



**Thesis By**

**Kabiru  
Stilaiman  
thafe**

**Ahmadi Bello  
Untvetsity, zafia,**

**The State and Economy in the Sokoto  
Caliphate: Policies and Practices in the  
Metropolitan Districts, C. 1804-1903 A.D**

---

**April, 1992**

A red triangle graphic is positioned in the bottom right corner of the page.

**THE STATE AND ECONOMY IN THE  
SOKOTO CALIPHATE:  
POLICIES AND PRACTICES IN THE METROPOLITAN  
DISTRICTS; C. 1804-1903 A.D.**

By

**Kabiru Suleiman**

**A thesis Submitted to the Post Graduate School,  
Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, in Partial fulfillment  
for the Award of the Degree of the Doctor of  
Philosophy (History)**



April, 1992.

## CERTIFICATION

I certify that this thesis is a product of my own research work and that it has never been presented for an award anywhere. All sources of information are duly acknowledged in the footnotes, and all materials consulted are provided in the bibliography.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Mahim', written over a horizontal line.

(signature)

## OEDICATION

This work is dedicated to the memory of my beloved teacher, who taught me the meaning of Nigerian history: the late br. Mahmud Modibbo Tikur; former Head of History Department and the Dean, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, ABU Zaria.

## COMMON ABBREVIATION.

ABU	Ahtnadu Bello University
BSOAS	Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African studies
CbDESRIA	Council for the Development of Econotnlc artd Social Research ih Africa
<b>IJAHS</b>	Itttrrtatlortal Journal of Africart Historical Studies
JAR	Journal of African History
jAs	Jotirrtal of African Society
JHSN	Journal of the iUstotlcai Society of Nigeria
KAI)CAP	Kaduna Capital (Doctiniertts Recovered Within.●.)
KIL	Ka.shim Ibrahim Library
NHRS	Notthetrt History Research Schetne
NOIUA	Northern Region Literacy Agency
OAU	Organisation of African t.Jntty
oUP	Oxford University Press
RBCAD	Research Bulletirt of the centre fot Arable botumentatlon
SOKPRdF	Sokoto Ptovirtcial Office (Doctiillent Recoveted...)

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Pages</u>
Cover Page.....	i
Certification Page.....	ii
Dedication Page.....	iii
Common Abbreviation.....	iv
Table of Contents.....	v-ix
List of Maps.....	x
Acknowledgements.....	xi-xv
0.0 PREFACE.....	xvi-liv
0.1 Abstract.....	xvi-xix
0.2 Rationale of the Study.....	xx-xxxvii
0.3 Notes on Sources.....	xxxiii-li
0.4 Research Methodology.....	lii-liv
<b>1.0 CHAPTER ONE: <u>The Social And Economic Structure of the Polities of The Rima Basin Area in the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century</u>.....</b>	<b>1-71</b>
<b>1.1 <u>The Rima Basin Area</u>.....</b>	<b>1-3</b>
<b>1.2 <u>General Physical features of the Rima Basin</u>.....</b>	<b>3-18</b>
<b>1.3 <u>The Polities of the Rima Basin</u>.....</b>	<b>18-54</b>

<u>Kebbi</u> .....	20-23
<u>Zamfara</u> .....	23-26
<u>Gobir</u> .....	26-29
b) Political System.....	29-36
c) Organisation of Economic Activities.....	36-48
i) <u>Land and Land Tenure</u> .....	36-39
ii) <u>Agriculture</u> .....	39-44
iii) <u>Pastoralism</u> .....	45-46
iv) <u>Fishing and Hunting</u> .....	46-48
d) Industrial Activity.....	48-50
e) Commerce.....	50-52
f) Forms of Labour .....	52-54
<b><u>1.4 Political and Socio-Economic Conditions in the Rima Basin, C. 1780-1804</u></b> .....	54-71
<b><u>2.0 CHAPTER TWO: The Social And Economic Basis of The Sokoto Caliphate</u></b> .....	72-128
<b><u>2.1 The Triumph of the Jihad Movement</u></b> .....	72-82
<b><u>2.2 The Development of the Metropolitan Districts</u></b> .....	83-95
<b><u>2.3 The Socio-Economic Agenda of the Jihad Leaders</u></b> .....	95-109
a) The Pre-1804 Period.....	98-103
b) The Post-1804 Period.....	103-109
<b><u>2.4 The Major Socio-Economic Policies of the Caliphate</u></b> .....	109-128

a) Land and Land Tenure.....	109-115
b) Agriculture and Animal Husbandry.....	115-117
c) Industrial and Crafts Production.....	117-119
d) Commerce.....	119-121
e) Taxes and Other Forms of Revenue.....	121-125
f) Slavery and Other Forms of Social Labour.....	125-126
g) Professional Services.....	126-128
<b>3.0 CHAPTER THREE: <u>Land Tenure, Agricultural Systems, Pastoralism And Animal Husbandry</u>.....</b>	<b>129-207</b>
<b>3.1 <u>The Role of the State in the Grant of land and Its Resource Use</u>.....</b>	<b>129-136</b>
<b>3.2 <u>Forms of Land Ownership</u>.....</b>	<b>136-142</b>
a) Membership Land Holding.....	137-139
b) Fief Holding.....	139-140
c) Other Forms of Land Holding.....	140-142
<b>3.3 <u>Agricultural Production and the Development of Cultivation Techniques</u>.....</b>	<b>142-185</b>
a) The Transformation of Agricultural Production.....	142-148
b) Agricultural Techniques and Cultivation Systems.....	148-162
i) <u>Upland Cultivation Systems</u> .....	149-158
ii) <u>Floodland and Lowland Cultivation</u> .....	158-162



c) The Role of Peasant Agricultural Production and the *Gandayē* in Social Production.....162-171

d) Agrarian Crises and the Role of the Caliphate Leadership in Its Management..172-185

**3.4 The Development of Pastoralism and Animal Husbandry.....185-207**

a) The Impact of the Jihad movement on the Pastoral Economy.....185-191

b) Pastoral Activities in the Metropolis..191-204

i) Transhumance..... 192- 197

ii) Animal Husbandry.....197-204

c) Pastoralists in the Caliphate's Social Formation.....204-207

**4.0 CHAPTER FOUR: Industrial Crafts Production, Commercial Activities And Professional Services.....208-262**

**4.1 Crafts and the Development of the Manufacturing Sector of the Economy.....208-223**

**4.2 The Nature and Significance of Commodity Production in the Metropolis..... 223-228**

**4.3 Internal and External Trade.....228-242**

**4.4 Financing and the Nature of Merchant Capital.....244-249**

**4.5 The Nature and Organisation of Professional Services.....249-251**

**4.6 The Professionals.....251-262**

a) Scholars and Intellectual Services.....251-256

b) Herbalists and Medicinemen.....256-259

c) <i>Maroka</i> (Praise Singers).....	259-262
<b>5.0 CHAPTER FIVE: <u>Institution of Slavery, And Other Forms of Social labour in Production.</u></b> .....	<b>263-304</b>
<b>5.1 <u>Parameter of the Institution of Slavery.</u></b> .....	<b>.....263-288</b>
a) Slaves and the Concept of the Slavery Mode of Production.....	265-272
b) Slavery and Slave Status.....	272-279
c) Slaves' Resistance and Protest.....	279-288
<b>5.2 <u>Domestic versus Marketing Slavery.</u></b> .....	<b>288-292</b>
<b>5.3 <u>The Nature of Non-Slavery Forms of Social labour.</u></b> .....	<b>292-304</b>
a) Clientage Labour ( <i>Barantaka</i> ).....	294-297
b) Hired or Wage Labour ( <i>Kwadago</i> ).....	297-302
c) Forced Labour.....	302-304
<b>6.0 GENERAL CONCLUSION: <u>Towards A Political Economy of The Sokoto Caliphate.</u></b> .....	<b>305-325</b>
<b>7.0 BIBLIOGRAPHY</b> .....	<b>326-357</b>

## LIST OF MAPS

1. A Map of the Sokoto Caliphate showing the Metropolitan Region.
2. A Relief Map of the Metropolitan Caliphate.
3. A Map Showing the *Fadama* Belt of the Metropolitan Caliphate.
4. A Map Showing the Major Trade Routes Across the Metropolitan Caliphate.
5. A Map Showing Important Crafts Centres in the Metropolitan Caliphate

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am, first and foremost, grateful to his Almighty Allah for granting me the health and the desire to pursue some measure of Intellectual activity.

This work has been made possible with many forms of support from my family, teachers, friends, students, and institutional grants over the last six years. It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, in few lines like these, to give due acknowledgements to all those who in one way or another are directly or indirectly connected to its successful completion.

In all humility I must singularly thank my Supervisor, Dr. Saleh Abubakar for his fatherly guidance through which this work matured into its present form. It is in the same vein that I recall the immeasurable loss of the late Dr. Mahmud Modibbo Tukur to whom I am indebted, particularly for his lessons on Nigerian History and his initial supervision and incisive comments, which has broaden my horizons.

It is only proper that I should acknowledge my first Supervisor, Dr. Peter K. Tibenderana, now of Makerere University, particularly for his friendly discussion with me since my undergraduate days. I also thank my Postgraduate seminar teachers: Professor

Joseph E. Inikori and Dr. Yusufu Bala Usman, for their thorough intellectual guidance. I owe a special recognition to Dr. Usman, who as the Postgraduate Co-ordinator during our time, took interest in my proposal, and his comments very much inspired me towards this particular work.

I specifically acknowledge the great concern of Dr. Yaro T. Gella, Director- General, National Commission for Museums and Monuments, where I am working on secondment. Dr. Gella has been very closely associated with this work, giving all possible assistance to see to its timely conclusion. It is in the same spirit I also thank Dr. Sule Bello, Director, National Council for Arts and Culture, for his encouragement and assistance. The same recognition extends to Dr. Ahmad Muhammad Kani of the Faculty of Arts and Islamic Studies, Usmanu Danfodio University, Sokoto.

I candidly acknowledge the words of encouragement that I have received from numerous people. Prominent among such people is Alhaji Dahiru Muhammed, Managing Director, New African Merchant Bank, Limited, who has showed to me his sincere concern towards my academic progress whenever we meet. Similarly, Dr. Abdullahi Rafi Augi, Director for Higher Education, Federal Ministry of Education,

deserved my thanks and due recognition for his encouragement in completing this work. In ABU, a fairly large group of individuals have extended to me their goodwill which I hold in very high esteem. Prominent among them is Professor Dalhat Muhammad, Dean, Postgraduate School. I am also thankful to Malam Abdullahi Musa, the Registrar, for his encouragement and sincere concern. I also wish to acknowledge the concern of Dr. Ayo R. Dunmoye, Head, Department of Political Science.

To my very good friends and colleagues in ABU, We lack the words to convey my 'comradey' regards to their struggles and affection for this work. These gentlemen are: Abubakar Hassan Fulata of the Department of Sociology; Tanimu Abubakar of the Department of English; Safiyanu Aminu Muhammed of the Department of History; Mansur Abdulkadir Funtua of the Department of English; Tajuddeen Ya'aqub Surakat of the Department of English; Bashir Usman Kurfi of the Department of Business Administration; Sabo Bako of the Department of Political Science; Nuhu Muhammed Jamo of the Faculty of Law; and a host of others I did not mention.

In History Department, I thank all the staff of the Northern History Research Scheme (NHRS) for their

valuable assistance in many forms, and I also thank the secretarial staff of the Department and all those who in one way or another share some goodwill in this work. However to my Head of Department, Dr. Ahmed Modibbo Muhammed I extend my warm regards for his assistance, both official and personal.

To my friends outside the University I also remain indebted for their goodwill and affection towards this work in particular, and towards my academic progress in general. In this category I acknowledge Alhaji Sani Tambaya and Abubakar Yahaya among many others.

In the course of this work I was awarded a Ph.D. thesis writing grant from the Council for the Development of Social and Economic Research in Africa (CODESRIA), Dakar, Senegal, which in no small measure assisted in bringing the work to its completion. I have also received some form of assistance from the National Council for Arts and Culture for which I am also grateful.

Last, but not the least, I extend my appreciation to members of my family for their understanding, patience and perseverance throughout the duration of this work, particularly during my numerous field work trips. I salute the obstinacy of my children: Zahidatu, Wahidatu, Izaddeen, Abdulwahid and Khalifa Sulaiman, who had to sacrifice my presence in many instances when they

most needed it. To my wives, Hajiya Aminatu and Binta, I acknowledged their affection and understanding, especially under pressure of work when on many occasions I insist on 'having things' in my way despite other open options. I must singularly acknowledge, salute, and cheer the remarkable assistance of my brother, Hadi Sulaiman and my sister, Hajiya Aminatu, during my entire academic life. I also thank the goodwill of my numerous brothers and sisters for their moral support.

On a final note, I am grateful to all those who view this work and further research a collective responsibility.



## PREFACE

### 0.1 ABSTRACT.

The study is on the socio-economic policies and practices of the Sokoto Caliphate with particular reference to the Metropolitan districts in the period 1804 to 1903 A.D. The main thrust of the study is to examine the social and economic origins of the Caliphate so as to have insight into the social conditions that produced the economic programme of the Caliphate government. This endeavour involves looking into what the Caliphate government found to be the condition of the economy when it came into being, and the nature and significance of the policies it pursued in the light of the jihad ideals that informed the programmes of the Caliphate administration. Words and deeds are treated in the context of changes or lack of them in the social relations of production. Our intention is to illuminate the nature and significance of the socio-economic progress brought about by the Caliphate government in the Metropolitan districts of the Sokoto Caliphate.

Chapter one examines the political, social and economic structures of the political communities that formed the core of the genesis of the Sokoto jihad

movement. The chapter provides an insight into the political, social and economic conditions which the Caliphate leadership found in the area in which the Metropolitan Caliphate was to be situated. It further examines how the jihad movement was related to the contradictions in the social, economic and political structures of the politics of the Rima Basin area.

In chapter two, attempts are made to examine the economic programme of the Caliphate government. This focuses on the economic philosophy of the caliphal leadership that was propounded during the early years of the movement and the first four decades of the Caliphate. The chapter, thus, gives an insight into the social and economic basis of the Caliphate.

Chapter three examines the economic structures of the Metropolitan Caliphate. It focuses on the pattern of land tenure, the nature and pattern of agricultural development and animal husbandry. Attempts are made to examine the role of the state in land ownership and its resource use; forms of land acquisitions; the nature and growth of agricultural production; aspects of cultivation techniques, agrarian crisis and the nature of its management; as well as the changing nature in practices connected with pastoralism and animal

husbandry in the light of the sedentarisation policies pursued in the Metropolitan districts of the Caliphate.

In chapter four we treat the developmental framework of the crafts industries as the primes of the manufacturing sector of the economy. We thus examine the organisation and pattern of commodity production within the context of growth and development of industrial activity in the Caliphate. This chapter further discusses the nature of commercial activities, merchant capital, and the organisation and nature of professional groups; their services and role in the Caliphate's social production.

It is chapter five that examines the nature and significance of the institution of slavery and the slave labour in relation to the other forms of social labour in social reproduction of the caliphal system. This chapter critically examines the validity or otherwise of the use of the concept of the slavery mode of production, or any of its variants, in understanding the nature of the institution of slavery itself and the impact of slave labour in social production in the Caliphate. The chapter further discusses the nature of slaves' resistance and protest, the economics of slavery, as well as the nature and significance of the non-slavery forms of labour in social relations.

Chapter six is devoted to the general conclusion of our study. We therefore provide concluding remarks on the economic structure of the Caliphate, the Caliphate's social formation that illuminates the dominant productive relations, the nature of social relations and their changing pattern, as well as the nature of classes and their material basis within the caliphal system. We thus attempt to sketch out the substance of the nature of social development in the Caliphate, and its significance in relation to the strength and the weakness of the Caliphal arrangement in the nineteenth century.

## 0.2 RATIONALE OF THE STUDY.

The Jihad movements led by the scholar, Shehu Usman dan Fodio, in the last two and a half decades of the eighteenth century and the first decade of the nineteenth century, known to history as the Sokoto Jihad is one most studied historical movements of pre-colonial Nigeria. There is a fairly large number of published and unpublished works, notably post-graduate theses, on the Jihad movement, and on aspects of the Caliphate or its Emirates. But a great deal of these studies on the Sokoto Jihad and the Caliphate concentrated on the ideals of the movement or on political and administrative matters. Not much has been written on the economy of the Caliphate.

Our study therefore attempts to redress the imbalance, and is conceived with regards to both the practical political problems facing the Nigerian political community and the existing literature on the Caliphate that has not adequately addressed issues on the political economy of the Caliphate. Regarding its contemporary significance, a study of pre-colonial period, more especially the nineteenth century is not only important but imperative in any attempt to understand the direction of our country. Clearly Nigeria as a political entity emerged in the twentieth century largely from

the nineteenth century political communities. The largest of these was the Sokoto Caliphate which, at the time it had consolidated its territory, covered an area of approximately 240,000 sq. kilometres. When Nigeria continue to face acute economic and political crisis, manifesting themselves in the multi-faceted problems of political and social integration, our study of the social and economic substance of the pre-colonial political entities, on whose study our contemporary problems can be understood at more than superficial level, is therefore functionally important

At the level of the existing literature there is the greater need, perhaps more than ever before, for research studies that will enable us to come closer to grasp the political economy of the Sokoto Caliphate. Searching through the historiographical trend on the Caliphate, there is the need to examine not only the ideals of the Caliphate but the concrete practices of the state in social development.

The early works on the Caliphate, particularly S.J.Hogben's, *The Muhammadan Emirates of Nigeria* (London, 1930) attempt to trace the history of the Emirates of the Caliphate based on oral traditions. This work was later revised by Hogben and A.H.M. Kirk-Greene as, *The Emirates of Northern Nigeria* (OUP,

London, 1966). Both works are anchored on the hamitic hypothesis and are also deficient in any attempt to examine the social substance of the Caliphate system.

Thus the first major work on the Caliphate is H.A.S. Johnston's, *The Fulani Empire of Sokoto* (OUP, London, 1967). This work is the first major attempt by a colonial historian to grasp the Sokoto Caliphate as a whole. The author served as a colonial officer for over 20 years in Northern Nigeria during which he served as the Resident of Sokoto. He therefore had the opportunity of travelling within the area that once formed the core of the Caliphate, and also has the benefit of using some of the writings of the jihad leaders. Johnston's work contains some useful information particularly on political and administrative aspects of the Caliphate. His perspective, however, obscures the dynamics of the history of the societies in the Caliphate. He perceived the jihad movement as a racial/tribal struggle between the Fulani and the Habe ruling class in Hausaland as well as an 'alliance' of the Fulani and Hausa against 'pagan tribes' outside Hausaland and Borno. His chapter on trade and economy is both too sketchy and descriptive to examine the dynamics of the economy in the Caliphate.

Another major work on the Caliphate is Murray Last's, *The Sokoto Caliphate* (Longman, London, 1971). The work was originally written for a Ph. D. degree at the University of Ibadan. Last's work is essentially a political and administrative history of the Caliphate's headquarters. He heavily dealt with the ethnic composition of the followers of Shehu Usman and was particularly interested in the Islamic intellectual character of the Sokoto community. In this context Last dealt with the administrative structure of the Caliphate; giving a biographical information on its personnel including the emergence and development of the Vizerate in the Caliphate. In fact, his work was based on a close study of contemporary sources. Last was almost concerned only with Sokoto itself and formulated his conclusions principally by official sources, both written and oral, available to him in Sokoto. The perspective of Last's work, however, remains within the ethnic, Fulani/non-Fulani dichotomy.

A major breakthrough in the conceptual perspective of early major works dealing with the jihad and the Sokoto Caliphate was done in R. A. Adeleye's, *Power and Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria 1804-1906 - The Sokoto Caliphate and Its Enemies* (Longman, London, 1971). The book is the outcome of Adeleye's Ph.D. thesis



at the University of Ibadan. The study is on power relations within which it attempts a comprehensive political history of the Sokoto Caliphate. Adeleye does not perceive the jihad as a racial and tribal struggle but as a revolutionary movement in the context of the social dynamics of the *bilad al-sudan*.

Adeleye also attempted a close study of the contemporary sources. He paid particular attention to the Caliphate's defence arrangement *vis-a-vis* the imperialist encirclement and destruction of the Sokoto Caliphate. It is in this direction, however, that Adeleye's study offers little towards understanding the political economy of the Caliphate, even from a purely political dimension. For instance, Adeleye rightly examined the internal dynamics of the jihad movement that lay the basis for the emergence of a large political entity in an area, that until then, consisted of smaller polities. But he gave little prominence to the role of internal forces in the decline and destruction of the Caliphate. Thus, after examining serious internal problems in the Caliphate, Adeleye terminated the first part of his book with a conclusion that the fall of the Caliphate was entirely due to external forces (pp.112-113).

The main limitation of Adeleye's perspective is his romanticisation of the Sokoto caliphate. Adeleye, for

example, adequately and solidly examines the significance of the challenges to the Caliphate from within, culminating in the mahdist movement and Jibril's revolt in the Bauchi-Gombe region but he reduces these to the traditional expectation of the Mahdi among the "fanatics" (pp.108-109), while, on the other hand, the successes of the revolts against the Caliphal authority are attributed to the "intrinsic" weakness of the Caliphate defence arrangement. Adeleye's perspective in this manner does not facilitate grasping the basis of Sokoto's inability to organise the defence of the whole Caliphate; an endeavour that would have shown the basis of the challenges against the Caliphal authorities emanating from within the same Islamic ideology.

Another landmark in the study of the jihad movement and the Caliphate was effected at the Sokoto seminar held in Sokoto between 6th and 10th January, 1975. Twenty four of the twenty five papers presented were published in, Y.B.Usman (ed.) *Studies in the History of the Sokoto Caliphate* (Third International Press, Lagos, 1979). The main inspiration of the seminar is

"to look at the Sokoto jihad and the Sokoto Caliphate from an authentic point of view, quite distinct from the point of view

established by the colonialist historiography..."(p.xii).

The papers covered important themes, from the significance of the jihad to the economy of Hausaland, to urbanisation, intellectual activity, political and administrative organisation, external relation, diplomacy, and biographies.

Two papers were presented on the economy: Mahdi Adamu, "Distribution of Trading Centres in the Central Sudan in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries"; and Sa'ad Abubakar, "A Survey of the Economy of the Eastern Emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate in the Nineteenth Century". The first paper covers the wider region in which the Caliphate was centrally located, while the second paper relates to two emirates of the Caliphate: Muri and Fombina. Adamu's paper concentrated on the markets in the region, the eclipse of some existing ones and the development of new ones in response to the political transformations brought about by the Sokoto jihad. The paper dealt more with the commercial networks of the market centres. It is in this context that Adamu tries to treat the jihad as a major factor in the economic expansion in the area. Abubakar's paper on the other hand, is an attempt to illuminate some economic relations between the societies of the Middle Benue and those of the Upper Benue regions in

the eighteenth century as well as the intensification of these relations, as a result of the jihad, in the nineteenth century.

Both papers can be said to have attempted to deal with the commercial aspect of the Caliphate's economy. In a sense they contributed to our knowledge of commercial activities in the Caliphate. These papers did not however examine the crucial sectors of the economy of the Caliphate. For instance, none of the papers attempt to examine production and the relations of production, an understanding of which is fundamental to any attempt to comprehend the nature of the economy of any given human society

After the publication of the Sokoto seminar papers very little has been published comprehensively on the Caliphate. There are some major works on the intellectual history of the Sokoto Caliphate written by A. M. Kani. The earliest being, *The Intellectual Origin of Sokoto Jihad* (Imam Publication, Ibadan, 1984) that the author updated and was published in London. There are two other works, largely on the ideals of the Sokoto Caliphate by Ibrahim Suleiman: *A Revolutionary in History-The Jihad of Usman Danfodio* (Mensell, London, 1987) and, *The Islamic State and the Challenge of History* (Mensell, London, 1987). These works attempt to

examine the revolutionary tradition of Islamic movements as exemplified by the Sokoto Caliphate. But the treatment of the ideals of the Sokoto Caliphate was not followed by an examination of the actual practices in historical perspective. However only recently another major work on the Caliphate emerged.: A. M. Kani & K. A. Gandi, *The State and Society in the Sokoto Caliphate* (Gaskiya corporation, Zaria, 1990). The book contains all, but one, of the papers presented during the National Seminar on the 'The State and Politics in the Sokoto Caliphate' held in Usmanu Danfodio University, between 12th and 15th March 1989, as part of the activities to mark the coronation of the 18th Sultan of Sokoto. Three papers are classified under the sub-theme, which dealt with the Economy of the Caliphate. The general indication is still the need for concrete study of socio-economic dimension of the Caliphate.

There are however several published works on aspects of social and economic history of the Caliphate, or those that deal with the wider region in which the Caliphate was located. Most of the works in this category are unambiguously outside the scope of our task. In this category there is for instance J. P. Smaldone's *Warfare in the Sokoto Caliphate: Historical and Sociological Perspective* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1977), which is a study of warfare in the emirates that

constituted the Sokoto Caliphate; the emphasis being on military technology and military organisation. M. Adamu's, *The Hausa Factor in West African History* (A.B.U. Press, Zaria, 1978), is based on the social and economic relationship that developed between Hausaland and the rest of West Africa to the end of the nineteenth century. Specifically the main thrust of the work is on the history of Hausa people outside Hausaland including social and economic developments outside Hausaland in which Hausa people were involved. In essence however, neither the jihad nor the Caliphate was wholly a "Hausa" phenomena. His chapter on the Sokoto jihad as a factor in the expansion of Hausa commerce and culture does not examine the economy of the Sokoto Caliphate.

Another work: S. Baier's, *An Economic History of the Central Sudan* (OUP, London, 1980) is on the impact of the trans-Saharan trade on Sahel. The study focuses on Damagaram and Dameru. This work lacks direct bearing on the task in our hands. Perhaps the most informative and significant work in this category is M. Watts' *Silent Violence-Food, Famine and Peasantry in Northern Nigeria* (University of California Press, Berkeley & Los Angeles, 1983) that attempted a political economy of the Caliphate in chapter two, titled, "The Caliphate and Hausaland in the Nineteenth Century". This attempt

is one major recent attempts to articulate strong theoretical base for achieving a concrete analysis of the social nature of the Sokoto Caliphate. Watts attempt is still significant though a sketchy one chapter analysis. His main concern is on the development and the nature of famine in Northern Nigeria from the pre-colonial times through colonialism to the early 80s,. Watts, however, claims to have examined the Caliphate "as a single form of social reproduction" that he has not empirically established to the best of our knowledge. But the study contributed in advancing the theoretical framework for a concrete study of the Caliphate.

Apart from such published works, there are quite several research works, notably, post-graduate theses (some of which are published) on the jihad and the Caliphate. In articulating this study our main concern have been those research works written on the Caliphate, Metropolitan Caliphate or on the area or section of the Rima Basin. In fact, we do recognise that there are some theses on the Emirates of the Caliphate who treat the economy of emirates in varying details. However, none of these theses intended to sketch out a political economy of particular emirate so as to grasp the nature of the economy of the whole Caliphate. Some of such theses, few of which are published, provide some useful data for comparative analysis with the

Metropolitan Caliphate. Notable in this category are : Sa'ad Abubakar, "The Emirate of Fombina, 1809-1903: The Attempts of Politically Segmented People to Establish and Maintain a Centralised Form of Government" (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, ABU, 1970) that was published by the ABU Press, 1978 as *The Lamibe of Fombina*; M. G. Smith "Social and Economic Change Among Hausa Communities, Northern Nigeria" (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1950); Y. B. Usman "Transformation of Katsina, C. 1796-1903: The Overthrow of the Sarauta System and the Establishment and Evolution of the Emirate" (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, ABU, 1974) that was published by the ABU Press, 1978 as *The Transformation of Katsina, 1400-1883* ; and, M. Hamman "The Rise and Fall of the Emirate of Muri (Hamaruwa) C. 1812-1903" (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, ABU, 1983). The published versions of some of these theses did not differ in importance from the unpublished, with regards to our area of interests.

In addition, there are studies of specific sectors of the economy of the wider region in which the Metropolitan Caliphate was located that would provide us with some important information. In this category there is the study on Dyed-cloth by P. Shea. There are also studies on Kolanuts by P. E. Lovejoy, Blacksmith by



P. J. Jaggar, and Currency and Finance by M. Johnson. Many works in this category are mentioned in the bibliography.

In fashioning out our study, we are motivated by some research studies that are directly about our task. One of these is D. E. Ferguson's "Nineteenth Century Hausaland-Being a Description by Imam Imoru of the Land, Economy, and Society of his people" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California-Los Angeles, 1973). This work is based on a manuscript written by Imam Umaru of Kete-Krachi who was born in Hausaland in 1858, moved to the Volta Basin in 1891 and settled permanently there in 1896. He died in 1934. The work that is based on an 'internal' account by a knowledgeable contemporary, and to some extent an eye witness, contains valuable information on the economy of our area. In fact it contains the description of crops and cereals of our region, festivals associated with some economic activities as well as information on the nature of the craft industries, the market centres and long distance trade.

However, Ferguson's work has the serious limitation of the lack of any attempt to show changes over time. Thus, one wonders whether the description is only applicable to nineteenth century Hausaland,

especially given that the title of the dissertation is explicit about the time scope. Furthermore, the study does not take into cognisance the existence of the political entity over virtually the whole of Hausaland during the nineteenth century, known as the Sokoto Caliphate. In fact, there is no attempt to examine the role of the state in the lives of the people of Hausaland. Generally, the study does not transcend the level of informative description. It definitely lacks concrete historical analysis.

Another major study is Mahmud Muhammad Tukur's "Values and Public Affairs: The Relevance of the Sokoto Caliphal Experience to the Transformation of the Nigerian Polity" (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, ABU, 1977). An ambitious study it really is, attempts to grasp the nature of political crisis in Nigeria that the author believes to have its origin in the imposition of an alien political culture on the peoples of Nigeria. On the other hand, Tukur is of the opinion that the political cultures in the various pre-colonial polities contained socio-political values that would help Nigeria escape from the political crisis it was in, at the time of his writing. The subject of the study was the Sokoto Caliphate, which according to the author,

"represents the quintessence of  
four hundred years of interaction,

evolution, social change and development of all the human waves which traversed more than two-thirds of today's Nigeria" (p.6).

A study of the Sokoto Caliph system becomes imperative because in Tukur's opinion, Nigeria was

"still in search of a system which, based on a relevant philosophy of life, would enable it to develop effective integration mechanisms and to forge responsive and efficient institutions and a style of government which would facilitate the creation of a civil polity and the tackling of socio-economic problems in a manner harmonious with the world view, way of life and temperament of the general society" (p.1).

To this end therefore, Tukur attempts to examine the nature of political and social integration in the Sokoto Caliphate itself, from which Nigeria should derive its lessons.

Yet, in the study itself Tukur did not posit any framework for the concrete analysis and evaluation of the extent of political integration in the Sokoto Caliphate. In reality, romanticism took precedence over any analysis of the political economy of the Caliphate. At his best Tukur shows the ideals of the Jihad leaders in their writings because in his opinion, 'values have as their

subject matter the ideal life and how to come closer to it'. Tukur did not show how the Caliphate came closer to its ideals. Practically, Tukur only relates the various ideas of public administration to the writings of Shehu Usman dan Fodio, Abdullahi dan Fodio, and Muhammad Bello. In doing this, he is more or less concerned with the ideals of the Caliphate but, less with the concrete attempts to realise these values in the Caliphate. Above all this, the Caliphate with which Tukur has been concerned was only the Caliphate of Shehu Usman and Muhammad Bello.

However, a very useful contribution in the study of the social dimension of the Sokoto jihad was made in Saleh Abubakar's "Birnin Shehu, the City of Sokoto: A Social and Economic History C. 1809-1903" (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, ABU, 1982). This is a study borne out of the consideration that not much has been written about Sokoto town itself, nor about the social and economic history of the Sokoto Caliphate. Though a study specifically on the urbanisation process of the capital of the Sokoto Caliphate, equally provides a framework for the study of the history of settlements and the nature and dynamics of urban and social organisation in a specific historical context. It is in this direction that the study provides a useful conceptual framework in

grasping the dynamics of social and economic change generally.

But this study did not intend to cover even the Metropolitan Caliphate itself. It was primarily concerned with the social and economic organisation of only the settlement of Sokoto. Therefore to advance our knowledge towards understanding the socio-economic dimension of the Sokoto Caliphate, there is the need to articulate the wider region of the Metropolis, and to examine the role of the State in the socio-economic processes.

Another useful study that fully articulated the Rima Basin area not only as a useful unit of study but also as the immediate arena of the core of the Jihad movement and the Sokoto Caliphate is Abdullahi R. Augi's "The Gobir Factor in the Social and Political History of the Rima Basin, C. 1650-1808 A.D." (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, ABU, 1984). This work demonstrates that the concrete political and social forces of the Sokoto Jihad were rooted in the structure of the polities of the Rima Basin area. In fact the study transcended the conventional 'generalistic' approach that explained the core of the Jihad movement as simply lying in Hausaland. Our study borrows from this basis that guarantees concrete historical analysis.

However, our study becomes desirable because Augi examines only the socio-political dimension of the Sokoto jihad. The study did not attempt an economic history of the Rima basin. More importantly, the study did not treat the Caliphate era since it terminated at the very time when the Caliphate was to take shape. Furthermore, Augi's concluding remarks are particularly motivating. He contended that the Caliphate that was established did not fundamentally transcend the social and political order represented by the polities of the Rima Basin overthrown by the jihad forces (p.592). In addition, he further argues that the 'Gobir factor' manifested itself considerably in society and state in the Metropolis of the Sokoto Caliphate. These contentions therefore constitute a source of an attraction toward the political economy of the Metropolitan Caliphate.

### **0.3 NOTES ON SOURCES**

There are six categories of sources that we used in this study. The first category is the writings of the jihad leaders and other contemporary scholars. The second category is the travellers accounts, mostly European. The third category is the monographs of the colonial officials using the first two categories. Fourthly, we use the colonial Archive materials. Fifthly is the oral information we derived from personal interviews. The sixth category is the secondary works, both published and unpublished

We found these types of sources important in their ways. Their significance, limitation and versatility vary in respect to time, relation to the event and above all, the contextual clarity and the ideological configuration of the author. While we intend to examine the nature of our sources, a more detailed enumeration of our sources is done in the bibliography at the end of this work.

#### **a) Writings of the Jihad Leaders and Contemporary Scholars**

The writings of the jihad leaders and contemporary scholars mainly consist of the Arabic manuscripts written by the Caliphate leadership, particularly the Shehu Usman dan Fodio, Abdullahi dan Fodio, and Muhammad Bello. There are also other works

written by officials of the Caliphate such as Gidado dan Laima and Muhammad Buhari b. Ahmad. We have also consulted the works by the descendants of these latter two personalities, notably, Abdulkadir Machido b. Muhammad Buhari and the present Waziri of Sokoto, Junaidu b. Muhammad Buhari. We have also found useful the writings of some contemporary scholars, such as Abdulkadir b. Mustafa and Al-Hajj Said.

In fact, the works of the three most important personalities in the history of the Sokoto jihad and the Caliphate, namely, the Shehu Usman dan Fodio, Abdullahi dan Fodio and Muhammad Bello are indispensable to understanding the nature of the jihad movement as well as the nature of the Sokoto Caliphate and its ideals. Their works are the constitutional programme of the Caliphate that they established. And since our study is primarily centred on the official policies of the Caliphate leadership, the writing of these *mujahhidun* provide us with one most authoritative category of primary sources.

Fortunately the *mujahhidun* were not only social revolutionaries but also intellectual giants. Each of the three important personalities in the history of the Sokoto jihad movement and the Caliphate was a prolific writer of intellectual repute, and each one of them also



had as much as a hundred or more written works to his credit. Their writings covered several important historical themes on the study of *the bilād as-sudan* in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Most of the works of these jihad leaders have been edited and translated in published works and research theses. In our study we have made use of these edited or/and translated versions where we find it appropriate. For the works that are neither edited nor translated we have employed our basic knowledge of Arabic to make relevant notes with the help of Ahmad Muhammad Kani, formerly the Senior Research Fellow in charge of the Northern History Research Scheme (N.H.R.S.) of the Department of History, A.B.U. Zaria and now an Associate Professor of History at the Usmanu Danfodio University, Sokoto.

A comprehensive source of information on the nature of social and economic crisis in Hausaland during the closing decades of the eighteenth century, and the social basis of the policies and programme of the Caliphate leadership are three of the works written by the Shehu. These are the *Kitab al-farq bayn wilayat ahl al-Islam wa bayn wilayat ahl al-kufr* that was edited and translated by M. Hiskett in the *BSOAS*, Vol xxiii, 3, pp.558-579.; *the Misbah li ahl hadha al-zaman min ahl bilad al-sudan* that is unedited but a photocopy of the

Ms is available in the NHRS, P 188/3; and the *Anwa mal-Allah* that is also unedited but we have attempted its draft translation with the help of Ahmad M. Kani, but a photocopy of the Ms is available in the NHRS P 139/1.

Other works by the Shehu that have provided us with useful information are the *Ihya al-sunna wa ikhmad al-bld'a*, which, was edited and translated by T. A. Balogun in his unpublished Ph.D. thesis, London, 1967. This work deals with the instructions on social conducts on the people of the *bilad as-sudan* as well as on economic injustices of the ruling classes against the commoners. There is the *Masa'il muhimma yahtaj ila ma'arifati ha ahl al-sudan* that is unedited but there is a photocopy of the Ms in the NHRS P 139/2 ; K 6/20. The work also deals with the social atrocities of the ruling classes in the sudan. We also used the *Wathiqat ahl al-sudan* that was edited and translated by A. D. H. Bivar as "A Manifesto of the Fulani Jihad" and published in *JAH*, VOL II, 2, 1961, pp.235-243. The work deals with the justification and the mobilisation of the people of the Sudan to emigrate and fight against the existing corrupt kingdoms. The *Tanbih al-ikhwan* was translated by H. R. Palmer as "An Early Fulani Conception of Islam" and published in *JAS*, 52, 53 and 54, 1914-1915. Similarly the work deals with the mobilisation of the people of Sudan for the creation of new political and social order.

The same is true of Shehu's two other works: the *Kitab al amr bi al-ma'aruf wa al-nahy an al-munkar* that is unedited but a photocopy of the Ms is available in the NHRS P119/11; and *Kitab al-nasa'ih al-umma al-Muhammadiyah li bayan hukum al-firaq al-shaytaniyya*, whose photocopy of the Ms is available in the NHRS K 4/17. There are two works on the mobilisation of the people for emigration, explaining the programme of a Caliphate government as well eliciting obedience to the Caliphate authorities. These are the *Bayan wujub al-hijra wa tahrir muwalatal-kafara wa wujrib muwalatal-mu'mini al-umma* whose photocopy of the Ms is available in the NHRS P 194/9, and the *Bayan wujub al-hijra 'ala al-ibad wa bayan wujub nasbal imam wa iqamat al-jihad* that was edited and translated by F. H. El-Masri as part of his Ph.D. thesis, Ibadan, 1965.

Some works written by the Shehu also help to illuminate the nature of the initial problems faced by the Caliphate leadership. Such works include, the *Siraj al-ikwan fi ahamma ma yuhtaju fi hadha al-zaman* that deals with some of the economic problems, and the *Najm al-ikhwan yahtaduna bihi bi adhni Allah fi umur al-zaman* that was written as a rejoinder to Abdullahi dan Fodio's criticism of the social contradiction emerging in the Caliphate. Photocopies of both Mss are available in

the NHRS JM 1/24;K 4/11 and P 1/1; K 1/23 respectively.

We have also used other early works written by the Shehu, such as the *Nur al-albab.*, one major known work of the Shehu. This work has been published and translated by Ismail Hamet in *Revue Africaine*, Vol xli & Vol xlii, 7, 1898. There is also a photocopy of the Ms in the NHRS, P 7/8. This work deals with the social problems in Hausaland during the second half of the eighteenth century. Another related work by the Shehu is the *Bayan al-bida'a ala-shaytaniyya allata adhathaha al-nas fi ahwab al-milla al-Muhammadiyya*. The work is unedited as far as we are aware, but there is a photocopy of the Ms in the NHRS, P 8/10. This work also deals with the social evils in the Sudan.

The works of Abdullahi dan Fodio covered a wide range of interests. One of his earliest works the *Tazyin al-waraqat*, edited and translated by M. Hiskett, Ibadan University Press, 1963, is a valuable book on the general history of the Sokoto jihad movement. He wrote three major works on the principles and structures of Caliphate administration, and the code of conduct for political officers. These works are, the *Diya al-siyasat* that has been edited with an introduction by Ahmad Muhammad Kani into a bound copy in the NHRS Post-

graduate Library; the *Diya al-hukkam* that was edited and translated by Shehu Yamusa as part of his M.A. thesis, A.B.C./A.B.U.,1975 and is also translated into Hausa by Alhaji Haliru Binji as *Liya al-hukkam (Hasken Mahukunta)* and published by Gaskiya, Zaria, 1969; and, the *Diya al-sultan*, whose photocopy of the Ms can be found in the NHRS P 1/2.

The only major source on the land tenure policy of the Caliphate administration is contained in Abdullahi's work, the *Ta'alim al-radi ashab al-ikhtisas bi mawat al-aradi* that has been translated by Muhammad Sani Zahradeen as an appendix to his Ph.D. thesis, Mc Gill University, 1976. Similarly, another Abdullahi's work, the *Kifayat al-awam fi al-buyu'* deals with the Caliphate's policy on commercial transactions. A photocopy of the Ms of this work is available in the NHRS P 156/4.

Similarly, the works of Muhammad Bello covered a wide range of interests on the study of the Caliphate. We have used some of his works that are particularly indispensable in understanding the nature of the jihadists' programmes in the Metropolitan Caliphate. One of his earliest works is the *Infaq al-maisur fi ta'rikh bilad al-takrur* which is a comprehensive work on the Sokoto jihad movement; containing valuable data on the

genesis and course of the jihad movements in the Central Sudan. This work was edited by C. E. J. Whitting from three local manuscripts. There is also another edition done by a Committee of the Egyptian Ministry of *Awqaf* in 1964 at Cairo. Besides these two editions, there is another well known paraphrase and, in parts translation of the work by E. J. Arnett, titled, *The Rise of the Sokoto Fulani* (Kano, 1920). In addition, there is a Hausa translation of some parts of the *Infaq* by Sidi Sayudi Muhammad and Jean Boyd (Published for the North Western State History Bureau, 1974).

Bello's *Usul al-siyasa* contains information on the principles of political administration as conceived by the Caliphate leadership. This work was edited and translated with Abdullahi's *Diya al-hukkam* by M. Yamusa. Our study immensely benefited from two other Bello's works that dealt with explanation on some legal, social and political issues as well as provide a comprehensive information on the political, social and economic policies of the Sokoto Caliphate's administration. These are the *Shams al-zahira fi minhaj ahl al-ilm wa al-basira* and the *Al-gayth al-wabl fi sirat al-imam al-adl*. The first one is unedited but a photocopy of the Ms. is available in the NHRS P 195/3 and the second was edited and translated by Omar Bello as part of his Ph.D. thesis, London, 1983. In addition, two

other important works of Bello deal specifically with the social and economic programmes of the Caliphate. The *Tanbih al-sahib ala ahkami al-makasib* centred on mobilising the people to pursue a variety of economic activities, while the *Al-ribata wa al-hirasa* deals with urbanisation programme in order to enhance the security of the Caliphate and its economic growth. The *Tanbih* was edited and translated by O. Bello in *Almuntaka*, Paris, No.2, (Oct. 1983). *Al-ribata* is said to have been translated by Late Abdullahi Smith, but I have not yet seen a copy. There is, however, a photocopy of the Ms. in the NHRS P 12/2.

Other written works by contemporary scholars and other officials of the Caliphate are also found to be significant to this study. Some of these works contained valuable information, and are also important in corroborating certain information contained in other sources. Such works include the *Raud al-jinan fi dhikr ba'ad karamat al-Sheikh Uthman* and *Al-kashf wa'l bayan an ahwal al-sayyid muhammad Bello bn. Sheikh Uthman* by Gidado dan Laima. Both works were edited by Umar F. Malumfashi in his M.A. thesis, ABC/ABU, 1973; the *Taqayid minna wasala ilaina min ahwal umara al-muslimin salatim hausa* by Al-hajj Sa'id; and the *Ba'd akhbar hadhihi al-bilad al-hausiyya al-sudaniyya* (known as *Raudat al-afkar*) by Abdulkadir dan Mustafa.

Works written by the descendants of the Caliphate officials are also important in the study of the Caliphate. They generally provide a general history of the Caliphate highlighting the character and the 'achievements' of the Caliphs. Such works can be used to corroborate other sources of information. In this category are the *Ta'anis al-ikhwan* by Muhammad Buhari b Ahmad that has been translated by H. G. Harris (NAK KADCAP O/AR 1/3); the *Tafshir al-ikhwan* by Abdulkadir Maccido b Muhammad Buhari that is available in NAK SOKPROF 22/7; and the *Dabt al-maltaqatat* by Junaid dan Muhammad Buhari that has been translated into Hausa and published as *Tarihin Fulani* (NORLA, Zaria, 1957).

One basic limitation of these works written in Arabic, regarding our task, is their lack of equal interests in the practices of the Caliphate leadership. While the works of the jihad leaders and the contemporary scholars predominated in explaining the ideals of the Caliphate, those of the second generation did not balance the equation by providing needed information on the concrete practices of the leadership of the Caliphate in the light of those ideals. Any scholar engages in the study of the Caliphate who did not make



this fundamental distinction would fall into the serious problem of grasping the dynamics of the Caliphate.

### b) Travellers Accounts

During the nineteenth century, European travellers had at different times visited Sokoto and parts of the Metropolitan Caliphate, among others, and had written their accounts from which we derived useful information. Such accounts contain useful data on topography of the area, description of agricultural practices, animal husbandry, crafts industries, and commercial activities among other things. We found the accounts of Hugh Clapperton, Henry Barth and Paul Staudinger particularly important, primarily because, their accounts spread conveniently across the century. Clapperton visited our region during the third decade of the century, Barth visited the area in the middle of the century and Staudinger in the last quarter of the century. Taking all the accounts together, both in relation and in corroboration to each other, provides a comprehensive source of primary data on the impressions of the European travellers about the Caliphate.

These and other European travellers were very apt in describing what they saw but, essentially, most of them interpreted features of social organisation of our

area against the background of their cultures and ideological prejudices. In using this category of sources this consideration ought to be put in place in addition to all other means of assessing historical sources.

### c) Monographs by Colonial Officers

This consists of the histories compiled by the British colonial officers based on local traditions and sometimes based on the writings of the jihad leaders. Some of these accounts are found in the National Archives, Kaduna and the Sokoto State History Bureau. Although there are bits and pieces of accounts dealing with the history of our region, there are two comprehensive works that largely comprised of relevant materials in this category. The first is E. J. Arnett's *Gazetteer of Sokoto Province* that was published in London in 1920. The second is P.G. Harris' *Sokoto Provincial Gazetteer* that is unpublished Monograph compiled in 1934 into three volumes. These volumes are available, in a painfully shabby condition, in the National Archives, Kaduna. Volume I is in SNP 15 278, volume II in SNP 15 261 and volume III in SNP 15 279.

These monographs contain valuable information on the Geology of the region, systems of agricultural and livestock production, pattern of economic activities including attempted statistical information on human

and animal resources, as well as trades' groups in the region.

#### **d) Colonial Archive Records**

In this category we made use of the Intelligence Reports, Ethnographic Accounts, Provincial Reports, and the District Assessment and Re-assessment Reports. Similar to the preceding category of sources, the usefulness of relevant Archive materials depend largely on their descriptive information and sometimes useful statistical data. But generally we made use of the earlier reports, such as the district assessment and the re-assessment reports, the intelligence reports and other related accounts that go back into the nineteenth century in attempts to outline the basis of some historical trends.

#### **e) Oral Information**

We have employed oral interview in this study primarily to fill in the gaps created by other sources. We have also found oral data useful in corroborating other sources or check some information. However, in the course of our field work, it become clear that oral interview is becoming too expensive and highly commercialised. In addition, certain useful information is becoming irretrievable either because the informants

are fast becoming fewer and fewer or because it is increasingly becoming difficult to get people to volunteer information.

Over three hundred separate interviews were conducted, but only a fraction provided new or significant information that has been utilised in this study. During my interviews, it also became clear to me that a lot of the knowledgeable informants on the history of the Sokoto jihad and the Caliphate seemed to have been largely influenced by the jihadists' literature in the type of information they give.

#### **f) Secondary Works (Published and Unpublished)**

The secondary works that have been written on our region invariably determined our area of interest. Beside providing useful information for our study the existing secondary works informed the systematic framework on which this study is largely anchored.

#### **0.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY.**

This study spanned a period of six years in which all the research activities leading to this work were undertaken. Three major research activities have been employed in this work. The first is the Library research; the second is the field work aimed at recovering relevant Arabic manuscripts and to obtain relevant oral information; and, the third is Archival research

The preliminary research leading to the proposal for this study was based on library research. During this period we spent a little over two months compiling relevant bibliography using source materials in the NHRS Post-Graduate Library, the Arewa House Library and the main ABU Library, the KIL. After obtaining some bibliographical guidance we spent about six months reading through the available secondary materials and making notes. Before writing our main proposal we spent three weeks in the National Archives, Kaduna to find out the nature of the available archive source materials.

Following the extensive comments on our tentative proposal by the Supervisors, the Departmental Post-Graduate co-ordinator and some members of Academic

Staff (from which we benefited), the main proposal upon which this study is based was finally articulated.

We eventually spent a total of eight months at the National Archives, Kaduna and in the Arewa House Library between October 1986 and June 1990. We also spent three weeks in Sokoto consulting available materials in the Sokoto State History Bureau.

Field work was undertaken between September 1987 and June 1989 for purposes of obtaining oral information as well as recovering Arabic Manuscripts, all of which are eventually deposited in the NHRS. In the course of the field work we have visited numerous towns, which in the nineteenth century were part of the Metropolitan Caliphate. These towns include Anka, Bodinga, Dange, Dogon Daji, Dundaye, Gwadabawa, Gummi, Gusau, Kaura Namoda, Kware, Rabah, Sifawa, Talata Mafara, Tureta, Tambawel, Wamakko, Wurno and Zurmi. While we have been able to obtain some oral information in virtually all these areas, collection of relevant Manuscripts is confined to only Sokoto, Wamakko, Wurno, Gusau, Kaura Namoda and Tsafe.

For this work, reading, writing, thinking and field research have been simultaneously undertaken throughout its duration. In addition to the main Libraries in Nigeria, this work benefited from some

materials which are collected in Niger Republic at the OAU Centre for Oral Documentation in Linguistic and Historical Studies, Niamey in June 1991. At the time when the work was taking its final shape we have benefited from the materials consulted at the Oxford Centre For Islamic Studies, Queen Elizabeth House (International Development Library), Oxford, Oriental Institute of the University of Oxford, as well as the main University of Oxford Library, the Bodleian particularly the Rhodes House unit.

## CHAPTER ONE

# THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICS OF THE RIMA BASIN AREA IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

### 1.1 The Rima Basin Area

It appears desirable to define the geographical area on which this study is based. The main concern of this study is the Metropolitan region of the Sokoto Caliphate which later became the Sokoto Emirate. The Metropolis of the Caliphate was centred in the heartland of the Rima Basin. However, this Metropolis never included all the area of the Rima Basin. Therefore our major preoccupation here is an attempt on the outline of the area which produced the core of the Sokoto jihad movement that created the Sokoto Caliphate.

The Rima basin is located between lat.11<sup>0</sup> and 16<sup>0</sup> north and long.4<sup>0</sup> and 8<sup>0</sup> east.<sup>1</sup> In this sense the region

---

<sup>1</sup> M.A.Gill "Hydrological Characteristics of the Rima Basin", in *Savanna*, VOL.III, No.1, June,1974, p.61.Gill's definition was also accepted by Augi: A.R. Augi, "The Gobir Factor in the Social and Political History of The Rima Basin, C.1650-1808 A.D."(Unpublished Ph.D.thesis, A.B.U., 1984), p.4. However, the definition given by Saleh Abubakar put the Rima



extends northwards to the southern edge of the plateau of Azbin and southwards to the valley of the River Niger, of which the Rima is a tributary. On the west, the Rima Basin extends to the marshes of the Dallol Mauri in the present Niger Republic and in the east to the deserted plateau of western Katsina, where the major rivers of the Rima, notably the Gulbin Maradi, Bunsuru, Gagare, Sokoto, Zamfara and the Ka, originate.<sup>2</sup> However, the Gulbin Maradi flows into Niger Republic north of Jibiya and thus hardly contributes any flow to the Rima. The Basin has been estimated to cover approximately 193,000sq.kilometres of an area, which is now shared between Nigeria and the Republic of Niger.<sup>3</sup>

The usage of the term, Rima Basin, to refer to the area identified above has been justified elsewhere.<sup>4</sup> The Metropolitan Caliphate did not include all the area that has been defined as the Rima basin but the societies that formed this region had close historical relations with the

---

Basin roughly between parallels 10° N and 14° N and between Longitude 3° 31' and 7° 15' East. See S. Abubakar, "Birnin Shehu, the city of Sokoto: A Social and Economic History, C.1809-1903 A.D." (Unpublished Ph.D.thesis, A.B.U., 1984), p.1.

<sup>2</sup> Augi, *op.cit.*, pp 3-4.

<sup>3</sup> Gill, *Loc.cit.*

<sup>4</sup> See Augi, *op.cit.*, pp.3-15.

section that became the Metropolis during the period before the jihad and after.

## **1.2 General Physical Features of the Rima Basin**

The Rima basin consists of geological sub-regions.<sup>5</sup> The West and North of the region are occupied by sedimentary rocks, which can be divided into two series: the Bush series and the Rima series. The Bush series occupies the triangle between the Sokoto River, the crystalline rocks and the south-west flowing portion of the Rima River and all the area west of a line from the present Jega town and passing between the present towns of Tangaza and Gwadabawa, and extending westwards to the Niger. The Rima series are of three sub-groups, namely, the calcareous group, the clayshale group and the sandstone group, all of which are found all over the geological region.

The south-eastern part of the Rima Basin is an area of crystalline rocks (basement complex). This falls into three important classes: the platonitic rocks

---

<sup>5</sup> Our discussion here is largely based on the findings of D.C.Ledger, "Recent Hydrological Changes in the Rima Basin, Northern Nigeria, *Geographical Journal*, Vol.cxxvii, 4(1961); B.jones, *The Sedimentary Rocks of Sokoto Province*, (Geological Survey of Nigeria, Bulletin No.18, 1948); M.A.Gill, *op.cit.*; and, R.N.J.keay.*An Outline of Nigerian Vegetation*, (2nd Edition, Lagos, 1958).

characteristic of the areas along the Zamfara Valley near Anka and Takare, with further exposures east of Talata Mafara, between Maradun and Faru, and other areas around Danko, Moriki and Ruwan Jema; the Gneisses which form most of the area to the east and south east of Bungudu; and, the metamorphosed rocks of sedimentary origin stretching from near Anka westwards towards the sedimentary boundary.

The geology of the basin is of historical importance, although our knowledge is based on geological findings in the former Sokoto Province and the more recent geological reports.<sup>6</sup> Geological reports on the Sokoto Province contain significant information on the assemblage of vertebrate and invertebrate fossils found. The fossil reptiles found in the region suggest ancient historical developments or at least cultural connections with some ancient centres in Africa.<sup>7</sup> Some of the more recent geological reports found the basement complex to be devoid of any significant ground water storage, while in the other areas ground

---

<sup>6</sup> The first major geological report on the Province was collected by the Anglo-French, Niger-Chad Boundary Commission of 1904. The Geological Survey Department of the Colonial Northern Regional Government was established in 1927. See P.G.Harris, "Gazetteer of the Sokoto Province", memo., 1934, P.363.

<sup>7</sup> See *ibid.*, pp.369-373.

water storage is said to be in large but indeterminate quantities.

Generally the Rima basin is flat and gently rolling area. The general flatness is pierced locally by ridges and outcrops at many places. The head waters of the basin rivers located in the south-east, are situated at an elevation of 600-700 metres above the mean sea level; the largest part of the catchment being 300-450 metres above the sea, and the lowest area of the catchment of 300 metres being the *fadamu*.<sup>8</sup> The region is also dissected by numerous shallow drainage, and there are many rivers, streams, pools and other sources of surface water in the region, which have been of great importance in the life of the population of the area.<sup>9</sup>

The climate of the Rima basin is of the tropical continental type, which is essentially semi-arid with generally high temperatures throughout the year, and marked seasonal rainfall. The climate, however, varies from hot and dry in the northern part of the basin to the hot and humid in the southern part.

---

<sup>8</sup> Augi, *op.cit.*, p.14..

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p.15.

Two seasons are recognised for the whole region, that is the wet and the dry seasons. There is however some little variation in the duration of these seasons, between the northern part and the southern part of the basin. The rainy season usually starts in late May or the beginning of June in the northern part, although in a particularly dry year, the beginning of the rainy season may be delayed until the end of June. In the southern part, the rainy season begins earlier and ends later than in the northern part. The rainy season closes by the end of September generally, but rains may sometimes continue into October. The wettest months are July and August. The highest rainfall is generally received in the southern part.

The dry season covers the period between November and April. The maximum air temperature attained its highest reading in the month of April. From April to August, the maximum temperature decreases progressively, it records another high reading in the month of November, soon after the end of the rainy season. In December-January, the temperature falls to another low reading due to the harmattan. The minimum temperature generally has its highest value in May decreasing to a low value in August. The lowest minimum air temperature is generally recorded in

December-January. The nature of air temperature has some significance for human life in the region. This is connected with human diseases associated with the climate during the hot periods.

In terms of the river system, the major tributaries of the Rima are the *Gulaben* Maradi, Gagare, Bunsuru, Shalla, Gawon Gulbi, Sokoto, Zamfara and Ka. The *gulbin* Maradi, as mentioned earlier, flows into the Niger Republic and hardly contributes much to the Rima. Similarly the Gawon Gulbi, though draining an appreciable area, also contributes little to the basin and disappears into marshes and pools.<sup>10</sup>

In terms of vegetation, the whole of the Rima basin falls within the Savanna type, with varying features however. Three major savanna zones have been identified in the region. The northern guinea savanna lies in the extreme southern parts, particularly in the Dendi region and the extreme southern parts of Zamfara. The sudan savanna covers the greater part of our region around the central plains, while the sahel savanna covers the extreme northern parts, particularly in parts of Arewa, Zabarma, Konni, Adar and Gobir. In addition, within each vegetation zone, there exist local variations

---

<sup>10</sup> Gill, *op.cit.*, p.64.

especially between the vegetation in the valleys and that in upland areas.

In view of the geological and the topographical features of the Rima basin, the region can be discussed in terms of six sub-regions. These are the Northern plains; the South-Eastern Rima Basin; the Central plains; the Gulbin Kebbi region; the Dendina region; and, the Dallol region.

The Northern plains consist of Adar, Konni and Gobir Tudu. This section due to its more northerly latitudes is generally drier than areas in the south and south-east of the basin. The vegetation here is mostly of the sahel savanna type.

The south-eastern section formed the eastern parts of the kingdom of Zamfara as well as the south-western part of the kingdom of Katsina; the area known as the Katsina *laka*. This is the crystalline rock area, where most of the tributaries of the Rima originate. The climate here is more favourable in terms of the annual distribution of rainfall. The soils are sandy and brown in colour, relatively fertile.

The central plains include southern Gobir, eastern Kebbi and the western parts of Zamfara. This section of the Rima is climatically more favourable than the

northern plains. The vegetation is mainly of the sudan savanna type.

The Gulbin Kebbi region consists of the stretch of the River Rima that lies between its confluence with the Sokoto river near the town of Wamakko in the north and the point at which it joins the River Niger in the south. The valley and the region immediately around it formed the core of the kingdom of Kebbi. The Gulbin Kebbi is characterised by a varying width of *fadama*. The river and its *fadama* has for long time influenced the local economy of the sub-region.

The sub-region of Dendi, forming the extreme south-western part of the Basin, is bounded in the north by the Gulbin Kebbi region and the Dallol, in the south by the region of Borgu, in the east by *kasar Yawuri*, while in the west it shares borders with the Songhai region. The Niger valley in the region has been very significant for its population. The Valley provides pastures for considerable animal population during the dry season, while the alluvial soils and adequate supply of rainfall ensure the opportunity for cultivating a variety of food crops.

The region of the Dallol consists of the Dallols Mauri, Fogha and Bosso (Boboye). Climatically the region varies with a decreasing duration of the wet season



northwards. The vegetation is of the sudan savanna type overlapped with the sahel type in the arid areas of the northern parts. The striking features of this section are the dallols: wide flat-bottomed valley on either side of which rise massive cliffs forming the edges of the plateau of the region. The dallols run parallel to one another in a north-south direction joining the River Niger in the region of Dendi. The dallols are the most important sources of water supply and contain the most fertile soils of the region as well as salt deposits particularly in the Dallol Fogha.

It should be very clear from the foregoing discussion that our region is geographically diverse. In simple terms, such a diversity is likely to form the basis of cultural diversity of the area. But differences in geological and topographical features of the sub-regions notwithstanding, the close historical affinity of the region is not in question. Augi has shown that variations within the Rima basin were not sharp enough to divide the region culturally.<sup>11</sup> Rather, in the region there developed similar cultural traits, the most important being a similarity in material production, which has been facilitated by migration and settlement of people between different sections of the region. In fact, regional

---

<sup>11</sup> Augi, *op.cit.*, p.40.

variations in Rima reinforced local economic specialisations that, in its turn, promoted commercial relations between the different sections of the area.

The historical unity of the Basin, in the sense of uniform patterns of social production and commercial relations, is also a reflection of the distribution of natural resources within the region. The Rima basin area is endowed with varying degree of fertile agricultural land. In the whole of the region, one type of crop or another is grown. In the alluvial soils of the *fadamu*, which are the most fertile soils of the area located in the river valleys of the region, are centres of rice production and dry season agricultural production. The *fadamu* areas are also important to pastoralists because of their rich supplies of pasture during the dry season. The *fadamu* areas were for a very long time before the jihad, centres of significant developments in the Rima.<sup>12</sup>

In addition, other types of soils were also agriculturally important in the area. This is more particularly true of the sandy brown soils (*jigawa*), which are the most widespread in the Rima Basin. It is in these soils that the most common crops of the region, notably, millet, guinea corn and beans are grown. In the

---

<sup>12</sup> R.K.Udo, *Geographical Regions of Nigeria*, (London, 1974), P.174.

clayey soils (*laka*), especially in the extreme south-eastern part of the basin, that is, in Zamfara and the adjacent areas of Katsina *laka* the industrial crops, namely cotton and indigo were grown in addition to the common crops.

The Rima Basin area is also endowed with many sources of water. The rivers of the region are the most important sources of water in the area, for man and animals. Gulbin Rima, Gulbin Kebbi and Gulbin Maradi contain surface water throughout the year. Other sources of drinking water were the numerous wells usually dug in the valleys, while lakes or ponds, which are normally numerous during the rainy season, provide other sources of surface or near surface water.

However, due to the climatic conditions in the area, the availability of the sources of the supply of water resources falls into two conditions. In the semi-arid conditions of the northern parts of the region, particularly in Gobir Tudu, sources of water are scarce. In the southern parts, conditions are more favourable. Generally the region is endowed with ground water, particularly in the section of sedimentary rocks that formed the greater part of our region.

The availability of pasture and the fact that the region is practically free from the scourge of tse-tse

flies, accounted for the animal resources of the Rima basin. As a result, animal husbandry developed as a major economic pursuit of man in the region. In the Rima area, therefore, are found many types of animals that include cattle, sheep and goats, camels horses and donkeys, as well as civet cats and ostriches among others.

In the Rima Basin, forest resources and wild animals were of economic significance to the population of the area. A number of forest types were represented in this tropical region. This included scrub and thorn on the ironstone plateaux and arid sands; Rivera thickets on the inundated flash; stunted orchards on the strong areas; park forests on the plains; higher storeyed forests on the richer levels; dense thickets with large timber along the streams; intensive fan palm belts on the wide river plains; and, palm and clunys of bamboo in the swamps.<sup>13</sup> The forests supply a variety of materials for human and animal uses. From the forests are obtained for fuel, fibres, fruits, grasses, fodder, gums and resins, medical extracts, vegetable products, timber for building and for canoes, and other agricultural implements. In the region, the famous Gundumi bush abounded in tall trees and presented the appearance of a real "forest".

---

<sup>13</sup> Harris, "Gazetteer...", *op.cit.*, p.335.

The Rima basin possess mineral resources, the most notable being iron ore and salt. In the central Rima basin there exist iron ore deposits, in the area between the town of Gada in the north and around Dogon Daji in the south east.<sup>14</sup> Another deposit is identified in the Goronyo district.<sup>15</sup> There existed another deposit in the Gobir-Adar borderlands, around the site of Birnin Lalle, and some areas in the eastern parts of Gobir.<sup>16</sup> There are other important deposits in the ancient settlements of Zamfara, particularly around Damaga, Karakai, near Faru and around Tureta.<sup>17</sup> Other sources of iron ore have been identified in Kebbi, Zabarma as well as in Arewa.<sup>18</sup>

The most important deposits of salt are in the Dallol Fogha in the south-western part of the Rima Basin.

---

<sup>14</sup> Jones, *op.cit.*, pp.61-62; Augi, *op.cit.*, p.49.

<sup>15</sup> C.L.Temple (ed.) *Notes on the Tribes, Provinces, Emirates and States of the Northern Nigeria*. (2nd Edition, London, 1965), p.543.

<sup>16</sup> Augi, *loc.cit.*

<sup>17</sup> G. Na-Dama, "The Rise and Collapse of a Hausa State: A Social and Political History of Zamfara", (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, ABU, 1975), pp.33-34.

<sup>18</sup> E. W. Bovill, *The Golden Trade of the Moors* ( OUP, London, 1968), p. 240; M.B.Alkali. "A Hausa Community in crisis: Kebbi in the Nineteenth Century" (Unpublished MA thesis, ABU, 1969), p.25.

Other sources of salt have also been identified in Kebbi around Suru and Raha.<sup>19</sup> Another related mineral, natron, exist in the Rima around the region of Zabarma and in some areas in the confluence of the Gulbin Maradi, Rima, Bunsuru and Gagare.<sup>20</sup> The *fadamar* Kanwa possesses some deposits of natron which is used for human consumption.<sup>21</sup>

Although there is no evidence of gold mining in the region before the twentieth century, gold is said to occur in all the rivers draining the crystalline rocks.<sup>22</sup> The gold within the region is mainly alluvial and is confined to the actual river beds. Areas of gold are the River Molendo, the Zamfara Valley about 41 kilometres between Bukkuyum and Anka, the River Ka, the Marere area in Gusau district and some areas around Maru, Maradun and Bungudu.

Agricultural production in our region is dependent upon the climate and the distribution of the rainfall. Studies have shown that the climate of the Rima Basin is the result of the interplay of two different air masses:

---

<sup>19</sup> Alkali, *loc.cit.*

<sup>20</sup> Augi, *op.cit.*, p.50.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>22</sup> Harris, *loc cit.*

the moist tropical maritime airmass from the Atlantic and the dry continental airmass from the Sahara.<sup>23</sup> The zone of convergence, the inter-tropical discontinuity (ITD) migrates north and south bringing an alteration of rainy and dry seasons. For much of the year the ITD lies to the south of the Rima Basin when dry north-easterly air, or harmattan, predominates. But when the ITD moves northwards, it is accompanied by disturbance line, thunderstorms and followed by more continuous rain.

The general trend of annual rainfall distribution is one of greater rainfall in the south (1,008 mm) with an onset of the rains around March, while further north Sokoto town has an average of 740 mm, which drops to 658 mm at the northerly edge, where the rains do not start until June and in some years finish by mid-September. Studies on average rainfall figures in the region say little of the reliability, cyclical patterns, and daily and monthly distribution of rainfall within any one season. One important characteristic of the ITD is its irregularity; generally it advances north at about 160 km per month and retreats at about 320 km, which

---

<sup>23</sup> The discussion on the climatology of the Sokoto-Rima basin is based on the studies of K. Swindell, *Soil and Water Survey of the Sokoto Valley, Nigeria*, (FAO, Rome);-"Population and Agriculture....", *op.cit.*

means the end of the rains is abrupt compared with the onset. However, this general trend varies; the annual total rainfall, its incidence and distribution can be very different from one year to the next.

Most rain occurs during relatively short but intense thunderstorms covering only small areas, and this is particularly so at the beginning and the end of the rains. Days without rainfall in the rainy season are common and, also, their number and frequency alter from year to year. Heavy rainstorms at the beginning of the wet season fall on land with little or no vegetational cover; run off is intense, with associated damage of valley and hill slopes and their soils through hill and gully erosion. Hence a more evenly distributed rainfall throughout the wet season is preferable, and thus an annual rainfall as little as 500 mm has produced better crops than a high rainfall of 750-1,000 mm, which is poorly distributed in time and space.

Agricultural production on the plains is dependent on local rainfall during the wet season, but cultivation of the floodplains, *fadama*, is related to rainfall and run-off in the upper Sokoto-Rima Basin. The drainage density and run-off are high on the basement complex rocks of the high plains and the streams carry large amount of sediment when they flood. On entering the level plains,



the rivers deposit large amounts of sediment along the *fadama*. The slow moving rivers on the plains and the sedimentation slow the pulse of water, which are transmitted downstream from the hills after storms; water is stored in the alluvial tract, which is of great importance for the cultivation in the dry season. During the dry season most rivers and streams cease to flow; the main streams shrink towards the end of December, leaving pools and lagoons, and the Niger, Rima and lower Zamfara are truly perennial. On the sedimentary rocks and superficial deposits of the adjacent plains, some pools and shallow wells may remain into the dry season, where there are perched water tables.

However even though the temperatures of the dry and wet seasons may sharply vary, it is obviously the seasonal distribution of rainfall and occurrence of localised water in the dry season which are of particular importance for agricultural production and animal husbandry in the region. But while the distribution of rainfall and water resources play the primary role, political factors also influence their patterns in social production.

### 1.3 The Polities of the Rima Basin

The three most important polities that will be considered here are Kebbi, Zamfara and Gobir. These

polities formed the core area of the Sokoto jihad movement as well as the Metropolitan Caliphate that was established as a result of the movement. These kingdoms formed the arena of the intense jihad activities which later spread to the wider Central Sudan region. Gobir was the home kingdom of the central figures of the jihad movement. Zamfara also served as the second home of the jihad leaders on account of the long periods that the Shehu spent there preaching. Kebbi was the third home of the Shehu, in terms of his preaching tours and the success he recorded there. In fact, it was in the kingdom of Kebbi that the event (the attack on Gimbana), which precipitated the jihad campaigns took place. The capital of the kingdom itself, Birnin Kebbi, was also the first major town in *kasar Hausa* to fall to the jihadists in 1805.

Three important studies have emerged on the social and political history of these polities before their overthrow by the jihad forces.<sup>24</sup> Therefore our intention here is simply to summarise the genesis and nature of these geopolitical entities. By this we hope to provide some basis for a subsequent understanding of the programmes of the jihad movement that overthrew these polities.

---

<sup>24</sup> Alkali, *op.cit*; Na-Dama, *op.cit*; and Augi, *op.cit*.

## **Kebbi:**

At the time it emerged as a state, Kebbi comprised all the land of the Gulbin Kebbi, that is, the area contained within the Basin of this river from its junction on the Niger up stream to the point it met the Gulbin Kaba. The state consisted of several clans. As part of the developments leading to the emergence of state structures in the area of the Gulbin Kebbi, was a series of migrations particularly of the Sarkawa. Similarly a number of Fulani clans had immigrated into Kebbi, especially in the fertile Dallol Fogha and the Dallol Bosso (Boboye). Both the Sarkawa and the Fulani had, by the last quarter of the eighteenth century, become part of the social and political fabric of the Kebbi society.

In Central Sudan, there was always a gap between the peopling of an area and the emergence of state structures in that area.<sup>25</sup> Thus, the area of Kebbi had been peopled before the first Millenium A.D., but it was between the eleventh and the fifteenth centuries that the area received waves of migration. However the emergence of state structures in Kebbi was a sixteenth century development.

---

<sup>25</sup> See A. Smith, "Some Considerations Relating to the Formation of States in Hausaland", *JHSN*, Vol I, 3 Dec.1970, pp329-346.

Between the eleventh and the fifteenth centuries, the political organisation of the Gulbin Kebbi area centred on the authority of the *Magaji*, a clan-head. The *Magaji* usually bore the title of some distant ancestor of the family around which the clan developed. The *magajis* who performed both administrative and religious functions of their respective clans, were completely independent of one another. However, common interests between the *Magajis* could develop.

The *magaji* system is said to have undergone some changes when the element of a serious economic competition was introduced. This was climaxed with the arrival of fresh waves of Sarkawa migrants from the Songhai region. This group with its superior techniques in farming and fishing attracted a large population of the already settled Sarkawa upstream. The Sarkawa in the upper Gulbin Kebbi were said to have refused to recognise the authority of the *Magajis* in whose territorial waters they were operating. The Sarkawa, however, recognised the authority of the descendants of one *Magaji* Alfa. Thus, with this cross-clan influence by one single clan, which was facilitated by the changing nature of social relations, state formation had started. Furthermore, with the emergence of some *birane* in the area, the *Magajis* reacted to the Sarkawa challenge by

the grouping of many *Magajis* into a few *birane*. This development permitted the emergence of group worship by clans belonging to the same *iskoki* belief system. This was to reinforce the process of centralisation, which was already taking place.

It was in the midst of these political crises that the Songhai occupation of Kebbi took place without a single battle. The Songhai simply established their presence through military outposts at Sakwa and Augi, where their representative, Dangara, was stationed. This development seemed to have escalated the hostility between Sarkawa and the Hausa population, leading to a popular uprising against Dangara. It was in this situation that Kanta, once a *barde* (captain) of the Songhai imperial forces and later a *de facto* Governor of the Sub-Province of Kebbi rose and unsettled the balance.

Muhammad Kanta who flourished between 1516 and 1554 A.D. is regarded as the founder of the kingdom of Kebbi. According to Alkali, the rebellion of Kanta can not be said to have immediately created the Kebbi state. However, the significance of the rebellion and events subsequent to it was that it caused a redefinition of political power. A new pattern of relationship between Kanta and the other *Magajis* had to be found since the success of the rebellion, and the exit of the Songhai

power from the area of the Gulbin Kebbi, had centralised command, and thus leadership, of all the *Magajis* in the hands of one person. While the emergence of Kebbi was a gradual process, the rise of Kanta simply represented its end product. With the emergence of new political arrangement, Kanta assumed the title of *Sarki*.

Between 1554 and 1722 A.D. the Kebbi *sarauta* system developed its internal contradictions as well as attracted external threats. By 1722 Surame, the capital of the ruling dynasty, the Lekawa, was sacked after repeated military expeditions by Ahir, Gobir and Zamfara. Between the fourth decade of the eighteenth century and the outbreak of the jihad wars, the power of Kebbi resurfaced in the west, at Birnin Kebbi. By the end of the eighteenth century Kebbi had recovered from the defeat it had suffered only to be sacked by the jihad forces in 1805.

#### **Zamfara:**

The state of Zamfara seems to have clearly emerged by the first decade of the sixteenth century. At the height of its power, the kingdom comprised all the areas covered by the *Gulaben* Bunsuru and Gagare, two of the major tributaries of the Rima. It had expanded up to the Rima area in the north, while to the south it extended to the borders of *Kasar Katsina* along the *Dajin*

...rugu, and to the north-west of the area along the *dajin* Gundumi cutting across the middle Sokoto river down to the River Ka, and merging with the dense forest to the south.

The emergence of state structures here revolved around the emergence of Birnin Zamfara, the abode of the *Sarautar* Zamfara. The evolution of Birnin Zamfara was connected with the ancient settlements that existed in the area, notably, the ancient settlements of Dutsi, Fata, Kiawa, Tsohuwar Banaga and Tozai; areas that are said to have been peopled since the pre-iron age.<sup>26</sup> These settlements had been founded either near the iron ore sites, inselbergs or near other prominent rocky areas. Besides the protection offered by these rocks, they, in addition, seem to have played a very important role in the religious lives of the people.

It is important to note that Birnin Zamfara did not emerge directly from one of these settlements. Similarly, some of these settlements never become some of the great *birane* of Zamfara. Na-Dama argues that Dutsi did not emerge as a great *birni* because the cultivable area around the settlement was not large enough to accommodate a large population. Birnin Zamfara, on the

---

<sup>26</sup> R.C.Soper. "Stone Age in Northern Nigeria", *JHSN*, No.1, 1964, p.191.

other hand, evolved as a result of immigration, which was encouraged from the ancient settlements as well as from other areas in the Rima basin and beyond. Unlike the ancient settlements, Birnin zamfara was located in the lower plains flanked for miles by an extensive belt of *fadama* containing very rich clay loams suitable for the cultivation of a great variety of crops. The emergence of Birnin Zamfara was particularly significant for the development of unified political authority within the area.

There is little material on either the emergence of the office of Sarkin Zamfara, or on the early rulers of the kingdom. It has been suggested that the first six rulers of Zamfara reigned at Dutsi, and that the emergence of the office of Sarkin Zamfara was connected with the control of the powerful spirit known as *iskan gidan Daka*, (the spirit of the house of Daka); Daka being the first ruler of the *birni* spirit. The spirit was regarded as the protector of the entire people within the kingdom. But the authority of Sarkin Zamfara *vi-a-vis* the other important *sarakuna* in *kasar* Zamfara took a very long time to become fully institutionalised. Perhaps the earlier *Sarakuna* of Zamfara, based at Birnin Zamfara, were merely first among equals in relation to *Sarakuna* of Kiawa, Jata, Kaya and Gora, all of whom had their own



local sources of legitimacy that were not directly dependent on Zamfara or its dynasty.

The emergence of the office of Sarkin Zamfara led to the evolution of *Sarakunan gargajiya* and other important state officials. The kingdom of Zamfara prospered from the early sixteenth century until the second half of the eighteenth century when Birnin Zamfara was sacked by the Gobirawa, and a substantial northern part of the state was incorporated into the Gobir kingdom. With the collapse of Birnin Zamfara, at around 1757 A.D., there emerged a number of powerful principalities in Zamfara most of whom continued to actively resist Gobir's hegemony until the outbreak of the jihad.

### **Gobir:**

The kingdom of Gobir would seem to have emerged much earlier than Kebbi and Zamfara, but unlike either of the two it did not enjoy a continuity in a defined territory. Augi has shown that the central institution of what became the kingdom of Gobir, that is, the *Sarautar* Gobir, probably emerged in the southern sahara in Azbin or Bilma. But it is uncertain when the territory of the *Sarakunan* Gobir emerged nor the location of its capital. Similarly, it is not possible to determine the precise territorial control of the

*sarakunan* Gobir in Azbin region. It would however appear that the influence of the *Sarakunan* Gobir in Azbin might have been confined mainly to areas in the south-eastern part of the region, around which the available traditions of Gobir mention Gobirawa settlements and their capital(s).

The stability of the state of Gobir in Azbin appears to have been in question. Gobir traditions mention the establishment of a number of political centres by the Gobirawa. These developments were sequel to population pressure and commercial expansion in Azbin, in response to the changing material conditions in the region. Furthermore, the eventual considerable migrations of the Temasheq speaking groups into the region culminated into conflicts between them and the Gobirawa over land and its resources. These conflicts however, were also prevalent among the Tuaregs themselves leading to the establishment of the Sultanate of Agades by a section of the Tuaregs. But conflicts between the Tuaregs and the Gobirawa was what occasioned the southward movement of the latter.

The southward migration of the Gobirawa led to the eventual establishment of the capital of the Gobir kingdom at Birnin Lalle, in the Tarka-Kaba region (Gobir Tudu). The capital was located on a site overlooking a

tributary Valley of the Gulbin Tarka and close to a major lake, which, Augi says, contains water for much of the dry season. However there is no adequate information about Birnin Lalle in particular and the kingdom of Gobir in general during the period when the state had its capital in this city.

Birnin Lalle prospered between C.1450 and 1650 A.D. The capital seem to have been an important commercial centre linking Azbin and the Rima Basin region. The city was located on a direct route coming from Agades through Maradet and Gadabeji, and then to the Gulbin Maradi Valley and other areas of the central Rima Basin. The period between the mid fifteenth century and the mid sixteenth century was an era of Islamic expansion along with commercial and political developments in the central savanna region generally.

Towards the close of the seventeenth century, the centre of the political gravity of the kingdom shifted further south from the Tarka-Kaba region into the *Gulbin* maradi region in the central Rima Basin. This southward migration was among other things, primarily facilitated by environmental conditions in the Tarka region, which was prone to drastic draught due to the general arid conditions of the area. On the other hand, the central Rima Basin formed by the Valleys of the

*Gulaben* Maradi, Bunsuru, Gagare and Sokoto, was by the mid seventeenth century attracting various groups of people from other parts of the Rima Basin and beyond because of the great wealth of the area, which was already being effectively exploited by the states in the region, particularly Zamfara.

Having migrated out of Gobir Tudu, the *Sarakunan* Gobir established themselves first at Birnin Magale. This city, which was situated on the northern bank of the Gulbin Maradi, is said to have been founded by Sarkin Gobir Muhammad Mai Gicci. However, with the sack of Birnin Zamfara around the year 1757 by the Gobirawa, Birnin Alkalawa became the capital of Gobir. Birnin Alkalawa therefore served as the capital of Gobir from about 1757 to 1808, when it was in its turn, sacked by the jihad forces, who then established their own capital at Sokoto, within the territory of the former kingdom of Gobir.

#### b) Political System

We are, here, concerned with the political system of the kingdoms we have just outlined. The state machinery was, by the mid eighteenth century, headed by the *Sarki*. This title was applied as Sarkin Kebbi, Sarkin Zamfara or Sarkin Gobir. The authority of the *Sarki* over the state was generally derived from his

claim to being a descendant of the first *Sarki*, although certain developments may tamper with this arrangement. For instance, in Kebbi, aspirants to this office at first must simply belong to the Lekawa family, but by the end of the eighteenth century this aspiration had only been limited to the senior members of the two main Lekawa groups.<sup>27</sup> Similarly, in Gobir during the Alkalawa period, *Sarakuna* of Gobir drew their authority from their military supremacy as exemplified by the destruction of Birnin Zamfara. Therefore, aspirants to this office were limited to the house of sarkin Gobir Ibrahim Babari, who was responsible for achieving this military feat, and who was even said to have drawn guidelines for succession to the office of the Sarkin Gobir.

Generally the *sarki* was assisted by a council of electors. The duty of this council was, above all others, to choose a successor to the office of *Sarki*. The powers of the members of this council, popularly referred to as *Sarakunan Karaga*, was highly pronounced. In Zamfara and Gobir, this council was made up of nine officials. In addition, seven of the nine official in both states had similar titles and to a considerable extent, similar duties

---

<sup>27</sup> Alkali, *op.cit.*, pp.97-98.

as well.<sup>28</sup> In both states also this council was referred to as the *Tara*, i.e. *Taran Zamfara* or *Taran Gobir*, as the case may be. In Kebbi however, such a council consisted of seven officials including three members in an advisory capacity.<sup>29</sup> The selection of a new *Sarki* involved some crucial consultation with the *iskoki*, while appointment to the office was accompanied by state rituals.

The *sarakunan Karaga*, whose leading members constituted the council of electors, might include other notable official of the central administration. In Kebbi, Galoji and Magajin Sangeldu, were among the notable state officials.<sup>30</sup> In Gobir, there were important state officials like the Sarkin Azbin who dealt with the affairs of the Tuaregs, the Sarkin Fulani who dealt with the affairs of the pastoralists, and the Sarkin Kanwa dealt with the affairs of salt and natron merchants especially the Barebari.<sup>31</sup> In Zamfara, the *Liman* is said to have

---

<sup>28</sup> These officials were the Sarkin Rafi, Sarkin Tudu, Ubandawaki, Magajin Gari, Sarkin Kaya and Sarkin Bazai. Augi, *op.cit.*, p.432; Na-Dama, *op.cit.*, p.340.

<sup>29</sup> Alkali, *op.cit.*, p.98.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>31</sup> Augi, *op.cit.*, p.429.

emerged as a powerful state official because of the prestige attached to the office.<sup>32</sup>

The third category of officials in the State's administrative machinery were the *Sarakunan garuruwa*, the provincial chiefs. This category of chiefs maintained a considerable autonomy from the central authority in their states. In fact the *Sarakunan Garuruwa* seem to have been the life-wire to the stability of these states because of their direct contact with the populace. They were also the main suppliers of the military force in times of need. Some of them were also great commanders. In Kebbi, a *Sarkin gari*, Kunduda emerged the commander-in-chief of the army of the state.<sup>33</sup> Some of the *sarakunan garuruwa* also emerged as members of the leading councillors of state and thus kingmakers in their respective states. In Kebbi, there was the example of Kunduda, and in Zamfara, Sarkin Bazai and Sarkin Kaya emerged as members of the *taran Zamfara*.<sup>34</sup> The considerable power wielded by the *Sarakunan Garuruwa* could constitute a serious problem to the central authorities of the states especially in times

---

<sup>32</sup> Na-Dama, *op.cit.*, p.343.

<sup>33</sup> Alkali, *op.cit.*, p.109.

<sup>34</sup> Harris, *op.cit.*, pp.226-227; Na-Dama, *op.cit.*, pp.86-88.

of crises. It was in response to this that in Zamfara the *Sarakunan Garuruwa* were under some checks, through the posting of supervisors to the provinces by the central administration.<sup>35</sup>

Other categories of title holders in the political system of the kingdoms of the Rima basin, were the *Sarakunan Fada*, or court officials, and the *Sarakunan Sana'a*, or occupational heads. The *Sarakunan Fada* included the *Yan Sarki*, members of the ruling dynasty, including the female members, and the *Bayin sarki*, the King's personal staff. The *Yan Sarki* were a privileged group, and some of them were given honorific titles without specific duties attached to them. In Kebbi, the titles of Karari, Daudu, Kasari and Yerima belong to this category<sup>36</sup>. Another important group among the *Sarakunan Fada* are the female members of the royal dynasty, some of them with titles that entailed special duties to the states. There were also slave officials, and the officials of the personal staff of the *Sarki*.

The occupational heads (*Sarakunan Sana'a*,) regulated the activities of their professional colleagues and served as the link between them and the state.

---

<sup>35</sup> Na-Dama, *op.cit.*, p.340.

<sup>36</sup> Alkali, *op.cit.*, p.113.



Some of the *Sarakunan Sana'a* like the *Sarkin makera* (head of the Blacksmiths) seem to have been important officials. The *Sarkin Makera* supervised the manufacture for the state arsenal. In Gobir the function of this officer included the safe custody of the royal kettle drums (*tamburra*).<sup>37</sup> Generally, the *Sarakunan Sana'a* were influential because of their role in the collection of occupational taxes as well as in regulating the services supplied by their members to the state. In Zamfara, all the *Sarakunan Sana'a* were under the *Ajiyan Zamfara* (state treasurer).<sup>38</sup> In Gobir, three important revenue yielding occupational groups were placed under the leadership of some princes of Gobir.<sup>39</sup> Some of the occupations that were so headed, and attracted dues, levies and fees to the *Sarki* included, blacksmithing, dying, shoe-making, hunting, butchering, gardening, trading, and the maintenance of ferries.

The last, but by no means the least category of titled officials, was the *Sarakunan Yaki* (war leaders). All the states had no standing army and no special officer

---

<sup>37</sup> Augi, *op.cit.*, p.430.

<sup>38</sup> Na-Dama, *op.cit.*, p.349.

<sup>39</sup> Group of crops such as beans and calabashes were placed under the Magajin Yado; cassava and potatoes planters were placed under the Magajin Rogo; and the dyers were under the Sarkin Baura. Augi, *op.cit.*, p.431.

corps. Instead, the *Sarki*, the *Sarakunan garuruwa* and other state officials performed military functions. However, there were those whose prime duties were military. The emergence of this category of officials, and in fact their influence, depended on the expansionist policy of the state, as well as its power politics. For example, during the expansionist era of Zamfara, around the opening decades of the eighteenth century, the state attached great importance to military activities, which gave rise to a strong group of *Sarakunan yaki*, who were said to have been determining state policy at the time.<sup>40</sup> Similarly, the state of Gobir based at Alkalawa was much dependent on its military reputation and this explains the influential position occupied by the *Sarakunan yaki*, and the abundance of its military titles.<sup>41</sup>

An important feature of the political system of the states in the Rima Basin during our period was the expansion of the *sarauta* system itself, and the proliferation of the *masu sarauta* class over time. This helped to sharpen the political division of the society into the *sarauta* class and the commoner class (the

---

<sup>40</sup> K.Krieger, *Geshchichte Von Zamfara* (Dietrich Reimer Verlag, Berlin, 1959), p.49.

<sup>41</sup> Augi, *op.cit.*, pp.432-433.

*talakawa*). The former played a very crucial role in public matters and exercised considerable power in the political, social, religious and economic affairs of their respective states. It is however important to stress the point that more than anything else, the prestige of the *masu sarauta* as well as their influence was a reflection of their dominant positions in the relations of productions in their societies.

### c) Organisation of Economic Activities

The economic activities that we attempt to discuss here, namely. agriculture, pastoralism, fishing and hunting are those that can appropriately be regarded as 'productive activities' in relation to the Rima Basin, during the period under discussion. It is recognised that the term productive entails far more than we focus on, but these activities form the basis of the social development of the societies of the region.

#### i) Land and Land Tenure

In the Rima Basin, land occupied the most important means of production. Therefore land tenure, by which we imply the nature and types of policies guiding the control, sharing, and the use of this most important natural resource, was very crucial to the lives of the people as well as for the nature of their social and

political organisation. The most crucial issues with regards to land tenure system/pattern was accessibility to the land, its ownership and control of its resources.

Augi has examined some four factors that influenced the nature and pattern of landholding in the Rima Basin immediately before our period.<sup>42</sup> These factors were the fertility of the soil; its proximity to water resources for human and animal use; the distribution of population; the nature of each sphere of productive activity, i.e. whether agriculture, pastoralism or fishing; and lastly, the level of the social and political development of the various societies in the region. These factors that determined the pressure for lands were very much relevant during the last half of the eighteenth century.

The fertility of the soils influenced the locations of population centres. By the second half of the eighteenth century, the pattern of land tenure in the Rima Basin was that each settlement whether it was *unguwa*, *kauye*, *gari*, or *birni* had its own piece of land surrounding it. This land included the *karkara* (farmland) of the settlement, including *saura* (the fallow land). Its portion of *daji* (bush) served as additional farmland in times of

---

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.205-206.

need. Grazing and hunting land, and fishing ground also formed part of this *daji*. The ultimate control of land was vested in the *sarakuna*, as the custodian of the land resources, and a hierarchy of officials with delegated authority over the control of land. In fact, the power of the states' officials rested in their control of this crucial means of production.

The main form of landholding was the *gandu*, which was also the most stable unit of social production. The *gandu* consists of members of patrilineage group including attached members as *bayi* (slaves) or *barori* (clients). There was also the *gamana* or *kurga*, a tenure in which a plot was allocated to a member of the patrilineage to work on his own. In addition to the *gandu* and the *gamana* there was also the large agricultural estates, the *gandayen sarakuna* belonging to the *Sarakuna* and the states' officials. Apart from the high offices of the *sarki* and the various *sarakunan garuruwa*, all leading state officials had royal estates on which they utilise unpaid labour for agricultural production.

Grazing and hunting lands, and fishing ground had a communal tenure policy. The *daji* immediately surrounding a settlement was used as the grazing lands of the inhabitants of the settlement, while a more

distant part was used for hunting and cattle grazing by the pastoral groups. Hunting was usually undertaken in groups. Grazing and hunting land was collectively held by the community under the custodianship of the village head or any person with delegated authority. Ordinarily permission had to be sought by all those outside the community before using any piece of land. This was the pattern that also obtained in respect of the tenure on fishing grounds. However, in all practical purposes the communal ownership and control over grazing land and fishing grounds did not, whatsoever, marginalise the predominant position of the *sarakuna*.

We have no evidence of the sale, hire or mortgage of lands in the region during the eighteenth century, but some form of *gaisuwa* made to the *sarakuna* might have influenced land decisions. Thus, some form of *gaisuwa* given to the rulers in the region had, by the end of the century, developed into a regular land tax called *tausa*.<sup>43</sup>

## ii) Agriculture

Agricultural production was the backbone of the economy of the societies of the region during the period under study. Human population in the Rima Basin was concentrated in the areas with fertile soils in and around

---

<sup>43</sup> NAK SNP 15 369 A3, f.4.

the major river valleys of the region. These were the Gulbin Kebbi valley, the region formed by the valleys of the *Gulaben* Sokoto, the Birnin- Konni and Adar-Dutsi region as well as the region of the Dallols Mauri, Fogha and Boboye (Bosso) of the river Niger. Similarly, agricultural production was very much instrumental to the development of the important occupations of the people of the Rima Basin.

Agriculture developed in our region as in the whole of the Central Savanna, through some practical knowledge, which was accumulated over millenia through experience. For instance, the peasant recognised grasses as indication of fertile soil; knew the relationship between soil types and fertility; they knew that regular weeding increased crop yields; 'mixed cropping' made better use of the soil; crop rotation did bring the soil back to life; the use of wood ash improved soil after it was made deficient by time; the use of animal manures regenerated the fertility of the soil; careful selection of appropriate tools; and, numerous other techniques and methods, which were the result of prolonged trial and error in agricultural activities.<sup>44</sup> In addition, successful

---

<sup>44</sup> See D. E .Ferguson, "Nineteenth Century Hausaland: Being a Description by Imam Imoru of the Land, Economy, and society of his People" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1973), p.51.

agricultural production involved the knowledge of the seasons: a requirement which the farmers in the region satisfied.

The whole of the region is suitable for the cultivation of various crops. the most notable crops include varieties of bullrush millet (*gero*), guinea corn (*dawa*), rice (*shinkafa*), and beans (*wake*). Others include millet (*maiwa*) and wheat (*alkama*). The huge tract of the *jigawa* soil is suitable for the cultivation of variety of cereals. Zamfara which falls entirely within this zone is said to have been the leading cereal producer in the whole of Hausaland.<sup>45</sup> The alluvial soils of the *fadamu* are very suitable for the cultivation of rice. A variety of this was widely grown in Kebbi. Other crops cultivated in the region include groundnut, tobacco, and cotton. Indigo and shea-butter were also cultivated, and various legumes and root crops, which are known to supplement the main food crops, were also widely grown. These crops included *kwaruru* (bambara nuts), *dankali* (sweet potato), *rogo* (cassava) and *gwaza* (kokoyam).

Agricultural activities start during the last days of the dry season (*rani*). During this time, before the first rains fall, clearing of the farmlands and manuring are

---

<sup>45</sup> *ibid.*, p.64.



undertaken. Major activities are however reserved for the rainy season (*damina*). The beginning of farming activity and the harvests periods were accompanied with certain festivities, mostly performed in the *gandun sarakuna* (royal agricultural estates).

During the period of the wet season, various agricultural activities beginning with the planting and ending with the harvesting of the crops are organised at the appropriate times. During the peak of the rainy season, the root crops are harvested. Such crops were used to make up for the shortages from the previous season. In years of draught, more often in the northern parts of our region, some of the legumes and tubers planted particularly beans, cassava and sweet potato make up for a poor harvest of cereals. Furthermore, legumes and tubers played an important role in the ecological cycles, with their nitrogen-conserving properties helping in preserving the fertility of the land. In addition, the leaves, pods and stack provide fodder (*harawa*) for the large herds of livestock of the region.

The basic unit of social production was the *gida* comprising all members of the patrilineal homestead under the leadership of the *maigida*, who would be the senior male member. The *gida* may include the *bayin gida* (domestic servants or slave) or the *barorin gida*

(clients). The numerical strength of *gida* differs from one to another, but the occupation and the status of the *maigida* was the prime determinant of the actual composition of the *gida*. Therefore agricultural activities are mainly undertaken in the *gandun gida* (the communal farm). All able-bodied members of the *gida* were expected to partake in one activity or another. These activities ranged from clearing the land, planting, weeding and harvesting. The *gandu* system, by our period, formed the social basis of the economic mainstay of the societies of the Rima Basin area.

The proceeds from the *gandun gida* were communally owned by the members of the *gida*. However, interests of members as well as their needs were catered for by the *maigida*. The manner in which the agricultural proceeds from the *gandun gida* were shared among the members of the *gida* was left to the wisdom and leadership of the *maigida*. This way, problems confronting any member of the *gida* were communally attended to, largely through the resources of the *gida*. However, it cannot be assumed that all members of the *gida* did have equal access to the resources of the *gida*. On the contrary, it would seem that both objective and subjective factors determined the status of the *gida* member within the entire homestead. On the other hand, the *gida* however

provided overall socio-economic security to its members, and also provided cultural flatfoams on which members participated in the affairs of the wider society.

Outside the *gandun gida*, members might possess some plots on which they carried out further agricultural activity for their own personal benefits. These plots are known as *gayauna*, *kurga* or *gonar tabe*. The proceeds from these farms entirely belong to their owners. Usually *gida* members worked on their personal plots on the days they were off from the activities of the *gandun gida*. These plots were important source of income, and eventually became part of the basis for social differentiation between members of the same *gida*. It may be likely that ownership of personal plots like the *gayauna* was one of the dynamic factors that were transforming the nature and pattern of the *gandu* system. Most probably it might have been one of the factors responsible for the collapse of the *gandu* system.

Another sector of agricultural production was the *gandaye*, which were normally large farms owned by the *sarakuna* and perhaps, members of the *sarauta* class. These *gandaye* were often worked by *bayi* (domestic slaves) and *barori* (clients). Generally these *gandaye*, whose proceeds belonged entirely to their owners were scenes of labour exploitation and social oppression.

### iii) Pastoralism

Pastoralism was another important economic activity in the Rima Basin. Pastoralism is associated with the rearing of domesticated animals. It is helpful to distinguish between rearing of animals, in large or small scale, often undertaken by the agricultural population and pastoralism which is associated with nomadic groups, notably the Fulani and the Temasheq speaking groups. The agricultural population kept cattle, sheep and goats as well as raised poultry, but the pastoral groups are not only specifically concerned with the rearing of cattle, or sheep and goats on a larger scale, they essentially depend on animal husbandry for their means of livelihood. Livestock provided them with their food and the means to engage in all social relations with the non-pastoral groups.

In the Rima Basin, the pastoral groups employed nomadism and a variety of transhumant movements as their principal mode of resource utilisation. Such movements involved both seasonal and long term, and vertical and horizontal migrations of stock and human population across ecological zones, in search of water and pasture. Transhumant movements are one of the major strategies employed by the pastoral groups to

make use of land resources in the absence of private ownership of land<sup>46</sup>

In the Rima Basin, a notable pattern of transhumant movements developed in a north-south and south-north movements in the dry season and rainy season, respectively. In these movements, the pastoral groups leave the northern areas in the dry season to southward areas in search of water and pasture. On the approach of the rainy season these groups also leave the southern areas and began a northward movement. However, some pastoralists simply left the upland areas into the valleys, in a similar pattern.

In terms of social organisation, the pastoral groups, particularly the Fulani, were fitted in a patrilineal family units similar to the *gida* under the leadership of the senior male members. Several units might form a *ruga* (camp) within which there might exist some form of kinship relations. Transhumant movements might be undertaken by the whole *ruga* or several *rugage*.

#### iv) Fishing and Hunting

---

<sup>46</sup> T.A.Mohammed-Baba, "The Pastoral Fulbe, Economy And Society in Contemporary Nigeria: The Political Economy of Agricultural and Livestock Development Policy Programs" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Missouri-Columbia, 1987), p.73.

Fishing was another major economic activity that was pursued in our region. Fishing was generally undertaken in rivers and lakes that contained water throughout the year round such as the Gulbin Kebbi. In the kingdom of Kebbi, fishing was next to agriculture in economic importance. Here, it took place along the Gulbin Kebbi where it was the most important single occupation of the Sarkawa.<sup>47</sup> Although fishing was carried all the year round, there was a peak fishing season between September and April, when the fishes were more abundant.<sup>48</sup>

Fishing as an occupation had two main grades. One of these was mainly concerned with catching the fish, and the other combined this activity with hunting in the water. But which ever type predominated in any given area depended on the size of the *gulbi* and the water available throughout the seasons.

Hunting was already an ancient activity in the Rima Basin by our period, but it still survived as an occupation to many people. Hunting as an occupation is likely to have antedated the development of agriculture.

---

<sup>47</sup> Alkali, *op.cit.*, pp.40-41.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*

In our region there were two categories of hunters. There was the category of professional hunters known as *mahalba*, and there was the category of *yan halbi*, which consisted of people who can be regarded as part-time hunters. The latter group include those who took to hunting as a game. They usually organised into groups for that purpose especially during the dry season.<sup>49</sup> Professional hunters spent most of their time in the bush, and in addition, hold the reputation of being great herbalists.

#### d) Industrial Activity

Industrial activity revolves around the crafts manufacturing industries, which depended on the utilisation of local resources. These resources included agricultural and animal products, as well as mineral and forest resources. The development of craft and manufacture denotes some high level of urbanisation and social differentiation.

The availability of substantial deposits of iron ore in the middle Rima Basin encouraged the development of iron smelting technology particularly in Zamfara and

---

<sup>49</sup> C.K.Meek, *The Northern Tribes of Nigeria* (2 Vols, Frank Cass, London, 1971), Vol I, p.103.

Gobir.<sup>50</sup> This area is said to have possessed iron ores which were among the best in the Central Sudan region.<sup>51</sup> As a result, there emerged some centres of iron smelting which facilitated the trades of blacksmiths. Blacksmithing was itself very crucial for the development of agriculture. The agricultural population depended on the blacksmiths for their tools and implements. Similarly, the blacksmiths were the suppliers of arsenal to their states' armies. They also manufacture the tools for hunting. In addition to blacksmithing, copper, silver and goldsmiths (*makeran fari*) had began to emerge in the region, particularly in Gobir where they engaged in the manufacture of ornaments, bracelets, stirrups and harness for horses.

Weaving too was an important craft industry in the region, utilising agricultural products. This industry flourished in the middle areas of the Rima Basin, largely due to the high level production of cotton. The weaving industry was closely bound up with spinning. Like weaving, spinning also flourished in the middle areas of our region particularly in Zamfara, where Na-Dama says,

---

<sup>50</sup> Na-Dama, *op.cit.*, p.122.

<sup>51</sup> K.Krieger, "Notes on Iron-Production of the Hausa", memo.,1963, p.8.



it was the most important activity of the womenfolk.<sup>52</sup> The dyeing industry seem to have been important in Zamfara and Gobir kingdoms where there was abundance of indigo.

Other major industries in the region included Pottery, Matmaking and Basketry, Tanning and Leatherwork. Pottery sites were scattered along the various river valleys because of the availability of suitable clay. Matmaking and Basketry flourished in various settlements utilising the resources of the *dazuzzuka* in the region, particularly deleb and dumpalm. The Tanning and Leatherwork industry utilised animal hides and skin with which the region was endowed. This industry was particularly developed in Gobir which was famous for its sandals and horses' carpets (*sirduna*).<sup>53</sup>

e) Commerce

Commercial activity between regions was normally facilitated by ecological differences, uneven distribution of natural resources, regional specialisation, and the utilisation of productive opportunities. These conditions

---

<sup>52</sup> Na-Dama, *op.cit.*, p.128.

<sup>53</sup> Augi, *op.cit.*, p.57.

to a large extent obtained in the Rima Basin. As a result, there developed a regional trade among the different parts of the region, as well as between the region as a whole and other areas of the Sudan.

The central areas of the region exported cotton and indigo to the other areas, particularly the northern parts of the Basin.<sup>54</sup> Zamfara areas also exported dyed cloth to other parts of the region, and perhaps even beyond. In addition, the central Rima areas were noted for the collection and treatment of Sylvan products, shea nuts and locust beans. The shea "butter" was of great economic value locally, directly as food, for making soaps and illuminants, for cooking purposes, and as an ointment. The locust beans were the raw material for *daddawa*, a chief ingredient in soup making, used at almost every meal by those who could afford it. The people of Kebbi received a substantial part of their *daddawa* requirements from the central areas. On its part, the kingdom of Kebbi, besides its control of salt traffic in the Dallol Fogha, possessed some natural salt deposits with which it traded with the other parts of the Rima Basin and beyond.

---

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, p.60.

Inter-regional trade, however, should not be seen as the only important commercial activity. Such a trade itself would suggest the existence of a fairly well developed merchants involved in some long distance trade. But there were also internal trade relations even between the sub-regions themselves. Internal trade was connected with the development of the middlemen and brokers. Indeed, all sales in the market were made through the middlemen (*dillalai*). In the case of cereal trade, sales were made through women retailers known as the *ma'auna*. The forces of demand and supply in the markets determined the crucial part played by the different groups of dealers, middlemen and brokers.

#### f) Forms of Labour

The main forms of social labour in our region were peasant labour, client labour, slave labour and forced labour. By this period however, hired or wage labour did not seem to have been particularly important in social production

In agricultural production peasant labour was utilised among the *manoma* (farmers), *makiyaya* (herdsmen), *mafarauta* (hunters) and *masunta* (fishermen) of the region. Peasant labour here denotes the form of labour organised and utilised by and for the

peasant population. Client labour was largely utilised by the *masu sarauta*, the *masu arziki* and the *mallamai*. Slave labour was utilised by the *masu sarauta*, and to some extent, by the *masu arziki*. Forced labour was used exclusively by *the masu sarauta*.

In all the productive human activities undertaken in our region (agriculture, pastoralism and manufacturing), the *gida* constituted the basic labour unit. *The maigida* as the head, was responsible for supplying equipment, raw materials, food requirement and for the regulation of the *gida's* labour. All able-bodied members of the *gida* participated, in one way or another, in agricultural production. For instance, in sowing all members of the *gida* including women and children take part. In all stages of production, it was generally accepted that women's share of labour would be lighter than men's, in consideration of women's arduous domestic duties. However, certain crops were exclusively grown by the women in our region.

The *gida* organisation also obtained among the pastoral populations. Here the *maigida* took the major decisions on the herds and the division of labour among the *gida* members. Generally men undertook such activities as the making of ropes for tethering the animals or in the construction of shelter. The women

Sokoto jihad movement in the Rima Basin area. Indeed this region was to provide the leadership for the overthrow of the *sarakuna* of the *kasashen* Hausa and beyond. The emergence of this leadership particularly in the state of Gobir, was explicable in terms of political and socio-economic conditions in the Rima Basin towards the closing years of the eighteenth century.

The political atmosphere during the last or so decades of the century was particularly tense. Last tried to portray the escalating nature of the political crises in Gobir by the time as having been influenced by what he regarded as the intensification of the 'revolt' of the Zamfarawa against Gobir, by then the ascendant power in the region.<sup>55</sup> It must however be noted that, the very basis of the kingdom of Gobir in the central Rima Basin, was made up of complex political relations. In establishing their political dominance in the Rima Basin the Gobirawa had only eclipsed the kingdom of Zamfara. In reality, the central authority of Zamfara kingdom actually collapsed in 1757 by the destruction of Birnin zamfara, but this collapse was not total. The various Zamfara principalities that emerged after the collapse of the centre did provide some continuity. Therefore, in a sense, Zamfara was very much a living phenomenon in

---

<sup>55</sup> Last, *op.cit.*, p.12.

the political crisis, in which the kingdom of Gobir was pitted against the other polities in the central Rima region.<sup>59</sup> Our interest here is focused on the consequences of these political upheavals in the context of the changing social relations in the Rima Basin.

The genesis of the Gobir factor in the Rima Basin was the shift of the political gravity of the kingdom from the Gulbin Maradi into the Tarka-Kaba region of the central Rima Basin. It is Augi's opinion that the circumstances of the migration of the Gobirawa into the central Rima Basin area, particularly into Zamfara territory resulted from a protracted dynastic crisis in Gobir itself.<sup>60</sup> This argument however seem to have down played the important material conditions of migrations in the region during the period under discussion. Moreover, the manner in which the Gobirawa were said to have rallied around Ibrahim Babari to destroy Birnin Zamfara, as well as the lucidity of the Gobir factor in the central Rima Basin before the second half of the century, does not lend much credence to the theory of a protracted dynastic crisis in Gobir.

---

<sup>59</sup> Augi, *op.cit.*, pp.447-458.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, p.389.

The prominence of Gobir in the central Rima can not also be simply explained in terms of the strength of the kingdom. In fact, to a large extent, Gobir's prominence also has to be explained in terms of the weakness of Zamfara. Zamfara, which had been commercially important in the whole of *kasar* Hausa up to the early decades of the century, had become entangled in serious political problems.<sup>61</sup> The power and prosperity of Zamfara had led to a considerable expansion in its size and influence, as well as led to the development of intra-class friction among the members of the ruling dynasty, and between sections of the dominant social groups of the society in the kingdom, including the *mallamai* and merchant groups.<sup>62</sup> This was sequel to the manner in which the central authority of Zamfara was thwarted by the Gobirawa with any possible re-emergence of a unified political centre hindered. By this time, the kingdom of Kebbi had shrank in terms of political significance with the break up of its major political centres early in the century.

Nonetheless, Gobir had to contend with the political realities in the central Rima area. The

---

<sup>61</sup> Krieger, "Geschichte Von Zamfara...", *op.cit.*, p.43.

<sup>62</sup> Augi, *op.cit.*, p.377.

Zamfarawa settlements that were incorporated under the authority of Gobir remained unyielding. Therefore, throughout the century there was a general atmosphere of insecurity which prevailed in the region, and Gobir having to put up with incessant attacks by the Zamfara chiefdoms that escaped Gobir's control. According to Augi, this state of insecurity was one of the factors that promoted the growth of Birnin Alkalawa itself.<sup>63</sup> The political atmosphere in the south and south-eastern peripheries of Gobir could only guarantee political order if total victory could be achieved. But this was not the case throughout the century.

Towards the close of the 1780s, the internal crisis within Gobir itself was heightened to a point that the kingdom could not effectively curtail the jihad movement maturing around the Shehu Usman dan Fodio. There was a serious outcry during the last years of the reign of Sarkin Gobir Bawa jan Gwarzo (1771-1789). Bawa who ruled for a period of 18 years was the last powerful ruler of Gobir. Indeed according to Augi, Gobir traditions regard Bawa as the most powerful and outstanding ruler during the Alkalawa period.<sup>64</sup> It was

---

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, p.459.



Bawa who made concerted efforts to consolidate the power of Gobir at Alkalawa.

It was the military activities of the *Sarakuna* of Gobir, particularly heightened during the reign of Bawa, that also began to tell on the populace of the kingdom. Bawa's earliest military exploits were against the Sarkin Zamfara Maroki whom he beleaguered in Kiawa for a prolonged period.<sup>65</sup> Bawa also attacked Katsina and was successful in his encounter with Maradi. However, around 1788/9 Bawa was defeated by Katsina forces at Dan Karshe. This battle was particularly tragic for Gobir, which lost a large number of fighting men including Bawa's son.<sup>66</sup> The outcome of this battle broke the heart of Bawa who died forty days later.<sup>67</sup>

The socio-economic consequences of the military exploits of the *Sarakuna* of Gobir were crushing to the people of the region. These military activities, besides promoting a sense of insecurity and uncertainty among the general populace, also necessitated heavy taxes and levies, as well as military conscription. More important

---

<sup>65</sup> Abdul Qadir al-Mustafa, *Raudat al al-Afkar*, NHRS/ABU P26/8. There is a draft translation by A.M.Kani.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*

than anything else, the state needed the material and human resources to prosecute its wars of expansion and to maintain the state apparatus. Thus the *sarakuna* of Gobir became settled for oppressive taxes and levies, compulsory military services, seizures of properties, and other various social and economic injustices.

The famous work of the Shehu, *Kitab al-Farq* provides an account of the oppressiveness that existed in the Rima Basin.<sup>68</sup> In this work the Shehu discussed the various taxes collected by the *sarakuna* of Gobir and presumably the *Sarakuna* of the *Kasashen* Hausa; the social division of classes and the oppression of the lower classes; the social injustices committed against the womenfolk; and, the general arbitrariness of the *sarauta* class.

These social injustices enumerated by the Shehu were rampant in Gobir since the time of Bawa Jan Gwarzo. Besides taxes like *Jangali*, *Kurdin Gari* and *Kurdin Sallah*, Bawa is reputed for having been the first ruler to collect a tax on *Kaura* (guinea corn).<sup>69</sup> Bawa is also noted for oppressing the pastoralists and attempting to collect tributes and levies through his

---

<sup>68</sup> BSOAS, Vol xxiii, 3 (1960), pp.558-579.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, p.567; Al-Mustafa, "Raudat...", *op.cit.*

appointed titled fulbe officials. Having recorded little success in generating revenue through his levies he began to terrorise the various pastoral groups in his kingdom through frequent raids.<sup>70</sup>

While Bawa was intensifying the economic exploitation of his subjects, he was at the same time exchanging gifts and tokens with other *sarakuna* as far as Nupeland. Sarkin Nupe Muazu is said to have sent to Bawa 500 young female and 500 young male slaves, each carrying 20,000 cowries. On his part Bawa sent his gifts of 100 horses, twelve of which were of the distinguished savanna breed as well as two young female slaves, dressed in silk and rich ornaments.<sup>71</sup> It is in this light that the Shehu's attack on the luxurious and lustful life style of the *sarakuna* and other privileged classes can be understood.

The issue of excessive taxation on the subjects of the polities in the Rima Basin seem to have received Shehu's particular attention during his preaching career. One of the requests that the Shehu forwarded to Sarkin

---

<sup>70</sup> Hopen, "The Pastoral Fulbe..."*op.cit.*, pp.10-11.

<sup>71</sup> Al-Mustafa, *op.cit.*; M.Mason "The Nupe Kingdom in the Nineteenth Century: A Political History" (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Birmingham, 1975), p51; S.F.Nadel, *A Black Byzantium: The Kingdom of Nupe in Nigeria*, (OUP, London, 1942), p.76.

Gobir Bawa during the *Idil al-adha* meeting of 1788 with other *Mallamai* centred around burden of taxes.<sup>72</sup> These issues of taxes, levies and social insecurity to have culminated in the support for the jihad movement by the general populace in the Rima Basin area did not, however, elicit a unanimous response among scholars. Augi believes that taxes in Gobir during the late eighteenth century were crucial and did endanger the survival of the state.<sup>73</sup> Similarly Na-Dama has shown the significant role of taxes in the support accorded to the jihad movement both in Zamfara and Gobir.<sup>74</sup> But Alkali, while noting the existence of levies and taxes in Kebbi, argues that conditions were more mild in comparison to the other kingdoms in the Rima Basin, and the Hausa states generally. According to him, levies and taxes were not as exacting as to discredit the state in the eyes of its subjects.<sup>75</sup> This argument in our opinion, left an important question ringing: whether the nature of taxes alone could have overthrown the state of Gobir or any

---

<sup>72</sup> Gidado dan Laima, *Raudat al-Jinan*, in U.F.Malumfashi."The Life of Sheikh Uthman dan Fodio and Sultan Muhammad Bello..."(Unpublished MA thesis ABC/ABU, 1973), p.22; Hiskett, "Tazyin...", *op.cit.*, p.88.

<sup>73</sup> Augi, *op.cit.*, pp.466-468.

<sup>74</sup> Na-Dama, *op.cit.*, pp.399-402.

<sup>75</sup> Alkali, *op.cit.*, pp.126-127.

other Hausa state? The nature and magnitude of taxes and levies were dictated by the material requirements of the political structures of the particular state. The fact is that, by the second half of the eighteenth century, the state of Gobir needed more material inputs for the survival of the kingdom than perhaps did Kebbi. But there is evidence to show that in Kebbi too the pastoralists at least were over burdened with taxes.<sup>76</sup>

Another social injustices levelled against the kingdoms of the Rima Basin is the compulsory enlistment of citizens into the army, which, according to the Shehu:

...they called *gargadi*, and "whoever does not go, they impose upon him a money payment not imposed by the *shari'a*".<sup>77</sup>

By the closing years of the eighteenth century Gobir was engaged in several unsuccessful military adventures against Agades, Kiawa and Katsina. The state therefore had to resort to conscription exercises. The attendant social dislocations were very much resented by the populace, and included the existence of essentially political prisoners. In fact, one of the major requests of

---

<sup>76</sup> Hopen, *loc.cit*

<sup>77</sup> Hiskett, "*Kitab al-Farq...*", *op.cit.*, p.568.

the Shehu to the Sarkin Gobir during the Magama meeting was for the release of prisoners.<sup>78</sup>

By the end of the reign of Bawa in 1789, the power of the Gobir state had seriously weakened in the face of the growing influence of the reform movement headed by the Shehu, which indeed was boosted by the five concessions granted to the Shehu in 1788. These concessions are: the freedom to preach in all parts of the kingdom; that no one should be barred from following the call of the Shehu; that the Shehu's community distinguishing itself by the wearing of cap and turban be respected; that Bawa should release all political prisoners in Gobir; and, that excessive taxes should be abolished.<sup>79</sup>

Yet after the death of Bawa, the subsequent *sarakuna* of Gobir imposed even more oppressive measures in order to maintain the state structures and had less pleasant attitude towards the Shehu's activities and therefore sought to curb his growing influence. It was by now very clear to the *sarakuna* of Gobir that the influence of the Shehu and the growing number of the community around him constituted the greatest threat

---

<sup>78</sup> Malumfashi, *loc.cit.*

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*; Last, *op.cit.*, p.8.

to the survival of the Gobir state. In fact, the reforms which the Shehu and his followers continued to advocate amounted to a complete restructuring of the politics of the Rima Basin.

Bawa's immediate successor, Sarkin Gobir Yakubu (1789-1796) is said to be more oppressive than his predecessor. Yakubu, it would seem, antagonised the Shehu and his followers so much that the Shehu advised his supporters to get armed.<sup>80</sup> On the other hand, this very proclamation of the Shehu became a matter of uttermost concern to the *sarakuna* of Gobir. Yakubu's measure against the jihadists were conditioned by his internal problems especially his conflicts with Katsina, Ruma and Kiawa. In 1796 Kiawa allied with Katsina and defeated the Gobirawa decisively.<sup>81</sup> Yakubu was killed in the battle, his head cut off and taken to Katsina.<sup>82</sup>

By the beginning of the nineteenth century Gobir's power had seriously weakened and was on the verge of collapse. The complex position of Gobir in the central Rima was sequel to the 'indifferent' attitude of the most

---

<sup>80</sup> Hiskett, "*Tazyin...*", *op.cit.*, p.105; F.H.El-Masri, "The Life of Shehu Usman dan Fodio before the Jihad". *JHSN*, II, 4 (1963), p.444.

<sup>81</sup> Al-Mustafa, "*Raudat...*", *op.cit.*

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*

of the *Sarakuna* of Zamfara chiefdoms in the face of the reforms campaigns by the jihadists. Although the reforms advocated by the jihadists seem likely to shake off the very foundation of the Zamfara chiefdoms, their *Sarakuna*, it seems, did not show any resentment at the growing influence of the jihad movement.<sup>83</sup> Rather, the Shehu was well received in many areas he undertook his preaching tours in Zamfara. It is possible the Shehu had rightly calculated his chances in Zamfara, especially in those areas that were far removed from Gobir's authority. Thus, between 1781 and 1786, the Shehu toured and stayed within Zamfara, preaching. And soon after, he had established a community in Zamfara.<sup>84</sup>

During his Zamfara tours the Shehu not only made a following among the peasantry but also inspired some notable *mallamai* into rising up and advocating reforms along the lines established by him.<sup>85</sup> Similarly the Shehu was also successful in his tour of the Kebbi areas in the 1790s going as far as across the River Niger into Illo and Zoma areas.<sup>86</sup> These tours were undertaken at a time

---

<sup>83</sup> Na-Dama, *op.cit.*, p.411.

<sup>84</sup> Hiskett, "Tazyin...", *op.cit.*, p.96.

<sup>85</sup> Na-Dama, *op.cit.*, p.409.

<sup>86</sup> Hiskett, *loc.cit.*; Alkali, *op.cit.*, p.128; Augi, *op.cit.*, p.483.



when Kebbi was facing serious internal crisis.<sup>87</sup> This crisis, among other things, had rendered the state unable to check the activities of the Shehu and other *Mallamai* who were also actively preaching in Kebbi, even though it seems Sarkin Kebbi Saleman (1783-1803) understood the implications of the activities of these reformers. Rather, the way and manner in which Saleman attempted to provide a solution to the imminent political crisis in the kingdom created another internal dissension. This action was the nomination of Umar Uka to succeed him as against the popular Muhammad Hodi, contrary to the Kebbi's political culture.

Therefore political conditions in Kebbi, at the opening of the nineteenth century, were particularly inflammable and needed only a spark to go off. The spark was provided by the *coup de'etat* executed by Muhammad Hodi in 1803.<sup>88</sup> Following this coup Kebbi society was split into three autonomous political camps, which explained the ease with which the jihadists captured Birnin Kebbi in 1805.

---

<sup>87</sup> See Alkali, *op.cit.*, pp.129-130.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.131-132.

Back in Gobir where the jihad movement took its roots, Bunu Nafata (1796-1803) who succeeded Yakubu introduced harsher measures in order to curb the influence and the growing power of the Shehu's community. First and foremost, Nafata sought to revoke the five concessions, which Sarkin Gobir Bawa had given to the Shehu. He further proclaimed three laws, namely: no one would be permitted to preach to the people except the Shehu alone; no one would be permitted to be a Muslim except those whose fathers belonged to the faith, and all those whose parents were not Muslims should revert to their parents' own religion; and, no one should henceforth be seen wearing a turban or veil, in the case of women.<sup>89</sup> However, by the end of Nafata's reign in 1803, the Shehu's influence had grown tremendously, with a large following from the masses, while the *jama'a* had virtually cut itself off from the jurisdiction of the Gobir state.<sup>90</sup>

---

<sup>89</sup> Hiskett, *op.cit.*, p.107; Last, *op.cit.*, p.12.

<sup>90</sup> Muhammad Bello wrote that during this time, "those who were not *mallams*" came in number to become Shehu's followers. This suggest that by 1803 among the Shehu's followers were those whose interests lie in the overthrow of the old order but who might not have been interested in Islamic learning. See his "*Infaq ..*" (Arnett), *op.cit.*, p.47.

Hence by the time Yumfa ascended the throne, the state of Gobir had virtually been politically dichotomised. What is more, in the very first year of his reign, Yunfa was confronted with military assault from the Zamfarawa, while Katsina seized the opportunity of Gobir's internal problems to raid right across the southern areas of Gobir.<sup>91</sup> By the end of Yunfa's reign, factional disputes within the expanded ruling dynasty had also become prominent. This development which had weakened the state of Gobir elicited greater hostility against the Shehu and the *jama'a* by Yunfa.

When Yunfa's persecutions against the *jama'a* heightened, the Shehu wrote his *Masa'il muhimma* in which he stated the obligation of emigration from, and jihad against 'pagan' states. It was in response to this call and the threats being faced by the Shehu's supporters that a noted scholar and a disciple of the Shehu, Abdussalam, emigrated with his followers from Gobir territory to settle in Gimbana, in Kebbi territory. Yunfa who seems to have fully understood the consequences of Abdussalam's action ordered him to return with his followers, but Abdussalam refused. Thereafter, Yunfa attacked Gimbana and took many

---

<sup>91</sup> Last, *op.cit.*, pp.13-14.

prisoners.<sup>92</sup> The prisoners, however were intercepted by the jihadists and set free. This episode led to open hostilities between the jihadists and the Gobir forces.

The Gimbana episode happened at a time of political weakness in the state of Kebbi, which was not only marginalised in a serious fracas in its territory but could not even quell internal rebellion against its own authority without an external assistance. Zamfara, on the hand, had been politically fragmented between the supporters of the Shehu like the Sarkin Mafara, Sarkin Burmi and Sarkin Danko, and the allies of Gobir like Sarkin Gummi, Waru.<sup>93</sup> By 1804 therefore the polities of the Rima Basin were socio-economically bankrupt and politically unable to effectively check the progress of the jihad movement led by the Shehu Usman dan Fodio.

---

<sup>92</sup> There are two versions on the nature of the expedition against Gimbana. According to the jihadists, the attack was deliberate either by Yunfa himself or on his orders, after Abdussalam had refused to return to Gobir. According to 'Hausa Chronicle', Sarkin Gummi, Waru on the orders of Yunfa undertook an expedition against Sarkin Dosso while assisting Kebbi to quell a rebellion. On his way to Dosso, Waru, passed through the walls of Gimbana and requested Abdussalam, as a scholar, to pray for his success which the latter refused. On his return Waru complained to Yunfa who then ordered the attack on Gimbana. See Harris, *op.cit.*, p.44.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid*; Na-Dama, *op.cit.*, p.411.

## CHAPTER TWO

# THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BASIS OF THE SOKOTO CALIPHATE

### 2.1 The Triumph of the Jihad Movement

It is important to stress the point that the causation of any historical event, in addition to its primary factors, is also shaped by other secondary factors of varying degree of importance. In relation to the Sokoto jihad movement, these secondary factors are blown out of proportion so much that their contextual significance are obscured or clouded. In our attempt to briefly examine the triumph of the Sokoto jihad movement, its concrete basis will be outlined while some of the secondary factors that shaped it the way it did, can be grasped in their proper historical context.

The success of the Sokoto jihad clearly depicted the social and political weakness of the polities of the Rima Basin area and the other kingdoms that were eventually overthrown.<sup>1</sup> The reform movement in the Rima Basin region was revolutionarised by Sheikh Jibril

---

<sup>1</sup> See Chapter one, pp. ~~54-71~~

bn. Umar, the famous teacher of the Shehu Usman and his brother Abdullahi. In his work, *Ida al-Nusukh man akhadhtu 'anhu min al-shuyukh* Abdullahi dan Fodio mentioned the learned Jibril as the Sheikh of their Sheikhs.<sup>2</sup>

In fact, more than any other scholar before him, Jibril was responsible for the emergence of reform movement in the towns of *kasar* Hausa. According to Hausa chronicle, the preaching of Jibril and his attacks on the *Sarakuna* was specifically regarded as precedent to that of the Shehu Usman dan Fodio.<sup>3</sup> It should not, however, be assumed that it was only Jibril that started a regorous reform movement in the Sudan since about three hundred years earlier the famous al-Maghili was noted for his wide reform activities.<sup>4</sup> The influence of al-maghili is evident in the writings of the Shehu Usman dan Fodio and Abdullahi dan Fodio.

---

<sup>2</sup> M. Hiskett, "Material Relating to the State of Learning Among the Fulani before their Jihad", *BSOAS*, XIX, 3 (1957), p.566.

<sup>3</sup> J.A.Burdon (ed.), *Historical Notes on Certain Emirates and Tribes in Northern Nigeria*, (London, 1909), p.91.

<sup>4</sup> A.D.H. Bivar & M. Hiskett, "The Arabic Literature Literature of Nigeria to 1804: a Provisional account", *BSOAS*, XXV, Part 1 (1962), pp.106-108.

A culture of Islamic reform activities had been developing in the *bilad as-Sudan* galvanising into the Shehu's critical appraisal of the Hausa kingdoms, within a particular historical context. But the ideological importance of Islam in the Jihad movement must be put in its historical perspective, and this should be further understood within the class position of the reformers and their antagonists.<sup>5</sup> We may need to stress that, ideology itself is a social force, whose basis lies in the socio-economic mechanism informing the basic human relations in any given human society. Thus, any analysis of the ideological impact of Islam or the *shari'a* in the Sokoto jihad has to take into cognisance the socio-economic dimension of ideology in human actions.

Some scholars have tended to perceive the ideological framework of the Sokoto jihad out of its social basis.<sup>6</sup> Such writers attempted to justify the jihad

---

<sup>5</sup> For a useful discussion of the ideological question in the Sokoto jihad movement see Tukur, "The Historian, the Jurist and the Sokoto jihad" (Post-Graduate Seminar Paper presented at the Department of History, ABU Zaria 1977).

<sup>6</sup> For example, Omar Bello recognises the importance of the socio-economic and political conditions in Hausaland in the jihad movement but he relegated all these factors and perceived the movement as a pre-conceived religious movement: "The Political thought of Muhammad Bello (c1781-1837). As Revealed in his Arabic Writings more especially, *Al-Ghayth al- Wabl fi sirat al-Imam al-Adl*" (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, London, 1983), pp.32-40. A similar conception is contained in the work of

movement as religiously motivated (and thus being its primary dimension) by emphasising the jihadists' detest on the practices of the rulers of Hausaland whom they accused of mixing Islam with 'paganism' and local practices. But if one examine the success of the jihad movement in Hausaland against the religious zeal attributed to its supporters, an ambiguous state of Islam in the region emerges and this is a point which has been addressed by the jihad leaders in their writings. The Shehu has shown that Islam in Hausaland before 1804 was more or less the preserve of the ruling classes and their patronised intelligentsia, while predominantly in many areas the populace had not 'smelt a scent of Islam'.<sup>7</sup> There is very little difficulty in suggesting that the forces who supported the jihad and fought for its success against those who opposed the jihad movement did so because it articulated and presented their practical problems for solution as against any abstract spiritual appeal. It is a known fact that one of the

---

M.S.Zahradden, "Addullahi Ibn Fodio's Contribution to the Fulani Jihad in Nineteenth Century Hausaland" (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Mc Gill University, Canada, 1976), pp.101-104. In some earlier works, the jihad was perceived as purely a religious activity. For instance, see M.A.Al-Hajj, "The Fulani Concept of Jihad: Shehu Uthman dan Fodio", *ODU*, I, 1(July 1964), pp.56-57. In fact, Al-Hajj concluded that the jihad "was primarily a religious conflict between the Fulani who had a long tradition of Islam and the indigenous Hausa who were only 'nominal Muslims' or half Islamised".

<sup>7</sup> Uthman bn.Fudi, *Nur al-albab*.



earliest and strongest antagonists to the Sokoto jihad movement were many Islamic scholars, as exemplified by the case of Yandoto based scholars.

The jihad as an ideology and specifically the *Shari'a* as the yardstick of the jihadists' measure of public conducts had their bases in the social and economic realities of the societies of *the bilad as-sudan*. It is in this sense that one should grasp the jihad leadership's emphasis, in their writings, on 'enjoining the right and forbidden the wrong'. In his famous work, *Kitab al-Farq* the Shehu specifically enumerated about twenty five grievances against the kingdoms in *Kasar Hausa*, out of which only about three can be regarded as rituals. All the remaining grievances touched on social and economic injustices of the rulers in Hausaland.

By the closing decades of the eighteenth century, the developed culture of Islamic reform activity in the Sudan had provided the ideological framework on which the leaders of the Sokoto jihad movement x-rayed their societies. Therefore, the success or failure of the jihad movement cannot be adequately analysed within the legal framework of either the *Shari'a* or Islam. On the contrary, such analysis has to examine the nature and pattern of the inter-play of concrete historical forces in the society that necessitated social outcry. In Hausaland,

the Islamic framework of analysis has a strong social root. The *Sarakuna* of Hausa kingdoms seem to have accommodated the protagonist of Islamic reform activities as a fabric of social and political culture. As a result therefore, movements of scholars among the various kingdoms prospered. Some scholars such as the famous al-Maghili was a State guest in Kano and Katsina kingdoms as early as the fifteenth century.

From the late fifteenth century up to the closing decades of the eighteenth century, the intelligentsia was an important segment of the peoples of Hausaland, playing crucial roles in the social and political life of their various kingdoms. The intelligentsia should not, however, be seen to have constituted a homogeneous social class. The scholars would seem to have cut across social classes, even if it means, in concrete terms, in alignment with either the *sarauta* class or the *talakawa* (the commoner class). The notion of *Ulama' al-su* and the *Ulama' al-sunna* can only be concretely understood in the context of such an alignment with either of these social classes in Hausaland by the intelligentsia, rather than any obscure legal definition.<sup>8</sup>

---

<sup>8</sup> Some writers tended to perceive and analyse the roles of scholars in the Sokoto jihad movement strictly in legal terms. The *Ulama'a* who legitimise and supported oppression are referred to as *Ulama' al-su* (venal scholars) implying that such scholars were not grounded in the knowledge of the

Any intellectual activity has its underlying social basis if it is to be functional. The substance, as different from the form, of intellectual activity depends on its socially defined functions. By this fact, the *shari'a* was the yardstick for analysing social relations by the jihad leaders, and Islam in a broader context provided them with the general framework of social analysis. That is to say, due to some obvious historical factors, the leaders of the Sokoto jihad movement operated within the orbit of the *shari'a* in specific terms, and Islam in general terms. But it was the concrete historical condition in the Rima Basin area, as developed in other parts of Hausaland, that determined the genesis, pattern and the course of the Sokoto jihad movements led by the Shehu Usman dan Fodio.

The success of the movement was facilitated by other important secondary factors. One of these is the ability of the Shehu to analyse his society concretely. An important condition in a social movement of the Sokoto jihad's magnitude, which the Shehu successfully fulfilled, is the need for concrete analysis of concrete situation. Not only was the Shehu able to analyse his

---

*shari'a*, while those who oppose social injustices are referred to as *Ulama' al-sunna*, implying that such scholars were knowledgeable in the *shari'a*. See Bello, "The Political Thought...", *op.cit.*, p.30; Zahradeen, "Abdullahi Ibn Fodio...", *op.cit.*, p.103.

society and expose its political and moral weakness, but he was also able to provide an alternative social order which appealed to the oppressed classes who constituted the core of their respective societies.

This ability of the Shehu is probably an edge over some of the scholars who operated before him. For instance the views of his famous teacher, Jibril bn Umar, were controversial even in the eyes of his students.<sup>9</sup> It is said that some of his controversial doctrines arouse great hostility among the rulers of the polities of the Rima Basin area, some of whom were even credited with attempts to put him to death.<sup>10</sup> Though Jibril's writings and ideas seemed to have been widely disseminated in the Rima Basin area and beyond, his ideological views were not popular even among the intelligentsia group.

Unlike Jibril, the Shehu's views were materially grounded in the realities of his society and were therefore popular and identified with. In fact even the Shehu's ideological views are derived from concrete analysis of the theological disputes in the Sudan.<sup>11</sup> This

---

<sup>9</sup> M.Last & M.A.Al-Hajj,"Attempts at Defining a Muslim in 19th Century Hausaland and Bornu", *JHSN*, III, 2(1965), p.233.

<sup>10</sup> Bivar & Hiskett,"The Arabic Literature...", *op.cit.*, p.140.

<sup>11</sup> Uthman bn Fudi,*Masa il al-Ummat al-Muhammadiya*, ms, NHRS/ABU, P 139/2.

ability of the Shehu seemed to have contributed in the large following which he commanded, and which also explained the malleable attitude with which the *Sarakunan* Gobir had had to deal with him.

Sarkin Gobir Bawa Jan Gwarzo (1771-1789) in whose reign the jihad practically started is said to be "soft" towards the Shehu.<sup>12</sup> Augi therefore sees Bawa's ineffectiveness to check the growing popularity of the Shehu's cause as the logical response to the Shehu's personality, and the fact that he was initially calling for reforms before the forceful overthrow of the Gobir kingdom. But what Augi's opinion seems to show is the analytical ability of the Shehu, which inculcated due respect from the people including Bawa himself.

In practical terms, the Shehu's analysis and the concomitant large following that identified with his cause determined the moral weakness with which the Sarkin Gobir Bawa responded to the growing influence of the jihad movement. In fact, the very reforms advocated by the Shehu imply a complete re-structuring of the economic, social and political institutions of the Gobir Kingdom in particular, and the other kingdoms in Hausaland by extension. The concessions obtained by

---

<sup>12</sup> Augi, *op.cit.*, pp.479-480.

the Shehu in the *Id al-adha* meeting of 1788 from Bawa pointed to the impact of Shehu's critical analysis of the Gobir society. As a result, the influence of the Shehu and his cause increased tremendously. After the death of Bawa, his successors were also incapable of checking the mounting crisis that threatened the very existence of the Gobir kingdom.

In addition to his analytical ability, his charisma and revolutionary character made him a towering personality over the Gobir rulers. It is perhaps this virtue of the Shehu that partly explains the attempt by Bawa to project his own image by his benevolence and generosity towards scholars in his kingdom.<sup>13</sup> Thus, Bawa attempted to solve the crises mounting in Gobir by undertaking to avoid being antagonistic to reforms.<sup>14</sup>

After the death of Bawa, his successors were similarly helpless against the growing power of the Shehu. But after Yabubu's reign, both his successors, Nafata and Yunfa, employed harsher tactics in order to deal with the Shehu. And sensing the danger of physical assault from the Gobir rulers, Shehu had instructed his

---

<sup>13</sup> Gidado, "Raudat...", in Malumfashi, *op.cit.*, p.23.

<sup>14</sup> See Augi, *op.cit.*, p.482. According to Augi, some Gobir traditions claimed that Bawa was a scholar who is even even regarded as a *mujaddid* (reformer) like the Shehu Usman.

supporters to be armed. Thus, on the face of persecutions, the Shehu adhered to his revolutionary goals until the time when the ground was prepared for armed struggle to decide the tide.

The course of the jihad movement-giving some details of the military campaigns-have been treated in a number of works.<sup>15</sup> However, the point to stress here is that, in each of the emirates, besides Gwandu, the pattern and the course of the movement was determined by local conditions respectively. There was no uniform army at the disposal of the *mujahhidun* to undertake the military campaigns leading to the establishment of the Caliphate. Therefore, in the Emirates, local figures rose against the old order and signified their allegiance to the Caliphate by receiving the 'flags' from the Shehu, who was appointed *Amir al-Muminina* (Commander of the faithful) in 1804. But it most also be noted, the success of the jihad forces against the Gobir inspired the local uprisings that culminated to the establishment of the Emirates of the Caliphate.

---

<sup>15</sup> For detailed accounts of the jihad campaigns see Johnston, "The Fulani...", *op.cit*, pp.60-91; Adeleye, "Power and Diplomacy...", *op.cit.*, pp.23-51.

## 2.2 The Development of the Metropolitan Districts.

The establishment of the caliphal authority dates back to 1804 at Gudu, with the *bay'a* to the Shehu after his election as the *amir al-muminin*.<sup>16</sup> By this event, the jihadists had constituted themselves into an independent polity under the political leadership of the Shehu.<sup>17</sup> However, before the capture of Birnin Kebbi, the capital of the kingdom of Kebbi, in 1805, the caliphal authority under the Shehu was not wholly territorially defined. Other communities loyal to the authority at Gudu existed in different parts of the Rima Basin area and beyond.<sup>18</sup> After the sack of Birnin Kebbi, the jihadists established their permanent base at Gwandu.<sup>19</sup> It was largely from this base that campaigns were coordinated in the Rima Basin area.<sup>20</sup>

The initial successes recorded by the jihadists in the Rima Basin area influenced simultaneous response

---

<sup>16</sup> Bello, "*Infaq al-maisur...*" (Whitting), *op.cit.*, pp.70-71.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.88, 105.

<sup>18</sup> Last, "The Sokoto Caliphate...", *op.cit.*, pp.16-17.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p.34.

<sup>20</sup> Hiskett, "*Tazyin...*", *op.cit.*, p.118.



from the *jama'a* in parts of Hausaland. While Alkalawa was strongly resisting by 1808, such powerful kingdoms including Zazzau, Katsina and Kano had fallen to the *mujahiddun*.<sup>21</sup> But the victory of the jihadists at the capture of Alkalawa in 1808 was the most significant event leading to the delineation of the Caliphate in practical terms. This victory had opened up for the structural organisation of the Caliphate.

When the Shehu moved from Gwandu to Sifawa, in the autumn of 1809, Muhammad Bello 'built' Sokoto.<sup>22</sup> The site around which Sokoto emerged is said to have been used by the jihadists, between 1805 and 1808, as a staging and command post for military expedition against the kingdom of Gobir.<sup>23</sup> The establishment of Sokoto, which replaced Alkalawa as the centre of political gravity, was certainly a significant event. For one thing, there was a complete redefinition of the political structure in the Rima Basin region, and for another thing, the foundation to the emergence of the Metropolitan districts of the Caliphate was firmly laid.

---

<sup>21</sup> Zaria fell in 1805, Katsina in 1806 and Kano in 1807. See Johnston, *op.cit.*, pp.60-72.

<sup>22</sup> Abubakar, "Birnin Shehu...", *op.cit.*, pp.24-28.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p.24.

Four years after the fall of Alkalawa, the Shehu, based at Sifawa, undertook the division of administrative responsibilities, to provide administrative machinery for the Caliphate. It is likely the Shehu partly tried to solve political problems that were likely to arise in the region. Meanwhile, Sokoto, under Bello was attracting waves of immigrants from all parts of the region and beyond. At the time of this division Sokoto was fast emerging as a political centre under Bello's control. Traditions in Sokoto claim that when Bello established his base at Sokoto, he had along with him the concentration of youthful population, war commanders and administrators.<sup>24</sup> On the other hand, the Shehu had the concentration of the scholars and older generation at Sifawa, and Abdullahi dan Fodio was living at Bodinga to be nearer the Shehu.<sup>25</sup>

Following the division made by the Shehu, Bello took charge of the eastern section of the Caliphate, Abdullahi took charge of the west, Muhammad Buhari and Abubakar Atiku were assigned the supervision of the south, and Aliyu Jedo, bearing the title of *amir al-jaish* (the commander of the army), was given the

---

<sup>24</sup> Mallam Muhammad Boyi, Kofar Atiku ,Sokoto, Oct.1987.

<sup>25</sup> Last, *op.cit.*, pp.41-42.

north.<sup>26</sup> This division also included Muhammad Moyijo as *amir* Kebbi, whose territory was not initially clear but he was later based at Yabo, which came to be ruled by his descendants. In fact, initially, both Jedo and Moyijo were assigned areas which were vague in territorial delineation, thus being also vaguely categorised as 'royal' emirs by Murray Last.<sup>27</sup>

The administrative division, at the time it was done, had much to do with the Emirates that the jihad movement had created between 1805 and 1812 including the anticipated areas. Thus, Bello was assigned the responsibility of supervising the emirates in the east, and Abdullahi the emirates in the west.<sup>28</sup> Aliyu Jedo was to supervise the northern areas, and Muhammad Buhari together with Abubakar Atiku were to take charge of the southern areas.<sup>29</sup> It is clear that at

---

<sup>26</sup> Muhammad Bello, *Sard al-kalam*, in NAK KADCAP O/AR 1/8.

<sup>27</sup> Last, *op.cit.*, p.43.

<sup>28</sup> By 1812 the 'east' comprised the emirates of Katsina, Daura, Kano, Zazzau, Bauchi, Gombe, Hadejia, Katagum and Adamawa. The 'west' had no established emirate although the jihadists had made some successful incursions into some areas in Dendi, Gwariland, Nupe and Zabarma. But by 1812 Gwandu itself did not emerge as a distinct emirate.

<sup>29</sup> The northern areas were practically confined to Konni, while the southern areas referred to the settlements around Tambuwal and Bakura, which Buhari and Atiku acquired later.

the time this division was done, the territorial division was not practically specified although it was implied.<sup>30</sup> Hence, subsequent political developments in the region, in the final analysis, determined the territorial control of each individual jihad leader. The division, however, made as it were by the *amir al-muminin* guided the political configuration of the Caliphate.

A number of factors were responsible for the transformation of the large section of the Rima Basin into the Metropolis of the Sokoto Caliphate. One of these factors was the political climate in the region by the beginning of the jihad campaigns as well as the political configuration of the Caliphate afterwards. The defeat of Kebbi in 1805 did not ensure a total control of the kingdom by the jihadists, but the kingdom broke into two with the larger section of the Kabbawa, who had established their base in upper Kebbi, effectively resisting the cause of the jihad movement.<sup>31</sup> Similarly the kingdom of Gobir, although decisively defeated in 1808 was not wholly under the effective control of the

---

<sup>30</sup> According to Sa'ad b. al-Rahman in his *Tartib al-ashab*, the Shehu made the division metaphorically. Cited in Last, *op.cit.*, p.44.

<sup>31</sup> Alkali, *op.cit.*, pp.154-155.

*mujahiddun*.<sup>32</sup> This explained the reason why the Caliphate administrator initially stationed to oversee the entire region of Gobir was not successful.<sup>33</sup> The absence of local jihad leaders in Gobir had therefore made indirect control over Gobir territory very difficult.

What obtained in the Rima Basin area, therefore, was the total dislocation of both the kingdoms of Kebbi and Gobir. These polities did not enjoy the sort of territorial continuity that characterised such kingdoms as Zazzau, Kano, Katsina and Daura. For the case of Zamfara, this dislocation dated to about fifty years before the outbreak of the jihad campaigns when the Gobirawa sacked Birnin Zamfara. In the absence of any of the three kingdoms of the Rima Basin re-emerging in their pre-jihad territorial structures, another kind of political arrangement had to evolve.

The founding of new political centres by the *mujahiddun* such as Gwandu and Sokoto was partly as a result of the political condition in the region. This development might not be as a result of the desire on the part of the jihad leaders to completely evolve a new political arrangement as envisaged in their writings. For

---

<sup>32</sup> Augi, *op.cit.*, p.513.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*

instance, it was the contention of the Shehu, in his *Kitab al-farq*, that the jihad movement endeavoured to establish a government based on the principles of the *Shari'a*, which radically differs from the pre-jihad kingdoms in form and structures.<sup>34</sup> But there are no reasons to establish that the jihadists deliberately avoided older political centres in the Metropolitan region, since the Shehu himself recognised the founding of some emirates in the pre-jihad political centres such as Kano, Zazzau, Katsina, and Daura.

When Shehu moved into Sokoto from Sifawa around 1815, the city received an unprecedented population growth which led to its extension.<sup>35</sup> Thus, the emergence of Sokoto and its dramatic growth and development between 1812 and 1817 did, to a large extent, encourage the development of the various *garuruwa*, situated in the Rima Basin, into important administrative units directly under the control of the caliph. This development was further enhanced by the proximity of these *garuruwa* to Sokoto, which by 1817 had emerged as the headquarters of the Caliphate

---

<sup>34</sup> The Shehu was concerned not only with the principles of government but even specified the political structures in terms of political offices and titles in *kitab al-farq*.

<sup>35</sup> Abubakar, *op.cit.*, p.35.

administration. This partly explains the genesis of Sokoto's direct control of the Metropolitan districts, which was thus effected with the succession of Muhammad Bello as the *amir al-muminin*, on the death of his father, Shehu Usman dan Fodio.

The administrative division by the Shehu had placed the eastern portion of the expanding Caliphate directly under Muhammad Bello, and this accelerated the development of the region as an important political centre. The Metropolis covers areas that were formerly occupied by the kingdoms of Zamfara, Gobir and some areas of upper Kebbi. The Emirate of Gwandu, which was initially part of the Metropolis emerged as a distinctive emirate in 1820.<sup>36</sup> Between 1817 and 1837, during the reign of Sarkin Musulmi Muhammad Bello, social policies in terms of urbanisation and sedentarisation of the pastoral groups in the Metropolitan region directly accelerated the growth and development of numerous settlements as administrative units under the direct control of the central administration, based in Sokoto.

One of the major impetus towards the development of the Metropolitan districts was the establishment of the *ribats* pursued by Muhammad

---

<sup>36</sup> Alkali, *op.cit.*, p.162.

Bello. The *ribats* were conceived as frontier posts primarily to serve as buffer to attacks by the enemies of the Caliphate. These defensive posts, however, carried along with this primary function, the seeds for social and economic growth.<sup>37</sup> The *ribats* resulted in the emergence of new towns and contributed greatly to the growth and development of older settlements. In addition, the *ribats* became the means for solving the resettlement problems that followed the jihad wars, and subsequently developed into centres of agricultural production, crafts manufacturing and other economic activities.

Several Metropolitan districts were originally founded as *ribats*. Sokoto itself was initially founded as a *ribat* against the threats of the Gobir kingdom.<sup>38</sup> When Muhammad Bello assumed office as the Caliph, he made concerted efforts to establish the *ribats* during his numerous expeditions. The initial expeditions were against the rebellions by the Gobirawa, Zamfarawa and Kabbawa after the death of the Shehu. Thus, against the threats of the Gobirawa, Bello established for himself the

---

<sup>37</sup> See M.D.Last, "An Aspect of the Caliph Muhammad Bello's Social Policy", *Kano Studies*, 2 (July 1966), p.58.

<sup>38</sup> See Last, "The Sokoto....", *op.cit.*, p.42.



*ribats* at Karindaya, Magarya and Wurno in succession.<sup>39</sup> In his campaigns against Gobir revolt in 1836, Bello also established the *ribats* at Lajinge, Shinaka and Kware.<sup>40</sup> During his campaigns against the rebellion of the Zamfarawa in the same year, Bello established for his son, Ibrahim the *ribat* at Gandi and for his brother, Abubakar Atiku the *ribat* at Bakura. On the Kebbi frontier the *ribat* at Silame was also established.<sup>41</sup>

After the death of Bello in 1837, his successors continued the tradition of founding and re-establishing *ribats* for the same purposes.<sup>42</sup> On the Gobir frontier Sarkin Musulmi Aliyu Babba (1842-1850), re-established the *ribat* his father, Bello had founded at Yanshawara, which later came to be known as Rabah. Aliyu also established Marnona and established, as a resettlement, the *ribat* at Isa when Lajinge was sacked by the Gobirawa. Other *ribats* on the frontiers of the Zamfarawa and the Gobirawa were established at Katuru, south of Isa and Gwamatse, east of Bakura. Aliyu's campaigns were also associated with the

---

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.77-78.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>42</sup> See *ibid.*, pp.79-115.

establishment of some settlements such as Tsafe and Kebbe, while Kotorkoshi was also resettled and Rabah expanded. Sarkin Musulmi Ahmadu dan Atiku (1859-1866), known as Ahmadu Zarruku, established the *ribat* at Chimola and also strengthened the settlements of Moriki and Maradun for defensive purposes. By the closing decades of the century some *ribats* such as Gwadabawa were still being founded.

The policy of founding *ribats* complimented the growth and status of the Metropolitan districts within the Caliphate's political structures. These districts emerged over a period spreading over the greater part of the century, with each district or a group of districts being established or re-established to serve particular social and political interests, and may differ from one another in political and social status. It appears that not all the settlements that were founded for similar reason(s) become significant. Some of the settlements shrank into insignificance and were overtaken by other settlements near them.

Most of the *ribats* in the Metropolis were established to shield Sokoto from attacks by the enemies of the Caliphate, in all directions. Therefore, quite a number of such settlements were situated in the Sokoto central plains. These settlements were also being

controlled by the central figures in the continuing jihad campaigns against the Kabbawa, the Gobirawa and the unyielding Zamfara principalities. Some of these settlements were ruled over by the descendants of the Shehu Usman dan Fodio, some of whom also became Caliphs.

Thus, a number of the *ribats* and other settlements that assumed positions of important administrative units in the Metropolis became an extension of the Sokoto establishment, and therefore maintained direct political relations with the Caliphate administration, in day to day affairs of such districts. Similarly, other settlements including those that antedated the jihad and are situated away from the Sokoto central plains had not only thus come under the direct control of the Caliph in Sokoto, owing to the wholesome state of political condition in the Metropolitan region, but were actually critical to the security and defence of the Metropolitan Caliphate. These districts, some of whom retained their pre-jihad ruling dynasties, were therefore brought under the direct supervision of the Caliph.

Due to the social and political forces underlying the establishment and consolidation of the Metropolitan districts, they became important political centres of the Metropolitan Caliphate. It is because of this

consideration that Na-Dama erroneously believes that what emerged in the Metropolitan region “were many small emirates” under the direct control of the central administration.<sup>43</sup> Similarly, Johnston had earlier on emphasised that the Metropolis was administered on the same line as the Emirates.<sup>44</sup> On the contrary to these simplistic assumptions, however, the Metropolitan districts cannot be seen as emirates-like, or as small emirates-whatever that means. The Metropolitan districts were important political units with some unique status that was dictated by their proximity to Caliphate’s headquarters; political conditions that developed in the Rima Basin region; as well as the eventual configuration of the Caliphate’s political arrangement. Unlike the Emirates, which maintained some sort of indirect political control by the Caliph, the Metropolitan districts were directly under his supervision.

### **2.3 The Socio-Economic Agenda of the Jihad Leaders.**

We have tried to show the social and economic nature of the jihad movement that swept the larger part

---

<sup>43</sup> Na-Dama, *op.cit.*,p.479.

<sup>44</sup> Johnston, *op.cit.*, p.174.

of the central Sudan region in the opening decades of the nineteenth century. Embodied in the writings of the jihad leaders is the socio-economic philosophy, which informed the agenda of the jihad movement and specific programmes of the Caliphate's administration. In their attacks on the political, social and economic structures of the polities of the Rima Basin area and beyond, they provided theories of an alternative social and economic order, which they regarded as the structures of a Muslim government as opposed to the existing structures they regarded as characteristic of non-Muslim governments.

While its philosophical foundation, as derived from the *shari'a* remained unchanged, the socio-economic agenda of the jihad leaders underwent some radical transformations over the period of their active preaching and political administration. Two broad discernible periods in the changing pattern of the socio-economic agenda of the jihad leaders are the pre-Caliphate era and the Caliphate era. In the pre-caliphate period, the jihad leaders propounded their agenda in a more general context. The writers of this period were specifically the Shehu, and to a very small extent his brother, Abdullahi. In the Caliphate period, the leadership was confronted with specific social and economic problems in a given historical circumstance, it

therefore had to specifically address itself to these social problems. In this particular period, the socio-economic agenda of the Caliphate became much more specific in articulation-and even in practice. The writers of the post-jihad period were mainly the Shehu, Abdullahi, Muhammad Bello, Gidado dan Laima, Umar dan Muhammad Buhari, Alhajj Sa'ad, Abdulkadir dan Mustapha and others. But the articulation of the socio-economic programme of the Caliphate mainly rested with the first three personalities.

In each of these two broad periods, there were given historical forces transforming the ideas of the *mujahhidun*. During the pre-caliphate era, there were noticeable changes in the Shehu's socio-political agenda, between the time he wrote the *Ihya al-sunna wa-ikhmad al-bid'a* around the late 1780s and the time he wrote his *Wathiqat ahl al-sudan* around the turn of the nineteenth century. Before 1790, the Shehu was advocating for reforms after which he began a stronger attack on the existing social order. But by the turn of the century, the Shehu, on the face of persecution by the rulers of Gobir, was calling for a forceful overthrow of the kingdom of Gobir and the politics in Hausaland at large.

The Caliphate era, spanning a period of about a century, yet witnessed tremendous transformations of the policies and programmes of the Caliphate leadership. In 1809, after the defeat of Gobir, the Shehu wrote his *Anwa mal-Allah* in which he sought to provide for the social and economic policies for the emerging Caliphate. By the end of the second decade of the century, the Caliphate leadership began to come into grips with specific social and economic problems. Some of these problems were the issues of re-settlement and rehabilitation, social services, economic ventures for the growing populations, as well as the need for increased agricultural production to sustain the increasing population. In response to these and other problems, there emerged specific policies and programmes for the Caliphate being articulated by the leadership over the period.

a) The Pre-1804 Period.

We are told that the leader of the Sokoto jihad movements, Shehu Usman dan Fodio, started preaching at the age of twenty.<sup>45</sup> Most of the Shehu's earliest documented ideas during the early period of his preaching dealt with the social problems in the *bilad as-*

---

<sup>45</sup> cf. Augi, *op.cit.*, p.470.

*sudan*. One of such works is the *Ihya al-sunna wa ikhmad al-bid'a*, a voluminous work written probably in the late 1780s.<sup>46</sup> In this particular work the Shehu dealt with a variety of themes in Islamic sciences, ranging from the commentary on the Holy *Qur'an* (*tafsir*) and the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad (*hadith*) to social analysis with due emphasis on the simple regulations on the daily life, within the context of Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*). In the *Ihya al-sunna*, the Shehu sought to instruct the people on the social conduct among themselves devoid of the exploitative 'customary' restrictions, which more often than not, complicate even the religious instructions on social conducts.

During the early years of his preaching activities, the Shehu seemed to have systematised his efforts at calling on the people to observe simple social virtues against the background of the existing social contradictions in the societies of the *bilad as-sudan*. It is in this direction that most of the early works of the Shehu were written. Some notables among such early works include the *Bayan al-bida'a al-shaytaniyya allati*

---

<sup>46</sup> This work is said to have been edited in Cairo in 1962 but I have not seen a copy. The edited copy is said to contain about 226 pages. However the Ms. copy in the NHR/ABU contains 88 folios of condensed small prints with marginal additions and comments.



*adhathaha al-nas fi abwab al-milla*,<sup>47</sup> the *Kitab al-amr bi al-ma'aruf wa al-nahy an al-munkar*,<sup>48</sup> the *Kitab al-nasa'ih al-umma al-muhammadiya li bayan hukum al-firaq al-shaytaniyya*,<sup>49</sup> and of course the famous work of the Shehu, the *Nur al-albab*.<sup>50</sup>

One common feature of these works is the emphasis on social justice among the people in their daily relation with fellow human beings. The Shehu was also calling on the people to recognise and distinguish between what is right and what is evil, thus, enjoining the people to do good and to forbid the evil. The Shehu further was similarly advocating for social justice to the womenfolk, particularly in their right to education. And, a silent message contained in Shehu's early works is a scholarly exposition of the treachery and atrocities being committed by the ruling classes, particularly those endorsed by the intelligentsia. The Shehu, drawing analogies from the works of many reputable Islamic

---

<sup>47</sup> This work is unedited, but a photocopy of the Ms. is available: NHRS/ABU, p.7/10.

<sup>48</sup> This work is unedited, but a photocopy of the Ms. is available: NHRS/ABU, P119/11.

<sup>49</sup> This is also unedited but a photocopy is of the Ms. is available: NHRS/ABU, K4/17, pp.473-536.

<sup>50</sup> This has been edited and translated into French by Isma'il Hamet in *Revue Afri'caine*, Algies, Vols.Xli & Xlii, 1897/98, pp.297-320 & pp.58-70 respectively.

scholars, made concerted efforts on mobilisation of the intelligentsia to actively support social justice and to forbid injustice.

Towards the end of the eighteenth century, the Shehu though vigorous in his preaching activities, was mild in making political statements. However, the Shehu got a tremendous number of audience during his preaching tours in the Rima Basin area.<sup>51</sup> The success of the Shehu in disseminating his ideas, and of course his growing influence even among the intelligentsia groups, was very much tied up with the social nature of his activities. The growing influence of the Shehu manifested political implications, which the *Sarakuna* of Gobir, after the death of Bawa, could not concede to. The resultant hostile reactions by Nafata and Yunfa softened the ground upon which the Shehu made stronger attacks on the Gobir kingdom in particular, and the other kingdoms in the Rima Basin and the rest of Hausaland in general.

By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the social and political conditions in the Gobir kingdom and the wider Rima Basin area enabled the Shehu to advance his attacks by calling for a new social order in

---

<sup>51</sup> Bello, "*infaq al maisur..*" (Arnet), p.47.

Hausaland. Most of the works the Shehu wrote by the end of the century, were categorical in exposing the socio-economic crisis in Hausaland.

When the tension between the reformers and the Gobir authorities heightened, the Shehu began to advocate for emigration from the Gobir territory and accused the Gobir kingdom and the Hausa kingdoms of perpetrating social and economic illegalities. In his *Masa'il muhimma* written around 1802, the Shehu stated the obligations of emigration in preparation for the struggle against the existing social order. He also cited specific examples of atrocities being committed against the people, such as enslavement of Muslims and exploitation of forced labour. It was also around this same period that the Shehu conceived one of his famous works, the *Bayan wujub al-hijra 'ala al-ibad*.<sup>52</sup> Other major works of the period also include the *Wathiqat ahl al-sudan wa man sha'a alahu min al-ikhwan*,<sup>53</sup> and the *Kitab al-farq bayn wilayat ahl al-Islam wa bayn ahl al-kufr*.<sup>54</sup>

---

<sup>52</sup> There is a draft Translation of this work by F.H.El-Masri in the NHRS/ABU.

<sup>53</sup> *JAH*,II, 3(1961), pp.235-242.

<sup>54</sup> Edited and translated by Hiskett, *BSOAS*, Vol XXIII, Part3, (1960).

While the *Wathiqat* addresses itself to imminent jihad struggles against the Hausa kingdoms, the *Kitab al-farq* made a detailed accusations of corruption and impiety rooted in the political, social and economic structures of the existing polities. The work further provided a detailed explanation on the nature of the Islamic government that should be applied in the Sudan. By 1804, therefore, Shehu's attacks were no longer limited to general accusations, but now made specific cases and propound specific political, social and economic programmes as the answer to the political, social and economic shortcomings which prompted the jihad movement.

#### b) The Post-1804 Period.

The social and economic policies propounded for the Caliphate after 1804 were not only specific but were particularly determined by the problems on the ground. In 1808, when the kingdom of Gobir was defeated by the jihad forces, the Caliphate had practically emerged. The jihad leaders therefore have to answer the basic problems of a new political community. Some of these problems included re-settlement and rehabilitation of the population displaced as a result of the political upheavals that characterised the jihad campaigns. The emergence of new population centres as well as the

expansion of the older settlements created the desire for economic expansion in order to advance the social well-being of the Caliphate community at large. There was therefore the need for new policies and programmes in the light of the criticism and accusations levelled against the pre-jihad kingdoms.

Some of the social challenges to the emerging Caliphate were initially and broadly addressed by the Shehu in his *Anwa mal-Allah*, which sought to provide for social and economic policies for the Caliphate, within the context of the jihad ideals.<sup>55</sup> The work provided the general framework of the social and economic agenda of the Caliphate's administration. The work was meant to guide the rulers of the Metropolitan districts as well as the Emirs in the Emirates of the Caliphate. The *Anwa mal-Allah*, in conjunction with the *Bayan wujub al-hijra*, provided the basis upon which later social and economic policies of the Caliphate were anchored.

After 1812 when the administrative structuring of the Caliphate was effected, its territorial expansion created the need for political structures, as well as the need for the desired social and economic readjustments. The initial problems had been partly addressed by the

---

<sup>55</sup> The work is unedited but there is a photocopy of the Ms. in NHRS/ABU, P139/1.

Shehu in his division of administrative responsibilities. He had also outlined the political structures for the Caliphate, and Abdullahi dan Fodio had written the *Diya al-hukkam*, which formulated the theory of political administration in the Caliphate.<sup>56</sup> Around 1812 Abdullahi wrote the *Diya al-sultan*, which treated the code of conduct for the rulers, and some general social problems in the Caliphate.<sup>57</sup> This work, for instance, specifically dealt with the question of enslavements of people in the Caliphate, the use of pre-jihad political titles and the re-emergence of the pre-jihad social activities in the religious functions such as the use of drums (and music) in worship. These issues raised by Abdullahi would suggest the re-emergence of social contradictions, at an early stage, in the Caliphate. The gravity of Abdullahi's criticism can be appreciated from the nature of Shehu's rejoinder contained in the *Najm al-ikhwan*.<sup>58</sup>

---

<sup>56</sup> This work is said to have been published in Cairo by one Abu Bakr ibn Muhammad al-Fulani, but the same work has been translated into Hausa by Alhaji Haliru Binji as, *Liya'ul Hukkami (Hasken Mahukunta)*, (Gaskiya, Zaria, 1969).

<sup>57</sup> A photocopy of the Ms. is available: NHRS/ABU, P1/2.

<sup>58</sup> In this work Shehu seems apologetic to the criticism of his brother, Abdullahi. The Shehu opens this work by saying:

“My usual custom in most of my works (*ta'alifi*) has been to encourage people not to engage in controversies (*khilaf*) because the learned theologians (*ulama'*) are agreed upon

After the death of the Shehu in 1817, his successor, Muhammad Bello faced new political and socio-economic problems. At the initial stage, Bello had to put up with the revolts of the Gobirawa, Zamfarawa and the Kabbawa, which characterised the region immediately after his ascension as the Caliph. And after the Caliphate had partly stabilised, there was the re-emergence of pre-jihad political culture concomitantly with an increasing number of parasitic social groups. In response to such problems, Bello wrote the *Tanbih al-sahib 'ala ahkam al-makasib*, in 1819.<sup>59</sup> This work extolled the dignity of labour and emphasised the need for self-reliance, through various economic ventures such as agricultural production, trade and crafts manufacturing. In addition, Bello intensified his intention on the social policy of developing *ribats* for multi-purposes. His work *Al-ribata wa al-hirasa* was written to encourage the growth and development of the *ribats* in the region.

---

discouraging people from controversies. My intention in all that...is to protect the structure upon which the community is built (*nizam al-umma*) and to evade the confusion of the general public (*ummah*) by opening a door for controversies. But whoever misinterprets my intentions to the contrary then he will be judged by God on the day that all things secret will be tested."

<sup>59</sup> This has been edited and translated into English by O. Bello, "Development Orientation of the Caliphate of Muhammad Bello", in *Al-Muntaka*, Paris, No.2, Oct.1983, pp.53-66.

As a result of the *ribat* policies, there emerged new big settlements and the enlargement of the older ones. Such development brought into significance the question of land tenure in the Caliphate. In response to this development, Abdullahi wrote the *Ta'lim al-radi fi ashab al-ikhtisas bi mawat al-aradi*.<sup>60</sup> This work dealt comprehensively with the land tenure policies for the Caliphate. It encompasses issues ranging from land proclamation, common land, distribution of land, and public pastures.

The demographic transformations of the region also brought the need for policies on commercial transactions. Trade is a vehicle to provide for the social and cultural integration of the caliphate, as well as to promote resource development, which the Caliphate leadership seem to be very much concerned with. However, in such endeavour the jihad leaders sought for guiding policies within the framework of social justice established by the *shari'a*. It was to provide for these policies that Abdullahi dan Fodio wrote the *Kifayat al-awam fi al-buyu*.<sup>61</sup> In this work, Abdullahi drew heavily

---

<sup>60</sup> This has been edited and translated into English by M.S.Zahredeen as an appendix to his Ph.D.thesis: pp.300-315.

<sup>61</sup> A photocopy of the Ms. is available: NHRS/ABU, P154/4.



from the *maliki* law on commercial transaction. The work dealt with the rules for sales of land, trees and other land resources, the sale of cloth and other merchandise, the sale of gold, silver and other minerals, the sales of slaves, and the sale of domestic animals. Earlier around 1811, the Shehu had broadly written on the system of marketing as regards what constitute cheating as well as the general procedure to be followed in buying and selling. This is contained in the *Siraj al-ikhwan fi ahamma ma yahtaju ilayhi fi hadha al-zaman*.<sup>62</sup> The work was also meant to influence the exploitative tendencies of the retailers in the markets who were bent on making unfair profits.

After the caliphate had achieved its territorial consolidation, there was also the need to guide the Emirs in the Emirates and the rulers of the Metropolitan districts to the pursue of outlined developmental programmes, in line with the ideals of the jihad movement. Thus, Muhammad Bello wrote one of his outstanding works ever known, the *Al-gayth al-wabl fi sirat al-imam al-adl*.<sup>63</sup> This work is perhaps comparable

---

<sup>62</sup> A photocopy of the Ms. is available: NHRS/ABU, K4/11, pp.377-414.

<sup>63</sup> Edited and translated as the main thrust of O. Bello's Ph.D.thesis, *op.cit*.

only to few of Bello's earlier work: the *Infaq al-maisur*, and it provided a comprehensive political, military, social and economic policies of the Caliphate. *Al-gayth* contains most of the other broad policies propounded by the author and those of his father, the Shehu, and his uncle, Abdullahi, in a comprehensive manner. After this work, as Omar Bello has noted, Muhammad Bello did not write any other work on state policy except the *Ifadat al-ikhwan* two years before his death.<sup>64</sup> In fact, after the *Al-gayth* no any other major work on state policy even by the successors of Bello had yet been recovered.

#### 2.4 The Major Socio-Economic Policies of the Caliphate.

##### a) Land and Land Tenure.

The Caliphate's land tenure policy is comprehensively contained in the work of Abdullahi dan Fodio, which has been mentioned. The work was eloquently based on the *shari'a*, as specifically derived from the Maliki school of jurisprudence. Accordingly, possession of land in the Caliphate was recognisable when a certain individual brought that piece of land

---

<sup>64</sup> Bello, "Political Thoughts...", *op.cit.*

under cultivation<sup>65</sup> This acquisition did not seem to be regarded as land ownership but merely rights to ownership for use. Hence the rule being that, any man who cultivates a piece of possessed land for the first time loses his rights to ownership if he neglects that piece of land, and the man who re-cultivates that piece of land claims the rights to its ownership. This policy was however inconclusive since the Muslim jurists are not unanimous in this decision.

Every member of the community had the recognition of accessibility to uncultivated land under the permission of the ruler. These propagated Caliphate's land tenure policies, however, recognised the authority of the rulers in land matters. Thus, a piece of land given by the ruler remains the property of the recipient even if it remains uncultivated.

The land which is situated near population centres was firmly protected according to the Caliphate's endorsed land policy. Rights of ownership over pieces of land immediately surrounding the *garuruwa* were thus more stable to the cultivator even if such piece of land is neglected by him, unless it elapsed over a long period of time and did not object to it being cultivated by another

---

<sup>65</sup> See Zahradeen, *op.cit.*, pp.299-315.

person. If the second cultivator does not know the original state of that piece of land before he cultivates it, he should be compensated for what he spends in bringing that piece of land under cultivation before he returns it to the original cultivator.

Accordingly, there are seven ways of bringing land under cultivation in order to warrant one's rights of ownership over it. These are: firstly, the drilling and the channelling of springs on a piece of land for cultivation purposes; secondly, the removal of water from a flooded piece of land; thirdly, setting up a substantial building on the piece of land; fourthly, considerable planting on the piece of land; fifthly, cultivating by ploughing and breaking up the ground (sowing alone without overturning the soil does not constitute cultivation); the six being clearing the piece of land by cutting or burning its trees; and lastly, breaking the stones on the land and levelling the ground and its steep slopes.

By the ideals of the Caliphate, delimitation of any piece of land by way of fencing it with a wall, stones or whatever with the intention of excluding other people from using it was not regarded as cultivation and it was declared as illegal. Grazing of livestock or digging a well for them on a piece of land did not constitute cultivation. These policies are meant to safeguard the rights of all

members of the community on land resources. The only exception are the *dhimmi*, whose only accessibility to uncultivated land was recognised in the *dazuzzuka* (bushes) situated far away from the *karkara* (farmland) and which were also not public areas.

There are certain areas which were considered public and should therefore not be brought under any form of cultivation. Such areas include the reserved space of the various *garuruwa* from where the people get their firewood and other forest resources or graze their animals, especially if such an area could be reached to and fro in a day's journey. Individuals had exclusive rights over the reserve spaces surrounding their houses particularly their entrances, exits, outdoor stone benches, toilets, drainage and earth storage for building purposes. If a house is surrounded by other people's property, public utility system should be adopted and no one should be allowed to do anything that would cause any harm to his neighbours. Anyone who puts up a building on public paths or adds part of the pathway to his property should be prohibited from doing so, while any building on a pathway should be demolished even if it cause no harm to the generality of the community.

The Caliphate land tenure policies recognised five categories of land. The first is the land taken by force which should neither be sold or given to anyone but remains a common property for the use of community members. The second being the land whose owners concluded peace treaty with the caliphate, and such land belongs to its owners and should be allowed to do what they like with it. The third is the land whose owners become integrated into the Caliphate, and should be treated as the second category. The fourth is the land whose owners fled and was deserted by them, and such a land remains at the discretion of the ruler. The fifth category is the land whose owners neither become integrated into the Caliphate nor entered into any peace treaty, and if such a land passes into the possession of the Caliphate its disposal stands at the discretion of the ruler.

In all matters on land allocation, the position of the ruler to use his discretion is upheld. For instance, the ruler can grant a fief in any location of the Caliphate. The ruler or his deputy reserved the right to determine the use of the common land and the state-owned land. Similarly, the ruler can reserve a common pasture for a particular livestock only. However in these cases, there are four conditions governing the legality of such

discretionary grants. Firstly, the land to be granted falls within the category in which the discretion of the ruler is unquestionable; secondly, the piece of land should be for the use of the Caliphate's members; thirdly, that piece of land should be an excess of what the people of the area use; and, fourthly, for the grant of public pasture, the livestock should be crucial to the security of the Caliphate, such as Horses used in jihad campaigns or Camels carrying goods for the jihadists or animals belonging to the poor section of the community.

There are also policies on sources of water and grazing lands. Abdullahi's work categorised four types of sources of water. The first being water of rivers and springs, which should be regarded as ownerless and therefore meant for the use of the general public. People would have equal right to this water and no one should have exclusive rights over it. The second source is that which is located in an owned land and whose owner benefits like well water. In this case, the owner has the right to sell it and prevent others from using it, except to people suffering from severe thirst and it is feared that they can die. The third source is the water collected from rainfall, like a tunnel from a highland flowing to the lowest land. This should be distributed among the people through whose land the water flows and no one should therefore block its flow to others. In this

particular case, the rule states that each concerned person should collect a maximum of two cubits of the flowing water and allow the rest of his neighbours until the water flows to the lowest land. The fourth source is the water from the wells dug in the desert to water the animals and their rearers. In this case the person who digs the well has priority over its water, but he is not allowed to prevent others from using the excess.

A pasture not located on any one's property should be freely accessible to everybody. But if such a pasture is located on a piece of land owned by someone then the owner has priority over others in using it, but there is no definite policy on the legality or other wise for the owner to prevent others from using it. It is however illegal for any person to prevent grazing rights on a piece of land, which he has left uncultivated because he does not need it. A person, however, has every right to prevent other people from grazing their livestock on land he reserved for the use of his own livestock.

#### **b) Agriculture and Animal Husbandry.**

The land tenure policies of the Caliphate leadership as expounded from the *shari'a* would give the impression of the concern by the Caliphate to achieve highest agricultural and livestock production possible.



Not only that the Caliphate authority recognised the right of every member to accessibility of the land resource for agriculture and livestock, but duly recognised the policy that prohibit any one to corner any piece of land, which he sought to keep uncultivated for the purpose of alienating others. In addition, the leadership recognised the crucial nature of all the viable land surrounding the *garuruwa*; an area of land which seem to have attracted more pressure in the Caliphate.

Agriculture being the mainstay of the Caliphate's economy was explicitly addressed by the Caliphate leadership. In the Shehu's *Anwa mal-Allah*, in which he explained the sources of finances for the Caliphate government, the prominent position of agriculture is firmly stated. As a result of the urbanisation drive in the region following the disruptions caused by the jihad campaigns, there was the need for intensive and extensive agricultural production to feed the increasing population as well as to stimulate other economic ventures. In his work, *Al-ribata wa al-hirasa*, Bello therefore encouraged the people to undertake the tilling of the land to realise the full advantages of earning a living. In fact, Bello's instruction to his *nuwab* (deputies), that is the rulers of the Metropolitan districts was that:

Your main task is to make them  
(the *ribats*) cultivated and  
prosperous, therefore, you  
should assign a plot of land to  
anybody seeking one to develop  
.66

The caliphate leadership sought to encourage increased production in food and non-food crops through both upland and lowland's cultivation. The sedentarisation policies pursued by Muhammad Bello were meant to improve livestock production through its closer integration with agriculture. Although no written works are written in this respect the Caliphate leadership practically encouraged increase in agricultural and livestock production, in the course of the century.

**c) Industrial and Crafts Production.**

Since the early years of the establishment of the Caliphate, its leadership envisaged the establishment of cosmopolitan settlements through the urbanisation policy. In this respect Muhammad Bello remarked that:

there is no doubt man is made  
urban by nature and in need of  
the great majority of the

---

<sup>66</sup> Abd al-Qadir bn. Gidado, *Majmu rasa'il amir al-muminina Muhammadu Bello*, cited in O.Bello, "The Development Orientation...", *op.cit.*, p.55.

people. Human perfection is only  
acquired through urbanisation.

67

Bello strongly encouraged the people to reside in the *ribats*. He is even noted to have remarked that, 'to encamp in a *ribat* for one night is better than one month's supererogatory fasting and prayer'.<sup>68</sup> And in addition, the Caliphate leadership encouraged the people to undertake to crafts production among other economic activities.

When Bello established Sokoto he encouraged occupational groups, most of whom had emigrated from Alkalawa and other areas in the Rima Basin, to settle in various quarters of the city.<sup>69</sup> What he did for Sokoto was also envisaged for the Metropolitan districts and the Emirates. Bello therefore charged the rulers in the Caliphate to:

...foster the artisans, and be concerned with tradesmen who are indispensable to the people, such as farmers and smiths, tailors and dyers, physicians and grocers, butchers and carpenters and all sorts of trades which

---

<sup>67</sup> Muhammad Bello, *Jawab shaf in wa khitab minna kafin*, cited in O.Bello, *ibid.*, p.65, fn.16.

<sup>68</sup> Muhammad Bello, *Al-ribata wa al-hirasa*.

<sup>69</sup> Abubakar, *op.cit.*, pp.55-61.

contributes to (stabilise) the proper order of this world. The ruler must allocate these tradesmen to every village and every locality.<sup>70</sup>

d) Commerce.

Within the context of the *Shari'a* and the practical circumstances of the Sokoto Caliphate, Muhammad Bello classified lawful sources of income in order of preference, and accordingly, the jihad was regarded as the best means of earning a living, then comes trade, which Bello specifically regarded as very beneficial to the people because it is carried out in all seasons.<sup>71</sup> Bello further charged the people to pursue and respect any legal trade no matter how contemptible it is in public eyes. Quoting an *hadith* Bello advised his people to 'take to trade because there are nine portions in it of ten portion of all income.'<sup>72</sup>

In outlining the economic policies for the Caliphate, the Shehu stated the general procedure to be followed in selling of various commodities. For instance,

---

<sup>70</sup> Muhammad Bello, *Usul as-siyasa*, in S.Yamusa, "The Political Ideas of the Jihad Leaders: Being Translation, Edition and Analysis", (Unpublished M.A.thesis, ABC/ABU, 1975), p.41.

<sup>71</sup> O.Bello. "Development...", *op.cit.*, p.57.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, p.60.

in the sales of grains, fruits and meat the use of standard measure and weighting were stipulated.<sup>73</sup> Shehu also charged the commodity retailers to detest making unfair profit. He similarly warned against the hoarding of commodities in order to create an artificial scarcity in efforts to make unfair profits.

The Shehu specifically expounded on the behaviour of retailers and the brokers. According to him, the man who goes to meet people bringing foodstuffs to the market or other produce and buys it before it reaches the market or after it reaches there and then sells it himself must be stopped, and then if he refuses, the commodities should be confiscated and in the last resort, the broker be expelled from the community.<sup>74</sup> The Shehu charged the rulers to 'ward off corruption and to promote the general good as far as possible and at every time in every place'. Thus, the Shehu enjoined the rulers to visit the markets themselves to see things for themselves and correct the evils. This was sought necessary because according to

---

<sup>73</sup> Uthman bn. Fudi, *"Siraj al-ikhwan..."*, *op.cit.*

<sup>74</sup> Uthman bn. Fudi, *"Tanbih al-ikhwan..."*.*op.cit.*

the Shehu, 'the report of a thing is not the same as actual observation'.<sup>75</sup>

The general principle governing the sale of all commodities emphasised the need for mutual agreement and sincerity, and the need to establish a third party (*shaidu*) in the sales which involve personal properties such as a house. But it was declared as illegal for anyone wishing to buy certain thing to engage in commercial bargain with the owner when another prospective buyer before him was in such a process.<sup>76</sup>

e) Taxes and other Forms of Revenue.

In explaining the foundations of a Muslim government, the Shehu mentioned seven kinds of revenue for the Caliphate government. These are the fifth, the tithe, poll tax, land tax, booty and surplus, the property whose owner is missing, and, the property which is ownerless.<sup>77</sup> All these were regarded as forming the public treasury. The implication here being that all these forms of revenue constitute the state's

---

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>76</sup> See Abdullahi bn. Fudi, *Kifayat al-awam fi al-buyu*.

<sup>77</sup> Uthman bn Fudi, "*Kitab al-farq..*", Hiskett, *op.cit.*, p.571.

expenditure, which would be spent for the common interests of the community.

According to the dictate of the *Shari'a* and the practical reality of the Sudan region, there were two earliest stipulated taxes: the poll tax which can be equated with *Kharaj* and the land tax, which can be called *kurdin kasa*. In addition, the non-Muslim subjects were to pay the *jizya*. There are also stipulated levies to be paid by the traders. Apart from these forms of revenue, there are also the stipulated ritual taxes. Accordingly, there is the *Zakkat* (tithe), which is payable in many kinds. There is a *zakkat* of cash, of agricultural produce, of livestock, of minerals and there is also the *zakkat al-fitr*, which is paid usually with agricultural produce on completion of the *Ramadan* fasting. Another form of revenue in this category is the one-fifth of the hidden treasures and minerals, and the one-fifth of booty.

The Shehu had made most of the pre-jihad forms of taxes illegal. These include the *jangali* (cattle-tax), *kurdin gari* ('town' tax) and *kurdin sallah* ('festivity' tax). He also illegalised all forms of official corruption in the form of presents (*gaisuwa*) and gifts. Explaining the dictates of the *shari'a* on presents and gifts to the rulers, the Shehu emphatically warned that:

It is not permissible for a sultan (ruler) or alike, judges and *ummal* (provisional governors) to accept gift from the subjects because it is the gate of every disaster. If the gift gets its way into a person with responsibility then justice and righteousness will evade him.<sup>78</sup>

The acceptance of gifts by a ruler from anyone would amount to receiving a bribery. According to the Shehu, rulers were only to receive gifts from the non-subjects of the Caliphate (unbelievers) in a move to establish some form of intimation, or from a tyrant ruler outside the Caliphate for the same purpose. Rulers were also allowed to receive gifts from their close relations (by blood), who are also not suspect. But in all these allowed cases the gifts should be regarded as *fay'a*, which should be deposited into the treasury (*Bait al-mal*). Similarly all gifts coming from *ummal*, the provincial governors, to the *caliph* is declared unlawful and should be deposited in the treasury.

All lawful forms of revenue to the state should be collected by the ruler or on his instruction and deposited with the public treasury. The revenue thus collected become state-owned, which should be disbursed for the

---

<sup>78</sup> Uthman bn. Fudi, "*Anwa mal-Allah...*", *op.cit.*



common benefit of the community at large. In this respect the Shehu stated that:

The way of just *Imams* concerning booty and the one-fifth is that a beginning should be made by sealing off the dangerous places, and the frontiers, and with the making ready of weapons of war and the pay of the soldiers. If anything is left over, it should go to the judges and the provincial governors, and the building of mosques and bridges. Then it should be divided among the poor, and if there is any left over then the *Imam* should choose between dividing it among the rich and keeping it against disasters (which may afflict) Islam [the community].<sup>79</sup>

Thus, disbursement of public resources is to be determined by the interests of the community. In addition, the rulers are to take into account the security of the community's existence. The public treasury is therefore to cater for the benefits of all section of the community. In the *Al-ghayth*, Bello enumerated the legal ways through which the amirs should spend the monies of *Fay'a* (state-owned) and the *jizya* collected from the *dhimmis*. The first way is to ensure adequate

---

<sup>79</sup> Hiskett, *op.cit.*, p.571.

provision for the security of the community through purchase of arms and the salaries of the soldiers.<sup>80</sup> Other ways include infrastructure development in building public utilities, and welfare package to the poor section of the community. As for the *zakat al-fitr*, it should be given to the poor residing in the nearest place to where the *zakat* is given. As for the booty, Bello stated that the first thing to be done is to deduct from it the cost of storing it and transporting it and the remainder should be divided into five shares: the first share is *Fay'a* , while the four-fifth should be divided among those who were present at the battle with the intention of fighting and were among the warriors. The one-fifth which is *Fay'a* is to be disbursed for the common good of the community.

#### **f) Slavery and other Forms of Social Labour.**

Within the context of the jihad ideals, slavery arises either from captivity, the prisoner being a non-Muslim, or from birth, the mother being a slave. In the Caliphate therefore, the concept of slave would only primarily apply to those captured in the process of the jihad campaigns, and the ultimate aim is to integrate

---

<sup>80</sup> See O.Bello, *op.cit.*, pp.292-324.

these slaves into the Caliphate community. The principles of the *shari'a* stipulated for a humane treatment of slaves, who are to be hopefully integrated into the community through kinship relations. In fact, by the outbreak of the jihad wars, the jihad leaders had criticised the selling of people as slaves, and the Caliphate ideals therefore sought to stamp out such practices.

The Caliphate leadership was very critical of all forms of forced labour imposed on the people of the Sudan by the rulers of the pre-jihad kingdoms. These included the conscription exercise commutable into money payment (*gargadi*) and forced labour in the royal farms (*gayyar sarki*).<sup>81</sup> The Caliphate leadership therefore spelt out the illegality of forced labour appropriated by the ruling classes. Labour units are to be formed for the purposes of undertaking communal projects, which would benefit the community such as building of roads, schools and mosques.

**g) Professional Services.**

One of the major economic policies of the Caliphate leadership was also to encourage the people to pursue legal means of earning a living through mental labour.

---

<sup>81</sup> See Hiskett, *op.cit.*, p.568.

The Shehu thus spelt out some professionals whose expertise duties should be paid for.<sup>82</sup> The first is a teacher who imparts functional knowledge to others. But whoever is given a gift because of his knowledge it is unlawful for him to accept unless the giver believes in the usefulness of that knowledge. And even if one gives out a gift in the belief of the usefulness of recipient's knowledge and later discovers otherwise, the gift becomes illegal. Similarly, it is illegal for any one to accept something because of his righteousness or uprightness.

Other professionals whose services require wages include the Physician who puts practical efforts on a patient but not simply through expertise advise by words. The Physician should not take a reward for one word which he directs for a medicine in an area which he is a specialist, such as the one who specialises in the knowledge of plants, which treats humourhords and the like. In this case the Physician is not allowed to take a reward for such prescription or for his knowledge because his knowledge is not transferable to others.

Experts in professions such as the sword repairer who straightened the bend or sharpen it should take

---

<sup>82</sup> See Uthman bn. Fudi ,*"Anwa mal-Allah.."*, *op.cit.*

wages for such jobs because such works requires energy and mental efforts. Similarly, a lawyer can take a reward, which should be considered as wages if his efforts require some energy and endurance or his action requires long speech provided that such an act is not meant to achieve an illegitimate action. However, if his purpose could be achieved with a word, which does not require any extra effort, then he should not take any reward.

Generally, the Caliphate leadership regarded the professional services that should attract wages to be those activities that requires functional usability of an expertise knowledge even if such knowledge is not transferable, or those that require putting substantial efforts or application of rare manual skills. But the nature of all services should be positive and legitimate in accordance with the principles of the *shari'a*.

## CHAPTER THREE

### LAND TENURE, AGRICULTURAL SYSTEMS, PASTORALISM AND ANIMAL HUSBANDRY

#### 3.1 The Role of the State in the Grant of Land and its Resource Use

In essence, the Caliphate authority was vested with the control of land and its resources under the guiding principles of the *shari'a*<sup>1</sup> The guiding philosophy aimed at achieving the overall economic well-being of the Caliphate was propounded by Sarkin Musulmi Muhammad Bello through founding *ribats*.<sup>2</sup> This policy was to be augmented by promotion of commercial networks, industrial activities and sedentarisation policies so that the agricultural, industrial and pastoral sectors would be integrated and the desired economic development of the Caliphate would be advanced.

One of the earliest tasks of the Caliphate leadership in the newly found *ribats* and other resettlements was the question of redistribution of land.

---

<sup>1</sup> See above, pp. 109-117

<sup>2</sup> Muhammad Bello, *al-ribata wa al-hirasa*..... *loc.cit.*

Bello indeed gave orders to his deputies in the Emirates and the rulers in the Metropolitan districts to distribute land.<sup>3</sup> We have no data to determine how land requests were attended to; whether or not particular interests of the rulers influenced land allocation. In the correspondences between the *caliph* and the rulers in the Caliphate, cases or complaints over land allocation are not common

In the pre-jihad era, the *Sarakuna* in Hausaland possessed recognised guardianship over land and its resources in their areas of jurisdiction. In theory there were supposedly certain social and political norms to regulate land matters. These norms were obviously at the discretion of the *sarakuna*.

In the Rima Basin, for instance, the *Sarakuna* of Kebbi, Zamfara and Gobir, as trustees, were all vested with the right to grant land as well as to delegate the same to their subordinate *Sarakunan garuruwa* in their respective domains.<sup>4</sup> There were also many conditions that regulate land tenure. For example, a man who cleared a farm would become the unquestionable 'owner', or a piece of land could be obtained through a

---

<sup>3</sup> See O. Bello, Development Orientation.....*Loc.cit.*

<sup>4</sup> Harris, Gazetteer...*op.cit.*, pp.273-274; NAK SNP 6 703/1907.

gift with the permission of the ruler, or with a permission of the ruler a piece of land could even be purchased. But no member of the community should be alienated from land. The *sarakuna* could also give out a piece of land as a gift or as a fief to political officials in the kingdoms. It is important to note that land tenure since the pre-jihad period was largely influenced by the Islamic laws particularly the *Maliki* law.

In practice, land tenure systems in the pre-jihad period were prone to many abuses, while the structures of the *sarauta* system further gave the *sarakuna* enormous powers in land matters. Although the Caliphate era did not differ in structures with the preceding era, the Caliphate authority however gave clear cut guiding rules and regulations on land matters, which were widely publicised as one of the key social programmes of the Caliphate government.<sup>5</sup>

During the pre-jihad era, chains of rulers, from the *Sarki* at the peak of the state's political structure down to the *Sarakunan garuruwa* and *Hakimai*, all possessed similar control of land and its resources in their respective areas of immediate control. With the obvious

---

<sup>5</sup> The work by Abdullah bn. fodio is widely known in the many *Ulama'a* in Sokoto area during my field work: Abdullahi bn. fodio, *Ta'alim al-radi fi ashab al ikhtisas bi mawat al-aradi*, Trans. in Zahraddeen, *loc.cit.*



lack of any clear cut principles and regulations to govern land matters, there was relative ambiguity even in theoretical framework of land policies in the Rima Basin area. Furthermore the political structures of some of the kingdoms in the region also promoted an ambiguous picture. For instance in Zamfara, the various *garuruwa* were administered as provinces with some greater sense of autonomy in political matters. In this particular case, the provincial rulers have their own local basis of authority and this tended to create some differences in land policies within the same kingdom.<sup>6</sup>

However unlike the pre-jihad period, the Caliphate leadership was conceived in the framework of an *imamate* embodied with established principles of delegation of authority. The general code of conduct on land issues, that is the *shari'a*, was uniformly clear. In reality however, the political structures that emerged in the Caliphate would not provide a uniform approach to political and socio-economic issues.

The first practical task on land matters to the Caliphate leadership in the Metropolis was to distribute land. The processes of land distributions were pursued in the Metropolitan districts, which in itself attracted

---

<sup>6</sup> For example in eastern Zamfara land taxes existed, which were not common in other areas. NAK SNP 15 369 A 3.

waves of immigrants into the region.<sup>7</sup> The rulers in the Metropolitan districts were said to have actively encouraged settlements of immigrants into their areas.<sup>8</sup> The very act of land distribution by the rulers in the Metropolitan Caliphate symbolised the concern of the caliphate authority towards effective land utilisation in the Caliphate during the early years of the century.

Although every member of the Caliphate community would have access to a piece of land, the political officials seemed to have proportionable huge area of land under their control. For instance, it was striking to me to learn how a portion of land, which Sarkin Musulmi Muhammad Bello gave to the *Imam* of the Shehu mosque in 1820s was still by the end of 1980s being fragmented into plots by the *Imam's* offspring in addition to the huge tract of land, which has been set aside for agricultural and livestock production by the members of the homestead.<sup>9</sup> This situation could also be obtainable in respect of the other leading political personalities of Sokoto such as Magajin Gari, Magajin Rafi, Ubandoma, and Waziri.

---

<sup>7</sup> Alhaji Shehu Na-Liman, Kofar Atiku, Sokoto, June 1989.

<sup>8</sup> Mallam Abdu, Waziri Junaid's house, June 1989.

<sup>9</sup> Alhaji Shehu Na-Liman, *loc.cit.*

In the course of the nineteenth century, the leading political figures in the Caliphate, based in the capital city, acquired landed properties in the various Metropolitan districts. These properties were supervised on their behalf by their appointed men. Thus, for example at Wurno the Galadiman Gari of Sokoto, the Magajin Rafi, the Magajin Gari and Ubandoman Gari all had titled officials: Sarkin Gida, Maiyaki, Shifkau and Marafa, respectively who looked after their interests in the district.<sup>10</sup> Similarly, a colonial officer, Mr. Y. Kirkpatrick gathered from Sarkin Rima of Wurno that, during the Caliphate era, the only recognised holders of private estates were the male and female descendants of the various leading political figures of the Metropolitan Caliphate who received unconditional gifts of land.<sup>11</sup>

It cannot therefore be assumed that the Caliphate leadership did regulate the grants of land resources equitably to every member of the community in the Caliphate era. On the contrary, the *sarauta* class that re-emerged appropriated land resources to the disadvantage of the commoner class.

---

<sup>10</sup> NAK SNP 7 1140/1911

<sup>11</sup> NAK SNP 7 1140 A.

Nevertheless, there are indications to argue that the Caliphate era marshalled a remarkable improvement in an effective utilisation of land resources in the Metropolitan districts of the Sokoto Caliphate.<sup>12</sup> It is on record that the Metropolitan region experienced agricultural improvement in terms of increased production of food and cash crops during the nineteenth century.

The Caliphate leadership recorded particular achievement in the utilisation of the river valleys for the cultivation of cash crops and tendering of *Lambuna* (gardens), which were scattered in the region, particularly around the river banks, ponds, small lakes and generally within the alluvial soils. The encouragement towards the growth of *Lambuna* in the region was encouraged by Muhammad Bello who himself took to it as a personal enterprise. This foundation was to be built upon by the cultivators in the region. The development of the gardening sector of

---

<sup>12</sup> Some well documented observations on land and agriculture in the Metropolitan region of the Caliphate by the two famous European travellers who visited the area, H.Clapperton and H.Barth, described a well cultivated and well planted areas all over the areas they passed through. See H.Clapperton, *Journal of a second Expedition*, (John Murray, London, 1826), *passim*.; H. Barth, *Travels and Discoveries in Northern and Central Africa* ( 3 Vols., Frankcass, 1965), Vol III, *passim*.

agricultural production carried along with it some important socio-economic consequences.

### 3.2 Forms of Land Ownership

It is important, at the beginning, to clearly understand the concept of 'ownership' on land matters as far as the policies and programmes of the caliphate government were concerned. Ownership would mean the right to use, which is however inheritable. Since land is state owned, it was therefore illegal to sell land. In this sense therefore, possession of a piece of land could not be taken to mean possession of a personal property that one could dispose any how he wishes. Possession of land, within the context of the ideals of the Sokoto Caliphate, was tied to the practicability of putting that piece of land under cultivation.

Different forms of land ownership in the Caliphate is contained in the work of Abdullahi dan Fodio.<sup>13</sup> In this particular work, two major categories of peoples' rights to land ownership are discernible: the believers (the Muslims) and the non-believers (the non-Muslims). The Muslims were the members of the Caliphate properly speaking, while the non-Muslim would be the protected members of the Caliphate. In each category,

---

<sup>13</sup> See pp. 109-115

there were specific conditions that guarantee different forms of land holding.<sup>14</sup>

In the first category, which is our main concern, there were two forms of land holding. The first is what can be termed as membership allottee. Every member of the community was entitled to a piece of an uncultivated land. The second form was fief holding. This was granted to the titled officials of the Caliphate. The second category concerned the *dhimmi* (the protected non-Muslims), who can be politically regarded as an appendage of the Caliphate. The *dhimmi* would pay the *jizya* for their use of land resources, as well as for the protection provided them by the Caliphate authority. In fact, the *dhimmi*'s access to the land is restricted to areas far away from the population centres. Furthermore, their basic form of land holding can be regarded as "rental". In the Metropolitan Caliphate, there was no community which was officially designated with the *dhimmi* status.

a) **Membership land holding:** This was the common form of land holding in the area. In the Caliphate, the principles guiding land tenure was

---

<sup>14</sup> *ibid.*

theoretically conceived within the *waqf* system.<sup>15</sup> Nevertheless, socio-political condition in the Metropolis did make easy access to the land by the peasantry. This was further reinforced by the plentiful nature of the land resource itself. Throughout the century, there was near absence of conflicts and undue pressure over land in the region. In cases where oral data provide some evidence of conflicts or/and pressure on land, the reasons have more to do with ecological than socio-political factors.

Membership land holding was both qualitatively and quantitatively affected by a number of reasons. One of these was the viability of the available land. In practical terms the viability of land would determine the pressure on land resource itself, which in effect would reflect on the distribution of population. In areas such as the Gundumi, Tureta bush, Tangaza and Gulbin Ka forest areas, there were no significant population

---

<sup>15</sup> *waqf* means, settlement of property under which ownership of the property is immobilised, and the user is devoted to a purpose which is deemed charitable by the (Islamic) law. See A Coulson, *A History of Islamic Law*, (Edinburgh, 1964), p.241. In theory, *waqf* as a system of economic integration designate the institutionalised movements through which the elements of the economic process—from material resources and labour to the transportation, storage, and distribution of goods—are connected. However, different systems operated under the term *waqf* by different societies in history: in Ottoman Turkey, Egypt, al-Magrib, Byzantine Empire, and so on.

centres, whereas in the central districts, there was a high population density.<sup>16</sup>

In the high density areas such as Sokoto itself, Wurno, Rabah, Kware, Dundaye, Gwadabawa, Acida, Gandi, Marnona and Kalambaina, as well as in districts such as Binji, Yabo, Birnin kaya, Moriki, Zurmi, Anka and Kaura-Namoda land holding for agricultural production was between 2.5 to 5.5 hectares on average. In areas with sparse population, fields for agricultural production were quite smaller, ranging between 0.08 to 1.05 hectares on average.<sup>17</sup> In actual sense, the sizes of agricultural fields were determined by the size of each farming household, the *gandu*.

b) **Fief Holding:** This form of land holding was the preserve of the aristocracy. Fief holding developed not only as the 'power generator' of the aristocracy, but also the concrete means through which this class consolidated and enhanced its power bases. Fiefs proliferated as the class expanded.

---

<sup>16</sup> cf. D.W. Norman, J.C. Fine, & A.D. Goddard, *A Socio-Economic Study of Three Villages in the Sokoto closed-settled zone: Input-Output Study* (IAR/ABU Samaru) Miscellaneous Papers, 2 Vols., 1976), *passim*.

<sup>17</sup> See K. Swindell, "Population and Agriculture in the Sokoto-Rima Basin of North-West Nigeria: A Study of Political Intervention, Adaptation and Change, 1800-1980", *Cahiers d'Etudes africaines*, 101-102, Vol. xxvi, 1-2, pp81-86.



In the capital city of the Caliphate, Sokoto, all the leading state officials of the Caliphate possessed fiefs around the city. In addition, many of them, if not all had landed properties in other areas of the Metropolis, particularly in the 'royal' districts. Thus, for instance, the Galadiman gari, Magajin rafi, Magajin gari and Ubandoman gari, all possessed fiefs in districts such as Wurno and Kware.<sup>18</sup> Some state officials also had fiefs in the districts that fall within their sphere of political supervision, such as Ubandoma in the case of Gusau.<sup>19</sup> It could also be possible that the Ubandoma also had some landed property in Kontagora in the 1860s when he assumed the supervision of the Emirate.<sup>20</sup> Within the Metropolis, virtually all the local political officials held fiefs in their respective areas.

c) **Other Forms of Land Holding:** In addition to the two main forms of land holding, there were other forms of land acquisitions, which were not exclusive forms or categories in themselves. The main characteristic of these modes of land acquisition is the strengthening of individualised form of land holdings.

---

<sup>18</sup> Alhaji Shehu Na-Liman, *op.cit.*

<sup>19</sup> See Last, *op.cit.*, p.100; Abubakar, *op.cit.*, pp.201-202.

<sup>20</sup> Last, *loc.cit.*

These modes of land acquisition were to gradually transform both the pre-jihad communal land tenure principles and the Caliphate's principles of community land holding into a permanent structure of private land ownership.<sup>21</sup>

One of the transactions which create new modes of land acquisition is gift. Normally members of a farming family, the *gandu*, were allocated pieces of land (*gayauna* or *kurga*) by the *maigida* on which they grow their own crops. In certain cases also, some children would receive gifts particularly after they had married. And, land transferred by gift before the death of the *maigida* would not be included in the properties to be inherited by the children and other members of the *gida*, as the case may be. There were thus cases of inheritance in which land would be divided among the offspring of the deceased. By the mid-nineteenth century, other forms of land acquisition was also effected through purchases, which involves complete alienation of land in return for money. It is not very clear whether *jingina* (pledge or lease) was common, but there are indications that many cases of land purchases

---

<sup>21</sup> See A.D.Goddard, "Land Tenure, Land Holding and Agricultural Development in the Central Sokoto Closed-Settled Zone, Nigeria, in *Savanna*, Vol 1, No. 1, June 1972, pp 29-41.

were initially on the bases of *jingina*.<sup>22</sup> During the reign of Sarkin Musulmi Ahmadu Zaruku (1859-1866) cases of land purchases were very common so as to have warranted the caliph's orders to curtail buying and selling of farms.<sup>23</sup> In fact, by the time of Sarkin Musulmi Umaru (1881-1891) sales of land were very common in the Metropolis including Sokoto town itself.<sup>24</sup>

It is widely known that land tax or any other form of related taxes were never officially levied in the whole of the Metropolitan region of the Sokoto Caliphate.<sup>25</sup>

### 3.3 Agricultural Production and the Development of Cultivation Techniques

#### a) The Transformation of Agricultural Production

The political transformations brought about by the Caliphate in the Metropolitan region expanded and intensified agricultural production. The Caliphate's economic policies laid strong emphasis on agricultural production, and this foundation was laid by Muhammad

---

<sup>22</sup> Shehu Na-Liman, *op.cit.*

<sup>23</sup> Harris, *Gazeteer...*, *op. cit.*, p. 274.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>25</sup> See Last, *op.cit.*, pp 103-104; Harris, *op.cit.*, p.105 (Vol III); Abubakar, *op.cit.*, p. 193.

Bello in whose reign the Metropolitan Caliphate experienced tremendous agricultural transformation. The basic foundation was the multiplication of the new population centres in the region. The immigrants were drawn from the pre-jihad political centres, with a long history of surplus food production and a new political atmosphere had emphasised increased production.

The impact of Bello's social and economic policies were far reaching. The accounts of Clapperton indicate a remarkable development of agriculture along all the areas of the Metropolis he passed through. On his way from Zurmi through Magarya to Sokoto, Clapperton noted that:

...every spot capable of cultivation was planted with millet and *dowra* [guinea corn], which was in fine condition.<sup>26</sup>

Ordinarily, population density meant a high labour input available, but indications have shown that the population was practically utilised in agricultural production in our region. Thus, although the soils of the Sokoto plains is not the best in the Central Sudan region, there was a possible correlation between substantial agricultural production and sustained strenuous labour

---

<sup>26</sup> Clapperton, "Journal..." op.cit.,p 192.

in the area.<sup>27</sup> The precepts of the caliphal political system seemed to have influenced the employment of substantial inputs of labour in the course of the century. For in the tropics, where hoe cultivation is dominant, adequate labour power provides the key to successful agriculture. The hoe type of cultivation system is dependent on population density; as population increases, so agriculture becomes intensified and fallow systems give way to permanent field cultivation.<sup>28</sup> Agricultural practices in the Metropolitan Caliphate in the 19th century seemed to have followed these patterns, although population in itself is not an independent variable, since we need to understand the historical processes that bring about population increase and the kinds of production relations which support particular populations.

Importantly however, not only did the concentration of people around the Metropolitan districts provide a demand for agricultural produce, it also provided the means. The immigrants into the

---

<sup>27</sup> See E. Boserup, *The condition of Agricultural Growth: The Economics of Agrarian Change Under Population Pressure*, (Allen&Unwin, London, 1965); A. M .D. Sutherland, "The Organisation and Redistribution of Labour in Peri-Urban Sokoto" (Unpublished Ph.D.thesis, University of Barmingham, 1985).

<sup>28</sup> Boserup, *op.cit.*

region, as peasants, slaves, or as clients, transformed the region agriculturally through cultivation of their farms and the agricultural estates, *gandaye*, owned by the aristocracy. Many areas were agriculturally transformed by a complete group of immigrants. For example, Gwomfa, Dundaye, Gidan Bubu and Safatawa were agriculturally transformed by the Adarawa who founded these settlements, when their leader Sarkin Adar followed the Shehu to Sokoto.<sup>29</sup>

Another factor which facilitated agricultural transformation of the Metropolitan Caliphate was the availability of huge inputs of manure to enrich the light porous sandy soils of the sedimentary rocks and the superficial deposits of the Sokoto plains. Land regeneration by the application of compound sweepings, old latrines and the dung of sheep and goats kept is common throughout Hausaland. This practice was widely applied in the Metropolitan districts, and donkeys were used to transport this refuse and manure out to the farms, where it is hoed into the ground.

Similarly, the Sokoto Rima Basin area is an important source of the dry season grazing for the

---

<sup>29</sup> See S. Abubakar, "Aspect of An Urban ...." in Usman(ed.), "Studies in the History of the Sokoto Caliphate....." *op.cit.*

nomads who come down from the northern areas into the region at the end of rainy season. In addition, as a result of the sedentarisation policies initiated by Muhammad Bello, large number of nomads settled in the region, which in the course of the century also introduced into this region large number of cattle, which were kept in various settlements and trekked out to the fields to graze on crops residue, or on the grasses of the uncultivated *fadama* during the dry season. Hence, both the nomadic and local herds became an important means of improving upland through manuring as the animals graze across the farmland. During the wet season, animals from the the various districts were taken out to the empty bush areas such as those around Rugu, Tureta and Gundumi. To improve this practice, as early as the 1820s, Sarkin Musulmi Muhammad Bello initiated the movement of herds through the cultivated farmland along organised drove routes, which were marked by the planting of *arguwa* trees (Demkon arguwa), popularly known as *burtali*. Cattle do not eat these trees, which have the added advantage that they also yield latex which can be used to repair calabashes used by fishermen as floats. This practice of organising *burtali* became widely applied in the Metropolitan districts, some of which still exist today.

The development and intensification of agriculture in the Metropolitan Caliphate was greatly enhanced by the opportunity provided by the perennial Sokoto-Rima Basin, which made the cultivation of the floodplains widespread in the course of the century. The lowlands made possible rice cultivation in the wet season, and the cultivation of the irrigated crops such as onions, tobacco, and bananas in the dry season. Clapperton and Barth, both of whom visited the region in the course of the century, were particularly impressed by the cultivation of the *fadama* lands and the system of irrigation being employed. Particularly Henry Barth mentioned the rice fields which he saw being cultivated along the Sokoto-Rima valley at Wuruno, as the most extensive he had seen on his journeys.<sup>30</sup>

By the third decade of the century, both upland and lowlands cultivation techniques had grown to some sophisticated levels of environmental management, which operate at the micro-scale, being responsive to seasonal and annual changes in climate. Within the framework of the Caliphate's political structures and the land tenure system, agricultural development was nurtured within the terrain of the pre-jihad socio-

---

<sup>30</sup> Barth, *op.cit.*, p 125.



agricultural sectors: the peasant based agricultural order, within the patrilineage group, supported by the royal agricultural estates and individualised production outputs.

**b) Agricultural Techniques and Cultivation Systems:**

A number of studies have shown a dominant continuity of the basic methods of farming and the types of crops grown from their development hundreds of years ago in Hausaland. Colonial sources, the writings of contemporary scholars and even oral information and casual observation clearly show a continuity of long established methods of foodstaple production and the techniques of upland and lowlands farming.

Farmland in the Metropolitan Caliphate can be divided into two basic types: upland (*tudu*) on the low plateau, and lowlands (*fadama*) along the edges of the rivers and the bottoms of their tributaries. Upland farms are cultivated only during the wet season as they are rain-fed; *fadama* farms are also cultivated in the wet season, primarily for rice, but cultivation may continue into the dry season by using shallow wells, or lifting water from the rivers. Upland farms have soils which are largely man-made, and require continuous inputs of manure, while floodland farms have soils which are

renewed annually by sedimentation and may be supplemented by manuring. In the area which is referred to as the Sokoto close-settled zone, around Sokoto city itself: Kware, Wurno, Acida, Rabah, Dundaye, Gagi, Kalambaina and Bodinga, many farmers integrate upland and floodland cultivation along catena of soils from the rivers edge up the basal slope of the valley side and onto the upland; this progression embraces several land-use elements and micro-environments which are used differentially according to the type of crop, season, soil and hydrological conditions.

i) Upland Cultivation Systems:

Upland cultivation was the predominant agricultural activity in the Metropolitan Caliphate. Upland agriculture embraces the entire south-eastern section of the region, geographically referred to as the high plains of the Sokoto-Rima Basin, covering such districts as Moriki, Kaura-Namoda, Gusau, Tsafe, Kurya, Bungudu, Maru, Nahuce and Anka. It also embraced the central districts of the Sokoto plains and its northern edge, consisting of areas around Gwadabawa, Tangaza, Talata-Mafara, Birnin-Kaya (Maradun), Gora, Gummi, Yabo, Dogon-Daji and Tambuwal.

The main food crops grown on upland farms are *gero* (bulrush millet), *dawa* (guinea corn), *wake* (beans),

and *gujiya* or *gyada* (groundnuts) which are of two varieties: *kwara-kwara*, small white seed usually grown by women; and, *mai bawo*, two kernels in one nut. In the central plains, the most important of the foodcrops is millet of which there exist varieties and many local names which farmers used to describe the form and habit of the plant. For example two common varieties are *zango*, a long slender spiked millet, and *wuyan bajimi*, which literally means 'bullneck' and is much shorter and thicker spike.

However, a basic distinction was between *gero*, early millet, and *maiwa*, late millet. *Gero* can be harvested within about 107 days, whereas *maiwa* and *dawa*, guinea corn, can take up to 145 days, which can therefore exceed the number of rainy days during the wet season. Thus, *maiwa* and *dawa* rely on residual moisture in the soil in order to ripen fully, and yields fall if the rains come late, or end early. Furthermore, the longer growing period of these crops means their development may be limited by changes in light intensity related to day length (photoperiodicity). *Gero* which breaks the hungry season can be harvested in August-September, while *maiwa* is ready in November-December. Therefore the cultivation of *gero*, which is important in the Sokoto plains and the closer areas of the high plains, is not without risk; if the early rains

prove premature, the crop may have to be replaced or abandoned. Some farmers actually plant millet in advance of the first rains—a practice known as *binne*, which is a calculated risk. This may not be more inconvenient than planting after the first rains, which may prove false, but if they succeed the hungry season is broken that much earlier. Farmers however interplant early and late millet with guinea corn, as this spreads the risk of crop failure.

Throughout the century, a variety of food crops cultivated on the upland in Hausaland were either widely or locally grown in virtually all the Metropolitan districts. These include *acha* (hungry rice) locally grown in the southern areas of the high plains, *alkama* (wheat) which was widely grown in the south eastern areas, *aya* (tiger nut) mostly grown by women all over the region, *doya* (yam) which is mostly grown in the high plains, *kubewa* or *guro* (okra) which is widely grown mostly by women as a compound crop, *gwaza* (koko yam) widely grown in the southern areas, *kabewa* (pumpkin) grown mostly by women as a compound crop, *dankali* or *kudaku* or *lawur* (sweet potatoes) widely cultivated and normally planted at the end of the rains and dug up about December, *masara* (maize) widely grown in the high plains but mostly as a compound crop, *ridi* (beniseed) locally grown in many parts, *rogo* (cassava)

widely grown throughout the high plains and the Sokoto plains, *rizga* (artichoke) locally grown in the high plains around Anka and Kotorkoshi, *takanda* ('sorghumic' sugar cane) grown locally in the south eastern areas, and, *yakuwa* or *sure* (sorrel) widely grown in the region.

Several important types of cash crops were also grown on the upland farms. Such crops include *baba* (indigo), which was widely grown in the high plains and the north eastern parts of the Sokoto plains. Another crop is *duma* (bottle gourd) which is grown particularly around Anka and Gummi districts. The large variety of *duma* are used for constructing fishing pots, for drums and for making *korai* (calabashes), while the small varieties are grown in compounds usually by women and are eaten and also used for making domestic utensils. Other crops include *abduga* or *kada* (cotton), mostly grown in the southern and eastern areas, *lalle* (henna) widely grown in the region, *taba* (tobacco) cultivated in the high plains on upland farms, and, *rama* (hemp) is also widely cultivated in farms and compounds and is used for eating and also used for making ropes and for thatching. *Rama* leaves are cooked and served with spices and its threads (*bawon rama*) is used for making the rope and thatching.

In the Metropolitan districts, interplanting was widely practised. This method allows the cultivation of two or more crops on the same piece of land in the same season, and planting and harvesting are either staggered or in succession. Henry Barth noticed how sorghum and cotton were cultivated in the same fields near Gandi, while at Zurmi he saw indigo and cotton being cultivated between rows of sorghum and at Rubo, indigo was grown between millet.<sup>31</sup> The same method was earlier recorded by Clapperton at Magarya.<sup>32</sup> Wallace visiting the region much later in the century also recorded the method of intercroppings, which he described as economically advantageous.<sup>33</sup> Mixed cropping is essentially crop rotation within one growing season, as different crops with different nutrient crop requirements complement each other. Mixed cropping is an important technique for spreading risk and smoothing labour inputs. Studies have shown that mixed cropping minimises the returns to labour, which is frequently the scarcest factor. The most common mixed cropping in the region was the combination of legumes

---

<sup>31</sup> Barth, "Travels....." Vol iii, *op.cit.*, p. 90

<sup>32</sup> Clapperton, "Journal..." *op.cit.*, pp. 178-192.

<sup>33</sup> W.Wallace, "Notes on a Journey through the Sokoto Empire and Borgu in 1894", *Geographical Journal*, VIII, 3, Sept. 1896.

with cereals. The advantage being that, since the soil on the Sokoto plains is not particularly good, legume helps with nitrogen fixing properties.

Cultivators in the region had adopted one important method which enabled them to minimise the physical constraints of climate, soils and biological factors. This method is the use of ridges in farming. Ridging when combine with the application of manure and ash, allows a concentration of soil and nutrients around plant roots and increases the thickness of soil and its fertility. Also, it limits erosion, especially if ridges are built along contours, while ridging improve generation of the soil as well as providing channels to either catch or drain water, depending on the crop planted. Ridges are constructed in several ways; the determining factors usually being the availability of labour inputs and the moisture need of the crops. For example, millet and guinea corn can be planted on the flat and manure laid in lines between rows. During the first weeding the young plants are ridged up and manure mixed around their roots. This method has the advantage of economising labour especially if it is in short supply. Another method is whereby ridges are made and seed planted along the furrow to catch the early rains; then the ridges are turned in and around the

crops at first weeding. In this method the crops began in the furrow and end up in the ridges.

In the south eastern areas, the soils are in most cases heavy; of the *laka* type. In this areas crops that do not like too much moisture such as groundnuts are planted along ridge tops. On the Sokoto plains soils are especially light and rainfall variable .Here furrows are a means of collecting rain, particularly the early showers, therefore, early millet and sometimes guinea corn are planted along the furrows. The amount of ridging and the disposition of crops depend on the labour available, together with local soil and rainfall conditions.

Generally upland cultivation requires less continuous labour inputs, unlike lowlands cultivation. However the region has high temperatures and quickly covered by grasses and weeds once there have been several rain showers. Hence, regular weeding is highly valued. In fact, a sort of weeding 'calender' was followed in order to obtain good harvest. Usually the first weeding, *noman fari*, is necessary about ten to fourteen days after planting and may be combined with ridging. The second weeding is referred to as *mai-mai* (repetition) usually undertaken about four weeks or so later, and this is then followed by turning the soils and keeping it around the base of the plant, a process which



is called *huda*, and which if labour is available is followed by the third weeding, *sassarya*. The importance of this is widely recognised since in certain cases yield crops can be reduced as much as half if planting is either delayed or weeding is inadequate.

In our region it was the local ecological variation that determined the nature of crop mixture and land-use elements. However, population density and the pressure on land could also be significant contributing factors. For crop mixture, the farmers recognised that different varieties are planted according to palatability and suitability sites. For example, on cultivating *dawa* one of the foodstaple in the region, different varieties became common to certain areas: on the Sokoto plains the common variety is *janjari*, a red form of the guinea corn species and *fara-fara*, a white form which is early maturing; and, in the south-eastern areas the common variety is *kaura* which is yellowish, although *fara-fara* is also cultivated. In the western districts their common variety is called *malle*.

To buttress their land-use techniques, farmers had their methods of classifying soils; their land use potentials and the farming technology appropriate to each type of soil. In this manner, the farmers systematised their responsiveness to soil conditions,

recognise its colour, texture and the types of weeds that grow. Similarly, the farmers have variable agricultural calendars, which divide the year into seasons, and also divide each season into stars. For example, the stars during *damina* (wet season) each implies the general pattern and volume of rainfall during its period. This is based on the lunar calendar, and there are indications that this calendar was widely known and had a lot of influence on the farmers in the Metropolitan Caliphate.<sup>34</sup>

Throughout the region, the hoe was the basic agricultural tool. In the south eastern districts, ox-ploughs were being used. There are many different types of hoes which are fashioned to suite specific jobs and types of soils. A short-handled hoe with a straight blade (*kwasa*) is used to clear land before planting, and at harvest to cut guinea corn at the base of the stem, which lay it on the ground ready for the heads to be cut. A long hoe (*sungumi* or *fartanya tsaye*) is used to plant millet on the flat, where the soil is broken to a depth of a few centimetres to receive the seed. Where ridging is required, a large bladed curved hoe with a short handle

---

<sup>34</sup> Many calendars which I have seen during my field work are very much similar. I have also seen a copy of the calendar which is said to have been written by Muhammad Bello.

(*galma*) is used, while weeding is done with a small hoe, (*fartanya*).

In the Metropolitan Caliphate upland cultivation progressively developed through adaptation and intensification of intercropping, manuring and crop rotation as the techniques for the management and improvement of the soil. In areas of high population density such as the central districts, and where land areas were intensively cultivated, such areas were fallowed for one or two years.

ii) Floodland and Lowland Cultivation:

Floodland and lowlands cultivation is associated with the *fadama* area. *Fadama* is any low-laying land which is subject to seasonal flooding, or water-logged, and includes the floodplains of streams and rivers which have been inundated, together with seasonal pools and depressions where land is moistened due to the rise in the water table.

Studies on *fadama* cultivation in the region had concentrated on the land on the floodplains of the Sokoto-Rima Basin, land along its tributaries and the areas of shallow depression and valley heads which dissect the upland with the Basin. The whole of this area however can be described as the *fadama* belt of the

Metropolitan Caliphate. But in the course of the century, *fadama* cultivation became extensive in the districts on the lowlands capable of sustaining *fadama* cropping.

*Fadama* cultivation requires intensive labour inputs. It also encompasses a wide range of farming methods and crops, which rely on farmers having a detailed knowledge of the extent of surface flooding, water-table, water levels, slopes, bundling and building raised beds, water lifting, well digging and the use of crop mixture relays. Certain *fadama* land may be continuously used, from the wet season through dry-season. This is more particularly with the land on shallow depressions and valley heads, where swamp rice is grown in the wet season and then followed by a variety of dry season crops which rely on accumulated soil moisture or irrigation. Both the labour requirements and the techniques of *fadama* cultivation seemed to have been fulfilled by the farmers in the Metropolitan Caliphate, both of which have been fully documented in the accounts of the travellers that visited the region in the course of the century.

The main crop being cultivated in the floodland in the region is rice, which is cultivated along the main floodplain of the Sokoto and Rima rivers from Goronyo, Wurno, Kware around Sokoto, and below towards

Birnin-Kebbi in the Gwandu Emirate. Along this stretch, it has been found out that some thirty varieties of rice are recognised, mainly of the indigenous species: *oryza glaberrima*, although there are some of the *oryza sativa* species, which were introduced between the 16th and 18th centuries by the Portuguese, and presumably diffused from the coast up the Niger river.<sup>35</sup> Farmers use the species and varieties in accordance with the depth of flooding of the area, the speed at which water rises, and the rate at which plant must grow.

During the course of the century, cultivation in the area was concentrated around the tributaries of the Sokoto and Rima rivers and in some Valley heads. These areas offer the advantage of continuous cultivation throughout the year, especially in areas where flooding is less and farming easily adapted to the rise and fall of water tables. One important advantage is that the same piece of land can grow two or three crops in succession. In such situation, irrigation cultivation become important for cultivation of variety of crops.

Lowlands cultivation in the dry-season by irrigation was common in the region. This type of

---

<sup>35</sup> A.J.Carpenter, "The History of Rice in Africa" in I.W.Buddenhagen & J.G.Persley (eds.), *Rice in Africa*, (Academic Press, London, 1978), p. 201.

cultivation is carried out in small plots in which different types of crops are grown. The common crops include onions, peppers, tomatoes, sugar cane, sweet potatoes and cassava. The cultivation of each of the variety of crops in the *fadama* requires specific techniques. For example, sets of small beds of about 6 m<sup>2</sup> (*fangallai*) which are defined by earth bands of some 150 mm in height are constructed to cultivate onions. These *fangallai* are linked with the irrigation device. Since the waterflow depends on gravity, the onion farms have to be carefully engineered to assure the right amount of dip across the system of beds. The cultivation of tomatoes and sweet potatoes require specific farming techniques because of their less requirement of excess moisture. But *fadama* cultivation in the region seemed to have generated new techniques and wider cropping of varieties in relatively small plot of land.

Lowlands cultivation was of considerable importance to the farmers in the region. *Fadama* offered the opportunity to cultivate both in the wet season and in the dry season, which in effect means dry season cropping preceding wet season crops. As a result, dry season crops such as *rogo* (cassava) and *rakke* or *arakke* (sugar cane) spans both seasons.

On fadama lands, the basic agricultural tool is *galma*, but where soils may be heavy and raised beds are to be constructed, large bladed hoes of the *galma* type are used, which are more like hand-ploughs.

### c) The Role of Peasant Agricultural Production and the Gandaye in social Production

Studies that generally examine aspects of agricultural production in the Sokoto Caliphate have, in varying degrees, depict the significance of slave labour in the Caliphate's social production. The focal point has always been fitted on the output of the *gandaye* (the large agricultural estates), and in specific reference to our region, it is the *gandayen sarauta* (royal agricultural estates), which are slave-based. These *gandayen sarauta* in the region, owned by members of the aristocracy, are called *runji*, *rumada* or simply *gandu*. The significance of these slave-based estates in the Metropolitan Caliphate influenced responsive studies into the nature and role of slavery in social production.<sup>36</sup> While Lovejoy painted a slave-based economy in the Caliphate's social

---

<sup>36</sup> P. E. Lovejoy's, "Plantation in the Economy of the Sokoto Caliphate", *JAH*, xix, 3(1978), pp. 341-368, is one of the earliest attempt in this direction. Recently Jumare's study specifically examined the institution of slavery in Sokoto City: I.M. Jumare, "Slavery in Sokoto City, 1804-1936" (Unpublished MA thesis, A.B.U., 1988).

production, Jumare confirms the 'manifestation of the slave owning mode of production' in the Sokoto area.<sup>37</sup> These issues will be discussed in chapter five, but here we intend to discuss the nature and significance of the peasant-based agricultural production in relation to the slave-based production in the *gandaye*.

It is important to clarify the usage of the term, *gandaye*. There were three main classes of *gandaye* in the Sokoto Caliphate: there were *gandayen sarauta*, which are royal agricultural estates attached to political offices; there were *gandayen masu sarauta*, which are agricultural estates held by members of the royal class in their private capacities; and, there were the *gandayen riko* or *gandayen masu arziki* which are agricultural estates held by rich individuals. In the Metropolitan Caliphate, the first two classes existed although it is very difficult to distinguish between the two.

In the Metropolis *gandaye* were owned only by the members of the aristocracy. Since *gandaye* depended largely on slave labour, and, in the region the mode of acquiring slaves was the preserve of the aristocracies, it is therefore very difficult to draw a line of distinction between the 'personal' *gandaye* and the

---

<sup>37</sup> Lovejoy, *ibid*; Jumare, *ibid*, p.13.



'official' ones. It is also for this reason that the agricultural estates held by the titled officials would have been large. There are indications that some scholars in the region own some form of agricultural estates, but labour condition in these estates differ very much with the *gandayen sarauta*. However, there were no slave based agricultural estates owned by scholars or merchants as was the case in some parts of the Caliphate.<sup>38</sup>

To assess the significance of peasant agricultural production in comparison to the slave-based agricultural estates means to examine and evaluate the productive output of each, and then to relate each to its position in social production. In so doing we will be able to grasp the role of each in reproducing the caliphal system, or, in economic sense, to comprehend the economic base of the Caliphate, which illuminates the dominant relations of production, then we shall be able to come to grips with the mode of productive relations that supported the Caliphate's political and legal structures.

But to clearly evaluate the productive output of each category requires a statistical data of production over time. This method is not just difficult but it is also

---

<sup>38</sup> Lovejoy, "Plantation Economy..." ,*op.cit.*, pp. 361-362.

not applicable in the task at hand. This is due to the time factor and the nature of the data itself. It has already been declared that 'there is a general lack of sources describing the organisation of rural production' in the Caliphate.<sup>39</sup>

Of course, lack of statistical data is not a hindrance in attempting the task at hand. From the available data and evidences from the general pattern of historical development in the region, it is quite reasonable to suggest, that, slave-based agricultural estates-whatever their significance-played a secondary role to peasant agricultural production in the Metropolitan districts of the Sokoto Caliphate. It is the lack of such a clear conclusion in the major works on slavery and slave-based agricultural estates in the Caliphate that implied (or even explicitly) suggest otherwise. The prominence given to these agricultural estates, without due qualification, create erroneous notion that these estates-taken all together-constituted the basis of social production in the Metropolitan Caliphate, or in the Caliphate as a whole, or even in the Sokoto city.

It is true Sokoto city and its immediate environs received, perhaps, the largest number of slaves than the

---

<sup>39</sup> Goddard, "Land Tenure...", *op.cit.*, p.30.

other parts of the Caliphate in the century. This do not imply that Sokoto has the largest number of slaves than any part of the Caliphate in the nineteenth century. It was the availability of slave labour and land resources that encouraged the aristocracy to establish slave-based agricultural estates around the Sokoto city and the surrounding districts. For this reason, Sokoto city, where the aristocracy in the region was based, had a substantial impact of slave-based production in its economy. The repercussion of this development seemed to have had serious effects on the region, particularly the central districts. It is also true slave labour was not only limited to the agricultural sector but played certain roles in commerce and crafts production.

But even in Sokoto city itself, slave-based agricultural production would seem to have been of secondary importance within the city economy. Jumare has shown the significance of the slave-based agricultural estates in the Sokoto economy.<sup>40</sup> We are told these estates produced grains and foodstuffs, some of which supplied the Sokoto market and were traded across the trans-saharan trade routes.<sup>41</sup> We are also told

---

<sup>40</sup> Jumare, *op.cit.*, pp.87-89.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*

some of these estates around the *fadama* produced fruits and vegetables<sup>42</sup>

We have no data to show the total peasant land holding in comparison to the total land area of all the estates around Sokoto city. But for sure, no one is likely to suggest that-whatever the exact figure-the total production from these slave based agricultural estates would exceed or even equal total peasant production output in the same area. Though it is also not possible to quantify the amount from peasant production that gets into the markets in comparison to the possible amount from the slave-based agricultural estates, it would seem more suggestive that peasant production was obviously the largest in all respects. This will be easy to contemplate given the needs by the peasants to meet their other social obligations, and considering the fact that marketing their agricultural produce was the surest way of raising sources of income by the peasantry. Available data has shown the predominance of peasant land holding and productive output in *fadama* cultivation. And, due to the nature of labour demand and their cultivation techniques, *fadama* plots are normally small.

---

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*

But when examining land management by the slaves in the agricultural estates around Sokoto city, Jumare found out slaves to be indifferent to the fertility of the soil, and single crop was usually cultivated for longer time.<sup>43</sup> This would seem to suggest a manifestation of very low production output in these agricultural estates. The very practice of giving slaves their own plots of land to produce their own crops naturally induced the slaves to give best of their time in their personal farms. Perhaps it was as a result of this that peasant populations living near the agricultural estates were forced into such estates' labour force by the aristocracy as we are also told by Jumare.

With all glaring evidences before him, Jumare erroneously relegated all other forms of labour to slave labour in social production in the Sokoto city.<sup>44</sup> It is in this context that his conception of the decline of slave owning mode of production in Sokoto with the blockade of the sources of slaves by the colonial aggressors without altering the social order in Sokoto appears contradictory. Jumare contended that, with the decline of the slave labour, the other forms of labour continued

---

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, p.79.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.13-14.

to support the economy and society of the city. But this is quite strange and surprising that the decline of the dominant mode of production did not bring about any radical transformation in the economy and society in the city. We shall however examine wider issues in this respect in chapter five.

We do not intend to relegate the importance of slave labour in social production in the Metropolitan Caliphate, but we only strive to place it in its proper perspective so as to properly comprehend its nature and significance in the Caliphate's economy. There is no doubt that slave-based agricultural estates owned by the aristocracy promoted increased food production and the luxuries, which were highly valued and demanded by the members of the aristocracy class. This development did facilitate commercial activities and industrial and crafts manufacturing.

Slave-based agricultural estates were not the innovation of the caliphal system. Such estates had existed in the pre-jihad kingdoms, in the Rima Basin area and in the kingdoms of the wider Central Sudan region. We do not know much about the pre-jihad slave-based agricultural estates, but there are indications that the nature of the estates in the Caliphate was a 'manifestation of the legacies' of the pre-jihad

kingdoms.<sup>45</sup> However such agricultural estates in the Metropolitan districts were perhaps an improved types of the pre-jihad types.

It should be clearly pointed out that the basis of social production and reproduction in the Metropolitan Caliphate lies in peasant agricultural production. Peasant agriculture was the backbone of the economy of the agrarian society in the area. Peasant land holding, land management and cultivation techniques were responsible for the adaptation and changes that characterised development of agricultural practices and improved cultivation output in the Metropolitan Caliphate.

Peasant farmers not only provided the greater stock of crops and the non-food crops used by the expanding crafts industries, but they also tender, within their farms, a variety of economic trees whose importance apart from uses for fuel and construction, are also sources for food and medicine for human beings and their animals. The baobab (*adansonia reticulata*), for instance, can be used for soups, its bark for rope and net-making, the seeds and bark are also used for medicine. The seeds of the locust bean tree (*parkia*

---

<sup>45</sup> cf. Augi, *op.cit.*, p.538.

*clappertonia*) are also used in soups, the fruits is used to sweeten fruit and drinks, and the bark is used for tanning in dyeing cloth and decorating pots. Winter thorn (*acacia albida*) and black plum (*vitex cienkowskii*) both provide leaves and fruits for animal fodder especially during the dry season.

Similarly, the *fadama* areas also contain a variety of grasses and weeds which can be used as fodder, roofing materials, and medicines for human beings and animals. For example, a small shrub, known locally as *tattaba* (*clerodendrum capitatum*) grows on uncultivated *fadama* in the dry season, and the leaves are collected and mixed with milk and given to children with chest complaints. In fact, seed and fruits collection was an integral part of annual cultivation systems, and can be extremely important in times of food scarcity when populations have to fall back to collecting leaves and seeds to supplement their diminished supplies of grains. Animals such as cows, sheep and goats also become more reliant on these sources.

#### **d) Agrarian Crises and the Role of the Caliphate Leadership in its Management**

....droughts and famine were integral parts of the economic ebb and flow of the desert edge of the central sudan during the nineteenth century...The history



of this area has been coloured by long-and short-term cycles of growth, famine and recovery....<sup>46</sup>

Our earlier discussion in chapter one, and at the beginning of this chapter had clearly shown the vulnerability of agriculture to unpredictable climatic conditions. The Metropolitan Caliphate was an agrarian society, whose agriculture largely depended on upland cultivation. In this case therefore, any society that is dependent upon rainfed upland cultivation, precipitation becomes the critical factor. The larger part of our region carry a soil-water deficit at the onset of the rains, and the crucial crops are largely dependent on the distribution and quantity of precipitation. Thus, the temperature condition in our region is such that the prosperity of the growing season is dependent upon the quantity and the distribution of annual rainfall. Therefore inadequate rainfall did trigger drought and famine. In addition to variability in rainfall, other environmental factors also constituted threats to agrarian societies. These include disease, pest and weed infestation, and erosion.

---

<sup>46</sup> M. Watts, *Silent Violence-Food, Famine and Peasantry in Northern Nigeria* (University of California Press, Barkely & Los Angeles, 1983), p.139.

Our focus is on agrarian crises and its management, in which not only the environmental factors play the critical role but also where human actions, within the context of the social relations of production, are also of fundamental importance. Drought is a climatic phenomenon, while famine is a social crises. In the Metropolitan Caliphate a relationship of causality existed between the two. The terms locally used illustrate the point clearly. *Fari* (drought) explains wholly meteorological anomalies, which would invariably lead to low agricultural yields, at certain times of insignificant quantity in relation to subsistence requirement, or at certain times of mere subsistence level. *Yunwa* (famine) conceptualises the general social condition arising from inadequate food requirements to fulfil the basic physiological needs of human beings. *Yunwa* is therefore the logical effects of *fari*. But while *fari* is wholly gravitated by environmental conditions, *yunwa*, depending upon the severity of *fari*, is gravitated by social condition such as mode of food control, distribution mechanism, and effectiveness of the distribution systems.

The Central Sudan region has a documented history of droughts and famines. But studies on droughts and famine in Hausaland contain no specific data on the

Metropolitan Caliphate.<sup>47</sup> It is correctly noted that a precise historical reconstruction of actual pre-colonial famines must forever remain elusive.<sup>48</sup> While desired details of droughts and famines in our region is unknown, the general consequences and broad parameters of famine behaviour are however discernible. In addition, existing sketchy remarks on droughts and famines in our contemporary sources including oral data could offer some basis for reconstructing, in general sense, the nature of agrarian crises and its management in the Metropolitan Caliphate.

There were, broadly speaking, documented droughts and famines in the nineteenth century that engulfed the wider region of the Caliphate.<sup>49</sup> The effects of these droughts in the Metropolitan Caliphate are confirmed by oral information.<sup>50</sup> In the first decade of the nineteenth century, it is said that famine was experienced in the Metropolitan Caliphate and the

---

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, p.102; P.Lovejoy & S.Baier, "The desert side Economy of the Central Sudan", *IJAHS*, 8(1975), pp.1-42.

<sup>48</sup> Watts, *op.cit.*, pp.141-142.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>50</sup> Group interview: Makarantar Mallam Boyi, Kofar Atiku, Sokoto, Sept.1987; Group Interview: Gidan Baban Sambo, Kofar Atiku, Sokoto, Sept.1987; Group Interview :Gidan Mallam Murtala Zawiyya, Gusau, Sept.1987; Group Interview:Gidan Mallam Babba, Kaura-Namoda, Sept.1987.

eastern emirates following the jihad campaigns that disrupted agricultural activities, compounded by the poor harvests of the 1790s, during which droughts affected a large area of the central Sudan region, with attendant consequences on severe food shortage.<sup>51</sup> During this period, the *mujahhidun* had to put up with sporadic hunger arising from shortages of cereals. This initial difficulty perhaps played a role on the strong pursuance of the social policies of Muhammad Bello during the second decade of the century.<sup>52</sup> In the 1860s, during the reign of the Sarkin Musulmi Ahmadu dan Atiku (known as Ahmadu Zarruku), there is said to be droughts for about two years running, whose effects were particularly felt in Sokoto and the northern districts.<sup>53</sup> This drought was perhaps related to the well known famine, *banga-banga*, which ravaged the northern areas of the Sokoto Caliphate particularly Daura, Kano, and Katsina emirates in the late 1850s.<sup>54</sup>

In addition to the capriciousness of rainfall that brought about drought and famine in the region, locust

---

51 Lovejoy & Baier, "The Desert Side..." *op.cit.*, p.570.

52 Mallam Ummaru Sambo, Gidan Waziri, Sept.1987.

53 Mallam Boyi, *op.cit.*

54 Watts, *op.cit.*,p.102; Lovejoy & Baier, "The Desert Side....", *loc.cit.*

invasion and other epidemics also brought about havoc to our societies. The epitome of these was around 1890s about the same time when the famous rinderpest epidemic, *sannu*, in 1893 brought about devastating effects on the pastoralists in the region and beyond. The years 1887-1891 were associated with one of the terrible period of rinderpest in the wider region of the Caliphate spreading from east to west.<sup>55</sup> In most cases rinderpest seemed to be preceded by drought and famine on a large scale.<sup>56</sup>

In certain cases, famine may be geographically contained within a smaller area. In the Metropolitan Caliphate there seemed to be indications of numerous cases of droughts and famines that affected only few districts. In 1826, for instance, Clapperton heard at Magarya that the district had experienced serious food scarcity for two years; a situation in which many people died as a result of hunger.<sup>57</sup> Such local crises however can be situated within the context of the nature of rural production in the region in which, even during a normal year, the critical months before harvest were generally

---

<sup>55</sup> F.W.de st. Croix, *The Fulani of Northern Nigeria* (Gregg International, Westmad, 1972), p.13.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>57</sup> Clapperton, "Journal.....", *op.cit.*, p.192.

of some hardship. In this circumstances, a poor harvest due to drought would make itself felt by the following dry season, and if the following harvest become poor a dangling threat of acute shortage emerged. In effect, the dynamics of rural production in the area would seem to require three years of good harvest; the duration of maximum storage capacity of the farmers' facilities, in order to achieve considerable advancement.

The effects of drought and famine in our region had been considerable. Famine is known to bring about a number of socio-economic dislocation to the rural dwellers. One of such effects was emigration out of the immediate locality, and in some cases the emigrants looked for wage labour in order to sustain themselves. Migrant labour is said to have been very significant in Sokoto city particularly in the crafts industries such as tannery, pottery, cloth-making and dying.<sup>58</sup> In fact, wage labour (*kwadago*) could be a social feature of an urban community such as Sokoto when rural dwellers simply leave their homes to work as wage labourers, but its magnitude was, of course, facilitated by agrarian crises in the country-side.

---

<sup>58</sup> Abubakar, "Birnin Shehu..." *op.cit.*, pp.65-67; Jumare, *op.cit.*, p.55..

Famines did cause some demographic changes in our region. Severe famines are known to have occasioned the movements of populations completely from their original homes to travel outside their localities, sometimes founding new settlements and settled there permanently. Other demographic consequences of drought and famine in our region include high mortality, with infants and aged people suffering the highest rate. Even when the effects of drought and famine did not lead to death, or seeking for wage labour, or complete emigration, oral histories had tales of terrible socio-economic misfortunes, which completely changed the status of several families with accompanying devastating psychological effects.

Practically famine itself has a certain logical sequence deriving from a chain of interacting events which makes it, in a sense, predictable.<sup>59</sup> The impact of climate variability had actually made the farmers prospectively equipped for meteorological anomalies like drought. Hence, in the words of Watts:

Hausa farmers did not sit and starve, or respond randomly when harvest failed; they adopted characteristic modes of famine behaviour graduated

---

<sup>59</sup> Watts, *op.cit.*, pp.139-140.

with respect to time....The households had a clear vision of where they might turn for direct assistance..<sup>60</sup>

In response to famine effects, farmers in the Metropolitan districts adopted and intensified some typical sequence of strategies. As a precautionary measure, farming strategies were adopted by the cultivators in order to curb, to the barest minimum, the effects of drought at the onset of the disaster signals. Thus, in the Sokoto central plains, for instance, diverse method of crop mixes were adopted to maximise productive value and to also maximise nutrient crop requirements.<sup>61</sup> Crop mixes or mixed cropping is an important technique for spreading risk. Different land use techniques were subject to different soil conditions in the region, which the farmers recognised according to colour, texture and type of weeds growing. In most areas, *gero* (early millet) and *wake* (beans) are mostly mixed with other food crops. The exact patterns of mixed cropping depend on the moisture condition of the soil.

The farmers recognised that soil fertility was maintained by the intercropping of nitrogen-fixing legumes, subtle use of crop mixtures and intensive

---

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, p.140.

<sup>61</sup> M.Aliyu, "Modifications of Agricultural Techniques in Response to Drought, Illela, Sokoto," (Unpublished BA dissertation, ABU, 1976)



manuring from the dry season visits of the Fulani cattle, domestic livestock dropping and ash. The farm's layer was naturally enriched through these manuring practices, which simultaneously raised the moisture holding capacity of the soil. While techniques such as ridging and bundling served to preserve moisture and to minimise the possibility of seed erosion during intense storms. All these methods and techniques were aimed at maximising production and thereby reduce the risk below subsistence production during droughts. Furthermore, the farmers cultivate certain crops such as *rogo* (cassava) along *fadama* margins, which were of particular importance during droughts. *Rogo*, unlike other tubes, can adopt to low rainfall conditions, being planted immediately after the sorghum and millets and harvested eight to ten months later when domestic foodstuffs are at their lowest ebb.

During the real period of scarcity, farmers began to collect and use, what has been regarded as, famine foods. These are available among the farmed parkland trees, shrubs and grasses. Prominent among these are *kadanya* (shea butter), *goriba* (dum palm), *giginya* (*borassus abyssinica*), *faru* (nem), *kurna* (christ's thorn), and *aduwa* (desert date). The shrubs include *sabara* (*guiera senegalensis*), *dilo* or *zayi* (*boscia senegalensis*) and *gwandar daji* (custard apple). Among grasses in the

region, *komayya* (*eragrostis spp.*) was specifically regarded as a famine food.

Provident responses to threats of famine also involve a diverse elements of temporary and short term available reliefs among household members, and any other form of reliefs from the neighbours or the state. But it is very clear that domestic mutual support was very crucial in managing agrarian crises in the region more than any other form of assistance from the state. This form of assistance was a component feature of what is referred to as the 'peasant's moral economy'.<sup>62</sup> A sort of communal assistance has been systematised principally due to regular occurrence of localised droughts, which affect certain areas or group of families in the Central Sudan.

It should be stressed that a sort of community welfare mechanism, which maximise security for the households in times of agrarian crises pre-dated the

---

<sup>62</sup> See J.Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant*, (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1976), and his critics : M.Adas, "Moral Economy or Contest State?: Elite Demands and the Origins of Peasant Protest in South East Asia", *Journal of Social History*, 15(1980), pp.521-546; R.H.Bates, "Peoples in Villages: Micro-Level Studies in Political Economy", *World Politics*, 31(1978), pp.129-149; B.Cummings, "Interest and Ideology in the Study of Agrarian Politics", *Politics and Society*, 10(1981), pp.467-495; and, S.Popkin, "The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Peasant Society", *Theory and Society*, 9(1980), pp.411-471.

establishment of the Caliphate. This welfare insurance had been anchored on the social structure of the corporate peasant communities. As Watts rightly noted:

The peasant patterns of social control and reciprocity structured an insurance to subsistence subsumed in both horizontal and vertical ties as primary normative concerns. Hence webs of kinship reciprocities maintained a collective resiliency among households, and gifts giving was most intense among close kin, within descent groupings, and between bond friends and neighbours. Variants of reciprocity were also evidenced in more formalised associations, often between individuals of different social status. For example, vertical relations between patron and client reflected cases in which reciprocal obligations, rights, and norms were closely defined and morally enforceable.<sup>63</sup>

In the Metropolitan Caliphate, a variety of 'peasant insurance' strategies played significant roles in managing agrarian crises. It could be assumed that members of the aristocracy might have played certain roles in patronage capacities. Since members of the

---

<sup>63</sup> Watts, *op.cit.*, p.

aristocracy owned large agricultural estates it is also possible that the proceeds from these farms would have been used in relief measures during agrarian crises.

We have no evidence to show that the Caliphate authority, as a state, did provide relief measure in cases of crises, or that the Caliphate state spear-headed relief packages in times of famine. Jumare has mentioned that the proceeds from the *gandayen sarakuna* were stored in central granaries of the state and were given to the peasants in periods of famine.<sup>64</sup> Watts has earlier indicated, that, in cases of crises the state was looked upon by the peasants as one of the sequence of options upon which they could turn for direct assistance.<sup>65</sup>

It is very difficult to establish the distinction between the state-owned granaries and those owned by the aristocracies in their private capacities. These state granaries were controlled by the members of the aristocracy, where both the proceeds from the *gandaye* and tributes from the emirates were stored, and were, more often than not, disposed of at the instruction of titled officials through the palace slaves.<sup>66</sup> The general

---

<sup>64</sup> Jumare, *op.cit.*, p.87.

<sup>65</sup> Watts, *op.cit.*, p.140.

<sup>66</sup> Mallam Baban Sambo, *op.cit.*

populace in the Metropolitan Caliphate did not place high expectations on the state granaries in times of famines primarily because such granaries do not exist in the Metropolitan districts besides Sokoto and Wurno.<sup>67</sup>

Rather than serving the needs of the members of the caliphate community, these State granaries established in Sokoto, had by the second half of the nineteenth century been the major depots in storing the grains that primarily get into the inter-regional trade with the Tuaregs in the north. In times of scarcity, this trade with the Tuaregs is known to become more profitable and therefore attract the participation of some of the members of the aristocracy.

The precepts of the 'moral economy' as could be drawn from the socio-economic ideals of the jihad leaders was, in the course of the century, undermined by a high level development of commodity production and the growth of merchant capital. Though our knowledge of the dimensions of agrarian crises in the century remain sketchy, the role of the caliphal state in providing relief package to the community as a temporary or short term famine relief measure was minimal and insignificant. The statements often made

---

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*

by scholars on the Caliphate government's significant contributions in times of droughts and famine was borne out of the consideration of the moral proponents of the Caliphate's economic ideals. But since the members of the Metropolitan Caliphate did not pay taxes there were no 'tax relief' measures in form of assistance during times of disasters. The ensemble of the Caliphate social relations of production that tie the aristocracy, the *ulama'a*, the merchants, the artisans and craftsmen, the peasants and the slaves together, produced no State guaranteed subsistence insurance.

### 3.4 The Development of Pastoralism and Animal Husbandry

#### a) The Impact of the Jihad Movement on the Pastoral Economy:

The success of the Sokoto Jihad movement attracted a large number of pastoral emigrants to the Metropolitan districts.<sup>68</sup> In addition, the drainage of the Sokoto-Rima Basin supported a prosperous pastoral economy-and in fact without which the area would have only been able to support its fraction of the cattle

---

<sup>68</sup> See C.E. Hopen, *Report on the Study of Field Fulani*, (Government Printer, Kaduna, n.d.), pp.1-11.

population it actually did.<sup>69</sup> The establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate facilitated the consolidation of the pastoral sector of the economy of the Central Sudan region in general terms.

Since the pre-jihad era, livestock production has largely been in the hands of the pastoral groups, particularly the Fulani. By the nineteenth century, there were two broad groups of Fulani: the pastoral Fulani (*fulbe na'i* or *fulbe ladde*) whose predominant way of life revolved around animal husbandry; and, the sedentarised Fulani (*fulbe shi'e*) who may own livestock in small or large scale or may not. From about the 10th century when both groups of Fulani migrated from the Senegambia and Futa Toro areas into various communities in the Sahel and Savanna, the sedentarised Fulani were said to be the majority. It is also this group that produced the intelligentsia (the *modibbo'en*) from among whose revolutionary intellectual activities, over the years, was to have far reaching consequences in the *bilad as-sudan*.<sup>70</sup>

Thus even before the turn of the century, pastoral and non-pastoral Fulani and their system of livestock

---

<sup>69</sup> Hopen, "The Pastoral Fulbe Family...." *op.cit.*, p.20.

<sup>70</sup> See A.D.H.Bivar & M.Hiskett, "The Arabic Literature...." *op.cit.*

production had existed as a major component of the society and economy of our area.<sup>71</sup> But the pastoral sector was in the course of the century fully integrated into the society and the general rubric of the agrarian economy of the Metropolitan Caliphate. The transformations brought about by the Sokoto jihad movement directly affected the social and physical environment in which pasture, water and socio-political congeniality were located, all of which were (and are) essential prerequisite for successful livestock production endeavours.<sup>72</sup>

The very revolutionary struggles which were to overthrow the pre-jihad kingdoms were led by the non-pastoral Fulani intelligentsia. And, the nomads and the sedentary populations who supported the jihad movement-and most of whom participated in specific military campaigns-did so in mutual anticipation that the caliphate government would enhance their material well-being. For the agriculturalists this entailed, among other things, access to fertile land resources and the means of production, while for the nomads it primarily

---

<sup>71</sup> Croix, "The Fulani of Northern Nigeria...." *op.cit.*, p.5.

<sup>72</sup> T.A.Muhammed-Baba, "Pastoral Ascendency in the Savanna:A sociological Assessment of the Impact of the 1804 Jihad on Pastoral Fulbe" A.M.Kani & K. Ahmed (eds.) *The state and Society in the Sokoto Caliphate*, (Gaskiya Corporation, Zaria, 1990)



require rights to grazing lands, cattle tracks, and water places. The Caliphate authorities in the Metropolis initiated many programmes in order to enhance agricultural and livestock production.

The establishment of the *ribats* in the Metropolis had created strong bases for collective defence, and therefore the agricultural settlements that emerged guaranteed seasonal movements of the pastoralists and their stock across the vegetational zones in the region. Hence pastoral activities were enhanced and animal husbandry continued to become important activity among the non-Fulani groups. The sedentarisation policies initiated by Muhammad Bello promoted political stability, which in itself was contributing to economic integration between the pastoralists and the sedentary groups.

The livestock production in the *gandaye* or *runji* contributed in the increased number of livestock in the region, as well as promoted wider application of techniques in animal husbandry generally. Normally livestock production in the *gandaye* was particularly profitable. It was crucial for the agricultural practices in these *gandaye* by providing manure and labour through the use of ox-driven plough, and livestock also provide milk and butter for the aristocrats. For this reason a

good section of the *gandu* or *runji* would be devoted to the production of *harawa* (fodder) for the use of the livestock, and in some cases, a fallow section would be devoted to the livestock in addition to grazing areas.<sup>73</sup>

During the nineteenth century, there was a remarkable growth in livestock production in the Metropolitan region. Although statistical figure in the century is not available to show the extent of this growth, an inter play of the social, political and economic factors would suggest a considerable increase in livestock and general pursuit of animal husbandry in our area. The earliest comprehensive data on livestock in the area began with the colonial statistics in the second decade of the twentieth century. By 1921 a census undertaken by the colonial officers show a cattle population of about 500,000 in the Sokoto Emirate, which was in the nineteenth century the core of the Metropolitan Caliphate.<sup>74</sup> Accordingly, there were 319,510 sheep, and 843,790 goats among other domestic animals.<sup>75</sup> Although this data did not directly relate to our period, it could still offer us with some basis to

---

<sup>73</sup> Mallam Shehu Na-Lima, *op.cit.*

<sup>74</sup> C.K.Meek, *The Northern Tribes of Nigeria*, (Frankcass & co., London, 1971, 2 vols.), vol. II, p.337.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*

contemplate the size of livestock in the Metropolitan Caliphate during our period. But in doing so, we must also bear in mind that the statistics given by the colonial records would have had a number of defects in many respects. First of all, the pastoralists and others who keep livestock avoided head count, in various ways, in order to evade colonial taxes particularly the *Jangali* (cattle tax). In addition, it can also be noted that during the closing decades of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth century there was the rinderpest epidemic in the area which is said to have wiped out the larger number of the cattle population.<sup>76</sup> Furthermore, in the initial years of colonial rule, the colonialists' policies on pastoralists reduced the cattle population and some domesticated animals as well.<sup>77</sup> On account of these and other considerations, it is possible that the number of livestock in the nineteenth century, at least doubled the figures given in the early colonial records.

The nineteenth century can rightly be described as a period of 'pastoral ascendancy' in the Caliphate. The Caliphate era provided for the consolidation of the

---

<sup>76</sup> st. Croix, "The Fulani of .....", *op.cit.*, pp.11-12: Hopen, "The Pastoral Fulbe...", *op.cit.*, p.12.

<sup>77</sup> Watts, *op.cit.*, pp.206-213.

Fulani pastoral economic sector within the orbit of the agrarian economy and society in our area. The development of pastoral systems greatly enhanced, and transformed animal husbandry generally. This development led to better and improved ways of tendering cattle and other domesticated animals.

**b) Pastoral Activities in the Metropolis:**

Pastoralism, like agriculture, is also sensitive to the variability of rainfall; indeed its survival depended upon it. In fact, all aspects of nomadism are dependent on brooms of ecological reality, in which vegetational affluence and drought were two outstanding crucial factors. Thus, for instance, to run the risk of poor pasture is to risk the loss of accumulated domestic capital, which means a massive decapitalisation of livestock that is not readily reconstituted. As a result, the pastoralists devised various forms of transhumance activities to sustain livestock production, as well as devised other forms of 'risk-averse' strategies to buffer themselves against risks of decapitalisation.

**i) Transhumance**

The first and primary concern in relation to animal management relates to eco-climatic practices in land use. In the Metropolitan districts, some pastoral groups


including the Tuaregs employed nomadism and a variety of transhumant movements as their mode of land and water resource utilisation. Transhumance movements generally involved a variety of migrations of cattle and their rearers either on a long-term or short-term basis, vertical or horizontal migrations within or across ecological zones. In the century, there were many different types of movements engaged in by the pastoralists. The main considerations were nutrition and welfare need of stock, as well as the socio-political characteristics of the area which the pastoralists utilise. The main mode of transhumant movement employed was determined by, what we call here, ecological resource logic. As it has been noted:

[A]nimals must be moved regularly to provide the best feed for them and to avoid overgrazing. In "normal" conditions annual patterns of movements may be quite regular. In periods of extreme drought pastoralists must be able to leave their traditional grazing lands and wander far in search of adequate feed resources. Large expanses of "common" pastures facilitate such movements.<sup>78</sup>

---

<sup>78</sup> J. Gilles & K. Jamtgaard, "Overgrazing in Pastoral Areas: The Commons Reconsidered", *Sociological Ruralis*, XXXI, 2(1981), p.134.

However the major transhumance was a seasonal movement of livestock through the years which may follow, a more or less, regular trend. It is thus a strategy for ecological adaptation intended to secure the best condition for the herds under the varying psychoclimatic conditions that existed through yearly cycle. Nomadism in this respect cannot simply be reduced to cultural or personality traits of the Fulani or the Tuaregs. The pastoralists would have preferred to live under conditions suitable to their needs than to engage in almost endless movements. But as their herds constitute their main source of livelihood, they are compelled-and in fact eager-to take their herds where they would feed the best. And, the pastoralists faced the constant threats against daily sustenance and access to primary means of production.



The main pattern of transhumant movements followed along north-south and south-north in the dry season and wet season respectively. However other pastoral groups simply moved eastwards or westwards away from the river or floodplains areas to the upland area that could provide adequate pastures during the wet season, while the reverse order takes place during the dry season. The north to south movement in the dry season and the south to north movement during the wet

season is typical of the region since climatically there decreases rainfall as one moves northwards towards the semi-arid zone. Transhumance routes during the pre-jihad period were fewer since their directions were restricted. The hazards of robbers and beasts as well as the general insecurity in the region made the pre-jihad routes to follow the main valleys of the villages where staging posts and water were obtainable.<sup>79</sup> However during the nineteenth century, routes connected all the Metropolitan districts particularly those that immediately surrounded the Sokoto city. In the 1820s Muhammad Bello initiated the establishment of *burtalai* (the cattle tracks) through the *dazuzzuka* (bush areas) in the Metropolitan region in order to create easy access to watering places and straggles for the pastoralists.

By the middle of the century, the Metropolitan region was almost entirely dissected with cattle tracks, which made transhumant movements by the pastoral groups across the ecological zones within the region much easier.<sup>80</sup> These developments facilitated the integration of the Tuareg groups into the Metropolis particularly the Adarawa, which meant that their

---

<sup>79</sup> Last, "The Sokoto Caliphate..." *op.cit.*, p. lxiv

<sup>80</sup> Group Interview: Makarantar Mallam Boyi, Kofar Atiku, Sokoto, Sept. 1987.

pastoral groups operated simultaneously with the Fulani in the region on similar status.

In the course of their transhumant movements, the pastoralists avoid areas which are dangerous to their cattle. Watering areas responsible for an outbreak of certain diseases such as trypanosomiasis (*sammore*) or even areas suspected to cause dangerous disease outbreak are avoided by the pastoralists.<sup>81</sup> Hence watering areas where the bamboo *oxytenanthera abyssinia* abounds are usually expected to be areas where *tse-tse* flies might be present, and therefore, such areas were also avoided.

In such transhumant movements also, the pastoralists gather information on disease outbreak; a process which influenced the routing of their seasonal or even short term migrations. For example, pasture lands infected with diseases such as Blackquarter and Anthrax, which are locally referred to as *hendu* would have to be abandoned for a period of about two years.<sup>82</sup> Generally, information on certain infectious diseases are easily obtainable along the staging posts on the routes through which the pastoralists avoid those contagious diseases

---

<sup>81</sup> st.Croix, "The Fulani of...", *op.cit.*, p.21.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid*, p.22.



which are still not endemic, and in these circumstances transhumant movements were strategically routed.

During wet seasonal grazing movements, the pastoralists usually establish camps. These camps are established in areas where grazing could be adequately systematised and shelter could also be given to the cattle and their rearers. Such camps are normally broken after the end of the rains and the pastoralists began their southwards migration or leave the upland into the marshlands. At the beginning of rains the pastoralists leave their dry season grounds towards their wet season camps.

It is usually during the dry season grazing that the pastoralists do enter into agreement with some farmers, whereby the pastoralists maximise grazing in the farms, while the farmers become contented with the manuring of their fields.<sup>83</sup> In some cases, the pastoralists spend quite a number of days in some farms on a sort of reciprocal agreement with the farmers.<sup>84</sup>

## ii) Animal Husbandry

---

<sup>83</sup> Mallam Bellon Ardo, Wamakko, April 1989.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*

The development of pastoral activities in the course of the century led to significant improvement in the methods and techniques in animal husbandry. Interestingly the Metropolis is endowed with animal resources. These animals include cattle, camels, sheep and goats. Others are horses and donkeys, which are used as means of transport, and in the case of horses, they were used in military campaigns as well. Poultry is widely maintained by families. Other animals that were kept for some economic purposes included the civet cats (*magen jibda*), which were trapped around the bushes. The pouch produced by the civet are used as scent that were readily sold in the markets. Similarly *tantabaru* are also kept in a near poultry conditions.

Cattle: were mostly under the ownership and control of the pastoral groups, the Fulani and the Tuaregs. However the non-pastoral groups also do own substantial number of cattle, particularly the sedentarised Fulani. In fact, members of the aristocracy in Sokoto city who owned herds of cattle usually utilised a section of their *gandaye* or *runji* to grazing their cattle in all seasons.

There are a number of different breeds of cattle in our area. The different breeds of cattle were unevenly found in the Metropolitan districts. Among the different

breeds, the Rahaji, Jabtoji, Gudali and Bunaji are said to be of very rare quality.<sup>85</sup> Among these also, the Rahaji was regarded as distinctive. The Jabtoji breed, dark red in colour with long horns, was also regarded as an exceptional bull similar to the Rahaji. The Rahaji are known to possess the ability to obey the slightest sign or signal from their owners whom they will also defend if attacked. The Rahaji breed was the exclusive herds of the pastoralists because of their regular need of appropriate climatic conditions. The Rahaji breed were mostly found in the northern districts such as Gwadabawa, Abdallo, Illela, Sabon-Birni, Arzarori and in the Adarawa settlements.

The Gudali and Bunaji breeds were the most common. They are medium sized, short-horns with a flea-bitten grey colour, placid, very prolific and good milkers as well. Their greatest advantage is their ability to graze in varying conditions; can graze successfully where the Rahaji would perhaps starve. The Gudali and Bunaji were found widely in the Metropolis. The non-pastoralists, but particularly semi-pastoral Fulani, prefer these breeds because of their economic importance in providing good quality milk and butter, both for consumption and exchange. Between the two categories

---

<sup>85</sup> Harris, *op.cit.* p.308.

are also other breeds of varying degrees. These included Kettije, Azawajo, Nori and Jallije.

Cattle owners particularly the pastoralists take serious care of the daily condition of their stock. Thus knowledge of an outbreak of rinderpest or contagious Bovine Pleuropneumonia elsewhere would easily strike fear among the pastoralists. Hence, beasts such as calves which are considered immune from or would only suffer a very mild attack of rinderpest were highly valued. Disease infected areas were either abandoned by the pastoralists for a very long time or were allowed to be cleaned by the rains during wet season before being visited.<sup>86</sup>

The pastoralists had adequate knowledge of curing many ailments on their cattle, usually made from concoction of barks, herbs and the like. For instance, bleeding could be stopped with a decoction of the soaked pods of *gabdi* (*Acacia Arabica*), which pastoralists recognised as a styptic. Similarly, powdered parch of the *kahi* tree (*Khaya Senegalensis*) is used on sores and wounds as well as remedy against moggots.<sup>87</sup>

---

<sup>86</sup> st.Croix, *lo.cit.*

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, p.24.

In addition, the pastoralists utilised a number of preventive medical measures to protect their cattle from the scourge of minor sickness, inflammation and swellings. Other preventive medicines are local salts used for cattle especially the white natron. Other types of salts such as *gishirin* mangul and *gishirin* Balma can either be given in small quantity. Branding or marking the skin with a hot iron was practiced as a measure to control inflammation or swellings and as a remedy against streptothincosis conditions.

Camels: Camels in the Metropolitan Caliphate were generally owned and controlled by the Tuaregs. Camels are also of different breeds. The most popular in the region is the Agadez breed. Camels are primarily used for transportation particularly in long distance trade, and in the nineteenth century they were used in the trade between the Tamasheq-speaking areas and the Metropolitan districts, as well as between these areas and the emirates of the Caliphate. In the Metropolitan Caliphate few camels were kept by the members of the aristocracy and other rich individuals, particularly the traders. However, even peasant families are known to have owned some camels in certain districts such as Wurno, Kware, Gwadabawa, Tangaza and Illela.

Sheep and Goats: Sheep and Goats are the common domesticated animals in the region. Perhaps by the end of the nineteenth century there were well over a million goats and a similar number of sheep. Unlike cattle, sheep and goats are largely owned by the non-pastoral groups. Some pastoralists however do undertake to breeding both sheep and goats. There is however the unique case of the Udawa who devote themselves exclusively to sheep breeding on almost entirely nomadic life.<sup>88</sup>

The Caliphate era indirectly encouraged the breeding of sheep particularly with the significance of rams during festivities especially the *id-el kabir*. The demand for large imposing rams stimulated the breeding of *Balami* type, which are found in the northern areas. In the south eastern districts, methods of cross-breeding between local breeds and the *Balami* or *Zabarma* breeds were widely practiced.

Sokoto has been very famous for producing one of the finest goat skins in the world.<sup>89</sup> In the area, goats breeding is famous both among the pastoral and the non-pastoral groups. Sokoto and the northern districts

---

<sup>88</sup> Harris, *Gazeteer...*, *op.,cit.*, p. 307.

<sup>89</sup> NAK SNP 15/279.

are particularly noted for breeding the 'red goats'. The number of goats in the region has been tremendous largely due to their greater multiple reproductive ability. In fact, breeding of goats is highly valued by the agriculturalists for its consequent economic benefits.

Poultry: Poultry is common in virtually all households in the region. Both the pastoral and the non-pastoral groups mainly raise chickens, ducks and *Zabbi*. Poultry is an integral part of the rural subsistence production, and the only difference is a matter of degree. Poultry raising has been very crucial to the rural dwellers in Hausaland. The products are used for consumption, exchange, gifts, entertainments and festivities.

Horses and Donkeys: Horses and Donkeys are largely bred for transportation purposes. The larger proportion of horses and donkeys in the region are bred in the northern areas. The most common breed among horses are the famous Sokoto ponies which are of Barber type.<sup>90</sup>Horses in the Metropolitan Caliphate was the exclusive preserve of the aristocracy and their clients. The common epithets on horses, namely, *rikon ka sai dan sarki* (meaning that only a royalist can maintain a

---

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*

horse) or *kyautar ka sai dan sarki* (meaning that only a royalist can give out a horse) clearly explain the total monopoly of horses by the aristocracy.

The demands occasioned by the jihad campaigns in the century necessitated an increasing demand of horses, many of which were imported from the emirates and the northern areas. In the Metropolis, the power and prestige of the rulers of the districts was partly increasingly being projected by the number of horses they controlled during the course of the century. As a result therefore, there were increasing efforts to acquire horses and breed them locally. For instance, the position of the *sarakuna* of Isa, since the initial headship of the district by Aliyu Dan Bello (known as Aliyu Karami) who later became Sarkin Musulmi, was respected because of the large holding of their horses.<sup>91</sup> Isa itself is known to have been a major outpost against the threats of Gobirawa and also a major staging-point to Katsina.

Unlike horses, donkeys survive with very little food, minimum care and yet carry out enormous amount of work. This made a donkey the darling of the lower classes. An average donkey can carry a load of 120 lbs to 150 lbs, and are used for all sorts of work which

---

<sup>91</sup> Alhaji Mamman Bature, Shinkafi, March 1989.



include transport of manure to the farms and harvests back to the homes. They are also used to carry goods between local or regional markets. In the Metropolitan Caliphate, donkeys were largely used by the agriculturalists, traders and craftsmen. Some pastoralists also owned donkeys, which they used for carrying their belongings in the course of their seasonal migrations.

### **c) Pastoralists in the Caliphate's Social Formation**

The pastoral sector in the Caliphate's economy was never fully self-sufficient. Nomadic system depended on agricultural systems. Thus the nomads depended on trade and in particular in exchange for cereals and other implements.<sup>92</sup> In our region, the pastoral Fulani maintained a strong cultural and economic identity, reproduced themselves exclusively by livestock herding and trade. For the pastoral Fulani, their livestock provided them with the means of their daily sustenance. Livestock provided them with a significant proportion of their daily diet, such as milk, butter, cheese and meat. Similarly, the livestock products also provided them with the means of exchanges for other needs with the non-Fulani groups

---

<sup>92</sup> Hopen, "The Pastoral Fulbe...", *op.cit.* p.152.

The livestock's daily products are commercially used by the pastoral Fulani for their daily expenses. Most of the pastoralists live a little distance from the sedentary populations in *ruga* particularly during the dry season, before they emigrate to other areas. In their *rugage* the men take the cattle around nearby bush for grazing while the women do the milking. Some of the women ferment the milk to prepare *nono* (yughort) and *mai* (butter), which they take to the markets.<sup>93</sup> The butter made in small slices are usually placed in a calabash floating in milk for sale or in water in order to keep it fresh, especially during hot weather. Returns from the sale are used to buy cereals, implements and other needs.

In addition to the exchanges which take place between the pastoralists and the agriculturalists, both pastoral systems and agricultural system are essentially interdependent. While the pastoralists would desire grazing fields, the agriculturalists would look for manure. Thus, pastoral households would make arrangements with farmers to graze their animals on post-harvest crop residues in return for the provision of manure or specialist herding services like cattle

---

<sup>93</sup> cf.Barth, "Travels and Discoveries....." *op.cit.*, p.100.

entrustment. Eleven years after the conquest of the Caliphate, one colonial officer recorded one form of such agreements, as he narrates:

As to manuring, the practice followed in Raba District seems to be thus: in the dry season a Fulani with cows and sheep is asked to let his flocks wander over the farm. One about 3300 sq yards would be thus manured by 200 sheep and 100 cows in a week for which payment of 2 bundles of *gero* and 2 of *dawa* would be made.<sup>94</sup>

Apart from using the daily products of their cattle, the Fulani pastoralists also sell their stock usually under conditions of extreme adversity when the terms of trade turned sharply against pastoral products.<sup>95</sup> Although it is very difficult to establish the nature of the changing terms of trade between the pastoralists and others, particularly the agriculturalists, in the century it seems that any decline in the composition of herds would lead to invariable hardship on the households. This can be easily figured out considering the fact that a reasonably high cattle population would be required for an average family to depend solely on their animals for daily

---

<sup>94</sup> NAK SNP 10 609p/1914.

<sup>95</sup> Watts, "Silent violence..." *op.cit.*, p.206.

sustenance. For example, Dahl and Hjort has shown that for a nomadic family of six to subsist entirely off their animal produce-assuming a herd of usual age and sex composition-would require a dry season population of 593 animals with a lactation rate of 4 per cent.<sup>96</sup>

Officially no cattle tax was levied in the Metropolitan Caliphate, but some form of *chofal* (tribute) is said to have been collected by the rulers from the pastoralists in many districts.<sup>97</sup> In fact, presents and gifts from the pastoralists to the rulers were not uncommon. It is also noted that enforced hospitality and presents did become a form of taxation in the Metropolitan Caliphate.<sup>98</sup> Though no any form of official tax was levied, the pastoralists were extorted by the ruling class through form of tributes, gifts or presents.

---

<sup>96</sup> G.Dahil & A.Hjort, *Having Herds: Pastoral Herd Growth and Household Economy* (Studies in Social Anthropology, Stockholm, 1976) cited in Watts, *loc.cit.*

<sup>97</sup> Alhaji Mamman Bature, *Ibid.*

<sup>98</sup> Last, "The Sokoto....." *op.cit.*, p.105.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### INDUSTRIAL CRAFTS PRODUCTION, COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES AND PROFESSIONAL SERVICES

#### 4.1 Crafts and the Development of the Manufacturing Sector of the Economy

The Metropolis was once the original home of many craftsmen who were partly responsible to the socio-economic development of the pre-jihad kingdoms of Kebbi, Zamfara and Gobir.<sup>1</sup> As we have mentioned earlier on, the political upheavals which characterised the jihad's military campaigns and the subsequent policies of establishing the *ribats* in our region provided for the demographic restructuring that influenced the emergence of new political centres, which in its turn stimulated greater crafts production and commerce. The climatic condition of our region provides for a long duration of dry season during which household members devote considerable labour time to at least one

---

<sup>1</sup> Three studies on these Kingdoms have shown a remarkable development in crafts manufacturing in these pre-jihad states. See Alkali, "Hausa State in Crises....", *op.cit.*; Na-Dama, "The Rise and Collapse....", *op.cit.*; Augi, "The Gobir Factor....", *op.cit.*

craft or trade. However, by the closing years of the second decade of the nineteenth century, seeds of urbanisation pioneered the flourishing of commoditisation in the Metropolitan Caliphate. By the second half of the century, the crafts industries-though basically located within the orbit of household-had become significant economic enterprises. Craft production in the region developed both for local consumption, and in the urban areas crafts production was substantially geared for exchange value. The increasing tendencies for localised specialisation, in the course of the century, contributed to the development of the manufacturing (and industrial) sector of the economy in the Metropolis.

In his study of the Sokoto city, Abubakar had adequately discussed the organisation of craft production, in which he highlighted the essential structures of the crafts industries; their framework of instruction and training; and, their labour-force organisation.<sup>2</sup> Abubakar's discussion of the Sokoto city is quite applicable to the Metropolitan region. He further identifies, categorises and discusses the major crafts

---

<sup>2</sup> Abubakar, "Birnin Shehu....." *op.cit.*, pp.62-67.

industries in the Sokoto city; an endeavour which still perfectly applies to the Metropolitan districts.<sup>3</sup>

The major categories of the crafts industries are: Smithing, which constituted the *Makera* (who smelt iron for their own use) and the *Yan Tama* (who smelt iron primarily to sell), and the specialists in either blacksmithing (*kiran baki*) or silver smithing (*kiran farin karfe* or *kiran jan karfe*); the Textile, which constituted *Kadi* (spinning), *Saka* (weaving), and *Dinki da Rini* (tailoring and dyeing); Leather work, which constituted *Jima* (tanning), *Rinin fata* (dyeing of leather), and *Dukanci* or *Aikin fata* (leatherworking); the Pottery, which is of many kinds; and, Woodcarving, which is also of many kinds.

Our concern is to discuss the nature and pattern of the development of the industrial sector of the Metropolitan Caliphate's economy, with a view to examining the changes from the pre-Caliphate era, within the context of the socio-economic policies of the Caliphate leadership.

We may need to stress the point that the organisation of the crafts industries and their structures in Sokoto city, as the pioneering study of Abubakar has

---

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid*, pp.72-121.

shown, is relevant to our region since the genesis and the expansion of the manufacturing industries were anchored on the forces of the Sokoto-Rima Basin area. However, historical developmental processes of these industries in Sokoto city may vary from the processes of their development in many Metropolitan districts. In the older settlements, crafts industries had over a very long period developed structurally on the basis of trial and error, while in the city of Sokoto and other new settlements, the development of the crafts industries and their expansion largely depended on 'technological transfer' and improvements by the immigrants, who themselves were the celebrated craftsmen in the pre-jihad political centres.

The development and expansion of the crafts industries in the region was in response to the changing political, economic and social climate. Thence, social policies of the Caliphate leadership and the new political climate, which accompanied the establishment of the central Caliphate authority, accelerated the movement of labour forces within and across the region. With the emergence of new political centres and the expansion of the older ones, free movement of labour forces created avenues for wider skills utilisation, and thus new markets as well as the expansion of older ones stimulated the growth of various crafts industries.



### **Smithing Industry:**

It is one of the earliest and crucial industry in the agricultural and technological development in the Savanna region as a whole. Specifically this industry is closely related to the development of agriculture because the manufacture of all the agricultural tools depended on it. In the Rima Basin area, smithing industry did develop to a very high level, technologically. Availability of iron ore deposits in the region led to the emergence of specialised iron smelting centres. This industry supplied all the needed agricultural tools and implements used by the armies of the pre-jihad kingdoms.

As early as the first decade of the nineteenth century, the smithing industry felt the impact of the Sokoto jihad movement. The jihad military campaigns necessitated an increasing demand for weaponry. Perhaps, unlike other industries such as textile, leatherworking, pottery and woodcarving, which might have experienced some set backs as a result of the upheavals, the smithing industry was presumably fully engaged.<sup>4</sup> Thereafter, new political climate augmented its expansion in the Metropolitan Caliphate.

---

<sup>4</sup> See K. Krieger, "Notes on Iron Production...", *op.cit.*

The emergence of Sokoto city, as the capital of the Caliphate around 1817 directly bear some consequences to the extensive use of iron smelting centres in the Metropolis. The region possessed large quantities of iron which were produced in notable centres such as Tureta.<sup>5</sup> Large quantities of iron which began to be produced stimulated trade in iron under the *Yan tama* (iron smelters) who established marketing centres in Talata-Mafara, Moriki, Kaura-Namoda, Sabon-Birni and Anka. Early in the century, our region was an important area of trade in iron ore.<sup>6</sup>

Trade in iron also influenced imports of copper and silver, particularly along the trade routes linking the region with North Africa. In the pre-jihad era, silver smithing is said to have been fairly developed in Gobir kingdom through imports of copper.<sup>7</sup> In the nineteenth century however, *kiran fari* (silver smithing) was highly developed in the urban centres of the Metropolitan Caliphate. In Sokoto city, Kaura-Namoda, Wurno and Sabon Birni there was large production of bracelets (*mundaye*), decorated rings (*zobba*) and other related

---

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p.3

<sup>6</sup> Wakala Bawa Makeri ,Makera Tsafe, Sept.1989.

<sup>7</sup> Augi, *op.cit.*

products, which were readily marketed as far as Adar, Konni and Zabarma.

Blacksmiths forged all the agricultural tools used by the cultivators, which varied according to purpose and types of the soils. For example, they manufacture *Kwasa* (short-handled hoe with a straight blade), *sungumi* (a long-handled hoe), *fartanya* (small hoe used in weeding) and *galma* (a large-bladed curved hoe with a short handle used in making big ridges). The blacksmith also manufacture axes and house wares; products of which were used by virtually every household in the region. They also make the instruments used by the *Wanzamai* (Barbers) whose crucial functions included not only for barber (*aski*) but also perform *kaciya* (circumcision) and other minor surgical operations. As it has already been shown, the blacksmiths were indispensable to the state's military preparedness since they manufacture all the needed arsenal. The head of the Blacksmiths, Sarkin Makera, was influential in each district.

It is said that the Caliphate leadership deliberately influenced the location of blacksmiths in Sokoto city as in many other Metropolitan districts, because of their importance in the social life and the political realm of

affairs.<sup>8</sup> Many blacksmiths who specialised in the manufacture of military hardwares were specially patronised by the state functionaries.<sup>9</sup>

By the middle of the nineteenth century, the smithing industry had expanded into an economically viable one. Due to the expansion in the other economic sectors, there was greater demand on the products of this industry. There were also new demands in iron decorated shields, horses harness and a variety of gadgets. As for the manufacture of horses harness, Abubakar has shown that districts such as Kaura-Namoda, Bodinga, Danko and Gada had, in the course of the century, emerged as important centres of *kiran dawaki*.<sup>10</sup> And in fact, due to a substantial demand of *kayan kiran dawaki* (a variety of horses harness), the enterprise therefore became very lucrative.

By the closing years of the nineteenth century, the smithing industry had gone through tremendous expansion in terms of production capacity and technological quality control. The century however did

---

<sup>8</sup> Mallam Muhammadu Boyi, Kofar Atiku, Sokoto, Sept. 1989.

<sup>9</sup> Mallam Shehu Na-Liman, *op.cit.*

<sup>10</sup> Abubakar, "Birnin Shehu..." *op.cit.*, p.81.

not witness what can be regarded as 'revolutionary' breakthrough in the technological know-how of the smithing industry, since the same methods and techniques of manufacturing as in the pre-jihad era came to prevail in the caliphate. Nevertheless, the degree of improvement and the expansion recorded in the century was in the process of eventual breakthrough when the colonial forces halted this technological drive. For instance, it is said that by the closing years of the nineteenth century, the industry was manufacturing *galmunan shanu* (ox driven plough) of three distinct types; according to the soil conditions in the region.<sup>11</sup> These types of *galmuna* are said to be superior and more appropriate in over-turning the soil or in making ridges or in weeding than the types of ploughs, which were later introduced by the colonialists in the twentieth century.<sup>12</sup>

### The Textile Industry:

This industry was very important in the export economy of the Metropolitan Caliphate. Abubakar has shown that the towns and the trading centres of our

---

<sup>11</sup> Group Interview: Makerar Bawa, Makera Tsafe, Sept.1989.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*

region were the main suppliers of cotton and textile material to the areas lying immediately to the north and northwest as far as Timbuktu.<sup>13</sup> In fact, our region had a near monopoly of good quality textile materials in the Central Sudan region because of the region's tremendous cotton production, particularly in the south eastern districts.<sup>14</sup>

The textile industry is related to, and indeed comprised of, spinning (*kadi*), weaving (*saka*), and tailoring and dyeing (*dinki da rini*). While each of these was undertaken as exclusive trades and hardly any two were combined by the same tradesmen, each was one sector of the textile industry. Thus, the growth or otherwise of the industry has to be grasped in the process of this inter-sectoral linkages between the integral parts of the textile industry.

Spinning (*kadi*) in the Metropolitan Caliphate during the early years of the century was largely in the hands of the womenfolk. Spinning was a very important trade/craft activity of the women in the region. Spinning provided them with the means of raising some capital,

---

<sup>13</sup> Abubakar, *op.cit.*, p.82.

<sup>14</sup> See Ferguson, "Nineteenth Century Hausaland...." *op.cit.*, p.80.

with which they invest in a contributory saving scheme known as *adashe*. Weaving (*saka*) was undertaken by both the men and the women, but in the course of the century, there emerged professional weavers among the menfolk in district such as Sabon-Birni, Isa, Kaura-Namoda, Zurmi, Moriki, Maradun, Talata-Mafara, Bakura, Tureta, Bungudu, Kurya, Katuru and Anka. The men produced bundles used for making different brands of *riguna* (gowns), and they also produced the sheets which would be tailored to make different kinds and sizes of clothes. The womenfolk produced threads (*zare*), and they also make bed-sheet (*gwado*) and wrappers (*zannuwa*, sing:*zane*). In the Metropolitan districts, the weaving areas (*unguwar masaka*) were a sort of corporate enterprises' enclaves, where individuals' weaving equipments and operational network were knitted together. Dry season labour migration seemed to have been very important in the weaving sub-industries of the region, particularly in the south eastern districts.<sup>15</sup> A large number of the tradesmen in the *unguwar masaka* in Kaura-Namoda, Gusau, Anka,

---

<sup>15</sup> cf. Abubakar, *op.cit.*, p.88.

Gummi, Dansadau, Moriki and Rawayya are said to be immigrants from Gobir.<sup>16</sup>

Tailoring and Dyeing (*Dinki da Rini*) in the Metropolitan Caliphate was the major export sector of the Textile industry. Dyed cloth formed the principal export of the region to Adar, Zabarma, the Niger bend, the Gonja areas as well as the northern areas.<sup>17</sup> In addition however, some quantities of dyed cloth were also exported to the eastern emirates, particularly Adamawa, Muri and Bauchi.<sup>18</sup> In fact, the Metropolis is noted for its production of high quality textile materials such as the highly prized gowns: *rigunan sawaye*, *yar Bungudu*, and a variety of trousers, which were marketed in all parts of the Caliphate and beyond.<sup>19</sup> In the course of the century, a variety of clothes were produced, ranging from the cheaper ones such as *saki*, which is woven with blue and black cotton, to an expensive variety of *rigunan sawaye* of elaborate

---

<sup>16</sup> Group Interview: Gidan Mallam Babba, Kaura-Namoda, *op.cit.*

<sup>17</sup> See Abubakar, *op.cit.*, p.92.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>19</sup> P.Staudinger, *In The Heart of the Hausa States*-Translated by Johanna E. Moody,(Monographs in International Studies, African Series, No.56, Ohio University, 1990, 2 Vols.), Vol I, p.206.



designs and decorations. Similarly, several dyes were made on cloth, and the most preferred was the indigo dye. Although there were dyeing services in several districts, the craft was eloquently centred in Sokoto city.

### Leatherworking Industry:

The sophistication level with which the leatherworking industry flourished, has captured the attention and due compliments of European travellers, who visited the region in the century.<sup>20</sup> This industry developed a unique feature in the region, which assured it a monopoly of sales in leather goods throughout the Central Sudan region and beyond. Consequentially, there was a large number of tanneries for leather production particularly in Sokoto city. And, in Sokoto city a specialised kind of leatherworking known as *korino* developed.<sup>21</sup>

Leather products of the region included large and small skins bags used for storing of various articles and for other purposes, such as barber's wallet (*zabira*) and

---

<sup>20</sup> See Clapperton, "Journal...", *op.cit.*, pp.221-222; Barth, "Travels..", Vol III, *op.cit.*, p.182; Staudinger, "In The Heart..." Vol I, *op.cit.*, p.300.

<sup>21</sup> *Korino* is a bluish green dye made from sour milk, iron fillings (*dusan karfe*), brass lead or tin (*farin karfe*), copper (*jan karfe*), ground salt and solder (*sunadari*). See Abubakar, *op.cit.*, pp.100-101.

books cases (*gafaka*). Other articles include shielding for swords and knives. There were also many household articles made from leather, while other occupational groups such as saddle makers also make use of leather products to fashion out the main goods of their trades. Leatherworks, which were made in the Metropolis competed favourably with other products made in notable areas of the Caliphate, both in quality and in price. And because of the high quality of its leatherworks, the Metropolis made substantial exports to famous leatherworking emirates of the Caliphate, notably Kano, Katsina and Zazzau. Outside the Central Sudan region, the famous Sokoto 'red skin' was valued as far as North African areas.

#### **Pottery and Woodcarving Industry:**

The expansion and growth which characterised pottery and woodcarving was squarely in response to local demands in the region. The dynamics of the domestic economy, as structured in the household social life, facilitated the growth and in fact maintained the expansion of this industry. The principal products are the various types of utensils and containers, made of clay or wood, for domestic and industrial use.

The industry had existed in the pre-jihad kingdoms of Gobir and Kebbi, but experienced its

significant growth during the Caliphate era, largely in response to larger demands. Pottery flourished particularly in the settlements along the river banks and ponds, where suitable clay were obtained. Sokoto, Kware, Wurno, Gwadabawa, Anka and Talata-Mafara became famous in the production of variety of pottery products. Woodcarving on the other hand flourished in the rural areas, where the woodcarvers of the region are endowed with abundant forest resources in the *dazuzzuka* (bushes), which they effectively utilise to make *Turame* (mortars), *Tabare* (pestles), *Kujeri* (seats and chairs), *Kotuna* or *Botuna* (hoe-and knife-tilts), *Koshiya* (big wooden spoon), and other related products. In his study, Abubakar has shown that some of these products were purchased by the Tuareg women who were frequent visitors into the region during the long dry season.<sup>22</sup>

Another trade, which is related to woodcarving, is the making and carving of *Korai* and related products, which is particularly a flourishing enterprise in Gummi district. The *fadama* area on the bank of river Zamfara, which flowed from Anka through Gummi is mostly used to grow *Duma*, which when matured and dried up are used by carvers to make *Korai* and *Luddai* that are

---

<sup>22</sup> Abubakar, *op.cit.*, p.105.

decorated with various designs. These products are very essential for domestic uses in the households. The products formed one of the major exports of Gummi to other parts of the Metropolis and the Caliphate.

#### 4.2 The Nature and Significance of Commodity Production in the Metropolis

Petty commodity production was a resourceful function of the agrarian economy of the Metropolitan Caliphate. Literally speaking, production means making things. But as Watts rightly noted, human beings do not just make things or produce in abstraction. Rather, they fabricate and fashion things in specific ways that necessitate particular social relations with others engaged in social production.<sup>23</sup> Watts further explains, that,

Production is both natural and social. Productive relations and ideas about production are produced and reproduced along with the products themselves.<sup>24</sup>

Commodity production in the Metropolitan Caliphate was located within the crafts manufacturing infrastructures. The region already has a developed

---

<sup>23</sup> Watts, *op.cit.*, p.60.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*

localised specialisation in crafts manufacture, by the turn of the century. The products, having surpassed the local needs, were therefore important articles for exchanges in the markets. By the third decade of the century, commodity production within the scale qualities of peasant economy had developed into significant economic enterprises, when craft productions were intended for exchange value.

Perhaps it was the tremendous expansions which the manufacturing sectors had undergone in the mid-century that led some scholars to erroneously posit the term, guilds, in examining the operational system of the crafts manufacturing industries in our region. However, Abubakar has critically examined the validity and usability of the concept of guilds in describing the craftsmen or the clusters they formed in the cities of the Savanna and he found the term both conceptually and methodologically problematic. Abubakar therefore argues that,

The problem with the use of this term arises from the fact that certain types of economic organisation may exhibit certain features of guilds and that in its application scholars often retain the medieval connotations of the term and yet apply it loosely to describe phenomena which are

structuarally and functionally  
dissimilar to the guild.<sup>25</sup>

It is also our opinion that the term guild is analytically inappropriate to describe the social organisation of craftsmen in the central Sudan region throughout the nineteenth century. Crafts and crafts-based production in the Metropolitan districts of the Sokoto Caliphate were neither located in formal guilds nor in lineage structures. Production was located within the household; with labour provision, organisation, mode of training and specialisation being predominantly controlled from, and essentially based in the household unit.

Throughout the course of the century, there was no formal association between craftsmen or occupational groups. Crafts production groups were independent of each other and as such there were no corporate existence of clusters which craftsmen formed. Although there were no mechanism outside the households for taking of decisions, there were of course strong informal cooperative organisational norms of altruism between and among members of a particular occupational group. Such cooperation among craftsmen was a feature of peasants' "moral economy", which bound productive forces in a typically agrarian society. Nevertheless,

---

<sup>25</sup> Abubakar, *op.cit.*, p.112.

occupational homogeneity tended to be reinforced through concrete factors such as immigration, co-residence and the expansion of producer household through clients and slaves affiliation, all of which tended to expand production units into highly organised units of social production. In fact, occupational homogeneity itself was further reinforced by factors of kinship, co-residence, extended friendly relations and common occupation.

Despite the growth in the crafts manufacturing industries during the course of the century, all the processes of labour procurement and levels of production were based in the households. Quality control of products were maintained through effective monitoring and supervision by the elders. One of my informants claimed that, the marketability of products largely depended on the reputation of the production units, which, in their turn, depended on the ability of the elders to regulate and maintain quality control of their products.<sup>26</sup>

The importance of the crafts industries in the general system of social production meant that occupational heads were usually appointed by the

---

<sup>26</sup> Wakkala Bawa, *op.cit.*

political authorities. These occupational heads were the channels for collection of tributes or presents to the rulers, and they generally formed the link between the aristocracy and their professional colleagues. Appropriation of surplus by the aristocracy was largely through this channel. The occupational heads such as the *Mazuga* (head of the blacksmiths), *Sarkin Fawa* (head of the butchers), *Sarkin Magina* (head of the potters), *Sarkin Dukawa* (head of the leatherworkers), and others, possessed considerable political and material privileges in the society.<sup>27</sup>

One important factor that facilitated the development of commodity production in the Metropolitan districts was the diffusion of immigrants from the emirates, particularly Bida Emirate.<sup>28</sup> These developments seemed to have fostered the proliferation of crafts manufacturing outlets, which with flourishing

---

<sup>27</sup> Both the heads of occupational groups and the supervisory heads such as *Lumu* (head of the market), were materially rewarded by the rulers, and more particularly, receive gratifications from the craftsmen/tradesmen under them.

<sup>28</sup> There are indications that immigrants from Bida Emirate dispersed into numerous districts, where they contributed to the development of crafts industries such as Smithing, Weaving and dyeing. Field data obtained in Talata-Mafara, Gusau, Kaura-Namoda, and Gwadabawa suggests that a large number of immigrants in those crafts industries claimed Nupe origin.



regional and long distance trade, enhanced the socio-economic status of the craftsmen. The effects of these, were manifested in considerable development of commoditisation, in varying degrees, in the Metropolitan districts.

The expansion of the crafts manufacturing outlets largely reoriented acquisition of crafts skills through non-hereditary channels. In an expanding industry, though production was basically based in the household, factors of immigration, the increasing magnitude of client and slave labour, and the increasing utilisation of wage labour are all factors that led to wider acquisition of skills through non-hereditary modes. Thus, throughout the century, only the Smithing and the Dyeing industries were largely dominated on hereditary lines.<sup>29</sup>

#### **4.3 Internal and External Trade**

The development of commerce in the region was largely in response to the growth of the *ribats*, the fostering of crafts and the development of commodity production, all of which led to a high degree of economic interdependence between the various settlements in the

---

<sup>29</sup> Most of my informants in these crafts believe that the true "secrets" of the trades are only learnt through heredity .

region, as well as between the region and the emirates as well as the other areas outside the Caliphate. As early as the third decade of the century, the Metropolitan districts had developed as trading links in the regional trade and as (important) stop overs (*zanguna*) in long distance trade routes, which connect with our region.

Accounts of contemporary travellers who visited the region mentioned the commercial importance of the districts in regional and long distance trade transactions. While social and economic factors provided the basis of the development of commerce in the region at a general level, the diplomatic actions initiated by Muhammad Bello promoted significant expansion, which was responsible for the strengthening of commercial relations between the Metropolitan Caliphate and the neighbouring areas of Agades, Adar to the north and Timbuktu to the west.<sup>30</sup> The importance of this initial diplomatic action is that, it provided the basis of the ultimate close economic ties, which bound the socio-economic history of these areas and the Metropolitan Caliphate throughout the century and beyond.

---

<sup>30</sup> See A. M. Kani & C. C. Stewart, "Sokoto-Masina Diplomatic Correspondences", *Research Bulletin*, Vol XI, Nos.1&2, (Centre for Arabic Documentation, University of Ibadan, 1975/76).

### **Internal Trade:**

Internal trade may be conceived at two levels: forms of trade links between the Metropolitan districts themselves, and the trade links between the Metropolis and the Emirates of the Caliphate. Taken together, these domestic trade relations represented a crucial tract of commercial growth in the Metropolitan Caliphate.

Early in the century, the Metropolitan districts emerged not only as new political centres but also as centres of economic and social activities as well. The Metropolitan districts were the main commercial centres of the community and the settlements immediately surrounding them. The districts therefore evolved their markets as centres of buying and selling on a more regular basis. They emerged as the centres, where import commodities were purchased and distributed into the rural communities, and they also emerged as crisscrossing trade routes into which craftsmen and traders ingratiated with the caliphal social system of production.

The pattern of commercial development of Sokoto city provided for a unique development of brokage system and a large concentration of transit merchants; a development which in itself influenced a unique feature

of commercial relations between the capital city and its districts, particularly those that immediately surrounded it.<sup>31</sup>

For the districts and settlements such as Shuni, Wababi, Dange, Rikina, Dundaye, Durbawa, Asari, Wamakko and Kware, the Sokoto markets provided them with their main commercial centres both for marketing their products and in making their purchases.<sup>32</sup> Hence, commercial axis between the capital city and its neighbouring settlements tended to be lopsided in favour of Sokoto. In major markets' transactions, these settlements-both individually and collectively-look towards Sokoto due to lack of crisscrosses commercial network between them.

The districts that are far away from Sokoto, particularly those situated in the south east of the Sokoto-Rima Basin developed a very strong patterns of crisscrosses commercial network among themselves on the one hand, and between them and Sokoto on the other hand.<sup>33</sup> Local specialisations promoted exports. For

---

<sup>31</sup> See Abubakar's illuminating accounts on the commercial organisation in 19th century Sokoto in his work "Birnin Shehu...." *op.cit.*, pp.129-137.

<sup>32</sup> Group Interview, Makarantar Mallam Boyi, *op.cit.*

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*

instance, Sabon-Birni and Kaura-Namoda exported saddle products such as *Sulke*, *Lihidi* and *Kaimi*. Zurmi and Kurya exported threads (*Sawaye*) of different kinds as far as Sokoto. Bungudu and Talata-Mafara exported different brands of gown (*Rigunan Sawaye*) all over the region and beyond.

However significant domestic commercial transactions occurred at the level of urban-rural axis within each district. Urban settlements were usually the primary collection centres of import goods in addition to being centres of crafts manufacturing. Rural settlements therefore purchased their goods from their immediate urban centres while at the same time provided the latter with their own articles for sale, particularly the needed raw materials for the manufacturing industries.<sup>34</sup> Pottery and woodcarving were mostly rural oriented, and the rural areas therefore take the products of these industries to the urban areas.

Generally even within the same locality, there existed some forms of exchanges primarily arising due to occupational specialisations, which promote interdependence between occupational groups and

---

<sup>34</sup> In the region, spinning (*Kadi*) was predominantly rural based. Similarly, threads (*Zare*) was largely produced in the rural areas, and the same is true in respect to iro ore smelting.

within them. Thus, the agriculturalists and the pastoralists enter into exchange relationships, whereby agricultural and livestock related products changed hands. Similar exchanges took place between the cultivators and the blacksmiths or between pastoral groups and the Weavers (*Masaka*).

The most notable form of domestic commerce within the caliphate social formation was the trade relations between the Metropolitan districts and the Emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate. The Metropolitan region developed a strong commercial connection with the Emirates, particularly Kano, Katsina, Zazzau, Bauchi, Adamawa, Bida and Ilorin. The Gwandu Emirate, though politically a separate unit from the Metropolitan Caliphate by 1820, was however, both socially and economically bound to the developments in the Metropolis. The trading links between the Metropolitan region and the Emirates were, on the other hand, closely connected with the long distance trade.

Close political relations cemented economic relations between the Metropolitan Caliphate and the Emirates. Bida and Ilorin Emirates, for instance, exported into the Metropolis, cloths and textile materials, metal manufactures, vegetable oil, palm oil, *kayan karo* (ornaments), as well as European import

purchased from the coastal towns.<sup>35</sup> The imports of the Emirates from our region included Sokoto dyed cloths and garments, leather and leathersgoods, hides and skins, food and medicinal items, livestock and ostrich feathers.<sup>36</sup> The Metropolitan region also maintained a two-way traffic in textile products with Katsina, Kano and Zazzau Emirates. Other exports of the Metropolis into these Emirates included leather and leather goods, civet perfume (*turaren jibda*), salt produced in the Dallol Fogha and other local manufactures of wood and metal. Our region also traded with Bauchi, Muri and Adamawa Emirates, mainly through Kano, in textile materials and local manufactures.

#### External or Long Distance Trade:

External or long distance trade which, using modern economic jargons, can be termed as the 'international' or 'foreign' trade, refers to the commercial relations between the Metropolitan Caliphate and other areas that fall outside the political control of the Caliphate authorities. However, the term, long distance trade, can be loosely applied to domestic trade, such as the trade between the Metropolis and the Adamawa

---

<sup>35</sup> See Mason, "Captive and Client.." *op.cit.*, p.465.

<sup>36</sup> NAK SNP 15 395 M2.

Emirate, for instance. But it is important to realise that, throughout the nineteenth century, long distance trade had always been maintained through the network of international trade. It is for this reason that the trading caravans, cutting through the Metropolis, involved both long distance and foreign traders in international routes, from the Sahilo-Saharan edge of North Africa down to the present West African coastal areas.

The most important trans-saharan trade route in the nineteenth century had its terminus in the heart of the Sokoto Caliphate. This was the Ghadames-Air-Kano route.<sup>37</sup> Kano therefore served as an entrepot from which trade routes radiated westwards into the Metropolitan Caliphate.<sup>38</sup> The famous caravan route cutting into our region was the Kano-Pauwa-Kotorkoshi-Kaura Namoda-Sokoto, which eventually led to Gonja in the Volta region through Jega and Yendi.<sup>39</sup> The significance of this caravan trade for the Metropolitan districts, was the extensive trading activities that usually took place between the merchants and the

---

<sup>37</sup> A.A.Boahen, "The Caravan Trade in the Nineteenth Century", *JAH*, III, 2 (1962), p.352.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, p.356.

<sup>39</sup> cf. I. Tahir, "Scholars, Sufis, Saints and Capitalists in Kano 1904-1974: The Pattern of Bourgeois Revolution in an Islamic Society" (Unpublished Ph.D., Cambridge, 1975), P.300.



communities of the settlements through which the merchants followed. These settlements served as collecting and distributing centres of commodities into the inner settlements. The caravan normally spend over two months in the Metropolitan Caliphate, engaging in trade and recruit the traders of the region into the journey as well.<sup>40</sup>

Besides the regular annual caravans, which passed through the Metropolis, there were also the small irregular caravans following the route almost all the year round. This development relied on the extent of the political control of the routes by the Caliphate authorities, which had to ensure the security of the routes both directly and indirectly. And in fact, even the importance which the Ghadames-Air-Kano route came to acquire in the century, was largely related to the new wholesome state of affairs created by the new political order established by the Sokoto Caliphate. This fact has been attested to by virtually all the contemporary travellers who wrote some accounts on the state of affairs in the Caliphate.<sup>41</sup> The main items of trade were

---

<sup>40</sup> See *ibid.*, and G.Iyon, *A Narrative of the Travels in Northern Africa, 1818-1820* (London, 1821), p.356.

<sup>41</sup> Some of these Travellers particularly noted the importance of the Kano-Sokoto-Gonja route as well as the intricate nature of the business operations in the commercial

salt and natron, kola nuts, calico and cloth, slaves, gold and other variety of local commodities.

In fact, the Kano-Pauwa-Kotorkoshi-Kaura Namoda-Sokoto-Jega route commercially integrated the larger part of the Metropolitan Caliphate with the North African areas up to the Mediterranean on the north, and with the forest areas in the Volta region on the southern frontiers. This development influenced extensive commercial transactions of use-value exchanges on a larger scale as well as promoted the emergence of a strong merchant class. The nature of the commercial nexus of long distance trade and the general framework of financial arrangements upon which commercial transactions were made, pioneered the socio-economic transformation of many traders within the orbit of 'foreign' merchant capital.

The caravan routes, which passed through the Metropolis seem to have engineered the participation of the merchants of the region into wider commercial activities, with attendant socio-cultural consequences in the coastal areas and the Volta region. Merchants from the Caliphate were directly responsible for the

---

centres along the route. For instance, see J. Richadson, *A Mission to Central Africa*, (Francass, London, 1853), Vol II, p. 225; Clapperton, "Journal...." *op.cit.*, pp.53; 67-68; 75; Barth, "Travels..." *op.cit.*, Vol III, p.364.

development of important entrepôts such as Yendi, Salaga and Kpembe; whose growth was a nineteenth century phenomenon.<sup>42</sup> One prominent feature of these commercial centres was the predominance of Hausa and Muslim traders in them. Some of the commercial centres in the Volta region were even said to have been founded or developed by merchants from the Caliphate, such as the case of Salaga.<sup>43</sup>

It was not only through the Kano-Sokoto-Gonja route that the Metropolitan Caliphate participated in international trade. The Sokoto-Adar-Zinder-Ghadames route was an important major commercial link with the desert side trade. There was also another route which connected the region with the coastal areas around Lagos and the Yorubaland, through Bida and Ilorin Emirates.

The desert side trade was a significant commercial link between the Metropolis and its northern neighbours, the Tuaregs and the Temasheq speaking groups. Arising from ecological factors, commerce was

---

<sup>42</sup> See I.Wilks, "Ashante Policy Towards the Hausa Trade in the 19th Century", in, C.Meillassoux(ed.), *The Development of Indigenous Trade and Markets in West Africa*, (OUP, London, 1971).

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid*, p.126.

the predominant activity of these groups for a very long time, pre-dating the establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate. During the nineteenth century, however, these groups controlled the Sahelian edge of the Trans-Saharan trade in addition to their total monopoly of the desert side trade; a development which gave credence to the suggestion of a strong interconnection between the trans-saharan trade and the desert side trade in the economy of the Central Sudan.<sup>44</sup>

The Tuaregs and the Temasheq speaking groups inhabited the immediate northern boundry of the Metropolitan region, and this made contact between these groups and our region naturally easier. Furthermore, the Caliphate exercised direct political influence over Sarkin Adar and some section of the Tuaregs.<sup>45</sup> Consequentially, the Tuaregs and the Adarawa became indispensable in the commercial sector of the economy of the Metropolitan Caliphate. The presence of the Tuareg merchants all the year round

---

<sup>44</sup> See P.E.Lovejoy, "Commercial Sectors in the Economy of the 19th Century Central Sudan: The Trans-Saharan Trade and the Desert Side Salt Trade", *African Economic History*, No.13, 1984, pp.85-116.

<sup>45</sup> D.Haman, "Adar, the Tuareg and Sokoto: Relations of Sokoto with the Hausa and Tuareg during the 19th Century", in Y.B.Usman (ed.) "Studies in the...." *op.cit.*, p.406.

was a common feature in Sokoto city.<sup>46</sup> While the Tuaregs are known to have largely confined their commercial activities in the Metropolitan region paying particular attention to Sokoto city and a few other districts, the Adarawa traders penetrated into the Emirates as far as to Kontagora and possibly into Bida and Ilorin.<sup>47</sup>

The main commercial activities of the Tuaregs and the Adarawa in our region included trade in foodstuff, livestock and general merchandise. They also provided transport services, storage, credit and brokerage facilities. Their principal export into the region include salt, natron and livestock. Their imports from our region were mainly grains, kolanuts, slaves, textile materials leather, and leathergoods as well as other local manufactures made from the Metropolis.

Another important international commercial link with our region was through the coastal trade in the south, from where our traders bring in European goods. These commercial relations were developed during the first half of the century, mainly through the southern

---

<sup>46</sup> Clapperton, "Journal....", *op.cit.*, p.229; Abubakar, "Birnin Shehu...", *op.cit.*, p.144.

<sup>47</sup> Hamman, *loc.cit.*

Emirates of the Caliphate. Between 1820 and 1850 there was a tremendous increase in the volume of European trade at the coast. Its main feature was then a dramatic rise and development of bulk handling of European imports at the coastal areas.<sup>48</sup> Some of these goods, a substantial part of which were traded in into the Metropolis, included Indian cotton, calicoes and prints, linens, silks, copper and cowrie currency.<sup>49</sup> These imports were serviced by African exports in hides and skin, gums, indigo, mahogany and slaves. The African exports were mainly the products from the Caliphate areas.<sup>50</sup>

The trade with the Europeans was usually accompanied by a large bulk of trade in foodstuff and livestock across Bida and Ilorin Emirates into the Yorubaland and Coastal areas. Such commercial traffic was mostly connected with seasonal migrations. This development was closely associated with the system of labour supplies, brokage systems, and the structure of credit system, all of which facilitated seasonal

---

<sup>48</sup> C.W.Newbury, "Prices and Profitability in early 19th Century West African Trade" ,in, Meillassoux (ed.) "The Development..." *op.cit.*, p.92.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, p.93.

<sup>50</sup> cf. *Ibid.*, pp.95-96 for his discussion of commerce between the coast and 'Hausa-Fulani' markets.

migrations. The aggregate result led to adaptation and extension of commercial intermediaries that structured exchanges between coastal and interior markets.

#### 4.4 Financing and the Nature of Merchant Capital

The accounts of European travellers clearly shows the predominance of 'foreign' investments and capital in commercial infrastructures in our region in particular, and in the Central Sudan region in general.<sup>51</sup> The secondary materials also depicted a similar picture.<sup>52</sup>

Writing about Sokoto city, Abubakar argues:

One has only to look at the level of Adarawa presence in Sokoto and their role in its economy (both manufacturing and commercial) to appreciate [their] significance....Thus a somewhat disproportionately large number of traders *attajirai*, financiers and *dillalai* of Sokoto in this period were Adarawa or other people claiming a northern

---

<sup>51</sup> For instance see Barth, "Travels..." *op.cit.*, Vol III, *passim*; Clapperton, "Journal..." *op.cit.*, *passim*; Staudinger, "In the Heart..." *op.cit.*, Vol I, *passim*.

<sup>52</sup> P.E.Lovejoy, "The Hausa Kola Trade 1700-1900:A Commercial System in the Continental Exchange of West Africa" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1973); C.W.Newbury, "North African and Western Sudan Trade in the 19th Century:A Re-Evaluation", *JAH*, VIII, 2, 1966, pp.233-246; Lovejoy & Baier, "The Desert Side..." *op.cit.* Lovejoy, "Commercial Sectors..." *op.cit.*

origin, such as the Azbinawa (people of Azben). Their role did not just stop in trade with the north, for they had a strong position and major investments in Sokoto's trade with the south and southwest particularly in kolanuts and livestock.<sup>53</sup>

The implication of Abubakar's statement on the entire Metropolis can only be appreciated in the light of his further arguments. For when he considers the relationship between the City of Sokoto and the Metropolitan districts, he noted, that,

When talking about Sokoto's foreign trade or its *fatauchi* with other areas, however, one must not lose sight of the dependence not only of the city's commerce but also of its industries and in fact its very survival on the strategic relations binding it to its hinterland.<sup>54</sup>

Although the Metropolitan region cannot be simply grasped as a single commercial unit within the context of either the Metropolitan Caliphate or the Caliphate as a whole, the fact is that, there were strong economic ties that certainly followed the particular political dissection of the Metropolitan region. In fact,

---

<sup>53</sup> Abubakar, "Birnin Shehu...", *op.cit.*, pp.144-145.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, p.155.



Sokoto city's markets and its commercial network were closely knitted with the markets in the Metropolitan districts situated within the Sokoto central plains.<sup>55</sup> In fact, only the south eastern districts seemed to have developed some independent external commercial network in the Metropolitan Caliphate.<sup>56</sup>

It would seem clear that the commercial infrastructures in our region were largely controlled by the Adarawa, Azbinawa and the people of North African origin. In other words, foreign trade in the Metropolitan Caliphate was essentially controlled by the Adarawa, Azbinawa and the 'Arab' merchants.<sup>57</sup> Not only that these merchants operated in Sokoto and the urban districts such as Wurno, Gidan goga, Dogon daji or Kaura Namoda but as Staudinger found out, the Azbinawa and Adarawa merchants profitably operated in "out-of-the-way" districts.<sup>58</sup> In virtually all the districts in the Metropolitan Caliphate were to be found Adarawa and Azbinawa merchants in scattered permanent settlements, consisting of petty merchants, brokers,

---

<sup>55</sup> Staudinger, *op.cit.*, pp.317-320..

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, p.342.

<sup>57</sup> See Barth, *op.cit.*, Vol I, p.129.

<sup>58</sup> Staudinger, *op.cit.*, p.271.

craftsmen and landlords operating lodging houses (*masaukai*) and storage facilities to trading firms or wealthier merchants' networks.<sup>59</sup>

The operational networks of foreign firms or foreign merchants in the Metropolis were determined by their scope of commercial activities as well as their credit liquidity facilities. The wealthy foreign merchants had commercial branches in several areas. For instance, in Sokoto, one Muhammed Boro, a native of Adar used a network of his numerous full-grown sons to expand his commercial operations in the Metropolitan districts.<sup>60</sup> Many Azbinawa merchants operating commercial branches in Sokoto and other districts had their headquarters in Zinder.<sup>61</sup> In addition, other big merchants, who had their headquarters in some of the emirates of the Caliphate, particularly Kano and Katsina, also maintained important branches in the Metropolis.<sup>62</sup>

Foreign trade in the Metropolis was related to, and in fact, flourished within the axis of the trans-saharan

---

<sup>59</sup> Barth, *op.cit.*, p.101; Staudinger, *op.cit.*, pp.274,276,287,345.

<sup>60</sup> Barth, *op.cit.*, p.129.

<sup>61</sup> Lovejoy & Baier, "The Desert Side...", *op.cit.*, p.566; Lovejoy, "Commercial Sectors...", *op.cit.*, p.109.

<sup>62</sup> See Tahir, "Scholars, Sufis...", *op.cit.*, p.272.

trade and what Lovejoy described, as, the desert side trade. While the latter had its substantial capital located in the Sahelian and Savanna region, the former had the genesis of its merchant capital in Europe, which recycled through Ghadames and Tripoli.<sup>63</sup> Foreign trade was facilitated and maintained through the practice of *hawala*; a borrowed commercial practice of North Africa, which regulated delegation of credit from one person to another.<sup>64</sup>

Many form of currencies were used for commercial transactions in the Metropolitan Caliphate.<sup>65</sup> The currencies included cowries, silver, gold, Maria Thresa dollars, slaves, strips of sawaye cloth, kolanuts and millet. The expansion of commercial activities in the century led to a corresponding wider application of currencies. However the propensity of credit facilities among circuit traders made foreign currencies such as the dollars, silver and gold the preserve of the wealthier merchants, and were often used in exchanges involving large sums.

---

<sup>63</sup> Boahen, "The Caravan Trade...", *op.cit.*, p.354; Lovejoy, "Commercial Sectors...", *loc.cit.*

<sup>64</sup> Lovejoy & Baier, "The Desert Side...", *op.cit.*, p.567.

<sup>65</sup> See Abubakar, *op.cit.*, pp.140-142.

Early in the century, when the merchants of our region were exploiting the benefits of long distance trade, there was a remarkable rise in prices for African exports to Europe, most of which were, however, produced outside our region. By this period, the prices of European imports fell and continued to fall for several decades in the nineteenth century.<sup>66</sup> The primary effect of this development was the proliferation of bulking centres along the coast. The nature of such international commercial network had a profound effect on the development of the foreign merchant capital in the Metropolitan Caliphate. While the general trend of trade tilted in favour of the European merchants and investors, the financial position of the local merchants in our region was also weaker in comparison to both the Arabs and the Tuareg merchants including the wealthier local merchants in Kano and Katsina emirates. The local merchants in our region were also weaker in comparison to the local merchants operating in the coastal areas.

The scanty evidence before us seem to indicate some substantial measure of seasonal migration of merchants from our region into the forest and the coastal areas in response to the brokage system and the

---

<sup>66</sup> Newbury, "Prices and Profitability...", *op.cit.*, pp.93-94.

credit structure of the 'trust' system, which was one of the main features of the commercial development during the century.

The 'trust' system financed by European merchants certainly boosted commercial activities in the interior by inducing capital investment in markets traditionally short of capital, but the intermediaries, the African merchants, were in most cases worse off; being hit by seasonal debts. On the other hand, ordinary lending of money in the Metropolitan region was exploitative enough to hinder financial recovery in cases of commercial investments since generally a substantial loan attracted one hundred per cent interest at four months grace.<sup>67</sup> Therefore, profitable commercial activities by the merchants were mostly mercantile speculation on a small scale. This development tended to push the merchants into the forest and coastal areas.

The preponderance of foreign capital and investments in the Metropolis had a number of repercussions on the development of local merchants of the region. While the local merchants might own a substantial capital to stimulate crafts production and trade, the needed extensive financial operation

---

<sup>67</sup> Barth, *op.cit.*, Vol III,p.578.

associated with external trade and long distance trade became dependent on foreign capital and investments. And, since capital extension and investments were actually related to diversification of commercial operations, the Tuaregs and the North African merchants held the commercial nerves of the Metropolitan Caliphate.

#### 4.5 The Nature and Organisation of Professional Services

The programmes and policies of the Caliphate leadership, articulated within the framework of the ideals of Sokoto jihad movement, clearly outlined the nature and significance of professional services. The broad policies on professionals and their services were outlined by the Shehu in some general sense.<sup>68</sup> The work, in which the Shehu dealt with professionals and their services, did not seem to have included all the professional services that could be deemed to have been significant in the Caliphate. Rather it would seem that, this work provided general identification of professional services, to which the Caliphate leadership endorsed its mark, as being crucial to social relations in the Caliphate.

---

<sup>68</sup> Uthman b.Fudi, *"Anwa mal'- Allah"*, *op.cit.*

There may be some difficulty in trying to conceptualise the difference between occupation and profession in a pre-colonial society. In the Sokoto Caliphate, the distinction made by the Shehu is employed here. Accordingly, occupation deal with manual skills and technical expertise, while profession deal more with mental skills.<sup>69</sup> It is in this sense that we made our distinction. The occupations have been treated in our discussion on the crafts industries. However we intend to discuss the 'professionals' (in our general understanding of the term), that were practically prominent in the socio-political life of the Metropolitan Caliphate. In fact, one of these professions that we shall discuss may be seen to have been counter-productive to the ideals of the caliphate. But this was the practical reality that obtained in the Metropolis during the Caliphate era.

The professionals, which we identified were by no means the only ones to be regarded as such. Nevertheless, these professions were crucial and also influential in the Caliphate's socio-economic and political spheres. And like the occupations, which we have treated in this chapter, they had assumed some high

---

<sup>69</sup> See *ibid.*

level of specialisation and organisational framework during the course of the century.

Most of the professions were predominantly based in the households. Their organisational structures were based in the *gida* system. Similarly, their framework of instruction and training was primarily acquired through *gado* (inheritance) and only secondarily through *koyo* (tutelage). But there is a strong exception in the case of Scholarship and Intellectual services, in which even though *gado* (inheritance) played a very significant role in regulating some areas of intellectual services, such as *Alkalai* (judges) and *Muftis* (court registrars), it did not seem to have been the predominant factor in the reproduction of intellectual services generally.

#### **4.6 The Professionals**

##### **a) Scholars and Intellectual Services:**

The jihad movement which created the Sokoto Caliphate was based on intense intellectual activities. Following the success of this movement, the Metropolitan region became the political and the spiritual headquarters of the Caliphate. Therefore, political circumstances in our region made scholarship and related intellectual services not only important but particularly prestigious. Thus, in Sokoto city, scholarship



became a source of political and socio-economic privileges reminiscent of aristocrat's status.

Abubakar's study on the city of Sokoto, following Monteil's argument, has shown the prominence and reputation of scholarship over all other socio-economic endeavours in the capital city of the Caliphate. Accounts of Clapperton dealing with the first two decades of the nineteenth century and those of Barth that relate to the middle of the century, have all shown the splendid position of scholars and intellectual services not only in Sokoto city but in the Metropolitan Caliphate as a whole.<sup>70</sup> Staudinger who visited the Metropolitan Caliphate in the last quarter of the century similarly noted the significant positions of scholars in Sokoto, which he assessed as a confirmation of the city being a seat of learning and the spiritual headquarters of the Caliphate.<sup>71</sup>

In fact, the prominence of scholarship and intellectual services was not only pronounced in the Metropolis but actually became characteristic of the political structures of the Metropolitan Caliphate. This

---

<sup>70</sup> Clapperton, "Journal...", *op.cit.*, *passim*; Barth, "Travels..." Vol III, *op.cit.*, *passim*.

<sup>71</sup> Staudinger, "In The Heart...", Vol I, *op.cit.*, esp. pp. 299-302.

was prompted by the initial attempt of the Shehu to outline, for the region, the political structures of 'a Muslim government'. These structures sought by the Shehu emphasised the relevance of scholarship and intellectual orientation of the 'believer' in order to be able to function properly in any of the streamlined political offices. Although subsequent political circumstances in the Metropolitan Caliphate led to a proliferation of political offices and titles along the pattern of the pre-jihad Hausa kingdoms, scholars and those offering intellectual services assumed important position within the Caliphate's social relations of production.

We conceptualise scholars here in a broad sense, to mean all the learned people although their individual's degree of learning, position, influence, involvement and participation in the Caliphate's socio-political life might differ. In the Metropolitan Caliphate, scholars-both ordinary and state recognised-seemed to have been accorded many privileges by the caliphate leadership, which facilitated their activities and maintained their reproduction.

However, a large number of scholars in our region were those ordinary scholars, who were squarely involved in learning and teaching in Islamic sciences

and the Arabic language. Such ordinary scholars were scattered all over the region. Many of them also operated within the old-aged seasonal migratory pattern; in which a scholar carry along with him entrusted pupils away from their homes mostly during the dry season and return at the onset of the wet season. In certain cases emigrated scholars settled permanently in new areas, which they find to be suitable for learning and for the production of the means of their sustenance. Immigration and subsequent re-settlement was facilitated by factors of patronage, either by a *sarki* or a wealthy individual.

In particular, ordinary scholarship operate and prosper under a general culture of trust, respect and benevolence to scholarship, which has been rooted in Western and Central Sudan for hundreds of years before the Sokoto jihad movement. In addition, the ideological and political climate established by the Caliphate further reinforced the position and status of ordinary scholars in the Metropolitan districts. But the status of these scholars, as professionals, was maintained through patronages which they received from various classes and strata of people in the society.

A group of scholars which was small but very influential were the descendants of the close associates

of the Shehu, many of whom were particularly active during the formative years of the Caliphate.<sup>72</sup> Most of such close associate of the Shehu were given certain politico-religious functions in the early days of the Caliphate. In this group were to be found many *Alkalai* (judges), *Muftis* (court registrars) and *Imams* that were religio-politically influential in the Metropolitan Caliphate. This category of scholars performed official functions within the political arrangement of the Metropolitan Caliphate. Such scholars, therefore, enjoyed the privileges of the aristocracy, mitigated however through the jihad ideology. There was also another group of scholars in between the two. This group though not assigned with politico-religious functions was highly influential, and a number of scholars from this group were granted certain privileges such as fiefs. In this group belong such scholars like Abdulkadir Ibn. Mustapha. In this group could also be found some women scholars such as Malama Nannagge. She was said to be a very famous scholar, who closely followed the activities of Nana Asma'u, the daughter of the Shehu, in the Metropolitan Caliphate.<sup>73</sup> She was highly involved in the mobilisation of the womenfolk through teaching in

---

<sup>72</sup> cf. Last, *op.cit.*, pp.46-53..

<sup>73</sup> Malam M.Boyi, *op.cit.*

Sokoto city and the surrounding environs, and she is also said to have been a celebrated teacher to a large number of male scholars, who flocked in to her for advance studies in Islamic sciences.<sup>74</sup>

A related segment in this category of professionals, the lawyers, which the Shehu identified in his work, *Anwa mal 'Allah* did not seem to have existed or at least were not prominent in the Caliphate's social formation. Clapperton's servant mentioned the existence of a 'native' lawyer in Sokoto, but it seems he was confusing the term with a Judge or perhaps a *Muhtasib* whom people could approach in their bid to get some redress on their complaints.<sup>75</sup> The writings of the leaders of the Caliphate and the contemporary scholars as well as the travellers accounts and other sources of information do not say much on Lawyers as distinct from a Judge, *Muhtasib*, or *Imam*, all of whom were charged with responsibilities of administering justice in both civil and criminal cases.

#### **b) Herbalists and Medicinemen:**

---

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>75</sup> Clapperton, "Journal...", *op.cit.*, p.270.

The physiological texture of human beings explains the importance of medicinemen in the social life of any given human society. The Metropolitan Caliphate was no exception. Moreover, the Caliphate's ideals coupled with the practical health problems in the Metropolitan districts expounded the important role of herbalists and medicinemen, as professionals, in the region.

Herbalists have been very crucial in the pre-jihad kingdoms. They were mostly *Mahalba* (hunters), who combined hunting with gathering plants and herbs, which they used for preparing medicines. There were however those who could be regarded as full time herbalists, who only take to agricultural production and animal husbandry, in addition to their profession.

There were efforts by the Caliphate leadership to popularise the acquisition of medical knowledge on common diseases affecting the populace in the Caliphate. For instance, towards the closing years of the second decade of the century, eye disease became serious in the Caliphate so much that Sarkin Musulmi Muhammad Bello wrote a prescriptive work on eye disease, which

was widely circulated in the Caliphate.<sup>76</sup> The problem of eye disease seemed to have persisted, since in 1886 when Staudinger visited Sokoto, he was disturbed by the number of blind people he saw.<sup>77</sup> It may be possible that this was an indication of the position of Sokoto then as an eye treatment centre. But whatever was exactly the situation, Sokoto became famous for medicinemen, who specialised in handling eye diseases during the century and beyond.<sup>78</sup>

Another serious ailment which affected the populace in the region is leprosy, whose stigma made Muhammad Bello to introduce the cultivation of *Tsawari*, which was used with other grasses to prepare medicine for the cure of this disease. This herb became widely cultivated in Sokoto and the neighbouring districts, and these areas became known for its professional herbalists, who treat cases of leprosy diseases.<sup>79</sup>

---

<sup>76</sup> A copy of this work is available in the NHRS/ABU, but is still uncatologued.

<sup>77</sup> Staudinger, *op.cit.*, p.299.

<sup>78</sup> There is still a concentration of herbalists who specialised in eye problems in Sokoto particularly around Kofar Atiku, where it is claimed they had always been.

<sup>79</sup> Mallam Baban Sambo, *op.cit.*

Generally herbalists and medicinemen became very crucial in the Metropolitan Caliphate, where they make brisk business in the absence of 'modern' medical facilities or the state offering medical facilities. It can however be stressed that, the Caliphate leadership, especially during the early years, practically encouraged acquisition of herbs and other medicinal foods in order to take care of local ailments. For instance, the cultivation of bananas in the Metropolis was encouraged by Muhammad Bello because of its additional medicinal uses in curing dysentery and stomach problems during the dry and hot seasons.<sup>80</sup>

c) *Maroka* (Praise-Singers):

*Roko* (praise singing), which seem counter-productive to the ideals and policies of the Sokoto Caliphate was to become a profitable profession in the Metropolitan Caliphate. *Roko* and *kade-kade* (musical performances) in the Metropolis were obviously the legacies of the pre-jihad kingdoms, which were intensified in new ways and fancies.

Ironically the ideals of the Sokoto jihad movement as well as the political and socio-economic

---

<sup>80</sup> Mallam M. Boyi, *op.cit.*



policies articulated by the Caliphate leadership were categorically against flamboyant *roko* (praise singing) and *kade-kade* (Musical performance), *wake-wake* (musical singing), *raye-raye* (dancing) and other related social performances. In fact, such performances were specifically attacked by the Shehu as characteristically belonging to 'non-Muslim governments'. The Shehu conceived these social activities as the ingredients to political laxity, corruption and misuse of power, inimical to the ideals of the jihad movement.

But the fact remains that, since early in the century political developments that evolved in the Metropolitan Caliphate led to a tremendous growth of an aristocracy class; its members occupying political offices or holding honorific titles, and such were attached with certain socio-economic privileges. These privileges were essentially an extension of what obtained in the pre-jihad period. It was this contradiction that attracted the parasitic classes such as the praise-singers, and at the same time these privileges accorded to members of the aristocracy, was also to become a mark of insolence and feeling of importance, which promote intra-class struggles among the class at the expense of the *Talakawa* (commoners). Such a power struggle provided a fertile ground for the activities of the praise-singers and the musicians.

During the course of the century, our region experienced a gradual increase in political titles and a corresponding expansion of the aristocracy. Similarly, the number (and status) of professional praise-singers also increased. And by the second half of the century, virtually all the notable members of the aristocracy had their special group of praise-singers and musicians. Usually groups of praise-singers comprised a very large following, which in itself is a mark of political power and influence of the aristocrat to which the group is attached. A similar scenario was observed by Staudinger in 1886, as he narrates:

I saw from a distance a king returning to his nearby homeland on a minor road and judging by his numerous and splendidly dressed following and by the musicians who preceded him, he must have been a very important and powerful personage.<sup>81</sup>

Praise-singers and musicians, who were professionally attached to the titled officials enjoyed good dresses, free food supplies and free means of transport. For instance, the notably expensive and embroidered gowns such as *aska takwas* or *aska tara*,

---

81. Staudinger, *op.cit.*, p.317.

including their expensive matching trousers were usually worn by the members of the aristocracy, their praise-singers and musicians. Thus, the privileges accorded to praise-singers and musicians in the Metropolitan Caliphate largely facilitated their reproduction within the Caliphate's social relations.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### INSTITUTION OF SLAVERY, AND OTHER FORMS OF SOCIAL LABOUR IN PRODUCTION

#### 5.1 Parameter of the Institution of Slavery

Slavery has been very prominent in the studies that seek to discuss the society and economy of the Sokoto Caliphate in varying degree of details. Some studies conceived the production sectors of the Caliphate's economy, particularly the agricultural sector, to have been based on slave labour.<sup>1</sup> Other studies, dealing with the wider region of the Central Sudan or some section of it, also tended to show the tremendous impact of the slave labour in the Sokoto Caliphate's social production, which however, is ambiguously constructed.<sup>2</sup> A number of issues dealing with the subject remains contentious or controversial. These

---

<sup>1</sup> For instance, Lovejoy's "Plantations in the Economy...", *op.cit.*

<sup>2</sup> Such works include Lovejoy & Baier, "The Desert Side...", *op.cit.*; Lovejoy, "Commercial Sectors...", *op.cit.*; Watts, "Silent Violence...", *op.cit.*; and Mason, "Captive and Client...", *op.cit.*

issues include the important and crucial question of the Caliphate's mode of production.

We shall endeavour to address this issue and the surrounding questions which the existing literature on the Caliphate misrepresented, subordinated or outright neglected and instead engage in some hovering attempts on mysticism. Although our study deals only with the Metropolitan Caliphate, we hope it may still give credence to understanding wider issues on slavery in the Caliphate. However, one consideration, which makes a study of such issues in the light of the historical experiences in the Metropolitan Caliphate important can be obvious. This is that, our region had a unique position in matters relating to slave holding in the Caliphate. The Metropolis experienced the highest influx of slaves throughout the century in comparison to the Emirates. And in fact, the nature of the acquisition of slaves in the supplying emirates was determined largely by the demands of the Metropolitan Caliphate through the annual tributes. Thus, if there were parts of the Caliphate, where statistical number of slaves and the use of slave labour assumed significant proportion, the Metropolis was perhaps second to none. Therefore, a study of slavery in the Metropolitan Caliphate may bear some concrete consequences on the nature of slavery in the Caliphate, in many respects.

### a) Slaves and the Concept of the Slave Mode of Production

As we have argued earlier, slave labour in the Caliphate was of course substantial in agricultural production, commerce and crafts production. It has also been significant in the political administration. The basic misconceptions of the existing studies on the Caliphate, about the nature of slavery and slave labour, the nature of all the other forms of social labour, as well as the practices that occupy the dominant place in the Caliphate's social formation call into significance the issue of mode of production. Some studies try to show the dominance of slavery in an "over-lapping modes of production" in the Sokoto Caliphate'.<sup>3</sup> Klein and Lovejoy suggested that slavery in the Sokoto Caliphate assumed a determinative quality and a distinct 'mode of production'.<sup>4</sup> They further argue that in the commercial sector of the central Sudan, the slaves exploiting states did emerge and slaves were essential to the

---

<sup>3</sup> Watts,*op.cit.*,p.75.

<sup>4</sup> M. Klein & P. Lovejoy,"Slavery in West Africa",in H. Gemery & J. Hogendon (eds.) *The Uncommon Market ; Essays in the Economic History of the Atlantic Slave Trade* (Academic Press,New York, 1979),pp.181-212.

reproduction of society in the nineteenth century.<sup>5</sup> In another work, Lovejoy has attempted to show the Caliphate's dependence on the institution of slavery in its economic expansion.<sup>6</sup>

Recently in the study of slavery in Sokoto city, Jumare articulated and applied a new concept of 'the slave-owning mode of production' to explain the significance of slavery and slave labour in the city's economy.<sup>7</sup> Within some orientation of political economy theory, Jumare conceived the Sokoto Caliphate's social production to have been based on an 'institutionalised system of large-scale employment of slave labour in both the country-side and the cities'.<sup>8</sup> It is in this context that Jumare grasped the usability and validity of 'the slave-owning mode of production' to examine slavery in Sokoto city. Clearly implying dominance of slave labour in the social production of Sokoto city, Jumare argues that :

...the continued supply of new slaves from emirates in form of

---

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p.209.

<sup>6</sup> Lovejoy, "Plantation in the ...", *op.cit.*

<sup>7</sup> Jumare, "Slavery in Sokoto...", *op.cit.*

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*

tribute and from among war captives in the Sokoto area implied an accumulation of huge number of slaves in Sokoto city which further confirms the manifestations of the slave-owning mode of production in the area. This continued supply of slaves in large numbers to Sokoto and the appropriation of both the (necessary and surplus) product of slave labour by the slave owners justify the use of this concept of slave-owning mode of production in [the] study of slavery in Sokoto city.<sup>9</sup>

Before marshalling this argument, Jumare had earlier on believe that social production in Sokoto city was based on slave labour for basic production, consumption and distribution of goods and services.<sup>10</sup>

But even if some of the arguments of Jumare could have been true, it is ahistorical to conceive the Sokoto society throughout the nineteenth century as having been dependant on slave labour for its reproduction. For sure, Jumare's conception of the predominance of institutionalised slave labour in social production in the country-side and the cities in the Metropolitan Caliphate

---

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*,p.13.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*,pp.10-11.



is grossly misleading. The fact is, in the nineteenth century, institutionalised slave labour was not the predominant form of social labour in Sokoto city nor in the Metropolitan districts of the Caliphate.

It is important to clarify and concretely assess the extent to which the significance of slave labour in the Metropolitan Caliphate did not pre-suppose the existence of the slavery mode of production, or 'the slave owning mode of production'-whatever this actually means. At the beginning, we need to clearly conceptualise what mode of production implies. In simple terms, the concept of mode of production signifies the dominant form of extraction of surplus labour and the practices that occupy the determinant place in the social formation. Hinders and Hirst clearly define a mode of production as,

an articulated combination of relations and forces of production structured by the dominance of the relations of production. The relations of production define a specific mode of appropriation of surplus labour and the specific form of social distribution and the means of production corresponding to

that mode of appropriation of surplus-labour.<sup>11</sup>

We do not intend to enter into debate or abstractions, but it is necessary to point out the very theoretical postulating of a slavery mode of production, in whatever disguise, is problematic. The central problem has to do with the nature of slavery as an institution and its basic conception both in legal and customary status. It is this same basic problem of conceptualising the slavery mode of production, in theoretical terms, which made the pundits of political economy theories to be uncertain on whether there is a slave mode of production. As Hindess and Hirst aptly explain, the answer to this question is not to be found in the existence of given forms of production based upon slave labour, from any where in history.<sup>12</sup> Rather, slaves and the institution of slavery can exist where slave labour is not the dominant form of social production. Therefore Klein and Lovejoy's' assumption of the distinctive feature of slave mode of production in the Caliphate can be misleading.

---

<sup>11</sup> B. Hindess & P.Q. Hirst, *Pre-capitalist Modes of Production* (Routledge & Kegan, London, 1975), pp.9-10.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p.125.

The problem in the theoretical postulating of a slave mode of production would therefore give credence to the doubt of any possible positive answer to the crucial question: whether 'slave mode' could exist independently of other 'modes of production'? In relation to the Sokoto Caliphate, we need to realise that the economic form that the slavery mode of production pre-supposes as its conditions of existence, were not applicable to its social formation. These conditions are: private property in land that ensure slaves are separated from the means of production; the slave market that reinforced strict separation of the slaves from the means of production; and, the system of the production of slaves, as against captivity of condemned freemen.<sup>13</sup>

The attempts by some scholars to employ the concept of the slavery mode of production in examining the Caliphate's social formation made them, directly or indirectly, to misrepresent the nature and significance of slavery and slave labour in the Caliphate's social production. And the contradiction of Jumare's conception, which we have pointed earlier, brought out

---

<sup>13</sup> See *ibid.*, pp.139-144.

this issue very clearly. For instance, while Jumare subordinated all forms of labour in Sokoto to slave labour, the framework of his study did not posit concrete means of assessing the quality and quantity of slave labour *vis-a-vis* the totality of the other forms of labour in reproducing the society in Sokoto city. The manner in which he portrays family and peasant labour as being supplementary to slave labour is simplistic, and if his conceptualization is only limited to agricultural estates owned by the aristocracy, then, his methodology is inadequate to grasp the entire social production of Sokoto city in the first place.

Our discussion thus far lead us to reject the use of the slavery mode of production or the slave-owning mode of production, in order to understand the nature and significance of slavery or slave labour in social production in the Metropolitan Caliphate. It is true that slave labour was extensively used in all the sectors of the economy in our region. Slave labour was substantially utilised in agricultural production, crafts production, commerce and animal husbandry. In agriculture, slave labour was largely used in the *gandaye* or *runji*, and in commerce slaves were used in long distance trade as porters, carriers, escorts and for defence purposes. Slave labour was also utilised in crafts industries such as the Smithing, Dyeing, Pottery and

Weaving, in which the slaves were involved in menial jobs and in basic stages of production process. Slaves are also known to have been used in animal husbandry particularly in tendering cattles for the members of the aristocracy and some rich individuals.

Despite the significance of slave labour in these sectors of the economy, it did not justify the use of the slave mode of production. In history, substantial forms of slave production have existed under conditions that pre-supposes the domination or combination with another mode. And the fact remains that, in our region the basic unit of social production throughout the nineteenth century is the *gida* which was predominantly based on peasant labour. Hence, the use of the slavery mode of production or the concept of slave-owning mode of production to grasp the dominant form of social labour in the Metropolitan Caliphate is inappropriate.

#### **b) Slavery and Slave Status**

The ideals of the Sokoto jihad movement and the policies of the Caliphate leadership seriously challenged the practices of slavery in Hausaland. Although at the establishment of the Caliphate its leadership seem to have accepted the institution of slavery, it nevertheless

articulated a social basis under which the slaves ought to be treated.<sup>14</sup> Thus, against the background of the Islamic ideological framework, within which the Caliphate leadership articulated the ideals of the jihad movement, the institution of slavery was then conceived as somewhat transitional. The confine in Islam to the institution of slavery as provided by the primary sources of injunctions, that is the *Qur'an* and the *Hadith*, imply that the ultimate aim of this pre-Islamic institution is to co-opt and integrate the slaves into the realm of the society through kinship and brotherhood relations.<sup>15</sup>

However, the nature of slavery in the Metropolitan Caliphate was largely dictated by the economic advantages of this institution to the aristocracies and those who could afford to keep slaves. The status of the slaves in our region sharply differs from the theoretical and ideological bases of the institution of slavery within

---

<sup>14</sup> This is contained in the works of the Shehu and Muhammad Bello: Uthman bn. Fudi, "*Masa'il muhimma...*", *op.cit.*; Muhammad Bello, "*Al-Ghayth al wabl...*", *op.cit.*

<sup>15</sup> See M. Qutb, *Islam: The Misunderstood Religion* (Islamic Publication, Lahore, 1982), p.29. For a general discussion on Islam and slavery see M.M. Qadr, *Islam and Slavery*, (Alqadir Islamic Publication, Lahore, 1980).

the jihad ideals that were articulated in the light of the *shari'a*. Jumare has shown how the jihad ideology had almost nothing to do with the practices of slavery and treatment of slaves in the Sokoto city.<sup>16</sup> The same situation obtained in the entire Metropolitan region, and perhaps, in the entire Caliphate.

But it must be made clear that, there was no homogeneous and static status of slaves in the Metropolitan Caliphate, except in its legal usage. Slaves are at the bottom of the society in categorising the people of the region sociologically, although certain literature on the Caliphate make such division in political and socio-economic sense. However, to conceive slaves in our region, throughout the century, as a single class within the political economy perspective is not only to cloud the dynamic features of the institution of slavery within the period, but is also to limit definition of class to its strict legal sense.<sup>17</sup>

Jumare re-asserted the opinion that slaves constituted the largest class in Sokoto city's population

---

<sup>16</sup> Jumare, *op.cit.*, pp.15-24.

<sup>17</sup> cf. *ibid.*, p.43; and Abubakar, *op.cit.*, p.215.

But he had earlier accepted Lenin's definition of classes, as:

large groups of people differing from each other by the place they occupy in a historically determined system of social production. Classes are groups of people one of which appropriate the labour of another owing to the different places they occupy in definite system of social economy.<sup>18</sup>

Taking this definition in relation to the social relations of production in the Metropolitan Caliphate one can easily conclude that, the term, slaves, must have been changing its contextual references to persons in the course of the century. The fact that, references to 'slaves' in the Metropolitan Caliphate do not suggest a single class (in political economy perspective) is reinforced by the observation of Staudinger, the German traveller, in Sokoto around 1885. He analysed his observation about the status of 'slaves' in the region and wrote that:

When I say "slave" one must not think as people in Germany tend to do, of a poor, half-naked

---

<sup>18</sup> V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works* (Progress publishers, Moscow), Vol 29, p.421. Quoted in, Jumare, *loc.cit.*



creature, behind him a man with a whip. In fact many slaves are among the richest and least unfree men in the country. Such a man was my host; he was regarded as one of the most affluent and well-respected citizens, and in turn had many slaves working on his extensive farms.<sup>19</sup>

There are many indications to understand the significant social mobility that characterised the people of 'slave' origin in the Metropolitan Caliphate, during the course of the nineteenth century. Even if Staudinger's opinion on 'slave' in the region is to be read the other way round, it will still show the unrestricted sense in which the term, 'slave' was applied to persons in the Caliphate. The greatest problem in the application of this term is the ambiguity of its equivalence in Hausa language. Thus, a royal slave who might occupy a privileged position within the Caliphate's social production was a slave just as the *bawan gandu* or *bawan runji*, who was tied to the agricultural estate would also be referred to as a slave. The term, *bawa*, which is translated as 'slave' can loosely be applied to

---

<sup>19</sup> Staudinger, *op.cit.*, p.299.

anyone as *bawan sarki*, which implies that all subjects are slaves of the ruler.

In the Metropolitan Caliphate slaves could be categorised into three categories, in which perhaps the only basic element common to each category was the simple 'legal' reference of being a slave. The first category are the royal slaves mostly based in Sokoto and a few districts, occupying important political offices. Some of such slaves were appointed as *kofas* supervising some settlements or agricultural estates in the region or were used as agents taking messages from Sokoto to the districts.<sup>20</sup> A number of such royal slaves, based in Sokoto, became wealthy and some of them owned landed properties on which they also utilised the labour of other "slaves". The second category consists of the domestic slaves, the *bayin gida* either based in the royal houses or in the houses of rich individuals particularly the rich merchants. The domestic slaves perform domestic function, and those owned by the merchants were also involved in commercial activities, while those owned by the craftsmen were involved in manufacturing. The position of slaves in this category differ depending on the status of the households to

---

<sup>20</sup> cf. Jumare, *op.cit.*, pp.26 and 46.

which such slaves were attached. In some cases however, slaves in this category might own substantial means of production.<sup>21</sup> The third category are the *gandu* or *runji* slaves who were tied to agricultural estates owned by the members of the aristocracy class. Slaves in this category are predominantly worse off, although in some cases they are said to be given some plots of land in order to produce their crops, which more or less would be able to maintain them.

The institution of slavery in the Metropolitan Caliphate, despite its dynamic feature during the course of the century, was however characteristically precarious. The status of slaves though mediated by the ideals of the Sokoto jihad movement, was largely dependant on the concrete socio-political forces in operation. Slaves who were subjected to intensive manual labour were often forced to work under sub-human conditions.<sup>22</sup> Mostly *gandu* or *runji* slaves were not fed well. They were also not clothed well; a situation which left them vulnerable to harsh climatic conditions especially during the wet and the dry-but cold-

---

<sup>21</sup> Interview: Alhaji Bala Moyi, Gidadawa-Sokoto, Sept. 1989.

<sup>22</sup> *Id.*

harmattan seasons. Similarly, the slaves who were employed in commercial networks largely as porters, carriers, guides and escorts also worked under severe conditions and risks. But on the other hand, slaves who perform only domestic duties particularly in the royal houses or in the palaces worked under relatively enjoyable conditions. In fact some of such *bayin gida*, besides their legal categorisation as slaves, live in more humane condition than the larger number of free men and the smaller craftsmen. The *bayin gida* in the royal palaces often raise large families, which were adequately catered for, through the appropriation of peasants' labour.

### c) Slaves' Resistance and Protest

Class struggle is an essential feature in any given social formation. Thus, presumably, in a society in which slavery assumed a distinctive form of social relation, slaves' resistance and protest is a logical characteristic of its class struggle. During the course of the nineteenth century, slavery as a form of social oppression and economic exploitation developed its inherent contradictions. The nature and forms of slaves' resistance and protest in the region were both product of the existing political order and basic contradictions of the institution of slavery in the light of the jihad ideals.

Resistance and protest is used here to denote all forms in which slaves, consciously or unconsciously, took available opportunities to resist subjugation by their masters. Slavery in the Metropolitan Caliphate did not operate in the classical sense of slavery system, and therefore theoretical postulating of slave resistance in this context are irrelevant to our task. What we mean by classical slavery is a situation in which slaves were both chattel and human. In such a situation, the slave is a particular variant of private property, with a system of exchange corresponding to this type of property, and this situation pre-supposes the existence of private property as a general institution and the state as a repressive legal apparatus, all of which did not apply to our region.<sup>23</sup>

It is in classical slavery that a necessary condition of the existence of a class of slaves pre-supposes slave revolts, as essential features of class struggle. But even one of the strong advocates of the existence of the slavery mode of production in the Sokoto Caliphate, Lovejoy, recognised the fact that there was no class of

---

<sup>23</sup> Hindess & Hirst, "pre capitalists...", *op.cit.*, p.110.

slaves in the Caliphate.<sup>24</sup> Therefore, resistance to slavery in our region could not be in a form of concerted attack on the institution by a conscious class. On the contrary, concrete political conditions made it that, field slaves, men and women, had some problems that overlapped with the peasantry, and in some cases their interests often conflicted with those of the palace slaves.<sup>25</sup> Therefore, there were fundamental differences in the forms of resistance offered by each of the categories of slaves against the social system, in the Metropolitan districts.

Despite a general lack of data on the nature of slaves revolt in our region, it would seem clear that the nature of slave resistance did not warrant revolts, which were connected with the violence of armed struggles. Instead, 'revolts' took the form of resistance and protest characterised by conspiracies, sabotage of master's properties in different ways, deliberate unproductivity, or by fleeing to escape even if temporarily.

---

<sup>24</sup> P.E.Lovejoy, "Fugitive Slaves: Resistance to Slavery in the Sokoto Caliphate", G.Okihiro(ed.) *Resistance Studies in Africa, Afro-America and Caribbean History* (University of Mass.Press, Amherst, 1986), p.78.

<sup>25</sup> *cf. ibid.*

To properly grasp the possible impact of different forms of resistance and protests by different categories of slaves, it is equally important to appreciate the essence of resistance in the light of the economic value of the slaves to their masters. To borrow the words of Lovejoy, 'as property, slaves often constitute investment of their masters, but as human they could reduce the value of themselves as property'.<sup>26</sup> Therefore, the major underlining effect of slaves' resistance was a loss of productive value of the slave himself; an action which could be economically ruinous on the master.

There were many ways in which slaves expressed their resistance and protest against their subjugation. For instance, slave could sabotage productive capacity of farm field through deliberate lack of manuring, or he could steal crops or man-handle farming implements. Jumare found out that low yield from the slave-based agricultural estates in Sokoto city was a result of deliberate negligence by the *runji* slaves, who work on these fields.<sup>27</sup> In addition, slaves often faked illness and resort to slow work. Such acts usually reduced, in no

---

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p.72.

<sup>27</sup> Jumare, *op.cit.*, p.80.

small measure,' normal' yields from the agricultural fields.

Perhaps the most common form of slaves resistance in the Metropolitan Caliphate was flight. Slave run away, and by so doing desired freedom from their bondage, and in effect flight offered some hope that freedom however temporary might be attained.<sup>28</sup> In preference to dramatic acts of open revolts or distraction of property, slaves tried the prospects of successful escape. Flight proved to have been the most effective form of slaves' resistance in the Metropolitan Caliphate.

We may however note that the intention of slaves, no matter in whatever form they expressed their resistance, may be distinguished from the consequences of their actions on their masters. Slaves, consciously or unconsciously, acted primarily to free themselves from their bondage but may end up in circumstances which might worsen their conditions. Sometimes slaves resisted in ways which could lead to the destruction of their master's properties but may not be necessarily motivated by the desire to destroy properties. Slave

---

<sup>28</sup> cf. Staudinger, *op.cit.*, p.294.



may even resist to the extent of killing his master but his intention may not be motivated by murder.<sup>29</sup> For the slaves, freedom was the end in itself but the ways in which this freedom were sought were the means to that end.

The general magnitude and tempo of slaves resistance during the century can be appreciated in three broad periods: the first period spanned between 1804 and 1830s, when slaves resistance and protest seem to have been influenced by the agenda of the jihad ideology; the second period is between 1840 and 1880s, when slave resistance was largely characterised by sabotage and flight that were influenced by the internal dynamics of slavery itself; and the third period is between 1890 and 1903, when the colonialists' penetration into the Caliphate and their subsequent anti slavery policies aggravated slaves flight.

The first major fracas between the jihadists and Gobir authority which signalled the outbreak of hostilities was centred on slavery issue. It all started with the Gimbana episode in which the jihadist intercepted the slaves being taken away by the Gobir

---

<sup>29</sup> cf. Clapperton, *op.cit.*, pp.171-172.

forces and set them free. It would seem implied that the newly elected *amir al-muminin* at Gudu, Shehu Usman dan Fodio, was invoking his pronouncements on slavery, which he duly documented in his *Masa'il al-muhimma*. The Shehu had argued that it was illegal to enslave believers and the *jama'a* had demonstrated this by intervening, among other reasons, in the Gimbana episode. Thus, at the opening of hostilities between the jihadists and the *sarakuna* in Hausaland, the Caliphate leadership had supported slaves resistance against their overlords. Slaves' resistance in the early years of the century found expression in these early programmes of the Caliphate leadership.

Emancipated slaves were very much active in the military campaigns, which overthrew the Hausa kingdoms during the early decades of the nineteenth century. As a result therefore, the Caliphate's policies and programmes on the slavery institution that aimed at integrating the slaves into the community was put into practical challenge. And, in the early years of the century adherence to Islam, as practically defined in terms of political support for the jihad movement, was sufficient ground for emancipation in the Caliphate. Those who escaped from the clutches of slavery and joined the jihadists were accepted and treated as free persons. Because of the important roles being played by

the fugitive slaves in the emerging caliphate, the Shehu was calling even the non-Muslim slaves to flee and join the jihadist to become free and members of the Caliphate community.<sup>30</sup> Until the fourth decade of the century, the ideals of the jihad movement promoted slaves resistance, at least ideologically.

However, between the fourth decade and the closing years of the century, the institution of slavery had developed its basic features outside the jihad ideology. During this period, the political transformation which characterised the region and the Caliphate dictated the dynamics of slavery as an institution within the Caliphate's social formation. During this period, the Metropolis experienced tremendous importation of slaves from the Emirates. These slaves were largely accommodated in the agricultural estates held by the members of the aristocracy, while some of them were also put in the palaces as domestic slaves. The practices of slavery therefore operated with sharp differences between the categories of slaves. The essential features of each category determined the socio-economic status of the slaves rather than the confines of legal interpretation of the institution itself. For the worse off

---

<sup>30</sup> Uthman bn. Fudi, "*Bayan Wujub al-hijra...*", *op.cit.*

slaves, the *runji* slaves and other domestic slaves, the moral weakness of their overlords, among other factors, provided them with opportunities to run away. There were many such cases during the period.<sup>31</sup> Many fugitive slaves are also said to have been actively involved in armed resistance and revolts against the Caliphate authorities by joining the Gobirawa, Kabbawa and Zamfarawa revolts.<sup>32</sup>

By the closing years of the century, cases of fugitive slaves was widespread in the Metropolitan districts. For sure, by the end of the century, the institution of slavery had developed serious contradictions in the Metropolis. This situation was further aggravated by the colonialists drive who imposed anti-slavery policies and deliberately encouraged the 'emancipation' of slaves. At the beginning of the twentieth century fugitive slaves had become a social problem, which captured the attention of the colonial administrators themselves.<sup>33</sup>

---

31 See Barth, *op.cit.*, pp.116-117.

32 Mallam M. Boyi, *op.cit.*

33 NAK SNP 6.137/1907.

By the end of the Caliphate era, thousands of slaves fled as far as Zaria, Keffi, Nupeland and Adamawa.<sup>34</sup> Colonial conquest accelerated, into new dimensions, the magnitude of slave resistance in the Metropolitan Caliphate. It is even said that the slaves who found their way into the Metropolis as tributes particularly from Adamawa and Zazzau Emirates and who were among the Caliphate forces in the defence of Sokoto city in 1903, during the aggression of the British colonial invaders, deliberately put up little or no efforts to defend the Caliphate.<sup>35</sup>

## 5.2 Domestic Versus Marketing Slavery

Studies on slavery in the Caliphate and the Central Sudan region recognised that, the operation of slavery institution was largely geared to domestic needs than for exchange value.<sup>36</sup> Our main concern here is simply to

---

<sup>34</sup> NAK SNP7/8 1643/1903.

<sup>35</sup> This information was offered to me by Dr. Yaro Gella through personal communication. The information was acquired by him during his field work in Sokoto in 1982.

<sup>36</sup> See P.D.Curtin, *The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census* (Madison, 1969) pp.258-260; L.G.Colvin, "The Commerce of Hausaland 1780-1833", in D.Mc Call & N. Bennet (eds.), *Aspects of West African Islam* (Boston University Papers on Africa, Vol.V, Boston, 1871), p.114; E.A.Ayandele, "Observations on some Social and Economic Aspects of Slavery in Pre-colonial Northern

re-examine and re-assess the validity of this argument in relation to the Metropolitan Caliphate; an area which in the course of the nineteenth century received a surplus of slave population more than any part of the Sokoto Caliphate.

The usage of the terms, marketing slavery, here applies to sales of the slaves in a network designed for external markets, while the term, domestic, primarily relates to the Metropolitan districts and only loosely it applies to the Caliphate. However, there are cases when slaves were marketed and sold but were essentially utilised in the domestic economy rather than being exported outside the region.

There are many reasons to assume that marketing slavery would have been significant in the Metropolitan Caliphate. One of these reasons is the nature of procurement of the slaves, which made it possible for the region to acquire large numbers of slave from emirates. This factor would have stimulated trade in slaves, in addition to utilising them for domestic purposes. But it is very clear from the available evidence, that, although there was trade in slaves, it did

---

Nigeria", *Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies*, IX, 3 (1967), p. 331; Boahen, "Britain, The Sudan...", *op.cit.*, pp. 127-128.

not seem to have been significant as in areas such as Zazzau, Kano, Katsina, Bida and Adamawa Emirates.

The nineteenth century is associated with the general decline of export slavery, and by the mid-century the trade in slaves across the Atlantic was therefore insignificant. However, during the same period there was an increase in the exports of slaves to the coastal areas, which was influenced by the expansion of commerce in palm produce in Yorubaland, Ibo and Old Calabar areas, whose labour-intensive economies relied heavily on slave labour.<sup>37</sup> In fact, during this period, slaves from the Caliphate were said to have been exported into the coastal areas, where they were employed both to harvest palm trees and to carry the produce to the markets.<sup>38</sup> The large number of slaves from the Caliphate were from the Emirates, though a number of slaves from the Metropolitan area also found their way into the coastal areas through Jega.<sup>39</sup>

---

<sup>37</sup> A.J.H.Latham, *Old calabar, 1600-1891: The Impact of the International Economy upon Traditional Society*, (London, 1971), pp.20-22.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*; A.G.Hopkins, *An Economic History of West Africa*, (New York, 1973), p.143.

<sup>39</sup> E.W.Bovill, "Jega Market" *JAS*, XXII (Oct.1922), pp.57-58.

Records of contemporary travellers contained information on the differences of operational features of slavery in the Metropolis with other parts of the Caliphate and the wider Central Sudan region. For instance, unlike the Emirates of Kano, Katsina, Zazzau, Bida or in Bornu, eunuch were rarely found in the palaces of the rulers in the Metropolis.<sup>40</sup> Furthermore, in the Metropolitan region slaves were co-opted into business, trade and crafts manufacturing in high proportion than in any part of the Caliphate so much that a large number of slaves eventually manage to become completely independent through socio-economic transformation of their status.<sup>41</sup>

Perhaps more than in any part of the Caliphate as well, slaves in our region were accorded exalted political positions, and in some cases were placed in control of freeborn citizens, and such 'slaves' do own their slaves as well. During the course of the century, many people of slave origin assumed new political status and in the process establish their own political lineages within the Caliphate's political structures. It is probably this

---

<sup>40</sup> Staudinger, *op.cit.*, Vol II, p.33

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, p.72.



development which explains some of the problems to scholars engaged in the study of slavery in the Metropolitan Caliphate.<sup>42</sup>

The main issues which need to be highlighted here are two. One, the slavery system in the Metropolitan Caliphate developed its peculiar features in many respects from the Emirates of the Caliphate partly due to the nature of the influx of slaves into the region and partly due to the basic contradictions of the operation of the slavery system within the confines of the jihad ideals. Secondly, these contradictions and the objective needs of slave labour in the region influenced its greater domestic utilisation in production than for export.

### 5.3 The Nature of Non-Slavery forms of Social Labour

The pre-occupation of scholars on slavery and the attempts, to disproportionately, show the significance of slave-based labour in the social production has created a

---

<sup>42</sup> For example, Jumare encountered some problem on identifying slave settlements at initial stages around the Sokoto city because the leaders of the 'well-known' slave settlements often claimed to be companions of either the Shehu or Bello but not of slave origin, in any way. M. I. Jumare, personal communication, ABU Zaria, 1987.

historiographical lag in a study of the non-slavery forms of social labour in the Caliphate.

There is no major work on the labour history of the Sokoto Caliphate. A paper written by Omar Bello on the labour policy of the Caliphate did not go beyond stating the ideals of the Caliphate government on labour relation as documented in the writings of Muhammad Bello.<sup>43</sup> Too sketchy as it is, the paper neither examines the substance of labour relations in the Metropolitan Caliphate much less in the Sokoto Caliphate it envisaged to conceptualise. Works on the emirates such as Michael Mason's work on captive and client labour in Bida emirate was squarely conceived within the framework of slavery studies.<sup>44</sup> But the fact remains that non-slavery forms of labour, such as clientage labour, wage labour and even forced labour played significant roles in the productive sectors of the economy in the Caliphate. In this section we intend to briefly examine the nature of these forms of social labour in the Metropolitan Caliphate.

---

<sup>43</sup> O.Bello, "Labour Policy of Sakkwato (Sokoto) Caliphate", R.I.Molla et al (eds.), *Frontiers and Mechanics of Islamic Economics*, (University of Sokoto, 1988), pp.241-245.

<sup>44</sup> Mason, "Captive and Client...", *op.cit.*

a) Clientage Labour (*Barantaka*):

*Barantaka* depicts a situation in which a person attaches himself to another household (*gida*), and thereafter participate in the activities of this *gida* as assigned to him by the *maigida* (leader of the household). Such attached members, as clients (*barori*) were often treated, more or less the same, as the biological members of the *gida*. *Barori* were fed, clothed and generally catered for within the resources of the household. In certain cases, *barori* could marry from their attached households, a process which help to facilitate their full integration into their new homes.<sup>45</sup>

In some other cases *barori* became fully integrated into their attached households through selfless services and exhibition of good virtues such as honesty, dedication to duty, and endurance.<sup>46</sup> There are indications that many people who were initially *barori* later became very influential members of their households, and the community at large. Social transformation of *barori* in the society, it seems, has

---

<sup>45</sup> Shehu Na-Liman, *op.cit.*

<sup>46</sup> Mallam Baban Sambo, *op.cit.*

been largely achieved through their social elevation as clients from their respective households.

The questions may be asked, why do people attach themselves as *barori*? And, how do people attach themselves? To begin with, it is important to stress that clientage relationship (*barantaka*) antedated the establishment of the Caliphate. In pre-jihad Hausaland, clientage relationship was a social feature of the politically centralised kingdoms. By the time of the establishment of the caliphal authority, clientage relationship was firmly rooted in the social and economic structures of the societies in Hausaland.

Clientage provided an extension of labour force to the production units within a virtually non-coersive and reciprocal relationship. The cherished culture of a person being his brother's keeper was part of the philosophical bases upon which the clientage relationship was accommodated and promoted in Hausaland. But whatever was its philosophical basis, clientage relationship found implicit approval of the Sokoto Caliphate leadership. The Caliphate leadership did not address themselves explicitly to the issue of clientage relationship when promulgating their policies and programmes for the emerging Caliphate. They neither recommended it, in categorical terms, nor

condemn its practices or even address some issues towards its modifications. Therefore, unlike slavery, clientage relationship was one of the practices that implied silent approval of the Caliphate leadership, within the context of the jihad ideology and the policies and programmes of the Caliphate.

Many reasons can be advanced to explain the circumstances that were possibly influencing clientage relationship; perhaps so peculiar to different cases that it is almost impossible to synthesize all the cases here. Reasons could be objective or subjective, or a combination of both. But, as many of my informants opined, one of the common reason was the objective desire by the members of the lower classes for social security.<sup>47</sup> Hence, clientage relationship was prospective in as much as social labour was needed in the productive units of the peasant economy. And in fact, client labour was significant in agriculture, crafts manufacturing and commerce.

*Barori* were not only confined to the aristocracy and the rich individuals. They were found in the royal

---

<sup>47</sup> Group Interviews: Makarantar Mallam Boyi, *loc.cit.*; Makarantar Murtala Zawiyya, *loc.cit.*; Gidan Mallam Babba, *loc.cit.*

houses and palaces, crafts manufacturing outlets, commercial enterprises, as well as in 'big' and 'small' peasant households. In particular however, by the middle of the century, clients, as apprentices, had formed a strong working force upon which the development of the manufacturing sector of the economy partly depended.

**b) Hired or Wage Labour (*Kwadago*):**

*Kwadago* (wage labour) depicts a situation where labour is paid for as a total wage. Payment could be made on an agreed process between the labourer (*dan kwadago*) and the employer. Thus, *kwadago* operated in a social formation where labour itself assumed the status of being a purchased commodity.

In theory, *kwadago* may explain a level of socio-economic development, where there developed a marked feature of social stratification and a corresponding high level of professionalism in productive sectors of the economy. Professionalism normally entails economic interdependence between the different strata of the productive forces. In the Metropolitan Caliphate, operational dynamics of *kwadago* combine all the elements of these theoretical postulations.

Wage labour seem to have began during the pre-jihad era, particularly by the second half of the eighteenth century.<sup>48</sup> During the course of the century however, the high level development of commodity production in the Metropolitan Caliphate facilitated the practices of wage labour. Two factors seem to have influenced this development in our region. The first is the increasing rise to individual land holdings, which in most cases were large agricultural fields that necessitated hiring of labour. In addition, such agricultural fields come to be owned by members of occupational groups including the merchants who needed hired labour. Secondly, the gradual collapse of the *gandu* system was increasingly creating landlessness or at least the lack of household insurance, which in itself was capable of creating wage labourer class. Thus, as wage labourer class began to emerge or become important in social production, wage labour assume a distinctive feature separate from *gayya* (communal) form of labour.

It should not be taken that *Yan kwadago* (wage labourers) were necessarily a landless class. Some wage

---

<sup>48</sup> Meek, "The Tribes...", Vol II, *op.cit.*

labourers do possess their own plots of land on which they engaged in agricultural production but may, in addition, work for wages to supplement their income.

Unlike the case of clientage labour, the Caliphate leadership had documented some policies on professional services that should attract wages.<sup>49</sup> Accordingly, *Kwadago* can be regarded as one of those activities that requires intensive labour inputs, which the Shehu said is to be paid for. Furthermore, the importance which the Caliphate leadership attached to manual labour in agricultural production, made *kwadago*, at least in theory, an encouraged socio-economic practice.<sup>50</sup>

Like many aspects of socio-economic life of the society in the Caliphate, there is a general dearth of data to show the pattern of changes on *kwadago* in social production. Nevertheless, fragmentary evidence suggest substantial transformation of wage labour in the Metropolitan districts in response to the practical needs of the cultivators rather than by the ideals of the Caliphate administration.

---

49 Uthman bn. Fudi, "Anwa mal-Allah...", *op.cit.*

50 See Muhammad Bello's, "Tanbih al-sahib...", *op.cit.*



In the opening decades of the century the practice of *kwadago* was not significant in the region particularly in the central districts, in comparison to the second half of the century.<sup>51</sup> The first three decades was characterised by dramatic demographic changes in the central districts, and although the existence of wage labour could not be denied there was largely the use of *gayya* form of labour particularly in response to demands of communal tasks.<sup>52</sup> In the south eastern districts, the area formally occupied by Zamfara kingdom, wage labour is said to have been widely practiced as early as the beginning of the century.<sup>53</sup>

Wage labour was essentially employed in upland agricultural areas during the rainy season. For this reason, wage labour was largely employed in the intensive and extensive upland agricultural areas of the south eastern districts of the Metropolis. By the mid-century, wage labour was also facilitated by the

---

51 See Harris, "Gazetteer...", Vol III, *op.cit.*, pp.50-86.

52 Shehu Na-Liman, *op.cit.*

53 Group Interviews: Makarantar Malam Murtala Zawiyya, Gusau; Makarantar Mallam Babba, Kaura-Namoda, Sept.1989.

increasing seasonal migration from the northern areas into the central plains and the south eastern districts.<sup>54</sup>

Seasonal migrations, from the north and northwest into the southeast were occasioned by lesser demand of labour in the much drier northern districts. In fact, seasonal migrations were regular trends at the beginning of the rains, on the northwest-southeast axis. The magnitude of seasonal migrations could however be accelerated by successive crop failures in the drier areas, and in which seasonal migrations could become a social crisis.

Although pattern of seasonal migrations in the region tended to show a regular traffic from northwest to southeast, there were also cases of migration on horizontal axis. However there is no simple correlation between the practice of *kwadago* and seasonal migrations. In fact, *kwadago* could be local; where a man sells his labour to earn certain wages to meet his extra obligations. No matter how and why wage labour was utilised, the crux of the matter is that, it had played important role in the agriculture-intensive areas of the Metropolitan Caliphate. It also enabled agricultural

---

<sup>54</sup> NAK SOKPROF S.2153.

expansion in areas where labour requirements exceeded its availability locally.

c) **Forced Labour:**

Forced labour is used here to denote a situation where free citizens are compelled to offer their labour without due payment of wages to them by the use of political coercive power, either covertly or overtly. In the Metropolis, forced labour was by its very nature appropriated by the aristocracies, and the labour was predominantly employed in agricultural production.

Forced labour was one of the key issues on which the Shehu made specific attacks on, at the very beginning, when he was advocating for the overthrow of the pre-jihad kingdoms in Hausaland. Therefore, such practices was one of those which the Caliphate's programmes sought to eradicate or reform.

Forced labour took different forms in the region. One of its earliest form was the *gayyar sarki*, in which members of the community were often required to work in the royal farms. This form of forced labour was particularly evoked during the process of land clearance at the onset of the rainy season and during the first weeding. It was also employed during harvests and transportation of grains to the royal granaries, and

normally all such related activities were organised and supervised by the *sarkin noma*.

Besides *gayyar sarki*, peasants could also be served invitations to work on royal farms. Such invitations which were given by the overseers of such farms on behalf of the *sarki* were as good as having come from the *sarki* himself. Oral data indicate the prevalence of forced labour in the Metropolitan districts of the Caliphate. In his study on slave-based agricultural estates in Sokoto city, Jumare shows how peasant settlements around these estates were forced into the labour force of these slave-based agricultural estates.<sup>55</sup>

Throughout the century, the Caliphate leadership recorded little or no success in eliminating forced labour in the region as they have envisaged for in their programmes. There were no concrete steps taken by the Caliphate leadership to stop the appropriation of labour by the aristocracies, besides the attacks on such practices by the Shehu and Muhammad Bello.<sup>56</sup> The structures such as the *gandayen sarauta*, which made

---

<sup>55</sup> Jumare, *op.cit.*, p.79.

<sup>56</sup> Junaid bn Muhammad Bukhari, *Tanbih al-Muhammad Bello*, Ms. (Centre for Islamic Studies, Usmanu Danfodio University, Sokoto).

forced labour some sort of necessary evil, were very much living phenomena in the Caliphate era. It was therefore almost impossible to eliminate the practices of forced labour in the Metropolitan Caliphate as long as its supporting structures remained intact.

Generally no one is likely to dispute the fact that during the era of Muhammad Bello there was the slightest notice and practice of forced labour. Not only that oral data and available documents support this conclusion but substantial part of the Caliphate policies were initiated in his era, when the ideals of the Caliphate were closely adhered to. It is very clear therefore that many of the social contradictions in the Caliphate era including very serious cases of forced labour escaped the era of Muhammad Bello. However after The death of Muhammad Bello in 1837, the Metropolitan Caliphate never had another Caliph of Bello's calibre, in terms of social programmes and the ability to address particular attention to certain manifestations of social contradictions in the course of social practice, at the appropriate times.

## CHAPTER SIX

### GENERAL CONCLUSION:

#### TOWARDS A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE SOKOTO CALIPHATE

The Sokoto Caliphate spanned a period of a century, from its inauguration at Gudu in 1804 with the *bay'a* to the Shehu to its defeat in March 1903 by the British colonial aggressors. The Caliphate was the largest political community in pre-colonial Nigeria and consisted of over thirty emirates (semi- autonomous political units), which were administered as some sort of 'states' within a confederation. However, in the Metropolitan Caliphate there were numerous districts, which were directly under the *Caliph*. These districts were administered, by the *Caliph's* appointed rulers, much on the pattern of small political units within a federation. It is this basic political complexity which could make it methodologically problematic to grasp the entire Sokoto Caliphate system as a single form of social reproduction.

Our study of the Metropolis clearly shows its unique political configuration within the Caliphate; an area which developed strong features of political

integration. In fact, any study which attempts to grasp the Caliphate should take into consideration the political configuration of the Caliphate in its wholly and dynamic features before making generalisations. Our limiting of the object of investigation to the Metropolitan Caliphate is partly borne out of the methodological problem of grasping the entire Caliphate in a single research endeavour, as well as the validity of attempting to investigate the political economy of the Caliphate from the historical experiences of the core area of the caliphal system. There is some credibility in the assumption that the Metropolitan districts were more integrated into the Caliphal system than perhaps the Emirates since they were more directly under the control of the central Caliphate authority. It is also in this light, that, one can go further to envisaged that the ideals of the Sokoto Jihad movement, which established the Caliphate, would receive practical attention in the Metropolitan districts than perhaps in the Emirates. It is well known fact that the ideals of the jihad movement and the programmes of the Sokoto Caliphate system were only documented by the central figures of the Caliphate who were based in the Metropolitan region. No emir is known to have articulated and documented soio-economic programmes or policies for his respective emirate. It is therefore in this understanding that we attempt to advance our

concluding remarks on the political economy of the Sokoto Caliphate as a whole.

It is important at this initial stage to stress that our analysis in the previous chapters do not simply intend to juxtapose any comparison between the Metropolitan Caliphate and what was obtained in the emirates. Where this is done, the essence is to concretely illustrate a point beyond reasonable doubt. Invariably however, the social programmes of the Caliphate were, more or less, consciously attempted in the Metropolitan region than any where in the Emirates. The Metropolitan Caliphate was the major arena in which the Caliphate policies and programmes could be significantly evaluated in terms of the success or other wise of their application, although the nature of the Caliphate's social formation, could be derived from a study of any part of the Caliphate.

Two reasons can be advanced to explain our contention that the Metropolitan Caliphate was unique, in a study of relationship between the policies and the practices of the Caliphate leadership. First, the political conditions in the Rima Basin area influenced the emergence of the Metropolitan Caliphate in a completely new political climate. In the Emirates, new political authority was largely founded on the older political



structures such as in the cases of Kano, Katsina, Daura, Zazzau, or largely from the experiences of such older centres, as in the cases of newly established centralised political systems such as Bida, Hadeija, Lapai, Katagum, Bauchi or Gombe. Thus, the political relations that developed in the whole Caliphate, partly because of its territorial size and partly because of the nature of the course of the jihad movement in the Central Sudan region, made the Emirates semi-autonomous units and the Metropolitan districts directly under the control of the jihad leaders. Secondly, the ideals of the Caliphate were only propounded directly from the historical experiences in the Metropolitan region. No any major work on similar political and socio-economic ideals by any Emir has yet been recovered to the best of our knowledge.

Thus, Caliphate authority was established in the larger part of the Central Sudan region on the strength of the jihad ideals and programmes of a Caliphate administration on the direct influence of the social and political structures in the Rima Basin region, which latter formed the core of the Metropolitan Caliphate. These ideals and programmes were however desired for the societies that were eventually incorporated into the Caliphate.

But, as we have tried to show, the role of Islam in general sense and the *shari'a* in specific sense, has to be understood in concrete social and historical context. To understand the impact of the Caliphal system on the societies that were incorporated into it, we may have to examine the success or otherwise of these ideals of the Sokoto jihad movement and the programmes of the Caliphate leadership. The underlying question is invariably: To what extent does the Caliphate era represent a new social order from the preceding era? To answer this important question, we need to investigate the nature of political, social and economic structures in the Caliphate. In this endeavour, we will also have to examine the nature of the material basis of the Caliphate's social formation, its ideological and class structure, as well as its mode of surplus appropriation.

On its specific political and socio-economic programmes, the Caliphate leadership did not achieve the substance of their ideals in the Metropolis, in many important respects. In the course of the century, political offices in the Metropolitan districts were essentially based on hereditary lines rather than on the general competence among the 'believers'. There were two major programmes of the Caliphate's political administration as propounded by the Shehu. The first

stem out from the Shehu's vehement attack on the hereditary tradition of the pre-jihad Hausa kingdoms, and the second was the emphasis on scholarship, and general uprightness as the main criteria for selection into an office of authority. These were some of the major critical policies upon which the jihad leaders marshalled their criticisms and attacks on the pre-jihad political structures in Hausaland. However neither the streamlined structures of political offices, as envisaged by the Shehu, obtained in the Metropolis nor was the Caliphate era able to essentially transform the *sarauta* system into an *Imamate*. In fact, it is curious to ask, did the Emirate system actually overthrew the *sarauta* system in Hausaland? On a closer look it would seem clear that the *sarauta* system, with new form of ideological legitimacy, made its mark fully in the region throughout the nineteenth century and was afterwards intensified in new forms and fashion.

On land matters, huge tracts of land were appropriated by the members of the aristocracy, in which they employed slave-based labour and unpaid peasant labour. The Caliphate leadership's programmes of land distribution, particularly in the newly established *ribats*, seem to have been short lived, perhaps successful in the early days of the Caliphate during the reign of Muhammad Bello, the sole initiator

of the programme. But as time wore on, the structures that emerged promoted unequal access to land resources and more importantly, labour relations in the Metropolis guaranteed sharp inequalities, particularly in relationship to the means of production.

On agriculture, the Metropolitan Caliphate experienced numerous technical innovations. While on animal husbandry, there were significant social programmes for the pastoralists, all of which were initiated by Muhammad Bello early in the nineteenth century. For instance, Bello had sought to boost agricultural production through the introduction of artificial irrigation system known locally as *kutara*. This was the practice of watering system by the use of a dipping beam similar to the Egyptian *shaddoof*. The *kutara* is a long pole, which works on a cross-bar and is weighted at one end with a lump of mud; at the other end is a calabash or leather bucket, which is to be dipped into the water and emptied into the trough leading to the garden. On animal husbandry, the sedentarisation policies also initiated and pursued by Muhammad Bello practically encouraged the full integration of pastoralism into the rubric of the agrarian economy. The aggregate result of all these developments was the tremendous increase in agriculture and livestock production in the Metropolis.

While the technical innovations in terms of cultivation methods and the introduction of new seedlings constituted a revolutionary development in the Metropolis, particularly in the Sokoto central plains, such innovations have for long been the traditional methods of agriculture in the older Hausa settlements, such as in Kano and Zazzau. Moreover, the tremendous increase in agricultural and livestock production was largely in response to the new political climate in the region, rather than as a result of the strength of the documented policies by the Caliphs. Although we do not have empirical data to show the nature and trends of agricultural growth in the Metropolis, it is reasonable to assume a general progressive trend, bearing in mind the ecological factors of fluctuating rainfall, upon which both agricultural and livestock production squarely depended.

On the other hand, although the Caliphate era promoted a new political climate in the Metropolitan districts, which in its turn directly influenced larger output in agricultural and livestock production, the condition of the productive forces in relation to the means of production as well as in relation to the non-producers remained on the pattern of the pre-jihad era.

On craft manufacture, the Caliphate era also promoted tremendous growth in crafts manufacturing outlets, and there was a very high level of commodatisation in the Metropolitan Caliphate. Muhammad Bello's endeavour to create industrial bases in the Metropolis, in pursuance of his urbanisation programme, had a marked social repercussion on Sokoto city, where Bello put his policies into action. Bello recorded huge success so much that till today many of the quarters in Sokoto city such as Masassaka, the carpenters' quarter; Takalmawa, the shoe-makers' quarter; Siriddawa, the saddlers' quarter; Tukanawa, the potters' quarter; Madunka, the tailors' quarter; Majema, the tanners' quarter; Marina, the dyers' quarter, were all named after the occupational groups that predominated in the respective wards.

The growth of commodity production facilitated an already existing regional commerce, while the political climate in the Central Sudan region, which was enhanced by the establishment of the Caliphate administration, maintained a prosperous long distance trade across the region; linking the Sahel and North African areas with the coast and the Volta region to the south. However, investments and capital in long distance trade was largely in the control of foreign merchants. Thus, the

commercial networks in the Metropolis was largely financed by foreign merchant capital, which had its genesis in North Africa and Europe. In effect, there was no strong merchant class in the Metropolitan Caliphate, and its traders trailed behind the big local merchants, who were often the intermediaries in long distance trade across the region, but who predominantly resided in emirates such as Kano and Katsina.

The main economic structures of the Metropolitan Caliphate was peasant agriculture closely knitted with pastoral activities, and an agrarian setting that pioneered commodity production and extensive commercial networks financed largely by foreign capital. The dominant form of social labour, which ensured the production and reproduction of the Caliphal system was therefore peasant labour supplemented by slave labour, (particularly in the royal agricultural estates), client labour, forced labour and wage labour.

In productive activities, the dominant unit of production was the *gandu*, which encompassed several generations of kin, clients, and the slaves. The Caliphate's social formation rested on the integration of the rubric of agriculture, animal husbandry, crafts manufacturing and commercial enterprises. It may be counter productive to labour on attempts to extract the

application of the concept of any given mode of production on the Caliphate's social formation. This is because in such attempt one is obviously confronted with a number of methodological problems. Other alternative attempts to create new concepts of mode of production, such as the use of 'tributary mode of production' is also not without its own serious limitations. It is this predicament which made Macheal Watts in his book, *The Silent Violence* to apply a rather vague phrase of 'modes of production' on the Caliphate's social formation.

But, specifically, our study of the Metropolitan Caliphate has shown the bankruptcy of the application of the slavery mode of production on the Caliphate's social formation. In fact, the statistical figure of 'slaves' given in the European travellers accounts, particularly those of Clapperton and Barth, which have been uncritically used by our scholars, is misleading. In addition, these travellers, perhaps, misused the proper contextual sense in which the term, 'slave', was used in the Caliphate. And, this misuse, was largely due to the fluidity of the use of this term in relation to commoner class in the Caliphate. This trend is commonly reflected in the study of slavery in the present West African sub-region, as Walter Rodney's study of slavery in Upper Guinea Coast has shown. Throughout the nineteenth



century there was no class of slaves in the Metropolitan Caliphate as distinct from a social category of people, and this, it seems, has to do with the practical challenges on the Caliphate's ideological instrument in mediating social conflicts arising from the operational nature of the institution of slavery.

However, there was a class of peasant; the largest class and the main productive force of the Caliphate's social production. But the use of the Feudal Mode of Production on the Caliphate's social formation is only theoretically made problematic by the fact that the peasants were not, as a rule, alienated from the land throughout the Caliphate era. Nevertheless, it may not be altogether methodologically problematic in using the term to specifically depict the dominant form of social relations that bound the aristocracy and the lower classes within the Caliphate's social formation. This can further be appreciated given the fact that concepts are not absolute in historical analysis. Concepts become concrete only when they are relative.

Thus, if we are to use relative terms, to describe the Caliphate's dominant form of social relations, we find it more appropriate and less methodologically problematic to apply the concept of the Feudal Mode of Production. Studies have shown that, feudalism in

history has taken a complex variety of forms ranging from the 'classical' feudalism in England and Europe to the 'tributary and bureaucratic' forms it assumed in Egypt and China. The main characteristic of feudalism is "the ownership, control, and appropriation of the labour, and products of labour, of subjects by their lords". This was the dominant mode of appropriation in the Caliphate's socio-economic system. It is actually possible to underline the dominant form of socio-economic system in the Caliphate, although many studies find it more appropriate to use the term, social formation, in its general and specific sense, to describe an interaction of social and productive phenomena in a pre-capitalist society as in the case of our area of study.

However, the fact that the Caliphate era did not transform new forms of political and social relations meant that the class structure of the Metropolitan Caliphate was essentially based on the pre-jihad pattern, with new ideological basis however. The concluding remarks by Augi in his work on the Social and Political History of the Rima Basin are found to be relevant here. Thus as a result of the failure of the Caliphate administration to transform new political relations, the *Sarauta* system re-emerged with all its class dimensions in the Metropolitan Caliphate. Not only that the essential elements of *sarauta* were evident but even the political

structures which the Shehu vehemently criticised resurfaced in the Metropolitan Caliphate's political arrangement. For instance, all the titles of the leading political figures in Sokoto were borrowed from Gobir.

While the Sokoto jihad and its Caliphate represented a political revolution, in terms of forging new 'universalistic' political relations over hitherto mutually antagonistic political communities, within the confines of popular ideological framework, it later, within the course of the century, largely operated within the political structures of the 'old order'.

Looking at the historical developments in the Metropolitan Caliphate during the nineteenth century as a whole, one can discern two broad periods. During the first half of the century, particularly within the first four decades, the Metropolis exhibited very strong integrative mechanism. This is largely related to the social and economic policies and programmes being progressively articulated by the Caliphate leadership, particularly Muhammad Bello and Abdullahi dan Fodio, in order to address themselves to the emerging problems in the Caliphate. Therefore, it must be realised that even in a study on the ideals of the Sokoto Caliphate, which many scholars erroneously projected as the actual practices, we still do not go beyond the first

four decades of the century. After the death of Muhammad Bello in 1837, no any major work on state policy by his successors, on the Caliphate, has yet been recovered. Any simplistic assumption, as has been paraded by some scholars such as Murray Last, that, the political degeneration in the Caliphate during the second half of the century was due to lack of learned *caliphs* like Muhammad Bello is grossly misleading. The fact is that even in the context of learning, the fundamental issue is not of quantifying the degree of learning, but situating learning in relation to social practice.

On the other hand, the second half of the century was politically less cohesive, in comparison to the preceding period. During this period, there was the absence of new policies and programmes by the Caliphate leadership, in order to address itself to new (emerging) problems in the course of social practice. Thus, while one of the tasks of a historian during the first half the century is to examine the relationship between the policies and the actual practices in order to grasp the substance of the Caliphate system, his greatest obstacle about the second half of the century is the clear lack of documented policies by the leadership of the period.

Sources from the writings of contemporary scholars as well as oral information seek to put on record that, although the successors of Muhammad Bello did not write new policies on state craft, they sought to live and administer the Caliphate on the basis of policies and programmes outlined by the Shehu, Abdullahi and Bello. These sources, for instance, point to the achievements of the successors of Bello. Sarkin Musulmi Aliyu Babba (C. 1842-1859) is said to have intensified the building of *ribats* and vigorously encouraged settlement in them. Similarly, Ahmad dan Atiku (C. 1859-1866) also pursued the urbanisation policies in the Metropolis, while Ahmadu Rufa'i (C. 1867-1873) is said to have encouraged construction of public utilities such as mosques and roads.

During the formative years of the Caliphate, the primary needs of the Metropolitan districts were, perhaps, infrastructural growth. These needs were substantially satisfied by the programmes initiated by Muhammad Bello. On the other hand, the secondary needs that involved transformation of new social and political relations were largely aimed at, but very little achievement was recorded. The main reason for little success is not unconnected with the nature of the political structures that evolved. On the other hand, by

about the mid-century when the Caliphate has consolidated its limits, the primary needs of the Caliphal system were, thus, new forms of social and political relations, and the infrastructural growth being its secondary needs. It is here that the primary needs were never achieved, and the Caliphate leadership paid attention to secondary needs which, however, would make less impact against the background of failure to realise the primary requirements.

In fact, even during the formative years of the Caliphate, these secondary needs were also very crucial to an evolution of the desired political and social structures that are in place with the jihad ideals, as well as to solidifying the Caliphate's integrative mechanism. This may explain why immediately after the establishment of the Caliphate administration, when very little progress was made in transforming new forms of social and political relations in the Caliphate, the Shehu became very critical of the social order. Having been certainly demoralised, the Shehu resigned to his base at Bodinga, where he is known to be publicly criticising the political degeneration of the Caliphal system during his Thursdays' seminar meetings with his students as this is fully documented in the research findings by Professor Thomas Hodgkin and partly published in his article, "Usman Dan Fodio" in

*Encyclopaedia Britannica* (15th Edition, 1974), pp 1100-1101. Similarly, it may also be recalled that Abdullahi made earlier attempts to abandon the Caliphate; an act, which was largely due to his concomitant demoralising spirit as a result of the failure of the Caliphal system to transform new forms of social relations.

Murray Last's study, *The Sokoto Caliphate*, which is empirically anchored on the historical developments in the Metropolitan Caliphate, has shown the nature of political contradictions which made the realisation of the jihad ideals and the programmes of the early Caliphate leadership in the Metropolis very difficult. Similarly, the pioneering study of R. A. Adeleye, that is, *Power and Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria* has shown the political problems that engulfed the entire Caliphate during the last quarter of the century. These problems are largely due to the failure of the Caliphate authorities- particularly the emirates- to transform new social and political relations, which the ideals of the jihad movement entailed.

One of the major problems which hindered substantial form of political integration in the Caliphate was the issue of slavery. The institution of slavery in the Caliphate took a very complex variety of forms of subordination and servility, mediated by the the socio-

economic system characteristic of the feudal (with a strong feature of tributary mode of appropriation). Slavery, as an important element in the Caliphate's social formation, necessitated slave raiding in the emirates. Thence extortions, atrocities and illegalities by the affluent aristocracies, which often accompanied slave raiding, were counter-productive to the vision of the Sokoto Caliphal system that inspired incorporation of diverse communities of the *bilad as-sudan* into an Islamic community.

A serious study on the repercussion of slavery in relation to the political economy of the Sokoto Caliphate is yet to be undertaken. But it seems clear that, slave raiding in the emirates, particularly in Fombina, Muri, Bauchi, Gombe, Jema'a, Zazzau and Bida emirates, were largely responsible for the low level of political integration in the Caliphate. This factor also contributed to the low level of development of the productive forces of the Caliphate, particularly as it affects its whole military defence system. In fact, this historical development-though now clearly projected outside any scientific historical analysis-partly explains the nature of contemporary political crisis between the societies that resisted political integration into the Caliphate and the societies that were in the main streams of the



Caliphate's political influence in the nineteenth century, in what is today regarded as Northern Nigeria.

The nature and dimensions of the Caliphate's failure to transform new political and social relations is largely, if not squarely, responsible for the challenges against its hegemony from within. Thus, the activities of Hayatu bn. Sa'id both in the Metropolitan Caliphate and in Balda, where he finally settled, as well as the activities of Gaini Jibril in the Bauchi-Gombe region were part of the general decline of the Caliphate's process of political integration. The mahdist movements in the Caliphate should therefore be examined from the basis of the internal dynamics in the Caliphate's social formation, rather than to perceive these movements as the handiwork of 'fanatics' or 'extremists', in the same manner in which some contemporary scholars are busy branding 'revolutionary' forms of social movements articulated within a religious framework.

When a study on the collapse of the Caliphate is fully written, we may be able to assess the impact of 'internal factors' in the inherent political weakness of the Caliphate's military arrangement. We may also come to grips with the full explanation of why the Caliphate failed to provide "a stimulus of movements of resistance" on the face of external aggression from the

**British colonial invaders during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.**

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### 7.1 Writings of the Jihad Leaders and Contemporary Scholars

Uthman bn. Fudi, *Nur al-albab.*

-----, *Bayan al-bida'a ala-shaytaniyya allati adhathaha al-nas fi abwab al-milla al-Muhammadiyya.*

-----, *Ihya al-sunna wa ikhmad al-bid'a.*

-----, *Masa'il muhimma yahtaj ila ma'arifati ha ahl al-sudan.*

-----, *Wathiqat ahl al-sudan.*

-----, *Tanbih al-ikhwan.*

-----, *Kitab al-amr bi al-ma'aruf wa al-nahy an al-munkar.*

-----, *Kitab al-farq bayna wilayat ahl al-Islam wa bayna wilayat ahl al-kufr.*

-----, *Bayan wujub al-hijra ala al-ibad wa bayan wujub nasbal imam wa iqmat al-jihad.*

-----, *Siraj al-ikhwan fi ahamma ma yuhtaju alayhi fi hadha al-zaman.*

-----, *Irshad al-Umma taysir al-milla.*

- , *Bayan wujub al-hijra wa tahrim muwalatal kafara wa wujrib muwalat mu'mini al-umma.*
- , *Misbah li ahl hadha al-zaman min ahl bilad al-sunna.*
- , *Anwa mal-Allah.*
- , *Kitab al-nasa'ih al-umma al-muhammadiyya li bayan hukum al-firaq al-shaytaniyya.*
- , *Najm al-ikhwan yahtuduna bihi idhni Allah fi umur al-zaman.*

**Abdullahi bn. Fudi, Tazyin al-waraqat.**

- , *Diya al-hukkam.*
- , *Tariq al-salihin.*
- , *Diya al-siyasat.*
- , *Diya al-sudan.*
- , *Kifayat al-awam fi al-buyu'u.*
- , *Ta'alim al-radi asbab al-ikhtisas bi-mawat al-aradi.*
- , *Diya al-sultan.*

**Muhammad Bello, Infaq al-maysur fi ta'arikh bilad al-takrur.**

- , *Tanbih al-sahib ala ahkami al-makasib.*
- , *Al-ribata wa al-hirasa.*
- , *Al-ghayth al-wabl fi sirat al-imam al-adl.*

-----, *Shams al-zahira fi minhaj ahl al-ilm wa al-basira.*

-----, *Usul al-siyasa.*

Abdulkadir bn. Mustafa, *Ba'ad akhbar hadhihi al-bilad al-hausiyya al-sudaniyya (Raudat al-afkar).*

-----, *Talsam al-duwwal.*

Gidado bn Laima, *Rawd al-jinan fi dhikr ba'ad karamat al-Sheikh Uthman.*

-----, *Al-kashf wa'l bayan an ahwal al-sayyid Muhammad Bello bn. Sheikh Uthman.*

Al-Hajj Sa'id, *Taqayid mimma wasala ilaina min ahwal umara al-Muslimin salatim Hausa.*

Muhammad Buhari bn. Ahmad, *Ta'nis al-ikhwan.*

Abdulkadir Machido bn. Muhammad Buhari, *Tabshir al-ikhwan.*

Junaid bn. Muhammad Buhari, *Dabt al-maltaqatat.*

-----, *Tanbih al-Muhammad Bello.*

## 7.2 Travellers Accounts

W. Allen & T.R.H. Thomson, *Narrative of the Expedition to the River Niger in 1841* (2 Vols., London, 1948)

W.B. Barkie, "Notes of a Journey from Bida in Nupe to Kano in Hausa", *JRSG*, Vol. xxxvii, 1867.

H. Barth, "Report on Agades", *JRGS*, Vol. xxi, 1857.

H. Barth, "A General Historical Description of Northern Central Africa", *JRGS*, Vol. xxx, 1860.

H. Barth, *Travels and Discoveries in Northern and Central Africa* (3 Vols., Francass, London, 1965).

E.W. Bovill (ed.) *Mission to the Niger, The Bornu Mission, 1822-25* (Vol. iv, Cambridge, 1966).

H. Clapperton, *Journal of a Second Expedition* (John Murray, London, 1829).

S.A. Crowther, *Journal of an Expedition up the Niger and Tshadde Rivers in 1854* (London, 1855).

C. Denham et.al, *Narrative and Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa* (John Murray, London, 1826).

J.G. Jackson, *An Account of Timbuctoo and Hausa* (London, 1820).

M. Laird & R.A.K. Oldfield, *Narrative of an Expedition into the Interior of Africa* (London, 1837).

R. Lander, *Records of Captain Clapperton's last Expedition* (2 Vols., London, 1830).

C.H. Robinson, *Hausaland* (Low Maiston, London, 1900).

J.F. Sihon & S.A. Crowther, *Journal of the Expedition up the Niger in 1841* (London, 1842).

P. Staudinger, *In the Heart of the Hausa States* (2 Vols., Monographs in International Studies, African Series, No.56, Ohio University, 1990).

J. Thompson, "Sketch of a Trip to Sokoto By the River Niger" *Journal of Manchester Geographical Society*, Vol. ii, Nos. 1,2 & 3, January-March 1886.

W. Wallace, "Notes on a Journey through the Sokoto Empire and Borgu in 1894", *JRGS*, Vol. iii, 1896.

### 7.3 Monographs and other Accounts

E.J. Arnett, *Gazetteer of Sokoto Province*, (London, 1920).

P.G. Harris, *Sokoto Provincial Gazetteer* (3 Vols., Unpublished Monograph, 1934).

#### **7.4 Colonial Archive Records**

##### **National Archives, Kaduna:**

###### **SNP 6**

- 137/1907 Slavery in Sokoto Province.
- 1864/1907 Report on Animal transport in Northern Nigeria.
- 162/1907 Land Tenure and Land Revenue in Northern Nigeria.

###### **SNP 7**

- 2390/1907 Kotorkoshi and Fawa Districts Assessment Report.
- 2696/1907 Tambawel District Assessment Report.
- 4303/1908 Kaura-Namoda, Moriki and Zurmi Districts Assessment Report.
- 1140/1911 Wurno District Assessment Report.
- 2365/1911 Sokoto Province Report for 1910-11.
- 2991/1911 Goronyo District Assessment Report.
- 2992/1911 Kware District Assessment Report.
- 2993/1911 Chafe District Assessment Report.
- 4503/1912 Sifawa and Bodinga Districts Assessment Report.

###### **SNP 8**

- 161/1916 Irregularities of Sarkin Musulmi.

###### **SNP 10**

- 395p/1913 Silame District Assessment Report

472p/1913	Moriki District Assessment Report.
567p/1913	Dange District Assessment Report
705p/1913	Kaura-Namoda District Assessment Report
706p/1913	Kotorkoshi District Assessment Report
769p/1913	Dogon-Daji District Assessment Report
69p/1914	Sokoto Province Report.
105p/1914	Talata-Mafara District Assessment Report.
609p/1914	Raba District Assessment Report.
54p/1915	Kwiambana District Assessment Report.
55p/1915	Bungudu District Assessment Report.
347p/1915	Maradun District Assessment Report.
465p/1915	Gummi District Assessment Report.
252p/1916	Binji District Assessment Report.
400p/1916	Tangaza District Assessment Report.
419p/1916	Kware District Assessment Report.
484p/1916	Bakura District Assessment Report.
569p/1916	Gwadabawa District Assessment Report.
303p/1918	Gandi District Assessment Report.
3812/1921	Sabon-Birni, Zurmi, Moriki, and Kaura-Namoda Districts Assessment Report.



- 3977/1921            Magajin Rafi District Assessment Report.
- SNP 15
- 4813/1903            Arabic Documents found in Sokoto in 1903 (Translation of Captain Morrish).
- 60/1904                Sokoto Province Monthly Reports.
- 109/1905              Sokoto Province, Two monthly Reports.
- 265/1931              Trade in Hides and Skins in Northern Provinces.
- 312/1906              "Satiru"- Letter by sir John Burdon brought by the Resident , Sokoto, Mr. L.T. Stevenson in May 1906.
- 367 A i                 Notes by Mr. Palmer on the Fulani in which he suggests that some middle way must be found between replacing the old Habe rulers and maintain the present ruling Fulani Families (1907)
- 395 M2                 Papers on the proposed abolishing of caravan tolls by C.A. Birtwistle, Commercial Intelligence Officer 1905.
- SNP 17
- 11039                  Ethnographical Notes on the Tribes in Sokoto Province and Fulani.
- SOKPROF 2/1
- 7/1903                 Report No.1 of 31/3/1903.
- 23/1903                Report No.2 of 30/4/1903.
- 32/1903                Report No.3 of 31/5/1903.
- 58/1903                Report No.5 of 31/7/1903.

129/1903 Report No.8 on tour by Resident Burdon  
in July, August and September 1903.

SOKPROF 2/2

51/1904 Sokoto Province Report for January and  
February 1904.

85/1904 Report of Tour to the Asbenawa District.

101/1904 Report for March 1904.

151/1904 Notes on Tribute in Sokoto Province.

401/1905 Report No.22 for January 1905.

190/1905 Report No.23 for February 1905.

260/1905 Report No.24 for March and April 1905.

315/1905 Report No.26 for July and August 1905.

756/1905 Report No.27 for September and October  
1905.

85/1906 Report No.28 for November and December  
1905.

755/1906 Report No.29 for Quarter ending March  
1906.

625/1906 Report No.30 for Quarter ending June  
1906.

977/1906 Report No.31 for September 1906.

SOKPROF 2/3

12/1911 Wababi District Assessment Statistics.

69/1911 Salame and Gwadabawa Districts  
Assessment Statistics.

215/1911 Chafe District Assessment Statistics.

- 368/1911 Isa District Assessment Statistics.
- 385/1911 Badarawa District Assessment Statistics.
- 387/1911 Bazai District Assessment Statistics.
- 542/1911 Gummi District Assessment Statistics.
- 553/1911 Bukwium District Assessment Statistics.
- SOKPROF 2/4
- 343/1912 Bodinga Re-assessment Report.
- 344/1912 Sayinna Daji Re-assessment Report.
- SOKPROF 2/5
- 152/1913 Sokoto Province, Annual Report, 1910-1913.
- 230/1913 Silame District Assessment Report.
- 264/1913 Moriki District Assessment Report
- 332/1913 Dange District Assessment Report.
- 379/1913 Dundaye District Assessment Report.
- 471/1913 Dogon-Daji District Assessment report.
- SOKPROF 2/6
- 581/1914 Annual Report-Sokoto and Argungu Divisions, 1914.
- SOKPROF 2/7
- 57/1915 Kwiambana District Assessment Report.
- 433/1915 Bukwium District Assessment Report.
- SOKPROF 2/8
- 452/1916 Tureta District Assessment Report.

SOKPOF 2/9

163/1917 Sarkin Ardon Dundaye District of Taki  
Assessment Report.

SOKPROF 2/12

105/1920 Chafe, Kwiambana, Gusau, Kotorkoshi, and  
Bungudu Districts Assessment  
Report.

SOKPROF 2/13

257/1921 Assessment Report on Districts of Sabon-  
Birni, Isa, Zurmi, Kaura-Namoda and Moriki.

284/1921 Assessment Report on Ubandoma District.

SOKPROF 2/14

10/1922 Goronyo District Assessment Report

15/1922 System of Accounting Jangali.

SOKPROF S

1857 Land Tenure In Sokoto Emirate- T.B.G.  
Welch.

**7.5 Selected Oral Informants**

Mallam Muhammad Boyi, (68 years, Interviewed  
several times between September 1987 and June 1989,  
Kofar Atiku, Sokoto).

Mallam Baban Sambo, (95 years, Interviewed at his  
house, Kofar Atiku, Sokoto, September 1987).

Alhaji Shehu Na-Liman, the Imam of Shehu Mosque in  
Sokoto, (60 years, Interviewed at his house, Kofar Atiku,  
September 1987).

Mallam Umar Sambo, (58 years, Interviewed near  
Waziri Junaid House, Gidadawa, Sokoto, September  
1987).

Mallam Abdu, (68 years, Interviewed at Waziri Junaid House, Gidadawa, Sokoto, June 1989).

Mallam Hamza Sa'i. (73 years, Interviewed at Gwadabawa, October 1987).

Mallam Bello Wamakko, (58 years, Interviewed at Wamakko, April 1989).

Alhaji Mamman Bature Shinkafi, (57 years, Interviewed at Shinkafi, March 1989).

Alhaji Bala Moyi, (64 years, Interviewed at Gidadawa, Sokoto, September 1989).

Mallam Sambo Wali (52 years, Interviewed at the University of Sokoto, now Usmanu Danfodio University, October 1987).

Mallam Sani Kaura-Namoda, (Interviewed at Kaura-Namoda, September 1987)

Mallam Murtala Zawiyya (58 years, Interviewed several times between June 1987 and September 1990 at Zawiyya Gusau).

Wakala Bawa Makeri, (46 years, Interviewed at Makera Tsafe, September 1989).

Group Interview: Makarantar Mallam Boyi, Kofar Atiku. Sokoto, September 1987.

Group Interview: Gidan Baban Sambo, Kofar Atiku, Sokoto, September 1987.

Group Interview: Makarantar Mallam Murtala Zawiyya. Gusau. September 1987.

Group Interview: Makarantar Mallam Babba, Kaura-Namoda, September 1987.

Group Interview: Makerar Bawa , Tsafe, September 1989.

## 7.6 Secondary Works

Abubakar, S. "The Emirate of Fombina, 1809-1903: The Attempts of Politically segmented people to Establish and maintain a Centralised Form of Government" (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, ABU, 1970).

Abubakar, S., "The Emirate Type of Government in the Sokoto Caliphate", *JHSN*, VII, 2 (June 1974), pp. 211-230.

Abubakar, S. *The Lamibe of Fombina* (ABU Press, Zaria, 1978).

Abubakar, S. "Birnin Shehu, the City of Sokoto: A Social and Economic History C 1809-1903" (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, ABU, 1982).

Abraham, R.C., *Dictionary of the Hausa language*, (Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1946).

Adams, W.M., "Traditional Agriculture and water Use in the Sokoto Valley, Nigeria", *The Geographical Journal*, Vol.152, No.1, 1986, pp.30-43.

Adeleye, R.A., *Power and Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria 1804-1906* (Longman, London, 1971).

Adeleye, R.A., "Hausaland and Borno 1600-1800", Ade-Ajayi, J.F. & Crowder, M. (eds.) *History of West Africa* (2 Vols., Longmans, London), Vol I.

Adeleye, R.A., "The Sokoto Caliphate in the Nineteenth Century" Ade-Ajayi, J.F. & Crowder, M. (eds.) *History of West Africa* (2 vols., Longmans, London, 1976), Vol. II.

Adeleye, R.A., "Mahdist Triumph and British Revenge in Northern Nigeria: Satiru 1906", *JHSN*, xi, 2 (1972), pp.193-214.

Adeleye, R. A., "The Dilemma of the Wazir: The Place of the Risalat al-wazir ila ahl al-ilm wa'l tadabbur in the History of the Sokoto Caliphate", *JHSN*, IV, 2 (June 1968), pp. 285- 312.

Adeleye, R. A., "Rabih B. Fadallah and the Diplomacy of European Imperial Invasion in the Central Sudan, 1893-1902", *JHSN*, V, 3 (December 1970), pp. 399- 418.

Africanus, L., *The History and Description of Africa*, Trans. J. Pory (1600); Brawn, R., (ed.) (3 Vols., London. 1896).

Ajayi, J.F.A., "Nineteenth Century Origins of Nigerian Nationalism", *JHSN*, II, 2, (December 1961), pp. 196-210.

Ajayi, J.F.A., *Milestones in Nigerian History* (Ibadan University Press, Ibadan, 1962), pp. 7- 16.

Ahn, P.M. *West African Soils* (OUP, London, 1970).

Al-Hajj, M., "Hayatee b. Sa'id: A Revolutionary Mahdist in the Western Sudan" Hassan, Y. (ed.) *Sudan in Africa*, (University Press, Khartum, 1971), pp.157-169.

Al-Hajj, M.A., "The Fulani Concept of Jihad- Shehu Uthman dan Fodio", *ODU*, i, 1 (1964), pp.45-58.

Alkali, M.B., "A Hausa Community in Crisis: Kebbi in the Nineteenth Century" (Unpublished MA thesis, ABU, 1969).

Augi, A.R. "The Gobir Factor in the Social and Political History of the Rima Basin, C. 1650-1808 A.D." (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, ABU, 1984).

Al-shah, A., *Tarikh es-Soudan*, O. Houdas (Paris, 1898).

Amin, S., (ed.) *Modern Migrations in West Africa* (OUP. London, 1974).

Anderson, J., *Islam in Africa* (Cass, London, 1970).

Arhin, K., "Aspects of the Ashanti Northern Trade in the Nineteenth Century", *Africa*, XL, 4 (1970).

Arnett, E.J., *The Rise of the Sokoto Fulani* (Kano, 1920).

Ayandele, E.A., "Observations on Some Social and Economic Aspects of Slavery in Pre-Colonial Northern Nigeria", *Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies*, ix, 3 (1967), pp.329-338.

Ayandele, E.A., *Nigerian Historical Studies* (Frank Cass, London, 1979).

Azanya, V., *Aristocrats Facing Change: The Fulbe in Guinea, Nigeria and Cameroons* (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1978).

Baier, S., "Trans-Saharan Trade and the Sahel: Damergu' 1870-1930", *JAH*, xxiii, 1 (1977), pp. 37-60.

Ballard, J.A., "Historical Interferences from the Linguistic Geography of the Nigerian Middle Belt", *Africa*, XLI, 4 (1971).

Balogun, I.A.B., "A Critical edition of the Ihya al-sunna wa ikhmad al-bid'a" (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1967).

Balogun, S.A., "Succession Tradition in Gwandu History, 1817- 1918", *JHSN*, VIII, 1 (December 1973), pp. 17- 34.

Balogun, S.A., "The Place of Argungu in Gwandu History", *JHSN*, VII, 3 (December 1974), pp. 403- 416.

Barkindo, B.M., (ed.) *Studies in the History of Kano* (Heinemann, Ibadan, 1983).

Batran, A., "An Introductory Note on the Impact of Sidi Al-Mukhtar Al-Kunti (1729- 1811) on West African Islam in the 18th and the 19th Centuries", *JHSN*, VI, 4 (June 1973), pp. 347- 352.

Bello, O., "The Political Thought of Muhammad Bello (1781-1837)....(Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, London, 1983).

Bennet, J., *The Ecological Transition* (Pergamon, Oxford, 1976).



Boahen, A.A., Britain, *The Sahara and The Sudan 1778-1861* (OUP, London, 1964).

Bovill, E.W., *The Golden Trade of the Moors*, (OUP, London, 1968).

Boyd, J., "The Contribution of Nana Asma'u Fodio to the Jihadist movement of Shehu Usman dan Fodio From 1820- 1855" (Unpublished M. Phil. thesis, North London Polytechnic, 1982).

Boyd, J., *The Caliph's Sister: Nana Asma'u, 1793- 1865: Teacher, Poet and Islamic Leader* (Frank Cass, London, 1989).

Brenner, L., "The North African Trading Communities in the Nineteenth Century Central Sudan", Mc Call, D.F. & Bennet, N.R. (eds.), *Aspects of West African Islam* (Boston University Papers on Africa, v, 1971), pp.135-150.

Burdon, J.A., "The Fulani Emirates of Northern Nigeria", *Geographical Journal*, xxiv, 6 (1904), pp.336-351.

Burdon, J.A., *Northern Nigeria: Historical Notes on certain Emirates and Tribes* (London, 1909).

Chayanov, A.V., *The Theory of Peasant Economy* (American Economic Association, Homewood, III, 1966).

Clarke, P.B., *West Africa and Islam* (Edward Arnold, London, 1982).

Clarke, P.B. & Linden, I. , *Islam in Modern Nigeria* (Grunewald, Kaiser, 1984).

Clarke, T., *The Last Caravan* (Putnam, New York, 1978).

Clough, P., "Farmers and Traders in Hausaland", *Development and Change*, 12 (1981), pp.273-292.

Cohen, A., "Politics of the Kola Trade, Some Process of Tribal Community Formation among Migrants in West African Towns", *Africa*, XXVI, 1 (1966).

Cohen, G., *Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1980).

Cohen, R., & Middleton, J., (eds.), *From Tribe to Nation in Africa: Studies in Incorporation Processes* (Scranton, P. A., 1970).

Colonial Intelligence Secret Report, *History of Islamic Propaganda in Nigeria* (2 Vols., Waterlow & Sons Ltd., London, n.d.)

Cooper, F., "The Problem of Slavery in African Studies", *JAH*, xx, 1 (1979), pp.103-125.

Crowder, M. & Abdullahi, G., *Nigeria: An Introduction to its History* (Longmans, London, 1979).

Crummy, P., & Stewart, C., (eds.) *Modes of Production in Africa: The Pre-colonial Era*, (Saga, Beverly Hills, 1981).

Dekmejian, R.H. & Wyszomirski, M.J., "Charismatic Leadership in Islam: The Mahadi of the Sudan", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, XIV, 2, pp. 193- 214.

de St. Croix, F.W., *The Fulani of Northern Nigeria* (Gregg International, Hants, 1972).

El-Masri, F.H., "Bayan Wujub Al-hijra Ala Al-ibad..." (Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, Ibadan, 1978).

El-Masri, F.H. "The Life of Shehu Usman before the Jihad", *JHSN*, ii, 4, (1963), pp.435-448.

Ferguson, D.E., "Nineteenth Century Hausaland- Being Description by Imam Imoru of the Land, Economy and Society of his People" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, California-Los Angeles, 1973).

Fika, A. *The Kano Civil War and British Over-rule 1882-1940* (OUP, Ibadan, 1978).

Fisher, A.G. & Fisher H.G., *Slavery and Muslim Society in Africa* (Clarendon Press, London, 1970).

Fisher, H.J., "He Swalloweth the Ground with Fierceness and Rage: The Horse in the Central Sudan", *JAH*, xiv, 3 (1973), pp.355-379.

Fisher, H.J. "Prayer and Military Activity in the History of Muslim Africa South of the Sahara", *JAH*, xii, 3 (1971), pp.391-406.

Forde, D. & Scott, R., *The Native Economies of Nigeria* (Faber, London, 1946), Vol I.

Fuglestad, F., "A Reconsideration of Hausa History before the jihad", *JAH*, XIX, 3, pp. 319+.

Freeman-Grenville, G.S.P., *The Muslim and Christian Calenders* (Rex Collings, London, 1977).

Freund, B., *Capital and Labour in the Nigerian Tin Mines* (Longmans, Harlow, 1981).

Freund, W.M., "Labour Migration to the Northern Nigerian Tin Mines, 1903- 1945", *JAH*, XXII, 1, pp. 73+.

Gbadamosi, G.O., "The Establishment of Western Education Among muslims in Nigeria", *JHSN*, IV, 1 (December 1967), pp. 89- 116.

Gbadamosi, G.O., "The Imamate Question Among Yoruba Muslim", *JHSN*, VI, 2 (December 1972), pp. 229- 237.

Gbadamosi, T.G.O., *The growth of Islam Among the Yoruba, 1841- 1908* (Longman, London, 1978).

Gella, T.Y., "The Foreign Policy of the Caliphate of Muhammad Bello (1817-1837), Towards the States of Borno, Adar, Ahir and the West" (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, ABU, 1986).

Gervis, P., *Emirs and Pagans* (Cassel, London, 1963).

Gill, M.A. "Hydrological Characteristics of the Rima Basin", *Savanna*, iii, 1 (1974).

Goddard, A.D., "Land Tenure, Land Holding and Agricultural Development in the Central Sokoto Closed-Settled Zone, Nigeria", *Savanna*, I, 1 (1972), pp.29-41.

Goddard, A.D., "Changing Family Structures among the Rural Hausa", *Africa*, XLIII, 2 (1973).

Goody, J., "Feudalism in Africa?", *JAH*, iv, 1 (1963), pp.1-18.

Goody, J., & Mustapha, T. M., "The Caravan Trade from Kano to Salaga", *JHSN*, III, 4 (June 1967), pp. 611- 616.

Gugler, J. & Flanagan, W.G., *Urbanization and Social Change in West Africa* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1978).

Greenberg, J., *The Influence of Islam on a Sudanese Religion* (J.J. Auguston, New York, 1946).

Griffin, K., *The Political Economy of Agrarian Change* (McMillan Press, London, 1979).

Hallam, W.K.R., "The Bayajida legend in Hausa Folklore", *JAH*, VII, 1, pp. 47+.

Hamman, M. "The Rise and fall of the Emirate of Muri (Hamaruwa) C. 1812-1903" (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, ABU, 1983).

Hart, K., *The Political Economy of West African Agriculture* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982).

Hastings, A., *Nigerian Days* (Budley Heard, London, 1925).

Helleiner, G., *Peasant Agriculture, Government and Economic Growth in Nigeria* (Irwan, Homewood, III, 1966).

Hinders, B. & Hirst, P. *Pre-Capitalist Modes of Production* (Routledge and Regan Paul, London, 1975).

Hill, P., "Hidden Trade in Hausaland", *Man*, 4 (1969), pp.392-409.

Hill, P., *Population, Prosperity and Poverty: Rural Kano 1900-1970* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1971).

Hill, P., *Rural Hausa: A Village and a Setting* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1972).

Hill, P., "Big Houses in Kano Emirate", *Africa*, XLIV, 2 (1974).

Hiskett, M., *A History of Hausa Islamic Verse* (London, 1975).

Hiskett, M., "Materials Relating to the State of Learning Among the Fulani before their Jihad", *BSOAS*, xix, 3 (1957).

Hiskett, M., "Materials Relating to the Cowry Currency of the Western Sudan", *BSOAS*, xxix, 1 & 2 (1966).

Hiskett, M., *The Development of Islam in West Africa* (Longmans, London, 1984).

Hogben, S.J. *The Muhammadan Emirates of Nigeria* (London, 1930).

Hogben, S.J. & Kirk-Greene, A.H.M., *The Emirates of Northern Nigeria* (OUP, London, 1966).

Hogendorn, J.S., "The Economies of Slave Use on Two Plantations in the Zaria Emirate of the Sokoto Caliphate", *IJAHS*, xi, 1977, pp.369-383.

Hogendorn, J., & Johnson, M., *The Shell Money of the Slave Trade* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986).

Hodgkin, T., *The Nigerian Perspectives* (OUP, London, 1964).

Hodgkin, T., "Usman Dan Fodio", *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 15th edition, 1974, pp. 1100- 1101.

Hopen, C.E., *A Pastoral Fulbe Family in Gwandu* (OUP, London, 1958).

Hopen, C.E., "A Note on Alkali Fulfulde : A Reformation Movement among the Nomadic Fulbe (Fulani) of Sokoto Province", *Africa*, XXXIV, 1 (1964).

Ikime, O., (ed.) *Groundwork of Nigerian History* (Heinemann, Ibadan, 1980).

Hoyt, R.S., (ed.) *Feudal Institutions* (New York, 1961).

Hussain, A., & Tribe, K. *Marxism and the Agrarian Question* (2 Vols., Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands, N.J.,1981).

Iliffe, J., "Poverty in Yorubaland", *JAH*, XXV, 1, pp. 43+.

Jaggar, P.J., "Kano city Blacksmiths: Pre-Colonial Distribution, Structure and Organisation", *Savanna*, ii, 1973, pp.11-26.

Johnson, M., "Calico Caravans: Tripoli-Kano Trade after 1880", *JAH*, XVII, 1976, PP.95-117.

Johnson, M., "The Slaves of Salaga", *JAH*, XXVII, 2, pp. 341+.

Johnston, H.A.S., *A Selection of Hausa Stories* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1966).

Johnston, H.A.S., *The Fulani Empire of Sokoto* (OUP, London. 1967).

Jones, B., *The Sedimentary Rocks of Sokoto Province* (Geological Survey of Nigeria, Bulletin No.18, 1948).

Jumare, I.M., "Slavery in Sokoto City, 1804-1936" (Unpublished M.A. thesis, ABU, 1988).

Kaba, L., *The Wahhabiyya: Islam Reform and Politics in West Africa* (Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1974).

Kani, A.M., *The Intellectual Origin of Sokoto Jihad* (Imam Publication, Ibadan, 1984).

Kani, A.M., "The Life and Works of Abd al-Qadir b. al-Mustafa: A Critical Edition of his Works and Historiographical Approach" (Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, ABU, 1987).

Kani, A.M. & Gandi, K.A. (eds.), *State and Society in the Sokoto Caliphate* (Gaskiya corporation, Zaria, 1990).

Keay, R., *An Outline of Nigerian Vegetation* (Government Printer, Lagos, 1953).

Keddie, N.R., *Scholars, Saints and Sufis* (University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles & London, 1972).

Khalduri, M., *War and Peace in the Law of Islam* (Baltimore, 1965).

Khuri, F.I., *Imams and the Emirs: State, Religion and Sects in Islam* (Saqi Books, London, 1990).

Kirk-Greene, A.H.M., *Barth's Travels in Nigeria* (OUP, London, 1962).

Kirk-Greene, A.H.M., "Expansion on the Benue 1830-1900", *JHSN*, i, 3 (1958), pp.215-237.

Kirk-Greene, A.H.M., "The Major Currencies in Nigerian History", *JHSN*, ii, 1 (1968), pp.132-150.

Kowal, J., & Knabe, D., *An Agriclimatological Atlas of the Northern States of Nigeria* (ABU Press, Zaria, 1972).

Krieger, K., *Geshichitche Von Zamfara* (Dietrich Reimer Verlag, Berlin, 1959).

Kumm, H.K.W., *From Hausaland to Egypt, through the Sudan* (London, 1910).

Last, D.M., "An Aspect of the Caliph Muhammad Bello's Social Policy, *Kano Studies*, No.2, (1966), pp.56-59.

Last, D.M., "Notes on Attitudes to the Supernatural in the Sokoto Jihad, *JHSN*, iv, 1 (1967), pp.3-13.

Last D.M., "Aspects of Administration and Dissent in Hausaland 1800-1968", *Africa*, Vol. XL, 4, 1970.

Last, M., *The Sokoto Caliphate* (Longman, London, 1971).

Last, M., "Reforms in West Africa: The Jihad Movements of the Nineteenth Century", in Ade-Ajayi, J.F., & Crowder, M., (eds.) *History of West Africa* (2 Vols., Longmans, 1976), Vol. II.

Last, D.M. & Al-Hajj, M. A., "Attempts at Defining a Muslim in the Nineteenth Century Hausaland and Bornu", *JHSN*, iii, 2 (1965), pp.231-340.

Ledger, D.C., "Recent Hydrological Changes in the Rima Basin, Northern Nigeria", *Geographical Journal*, xxii, 4, 1961.

Lewis, I.M., (ed.) *Islam in Tropical Africa* (Hutchinson, London, 1980).

Lovejoy, P.E., "Long Distance Trade and Islam: The Case of the Nineteenth Century Kola Trade", *JHSN*, v, 4 (1971), pp.547-567.

Lovejoy, P.E., "Plantations in the Economy of the Sokoto Caliphate", *JAH*, xix, 3 (1978), pp.341-368.

Lovejoy, P.E., "Commercial Sectors in the Economy of the Nineteenth Century Central Sudan : The Trans-saharan Trade and the Desert Side Salt Trade", *African Economic History*, No.13, 1984, pp.563-575.

Lovejoy, P.E., "Interregional Monetary Flows in the Pre-Colonial trade of Nigeria", *JAH*, xv, 1974, pp.563-575.



Lovejoy, P.E., "The Kambarin Bereberi : The Formation of a Specialised Groups of Hausa Kola Traders in the Nineteenth Century", *JAH*, xiv, 4.

Lovejoy, P.E., & Baier, S., "The Desert-Side Economy of the Central Sudan Economy", *IJAHS*, xiii, 1975, pp.551-581.

Lovejoy, P.E., *Caravan of Kola: The Hausa Kola Trade. 1700-1900* (ABU Press, Zaria, 1980).

Lovejoy, P.E., *Salt of the Desert Sun: A History of Salt Production and Trade in the Central Sudan* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986, African Studies Series No.46).

Lovejoy, P.E., "Fugitive Slaves: Resistance to Slavery in the Sokoto Caliphate", Okihiro, G.,(ed.) *In Resistance Studies in African, Afro-American and Caribbean History* (University of Mass. Press, Amherst, 1986).

Lovejoy, P.E., "Concubinage and the Status of Women Slaves in Early Colonial Nigeria", *JAH*, XXIX, 2, pp. 245-266.

Lovejoy, P.E. & Hogendorn, J., "Revolutionary Mahdism and Resistance to Colonial Rule in the Sokoto Caliphate", *JAH*, XXXI, 2, pp. 217- 244.

Low, V., *Three Nigerian Emirates : A Study of Oral History* (Northwester University Press, Evanston, 1972).

Lubeck, P., "Islam and Resistance in Northern Nigeria", in Goldfrank, W.C., (ed.) *The World System of capitalism: Past and Present* (Sage, Beverly Hills, 1979), pp.189-206.

Lubeck, P., *Islam and Urban Labor in Northern Nigeria. The Making of a Muslim Working Class* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986).

Lynn, M., "Change and Continuity in the British Palm Oil trade with West Africa", *JAH*, XXII, 3, pp. 331+.

Mabogunje, A.L., *Urbanization in Nigeria* (London, 1968).

Mahdi, A. "The State and Economy: The *Sarauta* System and its Roles in Shaping the Society and Economy of Kano with Particular reference to the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries" (Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, ABU, 1982).

Mahdi, A., & Inikori, J.E., "Population and Capitalist Development in Precolonial West Africa: Kasar Kano in the Nineteenth Century", in Cordell, D.D., & Gregory, J.W., (eds.) *African Population and Capitalist Development in Historical Perspectives* (Boulder & London, 1987).

Malumfashi, U.F., "The Life of Sheikh Uthman dan Fodio and Sultan Muhammad Bello..." (Unpublished M.A. thesis, ABC/ABU Kano, 1973).

Martin, B.G., *Muslim Brotherhoods in Nineteenth century Africa* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1976).

Martin, B.G., "Unbelief in the Western Sudan: Uthman dan Fodio's Ta'alim al-ikhwan", *Middle Eastern Studies*, 4 (1967), pp. 50- 97.

Mason, M., "Captive and Client Labour and the Economy of the Bida Emirate 1857-1901", *JAH*, xiv, 4 (1973), pp.557-564.

Mason, M., "Population Density and Slave Raiding- The case of the Middle Belt of Nigeria, *JAH*, x, 4 (1969), pp.557-564.

Mason, M., "The Jihad in the South: An Outline of the Nineteenth century Nupe hegemony in North-Eastern Yorubaland and Afenmai", *JHSN*, v, 2 (1970), pp.193-209.

Meek, C.K., *The Northern tribes Of Nigeria* (2 Vols., Francass, London, 1925)

Meek, C.K., "The Niger and the Classics: The History of a Name", *JAH*, I, 1, pp. 1+.

Meillassoux, C., (ed.) *The Development of Indigenous Trade and markets in West Africa* (OUP, London, 1971).

Meillassoux, C., "The Role of Slavery in the Economy and Social History of Sahelo-Sudanic Africa" (Paper Presented at the Seminar on the Economic History of the central Savanna of West Africa, Kano, January 1976).

Meyers, A., "Slavery in the Hausa-Fulani Emirates", in McCall, D.F., & Bennett, N.R., (eds,) *Aspects of West African Islam* (Boston University Papers on Africa, v, Boston, 1971).

Mohammad, A.S., "A Social Interpretation of the Satiru Revolt of 1894-1906 in Sokoto Province" (Unpublished M.A. thesis, ABU, 1983).

Mohammad-Baba, T.A., "The pastoral Fulbe, Economy And Society in Contemporary Nigeria; The Political Economy of Agricultural and Livestock Development Policy Programs" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. University of Missouri-Columbia, 1987).

Morel, E., *Nigeria : Its People and Problems* (Cass, London. 1911).

Morton-Williams, P., "The Fulani Penetration into Nupe and Yorubaland in the Nineteenth Century", in Lewis, I.M., (ed.) *History and Social Anthropology* (Association of Social Anthropologists Monograph, No.7, London, 1968), pp.1-24.

Muffet, J.D.M., "Nigeria- Sokoto Caliphate", in Crowder, M., (ed.) *West African Resistance* (London, 1971).

Na-Dama, G., "The Rise and Collapse of a Hausa State: A Social and Political History of Zamfara" (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, ABU, 1975).

Na-Dama, G. "Legends, Rituals and Ceremonies Connected with Agricultural Activity and Craft Production in Zamfara during the 19th Century" (Paper Presented on

the Seminar on the Economic History of the Central Savanna of West Africa, Kano, January 1976).

Nadel, S.F., *A Black Byzantium: The Kingdom of Nupe in Nigeria* (OUP, London, 1942).

Ndama-Egba, B., *Foreign Investment and Economic Transformations in West Africa 1870-1930 with Emphasis on Nigeria* (Economic History Association Lund, Lund, Vol. xv, 1974).

Newbury, C.W., "Credit in Early Nineteenth Century West African Trade", *JAH*, xiii. 1 (1972), pp.81-95.

Njuema, M.Z., *Fulani Hegemony in Yola (Old Adamawa)* (Centre for Teaching and Research (CEPER), Yaounde, 1978).

Obayemi, A., "The Sokoto Jihad and the 'O-Kun' Yoruba: A Review", *JHSN*, ix, 2 (1978), pp.61-88.

Olderoge, D.A., *Zapadni Sudan* (Moscow, 1960).

Ollman, B., *Alienation: Marx's Concept of Man* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1974).

Olofson, H., "Yawon Dandi: a Hausa category of Migration", *Africa*, XLVI, 1 (1976)

Orr, C.W.J., *The Making of Northern Nigeria* (London, 1911).

Padung, R.A., "Problems in the Theory and Slave Society", *Science and Society*, xl, 1 (1976), pp.3-27.

Palmer, H.R., *Bornu, Sahara and Sudan* (Cass, London, 1936).

Palmer, H.R., *Sudanese Memoirs* (3 Vols., Cass, London, 1967).

Patterson, O. "Slavery in Human History", *New Left Review*, 117, 1970, pp.31-68.

Patton, A., "Tarikh 'Umara Bauchi' and Its Contribution to Pre-Colonial Ningi Resistance to Sokoto Caliphate: Exegies and Methodology in African Oral History, C. 1846-1902", *A Current Bibliography on African Affairs*, Vol.18, No.2 (1985-86), pp.105-116.

Peel, J.D., "Urbanization and Urban History in West Africa", *JAH*, XXI, 2, pp. 269+.

Perham, M., *Native Administration in Nigeria* (London, 1962).

Peters, R., *Islam and Colonialism. The Doctrine of Jihad in Modern History* (Mouton, The Hague, Paris & New York, 1979).

Pilaszewick, S., "The Song of Poverty and Wealth: A hausa Poem on Social Problems by Imam Imoru", *Africana Bulletin*, 21, 1974, pp.67-117.

Pole, L.M., "Decline or Survival? Iron Production in West Africa From the Seventeenth the Twentieth Centuries", *JAH*, XXIII, 4. pp. 503+.

Porter, G., "A Note on Slavery, Seclusion and Agrarian Change in Northern Nigeria", *JAH*, XXX, 3, pp. 487- 491.

Reuke, I., *The Maguzawa in Nord Nigeria* (Bertilman Universitatsverlag, Freiburg, 1969).

Robinson, D., *The Holy War of Umar Tal: The Western Sudan in the Mid-Nineteenth Century* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1985).

Robinson, D., "French 'Islamic' Policy and Practice in Late Nineteenth Century Senegal", *JAH*, XXIX, 3, pp. 415- 435.

Robinson, M., *Islam and Capitalism* (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1974).

Rodney, W., "African Slavery and other Forms of Social Oppression on the Upper Guinea Coast in the Context of the Atlantic Slave-Trade", *JAH*, vii, 3 (1966).

Rodney, W., "Jihad and Social Revolution in Futa Djalon in the Eighteenth Century", *JHSN*, IV, 2 (June 1968), pp. 269- 284.

Rodney, W., *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (Harvard University Press, Harvard, 1972).

Ruxton, F.H., *Maliki law* (Luzal & col., London, 1916).

Ryan, P. & Missoula, *Imale: Yoruba Participation in the Muslim Tradition. A Study of Clerical Piety* (Scholars Press, London, 1979).

Salamone, F.A., "Becoming Hausa: Ethnic Identity, Change and its Implications for the Study of Ethnic Pluralism and Stratification", *Africa*, XLV, 4 (1975).

Schacht, J., *An Introduction to Islamic Law* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1974).

Schildkrout, E., "Young Traders of Northern Nigeria", *Natural History*, Vol.90, No.6 (June 1981), pp.44-53; 82-83.

Scott, J., *The Moral Economy of the Peasant* (Yale University Press, New heaven, 1976).

Sen, A., *Poverty and Famines* (OUP, London, 1980).

Shenton, R.W., *The Development of capitalism in Northern Nigeria* (University of Toronto, Toronto, 1986).

Smaldone, J.P., "Firearms in the Central Sudan :A Re-evaluation", *JAH*, xiii, 4 (1972), pp.591-607.

Smaldone, J.P. *Warfare in the Sokoto Caliphate: Historical and Sociological perspective* (Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1977).

Smith, A., *Baba of Karo* (OUP, London, 1954).

Smith, H.C.F., "A Neglected Theme of West African History : The Islamic Revolutions of the 19th Century", *JHSN*, II, 2 (December 1961), pp. 169- 185.

Smith, H.C.F., (Review Article) "The Fulani Empire of Sokoto", *JHSN*, IV, 4, (June 1969), pp. 615- 619.

Smith, M.G., "Field Histories Among the Hausa", *JAH*, II, 1. pp. 87+.

Smith, M.G., *Affairs of Daura* (University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, 1978).

Smith, M.G., *Government in Zazzau: A Study of Government in the Hausa Chiefdom of Zaria in Northern Nigeria 1800-1950* (OUP, Oxford, 1960).

Smith, M.G., "Historical and Cultural Conditions of Political Corruption Among the Hausa", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vi, 1964, pp.164-194.

Smith, M.G., *The Economy of Hausa Communities in Zaria*, (Colonial Research Series, No 16, HMSO, London, 1955).

Smith, M.G., "Slavery and Emancipation in two Societies", *Social and Economic Studies*, 3, 1954, pp.239-290.

Sokoto Seminar Papers, in Y.B. Usman (ed.) *Studies in the History Of the Sokoto Caliphate* (Third International Press, New York & Lagos, 1979).

Starr, M.A., "Risk, Environmental Variability and Drought-Induced Improverishment: The Pastoral Economy of Central Niger", *Africa*, LVII, 1, pp. 29-50.

Stewart, C.C., "Frontier Disputes and Problems of Legitimation: Sokoto- Masina Relations 1817-1837", *JAH*, xix,3 (1978), pp.319-339.

Sulaiman, I., *A Revolution in History: The Jihad of Usman dan Fodio* (Mansell, London, 1986).

Sulaiman, I., *The Islamic State and the Challenge of History: Ideas, Policies and Operation of the Sokoto Caliphate* (Mansell, London, 1987)

Sutton, J.E.G., "Towards a less Orthodox History of Hausaland", *JAH*, XX, 2, pp. 179+.

Swindell, K., "Population and Agriculture in the Sokoto-Rima Basin of North-West Nigeria", *Cahiers d'Etudes africaines*, 101-102, xxvi 1-2, 1986, pp.75-111.

Swindell, K., "Farmers, Traders and Labourers: Dry Season Migration From North-West Nigeria, 1900-1933", *Africa*, liv, 1, pp.3-19.

Tambo, D., "The Sokoto caliphate Slave Trade", *IJAHS*, ix, 2 (1976), pp.187-217.

Taylor, G.J., *From Modernization to Modes of production* (McMillan Press, London, 1979).

Temple, C., *Native Races and their Rulers* (Cass, London, 1918: Reprinted 1968).

Temple, C.L., (ed.) *Notes on the Tribes, Provinces, Emirates and States of the Northern Nigeria* (London, 1965).

Tomlinson, G. & Letham, G., *History of Islamic Propaganda in Nigeria* (Waterloo, London, 1927).

Trimingham, S., *Islam in West Africa* (OUP, London, 1958).

Tukur, M.M., "The Historian, The Jurist and The Sokoto Jihad" (Paper Presented at the Post-graduate Seminar, Department of History, ABU, Zaria, 1977).

Tukur, M. M., "Values and Public Affairs: The relevance of the Sokoto Caliphal Experience to the Transformation of the Nigerian Polity" (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, ABU, 1977).

Udo, R.K., *Geographical Regions of Nigeria* (London, 1974).

Usman, Y.B., "Transformation of Katsina, C. 1796-1903: The Overthrow of the Sarauta System and the Establishment and Evolution of the Emirate" (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, ABU, 1974).



Usman, Y.B., *The transformation of Katsina, 1400-1883* (ABU Press Zaria, 1978).

Usman, Y.B., "Some Conceptual Problems in the Study of the Economy and the Political Communities of the Central Sudan" (Paper Presented to the 19th Annual Congress of the Historical Society of Nigeria, Zaria, 1973).

Vischer, H., "Journeys in Northern Nigeria", *Geographical Journal*, xxviii, 4 (1906), pp.368-377.

Waldman, M.R., "A Note on the Ethenic Interpretation of the Jihad", *Africa*, July (1966).

Waldman, M.R., "The Fulani Jihad: A Reassessment", *JAH*, iv, 3 (1965).

Warbarg, G., *Islam, Nationalism and Communism in a Traditional Society: The case of Sudan* (Frank Cass, London, 1978).

Watts, M., *Silent Violence-Food, Famine and Peasantry in Northern Nigeria* (University of California Press, Barkeley & Los Angeles, 1983)

Wallis, C.B., *West African Warfare* (London, 1905).

White, A.S., *From Sphinx to Oracle* (London, 1899).

White, S., "A Study of Northern Throwing Knives", *Nigerian Magazine*, No.44 (1954), pp.363-368.

Whitford, J., *Trading Life in Western and Central Africa* (Liverpool, 1977).

Williams, G., (ed.) *Nigeria: Economy and Society* (Rex Collings, London, 1978).

Wilks, I., *Chronicle From Gonja: A Tradition of West African muslim Historiography* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987).

Willis, J.R., (ed.) *Studies in West African Islamic History: The Cultivators of Islam* (Vol.I, Frank Cass, London, 1979).

Wrigley, C.C., "Historicism in Africa: Slavery and State formation", *African Affairs*, lxx, 1971, pp.113-124.

Yamusa, S., "The Political Ideas of the Jihad Leaders : Being translation, edition and analysis..." (Unpublished M.A. thesis, ABC/ABU Kano, 1975).


Yeld, E.R., "Islam and Social Stratification in Northern Nigeria", *British Journal of Sociology*, xi, 2 (1960), pp.112-128.




Yusuf, A.B., "Capital Formation and Management Among the Muslim Hausa Traders of Kano, Nigeria", *Africa*, XL, 2 (1974).

Zahradeen, M.S., "Abdullahi Ibn Fodio's contributions to the Fulani Jihad in 19th Century Hausaland" (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, McGill University, Canada, 1976).



Map 1.  
Map Of The Sokoto Caliphate Showing  
The Metropolitan Region.




-  Metropolitan Caliphate
-  Sokoto Caliphate
-  Towns

0 200 Km.  
Scale


 Borno

# Map 2 The Relief Map Of The Metropolitan Caliphate



# MAP 3

## A Map Showing The Fadama Belt Of The Metropolitan Caliphate




### KEY


- Area liable to flood
- District Headquarter
- Rivers

# Map 4

## Major Trade Routes Across Sokoto Caliphate



# MAP 5. A Map Showing The Important Craft Centres In The Metropolitan Caliphate



## KEY TOWNS AND CRAFT CENTRES

- Kaura Namoda** --- Textile and Leather Working
- Bungudu** --- Textile and Pottery
- Isa** --- Pottery
- Sabon Birni** --- Blacksmithing and Pottery
- Gummi** --- Calabash
- Anka** --- Spinning Blacksmithing

## TOWNS AND CRAFT CENTRES

- Wurno** --- Leather working
- Sokoto** --- Leather/Blacksmithing
- Tureta** --- Blacksmithing / Iron smelting
- Talate Mafara** --- Textile / Iron working
- Moriki** --- Pottery / Textile
- Zurmi** --- Pottery / Textile