



Dissertation

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ECONOMICS UNIVERSITY ZARTA
NIGERIA**

**The political economy of poverty among the peasantry
in Kano State : a study of feudal Oppression and
exploitation in guri district of hadejia Emirate**

APRIL, 1990


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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF POVERTY AMONG THE
PEASANTRY IN KANO STATE: A STUDY OF FEUDAL
OPPRESSION AND EXPLOITATION IN GURI
DISTRICT OF HADEJIA EMIRATE.



By

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
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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis is a product of my own research effort. It has never been submitted in a previous application for a higher Degree. Quotations are distinguished by quotation marks and by indentation. All sources of information have been acknowledged by means of notes and references.

NAME: Abubakar Hassan Fulata

SIGNATURE:



DATE: MAY 1990

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DEDICATION

This work is dedicate to Dr. Mahmud Modibbo Tukur who paid the last price for the struggle and Dr. P.F. Wilmot who was deported from Nigeria because of the struggle for Social and Economic Justice.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Although a thesis is credited to an individual, it is not completely the product of an individual effort, even though I carry the responsibility for the analysis contained in this thesis, I could not have been able to produce this thesis without the moral, material and financial support of individuals and organisations. To this extent I am grateful to all those who contributes towards the success of this work.

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GLOSSARY

Meanings of Hausa Kanuri and Bade, Fulani terminologies used in the thesis.

1. Alkali: sing. Alkalai: plu. (Hausa): Judges(s)
2. Almajiri: sing. Almajirai: plu. (Hausa): Peripatetic student(s)
3. Amir-al-muminun (Arabic): leader of the faithful
4. Arg (Hausa): Borrowing.
5. Attajiri: sing. Attajirai: Plu. (Hausa) Richman/men.
6. Bara: sing. Barori: plu. (Hausa) servant(s)
7. Boka: sing. Rokaye: Plu. (Hausa) Diviner(s)
8. Bulama: sing. Bulamawa: plu. (Kanuri) village head(s)
9. Cancanta (Hausa) suitability.
10. Dagaci: Sing. Dagatai: plu. (Hausa) village head(s)
11. Fada (Hausa), place - Rafade, sing. courier, Fadawa plu courtings.
12. Fatoma, sing. Fatomawa plu. (Kanuri) patron(s).
13. Fanke (Hausa) floor cake
14. Fulani (Hausa), the Fulani race. Fulanin gida. Town Fulani, Fulani daji, the nomadic Fulani.
15. Gado (Hausa) inheritance.

16. Gandu: sing. Gandaye plu. (Hausa), Family farm(s) or unit(s) or production.
17. Gayya (Hausa) Communal labour
18. Habe (Fulani) meaning Hausa
19. Hakimi: sing. Hakimai: plu. (Hausa) District head(s)
20. Haraji (Hausa) Pool tax
21. Hatsi (Hausa) millets
22. Hatsin Kambi (Hausa) grain tax.
23. Jangali (Hausa) Jakadu: plu. (Hausa) Messenger(s)
24. Jangali (Hausa) livestock tax.
25. Jihad (Arabic), a religious war, duktion)
26. Kasa: sing. Kasasha: plu. (Hausa) land(s)
27. Kapalon (Bade), money given to the Hakimi before he arrives in any village
28. Kilisa (Hausa) Strolling. (plu.) Richman/men
29. Kodago (Hausa) wage labour. Dan Kodago, wage labourer. Yan Kodago, wage labourers.
30. Kosai (Hausa) beans cake..) Hausa servant(s)
31. Kudin kasa (Hausa), land tax Kudin sara'a (Hausa) occupational tax
32. Kudin rafi (Hausa), tax on irrigated plots
33. Kudin sarauta (Hausa), title money.

34. Kudin su (Hausa), fishing tax.
35. Kudin farauta (Hausa), game tax.
36. Kudin gandu (Hausa), money paid by peripatetic school students
37. Kudin gaisuwa (Hausa), greeting money.
38. Kudin ballasa (Hausa), farewell money.
39. Magarasi sing. Magarassa plu. (Kanuri), Queen(s)
40. Maharbia sing. Maharbai plu. (Hausa), hunter(s).
41. Mai, sing. Maiya plu. (Kanuri), superior(s) or King.
42. Mai unqawai sing. Masu unqawanni plu. (Hausa), Ward head(s)
43. Mallam sing. Mallamai plu. (Hausa), scholar(s)
44. Mallam Daji (Hausa), forestry officers.
45. Mallam Haraji (Hausa), Tax officials
46. Mallam tsaba (Hausa), sanitary officers.
47. Nudi (Hausa) measure.
48. Noman kashi (Hausa), farming to guarantee borrowing.
49. Qur'an (Arabic), The Holy Scripture of Islam.
50. Ranqadi (Hausa), tour.

51. Ga'a (Hausa), luck.
52. Sarki; sing. Sarkuna; plu. (Hausa), king(s) or title holder(s)
53. Sarkin kasuwa; sing. Sarkunan kasuwa; plu.(Hausa), chief(s)
54. Sarkin makera; sing. Sarakunan makera; plu.(Hausa), chief(s)
55. Sarkin fawa; sing. Sarakunan fawa; plu. (Hausa). Chief(s) of the butchers
56. Sarkin Yanka; sing. Sarakunan Yanka; plu.(Hausa), The possessor(s) of the power to administere death penalty.
57. Sarkin yaki; sing. Sarakunan yaki; plu. (Hausa), field marchall(s)
58. Sarauta (Hausa), kingship.
59. Talaka; sing. Talakawa; plu. (Hausa), subject(s)
60. Taimako (Hausa), help.
61. Wakili, sing. Wakilai; plu. (Hausa), representative(s)

62. Yarisala (Hausa), millet cake.
63. Zakkat (Arabic), religious tithe
64. Zalunci (Hausa), oppression.
65. Zillullahi (Arabic), the shadow of God.

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is about the continued existence of feudal relations in Guri District of Hadejia Emirate in the present day Kano state.

The research is intended to contribute to the existing knowledge on the poverty of the Nigerian rural populace. The study demystifies the role being played by the traditional rulers within the present political dispensation. This is done by analysing the various relationships that exist between the rural populace and the feudal aristocrats and the conclusion we arrive at is that these social relationships between feudal aristocrats and the rural populace are essentially oppressive and exploitative and that they constitute some of the major sources of rural poverty.

The study is presented in five chapters, the first chapter deals with a general literature review and the conceptualisation of the problem.

The second chapter, treats the theoretical framework of the study and the methodology used.

The third chapter analyses the dynamics of the pre-colonial and colonial social formation of Hadejia Emirate.

The fourth chapter is a case study in which the analysis of the various contradictions that sustain feudal relations in Guri district are made.

The fifth chapter summarises the entire thesis.

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INTRODUCTION

The existence of feudal relations within the Nigerian social formation is a reality that cannot be denied. However, for most people, the reasons for the existence of feudal relations in the Nigeria of the 20th century remain obscure. Similarly, very little is known about the degree or the extent of oppression and exploitation which characterises these relations.

For the academic minded individual, the existence of feudal relations within a predominantly capitalist mode of production is not a new thing. Infact, history has shown that all modes of production contain in them the vestiges of the former modes of production they have negated. These vestiges of the former, modes would be shaken off once the dominant mode reaches an advanced level. This is why feudal relations do not exist in all advanced capitalist countries.

In developing capitalist countries like Nigeria however, feudal relations not only exist side by side with capitalist relations but they also protect and perfect the system of primitive accumulation.

For the official government policy makers, the existence of the feudal institution is rationalised under the pretence of the indispensability of the traditional rulers in the political dispensation of the country. In this thesis, we argue that the

traditional rulers are not indispensable and that the liberation of the peasantry in Nigeria is inseparably tied to the abolition of the feudal institution.

The expropriation of the peasantry in Guri is effected through various means, ranging from Zakkat (religious tithe), constant tour of villages (rangadi), special levies, forced labour, wage labour, professional levies, heavy fines for offences, and through loans of grain which are paid with interest. Peasants who resisted these exploitative tendencies were either imprisoned or simply exiled.

At the centre of the wave of oppression and exploitation that characterise peasant feudal aristocrats relations is the religio - traditional feudal ideology. This feudal ideology serves the function of a tranquilliser which dulls the senses of the peasants. The peasant is made to believe that the source of his social problems is external to the relations that exist between him and his oppressors and exploiters.

All happenings are attributed to external factors. These factors could take the form of evil spirits, sorcerers and even God himself. The result of all these is fatalism and apathy.

In view of the fact that the religious ideology serves the function of diverting the attention of the peasants from the real

source of their problems, hostility of the peasantry is mostly directed at wrong targets. Thus the peasants see the nomadic Fulani and not the Sarakuna (Aristocrats) as their enemies even though the actions (destruction of crops) of the nomadic Fulani have the backing of the Sarakuna. While the nomadic Fulani get the support of the Sarakuna in the struggles against the peasantry, they pay heavily for this support. They are heavily fined once they are found guilty of destroying peasant crops. While the nomadic Fulani are fined for offences against the peasants, the victims hardly get compensation. In most cases both peasants and the nomadic Fulani do not benefit from legal suits against each other.

Interestingly, even though the peasants complain about the extortion meted to them by the Hakimi's court, they still prefer their cases to be handled by the Hakimi or his representative.

From the findings of this research, there seems to be a strong linkage between the Sarakuna at the local level and the wider state apparatus. Successive governments are quite aware of the oppressive and exploitative activities of the Sarakuna in the rural areas but still turn their eyes against what has been going on. This is essentially because the Sarakuna have been playing a significant role in holding down the rural populace in the interest of the Nigerian ruling class.

The thesis is presented in five chapters. The first chapter discusses the theory of the state, the general literature review and articulates the research problem. The section on the theory of the state argued that oppression and exploitation originated with the emergence of social classes. The section on literature review discusses the various modes of feudal relations and their ideological apparatus worldwide. The section argues that feudal relations could take many forms but the religious ideology that sustains feudal relations remains the same.

The second chapter deals with the theoretical framework of the study and the methodology used for this research.

The theoretical framework of the study is the theory of classes and class struggles as articulated by Marx and Engels in the Manifesto of the communist party, and their significance in changing society. The methodology used for the research is rooted in the method of political economy which studies a social phenomenon within the context of its contradictions both basic and non basic, antagonistic and non antagonistic.

The third chapter discusses the pre-colonial and colonial social formation of Hadejia Emirate. This serves as a historical background to what exists to this day. The chapter examines the nature of the pre-colonial political economy and its

contradictions. Also discussed is the nature of colonial conquest and the resistance of the people to colonial rule. The chapter also discusses the contradictions of the colonial economy and the role of the Sarakuna in maintaining colonial and neocolonial rule at the local level and at the wider national level.

The fourth chapter is a case study and it is divided into six sections. The first section deals with the economy and society of Guri. The second section examines the relationship between the feudal ideology and class relations. The third section examines the nature of the social relations of production in Guri. The fourth section examines legal and political relations. The fifth section discusses legal and political relations between the Sarakuna and the rural populace. The sixth section summarises the chapter.

Chapter five is a conclusion of the entire thesis and it highlightens the political and the theoretical significance of the study.

CHAPTER ONE

THE RESEARCH PROBLEM AND A GENERAL REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

1.1 THEORIES OF THE ORIGIN OF THE STATE

The phenomenon of oppression and exploitation in human society can be traced to the emergence of private property and the consequent division of society into classes as a result of which the state emerged as a power above society¹. According to Marx and Engels:

"The history of all hitherto existing society (with the exception of the history of societies that existed prior to recorded history) is the history of class struggles. Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild master and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes"²

*Thomas Hobbes does not accept the view that oppression and exploitation in human society started with the emergence of private property. Rather, he sees man as naturally unsociable, quarrelsome and competitive and under these conditions the idea of right and wrong is determined by man's pleasures and desires. Consequently, the state of nature is one of war of all against all giving rise to continual fear and the danger of violent death. It was this fear, according to Hobbes, that acted as a

force to control men and made men to "agree upon convenient Articles of peace, suggested by reason". This agreement was concretised in a form of submission to the authority of a ruler, and thus the state of nature gave rise to civil society through the institution of sovereign government.⁴

Once such power is constituted, according to Hobbes, the people are subjected to it, having surrendered all their liberty of action to it. If any subject is punished in whatever form for resisting the authority of the sovereign, then, "he is the author of his own punishment".⁵ To this extent, whatever the sovereign does with regards to the exercise of his power, "there can happen no breach of covenant on the part of the sovereign; and consequently none of his subjects, by any pretence of forfeiture, can be freed from his subjection"⁶. As far as Hobbes is concerned, "the sovereign is no part of the social contract but a recipient of powers conferred on him by a contract of all with all"⁷.

Spinoza also recognised the insecurity in the state of nature. However, he disagreed with Hobbes in the sense that men surrendered their natural rights to the whole society and not to a single monarch. Spinoza's argument is that once the monarch becomes an absolute power over the society, he is bound to be oppressive. To this extent, the contract with the sovereign power can be terminated once it becomes oppressive.⁸

In his polemics against the advocates of the divine origin of the state, John Locke argued that the origin of civil society was rooted in the state of nature which was a state of freedom and equality in which people were bound by real obligations. The state of nature was guided by the law of nature which compelled every one with reason not to do harm to another or destroy property that does not belong to him being all equal, independent and free.⁹

According to J.J. Rousseau, the state of nature

"was neither a Hobbesian war of all against all, nor a Lockian abode of peace and good will; it was just a condition of Brutish isolation, in which men were physically much stronger than they are today. Society developed with the family widening into tribe, nomadic existence giving place to fixed residence and the consequent acquisition of property. Inventions and the arts followed, but with them grew passions and needs, and then came vices and disorders, vanity, jealousy and self-assertion, violence and outrage. State and civil governments were created by the adroitness of the rich who imposed their will upon the poor"¹⁰.

In his Philosophy of Right, Hegel maintained that it is erroneous to "ground the nature of the state on the contractual relations, whether the state is supposed to be a contract of all with all or of all with the monarch and the government..... the state is not a contract at all, nor is its fundamental essence the unconditional protection and guarantee of life and property

of members of the public and as individuals. On the contrary, it is the highest entity which even lays claim to this very life and property and demands its sacrifice.¹¹

With the exception of the position advanced by Marx and Engels and to some extent by Rousseau, all the views we have so far cited have two things in common: they are all apologetic and idealistic. They are apologetic because they seek a justification for class domination in the name of "contract", and idealistic because class struggle is seen not as a result of material contradictions that characterise class societies but as a result of psychological conditions such as "fear of violent death", "pleasures and desires", etc. or predestined arrangement by an "absolute idea" as Hegel argued.

Thomas Hobbes not only dismissed the existence of class struggle in human history by his theory of "war of all against all", but he was also of the opinion that the state does not serve the interest of any class and as such the contract with the state cannot be terminated. This position is a clear justification for class domination.

While Spinoza recognised the need to change any oppressive state, he did not see this change arising within the context of class struggle but as a result of "envy and hatred", thereby making his explanation idealistic.

On the other hand, while John Locke's theory could be seen as more progressive than those of Hobbes, Spinoza and Hegel, it is never the less biased in favour of the bourgeoisie. This is because "equality", "independence", and "freedom", do not exist in any class society, not even in the state of nature. These were only bourgeois catch phrases used for the campaign against the moribund feudal order in Europe.

While John Locke was justifying the rule of the nascent bourgeoisie in Europe, Hegel sought a religio - political justification for the prussian state. In this way Hegel saw the dynamics of human society not within the context of the activities of human actors but as a result of a divine act of an "absolute idea". Thus Hegel's explanation is not only idealistic but is also a negation of class struggle because people are seen to be acting according to the dictates of an "absolute spirit".

While Rousseau's thesis where civilisation was seen to give rise to "inventions", which also gave rise to "passions and needs... vices and disorder, vanity jealousy and self-assertion... etc." is to a large extent moralistic, it has never the less grasped the essence of the state as an instrument of class domination and exploitation.

It is in view of the shortcomings of the idealist explanations of the origin, nature and character of the state

that Engels offered a scientific analysis of the state as it emerged and existed historically and materially. According to Engels,

"the state is..... by no means a power forced on society from without, just as little is it "the reality of the ethnical idea", "the image and reality of reason", as Hegel maintains. Rather, it is a product of society at a certain stage of development; it is the admission that this society has become entangled in an absolute contradiction with itself, that it has split into irreconcilable antagonisms which it is powerless to dispel. But in order that these antagonisms, classes with conflicting economic interest, might not consume themselves and society in fruitless struggle, it becomes necessary to have power seemingly standing above society that would alleviate the conflict, and keep it within the bounds of "order". This power, arising out of society, but placing itself above it, and alienating itself more and more from it, is the state Because the state arose from the need to hold class antagonisms in check, but because it arose, at the same time, in the midst of the conflict of these classes, it is, as a rule, the state of the most powerful, economically dominant class, which, through the medium of the state, becomes also the politically dominant class, and thus acquires new means of holding down and exploiting the oppressed class. Thus, the state of antiquity was above all the state of the slave owners for the purpose of holding down the slaves, as the feudal state was the organ of the nobility for holding down the peasant serfs and bondsmen, and the modern, representative state is an instrument of exploitation of wage labour by capital"¹²

In accordance with Engels position therefore the state had not always existed. The state emerged with the demise of the

primitive communal mode of production. Under the communal mode of production, production and the consumption of the society's wealth was essentially collective. Members of the society "knew what became of the product; they consumed it, it did not leave their hands and not grow beyond the control of the producers and it could not raise any strange, phantom powers against them, as is the case regularly and inevitably under civilization"¹³.

Within the communal society however, contradictions emerged as a result of the complex division of labour in the production process. This division of labour gave rise to specialisation in various fields. These division of labour and specialisation destroyed the communal basis of production and expropriation since individuals could now produce and expropriate on personal basis.¹⁴ The production and expropriation of commodities by individuals also made possible the development of exchange between individuals.¹⁵

The development of commodity production completely transformed the communal social relations of production because production was no longer solely for consumption but also for exchange.

With the introduction of metal money into the exchange process through the agency of the merchant who acted as a middleman between the producer and the consumer, human labour

itself became a purchasable commodity. This stage in the development of society was followed by another when man in whom labour was embodied became a commodity to be purchased and sold. This stage marked the beginning of the slave mode of production.

The slave - holding state which originated between 4000 and 3000 B.C. when states were formed in ancient Egypt, China and the territory of Mesopotamia was the first antagonistic and class based society in human history.¹⁷

The slave society was divided into three classes viz; the free producers, the slaves and the slave owners. The state was therefore a state of the slave owners to hold down the oppressed classes and to perpetuate their exploitation and oppression.

In his study of slave revolts in the united states of America, Herbert Aptheker (1974) concluded that the major cause of the revolt was "the degradation, exploitation, oppression and brutality"¹⁸, which the system of slavery had created. He also observed that "flight from the masters was one of the most popular means of protest"¹⁹.

The contradiction between the forces of production and the social relations of production within the slave mode of production burst asunder when slaves started revolting and often killed their masters.²⁰

Thus the inherent contradictions that were entrenched within the slave owning mode as cited above, undermined the basis of the slave mode of production and on its ruins emerged the feudal mode of production.

The feudal state like all other states remained a machine for the oppression of the majority of peasants or serfs by the minority land owning class. Whereas under the slave owning mode the slave was regarded as a chattel with no rights whatsoever, the feudal state tied the peasant to the land. Only the feudal lords enjoyed full rights and the peasants were seen as subjects and therefore treated as such. Even though peasants and serfs were not regarded as private property of the lord, they were deprived of all political rights since the lords were the only rulers. Hence the condition of the peasants was only slightly different from that of the slaves.²¹

Now, since the central concern of this study in feudal oppression and exploitation, we shall next examine the nature of feudal relations as they existed all over the world with a view to understanding their contradictions.

1.2 FEUDALISM: A HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE.

According to Joshua and Samuel (1968) Feudalism

"denotes the type of society and the political system originating in Western and central Europe and dominant there during the greater part of the middle ages. However, the term is also applied to other societies and systems of government with similar characteristics, in antiquity and in modern times. In the Marxist usage it refers to a type of society and economy characterised by serfdom, generally succeeding the economic systems based on slavery and preceding capitalism"²².

It has also been argued that the word Feudalism has also been loosely used to refer to

"such social realities as the political predominance of a land-holding aristocracy and the exploitation of the small and the weak by the powerful. It also came to denote any political system in which the state was weakened or paralysed by the privileges of the few and made efficient by the fractioning of political power, or by the opposition of powerful political or economic aristocratic factions"²³.

According to Maurice Dobbs "feudalism is an obligation laid on the producer by force and independently of his own volition to fulfil certain economic demands of an overlord, whether these demands take the form of services to be performed or dues to be paid in money or in kind"²⁷.

Samir Amin (1976) sees feudalism as an advanced form of the tribute-paying mode of production

in which the village community loses its dominium eminens over the land to the feudal lords and this continues as a community of families in which there was (1) organization of society into classes, that of the lords of the land (whose property is inalienable) and that of the serf-tenants; (2) appropriation of the surplus by the lords of the land as a matter of right ("duties") and not through commodity relations; (3) absence of commodity exchange inside the "domain" which constitute the primary cell of this kind of society"²⁵.

Max Weber ([1922] 1959) conceived of feudalism as a "patriarchal authority" in which

- (1) The authority of the chief lies in the likelihood that the vassals will voluntarily remain faithful to their oath of fealty.
- (2) The political corporate group is completely replaced by a system of relations of purely personal loyalty between the lord and his vassals and between these in turn, and their own subvassals (sub-infeudation).
- (3) Only in the case of a "felony" does the lord have a right to deprive his vassal of his fief.
- (4) There is a hierarchy of social rank corresponding to the hierarchy of fiefs (i.e. the bigger the fief the higher the status of the fief holder).
- (5) The elements in the population who do not hold fiefs with some

political authority are "subjects" - that is patrimonial dependents.

(6) Powers over the individual budgetary units (domains, slaves and serfs) sic, the rights of the political group to the receipt of taxes and contributions, and powers of jurisdiction and compulsion to military service....."26

The essential features of the definitions that have direct bearing on our research problem are their ideological content and their limitations in capturing the universal elements of feudalism. Thus for example, while the definition by Joshua and Samuel has captured the universal elements and/or variations of the feudal system, it has never the less distorted the Marxian conception of feudalism. By limiting feudalism to "society and economy characterised by serfdom" it has not only limited the definition to what obtained in Europe during the middle ages but also completely ignored Marx's thesis on the Asiatic mode of production.

Similarly, the definition by Samir Amin is largely restricted to what obtained in Africa and Asia where the mode of expropriation was tribute - payment. The definition does not take into consideration the situation in Europe where manorial serfdom was dominant.

Max Weber's definition does not correspond to the realities of feudalism anywhere in the World, including Europe. In most of the cases the vassals do not maintain their oath of fealty to one single chief. History has shown that in Europe a vassal could pay allegiance to about 40 lords at the same time.²⁷ Secondly, by maintaining that the relationship between the lord and his vassals and the vassals and their sub-vassals were paternal, Weber has greatly underplayed the role of coercion and oppression in feudal relations. Thirdly, by characterising the relations between the feudal lords and the subject population as that of "patrimonial dependence", Weber has clearly denied the existence of class exploitation which existed between the feudal lords and the subject population. Thus, all in all Weber's definition is ahistorical and unrepresentative of feudal relations. In anticipation of criticism of his theory, Weber would always claim that his thesis is an ideal construction.

It is in view of the shortcomings of these bourgeois definitions that I have accepted Maurice Dobbs definition cited above as a working definition in his thesis.

Although there is no general theory that explains exploitation under feudalism as it manifests itself in various forms all over the World, Marx in his theory of ground rent delineated three modes of surplus appropriation characteristic of

the feudal mode of production viz; labour rent or corvee labour, rent in kind and money rent.²⁵

Under the Corvee labour, the direct producers use instruments of labour which by law belongs to them to cultivate the land of the feudal lords. The self-sustaining serf or the peasant under these relations of production worked for himself on some days of the week or month and worked for the feudal lord for the rest of the days in the week e.g. four days for himself and three days a week of unpaid labour for the feudal lord.

The rent in kind was laid down as a responsibility of the peasant to the state or the feudal lord. Under this arrangement, the direct producers disposed of their labour time without sharing it with the feudal lord although the feudal lord had a share in the final product arising from the labour of the serf or the peasant. In this case, it should be clear that rent in kind is an objectification of labour rent in concrete material form. However, in some cases corvee labour and rent in kind co-existed side by side as in France before 1789 and in most parts of Africa before colonialism.

Thus according to Marx, the rent in kind corresponded to what obtained in Asia where the state stood as the land lord to the peasants, in the sense that no private ownership of land exists, although there is both private and common possession and

use of land"²⁹. This situation also corresponds to what obtained in Kano and Hadejia Emirates during the precolonial period where peasants processed and used lands individually and communally, though the emirs exercised sovereignty over the lands. Thus peasants were obliged to give one eighth (1/8) of their farm produce to the emir as a tribute. Consistent refusal to give anything might lead to a situation where the individual concerned might be sent out of the emirate thereby forfeiting his farmland.

Finally, Marx identified the money rent whereby the direct producer exchanges his commodity for money and makes a cash payment to the feudal lord or the state.³⁰ This situation was more common in Asia and Egypt.

1.21 HISTORICAL TYPES OF FEUDAL RELATIONS

Feudalism as a mode of production has been experienced in most parts of the world at different points in times. However, the manner of feudal relations varied from one society to another. The same is also true of the ideological structure that legitimised feudal relations. It is within this context that we want to examine five types of feudal relations viz; European, Latin American, Asiatic, Islamic and African.

1.211 EUROPEAN FEUDAL RELATIONS

Between the 12th and 15th centuries, the feudal state in Europe established a comprehensive and severe form of peasant

dependence. For example, the villeins of central England, the Remensi of Catalonia, the Servi of France and Southern Italy, the Coloni and Massari of Central and Northern Italy as well as the Leibeigene of Southern Germany were tied to the land without any right of departure from such lands; fugitives were subject to compulsory return.³¹

Subordination to the judicial authority of the feudal lord was hereditary and peasants had no right to alienate holdings and/or acquire immovable property.³² In fact Bloch (1978) has demonstrated that around 1291 it was common for a feudal lord to sell the loyalty of his people along with his fields, woods and his castles.³³

According to Rodney Hilton (1980) by the 12th Century, labour rent as a major form of feudal exaction in Europe was becoming less prominent and instead seigniorial taxation was introduced.³⁴ That is, the tenants of a manor were compelled to make cash payments in addition to other obligations. Other ways through which the peasants were oppressed and exploited in Europe included forcing them to grind corn at the lord's mill, bake in his oven or press grapes in his wine press. In addition some extra labour services were demanded but as from subjects rather than from tenants being mainly for road and castle building,

perhaps even to sow what remained of the demesne meadows or to cultivate the demesne vineyard".³⁵

In France, for example, the peasants were oppressed and exploited through various forms of taxation. These taxes include Taille, a form of poll tax paid by everybody, Gabelle or salt tax, that is money paid on salt purchased from the market for use, and each citizen was compelled by the state to buy a certain minimum amount of salt for domestic use. There were taxes on the use of bridges as well as market tolls, and the use of the feudal lord's wine-press and bakery was compulsory.³⁶ There were taxes on manufactured goods, religious taxes paid to the clergy known as the tithe made up of 1/10 of what one produced in his farm. The condition of the peasants in France was made worse by the manner in which such taxes as Taille were collected. When a particular province was assessed for taxation, what the state expected to get from such a province was usually paid for by a rich man (these type of people were popularly known as tax farmers). The rich man in turn went to the peasants and collected the tax under oppressive conditions and made a lot of profit.

In Russia as in France, control of the land remained in the hands of the state, the church and manorial feudal lords. The state in Russia periodically enacted decrees to define the social relations of production. For example, in 1767 serfs were forbidden to complain against their masters even under the most

severe punishment and the government had empowered the land owners to sentence their serfs to penal servitude.³⁷ Under catherin II (1767 - 1796) the state later abolished the estates of the monasteries and gave them out to the land owning class, and peasants were forced to provide corvee labour on such lands as well as pay quintrent. For example, after the harvest, the peasant gave out 1/5 of what he produced to the land lord.

The oppression and exploitation of the peasantry in Russia became so unbearable that between 1801 and 1861 there were over two thousand peasant revolts, and all over peasants refused to do corvee services pay quintrent or cut wood for their masters. They also burnt the houses of the landlords and often killed them.³⁸ Conditions became so serious that Nicholas I was forced in 1842 to pass a Ukase (decree) on "bound peasants" in which peasants were allowed to acquire personal rights from the landowners. However this Ukase was not effective as it succeeded in liberating only 24,000 of the ten million Russian serfs.³⁹

Infact in most of the Gubernias (Districts) ruthless oppression and exploitation continued as if the Ukase did not exist. Hence the riots and revolts which had started earlier persisted all over Russia. The revolts threatened the basis of the Czarist authority and as a result the government was forced to enact a law in 1861 which allowed peasants to own small farm-

lands of their own in return for quintrent or corvee labour until such a time they finish payment for the land. Land was acquired by the government from the landlords and sold to the peasants on loan payable in cash with interest within 49 years.⁴⁰

Lenin (1977) argued that despite the 1861 reforms, the peasants' farms were not actually separated from those of the landlords and the landlords "retained possession of very essential parts of the peasants' allotments: the 'cut-off lands', the woods, meadows, watering places, pasture, etc. without these lands (or easement rights) the peasants were absolutely unable to carry independent farming, so that the landlords were able to continue the old system of economy in the form of labour service. The possibility of exercising 'other than economic pressure', also remained in the shape of the peasants' temporarily bound status, collective responsibility, corporal punishment, forced labour on public works, etc.⁴¹

In addition to the above situation there developed labour-service in return for land which assumed the form of share-cropping or direct labour for rented land. For example,

"for every dessiatine, one and a half dessiatine to be cultivated plus ten eggs one chicken plus one day's female labour; for 43 dessiatine of spring crop land twelve rubbles per dessiatine, and for fifty-one dessiatine of winter crop land 16 rubbles per dessiatine in cash plus threshing of 50 many stacks of oats, seven stacks of buck wheat and 20 stacks

of rye plus manuring of not less than five dessiatines of rented land with manure from own animals, at the rate of 300 cart-loads per dessiatine."⁴²

Throughout Europe, the church and the christian religion were used to hold down the serfs and the peasants. Christianity was the ideology of the feudal class and effectively served their interests. While the peasants and the serfs suffered, their suffering was depicted to be transient and that an everlasting life free of all suffering awaited them in the world hereafter. In most of the cases the church also owned vast estates.

1.2.2 FEUDAL RELATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA

In Latin America, the lord of a Hacienda or Latifundio (society under private auspices) controlled his own little society in which he

defined and enforced the rights and duties of the households... and it is an entire social system and governs the life of those attached to it from the cradle to the grave.⁴³

The peasant is obliged to remain loyal to the lord. As part of his responsibilities, the peasant must serve in the lord's army, do domestic work and in addition work on the lord's farm for a certain number of days. On his part, the lord gives a hut and a small piece of land to the peasant on which he will grow his subsistence needs.⁴⁴ In some cases, the lord personalises the reciprocal relationship that exists between him and the peasants into one between a patron and his clients.

Just like the situation in Europe the role of the church in serving the interest of the feudallords in Latin America is crucial. Most landlords made sure that they set up chapels in their plantations. The priests spend a substantial part of their time in these plantation chapels preaching the gospel of "total submission to an omnipotent and omnipresent God who, while distant and little understood, is believed to be the embodiment of all good".⁴⁵ In this way, the priest succeeded in creating a comprehensive "peasant theology" at the centre of which lies.....

an all powerful God who is at the centre of all occurrences, good and bad, and to whose will each individual must submit completely and unquestionably and thus the peasant expect little from life, and he ask for little. He will tell you, with not a slight degree of melancholy and anguish, that he was born into this world to suffer in his particular condition as an act of God.⁴⁶

As in the case with all class ideologies, the religious ideology in Latin America served the interest of the landlords by depicting to the peasants a false conception of reality. In this way the peasant sees the landlord not as the source of his poverty and toil but his source of livelihood and salvation.

1.213 FEUDAL RELATIONS UNDER THE ASIATIC MODE OF PRODUCTION

The idea of the Asiatic mode of production was first formulated by Marx to explain the type of feudal relations that existed within the Slavic, Indian and Peruvian communities.⁴⁷

Under this mode of production there existed self-sustaining villages with the following characteristics:-

(1) Communal possession of the lands.

(a) Different parts of India have different forms of village communities, and different forms of land ownership.

(b) In the simplest form the community cultivates the land in common and distributed the product among its members.

(2) Direct connection of agriculture and handicrafts within the village.

(a) Each family carries on its own spinning and weaving as a side occupation.

(3) Fixed division of labour within the village, which serves as the model for the establishment of new communities as the population increases.

(4) Division of labour according to the traditional plan is shown by the mechanism of the community. Even when there is an increase in the number of professional groups such as the black smith, they don't subdivide their labour when producing a particular commodity such as a hoe for instance. Each one of them produces all that goes into producing a hoes. Thus each repeats what the other had done.

(5) Production for the immediate want within the village.

- (6) Absence or low development of commodity exchange and production within the village.
- (7) Production within the self-sustaining village community does not take into consideration what other parts of the Indian society produce, thereby giving very little room for specialization.
- (8) The excess of products of the community is transformed into commodities.
- (9) Apart of this, excess in commodity form is expropriated by the state.
- (10) The state collects tax as rent in kind and labour.⁴⁸

At the centre of this peasant-state relations was the ideology of the caste system. The Indian society was divided into five castes viz; Brahmins, Kshatriya, Vaisya, Shudra, and Harijans. The highest caste was that of the Brahmins who were both priests and landowners. The Brahmins caste was followed by the Kshatriya caste who were warriors, landowners and farmers. The Vaisya caste was essentially for yeoman farmers. The fourth caste was that of the Shudra made up of craftsmen, farm labourers and water carriers. The last caste was that of the Harijans other wise known as the caste of the impure or the untouchables. The Harijans performed odd jobs such as the

slaughter of animals, dumping of wastes, cleaning latrines, cutting hair and butchering.⁴⁹

Under the caste system, the state was controlled by the Brahmins and the Kshatriya. Members of the lower castes were held down through a belief system which emphasised reincarnation. Members of the lower castes were made to believe that their suffering will be alleviated when they die. That is to say, for example, a Harjian who accepted and endured his sufferings will be re-born into the Brahmin caste. In the same way, a Brahmin who did not observe the norms and values of his caste will be re-born into the Harjian caste after his death. Members of the lower castes were made to believe that they were at one time members of the higher castes who went astray. The only way members of the lower castes could regain their former status as members of the upper castes is to accept their situation and obey their superior so that when they die they would be re-born into the upper castes. In this way distance was maintained between the castes and the oppression and exploitation of the peasantry was maintained.

1.214 FEUDAL RELATIONS IN ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

A different mode of expropriating the peasantry existed in both pul Eliya, Ceylon, and Sakaltutan in Turkey. In these areas, the problem was not land but labour. The social relations of production which defined feudal lord - peasant relationship

was different from the cases we have so far considered. In this case, the feudal lords engaged in share cropping, that is to say, feudallords provided the seeds that were planted on the land while the peasants provided both the implements and the labour. At the end of the harvest, the proceeds from the farm were shared between the feudallord and the peasant according to an agreed formula.

In Egypt, Syria, Palastine and Lebanon before the Ottoman conquest of 1517 all members of the royal Mamluks (army) held fiefs and received a monthly pay (Jamakiyya), an annual allowance for the purchase of dresses (Kiswa), regular allocation in kind (rawatib), a daily supply of meat, a sheep each for the annual feast of Id al al-Nahr (dahaya). They also received barley for their horses, cloth for tent (Khan) etc.⁵⁰ To maintain the army therefore, the peasants were ruthlessly exploited. Every village under a Sultan was headed by a farmer, who collected taxes from the peasants. The amount that was paid as tax was either fixed or negotiated every year. The farmer (Multazim) of a crown domain exacted from the peasants the rent of the cultivated lands (kharaj)⁵¹ which was paid to the Diwan who kept all state revenues. The tax farmer (Multazim) gave out a fixed amount to the state and retained some part of the kharaj for himself.⁵²

In Syria, palestine and Lebanon, it was the governor general who collected the taxes. In Egypt, the fief was a life long possession which the tax farmer could alienate by sale, mortgage or lease. When he died, his children and the arsy had the right to farm it. Otherwise it was declared free by the state and sold to interested buyers.⁵³

In every village the peasant was not allowed to leave his village without permission from his lord, and even when allowed, it was only for a specified period otherwise he could be exiled from wherever he might be. The landlords punished the peasants by flogging, jailing or death.⁵⁴

A village in Egypt could be owned by more than one lord and in such a situation the village was divided into spheres of influences. What went to a particular lord as his share of the village depended on how powerful he was the other and each was a co-partner of the other.

The variety of taxes paid by each peasant in Egypt between 1200 - 1900, included (1) gifts in kind at specified times of the year (hadiya, difaya) later replaced in the district of al-khass by money tax; (2) the tax for the annual reparation of the local

irrigation dams and canals; (3) payment for pasture on uncultivated fields (a capitation tax on cattle, yearly rents or monthly payment); (4) the tax on fish caught when water descends from the fields after the annual inundation of the Nile; (5) a tenth of the produce of the date liquor; (6) tax on all home-made carpets etc.⁵⁵ These and the other taxes earlier mentioned made the peasants in Egypt worse off because they were always in debt.

In the Islam societies referred to above, the ideology of the feudal class was Islamic. The exploitation of the peasantry was projected as a religious obligation and obedience to the feudal lord was seen as obedience to God.

1.215 FEUDAL RELATION IN AFRICA

The discussion of feudal relation in Africa is problematic in the sense that there was no uniformity in the nature of the expropriation of the peasantry by feudal aristocrats. This complexity has led people like Polly Hill, as we shall see later, to outrightly deny the existence of feudal relations in precolonial Kano.

In his study entitled "serfs, peasants and socialists", William Dersan established the existence of serfdom in the Fouta-

Djallon, now the province of Middle Guinea (Moyenne Guinee), from the early part of the 19th century up to 1896 when the French occupied the territory.

In the Fouta-Djallon of the 19th century, serfs were the property of their respective landlords. The only difference between the serfs and the slaves in Fouta-Djallon was that while slaves could be sold, the serfs could not. Most of the serfs were descendants of war captives. Thus for example the owner of a female serf was also the owner of her children.⁵⁷ The obligation of a serf towards his landlord was essentially in the form of labour. Serfs men, women, and children worked five days a week for their landlords from morning to afternoon. The men worked on the fields, built and maintained the houses of their landlords. The women cultivated the gardens of their landlord's wives, fetched water, cooked food and washed clothes. The children helped in domestic work.⁵⁸

For the remaining two days of the week, the serfs worked for themselves on a piece of land usually provided by their landlords. After harvest, serfs were compelled to give out 10% of the harvest to the landlord. This was not seen as exploitation by the serfs because of their belief in the Islamic

injunction which made it compulsory for a Muslim to give out 10% of his harvest as Farilla or Zakkat (a religious tax to purify the harvest).⁵⁹ The most interesting thing is that while serfs were compelled to give the 10% to the landlord, the landlords gave their 10% to whoever they wanted. Thus, a serf who refused to pay the Farrila or Zakkat was denied land but landlords who refused to pay only rendered their harvest impure.⁶⁰ The Farilla was generally used to demonstrate religiosity in accordance with the belief that "eating the Farilla they received jeopardized the possibility of having many descendants, and that eating the Farilla of their own fields was to risk going straight to Hell".⁶¹

The situation in Ibadan between 1830 - 1900 was completely different from what obtained in Fouta-Djallon. In Ibadan, every family owned land "which nobody however powerful, could dispose of".⁶² The Baba Ogun (patron-Chief) had the right to allocate virgin lands to strangers. Similarly, families also had the right to allocate or give out some portion of their lands to strangers. In return for the piece of land, the tenants gave some part of their harvests or gifts in kind such as drinks, livestock or cleared the landlord's farm twice a year.⁶³ The most interesting thing is that even when tenants withheld gifts,

they could not be ejected from the land.⁶⁴ Although Falola described the mode of production that existed in Ibadan between 1830-1900 as a "family mode of production" the evidence he himself supplied cannot support his claim. For example, production within the economy was not for subsistence but largely for exchange. Coupled with the fact that there existed a powerful state apparatus with several thousands of standing army of conquest and of maintaining the territorial integrity of the Empire, all maintained by the labour of the peasantry, the question of a "family mode of production" cannot arise. By describing the articulated combination of the social relations of production that had existed in Ibadan between 1830 and 1900 as a "family mode of production, Falola had not only presented a secondary relation of production as primary, but had also sought to, along with people like Polly Hill, deny the existence of the feudal mode of production in Africa.

In the Kanem-Borno Empire which lasted from the 9th Century A.D up to 1860, the Dai (Emperor) remained the supreme leader who administered the Empire through a council of state made up of twelve members. Members of the council of state held military titles and resided within the capital so that they might not grow

stronger and rebel against the Mai's authority. Actual administration, collection of taxes from the peasants and other social classes, raising of military levies as well as supervision of local chiefs were undertaken by the Kokenawa who were either free-born commoners or men of servile origin.⁶⁵

In Dahomey for example, the feudal authorities under the regimes of Gezo, Glele, and Behanzin developed a planned economy. The production of crops as well as livestock was strictly regulated and controlled. Census of all domestic animals dead or alive was taken and if the consumption was seen to exceed production, the king stopped the slaughter of livestock for a certain period, say one year, and whenever such ban was imposed the animals were not allowed to pass through the toll gates leading to the markets.⁶⁶ Every province in Dahomey was made to specialise in the production of a particular crop. For example "Abomey specialised in beans and maize, Zagnanado in millet, Allada in maize and cassava, Savi in groundnut and maize and Adja also in maize".⁶⁷

The aim of centralising the economy in Dahomey was to ensure effective control over the economy, hence Dahomeans were one of those most heavily taxed West Africans. For example, taxes were

charged on all exportable agricultural commodities such as palm oil, and livestock were taxed every three years. Users of all major roads paid toll gates while artisans paid income tax and the wealthy paid death duties.⁶⁸

In her study of Kano close settled Zone, Polly Hill (1977) examined population, prosperity and poverty in Rural Kano from 1900 - 1970 and agreed with Y.B. Usman (1974) that there was in existence all over Hausa land the Sarauti system prior to the Fulani Jihad of 1804 - 1808, a political system that was completely feudal in nature and form.⁶⁹ But according to Hill, the situation in pre-Jihad and even post-Jihad Kano cannot be described as feudal. She justified her position by quoting Joshua and Samuel in the International Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences (already referred to above) and came to the conclusion that the term cannot be applied to the Kano case.

Because of its bearing on and relevance to our area of study, Hill's work will be given greater attention.

Hill's argument is that the Hakimai (district heads) did not constitute "a land holding aristocracy". She contended that it is misleading to describe the pre-colonial economy of Kano as feudal because;

- (1) the Hakimai did not own or had never claimed to have owned the land in their districts - that resident farmers were always free to clear and cultivate unoccupied land (provided that no communal rights such as grazing were exercised there) and in addition farmers were free to sale their lands for cash.
- (2) That the Hakimai were not a landed gentry living on their estates in their districts but city aristocrats (including high ranking slaves) who resided in the capital.
- (3) That the Hakimai owned their own farmlands which were cultivated by slaves and not by free farmers.
- (4) That free farmers were never bound by conditions of servitude, and they themselves owned slaves.
- (5) That districts were not territorial units but rather arbitrarily demarcated groups of households from whom the Hakimai (district head) was entitled to extract tax on behalf of the Emir.
- (6) As tax collectors, the Hakimai (plu. district heads) had limited powers as the Emir employed his own Jakadu

(messengers) for direct tax collection in the districts.

(7) That non-resident Hakimai had no judicial powers as most cases of importance that came before them were referred upwards to Kano.⁶⁹

While Polly Hill's views can be criticised on a number of grounds, her conception of feudalism is mechanistic and her understanding of the laws governing the social relations of production is not only shallow but also erroneous. It is mechanistic because she sees feudalism in the context of manorial serfdom as it existed in Europe and since the Hakimai were not "landed gentry living on their estates" with serfs, then they are not feudal lords. This conception of feudalism is clearly eurocentric and since history has shown that feudalism varied with society, this argument is not acceptable.

Hill also argued that feudalism cannot exist in a situation where people are free to cultivate unoccupied lands and can even sell it for cash. First of all, it is not true that there existed such a thing as "free and unoccupied lands". The free and unoccupied lands that Hill is referring to are actually farmlands which were usually allowed to fallow for as many as ten

year especially among families that have vast lands; and whoever wanted to cultivate such a land has to seek permission from the owners of the land. Because of the availability of land, most farmers in Kano and Hadejia practice shifting cultivation and as such people like Hill might actually assume that those lands that are not cultivated are "free" and have no owners.

Secondly, while it is true that peasants could sale off their lands, it is also true that the Hakimai or the Emir could also send packing a peasant from the same farmland, the District and/or the Emirate as a whole. The true situation is that while peasants possessed lands (physical occupation with some limited rights) they had no absolute control over such lands as the peasants themselves accepted that the entire territory on which their farmlands are located belongs to the Emir.

It is also not the case that only slaves cultivated the lands of the Hakimai. The fact is that most palace slaves are either courtiers (Dogarai) or title holders (Wasu Sarauta) e.g. a Jakada (messenger). Palace slaves largely participated in the day to day administration of the Emirate or District and not in production. The Gandun Sarki (Emir's estate) in Hadejia and Guri are to this date cultivated by the peasants through corvee

labour. Of course exceptional cases existed, for example in the 19th century Sokoto caliphate and to some extent in Kano, where an estate was largely cultivated by slave labour. Even under the above situation one can argue that the cultivators were not slaves even though their parents might have been slaves. They are similar to the serfs in Fouta-Djallon referred to above. This is because their owners were not selling them, they mainly exploit their labour.

Polly Hill is of the opinion that free farmers were not bound by conditions of servitude because they also owned slaves. The fact is that not all free farmers owned slaves. Only rich farmers owned slaves. Secondly, regardless of a farmer's wealth, as a Talaka (commoner) he was compelled to pay tax. For the poor peasants, they were always liable for conscription into forced labour which is a condition of servitude.

Finally, Hill laid an undue emphasis on the Hakimai not knowing that they are only fief holders and as such they are answerable to the Emir.

1.22. SUMMARY

Throughout the literature review I have tried to show

through different examples that feudalism as a mode of production existed in most parts of the world at different points in time with some societies experiencing it earlier than others. Furthermore, there are variations in the form of the feudal state and the manner in which each expropriated surplus from the peasantry or the serf.

In Europe, Russia and Latin America the feudal state was monarchic and the expropriation of the serfs was ensured through manorial serfdom where peasants were tied to the lands.

In the Egyptian, Lebanese, Syrian and Palestinian systems the peasants were expropriated through tax-farmers and vassal chiefs.

Under the Asiatic feudal relations, the state dealt with an entire community rather than individual peasants. Thus for example in India, an entire community was seen as the property of the state controlled by the Brahmin caste. A peasant could possess land (physical occupation) but the land is the property of the community and the community in turn is the property of the state.

In Africa, a combination of almost all the modes of

expropriation of the peasantry cited above was shown to have existed in a slightly modified form. For example, serfdom existed in Fouta-Djallon. The only thing that differentiated the situation in Fouta-Djallon from what obtained in Europe was the ideological content. That is, where as christianity was used in Europe, Islam was used in Fouta-Djallon.

Similarly, the situation that existed under the Asiatic mode of production share some similarities with what obtained among the Hausa states. Unlike the situation in India, peasants in Kano could alienate their land by sale.

Regardless of the mode of expropriating the peasantry, one feature that is common to feudalism throughout the world is its ideology. The ideology of feudalism is religion and it has effectively served the interest of the feudal lords by psychologically subjugating the peasantry or the serfs to sustain feudal oppression and exploitation.

1.3 STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

In almost all the societies cited in the literature review, feudal relations have either completely disappeared or exist mainly as a secondary forms of social relations especially in the

neocolonial social formations of Asia, Latin America and Africa. In the advanced capitalist countries, like Britain, feudalism ended with the industrial revolution of the 17th and 18th centuries which saw the ascendance of the bourgeoisie. In France, feudalism ended with the French revolution of 1789. Not only that the bourgeoisie in France in alliance with the peasantry crushed the feudal lords, they also dealt with the institution for its ideological production, the church. In the Soviet Union, feudalism ended with the October socialist revolution of 1917.

In all the societies cited above, feudal relations have been overtaken by higher forms of social relations or production whether capitalist or socialist.

In Nigeria however, despite the dominance of the capitalist mode of production, feudal relations still persist especially in the country side. It is within this context that this research seeks to examine the contradictions that sustain feudal relations in Guri District of Nadejia Emirate. Effort will be made to understand the inability of the peasantry to transform itself from a class "in itself" to a class "for itself" despite centuries of exploitation. An analysis would be made of the

nature of peasant resistance to oppression and exploitation in Guri District and the extent to which such methods of resistance have been effective or ineffective in liberating the peasantry from feudal oppression and exploitation.

Secondly, the research is intended to find out why for example the peasantry continue to respect the Sarakuna (aristocrats) and come to them for the settlement of their local disputes instead of the Area Court judges or Alkalai (Islamic judges) despite complains of extortion, plunder, forced labour and sexual harassment of their wives and children by the aristocrats.

Finally, effort will be made to locate the power base of the feudal aristocracy and its ideological structure.

1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The findings of this research shall make enormous contributions towards knowledge at the level of theory, politics and policy options.

At the level of theory, the research shall enrich the body of literature on oppression and exploitation as well as the problems of peasant liberation.

Politically, the research findings shall contribute towards a better understanding of the role of the traditional rulers within the present political dispensation.

At the level of policy formulation the research findings will be useful in understanding some of the problems of the rural populace with a view to solving them.

1.5 OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH

The major objective of this research is to understand one of the sources of rural poverty in Nigeria, that is, feudal oppression and exploitation.

Secondly, the research is aimed at demystifying the role played by traditional rulers in Nigerian politics. This is in view of the growing tendency within the Nigerian ruling class to portray the traditional rulers as the custodian of the people's culture and therefore indispensable to any government in Nigeria.

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CHAPTER TWO:

THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

2.1 THEORY: IDEOLOGY, SOCIAL CLASSES, AND CLASS STRUGGLES

The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas; i.e., the class which is the ruling material force of society is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, consequently also controls the means of mental production, so that the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are on the whole subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relations, the dominant material relations grasped as ideas; hence of the relations which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance.¹

In all historical epochs, ideologies represent false consciousness of social relations,² which consciousness either serves the interest of the dominant classes as is the case in all class based societies, ^{or the majority as in classless societies.} All ideologies are the reflection of the concrete social relations that exist among the various members of the society. Thus for example under the primitive communal societies the ideologies of the clan, the tribe and kinship were essentially aimed at strengthening the social cohesion among the various members of the society. Since private ownership of land and the means of production were non-existent in such societies, the communal ideology was necessary to discourage individualism and avarice which were inimical to collective interests.

With the division of society into hostile and antagonistic classes however, ideologies assumed a class character, ideologies became intellectual instruments for holding down the oppressed classes. Thus for example under the slave mode of production, the ideology of natural inequality was dominant. The ruling class preached that men are by nature unequal. So the oppression and exploitation of the slaves by the slave owners was rationalised under the guise of "natural inequality".

Under the feudal mode of production, every members of the society was assumed to have "rights". However, the nature of these "rights" are largely dependent on the position one occupies within the feudal order,³ such that the feudal lord had more rights than the peasant or serf. In this sense feudalism is an advancement over the slave mode which did not recognise the rights of the slave to anything. However, the feudal ideologies of "rights", ownership, duties and obligations,⁴ were essentially aimed at disguising the exploitative relationship between the feudal lord and the peasant or serf.

With the demise of feudalism and the emergence of capitalism, bourgeois ideology replaced feudal ideology. Thus the feudal ideas of "rights", "duties and obligations" were supplanted by bourgeois ideologies of the "equality of rights", "ownership" and "contract". The exploitation of the worker in

rationalised under the guise of "contract", bourgeois monopoly of the means of production is justified in the name of "ownership" while the "freedom" of the worker to sale his labour to whoever he wants as well as "choose" those who are going to rule him are all seen as part of his "inalienable human rights".

The fact that one ideology supplants another does not mean for example that two ideologies cannot co-exist. Since new ideologies are formed on the ruins of the old ones, the vestiges of the old ideology remain within the new one to serve the interest of the dominant class. Thus for example,

Although bourgeois ideology has often taken non-religious or anti-religious forms, it always leaves a loophole for religious and continually comes back to it, while in periods of crisis, when the system is seriously endangered, religious ideology is always brought to the fore and takes the offensive.

In backward social formations of Africa, Asia and Latin America, the feudal ideology is retained to effectively hold down the majority peasant populations.

Whenever a dominant ideology takes its roots, there tend to develop a counter ideology challenging the interest of the dominant class. The emergence of counter ideology within a dominant ideology is a manifestation of class struggle. This class struggle as Marx and Engels noted in the Manifesto of the Communist Party, either end in a "revolutionary re-constitution

of society at large or in the common ruin of the contending classes"⁶. Thus for example in the struggle between the advocates of private property and the communalists, the advocates of private property were victorious and the society was transformed from that characterised by communal relations to that of savile relations.

However, in the struggle between the slaves and the slave owners, a new class, i.e. a class of feudal lords emerged. The two contending forces were enmeshed in this struggle. Similarly, the struggle between the peasantry and the feudal lords ended with the common ruin of both the feudal class and the peasantry in Europe and on their ruins emerged the capitalist and the proletariat. The struggles between the capitalists and the proletariat in some countries already saw the proletariat victorious.

The ability of any oppressed class to wage a successful struggle against the oppressor depends to a large extent on the its ability to transform itself from a class "in itself" to a class "for itself". For most classes, this transformation has been quite difficult. This is true especially for the peasantry.

Various arguments have been advanced to explain the passivity of the peasantry. According to Marx, the problem of

the peasantry has to be seen within the context of their isolated small holdings:

Insofar as millions of families live under economic conditions of existence that separate their mode of life, their interests and their culture from those of the other classes, and put them in hostile opposition to the latter, they form a class. Insofar as there is merely a local interconnection among these small-holding peasants, and the identity of their interests begets no community, no national bond and no political organisation among them, they do not form a class. They are consequently incapable of enforcing their class interests in their own name, whether through a parliament or through a convention. They cannot represent themselves, they must be represented."

Karl Marx regarded any collection of peasants, existing as a class "in itself" as a bunch of "rural idiots" "much as potatoes in a sack form a sack of potatoes".⁶ Marx saw the liberation of the peasantry as organically linked to peasant-proletariat alliance, an alliance in which the proletariat provides the leadership.

To Frantz Fanon, the peasantry especially in backward social formations such as in Africa, constitutes the most revolutionary force. This is because the proletariat in Africa was a creation of colonialism and they are seen by the peasantry as collaborators and beneficiaries of the very system that oppressed and exploited them.⁷ However, this revolutionary potentials of

the peasantry has to be channelled by the nationalists and not by the proletariat.

To Teodor Shanin, the consciousness of the peasantry is determined by a number of factors such as the relationship of the peasant to the means of production i.e. land, the nature of family relations, and the village structure.

To most peasants, the ownership of land guarantee them a living. The peasant produces most of his basic needs on the land and this "gives the peasant relative independence from other producers".¹⁰ Secondly, in all peasant communities, "the individual and the family form an indivisible whole,"¹¹ such that most of the needs of the individual are met at the level of the family. Thirdly, those needs that could not be met at the village level are normally met at the village level. Invariably, the social organization of the peasantry is such that they are relatively self-sufficient. Consequently, the ownership of its means of production as well as living in an isolated and relatively self-sufficient villages makes the peasantry backward and reactionary. To the extent that his property is not tampered with, the peasant is not capable of undertaking a political action against the feudal lords.

According to Shanin, the peasantry is largely capable of three major political actions namely, independent class action,

guided political action and thirdly fully spontaneous, a morphous political action.¹² The independent class action of the peasantry is the least recorded political action among them. In this type of political action, the peasants organise themselves independent of an external influence and fight their oppressors. Such include for example "the "green" movements in Eastern Europe, the peasant Unions in Russia in 1905 and China of 1926, the Zapata movement in Mexico etc."¹³

Under the second form of political action, the peasantry become "an object of leadership or manipulation" by external forces such as secret societies, and liberation movements like the Chinese Communist Party etc.¹⁴

The third form of political action by the peasantry which is the most common in most peasant societies, can take two major forms viz; riots and passive resistance. Riots are short-lived as they end up being crushed by the state apparatus of the ruling class. Passive resistance which normally takes the form of refusal to pay taxes or refusal to obey certain laws are normally used against a more powerful enemy that cannot be physically attacked. This type of struggle was effectively used by Gandhi in India against the British.

Although most of these forms of peasant struggles rarely end with a revolutionary re-constitution of society at large, they

are nevertheless important as they influence changes in government policies or even in the overthrow of oppressive regimes.

In the Guri case study, I shall attempt, within the context of the theory of ideologies and class struggles analysed above, to understand the dynamics of peasant - aristocrats relations and the contradictions that inform the continued existence of these relations.

2.3 METHODOLOGY

In the literature review, I argued that oppression and exploitation had their roots in private property and also that the issue of control over land and/or labour played a central role in all cases of feudal oppression and exploitation cited. In other words, material and economic interest seems to lie at the root of feudal oppression in the historical cases referred to above. I have also shown how religious ideology played vital roles in justifying feudal relations throughout history. To this extent, in undertaking this research, I adopted the political-economy approach in which a social phenomenon is analysed historically and dialectically, collectively referred to as historical and dialectical materialism. That is, trying to understand the nature of material interest that informs the class struggle and contradictions within class societies over time. According to Marx:

In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond a definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process, political and intellectual life.¹⁵

Marx further contended that:

There is in every social formation a particular branch of production which determines the position and importance of all others, and the relations obtaining in this branch accordingly determine the relations of all other branches as well. It is as though light of a particular hue were cast upon everything, tingering all other colours and modifying their specific features.¹⁶

The major advantage of the political-economy approach is its ability to distinguish between appearance and reality as well as its ability:

to pierce deeper and deeper through successive layers of phenomena, towards laws of motion which explain why these phenomena evolve in a certain direction and in certain ways.¹⁷

In studying a particular country for example, it might seem proper to start with population "which forms the basis and the subject of the whole social process of production".¹⁸ A close examination however, will reveal that such an approach is

misleading. This is because population is an abstraction, a mere appearance especially if one sets aside the social classes of which it is composed.¹⁹ Similarly, classes in themselves remain abstract categories unless the social relations of production which characterise the existence of these classes are taken into consideration. The correct procedure for such an investigation is to start with the most fundamental abstract categories that inform the reality and motion of that society i.e. the inherent internal contradictions that are entrenched in it and the relationship which exist between these internal relations and the outside appearance i.e. population.

According to Paul A. Baran, the superiority of the political economy approach over bourgeois method of investigation is its

"capacity and willingness to look beyond the immediate observable facts and to see the tree of the future in the tiny shoots barely perceptible in the present. It is the combination of historical vision and the courage to be utopian with the vision sternly disciplined by an analysis of tendencies discernible at the present time, and with the Utopia rendered concrete by the identification of the social forces that may be expected to further its realisation"²⁰ (Emphasis in the original).

In this way, the political economy approach moves "from the more abstract to the more concrete in a step by step fashion, removing, simplifying assumptions at successive stages of the investigation so that theory may take account of actual

phenomena"²¹. This method of studying a social phenomenon sees social change within the context of a continuum

"in which the present becomes part of a continuum stretching from a definable past to a knowable future in which tomorrow is today extended as a coming to be of what potentially is, as the further unfolding of an already existing process taken as a special temporal relation"²²

In applying the political economy approach to this study, I shall examine the various forms of contradictions that existed within the society under study. These contradictions will be classified into primary and secondary, antagonistic and non antagonistic, basic and non basic, internal and external contradictions. These contradictions shall then be analysed within the context of concrete material interests which underlies the social relations of production that existed among various classes.

The primary contradictions are those contradictions that exist between antagonistic classes i.e. between peasants and feudal aristocrats or between peasants and colonial capital. These primary contradictions are antagonistic because they define the social relations of production between an oppressed class and an oppressor class. They are antagonistic because they cannot be resolved peacefully i.e. the feudal aristocrats cannot give up their privileges without any challenge from the peasantry. The

non antagonistic contradiction are those contradictions which exists among the oppressed classes or among the oppressor classes. For example, there was a secondary contradiction between the peasantry and the colonial working class interests of enforcing colonial rules. This contradiction was more pronounced especially between those employed as tax collectors or the forestry officers and the peasantry. Similarly contradictions existed between the feudal aristocrats and the colonial state which quite often led to the deposition of many Emirs and District heads (Hakimai).

These primary and secondary contradictions are also divided into internal and external contradictions. The primary internal contradictions are those between the peasants, the nomadic Fulani and the artisans on the one hand and the feudal class on the other. The secondary internal contradictions are those for example between the peasants and the nomadic Fulani. These two groups always engaged in rancour especially when the Fulani allowed their livestock to destroy the peasant's crops. The feudal class always exploits this contradiction between the nomadic Fulani and the peasants to their advantage.

The external contradiction is that between international capitalism and the peasantry. This contradiction manifested itself in terms of underpricing peasant cash crops and other raw

materials such as hides and skins. This contradiction became internalised with the consolidation of colonial rule, a process through which the entire Nigerian social formation was articulated into the global capitalist system.

Thus the dynamics of the Guri social formation will be analysed within the context of these contradictions.

2.21 THE SETTING

Guri District is located in the extreme North-Eastern part of Kano state. Kano state, formerly Kano province, was created in April 1968. Geographically, the state is located between $13^{\circ} 53'$ North, $10^{\circ} 25'$ North, $7^{\circ} 40'$ East and $10^{\circ} 35'$ East.

Kano state is bordered on the West by Katsina state; on the South by Bauchi and Kaduna states; on the East by Bauchi and Borno states and on the North by Katsina and Borno states and by Niger Republic. The state occupies an area of 43,070sq kilometres about 4.7% of Nigeria's land area.²³

During the 26th August 1976 local government reform, Kano state was divided into twenty local government authorities. There is one Municipal Council (Kano) and nineteen local government councils. Sixteen of these local governments were created out of Kano Emirate and they are Bichi, Birnin Kudu, Dabbata, Dawakin Kudu, Dawakin Tofa, Dutse, Gaya, Gerawa, Gwarzo, Jahun, Kano municipal, Minjibir, Rano, Ringim, Tudun Wada

and Mudil. Two were created out of Hadejia Emirate and they are Hadejia and Kafin Hausa and one each from Gwamel and Kazaure Emirates.²⁴

In 1989, the Feudal government created 26 more local government in the state which brought the total number of local governments in Kano state to 46.

During the 1952 census, the population of Kano state stood at 3,350,000. This figure rose to 5,775,000 in the 1963 census. In 1980, the state had a projected population of 9,043,000.²⁵

Prior to 1989, Guri District was under Hadejia local government. However, following the creation of more local governments, the District is now under Kirikasamma local government. Both Guri and Kirikasamma are still part of Hadejia Emirate. Hadejia town is located within 209 kilometres from Kano city. Hadejia Emirate occupies a total land area of 4,180sq kilometres. During the 1952 census, the Emirate had a total population of 148,000. This figure rose to 315,000 during the 1963 census. In 1980, the Emirate had a projected population of 480,000.²⁶

Guri town is located some 50km away from the East of Hadejia town. The District had a total population of 20,000 in 1952. In 1963, the total population of the District was 36,000.²⁷ By

1980, the total population of the District was projected at 55,000.²⁸ It occupies a total area of 910sq kilometres and it is inhabited by four ethnic groups viz; Kanuri, Hausa, Fulani and Bade. The District is the second largest in the Emirate after Birniwa which occupies a total area of 1,720sq kilometres.

The District experiences two seasons annually, the dry and the rainy seasons. The dry season lasts for about eight months beginning in October and ends in May. The dry season is characterised by a cold dry and dusty wind (harmattan) between November and March. The period between April and the end of May is normally hot and humid and its end marks the beginning of the rainy season. The rainy season begins in May and sometimes earlier in April or later in June. The rainy season lasts for about four months beginning in May and ends in early October. Sometimes the rainy season last for about only two or three months in which case droughts were experienced. Droughts are very common especially with the increasing desert encroachment.

The choice of Guri District of Hadejia Emirate for this study was informed by a number of seasons.

First of all my interest in this study was dictated by my peasant background. As a child, witnessed cases of extortion and plunder of peasant surplus by feudal aristocrats and most of such practices continued to exist to this date. This defines my

interest in trying to locate the forces and contradictions that inform the continued existence of the exploitative relationships between peasants and aristocrats in Guri District. Secondly, my choice of Guri District is based on the fact that I am fairly familiar with the history and culture of the people of the District. Thirdly, Guri District is one of the areas in Kano state where feudal aristocrats - peasant relations is still strong.

2.22 POPULATION AND SAMPLE

The population of Guri District was projected to be 55,000 in 1980, as I stated above. The population was projected to be increasing at the rate of 1,250 per annum.²⁹ By 1988 therefore, the projected population of Guri District was about 65,000. Out of this total population, I selected a sample of fifty respondents through purposive sampling technique. The thirteen villages are: Dagana (2) Abunabo (3) Garfagal (3) Gagiya (4) Galdiman (2) Guri (12) G-Gabas (3) G.Yamama (3) Hadejia (2) Kadira (4) Lafiya (4) Madammawa (4) Matara uku (2), Nomadic Fulani Settlements (2).

My choice of respondent was guided by two factors, age and class category. The reason for the choice of fairly older people was that some of them, particularly those within the age range of forty and sixty, provided more information especially on past events, some dating back to the colonial period. More

importantly, I was able to crosscheck the authenticity of the colonial records obtained from the archives through them. In some of the cases I was able to interview the victims of oppression on whom there are colonial reports e.g. Alhaji Muhammadu Danjani and Mallam Danjammai who was deported by the Emir of Wadajia in 1958.

In most of the cases, the choice of those to be interviewed was done in consultation with the villagers.

On the other hand, the choice of class category was based on the need to get a balanced information without being biased against one class. The table below shows the composition of the sample.

TABLE 1.1 SAMPLE STRUCTURES

CLASS	AGE RANGE	NO. INTERVIEWED
1. Feudal Aristocrats	50 - 60	5
2. Rural Petty Bourgeoisie	30 - 40	5
3. Peasantry:		
(a) Rich peasants	40 - 60	5
(b) Middle peasants	40 - 50	10
(c) poor peasants	40 - 50	15

4. Rural Labourers	30 - 50	4
5. Lumpen Elements	30 - 50	4
6. Nomadic Fulani	40 - 60	2
Total		50

This size of the sample could be considered small compared to the general population, however, I could not have obtained more information if the sample had been larger. This is because 90% of the respondents spoke on events that took place in villages other than their own. Thus, most of the information were repeated as I moved from one village to another. This does not mean that I have exhausted all the information obtainable from the people, what is implied here is that the information is quite representative of all the cases of feudal oppression and exploitation that take place in the area.

2.23 HYPOTHESES

From the statement of the research problem, I derive the following working hypothesis:

Guri society typifies the case of a class structured social formation in which a religio-traditional ideology is employed to give legitimacy to feudal relations of production which are essentially oppressive and exploitative.

In accordance with this hypothesis therefore, the study seeks to address the following questions:-

1. What role does religion play in the life of the people?
2. What is the class structure of Guri and the nature of the relations between the different strata?
3. What is the nature of the legal and political relations in Guri District?
4. What are the main features of property relations in Guri?
5. What is the relationship between the feudal aristocrats in Guri and the various apparatus of the modern Nigerian state?
6. What are the major forms and structures of oppression and exploitation in Guri?

2.24 RESEARCH VARIABLES AND THEIR EMPIRICAL INDICATORS

From the point of view and from the demands of our working hypothesis, the major variables for investigating the research problem are:- oppression, exploitation, powerbase and the ideological structure of the feudal aristocracy, the mode of production and the social relations of production and classes.

2.25 OPPRESSION

Oppression is used in this study to refer to cruel political action based on concrete material interest, for example the cases of deportation, imprisonment, flogging etc. of peasants by members of the aristocracy for their (peasants) inability or

refusal to pay feudal taxes or perform forced and unpaid labour.

2.26 EXPLOITATION

Exploitation is used in this study to refer to gratuitous appropriation by the class of owners of the means of production of the surplus and at times of a part of the necessary labour of the direct producers".³⁰

The existence of exploitation shall be established at two levels, namely, economic as well as political and judicial relations. At the economic level, I shall examine the social relations of production that exist among the various classes. Thus, all the cases of forced and unpaid labour, low wages paid to labourers etc. shall be cited as the empirical indicators of economic exploitation.

At the political and judicial levels, all cases of extortion of peasant surplus, obnoxious taxes, illegal fines and levies shall be also cited as the empirical indicators of the existence of exploitation.

2.27 POWER BASE OF THE ARISTOCRACY AND ITS IDEOLOGICAL STRUCTURE

Power base is conceived in this research as the type of authority invoked to legitimise the domination of one class by another. According to Max Weber, there are three bases for legitimising an authority viz; rational grounds, charismatic grounds and traditional grounds.³⁰ Rational authority is based

on the belief in the "legality" of codified rules and the "right" of those in authority to issue commands. A charismatic authority is rooted in the distinctive qualities of the leader on the basis of which he/she exercises authority on the subject population. A traditional authority is based on the "sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of the status of those exercising authority under them".³¹

Despite the existence of these distinct forms of authority, no authority has been shown to have existed independently in isolation from the other authorities. For a particular type of authority to be effective it has to be routinised, that is to say, for a charismatic authority to be effective, it has to be rational and legal or vice versa.

The determination of the power base of the aristocracy shall be derived from an analysis of the procedure involved in succession or recruitment into leadership positions. Also to be examined are the justification provided to legitimise the status-quo, the procedures by which legitimisation is accorded or denied to an individual or group of individuals occupying certain positions.

IDEOLOGY

Ideology is conceived in this research as a particular way of thinking aimed at rationalising and justifying a particular

socio-economic and political relationship that is dominant in a particular social formation. The ideology of the ruling class provides the intellectual basis of holding down the oppressed classes.

The determination of the ideological basis of feudal power shall be made through the establishment of the concrete relationships which exist between the abstract ideas and the daily experiences of the people in various social relationships. This could be seen for example at the level of production where various forms of tithe are collected from the peasantry after harvest.

2.28 MODE OF PRODUCTION AND SOCIAL RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION

A mode of production is "an articulated combination of relations and forces of production structured by the dominance of the relations of production".³²

"Within this dialectical unity, relations of production represent the social form of the development of the productive forces. However, the form inseparably bound to the content, and is dependent on it. The productive forces, their nature and level of

development determine economic relations among people, and above all the type of ownership of the means of production."³³

Relations of production "are the social form of production through which people appropriate the object of nature. In their unity with the productive forces, relations of production form a historically defined mode of production. The totality of the production relations of a given mode of production are the economic base of society that determines the emergence and functioning of a corresponding super-structure."³⁴

In determining the social relations of production in Guri, we shall examine the various classes in terms of their ownership of the means of production as well as their control over what was produced. For example, most of the peasants possessed the lands on which they earn a living, however, most of what they produced was taken away from them by the feudal class through various forms of taxation. Similarly, even among the peasantry, differences exist such that the poor peasants survive by sharing

their labour with the rich peasants. The poor peasants produce very little a substantial part of which went into paying taxes. In order to survive, the poor peasant has to sell his labour power to the rich peasants. So, the poor peasant is essentially facing double exploitation at the local level. On the one hand he is exploited by the feudal aristocrats through feudal exactions and on the other by the capitalist farmer through the expropriation of surplus value.

2.29 CLASSES

According to Lenin:

"classes are large groups of people differing from each other by the place they occupy in a historically determined system of production, by their relation (in most cases fixed and formulated in law) to the means of production, by their role in the social organisation of labour, and consequently, by the dimensions of the share of social wealth of which they dispose and mode of acquiring it. Classes are groups of people one of which can appropriate the labour of another owing to the different places they occupy in a definite system of social economy."³³

In our case study, the following classes could be identified: members of the feudal aristocracy, the rural petit bourgeoisie, the peasantry, rural labourers or proletariat and finally lumpenelements.

The feudal aristocrats are all those who belong to the royal families whether or not they hold titles. The members of this class are small in number, however, they control the administrative machine of the District. All the land and its resources within their area of jurisdiction supposedly belongs to them. In practice however, peasants collectively or individually possess lands and they could dispose of them. Members of the feudal class do not engage in production and hence they live off the labour of the rural populace.

The class of the rural petit bourgeoisie is composed largely of palace scholars (Mallams), judges (Alkalai), forestry officers (Mallaman Daji), Sanitary officers (Malleman Teabata), merchants, police etc. members of this class also do not engage in production and they work hand in hand with the members of the feudal class.

The third in the hierarchy is the peasantry. This class form the majority of the population. Members of this class not only own lands but they also engage in production. The peasantry itself can be divided into three categories. The first category consists of the rich peasants. The rich peasants engage wage labour on their farmlands. Because of their property, they

mostly identify with the members of the feudal and petit bourgeois class. Most of the time they bribe their way out and evade taxation. The second category consists of the middle peasantry. This category of the peasantry neither employs wage labour nor is it employed. Every year after paying all their taxes, they are normally left with enough food to last them for the rest of the year.

The last category of the peasantry are the poor peasants. The poor peasants are always in debt. After paying their taxes, they are virtually left with nothing. They borrow in order to survive. During the farming season, they sell their labour to the rich peasants. They work for the rich peasants in order to get the money with which to buy food to sustain them while they work on their farmlands.

The fourth class are the rural labourers. They are mostly members of the poor peasantry referred to above who have been rendered landless. They also include members of the nomadic Fulani who have gone bankrupt. Members of this class mostly earn their living by selling their labour power to the rich peasants.

The fifth class are the lumpen elements. They form the semi-employed or the un-employed section of the rural community.

Members of this class often form gangs and engage in such things as stealing and gambling. They also engage in drug pushing. For example, they sell energy giving drugs to the peasant farmers and hallucinating weeds like marijuana to the youth.

2.3 METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION

The material for this study was collected through three major sources viz; interviews, archives and secondary sources.

2.31 INTERVIEWS

In view of the fact that the majority of the people in the area under study could neither read nor write, I used an interview schedule drawn up in English and translated to the respondents in their first language through an interpreter. However, my knowledge of some of the language spoken by the people also helped. The intention was to communicate the research problem to the respondents in their first language.

At the initial stage, I faced a problem of co-operation from various groups. For example, the Sarakuna (aristocrats) were very suspicious because I was known to have been writing articles in a magazine that is noted for its anti-feudal stance. So they feared that I might use the information to embarrass them. However, some of them later cooperated on the condition that

their identity would not be disclosed.

Similarly, the peasants on their part also suspected me to be a "spy" of either the government or the aristocrats (Sarakuna). However, after disclosing my true identity and what I wanted the information for, most of them cooperated. Some of the peasants went to the extent of saying "we are ready to defend what we told you in any court of law".

The general problems encountered during the process of the interview notwithstanding I have been able to collect a substantial part of the data I needed.

Most of the interviews took place in the houses of the respondents while few took place on the streets. All responses have been recorded on tape.

2.32 ARCHIVAL SOURCES

The Archival data for this research were collected from four major institutions. These are; the National Archives, Kaduna, Arewa House, Kaduna, the Document section of the Kashim Ibrahim Library, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, and the Northern History Research Scheme of the Department of History, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASS), A.B.U., Zaria.

The data from the Archives are largely colonial dealing with annual and quarterly reports from various Districts and provinces, memoranda and correspondence, pertaining to economic, political, social, and legal matters. There are also reports of Anthropological researches financed by the colonial government. Being colonial, these data are biased towards justifying colonial oppression and exploitation and in some cases defend the feudal class against the peasantry. In extreme cases, the colonial state reacted by deposing those traditional rulers whose activities were seen to be undermining colonial rule. Such cases arose mostly from embezzlement of tax money, concealment of taxable population or extortion.

The shortcomings of the colonial data notwithstanding, they provided me with concrete cases of oppression and exploitation meted out to the peasant population. The biases of the colonial data have been checked by the information collected during the interviews.

2.33 SECONDARY SOURCES

A lot of secondary data were consulted for this research. This type of data were not only informative but also ideological.

They were informative in the sense that they provided me with a broad knowledge of various cases of oppression and exploitation characteristic of feudalism in various parts of the World at different points in time. They are ideological because some of them justified the relationship between the oppressed and the oppressor as a relationship of mutual benefit while others were opposed to such relationship on the ground that it is exploitative. Such data include published and un-published works by academicians and non-academicians, and in magazines, journals and Newspapers.

2.34 METHOD OF DATA ANALYSIS

In analysing the data, I started by sorting all the information collected.

The sorting out of the data involved three processes viz, (1) establishing the category of information desired from the data; (2) editing the information and (3) tabulation of the data.

Under categorization of the information, the data was divided into two i.e. those pertaining to oppression and those on exploitation.

After categorizing the information, I then proceeded to edit them. The editing involved the removal of all irrelevant information. For example, during the interview, some of the respondents made appeals to government to provide employment for their children, electricity for their villages etc. They cited various instances where successive governments made promises but failed to fulfil them.

Essentially, two types of data were collected, qualitative and quantitative. The analysis and interpretation of the qualitative data runs through all the chapters. The quantitative data are largely to be found in the fourth chapter which deals with the case study. The data is presented in tabular form with the various variables measured by the number of respondents giving a set of responses.

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CHAPTER THREE

3.1 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HADEJIA EMIRATE BEFORE AND DURING THE COLONIAL PERIOD

In chapter one, I examined the historical types of feudal relations and the religious ideology that justified these relations. On the basis of these historical types, I dismissed as untenable the argument by Polly Hill that the pre-colonial formation of Kano and by extension Hausa states, are not feudal. In this chapter, I examine the concept of feudalism as it is applied to the pre-colonial formation of Hadejia and the institutional changes that followed the colonial conquest of the Emirate.

Prior to the Islamic Jihad of Usman Danfodio which occurred between 1804 - 1808, the entire area occupied by Hadejia Emirate was under the control of the Galadima (a fief holder) of Borno who resided at Nguru. Hitherto, Nguru was a tribunary vassal of the King (Mai) of the Kanem-Borno Empire. Thus, the small chiefdoms of Hadejia, Auyo, Garin Gabas, Gatare, Mazura, Fagi, Dawa, Marma, and Adiyane,¹ were fiefs of the Galadima of Borno.

All these small chiefdoms paid tribute to the Galadima of Borno. The nature and the amount paid as tribute varied with the resources available to the peasants and the size of the population of each chiefdom. Items given out annually as tribute include grains, cotton products, horses and slaves. Each

Chiefdom paid the amount expected of it annually. Defaulting chiefdoms and/or towns were disciplined through punitive expeditions in which the army of the Galadima carried away large numbers of children and able bodied men and slaves, in addition to property². On the other hand, if it was an individual who defaulted on tax, his property was confiscated. Where the individual concerned had no property, he was imprisoned with hard labour. In the alternative, such an individual might be tied to a stake and starved to death³.

The 18th century Borno empire "consisted of Borno proper, the petty chieftaincies to the South and West, the nomadic clans, the vassal states of Kanem, Zinder, and Bagirmi and the tributary states of Kano, Katsina, and Zaria"⁴. Apart from Borno proper, i.e. the territory inhabited by Kanuri speaking people, all areas that merely paid annual tribute to the King (Mai) were indirectly administered through their local Chiefs under the supervision of a resident representative of the Mai. In the case of Hadejia and all the surrounding villages, the representative of the Mai resided in Nguru.

The Borno ruling class did not interfere with the political structure of those tribute paying states. The tribute paying states elected their leaders and notified Borno of their election. The relationship between Borno and these states was

largely economic. To the extent that they paid their annual tribute to the central government, Borno did not muddle in the internal affairs of small chiefdoms like Hadejia.

3.21 THE CLASS STRUCTURE OF PRE-JIHAD HADEJIA

Four major classes could be identified in pre-jihad Hadejia viz; Kanuri and Habe or Hausa aristocrats, the peasantry, the nomadic Fulani and the slaves.

The Kanuri ruling class did not reside in Hadejia, rather, they stayed in Nguru, a predominantly Kanuri town and administered Hadejia through their Habe rulers.

The peasants live in the surrounding villages. They produced primarily for subsistence and the surplus was expropriated by the Habe and Kanuri aristocrats.

The Fulani, unlike the peasants, are pre-dominantly nomadic people. They survive by rearing livestock. They move from place to place in search of pasture. The Fulani are divided into two groups; the bush Fulani (Fulanin Daji) and the town Fulani (Fulani gida). The former group are nomadic while the latter are sedentary. The town Fulani practise subsistence farming in addition to raising livestock. It was among the Fulanin Gida that the Mallams (scholars) emerged. These Mallams were later to serve as the ideologues of the Jihad of Usman Danfodio. With the

success of the Jihad, the Mallams were integrated into the emirate state structure as bureaucrats and judges (Alkalai).

The class struggle in Pre-jihad Hadejia was therefore between the Kanuri and Hausa ruling class, the peasantry, the nomadic Fulani and the slaves.

The contradiction between the ruling class and the pastoralists was largely based on the excessive demands made on the pastoralists by the ruling class. This demand took the form of cattle tax (Jangali) which was irregular. The nomadic Fulani were made to pay about 5,000 cowries per herd of cattle in one instance. The fact that for example a nomad had paid the Jangali in say Hadejia did not exempt him from paying another Jangali to the King of Marma (Sarkin Marma) once he entered his territory. Similarly, the town Fulani paid tribute both as farmers and also as owners of livestock. The Fulani responded to this exploitation by the ruling class in two ways, either they restricted themselves to one territory under the domain of a particular ruler or they violently attacked and robbed the Jangali collectors.

The contradictions between the peasantry and the ruling class was based on three major issues, namely, forced labour, the exaction of tribute and the conscription of their children into slavery. Peasants mostly reacted to the oppression and

exploitation by changing their loyalty. They migrated en masse out of the domain of any oppressive ruler. In the alternative, all the smaller Chiefdoms mobilised themselves and fought the more powerful enemy as exemplified by the frequent wars between the Damagaram and Hadejia people.

Contradictions existed between slaves and slave-owners. Most of these slaves were prisoners of war. They were owned mostly by the members of the aristocracy and some very few rich peasant families. The slaves were largely used to cultivate lands and some of them were integrated into the army. Most of these slaves ended up being absorbed into the families of their owners. Some palace slaves who have distinguished themselves in war or administration were given titles like Sarkin-Yaki (lit. field Marshal), Hakimi etc. The commonest form of protest by slaves in this area was desertions.

Contradictions also existed between the pastoralists and the peasantry. The Fulani quite often deliberately allowed their animals to eat the crops of the peasants. This happened especially when there were no good pasture around. The peasants most of the time reacted violently and the Fulani who were usually armed, killed the peasants. This contradiction exists to this day and as we shall see in the next chapter, the aristocrats fan the embers of disunity between the peasants and the pastoralists. The frequent clashes between these two classes

serves as a major source of revenue for the feudal aristocrats.

It was in the midst of these contradictions that when the Jihad broke out in 1804 the Fulani of Hadejia declared their support for the Jihad and took an active part in it. The Jihad of 1804 - 1808 destroyed the Sarautu system (the political system of the Hausa states) and in its place emerged the Fulani Emirate structure under the control of the Sokoto caliphate.

3.22 THE JIHAD AND THE FULANI OF HADEJIA

Before the arrival of Fulani in Hadejia towards the end of the 18th century, the area of Hadejia was inhabited by Hausa and Kanuri ethnic groups. Hadejia town itself was said to have been founded by a Kanuri hunter who came from Macina, a town about seventy kilometres to the North of Nguru in present day Borno state. This Kanuri hunter was known as Hadejia and the town of Hadejia derived its name from him.

Hadejia and his wife lived by hunting and they exchanged meat and hides for grains and other goods with the members of the surrounding villages.⁵ Through this exchange, Hadejia became popular with the people in the surrounding villages. When he became known to most of the people, Hadejia stopped moving from one village to another to sell his meat and hides; instead, people came to him to exchange their grains for meat and hides. In this process the residence of Mallam Hadejia became a centre

for exchange where people from the surrounding villages bought and sold commodities.

Although there are no records to show the exact date or period in which Hadejia was founded, evidences in the Kano chronicles show that Hadejia existed before 1450⁶. According to Abdulkadir Maigari, quoting sources in the Kano cronicles, during the reign of King (Sarki) Yakubu Abdullahi Barja of Kano 1452 - 1463, Agalfati the son of the King (Sarki) of Macina referred to above along with his four brothers visited Sarkin Kano and each one of them was given a title (Sarauta) by the then Sarkin Kano. Agalfati was sent to the king (Sarki) of Kano who made him the Sarki of Gaya, and his second brother was made the Sarki of Dal. The third person was sent to Zaria where the Sarki of Zazzau made him the Sarki of Gayan. The fourth person was sent to Garin Gabas where the Sarki appointed him the Sarki of Hadejia.⁷ Abdulkadir, also claimed that between 1450 and 1804, Hadejia was ruled by about 36 Hausa Kings (Habe Sarakuna).⁸

During the reign of Mai Ali (1731 - 1743) of Kanem - Borno empire, the small chiefdoms of Auyo, Garin Gabas, Hadejia and Narma were all attacked and defeated and consequently incorporated into the domain of the Kanem-Borno Empire. Hadejia and the rest of the chiefdoms remained under Borno until the Fulani Jihad of 1804.

The Fulani as I have earlier observed, were a property owning class as a result of which they were subjected to constant harassment and extortion by the Habe (Hausa) ruling class. By 1800, a large number of the Fulani had given up nomadic life. In Hadejia, the Fulani, under the leadership of Hardo Abdure created a big settlement a short distance east of Hadejia town proper. With the growth in the population of the Fulani settlement, the Fulani requested the Habe ruler of Hadejia to appoint a Sarkin Fulani (lit. King of the Fulani) for them. Thus Hardo Abdure was appointed the first Sarkin Fulani of Hadejia⁹.

By 1804, the news of the emergence of Usman Danfodio had reached Hadejia. Hardo Abdure mobilised all the Fulani and impressed on them the need to stay in one place. Thus by 1804, the Fulani had constituted the majority of the population of Hadejia.

With the death of Hardo Abdure in 1805, his son Umaru was made the Sarkin Fulani of Hadejia. Soon after becoming Sarki, Umaru called all the Fulani leaders within Hadejia territory for a meeting. Umaru told the Fulani leaders that he had a dream in which he saw a bright light which started from the West and passed through Hadejia but he did not see the light extending to the Northern part of Hadejia¹⁰. Umaru's intention in that "revelation" was to discourage the remaining Fulani who were

still practising nomadic life from migrating to Nguru and Macina areas during the rainy season. Hitherto, the Fulani stayed in Hadejia throughout the dry season and migrated to the Northern areas of Macina during the rainy season to avoid Tsetse flies and mosquitoes. Now, by stressing that the "light" he saw did not extend to the North, he was indirectly communicating to them through a religious language that Hadejia has been "blessed" because the light had passed through it and the North "doomed" because the "light" did not reach there. The "light" that Haro Umaru dreamt of was an implicit reference to the Jihad which was gathering momentum and its extension to Hadejia would see Umaru as the first Emir of Hadejia.

Having assembled all the Fulani into one place and persuaded them to give up nomadic life, Haro Umaru immediately sent a delegation to Usman Danfodio, first to pay him (Usman Danfodio) homage as the leader of the Jihad, and second, to collect from him the white flag which was to serve as a symbol of legitimacy for the emirship of Umaru and also as authorisation to spread the Jihad to other areas.

Having been recognised as a flag bearer of Usman Danfodio's Jihad, and also as the first emir of Hadejia, Umaru gathered both the Fulani and Hausa population and announced his appointment. The Habe rulers fled the capital and the Fulani took over the

control of Hadejia. At the same time, Umaru declared Hadejia independent of Borno.

As was the case in most Hausa states, the Jihad in Hadejia was largely a revolt of an oppressed Fulani community against their Habe oppressors and there was nothing religious about it, except that the Jihad used religion as an ideology. If anything, the flag acquired by Umaru Barkin Fulani Hadejia served mainly as a licence for plunder, extortion and barbaric acts against the peasant population. Up to 1840, the Fulani rulers in Hadejia were not interested in agriculture as they lived mainly by brigandage and plunder. For any Emir of Hadejia to gain acceptance and loyalty especially among the warrior class who were mostly of servile origin, he had to show interest in leading raids into villages. For example, the 8th emir of Hadejia, Umaru, who ruled from 1862 - 65, was deposed and driven out of Hadejia for his inability to lead raids into towns and villages.

The extortionist and plunderous tendencies of the rulers of Hadejia reached their peak during the reign of Buhari who ruled from 1848 - 1850 and also from 1851 - 62.

Oral tradition in Hadejia has it that right from the time before Buhari was born, his father, Sambo, had once visited Shehu Usman Danfodio in Sokoto. Sambo saw that all the children in the Shehu's house were afraid of him. On asking the Shehu for the

reason, Shehu told Sambo that he (Sambo) was going to give birth to an infidel and murderous son. From that time, Sambo killed all the newly born male babies in his house. When Buhari was born, the mother claimed that he was a baby girl and he was brought up as such.¹² When the truth was discovered that Buhari was not a girl but a boy, Sambo attempted to kill him but he was persuaded to spare him. Buhari was later driven out of Hadejia.¹³

Buhari wandered from one place to another until he was later sent for by his step-mother when she saw that Sambo was about to die.

"In the knowledge that his father hated him he still managed by a trick to get his father to hand him the insignia of office and the secrets of kingship. With the aid of his step mother, who for some reasons seems to have liked him (Buhari) better than his brothers, he made himself out to the dying Sambo to be Ahmadu, whom Sambo was expecting"¹⁴.

Buhari immediately got the support of the warrior class who confirmed him as the 6th emir of Hadejia. In accordance with the rule of succession, the right person to have been appointed the emir was Ahmadu because he was the eldest son of Sambo. The people of Hadejia objected to the emirship of Buhari on the grounds that it was a violation of the custom and unprecedented in the history of Hadejia.

The people of Hadejia immediately informed the then Sultan of Sokoto Aliyu Babba about what Buhari had done. The Sultan of Sokoto immediately declared that Buhari be deposed and Ahmadu made the new emir of Hadejia. Buhari defied the order from Sokoto and refused to abdicate.

Thus in 1850 while Buhari was away on a campaign against Macina, Ahmadu was made the 7th emir of Hadejia. On his return, Buhari came to know that Ahmadu had been made the emir and so he did not enter Hadejia. Buhari went to settle in his farmland at Shabawa, a few kilometres away from Hadejia. While at Shabawa, Buhari built a strong army. He later secured the support of the Shehu of Borno who was bitterly opposed to the Fulani.

A year later, Buhari launched an attack on Hadejia in which he killed emir Ahmadu and made himself the emir of Hadejia again. After taking over Hadejia, Buhari launched series of attacks on all the neighbouring states. He killed their Sarakuna, looted their property and installed his supporters as the Sarki of the conquered area or state. In this way the states of Anyo, Marma, Garin Gahas, Gatare and Kazure were all brought under the control of Buhari.

The response from Sokoto against the atrocities of Buhari was immediate. A combined team of soldiers from Sokoto, Zazzau, Kano and Katagum were sent to fight Buhari. Two days before

their arrival in Hadejia, Buhari got the information about their strength as well as the route they were following. A day before they could reach Hadejia, Buhari's army attacked and routed the combined forces in the night at Kafir. The attack was never expected. Many of the Sultan's soldiers were killed, some fled and some were taken away as slaves. Since the above incidence, Buhari cut off all links with Sokoto and engaged in more brigandage and raids until he was killed in 1863 in a campaign against the Bada at Gorgaram.

From 1848 up to 1906 when the colonialists conquered Hadejia, the relationship between Hadejia and Sokoto had not been cordial as most of the emirs from Ahmadu (1850 - 51) to Muhammadu (1885 - 1906) cherished the plunderous ideals of Buhari. None of the emirs of Hadejia ruled according to the prescriptions of the Islamic religion.

3.23 THE STATE AND ECONOMY

In all class based societies, the state primarily protects the interest of the dominant class. It is the legal and political superstructure.

This legal and political superstructure emerged in whole and in part only upon already entrenched antagonistic contradictions of material interests within the production relations which it regulates as well as expresses.

The state validates some or all existing relations of production (power) as legal property relations (rights),¹⁵ and in this way it validates and institutionalises the oppression and exploitation of the subordinate classes by the ruling class. In this way the feudal state in Hadejia served as a machine for holding down the peasantry.

Between 1804 when Hadejia emirate was founded and 1906 when the colonialists took over the control of Hadejia, the state was largely used for conquest, extortion, and the consolidation of the Fulani aristocracy. Between 1804 and 1848, Hadejia was an emirate under the control of the Sokoto caliphate. However, with the rebellion of Buhari it remained independent up to the time it was conquered by the British.

The Emirate was divided into Districts each of which was under a district head (Hakimi) who resided in Hadejia. Each Hakimi had a representative (Wakili) who was directly in charge of the rural community within that particular District. Each village had a leader called Eulama (among the Kanuri and Bade) or Dagaci (among the Hausa). The nomadic Fulani also had their leaders. Each village was divided into wards each of which was placed under the leadership of Mai Unguwa (ward head plu. Madu Unguwanni). All minor problems that could not be resolved by the family heads were directly reported to the Mai Unguwa who

summoned the parties involved and made peace between them. Things that passed the powers of the Mai Unguwa were directly reported to the village head who either solved them or referred them to the Wakili who reported everything to the Hakimi.

On the other hand, offences such as culpable homicide were directly reported to the Emir through the Hakimi. Thus most of the title holders from the ward heads up to the emir acted both as administrators and as judges. Unlike the emirates of Kano and Zaria which had established separate courts under judges (Alkalai) who presided over cases, for instance in Hadejia the position of the Alkalai was largely advisory. As late as 1924, it took a concerted effort on the part of the colonialists to persuade the emir of Hadejia to allow the Alkalai to try some cases.¹⁶

3.31 SUCCESSION AND DEPOSITION

Succession to positions of authority, especially to that of the emirship, is based on suitability (cananta) and inheritance (Gado). On the death or deposition of an emir, his eldest son usually succeed him. In Hadejia, this procedure for appointing new emirs was not always adhered to. On three occasions unpopular candidates manipulated themselves into power.¹⁷ In one of these instances i.e. the case of Buhari referred to above, it precipitated a civil war among the people.

Similarly, on the death of Buhari in 1863, his son Umaru, with the active support of the leadership of the army imposed himself as the emir of Hadejia. Although Umaru was a rightful successor of Buhari, Haru Babba the junior brother of Buhari would have been more appropriate, considering his experience and popularity among the people. Riot was not possible because nobody wanted to face the deadly soldiers of Umaru. Thus in order to get rid of Umaru, the Hakimai who were opposed to him, led by Haru Babba, caused disaffection between Umaru and his soldiers. The emir was told that there was a plan to kill him and that the plot was being hatched by Tatagana the leader of the soldiers. Umaru believed everything and thus ordered the execution of Tatagana. After getting rid of Tatagana, Jaji, the second in command was also accused of planning to kill the emir and was similarly killed. Civil war broke out among the soldiers and many of the emir's strong men were killed.

After getting rid of all his strong men, emir Umaru was persuaded by all the Hakimai to go for a stroll (kilisa) outside the walled town of Hadejia. Many people accompanied the emir on the kilisa. The emir was in front and everybody followed him from behind. Before Umaru could notice it, most of the people had deserted him, he was left with few people, and all the gates of Hadejia were closed against them. That was how Umaru was deposed in 1865 and Haru Babba was made the emir of Hadejia.

There are no clear-cut guide lines for eligibility for emirship other than being the son of an emir. Hence all princes aspire to be emirs. This ambition nursed by the princes often bring them into conflict with one another.

The possibility of any prince succeeding his father depends largely on two things. First of all he has to gain the confidence of his father in respect of his leadership capabilities and secondly, he has to earn the confidence of the countiers (fadawa) and the king makers through gift giving.

Whenever an incumbent emir was about to die, he was normally asked to mention the person to succeed him among his children. The kingmakers kept the secret to themselves until the death of the emir. Quite often, conflict of interest arises between the choice of the emir and that of the kingmakers. This conflict of interest arises largely from the nature of the promises made to the kingmakers by the aspirants. The aspirants make various commitments ranging from money, estate and/or titles. Thus in a situation where the choice of the emir did not agree with the interest of the kingmakers, the kingmakers changed the decision of the deceased emir.

On the other hand, succession to other less important positions like that of Hakimi was not hereditary but achieved.

The title of Hakimi was (prior to the colonial era) largely reserved for soldiers who distinguished themselves in war. Nowadays, the title has been made hereditary. Appointments into all offices were the prerogative of the emir and eligibility was based on competence and ability to undertake the obligations attached to that very office and to the extent that a title holder performed well, he retained his position for life.

Except at the village level, the peasants did not participate in electing any title holder. At the village level, however, the peasants elect the village heads and the ward heads (Masu Unguwa).

The peasants in Hadejia emirate have never on their own rioted against the feudal system in general. They only removed oppressive and dictatorial village heads or protested against the activities of certain title holders like the messengers (Jakadu) who assessed and collected all religious taxes. In the succession quarrels that ensued among princes, the peasants only took sides with the candidates of their choice.

3.32 SOCIAL RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION

The family had remained the primary unit of production in pre-colonial Hadejia. Thus most of the land was communally owned. Theoretically however, the entire land within Hadejia Emirate was seen as the property of the emir, Kasar Sarkin

Hadejia (lit. the land of the Emir of Hadejia). In practice individuals and families could dispose of their lands at will. Hence peasants bought and sold lands. Lands could also be mortgaged for fixed amount of money or grains. Production took place within the context of the household farm (Gandu plu. Gandaye) especially in the areas inhabited by the Hausa, while areas inhabited by the Kanuri and Bade practised a combination of Gandu and individual systems of production.

Each adult member of the family participated in the Gandu production. However, after getting married, the individual had the option of either moving out of the Gandu to set up a separate farmland or continue as a member of the Gandu. Most members of the Gandu owned small farmlands which they cultivated and the proceeds from which were accumulated individually.

In a situation where most members of a family opted out of the Gandu, they usually came together to undertake a system of production called Gayya. In the Gayya system of production many families came together and helped each other during farming and/or harvest periods. The Gayya was also practised at the village level where able bodied men in the village combine forces to cultivate the farmland of an individual members of the community who was ill and could not work. Gayya was also used to execute communal projects.

The essential difference between the two systems of production is that while the Gandu system is limited to individual families, the Bayya system involves more than one family and in some cases the entire community was involved.

Apart from the family and communal forms of labour, there also existed slave, client and wage labour (Kodago) as well as share cropping.

Slave labour was largely employed by two major classes, namely, the aristocrats and the richmen (Attajirai). Most of the aristocrats have large tracts of lands called Gandayen Sarakuna which were cultivated by a combination of slave and peasant corvee labour. With the territorial expansion of Hadejia in the late nineteenth century, the slaves were increasingly drafted into the army while the peasants were saddled with the responsibility of cultivating the Gandayen Sarakuna.

On account of their wealth, the Attajirai occupied a significant position within the society. Apart from participating in agriculture, they also participated in many profit oriented ventures, ranging from trade and commerce to usury. Through various trade relations, an Attajiri might become a patron (Fatoma) with several clients and house helps (Barori) who offered "free" labour to their patrons.

Kadaga (wage labour) was employed by a large section of the society and payment was mostly made in kind. Each year after the harvest, the peasants were subjected to various forms of taxation as a result of which most of them went bankrupt before the next harvest. In order to survive, they sold their labour to the rich peasants. Most of the rich peasants prefer free labour as a form of payment by debtors to wage labour (Kadaga). The advantage derived by the rich peasants from such a social relationship was that the poor peasants were required to provide free labour for a specified period of time, depending on the amount of grain he wanted. After say two or three days of free labour, the poor peasant was given two big tins of grain on credit to be paid with interest after the harvest.

The last form of production was share-cropping. This type of production was largely undertaken by strangers to the local community. Such strangers were usually given plots of land on request as Arg (Borrowing) for which they gave a token amount to the owner of the land and also some grains after the harvest.

3.33 IDEOLOGY AND EXPLOITATION

As stated in chapter one, the ideology of the feudal class is religion. The religious ideology provided the legal basis for extracting all forms of taxes from the peasantry.

Within the authority structure, the leader of the faithful (Amir-al-muslimun) is seen as the shadow of God (Zillulahi), and as "the possessor of the power of administer the death penalty" (Sarkin yanka),¹⁸ obedience to him is an obligation (wajib).

The material reflection of this ideology can be seen within the context of the religious taxes, chief among which was the Zakkat extracted from the poor peasants by the aristocrats. In the Qur'an (sura 9:103) it is stated that "take alms of their wealth where with you may purify and sanctify them", and in sura 9:60, it is stated "alms are for the poor and the needy and those employed to administer the (funds), for those whose hearts have been recently reconciled, and those in slavery, and those in debt, and in the way of God, and for the wayfarer".

Theoretically, the Zakkat, which is supposed to be levied on livestock such as camels, cows, sheep and goats, on farm produce such as grains and dates, on money in form of gold, silver and banknotes, is largely an obligation laid down on the rich. The duty of the state is to ensure the collection of Zakkat from the rich for distribution to the poor. In practice however, the aristocracy in Hadejia made the payment of Zakkat an obligation on the entire peasantry. The Zakkat was collected by the messengers (Jakadu) from the peasants and shared among the members of the aristocracy.¹⁹

When the British took over power, they allowed the emirs to continue collecting the Zakkat on the condition that they were to give the colonial state a quarter of whatever they collected. Later the Zakkat was paid directly to the British through the village heads. Though the Zakkat was officially abolished by 1911, the emirs continued to collect it throughout the colonial period.²⁰

The aristocrats claim that all the land within the confines of an emirate belongs to the emir who in turn allowed the peasants to use it as a gift. On the basis of this claim, the peasants were made to pay land tax (kudin kasa). This type of tax is different from Zakkat because while Zakkat is a religious obligation, kudin kasa was seen as a civil obligation. Kudin kasa was levied arbitrarily without taking into consideration the income of the individual peasants. Thus, after paying the Zakkat and meeting some few family obligations, most of the peasants went bankrupt and consequently they were compelled to sell their farmlands to pay the kudin kasa. In this way the peasants were proletarianised and became rural labourers (yan kodago). In 1918, the colonial state combined all precolonial forms of taxation into one community tax called Haraji. The Haraji was essentially a general poll tax.

Other forms of feudal taxation include levies on irrigated plots (kudin rafi) occupational taxes (kudin sana'a) which was levied on all occupational groups, ranging from craftsmen to butchers. Of all these taxes, the tax on livestock (Jengali) remained one of the most lucrative. In addition to paying the Zakkat, those members of the society such as the nomadic Fulani had to pay tax on their livestock.

All taxes were collected by the intermediaries or representatives (Wakilai or Jakadu) of the territorial or District heads (Hakimai). Most of these Wakilai extorted the peasantry by making higher demands than what they were officially asked to collect. In addition these Wakilai stole some part of what they were expected to bring. The amount collected by the Wakilai was passed to the Hakimai who also took their share and the remainder was sent to the emir who accumulated all the taxes received from the various Hakimai.

In addition to all these, the Sarki was entitled to half-share of the booty that was collected from military campaigns. The emir also has a share in the wealth and property of any of his title holders on their death. The emir also collected title money (kudin sarauta) from those people who were given titles. Death duties were also levied on the estate of rich people on their death.

The feudal ideology in Hadejia was also reflected in the culture of the people and the relationship between the ideology and the culture of the society could be seen in almost everything that the people do.

Every year, there are two major religious festivals i.e. id-al-fitr which takes place at the end of the fasting of the month of Ramadan and id-al-kabir which comes up about seventy days after id-al-fitr. On each of these occasions, the people pay homage to the leaders and offer them gifts in kind. In some cases the leaders also reciprocate by offering clothing and money to those who offered them gifts. Most of ceremonies in the society have religious flavour and are influenced by religious injunctions. All marriage and naming ceremonies were presided over by Islamic scholars (Mallamai) who are also the ideologues of the feudal class. The Mallamai were consulted on many issues economic, social or political. They gave charms for protection against diseases, evil spirits, and enemies. Thus both children and adults could be seen with chains of charms tied around their waists or necks. The Mallamai also gave charms for fortune especially to traders and merchants. Before people make long journeys, they usually consulted their Mallamai who advised them as to whether there is luck (sa'a) in the journey or not. The Mallamai also told them the time to start the journey and the direction from where to start the journey. Through the

activities mentioned above, the Mallamai lived very well as they charged those who patronised them various sums of money.

To control the institution of mental production, access to Islamic education was made difficult. Most members of the population were ignorant of the very religion they were practising. The content of the Qur'an was interpreted to them by the Mallamai. In this way, the religious texts were interpreted to justify the status-quo against which a revolt was heresy.

3.4 COLONIALISM AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES IN HADEJIA EMIRATE

Hadejia Emirate was one of the last to be defeated by the British West African Frontier Force in 1906. The reason was that the British had expected peaceful submission from Hadejia following the defeat of Kano in 1903 and the subsequent defeat of the neighbouring states of Bauchi and Katsina.

The year 1906 in which Hadejia was conquered also saw the beginning of the entrenchment of the colonial state.²² It was the year in which Lagos and the Southern protectorates were merged. It was also the year in which a systematic attempt was made to implement the colonial indirect rule.

Following the amalgamation of the Southern and Northern protectorates in 1914, Lugard, the colonial governor general in Nigeria divided the country into administrative units. The country was first divided into three regions viz: Northern,

Southern and Western regions. Each region was divided into provinces and each province subdivided into divisions. Divisions were divided into Districts and each District divided into villages, with the smallest administrative units being the wards.

Each of the regions was headed by a Lieutenant-governor who was responsible to the governor-general in Lagos. The provinces were headed by the residents who were answerable to the Lieutenant-governors. The divisions were headed by British Divisional officers (D.O's) assisted by Assistant Divisional officers (A.D.O's).

In accordance with the spirit of "indirect rule", the pre-colonial indigenous political structure was articulated into the new colonial structure with some limited and insignificant autonomy for the traditional local leaders. Problems arose especially in areas where the offices of chiefs were non-existent as a result of which the British appointed nonentities and village idiots as paramount chiefs. This act of destabilising the political structure of democratically segmented social formations was popularly opposed and rejected especially in the Eastern part of the country until imperialist violence silenced all dissent.

At the local level, the emir was assisted by a judicial council. The emir also presided over the Native

Administration.²³ The area over which each emir exercised jurisdiction was divided into Districts under the leadership of District headmen (Hakimai). The District headman collected taxes in the name of the emir and paid the amount collected into the "Native treasury" under the care of a Native treasurer and staff under the supervision of the emir.²⁴

The District headman was seen as a "territorial magnate with local connections". He was the chief executive in the area under his control. He was responsible for the village heads. Taxes were assessed and collected by the District heads through the agency of the village heads.

In Hadejia as else where all over the North, the District heads hitherto resident in the capital were compelled to reside in their respective District head quarters. By this action, the colonial state officially abolished the office of Jakada or Wakili as it is known in Hadejia.

The political relationship between the emirs and the residents was such that residents were in theory advisers and counsellors to the emirs.²⁵ In reality nothing could be further from the truth. In most of the cases the residents acted as superordinates over the Emirs, acting indirectly through the Divisional officers especially on matters that directly affected

the interest of the colonial state. For example in June 1924, the Yafida of Hadejia was dismissed from office without the consent of the emir for embezzling public works money.²⁶ Similarly, in October of the same year, Janna a District head in Gwari (then under Hadejia N.A.) was deposed for imposing illegal fines and embezzling the money.²⁷ Although emirs appointed their District heads in consultation with the divisional officers, the resident could dismiss a Hakimi without necessarily consulting the emir.

Sometimes the emirs and their District heads in Hadejia acted as law unto themselves especially in dealing with matters that did not directly affect the British interest. For example, village heads were constantly harassed to pay bribes to maintain their positions.²⁸ In 1917, the village head of Samsayin in Bulangum District of Hadejia abandoned his post and migrated to Katagum in present day Bauchi state. The problem was that he was subjected to constant harassment and extortion by Shehu an agent of the Wambei of Hadejia and the District head of Bulangum. When confronted with the allegation, Shehu pleaded guilty and he was banned from entering the District by the District officer. Wambei himself was severely censured. Sarkin Gwari was later recalled and paid all his entitlements.²⁹ There were many such cases that went unnoticed by the colonial state and they persist to date.



In the discharge of his duties, the Emir could issue orders to the District head (Hakimai) independent of the resident and/or District officers so long as such orders did not run counter to British interest in Nigeria. As Lugard put it "the authority of the Emir over his own people is absolute, and the profession of an alien creed does not absolve a native from the obligations to obey his lawful orders."³⁰

The above provision notwithstanding, the powers of the emir were limited by the following instruments:-

1. Native rulers were not allowed to raise and control armed forces or to grant permission to carry arms.
2. The sole right to impose taxation in any form was reserved to the colonial state and that the peasantry was "free" of all other exactions whatsoever (including unpaid labour).
3. The right to legislate was reserved mainly for the central government. However, the Native Administration (N.A.) can also legislate provided that such a legislation has the approval of the governor.
4. The right to appropriate land for public purposes and for commercial requirements was vested in the governor. In practice however, this provision allowed Emir's (as

representatives of the Governor-general at the local levels) to allocate lands to the local populace under their rule.

5. The right of confirming the successor to a chiefship chosen by the people and that of deposing any rulers for misrule and other adequate" (?) cause was reserved to the governor.³¹

To ensure their complete loyalty to the colonial state, all exirs were made to swear as follows during their installation ceremonies.

I swear in the name of God, well and truly to serve His/Her majesty (king George V. or Queen Elizabeth II depending on whoever was the monarch of Britain) and his/her representative the Governor of Nigeria and the lawful commands of the Governor, and of the Lieutenant-governor, provided that they are not contrary to my religion, and if they are so contrary I will at once inform the Governor through the Resident. I will cherish in my heart no treachery or disloyalty, and I will rule my people with justice and without partiality. And as I carry out his oath so may God judge me.³²

Through all its agencies both repressive as well as ideological, the Native Administration (N.A.) in Hadejia functioned first to maintain law and order for imperialist exploitation and secondly to protect and perpetuate the interest of the ruling class.

The process of consolidating the colonial state in Hadejia was effected at two broad levels viz; bureaucratic and economic.

At the bureaucratic level, all recalcitrant and disloyal local bureaucrats were systematically weeded out through outright deposition and other forms of punishment. For example, in 1920, the District head of Auyo and the Sarkin Dawaki of Hadejia were all deposed for extortion and embezzlement.³³ In the same year, Chorugo, an uncle to the emir of Gusel then under Hadejia, was sentenced to 18 months imprisonment for threats to hinder the judge (Alkali) of Gusel from administering justice.³⁴ In the same way, three village heads were deposed and imprisoned for embezzling tax money.³⁵ In 1917, the Chiroma of Hadejia was fined 10 pounds for extortion and embezzlement and he was later deposed.³⁶ These punishment served two objectives. First to ensure strict discipline among the traditional rulers and second to make the traditional rulers aware that even though they had powers over the local population, their offices were subordinate to the colonial state whose interest they must protect.

At the economic level, the economy was systematically monetised and disarticulated. First of all the British insisted that all taxes were to be paid in British currency. This policy did not only render the cowrie which served as the medium of exchange useless but also compelled Nigerians to work for the colonial state and/or British mining firms.

Colonial agrarian policies promoted the destruction of the local textile industry. Prior to colonial domination, the

Hadejia area was one of the major cotton producing centres that supplied the textile industries in Kano with raw materials. Thus to destroy the textile industry, the colonial state promoted the production of groundnut. This was done through campaigns, filmshows and even fixing higher prices for groundnut than cotton cultivation for local textile industries. This strategy was followed by another when the colonial state introduced a "superior" cotton variety mainly used and suitable only for machines in Europe.

To ensure the complete elimination of the local cotton seed variety, a colonial rule was enacted with the following provisions:

1. In any District where the so-called superior variety was distributed, it was forbidden to grow the local variety.
2. Farmers must make sure that before they plant the superior variety, the roots of the local cotton variety that they might have been planting in the previous years were dug-up and burnt.
3. It was an offence to mix foreign and local cotton varieties together.

"Any person who commits any of the above offences is liable on a first conviction to a fine of five shillings or to 7 days

imprisonment, on a second conviction to a fine of 10 shillings or 14 days imprisonment, and for subsequent offences to a fine of one pound or to one months imprisonment"³⁷.

To kill the local leather industry, special slaughter houses were created where all goats, sheep and cows were slaughtered especially in the urban areas. In this way the centralisation of hides and skin production was ensured and exported to Britain.

3.31 NATURE OF CLASS STRUGGLE IN COLONIAL HADEJIA

The class struggle that ensued in Hadejia during the colonial era was largely between four major forces viz; the colonial state, foreign capital, the feudal aristocrats and the peasantry.

The contradictions between the colonial state and the peasantry was largely centred around the issue of forced labour and taxation. Under the Nigerian Defence (Compulsory National Service Essential Mines Northern Province) Regulation Number 23 of 1942, it was common to conscript peasants to work free of charge on railways, roads, prisons and mines. The peasants of Hadejia Emirate participated actively in the construction of the railway between Kano and Nguru. Similarly, all roads, schools, courts, dispensaries and other colonial infrastructures in Hadejia were largely built through forced labour. Although the colonial records claim that the labour of all those who were engaged in public works have been paid for, the same records

state the contrary. For example in 1924, the Tafida of Hadejia was dismissed from office for embezzlement of public works money.³⁸ Infact all those peasants interviewed for this research could not remember a single day when they were paid for working on public infrastructures. The truth is that the Tafidan Hadejia who handled the payment swindled the money.

Every year, village heads were instructed to provide a specific number of people who worked on the various tin mining areas of Kano and Jos.

In addition to forced labour, the colonial state extorted obnoxious taxes through the unpopular poll tax (Haraji), Jangali (tax on livestock in the possession of both peasants and nomadic Fulani), custom duties (kudin fito), caravan tolls, Hawker's tax, Native Liquor tax, fishing tax (kudin su), game tax (kudin farauia).³⁹ These obnoxious taxes formed the bone of contention between the peasantry and the colonial state. Peasants either rioted or they defaulted on payment of these taxes. For example in 1924, the colonialist burnt the village of Lafia and executed the village head for "riot" against the taxes imposed by the British which his people refused to pay.⁴⁰ Similar instances occurred in some parts of the Northern Region. In 1908, the people of Dawakin Tofa in Kano province, specifically the villages of Danzabuwa, Yanoki, Bagwai, Dumbulum and Weri openly

defied paying all taxes. The village head of Dusbulus was chased out of the town by the people.⁴¹

In 1909, the people of Burai, in Gwasabawa area of Sokoto also refused to pay the kudin kasa. In the same year the people of Guriga in Adamawa emirate not only refused to pay the tax but also killed all the three messengers of the emir sent to collect such taxes. The messengers were killed after the expiration of a three day ultimatum served on them to leave the village. The British responded by destroying the village and killing many people.⁴²

In 1911, the Chamba in Adamawa also refused to pay the taxes as a result of which an expedition was sent against them. The British also killed many Chamba people.⁴³ Similarly, the Bura people not only refused to pay their tax but also beat up their District head and killed the policeman as well as the three village heads who accompanied the District head.⁴⁴

The class struggle between the peasantry and foreign capital in Hadejia was informed by three major contradictions.

First of all the peasantry was forced to grow a particular crop. For example, prior to colonialism, groundnut and cotton production were not the major pre-occupation of the peasantry in Guri and Hadejia. The former was only grown for local consumption while the latter was primarily produced for local

textile guilds and surplus was exported to Kano. The predominant occupations of the people around Hadejia and Guri were food crop-farming during the rainy season and fishing during the dry season. The fish was sold to traders from both Kano and far North up to Damagaram. A sizeable number of the population also engaged in raffia mat weaving.

With the implementation of colonial agricultural policy, not only were Guri and Hadejia made to specialise in groundnut and cotton production but the raffia mat and the weaving industry were almost wiped out. Moreover the variety of cotton they were forced to produce was not good for local weaving because it was too soft. Peasants responded to this colonial imposition either by refusing to produce what the colonial state had wanted them to produce or by refusing to offer their commodities for sale until better prices were offered.

The second contradiction that informed the class struggle between the peasantry and foreign capital in Hadejia Emirate was at the level of the pricing policy of imperialist firms. These firms, mostly operating through their agents in the rural areas popularly known as the Licensed Buying Agents (LBA's) daily exploited the peasant by underpricing his commodities. For example, groundnuts which was purchased from the producers for 15 pounds per ton, was sold for 110 pounds per ton in Europe.⁴⁵

In the case of cotton, peasants responded to the exploitative pricing policy by wetting the cotton so that it could weigh heavier on the LBA's scale.

The third contradiction that existed between the peasant and foreign capital was at the level of the law which compelled him to slaughter his goat, sheep or cow in the slaughter house so that the imperialist hides and skins dealer could easily get his needs without wasting his money going round looking for the commodities. Peasants not only refused to slaughter their animals in the slaughter houses but also sold their hides and skins (especially those in the rural areas) to the local leather guilds.

The struggle between the colonial state and the feudal aristocracy was informed by the contradiction that existed between them. This contradiction was essentially a non antagonistic one. It was non antagonistic because the interest of the colonialists and that of the feudal aristocrats were not fundamentally opposed.

During the early stages of colonial rule, most of the Emirs outrightly rejected any attempt by the British to impose taxes on their people. This was not done in support of the peasants against the British but they feared that the new taxes were a direct threat to their source of revenue. The Emirs also feared

that if the peasants were overburdened with taxes, they might revolt against both the Emirs and the British or on the alternative, peasants might flee their territories. Thus Muhammadu the Emir of Hadejia outrightly objected to the taxes imposed by the British.⁴⁶ The Emir of Gwandu Muhammadu Aliyu, the Emirs of Katsina Abubakar and Muhammadu Yero, the Emir of Keffi Ibrahim, the Sarkin Zazzau of Abuja, Muhammadu Gani all objected to the taxes imposed by the British on the peasants.⁴⁷ Also resistant were the Emir of Kano Muhammadu Abbas, Emir of Ilorin Shuaibu, Emir of Keffi Abdullahi and Shehu of Borno Abubakar Garbai.⁴⁸

With the consolidation of colonial rule and the realisation that they could no longer resist colonial taxes, the emirs and their agents responded by concealing the number of taxable population. Some of them concealed the number of livestock in possession of their subjects. In most of the cases the Emirs and their Hakimai collected the taxes and embezzled a substantial part of what they collected. The response of the colonial state to such acts of "sabotage" was prompt and ruthless.

In 1917, the Chiroma of Hadejia was fined 10 pounds for extortion and embezzlement.⁴⁹ Similarly in 1920, the District head of Auyo and the Sarkin Dawaki of Hadejia were both deposed for extortion, embezzlement and concealment of taxable population.⁵⁰ In the same year, three village heads in Hadejia

were deposed and imprisoned for embezzling tax money.⁵¹ On the 25th of November 1920, the village head of Kaugama and one of his ward heads were imprisoned for rendering false returns of revenue.⁵² In October 1924, Janna, a District head in Gumel, then under Hadejia Native Administration, was deposed for imposing illegal fines and embezzling the money.⁵³ In the same year, Manzo, the District Mallam of Tafidan Hadejia was dismissed and jailed for embezzling Jangali money. At the same time, three village heads in Hadejia were dismissed for embezzling tax money and six were dismissed in Gumel for the same reason.⁵⁴

Despite these mass deposition of the members of the feudal aristocracy for offences both against the peasantry and the colonial state, successive emirs in Hadejia and their agents went about such offences with impunity. For example despite the fact that Zakkai as a form of taxation was completely abolished by 1911, successive emirs in Hadejia and their agents in the rural areas continued to collect it throughout the colonial period.

The class struggle between the peasantry and the feudal aristocrats centred around the antagonistic contradictions that characterised the existence of the two classes. These contradiction predated colonialism. Prior to colonial conquest, emirs and their agents depended largely on the peasantry for their sustenance and as I have indicated earlier in this chapter,

peasants paid various forms of feudal taxes. Peasants were also conscripted to perform corvee labour. With the imposition of colonial rule however, most of the feudal forms of exactions such as kudin kasa (lit. ground rent), Zakkat etc. were either completely abolished or they were all combined into one poll tax called Haraji which was paid annually. The problem was that despite the fact that such taxes as Zakkat had been abolished, the emirs and their agents in Hadejia continued the collection of such taxes. The colonial policy of combining all pre-colonial taxes into one poll tax actually drained the revenue of the emirs and their Hakimai. In response to this colonial act, the emirs and their agents levied unofficial taxes on the peasantry. Most of the time, peasants paid such levies but sometimes they defaulted on payment.

With the abolition of the Zakkat the feudal aristocrats in Hadejia introduced two new forms of feudal exactions, these were the Hatsin kambi and kudin gandu. In the Hatsin kambi form of expropriation, peasants were given three pence each by the emir and his Hakimai. With the three pence, each peasant was expected to purchase four measures (mudu) of millet for the emir. At that time, each mudu cost about one shilling. Kudin gandu was a form of feudal exaction mainly imposed on Almajirai (peripatetic students).

Peasants who refused to pay such unofficially imposed taxes were either imprisoned or outrightly deported from the Native Administration area. For example, in 1959, Mallam Danjummai was deported from Hadejia by the the Emir Alhaji Haruna Abdulkadir. Before leaving Hadejia, Danjummai asked the District officer (D.O.) on what to do. The D.O. asked him to first of all get a letter from the Emir to the effect that he has been deported. Mallam Danjummai explained his ordeal to me as follows:

"after collecting the letter, the D.O. advised me to leave Hadejia as directed by the Emir. He gave me 3.00 pounds and told me that when I reach Kano, I should institute a legal action against the Emir. He told me that since I am a Nigerian, the deportation order did not make sense to him"⁵³.

On reaching Kano, the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) National Headquarters instituted a legal action against Danjummai's deportation by the Emir of Hadejia. After 38 days, the court ruled in favour of Mallam Danjummai and he was awarded 250 pounds as damages which was paid by the Emir of Hadejia. The "offence" for which Danjummai was deported was that he mobilised the people of Fantai in Hadejia to defy paying water charges illegally imposed by the Emir of Hadejia.

A year later, Alhaji Isyaku was deported from Hadejia on charges of disturbing public peace. When an official letter was demanded to that effect by NEPU, it was not granted. The Kano

provincial office in a letter dated 15th November, 1960, argued that "if a man as a stranger has been ordered to leave the area of a Native Authority, that man, but not some other third party, may appeal under section 47 of the Native Authority Law, to a magistrate court to have the order set aside".⁵⁶ Although the colonial government knew that the action of the emir could not be legally justified, it did not want to be seen as constraining the emir in the discharge of his duties as a colonial overseer of the local populace.

The institutional changes that accompanied colonial rule in Hadejia Emirate imposed on the peasantry a triple form of exploitation. The peasant was exploited by foreign firms through the underpricing of his cash crops, he was also exploited by the colonial state through all forms of obnoxious taxes and finally he was exploited by the feudal class through all forms of feudal exactions.

3.4 SUMMARY AND OBSERVATIONS

The political economy of Hadejia Emirate has been shown to have undergone two "revolutions". One religious and the second capitalist. The Islamic Jihad of Usman Danfodio 1804-1808 swept away the Ɔarauia system and its mode of expropriating the peasantry, the tribute system. New taxes like the Zakkat and kudin kasa were introduced. Even though the Zakkat was supposed to be levied on the rich and distributed to the poor, the state

made the payment of Zakkat compulsory for both the rich and the poor. All that was collected was accumulated by the ruling class.

Islam was used to justify all relations both economic and political. All obnoxious taxes were rationalised as "responsibility" of the subjects to the "Islamic" state.

The emir was seen as the representative of God and a challenge to his authority was a challenge to God's decision. Since in all bourgeois ideology "men and their circumstances appear upside down as in camera obscura",⁵⁷ the peasants of Hadejia like the Fulbe of Fouta-Djallon referred to in chapter one, "view life as the unfolding of a plan made by Allah. Allah decides the destiny of each individual. Life is to be accepted as it comes, and passivity and resignation in the face of life are virtues".⁵⁸ The peasants did not blame anybody for their poverty and hardship. Poverty and richness are seen to be the work of God. 90% of all those interviewed for this research believed that "there cannot be a bad king but a bad courtier", expressed in Hausa as baa muqun sarkin sai muqun bafada.

With the exception of the Fulani Jihad, I have not recorded a single instance of organised revolt against the feudal system. Most of the protests took the form of deposing village heads who were sometimes seen as responsible for causing some troubles.

Infact in all the succession quarrels that took place in Hadejia, the peasants only took sides.

The most popular form of protest among the peasantry prior to the colonial era was migration. It was common for an entire village to migrate from one oppressive emirate to another less oppressive one. The inability of the peasants to rise against the feudal system was largely due to lack of political consciousness which was hindered by the religious ideology which made opposition to the leaders as opposition to the religion of Islam.

Although colonialism had transformed the economy along capitalism, the fact that feudal aristocrats were retained as colonial bureaucrats, feudal relations remained intact. Unlike the situation in Europe where the peasantry was proletarianised completely, colonialism in Hadejia and Nigeria as a whole encouraged peasant production. Through the agency of indirect rule, feudal aristocrats continued to enjoy all their pre-colonial privileges even when they were abolished by the colonial state. The indirect rule allowed and promoted the persistence of the feudal ideology, hence the persistence of the individualistic forms of struggle among the peasantry against both colonial and feudalistic forms of oppression and exploitation.

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CHAPTER FOUR

THE GURI CASE STUDY

In the previous chapter, I examined feudal relations in Hadejia Emirate in general, in this chapter, I examine feudal relations as epitomised in the Guri political economy.

The chapter is divided into six sections. The first section deals with the nature of the economy and the society of Guri. The second section examines religion and the feudal ideology and their role in the daily life of the peasantry and of maintaining class relations. The third section deals with the class structure of Guri District and the nature of the social relations of production among the various classes. The fourth section examines legal and political relations between peasants and nomadic Fulani on the one hand and the members of the feudal aristocracy on the other. The fifth chapter deals with the nature of the relationship that had existed overtime between the state and the feudal institution. The sixth chapter summarises the entire chapter.

4.1 THE ECONOMY AND SOCIETY

The society under study, Guri District, is a predominantly peasant society. The primary occupation of the people is farming. The major food crops produced include millet, guineacorn and beans. The major staple food of the people is

millet. Cotton and groundnuts are also produced but mainly as cash crops. Irrigation farming is also practised around the Hadejia river which is 330 kilometre long and has cut across the district. The major crops cultivated on the irrigated farmlands include rice, wheat, maize and vegetables. Of recent, vegetable farming has become the major pre-occupation of the people of Guri District. This was necessitated by both climatic and economic factors. The climatic factor has to do with the problem of scanty rainfalls that last for only two to three months. This has compelled many people to abandon, temporarily, the production of crops such as millet and guinea corn which can only grow during the rainy season. The economic factor has to do with the fact that it is more profitable to grow vegetables than to grow millet. For example, an average farmer can get about five thousand naira through the sale of pepper and out of this, he could use one thousand naira to purchase ten bags of millet at an average cost of one hundred naira per bag. Due to the climatic factor mentioned above, it is impossible for a middle class farmer to harvest ten bags of millet from his farm, thus the profitability of vegetable farming.

The vegetables (mainly sweet and hot pepper) are sold to the surrounding urban centres of Nguru, Hadejia, Gashua, Bauchi and Kano. Sometimes peasants take their pepper to as far as Lagos.

Fishing is also one of the occupations of the people in this area, however, very few people take to it as a full time job.

In addition to farming most families practice animal husbandry. However, the Fulani are the only group that practice pastoralism as a way of living. Sometimes peasants with a large herd of cattle, flock of sheep or goats leave their villages and stay in the bush throughout the dry season. Unlike the nomadic Fulani, such peasants return to their villages at the beginning of the rainy season. Similarly, some nomadic Fulani undertake some farming but mainly as a secondary occupation to pastoralism.

Hunting is also common among the people of this area but it is done more as a hobby than a full time occupation.

Other occupations of the people of this area include cloth weaving and dyeing, raffia mat weaving and long distance trading.

Trade by barter is one of the major forms of exchange among the local populace. For example, the Fulani women who supply the rural populace with milk and butter prefer exchanging their commodities for grains rather than cash. Peasants also often exchange grains for farm implements from the blacksmith. Similarly, the women who sale food items like flour cake (Fanke), beans cake (kosai), millet cake (yar tsala) etc. accept payment in grains.

There are no major business centres throughout the District. Only three towns viz; Guri, Garfagal and Kadira have markets. Even in these towns, the markets are active only on market days which occur once in a week. Thus the market day for Guri is Friday while the corresponding ones for Garfagal and Kadira are Saturdays and Sundays. Most of what is obtainable within these markets are goods manufacture or produced within the District such as raffia mats, farm implements as well as grains and livestock. With the exception of Guri market days, those of Garfagal and Kadira are poorly attended. Most peasants from surrounding villages prefer taking their goods to Nguru in Borno state or Madafia where they could get better prices for their commodities and in return buy some commodities at relatively cheaper prices than those obtainable in the rural markets. In this context, there are more commercial transactions between the District and the surrounding urban centres than within the District itself.

Most families within the District practise more than one occupation. With the exception of specialised guilds like blacksmiths and cloth weaving, occupations like raffia mat weaving and fishing are generally practised by most members of the society. The proceeds from these secondary occupations are used to supplement income from agriculture.

Production within the District is both for subsistence and commercial purposes. However, peasants who are settled along the Hadejia river especially, are increasingly taking to commercial agriculture. The reason for this change has to do with the climatic and economic factors referred to above.

The development of commercial agriculture within the District has created a situation whereby land, especially in those areas along river Hadejia, has become scarce. The problem of scarcity of land for farming is compounded by the scarcity of grazing land. Since areas along the Hadejia river have water throughout the year, there tends to be green grass throughout the year. Thus, the availability of water and grass around the river areas naturally attracts the nomadic Fulani. While peasants struggle among themselves for control of land along the Hadejia river, they also have to contend with the nomadic Fulani who quite often allow their livestock to destroy farmers crops. Between 1973 and 1989, I recorded 22 clashes between peasants and nomads in Guri District with the worst being that of 1989 in Gagiya in which seven people lost their lives. The struggle among the peasantry for control over lands on the one hand and that between the peasantry and the nomadic Fulani over the destruction of peasant farm produce is always welcome by the feudal aristocrats. The feudal aristocrats, as we shall see later in this chapter, use their position as arbitrators to

extort both the peasants and the nomadic Fulani.

Thus, one of the major contradictions that informs the dynamics of the Guri social formation centres around the issue of land, its utilisation and the expropriation of its natural resources.

On a general note, the Guri economy can be described as a peasant agricultural economy with an ever growing commercial agricultural sector.

4.2 RELIGION, CULTURE AND THE FEUDAL IDEOLOGY IN GURI

The majority of the members of this population are muslims. Despite the fact that they practice Islam as a religion, quite a large number practice magic and invocation of spirits. All my respondents agreed that they have at one time or the other sought for the assistance of diviners when they were confronted with some difficulties.

Although most people can recite some portions of the Qur'an by heart, very few can read the Qur'an itself. For example, only 5 or 10% of my respondents can read the Qur'an. For the majority of the members of this population, it is the Islamic scholars (Mallamai) who read and interpret the Qur'an. In most of the cases, those who recite the Qur'an by heart do not know the meaning of what they are saying.

Parents encourage their children to attend the local Islamic schools once they are between the ages of seven and ten. Some parents go to the extent of sending their children to learned scholars in distant places. Most of these local Islamic schools encourage only rote learning. Within a period of eight to ten years, a good pupil can memorise the entire Qur'an. This marks the end of the first stage of his scholarship. After acquiring the basic knowledge of reading, writing and reciting the Qur'an, the student then enters the second stage of knowing the meaning of the text as well as general knowledge about the traditions and schools of thought. This last stage can take as long as ten years to complete, after which one can be considered a Mallam (scholar).

Due to its informal nature, the process of acquiring Islamic education within the context of the local Islamic schools is difficult and tedious. It is difficult and tedious because the pupils are solely responsible for their feeding and clothing and in most cases they also feed the teacher and his family.

In view of the difficulties enumerated above, very few pupils complete even the first stage and fewer still go into the second stage and complete it. In most of the cases it is these half-baked Mallamai that stay in the rural areas to spread their ignorance among the peasantry as most of the learned Mallamai stay in the urban centres. Throughout the District, only the

Imam (lit. the scholar who lead prayers) of Guri can be termed learned. Only five or 10% of the respondents could read the Qur'an while the remaining 45 or 90% are virtually ignorant of the very religion they profess. The same applies to most members of the population.

This ignorance of the religion has created a situation where people tend to treat religious texts with fear rather than respect and reverence. For example, a man whose property has been stolen needs to only indicate that he will invoke the powers of the Qur'an against the thief for his property to be returned. Throughout the District, the content of the Qur'an is used more for medicinal purposes than for worship. The verses of the Qur'an are written on planks of wood called allo by the Mallamai for individuals or the entire community on request. The allo is then washed inside drinking water and served to individuals. In the alternative, the verses are written on a piece of paper and wrapped into pieces of animal skins or leather and used as charms against human enemies, evil spirits or even diseases. When there is an epidemic disease in a particular locality, the communities normally send for popular Mallamai to come and offer prayers and provide medicines.

Apart from the Mallamai (Islamic scholars) the people also believe in diviners (Bokaye). The Bokaye claim to have the

monopoly of supernatural powers through the agency of the spirits. The diviners are also well respected in this District. They are consulted on many issues including medical, social economic, and political problems. At the medical level, they provide herbs for various diseases. They also give medicines for self protection against enemies.

At the social level, they undertake rituals to avert an anticipated calamity whether social or natural. Politically, they are consulted on certain crucial matters that affect the leaders or the entire community.

The people of Guri District also believe in the existence of spirits. The spirits are divided into two, evil and good spirits. These spirits are believed to live on trees, especially bobab trees and tamarind. The evil spirits can do a lot of harm to an individual or the entire community especially when they are annoyed. One of the ways to annoy the spirits is to cut down a tree on which they live. Any happening that cannot be easily explained is attributed to the evil spirits, sorcerers or witches. For example the persistence of the polio disease within a particular family or community is attributed to the activity of female evil spirit called Inna who resides on a bobab tree. The explanation is that the individual concerned had either destroyed her house or kicked her young ones unknowingly. If it is a child that is suffering from the disease, the father or the mother

might have offended the evil spirits. If it were persistent deaths of people of a particular age set, say old men or women, children or adults, the explanation is that witches are responsible. If it were a calamity of some sort befalling an individual or a family, say a very known rich man suddenly goes bankrupt or crazy, it is attributed to his enemies.

For the activities of the evil spirits, rituals are normally performed to appease them. These rituals take the form of slaughtering a particular type of animal, say a black sheep, goat or a white cock etc. Witches, on the other hand are usually identified and expelled from the villages. Whenever an individual is suspected to be menaced by a witch, some herbs are forced into his mouth after which the victim mentions the name of the witch. For the activities of sorcerers, usually counter sorcery is performed by a diviner or Mallam with a reputation for solving problems of a particular kind.

The major difference between the Bokaye and Mallamai is that while the diviners (Bokaye) administer mainly herbs to their clients and/or patients, the Islamic scholars (Mallamai) use the Islamic texts to solve the problems of their clients. Some Mallamai use both Islamic texts and herbs for solving the problems of their clients.

The ignorance of the peasant population also makes them susceptible to deceit by the Bokaye and the Mallamai, who usually claim to have the knowledge of the future. Thus for example before a peasant travels out of his village to another area for business, or goes into a marriage etc. he has to first consult with his Mallam who tells him whether there is fortune in it or not. In the case of the Bokaye, the business of forecasting the future is organised in a form of racket. Usually a "powerful" Koka (singular diviner) has his retinue who are not known to the public. These servants spread false information on the diviners ability to predict the future. Usually a Boka is an outsider to the community in which he lives but with strong local connections. Some times they operate from their home towns or villages. Before a client reaches the Boka he must, unknowingly pass through at least one of the Boka's servant who collects information about his name, where he came from and the nature of his problem. Thus, before the client reaches the Boka all these information about him had been passed to the Boka. The Boka who had never met that client before begins by addressing him or her by his or her first name. The Boka then goes on to tell the client what brought him or her. Most people get excited at this and they end up being extorted by the Bokaye without getting their problems solved.

Due to its ability to attribute all happenings in the society to the activities of elusive and imaginary entities like the evil spirits, the persistence of this religio - traditional ideology in Guri District, as we shall see later in this chapter, has served as a fertile ground for the persistence of feudal relations. This is done by first of all presenting feudal aristocrats - peasant relations as non antagonistic and non exploitative. Secondly, the relationship between the peasants and the feudal aristocrats is presented as a pre-ordained by God about which nothing can be done. Thirdly, since these relations have been pre-ordained by God, a challenge to the status - quo is a challenge to the will of God.

4.21 FEUDAL IDEOLOGY AND CLASS RELATIONS IN GURI DISTRICT

Under a classical system of theocracy, the ultimate legislative function is centred in the will of God as it is manifested in the scriptural writings. Thus, the functions of the Emir was an executor of divinely inspired legislation, not as a legislator. As sole interpreter of divine legislation, however, the emir was in effect an intermediate legislator. In this role, he was assisted by a council of advisers, most of whom also had specific executive responsibilities.¹

In any hitherto existing society which is divided into classes, the issue of ideology becomes important because it provides the intellectual basis for maintaining the status-quo. This issue of ideology involves what plato calls the fabrication of the "noble lie" to disguise the domination and exploitation of one class by

another. Thus in ancient Greece plato advised the rulers to claim that they were "golden" men while the remaining members of the society are men of mere "brass and iron"².

According to cornforth (1977) the process of ideological formulation involves three main steps viz;

1. abstract ideas are formed on the basis of various social relationships;
2. those abstract ideas are separated from the actual experiences and the relationships from which they were derived;
3. both particular conclusions and general ideas about all kinds of things are then worked out with the aid of those abstract ideas.³

As stated in chapter one, the ideology of the feudal class had essentially been rooted in religion. In the case study area, Hadejia and Guri had an early contact with the Islamic religion. As stated in the previous chapter, prior to the Islamic Jihad of Usman Danfodio (1804-1808), the areas of Hadejia and Guri were under Nguru, a tributary of the Kanem-Borno Empire. The Kanem-Borno Empire had a very early contact with the Arabs, dating back to the 12th century.

Thus, the ideology of the feudal aristocracy is based on Islam and tradition (Gargajiya). This ideology preaches that kingship (Sarauta) is the making of God. Since Sarauta is the making of God, disobedience to those in authority means disobedience to God. However, the correct Islamic position is that people should obey their leaders so long as the leaders also obey the rules of God. According to Abdullahi Danfodio:

"if authority is legitimate (based on the teachings of the Qur'an), protest is illegitimate. If authority is illegitimate, protest is legitimate"⁴.

Thus, the abstract ideas of the relationship between God and kingship is essentially aimed at legitimising the position of those in authority and invariably the exploitative relationship that exist between the feudal aristocrats and the peasantry.

As observed earlier, most of the peasants are ignorant of the Qur'an, thus palace Mallamai can always put up a case for the aristocrats by justifying their rule as Islamic and their position as Islamic leaders in their preaching. The aristocrats on their part practically exhibit their religio-traditional leadership of the people by presiding over most religious and cultural festivities and rituals. In the mosques, members of the aristocracy could be seen occupying the first row and all others follow from behind. In fact the emir does not use the gate used by everybody. He uses the eastern gate of the central mosque

along with the Imam and the most learned scholars. The same applies to all District heads in their District headquarters. In this way, the abstract ideas which emerged from concrete realities, i.e. the social relations of production between the feudal aristocrats and the peasantry are separated from their source and given independent existence. These supposedly independent abstract ideas are then used to explain all other social phenomena in the society. Thus issues like poverty and affluence are not seen as the product of concrete social relations but as acts of God. In this way, the feudal ideology function not only to conceal the exploitative character of feudal-peasant relations but also to hoodwink the peasantry into believing that the source of their problems is external to those relations that exist between them and the feudal aristocrats.

4.3 THE CLASS STRUCTURES OF GURI DISTRICT AND THE NATURE OF SOCIAL RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION

4.31 CLASS STRUCTURE OF GURI

Five major classes could be identified in Guri District viz; aristocrats, rural petty bourgeoisie, peasants, rural labourers and lusher elements.

The aristocrats are all those who belong to the royal (Sarauta) families at both village and district levels. Most members of this class owe their position to birth rights. Some of the titles are not hereditary and the Hakimi gives them to

whoever he wants but especially his favourites. Such titles as the chief of the market (sarkin kasuwa), leader of the blacksmiths (sarkin makera), chief of butchers (sarkin fawa) etc. are mainly given by the Hakimi to individual members of professional groups from outside the royal family. Although some of these titles are not hereditary, the son of a deceased title holder can inherit his father's position. Members of the aristocracy in the District include the Hakimi and his courtiers (fadawa), title holder as well as village and ward heads. Ward heads (Nasu Unguwa) are also not hereditary title holders, they are normally appointed from among the eldest men in the wards.

During the colonial period, the Hakimi was appointed by the Emir from within the members of the royal families in consultation with the British. At present, the District head (Hakimi) is appointed by the Emir in consultation with the chairman of the local government. Similarly, all village heads are appointed by the Emir in consultation with the Hakimi and the villagers.⁵ The appointment is then finally endorsed by the local government chairman. During the colonial period, it was the District officer (D.O.) who did the endorsement.

Once appointed to a position, a title holder owes allegiance to the Hakimi. A title holder keeps his position for life once he earns the confidence of the Hakimi. The confidence of the

Hakimi is earned through regular payment of homage and offer of gifts. Thus for example the chief of the butchers is directly responsible for the daily supply of meat to the Hakimi's house. What the chief of the butchers takes to the Hakimi's house is supplied by all the butchers on daily basis. Similarly, the chief of the market gives the Hakimi a fixed percentage of the total amount collected as taxes from all traders in the market. Now, apart from discharging their official functions, most title holders especially those who head professional groups like those mentioned above are expected to offer gifts to the Hakimi since it is assumed that they make personal fortunes from their titles. Failure to offer gifts regularly on the part of a title holder could cost him his title.

Since almost all title holders are appointed by the Hakimi with the exception of village and ward heads, he can depose any title holder whenever he wants. In view of the personal nature of these appointments, the holders of these titles see themselves only accountable to the Hakimi and not the people. They essentially see themselves as serving the Hakimi. When a title holder offends the people in the discharge of his "official" functions, public hostility is diverted only against the person of the man holding the post but not against the system which assigned the responsibility to him. In the same way when the Hakimi deposes a title holder for whatsoever reason, the public

does not sympathise with such people because they are seen as personal servants of the Hakimi rather than public servants.

The members of the aristocracy in Guri District perform a delegated executive function with the Hakimi as the chief executive in the District. Each title holder is seen by the people as acting on behalf of the Hakimi but the Hakimi cannot be held responsible for the misrule of any of his title holders.

Members of the aristocracy in Guri District control land and its resources in the rural areas. While land and fishing ponds could be possessed collectively by a family or individually, absolute power over the land and its resources rests with the members of the aristocracy and that explains why members of this class (aristocracy) could deport "recalcitrant" peasants from their areas of jurisdiction. Once a peasant has been deported from a particular District or Emirate he has forfeited his right over his farm land.

During the colonial period, the aristocracy served the colonial state as rural bureaucrats. While they protected the interest of the colonial administration in the rural areas, they also promoted their own class interests through extortion and embezzlement especially of tax money. Under the present political dispensation, they still retain their positions as local bureaucrats. For example, successive governments recognise

them as local administrators through whom government policies, as they affect the rural communities, are implemented. Thus, they assess and collect taxes, handle minor local disputes and general administration.

The second class in the hierarchy is the rural petty bourgeoisie. Members of this class include the Judges (Alkalai), revenue or tax officials (Mallamai Haraji), forestry officers (Mallaman Baiji), Sanitary officers (Mallaman Isabta), wealthy merchants, police men, District scribes and local Islamic scholars (Mallamai).

With the exception of the wealthy merchants and the local Islamic scholars, members of this class are government appointees and therefore salary earners. As civil servants, they do not owe and allegiance to the Hakimi or his representative. Their positions as civil servants could suggest that they are capable of actions independent of the wills of the Hakimi and his cohorts especially in the discharge of their day to day responsibilities. But nothing could be further from the truth. The members of this class could be seen collaborating with the members of the aristocracy to oppress and exploit the peasantry. In most cases they act on the dictates of the Hakimi and/or his representative. For example, there are only four policemen permanently stationed in the District. These policemen are resident in Guri town. In assessing the effectiveness of the police in maintaining law and

order, 80% of the respondents saw the police as serving the interest of the Hakimi and his courtiers. For example, that the police arrest only those people that the Hakimi and his cohorts wanted to be arrested. 20% of the respondents saw the police as serving the interest of everybody in the society. The police in particular, claimed that they made series of reports to Hadejia indicting the Hakimi and his cohorts on cases of plunder and miscarriage of justice but nothing has been done and that they have given up.⁶

Similarly, the judges try only those cases that the members of the aristocracy wanted to be tried as most of the cases are tried informally at home by the Hakimi or his representative such as Alhaji Usman. For example out of the total of 22 violent clashes recorded between 1973 and 1989, only two went to the Alkali's court in Guri while the remaining twenty were tried informally at home by the Hakimi or any of his courtiers. Of these twenty-two cases of violent clashes between peasants and the nomadic Fulani, ten involved murder. None of the murder cases were reported to the Alkali of Guri. Eight of the murder cases were reported to the Area Court in Hadejia while two of the cases were suppressed.⁸

The posts of forestry and sanitary officers were mainly of colonial creation. The former was created in order to reduce the

problems of bush burning and cutting trees and also to collect taxes from those people who took to firewood selling as an occupation and the latter to maintain certain degree of cleanliness among the people. The two offices serve the interest of the aristocracy in extorting money from the peasantry with the most notorious being the sanitary officers.

Every year, the sanitary officers undertake an inspection tour of all the villages in the District. Before the arrival of the sanitary officers in each village, the villagers are expected to contribute a fixed amount of money which is given out to the sanitary officers as "gift" once they arrive. Any village that fails to give anything runs the risk of being branded "dirty" and would be asked to pay a fine higher than what they could have given out as "gift" to the sanitary officers. Such a village might also be branded "over-crowded" and therefore need "re-planning". These re-planning" mainly involve the creation of new streets in which many families are displaced and resettled on some part of the village. Any village that does not want the "planning" exercise to take place must offer a fixed amount. Most villages prefer to give money to the sanitary officers than allow their houses to be destroyed. In 1970 for example, the people of Madammawa village resisted an attempt to re-plan" their village after refusing to offer "gifts" to the sanitary officers. Although the peasants later agreed to pay a fine of five

shillings for each adult members of the village, two families, that of Baba Kulalu and Baba Zabu refused to pay the fine and instead migrated out of the village in protest.⁹

The role of the local Mallamai and the diviners within this system of oppression and exploitation is crucial. Their position as public consultants on economic political and medical problems enable them to misdirect peoples awareness about the sources of their problems. Only spirits, sorcerers and enemies could be the source of an individuals problems. Thus for example a peasant whose income has gone into paying debts and taxes could be told that he is poor because his enemies have performed sorcery on him. Such a peasant could be asked to give a specific number of chickens, goats and/or money to the Mallam so that a counter ritual would be performed thereby compounding his problems. The problems of such a peasant is compounded because he has to go on borrowing in order to obtain what he had been asked to bring to the Mallam or Diviner.

As "learned scholars", the Mallamai also undertake religious sermons in which they interpret the Qur'an to the peasants mostly in the Hausa language. These sermons are largely limited to marital issues, the payment of alms and good followership.

With the exception of those who teach in the primary schools, most of the Mallamai do not receive any salary. Most of

them are fed and clothed by their pupils and the members of the community in which they reside. A Mallam with say fifty pupils normally allow them to go and beg for food. The pupils go from one house to another begging. After eating to their satisfaction, the remainder is brought home for the Mallam and his family. Some Mallamai normally insist that all the food collected from the people by his pupils is brought home and shared out in a proportion to be determined by the Mallam. The pupils also cultivate the Mallam's farm, fetch water and firewood for his wife etc. In addition, almost all members of a community in which a Mallam resides give the Mallam Zakkat (tithe) at the end of each harvest and also at the end of the month of Ramadan. The Zakkat given to the Islamic scholars is different from the one given to the members of the aristocracy. The one given to the members of the aristocracy was compulsory on all peasants and it was given as a fulfilment of the responsibility of the peasant to the state.

The Zakkat given out to the Mallamai is a fulfilment of a religious obligation to purify one's harvest or fasting and it is compulsory only on those who have enough to eat for a year. All Mallams collect the Zakkat even though the Islamic injunction stipulates that only those who are considered destitute by the society are entitled to it. A Mallam is only entitled to Zakkat if he is a destitute. Under an ideal Islamic state, the Zakkat

is supposed to be collected by the state for distribution to the poor and also to finance some of the expenses of the state. Under the Emirate political structure however, the state collected the Zakkai to mainly finance the operations of the state. At present, Emirs and District heads do not levy the Zakkai as a political obligation rather, each individual member of the society gives out the Zakkai as a religious obligation to whoever they want but especially to the Mallamai. This Zakkai serves as a major source of income for most Mallamai. Thus, as could be seen from TABLES 2:2, 3:3, 4:4, 5:5, the total amount given out as Zakkai by 32 of my respondents or 64% of the total sample is #18757.00. This amount constitute about 71.13% of the total income of the fifteen poor peasants which stood at #26650.00. Although the Mallamai serve the interest of the aristocrats, the peasants see them as serving their communities religiously and so they are sustained by the surplus generated by the peasantry. From the activities of the members of the rural petty bourgeoisie analysed above, it is clear that they serve the interest of the aristocracy.

The third class in the hierarchy is the peasantry. The peasantry itself is divided into three categories viz; the rich peasants, middle peasants and the poor peasants.

The rich peasants are those with more than three farmlands (the average size of a farmland is 1.92 hectares) and they employ

wage labour. They also give out irrigation machines on hire or poor peasants and engage in usury. The rich peasants most of the time identify with the petty bourgeois and the aristocratic classes.

The middle peasants are those that can be said to be "self-sufficient". At the end of each harvest year; after paying all their taxes, they are still left with enough money and/or food to last them for another year. As could be seen from TABLE 3:3, 90% of the ten peasants have enough to last them for another year.

The poor peasants are those who do not produce enough to sustain themselves. They constitute 30% of my sample. As could be seen from table 4:4, the poor peasants are mostly indebted to the rich peasants. After paying the feudal exactions and their debts, they are left with nothing. Some times they are forced by debt burden to sell their crops even before they are due for harvest. During the rainy season, they survive by selling their labour to the rich peasants during some days of the week and with the little money got, they buy some foodstuff. Throughout the year, they share their labour power with the rich peasants.

The rural labourers were poor peasants who have now been proletarianised. The members of this class live by selling their

labour power to the rich peasants. Similarly, Fulani nomads who have been pauperised also resort to selling their labour power to either Fulani relatives, in which case they work as paid herdmen, or they become farm labourers.

The differentiation within the peasant class notwithstanding, they all form an oppressed and exploited class. For example, of the total of two thousand six hundred and eleven naira (N2611.00) collected as special levies from 30 of the respondents by aristocrats, 37.28% of the total amount or one thousand and forty naira (N1025) was accounted for by only five rich peasants.

The lusher elements are those proletarianised peasants who could not get employed in any sector of the rural economy. They constitute 8% of my sample. They do not have a fixed job. The four respondents for this research admitted that they survive through numerous activities such as selling indiarbeep, amphetamine to farmers, gambling and praise singing.

4.32 SOCIAL RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION

Land in Guri District could be either collectively owned by a family or individually. The division of labour in this society has cut across sexes such that for example women participate in

TABLE 3.2

1989 INCOME AND EXPENSES OF FIVE RICH PEASANTS

FAMILY SIZE	NO. OF FARMS (HECT.)	TOTAL SIZE OF FARMS	TOTAL INCOME	AMOUNT GIVEN TO ARISTOCRATS	AMOUNT GIVEN OUT AS TAXXAT	OTHER EXPENSES	AMOUNT CONSUMED	
A1	10	4	10	28000	305	360	1500	15000
A2	12	4	12	44000	387	450	1950	18000
A3	9	4	8	45000	305	540	1950	12000
A4	6	4	8	38000	123	390	1500	10000
A5	8	4	8	44000	305	420	1450	14000
TOTAL	45	46	46	199000	1025	2160	8250	69000
B7	4	3	6	18000	62	225	8285	9730
B8	4	3	6	19500	62	210	10260	9228
B9	5	3	6	20300	93	216	12266	7987
B10	3	3	6	19500	62	195	9240	10248
TOTAL	42	28	62	101800	804	2151	98456	77062

NOTE: The sign + represents surplus

TABLE 3.3

1989 INCOME AND EXPENSES OF TEN MIDDLE-CLASS PEASANTS

FAMILY SIZE	NO. OF FARMS (HECT.)	TOTAL SIZE OF FARMS	TOTAL INCOME	AMOUNT GIVEN TO ARISTOCRATS	AMOUNT GIVEN OUT AS ZAKKAT	AMOUNT CONSUMED	AMOUNT LEFT
81	4	4	14000	62	150	7200	6788
82	5	6	19000	93	340	9290	10667
83	3	4	14200	62	165	7215	6974
84	6	6	19500	124	370	12330	7146
85	3	6	19000	62	240	9290	9698
86	7	6	19000	124	340	14390	4636
87	4	6	18000	61	225	8395	9730
88	4	6	19500	62	310	10340	9238
89	5	6	20300	93	210	13366	7987
810	3	6	19500	62	195	9240	10248
TOTAL:	42	62	181000	804	2151	98656	77642

NOTE: The sign + represents surplus

TABLE 4.4

1989 INCOME AND EXPENSES OF FIFTEEN POOR PEASANTS

FAMILY SIZE	NO. OF FARMS (HECT.)	TOTAL SIZE OF FARMS	TOTAL INCOME #'000	AMOUNT GIVEN TO ARISTOCRATS #	AMOUNT GIVEN BUT AS ZAKKAT #	AMOUNT WENT TO DEBT PAYMENT	UNSETTLED DEBT #	AMOUNT CO-INSURED IN THE FAMILY	AMOUNT LEFT #
01	3	1	470	60	60	-	210	540	210
02	4	1	480	60	90	-	310	540	310
03	3	1	490	30	75	-	130	515	130
04	4	2	520	90	120	-	540	950	540
05	1	1	420	30	45	-	80	425	80
06	5	2	3500	90	150	400	340	3200	340
07	3	2	3550	30	105	-	180	3575	180
08	3	2	3000	30	90	50	80	2910	80
09	6	3	4460	90	130	100	440	4572	440
010	2	1	440	30	60	-	330	680	330
011	2	1	470	30	60	-	180	560	180
012	5	2	3750	60	135	-	515	4070	515
013	5	2	3960	90	130	-	240	3972	240
014	2	1	570	30	90	-	10	460	-10
015	2	1	570	30	90	-	180	630	180
TOTAL	46	23	24650	720	1416	550	3675	27639	3565

TABLE B.5

TOTAL AMOUNT PAID AS ZAKKAT, LEVIES AND "GIFTS" TO ARISTOCRATS BY TD

FAMILY SIZE	SIZE OF HEAD		TOTAL VALUE OF PROPERTY	AMOUNT GIVEN TO ARISTOCRATS	AMOUNT GIVEN OUT AS ZAKKAT	AMOUNT PAID AS LEVIES AS DAMAGE ON CROPS
	COWS	GOATS SHEEP				
B1	12	100	150	610,000	5000	10240
B2	10	50	80	257,000	5000	5120
TOTAL	22	150	230	877,000	10,000	15360

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almost all the work done by men in addition to their household responsibilities. All the proceeds from family labour are entrusted to the eldest member of the family who controls everything in the interest of the members of the family. Individual members of the family also engage in private ventures in which case the proceeds belong to them alone. However, societal norms dictate that they share it with other members of the family. Unlike what obtains under family labour, the individual decides what to give other members of the family while he takes the larger share.

The largest unit of production within the society is the communal form of production in which a sizeable number of the members of a particular community participate. This communal form of production is popularly known as Gayya among the people of this District. However, it should be noted that this type of Gayya is slightly different from what obtains among the Hausa communities of Kano state in general. While the Hausa see Gayya as a normal communal co-operation to boost production or to execute communal projects, among the people of Guri, Gayya seems to be used on three occasions. First Gayya work is undertaken when a member of the community is sick and therefore cannot produce anything for his sustenance that year. In that case

members of the community come together and help that individual member of the community out by cultivating his farmland for him.

The second situation in which Gayya form of labour is undertaken is when for example the children of a particular family who have grown older and set up their own homes, come together during every farming or harvest season to help their parents with some work.

Thirdly, Gayya is also undertaken when a man gives out his daughter in marriage to a particular member of the community. Normally before or immediately after the marriage had been contracted, the families of the bride could ask the bridegroom to mobilise his friends or the entire village community in some cases, to do some work for them in their farmland. In some cases the bridegroom is asked to build a house for his father and/or mother in law.

Another form of production is the wage labour. It is largely employed by rich peasants. On the average, a rural labourer received about six naira (₦6.00) a day in 1988. The normal working day is six hours beginning at 8.00a.m. and ending at 2.00p.m. While at work, the labourers are entitled to two meals, breakfast and lunch. Another form of wage labour exists and most rich peasants prefer it to the one mentioned above. This type of wage labour is known to the local populace as noman

bashi (lit. farming for borrowing), what obtains under this type of wage labour is that payment is made in kind rather than cash. At the end of two or three days of free or unpaid labour, the labourer will be entitled to two or three big tins of millet on loan to be paid back with interest at the end of the harvest. On the average, a poor peasant could take three to four of such loans before the end of the rainy season. After paying the loans and meeting up other obligations, the poor peasants end up with nothing and thus they go on borrowing throughout the year. All in all 30% or 15 of the respondents engage in this posan bashi.

During the dry season, the poor peasants also work on the irrigated plots of the rich peasants. In return, the poor peasants would be allowed to borrow irrigation machines and water their plots. Only 14% or 7 of the respondents in this category (poor peasants) have irrigation plots of their own, while the remaining 16% mainly work for the rich peasants.

Another form of labour that is common among the people of Guri District is the client labour. This type of labour is also employed by the rich peasants. All the rich peasants that constitute 10% of the sample employ client labour. These clients offer "free" labour to their patrons during the farming and/or harvest seasons and in return, the patron offers gifts and presents to the clients.

Finally, there is in existence corvee or forced labour. This type of labour is undertaken mainly in the farmlands of aristocrats but especially the Emir and the District head (Hakimi). Both the Emir and the Hakimi have what is popularly known as Gandun sarki (lit. estate of the emir or the estate of the Hakimi). Whenever there is any work to be performed on the emir's or the Hakimi's estate, a directive is given to each village head within the District or the Emirate to supply a specific number of people. In most of the cases food is not provided and peasants are advised in advance to bring along with them their feeding money. At present, only peasants from three villages in Guri District i.e. Garmaguwan Babas, Garmaguwa Yassa and Garfagal perform corvee labour on the estate of the Hakimi of Guri and they feed themselves while they worked for the Hakimi on his farm.¹⁰ The estate of the Hakimi or the Emir is normally divided into portions with each village having its own. Whenever a village head was asked to send say ten peasants to the Hakimi's estate, he normally selected about fifteen people and while he sent ten to the Hakimi's estate, five worked for him on his farmland.

As could be seen from table 6.6 below, all the five Sarakuna (title holders) interviewed did not see the above situation as forced labour. They are unanimous in supporting the position

adopted by one of them that "nobody forced anyone to work for us, we only requested our subjects (Talakawa) to help us with some work and they did",¹¹

Of the nine peasants interviewed from among the three villages, five admitted that they were never forced to do it. The work done on the Hakimi's estate is seen as a help (Taimako). Four of the peasants disagreed with the above position on the ground that they have never volunteered to do it. Furthermore, they revealed that the three village heads (that of Garmaguwan Yama, Garmaguwan Gabas and Garfagal) are the closest friends of the Hakimi throughout the District. Thus refusal by any peasant from the three villages to take part in the work on the Hakimi's farmland can cause all sorts of political harassment and blackmail. Out of the 50 respondents, 40 or 80% described the type of work done on the Hakimi's farmland as forced labour and that they will not do it if it were voluntary, while ten of the respondents saw it as Taimako (help). Of this ten, five are peasants while the remaining five are Sarakuna (title holders).

TABLE 6.6

RESPONSES TO THE QUESTION: Do you regard the work by peasants in the Gandun sarki (estate of the Hakimi) as forced labour?

CLASS	RESPONSE					
	YES	%	NO	%	CANNOT SAY	%
1. Aristocrats	-	-	5	10		
2. Rural petty bourgeoisie	5	10	-	-		
3. Rich peasant	5	10	-	-		
4. Middle peasant	9	18	1	2		
5. Poor peasant	11	22	4	8		
6. Rural labourers	4	8	-	-		
7. Lumpen Elements	4	8	-	-		
8. Nomadic Fulani	-	-	-	-	2	4
Total	38	76	10	20	2	4

N.B: All percentages are calculated out of 50 which is the total number of respondents in the sample

It is not only the men that perform corvee labour, but also the women. Whenever there is a "woman's work" to be performed on the Hakimi's farmland or his house, the leader of the women (Magaram) mobilises the women to do it. Thus the Magaram mobilises the women to thresh the Hakimi's millet or corn, pound and grind it, fetch water etc.

During the reign of Ciroma Shehu, the first Hakimi of Guri, he did not only forced peasants to work on his estate like slaves

but went to the extent of flogging them while at work.¹² It was within that context that a group of peasants under the leadership of Mai Kavayoma rioted against him. Mai Kavayoma in particular violently attacked the Hakimi with the intention of killing him.¹³ Ciroma Shehu is remembered by the peasants as the most vicious and wicked Hakimi they have ever had.

Similarly, during the reign of the third Hakimi of Guri Haruna, Abdulkadir (1921 - 1950), the village head of Guri town, Mai Ari, with the active support of the Hakimi, destroyed the farm produced of all those peasants who failed to give certain portion of their harvest to the Hakimi. In 1934 the peasants rioted against Mai Ari and he was later deposed in 1948.¹⁴ Similarly, in Lafiya village, not less than eight village heads were deposed by the villagers themselves all for highhandedness between 1924 and 1970.¹⁵

Before and during the early part of the colonial era, every year after the harvest, the emir, through the Hakimai sent his representatives (Wakili) to physically assess the harvest of all the peasants. Based on what they saw, the Jakadu and Wakilai then levied the Zakkat on the individual peasant.¹⁶ In most of the cases, peasants made private arrangements with their respective village and/or ward heads to conceal some part of their harvests before the arrival of the Jakadu.¹⁷ In this type of arrangement the village and ward heads were usually given

something out of the harvest. The collection of the Zakkat was done by the village and ward heads under the supervision of the Jakadu. At the end of the collection, everything was taken to the Hakimi. However, the Jakadu made sure that they have kept some part of it for themselves. The Hakimai also did the same i.e. steal some part of the Zakkat grains collected from the peasants before finally handing over the remainder to the Emir.¹⁸

On receiving the Zakkat from all the Districts, the Emir kept everything for himself. Although the Zakkat is a religious tithe whose payment is compulsory only on those who have certain amount of property, it was levied as a compulsory tax on all able bodied men in the society as pointed out earlier. By 1908, even the colonial authorities became apprehensive of the abuses to which the Zakkat was subjected. Thus W.P. Hewby, the British colonial administrator in Kano, complained in the 1908 provincial report that:

the Koranic grain tithe Zakkat (or Zaka or Zakat) on guinea corn and millet had never been honestly levied or paid and was the biggest channel for extortion and robbery of the whole taxation system.¹⁹

According to Hewby:

the yield of the tax represented about a quarter of the total extracted by means of the various land taxes, including (kudin kasa). The tax had never been uniformly collected, but in haphazard instalments. Throughout the year, the ordinary farmer never knowing when

he might have to journey fifty miles with corn leads to Kano. It was no wonder that such of the grain held back as Zakkat was sold or eaten, that the grain that was actually delivered tended to be sub-standard, and that one-third of the original bulk was lost in transit partly by robbery and partly by the carrier taking his daily ration from it.²⁰

What actually happened as earlier explained above was that the Jakadu (messengers of the emir or Hakimi) who have direct contact with the peasants collaborate with the village heads to conceal the actual amount that was collected from the villages. The emir and the Hakimi had no any other means of ascertaining the actual amount of Zakkat collected from the peasantry except through the Jakadu. Similarly, at the village level, peasants made private arrangements with their respective village heads to conceal the actual volume of their harvest. The village heads were in return rewarded with some amount of grains, 10 or 20% of my respondents agreed that they had at one time or the other entered such agreements with their village heads.

The same situation as above also applied to the Janggali (tax on livestock). The Janggali was levied arbitrarily. Thus while peasant cow owners paid one out of 30 to 39 cows or one sheep or goat out of 40 to 120 sheep or goats, the nomadic Fulani paid their own in cash. Around 1892, the Fulani paid about 500 cowries per head.²¹ The situation of the Fulani nomads was worse because they paid the Janggali more than once in a year provided

they moved from one emirate to another.²² In response to this, the Fulani nomads either restricted themselves to one place in which case they were faced with the risk of starving their livestock or they moved to places where the Jangali was less. Thus for example in 1924 the Fulani nomads in Madafia area all migrated to Borno province where the Jangali was less.²³

The problem was that most of the time receipts were not issued to the Fulani whenever they paid the Jangali especially in Kano province. It was within this context that in 1925 the acting resident of Borno P. de putron wrote a strongly worded letter to the Secretary, Northern Provinces in Kaduna complaining about the activities of the authorities in Kano province as it affected the Jangali. Putron complained that:

Jangali is levied on pack oxen in the province irrespective of whether they have paid Jangali or not (sic) if without a permit..... undue hardship is inflicted on natives by these repeated levies of Jangali which would appear to have no legal sanctions, and they tended to restrict trade.²⁴

Putron went further to suggest that:

In the case of bona fide pack oxen which it is impossible to mistake, that the Jangali receipts issued in Borno should be accepted in lieu of the permit authorised by circular 616P/1916 of 10/1/1917 owing to the impossibility of issuing permits satisfactorily in province.²⁵ (sic)

In reality however, not only that the feudal aristocrats in Kano province did not honour Jangali receipts issued in Sorno, but they did not also honour receipts issued within Kano province. According to Alhaji Danjani Hadejia whose father was a one time courtier of the deceased Emir of Hadejias

there was a time, as a child, I followed my father along with other courtiers of the Emir to a tour (Kanqadi). On our way, we met a group of Fulani herdsmen migrating to the southern part of the Emirate. They were immediately stopped by one of the warriors (Jarimi) who asked them to produce their Jangali receipts which they did. Despite the fact that they had produced their Jangali receipts, they were compelled to pay another six pounds for which no receipt was issued and the money was immediately shared among the courtiers.²⁶

Not only that receipts of earlier payments of Jangali were not recognised, some times the aristocrats follow the Fulani to their Buga (temporary settlement) and demand for gifts.²⁷ Sometimes it was the Fulani who went on their own to the Emir or the Hakimi to make the offer of gifts both in cash and in kind, in addition to the Jangali they paid.²⁸

Through the agency of title holders, money was expropriated from all occupational groups. In addition to being extorted by the feudal class, members of the professional groups paid various taxes to the British. The British introduced various taxes on occupational groups in 1909. C.L. Temple, the resident of Kano

province in 1909 justified the imposition of new taxes on the masses on the ground that:

.....all authority of native over native and all recognition of authority by natives (was) based on collecting and payment of some kind of material tribute, i.e. rents, taxes or presents..... for that reason, the only way to make the authority of Emirs, District Heads and village heads over the native population continually effective was to ensure that taxes (were) regularly collected, paid and accounted for.²⁹

These new taxes introduced by the colonialists include the caravan tax, custom duties, game tax, hawkers licence, fishing tax, firewood licence etc. While some of these taxes were specific as to who paid them, some were vague the collection of which was based on discretion. For example, a hawker "was virtually any person who preferred being grainfully occupied in petty trading to either idle or going away to work on the mines and other British projects during the dry season". Such a vague definition of the "hawker" provided the members of the aristocracy with the opportunity to harass and intimidate virtually anybody who sold the smallest commodity. Similarly, the firewood licence which was imposed on all those who took to firewood selling as a profession also served the purpose of extorting money from those who engaged in it.

In 1911, the colonial state abolished all pre-colonial forms of taxation and in their place a general poll tax called Haraji was introduced. In response to this developments, the feudal class in Hadejia Emirate introduced Hatsin Kasbi and Kudin Gandu. The Hatsin Kasbi was basically intended to replace the official Zakat. The manner of expropriating the Hatsin Kasbi from the peasantry was as follows. Every year after the harvest, the Emir, through the Hakimi supplied each village in the District with a specific number of sacks, depending on the size of the village. For each bag that was supplied, a token amount of about 10 shillings was given. The ten shillings was shared out to a group of peasants who were charged with the responsibility of "buying" a 100kg bag of grains. The actual price of a 100kg bag of millet in the market was about 40 shillings. Since the peasants were given only 10 shillings to purchase 40 shillings worth of grains, they shouldered the responsibility for the deficit.

The Kudin Gandu was mainly a tax imposed on peripatetic school students who came from neighbouring towns and villages to Guri and Hadejia. On arrival into the town, each student was expected to pay five shillings to a Wakili (representative) of the Hakimi or the Emir. This would guarantee the student to stay and learn in the town for a year. The payment of Kudin Gandu also exempt such students from the payment of all other taxes

that might be levied.

Throughout the colonial era, the poor peasants suffered triple exploitation. At the level of production, he was exploited by the rich peasants. At the official level, he was exploited by the colonial state as well as colonial capital through obnoxious taxes and forced labour. At the local level, the peasant was virtually a slave of the feudal aristocrats. The social relations of production that persisted after the colonial period are essentially oppressive and exploitative. The feudal aristocrats clandestinely continued the collection of all pre-colonial forms of feudal exactions that were prohibited by the colonialists. In some cases, the names for such feudal exactions were simply changed and were openly collected. This could be seen for example in the case of Hatsin Kambi which is a continuation of the officially imposed Zakkat.

The present practice is that individual rich peasants and/or specific village heads, rather than the entire population are asked to provide the Hatsin Kambi. At the end of each harvest year those individual rich peasants and village heads are supplied with specific number of empty sacks normally between two and five and a token amount of money which they mostly reject, so that they would purchase grains for the Hakimi. Five or ten per cent of my respondents agreed that they are being asked annually to make such offers. Similarly, some five peasants of middle

category also agreed that they give out between two to five sacks to the Hakisi annually but unlike the case described above (i.e. the one involving the receipt of empty sacks with a small amount of money) there own is purely voluntary.

None of the five members of the aristocracy interviewed admitted that the collection of Hatsin Kambi represent an exploitative relationship. This is because as far as they are concerned the grains supplied had been paid for. None of the peasants, not even those from Garfaqal, Garmaguwan Yamma and Garmaguwan Gabas admitted that he Hatsin Kambi has been paid for.

Thus, the nature of the social relations of production in Guri District is characterised by exploitation between classes and within classes. Within the peasantry for example, the poor peasants are exploited by the rich peasants. At the level of inter class relations, the rich peasant also exploit the rural labourer while the feudal aristocrats exploit all the other classes.

4.4 LEGAL AND POLITICAL RELATIONS

The oppression and exploitation of the peasantry in Guri District does not stop at the level of the social relations of production. Much of what is expropriated from the peasantry is at the level of legal and political relations. I have earlier observed that members of the aristocracy have enormous powers

over peasant lands, the same also applies to the peasant himself.

Every year, each village head pays homage twice to the Hakimi and the Emir. The homage is paid during the two Muslim festivals of id-el-fitr and id-el-kabir. In the former, money and/or grains are given to the Hakimi and the Emir respectively while in the latter the gift of rams are made available to the Hakimi and the Emir. Each Hakimi on the other hand takes similar things to the Emir of Hadejia and each Emir in Kano state pays homage to the Emir of Kano. On each of these occasions, it is the peasants who provide what their village head takes to the Hakimi. The peasants also provide what the Hakimi of Guri takes to the Emir of Hadejia as well as what the Emir of Hadejia takes to the Emir of Kano. Although this practice was formally stopped in 1979 by the People's Redemption Party (PRP) administration under Muhammed Abubakar Rimi, the payment of homage has not stopped to this day. For example in 1988, during the two festivals of id-el-fitr and id-el-kabir each village head in Guri District was asked to bring four rams or their money equivalent (two for each festival). To produce the money, each village head imposed a levy on his people. The amount paid by each peasant vary from one village to another. Thus while in bigger villages like Kadira, Adiyani, Garfagal, Lafiya and Arin each taxable adult was levied two naira in smaller villages like Madammawa, Dawa, Tanga and Galdimari, each taxable adult paid five naira.

The expropriation of the peasantry is ensured through maintaining close contact with the peasantry especially at the District level. Contact with the peasantry is maintained through the Hakimi who frequently tour all the villages under his. During the tour, the Hakimi and his entourage stay for a day or two in each village. Wherever he goes, he listens to complains. He mediates in land and civil disputes. Those cases that could not be resolved during the tour (rangadi) are referred to Guri for further hearing informally in his house. Very few cases reach the Alkali's court. The Alkali's court is seen as the last resort. Most of the cases that reach the Alkali's court are those that the accused persons refused to pay the fines imposed on them either because they are too much or because the accused persons reasoned that the "offence" did not warrant the fine.³¹

Although there is an Alkali court in Guri, most of the time the Alkali (lit. judge) sits idle with no case to hear for weeks or even months.³² It is not that there are no cases to be presided over, but that very few cases are taken to court. 90% of those interviewed (as could be seen from Table 7.7) would prefer their cases to be handled by the Hakimi or his representative. Their argument is that when a case is taken to the Alkali it takes long to be resolved. In addition, when a case is taken to the Alkali, there would be too many people to

bribe i.e. the police, the Alkali's messenger, the court clerk and the Alkali himself. The argument in favour of the Hakimi's court is that the trial itself is informal, short, few people to bribe and there is only one punishment and that is fine. So long as one has something to offer, it is better to allow the Hakimi handle one's case.

TABLE 7.7

RESPONSES TO THE QUESTION: Would you prefer the Hakimi to handle all your cases?

Class Category	Yes	%	No	%
Rich peasants	5	10	-	-
Middle peasants	10	20	-	-
Poor peasants	15	30	-	-
Nomadic fulani	2	4	-	-
Total	32	64	-	-

NB: All percentages are calculated out of the total samples of 50 respondents.

At these informal levels, various cases are attended to ranging from civil to criminal, and attended to. Those of the ten murder cases, none was reported to the Alkali of Guri. Eight of the cases were reported to the Area Court in Hadejia, two were suppressed in Guri and none of the ten cases went to any higher court judge at the state level.³³

In one instance, the then Alkali of Guri Mallam Muktar tried a case against the wishes of the Hakimi and it proved disastrous for him. In 1985 a group of peasants from Lafiya village protested to the Alkali against the confiscation of their farmlands situated along the Hadejia river by the village head. The Alkali ruled that the peasants should be given their lands back.

The above judgement did not go well with the Hakimi who had already collected some money to the tune of one thousand six hundred naira (#1600) from the village head promising him victory in the case. Thus, the Hakimi, through one of his front men Alhaji Usman (Sarki Shehu), protested against the ruling of the Alkali. Not only did the Alkali order the detention of Alhaji Usman but he also compelled him and the Hakimi to refund the money they had earlier collected from the village head of Lafiya. In addition, Sarki Shehu was compelled to refund another four thousand four hundred naira (#4400), being the total amount he extorted from three persons from the same village over theft charges.

Soon after the above incident, the Dan Iya of Hadejia (a powerful title holder in the Emir of Hadejia's palace and a one time Kano state Commissioner for Education under Audu Bako's government 1969 - 1975), Alhaji Abdulkadir Naidugu came to Guri. The Alkali of Guri Mallam Muktar was disgraced in public by the

Dan Iya. Mallew Muktar was shortly after that incident transferred from Guri at the instance of the Emir of Madejia and the Dan Iya.

Although the above case has shown the Alkali to be upright rather than corrupt, it could also be argued that the above case is an indication of an intra class struggle in which the Alkali fought against the marginalisation of his court. I have earlier indicated that most of the cases were tried by the Hakimi. In addition, apart from the fact that peasants avoid the Alkali's court due to its corrupt nature and its tedious legal processes, the Hakimi and his cohorts also deliberately frustrate its functions by directly asking peasants to report their cases to them.

Since most of the cases that come to the Hakimi are disputes between nomads and peasants,³⁴ members of the aristocracy fan members of disunity between peasants and nomads. By virtue of their wealth in cattle, goats and sheep, the nomadic Fulani have enough to bribe the members of the aristocracy. In a situation where a Fulani nomad was found guilty of an accusation of wrong doing, he was heavily fined. Members of the aristocracy are fond of telling the Fulani, "Kuyi ta'adi yadda kukeso kudin sa dayane kanai", (destroy their farmlands as you like, it will only cost you an ox).³⁵

Whenever a Fulani man is fined for destroying peasant crops by the Hakimi or his representatives, the money is not given to the peasant immediately. Instead, the peasant is asked to swear with the Gur'an as to whether he deserves the money or not. In most of the cases peasants do not like swearing with the Gur'an on simple and/or serious matters for fear of death. Thus the money collected from the Fulani is left with the Hakimi. In most of the cases neither the Fulani nor the peasants benefit from "legal" suits against each other.³⁶ Of the 21 cases of peasant-nomad clashes recorded in this research, the Fulani were directly held responsible for 18 and each time they were heavily fined. These fines range from two thousand to ten thousand naira especially where there is a loss of life. While nomads are fined for destroying crops, the victims do not benefit from such fines due to the problem of swearing with the Gur'an referred to above.

There are no clear cut guidelines or rules for judging a case other than the Hakimi listening to the two sides and finally making the decisions known to the parties involved. In most cases, however, the decision as to who is guilty and who is not is largely determined by what an individual has been able to offer to the Hakimi or the village head even before his case comes up for hearing.

What the nomadic Fulani have been doing is that once they arrive at a certain locality, they first of all pay homage to the local leaders. Offers of gifts, both in cash and in kind, are made to the leaders by the nomadic Fulani. In this way the nomadic Fulani get the local leaders on their side. This can explain why murder cases involving nomads could be suppressed. It can also explain why some cases were handled the way they were handled. For example in 1987 the people of Madammawa passed a vote of no confidence on their village head Mallam Gambo on the grounds that he stopped them from cultivating their farmlands located to the West of the village. The argument of the village head was that these farmlands have been turned to a passage way (Burtali) for Fulani livestock on their way to and from grazing. The leader of the protest Kaba Munukduwa was arrested and detained by the police on the orders of the Hakimi. He was later set free after paying two hundred naira (#200) fine.³⁷

Some times the declaration of peasant farmlands as a passage way for the livestock of the nomadic Fulani (Burtali) is actually an excuse to confiscate those lands from the peasants. For example in Dole village, over twenty farmlands were taken away from peasants by Mallam Zubairu and Umaru Agona on behalf of the Hakimi. The farmlands were taken away on the ground that they were to be used as passage way for Fulani livestock. The people of Dole protested to the authorities in Hadejia who directed that

neither the peasants nor the Fulani should make use of the farmlands. After some five years, a new directive was issued to the effect that any farmland that had lay waste for five years, is automatically the property of the Hakimi. A similar incident also took place in Wareri village in which the farmland of Mallam Isa Maihatsi was taken away from him by the Hakimi of Guri for the simple reason that he left it "waste" for one year.

In the knowledge that whatever one does he would only be fined, anarchy seems to be reigning especially in the villages. The nomadic Fulani destroy peasant farmlands with impunity and in most cases beating and/or killing the owners of those farmlands. For example in Kadira village, Yerima Gobura (a brother to the village head) was murdered in his farmland in 1986 after his crops had been destroyed. The case was reported to the Hakimi by the village head of Kadira. The Fulani men who killed Yerima Gobura were fined some undisclosed amount after which the family of the deceased were persuaded by the Hakimi to forget about the case on the grounds that he was destined by God to die in that way. In Matara Uku village, Mallam Garba Jibillu was killed in his house in 1987 by a gang of armed Fulani men. Jibillu had earlier threatened to deal with any Fulani nomad who dare come near his farmland. Garba Jibillu's family took the case to court in Hadejia. For the fact that the murderers could not be arrested, the case was struck out.

Similarly, in Dagana village, Mallam Dada Kallamu was shot with an arrow in 1987 by a Fulani herdsman after his farmland had been destroyed. The case was taken to Hadejia after the Hakimi of Guri failed to resolve it. In Hadejia, Dada was fined two hundred naira (#200) for "provoking the Fulani herdsman into shooting him". In 1986, the people of Dasagi, Takazza, Gadwa and Nusari village collectively reported one Ruba Galadima for his waston destruction of peasant farmlands located around the four villages. When Ruba finally appeared before the Alkali, he categorically stated that "I am ready to pay any fine imposed on me but I cannot guarantee that my cows will stop destroying crops."³⁸ Ruba was fined two thousand naira which he paid immediately, however, the money was shared equally between the peasants, the Alkali and the Hakimi.

The state of lawlessness in the villages reached its highest level in 1989 when a group of Fulani herdsmen killed a peasant from Gagiya village and hanged the body on a tree. All the peasant from the surrounding villages declared a war against the Fulani. The peasants killed six Fulani and hundreds of their livestock. Few people were later arrested but all the villages in the District came to their support. All villages throughout the District contributed money to help fight the legal battle against the Fulani. All those arrested have been released and

the case seems to be over. Thus it appears that once one is ready to pay fine, one can commit any crime in Guri District and go free.

At the political level, the Hakimi is seen by the peasant as the political head of the District. Nobody can build an additional room to his compound without giving him twelve naira. When he goes on a tour of a village, the Hakimi makes sure that he collects more than his annual salary. Before arriving in any village, the Hakimi is given Kapalon (Bade, lit. a welcome allowance), each peasant paid one naira in 1988 as Kapalon throughout the District (except those in Guri town).³⁷ Whenever he goes, all able bodied men in the village contribute a fixed amount commensurate with their wealth and the number of taxable adults in the family. This money that is given to the Hakimi when he arrives in the village is called kudin gaisuwa (lit. greeting money). Similarly, while leaving one village for another, all peasants contribute what is known as kudin sallama (lit. a farewell allowance). As could be seen from TABLE 9.8, 9.9, and 10.1, the kapalon is charged uniformly without taking into consideration one's income. The kudin gaisuwa and kudin sallama are charged according to one's income and the number of taxable adults in the family.

TABLE 9

TOTAL AMOUNT GIVEN AS KAPALON, KUDIN GAISUMA AND KUDIN SALLAMA BY FIVE RICH PEASANTS IN 1988

	FAMILY SIZE	NUMBER OF TAXABLE ADULTS	AMOUNT GIVEN AS			TOTAL ₦
			KAPALON	KUDIN GAISUMA	KUDIN SALLAMA	
A1	10	5	5	100	100	205
A2	12	7	7	140	140	287
A3	9	5	5	100	100	205
A4	6	3	3	60	60	123
A5	8	5	5	100	100	205
TOTAL	45	25	25	500	500	1025

For the Kapalon (the welcome money) each taxable adult member of the family was charged one naira while the corresponding figure for Kudin Gaisuma (greeting money) and Kudin sallama (farewell money) was twenty naira for each taxable member of the family of this category of peasants. This does not include female adult members of the family. This is because females are generally exempted from all forms of taxation.

From the figures presented above, it could be seen that the five rich peasants who constitute 10% of the sample were expropriated to the tune of one thousand and twenty-five naira (#1025), while the poor peasants who constitute 30% of the sample accounted for only three hundred and forty-six naira (#346). The corresponding figure for the middle class peasants who constitute 20% of the sample is eight hundred and six naira (#806).

The above figures might suggest for example that the rich peasants are more exploited than the poor peasants or the middle class peasants. However, nothing could be further from the truth. I have earlier illustrated the fact that the poor peasant is not only exploited by the feudal aristocrats but also by the rich peasants. Similarly, the income of the five rich peasants, as presented in table 2.2, is six times bigger than the income of the fifteen poor peasants presented on table 4.4.

While women are not generally taxed, the unmarried old women in each village provide all the chicken that are slaughtered for the Hakimi and his entourage throughout the days that they stay in each village.

Each member of the Hakimi's entourage is hosted by individual members of the village. Throughout the days that they might stay in each village their horses eat millet and/or corn and they also ~~decide~~^{decide} what must be cooked for them. Thus for example in 1975, Alhaji Liman of Kadira village was fined for cooking fish for Baba Jibir (a powerful member of the Hakimi's entourage) instead of meat as directed by his guest (Baba Jibir). In addition, Alhaji Liman was cursed by the Hakimi.⁴⁰

Also serious are the allegations of promiscuity levelled against the Hakimi and the members of his entourage, especially when they are on a tour of the villages. Although none of my respondents could agree that he or a member of his family had been a victim, 80% agreed that the Hakimi and the member of his entourage sleep with girls when they are on a tour of any village. On two instances, youngmen from within and surrounding villages refused to marry two young girls from Lafiya on the ground that the two girls have slept with the Hakimi when he (the Hakimi) went on a tour to Lafiya.⁴¹

Whenever the Hakimi is to leave one village for another, the host village head must offer some gifts, both in cash and in kind

to him. The same applies to all those who hosted any member of the Hakimi's entourage. These visits drain quite a substantial part of a peasant's income. In 1987 for example, the Emir of Nadejia went on a tour of the entire emirate. All village heads gave the Emir one hundred naira (#100) each, and every ward head (Mai Unguwa) gave the Emir twenty naira in addition to other gifts in kind such as animals and grains. All in all there are eight Districts in Nadejia Emirate and there are a total of seven hundred village heads and about seven thousand six hundred ward heads. In the whole, a total of two hundred and twenty-two thousand naira (#22000) was expropriated from the peasants not to talk of the amount they might have spent for feeding the Emir and the members of his entourage.

Immediately after the Emir's tour, the Hakimi of Gari also went on a tour of all the villages and expropriated similar amount (as those given to the Emir) from the peasantry.

In addition to all that has been mentioned above, the feudal aristocrats have a wide range of 'rights' over peasant properties. For example, on the death of any rich peasant or a title holder, the Hakimi is "entitled" to death duty (ushira) made up of one-eighth (1/8) of the total property of the

deceased. A case in point was the death of Mai Saleh, (a one time village head of Lafiya) in 1976. Mai Saleh's fifty cows were divided into eight and the Hakimi took five.⁴²

In all the cases of oppression and exploitation cited above, there has never been a single instance in which the peasants took their case to a higher court in Kano. Once a case is lost in the Hakimi's court, the peasants leave everything to God.

While all the peasants interviewed believe that the socio-economic and political relationship that exist between them and the Sarakuna (aristocrats) are essentially oppressive and exploitative, 90% do not see themselves as being part of the solution. They believe only God can solve their problems. Only 8% or four people maintained that "God will not help us unless we fight". As Danjani put it ... talakawa (subject masses) are not opposed to the feudal class but for the fact that they oppress and exploit them. If they can give up such acts, they will follow them, but they cannot do that because if you stop them from doing one thing today, they will invent another tomorrow and so, the only solution is to fight them".⁴³ As a short time measure, Danjani believes that the "Talakawa should make sure that they do not elect children of feudal aristocrats into

power," and as a long time solution, "they should opt for a revolution".⁴⁴ However, 70% or 35 of the respondents did not see revolution as necessary but that those individual members of the aristocracy who are found guilty of wrong doing should be punished by being removed from office. Thus, in the respondents view, it is the individual and not the system of exploitation and oppression that is responsible for their problems.

4.5 THE STATE AND THE FEUDAL INSTITUTION IN GURI DISTRICT

Right from the colonial days, the relationship between the state and the members of the feudal aristocracy in Guri, as else where throughout Nigeria, has been that of subordination and superordination.

The feudal institution is essentially retained to exploit the peasant population and to subject them to the rule of the dominant class. However, while serving the ruling class, the feudal class promote their influence among the peasantry and expropriate their surplus through socio-economic and political relationships as those described earlier. Throughout the colonial era, the Hakimi (District heads) of Guri and the village heads performed double and similar roles. At the official level, they implemented all British policies, especially

those related to taxation. At the local level, they transformed themselves into rural overlords living off the labour of the peasantry through plunder and extortion. Although the colonial state responded to extreme cases of extortion by simply deposing the Hakimi and/or village head concerned most of the oppressive and exploitative acts referred to in this chapter persisted throughout the colonial period.

After independence, the Northern People Congress (NPC) regional government under Ahmadu Bello, became apprehensive and suspicious of the growing powers and influence of the members of the feudal class. All those emirs and Hakimai who were not loyal to the NPC government were systematically weeded out while the loyal ones were rewarded. In this way, all emirs and Hakimai throughout the North were made agents of the NPC. Opposition politicians were subjected to constant harassment. In Guri District, most of the peasants identified with the opposition party, the Northern (later Nigerian) Elements Progressive Union (NEPU). Those peasants who openly supported NEPU were blackmailed and then jailed. The nature of this blackmail is that one (the NEPU supporter) was over heard abusing the Hakimi or the Emir in public. In 1959 for example, Mallam Ali of Turabu village and fifteen others were arrested and jailed for six

months each on charges of abusing the emir.⁴⁵ The same Ali was deported to Niger Republic in 1979 on the orders of the Emir of Hadejia on the grounds that he was an alien.⁴⁶ Ali Turabu later came back to his village after the Nigerian Immigration Agents discovered that the information supplied by the Emir of Hadejia is not true.

Similarly, whenever NEPU was to campaign for votes among the peasantry, the people were told that the Hakimi had performed Saddabaru (lit. sorcery) and whoever opens his mouth to speak, flies will fill his mouth and he would die⁴⁷. Most people believed it and as a result few people normally turned out at the campaign ground.

All over the North, members of the feudal class became law unto themselves. While they served the interest of the NFC government, they were allowed free hand to extort and oppress peasants.

With the overthrow of the first republic and the taking over of power by the military, more policies to restrain the powers of the feudal class were evolved and implemented. With the creation of states and the implementation of the local government reforms,



the Emirs and the Hakimai were all relieved of their legal and administrative responsibilities, especially as they related to the local populace. Similarly, the 1978 land use decree abolished all feudal privileges in land.

To maintain their position and also to perpetuate their atrocities in the villages, the aristocrats ally with powerful state functionaries. Thus for example the Dan Iya who removed Mallam Muktar the Alkali of Guri is a close friend of the Turaki of Kano (now also the Dan Iya of Kano) Alhaji Ahmadu. Within the context of Kano state politics, the Dan Iya of Kano influences many government policies in the state. With the exception of the P.R.P. government of 1979-83, the Turaki was known to have single-handedly compiled the list of all those who held influential and lucrative posts in all the previous governments from independence to date in the state.⁴⁸

Similarly, Alhaji Usman of Guri, referred to above, is a member of the local police-public relations committee. The functions of this committee is primarily to improve the relationship between the police and the public so that the people co-operate with the police in reporting criminals and maintaining peace. Instead of maintaining the peace, members of this

committee encourage violent confrontation between the nomadic Fulani and the peasantry as could be seen from the insinuating statement of Sarki Shehu referred to in the previous section.


Officially the Emir and all the Hakimai are employees of the local government. They are all answerable to the local government chairman and his secretary. Now, although the local government is responsible for the salary of all the Hakimai and the village heads, it however has no disciplinary powers over them. All disciplinary cases against a Hakimi or village head are directed to the emirate council. Only the state governor can outrightly depose or discipline an Emir or Hakimi.

Although the chairman is the chief executive of the local government and the decision of his council is binding on all members of the local government, members of the aristocracy outrightly disobey those decisions that are against their interests. In some cases they force the reversal of such decisions. For example in 1983 the Hadejia local government chairman Alhaji Ahmadu Dikila allocated some plots to the people of Hadejia local government. The beneficiaries of the allocation were peasants from the surrounding villages. A year later after some of the beneficiaries have developed their plots, the Emir of

Hadejia ordered the demolishing of all the structures erected. When the newly appointed local government chairman Alhaji Sarki Aliyu complained against the action of the Emir, he was transferred from Hadejia to Dawakin Tofa, on the orders of the Emir.

Although almost all those affected by the demolition could not do anything against the action of the emir, one Mallam Yusufu Gauta instituted a court action against the local government for allowing such an action. The court in Kano ordered the payment of eight thousand eight hundred naira (#8,800) to Yusufu Gauta as compensation and another three hundred naira (#300) as damages. The local government paid the money but not even a warning was given to the emir.

While the state turns a blind eye on the atrocities of the feudal class, members of the ruling class benefit from the feudal class by using them to implement their policies at the grassroots level. The members of the feudal class also used to secretly canvass for votes among the rural masses during civilian regimes. During military regimes, they are used to get legitimacy and support for the government. Under the Babangida administration for example, the members of the feudal class were effectively



used to get people for registration and voting exercises. They are also being used for the mass mobilization campaign under MANSER.

The strong linkages between the aristocrats in the rural areas and those in the town on the one hand and state functionaries on the other would suggest that what we saw happening in Guri District is an epitome of a broad based racket which function to maintain the interest of the Nigerian ruling class by perpetuating feudal relations.

4.7 SUMMARY AND OBSERVATIONS

The Guri political economy so far analysed epitomised the contradictions and struggles on the part of a moribund ruling class to sustain itself within a dominant capitalist mode of production.

Although most of the socio-economic problems of the members of this District could be linked to the oppressive and exploitative activities of the members of the feudal class, the existence of a religio-traditional culture operates to hoodwink the peasants from knowing the sources of their problems. Feudal relations in the District are essentially sustained by this religio-traditional ideology.

Apart from the feudal ideology, members of the aristocracy manipulate other factors to maintain their influence among the peasantry. In their capacity as local administrators and judges, they mediate in local disputes. In reality however, they promote hostility especially between the peasant population and the nomadic Fulani. The frequent clashes between the peasants and the Fulani serves as a major source of revenue to the feudal class in Guri who impose heavy fines on both parties.

We have also seen that the oppression and exploitation of the peasantry is sustained through constant visits by the Sarakuna to the villages. Through these visits, the peasant is made to believe that members of the feudal class are more concerned with his problems. This, coupled with the fact that the Hakimi does not take long to dispose of any case and that the highest punishment that could be meted out to peasants (regardless of the gravity of the offence) is a fine makes most peasants prefer going to the Hakimi's court.

The feudal class in Hadejia Emirate has been shown to have been serving the interest of the dominant ruling class from the colonial period to date. While serving the interest of the



dominant ruling class, they also promote their own class interest. For example when the colonial state abolished all precolonial forms of taxation in 1911 and introduced the poll tax, the feudal class effectively served the interest of the colonial state by making sure that all peasants under their control paid the poll tax. However, while they ensured the collection of the poll tax, they continued to collect all those taxes that were abolished by the colonialists. They did this by either changing the names with which those abolished taxes were known or the taxes were simply collected clandestinely.

Thus, the "Zakkat" was renamed Hatsin Kambi while the jangali was quietly collected from the Fulani whether or not they show evidence of earlier payments. The colonial state punished only those cases that came to its notice while the thousands that went unnoticed were not punished. After independence, the feudal class simply transferred their loyalty to the class controlling the regional government.

In addition to supporting the government in power, members of the feudal class ally with powerful state functionaries to perpetuate and sustain their atrocities in the country side.

The response of the peasantry to this system of oppression and exploitation is a direct reflection of the workings of the feudal ideology. The nature of their protests are essentially individualistic, isolated, uncoordinated and spontaneous. Thus the individual emir, Hakimi, Alkali village head etc. rather than the feudal system is seen to be responsible for specific problems. Even things like disease which result from poor nutrition are attributed to evil spirits.

Poverty and richness are regarded as God given. Thus for example only God and not the system of exploitation is responsible for one's poverty. The same conception also applies to the position of those in authority. Kingship is given by God to whoever He wants and challenging those in authority is a challenge the will of God.

In conclusion, one can argue that it is the persistence and predominance of this religious and superstitious ideology among the peasantry that enables the feudal class in Guri District of Hadejia Emirate to perpetuate feudal oppression and exploitation.

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1973, p.229.
2. Maurice Cornforth Dialectical Materialism: vol.3: Theory of
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3. Ibid.
4. Abdullahi Danfodio "Diya al-Umma" (Light of the community) as
in Paden op. cit., p.221
5. The election of all village heads are done by the villagers
themselves and endorsed by the Hakimi and the Emir.
6. Interview with one of the four policemen in Guri on
10/11/1988.
7. Interview with Baba Kulalu on 8-11-1988.
8. This information was obtained from the interviews granted by
the relations of the deceased persons viz; the families of
Garba Jibillu, Yarima Gobura, Mai Julu and Gardoole.
9. Interview with Baba Kulalu 8-11-1988.

10. Interview with Alhaji Hamidu 10-11-1988.
11. The respondent is a courtier and he wanted to remain anonymous.
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27. Interview with Goje and Ali on 10-11-1988.
28. Ibid.
29. Mahmud Modibbo Tukur "The imposition of British Colonial Domination on the Sokoto Caliphate, Bornu and Neighbouring states", p. 605.
30. Ibid.
31. Interview with Alhaji Hamidu Guri 10-11-1988.
32. Ibid.
33. The respondent who was interviewed on 11-11-1988 wanted to remain anonymous.

34. Unless for serious cases like murder or cases of land grabbing, peasants try as much as possible to avoid legal disputes for their obvious financial implications. As explained by Mallam Yakubu "we settle most of our disputes locally because the moment you carry your case to them (Hakimi and his representatives) they will squeeze as much as possible from you in the name of fine".
35. Sarki Shehu is fond of saying this. Interview with Alhaji Hasidu Guri on 10-11-1988.
36. Ibid.
37. Interview with Ado Aliyu, Garba Kyari and Raba Wunukaduwa on 5-11-1988.
38. Although I could not get Daba Galadima to verify the extent of which the above statement credited to him is true, I was informed by seven people, two of whom are Fulani that they were present when Daba made that statement.
39. Guri is the Headquarters of the District where the Hakimi resides.



40. Interview with Adamu Musa on 11-11-1988. Although Adamu could not remember the exact amount collected as fine from Alhaji Liman, the incident was witnessed by many people.
41. Interview with Kafinta Sulama in Lafiya on 5-11-1988.
42. Interview with Baba Musa in Lafiya on 5-11-1988.
43. Interview with Alhaji Muhammadu Danjani Hadejia on 11-11-1988.
44. Ibid.
45. Interview with Ali Turabu 11-11-1988.
46. Ibid.
47. Interview with Danjani Hadejia op. cit.
48. The respondent is a top civil servant who want to remain anonymous.


CHAPTER FIVE

5.1 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This research, using the Marxist methodology, has attempted to study and analyse how a scribend class has effectively employed a religio-traditional ideology to sustain itself within a dominant capitalist mode of production. I did this by examining the contradictions that exist in the area of study and within the wider context of the Nigerian political economy. These contradictions which inform the theory of motion of the society under study were classified into internal and external contradictions, primary and secondary, antagonistic and non-antagonistic.

The internal contradictions deal with both antagonistic and non-antagonistic class relations before, during and after the colonial period. The external contradiction deal primarily with the influences of external factors such as the Jihad and colonialism on Hadejia Emirate in particular and in Nigeria in general. The primary contradictions deal with antagonistic class interest like the one between the peasants and Sarakuna, while the secondary contradictions represents the non-antagonistic class interests and struggles as those between the peasants and the nomadic Fulani both of whom belong to the oppressed classes.

The study started first by examining the nature of feudal



relations at the global level. After examining the nature of feudal relations throughout the world in the first chapter, the conclusion that feudalism and its attendant contradictions varied with time and society was drawn. It is also argued that regardless of the society, feudal relations are sustained through a religious ideology. With this conclusion in mind and the hypothesis developed in the second chapter, I went on to analyse the political-economy of Hadejia Emirate before and during the colonial period in the third chapter.

In the third chapter, I argued that the phenomenon of feudal oppression and exploitation within Hadejia Emirate had been in existence since about 1450 when the area was under the control of the kings (Sarakuna) of Kano. Between 1731 and 1743, the small chiefdoms of Auyo, Sarin Gabbas and Hadejia were all annexed to Kanem-Borno Empire. Between 1731 and 1804 following the outbreak of Usman Danfodio's Jihad, the social formation of Hadejia was under the Galadima of Nguru, a vassal chief of the Kanem-Borno Empire.

The nature of the social relations of production in Guri under the Kanem-Borno Empire was that peasants possessed lands communally. However, they paid annual tribute to the state. What the peasants paid as tribute was fixed annually by the state on the entire community. It was the particular community that

decided on who paid what to make up for the bulk of what was finally handed over as a tribute to the state. When a particular community defaulted on tribute payment, the entire community was punished through a punitive expedition in which the state carried away more property than what the community was expected to pay as tribute.

The contradictions that informed the dynamics of the pre-Jihad social formation of Hadejia were largely centred around the class struggles between four major classes viz; the Kanuri and Habe ruling class on the one hand, the nomadic Fulani, the peasants and the slaves on the other.

The contradictions between the peasants and the feudal ruling class centred around the issues of tribute and the conscription of their children into slavery. The contradictions between the nomadic Fulani and the ruling class largely centred around the issue of the Jangali tax which was indiscriminately levied on and collected from the nomadic Fulani based on the number of livestock they owned. Although they were small in number, the slaves were one of the most oppressed classes in the society. Most of the slaves were prisoners of war and quite often they run away from their masters. Those slaves who did not run away ended up being absorbed into the local communities. Infact palace slaves who distinguished themselves at the war front or in administration were given titles such as Sarkin Yaki

(field Marshal) or District head Hakimi, (District head).

It was within the context of these contradictions that when the Jihad of Usman Danfodio broke out, the Fulani of Hadejia, being one of the most oppressed groups in the society, massively supported it.

Usman Danfodio's Jihad of 1804 - 1808 ended with the overthrow of the Sarakuna system. On the ruins of the Habe Sarautu system emerged the Emirate political structure. Hadejia hitherto under the control of the Kanem-Borno Empire became an Emirate of the Sokoto Caliphate. The nature of the state became theocratic and Islam became the ideology of the state.

The basis of power of the aristocracy was spiritual (traditional) juxtaposed with rational legal forms of authority. Various forms of taxation were introduced by the state. Most of these taxes were collected within the context of the obligations of a muslim to the Islamic state.

Although the peasants and other social classes were oppressed and exploited by the state and its agencies, there had never been an organised revolt against the Emirate and/or feudal system as a whole. Most of the revolts were localised and directed to individual rulers. When the conditions of the oppressed classes became worse, individuals, rather than the

system were held responsible.

The explanation for the inability of the peasants to put up an organised revolt against the feudal oppression and exploitation is located in the nature of the Islamic ideology itself. The Islamic ideology of the state made a revolt against constituted authority a heresy while a revolt against the leadership was regarded as a revolt against Islam. According to Abdullahi Danfodio, "if authority is legitimate (that is based on the reacting of the Qur'an), protest is illegitimate. If authority is illegitimate, protest is legitimate".¹ Since the members of the aristocracy saw themselves as the flag bearers of Usman Danfodio's Jihad, they also saw themselves as the religious leaders of the people. All obnoxious taxes were justified as "responsibility" of a muslim to the Islamic state. The leaders were seen as the representatives of God and thus a challenge to their authority is a challenge to the decision of God who gave them the position of leadership. During dynastic quarrels, the oppressed classes only took sides. Through the monopoly of Islamic knowledge, the aristocracy made access to Islamic knowledge difficult and the content of the Qur'an was interpreted to the general public by palace Mallams who always justified the status-quo. Most of the people were ignorant of the very religion that they professed and thus were easily manipulated. Up to the time the colonialists conquered Nigeria as a whole, the



peasants were not able to put up a strong resistance against the system of feudal oppression and exploitation as a whole.

Following the violent creation of the colonial economy, members of the aristocracy in Hadejia Emirate were first of all tamed and then later used through the agency of the indirect rule to serve the interest of colonialism.

At the initial stage, the Emir of Hadejia Muhammadu and most Emirs throughout the Northern Region resisted some of the colonial policies especially those on taxation. The members of the aristocracy either outrightly refused to collect taxes imposed by the colonialists or they concealed the number of their taxable population. This action was not informed by a humanitarian gesture to protect the people against imperialists but by the fear that the policies would deprive them of their source of revenue in addition to risking peasant revolt especially when they are made to carry heavy burden of taxation.

The British responded to the intransigence of the Emirs and District heads (Makimai) and their subordinates by deposing many of them while several others were suspended and/or warned.

With the consolidation of colonial rule, members of the feudal class became the most faithful allies of the British colonialists. The loyalty of the members of the aristocracy to



the British notwithstanding, a secondary and non-antagonistic contradiction developed between them. This contradiction centred largely around the British policy which abolished all forms of feudal exactions in 1911. When the British unified all pre-colonial taxes into one poll tax called Haraji which was collected annually, the aristocrats refused to stop collecting those taxes like the Zakkat which were abolished. The collection of unofficial taxes and the embezzlement of official tax money formed the bone of contention between the aristocrats and the colonialists throughout the colonial period.

The Guri political-economy analysed described in detail how the members of the aristocracy tried to sustain feudal relations in an everchanging and predominant capitalist mode of production.

The first strategy for survival is that they remain loyal to the bourgeois state and implemented all its policies especially those related to the rural populace. For example, during the colonial period, they collected taxes and also mobilised the peasantry to perform forced and unpaid labour. In the same way, they served all previous administrations from independence to date in assessing and collecting taxes.

Another strategy for survival is that whenever a state policy abolish some of their privileges, the same privileges are enjoyed under a different name. For example, when the colonial

state abolished the Zakkat and kudin kasa in 1911, the feudal class introduced the Halsin Kambi and Kudin gandu respectively.

Thirdly, the Sarakuna tried to maintain as close a contact with the peasantry as possible. This was done through constant visits (rangadi) to villages by the Hakimi. The political significance of such an act cannot be under-estimated. For example, of the 50 people interviewed, only 5 or (10%) correctly mention the names of the last two local government chairmen while all the 50 or (100%) correctly listed all the six Hakimai of Hadejia from 1908 to date. Thus the Hakimi and his agents are the most known government officials.

Fourthly, the Sarakuna in Guri have evolved a faster and more efficient way of disposing cases. For example, while it will take an Alkali two to three months to dispose of a case, the Hakimi takes only days and at most two weeks to dispose of a case. This, coupled with the fact that the highest form of punishment imposed by the Hakimi is fine, the peasants prefer it to the Alkali's court. Thus, although the peasants complain of Zalunci (oppression) and cuta (exploitation) of the Hakimi's court, 90% of those interviewed would prefer their cases to be handled by the Hakimi's court.

Another strategy adopted by the Sarakuna to maintain their influence among the local populace is the manipulation of

secondary class contradictions. In Guri District, the Sarakuna incite the nomadic Fulani against the peasantry. While the two groups fight one another, the Sarakuna exploit them both through fines. Through the arbitration of local dispute, the impression is created in the minds of those in government that the Sarakuna are effectively in control of the local populace and therefore maintaining peace at the local level.

More importantly, a strong alliance has been created and maintained between the Sarakuna in the country side and top government functionaries. For example, the police in Guri complained to me that they have made several reports to their Divisional commander about arbitrary trial of cases and the corruption of the Hakimi's court but nothing has been done yet. Similarly, when I confronted the then chairman of Hadejia local government, Alhaji Zangoma on 12-11-1988, as to whether he was aware of the ongoing cases of extortion and the suppression of murder cases by the Hakimi's court, he denied ever knowing anything about it. When I threatened to publish my findings in a news magazine and indict the local government officials for their negligence, he admitted that he had been alerted on some of the cases and that agents of the state security service have been directed to make some investigations. When I was leaving the office of the chairman, he offered me some money which I declined. But the practical alliance between top government

functionaries and the Sarakuna could be seen in the manner in which the Dan Iya of Hadejia sent away Mallam Muktar, the Alkali of Guri out of the town. The efficiency with which honest government officials are dealt with when they attempt to expose or deal with corrupt Sarakuna would suggest the existence of a powerful racket that can go to any length to protect its field workers.

At the centre of this wave of oppression and exploitation is the feudal ideology which is used to confuse the minds of the peasantry and hinder their understanding of the reasons behind their poverty and sufferings. As stated earlier in the second chapter, the ideology of the exploiting class is basically an abstraction from the actual experiences and relationships that exist between the oppressed and oppressive classes. These abstractions are then articulated into a way of thinking or even a way of life. This way of thinking then functions practically to maintain the status-quo. In Guri District the feudal ideology manifest itself in a form of fatalism. God is seen to be responsible for everything including poverty and affluence life itself is seen as unfolding of events worked out by God and that patience and restraint are virtues.

Finally, what this thesis reveals about Guri is an epitome of a wider strategy for oppression and exploitation throughout

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the country.

5.2 POLITICAL AND THEORETICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS RESEARCH

The problem of the peasant liberation as could be seen from the details of this research work is centred around three issues viz;

- (a) Isolated nature of their production system.
- (b) Ownership of their means of production.
- (c) The persistence of superstitious ideology.

The problem posed by the isolated nature of peasant production is that it makes it difficult for the peasantry to develop collective consciousness. Thus each peasant sees his problems as his own and not the problem of the entire society. This makes the peasant individualistic in his approach towards his problems. Thus the individual oppressor rather than the system of oppression and exploitation could be seen as targets of attack. To the extent that peasants do not form unions to articulate their collective class interest, they will continue to be, for some times, victims of feudal and local bureaucratic oppression and exploitation.

The second issue that compounds the problems of the peasantry is their ownership of the means of production. Unlike the proletariat who own nothing but his own labour power which he sales to the capitalist, the peasant owns his means of production. Thus it is easier to explain exploitation to the

proletariat who assess his condition of living vis-a-vis his employer's than the peasant who employs himself and sometimes even employ others. Unless the ownership of his land is threatened, the peasant is less likely to undertake a political action against his oppressor and even when he does, it is usually spontaneous, short lived, self-centred and with no intention of overthrowing the system under which he is oppressed and exploited.

The third problem associated with the issue of peasant liberation is the persistence of a superstitious ideology that is used to hoodwink the peasantry. The workings of this ideology are essentially diversionary. Hostility is diverted against the real enemy and directed at members of the same class. Thus in Guri for example, the peasant sees the nomadic Fulani as his major enemy. They do not for example understand that the activities of the nomadic Fulani are inseparably tied to the support given to them by the Sarakuna.

Thus, the political significance of this is that it has been able to expose the ways in which a class has been able to sustain itself in power over a period of time.

Secondly, the research has shows that the activities of the Sarakuna in the rural areas can be one of the major causes of poverty among the rural populace.

Thirdly, the research demonstrates that the oppression and exploitation of the peasantry is perpetuated with the active connivance and support of the bourgeois state.

Finally, the Sarakuna are shown as members of a parasitic class which has no role to play within the present political dispensation. The retention of this class of hereditary title holders has not only created a situation where local government workers are underutilised but it is also a wastage of public money. In addition, their retention in public service constitutes a great burden on the peasantry. Thus, the liberation of the peasantry is also inseparably tied to the complete abolition of the feudal institution in Nigeria.

At the theoretical level, we have been able to learn how an old order could sustain itself within a dominant and new order. That is to say, an old order can only sustain itself within the new and dominant order from a defensive position and from making itself subject to the new order. For example, the feudal institution proper has ended with the creation of the colonial economy. However, despite that, vestiges of feudal relations persist to this date. This happened because the feudal institution was tamed and made to serve the interest of local and international capitalism. To the extent that the feudal

institution remain useful in serving the interest of capital, it would be allowed to survive. Thus for example despite the fact that the 1976 local government reform and the 1978 land use Decree have left Emirs and District heads with no specific roles successive governments in Nigeria have continued to sink a lot of money into the institution in order to sustain it. This is because the role of the Emirs and Hakimai in holding down the oppressed classes serves the interest of the Nigerian ruling class.

Secondly, we have learnt that no system of exploitation can be sustained without an ideology. An ideology is necessary to confuse and misdirect the oppressed. Under the primitive communal mode of production, the primitive ideology helped to maintain the social cohesion and bond that held the tribe together. The maintenance of this social cohesion was necessary for the survival of the tribe the disintegration of which meant the disintegration of the society.


With the birth of social classes and the disintegration of society into hostile camps of slaves and slave owners, feudal lords and serfs or peasants, capitalists and the proletariat, ideology functions to maintain the interest of the dominant class in power. Thus for example the religious ideology of the middle ages with its conception of the hierarchical arrangement of

heaven depicted the feudal order. The oppression and exploitation of the serf by the lord "was disguised as a subordination of the serf to his natural superiors under the rule of God"². The process of expropriating the surplus generated by the serfs was disguised by the abstract and hoodwinking feudal terminologies and ideas of "ownership, dues, rights and obligations"³.

Similarly, under the capitalist mode of production, the expropriation of the surplus value generated by the working class is rationalised and disguised by the capitalist ideas of "ownership, contract and equality of rights"⁴.

Although bourgeois ideology is essentially non-religious, it leaves room for the manipulation of religion especially when the system is in crisis. Thus for example the idea that poverty and wealth are given by God to whoever He wants would serve the interest of the bourgeoisie especially in times of crisis. Thus the rich are rich because God has made it so and the poor are poor because they have been predestined to be so.

In a neocolonial social formation like Nigeria, the retention of the feudal institution and its ideological structure is necessary because the system is always in crisis. Thus, the religio-traditional ideology of the feudal class is crucial for diverting peoples attention from the real sources of their



problems and in subjecting them to the rule of the bourgeoisie.

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
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INTERVIEW SCHEDULE ADMINISTERED TO ARISTOCRATS

NAME: _____
VILLAGE/TOWN _____

1. What is your title?
2. For how long have you held this title?
3. What are the responsibilities attached to your title?
4. Does your responsibilities involves the collection of taxes and levies?
5. How often do your Talakawa pay these taxes and levies?
6. What amount of these levies actually goes to the State government/Local government and your office?
7. Do you pay homage to your superiors?
8. How often is such homage paid?
9. What do you take to him in Cash or in kind during such a homage?
10. Do you have a Gandu?
11. What is the size of your Gandu?
12. What type of labour do you engage on your Gandu?
13. Do you employ forced labour on your Gandu?
14. Do you regard the work by peasants on your Gandu as forced labour?
15. Do you handle civil or criminal cases?
16. How often do you handle such cases?
17. How many such cases did you handle last year?
18. What type of punishment do you give on conviction of suspects?
19. How often do you go on tour of the District?
20. Do you collect gifts in cash or in kind from the Talakawa during such tours?



INTERVIEW SCHEDULE ADMINISTERED TO MY RESPONDENTS WHO ARE
NOT MEMBERS OF THE ARISTOCRATS

NAME: _____
VILLAGE/TOWN _____

1. What is your age?
2. What Religion do you practice?
3. Can you read and understand the Qur'an?
4. Do you also believe in diviners?
5. What is the size of your family?
6. How many farmlands do you have?
7. What is the size of your farmland(s)?
8. What is your total income last year?
9. What is your total expenditure last year?
10. What type of labour do you engage on your farm?
11. What is your major preoccupation?
12. What are your secondary preoccupation?
13. Do you pay taxes and levies to the government and/or Feudal aristocrats?
14. What is the total amount you paid as taxes and levies last year?
15. Have you ever been asked to work on the Gandu sarki (Emir or Hakimi's Estates) or construction site?
16. How many days do you spent working on the Gandu Sarki?
17. Do you regard the work by peasants in the Gandu Sarki as forced labour?
18. Do you pay homage to the Hakimi and the Emir?tion of suspects?
19. What do you give them during such homage?
20. What is the nature of the relationship between peasants and the Nomadic Fulani in this area?
21. What are the commonest ways of settling disputes in this area?
22. How often do you patronise the Alkali's Court?

23. Would you prefer the Hakimi to handle all your cases?

24. What are the general problems confronting the people of this area?

25. How do you think these problems can be solved?

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