



Thesis By
FELIX-NESTOR AHOYO

Department of Philosophy
UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN

**A CRITIQUE OF NIETZSCHE'S
METAPHYSICS**

DECEMBER, 2002

05.01.01
AHO
12670

**A CRITIQUE OF NIETZSCHE'S
METAPHYSICS.**

BY

FELIX-NESTOR AHOYO

B.A. (Bucharest) M. A. (Ibadan)

MATRIC N° 78781

**Being a thesis in the Department of Philosophy
Submitted To The Faculty of Arts
In Partial Fulfilment Of The Requirements
For The Award Of The Degree Of**

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Of The

UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN

DECEMBER, 2002

CODESRI LIBRARY

ABSTRACT

This thesis attempted an examination of Nietzsche's metaphysical philosophy which has for long been neglected. It strives to rise above the one-sided and superficial reading of Nietzsche's philosophy by western philosophers.

The method of study is a combination of hermeneutic and positivist approaches. The hermeneutic approach explored the implicit meanings of Nietzsche's metaphysics, while the positivist approach was used to analyse the explicit meaning of this metaphysic. The combination of these two approaches enables us to determine the central vision of Nietzsche's metaphysical program.

Nietzsche's philosophy can be characterised as a metaphysics of mythical type. What renders its specificity, however, is less the metaphysical aspect than its mythical configuration. The metaphysics of Nietzsche, like other modern metaphysical systems, is a metaphysics of immanence because it makes the last principle of things reside inside the things and not outside them. According to him natural existence in its totality is not created or determined by a supernatural principle, a prime mover or an ordering intelligence – but it is its own cause, its own principle. According to Nietzsche the metaphysical principle that determines the totality of existence can be termed the Zarathustran principle which has two fundamental components : the will to power and the eternal recurrence. The will to

power is an entity of contrary elements (sensible and supra-sensible), while the eternal return represents its modality or form of being in time.


On the ground of this metaphysics of the will to power, Nietzsche elaborates a dualistic philosophy of culture, that is he distinguishes a superior culture or the culture of the masters and an inferior culture or the culture of the slaves.

The significance of this study lies in the fact that it shows Nietzsche as a critic of western culture which he saw as a decaying culture. It also points out the need for African to ask themselves whether it makes sense to follow the western pattern of development which Nietzsche unrelentingly criticizes.

CODESRIA - LIBRARY

CERTIFICATION

I certify that this work was carried out by Mr. Felix-Nestor AHOYO, in the department of philosophy, University of Ibadan.



.....
(SUPERVISOR)

F.A. Adeigbo (Msgr), B. A. (Urban U. Rome)

M.A. (Howard), Ph.D. (Ottawa)

Professor and former head, Department of

Philosophy, University Of Ibadan,

Nigeria

December, 2002

CODESRIA LIBRARY

DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my mother Mèdékon(nee HOUMBADJI.)

CODESRIA - LIBRARY

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS :

I am grateful to the almighty God, "El Shaddai" who enabled me to successfully achieve this thesis and granted me journey mercies in all my journies from the Republic of Benin to Nigeria, throughout the period of my research works.

I am particularly grateful to C.O.D.E.S.R.I.A, council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (Dakar) which provided me the financial means to carry out successfully the research works. It is a truism to say that without the C. O. D. E. S. R. I. A . I should not have been able to achieve this thesis. The C. O. D. E. S. R. I. A. grant fortunately came at a moment of despair and arranged everything for the best.

I wish to express my indebtedness to my supervisor Professor Reverend Monsignor Adeigbo who particularly read through my manuscripts and provided thoughtful corrections and suggestions that led to its improvement.

I also wish to express my gratitude to all the lecturers in the department of Philosophy, University of Ibadan. especially Drs. Irele, Oladipo, Bello Owolabi, Udefi and Ujomu To all of them I feel indebted in one way or another.

In Benin Republic I am grateful to Professor Hountondji who strongly recommended me for the C.O.D.E.S.R.I.A grant.

However a particular acknowledgement goes straightforward to three of my former colleagues of the grammar school lycée Béhanzin where I have been

teaching philosophy for 15 years. These colleagues are two Europeans, Bernd Spieweg (from Germany) and Paul Vinois (from Belgium) and my compatriot Paul ABITAN. I cannot forget these three colleagues because they granted me an invaluable support which made easier my research task.

CODESRIA - LIBRARY

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
TITLE PAGE.....	
ABSTRACT.....	i - ii
CERTIFICATION.....	iii
DEDICATION.....	iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	v - vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	vii
INTRODUCTION.....	1-12
CHAPTER ONE	
BACKGROUND TO NIETZSCHE'S PHILOSOPHY.....	13-32
CHAPTER TWO	
ASPECTS OF NIETZSCHE'S METAPHYSICS.....	33-100
CHAPTER THREE	
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF NIETZSCHE'S METAPHYSICS....	101-167
CHAPTER FOUR	
NIETZSCHE'S METAPHYSICS AND PHILOSOPHY OF CULTURE.....	168-202
CHAPTER FIVE	
NIETZSCHE AND AFRICAN CONDITION.....	203-249
CONCLUSION.....	250-255
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	256-262
BILINGUAL TABLE.....	263

INTRODUCTION

The idea of writing this thesis has arisen from the resurgence of Nietzsche's philosophy owing to post – modern philosophy.

There is a wide divergence of assessments as regards the works of the controversial thinker that Nietzsche is. It has often been remarked that his works occupy a peculiar position in the line of those writers in the European tradition who have called themselves philosophers or who have had this label applied to them by a large sections of the educated public. There is not only a wide divergence of views concerning what he said or meant to say, or concerning the value of what he said. Specifically the disagreement seems to be about the status of Nietzsche's writings, i.e. about what genre of discipline they belong to.

It is a commonplace that for more than a century, academic philosophers have been reluctant to recognise him as a philosopher at all. This is true especially of the professionals in the Anglo – American academic world, and even on the continent of Europe. He has frequently been regarded as marginal to the concerns of a " genuine" philosopher. There are objective as well as subjective reasons for this appreciation of Nietzsche.

In the first place, Nietzsche made philosophical statements which are in contradistinction to the epistemic climate of his epoch for example, that the concept of "a thing in itself" is a contradiction in terms, or that there are no "subjects" or that all our common sense and scientific truths are false.

Some philosophers dismiss him for the reason that his published works are often closer to literature than to philosophy as traditionally conceived. Indeed the literary character is essential to Nietzsche's writings ; and as main features they are aphoristic, allusive, and sometimes delusive with a highly rhetorical style in contradistinction to philosophical conventions.

On the other hand, there is unfavourable prejudice provoked by his statement that the belief in God is a delusion, that God is dead. Paradoxically, for about three or four decades, due to the post – modern trend of thought we have been witnessing a keen interest in Nietzsche in whose work many scholars suddenly discover unsuspected valuable statements. It cannot be otherwise if we take into account that the post – modern approach to reality is very close, if not convergent to Nietzsche's thought. For example the post – modern approach there is neither any privileged means to attest the truth of beliefs, nor any specific methods to obtain knowledge. In this line of thought, Foucauld and Lyotard reject the universal truths. The universal truths, even if they exist, could not be indicated. The post – modern trend condemns

the meta – narrative discourse (schemes of explanation of Marx and Freud) as totalizing, and insists on the plurality of the forms of discourse. Scientific, artistic, religious, mythical discourses are all valuable and complementary.

Moreover, what rehabilitates Nietzsche for us Africans is that the author of the “will to power” is a hard critic of the western decaying civilisation. At this crossroads of our destiny, when we are looking for a sound pattern of development it is worth taking into account the warnings of Nietzsche about western civilisation, which according to him is dying away.

While we set out to study Nietzsche’s metaphysics, it should be convenient to present as preliminary the key concepts of this metaphysics as has been brought out by Heidegger, one of the first European scholars to acknowledge the metaphysical scope of Nietzsche’s thought.

According to Heidegger Nietzsche’s thought is of metaphysical rate, as was every western thought since Plato¹. In this respect, he distinguishes five key – concepts in Nietzsche which constitute the framework of his metaphysics that is :

¹ Heidegger Martin. *Nietzsche Tome II* subtitle: La métaphysique de Nietzsche Trans. From German by Pierre Klosowski. (Editions Gallimard 1971).

“the will to power”, “Nihilism”, “the Eternal return of the same”, “the superman” and “Justice”. We shall now briefly explain these concepts.

1- The will to power

Literally speaking, the will to power is without ambiguity, an aspiration to the possibility to exert violence, an aspiration to possess power. Besides, the will to power expresses a feeling of deficiency. The “will to” is not yet the power as such, because it is not yet in possession of the power. However, the will to power as impulsion to grasp the power is at the same time a pure greed to do violence. However, this literary explanation is not the sense in which it is used by Nietzsche.

In the Nietzschean sense, the will to power is a faculty of the soul, that psychology has demarcated for a long time, as distinct from reason and feeling. The will to power, according to Nietzsche, is the most intimate essence of the Being. That is, the will to power is the fundamental character of the being as being. In the second part of *Zarathustra*, Nietzsche declares “where I found the living, there I found the will to power and even in the will of the servant I found the will to be master²”. That is, the will to power is the fundamental character of life. The structures of the will to power are, for instance, science, knowledge, art, politics, religion and so on. Nietzsche terms these structures “formations of domination”.

² Nietzsche F. Ainsi parlait Zarathoustra II. De la victoire sur soi – même in œuvres complètes by Jean Lacoste and Jacques Le Ridier. (Ed. Robert Laffont 1998)

The will to power is, in accordance with its inner essence, a perspectivist way to calculate the conditions of its own possibility. The will to power is, in itself, an institution of values.

2- Nihilism :

The metaphysics of the will to power becomes an institution of values, and, its novelty consists in a transvaluation of all the prevailing values hitherto. It is this transvaluation which constitutes the essence of nihilism. This term "nihilism" does not mean in the Nietzschean understanding "nil" and nothingness, or that every will and every work should be vain. In Nietzsche, it is neither a doctrine nor an opinion. It does not mean the dissolution of everything into nothingness. In Nietzsche, it means that the supreme values are devalued, and there is not any answer to the question " why?". Nihilism is the process of devaluation of the then supreme values. The ruin of these values is the collapse of the truth on the being as such in its totality. The process of devaluation of the supreme values is not, an historical event among others, but the fundamental event in western history, carried out and directed by metaphysics. The peak event is the "death of God". The fact that the supreme values are devalued means that their ideals have lost their force. The death of God and the ruin of the supreme values constitute nihilism. However, the devaluation of the supreme values does not mean uniquely a relative loss of their validity ; devaluation is the total

upsetting of the hitherto prevailing values, which involves the necessity to establish new values. The devaluation of the hitherto prevailing supreme values is but the preliminary historical stage of a movement in which the fundamental feature comes to dominate as transvaluation of all the prevailing values ; that is why nihilism does not rush the movement towards a pure and simple annihilation. Thus nihilism in the Nietzschean sense is at the end of the day affirmative, not negative.

3- The eternal return of the same.

The metaphysical term << eternal return of the same >> is used to designate the absence of end and value of the being. This idea has been fully expressed for the first time by Nietzsche in the aphorism 341 of Gay Science.

This life that you live now or have lived, you must have to live it again and again many countless times ; and there will be nothing new in it, rather every suffering and every pleasure and every idea and every sigh and whatever is infinitely great, and whatever is infinitely small in your life must come back to you, and everything in the same succession and order. And so also this spider, this moonlight between the trees, and so also every moment and myself. Every everlasting hourglass of existence will always come back and you with it³.

The being which as such, has the fundamental character of the will to power, cannot be otherwise in its totality than eternal return of the same. And conversely the being which, in its totality is eternal return of the same, must necessarily have as being the fundamental character of the will to power.

³ Nietzsche F. Gai Savoir Aphorisme 341 in op. cit. in œuvres complètes Tome II

If the being as such is will to power and so eternal evolution, but that the will to power requires the absence of end and excludes the infinite progression towards an end in itself, that in the same time the eternal evolution of the will to power is limited in its possible figures and formations of domination, because it cannot renew itself *ad infinitum*, then the being as will to power in its totality must let come back the same and the return must be eternal. This cyclic movement contains the << original law >> of the being in its totality, given that the being as such is will to power. However, we must specify that for an observer the return of the same does not mean the same former state, which should come anew. Put differently the same does not mean the similar.

4- The superman.

The man who, in the middle of the being behaves in view of the being (which being, as such is will to power and in its whole eternal return) is named by Nietzsche << the superman >> The name superman contains a negation and means the fact of going beyond man such as he has been hitherto. The " no" of this negation is unconditional, absolute, given that it proceeds from the "yes" of the will to power and that it aims directly at the Platonic, Christian and moral interpretations in all their derived, manifested or hidden forms. The negative affirmation decides metaphysically

the conversion of the history of humanity into a new history. The general but non – exhaustive concept of superman means a rethinking of the nihilistic concept of humanity. That is why the announcer of the doctrine of the superman has as its name *Zarathustra*. As Nietzsche put it : “I needed to pay homage to Zarathustra, a Persian : the Persians were the first to think history in its greatness and in its totality⁴” In the prologue, which anticipates all his sayings, Zarathustra says : “Now I teach you the superman! The superman is the sense of the earth⁵” Without any doubt, the superman negates the prevailing essence of man, but it negates it in a nihilistic way, that is in a reconstructive way. The superman is not the rational man but the man in flesh. However the superman does not mean the crude glorification of arbitrary acts of violence, to which men have been accustomed hitherto. Unlike the pure and simple exaggeration of the existing man, the changing into superman will transform man into a new type of human.

5- Justice :

Nietzsche defines justice as a way of thinking which is constructive, eliminating and annihilating, on the ground of the assessments of value: supreme representative of the very life.

⁴ Nietzsche F. Ecce Homo. Aphorismes 2 – 3 in op. cit. In œuvres complètes Tome II

⁵ Nietzsche F. Ainsi parlait Zarathoustra. Aphorism 2. in op. cit. In œuvres complètes Tome II

Nietzsche does not say that justice should be a way of thinking among others, on the ground of any assessments of values. In the Nietzschean sense Justice is a thinking on the ground of the actual institutions of values. Justice is the fact of thinking in the sense that the will to power institutes uniquely to itself values. This thinking is not produced consecutively to the assessments; it is the very fact of assessments.

This way of thinking has three dimensions :

- This way of thinking is *constructive*. It makes to stand up what cannot yet stand up. The constructive thought is at the same time *eliminating*. This way, it makes and affirms what can support the edifice and rejects what can endanger it. So this thinking insures the foundations and chooses the materials. But the constructive and eliminating thinking is at the same time *annihilating*. It destroys whatever as consolidation pulls down and impedes the constructive to go higher. The fact of annihilating ensures the thinking against the pressure of all conditions of decline.

Thus, there is no construction without elimination and every construction involves a destruction, an annihilation. From the foregoing Nietzsche gives a condensed definition of Justice as "Supreme representative of the very life". Life is for Nietzsche nothing but another term to designate the Being. And the Being is will to power. To think of the essence of Justice in conformity with this metaphysics, one must of course

eliminate all the representations of Justice which come from Christian, bourgeois or socialist morality.

Our study aims at attaining two fundamental objectives ,namely, exposing the exact configuration and the specificity of Nietzschean thought and the making evident the differences and convergence's between this thought and African traditional thought.

Methodologically our interpretation strives to rise above the one-sided and superficial reading of Nietzsche's philosophic text which has been the unfortunate lot of many of his commentators. In order to obtain this goal, two basic modes of reading will be adopted.

A – The attempt to discover the implicit meanings, B- the attempt to explore The explicit meanings of Nietzsche's philosophy, or put differently , our method is the result of a combination of hermeneutic and positivist approaches . Why such a methodological synthesis? The reason is that the explicit level of Nietzsche's philosophic discourse contains many contradictory speculations so that its concept must be compared and related to the ideas that can be extrapolated from the zones of implicit (non contradictory) level in order to discover the theoretical grounds for the internal coherence of Nietzsche's philosophic system. Such a method may account for a fairly precise determination of what is collateral to the central vision of Nietzsche on

philosophy as well as demonstrate that everything that belongs to this sphere is the impure debris of affective language.

In analysing the system of concepts and reasoning contained in the works by Nietzsche, we intend to prove :

- 1) That his philosophy is a metaphysical philosophy.
- 2) That this metaphysical philosophy is a metaphysical philosophy of the mythical type. What renders, however its specificity, is less the metaphysical aspect than its mythical configuration. The conclusion of this thesis is that the mythical vision upon existence leaves its stamp on the very essence of Nietzsche's metaphysics.

To make the point we shall say that our introduction has been expository, analytic and comparative. The expository approach enables us to cast light on the controversial author who is Nietzsche ; the analytic approach provides us the conceptual tools necessary for a sound understanding of Nietzsche ; lastly the comparative approach foreshadows both the originality and topicality of Nietzsche. Our development is divided into five chapters.

The first chapter titled . Background to Nietzsche's philosophy presents us Nietzsche's biography and the main philosophers and trends of thought which have shaped the Nietzschean worldview.

The second chapter titled Aspects of Metaphysics explores the leading principles of Nietzsche's metaphysics.

Chapter three introduces us in the core of Nietzsche's metaphysics bringing out its main characteristics ; that is why it is titled, The Significance of Nietzsche's Metaphysics.

Chapter four explores the philosophy of culture which stems from Nietzsche's metaphysics.

Lastly, we carry out a comparative analysis between Nietzsche's philosophy and African traditional thought, on the one hand and we explore the significance of Nietzsche's philosophy for African development on the other, whence the title Nietzsche and the African Condition.

The conclusion highlights the relevance of Nietzsche for our contemporary time.

CHAPTER ONE

BACKGROUND TO NIETZSCHE'S PHILOSOPHY

I. Biographical notes

Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche was born on 1844 on October 15. His father Carl Ludwig Nietzsche (1813-1849), was a Lutheran minister and his mother Franziska Oehler (1826-1897) was one of the daughters of David Oehler, also an ecclesiastical official (superintendent)¹.

Nietzsche was the eldest of what became a family of three children. After him came his sister Elisabeth (1846), and his brother Ludwig Joseph (1849). In the year in which his youngest brother was born, his father, who had for a long time suffered from severe headaches, died of cerebral softening. One year later in 1850, his young brother Joseph died and was buried in his father's grave.

Because of his apparent intellectual talent he received a scholarship from the famous school of Schulpforta near Namburg. Nietzsche graduated from Schulpforta in 1864 with a thesis written in Latin on Theogonis of Megara (6th century B.C.), an antidemocratic aristocrat.

Nietzsche initially attended the university of Bonn where he registered in theology and philosophy. One year later he decided to study classical philology and left behind his study of theology and Christianity.

¹ For more biographical details see Paul S. M. Van Tongeren : Reinterpreting modern culture. An introduction to Friedrich Nietzsche's philosophy. Purdue University press. 1999.

In October 1865 Nietzsche followed his teacher E.W. Ritschl to the university of Leipzig, where he studied only philosophy.

During this time, Nietzsche became more and more interested in Schopenhauer and in the different ways in which his contemporaries received and developed Kant's thought. He discovered Schopenhauer according to his own report by chance. While in a used book store he picked up a book, read a few lines, and knew that it was Schopenhauer's, The World as Will and Representation. He bought the book, went home, and did not leave his chair until he had finished it.

In 1867, Nietzsche left Leipzig for military service where he was enrolled in an artillery regiment. He came into contact with Richard Wagner's music when his career in the armed forces ended abruptly as a result of a fall from horse. He later met Wagner and there a solid relationship developed which was one of the greatest joys of Nietzsche's life and later a source of bitter pain and disappointment. Nietzsche's relationship with Wagner was at first to the effect that this was his first encounter with a major artist. Nietzsche believed that Schopenhauer, Heine and Wagner were the most important men in German arts and letters since Goethe's death.

At the age of twenty-four (24), Nietzsche became a university professor in Basel. He was awarded his final degree from Leipzig without taking any examination. He went to Basel and became a Swiss subject in 1869. He was very lonely in Basel as a consequence of having left all his friends in Leipzig; but his loneliness was assuaged by the fact that Wagner had a house not too far away, where Nietzsche spent a considerable amount of time.

By 1876, Nietzsche and Wagner were already falling apart. Nietzsche felt justified in thinking that Wagner regarded him as a tool and wanted him to subordinate his interests to the propagation of Wagnerism. Nietzsche later realised that his ideal Wagner was different from the real Wagner. The publication of Parsifal completed the separation. Wagner had gone over to Christianity.

During the decade 1879 – 1889, Nietzsche published an average of a book each year. Each book represented a triumph over his half blinded eyes, terrible migraine headaches and manifold physical aches and pains. At one time he took a year leave from Basel because of his failing health and poor eye sight. He was warned by his doctors to do a little reading and writing as possible to save his eyes, but he did not heed the advice.

Nietzsche was by now in a state of extreme mental tension and distress brought on by lack of recognition, loneliness and insomnia which made him accustomed to taking drugs.

Early in January 1889, Nietzsche collapsed on a street of Turin and had to be carried back to his room. He became insane and for a time was at his home in Basel and then at Yena. His mother then took him to Namburg and after she died, his sister Elisabeth, took him to a new home in Weimar. He never recovered but he could still appreciate music and literature. He was patient, considerate and gentle. He died on August 25, 1900 at Weimar of pneumonia.

In order to better understand Nietzsche's philosophy, it matters above all things to resort to its immediate sources of inspiration and these are, the philosophies of Arthur Schopenhauer, of G. W. Hegel, of Emmanuel Kant and the art of the musician comedian, Richard Wagner. Indeed, the Nietzschean philosophy has been shaped from the critical assessments by Nietzsche, of the works of each of these authors.

The first decisive conversion of Nietzsche has been determined by the reading of the works of Schopenhauer, whence the particular importance of Schopenhaurian thought for the understanding of Nietzsche's meditation.

II. THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCHOPENHAUER

1. A critique of Kant :

To some extent the philosophy of Schopenhauer is a critique of Kantian philosophy : In his major work, the World as Will and Representation, he devoted a whole subtitle to eulogize at the first place Kant whose philosophy was ignored by his contemporary scholars². Even the post – Kantian philosophers have strongly contributed to the ignorance of Kant. The error of the Post- Kantian is to have neglected the fundamental discovery of Kant : the distinction between phenomenon and the thing – in – itself. Any endeavour to cancel the distinction is misleading. The force of Kant is to have developed further more the Platonic tradition, by creating, in

opposition to the Leibnizian dogmatism, the transcendental philosophy, which, in search of the origin of the eternal truths, finally comes to discover it in the very mind of man. Meanwhile the dogmatic philosophy imagines to itself to be able to have recourse to the absolute laws of time, space, causality, so as to explain the existence of the world, Kant has awoken the sleepers from their dream, showing that those laws are *conditioned* by the faculty of knowledge of the subject and that they could not know the world in itself. To pretend that these laws could serve to know the world in itself, amounts to wasting his time. That does not amount to saying that existence does not constitute a problem, but the sense of this problem is to be discovered in the inwardness and not in the exteriority. Here Schopenhauer says that Kant did nothing but introduce the perspective of the traditional Orient into the western mentality³.

So the Kantian conversion is not in the first place theoretical but moral. Against the realistic philosophy which pretended to found also morality on eternal ideas such as beatitude, perfection, or the will of a creator (ideas which are absolutely empty in themselves – Kant has shown, on the one hand that the practical life of man has nothing to do with intangible laws; on the other hand, this life has to do with the inner being of the world, in radical contradistinction to the visible phenomena.

² Schopenhauer Arthur, Le monde comme volonté et comme représentation (P. U.F. Paris 1998)
P 220 section 31

³ Ibid P. 204

After having payed this brief homage to Kant, Schopenhauer criticizes him for having aborted a revolution which put an end to fourteen centuries of scholasticism. The fundamental reproach is that Kant did not truly break with the behaviour to which he was opposed. He has continued to accept the idea of a metaphysics.

All at once, says Schopenhauer, Kant has emptied the world from his decisive significance by separating a domain of logics from a domain of sensible. It is this depreciation of the senses, compensated by an imaginary thing – in itself, which is the vice of Kantism. Put differently the substitution of the transcendental laws to the eternal truths did not change the essential difficulty⁴.

In short Schopenhauer reproaches Kant for having rejected the autonomy of the human subject, who remains subjected to God.

2. The negation of God

It is this autonomy that Schopenhauer wants to assure by rejecting every form of the transcendent. The idea of God is vain for practice and theory. Schopenhauer reduces to three hypotheses the nature of deism : either God has created the world from nothing, either he has created it himself, or he has formed it from a preparatory matter. Each of these hypotheses constitutes an absurdity. The first contradicts the truth that nothing is done from nothing ; the second amounts either to pantheism if God remains inside his creation or to emanatism, if the part of God which has become

⁴ Ibid P. 205

the world is separated from him. But these two perspectives are obvious untruths, incompatible with evil and suffering⁵. As regards the third hypothesis, it cancels the very concept of an absolute Transcendent, which it reduces to a mere demiurge changing the matter into an eternal reality. Schopenhauer puts it thus:

If the word – God is antipathic to me,
it is because in each case it carries outside
what is laying inside⁶.

Put differently, God does nothing but designate an object and not a subject⁷. Whence the necessity to evacuate this word from a philosophy which claims to be wholly a philosophy of the subject.

3. Philosophy and interrogation in Schopenhauer

The more a man is able to be astonished, the more he qualifies to become a philosopher; it is the astonishment which distinguishes man from animal ; it is astonishment, as has been said by Aristotle at the beginning of his metaphysics which has led the first thinkers to the philosophic speculations. This attitude needs to be surrounded closer, because the absence of astonishment in most of the philosophers is so that they talk about astonishment in their discourse without being astonished. In his analysis of the metaphysical need of humanity, schopenhauer gives the following definition of philosophy :

⁵ Ibid P. 206

⁶ Schopenhauer Arthur Parerga et Paralipomena, sur la religion Trad.Dietrich, Alcan 1906 P. 128

“To have the philosophic spirit, amounts to being able to be astonished about the usual daily events, to proposing to oneself as subject of study what is more general, more ordinary⁸”.

Under this form, the philosophic astonishment is distinct from the scientific astonishment, which occurs only about uncommon chosen phenomena. On the contrary the source of philosophy springs from any banality. Philosophy occurs daily because its problem is posed wherever there is man. Moreover, it is not only the extensive universality which characterizes the philosophic questioning, but also its radicality. To philosophize does not amount only to being astonished about the facts in the world but first of all about the fact of the world. Put differently, to philosophize amounts to asking oneself why the world exists .

“Philosophy springs from our astonishment about the world and about our own existence, which is imposed on our intellect. Like a riddle of which solution humanity cannot stop thinking about⁹”

If he is asked why question this way about our existence ? Schopenhauer answers that *such a question is enrolled, under one thousand modes, into the heart of man?*¹⁰.

⁷ Ibid P.135

⁸ Schopenhauer Arthur. Le monde comme volonté et comme représentation OP. cit. P. 852

⁹ Ibid P.863

The powerlessness of the traditional metaphysician and of the modern scientist is expressed in their inability to distinguish between cause and reason, to perceive the absolute originality of the problem of existence. They treat philosophically the world by reducing it to a series of phenomena of causal type meanwhile it is not. In short :

“The problem of the sense of existence today is never posed, worse of all, one imagines to pose it into an etiologic language which has nothing to do with it¹¹”

4. **The question of existence :**

To the question of why existence ?, Schopenhauer gave the following answer :

The world is an inextricable problem, and the most perfect philosophy will never stop to contain an unexplained element To the man who dares to raise this question : why the world and not nothing? – The world cannot be justified, it cannot show in itself any reason or finality of its existence in my theory, the true explanation is that the source of existence is formally without reason. Indeed this source resides in a blind will to live which cannot be subjected to the principle of reason¹².

Thus the answer is that there is no answer. The world is without reason and our life is absurd. It is not so because there is suffering, but it is essentially absurd in itself.

Life has no sense, according to the word of Calderon repeated like a leitmotiv by Schopenhauer *the greatest fault of man is to be born.*

¹⁰ Schopenhauer Arthur, Parerga et paralipomena, op cit P. 252

¹¹ Ibid PP 138 – 139

5. Will and force :

Life is absurd, our existence has no sense, however if we continue to live it is thanks to our will. Only our will maintains us in life. All the psychologic analyses of Schopenhauer were aimed at bringing out the supremacy of the will. It is the will alone which lead human life, more often without the knowledge of consciousness. If it happens that the intellect plays music and the will dances, it is an upsetting of the role, and an enfeeblement of the individual will. Thus he writes:

The will that we discover in our inwardness does not result, as was admitted until now by philosophy, from knowledge, it is not even a modification of the knowledge, that is a secondary element governed by the brain as it is the case of knowledge ; but will is prior to knowledge, it is the stone of our being and that own original force which creates and maintain the body, whose conscious and unconscious functions it carries out. To understand this truth is the first step to take in order to enter into metaphysics¹³.

Original force, such is the accurate definition of the will. In Schopenhauer, the will encompasses all the forces of the world and nature. Nietzsche will be very sensitive to the Schopenhauerian definition of the will, which he will change into the will to power.

6. Nietzsche against Schopenhauer

In the third Untimely Meditations Nietzsche eulogizes Schopenhauer. In the gallery of the philosophers, Schopenhauer will always remain apart because in his

¹² Schopenhauer Arthur. Le monde comme volonté et comme représentation op cit P. 1342

¹³ Ibid P. 1008

philosophy almost all the Nietzschean themes are represented. Moreover under all these themes he has brought out to day the question forgotten by metaphysics : the question of the sense of existence.

In book five of Gay Science, Nietzsche poses the problem as to know what is German¹⁴. He answers that whatever the philosophies of Leibniz, Kant and Hegel those philosophies are specifically, German because they are under the influence of christianity. However the philosophy of Schopenhauer departs from them, to such an extent that it is no longer German because he categorically rejects the existence of God on the ground of his pessimism. As will put Nietzsche Schopenhauer was as philosopher the first confessed and inflexible atheist to be found among the Germans. However, Nietzsche is sorry that Schopenhauer did not succeed in uprooting in him all religious need. In this respect Nietzsche affirms that :

“ All philosophy which let a trail of religious comet enlightened into the darkness of its ultimate perspectives gives to suspiscion the whole of its body represented as science¹⁵”

It is this trail of religious comet that one can follow the tracks in the Ethics which Schopenhauer has substituted to religion and metaphysics, since he founds it under an absolute principle – don't do evil to anybody and help everybody as much as you can – On the ground of which everybody becomes a competent judge and a

¹⁴ Nietzsche F. Gai savoir Section 357 in œuvres complète Tome II

perfect knower of good and evil, sanctified by the hatred of the one and the love of the other.

Nietzsche does not reject the desire of moral relationship between the individuals, but he rejects the foundation of this desire on the so – called evident principle (ie the distinction without problem of good and evil) which principle is, according to him, as empty as the image of God it extends.

Otherwise, Schopenhauer advocates a certain number of virtues which Nietzsche disapproves of, that is, purity, renunciation, asceticism, abnegation and heroism. According to Nietzsche, these virtues dissimulate a tremendous egocentrism¹⁶ ; they are nothing but the attractive masks of a basic illness, to which one must say no : the powerlessness to say yes to life. At the end of the day, Nietzsche characterizes - Schopenhaurian philosophy as a philosophy not of approbation, but rather, of depreciation, of bitterness and hatred¹⁷.

III. THE PHILOSOPHY OF HEGEL :

1. The Hegelian values :

¹⁵ Nietzsche F. Aurore Section 47 in œuvres complètes Tome I

¹⁶ Nietzsche F. Généalogie de la morale. Préface. in œuvres complètes II

¹⁷ Nietzsche F. Aurore Section 167

We find in Nietzsche two important texts which assess the contribution of Hegelianism to philosophy. The first is in the aphorism in Gay Science where Nietzsche, asking himself what in modern philosophy is German, put Schopenhauer apart from the trilogy Leibniz – Kant – Hegel. According to this first text, Hegel is the German philosopher who has upset all the customs and commodities of logics, when he dares to teach that the specific concepts develop one from the other, thesis by virtue of which the minds in Europe were preformed to the great scientific movements, to Darwinism – for, without Hegel there cannot be Darwin. Hegel was the first to introduce the concept of *evolution* in science.

Thanks to this innovation, we ascribe to evolution a deep significance and we do not believe in the legitimacy of the concept of being for even the being in itself is evolution. We do no longer ascribe to our human logics, the logics in itself, the unique logics.

The second text is in the preface of Daybreak. In this text Nietzsche pays homage to Hegel for having enunciated the fundamental principle of dialectics which definitely confirms the victory of German Spirit over the European, that is, that contradiction is the mover of the world, all the things contradict themselves, therefore, Nietzsche terms Hegel, like Schopenhauer as European events.

2. Nietzsche against Hegel :

However Nietzsche is of the view that Hegel does not succeed in making the German pessimism get over its ultimate step. "We still sense something of truth behind the fundamental principle of dialectics". For the dialectics is still a bad mask taking unto itself several figures. The figure of religion. Nietzsche says that Hegel is late on Schopenhauer who though incoherent with his atheism, claims nevertheless that he is atheistic.

According to Nietzsche it is to the German, contemporary to Schopenhauer that one must ascribe the fact of having retarded as long as possible the victory of atheism. And Hegel is par excellence one of those who have retarded atheism in Germany, in accordance with the grandiose attempt he undertook to convince the citizens of the divinity of existence.

According to Nietzsche the pantheism of Hegel on the one hand reduces the difference between man and God, and so it is an attempt to overtake the moral God, the God who rewards good and punishes evil. By doing so it tends to deprive God of

his personal power, but on the other hand. It replaces this God by many gods : The idea, the absolute Spirit realising itself through history. In this respect Granier writes:

The historical sense then is nothing but
a masked theology and Hegel remains

imprisoned into Christian circle¹⁸.

as Nietzsche puts :

It is by derision that history understood the way
of Hegel has been called the action of God on earth,
for God is here nothing but a creation of history¹⁹.

Thus the Hegelian history takes the succession of the moral God. Henceforth it is its task to judge absolutely and requires whole obedience.

Lastly we must mention that Nietzsche rejects categorically the Hegelian cult of the state. State according to him is a Monster which lies²⁰.

IV. THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT :

1. The Kantian values :

For Nietzsche, Kant has an exceptional importance for having introduced a decisive break as regards the former scholastics. To awaken the consciousness from its dogmatic sleep, to help consciousness to overcome the theoretical optimism, such was the Kantian enterprise.

In the Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche affirms that Kant has won the most difficult of the victories : he has triumphed from the optimism hidden in the heart of the logics on

¹⁸ Granier I. le problème de la vérité chez Hegel. P. 45 op. cit.

¹⁹ Nietzsche F. Considérations Inactuelles. Section 8 in œuvres complètes Tome I

²⁰ Nietzsche F. Ainsi parlait Zarathoustra P. 320 in œuvres complètes Tome II

which was grounded German culture. Meanwhile this optimism, supported by the *eternal truths* that believes incontestable, that all the riddles of the world could be known and completely elucidated and has considered space, time and causality as absolute laws, universally valid. Kant has revealed that these laws did not serve but to raise the appearance, the work of Maia, to the rank of unique and supreme reality, to situate it in place of the inner essence of the things, and to make impossible the true knowledge, that is, as Schopenhauer puts it, " to send back the sleeper more deeply to sleep"²¹.

Thus the Pre-Kantian philosophy has the pretension to know *absolutely* the things ; for that purpose it has invented absolute laws, eternal truths, to which the universe is related, like the effect to the cause. In fact this philosophy did nothing but project by absolutizing them, the laws of causality which govern the only finite phenomena ; so much so that the so – called eternal world is nothing but our world idealized and changed into something more unfathomable : the Pre-Kantian philosophy ends by the glorification of the appearance. Kant has rendered an invaluable service for having debunked the mechanism of the illusion which is in the heart of Pre-Kantian philosophy. This illusion is to believe that the world can be known absolutely by the knowledge of another world²².

²¹ Nietzsche F. Naissance de la tragédie. Section 18 in œuvres complètes Tome I

²² Nietzsche F. Considérations inaternelles Section 6 in œuvres complètes Tome I

Destruction of the eternal truths, such is, according to Nietzsche the principal value of Kantianism.

2. Nietzsche against Kant :

However, according to Nietzsche, Kant after having formulated a universal and creative criticism, did not succeed in raising the problem of man under the form of an absolute separation of the areas, science, ethics and religion. So much so that the interrogation on the sense of these areas falls into neglect. Thus Kant takes again with one hand, what he gave with the other. Otherwise Kant has maintained the idea of cause in the area designated by him as phenomenal world. On the one hand, Nietzsche declares that the distinction, between phenomenal and noumenal world, does not really exist ; on the other hand Nietzsche enunciates the absolute non – validity of the principle of causality. According to him the world is not governed by the principle of causality, but rather, by the principle of eternal recurrence.

Moreover Nietzsche rejects the moral universal with its categoric imperative. For he thinks that the abstract universal serves to mask the egocentrism of everybody and impede self – fulfilment under the cover of adherence to noble (and false) ideals. The categoric imperative, notes the Genealogy of Moral has a stink of cruelty. Even if you do not understand you must always obey²³. In Daybreak he writes that :

²³ Nietzsche F. Généalogie de la morale. Section 6 in œuvres complètes Tome II

To require that the duty should be always something impractical, the way of Kant amounts to requiring that it should never enter into the habits into the customs. This requirement contains a rest of ascetic cruelty²⁴.

V. THE MUSIC OF RICHARD WAGNER.

The assessments by Nietzsche of Richard Wagner are in his writing titled Reflections on Richard Wagner which are at the end of the second Untimely Meditations.

Nietzsche expresses all his sympathy to the art of the musician comedian Wagner for his antimodernism. Nietzsche, like Wagner, has a dislike for modernity. By modernity one must understand the bourgeois society, the society of luxury from which the people are alienated. Wagner understands very early that << the modern art is an art of luxury, and its fate is indissolubly linked to the existence of luxury society >>

(ref. 2^d Untimely – Meditations). And this society has used and continues to use all its power in an unpityful way to always enslave and abase the people, in order to always deprive it more and more from its attributes. In short the modern art, that is the bourgeois art, has stolen from the people all its resources, all that enabled the authentic artist to pour out its generous soul : its myth, its song, its dance, its

²⁴ Nietzsche F. Aurore Section 339 in œuvres complètes Tome I

language. Nevertheless, Nietzsche finally reproaches Wagner for doing a bad theatre. He reproaches Wagner for his attachment to the intoxicating, the noisy, the neurotic.

According to Nietzsche the art of Wagner floats in the high slopes, it is transcendental. It has an aspect of escape outside the world, it negates the world instead of being its transfiguration. Nietzsche defines Wagnerianism as an idealized Christianity, but then by Christianizing his work, Wagner empties it thus finally, from human reality. From the foregoing we can characterise Nietzschean philosophy as follows :

To show the earthly deep – rootedness of the more apparently celestial ideals, and to suggest also the vacuity of the distinction of the earthly and the celestial ; to interpret the values as signs of hidden forces, and also to reject every interpretation which claims to be unique ; to reveal the interests which are hidden under the instructive statements, and also to put into question every revelation which claims to be ultimate ; to unveil the hidden causes of our certainties, and also to reject every cause which claims to be the first : such is the twofold way which Nietzsche incessantly follows : on the one hand to demystify and to this end, to show, to prove, to debunk, to explain, to reveal, and, on the other hand, but in an indissoluble way, to make sensitive to an absence of foundation, to an incomprehensibility of the world, to

the abyss on which lies every evaluation. To express it in his own way << to make the veils fall down but to the way of the artist >>. That amounts to saying to bring to the light letting the night come. To light up by creating a split which let to catch sight on the unfathomable caves. Nietzsche is at the same time a demystifier (he who breaks down the idols) and a genealogist (he who knows that one can never attain the first origin), he admirably associates the handling of the hammer with the art of transmutation, the critique with an infinite interrogation ; that is why his ambiguous approach cannot miss the requirements which are at the core of philosophy, at least a genuine philosophy which is not invaded by the contemplative, theoretical attitude.

In his lifetime, Hegel loves to say that every philosopher is first of all Spinozist. In the same manner, by paraphrasing Hegel one could say that every philosopher is first of all Nietzschean, because Nietzsche strives to radicalise the two requirements which are at the birth of philosophy : to criticize the evidences which cover the world and to rouse by creation the astonishment before the irreducible riddle that it contains.

CHAPTER TWO

ASPECTS OF NIETZSCHE'S METAPHYSICS

A careful reading of Nietzsche's works as young man and later on in the years, only grounded on the explicit assertions contained in them, is able to reveal to us without too much complication one of the main dimensions of the thought of our philosopher, that is, the metaphysical dimension.

However, there is a shade of meaning between the way Nietzsche portrayed himself as metaphysician in some of his of works later on. The works of the matured Nietzsche begin with the publication of the Gay science.

If, in his youth he did so without hesitation, later on, he did so with reluctance, throughout a flood of criticisms directed against the rational-abstract metaphysics, even retiring from his self-characterisation as metaphysician. We must not forget that between the year 1878 and 1881, period of the publication of Human, all too Human and Daybreak, which can be called transition time towards maturity, Nietzsche was strongly influenced by positivist thought and this influence was materialised at the level of ideatic discourse which it monopolizes entirely.

It goes without saying, that spiritual event has also marked the later process of his thought. Nevertheless we must state that the transition time to maturity is constituted as an actual hiatus between the youth time and that of maturity, only at the explicit level of the philosophic discourse. But at the implicit level this hiatus disappears ; here is formed, despite the will of the author, a net of ideas which originates from the metaphysics of the philosophy of life¹. But it is not this level that retains the ideatic primacy in the whole of the philosophic discourse of the two aforementioned works, but the other one.

As we have mentioned, the explicit level of the philosophic text contained in Human, all too Human and Daybreak exerts also a significant influence on the works written in the maturity time, and determines the presence in their corpus of a series of antimetaphysical reflexion and self-characterisation of the author as antimetaphysician.

However, Nietzsche does not contend with persistence in those works that he ranks among the thinkers who originate from the sphere of attraction of metaphysical thought. For example, in a work like the Gay Science, he refers, but in a critical way, to the influence that Plato has exerted on him with his idea that "... God is the truth and

¹ We intend to make here a condensed abstract of the two levels available in the thread of the ideatic discourse of the two works published during the years 1878-1881, ie Human, all too Human and Daybreak

the truth is divine² He regretted that even a modern and free-thinker spirit like him has fed his inspiration with Plato's rational abstract metaphysics (in fact it is not true).

Elsewhere he speaks in praise of the "Authentic lies³" (myth) that is the fundamental element of that form of Plato's philosophy which can be conceived as (degraded) hypostasis of his rational and abstract metaphysics, confirming thereby indirectly that his thought has developed under the influence of one of the central directions of Plato's metaphysical thought.

Finally, we have to underline another aspect of the problem : in his works of maturity, Nietzsche tries to explain all the forms of natural existence by relating them to a principle that we could name the Zarathustran principle (further explanation will be given later) of which the main components, the will to power and the Eternal return, are characterised without any reserve as metaphysical entities.

Between the metaphysical thought of youth and the metaphysical thought of maturity intervenes however another specific difference. In his youth time Nietzsche intends to provide a metaphysical explanation first of all and consequently to human existence, and only afterwards, secondly and in a sporadic way, to natural existence. In the maturity time he corrects the balance and is now equally concerned in the possibility of metaphysical interpretation of nature and of human existence. It is also

² Gai Savoir in Nietzsche oeuvres complètes Tome II p 208

³ Généalogie de la morale in œuvre complète Tome II p 870

true that the conceptual foundation of his whole metaphysical outlook resides on his metaphysical interpretation of human existence ; he explains nature from a subjective anthropomorphical standpoint, extrapolating from it the metaphysical functions, relations and determinations defined as specific elements of human existence.

The will to put at the basis of natural and human existence, one and the same metaphysical principle filters through a work of his youth time ; the Birth of Tragedy, particularly the pages devoted to the Dionysian principle. A genuine interpretation of those pages leads us to the idea that of the metaphysical principles devised by Nietzsche in this work, only the Dionysian principle is in accordance with the requirements to found concomitantly both nature and human life.

In his works of maturity these functions (explained clearer and deeper) are transferred to the Zarathustran principle ; we must notice that between this principle and the Dionysian principle as we shall show later, there exist many fundamental similarities of content which finally turn them into identical principles.

In his endeavour to interpret human existence in its totality from a metaphysical standpoint, Nietzsche the young relates this existence to many principles whereas in

his maturity time he contents himself to relating it to a single principle. How can we explain this change of attitude and what is its Significance ?

To be able to provide an answer to this two- dimensionan question we must establish first what is the conception according to which Nietzsche the young puts in a system of relations the metaphysical principle of human existence ; these principles are as follows : Dionysian, Appolinian, Tragic. As will be proved later we must acknowledge a tragic principle and finally, a Socratic principle. We can affirm that from his standpoint, the Dionysian, Appolinian and Tragic principles represent the elements which generate the mythical period in the life of humanity. But the Socratic principle constitutes the element which generates the historical periods of the life of humanity, which in his opinion determine the superior forms of human existence, but the last one (the Socratic) determine the inferior forms of the human existence (a subheading will be devoted to the detailed explanation of each them).

Nietzsche ascribes to the Dionysian, Appolinian and tragic principles mythical functions and properties and considers that, in accordance with their innermost nature they can promote only the mythico-metaphysical configurations

of human life. The Socratic principle is defined as the negative reflex of those principles, because it should have discarded the fundamental sensible determinations of their structures, and have maintained only a small part of the non-essential sensible determinations of these structures. According to Nietzsche, the Socratic principle is in its essence a logical, rational principle and it founds the whole sphere of historical life. One may wonder whether a contradiction does not filter into this part of the Nietzschean comment. To tell the truth, how could a metaphysical principle generate a non-metaphysical historical reality ? Nietzsche does not seem to be the least conscious of this contradiction (or that which can be deemed as such), or he does not want to pay any attention to it, since he does not try to cancel it. However we can clear up this unfortunate impression of contradiction if we realize that the Socratic principle is, according to Nietzsche, a degraded form of the mythical metaphysical principles previously evoked, we may say a degraded myth ; but history (as we shall see later) is a constellation of forces derived from the specific balance of power of the mythical-metaphysical existence, by the decaying and the soiling of this balance.

Hence the contradiction can be cleared up when we realize that according to Nietzsche the Socratic principle is itself a metaphysical principle, but a degraded metaphysical principle, and history, a decayed mythical-metaphysical Universe ; decayed because history should have lost all its positive sensible determinations which characterize the mythical existence and also because the slight sensible values it still detains are fake sensible values or negative sensible values, which amounts to saying that their internal principles are rational in nature or that their contents meet the same requirements as the content of the rational values as such and that only in a formal way and superficially they display themselves as sensible values.

However we must acknowledge that the metaphysical speculation in The Birth of Tragedy is far from being irreproachable. The main objection to it is that the work does not respect its internal norms to the end. We know that the principle that governs human existence can be rightly called metaphysical principle only when it founds the existence in its totality, that is human existence as a spatio-temporal totality. But then the previously evoked principles do not respect entirely this postulate of metaphysics. To tell the truth each of them governs some spatial totalities. "That is each principle determines all the form "of human life within the scope of the temporal period on

which it limits its influence, but not, however the whole of the temporal forms of human existence.

Finally one must notice as a shortcoming of the metaphysics in The Birth of Tragedy, that it is not a general and complete metaphysics, Nietzsche should have found any means to extend it or, more precisely to extend also its main determinations, functions and relations to nature. Thereby introducing nature and human existence into the same system of interpretations and explanations. However what he did not succeed in achieving in his youth time, Nietzsche will achieve it in his maturity time.

In analysing through and through all the aspects of Nietzsche's metaphysics we can bring out five leading principles that is : the Dionysian principle, the Appolinian principle, the tragic principle, the Socratic principle and the Zarathustran principle.

The Dionysian principle, Appolinian principle and tragic principle are drawn from Greek mythology, meanwhile the Zarathustran principle is drawn from Persian mythology. The Socratic principle, though deriving from Greek philosophy gets a somewhat mythical coloration.

We shall analyse in detail each of these principles so as to bring out their significance.

THE DIONYSIAN PRINCIPLE

This principle is particularly noticeable in The Birth of Tragedy. But Nietzsche comes back to it in its mature works, thereby developing and deepening a part of its original meaning. Two things are to be noticed in relation with these re-interpretations : namely its denomination is now ascribed to a concept which in the past (in The Birth of Tragedy) had at least to some extent, another content, which we referred to as the concept of the tragic, and, its original determination. This principle finally confuses its ultimate attributes with those of the Zarathustran principle.

Nevertheless we shall maintain the denomination of Zarathustran principle as the metaphysical principle around which is founded the Nietzschean speculation of maturity time, because this speculation is first of all related to the mythological figure of Zarathustra, and, also, in order to avoid the impression which can set up in the consciousness of the reader, if we proceed otherwise, that between Nietzsche's thought of maturity time and that of youth time there is not any striking difference.

The idea from which Nietzsche starts is that in generating human existence and natural existence, the Dionysian principle determines them to manifest themselves as systems which encompass contrary attributes and contents. Nature, says Nietzsche, ties together in the same totality material and ideal contents, sensible and

supra-sensible determinations, visible and invisible components⁴ ; in its original essence nature displays itself as a group of material element led and coordinated by an "ideal substratum, a spiritualised matter, as an esthetical power⁵".

One must notice that whereas in his works of youth, namely, in The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche ascribes these properties, only to organic nature, in his works of maturity he now extends them to an inorganic nature. So also, human existence contains, from this standpoint, as has been previously told, contrary determinations and contents : material and ideal, sensible and suprasensible.

The most subtle forms of correlation of sensible elements with suprasensible ones appear, according to Nietzsche, in the field of human life. In the following lines we'll open a parenthesis in order to describe them (a more detailed analysis will be done in the following subheadings and chapter)

As is shown by Nietzsche, particularly in the works of maturity (but perhaps not always with enough clarity), in the case of the human life the collaboration between the sensible and supra-sensible contents is implemented at various levels : at the level of the body-soul system, at the level of each element separately considered of the aforementioned system, at the level of objectified knowledge in sensations, perceptions and representations, at the level of knowledge that is achieved by the

⁴ In Nietzsche's understanding sensible determination is one and the same thing with material determination

⁵ La Naissance de la Tragédie in œuvres complètes Tome I p 35

imaginative thought and, finally, at the level of the system of thought (of course imaginative thought first of all), affectivity.

Within the scope of the body-soul system, the body represents the province of the sensible ; in this particular case the province of the sensible is equivalent with the field of activity of the excitements, instincts, affects not made conscious, at the basis of the whole activity of the body are the excitements, the non-conscious impulses of the senses ; afterwards intervene the instincts which in absorbing and transforming the excitements, the non conscious impulses, become the main factors of coordination of the physiologic processes⁶, finally, the manifestations of instincts determine the appearance of affects, pleasures, pains etc⁷, but the soul, province of the supra-sensible, is equivalent with the field of conscious sensorial activity, the conscious affectivity and thought ; one must notice that according to Nietzsche, between the first two and the last there cannot exist any accurate demarcation⁸.

This separation and qualification simplifies, however, to some extent, the reality. Considered in itself, the body does not appear as the exclusive province of the sensible, its activity being also determined in a small proportion, by the supra-sensible energies (ideal). Conversely. If we consider the soul in itself we observe, says Nietzsche, that neither this one is the exclusive province of a single group of

⁶ *Par delà le Bien et le Mal* op cit T II p 563

⁷ *Gaï savoir* in op. cit T II p 49

⁸ *ibid* op cit T II p 563

supra-sensible determinations, that is of the group of supra-sensible, ideal determinations : the processes of ideal nature which gives specificity to existence, have or have had at their origins a material support : concrete sensible support which affects them in their content as such. We refer the data on the external world collected by the sense organs, taken and subjectified by the soul changing them into its property.

Without any doubt, the sensible determinations of the body are more numerous and more important than its supra-sensible elements. But if we compare them to each other in order to point out the specificity of each of them we can take no account of the components strange to their true nature and define the body with the term from the province of the sensible and the soul with the term from the province of the supra-sensible.

Also interesting are the forms of collaboration between the sensible and the supra-sensible determinations which develop themselves in the inner processes that characterize the life of the soul, the consciousness (for Nietzsche both amount to the same). Even if in the whole of the life of the soul the prominent factors are supra-sensible factors, within the scope of the activities displayed by one of the functions of the consciousness (cognitive function), and within the scope of the

relations developed between some of its functions, a process may take place that of virtual equilibration and totalisation of sensible elements with the supra-sensible ones.

Such a process takes place in the case of knowledge objectified in sensations perceptions and representations (representations in a restricted meaning of the word). All these are according to Nietzsche sensible intellectual intuitions and, also, in the case of knowledge achieved by imaginative thought ; the imaginative thought attains the performance of expressing the idea by the channel of sensible features, to constitute the idea as object, as matter.

Finally, the virtual equilibration of sensible determinations with the supra-sensible determinations and their totalisation can coincide with the virtual equilibration of two phenomena of consciousness – affectivity and thought - and their totalisation. The virtual equilibration of the elements of thought (in particular imaginative thought) with the affective components and their totalisation has as consequence, the formation of mythical consciousness, a consciousness of mythical type.

The reunion, the reconciliation and totalisation of sensible contents with supra-sensible contents represents a process which is not always made concrete in the sphere of human existence. This process (of which fundamental consequences are the

formation of imaginative thought and the appearance of consciousness) characterises in fact the existence of men who live in the mythical times of humanity. In the historical periods of humanity life, the aforementioned process develops itself in exceptional cases.

One of the mythical period in the life of humanity – says Nietzsche – is the Dionysian period. This is marked by the presence of “the superman”, of the Dionysian man. The Dionysian man – says Nietzsche – represents the confluence, the reconciliation and totalisation of the sensible factors with the supra-sensible factors, the unconscious activities and the sensible – conscious activities with the rational conscious activities. Nevertheless we must recognise that in The Birth of Tragedy as besides, in other works, Nietzsche in many times, tends to define the Dionysian man as a being dominated by instincts and affects (not made conscious).

But it seems that we should not look for the authentic spirit of Nietzsche, thought in these affirmations ; these are cases of deviations from this spirit, deviations which also appear as direct consequences of the necessities of argumentation required by the discussion about the concept of tragic discussion aimed at explaining more clearly (as will be seen later) the relationships which can be established between “nature” and “spirit”, between instinct and affectivity (each of the two latter assumes in

Nietzsche's standpoint two forms : an unconscious form and a conscious form), and thought.

In support to our viewpoint is, besides, the firm dissociation made by Nietzsche in The Birth of Tragedy, between the Dionysian manifestations in the Greeks and the Dionysian manifestations in the Barbarians ; the first - he contends - have helped man to attain the most complex and higher existential condition from the standpoint of value – the mythical – esthetical state – state of equilibration and harmony between the opposites⁹.

The fundamental contrary elements of the mythical esthetical state are – as has been shown very often by Nietzsche – the affects and the intellect ; however in the work of maturity he put them in an inferior existential state, that is a state devoid of equilibration and harmony between the opposites (it is dominated by the raging of the most bovine instincts¹⁰).

By making these affirmations Nietzsche makes us understand however, that only the Dionysian manifestations in the Greeks respect the original principles of Dionysian festivals and rites the Dionysian manifestations in the “Barbarians” represent only the alienating forms of the Dionysian festivals and rites from their

⁹ La Naissance de la Tragédie in op. cit Tome I p 40

¹⁰ *ibid* p 40

original attributes and, likewise, the authentic Dionysian manifestations are those existential actions and processes which open to the man possibility to tie together in the same whole the main contrary contents of his life.

The (authentic) Dionysian man should be, then, the individuality which has succeeded in introducing in a harmonious totality the energies of the unconscious and those of the conscious. One must notice that in his maturity works, Nietzsche puts in equal terms the Dionysian man and the type of superman and in the same vein he finally suggests at a certain point, that Goethe also- who appears to him before as a representative image of the Apollinian man – should be an incarnation of the Dionysian¹¹. The Dionysian man is characterised by :

- 1-The survival of some vigorous instincts and of some mobile, flexible, plastic unconscious affects ;
- 2- The presence of some conscious affects. These affects are compound with contradictory determinations, whence their note of complexity ; the most specific system of life for the Dionysian man is constituted by the mixing of joy with pain or in other words he encounters life as encompassing all the possible contradictions¹² ; and finally, by the fact that he transforms the imaginative

¹¹ Le Crépuscule des idoles op. cit. T II pp 1021- 22

¹² La Naissance de la Tragédie . op.cit p.49

thought and mythical consciousness in main modes of regulation of his relationship with the external world.

Another idea which characterizes the Dionysian standpoint about the world, comparable as regards the importance of its significance, with the idea that existence (natural and human) is a system in which are interconnected contrary contents and determinations (idea which is finally identical – as we shall see later – with the idea that existence is constituted in its substance, as will to power), is the idea of eternal return of every form of existence which has been succeeding to each other for ever.

This idea is explicit only in the work of maturity. In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche refers to that symbolic episode in the Orphic version of the Dionysian myth, which contains it (the episode of the rebirth of Dionysos -zagreus, which was cut to pieces by the titans)¹³, but without observing, in formal terms, its presence here. The German philosopher interprets this episode as a symbolic representation of the idea that men must stifle their belief in individuation and form themselves as unity of the opposites; but it is evident that this episode or this symbolic representation also hides, in itself, the idea that the structures and the processes of existence come back to life ad infinitum.

¹³ ibid p 69

Only later, in his works of maturity, Nietzsche gains a clear consciousness of the fact that the idea of eternal return belongs to the circle of determinations of the Dionysian myth. In analysing in The Twilight of Idols, for example, the significance of the Dionysian symbolistics, he notices, among other things, that the Dionysian mysteries and festivals proclaim, the everlasting life "beyond change and death", its endless return, its periodic regeneration, complete real life by procreation¹⁴.

According to Nietzsche the Dionysian principle founds the mythical periods of humanity life, that is the periods within the scope of which should have been realised the reunion and harmonious equilibration of all the human energies and capacities which, each of them taken separately and considered throughout the prism of their specific determinations, appears as opposite phenomena, but the Socratic principle governs the historical periods of their life.

In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche gives us to understand that according to his philosophic standpoint, the historical existence is but a degraded manifestation of mythical existence. For example, he affirms that the fate of any myth is to demean itself flowing out little by little in the Detroit of so-called historical reality and to be considered by any later time, as an only fact which requires a historical character¹⁵. Nevertheless the German philosopher does not show us clearly the process by which

¹⁴ Crépuscule des idoles op.cit. p.1021

¹⁵ La Naissance de la Tragédie p.71

a mythical structure can pass into a historical structure, process which from the philosophic perspective assumed by the mythical thought can be that of a tragic disjunction of the existential attributes which at the beginning (in the mythical period) was tied together into a totality.

Also, he does not show us clearly that in the Socratic principle we must see but a Dionysian degraded principle. Fortunately the analysis devoted to the particular structure of authentical musical language (true music - from the scope of which Nietzsche excludes the opera - is for Nietzsche, the deepest transposition, on the aesthetical level, of the meaning of the Dionysian principle) contains some reflection about which one can affirm that they include in themselves the germs of the above mentioned ideas.

The elements specific to the language of Dionysian music – says Nietzsche – are contrary, opposite values. Between them are established two kinds of relationship : the one involves the persistence of the basic opposition between them and realises themselves as musical dissonance ; the other presupposes their mediation and appears as melodic harmony. The two sound constellations which compose the whole structure of the Dionysian music can be easily interpreted from the perspective of musical thought ; the mythical thought suggests us to see in them the symbols of two

different world : in the first – the symbol of an inferior world (historical world), of a world in which, the values are in struggle and the second – the symbol of a superior world (the mythical world), a world in which the contrary values are reconciled, united.

We could go further to contend that in the interpretation that Nietzsche gives to the values of the Dionysian musical language is hidden another idea, the idea that the Socratic principle (which governs the historical world) is but a degraded form of the Dionysian principle (which governs the mythical world). We have shown that Nietzsche talks about two kinds of sound configurations of musical structures.

One structure evokes the struggles between the contrary elements, which symbolises the historical world and makes us catch a glimpse of the principle which permanently feeds the process of confrontation between the opposites. Another structure evokes to us the moment of totalisation and conciliation of contrary values ; this contains a symbolic reference to the specific mode of mythical existence and gives us to understand that the principle which founds this existence (the Dionysian principle) is a creative force which achieves the reunion, in the same whole, of opposites and their reconciliation.

If we now put face to face the interpretations given about the two kinds of specific structure of Dionysian musical language and we consider that from the standpoint of

mythical thought (which determines the very substance of Nietzsche's philosophy, the dissonance (of values) which is a characteristic datum of history, appears through the degrading harmony (of opposite values), which harmony is a characteristic component of mythical existence; we can draw the conclusion that it is not contrary to the authentic spirit of Nietzsche's thought that we should define the Socratic principle as a degraded form of the Dionysian principle.

One must notice, however, that Nietzsche does not show an explicit analysis, the above mentioned relationships which exist between the Dionysian principle and the Socratic principle ; he just leaves this task to his readers, his interpreters.

Despite the contradictions and the short-comings which mark the discussion about the Dionysian principle in The Birth of Tragedy, this book can be considered as the starting point of our endeavour to determine as accurately as possible, Nietzsche's metaphysical standpoint about existence. In this discussion , to central ideas of Nietzsche's philosophy are already traced, namely, the idea that existence (natural and human) is a complex of forces and relations, and the idea that human life takes place at two levels : the one mythical, the other historical. However we must underline once again that the way the latter idea is treated in The Birth of tragedy is not

consequent in itself because of the non clarity and the internal contradictions of the ideatic discourse.

THE APPOLINIAN PRINCIPLE

In Nietzsche's understanding, the Appolinian principle also determines just as the Dionysian principle, the mythical times of humanity life. We could affirm, in accordance with the hidden suggestion of Nietzsche's thought, that this principle is but a variation on the Dionysian principle (if we understand the latter as an original and ideal form of the mythical energies), the difference between it and the derived principle of which variation it is derived only resides in the extra- emphasis it puts on the attribute of harmony (conciliation) of the opposites, attribute which is immanent to the existence of mythical type. It is true, at the explicit level of philosophic discourse, Nietzsche tends to oppose, at least from a certain point of view, the Appolinian principle to the Dionysian principle, obnubilating the specific contents of both principles.

As we have already argued out, the German philosopher often comes to put an equal term between the Dionysian principle and the irrational, unconscious, obscure force of human life. The bringing out of such an outlook of the Dionysian principle is accompanied by the promotion of an interpretative viewpoint which changes the

Appolinian principle into the generating factor of a human existence characterised by the excessive inclination towards intellectual reflection and ethical self-constraint. The Appolinian principle should be a kind of abstractizing and logicising, rationalising spirit¹⁶.

It is significant that in these pages Nietzsche insists on the fact that the Appolinian principle is one and the same thing with the individuation principle. But then, we know that in Schopenhauer's conception, from whom Nietzsche borrows the concept and its fundamental notes, the individuation principle does not manifest itself only as an act of divinisation of individuality with its aptitudes for order and moderation, but also as an act of intellectual knowledge which leads the individual to the understanding of the things only as phenomena "or appearances"¹⁷.

But as we have shown, in Nietzsche's conception, "the rational energy, the abstract thought (which takes the denomination of Socratic principle) governs the world of history and not the mythical existence. Thus it is clear that in proceeding this way, Nietzsche comes into contradiction with the fundamental thesis of his metaphysics. Despite this in other pages of his works, Nietzsche interprets the Appolinian principle as a mythical power, thus as a force compound with instinctual, sensible, affective and rational elements.

¹⁶ *ibid* p. 64

¹⁷ Arthur Schopenhauer. The world as will and representation, Dover Publication 1969 vol I pp 363 – 66

The Appolinian principle - he says - is fed with instinctual, sensible and affective energies of nature, but as an esthetical power it moulds the nature, gives it a form, and spiritualises it. This principle glorifies the mythical outlook of life and puts in the first place, imaginative thought, in the hierarchy of spiritual functions.

The Appolinian principle evokes a world with a very complex content, a world in which the contrary forces, energies and values are tied together and put in equal terms a world in which, for example, good and evil are put on the same level, rather divinised. Thus this principle does not govern, an immaterial abstract existence without internal oppositions, but a world rich in contradictions which it has tied together in the same totality and has reconciled them.

The equilibration of the opposites, their integration into a harmonious totality, the elimination of the struggles between them are so many effects of the Appolinian principle. In realising the unity of the opposites, the Appolinian should produce concomitantly - believes Nietzsche - a state of harmony and quietness comparable with the one produced by the state of dream. The secret idea of the German philosopher is, as we have said before, that in comparison with the Dionysian, the Appolinian provides an extra note of intensity to the state of harmony or reconciliation

of the opposites, which is a constitutive and irrevocable attribute of the mythical universe.

In trying a temporal delimitation of that mythical period of humanity life, which has been determined by the Appolinian principle, Nietzsche sinks into the same mistake he committed while trying to do the same delimitation with the Dionysian principle. To tell the truth, if on the one hand, Nietzsche introduces a historical civilisation and culture (the Dorian civilisation and culture considered to be the expression of the Appolinian principle)¹⁸ in the sphere of existence of the myth, making coincide this way, the historical time with the mythical time; on the other hand he transforms a mythical culture and civilisation of which existence flows in immemorial times, beyond the unities of measurement of historical time, into entities of which content can be reproduced in the field of history (in Dorian time), coming this way to dissolve the mythical time into the historical time. Thus we have to do with a twofold logical inadvertences. We must add finally, that under the evident influence of historical outlook of existence which "chronologises" the moments of creation, the German philosopher consider the Appolinian principle as a genesis later than the Dionysian principle, though it should have been normal to contend – because both principles are of mythical type – that they have appeared concomitantly.

¹⁸ La naissance de la tragédie pp 41, 47

THE TRAGIC PRINCIPLE

The tragic principle also governs, as the former principles we have already analysed, a mythical period of humanity life. We could say about it that it is the second variation on the Dionysian principle (the first being the Appolinian principle) Its specific attribute consists of the fact that by its activity, it tends to underline that the harmony and the equilibration of the mythical universe are a harmony and an equilibration to which participate contrary elements; taking into account this individual note (and only this note) we could define the tragic principle as opposed to the Appolinian one. Another important note which particularises this principle is reflected in the fact that the cultural values which it generates (dominated of course by the mythical perspective of life) show, in a most expressive way, the exceptional intensity of the conflict between myth and history. The interpretation we have given to the tragic principle could be contested on the ground of some of Nietzsche's affirmations, that the tragic principle should be the result of the synthesis between two contrary metaphysical energies, the Appolinian and the Dionysian. The first remark we can make about this statement on the part of Nietzsche is that in proceeding to such a kind of putting in relationship of the Dionysian with the Appolinian, he comes into contradiction with the analysis from which it results their identity of content, that is the

fact that they are principle of the same nature, that is of mythical nature. To be able to define these principles as contrary forces, Nietzsche tends to transform the Dionysian principle into Dionysian "instinct" thus into sensible phenomenon, and the Appolinian principle into Appolinian "spirit", thus in "supra-sensible and intellectual phenomenon", but then, posting himself in this position, Nietzsche renounces volens - nolens the interpretation (inspired by the principled attitude of mythical thought) of those forces as complex existential structures, as structures which totalise the sensible determinations with the supra-sensible determinations, the instinctual, sensible and effectives elements with the intellectual elements.

On the one hand, however, in defining the tragic principle as a synthesis between the Appolinian principle as supra-sensible and intellectual energy and the Dionysian principle as sensible energy, Nietzsche does not do anything else but comprehend it as a totality compound with sensible elements (instinctual, sensorial

and affective) and supra-sensible elements (intellectual) and thereby, as a mythical principle.

In the same vein of the circumscription of the attributes which characterise the forces and values penetrated by a mythical spirit comes also the definition given to tragedy (the highest cultural-artistical expression of the tragic conception on existence), as imaginative representation of the Dionysian wisdom with the help of Apollinian artistic means¹⁹, we must not see, in essence, in this definition but a recognition of the fact that the work of art becomes mythical creation only in the extent in which the creator succeeds in introducing in a relationship of harmonious collaboration the instinctual, sensorial, affective and intellectual capacities which he possess.

Thus it is clear that the tragic principle can be reduced, in the last analysis, to the Dionysian principle: their determinations of content are, essentially, the same. In this way has proceeded Nietzsche in his works of maturity, in The Twilight of Idols, for example (one must notice, still in the last analysis that these principles can be put in equal terms with what we shall call the Zarathustran principle). But, a suggestion in the same interpretative vein, can be glimpsed also in The Birth of Tragedy. Here

¹⁹ ibid p.126

Nietzsche declares that, at the final of the tragedy, the Dionysian element reconquers its primacy it has gradually lost on the way of unfolding actions, in favor of the Apollonian element and that the feeling of harmony of the things this latter builds is an echo of the metaphysical power concentrated in the Dionysian principle.

As a mythical-metaphysical principle, the tragic principle determined – says Nietzsche – all the fundamental actions, processes and events in the life of the Greek people who lived in the time of Aeschylus and Sophocles giving them the seal of social, political and spiritual values in which was expressed the people's consciousness. Existence governed by the tragic principle was a vast totality of structures, functions and relationships in which the contradictions disappeared in the concord of a superior harmony. The greatest achievements in this time, of the Greek people should be explained by the fact that the Greek people built its life in accordance with the norms and the innermost requirements of the mythical attitude before existence. Later, she (the people) subordinated life to the imperatives of abstract thought, event which caused her decline, the fall in the relativity and fickleness of history²⁰.

As said previously, another specific note of this metaphysical principle consists in the exceptional ability it has to make it possible for the cultural values generated by

²⁰ See the comment by Vasile Frateanu in *critica Gindirü mitice*(Editura dacia cluj-Napoca 1980).p30

it, to shape up an outlook of the world from which clearly results an incompatibility of relationships between myth and history. Nietzsche considers that such an outlook of existence – which he named, tragic – is expressed at the higher level in the plays of Aeschylus and Sophocles. The opinion that only the plays of Aeschylus and Sophocles represent the developed artistic forms of objectivity of the tragic conception of existence is crystallised in his maturity works ; in the youth works, in The Birth of Tragedy for example, Nietzsche puts beside these plays, also the musical tragedies of Wagner ; in maturity he renounces, however, to venture anymore positive assessments as regards these musical tragedies.

Tragedy — evokes two contradictory, worlds. One of the worlds evoked has as symbolic corresponding the universe of epic situations in which is projected the main hero of the piece ; this universe is a reflection of the horrors, sufferings caused by the fact that the tragic hero is captured in the place of endless contradictions, generated by a destructive universal principle. The actions, the events, the epic scene should constitute the specific forms of objectification of the Appolinian principle within the tragic work of art²¹. They form what Nietzsche calls the world of appearance. Without any doubt that in identifying the universe of epic events with the Appolinian world, Nietzsche comes into contradiction with the authentical spirit of his own thought. He

²¹ Aristotles poetics translated by S. H. Butcher. Hill and wang (N.Y. 1961) p. 33

should have remained consequent with his spirit, only if he interprets the totality of epic scenes (which draw in obvious way the image of the world of history, with its trail of unreconciled contradictions) as symbolic representation of the harmful consequences which has the intervention of Socratic principle in the field of human existence.

The other existential structure that the (authentic) tragedy evokes to us, in a symbolic way, of course, is a world governed by mythical principles. This world is represented first in the scene (and during the development of action) ; its symbol is the Dionysian chorus, as developed expression of musical harmony. It appears, afterwards, not on the scene, but in the consciousness of the spectator , as pure ideal image. At the end of the piece, the spectator becomes able to imagine to himself the existence of a world superior to empirical (historical), reality, a world in which, for example, good and evil , beautiful and ugly, creation and destruction are equally enhanced in value, and finally made equivalent²². The affective vehicle for the appearance of such a pure mental representation is constituted by the feeling that the musical harmonies of the Dionysian chorus inculcates in the soul of the spectator. Thus one can say that this mental representation is formed in the continuation of these symbolic images on the scene that is the Dionysian scene.

²² ibid p. 33

Tragedy evokes, the incompatibility of content between two worlds, namely between the world of history and the world of myth, and the possibility that man has to overtake the first to the benefit of the second. If it were to limit itself to bringing out the tension and the implacable struggle which explodes between the two worlds, tragedy should have built up a pessimistic outlook of life. However, since it ends up in making us glimpse of the existence of a superior world, in which the opposites are united and reconciled, one can say – in Nietzsche's understanding - that what is specific to the conception of life it shapes up, is a moderated optimism, that is an attitude which does not disregard the great difficulties which lay before man who wants to build up a better world, but he believes in the possibility to overtake them. Then we can conclude that the so called tragic outlook of existence is not a pessimistic outlook, but a moderated optimistic one and coincides, in the last analysis, with the mythical outlook of existence.

The explicit extension of the concept of tragedy from the limited sphere of artistic area, to the totality of the manifestations of human life took place very late after the appearance of the first theoretic speculations about tragedy, that is in the 19th century, in the works of Schopenhauer. But the idea that tragedy develops a larger conception of life in which the interpretation can easily get a glimpse of a philosophical

conception of a specific type is in embryonic form in the works of Aristotle, who was the first to deal systematically with this literary form.

Now let us see the place of Nietzsche's interpretation of the tragic in the history of critical analysis devoted to this concept and what its originality consists of. It seems that the theoretical position adopted by Nietzsche can be defined as a median one between the rationalism of philosophic outlook specific to Aristotle and Hegel and the manifest irrationalism specific to Schopenhauer's conceptions and those of modern thinkers influenced by him, whence also its note of originality among the various comments related to the idea of tragic.

It will not be useless to make a comparison between the interpretation given by Nietzsche to the concept of tragic attitude of life as philosophic attitude and the interpretation given by the two opposite philosophic trends, from which emerges the heterogeneous conceptions promoted by the author of The Birth Tragedy.

The rationalists think that the events that evoke tragedy derive from the belief - explicit or implicit - the tragic authors have, that the rational principles govern human life in all its manifestations, even in those which seem absurd (the absurd should not be so but it appears as such because it is, for the moment unknown).

The most important representatives of this trend are Aristotle and Hegel ; the first develops about tragedy a true physics, the second a true metaphysics.

For Aristotle tragedy is an imitation of nature (as any art) but in a concrete expression in language of chosen complete actions of any extent, imitation imagined by men in action and not recorded and which, in arousing pity and fear realises the cleaning of the passion²³. In contending that tragedy is an imitation of nature or, more exactly, an imitation of an action achieved by men, Aristotle implicitly affirms the rationality of the specific outlook of the tragic work of art, because, according to him, nature in whole evolves, develops itself by virtue of rational criteria respectively by virtue of goals or final causes. In everything natural – he says – exists an inner principle, an instinctive reason, a goal which in acting on matter of which it is compound tends to help it express the essence, the genuine nature, to help it become a perfect thing, a perfect form²⁴. In Aristotle's conception, the task of art in general and of tragedy in particular is – as has been told previously – the imitation of nature ; however we have added that it is the nature which has attained its goal, in creating perfect and exemplary forms²⁵ ; only a nature which has completely developed according to its inner reason, its true essence, in short a complete achievement.

²³ Aristotles (poetics translate by S. H. Butcher. Hill and wang N.Y.196) VI, 1449b– 20 - 30.

²⁴ Aristotles Physics Translate by Richard Hope. University of Nebraska Press. Lincoln 1961. 1986-1996

²⁵ *ibid* 199 a

As an imitation of a perfect form of existence, it is evident that tragedy presents us selected men²⁶. That is men activated in conformity with their genuine essence, genuine nature²⁷, and finally it is evident that it cannot reflect history, because history is something imperfect (as compared with the perfect achievement of existence reflected in tragedy) history, - contends Aristotle – is but a collection of imperfects facts or events, still reliant on the particular, the contingent.

The fact that the heroes of tragedy are “selected men” does not mean that they are not able to commit error. They do not escape from committing error and therefore they also run into misfortune²⁸. But their error – and direct consequences – the horrible events in which they are thrown are transformed into absolute pretexts necessary for the proving of their exceptional moral qualities with which these heroes are endowed. We should say that the series of disasters the tragic hero passes through have an intrinsic superior reason for, it is due to them that the respective hero can appear to us as a selected moral consciousness. Aristotle gives us to understand that, by putting the hero in such situations, the writer validates for himself in a symbolic way the conviction that nature can achieve itself, by some of its exemplaries, something perfect.

²⁶ *ibid* Poetics XV 1454 b 10

²⁷ *ibid* 1451 b1-10

²⁸ *ibid* XIII 1453 a 10-15

Tragedy should be thus, for Aristotle the perfect illustration of a philosophic conception which identifies nature with an active energy which develops itself by virtue of an instinctive reason, of an immanent goal, of a final cause.

If Aristotle excluded the "divine", metaphysics from the content of tragedy. (rejection of its intervention in the development of action) , Hegel to the contrary introduces the divine, that is the metaphysics in its content and even changes it into the genuine topic of original tragedy²⁹, it is clear that Hegel treats this concept in the spirit of his philosophy, which conditions – as the theologic philosophies - human existence by a transcendent reality, God, and afterwards laicizes him : the divine – says Hegel – is not beyond the world, rather it is here, in the world, among men and it represents the very essence of their life, the spiritual substance of man's " life and achievement"³⁰ , their ethical principle.

Tragedy is a symbolic reflection of the mode in which this spiritual eternal substance, this ethical principle intervenes in reality. This substance can manifest itself as a concrete unity, as a totality of distinct powers equilibrated into an absolute undisturbed harmony. But in this substance is also hidden the possibility of transformation of the mere relation of difference between the forces, into a relation of opposition, of struggle between them. This struggle between the opposites is evoked

²⁹ Hegel introduction à l'esthétique. Le beau (Editions Flammarion Paris 1979) Tome II p. 80

³⁰ *ibid* p 235

first of all by tragedy . In setting this opposition the ethical essence is however alienated from its ideal essence and assumed for itself its own difference. It will recover its ideal essence only when it will succeed in doing away with the opposites as contraries, in reconciling them, one with the other and in introducing them in a harmonious totality.

The attainment of this objective is evoked in the ending of the tragedy. Ending in this way, that is by reconciliation of the opposites, tragedy transforms itself into an illustration of deep rationality of human destiny, for the rationality just resides in the fact that the supreme power, which masters over all the various gods and over man, cannot tolerate that the powers, which become independent in an unilateral way should overtake this limit of their rights and should become lasting³¹.

To these rational interpretations of tragedy is opposed its irrational interpretation promoted by many idealist thinkers and particularly schopenhauer. All these thinkers imagine tragedy as an expression of the absurd, of the a priori, of the everlasting struggle between irreconcilable opposites, so, as an expression of those principles which, in their outlook, determine the nature as such of human existence.

According to schopenhauer tragedy is a literary and artistic form which reflects human existence as a vast complex contradictory, irreconcilable manifestations, or,

³¹ ibid Tome I p.235

what amounts to the same, a reality governed by the irrational principle of the will to live³². Or in other word a reality governed by the irrational principle of our existence. Life and tragedy (which is a symbol of life) then have an identical essence. This essence could be defined as being of tragic nature³³. Appealing to such an interpretation, schopenhauer extends implicitly the sphere of manifestations of the tragic to our whole existence.

He who gets the consciousness of the aporetic nature of our life – says Schopenhauer – of its tragic essence, becomes able to understand that life has no value, that it does not merit any positive assessment, nor any attachment³⁴. The tragic hero, covers all these stages of initiation. However we must notice, that the ultimate stage – that which shows him to us, becoming convinced of the necessity to renounce the life involved in the center of the events of life- is presented to us in the tragedies of the modern larger and deeper than in the tragedies of the ancient – therefore – says schopenhauer – The tragedy of the modern have a higher principled philosophic value³⁵.

Under the influence of schopenhauer and of the subjectivist interpretations which have falsified the spirit of Nietzsche's thought, many of the idealistic modern thinker have come to define tragedy as a pure artistic expression of irrationality and

³² Arthur Schopenhauer. The world as will and representation. Translate by E. F. J. Payne. (The Falcon's wing Press 1958) vol II p.433

³³ ibid vol I p.322

³⁴ ibid vol II p.433

³⁵ ibid vol II p 434

absurd which should govern life in its essence and have changed the tragic as ambiguity, into aporia and irreconciled struggle between the opposites, the most important category of life. In the conception of the French writer Albert Camus, tragedy is a symbolic image of the metaphysical conflict in which takes place at the very basis of our existence, between the spirit of revolt and the spirit of order, conflict in which both forces involved are equally legitimate and equally necessary³⁶, but the tragic man is the man who has got the consciousness of his spiritual ambiguity and his inner split derives from his inability to realise an equilibration between the unlimited ideals claimed by liberty and the limits imposed to them by necessity³⁷.

As we have already told, Nietzsche's interpretation is somewhat midway of the rational interpretation and the irrational ones of tragedy and of the tragic as a metaphysical category of life. In his outlook, human existence has an irrational form of manifestation and a rational form of manifestation, more precisely a rational – sensible, that is mythical. In the content of the first form of life (which coincides with the world of history) the contradictions should have a permanent validity, never coming to reconciliation. Contrary to other idealist philosophers, Nietzsche however does not see in the aporia and ambiguity of history the objective manifestations of what some of them name the irrational spirit of life, but rather the manifestations of

³⁶ Camus Albert, théâtre, récits, nouvelles vol I Gallimard 1962. pp 496 – 497

³⁷ *ibid* p.1707

absolute reason, of abstract thought (which is in direct opposition to the sensible component of life) ; this reason, this thought – he says – spirits away the instinctual, sensorial and affective energies of our existence and proceeding this way falsifies its nature because the instinctual, sensorial and affective and intellectual nature ties together and reconciles its components and reconcile them.

This way Nietzsche comes in fact to put in equal terms, the absurd and irrational and the rational which has lost contact with the instinctual, sensible and affective determinations of human existence and has transformed itself into a pure abstract energy. This reason, in his conception is the founder of history. A form of existence (assumed superior) in which the opposites are tied together and reconciled is strange to history; this should be a mythical existence , existence governed by mythical principles (authentic, non degraded). In Nietzsche's conception tragedy reflects both worlds, proves the incompatibility of content between them and underlines the necessity and the possibility that man could overtake history to the benefit of a superior form of life, which should be the mythical form of existence.

THE SOCRATIC PRINCIPLE

In the interpretative system of Nietzsche, the Dionysian, the Apollinian and the tragic principles determine the mythical periods in the life of humanity ; in opposition

the Socratic principle governs the history of humanity. The Socratic principle - holds Nietzsche – does away with the unity of the opposites, in the spirit of which is developed the life of man in mythical times, and sets up the primacy of reason (this amounts to saying that it sets up itself as dominant power), devalues sensibility, breaks the harmonious link between the various values of civilisation and culture which was assured by the mythical consciousness and these values are reshaped in an individualistic and fragmentary perspective and are introduced in a relationship of permanent opposition and struggle. In comparison with the other principles, the Socratic principle determines thus, an inferior form of life. Since it founds an existential totality, we can consider it as a metaphysical principle. Nietzsche gives us to understand that it is a degraded metaphysical principle for it no longer determines a mythical existence (the single one which is authentically metaphysical), but rather an existence which has appeared after the degrading of the first one.

In the historical existence – says Nietzsche – appears a new type of man, the theoretic man³⁸, a man whose main creative energy is reason, abstract thought. The first model of this type of man should be Socrates. The theoretic man is characterised by the fact that he tries to extend the logic spirit, pure reason to all the aspects and areas of life by the fact that he tries to transform all the values of life into values

³⁸ La Naissance de la Tragédie in op. cit Tome I p.88

dominated by abstract principles. The theoretic man is convinced that appealing to logic spirit, to abstract thought, he can disperse the circle of appearances and break into the essence of things, and attain the prime causes of the world, he can do away with error and discover the truth³⁹.

Nietzsche does not agree with this viewpoint, for according to him none type of thought can attain this objective.

The theoretic man believes as a negative phenomenon, that struggle between the opposites, does not express the very essence of historical existence, but rather expresses the misleading appearances of this existence and the deviation of its true spirit, which tends to do away with all the contradictions within its scope and to change it into a system containing only similar determination, that is a universe of undisturbed perfection. The true spirit of history – according to this type of man can be found only if we investigate history with the means of abstract thoughts, and it is also with the same means – he contends – we could have the possibility – when we notice its imperfections- we can remake history as an exemplary form of existence, thus as idyllic reality, as a reality in which the opposites are tied together and reconciled ; for the man endowed with a theoretic consciousness, the world appears as a universe in which the opposites have lost their content, have canceled themselves, have

³⁹ ibid p. 103

renounced to be present again, in short have vanished. Finally, if the man with the mythical consciousness refuses the present (according to history) in the name of the past and future and pretends that a superior existence can be built up only by overtaking history, the theoretic man refuses the past and future (according to myth) living exclusively in present⁴⁰, and is of the opinion that a superior stage of existence can be attained only within the scope of history and not beyond it, or more concretely put, that is in fact a kind of archetype of form within history, to which humanity can easily accede if it puts on the basis of its mode of life the requirements and norms of activity of pure reason, of abstract thought.

The attitude of the theoretic man is, therefore, an absolute optimistic attitude, an attitude which does not involve any reservation as regards the possibility of achievement as quickly and as completely as possible of his ideals. However the optimism of the theoretic man does not derive – as he believes – from an adequate knowledge of historical realities, but rather from a delusion; delusion is – says Nietzsche – the opinion that, in its essence history manifests itself as pure harmony, undisturbed perfection, exclusive reunion of similar elements, but only through appearances, at the surface, it manifests itself as struggle between the opposites, being permanently an inextricable knot of contradictions, fact that makes it able to

⁴⁰ *ibid* p. 79

overtake itself in order to attain a so called superior form of existence, which should be the expression of a deeper nature. One can say – according to Nietzsche – that the historical man acts by virtue of a mystified consciousness, which generates endlessly, aspirations and desires which seem easy to satisfy, but which actually cannot be achieved. The historical man longs for realising himself as an harmonious totality but he remains an imperfect being, pure reason, abstract thought, having developed itself, in this case, in a exaggerated way.

History – will conclude Nietzsche in a categorical way - is the field of violent confrontations between various energies, functions, capacities of human life. All these have been more and more enslaved to common principles (the principles of pure reason), but thereby they did not become more receptive one to the other, rather, they have gradually (paradoxically) transformed themselves into fierce opponents.

Nietzsche particularly insists on the way in which the specific attitude of the theoretic man (rational abstract and naïve-optimistic) becomes also the spiritual attitude specific to the majority of the artists of historical time. The direct consequence of the infiltration of the spirit of the theoretic man in the area of artistic values is the annihilation of their original feature (which presupposes the presence of a mythical outlook of existence and their transformation in inferior artistic values. This situation is

mainly reflected in the Euripidean tragedy (the first manifestation of this spirit) and in Opera. Both are for Nietzsche unfaithful imitation or copy of the tragedies of Aeschylus and Sophocles. Nietzsche analyses with a particular attention the consequences of the intrusion of the logic spirit into the structure of the work of art.

For example, in the Euripidean tragedy the first effect of the massive intervention of critical and rational spirit in its content is the modification of perspective in the existential attitude of the chorus ; if in the most ancient tragedy the chorus was based in its comments, on a mythical-metaphysical conception of life-whence its visionary character, in the new tragedy the chorus-grounds its reflections on profane rational, historical conception of life. The second consequences is the cancelling of the enigmatic mysterious element of the dramatical subject. By confining himself to the principles of logic spirit, which induces it to renounce the enigmatic aspect of the subject, Euripides devises a character whom he puts in the prologue⁴¹ of his tragedies in order to bring forward the scene and to tell the spectators the events which precede the action and those which will constitute the content of its development, which will oblige him to appear again before the scene at the end of the plays, so as to inform the spectators about the future destiny of the tragic hero.

⁴¹ ibid p 79

In proceeding this way Euripides succeeds in focusing the attention on the psychological processes of the main heroes whom he describes with a subtle dialectics and with a particular concern so as not to let any more important detail unclarified, non illuminated and non interpreted by reason. He demystifies the tragic heroes and transforms them in ordinary men confined in the narrow perimeter of usual, daily experiences, in beings who live exclusively in the present, in history without the power to look forward to an ideal future, or backward to a mythical existence, thus without the power of becoming convinced of authentic metaphysical aspirations. The Euripidean tragedy presents us this way a show of world dominated, governed and ruled by the logic spirit, abstract thought. However⁴², paradoxically this universe is doubled with a universe of bursting out affect, in which the characters become the embodiment of the most passionate feelings.

Euripide's tragedy ends up with an optimistic naïve and superficial tone-which is another specific element of the attitude he adopts before the existence the theoretic man. If the ending of the tragedies of Easchylus and Sophocles evokes the possibility of overtaking the imperfections of historical life in another sphere of existence, that of mythical existence, the ending of Euripide's tragedies in presenting the show of an

⁴² ibid pp 79- 80

hero whom the fate rewards according to his merits and open to him the perspectives of a happy existence in history, suggests that the unpleasant aspects of historical life (endured by the hero) represent but some accidents of life and that an harmonious universe without contradictions, can be built up within the scope of this life, which should recover this way its true identity.

Another form of artistic manifestation of the spirit of the theoretic man, which is particular to modern culture is the Opera⁴³. The prominence of reason, of abstract thought, of logics is materialised here essentially in the enslavement of musical structures to the text (libretto), which constitutes a series of rational dogmatic analysis of the tribulations of the heroes. The opera becomes, this way a rational, dogmatic description and interpretation of the psychical processes the heroes experiences in daily life.

The outlook of existence that presents the opera is also idyllic and naïve-optimistic. The main philosophic idea of the opera is that human existence can constitute an idyllic universe, as a universe devoid of any contradictions. Idyllism, lack of contradictions should characterize first the prehistorically time of humanity life. In contending that , the opera overtakes the outlook specific to Euripidean tragedy, which limited this phenomenon to the universe of history ; but idyllism and lack of

⁴³ ibid pp.104

contradictions should not be only proper attributes of this time, but rather also the ideal forms of manifestations of history, the forms in which the inner principle of history poses itself in its absolute purity. Without any doubt, the opera gives us to understand that history also meets a degraded hypostasis, hypostasis's which casts the individual in the hell of contradictions and causes him sufferings ; but it holds that man can overtake easily this negative reality of history, in order to recover its idyllic, pure, immaculate form.

Nietzsche objects to the idea that humanity has lived or should be ever able to live in a paradisiacal reality devoid of any contradictions. In his conception, the contradictions are inherent in any forms of social life. Between these contradictions – he contends – are established two types of relationships : a relationship of opposition, fierce confrontation, and another relationship of harmonious collaboration, mutual help. The first should characterise the inferior form of human existence (history), but the second should be proper to a superior form human existence (mythical society)

THE ZARATHUSTRAN PRINCIPLE

Beginning with the Gay Science (1882), Nietzsche shifts – but not without contradictions and ambiguity, to the consolidation of his metaphysics around the Zarathustran principle. It is true that Nietzsche does not refer in an explicit way to a

Zarathustran principle, as he refers for example to a Dionysian principle. But the larger part of his metaphysical speculations of maturity works converge towards a mythologic figure. This figure – Zarathustra - plays the role of a concrete universal which absorbs in itself and totalises the main metaphysical determinations interpreted by Nietzsche as characteristic for the whole of existence and which becomes thereby according to him a kind of equivalent for the ultimate principle of everything, of universe.

As we have told in the previous development, in his works of maturity, Nietzsche often proceeds to the dissolution of the Dionysian principle, (now reinterpreted in a clearer and more extended philosophic perspective) into what we named the Zarathustran principle, or if we prefer, to their superposition. Nevertheless we only keep the denomination of Zarathustran principle for the metaphysical principle around which is structured, Nietzsche's thought in the maturity time, because Zarathustra is the main ideatic determinations of this principle and so also, in order to bring out the fact that the Dionysian principle as has been shaped in the works of youth, is only a prefiguration of the metaphysical principle of the works of maturity and, thus, the complete identification of content of the two periods of philosophic creation is impossible.

Again, we have to make it clear from the beginning that proceeding in conformity with the modality of thought which is characteristic of his whole meditation, Nietzsche transforms the main ideatic determinations of the metaphysical principle structured by him in maturity time, in concrete concepts: one of them (the will to power) gives itself as "object", materializes itself into a figure, taking, so to speak the face and the look of Zarathustra (which is the symbol of the absolute and complete development), but the other one (the eternal return) is so closely associated to Zarathustra's real-life and spiritual attitude as the hero of the Nietzschean's philosophic "novel", that, even if it does not appear as "plastic" representation as is the case for the first, it can no longer be conceived as a simple abstract concept, but rather as an ideatic concrete entity.

Nietzsche's metaphysics is just as almost all the modern metaphysics, a metaphysics of immanence, because it holds that the ultimate principle or the original cause of the things resides inside them and not outside them. According to it, natural existence in its totality should develop by virtue of its own energies or forces, and not following the requirements of a supernatural intelligence. This aspect of Nietzsche's metaphysics filters through his works of youth as well as his works of maturity, but it is more emphasized with vigor in the reflections in the works of maturity.

As we have already made clear, it comes out that the ultimate principle of the things should be the Zarathustran principle. To affirm in accordance with Nietzsche's suggestions, that the world in its whole is determined by the Zarathustran principle amounts to saying that its substance, its content, its consistency, is the will to power, and the form in which it manifests itself or its specific modality of existence in time is that of eternal return.

The Will to Power, which constitutes the very content of the world, reveals itself in fact as a totality of "centres of power"⁴⁴, games of power⁴⁵, in short a complex of powers with various properties: some centres of power are supra-sensible structures (ideal, invisible). But others are sensible structures (material, visible). Absolutely all the individual configurations of nature include the material determinations as well as ideal determinations.

The will to power, as the single creative principle of the world, can exist but hypostasised concomitantly in two types of structures : sensible and supra-sensible. Each existential configuration in which it objectifies itself contains – according to Nietzsche's belief – sensible determinations as well as supra-sensible determinations. the sensible determinations (transposed, constituted as material, corporal, visible structures) represent according to the German philosopher- the less active elements ;

⁴⁴ Friedrich Nietzsche la volonté de puissance. (Librairie générale française 1991) p.382 Aphorisme 337

⁴⁵ ibid p 345 Aphorisme 299

making explicit an idea which in Nietzsche only appears implicitly, we could say that the sensible determinations could be also defined as sensible forces (energies, powers), because they have at their disposal a somewhat internal dynamism. The supra-sensible determinations (given by the ideal, immaterial, invisible structures) represent, at the contrary, the most active elements ; making explicit an idea which appears in Nietzsche only in an implicit way we could say that due to their internal dynamism – without any doubt more intense than that of the sensible determinations - they can be also defined as forces (energies, powers).

This way, the category of force (power, energy) is no longer for Nietzsche the non – sensible component of the objects of existence, rather it is the very existence as structure which ties together in the same totality, the sensible components with the supra-sensible components.

Thus, in Nietzsche's conception, all the forms of existence reveal to us the show of a simultaneous flow of sensible and supra-sensible forces. However strange it may seem, and even at the level of inorganic nature – Nietzsche emphasizes - takes place such a flow of forces. However one can observe a difference between the mode in which these two types of forces are structured at this level of existence and the mode in which they are structured at the level of inorganic nature. If, within the scope of

inorganic nature, these forces are posed as a kind of potential opposites, then as some opposites which do not ever come into conflict between them, limiting themselves to relate one to the other as solidary and even interpenetrated determinations, in their content of a harmonious totality ; within the scope of organic nature these forces are posed as true and actual opposites, then as some opposites which are actually differentiated the ones from the others, making to appear, this way, between them – even if it is not in an absolute permanent way - also a relationship of opposition, struggle and confrontation. Inside the organic nature, a specific form of manifestation of the contents of the two forces appears at the level of human existence. In this context, all the supra sensible components activate as conscious phenomena and even some sensible elements also activate as such. The interaction of the sensible forces with the supra-sensible forces (within the scope of which the main role is played by supra-sensible energy) determines on the side of each configuration, the formation of a perspectivist outlook of the surrounding reality⁴⁶, that is the capability to perceive, to represent this reality in a particular point of view and in a more or less precise and adequate modality⁴⁷.

⁴⁶ Nietzsche holds that in certain conditions, the suprasensible can eliminate, gradually, the sensible form the conscious factors of the process of knowledge, positing itself as the single determining element of this process, event which coincides with the formation of abstract thought.

⁴⁷ Le Gai savoir in op cit tome II p.55

In contending the idea that the world is, in its content, will to power, Nietzsche wants to say, thus, that it is a structure which totalises material and ideal determinations, sensible and supra-sensible forces.

In Nietzsche's conception, the world is formed as has been seen, with values with different powers as structure and as ontologic density, all these centres or values of power are their own causes. All these centres or values of power create and destroy themselves endlessly. They pose themselves such a way that they repeat endlessly the one and same cycle of existence, of which main stages are creation and completion or maturation, and destruction. The world repeats endlessly the configurations and the combinations (relationships) between them. The world is a circuit which has already often repeat itself *ad infinitum*, which plays its game in *infinitum*⁴⁸.

All the states or processes of existence – holds Nietzsche – are reversible. There is nothing in the world, which does not return endlessly.

This life that you live now or have lived, you must have to live it again and again many countless times ; and there will be nothing new in it, rather every suffering, and every pleasure and every idea and every sigh and whatever is infinitely great, and whatever is infinitely small in your life must come back to you, and everything in the same succession and order. And so also this spider, this moonlight between the trees, and so also every moment and myself. Every everlasting hourglass of existence will always come back and you with it⁴⁹.

⁴⁸ la volonté de puissance op. cit. p 434

⁴⁹ Le Gai savoir op. cit. p. 202 Aphorisme 341

Nietzsche is especially concerned with bringing out the particular mode of objectification of the Zarathustran metaphysical principle in the sphere of existence. As we know the Zarathustran principle has two components : the will to power and the eternal return. The will to power represents the content, the substance, the foundation of existence (inclusively human existence); but the eternal return represents its modality or its form of being in time. What must be particularly emphasized is the fact that, in Nietzsche's conception, circular time, within the scope of which flows existence in its whole, is a formal determination and not a determination of content, because it comes to be applied to existence as something outside and as something which does not provide to existence its main properties and the general relationships established between them ; it just obliges them to repeat themselves endlessly. Metaphorically speaking , we could say that for Nietzsche the circular time is a kind of big clothing that existence in its whole must wear, volens–nolens but is not its "material"

Now we shall see how these two fundamental components of the Zarathustran principle are manifested at the level of human existence. The will to power (which is a reunion of opposites) should structure itself in two ways : once as authentic, pure will to power, and another time as false, degraded decaying⁵⁰ will to power ; in the first case it should realise itself as unity and harmony of the opposites. The splitting into two of the

⁵⁰ La volonté de puissance op cit p 104 Aphorisme 80

will to power is accompanied with the appearance of some temporal processes which contain determinations absolutely new as related with the specific determinations of the circular time. These processes do not represent external phenomena for human life, but rather its internal relationships, that is elements which define some main aspects of its content, of its substance. Duration and succession become factors which affects the very essence of man's life, or more precisely, this essence, this being is constituted among others, as the very duration and succession of some biological phenomena. However Nietzsche does not respect consequently this idea on human temporality ; in the last analysis he subordinates it to the idea of eternal return. Nietzsche considers that the temporal structures which influence the very being of human existence depend , in the last analysis, of temporal transcendent determination of man which is "eternal return". The German philosopher holds that the authentic will to power founds the mythical times of humanity life but the false, decaying will to power, founds the historical time of humanity life. Moreover he affirms that the mythical periods as well as the historical period repeat themselves infinitely, return everlastingly. So far, we have seen in short, Nietzsche's conception of the particular modality by which the zarathustran principle governs human existence. Now we shall

shift and see the meanings that he ascribes to the will to power (the second component of the zarathustran principle).

As aforesaid, Nietzsche holds that in the sphere of human existence, the will to power splits itself into authentic pure will to power, and false, degraded will to power. He adds that the authentic, pure will to power materialises itself in human harmonious totality, that is those human beings who in order to represent reality and to create values develop in the same extent their instinctual, sensorial, affective and intellectual energies, but the false, degraded will to power materialises itself in disharmonious human beings, that is in human beings whom the development of intellectual energies is exaggerated, impeding thereby the flowing of the other energies. The men in whom is embodied the authentic will to power are complete men, "supermen". The superman represents his existence by the means of imaginative thought and mythical consciousness and creates values and culture only by their means. The values of culture produced by the superman are exclusively mythical values (authentic). Finally one must notice, says Nietzsche, that on ethical level, the superman is built up by introducing opposed attitudes into a relationship of harmonious collaboration and making them equal.

To the question about the time in which the superman live, Nietzsche should have been consistent with himself in saying that it is on the mythical time. But he considers that also in the historical time have appeared complete men, supermen. As example he cites Goethe⁵¹, first of all, and also Shakespeare ; Napoleon, Beethoven. However in the content of historical periods - says Nietzsche – the supermen are only fortunate exceptions. Only in special conditions a whole lineage can become the embodiment of a fortunate twist of fate, that is supermen⁵². Only in special conditions, that is in mythical time, the supermen can appear numerously and can constitute themselves, in social groups, collectivity, people. In fact in the mythical time the supermen form the whole of humanity.

The supermen of the mythical periods as well as the supermen of the historical periods – shows Nietzsche – are formed as harmonious totalities of the opposites. But one can ask whether beyond this similarity there is not any difference. To say the truth in order to respect to the very end, the authentic spirit of mythical thought. (So well expressed in the myth of paradise)⁵³, Nietzsche should have affirmed that between the supermen of mythical times and the supermen of historical times intervenes an enormous difference from the biologic standpoint, the first manifesting themselves

⁵¹ Le crépuscule des idoles in op.cit. Tome II pp 1021 – 23

⁵² le Gai savoir p. 58

⁵³ About the myth of paradise see Mircea Eliade, the myth of Eternal return. (Princeton university press N.Y 1971) p.121

everlastingly, meanwhile the second are mortal men. But thereupon he does not make any clarification leaving this task to his readers, his interpreters.

Behind the difference between the two species of supermen emerge in fact, the difference between two temporal forms: the mythical time and the historical time. We can now shift and see the relationship between the mythical time and the historical time. A distinction in the spirit of mythical thought, between the mythical time (sometimes named original time) and the historical time, is made in an allegorical way in Thus spoke Zarathustra (the chapter entitled *on the vision and the riddle*). The hero of the book, Zarathustra, has at a given moment, the vision of a strange entry gate named “instant” from where leads backward “a long everlasting street” and forward another “long everlasting street”, on which many things are running and are transformed themselves; we can convene easily that the entry gate “instant” represents the symbolic denomination of the ephemeral time of history, and the “long everlasting street” – the symbolic denomination of eternal time of mythical existence⁵⁴. We can say that Nietzsche has about the idea of historical time, a clear outlook which respects strictly the general conception of the specific determinations of historical time on which is based the philosophic consciousness of mythical type. But we cannot affirm the same thing about his conception of the mythical time. It is true that he suggests us to define this time as an eternal “,

⁵⁴ Ainsi parlait Zarathoustra in op.cit pp 404 - 407

atemporal” time, but he does not say anything concrete as regards the element of “eternity ” that this time contains ; we know that he defines temporality as the succession of events. The mythical outlook on the idea of time cannot however limit itself to such an explanation.

In the conception of mythical thought, “eternity ” appears once with the elimination of the process of transformation produced in man’s life ; it is previous to the phenomenon of succession of the events man goes through. As a “atemporal time”⁵⁵, the mythical time is a time in which, as is indicated by the myth of paradise, the successive evolution of the stages of human existence takes place only as far as a determined point, afterwards follows stagnation, of this existence to a biological stage (the complete man, is thus, the man who settles down to a certain stage of evolution of life and comes to live limitlessly). The determinations of the mythical time are heterogeneous. It represents that duration in which the succession of the events of human existence stops at a certain point. The mythical time can be defined but by the reunion into the same expression, of two terms of which ideatic meanings are contrary at the origin : (time and eternity). However there is again a specific note of this time: Eternity (that is the suspension of the succession of the events) is not actually eternal, because it contains in itself the possibility of its own elimination ; we don’t know how and we don’t know when, this time starts again on the route of successive running of

⁵⁵ Mircea Eliade, Aspects du mythe. Gallimard 1963 p.70

the events, covering now the way to the end, and transforming itself consequently into historical, irreversible time, in pure evolution.

As regards the problem of the determinations of the characteristics of the historical time, Nietzsche's conception coincides with that of the mythical – Archaic thought. According to this thought, living in historical time, the human being does no longer succeed to immobilize one of the stages of his evolution, and to persevere in it, rather it degrades progressively and perishes. Human life appears and disappears at every moment : it is ephemeral, passing, temporal. Its evolution is successive and continuous. The historical time – as emphasised by this doctrine – is degraded time, because its content, the human being, gradually loses its ontological solidity and finally perishes. But this time eliminates itself miraculously, at a given moment, in order to give way to the mythical time ; the ancient times – says Nietzsche – are reiterable (here we are given to understand that there is not pure historical time, but only virtual historical time).

Thus, the principle of the authentic will to power founds the mythical times in the life of humanity, creating a species of men who build themselves as harmonious totality and who live in duration and the specific rhythm of succession of a “virtually temporal” and “virtually eternal ” time. However, there is a principle of the false

degraded will to power, a principle which governs a humanity who lives in the duration and rhythm of succession specific to historical time and whose representatives do not succeed in forming themselves as harmonious totality. That degraded will to power is embodied in the humans - named the nihilists. The nihilists constitute those human types who are in direct opposition with the supermen⁵⁶. If the supermen were harmonious totalities, complete beings, unities of the opposites, the nihilists are incomplete, fragmentary beings, they no more enjoy the happiness and the completeness of a life in which the senses collaborate with the intellect and the contrary moral attitudes are equal. The reason why the nihilists manifest themselves as disharmonious personalities, stifled by internal contradictions, should be the transformation of abstract thought in main factor that coordinates their lives. This form of thought, holds Nietzsche, works in order to reduce and to degrade the instinctual, sensorial and affective energies that man possesses, and it is also this form of thought which split up its moral attitudes and introduces them into a relationship of confrontation.

Thus, in Nietzsche's conception, humanity lives through two specific forms of existence : a mythical form and a historical form. Nietzsche considers that these fundamental forms of existence are integrated in the process of evolution of a

⁵⁶ Le Crépuscule des idoles p.567

temporal cycle according to the following scheme : mythical past-historical present – mythical future. This idea is represented symbolically in the chapter on the vision and the riddle in Thus spoke Zarathustra. Here Nietzsche imagines a temporal route formed by the “ long everlasting way ” which, while going out from the “entry gate” named “instant” leads backward (mythical past) ; the entry gate itself represents the historical present, and, finally, leading forward represents the mythical future. Nietzsche adds that every one of these temporal periods and the form of life they contain repeat itself everlastingly, and return endlessly⁵⁷. The implicit idea in this affirmation is that the life of humanity flows through an infinity of temporal cycles, of the same type as those cycles aforementioned.

We recognise in Nietzsche’s thought, some of the fundamental theses of mythical thought in general : the eternal return of everything, the completeness and perfection of mythical existence, the anti-historicism. This last attribute of his thought can generate rich interpretations for, if on the one hand, it expresses the anachronism and conservatism of a philosophic outlook of the world, on the other hand it appears as the expression of a justified critical attitude before the universe of values created by some historical societies, that is western societies.

⁵⁷ Ainsi parlait Zarathoustra p.459

We can analyse now Nietzsche's ideas about the principles which have grounded the constitution of values in western historical societies.

In the historical time in the life of humanity – holds Nietzsche – the consciousness which produces values is almost in every case, a consciousness which creates, grounding itself exclusively or in the most part, on abstract, intellectual energies. The available values in the field of manifestation of history are, in the most part, abstract values. (values of which contents are formed only, or almost only with abstract determinations). In an exceptional way, within the scope of history appear also values of mythical nature, values inspired by the principles of mythical imaginative thought. However, these values cannot influence the whole life of humanity who lives in this period of time. The behaviour of the historical man is determined by the abstract values. From the complex of these values, those which have strongly influenced the attitude and behaviour of the historical man are religion (abstract), metaphysics (abstract) and ethics (abstract), a lesser influence but not inconsiderable role has been played as this regards abstract moralising science and art.

Nietzsche contends that most of the abstract values have appeared in the historical time previous to the historical period of his life time in this latter historical period, the abstract values are constituted by chance. The period of his life – time

should be dominated, in fact, by an annihilating consciousness of values and not by a consciousness creative of values.

Thus, in Nietzsche's conception, the abstract values are values with a content exclusively or in the most part formed by abstract determinations, are values which do not incorporate sensible determinations or which only incorporate sham of sensible determinations. By refusing to assimilate in depth a part of the energies of life (sensible energies), the abstract values, holds Nietzsche, become the adversaries of life as a structure which ties together in the same whole, and at the level of the essence, sensible determinations with supra-sensible determinations. Therefore, Nietzsche named them nihilistic values.

The aforementioned values are, nevertheless, only expressions of a moderate nihilist consciousness, of a consciousness which does not depreciate human existence in the whole, but rather only in the sphere of its sensible attributes. Moreover, if we realise that this nihilist consciousness appraises the supra-sensible ideal contents of this existence, and sees in them the manifestations of its supreme qualities, we should say that Nietzsche makes us understand that the respective nihilist consciousness is, in fact a partially affirmative consciousness. However, we meet another form of nihilism, an extreme form which negates life in its totality, and

considers it as devoid of any sense. This nihilism actively works to destroy all the values of culture and civilisation already constituted, without replacing them with other values and ends by destroying itself⁵⁸. This form of nihilism appears only in a later time of history and Nietzsche holds that it is characteristic only of his life-time⁵⁹. This appears at a critical time of human consciousness, a time in which the consciousness creative of values is eclipsed (the values available now are few and are even servile imitations of ancient values, they are but existential structures devoid of originality) and is now replaced by an extremist critical consciousness, which proclaims the "death" of every value (and first of all the religious values, of God) and which confines man in the circle of negativist attitudes, changing him this way into a mere anti-establishment protester.

The vehement criticism of some historical societies is considered by Nietzsche as a spiritual operation fully justified by the high abstraction without efficiency of the principles of which is inspired the table of values. To maintain oneself in these values amounts to losing oneself in the absurd, the nonsense of history. In order to recuperate the positive energies of life and its higher significance, we must overtake history so as to step into another form of existence, the mythical existence, and to build up a new table of values governed by the principles of mythical thought.

⁵⁸ La volonté de puissance pp 39 – 40

⁵⁹ *ibid* p. 231

Humanity who destroys the old table of values and builds up new ones fed by the ideals of mythical thought, represents a human species superior as compared with the species of historical man ; it consecrates the appearance, or better said the reappearance of the superman. Nietzsche gives us to understand that the superman of the future will achieve the highest level of human consciousness of power, of existence. Thus the superman of future will realise a clearer and more encompassing outlook of existence, than the one of the superman of the past. However, either in the prehistoric time or in the posthistoric time the superman remains essentially the same, that is, he is a God- Man, or a man who has become a kind of God, not by overtaking his natural condition to the benefit of supra-natural condition, but rather by sacralising his own vital energies or in an other word, by the discovery of the valuable possibilities of his vital energies in such a way that the contrary determinations merge together and become equal in the same totality, and by transforming these possibilities in actual realities of his personality.

In creating the symbol of the superman, Nietzsche wanted to underline the urgent necessity which lays before humanity, that of overtaking a form of existence (identified with history) dominated by abstracts, supra-sensible principles, to the benefit of a form of existence which should have actual contact with the sensible values of life.

We find in Nietzsche a permanent endeavour to open his philosophy to the requirements of the concrete. However, we cannot say that he has achieved his goal. He does not offer any pragmatic solution in order to transcend the social structures of his life-time, to the benefit of higher comforting social structure, the superman is, nevertheless, a comforting fiction, an optimistic symbol and nothing more. To be sure, Nietzsche strongly believes that in an undetermined future, man created by history will disappear and will be replaced by the superman, but as for now he does not envision the possibility of such an evolution of the human species.

CODESRIA - LIBRARY

CHAPTER THREE

The significance of Nietzsche's metaphysics

Metaphysics and existence

Nietzsche's metaphysics is a metaphysics of immanence : it makes the ultimate principle of the things reside inside them and not outside them. In Nietzsche's conception, natural existence in its totality (nature in the broad sense of the term) is not "laid down", created, determined by a supranatural principle (by a prime mover, or by an organising intelligence for instance) ; but rather it is its own cause, its own principle ; it creates itself as a system of relationships between contrary contents or more exactly said, as a totality of such systems which reiterate themselves endlessly, respecting mainly, their particular characteristics. In the composition of each natural configuration enter as element with (contrary determinations the material sensible, visible contents and the ideal, supra-sensible, invisible contents. The supra-sensible determinations constitute the active principles of the systems, values of power which "attract", but the sensible determinations are the passive principles, values of power which "are felt attracted"¹ or better said, the supra-sensible determinations represent the most active principles of the system, but its sensible principles are less active

¹ Nietzsche F. commented by Frateanu V. in Din istoria gindirii mitice P.99.

because in the latter even if they have not the capacity to attract and to assimilate, are not none the less, absolutely passive principles, but rather material structures endowed with somewhat internal excitability or, put in other terms the values of power which contain in themselves the force to surrender themselves to the supra-sensible contents in order to be assimilated and transformed by these latter². Each natural configuration presents itself, thus in Nietzsche's conception as a unity composed with sensible and supra-sensible determinations, both types of determinations are developed by virtue of a more or less intense self-dynamism.

Moreover, after the interactions of these forces, each natural configuration becomes a beneficiary of a perspectivist outlook on the surrounding reality, thus of the property to "perceive", to "represent", to reproduce from its own point of view and in a more or less precise and adequate way this reality³. Nietzsche shows that representations which appear only at the level of human life and are the direct consequences of their conscious performances, but also the non human forms of the inorganic and the configurations of the organic dispose the capacity to reflect some "perceptions". Some primitive, elementary representations.

² As we have seen, Nietzsche is of the opinion that this force can even eliminate, little by little, the sensible determinations from the scene of knowledge, instituting the domination of abstract thought.

³ Nietzsche F. Gai savoir in œuvres complètes Tomell P.245

Existence on the whole does not know only a simple modality of objectification of the activities of the sensible and supra-sensible forces. One can number three fundamental forms of objectification of these activities. One form is characteristic to inorganic nature, the other to organic nature (taken in the restricted sense of the term, that is the totality of non human organic beings), and the third one for human existence. Within the scope of the first natural system, the sensible forces and the supra-sensible forces are laid as some potential opposites, thus as forces which, though they have a different content do not act in fact, as different elements, but rather as complementary elements of a harmonious whole. Within the scope of organic nature, however, these forces come to lay themselves as some real opposites, so as some contents which do not know only a mere differentiation between them, but also-even if it is not as something permanent,-struggle, opposition, internal confrontation. Just as real opposites these forces also behave within human existence ; but if at the level of organic nature (taken in a restricted sense of the term) they manifest themselves only as unconscious phenomena, at the level of human life, they manifest themselves as conscious phenomena (supra-sensible elements in their totality, but sensible elements only partially).

The number and complexity of the relationships established between the sensible components and those supra-sensible of the forms of existence cause the quantitative variation of the "perceptions", "representations", by which these forms seize the external reality ; their increase determines the increase of the number of "perceptions" "representations" but their drop determines the drop of their number.

There is, however, also a borderline case, when the number of these relationships have become equal with zero : the representations are, in this case the results of the activities of some faculties supra-sensible par excellence. The formations of these representations are not achieved however at once, but rather during a long time, during the course of which the supra-sensible determinations have succeeded in annihilating, gradually the value of "knowledge" of the sensible determinations and in imposing finally abstract knowledge as the new modality of knowledge in the general history of knowledge.

Let us see now from the viewpoint of quantitative variation, of the representations, how behave the great system of existence. Inorganic nature has at its disposal, a limited number of perceptions, its optic of perception is as a consequence rigid, schematic.⁴ Organic nature (taken in the restricted sense of the term has at its disposal a greater number of perceptions, representations ; its optic of

perception is mobile, flexible, dynamic. Finally, human existence can have at its disposal either a very great number, (practically unlimited) of "representations" (fundamental and non fundamental), or a little number of fundamental representations.

In the first case, it is an existence of mythical type.(an existence governed by the principle of imaginative thought and mythical consciousness), while in the second case, it is an existence of historical type.(an existence governed by abstract thought, an existence which only uses these principles with the aim of achieving a global knowledge of the external world). We can rightly say that the perspectivist outlook of man (in fact the superman) who lives within the scope of the first type of existence is a mobile, fluid dynamic outlook while that of the man who lives within the second type of existence is (because of the little number of fundamental representations by which it seizes the external world) a fixist, rigid and schematic outlook⁴.

The differences between these three categories of natural systems do not matter, what matters is their similarities. All the three entities which contain sensible and supra-sensible determinations and have at their disposal the capacity to represent for themselves the components of the external reality to them. Considered through this prism the three categories of natural systems, and the individual forms of existence which are specific to them are configurations which are identical to one another. The

4) ⁴ Nietzsche F. quoted by Frateanu V. in op. cit P. 101

conclusion from this is that existence in its whole can be defined as a vast totality encompassing numerous individual entities which tie each of them together. The determinations of sensible nature with the determinations of supra-sensible nature, contents of material nature with content of ideal nature and benefits, as a consequence of their interactions, the possibility to seize external reality by the means of "perceptions" "representations". To this main idea, Nietzsche also adds the precision that this vast totality transforms itself, and adapts itself in the framework given by a circular time. This way is cristalised in Nietzsche's philosophic outlook on the ultimate principle of the things. This principle can be formulated again this way : *Existence is a process structuration of sensible and supra-sensible determinations in uniting totalities which appear and disappear periodically, which are absorbed in the flux of an everlasting circularity .*

As regards the method Nietzsche uses in order to come about the formulation of this principle, he proceeds, as has been rightly observed by Heidegger, in the spirit of Descartes, the father of modern metaphysics, taking as lead of his speculation the human subject and designating this latter as ideal measure, as regards the act of representation for any other "natural existence"⁵. There is however an important difference between Descartes and Nietzsche, as has been shown by Heidegger.

⁵ We think that it is not devoid of interest to pay attention to the interpretations given by Heidegger to modern metaphysics (particularly the Cartesian metaphysics) and to the comparison he makes between Descartes and Nietzsche

Nietzsche conceives the human subject as absolutely free and independent ; non conditioned by a divine being. (according to him such a being does not exist), meanwhile, Descartes subordinates the human being to divinity) and affirms that by the clear and distinct ideas about existence he acquires, man (finite being) takes part in the perfection which is embodied by God, infinite being. By raising the human subject to the rank of a subject absolutely free and independent and human subjectivity to the rank of an unconditioned subjectivity, Nietzsche comes in fact as has been shown by the same Heidegger in continuation with the Hegelian metaphysical interpretation. Hegel -says Heidegger- is the first who has transformed human subjectivity into an unconditioned subjectivity, removing it from the tutelage of the divine and placing it into a context with par excellence lay significances. According to Heidegger, Hegel should have interpreted unconditioned subjectivity as reason -but not as "absolute" reason, as abstract "spirit but rather as unity between rational" knowledge and will -as possibility of representation unconditioned by any divine being and as self creation, self-appearance, self-development, and in this understanding, Hegel should have confirmed it afterwards as ideal measure of every natural existence⁶ But what are the fundamental attributes of the human subject and of subjectivity in the conception of Nietzsche ? Heidegger, for example, contends that in

⁶ Heidegger commented by Fratenu V. in op. cit P. 104

Nietzsche's outlook, the fundamental energies of man should be the instincts and the affects and that the self-creation of human being as will to power should equal the transformation of the body in its main vital value and with the unlimited bubbling of the instincts and the affects. This is without any doubt, a contestable viewpoint. The truth, as we have shown, is that in Nietzsche's conception, the complete existential state of man (which is at the same time his original state) equals a state in which is realised a harmonious collaboration between body and soul, between the corporal energies and the energies of the soul. The collaboration between the corporal-energies and these of the soul is, in his interpretation, a sine qua non condition for the realisation of a knowledge from the mythico-imaginative perspective of existence. To be sure, this knowledge is produced in the innermost life of the soul and afterwards it uses the elements made conscious ; but a part of the elements made conscious is nothing but sensible corporal phenomena but corporal state on which is projected the light of consciousness and therefore they can be named corporal energies. The concrete result of the cooperation between sensible factors and those corporal energies which are the testimony (made conscious) of the senses and those supra-sensible factors of the soul, which are the operating forms of the creative intellect, which aims at overtaking the present world, (Historical world) to the benefit of a better world, is the

appearance of imaginative thought (authentic) and of the representations (authentic) in which it is objectified. The main element of mythico-imaginative knowledge is constituted by imaginative thought. In order to become complete, mythico-imaginative knowledge claims, however the realisation of a collaboration between affectivity and imaginative thought ; the realisation of this collaboration determines the formation of the so-called multi-perspectivist outlook on existence. The formation of the affect is due, especially, to affectivity, which is an uninterrupted flux of opposing states. To be noticed, that one of the aforementioned factors of cooperation, affectivity can be characterised as sensible factor. Imaginative thought, says Nietzsche, is not a pure supra-sensible thought, because there is a need to appeal, for its self-expression, to some sensorial mechanism, but it could be defined nevertheless -as a faculty of supra-sensible nature in its essence, because its motive is constituted by the projection into ideal, into supra-sensible, into supra-historic. But not every man is able to attain the requirements of the knowledge of a mythical type. These requirements can only be attained by the complete man, that is the superman, only by the individual who is an embodiment of the authentic will to power.

However, there is also another type of man, says Nietzsche, the decadent man, the man who is an embodiment of the degraded will to power and a kid of history. This

kind of man appropriates existence as totality by the means of the non-authentic representations (fictions) of the concepts, of the abstract ideas. The supra-sensible and intellectual faculties of the consciousness of the decadent man have forgotten - holds Nietzsche - the testimonies of the senses and have encysted in themselves failing this way any possibility to realise an authentic representation of existence as totality. The domination of abstract thought has, afterwards, as consequence, the decrease of the displayed power and of the role played in the life of man by the constellation of the affective states, whence the impossibility that the individual whose main faculty of the soul has become abstract thought, should acquire a multi-perspectivist outlook on existence : his outlook is a concretised, a limited, rigid, schematic perspectivist outlook. It is interesting to show that by putting sometimes in equals terms the body and the area of sensible in human existence, and on equal terms the soul and the area of supra-sensible of this existence (operation which comes however in contradiction with the true spirit of his thought), Nietzsche concludes that in his activity of knowledge, the man of the historical time has forgotten the body and takes into account only the soul.

Beyond, however, these aforementioned differences the two human types have the following common fundamental attributes :

1. They tie together in the content of their life the sensible elements with the supra-sensible elements, the material determinations with the ideal determinations;
2. The specific factor of their life is the activity of consciousness ;
3. The appropriation, the knowledge of existence is achieved by the means of some perceptions, some images, some representations.

Nietzsche interprets afterwards, natural non human existence from the perspective of the analysis he started on human existence, extrapolating the first and the third feature of this latter (in general) to the whole of that natural existence ; but the second attribute, characteristic of human life (activity of consciousness) is deemed to be a property specific to the human form of existence. All the configurations natural existence should have, this way, in common with man, two main characteristics : the capacity of structuring into a system, of some material and ideal, sensible and supra-sensible contents, and the capacity of representation (perception of the external world). Nietzsche states that these attributes, benefits not only the organic nature, but also the inorganic nature, and in order to bring out this idea, which derives from an animist conception of the universe, Nietzsche uses a paradoxical expression in saying that in fact an inorganic world does not exist but rather an organic world⁷ . It is not devoid of interest to show that in the differentiation made between inorganic nature

⁷ Ibid P. 108

and organic nature, Nietzsche is somewhat led by the dissociation previously formulated between the two human types, attributing this way to the natural organic configurations -by analogy with the specific qualities of the life of the soul of the superman, the capacity to have at their disposal a perspectivist, mobile, fluid, dynamic outlook on the same reality.

Finally, we should ask again a question : if the idea of circular time, of eternal return, which shows us the form of temporalisation of the content of existence in its whole, is brought out to Nietzsche in the same way as an attribute which refers first of all to the life of man and which is extrapolated, afterwards, from this sphere, to the sphere of natural existence. Judging according to the comment, devoted exclusively to this index, it is more difficult to establish the truth (Nietzsche does not make any precision thereabout), but in associating them with a part of his reflections about the concept of time in general, it is gradually brought out.

Nietzsche affirms that our idea about the totality of the temporal forms of existence has their foundation in our conception about human time⁸, whence it clearly results that the German philosopher has proceeded first in the converse sense of the archaic thought which starts from the observations made about the specific rhythms of

⁸ Nietzsche F. par delà le bien et le mal. In œuvres complètes Tome II P.578

the natural cycles-using the data which can be provided to him, according to his belief, by the process of evolution of human species in its whole.

Nietzschean metaphysics investigates, thus the essential structures of natural existence through the prism of the essential structures of the human subject and of his subjectivity. In Nietzsche's conception the main determinations of the human subject (except consciousness) should be like the main determinations of nature. This whole focus of metaphysical preoccupations of Nietzsche on some main aspects of the activities of the human subject and their later extrapolation on the aspects of natural configurations seems to constitute the residues of a psychologist understanding of existence ; but that is a mere appearance. In its pure expression, the psychologist understanding is that which transforms the things, the objects in mere projections or symbols of our spiritual states. Nietzsche does not accept, however, such a proceeding : in his conception, the objects have an ontic-consistency, they exist in and by themselves. Without any doubt, the object is given as form exclusively structured by the subject, but this idea does not mean that the object is an existential creation of the subject.

Nevertheless we can talk about the existence of a psychologic outlook (in another sense) in Nietzsche's philosophy. We could even name his philosophy a

somewhat paradoxical formulation, psychologic metaphysics. That amounts to saying that existence in its whole is analysed by Nietzsche from a subjective perspective and that the processes characteristic of the natural configurations are interpreted by him through the prism of the psychical activities, specific to the human subject, and by analogy with them. As I have previously said, the formula psychologic metaphysics applied to Nietzsche's philosophy is apparently paradoxical, because in Nietzsche's conception there is not any contradiction in essence, between metaphysics and psychology, the latter only designates a particular area of the first "science" as theory of the will to power reflected in the sphere of human life⁹. According to him psychology is thus identified, in the last analysis with a metaphysics of human existence. In the light of the above mentioned ideas, our affirmation that Nietzsche's metaphysics is a psychologic metaphysics could be reformulated as follows : *Nietzsche's metaphysics, as philosophic discipline of which aim is to grasp the ultimate principles of existence in its whole, is founded on the metaphysics of human existence, as philosophic discipline of which the final aim is the discovery of the essences of human existence.*

In analysing Nietzschean metaphysics we have discovered, thus, that it can be designated as metaphysics of immanence, and psychologic. But it can also be

⁹ Nietzsche F. commented by Frateanu V. In op cit P. 109

characterised in another way : as monism more exactly, Nietzsche's metaphysics as we know it from the works of maturity, can be characterised as monism, because, as we have shown, one of his main ideas stipulates that existence in its whole (nature and human life) is determined by a single principle, but which Nietzsche himself named the principle of the will to power). Nietzschean monism can be afterwards defined as a monism with spiritualist tendencies, because it includes that the "being", "the essence" or the "substance" of this single principle and of the existence as its objectified expression is of spiritual nature. The substance of the will to power or of the existence as will to power is -says Nietzsche- its inner will¹⁰, that its supra-sensible energy, its immaterial content. The German philosopher vehemently fights against the thesis that matter should constitute the substratum of existence. The foundation of existence -he specifies- is energy (in the sense of immaterial, supra-sensible energy¹¹).

Despite all this, Nietzsche's philosophy cannot be characterised as pure spiritualist monism. In order for his philosophy to be designated by this term, Nietzsche should need to discover in the spiritual principle of existence the creative factor of existence. But he did not proceed in this way ; in his conception, the will to power or existence as expression of the will to power represents a totality in which the ideal and the material are self-constituted in the same time. It can even be objected to us that by changing

¹⁰ Nietzsche F. quoted by Frateanu v. in op cit. P. 110

¹¹ Nietzsche F. quoted by Frateanu v. in op cit. P. 111

the will to power, into a totality composed of two kinds of contents, Nietzsche falls into dualism. Such an idea cannot however be contended, because Nietzsche does not define matter or spirit as two principles or two irreconcilable substances. We have to notice here that the Cartesian concept of matter as corporal substance opposed to the spiritual substance, that is *Res extensa* opposed to *Res cogitans*, Nietzsche says that it is pure subjective fiction¹². Therefore, according to him matter and spirit are two different aspects of one and the same principle, of one and the same universal substance- the will to power (these two aspects should be present in each existential configuration in which this principle is objectified in which this principle is particularised). On the other hand however, as we have shown, Nietzsche does not consider that the material component of the will to power should be derived from the spiritual principle, this is the reason why we cannot characterise his metaphysics with the terms of pure spiritualist monism. Nevertheless he specifies that immaterial energy constitutes the coordinating and leading force of the will to power (will which encompasses beside this, also a material content) and, thus, for the aforementioned cause, we must see in his thought a monist thought with spiritualist tendencies.

Finally, there is again another problem we need to clarify : what is the determinative factor of the very process of meditation in Nietzschean metaphysical

¹² Ibid P. 111

thought? Heidegger is of the opinion that the instinct and the affect, that is irrational factors in the life of the human subject become the motive of Nietzschean metaphysical speculation, reason being transformed in this case into a faculty with secondary role and with functions of lesser importance¹³. Without any doubt Heidegger has missed the point. The truth is that Nietzsche attempts to put at the basis of his philosophic meditations the principle of cooperation between the rational, sensorial, and affective faculties of the human subject. Because he changes imaginative thought and mythical consciousness into creative factors of his outlook on the world, we can say that he succeeded in his attempt. Nietzsche as metaphysician does not operate with abstract concepts, but rather with image-concepts, with myths (authentic). We must notice afterwards, that he does not pretend to discover the ultimate truths of the world, rather he just assesses the ideas to which he attains as only mere hypothesis presuppositions, fictions. This way is designated the idea of will to power¹⁴ and the same way we are suggested to understand even the idea of eternal return, of circular time, since it is affirmed that the concept of time in general is nothing but a representation (a fiction) of our consciousness¹⁵.

Of the characteristic aspects of Nietzsche's metaphysics, there are two which seem to assure its pronounced notes of originality and as such deserve to be

¹³ Heidegger considers that by proceeding in this way, Nietzsche has carried out an act of up setting of the traditional positions of metaphysics, in short he aimed at bringing to an end, the ancient metaphysics.

¹⁴ Nietzsche F. *Par delà le bien et le mal* op. cit. P. 592

¹⁵ Nietzsche F. Frateanu V. op. cit. P. 112

developed in detail :that is Nietzschean metaphysics as metaphysics (above all things) of human existence, and Nietzsche's metaphysics as a mythico-imaginative metaphysics.

The main problem which Nietzsche attempts to solve in his metaphysics is the relationship between myth and history. We have already seen the mode in which he interprets this relationship in a previous chapter, here however we take up the subject in order to make a more detailed analysis of it, so as to bring out the most general and systematic conclusions.

Nietzsche starts from the observation that the world contemporary to him, the historical present is an imperfect elaboration of life, whence the necessity to replace them with other existential moulds. The period contemporary to him -he holds- suffers from a sickness provoked by the exaggerated interest in the historical outlook on existence.

«The excess of history has attacked the plastic power of life¹⁶».

A new sense, the sense of history, should dominate the consciousness of contemporary man. This state of affair is deemed by Nietzsche to be an impetus towards destruction, towards annihilation, a refusal to look forwards to the future, a decisive "no" to the impulse of edification. In short it is a principle of negation. Other

¹⁶ Nietzsche F. considérations inactuelles. In œuvres complètes Tome I P. 280

penetrating characterisations about this topic can be found in Untimely Reflections and in Of the use and Disadvantage of history.

To make the point, we can say that, due to the analytic illness of which it is possessed, the historical sense pulverises every possible understanding of life as totality : it removes from man the precious support of the instincts and of the illusions, without which it is impossible to realise a constructive inveiglement of life, and lead him to a state of disgust, it favours the appearance of an artificial culture, a culture which has no longer any content or almost any contact with the sensible values of life ; it overcomes us with the chaotic mixture of styles (between which, very often, we cannot establish any dialogue) and open the way to barbarity and epigonism ; historical sense, historical education promotes the type of cultural philistinism, which represents a true parody of the authentic man of culture. But Nietzsche does not attack only the historical sense (which is, in the last analysis, nothing but the creation of the XIX^e century), but also human history in general on the ground that it is the expression of the absurd, a symbol of nothingness. *Historia in nuce* (shortened history) appears to him as an action directed by the non-sense¹⁷. Nietzsche affirms that what has borne until now the name of history is the embodiment of chance and non-sense¹⁸. Time should have come that we should put an end once for ever, to the

¹⁷ Nietzsche F. Humain trop Humain in œuvres complètes Tome I P. 712

¹⁸ Nietzsche F. par delà le bien et le mal in op. cit P. 647

reign of history as expression of the absurd, time should have come that man should become master of his own fate and should direct his will towards an ennobling-goal-the edification of the future¹⁹.

Nietzsche wants to overtake history as non-sense to the benefit of a form of existence motivated by the idea of self-edification as something complete and right²⁰, as harmony between thought, sensibility and will²¹, as a harmonious totality comparable with a work of art²², thus to the benefit of mythical existence.

We have to notice the fact that Nietzsche does not point out in a clear way that this new form of existence can be constituted only through a radical transcendence of history. Sometimes, we tends to believe that it could spring out even within its scope, event which should coincide with the transformation of history as non-sense, into history as sense, history as form of life permanently fed with the belief in its possibility of perfection and even of completion. This idea appear, sometimes also in his works of youth, but it is more evident in his works of maturity²³. This modification of shade must be put in relationship with the new interpretation which Nietzsche gives to activist senses of history as expression of non-sense and absurd. As has been rightly observed by Karl Schechta, "if until 1875, Nietzsche has negated history, more precisely history for the sake of history, historicism, on the ground that it is the

¹⁹ Ibid

²⁰ Nietzsche F. Considérations inactuelles in op. cit. P. 281

²¹ Ibid P. 283

²² Ibid P. 280

²³ Ibid P. 282

manifestation of a nihilistic attitude before life, starting from 1876, he approves of it just because of that specific feature : From now on, he believes that history could lead us towards a generalised nihilism, which appears to him as a necessary datum for the new beginning of humanity which he envisions²⁴"

In the 1886 preface of Human, All Too Human vol II, Nietzsche makes a direct reference to the critical way he understood "historical sickness" in Untimely Reflections, "historical sickness", and he remarked afterwards in his later evolution he did not want at all to renounce history, because he formerly suffered from it²⁵. But in the Gay Science he termed "historical sense" as one of the most brilliant aptitudes of modern man (a kind of strange sickness and virtue tied together.), able to pre-dispose us for something absolutely new and strange in history²⁶.

The main problem which is posed now is to know what represents in Nietzsche's conception this new period in the life of humanity. According to him it names a form of existence in which history is revealed as history animated by the immutable belief in the possibilities of human kind to act in order to its self completion. This new beginning in the life of humanity will bring with it a feeling of particular excitement, a happiness which man has never enjoyed until now. A happiness of a God full of power and love, full of tears and laughs²⁷. Nevertheless as it results from

²⁴ Schehta Karl. Le cas Nietzsche. Trans. By André Cocuroy (Gallimard 1960) P.82

²⁵ Nietzsche F. Humain trop Humain. In op. cit. Tome II P. 82

²⁶ Nietzsche F. Gai savoir op. cit. P. 198

²⁷ Nietzsche F. in Frateanu V. P. 115

other Nietzschean reflections, the self realisation of history under the form of history as sense does not appear only as a possibility of future, but rather as an achievement of the past :

History previous to history, led by the vertigo of non sense, "the main history", original of humanity was -says Nietzsche- a time dominated by the unlimited belief in the creative value of the energies of life²⁸ " therefore history as a manifestation of some existential superior significance's should be a previous stage of the history as expression of non-sense, of absurd.

The expression of history as manifestation of superior existential significance is nothing however, but a metaphoric expression of the mythical period in the life of humanity. This conclusion can be drawn if we take into account the fact that Nietzsche understands sometimes by the aforementioned concept of history one and the same thing with what he understands formerly, by the concept of "original time", of "prehistoric time²⁹", mythical time.

The absolute superiority of the mythical period in the life of humanity is explained, according to Nietzsche by the fact that within its scope man should have succeeded in forming himself as a totality in which the unconscious energies and the conscious energies cooperate in a harmonious way. The particular quality of the form

²⁸ Ibid

²⁹ Ibid P 116

of knowledge by which man of this period of time becomes master of the existence (the objectified form in the so called authentic fictions) is a direct consequence of the environment he has constituted to himself as such a totality.

In the conception of the German thinker, human existence developed under the sign of the myth is an intermediary phenomenon between the life of bovine nature and the existence of historical civilisation : if the life of bovine nature is dominated by unconscious energies, and historical existence is dominated by abstract rational energies of unconsciousness, human existence of mythical type is characterised by the permanent endeavour that it makes in order to tie together into a harmonious totality the unconscious energies with the conscious energies or more precisely put, the sensible determinations with the intellectual determinations. From a chronologic viewpoint, mythical existence should be a previous stage of history as well as a later stage of history. The historical period -holds Nietzsche- has appeared throughout a process of degrading of the principles of mythical existence, and of unbalance of the relationship between its fundamental components. History is nothing but a pale shadow, a negative copy of the mythical time in the life of humanity. Within its scope, the rational values were separated from the sensible values (made conscious or not)

and have monopolised the whole field of manifestation of human life, coming to filter in the innermost of the sensible values and to degrade them.

The task that lays before humanity of the historical period should be that of transcending this period to the benefit of a period governed by the mythical principles. The mythical future, holds Nietzsche, will recuperate the fundamental structures of the mythical past, of the primordial times ; to be sure, it will be different, in many regards, from the mythical past (for example the consciousness of the man who will live in this time will benefit a philosophic perspective, more encompassing than that of the man who lived in the primordial times), but his requirements will coincide with the requirements of the latter. The life of man is in this way adequate with the framework of the future. But this very evolution, despite all its important moments (that is the mythical past, the ephemeral present of history and the mythical future) repeats itself *ad infinitum*. Thus, according to Nietzsche, the time in which is projected human existence is to be imagined first of all as describing a circular motion. But Nietzsche does not content himself with this idea, since he suggests to us that circular time encompasses an infinity of times which we can name parabolic, an infinity of times about which we could say that they move on parabolic line. The central idea of Nietzschean philosophic anthropology, the axiologic superiority of the mythical period

in the life of humanity -can be verified in another way, that is by the analysis of the metaphysical principles, around which Nietzsche focuses his speculation, as myths, symbolic images of existence. The Nietzschean myths represent in a symbolic way, two different ontologic areas, two different forms of existence, that is the world of history and the world of suprahistory, and he proposes to us as superior patterns of life the latter. In order to reflect the relationships between the two worlds and to convey their significances, the Nietzschean myths use, as we shall see, many forms of expression.

Before we go on to the analysis of the modalities in which these ideals are objectified at the level of language, , we shall reveal more precisely the intrinsic symbolism of the Dyonisian, Apollinian and tragic myths, without referring to their philosophic hypostases. (that is, to their mythico -conceptual structures set up in the Nietzschean philosophic discourse), but only to their artistic variations. That is to what Nietzsche names Dionysian music, Apollinian paint and Aeschilean and Sophoclean tragedy, because on the way of the critico-aesthetic comment he devotes to the mythical typologies, the German philosopher attains the performance to illustrate this symbolism in the most blatant way or rather he gives us the opportunity to make it in a transparent way in our own consciousness.

Artistic hypostases of Metaphysics

We shall now analyse the modalities in which the problematics of the relationships between history and suprahistory, as it is treated in the perspective of mythical thought, is reflected at the level of the language, at the level of the formal structures of the Dionysian music, Apollinian paint, and Aeschylean and Sophoclean tragedy.

Dionysian music, holds Nietzsche, ties together in a whole, the fratricidal violence of the tones with their harmony, the dissonance of the sound system with its consonance. It has the necessary force to tie together the contradictory elements of the sound language (which is an abstract non figurative language) in two different ways : by underlying on the one hand the disagreement between them and by evoking on the other hand their process of totalisation and reunification. In the whole of musical structure, the main role is played by the second relationship. The final impression Dionysian music gives us is that the brutal dissonance was absorbed into a superior harmony. Having in mind the characteristics of mythical thought, we can hold now easily -by making this way explicit an idea which appears in Nietzsche only implicitly- that the first sound structure, which is developed on the background of violent collisions of the contradictory elements of musical grammar, functions as a kind

of abstract symbol, non-figurative sign of historical world, but the second sound structure, which does away with the tragic struggle between the opposites, tying them together into a configuration governed by the principles of cooperation and harmony (which finally is imposed to the listener) constitutes the abstract symbol, the non-figurative sign of the suprahistorical world. (together, these symbols constitute a global symbol, which is a musical equivalence for the totality of existence).

This analogy also determines the formation of the system of symbolic images of the paint of Apollinian type. The example given by Nietzsche is that of a painting by Raphael (Transfiguration) in Daybreak. Nietzsche discovers in this painting the symbolic presence of two different ontologic areas : a inferior world macerated with the endless trial of sufferings, and a superior world, in which the dissonances are removed and absorbed into a harmonious totality. The inferior form of existence (the universe of history) as well as the superior form of existence (the universe of suprahistory)³⁰ are evoked by the means of figurative symbols ; the scene (of the lower part of the painting) with a child possessed, the parents despaired and the apostles powerless represent the symbolic correspondence of the world of history (the world dominated by the opposition and the struggle between different qualitative structures of life), but the scene (of the higher part of the painting) which shows us Christ, Moses and Elia

³⁰ In the passages reserved to the comment of this picture, Nietzsche does not specify that the inferior world is equivalent with the world of history, and the superior world with the world of supra-history.

floating and wrapped into a celestial light, above the earth, constitutes the symbolic correspondence of the principle of the realisation of full harmony between things.

The problematics of the relationship history -suprahistory is also transformed in the system of symbols of Aeschilean and Sophoclean tragedy. These forms of tragic works represent the historical existence (the inferior world) in concrete painting, in epic scenes (figurative symbols) and contain suprahistorical existence (superior world), particularly by the means of music, into an abstract non figurative symbol, which the spectator seizes at the ending of the dramatic act.

The same problematics is also conveyed by the main symbol in which is embodied the Zarathustran (the myth) principle the symbol of the superman. This symbol is built on the ground of a synecdocic relation. The superman designates first of all the superior being who lives within the scope of suprahistory, his qualities, his attributes (as they appear in Nietzsche's comment) compel us to make, however a comparison (which Nietzsche actually did) between him and that lesser perfect being who is man and who represents, in his conception, the symbol of history. The symbol of history the superman refers thus, simultaneously to two existential structures. One can easily observe that in order to show the significances and the main contents of these structures, Nietzsche uses a more particular expression than the one which

should be truly adequate and which need to have a more general character ; it has chosen, however, just in order to underline the necessity of overtaking history to the benefit of a superior reality (the mythical reality) one of the central ideas of his philosophic anthropology.

A particular case is that of the Socratic principle. This principle, shows Nietzsche, can be objectified in some spiritual, creations, some symbolic representations which receive the plastico -imaginative form of the authentic myths, but which are different from them, from the viewpoint of content, of the general conception about the world.

As significant examples in this sense, Nietzsche cites the cases of Euripidean tragedies and of opera. The Euripidean tragedy and opera should be characterised by the praise adduced to history as form of life in which can be realised the elimination of the contrary existential determinations and the reunion of the homogenous existential structures (the only which have remained after the elimination) into a paradisiacal universe, into an idyllic entity, to be sure, adds Nietzsche, the Euripidean tragedy and the opera do not forget to show us the fact that history can be manifested also as a process of struggles between the opposites, but they present us this process as being a phenomenon of alteration, of degrading of its authentic spirit, that man could cancel

in anytime, and easily opening therefore the way to the reconstruction of history in the direction of its main principles, thus as a paradisiacal form of life.

The philosophic perspective on the world which offers to us the Euripidean tragedy coincides, however, perfectly with that which opera offers to us. This latter adduces with it an element new in conception, as a result of the process of mystification of one of the fundamental ideas of the mythical outlook on life. To be sure, the creator of opera believes, with force, that has existed a prehistorical period in the life of humanity, but he represents it as a paradisiacal universe, as a universe from which the tensions, the oppositions, and struggles have purely and simply disappeared and we are given to understand afterwards, that its fundamental principles are perpetuated also in the historical times in the life of humanity, forming the determinative factors of the objectification of history as a superior form of life.

Another problem which needs to be discussed in an analytic way is that of the spiritual faculties which play the functions of foundation and guide to the Nietzschean meditations. As we have already shown, Nietzsche himself recognises in imaginative thought and mythical consciousness the generating factors of his speculation. In which ideatic context comes Nietzsche to designate imaginative thought and mythical consciousness as central metaphysical functions ? The moment of genetic explosion,

so to speak, of this idea, is prepared on the one hand, by the polemic against platonic metaphysics, and on the other hand, by the positive interpretation given to platonic "physics". As we have shown very often, Nietzsche negates the functionality of Platonic metaphysics as a metaphysics of transcendence and as rationalist metaphysics. In his conception, the object that Platonic metaphysics, as science of a pure reason, designates as fundamental element of its project of research, is an unreal object, a "devised" object. A nothingness : the idea of a suprasensible world immaculate world (of the being), of a world which encompasses in its content absolutely not a single sensible determination is -he says- a false idea. Platonic metaphysics, concludes Nietzsche, is an unwarranted and barren idea.

About Platonic "physics" however he emits only laudative considerations. He notices, this way, in an eulogistic way, the positive role which Plato ascribes to "authentic lie" in the process of appropriation of reality by man³¹. Referring to the "authentic lie" and its valorisation by Plato, Nietzsche does not adduce extra precisions in this context, but it is evident that he hints to the idea of Plato, which constitutes the basic principle of his physics, that human beings can represent to him the sensible universe (whatever becomes sensible and has a body) only by the means

³¹ Nietzsche F. quoted by Frateanu V. op. cit. P. 121

of the myths, which are plausible, believable, but are not true explanations or knowledge³².

Nietzsche takes, rectifies and develops in a creative way the main theses of "Platonic physics". He accepts the idea that imaginative thought can become the lead of a certain form of philosophic speculation. But unlike Plato, who defined imaginative thought (first of all the *opinion* - its main constitutive element) as an inferior human faculty, appeared with the degrading of pure thought, of pure reason, as an act of simulation of the intellect³³, Nietzsche defines it as the highest spiritual faculty of man. Still, unlike Plato, who held that imaginative thought can be exerted only on sensible reality, Nietzsche considers that it can take as an object of inquiry only a reality compound with sensible and suprasensible elements, given that existence manifests itself in every moment of its evolution as a configuration which ties together such elements.

It still remains to prove now, by the logico-structural analysis of the components of the Nietzschean metaphysical principles, as these latter are unveiled along with the ideatic discourse, that these principles are emergences of a philosophic consciousness of mythical type.

³² Plato. *Timeo* 28a - 29d

³³ Plato. *Republic* 534a

The myth, as specific manifestation of a certain type of philosophic consciousness, of a certain modality of thought with permanent value in the history of human culture is constituted -the very philosophy of Nietzsche is a proof, among so many others- as representation (as fiction) which incorporates and totalises rational sensorial and affective determinations. To the realisation of the myth as a global image of existence, cooperate many spiritual faculties : the imaginative thought, (which plays the most important role), affective logic and the affect as such. We shall analyse by turn the mode in which is materialised the contribution of these spiritual faculties in the process of foundation of Nietzschean myths.

Each Nietzschean metaphysical principle (each Nietzschean myth) contains an essential idea or a nucleus of essential ideas. None of these ideas have, however, the properties of an abstract concept, none of them represents, however, a concrete content, phenomenon which is reflected either in the fact that they take a plastic configuration, transforming their determinations in (as) many qualities of a mythological figure and giving to themselves finally this mythological figure (proper result of the activity of imaginative thought), or in the fact that when their significances are analysed they are always related to the ideas incorporated in whole

in the imaginative representations, as if they should only come in continuation of those latter and should be nothing but their auxiliaries.

The most interesting is the group of ideas which take a plastic configuration, of which determinations are metamorphosed in the attribute of some mythologic figures, so the group of the ideas which are given as one, concrete, indivisible totality. To be sure, Nietzsche associates each of these ideas or their variations to one or two mythologic figures, or to human figures which his interpretation supra-lays out and projects in this mode, in the empire of the divinities, underlying that each of these figures symbolises the satisfaction in an absolute way of the senses of the idea or the variation of idea with which it has been put in correlation. This way, Dionysos and Zarathustra become figure which hypostasises in the most complete way the idea of unity of the opposites, Apollo becomes the figure which satisfies in an absolute extent a variation of this idea, that is, the idea which puts emphasis on the fact that the harmony of opposites is *an harmony* of the opposites. Aeschilus and Sophocles become the personalities who satisfy in a complete way another variation of this idea, that is, the idea which brings out the fact that the unity of the opposites must be understood as an *unity of the opposites*, and Socrates become the personality who

satisfies in an absolute way the idea that in the field of the empirical manifestation of history, the struggle of the opposites is permanent³⁴.

These ideas are put afterwards by Nietzsche as a kind of internal forms or essences of the metaphysical principles which govern human existence and understood therefore, in the last analysis, as those energies, forces or powers which generate the process of this existence. As we know, in his conception the idea of the unity of the opposites is the internal principle which determines the socio-political configuration of the mythical times in the life of humanity and the idea of the struggle between the opposites is the internal principle which determines the socio-political structure of historical time in the life of humanity.

We meet again however, also another category of concrete concepts, of "sensibilised", "plasticised" ideas, which, even if they do not constitute themselves as imaginative representations as such, as single totality, concrete and indivisible, as mythological figures, permanently keep a refined shade of materiality, because there are always related to these figures, by and in which is objectified the imaginative thought, as in a kind of living presence, dynamic consciousness, which assimilates these ideas and pass then through the filter of their subjectivity. A significant example in this respect is that of the concept of eternal return. As we have shown, the German

³⁴ Socrates lives alternatively two spiritual hypostases -that of philosopher and that of artist.

philosopher associates to it in an indissoluble way the concept of will to power. With the idea of will to power, Nietzschean thought makes a classic case of image idea : the idea of will to power is constituted as a concrete structure, is embodied into a mythological figure (Zarathustra), is given just as this very figure.

We cannot affirm anything alike about the idea of eternal return of everything. Zarathustra is not the one and same thing with this idea, it is not passed of in absolute way, as itself or stucked down on a sensible concrete level as its very personality. That Nietzsche did not transform this idea into a pure imaginative representation, is also proved by the fact that we do not meet in Thus Spoke Zarathustra any symbolic scene aimed at recording the death and rebirth of the prophet. But Zarathustra lives a real life and spreads around this idea, so much so that it becomes linked to his name. By proceeding this way, Nietzsche gives to this idea a particular affective coloration and changes it into a living idea.

In the act of founding of the metaphysical principles as mythical representations, intervenes afterwards also affective logic. We understand by affective logic the operation of abstractisation, and raising to the rank of existential concepts the affective dispositions that man can experience before a totality of the history of his evolution (these affective dispositions must be considered beside the attributes with

other content, as fundamental, essential attributes of human life). This is also a logic founded in the subjectivity of human being, and the logic of feelings described by Ribot³⁵; but it is different from this latter by the fact that it does not bring out the affective determinations specific to empirical subjectivity, but rather those characteristic of human subjectivity as an embodiment of an assumed metaphysical energy (in Nietzsche this is the will to power), and also by the fact that it does not have as aim the satisfaction of the practical needs of human subject; but rather the discovery of the metaphysical implications of real life of this subject. We could rather relate this logic to the method of thought used by Heidegger, which method aims at leaving to human beings the possibility to present its own explicitation³⁶ or in a more concrete formula, which contents itself to refining the affective dispositions that the human being unveils to himself as original attributes and contents itself to transform them in existential concepts.

Nietzsche does not evoke in an explicit way the idea of affective logic in the sense we have previously retained, but one can say that the spirit of this form of logic is present in the very modality in which Nietzsche understands to develop the ideatic discourse. To tell the truth how does Nietzsche proceed? from the constellation of affective states which man can experience before some aspects of human existence he is

³⁵ Ribot Theodule : La Logique des sentiments. (5è édition Paris librairie Félix Alean 1926) P. 61

³⁶ Heidegger Martin : Etre et temps (Paris Gallimard 1986) P. 140

confronted with, Nietzsche chooses as fundamental those states he has experienced himself as such and, by developing a sustained speculation around them, raises them finally to the rank of existential concepts.

Nietzsche develops this speculation in two directions. On the one hand, he associates each of these affective dispositions to one or many mythological figures or virtual mythological figures (by the term virtual mythological figure we designate the human figures to which Nietzsche ascribes the majority of the qualities which are usually ascribed to mythological figures) showing to us that each of these figures satisfy in an absolute way the affective attitude with which it has been put in correlation. Dionysos, Apollo, Zarathustra, Aeschylus and Sophocles should constitute, this way, personalities who live in the highest possible incandescence, the feeling of love before human existence of mythical type, meanwhile Socrates should represent the personalities who live, at the same temperature, the feeling of hatred before the values and principles of this form of existence. On the other hand, Nietzsche extrapolates these fundamental affective attitudes on the totality of the individuals who are integrated in an affective way into a type or another of society ; he holds this way, that love before existence governed by mythical principles should be the prevailing feeling of every individual who is member of the society of mythical type,

but the hatred before the values and principles of existence of mythical type should be the prevailing feeling of every individual, who, by living in the historical times is penetrated till the innermost of their being of the spirit of these times. Nietzsche specifies however, that not every individual who lives in historical times are motivated by a feeling of hatred before the mythical structures and values, some of them -to be sure, a few of them,- those endowed with fervour, with passion, with love ; in return human collectivity which activates in mythical times is, according to Nietzsche- a homogeneous collectivity ; all their members have the same form of consciousness, the consciousness of mythical type.

Finally, in the process of elaboration of Nietzschean metaphysical principles as mythical representations, as ideatic narrative, or drama intervene, beside the imaginative thought and affective logic, the actual affectivity. The intervention of affectivity in the act of foundation of the Nietzschean philosophic discourse determines a vehement polemic of the tone of his discourse and generate its frequent come back on some ideas which have already been analysed and overcome.

In conclusion the Nietzschean metaphysics is above all things a metaphysics of human existence and only in the second order it is a metaphysics of nature. We can

say that Nietzsche subordinates the metaphysics of nature to the metaphysics of human existence.

It is significant in this respect that Nietzsche interprets nature by analogy with some fundamental data of human existence. As it emerges from his works of maturity, Nietzsche believes that existence in its whole is governed by a simple metaphysical principle. This principle does not stay however, fixed into an eternal abstract identity with itself, it rather objectifies itself in three main hypostases each of them corresponding to a specific form of existence.

When it does not yet attain a self conscious configuration, it determines the system of functioning of nature. When it attains the self-consciousness and manifests itself as imaginative thought and mythical consciousness, it determines the mythical periods in the life of humanity and finally, when it attains the same level of consciousness and realise itself as consciousness dominated by the of abstract thought, it determines the historical existence of humanity. The pure ideal form of manifestation of the universal metaphysical principle is the second one, the first form of manifestation is only a prefiguration, but the third is a degrading, a debasement of it.

There is an ultimate appreciation : *the Nietzschean metaphysics uses as guide in its speculative approaches the imaginative thought and mythical consciousness and not logic; not abstract thought, as proceeds usually traditional metaphysics.*

Metaphysics and Aesthetics

Nietzsche's aesthetics constitutes a special sub-heading of his metaphysics. The artistic phenomenon is interpreted by him as a phenomenon of metaphysical nature. As it emerges from his works of maturity, the art represents for him a particular manifestation of the will to power (the central determination of the Zarathustran principle) ; and such as the will to power according to him, has two fundamental forms of objectification (the pure form and the degraded form), so also he affirms that art has also two fundamental forms of expression, the beautiful art (authentic, great) and the ugly art (degenerated, inferior art) which we must understand according to the aforementioned hypostases of the will to power ; he defines the one (beautiful art) as a particular -modality of objectification of the authentic will to power, and the other (ugly art) as a particular modality of objectification of the degraded will to power.

Nietzsche founds his aesthetics on a bipolar system : beautiful - ugly. In his conception, the beautiful and ugly are qualities (properties) of human subject revealed in the act of creation of the artistic objects or what amounts to the same, beautiful and ugly are the very artistic productions when these are understood as the spiritual event in the life of man which enables this latter to discover some realities specific to his innermost being or, in other word, when they are understood as the very processes of genesis and concrete structuration of some qualities (properties) of human being. Such an interpretation of values of beautiful and ugly originates from the general Nietzschean conception of values. According to Nietzsche, value can be defined as a quality of a thing, of a real object as well as a thing, as real object endowed with any quality, but these two definitions are, in principle, equivalent because, he says, any quality is always an objectual quality, it is a quality invested as objectual determination, it is the very stone of the thing or the very thing in what it has as essential, but the real object always appears has a system of relationships established between many material qualities, among which at least one pertains to the sphere of the essential : the beautiful and the ugly are hypostases of human being (as expression of the will to power) and only of this being. "*Nothing except man*

*(endowed with a bursting vitality) is beautiful. Nothing is ugly but the degenerated man*³⁷"

We shall now look more closely at the interpretation that the German philosopher ascribes to the categories of beautiful and ugly. Nietzsche understands the beautiful as a specific property of some modalities to be of the human subject. He rejects the idea (platonian idea) that there is a divine beautiful, supra-sensible, absolute and independent of our consciousness³⁸, holding in the spirit of kantian aesthetics, that the beautiful can be conceived only through an act of relationship with the life of human consciousness. Nietzsche also contests the value of the theory of the natural beautiful³⁹; one cannot talk about a beauty which should exist independently from the artistical activity of imagination: the beautiful is something synonymous with the poetical, by a refusal to accept the legitimacy of the idea of natural beautiful, Nietzsche joins the group of postkantian thinkers (Schiller⁴⁰, Schleiermacher Hegel etc) who have cancelled the kantian dichotomy between natural beautiful and artistic beautiful⁴¹ and have merged together the concept of beautiful with the concept of art.

At a more concrete level of his analysis, Nietzsche understands by beautiful the expression of materialisation of an existential state specific to man and only to man, a state in which the opposites enter into a complete unity and into a perfect equilibration.

³⁷ Nietzsche F. Crépuscule des idoles in op. cit. Tome II P. 1001

³⁸ Nietzsche F. Crépuscule des idoles P. 1000 Aphorisme 20

³⁹ Nietzsche F. Humain trop Humain II in op. cit. T II P. 906

⁴⁰ Schiller (quoted by Frateanu in op. cit.) seems to have been the first who tried to adduce correction, in the mentioned sense, to the Kantian theory of the opposition between natural beautiful and artistic beautiful.

⁴¹ We must notice that the Kantian dichotomy between natural beautiful (beautiful in nature) and artistic beautiful is not nevertheless, an absolute dichotomy

(the main opposites introduced into such unity and into such an equilibration are the affective energies and intellectual energies). By giving birth to the beautiful, man - holds Nietzsche- realises himself as perfection⁴², what amounts to saying that he transcends his "human all too human" condition, becoming superman and manifesting himself as pure embodiment of the authentic will to power. In the beautiful art, man poses himself as complete being, thus as a being who ties together into a harmonious whole matter and thought (imaginative at the first place). The beautiful is neither a mere expression of the affect and nor a mere expression of the intellect, but their perfect synthesis. It represents whatever can be far from the violent will⁴³ of the pure affects as well as from the abstract intellect, pure reason ; we must conceive the beautiful -affirms Nietzsche- as the expression of a correction adduced to nature by spirit, as the result of logic simplification of the instincts of power⁴⁴, as intellectualisation of the passions⁴⁵, as limit put to the affective chaos⁴⁶, as changing of the inform into form⁴⁷.

The idea, by Nietzsche, that the beautiful represents an expression of the realisation of man as perfection, that it represents the implementation of man as unity between matter and spirit, unconscious and conscious, sensibility and reason, has very probably, its origin in these reflections by Schiller :

⁴² Nietzsche F. Crépuscule des idoles in op. cit. P.995 APH. 9

⁴³ Nietzsche F. quoted by Frateanu V. in op. cit. P. 137

⁴⁴ Nietzsche F. Par delà le Bien et le Mal P. 565

⁴⁵ Nietzsche F. Crépuscule des idoles. P. 969

⁴⁶ Frateanu V. P. 137

⁴⁷ Nietzsche F. Ainsi parlait Zarathoustra : in op. cit. vol II P. 295

We know that man is neither exclusively matter, nor exclusively spirit. The beautiful as completion of his humanity, cannot be thus exclusively life ... nor cannot be exclusively form ... the beautiful is the common object of both tendencies⁴⁸.

we have to affirm again that the aforementioned Nietzschean theory of the beautiful, as, besides, the Schillerian conception of beautiful, can be compared with the conception by Kant of ideal beautifulness which, says the author of critique of Judgement, can create only the artist of genius, because only he, is able to produce himself the spiritual state favourable to its formation, that is the complete unity and harmony between sensibility and intellect⁴⁹.

Finally we have to add again, that as compared with the theory by Kant of the beauty created by the artist of genius, theory which has also a metaphysical content, even if it is not founded in explicit terms, this beauty is not a pure expression of the arbitrariness of human subjectivity, but rather an achievement of the human subject who can put himself in this beauty, as perfection, overtaking this way the genuine determinations of nature ; this beauty has become thus, a higher achievement of all the modalities of objectification of nature because, among others, in the initial stage of its genesis it formed itself in accordance with the immanent plans of nature⁵⁰.

⁴⁸ Schiller quoted by Frateanu. We must notice that the position of Schiller is alike that of the French author Guyau. J. M. Guyau. See Les problèmes de l'esthétique contemporaine (12^e édition, Paris. Librairie Félix Alcan 1929) P. 27

⁴⁹ Immanuel Kant The critique of judgement. Translated by James creed. Meredith. (Oxford. Clarendon Press 1961). P. 77

⁵⁰ In this sense see also Basch, Victor, Essai. Critique sur l'esthétique de Kant, (Paris, Librairie philosophique J. Vrin 1927) P. 605

Nietzsche's theory of the beautiful (in general) has a more evident metaphysical character. The author of The Birth of Tragedy, formulates in explicit terms the idea that beauty (human) is the highest form of objectification that can attain, in its evolution the metaphysical principle of existence in its whole (the principle of will to power).

Now how, in Nietzsche's conception, are the relationships between the value of the beautiful and the value of truth ? Before trying to answer this question, we must remember that Nietzsche contests the traditional interpretation given to truth (as accordance of knowledge with reality), holding that this is nothing but a degraded myth (a fiction which has lost all its sensible determinations keeping only or in most part the supra-sensible, abstract determinations). Between truth viewed in this acception and artistic beautiful there is not -holds Nietzsche- any real link, any point of contact⁵¹.

The beautiful art is a hypostasis of authentic myth (of fiction which introduces into a harmonious whole the sensible and supra-sensible determinations) and only that. We must not believe, however, that between the artistic value and truth (understood in the previous sense) there cannot be established any kind of relationship. There is -says Nietzsche- a certain type of art, which embodies and represents the truth value, viewed in this particular acception of degraded myth, and this is the type of ugly art.

⁵¹ Nietzsche F. Considérations inactuelles op. cit. Vol I P.375

We can even affirm that the ugly coincides in its essence with the logic, the truth⁵². By opening this theoretical perspective, Nietzsche breaks the powerful tradition of aesthetics, which enabled that truth should be associated with and only with the beautiful. By proceeding to an unusual comparison between truth and ugly, and by making them equivalent in the last analysis Nietzsche has introduced us into an aesthetico-philosophic paradox.

Another problem which needs to be cleared up is relative to the relationship between beautiful and good, between art (beautiful art) and ethics in Nietzsche's conception.

Grounding ourselves on some affirmations in The Birth of Tragedy, some commentators blamed Nietzsche for propagating an aesthetizing conception about art and even about existence in general. It is true that, speaking about the tragic myth Nietzsche affirms at a given moment that this finds an explanation and a justification only in the sphere of the pure aesthetic of spiritual life, which does not suffer any influence on the part of the extra aesthetic values. What should disavow the tragic myth in the first place, he believes, should be the universe of ethical values. He rejects these values more strongly than other values. But in the same book Nietzsche shows an absolutely opposite assertion : the myth and the customs. Tragedy and State -he says- are entangled, inter-wined in their foundations⁵³. We must wonder which of these

⁵² See comment by Frateanu V. P. 137

⁵³ Nietzsche F. Naissance de la Tragédie. op. cit. vol I P. 45

affirmations represents Nietzsche's true conception. It seems that it should be the second one because : 1°) it does not contain, as the first, does, any contradiction with the very idea of myth and 2°) it is confirmed by the evolution of his thought, by the postulates on which his thought of maturity is grounded.

As regards this latter aspect of the problem, we must refer in the first place, to another work Twilight of Idols. From its content, it is clear that Nietzsche is an adversary of aestheticism. In this book he ridicules the theory of "art for the sake of art" and he compares it with a worm which bites its own tail, and considers as an absurdity the idea that art should be without goal, without target, without sense⁵⁴. To be sure, says Nietzsche, the art (the great art) must be subordinated to some imperatives of extraaesthetics order, as should be for example ethical imperatives, but it cannot more be isolated from life into a ivory tower. The great art (beautiful art)⁵⁵ encompasses and absorbs in its imaginative specific language, a whole system of values, within the scope of which appears also the moral value.

Without any doubt, the art does not teach us moral precepts nor does it show us with accuracy what are the means of moral salvation, but it suggests to us, in return, what the superiority of a given moral attitude consists in, and emphasized some of its intrinsic attributes, as should be harmony and equilibration of spiritual

⁵⁴ Nietzsche F. *Crépuscule des idoles*. op. cit. P. 995

⁵⁵ In Nietzsche's conception, the great art is one and the same thing with the beautiful art

order. Thus, the great art is not, a modality of application in practice of any ethics, but rather a symbolic correspondent of a certain type of ethics.

In The Case of Wagner Nietzsche associates the beautiful art with the ethics of the masters and the ugly art with the ethics of the slaves, suggesting to us, however to see in the art, not a symbolic correspondent of the aforementioned ethics, but rather a direct expression of it, its embodiment. So he puts them in the same axiologic level⁵⁶. This high consideration adduced to the ethics of the masters comes nevertheless in contradiction with the authentic spirit of his thought, because, as we shall prove it later not the ethics of the masters represents for him a superior hypostasis of ethics but rather the ethics which proposes as pattern the mythical attitude on life, and this is an ethics which calms down the violent instincts, imposes limits to the affective energies, introduces instincts and affects in relationship of harmonious collaboration with the intellect and reconciles the opposites points of view on existence, objectives at which the ethics of masters does not aim at all.

And now, if we want to make an association between the mythical ethics and a certain form of art, it is evident that we cannot do it but in choosing the second term of the comparison, the beautiful art, because only this "one aims at identical objectives - using however different means- with the aims of mythical ethics. This idea is not very

⁵⁶ Nietzsche F. le cas Wagner. In op. cit. vol II P. 914

clear in Nietzsche, but it seems to be foreseen nevertheless at least in The Birth of Tragedy, for in its content is established a close link between the foundations of tragic myth (the deepest artistic symbol) which puts its imprint on the existence of a people living into a mythical period.

We shall now analyse at a deeper level the meaning which Nietzsche ascribes to the beautiful art, in order to see which role he ascribes to it in the whole of the other specific activities of man and what are in the conception of the German philosopher, its main existential functions.

We have previously shown that according to Nietzsche, only a subject who is in an existential state can create the beautiful art, this state also named aesthetics can be noticed by the fact that within its scope is realised the unity of the opposite faculties of the soul. Therefore, it should represent the true measurement of human perfection. In the subjectivity of the artist who creates under this state is realised on the one hand, the totalisation and unification of affective energies with the intellectual energies, and on the other hand the coincidence of these spiritual attitudes which usually are in struggle, in conflict. The artist creator of beautiful (the great artist)-holds Nietzsche-always builds himself as harmonious totality of affective and intellectual

energies. He is -says Nietzsche- at the same time "farical and God", "Sinner and Saint"⁵⁷

But does not this state of consciousness, reproduce, reiterate another consciousness with the scope of which is produced the same totalisation and the same equivalence of the opposites, that is the mythical state of consciousness ? Without any doubt, yes. Even moreover we can affirm, that, in Nietzsche's conception, this state of consciousness is identical with the mythical state of consciousness, when this latter aims at expressing in the specific language of art, that is, into a concrete sensorial language into an imaginative language with an exceptional density.

The problem which arises now is that of the form of language in which consciousness presents the values of mythical type. We must notice that it is not treated by Nietzsche with enough clarity. Nietzsche affirms that all the mythical values aimed at expressing themselves into an imaginative language but he does not show us in an explicit way that, among these values, the one which is expressed with the greatest intensity in that form of language is the mythico-artistic values.

Nevertheless there are suggestions in that sense, in Nietzsche's works. As a kind of such a suggestion we can mention the assertion by Nietzsche that, the *"beautiful music, with its unrivalled power to express into sensible language the*

⁵⁷ Quotation by Frateanu F. P. 137

*abstractions, can put a philosophic spirit in such a disposition that this one could illuminate the grey sky of abstractions...the living lightening of the concrete*⁵⁸ and realise, thus one the conditions which must be fulfilled in order that this philosophic spirit can be named a great philosopher.

We shall go further so as to analyse the Nietzschean concept of aesthetic state, and bring out the relationship within the scope of this state between the creative subject and the external world. Pure embodiment of the authentic will to power and so, measurement of the very human completion, the artist (that is the great artist) transforms the things, until when they become reflex of his ego and then of his intrinsic perfection⁵⁹. The artist (the great artist) always proceeds to a correction of nature⁶⁰, that is, he interprets it by analogy with his own person; changing it this way into a system which ties together sensible determinations with suprasensible determinations, and makes it perfect, that is, his creative activity, by which he produces artistic objects, transcends the unconscious spontaneous activity of nature and is accomplished as conscious activity.

But the creator of beautiful proposes to us not only an overtaking of nature, but also an overtaking of history to the benefit of a superior form of existence, governed by a mythico-metaphysical principle. The great artist creates an aesthetic object of which

⁵⁸ Nietzsche F. *le cas Wagner* P. 902

⁵⁹ Nietzsche F. *Crépuscule des idoles* P. 995 Aphorism 9

⁶⁰ See Frateanu V. *op. cit.* P. 141

message is mainly built around the idea that it is absolutely necessary that humanity should attempt to overtake the historical existence, to the benefit of a higher form of life, that is the mythical form. To this superior requirement of art refers, Nietzsche when he designates this activity as metaphysics and discovers in it the great stimulant of life⁶¹. The beautiful which is itself the supreme sign of power "that is the actual realisation of the synthesis of the opposites"⁶², incites this form of inferior existence which is history to overtake itself to the benefit of a form of life which, by totalising and unifying contrary spiritual attitudes and opposite values manifest itself as the complete expression of an authentic will to power. So Nietzsche, essentially affirms : the beautiful art, which is a projection of an artistic consciousness fed on the principles specific to a mythical vision on life, insufflates into man the desire to transform the existential structure dominated by the principles of historical consciousness into existential structures determined by the principles of mythical consciousness. In this moment we have the possibility to interpret the famous expression in The Birth of Tragedy : *human existence and the world are justified only as aesthetical phenomena*⁶³, and we can see in this expression not an indication of a aesthetising attitude before life, but rather an infinitely superior attitude before life, a mythical attitude, because to require that life should conform itself to aesthetic ideal, can mean,

⁶¹ Nietzsche F. Crépuscule des idoles P. 1003 Aphorism 24

⁶² See Frateanu. P.142

⁶³ Nietzsche F. Naissance de la Tragédie P. 51

in the general context of Nietzschean thought, but to require that life should mould itself in function of a mythical ideal, ideal which permanently glorifies the perspective of reconciliation of the opposite forms of existence and of merging them into a superior unity.

At the base of the constitution of all the beautiful arts -says Nietzsche- is the same type of creative intentionality. All the beautiful arts encompasses the same fundamental determinations of content. However, they differ from the viewpoint of form. At the top of the pyramid are those values of the beautiful which are characterised by a virile supple and proteic form. Only some types of art enter in the rank of these supreme values, only some of them represent the purest expressions of the principle of authentic will to power. But the question to know which are these types, Nietzsche gives us an ambiguous and contradictory answer. Sometimes he declares that the suprem artistic value should be architecture⁶⁴, but elsewhere he declares that the suprem artistic values should be music and Dionysian Tragedy⁶⁵ (Dionysian art). but the mobile evoked in the spirit of all these assertions is always the same⁶⁶ : these types of art should represent the most complete forms of artistic objectification. (so, in concrete -sensorial language) of the will to power (authentic). It ensues from here that beyond the subjectivism, the affective exaggerations and

⁶⁴ Nietzsche F. Crépuscule des idoles. P. 997 Aphorisme 11

⁶⁵ Nietzsche F. Naissance de la Tragédie P. 47

⁶⁶ Nietzsche F. Crépuscule des idoles P. 997

untruths of some declarations, in Nietzsche's conception emerges nevertheless the idea of axiologic equivalence between the three aforementioned artistic forms. Finally we must notice, that in ascribing these artistic forms the quality of being the highest expressions of the beautiful, on the one hand, and in putting the sign of equality between these values of beautiful, on the other hand, Nietzsche gives us to understand that all the three aforementioned forms, can be tied together under the term of Dionysian art.

Immediately under these three artistic forms or, if we prefer, under the Dionysian art, Nietzsche places the Apollinian art (plastic art). and this one should be born from a supra affluence of life, from a surplus of life, and its appearance should be determined by the fact that it puts the creative subject into a disposition of the soul (unusual) in which the affective and intellectual energies constitute a harmonious whole, but its form should not acquire, nevertheless the virility, mobility and proteism which characterizes the forms of the other three types of art, because, in the process of the constitution of the Dionysian art, the senses of man are not introduced in the relationship of equality and are not attracted into an harmonious collaboration, given that the main role pertains to the faculty of vision⁶⁷. Of course now one could ask the question -whether in the process of the creation of architectural structures (supra

⁶⁷ Idem Crépuscule des idoles P. 996

elogized by the German philosopher) the principal sensorial factor mobilized is not just as the process of creation of the Apollinian art, the faculty of vision ? And this turns out to be true (as is confirmed by the experience) then we no longer see how the architectural forms could be realised as Dionysian, mobile and proteic forms. Nietzsche does not foresee however this contradiction existing in his comment.

The great art, the beautiful art receives in various places⁶⁸, the denomination of classical art. there is, nevertheless, also some hesitations ; sometimes it seems to Nietzsche that the term classical art is outdated, and has been emptied from its positive initial implications, and he proposes then its replacement with the term Dionysian art⁶⁹. But in general, however the great art, the beautiful art keeps its denomination of classical art.

As we have seen, Nietzsche considers that the diverse structures of the beautiful art (classical) is classified from the axiological viewpoint. At the top should be, equally three main forms of art. these represent, according to him the maxime point of flowering of the authentic will to power, the complete manifestation of the beautiful, the expression of coordination, equilibration and perfect harmonisation of all the faculties, inclinations and requirements specific to human being. In these cases, in which the beautiful gains the most brilliant victory upon the monstrous⁷⁰, we witness

⁶⁸ Idem Humain trop Humain in OP Cit Vol I P. 755.

⁶⁹ Idem Gai savoir P. 240

⁷⁰ Idem Humain trop Humain P.743

the appearance of the great style. The suprem feeling of power acquires expression - says Nietzsche- in what he names great style⁷¹. The great style constitutes the highest expression of art of classic types.

At the beginning of this subheading we have affirmed that Nietzsche focusses his aesthetics on the idea of existence of a bipolar system of aesthetics categories : beautiful - ugly. This is also, in essence, the truth. We must notice nevertheless, that his critical intuition and his wide artistic culture make him doubt on the fact that between the beautiful art (great art) and the ugly art (degraded art) should exist but a kind of no man's land, a gap, an abyssal zone and, as a consequence, he attempts to find out an intermediary artistical form, a form which should make the jonction between the two main artistic forms.

This way, Nietzsche refers to the baroque art (and the baroque style), without succeeding, however, in ascribing to it the actual status of intermediary artistic phenomenon. In the last analysis, Nietzsche transforms the baroque art into a species of classic art and the sublime (deemed sometimes to be the ideal category of the baroque art) into a variation of the beautiful. In his conception the baroque art respects, in general the principle of the necessity to realise a coordination between the component part of the form, which principle is promoted and concretised in a complete

⁷¹ Idem Crépuscule des idoles P. 126

way by the actual beautiful art ; of course, -he adds-, in comparison with the classic art, the baroque art is characterised by a certain disharmony of the internal lines of the forms, by a certain overflowing of the forms, by certain distance from, the ideal norm of harmony and equilibration, which is perfectly respected by the classic art, and if to these properties we add the rhetorism and pathetism of the content of ideas and feelings, we have in face the painting of the main aesthetic notes and attributes which change the baroque art into a moment of decline of the great art and of the great style⁷² ; but the baroque art keeps the forms and does not destroy them, that is it does not annihilate the internal equilibration of their components as proceeds the ugly art, and therefore it belongs to the category of beautiful art, even if it is as its inferior form.

In absolute contradiction with the aesthetic category of beautiful is the aesthetic category of ugly. The ugly represents the modality of artistic manifestation of a degenerated human being, of man characterised by vital weakness, deficit of energy and hatred against sensible life, of man who can no longer realise himself as totality by the harmonious cooperation of his faculties, and remains a fragmentary being, overcome by all possible contradictions and the permanent struggles between them. The ugly is the indication, the most transparent symptom of the degeneracy of the will to power⁷³, it is the most evident expression of the will to power as degraded principle.

⁷² Idem Humain trop Humain P. 751

⁷³ Idem Crépuscule des idoles P. 1001

If the beautiful art is characterised by the perfect correspondence of the content with the form, or by their coincidence⁷⁴, in other words, by the fact that within the scope of its structure it gives, on the one hand, an equal importance role to the content and the form and subjects both of them on the other hand, to the one and the same fundamental creative intentionality, the ugly art shows us an absolute opposite spectacle : on the one hand, it pays a special attention to the content (which is the projection of an abstractizing moralising consciousness) neglecting the contribution of the form, and on the other hand, it breaks the harmony between them because the process followed is not that to develop the form in the sense of the intentionality of the type of consciousness which founds the content, but rather to develop it in an opposite direction. Finally if the beautiful art realises the complete equilibration of the component parts of the form, the ugly art destroys it, and gives birth this way to an imitation of form. As an example we have the music of Richard Wagner. (the purest manifestation of the decaying art or romantic art⁷⁵) Wagner emphasises the content, the substance of the ideas, which is almost the open expression of the need to save Christian ethics⁷⁶. On the contrary Wagner does not pay too much attention to the form, he creates without being interested in the realisation of internal equilibration. Moreover, the "form" or what is pretended to be so, does not harmonize itself with the manifest intentions of the

⁷⁴ See Frateanu P. 147

⁷⁵ Nietzsche F. *Gai savoir* P.240

⁷⁶ Idem Le cas Wagner P. 918

content, but on the contrary the ideas of the work invite us to reconciliation, to contemplative silence and innermost peace, but the actual musical language, which helps us discover the spectacle of desagregation of the forms⁷⁷, awakes in our soul an opposite reaction, that is a strange feeling of despair.

From the critical analysis made by Nietzsche (and in the first place that caused by the music of Wagner) it results, however a curious illogic and ever absurd thesis : an abstractising consciousness, a rational content should determine the progressive development of a language full of sensorial and affective element. This idea, more implicit than explicit, remains a unresolved contradiction in his aesthetic thought.

The second central topic, which invites us to discuss the specific attitude taken by the contemplative subject before the object of art (and, so, of his judgement of taste) is treated by Nietzsche in correspondence with the first central topic of aesthetics which refers, as we know to the artist, the creative subject. We have to specify that this second topic does not benefit, however, the sustained attention which treated the first topic ; Nietzsche treats this second topic in a sporadic way, with less passion and less clarity, whence the necessity to combine the explicit meaning of our reading with the implicit meaning in order to grasp the complete system of ideas developed by Nietzsche.

⁷⁷ Ibid

In order to emit judgement of taste, says Nietzsche, the subject who receives an object of art must be in a state of the soul alike the state that experiences the artist in his moment of creation⁷⁸. We know however that Nietzsche theorizes the existence of two different forms of creative states and of two different types of artists and artistic values, that he dissociates between an authentic creative state (the actual aesthetic state) in which man is realised as a total being and pure mythico-imaginative consciousness, and a false creative state, degenerated, in which man changes himself into a fragmentary being and close himself in the deep unhappiness of a consciousness dominated by the activity of abstract thought.

Nietzsche suggests to us that the operation of classification of the subjects who are able to emit judgements of taste and of these very judgements, should be done into the same perspective. Unlike the gregarious man -he says- the exceptional man or the superman⁷⁹ will perceive the artistic value. We can reformulate this affirmation and discover beyond its metaphorism this plausible ideatic sense : the great or authentic critic interprets the art in a different way from the one of the false critic and expresses judgement of taste in a way different from the judgements of the latter.

But what is the main factor of dissociation between the two aforementioned forms of judgement of taste ? Before we answer this question, we must notice

⁷⁸ Nietzsche F. Crépuscule des idoles P.122

⁷⁹ See Frateanu V. P.147

however, the fact that, for Nietzsche, the judgement of taste, whichever they belong to the authentic critic or pretended to be so, have a common characteristics: they are not judgements of knowledge (in the classic assertion of the term), but rather aesthetic judgements if we use Kant's expression. The judgement of taste, the judgements by which we represent the artistic objects as being beautiful or ugly, should be false, imaginative, fictive judgements⁸⁰. Such an attitude has its origin in Kant's thought who affirms that in order to distinguish, if something is beautiful or not, we relate the representation not by intellect to the object in view to knowledge, but rather by the power of imagination (may be in cooperation with the intellect) to the subject and his feeling of pleasure or displeasure. we can read in Kant that

the judgement of taste is not so, a judgement of knowledge so, it is not logic, but aesthetic, by which term we understand a judgement of which principle of determination can be otherwise but subjective⁸¹

; it is nevertheless different, in a significant way from this, because for Nietzsche the judgement of taste is not only a aesthetic a fictive judgement but even also a logic judgement (judgement of knowledge) or what is defined as such by Kant. So, Nietzsche considers, that we must interpret the judgement of taste as an aesthetic fictive imaginative judgement. He suggests afterwards, that we should make a dissociation between the authentic judgement of taste and the false judgement of

⁸⁰ Ibid

⁸¹ Kant the critique of judgement op. cit. PP 41, 42

taste. Finally, in the spirit of his thought, in general, and in his conception about the specific differences between the exceptional man and the gregarious man, in particular, he indirectly invites us to affirm that the authentic judgement of taste can be formulated only by a contemplative subject who is in the state of soul in which the intellect cooperates harmoniously with the affect, but the false judgement of taste can be expressed by that subject who is in a disposition of soul decisively controlled by the intellectual faculties.

Of course we must be always conscious of the fact that such a motivation of dissociation between the authentic judgements of taste and the non-authentic ones, is not never available at the level of the explicit development of Nietzschean discourse. Moreover we must acknowledge that such explication of the difference between them has been sometimes contested, as when it is hold, for example, that the authentic aesthetic judgements are instinctual judgements, mere projections and requirements of the instincts and the affects, appreciations deprived of any intellectual foundation⁸².

We understand this thesis as an act of betrayal of his true spirit, because the judgement of taste cannot be conceived without the operational intervention of the intellect, such a judgement as has been righteously shown by Kant always contains a relationship with the intellect⁸³»

⁸² See Frateanu V.P. 148

⁸³ Ibid

We want not contradict Nietzsche's conception about the special disposition of soul in which the exceptional man, the great artist creates, we have to acknowledge that the authentic aesthetic judgement presupposes the existence of a state of the soul in which the affect cooperates harmoniously with the intellect. To this thesis we must add the idea (which is not explicitly present in Nietzsche, but implicitly present in him) that, in its essence, the false aesthetic judgement is an abstract judgement, and that the determinative factor in its constitution is the abstract thought. In continuation of this idea, we have to hold, afterwards, that Nietzsche could have completed his theoretical system in affirming that only the authentic critic disposes the necessary capacity to make a distinction between beautiful and ugly, and only him, experiences a feeling of full pleasure, when he perceives an artistic object as being beautiful, and a feeling of very intense displeasure when he perceives an artistic object as being ugly.

A judgement of taste is, thus, for Nietzsche, a fictive, imaginative judgement and not a judgement of knowledge (in the traditional sense of the term). It is, then, mainly subjective, because the harmony or disharmony ascribed to the artistic object pertains, at the origin, to the contemplative subject, who names the feeling of pleasure or displeasure that he experiences before such an object⁸⁴.

⁸⁴ Ibid

This idea is from Kant. But unlike Kant Nietzsche does not believe that the judgement of taste has a subjective-universal value. Kant holds that unlike the logic judgement, which has an objective-universal value, the judgement of taste, the aesthetic judgement has only a subjective-universal value, because it does not link the predicator beautiful to the concept of the object considered in its whole logic sphere, and nevertheless, it extends it to the whole sphere of those who judge⁸⁵. The judgement of taste does not postulate the agreement of anybody, it only ascribes this agreement as a case of the rule, as regards which it awaits the confirmation not from the concept but from the adherence of others⁸⁶. The judgement of taste, which is subjective judgement, because it puts in relationship the representation of the artistic object with the subject and his innermost feeling, is in the same time also an universal judgement, because it pretends (but does not postulate, or affirm with assurance) the adherence of all those who perceive the artistic object, to itself, as to a "*judgement which is considered as an example of a universal rule*"⁸⁷. (which cannot nevertheless be enunciated) when it (the judgement) enters in agreement with the ideal norm of a presupposed sense of common feeling⁸⁸.

Nietzsche opposes the Kantian thesis of subjective-universal value of the judgement of taste, the very well known thesis of skepticism, that the judgements of

⁸⁵ Kant. Op. cit. 46

⁸⁶ See Frateanu F P. 151

⁸⁷ Kant . op. cit. P. 55

⁸⁸ Ibid P. 56

taste are personal, individual judgements or, if we use the word by kant "a *mere subjective play of the powers of representation*"⁸⁹

An assessment, an appreciation of an aesthetic judgement -says Nietzsche at a given moment- is fundamentally different from an assessment, an appreciation, on moral judgement because they are valid only for each individual, and do not pretend as other judgements, to a public validity⁹⁰.

We do not believe, that we should see in this opinion a fundamental idea, it seems rather conjectural. For the true spirit of Nietzsche's thought can be found elsewhere, that is in his reflections which dissociates between the judgement of taste (superior) of the exceptional men (authentic critics) and the judgement of taste (inferior) of the gregarious men (the impostors). From this partition it clearly results that the judgement of taste is not for Nietzsche neither personal, individual, but rather a subject of particular judgement, so to speak, because it pretends the adherence of some socio-intellectual, a very limited socio-intellectual groups ; and as there are two types of judgement of taste, we must conclude that it is in the spirit of Nietzsche's thought, to affirm that each of them requires the adherence of the corresponding socio-intellectual groups. At first sight, it should seem that this attitude can be labelled an aristocratic vision on the process of inveiglement of the artistic creation. We do not

⁸⁹ Ibid P.51

⁹⁰ Ibid P. 54

believe, however, that we must go so far. In the language we must acknowledge - somewhat brutal- by Nietzsche, is hidden at the bottom an idea of common sense : the pronouncement of some authentic judgement of taste presupposes the harmonious cooperation of many factors : a rational (analytic and systematic) deep spirit, a fine sensibility, a critical imagination and a broad artistic culture.

CODESRIA - LIBRARY

CHAPTER FOUR

Nietzsche's Metaphysics and Philosophy of Culture

The concept of culture

Nietzsche interprets culture from a metaphysical perspective. One can say that the philosophy of culture is for him but a sub-chapter of metaphysics. In this conception, culture constitutes the totality of the artistic, scientific, moral and religious values determined by that prime, original, supra-sensible value which is life as will to power. The will to power is the metaphysical principle which assures the unity of style of a culture, unity without which, otherwise one cannot find any culture even if this one is of inferior quality¹. The existence of two forms of objectification of the will to power (one pure, authentic and the other degraded, mackled) is reflected in the field of culture by the appearance of a typologic differentiation, to one pole is situated the superior culture and the other pole is the inferior culture.

The leading principle of the superior culture is the authentic will to power as mythical consciousness. The mythical consciousness is the consciousness which realises the reunion into the same whole imaginative thought, as coordinating factor, and affectivity. It is necessary to remember now that for Nietzsche these components of the mythical consciousness are in close link with the unconscious activity.

¹ Nietzsche Fredrich in Considerations inactuelles quoted by Vasile Frateanu in Critica Gindirii mitice (Ed. Dacia. Cluj-Napoca 1980) P.166

Nietzsche Fredrich in Humain, trop Humain op. cit. Tome I P591

Nietzsche affirms that the activity of mythical consciousness presupposes the use of elements of unconscious activity or that it presupposes the formation of some subtle relationship of collaboration between the conscious and the unconscious.

The mythical consciousness and the imaginative thought, in its function as coordinating centre of this consciousness presides over the appearances and the institution as values of culture, of the authentic fiction, the authentic myth. The main characteristics of the values of superior culture is that they do not enter into opposition with each other, because each of them totalises, as authentic myths numerous determinations and senses : aesthetic, theoretic, moral religious. (and even sometimes politic), the single difference between them derives from the fact that the creative subject puts emphasis sometimes on one, sometimes on the other of the significant structures immanent to them. One can say that basically the superior culture knows a single value the myth (authentic). That is why it has always succeeded in conciliating and harmonizing the contrary power which are the basis of human existence² and of humanity as a vast living system compound with countless totalities of this genius. The superior culture is characteristic of the mythical periods in the life of humanity. Nevertheless the higher value can appear, in an exceptional way, also within the scope of the historical periods ; they are creations of the "supermen",

² Andler Charles - Les précurseurs de Nietzsche, 2^e édition(Paris. Editions Bossard, 1920.) P. 269

that is of the individuals who have a mythical conception about existence and build themselves in the sense of their ideas. If the leading principle of superior culture is the authentic will to power, given under the form of mythical consciousness³, the leading principle of the inferior culture is the degraded will to power, as consciousness dominated by the activity of abstract thought, of consciousness which has broken every fertile contact with the universe of the sensible determinations of life. The inferior culture constitutes a collection of suprasensible values (abstract), of false fictions, of degraded myths. It leads to a fierce struggle against the sensible values of life, it aims at eliminating the most important part of them, and at degrading those it cannot eliminate and changing them into values subordinated to the abstract, suprasensible values. The result of its endeavour to overtake the sensible world to the benefit of the suprasensible world can be but the splitting up of human existence, which has the original inclination to tie together the sensible attributes with the suprasensible attributes, the sensorial, affective energies with the intellectual energies. The inferior culture is an abstractising culture and the man educated in its spirit becomes a slave of abstract thought, slave of death, ossified, petrified reason.

The abstractizing consciousness is an egoistic, evil individualistic consciousness, and it transmits those features to the cultural values it generates.

³ Nietzsche Friedrich Aurore in op. cit. Tome I P. 994

These, though, in essence, have an identical content (content of abstract nature), enter into conflict the ones with the others, each of them seeking to subordinate the others and to become supra-natural value. The inferior culture is, so, a culture permanently crushed with internal struggles. Finally, we have also to notice that it is specific to the historical periods in the life of humanity.

It is interesting to mention the analysis made by Nietzsche on the relationship between culture and civilisation. It has been said that in following closer the ideas conveyed by F. Wolf and Buckhard⁴, Nietzsche opposes culture to civilisation, seeing in the first an expression of theoretic spiritual life of humanity, or put in other words, the whole of the artistic, moral, scientific and religious values, but in the second, the expressions of its practico-social life or put in other words, the complex of political, technico economical values and he designates the first the superior form of existence as compared to the second. It is very true that in interpreting the first as an expression of contemplative life (*vita contemplativa*), and the second as an expression of active life (*vita activa*)⁵, Nietzsche opposes culture to civilisation, but it is not true that his ultimate conclusion should be that the values of culture are always superior to the values of civilisation or at least, to some of its elements. We cannot negate that Nietzsche holds sometimes the thesis of inferiority in principle of the values of

⁴ *ibid* P. 1076

⁵ *ibid*.

civilisation. Of economic and politic values are concerned only the very less endowed spirits⁶. To work in view to making perfect the commerce (trade) and to assuring our daily comfort -he specifies- amounts to having inferior goal and not at all indispensable⁷. As regards the social and political form of the organisation of human life, these should be characterised by the tendency to put obstacles on the way of the free development of cultural activities. "Culture and state we should not make any mistake there upon, -are antagonists,"- says the German philosopher⁸. However Nietzsche does not make always such assessments on the whole system of the values of civilisation. It is true that the technico-economic value does receive but negative assessments, but the political value benefits very often positive considerations, and Nietzsche insists on the superior content that it should have acquired when it was embodied in the form of organisation of the States in the mythical periods in the life of humanity.

These States favour, believes Nietzsche, the development of a superior culture. (some superior cultural values can appear however within the scope of the modern States but against their spirit, which imposes on them to intervene in view to ostracizing these values and, to the extent of possibility, annihilating their positive content and significance⁹) and conversely, a superior culture should determine the

⁶ Nietzsche Friedrich. Crépuscule des idoles in op. cit. Tome II P.987

⁷ Nietzsche F. Considérations Inactuelles in op. cit. Tome I P.335

⁸ About the way in which we must interpret the less restrictive affirmaton by Nietzsche, in some of his works, that the will to power should be the metaphysical principle of existence in its whole, we made specific references in the preceeding chapters.

⁹ Nietzsche F. par delà le bien et le mal in op. cit. Tome II P.592

constant improvement of the structure of these form of State in which men live together on the basis of mythical principles.

Now we can shift and see the explanation by Nietzsche of the solidarity and complementarity of the superior cultural values with the superior political value. According to Nietzsche, these values are generated by the one and same metaphysical principle, the will to power¹⁰ (authentic), event which is reflected in the similarity of their content (which combines the sensible determination with those supra-sensible, the affective determinations with those intellectual, content in which it represents itself as a consciousness of mythical type. Of course, any difference between the superior cultural value and the superior political value is permanently kept, because, though they are produced by the same vital metaphysical energy (authentic will to power), the first one expresses the tendencies, the inclinations and desire specific to man as individual being, specific to his inner life, meanwhile the second expresses the tendencies, the inclinations and the desires specific to man as social being, specific to his external, social life (these latter tendencies, inclinations, desires, shows Nietzsche, are absorbed into a deep aspiration towards the order, which finds its material expression in the formation of those tools of governing the individual and the collectivities which are the State in the mythical periods of

¹⁰ Idem

humanity.) what brings closer these values is however more important than what separates them.

The inferior cultural value and the inferior political value can have themselves such a comparison. To be sure, for the German philosopher, the first ones as well as the second are generated by the same metaphysical principle : the degraded will to power. This means that they have identical determinations of content (their determinations are the reflection of an abstractising consciousness). There are differences between them, but these are of the same nature as these between the superior cultural values and the superior political values ; so they are of little importance.

Finally we have to note, that if the political value has, in Nietzsche's vision, two aspects, displaying itself, sometimes as superior value (when it is the expression of the authentic will to power) sometimes as inferior value (when it is the expression of the degraded will to power), the economic value has permanently a single face, it still remains as a product of the degraded will to power, inferior value. By giving such an interpretation to the economic value and by recognizing, at the same time that it is indispensable every time in the life of humanity, Nietzsche comes in contradiction with one of the postulates of his thought : the authentic will to power determines all the

activities of humanity in the mythical times of its life, and to affirm the presence of economic values within the scope of these periods amounts implicitly to holding that partially, they are governed by the degraded will to power.

Beyond this contradiction we can, however, retain the basic Nietzschean ideas concerning the relationship between culture and civilisation :

1. Culture as well as civilisation are forms of manifestation of the same metaphysical principle which is the will to power ;
2. As such there are two hypostases of the will to power, (the pure hypostasis and the degraded hypostasis), so also there are two types of culture and civilisation. (superior and inferior) ;
3. The values of culture and partially, the values of civilisation are divided into superior and inferior values (the only partial adherence of the values of civilisation to this classification is due to the fact that one of these values, the economic value is permanently presented as an inferior structure of life.)

We shall now shift and analyse in details the interpretation that Nietzsche ascribes to the concept of value : Nietzsche contests the idea that value should be an ideal of suprahuman essence, underlying its adherence to the actual existence of man.

The concept of value

The values should be those objects or those properties of the objects which human existence devises in view to its preservation as will to power¹¹. We can observe that Nietzsche ascribes to value two meanings : that to be an object created by human existence (for the aforementioned aim) and that to be a property of an object, conferred to it by existence (in the same aim). At first sight it should seem that in the content of the general definition of value enter two subdefinitions more or less opposed between them. To be sure, however, those two subdefinitions or those two meaning of the concept of value are, in the last analysis identical in Nietzsche's vision. The identity of essence between these is motivated in two modes. First, Nietzsche holds that the object of value as well as the value of an object (value as main property of an object) are specific forms of objectification of the will to power or, in a more accurate formulation, they are those existential forms in which the will to power is embodied in order to be able to keep itself as will to power. But he goes as far with the speculation as to suggest that we discover the identity between the object (real) posited as value, and the property (quality) of the object as value, also at a more concrete level of determinations : the object (real) -he shows- is nothing but a system of relationships between many existential properties, between many

¹¹ Ibid.

viewpoints, or appreciative judgements aimed at preserving the object as centre of "domination"¹², as an expression of the will to power, but the properties of an object (ie the viewpoints the appreciative judgements uttered as regards that object, the qualities which are established as such only by an act of evaluation) should be nothing but the essential components of this one or this very object (expression of the will to power) in its fundamental content.

From the foregoing we can reformulate the definition given by Nietzsche to value in the following way : value is the concrete form in which human existence posits itself in view to preserving itself as will to power, and further more we can affirm that this definition merges two sub-definitions of which one put emphasis on the fact that, the concrete form is an *object* endowed with a real fundamental quality (natural) or a system of relationships between many real (natural) fundamental properties and the second sub-definition puts emphasis on the fact that it is a fundamental *property* of a real object or this very object when it is given to us as a system of relationships between many *properties* of this kind.

We have earlier shown that, in Nietzsche's conception, the values are elaborations, creations, devises of human life. We can add now that Nietzsche means to change human life in a form of manifestation of the metaphysical principle of the

¹² Ibid

will to power, a primary, essential, original value and to conceive all the other values just as its embodiment¹³.

According to Nietzsche the values are divided in two groups : The group of superior values and the group of inferior values. The superior values as well as the inferior values must be related ,he says, to "a scale of number and measure of power¹⁴". But the first are generated by the authentic will to power, while the second are generated by the degraded will to power ; the first are objectified as authentic mythical structures, the second as degraded mythical structures. The superior values are aimed at keeping unchanged the substance, the essence of the whole content of the life of humanity in the mythical times and, in the (rarest) cases -when they appear within the scope of historical times, at pre-disposing and preparing humanity for a superior stage of its existence (mythical time). But the inferior values are aimed at preserving the fundamental structures of historical existence. The superior values (the values which assure the efficient collaboration of the affect with the intellect) act in conformity with the original principles of human life (principles which derive from a mythical vision on existence), nevertheless the inferior values. (the values which crack the solidarity of the two energies and isolate themselves in the frozen ocean of reason) act against the authentic spirit of human existence and the superior sense of its evolution, and

¹³ Nietzsche F. Gai Savoir in op. cit. Tome II P.646

¹⁴ Nietzsche F. Par delà le bien et le mal in op. cit. Tome II P. 645 Nietzsche looks for the ideal pattern of the metaphysician philosopher in the time of the Ancient Greeks and he discovers him in the person of Heraclitus.

therefore can be defined as nihilistic values. The negativity or the nihilism of the inferior values does not derive from the fact that they should be the expression of a supra-natural power, which should be in principle hostile to man, but from the negativity or nihilism intrinsic to the individual fall into the universe of history the individual who refuses to give to his life a status of actual independence, imagining himself that it is in the hands of a supra-natural being, who dictates to him his principles and the norms of his activity. It emerges from here that we must not see in the nihilistic values the echoes in human consciousness of a divine consciousness, the transparencies of a supra-natural universe, the emergences of an ideal world which transcends man's life, but rather the projection, of a mystified human consciousness, which imagines itself that there is a world formed only with ideal essences.

Both types of values represent, thus, the concretisations, objectifications, exteriorizations of some natural and not supernatural contents and determinations, of a human and not suprahuman contents and determinations (divine) ; in the superior values are embodied human existence as authentic will to power what amounts to saying that their generating substratum is mythical consciousness, the mythical attitude, vision, but in the inferior values is embodied the degraded will to power, what

amounts to saying that their generating substratum is abstractizing, rationalizing consciousness.

Though they are creations of two different forms of manifestation of human existence, the superior values as well as the inferior values are related to one and the same criteria of hierarchisation -mythical existence : are defined as superior values those values which assure the stabilisation of the mythical hypostasis of human life or prepare man, still captured in the chain of history, in view to a possible overtaking of this one to the benefit of the mythical stage of life, and as inferior values those values that fight, denigrate and refuse the existential structures of mythical type. So we cannot say with some exegetes of Nietzsche's thought that Nietzsche has a relativist vision on culture, because he does not relate its values to absolute norms, principles, criteria. We shall not deny that some Nietzschean texts invite to such an interpretation, but do not represent the authentic spirit of Nietzsche's thought, they are nothing but the consequences of the irritations of his critical sensibility in contact with the interpretations which apply to the values, norms and criteria of hierarchization which pertain a so called suprasensible supranatural divine world. So, -as we have shown- Nietzsche refuses to believe in the permanent validity of some principles, norms, criteria of hierarchization, but he considers that all these do not emanate from

a reality transcendent to human existence, but rather are immanent to this one, more precisely, they are immanent to existence of mythical type.

The superior cultural values

The superior cultural values are the expressions or the representations of one and the same vision on existence : the mythical vision. One could say that there is nothing but the variations in which, sometimes one, sometimes the other of the specific determinations of the myth appears in the foreground, without, however, that this way the other determinations should be eliminated from their content.

A superior cultural value is not, absolutely independent of the other superior cultural values, because, as mythical value, it encompasses, beside its own contents, the contents of all the other cultural values. For sure, every superior cultural value has its characteristics, its individuality. But this is not due to the fact that it should comprehend determinations and significances which do not enter into the component of the other superior cultural values, but rather it is due to circumstances of absolutely different nature : on the one hand, the circumstances that its strictly particular determinations are more numerous than those heterogenous to them, and on the other hand the circumstances that it develops its strictly particular determinations at

the explicit level of its structures meanwhile those heterogenous to them are left to develop at

the implicit level of those structures

Now we shall shift and see the specific of each superior cultural value, considered individually.

For example, the theoretical superior values. In Nietzsches conception, this value is always objectified under the form of mythico-imaginative metaphysics. Asking itself what are the ultimate principle which governs existence in its whole, the mythico-imaginative metaphysics puts forward only hypothetical answers. As superior theoretical value, metaphysics attempts to encompass the world into a fictive system of explanation (to notice that, by proceeding this way, it comes in continuation of the very manifestations of life, which are enigmatical¹⁵), but into an authentic fictive system of explanation, what means, in the last analysis, that it is always, by the channel of this fictions, an expression of the human subject realised as unity of all his faculties of the soul. The mythico-imaginative metaphysics refuses with persistence the search of the truth, and claims that in fact there is no truth in the sense of certainty about existence and that could be nothing but degraded mythical fiction, that is an abstract expression, a product of pure reasoning.

¹⁵ Nietzsche F. Généalogie de la morale quoted by Frateanu Vasile in op. cit. P.178

Within the scope of the mythical times in the life of humanity, the mythico-imaginative metaphysics plays, beside the other superior cultural values, the role of preservation of the whole of the principles of life specific to these periods, but within the scope of the historical stages in its existence, it plays the role to work in view to the upsetting the old tables of values and to legislating¹⁶, new ones. Within the historical periods occurs a permanent struggle between the philosophies which intend to introduce a system of values materialised as authentic mythical structures and those which endeavour to maintain a system of values understood and embodied as "truths", as degraded myth, as suprasensible world, in the universe transcendent to human universe : these ones have become "free spirit" the seconds are not yet liberated from the belief in truth, in the suprasensible world, in the universe transcendent to human universe : these ones have remained unfree spirit¹⁷.

Afterwards, Nietzsche analysed the specifics of the superior ethical values. The superior ethics, he holds, appear by constraint (as appears, beside, any ethics¹⁸), by taming the human instincts and affect, by their spiritualisation and they are constituted as a totality of norms of behaviour and theoretical principles¹⁹ which meet the innermost demands of human nature (and not the imperative formulated and fixed by a supranatural being). The ultimate aim of the superior ethics is the building of the

¹⁶ Nietzsche F. Par delà le bien et le mal in op. cit. Tome I P.633

¹⁷ In the vision of Nietzsche, the theoretical principles of ethics represent but the most essential forms, most abstract forms of expression of the norms of moral behaviour. According to him there is not any difference of content between ethics and Morals

¹⁸ Nietzsche F. la Naissance de la Tragedie quoted by Frateanu Vasile in op. cit. P.178

¹⁹ The thesis of dissociation between good and evil according to the support that the moral actions give or do not give to the process of stabilisation of the existence of mythical type does not appear in an explicit way in the works by Nietzsche. It is present, however, at the implicit level of the ideatic discourse.

totality of the individuals which compose the human species in conformity with the ideas about goodness and liberty of mythical thought. From the viewpoint of the mythical conception on existence, the good man, the perfect man the noble and dignified is he who activates in view to maintaining the social structures and the spiritual principle specific to the mythical times in the life of humanity (succeeding in maintaining them and preserving them, he marks them -as Nietzsche says- with the seal of eternity²⁰). Or in view to overtaking the historical periods in this life to the benefit of the mythical times. There is but a single criterion of assessment whether the deeds of men are goods or evils : their utility for preserving the mythical structures of life or for the progress of human life towards its mythical form of manifestation; the deeds that exert a fruitful influence in this direction are good deeds, those which exert an influence in the opposite sense are evil fictions²¹.

The superior ethics ascribes to the concept of good a more encompassing content than that which is ascribed to it by the inferior ethics (of which prototype is christian ethics). For the superior ethics, the good does not come down to being composed of what the inferior ethics consider as selfishness, narcissism and indifference before men. In the conception of the superior ethics, the good action can be the expression of what the inferior ethics considers as altruistic and disinterested

²⁰ *Crepuscles des idoles*, Tom II, p. 965

²¹ *Ibid*

consciousness, as well as what it considers as selfish and interested consciousness. The single condition that must fulfill the actions of men to be assessed as good, is that, they should help human life to maintain themselves as mythical forms of manifestation or to develop towards this direction. Therefore, what from the view point of inferior ethics is either good, or evil, from the view point of the superior ethics can be exclusively good (or exclusively evil). The superior ethics proceeds, so, to a totalisation and equivalence of the human values, attributes and actions which in the vision of the inferior ethics are irreconcilable opposites.

The superior ethics do not activate however only in view to forming man as "good" man (in the aforementioned acception of the term), but rather in view to forming him as "free" man. In its perspective to build a "free" man amounts to doing away with the anarchy of the instincts, to becoming conscious that your task is to form yourself as a whole²², as a complete being, so, as a being which introduces into harmonious equilibration all the energies of the soul, and to realise yourself as such. Thus, man become free when he conquers the idea that only on himself depends his formation as a complete, noble, dignified man as superior man²³, and he takes action for this purpose.

²² Crepuscule des idoles in op. cit. Tome II P.995

²³ Ibid P.968

We cannot end the analysis of the interpretation given by Nietzsche to ethics, without indicating that in some of his works of maturity time (mainly the Genealogy of moral.) there is another vision of superior ethics than what we have presented above. Sometimes Nietzsche conceives the superior ethics as a totality of rules and behaviour and theoretical principles which consecrate the victory of the "Masters" on the "slaves", of those who are endowed with an outbursting energy on those tired and passive, of those powerful on those weak and in the last analysis, of the unleashed senses and the aggressive instincts on reason. The superior ethics should be an ethics instituted by Aristocracy (which is a warlike class par excellence and it should be composed with a series of appreciative norms, judgements and principles which express the consciousness of superiority of group, that the members of the aristocratic caste have as compared with other men²⁴, the consciousness that they, the aristocrats, represent a superior race characterized by a powerful corporal constitution, a flowering health and outbursting force²⁵.

It is interesting how the aristocratic ethics interprets those fundamental concepts of ethics, that is the concepts of good and evil. In its vision, the idea of good designates the following human features : the frantic energy, the instinct of domination and, contempt (the pathos of the distance) which some individuals have for the others,

²⁴ Nietzsche F. Généalogie de la Morale in op. cit. Tome I P.781

²⁵ Ibid P.784

as a consequence of the frantic energy they have at their disposal and the instinct of domination which directs their activity. These should be, besides, the supreme qualities of human being. But only a few part of men possess them trully ; this part should be constituted by the members of the aristocratic class.

So, the "good" man should be the noble, the powerful, the dominating. The noble, powerful, dominating men, by virtue of their feelings of superiority before the others men - says Nietzsche - have the right, to appreciate their own actions as "good", and the actions of the others (the people) as "evil", vulgar, base, men²⁶. They consider that their actions are "good" because it is developed in the spirit of the positive values of human life (these values should be the outbursting energy, activism and instinct of domination), and that the actions of the people are "evil" because they are directed against those positive values of life²⁷. In short the concept of good and evil should have been created by the representatives of the Aristocratic class, in order to name their behaviour, and that of the people ; good should refer to the specific behaviour of the aristocracy and evil should refer to the specific behaviour of the people.

It goes without saying that this latter vision of ethics as superior value can be defined as deeply irrationalist anti humanistic. However, as we have proved, the

²⁶ Ibid P.781

²⁷ Ibid P.789

philosophy of Nietzsche is not in its essence, neither antirationalist (it only rejects the pretensions of abstractizing thought, of mortified reason to discover the ultimate, immutable truths of the world) nor antihumanistic, but rather a meditation with contrary significances, given that it eulogizes the mythical consciousness and imaginative thought. It expresses the belief that humanity has at its disposal the necessary forces, so, at its least, at some periods its life ; it should overtake itself, that is it should pass from an inferior form of existence to a superior form of existence (the mythical form).

How can we explain then the spiritual act by which he decrees the aristocratic ethics as the type of superior ethics ?

It seems to us that in this case, as in many others, Nietzsche allows himself to be dominated by the affects and, as a consequence, elaborates an interpretation which swerves from the authentic spirit of his thought.

Exceeded by the conception specific to christian ethics, that good should be an obligation imposed, and transmitted to man by God and, so a value of which essence is of suprasensible nature, Nietzsche sometimes proceeds to the mere reversal of the principles of this conception, and builds the vision of a type of ethics (which he pretends to be superior to the christian ethics), in which good represents the act of satisfaction of the instinctual wants of the affective impulses and is realised thus as a pure sensible value. However, the interpretation of superior ethics as aristocratic value

does not meet the authentic spirit of Nietzschean ethical philosophy. As we have shown, according to the authentic spirit of his philosophy the mythical consciousness and imaginative thought are supreme values in the life of man. For Nietzsche, the superior ethics is the mythical ethics this -he holds- is the ethics which defines its intrinsic values as the objects of human wants and demands and discovers that in them man is manifested as a sensibilised spirit.

Nietzsche gives a very personal interpretation to the religious values. Before we begin the analysis of religious values it is worth asking oneself the question whether Nietzsche is an adversary of religion in its whole ?

Some consideration on the part of the German philosopher strengthens us in the conviction that the answer is positive. Here is for example a categoric text :

Until now, none religion has ever contained any truth, neither as dogma, nor as parabol, because each of them originates from anxiety and necessity and has filtered into existence through misled ways²⁸

In the past, however, Nietzsche is more supple in his comment : he negates any positive content of ideas in the monotheistic religions, but he does not proceed in the same way when he refers to the pagan religions. Unlike the monotheistic religions -he says- the pagan religions do not propose to us a system of representations and

²⁸ Nietzsche F. Humain trop Humain in op. cit. Tome I P.503

concepts in which life as unity of the opposites, is negated but rather, a system of representations and concepts which affirm life as a totalising phenomenon of opposite contents²⁹. Nietzsche gives as example of positive religion the cult of Dionysos in the Hellene³⁰. This cult should have insuflated to the ancient Greeks a tragic optimistic vision on life, that is, it should have helped them understand that life is composed of contradictory elements, that its superior significance, of metaphysical essence, imposes on it to realise itself as it succeeds sometimes to build itself in conformity with this suprem requirement, without closing itself, however, never difinitively in such totalising structures.

However, Nietzsche does not content himself either with this particular concept of religion, or with the general concept (ie traditional concept of religion) given that -he holds- religion institutes, somehow, a distance between man and some so-called spiritual superior powers, which are deemed factors of creation and destruction of his existential universe. Nietzsche aims at doing away with the idea of suprahuman spiritual power in general and that of supranatural being or supranatural beings (the ancient God is dead, he says³¹) especially, and the traditional conception about the sacred, in accordance with which the sacred is the character of those absolute forces which transcend man and arouse in him a feeling of veneration, a feeling of fear and a

²⁹ Nietzsche F. *L'antichrist* in op. cit. Tome II P.1093

³⁰ By analysing the Dionysian mysteries, Nietzsche does not realise however, that these ones have fundamentally nothing in common, from the viewpoint of the principles, with the Hellenistic polytheistic religions (of the Homeric times), because, as it has been shown by many authors, these religions manifest evident monotheistic tendencies.

³¹ Nietzsche F. in *Gai Savoir* op. cit. Tome II P.206

feeling of the mystic state. He attempts to replace the traditional religion with another form of religion, aimed at liberating human existence from the domination of some illusory (he believes) transcendent forces and at conferring to the very existence the supreme value. This form of religion -the single one which should be characteristic to the true mythical times in the life of humanity- needs to resort to the deification of the very men ; (*should not we, after this great achievement - the killing of God- become ourselves Gods ? asks the mad man*³²) and the sacralisation of the very existence³³, that is its transformation -as unity of the opposites, and impenetrable enigma- in single value of reference for the attitudes and manifestations of man. We could say that Nietzsche proposes to us the institutions as supreme religious value, a kind of curious and paradoxical form of atheistic religion.

Afterwards, Nietzsche eulogizes the superior artistic values which, as we have seen, he defines as a modality of expression of mythico-imaginative consciousness. The great art is the beautiful art, that is the art in which man posits himself as complete being, as a being which ties together into a totality matter with spirit, the sensible and the suprasensible, the affect with the thought, as a being in which is realised the harmony of the opposites. We have to notice, finally, that the language of

³² Ibid P.132

³³ Nietzsche F. quoted by Vasile Frateanu in op. cit. P.185

the beautiful art is, as the language of other mythical values, a language of imaginative nature, but as compared with the language of those latter, it has a greater "density".

It is worth to remember now that Nietzsche does not speak only about superior cultural values but rather of superior value of civilisation, that is superior political value. A more detailed analysis of the interpretation that Nietzsche gives to political values should not be devoid of interest³⁴.

As we have shown, if the superior cultural values are, in Nietzsche's conception, the creations of mythico-imaginative consciousness (consciousness as expression of will to power), the inferior cultural values are, according to him, the product of abstractising, rationalising consciousness (consciousness as expression of mystified degraded will to power).

The inferior cultural values

The inferior cultural values, he says, have in essence, an identical content (content of abstract nature) and follow the same goal (the inveiglement of truth, truth which as we know is in his vision, a mere degraded myth). We can say that they are variations of the one and the same values : the degraded myth, the suprasensible fiction. Constituting themselves as suprasensible structures the inferior cultural values impede the development of human life, in the direction of its superior finality, so its

³⁴ Nietzsche believes that the problem of organisation of the relationships between the members of a collectivity, the problem of social order can be resolved but if we embrace the viewpoint of the mythical conception. From this viewpoint, the internal norm of the political value should be liberty.

realisation as harmonious unity of the sensible determinations with the supra-sensible determinations. Due to these functions which the inferior cultural values play, Nietzsche gives them the denomination of nihilistic values.

Though they have in essence, an identical content (a content of abstract nature) and follow the same objectives (the inveiglement of truth) or in other words, though they are structured, in fact, as variations of one and the same superior values -the degraded myth- the inferior values, enter into an irreconcilable, internal conflict, generated by the moral attitude specific to the consciousness which creates them (abstractizing consciousness). This consciousness is a guilty individualistic selfish conscience (it has been formed by the cancelling of the positive affects in the life of man or by the reducing of their role, by the splitting out of the original unity affect - intellect- by their splitting up.) it is normal that also the values in which is objectified this consciousness should borrow its moral attributes, displaying this way, the show of the extraordinary endeavour performed by each of them in order to subordinate the other values. Despite the immensity of the endeavour performed in this direction, none inferior cultural value can succeed, however, in subordinating the other inferior cultural values and in becoming a supraordinated value ; the inferior cultural values will continue to be determined, in a transcendental way -so to speak- by a supreme value-

the degraded myth- of which finality (the quest for certainty, and truth) is reiterated at the level of each of them, but, surely in specified way.

Man's desire to encompass the world in which he lives into a system of true explanations finds its expression -holds Nietzsche- in three variations of inferior theoretical values : the inferior theoretical value constituted as rationalist abstractizing metaphysics, that constituted by positivist philosophy and finally, that constituted as particular science and so as a whole united body of knowledge about a certain class of phenomena.

The rationalist -abstractizing metaphysics (of which original form should coincide with Platonic metaphysics) is characterised by the fact that it attempts to explain the whole structure of a so called supra-natural, supra-sensible world, and sees in the natural world a copy or degraded image of the supra-sensible ; for it, natural existence is an existence composed of "appearances" or decaying elements of the ideal essences (truths) which compose the transcendental existence. But to separate the world, in the way of Platonism, of Christianity or of Kant (who is, according to Nietzsche, a thinker of Platonic trend), in a world of appearances and a world of truths is -says the German philosopher- a pure aberration³⁵. There is but a single world and this world is the world of nature (in a broad sense of the term) and, as

³⁵ Nietzsche F. Crepuscule des idoles in op. cit. Tome II P.968

a consequence there is not any metaphysical principle transcending natural existence, but rather metaphysical principles immanent to it. The concept of suprasensible world, of true world is a devise devoid of sense, a false fiction. The true world, the suprasensible world, the world of pure reason -concludes Nietzsche- equals to nothingness³⁶

So, there is, but a single world, the world of nature (human and non human nature), and we must imagine this one as being composed of sensible determinations, which tends to equilibrate themselves within the scope of a totality. Their perfect equilibration (or almost perfect) can be realised only by human being³⁷. About the human being who has realised it, we must say that he has succeeded in moulding the consciousness as a consciousness of mythical type. But the process of equilibration does not always succeed, and this failure -which is a natural event for the historical periods in the life of humanity- has as consequence the appearance of a man dominated by the abstractizing, rationalizing consciousness.

The will to come to certainty, to truth is also the internal drive of positivist philosophy. To be sure, positivist philosophy no longer pretend, as the rationalisto-abstractizing metaphysics proceed, that it could possess the absolute truth of existence, that it could discover the generating causes of the phenomena, specifying

³⁶ *ibid.*

³⁷ in the polemic, he makes with the main theses of the rationalisto -abstractizing metaphysics of Platonic inspiration, Nietzsche sometimes comes to declare that the original and fundamental determinations of human existence are the determination of the instincts and affects. (Ref. Crepuscule des idoles).

that it could but offer to us only relative truths concerning the whole structure of the world, that it is but able to make inquiry by the channel of observation and arguments, about the circumstances in which the phenomena are produced and to establish their constant relationship of similarity and co-existence, that is their laws of functioning. But even if their are not absolute, but only relative, the truths designated by positivist philosophy are nevertheless *truths, certainties*³⁸.

So, the positivist philosophy is grounded, on the conviction that the value of truth (be it even relative) is a real value, that truth, in the sense of adequation even - imperfect- of the intellect with the things, can be established, and the imprecision, the vagueness, and the error can be eliminated. But this belief in the supremacy of truth (be it even relative) -says Nietzsche- is grounded in the old Platonic belief that "truth is divine", that truth is the most important of all values. And we must see, then in positivist philosophy but a variation of the old rationalist -abstractizing metaphysics³⁹.

Finally, it is also the desire of certainty, of truth, which constitutes the innermost drive of the particular sciences. each science constitutes for itself a system of concepts and principles, that it considers as values of truth, though -holds Nietzsche - they are but fictions, false fictions (or degraded myth). By designating truth as suprem value, the particular sciences prove us that they did not succeed in untying

³⁸ Nietzsche F. Gai savoir in op. cit. P. 246

³⁹ Ibid

themselves, as it is believed, from the common stock of rationalistic -abstractizing metaphysics on which they have initially grown ; it is evident- says Nietzsche that they are also characterised, like this metaphysics, by the quest for truth.

The inferior ethical value also aims at imposing on men some "truths", some "certainties". In the conception of the inferior ethical value, good is at its origin, a supra-sensible value, a value which defines the attitudes and the manifestations of the divine being. The divine being, holds this ethics, seeks to transmit to man his main ethical attributes (which designates the very content of his goodness : love, pity, altruism, abnegation, spirit of justice) and to help him build himself in this perspective on pain of punishment he will endure in the coming life, if he does not conform to these prescriptions and imperatives.

The principles of this ethics of religious inspiration (Christian in the first place) which derives, holds the aforementioned form of ethics, from the sphere of suprasensible imperatives and requirements (god being he who imposes these imperatives and requirements) constitute in fact, according to Nietzsche, conceptual devices of the so-called "evil -conscience"⁴⁰ of man, that is, that conscience which intellectualizes and abstractizes in an excessive way the instinct and the affects of the individual, ending by cancelling their original determination, their lively content, power

⁴⁰ Nietzsche F. Généalogie de la morale in op. cit. P.829

and dynamism. The evil conscience uses the abstract concepts of love, compassion, altruism, renouncement, abnegation, spirit of justice etc..., in view to raising human life to a superior stage from the qualitative view point, but it activates in fact in an opposite sense : by using this abstract concepts, it determines first of all, the reduction of the forces of the sensible values of human existence, and finally, the destruction of the original unity of the life of the soul of the individual (unity between sensible and suprasensible, between affect and intellect).

The tendency to abstractizing the life, manifested by the inferior ethics, comes - says Nietzsche- from a resentment which the weak have against the powerful, those devoid of vitality and creative capacity against those endowed with creative energy and dynamism. The inferior ethics should be the product of the so-called man of resentment. It should be the prevailing ethics in the historical times in the life of humanity.

The inferior religious value, according to the German philosopher -assumes as internal truth the idea that above the individual empirical existence, inconsistent, perishable and finite existence, there is, as infinite eternal absolute principle, God, who activates either as factor of its creation, or as factor of its destruction.

There are many important inferior religions⁴¹ and they ascribe to the concept of God a somewhat different interpretation : For the pure monotheistic religion (Judaism, Christianity and Islam) God is a single and personal being who creates and governs the world, remaining separated and transcendent to it⁴², for the Brahmanism (Pantheistic religion) God is a spiritual, impersonal power which created the world, becoming the very soul of the world, becoming the immanent principle of the world on the one hand, and remaining on the other hand, nevertheless distinct from it, into an absolute stillness and indestructibility, and finally, for Buddhism, God (in the extent which one can speak about the presence of such an idea within the scope of religion) is the very non -being, the absolute nothingness (Nirvana) opposed to life.

These differences of interpretation, holds Nietzsche, are nevertheless but differences of shades. If we consider the things in depth, we can observe that all the aforementioned religions do nothing else but name the nothingness with the term "God". This process is surely transparent in the case of Buddhism and even of Brahmanism (of which concept of God -says Nietzsche- should have drawn inspiration from Buddhism.- Brahman, as abstract spiritual principle, distinct from the *Brahman* hypostasied as phenomenal world and revolving around this latter as a kind of dissolving and absorbing entity should constitute the negation of existence, should

⁴¹ We have to observe that though Nietzsche contests, in the last analysis, the totality of the religious practices and attitudes, he does not introduce among the inferior religions, the pagan (polytheistic religions).

⁴² We (have to) notice that according to Nietzsche's opinion the idea of transcendent God should not be the characteristic of the original christianity, preached by Jesus, rather the later doctrine, created by st Paul and other mystic thinkers.

represent the very nothingness⁴³ unlike the case of pure monotheistic religion. In the conception of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, God is not an impersonal principle, but rather a single and personal being, who creates and governs the world. But God conceived this way, is but a fiction of the mind, a fiction without any contact with reality, a false fiction. Nobody can notice the existence of such a God, of such a supreme "cause" of life. This God does not exist or he is the very negation of existence -Nothingness (sanctified, sacralised, divinised)⁴⁴. To these conceptions of God and about his relationships with natural existence, these religions add, naturally, also the idea that man's life on earth, his empirical life, is nothing but a test, and a preparation in view to the life of hereafter, or in view to his extatic union with God (with Brahman or with Nirvana). Man -they specify- must live his empirical existence (existence which, in the conception of Judaism, Christianity and Islam is limited to a single life, but in the conception of Brahmanism and Budhism is resolved into a series of successive life) in conformity with some moral and rigorous norms and prescriptions, because it is only this way he will be able to take part to the positive attributes of a superior form of life (life of hereafter) or to realise a state favourable to this union with the absolute, with God (with Brahman or Nirvana). Judaism, Christianity and Islam hold that these moral norms and prescriptions have been revealed to man by a

⁴³ Nietzsche F. Généalogie de la morale quoted by vasile Frateanu in op. cit. P.191

⁴⁴ Nietzsche F. L'antéchrist quoted by Vasile Frateanu. In op. cit. P.191

transcendent God, who decides, that in his life of hereafter, man should receive an eternal reward if his actions performed along his life on earth he has put the imprint of his moral virtues, and an eternal punishment if on his actions he has put an evil, sinful conscience⁴⁵. In exchange, the Brahmanism and the Buddhism, which do not know the idea of a transcendent God, consider that the moral precepts that man must follow in view to his continuous purification along his successive reincarnation and in view to his positing into a disposition of the soul favourable to his union with the absolute, are spiritual data to which he (man) attains only by his own endeavours. Beyond these differences between the two groups of religion, it is however evident that both remove the centre of gravity of man's life into a transcendent sphere, in the empire of God, what amounts to saying, in Nietzschean terms, that they project it purely and simply in nothingness. The aforementioned religions continuously strive to annihilate the instinctual and affective energies in man's life and one can say that the individuals subjected to their nocive influence end up loosing every thing that is beneficial or vital in instinct⁴⁶.

Man's life (which is in its original essence an active process, in which are combined sensible elements with suprasensible elements) is cleansed little by little, of the fundamental instinctual and affective energies, becomes governed exclusively by

⁴⁵ In relationship with the way in which the idea of sin, and of reward and punishment of man in the life hereafter is reflected in Christian religion, Nietzsche specifies that these ideas do not belong to the original teaching of Christianity, of Christ, but rather to the later development of the Christian doctrine (Ref. the antichrist)

⁴⁶ Nietzsche F. L'antéchrist in op. cit. P.1099

the logical principles and comes to mortify itself, and finally turns to nothingness. All the aforementioned religions activate this way, as fierce adversaries of life. But though all are nihilistic religions, almost nowhere is manifested so violently the hatred against the senses, against the pleasures of the senses, against pleasure in general⁴⁷, than in Christianity. Therefore, -says Nietzsche- we must conclude that in the most furious will to sanctify and divinize nothingness is present in Christianity⁴⁸.

Lastly, the inferior artistic value, says Nietzsche, appeals to the tendentious propagation of the ideas of the inferior ethics, destroys the equilibration and harmony of content and form and, finally, even the internal unity of the form. The inferior art is ugly art, which conveys the religious theses.

In conclusion we can say that Nietzsche holds the thesis of the existence of two types of culture : the type of superior culture and the type of inferior culture : the first should represent the expression of authentic will to power, the second, the degraded will to power. The first should characterize specifically but not exclusively the mythical times in the life humanity, meanwhile the second should characterize exclusively the historical periods in the life of humanity.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

CHAPTER FIVE

- Nietzsche and African condition

In this last chapter titled Nietzsche and African condition, we do not purport to speak about Nietzsche's thought on Africa because such a thought, such a reflection on Africa, does not exist in Nietzsche. his reference to Africa we only know from the passage in Ecce Homo where he ridiculed the German emperor who thinks that it is his Christian duty to free the slaves of Africa¹. There will be a comparative study of African metaphysics and Nietzsche's metaphysics, African theory of knowledge and Nietzsche's theory of knowledge, African ethics and Nietzsche's ethics, African religious thought and Nietzsche's religious thought, and lastly, African artistic thought and Nietzsche's artistic thought. We shall also examine the social and economic concern of Africa so as to bring out the positive implications of Nietzsche's thought for the development of Africa.

I- Nietzsche and African traditional thought

From the start, we need to say that we are in perfect agreement with the Senegalese L. S. Senghor and Allasane Ndaw, and the Nigerians K. C Anyanwu and Jim I Unah². that there is an African thought as different from western thought, an African mindset as different from western mindset, as a result of different historical and cultural

¹ Nietzsche Friedrich. Ecce Homo P1188 in œuvres complètes tome II.

² For the aforementioned authors, see the general bibliography.

experiences. However, we also share the viewpoints of scholars like G. Sogolo, A. G. A Bello, Dele Balogoun and Kola Owolabi³, that this African thought or mindset is not opposed to Western thought or mindset. There is not a relationship of exclusion between the two ; they are rather complementary ; moreover the African pattern of explanation of the world is not alien to Western explanation and vice-versa.

Nietzsche and African metaphysics.

Metaphysics can be classically defined as the study of the ultimate principle of reality. as I. Unah has put it : «if metaphysics generally deals with the question of reality or what constitutes reality, we can define African metaphysics as the thinking on reality which is predominant among Africans⁴».

The approach to reality by Africans is somewhat specific. For the African, the spiritual and the physical intermingle . Therefore, reality is an inseparable mixture of mind and matter. Mind and matter, the spiritual and the physical have never been apart. African metaphysics also postulates the reality and interdependant existence of spirits⁵. Having seen what constitutes reality for the African we shall shift and see the metaphysical principle.

This principle has been studied by many authors ; among others we have Placide Tempels in his Work Bantu philosophy, Marcel Griaule in his Work Conversation with

³ Sogolo G. Foundations of African philosophy : a definitive analysis of conceptual issues in African thought (Ibadan University Press 1986). Bello A.G.A. Review article on the African Experience in the American market place by K.C. Anyanwu in Imodoye : a journal of African philosophy vol I N°1.

⁴ Unah J I op cit P 338.

⁵ Idoniboye : the idea of an African philosophy, the concept of spirit in African metaphysics. Second order vol II N°1 1973 P. 84

Ogotomeli, Maya Doven : The living God of Haiti in which he gave a thorough exposition of the voodoo cult among the Haitian, Alexis Kagame ref. La philosophie bantoue rwandaise de l'être, Basile Kossou in Sê et Gbê, Dynamique de l'existence chez les Fon, and Jacob Agossou in Gbeto, Gbedoto selon les Sud-Dahoméens.

Each of the aforementioned works from different backgrounds and motivations has the same point of convergence, that is, the metaphysical concept of being in the negro-African is Force ; every living thing, all objects are endowed with force.

Let us study in detail some illustrations of this ontology of force.

Revd Placide Tempels and Bantu philosophy (1945)

Tempels speaks about a conception of being and universe, which is specific to the Baluba, even to the Bantu and, why not, to all African.

For Tempels the fundamental concept of the Bantu and in general of African is what he termed «vital force⁶» ; force is the thing in itself and being is force, force is not an accident, it is the very being in its totality actually realised and actually capable of a more intense realisation as he puts it :

We can conceive the transcendental notion of "being" by separating it from its attribute, "force", but the Bantu cannot. "Force" in his thought is a necessary element in "being" and the concept "force" is inseparable from the definition of "being".

⁶ Tempels Placide. Bantu philosophy. Transl by DR. A Rubbens (Présence Africaine. Paris 1959) P.30

There is no idea among Bantu of "being" divorced from the idea of "force". Without the element "force", "being" cannot be conceived⁷

Thus, according to Tempels, Bantu philosophy is defined basically by a theory of forces ; it is a dynamic conception of being, which is different from Western ontology which is a static conception. In fact Greek philosophy was looking for the immutable, the stable which lies beyond evolution, that is which does not change. Basically, being for Plato for instance is the idea static in its intelligible structure, non subjected to corruption or degeneration. But then the negro-African conception is exactly the opposite. It is in the dynamism of the being that is located the true reality.

Tempels is the first scholar who had the merit to draw attention on the systematic character of negro-African thought : that Being-Force has three main features.

- this vital force can increase or decrease ; it can be strengthened. All the behaviour of black African is linked to this capability to increase
- the aim of everybody, of course is to increase his being. Some people have more vital force than others.
- In the hierarchy of forces God is the being who provides to himself his own force ; it is him who transmits force to the other beings

⁷ Ibid P.34

Alexis Kagame and the Bantu-Rwanda philosophy of being

With a more rigorous methodology, Alexis Kagame in his work La philosophie bantoue Rwandaise de l'être set up a classification grounded in a Bantu language : the Kiryarwanda. This classification is adopted by Janheinz Jahn (Muntu) who uses the concept of force described by Tempels and underlines that «man is a force, everything are forces, space and time are forces». In fact the revd father Alexis Kagame has taken up again the study on the Bantu conception, but from the linguistic structures of a particular Bantu language the Kiryarwanda, and, so, he puts into evidence the articulations of reality and a world-view. For Kagame language is a kind of grill through which it is possible to grasp the way Bantu perceive universe. He tried to put up the table of Bantu ontologic categories ; by doing so he aimed at realising what Aristotle realised with Greek language. In other words he thought that by scrutinizing the grammar and the grammatical categories of Bantu language he could discover the articulations of reality. unlike Aristotle who got ten (10) categories, he got four (4) categories

- the first category is the Umuntu which designates man, that is the being endowed with intelligence.

- The second category is the Ikintu. It refers to the things that is being devoid of intelligence

These two categories are equivalent to the Aristotelian category of substance or reality.

- the third category is the Hantu which designates at the same time the category of space and time. Kagame makes us observe that Aristotle used to separate space and time . Meanwhile for Aristotle and Greek thought space and time are two separate categories, for the Bantu, they are not separated that is why he uses the same word to designate the two.
- The fourth category is the Ukuntu which designates modality, and encompasses all the other categories enumerated by Aristotle (quantity, quality, relation, action, passion, position and possession).

These categories refer to the linguistic stem Ntu. Ntu is the foundation of the manifestations of being in its diverse existences in the universe. For Janheinz Jahn⁸ this Ntu is the universal force which never expresses itself without the scope of its manifestations, Muntu, Kintu, Hantu and Kuntu. As Alassane Ndaw put it :

thus it is set up before us a mens Africana for whom
the whole reality of universe is one, the western dichotomy
of mind and spirit is alien to him⁹.

⁸ Janheinz Jahn Muntu transl in French by Brian de Martinoir. (Ed. Seuil 1961). See chapter IV PP 105-133

⁹ Alassane Ndaw op cit P.245

Revd Jacob Agossou and Dr Basile Kossou Fon ontology.

We meet again the same theory of Being-Force in the Fon of Dahomey (Benin) the Mina of Togo and the Ewe of Ghana.

A keen analysis of the conception of being among these aforementioned people reveals to us that what Kagame designated by the stem Ntu is equivalent to what the Fon, the Mina and Ewe designate by the Sê. However it does not appear in the language of these people as a linguistic stem but rather as a full word, a full concept.

As revd father Jacob Agossou has put it : «the Sê is the essential part of a being, it is the vital principle¹⁰». Basile Kossou affirms that every thing which exists has its Sê. Quoting the revd father Placide Tempels, Basile Kossou says that instead of "force" he prefers to use the terminology "transcendent power¹¹".

We have to distinguish the individual Sê from the greatest Sê (Sêmédo) or Mahu (God) He whom nothing can surpass. The latter is the source of the individual Sê. The individual Sê is the creating power, the transcendent power from which and by which everything (man, animal, vegetable, mineral) has been brought into existence. It is the Sê which gives specificity to the beings. It constitutes at the same time the destiny of each being, so much so that when something or someone perishes, it is said : «that is

¹⁰ Agossou Jacob Gbeto Gbedoto. L'homme et le Dieu créateur selon les Sud-Dahoméens. Beauchesne Paris 1972. P.29

¹¹ Kossou Basile Sê et Gbê. Dynamique de l'existence chez les Fon du Dahomey. P119

the trajectory of its Sê». The Sê, vital force or transcendent power cannot be confused with the soul (Lindon).

At the end of the day we have to acknowledge with Senghor two basic features of black African ontology :

- there is a hierarchy of vital forces which do nothing but express the integration of the universe to the family or more accurately said, the dilation of the family to the dimensions of the universe.
- The eminent place that the living man, the existent occupies in the hierarchy of forces as Senghor put it :

Man is the centre of universe, which has not other aim than strengthening his force, to make him more living, more existing, to realise man in person¹².

Lastly there is a specific feature of African metaphysics we cannot overlook, that is causality¹³ which plays an important role in African worldview

Now if we compare Nietzsche's metaphysics to traditional African metaphysics the first thing which can capture our attention is the strange resemblance between the ultimate principle in Nietzsche, the will to power which tends to increase in everybody whatever his social rank and the African vital force that every African strives to increase.

¹² Senghor L. S. op cit P 266

¹³ See I. O. Sodipo 1973 Notes on the concept of cause and chance in Yoruba traditional thought. Second order : An African journal of philosophy. Vol II N°2 July 73.

At any rate, something is sure, like Nietzschean metaphysics, African metaphysics is a spiritualist monism both admit as ultimate principle of reality a spiritual principle : will to power on the one hand, vital force on the other.

Another striking resemblance is that like Nietzschean thought, African thought also rejects the Cartesian dualism matter and spirit. According to Nietzsche, mythical human reality (the authentic reality) ties together the sensible determination with the supra-sensible determination, into a harmonious whole. But then, to quote again Alassane Ndaw, we shall say that

«it is set up before us a "Mens Africana" for whom the whole reality of universe is one. The western dichotomy matter-spirit is alien to him».

Furthermore, we know that Nietzsche's metaphysics is a metaphysics of human existence, and the same applies to African metaphysics, man, says senghor, is the centre of universe.

Another resemblance between African metaphysics and Nietzschean metaphysics is that both are of mythical type. As will say Alassane Ndaw,

«myth appears as the fundamental element of negro-African thought¹⁴».

However, we know that Nietzschean metaphysics is a metaphysics of immanence for it makes reside inside the things the ultimate principle of the things and

¹⁴ Ndaw Alassane op. cit P.95

not outside them. But then it is difficult to draw such a conclusion from African metaphysics. To be sure, the ultimate principle of the thing Ntu in the Bantu, or Sê in the Fon, Mina and Ewe resides inside the things and can be equated with the very thing, so, there is immanence. But we must acknowledge that the greatest Ntu or greatest Sê is God, so, there is transcendence.

At any rate, the point of complete divergence is about the problem of causality. Meanwhile causality is a specific and fundamental feature of African metaphysics¹⁵, Nietzschean metaphysics rejects causality and advocates the principle of eternal recurrence. It may be praiseworthy to mention that the principle of eternal recurrence is not alien to African thought but here it applies only to the conception of historical time, not to the whole manifestation of existence.

Nietzsche and African theory of knowledge

According to K. C. Anyanwu, the question of African theory of knowledge is

how do these people justify their beliefs ? What basic assumptions govern those beliefs ? How do they know the things they claim to know ? What logic, that is what standard does the mind follow in order to arrive at the knowledge of things ?¹⁶.

He goes on to hold that if the African people have beliefs and knowledge about reality, these must be the products of human experience. However human experience has something encompassing. Human experience cannot be equated with scientific

¹⁵ Ozoumba G.O. in the Nigerian Journal of philosophy Vol 16 N°182. 97/98

¹⁶ Anyanwu K.C. op cit P83.

experience. Meanwhile scientific experience calls for self-detachment, human experience considered as a whole does not call for self-detachment, human experience, says Anyanwu, is personal experience.

To know the truth about personal experience,
a person must put himself in the context of that
experience, to feel, live with and grasp its relation¹⁷

as regards the main question raised by African theory of knowledge as has been stated by Anyanwu, we have a sound answer in the work of the Senegalese, scholar Alassane Ndaw La pensée Africaine (African thought). According to Alassane Ndaw, unlike the whole history of western thought which can be read under the prism of a perpetual interrogation on the value of knowledge, for the African, knowledge is a cosmic reality, since it is of the same substance with the cosmos. Because of its interweaving into Being African thought does not pose the problem of skepticism¹⁸.

Alassane Ndaw will contend further that the intellectual procedures set forth for the organisation of knowledge is different when we pass from a type of society to another. Organisation of knowledge is the result of various system of logic specific to various types of society. If we compare the African system of logic with the western one, we can find a clear difference. In the first one, the procedure starts from a single basic principles, which is the common denominator which introduces unity and coherence into the world of variety and diversity : it is the principle of life which does

¹⁷ Ibid P.84

¹⁸ Ndaw Alassane op cit P.118

not have opposite and which unifies complementarities. On the contrary, in western thought it is rather duality which is the foundation of knowledge : two absolutely opposite principles are set forth.

Still, according to Alassane Ndaw, one can term Negro-African thought «symbolic praxis» for it reconciles the theoretical discourse with the practical discourse that western rationalism has unfortunately separated, casting doubt on the value of knowledge. There is in the African, even if he does not ignore doubt and error, a serene confidence in the truthfulness of the senses and the cognitive superior functions¹⁹.

It emerges from this comment of Alassane Ndaw that in the process of true knowledge, the dichotomy epistemic subject and epistemic object is alien to African type of knowing. Likewise in the African theory of knowledge the classic rival theories, empiricism which claims that the world is known only through sense, and rationalism which claims that knowledge is acquired only through reason, is alien to traditional African thought.

Still, from the foregoing, we can understand Anyanwu when he puts that :

the African culture makes no sharp distinction between the ego and the world, subject and object. In the conflict between the self and the world. Since the African world is centred on the self, every experience and reality itself is personal. In other words, whatever reality may be, it

¹⁹ Ibid PP 117-118

must have reference to personal experience. Personal experience refers to totality of man and his faculties. Such experience does not address itself to reason alone imagination alone, feeling and intuition alone, but to the totality of a person's faculty²⁰.

Thus in order to get sound knowledge, the African sees, feels, imagines, reasons or thinks or intuits all at the same time. Anyanwu will conclude that *«the method through which the African arrives at the trustworthy knowledge of reality (God, man, spirit, society, social facts) is intuitive and personal experience²¹»*

Lastly we must agree with A. F Uduigwomen that there is no way one can explain African theory of knowledge without a reference to the tradition that is orally expressed. What makes a man acceptable in any given African society is the ability to recount those principles of the society's tradition. «it can therefore be safely concluded that oral tradition constitutes for African a vital source and carrier of knowledge²²». In this regards, we know that Plato acknowledges the high value of oral knowledge, as compared to written knowledge when he affirms in the Phaedra that writing yields as result to make the soul forgetful and empedes the people from exerting their memory²³.

There is no way to compare African traditional theory of knowledge with Nietzschean theory of knowledge if any. Meanwhile, for the African, knowledge of the world is quite possible, -the problem of skepticism according to Alassane Ndaw is

²⁰ Anyanwu K.C. op cit PP 86-87

²¹ Ibid P. 94

²² Uduigwomen. The place of Oral tradition in African epistemology. In foot marks on African philosophy (oop press 1995)

²³ Plato. Phaedra. 275ab

alien to African thought, Nietzsche on the contrary is skeptical as regards knowledge. According to him "there is no truth", the world of truth has been abolished, all our assumed knowledges are mere fictions. However there is a specific feature in African theory of knowledge which meets the requirements of the true spirit of Nietzsche's thought that is, the valorisation of the senses, imagination and feelings in the process of knowledge, to the detriment of reason. This anti-intellectual, anti-rationalist feature of African traditional thought is consonant with Nietzsche's thought.

Nietzsche and African Ethics

From the outset we have to state that according to the scholars in the study of African thought, like Placide Tempels and Basile Kossou, African moral thought necessarily derives from African metaphysics, African ontology. In this line of thought, Placide Tempels says that for the Bantu, and for the African in general

every act, every detail of behaviour, every attitude and every human custom which militates against vital force or against the increase of the hierarchy of muntu is bad, conversely, every detail of behaviour, every attitude and every human custom which militates in favour of vital force is good²⁴.

Likewise, in the same vein we could say with revd father Jacob Agossou that in African ethical thought, bad and evil are defined according to life²⁵. And as John Mbiti

²⁴ Tempels Placide op cit P.79

²⁵ Agossou Jacob. Concilium N° 126 1977 P. 58

put it «the essence of African morality is that it is more societal than spiritual, it is a morality of conduct rather than a morality of being. This is what we might call dynamic ethics rather than static ethics, for it defines what a person does rather than what he is²⁶»

Now we shall present here this ethics as it emerges from the works of scholars such as the Nigerian Bolaji Idowu, the Ghanaian Kwasi Wiredu, the Nigerian Sophie Oluwole, the Senegalese Assane Sylla and lastly, the Beninese Basile Kossou.

Bolaji Idowu and Yoruba ethics

In his works, Oludumare God and Yoruba Belief²⁷, professor Idowu analyses the weight of religion in Yoruba culture. He devoted a whole chapter to the relationship between the supreme God of the Yoruba (Oludumare) and moral values. He holds that in the Yoruba, the moral values derives from the very nature of God ; as he puts it :

Morality is certainly the fruit of religion (and that they do not make any attempt to separate the two... what have been named *tabu* took their origin from the fact that people discerned that there were certain things which were morally approved or disapproved of by the Deity. So the Yoruba call *tabu Ewo* things forbidden things not done²⁸.

However, Idowu is not the only one who holds this viewpoint ; for instance Awolalu and Dopamu, co-authors of the book West African traditional religions²⁹, hold virtually the same thesis when they pointed out from the perspective of African culture, that moral values are the fruits or offspring of religion and not just an invention. Like

²⁶ Mbiti John African religions and philosophy. Heinemann educational Books L.T.D 1982 P.214.

²⁷ Idowu Bolaji. Oludumare, God and Yoruba belief. London Longman LTD 1962

²⁸ Ibid P 146

²⁹ Owolalu and Dopanu. West African traditional religion Ibadan Onbonje Press and Book industries LMT 1979

Oludumare the authors claim that among the Akan of Ghana, Nyame (the Akan Name of God) is regarded as the ultimate originator and upholder of moral law³⁰.

However most of eminent African scholars do not partake in this viewpoint, they think like Tempels that

It is difficult to decide and to set out what may have been preserved among primitive peoples of what was originally revealed in explicit terms by God concerning moral law³¹.

Kwasi Wiredu and Akan Ethics

The Ghanaian scholar holds that the familiar concept of a dependence of morals on religion derives from an intellectual confusion and a misunderstanding of the relationship between the metaphysical assumptions and practical norms. To this must be added some gross mistakes as regards the description of indigenous moral life

if you ask an ordinary Akan why it is that it is the duty of the children of a deceased person, as distinct from any other relations, to dig his or her grave, the answer is most likely to be : "that is how it has always been done", but if you ask him why one should abstain from neighbour's wife, he would almost certainly reply : "would you like the same if it were done to you ?" or suppose you were to ask him : why should one help a person in distress ? The characteristic Akan answer would be aphoristic : "Mortals need help, or the plight of your fellow man is your plight"³².

we can see that to the two last questions which are moral questions, the Akan who is yet very religious will not tell you that it is a divine prescription. He justifies his

³⁰ Ibid P.217

³¹ Tempels Placide op cit P. 78

³² Wiredu Kwasi «Morality and religion in Akan thought» in philosophy and culture Ed. by philosophical association of Kenya 1983 P.7

moral behaviour by the argument of social welfare. It ensues that in the Akan moral thought there is no room for divine revelation. Morality is rather grounded in rational reflection on human welfare, and the codes of behaviour derive from the individual reflection on whatever enables to promote human interests or whatever can contribute to the harmonisation of such interests. In short, according to Wiredu the gods interfere in morals only in order to punish those who do not respect moral codes. Thus, it is the fear of divine sanction which helps the individual to perform virtue, but it is not this fear which creates the sense of moral obligations. According to Wiredu one of the source of the misunderstanding of the relationship between religion and ethics is the confusion between tabu and morals. Tabu are divine prescription, not morals.

Sophie Oluwole and Yoruba morality

According to Sophie Oluwole, to found morality on religion and to accept religious elements in moral system are two distinct things. To found moral on religion amounts to holding that the moral norms are of divine origin as in the Jews, or to justifying the moral norms by referring to gods. It is quite true that the Yoruba could tell you that god Ogun does not allow him to steal or that god Oya forbids him to lie. But if you ask him why it is not good to steal or to lie, he will provide you empirical reasons. From here it ensues that the gods sanction the moral norms not because these ones should be

from divine origin. The ordinary Yoruba is not concerned with knowing the source of moral norms but he is rather concerned with how to justify them. Moral system is not a divine institution, but rather a social institution expressing the ideals which can facilitate life to men. Oluwole also makes distinction between tabu (prescribed by gods) and moral rule founded on an utilitarian principle³³.

Assane Sylla and Wolof ethical thought

In his work La philosophie morale des wolof³⁴, Assane Sylla acknowledges that in general, metaphysico-religious postulates used to serve as foundation of ethics. However he holds that in the Wolof it is the converse which is true. Though religious feeling is inseparable from morality, it will be a mistake to found wolof ethical thought on religion. In the Wolof, morals rather stems from the only intellectual and emotive faculties of man³⁵. The beliefs and common representations that society have created and implanted in the mind of the individuals act in their consciousness so as to coincide with the voluntary adherence and help to maintain social order and the safeguard of morality³⁶.

Basile Toussaint Kossou and Fon ethics

In his resounding work «Sê et GBê, Dynamique de l'existence chez les Fon³⁷», Basile Kossou holds that unlike western ethics which is a precepts -based ethics to

³³ Oluwole Sophie. The rational basis of Yoruba ethical thinking. In whichcraft, reincarnation and the God-Head. (Excel Publisher 1992)

³⁴ Sylla Assane, La philosophie morale des wolof. (Ed Sankore Dakar 1978)

³⁵ Ibid P.31

³⁶ Ibid P64

³⁷ Kossou Basile. Sê et Gbê, dynamique de l'existence chez les Fon op cit

which man must endeavour to conform himself, that is, a theoretical ethics, the moral thought of the Fon of the former Dahomey is rather action-based, that is moral duty is not posited a priori ; it has a personal character and is edicted by the Fa (system of divination) spokeman of God. «moral necessity appears as a necessity to act. We are far from the concepts and principles of classic moralist³⁸»

This does not give in any way a sensualist or materialist character to ethics because for the Fon the supreme achievement in their life has an eschatologic character. «the Fon do not believe in the complete extinction of their life in the hereafter. They believe in the spiritual permanence and infinitude³⁹.»

However one could ask whether the determination of duty of the individual by the Fa does not deprive the latter from its liberty the sine qua non condition for moral action. Quite the contrary, it is the individual who freely decides to consult the Fa but once the verdict of the Fa is known he makes it his duty to obey so as to avoid the harmful consequences which could result from disobedience.

Lastly we must acknowledge that the interpreter of the Fa is a man in flesh, and not a disincarnated spirit, committed into a society of which expectations, of which aspirations he shares.

Now let us compare African ethical thought with Nietzschean ethical thought.

³⁸ Ibid P. 163

³⁹ Ibid P. 76

If we take for granted the thesis by Bolaji Idowu, that African ethics derives from divine prescription we should be in contradistinction with Nietzsche's ethical thought. According to Nietzsche, the source of moral norms is the will to power, an immanent spiritual energy.

However, as we have previously stated, there are two possible interpretations of Nietzsche's ethics.

The first interpretation postulates that is good whatever helps to increase, to enforce, to maintain the will to power ; is bad whatever contributes to enfeeble the will to power. Such an interpretation is consonant with the interpretation by Tempels to Bantu ethics. That is, is good whatever helps to increase the vital force, is bad whatever helps to decrease the vital force..

The second interpretation of Nietzsche's ethical thought is the distinction of two ethics. The ethics of the masters and the ethics of the slaves. Such an interpretation is alien to African culture. In traditional Africa we know that all men are brothers and there is social duty of solidarity.

Finally the interpretation given by many African scholars, that African ethical thought derives from social requirements rather than divine prescription, is also consonant with the spirit of Nietzsche's ethics.

Nietzsche and African religious thought

The religion of the Fon people is fetishism. The dictionary defines this word as «the cult of fetish», this definition is elastic and vague. But then the religion of the Fon is especially the cult of the forces of nature, the spirits under material forms. Basically this cult was addressed, at the beginning, to a single spirit which cannot be but God. In order that this monotheism without dogma should escape the temporary evanescence in a people deeply religious by his feeling it should need a miracle. The religious inclinations of the Fon contribute to the fast degeneration of the monotheistic beliefs Dazzled by the splendour of nature and constantly afraid by the forces of nature, the Fon realised his weakness before the forces of nature. Thus the Fon finally came to confuse God with the manifestations of his actual presence in the natural forces (thunder, cyclone) and in the creatures (animals, plants), which dominate his imagination. However, the personification of these forces leading to the confusion of God with his manifestations did not do away with God. The Fon imagine God as governing the world to the way of a terrestrial sovereign, that is with the help of lesser gods as ministers. He puts them in charge of everything created and they form around him like satellites, a brilliant court⁴⁰.

This short account of the religious beliefs in the Fon of the former Dahomey also applies to all black African people. No wonder when Mbiti affirms that :

«according to African peoples man lives in a religious universe, so that natural phenomena and objects are intimately associated with God. They not only originate from him but also bear witness to him. Man's understanding of God is strongly coloured by the universe of which man is himself part⁴¹»

⁴⁰ Quenum Maximilien. Au pays des Fon. Us et coutumes (Larose Paris 1936) P. 65

⁴¹ Mbiti John op cit P. 48

For the African, nature is not an empty impersonal object or phenomenon. God is seen in and behind the objects and phenomena of the world, that is why African traditional religion has been termed animism. We find in the African :

surrounded by a universe of tangible and visible things : man, animals, vegetables, star etc the Blackman has always perceived that in the depths of these beings and these things, was something powerful he could not describe, and which animate them»

That is why African religion has been termed animism, everything is sacred for the African, everything is inhabited by a soul, an active force, which is an emanation of divine force. Even minerals are deemed inhabited by a force. Such is how we can explain that many foreign scholars were mistaken and termed African of idolatry while seeing them invoking stones.

This belief, far from excluding that of the supreme Being rather founds it⁴².

In this line of thought the famous African writer Hampate Bâ put :

the African man is a born believer, he did not wait for the revealed books so as to acquire the conviction of the existence of a force, a power, source of the existence and motor of the actions and motions of the beings. However, for him, this force is not outside the creatures, but rather dwells inside them. It is in every being. It gives him life, care for its development and likewise, for its reproduction⁴³.

From the foregoing is raised the problem of monotheism. African religions have been termed polytheism by western scholars. Paradoxically all the African scholars devoted to the positive study of African culture, for instance (among others) John Mbiti, Leopold Senghor, Alassane Ndaw, Bolaji Idowu etc, are of the view that African religion cannot be termed as polytheistic.

⁴² Ndaw Alassane op cit P. 236

⁴³ Ibid P 226

Grounding his argumentation on the idea by Paul Tillich⁴⁴, that polytheism is a qualitative and not a quantitative concept, that it is not a belief in a plurality of gods but rather the lack of a unifying and transcending ultimate which determines its character, professor Bolaji Idowu will observe that "the lack of such a unifying and transcending ultimate" does not apply to African religions ; at the end of the day he termed African religion as a "diffused monotheism."

I do not know of any place in Africa where the ultimacy is not accorded to God. That is why, because this is very true of the Yoruba, I conclude that the religion can only be adequately described as monotheistic. I modify this monotheism by the adjective "diffused" because here we have a monotheism in which there exist other powers which derive from Deity⁴⁵.

A priori there is no way to compare African religious thought with Nietzsche's thought since, as we know Nietzsche has no religious conviction. Worst of all he is an implacable adversary of all religions. According to him the existing religions have done more harm than good to humanity.

However, if we accept for granted the western assessments about African religions as primitive polytheistic, that African mind can only think in concrete terms, since it is incapable of having a concept of God as an abstraction, then such assessments are in perfect consonance with Nietzsche's thought for two reasons :

- Nietzsche is an adversary of abstract thought.

⁴⁴ Hampate Bâ. A. Aspects de la civilisation Africaine. (Présence Africaine) 1972 P10

⁴⁵ Tillich Paul Systematic theology vol I 1953 P. 246

- Nietzsche ascribes to polytheism a positive content as he puts its *«In polytheism were prefigured free thought and multiple thought of man : the force to self-create new and personal eyes, always new and personal eyes : so that for man only, among the animals, there are not eternal horizons and perspectives⁴⁶»*

Moreover we find in Mbiti a characterisation of African religion which does not contradict Nietzsche's thought : *«there is neither paradise to be hoped for nor hell to be feared in the hereafter. The soul of man does not long for spiritual redemptions, or for closer contact with God in the next world. This is an important element in traditional religions, and one which will help us to understand the concentration of African religiosity in earthly matters, with man at the centre of this religiosity⁴⁷»* Such a religion where the transcending being does not require faithful obedience, where there is nothing to be feared is consonant with the thought of the apostle of the "free spirit". On the contrary if we admit of the viewpoint of the many African scholars who advocate monotheism, then we must acknowledge that African religious thought is dissonant with Nietzsche's thought, for according to him monotheism has been until now the greatest danger of humanity⁴⁸.

⁴⁶ Idowu Bolaji : African traditional religion a definition (Fountain Publications 1973) P. 135

⁴⁷ Nietzsche Friedrich gai savoir in œuvres complètes (op cit) volIII P 140

⁴⁸ Mbiti John op cit P.5

Nietzsche and African art

According to K. C. Anyanwu «*If the west is a world of great rational thought and analysis, the African culture is a world of great art and synthesis, the African gives an artistic solution to the duality of experience, hence creates a world of aesthetic qualities and continuum*⁴⁹».

The forms of art we can find in the different regions of Black Africa and in the different ethnic groups, often present dissimilarities of style, however we discover that they possess in common a certain number of general characteristics which prevail over the differences of styles.

These general characteristics are as follows :

- 1) Generally the concept of art for art's sake is alien to Black African. Black art is functional and utilitarian that is, it is not an entertainment, not an ornament which is added to the object. It gives to the object its efficiency. Joseph Ki-Zerbo says that «the created object serves in the daily life ; seat, pipe-case, mask... in the latter case, it is mainly a support of force which is useful for its religious efficiency ; there is no detail of the work of art which has not its meaning, its symbolism, that is its usefulness⁵⁰.»

⁴⁹ Nietzsche F. op. cit P. 139

⁵⁰ Anyanwu K.C. op. cit. P. 87

Thus, the masks are not conceived in order to be contemplated as work of art, but rather in order to be used-during religious, social, ritual ceremonies. Their aesthetic character resides in the form and not in the aim or in the content which are religious or ritual. However there are some exceptions. For instance, the Fon of Dahomey make brass castings of animals and of people at work or in processions which have no religious or didactic intent. They are made as objects of beauty by brass-smith and in this respect are to be considered examples of art for art's sake.

- 2) Black art is a collective art. «The work of art is made by all for all⁵¹». For instance, the black smith as polytechnician of magic and art, the first artist according to a Dogon myth, who by the rythm of drum made the rain fall on earth. However «beside those professionals there are, the anonymous croud which sings, dances, sculpts, paints⁵²»
- 3) African art is a committed art. «It commits the person...in a future which will be henceforth present to him as, an integral part of his self, what is striking is the variety of the execution according to the personal temperament and to the circumstances⁵³»
- 4) Black art is vital. «the widely spread opinion that art is a luxury and serves not vital purposes is, at least, as far as Africa is concerned, a myth. for, apart from having

⁵¹ Ki-Zerbo Joseph. Le monde africain Noir (Hatier 1972) P.75

⁵² Senghor L.S. L'Esthétique Africaine in liberté I (seuil 1964) P. 207

⁵³ Ibid P.207

well-known social and religious functions, much of African art also plays a prominent part in the sphere of political leadership, that is in governing the people⁵⁴». Art accompanies and performs the activities of production. By this, we must understand not only spiritual production, not only work in the western sense, but also social activities of the different groups, of which we can mention leizures⁵⁵.

- 5) black art is characterised by rhythm. The rhythm is undefinable. «It is the most sovereign expression of African soul⁵⁶». Robert Simmons⁵⁷ witnesses the capacity of the African to coordinate multiple systems (more pronounced in the art of music and dance) where its use of polyrhythmic structures is unintelligible to those people whose sensitivity is not sufficiently developed to hear or observe several distinct rhythmic patterns simultaneously. Actually the African dances with all his body, the left can follow the drum, the head, the balafo, the right the castanets. As Ki-Zerbo puts: «The syncopated, charming, majestic and powerful rhythm of Black Africa echoed by the American continent, floods now the world under the species of jazz and Afro-Cuban Tune⁵⁸».
- 6) African art is non-naturalistic. The African artist does not aim at reproducing reality. there is not a faithful imitation of nature. For instance a particularity of African sculpture which puzzles the western artist is the disproportionated size of the head.

⁵⁴ Ibid P.207

⁵⁵ Douglas Fraser and Herbert M. African art and leadership (Univ. Of Wisconsin Press 1972) P. 7

⁵⁶ Senghor L.S. Eléments constitutifs d'une civilisation d'inspiration négro-africaine P.281

⁵⁷ Mveng E. L'art d'Afrique Noire. Ed. (Cié Yaoundé) 1974 P. 86

⁵⁸ Simmons Robert H. L'art Africain dans les collections américaines. (Frederik Prayer Publisher 1960) P.8.

For long they have believed that it should be the uncleverness of the African sculpter who pays more attention to the details than to the proportions. But further investigation realised in many African countries have revealed that this hypothesis is wrong. In fact the disproportion is deliberately chosen. The African art is more conceptual than representative, given that the aim of the artist is not to provide a faithful reproduction of something, but rather, it is the expression of an essential concept, or a conviction related to that concept.

7) African art is very often anonymous. «Traditionally the items, mainly if they are religious use, are the work of unknown crafts men⁵⁹»

There are two main reasons for this fact :

- African culture is a culture of orality and the artist does not sign his work with a written label as his western counterpart
- It is assumed that the true authors of the work of art are the gods, the artist being a mere tool in the hands of the gods.

However Gene Blocker contends that the argument that African art is anonymous is false, for, he says,

careful analysis of individual works, along with extensive field research, reveals that individual artists are not anonymous but are identifiable on the basis of stylistic considerations⁶⁰.

⁵⁹ Ki-Zerbo. J. op cit P. 78

⁶⁰ Ibid P. 26

Lastly we have to mention two fundamental functions of African art.

a) Religious functions

Art enables the African to relate himself to Deity. So the work of art serves to the cult. The work of art has a religious sense. For instance if any body gets into trouble the magician of the village, consulted can advise him to sculpt a fetish. However, there are some exceptions. Among the Yoruba for instance it is the custom to offer kola nuts to visitors : a wealthy man would offer them in an elaborated carved lidded bowl kept especially for the purpose. This is an illustration of art with non religious purpose.

b) Social functions

Art is not separate from the generic activities of man. In various occasions, birthdays, weddings, funerals, sowing festivals, harvest festivals even festivals for the dead (egungun), we have songs and dances.

Moreover the works of art in Africa serve to establish a hierarchy between the different social stratum. One can situate the place of a man in a given society in Africa from the artistic items he possesses. For instance in the Bamileke society, there are chairs which are strictly reserved to the chiefs⁶¹.

⁶¹ Blocker H. Gene. The role of creativity in traditional African art in Second order. An African journal of philosophy vol XI N°142. 1982 P.7

Now if we compare African art with Nietzsche's art we observe that the two have in common the rejection of the theory of art for art's sake. Further more there is something common in the African and in Nietzsche, that is the praise of the "spirit of dance" merged with the "joy of life". These are elements Nietzsche always eulogizes in the Dionysian spirit. Senghor on his part finds that these elements are also in the African soul⁶².

K.C. Anyanwu characterizes African art as great art. But then the great art in Nietzsche vision is art which is a modality of expansion of mythico-imaginative thought. Such a characteristics is consonant with African thought. So, to some extent Anyanwu's characterisation of African art as great art meets the requirements of Nietzsche's great art. Further more Anyanwu says that the African gives an artistic solution to the duality of experience, hence he creates a world of aesthetic qualities... But then we know the famous statement by Nietzsche that *the world is justified only as aesthetic phenomenon*.

Thus, aesthetically speaking African world coincides with Nietzsche's world.

However we know that according to Nietzsche the inferior art, the ugly art is that one which conveys religious theses. But then, we know that African art is at the service of

⁶² Pauln Denise. Les sculptures d'Afrique Noire, (P.U.F 1956 P. 8)

religion. So, African art viewed through this perspective should be an inferior, ugly art in a Nietzschean artistic vision.

At the end of the day we can draw two main conclusions from our comparison of African traditional thought with Nietzsche's thought :

- The first is that we must acknowledge with Anyanwu that «It is impossible within the African cultural reality and experience to speak of art as if it were detached from religion, religion as if it were detached from mythology and speculative thought, speculative thought as if it were detached from mythical feelings and these feelings as if it were detached from moral principles and political ideas⁶³»

The second is that, we can observe that African thought has many similarities with Nietzsche's thought.

We could even dare affirm that Nietzsche's thought is to some extent African thought less religion. Thus Nietzsche is closer to we Africans than we can imagine.

II- Nietzsche and African development

One should go a wrong way if one thinks that a reading of Nietzsche's discourse only at the explicit level should provide us saving solutions for African predicament. It

⁶³ Senghor L. S. Liberté | op cit.

is quite the contrary. Nietzsche is well known as an advocate of the exploitation of man by man ; he is an anti-democratic and elitist thinker.

Nietzsche rejects the argument of the so called cruelty of slavery. Cruelty is at the heart of every civilisation, «it is the law of all cultural praxis⁶⁴»

According to Nietzsche we should not deceive ourselves about human nature. Man is an animal which measures the variation of his feeling of power to the cruelty he inflicts to his peers. A fierce beast lives in each of us and expresses itself in each of our deeds, that is why the exploitation of man by man is one of the fundamental conditions of all society. It is «inherent to the very nature of life, it is a primordial organic function, a consequence of the will to power as such which is the very will to life⁶⁵». To live amounts essentially to dispossessing, to injuring, to doing violence to the weak and the foreigner, to oppress him harshly, to imposing him one's own forms, to assimilating him or at least to exploiting him⁶⁶».

Nietzsche dreads more than everything socialism which he designates as «the degeneration of humanity⁶⁷», because according to him socialism is against life, against the blooming of the will to power.

⁶⁴ Anyanwu K.C. op cit P.78

⁶⁵ Wotling P. Nietzsche et le problème de la civilisation, Paris1960

⁶⁶ Nietzsche F. Par delà bien et mal Aph 259 In œuvres complètes op cit

⁶⁷ Ibid

Nietzsche objects violently to democracy not by conservatism but rather because he was convinced that the setting up of hierarchy, that the restoration of the pathos of distance is the sine qua non condition for the emergence of a superior type of men.

Nietzsche remains, despite all opposition, an elitist thinker. For him the civilisation of the future will be constituted on a base composed by laborious men put in charge of production for an elite which will be devoted to the higher tasks. So Nietzsche's political ideas present many similarities with Platonic republic. Indeed Plato's republic is organised on the base of a strict hierarchy. The right man is at the right place⁶⁸.

Nietzsche takes up again the Platonic principle of a hierarchical classification of the society. The men endowed with a superior spirit will be at the top of the politic pyramid. Philosophers, «the physicians of civilisation» and the artists, not many, are part of the social elite⁶⁹. The guardian of the city, who are endowed with superior physical force will be in charge to attend to the enforcement of the laws. The third group, all those who exert a professional activity «these intelligent machines» who do not excel neither by their physical force nor by their spirit.

This parallel between Platonic philosophy and Nietzsche can surprise because we do not retain in general the relationship Nietzsche-Plato, but their obvious and

⁶⁸ Ibid Aph 202-203

⁶⁹ Platon. La republique, livre II 374.

irreducible opposition. Such a reading used to neglect the admiration of the German philosopher for Plato's politics.

Thus we have argued that at the explicit level of Nietzschean discourse, there is nothing to draw for the development of Africa. However it would be in the advantage of the African to be interested in Nietzsche at the level of the implicit discourse which is intimately linked to the critique he did about western decadent civilisation which has two main features at the societal level that is the critique of the idolatry of economics and the critique of the enfeeblement of culture.

The idolatry of economics

Modern civilisation, polluted by its need to possess everything, changes *money* into god. Nietzsche does not deny at all the necessity of money, however, if money has a sense it is but as a *means* to develop human life. But then, more and more the rich men change it into an absolute, that is a tool of slavery. Whence this utopian ideal : «only he who has spirit should have good ; otherwise possession is a public danger⁷⁰». Indeed the possessor who «does not know how to use the free time which is given to him by his good, will always continue to long for possession : this aspiration will be his entertainment, his stratagem in the struggle against trouble⁷¹». By the means of money the reign of appearance risks to be substituted to the reign of spirit ;

⁷⁰ In Plato. The artists were not part of the social elite.

⁷¹ Nietzsche F. la volonté de puissance op cit P. 206

by the means of money the wealthy man, spiritually poor, can give the illusion of human wealthiness «he can take the mask of culture and art ; he can buy this mask». This is a supreme vice : not only the purchasing of material goods but also the purchasing of spiritual values.

In short, money has become in contemporary society the mock of the will to power enslaved by the reactive forces. To write that money is *god* is but an allegoric formula : money is today one of the miserable substitutes of the incarnated God. In Daybreaks Nietzsche wonders what is the force which pushes the three fourth of the high society to more or less fraudulent stock exchange transaction. The desire to possess more money ? Of course yes. Unfortunately here we must understand that money means the very sense of existence. The impatience and the disproportionated love for money always involve victims «Whatever in the past was done for the love of God, is, now done for the love of money⁷²». «Money is power, glory, pre-eminence of dignity, influence⁷³». From Christianity to the present economic universe there has been a shifting and not an overtaking : in both cases there is a purchasing-or repurchase : Formerly it was God directly who was for sale, today it is the whole value of a society, «of which trade is the soul» :

He who devotes himself to trade wants to tax everything... according to the needs of the consumers, not according to his own needs. For him the core of the question is to know who and how many consume

⁷² Nietzsche F. Gai savoir Aph 350 op cit.

⁷³ Nietzsche F. aurore in op cit Aph 204

such products. It is the type of taxation that he uses instinctively and ceaselessly -about everything, so, also about artistic and scientific productions, the work of the thinkers, the scientists, the statemen, the peoples, the parties and even whole times : he seeks information about whatever is created, about supply and demand, so as to fix for him the value of a thing⁷⁴.

In the liberal universe, the evaluation of the values even spiritual, is done according to quantitative norms : everything is reified, indifferntiated, homogenized.

This reduction of the individuals to the same is particularly sensitive in the modern *labor*. like the necessity of money, Nietzsche does not deny the necessity of the industrial transformations but he says that one should not forget the tremendous human cost of which these transformations are paid.

First of all machinism deshumanizes. Nietzsche evokes the time of craft industry where every object underlined the individual distinctions, when the furniture and the clothes were symbols of reciprocal respect, meanwhile today it seems that we live among a society of slaves, anonymous and impersonal.

But then the deshumanization by the machine is enrooted into a deeper deshumanization : the fact that the worker is himself treated as a machine by the industrialist, not only in the direct relationship of individual to individual, but also in the process of work. Nietzsche deplores the fact that the industrialist depreciates the work and treats him as a thing and deprives him for instance of any decision -making. The

⁷⁴ Ibid Aph 203

only criterion in the industrial modern work is *utility*. And if apparently the industrialist is concerned about the physical or moral state of the worker, it is only in order that he and his family should be able to serve as long as possible, and as efficiently as possible.

Such is the exploitation of the workers, exploitation pushed today to madness by the exploiters. «This exploitation was a stupidity, a theft to the detriment of future⁷⁵»

so, it is from the ground of social economic efficiency that Nietzsche judges the stupidity and cowardice of the capitalist system. He thinks that the situation of the proletariat is worst than that of the ancient slave. However, he does not think (here is the difference between him and K. Marx) that the workers are good men as opposed to the wicked industrialist. He thinks that the workers are also perverted by the liberal ideology.

the spirit of injustice is also pegged in the soul of the
have not, they are not better than the have ; they have no moral privilege⁷⁶».

«If you present to a beast pieces of bleeding meat, then you retire it, so
much so that at the end she starts to roar, do you think that this
roaring means justice?⁷⁷».

The enfeeblement of culture

If with money one can buy everything today even culture, it is that *culture* has become in itself venal.

⁷⁵ Ibid Aph 175

⁷⁶ Nietzsche F. Humain trop humain op cit. Aph 286

⁷⁷ Ibid Aph 452

If one believes that culture has a utility, one should confuse quickly the useful with the true culture, generalised culture is transformed into hatred of the true culture⁷⁸.

Nietzsche dreads the generalisation of culture only because this generalisation does not stop to change into lost of the irreplaceable value of everyone «public opinion, private laziness⁷⁹». To standardize culture, amounts, for the moment at least, to changing it into a mediocre thing. «For the same reason that in the big kitchens, one does not cook, by putting the thing to the best, but a mediocre food⁸⁰».

In fact what is striking in the present culture is at the first place its mediocrity :

The philosopher almost believes to perceive a destruction and a complete uprooting of culture, when he thinks about the general haste, the acceleration of this motion of fall, about the impossibility of every contemplative life and of every simplicity. The waters of religion flow away and leave behind them swamps and ponds. The sciences practised without any measure and in the most blind *laisser-faire* are scattered and dissolve every sound conviction ; the classes and cultivated societies are dragged into a grandiose and contemptuous financial exploitation... the scientist professions are no longer leading-lights, among this frivolous anxiety, their representatives become day by day more worried, having day by day less thought, less love. «Everything is being put at the service of the barbarity to come, the present science and the present art are not excepted⁸¹»

⁷⁸ Ibid Aph 451

⁷⁹ Nietzsche F. Volonté de puissance (op cit) P. 188

⁸⁰ Nietzsche F. Humain trop humain Aph 482

⁸¹ Ibid Aph 482

The slavery of the three M, moment, milieu, and mode is diversified into a dozen of vices which Nietzsche detects, in a rhetorical style, in the contemporary culture. For instance *myopia*, which empedes the individual to perceive great perspectives ; thus to the modern man the literary or scientific writings give but the impression of scattered tasks, without link between them, without general views :

he will judge a writing of which whole he is not on state to see, according to some pieces, some sentences, some mistakes⁸².

Nietzsche ironically adds that

it should be premature to purport that for him an oil painting is but a wild heap of blots⁸³

another vice is poverty of *feeling*. The predominance of abstraction, of theory, changes more and more the cultural world into a desert of pityful dryness. Likewise, the inability of originality : as soon as you scratch under the variety of the appeareances, you realise that the modern works are desperately monotonous this emptyness already explains the quantitative inflation of the cultural production -which, besides, finally engenders a professional disgust.

the modern man drags behind him the enormous and heavy building stones of knowledge, which sometimes rumble in his stomach - as the saying goes in the story - this rumble betrays the most singular quality of modern man, the strange contrast between his intimate being to which nothing external corresponds and his external being to which nothing internal corresponds - this contradiction is unknown by the ancient peoples⁸⁴.

⁸² Nietzsche F. 3è considérations inactuelles. Aph 4

⁸³ Ibid

⁸⁴ Nietzsche F 2è considérations inactuelles Aph 4

The intellectual poverty of culture -hardly veiled by its glass and its sophistication - is more deeply, a moral poverty. «the modern man suffers from the enfeeblement of his personality⁸⁵»

Nobody today dares to be himself, «everybody bears the masks and is disguised into cultivated man... if you attack one of these masks, believing that they are serious -because all of them display seriousness- and not puppets- you suddenly have in your hands multicolored tawdry rags⁸⁶». This is just so because the modern man has lost confidence in himself and seeks to dissimulate under the mask of culture his nullity.

an untruthful elegance becomes necessary so as to mask the sickness of haste without dignity. For in the modern man the greedy mode of beautiful forms corresponds to the ugliness of content : the one must be hidden, the other must hide⁸⁷.

Whence this more exact definition of the mock-culture. «to be cultivated means today not to let see how much miserable or wicked you are⁸⁸»

This sickness which is culture is more and more visible in its body, that is *language*. The every day language has become seriously sick, exhausted, «the modern man can no longer make him understood by the means of language⁸⁹»

As soon as some individuals try to understand themselves and to undergo together a common work, they are grasped by the madness of the general concepts, the vertigo of the words⁹⁰.

In short they become slaves of the verb, today when language is decadent.

⁸⁵ Ibid Aph. 5

⁸⁶ Ibid

⁸⁷ Ibid

⁸⁸ Ibid

⁸⁹ Ibid 4è considérations inactuelles Aph 5

⁹⁰ Ibid

However, the major sign of this cultural mediocrity is the discredit of *philosophy*, since by definition, philosophy is the art to analyse the problems in their roots and to elucidate them. But then, into a derision, philosophy has become exactly the contrary : «an opium against every upsetting and innovative tendency⁹¹». Philosophy as consolation is the worst symptom of powerlessness. Yet it is what the mass is expecting, and it is what our so-called present philosophers offer to them. They have changed philosophy into a pastime, a means of existence, a remedy against trouble, a way to appear.

Philosophy in its true and strong sense of experience and risk is ignored. Nobody no longer dare to follow in his inner life the principle of philosophy. Nobody no longer lives a philosophic life⁹².

The fear of philosophy, that is the interrogation which should snatch man from his short visions, does no more exist. But when a society does no longer put itself into question, how could it be sensical ?

⁹¹ Ibid 4è considérations inactuelles Aph 3

⁹² Ibid 3è considérations inactuelles Aph 5

Nietzsche's perspective of development.

Taking into account on the one hand these critiques by Nietzsche to western civilisation and rebelling on the other hand against the ready-made schemes of development which are proposed to Africa, the Togolese scholar Kwakuvi Mawule rightly put :

How can we change something which is dying away, into the parameter of our future ? ...everything has been but sordid manipulations guided by egoistic interest... The day will come when we could expose the untruthfulness and treacheries which have been used and are still used in the North-South relationship⁹³.

We find in Claude Ake an answer to Kuakuvi's concern :

The developed countries have filled the underdeveloped countries with a strong desire for western way of life and the paraphernalia of this way of life. Since the developed countries control the supply of the goods that will satisfy these desires, they are able to exercise power over the underdeveloped countries⁹⁴.

From the foregoing, if we have to find any interest in Nietzsche's thought for African predicament as has been sketched by Kuakuvi and Claude Ake, it should necessarily be at two levels :

- Nietzsche's agonistic conception of social life as it emerges from his critique of western culture and particularly the critique of democracy.
- Nietzsche's plea for the merging together of sensible determinations, with suprasensible determinations, subjectivity with objectivity as only

⁹³ Kuakuvi Mawulé.- «Nietzsche et le fanatisme moral» Paper delivered in the Goethe Institute - Lomé. 1984. P. 10

⁹⁴ Ake Claude. Social science as imperialism. The theory of political development. (Ibadan University Press 1979). P.102

way to achieve a harmonious equilibration in human life. A harmonious development.

Throughout his work, Nietzsche addresses the problem of modern "democratic" culture that has inherited the prejudice of "slave morality" against individualizing action. Beyond Good and Evil 1886 and On the Genealogy of morals 1887 provide the most profound meditation on this theme. In these works, Nietzsche focuses on those structures that inhibit independent action.

In the Twilight of Idols, skirmish titled «My conception of freedom», Nietzsche offers us an account of freedom in the context of a critique of liberalism. The value of a thing he says, lies not in what one attains with it, but in what one must do to attain it. The example he gives is liberal institutions, which cease to be liberal as soon as they are attained. As a result, there is in fact nothing more thoroughly harmful to freedom than liberal institutions, because in their drive towards making everything equal, they undermine the will to power that is necessary for freedom to exert itself in the overcoming of resistance.

In the skirmish 39 titled «critique of modernity», Nietzsche notes that everyone now agreed that our institutions are no longer fit for anything. The problem lies not in

our institutions but in us. We modern have lost all those instincts out of which institutions grow, instincts that Nietzsche describes as antiliberal to the point of malice.

The entire West has lost those instincts out of which institutions grow, out of which future grows : perhaps nothing goes so much against the grain of its modern spirit as this. It is precisely this which one calls freedom.

According to Nietzsche, nations and individuals, which were worth something never become so under liberal institutions : it was a *great danger* which made them something deserving reverence, danger which first teaches us to know our resources, our virtues, our shield and spear, out of *spirit* -which compells us to be strong. Freedom, he concludes, should be understood as something one has and does not have, something one wants, something one conquers. For this reason, it is not liberal institutions but struggle for liberal institutions that is most likely to promote the freedom. Putting Nietzsche's reflection in a contemporary African context, one should say that democracy and development are something to "come", something that we are on the way toward. So we always need to take action⁹⁵.

In creating the symbol of the superman, Nietzsche suggests to us, Africans, that we should cease to adopt a slavish behaviour, before the western partners. We should become superman in order to overtake a form of existence dominated by passivity,

⁹⁵ The merit of such an agonal politics have been explored recently by several political theorists. For example Chantal Mouffe and Michel Foucauld

subjection, extraversion. Time has come when we should put an end once for all to the reign of the present history made by domination and exploitation, that we should become master of our own fate and should direct our will towards ennobling goals.

Last but not least the second interest of Nietzsche's thought for African development is the war he waged against abstract thought as has been promoted by the 19th century positivism.

More precisely, Nietzsche always condemns in his metaphysics, the western development pattern based on abstract thought, without any relationship with the real life, the sensible. As it emerges from his critique of western modern culture, he condemns the material one-sided development without any link with spiritual development. Finally he always advocates an interconnection between the material and the spiritual determinations of existence. Objectivity with subjectivity, the abstract with the concrete, as only means to achieve harmonious equilibration in human life, that is, authentic and sustainable development.

Beside, one must notice that Nietzsche is not alone in condemning the abstract thought generated by positivism. We know that it is the origin of philosophy of life which emphasizes real life to the detriment of abstract thought, it is also the origin of existentialism which advocates that concrete existence should prevail over abstract

thought. The same applies to the phenomenology of Husserl who advocates the merging together of objectivity with subjectivity in human affairs.

Together with those aforementioned western philosophic trends, Nietzsche condemns the short-comings of western pattern of development, that is a type of development conceived only as socio-technological increase which does not take into account human dimension, whence the blatant phenomenon of alienation.

In the under-developed countries, this negative perspective of development is materialized into the structural adjustment-program (S.A.P) which treats man as a thing and not as end -in-itself, and postulates that the only quantitative improvements are able to solve the problem of underdevelopment.

A genuine understanding at every decision-making level, of the Nietzschean perspective of development as involved in his metaphysics will definitely help to invert the negative tendency and to conceive otherwise African development. This change of perspective will lead to conceive a new pattern of development which should associate in a harmonious equilibration the material and the spiritual, the quantitative with the qualitative.

In short, the greatest result expected is a reconversion of the mentalities and an awareness of the fact that we, Africans, should no longer take a pattern of development, a pattern which is dying away.

CODESRIA - LIBRARY

CONCLUSION

It has often been contended that philosophic thought is useless to the development of any country. After Socrates, Descartes, and Rousseau, to mention only these, Nietzsche sets out anew on proving the contrary of this contention. He holds that the "*greatest thoughts are the greatest events*"¹. Otherwise, that philosophic thoughts are the leading force of the world. We must acknowledge that he successfully carried out this challenge and proved that he was a true philosopher, that is a «physician of European culture»

All our endeavour has been focussed on demonstrating the topicality of Nietzsche's thought for contemporary culture and particularly its relevance for African predicament.

In fact, Nietzsche predicted his own fate ; he knew that one day his name would be associated with the memory of something tremendous, a crisis without equal on earth, the most profound collision of conscience².

So it is important to understand that Nietzsche's philosophy is literally about us. It addresses not only his nineteenth century contemporary fellow men, but also his twenty first century readers. Nietzsche expected his writing would begin to be

¹ Nietzsche Friedrich. Beyond Good and Evil op cit P. 727

² Nietzsche Friedrich Ecce Homo. Destiny

understood only after one hundred years and he expressed time and again his feeling of being far ahead of his age.

The course of his history has proved and is still proving that his prediction was right.

There is no doubt as to whether Nietzsche's thought is relevant for contemporary culture ; suffice it to mention a few testimonies in this regards.

For instance, in his work titled The Importance of Nietzsche, Erich Heller acknowledges that for modern German literature and thought it is hardly an exaggeration to say that they would not be what they are if Nietzsche had never lived.

Name almost any poet, man of letters, philosopher, who wrote in German during the twentieth century and attained to stature and influence -Rilke, George Kafka, Thomas Mann, Ernst Jünger, Musil, Benn, Heidegger, Jaspers -and you name at the same time Friedrich Nietzsche³.

To the question why still Nietzsche ? Daniel I. O'ttara, the editor of a journal of post-modern literature and culture acknowledges the omnipresent influence of Nietzsche in America as far as the disciplines of philosophy, cultural history, religious studies and literary theory are concerned. O'ttara went on and isolate what he took to be the three major forms taken by the post-modern appropriation of Nietzsche :

- the hermeneutical / philosophical strain that follows from Heidegger.

³ Heller Erich. The importance of Nietzsche. (The university of Chicago Press 1958). P.2

- The destructive hermeneutics, the deconstructive strain inspired by Derrida.
- And the archeological or genealogical strain informed by Foucault's genealogy of power.

Whether taken in isolation or blended together, these strains of American critical theory are inspired by Nietzsche's recent appearance as post-structuralist strategist of textual power and diagnostician of decadence.

Tracy B. Strong and Michael Allen take, on their part, a similar track in their 1988 collections, Nietzsche's New seas : Exploration in philosophy Aesthetics and Politics⁴, noting the pertinence of Nietzsche's claim to a posthumous birth, they write that "One might say that he has been rebirth again and again as different generations of commentators repeatedly thought they had uncovered his true meaning. They go on to comment that the most recent rebirth of this "most protean of protean thinkers" is different however. For his most recent incarnation, Nietzsche no longer appears primarily as the prophet and purveyor of Nihilism - but as the thinker who marks a kind of ending to ; or at least a rift in, the continuity of the west.

According to Erich Heller, the knowledge which he claims to have, raising him in his own opinion far above the contemporary level of thought, is the *Death of God*.

⁴ Tracy B. and Michael Allen Gillepsie .- introduction to Nietzsche's New seas : Explorations in philosophy, Aesthetics, and Politics. (University of Chicago Press 1988) P.1

The death of God he calls the greatest event in modern history and the cause of extreme danger.

This discovery he dared to expose to the knowledge of the public was the cause of the disdain and hatred against him. Nietzsche was simply misunderstood.

To tell the truth this affirmation of the death of God is but a metaphor meaning that from now onward, humanity has lost the parameter of the parameters, that which gives sense and dignity to human existence and thus, humanity is running straight forward into decline.

Fortunately, nowadays, most scholars are discovering the true meaning of Nietzsche's thought and its relevance for contemporary time. However, there is still backlash on Nietzsche. An expression of this backlash is the indictment against him as an advocate of nationalism, anti-semitism and racism. Those indictments can be easily refuted and have been refuted by many scholars⁵. For instance in section 475 of *Human, all too human* Nietzsche offers one of his most powerful indictments against nationalism.

In the context of rejecting the artificial and perilous separation of Europe into distinct nations through the "production of national hostilities", Nietzsche suggests that it is not the interests of the many, but the interests of a few -"certain princely

⁵ As this regards see the fine work of Thomas Münster, *Nietzsche et le Nazisme*, which restores exactly the historical truth. Paris Kime 1995

dynasties and certain classes of business and society" - that "impel to this nationalism". It is

Precisely at this point that Nietzsche situates the origin of modern anti-semitism. "the entire problem of the Jews", he writes, "exists only in national states". However, the charge of antisemitism is definitively refuted in the following passage :

it is here their (the Jews') energy and higher intelligence, their capital in will and spirit accumulated from generation in a long school of suffering, must come to preponderate to a degree calculated to arouse envy and hatred, so that in almost every nation-and the more so nationalist a posture the nation is against adoption -there is gaining ground the literary indecency of leading the jews to the sacrificial slaughter as scape -goats for every possible public or private misfortunate⁶.

According to Mathieu Kessler Nietzsche is in fact philosemitic and antijudaic. The antijudaism of Nietzsche is the reason for the persistence of the popular illusion that he is antisemite, because one can actually find in him attacks against the Jews. Nevertheless, he criticizes the Jews exactly for the same reason as the Christians, so, for exclusively religious and no other specific reason.

Mathieu Kessler further holds that it is necessary to recall that he is philosemite, because, very soon he realised that only the Jews scholar was capable of understanding his writings meanwhile the German could not understand him⁷.

⁶ Nietzsche Friedrich. Humain trop Humain section 475

⁷ Kessler Mathieu Nietzsche ou le dépassement esthétique de la métaphysique . PUF Paris 1999 P. 299

To end with, Kessler said that apart from his well known anti-nationalism, anti-antisémitism and anti-racism, «one can only add that no political doctrine, till present, has been so far from totalitarianism than Nietzschean individualism of which one of the rare merits in political issue is to warn against the phenomena of mass, because of their uniformicizing and destructive dimensions⁸».

Similarly, Alan Schrift, co-author and editor of the collection titled Why Nietzsche still ? said that

the Nietzschean critique of dogmatism, grounded as it is in a perspectivist position that calls for multiplying points of view and avoiding fixed and rigid posturing, may be an important voice to heed in constructing a politics that can challenge the panoply of emerging fundamentalism⁹.

Taking into account all these testimonies on the one hand, and on the other, the blatant reality of the resurgence of fundamentalism and integristism in our countries, we can say that we African, have good reason to be Nietzschean.

⁸ Ibid P 108

⁹ Schrift O. Alan. Why Nietzsche still ? (University of Californie Press. 2000) P 192

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Works by NIETZSCHE

Friedrich NIETZSCHE., -œuvres complètes tome I et II By Jean Lacoste and Jacques Le Ridier. Ed. Robert Laffont 1998.

Works on NIETZSCHE

- Alan D., - Why Nietzsche still ? (University of California press 2000).
- Andler C., - Nietzsche, sa vie et sa pensée. 3vol. (Paris 1958)
- Bataille G., - Sur Nietzsche. (Paris 1945)
- Bertrand E., - Nietzsche. Essai de Mythologie. (Éditions du Félin 1990)
- Blaga L., - Nietzsche in Fenomenal originar (Bucarest 1960)
- Camus. A., - Nietzsche et le nihilisme In l'homme révolté. (Paris 1951)
- Chestor L., - L'idée de bien chez Tolstoi et Nietzsche. (Paris 1949).
- Deleuze G., - Nietzsche et la philosophie. (Paris 1962)
- Frateanu. U., - critica gindirii mitice. (Ed. dacia. 1980)
- Garnier P., - Nietzsche. (Paris 1957).
- Granier J., - Le problème de la vérité dans la philosophie de Nietzsche. (Paris 1966)
- Haar M., - Nietzsche et la métaphysique. (Gallimard Paris 1987)

- Heidegger M., - Nietzsche tome I et II traduit de l'allemand par Pierre Klossowski
(Ed Gallimard 1971)
- Heller E., - The importance of Nietzsche. (University of Chicago Press 1988)
- Höffding H., - Friedrich Nietzsche. In philosophes contemporains (Paris 1907)
- Kaufmann W., - Nietzsche. (New-York 1956)
- Kessler M., - Nietzsche ou le dépassement esthétique de la métaphysique.
(PUF 1996).
- Louette F., - Sartre contre Nietzsche. (PUF. 1996)
- Morel G., - Nietzsche. Introduction à une première lecture. (Aubier 1985)
- Morgan G.A., - What Nietzsche means. (New-York 1941)
- Münster Thomas., - Nietzsche et le Nazisme. (Paris 1995)
- Nudubusi F. N. - Man and Freedom. Sartre. Nietzsche Panacea (Lagos 1978)
- Pernin S. M. J., - Nietzsche et Schopenhauer. (Editions l'harmattan 1999).
- Poellner P., - Nietzsche and metaphysics. (Clarendon Press. Oxford 1995).
- Roeschl H., - Nietzsche poète de la solitude. (Paris 1960)
- Schlecta K., - Le cas Nietzsche. (Paris 1966)
- Serrano M., - Nietzsche et l'éternel retour. (Éditions Jean Caruchet 1999)
- Simha A., - Connaitre Nietzsche. (Bordas 1988).

- Tracy B. and Michael A. G., - Introduction to Nietzsche's new seas : Exploration in Philosophy, Aesthetics and Politics. (University of Chicago press 1988)
- Von Tongeren P., - An introduction to Friedrich Nietzsche's philosophy. (Pardue university Press 1999).
- Wolting P., - Nietzsche et le problème de la civilisation. (Paris 1966)

General Bibliography.

- AGOSSOU M. J., - Gbeto Gbetdoto. L'homme et le Dieu créateur selon les Sud-Dahoméens. (Beauchesne Paris 1972)
- AKE C., - Social science as imperialism. The theory of political development. (Ibadan University Press 1979).
- Anyanwu K. C., - The African Worldview and theory of knowledge in E.A. Ruch Omi and K.C. Anyanwu, African philosophy. (Catholic Book Agency. Rome 1981)
- Bergson H., - L'évolution créatrice.(Paris 1928)
- ——— - La pensée et le mouvant.(Paris 1934)
- ——— - Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion.(Paris 1939).
- Caillois R., - Le mythe et l'homme. Paris 1938

- Collingwood. R., - Principles of Art. (oxford 1938)
- Eliade M., - Le mythe de l'éternel retour.(Paris 1963)
- ——— - Aspects du mythe(Paris 1969)
- Feiblemann J. - The theory of human culture. (New-York 1946).
- Frateanu v., - Critica Gindirii Mitice. (Ed Dacia. Cluj – Napoka 1980)
- Frutiger P., - Les mythes de Platon. (Paris 1930).
- Grimal P., - L'expérience mythique. (Paris 1956)
- Gusdorf G., - Mythe et métaphysique. (Paris 1953)
- Guyau J. M., - L'art du point de vue sociologique. (Paris 1929)
- ——— - L'irreligion de l'avenir. (paris 1930)
- ——— - Esquisse d'une morale sans obligation ni sanction.(Paris 1935)
- ——— - L'irreligion de l'avenir. (paris 1930)
- Heidegger M., - Lettres sur l'humanisme. (Paris 1964)
- ——— - Etre et temps. (Gallimard 1986)
- ——— - Kant et le problème de la métaphysique. (Paris 5^e édition)
- ——— - Qu'est-ce que la métaphysique ? (Paris 3^e édition)
- Idowu B., - African traditional religion. A definition. (Fountain publications
- Irele D., - 1973) f African predicament. (Ibadan 1993)
- Janheinz J., - Muntu. (Ed. du Seuil 1961)

- Jung. C. and Kerenyi C., - Essays on science and mythology. (New-York 1944)
- Kant E., - The critique of judgement translated by James Creed Meredith. (Oxford. Clarendon press)
- Zerbo. J., - Le monde africain noir. (Hatier 1972)
- Kossou. B., - Sè et Gbè, dynamique de l'existence chez les fon. (La pensée universelle Paris 1983)
- Krappe A. H., - La genèse des mythes. (Paris 1952)
- Kroeber A.L., - the nature of culture. (Chicago 1952)
- Kuakuvi M., - Nietzsche et le fanatisme moral. (Goethe institute Lomé 1984).
- Laloup J. and Nelis J.- Culture et civilisation. (Paris 1955)
- Levi-Strauss. C., - La pensée sauvage. (Paris 1962).
- Malinowski B., - Myth in primitive psychology. (London 1926)
- Masolo D. A., - african philosophy in search of identity. (East African Edu. Publisher 1995)
- Mbiti. J., - African religions and philosophy. (Heinemann Educational Books LTD. 1982)
- Momoh. C. S., - The substance of African philosophy. (African philosophy project publications 2000).
- Mveng E., - L'art d'Afrique Noire (ed. clé Yaoundé 1974).

- Ndaw A., - La pensée africaine (NEA Dakar 1983)
- O-Guejiofor J.o., - Philosophy and the African predicament. (Hope Publications Ibadan 2001)
- Oladipo O., - Remaking Africa. Challenges of the twenty-first century. (Ibadan 1998)
- Oluwole S., - Which-Craft, reincarnation and the God-Head. (Excel publisher 1992).
- Pauln D., - Les sculptures d'Afrique noire. (PUF, 1956)
- Platon., - Œuvre complètes vol I-II. (L. Rosin Paris 1956)
- Ribot T., - La logique des sentiments. (Paris 1948)
- Sartre J. P., - L'être et le néant (Paris Gallimard 1948)
- _____ - L'imaginaire. (Paris Gallimard 1966)
- Schopenhauer A., - The world as will and as representation. (Vol I-II. Oxford 1982).
- _____ - le monde comme volonté et représentation. (P.u.f. paris 1998)
- Senghor L.S., - Liberté I - Négritude et humanisme. (Ed du Seuil 1964)
- Sogolo G., - Foundations of African philosophy. (Ibadan university Press 1986)

- Tempels. P., - Bantu philosophy. Transl by Dr A. Rubbens (Pensée Africaine Paris 1959).
- Unah. I J., - Metaphysics.- (Hope publications 1998)
- Unamuno. M., - le sentiment tragique de la vie. (Paris 1965).
- Willams R., - culture and society. (London 1958).

CODESRIA - LIBRARY

**Bilingual Table of the denominations of the books by
Nietzsche**

FRENCH**ENGLISH**

La naissance de la Tragédie 1972	The Birth of Tragedy
Considérations Inactuelles 1973-1976.....	Untimely Meditations
Humain, Trop Humain 1878-80.....	Humain, All Too Humain
Aurore 1881	Daybreak
Ainsi Parlait Zarathoustra 1883-85.....	Thus Spoke Zarathoustra
Par Delà Bien et Mal 1886	Beyond Good and Evil
Le Gai Savoir 1882-87.....	The Gay Science
La Généalogie de la Morale 1887	On The Genealogy of Morals
Nietzsche contre Wagner 1888	Nietzsche contra Wagner
L'Antéchrist 1888	The Antichrist
Ecce Homo. 1988.....	Ecce Homo
Le Cas Wagner 1888	The Case of Wagner
La volonté de Puissance 1906.....	The Will to Power