French Foreign Ministry pin-pointed the rationale for France's interests in Africa especially in economic and investment terms as follows:

Africa is becoming more and more indispensable to Europe which largely depends, for its industrial activity, and the importation of energy resources and raw materials from Africa. Africa will more and more become a privileged supplier of France and Europe because its resources are enormous and are still relatively untapped¹²⁵.

There was no where else that France had an unfettered influence or alternative source of raw materials other than the African continent. Due to this type of informed self interest, the relationship between France and Francophone Africa became so close to the extent that sending postage mail from Paris to Dakar, Senegal (in West Africa) costs the same amount as doing the same within Paris. Coupled with that, the French were also

subsidizing air fares, telephone and telex communication for the French-speaking Africans in the colonies then¹²⁶.

In fact, since the time of Charles de Gaulle, the French governments did not want to be replaced as a power, in Africa, by any other country – to the extent that it did not want to disengage from Africa. This was cemented with the establishment of military bases in all the Francophone territories – simply to facilitate the deployment of troops to any trouble spot. France also became the spokesman for African countries especially in the developed world – urging them (i.e. its Euro-American partners) to provide or increase development assistance, military assistance and intensify intelligence activities in Africa. It further encourages and sustains the establishment of Francophone institutions whose objectives and problems are not different at all from those of other purely African organizations. There is no way that this leadership role would not have clashed with that of Nigeria's in the continent. For historical reasons, Francophone Africans have generally given support to French activities in Africa. It appears they are more at home leaning on the side of France than supporting the common position of other African states. This explains why France had always argued that its interventions in Africa were on request. It is evident from the foregoing that, Africa, from the perspective of France, is a strategic continent; it is an instrument for France in its search for a great power status; it is a source of raw materials and an outlet for French goods, it is a required avenue in the anti-hegemonic struggle of France and a general platform for the making of a new France – on many of these issues, Nigeria's ego is somewhat challenged or banished and it has led to series of crisis of trust and relationship between Nigeria and France¹²⁷.

Nigeria sees France interventionist role in most of the countries in Africa as being too intrusive, imperialistic and neo-colonial. This is a self-acclaimed recognition of capability on the part of Nigerian that it can provide a form of bridge-the-gap assistance

to its Francophone neighbours rather than France taking over such role. Nigeria is disposed to freeing Africa and particularly its immediate neighbourhood of the preponderance of French presence. For instance, Nigeria instituted Technical Aid Corps aimed primarily at providing African and the Caribbean states with any category of manpower they may need. This is meant to be free-of-charge to the recipients. Though, they are merely required to pay for local transportation, medical bills and housing of the corps¹²⁸. Nigeria volunteers to pay the lion share of dues in many African organizations and carries heavy burden financing the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in particular¹²⁹.

It has been forecasted that in the foreseeable future, the relationship will continue to be problematic for the following reasons:

- The Francophone states are not averse to the leadership, mentoring and assistance provided by France.
- France is not in any time soon going to de-emphasize its involvement in the Francophone states, neither is it going to reject its privileged relationship with the Francophone neighbours.
- Budget subsidies and other such like assistance that Nigeria's Francophone neighbours and other Francophone African states benefit from France is greater than what Nigeria could offer them.
- In fact, some of them prefer the CEAO – a heavily funded Francophone institution by France, to ECOWAS.
- Even if French withdrawal from Africa is contemplated at all, Francophone institutions in the continent have been strengthened enough to last 'forever' or foster high degree of solidarity between and among the Francophone countries. Not to talk

of the impressive breakthroughs that France has been able to make in non-French speaking African countries¹³⁰.

This goes to say that it has become inevitable for France to be actively present in any area of African life. This fact is needed to be digested by Nigeria's policy makers and security planners. Besides, there is the concept of 'manifest destiny'¹³¹ in which many Nigerian leaders, since independence, believe that it is God who wants them to provide leadership for Africa. Therefore, the leadership role should be normally conceded to Nigeria as a matter of right without having to plead or ask for it. For instance, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa – the first Nigerian Prime Minister, was quoted to have said the following in his address to the Parliament on November 24, 1960:

There is no reason why they (other West African countries) should not give us our recognized position by virtue of our size and population but it not for us to go out to show to those smaller countries that we are big in size and population¹³².

Successive Nigerian leaders have also passionately believed in this as well. In all of these, however, Nigeria cannot but come in conflict with France that sees the continent, too, as being strategic for the following reasons:

- a big outlet for French exports;
- a major source of raw materials;
- a means to France's policy of grandeur and;
- the bastion of French culture outside of metropolitan France¹³³

Franco-Nigeria relations has however improved lately especially due to the decline in the level of French military intervention in Africa and the greater concentration on economic investment in Nigeria. Coupled with that, France itself is increasingly confronted by the competitive environment of a post Cold War Europe and the opening up of newer and more attractive investment opportunities in the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and South Africa. By implication, the improvement of Franco-Nigeria

relations has also enhanced relations with the Francophone West Africa countries – who are now less defensive and apologetic, and a great deal, due to this understanding, became less intimidated by Nigeria's power and influence. After France has played a very co-operative role in effecting the rescheduling of Nigeria's debt, President Ibrahim Babangida (of Nigeria) paid an official visit to Paris. France has also shown a great deal of reluctance to over-extend itself militarily and politically in Africa – especially by refusing to commit its military and political resources into conflict situations. In the past, France was deeply involved and had particularly established a special intervention forces designed for such occasions¹³⁴.

There is no doubt that while France is interested in courting Nigeria's friendship, it is also not lost on preventing Nigeria from influencing the Francophones against French interests in Africa. To ensure this, France had not only intensified economic inroads, and promotes French cultural presence through exchange of artistes, cultural exhibitions, scholarship awards; but it has also avoided direct intrusion in Nigeria's affairs. It is inevitable to ensure regular Franco-Nigerian dialogues on African and international questions – which will definitely reduce or obliterate area of hostility between the two. Preventive diplomacy rather than reactive or reconciliatory diplomacy will stem the tide of Franco-Nigeria conflict. As long as Nigeria has Francophone neighbours, Nigeria cannot do away with France. So there is the need for mutual understanding and tolerance between the two¹³⁵.

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Chapter Five

Nigeria's National Security and its Neighbours in a Contemporary Context

This chapter situates Nigeria within the context and requirement of its national security especially as it affects it and its neighbours. In it, three strands of issues emerged. The first is the need for the country to appreciate an extensive, non-military or non-defence-only type of definition of security. It is this kind of appreciation that manifests today in the world's leading democracies. The second strand is that pursuant of a thorough national security strategy, Nigeria needs to 'provoke' mutual beneficial relations with its neighbours especially at its borders – the incongruities and occasional skirmishes between it and those neighbours notwithstanding. The third dwells on the manner of mutual strategy Nigeria is embarking on in its national security template with its neighbours to be able to overcome the peculiar problem of historical and geographic linkages with its neighbours and crimes induced by the recent revolution in information and communication technology, among others.

5.1 The Expansive Scope of Security and its Requirements on Nigeria and its Neighbours

One interesting dynamics of International Relations today is the manner by which concepts in the field lend itself to many uses not only because of the dynamic nature of the subject matter – the state, and by that very fact, men – the indispensable collective that makes the state function as an entity, but also because of the critical and depth of passion of the students of international politics. To this extent, the meaning of security in the social sciences today has been eclectic as it is all embracing. For instance, international security, broadly speaking, could be any event or process that leads to large scale death or lessening of life chances and undermines states as the basic unit of the international system¹.

Shortly after the end of the Cold War, hopes are that a new concept of global security which encapsulates all issues of politics, economics, diplomacy and environment would emerge. It was also hoped that such development will supplement narrow, defence-oriented concepts. Military spending was expected to be cut so as to increase the quantum of money needed and directed to sustainable development, which in turn would help to prevent wars². But due to rhetoric and vague commitment to democracy, human rights protection, and arms control agreements by political leaders, violence and wars have reached the plateau with untoward consequences for the countries or regions concerned and the world at large. In the 1990s the number of deaths (of mostly civilians), as a result of avoidable wars have surpassed any decade since the end of the Second World War³.

No doubt, modern day wars have increased civilian casualties more than any period in history. Statistics from the world wars are quite illuminating. During the First World War, 8.4 million soldiers and 1.4 million civilians died; while World War II killed 16.9 million troops and 34.3 million civilians⁴. Since then, worst civilian casualties have been recorded in many wars. This, therefore, calls for a jettisoning of traditional path of conceiving security mainly as national self-defence by amassing arms to deter aggression as well as regime security with attendant adverse consequences.

Certainly, though military prowess is an enviable national asset which every nation must have or aspire to have. Be that as it may, there are clear dangers associated with over-empowering military power which could be any of the following:

- Such a state becoming a target for terrorism;
- Existence of general spate of insecurity – when others see the weapon amassed as a source of insecurity to them;
- The temptation to use the military might even when it is least necessary in the name of national interest;

- Another is expense – over pursuing of resources into acquisition and maintenance of military hardware to the detriment of other amenities⁵.

Although, some have argued that it is more expensive to rush to rearm to face new dangers after drastic cut in military spending.

It is, thus, striking to note that the main issues in the body polity of US – which is one of the world most advanced polities today are social security, medicare, care of the aged, and other related issues. This is why it is, therefore, more telling to Nigeria and its neighbours that as much as devotion to the issues relating to their national security is paramount, they need to focus on how to improve the lots of their improvised populace in order to ensure sustainable development and security. In other words, both national and human securities are tangential and symbiotic. It is believed that one cannot be treated in isolation of the other or to the detriment of the other.

If that is accepted as a given, Nigeria and its neighbours are, therefore, faced with the onerous task of nurturing and sustaining their security. This emanates from the realization that the advanced countries of the world underestimate the type of wars going on in Africa and try to characterize them either as ‘low intensity war’ or ‘military operation other than war’ or internal conflict or ‘anarchy’. To them, these wars are rather insignificant phenomena and that is why they are slow in intervening, or at best, react with humanitarian assistance which is at variance with the physical destruction and irreparable loss of lives⁶. To illustrate this clearly, an American motive for intervening in different troubled spots of the world is to project its military prowess. On each of these occasions, it claims to be acting in the global interest, but the reverse is the case. For example, the US intervenes when it least risks American casualties. By extension the issues of non-Americans do not have the same value as those of American. The loss of non-Americans lives is treated as an inevitable and perhaps regrettable⁷. Furthermore, in

the ranging civil war in Afghanistan, the reportage of Afghan civilian casualties was deliberately downplayed and remarked contemptuously by the American press and military – they often argue that civilian casualties are historically and by definition, a part of war, and comments like the following, abound: ‘those casualties should not be big news, after all’, ‘war is about killing people’ and ‘civilian casualties are unavoidable’⁸.

However, this was not so in the case of cataclysmic event of September 11, 2001 in the US in which two passenger planes were hijacked by suicide bombers and deliberately crashed into the twin towers of the World Trade Centre and a third plane crashed into the Pentagon – leading to the death and disappearance of over 3,000 persons⁹. The event was more ‘trumpeted’ by the Bush government as ‘an act of war’ and was given extensive and adequate media coverage. The same way that no single one of the American 1,500 daily newspapers did not condemn US/NATO in 1999 when it bombed Yugoslavia for 78 days and nights or the US 40 days and nights of relentless bombing of Iraq in 1991¹⁰.

In the past, interstate relations everywhere were replete with tales of wars waged by one state against the other or constellation of states or vice-versa. In short, this kind of series of wars between and among states was the norm at that time. But today, aggressive interstate wars have been replaced by numerous security threats to human race. These frustrating security threats range from poverty, infectious disease, environmental degradation, intra-state war or violence, the spread and possible use of nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons, terrorism, to transnational crime¹¹. Interestingly, the security threats are both from state and non-state actors in a manner that not only bother on human security but on state security also. This becomes worrisome today when it is increasingly becoming clear that there is no device to partition the issues of security, economic development and human freedom. Again, this scenario definitely

calls for serious reflections in national security discourse in Nigeria's relations with its neighbours in West and Central Africa.

The above caution is tellingly so to the extent that today's threats to security are not respecters of national boundaries. The underpinning assumption here is that, no single state, however powerful, can single handedly handle or make itself invulnerable to today's threats. Furthermore, every state could not be assumed to be capable or willing to meet its responsibility to protect its own peoples without any danger to its neighbours.

Hence, for the common good of Nigeria and its neighbours, there is a compelling need to appraise the broadness of security issues. Doing this will enhance the apprehension of old and new threats and accommodate the fears of the various countries within the neighbourhood – both rich and poor or weak or strong. It is germane to state that no security issue should be studied in isolation because one security issue is related to the other. This understanding will better facilitate the security of citizens in the neighbourhood. We shall also demonstrate, later in this study, how the need to act in concert would be an effective means of response to the various threats to collective security of these nations.

However, just like individuals, there may be distinction in nations because of differences of power, wealth or geography, and variegated sense of threat perception. Therefore, to some countries what stands as threats, are not threats to others. Such type of perceptions constitutes a grave challenge to collective security. Hence, for Nigeria and its neighbours, mutual recognition of threats is imperative, especially in view of the interconnectedness of their boundaries and visions. This is what could enhance their collective security. On the reverse, self-help cannot but breed mistrust and subvert long-term mutual gain because nations share responsibility for each other's security.

The foregoing is imperative, especially today, when the great powers are particularly indifferent to the crisis in the world's poorest region(s), excepting in areas where their core interests are at stake. It could be said that today's world is one in which optimism has yielded to renewed cynicism about the willingness of the great powers to intervene purely for the sake of humanity in any troubled spot of the world¹².

Every state requires the cooperation of other states to make itself secure. Thus, it is in the interest of every state to cooperate with other states in order to address their most pressing threats – it is by so doing that such a state will take advantage of reciprocal cooperation to address its own threat priorities. For instance, no amount of state control could effectively check a cross border smuggle of a small quantity of highly enriched uranium which could be used to create a crude nuclear device that has the capacity of levelling a city. Rather cooperation of all states to clean up stockpiles of such highly enriched uranium; protection of shipping containers at ports; creation of general and new rules to regulate the enrichment of uranium; as well as sharing of intelligence by states are measures that could stalemate this kind of nuclear threat¹³. That nuclear terror incidence has not happened between Nigeria and its neighbours, is not a guarantee that it cannot happen. We should hasten to remember that any use of nuclear weapon, either by accident or design, risks human casualties and economic dislocation on a catastrophic scale. Therefore, the need to be on the alert to such threat between Nigeria and its neighbours now and in the distant future is not misplaced.

As much as a concerted effort is required to circumvent such threat as nuclear catastrophe, the same way that some collective action is required to stem the tide of money-laundering, trafficking in drugs and persons as well as corruption of the law enforcement agencies those the boundaries between Nigeria and its neighbours¹⁴. Arising from the foregoing, the presence of broad array of threats in the contemporary

international system, undoubtedly presents enormous limitations to self-help or self protection by individual country.

The collective action so advocated above is expected to be laced with compliance, strict monitoring, verification and enforcement – because early warning is complemented or work best with early action for prevention. In this regard, the action must be geared towards promoting security for all the concerned states irrespective of status, resources and connections with other (great) powers.

Thus, we can observe that today the scope of security has been expanded and it affects Nigeria and its neighbours. To illustrate some of these threats, we found that the number of people living in extreme poverty has increased. In Africa alone, almost 11 million children die from preventable diseases and more than half a million women die during pregnancy and childbirth. Worldwide, women and youth are said to be disproportionately poor. It is a combination of an increasing growth in youth population, poverty, urbanization and unemployment that has resulted in increased gang violence in many cities of the developing countries. Africa, to say the least, is one of the continents hardest hit by poverty. In sub-Saharan Africa – the area within the scope of this study, average life expectancy has declined from 50 to 46 since 1990. In the developed world less than one in a 100 children dies before age five. The reverse is the case in most sub-Saharan Africa, where every one in 10 children die before age five, and in some worst cases in some of the countries it is every one in 5 children that die before age five¹⁵.

More deplorably, Africa has the largest number of people, close to 48 per cent of the world's living in extreme poverty¹⁶. Invariably too, this is a continent where 340 million people or half of the continent's population live on less than one US dollar per day¹⁷. It is in May 2001, in a meeting of the least developed countries held in Belgium that there was raised an appalling revelation that African countries were worse than they

were 30 years ago. For instance, as at that 2001, out of forty-nine least developed countries in the world, thirty-four were located in sub-Saharan Africa and thirteen in ECOWAS sub-regional zone¹⁸.

The poverty profile of Nigeria – a country which is ‘erroneously’ seen as one of the most prosperous in Africa, is startling as it is frustrating. Olusegun Okikiola Obasanjo – the country’s immediate past civilian President once said pungently that:

70 per cent of Nigerians are living below poverty line. Out of which 48.5 per cent is in abject poverty. Per capital income of the country is about \$300.00 – which places Nigeria amongst the 30 poorest nations of the world. The economy is monocultural – oil revenues providing 95 per cent of total export income; the GDP growth rate is still less than 3 per cent per annum. External debt burden is currently \$30 billion; our external reserve of about \$6.693 billion is just enough to pay for little over the minimum level of three months of import bills; the level of capacity utilization in manufacturing is not more than 30 per cent; and the level of unemployment is very high¹⁹.

Furthermore, Nigeria, in World Bank’s 2005/2006 global competitiveness ranking is in the 88th position out of 117 countries²⁰. Today, though the poverty level in Nigeria is said to have dropped from 70 per cent in 1999 to 54 per cent in 2007, yet Umaru Yar’Adua, the current civilian President affirmed that most “Nigerians still live below one dollar per day²¹”.

Gabriel O. Olusanya, an academic and former Director of Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, later appointed as the Nigerian Ambassador to France, who is now retired, succinctly captures the foregoing thus:

... I see millions sunk in apathetic poverty, reduced to shiftless improvidence, foraging for food in the garbage and sleeping under the bridges and in the market places and ravaged by diseases in a land flowing with milk and honey, a land that is an envy of other nations of the world ...²².

Another threat is the scourge of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and other lethal diseases. Currently, there were more than 11 million children orphaned by HIV/AIDS in Africa. Yet, international response to the scourge is slow and ill-resourced. The same goes for the geometric rise in population of these developing countries that are ill-equipped. The world's population is expected to increase from 6.3 billion today to 8.9 billion in 2050. Coupled with that is the neglect of the menace of environmental degradation²³.

It could be argued, using the above general picture as a basis, that a large chunk of the poor live in rural areas and earn their income from agriculture. However, they pay a damming cost when developed countries impose trade barriers on agricultural imports and subsidize their own agricultural exports. Also HIV/AIDS does not only deplete the capacity of states and economies in Africa faster than redeemable, but it also has cumulative effects on loss of government officials, skilled health professionals, teachers, service providers, caregivers, police, and soldiers – all of these impact, even if on the long-run, on state stability²⁴.

Besides, climate change has made it imperative for all states of the world irrespective of their location to be mindful of their dependence on hydrocarbons. This, therefore, makes it mandatory for them to promote climate-friendly devices and develop low carbon energy sources, including natural gas renewable power and nuclear power. This is an initiative that will promote low-greenhouse gas technologies. Meanwhile, developed industrialized countries as well as developing ones – for reason of seeing it as impediments to their economic growth are not favourably disposed to ratifying global initiative (like the Kyoto Protocol) – which is meant to check the menace of global warming²⁵.

Another security concern for Nigeria and its neighbours is the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. We would recall that many civil wars in the 1990s were a

product of free flow of small arms, light weapons and landmines. Since this has once played out in the civil wars experienced in Nigeria's neighbourhood in the 1990s, there is an imperative to co-ordinate a more integrated international action to check the menace or recourse to its use. This could take the form of creating a comprehensive standard rules aimed at preventing and eradicating the illicit manufacture, transfer and circulating of small arms and light weapons.

5.2 Efforts at Making the Borders Mutually Beneficial to Nigeria and its Neighbours

Nigeria and its borders are a bundle of contradictions. The borders are ill-defined and very porous. Consanguinal and linguistic affinities across the Nigerian borders with its neighbours is technically a seemingly irreconcilable contradiction. The history of how the borders came into being as well as the character and motive of their 'partitioners' is paradoxical. That being the case, the nature and dynamics of interactions that have evolved over the years along these borders after their creation especially in the post-colonial era is another interesting paradox that necessitates an in-depth study. Therefore, in this section, our focus is on the efforts at making the borders mutually beneficial to Nigeria and its neighbours.

Since independence by October 1, 1960, Nigeria has been mindful of ensuring that its borders are not hostile – all in an attempt to making them mutually beneficial to it and all its immediate neighbours. This finds implicit expression in the guiding principles of Nigeria's foreign policy especially that which speaks to the "creation of necessary economic and political conditions to secure the government, territorial integrity and national independence of other countries ... and respect for the territorial integrity of all nations"²⁶. This has retained its vitality and remained virtually unedited through the changes of governments. The inherited colonial boundaries were made sacrosanct and Nigeria, in spite of its clout and endowments did not nurse any expansionist ambition

against any of its neighbours. It tried to promote peace and mutual respect with its neighbours at all cost.

In line with the above principle, Nigeria established enduring diplomatic ties with these neighbours and pursued a policy of friendly and neighbourly relations towards them. Nigeria gave them moral support and entered into bilateral economic agreements with some of them in the early 1960s, e.g. trade and customs agreements with Benin, Niger and even Togo. In Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria opened a consulate specifically to monitor the interests and security of Nigerians working in the plantations there, though serious economic ties were not developed between the two countries²⁷.

As mentioned in chapter one of this study, this good intention was not watered down by the untoward experience which Nigeria had from some of its contiguous neighbours during the civil war years. Instead, it enthused itself with maintaining and sustaining warm relationship with these neighbours. It further became clear to the country that it is better off if it keenly nurture better understanding with its neighbours. As a matter of policy the government introduced the policy of 'good neighbourliness' in order to draw its neighbours closer than ever before and maintain mutual relationship with them. The civil war made Nigeria to realize that its survival, peace, stability and development depended a great deal on good relations with these neighbours and vice versa. As it came to be seen later, if these neighbours had supported the secessionist group it would have spelt doom for the country.

The military regime of General Muhammadu Buhari did not deviate from this stance, especially when the new concept of "concentric circle" was brought to bear on the canvas of the country's external relations. At the centre of the circles were the national economic and security interests that were intricately tied up with the security, stability and economic wellbeing of Nigeria's immediate neighbours. The next important circle

was the West African sub-region and followed by the circle of relations with individual countries and inter-governmental organizations in Africa and the rest of the world²⁸.

Similarly, the Ibrahim Babangida's government was committed to the promotion of peace and stability on the African continent and security in the West African sub-region as well as commitment to the principles of respect for the provisions of the defunct Organization of African Unity (OAU) Charter, especially as they relate to the "inviolability of inherited frontiers, sovereign equality and territorial integrity of all countries, and peaceful accommodation and settlement of all disputes without foreign interference"²⁹.

Pursuant of this friendly neighbourhood policy, for instance, Nigeria initiated the formation of the Chad Basin Commission – consisting of Nigeria, Niger Republic, Cameroon and Chad in 1964³⁰. In the same year, it joined Niger and other Basin states to form the Niger River Basin Commission.

Besides that, Nigeria was encouraged by its newly found oil wealth of the 1970s hence it gave myriad of assistance to the neighbouring countries, e.g. the plans for the Onigolo cement joint project with Republic of Benin which began in 1970. In the same year, Nigeria also entered into trade and economic agreements with Benin, Chad, Cameroon, Niger and Togo. It was also then that Nigeria began to press for a West African Economic Community. In April 1972, Nigeria and Togo signed a treaty creating the nucleus of a union which later emerged as Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in May 1975³¹.

However, the reality of the good neighbourly relations has not always lived up to Nigeria's expectations or that of its neighbours. For instance, Nigeria often expected but did not always get the cooperation of the neighbouring countries in critical problem areas such as currency trafficking, smuggling and violent cross-border clashes

particularly with the Republics of Benin, Cameroon and Chad. On their part, the neighbouring countries often expected more from Nigeria than they received in economic, financial and trade considerations³².

Furthermore, Nigeria was a major aid donor and has entered into bilateral relations not only with its immediate neighbours but others in the West African sub-region³³. Shortly after the civil war (in the early 1970s), Nigeria took a credible initiative, as a result of its experience during the civil war years to ensure the formation of ECOWAS. In the process, one million pound (£1 m) interest free loan was granted to Republic of Benin and along with it two million pounds (£2m) to pay for imports from Nigeria. The country's strategy to win over some of its Francophone neighbours was regarded as "spray" diplomacy – within the context of concessionary oil prices, grants and interest free loans. The only noticeable impact of Nigeria's kind gesturing to these neighbours is that the country was venerated in the sub-region³⁴ and regarded with awe far beyond – in the continent.

With its immediate central African neighbour, Nigeria supported Nzo Ekwangaki of Cameroon for the Secretary Generalship of the Organization of African Unity (now the African Union (AU)) in 1972 and facilitated his winning in the contest for the office of the Secretary General³⁵.

It cannot be gainsaid that Africa, and for that matter, the West African sub-region is one of the weak points or links in the global political, economic and security order. Yet, the contemporary international system is undergoing a revolution especially after the Cold War. The sub-region, nay the continent, is lagging behind in a world characterized by rapid growth and strengthening of economic blocs and new patterns of security and strategic thinking³⁶. It is, therefore, instructive to state in this section the fact that most countries in the Nigerian neighbourhood have been devastated by seemingly intractable


wars either as a result of predatory nature of some factional leaders turned warlords or because of the sad inheritance of colonial balkanization and Cold War rivalry. This has been exacerbated by policies of the 'economic bullies' – the IMF/World Bank and other international lenders. The failed IMF imposed Structural Adjustment Programme has not only caused political dislocation of the sub-region it has so much wrecked the sense of self-worth of its peoples as a result of excruciating poverty that the policy has engendered. To that extent, there is a limit to what could be achieved, at least now, by the country and its West and Central African neighbours in terms of evolving a mutually beneficial cross-boundary relationship.

A corollary to that position could be seen in the fact that many African countries began to face myriad of problems shortly after their independence. One of those problems is that of boundaries. As it has been established elsewhere in this study, political boundaries established by colonial powers harboured the seeds of trouble because of their presumed artificiality to the African political landscape. These boundaries thus contained a high potential for conflict and many believed they would have to be shifted, changed or redrawn. The point is that the colonial imperialists lacked geographic knowledge of Africa, coupled with the fact that little attention was paid to exploration prior to claims, and the major purpose of African possessions to the colonizers was prestige and power. Added to that is the sense in which the concept of territoriality resulted in a boundary framework that ran counter to indigenous ideas and cannot but cause friction. Some European powers at that time were preoccupied with gaining access to a river rather than considering other variables like ethnic composition or other local peculiarities. The imposition by Europeans of a territorial framework upon established patterns of occupation created cultural dislocation and social change³⁷. The European powers were less interested in maintaining the cohesiveness of the different ethnic groups within the

borderlands than in acquiring the most territory with the minimum friction between them. In many events at settling African boundary issues on conference table by the European colonizers, evidence abound of an atmosphere of keen competition, jealousy and a desire to outwit each other and retain the greatest advantage³⁸.

However, time has shown that while the potentials are obvious, low and few cases of actual conflict have occurred between the colonizers that were keen on having colonial possessions at that time. The boundaries, even for the political elites of the independent countries, have proved resilient and resistant to change. In fact, some studies have shown that initial function of the boundary line was to separate colonial administrative territories; that these borderlines today did not inhibit local patterns of spatial interactions; and that the present day appearance of boundary conditions is as a result of the dynamic population change even after the imposition of the lines. A case in point is the mutual and stable relationship that is prevalent in the Nigerian-Niger boundary³⁹.

To be sure, one of the reasons why the Nigeria/Niger border has not been volatile and led to incessant rancour between the two countries is that the negotiation and decision making process involved in the evolution of the Nigeria-Niger boundary indicate that the boundary eventually demarcated took into consideration the indigenous political situation. In that the rival Hausa states were divided through frontier of separation in a manner that will not engender tension and conflict. This is done with the understanding that the Hausa tribe is not a monolith. However, the separation did not remain for long. With the establishment of peace in the borderlands, the population gradually migrated to reoccupy the depopulated frontier areas – especially from the French into British controlled territory. Therefore, as a result of the homogeneity of population as well as voluntary migrations, the Nigeria/Niger boundary has created a minimum stress. Today,



that patterns remained since the governments, either way, did not make any conscious effort to disrupt the settlement pattern. This explains the sustainable of mutually beneficial interaction between Nigeria/Niger in boundary settlements and towns like Jibia, Daura, Maradi, Zandam, Dankama etc⁴⁰.

As mentioned earlier in this study, the boundary did not inhibit movement of peoples and goods since numerous trails crossed the boundary and there are no natural barriers that could hinder free movement. Thus, the Nigeria/Niger boundary in some areas have unifying variables which enhance spatial interaction at the local level. For instance, in the borderlands there are large city markets, border or route markets as well as numerous bush markets with the resultant cross-boundary movements on market days. In this event, cross-boundary cultivation, journey-to-market movement and cross-boundary trade became inevitable⁴¹. We can, therefore, conclude that the Nigeria/Niger boundary has been stable – there is no conflict due largely to the fact that the European demarcation took cognizance of its anthropogeography.

Another compelling account of Nigeria's relationship with the Republic of Niger, which also states that it is markedly very warm and cordial since the two countries attained independence in 1960, is that of Nigeria's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Here, the warmth is attributed to the proactive nature of Nigeria's policy of good neighbourliness. As mentioned elsewhere before now, the good relationship between Nigeria and its contiguous neighbours, just like what obtained with the Republic of Niger, is further cemented by the economic, socio-cultural affinities, including marital relationship that exist between the peoples even before colonial independence. Apart from this, Nigeria's ties with its neighbours are further strengthened by exchange of visits, both at the highest and various official levels⁴².

Again, with Niger Republic, Nigeria's economic relations are mostly conducted by the Nigeria – Niger Joint Commission for Co-operation in 1969, revised in 1979 and it is still operational till today. It is responsible for the promotion of trade and commerce between the two countries. The Nigerian Association of Chambers of Commerce, Industries, Mines and Agriculture (NACCIMA) and the Nigerian Chamber of Commerce, Industries, Agriculture and Handicraft (CIAAN) constantly work on promoting trade and cottage industries between the two countries. The two agencies are determined to promote the potentials that are available in the areas of agriculture, industry, handicraft and mining. It should be noted that Niger has abundant untapped mineral resources such as uranium, iron ore, coal, pewter and phosphate, petroleum, chloride, atomic mass and gypsum, etc⁴³.

The energy cooperation agreement signed in 1973 forms the basis for the supply of electricity from Nigeria to Niger Republic from 1976 to date; the health agreement signed in 1982 and amended in 1990 is the basis for cooperation in the control of common diseases between the two countries. Since Niger Republic is an arid zone, there exist an agreement between it and Nigeria signed in 1990 to control desert encroachment and the menace of water hyacinths on the river Niger⁴⁴. The cultural and educational agreement signed in 1976 and 1982, respectively were aimed at exchange of teachers and students – and it is operational to date. Participating universities in the exchange programme include Usman Danfodio University Sokoto, Ahmadu Bello University, Kano and Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife. A new Protocol is working at getting Niger Republic to supply French teachers to Nigeria, and Nigeria in turn to supply English teachers to Niger Republic⁴⁵.

There is also an agreement focusing on concessional supply of both crude and refined oil to Niger Republic from Nigeria. The former has just recently sought the

latter's assistance in the area of exploration of newly discovered oil deposits in Niger⁴⁶. Niger Republic also enjoy consistent military co-operation with Nigeria, especially in the area of manpower development and training of its personnel in Nigerian military institutions. Despite its military pact with France, by virtue of being a Francophone country, Niger Republic explores the possibility of training its officers in Nigerian military institutions. This was necessitated by the reduction in training facilities offered to Niger elsewhere following the Tuareg's rebellion which was brought to an end in April 1996 after signing a Peace Accord between the government and the Tuareg rebels. Thus, a number of Nigerien military officers have been trained in Nigerian military institutions like the Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna, Command and Staff College, Jaji as well as the National War College, Abuja. A Defence Agreement to be signed soon is also being currently negotiated by the two countries⁴⁷.

Niger Republic is also a beneficiary of the Technical Aid Corps (TAC) Programme instituted by Nigeria. The TAC bilateral agreement was signed between the two countries on May 9, 2002. It is renewable automatically every two years. Many Nigerian who engage in artisanal and trading activities live in Niger, just as there are many young female Nigerians that are smuggled to Niger on a false pretence that they would be taken to Europe by their traffickers. This latter category is forced into prostitution. Not only that, there are miscreants, composed of nationals of both countries that are engaged in trans-border banditry and other crimes. One that could easily be used as an instance is cars stolen from Nigeria get ready haven in Niger Republic. This needs to be checked so as not to jeopardize the mutual, longstanding, beneficial and warm relationship between the two countries⁴⁸. Though, the Nigeria-Niger Joint Commission for Cooperation regularly meets to strengthen understanding between the two countries⁴⁹.

More specifically, there is about 1,500 kilometres long land border between Nigeria and Niger. Due to the nature of this long border, trans-border crimes like smuggling and theft of vehicles are prevalent. The two countries, therefore, through the Nigeria/Niger Joint Commission have adopted the following measures:

- a trans-border technical committee on security has been set up since 1996. It has 16 members, eight from each country – drawn from the police, state security service, customs service, immigration service, foreign affairs and justice ministries. The committee meets once a year, though extra-ordinary meetings could be held when the need arises – at border towns of both countries;
- establishment of Nigeria/Niger Joint border patrol by the security agencies of both countries. It began in 1996;
- installation of communication equipment along the borders – to facilitate the flow of information;
- training of Nigerian police personnel in Nigerian police institutions in order to enhance their law enforcing skills;
- provision of four-wheel drive vehicles for the security personnel on joint patrol to facilitate mobility;
- cooperation between the police of both countries in providing information on trans-border crimes;
- cooperation among border states/provinces of both countries⁵⁰.

However, the most nagging trans-border problem that requires intensive mutual cooperation on the part of the two countries is the incessant raids by armed bandits on Nigerian villages along the border. This is rampant in Yobe and Borno states of Nigeria. It was reported that though joint border patrols are carried out by both countries and even the tripartite agreement between Nigeria, Niger and Chad – whereby the three countries

contribute soldiers to a common pool to combat this menace, yet the devastating border raids by the robbers have not abated⁵¹.

Apart from the border situation of Niger Republic, Nigeria and its other contiguous neighbours have a general longstanding relation. For example, prior to the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between Nigeria and Cameroon in 1960, there had been interactions in the areas of commerce, trade, and culture. Nigeria and most of its contiguous neighbours share common membership of several international organizations like the defunct Organization of African Unity (OAU), the United Nations Organization (UNO), the Commonwealth (at a time with Cameroon), the Lake Chad Basin Commission and the Gulf of Guinea Commission⁵².

Mention need be made at this juncture that the bilateral relations between Nigeria and Cameroon stagnated from 1994 to 2002 because of the land maritime border dispute. Nigeria chose the path of dialogue even when it was insinuated that France was supporting Cameroon in the feud over the ownership and control of Bakassi peninsula. It was reported that France had already deployed its troops to east Atabong and Isangele parts of the disputed territory and that a French Frigate warship had arrived in the Cameroonian port city of Douala with troops, ostensibly on surveillance mission⁵³.

Due to the said land and maritime border dispute between the two countries, all forms of official transactions were stalled or took place only if Cameroon could not avoid them. However, as a result of the ICJ verdict of October 10, 2002 and the resolve of the Presidents of both countries to implement the ruling – in an amicable way, relations between the two countries began to improve. For instance, President Paul Biya visited Abuja (Nigeria's federal capital) on two different occasions in 2003 while Vice President Atiku Abubakar also visited Cameroon in July 2003 as special envoy of President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria. Subsequently, Nigerian Minister for Environment,

Minister of State for Water Resources and the former Group Managing Director of Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) also visited Cameroon⁵⁴.

No doubt, Nigeria and Cameroon had several bilateral agreements that the event of the border dispute stalled or slowed their pace. The following are the examples of such agreement: visa abolition agreement which was entered into in 1962; free movement of persons and goods between both countries; the trade agreement signed between Nigeria and Cameroon in Lagos in 1982 expired in 1987 but a revised version which was submitted by Nigeria to Cameroon since 1990 is yet to receive official response; a draft fishing agreement of 1987 between the two countries is yet to be formally signed; a telecommunication agreement signed since 1982 is still moribund; a draft customs agreement submitted to Cameroon since 1983 is yet to receive an official response; an economic scientific and technical cooperation agreement signed since 1983 expired in 1990, but it is yet to be renewed; and the Nigerian delegation to the second session of Nigeria-Cameroon Joint Commission which held in Abuja in 1993 proposed a draft agreement on equitable sharing, development, conservation and use of water resources to their Cameroonian counterparts, but a positive reaction from Cameroon is still outstanding⁵⁵.

However, the Nigeria/Cameroon Joint Commission which was inaugurated in 1987, which also had its second session held in Abuja in 1983 and the third in Yaoundé in 1995 was put on hold due to the said border dispute between the two countries. But the third session was revived in September 30, 2002 in Abuja. These are the highlights:

- the revival of all dormant agreement and treaties;
- a resolve to encourage private sector participation in joint liberalization policy of both countries;

- a deliberation on other areas of mutual cooperation, e.g., water, education, environment, oil, science and technology and transportation and aviation⁵⁶.

The fourth session was scheduled for 2004 in Yaoundé. The joint commission recommended the establishment of a permanent commission to handle security, consular and immigration matters; although report has it that the proposal on these matters needs further prompting on the side of Nigeria⁵⁷. Just like the other neighbours, the issues pertaining to border relations between Nigeria and Cameroon centre around the deep social-cultural and linguistic commonalities of the various groups that inhabit both sides of the border. No doubt, these commonalities have created ample opportunities for cross-border crimes such as smuggling, child and human trafficking, gun running, cross-border robberies, to mention but just a few⁵⁸. On the strength of this appears the imperative of establishing a Nigeria-Cameroon Joint Committee on security to check cross-border crimes. This has been discussed severally but it is yet to be given the deserved attention by the two countries⁵⁹.

Also in spite of the alleged maiming and killing of Nigerians in Bakassi by the Cameroonian gendarmes, the Nigerian government did nothing to retaliate. It was said by Brigadier General Fred Chijuka, the then Director of Defence Information, that Nigeria's insistence on a peaceful resolution of the crisis "was not borne out of weakness but in consonance with the belief that Africans should always resolve their problems without external interference"⁶⁰.

Aside Niger-Nigeria, and Cameroon-Nigerian relations, the issue of mutual co-existence between Nigeria and the Equatorial Guinea gets illuminated with a participant account of Gabriel O. Olusanya who served on the Task Force on Equatorial Guinea in the Nigerian Federal Cabinet office. Also in the Task Force were the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other relevant arms of the government⁶¹. It should

be recalled that the irritant in Nigeria-Equatorial Guinea was ignited by the South African presence in Equatorial Guinea, ostensibly to engage in agricultural activities. The South Africa presence in Equatorial Guinea became an object of suspicion because there is no dearth of arable land in South Africa, as to warrant its coming to Equatorial Guinea, which is several millions of kilometres away from it. On the contrary, Equatorial Guinea is in the proximity of Nigeria. The suspicion was heightened between Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea because the latter did not confirm to Nigeria the presence of South Africa in its territory early enough. It was reasoned that Equatorial Guinea would not have been dilatory in revealing South Africa's presence in its territory if it was actually harmless as the Nigerian government was made to believe⁶².

Not only that, tension and mistrust began to reach the plateau because a C-130 South African military aircraft disguised as a passenger airliner had landed at Malabo (Equatorial Guinea's capital city) Airport in March 1988 and had offloaded several containers into waiting vehicles which had left for an unknown destination. The containers were accompanied by seven Equatorial Guinean's officials and were not inspected by custom officials⁶³. Expectedly, the Nigerian government felt uncomfortable with the developments.

It would be recalled that Nigeria became a honorary 'frontline state' in spite of its distance to South Africa because of its vociferous opposition to the apartheid policy in South Africa. Nigeria was also instrumental to the expulsion of apartheid South Africa from the Commonwealth and it remained absolutely uncompromising on the issue. It was on the strength of this that it became a Permanent Chairman of United Nations Anti-Apartheid Committee⁶⁴. Nigeria galvanized the Organization of African Unity (OAU) now African Union (AU) into taking a collective action against the apartheid question in South Africa. It also contributed handsomely to the Special Fund initiated by the OAU

Liberation Committee, not to talk of the support it gave to Liberation Movement in Southern Africa, in form of supply of trucks, military hardware, medical supplies, clothing and food. Besides, Nigeria sponsored the idea of an "African Task Force" to help defend African countries that are called the 'Frontline states' facing the racist offensive⁶⁵. Nigeria also spearheaded the campaign that led to the withdrawal of African countries from the Montreal Olympic Games which was meant to hold in South Africa in 1976, just as it hosted the first international conference in Africa on "Action against Apartheid" in Lagos in 1977⁶⁶. Furthermore, Nigeria's deposit was withdrawn from the British owned Barclays Bank because of its continued transactions with the apartheid government. Nigeria assisted and harboured South African National Liberation Movements, especially the African National Congress (ANC) and Pan African Congress (PAC), it also ensured that the ANC and PAC got Nigerian Liaison office in Lagos – the then seat of government⁶⁷.

Arising from the foregoing, the South African 'incursion' into its 'backyard' – (Equatorial Guinea) was, thus, totally unacceptable. For any country that cares about its national security, ignoring such move was to say the least, suicidal. The reason is not far-fetched. It would only take a jet fighter thirty minutes to fly from Malabo (Equatorial Guinea) to Abuja (Nigeria's federal capital territory, and the heart of the country) and the flight would pass over Nigeria's oil rigs – its economic main-stay located in the South – east of the country. Beyond that, speculations were rife that South Africa was building a satellite station in Equatorial Guinea⁶⁸. One interesting thing about the crisis in Nigeria-Equatorial Guinea's relations is the way it was mutually resolved and the South African presence was terminated.

On Nigeria's 'political neighbours', it could be argued that no region can develop in the absence of a viable security arrangement. When there is a sustainable security

arrangement, certainly strategic interest, peace, territorial integrity and sovereignty of states can be guaranteed. It is in the light of this that Nigeria is resolute in ensuring peace and stability in the West African sub-region. For instance, Nigeria sprung into action in the 90s to contain the hostilities which arose when the regime of Sergeant Samuel Doe was declining in Liberia. Working through the ECOWAS Monitoring Observer Group (ECOMOG), Nigeria committed both human and material resources to restore relative peace and security, as part of its wider programme of West African security. The same could be said of its involvement in Sierra Leone and Guinea which imploded as a result of people living in the same geography taking up arms against one another. The spill over effect of the Liberian civil war played out in quick succession in its neighbourhood. The wars were not only protracted but were also of grave humanitarian disasters cum social and economic dislocations⁶⁹.

As evident from the foregoing, it could be summarized that efforts at making the borders beneficial to Nigeria and its neighbours no doubt require some level of trust and depend on the triumph of the spirit of human cooperation over human avarice and power-seeking⁷⁰. It is in almost 'everyone's' interest to prevent and contain crises, and there is a growing recognition that cooperation may often be a more effective way to maintain and restore peace than its continued reliance on unlimited national self-defence in a world capable of many deadly eventualities like producing and using nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. Therefore, international security efforts between Nigeria and its neighbours are arguably necessary and have almost certainly become a permanent part of world politics.

5.3 Mutual Strategies at Combating other Security Violations between Nigeria and its Neighbours

In the preceding section, we emphasise the need for cooperation and mutual understanding between and among countries that share contiguous borders or neighbours that are in an inevitable state of cohabitation. This particular section uses the collective-problem-solving basis as its point of departure. It is inevitable for neighbours to infringe on each other's territory, law and people for as long as they cohabit. But, a mutual resolution of these unavoidable infringements is the most desired aspect of interstate intercourse. This section, therefore, dwells on such mutual strategies at combating all manners of security violations in the course of interactions between Nigeria and its neighbours.

As a basis for understanding this section, let us make the following propositions – that wars could easily spread if one or all of the following obtains: first, it would be recalled that Nigeria's borders are porous and as such porous borders make it relatively easy to smuggle arms and people from one country to another. Invariably, this is a ground for one country to interfere in the affairs of its neighbours. Border zones are often politically complex and sensitive because smugglers and 'political entrepreneurs' need borders. One cannot also rule out the possibility of an insurgent residing within a neighbour's border igniting or stoking disorder and war to the neighbour, just as they might introduce militant and destabilizing ideologies into their host countries⁷¹. A quick instance is what obtained between the Republics of Niger, Chad and Nigeria in 2001. Youths from Niger and Chad stormed Jos (Nigeria) killing over 20 people and destroying several houses – following the ethno-religious conflict between the Muslim Hausa-Fulani and Christian indigenes in September 2001⁷². Though, this might not be insurgents or rebels per excellence, but the border has been violated by this sporadic attack and if it was

not properly managed, it could have escalated and degenerated, thereby provoking a state of war.

The second is an extreme case of insurgents using refugee camps in the neighbouring countries as military mobilization points or strategic zone from where they launch out to their target. For instance, during the Cold War, the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and Western non-governmental organizations (NGOs) fed and protected many anti-communist insurgents in places like Thailand, Afghanistan, Somalia and Central America. In the same vein, Southern African liberation movements tried to use refugee camps for similar purposes but with little success, especially after the South African military's tendency of attacking refugee camps forced UNHCR and South Africa to negotiate over the principle of demilitarizing camps⁷³.

The third underlying assumption is that states may be unable to control armed factions on their territories. This is contingent on weakness of such state and on cases of the inability of a state to police far away regions. For instance, the Sudanese government was unable to control Chadian factions on its western borders in the late 1980s and early 1990s. A variant of this is when the armed faction is related, in some way, to the host state, e.g., the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) of Rwanda which grew inside the ruling National Resistance Army (URA) in Uganda⁷⁴.

The fourth is 'military entrepreneurs' who benefit from ranging wars and explore such benefits especially when the war spreads to a neighbouring state. In such neighbouring state to which the war must have spread to, the military entrepreneurs might be interested in the contagion for reasons of:

- resources control
- setting up a safe haven
- putting a friendly government in power or

- simply destabilizing a potentially hostile power⁷⁵.

The fifth and final one is the logic of retaliation and escalation which know no border. In all of the foregoing scenarios, it would be futile to talk of a mutual strategy towards ensuring that the security of countries, citizens, and territories in such neighbourhood is not egregiously violated.

In another breadth, Nigeria needs to be wary in its attempt at working out mutual strategies at combating security violations with the neighbours such that in the event of war, extra-African factors would no longer be instrumental in shaping their nature. For instance, the involvement of colonial powers and superpowers is critical in starting wars, just as weapon procurement and supply. Western imposed economic policies such as the structural adjustment programme have also acted in creating the economic context in which governments and insurgents have relied on militias, child soldiers and 'dirty war' methods. Not only that, humanitarian agencies have also dictated some war strategies – predicated on the availability of relief food for war zone⁷⁶.

Added to that is the fact that Western powers and notably the US are simply wary not to risk their military resources much less the lives of their troops in Africa. Hence, their involvement has been markedly that of self engagement – sometimes connoting verbal and symbolic commitments not backed up by resources or strenuous political and diplomatic engagement⁷⁷. No doubt, opinions have been expressed, loud noise has been made and emotions shown by these Western powers but in many cases they did not go beyond that. Their aid policies have been hydra-headed, confusing and often contradictory. They are unwilling and not ready to stake time and resources to sustain a credible peacemaking effort, even where they have vested political interests as in Congo, Sudan, or Ethiopia and Eritrea.

With the foregoing at the background, Nigeria will have the benefit of hindsight to ensure that its security challenges and its relationship with its neighbours are its exclusive responsibility ultimately and as such, it should be wary in order to ensure that strategies are put in place to avoid war situations.

Again, it is increasingly becoming clear that a way to ensuring mutual peace and security is to establish a common consent among states. The essential elements are:

- good neighbourliness;
- a common culture of tolerance and pluralism and;
- respect for regional and sub-regional institutions;
- at least a minimum respect for human right⁷⁸.

Another strategy that could be adapted from Europe, which is also pursuant of good neighbourliness mentioned above, is 'Europol' and the Schengen Agreement for cross-border judicial activities. By this, the increasing European Union (EU) pressure for ever-greater integration has necessitated a corresponding EU-wide criminal justice system such that individual state mirrors initiatives in the other. To that extent, certain categories of crime become punishable in whichever country within the EU it was committed⁷⁹.

The above development is occasioned by the revolution in information technology and the pressure of globalization and borderlessness of the countries of the world. Adopting this type of strategy by Nigeria and its neighbours for the purpose of collective security would, therefore, not be a misplaced priority. A further justification for this is that law enforcement and national security dividend is quite insignificant; because an efficient national security is proactive and deals with aggressive intelligence gathering. It anticipates threats and pre-emptes the actions of suspected targets. This, as opposed to reactionary prompting, ex-post-facto arrests and trials – governed by rules of evidence, is most expedient in this age of globalization and its attendant skirmishes and surprises⁸⁰.

For instance, after the September 11, 2001 attack in which two passenger planes were hijacked by suicide bombers and deliberately crashed into the twin towers of the World Trade Centre and a third plane crashed into the Pentagon – leading to the death and disappearance of over 3,000 persons on the twin towers of the US⁸¹, the British intelligence service, by September 13, 2001, ordered that all communication service providers to retain:

- logs of all e-mails sent and received (not the content);
- logs showing the allocation of dynamic IP addresses (internet usage);
- logs identifying the source, destination and times of all calls made or routed through their telephone networks⁸².

Shortly after the passage of this ‘tall order’, observers have maintained that a conspiracy theory of the new world order is brewing. In this event, the state has started encroaching on private lives of the citizens in an unprecedented manner. One of its manifestations is the passage of Patriot Act – a fall out of the attack and an expansion of the authority of the US government to conduct secret searches, obtain private records and intercept telephone calls, among other activities, in its effort to track down suspected terror cells⁸³. This Act, just like the British order mentioned earlier on, has limited or eliminated American/British constitutionally guaranteed freedoms and by extension many of such freedom and human rights of other nationals living in those countries⁸⁴.

The slice of the report given above is to demonstrate that the developed countries of the world did not see their recent rabid intelligence gathering as infringement on human rights. Rather they have argued that they are meant to serve national security purposes in an era of globalization, and make up for the virtual erosion of state control on sub-national groups and saboteurs. It, therefore, behoves on Nigeria and its neighbours to

be more reflective on measures to be put in place in order to combat security violations on their territories and borders.

Some of such major security issues between Nigeria and Cameroon that could be highlighted as requiring a mutual strategy include refugee problems, the aged, the destitute and pension matters. To start with, there is a large number of Nigerians taking refuge in communities around Nigeria's borders with Cameroon. It was reported that the Tivs and Fulanis ethnic groups of Nigeria are refugees in the North West Adamawa and Western Provinces of Cameroon. They appear to have overstayed thereby constituting a source of concern for the local authorities there. The Nigerian mission in Cameroon has, therefore, made spirited effort to contact a Nigerian agency named the National Emergency Agency (NEMA) to facilitate their repatriation to their native abodes in Nigeria, but the effort is yet to yield the desired results⁸⁵. Besides that, it would be recalled that part of Cameroon used to be a province of Nigeria before the plebiscite that severed the Cameroonian part and got it incorporated into the Republic of Cameroon. This peculiar historical linkage between the two countries gave rise to a large number of aged, sick and destitute Nigerians living in Cameroon. The development is no doubt an enigmatic consular problem to the Nigerian mission in Cameroon, which also call for a mutual strategy to expatriate them en-mass to Nigeria without further delay⁸⁶.

Furthermore, the mood of rapprochement between the two countries following the resolution of the Bakassi peninsula debacle via the International Court of Justice's verdict of November 10, 2002, should be made to resolve the issue of suspension of payment of pension to about 278 Cameroonians and 25 Nigerians who had retired from the public services of both countries. Hitherto, the Nigerian mission in Cameroon had to contend with aged and widowed Cameroonians protesting the non-payment of their pensions⁸⁷.

In like manner mutual strategy needs to be explored to put to rest the embarrassing spate of prostitution and human trafficking between Nigeria and Niger Republic. As a background to understanding the scenarios of human trafficking and prostitution between Nigeria and Niger Republic, it is instructive to note that close to 1.5 million of Nigerians are resident in Niger Republic. This is certainly a variable of long standing cordial relationship that exists between the two countries. There exist the factors of cultural and religious ties, inter-marriages and proximity between the two countries⁸⁸. Furthermore, Niger Republic shares boundaries with seven states of Nigeria – Sokoto, Kebbi, Katsina, Jigawa, Zamfara, Yobe and Borno. The people in these states share the same language and religion with people in Nigerian provinces. Giving this type of affinity, many Nigerians go to Niger and vice-versa without travel documents such as passports and identity cards. Therefore, differentiating a Nigerian Hausa man from that of his Nigerian counterpart has been a herculean task for the Nigerian embassy in Niamey. Be that as it may, many Nigerians that are deceived by their fellow Nigerians that they would be taken to Europe via Niger Republic often end up in the arid desert of Agadez or deported with ignominy from Algeria, Libya or Mali⁸⁹.

Another variant of the free movement of people across Nigerian-Nigerien borders is the presence of large number of Nigerians (about 5,000) engaged in Niger as commercial sex workers; just as there are scores of Nigerians that ended up in Nigerien prisons – for offences ranging from drug trafficking, aircraft hijacking, murder and theft. Many of the detainees spend longer time in prisons than would have been permitted were they charged to the law court early enough⁹⁰. These are the areas requiring mutual strategies by the two countries – and which, of course, are similar to what is required between Nigeria and its neighbours to the West and Central parts of Africa.

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Chapter Six

New Security Issues and Challenges in Nigeria's National Security with its Neighbours

The first thing examined in this chapter is the historical content and the arguments on the war on terror. This is done with a view to exploring Nigeria's involvement and/or response on the war. The second is on the nature and dynamics of free movement of people in West and Central Africa as it affects Nigeria's national security. The third focuses on the 'notoriety' that characterized Nigeria/Cameroon relations on the land and maritime border cum oil-rich Bakassi peninsula, and more important, as the controversial peninsula impinges on Nigeria's national security. The fourth which is on the Gulf of Guinea pinpoints its oil endowment, US's vested interest there and the implications of these for Nigeria's national security.

6.1 The War on Terror and New Security Dilemma

This sub-section will be devoted to a discussion on terrorism and all the challenges it has generated in the contemporary international system. It is not as if there were no acts of terrorism before. But today there is a renewed global attention to the problem from the beginning of the 2000s. As it is going to be demonstrated, the rejuvenation of attempts at combating the menace is a function of a multiplicity of factors ranging from the intensity of the activities of terrorists organisations to the daring potentials of the terrorists, the suicidal instinct and brazen sense of impunity of many terrorists organizations, the extent of destructions occasioned by their attacks, the category of nationals affected by their attacks, the widespread nature of activism, the multiplication of activists and the global spread of terrorist cells.

In order to fully grasp the war on terror and the new security dilemma facing Nigeria and its neighbours, it is pertinent to make the following preliminary remarks.

There have been myriad of definitions of the phenomenon called terrorism but the study will adopt the one below:

A premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine state agents, usually involving the citizens or terrorists of more than one country.¹

Some have argued that to call certain group of people terrorists is not only a debating stratagem, but also a judgmental statement. In their words, "terrorist is what one calls one's opponent regardless of whether or not one's friend is a freedom fighter"²; and as such, "to call an act of political violence 'terrorist' is not merely to describe it but to judge it. Descriptively, terrorism suggests violent actions by individuals or small groups; judgmentally, it implies illegitimacy"³. In most cases, to classify an act as terrorism indicates the decision to place the particular use of violence outside the spectrum of accepted behaviour or norms and it is a socially constructed concept identifying anti-establishment⁴.

It should also be said that the phenomenon terrorism will increase with increasing contemporary struggles over issues of justice, democracy, public accountability, national resources distribution, power sharing and ethnic cum religious tolerance. This is why extremists or dissidents, especially those with suicide tendencies, as well as patriots, who can no longer bear the retrogression of their country in the midst of plenty, can always emerge to form terrorist groups⁵. Hence, the United Nations assembly affirmed that terrorism flourishes when there is despair, humiliation, poverty, political oppression, extremism and human right abuses. It flourishes also in contexts such as regional conflict, foreign occupation, state weakness or failure of the state to maintain law and order⁶.

A focus on the US could better illuminate some of the premises given above. For instance, the Arab communities in the Middle East that have 'a stone to grind' with the US government. The US has created a huge number of potential terrorists all over Latin

America during a half-century of American actions far worse than those perpetuated in the Middle East⁷. In fact, William Blum argued that “If Latin Americans shared the belief of many Muslims that they will go directly to paradise for martyring themselves by killing the ‘Great Satan’, by now we might have had decades of repeated terrorist horror coming from South of the US/Mexican border”⁸. Blum further argued that the same could be said of Asia and Africa in relation to the US⁹. The pool of unemployed hungry/angry youth in Nigeria could be a source of concern especially in a discourse like this¹⁰.

We have to be careful in Africa, however, such that Western nations, just as during the heat of the Cold War, would not erroneously label all the desires for self determination and social justice as the activities of terrorist organisations/groups. Just like the African National Congress (ANC) and Pan African Congress (PAC) – liberation movements in Southern Africa during the apartheid years were erroneously labelled as terrorist organisations. The motive for such label by the Western world was simply to serve and protect their interests and investment in the apartheid enclave. Under the natural law and justice, the United Nations (UN) Charter, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) (now African Union (AU) Charter and international law, these liberation fighters in Africa were pursuing a just cause¹¹. In fact, the UN endorsed the methodology of these organizations – saying that they had no alternative method of pursuing their cause(s) – as long as such organisations do not divorce themselves from pursuing the cause of the masses¹². Hence, Carlos Lage Davila, the Cuban Vice-President’s viewpoint on this is worthy of citation:

*Terrorism is born of injustice, ..., of poverty and inequality, of the humiliation suffered by whole nations, of the contempt towards and the underestimation of belief systems, of arrogance, of abuse and of crimes. It is not a consequence of radical ideologies that must be swept off the face of the earth with bombs and missiles*¹³.

Origin of the Global 'War on Terror'

The global 'war on terror' originated from the US. Certainly today, terrorism has acquired an extraordinary status in American public discourse. It has displaced communism as the foremost public enemy, though there are series of attempts to lump the two together. In fact, rhetorics that are frightening in their capacity for mobilizing public opinion, gaining legitimacy and provoking various forms of murderous action, have been generated in the politics of political violence called terrorism¹⁴. Interestingly, most of the interpretations are merely based on rumour, fabrication and incestuous scholarship¹⁵ – to the extent that some of the scholars and their interpretations have become paranoid.

Strikingly too, the various interpretations mentioned above erroneously assume that terrorism is novel in its contemporary manifestation and destructiveness hence it is counter-terrorism that could annihilate it¹⁶. As a footnote to this, they campaign for formal and procedural democracy and the rhetoric of freedom.

The end of the Cold War/demise of Socialism – which was seen as a traditional source of terrorist activity, has flattened the argument of this 'community of interpretation'. This was particularly so when the social roots of political violence became more apparent with the multiplication of powerful expressions of national and ethnic aspirations in the form of a large-scale, sustained violence as opposed to the more episodic and small-scale activities of the past¹⁷.

It is however, useful at this juncture, to graphically state how the stage was set for the demonisation of terrorism – which eventually gave rise to the 'community of interpretation' we have mentioned. It began during the Ronald Regan administration in 1981 when terrorism was combined with communism and fascism as one more of the perilous society movements of the 20th century. Having already made several explosive impressions on the international scene in the 1970s, by the inauguration of Regan's

administration in 1981, terrorism was already occupying the centre-stage in the discourse of US national security and as a prime threat to its national interests¹⁸. Such committee as the Committee on the Present Danger and institution as the Heritage Foundation began to create images that demonized terrorism and linking it with a grand Soviet attempt to dominate the world¹⁹. To subdue such war, a fight-back or a counterattack was recommended²⁰.

Arising from the foregoing is the abrupt transformation of terrorism from a political process, which has historical trend²¹, into an apolitical monstrosity lacking any possibility of explanation and a symptom or maladies of the contemporary world²². This interpretation came to a head in the US from 1981 to 1986 during Reagan's era. The study of violence was dissociated from its original historical context; hence the conspiracy theorists have created a distorted mirror of violence that serves selected images and conceptualization of politics. Since this switch, terrorism became a menace to be confronted.

With that at the background, the 'war on terror' was intensified after the cataclysmic event of September 11, 2001 in the US. In that event two passenger planes were hijacked by suicide bombers and deliberately crashed into the twin towers of the World Trade Centre and a third plane crashed into the Pentagon – leading to the death and disappearance of over 3,000 persons²⁴. The fourth plane's target attack was averted by the physical intervention and struggle of the passengers, but this resulted in the plane crashing and the tragic loss of the lives of all on board²⁵. The choice of the two buildings targeted by the terrorists was not at random, because the Pentagon and World Trade Centre represented the military and economic might of the US and the plane that crashed in Pennsylvania may be conjectured to be heading to the political quarters, the White House²⁶. This gruesome destruction provoked international public opinion against

terrorism and renewed the attempt to confront the deadly assault on human integrity at all fronts²⁷.

However, while testifying before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee in 1999, George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) remarked to the panel that the threats to US citizens and interests in the world are multifarious; they include threats from terrorism; the challenge of Russia and China; threat from regional trouble-makers – Iraq, North Korea and Iran; national security worries about the India-Pakistan confrontation; unrest in the Balkans; potential hot spots in the Aegean Sea region, Haiti and Africa; and the increased risk of attack by weapons of mass destruction, e.g., fuel-air explosives, nuclear, biological and chemical weapons²⁸. Therefore, it could be argued that most of these security threats arise as a result of the standing of the US as a global hegemon. As would be argued also later in this study, it is, thus, expedient for Nigeria to be cautious so that the US peculiar security interests will not becloud its own security interests.

Since the end of the Cold War, the has US become unchallenged in global military capability. It is now the only country that can to intervene in any conflict anywhere in the world. It has remained committed to maintaining the ground, naval, and air forces that would be needed in an event of outbreak of war in any troubled spot of the world together with the means to move and supply them, overseas bases to support them and spaced-based reconnaissance systems to locate threats and guide weapons to their targets. Coupled with all these, the US continued its military research and development efforts to keep its technological edge over potential challengers for as long as possible. These capabilities have allowed the US to act mostly as the world police dominating other major states militarily and directing the security agenda of many others wittingly and unwittingly²⁹. How long the US will continue to bear the cost of maintaining its global

military infrastructure and leadership in defence technology, as well as undertake military missions anytime, anywhere against any aggressor is beyond the scope of this study as it remains unclear yet.

Rather than appreciating the multifarious causes of anti-American feeling, all over the world, American Congressmen were busy singing the American anthem "God bless America", stores quickly sold out their stocks of American flags, callers to radio programmes began to pour venom on the terrorists, sporting events began with military-praise and/or patriotic ceremonies. Many American newspapers, radio and television programmes are replete with some tributes to American courage (this spanned for more than one year after the September 11, 2001 saga)³⁰. Many did not share the opinion that the attack was a revenge for American policies abroad, instead they construed that the attack was directed against the US because of its democracy, wealth and being an 'apostle' of freedom³¹. For instance, the American Council of Trustees and Alumni, a conservative watchdog group founded by Lynne Cheney, wife of the Vice President, and Senator Joseph Lieberman, in November (2001) during the formation of the Defence of Civilization Fund declared that:

*It was not only America that was attacked on September 11, but civilization. We were attacked not for our vices, but for our virtues*³².

However, the terrorists responsible for the original bombing of the World Trade Centre back in 1993 were unequivocal on the reason that motivated them, one of which is:

*We declare our responsibility for the explosion on the mentioned building (World Trade Centre). The action was done in response for the American political, economic and military support to Israel the state of terrorism and to the rest of the dictator countries in the region*³³.

Unlike the September 11 attack, which was placed on record that even most of the hijackers did not know that they were part of a suicide mission until they prepared to

board the planes³⁴, the US directed a premeditated ploy to assassinate/maim thousands of Afghans – as a reprisal attack against the September 11 aggression which was a bloodbath more than that of September 11³⁵.

Besides, if Timothy McVeigh, the perpetrator of the terrible bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma city in 1995, had not been quickly caught, the US would not have bombed the state of Michigan or any other places he called home, rather it would have embarked on a manhunt until they found and punish him³⁶. So, rather than showing restraint as it did in the Russia's problem with Chechnya in 1999, the US took action against the terrorists in the Afghanistan's case, by using indiscriminate force that endangered innocent citizens³⁷.

The US intervenes when it least risks American casualties – this is particularly so in its intervention in African wars. By extension the issues of lives of non-Americans do not have the same value as those of Americans. The loss of non-American lives is usually treated as inevitable and perhaps regrettable³⁸. For instance, in the raging civil war in Afghanistan, the reportage of Afghan civilian casualties was deliberately downplayed and remarked contemptuously by the American press and military³⁹. However, this was not so in the case of cataclysmic event of September 11, 2001 in the US in which two passenger planes were hijacked by suicide bombers and deliberately crashed into the twin towers of the World Trade Centre and a third plane crashed before it got to the Pentagon – leading to the death and disappearance of over 3,000 persons⁴⁰. The event was more 'trumpeted' by the Bush government as 'an act of war' and was given enormous media attention. The same way that no single one of the American 1,500 daily newspapers condemn US/NATO in 1999 when it bombed Yugoslavia for 78 days and nights or the US 40 days and nights of relentless bombing of Iraq in 1991⁴¹.

Regrettably:

The United States has a long record of bombing nations, reducing entire neighbourhoods, and much of cities, to rubble, wrecking infrastructure, ruining the lives of those the bomb didn't kill. And afterward doing nothing to repair the damage⁴².

There are allegations that the US government is rather political on its 'war on terror'. In fact, public approval rating of Bush's handling of foreign policy and terrorism has dropped to 40 per cent, near the lowest level of his presidency, according to Associate Press poll in August, 2006⁴³. This is what informed the criticism that:

... Doing the right thing is not a principle of American foreign policy, not an ideal or a goal of policy in and of itself. If it happens that doing the right thing coincides with ... Washington's overriding international ambitions, American officials have no problem walking the high moral ground⁴⁴.

Blum is of the view that the above coincidence is rarely so. He contends that many American 'interventions', (to quote him again):

... show clearly that the engine of American foreign policy has been fuelled not by a devotion to any kind of morality, nor even simple decency, but rather by the necessity to serve other masters⁴⁵.

Furthermore, it was suggested that as a fall out of the collapse of international communist conspiracy, the need to justify the swollen budgets of the various components of national security, protect their jobs and to give themselves a mission in the aftermath of the Soviet Union, Washington's security establishments prefer to give the impression that the new 'enemies' now are drugs, military or industrial spying, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction', organised crime and most important, terrorism⁴⁶. Thus, he concluded that 'Washington's war on terrorism is doomed to failure as its war on drugs has been⁴⁷.

It need be mentioned here that terrorists, whatever else they might be – might also be rational human beings. Most of them are deeply concerned by what they see as social, political or religious injustice and hypocrisy⁴⁸. The following will illustrate that standpoint better. The shooting down of two Libyan planes in 1981; the bombardment of

Beirut in 1983 and 1984; the bombing of two Libyan cities in 1986; the bombing and sinking of an Iranian ship in 1987; the shooting down of two more Libyan planes in 1989; the massive bombing of the Iraqi people in 1991; continuing sanctions, bombing and seemingly unending occupation of Iraq even after the US-induced ouster of Saddam Hussein; the bombing of Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998; the habitual support of Israel despite its belligerence and routine torture and condemnation of Arabs resistance to it; the double standard applied against Israel terrorism, such as the wilful massacre of 106 Lebanese at the UN base at Qana in 1996; the continued persecution of Libya (of close to two decades); the abduction of wanted men from Muslim countries, such as Malaysia, Pakistan, Lebanon and Albania; the large military and hi-tech presence in Saudi Arabia – Islam's holiest land and elsewhere in the Persian Gulf region, to mention but a few, are some of the American actions that can turn an Arab or a Muslim into a fanatic and into a terrorist⁴⁹.

Mir Aimal Kansi (a Pakistani) who shot 5 people in front of CIA headquarters was convicted in 1997. His motive was to protest US policies toward Muslims in the Middle East and the bombing of Iraq⁵⁰. Two days after Kansi's conviction, four Americans were gunned down in Karachi, Pakistan. In 1998, Iran bombed Pan AM 103 to retaliate for the shooting down of its own passenger plane by the US a few months earlier and during the US bombing of Iraq in 1991, there were series of terrorist attacks against American institutions all over the Middle East and elsewhere⁵¹. In return, some countries have been branded as Washington's officially-designated enemies (ODE) who are thus treated as enemies – 'terrorist states' by the US⁵².

Interestingly too, the growth of the internet has brought a new security dilemma to bear. While it is providing fabulous instrument for intelligence gathering, the interconnection of data on a worldwide scale is also a source of stupendous opportunities

of massive striking power for terrorist and criminal networks, and it has opened up new dimensions for cyber-warfare⁵³. Unfortunately, as the world's intelligence services redefine their missions, they pose new dangers to civil rights. For instance, the fallout of the September 11, 2001 attack in the US, has led to some sort of a conspiracy theory of the new world order. The US parliament passed a Patriot Act – which is a response to the September 11 attack and much of what the new world order conspiracy theorists predicted. Certainly, the Act has limited or eliminated many American constitutionally guaranteed freedoms not just for Americans but for many other nationals on American soil⁵⁴. In effect, the Act expanded the authority of the US government to conduct secret searches, obtain private records and intercept telephone calls, among other activities, in its effort to track down suspected terror cells⁵⁵. Thus, the huge changes in technological development have increased the potential for totalitarian monitoring and manipulation of public understanding. To that extent, the new world of revolution in information technology is accompanied by a proactive intelligence intervention replacing a reactive law enforcement⁵⁶.

Giving this premise, it is germane to switch to an assessment of Nigerian peculiarities within the context of 'war on terror' with a view to situating its security needs properly. In essence, this standpoint will afford us the opportunity of appreciating the new security dilemma facing the country in the contemporary international system and how this affects its national security in relations with its neighbours. The above position requires that there is a need to dismiss the viewpoint that terrorism is a novel phenomenon and that counter-terrorism is the means by which the menace could be checked. If that is accepted as a given, then the tendency to demonise the phenomenon would reduce or cease outright. It is within this prism that we would be able to appreciate that the phenomenon is not just a symptom or malady but a political process and a social

construct that is deserving of a possibility of explanation and realistic solution. Doing so would not only liberate the country from using foreign lenses to view the act of terror or the war on it, it will also open up the possibility of seeing the danger in using the 'war on terror' to serve a select image and interpretation that are extraneous to its peculiar national security needs.

While acknowledging that the most fundamental of all human rights is the right to life, arguments abound that approaches to terror focusing mainly on military, police and intelligence measures may undermine efforts to promote good governance and human rights. It may also alienate large part of world's population and thereby weaken the potential for collective action against terrorism⁵⁷. What is required is a holistic strategy to address the root causes of terrorism and strengthen responsible states and rule of law and fundamental human rights i.e. democratic reform, ending 'occupations', addressing major political grievances, combating organised crime⁵⁸, reducing poverty, and unemployment – which is prevalent in Nigeria and its neighbourhood. It also calls for checking extremism and intolerance – via the promotion of education and fostering of public debate.

6.2 Free Movement of People and New Security Challenges

You cannot build states without controlling borders. In fact, the military-administrative power of any state can best be gauged through an analysis of its success in controlling interaction across its boundaries, in checking the movement of men, commodities and ideas⁵⁹.

This section shall be devoted to examining critically the above quotation with a view to situating it within the capability, weakness or constraints facing Nigeria and its neighbours on the nature and dynamics of interactions that exist on their borders and how that affect Nigeria's national security. Such a discussion could be opened with an understanding of what movement or migration means.

Movement or migration as it were is a constant factor in human history. It is a major element in the development of people's culture and relations. Man's history is the story of wanderings. Ever since creation man has multiplied and spread to all the habitable portions of the globe. Though blind dispersions and wanderings often into undefined and inhabited land where opposition or conflicts do not arise from are the original forms of migration. Archaeological records, oral traditions, linguistic factors, racial characteristics and cultural elements are the testimonials to the said nature of migration⁶⁰. Evidently, such terms as invasion, conquest, colonization and immigration derived their origins from migration. It could be said that migration has played a pivotal role in the history of all nations. People who have had to move across borders have intermingled, survived as distinct groups, created ethnic communities or minorities⁶¹.

With that as the premise, it could be argued that free movement of peoples across national boundary is worthwhile. In fact, Liberal economic theory states that economic development is often hampered by the inhibitions placed against free movement of capital goods and services and labour across national boundaries. This is the more reason that it is suggested that such barriers need be removed in order to develop⁶².

It is instructive to note that during the era of colonialism there was free movement of elites within the territories administered by each colonial power. For instance, many Sierra Leonean and Ghanaian lawyers, teachers and civil servants served in Nigeria, – being the largest employer of external manpower in West African sub-region as a result of its vastness and endowments⁶³. Furthermore, not only had many Ghanaian fishermen settled freely on the Bights of Biafra and Benin, but many pastoralists and petit traders also crossed unimpeded across the colonial frontiers. In the same vein, many Dahomeyans (Beninoise) featured in the Senegalese administrative cadre⁶⁴.

Also as a background to this part of our study, a review of the nature and dynamic of migration and free movement of people before and after the Nigerian Civil War is equally worthwhile here. Shortly after its independence and prior to the Civil War of 1967-1970, Nigeria had by 1964 signed bilateral agreements with Cameroon, Dahomey (Now Benin Republic), Niger, Chad, Togo, Guinea, Morocco and Cote d'Ivoire which exempted nationals of these countries visiting Nigeria from satisfying visa requirements. The agreements which were suspended during the Civil War years were later reactivated after the Civil War⁶⁵. No doubt, Nigeria is the most attractive place for immigrants in the sub-region and in its entire neighbourhood. Citizens in most of the neighbouring states have good reasons to go to Nigeria because of an assurance of securing a job – although the nature of such jobs vary. Hence, the number of immigrants from the English and French speaking parts of the West and Central Africa, that are sharing borders with Nigeria and even far off, have increased over time, more so with the ratification of the ECOWAS protocol on free movement⁶⁶.

To be sure, the free movement of people in the ECOWAS treaty is a landmark instrument in the annals of the organization that encompasses 15 West African countries. It is article 27 of the treaty which confers on citizens of member states the right to be regarded as community citizens. This in effect abolishes all obstacles to citizen's freedom of movement and residence within the community. In fact, article 27 paragraph 2 says that the citizens of the community will be exempted from holding visitors' visas and residence permits. Furthermore, community citizens will have the legal right to work and undertake commercial and industrial activities with the territories of member states. It is also the same article that covers movement of people, services and capital and undertakes to abolish obstacles to free movement⁶⁷. The snag since the instrument came into existence has been how to obtain entry visa, therefore, facilitating how entry visas could

be obtained is the only way by which the instrument could be made fully operational and effective.

In a one-day summit of heads of state and government of the ECOWAS that took place in March 2000, in Abuja (Nigeria), attempts were made to cement the forging of greater economic integration in the sub-region by creating a borderless trade area. The following were agreed upon, among others, that:

- check points on international highways within the sub-region should be dismantled;
- rigid border formalities, which have inhibited movement of goods and services among member countries, were to be eliminated;
- limiting border post personnel to essential officials only, such as customs and immigration; joint border patrols should be reinvigorated;
- free flow of information among security agencies within ECOWAS should be encouraged;
- a single ECOWAS passport should be adopted;
- the ECOWAS travel certificate should be effectively used;
- a railway line from Lagos through Cotonou to Lome and Accra should be constructed and;
- a sub-regional airline should be launched⁶⁸.

As laudable as these attempts or goals were, there are yet seemingly insurmountable obstacles. For instance, trade barriers are yet to be removed in spite of the numerous resolutions of the past – because many ECOWAS member countries do not want to lose revenue accruing from tariffs⁶⁹. But beyond this, are the challenges that free movement of goods and services will engender – especially with the increasing cross-border crimes in the sub-region. Coupled with that, we found that the full implementation

of the first protocol of free movement of goods, labour and capital, which is meant to ensure the right of entry and abolition of visas, which is currently in force, is being hampered by the ineptitude of the customs, immigrations and other border officials throughout West Africa. These law enforcement agencies often demand bribes from helpless travellers. They have also been alleged to have employed tactics such as extortion, harassment and intimidation to achieve these inglorious aims⁷⁰.

By 2005, ECOWAS, on free movement of people could readily boast that after 30 years of its existence it has succeeded in the following areas:

- abolition of entry visa for community citizens;
- provision of rights of residence and establishment for community citizens;
- removal of the blocks and security check points and;
- introduction of ECOWAS passport and travel certificate⁷¹.

Again, with the abolition of entry visa for community citizens and rights of residence and establishment, there are no doubt security problems of cross-border crime which have become increasingly intractable. Nonetheless, the organization is working against trans-border crime through the following means:

- convention on mutual assistance in criminal matters;
- a convention on extradition;
- the creation of the inter-governmental action group against money laundering;
- declaration of plan of action on the fight against trafficking in persons;
- a protocol relating to the fight against corruption and;
- a cooperation agreement on criminal matters⁷².

It is also a ruse to say that roadblocks and security check points at the borders have been removed. Essentially, these roadblocks and security check points are still maintained – serving extortion purposes⁷³.

Be that as it may, some of the social security problems associated with free movement of people across national boundaries in West and Central Africa merit a discussion at this juncture. One of the reasons given by the Nigerian government in 1983 to justify the expulsion of 'illegal aliens' from many of its neighbours (both far and near) is that they not only constitute serious security problems by virtue of the religious and social upheavals taking place in Nigerian cities of Maiduguri, Kano and Kaduna; but that they have also encroached upon the job opportunities that could have been opened to many Nigerians⁷⁴. The impression that is given in the literature is that between 1 and 2 million people were expelled from Nigeria – which was characterized as the "largest forced migration of people since the nineteenth century⁷⁵". The breakdown is 700,000 Ghanaians; 150,000 Chadians; 18,000 Beninoise and 5,000 Togolese, totalling 1.2 million according to the Nigerian Minister of the Interior⁷⁶.

Many nomadic farmers rearing their herds across national boundaries is another flash-point within the context of free movement of people in countries surrounding Nigeria. The menace of these aggressive nomads is increasingly becoming a serious security issue. This is either due to overgrazing or trespasses by these nomads on other farmer's crops and land. These itinerant nomads' activities are no respecter of boundaries – as they rear their cattle across the borders. Perhaps, common grazing reserves for them could stem the tide of notoriety of these nomadic cattle rearers and widespread clashes they engaged other farmers that are into food and cash crops in⁷⁷.

Other sundry social evils associated with free movement of people across the different West and Central African boundaries include cross-border crime, destitution,

disruption of family life, poor conditions of employment and damage to the economies of both the receiving and the migrants' countries⁷⁸. Needless to say that organized labour migration is limited in scope as it is actually a novel phenomenon in West Africa e.g. the agreements of organized labour movement between Nigeria and Gabon, Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea and between Cote d' Ivoire and Burkina Faso⁷⁹. Besides, there is a tendency that, with free movement of people in ECOWAS countries, people would move away from low-wage areas to high-wage areas. Beyond that, many migrant workers that are often willing to sell their labour cheaply might begin to deprive the locals from getting jobs. Furthermore, the grossly inadequate public utilities and security apparatus of the more developed sister states that migrants workers might be keen on going to would definitely be overstretched⁸⁰.

For instance, with free movement of people from both ECOWAS and non-ECOWAS countries surrounding Nigeria, there is a blatant disregard for Nigeria's immigration laws and generations of swarm of cheap labour in the Nigerian construction and service industries. In some ways, this category of cheap labourers constitutes some sense of national security problem, not to talk of how they constitute a destabilizing force to an effective labour unionism in Nigeria. This standpoint is predicated on the fact that this crop of cheap labourers were willing to take up any odd job and inferior working conditions of service, just as they were readily available to replace in duties or positions protested against by Nigerian workers⁸¹.

Interestingly too, it is not all the immigrants that are gainfully employed whether at the level of professional cadre or on menial jobs. Thus, this other category constitutes what could be called unemployed visitors and refugees which in turn constitute social and security strain on Nigeria. For instance, the Chadian war of the 1980s generated people that constituted enormous burden on the Nigerian social and security spaces⁸². They

engaged in illegal syndicate activities, and crimes, smuggling, prostitution destitution and vagrancy⁸³.

Another danger with mass movement of people as a result of 'free movement' under discourse is the high probability of importing pests and diseases by the immigrant to their host countries as well as the stress on the amenities like houses, schools, transportation and medical services in the receiving countries⁸⁴.

In a situation where there are no physical barriers across the borders; where people of common culture and language live in both sides of the border and above all, there are several bush trails connecting neighbouring markets and villages like the Nigerian/Nigerien border, then the act of restraining or monitoring freedom of movement across national boundaries effectively becomes cumbersome and somewhat unrealizable⁸⁵. Igor Kopytoff captures this African porous and gregarious scenario in the following manner;

Established societies were surrounded by large tracts of land that were open politically and or physically, or both ... settlers wishing to leave the established societies could move into this internal African frontier and set up their own social order in the midst of what was effectively in institution of vacuum⁸⁶.

A corollary to that and that which is also associated with free movement of people in Nigeria's neighbourhood to the West and Central parts of Africa is that which is common to other African countries – and that is the problem of arbitrary boundary demarcation by the colonialists. It is this that would necessitate the appraisal that follows. It has been rightly observed that the concept of nationality or a sense of or claim to having originated from a particular country in Africa is so problematic. To illustrate this position, the following reflection is pertinent.

In many parts of Africa the concept of nationality is new and the consciousness of being a national of one country is not yet strong. Some residents of foreign origin might have a good claim to

*citizenship if the necessary documentary evidence could be produced. In this kind of situation, irrespective of a person's legal status, members of the general public may assume, because of his appearance, or mode of behaviour, that he is of another nationality*⁸⁷.

As previously hinted elsewhere in this study, it is further observed that

*Some communities inhabit both sides of a frontier and, in less intensely administered areas, they migrate so freely that their nationality is not yet distinguishable. The descendants of inter-tribal or inter-racial marriages often pose similar problems of nationality*⁸⁸.

In fact, many Nigerians see the colonial boundaries as serving purpose(s) for France and Britain not as a barrier for Africans against each other across borders. It is rather a postcolonial phenomenon that the various African countries after their independence began to mount a variety of immigration laws to discourage 'alien' from getting into their countries. Whereas, hitherto, citizens of the various countries were once free to live and work in any country in their neighbourhood⁸⁹. But today, immigration laws have been made hostile to 'aliens', thereby leading to brutality of law enforcement and flagrant disregard of the fundamental human rights of the so called 'aliens' by the state agents in charge of policing of immigrants and customs and excise assignments. This kind of development does not augur well for sub-regional cohesion and integration and as such a proposal for the harmonizing the immigration laws of the various countries surrounding Nigeria should be considered to be highly desirable.

For instance, visa abolition agreement exists between Nigeria and Cameroon. This bilateral agreement was signed in 1962 to facilitate free movement of person and goods between both countries. But unfortunately, the event of land and maritime border dispute that spanned between 1994 and 2002 stalled or slowed down the pace of this agreement⁹⁰. Apart from that, there is a germane and peculiar problem which though not part of the fallout of the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement, bothers on free movement of people in a Nigerian contiguous neighbourhood of Cameroon. This issue is germane and peculiar

to the extent that it speaks to the historical affinities that exist between Nigeria and Cameroon. Both of them shared cultural and colonial experience which has led to the presence of a large settler population of Nigerians in the Anglophone part of Cameroon. Furthermore, there exists a large as well as a continuous drift of Nigerians of the commercial class into the Francophone part of Cameroon. Report has it that this large chunk of Nigerians (numbering about 4 million) place on the Nigerian missions in Cameroon tremendous consular responsibility and/or problem⁹¹.

The problem is reportedly hinged on the payment of resident permit, arbitrary and multiple taxation, illegal detention, seizure of personal properties, extortion, physical abuse and so forth – which the Nigerian migrant population suffers in the course of their living in Cameroon as foreign nationals. This could be illustrated with the payment (by Nigerians) of 83, 000 cfa (₦18, 888. 00 – Nigerian currency equivalent) to obtain a ‘resident permit’ that is valid for only two years and ‘exit tax’ of 31, 500 cfa (₦7, 188.00 – Nigerian currency equivalent) for each journey out of Cameroon. The inability of these immigrants to meet the tough immigration laws is often greeted with brute force by the Cameroonian law enforcement agents⁹².

It is instructive to note also that there exist a consular agreement on a 90-day entry visa exemption between the two countries, but report has it that even when some Nigerians are yet to exhaust the expiry date of the exemption, they are often harassed and violated by the Cameroonian law enforcers. Arising from this is the imperative to establish a joint Nigeria-Cameroon permanent commission on consular, immigration and security matters⁹³.

Another similar illustrating development on the issue bordering also on free movement of people in Nigeria neighbourhood is a case study of the consular matters between Nigeria and Niger Republic. To appreciate this better, we have to recall that an

estimated 1.5 million Nigerians are resident in Niger Republic. This could not be divorced from the nature of cordial relationship existing between the two countries – the cultural and religious ties, inter-marriages and proximity. It is instructive to note that Niger Republic shares boundaries with seven states of Nigeria i.e. Sokoto, Kebbi, Katsina, Jigawa, Zamfara, Yobe and Borno. *Ipsa facto*, it is, therefore, easy for the people sharing the same language and religion to cross the borders. Certainly, as a result of this affinity, many Nigerians go to Niger Republic and vice versa without travel documents – i.e. passports, identity cards and so forth⁹⁴.

Interestingly, many Nigeriens that travel to Nigeria without travel documents are reported to visit the Nigerian embassy in Niger asking for passports and identity cards. The problematic, according to the report, is how to differentiate between a Hausa man from Jigawa State (in Nigeria) and a Nigerien Hausa man from Maradi (Niger Republic) – especially as there are daily markets patronized by the border communities in Nigerien border towns and vice versa. Not only that, the major Nigerian ethnic groups – the Hausas, Yorubas and Igbos have chiefs – organizing themselves along ethnic lines in Niger – although the Nigerian embassy in Niger has encouraged an all encompassing Nigerian community organization in Niger which is a step ahead of ethnic cleavages as stated above. It is interesting to note that the arrangement is already coming into fruition⁹⁵.

Another striking feature of the free movement of people is the luring of a large number of Nigerians into Niger Republic with the promise of being taken to Europe through Algeria and Libya. Regrettably, many of them get stranded in the northern region of Agadez, which shares a common border with both Libya and Algeria. Many of them are reported to perish in the desert in their attempt to cross to the two countries, while a

few of them that make it into Algeria, if caught, are deported to some kilometres from the Malian border since Niger Republic had refused to accept them⁹⁶.

Apart from the foregoing, the facility of free movement of people has also given rise to an estimated number of 5,000 Nigerian ladies living in Niger Republic prostituting. Most of these girls are taken to Niger Republic by their fellow Nigerians also under the guise of taking them to Europe⁹⁷.

The flow of small arms is another major national security concern that seems tangential to the subject of free movement of people. The world is estimated to be plagued by 500 million small arms in global circulation. If that is accepted as a given, it means that one small arm is in circulation for at least every thirteen people. Hence, free movement of people in Nigeria's West and Central African neighbourhood and proliferation of light and small arms have to contend with the obvious snag of lengthy, porous and poorly policed borders, inadequate training for security forces, inefficient border controls and modern technology⁹⁸. These obstacles have singly or collectively combined to reduce the effectiveness of efforts to monitor and detect the illicit flow of small arms and this portends national security danger (for Nigeria) in view of the ECOWAS protocol institutionalizing free movement of persons as a way to ensuring or consolidating regional integration.

The danger becomes more telling if we consider the fact that more than 80 countries manufacture these weapons for an estimated US 4 to 5 billion dollars annually and over 40 per cent of total supplies are believed to be through illicit means⁹⁹. Furthermore, the United Nations Organization has it that easy availability of over seven million military-style arms and light weapons in West Africa facilitated the abduction and exploitation of over 25,000 children as child soldiers in armed conflicts, civil strife and

rebellions, in the last decade alone and have claimed over two million lives in the sub-region¹⁰⁰.

In this circumstance, heavy responsibility is on the state to ensure national security and provide adequate resources to guaranteeing safety of life of its citizens and their property – thereby reassuring them of protection from fear, widespread insecurity and armed banditry by those who carry weapons illegally¹⁰¹. Beyond that, the state armoury ought to hold weapons in absolute security, away from the possibilities of theft and 'rent' to criminals by corrupt security officials. A corollary to this, as mentioned elsewhere in this study, is a collective responsibility on ECOWAS member states to facilitate work on harmonizing legislation and administrative procedure concerning firearms. Such legislation is expected to be binding on all countries especially those with factories that are involved in sophisticated traditional gun-making. Furthermore, a measure of such nature would enable Nigeria security agents and those of its neighbours to act on a common line of pre-agreed rules and regulations in the control of small arms as people freely cross international boundaries in Nigeria's West and Central African neighbourhood. This kind of measure would also ensure that a couple of countries would take action in isolation to suspend the issuance of personal firearms permits¹⁰².

It is also interesting to note that in the contemporary international system in which technological revolution has changed a number of things radically, we see that the worlds of communication technology, information processing and transportation have eroded borders, altered migration and allowed individuals all over the world to share information at a speed that is hitherto inconceivable¹⁰³. There is no doubt that such changes cannot but have its own benefits. However, such benefits have been dwarfed by great potential harm. For instance smaller and smaller number of people is able to inflict greater and greater amount of damage without the support of any state. Also, a new set of threat and

transnational organized crime have undermined the rule of law within and across borders. Ironically, therefore, technologies that were originally designed to transform and improve daily life are now being used for aggressive purposes.¹⁰⁴ So, the technological revolution and free movement of people across borders have generated a different and fundamental security climate – one whose unique opportunities for co-operation are side-by-side with unprecedented scope for destruction¹⁰⁵. Arising from this is the stark reality that more than ever before, threats are interrelated today and a threat to one is a threat to all – which speaks to the fact that there is no time in human recollection when mutual vulnerability of states is quite evident as we have today.

To gain further insight into the nature and dynamics of today's threat arising from free movement of people the following citation is apposite:

... because international flight times are shorter than the incubation periods for many infectious diseases, any one of 700 million international airline passengers every year can be unwitting global disease-carrier. Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) spread to more than 8,000 people in 30 countries in three months, killing almost 700. The influenza pandemic of 1919 killed as many as 100 million people, far more than the First World War, over a little more than a year. Today, a similar virus could kill ten of millions in a fraction of the time¹⁰⁶

Evidently many states which Nigeria is sharing borders with are not only in gross disability to control their borders, they are also weak. This position should be digested alongside the fact that weak states are easy sanctuaries for international terrorist groups whose recruitment is aided by grievances nurtured by poverty, foreign occupation, absence of human rights, religious and other intolerance and civil violence.

6.3 Bakassi Peninsula as a Security and Strategic Issue

The Bakassi peninsula is Nigerian and should be protected. But where Nigeria's sovereignty over the peninsula is contested, I think the first approach should be "jaw-jaw", it may not be easy...¹⁰⁷

The above terse quotation speaks to the controversial and tension-soaked claim to Bakassi peninsula by Nigeria and Cameroon. It also hints us of the horn of dilemma that Nigeria found itself as a result of the conflictual claim to the ownership of the peninsula and the uncertainties that surround the sustenance of the means of livelihood of many Nigerians living there. Implicit in it too is the hint of the peninsula's resourcefulness – its oil-richness as well as the uneasiness that surrounds Nigeria's long drawn historical basis of ownership as well as its capability to sustain the claim, as shall be seen later as the study progresses. It is a combination this that makes us see it a security and strategic issue that is worthy of attention.

Obiozor's anxiety and unease in the above quotation also found expression in President Olusègun Obasanjo's¹⁰⁸ submission when, as shall also be fully shown later as the study progresses, Nigeria eventually handed over the peninsula to Cameroon following the International Court of Justice (ICJ) verdict on the issue at the Hague in 2002. His words were:

As a great advocate of the observance of the rule of law nationally and internationally and a great believer in the settlement of disputes peacefully, we accepted the verdict notwithstanding our disappointment¹⁰⁹.

With the foregoing at the background, it is apposite to dilate a little into understanding Cameroon, the peninsula and the nature and dynamics of the country's relationship with Nigeria as well as the trend of events that took place between both of them on the contentious Bakassi peninsula – in order to properly situate the discourse within the context of security and strategy.

Cameroon has a population of about 15.5 million and shares 1700 kilometres of land boundary with Nigeria – stretching from Lake Chad to the Atlantic Ocean. In ethnic terms, the country, like Nigeria is a mosaic of over 200 ethnic groups¹¹⁰. The

country was initially colonized by Germany, but it lost the territory to France and Britain after World War I under the United Nations trusteeship. While France administered eastern Cameroon directly from Paris, under its assimilation policy, Britain administered southern Cameroon as part of Nigeria. France granted independence to its section (of Cameroon) on January 1, 1960 – thereby taking the name “La Republic du Cameroon”. Southern Cameroon, along with Nigeria, in the same year, attained independence from British rule on October 1, 1960. This informs the country’s membership of both La Francophonie and the Commonwealth¹¹¹.

Following the 1961 UN plebiscite, southern Cameroon voted to join La Republic du Cameroon to form the Federal Republic of Cameroon. This federal structure agreed to at the Fouban Conference in 1961 gave way to a unitary state, thanks to a 1972 Presidential Decree. It is instructive to note that this unilateral action of the pioneering President Ahmadou Ahidjo, to change Cameroon from a federal to a unitary state is the basis of the problem of the southern Cameroon. The southern Cameroonians are those referred to as Anglophones who suddenly lost their rights to self assertion, equality and participation in Cameroon’s national life¹¹².

Cameroonian economy is predominantly agrarian in cocoa, coffee, banana, tea and timber production as major foreign exchange earners. In recent years, however, crude oil, offshore in the Bakassi has become a new source of income. Interestingly too, the government is making efforts to privatize most of its parastatals in order to be in the ‘good book’ of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Furthermore, the attempt to privatize is hinged on the need to fully comply with the requirements of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC-I) by the end of 2004 so as to enable it benefit fully from debt relief from its creditors that are chiefly Western countries¹¹³. Therefore, the country that prides itself in leading the Central African Monetary and

Economic Community (CEMAC) – an umbrella organization for six central African countries formed in 1994, to foster economic growth and integration of the sub-region, is bankrupt, after all. Thus and understandably too, it was bent on claiming the disputed oil-rich Bakassi peninsula¹¹⁴.

The peaceful cooperation and longstanding good neighbourliness between Nigeria and Cameroon only gave way to rancour and uneasiness due to the Bakassi issue. Bakassi peninsula was historically Nigerian. Record has it that more than 90 per cent of the inhabitants there are Nigerian by '*jus sanguinis*' i.e. by blood relationship¹¹⁵.

The peninsula is peopled by Efik ethnic group – one of the Nigerian numerous ethnic groups. The peninsula is located at the western side of the Rio del Rey River. The maritime area is contiguous to the Cross-River (Nigeria) estuary and the main preoccupation of the people is fishing¹¹⁶. Another account that is similar to the one just mentioned states that the peninsula is a collection of small islands located at the south-eastern tip of Nigeria. It is a low lying region bordered in the West by the estuary of the Cross River (mentioned above), in the North by the Akpa Yafe River, in the East by the Rio del Rey estuary and in the South by the Gulf of Guinea. The Bakassi area is predominantly inhabited by the Efik and Efut peoples of Nigeria. They have been living in the area since the 16th century when they founded fishing settlements in the islands. It is estimated that there are about 2 million Nigerian fishing families in the area¹¹⁷.

As a result of numerous unprovoked attacks and assaults from the Cameroonian gendarmes (law enforcement agents) and utter neglect of the Nigerian government, the Bakassi people have often alleged the Nigerian government of abandonment¹¹⁸. Hostility between Nigeria and Cameroon on this peninsula began in the 1970s, as stated elsewhere in the study, when three custom officers on patrol, were kidnapped near Ekang by Cameroonian security agents (the gendarmes). This event was followed in 1972 by the

Cameroonian security operative's seizure of one fishing boat belonging to the Ewang Multi-Purpose Society in the Cross-River state (one of Nigeria's states). Also in 1981, the gendarmes again killed Nigerian military officers on patrol duty on Nigerian territory – close to the peninsula. This nearly led to war between the two countries. Interestingly, this manner of unprovoked attack by the gendarmes on the properties and persons of Nigerians living in the peninsula continued unabated till today¹¹⁹. Therefore, the 'Cameroonization' of the peninsula through the instrument of violence and aggression and forceful collection of taxes from the Nigerians 'on their own land' is the major source of irritant and over time, it has brought tension to bear in the Nigeria – Cameroon relations¹²⁰.

Fundamentally, the Nigeria-Cameroon dispute cannot be divorced from the incongruity of colonial agreements which tried to define the boundary between the two countries from two conflicting interpretations. It is assumed from the following citation that the Nigeria-Cameroon borders have been clearly demarcated:

The boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria was the object of negotiations between the UK and Imperial German Government between 1885 and 1913. These negotiations ended in treaties which were duly ratified before the outbreak of World War I. Before the partition of Cameroon in 1916, this boundary has been actually demarcated on the ground throughout its entire length from Lake Chad to the Atlantic Ocean and was not therefore the object of any controversy¹²¹.

However, problem arose because some of these agreements were duly ratified others were not; much less the fact that boundaries are not as perfect as they are roughly generally indicated on maps and papers. Prior to the controversial, 1913 agreement, all the previous agreements on Nigeria-Cameroon borders put the Bakassi peninsula on the western side of Nigeria and make the Rio del Rey River the boundary between the two countries. But the 1913 agreement shifted the boundary from the Rio del Rey River

westward to Akpa Yafe River – which is a tributary of the Cross River (Nigeria), thus putting the disputed territories on the Cameroonian side¹²². The bone of contention is whether or not the agreement (of 1913) is valid or enforceable.

It is important to dwell a bit on the subjects of 'demarcation', 'delimitation' and 'delineation' in order to get a fuller understanding of the clause 'duly ratified'. Demarcation could be by any of these methods: triangulation, dilatation, doppler satellite positioning, global positioning system or traversing – which is the most popular today. Delimitation is the first step to be taken before demarcation – it is 'delineation' on paper and not on the ground. It is a theoretical description of a boundary on a map or chart which only serves as a guide to surveyors and cartographers in actual demarcation on the ground¹²³. By demarcation we refer to physical emplacement on the ground of marks, pillars and beacons – as proof of alignment of the boundary as agreed in the agreements. After a joint actual demarcation on the ground, a map of the jointly accepted border will then be made – using any of the ground or aerial survey methods. But this was never the case in the border between Nigeria and Cameroon.

The imperative of the Nigerian civil war then made for a discussion on the inconclusiveness of the Nigeria-Cameroonian border. Thus, in 1975 through the Maroua declaration between General Yakubu Gowon and Ahmadou Ahidjo – the Nigerian and Cameroonian heads of states respectively, Cameroon claimed that Bakassi had been ceded to it. It is true that General Yakubu Gowon, the then Nigerian Head of State signed the Maroua Declaration but the Supreme Military Council – the Nigerian highest ruling body, refused to ratify it, thus making the Declaration null and void¹²⁴.

Interestingly, there are strong claims in the literature that in the Maroua Declaration, the peninsula was given to Cameroon as a gift. If then Cameroon accepted to sign an agreement by which she showed readiness to accept the Bakassi peninsula as a

gift from Nigeria, it can never lay a legitimate claim to own the peninsula originally. Another thing is that Cameroon seems to be downplaying if not disregarding the issue of ratification of the Maroua agreement by the Nigerian Supreme Military Council, as if it is strange to the practice of law of nations – particularly when it comes to ceding territories, or that similar practice is not obtainable in the Cameroonian legal system¹²⁵. Murtala Ramat Mohammed, Olusegun Obasanjo and Sheu Shagari – successive Nigerian heads of state, both military and civilian alike, even repudiated the Declaration¹²⁶. Given this scenario, while Cameroon was confrontational on the issue, Nigeria was conciliatory because of the need to maintain its good neighbourliness policy and its alertness to overall leadership role in the continent.

Another interesting character of the dispute is the keen economic and political interest that France has there. France is thus regarded as the first and foremost extra-African neighbour of Nigeria particularly because of its stake in its erstwhile colonies which are Nigeria's immediate neighbours – surrounding it left and right. Added to that is the bond of defence pact France has with Cameroon (akin to that which it has with all its former colonies) which requires France to provide assistance to Cameroon in the event of war with another non-French speaking country. Some surmised that France did not wait for any provocation from Nigeria before it began to encourage Cameroon to take to confrontation. In addition to having enormous economic interest in the disputed territory, France sees its involvement in the dispute as strategic; particularly in its bid to contain Nigeria – the African giant, against its predominantly Francophone next-door neighbours most of which are poor, weak and small¹²⁶. Be that as it may, the Efiks in Bakassi peninsula do not want to be Cameroonians even if it is ceded to the authorities in Yaounde¹²⁷.

As the recent event which culminated into in the Green Tree Accord signed in the US between the immediate past Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo and President Paul Biya of Cameroon revealed, some have argued that the Bakassi issue was unduly internationalised by Cameroon – by rushing to the United Nations Organization and the International Court of Justice. It was further argued that this action, therefore, rendered useless, the utility of formal unfettered exercise of state discretions – which is a function of an informal or political means for resolving dispute between traditionally friendly nations¹²⁸.

There is a much held view that France is Nigeria's arch-enemy by virtue of what has been transpiring between the two countries. For instance, earlier in the crisis over the ownership of the peninsula between Nigeria and Cameroon, the Nigerian Army through Brigadier-General Fred Chijuka – the then Nigerian Director of Defence Information, confirmed the French physical presence in the area disclosing that the French troops were deployed to east Atabong and Isangele parts of the disputed territory. The French troops, war machines and frigate warship arrived in the Cameroon port city of Douala supposedly on surveillance mission¹²⁹.

However, Jean-Marc Simon – the French ambassador to Nigeria suggested that the Nigeria-Cameroon rift over the Bakassi Peninsula should be settled amicably. He argued that Nigeria is already included in France's "area of priority and solidarity in Africa" The basis for this is that France has well over \$4 billion investment in Nigeria and this surpasses all the businesses it has in the entire West African sub-region, including Cameroon¹³⁰.

The ambassador was quoted to have said that:

Our policy has always been that of neutrality. Our policy is no longer focused on French speaking countries..... We believe Nigeria is a major actor on the African stage and a great partner

*whose views should be cultivated seriously towards the stability and development of the continent*¹³¹.

Interestingly too, French oil companies (Total, Fina, Elf) have no wells in the disputed peninsula. Though, France's military pact with Cameroon provides for training with a restricted direct support, yet it was not ready to encourage a war situation between Nigeria and Cameroon on the disputed territory¹³².

At a strategic level, the coverage rate of Nigeria-French bilateral trade is about 86 per cent in favour of Nigeria. Nigeria is the first trading partner of France in sub-Saharan Africa and it is the second trading customer with 90 per cent of export based on oil from Nigeria. From France, Nigeria imports equipments for its agricultural, automobile and oil industries. Nigeria as at 2002 owes France to the tune of \$3.8 billion. French investment in Nigeria trails that of the US and it is more than that of the UK. While the US has \$8 billion investment in Nigeria, France has \$4 billion while U.K. has \$3.5 billion¹³³.

Before what later culminated into signing of the Green Tree Accord¹³⁴, there was a Saint Cloud (a Paris neighbourhood) meeting held on September 5, 2002 and a General Summit of November 15 and 16, 2002 – all aimed at extracting a commitment from the leaders of Nigeria and Cameroon to honour the ICJ's verdict. Apart from that, there was a Mixed Bilateral Commission which comprised representatives of Nigeria and Cameroon, a representative of the UN Secretary General and four international observers. This Commission was chaired by Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, representing the UN Secretary General. It was to implement the verdict, demarcate the land and maritime boundaries and affect the withdrawal of troops along the disputed areas. In no distance time the Commission achieved appreciable progress on its mandate¹³⁵. Troops were withdrawn, villages were sorted out in the Lake Chad area and agreements to improve diplomatic relations had been reached just as joint security patrol along the border areas have been worked out. All of these encouraged the UN and the four nations (the US, UK,

Germany and France) mandated by the UN to be observers. These observers were expected to see that the letters of the verdict come into fruition¹³⁶. Obviously with this scenario, Nigeria was on a horn of a dilemma as to protecting its citizens living on the peninsula in one hand and honouring the verdict stoked by the push and pull of the international community, on the other.

An overview of the essence and mandate of the above mentioned Nigeria-Cameroon Mixed Commission is quite illuminating and merits our attention at this juncture. The Commission was set up under the auspices of the UN. It is a fallout of the October 10, 2002 verdict of the ICJ, regarding the land and maritime boundary dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon, and the subsequent summit meeting held in Geneva in November 16, 2002 between the Presidents of the two countries. The first session of the Mixed Commission was held in Yaoundé from December 2 – 3, 2003 and since then, six other regular sessions and two extra-ordinary sessions have been held¹³⁷. Highlights of the discussions of the Commission have been on confidence building, demarcation of boundary as well as issues pertaining to rights of the affected population and withdrawal from affected areas¹³⁸.

It could be said that the ICJ verdict was not premised on the consideration of traditional title and Lordship of the Efik people over the area. Instead, it chose to use the 1913 treaty (referred to elsewhere in this section). The treaty which was between Britain and Germany gave the peninsula to Germany. Later on, by the treaty of Versailles, Germany was said to have transferred the area to France which in turn gave it to Cameroon. Interestingly, there is a clause in the agreement which says that Nigerians, who so desire, can resettle in Nigeria or decide to stay put in the peninsula and will be seen as 'Nigerians resident in Cameroon' – in this event, the Accord stresses that Cameroon should not force them to change their nationality, language and/or belief

system¹³⁹. No doubt, in the clause mentioned above, we see a contradiction in terms, if we begin to raise posers such as the following: to which government will such people pledge allegiance?; to which country, (of the two) would they be paying taxes?; under which regime of law enforcement would they be?; which local government would be theirs and to which country would such a local government belong to? ; among other legitimate posers.

The Green Tree Accord was signed by June 12, 2006 pursuant of Nigeria's bid to obey the International Court of Justice ruling and the country finally quits Bakassi on August 14, 2006. The area in contest is about 1000 square kilometers patch of Atlantic coastal swap. The agreement was signed in New York between Chief Olusegun Obasanjo and Mr. Paul Biya the respective Nigerian and Cameroonian Heads of State. Subsequently, at a ceremony which took place in Archibong Island, the Nigerian flag was lowered in place of the Cameroonian flag to symbolize total take over and an end of 30 years of dispute over ownership of the area¹⁴⁰.

Many people objected to Nigeria handing over of the peninsula to Cameroon – One of them is Major General David Ejoor, a former Chief of Army Staff, and a major actor in the Nigerian civil war who worked closely with General Yakubu Gowon, the then Nigerian Head of State. He refuted the allegation that it was Gowon who actually ceded Bakassi to Cameroon in an agreement¹⁴¹.

It is interesting to note here that the Green Tree Accord was preceded with an ad-hoc security committee set up by President Olusegun Obasanjo. The committee was to study and advise him on the ICJ's verdict of 2002, but the recommendation of the committee not to cede the peninsula to Cameroon was simply ignored by the President¹⁴². In fact, Donald Duke, the then governor of Cross River state, in whose territory the peninsula is located once assured the Bakassi people that "the Federal Government of

Nigeria is not prepared to cede an inch of this island to any country¹⁴³. The people of Bakassi only woke up to the rude shock of signing off the peninsula to Cameroon¹⁴⁴.

Interestingly too, the said ad-hoc security committee was headed by General Theophilus Danjuma, a former Minister of Defence during the fourth republic. It also has on board Chief Richard Akinjide, Senior Advocate of Nigeria (SAN), co-agent and member of the Nigeria's legal team at The Hague, and security chiefs. To the committee, ceding the peninsula away to Cameroon, in compliance with the ICJ's verdict, is tantamount to trading away the traditional homeland of the people of Bakassi that hitherto see themselves as Nigerians per excellence. In fact, it was insinuated that the ICJ's judgment presided over by a French man could not have been any better – giving the known and perceived disposition of France towards Nigeria¹⁴⁵, as argued elsewhere in this study.

It was argued from a technical standpoint that complying with the ICJ's verdict has a security implication of inhibiting an effective security monitoring of Nigeria's territorial waters¹⁴⁶. For instance, an intrusion into the Cameroon territorial waters is inevitable if the Nigerian Navy at the Naval Base in Calabar is to effectively patrol the Nigerian international waters. Apart from that, once the peninsula is ceded to Cameroon, the argument continues to say that it is definitely 'too-close-for-comfort' to Nigeria and as such it could be used as a launching pad to attack Nigeria if need be¹⁴⁷. This argument was premised on the discovery of a large cache of arms huge enough to equip a military command on the island in 1996 after the Nigerian military pushed back the Cameroonian gendarmes¹⁴⁸.

Furthermore, the committee in its submission argued that complying with the ICJ's judgment has the damning potential of threatening Nigeria's economic activities in the area. To illustrate this, the verdict required that the nine Nigerian oil wells on the

peninsula should be respected by Cameroon. This translates to the fact that oil exploration sites in the peninsula should be left under the current national ownership¹⁴⁹ – a clause that Cameroon may not honour.

The other side of the argument is that if Nigeria refused to comply with the verdict, any further attack of the Cameroonian gendarmes on the Nigerian fishing community in the peninsula will surely receive international sympathy in support of Cameroon. But the 1996 experience, when late General Sani Abacha approved a military action to push back the Cameroonian security forces as far back as Abana – which is about one third of the peninsula could effectively deter any aggression on the part of Cameroon¹⁵⁰.

However, the fate of Nigerians still living in the peninsula now is at the mercy of the Cameroonians. Speaking on this, General Martins Agwai – Nigeria's Chief of Defence Staff during the immediate past regime of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo hoped "... that the Cameroonian armed forces will in the spirit and letter of the Green Tree Agreement safeguard the lives and property and dignity of Nigerians who have decided to stay in the peninsula and invariably Cameroon"¹⁵¹. By this act, Bakassi, an island of about 1,000 square kilometers divided among 32 communities populated by about 600,000 Nigerians was signed off to Cameroon¹⁵².

Expectedly, there cannot but be violations of the Agreement. It was reported that 70 Cameroonian gendarmes have occupied Ibekwe village – part of Northern Bakassi to be administered by Nigeria for two years – until it is able to relocate its nationals. The area was to be demilitarized for another five years before the final handover to Cameroon. In less than 24 hours after Nigeria formally handed over the peninsula to Cameroon, Nigerians still residing in the Northern part of the island have raised allegation of torture and harassment against Cameroonian gendarmes¹⁵³.

Shortly before the ceding of the peninsula, youths drawn from the ten clans of Bakassi named Bakassi Movement for Self Determination, in a public protest condemned what they termed as ill-fated surrendering of the peninsula by the Nigerian government to the Cameroonian authorities. They designed a white and blue striped flag with ten stars – representing their clans to register their ‘avowed disapproval of the Accord’. They called their ‘new nation’ Democratic Republic of Bakassi with the motto ‘God is our strength’. They did this purportedly to say that their secession from Nigeria is in line with Article 1 and 55 of the UN Charter and that the ‘unilateral’ action of President Olusegun Obasanjo to change Nigeria’s boundary without recourse to the National Assembly left much to be desired as it is unconstitutional. This resonated later as we shall observe in the actions of the current Nigerian Senate in the National Assembly shortly after President Olusegun Obasanjo left the reins of government. It was also argued that sidestepping a conduct of plebiscite of the Bakassi people is an outright violation of their fundamental rights for self-determination¹⁵⁴.

A discussion on the state of Bakassi now after the Green Tree Accord is germane to this study as it would be quite revealing of the experience cum nostalgic feeling of the displaced Nigerians there. Also, the nature and character of the new security environment that the Bakassians found themselves, the attitude of the Nigerian government to them as well as their anxiety or plight in the hands of the Cameroonian gendarmes – are the accounts that follow. Shortly after the ‘Green Tree Accord’ that took effect on August 14, 2006 the new security challenges that face the people in the area are that of apprehension of the Cameroonian gendarmes; the anxieties and agonies of relocation/resettlement of the people as well as their economic well-being. To illustrate this, many Nigerian Bakassi indigenes have relocated from villages called Archibong and Atabong in Bakassi to towns and cities in Nigerian states of Bayelsa, Akwa Ibom and Cross River. The reason for the

flurry of the people from these villages to Nigeria's towns and cities is because of the trepidation in which these Nigerians hold the Cameroonian armed forces personnel, called gendarmes, who are known to be very hostile to them¹⁵⁵.

Part of the problem is alleged to be resulting from unwholesome competition arising from the fact that some of these gendarmes, who combine their security work with fishing, see Nigerians as rivals in the fishing business – which is the common occupation of most people living in the settlements within this border between Nigeria and Cameroon¹⁵⁶. The combination of mass migration and social dislocation of these Nigerians have untoward implications for transportation and economic activity of the people in the area. Many are stranded as there are no means of transportation and buying and selling have been hampered in view of the fact that the settlements are now desolated. This type of development is already defeatist of the spirit and letter of the Green Tree Accord because a part of the terms of the agreement states that Nigerians will remain in Bakassi till 2011 with Nigerian security officials in control of certain territories¹⁵⁷.

Another problem is the insincerity and derelict of the Nigerian government to those displaced or supposed to be evacuated from the peninsula to new settlements. Although the Federal government of Nigeria promised these displaced Bakassi indigenes a place to resettle, and a joint Federal and Cross River state governments task force was set up for the purpose, but many months after the promise was made, there is no evidence of any action taken to that effect¹⁵⁸. The proposed land for the resettlement is to be carved out from Akwa Abutong village in Akpabuyo local government area of Cross River state¹⁵⁹.

For not resorting to war in settling the Bakassi debacle, African leaders have christened Presidents Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria and Paul Biya of Cameroon as Africa's 'peace ambassadors', and they are, thus, slated for honours in Abuja on May 27,

2007. Chad, Niger, Congo Brazzaville, Representatives of Congo, Libya and Sudan, among others, are to grace the occasion¹⁶⁰. While this is on, there is also a regrettable rhetoric (as it later becomes) – as captured below:

We have ensured that Nigerians living now on the peninsula have a choice to (they can) make, we have taken adequate measures for their protection, security, welfare and well-being¹⁶¹.

The experience of the Bakassi people two years down the road after the Green Tree Accord has rendered the above position impotent. It is not only embarrassing but also appalling to see that the people of Bakassi were abandoned – with no hope of resettlement – over two years after Nigeria formally handed over the peninsula to Cameroon. Ikang north, central and south in Akpabuyo local government area of Cross River state (Nigeria) has been agreed upon since July 2006 but no construction work is ongoing in the area, not even in spite of N6 billion sought in the supplementary budget for the resettlement of the people of Bakassi¹⁶². A Nigerian tabloid in its editorial took a swipe on the Nigerian federal/state governments, the representatives of this people in the national assembly as well as those others that are in the corridors of power from the area for negligence, irresponsibility and insensitivity to the plight of the mass of the displaced Bakassians¹⁶³.

Finally, part of the incongruities in the demarcation of African boundaries – that was mentioned earlier on in chapter four manifested in the Bakassi crisis. Loudly though, the crisis was between Nigeria and Cameroon, but it is also to protect Nigeria's legal rights in the Gulf of Guinea. We could recall that Equatorial Guinea shares maritime boundary in the Gulf of Guinea with Nigeria and Cameroon. This then made Equatorial Guinea challenged the Cameroonian claims (of March 16, 1995) to the extent that it ignored "the legal rights of Equatorial Guinea in the most flagrant way because it disregards the meridian line that divided the two states¹⁶⁴" – Equatorial Guinea and

Cameroon. This is said against the backdrop of the fact that the Bakassi issue is hydra-headed; just as the Nigerian Senate, after the ouster of President Olusegun Obasanjo, began to cry wolf on the issue. They repudiated the Green Tree Accord and contested its constitutionality, its violation of due process, its arbitrariness and gross insensitivity of the government of Federal Republic of Nigeria to the yearnings, aspirations, human rights and rights to self determination of the mass of the Bakassi people who felt empty and betrayed by the singular action of the Nigerian government to cede the peninsula to Cameroon¹⁶⁵. The local and international context of this repudiation by the Nigerian Senate is currently occupying the front burner of political debate in Nigeria¹⁶⁶; though that is outside the scope of this study.

6.4 The Gulf of Guinea, Extra Regional Power's Intrusion and its Security Implications

This section dwells chiefly on the nature and dynamics of US's intrusion into Nigeria's neighbourhood of the Gulf of Guinea and the cost benefit analysis of such intrusion for Nigeria's national security. This analysis intends to x-ray the resource endowment of the Gulf of Guinea which qualifies it to merit this kind of focused discussion and Nigeria's overdependence on such type of resource that the region is endowed with. It is also within the prism of the foregoing that we would be examining the *raison d'etre* for an alternative fuel initiated by the developed industrialized countries of the West and the national security and environmental challenges that such a development poses not only for Nigeria's national security but also for that of its neighbours and many countries in the developing genre.

To start with, Nigeria has 35.9 billion barrels of proven petroleum reserves – which is the largest of any African country and the eight largest on earth. It exports 2.5 million barrels per day and the government plans to nearly double that amount by

2010¹⁶⁷. If that is accepted as a given, then it is not misplaced to examine, again at this seminal stage, the nexus of interaction between the US with Nigeria's oil. The volatility of the Middle East is not the beginning of what ignited US's interest in the Nigerian oil sector rather it is an interest that has been consciously sustained over the years and particularly commencing from the discovery of oil in Nigeria. Little surprise, therefore, that Nigeria's relations with the US have been conditioned by the oil factor. The US became the major consumer of Nigerian oil in the 1970s – at a time when the oil sector was fetching 82 per cent of Nigeria's foreign earnings¹⁶⁸. Between 1972 and 1973 American imports of Nigeria oil increased by 84 per cent¹⁶⁹.

Interestingly, the US is less than 5 per cent of the world's population but consumes 25 per cent of the world's petroleum. It has, thus, initiated a programme called African Oil Policy Initiative Group (AOPIG) which will facilitate its drive to source oil from the continent more than ever before. Today, the US increases its oil imports from Nigeria from 900,000 barrels per day (bpd) to 1.8 million bpd in the next five years and African oil exports to the US will rise to 50 per cent of total oil supply by 2015. Currently, Nigeria is the fifth largest exporter of oil to the US behind Canada 1.8 million bpd, Saudi Arabia 1.4 million bpd, Mexico and Venezuela (each also with) 1.4 million bpd¹⁷⁰. However, the most recent report has even shown that Nigeria has overtaken Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. It is now the third largest exporter of crude oil to the US; from 8 per cent in the yesteryears, Nigeria now supplies about 12 per cent of US oil imports – trailing behind Canada and Mexico (the first two largest exporters of oil to the US) by exporting up to 1,156,000 bpd¹⁷¹.

Another variant of the nexus of interaction between the US and Nigeria is the latter's oil export to the former. In 1994, 53 per cent of Nigeria's oil went to the US, 36 per cent to Western Europe, 6 per cent to Asia and 5 per cent to Africa¹⁷².

As mentioned earlier, the monocultural character of Nigeria's economy which also borders on over-reliance on oil as the country's major export earner is another preliminary commentary needed to be able to situate this discourse in proper context. Between 2002 and 2006 alone, Nigeria earned a total of N8.875 trillion or \$71.12 billion from the sale and exploration of petroleum resources. The breakdown of this is the revenue from crude exports, profit tax and royalties paid to the Federal Government by oil companies, penalty for gas flaring, rentals and signature bonuses¹⁷³.

Therefore, the essence of the Gulf of Guinea as it relates to this study is that of oil. Obviously, oil supply and utilization underlie modes of production and social organization, its source and availability determine industrial development, means of transportation and subsistence, it changes social relations within and between regions of the world. But more important, US hegemonic interest in West Africa would not have evolved safe the realization of the region's deep-water oil and natural gas since the 1990s¹⁷⁴.

Today, the major motivation for the interest of the US in the Gulf of Guinea is the realization of the increasing volatility of the Middle East which is one of its major oil suppliers. This became obvious in the words of Tom Lantos – a Californian Congressman, which read in part as follows:

...America's dwindling oil reserves provide less than half of the oil our economy needs. This leaves us heavily dependent on the Middle Eastern regimes that control the vast majority of the world's known oil reserves. Many of these regimes are either actively hostile to the United States, as in the case with Iran, Iraq, and Libya, or unsteady autocratic regimes beholden to Islamic Fundamentalists like Saudi Arabia¹⁷⁵.

As a result of this, the Gulf of Guinea emerged as an area to be seen as vital to the US interest and other major oil consumers in the globe should be deterred from the area¹⁷⁶. By early 2004 the US army's European Command had embarked on the Pan-

Sahel Initiative, training troops from Chad, Niger, Mauritania and Mali, completing the training and supplying of armies of the Maghreb. All these were preparatory to containing the 'arc of instability' spanning from the Caucasus, through the Caspian states, the Middle East and Sahel to the West Coast of Africa¹⁷⁷. The overriding interest of the US is oil.

The US energy officials have predicted that within ten years, the Gulf of Guinea region will provide a quarter of America's crude which is equal to that of the Gulf of Mexico today¹⁷⁸. Hence, since September 11 2001, the US/Bush government has courted Nigeria as an alternative to volatile petrol-states in the Middle East and Latin America. In fact, in 2002, the white house declared the oil of Africa¹⁷⁹ a strategic national interest and that is to say that the US is inclined on using military force, if necessary, to protect it. This translates to the fact that Nigeria's 'troubles' could become America's¹⁸⁰.

But Nigeria's troubles are hydra-headed too when compared with the troubles of the oil-bearing Middle East states that the US administration seeks to sidestep. Some emanate from the problematic that this study introduced in the preceding chapters i.e. lack of single minded cohesion in the country as a result of the colonial legacy and problems brought about by the arbitrary border demarcation where kiths and kins were scattered all over, thereby giving Nigeria a 'difficult-to-manage' multinational conglomerate. The intent of the colonialists at that time was purely to serve London's economic interests.

In this event, the country was divided along ethnic and religious lines. The Muslim north, arid and poor but with almost half of the country's population and dominates the army. The northern praetorian leaders dominate the Nigerian body polity and plunder the fertile and oil-rich but disunited south whose largest ethnic groups – the Yorubas in the west and the Igbo in the east – together represent just 39 per cent of the population¹⁸¹. Democracy also favours the north, which, united by Islam and voting en-

bloc has determined the outcome of virtually many elections. Yet the multinational character of the country has been worsened by the en-bloc voting pattern along ethnic and religious lines¹⁸².

Another problem is corruption. For instance, in the last twenty-five years, Nigeria earned more than \$300 billion in oil revenue – but annual per capital income plummeted from \$1,000 to \$390¹⁸³. More than two-thirds of the population live beneath poverty line, subsisting on less than a dollar per day. Since independence, its leaders have squandered or stolen some \$400 billion in government coffers¹⁸⁴. According to a 2004 World Bank report, 80 per cent of the country's oil wealth accrues to the private purse of one per cent of the population. The UN Human Development Index ranks Nigeria as having one of the worst standards of living, below both Haiti and Bangladesh¹⁸⁵. This cannot but breed violence from the large populace who toil daily to make ends meet in the face of debauchery of those holding political offices.

In sum, if by virtue of its energy interest, Nigeria's troubles become that of the US's; then, the latter should be on the alert and responsive to the crime, neglect and inefficiency that is rampant in the former's oil sector. For instance, the issue of 'bunkering' – tapping into pipelines and siphoning oil into makeshift tankers hidden in the swamps of the Niger River Delta, is now widespread and responsible for the loss of some 200,000 bpd¹⁸⁶. In 2003 alone, Shell Producing and Development Company (SPDC) – an American oil prospecting firm in Nigeria which produces half of country's oil, lost an average of 100,000 bpd to bunkering. However, the loss dropped to 20,000 bpd in 2005¹⁸⁷. Furthermore, the security implication of bunkering is untoward for Nigeria's national security, 'well-being' of the oil prospecting firms and by implication for the US vested interest in the Delta region and by extension the Gulf of Guinea. This is so because bunkering or siphoning of oil from pipelines for sale in the black market

generates huge sums of cash with which the Niger Delta militias have been able to buy arms. For instance, in September 2004, Alhaji Asari Dokubo, leader of the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force threatened an all-out war with the Nigerian government. This was at a time that the international oil price skyrocketed to \$50 per barrel for the first time and preceded his arrest, detention and charge with five counts of treason in October 2005¹⁸⁸.

Again, if Nigeria's troubles become that of the US, then, the latter is expected to find a lasting solution to the crime, neglect and inefficiency that manifest also in oil spills and gas flares that blights the delta region of Nigeria – thereby ruining farmland and poisoning fishing grounds. It should also stem the rising spate of tension and conflict in the Niger Delta¹⁸⁹ – the site of most of Nigeria's mainland petroleum reserves, where restive youths have taken up arms to challenge the state and the 'insensitivity' of the oil prospecting firms to environmental spoliation of their land as a result of spillages, gas flaring and other suchlike fallouts of the activities of the oil multinationals. Otherwise, the troubles that the US shall face in Nigeria and its 'thirst' for alternative oil in the Gulf of Guinea shall dwarf the ones it is trying to sidestep in the Persian Gulf or the Middle East. For instance, if persistent activities of the numerous Niger Delta militias succeed in halting oil extraction in the delta, drying up the revenues in which the political élites depend, it will ignite colossal chaos and perhaps intractable religious crises which may absolve the resolve of the US greater than its massive military intervention in Iraq¹⁹⁰.

Evidently, the US has an unstoppable 'thirst' for oil and gas. It has been estimated that within the next few years, some 25 to 30 per cent of American oil would come from Africa, primarily West Africa and Nigeria. Thus, while the US responds to September 11, 2001 Al-Qaeda's attack by waging wars in Afghanistan and Iraq under the guise of protecting national security, it has also sought new ways of protecting its economic

security. This means protecting energy diversity and getting oil from as many sources as possible, especially outside of the troublesome Persian Gulf. America, therefore, sees Nigeria and other countries in the Gulf of Guinea as the 'Next Gulf' – i.e. a counterweight to the Middle East. Increasingly, Nigeria will play a strategic role in America's energy needs whether the communities of the Delta want it or not¹⁹¹. Without equivocation, this conclusion spells grave security implications for Nigeria and the US.

More graphically than its earlier mention, there have been repeated calls from a variety of influential right-wing and non-conservative think-tanks in Washington to declare the Gulf of Guinea an area of 'vital interest' to the US, which need to be protected by American military might. The Heritage Foundation, the American Enterprise Institute of Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) are in the frontline of the campaign for greater US intervention in the Gulf of Guinea. In July 2005, for instance, CSIS recommended that the US should "make security and governance in the Gulf of Guinea an explicit priority of US foreign policy" and that the area should become a regular item on the agenda of the G8 – the world most industrialized nations¹⁹². Britain and the US already have a close working relationship called the UK-US Energy Dialogue where they have agreed to cooperate on 'promoting the security and diversity of future international energy supplies' which also targets Nigeria¹⁹³.

It is also becoming clear that the dependence of the US is not only on Nigeria's oil but also on its natural gas. Nigeria's vast gas reserve which has been flared for decades thereby causing huge ecological and social problems can now be put into a productive and perhaps more strategic use. Invariably, no sooner than the US began to import natural gas rocket, Nigeria will become its key supplier. This is said also against the backdrop of Nigeria accounting for about half of the Gulf of Guinea's oil¹⁹⁴.

With these at the background, the US is steadily intensifying its military operations on the African continent. For instance, in October 2005, Pentagon officials secured agreement with eight to ten African nations to allow the US military utilize their air fields and other suitable sites to establish 'cooperative security locations' from which it can launch military strikes¹⁹⁵. In the same vein, the US is also increasing its military presence in Nigeria. That is if the following are anything to go by – increase in the number of the US military officers detailed to provide security assistance between the US and Nigeria military and increasing emergence of American weapons in the hands of the Nigerian army and navy in the Delta region¹⁹⁶.

It has been argued that increasing American military presence in the Niger Delta is worrisome. This, therefore, bespeaks the fact that what is best for American energy security is not the best for the millions of people who live in the Delta and by implication Nigeria's national security. The palpable presence of the American force in the Nigerian Delta region can only heighten tension and in all probability lead to a more protracted violent conflict; this is certainly a new form of national security challenge that the Nigerian state has to contend with. In other words, if the US military intervention in the Delta region and the Gulf of Guinea does not have human face, then in a couple of years to come, it will be difficult to get a barrel of oil without a life¹⁹⁷.

Hence, violent youth militias, untoward activities of pirates, the enigma of corruption, and environmental catastrophes i.e. gas flaring, oil spillages, killing artisanal fishing and despoliation of arable land – on which the mainly peasant population living in the Niger Delta depend are part of the daunting obstacles and challenges that Nigeria and the US face in the serpentine creeks and boggy coastal land of the Niger Delta and the Gulf of Guinea¹⁹⁸. Thus, environmental damage and often-violent scramble for the spoils are fuelling instability and popular resentment cum combustible anger against the state.

and its foreign collaborators – all of which translate to unhealthy signals for Nigeria's national security.

With the discovery of oil in commercial quantity in the Delta in 1957, Nigeria began transforming from an agriculture-based economy to an oil-dependent one. Expectedly, at first there was a stark shortage of food supply leading to importation of food items. This was followed by a large-scale theft of the oil wealth. The oil thievery is carried out by low-level operatives who work for sophisticated crime syndicates with ties to senior government, military, and police officials¹⁹⁹. Most of the siphoned oil was done through high-tech equipment that taps into the official lines and diverted into waiting barges. The barges then bring the stolen oil to other tankers waiting offshore. Those tankers are believed to dispense the oil to other West African countries²⁰⁰. This kind of theft called bunkering is now very pervasive in the Delta region of Nigeria and shall certainly be a source of worry and security concern for the Nigerian and the US governments in the Gulf of Guinea.

At this juncture, it is worthy of mention again that the US did not suddenly begin to develop keen interest in oil. It is rather a systematic development that spanned many centuries ago. The US is almost unique in the development of petroleum industry from about 1860 until the 1870s. This is due to a combination of the following factors: known recoverable reserves, private property, freedom of contract, a highly literate population conditioned to seek its own self-interest through competitive markets and a stable political environment. Thus, the US was a clear and early leader in the exploration of its petroleum reserves. Except for a few years around the turn of the century, the US until 1951 produced more oil than all other countries combined²⁰¹. It is, therefore, understandable that the US energy goal since the 1970s is to achieve a high level of security in regard to supply and to minimize cost. By extension this means maintaining

the supply sources which are secure enough to ensure adequate national defence capabilities as well as utilization of resources which can be obtained at relatively low real costs²⁰². This could also explain away the US's goaded incursion to the Gulf of Guinea.

In comparative terms, the influence of the oil majors is strong and the dependence on foreign oil is compelling in the US, but in some high oil consuming countries like France and Germany, alternative policies have been introduced. For instance in France, there is an active nuclear programme meant to minimize dependence on foreign energy coupled with the fact that domestic producer interests in oil and natural gas are weak. In Germany, domestic oil producer interests have been strong yet the international oil majors are relatively weak. The same could be said of Japan – i.e. relative weak clout of the oil majors. Great Britain and Norway have large interests in the North Sea oil²⁰³.

The above being the case with the US, then it is obvious that its energy need is unique – with only five per cent of the world's population, it consumes more than one quarter of the energy produced world wide each year. In 2001, the US consumed 19.8 million bpd. Government calculations see that increasing between 26.9 and 31.8 million bpd in 2025²⁰⁴. There are other nine large consumers of oil, apart from the US, that round out the top ten. These ten countries consume about three-fourths of all energy produced each year²⁰⁵. So it is not exaggerated to say that the world runs on oil. As far back as the period before World War I, the US was consistently producing well over 60 per cent of the entire world's oil and possessed probably 85 per cent of the world's refining capacity²⁰⁶. However, the situation today has changed. The US oil consuming propensity has dwarfed its producing capacity – thereby making its oil need spectacular as never before.

It is this type of development that can explain better such US initiative as the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) which tends to present a glowing picture of increasing access for African countries to the US market. The US Department of Commerce in 2003 reported that the volume of trade between Africa and the US increased to 54 per cent, but on a closer look, 80 per cent of this represents petroleum exports to the US. The remaining 20 per cent consists of textiles and apparel, transportation and agricultural equipments. Interestingly too, the leading beneficiary countries of the (so called) exports to the US market are Nigeria, South Africa, Gabon Lesotho and Kenya. These five countries accounted for 93 per cent of AGOA utilization in 2002. To get a clear picture, an estimated 85 per cent of non-petroleum AGOA exports to the US originate from countries in Southern Africa²⁰⁷

Since our sub-theme here dwells chiefly on oil in the US/Nigeria and its neighbours relations, it would not be misplaced to touch on alternative sources of energy and its implications on the said relationship. The search for alternative energy sources is beneficial to the battle against greenhouse gas emissions; just as it could be said that the terms 'alternative fuels' and 'energy conservation' are associated with the demands of environmentalists to substitute oil, natural gas, coal (and for other reasons, nuclear) energy sources with others that do not contribute to global warming and that do not pose immediate threats to communities and ecologies through pollution²⁰⁸. Furthermore, the quest to transform the global economy from one based on hydrocarbons to one fuelled by hydrogen emerged in the late 20th century, borne out of scientific advances, industrialized-country's fear of dependence on developing oil-bearing countries and growing realization of the environmental catastrophes that global warming will bring²⁰⁹. But then, a hydrocarbon-free future is a very long way off. In fact, claims from scientific observations of the International Energy Agency and the US put it that it will take

between a decade and five (from 2005) before hydrogen becomes more than a minor part of the energy mix²¹⁰. To look at it more closely, the development of hydrogen fuel cells is not an immediate threat to the oil and gas industries to the extent that hydrogen in itself is not an energy source but a carrier of energy derived elsewhere. In other words, hydrogen like electricity is not available without being powered – either by chemically splitting it from hydrocarbons, which currently accounts for 98 per cent of hydrogen production, or by electrolysis²¹¹. Hence, the prospect of massive new demand for hydrogen also opens up the prospect of a new market for oil and gas (producers). In fact, a report has it that the US government support of fuel cell vehicles is aimed primarily at reducing dependence on foreign oil, not at reducing emissions per se²¹².

It has been observed while reflecting on biofuel as it affects Africa, and by implication Nigeria and its neighbours, that there is growing anxiety that the Third World countries especially African countries would be worse off for it, soon as the developed industrialized countries, in their desperate bid to source for fuel or find an alternative to it, began to divert agricultural produce into generating agrifuels. The reason is not far fetched, neither the US nor the European Union have enough land to support massive food production and an expansion of the agricultural produce for agrifuels at the same time²¹³. Thus, the pressure of food crisis that is already facing the mass of the poor people in the South would be worsened, as much as the problem of desertification arising from clearing of land surface to be able to cultivate agricultural produce to the extent which we have hinted²¹⁴.

Currently, more than 2 million people are suffering from hunger worldwide. It, therefore, means that the growing world population of 76 million people per year, whose larger percentage comes from the South, will obviously be compelled to scramble for food that will certainly be expensive or unavailable then²¹⁵. The foregoing might seem

remote to our study but a reflection on Nigeria's demography and its unbridled population growth coupled with food crisis already being experienced by it and its neighbours would certainly speak volume on the nearness of the issue to them just as it would illuminate its national security implications. Apart from those mentioned above, the process of producing ethanol and agrifuels is not environmentally friendly as we might be made to believe. Even if ethanol produces less carbon emissions, processing it pollutes the surface and water with nitrates, herbicides, pesticides and waste; the same way the air is polluted with aldehydes and alcohols that are carcinogenic²¹⁶.

This emphasizes the fact that the present state of technological know-how notwithstanding, the much-desired hydrogen economy would be based on oil and natural gas²¹⁷. By implication the increasing saliency of oil and natural gas cannot be ducked. This remains germane for a Nigeria whose 1977 figure of export earning from oil averages 93 per cent and 99 per cent in 2002²¹⁸.

What this portends is that the developed industrialized world now has to rely on their former colonies, dependencies and mandate territories that sit on top of the bulk of the world's oil and natural gas. For instance, in 2000, the demand for oil was some 75 million bpd, compared with less than 47 million in 1970 and 66 million in 1990. 2030 projection stands at 120 million bpd. Industrialized countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) currently account for over 60 per cent of world oil demand and 55 per cent of natural gas demand²¹⁹. All of this adds up to explain why the Gulf of Guinea is strategic not only to Nigeria and its neighbours that are joint stakeholders in the area, but also why a spirited attempt is made by the US to guard what goes on there.

Linked with the above are the following challenges; first, it would be recalled that elsewhere in this study is a background discussion on the artificiality of African

boundaries as a result of colonization. Arising from that, the fact that European scrambled for the African natural resources, as they did in other territories of the world that they colonized, there arose conflict between these imperialists and the indigenous peoples. Shortly after colonial disengagement, such conflicts have been devolved to successor states of the colonial entities such that the lure for rent from exports to the North generates and sustains competition for natural resources between the successor states²²⁰. The nature and character of US scramble for the African natural resources, particularly oil in the Gulf of Guinea, is not different from those of the former European imperialists characterized above. Hence, Nigeria needs to be cautious in the Gulf of Guinea not to 'pick quarrel' with the countries in the region or any extra-African power on the issue of the mineral deposit that the region is so endowed with. This remains pertinent if we reflect on the fact that the late 1990s saw a rush for oil and natural gas in the Gulf of Guinea which is off the coast of West Africa. It is instructive to note that it is the scramble to claim rights over marine acreage that has resulted in more than thirty territorial disputes across the globes. Those that could be quickly instanced include the territorial dispute between Senegal and Guinea Bissau, Nigeria and Cameroon, Morocco and Mauritania etc²²¹.

Another challenge facing Nigeria's national security and its Gulf of Guinea's neighbours is the standpoint that "for the big powers oil and gas are too important to be left to their owners to manage²²²". This was clearly stated in the thoughts expressed below:

...OPEC...conspires to fix prices and restrict the supply of crude oil to the world market in order to maximize profits. We must devise alternate sources of energy and supplies to confront this threat²²³.

In the same vein, it was argued elsewhere (in Britain) that

Our economic well-being depends on secure energy supplies at affordable prices for the UK and world economies. We will need to

*improve the long term efficiency and stability of the international energy market through politics and economic reform in key supplier and transit countries*²²⁴.

The foregoing portends that a secured supply of energy (oil and natural gas) is a key or strategic objective of consumer-country's foreign policy and that is certainly a challenge that Nigeria must come to term with in its activities especially as it concern the Gulf of Guinea. Evidently, the demand for oil will continue to rise as natural gas and oil consumption continue to increase in many years to come. As far as 2025/2030, it is projected that oil shall remain the dominant energy source. This remains critically so because the path to hydrogen economy, which was projected to have been attained since the 19th century, lies yet on fossil fuels²²⁵. Interestingly enough, the rising demand for oil is not limited to the US or developed economies alone but to developing ones as well. For instance, in 2001, developing countries consumed 64 per cent as much oil as industrialized countries. It is projected that by 2025, they will consume 94 per cent as much²²⁶. One of the reasons is that they are the ones that serve as factories for the industrialized countries and the other is that their energy intensity is greater and their demand is growing, even faster than their ability to pay. Hence, developing oil-importing countries bear the brunt of higher (oil) prices²²⁷.

Apart from the mounting evidence of growing demand for oil globally and by extension growing attractiveness of the Gulf of Guinea to the major player(s) in the global economy, it is pertinent to note that oil and natural gas are an integral part of geopolitics. The basis for this is that beginning from the time the imperial powers were committed to the change of energy source from coal to oil, they have sought to ensure its supply through power relationships. Major oil consumers ensured its supply either through outright plunder as obtained in the concession system, or the exertion of influence over client states, or the undermining of a regime that is seen to be non-conforming to their

whims and caprices. Also to ensure an uninterrupted flow of oil, they relied on garrisoning of producer regions and the extension of political and economic influence over new producer countries²²⁸. It is when this is fully appreciated that we would come into a fuller grasp of the geo-strategic essence of the Gulf of Guinea, the extra-regional power's intrusion there and the national security weight of the area for Nigeria – being focused in this section²²⁹.

Although, Nigeria has not refused multinational oil companies to operate as done by some radical oil-producing developing countries. It could be argued that as new opportunities for the West arises in countries like Equatorial Guinea or Sao Tome and Principe, Cameroon and Gabon – Nigeria's neighbours on the Gulf of Guinea, the Western focus would not be on regime change or good governance but strengthening of military links between them and the West (especially the US). This shall be done in order to further secure commercial ties. Hence, the new nature of security challenge for these West and Central African countries is the brazen quest of the powerful consumer nations (particularly the US) for access to energy on their own terms which runs parallel to the commercial well-being and decency of the oil producers. In this event, the natives of producer countries are good natives to the extent that they can guarantee supply of oil and natural gas at prices that are low enough to be acceptable to companies and governments in the rich consumer countries and high enough to keep the shareholders of the oil majors happy²³⁰.

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218. Ibid. P. 6; This same point could not be stressed of a country like Indonesia that managed its oil revenues properly during the price booms of the 70s, but is now least dependent on oil. Today in Indonesia, oil now accounts for 15 per cent of export value as reserves deplete.
219. Ibid. P. 7.
220. Ibid. P. 77.
221. Ibid. PP. 78 – 80. Some other territorial disputes arising from conflicting claims over marine acreage or other boundary issues include that between China and Vietnam, Taiwan and the Philippine, Malaysia and Brunei, Iran and Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Russia, United Arab Emirates and Iran, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, Qatar and Bahrain, Kuwait and Iraq etc.
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227. Shelley, Ibid. P. 183.
228. Ibid. P. 190.
229. Ibid. PP. 191 – 193. It has been argued that Saddam Hussein only became a monster after he had been used by the West to confront the totalitarian regime of Shah of Iran; this was at a time that Arab nationalism was perceived as a threat to OECD interests. Saddam was only demonized after his invasion of Kuwait in 1990. In like manner, Libya returned to the good book of the West only when it encouraged the return of the oil companies and abandoned its widely alleged role as sponsor of terrorism in the Middle East and Africa. The same way that Algeria, also an oil producer, became a favourite of the White House (the US) after suppressing its Islamic rebellion and welcomed the oil companies. In Central Asia, the social and political inequalities of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are non-issues as long as regimes ensure oil the natural gas flows in the right direction. Australia was so delighted to deal with the Indonesian occupier of East Timor simply to secure a share of the offshore oil and natural gas of the Timor Gap. Not only that, it is the increasing fuel import requirement that made China and India to begin to source for the product in divers of places. In fact, it has been speculated for instance that China’s

hobnobbing with Saudi Arabia, to the extent of securing a role in developing Saudi Arabian natural gas reserves, may have been a function of the misunderstanding between Riyadh and Washington.

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Chapter Seven

Conclusion

This section contains the summary of our findings. This is followed by highlights of the problems and prospects that are inherent in the study. The last part of the chapter also highlights the recurring decimals, barren areas and those suffering from dearth of scholarly attention with a view to offering suggestions. They are thereby considered as the recommendations that could enhance Nigeria's national security in relations with its West and Central Africa neighbours and areas for further study.

7.1 Summary of Findings

These are the synopsis of our findings in this study.

- It is evident that there are no systemised and consistent programmes on Nigeria's national security in relations with its West and Central African neighbours.
- As a corollary to the above Nigeria's security agenda is still 'somewhat' foreign-driven i.e. driven mainly by the major players in the international system, especially the United States of America.
- Apart from scholarly analysis of Nigeria's national security in relations with its neighbours, the Nigerian government did not give it more deserving attention.
- The post Cold War realities have tremendous geo-political implications for Nigeria as it pertains to the country's relations with its neighbours.
- Nigeria's hegemonic sway in West and Central Africa demands that the nature and character of its national security concerns become more expansive.
- The nature of Nigeria's relations with its neighbours also requires that they should be 'inward looking' in terms of promoting and sustaining efforts at ensuring peace between and among themselves.

- More than ever before, it is obvious that Nigeria needs to place higher premium on its national security in relations with its neighbours.
- Overall, most Nigerian citizens and the law enforcement agents, in particular, are not properly mobilised towards the promotion of national security. This has been exacerbated by poor attitude change on the part of many Nigerians themselves towards self-induced patriotism and commitment to the development of Nigeria nationhood. This, in part, is due to their informed self-interest, desperation for personal gains, corruption, greed and today's warped notion of success and achievement in the larger society.

7.2 Problems and Prospects

Having considered the array of issues, this section examines the problems that are inherent in the series of our discussions as well as pinpoints areas of hope for Nigeria's national security within the context of its relationship with its West and Central African neighbours.

First, there is the need to stress that many trends today have combined to reduce the significance of boundaries even as many states strive to fix and demarcate theirs. This development could be attributed to the fact that peoples are brought closer together by vastly better communications and transportation; they are more and more being forced or lured to look beyond their own national boundaries and become more familiar with the people elsewhere. As trade, travel and tourism increase, boundary formalities are being recognized as unnecessary and very harmful impediments; thus, the formalities have been downplayed or removed outright. Be that as it may, many groups of states around the world are integrating their economies in varying degrees and fundamental to all integration is free movement across borders. Boundaries are becoming more permeable

and less hostile¹. However, this development holds grave implications for Nigeria's national security in relations with its neighbours – not only because of the porosity of the borders but also because of the stark deficiency in policing and monitoring systems across the borders – the detail of which has been given in the body of this study.

Aside the problems associated with natural boundaries, there is also the problem arising from neighbours as it has been demonstrated variously in the body of the work. For this purpose, it could be reiterated that neighbours are the major determinants of the measure of security a nation could enjoy and needless to say that countries should be mindful of their relations with neighbours. The premise is that inter-state relations may be inadvertent and intricate. For instance, the recent developments in Darfur region of Sudan have complicated the relationship between Libya, Chad and Sudan. It has been argued that the distinction between Arabs and non-Arabs in Darfur has been intensified via Libyan political agitation. As if that is not enough, Chad that is weak depends on a stronger Sudan, at the same time certain ethnic group called the Zaghawas whose homeland straddles the border between Chad and Darfur demands that Idris Derby's government should be sympathetic to their cause. Hence Derby's government cannot afford to be neutral or act as a facilitator for peace negotiations. It is not misplaced to argue that with considerable number of refugees entering the Chadian territory from Darfur, naturally a political action, of sort, is expected from the Chadian government². The kind of intricate relationship illustrated above is an alert note for the delicate nature of relationship that Nigeria might encounter in its intercourse with its West and Central African neighbours.

Another problem is that of arms flow. Since the end of the Cold War there has been massive flow of arms across national boundaries. The US is the world's leading arms merchant with 58.3 per cent of the market³. In fact, there have been some years

since the end of the Cold War in which the US defence industry has sold more warplanes to other countries than to the US government. Such weapon production keeps (US) workers on the job, increases taxes from their incomes flowing to the government, and profits from sales rolling in to corporations and their investors⁴.

The above specific reference is germane to the extent that the flow of some of these arms comes to West and Central Africa and most time they are engaged by regimes in there to maintain some manner of 'security'. Such endeavours, in the real sense, are not to promote genuine national security, hence they remain a suspect. Tax payers monies that are expected to take care of providing for social amenities and security are 'squandered' on matters of amassing weapons of destruction. The overall implication of the continuation of this kind of endeavours certainly spells doom for the continent and it is hereby problematised to the extent that the US national security interest would not be misconstrued for West and Central African security.

Aside that, poorer countries that import arms massively stand the danger of what could be called classic 'gun or butter' budget decisions, whether to spend on defence or domestic social programmes. Underlying the massive flow of arms is the increasing level and frequency of violence within and between countries as well as wars that may be greater in intensity, duration and reach⁵. The other danger is the dangerous symbolic relationship that develops between the countries supplying the weapons and the recipients. For instance, unpleasant incidences in the arms recipient country might tempt or compel the supplier to send advisers to the recipient, engage in limited combat support and eventually commit to a full-scale military intervention with its troops in the recipient country⁶. This does not exempt the possibility of the suppliers too having to face its own weapons if things go sour between it and the recipient⁷. Neither does it place the supplier on high moral ground if it attempts to check other countries not to sell⁸.

With the massive flow of arms is the associated problem of organised crime. It becomes problematic that after wars, many belligerents attempt to exploit criminal connection and know-how developed during the war to jeopardize peace building efforts and cause havoc at home and across borders. Beneath this are the obvious manifestations of corrupt practices, the use of violence to protect criminal activities and unholy alliance between criminal elements and political elites hindering the observance of rule of law and an effective state performance⁹.

Further linked with illegal massive flow cum official acquisition of arms, Nigeria partly faces the problem of sorting the disturbing spate of the law enforcement agents lending their rifles to robbers who usually returned them along with the agent's share of the stolen loot. More disturbing but connected to the above is the discovery that some soldiers in the Army are involved in robbery than the men of the Air Force and Navy¹⁰. This manner of national security threat looks local yet has a devastating effect on the overall concept of national security within and outside Nigeria and most especially in the country's relations with its neighbours – in as much as the process and attempt at curbing arms trafficking have been insufficient and sanction regimes have also been insufficiently enforced¹¹.

Worse still, organized crime is increasingly operating through fluid networks. It provides criminals with diversity, flexibility, low visibility and longevity of activity. There are networks of networks as organized criminal groups move freely across borders; whereas states are hindered by cumbersome information sharing, just as they are also weak in cooperating in criminal investigations and prosecutions¹². Thus, there is the nagging problem of cross-border crimes between Nigeria and its neighbours. It has been particularly hinted that the affinity and deep socio-cultural and linguistic homogeneity of the various groups inhabiting both sides of the border, have in its own way, created

enormous opportunities for illicit trade, like smuggling, child or human trafficking, gun running and cross-border robberies¹³. A glowing example of a notorious cross border activity, especially smuggling, is that which takes place at Seme border between Nigeria and Republic of Benin. The border post is heavily trafficked and the notoriety of the 200 metre stretch of borderland between the two countries is at best characterised by a multitude of illegal checkpoints manned by thugs who operate side by side those of the official law enforcement agents¹⁴. However, it is not just the presence and acknowledgement of this fact that is a problem but the several haphazard or ineffective attempts by the two countries to mount a joint-security committee to stem the tide of this menace.

Besides the foregoing, there are major developments in the world economy today that have serious implications for Nigeria's national security in relation to its neighbours. One of such is the further extension of the European Union (EU) to include members of the European Free Trade Areas (AFTA) and the admission of Eastern European countries which were formerly part of the defunct Soviet Union. The effect of this development means further weakening of EU trade ties with many African countries. Certainly, the poorer countries of Europe – Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland will have the first call on EU resources for development assistance¹⁵, not the many 'beggarly' economies like Nigeria's and its West and Central African neighbours.

In fact, Africa is becoming increasingly marginalized as we move on in the 21st century. Many African countries are raw material producers while some of them are monocultural economies. As a result, their products are subjected to price fluctuation which has serious implications for their economic development and other social programmes. Worse still, developed countries of the world have increased the tempo of creating artificial substitutes for the raw materials. This is what is referred to as

dematerialization of the global economy – which means changing the content and style of manufacturing thereby reducing or totally eliminating the use of raw materials¹⁶ which mainly emanate from the Third World. In view of this development, more pressures or obligations have thereby been placed on Nigeria, being the most pre-eminent power among its West Africa and immediate Central African neighbours. The country needs to take care of its national security more than ever before and ensure mutual and progressive intercourse with its neighbours. Indeed, there is a need for rapid expansion of their industrial bases, enhancement of their exports and penetration of the market of the industrialized countries. But this requirement is easily said than done. This is because both Nigeria and its neighbours are importers of food items meant to keep pace with the high rate of population growth. Added to this is mammoth debt burden which weighs heavily on their economies and constitutes a major drain on their foreign earnings¹⁷.

Furthermore, the evolving world communication order which allows nations to share industrial information through the internet is gradually creating a situation where competitiveness in production and export would depend less on the ownership of natural raw materials and more on the possession of high levels of technological skills¹⁸. Certainly, this requires that Nigeria and the variety of its neighbours need to keep abreast the pace of these developments in order to avoid increasing marginalization and unemployment of their peoples. To illustrate this with the Nigerian experience, it has been emphasized that one of the prospects of updating the country within context of the global wave of revolution technology and ensure its proper standing in globalized trade and (world) production, there is an imperative to enhance its infrastructures especially its telecommunication system. It is quite appalling, however, to see that over a half of the world population have never dialled a telephone number and there are more telephone lines in Manhattan, New York city alone, than in the whole of sub-Saharan Africa¹⁹.

Another problem that this study envisages is also of a global character. It is the problem of global inequality which has various manifestations. Some of the manifestations speak to the harrowing experiences of many countries in the South particularly the countries in the Nigerian neighbourhood. This is a neighbourhood that has hundreds of thousands of children die of preventable or curable diseases each year; where many outstanding graduates end up working or doing research work in developed countries; where fossil fuel reserves are being depleted and the growth in the number of proven oil and natural gas reserves is out-spaced by consumption, and where the environment deteriorates as a result of the activities of rich nations which encourages extreme forms of consumerism; where unemployment, poverty and hunger persist; and where war and economic might are being used to impose a veritable dictatorship upon the people; and deceitful discourse aims to distort reality²⁰. This is part of the security challenges that touches, even if latently, on Nigeria national security in relation with its neighbours and as such, worthy of it being alert to them. This becomes pertinent in view of the fact that certainly walls are erected across borders and immigration/police forces assembled, but the 'tall walls' could not prevent the entry of scientists, doctors, nurses, information experts and other highly qualified professionals and technicians into developed countries of the world, while the developing ones, such as those in Nigeria's neighbourhood have had to live with their harrowing experiences.

The next is an intricate problem associated with oil resources. If what has been documented by Noam Chomsky is anything to go by, namely that

It's been a leading, driving doctrine of US foreign policy since the 1940s that the vast and unparalleled energy resources of the (Persian) Gulf region will be effectively dominated by the United States and its clients, and, crucially, that no independent, indigenous force will be permitted to have a substantial influence on the administration of oil production and price²¹

; if Iraq's attempt to be independent on the administration of its oil resources may have been its crime, which necessitated US intervention, rather than the hype that the intervention and occupation of Iraq was as a result of its invasion of Kuwait in 1990; and if we see that Iraq's invasion was, after all, no more than what Indonesia had done to East Timor, with Washington's blessings²², then the US's renewed and reinvigorated interest in the Gulf of Guinea certainly cannot but generate a serious national security problem for Nigeria if not now, in no distant future.

The national security question in Nigeria's relations with its neighbours is also problematised by human security. It is true that foreign press refers to Nigeria in glowing terms and Nigerians themselves enjoy basking in the euphoria of reference to the greatness and wealth of their nation; as if this wealth rubbed off on the mass of its people²³ or whether the nation's prestigious 'frontlining' in the affairs of the continent alone sufficed and solved the entirety of its national security problems. Indeed, the Nigerian state has been found wanting in the management and nurturing of its human capital. The country is yet to evolve an effective mechanism by which the mass of its populace could be mobilized to support national cause in the area of security. A large percentage of the populace is malnourished, there are armies of unemployed youths, there are bottled-up emotions arising out of long years of deprivation and the hope to 'get out of the doldrums' for millions of the impoverished and disgruntled populace are not in sight – due mainly to the totalitarian grip of some privileged few on the nation's economy and polity. The point must be made that leadership abroad as well as national security with neighbours can never be sustained unless it is complemented by good leadership at home i.e. leadership supported by all the people. With respect to this study, Nigeria's national security with its neighbours would be strengthened if human security of its own nationals are activated in a manner that will jolt the entire citizenry into supporting the

promoting the national security project²⁴. In this direction, what obtained in the US in the early 1960s is instructive. The US populace supported its government which was obviously rich and powerful enough to enter South-East Asia then. But the government was brought down when Americans saw that their wealth was squandered abroad only for the benefit and interests of a few corporations, not for the interest of all and that the home front was ignored with decaying cities uncared for²⁵. Therefore, Nigeria's wealth is expected to be used in transforming all citizens' lives not merely those of the few, if national security with neighbours is to be promoted in the real sense. Quoting Lt-General Olusegun Obasanjo in what he called "Dodan-Declaration" of January 1, 1977, which is also relevant today and to our topic, Joseph Wayas agrees with the then Nigerian military Head of State that:

We cannot afford to build a nation in which a handful of people exclusively own and control the means of production and distribution to the perpetual detriment of the majority.....We must all rededicate ourselves anew to the tasks of reducing the mental and material hardship brought on fellow Nigerians by artificial scarcity, poor means of distribution, greed, selfishness and minority control of resources belonging rightly to all Nigerians²⁶.

7.3 Recommendations

There have been several prescriptions aimed at changing the fortune of many African countries for better, but most of such prescriptions have failed, hence, there is need for these countries to be more inward-looking. As it relates to our study, Nigeria needs to work concertedly with its West and Central African neighbours to ensure mutual security and peace. As a preliminary remark and from a foreign policy perspective, states attempt to change their environment in accordance with aims and objectives they have set for themselves, but from a structural perspective, states attempt to adapt to their environment by making the best of what is available in the international system²⁷. That being the case, the study, just like many others, has shown that there are clear indications

that African countries are 'on their own' when wars break out. The Western world are not enthused to spill the blood of their citizens on African wars whenever they break out as they are keenly interested in procuring the things that are beneficial to them especially as the war cases in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Congo, Sudan and Ethiopia/Eritrea have demonstrated. Therefore, since economic factors are central to the beginning, sustenance and spread of wars in Africa – even in derailing post war programmes of disarmament and demobilization, then economic policies initiated by Nigeria and its neighbours need to be designed with more attention paid to their security implications²⁸.

As remote as it may be, Mikhail Gorbachev's stance, cited hereafter, during the intense Cold War rivalry between the defunct Soviet Union and the US is not only worthy of repeating, but worthy of emulating in order to benefit Nigeria and its neighbours:

*We certainly do not need an enemy image..., neither for domestic nor foreign policy interests. An imaginary or real enemy is needed only if one is bent on maintaining tension on confrontation with far reaching and ... unpredictable consequences... I am convinced that we have every opportunity to rectify the situation*²⁹.

Nigeria caught the image of 'big brother' by many of its neighbours as many of them look up to it for assistance and leadership. It is on the strength of this that Nigeria should strengthen its policy of 'good-neighbourliness' in order to further enjoy the goodwill and reverence of these neighbours. For instance, Niger Republic, one of Nigeria's contiguous neighbours also shares boundary with an oil-rich and influential country – Libya. It, therefore, behoves Nigeria to be on the alert to keeping Niger Republic in its fold so as to keep Libya at bay. Interestingly, Burkina Faso is already in the Libyan's fold and Mali and Niger are the next Libyan targets in order to complete its dream of a greater Maghreb empire³⁰, which will be devastating to Nigeria's national security and interest if eventually they are all encapsulated by Libya's expansionist drive.

There is a need to give Cameroon a special mention because, unlike all the other Nigeria's contiguous neighbours, there was a very recent case of soured relationship bordering on a declaration of war due mainly to the ownership and control of the oil-rich Bakassi peninsula – detailed elsewhere in this study. Even on the same issue there is an ongoing misunderstanding between the two countries. Given all that have transpired between the two, it is, therefore, recommended that there is a need to:

- reactivate moribund and outstanding bilateral agreements and work at ensuring that they are implemented to the letter;
- have a mutual arrangement with neighbour(s) towards reorienting their security operatives against unprofessional brutalization of each others civilian population especially traders and the vulnerable border communities. In cases where applicable, there is a need for reciprocal abrogation of residence permit or a reduction in its tariff to the barest affordable minimum;
- institute a joint permanent commission on security, immigration and consular matters;
- undertake a mutual repatriation of refugees and destitute to their respective countries, where applicable;
- reinforce border security patrol apparatus in order to check cross-border crimes;
- ensure that Nigeria's joint commission with neighbour(s) should not be starved of fund – for such commission to be really functional, facilitate their experts meetings and provide their financial obligations such as payment of salaries and settlement of utility bill;
- ensure that the Nigerian Ministry of Internal Affairs, and by that very fact, the Department of Customs and Immigration Services should be adequately funded in

order to cope effectively with the challenges of border monitoring and allied immigration legislations that work in a manner that would not compromise the nation's security – in the area of smuggling, trans-border crime, trans-border violence and ECOWAS and non-ECOWAS expatriates constituting security risk – by insinuating or stoking instability and violent insurrections³¹.

As evident in the above presentation, it need be stressed that these set of recommendations are not exclusive to Nigeria and Cameroon alone, they can also be adopted by other neighbours that are sharing contiguous borders with the former.

Certainly, an unbridled flow of small arms and weapons are part of the challenges that the ECOWAS protocol on free movement of persons brings along, therefore, as a corollary to the above suggestions, there is the need to strengthen the control at border posts to prevent illicit trafficking of small arms and enhance the capacities of the whole system of law enforcement in the control of small arms³². Nigeria's national security and peace in the neighbourhood would be fostered if there is a collective responsibility on the part of all the states in the neighbourhood towards harmonizing legislation and administrative procedure concerning firearms. Such legislation is expected to be binding on all countries especially those with factories that are involved in sophisticated traditional gun-making. Furthermore, a measure of such nature would enable Nigeria security agents and those of its neighbours to act on a common line of pre-agreed rules and regulations in the control of small arms as people freely cross international boundaries in Nigeria's West and Central African neighbourhood. This kind of measure would ensure that there is a uniform issuance of personal firearms permits³³.

Nigeria security agenda in relations with its neighbours need not be foreign (US or Western) driven. The African peculiarities or Nigeria's peculiarities or those that border on its national security with its neighbours should be focused. This calls for proper

training and re-training of the law enforcement agencies so as to measure up to the modern day standard of border patrol/protection and tackling of terrorist-action. In this regard, all the citizens must be tuned and ready to assist the law enforcement agents. The government in turn should be devoted to enhancing the welfare of the people. Time has come for the nation(s) to redefine its (their) conception of national security to be all embracing – especially of non-military security. It is by so doing that we can easily evolve what could be called a ‘civilian-based’ defence or national security³⁴. Besides, a reinvigoration of the existing cooperation between Nigerian and its neighbours’ security apparatuses is imperative to stemming the tide of trans-border crime and other security violations. Training and retraining of military and police officers should be facilitated using the well established Nigerian law enforcement training institutions such as the Command and Staff College, Jaji, the National War College Abuja and the Police College, Ikeja, to mention but a few. The advantages of the training are multifarious. One of them is that those trained in these institutions, who would later return to assume high level decision-making positions in their countries would not be averse to Nigeria or would at least have colleagues, classmates or mentors that they would be willing to listen to or deferred to when it is most crucial. Closely linked to this is the need for a subtle and long-term strategy for creating a mutual understanding between Nigeria and its neighbours – by putting in place an orientation and mind-developing institutions that are obviously non-existent in Nigeria’s neighbours. For instance, nothing stops Nigeria from taking the initiative of establishing an English speaking school in the country. Perennially such a school would be enrolling young Nigerians, Nigeriens, Beninoise, Cameroonians, Gabonese, Equatorial Guineans, Chadians and other citizens in the Nigerian neighbourhood. The advantage in this is to develop, in the minds of these youngsters and

from the scratch, a Nigerian orientation throughout their studies, and by so doing, they would have imbibed some positive notion of Nigeria and Nigerians.

In like manner, joint military exercises should be encouraged and the Nigerian Police and other law enforcement agents of its neighbours need to cooperate in order to 'exchange notes' pursuant of tracking down cross-border criminals and organised criminals. A corollary to this is the availability of better communication gadgets to security men on joint patrol. More patrol vehicles and better cooperation by the local people in the border areas and the security operatives is also helpful. However, enlightening the border communities on why they need to cooperate with the security operatives has to be stressed and promoted.

Olusegun Obasanjo, the immediate past Nigerian leader and Col. Moummar Gaddafi, his Libyan counterpart, recently have jointly initiated a health initiative aimed at assisting needy Africa countries. The Republics of Niger and Chad, The Gambia, Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso and Mali were to benefit in the first phase of the programme. The initiative is to help in the area of health delivery in the select countries – by way of providing hospital equipment, drugs and expertise of Cuban, Nigerian and Libyan medical personnel. The programme also enjoys the collaboration of the World Health Organization and the UN Children Fund (UNICEF)³⁵. Reference is made to it because it is certainly a kind of initiative that is confidence-building and good-neighbourly and as such should be promoted and sustained.

The ongoing global war on terror is germane to Nigeria's national security and its relations with its neighbours. Therefore, a holistic strategy is required to address the root causes of terrorism and strengthen responsible states and rule of law and fundamental human rights. This calls for democratic reform – that has human face, major political grievances need to be addressed, organised crime has to be combated, military

'occupations' have to stop, and poverty/unemployment – which is prevalent in Nigeria and its neighbourhood has to be vigorously tackled. It also calls for checking extremism and intolerance – in this regard, education and the culture of public debate have to be fostered and promoted.

Also facing Nigeria's national security is the menace of the nomadic farmers. The aggressive activities of the nomads are increasingly becoming a serious security issue. This is either due to overgrazing or trespasses by these nomads on other farmer's crops and land. The nomads' activities are no respecter of boundaries – as they rear their cattle across the borders. Perhaps, common grazing reserves for them could stem the tide of their notoriety and widespread clashes they engaged other farmers that are into food and cash crops in.

It must be stressed in this section that if Nigeria's troubles are to become that of the US then, the latter should play an active role in finding a lasting solution to the crime, neglect and inefficiency that manifest in oil bunkering, spills and gas flares that blight the Delta region of Nigeria – thereby ruining farmland and poisoning fishing grounds. It should also contribute to stem the rising spate of tension and conflict in the Niger Delta – the site of most of Nigeria's mainland petroleum reserves. This is said against the backdrop of restive Niger Delta youths who have taken up arms to challenge the state and 'insensitivity' of the oil prospecting firms to environmental spoliation of their land as a result of spillages, gas flaring and other fallout of the activities of the oil multinationals. Otherwise, the troubles that the US shall face in Nigeria in its 'thirst' for alternative oil in the Gulf of Guinea shall dwarf the ones it is trying to sidestep in the Persian Gulf or the Middle East. For instance, if persistent activities of the numerous Niger Delta militias succeed in halting oil extraction in the region, drying up the revenues on which the

Nigerian political elites depend, it will ignite colossal chaos and perhaps an intractable crisis which may confound the US greater than its massive military intervention in Iraq.

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Appendixes

Appendix 1

Department of International Relations, Faculty of Administration, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria.

Research Topic: National Security in Nigeria's Relations with its Neighbours.

Research Instrument A

In-depth Interview for Officials of the Nigerian Federal Ministry of External Affairs:
(Desk Officers, Cultural Attaches and Consular Officers - those relevant to our study).

- What in your own opinion is national security?
- What is the trend and dynamics of national security in Nigeria's relations with its neighbours, over the years?
- What is your perception of national security in Nigeria's relations with its neighbours; especially in the country that you served?
- How does national security feature in Nigeria's relations with its neighbours; in the country that you were posted to?
- Can you (please) identify and critically discuss any extra-African power(s) whose actions and policies impinge on Nigeria's national security in relations with its neighbours?
- What is the role(s) played by your own Department/Ministry with respect to national security in Nigeria's relations with its neighbours?
- What in your own view, are the problems associated with national security in Nigeria's relations with its neighbours?
- What do you suggest to be the solution to these problems?

Appendix 2

Department of International Relations, Faculty of Administration, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria.

Research Topic: National Security in Nigeria's Relations with its Neighbours.

Research Instrument B

In-depth Interview for the Secretariat Staff of the Nigerian National Boundary Commission; (Field Officer, Secretariat Staff and the Director General).

- What in your own opinion is national security?
- What is your view on the sanctity of Nigeria's national boundaries (as well as those of its neighbours) as delineated by the Colonialists?
- What is the trend and dynamics of national security in Nigeria's relations with its neighbours, over the years?
- What is your perception of national security in Nigeria's relations with its neighbours?
- What is your own reading of occasional disagreements and clashes between Nigeria and its neighbours, over the years?
- How does national security feature in Nigeria's relations with its neighbours?
- Can you (please) identify and critically discuss any extra-African power(s) whose actions and policies impinge on Nigeria's national security in relations with its neighbours?
- What is the role(s) played by your Commission with respect to Nigeria's national security in relations with its neighbours?
- What in your own view, are the problems associated respect to Nigeria's national security in relations with its neighbours?
- What do you suggest to be the solution to these problems?

Appendix 3

Department of International Relations, Faculty of Administration, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife. Nigeria.

Research Topic: National Security in Nigeria's Relations with its Neighbours.

Research Instrument C

In-depth Interviews/Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with Border Communities of Nigeria and its neighbours.

- What is the nature of the relationship that exists between your country and people with Nigeria (and vice versa)?
- How would you characterise the activities and conduct of the law enforcement agents on either sides of the border?
- What is the trend and dynamics of national security in Nigeria's relations with its neighbours, over the years?
- Please narrate any of your experience on security violations or border crimes that you have ever witnessed.
- What is the reason for and the consequence of border closure between your country and Nigeria?
- What do you like or hate about Nigeria and Nigerians (and vice versa)?

Appendix 4

Department of International Relations, Faculty of Administration, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria.

Research Topic: National Security in Nigeria's Relations with its Neighbours.

Research Instrument D

In-depth Interview with Experts (Academics) i. e. Specialists on the issue area.

- What in your own opinion is national security?
- What is the trend and dynamics of national security in Nigeria's relations with its neighbours, over the years?
- What is your perception of national security in Nigeria's relations with its neighbours?
- How does national security feature in Nigeria's relations with its neighbours?
- Can you (please) identify and critically discuss any extra-African power(s) whose actions and policies impinge on Nigeria's national security in relations with its neighbours?
- What in your own view, are the problems associated with national security in Nigeria's relations with its neighbours?
- What do you suggest to be the solution to these problems?

Appendix 5

ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Services and Capital

THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES

RECALLING that sub-paragraph (d) of paragraph 2 of Article 2 of the Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States calls on Member States to ensure by stages the abolition of the obstacles to free movement of persons, services and capital;

RECALLING also that paragraph 1 of Article 27 of the Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States confers the status of Community citizenship on the citizens of Member States, and also enjoins Member States to abolish all obstacles to freedom of movement and residence within the Community;

RECALLING further that paragraph 2 of Article 27 of the Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States further calls on Member States to exempt Community citizens from holding visitor's visa and residence permits and allow them to work and undertake commercial and industrial activities within their territories;

CONVINCED of the need to spell out in this protocol the various stages to be undergone to accomplish complete freedom of movement as envisaged by sub-paragraph (d) of paragraph 2 of Article 27 of the Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States;

HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:

PART I

DEFINITIONS

Articles 1

In this Protocol:

“**Treaty**” means the Treaty of the Economic Community of West Africa States;

“**Council of Ministers**” means the Council of Ministers established by Article 6 of the Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States;

“**Executive Secretary**” means the Executive Secretary of the Economic Community of West African States;

“**Community**” means the Economic Community of West African States;

“**Member State**” or “**Member States**” means a Member State or Member States of the Economic Community of West African States;

“**A citizen of the Community**” means a citizen of any Member State;

“**A valid travel document**” means a passport or any other valid travel document establishing the identity of the holder with his photograph, issued by or on behalf of the Member State of which he is a citizen and on which endorsement by immigration and emigration authorities may be made. A valid travel document shall also include a laissez-passer issued by the Community to its officials establishing the identity of the holder.

PART II

GENERAL PRINCIPLES ON MOVEMENT OF PERSONS, RESIDENCE AND ESTABLISHMENT

Article 2

- The Community citizens have the right to enter, reside and establish in the territory of Member States.
- The right of entry, residence and establishment referred to in paragraph 1 above shall be progressively established in the course of a maximum transitional period of fifteen (15) years from the definitive entry into force of this Protocol by abolishing all other obstacles to free movement of persons and the right of residence and establishment.
- The right of entry, residence and establishment which shall be established in the course of a transitional period shall be accomplished in three phases, namely:

Phase I - Right of Entry and Abolition of Visa

Phase II - Right of Residence

Phase II - Right of Establishment

Upon the expiration of a maximum period of five (5) years from the definitive entry into force of this Protocol, the Commission, based upon the experience gained from the implementation of the first phase as set out in Article 3 below, shall make proposals to the Council of Ministers for further liberalization towards the subsequent phases of freedom of residence and establishment of persons within the Community and phases shall be dealt with in subsequent Annexes in this Protocol.

PART III

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FIRST PHASE: ABOLITION OF VISAS AND ENTRY PERMIT

Article 3

1. Any citizen of the Community who wishes to enter the territory of any other Member State shall be required to possess a valid travel document and an international health certificate.
2. A citizen of the Community visiting any Member State for a period not exceeding ninety (90) days shall enter the territory of that Member State through the official entry point free of visa requirements. Such citizen shall, however, be required to obtain permission for an extension of stay from the appropriate authority if after such entry that citizen has cause to stay for more than ninety (90) days.

Article 4

Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 3 above, Member States shall reserve the right to refuse admission into their territory to any Community citizen who comes within the category of inadmissible immigrant under its laws.

PART IV

MOVEMENT OF VEHICLES FOR THE TRANSPORTATION OF PERSONS

Article 5

In order to facilitate the movement of persons transported in private or commercial vehicles the following shall apply:

1. Private Vehicles

A private vehicle registered in the territory of a Member State may enter the territory of another Member State and remain there for a period not exceeding ninety (90) days upon presentation of the documents listed hereunder to the competent authority of that Member State:

- Valid driving license
- Matriculation Certificate (Ownership Card) or Log Book
- Insurance Policy recognized by Member States
- International customs documents recognized within the Community.

2. Commercial Vehicles

A commercial vehicle registered in the territory of a Member State and carrying passengers may enter the territory of another Member State and remain there for a period not exceeding fifteen (15) days upon presentation of the documents listed hereunder to the competent authority of that Member State:

- Valid driving license
- Matriculation Certificate (Ownership Card) or Log Book
- Insurance Policy recognized by Member States
- International customs documents recognized within the Community.

During the period of fifteen (15) days the commercial motor vehicle shall however not engage in any commercial activities within the territory of the Member State entered.

PART V

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

Article 6

Each Member State shall deposit at the Executive Secretariat specimen of travel documents defined in Article 1 in the present Protocol with a view to communicating them to all Member States.

Article 7

Any dispute that may arise among Member State regarding the interpretation or application of this Protocol shall be amicably settled by direct agreement. In the event of failure to settle such disputes, the matter may be referred to the Tribunal of the Community by a party to such disputes and the decision of the Tribunal shall be final.

Article 8

- Any Member State may submit proposals for the amendment or revision of this Protocol.

- Any such proposals shall be submitted to the Executive Secretary who shall communicate them to other Member States not later than thirty (30) days after the receipt of such proposal. Amendments or revisions shall be considered by the Council of Ministers after Member States have been given one month's notice thereof.

Article 9

Member States undertake to co-operate among themselves by exchanging information on such matters that are likely to affect the effective implementation of this Protocol. Such information shall also be sent to the Executive Secretary for necessary action in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty.

Article 10

The provisions of this Protocol shall not operate to the prejudice of citizens of the Community who are already in residence and established in a Member State provided they comply with the laws in general and in particular the immigration laws of that Member State.

Article 11

- A decision to expel any citizen of the Community from the territory of a Member State shall be notified to the citizen concerned as well as the government of which he is a citizen and the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS.
- The expenses incurred in the expulsion of a citizen shall be borne by the Member State which expels him.
- In case of expulsion, the security of the citizen concerned as well as that of his family shall be guaranteed and his property protected and returned to him without prejudice to his obligations to third party.
- In case of repatriation of a citizen of the Community from the territory of a Member State, that Member State shall notify the government of the State of origin of the citizen and the Executive Secretary.
- The cost of repatriation of a citizen of the Community from the territory of a Member State shall be borne by the citizen himself or in the event that he is unable to do so by the country of which he is a citizen.

Article 12

The provisions of the present Protocol shall not affect more favourable provisions contained in agreements that have already been concluded between two or among several Member States.

PART VI

FINAL PROVISIONS: DEPOSIT AND ENTRY INTO FORCE

Article 13

- This Protocol shall enter into force provisionally upon signature by Heads of State and Government of Member States and definitively upon ratification by at least seven signatory States in accordance with the constitutional procedures applicable for each signatory State.
- The Protocol and all the instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Executive Secretariat which shall transmit certified true copies of this Protocol to all Member States and notify them of the dates of deposit of the instruments of ratification and shall register this Protocol with the Organisation of African Unity, the United Nations and such Organisations as the Council shall determine.

- This Protocol shall be annexed to and shall form an integral part of the Treaty.

IN FAITH WHEREOF, WE, THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT OF THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES. HAVE SIGNED THIS PROTOCOL

DONE AT DAKAR, THIS 29TH DAY OF MAY, 1979 IN A SINGLE ORIGINAL IN THE ENGLISH AND FRENCH LANGUAGES, BOTH TEXTS BEING EQUALLY AUTHENTIC.

Source: webmaster@ecowas.int

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Appendix 6

Details of the Green Tree Accord

Details of the Green Tree Accord signed between Nigeria and Cameroon in Long Island, New York June 12, 2006 and witnessed by the UN Secretary General and representatives of United States, United Kingdom, France and Germany.

Nigerian troops will withdraw within the next 60 days after they had fought gallantly to protect lives and properties of Nigerians on the peninsula and continuously protected them for the last 13 years. If for any extraordinary circumstances there will be need for extra time for Nigerian troops' withdrawal, the UN Secretary General will consider and grant not more than 30 days in totality.

The two islands of Atabong and Abana which form the western part of Bakassi peninsula will continue to be administered by Nigeria for two years after the withdrawal of Nigerian troops. Mobile police force will be stationed on the two popular centres until cessation of Nigerian administration. In the meantime, the Federal Government with the Cross River State Government will sensitize the Nigerian population in Bakassi to the new political reality of the peninsula and advise them to make a choice of either being resettled back into Nigeria or remaining as Nigerians resident in Cameroon after the cessation of Nigerian administration.

A special transitional provision will be put in place five years for Nigerians after the cessation of Nigerian administration in the peninsula to enable them to have access, without formalities, to Bakassi with similar access for our law-enforcement agents for investigation.

It is very important to emphasize the Cameroon obligations under the Green Tree Agreement. Article 3 states:

Not to force Nigerian nationals living in the Bakassi to leave the zone or to change their nationality;

Respect their culture, language and beliefs;

Respect their rights to continue their agricultural and fishing activities;

Protect their property and their customary land rights;

Not levy, in any discriminatory manner, any taxes and other dues on Nigerian national living in the zone; and

Take every necessary measure to protect Nigerian nationals living in the zone from any harassment or harm.

Source: Olusegun Obasanjo (2006), "We abided by the Rule of Law" – excerpts of the text of a national broadcast of June 22 – cited in Tell: June 26. P. 21.

Appendix 7

French Ambassador: Oil firms alone can't develop Niger Delta 21/11/2006 (The Nation)

what extent has France impacted on Nigeria and her democratic development?

What I can say about this is that Nigeria has a democracy, the best in its history and that Nigeria is more influenced by the British and by the US. Your constitution is inspired by the US constitution and your laws are designed along the line of the UK legislation. Our action towards Nigeria is less visible on the bilateral level than it is through the European development fund, which is a global fund through which European countries and the European Union support many countries especially in Africa. We have shown that we support your democratic venture, we support the establishment of your parliament (the two houses of parliaments), and also we support fully the renovation of your justice, police, immigration departments and so on.

As far as France is concerned, you can be sure that at the highest level in my country, we understand that Nigeria wants democracy and has indeed established democracy, even if it's not perfect. One thing that has not yet been done is to establish a relationship between your parliament and our parliament, and this is an area we'll like to explore after your next election.

Your Excellency, you've been here since 2003, can you tell us the specific developments you can attribute to your term as the French Ambassador in Nigeria?

I will say two things in which I think we've done some works. The first is Debt relief. When I arrived here, I was surprised to see that the amount of cooperation money that we have for Nigeria was very small and I told my head of Department for cooperation that this is unfair, and that we should bring more money to Nigeria. And he said to me that we would do it but the best thing to do to help Nigeria is to give them debt relief.

Servicing debts alone cost Nigeria more than one billion dollars a year. In no way can we bring one billion dollars to Nigeria each year, but if you get debt relief, you will help the government, help the people of Nigeria to have more money for schools, hospitals, roads and so on. And I just took what he said to me, and I think that I have done some work in Nigeria with my colleagues and with other institutions, mainly in France to explain the situation and the challenge at the Paris Club.

We took time to sort out this question and find a final agreement, and fortunately Mrs. Okonjo-Iweala was in the same track and she made a very interesting proposal so that we can reach an agreement. But I can tell you that it has not been very easy. I never said that France had been alone in that, the British in particular have been very instrumental.

The second thing I have done was to try to balance better our efforts regarding the many regions we have in Nigeria. Usually, we were more focussed on Lagos and Port-Harcourt. Now, the capital is in Abuja so we realized that something has to be done and also we have neglected too long perhaps, the Hausa region.

I managed to convince my government to make more efforts; for example now, there will soon be a French radio station (Radio France Internationale, RFI), which will produce and broadcast programmes in Hausa, in conjunction with Radio Nigeria. We also have a researcher in Zaria where we are working with the Ahmadu Bello University. Presently we are working from four main places Kano/Zaria, Lagos, Port-Harcourt and Abuja.

To give you an example of our commitment to your country, recently, on March 6, we had a meeting in Paris at the headquarters of our foreign minister. The meeting was devoted to what we could do to improve our knowledge and position in Nigeria. We hope some good will result from it soon.

Let's look at Port Harcourt, what specific things do you think you can do for the people, towards the city and the people of that region in general?

I think that first of all, the problem of unemployment has to be seriously tackled in Port-Harcourt. Companies operating there need well-trained people. Not even at highest levels of say engineers or high-ranking people, but at the medium level. There is a lack of training and they don't find the people to employ in a place where there are so many unemployed people. Not only oil companies but also other companies have this problem. "Perhaps if you look at your educational system, in the area of technical schools and polytechnics, there is a lot of improvement to do."

The second thing is that there is a lot to do in the field of farming. Farming has been neglected, not only in the Delta region but everywhere in your country. Here also, I think a big effort has to be done to improve the situation.

In both sectors we try to help, in the first case through the training brought by the French companies, in the second through cooperation programmes we have developed in agriculture.

On Niger Delta, there have been cases of kidnappings, killing and disruption of oil company's activities. What do you think can be done to stem the unrest there?

I think that it is a great problem of course, as people are taken hostages. But I think that perhaps sometimes they have a wrong perception about the oil companies. I think the companies have paid a lot of money to the government of Nigeria, and they don't deny that they have taxes to pay and they are doing it.

The Federal government and the South-South state governments get a lot of money; the question is on what they have been doing with the money. What the companies do is to take oil and gas in proper manner with no damage to the environment and they pay their staff salaries and also help some communities. And when they have done that and even pay their taxes, it is a question of the government to look at the schools without teachers, hospitals and clinics without doctors. I think the companies cannot do the work without the authority of your nation. People think that the companies have to do everything. It is not true, the companies do their work, which is bringing the oil, bringing the gas, paying the taxes and the government will determine what to be done so as to bring benefit to the people.

On the question of the environment. As far as I know because I spoke with French companies that are there, I think they are doing their work in a way that damage to the environment is minimal. I know them, I know that they are doing their best to prevent damage as possible, and if there is any, they repair them, but I don't know about the other companies.

Also, the companies are well informed that the communities living around have to benefit from the oil and they are devoting important means to improve their living conditions.

One of the questions is perhaps the youths are aggrieved because the money is not in their opinion going to where it ought to go. And I think there is work to be done to be sure that the money is properly channeled. I agree fully with you that companies have to take care of people and the communities around and to improve the environment. But you can't ask the companies to do everything

It was understood that there was a tripartite meeting among the Nigerian government, British and American, and nothing seems to have come out of this to stem the problems there and it has been said that all western countries want is get the oil and leave. And some are not only getting the oil, they are creating problems of wealth, job and general economic problems.

We have seen the presidential programme for the Delta region. And this programme, we looked at it and it seems it's a serious programme, it says things that are to be done. But they are long-

term, you don't see instantly the result or the impact of such. We certainly wish to support this programme. We wish also that the stakeholders would work together to make it succeed.

But the question is after this president has gone; will the next president keep the programme?

But don't think that our companies only aim to take the oil and gas and to leave. We wish to have also sustainable projects. For instance we want to increase the surface for rubber trees. The price of natural rubber is very high at the moment and will probably stay high because there is a huge demand from China for this product and when you plant a rubber tree you have development for 30 years. The tree will produce rubber for 30 years.

It is a kind of thing you can do and we are working on such a programme at the moment but it will also take some time.

There is this opinion that some western countries are actually causing trouble in the Niger Delta so as to help the people to have their separate country. What do you say to this?

I have no idea about this at all. I don't think either British or American governments would want to think that way. This is the first time I hear somebody mentioning this idea. As far as France is concerned, there is no idea like that at all, and I don't think any foreign government wish to do something similar.

On Bakassi, the perception of many Nigerians is that France's support to Cameroun influenced the judgment at The Hague to cede Bakassi to Cameroun.

I am aware of this allegation. What I can say is that when this issue arose, on the contrary, President Chirac brought President Biya and Obasanjo together to convince both of them to go to the court and present their case to the international court in The Hague. I know, as at that time, the President of the court was a Frenchman. I know him personally, and because I know him personally, I can tell you he is a very honest man and very much devoted to doing things in a very legal way. I am so sure that the judgment was given only on legal point of view. There has been no influence whatsoever from the French government.

This is one of the few cases in which a judgment has been given and it has been implemented. What is very important is to see that after the judgment, there has been a committee for implementation, and they had many meetings and at the end it has been implemented. I was a witness at the ceremony on the 14th of August in Bakassi, and it was done in a very moving way. I think the way it has been done and the way Nigeria has respected its word has been very good for the image of Nigeria around the world.

Nigeria is now known as a country, which respects its word. But really, we have not tried to influence the court. We have supported Cameroun so that it will not be invaded but we have not done anything more.

It was said that you supported Cameroun because of the economic advantage of the oil on the location in dispute.

What is the difference if we get the oil from Cameroun or Nigeria? It is not true. We have a very good relationship with Nigeria as we have with Cameroun. And you know, many French speaking countries now, they are dealing with American companies instead of French countries to sell their oil. Look at Chad and Mauritania recently. And we are getting more oil programmes in Nigeria than in many of these countries. The issue of oil cannot be the explanation.

As a friend of Nigeria, what is your position on the gale of impeachments? Secondly, what is your country doing by way of advice because we envisage that there will be problems?

We are looking at this matter as observers. We are not involved directly in this matter. We are just observers. Well, it is interesting; it's also surprising in a way. As far as I understand, the issue is mainly the fight against corruption. Perhaps the governors use the money for themselves or friends and not to the benefit of their population. I mentioned earlier some states where it could be guessed that perhaps funds don't go where they should go. Let me just say that we are not involved in your domestic problem. We are only interested in the implementation of democracy.

But also, I would like to say that this problem in Nigeria comes in part from the way Nigeria pays its officials, governors or ministers are very little paid. And you cannot live as a governor or as a minister with the money you get from the government. That means if you have to keep your rank in the society, you have to find the money elsewhere. And one of the aspects of democracy and fight against corruption is to pay civil servants, high ranking politicians in high positions, not too much, but for what they are doing. It is a big job to be a governor, it is a job to be a minister, you have to devote a lot of your time, and you have to expend a lot of energy.

When there is corruption in high places, you move against such corrupt officials. In doing that, do you subvert the law of your country? What process do you follow? Is it that the end must justify the means?

No, not at all.

What I will say first is that we have established accountability in our system for long. Meaning that, in France, if you use money coming from the taxpayers, you need to get approval from elected assemblies.

The second thing is that there is a control by the state government on the way executive powers at every level are using the money. There is a special court, the court of accountability (Cour des Comptes), which checks everything each year and scrutinises the way you have spent the money, and through which channel. Nobody is perfect; when you are offered the possibility of stealing the money, the temptation is high. Our people are not better than your people. But it calls for much more efficiency and when people are seen to have embezzled money, they are taken to court, normal courts, they are convicted and barred from contesting again.

On the racial tension in France, why are others not integrated into the system?

It is a question that is important. We have a principle that is as you said, liberty, equality and fraternity. Also, we have another principle which is 'laïcité' meaning secularism. Many problems were raised from the fact that some people want to bring religion to the fore of our society, to consider everything through religion. It is not the way we do things. On the question of integration, I think in France, we have managed pretty well until this recent period of time. We have a long tradition of integration of people coming from many of the countries of the world especially Spain, Portugal, Italy, Asia and so on. As far as I know, some people have been integrated easily. But usually, it takes two or sometimes three generations to be fully integrated. But sometimes it is going quicker. Now, we have some kinds of immigrants who don't want to be integrated into the French society. They want to keep their habits, they are not sending their children to school, and they are not complying with French laws. When you want to live in a country, you have to comply with the laws of the country.

To summarize this, it is more difficult now to integrate immigrants than it used to be because they are coming from countries with more diverse ethnicity. But we are trying our best. I know we try to integrate them through schools, sports and culture, but when you want to integrate people who don't want to be integrated into the society, it becomes difficult. This is the problem we are facing at the moment.

Why are Nigerians being discriminated against in the issuance of visa?

We are a country of 60 million people. We cannot have huge inflow of immigrants but we want to develop trade through relationship. We are ready to give visa to people who are going to France

to do business or to visit but we have to be sure these people will come back to Nigeria. We have tried to organise our service especially the Consul-General office in Lagos, in a way that people are received in proper manner and don't also have to wait too much and get their visas as quickly as possible if they have with them all the proper documents we ask for. I know in some cases perhaps, people have not been received as well as they should. Nobody is perfect. There is no discrimination in the way we treat Nigerians but we should not hide the fact that sometimes we have difficulties.

When you consider the figures of applicants, sometimes 25,000 people will come to the Consul general in Lagos to get visas: out of these 25,000 more or less 20,000 get their visas. That is 80 per cent! One of the problems we have is that often people come too late. Some people will come on Friday to have their visa delivered on Monday. It takes time. If you want to go to France it takes at least one week to apply before coming for the visa. Tell the people to come in advance and not the last day they need it. At least, we need to cross check a few things in the documents.

One other constraint is that people come with fake passports and documents. When I arrived here in Nigeria, I tried to see how people are received. I waited in the queue for half an hour. During that time, I saw seven people with fake tickets from Air France. When people have the right documents, whether they are invited or they have enough money to spend their holidays in France, we grant them visas.

Americans have spoken through their mid-term election against the war in Iraq, France's position on the war is known. Now with the change in Congress of America through the mid-term election, will France not feel vindicated on their position on Iraqi war?

You knew our position on Iraq. It was not a position against America; it was a position that says only the UN Security Council could decide this kind of operation. We thought that as at that time, to go to war was not the best idea to solve the problem of Iraq. Although we didn't say there was no problem in Iraq. We just said it is not by force that the problem can be solved.

And I think by what happened it showed that we were right. As you know, America has a lot of casualties, hundreds of Iraqis are killed each day, it's a pity, and this nation is in danger of falling apart.

We are not saying that Iraq is not to be helped. We help, through European funding mainly, Iraq to restore peace and its economy. But when there is war everywhere, what can be done? We have to have a more secured environment to rebuild the country.

And also, a way to help was to give debt relief to Iraq. You know, Iraq also got debt relief as well as Nigeria. And it costs a lot of money to us because we are one of the most exposed countries as regards what we have been giving to the government long time ago.

To answer your question about the American election, we don't interfere in domestic situations; we understand that the voters decided to change the trend to a majority of Democrats.

I think President Bush himself has found the message very clear. The US is a great nation and democracy is working well there. The president seems to have started working according to the will expressed by the people at the last election.

Your Excellency, Nigeria got a debt pardon of 60 percent from the Paris Club and we had to pay about \$12 billion. This caused a lot of furore in the country because it's a whole lot of money. It's like a double jeopardy when the money we are supposed to owe did not come into the country. Although it appeared that the Paris Club was benevolent, but actually some saw it was a wicked act. It was like extracting money from the poor. What do you say to this?

To answer that, I would say that when you borrow money you have to pay it back.

It's very simple. There are two problems here. The money that was borrowed had not been used properly; it should have produced some benefits if properly used. But it was not done this way.

And instead of increasing, your revenues decreased. It is not our fault but a result of bad management of Nigeria at that time.

In any case, I think it is better to pay back \$12 billion instead of the \$31 billion dollars owed. And the government of Nigeria has accepted it as it has seen it as the best way to do it. At least, Nigeria is saving now one billion dollar a year.

If you borrow N100 and your creditor says you should pay N40, this is fair. What is bad is that the money borrowed had not been used properly.

What people are saying, your Excellency is that to pay \$12 billion in one instant while that \$12 billion can solve the problem of infrastructure in this country and in the process the problem of unemployment.

It was the decision of the government of Nigeria. We gave time to the government of Nigeria to think on it before the final agreement.

I agree with you that on economic basis perhaps it is not the best solution. I do agree with you, I am not disputing that.

But that's the way the Nigerian government has decided to do it. And we accepted to do it that way. It is for the citizens of Nigeria to make judgment about it.

China just had a big deal with Africa. And as far as China is concerned, it seems it is edging out Europe and this is generating a lot of tension. What do you say to this?

I read many reports about that, but to tell you the truth, we are not judging at all what China is doing, and each country has a right to what ever they want.

China needs many of the products you are producing especially oil, and minerals. If Africans prefer to sell with better price to China, it's their choice. Competition is the main principle for trade. If you get a better bargain with China, why not go with this country. Fair enough as long as everybody respects the same rules especially in terms of the environment, and the conditions of security and salaries.

The question is to look carefully at the terms of the contract before signing it, to make sure there is fair agreement and that Africa, and Nigeria especially, will get what it needs.

But we see no problem that you trade with China and also, I think that the Chinese kind of cooperation has a lot to teach on this continent. China has been successful in developing its own economy. There are certainly lessons to take from China because perhaps their problems are more comparable to the ones African countries are facing than the ones European countries are facing.

Ultimately, it is your decision and you have to think of what is best for you.

Your Excellency, we thank you for your time

The pleasure is mine. Thank you all.

Courtesy of: Embassy of France in Nigeria, 37 Udi Hills Street, Abuja –Tel. (234 – 9) 523 55 10 – Fax (234 – 9) 523 54 82

Appendix 8

Interview with The Champion Newspaper (Dec 6, 2006)
Foreign Affairs and Diplomacy

French Ambassador Yves GAUDEUL gives his recipe for Nigeria's Development

"Nigeria can't develop unless it has highly skilled manpower"

France is a curious country which many still don't understand though the French language is now official language in Nigeria. Abdullahi M. DOKI in this encounter with the French Ambassador to Nigeria, SE Yves GAUDEUL, presents wide range of issues. Excerpts

Can you please briefly introduce yourself by telling us about your impressions of Nigeria and your tenure as the French Ambassador in Nigeria?

I am 63. I started my career in the army. I was an officer for 10 years before going through the Ecole Nationale d'Administration (ENA), which trains France's high ranking civil servants. After a short time at the Ministry of Education, I embraced diplomacy. I served alternately in Paris, at the Ministry of Foreign affairs, and abroad : in Ottawa, Budapest, Nouakchott, in what was once East-Germany, and in the United States, in Chicago, where I was Consul General. Finally, I had three postings as an Ambassador : in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Haiti and Nigeria (since 2003).

After 3 years in Nigeria, I cannot pretend to have a complete knowledge of this country, in spite of all my efforts and my many travels throughout most of its 36 States. Nigeria is a big, complex and crowded country, very different from one region to another. It is based on a lot of mechanisms and layers of decision-making entities. There is a constitution and written rules, but there are also traditions and unwritten rules which are not easy to apprehend at times.

Nigeria is a fascinating country because of that complexity; here, nothing seems to be obvious. It requires a great deal of thinking and some good Nigerian friends whom to rely on. Fact is Nigeria is an important partner to France as regards its diplomacy as well as its economy, and it's important to pass a fair and accurate judgment.

How do you sum up the relationship between Nigeria and France?

The official relationship between our two countries had not started well. French nuclear tests in Algeria, at the time a part of France, and the Biafra civil war had seriously damaged them. On the other hand, it has to be noted that French businessmen have been in Nigeria for a very long time, since the beginning of the 20th century. Today, the political relations are excellent as the respective visits of presidents Obasanjo and Chirac bear testimony to it. France considers Nigeria as an essential partner for its role on this continent but also, on a larger scale, because of its views on the world situation. Within the international organizations, our two countries share similar or very close positions most of the time. Experts from both sides maintain a close contact. On the economic level, relations are very good and increasing sharply in density. Of course, the increase in cost of the barrel of oil has strongly inflated our imports from Nigeria, but the French companies' dynamism has so far limited that impact. French companies are still interested in investing here, in spite of challenges such as security, including legal security, where progress still needs to be made.

On the cultural level, I note a constant increase in attendance at the 9 Alliances Françaises around the country: an increase of 25% in 2005. Also, we try to help Nigerian artists to be better known from French audiences, but we have to acknowledge that our 2 peoples still do not know each other well. On the French side, Nigeria's image remains partially wrong, and still carries with it a lot of fears. This image can be changed through more exchanges, including exchanges of students, academics or researchers. The exhibit to be shown next year at the new Quai Branly Museum, in Paris, on « Arts and Civilizations of the Benue » could be used as an opportunity to go beyond the mere cultural sphere and show another Nigerian reality.

In what context would you explain France's role in world peace, stability and international cooperation?

Throughout its history, France has been confronted to many wars, be it invaded or trying to conquer new territories... After last century's two World Wars and with the decolonization process, France committed itself resolutely to building peace. It really started to get some success in the 1950s and 1960s : in Europe first, with the great achievement the European Union is today, to such a point that for the young generations a war within Europe would nowadays be totally unthinkable. Wars in Bosnia, Kosovo and Cyprus showed us though that violence can still arise very suddenly.

As you know, France is very active within the United Nations, of which it is a founding member. As a permanent member, it is particularly active within the Security Council; it is active also within the UN's other multilateral agencies. President Chirac put the UN at the heart of the French diplomacy. For France, the UN is the guarantor for peace, and should military operations be launched, it should be done under the UN's aegis, under the control of the international community.

For France, multilateral bodies such as UNESCO, WHO or FAO should be strengthened and given all the means they need to promote the right policies for the good of the whole world.

I would like to make a special mention of environment issues, which are also a determining part of our diplomacy and France's international action. President Chirac pleads for the creation of an international organization dedicated to dealing with the environment. This would be a very significant step further from the actual UN environment program based in Nairobi. The WTO has an essential role to play to regulate international trade, even though one might criticize the fact that the human dimension be not at the center of its concerns. I personally think we should give economy a more humanist approach, and remember that economy is meant to help human beings and not the opposite.

Is France's role in relations to its former colonies the same that it used to be in colonial times, or has it changed? If yes, how and in what direction?

France's role towards its former colonies has changed for an obvious reason: they are not colonies any more, and the relationships are today nurtured on the basis of equality between sovereign States. In a first phase after the independences, France kept a very close attention to these countries because they were lacking managers and civil servants. But of course, the type of cooperation France maintains with its former colonies has very thoroughly evolved during the last 50 years, and the number of « coopérants » (technical assistants) has steadily decreased, especially in the last 15 years. The strategic issue remains. There are still a lot of defense agreements between France and a number of African countries. They will be valid as long as African states wish to rely on them.

Finally, I should not forget to mention the very strong affective bond the French have with Africa, and especially with the former French-speaking colonies. I think it's a positive element that one should not deny or try erase.

How is France's policy towards Nigeria? Is that policy exclusively political, or exclusively economic, or only socio-cultural, or is it a balanced mixture of all?

In a way, the answer is in your question. At the beginning, the relationship was purely economic. Nigeria's independence coincided more or less with the discovery of oil. The Nigerian market was at that time one of the most active and attractive markets in the world. Today, Nigeria still holds a major place in our trade and our oil supplying. But French investments go to a more wider scope of interests : from tires, to cement, electrical appliances, the hotel industry and so on. 120 French companies are present in this country, and are significant employers in terms of manpower. The political relationship started gaining real momentum in 1999, encouraged by a policy of economic reforms and development initiated by president Obasanjo. I would like to emphasize the treatment

of Nigeria's external debt as a symbol of their success. I consider the debt cancellation as a prime example of an excellent cooperation between the Nigerian authorities, the Paris Club and a number of lending countries, which understood that the problem needed a radical decision.

Political relations are excellent even if one could hope for more bilateral visits. A lot of sectors remain to be explored. For instance, at Parliamentary level, there's no interaction between Parliaments of our two countries. I have raised that question with Parliament officials here, and I hope something will be done sometime after the coming elections.

Finally, at the cultural level, I think we could do more and better. Our peoples, as I said earlier, do not know each other well enough. And I think culture and sport are very good channels of communication, that we have to develop.

Yes, the answer was in the question. Our relationship is dense, multi-dimensional and is evolving in a satisfying way, even though in certain areas I would like things to go faster.

In Nigeria, French language is almost an official language, unofficially : Nigerians are learning French in primary schools, secondary schools and at tertiary institutions. Is France considering or has it ever considered investing its political influence in reshaping Nigeria's politics and ideological orientation, like the Americans are doing now?

The French language is the first foreign language taught in Nigeria. This is true, and demand is strong from various sectors of the Nigerian society, including administrations which feel the need to have French-speaking civil servants to better communicate with Nigeria's French-speaking neighbors. We have developed specific programs of cooperation with experts in the teaching of French as a second language.

The teaching of French is not efficient enough though, and that for 3 reasons :

- ▶ there are still too many pupils in Nigerian classrooms, and this is not conducive to the learning of foreign languages, despite a total commitment from the teachers
- ▶ exams at the end of the school curriculum are organized in such a way that foreign languages are depreciated vis-à-vis other topics in the course of the last years. I talked about that recently with the Minister of Education, who is quite aware of the problem and ready to solve it.
- ▶ the level of the teachers is still not where it should be, despite their personal investment and dedication. Teaching methods need to be improved and we are trying to adapt them in the 3 centres we support in Jos, Enugu and Ibadan, where teachers of French get their training.

There is still work to make the French language Nigerians' second language. But I am very encouraged by the progress made.

As far as a political orientation is concerned, France certainly doesn't intend to impose its vision of the world. Our objective is merely to offer opportunities to better know the French culture and today's France to those who wish so. Actually, our political orientation in terms of culture is rather to defend and promote a cultural diversity, and a cultural dialogue between all cultures considered on an equal footing. We think that the world is rich of its cultural multiplicity. We're certainly not in favor of some kind of a cultural standardization. I would like to recall the recent UNESCO vote, at France's initiative, of a convention precisely on cultural diversity, which by the way was also voted by Nigeria. We hope that Nigeria will ratify it as soon as possible so it can be enforced. We believe cultural diversity is as essential to human beings as bio-diversity. A festival of Hausa music organized in France a few months ago enjoyed a big success. We want to help the French know more about the Nigerian culture and creativity, a cultural asset which Nigerians themselves are sometimes not always aware of.

It seems the United States is gradually taking away from France former Francophone countries in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, as cases in Rwanda, Cote d'Ivoire etc have

shown, with emergence of pro-American leaders and increasing adoption of English instead of French. Is France losing out?

I think this fear of the United States replacing France and the French influence all around the world belongs to fantasies some like to brandish from time to time. Neither France nor the US, I think, has an imperialist approach to Africa. Of course, this is a continent of major stakes: humanitarian, economic, strategic, in terms of peace and security and so on. French and American policies are very often complementary. To be frank with you, there is room for everyone. There is still a lot to do on this continent, and we do not wish to be the only ones to care about Africa.

As far as the English language is concerned, it would be stupid not to realize that English has become the universal language, like it or not. This reality doesn't bother us. And of course, it would be totally counterproductive to try to impose that the French language be the only language to be spoken in countries in strong need of development. More generally, the global trend is that people need to speak more languages than just their own. There's the language you use at work, and there's the language(s) you choose because of affective or intellectual reasons.

What are the best French policies you think Nigeria could benefit from to make Nigerians more law abiding, like say our neighbours in Niger Republic or any other French-speaking African country?

Some say Nigerians are not law-abiding. It seems that sometimes they don't find a rational justification to the rules. For one thing, I think the reason lies with Nigeria's juxtaposition of several different legal systems. I also believe that the rapid change from a rural society with its own particular rules, to an urban society, which carries other rules, has to do with the difficulty encountered by some Nigerians. The more complex a society becomes, the more difficult it is of course to cope with it.

I would also add that, for a long time, the French have had a bad reputation for indiscipline. With time, we managed to unite around fundamental principles in order to organize our collective life in an efficient and peaceful way, and reduce the bad effects of individualism. Some African countries have made theirs those very principles in order to live peacefully together in spite of ethnic or confessional differences. Some others have apparently and unfortunately forgotten them!

Nigeria, I think, would benefit from thinking about that issue of how to live together, especially in big cities where social links based on tradition or religion tend to fade away. We certainly have there experiences we could share for our mutual good.

Today's France is the product of a long and tumultuous history, with a lot of external contributions (Greek and Roman notably). There would be plenty to say, but to sum it up, I think development is linked to a steady increase in quality and knowledge a given society is able to integrate into labor. Collective discipline and personal achievements are the two engines, which means a mobilization of the energies (that's the responsibility of the public sphere), and a commitment of each and everyone to give his or her best. And you will be ready to give your best when you know that the added value you put into your work is recognized through a decent salary and an evolving social status. I think social and economic development cannot be separated from a human quest for dignity. This means respect for the other's work, and a possibility to climb the social ladder according to personal merits and what each individual can bring to society.

Courtesy of: Embassy of France in Nigeria, 37 Udi Hills Street, Abuja - Tel. (234 - 9) 523 55 10 - Fax (234 - 9) 523 54 82

Appendix 9

Interview of HE Mr Yves GAUDEUL in The Nation, July 8, 2007

July 14 is to be marked again by France and her citizens across the globe. Since that Day in 1789 when the old order gave way to a new one, France has gone through difficulties and challenges as her Ambassador in Nigeria, His Excellency Yves GAUDEUL reveals in this interview with Eni Akinsola

Your Excellency, the day seen as the day of birth of the modern France, July 14 is known as Bastille Day, what is the day to France and her citizens all over the world?

It commemorates the 1790 Fête de la Fédération, held on the first anniversary of the storming of the Bastille on 14 July 1789. The storming of the Bastille was seen as a symbol of the uprising of the modern French "nation", and of the reconciliation of all the French inside the constitutional monarchy which preceded the First Republic, during the French Revolution.

It came because the people then saw the absolute power of the king as far from acceptable. So the storming of the Bastille and the change of the order was a turning point, hence the celebration.

The other meaning if you go back into more political issues is that at that time, before the Bastille Day, not all the people were equal. Some were privileged. There were three orders, i.e. ordinary people, the clergy and the nobility and at that point, only the ordinary people paid tax. The nobility and the clergy were exempted. The situation from that day turned out to be such that all became equal before the law. It means that the law no longer places one above another.

It was not that land and wealth were distributed equally but that all French citizens had and have equal rights under the law.

For us, it is a very important event. And it was important for a lot of countries throughout Europe as it was the starting point of an evolution towards an equal status.

Since that day, how has it been for France?

Right after the revolution there was a period of turmoil and terror. Some people wanted to go too far and lots of peoples – clergy and nobility were killed, most of them guillotined. Then there was the Napoleon era from 1804 which was another era of dictatorship. He was defeated in the battle of Waterloo, and the King then came back in a period called the restoration. We, from then, had a long period of change spanning two centuries in which we had 17 different constitutions. We have been a stable country for more than 50 years. We went through two world wars but have managed to remain a country, prosperous, and playing our role.

We have since teamed up with several countries of Europe, at the very beginning with Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany to form what is now known as the European Union. We were six at first; we got to 9, 12, 15, and now 27. The main trend now is to build the EU and to grow and prosper; and integrate new countries, particularly those within the old Soviet Union's sphere of influence, though we have some difficulties with Turkey.

We must admit that we have had a troubled history, we have however moved on such that we are now well placed to face the global economy. More than this, we have maintained an enviable position in the community of nations. At the end, the people of France are free, they are rich, not everybody though, we are in peace, and we are members of important international economic and political bodies.

In what ways has France's global economic and political status affected her relations with Nigeria?

Nigeria most of the time have similar position to France's on how to deal with the problems confronting the world, small and big ones. We have had, in this regard, very good relations with Nigeria. And we are also in favour of economic integration in Africa, we are in favour of NEPAD, and want all African countries to work together and pursue their common views.

And Nigeria being one of the largest country in terms of population is very important. It is essential to share opinions and views with Nigeria on account of her position and her prospects in the continent and the world. We have very good economic relations with Nigeria but there is a lot of room for improvement. Our level of economic relations we must say however is higher than our level of political relations. Even when there was a situation of friendship between former President Olusegun Obasanjo and President Chirac, the level of visits of France government officials to Nigeria was low. We hope to however build on it in the new dispensation.

You mentioned the fact that the level of economic relations between Nigeria and France is bigger than the level of political relations. Is it also true of France and other Africa countries, particularly Anglophone countries, since it is a known fact that relations with the Francophone countries are closer?

I think we are discovering Anglophone Africa. It is true of Ghana with who we have an important relation, though quite new. It was easier with Ghana because she is a smaller country and cooperation doesn't need as much money as we'll need in Nigeria. We also have a very good relationship with South Africa and our relationship is important because of the specific realities of the region. In the Eastern part of Africa, we are developing relationship but such are still low.

In summary, we began with Francophone countries, we have developed relations with Lusophone African countries, and now we are getting more and more committed to and involved with the Anglophone countries. The language problem is not a problem any more.

France's current president, Nicolas Sarkozy in the events preceding the last election emphasised the need for France to open up more, he said this thing about expanding the use of English language. Is it a carry over of this that France is reaching out to more countries outside the Francophone African States?

There are two aspects to the question. The first is that we want to continually develop the French language and make it one of the most important internationally accepted languages in international organisations. Either in the UN or other international bodies, we ask for bilingual interpretations and documentations, so that we can have documents written in French.

At the same time, we realise more and more, especially in business even in politics that we have to be open to other cultures, the culture of the UK and the US as well as other countries, we are also open to the German speaking countries. We are in favour of a diversity of cultures. As you know a convention has been signed at the level of UNESCO of which Nigeria is a signatory on the issue of diversity of culture.

The underlying philosophy is that the world will be better with many cultures. If we have just one culture, it will be boring and the people will not understand the differences and similarities between themselves and others and be able from there to be more open to others. We realise this and that is why young people in France are aware of the need to understand English. It is will be very difficult to make any career in France now without having a satisfactory level of understanding of English language.

For instance, as with computers it is becoming increasingly difficult to live now without it, foreign language is as important. For peoples of Europe, the future for instance will demand that they have working understanding of at least two other languages apart from the one of their countries. Other countries of Europe are doing better than us now in that direction. The Netherlands, Germany and Spain have put more emphasis on other languages than we did so we are trying to do better so as to at least draw level.

France had elections almost at the same time as Nigeria. There were no disputes about the results as we have here. At the earlier stages, most European countries were forthright about the truths of the Nigerian polls, but not long after that, Europe and indeed the rest of the World are urging Nigeria to move ahead by accepting the product of the polls. Has the involvement of France, and by extrapolation all the other European countries, been sufficient in the democratic evolution of Africa. With Nigeria as a reference point, have you done enough? Can you still do more?

That is an interesting question. It is true that we sent observers for the last election. It was a European team with many nations represented. I think we had about 150 observers with the chief being from the Netherlands. Also, the French embassy sent a few individuals to observe for our own purposes. It is true from what we saw that the elections were not free and fair and this much every other observer, mission and country have said. It has been said publicly by the EU, and the European parliament also made another statement, which was well reported here.

The truth however is that you have a president. INEC has announced a winner, and we have to accept the process as done by Nigerians, who have not revolted against this fact of life. There are voices raised in disagreement with this reality and some are in court challenging the result. Be that as it may, there is a president who is at the head of the government of Nigeria and that reality is sufficient for relationships.

It is sad for Nigerians who feel that the outcome did not reflect their democratic decisions at the polls. But, I must confess that I have no idea if the PDP would have won or lost had the elections been free and fair. So, that is an option we never got to see materialise.

In life, it is such that you have to go forward. What we have is a president who in honesty admitted that the elections were flawed. That is a good way to start. Also, he seems to have a clear idea of the problems. He wants to fight corruption. We also saw him quickly implement the judgement of the Supreme Court as in the Anambra State. He was open, at the last strike, to dialogue and an agreement was found. So we may have to look at other parameters to judge the man. We must also be conscious of what he is doing. The Nigerian people seem to like what he is doing. The president seems to want to work in a progressive direction by listening to the courts, listening to the opposition and engaging labour in dialogue. I think we have to give him a chance.

France is a big player in Africa, and there are crisis points here and there on the continent; Darfur, Sierra Leone, Somalia, etc. Even in Zimbabwe there are problems. What has been the role of France in maintaining, or evolving peace, as it were, in Africa?

In Sierra Leone and Liberia, though we were not at the forefront, we supported what the UN and ECOWAS have been able to do. You have to remember that ECOWAS has displayed efficiency and effectiveness in peace keeping and finding political settlement to crisis in the sub continent. On Darfur, we had an important ministerial meeting on Monday 25 June in Paris with several dignitaries present under the chairmanship of the new French Foreign Affairs Minister, Mr Bernard Kouchner. Mrs Condoleeza Rice was there, and the UN Secretary General was there among many others. I think it was a successful conference and we hope that the outcome is a step in the right direction. We do not pretend that everything has been solved. Going back to Liberia, Mrs Johnson-Sirleaf was in France and was received by President Sarkozy.

We are less involved in Zimbabwe. It is more of a matter for the British but we have tried to convince President Mugabe to make reforms, to listen to his population. I think he is leading the nation to a catastrophe. But we want to help him, not to punish him. We have to help the Zimbabweans to get out of what is a political as well as an economic crisis.

It is a difficult situation, because oftentimes in the process of making the leader of a country accountable, the people suffer. Apart from these, we are also involved in the settlement of difficulties in Chad, CAR and we try to do our best.

Looked at in a wholistic form, it is obvious that Africa is going through less periods of crisis now than in the immediate past. It is more peaceful than 3 or four years ago and that is encouraging. Also, the growth of Africa is not as bad as it used to be. It was estimated at about 6% as at last June. That, you will agree with me, is not enough for the millennium development goals, but we hope that the AU summit in Ghana have set the tone for further growths and development.

What do you think was interesting about the AU summit?

That is a question that should be directed at the African leaders. But I think that because it looked at the prospects of strengthening the Unity of Africa, it is interesting. My understanding of it, though I am not qualified to exercise any deep knowledge of the underlying politics, is that some countries prefer to work within the ambit of sub-regional institutions i.e they want Africa to begin from the basics. But some others are more ambitious and want to create immediately a federation of African states with an army, a common currency and all the trappings. Another group think it is too early to do that and that there are too many problems to be solved. The decision is one that is best left for Africans to take. What we know is that we are willing to continue to help Africa to achieve her potentials.

Candidly, what would you say are the specific interest of France in Nigeria?

To be very sincere, we do have clear economic interest. You are a huge country with a large population and that means Nigeria is a huge market. Also, we are interested in the oil and gas that Nigeria has in abundance. French companies are working here, though it sometimes gets tough to do so. We are pleased with the results we get. Not only with Total or other companies in Nigeria, but we are talking of consumer goods like cement, and some other important consumer goods, so economic relations is certainly the first area of interest.

Secondly, Nigeria is hugely influential in sub-Sahara Africa. In peacekeeping and security, we need Nigeria. That is why we are building on our relations with Nigerian on the political sphere. We must confess that Nigeria has done creditably well in recent years in arresting crises in Africa, if you look at Cote d'Ivoire, Togo, Liberia and even in Darfur. The agreement on Darfur was signed in Abuja and Nigeria has three battalions in Darfur, a costly exercise in human and material terms.

We know Darfur is a different place to deploy soldiers and Nigeria has lost a number in Darfur. So Nigeria is quite important to the peace of Africa. You have men in most places, and that is to Nigeria's credit. On culture, Nigeria is one of the countries in Africa having a diverse and vast culture. One Nigerian Director, Wale Adenuga, was rewarded in Ouagadougou with the first prize and his film on the child-soldiers was good, very interesting. You also have good music which could be further developed. You have good literature with two of your people recently honoured with awards for their literary works. So essentially, a country that is able to have what Nigerian has and its diversities cannot help but interest every serious player in the international system. Above all, Nigeria with its diverse cultures and people is big enough and interesting enough to attract attention.

What, in your opinion, has France lost or gained from the crisis in the Niger Delta?

I do not see what we can gain from the crisis at all. But we are losing a lot. We have had our people taken as hostage, though fortunately released. The situation has made operations much more difficult and expensive. More is being expended on security and logistics and that is not helping at all. Also, since the quantity of oil and gas produced has reduced, this has impacted negatively on the prices of these international goods. Even if the increases are a few dollars they count in the long run. French companies in Nigeria are as a result of this not making as much as they could have made and so that had too.

I think much has been done already to realise that perhaps the people of the Delta region have not been treated in a fair way in the past by the federal government, by state and local governments as well as by the companies. But we must say that French companies have a fair

understanding of the needs of the region and are ready always to pay maximum attention. We hope that now that we all know what the people want and there is a realisation that the problems would have to be solved, the condition of living of the people will begin to improve.

Really, I do not know what you mean by "gaining" from it. We really cannot be gaining from the crisis.

The question of what is being gained came in because the arms that are being used in the region are not home-made. They probably came from countries outside Africa. The question then is, if we want genuine solution what has friends of Nigeria done about it.

It is true that arms are getting into the region. We see and hear of guns and explosives. Guns may be getting in from abroad, but sincerely I have no indication that such are with the authorisation of the governments of their countries of origin.

France, and I believe other countries, have in place stringent conditions, tough procedures, which must be met before arms are allowed to be exported. We have never received any report of French involvement in arms importation. We have as always traffickers who work against known international laws to profit from gun running. It is possible that some of them are established in Europe but I know they are not authorised.

But you have raised a good question which hinges on how to fight trafficking in small arms. It is known across nations that small arms kill more people than major weapons. I was, as I told you, at the Foreign Affairs Ministry recently to discuss a proposal by the UN Secretary General to reinforce and to establish international rule on the trafficking of arms. We passed our position to the ministry which is of our firm support for the UN secretary's initiative. We have along that direction forwarded our statement of commitment to the UN secretary, to support him and encourage him to follow up on this matter. We hope also that Nigeria will go along the same direction so that we can rid the society of traffic in small arms.

You know that in ECOWAS, you already have rules on small arms. The 15 countries have signed and all it needs now is the ratification of the different parliaments of the member countries of ECOWAS. That is one sure way of fighting the problem of trafficking in small arms.

We have a new French president and an admixture of old and new hands in the cabinet. What are the things that will change as a result of this reality?

Yes, it is a new government. There is, first and foremost, a generational shift. But that is not necessarily to say that there is a change in the political reality. Both the incumbent and the former president are of the same right wing party.

I must say however that the way we consider Africa will change. After independence, we had perhaps a paternalistic relation with Africa, French speaking and the rest. That had its good as well as its bad sides. Perhaps the relationship became too intimate between us to the extent that we were interfering in the policies of some of these countries. I think that aspect will change. Also, we are increasing the amount of funds committed to Africa but we hope Africa will increasingly take her destiny into her own hand. We are however still at the disposal of Africa. The other aspect is the question of immigration. We have a lot of West Africans in France some from Nigerian but mainly from francophone countries. The idea now is to, as being championed by President Sarkozy, make immigration a win-win situation in the sense that we'll accept some immigrants having in mind that they will not forever be in France.

They can get better education and jobs but will have to go back at some point in time to put their knowledge at the service of their countries. Also, the idea is that because they earn money in Europe, some of the money will have to go back to Africa not only in paying school fees, building new houses or paying for other things, which is obviously the case at the moment, part of this money could go for medium and small enterprises or initiatives. In this case, it is possible that this money may be augmented by both the Nigerian and the French governments since the direction

is the improvement of the economy. The details are still to be worked out but that is the general idea and we have to see how it can be implemented. I am sure that is the way President Sarkozy wants to genuinely deal with the immigration problem.

What message do you have for the average French citizen in Nigeria and friends of France ahead of the forthcoming Bastille Day?

I have not yet written my speech for the day, through I am sure it will be a short one. First, I would say to the French people: thank you for the work you are doing here. We are not numerous, we are just about 2000. I say: "you are working very much; you are gaining market for France, selling French knowledge, technology, projects and winning for her new friends. Through your work, many people find jobs in France, because we are exporting what is produced by those employed at home. You are at the frontline, sometimes in difficult situation, we thank you".

My fellow citizens are doing well and they are well accepted and integrated by Nigerians. They are open to Nigerians and Nigeria are very open to them too. So it has been good. To our Nigerian friends, we say thank you for accepting us, the way you have always welcomed us, we are pleased to be in your country. We assure that France is devoted to the growth and progress as well as the peace of Africa.

Nigeria has enormous prospects, great future and what is left is for the country to be well-led and have good-governance. Nigeria needs only to be well-organised to make better use of your resources. Oil and gas will not be there for ever and so Nigeria should think of the future. Invest in what could be sustained in the long run. We wish you well. You have been our great partner.

Courtesy of: Embassy of France in Nigeria, 37 Udi Hills Street, Abuja –Tel. (234 – 9) 523 55 10 – Fax (234 – 9) 523 54 82

Appendix 10

Interview of Ambassador Jean-Michel DUMOND by the LEADERSHIP newspaper

Nigeria Is Not Well Known In France – French Ambassador

LEADERSHIP, MARCH 17, 2008

Kunle Somorin, Foreign Editor


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DIPLOMATIC INTERVIEW

Until his posting to Nigeria as the French ambassador and an accredited representative of the French government Jean Michel Dumond was the deputy head of the French mission in Berlin, Germany. His career spanning many years, had mostly been in Europe. Therefore, his assignment in Nigeria where his country has so much business interest becomes his first posting to Africa, yet the interaction between the two countries and its peoples remains at a very low level, but the French diplomat would not accept that language has been responsible for it. To Ambassador Dumond, the real reason is "ignorance" This he said, in his first interview since arriving the country in January, will be his major task during his duty tour in Nigeria. He also spoke on many other global issues to Kunle Somorin and Emmanuel Iffer. Excerpts:

Nigeria Is Not Well Known In France – French Ambassador

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Your Excellency can you paint a picture of the relationship between France and Nigeria?

Well! France and Nigeria share the same global vision, we share the same basic values, and we both work towards adapting to a globalised world. We both have a common ambition of eliminating poverty and making progress towards development. We both work towards strengthening the rule of law, justice and transparency, as well as cultural diversity. So those are our common goals as members of the world community.

And when you look at events on the world stage, on many occasions, France and Nigeria have been on the same line. One can say that we both have common interests. When it comes to trade, Nigeria is the second biggest trade partner of France in sub-Saharan Africa; we have about 10 per cent of Nigeria's internal market. We also top the list of investors in this country. We have about 160 enterprises that are performing very well in Nigeria's economy. So clearly we have a very large economic interest in this country.

On the other hand, Nigeria is also exporting a lot of oil to France, last year alone; one billion dollars worth of oil was exported from here to France. So that is the first point I want to emphasize: huge economic interests. Secondly, the stability of the West African region, and we are indeed appreciative of the rôle Nigeria is playing in this part of the world, as a global power on

the continent of Africa. We do appreciate the role its forces are playing in peacekeeping operations all over Africa.

But when we look at the political level, the relationship doesn't match our present economic relation, as well as the role we are playing in the region, and I think in the coming years, this has to be considered as an important aspect of the relation between Nigeria and France. France is not well known in Nigeria, just as Nigeria is also not well known back in France, so I think one of my major tasks while I serve here will be to work on this to ensure that our two countries get to know each other better than it is the case presently.

How do you hope to bring about the realisation of this vision?

I think we have to develop the political, cultural and economic relation between our two countries. How do we go about this is by facilitating missions from Nigeria to France, and from France to Nigeria. By facilitating, particularly, trips of business people from France to Nigeria, as well as for me to go to France from time to time to present the diversified realities of Nigeria to the people of France. And it is within this global framework that we shall strengthen the bond between our two countries.

I think we can begin this process with exchanges at many levels. Already our minister has extended an invitation to your minister of foreign affairs to visit France, and your foreign minister has accepted the invitation in principle, this visit will provide them the opportunity to discuss on how to establish a global relation between Nigeria and France, which would allow for the setting out of a new partnership between us. As you know, we have decided to establish a framework between France and Nigeria which would deal with any issue on the international agenda. Our plan is to take full advantage of the pending meeting between the two ministers to set out the global framework of our relation. Our thinking is that this relation should no longer be just between one arm of government alone, but all the other arms of government as well, for instance, between parliaments, a situation where parliamentarians from Nigeria would visit France and interact with their fellow parliamentarians in France and the other way round. These encounters would afford the visitors an opportunity of exchanging views, thereby sharing experiences amongst themselves.

There could also be relations between other bodies such as civil society groups and NGOs, or between Nigerian States and France regions. It is a pity that at present, there is no single partnership existing between any Nigerian State and any French region.

Don't you think that language could have been a barrier, considering that Nigeria is English speaking country?

Absolutely not. Honestly, I don't think language can be a barrier.

So what do you think is responsible for this situation?

I think it is a question of mutual ignorance, I think our two peoples do not know themselves well enough, because so far as culture is concerned, there is no barrier. For instance, the French people have recently discovered that Nigeria had in the past an incredibly rich culture, thanks to an exhibition in Paris about Benin culture of Nigeria, and most French didn't know there were such rich art works in Nigeria. So it is more a matter of ignorance. We must now work towards developing the knowledge about ourselves.

So clearly, the question of language is not much of a problem, after all, there are many Nigerians who speak French or want to speak French. When you go out there, you meet many Nigerians who are willing to learn the French language, without asking for a sponsoring from the French, which tells you a lot about a desire for the French language in the country.

At some point, French language was adopted as Nigeria's second official language, how did the French government get involved with this project?

Well, it is up to the Nigerian government to tell us exactly what they want us to do, but what I can tell you is that when you consider our cooperation, and I can assure you that what we are doing is always based on local requests, you will notice a clear difference between us and many others. Our cooperation focuses mainly on teaching the French language and on cooperation with schools and other learning institutions.

We do know that there is a French language school in Lagos, which is purely managed by Nigerians are we likely to see your government sending some experts to assist?

Well, we have a network of schools, and in all these schools, we have French people sent by the French government to organise French lessons. We are happy that many Nigerians attend classes in these places and learn the language.

Most international relation experts are of the view that Nigeria has not benefited from her relation with France, particularly in ECOWAS, it is believed that France is the one that has always worked against Nigeria's interest in favour of its former colonies within the organization what is your take on this?

Very bluntly, I think this is not accurate. I cannot recall a single occasion when we worked against Nigeria's interests in ECOWAS. What I must tell you is that we commend the role ECOWAS is playing. Let's take the issue of peace, security and stability. If you recall what happened in Chad when rebel groups decided to overthrow the legal government there, we refrained from firing a single shot. We decided to wait for the decision of the African Union in Addis Ababa and for the declaration by the president of the Security Council in New York.

So our major concern now is to see how we can help to build a new security system on the continent of Africa, which we believe should be in accordance with the way Africans themselves want it to be built. In this regard I can say that ECOWAS is playing an active role, by building a force that sometimes in the future can be deployed to intervene when security is threatened. Our objective is to help, through an open and honest assistance, so that Africa meet up with this objective of peace, security and stability on their continent, not only through the ECOWAS but the African Union as well.

For instance, there is going to be an exercise in Bamako to demonstrate how these forces are being built, there has been similar exercises in Abuja, a few weeks back, in which many French officers were involved, so that is how we are looking at things now.

As you know, we want to give a new impetus to the relation between France and Africa, our President, Nicolas Sarkozy, was in South Africa a few days ago. When you look at his speech in Cape Town, it is clearly said that he wants to establish a new pattern of relationship with Africa, which is based on our common values and understanding of the world and common interests, but this is not something that can be achieved in a day.

Are we likely to be seen a relationship between France and African more in terms of strategic interest rather than historical as has been the case all this while?

Clearly, history is history and we can not change it, but what I would like to stress is our desire to establish a new partnership with all African nations. It does not mean losing sight of the reality history has forged between France and some African countries. Definitely France is looking at deepening cooperation with all African countries.

Are you likely going to have a stronger relation with Nigeria more than some Francophones?

But why would you look at it as a competition. Nigeria is a very huge country with a very large population, it is one of our largest trade partners in Africa, and as far as trade is concerned we want the relation to be even more active.

Many Nigerians believe that, the lose of Bakassi to Cameroon is because of France, due to the large deposit of oil in the area, how do you react to this?

What I can say is that there was a judgment delivered by the international court of Justice, and both the Nigerian and Cameroonesse governments had decided to abide by the judgement. France never interfered.

But really, is the French government happy with the fact that the judgment reduced Nigeria's local governments and given to Cameroon?

Well, as you know, the case was not just about Bakassi but all along the border from Lake Chad to the Gulf of Guinea. There are spots where the court decided in favour of Nigeria, and in some instances in favour of Cameroon. But what the court decided was not our concern. Our concern is about stability, because it could have led to instability which we are always worried about, especially when the stability and security of the region is at stake.

One was wondering why the group from France which was caught with children in Chad has to be sent to France for their jail term at the request of the French government?

Because it is a legal agreement entered into for certain cases, between independent states, whereby people condemned abroad can serve their jail terms in their home countries, without changing the nature of the punishment, except in a situation where the authorities where the judgement was rendered decide to pardon or adjust the sentence.

But really what is the philosophy behind this kind of agreement?

It is very simple, when such a sentence is passed on you, you prefer to serve your time in jail where your family members are, where you have your own people. But this is only possible when such an agreement already exists between France and the considered country.

The issue of the economic partnership between Europe and ECOWAS, where the EU was given ECOWAS a deadline to enter into the agreement, what do you think is the implication of this hard line posture on the part of Europe?

As you see negotiations are still on, that is all I can say.

But there was a deadline; can you say that negotiations are still going on?

You see there was nothing hidden about it. The only thing is that the former Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) agreement was about to expire on December 31, 2007 and countries that benefit from this agreement were bound to loose such advantages. But negotiations are still on.

But do you think that African countries stand to benefit from these kinds of agreements?

Of course, that is the intention.

Because we have seen things happen and you know that such relationship between Africa and Europe has never been mutual, so do Africans stand to benefit from EPA?

Yes, that is the reason for negotiations to be going on. I do believe that, at the end of the day, everyone will get some benefit from it.

The agreement was that under this arrangement, there wasn't going to be subsidy if we are to trade like partners, but till today subsidy existing, in OECD countries, so what have to you to say about that?

Well, we are going to negotiation with an open mind that there will be something for everyone to benefit in a mutual way.

Recently Kosovo declared independence, you and other Europeans supported it, and now Taiwan is already looking in that direction, do France think that the unilaterally way Kosovo declared independence is in order, wouldn't it create stability problem in that region?

We think this move will contribute to political stability in the region. Shortly after the unilateral declaration of independence, member states from the European Union met and agreed on two things, one, every country should decide on what it feels is right, secondly, they agreed on sending European forces to take over from those of the UN, so as to help stabilize the situation.

But how are you going to resolve the looming crisis between Serbia that is supporting the Kosovo action?

Well, we are open to discussion with Serbia and we are taking into consideration their views, but we believe, under the present circumstances, this move remains the best option to calm down the volatile situation in that area.

About Iran, how do will reconcile that accusation Iran that it is planning nuclear weapon, considering that this was the same way Saddam was accused eventually invaded but the story now is no weapon of mass destruction?

I do not see any contradiction between the positions we adopted vis-à-vis the two countries. Events in Iraq, as you know, showed that we were right. Concerning Iran, we want to find a way to solve the issue. That's why we are trying to combine openness and firmness.

Nigeria had election last year, which EU has deeply interested in, and your observers, like many others returned a negative verdict on the conduct of the polls, but few days back the tribunal said that the election was clean, how does France react to this?

As you know, final judgement is not yet known since the case is now going to the Supreme Court. So let's wait for the outcome at the Supreme Court.

Courtesy of: Embassy of France in Nigeria, 37 Udi Hills Street, Abuja –Tel. (234 – 9) 523 55 10 – Fax (234 – 9) 523 54 82

News

THE NATION ON SUNDAY, APRIL 27, 2008

Nigerians want to work

—French Ambassador

The French Ambassador to Nigeria, His Excellency Jean-Michel Dumond in this interview with Eni Akinsola speaks of his country's mission in Nigeria, the European Union and prospects for greater France-Nigeria relation.

You have just arrived, have you identified areas that you think you can improve upon or the Nigerian government can improve upon in fostering better relations?

Let me say there is a big gap between what happens in the economy and trade and what happens in politics. I think the most important thing is to have relations established between political authorities at the highest level so that means the level of the French President meeting with the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The two heads of State have met from time to time, in Heiligendam when there was the G-8, in which Nigeria took part as a member of the G-13, they met in the margins of the General Assembly of the UN in New York and lastly at the margins of the European Union Summit in Lisbon under the Portuguese presidency. Now is time to have discussions where the two heads of State can state their views about the international situation and set the framework for relations between France and Nigeria.

These relations are also to be established at the level of ministers of foreign affairs to be followed by meetings between responsible ministers in different stages. Relations between parliamentarians will also follow. We are glad to mention that the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Mr. Dimeji Bankole visited between the 26th and 27th of March and met several high ranking French officials, including the president of the Assemblée Nationale, Mr. Bernard Accoyer, as well as the president of the friendship group in the National Assembly.

France is already the president of the EU on behalf of whom she is trying to get a resolution in Nigeria that would allow the French to be able to do a lot of things that you are going to do in a short time out of the presidency of the EU.

What are the main areas of cooperation between France and Nigeria? We have a lot of cooperation in the areas of trade, investment, education, health, agriculture, energy, infrastructure, etc. We are also working on the fight against HIV/AIDS in Nigeria.

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His Excellency Jean-Michel Dumond, French Ambassador to Nigeria, in an interview with Eni Akinsola. He is seen here on the background of the French Embassy in Abuja. He is accompanied by his wife and daughter. The interview took place in the margins of the French Embassy in Abuja.

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France is already the president of the EU on behalf of Slovenia since Slovenia does not have a mission in Nigeria. In this capacity, what are the specific contributions of the EU that you can point to as a direct fall out of the Presidency of the EU?

As the president of the EU, and on behalf of the European Union, we have led the normal work of the different groups of the European Union. We have also met the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Justice to express the support of the European Union on the fight President Yar'Adua is launching against corruption.

Starting from July 1, France will effectively take over the EU presidency. Can you let us in to some specific goals France will pursue as EU presidency?

I'll with representatives of the European Commission in Abuja meet with journalists to highlight the priorities of the French presidency during the commencement of our tenure later in the year. For now, I will only repeat our general goals which are energy, environment, climate change, migration, European defence and more broadly, external and internal security policy, and of course preparation of the implementation of the EU treaty which was signed in Lisbon.

The French President was in South Africa a few weeks ago, and he highlighted a new approach to French-African relations. Are there direct ways that this would impact on Nigeria particularly your posting as the Ambassador of France to Nigeria?

Our president expressed intention to establish new patterns of relations between France and Africa. Our main goal in this framework is to help Africa to build its capacities in the field of peace and Security. And this I think will greatly impact as far as, for example, we are trying to do our utmost in the framework of ECOWAS to help this regional organisation to build its own capacity. There was an exercise organised in Abuja some weeks ago, in which seven French officers took part with the aim of helping to prepare an exercise which will be organised in Bamako and which is to test the capacity of the organisation to match such challenges. **Sudan is a sore point in Africa. France is an important player in the continent and has maintained strong presence in Africa. Is there a way that France thinks that the world and indeed Africa can approach the Sudan issue differently?**

There was an agreement which was signed between the presidents of Chad and of Sudan in Dakar at the margins of the meeting of the Organisation of Islamic Conference. We welcome the signing of this agreement which was a direct agreement between the two countries and we hope that it will help bring peace back to this region. As a sign of the new pattern of relations which we want to establish with the African continent, the French Army which was present did not intervene in fighting in N'Djamena. We can't accept the tentative attempt to overthrow a government established after elections and we expressed our support to the government of Chad. And I think that is a sign of this new attitude.

At the same time the European Union has sent a force of 3,700 soldiers, among them 2000 French soldiers, which is based in the Eastern part of Chad in order to protect the population which are there.

Let's come to Nigeria, has France's business interest been affected by developments in Nigeria's Niger Delta?

Honestly, our companies are very active in the Southern part of Nigeria. There are companies implementing new plans for production of oil and I can say with satisfaction that there have been many new projects in Nigeria.

Nigerians accept for instance that we have a huge problem with power generation and several countries have expressed interest in the past to help out. Is there any French interest involved in Nigeria power sector?

Yes, there are many French companies involved. We have Schneider, Areva, LeGrand and many other companies active in the field of electricity supply.

Are they under any stress as a fall out of the probe by the Nigerian parliament of the energy sector?

No, to the best of my knowledge.

Has France's presence in Africa achieved the desire of France, or are there areas that you could still participate in helping Africa?

We can say with some confidence and optimism that the situation has improved above what it was in previous years, and in this regard we appreciate the positive role that Nigeria has been playing, and is actually still playing, and will be playing to improve the stability of whole region. As you see, the announcement of election in Cote d'Ivoire on the 30th of November of this year and compare with the situation which was prevailing in this country on few years ago, we can only share within you that there has been an improvement with a new development which have has occurred in Cote d'Ivoire and we are hoping that this will continue.

What would you say qualifies you to be the French Ambassador to Nigeria? Why were you not posted to other countries elsewhere, why Nigeria?

Because I have worked in big countries and Nigeria is a big country which we want to consider as a global player; to partner with and discuss on general questions affecting the future of the World such issues as climate change, environment, migration, terrorism, fight against poverty, development, peace and security, rule of law.

Call we just take a walk back into the places that you have worked and then the experience that you have garnered that will be of direct advantage to you in Nigeria?

I was responsible for relation with French-speaking countries during four years and I had traveled quite a lot to all these countries which gave me the opportunity to come to Lagos some years ago.

You've been here in Lagos before?

Yes, I made a stop in Lagos in 2002 .

Then, you were on Ambassadorial posting in Africa?

No, I was responsible for relations with French speaking countries and particularly these countries which are in Africa.

So, can we say Nigeria is your first African posting?

This is my first as Ambassador in Africa.

In France, what determines Ambassadorial postings, is it politics, or your career in the diplomatic service?

Well, we are chosen by the president following procedures which include the selection by a committee of people assisting the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The committee will propose a list of persons which the minister will consider.

So it does not matter if you are in the Foreign Service before on the ministry of foreign affairs?

Most ambassadors are career diplomats but it is the choice of the president to choose people outside of the career and it is going to have new faces of people representing diversities of France.

You have not been here for long. So what has the experience of serving in Nigeria been?

Well, I think it is a very interesting experience. It is a very huge country, a very vibrant country. I have not been everywhere but I plan to go to the 36 states of the Nigerian Federation. I have already been to Kaduna, to Zaria, Kano, Port Harcourt, to Lagos quite a number of times. I could already see the diversity of the population, of the landscape of Nigeria from North to South, from West to East and I think it is a very interesting experience of people wanting to work.

What are the specific areas that the ambassador or the Embassy under your leadership will be focusing in Nigeria?

The main part of our cooperation is to support cultural exchanges between France and Nigeria. You know that Nigeria is surrounded by French speaking countries. I am struck by the number of people who want to learn French either in the population or among the administration, especially in the field of peace and security, in the Ministry of Defence, in the police and elsewhere. There are many people who want to know better our language and culture and we try to respond to them. And to the question of assistance, we want to answer to requests, which are made by certain communities and we have developed a number of projects in different states, all over the country.

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Appendix 12

Nigeria does not have bad reputation in France—French ambassador

Written by: Chinyere Amalu

Saturday, 02 August 2008 Vanguard (online) (date accessed 09/08/2008).

Ambassador of France to Nigeria, Jean-Michel Dumond, is six months old in Nigeria. He believes that with the official visit of President Yar'Adua to France, the relationship existing between the two countries will deepen.

He also speaks on the significance of France's National day to all French nationals. In this interview with Saturday Vanguard, Ambassador Dumond also assured that the two parties will fulfil the agreement signed. The full interview.

Sir, before now, what is the existing relationship between Nigeria and France like?

The relationship between our two countries is excellent. It got a boost with the return to democracy in 1999, of course. We can only be confident it will be even better after the official visit of President Yar'Adua to France, during which France and Nigeria decided to establish a strong strategic partnership.

Still on the visit of President Yar'Adua to France, there is this perception that since Nigeria is not a French speaking country, the bilateral agreement signed between the two countries will not yield any positive result. What is your opinion?

It has nothing to do with language, really. Last month, June 12 marked a new stage in our relationship and a deepening of Nigeria and France relations, we decided to sign a joint communiqué during the visit to establish a strategic partnership.

We agreed to strengthen our cooperation in a number of fields which were pointed out by the President of Nigeria in his 7-point agenda, and I will like to, specifically, mention energy, transportation, agriculture, tourism, vocational training, infrastructures, environment and security.

More than 100 French companies are already operating in Nigeria and are pleased to work here. France is among the very first investors in this country, so there will be no problem in cooperating with Nigeria in those areas.

On energy precisely, what is France likely to offer to Nigeria to improve its energy sector?

In cooperation, we hope to strengthen the partnership between France and Nigeria covering all relevant sectors, and that means electricity generation, construction of hydraulic dams as much as transmission and distribution, and even programmes in nuclear energy. Nigeria has expressed its desire to acquire a long-term nuclear power in order to increase its energy and we are ready to look into developing this in a long term, depending on safety measures and in accordance with all international agreements, of course. Before an involvement of the relevant French firms in the Nigerian power sector, there will be, very soon, a mission in order to assess the situation and see how we can best implement measures based on decisions to be taken during this French visit.

What is the trade volume between the two countries, who exports and imports what and in whose favour?

The balance of trade between France and Nigeria in 2007 was 2.4 billion euros. We import approximately 1.3 billion worth of goods, and export 1.1 billion. Of course, the biggest share in French imports consists of crude oil, and our exports are petroleum equipment, electricity equipment, chemicals and refined oil products etc. In 2006, France was the 3rd importer in Nigeria (6th in 2007). Depending on the year, Nigeria is France's first or second trade partner in Sub-saharan Africa. Bilateral trade is in favour of Nigeria.

Talking of good relationship between the two countries, how many Nigerians are serving jail terms in France as a result of illegal migrations and other offences?

I don't know the actual figure, but they are not many because the number of Nigerians in France is relatively low. I would like to add that cooperation in terms of justice and police between the two countries is very cordial and efficient.

So, how does your government tackle illegal migration by foreigners?

Relatively few Nigerians are going to France, compared with other European countries. We process on average approximately 27,000 visas every year but the number of Nigerians living in France is not high and, so far, there's no problem of bad history or reputation.

Recently, your President visited Israel and pledged his support to Israel's State and, at the same time, called on Israel to end its war with Palestine. What happens if Israel disobeys this call? Will France withdraw its pledge?

France has a clear position on this issue. The right of existence of two States living in security within borders recognized by everyone. We are encouraging the two countries to negotiate in order to reach a peaceful settlement of this long lasting crisis.

This is our calling; we hope that they will listen to us. You noticed that all the parties involved were around the same table, in Paris, on July 13, on the occasion of the launch of the Union for the Mediterranean.

On Iran's nuclear programme, your President also, during his visit to Israel, said that Israel is not alone in the fight but has the full support of France.

Why the statement, has Iran threatened France with its nuclear power?

In this matter, France's position is the same as the European Union's and the international community's position, as expressed at the Security Council. As far as Iran's nuclear programme is concerned, there has been proposals submitted to Iran and we are waiting for the Iranian authorities' answer to them.

Those proposals put forward in June 2006 provide for cooperation in the area of civilian nuclear power as well as economic and political cooperation if Iran would agree to suspend its sensitive nuclear activities and to negotiate. This proposal remains on the table

Members of G8 Country called on all the developed countries to assist African countries in solving the food crisis in the sub-region. In what area do you think France can come in?

We have developed proposals for solving the food crisis in the world, which consist in short, middle and long-term measures. As you know, at the European level, we are concerned at developing a common agricultural policy that will help in ensuring food security on the continent and the world as a whole.

We have to think about how to organize, in the next few years, this common policy in the frame-work of this new context of possible shortages. By the end of the French presidency of the Council of the EU, Europeans must have defined guidelines for common agricultural policy so that we can set aside the surge in food crisis. We also believe that setting up a policy within the ECOWAS region will give a good basis for all governments in the region to face the challenges of food security.

Any French assistance programme in Nigeria?

We do have assistance programmes in Nigeria, essentially through our participation in the programmes of 10th European Development Fund, which runs between 2008-2013. France contributes financially to up to 24% of these programmes. This will amount to some 600 million euros on bilateral basis, to which we must add about the same amount to ECOWAS.

We also have bilateral assistance programme from France to Nigeria, which based mainly on the teaching of the French language, on encouraging Nigerians students to come for studies in universities in France, and

on responding to a strong demand from Nigerian authorities and the general public.

I would also like to mention the opening of an office in Abuja, in September, of Agence Française de Développement, which already opened an office of its subsidiary, Proparco, in Lagos: just a few weeks ago. In health, we are participating in programmes in conjunction with the European Union. As you can see, France is confident in Nigeria's capacity to move forward as well as it recognizes the importance of the role that Nigeria plays in the region and in the world.

What is the significance of French National Day, which was celebrated on July 14th? Is it significant to French Nationals all over the world?

France National Day is the day when we commemorate the 1790 "Fete de la Federation" held on the first anniversary of the storming of the Bastille prison, when delegates from all the regions of France proclaimed their allegiance to the national community. It was the first time in history that a people claimed its right to self-determination.

The French sees the 14th of July as the symbol of their reconciliation, solidarity, freedom and as the symbol of the uprising of the modern French Nation. This year, we also celebrate the 60th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in Paris, on 10th December 1948. We are expecting our Nigerian friends to share with the French from Nigeria and diplomats from other countries our confidence in the future of our relationship.

Appendix 13

Country Profile (Nigeria)

Population:	138,283, 240	(July 2008 estimate)
Population Growth Rate:	2.382%	(2008 estimate)
Birth Rate:	39.98 birth/1,000 population	(2008 estimate)
Death Rate:	16.41 birth/1,000 population	(2008 estimate)
Life Expectancy at Birth:	47.81 years total population	
	Male 47.15years	
	Female 48.5 years	(2008 estimate)
Ethnic Groups:	Hausa Fulani 29%, Yoruba 21%, Igbo 18%, Ijaw10%, Kanuri 4%, Ibibio 3.5%. Tiv 2.5%	
Religion:	Muslim 50%, Christian 40%, Indigenous Belief 10%	
Literacy Rate:	68% total population	
	Male 75. 7%	
	Female 60.6%	(2003 estimate)
GDP:	\$292.7	(2007 estimate)
Unemployment Rate:	4.9%	(2007 estimate)
Population below Poverty Line:	70%	(2007 estimate)

Source: Central Intelligence Agency (2008), "Nigeria", The World Factbook (online), (date accessed 19/07/2008).

