



**Thesis by  
JOHN OLUSHOLA  
MAGBADELO**

**USMANU DANFODIYO  
UNIVERSITY, SOKOTO**

**A comparative study of democratisation  
process in Nigeria and South Korea**

---

**FEBRUARY  
2001**




13 MARS 2003

04.02.02

MAG

12573

USMANU DANFODIYO UNIVERSITY, SOKOTO  
(POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL)



**A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF DEMOCRATISATION  
PROCESS IN NIGERIA AND SOUTH KOREA**

*A Thesis submitted to the Postgraduate School,  
Usmanu Danfodiyo University,  
Sokoto in Full Fulfilment of the Requirements for the  
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy*

**By**

**JOHN OLUSHOLA MAGBADELO**

**SOKOTO, NIGERIA**

**FEBRUARY, 2001**







## **DEDICATION**

This Thesis is dedicated to my late parents, who nurtured me from the cradle of my existence to Adulthood, and instilled the love for academic discipline in my heart, but who were snatched by the cruel hands of death when the fruits of their labour were maturing.

CODESRIA - LIBRARY

# CERTIFICATION

This thesis by *John Olushola Magbadelo* has met the requirements for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the Usmanu Danfodiyo University, Sokoto and is approved for its contribution to knowledge.

- (i)   
DR. NUHU O. YAKUB  
MAJOR SUPERVISOR  
(INTERNAL EXAMINER)
- (ii)   
Prof. J. E. OKALO  
SECOND SUPERVISOR  
(INTERNAL EXAMINER)
- (iii)   
Prof. A. S. MUBAREK  
THIRD SUPERVISOR  
(INTERNAL EXAMINER)
- (iv)   
HEAD OF DEPARTMENT  
(CHIEF EXAMINER)
- (v)   
EXTERNAL EXAMINER
- (vi)   
Prof. A. D. SHAIKU  
DEAN, FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
AND ADMINISTRATION.

Date of Examination: 16th September, 2000



## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

I give God the glory for enabling me to complete this doctoral thesis, and for being my source of wisdom and knowledge. As it is normally the case, a lot of people and institutions were supportive of my research interest, and indeed facilitated the completion of the study. I acknowledge the invaluable suggestions and intellectual perspectives of my main supervisor, Professor Nuhu Yaqub. Infact Professor Yaqub encouraged and stimulated my interest in the thesis. When at a critical point in this study, I felt like abandoning the work, his fatherly counsel was rejuvenating, and I soon found my bearings again. I also enjoyed the sisterly affection of Mrs B. Yaqub, whose several acts and words of encouragement spurred me on.

I must place on record the remarkable understanding and support of Prof A. S. Mikailu, Prof Emeka Okolo, Prof Mohammed Junaidu, Dr. Dejo Abdulrahman, Dr. S. S. Mohammed and Dr. Tijani Bande. This work benefitted also from the intellectual perspectives of Dr. Paul Izah.

I acknowledge the generous assistance of the Korea Foundation – a Foundation that provided me a 3-Month research Fellowship in South Korea. The Korea Foundation did not only sponsor the return-trip to South Korea for a duration of 3 months, it also provided me institutional affiliation in Seoul with the prestigious Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University. There at the Institute in Seoul, from 2 April – 2 July, 1998, I had the privilege of interacting with such brilliant minds like Prof. Tae-Hwan Kwak, the Executive Director (IFES) Prof. Su-Hoon Lee, Prof. Gil-Hyun Yang, Prof. Taik-Young Hamm and Prof. Sungkwan Park.

Needless to say that these scholars in so many ways made my stay in Korea fruitful and indeed rewarding.

I should like to mention some other scholars of other Korean Universities who showed interest in this research. They are Prof. Hyug-Baeg IM of the Department of Political Science, University of Korea; Prof. Sang-Yong Choi, Director, Asiatic Research Center and President, the Korean Political Science Association; Dr Kwang-Pil Choi, Chief Executive Secretary, Asiatic Research Center; Prof. Chung-in Moon, Head, Department of International Relations, Yonsei University; Prof. Sung-Hoon Lee, Assistant Professor of International Relations, Yonsei University; Professor Kyudok Hong, Director, Office of International Affairs, Sookmyung Women's University, and Mr Moon Hwan Yuh, Programme Coordinator, Office of International Affairs, Sookmyung Women's University. These scholars and a host of others, too numerous to mention here, for lack of space, accorded me warm reception and assistance. Most of them gave me relevant publications and information, for this research.

I must commend the Korea Foundation again, for making a success out of my Fellowship Programme in Seoul. In particular, I am very grateful for the immense help I received from the Staff of the International Cooperation Department II of the Korea Foundation. In this regard, Messrs Namgoong, Yong, Park Kyoung-Chul, Jee, and Miss Min deserve my admiration. And for my pleasant stay in Korea, I owe a sense of gratitude to the charged d'Affairs of Nigerian Embassy, Mr Fayomi, and Ambassador G.O. Ajonye (who introduced me to the former).

I must also place on record my appreciation of the efforts of Mr Young Jip Ahn, the First Secretary of the Korean Embassy in Nigeria. Mr. Ahn stood by me during the preliminary days of my search for the Fellowship. He allowed me the use of his embassy's facilities, to communicate with different institutions in Korea. Mr Ahn helped me secure the transit visa to Amsterdam, which ordinarily would have been elusive. His successor, Mr Seoung-Hung Moon, has been no less supportive, and indeed I have found him to be very cooperative, understanding and insightful.

This thesis received remarkable support from CODESRIA – Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa). CODESRIA's grants facilitated the completion of the study and the final production of the full blown copies of the thesis. The scholarly literature provided by CODESRIA were not only current, but also relevant to the study.

I am appreciative of the spiritual, moral and emotional support of my sisters, brothers, Nieces, Nephews and other relations. These wonderful people have been a source of inspiration to me, especially after the demise of my beloved parents. I must also express my unreserved gratitude to my wife, Ibifubara for being a bulwark behind my zeal for academic excellence. My typists, Messrs Garuba D. Bwari and Owolabi M. Olutoba deserve commendation too. To God and all these people, I owe my gratitude, while responsibilities for errors and opinions canvassed in the thesis are entirely mine.

# **TABLE OF CONTENTS**

	PAGE
Dedication	iii
Certification	iv
Acknowledgements	v
List of Abbreviations	xiii
Abstract	xv -xv

## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **BACKGROUND TO DEMOCRATISATION IN NIGERIA AND SOUTH KOREA**

1.0.	Introduction	1
1.1	Democratisation Defined	5
1.2.	Research Assumptions	5
1.3.	Scope of Study	6
1.4.	Methodology	6
1.5.	Chapter Overview	7-8
	References	9-10

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **Literature Review**

2.0	Introduction	11
2.10.	Structural Perspectives on Democratisation	12
2.11.	Economic Theory of Democracy	13
2.12.	Political Culture Theory	18
2.13.	Social Classification Theory	20

2.14. Externalities in the Democratisation	24
2.20 Genetic theory of Democratisation	27
2.21 Bottom-up Democratisation	29
2.22 Top-Down Democratisation	31
References	34-44

### **CHAPTER THREE**

## **Comparing Nigeria and South Korea**

3.10 Historical Background	45
3.10.1 Nigeria's Historical Background	45
3.30.1 South Korea's Historical Background	49
3.20 The Civil Societies in Nigeria and South Korea	52
3.20.1 Nigerian Civil Society	52
3.20.2 South Korean Civil Society	55
3.30 Ethnicity in Nigeria and South Korea	58
3.30.1 Ethnicity in Nigeria	58
3.30.2 Ethnicity /Regionalism in south Korea	63
3.40 Political Culture of Nigeria's and Koreans	65
3.40.1 Political Culture of Nigerians	65
3.40.2 South Korean's Political Culture	69
3.50 The Military Factor in Democratisation in Nigeria and South Korea	72
3.50.1 Military in Nigerian Politics	73
3.50.2 The Military in South Korea	78
3.60 Nigerian and South Korean Economies Compared	82
3.60.1 Nigerian Economy	83

3.60.2	South Korean Economy	86
3.70	Nigeria and South Korea in the International System	88
3.70.1	Nigeria's International Relations	89
3.70.2	South Korea's International Relations	91
	References	93 - 105

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **The Main Features of Transition to Democracy in Nigeria (1985 – 1993)**

4.10	Introduction	106
4.20	Babangida's Civil Rule Programme's Concept and Practice	109
4.21	Institutions of the Transition programme	110
4.22	Political Bureau	111
4.23	The National Electoral Commission (NEC)	115
4.24	Background to Party Formation	117
4.25	Political Education Institutions	126
4.26	Intra-Party and Inter-Party Electoral Contest	130
4.40	The Economic Environment of Babangida's Transition Programme	136
4.50	Ethnicity, Civil society and the political Transition programme	142
4.60	Babangida's personality and His Rule	148
4.70	Crises of Transition, Mass-protests and Institutionalized Opposition.	153
4.80	Externalities in the Transition Politics	162
4.90.	Concluding Remarks	169
	References	171 - 188

## CHAPTER FIVE

### **DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN SOUTH KOREA (1985 – 1988)**

5.1. Introduction	189
5.11. Background to Democratisation in South Korea	189
5.20 Transition Politics : From Chun – Doo Hwan to Roh Tae-Woo 1985-1988	195
5.21 1985 National Assembly Election	196
5.22 Increased Oppositional Agitation	200
5.23 Stalemate, Crises and Division of the Opposition	203
5.24 June Unrest and the June 29 <sup>th</sup> Pro-Democracy Declaration	206
5.25 Transitional Election under Chun’s Transition and the Ascension of Roh-Tae Woo	210
5.30 Factors in Korean Democratisation	213
5.30.1 Socioeconomic Background	213
5.30.2 The Korean Society and Democratic Struggle	215
5.30.3 Students’ Movement	216
5.30.4 Labour Movement	217
5.30.5 Farmers’ Movement	218
5.30.6 The Religious Groups	220
5.30.7 The Business Conglomerates	221
5.40 The Effects of External Factors on Korean Democratisation	223
5.40.1 The Role of the U.S	223
5.40.2 The Role of Seoul Olympic	226
5.50 Korean Democratisation and Institutionalized Opposition	228
References	233-249

## CHAPTER SIX

### **DEMOCRATISATION IN NIGERIA AND SOUTH KOREA : SOME TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS**

6.10	Introduction	250
6.11	Democratisation and the Economy	255
6.20.	Democratisation and Ethnicity /Regionalism	258
6.30	Democratisation and Regime Interest	260
6.40	Democratisation and Mass Protests	262
6.50.	Democratisation and External Influences	264
	References	268-271
	Bibliography	272-305
	Documents	306
	Appendix I	307-309
	Appendix II	310
	Appendix III	311



## List of Abbreviations

NKDP	-	New Korea Democratic Party
DKP	-	Democratic Korea Party
DJP	-	Democratic Justice Party
KNP	-	Korea Nationalist Party
NLOD	-	National Liaison Organisation for Democracy
RDP	-	Reunification Democratic Party
NCDC	-	National Coalition for Democratic Constitution
PDP	-	Peace and Democracy Party
NDRP	-	New Democratic Reunification Party
NFSA	-	National Federation of Students Association
FAC	-	Federation of Agricultural Cooperation and Development
OECD	-	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
NFC	-	National Farmers Committee
NFA	-	National Farmers' Association
KNCC	-	Korean National Council of Churches
SAP	-	Structural Adjustment Programme
CD	-	Campaign for Democracy
CLO	-	Civil Liberties Organisation
NADL	-	National Association of Democratic Lawyers
CDHR	-	Committee for the Defence of Human Rights
NLC	-	Nigerian Labour Congress
NUPENG	-	National Union of Petroleum and National Gas Workers
ING	-	Interim National Government
SDP	-	Social Democratic Party
NRC	-	National Republic Convention

- EC - European Community
- IFIS - International Financial Institutions
- IMF - International Monetary Fund

CODESRIA - LIBRARY

## **ABSTRACT**

This thesis compares the democratisation process in Nigeria with the South Korean experience. The factors which facilitated democratisation in the two countries and the effect of democratisation varied from one to another.

The study utilised the structural determination theory to bring to fore the conditions which were instrumental in effecting democratic transition in South Korea, and increasing the fervour and agitation for democratisation in Nigeria.

After an in-depth study of the causation and effects of democratisation in both countries, the conclusions drawn reflect to some extent the differences and similarities between Nigeria and South Korea. First, economic factors played a major role in both Nigerian and Korean democratisation. While economic development propelled the struggle for democracy in Korea, the lack of it fuelled anti-military and pro-democracy struggles in Nigeria.

Secondly, ethnicity and regionalism were utilised by the authoritarian leaders to divide the Civil Society and delay or abort the transition to democracy. In Nigeria, the abortion of the transition to democracy project under General Babangida had ethnic undertone. While in South Korea, regionalism delayed the transition to democracy.

Thirdly, in both countries, the leadership conceived of a plan to retain and perpetuate their hold on power. Thus, regime interests guided the implementation of the transition to democracy projects of both Generals Babangida and Chun-Doo Hwan.

Furthermore, the democratisation experiences of Nigeria and South Korea reflected the chronic crises of political legitimacy of the authoritarian regimes of Generals Babangida and Chun-Doo Hwan, respectively.

In addition to the foregoing, the study exposes the salience of external influences on the transition process and politics in both Nigeria and South Korea.

Overall, the study reveals that democratisation by virtue of the fact that it expands the democratic space is creative of crises. But the greatest opposition of the civil society has always been against undemocratic democratisation, as the experiences of Nigeria and South Korea have shown.

## CHAPTER ONE

# BACKGROUND TO DEMOCRATISATION IN NIGERIA AND SOUTH KOREA

### 1.0 INTRODUCTION

The spate of democratisation across countries of the world which began with the demise of Eastern communist bloc in late 1980's has led to the transformation of politics in the developing countries of the world. Pressures increasingly mounted on authoritarian regimes in Africa and Asia, as the authoritarian rulers began to loose hold of their political power, sequel to the growing assertiveness of their civil societies.

Democratisation as a global phenomenon has taken place in different countries of the world in different styles and dimension. Perceptibly, the process has meant more conflicts in developing countries of the world. While the resurgence of violence in democratizing African countries is explainable in terms of the ethnic heterogeneity of these countries, the Asian experience is no less conflictual despite its ethnic homogeneity.<sup>1</sup>

The comparative study of democratisation in Nigerian and South Korea is indeed a Cross-National Study, which aims at unraveling the forces responsible for democratic ferment in both countries. The peculiarities of each country, of necessity, were influential in determining the outcome of the process of change. Nigeria and South Korea are different in some respects and similar in some other areas. Both countries had a history of colonial misrule and prolonged period of military dictatorship. It is most certain that the comparison of democratization in Nigeria with South Korea

would provide some insight into the cultural, political and socio-economic constraints of the phenomenon in these two seemingly contrasting countries.

Furthermore, it is reasonable to explain the outcome of contemporary efforts in the two societies to democratize within the context of their political histories. In Nigeria, the colonial administration invigorated regional, ethnic and religious cleavages through the establishment of separate institutions for Finance, representation, and governance, which in turn created strong regional identities for the three main ethnic groups – Hausa-Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba. Indeed, as Robert Shelton claims: “Nigeria moved toward independence as separate economics and nearly three separate nations.”<sup>2</sup> This pattern of political development created conflict between the central government and the regional governments, and continued until the 1970’s when the military weakened regional actors through states creation exercises.<sup>3</sup> As the centre became more stronger through the centralization of oil revenues, the states soon became the clients of the Federal government.<sup>4</sup>

The contemporary political history of Korea dates back to period between 1910 and 1945 under the Japanese Colonial rule. The Japanese created a strong bureaucratic state centred in Seoul, which undertook a programme of National integration and economic development. When the United States gained control of the South after the war, they found the leadership split between a party of the economics elite (Korean Democratic Party, KDP) and a hastily established leftist provisional government and the Korean People’s Republic (KPR). From 1948 to 1960, Syngman Rhee’s Republic regime used a mixture of Patronage and coercion to link state and society. Popular protests for democracy, principally among

students of universities in Seoul, were met with severe repression by the national police.<sup>5</sup> The eventual demise of the First Republic in 1961, gave room for a long drawn period of military dictatorships spanning over three decades. But the success of the military's development programme created conditions under which mobilizing institutions can develop. Rising standards of living and greater access to media among the Korean population have raised demands for democracy sequel to the emergence of an assertive middle class and vibrant civil society.<sup>6</sup>

In Nigeria, the salience of ethnicity in the calculus of power has continued to forestall the emergence of National Culture which is promotive of democratisation. Successive Nigerian leaderships have always played one ethnic group against others, in order to retain control over the whole. During periods of democratic rule, party politics polarized along ethnic lines.

In South Korea, politics revolves around personalities as political parties are creation of powerful politicians. Political parties despite the ethnic homogeneity of Koreans reflect regional differences, since Koreans only identify with political parties of their regions.

The peculiarities of Nigerian and south Korean societies could have been influential in the sustenance of authoritarian rule for no less than three decades. In Nigeria, the prolonged period of military rule could have been a consequence of the country's ethnic diversity as well as the docility of its civil society. Most certainly, the ease with which Nigerian successive military rulers averted the natural evolution of democratic sentiment among Nigerians for so long was a function of the nature and character of the Nigerian civil society which (and still is) was divided along ethnic lines and indeed manipulable and compliant.

However, there were visible signs of democratic ferment in Nigeria and South Korea, particularly in periods following the demise of Soviet Union in the late 1980's. The civil societies of these two countries became more assertive as new groups emerged on the political scene to champion the struggle for democratisation. The pattern of democratisation in Nigeria and South Korea should be expected to vary one from another, since the two societies are different at some levels. In the same sense, democratisation in the two countries could be explained along certain common themes since both countries are developing capitalist economies with long history of military dictatorship.

Like any other comparative studies, the comparative study of democratisation in Nigeria and South Korea would utilize some set criteria to evaluate the appropriateness of comparing social phenomena observed in these different systems.<sup>7</sup> As Osgood has stated: "...an interpretation strategy is required to solve such vexing questions as the following : when is the same really the same? When is the same really different? When is different really different?"<sup>8</sup>

Thus, it is important to note that the essence of analyzing the patterns and forms of democratisation in Nigeria and South Korea is to situate the consequences of the process within its context, to identify the forces clamouring for socio-economic and political reforms and to project the outcomes of the processes. It is also to find out the uniqueness or uniformity of democratisation in Nigeria and South Korea. Can democratisation create veritable bases for the economic development of the democratising countries, and better living conditions for the masses, while at the same time progressively transiting these countries to democracy? Does it seem the masses would oppose the democratisation process which



does not affect their interest negatively? What is the cultural imperative of democratisation, and can one impute any cultural explanation for the incidence of democratisation across countries of the World? What are the limitations of the multiplicity of ethnic groups (in the case of Nigeria) to democratisation process? What are the implications of mono-ethnicity for democratisation in South Korea? What measure of support or assistance of International Community is eufunctional to the democratisation process in Nigeria and South Korea, and what degree of foreign involvement is dysfunctional? These and other questions seek further research. And in attempting to provide answers to these questions, the structural theory would be used.

**1.1. DEMOCRATISATION DEFINED:** Democratisation has been conceptualized variously by several scholars. But the operational definition one would give this concept is to see it as a process indigenously designed by the democratising countries to address the peculiar problems bedeviling or hindering the perfection or practice of democracy. However, democratisation should also be expected to lead to the emergence of political institutions that can peacefully compete to form governments and influence public policy, that can channel social and economic conflicts through regular procedures, and that have sufficient linkages to civil society to represent their constituencies and commit them to collective courses of action.<sup>9</sup> It should, however, be noted that democratisation aims at resolving the disputes between the supporters of change 'aperturists' and the 'obstructionist' to the transition project over four key issues of democratisation; (i) restoration of the rule of law; (ii) constitutional revision; (iii) implementation of an electoral process; and (iv) actual transfer of

power<sup>10</sup> It is certain that every democratizing society defines these issues on the basis of some societal variables impinging as well on the commitment of the democratising regime(s).

## 1.2 RESEARCH ASSUMPTIONS:

(i) A democratisation process which imposes more socio-economic burden on the majority of the people is likely to engender more opposition from the civil society to the democratising regimes.

(ii) A democratisation process which entails the expansion of democratic space and the weakening of the authoritarian repressive apparatus is likely to create openings for the expression of ethnic and cultural differences in the democratising countries.

(iii) Democratisation in countries that had been badly fragmented and sectionalized by colonisation, without much efforts by post-colonial governments to ameliorate these anomalies – is likely to reproduce the bitterness and fierceness of the zero-sum struggle for political power with higher possibility of violence.

(iv) Democratisation in the context of mass poverty, acute unemployment and growing inequalities is likely to result in the democratization of the levels of violence – thus creating an evidently insecure environment for the democratizing regime.

(v) Democratisation process which enjoys complementary support from external sources may more likely translate successfully into the establishment democratic rule in the democratising country.

## 1.3 SCOPE OF STUDY

We shall treat the democratisation experience of Nigeria and South Korea – with specific focus on the transition projects in both countries – in

South Korea the Roh Tae-woo regime, and in Nigeria – the Babangida Administration. These two transitional governments are revealing and could provide veritable empirical bases for our theoretical appreciation of democratisation. These two countries are chosen with an intention to compare the commitment of the political leadership in one country with the other, and to identify the differences levels of socio-economic development and industrialization attained by these countries as they impinge on the development of their civil societies and the prospects of democratisation. Overall, the research would also unearth other conditions and causes of democratic transitions in both South Korea and Nigeria.

#### 1.4. **METHODOLOGY:**

This research would rely on library materials and the qualitative content analysis of relevant scholarly publications. Textbooks, journal articles, magazines, and other periodicals shall be the means of finding answers to the research questions. This scholar had embarked on a research trip to South Korea, which exposed him to relevant literature, and an opportunity also to interact with the broader spectrum of the Korean society. Scholarly literature in Korea were obtained from Libraries of academic institutions such as the Institute of Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University, Korea Foundation, Korea University, and Academy of Korean Studies.

#### 1.5. **CHAPTER OVERVIEW**

This study examines the following issues:- In chapter one, the purpose of the study, its scope and the basic research assumptions are clearly spelt out. In chapter two, the two broad theories of democratisation

i.e. “structural determination” theory and the “genetic” theory are discussed. Their limitations and strengths are identified. And conclusively, the structural determination theory which has more explanatory powers in terms of the several variables it accommodate was chosen as the theoretical framework of analysis for the study.

In chapter three, Nigeria and South Korea are compared along such characteristics as the historical background, the role of civil society, ethnicity/regionalism political culture, the military, economy, and international relations. In chapter Four, the main features of Nigeria’s transition to democracy programme under the Babangida Administration (1985 – 1993) and the crises the programme engendered are critically examined against the backdrop of the regime’s economic programme and the personality of General Babangida.

In chapter five, the processes and institution that led to the transition of South Korea to Democracy in Dec, 1987 are examined in the light of favourable socio-economic conditions, and external support for the Korean civil Society.

In chapter six, some tentative conclusions on democratisation are drawn from the experiences of Nigeria and South Korea, Particularly in respect of such variables as the economy, regime interest, ethnicity/regionalism, externalities, and mass protest.

## ENDNOTES

1. See Marina Ottaway, "Democracy and the challenge of ethnicity" Africa Demos Vol. III, No. 4 March, 1995 pp. 22-24; Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, (eds) Democracy in Developing Countries (Vol 3) Asia (Boulder & Colorado, Lynne Rienner, 1989).
2. Robert Shenton, "Nigerian Agriculture in historical Perspective: Development and Crisis, 1900 – 1960" in Michael Watts, ed, State, Oil, and Agriculture in Nigeria (Berkeley, CA: Institute for International Studies, 1987) Pp. 55 – 56.
3. F. C. Okoli, "Dilemmas of Premature Bureaucratisation in the New States in Africa.: The Case of Nigeria", African Studies Review , 23, No. (1980 ), PP 1 – 16; John F. Ohiorhenuan, Capital and the State in Nigeria, (Newyork: Greenwood, 1989) PP 11 – 24; See also, Peter Koehn, "Competitive Transition to Civilian Rule: Nigeria's First and Second Experiments", Journal of Modern African Studies, 27, No 3 (1983) pp. 401 – 403; Okwudiba Nnoli, Ethnic Politics in Nigeria, (Enugu : Fourth Dimension Pub, 1978), Pp 256 – 68.
4. See Otwin Marenin, "The Nigerian state as process and Manager: A Conceptualisation", Comparative Politics 20, no 2 (1988) pp 73 – 93.
5. Sung – Joo Han, "South Korea : Politics in Transition", in Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, and Alfred Stepan eds, Democracy in Developing countries: Asia (Boulder, Co, Lynne Rienner, 1989) p.300.
6. Matthew J. Costello, "State Softness as a Product of Environmental uncertainty: A theory with Applications to Nigeria, Kenya, and South Korea", The Journal of Developing Areas, 28, (April 1994) pp 345 – 364.
7. Adam Przeworski & Henry Tenune, The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry (Newyork, Wiley-Interscience, 1970) p.11

8. See C.E. Osgood, "On the strategy of Cross-National Research into subjective Culture," Social Science Information 6, 1967, p.7.
9. Philippe C. Schmitter & Terry Lynn Karl "What Democracy is and is not" Journal of Democracy, Summer 1991, vol 2, No 3, pp. 85 – 87.
10. Enrique A. Balora, Dilemmas of Political Transition in El Salvador", Journal of International Affairs, winter 1985, vol 38, pp 21 – 242.

CODESRIA - LIBRARY

## CHAPTER TWO

### LITERATURE REVIEW

#### 2.0. INTRODUCTION

The aim of this literature review section is to find out how some scholars have grappled with the reality of democratisation, its causes and consequences. The review would no doubt reveal some truths about democratisation, and project the futuristic value of our preoccupation in this study, as it would essentially furnish us with more insights into the study of governance in a comparative sense. There is therefore, no doubt that previous theoretical expositions are especially relevant to this study.

Democratisation has meant different thing to different scholars. The differences in the understanding of this globalized concept could be attributed to the fact that democratization itself is a product of several variables – variables whose influences and degrees differ from one society to another. Democratisation can be broadly conceived as the process of moving from an authoritarian system to a democratic system. The process may be dictated by the geographic, demographic, cultural and past experiences of a given country. Yet, the interdependent nature of the world system supports the adoption of workable blueprints of democratization from other countries of the world with similar experiences, as well as it provides lee-way for autonomous derivation of blueprints well-suited for the socio-economic and political realities of the democratizing countries.<sup>1</sup>

The emergence of democratic regimes had been explained variously, but these multiple explanations can be classified into two broad theories – structural theory and genetic theory.<sup>2</sup> These two paradigms have been at

each other's throat, in a sort of theoretical struggle for relevance in the social sciences. At issue is to find out whether or not democratic transition is explainable solely as a creation of some structural forces in society, or the outcome of human intention, action, craft and choice.<sup>3</sup>

#### 2.10. STRUCTURAL PERSPECTIVES ON DEMOCRATISATION

The structures are concerned about the objective conditions that originate and facilitate or obstruct the democratic transition.<sup>4</sup> The proponents of structural paradigm are less concerned about short-term dynamic political development, and view political transformations as predetermined, and search for the "patterns of determination by inductive generalization."<sup>5</sup>

The structuralists are of the view that the socioeconomic, and cultural framework of society, and the influences of externalities provide a "contending perimeter within which political choices have to be made and solutions sought."<sup>6</sup> In a sense therefore, they argue that decisions made by political decision makers must "respond to and are conditioned by socioeconomic structures and political institutions."<sup>7</sup> The structures in existence in the democratising countries are either restrictive or promotive of the policy options for the implantation of democracy by the political actors.<sup>8</sup> Pointedly, structural studies see the development of democracy as a consequence of "historically – created structures" such as economic development, transformation of class structure, increased education, etc.<sup>9</sup> And Robert Dahl has observed that some structural factors like "historical sequences, the degree of concentration in the socioeconomic order, level of socioeconomic development, inequality, sub-cultural cleavages, foreign



control, and the beliefs of political actor” are influential conditions for public competition and polyarchy.<sup>10</sup>

Thus from the foregoing, structural determination theory can be subdivided into: the economic theory of democracy, the political culture theory, the social structure theory, and international situation theory. Essentially, the structural determination theory considers socioeconomic, cultural and social structural variables as important requirements of democracy.

### 2.11 ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY:

Early theories of democracy were those propounded by scholars often referred to as “Modernizers” or modernisation theorists. For the modernizers, democracy is attainable in societies that are experiencing socio-economic development and industrialization. Lipset posits that greater economic affluence in a country is a favourable condition for democracy and that “the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy”<sup>11</sup> and Samuel Huntington, subscribes to the postulation of Lipset that the success of democratic agenda requires supportive socio-economic development.<sup>12</sup> Thus, democratisation in this regard is conceived as an inevitable consequence of socioeconomic advancement. And the obvious deduction therefore is that the success or failure of any democratic transition is dependent on the level of socioeconomic development that the democratizing society has attained.<sup>13</sup>

The protagonists of socioeconomic variable as a causative factor in the march of States towards democratisation often hinge their theses on the belief that economic development enhances urbanization, promotes literacy and the expansion of mass media. And sequel to these influences, the citizenry becomes more politically conscious and assertive as they are

strengthened to participate in politics. Moreover, they reason that attendant higher standards of living encourages the development of a middle class; increase social diversity, and promotes civil consciousness among the populace.<sup>14</sup>

For as Diamond pointed out:

Socioeconomic development tends to loosen or sever traditional ties of deference and obedience to authority. New interests are generated, new consciousness is kindled and new political and organisational capacities are acquired at the individual and group level.<sup>15</sup>

Furthermore, the adherents of the socioeconomic paradigm are agreed that economic development increases the capacity of a society to satisfy the expectations and aspirations of its citizens, as it reduces social frustrations and tensions and subverts potential political crisis.<sup>16</sup> Writing on the resultant effects of mass communications and urbanisation, McCrone and Cnudde argue that urbanisation encourages democratic political development by increasing the educational attainment of the citizens through their exposure to newspapers, television and radio.<sup>17</sup> Public awareness increases and the people become actively involved in the affairs of their countries with greater influence on government policies and practices.<sup>18</sup> Generally, economic development produces a vibrant civil society and a pluralistic social order.<sup>19</sup> Also, the rise of a middle class and the production of a broadly educated citizenry lead to the emergence of independently, organised, articulate and politically assertive groups; which could confidently demand for the expansion of the democratic space, and /or the overturning of the existing political order. Additionally, socio-economic theories of democratization claim that countries which are more economically, politically and socially

developed produce more sophisticated and participatory populace, less burdened by political conflict.<sup>20</sup>

The underlying assumption of this school of thought is that the poor are usually far less educated and are ignorant of the intricacies of politics and governmental policies. Consequently, not only are the poor pawns in the chessboard of powerful elites, they are also the prey of demagogues, who place excessive demands on the political system by advocating for fundamental redistribution of their countries' wealth. Thus, the socio-economic school of democratization contends that the converse obtains when there is an improvement in the socioeconomic status of the masses. With an improved social status, the masses can acquire some leverage as they become less vulnerable to the gimmick of the power elite; they are even less passive and can demand for the reform of existing undemocratic practices and institutions<sup>21</sup>.

More importantly, and in another sense, democracy is less likely to emerge in countries where an impoverished mass confronts a few wealthy elite who control the means of production and distribution<sup>22</sup>. The economic theorists further reason that economic development, because it entails among others industrialization, promotes diverse and complex interrelated economy which is hostile to authoritarian regimes. The prevalence of multiple and competing institutions resulting from the progressive industrialization of the society, the economic theorists argue, would forestall the entrenchment of authoritarian regime.<sup>23</sup> And in another sense, according to the economic theorists, economic development which involved the promotion of foreign trade and investment, facilitates the opening of a country to the world economy, advanced technology and communications. Consequently, the country which becomes so integrated into the world economy could begin to

experience the growth of non-government sources of wealth, and the existence of non-governmental civil groups akin to what obtains in the industrialized capitalist democratic countries of the world. Nigeria's quest for western technology can be adduced as one of the reasons for the infiltration of Western liberal ideas and the growing assertiveness of its civil society. In the case of Korea, the desire to be recognised as one of the leading industrialized countries in the world has continued to influence its democratic change.<sup>24</sup>

In a more detailed analysis, Huntington has attempted to indicate the level of economic development requisite for the successful establishment and sustenance of democracy. This he describes as "transition zone"<sup>25</sup> In a similar vein, other scholars have used different terms to designate the acceptable level of economic growth or development supportive of democratic political development, and below which democracy is unattainable. Neubauer utilizes the term "development threshold" to assess the possibility or otherwise, of the emergence of democracy in any given country.<sup>26</sup> However, the plausibility of socioeconomic theory of democratization notwithstanding, it is not without its own shortcomings. First, it has been pointed out that the theory lacks universal applicability as it cannot explain in entirety the diverse manifestations of democratization across countries of the world. For instance some scholars have sought for explanations for countries that are economically developed but lacking democratic development, as in Latin America, and countries that have achieved democratic growth without prior economic development like it happened in Singapore.<sup>27</sup> India, Costa Rica, Kenya, Jamaica and Zimbabwe were also cited as examples of democratic countries lacking economic development.

It is also noteworthy that O'Donnell's theory of bureaucratic authoritarianism is in sharp opposition to the economic theory of democracy. For O'Donnell, socioeconomic development is more likely to lead to authoritarian regimes than democracy. He averred that there is a linkage between higher levels of modernization and the emergence of bureaucratic authoritarianism in South America.<sup>28</sup> Also, Lummis and Cheng have argued that economic development consolidates authoritarian regimes and prevents democratic ferment through the policy of cooperation or assimilation of democrats and democratic movements.<sup>29</sup>

The limitations of the economic theory of democratization are more glaring when utilized in explicating the democratic transition projects in most African countries. The agitation and sporadic violence, prompted by the ever-worsening predicament of the African masses were instrumental to the establishment of democratic dispensation in much of Africa. Claude Ake argues that:

The democracy movement gathered momentum as commodities disappeared from grocery stores in Lusaka and Dare-Salaam, as unemployment and inflation got out of control in Kinshasha and Lagos, as a bankrupt government failed to pay wages in Cotonou .... as poverty intensified everywhere, defeating all possibilities of self-realization, threatening even mere physical existence.<sup>30</sup>

From the foregoing, it is palpable that the socioeconomic theory of democratization cannot be used in analyzing all the democratization processes that had taken place across the globe. Economic prosperity may stimulate democratic aspirations and emergence of democratic institutions in some countries while it could consolidate authoritarian regimes in yet other

countries. Also, socioeconomic adversities can spur democratic ferment in some countries while in yet others it entrenches authoritarian regimes.

## 2.12 POLITICAL CULTURE THEORY

It has been widely theorized by most contemporary political scientists that the difference among political systems across countries of the world are explainable by recourse to their disparate political cultures.<sup>31</sup> The principal argument of political culture theorists is that democracy thrives when existing democratic institutions are complemented by supportive political culture. Thus, they reasoned that democracy cannot exist nor can it be sustained where undemocratic political culture prevails. Notably, Western liberal orthodox literature has devoted a lot of attention to the search for the kinds of societies that manifest the requisite cultural or behavioural traits for the emergence and sustenance of democracy. Almond and Verba in an elaborate study entitled: The Civic Culture (1989) attempted to explain why there is political development in some countries ( in terms of the practice of democracy) and why there is none in some other countries. And at the end of their five-nation study, Almond and Verba came up with three ideal types of political culture. These are, Parochial, subject, and Participant Political Culture<sup>32</sup>. By parochial political culture, Almond and Verba refer to a people who lack opinions and are not conscious about their political system. They don't in-put into the political system, and they are deficient in knowledge about the functions of the political system. In the case of the subject culture, the people have good knowledge about the political system, but they do not in-put into the political system. The participant culture is representative of the civic culture, in which the citizens have good knowledge about the political system and participate actively in

the various aspects of the political process. For Almond and Verba, the civic culture or the participant political culture exists in Western democracies, while the subject and parochial culture are found in non-Western societies.<sup>33</sup> For Almond and Verba, therefore, democracy is not attainable in societies with subject and parochial cultures.<sup>34</sup>

Western democracies are believed to possess such norms as individualism, freedom, respect for human dignity, and tolerance of views of others, which are conducive to the sustenance of democratic practice.<sup>35</sup> And by logical inference, any culture that does not possess norms similar to the Western norms is perceived incapable of sustaining democratic institutions. Thus, the failure of democracy in Asian and African countries has been attributed to the existence of “philosophical traditions anti-thetical to liberalism.”<sup>36</sup> Accordingly, Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore’s former prime Minister, once argued that the quest by the West to foist its democratic traditions and institutions on Asian societies would not succeed because Asian societies are traditionally authoritarian in culture.<sup>37</sup> And in a more recent study, Geir Helgesen, pointed out the incongruities between contemporary Korean political structures and Korean culture. According to Helgesen:

The blueprint for South Korea’s democratization is made up of ideas, rules and institutions imported and translated from Western democratic models. Problems arising from remodeling the whole political landscape on foreign examples and the prolonged cold war on the peninsula seems to have frozen political structures as well as the creative capacities of the political actors<sup>38</sup>

The implications of the cultural constraints to democratization in Africa have been forthrightly articulated by some African scholars. Amuwo

contends that the democratic process in Africa inherited an unsophisticated political culture which is based more on the charisma of individuals than on political ideas. This hostile cultural outlook provokes “adulation of hard-fisted ruler or implacable criticism of democratic ruler.”<sup>39</sup> In the same vein, Ekeh argues that the problem of democracy in Africa is worsened by the unscrupulous replication of institutions and norms of Western democracy in Africa with utmost disregard of the norms that derive from African primordial public sphere.<sup>40</sup>

It is instructive, however, to note that although cultural perspective on democratic praxis could be explanatory of some of the problems of democratic development in Africa and Asia, it cannot claim to be independent of other explanatory variables. More repulsive is the Eurocentrism of political culture theorists who consign perfection of democratic practice to the West, as if democracy is the exclusive preserve of Western culture. And as Richard Sklar argues, every country in the world is a veritable laboratory for the discovery of democratic principles and workshop for the construction of democratic machinery.<sup>41</sup>

### 2.13 SOCIAL CLASSIFICATION THEORY

The social classification theory of democratization concerns itself with the existing social forces – groups and classes in the democratizing societies. This theory can be subdivided into two schools. The first school concerns itself with the study of groups that are instrumental to the establishment of democratic order. The second school focuses on the elite structures responsible for the construction of and sustenance of democracy.<sup>42</sup> According to the social theorists of democratization, a broadly differentiated social structure composes social classes, ethnic, regional, religious and



occupational groups which serve to check the excesses of the state as a countervailing force. These social groups are pivotal to the establishment, sustenance and consolidation of democratic development.<sup>43</sup> But where these groups do not exist, it then becomes possible for the state to exercise absolute power without any restraint, in a manner akin to what obtains in totalitarian dictatorship.<sup>44</sup> O'Donnell et.al have observed that an effective and enduring challenge to authoritarian rule for the inauguration of political democracy, can only exist in societies with vibrant civil societies which are richly endowed with multiple independent group identities. These groups according to O'Donnell et.al must be independent and capable of acting autonomously in defence of their own interest and ideals.<sup>45</sup>

The social theorists of democratization are emphatic of the role of social movements in the transformation of the socioeconomic and political systems of any given society. Thus, for these theorists, social struggle for the enthronement of democracy requires that the struggle be organised and consistent if it is to make the desirable impact, since it has to be against government's interest.<sup>46</sup> Moreover, the labour unions are considered as a veritable force in the power equation of democratizing societies. These unions are usually available for the instigation and expansion of demonstrations, strikes and protests, which often have debilitating effects on the economy. The broad base and all-encompassing membership of the labour unions, enable them affect the economy, and thus constitute a check on authoritarian regimes.<sup>47</sup> Notably, the labour union struggle for democratic order could be explained as a desire by the labour unions to put an end to their marginalization. Thus, certain governmental policies, programmes and laws considered by labour Union to be inimical to its interest have always provided raison d'être for relentless agitation.<sup>48</sup>

The prevalence of religious groups in multi-religious societies like Latin American countries, south Korea, India, Nigeria, etc, has received the attention of social theorists. In most of the religiously diverse societies, religious sects and groups often constitute themselves into pressure groups, and champion the advocacy for religious practice and religious freedom.<sup>49</sup> Additionally, the peasantries in such countries as China and Russia were instrumental to the revolutionary transformation of their countries. But the peasantries in developing countries of Africa and Asia lack organizational strength and political will requisite for democratic transformation of their milieux.<sup>50</sup>

The second strand of social theory is majorly concerned with the nature and character of elite structure. Theorists who use this paradigm to explicate the character of political regimes, believe that elite structure – whether it is disunified, ideologically unified or consensually unified – would determine to a great extent the type of political regime and political development that exists in a given country.<sup>51</sup> “Structure” means the “amalgam of attitudes, values and interpersonal relations among factions that make up the elite.”<sup>52</sup> Thus, according to the elite structure theorists, the disunified elite structures exist when the members of the elite distrust each other. The disunified elite structure lacks cooperation or political negotiation, and the members of this structure would utilize every means – even violence to achieve their aims.<sup>53</sup> The ideologically unified elite structure is homogeneous, monolithic and cohesive, and every member of this group identifies with the mainstream ideology that binds and brings them together. Moreover, ideologically unified elite structure allows for the centralization of power, and a highly reduced rate of elite circulation. Also,

competition for power in this kind of elite structure is not organised and in most cases, this competition often leads to enmity.<sup>54</sup>

The third kind of elite structure is the “consensually unified elite structure.” This elite structure tolerates diverse ideologies and it is pluralistic, and members compete with each other for political power. The elite are favourably disposed to the practice of politics in accordance with the laid down rules of the game. The different factions cooperate with one another because of the existence of interpersonal exchanges among the elite. There are several methods through which recruitment of the elite is done, as it exists in the USA and West European countries.<sup>55</sup>

It is noteworthy, as these sociologists would want us believe that the political system which manifests the disunified elite structures is extremely unstable, with the possibility of a high incidence of military coups, and / or popular protests. While in the case of the “ideologically unified structure” the political system is relatively stable as a result of the absence of substantial opposition to the government – perhaps, because opposition to the constituted order is not tolerated in this society. And finally, a society with “consensually unified elite structure has a political system that is stable, with a well-regulated means of transferring power through elections.<sup>56</sup>

In a sense, democratic transition is conceived as a change of elite structure from a disunified structure or ideologically unified structure to a consensually unified elite structure. Higley and Burton argue that the attainment of consensually unified elite is dependent on the readiness of the competing national elite factions to reconcile and abandon their different ideologies. They used the term “elite settlement” to describe the process through which compromise is struck among the diverse elite factions, in a manner similar to what O’Donnell and Schmitter call “elite pacts.”<sup>57</sup> Burton

and Higley's thesis explains the patterns and prospects of democratization as a reflection of the character of the society's elite structures. But Burton and Higley's theory is defective on the grounds of its inability to equip us with the mechanisms for the reproduction and maintenance of consensual unification of the elites, and of the process for coopting new members into the "rubric of consensus."<sup>58</sup>

#### 2.14 EXTERNALITIES IN THE DEMOCRATISATION PROCESS

It is noteworthy that scholars have identified externalities as potent factors responsible for the incidence of democratic ferment across countries of the world. The scholars in this intellectual mode explain the democratisation process in a country as a function of exogenous variables. These scholars view democratisation as a function of a multiplicity of externalities to which that country is accessible or vulnerable. In other words, these scholars explain externalities as factors which are themselves adaptable to foreign influences. Essentially, the main thesis of this school is that external factors influence governmental elites, non-governmental elite, and the wider segments of the population – and indeed democratic transition project of a given country.<sup>59</sup>

For the scholars espousing the idea that externalities are significant explanatory variables for assessing and understanding the trends and prospects of democratisation in countries of the world, the interdependent nature of the world favours the spread through diffusion effects, of democratisation on a global basis. The global, regional, sub-regional, neighborhood changes toward democratisation are believed by these scholars to have decisive impact on undemocratic regimes across countries of the world.<sup>60</sup> The degree of influence that external factors have on a

country is to a great extent determined by the degree of that country's sensitivity or vulnerability to these externalities.<sup>61</sup>

Additionally, it is argued that the world has become a global village, neatly welded together more intimately in contemporary times than it was. Today, national boundaries are dissolved by a network of modern communication systems and transportation systems. These new developments have impacted tremendously on the conduct of international diplomacy among countries of the world. Consequently, the independence of states in the world system is being challenged by multiple international forces with their compelling allegiance to international standards. Thus, sequel to the globalizing effects of modern communication systems, it becomes difficult for any country's leadership to prevent its citizenry from accessing information about political and economic changes elsewhere in the world.<sup>62</sup>

Notably, as the scholars have pointed out, the success of democratisation in one country could have "demonstration effects" or snowballing effects" on other countries. As Huntington pointed out, the success of democratization in a country serves as signpost to others that the process is attainable. The process in one country could present the possibilities, problems and techniques of accomplishing democratisation.<sup>63</sup> Yet, on the other hand, it has been noted that the West – and indeed the United States with their encouraging success story in the realm of democratic and economic development, have never really supported genuine democratisation in any country of the world. The foreign policies of the West in general and the United States are phrased to cater selfishly for the economic and political interests of their societies, without any altruistic concern for the well-being of other countries of the world.<sup>64</sup>

But in cases where some powerful states have been seen to wield remarkable influence on other countries in the direction of effecting democratisation, scholars are quick to point to factors such as cultural affinity, geographical proximity as some of the supportive variables conducive to such influence. These influences are often exerted by the powerful states through covert means. Notably, the United States uses diplomatic, economic and military means to effect socio-economic and political changes in other countries of the world, in a manner favourable to the U.S. strategic political and military interests.<sup>65</sup> Invariably, the United States through the institutional efforts of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) has actively sponsored democratic reforms in communist and non-communist countries. Furthermore, the United States has utilised such other means as economic and trade sanctions, diplomatic sanctions, military action, multilateral diplomacy via the United Nations (UN) and presidential pronouncements, to influence some target countries in a predetermined way, suitable to the United States' interest at a given point in time.<sup>66</sup>

Related to the above is the combined effect of the activities of transnational corporations (TNCS) and the policies of such international financial institutions (IFIs) like the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, on democratisation. The state in Africa, according to some scholars has been rendered more oppressive and less productive by these institutions, and consequently opened up the African State to stiffer opposition from its civil society over the years.<sup>67</sup> And in his writings on the role of external factors in the upsurge of democratisation across Africa, Issa Shivji argues that democratization is essentially a process instigated majorly by externalities than internal urgings. According to Shivji:

“The origin of the wind of democratisation in Africa lie in Eastern Europe. The mentors of change, as always, are from the West, including the IMF and World Bank. Conform or else ... is the tenth commandment. And lo, behold – from Military to multi-party – from one party to multiparty; From no party to multiparty – African rulers are changing colours – haltingly at times, reluctantly often, but surely no doubt, lest they fall out of the queue of aid beggars.”<sup>68</sup>

From the foregoing expository presentations of the different strands of structural school of democratisation, it seems apparent that no one strand of the school has captured accurately, the substance and essence of democratisation, just as even the entire structural school is imperfect. It was observed that the structural school is too deterministic, and it lays too much emphasis on economic, social, cultural, psychological and international-situation factors without any meaningful reference to the political factors.<sup>69</sup>

Secondly, the structural school has not explained why countries with the same socio-economic structure have different political systems.

However, the manifest limitations of the structural theory have led scholars to reconceptualise democratization along political indices. This rethink gave birth to another theory known as the genetic theory.

## 2.20 GENETIC THEORY OF DEMOCRATISATION

The genetic theory of democratisation is concerned with political variables such as the political process operating during regime changes; political actors, their interests and strategies and the transforming power configuration of contending forces.<sup>70</sup>

It is noteworthy to point out here that while structural determination theory concerns itself with the perfection of an established democratic system, genetic theory focuses on how to inaugurate a democracy in a

country. In other words, genetic theory emphasizes “causation” more than “correlation.”<sup>71</sup>

According to genetic theorists, democratization results from political processes, not from structural factors, because as they argue, the outcome of the transition occurring under the same structural condition may differ depending on the choice of political actors. Even, theories of democratization that emphasize macro-variables which view political change as a process originating from non-political actors, cannot discountenance political variables.<sup>72</sup> From the perspective of genetic theory, transition to democracy is dependent on the cooperation between power wielder and the opposition leaders. The principal actors in the transition process are “hardliners” and “Softliners” in the governing coalition, and minimalists (or democratic moderates) in the opposition. The outcome of the interactions between hardliners/softliners and maximalists/minimalist depends on the group within the governing coalition that relates with any of the two groups in the opposition. For Huntington, “the three crucial interactions in democratization process were those between government and opposition, between reformers and standpatters in the governing coalition, and between moderates and extremists in the opposition.”<sup>73</sup> There can be different permutations of likely interactions between the members of ruling coalition and the opposition groups. The movement from confrontation to bargaining is pivotal to democratic breakthrough. The relationship between the four contending groups – softliners, hardliners, maximalists, and minimalists can be as indicated below:



GOVERNMENT	OPPOSITION	OUTCOME
Hardliners	Maximalists	Confrontation and brinkmanship
Hard-liners	Moderates	Suppression
Softliners	Maximalists	Re-emergence of hardliners
Softliners	Moderates	Negotiations/bargaining

**Source:** *Samuel P. Huntington, The Third wave: Democratization in the Twentieth Century (Norman; University of Oklahoma press, 1991), p.123*

These possible outcomes are reflective of the depth of democratisation – whether it is fundamental or reformist. Genetic theory also portrays the dynamics of democratic transition at a given period, without recourse to historical and structural forces, which in actuality have important influence on political choices made by the political actors. Genetic theory can be subdivided into two strands (I) Bottom-up democratisation, and (ii) Top-down democratisation.<sup>74</sup>

### 2.21 **BOTTOM-UP DEMOCRATISATION**

Bottom-up democratisation entails intense struggle from the society for political change. The struggle is often masterminded and coordinated by political actors or challengers.”<sup>75</sup> In a sense, the demise of authoritarian regime and the concomitant democratization of polity have been explained as the consequences of the vibrancy of civil society. Authoritarian regimes, it has been noted do not surrender power voluntarily, excepting through consistent and well-sustained opposition from the civil society.<sup>76</sup> Thus, as it is often espoused by genetic scholars who recognized the salience of the push from the civil society, regime change naturally must be in consonance with the programmes of the opposition groups in the civil society. In other

words, bottom-up theorists of democratization believe that the democratization process can only reflect the yearnings and requirements of the civil society, when the civil society is capable to assert its claims by pushing for the enlargement of the democratic space.<sup>77</sup> On the other hand, the durability of authoritarian regimes, particularly in African societies, has been explained as a depiction of the fragility of African civil societies, and the absence of competing organisations in African civil societies.<sup>78</sup> Indeed, African civil societies have been described as being indifferent to the affairs of the state.<sup>79</sup>

The desideratum of consistent opposition from the civil societies to the authoritarian regime has always been stressed by scholars who are favourably disposed to democratization from below: According to O'Donnell *et.al*:

For an effective and enduring challenge to authoritarian rule to be mounted, and for political democracy to become and remain an alternative mode of political domination, a country must possess a civil society in which certain community and group identities exist independent of the state and in which certain types of self-constituted units are capable of acting autonomously in defence of their own interests and ideals.<sup>80</sup>

Bottom – up democratisation is often conceived as a conflict-prone process, mainly because it involves the overturning of the existing political authoritarian order, and an eventual replacement with a democratic system. Sporadic outburst and political protest result from the desire of politically excluded groups to be incorporated into the body politic. This conflict may exist as a result of the shift in the balance of economic, military and organisational resources among groups in the society.<sup>81</sup> Specifically, the spark of massive resistance to authoritarian regime often originates from the middle classes, and such professional groups as lawyers, academics,

journalists, Bishops (Clergymen), writers etc. These groups agitate for the observance of human rights and champion the struggle for democratization in any democratizing enclave.<sup>82</sup> The choice of repression on the part of the authoritarian regimes, of the dissenting voices from the civil society would aggravate the struggle for democratization, with even more deleterious consequences for the authoritarian regimes. But if the authoritarian regimes introduce “corrective measures” and accede to the demand of the protesting groups, then protests and violent demonstrations can be abated. For as Larry Diamond pointed out, “broad and sustained popular mobilization” for the implantation of democracy require “Political entrepreneurship” and shrewd political maneuvering.”<sup>83</sup>

## 2.22 TOP-DOWN DEMOCRATISATION

The Top-Down democratisation process is one in which the initiative for political reforms emanates from within the authoritarian leadership. This initiative for political reforms often results from the disagreement between the “hard-liners” and “softliners” within the ruling coalition. Essentially, therefore, democratic transition via the top-down design is a consequence of intra-ruling class struggle.<sup>84</sup> It is believed that leaders of authoritarian regimes voluntarily throw-up democratic agenda in order to abate the spiraling legitimacy crisis which threatens to erode the foundation of their regimes. Thus, the limited liberalization pursued by authoritarian regimes is aimed at softening and calming the nerves of the opposition. And sequel to the accommodation of democratic reforms by the authoritarian regimes, the democratic space so opened-up could form a credible platform for more agitation among the softliners in the ruling coalition for more encompassing democratic reform.<sup>85</sup>

In a sense the leaders of authoritarian regimes may feel that through the inauguration of medium-sized democratic agenda, they can prolong the life spans of their regimes and achieve international legitimacy by minimizing domestic opposition and the incidence of civil violence.<sup>86</sup> Then democratic transition projects as introduced by the authoritarian leadership should have to be “a conscious expression of will, to remove and/or neutralize institutional weaknesses through the selective creation of new institutions.”<sup>87</sup>

Furthermore, authoritarian regimes which ensured the industrialisation and socio-economic development of their countries are often faced with broader opposition from the civil society, as a result of improvement in the socio-economic status of the citizens. The citizens of these countries could then clamour for democratization to complement the socio-economic status which industrialization had bestowed on these countries.<sup>88</sup> In other words, the success of an authoritarian regime in achieving socio-economic development of its country could be said to have produced adverse consequences for the regime’s stability.

What is evident in the democratic transition agenda of the authoritarian regime as initiated from the top- is that the democracy project is reformist and not revolutionary. Top-down democratic transition project is also not evolutionary, since it is just an appeasement political package to calm the opposition, without any strong desire for implanting genuine democracy. Overall, democratic transition may more likely result from the pressure of the opposition forces in the civil society, than through the preemptive and instinctive move of authoritarian leaders to democratize. Thus, in accordance with genetic theory, democratisation is the result of the interplay between the innovative efforts of the authoritarian leaders to

maintain their hold on power and the resistance of the civil society to the authoritarian regime.

Notably, however, the democratic transition greatly influenced by the civil society, in the extreme, could be totally transformatory and violent. And on the other hand, the democracy project guided by the authoritarian leadership could relapse into repression, thereby forestalling democracy.

Although no one paradigm can capture the essence, the causes and effects of democratisation, the structural determination theory seems more explanatory of democratisation in Nigeria and south Korea. The limitations of the structural theory notwithstanding, its emphasis on economic, social, cultural, psychological and international situation factors make the theory more suitable for the comparative analysis of democratisation in Nigeria and South Korea.

In essence, therefore, the structural determination theory would be the theoretical framework of this study.

## ENDNOTES

1. Omo Omoruyi, "Designing the Nigerian Transition programme" in Omo Omoruyi, Dirk-Berg schlosser, Adesina Sambo eds, Democratization in Africa: Nigerian Perspective, (vol.1) (Abuja; Centre for Democratic Studies 1994); pp.196-199; see also Adele Jinadu, "Introduction; The NEC Elections and the Transition programme" in Adele Jinadu & Tony Edoh, eds, The 1987 - 1988 Local Government Elections in Nigeria, (Lagos, Federal Electoral Commission, 1990) pp.xii-xiii; Adesina Sambo, "Transition to Democracy in Nigeria: Possibilities and Limitations" in Omo Omoruyi, et.al (eds), Op.cit pp. 213-226.
2. Dankwart A, Rustow, "Transition to Democracy: Toward a dynamic model" Comparative Politics, 2 (3) 1970, pp 337-363, see also Geoffrey Pridham, "Southern European Democracies on the Road to consolidation: A comparative Assessment of the Role of political parties" in Geoffrey pridham, ed, Securing Democracy: Political Parties and Democratic consolidation in Southern Europe, (London; Routledge, 1990), pp. 1-4 Scott, Mainwaring, "Transition to Democracy and Democratic consolidation: Theoretical and comparative issues" Working paper 130, The Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, University of Notre Dame, 1989.
3. Larry Diamond, "Crisis, choice, and structure; Reconciling Alternative Models for Explaining Democratic Success and Failure in the Third World" - A Paper presented at the 1989 Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, August, 31 - September, 1989. P1.
4. Samuel P. Huntington, "Will More Countries Become Democratic?" Political Science Quarterly, 99, (2) 1984, pp 193-218.
5. Adams Przeworski, "Some problems in the study of the Transitions to Democracy" in O'Donnell, Guillermo, Philippe C. Schmitter and Lawrence Whitehead, (eds), Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspective, (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Uni. Press, 1986) pp 47-63; Geoffery pridham, op.cit,

6. Geoffery Pridham, op.cit, p.12
7. Terry Lynn, Karl, and Philippe C, Schmitter, "Modes of Transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe", International Social Science journal, 43, (2), 1991, p. 271.
8. Ian Roxborough, "The Dilemmas of Redemocratization", Government and Opposition, 23, (3), 1988, pp 354-367.
9. See Adams Przeworski, op.cit
10. Robert, A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1971) p.32.
11. Seymour Martin, Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (Expanded Edition), (Baltimore; Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), p.31; Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernising the Middle East, ( New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1958); Philips Cutright, "National Political Development. Measurement and Analysis", American Sociological Review, 28, (2), 1963, pp. 253-263; see also, Gilbert. P. Winham, "Political Development and Lerner's Theory: Further Test of a Causal Model", American Political Science Review , 64, (1970).
12. Samuel P. Huntington, op.cit.
13. Tatu Vanhanem, "Strategies of Democratization" A paper presented at European Consortium for Political Research of University of Essex, England, 1988; p.2; Chong Lim, Kim, "Politics for Democratic Change" in Kim Ilpyong and Young Whan Khil, Political Change in South Korea, (New York, The Korean PWPA, Inc, 1988), pp 44-74; James Cotton, "From Authoritarianism to Democracy in South Korea, " Political Studies, vol.xxxvii, 1989 pp 244-259, Sung-Joo, Han, "South Korea: Politics in Transition" in Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset (eds), Democracy in Developing Countries: volume 3 (Asia) (Boulder & Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1989), pp. 267-303, Sang Joon, Kim, "Characteristic Features of Korean Democratisation" Asian Perspective, vol.18, no.2, (Fall-Winter, 1994) pp.181-196; Chalmers Johnson, South Korean

Democratisation: The Role of Economic Development”, Pacific Review, vol.2, No 1, 1989, pp.1-10.

14. Nasser, Momayezi, “Unbalanced development and domestic instability: The case of South Korea” Asian Thought & Society, 13, (38), 1988, pp 114-124; Larry Diamond, “Introduction; Persistence, Breakdown and Renewal” in Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, (eds), Democracy in Developing countries: Asia (vol.3) (Boulder : Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), pp. 1-52, Terry Lynn Karl, “Dilemmas of Democratisation in Latin America” Comparative Politics 23 (1) 1990, pp 1-21; Manning, Stephen Dale, “Democratising the Leninist Party State: The Political Economy of Reform in China and the Soviet Union”, Ph.D Dissertation, University of Wisconsin – Madison, 1990.
15. Larry Diamond, “Introduction: Persistence, Breakdown and Renewal” in Larry Diamond et.al (eds), op.cit, p.34.
16. Samuel P. Huntington, op.cit
17. Donald J. McCrone and Charles F. Cnudde, “Toward a Communications Theory of Democratic Political Development: A Causal Model”, American Political Science Review, 61, (1), 1967, pp. 72-79.
18. Jong Duck, park, “Regional Cleavages and Orientation Toward the political System in South Korea” Ph.D Dissertation, Temple University, 1989; see also Lawrence krause and Tun-jen cheng, “Development and Democracy: Special attention to Korea” A paper presented to International Conference on Korea’s Democratic Experiment. Asiatic Research Centre of Korea University and Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, Seoul Korea, June 27-28, 1991.
19. Peter M. Lewis, “Endgame in Nigeria? The politics of a Failed Democratic Transition”, African Affairs, 93, 1994, pp. 335-336.
20. Stephen Z, Solarz, “Promoting Democracy in the Third World: Lost Cause or Sound policy?” SAIS Review, 15, (2), 1985, pp. 139-153.



21. Nasser Momayezi, op.cit, p.114; Larry Diamond, "Introduction; persistence, Breakdown and Renewal", op.cit, p.35; Young Ho, Park, "State, Society and Authoritarian Development: The case of Korea" Ph.D Dissertation, University of Cincinnati, 1988, p.58
22. Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: ..... op.cit, p.50; Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, (Norman; University of Oklahoma press, 1991) pp.65-67; Abbas, Pourgerami, Development and Democracy in the Third World (Boulder; Westview Press 1991), p.9: Crawford Young "Permanent Transition and Changing conjectures; Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria in Comparative Perspective" in Paul A. Beckett and Crawford Young (eds), Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria, (U.K., University of Rochester press, 1997), p.76.
23. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Context of Democratisation in Taiwan", Sino-American Relations, 16, (4), 1990, pp.17-28.
24. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Third wave: Democratisation in The Late Twentieth Century, op.cit, pp.65-67; see also Lawrence Krause, and Tun-jen Cheng, op.cit, p.15.
25. Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave ,..... op.cit, pp.60-61
26. Deane E. Neubauer, "Some conditions of Democracy", American Political Science Review, 61, (4), 1967, pp. 1002-1009; Robert Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition op.cit pp. 67-68, Samuel P. Huntington, "Will More countries Become Democratic?", op.cit, pp.193-218, Mitchell A, Seligson, "Development, Democratization and Decay: Central America at the Crossroads" in Malloy, James, M. and Mitchell A. Seligson (eds), Authoritarians and Democrats: Regime Transition in Latin America, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987) pp 167 –192; Larry Diamond, "Crisis, choice, and structure; Reconciling Alternative models for Explaining Democratic success and Failure in the Third World", Op.cit, p.5.

Che-Shen J, Yen "Consequences of Socio-economic Development in Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea; Democracy or a continuation of Authoritarianism?" Ph.D Dissertation, Purdue University, 1990, pp43-44; Adewale Olaitan, "Reflections on the

Democratisation Process in Africa" Social Analyst, vol.1, No.2, January, 1992 p.10.

27. Jisoo, Oh, "Korea and Democracy: An Examination of Attitude Adoptability", Ph.D Dissertation, Claremont graduate School, 1989, p.41; Stephen Dale Manning, "Democratizing the Leninist Party-State: The Political Economy of Reform in China and the Soviet Union", Ph.D Dissertation, University of Wisconsin – Madison, 1990.
28. Guillermo O'Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics, (Berkeley, University of California, 1973); Tatu Vanhanen, "The Level of Democratisation Related to Socioeconomic Variables in 147 States in 1980 –85", Scandinavian Political Studies, 12, (2), 1989, pp 96-97.
29. Tun-jen, cheng, "Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan", World Politics, 4, (4), 1989, pp.471-499; Douglas C. Lummis, "Development against Democracy" Alternatives, 16, (1), 1991, pp. 31-66.
30. Claude Ake "The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa", Keynote Address at the Symposium on Democratic Transition in Africa, organised by the Centre for Research, Documentation and University Exchange, university of Ibadan, 16-19 June, 1992.
31. Robert Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, op.cit p.166; Larry Diamond, Juan j. Linz, and Seymour martin Lipset, "Building and sustaining Democratic Government in Developing Countries: Some tentative findings" World politics, 150, (1), 1987, pp. 5-18; Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave; Democratisation in the late twentieth Century op.cit, p.68.
32. Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney verba, The Civic Culture Revisited (Newbury Park; Sage Publications, 1989)
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.

35. Stephen Z. Solarz, "Promoting Democracy in the Third World : Lost Cause or Sound Policy?" Op.cit, p.114.
36. Ibid, p.144; Peter McDonough and Doh. C. Shin, "Conservative Democratisation and the Transition to Mass politics in Korea" in Sung Chul Yang, ed, Democracy and Communism: Theory, Reality and the Future, (Seoul, The Korean Association of International Studies, 1995).
37. See, Foreign Affairs, March/April 1994
38. Geir Helgesen, Democracy and Authority in Korea: The Cultural Dimension in Korean Politics, (London & Richmond, Curzon Press, 1998) pp. 250-253.
39. Kunle Amuwo, "The International (And Domestic) Context of democratic Transition in Africa: Road Blocks to Democracy?" in B. Caron, A. Gboyega, and E. Osaghae, eds, Democratic Transition in Africa, (Ibadan: CREU Institute of African Studies, 1992) p.19.
40. Peter P. Ekeh, "The Constitution of Civil Society in African History and Politics", in B. Caron et.al, eds, Ibid, pp. 187-209.
41. Richard Sklar & C. S. Whitaker, African Politics and Problems in Development, (London, Lyne Rienner, 1991), p. 308.
42. John, Higley and Michael G. Burton, "The Elite Variable in Transition and Breakdowns", American Sociological Review , 54, (1), 1989, pp.12-32.
43. Samuel P. Huntington, "will More Countries Become Democratic?" Op.cit, p. 197; Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, "Building and Sustaining Democratic Government in Developing Countries....." Op.cit, pp. 10-12;
44. Samuel P. Huntington, " Will More Countries Become Democratic ..." Op.cit, p.197.

45. Guillermo, O'Donnell , Philippe C. Schmitter and Lawrence Whitehead, (eds) Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe, (Baltimore; Johns Hopkins University Press 1986,) p.6.
46. Fred. E. Onyeoziri, "Towards, A Theory of Democratic Mobilization; The Comparative and Theoretical Perspective" A paper presented at the 15<sup>th</sup> Annual Conference of the NPSA, Ibadan, 1988, P.6; Mahmood Mamdani, Thandika Mkandawire, and Wamba-dia-Wamba, Social Movements, Social Transformation and the Struggle for Democracy in Africa (Dakar, CODESRIA working paper 1/88).
47. Samuel J. Valenzuela, "Labour Movements in Transition to Democracy: A Framework for Analysis", Comparative Politics , 21, (4), 1989. Pp.446-447.
48. Nuhu Yaqub, "The Contribution of Labour to the Democratisation Process in Nigeria" in Omo Omoruyi, Dirk-Berg Schlosser, Adesina Sambo, and Ada Okwuosa eds, Democratisation in Africa: Nigerian Perspectives vol. 2 (Abuja, centre for Democratic Studies, 1994) pp. 141-161; Funmi Adewumi, "Organised Labour and the Democratisation process in Nigeria" in Omo Omoruyi et.al, eds, Ibid, pp. 162-177.
49. Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset, "Building and sustaining Democratic Government, Op.cit, p.12.
50. Ibid, p.12.
51. Michael G. Burton, and John Higley, "Elite Settlements", American Sociological Review , 52, (3), 1987, p. 295-307.
52. Ibid, p.296.
53. Ibid, pp. 296-297.
54. Ibid, pp. 298.
55. John Higley and Gwen Moore, "Elite Integration in the United States and Australia" American Political Science Review , 75, (1981), pp. 581-597.

56. Michael G. Burton and John Higley "Elite Settlements", Op.cit, p.297.
57. Ibid, p.295, Guillermo O'Donnell, and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about uncertain Democracies, (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986, pp216-220.
58. Larry Diamond, "Introduction: Persistence, Breakdown and Renewal", Op.cit, pp.14-15.
59. Terry Lynn, Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratisation in Latin America", Comparative Politics, 23, (1), 1990, pp.1-21; Stephen Dale, Manning, "Democratisation the Leninist party State: The Political Economy of Reform in China and Soviet Union" Ph. D Dissertation University of Wisconsin – Madison, 1990 p.94; Harvey Starr, "Democratic Dominoes", Journal of Conflict Resolution, 35 (2) 1991 p. 378, Hyug Baeg Im, "Politics of Democratic Transition from Authoritarian Rule in South Korea", Korean Social Science Journal , vol.21, 1995; See also Hyug-Baeg Im, "Opportunities and Constraints to Democratic consolidation in South Korea" A paper presented at the Centre for Korean Studies, University of California, Berkeley, April, 3, 1996.
60. Harvey Starr, Op.cit, p. 358.
61. Robert Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition Op.cit, p.190, Samuel P. Huntington, "Will more countries Become Democratic?", Op.cit, p.205; Lawrence Whitehead, "International Aspects of Democratisation" in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Lawrence Whitehead, eds Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives, (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p.4; Harvey Starr, "Democratic Dominoes", Op.cit, p.378.
62. Mikyung Lee, Chin, "Legitimacy Crisis in Authoritarian Regime" Ph.D Dissertation, University of California Berkeley, 1988, P. 128; David Held, "Democracy and Globalization", Alternatives, 16, (2), 1991, pp. 201-208; Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratisation in the late Twentieth Century Op.cit, p.102.

63. Samuel P. Huntington, Ibid, pp. 100-101.
64. Omo Omoruyi, "Western Global Agenda: Democracy and the Free Market", in Sonni Gwanle Tyoden, ed, Nigeria: Youth Agenda for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, (Abuja: Yakubu Gowon Centre, 1995), pp.101-106.
65. Michael A. Samuels, and William A. Douglas, "Promoting Democracy" Washington Quarterly, 4 (3), 1981, pp.52-65; Stephen Z, Solarz, "Promoting Democracy in the Third World: Lost cause or sound Policy?", Op.cit., p.146.
66. Robert Dahl, Polyarchy, Participation and Opposition, Op.Cit, pp.210-211; Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century, Op.cit, pp.91-94.
67. Kunle Amuwo, "The International (and Domestic) Context of Democratic Transition in Africa.... Op.Cit,
68. Issa Shivji, "The POS and the NGOs: Reflection on the place of working people in the Battle for Democracy", CODESRIA Bulletin, No.4, 1990 p. 95, Issa Shivji, Fight My Beloved Continent: New Democracy in Africa, (Harare, SAPES, 1988.)
69. Dankwart Rustow, Op.cit, p.337
70. Adams Przeworski, "Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy" Op.cit p.47; Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about uncertain Democracies, Op.cit; Tatu Vanhanen, "The level of Democratisation Related to Socio-economic variables in the 147 States in 1980-85", Scandinavian Political Studies, 12, (7), 1989), pp.95-127.
71. Philippe C. Schmitter, "The Transition from Authoritarian Rule to Democracy in Modernising Societies: Can German's Proposition (and Pessimism) be reversed" unpublished paper, University of Chicago 1982, pp.12-14; see Dankwart Rustow, Op.cit, pp. 337-363
72. Juan J. Linz, "Innovation Leadership in the Transition to Democracy and a New Democracy: The case of Spain" A paper presented at the

Conference on “Innovative Leadership and International Politics” of the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, Hebrew University, p. 2 Mikyung Lee, Chin, Op.cit, p.22; Larry Diamond “Crisis, Choice, and Structure; Reconciling Alternative Models for Explaining Democratic Success and Failure in the Third World”, A paper presented at the 1989 Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, August, 31 – September 3, 1989, p.3

73. Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century, Op.cit p.122
74. Huber Evelyne Stephen, “Democracy in Latin America: Recent Development in comparative historical perspective”, Latin America Research, 25, (2) 1990 pp. 168-169; Yoshikazu, Sakamoto, “Introduction: The global context of Democratisation” Alternatives, 16, (2), 1991, pp.119-128.
75. Raul S. Manglapus, Will of the People: Original Democracy in Non-Western Societies (New Delhii: Vikas Pub. House Ltd, 1990), p. xiv).
76. Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, “Transitions from Authoritarian, Capital-owing classes, and the politics of Newly Industrialising countries: The case of Indonesia”, World Politics, 40, (1), 1988 p.58.
77. Richard Robinson, Ibid, p.58, Scott Mainwaring, “Transition to Democracy and Democratic Consolidation: Theoretical and comparative issues”, Op.cit, p.5.
78. Michael Bratton, “Beyond the State: Civil Society and Associational Life in Africa”, World Politics, 41 (3), 1989, p.407.
79. Peter Ekeh, “The Constitution of Civil Society in African History and Politics” In B. Caron et.al, eds, Op.cit, p. 187; E Osaghae, “ Managing Ethnic Conflicts under democratic Transition in Africa: The Promise, the Failure and the Future” in B. Caron et.al (eds), Op.cit, p.213; Peter M. Lewis, “Endgame in Nigeria? The Politics of a Failed Democratic Transition”, African Affairs, 93, 1994; pp.335-336; Larry Diamond, “Postscript and postmortem” in Larry Diamond, A. Kirk-greene and Oyeleye Oyediran eds, Transition Without End, (Ibadan: Vantage

- Pub. Int. Ltd., 1997, p. 575; Paul Beckett and Crawford Young, "Introduction Beyond the Impasse of Permanent Transition in Nigeria" in Paul A. Beckett and Crawford Young, eds, Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria, (N.Y., University of Rochester Press, 1997), pp.1-5.
80. Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter Laurence Whitehead, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives, Op.cit, p.6.
81. Susan Eckstein, "Power and Popular Protest in Latin America" in Susan Eckstein ed, Power and Popular Protest: Latin American Social Movements, (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1989), pp.1-60.
82. Henrique Fernando Cardoso, "Entrepreneurs and the Transition Process: The Brazilian Case" in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead, eds, Op.cit, pp.137-153; Henrique Fernando Cardoso, "Democracy in Latin America" Politics and Society , 15, (1), 1986-7, pp.23-41.
83. Larry Diamond, "Beyond Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism: Strategies for Democratisation" in Roberts Brad, The New Democracies: Global Change and U.S. Policy (Cambridge M. A.: The M.T. Press, 1990) pp.227-249
84. Juan Rial "Transition in Latin America on the Threshold of 1990's", International Social Science Journal, 43, (2), 1991, pp. 285-300.
85. Tunji Olagunju, Adele Jinadu, and Sam Oyovbaire, Transition to Democracy in Nigeria (1985-1993), (Ibadan: Spectrum Books Ltd. 1993).
86. Samuel P. Huntington, "Will more Countries Become Democratic?", op.cit, pp. 212-214
87. Tunji Olagunju, et.al, op.cit, p.21.
88. Juan Rial "Transition in Latin America on the Threshold of 1990's", op.cit.



## CHAPTER THREE

### COMPARING NIGERIA AND SOUTH KOREA

In this chapter an attempt would be made to highlight the characteristics of the Nigerian and South Korean societies – characteristics bordering on the historical antecedents, economic variables and socio-political realities of these two societies. The intent of such comparison is to provide an overview of the forces-both institutional and cultural – that have been responsible for the construction and reconstruction of the democracy projects in our countries of reference. In this task, however, more of thematic analysis than chronological analysis would suffice. And issues to be periscoped include, among others, the historical background of contemporary Nigeria and South Korea; the role of civil society; ethnicity/regionalism, Political culture; the military; economic development; and international relations.

#### **3.10 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND**

##### **3.10.1 NIGERIA'S HISTORICAL BACKGROUND**

What is today known as Nigeria was an amorphous amalgam of ethnic nationalities, without any uniting structure, lacking common purpose. When in fact the British established its presence around the coast of Lagos in 1862, and Lagos became a colony, some of the Northern parts of the country were separately governed by the Royal Niger Company. The eventual amalgamation of the Lagos colony, the Southern protectorate and the protectorate of Northern Nigeria by the Governor-General, Frederick Lugard, in 1914 marked the beginning of the Nigerian state. But in spite of

the amalgamation, the different regions were run by the British through a subterfuge known as “indirect rule,” which allowed the traditional local rulers to wield tremendous power in their separate communities at the instance of the British colonial officials. Lugard had reasoned that the best way of governing the disparate and “barbarous” people composed of numerous “tribes” into “civilization” was to impose British rule “like a great steel grid”, and use the army to maintain law and order.<sup>1</sup>

Although, the British colonial government was not manifestly repressive, it utilized several subterranean repressive means to quell local protests by the Natives. The colonial army was established to give protection to the regions under British control. The army right from the beginning was structured on a regional basis. And by 1914 the army had been structured into a effective fighting force in dealing with small colonial wars.<sup>2</sup>

The amalgamation exercise was fraught with many problems as it was neither federal nor unitary in status. More distressing was the yoking together of no less than a hundred and forty nations in one complex country without any input from these different peoples.<sup>3</sup> Notably, the practice of indirect rule which enabled the native chiefs to play rulership role through the utilization of their existing local administrative institutions, also promoted regionalisation of administration as no specific standard was imposed on the whole country by the colonial authority.<sup>4</sup>

Although the Lugardian amalgamation of Northern and Southern protectorates, and the adoption of indirect rule policy, were rationalized as efforts aimed at terminating “the disunity existing between the two component parts of the country,”<sup>5</sup> Political developments afterwards have proved that these efforts halted natural evolution of political union among

the diverse groups.<sup>6</sup> The bipolar administrative structures of the country – the Northern and Southern parts of Nigeria – soon became a tripod system with the introduction of Richards constitution in 1946. The country was thus divided into the Northern, Eastern and Western regions. The Richards constitution was criticised broadly by the Nigerian nationalists for discouraging unification, while promoting “separatism.”<sup>7</sup>

But Richard’s constitution sensitized the nationalist leaders to the imminent devolution of power, and the likely disintegration of the Nationalist movement. Thus, sectional sentiments began to manifest themselves in the actions and pronouncements of early nationalists. The Northern leaders were not favourably disposed to territorial divisions advocated by Eastern and Western Nigerian leaders as being complementary to Federal arrangement proposed by Richards constitution. In fact the Northern leaders threatened secession if the existing territorial boundaries were tampered with.<sup>8</sup> The spate of reactions to the Richards constitution soon took a new dimension, as two hitherto cultural associations got transformed into political parties to fight for their separate ethnic interests. These groups were the Egbe Omo Oduduwa which metamorphosed into the Action Group (AG) in March 1951, and the Jamiyyar Mutanen Arewa which became the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) in October, 1951.<sup>9</sup> The NCNC became the mouthpiece of the Eastern Region, since most of its prominent leaders hailed from the East. Following these trends in constitutional and political development, were pronounced ethnic rivalries and tensions across the country. Each of the three major ethnic groups was derisive of the other two. In fact, the political climate was suffused with acrimony and bitterness, particularly among the political gladiators who were desirous of acquiring political power.

The Richards Constitution may not have presented a perfect working tool for the structuring of the country's politics, it marked the origin of Federal Principle in Nigeria.<sup>10</sup> Subsequent political and constitutional development did little to address the manifest upsurge in ethnic consciousness. The 1951 Macpherson Constitution and the Lyttleton Constitution of 1954 consolidated the regionalization of the country's political structure and the regional political parties.<sup>11</sup>

And it was on the platform of these sectional political parties that the nationalist struggles for independence were carried out in the 1950's. The agitations for sovereign independent status among nationalist leaders particularly from the Western and Eastern parts of Nigeria soon led to the conduct of several constitutional conferences in London, and the eventual granting of self-government to both the Western and Eastern regions in 1956. Notably, the Northern leaders were moderate in their requests, and were averse to the speedy handing over by the British overlords to Nigerian politicians because of their fears of Southern domination. When eventually independence was granted in October 1960, the differences among the Nigerian political gladiators across the spectrum of the Nigerian nation-state had not eased. The fear of one ethnic group for others among the majority ethnic groups (Hausa, Ibo and Yoruba), and the fears of ethnic minorities for the majority ethnic groups had worsened, and these fears had and continue to contribute, to the failure of democratic praxis in Nigeria. The military leaderships of the country's politics since independence have profited greatly from the diversities that characterize the Nigerian nation-state particularly through the use of the principle of divide and rule.

### 3.10.2 SOUTH KOREA'S HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The history of the Korean people dates back to some 2000 years ago.<sup>12</sup> The Korean people have a long history of dictatorship. The more recent history records the account of the Korean people's colonization in the late 1800 and the concomitant partition of the Korean Peninsula between the superpowers in 1943. In periods preceding 1943, particularly from 1919 after the First World War, Japan succeeded in establishing her colonial control over Korea.<sup>13</sup> Notably, Japanese expansionism had led earlier on to Sino-Japanese War (1895) and Russo-Japanese War (1905). The victories of Japan in these Wars and in the First World War gave Japan an easy ride into the Korean Peninsula, and thereafter unleashed painful reign of terror on the Koreans.<sup>14</sup> The Japanese attempted to obliterate the homogeneous cultural and linguistic identities of the Korean people. Efforts by the Koreans to associate and resist the Japanese encroachment on their culture, were forcefully and brutally suppressed by the Japanese.

The Koreans were liberated at the end of the World War II, following the defeat of Japan and other aggressor states by the Allied powers. The joy of Korean liberation from the Japanese 36 years colonial rule was short-lived, as a result of the fact that the superpowers – U.S. and the USSR – were interested in establishing their spheres of influence in Northeast Asia. Consequently, Korean Peninsula soon became drawn into the vortex of superpowers ideological, political and strategic rivalries. Thus, the two superpowers agreed to divide Korean Peninsula between themselves along the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel. The Southern part of the Korean peninsula was possessed by the U.S. while the Northern part was taken by the USSR.<sup>15</sup> The decision

to divide Korea was in accordance with the cold war politics. Both the Soviet Union and the United States wished to mould the whole of Korea after their images. The Soviet wanted a communist Korea which would be a friendly neighbour and an ally, while the Americans desired a capitalist Korea which would be an extension of the West. The post-division developments in the two halves – South Korea and North Korea – have been reflective of the ideological inclinations of the United States and Soviet Union respectively. In other words, South-Korea is capitalist while North Korea is socialist.<sup>16</sup> Needless to say, however, that the division of Korean Peninsula continues to affect every aspect of Korean life: political, economic, social and psychological. The two Koreas have been at each other's throat since the forceful partition by the superpowers. The struggle for reunification had led to a fratricidal war between the two Koreas in 1950 – 53.<sup>17</sup> And at the end of the war which claimed several lives and destroyed valuables, it became clear that the reunification of the two Koreas may not be achieved through force, but hopefully through negotiations. However, the Korean War-a consequence of the division of Korea – is testamentary to the urge and desires of Koreans to reunify. It may also have shown that Koreans are victims of superpowers' rivalry and hegemonic designs, which led to their partition into two zones of military occupation by both the United States and the Soviet Union.<sup>18</sup>

An independent government was established in South Korea in 1948. And since that period, South Korea has experienced political changes. The First Republic spanned over a period of twelve years under the leadership of President Syngman Rhee (1948-60). The government of Syngman Rhee eventually began to manifest dictatorial tendencies. The second Republic was short-lived (1960 – 61) because the military struck and put an end to the

transient democratic gains. The emergence of the military marked the commencement of semi-authoritarian rule in South Korea's political landscape. The President – a military General turned civilian President, Park Chung Hee, used every political gimmick to justify his repressive political control of the Korean people under the system of semi-authoritarianism for eleven years (1961 – 1972). And as it became apparent that President Park Chung Hee was losing grip of state affairs, he introduced a more authoritarian leadership under the “Yushin system” – a period of “revitalizing reforms” (1973 – 1979). During this period, there were intense agitations within the civil society for liberalization. And as the pressures for political reforms mounted, President Park was unceremoniously assassinated by one of his trusted security operatives.<sup>19</sup> With the exit of Park and the subsequent ascension of General Chun Doon Hwan as the President, (from 1980 – 1987) a new authoritarian leadership style commenced. However, the South Korean people were unrelenting in their quest for genuine democracy, as they continuously challenged the dictatorship of President Chun Doon Hwan, on the street in form of protests and violent demonstrations in city centres and suburbs, until they ensured that Chun's regime embraced their democratic aspirations.<sup>20</sup>

It is noteworthy that despite all the repressive measures utilized by successive governments in South Korea, the Koreans have always been desirous of democracy. But also it is important to point out that the limitations imposed on the express wish of Koreans hindered democracy in Korea. Firstly, Korea's historical legacies are inimical to democratic growth. The Confucian kings of the early dynastic rulership (1392-1910) had bequeathed centralized state authority. Secondly, the Japanese established a strong state structure for the suppression of revolt. And third,

the extensive militarization of Korea, evident in the presence of large standing armies, poses real threat to democracy.<sup>21</sup> From the foregoing historical analyses of Nigeria and south Korea, it is palpably clear that the historical background of the two countries may not be supportive of their quest for democratic development.

### **3.20. THE CIVIL SOCIETIES IN NIGERIA AND SOUTH KOREA.**

#### **3.20.1 NIGERIAN CIVIL SOCIETY**

The Nigerian civil society has gone through historical developmental changes, from the pre-independence period to the immediate post-independence era, and under the more extensive period of military rule. In all of this, the Nigerian civil society has reached and/or adjusted to the challenges thrown-up by the different historical epochs through which Nigeria has gone. The plurality of ethnic identities in the Nigerian civil society has often served as a limitation to the mobilizational capacity of pro-democracy institutions and actors. The Nigerian political parties, the politicians and the civil society are factionalized, fragmented and indeed permeable. The major organizing principles in Nigerian political and social life have always been corruption and clientelism.<sup>22</sup> These principles have militated as it were, against the early evolution of a vibrant civil society, and has rendered the civil society as a manipulable institution subject to the whims and caprices of the wielders of state power.

In a sense, the failure of democracy in Nigeria is inseparable from the manifest problematics of the Nigerian civil society. The promotion of contrarities within the political class and civil society and the politicization of ethnic differences among the Nigerian political leaders have served to



alienate the potential democratic leadership from their potential organizational and popular base.<sup>23</sup> Notably, the political groups which emerged during the early period of nationalist struggles were national, because they drew their membership across the broader spectrum of Nigeria's multi-ethnic landscape. But in periods closer to the attainment of political independence, particularly sequel to the introduction of Richards Constitution in 1946, national political movements such as NCNC, soon became an Ibo political party. While the Yoruba leaders formed the Egbe Omo Oduduwa which eventually got transformed into the Action Group (AG). The transformation of the Pan-Hausa cultural group known as Mutanen Arewa into Northern Peoples' Congress was a similar step in the direction of providing platform for the expression of ethnic interests across Nigeria. These tribally-inclined political parties rivaled one another for political relevance and the acquisition of political power. During periods preceding the granting of political independence, these parties successfully established their prominence in their regions of habitation and operation. The AG was the sole party in the Western Region before the region went ablaze in 1962. The NCNC had its base in the Eastern Region; the NPC was highly revered in the Northern region, and the United Middle Belt Congress (U.M.B.C.) was preeminent in certain sections of the Middle Belt of the country.<sup>24</sup>

The ethnic rivalries which conduced to the formation of ethnically-inclined political parties did not abate even after the attainment of independence in 1960. The Nigerian civil society was factionalized by tribal political parties, during the First and Second Republics. Political power was sought through violent conduct, thuggery and electoral malpractices.<sup>25</sup> This violence –

prone and zero-sum character of competitive party politics impacted negatively on the Nigerian civil society. The post-independence history of Nigerian civil society would be incomplete without making reference to the role the military played in twenty nine years of rulership out of the 39 years post- independence existence of Nigeria. The Nigerian military has almost entrenched itself within the fabric of the country's civil society as it has ingrained itself in the mentalities of Nigerians. The influence of the Nigerian military finds expression in such conception of its being part of civil society.<sup>26</sup> In this vein, Olagunju, et. al argue that the military ought not be regarded as an absolutely autonomous, cohesive and undifferentiated organization standing inevitably above civil society in a contradictory, antagonistic and commanding relationship and in opposition to it. They view the Nigerian military as being interwoven with the civil society.<sup>27</sup> The reason for the seeming inseparability of the military from the civil society could be found in the ease with which members of the Nigerian political class accept co-optation into military leadership and the receptivity of the civil society to military rule. The direct consequence of the entrenchment of the military in Nigerian society has been the promotion and elevation of self-interest, exploitation, cynicism and distrust, to the level of state policy.<sup>28</sup> It is however evident that the prevalence of these principles in Nigeria affects the civil society negatively. Thus, the weakness of the Nigerian civil society is explainable both in terms of the durability of military rule, and the recklessness of its operations. The failure of democratic experiment in Nigeria cannot be divorced from the docility of its civil society. And the recurring phenomenon of chronic misrule in Nigeria under both civilian and military regimes has been explained as an indication of the spread of that cancerous rot known as "prebendal politics." Prebendalism in the Nigerian

context entails “the virtual conversion of public offices into private” assets to be manipulated for the extraction of personal wealth.<sup>29</sup>

The foregoing portrayal of the Nigerian civil society as a weak entity does not however represent the whole truth about it. The Nigerian civil society has over the years of civilian misrule and military dictatorship become sensitized to the necessity of waging a relentless struggle for democratization. The peak of this new realization came after the much-orchestrated Babangida civil rule transition programme failed to give birth to the envisaged democratic order. Perhaps as a result of the political learning espoused by the Babangida transition programme, the Nigerian civil society is indeed becoming more vibrant and more assertive as some associational groups sprang up to make some claims on the transitional government. The true test of democratization is in its being eufunctional to pluralism and the development of civil society.<sup>30</sup>

### 3.20.2 SOUTH KOREAN CIVIL SOCIETY

South Korea is known for its overbearing state. The state – civil society relations in South Korea is lopsided in favour of the State. The state overpowers the civil society, and it possesses the capacity to penetrate the society and mold the behaviour of social groups and individuals.<sup>31</sup> The state is paternalistic in orientation, viewing its role as one of protecting the weak civil society. Operating within the confines of a capitalist society, the Korean state has an incredible capacity to maintain tight control over the economy and society.<sup>32</sup> The homogeneity of Korean society was indeed what sustained authoritarian rule for almost four decades. But in more recent periods, Korean homogeneity is beginning to be a source of strength for Korean civil society. Thus, far from being weak, submissive and

quiescent, contemporary Korean civil society is characterized by numerous social conflicts and pro-democracy struggles against the repressive state power. No doubt, Korea's recent political history is replete with incidents of political violence, street protests and sporadic outbursts, often masterminded by students of high school. The students' uprising of April, 19, 1960 which brought down the regime of President Syngman Rhee was one of such violent demonstrations, indicative as it were, of increased assertiveness on the part of Korean civil society.

In 1960, the ascendant democratic government of Chang Myon, after the demise of Syngman Rhee's government was incapacitated by intermittent street demonstrations, and an unsteady economy. It was evident that Chang Myon's regime would not withstand the potent opposition from Korean civil society. Myon's regime survived for just one year. General Park Chung Hee came to power in 1961 through a bloodless coup and his preeminent concern was to transform South Korean economy to an industrialised economy which would be supportive of the country's march to technological greatness. President Park's effort in creating the "Korean miracle" did not avert the massive onslaught of the people against his regime. In fact, Park's regime was embattled by students, and rural workers who extended their resentments to the urban centres. The movement from Park's regime (1961 – 79) to Chun's regime (1980-87) witnessed more vibrant civil society, as labour strife, and civil protests increased. General Chun Doo Hwan rose to power after the violent suppression of the Kwaju uprising. No doubt, Chun's repressive and authoritarian rule led to more aggressive protests from the students, urban poor, rural poor and even the middle class citizens.<sup>33</sup> The spate of protests soon forced President Chun

Doo Hwan to transfer power through a direct Presidential election. Thus, to some extent, the democratic transition from authoritarian rule was actualized through the active participation of Korean civil society.

The three major cleavages in the Korean civil society have centered around issues of democracy, economic justice, and reunification. These three issues direct the political course of South Korea.<sup>34</sup> It is however noteworthy to point out that the development of Korean civil society is amenable to the United States' influence. The U.S. military authorities in South Korea after taking over from Japanese colonial rulers, tried to institute an anti-communist state, a capitalist economy and a democratic government.<sup>35</sup> At inception the Korean State was so strong in comparison to the civil society, but as from 1960', the opposition forces began to mobilize the masses against state power. Nonetheless, the relative weakness of Korean civil society in the 1960's and 1970's sustained Park's authoritarian rule (1961 – 80).<sup>36</sup>

The students as a categoric group in South Korea have played significant role in putting an end to authoritarian leaderships. The immediate post-independence government of Syngman Rhee bowed out after the massive students' uprising in 1960;<sup>37</sup> the violent demonstrations that preceded the eventual assassination of President Park in 1979 were sparked off by students, and thereafter the wider citizenry of Kwaju cashed-in and made more pressing demands. The military crushed the rebellion in which some 2,000 people were killed and many others injured. In march 1982, radical students burnt U.S.I.S. office in Pusan, seized cultural centers and attacked consulates in major cities.<sup>38</sup> Also in 1987, the

student led mass uprising which eventually forced the military to democratize.

From the foregoing it has become clear that the Korean civil society has been developing over the years, as democratic space expands. Korean businessmen, workers, farmers, urban poor, artists, teachers, journalists have all formed independent interest groups to defend their class, sectional, professional or occupational interests.<sup>39</sup> These groups have made it difficult for authoritarianism to thrive in South Korea. Thus, in spite of Korea's ethnic homogeneity, it still remains a plural society. Notably, both Nigeria and South Korea have vibrant civil societies, but in the case of Nigeria ethnicity still influences political reasoning and actions, while in South Korea, regionalism now has great influence on the political choices of Koreans.

### **3.30. ETHNICITY IN NIGERIA AND SOUTH KOREA**

#### **3.30.1 ETHNICITY IN NIGERIA**

Nigeria is a multi-ethnic society with over 400 groups.<sup>40</sup> But the direction of political and constitutional development of Nigeria has always been influenced by the rivalry among the Igbo, Yoruba and the Hausa-Fulani ethnic groups. These three major ethnic groups have even succeeded in coalescing some minority ethnic groups under their hegemonic control. The coalescence of ethnic identities under some powerful ethnic groups has not whittled-down the salience of ethnicity in Nigerian politics. Ethnicity, right from pre-independence period has been the main pivot for mobilizational politics in Nigeria.

The origin of ethnicity in Nigerian politics, has been traced to the crisis which erupted within the N.Y.M (Nigerian Youth Movement) in 1941. The Ikoli – Akinsanya election crisis in 1941 which eventually led to the collapse of NYM threw-up ethnic propaganda which laid the foundation for subsequent ethnic assertiveness and claims. The internal political maneuvers, and intrigues within the NYM which led to the disputed election of Ernest Ikoli as the Vice-President was decried as a manifestation of the general dislike of Ijebu people who were seen as the Jews of Yorubaland.<sup>41</sup> Nigerian nationalists in the 1940's started reflecting tribalist postures in their pronouncements as well as in their relationships. For instance, in 1947, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the founder and leader of the Egbe Omo Oduduwa, and leader of the Action Group, wrote as follows:

Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical expression there are no "Nigerians" in the same sense as there are "English" "Welsh" or "French". The word Nigeria is merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish those who live within the boundaries of Nigeria from those who do not.<sup>42</sup>

In 1948 Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, one of the leaders of the Northern People Congress, affirmed in the legislative council that "the Nigerian people are historically different in their backgrounds, religious beliefs and customs, and do not show themselves any sign of willingness to unite."<sup>43</sup> When in 1949, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe was elected Ibo State President, and at the first Ibo State conference he said "... the God of Africa has specifically created the Ibo nation to lead the children of Africa from the bondage of the ages ... The martial prowess of the Ibo nation at all stages of human history has enabled them not only to conquer others but also to adapt themselves to the role of preserver ... The Ibo nation cannot shirk its responsibility."<sup>44</sup>

The resort to ethnic or tribal politics by the nationalists was a great obstacle to the struggle for political independence. And with the emergence of regional politics in Nigeria in the 1940's consequent upon the introduction of Richards constitution, the political parties which were national at the early stages of nationalist struggles, became tribal champions. The NCNC which at inception was a multi-tribal front soon became a party with the predominance of Ibos; the Action Group (AG) which has a Yoruba traditional background consolidated its hold on the Yorubas, while the Northern people's Congress (NPC) which originated from the Hausa-Fulani outfit called Mutanen Arewa became a purely Northern party.<sup>45</sup> Notably, the resort to tribal politics succeeded in mobilizing the populace for a limited and more parochial objective. These regional political parties and its leaders, it seems, were less interested in promoting consensus among the tribal groups that compose Nigeria than their desire to consolidate their hold on their political parties and their regions of influence. And while this drift continued, the Colonial Administration became more formidable, as independence struggle – the platform on which future democratic struggle was to be based – was factionalised. Mass mobilization was for tribal cause, with little or no reference to the national issue.

The fall of the First Republic in 1966 could be attributed to the absence of national consensus, in spite of the attempts made to present a national government at the Federal level by the ruling elites. As Ademolekun has pointed out, 'important disagreements have always featured in respect of priorities and specific approaches to tackling each problem. And these disagreements assume serious dimensions because of the absence of nation-wide agreement on basic values and norms.'<sup>46</sup> There is



abundant evidence to confirm the viewpoint that parliamentary democracy failed in Nigeria in January, 1966 because the values and norms conducive to the successful functioning of the governmental system were either non-existent or not sufficiently widely shared among the relevant actors in the governmental process.<sup>47</sup>

The absence of consensus among the competing groups that compose both the regional and national governments led inadvertently to the collapse of the First Republic, through a military coup d'état. The efforts of succeeding regimes, both military and civilian, had been directed at building a veritable basis for the coexistence of the different groups that make-up the Federation, both in government and other central institutions in the country. The National Consensus and Mobilization requisite for Nation-building was not helped by the outbreak of a 30 – month civil war. Despite the post-civil war reconstruction efforts of successive governments, the scar of the Nigerian civil war is an additional strain on the nationality question in Nigeria.

Ethnicity has remained the fulcrum of Nigerian political calculation. Ethnic balancing through the mechanism of “federal character” system has continued to play significant role in ensuring that no ethnic group dominates other ethnic groups. But the efforts of successive Nigerian governments, both civilian and military, in allaying fears of ethnic domination of other groups by a particular ethnic group have not achieved meaningful result. Ethnic groups of the Southern part of Nigeria have continually complained about Northern domination, noting that Northerners have held more leadership positions since Nigeria attained political independence than Southerners.<sup>48</sup> Of the 39 years of Nigeria's independence since 1960, there

had been 8 Heads of State from the North while only three came from the South . The North has ruled the country for 34 years while the South had ruled for only 3 years and 4 months. This regional analysis of the country's central leadership is reflective of the mood of the nation.

The salience of ethnicity in Nigerian politics cannot be overemphasized. It is a tool for mobilizing support often utilized by the political gladiators to outplay their opponents in an electoral contest. The origin, purpose and context of ethnicity in Nigeria have been properly articulated by Professor Okwudiba Nnoli, in his classic entitled: Ethnic Politics in Nigeria.<sup>49</sup> There seems no need for a representation of Nnoli's work. However, what is of importance to our work is the identification of the implications of ethnicity for democratization in Nigeria, particularly under the military-brokered transition to democracy programme of General Babangida's Administration (1985 – 1993). In spite of the mediatory role of the transitional military Administration of General Babangida, competitive politics within the country's political landscape still reflected ethnic manipulation and maneuvering. Political associations emerged across ethnic divide in the country. This tendency informed the creation de jure of two government – funded political parties – Social Democratic Party (SDP) and National Republican convention (NRC).<sup>50</sup> More of the actions and policies of the Babangida transitional government continued to be a reaction to the ethnic character of the Nigerian Civil society.

### 3.30.2 ETHNICITY/REGIONALISM IN SOUTH KOREA

Although the Koreans are noted for their homogeneous ethnic, linguistic and cultural characteristics, since 1945 opposing political systems and separate States have emerged in Korea that are actually hostile and antagonistic. The leaderships of the two Koreas are ideologically incompatible and they continue to create dissensions in each other's country. The dissemination of propaganda by each side of the divide has created citizenry of opposing view-points, and hostile outlooks on their countries' national interests, and more particularly, on issues relating to the reunification of Korea.<sup>51</sup>

Even within South Korea alone, there is a raging trend of increased polarization and pluralism. The most manifest of the disturbing trends of pluralism in South Korea is the recurring and seemingly entrenched patterns of regional rivalry, especially between the Cholla and the Non-Cholla communities in South Korea. It is on record that during the military regime of President Park Chung Hee, the Cholla province was largely excluded from the industrialization process of the 1960's and 1970's. Also President Park Chung Hee, who was from Kyongsang province (a non-Cholla Province) consolidated himself in power by filling top political posts with men from his own province.<sup>52</sup> The socio-economic hierarchy in South Korea was soon dominated by men from Kyongsang province to the chagrin and displeasure of other provinces in South Korea.<sup>53</sup>

The major cause of Kwangju uprising of 1980 was the seeming persistence of discrimination against Cholla province by Park regime. The hard-line military cabal that took over the reins of power in 1980 was made up of men from Kyongsang province. Thus the suppression of Kwangju

revolt by the Kyongsang-led-military leadership was savage and “brutal,” since it was done with all sense of enmity and bitterness.<sup>54</sup> Regionalism in Korea has also manifested itself in electoral activities and election results. The direct presidential election of 1971, 1987 and 1992 provided classic example of how the introduction of a democratic electoral process intensifies regional cleavage, even at the expense of democratic institution – building and democratic consolidation.<sup>55</sup>

Notably, regional bloc voting has been a recurring decimal in the electoral behaviour of South Koreans. The clash of regional interests between the Kyongsang and Cholla regions during the past 25 years, with all its implications for political stability in South Korea, is a phenomenon which remains as perplexing as it is disturbing, when the manifest ethnic homogeneity of Koreans is considered. Specifically, regional bloc voting in South Korea could be gleaned through an indepth analysis of the voting patterns of Koreans during the 1987 presidential election. The presidential candidates – Kim Dae Jung (a native son of the Cholla region); Kim Young Sam (a native of South Kyongsang); Roh Tae Woo ( a native of North Kyongsang) and Kim Jong Pil (a native of Kangwon) each got substantial support from his own region.<sup>56</sup> Regionalism in Korea is not based on religion, ethnicity or class, but rather it waxes strong on the “sentiment of belonging”. The Korean people’s strong identification with their home town and home region has hindered the emergence of political parties with widespread membership. Thus, political parties in South Korea maintain strong regional base, and they failed to secure foothold elsewhere outside their regions of operation.<sup>57</sup> Thus, while ethnicity plays important political mobilizational role in Nigeria, regionalism forms the bedrock of social and

political mobilization in South Korea. In both societies the military institutions were not neutral in the promotion of the hegemony of one social group over other groups.

### 3.40. POLITICAL CULTURE OF NIGERIANS AND KOREANS

The much-popularised interdisciplinary analysis of political behaviour carried out by Gabriel Almond, Sidney Verba and Lucian pye can be utilized in explicating the historical development of political culture of Nigerians and Koreans.<sup>58</sup> According to Almond and Powell, political culture “is the pattern of individual attitudes, and orientations toward politics among the members of political system”.<sup>59</sup> By delving into analysis of political culture of Nigerians and Koreans, we are concerned with the subjective realm, the knowledge accurate or otherwise – feelings of attachment, involvement or rejection, judgements and opinions about politics and its actors, as they are manifestly displayed by the citizens of these two countries.

#### 3.40.1 POLITICAL CULTURE OF NIGERIANS

It is however doubtful whether we can talk of the existence of a national political culture in a multi-ethnic society, so diverse in its cultural identities as Nigeria. But one safe way of theorizing about political culture of Nigerians is to situate the attitudinal and behavioural orientations of Nigerians toward their political system, politics and political actors within the context of its historical development. The political development of Nigeria has evolved over a period of no less than eight decades, since the amalgamation of the Northern part with the southern part of the country in

1914. The immediate experience of post-amalgamation period in Nigerian politics was less cordial, as political actors, nationalists from across Nigeria were suspicious of one another. This attitudinal disposition of the political elites was imparted to their followers, and the rivalries among these early Nationalists soon took ethnic and regional dimensions, sequel to the introduction of Richards, Constitution in 1946. B.J. Dudley captures the political attitudes of Nigerians poignantly as “East for the Easterners, West for the Westerners, North for the Northerners and Nigeria for Nobody.”<sup>60</sup> Government, as the mass-electorate understood it, began and ended with the regions. The political parties were regional in focus and background. The A.G. controlled the West, the NCNC dominated the East, while the NPC reigned unchallenged in the North. The central government was a weak amalgam of equal number of representatives of the three regions. This continued until 1958 when the basis of representation at the federal level was changed to the population.<sup>61</sup>

The introduction of independence constitution in 1963 and the ascension of Nigerians to leadership heights at the central level did not allay the fears of domination by one ethnic group over the others. If anything, the competition for power and positions at the central government level among key political figures from the Northern, Eastern and Western parts of Nigeria worsened. The series of inter-ethnic political alliances across Nigerian political parties broke down, and the process of institutionalization of parliamentary democracy began to erode. The poor quality of politicking among the politicians of the First Republic, at both central and regional levels, soon gave inroads for the military to strike in 1966. The incursion of the military into Nigerian politics marked the beginning of the militarization

of the Nigerian social formation and the political system. Consequently, Nigerians who hitherto had begun to identify and associate with their political leaders, became withdrawn from the political process, and began to manifest a clear sense of political abnegation.<sup>62</sup>

The series of military leaderships of Nigeria since the military regime of Major-Gen. J.T. Aguiyi-Ironsi, could not weld the disparate ethnic identities in the country together. The state creation exercise which was meant to ease the burden of administering a large and diverse country like Nigeria, and as well sound the death knell to regionalism in the country's politics, did not dampen ethnic consciousness and ethnically – induced behaviours among Nigerians. On the contrary, every action of the government was viewed through the prism of ethnicity and regional biases.<sup>63</sup> This renewed upsurge in ethnic consciousness soon penetrated the military institution, and eventually led to unhealthy rivalry between Col. Yakubu Gowon and Col. Odumegwu Ojukwu – a rivalry that culminated in a 30 month civil War between Biafra (Eastern Region's forces) and the rest of Nigeria in 1967. The prosecution of Civil War in Nigeria for a period of 30 months, no doubt, must have impacted greatly on the psyche of Nigerians, most importantly the Ibos from the Eastern part of the country – whose leaders had through the declaration of the war, attempted to secede from the Federation.<sup>64</sup> It is noteworthy that the rivalry between Col Yakubu Gowon and Col Ojukwu which was initially personal and professional took on ethnic coloration.

The success of the federal government of Nigeria in the Civil War notwithstanding, the victory of the federal side in the war remains a pyrrhic victory. However, that the civil war was lost by the secessionists must have spelt out to the other federating units in Nigeria that secessionist bid and

extreme rebellious political behaviour would invite violent suppression by the central authority. Consequently, the fears of the federating units could have translated into a more powerful central government, and that could be explanatory of the seeming hegemony of military rulerships in Nigeria for 29 years out of the country's 39 years of existence. Thus, the lack or inadequate existence of certain beliefs or attitudes among members of the political class and the citizens is responsible for the failed attempts at democratic governance in Nigeria.<sup>65</sup> And these attitudinal and behavioural dispositions which ought to be supportive of democratic praxis in Nigeria are lacking among the politicians and the electorate because the military stayed too long in power.<sup>66</sup>

The point cannot be overemphasised that the most critical determinant of the electoral behaviour of Nigerians in any electoral contest still remains primordial loyalties. Peter Ekeh argues in this regard as follows:

“... Most Nigerians have deep sacred feelings about their ethnic groups. In fact many do sacrifice their lives and their life savings in the service of perpetuating these primordial groupings. They gain little in return from them. In other words, their relations to the more primordial public is one-sided; in terms of their duties to preserving and servicing it but not in terms of benefits or rights from it. Contrariwise, the relationships of Nigerians to the amoral civic public are predominantly in terms of one's expectations of rights from the government, with little conception of concomitant duties to it.”<sup>67</sup>

Ekeh's analysis offers a convincing explanation of anti-democratic behaviour of Nigerians, on the grounds of their desperate desires to do the bidding of their “moral primordial public” at the expense of the “amoral civic public.”<sup>68</sup> Thus, such manifest electoral malpractices like rigging, electoral violence, intimidation and harassment of voters, ethnic voting and



other contraventions of electoral rules are explainable by Ekeh's perspective. Sadly, however, the potentials of ethnic diversity in Nigeria have been ignored by successive Nigerian leadership since independence. Richard Sklar has pointed attention to the positive impact ethnic diversity could have on nation-building. He noted that in Africa as elsewhere ethnic diversity can be managed to promote inclusive rather than parochial and exclusive forms of nationhood. For Nigeria to utilize ethnic diversity positively in a manner promotive of democracy and development, the country, according to Sklar, requires a political leadership of a consistently integrative character.<sup>69</sup>

#### 3.40.2 SOUTH KOREANS' POLITICAL CULTURE

The Koreans like Nigerians are affected by their historical experiences. But significantly, the Koreans attach immense value to the subjective meanings of those historical events. The older generation of Koreans are influenced by such experiences as Korea's national liberation struggle of 1945 and the debilitating war of 1950 – 53. The anti-Communist orientation of the South Koreans and their leaders was influenced by the influx of refugees from North Korea.<sup>70</sup>

Korean society is hierarchical and the average Korean has a high sense of deference to the authority. Korea is highly centralised and Koreans are authority-conscious. The leaders in Korea perceive their role as one of active command, and those on the receiving end accept their role as one of blind submission.<sup>71</sup> Although Korea is a culturally homogeneous society, it is classified and highly stratified. Perceptibly, vertical and unequal relations exist in Korea at both interpersonal level and between the rulers and the ruled, between elite and the masses – a manifestation of the hierarchical principle of Confucianism.<sup>72</sup> Political stratification in Korea is based on

power and influence, reflective of the hierarchical structuring of authority relations characteristic of Korean society.<sup>73</sup>

Political participation by the Korean masses, as elsewhere including Nigeria, is manipulable. Particularly, during the several years of military dictatorships Korean masses were always cajoled by their leaders into participating in politics in a predetermined manner. The citizenry in Korea were compelled to play passive role in politics as “subject” rather than as “participant.” Consequently, the dominant political culture and behaviour of the masses in Korea often portray habitual compliance with order and command of authority.<sup>74</sup>

Although elections are regularly held in Korea, political choices of the central authority have always been ratified by the electorate without much room for alteration.<sup>75</sup> In Korea, voters are often mobilized by the political elite, and this is a manifestation of top-down approach to Korean political development. The phenomenon of mobilized voting is partially explanatory of why voter turn out is high in South Korea, especially in rural areas.<sup>76</sup> Notably, the tremendous progress in socio-economic development by South Korea has necessitated increasing participation in politics by Koreans.<sup>77</sup> There is also an ever-widening gap between the elite and the masses in their perception of political issues in contemporary Korean politics.<sup>78</sup> This elite-mass gap is not peculiar to South Korea, and with increasing growth in industrialization, and socio-economic development, the gap will widen.

The fact of Korean respect for constituted authority should not be misrepresented as passivity or docility. Koreans are also noted for their tradition of defiance. There is in Korea today an ever-present danger of renewed political instability, through the resurgence of a tradition of mass revolt. Despite the deferential attitudes of Koreans to established authority,

in times of acute crises the spirit of violent defiance may flare-up.<sup>79</sup> In Korea, the masses indicate their discontent and disapproval of governmental authority through violent protestations and sporadic outbursts. Korean propensity for violence finds evidence in such explosive protests as the 1960 student revolution and the Kwangju uprising of 1980. The major drive of Koreans to violence are the pervasiveness of corruption and injustices, and the Korean perceived sense of oppression.<sup>80</sup> Violent political behaviour often manifests itself in form of assassination, arson, hostage-taking, mass rebellion and other forms of anarchic behaviour.

From another analytical prism, Korean political culture can also be described as a high-risk system. By a high risk-system, it is meant that the super-intellect, imaginative powers and intense nature of Koreans discourage compromise or negotiated solution to manifest problems. Thus, in this regard, the nature of political contest often reflect a zero-sum character, with the winners possessing all at the expense of the losers.<sup>81</sup>

When all the foregoing characteristics of Korean politics are taken into consideration, the obvious conclusion is that Korean politics is volatile. Notably also is the strong impact of externalities on the domestic life of Korean society-particularly the "enemy-next-door syndrome which the North Korean society constitutes to South Korea. Koreans generally have participatory culture, and can as well be highly submissive to a political authority acceptable to them. Thus, despite the overbearing presence of the state, Korean Civil Society has demonstrated, and continues to demonstrate combative character.<sup>82</sup> Throughout the authoritarian periods, Korean vocal critics, and anti-government forces and opposition parties were active in their quest for political reforms.<sup>83</sup>

In both Nigeria and South Korea there is the culture of mass protest against dictatorship. The civil societies in these countries are vibrant, and the students as a categorical group often play significant role in the struggle for democracy and economic reforms. Notably, in both societies class stratifications are not fixed, there are cross-cutting inter-class, inter-familial relationships, which tend to blend and facilitates cooperative interactions during peaceful periods. But in crises periods, when the people are ranged against their perceived oppressors, these bonds are of no consequence. The obvious conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing analyses of Korean and Nigerian political culture is that these societies have dual cultural outlooks—one supportive of democratic growth and the other is opposed and inimical to democratic development and by extension, promotive of authoritarianism.

### **3.50 THE MILITARY FACTOR IN DEMOCRATISATION IN NIGERIA AND SOUTH KOREA.**

The military have played significant roles in the political histories of both Nigeria and South Korea. In Nigeria, the military has ruled for no less than 29 years of the country's more than 39 years of independence. In Korea, the military ruled for more than three decades, before the country attained full democratic status in 1992. In both countries the military institutions have fundamental belief in the credibility of civilian democratic system although they had subverted their countries' democratic governments to install themselves (soldiers) in power. It is this belief in the sanctity of democratic government that explains the commitment of military leaders to bequeath power peacefully to the civilians or to civilianize their hold on power to give their regimes a modicum of legitimacy. Although, the military institutions in Nigeria and Korea are perceptibly democratizing their

societies, but the impetus came from the international community. The globalization of democratic ideals and practice has necessitated democratic ferment in countries where the seed of democracy had not been planted.

### 3.50.1 **MILITARY IN NIGERIAN POLITICS**

Nigeria has had no less than seven military Heads of State since the first military coup. The first coup was planned by five majors in the Nigerian Army against the civilian parliamentary democratic government of Alhaji Tafawa Balewa.<sup>84</sup> The fall of the First Republic in 1966 can be attributed to the absence of national consensus despite attempts made by the Balewa government to form a national government at the federal level by the ruling elites. As Ademolekun has pointed out, ‘important disagreements have always featured in respect of priorities and specific approaches to tackling problems’. And “these disagreements often assume serious dimensions because of the absence of nation-wide agreement on basic values and norms.”<sup>85</sup> There is abundant evidence to confirm the viewpoint that parliamentary democracy failed in Nigeria in January 1966-when the military struck and Major-General J.T. Aguiyi Ironsi took over the reins of power – because the values and norms conducive to the successful functioning of the governmental system “were either non-existent or not sufficiently widely shared among the relevant actors in the governmental process.”<sup>86</sup>

The absence of consensus among the competing groups that composed both the regional and national governments led inadvertently to the collapse of the First Republic, through a military coup d’etat. But attempts by Major-Gen. J.T. Aguiyi-Ironsi to consolidate his rule through his choice of unitarism as opposed to federalism, created suspicion in the minds of

Northern Soldiers who felt he was promoting the interests of his Igbo ethnic group, to the detriment of other ethnic identities in Nigeria. Subsequently, Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi was killed, and Col. Yakubu Gowon was installed as the new Head of State. The efforts of Gowon's régime to promote national consensus was not helped by the outbreak of a 30 – month civil war. The military regime of Lt. Col. (later General) Yakubu Gowon prosecuted the civil war, which today is still a scar on the nationality question. Apart from the post war reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts of Gowon regime, it was evident that the regime was not interested in returning the country to civil rule. Consequently, the civil society became hostile to the regime, as the press championed the vanguard of the "military must go" campaigns.<sup>87</sup>

Although the mood of the nation will always influence the way a coup d'état is perceived by the populace, the major determinant of a coup might have no reference to the interest of the citizenry. The internal ordering, scheming within the military institution, to a large extent, could be the immediate cause of military coup. There could have been several reasons for the 29<sup>th</sup> July, 1975 coup against General Gowon regime. But, the coup was welcomed by the Nigerian civil society as a step in the right direction.

The succeeding military regime of General Murtala Muhammed took a step to reassure the Nigerian society of its commitment to hand over power to a democratically elected civilian government in 1979. But, while the regime was still settling down to administer the country, and sanitize the public service, within six months of its inception, an abortive coup d'état claimed the life of the Head of State. Consequently, Lt. General Olusegun Obasanjo, Murtala Mohammed's deputy, became the Head of State. Thus, the programmes of Mohammed's regime were vigorously pursued by the

Obasanjo regime. And in order to avoid the error of Gowon regime, the Mohammed/Obasanjo regime charted a political transition programme which was designed to usher in a full-blown democratic government in 1979. Towards this end, relevant institutions and processes that would warrant the smooth transition to civil rule were put in place.<sup>88</sup>

The programme of military disengagement and democratic construction supervised by the Obasanjo regime was criticized for its lack of thoroughness since it did not involve elements of political learning required for the attitudinal transformation of the Nigerian political elite.<sup>89</sup> The fall of the Second Republic in Nigeria depicts the difference between demilitarization and democratization. The regime of Mohammed/Obasanjo concentrated more on the promotion of the structural bases of democratic practice while little or no effort was made to put-in-place or influence the growth of the supportive cultural environment of democracy.<sup>90</sup>

The military regime of Major-General Mohammedu Buhari and Babatunde Idiagbon which sacked the civilian government of Alhaji Shehu Shagari on the 31<sup>st</sup> December, 1983, did not feel committed to marching the nation toward another experiment in democracy. And so this military regime conceived of a grandiose plan to settle down and govern, as opposed to the often repeated claims by previous military leaders who came to power "to correct social ills that are inimical to democratic practice" Although, the Buhari/Idiagbon regime set-out on a more "progressive" pedestal by punishing the perceived looters and plunderers of the nation's wealth, but it soon became clear that the guiding principle of the regime was vindictiveness, contrary to its much-orchestrated quest for social justice. However, the major lapse in the conduct of this regime was its refusal to put forward a programmed transition timetable for the establishment of

democracy. Thus, while the regime was consolidating its hold on power without reference to any democratic mission, it was toppled in a military coup on the 27<sup>th</sup> of August, 1985. But the reaction of the civil society to the announcement of this coup was one of mute indifference, as the populace was withdrawn from the political process.<sup>91</sup>

The emergent military regime of General Ibrahim Babangida sought ways to endear its programmes to the people by taking solace in the court of public opinion. The regime repealed the obnoxious decree 4, of 1984 (which incapacitated the press) and released most detained politicians of the Second Republic, whose cases were yet to be determined. Those politicians who had been convicted of varying offences had their sentences commuted drastically to lesser sentences. Moreover, the Babangida regime began a broadly-spaced transition to democracy programme, with emphasis on political learning and institution-building.

However, in spite of the Babangida regime's quest for popular support, the regime witnessed more students' demonstrations, and popular protests from the civil society. The eight – year transition to democracy project of President Babangida was dotted by violence, and sporadic outburst, occasioned by the ever-worsening plight of the masses who were made to bear the brunt of government's economic reforms. Another important characteristic of the Babangida regime was the frequency of extension in the transition programme. On more than three occasions, the hand over date was shifted backward. This alteration in the transition timetable confirmed the fears expressed in some quarters about the insincerity of the Babangida regime. And when eventually the transitional presidential election of June 12, 1993 was annulled, the "hidden agenda" of the Babangida regime, to perpetuate itself in power became manifest. The



presidential election annulment threatened the corporate existence of Nigeria,<sup>92</sup> and created extreme sense of national insecurity for the country. The spate of crises, violence and mass protests that followed the annulment saga shook the foundations of the Babangida Administration's security, and paved the way for the resignation or "stepping-aside" of President Babangida.

From the Presidential Election annulment episode, it became clear that the military institution cannot supervise neutrally the process of its own disengagement, without concerning itself with its post-disengagement security. Oyediran has observed that the military being anti-democratic in orientation, must be blamed for the political problems confronting Nigeria.

He writes.

The military is not a democratic institution. It is an authoritarian institution... the inability of Nigeria to live up to expectation as the leading democratic country in Africa can legitimately be assigned to the military. The Nigerian military has not only made fruitless the whole nationalist struggle, it has constituted itself into a great problem for the Nigerian political system.<sup>93</sup>

The failure of Babangida's tortuous transition programme, inspite of its extensive programmatic outlay must have proved the point that the outcome of a democratic transition project depends, to a large extent, on the commitment of those presiding over the transition machinery.

### 3.50.2 THE MILITARY IN SOUTH KOREA

The military institution in South Korea entered into the political scene in 1961 following the political rustication of Syngman Rhee – Syngman Rhee became the first civilian President of South Korea after the partitioning of Korean peninsula in 1945. President Rhee enjoyed the United States' support – a support occasioned by the necessities of cold war politics in which the two diametrically opposed superpowers (U.S.A. and USSR) were supporting their stooges blindly. Rhee's credibility as an independence fighter during Japanese colonial rule was not enough to earn his regime the requisite mass support to prolong his rule in office. Rhee's introduction of land reform and the concomitant peasant revolts, with the prosecution of Korean war, soon frittered away the modicum of legitimacy his government enjoyed in periods following South Korea's attainment of political independence. The traditional ruling class of landowners who hitherto were supportive of Rhee's government did a somer-sault and became opposed to his government.<sup>94</sup> What remained as veritable sources of support for Rhee's government were the United State's government, state's bureaucracies and repressive institutions such as the police and the military. Thus, in order to maintain his hold on power, Rhee perpetrated all sorts of electoral fraud and indulged in other forms of corrupt practices. The pervasiveness of corruption in South Korea incensed urban high school and university students, who mobilized their ranks against Rhee's leadership. The last straw that led to the fall of Rhee's government came when the students revolted during the "April, 1960 Revolution."<sup>95</sup>

The fall of Syngman Rhee in 1960 created a period of democratic interregnum that lasted till 1961, when the military eventually struck to put

an end to uncertainties and the spate of students' demonstrations and bickering among party politicians. The 1961 military coup led by General Park Chung-Hee quashed parliamentary democracy in South Korea. That the military was strong and enabled to strike at that critical point in the political history of South Korea was not surprising. Syngman Rhee's reliance on the military and the United States military aid initiated the military into political roles. Park Chung Hee's style of leadership was not too different from that of his predecessor, Syngman Rhee. Park also did not enjoy much support outside his constituency-the military. The poor performance of President Park at the 1963 election despite the institutional weakness of the opposition confirmed his low level of support in the wider Korean society.

Park Chung Hee's extensive rulership was authoritarian in all its ramifications. Yet the Park leadership utilized the instrumentality of election to legitimize its retention of political power. Park's regime was plagued by recurrent students' revolts and immense agitation from the middle class in urban centres. The clamour for democracy and reunification of the two Koreas received a renewed salience during the Park years in Korea, in spite of the regime's authoritarian outlook.<sup>96</sup> Park's regime pursued the ideological interest and policies of its mentor-the United States. The anti-Communist posture of Park's leadership endeared South Korea, during the Park years to the United States, and facilitated South Korea's access to loans offered by the Bretton Wood institutions – World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Aside from promoting authoritarian politics, President Park achieved economic and industrial development in South Korea, through the skilful use of the rhetorics of economic nationalism.<sup>97</sup>

The soaring rate of industrialization and economic development achieved by Park's leadership did not simmer down the tempo of advocacy for political reform. Civil disobedience, students' uprisings and street violence were regular occurrence during Park's authoritarian regime. In 1979, President Park was assassinated by one of his trusted security operatives.<sup>98</sup> Subsequently, President Park's Lieutenant General Chun Doo Hwan assumed the Presidency after the successful execution of the military coup of 12<sup>th</sup> December, 1979. This regime was soon faced with the bloody incident in Kwangju in May, 1980. To consolidate his hold on power, President Chun violently suppressed public revolt. He also amended the constitution to suit his hidden desire of prolonging his rule, by enshrining in the constitution provision for a seven-year-one-term presidency. On August, 27, 1980 Chun Doo Hwan was elected as President by the electoral college. On February, 25, 1981 he was reelected as the first full-term President of the new regime by the electoral college votes.<sup>99</sup> Chun ruled South Korea with strong-arm. And when it became apparent that the civil society was rebellious and violently demanding for democratic reforms, President Chun increased his authoritarian repression of Koreans to maintain himself in power. But, in May 1987, there was a resurgence of violent demonstrations across Korea, following the killing of a Student through torture by State Security operatives.<sup>100</sup>

This new wave of violence resulted in the fall from power of the core members of hard-line faction within the regime. Eventually, President Chun Doo Hwan handed power over to his co-coup plotter, Gen. Roh Tae-Woo. On the 29<sup>th</sup> June, 1987, Roh Tae-Woo promised pro-democracy advocates that he would provide the enabling environment for the commencement of democratic transition.<sup>101</sup> It is evident from the foregoing that the military

regimes preceding Roh's regime were concerned with the question of legality (government's right to govern) at the expense of legitimacy. But such efforts had proven to be futile. Syngman Rhee was forced to step down, Park Chung Hee was assassinated; and Chun Doo Hwan was condemned to internal political banishment.<sup>102</sup> It is remarkable, however, that President Roh Tae-Woo created the climate for democratic transition. Roh, a member of the ruling class with reformist vision, set in motion processes for the establishment of democracy in South Korea. These processes commenced in 1987 leading to his election in 1988, and culminated into full-blown democratic transition in 1992 when a civilian President, in person of Mr. Kim Young Sam was elected.

Overall, the South Koreans are opposed to military dictatorship, and that explains why the military leaders had to civilianize their hold on power – through electoral participation. On the other hand, the military in South Korea, as an institution, believes that it has made great contributions to national development with its active involvement in social sectors. The military often point to the outstanding rate of Korean Economic development, political stability and enhanced posture of military defense, as some of its achievements in four decades of rulership.<sup>103</sup> The long reign of the military in South Korea must have infused in the social fabric of Korean civil society the virus of military culture and traditions. The South Korean military was fond of justifying its intervention in politics on the grounds of the threats posed by North Korea to the security of South Korea. Sequel to the division of the Korean Peninsula, North Korea has competitively struggled to attain higher military might and thus continually constitutes a major threat to South Korea's National Security. The presence of the U.S.

Soldiers and military bases in South Korea is seen by most South Koreans as a powerful bulwark against the threat from North Korea.<sup>104</sup>

From the foregoing, it is noteworthy to point out that the military in both Nigeria and South Korea have played important role in the political history, and the evolution of democratic sentiments in these countries. In South Korea, authoritarian repression and the outright violation of human rights by successive military regimes since 1961, must have created an awareness in Koreans to fight for democratic alternative. And in the case of Nigeria, the pervasiveness of poverty, economic adversities and a host of other socioeconomic problems, - all being the resultant effects of prolonged military dictatorship-could have spurred Nigerians to demand for democratic rule.

### **3.60 NIGERIAN AND SOUTH KOREAN ECONOMIES COMPARED**

A brief expository survey of the structure and character of Nigerian and South Korean economies would of necessity assist in the analysis of the socioeconomic atmospherics of democratisation in these countries of reference. Whether or not the latter-day democratization efforts of the leaderships of these countries were borne out of successes recorded in the economic sphere would become clear through the study of the strengths and weaknesses of these economies as it relates to their capacity –utilization, productive capacity, institution-building, distributive mechanism, and availability of resources-human and material.

### **3.60.1 NIGERIAN ECONOMY**

At independence in 1960, Nigeria was an agrarian economy. Agriculture generated the bulk of employment, foreign exchange earnings and government revenues. By the 1970s, sequel to the boom in the world petroleum market, Nigeria became totally dependent on the petroleum sector. To put it differently, the oil sector accounts for 90% of Nigeria's export earnings and about 80% of government revenues.<sup>105</sup>

Although petroleum is pivotal to Nigerian economy, and indeed the mainstay of the economy, Successive leaderships of the country had not managed this oil sector to the overall advantage of Nigerians. Even more painful is the lack of economic independence of the country. In the oil sector for instance, there is the preponderance of foreign oil companies participation. Such conglomerate like Shell, BP, Gulf, Mobil, Agip, Texaco, Deminex Sagrap, Occidental and Japan Petroleum, etc, are prospecting and producing oil, while Nigeria, the host, lacks the competence in oil production.<sup>106</sup> Nigeria being the most populous black nation in the world with a population of 120 million, has a large pool of human resources. 20% of the country's Labour force is engaged in the manufacturing sector while close to 60% of the Labour force is engaged in agriculture.<sup>107</sup> With a territorial expanse of 923.770km<sup>2</sup>, Nigeria is rich in other natural resources such as coal, tin, uranium, gold, iron ore, bauxite etc. These mineral resources have not been well exploited for the expansion and diversification of the country's sources of foreign exchange earnings.<sup>108</sup>

The private interest in Nigerian economy is insignificant. Successive governments' policies have stifled the private sector, and the government still remains the largest employer of Labour,. The indigenisation of foreign enterprises of 1972 and 1977 only succeeded in transferring foreign wealth

to the hands of ill-prepared local entrepreneurs who lacked the managerial acumen.<sup>109</sup> Apart from the poor managerial skills of the inheriting Nigerian bourgeoisies – who for several years served as ‘comprador elements’ to foreign investors – successive Nigerian governments have not also pushed the policies of economic independence with the vigor requisite for the consolidation of the indigenization of Nigerian economy. Indeed, the Nigerian economy has been going through crises-both structural and institutional,-borne out of conflicting government policies over the years.<sup>110</sup> Although the Nigerian government through the instrumentality of nationalization and indigenization decrees – otherwise known as Enterprises Promotion Decrees established firm monopoly in a number of industrial subsectors, such as in basic steel production, petroleum refining, petrochemicals, liquefied natural gas, edible salt, flat steel Plants, machine tools, pulp and papers, yeast and alcohol, fertilizer, etc, the government ownership of these concerns has spelt doom. Government investments in manufacturing has not led to the industrial transformation of Nigeria.<sup>111</sup>

For more than twenty years of centralization and concentration of the Nigerian Economy by successive governments, the Nigerian economy has been reeling in seemingly endless crises, and dramatically vacillating between short periods of boom and long periods of gloom. The rationale for government entry into many of the ventures may have been defeated by the manifest problems of Nigerian economy. Available evidence shows that government projects are big in expenditures, big in planning but very small in terms of result attainment.<sup>112</sup>

It is noteworthy to state that government’s poor handling of the manufacturing sectors is explainable as a consequence of the characteristic slowness of government bureaucratic process and inefficiency, and the



pervasiveness of corruption. These reasons account for the underdevelopment of the private sector in Nigeria. The private sector in Nigeria lacks the capacity to satisfy the local demand for its products. And there is a relationship between the low technological bases of the Nigerian private sector and its low supply capacity or inability to produce adequately for the Nigerian market.<sup>113</sup>

But with the severe economic problems of Nigeria since 1980's the successive Nigerian governments began to rethink the role of the 'state' in the economy, sequel to the advice of the International Financial Institutions such as IMF and the World Bank. The systematic process of withdrawing the 'state' from the economy, and widening the domain of private interest in the Nigerian economy began with the Babangida Administration. The bid to privatize state-owned enterprises (SOEs) which are unviable is in consonance with some of the key policy dictates of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) foisted as it were on developing countries of Africa and Asia – by the IMF and the World Bank. Other elements of SAP include trade reform and exchange rates stabilization policies intended to revitalize the non-oil sector and the restoration of the balance of payment; the curtailment of public sector expenditure through down-sizing the public sector; the elimination of import license system, the abolition of commodity marketing boards and the removal of price control mechanisms, and the deregulation of the banking system.<sup>114</sup>

The implementation of SAP by the transitional regime of General Babangida was violently resisted by the Nigerian masses who were hard hit by SAP. Several protest were staged by the rural and urban people and the students against SAP and military dictatorship. Indeed one of the major forces responsible for the inauguration of democratisation process in Nigeria

was the push from the civil society <sup>115</sup> – a push occasioned by the zeal displayed by the people's desire to turn their economic adversities under military dictatorship into prosperity in an envisaged democratic order. It is noteworthy to point out that the Nigerian economy had suffered series of distortions and fluctuations, which were caused by the intermittent military take over of power, and the concomitant irregularity of government development programmes and policies.

### **3.60.2 SOUTH KOREAN ECONOMY**

Just like the Nigerian economy, South Korean economy is a developing capitalist economy. But unlike the Nigerian economy, South Korean economy has a pronounced presence of private corporate investments. With a land mass of 99,314sq km and a population of 45.5 million, no less than 62.0% of the population are actively involved in the economy. <sup>116</sup>

South Korea has a paucity of natural resources. It has no onshore oil or natural gas, and prospects of offshore has not come up to anything. Tungsten was the only metal once available in commercially significant quantity, of which output peaked in 1977 at 5,019 tonnes. Output from iron ore cannot match the requirements of South Korean Steel industry. <sup>117</sup>

South Korean industrialization effectively began in 1962 with the inauguration of the First five year-plan. Subsequent efforts at promoting industrialization through import substitution and labour – intensive manufactures were encouraged in South Korea by successive governments. And within a space of 20 years, South Korea had shifted emphasis from light industry to heavy industry, thus diversifying into the production of motor vehicle; shipbuilding and construction industries. <sup>118</sup>

The South Korean economy is the 11<sup>th</sup> biggest economy in the world. By its cooptation into the membership of OECD, the South Korean economy is in the league of such developed economies like the United States, Japan and United Kingdom. The impact of the growing rate of industrialization and eventual economic development on the Koreans has been positive. South Korean labour has grown more expensive and this means better and improved living standards for Koreans. Rapid economic growth in Korea has also brought about social changes that increased the pressure on government for performance and democratization.<sup>119</sup> It is remarkable that the military leaderships launched South Korea into an era of industrial growth. Particularly distinct in this regard, was the military leadership of Park Chung Hee (1961-79) – a leadership that introduced the export-led industrialization strategy, and provided ample incentives to local entrepreneurs (who today own big conglomerates that have turned the Korean economy around).<sup>120</sup>

Also remarkable in the case of South Korea is the fact that the military relinquished power not as a result of poor economic performance but because of political pressure consequent upon the economic success story of the military.<sup>121</sup> In other words, in the South Korean case, the success of the “developmental state” of the military fostered the growth of civil society, especially of the middle class, and produced a seriously unbalanced society, - which though developed economically is moderately developed socially, and undeveloped politically. This trend imposed on the civil society, a determination to change the outcome of events in South Korea.<sup>122</sup>

It is luridly clear that capitalism in South Korea has attained higher level of fulfilment than in Nigeria. The private sector in South Korea is

larger than the public sector, while in Nigeria, the opposite is the case. Moreover, the military dictatorships in South Korea were developmental, as they created the impetus, through well-intentioned economic policies, that shot South Korea into technological and industrial development. Thus, democratization was sought by South Korean civil society as a result of the positive liberalizing effects of the socio-economic well-being of Koreans. But in the case of Nigeria the military institution is opposed by the people because it is detested for being the originator of their economic wretchedness in the midst of plenty. Thus, democratization from below in Nigeria, unlike South Korea was driven by a deep sense of frustration by the masses, borne out of poverty and hunger – a consciousness of opposition to objects responsible for their ever-worsening standard of living in Nigeria. For the Koreans, it was the desire for a “luxury” of participating in the choice of their leaders through democratic means that propelled them to fight against authoritarianism.

### **3.70 NIGERIA AND SOUTH KOREA IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM**

In this section, we are concerned with the external forces that influenced and are still influencing domestic politics in Nigeria and South Korea. These externalities are also explanatory of the international behaviour of our countries of reference. It is significant to note that the globalisation of democratic principles and practices is traceable to the dawn of a new era occasioned by the end of cold war politics in the late 1980's. It is as well remarkable that the ascension of democracy, marking the end of authoritarian rule in South Korea was actualized in 1992. In Nigeria, the death knell against military dictatorship began to sound in the late 1980's

and the pressure for democratisation since then have been soaring. In both Nigeria and South Korea, the civil societies have found allies in the international system that are supportive of their quest for the inauguration of democratic rule in these countries.

Thus, a review of the impact of externalities on the domestic affairs of Nigeria and South Korea is bound to be revealing, particularly as it exposes the pressures for democratisation imposed by international organizations (where applicable) and some powerful nations on our countries of reference.

### **3.70.1 NIGERIA'S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

Nigeria's foreign relations since the attainment of sovereign independent status in 1960 have been a product of its political history as well as its socio-cultural compositions. The immediate post-colonial history of Nigeria would present the country as one which value her newly won independence and would not want to come under the control of any other country no matter how powerful. The obvious policy option for Nigeria's foreign relations at the heat of the cold war politics was "Non-alignment". Nigeria utilized the policy of non-alignment in her relations with the capitalist west and socialist east profitably. The politics of non-alignment through her membership in the Non-Aligned Movement afforded Nigeria great independence from external manipulations and controls of the superpowers and international organisations.<sup>123</sup> This trend continued throughout the 1970's and the 1980's until the end of the cold war. Needless however to say that Nigeria enjoyed the competitive support of the superpowers during the cold war, as each of the superpowers – United States

of America and Soviet Union – was desirous of establishing its strategic sphere of influence in Nigeria, and indeed Africa.<sup>124</sup>

The end of the cold war politics marked the dawn of a new era of democratisation. The Western capitalist powers, having won the ideological war against the Eastern socialist bloc, began to withdraw their (hitherto blind) assistance from military dictatorships across the world. Western institutions were being influenced by the Western Powers such as USA, U.K, etc to tie their financial assistance to third world countries to certain political conditionalities. Thus, it soon became a rule for prospective beneficiaries of IMF loans to embrace democratic reforms. In this regard, Nigeria as from the late 1980's to the early 1990's was under intense pressure from the IMF and World Bank, as these financial institutions were bent on promoting economic and political reforms.<sup>125</sup> The efficacy of the pressure mounted by international financial institutions was no doubt responsible for the introduction of democratic transition agenda by the Babangida Administration. The Nigerian civil society became assertive, perhaps as a result of the credible and remarkable prompting of the international community. Several civil groups sprang-up to champion the struggle for democracy in Nigeria.<sup>126</sup> Invariably, Nigeria's membership of international organisations such as the Commonwealth, Non-aligned Movement, United Nations; Organisation of African Unity, and the Economic Community of West African States, etc, exposed Nigeria to some external controls, requiring that she behaves responsibly in accordance with the tenets of multilateralism in the international state system.<sup>127</sup>

Furthermore, Nigeria's bilateral relations with advanced capitalist countries such as the United States of America, Britain, West Germany, Australia, Netherlands, France, Canada, Italy, and a host of other countries

in the international system carry along with it mild regulative control of her international behaviour.<sup>128</sup> This is so because Nigeria's desire to maintain cordial relations with these countries requires that she conforms with standards promotive of the relations.

From the foregoing, it is evident that Nigeria's quest for democracy, and in particular the mouthing of democratisation by successive Nigerian military regimes since 1985 have inputs from the international community. Specifically, democratisation became the sing-song of the Babangida Administration, supposedly with the intent of calming down internal dissent, and soothing the nerves of the international community.

### 3.70.2 SOUTH KOREA'S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The creation of South Korea, sequel to the partitioning of Korea Peninsula after the second world war, was in consonance with the post-war strategic designs of the United States. The United States and the Soviet Union were interested in establishing their spheres of influence in North-East Asia, and indeed the whole of Asia for strategic reasons. South Korea became Western capitalist enclave in the Korean peninsula while North Korea became Soviet enclave.<sup>129</sup> The division of Korean peninsula led to unhealthy rivalries between the two Koreas which culminated into a three-year fratricidal war (1950-53). The experience of the war sensitized the leaderships on both sides of the divide in the Korean peninsula to the reality of their insecurity.<sup>130</sup> Invariably, South Korea's overriding external preoccupation has been with North Korea, as the threats of renewed aggression from that quarter has never been wholly lifted and has been reinforced intermittently by acts of terrorism.<sup>131</sup> This fear of the possibility of North Korea's attacks or invasion has made South Korea to continually

maintain her military alliance with the United States of America. Even till today, the US still has troops stationed between Seoul and the demilitarised zone (DMZ) as a guarantee against North Korea's hostility.<sup>132</sup>

In another sense, the support (both military and economic) given to South Korea's authoritarian regimes by the United States during the cold war was meant to repel North Korea, and maintain the security of South Korea.<sup>133</sup> But with the end of cold war in the late 1980's the US saw no need in pampering authoritarian regimes any more. The withdrawal of support from South Korea's military dictatorship by the US soon sent shivers down the spleen of South Korean military ruler, President Chun Doo Hwan, who was eventually forced to resign by the reformists within the military, following the recurrent protestations by students and the urban dwellers.<sup>134</sup>

The subsequent establishment of democratic transition agenda in 1987 and the eventual inauguration of democratic order in 1992 necessitated a new security objective for South Korea. The ascendant democratic political leadership in South Korea today is preoccupied with the security objective of protecting liberal democracy and market economy, and its attendant prosperity.<sup>135</sup> Towards the goal of ensuring security for South Koreans in all its ramifications, the South Korean leadership reflects its domestic demands in its international relations. South Korea's bilateral relations with the US and Japan provide a three-way relationship which is beneficial to South Korea, and important for long term stability in Asia.<sup>136</sup>

Overall, South Korea's international relations like that of Nigeria, are dictated by the requirements of its immediate milieu. In both cases the international community was contributory to the vibrancy of their civil societies' agitation for democracy.



## ENDNOTES

1. Cited in James S. Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, (Benin City, Broburg & Wistrom, 1986, pp. 45-46.
2. G.N. Uzoigwe, "Evolution of the Nigerian State, 1900-1914" in J. Isawa Elaigwu and G. N. Uzoigwe (eds), Foundations of Nigerian Federalism 1900-1960 (Vol.2), (Abuja, National Council on international Relations, 1996) p.4.
3. Ibid, p.14.
4. Michael Crowder, The story of Nigeria, (London, Faber & Faber, 1966) p.243.
5. Margery Perham, Lugard: The years of authority, (London, Collins, 1966) p.61.
6. G.N. Uzoigwe, op cit, p.30.
7. K.O. Dike, 100 years of British Rule in Nigeria 1860-1960, (Lagos, Government Printer, 1961)
8. Michael Crowder, Op cit, p. 281.
9. James S. Coleman, Op cit, P.362.
10. Anthony I. Nwabughuogu, "Unitarism versus Federalism: A British Dilemma, 1914-1954" In J. Isawa Elaigwu, and G.N. Uzoigwe (eds), Foundations of Nigerian Federalism 1900-1960, op. cit p.53.
11. U. G. Ajene, "Political parties and Federalism" in J. Isawa Elaigwu, and G.N. Uzoigwe (eds), Foundations of Nigerian Federalism, op. cit, pp. 189-208.
12. Horace G. Underwood, "Korean Society and culture" Korean Studies Workshop Lecture Notes, (Seoul, Korea University & The Korean Foundation, 1998), p. 49. However, a popular expression speaks of Korea's 5,000 years of history.

13. George M. Mccune, Korea Today, (London, Allen & Unwin 1950), p.43.
14. Horace G. Underwood, op.cit., p.51.
15. E. Grant Meade, American Military Government in Korea, (New-York: Harcourt Brace & Jovanovich, 1951), p.55.
16. Reeve, W.D., The Republic of Korea: A political and Economic Survey, (London Oxford University Press, 1963) p.143; Kim-Il-Sung selected Works Vol.5, (Foreign languages Publishing House, Pyongyang, Korea, 1970) p. 227.
17. Morton H. Halperin, "The Limiting Process in Korean War", Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 78, 1963, p.23.
18. Young Whan Kihl, Politics and policies in Divided Korea: Regimes in contest, (London, Westview Press, 1984, p.22.
19. John Lie, "Democratization and Its Discontents: Origin of the present crisis in South Korea" Monthly Review, February, 1991, pp. 43-44.
20. Sung-joo Han, "South Korea: Politics in Transition" in Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, (eds), Democracy in Developing Countries Vol. 3 (Asia) (Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Reinner, 1989), p.267.
21. Sang Joon, Kim, "Characteristic Features of Korean Democratisation", Asian Perspective, Vol. 18, No. 2 Fall-Winter 1994, p. 182.
22. Larry Diamond, Anthony Kirk-Greene & Oyeleye Oyediran, (eds) Transition Without end, (Ibadan, Vantage, Pub. Int. Ltd., 1997) pp.xv-L.
23. Peter M. Lewis, "End-game in Nigeria?: The Politics of Failed Democratic Transition", African Affairs, No. 93, (1994), pp.335-36.
24. Billy J. Dudley, Instability and Political Order: Politics and Crisis in Nigeria (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1973; and Billy J. Dudley,

An Introduction to Nigerian Government and Politics, (Bloomington, Indiana, Indiana University Press, 1982).

25. J.Bayo Adekanye, "Elections in Nigeria; Problems, Strategies and options" Nigerian Journal of Electoral and Political Behaviour, Vol.1, No. 1 1990, pp. 1-14; Leo Dare, "The 1964 elections" in p. Ekeh, P.D. Cole, and G.O. Olusanya (eds), Nigeria Since Independence: The first Twenty-Five Years, Vol. 5 (politics and the Constitution), (Ibadan, Heineman, 1989).
26. Tunji Olagunju, Adele Jinadu & Sam Oyovbaire, Transition to Democracy in Nigeria (1985-1993), (Ibadan, Spectrum Books Ltd., 1993), p.28.
27. Ibid, p.28.
28. Larry Diamond, "Postscript and Postmortem" in Larry Diamond, A. Kirk-Greene & Oyeleye Oyediran, (eds), Transition Without end, op. Cit, pp.575-600.
29. Joseph Richard, A, "Affluence and Underdevelopment: The Nigerian Experience" The Journal of Modern African Studies xvi, 2 (June, 1978) pp. 221-239; see also "Class, State and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria" The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics xxi, 3 (Nov. 1983), pp. 21-38; Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria, (Cambridge University Press, 1987).
30. Abubakar, Momoh, "Some Associational Groups and the Transition to Civil Rule in Nigeria" in omo Omoruyi, Dirk-Berg Schlosser, Adesina Sambo, & Ada Okwuosa, (eds), Democratization in Africa; Nigerian Perspectives, Vol. 2, pp. 178-201.
31. Hagen Koo, "Introduction: Beyond State-Market Relations" in Hagen Koo, ed, State and Society in Contemporary Korea, (London, Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 1-11.
32. Ibid.
33. Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, and S.M. Lipset, eds, Democracy in Developing Countries, op. Cit, pp. 1-52.

34. Jang Jip Choi, "Political Cleavages in South Korea" in Hagen Koo, ed., State and Society in Contemporary Korea, op. cit, pp. 33-50.
35. Ibid, p.19.
36. Ibid, p.35.
37. Nahzeem, Olufemi Mimiko, "From 'hard Authoritarianism' to a Demacradura': The dynamics of Democratic Consolidation in South Korea", The Korean journal of International Studies, Vol. Xxvii, 1, (1996), pp. 59-88.
38. John Lie, "Democratization and its Discontents", Op. Cit, p. 45.
39. Hyug Baeg Im, "Korean Democratic Consolidation in Comparative Perspective", Korean Studies Workshop Lecture Notes, op. cit pp. 261-288.
40. Fred I. Omu, "Ethnicity, Nationalism and Federalism" in J. Isawa Elaigwu and G.N. Uzoigwe, eds, Foundations of Nigerian Federalism 1900-1960, op.cit, p.171.
41. James S. Coleman, op. cit, p.228.
42. Obafemi Awolowo, Path to Nigerian Freedom, (London, Faber & Faber, 1947) pp.47-48
43. James Coleman, op. cit, p.320.
44. Ibid, p.347.
45. Fred I. Omu, op cit, pp.177-179.
46. Adamolekun, Ladipo, The Fall of the Second Republic, (Ibadan, Spectrum Books, Ltd, 1985), pp. 8-9.
47. Ibid.

48. Larry Diamond, Class, Ethnic Politics and Democracy in Nigeria (London, Macmillan Press, 1978).
49. Okwudiba Nnoli, Ethnic Politics in Nigeria, (Enugu, Fourth Dimension Pub. Co. Ltd, 1978).
50. Tunji olagunju, Adele Jinadu, & Sam Oyovbaire, Transition to Democracy in Nigeria (1985-1993), *op cit*, pp. 197-220.
51. Young Whan Kihl, Politics and Policies in Divided Korea, (London, Westview Press, 1984), pp. 1-6.
52. Jang Jip Choi, "Political Cleavages in South Korea", *op cit*, p.35.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid, Also see Kim Jae-on, and B.C. Koh, "Electoral Behaviour and Social Development in South Korea; An Aggregate Data Analysis of Presidential Election" Journal of Politics, Vol. 34, No. 3, (1972), pp.825-59.
55. Wonmo Dong, "Regional Cleavage in South Korean Politics" in Sang-Yong Choi, ed, Democracy in Korea: Its ideals and Realities, (Seoul, The Korean Political Science Association, Pub., 1997) p. 225.
56. Ibid, pp.246-247; See, Kim Hong-nack and Sun-Ki Choe, 'Urbanization and changing voting patterns in South Korean Parliamentary Elections, Journal of North-East Asian Studies, Vol. 6, No.3, (1987), pp. 31-50; Also, see Baesunkwang and James Cotton, "Regionalism in Electoral Politics" in James Cotton, (ed), Korea Under Roh Tae-Woo: Democratisation, Northern Policy, and Inter-Korean Relations, (Australia, Canberra, Allen & Unwin Pty Ltd, 1993), pp. 170-186).
57. Kim Byung-Kook, "A Journey without a Vision: Politics of Democratic consolidation in Korea" A paper Presented at the Conference on Democracy in East Asia held in Washington D.C., march 14-15, 1996, p.10

58. See Gabriel Almond, and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture, (Boston, little Brown & Co, 1963); Lucian Pye, and Sidney Verba, eds, political Culture and Political Development, (Princeton, N. J. Princeton University Press 1965); See also Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture Revisited, (Boston, Little Brown & Co. 1980).
59. Almond A. Gabriel and G. Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach, (Boston, Little Brown & Co. 1966).
60. B. J. Dudley, Parties and Politics in Northern Nigeria, (London, Frank Cass & Co. Ltd, 1968), p.297.
61. Ibid.
62. J. Isawa Elaigwu, "The Challenge of Unity in a Heterogeneous Society; The case of Nigeria", Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2, Oct. 1987, pp. 78-93 J. Isawa Elaigwu, "Ethnicity and the Federal Option in Africa", in J. Isawa Elaigwu, P.C. Logams and H.S. Galadima, eds, Federalism and Nation-Building in Nigeria: The Challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century (Abuja; National Council on Intergovernmental Relations, 1994) pp. 145.
63. Olusegun Obasanjo, Constitution of National Integration and Development, (Lagos, Friends Foundation Pub. Inc. 1989) pp. 51-55.
64. Adewale Ademuyega, Why we Struck; (Ibadan, Spectrum, 1980).
65. Sam Oyovbaire, "The Context of Democracy in Nigeria" in Sam Egite Oyovbaire (ed), Democratic Experiment in Nigeria: Interpretative Essays, (Benin City, Omega Publishers 1987), p.8.
66. A. Oyewole, "Failure of the First Experiment: A viewpoint" in Oyovbaire (ed), Democratic Experiment in Nigeria, Ibid, P. 23
67. Peter Ekeh, "Colonialism and Development of Citizenship" in Onigu Otite, (ed), Themes in African Social and Political thought (Enugu, Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1978, pp.318-319.

68. Ibid, see, Peter Ekeh, "Citizenship and political Conflict" in Okpaku Joseph (ed), Nigeria: Dilemma of Nationhood (New York, The Third Press, 1974), pp.76-117; Also see, Whitaker, C.S. Jnr, "The unfinished state of Nigeria" Worldview 27, 3 (March, 1984), pp. 5-8.
69. Richard L. Sklar, "Crises and Transitions in the Political History of Independent Nigeria" in Paul A. Beckett and Crawford Young (eds), Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria (U.K, University of Rochester Press, 1997) see Funsho Afolayan, "Nigeria: A Political Entity and a Society", in Paul A. Beckett and Crawford Young, (eds), Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria, pp. 45-62. Funsho Afolayan agrees with Crawford Young's instrumentalist and constructivist perspective on ethnicity. For Afolayan, the continuous systematic and regressive manipulation of differences by the ruling elite for the furtherance of their narrow, individual and elite group interest will continue to shape and re-shape, sharpen and further entrench these differences while hampering economic and political progress as well as national unity and integration.
70. Young, Whan Kihl, Policies in Divided Korea: Regimes in contest (London, Westview Press, 1984) p.12.
71. Edward Wright, Korean Politics in Transition, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1975), p.3.
72. Geir Helgesen, Democracy and Authority in Korea The Cultural Dimension in Korean Politics, (London, Richmond Curzon Press, 1998). P.99.
73. Young Whan Kihl, op. cit, p.16.
74. See various articles in Chong Lim Kim, (ed) The Political Participation in Korea: Democracy, Mobilization, and Stability (Santa Barbara, Calif. Clio Press, 1980; and also in the special issue "Symposium: Political participation in Korea" Journal of Korean Studies 1979 pp. 73-223.
75. C.I. Eugene Kim, and Young, Whan Kihl, (eds), Party Politics and Elections in Korea (Silver Spring Md: Research Institute on Korean Affairs, 1976).

76. Young Whan Kihl, "Politics of Agrarian Change in South Korea: Rural Modernization by induced Mobilization in Ray Hopkins, Donald Puchala and Ross Talbot (eds) Food, Politics and Agricultural Development: Case Studies in the Public Policy of Rural Modernization (Boulder, C.: Westview Press, 1979) pp.133-169.
77. Chong Lim kim, Political participation Korea, op. cit p.138.
78. Young Whan Kihl, Politics and Policies in Divided Korea, op. cit, p.20.
79. Geir Helgesen, op. cit, p.101.
80. Ibid, p.102.
81. Young Whan Kihl, Politics and Policies of Divided Korea, op. cit, p.22.
82. Koo Hagen, "Strong State and Contentious Society" in Koo, Hagen, (ed), State and Society in Contemporary Korea, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1993), p.235.
83. Ibid, p.240.
84. See Adewale Ademoyega, Why We Struck (Ibadan: Spectrum, 1980)
85. Ademolekun Ladipo, The fall of the Second Republic (Ibadan, Spectrum, Books Ltd, 1985) pp. 8-9.
86. Ibid.
87. Oluleye James, J, Military Leadership in Nigeria: 1966 – 79, (Lagos, University Press, 1985) pp. 162 - 166
88. Adekson J. Bayo, "Dilemma of Military disengagement" in Oyeleye Oyediran (ed), Nigerian Government and Politics under Military Rule 1966 – 79 , (Lagos, The Macmillan Press, 1988) pp.220.
89. Omo Omoruyi, "Designing the Nigerian Transition Programme" – A paper



Presented at the Round Table session during the Conference of the International Political Science Association (IPSA) on the Problem of Democratisation in Africa held on the 22<sup>nd</sup> of September, 1992 at the Centre for Democratic Studies, Abuja, Nigeria.

90. Ibid.
91. Daily Times, 28<sup>th</sup> August, 1985, pp.146.
92. Nosa Igiebor, "Deception as Game Plan" Tell, No. 29 July 19, 1993, p.3.
93. Oyeleye Oyediran, "The Military, Democracy and the Nigerian Political System" in Adebayo Ninalowo, (ed), The Quest for Democratisation: Military Governance and Trade unionism, (Lagos, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 1998), pp.4 (Emphasis mine).
94. See Edward S. Mason, et. al, The Economic and Social Modernisation of Republic of Korea, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Council on East Asian Studies, 1980)
95. C.I. Eugene Kim. "Government and Politics" in Han-Hyo, (ed), Studies On Korea: A Scholar's Guide (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1980), pp 301 – 337.
96. Ibid, pp 303.
97. John Lie, "Democratisation and Its Discontents: Origins of Present crisis in South Korea" Monthly review, February, 1991 p. 42.
98. Ibid, p.44.
99. Sung Chul yang, "Where Does South Korean Political Development stand Now? From legitimacy crisis to Democratisation Trial" Korea and World Affaris Vol. 18. No. 1 Spring, 1994, pp. 17 – 19.
100. Hyug Baeg Im, "Politics of Democratic Transition from Authoritarian Rule in Korea", in Sang – Yong Choi (ed), Democracy in Korea: Its

Ideals and Realities (Seoul, The Korean Political Science Association, 1997), p. 84.

101. Ibid p.85.
103. See Sung-Chul Yang, op.cit, p. 19.
103. John-Chun Beak & Min. Yong Lee, "Civil-Military Relations in Korea: Issues And Alternatives", Pacific Focus Vol. IV, No. 2, (Fall, 1989) pp. 35 – 48.
104. John Lie, op.cit, p.46.
105. A. L. Mabogunje, "Last Thing First: A Re-appraisal of the Fundamentals of Nigeria's Development Crisis" in Nigerian national merit Award endowment Fund, National Merit Award Lecture, Vol. 2, Ibadan: Spectrum 1989), pp. 7-8.
106. Faruqee, R. "Nigeria: Ownership Abandoned" in Ishrat Husain, et. al (eds), Adjustment in Africa: Lessons from Country Case Studies, (The World Bank) 1994, Washinton D.C.)
107. T. O. Adeboye, " A general Survey of the Economy" in M.O. Kayode, & Y. B.Usman (eds), Nigeria Since Independence: The First 25 years VOL II (The Economy), (Ibadan, Heineman Educational Books Nig. Ltd. 1989), pp.14.
108. Ibid, pp.20-27.
109. Luke Uka Uche, "Contradictions of Democracy in a State of Underdevelopment: The roles of African elites" in Adebayo Ninalowo, (ed), The Quest for Democratisation: Military Governance and Trade Unionism (Lagos, friedrich Ebert Foundation, 1998), pp. 40-41.
110. Ibid, p.41.
111. T. O. Adeboye, op.cit, p.27

112. Shonekan E.A.O. "The Nigerian Economy in the Twenty-First Century: Problems and prospects" Governance, Vol.1, No1, April, 1998, pp.20-21.
113. See. A.K. Ubeku, The privatisation of Government Companies: The Imperative of our Time, (Lagos, NIIA Lecture Series, No.44, 1987).
113. R.A. Alkali, "The world Bank and Structural Adjustment in Nigeria; Lessons for Vision 2010", Africa Peace Review , Vol. 1, No. 1, April, 1997, p.56.
115. See I.D. Ayu and Sam Egwu, "The Debt Crisis and the Crisis of the Democracy in Nigeria" in A. T. Gana and S. G. Tyoden (eds), Towards the Survival of the Third Republic, (Jos; source Publications; 1990), pp.81-90 see also A. Olukoshi, "The March to Adjustment in the Nigerian Economy" in A. Olukoshi, (ed), Crisis and Adjustment in the Nigerian Economy (Lagos, JAD Publishers, 1991).
116. Country Profile, 1997-98 South Korea, & North Korea (The Economist Intelligence Unit, London) p.18
117. Ibid, p.20.
118. Ibid, p.25
119. Sung-Joo Han, "South Korea: Politics in Transition" in Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour M. Lipset (eds), Democracy in Developing Countries: Vol. 3 (Asia), op.cit, pp.293-94; See also George A. Obiozor, "Nigeria and South Korea. 1980-1985" in G. O. Olusanya and R. A. Akindele, (eds), Nigeria's External Relations: The First Twenty-Five Years (Ibadan, university Press Ltd., 1986) pp. 451-458.
120. Sang Joon, Kim, "Characteristic Features of Korean Democratisation", Asian Perspective, Vol. 18, No.2 Fall-winter, .1994, p.194
121. Ibid,

122. Johnson, Chalmers, "South Korean Democratization: "The Role of Economic Development" Pacific Focus, Vol. 2, No.1, 1989, pp. 6-7.
123. H. Assisi Asobie, "Nigeria and the Non-Aligned Movement" in G. O. Olusanya and R. A. Akindele, (eds), Nigeria's External Relations: The First Twenty-Five Years (Ibadan, University Press Ltd. 1986) pp. 141-164
124. Ibid,
125. See Kunle Amuwo, "The International (And domestic) context of democratic transition in Africa: Road Blocks to Democracy" in B. Caron, A. Gboyega and E. Osaghae, (eds), Democratic Transition in Africa (Ibadan, CREDEU, Institute of African Studies, 1992).
126. Issa Shivji, "The POS and the NGOs: Reflection on the place of working people in the Battle for Democracy" CODESRIA Bulletin, No. 4, 1990, p.9.
127. See, G.O. Olusanya, "Nigeria and the commonwealth" in G. O. Olusanya and R. A. Akindele (eds) Nigeria's external Relations: The First Twenty-five Years, op.cit, pp. 141-164, Olajide Aluko, "Nigeria and The Organisation of African Unity" in G. O. Olusanya and R. A. Akindele (eds), Ibid, pp.89-97; H. Assisi Asobie, op.cit, pp. 141-164; Tunde Adeniran, "Nigeria and the Economic Community of West African States: A Role and Problem Analysis", in Ibid, pp.126-140.
128. Bassey E. Ate, "Nigeria and the United States: A Theoretical Framework for the Analysis of Twenty-Five Years of their Relationship" in G. O. Olusanya, and R. A. Akindele (eds), Nigeria's external relations: The First Twenty-Five Years, pp.233-248; Olajide Aluko, "Nigeria and Britain" in G. O. Olusanya and R. A. Akindele, Ibid, pp.276-283; Emeka Nwokedi, "Nigeria and France" in Ibid, pp.284-293; Femi Aribisala, "Nigeria and West Germany" in Ibid pp. 308-318.
129. See Hyug Baeg, Im, "The Rise of Bureaucratic – Authoritarianism in South Korea", World Politics, 1987, pp.231-232.
130. Ibid.

131. Thomas L. Wilborn, "Dimensions of ROK- U.S. Security Cooperation and Building Peace on the Korean Peninsula" in Tae-Hwan Kwak (ed), The Search for Peace and Security in North-East Asia: Toward the 21<sup>st</sup> Century (Seoul, Kyungnam University Press, 1997) pp. 289-315.
132. See Kyongmann Jeon, "Security Policy and Strategy of North and South Korea" in Tae-Hwan Kwak (ed), The Search for Peace and Security in North-East Asia, Ibid, pp.35-37.
133. Kongdan Oh, "Security Strategies of South and North Korea: Through the Looking Glass" in Tae-Hwan Kwak, (ed) Ibid pp. 45-59.
134. Chung-in Moon and Kang Mun-Gu, " Democratic opening and Military Intervention in South Korea: Comparative Assessment and Implications", in James Cotton, (ed), Politics and Policy in the New Korean State: from Roh Tae-Woo to Kim Young-Sam (New York, Longman & St. Martin's Press 1995) pp.175-176.
135. Kyongmann Jeon, op.cit, p.33.
136. Ralph Cossa, "Security Goals and Military Strategy of the U.S. and Japan: Mutual defense Treaties and Their impact on Regional Security" in Tae-Hwan Kwak, (ed), Ibid, pp. 96-100.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### THE MAIN FEATURES OF TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN NIGERIA (1985 - 1993)

#### 4.10 INTRODUCTION

The intermittent termination of democratic governments in Nigeria is a phenomenon which has been explained by some scholars.<sup>1</sup> In all, popular verdict holds that the military regime is an aberration. Thus, the military governments have always conceived of a plan to transit Nigeria to democracy, each time they shot their way to power. Indeed, in most cases the promisory note of a handover date was often pronounced during coup broadcast. In a sense, the promised transition was to promote the regime's acceptability by the Nigerian civil society, and not so much a desire for genuine inauguration of democratic rule. Although, the regime of Gen. Mohammed - Obasanjo (1976 - 79) prepared a transition programme that was faithfully implemented, and gave birth to the second Republic, some critics of the programme have maintained afterwards, that it was neither designed to forestall military coup nor was it meant to provide a stable democracy.<sup>2</sup> Some other scholars have heaped the blame of the Fall of Second Republic on the absence of supportive cultural environment needed for the institutionalisation of democratic system in Nigeria.<sup>3</sup> However, what remains an almost regular pattern of Nigeria's political history is the involvement of the military in the political scene. And just like a revolving chair, political power in Nigeria has been vacillating between the military and the civilian governments – but more in favour of the military.

The military coup that brought General Babangida to the political scene, as the President and Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces, was one of the contradictions inherent in the Nigerian Civil society. The Nigerian civil society, though desirous of democratic rule, is often receptive to military coup. And in order for the Babangida Administration to pacify the pro-democracy elements in the civil society, the Administration set up the political Bureau, consisting of a select group of professionals, academics, politicians and bureaucrats, to design a political programme for the country.<sup>4</sup> The mandate of the political Bureau was elaborate, just as its membership was extensive. It will be shown that despite the achievements of the political Bureau in terms of its origin of a political transition programme for the Babangida Administration, the implementation of the political programme lacked supportive socio-economic environment as well as the political will on the part of the leadership of the Babangida military Administration.<sup>5</sup>

Although, General Babangida Administration claimed, and was intent on making the “palace coup”<sup>6</sup> that brought his regime into existence the last coup, it soon became clear that the Babangida transition to civil rule programme threw-up some contradictions that were capable of subverting the transition agenda, and in the extreme, creating crises that could undermine the National Security of the country. The enigmatic character of the self-proclaimed “first Military President” of Nigeria, General Babangida, created credibility problems for the transition project of his regime. Several actions and policies of General Babangida’s government portrayed the personality of President Babangida as a “political dribbler” likened to the football maestro, Diego Maradona.<sup>7</sup>

The utilization of propaganda machines such as the Mass Mobilization for Social Justice and Economic Recovery (MAMSER) and the Centre for Democratic Studies provided immense theoretical justification for the “turns and twists” of the Babangida transition to civil rule programme. These institutions to a great extent popularised the transition programme, and provided some legitimacy for Babangida Administration. But unfortunately, legitimacy was squandered after the Administration annulled the last election,<sup>8</sup> – the Presidential election held on 12<sup>th</sup> June, 1993 – an election which was monitored by the International Community and a group of local monitors (under the umbrella of Nigerian Election Monitoring Group, NEMG). Needless however to state that the fall of General Babangida from the pinnacle of power on the 26<sup>th</sup> August, 1993 was occasioned by the recurrence of violent protest across some part of the country following the unpopular annulment of the Presidential election of June 12, 1993. Equally remarkable was the intensity of the crises that rocked the Babangida Administration and almost dismembered the Nigerian Federation. The National Security of the Country was threatened to such an extent that Nigerians began to feel that there was no way out of the quagmire other than outright dissolution of the Federation. And it was in this climate of political uncertainties that a new authoritarian regime of General Sani Abacha emerged, having swept aside the Interim National Government contraption headed by Chief Ernest Shonekan.

From the foregoing prefatory comments, it has become clear that the study of the security implications of the transition to civil rule programme of General Ibrahim Babangida Administration, requires in-depth analysis of the programme’s conception and implementation; an overview of the



political economy of the programme; an assessment of General Babangida's personality; and a review of the crises and conflicts thrown-up by the transition programme resulting from the reactions of the Nigerian civil society to the seeming reluctance of the Babangida regime to transit the country to civil rule.

#### 4.20 BABANGIDA'S CIVIL RULE PROGRAMME: CONCEPT AND PRACTICE

The transition to democracy project of General Babangida Administration was conceived broadly from two different perspectives. First, it was viewed as a "learning process." By this it was presumed that:

Social change can be brought about through the conscious application of human will, reflected in the deliberate adoption of one set of institutional arrangements in preference to others, and the system of inducements and sanctions underlying the preferred ones.<sup>9</sup>

The conception of the transition project of the Babangida military leadership was aimed at providing justification for the programme, as one intent on "the identification of what went wrong and how it can be rectified and its recurrence prevented"<sup>10</sup> at subsequent stages. Thus, Babangida Administration conceived of its role as a corrective regime saddled with the responsibility of implanting democracy in Nigeria through a systematic effort directed at institution – building. And secondly, the transition programme was seen not just as a "democratisation process" but a "programmed democratisation" process in which a military junta consciously and fundamentally seeks to "move political order from one state of affairs to another state of affairs".<sup>11</sup> The advertised and overly orchestrated conception of the democratisation process initiated by

Babangida Administration was to portray the regime as one which was not interested in succeeding itself, but was merely concerned with the installation of a stable and enduring democratic order.<sup>12</sup>

Furthermore, the Nigerian democratisation process under the leadership of General Ibrahim Babangida was rationalised by the regime as being “unique” not only in the sense that it took into account the past political history of the country and that it was independent from external influences, but also in its ability to provide for: “the de-militarisation of Nigerian politics, or the reduction of military participation ratio in the political process; the process of setting up civilian institutions, rules and practices which would conduce to “normal democratic life” and the development of the attitudinal dispositions conducive to the realisation of democratic governance.”<sup>13</sup> Consequent upon these characterisation of the Babangida transition programme, the Administration was described by one of its enthusiastic supporters as being introspective and purposeful.<sup>14</sup> The regime was viewed by pro-government scholars as sincere, and highly committed to its avowed plan of “bequeathing a stable political order to generations yet unborn.”<sup>15</sup> Moreover, the Babangida transition programme was even praised for its “in-depth and sophisticated analysis of Nigerian state and society,” for encompassing all aspects of political life and for basing its raison d’etre on systematic learning coupled with institution – building.<sup>16</sup>

#### 4.21. INSTITUTIONS OF THE TRANSITION PROGRAMME

It was within the foregoing theoretical matrix that Babangida Administration established such institutions as the political Bureau,

Directorate for Social Mobilisation, the Code of Conduct Bureau, Centre for Democratic Studies; and restructured the National Electoral Commission (NEC). Specifically, each of these institutions had its peculiar role to play in the Babangida transition programme.

(i) *Political Bureau*

The Political Bureau was inaugurated on the 13<sup>th</sup> of January, 1986. It was charged with the task of preparing the ground for the transition to civil rule programme. The Bureau was assigned the responsibility of organizing, guiding, monitoring, analysing and documenting a national political debate. It was also to provide an objective and thorough critique of Nigeria's past political experience, in order to serve as background information for the eventual co-ordination of national debate on the political future of Nigeria.<sup>17</sup> Specifically, the terms of reference for the political Bureau were as follows:

- (a) Review Nigeria's political history and identify the basic problems which have led to our failure in the past, and suggest ways of resolving and coping with these problems;
- (b) Identify a basic philosophy of government which will determine goals, and serve as a guide to the activities of government;
- (c) Collect relevant information and data for the government as well as identify other political problems that may arise from the debate;
- (d) Gather, collate and evaluate the contributions of Nigerians to the search for a viable political future and provide guidelines for the attainment of the consensus objectives;
- (e) Deliberate on other political problems as may be referred to it from time to time.<sup>18</sup>

In conducting its assignments, the political Bureau listed thirty issues covering politics, economy, religion, judiciary, citizenship, bureaucracy, interest and pressure groups, election and electoral processes, federalism, state creation and external relations.<sup>19</sup> The Bureau received inputs from the Nigerian society in form of memoranda; commissioned papers; papers on debates, seminars, conferences; summaries of debates and interviews; contributions at Public hearing sessions and In-Camera interviews; recorded cassettes and video tapes and newspaper articles.<sup>20</sup>

The Political Bureau submitted its report to the Babangida government on 18<sup>th</sup> May, 1987. Subsequently, the Federal government released its White paper on the Bureau's report with a highlight of the time-table of the political transition programme.<sup>21</sup> This programme's time-table was in phases as indicated below:

### **Time table for the Political Programme**

#### **3<sup>RD</sup> Quarter – 1987:**

- Establishment of the Directorate of Social Mobilisation
- Establishment of a National Electoral Commission
- Establishment of a Constitution Drafting Committee

#### **4<sup>th</sup> Quarter – 1987**

- Elections into the Local Governments on Non-Party Basis

#### **1<sup>st</sup> Quarters – 1988**

- Establishment of National Population Commission
- Establishment of Code of Conduct Bureau

Establishment of Code of Conduct Tribunal

Establishment of Constituent Assembly

Inauguration of National Revenue Mobilisation Commission

**1<sup>st</sup> Quarter – 1988**

Consolidation of gains of Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP)

**2<sup>nd</sup> Quarter – 1988**

Termination of Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP)

**3<sup>rd</sup> Quarter – 1988:**

Consolidation of gains of Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP)

**1<sup>st</sup> Quarter – 1989:**

Promulgation of a New Constitution

Release of New Fiscal Arrangements

**2<sup>nd</sup> Quarter – 1989**

Lift of ban on Party Politics

**3<sup>rd</sup> Quarter 1989:**

Announcement of two recognised and registered Political Parties.

**4<sup>th</sup> Quarter – 1989:**

Election into Local Governments on Political party Basis

**1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> Quarter – 1990:**

Election into State Legislatures and State Executives.

**3<sup>rd</sup> Quarter – 1990:**

Convening of State Legislatures

**4<sup>th</sup> Quarter – 1991**

Census

**2<sup>nd</sup> Quarter – 1991**

Census

**3<sup>rd</sup> Quarter – 1991**

Census

**4<sup>th</sup> Quarter – 1991**

Local Government Elections

**1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> Quarters – 1992**

Elections into Federal Legislatures and convening of National Assembly.

### 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> Quarters – 1992

(a) Presidential Election

(b) Swearing in of New President and final disengagement by the Armed forces.

It should be pointed out here that the Transition Time-Table was subjected to changes by the Federal Military Government. For instance, the swearing-in of the new President was shifted from 1990 to October 1992, and then to 1993. The reason for these changes in the time table was rationalised by the ideologues of the regime as allowing enough period for the politicians to learn. The time-table was so flexible that the government was not bound by it, as the government had the freedom to set aside any programme at any given point in time, and implement any one of the programmes at will. Notably, the Political Bureau did a thorough job by involving diverse interest groups, institutions and personalities in the deliberations on the political future of Nigeria.

But on the other hand, the political Bureau's report was not without its limitations. There were points of disagreement between the Bureau's recommendations and the government's positions. For instance, the federal government was critical of the Bureau's suggestion that the government should impose national socialist ideology on the country.<sup>22</sup> The government declared that the principle of democracy and social justice was a suitable expression of the national philosophy.<sup>23</sup> Moreover, the Bureau's recommendation that the number of political parties be limited to two, and that each party should subscribe to a national philosophy of socialism – with each differing from one another only on “priorities and strategies of implementation” was opposed to liberalism, and in essence antithetical to

democratic practice, and as well contrary to the pervasive trend in a fastly democratizing world.<sup>24</sup> Therefore, the Bureau in spite of its thoroughness in the discharge of its duties was not without an attachment to a particular value-system. But overall, the political Bureau provided the framework and programmes for the Babangida administration<sup>25</sup> --- Programmes encompassing socio-economic and political agenda of the Babangida régime. Yet, in all of the Bureau's suggested programmes, the political aspect of the transition retained the greater attention of the Babangida government. And it was in the implementation of the political programmes that the Babangida administration manifested insincerity without restraint as the regime manipulated and twisted the political Bureau's report out of context in order to subvert the process of transfer of power to elected civilians.<sup>26</sup>

#### 4.23 THE NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION (NEC)

The Babangida administration in its bid to ensure that the body to supervise the conduct of elections was adequately strengthened and empowered, carried out some restructuring of the erstwhile electoral commission. Thus the emergent, National Electoral Commission (NEC), which was established by Decree No.23 of 1987 (amended) had wide powers of control and regulation over the activities of political parties and the electoral system. In clear terms, NEC was charged with the responsibility of organising, conducting and supervising all elections, and matters pertaining to election into all elective offices. Aside from the provision of guidelines for the emergence, recognition and registration of political parties, NEC was to monitor the organisation and conduct of the political parties. Additionally, NEC was to arrange for the annual

examination and auditing of the funds and accounts of the parties. And finally, NEC was to provide rules which were to govern the qualification to vote and be voted for at elections.<sup>27</sup>

Furthermore, the law also vested the NEC with wide powers such as the delimitation of constituencies and wards; the registration of voters as well as the keeping and maintenance of voters' register; the screening of applicants seeking elective offices in order to determine their eligibility to contest for such posts.<sup>28</sup> Moreover, the NEC was in charge of providing the procedures for the political parties, and monitoring their activities such as finance, elections of members of their executives at all levels, coupled with the examination of their campaigns and electioneering strategies and utterances.<sup>29</sup>

Perhaps in order to ensure that the NEC dispenses its functions properly, it was decentralised along broader organisational structures, covering the then 30 states and the 593 Local Government Areas of the country.<sup>30</sup> The Chairman of the NEC was assisted by eight National commissioners and Resident Electoral Commissioners in the 30 States of the Federation and the Federal Capital Territory. Thus, given the enormous powers of the NEC and the broadness of its organisational and functional facilities, it was expected to perform in such a way that is promotive of the credibility of the transition programme. But as the critical events of the Babangida transition programme unfolded, such expectation became a sham. It became clear that the NEC's powers and responsibilities without a complementary measure of functional independence from the government, were like mere "dust" or "chaff" before the wind. As would be shown



later, in this chapter, the Babangida government exerted tremendous influence on the NEC in all the phases of the transition programme. And in a manner comparable to the popular political dictum, which describes “power” as having “two faces”, the Babangida government manifested the “covert side of power” in its dealings with the NEC, while the NEC displayed – without options – the “overt side of power.” Yet the real decisions about the programming of the civil rule project were taken covertly by a very small group or cabal in the Babangida administration. There is no doubt that the series of cancellation of elections and postponements of the terminal date of transition from 1990 to 1992 and to 1993 - as we shall show in this chapter – cannot be dissociated from the highly manipulative style of the Babangida leadership, and the “psychotic desire” of President Babangida for “millennial reign”. The NEC soon became instrument for the actualisation of Babangida’s “hidden agenda.”

#### 4.24 **BACKGROUND TO PARTY FORMATION**

The Political Bureau in its report recommended the formation of a two party system for the Third Republic with the following conditions:

- (i) that both political parties accept the national philosophy of government;
- (ii) that the differences between the two political parties are the priorities and strategies of implementation of the national objectives;
- (iii) that membership of the two political parties be open to every citizen of Nigeria irrespective of place of origin, sex, religion or ethnic grouping;

- (iv) that the national executive organ and the principal officers of each political party reflect the Federal Character ( i.e. the geographical spread ) of the country; and
- (v) that each of the political parties be firmly established in at least two third (2/3) of the Local Government areas in each of the States including the Federal Territory (Abuja).<sup>31</sup>

The Political Bureau also recommended that the Government should “substantially” fund the two political parties, in addition to the “limited” funds that might accrue from the membership dues, registration fees and the sales of party emblems.<sup>32</sup> Notably, the Constitution Review Committee (CRC) agreed with the Federal Military Government in accepting the two party system recommended by the Political Bureau.<sup>33</sup> Invariably, the 1989 constitution strengthened the conditions stipulated by the Political Bureau for the registration of political parties.<sup>34</sup>

However, an in-depth account of processes leading to the formation of political parties under the Babangida administration would be incomplete without making reference to the government’s decision to ban some categories of Nigerians from participating in party politics. In 1986, the Babangida government announced a ten-year ban on some old politicians. In September, 1987 the ban was extended to all those who had held political office in the First and Second Republics, top public officers and those found guilty of diverse offences like corruption, fraud etc; were affected. Also, other categories of Nigerians, comprising mainly of retired and serving top military and police officers, were banned from participating in party politics and elections during the transition to civil rule period.<sup>35</sup> In March, 1989, the ban order was extended to include serving

senior officials of the transition agencies like NEC, Directorate of Social Mobilisation, Code of Conduct Bureau, and the National Population Commission.

The reason advanced by the federal Government for banning these categories of Nigerians from participating in politics “was to allow for the emergence of newbreed politicians, and to sanitise the political scene,” Additionally, President Babangida argued that ; “the time has come for new generation of men and women to take up the leadership mantle of this country.”<sup>37</sup> Another reason advanced by Babangida was that his administration intended to correct past political misdeeds. As he puts it:

(the) political history of Nigeria to date is replete with individual acts and party political activities detrimental to the evolution of such good government and assurance of the welfare of the people... to avoid a repetition of the political misdeeds of previous civilian administration... (by) laying sound and proper foundation for the future democratic order, good government and welfare of all Nigerians, and ensure... smooth and effective future civilian governance for Nigeria.<sup>38</sup>

Plausible as President Babangida’s explanation might be, it was not welcomed by the affected members of the Nigerian Political class, who seemingly felt victimised and vilified by the Babangida administration. Consequently, the banned politicians, joined with the ranks of those disaffected by the economic policies of the Babangida government, became opposed to the government. It was not difficult for those the Babangida government tagged “sceptics” and “cynics” to see the ulterior motives of President Babangida in the whole political drama. To some of these so-

called “sceptics”, the agenda of the Babangida administration was to destabilise the country’s political class, because of the administration’s fear that previous attempts by the military to control the political class were derailed by politicians.<sup>39</sup> Yet some others argued that the Babangida’s government must have had a misplaced hope, and expectation that the “newbreed of grassroots politicians” – particularly those persons elected from the “grassroots” in 1987 non-party local government elections – were suitable for the formation of the newbreed parties.<sup>40</sup> But the “sceptics” and “cynics” were soon proved right, when the Babangida administration dissolved all local government councils eighteen months before the end of the terms of Local Council Officials – a dissolution occasioned by the government’s discovery that the local government counsellors had started consulting nationally in an attempt to form a nation-wide grassroots party.<sup>41</sup>

Consequent upon the dissolution of the local government councils, the stage was set for the Babangida government to commence, yet another round of political meandering. Invariably, President Babangida lifted the six-year old ban on party politics on 3<sup>rd</sup> May, 1989. Following the lifting of the ban on party politics, the government allowed a period of two months for interested Nigerians to form political associations. The political associations were to be vetted by NEC in order to qualify for registration as political parties. It was however not surprising that within two months of the lifting of ban on party politics, forty-nine political associations were formed.<sup>42</sup> This was so because there were clandestine political groups in existence before the lifting of ban on party politics. These groups, for instance were visibly in operation within the constituent Assembly – when elected representatives of the people converged in May, 1988 to vet the proposed 1989 constitution.<sup>43</sup>

However, for any two of these 49 political associations to qualify for registration as political parties, the NEC and the government criteria which are very expensive and virtually impossible preconditions which only the very affluent section of the propertied class or old politicians with established connections could satisfy, must be met.<sup>44</sup> A political association was expected to meet the following draconian requirements in order to qualify as a political party:

- (i) It must reflect the Federal Character of Nigeria;
- (ii) Its membership must be open to all Nigerians, irrespective of place of origin, religions sex and ethnic group with the exception of persons below the age of eighteen years;
- (iii) It must be established in all the state capitals, Local Government Headquarters and the Federal Capital Territory;
- (iv) It must pay a non-refundable registration fee of N500,000 to the NEC headquarters ;
- (v) It must submit a statement of its assets and liabilities when applying for registration;
- (vi) It must not have a youth wing structure;
- (vii) It must attach two photographs of each of their members to their application form; and
- (viii) It must have submitted twenty-six position papers to selected national dailies.<sup>45</sup>

In spite of these stringent and tough conditionalities, thirteen of the 49 Political Associations submitted their files to the NEC for registration as

political parties.<sup>46</sup> Nevertheless, none of these political associations was able to meet fifty percent (50%) of the requirements for party formation. The NEC, however, recommended the following six political associations to the Federal Military Government for consideration as political parties, out of which the AFRC was to choose only two.<sup>47</sup>

- |       |                                   |     |
|-------|-----------------------------------|-----|
| (i)   | People's Solidarity Party scored  | 43% |
| (ii)  | Nigerian National Congress scored | 42% |
| (iii) | People's Front of Nigeria scored  | 41% |
| (iv)  | Liberal Convention scored         | 34% |
| (v)   | Nigerian Labour Party scored      | 17% |
| (vi)  | Republican Party scored           | 17% |

**Source:** National Electoral Commission Report and Recommendation on Party Registration, September, 1989, p.23

It should be pointed out that these six political associations were referred to the AFRC by NEC with little enthusiasm since all of them appeared to the NEC to be stamped indelibly with the regional and other undesirable characteristics of parties in previous eras. The NEC specifically identified, among other things, that the political associations were rent by factionalism; they falsified and made exaggerated claims; they disregarded the guidelines for party registration; they lacked grassroots organisational structures, and that these associations depended largely on charity donations from undisclosed sources.<sup>49</sup> On the antecedents of the political associations, the NEC noted that the associations operated "“underground” prior to the lifting of the ban on party politics. The NEC observed in this respect that :

The top four associations in the overall ranking of the commission have deep roots in the party politics of the First and Second Republics, and in the context of the transition programme, important national figures affected by Decree 25 of 1987, as amended by Decree 9 of 1987, have played and continue to play significant roles in their formation, consolidation, finance and organisation.<sup>50</sup>

With the foregoing observations, the NEC set the tone for the eventual disapproval of the political associations by the AFRC. According to the AFRC, none of the political associations passed the test as set out by the regime's vision of a new political order. Thus, the AFRC decided "not to register any of the political associations as a political party."<sup>51</sup> And in an apparent display of its penchant for surprises, President Babangida abolished all the political associations and directed the NEC to create two national parties – "one a little to the left and the other a little to the right of the centre" – which on their emergence, were named respectively, the Social Democratic Party (SDP), and the National Republican Convention (NRC).

However, the decision of the AFRC was not entirely popular, as some Nigerians wondered what kind of democracy Nigeria intended to achieve through the express proclamation into existence of two government-sponsored, and government-created political parties.<sup>52</sup> But the Babangida regime's ideologues praised the creation *de jure* of a two – party system, as one which offers the country "the prospects of a de-ethnicised, mass-oriented participatory grassroots – based party politics"<sup>53</sup> Contestable as the position of the regime's ideologues might be, the government of General Babangida added some justificatory reasons for "decreeing" the two political parties into existence. According to the government, the two party

system “would give equal rights and opportunities to all Nigerians to participate in the political process irrespective of their wealth, religion, geo-political backgrounds and professional endeavours.”<sup>54</sup>

This short-cut to party formation, the Federal Military Government further reasoned, would ensure that the parties are not only mass parties but all members would be “equal” – with no sponsors’ or founders’ and in essence, all members are equal ‘founders as well as joiners’<sup>55</sup>. And in order to effectuate the take-off of the parties, the National Electoral Commission in consultation with the AFRC drafted their constitutions and manifestoes. The ensuing manifestoes reflected centrist tendencies; that of the NRC is a “little to the Right” while that of the SDP is “a little to the left”<sup>56</sup>. The NEC, with the approval of the AFRC, also designed the flag, emblem and colour of the parties.<sup>57</sup>

The Federal Military Government’s full control over the programming and structuring of the parties was also manifest in the government’s effort in constructing party offices for the two political parties, in all the Local Government Headquarters, State Capitals and the Federal Capital Territory.<sup>58</sup> The government thereafter appointed administrative Secretaries at all these levels for the parties. The NEC was further charged with the responsibility of supervising and monitoring membership recruitment for the two political parties, and that of organising the conventions of the parties at the four levels of party organisation (i.e. Ward, Local Government, States, and National levels) And in order to ensure the take-off of the parties, the Federal Government provided grants. Notably, by May, 1990, the membership strength of the two political parties was put at ten million Nigerians drawn from all over the country.<sup>59</sup>



From the foregoing it is clear that the Babangida administration in its desire to implant a 'top-down democratisation process' in the entire fabric of Nigerian civil society could not have been without opposition from the disaffected groups. The resistance movements by the enlightened and articulate sections of the Nigerian society were instituted to check the excesses of the overbearing, and domineering leadership of General Babangida's administration.

In all, the politics of exclusion and selective inclusion utilised by the Babangida government in piloting the "military-brokered transition to civil rule programme" did not promote the legitimacy of the democratisation process. If anything, the pronounced presence of the government in the transition machinery gave the process a semblance of "guided democratisation." Thus, the imposition of the two political parties; the banning and unbanning of members of the political class; the extraordinary empowerment of transition agencies – most significantly the NEC; and the wilful alteration of the transition time-table by the Babangida administration, were enough signposts of an impending and imminent political crisis in the country.

Yet, the Babangida administration still went ahead to popularise its transition to civil rule programme by enlisting the support of notable intellectuals. The task of ideologizing and conscientising Nigerian civil society was therefore assigned to the Centre for Democratic Studies (CDS) and the Directorate for Social Mobilisation – both institutions housed intellectual ideologues of the Babangida regime, who were fanatically inclined towards the regime's democratisation programme.

#### 4.25 POLITICAL EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS

The political Bureau had emphasised in its report the desideratum of attitudinal reorientation of Nigerians, and the need for the inauguration of a new political culture as indispensable condition for the success of the envisaged socio-political and economic order of the Third Republic.<sup>60</sup> The Political Bureau conceived political culture as being developmental and amenable to changes. The Bureau noted that the establishment of socialising or mobilising agency would be instrumental in the origination of the requisite behavioural and attitudinal transformation of Nigerians, in a manner promotive of democratic practice in the Third Republic. By mobilisation, the Bureau meant the process of increasing the people's level of awareness, and ensuring their participation in discussions and decisions which affect their general welfare.<sup>61</sup>

Furthermore, the Bureau recommended that the transition programme should be well-spaced in order to ensure adequate period for behavioural adjustment. The Bureau was derisive of the Mohammed - Obasanjo transition to democracy project which it described as a "one- second photo-finish total handing over of all instruments of government at a parade."<sup>62</sup> Accordingly, the Bureau proposed that the Babangida transition programme should be different from the 1979 experience, by being broadly-spaced; promotive of political learning, institutional adjustment and reorientation of the political culture of Nigerians.<sup>63</sup>

Thus, in accordance with the recommendation of the political Bureau that institutions for the promotion of democratic values be established, the Babangida Administration created the Directorate for Social Mobilization

(MAMSER), the Code of conduct Bureau and the Centre for Democratic Studies. Specifically, the Directorate for Social Mobilisation was launched on 25 July, 1987, and inaugurated on 2 September 1987.<sup>64</sup> The Directorate was assigned the all important task of fundamentally transforming the anti-democratic orientations of Nigerians into one that would be supportive of the democratic order. The principal objectives of the Directorate as spelt out by the Decree which established it include among others;

- a. to create a new cultural and productive environment which will promote pride in productive work, self reliance and self discipline;
- b. generally awaken the rights and obligation of a citizen to the Nation;
- c. encourage the people to take part actively and freely in discussions and decisions affecting their general welfare; and
- d. promote new sets of attitudes and culture for the attainment of the goals and objectives of the Nigerian State.<sup>65</sup>

The Directorate after some years of operation assessed the impact of its numerous public awareness lectures, radio and Television jingles as impressive.<sup>66</sup> But the Directorate's activities could not have been without significant opposition from some members of the political class who felt, perhaps correctly, that the Directorate was a propaganda machinery for the prolongation of military hegemonic order in the country. To be sure, the "Campaigns" and workshops mounted by the Directorate for social Mobilisation were almost neutralised by the opposing agitations of the

banned politicians and some other statesmen who were disinterested in the whole transition process - a process they denounced as mere 'charade'.<sup>67</sup>

Thus, as the transitional government intensified its campaigns for the envisaged 'civil rule', the opposition groups in the Nigerian civil society were vociferous in their condemnation of the transition programme. The opposition groups derided the Babangida transition project as being undemocratic in conception and implementation. Particularly, the pro-democracy groups decried the imposition of two-party system; the banning of credible politicians of the First and Second Republics and the extreme regulation of the transition programme by the Babangida administration.<sup>68</sup> Consequently, the disaffected political groups, joined by the ever widening pool of the economically dispossessed and marginalised people in the Nigerian civil society, began to champion the course of an alternative democracy project-known as "National Conference" or "Consensus Government"<sup>69</sup> And in all, the MAMSER propaganda was held suspect by the Nigerian populace, perhaps, because the Babangida administration did little or nothing to alleviate the economic adversities of a good number of Nigerians.<sup>70</sup>

The activities of the Code of conduct Bureau, with regard "to monitoring the actions and behaviour of public officers in order to ensure that they conform to the highest standard of morality and public accountability"<sup>71</sup> still did not succeed in its bid to sanitise the political space during the Babangida transition period. Although the Code of Conduct Bureau was given the mandate of receiving declaration of assets by public officers, and examining such declarations to ensure that they

conform with the requirements of the Law, the Bureau was not given the requisite co-operation by the Babangida administration to perform its function impartially. Thus, the emergent public officers during the transition reveled in reckless looting of state's treasury without any official reprimand from the Babangida administration. The resultant effect of the Babangida government's laissez faire approach to public morality was its debilitating and deleterious consequences for the regime's legitimacy.

The creation of Centre for Democratic Studies (CDS) by the Babangida administration, which was meant to augment the efforts of the Directorate of Social Mobilisation, did not amount to much. Specifically, the CDS was assigned the role of identifying "the sources and types of anti-democratic attitudes in Nigerians and to devise measures of correcting them through the educational, bureaucratic and political institutions."<sup>72</sup> But while the directorate of social Mobilisation concentrated more on the citizenry, the CDS focused on the political actors. And within the first - three years of its creation, the CDS organised training workshops for the different categories of the members of the Nigerian political class.<sup>73</sup> Yet, and regrettably, the Centre for Democratic Studies like other political educational institutions during the Babangida years, did not achieve the much-orchestrated objective of creating a new social order despite the huge resources expended on it.<sup>74</sup> The reason for the lack lustre performance of the transition agencies, and their inability to transform the cultural environment of the transitional politics in a manner supportive of the envisaged democratic order, could be found in the refusal of the Babangida administration to tie political reforms with economic reforms.<sup>75</sup>

#### 4.30 INTRA-PARTY AND INTER-PARTY ELECTORAL CONTEST

The true test of the efficacy or otherwise of the transition agencies in mobilising and conscientizing the Nigerian populace for their active participation in the processes preceding the emergence of third Republic is the electoral behaviour of Nigerians. But as was discovered by most keen observers of the electoral polls during the Babangida transitional period, the electoral behaviour of Nigerians was not markedly different from what it used to be in the First and Second Republics.<sup>76</sup> What was most disturbing was the extreme commercialisation of the nomination process within the two government - financed political parties.<sup>77</sup> Notably, the political gladiators were visibly involved in “horse-trading” throwing monies around to sway the decisions of the party faithfuls in their favour. Although, the “oldbreed” politicians were not physically visible in the political landscape of partisan contest within the parties, the newbreed politicians seemed to have imbibed the culture of vote-buying.

The utilisation of open balloting or open queuing system in which voters queued up in public behind their preferred candidate, or party symbol of their choice, complicated the electoral system and provided room for ‘open violence. The most grievous shortcoming of the ‘open-ballot system was its fundamentally anti-democratic character.<sup>78</sup> And despite well-intentioned opposition to the open ballot system by public-spirited Nigerians, the Babangida government still went ahead to implement it from the local government’s election of December, 1990 through all the other stages of elections. The open balloting system rather than being an antidote against electoral fraud, and a mechanism for a

healthy political life became an index of democratic savagery in the contemporary world.<sup>79</sup>

Contrary to the expectation of the Babangida administration that the open voting system would be rig-proof, the system was ridden with all sorts of electoral malpractices which reduced the legitimacy of election verdict.<sup>80</sup> In some extreme cases, party aides harassed the voters who had been bought to vote in a pre-determined way, i.e. to vote for the candidate who had paid for their votes. Even the NEC Chairman, Prof. Humphrey Nwosu decried the excessive use of money in politics, and observed that the Nigerian voters were fond of using electioneering politics to enrich themselves.<sup>81</sup> In a sense, however, the Nigerian electorate could have developed the “cash-and-carry” sentiment as a result of the harsh economic reality of its existence. But ironically, the electorate got what it bargained for, if not more. It is on record that the State Governors who were elected in 1991 were known to be some of the most corrupt and notorious people in the Nigerian society.<sup>82</sup>

In all the levels of electoral competition among the political elites, from the ward level to the local government, through to the state level, and the national (federal) level, rigging and falsification of figures characterised the whole process. The “free style rigging” during the transitional elections of the Babangida years made the occurrences of the Second Republic appear sluggish and amateurish.<sup>83</sup> Particularly disturbing was the preponderant presence of the government in the party primaries. All the party nominees for presidential primaries had to personally seek the blessing of President Babangida before progressing to the next stage. And

invariably, General Babangida was reported to have given a lot of money and encouragement to each of the twenty three presidential aspirants of the two political parties when they consulted him privately.<sup>84</sup>

Thus, when the 1992 presidential primaries of the two political parties were cancelled, and the presidential candidates banned by the Babangida administration on the grounds that the primaries were characterised by massive rigging, falsification of figures and excessive use of money, the presidential aspirants (who hitherto had collected monies from President Babangida) found it extremely difficult to challenge the cancellation of the primaries and the ban order clamped on them. Consequently, the Babangida administration designed another scheme to complicate the process of choosing the presidential candidates for the two political parties. The adoption of Option A4 method by the Babangida administration, ostensibly was to check the undue influence of the rich or “money bags” within the parties, while in actuality it was to make the contest more expensive and unaffordable for most interested aspirants. “Option A4” entailed that presidential aspirants had to pass through a series of elections from the Ward level, through the local governments and states, to the national level. All these levels of elections meant more costs to the aspirants, thus making the nomination accessible to the highest bidder.<sup>85</sup>

Notably, the cancellation of the first presidential primaries of the two political parties by the Babangida administration, sensitised the political class to the hidden plan of President Babangida to hold on to power in perpetuity. Therefore, the members of the political class began to plan ways and means of easing President Babangida out of office through the



instrumentality of party politics. Invariably, the two parties nominated close friends and business associates of Babangida as their presidential candidates – M.K.O Abiola for the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and Bashir Tofa for the National Republican Convention (NRC).<sup>86</sup> But the Babangida administration appeared to have changed its style, by not cancelling the presidential primaries of the two political parties, despite reports of manipulations, excessive use of money and massive rigging. Thus, unknown to many, the Babangida administration had perfected a scheme to either avert the holding of the presidential elections, which was billed to hold on 12<sup>th</sup> June, 1993, or cancel the results of the presidential elections.

For a start, the Babangida administration tried unsuccessfully to prevent the holding of the June 12 presidential election through the nefarious activities of one unpopular organisation known as “Association for Better Nigeria” (ABN). The presidential elections which eventually held on 12 June, 1993 were adjudged by the National Electoral Commission (NEC) to be the best it ever conducted.<sup>87</sup> The International Observer Team (IOT) commended the NEC, the parties’ candidates, security forces, and praised in particular, the ‘maturity and decency’ of the campaigns. The Nigerian Elections Monitoring Group (NEMG) acknowledged the NEC for its ‘diligent’ dutiful, and in the main, patriotic’ handling of the elections,<sup>88</sup> which were good signs for the future of elections in Nigeria. Furthermore, encomiums were showered on the NEC by the Director General of the Centre for Democratic Studies (now defunct) Omo Omoruyi, and the Chairman of the Campaign for Democracy (CD), Beko Kutu, for supervising a free and fair election. According to Beko Kutu, ‘the elections

were orderly. It was a vote for the presidential candidates as well as a clear demonstration of the resolve of Nigerians that they would not give Babangida the excuse he needed to derail the transition to democracy.”<sup>89</sup>

But despite the foregoing commendations of the NEC’s performance during the presidential elections, the Babangida administration, on 26 June 1993 annulled the elections. General Babangida in a nation-wide broadcast announced that the elections were cancelled and that Chief MKO Abiola and Alhaji Bashir Tofa were banned from any future presidential contests, and that new rules would be imposed to guide future campaigns.<sup>90</sup> From the foregoing, it has become clear that even that sacred institution in a democracy – election – suffered extreme violation, corruption and ridicule during the Babangida transitional period. The side effects of the annulment of 12<sup>th</sup> June presidential election results were not expected by the Babangida administration. The spate of violence, the complete loss of legitimacy by the Babangida leadership, pronounced state of insecurity, and the imminent threats of the dissolution of Nigeria’s federal structure were definitely beyond the wildest imagination of President Babangida.<sup>91</sup> No doubt, the annulment saga brought to the fore the fragility of the Nigerian nation state as well as the insincerity of the Babangida’s democracy project.<sup>92</sup> Of course, the heightened expectation of a likely inauguration of the Third Republic, which was occasioned by the successful conduct of earlier elections to the federal legislature, state assemblies and the local government councils, was frittered away by that singular act of annulment.<sup>93</sup>

What however should retain our attention here are the implications of the annulment of the 12<sup>th</sup> June presidential elections (Presumed to have been won by Chief MKO Abiola, a Yoruba man from the South Western part of Nigeria) for ethnic balancing and the security of the corporate existence of Nigeria. The decision to annul the June 12 elections perhaps, would not have triggered off much resistance from the South Western part of Nigeria in particular, if there were no indications that Chief MKO Abiola had won the ballot. But in all, the annulment was widely condemned initially by Nigerians across the ethnic divide. But subsequently, the Babangida administration soon found a solace in the utilisation of its usual divide-and-rule strategy. By playing one ethnic group against the others, the Babangida administration, to some extent, succeeded in dividing the June 12 mandate bestowed by a large number of Nigerian electorate on Abiola, and by extension whittled-down the struggle for the actualisation of the 12 June presidential mandate.<sup>94</sup> It is however instructive to note that the “June 12 saga” woke up a seemingly dormant and docile society, as it encouraged the formation of some pro-democracy and civil liberty organisations in Nigeria.<sup>95</sup>

Overall, the Babangida administration did everything possible to prevent the emergence of full-blown democracy in Nigeria through the mechanism of the tortuous transition programme. Perhaps more notable was President Babangida’s desire to remain in office through the civilianisation of his hold on political power. That could be explanatory of why the Babangida administration stalemated all efforts by the Nigerian civil populace to effect its exit.

#### 4.40 THE ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT OF BABANGIDA'S TRANSITION PROGRAMME

The Babangida transition would have amounted in entirety, to a mirage, if it did not concern itself with the economic reality of the country. At the point in time that General Babangida's administration came into existence, the Nigerian economy was in a comatose state. Indeed, one of the reasons for the 27 August, 1985 coup as identified by Brigadier Joshua Dongoyaro when he formally announced the news of the Babangida coup to the nation, was to check the ever-worsening state of the Nigerian economy<sup>96</sup> General Babangida in his maiden broadcast substantiated Dongoyaro's claims. According to General Babangida, the August, 27, 1985 coup was motivated by his desire, in collaboration with other officers with similar determination, to redeem the Nigerian economy. Babangida noted that "the last twenty months (under Generals Buhari and Idiagbon ) did not witness any significant changes in the National economy."<sup>97</sup> Accordingly, General Babangida promised the country that his administration would lighten the yoke of Nigerians, and set the Nigerian economy on the path of growth again.

Preceding General Babangida's administration, the Nigerian economy was engulfed in the existing global crisis, which necessitated the reopening of discussions by the country's erstwhile leadership, with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The IMF had suggested to the Nigerian leadership in 1984 that the country should implement some market reforms and continue with the austerity measures of the Shagari regime. Also, IMF had agreed to make available to Nigeria on request, \$2.4 billion loan on condition of currency devaluation and the elimination of

subsidies in tradeable goods.<sup>98</sup> But the Buhari Administration rejected the IMF offer on the grounds that it would not accept the devaluation of the naira as one of the conditions for the IMF loan.<sup>99</sup> As a reaction, the western governments and western creditors refused to reschedule Nigeria's debt, and did not open letters of credit for Nigerian imports.<sup>100</sup> Consequently, economic crisis worsened in Nigeria during Buhari regime, and these problems did not endear the regime to the citizenry.

Shortly after his assumption of power, General Babangida threw the issue of whether or not Nigeria should accept the \$2.4 billion IMF loan to a public debate. National debate was organised, and Nigerians actively participated in the debates. When eventually the curtain was drawn to signal the end of the debate, Nigerians had spoken vehemently against the IMF loan.<sup>101</sup> Thus, in accordance with public opinion, President Babangida rejected the conditional IMF loan but adopted a self-directed and "home-grown reform" programme, which in all its policy directives had the semblance of the IMF – prescribed Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). The profession of President Babangida that the Nigerian variant of Structural Adjustment Programme was "home-grown" notwithstanding, the Nigerian SAP had the imprints of the IMF and the World Bank.<sup>102</sup>

The Babangida administration's SAP which was ushered-in by the 1986 budget, was intended to run from July 1986 to June 1988. The policy-thrust of the Structural Adjustment Programme entailed currency devaluation, trade liberalization, revision of domestic tariff structure; removal of government subsidies from public and social services; and the privatisation of state parastatals and companies.<sup>103</sup> These policies were not

different from the conditionalities set by IMF/World Bank as recovery pills for the transformation of any other heavily indebted economy. The objectives of the government for introducing the Structural Adjustment Programme were to remedy major distortions in the economy and improve relations with external creditors; to reduce the ever-mounting debt burden, and to launch Nigeria on the path of economic and political transformation.<sup>104</sup>

The objectives were not achieved because the administration reneged on the policy dictates of its Structural Adjustment Programme. The adjustment programme within two years of its implementation was in jeopardy. Visible signs of the Babangida administration's inability to salvage the country's economy were pronounced. Thus, the burden of adjustment fell more on the Nigerian masses as the naira dropped in value by almost 500%<sup>105</sup> The adjustment policy of the government meant a reduction of the work force, in the public sector and a good number of civil servants were retrenched.<sup>106</sup> The removal of petroleum subsidy deepened the problem of the poorly paid civil servants and the unemployed because the policy meant higher transport fares.<sup>107</sup> Furthermore, trade liberalization policy of SAP opened-up the country to foreign goods, and Nigeria overnight became a dumping ground for foreign goods, with all its adverse consequences on local industries. Most local industries had to fold up and a good number of Nigerians lost their jobs.<sup>108</sup> In addition to the foregoing, the preliminary privatisation of hitherto government-controlled corporations in Agriculture and wholesale distribution led to the reduction of Staff in all the privatised agencies.<sup>109</sup> Even more painful was the corruption surrounding the privatisation exercise in which some

unscrupulous Nigerians served as fronts for multinationals to buy more equity shares in the private enterprises.<sup>110</sup> Many Nigerians who were barely existing, perhaps under the pangs of hunger, could not afford to buy shares in the privatised firms.<sup>111</sup> Overall, privatisation exercise implemented by the Babangida administration favoured mostly the retired army generals, big-time contractors and fronts of foreign speculators.<sup>112</sup> Throughout the duration of the Structural Adjustment Programme, the Nigerian masses were worse-off as death rate, mental illness, suicides and suicide attempts increased.<sup>113</sup>

The Structural Adjustment Programme was officially ended in mid-1988 but the Babangida administration continued its policy thrust.<sup>114</sup> The economic score card of the regime was in the negative, as the standard of living of Nigerians unprecedentedly worsened. Unemployment rose sharply and inflation moved into double digits.<sup>115</sup>

With all these unpleasant statistics of wretchedness, hardship and great discomfort that a good number of Nigerians had to suffer under the Babangida's structural adjustment programme, it was only natural to expect stiff opposition from the Nigerian masses, the real victims of the SAP policies. At the most auspicious time, when the Babangida administration was framing its transition to civil rule programme in mid-1987, a series of anti-SAP protests were launched by students, traders and organised labour.<sup>116</sup> These protests were indeed capable of undermining the security of the Babangida regime, since the legitimacy of the administration had been badly fractured. Thus, in an attempt to abate the violent demonstrations which were spreading round the country, President Babangida announced in January 1988, a 'reflationary' budget with a number of compensatory

measures, including increases in wages and public spending and a commitment to sustain the petroleum subsidy.<sup>117</sup>

The notable feature of Nigeria's adjustment programme during the Babangida years was the over centralisation of the economy or even the extreme personalization of economic power under Babangida.<sup>118</sup> Notably, the adjustment programme was maintained by a small group of elite, contrary to the tenet of capitalism (i.e. openness and competition) which SAP intended to foster.<sup>119</sup> The Babangida administration had almost total control over the economy, altering the pattern of the economy from one of diffuse clientelism to more arbitrary and debilitating control by a single leader. This over-concentration of economic power in the state was highly visible, in spite of the efforts of the Babangida administration to present a populist posture through consultative measures such as the IMF debate, local government reforms and political debate.<sup>120</sup>

The Babangida administration aside from facing the difficulties of sustaining the adjustment programme, had to battle against the encroachment of its credibility by opposing groups within the military and owners of productive resources in Nigeria.<sup>121</sup> The regime continually struggled to promote and maintain its credibility in the teeth of extreme opposition, through the utilisation of selective compensatory measures. In mid-1989 when SAP riots spread throughout the Nigerian universities, and commercial centres in the cities, the Babangida administration swiftly announced a compensatory package of job creation, health and transport subsidies, and enhanced food production.<sup>122</sup>



In addition to the restoration of social subsidies, the Babangida administration created institutions such as the Directorate for Food, Roads and Rural Infrastructures, (DFRRI) to provide special assistance to rural areas; the people's Banks and Community Banks, and Better Life programme which were to extend financial assistance and credit facilities to small-scale and local entrepreneurs.<sup>123</sup> But the operation of these institutions did not justify the rationale for their establishment, because they were ridden with corruption. Thus, these institutions had negligible impact on popular welfare,<sup>124</sup> and with all the attendant consequences for the Babangida administration's stability and security. The resultant expansion of the levels of oppositions and violence in the Nigerian civil society, no doubt, created cynicism and scepticism among Nigerians about the sincerity of General Babangida transition programme. Invariably, the corruption that characterised the Babangida administration's programmes; the glaring diversion of public resources into private coffers; the promotion of fiscal and monetary indiscipline, proved the failure of the structural adjustment programme.<sup>125</sup>

From the foregoing, it is evident that the economic performance of the Babangida administration was an outright subversion of the expectations of the international financial institutions, as well as a negation of capitalist principles. Excessive monopolisation and control of the means of production, of distribution and of major services, are not conducive to healthy democratic competition because wide distribution of power and resources allows for healthy political competition.<sup>126</sup> Thus, the monopolistic centralisation of economic power under General Babangida's administration was inimical to the spirit of political democratisation. The illicit expropriation of Nigerian resources by the Babangida administration

gave President Babangida ultimate freedom to divert immense resources into his private purse. For instance, profitable sale of petroleum during the Gulf war in 1990, was sidelined into off-budget accounts for President Babangida's discretionary use.<sup>127</sup> The consequent decapitalisation of the Nigerian civil society, no doubt activated the civil groups, associational groups and indeed the entire civil society against military dictatorship in general, and in particular the Babangida administration, which was perceived as the immediate creator of their adversities. For the Babangida military Administration, the Structural Adjustment programme (SAP) was to blame for its destabilising political effects.<sup>128</sup> But in most of the administration's reactions to public protests and riots, there were manifest signs of the Babangida administration's recourse to greater coercion and authoritarianism, perhaps in an attempt to secure its power base.<sup>129</sup>

In a sense, the ethnic diversity and religious differences in Nigeria were blown up and exploited by the Babangida administration, essentially in order to divide the struggle and confuse the civil society with the intent of consolidating its hold on power. And in another sense, the economic crises occasioned by the structural adjustment programme found expression in bitter ethnic conflicts and religious acrimonies in Nigeria.<sup>130</sup> And as the economic environment of the Babangida transition programme continuously created pockets of crises, conflicts and riots, the legitimacy of the transition programme and the transitional administration were contested.

#### 4.50. **ETHNICITY, CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE POLITICAL TRANSITION PROGRAMME**

The goal of institutionalising durable democratic system in Nigeria has been so difficult to achieve partly as a result of the deep ethnic, regional

and religious divisions. But it has been observed that Nigeria's cultural pluralism "defies successful management through any but democratic and rigorously federalist principle."<sup>131</sup> In the same vein, the existence of "competitive regional and ethnic blocs of population" does not allow for the emergence of full-fledged authoritarian leadership in Nigeria.<sup>132</sup> If anything, ethnic competition necessitates legitimate concerns for mediation, regulation and accommodation of diverse ethnic interests.<sup>133</sup> It is therefore popularly accepted that democracy or democratic political activities, no matter the destructiveness of their ideals, still offered better prospects for the resolution of inter-communal, inter-ethnic and inter religious rivalries and conflicts. But military leaderships, being authoritarian, unitarian, arbitrary and reckless have often undermined the basis of Nigeria's federal system.<sup>134</sup>

The mid-way between the two extremes (authoritarian rulership and democracy) is the democratising regime. Thus, it should naturally be expected that the transitional and democratising administration of General Babangida would be more liberal to and accommodating of the different dimensions of ethnic competition in the Country. But such expectation was perhaps misplaced, in view of the fact that President Babangida was the sixth of Northern President/Heads of States of the Country's eight Heads of States since the attainment of political autonomy. Thus, some of President Babangida administration's programmes and actions were still ethnic based than was expected, despite the regime's attempts to observe "Federal Character" principles and promote national identity among politicians of the Third Republic.<sup>135</sup> The imposition of two-party system on the Nigerian political and civil societies was to avert the resurgence of tribal politics of the First and Second Republics in which political parties became vehicles for

the expression of ethnic identities in the country. The Babangida administration raised threshold requirements for the direct election of the President to one-third of the voters in two-thirds of the States, plurality of the votes cast.<sup>136</sup> This was done in a bid to ensure that whoever would emerge as the president in the third republic should have national acceptance.

Furthermore, the Babangida administration attempted to allay the Southern fears of Northern political domination through the encouragement of the adoption of "zoning systems" of power-sharing within the two political parties (SDP and NRC). But these provisions did not contain fears and allegations of ethno-regional domination of the Presidency.<sup>137</sup> Radical proposals were advanced by several groups on the need for the redistribution of constitutional powers and functions of the Federal Government in favour of the states and local governments, particularly through the adoption of a new revenue sharing system; the introduction of effective power sharing mechanisms at the Federal level; the inclusion of grassroots associations and local councils as an important level of the government; the rapid democratisation of the political system in order to put an end to all the inequalities, ethnic competition and unhealthy intergovernmental relations in the country.<sup>138</sup> These and many other demands were forcefully articulated by some associational and non-associational groups (mostly based in the Southern part of Nigeria), during the Babangida years.

The Nigerian civil society during the Babangida transitional administration was vibrant and articulate despite the efforts of the administration to repress and suppress it. Such vibrancy was the product of an articulate and oppositional press, expansion in education, networking

of professional groups and human rights organisations, well-organised labour, easily mobilised student groups, and co-operative market women associations and occupational groups.<sup>139</sup> The overt signs of vibrancy in the Nigerian civil society, notwithstanding, the Babangida administration utilised all available methods to divide, coopt, intimidate and compromise oppositional groups within the civil society. Notably, General Babangida was fond of inducing perceived opponents or critics, in order to effect attitudinal change in them in a manner favourable to his administration. The aim of General Babangida for deploying generously state resources to induce the critical segment of the Nigerian civil society was to strengthen his personal rule and to recast civil society to serve the interest of his increasingly predatory rulership.<sup>140</sup>

In the implementation of the democratisation project, the Babangida administration selectively induced those political actors who were considered innocuous to, and supportive of the ambition of General Babangida, while those who were perceived as being opposed to his political ambition got excluded from the political process. Indeed, the civil society and political society came under siege under the whims and caprices of General Babangida – who seemingly had perfected a project of “de-democratisation.”<sup>141</sup> In the pursuit of its ‘de-democratisation process’ the Babangida administration used promises, imagery and appearance of democratisation to incapacitate, corrupt and destroy democratic processes, values, and structures while promoting and institutionalising political corruption and patrimonial rulership in the country.<sup>142</sup> The labour unions, and in particular the umbrella organisation of Nigerian workers – the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) – were not immuned against the corrosive and corruptive influences of the Babangida administration.<sup>143</sup>

Aside from the infiltration of the leaderships of labour union by the Babangida administration,<sup>144</sup> the debilitating effects of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) on the workers, crippled the workers' economic base and rendered their body-the NLC-manipulable.<sup>145</sup> Notably, the NLC leadership became more compliant with government policies after Paschal Bafyau emerged as its President (through the support of the government).<sup>146</sup> And while the NLC leadership was buffeted and cuddled by the Babangida administration, government security agencies constantly harassed the leaders of the Nigerian Medical Association (NMA), the National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS) and the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU). Although these professional associations had their strength diminished by the intermittent repression by the government, they still tried to assert their claims.<sup>147</sup> The harassment and intimidation of the professional associations by the government even led to the emergence of new associations with greater determination and commitment to challenge government's policies and abuse of human rights. These associations included amongst others, Civil Liberties Organisation (CLO), the Constitutional Rights Project (CRP), the committee for the Defence of Human Rights (CDHR), the Gani Fawehinmi Solidarity Association (GFSA), and the National Association of Democratic Lawyers (NADL).<sup>148</sup>

The major stimulus for the massive pro-democracy mobilisation of new associations and the reorientation of old ones was the social cost of the Structural Adjustment Programme. The pain and suffering occasioned by SAP was responsible for the expansion of associational activities in Nigeria during the Babangida years.<sup>149</sup> But, ironically, while the civil society organisations and their leaders suffered proscription, detention and

harassment of all sorts, the political society was ridden with crass opportunism, as politicians sought patronage from the Babangida authoritarian administration.<sup>150</sup> It is on record that with the substantial support of the political class, Babangida administration was bold in its violation of the associational rights of the Nigerian civil society. Particularly, from 1988 to 1990, the administration consistently harassed and detained several human rights activists, lecturers, students, labour leaders, journalists and social critics for demanding for a more fundamental political reform and economic planning.<sup>151</sup>

The foregoing has confirmed to some extent that the Babangida administration, far from providing the socio-economic and political environments that were conducive for the inauguration of democratic rule, was only promotive of authoritarianism. The imposition of the two government-funded political parties; the wilful banning of politicians; the proscription of civil groups and political associations; incarceration of human rights activists; the implementation of an unpopular economic adjustment programme and the continuation of same despite popular protests against the programme were all indicative of a regime that was unwilling to democratise. Yet, the Babangida administration continuously made pretensions to some form of democratisation. But in actuality, the regime's transition to democracy programme was perhaps designed to prolong the despotic rulership of General Ibrahim Babangida. And it was the public knowledge of the regime's hidden agenda that fuelled recurrent violent protests against the regime within the civil society, and motivated some coup attempts by the soldiers. Related however to this clear state of insecurity for the regime and the Nigerian society at large, was the net cost of the prolonged period of political transition of the Babangida years.<sup>152</sup>

First, the series of violent protest, coups and counter-coups discouraged foreign investments. Second, the intermittent recourse to street demonstrations have often been accompanied by looting, mass murders, and reckless and wanton destruction of government buildings.<sup>153</sup> Third, in some cases, public protests against the Babangida administration took on ethnic dimension, as the hoodlums often gave leadership and direction to the protests, thereby exploiting such opportunities.

Therefore, whether or not a programme of political reform would be crises-prone could depend on the policies it throws-up and the reaction of the civil society to it. And the civil society's reaction is a function of its perception of the reform process, as well as the nature and character of the civil society itself. And also to a great extent, the programming and planning of the transition to democracy would be reflective of the interest of the supervisor of the programme – in this case, President Babangida. But the interest of the President is dependent on his personality, intellectual bent, and his antecedents. In all, the vision, sentiments, courage, and understanding that Babangida brought to bear in the execution of his regime's democratisation process could be explanatory of the outcomes of the process. This is moreso, since a perfect plan needs the complementary perfection of its implementor.

#### **4.60 BABANGIDA'S PERSONALITY AND HIS RULE**

The personality of General Babangida was formed at his cradle during his childhood. The early experiences of President Babangida; his parental care; the influence of peer groups; his education and specialised training, are some of his antecedents that had great impact on him. President Babangida did not enjoy the affection of his parents for long. At



a very early age of 12 he lost his Mother, and at the age of 14, his father followed suit. The death of Babangida's parents had debilitating and demoralising effects on him. He was eventually raised by his paternal grand mother and uncles.<sup>154</sup>

General Babangida's childhood friends described him as being assertive and defensive of his interest. They often illustrate their understanding of Babangida with the symbolic difficulties of snatching the wolves from the lion, to depict how difficult it is to take an object from the hands of the young Babangida once he was convinced that the object was his as a matter of right.<sup>155</sup>

Without doubt, General Babangida's childhood experiences had immense influence on his personality, and he brought to bear these experiences even in the discharge of his assignments as the country's President. Babangida utilised a combination of political manipulation, populist gestures, elite patronage and overt repression in the running of state affairs. His skilful and astute manipulations of the political actors and the political scene in a manner supportive of his interest, soon earned him the sobriquet "Maradona" (after the renowned Argentina footballer).<sup>156</sup> This appellation was to denote "his considerable alacrity in selling programs, balancing different interests, and disarming potential opponents"<sup>157</sup> Babangida also used a number of diversionary tactics to sustain popular expectation, including frequent alterations in the schedule and institutions of the transition programme, administrative changes such as the creation of new states, selective recruitment of new political officers, intermittent reshuffling of his cabinet and continuous reshuffling of divisional Commanders.<sup>158</sup>

Although General Babangida at the inception of his administration, through the skilful use of propaganda and populist posture, succeeded in winning popular support for the painful economic measures thrown-up by his regime, but eventually as the regime lost its modicum of legitimacy, public scepticism became manifest.<sup>159</sup> The public perception of Babangida as “Military democrat” following his release of those who were detained and imprisoned by the Buhari – Idiagbon government, soon gave way for a derogatory appellation, as the “Head of a military Junta” or a dictator.<sup>160</sup> The choice of a unique title of “President” instead of the usual “Head of State” by General Babangida, fuelled suspicion and speculation that Babangida intended to civilianise his hold on power and perpetuate himself in office.<sup>161</sup>

By his carriage, comportment and confident assertion of authority, Babangida did not leave anyone in doubt as to who really was in charge. When in 1986, Babangida’s first Chief of Staff, Commodore Ebitu Ukiwe was showing signs of independence, and thereby attracting some publicity to himself, President Babangida did not hesitate to replace and retire him.<sup>162</sup> Furthermore, General Babangida’s usual policy of divide-and-rule, as a strategy of ethnic balancing, soon lost its efficacy. Many Nigerians became aware that General Babangida was playing one major group against others in order to enhance his control over the whole, and promote his interest of dominating all the ethnic groups.<sup>163</sup> The public awareness and publicity of General Babangida’s agenda to entrench a system of personal dictatorship, worked against him, as the critical segments of the population mobilised significant forces against him.<sup>164</sup> But Babangida saw opposition as a manageable and manipulable process, and in almost all the

series of protests and riots against his administration, he skilfully diffused the tension by dividing the opposition.

Also central to General Babangida's perpetuation in power for over eight years was his ability to manage effectively the military as an institution. He bought loyalty and support of the military by providing inducements for Senior Military Officers and the other ranks. Babangida's acts of munificence surpassed any of his predecessors. As Bayo Adekanye puts it:

General Babangida became famous for his many acts of generosity towards individual members of the armed forces (as well as civilian aides and allies) These included the proverbial "brown envelopes" occasionally given to officers at birthdays, Christmas or eid festival, marriages, and new births and deaths in military families; sponsorship of medical treatment for officers or their families abroad, with all the expenses paid for by Mr President; and gifts of new cars and building materials.<sup>165</sup>

Notably, Babangida's fanatical love for the military was visible, particularly after the second abortive coup which was master-minded by Gideon Orkar against his administration. It was not surprising therefore that the military occupied an important position in president Babangida's scheme to prolong his stay in power, perhaps indefinitely. But the military was not the only interest group pacified by General Babangida in his bid to establish his hegemony over the entire Nigerian society. The intellectuals and other opportunistic members of the Nigerian political class were also coopted by General Babangida into his administration.<sup>166</sup> Another remarkable behavioural trait of President Babangida, was his love for springing surprises. Throughout his eight years of rulership, Babangida thrived on his unpredictable nature. Even his personal staff, those who were

in constant contact with him never knew what step he would take at any given time on any issue at stake. Indeed, it was after Babangida had done what he wanted that it then became public knowledge. When Babangida was asked about his love for putting the country in suspense, and making the unexpected happen, he answered with some pride: "I am a military officer and they say surprise is one of the attributes of a good general."<sup>168</sup>

In all of these, General Babangida presented an image of himself as a military ruler with an eye on everlasting power, while at the same time giving an impression of his commitment to the transition to democracy. The contradiction in Babangida's interests became manifest when the transition programme drew very close to the conduct of the presidential elections. It was only then that the allegations that President Babangida had a "hidden agenda" received credible acceptance across Nigeria.

Overall, President Babangida held the nation spell-bound for eight years, by utilising different political methods for sustaining himself in office. He tried to promote the interest of the Nigerian populace in his democracy project and initially the project was applauded and accepted with open hands by Nigerians, but it was eventually widely opposed, and denounced as mere "charade" sequel to the manifest insincerity and lack of commitment of the General to the project. The crises and conflicts thrown up by the transition to civil rule programme of General Babangida were instigated by the perception of Nigerians that President Babangida was nurturing the realisation of his hidden agenda. Thus, far from being a permanent antidote to coups and mass protests, General Babangida's "Maradonic" manipulations engineered new bases for conflicts and crises. The legitimacy of the Babangida transition to democracy could have received a great leap if the conduct of General Babangida was devoid of

ulterior motives. The crises engendered by Babangida's dictatorial tendencies found expression in the Final Crisis - the June 12 presidential elections' annulment crisis - that spelt the end of General Babangida's rulership.

#### 4.70. CRISES OF TRANSITION, MASS PROTESTS AND INSTITUTIONALISED OPPOSITION

As it has become clear, the Babangida transition to democracy was not without some crises, like any other democratisation process. The processes thrown up by the administration created conflicts within the civil society among competing institutions, and in most cases stimulated opposition groups against the Babangida regime.<sup>169</sup> The entire transition programme, often acclaimed by the regime and its adherents as "a democratisation process" was fraught with a lot of irregularities and anti-democratic machinations, which in itself subjected the whole process to scathing and bitter criticisms. And each time the civil society opens up its bowel of anger against some of the policies and programmes of the Babangida administration, the administration always reacted violently in its attempt to suppress such popular protests.<sup>170</sup>

On the other hand, the civil society utilised to its advantage, the little democratic space provided by the "democratising" regime of President Babangida. The perception or misperception of the regime by the civil society, as a "democratising regime" led the civil society in most instances, to publicly assert itself, and make fundamental and far-reaching demands on the regime. But the regime often misconstrued such demands as a challenge of its authority, and thereby resorted to all forms of repressive measures to discourage and restrain civil society.<sup>171</sup> Such measures

included among others numerous instances of detention without trial, confrontations with students involving the use of deadly weapons, and selective assassination.<sup>172</sup>

The economic plank of the Babangida administration's democratisation process was indeed promotive of social crises. The Structural Adjustment Programme was impoverishing many more Nigerians, while a few continually were getting richer. The scandalous pillaging of Nigeria's wealth by the Babangida administration, and the mindless display of the loot by officials of the administration to the chagrin of the dispossessed Nigerians, squandered the reception accorded the SAP reform, at inception. The concomitant SAP riots were to check the progressive encroachment of the Babangida administration on the basic socio-economic rights of Nigerians. But by implementing such painful economic reforms, the regime deviated sporadically from the path of liberalism.<sup>173</sup> And it was such deviation that often necessitated and prompted the opposition of the civil society to Babangida administration.

As Larry Diamond, et.al noted:

The popular resentment of SAP was greatly intensified and broadened by the obvious signs of continuing corruption in high places, the blatant lack of accountability in governance, and the authoritarian manner in which economic reform policies were imposed from above.<sup>174</sup>

The public disaffection was volatile and profound, and it was also widespread. In May 1989, students took to the streets in most Southern cities to protest against the policies and implementation of SAP. In May 1992, three years later, students protested over the escalating costs of living, fuel shortages and other socio-economic and political complaints. In

all these instances, there were massive looting and burning, killings and maiming.<sup>175</sup>

Remarkable opposition to the regime also came from the disaffected members of the military (Babangida's constituency). Following the General Mamman Vasta's abortive coup of 1985 was Gideon Orkar's abortive coup in 1990. The 1990 coup was particularly more disturbing to General Babangida, not because of the violence that attended its execution, but the divisive message broadcast by the coupists.<sup>176</sup> Moreover, the 1990 coup, unlike the Vasta's coup, came after the Babangida administration had rolled out its transition programme. The coup therefore was a clear indication of the disapproval by a segment of the empowered elites of the transition programme, and perhaps a rejection of the Babangida administration.

The poor management of the country's diversity, and its federal system by the Babangida administration, propelled the 1990 coupists to attempt the dismemberment of five Northern states from the Nigerian Federation.<sup>177</sup> Although the coup failed, the lessons of the insurgence were loud and clear. Major Gideon Orkar, a Tiv of Benue State, and leader of the coup had alleged that the "aristocratic class in the Northern parts" of Nigeria was subjugating the Middle Belt.<sup>178</sup> Thus, in his bid to redress the adversities suffered by the Middle Belt people – his people, he and some other officers from the minority ethnic group in the Midwestern State of defunct Bendel State staged the 1990 coup.<sup>179</sup>

The regime's reaction was harsh. No less than 800 people including Journalists, Civil rights lawyers and Critics were arrested and interrogated in connection with the 1990 Coup. Although most of these people were

released within few months of their detention, the sixty-nine military officers and men including Major Gideon Orkar were convicted by extra-judicial means and executed.<sup>180</sup> No doubt, however, the Orkar coup compelled General Babangida to respect and uphold the 'Federal Character' principle in order to allay fears of marginalisation expressed by some ethnic identities in the country.<sup>181</sup>

The manner the political transition programme was implemented reactivated the social forces inherent in the society. Political associations, civil groups and other associational and non-associational interest group in the Nigerian society cashed-in on the apparent expansion of democratic space to articulate their demands. But no sooner had these groups emerged than the Babangida administration clamped down or banned most of the patrons of these groups. The administration utilised selective inclusion and exclusion principles in manipulating the participation of members of the political class.<sup>182</sup> To be sure, the regime had total control over the transition process. It formed two political parties for the political class; built party offices in all the Wards; local governments and State capitals of the federation; funded party politics; influenced the election of party officers and enforced its prescribed political transition time table on the political actors.<sup>183</sup> Yet, in spite of the 'regimented' democratisation process being imposed on the political society and the civil society by the Babangida administration, the administration still encouraged its political education institutions (the Directorate of Social Mobilisation and Centre for Democratic Studies) to intensify their efforts at promoting awareness about and interest in the 'democratisation' process. Even though these institutions achieved modest success in popularising the Babangida transition



programme, the regime nullified the achievements of these institutions through its opposing agenda.<sup>184</sup>

Perhaps no other event in the life of the Babangida administration can depict clearly the disinterestedness of General Babangida in handing over power to elected civilian government, than the criminal annulment of the June 12 Presidential election. General Babangida had claimed that despite the presumed orderliness of the June 12 Presidential election and its legitimisation by the national and international election observer, it lacked electoral “perfection” which his administration envisioned.<sup>185</sup> Preceding the annulment of the June 12 Presidential election was the cancellation of the Presidential primaries in which 23 presidential aspirants had participated and contested. Although the cancellation of Presidential primaries did not attract much condemnation, it provided the basis for the eventual castigation of the regime after it had annulled the real presidential elections.<sup>186</sup>

The spate of reactions occasioned by the unpopular annulment of the presidential election was not anticipated by the Babangida administration. Turbulent protests and civil violence were provoked by the abrogation of June 12 election.<sup>187</sup> The struggle for the revalidation of the June 12 Presidential election soon led to a resurgence of ethnic tension, and consternation about possible political breakdown.<sup>188</sup> Open clashes between the Hausa – Fulani Muslims and their Yoruba Muslim counterparts were recorded during the struggle for the restoration of June 12, 1993 Presidential election verdict. Accordingly, the Yoruba Muslim Community and Chief Abiola, the presumed Winner of the annulled presidential election, accused Sultan Dasuki and the “Sokoto Caliphate” for being party

to the annulment, or refusing to fight for the restoration and actualization of Abiola's mandate.<sup>189</sup>

However, the initial steam of the struggle against the annulment, because of its intensity and spontaneity, shook the very foundation of General Babangida's administration. At least, the Nigerian Civil Society was unanimous in its condemnation of the regime's annulment of the June 12 presidential election, and in its struggle against the continuation of General Babangida in office.<sup>190</sup> From the time General Babangida cancelled the presidential elections on June 26, 1993 to the period he stepped aside from office on 26 August, the country witnessed widespread looting, burning and carnage, running through all the major cities across the country.<sup>191</sup> Of significance was the role played by the civil groups and Human Rights Organisations in the struggle for the restoration of the June 12 presidential election mandate.<sup>192</sup> Notable among the Human Rights Organisations in the struggle, were the Campaign for Democracy (CD); the Civil Liberties Organisation (CLO); the National Association of Democratic Lawyers, the Committee for the Defence of Human Rights (CDHR); and the Constitutional Rights Projects (CRP).<sup>193</sup> Other associational groups like the National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS) the Nigerian Bar Association, the Nigerian Union of Journalists, Women in Nigeria, and the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) were all openly opposed to Babangida's plan to perpetuate himself in power.<sup>194</sup> The National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG) proclaimed a strike action against the annulment of the elections. The traditional rulers in the Southwest prominent politicians across Nigeria and some elected SDP civilian Governors, openly backed the series of protest for the validation of June 12 mandate of Chief Abiola.<sup>195</sup> Even the National Association of Sea Dogs (the

Pirates Confraternity) called on Nigerians to resort to more civil disobedience if the annulment was not revisited by the Babangida administration.<sup>196</sup>

These domestic pro-democracy forces were given filip by the support they received from the international community. The international community was pained by Nigeria's apparent backsliding from the worldwide movement towards democracy.<sup>197</sup> Thus, following the annulment of the June 12 presidential elections, the United States reacted by suspending non-humanitarian assistance to Nigeria, thereby reducing the level of military personnel exchange between the two countries; reviewing all new applications for exports of defence articles and services to Nigeria; imposing restrictions on the issuance of American diplomatic visas to Nigerian officials and advising prospective American visitors to avoid Nigeria.<sup>198</sup> Britain, Canada and indeed the whole of the European Community reacted to the annulment saga by suspending all military aid and training programmes, and cancelling visas to Nigerian military personnel and their families.<sup>199</sup>

With the support of the international Community, the Nigerian Civil groups and the pro-democracy movements became more determined to either ensure the installation of the acclaimed winner of the annulled elections or at least disgrace the military regime of General Babangida out of office.<sup>200</sup> In accomplishing this objective, the pro-democracy groups expanded their outreaches and began mass mobilisation of the populace against the Babangida regime. Series of strike actions, protests and violent demonstrations were staged, with all the attendant implications for regime security and political stability. Julius Ihonvbere describes the socio-political and economic atmospherics of the country thus:

The country became paralysed as banks, Markets, Schools, and government offices were closed, while many streets in the major cities were deserted. Perhaps inevitably given the high rate of unemployment, thugs and other criminals infiltrated the protests and unleashed a range of crimes on their victims.<sup>201</sup>

The mood of the nation was particularly opposed to continued military rulership. Thus, the Nigerian people were resolved to put an end to the eight – year rule of General Babangida, and perhaps put in place a more people – oriented leadership, if democracy was unattainable. This resolve and determination of a greater number of Nigerians, coupled with the near-separatist sentiments in some quarters in the South, increased the ferocity of the struggle and interminable violence.<sup>202</sup> The fact was clear to all Nigerians that the end of Babangida's regime had come, as the regime was jittery, but unrepentant.

The regime took some nervy steps to calm the irate groups in civil society. These steps included among others, arrest of the most vocal leaders of the pro-democracy movements; closure of universities and media houses; tightening security around the country; increasing the co-optation of members of the political class into government; bribing the factions of the two political parties as well as the national assembly men and women, journalists, and social critics.<sup>203</sup> These methods did not succeed in dousing the flame of opposition, and consequently, General Babangida realised that he had to step down. Thus, exploiting the cracks in the two political parties SDP and NRC, Babangida proposed to the members of the political class the setting up of the Interim National Government (ING) with some participation from the parties. And as a result of the subsisting division within the SDP, the principled resistance of the Babangida administration

by the political class and insistence on the sanctity of the June 12 mandate of Chief Abiola was weakened.<sup>204</sup>

Invariably, the political class accepted the ING proposal which was sponsored by General Babangida. Consequently, General Babangida in his valedictory address to the nation on 26 August, 1993 announced the inauguration of a 32 – member ING, which was to be headed by Chief Ernest Shonekan, the former Head of the Transitional Council.<sup>205</sup> The ING subsequently was sworn-in, and began to function in opposition to the June 12 mandate of Abiola. Consequently, rather than stem the tide of agitation and violent protests across major cities in Nigeria, particularly in the South West, the ING was an object of stiff opposition and reproach. The ING found it extremely difficult to function, as some state governments refused to cooperate with it in the face of widespread protests and strikes with all its socio-economic and political implications.<sup>206</sup> It was clear to discerning observers of Nigeria's political scene that the ING would be short-lived. And when eventually General Sani Abacha on 17 November, 1993, struck the pro-democracy activists were expectant that he was going to restore and validate the electoral victory of Chief Abiola. But the initial reception accorded the Abacha regime was withdrawn, when on the second day General Abacha in a national broadcast dismantled all democratic structures and commenced another round of military imposed transition to democracy programme..<sup>207</sup> Overall, the political and socio-economic crises occasioned by the programmed democratisation of the Babangida years were some of the costs of establishing and sustaining as it were, the envisaged democratic order. In addition to the social costs were the countless number of people who lost their lives in the struggle for the restoration of democracy in Nigeria. And again, the book keepers have

observed that the transition to democracy of General Babangida cost Nigeria a conservative amount of N40 billion.<sup>208</sup> But the eventual annulment of the presidential elections and the concomitant crises among social groups in Nigeria and acute international sanctions imposed on Nigeria, really cost Nigeria and Nigerians even more. The Babangida self-styled democratisation programme claimed uniqueness in term of its utilisation of autochthonous ideas for constructing a democratic order for Nigeria, but it was also unique in its uncertainties and destructive outcomes.

#### 4.80. EXTERNALITIES IN THE TRANSITION POLITICS

It is very clear from the foregoing that the international community played important role in the origination and implementation of Nigeria's transition programme under president Babangida's regime. The regime was influenced by external forces, just as it was responsive to pressures within the civil society. As we pointed out in the preceding sections, the international community through the instrumentality of the International Financial Institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank succeeded in influencing the Babangida Administration to design a democratic transition programme. This was achieved through the decision of these International Financial Institutions (IFIS) to tie economic assistance to developing countries to certain political conditionalities.<sup>209</sup>

Pointedly, IFIS made it clear that no financial assistance would be extended to authoritarian regimes anywhere in the world. Thus, despite the fact that the Babangida Administration rejected the IMF loan and adopted instead the structural Adjustment Programme, it started immediately to implement all the conditionalities laid down by the IMF. Invariably, the government declared support for democracy and fundamental Human

Rights, perhaps in order to win the confidence and assistance of Western governments and Creditors.<sup>210</sup>

In addition to the pressures from the IFIS, the developed democracies such as USA, Britain, France, Canada, and Germany have continued to insist that the rest of the World become democratic. These developed democracies threw-up the issue of democratisation as a yardstick for aiding poor countries. In essence, it became mandatory for countries intending to receive loan or any economic assistance from the developed Western Countries to embrace democracy.<sup>211</sup> For instance, President Francois Mitterrand of France was quoted to have said sometimes in June 1990 that

It is clear that traditional aid will be more lukewarm towards regimes which behave in authoritarian manner without accepting the evolution towards democracy and it will be enthusiastic to those who take this step with courage and as far as possible for them.<sup>212</sup>

Similarly, the US Ambassador to Kenya pointed out in May 1990 that there was a strong tide flowing in the US congress favourable to the concentration of economic assistance on those nations that nourish democratic institutions, defend human rights and practice multi-party politics.<sup>213</sup> This position was similar to the stance of the Canadian Prime Minister.<sup>214</sup> And also in the same vein, the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Douglas Hurd indicated in 1992 that his country's assistance would be for "countries tending toward pluralism public accountability, respect for the rule of law, human rights and market principles. Also, the British Overseas Development Minister was reported to have said that ; "where human rights are systematically abused, or where aid is feeding corruption rather than mouths, we shall have no alternative but to cut it."<sup>215</sup>

It should be noted that fifty five percent of Britain's bilateral aid goes to Sub-Saharan Africa. Britain took the lead in cancelling the official aid debts of the Poorest African Countries. Fourteen of such countries benefited from British gesture which amounted to \$260 million.<sup>216</sup> This goes to show that the stipulation by Britain of a minimum standard of Political reforms as an essential criterium which must be met by African countries before they are eligible for consideration for British economic assistance was viewed by African leaders with seriousness. Thus, it was not surprising that most African countries including Nigeria began some form of Political reform. Indeed, Nigeria's democracy project of President Babangida was an attempt towards the attraction of foreign patronage and the promotion of the credibility of his government beyond the limited confines of the country. But quite apart from the series of external pressures on the Nigerian leadership to democratise, the international community played remarkable role at the crucial stages of the transition programme. Particularly of importance was the interest shown by the advanced democratic countries in the Nigerian transitional elections. International election observers from such countries as Britain, USA, Canada, France, and India were accredited by the National Electoral Commission to observe the elections. The international Community had more interest in the last phase of elections, the Presidential election, and that attracted increased participation of 138 international observers, who were subsequently accredited by the Centre for Democratic Studies.<sup>217</sup> the international observers came from Britain, United States, France, Denmark, Canada, India, Belgium china, Italy, Jamaica, Czechoslovakia, Australia, Netherlands and Philippines.<sup>218</sup>



On June 10, 1993, two days to the presidential election, a diplomatic row ensued between Nigeria and the United States. It all started when the Director of United States Information Service (USIS), Mr Mike O'Brien expressed the displeasure of his country with Justice Ikpeme's ruling which restrained the National Electoral Commission (NEC) from holding the Presidential election. In his reaction, Mr O'Brien said "we are awaiting the Federal Military Government's reaction to this court's decision. However, any postponement of the elections would cause grave concern to United States government" He added that the government of his country would not entertain any postponement of the presidential election.<sup>219</sup> Reacting to the statement made by the USIS Director, the Nigerian Government through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs raised strong objection to the statement which was denounced as 'a blatant interference in Nigeria's internal affairs.'<sup>220</sup> Accordingly, the Ministry argued further thus:

The transition programme as well as the operation of legal system in Nigeria are both internal which cannot be the subject of such uncalled statement by the Agency of a Foreign government in Nigeria.<sup>221</sup>

In this regard, the Nigerian government demanded the withdrawal within 72hrs of the Director of the United States Information Agency.<sup>222</sup> More reactions came from the Chairman of the National Electoral Commission, Prof H. Nwosu, and the Director General of the Centre for Democratic Studies, Prof Omo Omoruyi. In a six-paragraph statement, Professor Omoruyi condemned the unwarranted intrusion of the American Director of USIS in matters which were completely internal to Nigeria. The statement read further that :

Nigeria had reason to anticipate the likely action of the United States citizens so far accredited to observe the presidential election. This action by the United States government could be construed as a beginning of an interference in the political process.<sup>223</sup>

Consequently, the accreditation issued to eight American diplomats to observe the presidential election were withdrawn because as Omoruyi put it “the US citizens have not shown respect for the people’s culture and government of the country.”<sup>214</sup> It is noteworthy that some civil groups in Nigeria kicked against the expulsion of Mr O’Brien and the withdrawal of accreditation issued to eight American poll monitors. Prominent opposition to the government’s action came from the Campaign for Democracy (CD), and the National Association of Democratic Lawyers (NADL). These groups argued that the advice of USIS Director was not inconsistent with laws laid down for the transition programme, adding that the presidential election was no longer an internal affair.<sup>225</sup>

The role of the international community in Nigeria’s transition programme became more visible following indications that the June 12 presidential election results were likely to be annulled. The British Minister for Overseas Development Baroness Lynda Chalker expressed the displeasure of the British government at the delay in releasing the result of the presidential election. She described the conduct of the presidential election as orderly and peaceful, adding however that the delay in announcing the result was confusing.<sup>226</sup> In the same vein, Foreign diplomats in Nigeria who had taken part in election Monitoring and whose reports portrayed the Presidential election as peaceful and orderly could not see any reason or justification for the delay in the announcement of election

results. Thus, when eventually the election result was annulled by the Babangida Administration on the 23<sup>rd</sup> June 1993, the international Community swiftly reacted against the purported annulment of the June 12, Presidential election result. Britain and the United States were spontaneous in their reaction to the annulment episode. On June 24, 1993, the British government announced the suspension of all New Military Courses designed for Nigerian Armed Forces in the United Kingdom; and cancelled its assistance to the Nigerian National War College. Furthermore, the British government placed embargo on Entry visas for all members of the Nigerian Armed Forces, the National Guard and state Security.<sup>227</sup> Finally, all new aid previously earmarked for Nigeria were frozen by the British Government<sup>228</sup> The United States government in its reaction, stopped the \$450,000 US aid to Nigeria and expelled the Nigerian Military attachee to the US.

Furthermore, the United States cancelled all assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act except those offered on humanitarian grounds. Finally, the US government advised US citizens against visiting or travelling to Nigeria, while the American Ambassador to Nigeria, Mr William Lancy was urged to establish close contact with Chief MKO Abiola and Pro-democracy groups in Nigeria.<sup>229</sup>

In his reaction to the United States and Britain over the sanctions slammed on Nigeria, General Babangida said that the presidential election was not an exercise imposed on Nigerians by the international community or by some global policing of democracy. He asserted that the transition programme was an independent pursuit of the Nigerian government, in consonance with the country's National Interest. He particularly praised the patience and understanding of the French, German, Russian and Irish

governments and thereafter reeled-out the new transition agenda which was planned to terminate on August 27, 1993 and the subsequent inauguration of a civilian democratic government.<sup>230</sup>

The new transition agenda of the Babangida Administration was roundly condemned by United States, Britain and Canada. The United States imposed additional sanctions on the country. The United States Department of Transport suspended air services between Nigeria and the United States. Furthermore, the United States expressed its determination to review all new applications for export of defence articles and services to Nigeria. Also, the European Community imposed four sanctions on Nigeria. First was the suspension of cooperation in the military sphere. Second, was restriction on visas for members of the military and their families. Third, was the suspension of visits by members of the military, and fourth, suspension of any further cooperation.<sup>231</sup>

It is also remarkable that despite the intransigence of the Babangida Administration of June 12 presidential election result, Chief MKO Abiola the presumed winner of the election took his struggle for his mandate to the international community. Chief Abiola travelled to London, where he was a constant guest of British Broadcasting Service (BBC), CNN and Sky News. Indeed, he was widely reported by many British Newspapers. Thereafter, he was in the United States, and later in France, to sensitize the western democracies to the desirability of democratic struggle in Nigeria<sup>232</sup>

From the foregoing it is clear that although the Babangida Administration did not de-annul the presidential election results as demanded by the Nigerian civil society and the international community, but the Administration could not prolong its life span beyond the 27<sup>th</sup> August, 1993 – a date it fixed earlier for its exit. The inability of the

Babangida Administration to prolong its tenure was as a result of the potent pressure mounted on it by the international community and the Nigerian Civil Society.

Overall, it is an ineluctable fact that externalities influenced to a great extent the origination and implementation of the transition to civil rule programme of the Babangida Administration, as it was evident in the role played by the international financial institutions, international election observers and the advanced democracies.


#### 4.90 CONCLUDING REMARKS

The lesson of Babangida's transition programme is clear: that no democratisation programme pursued by a receding authoritarian leadership can translate into full-blown democracy without deep-rooted commitment to democracy on the part of the supervisors of the programme. Although democratisation by its very nature, where mass politics mixes with authoritarian elite politics in a volatile way, is conflict-prone, and at the extreme, war-prone,<sup>232</sup> the Babangida democratisation particularly threw up so many crises, perhaps as a result of the anti-democratic means the administration utilised in executing its democracy project. The anti-democratic measures introduced by the administration as we have shown, cast a slur on the sincerity of the administration to transit Nigeria to democracy.

In summary, this chapter has been devoted to the analyses of the main features of Babangida's democratisation programme, as they engendered conflicts and created insecurity for the corporate survival of Nigeria. Indeed, as we have pointed out, the multi-ethnic and plural characteristics of the Nigerian society were exploited by the Babangida

authoritarian leadership to divide the pro-democracy groups, and perpetuate himself in office. The resultant crises that followed the criminal cancellation of the 1993 presidential elections that would have led to his final exit from office, finally consumed President Babangida's ambition to retain power indefinitely.

In the next chapter, we shall treat the Chun-Roh Tae-Woo's democratisation programme in a more homogenous South Korea. with a view to assessing its security implications and the crises-ridden nature of democratisation in a more homogenous Korean society.



## ENDNOTES

1. For a detailed analysis of the fall of Nigeria's second Republic, See T. Falola and J. Ihonvbere, The Rise and Fall of Nigeria's Second Republic, (London; Zed Publishers 1985).
2. Tunji Olagunju, Adele Jinadu and Sam Oyovbaire, Transition to Democracy in Nigeria (1985 – 1993), (Ibadan, Spectrum Books Ltd & Safari Books, 1991) p.3 p.64' see also Israel Igwe, "The Military and Transition to Democratic Rule in Nigeria; A Comparative Assessment of the transition to Civil Rule under the Obasanjo and Babangida Regimes" in Omo Omoruyi, Dirk Berg-Schlosser, Adesina Sambo, and Ada Okwuosa, eds, Democratisation in Africa: Nigerian Perspective (Vol. One) (Abuja, Centre for Democratic Studies, 1994) pp.100 – 117.
3. Omo Omoruyi ; "Designing the Nigerian Transition programme" in Omo Omoruyi; et-al eds, Ibid, p.198; see also Adesina Sambo, "Transition to Democracy in Nigeria; Possibilities and Limitation" in Omo Omoruyi, et-al eds, Ibid, p.212.
4. Oyeleye Oyediran, "The Political Bureau" in Larry Diamond, A. Kirk-Greene and Oyeleye Oyediran, eds, Transition Without End, (Lagos, Vantage Press 1997) p.81.
- J. Bayo Adekanye, "The Military" in Larry Diamond, A Kirk Greene and Oyeleye Oyediran eds, Transition Without End, Ibid, p.55.
6. Oyeleye Oyediran, Op cit, p.81.
7. J. Bayo Adekanye, Op cit, p.56
8. Wale Segun Banjo, Nigeria: Political Violence in the Third Republic (Lagos Afreb Publishers, 1997), p13.
9. L. A. Jinadu, "The National Electoral Commission, elections and Transition Programme" in L. A. Jinadu and T. Edoh, (eds), The 1987 – 1988 Local Government Elections in Nigeria, Vol 1 Case Studies (Lagos: National Electoral Commission 1990, p.18)

10. Ibid., p.18
11. Omo Omoruyi, "Programmed Democratisation : Nigeria's Experience" Outline of a paper for the symposium on democratisation Processes in Comparative Perspective Hawaii, USA March 26 – 29, 1992 p1; see also Omo Omoruyi, "The challenges of Democratisation in Nigeria" Being the convocation Lecture delivered at the Lagos State University, Lagos, on 7<sup>th</sup> January , 1992.
12. Ibid, p7
13. Omo Omoruyi, "The challenges of Democratisation in Nigeria " Op.cit, pp. 7-9
14. Ibid
15. Ibid
16. Ibid
17. I. B. Babangida, "The Search for a New Political Order", in Portrait of a New Nigeria: Selected Speeches of IBB (Lagos, Precision Press, 1989).
18. Ibid, pp32-33
19. "Text of a Broadcast to the Nation on 3<sup>rd</sup> February, 1986 by the Chairman of the political Bureau, by Dr. S.J, Cookey" in Report of the Political Bureau, March 1987, (Abuja, the Directorate for Social Mobilisation, 1988).
20. Ibid; p255
21. Government's View and Comments on the Findings and Recommendation of the political Bureau, (1987, Abuja : the Directorate for Social Mobilisation MAMSER") pp110 – 111.
22. Ibid.



23. Richard L Sklar, "Crisis and Transitions in the Political History of independent Nigeria" in Paul A. Beckett and Crawford Young, eds, Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria, (Rochester, N.T. University of Rochester Press, 1997) p.31).
24. Ibid.
25. Tunji Olagunju, Adele Jinadu and Sam Oyovbaire, Transition to Democracy in Nigeria, op.cit p165.
26. Oyeleye Oyediran, "Transition without End; From Hope to Despair-Reflections of a participant – Observer" in Paul A, Beckett and Crawford Young eds, Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria; op.cit, pp179 – 80.
27. Decree No. 25 : Participation in politics and Elections (prohibition) Decree 1987" in Federal Republic of Nigeria; Selected Legislation Relating to the Political Transition Programme, Vol.1 (Legal Department, National Electoral Commission, 1990) p.24.
28. Ibid.
29. See "Decree No. 27: Transition to Civil Rule (Political Parties Registration and Activities) Decree 1989" in Ibid.
30. L. A. Jinadu, "Competitive Elections and the Multi-party system in Nigeria" in Omo Omoruyi, et.al (eds), Democratisation in Africa: Nigerian Perspective (Vol One ), Op.cit p.216.
31. Report of the political Bureau, op cit, p.131.
32. Government' Views and Comments on the finding and Recommendations of the Political Bureau, Op.cit pp57 – 58.
33. See Sections 219 – 226 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria Abuja, MAMSER 1989.
34. See Decree No.25 ; Participation in Politics and Elections (Prohibition) Decree 1987" The constitution stipulates that political associations seeking registration as political parties would have to

have the names and addresses of their national officers registered with the NEC; its membership must be open to all; its name, emblem and motto must not contain any ethnic and religious connotation or give it a geographical outlook; and its headquarters must be based in the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja.

35. See "Decree No.9 : Participation in Politics and Elections (Prohibition) (amendment) Decree 1989" in selected Legislation Relating to the political Transition Programme, Vol.1.
36. See "Decree No.25 : Participation in Politics and Elections (prohibition) Decree 1987"
37. See I. B. Babangida, "The Grass-Roots Democratic Party Systems and the Dawn of a New Socio-political Order" in For Their Tomorrow we Gave our Today: Selected Speeches of IBB, Vol.11 (Ibadan, London/Accra, Safari Books Ltd, 1991), pp.5 – 7.
38. Ibid.
39. Jibrin Ibrahim, "Obstacles to Democratisation in Nigeria" in Paul A Beckett and Crawford Young, eds, Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria, op.cit, p.166.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Oyeleye Oyediran and Adigun Agbaje, "Two Partyism and Democratic Transition in Nigeria" The journal of Modern African Studies Vol 29, No.2 June, 1991, pp223-225; for the list of the 49 Associations see Appendix 1.
43. Ibid.
44. Jibrin Ibrahim, op.cit, p167.
45. A.C. Nweke, "Monitoring of public Reactions to the National Electoral Commission's Report on Party Registration and the Armed Forces Ruling Council Decision on the Report in Kano State" Nigerian

Journal of Electoral and Political Behaviour, Vol. 1 No 1 September, 1990, pp36-37.

46. See Oyeleye Oyediran and Adigun Agbaje, op.cit. Also for the list of the 13 political Associations – refer to Appendix II.
47. See: National Electoral Commission, Report and Recommendations on Party Registration, September, 1989, p23; see also Babafemi Badejo, “Party formation and Competition” in Larry diamond, A. Kirk Greene, and Oyeleye Oyediran eds, Transition Without End (Ibadan, Vantage Publishers (int) Ltd, 1996 p.56. For the breakdown of performance of the 13 Political Associations as graded by the NEC, refer to Appendix III.
48. Richard Sklar, “Crisis and Transitions in the Political History of Independent Nigeria” Op.cit. p.32.
49. I.B. Babangida, “The Grassroots Democratic Party System and the Dawn of a New Socio-Political Order” op.cit,p24.
50. Ibid
51. Ibid, p20.
52. Uwazurike, P. Chudi, “Confronting potential Breakdown: The Nigerian Democratisation process in critical perspective” The Journal of Modern African Studies xxviii 1, (March, 1990 pp55 – 77; See also Oyeleye Oyediran and Adigun Agbaje, “Two-Partyism and Democratic Transition in Nigeria’ The Journal of Modern African Studies , xxix, 2 (June ) 1991, p213 – 35.  
Koehn, Peter, “Competitive Transition to Civilian Rule : Nigeria’s First and Second Experiments” The Journal of Modern African Studies, xxvii, 3, 1989 (September ) pp.401 – 30.
53. Tunji Olagunju, Adele Jinadu and Sam Oyovbaire, Transition to Democracy in Nigeria (1985 – 1993), op.cit, p.211.
54. I. B. Babangida “The Grassroots Democratic Party System...” op.cit p.4.

55. Ibid, p22.
56. Oyeleye Oyediran "Democratic Electoral Process: Can Nigerian Make it this time Around?" Nigerian Journal of Electoral and Political Behaviour, Vol 1 No. 1, September, 1990, p21.
57. The emblem of the NRC carried a green Eagle and white Flag, while that of the SDP was a white Horse and a green Flag. Both symbols were derived from Nigerian coat of Arms and the National Flag.
58. I.B. Babangida, "The Grass-roots Democratic System and the Dawn of a New Socio-political order" pp.18 – 19.
59. Ibid. The Federal Government gave the two political parties N539,980,656.20 in 1990 and in 1991, the two parties were given N200,000,000.00. See Tunji Olagunju, et.al, (eds), Transition to Democracy in Nigeria, op cit.
60. Report of the political Bureau; (Lagos; Federal Government Printer, 1987) p.203.
61. Ibid.p205.
62. Ibid. p221.
63. Ibid.
64. See Tunji Olagunju, Adele Jinadu and Sam Oyovbaire op.cit, p176.
65. See Adesina Sambo "Transition; Possibilities and Limitations" in Omo Omoruyi Dirk Berg-Schlosser, Adesina Sambo and Ada Okwuosa eds, Democratisation in Africa: Nigerian Perspectives (Vol. One ), op.cit, p.220.
66. Tunde Adeniran, "Beyond the transition: Possibilities and Limitations " in Omo Omoruyi, Ibid. pp.238 – 246.

67. See Olushola Magbadelo, "National Interest and the quest for Democracy in Nigeria: A Theoretical appraisal of Nigeria's Transition to Civil Rule Programme", in Omo Omoruyi, Ibid, pp56 - 59
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid.
70. See Claude Ake, "The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa" Keynote Address at the symposium on Democratic Transition in Africa, Organised by the Centre for Research, Documentation and University Exchange, University of Ibadan, 16 – 19 June, 1992.
71. Adesina Sambo, op.cit. p221.
72. Ibid. p.222
73. The Political actors still saw political contest for public office as a zero sum competition. And so, these actors deployed all available resources into the contest, with all the attendant desperation. Rigging, violence and other forms of electoral malpractices resurfaced during the transition period.
74. Yusuf Bangura, "Authoritarian Rule and Democracy in Africa: A Theoretical Discourse" in Peter Gibbon, Yusuf Bangura and Arve Ofstad eds, Authoritarianism, Democracy, and Adjustment. (Uppsala; The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1992) pp.68 – 72)
75. Ibid.
76. Ibrahim Jibrin "Obstacles to democratisation in Nigeria", op.cit., p.169.
77. Ibid.
78. Ibid.

79. S. T. Akindele, "Democracy and Imaginary Thinking in Nigeria: A Critical X-Ray of Issues and Facts" in Omo Omoruyi, et.al, eds, op.cit, p7.
80. Ibid.
81. Ibrahim Jibrin, op.cit, p169.
82. Ibid.
83. This description was attributed to the former civilian governor of Oyo State during the Second Republic, Chief Bola Ige, see The Guardian, Dec.12, 1992.
84. Ibrahim Jibrin, op.cit, p.171.
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid.
87. See Julius O. Ihonvbere, "Are things falling apart? The Military and the Crisis of Democratisation in Nigeria" The Journal of Modern African Studies, 34, 2 (1996) p.199.
88. Ibid. p.200
89. Ibid
90. Ibid
91. David Emelifeonwu, "1993: Crisis and Breakdown of Nigeria's Transition to Democracy" in Paul A. Beckett, and Crawford young, eds Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria, op.cit p.193.
92. Oyeleye Oyediran, "Transition without end; From Hope to Despair – Reflections of a Participant – Observer" in Paul A Beckett and Crawford Young eds, Ibid, p184.
93. Julius O. Ihonvbere, "Are Things Falling Apart? ... op.cit, p.200.

94. Oyeleye Oyediran, "Transition without End..." op.cit p.184.
95. Julius O Ihonvbere, and Olufemi Vaughan, "Nigerian; Democracy and Civil Society. The Nigerian Transition Programme, 1985 – 1993" in John Wiseman (ed) Democracy and Political Change in Sub-Saharan Africa (London, Routledge 1995), pp.71-91
96. See Tunji Olagunju, L.Adele Jinadu & Sam Oyovbaire, Transition to Democracy in Nigeria (1985 – 1993) op.cit p.71.
97. Ibid, p.72.
98. Bright Ekuerehare, "Second tier Foreign Exchange Market and Structure of industrial Growth in Nigeria" in R. Omotayo Olaniyan and Chibuzo N. Nwoke, (eds) Structural Adjustment Programme in Nigeria : The Impact of SFEM on the economy, p.50
99. Ibid.
100. Ibid.
101. Adebayo Oluyemi Kusa, "The Structural Adjustment Programme of the Nigerian State" in Adebayo O. Olukoshi, R. Omotayo Olaniyan and Femi Aribisala eds, Structural Adjustment Program in West Africa (Lagos Pumark Nig. Ltd & NIIA, 1994) p.80
102. Ibid.
103. Bright Ekuerehare, op.cit pp50-51 See also Mosley, Paul, "Policy-making without facts: A note on the Assessment of Structural Adjustment policies in Nigeria, 1985 – 1990 African Affairs, 1991 – 1992, p230.
104. Peter Lewis, "Politics and the Economy, A Downward spiral" in Paul A. Beckett and Crawford Young eds, Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria, op.cit p.303.
105. Adedayo Oluyemi Kusa, op.cit.

106. Issa Aremu, "The Structural Adjustment Programme and Nigerian Labour" in R. Omotayo Olaniyan and Chibuzo N. Nwoke eds, Structural Adjustment in Nigeria ... op.cit, p.145.
107. Ibid, p145.
108. Ibid, p145.
109. Paul Mosley, op cit, pp233 – 234
110. Issa Aremu, op.cit, p.147.
111. Ibid.
112. Ibid.
113. Ibid, pp.153 – 156.
114. Peter Lewis, op.cit, p.308
115. Ibrahim Jibrin, "The transition to civilian rule: Sapping Democracy" in Adebayo O. Olukoshi ed, The Politics of Structural Adjustment in Nigeria (London : James Currey, 1993), p.133.
116. Peter Lewis, "From prebendalism to Predation: The Political Economy of Decline in Nigeria" The Journal of Modern African Studies, 34, 1 (1996), p84.
117. Ibid, p85.
118. Ibid p.80.
119. Forrest Tom, Politics and Economic Development in Nigeria (Revised edition, Boulder: Westview, 1995), pp. 209 – 10.
120. Ibid.
121. Tunji Olagunju, & Adele Jinadu and Sam Oyovbaire, Transition to Democracy in Nigeria (1985 – 1993), op.cit, p.88.



122. Peter Lewis , “From Prebendalism to Predation...”, op.cit, p.86.
123. Julius O. Ihonvbere, “Economic Crisis, Structural Adjustment and Social Crisis in Nigeria” World Development, 21, 1, 1993, p146.
124. Ibid.
125. Peter Lewis, “Economic Statism, Private Capital and the Dilemmas of Accumulation in Nigeria” World Development, 22 (March), 1994, pp437 – 51.
126. Omo Omoruyi, “Western global Agenda; Democracy and the Free Market” Sonni Gwanle Tyoden (ed), Nigeria; Youth Agenda for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, Abuja, Yakubu Gowon Centre, 1995), p.102.
127. Peter Lewis, “Politics and the Economy : A Downward Spiral “ Op.cit, p.322.
128. J. Bayo Adekanye, “The Military in the Transition” in Larry Diamond, A Kirk-Greene, and Oyeleye Oyediran, eds, Transition without End op.cit p.45 ; see also Yusuf Bangura “Structural Adjustment and the political question” Review of African Political Economy Vol.37, December, 1986, pp. 24-37; Jeffrey Herbst, “The Structural Adjustment of Politics in Africa “ World Development, Vol.18 No.7 1990, pp.949 – 58.
129. J. Bayo Adekanye, Ibid.
130. See Stephen P. Riley, “political Adjustment or domestic pressure democratic politics and political choice in Africa” Third World Quarterly, Vol 13 no3 1992. 543-47.
131. Larry diamond, “Nigeria’s Search for a New Political Order” Journal of Democracy 2,2 (Spring 1991), p55.
132. Richard Joseph, Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic, (Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 1991) p.4.
133. Ibid.

134. Rotimi T. Suberu, "Federalism, Ethnicity and Regionalism in Nigeria" in Paul A. Beckett, and Crawford Young (eds) Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria, op.cit p342.
135. See Rotimi T. Suberu, "The travails of Federalism in Nigeria" Journal of Democracy 4,4 (October 1993), pp39-53.
136. Ibid, p48.
137. Rotimi T. Suberu, "Federalism, Ethnicity and Regionalism " op.cit p343.
138. Rotimi Suberu, "The Travails of Federalism in Nigeria", op.cit.
139. Adigun Agbaje, "Party Systems and Civil Society" in Paul A. Beckett and Crawford Young eds, Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria op.cit p.377
140. Ibid, p.378.
141. Ibid, p378.
142. Bratton M. and N. Van de Walle, "Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa" World Politics, 46 1994, pp.453 – 890; See also Forrest T. Politics and Economic Development in Nigeria (Boulder: Westview, 1995).
143. Nuhu Yaqub, "The Contribution of Labour to the Democratisation process in Nigeria" in Omo Omoruyi, Dirk Berg-Schosser, Adesina Sambo and Ada Okwuosa eds, Democratisation in Africa: Nigerian Perspectives, (Vol. Two ) Abuja, Centre for Democratic Studies, 1994), p.156.
144. Ibid.
145. Funmi Adewunmi, "Organised Labour and the Democratisation Process in Nigeria" in Omo Omoruyi et.al eds, Democratisation in Africa, Ibid, p.169.

146. Alex Gboyega “Local Institutions, Civil Society, and Democratisation” in Paul A. Beckett and Crawford Young (eds) Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria, op.cit pp.400.
147. Ibid, p401.
148. Abubakar Momoh, “Some Associational Groups and the Transition to Civil Rule in Nigeria” in Omo Omoruyi : Dirk Schlosser, Adesina Sambo and Ada Okwuosa, (eds) Democratisation in Africa: Nigerian Perspectives (Vol.Two) op.cit pp174 – 201.
149. Adebayo Olukoshi, “Associational Life” In Larry Diamond, A Kirk – Greene, and Oyeleye Oyediran, (eds), Op.cit, p.52.
150. Ibid.
151. J.Bayo Adekanye, “The Military in the Transition” in Larry Diamond, A Kirk Greene and Oyeleye Oyediran, (eds), Ibid p.52.
152. See Nicolas Van de Walle, “Political Liberation and Economic Policy Reform in Africa” World Development, Vol 11 No.4, 1994, p486.
153. Ibid, pp.486-487.
154. Chidi Amuta, Prince of the Niger: The Babangida Years (Lagos, Tanus Communication & Zomax Ltd, 1992) p.25.
155. Ibid, p.26.
156. Peter Lewis, “Politics and the Economy: A Downward Spiral” in Paul A Beckett and Crawford Young, (eds) Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria op.cit, p310.
157. Ibid.
158. Ibid, pp.322-323.
159. See Larry Diamond, A. Kirk-Greene and Oyeleye Oyediran, “Introduction : The Politics of Transition Without End”, in Larry

Diamond, A. Kirk Green and Oyeleye oyediran, (eds), Transition Without End op.cit, pxxii.

160. J. Bayo Adekanye, "The Military in the Transition", op.cit , p.34.
161. Ibid p.35.
162. Ibid.
163. Ibid, p.38.
164. Ibid, p.38.
165. Ibid, pp43-45 General Babangida allocated Five Hundred Million Naira (N500M) in 1992 to the Ministry of Defence for the purchase of Cars for Military officers mostly Majors and Captains and their equivalents in the Navy and Air force. By Jan 1993, Junior Ranks from warrant officers to Sergeants were reported to have had their own share of Babangida's motor donation in the form of motor cycles, while other ranks collected bicycles. Other security agencies including the Police also partook of this largesse.
166. Chidi Amuta, op.cit p24.
167. Ibid, p.31.
168. See Babafemi Badejo, "Party Formation and Competition" in Larry Diamond A. Kirk-Greene and Oyeleye Oyediran (eds) Transition Without End, op.cit, p186.
169. Larry Diamond, "Nigeria's perennial struggle," Journal of Democracy, II 4 (Fall 1991), pp.76-85.
170. Ibid, p78.
171. Richard I Sklar, "Crisis and Transitions in the Political history of independent Nigeria" op.cit, p.30. The assassination of the publisher and editor of the Newswatch, Mr. Dele Giwa, was linked to the Babangida Administration.

172. Reno Williams, "Old Brigades, Moneybags, Newbreeds, and the Ironies of Reform in Nigeria" Canadian Journal of African Studies, xxvii, 1, 1993, pp66-87.
173. Ibid, p76.
174. See Larry Diamond, A Kirk-Greene and Oyeleye Oyediran "Introducing : The politics of Transition without End" in Larry Diamond A. Kirk – Greene and Oyeleye Oyediran eds, Transition Without End op.cit, p.xxvii ; see also J. Bayo Adekanye, "The Military in the Transition" in Larry Diamond A. Kirk Greene, and Oyeleye Oyediran, (eds), ibid.
175. Ibid, pxxiii.
176. Julius O. Ihonvbere, "A Critical Evaluation of the Failed 1990 Coup in Nigeria" The Journal of Modern African Studies xxix, 4 (December 1991), pp.601-26.
177. Ibid p.617.
178. Ibid, p618 – 19.
179. Richard Sklar, op.cit, p.34.
180. Ibid.
181. Ibid.
182. Julius O Ihonvbere and Olufemi Vaughan, op.cit, p85.
183. Ibid, p86.
184. Bayo Adekanye "The Military and Grassroots Democracy." A paper presented at a National Conference of Grassroots Democracy in Nigeria, organised at Abeokuta by the Department of Political Science, Ogun State University, Ago-Iwoye, Ogun State Nigeria 23-25, July, 1990, pp.6-8.

185. E. Ike Udogu, "The Military, Civil Society and the Issue of Democratic Governance : Toward Nigeria's Fourth Republic", Journal of Developing Societies, Vol.xi 2, 1995 pp.206 – 220.
186. Ibid, p209.
187. See Peter Lewis "Endgame in Nigeria? The Politics of a Failed Democratic Transition " African Affairs, 93, July 1994: See also Larry Diamond, "Nigeria: The uncivil society and the Descent into Praetorianism " in Larry Diamond, J. Linz and S. M. Lipset, eds, Politics in Developing countries : Comparing Experiences with Democracy in Nigeria, op.cit, p.297.
188. Peter Lewis, "Politics and the Economy: A Downward Spiral...", op.cit p.315.
189. Sabo Bako, "Muslims, state, and the struggle for Democratic Transition in Nigeria: From Cooperation to conflict" in Paul A. Beckett and Crawford Young, eds Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria, op.cit, p.297.
190. Julius O Ihonvbere, "Are things falling Apart", The Military and the Crisis of Democratisation in Nigeria" The Journal of Modern African Studies, op.cit, p.201.
191. Ibid.
192. Wale Segun Banjo, Nigeria : Political Violence in The Third Republic, op.cit, pp13-14 See Also Orji Uzor Kalu, Nigerian Foreign Policy and the June 12 Crisis (Lagos, Adamawa Pub. Co Ltd, 1997), 14 million Nigerians voted during the 1993 Presidential election.
193. Wale Segun Banjo, Ibid, p14.
194. Julius O Ihonvbere, "Are Things Falling Apart... ?" op.cit, p202.
195. Ibid.
196. Ibid, p.203.

197. See Rotimi Suberu, "Crisis and Collapse : June – Nov. 1993" in Larry Diamond, A Kirk-Greene and Oyeleye Oyediran (eds) Transition Without End, op.cit, p.310.
198. Ibid, p311; see also West Africa, 5<sup>th</sup> July, 1993, p.1139 for full details.
199. Ibid, p311; see also Oyeleye Oyediran, "Transition without End; From Hope Despair – Reflections of a Participant Observer", op.cit, p.186.
200. Orji Uzor Kalu, op.cit, p.35.
201. Julius D. Ihonvbere, "Are things falling Apart...?", op.cit, pp.202-203.
202. See Ima Niboro "End Game? The Nation's long drawn out political crisis builds to a denouement" The African Guardian, Vol 9, No.24 (June 20), 1993.
203. Julius D. Ihonvbere, "Are things falling Apart...?", op.cit pp.203 – 204.
204. Ibid, p.204 The SDP had split into two faction; (I) those who believed that Abiola was Nigeria's president-elect and (ii) those who were against the June 12 mandate, mainly because they had been "settled" and/or belonged to the Shehu Yar Adua group.
205. Ibid.
206. See ibid, p.205.
207. Abraham Useh, "Return of the Military: Fear of Apocalypse", Tell, 13 September, 1993, p.6.
208. See "Tragedy: Abacha Sweeps off Democracy, 40 billion down the drain" in Tempo (Lagos) Special Edition, November, 1993. This estimate does not include the amount spent on the political actors to sway their stance in favour of the Babangida administration. National Assembly gulped N5 billion and N45 million was spent weekly on hotel accommodation of Legislators in Abuja, See Kunle Oyatomi,

- “National Assembly Gulps N5 billion ... spends N45 million weekly on Hotel Expenses” in Sunday vanguard (Lagos 24 October, 1993).
209. Kunle Amuwo, “The International (and Domestic) Context of Democratic Transition in Africa: Roadblock to democracy?” in B. Caron, A Gboyega, E. Osaghae, eds, Democratic Transition in Africa (Ibadan, CREDU, 1992), pp.67.
  210. Ibid.
  211. Ibid, p12.
  212. Ibid.
  213. Ibid.
  214. See West Africa, 28 October – 3 November 1991, pp 1798 – 1800.
  215. See Africa International (Paris) 241, September, 1991, p7 West Africa, 24 Feb – 1 March, 1992, p.337.
  216. Timothy Raison, “Britain, Europe and Africa” Public Lecture at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, 1990, p.13. Mr Raison was the former British Overseas Development Minister.
  217. The Guardian, April 28, 1993, pp.182.
  218. Ibid, p.2 Britain sent 24 observers, 8 from USA, 5 each from France and Denmark, 4 from Canada while 2 each from Australia, Netherlands and Phillipines and one each from India, Belgium, China, Italy Jamaica and Czechoslovakia.
  219. The African Guardian, June 21, 1993, pp 12-13
  220. Ibid.
  221. Ibid.
  222. Ibid.
  223. Daily Times, June 14, 1993 p.1
  224. Ibid, p.2.
  225. The Guardian, June 14, 1993, p40.
  226. The Guardian June 22, 1993, p.32.
  227. The Guardian, June 25, 1993, pp1-2.
  228. Ibid, p.2.
  229. Tell Magazine, July 5, 1993,p.16.
  230. Ibid.
  231. Newswatch, August 15, 1993.
  232. The Guardian, August 23, 1993, p.1.
  233. Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratisation and War” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No.3. May/June, 1995 pp.79-97.



## CHAPTER FIVE

### DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN SOUTH KOREA (1985 – 1988)

#### 5.1 INTRODUCTION:

##### 5.11 BACKGROUND TO DEMOCRATISATION IN SOUTH KOREA

What popularly is acknowledged today as “democratic transition” in South Korea under the leadership of President , Chun Doo Hwan and Roh-Tae-woo, can only be viewed meaningfully, as a consequence of multiple efforts by the Korean civil society over the years, since independence. The ascension of Roh Tae-Woo in June 1987 as the Presidential candidate for the ruling party marked the commencement of genuine efforts at democratizing South Korea by its leadership. But several other efforts at implanting democracy in the country predated 1987. The history of the struggle for democracy in the case of South Korea was an unbroken process. Yet, it is significant to note that the Regimes of General Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae-Woo read the signs of time partially well, and thus introduced a reform process, which eventually resulted in the origination and complication of civil agitation for more political liberalisation.<sup>1</sup>

However, a preview of the antecedents of Korea’s quest for democracy could be desirable in this introductory part of the chapter. This is necessary in order to put in perspective the spate of crises that accompanied the expansion of democratic space in Korea in 1987. When the history of the Korean people’s struggle against authoritarianism, and leadership failure is x-rayed, it would be clear why Koreans despite the advent of a more liberalized leadership in the late 1980’s were still apprehensive.

In this wise, it should be pointed out that in period preceding the emergence of democratic transition in June 1987, South Korea lacked the basic democratic experience, which would have made some influential impact on its prospects of democratizing. But the consolation was that South Korea was still believed by most scholars to be susceptible to the resultant effects of its fast – growing, affluent and industrializing economy, with its concomitant transformation of the middle class. It was also believed that the socioeconomic development of South Korea would lead to an increase in social pluralism, thereby promoting the vibrancy of its civil society.<sup>2</sup>

Although the Republic of Korea had a democratic constitution in 1948, sequel to the attainment of independence from Japanese rule, through the paternalistic supervision of the United States, but the operation of the constitution under the leadership of Sygman Rhee, was at variance with democratic norms and values. Thus, contrary to the expectations of Koreans that Sygman Rhee, being one of the founding fathers of independent Korea, would provide the necessary socio-economic and political atmospherics for the establishment and sustenance of democracy, he concentrated power in his hands and used every repressive means to intimidate political opponents.<sup>3</sup> President Rhee was however particularly careful not to introduce an openly authoritarian regime, as he allowed national elections to hold at regular intervals - even though these elections were ridden with irregularities.<sup>4</sup> And as the Rhee regimes continued with its repressive rule, the Koreans soon found an opportunity in the regime's mismanagement of the March, 1960 elections, and took to the streets

enmasse to protest against Rhee's continuation in office. Consequently, Syngman Rhee had to resign on April 26, 1960.<sup>5</sup>

The resignation of Rhee led to the ascension of an interim government of Ho Chong, who stirred the affairs of the state until elections were held and a new legitimate government of Chang Myon was inaugurated. But the lily-livered government of President Chang Myon was soon swept aside as a result of its inability to provide the desired revolutionary changes that the progressive intellectuals and students demanded. The progressive and the lower echelon of military officers who demanded a purge of the corrupt and incapable generals, and indeed the fundamental liquidation of the remnants of Rhee's regime, eventually discovered that the Chang Myon leadership was weak, and incapable of handling the resultant pressures from the various segments of the society. Economic difficulties such as high rate of unemployment, worsened the state of political and social disorder and finally led to the displacement of the Chang Myon government through a military coup masterminded by Major General Park Chung Hee in May, 1961.<sup>6</sup>

General Park's coup had no support of any social group or institution in the civil society, but it was borne out of the determination of a select group of military officers, who had confidence in their abilities to suppress disorder and create political order and achieve economic development.<sup>7</sup> But as a result of the fact that the civil society had no interest in supplanting a democratic system with a military regime, there was intense mass opposition to general Park's rule.<sup>8</sup> In addition to the local pressure against the new military leadership, the United States also persuaded General Park to

liberalize his hold on power.<sup>9</sup> Consequently, in 1963, General Park adopted a system of semi-authoritarian rule with some paraphernalia of democracy. But in all, the Third republic (1963 - 72) was authoritarian in content and practice. The most politically powerful positions in Park's government were held by former military officers.<sup>10</sup> Also, General Park created the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), which he used effectively to harass and repress the opposition. Moreover, the military was used often to restore domestic order, any time there was public protest against the regime.<sup>11</sup>

Although there were some democratic institutions in operation during the Third Republic, such as the National Assembly, political parties, Presidential and Assembly elections were held on regular basis, yet the authoritarian character and disposition of the Park regime remained the dominant feature.<sup>12</sup> Notably too, the regime, aside from the utilization of force for its maintenance, also concentrated on efforts aimed at popularizing its programmes with the citizenry. The regime's export-led, labour-intensive industrialization ensured rapid economic growth rate and rise in the living standard of virtually all social groups.<sup>13</sup> Thus, opposition against Park's regime was more political than economic. If anything, the Korean civil society was vibrant as a result of economic growth and growing industrialisation.<sup>14</sup> There were also manifest signs of regional rivalries among the regions. But what particularly mobilized broader opposition against Park's regime was the suspicion among the citizenry that President Park had a hidden agenda to perpetuate himself in office. Many Koreans kicked against the 1969 constitutional provision of third term for Park's Presidency.<sup>15</sup>

The rising spate of civil protests against President Park made him unpopular almost to the point of risking his presidential election victory, which he won narrowly in 1971. Park's victory marked however, the continuation of intensive agitation and protests against his regime. But in order to stem the tide of rising opposition, President Park introduced the Yushin constitution.<sup>16</sup> Thereafter, President Park established a more oppressive and repressive authoritarian rule. The National Assembly was dissolved and political activities were prohibited under the Yushin system. President Park used his newly acquired power to suppress the student and religious leaders, labour unionists, and opposition politicians.<sup>17</sup> Even more offensive to the Koreans was the operation of the Korea Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), as an instrument for the expansion of authoritarian control of Koreans by Park's regime within and without South Korea. The KCIA masterminded the kidnapping of a renowned opposition leader, Kim Dae-Jung from Japan.<sup>18</sup>

The formation of the National Alliance for Democracy (NAD) in July, 1978, as a platform for waging a consistent struggle against President Park's authoritarian rule was one of such efforts by the civil society to ensure the restoration of democratic order in Korea. Several other groups like National Alliance for Democracy and Unification (NADU), New Democratic Party (NDP); Unification Democratic Party (UDP) etc, provided real institutionalized opposition to President Park's authoritarian leadership.<sup>19</sup> Consequently, the spate of protests created two divergent groups within the ruling coalitions - the hard-liners and softliners. The ensuing disintegration of the ruling coalitions was a harbinger of the imminent fall of Park's regime. And on the 26<sup>th</sup> October, 1979, President

Park was assassinated by Kim Chae-gyu, the Director of KCIA (and one of those who supported the idea that Yushin system be reformed).<sup>20</sup>

The assassination of President Park heightened expectation of Koreans about the prospects of the resurrection of democracy. But that expectation was short-lived as the military swiftly re-established its control over the state apparatus, after sweeping aside the interim civilian government headed by Choe Kyu-ha (former Prime Minister under General Park)<sup>21</sup>. The bloody military coup of December 12, 1979 led by General Chung Doo-Hwan, a former Head of the Defence Security Command (DSC) and the Joint Investigation Headquarters (JIH), was a victory for the hard-liners within the ruling coalitions of the erstwhile Park's regime.<sup>22</sup> But the pro-democracy groups which had thought the assassination of General Park would bring about genuine democratisation in Korea, were soon to discover the futility of their hope. The lack of organisation and co-operation among the multiple opposition forces in Korea, gave General Chun the Lee-way to dig in and consolidate himself in office. And on August, 27, 1980, Gen Chun became the new President in accordance with the Yushin constitution, and thereafter drafted a new constitution by September 29, 1980. Also in February 25, 1981, President Chun was re-elected in consonance with the constitution of the Fifth Republic, and on March 3, 1981, he was inaugurated as the 12<sup>th</sup> President.<sup>23</sup>

Although in the face of it, it appeared as if President Chun Doo Hwan was going to continue with the authoritarian rulership of the past, but the constellation of forces and the historicity of the struggle for the restoration of democratic rule in Korea compelled him to adopt a more liberal approach to rulership. And it was during president Chun Doo Hwan's regime that the opposition forces became resolute in their struggle for the restoration of

democratic rule in Korea. Yet, Chun's government was authoritarian because the military still remained a dominant institution in politics. Chun's regime was anti-Communist and developmentalist, as well as security-conscious.<sup>24</sup> And with all the efforts of the regime to popularize its programme, its origin and military background whittled down the modicum of legitimacy it enjoyed over the years. Furthermore, Chun's regime inherited the hostility and antagonism directed toward General Park's regime<sup>25</sup> But it was during Chun's regime that the popular struggle for democracy received a great leap, despite the government's repressive measures.

#### 5.20 TRANSITION POLITICS: FROM CHUN DOO HWAN TO ROH TAE-WOO 1985 - 1988

President Chun Doo-Hwan's deliberate effort at liberalizing his hold on power and promoting democratization was a consequence of economic stability.<sup>26</sup> The political restructuring that ensued affected the whole facet of the society (workers, students, politicians and the press ) as the civil society became more assertive but less violent.<sup>27</sup> It was as if the government of President Chun had realised that the brutalisation of civil protest was injurious to political stability. Thus, rather than indulge in such repressive act of quelling public protest and the ever-mounting agitation from the opposition forces, President Chun chose to give ideological education to the populace, and often separated the radical students from the moderate factions of the opposition.<sup>28</sup>

As the Chun government concentrated its efforts toward the expansion of democratic space within Korea, it continued to face more pressure for greater liberalisation from the technocrats, businessmen and the

emergent middle class.<sup>29</sup> In addition to the local advocacy for democratisation, the regime had to contend with the rising international demand for political liberalization in Korea. The Pope's visit to Korea in May, 1984, and the U.S. elections of the same year, contributed immensely to the reform process in South Korea. No doubt, Chun's political liberalization ensured the emergence of several civil groups which hitherto were driven underground, to participate in the reconstruction of opposition groups in the Korean civil society.<sup>30</sup> And with the influx of these new opposition groups into the civil society, there were more demands for democracy and social equity in accordance with the level of socio-economic development of Korea.<sup>31</sup>

#### **5.21. 1985 NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTION**

Prelude to the conduct of the 1985 National Assembly election, the Chun Doo Hwan government lifted the ban hitherto placed on some dissident politicians and former ruling party officials. Although the Korean civil society began to show some interest in the unfolding political transition to democracy, the opposition forces were divided on whether or not to participate actively in the National Assembly election. Those who urged a boycott of the election, reasoned that the participation of the opposition forces would give an unmerited legitimacy to the authoritarian regime. Election under authoritarian regime was viewed, therefore, as a mere ritual or pseudo-democratic facade because it would not offer any fundamental power change, but more likely to stabilize or perpetuate military dictatorship.<sup>32</sup>

On the other side of the divide were those who favoured the active participation of the opposition in the National Assembly election, and



indeed all transitional elections. This group had the conviction that the involvement of the opposition forces would open public space and enhance the mobilization and organisation of popular masses for democratization, thereby exposing the dictatorial nature of the regime to the public<sup>33</sup> But in the long-run, those who had hitherto championed the advocacy for boycotting the National Assembly election agreed to participate on the strength of the argument that the opposition could utilize the electoral space to advance the democratic struggle.<sup>34</sup>

The 12<sup>th</sup> National Assembly election which held on the 12<sup>th</sup> of February, 1985 was peaceful. The election was significant to both the ruling forces and the opposition groups. In the case of the ruling party, it was the first election meant to assess its popularity since the emergence of the Chun administration. And for the opposition groups, the election afforded them an opportunity to reorganize and reinvigorate their efforts towards displaying the fragility and unpopularity of the Chun regime.<sup>35</sup>

Notably, opposition politics picked up tremendously during the electioneering period, as a result of the active participation of two prominent opposition leaders - Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae-Jung. These leaders founded an independent political party known as "New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP) on January 18, 1985. This party charged itself with the responsibility of terminating military rule, and fighting for the introduction of the direct presidential election system, and the achievement of national unification.<sup>36</sup>

Although the NKDP arrived late on the political arena, as a political force - some three weeks to the conduct of the National Assembly election - it was still able to garner meaningful following and popular support. The NKDP whipped up sentiments by appealing to anti-government feelings of

the Korean people, particularly on such issues as the living conditions of the workers, farmers and the urban poor. The NKDP enlightened the Koreans about the unholy accord between the government and big business entities. The NKDP portrayed itself in the public eye, as an independent political party, unlike the other political parties (DKP, DJP, and KNP).<sup>37</sup>

In the struggle to put an end to authoritarian leadership in Korea, through the instrumentality of electioneering politics, the students played significant role, in giving necessary strategic and functional support to the opposition forces. The students, democratic movements and labour activists helped the NKDP in managing its campaigns, and monitoring (as poll-watchers) during the National Assembly election.<sup>38</sup>

The ruling party (DJP) had expected the 1985 National Assembly election to consolidate and institutionalize its hold on power. To achieve this objective, the DJP attempted to improve upon its 1981 electoral performance by pumping more financial and organizational resources into its electioneering efforts. The ruling party was particularly confident because the country's economy, and relations with the U.S. and Japan were favourable.<sup>39</sup>

Although the ruling party (DJP) won more seats than other political parties at the National Assembly election as shown in Table 1 below, the performance of the DJP was not as impressive as it had thought would be the case. The percentage of votes it obtained decreased from 35.6 percent in the 11<sup>th</sup> National Assembly election to 35.3 percent in the 12<sup>th</sup> National Assembly election. Also the DJP had only 148 seats of the 276, despite the utilization of proportional representative system, while the NKDP won 67 seats with 29.3 percent votes.<sup>40</sup>

Table 5.1 The Results of 1985 National Assembly

PARTY	VOTES%	SHARE OF SEATS TO				
		DISTRICT	PR	TOTAL	DISTRICT	TOTAL
DJP	35.3	87	61	148	47.3	53.6
NKDP	29.3	50	17	67	27.2	24.3
DKP	19.7	26	9	35	14.1	12.7
KNP	9.2	15	5	20	8.2	7.2
OTHER	6.5	6	0	6	3.2	2.2
TOTAL	100	184	92	276	100	100

**Source:** Koh, B.C (1985) "The parliamentary election in South Korea", *Asian Survey*, 25 (9), p.889

NOTE: DJP - Democratic Justice Party; NKDP - New Korea Democratic Party  
DKP - Democratic Korea Party; KNP - Korea Nationalist Party

Table 5.2 The election Returns of Five Largest Cities

	PROPORTION OF VOTERS (%)			NUMBER OF SEATS WON (%)		
	DJP	NKDP	OTHER	DJP	NKDP	OTHER
Seoul	27.3	43.3	29.4	13	14	1
Pusan	28.0	37.0	35.0	3	6	3
Taegu	28.3	29.8	41.9	2	2	2
Inchon	37.3	37.4	25.5	2	2	0
Kwangju	29.1	45.4	25.2	2	2	0
Total	28.4	40.2	31.4	22	26	6
Nation as whole	35.3	29.3	35.4	87	52	7

**Source:** Koh, B.C (1985) "The parliamentary election in South Korea", *Asian Survey*, 25 (9), p.889

As it is revealed in table 5.2 above, the opposition party (NKDP) did comparatively better than the other political parties in these five major cities in Korea. In urban cities like Seoul, Pusan, Taegu, Inchon and Kwangju as shown in table 5.2. the votes received by NKDP far outstripped those of the ruling DJP by 12 percent. The strong performance of the NKDP in the larger cities was as a result of the enthusiastic support of the urban middle class and workers who were fully mobilized and conscientized to

appreciate the necessity of waging a consistent struggle for the democratization of the authoritarian regime.<sup>41</sup> Furthermore, the opposition forces concentrated their efforts on the major cities, instead of spreading their outreaches to the rural areas.<sup>42</sup> Even though the NKDP did not record overall victory at the National Assembly polls, its performance in the cities transformed it to a frontline opposition party, which enjoyed tremendous goodwill among Koreans. Consequently, many DKP and KNP members defected to the NKDP, thereby increasing its 67 seats to 102 seats in NKDP, and gave it the right to convene the assembly, and veto the passage of any proposal by the ruling party for constitutional revision.<sup>43</sup>

The emergence of the NKDP and its formidable posturing marked the beginning of intense pressure of the opposition forces in the civil society on the Chun regime. The NKDP under the leadership of the most respected and resolute opposition party leaders - Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae-Jung provided immense impetus for democratic struggle in South Korea.<sup>44</sup>

## 5.22 INCREASED OPPOSITIONAL AGITATION

Sequel to the conclusion of the National Assembly election, the opposition forces began to fight for constitutional revision. Particularly of concern to the opposition forces was their campaign for the introduction of direct presidential election system, to replace the indirect presidential election system - which the ruling party over the years had utilized to its advantage. The NKDP had attempted to influence the Chun regime through institutional means to adopt the direct presidential election system, without success. Consequently, the NKDP resorted to extra-parliamentary means in its drive for constitutional revision. This new

effort by the NKDP gave rise to some collaborative initiative between institutional and extra - institutional opposition forces in the civil society.<sup>45</sup> Eventually, the NKDP joined forces with so many extra - institutional opposition groups to form the National Liaison Organisation for Democracy (NLOD).<sup>46</sup>

No sooner had the NLOD emerged on the political scene than the country began to witness spate of crises and mass protests against authoritarian rule. In the spring of 1986, the NKDP, the NLOD and the student movement held a series of mass rallies in Seoul, Pusan, Kwangju, Taegu, Inchon, Masan, Taejun and Chonju. These rallies were organised to canvass for constitutional revision and mobilize grassroots support for political change.<sup>47</sup> In all, across these cities, no less than 500,000 people participated in the rallies. The table below indicates the number of participants at each of the rallies across the major cities in Korea.

Table 5.3 PARTICIPANTS AT THE NKDP'S RALLIES

DAY	PLACE	NO OF PARTICIPANTS
March 11, 1986	Seoul	2,000
March 23, 1986	Pusan	30,000 - 50,000
March 30, 1986	Kwangju	200,000 - 300,000
April 5, 1986	Taegu	50,000 - 70,000
April 5, 1986	Taejum	50,000 - 70,000
Ma 3, 1986	Inchon	30,000 - 70,000
May 10, 1986	Masan	30,000 - 50,000
May 31, 1986	Chonju	50,000 - 70,000

*Source: Kisanyon (1986), Constitutional Revision and the Democratization (Seoul, Minjungsa), p.43)*

The widespread nature of protest marches and rallies, mounted immense pressure on the Chun government. The international community also lent its support to the Korean civil society in its struggle to ensure

constitutional revision. These internal and external pressures on the Chun regime forced the regime to compromise with the opposition forces. And subsequently, on June 24, 1986, the regime instituted a special Constitution Revision Committee - a body charged with the task of producing a new draft of the constitution before the National Assembly ended its session.<sup>48</sup> But the committee could not achieve much, because of the differences between the ruling party's preference for indirect parliamentary election system and the opposition parties' demand for direct presidential election system.<sup>49</sup>

It is noteworthy to point out that the opposition groups and NKDP in particular, wanted direct presidential election system, because it would serve their interest better. The opposition groups were emboldened by their experience in waging anti-government struggles, and had an unshakable faith in their ability to mobilize mass support, for electoral victory.<sup>50</sup> This concern of the NKDP for constitutional revision marked out the party as a moderate opposition group, which believed in the sanctity of electoral process and had a fervent faith in the possibility of political change through institutional means. But there were some radical factions of the opposition forces in the civil society which demanded fundamental change in Korean society. These radical elements were hitherto suppressed by the authoritarian leadership of Park Chung Hee. The resurgence of these radical groups was a consequence of the seemingly liberal posture of the Chun regime.<sup>51</sup> These radical elements were not totally satisfied with liberalism, which they felt was inadequate as a solution to the Korean political and socioeconomic problems.<sup>52</sup> Invariably, the radical elements believed that the right type of action for the democratic movement would be to begin an anti-imperialist and anti-fascist revolution. These radical

elements condemned the United States government for extending support to the authoritarian leadership in South Korea. The radical activists described the United States as being opportunistic in its support for stability in South Korea, and the maintenance of its hegemony in world politics (including its concern for the sanctity of collective security in North-East Asia).<sup>53</sup>

The activities of the radical factions of the opposition forces were evidently contrary to the peaceful approach which the NKDP had strongly stood for over the years. The radical factions denounced the leadership of the NKDP as “defacto collaborators with the Chun regime”.<sup>54</sup> This visible crack within the opposition forces soon gave rise to the expansion of public protest with revolutionary undertone. The radical elements became highly mobilized and were readily available to utilize any opportunity for expressing their disenchantment with the Chun regime. The May 3, 1986 Inchon rally, which originally was organized by the NKDP was hijacked by the radical activists, who used the occasion to instigate the workers and students against military dictatorship, American interest, and the moderate NKDP.<sup>55</sup> The hitherto peaceful rally turned violent as the riot Police found it difficult to maintain order. And as a result of the ever-rising state of insecurity caused by the frequent violent demonstrations, the Chun government reverted to the use of the military to suppress the opposition forces which were clamouring for constitutional revision.<sup>56</sup>

### **5.32. STALEMATE, CRISES AND DIVISION OF THE OPPOSITION**

The NKDP as an opposition political party still continued its struggle for constitutional revision despite the antagonistic opposition of its approach by the radical factions. On 29<sup>th</sup> November, 1986, the NKDP attempted

unsuccessfully to hold a rally in Seoul, essentially for mobilizing support for constitutional revision. The rally did not hold because the police prevented it.<sup>57</sup> The open opposition of the Chun government to public rallies spurred some members of the NKDP to reconsider the party's strategies for promoting democratisation and effecting constitutional revision. And on December 24, 1986, Yi Min-u, the President of the NKDP proposed a "seven point democratisation demand." The highlight of the demand were as follows: Freedom of Press and Freedom of Speech (with the abrogation of the basic law on the Press); guarantee of people's full basic rights; political neutrality of government officials; release of prisoners of conscience and restoration of local autonomy; and fair election laws.<sup>58</sup>

This proposal by the President of NKDP was not approved by two other frontline leaders of the party - Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae - Jung. The proposal marked the beginning of strong internal squabbling within the NKDP. There were schemes and maneuvers to impeach the President and replace him with Kim Young Sam. But on April 8, 1987, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung founded a new opposition party, known as Reunification Democratic Party (RDP). This new party was bent on removing all the obstacles to democratization, particularly those within the opposition party. It is remarkable that the efforts of Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung received the support of seventy three out of 92 National Assembly members.<sup>59</sup>

The moderate proposal of the NKDP's president was welcomed by the Chun government and the government of the US. The proposal strengthened the hardliners in the ruling forces, and gave them the justification for prolonging the process of transition. The eventual



suspension of the debate on constitutional revision by the Chun government was consequential upon the seeming withdrawal of the opposition forces from the path of confrontational struggle for democracy, as was evident in Yi Min-u's proposal. The April 13, 1987 declaration by President Chun Doo Hwan, which banned further discussion of the constitutional revision, was sequel to the increasing popular criticism of his regime over the handling of Park Chong-Chol's case - a student who was arrested and tortured to death by the Police.<sup>60</sup> However, Chun's government justified the suspension of the constitutional revision debates, on the grounds that it was necessary to put an end to the uncertainty and instability that characterized the debates, and provide a conducive climate for the peaceful change of government and the hosting of 1988 Seoul Olympics.<sup>61</sup>

No doubt, President Chun's expectation that the suspension of constitutional debates would douse the flame of agitation and create basis for political stability was not well - founded. Chun's pronouncement on April 13, 1987 provoked violent protests against his regime. The opposition to the Chun regime was massive, encompassing all the diverse interest groups in the Korean civil society. Roman Catholic Ministers, priests and nuns went on hunger strike to register their displeasure with President Chun, over the suspension of constitutional debates. Also professionals, intellectuals, artists, and literary men condemned President Chun's action, while the students staged violent anti-government demonstrations, which in turn led to violent clashes between the students and riot police.<sup>62</sup>

In order to stem the tide of violent demonstrations, the Chun government attempted again to divide the new opposition party - the

Reunification Democratic Party (RDP) founded by Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae-Jung. The government sponsored thugs to harass and intimidate participants at the RDP's rallies. But the more the government harassed and assaulted the members of the opposition, the more cohesive and determined the opposition became. And on May 27, 1987, the National Coalition for a Democratic constitution (NCDC) was formed by the opposition forces, to mount consistent pressure on the Chun government for democratisation.<sup>63</sup> The eventual reshuffling of the cabinet by president Chun, never really appeased the opposition, as they continued to demand for complete democratization and the revocation of the April 13<sup>th</sup> 1987 declaration. Yet, the ruling forces went ahead with its alternative plans of nominating General Roh Tae-Woo at the party convention, as the next presidential candidate on June 10, 1987.<sup>64</sup>

#### **5.24 JUNE UNREST AND THE JUNE 29<sup>TH</sup> PRO-DEMOCRACY DECLARATION**

Since the April 13<sup>th</sup> declaration of President Chun, the opposition forces became highly aggrieved and resolute in their quest to terminate authoritarian rule in Korea. Several rallies and protests were held by the opposition forces, to register their disapproval of the Chun Government's action and to call for the restoration of democracy in Korea. On June 10, 1987, the National Coalition for Democratic Constitution (NCDC) mobilized the populace, drawn from the different strata of the Korean society, to demonstrate against the cover-up of the torture death of Park Chong-Chol, and to demand for the annulment of Chun's April 13<sup>th</sup>, Declaration.<sup>65</sup>

The June 10 uprising was particularly different in its strategies and effects. It was the climax of all anti-government protests, and it was coming at a point in time when the Chun regime was less prepared for such expansive opposition. Some other reasons could be adduced for the mass involvement in the uprising. First, the people feared that in the absence of such mass revolt, the Chun's government would institutionalize or consolidate military rule. Second, there was a pent-up anger over President Chun's scuttling of the constitutional debate and human rights violations. Third, the growing knowledge of the public about the blatant corruption cases involving Chun's family and high-ranking officials of the regime. Fourth, the formation of an all encompassing opposition organisation, to articulate the interest of the people as it relates to the implantation of democracy in Korea. Fifth and finally, the adoption and use of such mass appealing catch phrases as "End to Military dictatorship; "abolition of the Chun's constitution" restoration of democracy now" etc.<sup>66</sup>

Government's effort to quell the raging fire of public demonstration through the drafting of 60,000 riot police did not avail much. Even in most areas, the masses overwhelmed the security operative. The demonstration in Pusan on June 18, 1987, was so pervasive, to the extent that the government was almost tempted to declare a state of emergency – a plan it did not implement eventually.<sup>67</sup>

The political turmoil that began on 10<sup>th</sup> June, 1987, the same day the Chairman of the ruling Democratic Justice Party, Roh Tae Woo was nominated at the party's convention, as the presidential candidate, was brought under control on the 29<sup>th</sup> June, 1987, sequel to Roh's pro-democracy declaration.<sup>68</sup> The declaration was unexpected by both the ruling forces and the opposition forces. It was an acceptance of the opposition's

demands' and it contained such provisions as: support for the speedy revision of the constitution; adoption of direct presidential election system; amnesty for Kim Dae-Jung and other political prisoners; maximum promotion and protection of basic rights, freedom of the press, local autonomy and self-governance of universities; guarantee of freedom of political parties, and bold social reforms against corruption and crime.<sup>69</sup> Indeed, Roh's declaration was a mark of victory for the opposition. The decision of Roh Tae-Woo to make pronouncement contrary to the expectation of its ruling party equally distinguished Roh as a softliner within the ruling forces, who deemed it a necessity to restore the country back to the path of democratic transition and put an end to the pervasive crises that had resulted from the April 13<sup>th</sup> declaration of President Chun.<sup>70</sup>

The June 29<sup>th</sup> declaration could be seen as a deliberate effort on the part of President Chun, and Roh Tae-Woo to bring the political crises under control by relinquishing the consuming interest for maintaining political power at all cost.<sup>71</sup> It appeared to most observers of Korean political scene, after the June 29 declaration, that president Chun had quietly relinquished power to Roh Tae-Woo, whose rising profile stood the ruling party in good stead.<sup>72</sup> Presidential candidate Roh Tae-Woo, through his June 29 declaration, reintroduced democratic agenda, and began to champion the realization of the transition process toward democracy. Thus, the seed of democracy that grew in the womb of the authoritarian regimes of Park and Chun Doo-Hwan blossomed under Roh Tae-Woo. And all of a sudden, Presidential candidate Roh Tae-Woo became a fearless harbinger of democracy in Korea.<sup>73</sup>

It is noteworthy however to point out that the June 29<sup>th</sup> declaration did not spell the end of agitation in Korea. It heightened the expectations

of the populace about the imminence of democratic order, and created a new awareness among Koreans that the struggle for democracy must be carried out to its logical end. The industrial workers were the first to react to the June 29 declaration. Thousands of workers actively participated in strikes to demand for improved working conditions, higher wages, and autonomy of labour unions. It is to be noted that no less than 3,200 workers' strikes or walkouts were held between July and September, 1987. And over 1 million workers participated in these strikes involving 10,306 new unions.<sup>74</sup>

With the recurrence of street demonstrations, the Chun government showed some moderation, and implored employers to heed the demands of their workers. Although the government was scared about the possibility of convergence between the labour movements and the opposition forces, it could not repress the growing labour agitation, because the regime feared that such action would undermine the chances of Roh Tae-Woo, the ruling party's presidential candidate in the upcoming presidential election.<sup>75</sup> Invariably, the middle class and the workers, who had contributed immensely to the restoration of political liberalization through their concerted and relentless struggle meticulously guided the transition process in order to prevent its derailment.<sup>76</sup> The leftist activists, though lacking substantial following, still served as watchdogs of the process from the sidelines.<sup>77</sup>

## 5.25 TRANSITIONAL ELECTIONS UNDER CHUN'S TRANSITION AND THE ASCENSION OF ROH TAE-WOO

### (i) Presidential Election:

The Presidential election of December 16, 1987 was one of the series of transitional elections, sequel to the restoration of political freedoms in South Korea. The outcome of transitional elections often reflect the nature and character of the transitional regime, the configuration of class structure, which would have developed during the authoritarian period and the capacity of the opposition before the regime is transformed.<sup>78</sup> In the case of the December 16, 1987 presidential election in Korea, it was supposed to be a contest between the opposition forces and the ruling party. But as events turned out, the opposition forces were not cohesive enough to give the ruling party's candidate, Roh Tae-Woo, frontal challenge during the presidential election.<sup>79</sup> Consequently, the new opposition RDP which was formed by Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae-Jung as an umbrella for institutionalized opposition against Chun's regime became divided between its two frontline founders. Kim Dae-Jung broke away from the RDP to form his own peace and Democracy Party (PDP).<sup>80</sup>

It is noteworthy that the Chun government had tried without success, to divide the opposition forces in periods preceding the eventual disintegration of the RDP. The final division of the RDP was consequent upon the regional and personal rivalries between Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae-Jung, as both were interested in contesting the presidential election of December 16, 1987. The electoral base of Kim Young-Sam was South Kyongsang province, while Kim Dae-Jung's electoral base was in the Cholla province. Also Kim Young-Sam drew his major support from

the middle class while Kim Dae-Jung's support was from manual workers and the urban poor.<sup>81</sup>

The presidential contest was between one government candidate, Roh Tae-Woo, and three opposition candidates-Kim Young Sam (RDP), Kim Dae-Jung (PDP), and Kim Chong-Pil (NDRP). Each of these candidates whipped up regional sentiments, and forcefully campaigned with the intent of establishing his advantage over others. Regional schisms and their accompanying skirmishes worked to the advantage of Roh Tae-Woo, who was seen by the electorate to possess the capability of maintaining political stability – which Koreans preferred to violent political change.<sup>82</sup> And it is remarkable that Roh Tae Woo promised to provide political stability and continued economic growth in a country, which had almost disintegrated after several years of authoritarian repression. The three opposition candidates promised the Korean electorate that they would terminate military dictatorship, and consolidate Korean democracy.<sup>83</sup>

Amidst violence and demonstrations across the country, the presidential election still held as scheduled on December 16, 1987. Roh Tae-Woo was elected as President with 36.6 percent of votes cast. Kim Young-Sam came second with 28.0 percent, and Kim Dae-Jung was third with 27.0 percent, Kim Chong-pil came fourth with less than 9.0 percent of votes cast. The results of the presidential election showed that had the opposition forces combined resources to support just one of the three candidates, Roh Tae-Woo, the government candidate, would not have won. Although, there were some allegations of electoral fraud, but a good number of Koreans accepted the validity of the election results. Also, the adoption of direct presidential election system did not create any

legitimacy problem for Roh Tae-Woo, unlike it was the case in previous presidential elections.<sup>85</sup>

No doubt, the successful conduct of the presidential election, and the approval of its outcome by the opposition forces in the Korean civil society marked the emergence of the sixth republic and the commencement of genuine efforts by Koreans to sustain the gains of their country's democratisation.

(ii) **PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION**

The first peaceful transfer of power from one leadership structure to another took place on February 25, 1988, sequel to the successful conduct of the presidential election on Dec. 16, 1987. The handing over of power to the newly, popularly elected President, Roh Tae-Woo by the outgoing authoritarian leader, President Chun Doo Hwan, was indeed a landmark event in Korean political history.<sup>86</sup>

After the installation of the new civilian democratic government of Roh Tae-Woo the stage was set for the parliamentary election billed for April 26, 1988. Toward the election, the ruling party (DJP), bargained with the PDP (an opposition party) on the prospect of reviewing the parliamentary election law. Notably, all the political parties had their separate and different strategies of modifying the parliamentary election law. But the DJP and PDP favoured a single-member, single district system in order to checkmate the chances of RDP, since that would guarantee the ruling party electoral victory in the parliamentary polls. Eventually, the adoption of the single - member, single district system easily gave the ruling party DJP more seats in the parliamentary election. The ruling party had 125 of the 299 seats in the National Assembly, the PDP



(Kim Dae-Jung's party) had 70 seats; Kim Young-Sam's RDP got 59 seats; Kim Chong-pil's NDRP won 35 seats, while 10 seats went to independents.<sup>87</sup>

It is also important to state that like the presidential election, the outcome of the parliamentary election was greatly influenced more by regional biases than other factors. Each of the political parties won seats within their native regions.<sup>88</sup> Furthermore, the timing and circumstances surrounding the April 26, 1988 parliamentary election made it difficult for the ruling party (DJP) to secure overwhelming predominance over the other parties. First, the association of the DJP with the erstwhile regime of President Chun Doo Hwan, worked to the disadvantage of the party, especially after scandal involving the Younger brother of the former President Chun, Chun Kyong-Hwan became public knowledge.<sup>89</sup> Secondly, the adoption of single-member district system which was promotive of regional politics, favoured the PDP, and NDRP which had strong regional bases, to the detriment of DJP.<sup>90</sup>

In all, the successful completion of transition formalities through the conduct of presidential and parliamentary elections provided great impetus for democratic consolidation in Korea.

### **5.30. FACTORS IN KOREAN DEMOCRATISATION:**

#### **5.30.1 SOCIOECONOMIC BACKGROUND**

The attainment of great economic height in Korea was during the regime of President Park Chung-Hee in the Third Republic. Particularly, between the 1960's and 1980's, Korea's growth rates were among the highest in the world. Remarkable advancement in the economic field transformed Korea from an underdeveloped, low-income country to one of

the developing newly industrializing countries (NICs) having a per capital income of close to \$3,000 in 1987.<sup>91</sup>

It is instructive to point out that Korea achieved “economic miracle” under authoritarian leaderships of the 1960’s through to the 1980’s. This achievement is explainable as a consequence of the emphasis placed on economic and industrial development programmes by successive Korean governments. The authoritarian leaderships pursued economic development programmes essentially, for the achievement of political legitimacy for their regimes. But ironically, economic development in Korea was at the expense of social and political development.<sup>92</sup>

Consequent upon the growing rate of economic advancement and industrialization, the standard of living of Koreans heightens, and they became aware of their weak political status and the authoritarian character of their political system. The Koreans were aggrieved by their lack of political freedom to participate en masse in the construction of the leadership structure of their country. As a matter of fact, Koreans were not persuaded by such trite argument that economic development must naturally precede political development. If anything, Korean economic success undermined the modicum of legitimacy accruing to authoritarian regimes, and made stupid the contention in some quarters that democratisation in Korea should be delayed until the economy had attained full-blown development.<sup>93</sup>

Moreover, economic development brought about increased social fragmentation and pluralism. The authoritarian leadership found it difficult to maintain its hold on the society, as a result of the growing assertiveness of the Korean civil society and vigorous anti-government activities of workers, students and intellectuals.<sup>94</sup> Related to the assertiveness of Korean civil society was the phenomenal expansion of mass education.

And the more the people became educated, the more they possessed democratic consciousness. This partly explains why Korean students played such a prominent role in the struggle for democracy in Korea.<sup>95</sup>

The development of mass media organisations in Korea was consequent upon the development of modern science and technology, the promotion of education generally, and indeed, increased economic growth. Even though successive authoritarian governments in Korea attempted to suppress the media, but the mass media still contributed immensely to democratisation in Korea.<sup>96</sup>

### 5.30.2 **THE KOREAN SOCIETY AND DEMOCRATIC STRUGGLE**

As we have indicated in Chapter 3, and the preceding sections of this Chapter, the Korean civil society became highly activated by improvement in the socio-economic conditions of Koreans. Industrialization and all its attendant impacts on the Korean society, transformed the attitudinal and behavioral orientations of Koreans, consequent upon the expansion of mass education and Mass Media communication Network.<sup>97</sup> Rapid industrialization of Korea, particularly from the 1960's through to the 1970's brought enormous change in class composition, and the middle and working class grew significantly. The urban centres experienced noticeable expansion of social classes, and with this development, opposition against authoritarian rule was pronounced in urban centres.<sup>98</sup>

Political opposition against authoritarian rule which hitherto was consigned to the student populace took a new turn in the 1980s, as the democratisation movement penetrated the Korean civil society through the involvement of diverse groups of citizens. Specifically, as from the 1980's

during the Chun regime, diverse groups within the civil society organised themselves against the regime.<sup>99</sup> The democratisation movements encompassing students, labourers, farmers, religious leaders and the opposition political parties fought relentlessly for political change.<sup>100</sup> Even though these groups of opposition activists in periods of authoritarian rulership in Korea were ideologically different, they were unanimous in their advocacy for democracy.

### 5.30.3 STUDENTS' MOVEMENTS

The students since Korea's attainment of independence from Japanese rule in 1945 have always championed opposition against successive authoritarian regimes. They were particularly responsible for the demise of Syngman Rhee's regime in 1960, and the popularization of mass struggle for democracy in 1987.<sup>101</sup> Although the Chun regime of the Fifth Republic instituted strong repressive measures against the students, the students were strong in their conviction to continue the struggle for democracy, in spite of their very temporary withdrawal. The students' collaborative struggle for democracy was actualized through the establishment of the National Federation of Students' Association (NFSA), which represented sixty-two universities and Colleges in South Korea.<sup>102</sup> The NFSA subsequently initiated the formation of Labour – Student Solidarity committee and the coalition of political opposition forces and social movement forces.<sup>103</sup> In 1987, the number of on – campus demonstrations rose to 4,568 from 1,743 and the participants of on-campus demonstrations rose from 405, 190 (in 1986) to 1,317, 256 in 1987.<sup>104</sup> Also, the number of off-campus demonstrations rose from 258 in 1986 to

3,063 in 1987, while the number of participants of off-campus demonstrations increased from 52, 182 in 1986 to 1,013, 543 in 1987.<sup>105</sup>

Overall, it is remarkable that the students determined the tempo and character of Korean democratisation, especially in 1987, when they set agenda for the emerging democratic forces. Such issues that made impressions on the political opposition forces included amongst others, reunification, democratisation, economic equality and justice.

#### 5.30.4 LABOUR MOVEMENT

The Labour Unions worked harmoniously against authoritarian rule since the 1960's and throughout the struggle period for democracy with other groups in the civil society. The existence of cooperation between the grassroots labour groups and the democratic struggle in the larger society actually strengthened the pro-democracy groups in the society.<sup>106</sup>

It is significant to note that even in the face of authoritarian high-handedness the Labour Movement did register its disdain for authoritarian rule. Particularly in the 1980's and indeed throughout the tenure of Chun Doo-Hwan as President of the fifth Republic, a variety of social forces played important roles in effecting political change in South Korea. The component of the social forces in the struggle included the militant industrial workers, reform-minded White-collar Workers, intellectuals (including students, and traders).<sup>107</sup> With these classifications, the workers constituted a critical segment of Korean civil society. The success of export-led industrialization impacted greatly on South Korean Working class. The suspension of all collective bargaining and the ban on organised labour protest and prevention of the formation of independent labour unions

were some of the measures enforced by the Chun regime to incapacitate the labour movement.<sup>108</sup>

The more the Chun regime attempted to silence the opposition forces, the more offensive the opposition forces became. The government's repressive measures only succeeded in dousing the flame of public protest temporarily, while in the long-run, the workers bounced back and unleashed a wave of strikes against the Chun government in 1987. The workers embarked upon work stoppages and often joined in numerous demonstrations to support students' call for more democratic reforms and Korean reunification. The workers demanded for wage increases, better working conditions and restoration of collective bargaining rights and guarantees. Beyond the fight for worker's right, the labour movement did everything to promote the democratisation process which engulfed South Korea in the late 1980's.<sup>109</sup>

The industrial workers waged a relentless struggle for three months consecutively after the June 29, 1987 Declaration. During this period, no less than 4,000 strikes at 3,341 workplaces with the participation of almost 1.3 million workers took place, to demand organisation of labour unions, increased wages, and workplace democracy. Also, during this period of apparent political liberalization, about 1,200 new Labour Unions were formed.<sup>110</sup>

#### 5.30.5 THE FARMERS' MOVEMENT

The farmers were disadvantageously placed in the scheme of things under successive governments in Korea. Aside from the fact of their obvious neglect in the developmental process, farmers were made to sell their grains at prices substantially below market value (about 85 percent

of the market prices). The farmers were badly affected by the unscrupulous decision of the Chun government to import grains, meat and other agricultural products.<sup>111</sup> And in spite of all these oppressive policies, the Chun government still manipulated the Federation of Agricultural Cooperatives (FAC) in order to receive political support.<sup>112</sup>

Although, traditionally Farmers are conservative, passive and withdrawn, but the intensity of the Chun government's policies and its impact on the farmers and on Agriculture in general, stimulated some opposition from the farmers to the Chun government. Farmers across Korea, inspite of their lack of organisation still constituted a political explosive source of social upheaval in the 1980's.<sup>113</sup> The solidarity between farmers and other groups in the Korean society, strengthened the resolve of the farmers to redress all the wrongs. The students were more determined to sensitize the farmers to the need of fighting for the democratisation of the agricultural cooperatives, and the subsidization of farmers income by the government.<sup>114</sup>

In February, 1987, the grassroots farmers formed the National Farmers Association (NFA) with many local branches across the country. Also, the National Farmers' Committee (NFC) in the NCDC (National Coalition for Democratic Constitution) with its close to 90 local branches became very active after the June 29 Declaration. Notably, these farmers associations sponsored public rallies in August and October 1987, to mobilize public support for their call for constitutional revision and the democratisation of Federation of Agricultural Cooperatives.<sup>115</sup>

### 5.30.6 THE RELIGIOUS GROUPS

The religious groups in Korea, especially the Christian groups, multiplied greatly during periods of authoritarian rule. Particularly, the introduction of Yushin Constitution in 1972 necessitated a renewed effort on the part of groups in the civil society to challenge the seeming institutionalization of authoritarianism in Korea. The religious groups rose to the occasion by providing doctrinal and institutional base for the opposition forces.<sup>116</sup> such issues as human rights, social justice, and democratisation of Korea, occupied the focus of the religious groups.

One remarkable feature of the religious groups in Korea during the years of intense struggle for democratisation, was the independence of these groups, even in the face of brutal repression and corrupting influences of the wielders of state power<sup>117</sup> The Christian groups were more formidable, better organised and politically active than any other religious groups. The Korean Christians had strong convictions about their responsibilities to and concern for their society. On the other hand, the Confucians respect orderly systems of authority, and believe in the promotion of homogeneity.<sup>118</sup>

The Christian Protestants since the 1970's became concerned not only with human rights problems, but actually began to participate in politics. Some church – inspired political organisations were formed. The Korean National Council of Churches (KNCC) aside from the intermittent hosting of prayer services for the country's political future also expanded its outreaches in the wider society. The christian populace in Korea was influenced greatly by the seeming resurgence of liberation theology with all its effects on the mentality of Korean Christians. Liberation theology moralises pro-democracy struggle and justifies the attainment of democracy



through any available means. This consciousness influenced the creation of other associations in the civil society.<sup>119</sup>

The Buddhist monks took their cue from the Christian groups in the 1980's. In May, 1985 the Buddhists demanded unequivocally for constitutional revision, and thereafter formed themselves into the National Buddhists Monk Organisation for the Realisation of the Promised Land on June 5, 1986. The Buddhists Monks were determined to fight for the construction of democracy<sup>120</sup>

Overall, the religious groups played important roles in the democratisation process in Korea. These groups worked harmoniously with other anti-government groups to influence political change and chart a new order for the country's future political development.

#### 5.30.7 THE BUSINESS CONGLOMERATES (ENTREPRENEURS)

The emergence of propertied or bourgeois class in any given country is always a prelude to economic development and the construction of democracy. In the developed democracies, the bourgeois class played significant role in the struggle for the establishment of democratic order.<sup>121</sup> But regrettably, in the Third world, the bourgeois class is supportive and promotive of authoritarian rule, so long as its economic interests are not jeopardised. The bourgeoisie in the Third world often opts for dictatorship which fosters its economic interest as opposed to democratic order which it perceive as being injurious to its interests.<sup>122</sup>

In the early period of post-independence in Korea, the entrepreneurs were aggrieved by the domineering role of the state over the economy. Thus, the preliminary step towards democratisation originated from the rivalry between the bureaucrats and the industrial bourgeoisie<sup>123</sup> and over

time the capitalist class which made up 1.4 percent of the population in 1985 benefited the most from the state-directed industrialisation programme. The economic policies of successive governments in Korea have been promotive of the interest of the capitalist class, while the workers were disadvantageously placed in the scheme of things. Even Labour unrest, occasioned by the seeming adversities of the workers were quelled violently by the state, in a manner supportive of the interests of the entrepreneurs.<sup>124</sup>

The existence of rapport between the bureaucratic elite of the state and the entrepreneurs, made it unreasonable for the entrepreneurs to challenge the government which they (entrepreneurs) considered as an ally. Moreover, the entrepreneurs lacked any support base in the society, and consequently had to rely wholly on the state.<sup>125</sup> The continuous protection of the entrepreneurs by successive Korean governments strengthened and enhanced the development of the capitalist class. In due course, the entrepreneurs acquired immense power that they occupied important position in the Korean national economy. The entrepreneurs, also known as “Chaebol” established large business corporations, which became so large to the extent of almost changing the balance of power between the state and entrepreneurs.<sup>126</sup> Invariably, the growing expansion of the “Chaebol” in Korean economy became visible as the Chaebol” began to invest in high profit non-bank financial institutions unlike what obtained previously. This diversification reduced the autonomy of the state, and curtailed its interventionist role in economic activities.<sup>127</sup> Indeed, the strong presence of Korean “Chaebol” in the national economy prevented successive governments of Korea, since the 1970’s from having firm grip on the economy.<sup>128</sup>

Although the Chaebol (Korean entrepreneurs) did not persuade the ruling forces to pursue democratisation, the Korean entrepreneurs, through their creation of wealth and the expansion of the material foundation of Korean society raised the aspirations and consciousness of Koreans about democratisation. The Korean entrepreneurs were passive and less concerned about the democratisation process, even in the face of pro-democracy protests with all its attendant implications for Korean security.<sup>129</sup>

#### 5.40 THE EFFECTS OF EXTERNAL FACTORS ON KOREAN DEMOCRATISATION

##### 5.40.1 THE ROLE OF THE U.S.

Several international occurrences impacted on the Korean society, in spite of the efforts of the Chun Doo Hwan government to isolate Korea from international developments. The opposition forces in Korea were motivated and energised by the spate of democratic ferment in other countries. Indeed, as it became palpable that the Chun government was unable to contain the spread of “democratic contagion” the opposition forces resolved to fight for rapid democratisation.<sup>130</sup> In other words, the wind of change resulting in democratic reforms elsewhere heightened public awareness in Korea and increased the prospect for democratisation through the relentless efforts of the political class in South Korea.<sup>131</sup>

According to Cheng and Kim “the scenes of violent street demonstrations - showing not only the students but the middle class - and the dreadful response of the riot police were broadcast almost daily on evening news in Korea, and the United States, and reported on front page of

Newspapers around the world.<sup>132</sup> The broadcast of events in Korea by international media mobilised public opinion in support of democratic forces in Korea. The awareness among Korean opposition leaders receiving international attention, stimulated the opposition to seek further democratic reforms.<sup>133</sup>

The demise of Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines in February, 1987 through the concerted efforts of the opposition forces had great impact on the development of mass oppositional politics in Korea. The repetitive report of the people's struggle in the Philippines by the Korean news media, despite the stringent restrictions placed on them by the government, contributed immensely in mobilizing and conscientizing the Korean populace in their opposition of Chun's authoritarian rule.<sup>134</sup> Thus, the fall of Marcos in the Philippines cautioned the dictatorship of Chun Doo-Hwan, and made the South Korean leadership to begin a reform process. The pressure from within in Korea was bolstered by externalities with the effect that Chun's leadership had to drop its original insistence on deferring the transfer of power to a democratically elected leadership.<sup>135</sup>

The United States of America has been very influential in south Korea's Affairs since the end of World War II. The U.S., immediately in periods following the independence of Korea from Japanese rule, began active involvement in Korean politics and has since been concerned about the protection of South Korea against North Korea's invasion. As we pointed out in Chapter 3, Korea since independence has been significant to the U.S. economic interest, as it remains the seventh U.S largest trading partner. The United States also views South Korea as being central to its security interest in East Asia. Thus, the 42,000 US soldiers stationed in South Korea against possible North Korea's invasion are also for the

maintenance of the strategic interests of the U.S.<sup>136</sup> Notably, the most important concern of the United States about South Korea during the cold war era, was to ensure security and economic development of Korea while the democratisation of Korean politics received less attention. The United States gave more strategic and economic support to the authoritarian regime of Park Chung Hee, during the cold war years.<sup>137</sup> Infact, the United States was solidly behind all authoritarian regimes in South Korea, particularly as a result of these regime's profession of anti-Communist and pro-American ideologies.<sup>138</sup>

The United States' support of authoritarian regimes in period preceding the ascension of Roh Tae-Woo was borne out of the belief by the U.S that authoritarian leaders are well placed to enforce development plan, and maintain political stability. And political stability was considered by the U.S as one and the same with political development. The U.S. felt as well that economic development would conduce to political development.<sup>139</sup>

But with the progressive reduction in the East-West ideological rivalry between the U.S and the USSR, and sequel to the extremist tendencies of the opposition forces in Korea against the authoritarian and repressive government of President Chun Doo Hwan, the United States, particularly from 1986, began to withdraw its support for authoritarianism in South Korea. Consequently, the U.S openly denounced Chun's authoritarian leadership through a message delivered by the U.S. Ambassador to South Korea who met with opposition leaders.<sup>140</sup> And in June 1987, when pro-democracy demonstrations were recurrent and violent, with a high prospects of military intervention, the U.S. government mounted strong pressure on the Chun government to negotiate with the opposition leaders.<sup>141</sup>

Overall, opinions differ among scholars regarding the role of the U.S in Korean democratisation. There are two schools of thought in this regard. First, there are those scholars who believe that the United States played significant role in ensuring the peaceful transition of Korea to democracy. These scholars reasoned that because of the long standing relationship between the U.S and South Korea, it was natural for the United States government to support the popular movement for democracy in Korea.<sup>142</sup> On the other side, are scholars who argue that the United States did very little in aid of democracy in Korea, since it was very difficult for the U.S. to influence Korean politics.<sup>143</sup>

However, whether or not the United States played any significant role in Korean democratisation, the fact remains that the internal forces within Korean society were activated by events outside Korea, to demand for democracy and human rights observance.

#### 5.40.2 THE ROLE OF SEOUL OLYMPICS

Aside from the influence of the United States government on the Korean government regarding the desirability of democratising Korean society, the Seoul Olympics which the Chun government intended to host in 1988 became a major factor responsible for the introduction of political reform in Korea. The issue of hosting the Olympics was well exploited by the opposition forces in Korea. The opposition forces being aware of the importance the Chun government attached to the hosting of Olympic games, decided to use the same issue to fight President Chun. The opposition would not allow President Chun to use the hosting of Olympic games to promote the legitimacy of his authoritarian regime. Thus, the

opposition resorted to more demonstrations against the Chun regime, while the Chun regime used the hosting of Olympic games as an excuse for violently repressing opposition forces, in order to guarantee stable political climate for the sport fiesta.<sup>144</sup>

It should be noted that the entire Korean society favoured the staging of Olympic games in Seoul, and a lot of advantages were expected to accrue to Korea through such venture. Consequently, Koreans were all demanding that the Chun government should provide a conducive climate for the sports fiesta through the granting of some concessions to the opposition forces.<sup>145</sup>

Inevitably, President Chun Doo Hwan, following the series of pressure on his regime by the opposition movements and indeed the Korean society, opted for conciliatory measures, which could be liken to a political suicide. Thus, for the Olympics to hold in Seoul, the ruling elites resorted to the liberalisation of politics, with the intent of dousing the flame of street demonstrations which had engulfed Korea since April 1987, following the unpopular pronouncement of President Chun.<sup>146</sup>

The politicisation of the Olympic games by both the opposition and the Chun regime clearly shows how non-political issues can be exploited by the different actors in the democratic transition period for the advancement of their separate and different goals.<sup>147</sup> Without doubt, the International Olympic committee (I.O.C) would have shifted the games to another country, if the political climate in south Korea had been unfavourable.

Overall, the Korean democratisation was influenced by external factors. These factors like the “contagion or bandwagon effect” of successful democratisation in other countries on South Korea, and the

influence of the United States on the authoritarian regime of Chun Doo Hwan added impetus to the internal demands for democratic development.

#### 5.50 KOREAN DEMOCRATISATION AND INSTITUTIONALISED OPPOSITION

From the foregoing it is very clear that Korean democratisation was highly participatory. The Korean society was activated by the opposition forces, which continuously sought political reforms from the 1960's till democracy was attained in December, 1987. It is remarkable to note that the opposition political parties functioned without any legal constraints since 1948.<sup>148</sup> But in spite of the freedom of Koreans to form and organise political parties, these parties had often centred around notable personalities with no significant institutionalisation, thereby being unable to impact much on the political system.<sup>149</sup> This constraint accounted for the delay in the democratisation process and the consequential prolongation of authoritarian rule in South Korea.

Aside from the low institutionalisation of the opposition parties, successive authoritarian regimes have always made it difficult for the opposition parties to mobilise mass support and raise substantial fund.<sup>150</sup> The consequence of such marginalisation of the opposition forces was to create basis for the expansion of opposition across the broader spectrum of Korean society. Opposition groups became radicalised and were joined by other groups in the society. The students, workers, and farmers were mobilised by the opposition parties, particularly from the 1970's to fight for the democratisation of Korea.<sup>151</sup>

Institutionalised opposition to the ruling authoritarian party began to enjoy some leap in Korean politics, consequent upon the sympathy the opposition parties received from the electorate over the years, sequel to the



increasing repressiveness of successive authoritarian regimes in Korea. In the Presidential elections of President Park Chung-Hee's era (1963, 1967 and 1971), the opposition parties candidates received between 41 percent and 45 percent of the valid votes cast.<sup>152</sup> Also in the 1978 Assembly elections, despite the fact that the Yushin constitution of 1972 gave the government of Park Chung-Hee the power to appoint additional members in the National Assembly, thereby guaranteeing permanent majority for the ruling party, the opposition party (the New Democratic Party led by Kim Young-Sam) received a plurality vote of 34.7 percent, against 30.9 percent for the ruling Democratic Republican Party.<sup>153</sup> And in 1985, another newly formed opposition party - New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP) - received 29.2 percent against the ruling Democratic Justice Party's 35.2 percent.<sup>154</sup>

The growing electoral successes of the opposition parties indicated that Koreans were beginning to identify more with the opposition forces and what they represented. The NKDP was instrumental in the mobilisation of opposition to President Chun's design of perpetuating himself in office beyond 1987. In the struggle for the introduction of direct presidential election system, which the opposition forces believed was more democratic and more immune against the manipulation of the ruling party than the electoral college system, the opposition motivated conjeries of radical students movement, labour movements and christian groups against the Chun regime.<sup>155</sup> Although the Chun government was authoritarian, it was relatively liberal than the Park's dictatorship, and the different groups in the Korean society exploited the seeming expanded democratic space to their advantage. In protesting the Chun government's murder of Park Chong-Chol (through torture in police custody), the students, the workers and other

opposition groups utilised this event to galvanise mass demonstrations against Chun's regime. The opposition forces across the Korean civil society were activated by Park Chong-Chol's death in detention, and President Chun's renunciation of his regime's earlier plans of transiting the country to democracy.<sup>156</sup>

As we have shown in the preceding sections of this chapter, the increase in street demonstrations, and violent protests in the 1980's in Korea could be attributed to the political liberalisation process which was introduced by the Chun government in response to the internal and external pressures for Korean democratisation.<sup>157</sup> In June 1987, there were 3,311 labour disputes, out of which 3,235 or 97.7 percent were accompanied by collective actions and involved 1,225,830 workers.<sup>158</sup> The students had several on-campus and off-campus violent demonstration for democratic reforms in Korea. The spate of violent demonstrations, complicated by the active participation of the middle class citizens, certainly yielded results when on 29<sup>th</sup> June, 1987, the new leader of the ruling DJP declared his pro-democracy agenda.<sup>159</sup>

It is instructive to point out that South Korea's crises of democratic transition were taking place in an environment of insecurity, in which the North Korean troops have remained alert and battle ready to infiltrate south Korea at the slightest opportunity.<sup>160</sup> The violent demonstrations by the opposition forces in South Korea did not only undermine the legitimacy of the Chun government, but also created security risk for South Korea and its people. The degree of insecurity in South Korea would have heightened if General Roh-Tae-Woo did not make the June 29<sup>th</sup> pro-democracy declaration, which doused the recurrent violent street demonstration of almost three months.<sup>161</sup> What the political reforms

which began with the Chun regime did to South Korea was the opening of a Pandora's box, which was hitherto closed under the strict authoritarian rule of President Park Chung-Hee. Under the dictatorship of Park Chung Hee, the Korean civil society was tamed and disciplined by authoritarian repression and intimidation. But under President Chun's government, with its liberalization of power, the Korean society was let loose, as all social groups became unruly, and bent on maximising their particularistic interests. South Korea under the liberalizing influence of a receding authoritarian leader approximated the nasty picture of Hobbesian chaos.<sup>162</sup> For instance, in July 1987, even after Roh Tae-Woo had assured Koreans of the willingness of the ruling government to democratise fully, there were 600 labour disputes. And between July and December, 1987 there were more than 3,000 labour disputes, while the number of labour unions increased from 2,725 to 4,086 and the number of union members increased from 1,050,201 to 1,267,457 during the same period.<sup>163</sup> The expansion of the democratic space and the growing process of industrialisation in South Korea, with its direct impact on the consciousness of the middle class in south Korea were to a large extent, responsible for the decentralisation of the levels of violent protests.<sup>164</sup>

Notably, the democratisation process in South Korea was more volatile, in terms of the degree of mass involvement in the politic of the transition process, than it was the case in the transition period of the Babangida years in Nigeria. And, as it was the case under the military dictatorships in Nigeria, where the ethnic differences of Nigerians were manipulated by successive military regimes to the political advantage of such regimes, the South Korean authoritarian regimes heightened the regional rivalries among South Koreans. This principle of divide and rule

delayed the democratisation of South Korea,<sup>165</sup> and aborted the transition to democracy project in Nigeria under the Babangida regime.<sup>166</sup> The democratisation process in South Korea, has been shown in the preceding sections to be conflict and crises-ridden. The crises thrown –up by Korean democratisation fundamentally challenged the security agencies, and posed complex dilemma both in the realm of national security politics and in the relations between the military and society.<sup>167</sup> The democratisation process in Korea as in Nigeria was presided over by a military-General-turned civilian President, and the dual traits of the supervisor of the transition project resulted in some crises of identity for both the military institution and the civilian leadership institutions. The conceptual confusion about the role which the military institution ought to play during the period of democratisation in South Korea, was complicated by the intermittent involvement of the military in the resolution of the crises of transition. The opening of democratic space in Korea under the Chun regime did not lead to civilian control of the military, but it intensified over-lapping claims between the military and the civilians and deepened civil-military frictions.<sup>168</sup>

All in all, the spate of demonstrations in South Korea during the Chun-Roh years of democratisation, weakened the security environment of South Korea and made the country vulnerable to the real threats of the Neighboring North Korea.<sup>169</sup> Although democratic opening in South Korea encouraged mass political participation, and enhanced freedom of expression unlike what obtained during the erstwhile eras of dictatorship, it equally undermined political stability.<sup>170</sup>

## ENDNOTES

1. Hyug Baeg Im, "Politics of Democratic Transition from Authoritarian Rule in Korea" in Sang-Yong Choi, (ed), Democracy in Korea: Its Ideas and Realities (Seoul, The Korean Political Science Association, 1997), pp.84 – 85.
2. Chang-Huh Oh, "The Institutional Basis of Democratisation in Korea", Korea Observer, Vol.XXVII, No.4, Winter, 1996, pp609-610, See also Robert A. Scalapino, Democratizing Dragons: South Korea and Taiwan," Journal of Democracy Vol.4, No.3, (July, 1993), pp.70-83.
3. Gregory Henderson,, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex (Cambridge Harvard University Press, 1968)
4. Byung-Joon, Ahn "Political Changes and industrialization in south Korea", Korean Social Science Journal , No.10, (1983),p.48
5. Ibid, pp.48-49; Peter R. Moody Jr, Political Opposition in Post-Confucian Society (New York: Preager, 1988) p.115; Hak-kyu, Sohn, Authoritarianism and opposition in South Korea (London, Routledge, 1989), p.18.
6. Sung-Joo, Han, The Failure of Democracy in South Korea (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1974) See also Sung-Joo, Han, "South Korea; Politics in Transition", in Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset (eds), Democracy in Developing Countries : Asia (Vol.III), (Boulder: Co Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989) pp.270-72.
7. Chang-Huh, Oh, Op.cit. p618.
8. Ibid.
9. Hak-Kyu, Sohn, op.cit. p.21.
10. C.I. Eugene Kim, "The Value congruity of ROK civilian and Former Military party elites", Asian Survey, Vol.18, No.8, (August, 1978), p.841. See also C.I. Eugene Kim, "The South Korean military and Its Political Role" in Kim Iipyong, and Young Whan Kihl (eds), Political

Change in South Korea, (New York: The Korean PWPA, Inc, 1988), pp. 91-112. (35 percent of Cabinet Ministers, 32.1 percent of provincial Governors, and 33.3 percent of Assembly speakers during the period 1963-1975 were occupied by ex-military officers).

11. Hak-kyu, Sohn, op.cit; p146.
12. Chang-Hun, Oh, op.cit, p.620.
13. David C. Cole, and Princeton N. Lyman, Korean Development: The Inter-play of politics and Economics, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), p.34; See also Hyug Baeg Im, "The Rise of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism in South Korea" World Politics Vol XXXIX, No.2, Jan,1987,pp231-257.
14. David C. Cole & Princeton N. Lyman, Ibid,pp.36 – 38.
15. Hak-kyu, Sohn, op.cit p.40.
16. Minho Kuk, "The Governmental Role in the Making of Chaebol in the Industrial Development of South Korea", Asian Perspective 13, 2, (1989), p.115.
17. Chong-Sik, Lee, "South Korea 1979; confrontation, assassination, and Transition" Asian Survey, 20, 1, (1980) p.63 – 64.
18. Kwang H. Ro, "The Characteristics of the Praetorian Military in Korea 1961 – 1979" Asian Profile 17, 4, (1989), p320.
19. Hak-kyu, Sohn, Authoritarianism and opposition in South Korea, pp.143-152
20. Hong-Choo Hyun, "Korea at the Threshold of Democratisation: A Case for Gradualism in Political Development" in Progress in Democracy: The Pacific Basin Experience (Seminar series 87 – 88) Ilhae institute, Seoul, Ilhae Institute, 1987, p.69.
21. Hyug Baeg, Im, "The Rise of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism in South Korea", World Politics 39, 2, 1987, pp.231 – 257.

22. Peter R. Moody, Political Opposition in Post –Confucian Society , (New York: Praeger, 1988). p.129.
23. Young Whan, Kihl, “Korea’s fifth Republic: Domestic Political Trends” Journal of Northeast Asian Studies 1, (2), 1982, pp.39 – 42.
24. Koon Woo Nam, South Korean Politics: The Search for Political Consensus and Stability, (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1989). P.277.
25. Ibid. p.327 See also Sung-joo, Han “South Korea: Politics in Transition” op.cit, p.283.
26. Kyoung Euu Lee & June Hyung Rhie, “Democratic Transition and civil Military Relations: Partnership or Confrontation?” Pacific Focus, Vol. IV, No.2 (Fall 1989), p216.
27. Ibid., pp.218 – 220.
28. Wonmo Dong, “University Students in South Korean Politics : Patterns of radicalization in the 1980’s”, Journal of international Affairs, 40, (2), 1987, p.241.
29. Hyug Baeg Im, “Politics of Democratic Transition form Authoritarian Rule in South Korea” Korean Social Science Journal, Vol XX1, (1995), pp.139 – 140)
30. Ibid.,p140.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid. p.141.
33. Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratisation in the late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), p. 188-189
34. Hyug-Baeg Im, “Politics of Democratic Transition from Authoritarian Rule in South Korea”, Op.cit, pp.142 – 143.

35. Eugene C.I Kim, "South Korea in 1985 : An Eventful year amidst uncertainty" Asian Survey, 16 (1), 1986, p.67.
36. Ibid, pp.68 – 69.
37. Byung-Young, Ahn "Industrialization and Political Parties in Korea" Korean Social Science Journal 13, (1986 – 1987) p.36; See also Stephen Haggard and Chung-in Moon, "Institutions and Economic Policy; theory and a Korean case study" World Politics, 42, (2), 1990 p.231.
38. Wonmo dong, "University Students in South Korean politics: Patterns of Radicalization in the 1980's", Journal of International Affairs , 40, (2), 1987, p242 - 243;. See also James Cotton, "From Authoritarianism to Democracy in South Korean", Political Studies 37, 2, 1989, p.251.
39. Eugene C.I Kim, "South Korea in 1985 ..." Op.cit, p.68.
40. B.C.Koh, "The Parliamentary election in South Korea," Asian Survey, 25 (9) 1985, pp.889-891.
41. Ibid, p.891.
42. James Cotton, "From Authoritarianism to Democracy in south Korea," op.cit, p.256.
43. Michael Williams, "South Korea: Democracy Strikes Back," World Today, 41(4) 1985, p.68.
44. Jong-Ryool, Lee "Recent political Development in Korea," Korea and World Affairs 9(3), 1985, p553.
45. Baek-San, Chang, "Teargas Drops, Democracy Explodes: An inside Report on Korea's Democratic Movement's Advance," AMPO: Japan – Asia Quarterly Review 19 (2) 1987,pp45-46.
46. Ibid, p.46
47. Ibid, p.47



48. Hong Nak, Kim, "Political Changes in South Korea and their Implications for US – Korean Security Relations," Korea and World Affairs, 11, (4), 1987, p.656.
49. Ibid, pp.656 – 657; See also, Eugene CI Kim, "South Korea in 1986; Preparing for a Power Transition," Asian Survey, 17, (1), 1987, p.66.
50. Adrian Buzo, "South Korea : An opening of the political Process?" Current Affairs Bulletin 64(5) 1987, pp.16 – 17. See also Eugene CI Kim, "South Korea in 1986:...", Op.cit, pp.65-66.
51. Hak-Kyu, Sohn, "The Foundations of Radical Trends in Korean Politics : With Special Reference the unofficial opposition," A Paper presented at the Conference on Political Authority and Economic Exchange in Korea (Honolulu : East-West Centre,) January 3 – 5, 1991, p.12.
52. Ibid, pp.12-13.
53. Ibid, p.14.
54. Tim, Shorrock, "The Struggle for Democracy in south Korea in the 1980's and the Rise of Anti-Americanism" Third World Quarterly 8(4) 1986, pp.1195 – 1218; and Tim Shorrock, South Korean: Chun, the Kims, and Constitutional Struggle" Third World Quarterly, 10 (1) 1988, p.99.
55. Tim Shorrock, Ibid, p.100.
56. Andrew C. Nahm, "History," in The Far East And Australia 1988 (London : Europa Publications Ltd. 1989, 19<sup>th</sup> edition), p.534.
57. Ibid, p.535.
58. Adrian Buzo, "South Korea: An opening of the Political process?" Op.cit p.17; Peter R. Moody Jr, Political Opposition in Post Confucian Society (New York, Praeger, 1988), P.132; and James Cotton, "From Authoritarianism to Democracy in South Korea" Political Studies, 32 (2) 1989 pp.251-252.

59. Wan-Sang, Han "Change in the political Conception of Koreans over a Transitional Period" Korea Journal, 29 (9) 1989, p.53.
60. Ibid, pp. 53-54.
61. Andrew C. Nahm, op.cit, p.534; and Brian Bridges, "Notes of the month," World Today, 43 (10) 1987, p.467.
62. Sung-Joo, Han "South Korea: Politics in Transition" in Larry Diamond, et.al (eds), op.cit, p.286.
63. James Cotton, "Introduction" in James Cotton (ed), Korea Under Roh Tae-Woo Democratisation, Northern Policy, and Inter-korean Relations (Australia, Allen & Unwin Pty, Ltd 1993) p.1 and Okonogi Masao, "South Korea's Experiment in Democracy," in James Cotton (ed), Ibid, p.8.
64. Adrian Buzo, op.cit, pp.15-16.
65. Ibid, Brian Bridges, op.cit, p.467; and The Economist, June 20, 1987, p.39.
66. The Eastern Economic Review, July 2, 1987, p.9.
67. Okonogi Masao, "South Korea's Experiment in Democracy" op.cit, p.11.
68. Kyoung Eun, Lee and June Hyoung Rhie, "Democratic Transition and Civil-Military Relations: Partnership or Confrontation?," Pacific Focus, 4(2) 1989 p.231.
69. Daryl, M. Plunk, "Political Developments in the Republic of Korea" in Thomas W. Robinson ed, Democracy and Development in East Asia (Washington, DC : The AEI Press, 1991) p.108; Tun-jen Cheng, and Eun Mee Kim, "The Games of Democratization: Suggestions from the case of South Korea," A paper presented at the 1989 Convention of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta Hilton, September 1, 1989, p.15.

70. Okonogi Masao, "South Korea's Experiment in Democracy", Japan Review of International Affairs 2, (1), 1988, p.30.
71. Donald, MacDonald, "Korea's Transition to Democracy," A paper presented at International Conference on Korea's Democratic Experiment (Korea, Seoul, June 27 – 28, 1991), p21.
72. Aiden, Foster-Carter, "Korea: From Dependency to Democracy?" Capital & Class 33 (1987), pp.15-16.
73. Tim, Shorrok "Chun, the Kims and the Constitutional Struggle" Third World Quarterly, 10 (1) 1988, p.101.
74. Ibid, p.102.
75. Hagen, Koo, and Hyun-Chin Lim, "Labour and Democratisation in South Korea" in J. Samuel Valenzuela ed, Labour movements in Recent Transition to Democracy (Notre Dame, IL: University of Norte Dame Press 1992), pp.17 – 27.
76. Martin, Hart-Landsberg, "South Korea :Looking At the Left," Monthly Review, 41 (3), 1989, p.67.
77. Chai bong, Hahm and Sang Young Rhyu, Democratic reforms in Korea : Theory and Practice" A paper presented at the concurrent session on the 17<sup>th</sup> World congress of IPSA Democratisation and Globalization in Korea: Assessment and prospects, August 18 – 19 1997, pp1-2.
78. Okonogi, Masao, op.cit p.33.
79. James Cotton, "From authoritarianism to Democracy in South Korea," in James Cotton, (ed), Korea under Roh Tae-Woo: Democratisation, Northern Policy and Inter-Korean Relations op.cit., p32..
80. Okonogi Masao, "South Korea's Experiment in Democracy," opcit. p.33.
81. Sung-Joo, Han, "South Korea in 1987: The Politics of Democratisation," Asian Survey 28 (1) 1988, pp.52 – 61.

82. Brian Bridges, "East Asia in Transition : South Korea in the Lime Light" International Affairs, 64 (3), 1988, pp. 383 – 384.
83. Young-Whan, Kihl, "Political Change in South Korea and its implications for the Inter-Korean Relations," Korea Observer, 19 (3) 1988, pp.317 – 318.
84. Myong-Soon Shin "Democratisation in Korean Politics : Presidential and Parliamentary Aspects," Korea Observer, 20(1) 1989, 111-112.
85. Ibid.
86. Larry L. Wade and Seong Jin Kang , "Economic voting in South Korea: The 1988 Assembly Elections " Journal of North – East Asian Studies 9(2) 1990 p.46.
87. Sung-Joo, Han "South Korea in 1988 : A Revolution in the making" Asian Survey, 29, (1), 1989, pp.30 – 31.
88. Hong-Nak, kim, "The 1988 parliamentary Election in South Korean" Asian Survey, 29 (5) 1989, pp.491 – 493.
89. Kap-Yun Lee, "Democratisation, Party failure, and the Emergence of the Unification National Party," Korea and World Affairs, Vol XVIII, No.4 Winter, 1994 pp.751-755; Kisuk Cho, "Regionalism in Korean Elections and Democratisation: An Empirical Analysis," Asian Perspective, Vol.22, No.1 Spring 1998, pp.140 – 143.
90. Euu Sun Chung, "Transition to Democracy in south Korea" Asian Profile, 17, (1), 1989 p.26; Chalmers Johnson , "South Korean Democratisation: The Role of Economic Development," Pacific Review, 2, (1), 1989 p.7 ; and John T. Bennet, "Economic Development in the Republic of Korea" in Thomas W. Robinson (ed) Democracy and Development in East Asia, (Washington D.C.The AEI Press, 1991) pp.119- 120.
91. Chalmers Johnson, "South Korean Democratisation : The Role of Economic Development," op.cit p.5; and Paul W. Kuznets,

“Government and Economic Strategy in Contemporary South Korea,” Pacific Affairs, 58, (1), 1985, pp.51 – 52.

92. Peter K, Kang, “Political and corporate Group Interests in south Korea’s political Economy” Asian Profile, 16, (3) 1988, p.219.
93. Chalmers Johnson, op.cit p.4.
94. Sung-Joo, Han, “South Korea : Politics in Transition,” in Larry Diamond et.al (eds), op.cit, p.269.
95. Donald S. Macdonald, The Korean Contemporary Politics and Society (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988) p.138.
96. Lawrence, Krause, and Tun-Jen, Cheng, “Development and Democracy : special Attention to Korea” A paper presented to international conference on Korea’s Democratic Experiment. Asiatic Research Centre of Korea University and Carnegie council on Ethics and international Affairs, Seoul, Korea, June 27 – 28 1991, pp.3-4.
97. Hagen, Koo, “Middle Classes, Democratisation, and Class Formation: The Case of South Korea,” Theory and Society, 20, (1991), pp.486-489.
98. Sook-Joung Lee, “Political Liberalization and Economic Development in South Korea,” A paper presented at the 88<sup>th</sup> Atlanta Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association in August 24 – 28, 1988, p.13.
99. Larry Diamond, “Crisis, Choice, and Structure: Reconciling Alternative Models for Explaining Democratic Successive and Failure in the Third World,” A paper presented at the 1989 Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, August, 31 – September, 3 1989, p43.
100. Jung Jip choi, “Political Cleavages in South Korea,” in Hagen Koo (ed), State, Society in Contemporary Korea, op.cit, pp33-50.

101. Wonmo, song, "University Students in South Korean Politics: Patterns of Radicalization in the 1980's," Journal of International Affairs 40, (2), 1987, p.244.
102. Myung-Hyun, Cho, "The New Students Movement in Korea: Emerging Patterns of Ideological Orientation in the 1980's" "Korea Observer, 20, (1), 1989, p.99.
103. Myngyobu, (1985), The White Paper on Campus Unrest, (Seoul) pp. 22-23 ; Naemubu (1988) The Materials for the Inspection of the Administration Conducted by the National Assembly. P.19.
104. Ibid.
105. Su-Hoon, Lee, "Transitional Politics of Korea, 1987 – 1992: Activation of Civil Society" Pacific Affairs Vol.66 No.3 (Fall ,1993) pp.353 – 354; Clive Hamilton and Richard Tanter, "The Antinomies of Success in South Korea," Journal of International Affairs 41(1987) p.66; and Hagen Koo "From Farm to Factory: Proletarianisation in Korea," American Sociological Review , 55 (1990), p.10.
106. Seongyi Yun, "Democratisation in South Korea: Social movements and their Political opportunity structures," Asian Perspective, Vol 21, No.3 (Winter, 1997), pp.145 – 171.
107. Fred Deyo, "State and Labour: Modes of Political Exclusion in East Asian Development," in Fred Deyo (ed) The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1987) p.182.
108. Chong-O Ra, "Korean Labour in Politics : Preliminary Research Question for a Comparative Analysis," A paper presented at the Second World Conference on Korean Politics in Seoul, Korean Political Science Association, July, 25 – 27, 1991, pp.26 – 27.
109. Su-Hoon, Lee, op.cit, p.359.
110. Hagen, Koo "From Farm to Factory:...", Op.cit, p.7.

111. Larry L. Burmeister "Korean Agricultural cooperatives in Transition : Shifting Corporatist Foundations?," A paper presented at the Conference on Authority and Exchange in Korea, International Relations Programme, East – West Centre, Honolulu Hawali, January 3-5, 1991, pp.9-10.
112. Ibid.
113. Chung-In Moon, "Democratisation, National Security Politics, and Civil – Military Relations : Some Theoretical Issues and the South Korean Case," Pacific Focus, 4(2), (Fall,1989), p1 – 8.
114. Ibid, pp. 18 – 20.
115. Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), p.74.
116. Kyoung Eun Lee, And June Hyoung Rhie, "Democratic Transition and Civil-Military Relations: Partnership or Confrontation? Pacific Focus, 4(2), 1989, p.219.
117. Ibid.
118. Peter R. Moody Jr., Political Opposition in Post Confucian Society (New York Praeger, 1988) p.119 and Kyoung Eun, Lee and June Hyoung Rhie, "Democratic Transition and Civil-Military Relations: Partnership or Confrontation?" op.cit, p.219.
119. Peter R. Moody Jr op.cit, p.120.
120. Zehra F. Arat, Democracy and Human Rights in Developing Countries (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1991), pp.38 – 39.
121. Chang – Hee Nam, "South Korea's Big Business Clientelism in Democratic Reform Asian Survey Vol XXXVI, No.4 (April, 1995), pp.365 – 366.
122. Hyug Baeg, Im, "State, Labour and Capital in the Consolidation of Democracy: A Search for post Authoritarian Industrial Relations in

South Korea,” A paper presented at the conference on Political Authority and Economic Exchange in Korea, East-West Center, Honolulu, Hawaii, January 3 – 5, 1991, p.10.

123. Hagen, Koo, “Middle Classes, Democratisation, and Class Formation: The Case of South Korea” Theory and Society, 20 (1991) pp.496 – 498.
124. Minho, Kuk, “The Government Role in the Making of Chaebol in the Industrial Development of South Korea,” Asian Perspective, 13(2), 1989, pp.117.
125. Oleg, Davydov, “South Korea: Capitalist Modernization and some Aspects of Its Political Development “ Far Eastern Affairs (2) 1988, p.77 and Richard M. Steers, Yoo Keun Shin and Gerardo R. Ungson, The Chaebol : Korea’s New Industrial Might (New York: Harper Business, 1989), pp. 42 – 43.
126. Chang – Hee Nam, Op.cit, p367.
127. Nora Hamilton and Eun Mee Kim, “Economic and Political Liberalization in south Korea and Mexico” Third World Quarterly, Vol 14, No 1 (1993), pp.116 – 118 and Ky Hyon Jung “Business – Government Relations in the Growth of Korean Business Groups” Korean Social Science Journal, Vol.14 (1988), pp74 – 75.
128. Eu Mee Kim, Big Business Strong State: Collusion and Conflict in South Korean Development 1960 – 1990 (Albany: State University of New York Press 1997), especially Chapter 12.
129. Chaibong Hahm, “Preparing for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century : Korea’s Political and Social Reforms” Korea and World Affairs, (Spring 1996), pp.38-40.
130. Edward S Herman and James Peters, “Resurgent Democracy: Rhetoric and Reality” New Left Review, 15 (4), 1985, p.83 – 98.
131. Sang Joon Kim, “Characteristic Features of Korean Democratisation” Asian Perspective, Vol.18 No.2 (Fall – Winter 1994) p.189.



132. Ibid, pp.189 – 190.
133. Michael G. Burton, and Jai P.Ryu, “South Korea’s elite settlement and Democratic Consolidation” Journal of Political and Military Sociology Vol.25 No.1 (Summer 1997), pp.8-10.
134. See Larry Diamond, “Introduction : Persistence, Breakdown, and Renewal,” in Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset (eds), Democracy in Developing Countries: Asia (vol.3) (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), pp.52.
135. James Cotton, “From Authoritarianism to Democracy in South Korea,” Political Studies, 37 (2), 1989, pp. 244 – 259.
136. William H. Gleysteen Jr. and Alan D. Romberg, “Korea : Asian Paradox,” Foreign Affairs, 65 (5) 1987, pp1044-1054.
137. Tim Shorrock, “The Struggle for Democracy in South Korea in the 1980’s and the rise of anti-Americanism” Third World Quarterly, 8 (4), 1986, p.108: and Jerome A. Cohon and Edward J. Baker, U.S. Foreign Policy and Human Rights in South Korea” in William Shaw, ed, Human Rights in Korea (Cambridge, M. A: The East Asian Legal Studies Program of the Harvard Law School, 1991), pp.171.
138. Edward N. Muller “Dependent Economic Development, Aid Dependence on the United States, and Democratic Breakdown in the Third World,” International Studies Quarterly, 29, ( 4) 1985, pp.445 – 469.
139. Koon Woo Nam, South Korean Politics : The Search for Political Consensus and Stability (Lanham; M.D. University Press of America 1989) pp.167 – 168; See also Robert L. Rothstein, “Democracy, Conflict, and Development in the Third World,” Washington Quarterly, 14(2), 1991, pp 58 – 59.
140. William, Shaw, “Introduction,” in William Shaw (ed), Human Rights in Korea: Historical and Policy Perspectives (Cambridge, M. A. : The East Asian Legal Studies programme of the Harvard Law School, 1991) pp.15-16.

141. Richard C. Gripp, "Political Reform in Three Asian Politics," The Asian Profile 17(2), 1989, pp192 – 193.
142. Larry Diamond, Seymour S. Lipset, and Juan J. Linz "Building and sustaining Democratic Government in Developing Countries: Some Tentative Findings," World Affairs, 150 (1) 1987, pp16-18; and Jerome A. Cohen and Edward, J. Baker, op.cit p.172; and Sung – Joo, Han, "South Korea: Politics in Transition," op.cit, pp.287 – 288.
143. Eugene C.I. Kim, "The South Korean Military and Its Political Role" in Ipiyoung, Kim and Young Whan Kihl (eds), Political Change in South Korea (New York : The Korean PWPA, Inc, 1988), pp.85 – 113; and Crystal , Nix "South Korea: United States Policy and the 1987 Presidential Elections, Harvard Human Rights Year Book 1, (1988), P.259.
144. George Totten, "The Democratisation of South Korea and the Role of the Olympics in the Process" Occasional Paper 3, Centre for Pacific Asian Studies of Universities of Stockholm, 1988, p.14–15; James Cotton, "From Authoritarianism to Democracy in South Korea" op.cit, p.253; and Brian Bridges, "East Asia in Transition: South Korea in the Lime light, op.cit, p.382.
145. David I. Steinberg, "Korea Triumph Amid Turmoil", Journal of Democracy, Vol. 9, No.2 (April 1998), pp.85 – 86.
146. Chalmers Johnson "South Korean Democratisation: The Role of Economic Development," op.cit, p.8.
147. George totten , op.cit p.18 and Dankwart A. Rustow, "Democracy : A Global Revolution," Foreign Affairs, 69(4), 1990, p.79.
148. Sung M. Pae, Testing Democratic Theories in Korea, (Lanham, MD. University Press of America, 1986), p.155.
149. Sung-Joo, Han "Political Institutionalization in South Korea, 1961 – 1984," in Robert A. Scalapino and Jusuf Wanad; (eds), Asian Political Institutionalization (Berkeley : University of California, Institute of East Asian Studies, 1986), pp.116 – 137.

150. Gregory Henderson, "The Politics of Korea" in John Sullivan and Roberta Foss, eds, Two Koreas – One Future?, (Lanhan Md, University Press of America 1987), pp 109 – 110; and Byung – Joon Ahn, "Political Changes and Institutionalization in South Korea" Korean Social Science Journal, Vol.10, (1983), pp.41 – 45.
151. Jounghwon A. Kim, Divided Korea The Politics of Development 1945 – 1972 (Cambridge: Mass, Harvard University Press, 1976), p.216.
152. Ibid.
153. Chong-Sik, Lee "South Korea in 1979: Confrontation, Assassination and Transition" Asian Survey, Vol 20 (1980), p.67.
154. B.C. Koh, "The 1985 Parliamentary Election in south Korea," Asian Survey, Vol 25, 1985, pp.888—889.
155. Ji Hun Jo, The Youth and Student Movement of the Late 1980's (Seoul : Hyeongseongsa, 1989), pp.16 – 24.
156. Sung-Joo Han "South Korea in 1987: The Politics of Democratisation," Asian Survey, Vol.23, (1988), pp.52 – 61.
157. Peter R. Moody, Political Opposition in Post Confucian Society..., op.cit. p.134.
158. The Ministry of Labour Yearbook of Labour Statistics 1987 (Seoul, Korea), pp.330 – 331.
159. James Cotton "Understanding the State in South Korea: Bureaucratic Authoritarian or state autonomy Theory?" Comparative Political Studies 24, (1991), p.512 – 531.
160. Yong – Sup Han, "South Korea's New Security Strategy of Cooperation and Conflict" in Yong-Soon Yim, Jong – Ho Yoon, Min-Yong Lee, Sahng-Gyoun Lee, and Sung Ham Kim, (eds), Security Environment in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century and Korea's Strategic Options (Seoul, The Research Institute for International Affairs & The Korean Association of International Studies, 1997), pp.292 – 293.

161. John Lie, "Democratisation and Its Discontents: Origins of the present crisis in South Korea," Monthly Review (February, 1991), pp.47 – 49.
162. Chung-in, Moon and Yong –Cheol, Kim, "A Circle of Paradox: Development, Politics and Democracy in South Korea," in Adrian Leftwich (ed), Democracy and Development (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1996), pp 157 – 158.
163. Myungsoon Shin, "Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Korean Politics" Korea Observer, Vol. XXVII, No.2 (Summer 1996), pp.168 – 169.
164. Matthew J. Costello, "State Softness as a product of Environmental Uncertainty: A Theory with Applications to Nigeria, Kenya and South Korea" The Journal of Developing Areas 28, (April, 1994), pp. 358 – 359.
165. David I. Steinberg, "The Republic of Korea: Pluralising Politics" in Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Marting Lipset (eds) Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experience with Democracy (Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner, (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition), 1995, pp369-415.
166. Ayo Akinbobola, "Ethnicity, Politics and Trade Union Advocacy" in Adebayo Ninalowo (eds) The Quest for Democratisation: Military Governance and Trade Unionism (Lagos, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 1996), p.88 – 92.
167. Chung-in Moon "Democratisation, National Security Politics and Civil – Military Relations : Some Theoretical Issues and the South Korean Case," Pacific Focus, Vol IV No.2 (Fall 1989), pp. 8-12.
168. Ibid.
169. Chung-in, Moon "South Korea: Between Security and Vulnerability" in James E. Katz (ed), The Implications of Third World Defence Industrialization (Lexington Books, Lexington, MA 1986), pp. 247 – 251.

170. Chung-in, Moon “The Political Economy of Security on the Korean Peninsula in the Regional Context,” in Andrew Mack, (ed), Asian Flashpoint: Security and the Korean Peninsula, ( Australian : Allen & Unwin, 1993), pp.116 – 117.

CODESRIA - LIBRARY

## CHAPTER SIX

### DEMOCRATISATION IN NIGERIA AND SOUTH KOREA: SOME TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS

#### 6.0 INTRODUCTION

In the foregoing chapters, we have pointed out that democratization impacted a great deal on the Nigerian and Korean societies, just as these civil societies fought for the democratization of their countries. The adversities of military rule in our countries of reference destroyed the bases for the building of political institutions, and ensured the prolongation of their transition to democracy.

Particularly, with reference to the Nigerian case, the Babangida administration politicized ethnicity deliberately to forestall a united front against its programme of perpetuating itself in office. The government's imposition of a two party system on Nigerians, on the pretext that it would allow for the origination of de-ethnicised party politics, was antithetical to democratic praxis. Also, in practice, the two government funded and founded political parties - the National Republican Convention (NRC) and the social Democratic Party (SDP) were easily manipulated by the Babangida Administration, in consonance with its dictates. Furthermore, we also indicted President Babangida in our analysis of Nigeria's transition project, in chapter four for his wilful and unscrupulous disruption of the transition time-table. These intermittent adjustments in the transition time table became pronounced as to justify the well-conceived comments of the regime's critics that President Babangida did not intend to handover the

reins of power to a democratically elected civilian regime. Finally, the voting system open-queuing and counting, and the eventual annulment of the Presidential election results by the Babangida Administration outrightly confirmed the anti-democratic disposition of President Babangida as well as commenced a series of interminable crisis which threatened the security of the country beyond all imaginations.

The struggle for the validation or de-annulment of the annulled June 12 Presidential election took a tribal turn, as the south-west yorubas were left to do the fight without complementary support from other ethnic groups in the country. This trend threw ethnic acrimonies into the forefront of the country's politics once again. Ethnic violence were reported in the major cities across Nigeria, indicating perhaps the strained relationship among peoples' of different ethnic identities. This sequence of events no doubt endangered the corporate existence of Nigerians, and returned the country back to the 1960's. The crises occasioned by the Babangida government's annulment of June 12 elections also truncated General Babangida's ambition, as he had to hurriedly hand over power to an interim government of Chief Ernest Shonekan on the 26<sup>th</sup> of August, 1993. But violent demonstrations in the western part of Nigeria and some other places did not abate, despite General Babangida's exit from power. The series of mass protest and riots were worsened by the deleterious consequences of the Structural Adjustment Programme of Babangida regime. Thus, the eventual termination of the interim government by General Sani Abacha on the 17<sup>th</sup> November 1993 was no surprise to most Nigerians, who were disturbed by the country's slide into chaos. However, the emergence of another military

regime of General Abacha marked the beginning of yet another circumlocutious transition programme.

Overall, as we noted in chapter four, the Nigerian variant of democratization under the Babangida regime was undemocratic and creative of conflicts, and mass revolt within the country's political landscape.

In the case of south Korea, every authoritarian leader had always concieved of an idea of civilianizing his hold on power, since the fall of the first Republic in 1960. But the regime of the General-turned-President, Chun-Doo Hwan was particularly remarkable in its efforts to promote electoral democracy in south korea. In fact, President Chun used the electoral process to beef up the legitimacy of his regime, but the half hearted measures of Chun leadership were not capable of stemming the tidal wave of violent student demonstrations and other pro-democracy forces including the labour unions. The Korean society was activated by socio economic advancement and industrialisation. The rise of a vibrant middle class contributed significantly to the expansion of democratic space in south korea. Thus, political liberalization in South Korea rather than reduce the level of agitation among the students, labour unions, the urban middle class, and the rural poor, heightened the tempo of civil disturbance.

As it became apparent to President Chun Doo Hwan that he might be stampeded into embarking upon a full scale democratization by the korean society, he swiftly made a somersault and reneged on his ealier promise of effecting constitutional revision. President Chun's April, 13 Declaration of 1987 incensed the democratic forces and the opposition groups, as they championed renewed hostilities against the authoritarian leadership of Chun



Doo Hwan. The raging fire of popular protest was not doused by the Chun government's resort to violent repression of the protesters. The more the regime tried to suppress the protests, the more pervasive and encompassing the protest became.

Indeed the Korean society knew no peace since the April 13, 1987 Declaration by President Chun. The consequent divisions within the ruling forces and the June 29 pro-democracy declaration by Roh Tae-Woo did not abate the spate of crises until the final conclusion of the transition agenda, which culminated in the conduct of Presidential election (through the direct electoral system) on December 16, 1987.

The lessons of the democratization experience of South Korea and Nigeria are instructive. Although, democratization was divisive in South Korea as it complicated and heightened regional differences, the Koreans were still able to galvanize a common opposition front against authoritarianism. The success of democratic struggle in South Korea is explainable as the consequence of the vibrancy of its civil society, and not so much as a result of the ethnic homogeneity of its population. The South Korean politics is heavily influenced by regional sentiment, as electoral success of political parties and politicians depend on their regional base. The dysfunctions of regional sentiment in Korean politics have grown to an alarming proportions in recent years. Political appointments and other perquisites of power are dispensed to those from the same regions as the power wielder in Korea. But in spite of heightened regional rivalries among Koreans from different regions, the Koreans were unanimous in their resolve to put an end to military rule and all forms of authoritarianism.

Nigeria on the other hand, with its disparate ethnic identities and its pronounced ethnic cleavages could not attain democratic status through the Babangida tortuous transition programme, because of the successful manipulation of ethnicity by the Babangida regime, to divide the democratic struggle. The Nigerian civil society has often been divided by successive military leaderships. And in the case of the crises which resulted from the Babangida government's annulment of June 12 Presidential election results, the western part of the country (mainly populated by the Yorubas) stoutly fought for the validation or de-annulment of the Presidential election, which was presumed to be won by Chief M.K.O. Abiola, a Yoruba business magnate of Egba ancestry. The localization of the struggle for democracy in the western part of Nigeria during the tail end of the Babangida years, created separatist sentiments among the Yorubas, who had felt estranged from the mainstream of Nigerian politics. As we noted in chapter four, the inglorious end of General Babangida's Administration threw the country into avoidable crises which threatened the corporate existence of Nigeria, and uncertainty which enveloped the country throughout the eight year rule of General Ibrahim Babangida. The unsuccessful coup of General Mamman Vatsa and Major Gideon Orka in 1987 and 1990 respectively, signified the low level of acceptance of the Babangida regime and its transition to democracy project by the military.

From the foregoing treatise on the impacts of democratization on Nigerian and south Korean societies, certain theoretical universals could be identified. These theories validate some of our assumptions, stated in chapter one. These theories are classified as follows: (a) Democratisation and the economy; (b) Democratisation and ethnicity/Regionalism; (c.)

Democratisation and regime interest(s); (d) Democratisation and Mass Protests; and finally (e) Democratisation and external influences. These identified theories can be briefly discussed as they relate to our case studies, with the intent of validating our research assumption.

## 6.10 DEMOCRATISATION AND THE ECONOMY

As we have shown in chapter four, Nigerians were desirous of democratisation, because they felt their socio economic well being would be bettered in a democracy more than they experienced under military dictatorships. The untold hardship that most Nigerians went through under successive military governments must have contributed to the development of anti-military sentiment among the Nigerian people.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, the recurrent economic down-turn occasioned by wrong economic policies and programmes, which continued to impoverish the majority of Nigerians in the midst of abundant resources instigated mass protest and sporadic outburst against military rulership in the country. The adoption of the IMF-Inspired Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), worsened the economic adversities of the Nigerian people. Thus it was as a result of the prevalent economic hardship of Nigerians that social frustrations, tensions and political crises were heightened during the Babangida regime.<sup>2</sup> All in all the democratisation process in both Nigeria and south Korea were conflict ridden. This was as a result of the nature and character of democratisation pursued by the democratizing regimes in both countries. President Chun Doo Hwan and General Babangida had a common agenda of perpetuating themselves in office. Both leaders did everything to give an appearance of commitment to democracy, while in actuality they were trying to supplant their -democratic transition projects through clandestine means, to prolong

their stay in office. In other words, President Chun Doo Hwan and Babangida were interested in transiting their countries to democracy only to the extent to which they would remain in office.

However, insecurity in both countries during the regimes of Chun (and later Roh-Tae-Woo) and Babangida were caused as much by the nature of democratisation they presided over, and this was evidenced by the absence of substantial support from within and outside the south korean and Nigerian societies. The security reality of the two countries was a function of internal factors and external factors, such as threats from neighbouring countries. Particularly in the case of south korea, the direct pressures mounted by the United States governments, to democratise was really influential in determining the outcome of events in the struggle for democracy. The threats from Neighbouring North korea imposed additional responsibility on the Chun government to maintain political stability in south korea, since any prolonged crisis could provide opportunity for the North korean troops to infiltrate south korea.

Also, aside from the internal schisms and skirmishes in Nigeria, which were accentuated by the contradictions inherent in the Babangida transition programme, there were threats of external invasion across some northern borders such as the Maitatsine from Niger Republic and the south- south region of the country such as the Cameroun's gendarme over the oil rich Bakassi region. Although, these threats were contained, they still added to the apparent state of insecurity. The Babangida regime in additon to the implementation of wrong economic policies, squandered no less than N44 billion on its tortuous democracy project - a project that ended up

endangering the corporate existence of Nigeria with all its implications for the country's security. It is also clear that, in the Nigerian context, political participation in the democratisation process was low, while extra-institutional participation (through riots, protests etc) was high.<sup>3</sup> The top down nature of the Babangida democracy project smacked of conspiracy against popular participation in favour of limited political liberalisation.<sup>4</sup> And in another sense, the low level of institutional process can be explained as a consequence of the growing economic impoverishment of a good number of Nigerians.<sup>5</sup>

Democratization in south korea on the other hand conformed with the theories of the modernisers that democracy is achievable in societies which are experiencing socio-economic development and industrialisation<sup>6</sup>. The south korean democratisation was a product of its economic development and attainment of technological advancement. And as we pointed out in chapter five of this thesis, economic development of korea undermined the Chun government's authority, as the koreans became more assertive sequel to their improved standard of living and the vibrancy of south korea's civil society<sup>7</sup>. Public awareness in South Korea increased as a result of the development of mass media organisations and indeed increased economic growth and technological advancement<sup>8</sup>.

Overall, the economic factor played a significant role in both Nigerian and korean democratization. While the economic development propelled the struggle for democracy in korea, the lack of it fuelled anti-military and pro-democracy struggles in Nigeria.

## 6.20. DEMOCRATISATION AND ETHNICITY/REGIONALISM

We noted in chapter four that the Nigerian democratization experience under the Babangida regime threw up intense ethnic competition among the diverse ethnic groups in Nigeria, but more pronounced among the major ethnic identities (Hausa-Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba). The political history of the country's domination by the northern Hausa/Fulani tribe since 1960 cast a slur on the integrity of General Babangida, a northerner (of Gwari extraction), who was perceived by the southern ethnic groups as a partial supervisor of his democracy project. Every effort of the Babangida regime to portray itself as being disinterested in any ethnic agenda was read by many associational and non-associational groups in the southern part of Nigeria as a northern ploy to consolidate its hold on the country. Mingled with the ethnicity problem was the North-South regional rivalry, which has continued to haunt the country since its attainment of independence<sup>10</sup>.

The introduction of 'zoning system' of power sharing within the two government founded and funded political parties (SDP and NRC) by the Babangida regime was to allay fears of northern political domination of the country-fears expressed by southern politicians. But in practice the arrangement did not contain fears and allegations of ethno-regional domination of the Presidency<sup>11</sup>. Thus, when eventually the final transitional election - the June 12 presidential election result, which was presumably won by Chief M.K.O. Abiola, a Yoruba business magnate from the south western part of Nigeria - was annulled by President Babangida, there emerged a renewed fervour of ethnic acrimonies and hostilities across the country<sup>12</sup>.

In the case of south korea, regionalism has become entrenched in the political life of the koreans, since the liberation of korea from the Japanese in 1945. Despite its ethnic homogeneity, south korea has been polarised along regions or provinces, and koreans attach preeminence to their regions of birth than any other identification marks. As we observed in chapter three and five, there exist in south korea a disturbing trend of regional rivalry especially between the cholla and the non-cholla communities<sup>13</sup>. Successive south korean presidents since 1960 till 1994 were all from the non-cholla communities in south korea<sup>14</sup>.

Additionally, koreans have always voted along regional lines. Regional block voting has remained a recurring decimal in the electoral behaviour of south koreans. Indeed the regional rivalries between the cholla and non-cholla provinces have always carried along with it a sense of enmity and bitterness. Also regionalism in korean politics has hindered the growth of political institutions as political parties are mere representatives of regional interests. But it is remarkable that despite the regional differences koreans fought eventually against the Chun authoritarian rulership. The restoration of democracy in 1987 was a consequence of the unanimous and relentless struggles of the koreans for democracy<sup>17</sup>. All in all, ethnicity and regionalism were utilised by the authoritarian leaders to divide the civil society and delay or abort the transition to democracy. In Nigeria the abortion of the Babangida transition to democracy project had ethnic undertone. While in south korea, regionalism delayed the transition to democracy.

### 6.30. DEMOCRATISATION AND REGIME INTEREST

Democratisation in our countries of reference reflected the interests of the supervisors of the democratisation process: particularly in Nigeria during the Babangida regime, the transition to democracy project was subject to the whims and caprices of President Babangida. As we pointed out in chapter four, the democratization process of the Babangida years in Nigeria was manipulated by General Babangida in a manner supportive of his interest. On more than two occasions the transition time table was subjected to change by the regime. For instance, the handing over date (the end of the transition programme and the exit of General Babangida) was shifted from 1990-1992, and then to August 1993. Although the regime tried to justify the shifts, but with the benefit of the hindsight, it has become clear that General Babangida was merely interested in prolonging or perpetuating himself in power<sup>18</sup>.

All the political devices that the regime introduced such as the two government funded political parties, and open-ballot open-queing voting system were meant for building a new class of politicians that could easily be manipulated and made compliant. Thus, the emergent political class under the Babangida regime was supportive of the regime. With this pliable political class, General Babangida believed he could transform into the civilian President of the country. When the June 12 Presidential election result was annulled on the 23<sup>rd</sup> of June 1993, just the same way he cancelled the results of the Presidential primaries in 1992, it then became clear that General Babangida had a hidden agenda of maintaining his regime in power<sup>19</sup>.



The case of South Korea was not different from that of Nigeria. President Chun-Doo-Hwan was firmly in control of the democratization process from 1980 to April, 1987. Chun manipulated the electoral process to achieve victory in the Presidential election of February 25, 1981. President Chun also used the state apparatus to suppress political opposition, as he concentrated powers in his hands. As we noted in chapter five, the Chun authoritarian rulership peaked in 1986, as the regime became more committed to its plan of succeeding itself<sup>20</sup>. But the more the Chun government tried to incapacitate the opposition forces, the more violent they became. The decision of President Chun to renege on his earlier plans of effecting constitutional revision led to a spate of crises. Indeed, the April 13, 1987 Declaration suspending constitutional debates on the political future of Korea was rejected by both the parliamentary oppositional groups and extra-parliamentary opposition forces in the Korean civil society<sup>21</sup>.

Consequently, as President Chun discovered that he could no longer maintain his hold on power, he then stepped aside for General Roh-Tae-Woo who, in his June 29 Pro-democracy Declaration, restored relative calmness in Korea for a brief period. The final conclusion of the transition to democracy project in South Korea was sequel to the conduct of the December 16, 1987 presidential election through direct electoral system<sup>22</sup>.

In both countries, the leadership conceived of a plan to retain and perpetuate their hold on power. Thus, regime interests and not the national interest, guided the implementation of the transition to democracy projects of both Generals Babangida and Chun Doo-Hwan.

#### 6.40. DEMOCRATISATION AND MASS PROTESTS

The democratisation programme pursued by the Babangida regime in Nigeria, as we have argued in chapter four was crisis ridden. The anti-democratic machinations of the regime's transition programme - such as the imposition of two political parties; the open voting system and the Structural Adjustment Programme - heightened widespread disenchantment with the Babangida regime<sup>23</sup>. The popular resentment of SAP was accentuated by the palpable signs of continuing corruption and lack of accountability in governance, coupled with the authoritarian manner in which economic reform policies were imposed on the country by the Babangida regime<sup>24</sup>.

The ethno-regional orientation of the Babangida regime despite claims by the regime to the contrary, and the suspicion among the southern ethnic groups that General Babangida was pursuing an ethnic agenda, evidently undermined the credibility of the Babangida Administration. Also, the authoritarian repression of public protests by the regime, portrayed the Babangida government as a dictatorial regime in all its ramifications. Thus, when the regime annulled the presidential election results on 23<sup>rd</sup> June, 1993, the pent up anger of the pro-democracy groups domiciled in Lagos was let loose<sup>25</sup>. The series of endless violent protests and demonstrations, which engulfed the western parts of Nigeria, and some isolated cases in Edo and Delta states, threatened the corporate existence of the country. The intermittent protests with its high casualties in western Nigeria rendered the country ungovernable for almost six months since the annulment of the election results till the emergence of General Abacha's regime on 17<sup>th</sup> November, 1993<sup>26</sup>.

As we have shown in chapter five, the democratisation process in south korea, which commenced during Chun regime was undertaken in a manner promotive of the interest of President Chun Doo-Hwan. Although at the initial stage, the Chun regime intended to carry out constitutional revision and ensure the implantation of democratic practice in korea through the direct election of the president, but on the 13<sup>th</sup> April, 1987, President Chun Doo-Hwan called off the constitutional debates<sup>27</sup>. This action was interpreted by the opposition forces as an attempt by President Chun to perpetuate himself in office beyond 1987. Consequently, the hitherto low ebb of public protestations and demonstrations heightened. There were numerous cases of violent demonstrations against the Chun government with the active participation of the members of the middle class, students, white-collar workers, industrial workers and farmers<sup>28</sup>. The violent demonstrations by the opposition forces in south korea did not only undermine the legitimacy of the Chun government, it also threatened the security of the country and its people. Yet, the crises of democratic transition in south korea were taking place in an environment of territorial insecurity, in which the North Korean troops have always remained ready to infiltrate south korea at the slightest opportunity<sup>29</sup>.

The eventual pro-democracy declaration by General Roh Tae-Woo on 29<sup>th</sup> June, 1987 did not put an end to democratic struggle. If anything, it encouraged broader participation of koreans in the struggle for the installation of democratic order in south korea. Thus, the expansion of democratic space and the growing process of industrialization in south korea were contributory to the decentralisation of the levels of violent protests<sup>30</sup>.

All in all, the democratisation experiences of Nigeria and south korea reflected the chronic crises of political legitimacy of the authoritarian regimes of Generals Babangida and Chun Doo-Hwan respectively. The experiences of Nigeria and South korea have also shown that the crisis of integration, mass poverty, hunger, misery and concomitant social and political instabilities (or chaos) can create both regime insecurity and national insecurity. Moreover, the democratization process being superintended by a receding authoritarian regime can easily relapse into extreme authoritarian rule. And such democratic reversals as it happened in Nigeria and South korea, created multiple and widespread crises which disrupted social, political and economic life of both countries. Thus, as we have argued in the preceding chapters, democratization activates the civil society's consistent and relentless opposition to every trace of authoritarianism. But the geatest opposition of the civil society has always been against undemocratic democratization, as the experiences of Nigeria and south korea have shown.

#### **6.50. DEMOCRATISATION AND EXTERNAL INFLUENCES**

In our countries of reference, democratisation was greatly influenced by external forces. In chapter four, we noted that foreign influences were discernible in the origination and indeed, the implementation of Nigeria's transition to civil rule programme. The International Financial Institutions (IFIS) such as the International Monetary fund (IMF) and World Bank instigated political and economic reforms in the developing countries of the world, through their stipulation of certain preconditions as criteria which must be met by prospective loan seekers in the developing countries. In deed, the developed democracies such as the United States,

Britain, Canada and France mounted consistent pressure on authoritarian regimes worldwide for political reforms. Thus, as we pointed out in chapter four, the Nigerian transition to democracy project was an attempt to work within the acceptable minimum standard of international behaviour.

The role of international election observers in contemporary times cannot be overemphasized. In countries where election results are often contested by the opposition political parties, and where the ruling parties do everything to retain political power, there is the need for an independent election observer group. As we showed in chapter four, the international election observers who monitored the June 12, 1993 presidential election in Nigeria represented a variety of foreign interests in Nigeria's democracy project. The International observers came from Britain, United States, France, Denmark, Canada, India, Belgium, China, Italy, Jamaica, Czechoslovakia, Australia, Netherlands and Philippines. These foreign observers reported favourably on the June 12, 1993 presidential election in Nigeria, and that made it difficult for the Babangida Administration to find any credible reasons for annulling the election afterwards. The International Community did not restrict its role to one of observing the election alone, it was visibly opposed to the annulment of the election result by the Babangida Administration. Series of sanctions were imposed on Nigeria by the United States, Britain, Canada and indeed the European Community sequel to the annulment of the June 12, 1993 Presidential election result. Furthermore, the international community intensified its opposition to the Babangida Administration and demanded an end to military rule in Nigeria. No doubt the sanctions imposed on Nigeria and in particular the Nigerian military, had tremendous impact on the Babangida Administration. In fact, the inability of the Babangida Administration to

extend its terminal date was partly as a result of the relentless pressure of the international community and the Nigerian civil society on the Babangida Administration.

In the case of South Korea, the effects of the international community on Korean democratisation were not different. As we pointed out in chapter five, some international occurrences impacted on the Korean society and influenced the opposition forces and the political leadership in the direction of democratic reforms. The fall of President Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines in February, 1987 which resulted from the concerted efforts of the opposition forces, had great impact on the development of oppositional politics in Korea. Secondly, the United States withdrew its support from the authoritarian regime of General Chun-Doo Hwan, following the reduction in the East-West ideological rivalry between the US and the USSR.

Subsequently, the US Ambassador to South Korea met with opposition forces in Korea and gave Filip to the Korean Civil Society's struggle for democracy. Another important event that accentuated the struggle for democracy in Korea was the hosting of 1988 Olympics which was scheduled to hold in Seoul. The Korean Civil Society was agitated that President Chun-Doo Hwan wanted to use the 1988 Seoul Olympics to promote his legitimacy and international credibility. Therefore, the Korean opposition forces resolved to create unfavourable political climate in South Korea – an action which might warrant the cancellation of South Korea's bid to host the 1988 Olympics.

Consequently, President Chun had to concede to the demands of the opposition forces by continuing the constitutional revision and accepting to hold the next presidential election through the direct election system. The concession by the Chun-leadership in Korea was meant to secure the bid of

south Korea to host the 1988 Olympic games as well as to douse the flame of public protest. No doubt, these concessions as we pointed out in chapter five formed the bedrock for the eventual completion of democratic transition in South Korea. Also, as we noted previously, the success of democratisation in South Korea is explainable as a function of the relentless struggle of the Korean Civil Society and the potent pressure exerted on the authoritarian government of Chun-Doo Hwan by the United States. In both Nigeria and South Korea, the success of democratisation elsewhere created impetus for democratic struggle in these two societies. In the case of Nigeria, the seeming reluctance of the Babangida Administration to concede to the demands of the Nigerian electorate, incurred the wrath of the international community. And in the case of South Korea, the Chun government yielded to the demands of the Korean Civil Society in order to avert sanctions from the international community. Therefore, as we have seen in the two societies, externalities played significant role, either directly or indirectly in the determination of the outcome of their democratic transition projects.

From the foregoing, it is evident that the international community played purely complementary role in the democracy projects of Nigeria and South Korea, while the major prompting for democratic reforms came from their civil societies.

## ENDNOTES

1. See Claude Ake, "The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa," Keynote Address at the Symposium on Democratic Transition in Africa, organised by the Centre for Research, Documentation and University Exchange, University of Ibadan, 16-19 June, 1992.
2. Kunle Amuwo, "The International (And Domestic) context of Democratic Transition in Africa: Roads Blocks to Democracy", in B Caron, A Gboyega, and E, Osaghae (eds), Democratic Transition in Africa , (Ibadan, CREDU, Institute of African Studies 1992), pp.3-27.
3. 14 Million Nigerians voted at the 1993 June 12 Presidential Elections. The two government-funded political parties had less than 5 million members. See Tunji Olagunji, Adele Jinadu & Sam Oyovbaire, Transition to Democracy in Nigeria (1985-1993), (Ibadan pectrum Books Ltd, 1993), p 21.
4. Larry Diamond, "Beyond Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism: Strategies for Democratisation," in B. Roberts (eds), The New Democracies: Global Change and US Policy, (Cambridge, M.A. The M.T. Press, 1990), pp.227-249.
5. Claude Ake, Democratization of Disempowerment, (Lagos: Malthouse Publishers Ltd. 1994).
6. Seymour Martin, Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981 Expanded edition), pp. 31-34.
7. Chalmers Johnson, "South Korean Democratisation: The Role of Economic Development," Pacific Review, 2(1), 1989, pp. 3-4.
8. Lawrence, Krause and Tun-jen, Cheng, "Development and Democracy: Special Attention to Korea," A Paper presented at the International Conference on Korea's Democratic Experiment. Asiatic Research Centre of Korea University, and Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, Seoul, Korea, June 27-28, 1991, pp. 3-4.



9. See Rotimi Suberu, "Federalism, Ethnicity and Regionalism," in Paul A. Beckett, and Crawford Young, (eds), Dilemmas of Democracy, (Rochester, N.Y. University of Rochester Press, 1997), p. 343.
10. Rotimi Suberu, "The Travails of Federalism in Nigeria," Journal of Democracy, 4, (October 1993), pp. 39-53.
11. Ibid.
12. Julius Ihonvbere, "Are Things Falling Apart? The Military and the crisis of Democratisation of Nigeria," The Journal of Modern African Studies, 34, 2 1996, pp. 201.
13. Jang Jip Choi, "Political Cleavages in the South Korea," in Hagen Koo (ed), State and Society in Contemporary Korea, (London, Cornell University Press, 1993), pp.35.
14. Chung-in Moon, and Kang Mun-Gu, "Democratic opening and military intervention in South Korea: Comparative Assessment and Implications," in James Cotton (ed), Politics and Policy in the New Korean State: from Roh Tae-Woo to Kim Young Sam, (New York , Longman & St Martins's Press, 1995 ) pp.175-176.
15. See, Kim Jae-on, and B.C.Koh, Electoral Behaviour and Social Development in Korea: An Aggregate data Analysis of Presidential Election," Journal of Politics, Vol. 34, No. 3 (1972), PP. 825-59: See also James Cotton, "Regionalism in Electoral Politics," in James Cotton (ed.) Korea Under Roh Tae-Woo: Democratization, Northern Policy, and Inter-Korean Relations, (Australia, Camberra, Allen & Unwin Pty Ltd, 1993) pp.170 – 186.
16. Kim Byung-Kook, "Journey without a vision: Politics of Democratic Consolidation in korea," A paper presented at he conference on Democracy in East Asia, held in Washington D.C. March 14-15, 1996, p. 10.
17. Myungsoon, Shin, "Democratic Transition and consolidation in korean Politics," korea observer, Vol xxvii, No. 2 (Summer 1996), pp. 168-169.

18. Rotimi Suberu, "Crisis and Collapse: June -Nov. 1993," in Larry Diamond, A Kirk Green and Oyeleye Oyediran (eds), Transition Without End, (Ibadan, Vantage Publishers int. Ltd, 1996) p. 310.
19. Bayo Adekanye, "The Military in the Transition," in Larry Diamond, A, Kirk-Greene and Oyeleye Oyediran, (eds), Ibid; p. 51.
20. James Cotton, "From Authoritarianism to Democracy in South Korea," Political Studies, 37 (2), 1989, pp. 244-259.
21. Sun-Hoon Lee, "Transitional Politics of Korea, 1987-1992: Activation of Civil Society," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 66, No. 3 (Fall, 1993), pp. 353-354.
22. Myung-Soon Shin, "Democratization in Korean Politics; Presidential and Parliamentary Aspects," korea observer, 20 (1), 1989, pp. 111-112.
23. Reno Williams, "Old Brigades, Moneybags, Newbreeds and the Ironies of Reform in Nigeria," Canadian Journal of African Studies, xxvii, 1, 1993, pp. 66-87.
24. Larry Diamond, A Kirk-Greene and Oyeleye Oyediran, "Introduction: The Politics of Transition Without End" in Larry Diamond, A Kirk Greene and Oyeleye Oyediran (eds), op-cit, p. xxiii.
25. David Emelifeonwu, "1993: Crises and Breakdown of Nigeria's Transition to Democracy" in Paul A. Beckett, and Crawford Young, (eds), Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria (Rochester, N.Y. University of Rochester Press, 1997), p. 193.
26. Julius O. Ihonybere, "Are Things Falling Apart? The Military and the Crisis of Democratisation in Nigeria ," The Journal of Modern African Studies, 34, 2 (1996).
27. Okonogi Masao, "South Korea's Experiment in Democracy," Japan Review of International Affairs, (1), 1988, p. 30.
28. Chung-in Moon, and Young-Cheol, Kim, "A circle of paradox: Development, politics and Democracy in South Korea," in Adrian Leftwich (eds), Democracy and Development (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1996), pp.157-158.

29. Yong- Sup Han, "South Korea's New Security Strategy of Cooperation and Conflicts" in Yong-Soon, Yim, Jong-Ho, Yoon, Min Yong Lee, Sang-Gyoung, and Sung-Ham, Kim (eds), Security Environment in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century and Korea's Strategic Options,(Seoul: The Research Institute for International Affairs & The Korea Association of International Studies, 1997), pp. 292-293.

30. David I. Steinberg, "The Republic of Korea: Pluralizing Politics ," in Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset (eds), Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition) (Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner, 1995), pp. 365-415.

CODESRIA - LIBRARY

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

*Adamolekun, Ladipo*, The Fall of the Second Republic, (Ibadan, Spectrum Books Ltd, 1985).

*Adebayo T.O.* "A General Survey of the Economy" in M.O. Kayode & Y.B. Usman (eds), Nigeria Since Independence: The First 25 years Vol.II: (The Economy) (Ibadan, Heinemann Educational Books Nig. Ltd, 1989), pp. 14-27.

*Ademoyega, Adewale*, Why we Struck, (Ibadan, Spectrum 1980).

*Adeniran Tunde*, "Beyond the Transition: Possibilities and Limitations" in Omo Omoruyi, Dirk- Berg Schlosser, Adesina Sambo, and Ada Okwuosa, eds, Democratisation in Africa: Nigerian Perspective (Vol.1) (Abuja: Centre for Democratic Studies 1994) pp.238-246.

*Adeniran, Tunde*, "Nigeria and the United Nations" in G.O. Olusanya and R.A. Akindele eds, Nigeria's External Relations: The First Twenty Five years (Ibadan University Press, 1986), pp.71-80.

*Adekanye Bayo*, "The Military and Grassroots Democracy," A Paper Presented at a National Conference on Grassroots Democracy in Nigeria, organised at Abeokuta by the Department of Political Science, Ogun state University, Ago Iwoye, Ogun state Nigeria 23-25, July 1990.

*Adekanye, Bayo J*, "The Military" in Larry Diamond, A Kirk-Greene and Oyeleye Oyediran, eds, Transition Without End, (Lagos, Vantage Press, 1997).

*Adekanye, Bayo J*, "Elections in Nigeria: Problems Strategies and Options" Nigerian Journal of Electoral and Political Behaviour, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1990, pp 1-14.

*Adekanye, Bayo J*, "Dilemma of Military Disengagement" in Oyeleye Oyediran ed, Nigerian Government and Politics Under Military Rule 1966-1979, (Lagos, The Macmillan Press, 1988).

**Adewumi, Fumi**, "Organised Labour and the Democratisation Process in Nigeria" in Omo Omoruyi, Dirk-Berg Schlosser, Adesina Sambo, Ada Okwuosa, eds, Democratization in Africa: Nigerian Perspective. (Vol. 2) (Abuja: Centre for Democratic Studies, 1994) pp 162-177.

**Afolayan, Funsho** "Nigeria: A Political Entity and a Society" in Paul A. Beckett and Crawford Young eds, Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria, (U.K. University of Rochester Press 1997).

**Agbaje Adigun**, "Party Systems and Civil Society in Beckett and Crawford Young eds, Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria (Rochester, N.Y. University of Rochester Press 1997).

**Ahn Byung-Joon**, "Industrialization, and Political Parties in Korea, Korean Social Science Journal, 13, (1986-1987), pp. 33-40.

**Ahn Byung-Joon**, Political Changes and Industrialization in South Korea" Korean Social Science Journal, No. 10, (1983), Pp. 41-45.

**Ajene, U.G**, "Political Parties and Federalism" in J. Isawa Elaigwu, and G.N. Uzoigwe , eds, Foundations of Nigerian Federalism 1900-1960 (Vol. 2), (Abuja, National Council on Intergovernmental Relations, (1996) pp 189-208.

**Ake, Claude**, Democratisation of Disempowerment (Lagos, Malthouse 1994). Ake, Claude, "The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa" Keynote Address at the Symposium on Democratic Transition in Africa, Organised by the Centre for Research, Documentation and University Exchange, University of Ibadan, 16-19 June, 1992.

**Akinbobola, Ayo**, "Ethnicity, Politics and Trade Union Advocacy" in Adebayo Ninalowo ed, The Quest for Democratization: Military Governance and Trade Unionism (Lagos Friedrich Ebert foundation 1996) pp 88-92.

**Akindele S.T.** "Democracy and Imaginary Thinking in Nigeria: A Critical X-Ray of Issues and Facts" in Omo Omoruyi, Dirk-Berg Schlosser, Adesina Sambo and Ada, Okwuosa, eds, Democratisation in Africa: Nigerian Perspective.(Vol.1) Abuja: Centre for Democratic Studies, 1994.

*Alkali R.A.*, "The World Bank and Structural Adjustment in Nigeria: Lessons for Vision 2010" Africa Peace Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, April, 1997.

*Aluko, Olajide*, "Nigeria and the Organisation of African Unity" in G.O. Olusanya, and R.A. Akindele, eds, Nigeria's External Relations: The First Twenty Five years (Ibadan, University Press, 1986) pp 87-97.

*Almond, Gabriel A.*, and Sidney Verba The Civic Culture Revisited (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1989) Almond, Gabriel, and Bingham G. Powell, Comparative Politics: A Development Approach, (Boston, Little Brown & Co. 1966).

*Almond Gabriel and Sidney Verba*, The Civic Culture, (Boston. Little Brown & Co. 1963).

*Amuta Chidi*, Prince of the Niger: The Babangida years (Lagos, Tanus Communications and Zomax Ltd, 1992)

*Amuwo, Kunle*, "The International (and Domestic) context of Democratic Transition in Africa: Road Blocks to Democracy?" in B Caron, A Gboyega, and E. Osaghae, eds, Democratic Transition in Africa (Ibadan, CREU, Institute of African Studies, 1992) pp 3-27.

*Arat, Zehra F.*, Democracy and Human Rights in Developing Countries, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, Pub. 1991) pp. 30-39.

*Aremu, Issa*, "The Structural Adjustment Programme and Nigerian Labour" in R. Omotayo Olaniyan, Chibuzor N. Nwoke eds, Structural Adjustment Programme in Nigeria: The Impact of the SFEM on the Economy (Lagos, NIIA Press, 1992).

*Aribisala Femi*, "Nigeria and West Germany" in G.O. Olasanya, and R.A. Akindele eds, Nigeria's External Relations: The First Twenty five years (Ibadan, University Press, 1986, pp.308-318).

*Asobie, H, Assisi*, "Nigeria and the Non-Aligned Movement" in G.O. Olusanya and R.A. Akindele eds, Nigeria's External Relations: The First Twenty five years (Ibadan, University Press, 1986) pp. 141-164.

*Ate, Bassey*, "Nigeria and the United States: A Theoretical Framework for the Analysis of Twenty five years of their relationship" in G.O. Olusanya and R.A. Akindele eds, Nigeria's External Relations: The First Twenty five years (Ibadan, University Press, 1986) pp. 233-248.

*Awolowo Obafemi*, Path to Nigerian Freedom (London, Faber & Faber, 1947).

*Ayu, I.D. and Sam Egwu*, "The Debt Crisis and the Crisis of Democracy in Nigeria" in A.T. Gana and S.G. Tyoden (eds), Towards the Survival of the Third Republic (Jos: Source Publications, 1990).

*Babangida I.B.* "The Grassroots Democratic Party System and the Dawn of a New Socio-Political Order" in For Their Tomorrow We Gave Our Today: Selected Speeches of IBB, Vol II, (Ibadan, London/Accra, Safari Books Ltd, 1991).

*Babangida I.B.* "The Search for a New Political Order" in Portrait of a New Nigeria: Selected Speeches of IBB (Lagos, Precision Press 1989).

*Badejo, Babafemi*, "Party Formation and Competition" in Larry Diamond, A. Kirk-Greene and Oyeleye Oyediran, eds, Transition Without End (Ibadan, Vantage Publications, 1996)

*Baek Yong-Chun & Min Yong Lee*, "Civil-Military Relations in Korea: Issues and Alternatives" Pacific Focus Vol. IV, No. 2 (Fall, 1989) pp. 35-48.

*Bako, Sabo*, "Muslims, States and the Struggle for Democratic Transition in Nigeria From Cooperation to Conflict" in Paul A. Beckett and Crawford Young, eds, Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria (Rochester, N.Y, University of Rochester Press, 1997).

*Baloyra A. Enrique*, "Dilemmas of Political Transition in Elsa Vador" Journal of International Affairs, Winter, 1985, Vol 38, pp. 221-242.

*Bangura Yusuf*, "Authoritarian Rule and Democracy in Africa: A Theoretical Discourse" in Peter Gibbon, Yusuf Bangura, Arve Ofstad, eds, Authoritarianism Democracy, and Adjustment (Uppsala Scandinavian Institute of African Studies 1992).

**Bangura Yusuf**, "Structural Adjustment and the Political Question," Review of African Political Economy, Vol, 37, December, 1986. Pp. 24-37.

**Banjo Wale Segun**, Nigeria: Political Violence in the Third Republic (Lagos, Afreb Publishers 1997).

**Bayart, Jean-Francios**, "The Historicity of African Societies." Journal of International Affairs, Summer, 1992, Vol 46, pp. 55-79

**Beckett, Paul & Crawford Young**, "Introduction: Beyond the Impasse of Permanent Transition in Nigeria" in Paul A. Beckett and Crawford Young eds, Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria (U.K, University of Rochester, Press, 1997) pp 1-5.

**Bennet, John I**, "Economic Development in the Republic of Korea" in Thomas W. Robinson ed, Democracy & Development in East Asia (Washington DC: The AEI Press, 1991) pp. 119-121.

**Bratton Michael**, "Beyond the State: Civil Society and Associational Life in Africa," World Politics, 41, (3), 1989, pp 407-429.

**Bratton, M & Van de Walle**, "Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa" World Politics 46, 1994, pp. 453-489.

**Bridges Brian**, "East Asia In Transition: South Korea in lime light" International Affairs, 64 (3) 1988, pp.383-394.

**Burmeister, L.L**, "Korea Agricultural Cooperatives in Transition: Shifting Corporatist Foundations?, A Paper Presented at a Conference on Authority and Exchange in Korea: International Relations Programme, East-West Centre, Honolulu, Hawaii, Jan 3-5, 1991.

**Burton Michael G. & John Higley**, "Elite Settlements," American Sociological Review, 52, (3), 1987; pp297-307.

**Burton, Michael G. and Jai P. Ryu**, "South Korea's Elite Settlement and Democratic Consolidation," Journal of Political and Military Sociology, Vol. 25, No1, Summer, 1997, pp. 1-10.



**Buzo Adrian,** "South Korea: An opening of the Political Progress?" Current Affairs Bulletin 64 (5) 1987, pp.16-19.

**Cardoso, Fernando** "Democracy in Latin America," Politics and Society, 15 (1) 1986 -7, pp. 23-41.

**Cardoso Fernando, H,** "Entrepreneurs and the Transition Process: The Brazilian Case" in O' Donnell, Guillermo, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds, Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives, (Baltimore; Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986) pp.137-153.

**Chalmers Johnson,** "South Korean Democratisation: The Role of Economic Development" Pacific Review , Vol. 2, No. 1, 1989, pp1-10.

**Chang Beak-San,** "Tear Gas Drops, Democracy Explodes : An inside Report on Korea's Democratic Movement's Advance," Ampo: Japan Asia Quarterly Review, 19, (2), 1987, pp. 45 - 49.

**Cheng, Tun-Jen** "Democratising the Quasi - Leninist Regime in Taiwan" World Politics, 4, (4), 1989, pp. 471 - 499.

**Cheng, Tun-jen, and Eun mee Kim,** "The Games of Democratisation: Suggestions from the case of South Korea," A paper Presented at the 1989 Convention of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, Hilton, September 1, 1989.

**Cho, Kisuk,** "Regionalism in Korean elections and Democratisation: An Empirical Analysis" Asian Perspective Vol. 22 No, 1 Spring 1998. Pp 140 - 145.

**Cho, Myung-Hyun,** "The New Student Movement in Korea: Emerging Patterns of Ideological Orientation in the 1980s," Korea' Observer, 20 (1) 1989.

**Chung Eun Sun** "Transition to Democracy in South Korea" Asian Profile, Vol.1, No. 17, 1989, Pp.26- 29

**Cohen Jerome, A and Edward J. Baker,** "US Foreign Policy and Human Rights in South Korea " in William Shaw, ed, Human Rights in Korea

(Cambridge, M.A. The East Asian Legal Studies Programme of the Harvard Law School, 1991)

**Cole C. David, and Princeton N. Lyman,** Korean Development: The Interplay of Politics and Economics, (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1971).

**Coleman, James, S.** Nigeria: Background to Nationalism (Benin City, Broburg & Wistrom, 1986).

**Cossa, Ralph** "Security Goals and Military Strategy of the US and Japan: Mutual Defence Teaties and Their Impact on Regional Security" in Tae-Hwan Kwak, ed, The Search for Peace and Security in North East Asia: Towards the 21<sup>st</sup> Century (Seoul, Kyungnan University Press, 1997)

**Costello Matthew J** "State Softness as a Product of Environmental Uncertainty: A Theory with Applications to Nigeria, Kenya and South Korea," The Journal of Developing Areas, 28, April, 1994, pp358-362.

**Cotton James,** "Introduction" in James Cotton ed, Korea under Roh Tae-Woo: Democratisation, Northern Policy and Inter-Korean Relations (Australia, Allen & Unwin Pty Ltd, 1993.)

**Cotton James,** "Regionalism in Electoral Politics" in James Cotton ed, Korea under Roh Tae-Woo: Democratisation, Northern Policy, and Inter-Korean Relations (Australia, Camberra, Allen and Unwin Pty Ltd, 1993) pp. 170-186.

**Cotton James,** "Understanding the State in South Korea: Bureaucratic-Authoritarian or state autonomy Theory?" Comparative Political Studies, 24:1991, pp512-531.

**Cotton James,** "From Authoritarianism to Democracy in South korea," Political Studies. Vol. Xxxvii, 1989, pp, 244-259.

**Crowder Michael,** The Story of Nigeria (London, Faber & Faber, 1996).

**Cutright P,** "National Political Development: Measurement and Analysis" American Sociological Review 28, (2), 1963, pp. 253-263,

**Dahl, Robert**, Democracy and its Critics, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1989.)

**Dahl, Robert A**, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1971) p67-68.

**Dare Leo**, "The 1964 Elections" in P Ekeh, P.D Cole and G.O Olusanya (eds) Nigeria Since Independence: The First Twenty five years Vol. 5 (Politics and the Constitution), (Ibadan; Heinemann, 1989.)

**Davydov, Oleg**, "South Korea: Capitalist Modernization and some Aspects of its Political Development," Far Eastern Affairs (2) 1988, pp.70-79.

**Deyo Fred**, "State and Labour: Modes of Political Exclusion in East Asian Development" in Fred Deyo ed, The Political Economy of the New Industrialism (Ithaca, N.Y Cornell University Press, 1987).

**Diamond, Larry**, "Postscript and Postmortem" in Larry Diamond, A. Kirk-Greene, and Oyeleye Oyediran, eds, Transition Without End (Ibadan, Vantage Pub. Int. Ltd, 1997) pp. 575-600.

**Diamond Larry**, "Nigeria: The Uncivic Society and the Descent into Praetorianism" in Larry Diamond, J. Linz, and S.M Lipset, eds, Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy, (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition) (Boulder, Lynne Rienner Pub. 1995)

**Diamond Larry**, "Nigeria's Search for a New Political Order," Journal of Democracy 2, 2 (Spring 1991).

**Diamond Larry**, "Nigeria's Perennial Struggle" Journal of Democracy, 11, 4 (Fall) 1991, pp,76-85.

**Diamond Larry**, "Beyond Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism; Strategies for Democratisation," in Brad Roberts ed, The New Democracies: Global Changes and US Policy (Washington quarterly Reader. The MIT Press, 1990) pp,220-230.

**Diamond Larry**, “Crisis, Choice, and Structure: Reconciling Alternative Models for Explaining Democratic Success and Failure in the Third World,” A Paper Presented at the 1989 Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, August 31-September 3, 1989.

**Diamond Larry**, “Introduction: Persistence, Breakdown, and Renewal” in Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martins Lipset, eds, Democracy in Developing Countries: Asia (Vol. 3) (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Pub. 1989) pp.1-52.

**Diamond Larry**, Class, Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria (London, Macmillan Press, 1988) pp. 1-14

**Diamond Larry, Anthony, Kirk-Greene & Oyeleye Oyediran**, “Introduction: The Politics of Transition Without End,” in Larry Diamond, A. Kirk-Greene, & Oyeleye Oyediran, eds, Transition Without End, (Ibadan, Vantage Pub. Int. Ltd. 1997)

**Diamond Larry, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset**, Democracy in Developing Countries, (Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner Pub. (1988).

**Diamond Larry, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Mar Martin Lipset**, “Building and Sustaining Democratic Government in Developing Countries: Some tentative Findings” World Politics, 150, (1), 1987.

**Dike, K.O.** 100 Years of British Rule in Nigeria 1850 - 1960 (Lagos, Government Printer, 1961).

**Dong, Wonmo**, “Regional cleavage in South Korea Politics” in Sang - young Choi ed, Democracy in Korea: Its ideals and realities (Seoul, the Korean political Science Association, 1997.

**Dong Wonmo**, “University Students in South Korean Politics: Patterns of Radicalisation in the 1980’s” Journal of International Affairs, 40, (2) 1987 pp242 - 248.

**Dudley, Billy, J**, An Introduction to Nigerian Government and politics (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1973.)

**Dudley, Billy, J**, Instability and Political order: Politics and Crisis in Nigeria (Ibadan, University Press, 1973)

**Eckstein, Susan**, "Power and Popular Protest in Latin America" in Eckstein Susan, ed, Power and Popular Potest: Latin America Social Movements (Berkeley, University of California Press 1989) pp. 1-60.

**Ekeh Peter**, "The Constitution of Civil Society in African History and Politics" in B. Caron A. Gboyega, and E. Osaghae, eds, Democratic Transition in Africa (Ibadan, CREU Institute of African Studies, 1992) pp.187 - 209.

**Ekeh, Peter**, "Colonialism and Development of Citizenship" in Onogu Otite ed, Themes in African social and Political Thought (Enugu, Fourth Dimension Pub. 1987), pp.318 - 328.

**Ekeh, Peter**, "Citizenship and Political Conflict " in Okpaku Joseph ed, Nigerian dilemmas of Nationhood (New York, The Third Press, 1974 ) pp.76 - 117.

**Ekuerhare, Bright**, "Second-tier foreign Exchange Market and Structure of Industrial Growth in Nigeria" in R. Omotayo Olaniyan, and Chibuzo N. Nwoke, eds, Structural Adjustment in Nigeria: The Impact of SFEM on the Economy, (Lagos, NIIA Press 1992).

**Elaigwu, Isawa J.** "Ethnicity and the Federal Option in Africa" in J. Isawa Elaigwu, P.C. Logams, and H.S. Galadima, eds, Federalism and Nation-Building in Nigeria: The Challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, (Abuja, National Council on intergovernmental Relations, 1994).

**Elaigwu, Isawa, J.** "The challenge of Unity in a Heterogeneous Society : The Case of Nigeria," Journal of Development Studies, Vol.2, No.2 , Oct. 1987, pp.78 - 93.

**Emelifeonwu, David**, "Crisis and Breakdown of Nigeria's Transition to Democracy " in Paul A Becett, and Crawford Young, eds Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria (Rochester, NY; University of Rochester Press 1997)

**Falola, T. and Julius Ihonvbere**, The Rise and Fall of Nigeria's Second Republic, (London, Zed Pub 1985).

**Faruqee, R.** "Nigeria : Ownership Abandoned" in Ishrat Hussain, et al, eds, Adjustment in Africa: Lesson from Country Case Studies, (The World Bank, Washington D.C. 1996)

**Forrest, Tom,** Politics and Economic Development in Nigeria, (Revised Edition), (Boulder: Westview: 1995)

**Foster-Carter, Aiden,** "Korea : From Dependency to Democracy?" Capital & Class (33) (1987 ), pp.15 – 18; Gboyega, Alex, "Local Institutions, Civil Society and Democratisation" in Paul A. Beckett, and Crawford Young, eds, Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria (Rochester Press, 1997)

**Gleysteen William H, and Alan D. Romberg,** "Korea: Asian Paradox," Foreign Affairs 65, (5) 1987 pp.1044 - 1054.

**Glickman Harvey,** "Issues in the analysis of Ethnic Conflict and Democratisation Process in Africa Today " in Harvey Glickman (ed), Ethnic conflict and Democratisation in Africa (Atlanta, Georgia, The African Studies Association Press, 1995) pp.1-31.

**Greenstein I. Fred, & Nelson W. Polsby,** Handbook of Political Science, (Reading, Mass Addison - Wesley, Pub Co. 1997).

**Gripp, Richard C,** "Political reform in three Asian Politics," Asian Profile 17 (2) 1989.

**Haggard Stephen and Chung-In Moon,** "Institutions and Economic Policy: Theory and a Korean Case Study," World Politics, 42, (2), 1990, pp.230 - 234.

**Hahm Chaibong** "Preparing for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: Korea's Political and Social Reforms," Korea and World Affairs, Spring 1996.

**Hahm, Chaibong, and Sang Young Rhyu,** "Democratic Reform in Korea : Theory and Practice," A paper presented at the concurrent Session on the 17<sup>th</sup> World Congress of IPSA Democratisation and Globalisation in Korea: Assessments and Prospects, August, 18 - 19, 1997.

**Halperin H. Morton,** "The Limiting Process in Korean War," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 78, 1963.

**Hamilton Clive, and Richard Tanter**, "The Antinomies of success in South Korea" Journal of International Affairs, 41, (1987) pp.66 - 68.

**Han, Sung-Joo**, "South Korea: Politics in Transition" in Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset (eds), Democracy in Developing countries (Vol.3) (Asia) (Boulder & Colorado, Lynne Rienner, 1989), pp. 267 - 303.

**Han, Sung-Joo**, "South Korea in 1987: The Politics of Democratisation" Asian Survey, 28, (1), 1988, pp.52 - 61.

**Han, Sung-Joo**, "Political Institutionalisation in South Korea, 1961 - 1984" in Robert A. Scalapino and Yusuf Wanadi, eds, Asian Political Institutionalisation (Berkeley, University of California: institute of East Asian Studies 1986) pp.116 - 137.

**Han, Sung-joo**, The Failure of Democracy in South Korea (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1974)

**Han, Yong-Sup**, "South Korea's New Security Strategy of Cooperation and conflict' in Young Soon Yim, Jong-Ho, Yoon, Min-Yong Lee, Sahng-Gyoun, Lee and Sung-Ham Kim, eds, Security Environment in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century and Korea's Strategic Options, (Seoul, The Research Institute for International Affairs & The Korea Association of International Studies, 1997).

**Hart-Landsberg, Martin**, "South Korea: Looking at the Left, "Monthly Review, 41, (3), 1989.

**Held, David**, "Democracy and Globalization," Alternatives , 16, (2), 1991, pp.201-208.

**Helgesen, Geir**, "Democracy and Authority in Korea: The Cultural dimension in Korean Politics (London, Richmod, Curzon Press, 1998).

**Henderson, Gregory**, "The Politics of Korea" in John Sullivan and Roberta Foss, eds, Two koreas - One future? (Lanhan, Md, University Press of America, 1987).

**Henderson, Gregory**, Korea : The Politics of The vortex (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1968)

**Herbst, Jeffrey**, "The Structural Adjustment of Politics in Africa," World Development, Vol. 18, No. 7, 1990, pp.949 - 958.

**Herman Edward S, and James Petras**, "Resurgent Democracy: Rhetoric and Reality" New Left Review, 154, 1985, pp.83 - 98.

**Higley, John And Michael G. Burton**, "The Elite Variable in Transition and Breakdown," American Sociological Review, 54(1) 1989, pp.12 - 32.

**Higley John and Gwen Moore**, "Elite Integration in the United States and Australia," American Political Science Review, 76 (1981) pp. 581 - 597.

**Huntington, Samuel P.** The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century, (Norman : University of Oklahoma Press, 1991) pp.65 - 69.

**Huntington, Samuel P.** "Democracy's Third Wave", Journal of Democracy, Vol 2, No.2, Spring, 1991)

**Huntington, Samuel P.** "The Context of Democratisation in Taiwan", Sino-America Relations, 16, (4), 1990, pp. 17 - 28.

**Huntngton, Samuel P.** "Will More Countries Become Democratic?" Political Science Quarterly, 99 (2) 1984, pp. 193 - 218.

**Hyun, Hong-Choo**, "Korea at the Threshold of Democratisation: A Case for Gradualism in Political Development" in Progress in Democracy : The Pacific Basin Experience (Seminar Series 87 - 88 ) ed. Iihae Institute, Seoul 1987.)

**Ibrahim Jibrin**, "Obstacles to Democratisation in Nigeria in Paul A. Beckett, and Crawford Young, eds, Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria (Rochester, N.Y. University of Rochester Press N.Y. University of Rochester Press 1997.

**Ibrahim Jibril**, "The Transition to Civilian Rule: Sapping Democracy" in Adebayo O. Olukoshi, ed, The politics of Structural Adjustment in Nigeria. (London, James Currey, 1993).



**Igwe, Isreal**, "The Military and Transition to Democratic Rule in Nigeria : A Comparative Assessment of the Transition to Civil Rule under the Obasanjo and Babangida Regimes" in Omo Omoruyi, Dirk-Berg Scholsser, Adesina Sambo, and Ada Okwuosa , eds, Democratisation in Africa. Nigerian Perspective (vol. 1) (Abuja, Centre for Democratic Studies, 1994) pp. 100 - 117.

**Ihonvbere O. Julius** , "Are things Falling Apart? The Military and the Crisis of Democratisation in Nigeria " The Journal of Modern African Studies 34, 2, (1996).

**Ihonvbere O. Julius**, "Economic Crisis, Structural Adjustment and Social Crisis in Nigeria," World Development, Vol.21, No .1, 1993.

**Ihonvbere O. Julius** , "A Critical Evaluation of the Failed 1990 Coup in Nigeria," The Journal of Modern African Studies xxiv, 4 (December), 1991, pp.601 - 26.

**Ihonvbere O. Julius**, and Olufemi Vaughan, Nigeria: Democracy and Civil Society, The Nigerian Transition Programme, 1985 – 1993" in John Wiseman, ed, Democracy and political Change in Sub-Saharan African (London, Routledge Pub. 1995), pp. 71- 91.

**Im Hyug Baeg**, "Korean Democratic Consolidation in Comparative Perspective," Korean Studies Workshop Lecture Notes (Seoul, Korea University & the Korea Foundation 1998)

**Im Hyug Baeg**, "Politics of Democratic Transition from Authoritarian Rule in Korea?" in Sang -Yong Choi, ed, Democracy in Korea: Its ideals and Realities (Seoul, The Korean Political Science Association, 1997).

**Im, Hyug Baeg**, "Opportunities and Constraints to Democratic Consolidation in South Korea," A Paper Presented at the Centre for Korean Studies, University of California, Berkeley, April 3, 1997.

**Im, Hyug Baeg**, "Politics of Democratic Transition from Authoritarian Rule in South Korea," Korean Social Science Journal , Vol. 21, 1995.

**Im, Hyug Baeg**, "Economic Globalisation and the Vulnerability and democracy " Paper presented at the Roundtable Discussion at the

International Forum for Democratic Studies organised by the National Endowment for Democracy (1995).

**Im, Hyug Baeg**, "State, Labour and Capital in the consolidation of Democracy: A Search for Post-Authoritarian Industrial Relations in South Korea," A paper Presented at the Conference on Political Authority and Economic Exchange in Korea, East - West Centre, Honolulu Hawali, Jan 3 - 5, 1991.

**Im, Hyug Baeg**, "The Rise of Bureaucratic - Authoritarianism in South Korea" World Politics, xxxvi, 1987, pp 231 - 257.

**Jackson, H. Robert**, "Juridical Statehood in Sub-Saharan Africa," Journal of International Affairs, Summer, 1992, Vol 46, pp 55- 79.

**Jang Jip Choi**, "Political Cleavages in South Korea" in Hagen Koo, ed, State and Society in Contemporary Korea (London, Cornell University Press, 1993) pp. 33-50.

**Jeon, Kyongnam**, "Security Policy and Strategy of North and South Korea" in Tae-Hwan, Kwak (ed), The Search for Peace and Security in North -East Asia, (Seoul, Kyungnam University Press 1997)

**Jinadu Adele**, "Competitive Elections and the Multi-Party System in Nigeria" in Omo Omoruyi, Dirk-Berg Schlosser, Adesina Sambo, and Ada Okwuosa, eds, Democratisation in Africa: Nigerian Perspective (Vol. 1) (Abuja : Centre for Democratic Studies, 1994)

**Jinadu Adele**, "Introduction: The NEC, Elections and the Transition Programme" in L. Adele Jinadu and Tony Edoh, eds, The 1987 - 1988 Local Government Elections in Nigeria (Lagos, Federal Electoral Commission, 1990)

**Jo Ji Hun**, The Youth and Student Movement of the Late 1980's (Seoul : Hyeongseongsa, 1989) pp. 16 - 28.

**Joseph Richard**, "Africa : The Rebirth of Political Freedom" Journal of Democracy 2,4, Fall, 1991, pp.13 - 18.

**Joseph Richard**, Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria (Cambridge University Press, 1987.)

**Joseph Richard**, "Class, State and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria," The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics xxi 3 (Nov, 1983). Pp. 21 - 38.

**Joseph Richard** "Affluence and underdevelopment : The Nigerian Experience," The Journal of Modern African Studies xvi, 2 (June , 1978) pp.221 - 239.

**Kang, Peter, K** "Political and corporate Group Interests in South Korea's Political Economy," Asian Profile 16, (3), 1988, pp.219 - 23.

**Karl, Terry Lynn, and Phillippe C. Schmitter**, "Models of Transition in Latin America, Southern And Eastern Europe," International Social Science Journal, 43, (2) 1991.

**Karl Terry Lynn**, "Dilemmas of Democratisation in Latin America," Comparative Politics, 23, (1), 1990, pp1 - 21.

**Kim Byong-Kook**, "A Journey Without a Vision: Politics of Democratic Consolidation in Korea" A paper presented at the Conference on Democracy in East Asia Held in Washington D.C. March 14 - 15, 1996.

**Kim, Chong Lim**, "Politics for Democratic Change" in Kim IIPyong and Young Whan Kihl, eds, Political Change in South Korea, (New York, The Korea PWPA, Inc. 1988) pp.44 - 74.

**Kim Chong Lim**, ed. The Political Participation in Korea: Democracy, Mobilization, and Stability (Santa Barbara, Calif, UIO Press 1980)

**Kim, Eugene C.I.**, "The South Korean Military and its Political Role" in Kim IIPyong and Young Whan Kihl, eds, Political Change in South Korea (New York: The Korean PWPA, Inc. 1988) pp.85 - 113.

**Kim, Eugene C.I.** "South Korea in 1986: Preparing for a Power Transition" Asian Survey, 17, (1), 1987.

**Kim Eugene, C.I.** “South Korea in 1985: An Eventful year Amidst Uncertainties” Asian Survey, 16, (1), 1986 pp.67 - 70.

**Kim Eugene, C.I.**, “Government and Politics” in Han-kyo Kim, ed, Studies on Korea: A Scholar’s Guide, (Honolulu; University Press of Hawai. 1980, pp.301 - 307.

**Kim Eugene C. I.**, “The Value Congruity of ROK Civilian and former Military Party elites,” Asian Survey Vol.18 No.8 (August 1987)

**Kim, Eugene C.I. & Young Whan Kihl**, eds, Party Politics and Elections in Korea (Silver Spring Md, Research Institute on Korean Affairs, 1976)

**Kim, Eun Mee** Big Business, Strong State: Collusion and Conflict in South Korean Development (1960 – 1990) (Albany: State University of New York Press 1997), especially Chapter 12.

**Kim, Hee-Min**, “A Theory of Government Driven Democratisation : The Case of Korea” World Affairs, Vol. 156, No.3, Winter, 1994,pp 130 - 140.

**Kim, Hong Nak**, “The 1988 parliamentary Election in South Korea” Asian Survey 29,(5) 1989 pp.491-498.

**Kim Hong Nak**, “Political Changes in South Korea and their Implication for U.S - Korean Security Relations,” Korea and World Affairs. 11 (4) 1987.

**Kim, Hong-Nak and Sun-Ki Choe**, “Urbanization and Changing Voting Patterns in South Korean Parliamentary Elections” Journal of North East Asian Studies, Vol.6, No.3, 1987, pp.33 - 50.

**Kim-II-Sung’s Selected Works (Volume 5)** ( Foreign Languages, Publishing House, Pyongyang, Korea, 1970).

**Kim, Jae-on and BC Koh**, “Electoral Behaviour and Social Development in South Korea: An Aggregate data analysis of Presidential Election “Journal of Politics, Vol 34, No 3, 1993

**Kim, Joungwon A.** Divided Korea: The Politics of Development 1945 - 1972 (Cambridge, Mass, Harvard Press 1976.

**Kim, Sang Joon**, "Characteristic Feature of Korean Democratisation"  
Asian Perspective Vol. 18 No2, Fall - winter, 1994 pp.181 - 196.

**Koehn, Peter**, Competitive Transition to Civilian Rule : Nigeria's First and Second experiments," The Journal of Modern African Studies, xxviii (3), 1989, pp. 401 - 430.

**Koh, B.C**, "The 1985 Parliamentary Election in South Korea," Asian Survey, 25 (9) 1985. pp.889-892.

**Koo, Hagen**, "Introduction: Beyond State - Market Relations" in Hagen Koo, ed, State and Society in Contemporary Korea (London, Cornell University Press, 1993).

**Koo, Hagen**, "Strong State and contentious Society" in Hagen Koo, ed, State and Society in contemporary Korea ( Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993)

**Koo, Hagen**, "Middle Classes, Democratisation and Class Formation: The Case of South Korea" Theory and Society 20 (1991) pp.486 - 492.

**Koo, Hagen**, "From farm to Factory : Proletarianisation in Korea"  
American Sociological Review 55(1990) pp 10 - 12.

**Koo, Hagen and Hyun-Chin, Lim** "Labour and Democratisation in South Korea" in J. Samuel Valenzuela, ed, Labour Movements in Recent Transition to Democracy (Notre Dame, IL: University of Notre Dame, 1992) 17 - 27.

**Krause Lawrence, and Tun-jen, Cheng**, "Development and Democracy : Special Attention to Korea," A paper presented at the International Conference of Korea's Democratic Experiment (Asiatic Research Centre of Korea University and Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, Seoul Korea, June 27-28 1991)

**Kuk, Minho**, "The Governmental Role in the Making of Chaebol in the Industrial Development of South Korea," Asian Perspective, 13, (2), 1989.

**Kuznets, Paul, W**, "Government and Economic Strategy in Contemporary South Korea," Pacific Affairs 58 (1) 1985 pp.51-54.

**Kwang, Bae Sun, & J Cotton** "Regionalism in Electoral Politics" in James Cotton, ed, Korea Under Roh Tae-Woo: Democratisation Northern Policy and Inter-Korean Relations, (Australia, Canberra, Allen & Unwin Pty Ltd, 1993) pp 170 - 186.

**Lee, Chin Mikyung**, "Legitimacy Crisis in Authoritarian Regimes," Ph.D Dissertation, University of California, Berkley 1988.

**Lee, Chong-Sik** "South Korea 1979: Confrontation, Assassination, and Transition" Asian Survey, Vol.20, No.1, 1980, pp.60 - 68.

**Lee Eun Kyoung & June Hyoung Rhie**, "Democratic Transition and Civil - Military Relations: Partnership or Confrontation?" Pacific Focus Vol. iv No.2 (Fall, 1989)

**Lee Jong-Ryool**, "Recent Political Development in Korea," Korea and World Affairs 9(3) 1985.

**Lee, Kap-yun**, "Democratisation, Party failure, and the Emergence of the Unification National Party" Korea World Affairs, Vol. Xviii, No.4, Winter, 1994, pp 751 - 759.

**Lee, Sook-Joung**, "Political Liberalization and Economic Development in South Korea," A paper presented at the 88<sup>th</sup> Atlanta Annual meeting of the American Sociological Association in August 24 - 28, 1988.

**Lee, Su-Hoon**, "Transitional Politics of Korea, 1987-1992: Activation of Civil Society," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 66, No. 3, Fall, 1993.

**Lerner, Daniel**, The Passing of Traditional Society; Modernising the Middle East (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1959).

**Lewis M. Peter**, "Politics and the Economy: a Downward Spiral " in Paul A. Beckett, and Crawford Young, eds, Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria (Rochester, NY University of Rochester Press, 1997).

**Lewis, M Peter**, "Economic Statism, Private Capital, and the Dilemmas of Accumulation in Nigeria," World Development, Vol.22, No.3, (March) 1994, pp 437 - 451.

**Lewis, M. Peter**, "From Prebendalism to Predation: The political Economy of Decline in Nigeria," The Journal of Modern African Studies 34,1, (1996).

**Lewis, M Peter**, "End game of Nigeria" The Politics of a Failed Democratic Transition," African Affairs 93, 1994.

**Lie John**, "Democratisation and its discontents: Origins of Present Crisis in South Korea," Monthly Review, February, 1991.

**Linz, Juan J.** "Innovation Leadership in the Transition to Democracy and a New Democracy: The Case of Spain," A Paper Presented at the Conference on Innovation Leadership and International Politics" of the Leonard Davids Institute for International Relations, Hebrew University , Jerusalem, June 8 - 10, 1987.

**Lipset, Seymour Martin**, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics, (Expanded edition,) (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981).

**Lummis C. Douglas**, "Development against Democracy" Alternatives 16, (1), 1991, pp.31 - 66.

**Mabogunje, A. L.** "Last Things First: A Re-appraisal of the fundamentals of Nigeria's Development Crisis" in Nigerian National Merit Award Lectures, vol. 2, Ibadan: Spectrum 1989.

**Macdonald Donald**, "Korea's Transition to Democracy", A paper presented at International Conference on Korea's Democratic Experiment (Korea, Seoul, June 27 – 28, 1991).

**MacDonald Donald**, The Korean Contemporary Politics and Society (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988) pp. 130 - 138.

**Magbadelo, Olushola**, "National Interest and the quest for Democracy in Nigeria: A Theoretical appraisal of Nigeria's Transition to Civil Rule Programme" in Omo Omoruyi, Dirk-Berg Schlosser, Adesina Sambo, and Ada Okwuosa, (eds), Democratisation in Africa: Nigerian Perspective (Vol. 1) (Abuja, Centre for Democratic Studies (1994) pp 56-62.

**Mainwaring, Scott**, "Transition to Democracy and Democratic Consolidation : Theoretical and Comparative Issues" Working paper 130, The Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, University of Notre Dame, 1989.

**Mamdani, Mahmood, Thandika Mkandawire, and Wambadia-Wamba**, Social Movements, Social Transformation and the Struggle for Democracy in Africa (Dakar, CODESRIA Working Paper 1/88)

**Manglapus, Raul S.**, Will of the People: Original Democracy in Non-Western Societies (New Delhil : Vikas Pub. Ltd. 1990).

**Manning, Stephen Dale**, "Democratizing the Leninist Party - State : The Political Economy of Reform in China and the Soviet Union," Ph.D dissertation University of Wiconson Madison.

**Mansfield D. Edward and Jack Snyder**, "Democratisation and War," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No.3, May-June, 1995, pp. 79 - 97.

**Masao Okonogi**, "South Korea's Experiment in Democracy," Japan Review of International Affairs, 2(1), 1988.

**Mason Edward**, et'al, eds, The Economic and Social Modernization of Republic of Korea (Cambridge, Mass ; Harvard University Council on East Asian Studies, 1980).

**Mccune, George.**, Korea Today (London, Allen & Unwin 1950).

**McCrone, Dolnald J, and Charles F. Crudde**, "Toward a Communications Theory of Democratic Political Development: A Causal Model," American Political Science Review, 61, (1), 1967, pp.72 - 79.

**McDonough, Peter, and Doh C. Shin**, "Conservative Democratisation And Transition to Mass Politics in Korea" in Sung Chul Yang, ed, Democracy & Communism: Theory, Reality and the Future (Seoul, The Korean Association of International Studies, 1995)

**Meade E. Grant**, American Military Government in Korea (New York: Harcourt Brace & Jovanovich, 1951.)



**Michaels Marguerite**, "Retreat From Africa," Foreign Affairs, Vol 72 No.1 1993..

**Mimiko Olufemi N.** "From Hard Authoritarianism to a Democradura: The dynamics of Democratic Consolidation in South Korea", The Korea Journal of International Studies Vol xxviii, (1), (1996), pp. 59 - 88.

**Momayesi, Naser**, "Unbalanced development and Democratic Consolidation in South Korea", Asian Thought & Society, 13, (38), pp.114 - 124.

**Momoh, Abubakar** "Some Associational Groups and the Transition to Civil Rule in Nigeria" in Omo Omoruyi, Dirk Berg Schlosser, Adesina Sambo & Okwuosa, (eds), Democratisation in Africa: Nigerian Perspectives (Vol. Two)(Abuja: Centre for Democratic Studies, 1994), pp178 - 201.

**Moody, Peter, R, Jnr**, Political opposition in Post Confucian Society (New York : Praeger, 1988).

**Moon, Chung-in**, "The Political Economy of Security on the Korean Peninsula in the Regional Context" in Andrew Mack, (ed), Asian Flashpoint: Security and the Korean Peninsula (Australian : Allen & Unwin, 1993)

**Moon, Chung-in** "Democratisation, National Security Politics and Civil – Military Relations : Some Theoretical Issues and the South Korean Case," Pacific Focus, 4 (2) Fall, 1989, pp. 1-12.

**Moon, Chung-in**, "South Korea: Between Security and Vulnerability" in James E. Katz, (ed), The Implications of Third World Defence Industrialization (Lexington Books, Lexington, MA 1986).

**Moon, Chung-in and Yon-Cheol, Kim**, "A Circle of Paradox: Development, Politics and Democracy in South Korea" in Adrian Leftwich, ed, Democracy and Development, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1996)

**Moon, Chung-in, and Kang Mun-Gu**, "Democratic opening and Military intervention in South Korea: Comparative Assessment and Implications" in James Cotton ed, Politics and Policy in the New Korean State: From Roh

Tae-Woo to Kiin Young Sam (New York, Longman and St Martin Press, 1995)

**Mosley, Paul**, "Policy - Making without Facts: A Note on the Assessment of Structural Adjustment Policies in Nigeria, 1985 - 1990", African Affairs, No 91, 1992.

**Muller, Edward, N**, "Dependent Economic Development, Aid Dependence on the United States, and Democratic breakdown in the Third World" International Studies Quarterly, 29, (4) 1985, pp445 - 469.

**Nahm, Andrew C**, "History" in The Far East and Australia 1998 (Nineteenth Edition) London: Europe Pub. Ltd. 1989, pp. 534 - 537.

**Nam, Chang-Hee**, "South Korea's Big Business Clientelism in Democratic Reforms" Asian Survey Vol. xxxvi, No. 4, April, 1995, pp.365 - 369.

**Nam, Koon Woo**, South Korean Politics: The Search for Political Consensus and Stability (Lanham, MD, University Press of America 1989)

**Neubauer, Deane, E**. "Some Conditions of Democracy," American Political Science Review, 61, (4), 1967, pp.100 - 1009.

**Mix Crystal**, "South Korea: United States Policy and the 1987 Presidential Elections", Harvard Human Rights Year Book (1) 1988).

**Nnoli, Okwudiba**, Ethnic Politics in Nigeria (Enugu, Forth Dimension Pub. Co. Ltd 1978).

**Uwabughuogu, Anthony I**, "Unitarianism Versus Federalism; A British Dilemma 1914 - 1954" in J. Isawa Elaigwu and G.N. Uzoigwe, eds, Foundations of Nigerian Federalism 1900 -1960 (Vol.2), (Abuja - National Council on Intergovernmental Relations, 1996)

**Nweke A.C.**, "Monitoring of Public Reactions to the National Electoral Commission's Report on Party Registration and Armed Forces Ruling Council Decision on the Report in Kano State", Nigerian Journal of Electoral and Political Behaviour, Vol. 1, No 1, September, 1990.

*Nwokedi Emeka*, "Nigeria and France " in G.O. Olusanya and R.A. Akindele, eds, Nigeria's External Relations: the First Twenty Five years (Ibadan, University Press, 1986) pp284 - 293.

*Obasanjo Olusegun*, Constitution for National Integration and Development (Lagos, Friends Foundation Pub. Inc, 1989).

*Obiozor George*, "Nigeria and South Korea, 1980 - 1985" in G.O. Olusanya and R.A. Akindele, eds, Nigeria's External Relations: The First Twenty five Years (Ibadan, University Press, 1986), Pp.451 - 458.

*O'Donnell, Guillermo & Phillippe C. Schmitter*, Transition from Authoritarian Rule : Tentative Conclusions and Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992).

*O'Donnell, Guillermo, Phillppe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead*, eds, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe (Baltimore; Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

*O' Donnell, Guillermo*, Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics (Berkeley University of California, 1973)

*Oh, Chang-Huh*, "The Institutional Basis of Democratisation in Korea" Korea Observer, xxvii, No 4, Winter, 1996.

*Oh, Jisoo*, "Korea and Democracy: An Examination of Attitude Adoptability" Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School, 1989.

*Oh, Kongdan*, "Security Strategies of South and North Korea: Through the Looking Glass" in Tae-Hwan Kwak, ed, The Search for Peace and security in North East Asia : Toward the 21<sup>st</sup> Century (Seoul, Kyungnam University Press, 1997)

*Olagunju, Tunji*, Adele Jinadu & Oyovbaire, Transition to Democracy in Nigeria (1985-1993) (Ibadan, Spectrum Books Ltd, 1993).

*Olaitan, Adewale*, "Reflections on the Democratisation Process in Africa", Social Analyst , Vol 1, No.2, January, 1992.

**Olaniyan R, Omotayo**, “Nigeria and the Economic community of West African States: A role and Problem Analysis” in G.O. Olusanya, and R.A. Akindele eds, Nigeria’s External Relations : The first Twenty - five Years (Ibadan ; University Press, 1986) pp. 126-140.

**Olukoshi Adebayo**, “Associational Life” in Larry Diamond, A.Kirk-Greene and Oyeleye Oyediran, eds, Transition Without End (Lagos, Vantage Press 1996) pp. 450 - 476.

**Olukoshi, Adebayo**, “The March to Adjustment in the Nigerian Economy” in A Olukoshi, ed, Crisis and Adjustment in the Nigerian Economy (Lagos, JAD Publishers, 1991)

**Oluleye James J.** Military Leadership in Nigeria 1966 - 79 (Lagos, University Press, 1985).

**Olusanya G.O.** “Nigeria and the Commonwealth” in G. O. Olusanya and R.A. Akindele, eds, Nigeria’s External Relations: The First Twenty five years (Ibadan, University Press, 1986), pp.141 - 164.

**Oluyemi - Kusa, A**, “The Structural Adjustment Programme of the Nigerian State” in Adebayo Olukoshi, R. Omotayo Olaniyan, and Femi Aribisala, eds, Structural Adjustment in West Africa (Lagos, Pumark, Nig, and NIIA 1994).

**Omoruyi, Omo**, “Western Global Agenda: Democracy and the Free Market” in Sonni Gwanle Tyoden, ed, Nigeria: Youth Agenda for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century (Abuja, Yakubu Gowon Centre, 1995).

**Omoruyi, Omo** “Designing the Nigerian Transition Programme” in Omo Omoruyi, Dirk-Berg Schlosser, Adesina Sambo, & Ada Okwuosa, eds, Democratisation in Africa: Nigerian Perspectives, Vol.1, (Abuja : Centre for Democratic Studies, 1994), pp194-201.

**Omoruyi Omo**, “The Challenges of Democratisation in Nigeria” Convocation Lecture Delivered at the Lagos State University, Lagos on 7<sup>th</sup> January, 1993.

**Omoruyi Omo** "Programmed Democratisation : Nigeria's Experience", A Paper Presented at the Symposium on Democratisation Process in Comparative Perspective, Hawaii, USA March 26 - 29, 1992.

**Omu, Fred I.** "Ethnicity, Nationalism and Federalism" in J. Isawa Elaigwu and G.N. Uzoigwe, eds, Foundations of Nigerian Federalism 1900 - 1960 (Abuja, National Council on Intergovernmental Relations, 1996).

**Onyeoziri, Fred, E.** "Towards A theory of Democratic Mobilization: The Comparative and Theoretical Perspective", A Paper Presented at the 15<sup>th</sup> Annual Conference of the NPSA, Ibadan, 1988).

**Osaghae, Eghosa,** "Managing Ethnic conflicts Under Democratic Transition in Africa: The Promise, The Failure and the Future" in B. Caron, A Gboyega, and E. Osaghae, eds, Democratic Transition in Africa, (Ibadan, CREU, Institute of African Studies, 1992), pp.213 - 234.

**Ottaway Marina,** "Democracy and the Challenge of Ethnicity", Africa Demos, Vol.III, No, 4, March, 1995, pp.22 - 24.

**Oyediran Oyeleye,** "The Political Bureau " in Larry Diamond, A. Kirk Greene and Oyeleye-Oyediran, eds, Transition Without End, (Lagos, Vantage Press, 1997).

**Oyediran Oyeleye,** "Transition Without End: From Hope to Despair - Reflections of a Participant Observer" in Paul a. Beckett, and Crawford Young, eds, Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria (Rochester , N.Y. University of Rochester Press, 1997.)

**Oyediran Oyeleye,** "The Military, Democracy and the Nigerian Political system" in Adebayo Ninalowo, ed, The Quest for Democratisation : Military Governance and Trade Unionism (Lagos, Friedrich Hebert Foundation, 1996) pp.1 - 6.

**Oyediran Oyeleye,** "Democratic Electoral Process : Can Nigeria Make it this Time Around?", Nigerian Journal of Electoral and Political Behaviour, Vol.1, September, 1990.

*Oyediran Oyeleye & Adigun Agbaje*, "Two Partyism and Democratic Transition in Nigeria", The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol.29, No. 2, June 1991, pp.213 - 235.

*Oyewole A.* "Failure of the first Experiment: A Viewpoint" in S. Egite Oyovbaire ed, Democratic Experiment in Nigeria: Interpretative Essays Essays (Benin City, Omega Pub, 1987)

*Oyovbaire Egite, S.* "The Context of Democracy in Nigeria" in S. Egite Oyovbaire, ed, Democratic Experiment in Nigeria: Interpretative Essays (Benin city, Omega Publishers 1987).

*Pae, M. Sung*, Testing Democratic Theories in Korea (Lanham, MD: University Press of America 1986)

*Park, Chon Min*, "Political Support Under Authoritarian Rule: The case of South Korea" Ph.D Dissertation University of California, Berkeley, 1989.

*Park, Jong Duck*, "Regional Cleavages and Orientations Towards the Political System in South Korea", Ph.D Dissertation, Temple University, 1989.

*Park, Young Ho*, "State, Society and Authoritarian Development : The Case of Korea", Ph.D dissertation, University of Cincinnati 1988, p58.

*Perham, Margery*, Luggard: The Years of Authority (London Collins, 1960).

*Plunk, Daryl M*, "Political Developments in the Republic of Korea" in Thomas W. Robinson ed, Democracy and Development in East Asia, (Washington, D.C.: The AEI Press 1991)

*Pourgerami, Abbas*, Development and Democracy in the Third World (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991).

*Pridham, Geoffrey* "Southern European Democracies on the Road to Consolidation: A Comparative Assessment of the Role of Political Parties" in Geoffrey Pridham ed, Security, Democracy, Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe (London, Routledge, 1990) pp. 1-14.

**Przeworski, Adam**, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (Newyork, Cambridge University Press, 1991).

**Przeworski, Adam**, "Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to democracy" in O'Donnell, Guillermo, Phillippe C, Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds, Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspective (Baltimore; John Hopkins, University Press, 1986) pp 47-63.

**Przeworski, Adam & Henry Teune**, The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry (Newyork, John Riley, 1969).

**Ra, Chong-O**, "Korean Labour in Politics: Preliminary Research Questions for a Comparative Analysis", A Paper Presented at the Second World Conference on Korean Politics in Seoul, Korean Political Science Association, July 25-27, 1991.

**Reeve, W.D.** The Republic of Korea: A Political and Economic Survey (London, Oxford, University Press, 1963).

**Rial, Juan**, "Transition in Latin America on the Threshold of 1990's", International Social Science Journal, 43, (2), 1991, pp. 285-300.

**Riley P. Stephen**, "Political Adjustment or Domestic Pressure Democratic Politics and Political Choice in Africa", Third World Quarterly Vol. 13, No. 3, 1992, pp. 543-547,

**Ro, Kwang, H.** "The Characteristics of the Praetorian Military in Korea 1961-1949" Asian Profile, 17, (4), 1989.

**Roberts Brad**, The New Democracies: Global Changes and US Policy (Washington Quarterly Reader, The MIT Press, 1990).

**Robinson, Richard**, "Authoritarian States, Capital-Owing Classes, and the Politics of Indonesia", World Politics, 40, (1), 1998; pp. 52-74.

**Rothstein, Robert L.** "Democracy, Conflict and development in the Third World", Washington Quarterly, 14(2), 1991, pp. 58-60.

**Roxborough, Ian**, "The Dilemmas of Redemocratisation", Government and Opposition, 23(3) 1988, pp354-367.

**Rustow, Dankwart, A,** "Transition to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model" Comparative Politics 2(3) 1970, pp337- 363.

**Sakamoto, Yoshikazu,** "Introduction: The Global Context of Democratisation," Alternatives, 16 (2) 1991, pp. 119-128.

**Sambo Adesina,** "Transition to Democracy in Nigeria; Possibilities and Limitations" in Omo Omoruyi, Dirk-Berg Schlosser, Adesina Sambo, & Ada Okwuosa, eds, Democratisation in Africa: Nigerian Perspectives (Vol. 1) (Abuja: Centre for Democratic Studies, 1994) pp. 213-226.

**Samuel Michael A, and William A. Douglas,** "Promoting Democracy", Washington Quarterly, 4 (3) 1981, pp.52-65.

**Scalapino, Robert A,** "Democratizing Dragons: South Korea and Taiwan" Journal of Democracy, Vol. 4, No. 3 (July 1993) pp. 70-83.

**Schmitter C. Phillippe, & Terry Lynn Karl** "What Democracy is ... and is not" Journal of Democracy, Summer, 1991, Vol.2 No.3, pp.81 - 89.

**Schmitter C. Phillippe,** "The Transition from Authoritarian Rule to Democracy in Modernizing Societies: Can German's Proposition (and Pessimism) be reversed?" (unpublished paper) University of Chicago, 1982).

**Seligson, Mitchell, A.** "Development, Democratisation and Decay: Central America at the Crossroads" in Malloy, James M, and Mitchell A. Seligson, eds, Authoritarians and Democrats: Regime Transition in Latin America (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987), pp. 167-192.

**Shaw, Williams,** "Introduction" in William Shaw, ed. Human Rights in Korea: Historical and Policy Perspectives (Cambridge, M.A.: The East Asian Legal Studies Programme of the Harvard Law School, 1991, pp. 15-16.

**Shin, Myong-Soon,** "Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Korean Politics" Korea Observer, Vol. xxvii, No. 2, Summer, 1996.

**Shin Myong-Soon,** "Democratisation in Korean Politics: Presidential and Parliamentary Aspects", Korea Observer, 20 (1) 1989, pp. 111-115.



*Shivji, Issa*, "The Pos and the NGOS: Reflection on the Place of Working People in the Battle for Democracy", CODESRIA Bulletin, No. 4, 1990.

*Shivji Issa*, Fight My Beloved Continent: New Democracy in Africa (Harare: SAPES, 1988)

*Shonekan, E.A.O.* "The Nigerian Economy in the Twenty-First Century: Problems and Prospects", Governance, Vol. 1, No.1, April, 1998.

*Shorrock, Tim* "South Korea, Chun The Kims, and Constitutional Struggle", Third World Quarterly, 10, (1), 1988.

*Shorrock Tim*, "The Struggle for Democracy in South Korea in the 1980's and the Rise of anti-Americanism", Third World Quarterly, 8 (4) 1986, pp. 1195-1218.

*Sklar, Richard* "Crisis and Transition in the Political History of Independent Nigeria" in Paul A. Beckett and Crawford Young, eds, Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria (U.K. University of Rochester Press, 1997).

*Sklar Richard*, and C.S Whitaker, African Politics and Problems in Development (London, Lynne Rienner, 1991).

*Sohn Hak-Kyu*, "The Foundations of Radical Trends in Korean Politics, with special Reference to the Unofficial Opposition", A Paper presented at the Conference on Political Authority and Economic Exchange in Korea (East-West Centre, Honolulu, Hawaii, January 3-5, 1991)

*Sohn, HakKyu*, Authoritarianism and Opposition in South Korea (London, Routledge, 1989).

*Solarz, Stephen, Z.* "Promoting Democracy in the Third World: Last Cause or Sound Policy?" SAIS Review 15 (2) 1985, pp. 139-153.

*Starr Harvey*, "Democratic Dominoes", Journal of Conflict Resolution, 35 (2) 1991.

*Sterrs, Richard M.*, Yoo Keun Shin, and Gerado R. Ungson, The Chaebol: Korea's New Industrial Might (Newyork, Harper Business, 1989. Pp. 40-45.

**Steinberg David**, “Korea: Triumph Amid Turmoil”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 9, No 2, April, 1998.

**Steinberg David**, “The Republic of Korea: Pluralizing Politics” in Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset eds, Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition) (Boulder, Co. Lynne Rienner 1995) pp. 369-415.

**Stephen, Evelyn, H**, “Democracy in Latin America: Recent Development in Comparative Historical Perspective” Latin America Research Review 25 (2) 1990, pp. 157-176.

**Suberu Rotimi**, “Federalism, Ethnicity and Regionalism in Nigeria” in Paul A. Beckett and Crawford Young, eds, Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria (Rochester, N.Y. University of Rochester Press, 1997).

**Suberu Rotimi**, “Crisis and Collapse: June-November, 1993” in Larry Diamond, A. Kirk-Greene, and Oyeleye Oyediran eds, Transition Without End (Lagos, Vantage Int. Ltd. Press, 1996).

**Suberu Rotimi, V**, “The Travails of Federalism in Nigeria” Journal of Democracy 4,4 October, 1993, pp.39-53.

**Totten, George**, “The Democratisation of South Korea and the Role of the Olympics in the Process”, Occasional paper 3, (Centre for Pacific Asian Studies of University of Stockholm, 1988).

**Ubeku, A.K**, “The Privatization of Government Companies: The Imperative of Our Time (Lagos, NIIA Lecture Series, No. 44, 1987).

**Uche, Luke Uka**, “Contradictions of Democracy in a State of Underdevelopment : The Role of African Elites” in Adebayo Ninalowo ed, The Quest for Democratisation :Military Governance and Trade Unionism (Lagos, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 1998) pp.33 – 47.

**Udogu, E. Ike**, “The Military, Civil Society and the Issue of Democratic Governance: Toward Nigeria’s Fourth Republic,” Journal of Developing Societies, Vol.xi, 2, 1995 pp.206 – 220.

**Underwood G. Horace**, "Korean Society and Culture", Korean Studies Workshop Lecture Notes (Seoul, Korea University & The Korea Foundation, 1998)

**Uwazurike , P. Chudi**, "Confronting Potential Breakdown: The Nigerian Democratisation Process in Critical Perspective", The Journal of Modern African Studies. xxviii 1 (March ) 1990 pp. 55 – 77.

**Uzoigwe G.N** "Evolution of Nigerian State, 1900 – 1914" in J. Isawa Elaigwu , and G.N. Uzoigwe, eds, Foundations of Nigerian Federalism 1900 – 1960, Vol 2 (Abuja , National Council on Inter-Governmental Relations 1996)

**Valenzuela, J.Samuel**, "Labour Movements in Transition to Democracy: A Framework for Analysis", Comparative Politics 21(4) 1989; pp.445 – 472.

**Van de Walle , Nicolas** "Political Liberalization and Economic Policy Reform in Africa", World Development, Vol.11 No. 4. 1994.

**Vanhanem, Tatu**, "The Level of Democratisation Related to Socio-Economic Variables in 147 States in 1980 - 85" Scandinavian Political Studies 12(7) 1989,pp95 – 127.

**Vanhanem, Tatu**, " Strategies of Democratisation", A Paper presented at European Consortium for Political Research of University of Essex, England, 1988.

**Wade, Larry L. and Seong Jin Kang**, "Economic Voting in South Korea : The 1988 Assembly Election", Journal of North East Asian Studies 9(2) 1990.

**Whitehead, Laurence**, "International Aspects of Democratisation" in O'Donnell Guillermo, Philippe C. Schmitter & Laurence Whitehead, eds, Transitions From Authoritarian Rule : Comparative Perspectives (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986) pp. 3 – 46.

**Whitaker C.S. Jnr.** "The Unfinished State of Nigeria," Worldview, 27 No. 3, March, 1984. Pp5 – 8.

**Wilborn, L. Thomas**, “Dimensions of Rok-US Security Cooperation and Building Peace in the Korean Peninsula” in Tae-Hwan Kwak, ed, The search for Peace and Security in A North East Asia: Toward the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, (Seoul, Kyungnam University Press, 1997), pp.289 - 315.

**Williams Michael**, “South Korea: Democracy Strikes Back”, World Today, 41, (4) 1985, pp.68 – 69.

**Williams, Reno**, “Old Brigades, Money bags, Newsbreeds, and the ironies of reform in Nigeria,” Canadian Journal of African Studies. No. xxvii, 1, 1993, pp.66 – 87.

**Winham, Gilbert P.** “Political Development and Lerner’s Theory : Further Test of a Causal Model,” American Political Science Review 64 (1970).

**Wright, Edward**, Korean Politics in Transition (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1975).

**Yang Sung Chul**, “Where Does South Korean Political Development Stand Now? From Legitimacy Crisis to Democratisation Trial”, Korea and World Affairs, Vol.18, No.1, Spring, 1994, pp.17 – 20.

**Yaqub, Nuhu**, “The Contribution of Labour to the Democratisation Process in Nigeria” in Omo Omoruyi, Dirk-Berg Schlosser, Adesina Sambo & Ada Okwuosa, eds, Democratisation in Africa: Nigerian Perspectives Vol.2 (Abuja: Centre for Democratisation Studies 1994) pp. 141 – 161.

**Yen, Chen – Shen J**, “Consequences of Socioeconomic development in Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea: Democracy or a Continuation of Authoritarianism” Ph.D Dissertation Purde University, 1990, pp.43 – 44.

**Young, Crawford**, “Permanent Transition and Changing Conjectures: Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria in Comparative Perspective “ in Paul Beckett and Crawford Young, eds, Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria (UK, University of Rochester Press, 1997)

**Young Whan Kihl**, Political Change in South Korea and its implications for Inter-Korean Relations”, Korea Observer, 19 (3) 1988, pp.317 – 322..

*Young Whan Kihl*, Politics and Policies in Divided Korea: Regimes in Contest (London, Westview Press, 1984).

*Young Whan Kihl*, "Korea's Fifth Republic: Domestic Political Trends" Journal of North East Asian Studies 1 (2) 1982, pp39 – 52.

*Young Whan Kihl*, "Politics of Agrarian Change in South Korea: Rural Modernization by Induced Mobilization" in Ray Hopkins, Donald Puchala, and Ross Talbot (eds), Food, Politics and Agricultural Development : Case Studies in the Public Policy of Rural Modernization (Boulder, Westview Press, 1979) pp.133-169.

*Yun, Seongyi*, "Democratisation in South Korea: Social Movements and their Political opportunity Structures", Asian Perspective, Vol.21, No. 3, Winter, 1997, pp.145 – 171.

## DOCUMENTS


1. Country Profile 1997-1998: South Korea and North Korea  
(London: The Economist Intelligence Unit)
2. Government's Views and Comments on the findings and Recommendations of the Political Bureau (1987) Abuja The Directorate for Social Mobilization)
3. The Text of a Broadcast to the Nation (Nigeria) on 3<sup>rd</sup> February 1986 by the Chairman of the Political Bureau Dr. S.J. Coockey.
4. Report of the Political Bureau, March 1989 (Abuja: The Directorate for Social Mobilization).
5. Decree No. 27: Transition to Civil Rule (Political Parties Registration and Activities) Decree 1989
6. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Abuja; MAMSER, 1989)
7. Decree No. 25 Participation in Politics and Elections (Prohibition) Decree 1987
8. Decree No. 9: Participation in Politics and Elections (Prohibition) (Amendment) Decree 1989
9. National Electoral Commission Report and Recommendations on Party Registration
10. Myngyobu (1985) The White Paper on Campus Unrest (Seoul pp 22-23)
11. Nawmubu (1988) The Materials for the Inspection of the Administration conducted by the National Assembly
12. The Ministry of Labour Yearbook of Labour Statistics 1987, Seoul Korea

## **APPENDIX I**

### **POLITICAL GROUPS THAT EMERGED AFTER THE LIFTING OF BAN ON POLITICS**

1. Abuja Unity Front (A.U.F.)
2. All Nigerian People's Party (A.N.P.P.)
3. All People's Party (A.P.P.)
4. Association for National Progress (A.N.P.)
5. Black But Beautiful Party (B.B.B.P.)
6. Brotherhood of Nigeria (B.N.)
7. Civil Democratic Party (C.D.P.)
8. Democratic Party of Nigeria (D.P.N.)
9. Democratic People's Congress (D.P.C.)
10. Federal Republican Party (F.R.P.)
11. Federal Solidarity Party (F.S.P.)
12. Freedom Solidarity Party (F.S.P)
13. Ideal Party of Nigeria (I.P.N.)
14. Liberal Convention (L.C.)
15. Liberal Movement (L.M.)
16. Loyalists Movement of Nigeria (L.M.N.)
17. Movement of Nationalists and Dynamos (MONAD)

18. National Development Party (N.D.P.)
19. National Union Party (N.U.P.)
20. New Era Movement (N.E.M.)
21. New Generation Party (N.G.P.)
22. New Liberal Movement (N.L.M.)
23. New Progressive Party (N.P.P.)
24. New Vanguard (N.V.)
25. Nigeria Corrective Party (N.C.P.)
26. Nigeria Emancipation Party (N.E.P.)
27. Nigeria Labour Party (N.L.P.)
28. Nigeria National Congress (N.N.C.)
29. Nigerian Socialist Party (N.S.P.)
30. Nigerian Youth Congress (N.Y.C.)
31. Oriental Progressive Party (N.Y.C.)
32. People's Alliance Party (P.A.P)
33. People's Convention Party (P.C.P.)
34. People's Front of Nigeria (P.F.N.)
35. People's Improvement Party (P.I.P.)
36. People's Liberation Party (P.L.p.)
37. People's Party of Nigeria (P.P.N.)





38. People's Patriotic Party (P.P.P.)
39. People's Solidarity Party (P.S.P.)
40. People's Welfare Party (P.W.P.)
41. Popular Democratic Alliance (P.D.A.)
42. Realistic Democratic Movement (R.D.M.)
43. Reformer's Party of Nigeria (R.P.N.)
44. Republican Party of Nigeria (R.P.N.)
45. True Party of Nigeria(T.P.N.)
46. United Democratic Movement (U.D.M.)
47. United Front of Nigeria (U.F.N.)
48. United Nigeria Democratic Party (U.N.D.P.)
49. Wazobia Democratic Party (W.D.P.)

## **APPENDIX II**

### **ASSOCIATIONS THAT INDICATED INTEREST IN POLITICS OF THE THIRD REPUBLIC**

1. All Nigeria's Party (A.N.P)
2. Ideal People's Party (I.P.P.)
3. Liberal Convention (L.C.)
4. National Unity Party (U.N.P.)
5. Nigerian Labour Party (N.L.P.)
6. Nigerian National Congress (N.N.C.)
7. Nigeria People's Welfare Party (N.P.W.P.)
8. Patriotic Nigerian Party (P.N.P.)
9. People's Front of Nigeria (P.F.N.)
10. People's Patriotic Party (P.P.P.)
11. People's Solidarity Party (P.S.P.)
12. Republican Party of Nigeria (R.P.N.)
13. United Nigeria Democratic Party (U.N.D.P.)

### APPENDIX III

#### OVERALL PERFORMANCE OF POLITICAL ASSOCIATIONS AS RANKED BY THE NEC

	MEMBERSHIP	ADMIN. ORGAN.					
ASSOCIATION	size 25.00	spread 25.00	size 15.00	spread 25.00	manifesto 20.00	total 100.00	Ranking
People's Solidarity Party	8.70	5.30	9.30	8.10	12.5	43.90	1 <sup>st</sup>
Nigerian National Congress	4.30	7.80	9.70	8.50	12.30	42.60	2 <sup>nd</sup>
People's Front of Nigeria	5.20	5.20	9.40	7.90	13.50	41.20	3 <sup>rd</sup>
Liberal Convention	2.50	5.10	9.00	7.20	10.20	34.00	4 <sup>th</sup>
Nigeria Labour Party	.10	.90	4.20	3.60	9.10	17.90	5 <sup>th</sup>
Republican Party of Nigeria	.50	2.10	3.10	2.90	8.40	17.00	6 <sup>th</sup>
All Nigeria People's Party	.07	.03	2.10	1.50	7.80	11.77	7 <sup>th</sup>
Ideal People's Party	.03	.14	.94	.77	7.60	9.48	8 <sup>th</sup>
United Nigeria Democratic Party	.04	.17	1.68	1.39	5.80	9.08	9 <sup>th</sup>
National Union Party	.01	.02	0.00	.02	7.88	7.93	10 <sup>th</sup>
People's Patriotic Party	.03	.20	1.10	.90	4.60	6.83	11 <sup>th</sup>
Patriotic Nigerian Party	0.00	0.00	.09	.07	3.30	3.40	12 <sup>th</sup>
Nigerian People's Welfare Party	.01	.02	.24	.17	0.00	.44	13 <sup>th</sup>

*Source: National Electoral Commission Report and Recommendation on Party Registration, September, 1989, p.23.*

*See also, Babafemi Badejo, "Party Formation and Competititon " in Larry Diamond, et.al, eds, Transition Without End, p.187.*