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Conflict resolution in the post-cold war Era; a case study of the Angola civil war

June , 1994

THE UNIVERSITY OF YAOUNDE II

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS INSTITUTE OF CAMEROON (IRIC)

CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE POST-COLDWAR ERA: A Case Study of the Angolan Civil War

Thesis Presented and Publicly defended for the Award of the Doctorat de 3ème Cycle in International Relations.

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Thesis Sponsored by a CODESRIA Subvention

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Yaounde, June, 1994

I

P R O L O G U E

"Peace-like liberty -   is never given . . .

the pursuit of both is a continual one . . .

In the turbulent times we live in, solidarity

among friends is essential"

Ronald Wilson Reagan,
Former President of the USA.

CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that this work on "Conflict Resolution in the Post-Coldwar Era : A case study of the Angolan Civil War", was done by BESONG Samuel ENOH under the Supervision of Professor Peter AGBOR-TABI. The ideas views and opinions expressed herein are entirely of the author and he takes full responsibility for them; neither the University of Yaounde II nor I.R.I.C. are committed.

The Supervisor
Professor, Peter AGBOR-TABI

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P R E F A C E

THE AFRICAN PARADOX

35 million Africans are menaced by famine. Paradoxically there exists in the continent 500 million hectas of arable land, susceptible to being put into use. In a continent that is abondantly dotted with fabulous resources: treasures of the sub-soil and a rich forest reserve, there exists alarming poverty, disease and rabid underdevelopment. In the face of such a paradox, what should Africa do? Should it be discouraged and resign itself to fate? Should it continue with the plunder of its meagre resources in internecine struggles that do not augur well for its future? Should the international community just sit and be watching this precarious situation of human degradation and economic savagery? In examining the African paradox, we shall be exposing the debilitating situations that face the continent, and in this exercise, attempt to show how this situation can be remedied. It is in doing this that we shall be contributing our own part to the on-going efforts aimed at extricating Africa from the paradoxical situation of excruciating poverty in the midst of plenty.

Edem Kodjo in *Et demain l'Afrique* looks at this African delimma and attempts a proposal for the continent which if followed, could transform the appalling situation. The new world order that is born out of the ashes of Coldwar confrontation must be one filled with realism. Africa must join the moving train in order not to be left behind.
The end of the Coldwar and the birth of new values should signal the end of all Coldwar-oriented conflicts that have delayed progress in this unfortunate continent. Africans must realise

that "History is there to teach us that late comers risk being eliminated at every instance and man has added to
this process.[1] If the Continent has to come out of this mess and forge a new future, Denis Sassou-Nguesso holds that:

> Africa has to clean its door-step,
> stop from being an immature giant,
> assume fully and directly its destiny,
> resign itself to a new vicious cycle;
> that of oppression, of slavery and of
> recolonization.[2]

If this is done, then the African paradox will be reversed, for, according to Gabriel d'Arboussieur,

> ... it is possible for us to build
> together an image of tomorrow...
> Better still, I would say it is
> possible for us to build an image
> of ourselves in the world of tomorrow.[3]

In this optimism, Frantz Fanon agrees when he asserts that "Each generation has the duty to discover its mission within a specific time, fulfil it, or betray it."[4]

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[1] Andre Danzin, *Science et Renaissance de l'Europe*, in Kodjo, 1986, p. 323.

[2] Denis Sassou-Nguesso in Kodjo, 1986, P. 348.(Author's Translation.)

[3] Gabriel d'Arboussieur, in Kodjo, 1986, p. 201.(Author's translation.)

[4] Frantz Fanon, in Kodjo, 1986, p. 277.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The collective venture of any research work is what makes its finesse. This explains why in doing our work we received help from various quarters that we will attempt here to cite. Invaluable contributions were made by a number of persons to whom I do here express my gratitude. In particular, Dr Elvis Ngolle-Ngolle(my mentor) under whose scholarly co-guidance, this work was born. As an academic director, he went way beyond the call of duty. Not only was he there to talk to when I needed to clarify my thoughts as I was writing, he later spent innumerable hours reading through my manuscript. Professor Peter Agbor-Tabi, who supervised the work, making salient criticisms when necessary, deserves our gratitude. His devotion, absorption and resolve to see this work to fruition, despite his loaded programme is commendable. The brilliant and timely intervention of Professor Dieudonné Oyono in criticising the original plan, helped to shape our ideas, reorientating our feelings, fashioning them the way they are here. To all these teachers, I reserve a special "thank you".

The Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa - CODESRIA cannot escape our mention. Its appraisal of our research project, and selecting it for the 1993/94 CODESRIA award - A subvention that financed some of the research books and documents, and also sponsored the entire research endeavour with a collosal $3000 award; an amount which in these hard times helped to facilitate the research process from conception to finality. The Libraries of IRIC, American Cultural Centre, French Cultural Centre, The British Council, The Nigerian Institute for International Affairs - NIIA, and MINREX were also helpful in furnishing me with required research materials.

unseen hands have always guided my every motion to the prodiguous yearning for more knowledge. Credit for the typing goes to Ms Florence Munoh of the Library of the University of Yaounde I. We will not forget the moral support of Ms Ernestine Samba, who was always there to give us hope, and Mr Eric Elad of the United Nations Development Programme - UNDP, Yaounde for his material assistance.

I do acknowledge any errors, ommission of facts, misinterpretation of information that could in any way have blurred comprehension of the work. The arduous task of research could hardly be complete without them; they add up to make the work what it is .

BESONG Samuel ENOH   Yaounde, June 1994

DEDICATION

TO TYNA

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS USED

1.	ACR	–	African Contemporary Record
2.	ADB	–	African Development Bank
3.	ANC	–	African National Congress
4.	BBC	–	British Broadcasting Corporation
5.	CIA	–	Central Intelligence Agency
6.	CIS	–	Commonwealth of Independent States
7.	COMECON	–	Council for mutual Economic Assistance
8.	COMINFORM	–	Communist Information Bureau
9.	CP	–	Conservative Party
10.	CPDM	–	Cameroon People's Democratic Movement
11.	CRTV	–	Cameroon Radio and Television Corporation
12.	CWC	–	Chemical Weapons Convention
13.	EC	–	European Community
14.	ECOMOG	–	West African Military Observer Group
15.	EFTA	–	European Free Trade Association
16.	EMU	–	European Monetary Union
17.	FAPLA	–	The People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola.
18.	FALA	–	Angolan Liberation Army
19.	FNLA	–	Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola
20.	GATT	–	General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs.
21.	GNP	–	Gross National Product

22. IRIC   –   International Relations Institute of
Cameroon.

23. ISS   –   Isreali Secret Service

24. LGDJ   –   Librairie Général de Droit et de
Jurisprudence

25. MAI   –   Multilateral Aid Initiative

26. MDC   –   Movement for Dialogue and Cooperation

27. MINREX   –   Ministry of External Relations

28. MPLA   –   Movimento Popular de Libertaçao de Angola

29. NATO   –   North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

30. NIIA   –   Nigerian Institute of International
Affairs.

31. NP   –   National Party

32. NPFL   –   National Patriotic Front of Liberia

33. OAU   –   Organisation of African Unity

34. OPEC   –   Organisation of Petroleum Exporting
Countries

35. PLFA   –   Popular Forces for the liberation of
Angola

36. PTA   –   Preferential Trade Area

37. RENAMO   –   Mozambique Resistance Army

38. RFI   –   Radio France Internationale

39. RSA   –   Republic of South Africa

40. SACP   –   South African Communist Party

41. SADAAP   –   South African Democracy Aid Analysis
Project.

42. SADAI   –   South African Democracy Aid Initiative

43. SADCC   –   Southern African Development Coordination
Conference

44. SADP   –   South African Defense Forces

45. SWAPO   –   South West African People's Organisation

46. UNAVEM   –   United Nations Angola Verification Mission

47. UDEAC   – . Central African Economic and Customs Union

48. UNDP   –   United Nations Development Programme

49. UNICEF   –   United Nations International Children's
Emergency Fund

50. UNITA	–	Uniao Nacional para Independencia Total de Angola
51. UNO	–	United Nations Organisation
52. USA	–	United States of America
53. USSR	–	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
54. WRA	–	Washington Report on Africa

T A B L E   O F   C O N T E N T S

APPENDICES

1. United Nations Security Council Resolution 431 of July 27, 1978.

2. United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 of September 29, 1978.

3. The Tripartite Accord between Angola, Cuba and South Africa, signed on December 22, 1988 at New York.

4. The Bilateral Accord between Angola and Cuba, signed on December 22, 1988 at New YorK

5. Agreement between Angola and Cuba on the end of mission of the Cuban Internationalist Contingent.

6. The Gbadolité Declaration of June 22, 1989.

7. The Final Communiqué of the Harare Summit of August 22, 1989.

8. The Brazzaville Protocole between Angola, Cuba and South Africa, mediated by the U/S, under the auspices of Colonel Denis Sassou-Nguesso.

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10. Testimony of UNITA escapee(1) Rufino Satumbo.

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PRELIMINARY CHAPTER
GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN OF THE WORK

I A. Background to the study

With the seeming end of the Coldwar, the external arm of the superpowers, driven by ideological rivalry and proxy confrontation, appears to be withdrawing. A question to be asked is whether external dependency will cease with the withdrawal of the superpowers or will merely be redirected to other sources of external support? Will the change in the attitude of the superpowers likely to be limited to the withdrawal of support or restraint from involvement, or might extend into positive cooperation in resolving regional conflicts?[1] The advent of the new international order due to the present East/West detente has in a way, affected the evolution of regional conflicts. This detente, says Pierre Metge, started with the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, decided in April 1988, the cease-fire accord in the war between Iran and Iraq in 1989, and the beginning of the peace process in the Middle East-these constitute glaring factors of East/West detente.[2] The acceptance by South Africa to cooperate in the New York Accords of December 22, 1988, leading to Namibian independence is the first concrete illustration of this detente.[3] The signing of these accords marked a new beginning in international relations, and in the

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[1]   See *Conflict Resolution in Africa*, Francis Deng and I, William Zartman (eds), Washington D.C.,The Brookings Institution, 1991, p.12.

[2]   In the view of certain authors such as J. Okoroma, what innaugurates this new detente is the signing in December 1987 of the Americano-Soviet Treaty on the elimination of intermediate-range missiles. See *Revue de Politique Internationale*, July 1989, p. 37.

[3]   South Africa has always violated the rules of   international law eventhough such laws are ratified by the country, affirms Olara A. Otunnu, in *Politique Etrangère*, N° 3, 1988, p. 607.

history of cooperation and resolution of conflicts.[4]

The wind of change that blew across Africa in the 1960s marked a turning point in the history of this truncated continent. Independence was won, but not without problems, as it soon became an aberation of the term. Complete independence for the continent remained illusiye, especially as Portugal manifested an intransigent attitude, by refusing to yield to the momentum of African nationalism.[2] The continent witnessed a plethora of liberation movements and the marked trait amongst them was disagreement.[3] In the course of such disagreements, extra-African powers intervened and this is what Henry Wiseman states:

> ... the elements of destabilization are
> numerous, arising from wars of national
> liberation, conflicts between competing
> groups, civil and tribal conflicts, border
> conflicts, direct external interferences
> and foreign military intervention.[4]

The African continent is today riven by these conflicts that threaten not only human rights and social order, but also prospects for development and even the sovereignty of African states.

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[1] Afredo G.A. Valladâo, "Les conflits régionaux, terrain de coopération" in *L'Etat du Monde,* 1989-1990, p. 26.

[2] Harry O. Ododa, "The Dynamics of Decolonization in Angola and the Impact of MPLA victory on the Future of White Minority Rule in South Africa", in *Pan-African Journal,* (1977) 10(1), p. 73.

[3] Gabche J. N., "Nigeria and African Conflict Resolution: The Quest for Continental Peace (1960-1987)" Doctorat du 3ème cycle thesis, Yaounde, IRIC, 1989.

[4] Henry Wiseman,"The OAU: Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution" in *The OAU After Twenty Years*, Yassin EL-Ayouty and I.W. Zartman (eds), New York: Praeger Publications, 1984, p. 127-128.

The conflicts that bisect Africa today started as internal problems due to misunderstanding between the leaders and the situation was later to be exploited by extra-African powers. In Chad, in Somalia, in Ethiopia, in the Sudan, in Western Sahara, in Mozambique, in Namibia, and in Angola, the situation was the same. Angola and Mozambique, the two Portuguese-speaking countries of Southern Africa, have been fated to mirror each other both in colonial history and after independence in marxist rule and vicious, foreign-backed civil wars. The end of the Coldwar brought the possibility of peace to both countries; but this was not to be so. Both countries found themselves hanging in the precarious balance between war and peace, unity and division, calm and violence. This hope at the dawn of the post-Coldwar period is what Peter Lainé calls "... the dawning of a world order devoid of superpower competition [that will] provide new answers to solving regional conflicts".[1]

The basis and nature of superpower rivalry in Africa have to be understood within the context of the global struggle between imperialism as represented by the US and its NATO allies, and the Soviet bloc as represented by the USSR and its allies. This rivalry, for ideological, economic and strategic interests, shaped each camp's attitude towards the African states. While the US came out of the second world war and its long abandoned isolationist policy with the hope of establishing a foothold in the third world in general and Africa in particular, the USSR, "Consistent with their declared anti-imperialist stance and commitment to decolonization and liberation the world over",[2] was concerned with the struggle in Africa and provided material, political and diplomatic support to both the liberation movements and newly independent states.

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[1]   Peter J. Lainé, in Introduction to I. W. Zartman,   "Solving Regional Conflicts", in *Dialogue*, N° 97. 3/92, p. 13.

[2]   Ibbo   Mandaza,   "Conflict   in   Southern   Africa"   in *Africa:Perspectives on Peace and Development*, Emmanuel Hansen (ed), London, Zed Books Ltd., 1987, p. 102.

While the US acted more in proxy through its NATO allies, the USSR to a larger extent was present directly, and later used her own proxy, Cuba, to perpetrate her influence. Ibbo Mandaza again affirms that "Ever since the Russian Revolution of 1917, the major objective of the US and its allies has been to prevent the contraction of the world's capitalist system".[1] To this end, imperialism - and particularly its US manifestation - has developed a complex strategy that includes, inter alia, "regional and defense arragements which provide and take advantage of shared responsibilities" among the capitalist countries and their outposts.[2]

One of the hotbeds of superpower rivalry in Africa was the Southern end - in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa. The strategic importance of Southern Africa, particularly with the closing of the Suez canal following the 1967 Middle East war and the increased Soviet naval activities in the Indian Ocean made the US to renew its policy in this region.[3] According to Zaki Laïdi, the action of the USSR was aimed at reinforcing the positon of its African allies and to avoid any eventual settlement that would lead to complete American success[4] China's intervention was to denounce "Soviet imperialism and hegemony in Africa"[5] The intervention of the Cubans to help "their African brothers" and that of the US joins

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[1]   Mandaza, 1987, p. 105

[2]   Cited in the introduction, by Barry Cohen and Mohamed A. El-Khawas, in *The Kissinger Study of South African Africa*, Spokesman Books, Nottingham, 1975, p. 16.

[3]   See Emmanuel Hansen, *Africa: Perspectives on Peace and Development*, 1987, p. 38. We shall not go into an enumeration of all the strategic considerations here. See also Robert H. Davies and Dan O'Meara, "The State of Analysis of the Southern African Region: Issues raised by South African Strategy", *Review of African Political Economy*, 29, 1984. p. 64-76.

[4]   Zaki Laïdi, "Les contraintes de la rivalité Sovieto-Americaine en Afrique" in *Année Africaine* 1982, p.320-321.

[5]   Quoted by Ezzedine Mestiri, *Les Cubains et l'Afrique*, Paris, ed. Karthala, 1980, p. 70.

all extra-African powers to widen an otherwise local conflict.

Russia acted "at the request of the movements or countries concerned and with the specifique objective of ensuring both that the Africans themselves maintain the initiative and to avoid providing the US and its NATO allies with a justification for a major showdown in an area which it regards as part of its own sphere of influence",[1] asserts Ibbo Mandaza and "The main thrust of US foreign policy [in Africa] is largely pre-emptive, propagandist and jingoist, designed to prevent its global enemies from establishing a foothold in the region".[2] This explains why each state that associated with any member of the Socialist bloc was quickly branded as communist and subjected to a combination of economic boycott[3]

B. Geostrategic Presentation of Angola
The Republic of Angola is located on the Western flank of the Southern end of Africa, between latitudes 4°22 and 18°02 South, and longitudes 11°41 and 24°05 East. It has an area of 1.246.700 Km², with a maritime frontier of 1650 Km and a land frontier of 4837 km. This of course includes the enclave of Cabinda, which is physically separated from Angola proper, which is borded on its landward side by Zaire and the Congo Republic. Cabinda has an area of 7107 Km². The entire Angolan territory is boarded to the North by the Republic of
Congo, and Zaire, to the East by Zambia and Zaire, to the South by Namibia, and to the West by the Atlantic Ocean. It has a North/South length of 1277Km and a West/East breadth of
1236 Km, which makes it the largest country in Southern Africa, only closely followed by the RSA with a total area of 1.224.206

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[1]   Mandaza, 1987, p. 102.

[2]   Ibid.

[3]   The number of African states which have suffered from such US action are too many. Either directly or indirectly, the US has punished countries like Guinea, Ethiopia, the Sudan, Mozambique, Angola, Libya, to name just these.

km²[1].

The population of 9.39 million[2] inhabitants has 85% of it rural, but with the war, there has been a net migration to the urban centres for socio-economic reasons. Many refugees who were living in the neighbouring countries are gradually returning. Population is concentrated in the provinces around the centre, with about 40% of the inhabitants. The most populous provinces are Huambo and Bié while the least are Kuando-Kubango and Moxico with only 5% of the population and a low density of 1 inhabitant per Sq.Km. The principal urban centres are Luanda, Huambo, Lobito, Benguala and Lubango. Luanda alone has about 1 million inhabitants, and the greatest concentration of industries - of course, for security reasons.

Angola's geographical location on the Atlantic Coast gives her a strategic position. The closure of the Suez Canal, leaves the Cape route as the only important transit route four most Western trade with the far East, Australia and the Middle East.[3] This cape route is today vital to the Western economies and defence networks that use it. Of all the oil supply to the West, about 400 million tons of oil per year passes through the

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[1] René Pelisser, "Angola: Physical and Social Geography"in *Africa South of the Sahara 1984-1985*, London: Europa Publications Ltd. 1984, p. 199.

[2] See *Dictionaire de Culture Générale, Micro Robert 2*, Alain Rey(ed), Paris, 1990, p.22. This figure has always been contested by different parties, due to the impossibility of counting in certain regions, and insufficient census officials. Nevertheless, 42% of this population is youthful and are less than 15 years, and only 4% are adults of up to 60 years. This Seriously handicaps the economy because vital energy in human resources is low, and this low figure is put into the war effort.

[3] R.W. Johnson, "How Long will South Africa Survive?" (1977) p. 211, in Charles C. Tantoh," The Contact Group and the Namibian Question, 1977-1985", Doctorate Thesis, Yaounde, I.R.I.C., 1986, p. 78-79.

Atlantic Coast.[4] This strategic location is of great significance, because the government in power there could be very determinant in Western oil supplies and defence systems, especially in moments of crisis. This strategic importance is also linked to that of Southern Africa and the RSA, off whose coast the various sea lanes making up the cape route pass. Thus it is not surprising that both Southern Africa in general and Angola in particular remained predilected areas of East-West rivalry.

Economically, the Southern end of Africa is dotted with strategic raw materials and the richest sub-soils. Angola alone accounts for a substantial portion of these natural resources and stands out as the only competitor to South Africa's economic preeminence in the region. As concerns energy, oil stands tall, found in huge deposits in Luanda and Cabinda. Iron-ore deposits are to be found in all regions, while there is gold, phosphates, copper, zinc, nickel, manganese, diamond dotted all over. These riches contrast with the poverty of the population that is accentuated by the war. Oil was dicovered near Luanda by a Belgian Company in 1955, and later in the Cabinda enclave by the Cabinda Gulf oil Company in 1966. With a production capacity of 9 million tons as of 1976, making the country the 6th oil producer in the world,[2] the returns from this "black gold" are diverted to war efforts, thus accounting for why the people are languishing in poverty.

Apart from Angola that shows some autonomy vis-à-vis the RSA, the rest of the countries in the sub region are highly dependent on the latter. Another perculiarity is that, Angola

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[1] Phillippe Leymarie, "Grands Maneouvres dan l'Ocean indien" (1976) p. 19-23, in Moundolock "L'intervention Exterieure en Angola," Unpublished, Diplome de 3ème cycle, IRIC, The University of Yaounde, 1981, p. 63.

[2] Phillippe Leymarie, 1976, p. 55-56, and 68-69. See also Joseph Hanlon, *Begger Your Neighbour:Apartheid Power in Southern Africa*, London, Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1986, P.167.

is the only oil-producing state in the Southern African Sub-region. This distinct possession coupled with her less dependence on the RSA and her abundant mineral resources, make her the only potential power that could counter-balance South Africa, play a significant and leading role among black states and be very determinant in the political chessboard of Southern Africa,[1] and extra-African powers, and an area of interest between African states which see in her the upholding of African interest in Southern Africa.

C. Statement of the problem and hypotheses:

The Angolan civil war that started as an internal dispute in 1975, soon escalated into a violent confrontation of the superpowers. This foreign intervention that prolonged the war, came to an end with the signing on December 22, 1988 of the now famous New York Accords. Hopes for a pacific settlement of the dispute were high, especially as the external factor in the conflict had been removed, and the world was witnessing a new detente. But this was not to be so, for, after the September 28-29, 1992 general elections, the country was plunged into a horrendous civil war unprecedented in the history of the conflict. Never before have so many people been killed by so few soldiers in so short a time.[2]

Contrary to expectations that this war that was prolonged due to superpower intervention would probably end with their withdrawal, the new violence that is witnessed in this country,

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[1] Gabche James Nche, "Nigeria and African Conflict Resolution:The Quest for Continental Peace (1960-1987)", Unpublished, Diplome de 3ème cycle, IRIC, The University of Yaounde, 1989.

[2] United Nations Secretary-General, Dr. Pierre Boutros-Boutros Ghali has described the Angolan situation as catastrophic. More than 3 million people have lost their lives by causes related to the war. About 1000 peopledie daily; the highest mortality rate in any conflictin the world, in recent times. This situation can be compared only to the tragic killings in Rwanda that followed the death of Rwandan President, Habyarimana as he returned from Dar-es-Salaam. In the words of the UN Chief Executive, "Something must be done quickly to arrest the situation". C.R.T.V. Radio News Bulletin, September 16, 1993, 3 p.m.

leaves many an observer stupefounded and this expectation that the end of ideological disparity between the former West and former East would bring the war towards resolution, or even sound a dead note to it becomes an illusion. Rather, the war has taken the widest proportion, leaving behind carnage, pogrom, and holocaust. Out of this complex and intriguing situation, has developed the main problem of this study namely;

> What are the new roots of this war; what
> are the implications of a "post-Coldwar" world
> for African conflicts and their resolution?

The complexities of this war, the many attempts at solving it, and the dangers it continues to pose to human rights, compels us to ask the following subsidiary questions:

(a) Are there internal and regional factors that determine the course of the war?

(b) If major powers are less eager to acquire clients and fight proxy battles, will that fact dampen regional conflicts or will it stimulate them by removing the restraining danger of superpower confrontation?

(c) What is the impact of external actors on the sources of conflict and the potential for resolution?

(d) Are there basic changes in the international context producing consistent effects towards conflict resolution, or are root causes of regional conflicts?

(e) Once a conflict has erupted, to what extent is it sustained by the grievances that had triggered it in the first place?

There are many of such questions that could be asked, but it suffices to state that all cannot be put in the context above as it will make our problematique too long. Otherwise, we wonder whether external dependency will cease with the withdrawal of the superpowers or will merely be redirected to other sources of external support? Is the change in the attitude of the superpowers likely to be limited to the withdrawal of support or

restraint from involvement or might extend into positive cooperation in resolving regional conflicts? To elucidate our main problem and the subsidiary ones that follow, we shall attempt to verify the following hypotheses:

Hypotheses:

> The Angolan conflict continues to escalate
> due to other causes that have nothing to do
> with superpower rivalry. Rather, the change
> in the international scene has created new
> conditions for conflict resolution in the
> post-Coldwar period.

Out of the Central hypothesis we have established the following secondary hypotheses which constitute the many facets of our study;

(a) The conflict continues due to internal and regional factors that continue to fan it.

(b) The change in the attitude of major powers will increase the chances of conflict resolution, since they will no longer fight proxy battles.

(c) External actors have a great role to play in determining the sources of conflict and the potential for their resolution.

(d) The basic changes in the international system opens the way for conflict resolution.

(e) The grievances that trigger a conflict are not what sustain it in the long run.

In the course of our study, we have realised that the change in the international system has promoted peace since it has an effect on the internal underlying causes of conflicts. The US and the USSR no longer perceive regional conflicts as an opportunity to shift the international balance of power ideologically and militarily, but as a burden that distracts them from matters of greater importance to their national interests. The withdrawal and restraint from involvement has extended to

positive cooperation in resolving regional conflicts. We have seen the assertions that guide us all through our work, let us now attempt to illustrate the scientific interest of it, and a justification of our subject.

D. Interest and Justification of the study:

Our scientific interest in this work is based on the fact that it is an empirical investigation which we have carried out, which employs the use of concepts and theories that have led into new knowledge on the methods and mechanisms of conflict resolution in Africa. Also, the very nature of our topic, exploring into conflict resolution in the post-coldwar era, opens up new challenges and a desire to exploit this area, has led us into discovering new facts, and to propound new propositions on conflict resolution, thus enriching academia. We study this subject because it falls in line with the challenges of third world diplomacy on the eve of the 21st century, a major preoccupation of African diplomats and intellectuals at the close of the 21st century. When delegates from Trinidad, Egypt, Kenya, Switzerland and Cameroon met from the 18th to the 23rd of October, 1993 at Mont Fébé,[1] they had as aim, to come out with basic proposals that will guide the continent of Africa as it grops its first steps into the 21st century. Africa has to stop from being the eyesore of the world, the laughing stock. The shackles of poverty must be thrown off and this can be done only if resources that are put into the purchase of arms are re-directed into veritable areas of development.

In terms of policy interest we have realised that the common desire to reach a negotiated settlement to all the conflicts that plague mankind makes our study vital. It is the synergetic interest of all humanity to live in a peaceful and calm atmosphere and this makes the search for conflict resolution – especially the intractable Angolan war, the concern of the

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[1]   Seminar on "The Challenges of Third World Diplomacy on the Eve of the 21st Century," Yaounde, October, 18-23, 1993 at Mont Fébé.

international community today. The Angolan conflict is particularly important to be resolved because it is a clear example of an intractable internecine struggle, in which extra-African powers involvement has only helped to heighten the conflict, thus resolving it will necessarily give clues as to how others of its kind could be resolved.

At the level of Cameroon, this study could contribute to the efforts the government is making towards a resolution of the major African and other third world conflicts. When President Biya received Jonas Savimbi at the Unity Palace, and when the former took part in the Gbadolité talks, the aim was to search for a means of resolving the Angolan dispute.

At the level of the OAU and the UNO, the importance of this work cannot be over-emphasised since we all are aware of the efforts which these two bodies are making towards a pacific settlement to all conflicts, and particularly, the Angolan conflict. When we look at the economic setbacks Angola has faced since the commencement of this war, the great loss in human life, the material damages incured, we begin to wonder whether it is not yet time for this internecine struggle to come to an end. Thus our work finds justification in seeing that this intractable civil conflagration that has cost Africa so much should be arrested once and for good.

With the removal of the colonial factor, and the ideological element in the Angolan conflict, the factor of personality that is very determinant in this war could sound a message to other personalities in Africa who continue to dominate the political scene, in spite of the gruesome killings, the pillage, the fratricide, holocaust and carnage that is perpetuated on the people because of their greed and atarvism. This work could be a contributor to the policy orientations of many African governments.

With regards to research at IRIC, our work finds

justification in the fact that practically nothing has been written on the resolution of conflicts in the post-coldwar era. In trying to fill this gap, this study intends to open a new path, especially as the coldwar just ended a few years ago.[1] Much has been written on superpower intervention in African conflicts, and the search for a resolution of conflicts in the coldward period. Another justification to the above reason is the fact that this subject we are examining approaches an earlier research work which we had carried out in the maîtrise course, which had to do with "Changes in Soviet Foreign Policy since Gorbachev and their Impact on Soviet/African Relations: 1985-1991".[2] A link can be established between the two research topics, since the changes in the foreign policy of the USSR during the Gorbachev era were very instrumental in bringing an end to the Coldwar which now gives us room to prospect into conflict resolution in the period. Let us now proceed into an examination of the literature on our subject and attempt to establish how different our work is, from others.

E. Review of the Literature

In this section we have examined a basic aspect of conflict which has a great role to play in the analysis we have made. Conflict is a conception on which there is abundant scholarship. Michael Nicholson and R.J. Rummel are cases in point. Nicholson analyses political behaviour as a branch of social sciences. He devotes part of his work to the study of states' behaviour vis-à-vis international crisis.[3] We shall look at a typology of his

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[1] No definite date has been given as the date when the Coldwar came to an end, but we know that the treaty to eliminate intermediate nuclear missiles signed in December 1987 between the US and the USSR opened a period of detente in the world.

[2] Besong Samuel Enoh, "Changes in Soviet Foreign Policy Since Gorbachev and their Impact on Soviet/African Relations: 1985-1991", Maîtrise Memoire, IRIC, The University of Yaounde, 1991.

[3] Michael Nicholson, *Conflict Analysis*, London, the University Press, 1970, p. 12.   English

schemata:

FIGURE 1

Nicholson's schemata of international crisis[1]

I	II	III
Dispute ___>	Pre-Dispute ___>	Hostility
Resolution <_____	Dispute <_____	Post-Hostility

Rummel divides his work into five volumes centering around the philosophical, empirical and normative theory of war.[2] When we examine conflict, we have to look at another assessory, power, which is a goal that people go for, and in their quest to obtain it, they create conflict. Literature on power has centred on the "realist" and "behavioural" scholarship. "Realist" scholars developed the use of power as the key explanatory concept in the study of international relations. In this group we will have Arnold Wolfers, Frederick Schuman, Morton Kaplan, T.C. Spelling, Raymond Aron and Hans Morgenthau[3]. Among the "realists", the most remarkable scholar remains Morgenthau who in his work *Politics Among Nations*, he argues that "international politics like all politics is a struggle for power".[4]

"Behavioral" literature is the product of efforts by Robert Dahl, H. Sprout and M. Sprout, Karl Deutsch and David Baldwin, and others. These authors have reviewed a range of power

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[1] See Kamga Sobngwi, Doctorat Thesis, IRIC, 1990, p. 15.

[2] R. J. Rummel, *Understanding Conflict and War*, Vol. 2, *The Conflict Helix*, New York: Sage Publications Inc., 1976.

[3] A.V.S. de Rueck, "Power, Influence and Authority" in *International Relations: A Handbook of Current Theory*, Margot Night and A.J.R. Groom (eds), London: Lynee Riener Publishers Inc., 1985, p. 113. See also James E. Dougherty and R.L. Pfaltzgraff Jr. *Contending Theories of International Relations*, Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1980, pgs. 66-76.

[4] Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The struggle for Power and Peace*, in Charles E. McClelland, Theory and the International System, London: Macmillan Company, 1966, p. 64.

approaches in international relations and have formulated operational definitions for the concept. Africanists too have spent some time looking at the power concept among whom are Leonard Doob, Catherine Hoskyns, and I. William Zartman. Leonard Doob dwells on a workshop aimed at improving African's understanding of, and proposing solutions to the Ethiopia - Somalia and Kenya-Somalia border conflicts.[1] This study has as its basis, the resolution of African border disputes. Our study parts way with it, because it looks at a different aspect of conflict - an internal one, and in the post-Coldwar period.

Catherine Hoskyns in *Case Studies in African Diplomacy,* centres on the Ethiopia-Somalia-Kenya dispute and the Congo crisis. In her case studies, she analyses the origin and evolution of the conflicts and the efforts made so far in resolving them.[2] The conflict resolution aspect of her work interests us, but we delink ourselves from it due to the conflict we are treating - the Angolan conflict.

I. William Zartman examines African conflicts and goes on to look at the various conflict resolution possibilities.[3] While we appreciate the work from the indepth study that it gives to African conflicts, we still distinguish ourselves from Zartman who centres on the efforts and possibilities of extra-African powers, especially the US, playing a marked role in the resolution of African conflicts, because we are taking a different dimension - that of looking at this extra-African intervention in African conflict resolution in the post-Coldwar era. The Angolan conflict has been a case study of many

[1] Leonard W. Doob (ed), *Resolving Conflicts in Africa,* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970.

[2] Catherine Hoskyns, Case Studies in African Diplomacy, Vol. 1, *The Organisation of African Unity and the Congo Crisis 1964-65,* Vol. 2, *The Ethiopia-Somalia-Kenya Dispute, 1960-67,* Dar-es-Salaam: Oxford University Press, Nairobi, 1969.

[3] I. William Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution; Conflict and Intervention in Africa,* New York: Oxford University Press, 1985.

scholars, some of whom are Ignace-Bertrand Moundolock, Felix Mbayu, Madina Njimta, Yogang-ne Nodjitoloum, Gabche James, Kamga Sobngwi and Ribeiro Borges all of I.R.I.C.

Moundolock studies extra-African powers' interventions in Angola, highlighting and describing the consequences of such interventions.[1] Felix Mbayu concentrates his study on the escalation of the Chadian conflict and seeks responses as to how and why this conflict escalated.[2] Though we welcome both as contributions to the understanding of the Angolan and Chadian conflicts, we still innovate these works in our desire to look at the new roots of the Angolan war after the end of the coldwar, wherein lies our specificity. Madina Njimta examines French involvement in the Chadian conflict, and asserts that as an ex-colonial master, France bears historical and recent times responsibility for the deteriorating state of affairs in Chad.[3] While this work is related to our study in the sense that it examines extra-African involvement and responsibility in an African conflict, our case study which is different, our point in time too, and our dimension of looking at the new roots gives us originality.

Gabche James dwells on role playing by an African state in the search for peace in Angola and Chad.[4] While he assesses the conflict spectrum in African conflicts that our work bears striking resemblance to, the focal point of his work which is Nigeria's role in the resolution of these conflicts, enables us to shift from him and embrace a wider dimension of role playing - that of the OAU and the UNO. Kamga Sobngwi on his part examines

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[1]   Moundolock, 1981.

[2]   Felix Mbayu, "Patterns of Escalation in the Chad Conflict", Unpublished, Diplome de 3ème Cycle, IRIC, The University of Yaounde, 1981.

[3]   Madina Njimta, "La France et la Question Tchadienne,1963-1983", Unpublished, Diplome de 3ème cycle, IRIC, The University of Yaounde, 1989.

[4]   Gabche, 1989.

external intervention in civil wars, and his case study is the Angolan civil war.[1] He gives a historical analysis of the war, the genesis and evolution up to 1990. He attempts a breakthrough when he examines the Bush Presidency era and its impact on the war. Nevertheless, not foreseeing an end to the Coldwar during his time constraint, he makes no mention of what will be the outcome of this war if the Coldwar were to end. Herein lies our innovation, that keeps our work distinct, as it attempts to unravel the mechanisms of conflict resolution in the post-Coldwar era. Ribeiro Borges on his part treats the extra-African intervention in the Angolan civil war, just like Kamga Sobngwi,[2]and concludes that the intervention is what has helped to complicate and prolong the war, thus retarding its settlement. All the research works at IRIC that have been examined have one main aspect in which they differ from the work under study: the fact that these works attempt to examine conflict resolution but in the Coldwar period.

Neil MacFarlane, Gerald Bender, Donald Rothchild and Sam Amoo are other scholars outside IRIC whose works have also been examined. MacFarlane investigates how the Ex-USSR became involved in the Southern part of Africa, precisely in Mozambique, Angola, and Namibia and its role in the search for space in the region to counter the presence of the US.[3] Gerald Bender examines the roles of the super-powers and Pretoria connections in attempts at solving the Angolan impass.[4] Donald Rothchild and

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[1]   Kamga Sobngwi, "L'intervention Exterieure dans les
        Conflicts Civils: Le cas de l'Angola (1975-Juin 1990)",
        Unpublished, Diplôme de 3ème cycle IRIC, The University of
        Yaounde, 1990.

[2]   Ribeiro Borges, "Influence des deux superpuissances dans la
        guerre de l'Angola", unpublished, RSD IRIC, Yaoundé, 1988.

[3]   Neil S. MacFarlane, "The Soviet Union and Southern   African
        Security" in *Problems of Communism*, March-June
        1989.

[4]   Gerald Bender, "Peace-making in Southern Africa. The
        Luanda-Pretoria Tug of War", in *Problems of Communism*,
        March-June, 1989.

others in a recent work[1] look at the role of the United States and African countries like Zaire and Cameroon in mediation efforts on Angola. Sam Amoo[2] specifically examines the role of the OAU in solving regional conflicts in Africa.

One general aspect that runs through the above works is the involvement of the superpowers in conflict regions of Africa, and the role played by them and the OAU in seeking a redress of the situation. The new roots of the Angolan crisis and methods of solving them in the post-Coldwar period thus distinguishes our work. When we consider that these works were written before the Coldwar came to an end, we quickly see why they have a different orientation from ours. This select literature review on the key concepts of our study. African conflicts and conflict resolution, permits us to know the state of scholarship in our domain of interest, distinguish our study from such scholarship and thus give it an originality in conception and style. After having explored the existing literature in the area of our study, let us now turn to the confines of our work, the limitatins so to speak.

F. Scope and Delimitation of the work:

Our work falls precisely within a given time period, 1988 to 1994. The date 1988 is very important as a beginning point, since it marks the year in which the historic tripartite accord between Angola, Cuba and the RSA was signed, ushering in fresh hopes for the future resolution of the problems in Southern Africa, and more important, bringing into the international arena, a new political order. In the course of our analysis we will prospect a little into the Coldwar period, just to lay the

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[1] Donald Rothchild et al, "The Road to Gbadolité: Great Power and African mediations in Angola", paper presented at the 1990 American Political Science Association Convention, Sans Francisco, California.

[2] Sam Amoo, "Conflict Resolution in the O.A.U.," Ph.D. Thesis, John Hopkins University , 1989.

groundwork on the post-Coldwar conflict resolution which is the object of our study. Thus as concerns scope, our analysis is based on resolution efforts especially during the 1970s when the Angolan war started, englobing from time to time other regional conflicts, up to the time under study, 1994. Spatially, our analysis covers Angola and the Southern end of Africa. The intention behind this spatial coverage is to enable us to prospect at least to all the conflict areas of the region.

Our decision to choose Angola for our case study lies in the fact that it is a typical Coldwar-oriented conflict, which has dragged on for close to twenty years, and which continues to be a major preoccupation of the peace makers of Africa. Never before, have so many people been killed by so many soldiers, in so long a period in the history of African conflicts. Like Mozambique where the rebels of RENAMO are inflicting untold suffering on the citizenery, Angola is witnessing the carnage, pogrom and holocaust that is being perpetuated on the population by UNITA.

Another main reason why the Angolan conflict is chosen is due to a number of considerations. Generally, the conflict is a glaring example of internationalized conflict. It also portrays the many facets of African conflicts which are, colonial, intra-state, inter-state and post-colonial African-extra African conflict.[1] Also, the conflict presents a good case study of assessing the role of the O.A.U. and other mediation efforts at seeking a negotiated settlement to an African regional conflict.

Specifically, the Angolan conflict has never been satisfactorily concluded with the result that its present day

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[1]   Gabche, 1989, p. 16. These conflict facets could be related to the factors responsible for destabilization in Africa as indicated earlier in our introductory background.

escalation makes it a threat to African peace.[2] Moreover, the fact that it has in the past been linked to the political emancipation of Southern Africa and has contributed enormously to the elimination of the last vestiges of colonialism and racial discrimination in Namibia and to an extent South Africa, makes the choice of this conflict less controversial. It is in this wise that in the temporal sense our study could stretch from 1970 to 1994. 1970 marks the year which inaugurates Africa's real involvement in regional conflicts with the Nigerian/Biafran war, while 1994 is simply an attempt to make our work current.

II Theoretical Framework, Methodology and Structural Organisation of the work:

A.1. Theoretical Framework:

Theory enables us to explain what we know or think we know [about] reality, to systematically reunite different elements of our knowledge."
- Philippe Braillard[2]

The theoretical framework of our study is based on an explanation of the basic concepts that form the corpus of our analysis. By concept, we mean "any theme, idea or label which we may use to group different items of knowledge". The significance of this lies in its usefulness "in dealing with familiar problems of the past [and] in facilitating new insights and new intellectual operations on problems that are becoming salient for the present and the future".[3] Theory, that is linked to concept is understood to be "a body of statements aimed at elucidating phenomena that are studied in political science or

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[1]   Ibid.

[2]   Philippe Braillard, *Theorie des Relations Internationales*, Presses Universitaires de France (P.U.F.), 1977, p. 13 (author's translation).

[3]   Karl Deutsch, *The Analysis of International Relations*, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall Inc. 1968, p. 113.

any other discipline."[4]

We should look at conflict, which for long has been the object of international politics scholarship. There are basically two approaches to this concept: there is the micro-approach by the psychologists, and there is the macro-approach by the sociologists. While psychologists have tended to "analyse conflict from the knowledge of [the] individual", sociologists have prefered analysing it "from the knowledge of collective behaviour".[2]

From the micro perspective, Nicholson defines and explains conflict as a situation which "exists when two people wish to carry out acts which are mutually inconsistent. They may both want to do the same thing... or they may want to do different things where the different things are mutually incompatible".[3] The micro-psychological approach permits us to understand the comportment of individuals involved in our conflict under study.

Scholars like Dahrendorf, Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Lewis Coser and Kenneth Boulding have in the macro-sociological perspective, given definitions that are useful to us. Dahrendorf defines conflict as a "confrontation between collective actors aimed at modifying a type of distribution of authority within a given society".[4] Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff on their part relate conflict "to a situation in which one identifiable group of human beings... is engaged in conscious opposition to one or more other identifiable human groups because these groups are pursuing what

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1   Stanley Hoffmann, "Theory and International Relations," in *International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory*, James N. Rosenau (ed), New York, The Free Press, 1969, p. 32.

2   Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1980, p. 140-141.

3   Nicholson, 1970, p. 2.

4   Bertrand Badie and Jacques Gerstlé, *Lexique: Sociologie Politique*, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1979, p. 27.

are or appears to be incompatible".[1]Lewis Coser attempts a definition which we find interesting. He first defines conflict as "a struggle over values, and claims to scarce status, power and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, or injure or eliminate their rivals."[2] Secondly he proceeds to distinguish "realistic" from "unrealistic" conflicts. By realistic conflicts, he means a "means towards a specific result" while unrealistic is more of "the need for tension release of at least one of [the participants]".

Coser explains realistic conflicts as those "which arise from frustration of specific demands within the relationship and from estimates of gains of participants, and which are directed at a presumed frustrating object..."[3] Coser's explanation of "realistic" conflicts is complemented by Kenneth Boulding who defines conflict as "a situation of competition in which the parties are aware of the incompatibility of potential future positions and in which each party wishes to occupy a position that is incompatible with the wishes of the other."[4] The definitions which we have touched give us a clear picture of what conflict is, and serve the purpose of our research. Nevertheless, this concept remains shrouded in usage especially with others such as tension and crisis.

In attempting to distinguish tension from conflict, Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff hold that tension "often precede[s] the outbreak of conflict, but [it] is not the same as conflict".[5]

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[1]   Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1980, p. 139.

[2]   Ibid; see also Badie and Gerstlé, 1979. p. 27.

[3]   Lewis Coser, "The Functions of Social Conflict", in R.A. Akindele, "Conflict Theory, Conflict Behaviour and Conflict Control in the International System: A Theoretical Survey and Analysis" in *Nigerian Journal of International Affairs*, 1987, 13(1), p. 2-3.

[4]   Kenneth Boulding, "The Role of the War Industry in International Conflict", in *Nigerian Journal*, 1987, p. 3-4.

[5]   Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1980, p. 139.

According to Holsti, "tensions do not in themselves cause conflict, but only predispose parties to employ and manifest conflict behaviour should they seek incompatible objectives". He defines conflict as "the set of attitudes and predispositions such as distrust and suspicion that populations and policy makers hold towards any other party."[1] The notion of tension might not come close to conflict, but that of crisis does. Holsti distinguishes crisis from conflict by regarding crisis as a stage in conflict. He then identifies a crisis inside a conflict when "occasionally sudden and unexpectedly hostile actions by one party will raise tension and perceive threat to such a point that policy makers of the responding state are unexpectedly forced to choose between alternatives, including making war or surrendering."[2] Lasswel Kaplan agrees with Holsti when he terms crisis "[as] a conflict situation of high intensity".[3] We will in our research pay little attention to tension, but will synonymously use crisis and conflict. These situations have their components. These components which include conflict arena, conflict situation that has an actor, though important, are not relevant to our study, thus we shall leave them at this point and move ahead. Let us now focus our attention on the typology of conflicts.

Many scholars[4] have attempted to establish conflict typologies, but that of Holsti interests us most. In his opinion,

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[1] Holsti, *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*, 4th ed. Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall, 1983, p. 450.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Badie and Gerstlé, p. 32 (author's translation).

[4] Apart from Holsti, typology on conflicts with reference to Africa are provided by Gonidec, *Les Systèmes Politiques Africaine: Deuxième Partie: Les Réalités du Pouvoir*, Paris, Librairie Général de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1974. P. 152. See also Antoine Zanga, *L'OUA et le Reglement Pacifique des Differends*, Paris, Editions ABC, 1987, p. 75-81; Vernon McKay (ed), *African Diplomacy:Studies in the Determinants of Foreign Policy*, New York, Frederick A. Praeger Inc. 1966, p. 4-7; Charles E. Onwuagbu, "The Conflict Resolution Capacity of the Organisation of African Unity", Unpublished, M.Sc. Class Seminar, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, 1986, p. 4-8.

liberation conflicts, conflicts concerned primarily with the composition of governments, limited territorial conflicts, national unification conflicts and unlimited imperialism are among the many conflict types that exist.

We have looked only at the first three types, since they touch the object of our study. Liberation conflicts surface as groups struggle to free themselves from colonial subjugation by others. These over composition of governments emerge when incompatible conceptions as to what should constitute a legitimate government become very evident in a state. The former is epitomized by colonial liberation wars or decolonization conflicts while the latter by civil conflicts. As for limited territorial conflicts, they surface when mostly contiguous states have incompatible positions with reference to a specific territory or rights enjoyed by one state in or near the territory of another.[1] Another dimension evident in conflict typology is establishing conflict types as a function of the actors involved in conflicts. There are intra-national, internal, international and internationalized conflicts.[2] Both internal and intra-national conflicts refer to conflicts inside states, international conflicts relate to those that oppose one sovereign entity to another, while internationalized conflicts attempt to encompass the internal and internationalized dimensions of conflict. Conflicts, holds Gabche James, "are said to be internationalized once an internal conflict develops to assume an international dimension as concerns its actors and space."[3] This second dimension of conflict type is relevant to us because the nature of our study has to do with internationalized conflicts. Defining conflict as above enables us to situate conflict analysis with the more fashionable approaches to conflict studies. These include, "the structural origin of conflict and ... the study of behaviour of [sovereign entities] in conflict

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[1] Holsti, 1983, p. 452-454.

[2] Holsti, 1983 p. 452, see also Gonidec, 1974. p. 152.

[3] Gabche, 1989, p. 35.

situations."[1] It is the latter aspect which is our concern in this study.

One of the techniques of conflict resolution is mediation.[2] This technique "entails [the] use of a third party to assist the disputants in reaching a voluntary agreement".[3] It is generally situated in the domain of "pacific settlement" of conflicts.

Historically, the concept of mediation originated from the efforts made "to attenuate or avoid conflicts in the antiquity and the middle ages while juridically, it emerged from attempts to institutionalize such efforts in global and regional organisations".[4] In the antiquity, international conflicts often had spill-over effects into the issue areas or territories of especially contiguous third parties(states). Such states had two options. They either remained neutral or intervened as mediators, with an aim of de-escalating the conflicts. Among the Greek city states, those not involved in conflict situations took it as a duty to bring others together and bargain, with a view to arriving at a settlement among warring states. In the case of Europe, the Pope occasionally provided the services of a mediator. Meanwhile, the emergence of European nation-states downgraded the mediatory role of the Pope and paved the way for the institutionalization of procedures of conflict management and resolution.[5]

The Hague International Conferences of 1899 and 1907 which gave birth to the "General Act for the Peaceful Settlement of

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[1] A.K. Akindele," International peace-keeping:Some main issues and Problems", in *Peace-keeping*, 1989, p. 2.

[2] Conflict resolution, mechanisms of, and management of conflicts is handled in this work.

[3] Gregory A. Raymond and Charles W. Kegley, "Third Party Mediation and International Norms:A Test of Two Models", in *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, (1985), 9 (1), 34.

[4] Gabche, 1989, p. 40.

[5] Ibid.

International Disputes"[1] was the outcome of this institutionalization. This juridical wave in the development of mediation was accentuated by the League of Nations. In its article 15, the League's Council was authorized to examine and seek solutions to conflicts brought before it. The Council then proceeded in practice to use among others, the procedure of Mediation, Commissions of Inquiry and Conciliation Commissions.[2] The place of mediation as one of the techniques for the peaceful settlement of conflicts in the present global system is spelled out in articles 33 through 38, chapter VI of the United Nations Charter. Article 33 states inter-alia:

The parties to any dispute, the continuance of
which is likely to endanger the maintenance
of international peace and security, shall
first of all, seek a solution by negotiation,
enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration,
judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies
or arrangements or other peaceful means of their
own choice.[3]

Mediation as a pacific means of settling conflicts has always been used in Africa. Articles 3 and 19 of the O.A.U. charter are based on this. Particularly, part 3, articles 20 and 21 of the Charter linked "Protocol of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration". According to article 20, "when a dispute between member states is referred to the commission for Mediation, the President shall, with the consent of the parties appoint one or more members of the commission to mediate the dispute".[4] The qualities of a good mediator, tactics and procedures followed,

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[1] Holsti, 1983, p. 468.

[2] Ibid.

[3] *Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice,* New York: United Nations, p. 19.

[4] Louis B. Sohn (ed.), *Basic Documents of African Regional Organisations,* New York: Oceana Publications Inc., 1971, p. 72, see also Zanga, 1987, p. 174.

difficulties encountered and outcome of mediatory efforts are all important but not relevant to our study, thus we leave them at that.

When extra-African states intervene in African conflicts, their desire is to display power and in the process, make their influence felt. Thus the power concept which is one of the oldest in international politics, is one of the concepts which we have to look into, especially as it concerns our study. The contribution of power to any foreign policy analysis, is evident at two levels: power as a foreign policy end, and as a foreign policy means or determinant. A state in its external behaviour has as an objective, the quest for power, that is, generating power for herself.[1] Hans Morgenthau brings it out clearly when he holds that international politics is "the struggle for power".[2] In presenting power as a foreign policy end, and also as a foreign policy means, we have seen how extra-African states have used it to influence the course of conflicts in Africa, and in the end, escalating them.

States usually use their power to influence others. This makes us to attempt to distinguish between power and influence though such a distinction hardly comes out, since both could be used inter-changeably. David Singer, a renowned influence scholar is of the opinion that power is "the capacity to influence." He proceeds to explain that influence is "one in which A seeks to modify the behaviour of B, or to identify A's influence over B in terms of the extent to which he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do".[3] According to Singer, persuation and dissuasion are all modes of influence, and they interest us as

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[1]   Hoffmann, 1969, p. 32. See also Jack C. Plano and Roy Olton, *International Relations Dictionary*, New York, Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1969, p. 17-18.

[2]   Morgenthau, 1966, p. 29.

[3]   David J. Singer, "Inter-Nation Influence: A Formal Model", in *International Politics and Foreign Policy*, Rosenau (ed), New York, The Free Press, 1969, p. 381.

we see in our study how they affect the African conflict situation.

Just as the definition of power is crowded with many definitional ambiguities, so too is the identification and classification of national power bases. Karl Deutsch regards as national power bases, the "aggregate power resources of a nation".[1] Such a view limits itself to the old power school. Baldwin attempts to push this further so as to englobe the new power school vision. As he points out, could be implicitly or explicitly regarded as power bases, all resources that appear as a "means by which one [state] can influence the behaviour of other [states].[2] The last concepts which we have looked at in this study due to their relevance to our work are conflict resolution and peace. The roles played by states in conflict situations could be placed within the framework of conflict resolution and the ultimate quest is for peace. Conflict resolution is the definitive acceptance of a decision(s) by all parties involved in a conflict especially the target actors.[3] Such decision(s) may be absolute as could be the case with conflicts where all but one party are annihilated. The words "definitive", "acceptance", and "all" are often considered relatively. What most conflict resolution efforts attain are relative rather than definitive or absolute solutions.[4]

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[1]   Deutsch, 1968, p. 23.

[2]   Baldwin, "Power Analysis and World politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies", in *World Politics*, Vol. 31, N° 2, 1979, pp. 162 and 164-165. See also William C. Olson, et al (eds), *The Theory and practice of International Relations*, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall Inc. 1983, p. 100; Charles E.Onwuagbu, review of Baldwin, Msc. class Seminar(Unpublished), Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, 1986, pp. 1-2 and 4.

[3]   Quincy Wright, "The Nature of Conflict" in *The War System: An Interdisciplinary Approach*, Richard A. Falk and Samuel S. Kim (eds), Boulder, Westview Press, 1980, p. 329.

[4]   Gabche, 1989, P. 58.

Conflicts may be resolved through four main techniques.[5]
First the bellingerents in a conflict "may choose to remain at
loggerheads until one side forces the other to acquiesce." In
this situation, the conflict is resolved through dictation of
decision(s) that are in accordance with the will of one party to
the conflict.[2] Second,the parties "may decide to negotiate
diplomatic settlement". Such efforts may result in a settlment
that is in accordance with the will of all the parties to the
conflict.[3] Third, conflict may be resolved by third party
intervention.. The parties involded in a conflict "may employ the
assistance of a third party to help resolve their disagreement."
Some forms of third party conflict resolution techniques, are
mediation, conciliation, good offices, inquiry and adjudication
in the form of arbitration and judicial settlement".[4] Finally, a
conflict may be resolved through obsolence. The prolonged nature
of some conflicts may make them attain a façade of settlement.
With time, new issues arise which "sink the conflict(s) into
oblivion and result in a settlement according to the will of no
one."[5]

The concept of peace is generally approached from the
standpoint of the negation of conflict. Conflict is epitomized
in **war**, which is, "a condition of sustained violence between two
or more groups or nation states organised with the intent of
inflicting injury on one another."[6] **Peace**, is regarded as, "the
absence of war [that is, a] situation existing between two or

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1   Techniques of conflict resolution are not handled here in detail
     since they do not constitute the focus of our work.

2   Raymond and Kegley, "Third Party Mediation and International
     Norms", in *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, Vol. 9. N°. 1.,
     1985, p. 34, see also Wright, "The Nature of Conflict", p. 330.

3   Raymond and Kegley, p. 34.

4   Wright, 1980, p. 330.

5   Ibid.

6   John P. Lovell, *The Search for Peace: An Appraisal of Alternative
     Approaches*, Pittsburgh, International Studies, 1987, p. 22.

many states which are not or which are no more in war".[1] Relating it to the system of power politics, Schwarzenberger regards peace as "a negative state, that is, the state in which subjects of international law are not at war with each other".[2] For Cranston, peace is the termination of actual hostilities as evident in an international agreement or peace treaty among the bellingerents.[3]

Peace seen as a negation of states' use of force in international politics except for legitimate self-defense was spelt out in the 1928 Briand-Kellog Pact. It is today enshrined in the UN Charter. The UN Resolution 290(4) of December 1, 1949 titled the "Essentials of Peace" pointed out some basic principles which states were expected to act in accordance in view of world peace.[4] The concept of peace is related to peace making and peace keeping. Peacemaking entails "the art of settling disputes or conflicts through mediation, arbitration, conciliation or any form of peaceful settlement."[5] Peace-keeping according to the International Peace Academy is "the prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities, between and within states, through the medium of a peaceful third party intervention organised and directed internationally, using multilateral forces of soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain peace".[6] Both peace-making and peace-keeping involve the role of third parties. When there is neither peace nor war as in the Coldwar, the situation could be refered to as "cold

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[1] *Dictionnaire de la Terminologie du Droit Internationale*, Paris, Sirey, 1960, P. 435 (Author's translation).

[2] Melquiades J; Gamboa, *A Dictionary of International Law and Diplomacy*, Quezon City, Phoenix Press Inc., 1973, p. 209.

[3] Maurice Cranston (ed), *A Glossary of Political Terms*, London: Bodley Head Ltd, 1977, p. 78.

[4] Gamboa, in *A Dictionary of International Law and Diplomacy*, Michigan, Western Michigan University, P. 210.

[5] Akindele, 1989, p. 13.

[6] Ibid.

peace;"[7] A situation prevails, characterised by preparedness for war, sustained tension, polemical propaganda, subversion, and support for revolutionary movements in third countries. It is hard to say whether this "status mixtus" is war or peace[2].

This research work attempts to argue that in the new world order, both the US and the Ex-USSR have abandoned their claim for territorial domination and have opted for peace and justice. The changes that are taking place in Southern Africa today have come as a result of changes that have taken place in the policies of the two superpowers towards the region in particular and the entire world in general. On the American side, the policies remained almost the same, but the instruments of policy varied depending on different circumstances. Moreso, one sees the profound influence of realism and power politics in the actions of the US particularly in the 1980s.

Realists have always assumed that "morality" does not count much in the political actions of states. This is so because each state operates in an international environment of which it has no control. This international environment, assets Oben Victor, "... is typically characterised by the absence of any regulatory and authoritative political institution and common standard of conduct."[3] In this circumstance, the power of each state becomes its only source of survival and the ultimate arbiter. This explains why realists believe that politics is not a "function of ethical philosophy".[4] The influence of realism in superpower politics led to the definition of goals, based on ideological considerations. Each superpower sought to dominate the other by cajoling extensive areas under its sphere of influence. One can

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[1]   Northedge Maurice Cranston (ed). p. 79.

[2]   Ibid.

[3]   Oben Victor Enoh, "United States Foreign Policy and Change in South Africa: 1980-1991", Unpublished, Maîtrise Memoire, IRIC, The Univeristy of Yaounde II, 1993, p. 4.

[4]   Oben, 1993. p. 5.

therefore affirm that to the realists, security boundaries are not usually coterminous with the political boundaries of states. Thus, the US and the Ex-USSR could justify their interest and actions in Southern Africa in security terms.

Emphasising more on the power of states and their attainment of a stable system, Dr Henry Kissinger held that states essentially seek power so as to preserve peace and when peace becomes the primary objective of state actors, the unfolding of events is decisively determined by "ruthless power". He further holds that "whenever the international order had acknowledged that certain principles could not be compromised even for the sake of peace, stability based on an equilibrium of forces is at least conceivable."[1] It is in this wise that Nicholas J. Spykman asserts that "all civilised life rests in the last instance on power", and Frederick Schuman agrees with him when he too states that "in an international system lacking a common government, each unit necessarily seeks safety by relying on its own power and viewing with alarm the power of its neighbours."[2] Kissinger further postulated that a stable international system derives from the necessity for a certain balance between the opposing major powers being the US and the Ex-USSR. Thus to him "... if history teaches anything, it is that there can be no peace without equilibrium and no justice without restraint"...[and] national power and interest [should determine foreign policy] rather than abstract moralistic principles".[3]

Another fundamental aspect which states take into consideration when intervening somewhere is the factor of interest. Hans Morgenthau holds that, the politics among nations is the adjustment of national interest. To him:

> the concept of national interest
> presupposes neither a naturally

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[1]   Henry Kissinger, in Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1980, p. 113.

[2]   Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1980, p. 88.

[3]   Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1980, p. 114.

> harmonious, peaceful world nor
> the inevitability of war as a
> consequence of the pursuit by all
> nations of their national interest.
> Quite to the contrary it assumes
> continuous conflict and threat of
> war to be minimised through the
> continuous adjustment of conflicting
> interest by diplomatic action.[1]

We have discovered that there is too much ambiguity in the definition of the concept of national interest,[2] nevertheless, it could be taken to mean the general and continuing ends for which a state acts. This is based on the values of the national community.[3] Thus, there is always an interplay between the value of ideology and the interest of the state. In most cases ideology helps to guide decision makers but when confronted with the choice of core or vital interest, it is used as a measurement to establish a hierarchy of the various interests of the state. In summarising US vital interests, Couloumbus and Wolfe identified several elements, which included:

> The individual freedom and dignity
> and the protection of human rights
> of every society ... free enterprise
> and economic freedom ... The United
> States as the major centre of political,
> economic, military and cultural power,
> is the leader of the free world and has
> a special responsibility to contain the
> aggressive and expansionist international

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[1]   Morgenthau, 1966, p. 281.

[2]   Daniel S. Papp, *Contemporary International Relations, Frameworks for Understanding*, New York, Macmillan, 1984, p. 29.

[3]   Joseph Frankel, *International Relations in a Changing World*, Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1979, p. 85.

communist movement.[1]

Notwithstanding, US interest has always displayed a
disparity between statements of value and principle and practical
policies. Since the second world war, this interest has centred
around a balance of power in the world, and of course, that which
is in its favour. It is the concern for this that pushes the US
to seek for vital spheres of influence, the guarantee and
guarding of freedom of commerce through open sea lanes, the
support of governments committed to the free market and free
trade philosophy. This occasioned the US to maintain at times
good and even friendly relations with ideologically incompatible
regimes as the case would be
in its action towards the RSA. These are the complex issues that
make the definition of national interest both controversial and
indeterminate.

In international relations, there are no permanent enemies
and no permanent friends, but there are permanent interests.
These interests are permanent and range in hierarchy of greater
and lesser interest, with the greater and core interest to be
defended at all cost. The classification of interest is
determined by policy makers and this depends on their perceptions
on the one hand and the complexities of the external environment
on the other hand. There is in all, a mutual relationship between
ideology and the vital interest and each affects, shapes and
reinforces the other.

According to Rosenau the external environment or
international system affects the internal political behaviour of
states and has a direct impact on their foreign policies.
Environment policies which are the sequences of behaviour
originating from the external environment of a polity are either
sustained or terminated within the polity. The polity imputs are
those behavioural sequences within a polity to which

[1]   Theodore A. Couloumbus and James A. Wolfe, *International
Relations: Power and Justice*, Delhi, Prentice-Hall, 1989, p. 131.

enviornmental output gives rise.

In line with Rosenau's formulation, some outputs,[1] conventionally called foreign policy are designed to bring about responses in other systems. These are direct policy outputs or environmental outputs. He further elaborates three processes through which linkages are affected, viz, the penetrative, reactive and emulative processes. He holds that the reactive process is a recurring boundary crossing reaction. In this case, the actors initiating the output do not participate in the allocative activities of those who experience the input, but the latter's behaviour is clearly a response to behaviour undertaken by the external polity. This results from the joining together of both direct and indirect output to their corresponding inputs. After having given an indepth study of our theoretical framework, it will be necessary that we proceed to define some of the key terminologies and expressions that have been used, and will still be used several times in our work. This definitional clarification is very necessary for better understanding.

A.2. Definitional Clarifications:

In the course of our study we have constantly used certain words and expressions which need necessarily be clarified so as to avoid ambiguity. Let us begin with the word "conflict". According to Micheal Nicholson[2], conflict exists when two people want to carry out acts which are mutually inconsistent. They may both want to do the same things, or they may want to do different things where the different things are mutually incompartible. He holds that defining conflict can be extended from single people to groups (such as nations), and more than two parties conflict must be defined in terms of the wants or needs of the parties involved. This conflict comes about through the

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[1]   James N. Rosenau (ed), *Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and Internationl Systems*, New York, Macmillan, 1969, p. 60.

[2]   Nicholson, 1970, p.2.

perceived structure of what the power wants.[3]

In an article, "conflict Reduction: Prevention, Management, and Resolution", I. William Zartman defines conflict as "... an inevitable aspect of human interaction, an unavoidable concomitant of choices and decisions. [It is] prevented on some occasions and managed on others, but resolved only if the term is taken to mean the satisfaction of apparent demands rather than the total eradication of underlying sentiments"[2] We do not want to go into an elaboration of the types of conflict, the nature of conflict, the character of conflicts in Africa, the dynamics of conflict, the partterns of conflict, the effect of conflict, the problems of conflict resolution, the mechanisms of conflict resolution, the different approaches to the study of conflict, the parameters of conflict, due to the fact that they do not have a direct bearing to our desire to clarify the term. Nevertheless, they have been mentioned, just to show the different facets of this concept.

Let us now look at the expression "civil war". Jack Plano gives us a very clear definition when he says that it is a war that opposes geographical regions, political divisions, or ideological factions within the same country.[3] A civil war can put an established government against anti-government forces or it can develop in an interim period that is marked by the fight for legitimacy.[4] Charles Zorgbibe[5] too buys Plano's view when he holds that it is the development of a policy that is chosen by a group of people when they realize that the political goals are no longer the same as they expected.

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[1] Ibid.

[2] I. William Zartman, in Zartman and Deng, 1991, p. 299.

[3] Jack C. Plano, in *The International Relations Dictionary*, Jack Plano and Roy Olson (eds), Michigan, Western Michigan University, 1982, p. 64.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Charles Zorgbibe, in Plano and Olson, 1982, p. 5.

Civil wars are distinct from international conflagrations in that they are not confrontations between states. On the contrary, to use the expression of Grotius, are "guerre mixte"[1], because they oppose a sovereign and a fraction of his subjects. It is in this light that each time we will be talking about "civil conflicts", we will be meaning "civil wars", signifying a military struggle between at least two groups within the same nation and defending divergent interests.

States in the international system exercise considerable influence on the events that happen the world over. It is in the light of this that we shall look at the expression "foreign intervention" as it applies to our work. By intervention we mean third party involvement in a dispute. Foreign intervention will be confined to all maneovres of a state to influence through any means, the conflict within another state. Intervention could go with neutrality or inaction. Talleyrand states this more clearly that nonintervention is a metaphysical and political expression that has the same meaning as intervention.[2]

After having looked at the definitions and expressions that will frequently come up in our work, we come to conclude with Zartman that "Regional conflicts present a real challenge for the maintenance of world order and the resolution and management of international political issues... they frequently involve external powers, and sometimes superpowers themselves, called in to lend strength to the parties to the conflict, or inserting themselves because of their own perceived interests in the parties or the outcomes. [They] involve serious stakes for the parties and carry with them the danger of transcending the original actors and becoming no longer merely regional".[3] Having

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[1] Expression of Sobngwi, 1990, p. 15.

[2] Quoted by Northedge and Donelan, *International Disputes:The Political Aspects*, London, Europa Publications, 1971, p. 118. Quoted by Sobngwi, p. 16.

[3] I. William Zartman, in *Dialogue*, N° 97. 3/92, p. 13.

set the theoretical basis of our work, let us now turn to the manner in which we have handled this work; that is to say, the methodology.

B. Methodology of the Research:

One Objective of our work is to analyse the factors that explain the change in the attitude of the superpowers and the RSA in their politics towards Southern Africa, and to find out how this change has affected or will affect their reaction in solving the problems in this region in general, and the Angolan conflict in particular. We notice that the superpowers and the RSA are actors in the international system, thus each action they take, will obviously have a reaction on the "total environment". According to Lambatim Nadjilengar, intra-societal environment proceeds from an organisational context of socio-politico-economic relations of members of the international system whose interactions are susceptible to provocking the stability of the state like Angola.[1] Thus Angola is obliged to adapt to these influences of the environment if it has to benefit from it. The changes that are observed in Angola today reveal that it is seriously taking the external environment into consideration.

Our intention in this section is to give clarification to the questions that have been asked in the course of our study, and to attempt to show the steps which we shall adopt in bringing this out. This is so because, to quote Professor Maurice KAMTO, "The problem of methodology is at the heart of all scientific endeavour."[2]

Similarly, Morton Kaplan holds that the goal of methodology

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[1] Lambatim Nadjilengar, "L'Afrique du Sud et la Question de l'independence de la Namibie (1945-1990)" Thèse de Doctorat du 3ème cycle, IRIC, Yaoundé, 1991, p. 22. See also Roger-Gerard Schwartzenberg, *Sociologie Politique*, Paris, Montchrestien, 1981, p. 120.

[2] Professor Maurice KAMTO, *Pouvoir et Droit en Afrique Noire: Essai sur les Fondement du Constitutionalisme dans les Etats d'Afrique Francophone*, Paris, Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, (LGDJ), 1987, p. 41.

is to assist us to better understand not just the scientific work, but also the steps of the actual research process.[1] This means that we have to show the different approaches and steps that will guide us to answer the research questions asked. We realise that these approaches are many, but they complement each other, to quote Kaplan, "Complementary appraoches enable the analyst to reveal distorted truths for better understanding."[2]

Thus in our analysis we shall use the historical approach that reveals the causal element in facts and situations, and also the systemic method. In explaining methodology, Kamga Sobngwi says it is the sum total of all the steps aimed at discovering the truth. It is the attitude of the human spirit vis-à-vis the object under study and the logic of the scientific steps that are pursued.[3] It is a particular procedure that is applied to one or more stages of research, or the explicative logic of an ensemble of steps.[4]

The inductive method which ascribes to plunging into history is what Professor Dieudonné OYONO asserts that it "... takes as its starting point history to explain international phenomena".[5] Since this method focuses on history as its pivot, thus leading to the historical approach, we have examined our subject lending a hand to the "traditional" or "classical" approaches in the

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[1] Morton A. Kaplan, *The Conduct of Inquiry, Methodology for Behavioural Science*, San Francisco, Chandler Publishers, 1964, p. 428.

[2] Morton A. Kaplan, *Science, Language and the Human Condition*, New York, Paragon House Publishers, 1984, p. 137.

[3] Sobngwi, 1990, p. 18.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Dieudonné OYONO, "L'apport de l'Histoire dans l'Enseignement des Relations Internationales" in *Revue Camerounaise des Reltions Internationales*, 16-17 Décembre, 1982, p. 23. (Authors translation).

study of international relations.[6] The reason for our using the historical method is that history provides "... the indispensable background for the understanding of human experience".[2] This has enabled us, to quote Professor KAMTO, to integrate into the analysis, a temporal dimension that is indispensible for a proper understanding of phenomenon.[3]

We find the historical method very adequate for our analysis because the decolonizaiton of the Southern African region and the resolution of the conflicts therein, constitute a historical factor that cannot escape the explanation of the causal elements of these events. To interpret Professor OYONO, the historical approach also suggests the use of analytical techniques such as diachronic and synchronic.[4] It thus permits us to make a necessary backward movement so as to study the change in the politics of the extra-African powers towards Southern Africa. It enables us to compare and make reference to others that are similar, like the attitude of the superpowers towards other conflicts in the continent. The historical method also enables us to study the different attitudes adopted by the extra-African powers, like their refusal of change in the first place, the hesitations of the 1970s, and the ruptures of 1989 that finally led to Namibian independence, and moves towards a resolution of the Angolan crisis.

The historical method is inductive and empirical[5], and it is

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[1] Wilson A. Short, "History and Theory in International Relations: Some Observations for Nigeria", in *Nigerian Journal of International Affairs* (1983), 8, p. 69-70; see also Holsti, *International Politics,* pp. 9 and 14-15.

[2] Collins E. NGWA, "Teaching History at the International Relations Institute of Cameroon" in *Revue Camerounaise des Relations Internationales,* 1982, p. 27.

[3] KAMTO, 1987, p. 57.

[4] OYONO, 1982 p. 24.

[5] Henry Steele Commager, *L'Historien et l'Histoire,* Paris, Seghey, 1967, p. 77.

the "Key to the explanation of international politics".[6]
In our effort to describe, analyse and explain the causes and evolution of the Angolan war, we have used the "traditional" and "classical" approach that is descriptive, because the "purpose is ... to report and analyse current international problems and speculate on the sources and outcomes of various policy alternatives for specific states"[2] The temporal and spatial framework of our study permits us just like other historians, to be concerned "... primarily with the nature of international relations during a limited and specific period of history".[3] It is in this light that the historical approach in a contextual setting and its predominance in our work is justified by the very nature of our topic.

The dominance of the historical approach does not dismiss the presence of the systemic method in our work. Systemic analysis consists of studying the ensemble of interactions that are produced between the system and its environment. This system that consists of a determined ensemble of relations is in communication with its environment through the mechanism of "inputs" and "outputs". Inputs are made up of all the demands towards the system which are converted in the system by a reaction of the combined constitutive elements and this finally provokes a global reaction through a regulatory authority. This reaction expresses the manner in which the system tries to adapt to the pressures that come from the environment. This global reaction (Output) constitutes the response of the system, but at the same time joins a new circuit of reactions (Feedback) that contribute to modify the environment. Let us examine the figure below:

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[1]   OYONO, 1982, p. 23.

[2]   Holsti, 1983, p. 8-9.

[3]   OYONO, 1982, p. 63.

Figure 2:   Easton's Model of a Political System

Environment   Environment

      Demands   Decisions

Inputs   Outputs

                           | The Political System |

      Supports   and Actions

                  Feedback

Environment   Environment

Source: Kamga Sobngwi, Doctorate Thesis, 1990, p. 20.

Examining this systemic analysis of a political system as presented by Easton, we realize that it presents two advantages, to quote Sobngwi, it enables us to elaborate laws of a dynamic system, and to make a very precise evaluation of the interactions that manifest themselves all through the circuit between internal and external variables.[1]

The relationship we gather from our use of the systemic approach and our study is to see how the external environment, in this case, the extra-African powers intervened in the course of the Angolan conflict and how this inter-change of positions helped to influence the war, and how it is influencing the efforts towards resolution. The changes that are taking place in the international system with the virtual end of the Coldwar, the signing of the Tripartite Accord and the Bilateral Accord on December 22, 1988 in New York, have impacted considerably the settlement process in Southern Africa in general and Angola in particular. The external environment, that is, the superpowers, and the internal environment, that is, Angola, are in an exchange process that produces a result as a consequence of the reaction between the "input" and "output". In this light, the methodological insight which we have made has enabled us to adopt a two part plan, as we shall see in our structural organisation.

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[1]   Sobngwi, 1990, p. 20.

For us to accomplish this task, we collected and exploited documentation on the Angolan conflict. This documentation was got from primary, secondary and oral sources. Primary sources include the testimonies of escapees from the war zones, official correspondences exchanged,
accords, resolutions, and newspapers. Secondary sources like textbooks, monographs, contemporary records, articles, memoires and theses were also consulted. Oral sources are made up of the discussions we held with His Excellency William-Aurélien Eteki à Mboumoua, former Secretary General of the OAU and former minister of foreign affairs of Cameroon[1], who in his term of office as OAU chief executive handled issues on the Angolan conflict. We also talked to some officials of the Cameroon External Relations Ministry, and Lecturers of IRIC. Mention should also be made of our use of the Libraries of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, that of IRIC, the American Cultural Centre and MINREX.

C. Structural Organisation of the Study:

This research work is divided into two principal parts, that open with a priliminary chapter, that lays the groundwork, giving the theoretical framework, general background and orientation, and definitional clarifications of some of the terminologies and expressions that we have used in the work. Each of the two parts is equally divided into three chapters that examine the changing tides and fortunes of the international system in general, and the Angolan conflict in particular. Part one dwells on the changes in the international scene and their incidence on Southern Africa. Part two on the other hand examines the Angolan conflict, and situates it within the context of the New International Order. Let us attempt an elaboration of the various chapters.

Chapter One of part one examines the Triprtite and Bilateral Accords of December 22, 1988, with emphasis on the end of

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[1] Interview conducted on December 17, 1993 at IRIC Yaounde.

superpower rivalry.

Chapter two dwells on the policy of linkage, the Namibian question, the conception, adoption and implementation of linkage, its terms and consequences on the parties.

Chapter three treats the consequences of the Tripartite and Bilateral Accords and their application to Angola. Here, we examine the disappearance of the international aspect of the war, prospects for settlement, and birth of a new dynamism.

Chapter one of part two explores Soviet and Cuban disengagement, and the preeminence of the US in the region. The rapproachement between the US and Luanda, the changing tides in the conflict, and it ends with the recognition of the MPLA government by the US.

Chapter two looks at the Gbadolité connection in efforts to seek a negotiated settlement to the Angolan conflict. Here, the African approach is the centre of focus, and also, the post-Gbadolité initiatives.

Chapter three postulates on the preeminence of the economy over the military in the new international system. A prognostic of the Angolan conflict is made; the liquidation of UNITA by the RSA and the liberalisation of political life in the latter is the corpus of this chapter.

Of course, there is the concluding part of our thesis that retrospects on conflict resolution in the Coldwar period, an evaluation of the six chapters, effects of conflicts on economies, prospects for resolution in the post-Coldwar period and some recommendations. The conclusion is closely followed by an appendix that includes some of the very important treaties, accords and documents like resolutions of the UN. that are related to the Angolan conflict and its resolution.

PART ONE

CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE AND THEIR INCIDENCE ON SOUTH AFRICA

CHAPTER ONE
THE NEW YORK ACCORDS OF DECEMBER, 22, 1988
AND THE END OF EAST/WEST CONFRONTATION

A.   The London quadripartite Meeting vis-à-vis the Peace Process to be followed:

"Our failure to find a solution here
[in Angola] confirms that the
Organisation of African Unity-OAU
has no power to shape the destiny of
Africa. Power is in the hands of the
superpowers, to whom we are handing
Africa by our failure."[1]
                            - President Kenneth David KAUNDA

The Angolan civil war that broke out in 1975, soon became a thorn in the flesh of African mediators. The internalization of the conflict had become so obvious that solutions to the problem had necessarily to be sought from the various parties that had become interested in the country. The lamentations of former President Kaunda on the inability of the OAU to tackle the Angolan imbroglio shows how "African linen" had to leave the continent to be washed in Europe and in the US. The first major attempt towards seeking a negotiated settlement of, or laying the groundwork for settlement started with the quadripartite meeing of May 3 and 4 in London which received the benediction of the USSR favorable to a US mediation. But before this meeting, various African countries had tried on numerous occasions to tackle the Angolan problem.

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[1]   Kenneth David Kaunda, Former President of Zambia, quoted in Sobngwi, 1990, . 70.

Nigeria, Kenya and Zambia took the lead far before 1988.[1]
They all were in consensus that all foreign troops should pull
out from Angola so that there could be reconciliation between the
different factional movements. This same proposition had been
made by Dr. Chester Crocker, US Assistant Secretary of State for
African Affairs. In 1980 before his appearance at the State
Department, in an article in *Foreign Affairs*, Chester Crocker
explained what later was to constitute the cream of his African
policy. He affirmed that the US was to gain much by adopting
this policy vis-à-vis South Africa, a policy that he estimated
to be more conciliatory, more constructive, to be precise, what
was to become "constructive engagement". He felt that sanctions
against South Africa could only end up estrangling the US from
the latter. On the contrary, by demonstrating an attitude of
"paria", he felt, the US could lead South Africa into instituting
reforms in its internal and regional politics.[2] For this, he was
brandished racist.

From such a conceptual framework, Crocker was going to apply
another theoretical schemata with the view to obtaining a
resolution of the conflict in South Africa. If at the beginning
the term "Linkage" was vague, during the proceeding negotiations
it became clear, and Crocker became the apostle of it, admirably
and conveniently explaining it to all the parties. In 1988,
Chester Crocker had the task of constructing an accord that will
lead to a concomitant withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, and
the independence of neighbouring Namibia.[3] There was a non-

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[1]   "Good signs in Angola" in *Los Angeles Times*, January 3, 1988.

[2]   John M. Goshko, "For Crocker, Accord was long time coming" in *The Washington Post*, December 14, 1988. Recent events in South Africa have proved Crocker wrong. The internal changes that are going on in the bastion of apartheid are no doubt motivated by the bitting effects of sanctions on the latter.

[3]   *Los Angeles Times*, January 3, 1988.

negligeable reason too – the willingness of the Reagen Administration to close up in beauty.[1] In this light, Chester Crocker multiplied contacts with Angola, Cuba, South Africa and Soviet officials. Each of the parties had a capital interest on the outcome of the Angolan conflict, thus they had to maneouvre with much tact and agility. Chester Crocker was to obtain in January 1988 form the Cubans in Luanda, an accord of principle on their withdrawal from Angola.[2]

The London meeting of May 3 and 4 1988 was one of the multiple meetings that were held, all in an effort to arrive at a veritable solution to the Angolan problem. Contacts had been made between the different parties in the conflict, thus clearing the way for the negotiations. The London meeting was marked by great prudence by the parties, and at times hesitation by the protagonists, such that it gave the impression of immobility or stalemate. This meeting is significant because it was the first time since the beginning of negotiations that we found on the same table, Angolans, Cubans, South Africans and Americans.[3] Nevertheless, the meeting was a mere meeting in the sense of the word, a kind of "talks about talks", to echo Shakespeare, motivated by the peaceful intention of the bellingerents.

The Angolan delegation was headed by Mr. Alfonso Van-Dunem "Mbinda", Mr. Neil Van Hurden for the RSA, Mr Risquet for Cuba, and the US led by Dr. Chester Crocker. The USSR through its Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Anatoly L. Adamishin had expressed the wish to attend,[4] but this offer was turned down by the US which instead asked the former to influence their "poulains" into accepting to negotiate.

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[1]   E. A. Wayne, "Signs of a way out of the Angola-Namibia quagmire", in *The Christian Science Monitor*, April 4, 1988.

[2]   Don Oberdorfer, in *The Washington Post*, March 12, 1988.

[3]   *Keesing's*, vol. XXXIV, August 1988, p. 36079.

[4]   Bill Keller, "Russians want to expediate an Angola Settlement" in *New York Times*, June 6, 1988. See also Foreign Affairs, Vol. 68, N°3, Summer 1989, p. 134.

The failure to come out with any veritable result in London, led the parties to agree to meet again on May 12, this time in Brazzaville, Congo. This meeting was to be a bilateral meeting between Angolans and South Africans, which simply reaffirmed their earlier positions - the RSA determined to leave Angola and Namibia only after a total pullout of all foreign forces from Angola. Angola on its part insisted on the immediate stop to US and South African military assistance to the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola - UNITA, as a pre-requisite for the departure of Cuban troops from Angola. She also requested a pullout of the South African Defense Force-SADF from Southern Angola, and the application of UN Security Council Resolution 435.[1] A meeting like this one, founded on a concantenation of deep-rooted mistrust of each other, fraught with conditionalities, had to preclude future necessary adjustments.

June 24 and 25 1988, this time in Cairo, Egypt, the four parties of London met again; but the change of venue from London to Cairo was not an indication of their keeness for the objectives they had in mind, or their effectiveness in negotiation. In fact, this meeting did not produce any significant moderation on the stance of the parties concerned, and their bellingerents. On this occasion, Dr. Chester Crocker declared that the parametres for resolution had been posed, but much was still left to be done.[2] The four parties were again to meet from July 11 to 13, this time in New York. Here, they came out with an "accord of principle", for a resolution of the conflict. The objective was to achieve a resolution of the conflict before the 29th of September, as wished by the superpowers in their Moscow summit.[3] For the first time in the tedious process of negotiations, the parties appeared to be on

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[1] United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 of September, 29, 1978 called for a one-man, one-vote election that will lead to the independence of Namibia.

[2] *Keesing's*, August 1988, P. 36079.

[3] Bill Keller, June 6, 1988.

the road to success in achieving unanimity and settlement[1] - though later events will only prove how illusionary this hope was. The RSA was still to drift the parties to greater worries,[2] as a result of their unchanging and inflexible position in the negotiation.[3] There was also a polemic concerning the continuous military support to UNITA by the US; here, Dr. Chocker insisted that the US was not in any way held by the "accord of principle".[4]

July, 20, 1988. A document was published simulteneously in Angola, Cuba and South Africa, establishing the principles achieved at New York. The most important aspect of this document, according to South African Foreign Minister Roelof Pik Botha, was the acceptance of the principle of linkage (the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola as a pre-condition for the application of UN Resolution 435 calling on the independence of Namibia) by the parties.[5] The bumpy road to resolution took the parties anew to Ile de Sal in Cape Verd. July 22 and 23. This time the main item on the agenda was the adoption of a calender for the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, which had been a major point of controversy, a bone of contention, in these negotiations.[6]

July 26, 1988. Cuban President Fidel Castro surprised the world. He declared that he favoured a gradual and total pullout

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[1] "A break through in the Angola Stalemate" in *New York Times*, July 16, 1988.

[2] Roger Thurow, "Accord on Angola-Namibia still faces tough test of South African approval", in *The Wall Street Journal*, July 18, 1988.

[3] "Forward in Southern Africa" in *The Washington Post*, July 22, 1988.

[4] David B. Ottaway, "Fate of UNITA unresolved by accord" in *The Washington Post*, July 21, 1988.

[5] *Keesing's*, vol, XXXV, N° 2, p. 36479.

[6] Edward Cody, "Soviet says settlement of Angolan conflict is near" in *The Washington Post*, August 2, 1988.

of the Cuban Internationalist Mission Forces from Angola. A new round of negotiation was scheduled for Geneva, after Americano-Soviet consultations. The main point on the agenda, of course, had to be that of Cape Verd.[1] In this meeting, Angola rejected the proposition of the RSA, and instead posed theirs and this resulted into a stalemate that was only finally to be resolved on August 5, to be accepted by all the parties.[2] An accord was published on August 8, in all the capitals of the countries involved in the negotiations, and it was based on an immediate ceasefire and the withdrawal of the SADF from Angola on September 1, followed by the application of UN Security Council Resolution 435 as from November 1.[3] South Africa insisted that the application of this resolution had to depend on the signing of an accord on the calender of the pullout of Cuban troops before September 1, 1988.

August 10, 1988. SADF started pulling out of southeastern Angola under the supervision of a joint commission of Angola, Cuba and South Africa. On August 22, the three parties signed a formal ceasefire accord in Ruacana, in northern Namibia. In response to this, the South-West African People's Organisation-SWAPO too announced that it will observe the ceasefire. Not surprisingly, only UNITA remained intransigent; thus the war between the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola – MPLA and UNITA continued,[4] as if to affirm the assertion that "he who wants peace must prepare for war".

Thinking that the hostilities in Angola do not menace the regional peace process,[5] the US offered to participate in the

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[1] E.A. Wagne, "Now the "nitty-gritty" on Namibia-Angola" in *The Christian Science Monitor*, August 1, 1988.

[2] *Keesing's*, December 3, 1989, p. 366479.

[3] Robert Pear, "3 nations agree to truce in Africa immediately" in *The New York Times*, August 9, 1988.

[4] "Cease-fire in Angola" in *The Sun*, August 10, 1988.

[5] *Keesing's*, December 3, 1989, P. 366489.

ceasefire supervisory commission.[1] This offer, comprehensive as it was, marked a promising future, for the peace process in the region. What was now left, and being impatiently waited, was, the calender for the Cuban troop withdrawal, since it was the fulcrum, the hang-pin of the Geneva meeting, and the subject of the three meetings of Brazzaville that were to follow.

August 24, 1988. The four parties of London again met in Brazzaville. Here Chester Crocker proposed a compromise solution, for a Cuban troop withdrawal within 18 months. The RSA proposed 12 months, while Angola talked of 36 months! The parties were to separate on August 26, without reaching an accord, but taking another rendez-vous for September. The meeting of September 7 and 9 turned out to be unfruitful, just like its precedent, and here Crocker moved the compromise to 24 months. The various delegations had to separate with the intention of going to consult with their respective governments.

October 7 to 9, 1988. New York. The next meeting between Angola, Cuba and South Africa was held. *The New York Times* made a premature announcement of a breakthrough in the negotiations, which was quickly refuted by the parties. The Angolan Foreign Minister, Alfonso Van-Dunem "Mbinda" declared to the General Assembly of the UN on October 13, that the New York negotiations were only exploratory and that they still had a long way to go.[2] Also, the idea of an accord on a 24 to 30 months pullout calender was not to be considered seriously.

Two problems on the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola were now posed. The first had to do with the date limit and the second with the speed with which it had to be done. For Angolans, they were against any brutal and dangerous Cuban pullout that could result in a weakening of the Popular Forces for the Liberation of Angola - PFLA. For the RSA, the Cubans

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[1] Ibid.

[2] *Keesing's*, March 24, 1988, p. 36480

were not to profit from the withdrawal of the SADF to assist the
MPLA to finish with Savimbi. The Angolan representative at the
U.N., Manuel Pedro Pacavira declared on October 13 that a 30-
month pullout calender of Cuban troops was the maximum concession
that Angola could accept. In the face of this impossibility to
arrive at an accord on the Cuban troop withdrawal calender, the
U.N. Resolution 435 could also not be applied before November 1,
1988, as initially accepted. In order not to put to peril all
that the parties had achieved, they all accepted to arrive at an
accord within the shortest time possible.

Breakthrough in Negotiations

Certain observers hold that the impass in the negotiations
during the months of October 1988 was perhaps due to the American
elections.[1] A democratic victory by Michael Dukakis, opposed to
the U.S. assistance to UNITA and favourable to sanctions against
South Africa was to be looked at as an obvious consequence of a
new U.S. policy. Unfortunately, Bush won and this victory
constituted a continuity in the foreign policy of the U.S. The
period during which Reagan was to stay in office before handing
over to Bush was 2 months - two months in which Chester Crocker
was decided to end with his dream. He was to meet his Soviet
colleague, Anatoly Adamishin in order that they prepare the
future Geneva meeting built for November 11, 12, and 13.[2]

The Geneva meeting was in effect, to prolong up to November
14. On November 15, Mr. Neil Van Herden, the South African
Director-General of Foreign Affairs, declared that all the
parties had arrived at a provisionary accord which could become
difinitive once it received the approbation of their respective
governments.[3] The Angolan and Cuban governments approved the
document on November 18, while the RSA on its part followed suit

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[1]   E.A. Wayne, "Bush victory might spark peace talks on Namibia-Angola," in *The Christian Science Monitor*, November 10, 1988.

[2] Ibid.

[3]   *Keesing's*, March 24, 1988, p. 36480.

four days later, that is, on November 22. A visibly satisfied Pik Botha expressed the hope that a protocole will be signed, to establish the calender for a Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola.

It should be remarked that a secret protocole had first been signed in Geneva, in which the Cubans had engaged never to intervene again on any part of Angolan territory.[1] Brazzaville became the next meeting point for the signing of this expected protocole.[2] Putting aside the menace which constituted the hostility of SADFs vis-à-vis such an accord,[3] the Geneva resolutions have to be integrated into the December 2, 1988 Brazzaville protocole. These resolutions were summarized into a Cuban withdrawal calender of 27 months. During the first 12 months, 36.000 Cuban troops had to be evacuated after the beginning of the Namibian independence process.[4] In Brazzaville, discord appeared on the question of the procedure of verification of the Cuban troop withdrawal. It started with the abrupt departure of the South African delegation on December 4. Pik Botha nevertheless declared that this deprture was motivated by a necessity to make consultations with his government.[5] When the South Africans came back, a protocole was signed on December 13. It contained four points.

The four parties concerned, with the US playing the role of mediator arrived at a decision that the date of April 1, 1989 was to be recommended to the UN Secretary-General as the date for the beginning of the application of Resolution 435; the date of December 22, 1988, at New York, for the signing of a tripartite

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[1] *Jeune Afrique*, November 13, 1989, p. 45

[2] "Parties achieve accord on Namibia", in *The New York Times*, November 16, 1988.

[3] "Turning point in Southern Africa" in *The Christian Science Monitor*, November 17, 1988.

[4] William Claiborne, "Cease-Fire in Angola revealed", in *The Washington Post*, November 20,1988.

[5] Christopher S. Wren, "Substantive agreement concluded on Angola and a free Namibia", in *The New York Times*, December 14, 1988.

(Angola, Cuba and South Africa) and a bilateral (Angola and Cuba) accord, an exchange of prisoners of war-POW, and the establishment of a joint commission within the 30 days that preceeded the signing of the tripartite and bilateral accords. This commission was to be responsible for planning the different propositions which will be given to the various parties in their study, interpretation and application of the tripartite accord. It was also accepted that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. will be invited to participate in the work of the commission as observers. In the like manner, the government of Namibia at independence will become a full-fledged member of this commission.[1] With all these efforts made, the stage was now set for the December 22, 1988 meeting at New York. A breakthrough, at last, had been achieved.

B.   The Tripartite Accord between Angola, Cuba and the Republic of South Africa: December 22, 1988. New York.

New York. December 22, 1988. 9 a.m. The world saw the birth of a new era in world politics. An event was going to take place that will completely change the trends in international relations. The path to a new language, to a new understanding, to a new partnership, to a new feeling was to be cleared. This time, date, and location will remain historic, as it brought a new detente to the stale politics of confrontation, and paved the way for confluence in future issues affecting mankind and the international community. The eyes of the world were turned to, and the ears of the world were waiting for, the great event that had to take place.

The Tripartite Accord turned out to be an 8-point accord that was signed in three copies, representing the different languages of the parties to it - Portuguese for Angola, Spanish for Cuba and of course, English for the RSA. The signing of this accord was the fruit of 8 years of laborious and streneous negotiations and politiking. Following the terms of the first

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[1]   *Keesing's,* January 24, 1989, p. 36481

point, the parties prayed that the UN Secretary-General should ask the Security Council, the authorization to begin with the implementation of Resolution 435, on April 1, 1989.

On the sencond point, the accord stipulated that the SADF will leave Namibia in conformity with Resolution 435. Angola and South Africa had to cooperate with the UN Secretary-General to achieve Namibian independence within the time proposed, and in conformity with the rules of fair play - free and fair elections. The two parties had to abstain from all actions that were susceptible to impede the application of Resoltuion 435. They equally had to respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of Namibian frontiers, and see to it that no state, organisation, or whosoever, does not use the latter's territory for acts of war, aggression or violence against the latter.

In short, the Tripartite Accord constituted a guarantee of Namibian independence[1]. Signed by the Foreign Ministers of Angola, Alfonso Van-Dunem "Mbinda", South African Roelof Pik Botha, and the Cuban Isidoro Malmeirca Peoli, it was a classic document - classic because it put the future confrontation between the parties in peril. The accord had to take effect on the day of signature.[2] Dr. Chester Crocker was to remark that the accord took into consideration the interest of the various parties. Angola could jolly-well begin to forget the South African menace, Cuba was satisfied for leaving heads high - satisfied for having demonstrated to South Africa the strength of its army, and the RSA too could now breath as a result of the departure of the Cuban Internationalist Contingent, a perpetural menace to them. The accord thus gave the RSA the opportunity to

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[1]   Only posterity was going to reveal that, the Tripartite Accord was not afterall, a complete success. This is because it came to portray the biggest winner in the game - the US, and ironically, the Angolan people, as no framework was layed for a pacific resolution of the intractable internal conflict here.

[2]   *Keesing's*, March 24, 1989, p. 36481.

begin striking a diplomatic offensive towards Moscow.[3] Chester Crocker called it a victory for all.[2]

Nevertheless, the control of Cuban troop pullout could be criticized, given that no person could give the exact number of "Cuban interventionists" in Angola. UNITA and the MPLA have always contradicted themselves on this subject. The gravity of this problem is seen when we realize that a great majority of these soldiers were black, just like the majority of Angolans. Also, and here a remark by the extreme right, at the independence of Namibia, Cuban troops were still present in Angola. One will also judge the impartiality of the UN forces taking into consideration the fact that the latter was the financier of SWAPO. We could also reveal that in the Brazzaville protocole that was put into application, three Marxist countries figured – the USSR, Angola, and Cuba, in contradistinction to only two Capitalist states – the US and the RSA, this notwithstanding the fact that in the course of a SWAPO victory in Namibia, it would make four Marxist states![3]

The remarks above, whether founded or not, remain at least, significant. The truth is that the accord could not solve all the problems squarely. The greatest ommission was of course, the question of the internal situation in Angola. By leaving this part untouched, the negotiators had created a loophole. Nevertheless, the Tripartite Accord considerably reduced the terms of the Angolan problem by suppressing the presence of foreign troops in Angolan territory, but still left was the problem of the civil war itself. With or without the accord, the

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[1]   Lally Weymouth, "A Moscow-Pretoria axis", in *The Washington Post*, December 18, 1988.

[2]   Christopher Wren, December 14, 1988.

[3]   In the course of an election, it was certain that SWAPO was to come to power and this is exactly what obtained; Sam Nujoma became President. Eventhough SWAPO did not win an outright majority, they nevertheless controlled the instruments of power, and could take their decisions as they so pleased.

MPLA and UNITA remained radically opposed to each other. But it must be agreed that the accord brought in fresh hopes; hopes that were to be reinforced by the emergence of perestroïka that was already pointing in the horizon.

C. The Bilateral Accord between Angola and Cuba:

This was a follow-up accord to the Tripartite Accord, signed between Angola and Cuba, on the same day as the latter, and in New York too. Signed in two copies (in Porturguese and Spanish),it was composed of four articles. It was to go operational immediately after the signing of the Tripartite Accord. As agreed in the Brazzaville protocole, this accord was signed in the presence of UN Secretary-General, Javier Perez de Cuellar. The objective of the accord was to control the withdrawal of the Cuban Interventionist Contingent from Angola. It opinned the redeployment of these forces at the 15th and 13th parallels, and a total pullout of the contingent of 50.000 soldiers who constituted the Cuban forces in Angola.[1] The total pullout had to be before July 1991.

On article 2 of the accord, we notice that the two parties reserved the possibility to react in the case that there was a violation of the independence process, by the other party.[2] It should be noted that in a bid to ensure control of a gradual and total withdrawal of the Cuban troops, the parties in article 3, called on the Security Council of the UN and the Secretary-General to supervise the procedure. An addendum to this Bilateral Accord established a redeployment and withdrawal plan as follows:

Deadline:

* Before April 1, 1989 (Date of application of U.N. Resoltuion 435) 3000 men.

* Total duration of the withdrawal (calender) as from April 1,

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[1] "Text of pacts on Namibia independence and a pullout by Cuban", in *The New York Times*, December 23, 1988.

[2] This clause was applied in February 1990 when Cuban soldiers were attacked by UNITA guerillas.

1989 - 27 months:

* Redeployment Northward:
  - To the 15th parallel - August 1, 1989
  - To the 13th parallel - October 30, 1989
* Total number of troops to be evacuated;
  - as on November 1, 1989 (25,000) = 50%
  - as on April 1, 1990 (33,000)   = 66%
  - as on October 1, 1990 (38,000) = 76%
  - as on July 1, 1990 (50,000)   = 100%

The main problem posed by this accord was the raison d'être of a particular accord on the withdrawal of Cuban Internationalist Contingent from Angola, given the fact that the negotiation had been all-embracing and accomodating. One of the reasons which we could advance is that may be it was in consideration of the element of the sovereignty of the states, given the fact that Cuban presence in Angola came as a result of a government-to-government aid.[1]

We notice that the Security Council had some sort of gone ahead of the signitories of this accord by voting on December 21, 1988 in unanimity to send a mission of 70 members charged with the supervision of the Cuban withdrawal (the United Nations Angola Verification Mission-UNAVEM)[2]. To this military commission was added 20 civil administrators, under the command of the Brazilian General Péricles Ferreira Gomes. The members of these two commissions originated from Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Congo, Czechoslovakia, India, Jordan, Spain, Jugloslavia and Norway.[3] With the certainty of the withdrawal of the Cuban forces established, the different parties could now engage themselves according to the terms that had been agreed at New

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[1]   Christopher Wren, "The Crocker formula for African Diplomacy", in *The New York Times*, December 18, 1988.

[2]   Paul Lewis, "Security Council votes to send a force to Angola" in *The New York Times*, December 21, 1988.

[3]   *Keesing's*, March 24, 1989, 36481.

York on July 13, 1988, lightly moderated.

Commentary on both the Bilateral and Tripartite Accords:

According to Dr. Chester Crocker, "The Namibia - Angola settlement of 1988 ended one historical phase and opened the door to the best opportunity that regional leaders have ever had to build a constructive future ... have provided the example; they could also provide a tangible basis for hope in what South African opposition leader Frederick Van Zyl Slabbert has called " the politics of negotiation".[1]

Chas. W. Freeman Jr.[2] considers the signing of the accords a bizarre event. In his words, right in the chambers of the UN Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister looked on approvingly, Secretary of State George Shultz presided over, and three ministers - Angolan, Cuban and South African, made speeches. When the odd[3] ceremony was over, the colonial era in Africa had finally drawn to a close. Both the 13-Year presence of the Cuban expeditionary forces in Angola and the three-quarters-century-long South African administration, were set on the way to ending.[4] Diplomats and Generals from Angola, Cuba, RSA, the USSR, SWAPO, and the neighbouring African states raised their glasses to the historic achievement of an American mediation effort that they had spent nearly a decade denigrating and obstructing. We nevertheless come out of these two accords with some worries or surprises in our minds.

How did the US, which had no significant historical ties to

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[1] See *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 68 No.4, Fall 1989, p. 153.

[2] See "The Angola/Namibia Accords" in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 68, No. 3, Summer 1989, P.126.

[3] Expression of Chas. W. Freeman Jr, 1989. P. 126.

[4] It should be remarked that this colonial domination was to end finally on February 28, 1994 when the RSA flag was pulled down on Walvis Bay, a Namibian port which was still under the latter's control, and the former's flag was hoisted amidst cheering applaus by the large crowd present, including of course, Dr. Sam Nujoma, the Nambian President.

Southern Africa and few concrete interests there, come to play a central role in the resolution of that region's problems? How did the US, which had not yet recognised the government in Luanda,[1] has no diplomatic relation with Cuba, and had seriously strained relations with the RSA, come to be the indispensable mediator of a peace between them? How did Southwestern Africa, which had become a focal point of East/West contention, emerge as a symbol of creative diplomatic cooperation between Washington and Moscow in the resolution of regional disputes?

An interesting remark about these accords is that they did not resolve all issues of concern and even generated some new problems. But that does not detract from either their significance or the hopes they raised for the resolution of other longstanding problems in the region, such as the anarchy and carnage in Mozambique. It may be too early to draw firm lessons from this unprecedented mediation effort by the US in remote Southwestern Africa. Nevertheless, a few points of consideration are noteworthy making.

The only deal that will work is one that is good for all the parties to it and tolerable to those who have the capacity to wreck it, that is, peace without losers. A formula that has the logic of fundamental national interests behind it is worth sticking with; patience will reward such a formula. Military force remains a persuasive tool of foreign and national security policy. Without South African intervention in Angola, there would have been no recognition in Luanda of an Angolan security interest in Namibian independence and no Cuban consideration of withdrawal to realise it. Without Cuba's demonstration of its willingness to match South African
escalation, there would have been on urgency to reach an agreement; Without US aid to UNITA, there would have been no convincing stalemate to propel the parties to the negotiating

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[1] Washington was 5 years later to recognise the MPLA government in Luanda, with José Eduardo dos Santos as President. This historic act was on November 8, 1993 When President Clinton appointed Edmund T. DeJarnett, Jr as Washington's Ambassador to Luanda.

table. Nor, absent a convincing US commitment to help UNITA maintain its military balance with the MPLA, would the South African military have been willing to consider an end to its own aid to UNITA.

The above observations make us to conclude that mediation indeed, is different from negotiation per se. It provides an opportunity to guide the parties to definitions of their national interests and toward outcomes compartible with the mediator's objectives, but in the end they - not the mediator - determine the results. At various stages in the Angola/Namibia negotiations, the parties gave in on points Crocker did not believe they needed to concede, and which the US would rather they had not. Recognition of the limits of the mediator's role and of his power to compel the result is his first virtue; forebearance from pointing out the petty and grand studpidities of the parties to the negotiation is his second.[1]

D. New Detente in Superpower Rivalry:

> "It is too soon for historians to say that
> the coldwar is over. There are still many
> unresolved tensions where mistakes on one
> or the other could revive it ... excessive
> optimism could... be a cause of failure as
> it had been in the past."[2]
>
>   McGeorge Bundy

The romance of the coldwar, that became visible with the end of the second international conflagration in 1945, is now wanning - approaching a seeming end. The fact that communism as an international ideology is dead does not mean that disparity in the conception of national security and national interest have disappeared. The main worry of the West, which was the USSR's explosion of the atomic bomb in 1949 (an event that heightened

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[1]   Freeman, Jr. Summer 1989. p. 126.

[2]   McGeorge Bundy, in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 69, No. 1, 1990, p. 198.

the fear of this "evil empire"[1]) continues to exist[2], since the present day Commonwealth of Independent States - CIS still controls the same nuclear arsenals. The communist empire in the East has collapsed, but the CIS still controls massive destructive weapons that could still be a source of worry, and thay could still change the tide of world history. This is not a pessimistic view, but an evaluation based on an assessment of the past events that marked the highpoints of the coldwar. The great majority of the weapons could be destroyed, but with the scientists still around with their formulars, their consequent re-production is not, and cannot be put to doubt; it cannot be dismissed.

Nevertheless, there is every reason to hope; hope in the horizon for a new international order - an order dictated by the quest for democratic principles and market economy, as against ideological theorising and propagandism, and warfare. Today, more than ever before, we live in world detente, a detente that is dictated by collective action, as we saw in 1990 when like one whole, peace-loving nations lent their support to quel off agression in the gulf. The world has moved from confrontation to confluence, from conflict to consortium, from rivalry to consensus. In spite of this, pundits still doubt this new detente, given the fact that it is not new in the history of the coldwar for there to be a thaw. Michael Howard belongs to this school. He holds that:

> The end of ideological confrontation,
> however should have one far-reaching
> consequence for the affairs of the
> world. The Soviet Union(barring its
> total disintegration) will remain a
> great power and will continue to pursue
> its interest throughout the world; but

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[1] Expression often used by Ronald Reagan, former president of the U.S. to describe the USSR.

[2] See Valéry Giscard d'Estaing et al., "East-West Relations" in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 68, No. 3, 1989, p. 7.

> these interests will be as likely to
> lie in cooperating with the West as
> in opposing it.[1]

As the decade of the 1980s closed, the US and the USSR appeared finally to have mastered their forty-year-old conflict. At the Malta summit,[2] the convergence of American and Soviet positions on most agenda items was unprecedented. Their relationship seemed likely to develop with minimum tension, low risk, and prospectively, at greatly reduced cost.[3] It was thus not surprising that here both leaders used almost identical language in proclaiming that their two countries were "at the threshold of a new era".[4]

1989 will go down in history as the most significant year in postwar ideological and propagandistic confrontation. This "annus mirabilis" has made it clear that the USSR and the US now have it in their power to put an end to the Coldwar - the most important, expensive and dangerous phenomenon of the second half of our tumultuous century. We are right to celebrate the great events that 1989, the best year in contemporary world history, have brought. Many changes have taken place in Eastern and Western Europe, but in the former, these changes are so profound that they call for concern. Dictatorships have crumbled. The Coldwar started in Eastern Europe, and it is ending there[5] - what a coincidence of history! We will recall it is as a result of Soviet expansionist ambition that the US was bound to "support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed

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[1] Michael Howard, "The Springtime of Nations" in *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 69, No. 1, 1990, p. 30.

[2] Malta Summit took place between Reagan and Gorbachev, in 1987.

[3] Arnold L. Horelick, "US-Soviet Relations: Threshold of a New Era", in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 69, No. 1, 1990, p. 51.

[4] Expression of Ronald Reagan.

[5] McGeorge Bundy, 1990, p. 198.

minorities, or by outside pressure".[1] This responsive determinism by the US to check the Soviets at bay led to superpower confrontations in Central and Eastern Europe. It is then that the Coldwar was born, took its height, and today is dying.

"From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has decended across the continent",[2] Winston Churchill, the British Premier exploded in a speech in Fulton Missouri in 1946. This speech was to get its reply in 1947 when Harry S. Truman, US President warned that, "Unless Russia is faced with an iron fist and strong language, another war is in the making".[3] Today, all this is history. Ideological confrontation has gone to rest. It has been pushed into the dust-bin of history. Since communism is fading away as an international ideology, there will be a parallel decline in the political appeal of anticommunism; not many will persist in endless war against the dead.[4]

"The postwar era collapsed in 1989", asserts Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, who continues to say that "when the year began, relations among countries were essentially what they had been for forty years:divided Europe, a USSR that maintained an East European empire by force, and an America that assumed "superpower" responsibilities vis-à-vis its allies in NATO and in Asia".[5] By the year's end the countries of Eastern Europe seemed to have been liberated from the pressures of the Brezhnev

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[1]   Harry S. Truman, quoted in R.D. Cornwell, *Twentieth Century World Affairs*, London, Longman, 1985, p. 74.

[2]   Winston Churchill, quoted in Cornwell, 1985, p. 73.

[3]   Harry S. Truman, quoted in Cornwell, 1985, p. 73.

[4]   McGeorge Bundy, 1990, p. 198.

[5]   Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, "Beyond the Coldwar" in *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 69. No. 1, 1989/90, p.1.

Doctrine[6] (though Soviet troops remained). Communist governments put in place and held by force had collapsed. The division of Europe (which Churchill evoked) had been overcome with symbolically with the collapse of the Berlin wall, and the will to empire had apparently been replaced by a will to modernization.[2]

An important factor worth noting is the trend of events in the US during this time. The relative decline in US economic power, the rising pressure of budget and trade deficits and the apparently declining Soviet military threat made defense costs and the "superpower" responsiblities of the US seem less necessary to the defense of Europe and more difficult to justify and finance. "The coldwar is over - nearly. The postwar era is finished - absolutely".[3] The structures through which international affairs have been conducted for the past forty years have been shaken to their foundations. Four major processes of change were at work in 1989 reshaping what had become to be called East/West relations: liberalization and reform inside the USSR; the democratization of Eastern Europe; the determined move towards economic integration in Western Europe; and German unification.

These events took place, thanks to the "event-making man"[4] - Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, who said, "The bell of all, ideological conflicts [begins] to toll for us"[5]. Gorbachev announced and quickly began to dismantle the dangerous structures of monolithism in the USSR and its empire. He had come to

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[1]   Brezhnev Doctrine was a strict policy adopted by Leonid Brezhnev to protect the satellite states from breaking away.

[2]   Kirkpatrick, 1989/90, p. 2.

[3]   Ibid.

[4]   Sidney Hook's description of the charismatic Soviet Leader, in *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 69, No. 1, 1989/90, p. 2.

[5]   Mikhail S. Gorbachev, "Statement at Plenary Meeting of the UN General Assembly", December 7, 1988, p. 15.

realise that the USSR was a "Third world country with First World weapons".[1]The Warsaw Pact that was formed in 1955, lost its raison d'être and disappeared, the Communist Information Bureau - COMINFORM had to follow, then later it was the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance - COMECON. "Glasnost" - openness, and "perestroïka" - restructuring, became the watchwords of his policy that won for him the admiration and serious consideration of the West. In the words of Kirkpatrick "Gorbachev [acted] from the apex of the Soviet system ... the Soviet Union was founded on the decision of a single man and is being reshaped by the decision of another".[2] Lenin thought that he could jump over stages of history. Gorbachev has moved the Soviet Polity "backward" in Marx's historical trajectory from "socialism" to a stage of "pluralism" that the Bolshevik Revolution "skipped" on its way to the end of history. While ageing Soviet leaders relapsed into immobilism and corruption like the cardinals of a decadent church, Gorbachev being exceptional in his talents rather than in his perceptions changed the status quo. He was "no fortuitous deus ex machina".[3] In stating the foreign policy of the USSR, he was succinct and lucid:

> Our foreign policy is today, to a
> great extent than before, determined
> by domestic policy, by our interest in
> concentrating our efforts on construc-
> tive activities aimed at improving our
> country. And that is why we need a
> lasting peace, predictability and
> constructive new international
> relations.[4]

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[1]   *The Times of London*, quoted in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 69, No. 1, 1989/90, p. 5.

[2]   *Foreign Affairs*, 1989/90, p. 3.

[3]   Howard, 1990, p. 19.

[4]   Quoted by Valéry Giscard d'Estaing et al "East-West Relations", a joint report to the Trilateral Commission, 1989, in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 68, No. 3, 1989, p. 6.

There were sufficient reasons to doubt Gorbachev's pronouncements when they were first made. This atmosphere of bemused skepticism that gripped Western opinion was founded, and very akin to the period prior to this time - 1989. The cooperation between the East and the West that had been founded on a concantenation of deep-rooted ideological mistrust had to preclude future necessary adjustments. Nikita S. Khrushchev, Leonid Brezhnev, and even Joseph Stalin at one time or the other had made similar declarations of dentente; the difference lay in what they did, and not in what they said. This suspicion was later to give way to optimism and hope. Since Gorby (as he was funly called) marked a new era in world history, as he matched rhetoric with action.

Soviet troops pulled out of Afghanistan, East and Central European countries under Soviet control were allowed to go their own way as if to recall Khrushchev's "Many roads to socialism". The abandonement of the Brezhnev Doctrine with its corresponding desire to control East Europe by force, marked the gradual and progessive end of the coldwar.

The consequences of these changes are profound. Being unanticipated as they are, these momentous changes will not only liberate East and Central Europe. If completed, they will liberate US and Western Europe from the constraints of the sustained global military preparedness imposed by the Coldwar. Above all, the changes signify a positive change of policy, a change that probably will lead to resolution of the Angolan and Mozambique civil strives. Realising that the USSR was a military and not an economic power, he decided to act, and to act fast. If the Warsaw Pact countries moved to the West, he thought, joining the European Community -EC or the European Free Trade Association - EFTA, withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact, orientating their policies towards the West, the USSR
stood to lose its status as a major power. The Coldwar, the result of successive Soviet government policy of using force to extend and preserve power in Eastern Europe, was seeing its end

with the introduction of "New Realism".

What vision for NATO in the new international order? Should it be dismantled? The central theme - and title-of Secretary of State James A. Baker's[1] speech at the Berlin Press Club in December 1989 was "America in Europe After the Coldwar". At about the same time President Bush in reinforcing NATO, declared that "the United States is and will remain a European Power",[2] Baker in Berlin asserted, "NATO will remain North America's primary link with Europe", [3] and proposed new functions for the organisation. His vision of a "New Europe on the basis of a new Atlanticism", with NATO as its central institution, reflects the familiar American view of NATO as a multipurpose alliance of democracies.

The climax of the end of superpower rivalry was on November 9, 1989. A historic event. The Berlin wall, the symbol of oppression at least as gruesome as the Bastille, was pierced and pushed down by crowds who poured into West Berlin, dancing, singing and weeping in joy. Unlike the events of 1789[4], all this happened, Romania alone excepted, without the loss of a single life. This recalls to us the feelings of the great Romantic poet, William Wordsworth when he wrote:

> Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive
> But to be young was very Heaven![5]

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[1]   U.S. Secretary of State under the Bush Administration.

[2]   *Foreign Affairs*, 1990, p. 15.

[3]   Ibid.

[4]   Date of the French Revolution, when the Bastille, the symbol of cruelty and oppression, was stormed and many people lost their lives. Its fall that was followed by so many terrible events, leaves many French people today wondering whether the revolution deserves to be celebrated at all.

[5]   William Wordsworth, quoted in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 69 No. 1, 1989/90, p. 17.

Freedom has come, but the biggest skepticism is what lies ahead for the 1990s. To free oneself, as André Gide once remarked, is only the beginning. The real problem is to live in freedom. Some conservatives still ponder about the future, asserting that the new world order will collapse due to the lack of essential support. They may have a point. There may indeed be a back-lash, bringing to power a tough, authoritarian regime that will put an end to glasnost, perestroïka, and demokratizatsia. But authoritarian regimes, as Kirkpatrick affirms, are not totalitarian regimes. However brutal, a new regime could not restore the exploded ideology of Marxism-Leninism. Any future Soviet leader would still have to solve the same problems that brought Gorbachev into power and to recognize, like Gorbachev, that the solution lies in good relations with the West, and reduction in military expenditure and a renunciation of global ambitions. As for the reimposition of Soviet rule on an Eastern Europe from which every shred of communist legitimacy has now disappeared, it is hard to see what benefits Moscow would hope to get against the enormous calculable costs.

Whatever happens, the structure of world politics has been changed; and change irrevocably. The problems that those changes present to our statesmen are urgent and complex, but never has there been a better opportunity - not in 1918, not even in 1945 - to construct a new world order that will finally diffuse Europe as a force of world conflict, and Africa as her accessory, and allow them to reemerge, after nearly a century of pain and labour, as a dynamic and stable centre of prosperity and peace. However inadequately those opportunities are grasped, 1989 is likely to be seen as a historic turning point, a kind of volte face, one ending the castastrophic era that began in 1914. It has been an "annus mirabilis": a truly wonderful year.[1]

George Herbert Walker Bush and Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev will go down in history as the two statemen who carried the

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[1]   Howard, 1990, p. 32.

greatest credit for ending the Coldwar. Just when they were perfecting their methods for managing the conflicts of the coldwar era, that era abruptly ended. The finely honed instruments of conflict management face early obsolescence. Instead, policy makers in both capitals (Washington and Moscow) face a new international politics in which their bipolar competition will no longer provide the dominent framework for ordering the system and disciplining the behaviour of states. By every measure of conventional postwar scorekeeping, 1989 was the year in which the West won the Coldwar.[1] Gorbachev, of course did not lose the war (it is a ware that was wone by one party, but not lost by the other), but he simply had stopped playing the game according to the old rules. His performance was therefore to be judged by a set of new, distinctly different non-zero-sum rules that gave the highest grades for self-restraint and unilateral arms reductions. Having boldly concluded the game was not worth the candle, he cut his losses - in some cases brilliantly making a virtue of the hardest necessity and redefining the rules so that what might have counted as defeats and retreats became bold initiatives and daring challenges to old-thinking partners.[2]

1989 saw James Baker meeting his Soviet counterpart Eduard Shevardnadze for the first time in Moscow, in May. They were to meet again the same year, this time in September, and the venue was Wyoming, with unusual and celebrated cordiality. Going into Malta, the Soviet and American leaders had slogans, not visions, and much less blue-prints, for a new European order. Gorbachev talked of a "Common European Home"[3] and Bush equivocated with a "Europe whole and Free"[4]. Gorby's "Freedom of choice"[5] in Eastern

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[1]   Horelick, 1990, p. 51.

[2]   Ibid.

[3]   Horelick, 1990, p. 59.

[4]   Ibid.

[5]   Horelick, 1990, p. 63.

Europe, and "free self-determination of the German people"[1] - in support for German unification, and "self-determination of peoples and states",[2] that made him to accept Bush's idea of German unification that "should occur in the context of Germany's alignment with NATO",[3] thus "overcoming the division of Europe"[4] had sounded a new bell.

Neither Washington nor Moscow can yet see what will replace the coldwar system. The 1990s are likely to be a transitional period for relations between the two superpowers. In the multipolar world now emerging, they are likely to have more parallel and convergent interests than before. A new architectural design is being drawn for the world. As both the US and the new Russia reach the threshold of a new era in their relations, their roles in shaping the post-Coldwar world will be different from those they played in managing the East/West conflict, but no less crucial. The drama has ended. Both will have to adopt their new policies and behaviour to environments in which they will have substantially diminished control and influence. The CIS may no longer see it to be in their national interest to support every revolutionary movement in the Third World that, professing Marxism-Leninism, turns to Moscow for help. Conversely, Washington may no longer feel it necessary to support any regime, however brutal, corrupt and arbitrary, that opposes communism. With the intention of being prudent, and not necessarily pessimistic about this new thaw in tension in world politics, we cannot yet say that the Coldwar is over. But as we enter the next millenium, looking ahead from where we are now, we can only wait and see.

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1   Ibid.

2   Ibid.

3   Ibid.

4   Ibid.

CHAPTER TWO
THE CONTROVERSY OF THE POLICY OF LINKAGE AND ITS
APPLICATION TO THE NAMIBIAN QUESTION

A. Linkage conception and adoption by the US

> "No matter who is given the responsibility
> to govern an empire, the same policies
> are pursued though in different styles"[1]
> — Claude Julien

The significant role that interest plays in the policy options of states, pushes them to sometimes take certain decisions that baffle the international community. At one time it is the US or Britain standing against the imposition of sanctions on the RSA, in spite of the fact that the international community condemns the audious system of apartheid practised there, and calls just for that. On other occasions, the US, being the de facto leader of the Western alliance, arrogates to itself the power to define policy guidelines in certain regions; guidelines that in most cases leaves the international community stupefounded. This is exactly what happened in 1981, when the U.S. government conceived, and later implemented, the controversial policy of linkage, that saw the linking of disparaged things, just in the end, to reap its interest.

Some observers believe that Dr. Chester Crocker, working in the State Department, who was later to become U.S. Under Secretary of State for African Affairs is the brain behind the conception of this controversial policy. Despite the fact that this policy came into the limelight of international relations in 1981, its consecration was only finally consumated in 1988,

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[1] Claude Julien, *L'empire Américain*, Paris, Grasset, 1968, pp. 7-8.

with the signing of the now famous New York Accords of December 22, 1988. It had become glaring to the entire world that linkage formed the bed-rock of US policy towards Southern Africa, and thus a resolution of the intractable delimma afflicting the region had to be achieved with a de jure consideration of this policy.

The fulcrum of linkage stood on the withdrawal of Cuban Interventionist Contingent based in Angola, as a pre-requisite for the implementation of U.N. Resolution 435, that called for the independence of Namibia. The notion of linkage came to introduce a new variable to the question of foreign troops in Southern Africa. It came to be regarded not just as a simply military option, but also as a political and diplomatic one. Profitting from the relative withdrawal of the USSR from Southern Africa after the victory of the MPLA in Angola,[1] the US under President Reagan adopted a policy which had as objective the re-establishment of an equilibrium of "forces" in the region. The pursuance of this objective, thus pushed the Administration to link disparaged things, like the pullout of Cuban forces from Angola before there could be independence for Namibia.

Throughout the Reagen and Bush Administration, this linkage policy became the watchdog of the Whitehouse in whatever reference was made to Southern Africa, especially when it concerned Angola and Namibia. According to Hassner, the policy supposes:

> ... the interaction of behaviours, the
> interdependence of interests and the
> interpenetration of societies".[2]

As far back as 1975, Dr Henry Kissinger, US Secretary of State at the time had envisaged a policy towards the same region that

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[1]   Jean-Claude Gautron, "Le jeu Africain des deux grands", quoted by Sobngwi, 1990, p. 104.

[2]   P. Hassner, "Intégration et Coopération ou inégalité et dépendence" in *Revue Française de Science Politique*, Décembre 1974, p. 1266. (Author's translation).

was very much like what was to become linkage in 1981. He talked
of the instauration of a "reseau d'interdependence" between the
East and the West.[1] The ambition of Kissinger was to create for
the USSR "a restricting framework within which she shall be
permenently brought round to face the cost of a new engagement
in the third world with its growing profits withdrawn from its
stoppage (deduction)".[2]

Unfortunately, Kissinger hadn't the opportunity to apply
this mechanism in Angola. By sacrificing the global dimension
of the conflict, he neglected the sub-regional factors that were
important, particularly, the negative potential of the repulsion
which was pushing an actor such as the RSA, with whom the US was
associating. In effect, Zaki Laïdi thinks that in the belief of
Kissinger, the policy of linkage could be put into application
only on the hypothesis of a military parity on the Angolan camp,
between the US and the USSR. This, he thought, will guarantee
American intervention in case the MPLA takes advantage over its
rivals in the internal conflict.

Linkage was not an important policy consideration of the
Carter Administration, which sought for a policy of regionalism
and an approach to situations on a case by case basis. Andrew
Young, US Ambassasor to the UN under the Carter Administration
who had attempted to be a bit discrete in his policy towards
Southern Africa, was replaced by Zbiegniew Brzezinski who now
tried an approach to problems from a global angle.[3] It should be
noted that since the victory of the MPLA in Luanda the US had
always insisted that their recognition of the Luandan government
will be linked to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from the latter.

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[1]   Zaki Laïdi, *Les Contraintes d'une Rivalité,*, les Superpuissance
       et l'Afrique, (1960-1985) Paris, ed. de la découverte, 1986,
       p. 116.

[2]   Ibid.(Author's translation).

[3]   Marc Aicardi de Saint-Paul, *La politique Africaine des Etats-
       Unies: Mécanisme et conduites,* Paris, Economica, 1984, P. 116.

Thus the double-facetness of linkage was established, in direct relation to the internal policies of Angola.

The Reagan Administration remained faithful to this policy from January 20, 1981,[1] till it left office in 1989. Under him, linkage became a kind of religion, a philosophy and the springboard of US policy towards Southern Africa, and it was given a concrete application. There is a controversy as to the real conceptor of the policy of linkage. While Zaki Laïdi feels that it is Dr Chester Crocker who is the genius behind it,[2] to others, principally *Africa Contemporary Record*, it is the RSA which is at the origin of this policy.[3] We nevertheless are not concerned with the polemics as to who is the mentor behind this policy. Our concern in this work is to see how it came into existence, and how it was finally adopted by the US as its official policy guideline towards Southern Africa. It is its evolution that captures our interest the most. Considering this, we shall dwell heavily on its final form, that is, the link that it established between the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and the subsequent withdrawal of SADFs from Namibia, followed by the independence of the colonial entity-Namibia. Through the instigation of Chester Crocker, the Reagen Administratin made this aspect a major factor of its African policy.

The adoption of linkage as the official policy of the U.S. towards Southern Africa spans through the Reagan and Bush Administrations, and it is remarkable for its ambiguous attitude vis-à-vis Angola: that of globalism. This policy of globalism pre-supposed an opposition to all communist regimes, and on Soviet presence in Angola. It pushed the U.S. government into opening negotiations with Angola.[4] On its innauguration into

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[1]   The date on which President Ronald Wilson Reagan took office as President of the United States of America.

[2]   Laïdi, 1986, p. 168.

[3]   *Africa Contemporary Record*, 1982-83, p. B593.

[4]   Marc Aicardi de Saint-Paul, 1984, p. 268.

office, the Reagan Administration did not hide its intentions, which were, to reinforce the security of the US through the building of a strong army, restore American prestige the world over (after the disgrace the US suffered in the Iran hostage affair), and to check Soviet expansionism by bringing much closer, its Western allies. This approach led the Administration to restore sound relationship with the RSA, (relationship that had been stalled by the Carter Administration) in which President Reagen in a press interview lauded "The long friendship ties between the US and the RSA".[1] Reolof Pik Botha was received at the Whitehouse, visas were now given to springboks at will,[2] and now South African consulates were opened in the US, US investments in South Africa correspondingly grew. In 1981 US investments in South Africa estimated at 13.3%, increased by 2.8% by 1982. By this time, US exports to South Africa had totalled a collosal 2.9 billion.[3]

While we infer into two political declarations that were made by Dr Chester Crocker, we will understand his political options, how they cement the policy of linkage, and how they contributed to the development of this controversial policy:

> It is not possible and no doubt, has never
> been possible to consider that Africa is in
> isolation and that it is separated and does
> not form a part of the rest of the world.[4]

This was in November 1980. The second extract should also be scrutinized:

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[1]   Biwole Meke Lazare, "Les Etats-Unies et l'Afrique du Sud de Carter à Reagan", IRIC, mémoire de maîtrise, 1986, p. 30.

[2]   The Springboks are a rugby team of the Republic of South Africa who were constantly refused visas to enter Western countries due to the apartheid policies of South Africa.

[3]   Sobngwi, "L'intervention Extérieure dans les conflicts civiles: le case de l'Angola (1975-Juin 1990) Thèse de 3ème cycle. Yaounde, IRIC, Décembre 1990, p. 106.

[4]   Marc Aicardi, 1984, P. 268 (Author's translation).

> Our principal goal is to try to resolve
> the situation in such a manner that, the
> Cubans and their Soviet protégés will come
> to find their numbers gradually reduced
> and that there will be reconciliation which
> gives Savimbi the role he deserves in this
> country.[1]

A careful examination of the two extracts above reveal the desire of the US to establish a vast anti-Soviet "strategic consensus" in Southern Africa in general. This desire is founded in three elements: Southern Africa is the region of the continent in which direct American interests were more exposed; Southern Africa constituted the only African regional space where the costs of an American economic engagement remained inferior to the gains it envisaged from there in the long run; to check Soviet influence in the region, which was already manifesting itself.[2]

To attain these objectives, the U.S. had to very tactfully manipulate the policy of "carrot and stick".[3] To put pressure on the Luanda government, the Reagan Administration tried to uplift the Clark ammendment. This succeeded in 1985[4] by a Senate vote of 63 votes against 34, and of the Congress on July 10, 1985 of 236 votes against 185. The Clark ammendment was thus uplifted.[5] American pressure on Luanda increased, calling on the latter to order a pullout of Cuban troops, in reward for a corresponding withdrawal of SADFs from Angola and Namibia, and the latter's independence. It is the mixture of these two different situations that formed the bedrock of linkage. Notice

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[1]   Ibid. (Author's translation).

[2]   Zaki Laïdi, in *Année Africaine 1982*, pp. 311-314, quoted by Sobngwi, 1990, p. 107.

[3]   The carrot and stick policy is one of the numerous policies adopted by the U.S. government in its relationship with small powers. First, there's an attempt at cajolling, then later, bullying and pressure. A kind of odd mixture.

[4]   *Kessing's*, vol. XXXI, December 1985, p. 34028.

[5]   Sobngwi, 1990, p. 107.

what Chester Crocker had declared in August 1981.

> Our diplomacy openly recognises the direct
> relationship between the Namibian and
> Angolan conflicts.[1]

This meant a deployment into Southern Africa by the US Administration, a globalised regionalism, that is, " a regional activism geared towards the imperatives of global rivalry with the Soviet Union".[2]

Throughout the Reagan and Bush Administration, the Cuban presence constituted a headache that made the MPLA the "bête noire" of the US.[3] The Contact Group[4] negotiations for Namibian independence and the one undertaken by other parties to halt Western support for UNITA revolved on this point. However, since December 22, 1988, with the signing of the Bilateral and the Tripartite Accords in New York, Cuban troops have finally left Angola, and Namibia too has ascended into independence. A great sign of relief. Ever since, the priliminary negotiations on the Angolan civil war resolution have been relatively successful. What remains of those negotiations is for them to become more committed and serious, so as to bring about a veritable solution to the Angolan problem. The US government has already opened up negotiations on this. If the Carter Administration through the influence of Andrew Young had the tendency of familiarizing itself with the Luanda regime, the Republican Administration that repalced the Democrats since 1981, eventhough involved in negotiations, still maintained their financial assistance to Savimbi's war effort. Farida Ayari confirms this fact. He states that UNITA received aid of about $50 million from the US

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[1]   In Laïda, 1986, p. 169 (Author's translation).

[2]   Chester Crocker, "A Strategy for Change", in *Foreign Affairs*, quoted in Kamga Sobngwi, 1990, p. 107.

[3] *African Contemporary Record*, 1982-1983, p. B593.

[4]   The Contact group was made up of West Germany, Britain, France, Canada and Italy, press for Namibian independence.

annually.[1] On the other hand, *Jeune Afrique* notes that a cargo plane belonging to the American firm TEPPERS Airways was charged with the delivery of US arms to UNITA, through the Zairean base of Kamina.[2] The above are proofs that the US continues to exert pressure on the Luanda government, using its regional allies when necessary.

B.   The terms of Linkage as envisaged:

The principal point of the terms of linkage had to do with the withdrawal of Cuban Interventionist Contingent in Angola, as a pre-condition for Namibian independence. While examining the overall terms of linkage in this section, we shall dwell on the Namibian questin, plowing into the historicity of the problem, and the various attempts made towards a careful handling of Namibia; attempts which failed, thereby creating room for South African occupation, exploitation and domination. It is this that gave the opportunity to the Republican Administrations of Reagan and Bush to adopt the policy of linkage and armtwist the Angolan government into submission.

Being a decolonization problem, the Namibian question started with the German colonization before the first world woar. This was later to be succeeded by that of the League of Nations, from 1915-1920. The RSA took over at this point, and ruled the country till independence was given the territory in 1991. The RSA's system of governance for Namibia was that of brutal exploitation, but in spite of this, the policy of linkage that was adopted by successive U.S. governments in the 1980s kept blind eyes to this barbary.

Dr Jacques-Roger Booh Booh affirms that:
> The German government that was to colonize
> Southwest Africa in August 1884 was to pursue

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[1]   Farida Ayari is an RFI journalist and his report is quoted by Kamga Sobngwi, 1990, p. 108.

[2]   *Jeune Afrique*, April 20, 1990, No. 1526, p. 1.

> this politics of opposition between the Africans
> that consisted of exploiting the divergences
> between the African chiefs, favouring some and
> dominating the very weak.[1]

Our aim in looking at the above extract, and the subsequent one is founded on a desire to establish a basis for prospection into the troubled history of Namibia, that went on until the policy of linkage came to aggravate the situation. The next extract is a letter by Nama chief, Captain Hendrik Witbooi, written to Heroro chief, Maharero and published by Fraenkel:

> My dear Captain, you will forever regret
> to have ceded to the whiteman the right
> to govern your country. Above all, the
> main difference between us is not as
> serious as you are thinking. But what you
> have done, and are still doing by
> submitting to the whiteman, will be a
> burden that will weigh heavily on your
> shoulders.[2]

What a visionary premonition, indeed. The third extract is by South African Premier, Smuts, after the failure of the League of Nations to clearly define the mandatory aspect of Namibia:

> I do not think that it is necessary to
> annex Southwest Africa ... the mandate
> gives complete sovereignty not just to
> the administrative domain, but also to
> the legislative. It is not necessary
> to take advantage.[3]

In the face of all these ups and downs in the history of Namibia, the colony became subjected to all kinds of treatment in the hands of the last colonizers, the RSA, especially with the

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[1] Jacques-Roger Booh Booh, *La Décolonisation de la Namibie; Un Mandat Usurpé*, Paris, PUF, 1982, p. 26. (Author's translation).

[2] Peter Freankel, *Les Namibiens*, Paris, editions entente, 1976, p. 30 (Author's translation).

[3] Frankel, 1976, p. 35 (Author's translation).

introduction of the policy of linkage, that greatly delayed the ascension to independence of the former. The UN inherited the Namibian problem in 1945. In Resolution 2145(XXI) of October 27, 1966, it put an end to the League's mandate over Namibia.[1] The General Assembly of the UN also declared that:

> South Africa has no right to intervene
> in the administration of [Namibia] ...
> Southwest Africa will henceforth be the
> direct responsibility of the U.N.O.[2]

The Security Council in Resolution 276 of January 30, 1970 confirmed that the continuous presence of the RSA in Namibia was illegal, and in consequence all measures taken by the Pretoria government after the revocation of their mandate, in the name of Namibia, was in consequence "illegal and void." The Council demanded that the states that had any interest in Namibia, should rupture relations, with the RSA. Respectively, on April 21 and June 13, 1967, the General Assembly in Resolution 2248(S-V) had created organs charged with the administration of Namibia. Resolution 2679(XXV) of December 9, 1970 created the United Nations Fund for Namibia[3]. Of course, the RSA opposed this body and subsequent Resolutions with the result that this nitty-gritty continued between her and the world body. 1978 saw the birth of UN Security Council Resolution 435 which due to the intransigence of the RSA, and aided and abetted by the US through its linkage policy, could only be implemented many years later, precisely in 1991.

The independence of Angola in 1975 was to have a significant impact on South African attitude towards Namibia. The first

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[1] Adopted by 114 votes against 2 (South Africa and Portugal) and 3 abstensions (France, Malawi and the United Arab Emirates).

[2] Quoted by Frankel, 1976, p. 50 (Author's translation).

[3] This precisely is The United Nations Council for Southwest Africa, charged with the Administration of the territory till independence is accorded it, with the maximum participation of the poeple of the territory. Of course, we know that the RSA without surprising anyone refused to respect this decision.

reaction was for Pretoria to intensify its hostility in attacking SWAPO nationalists, up to entering Angolan territory. This strategy, of course, had a consequence: that of the implication of the factor of Angola in the Namibian independence question, especially as the former was clearly supporting the latter. Thus the policy of linkage only came to aggravate an already chaotic situation, the result being the enormous efforts of states and groups in their bid to unravel the Namibian question. The South African attacks on SWAPO into Angolan territory, obviously made complex an already flaming conflict; and the US administration felt either rightly or wrongly that linkage could be the only solution to bring remedy to this conflict. The presence, thus, of SADFs in Angola, concurrently with those of the Cubans, made the US to adopt linkage, a hideous policy that maimed and mared, rather making and marvelling. The justification of the link between the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola as a pre-condition for Namibian independence shows just how hollow, short-sighted, interest-inclined and inconsequential US policy to the outside world, especially Africa, could be.

It should be noted that linkage is first and foremost a theoretical notion which according to Hassner presupposes "..the interaction of behaviours, the interdependence of interests and the interpenetration of societies,"[1] and the link that is established between the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola as a pre-requisite for South African pullout form Angola and Namibia and granting the latter independence forms the fulcrum, the very corpus, of the theory of linkage. If the US placed too much emphasis and importance on linkage and went along with it, it does not mean that the parties affected accepted it lying low; rather, they all manifested great reticence, that spanned from outright rejection, to full time acceptance in 1988. A case in point is the refusal of the MPLA government in Luanda which saw in linkage, an acceptance of a policy that will send away the cherished Cuban troops, and thus render the government porous and

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[1]   Hassner, 1974, p. 1266.

susceptible to UNITA incursions. Thus the stakes were high for many parties but the strength was much for one party. After hesitating for 7 years, Uncle Sam pushed the Angolans into making Chester Crocker's brain child, a reality in 1988.

C. Parties Reaction to, and stakes in adopting Linkage.

We had mentioned in the earlier part of this work that the attitude of the parties concerned towards linkage was characterized by outright refusal at first, then later to be followed by acceptance; but each party's reaction depended largely on the stakes it had in the region. While the objective of the RSA was to saveguard South African sovereignty over Namibia and in achieving this, to fight against all menace in the sub-region, that of the U.S. was to maintain a certain "globalised regionalism", while for the MPLA government, it was the security and sovereignty of its government that was all too important. In a bid to achieve its objective, the RSA fought duely against SWAPO, that constituted a menace to its ambition, fought against the MPLA that it considered an arm of SWAPO, and supported UNITA in its rampage against the MPLA, all in an effort to weaken the latter. "We will no longer allow them to operate against South Africa in Namibia[1] declared Savimbi, who continued, "One of the decisions taken by UNITA is to chase SWAPO out of its bases in Angola."[2] This convergence of viewpoints, justifies by alliance and ideology, the relationship between UNITA and the RSA. The ravage that was caused on Mavinga by UNITA in constant attacks led to the reinforcement of the Cuban troops, thus causing a great worry to the South Africans, and at the same time acting as the key stake for the refusal by the MPLA government to apply linkage. Judging from this "dialogue of the deaf"[3] that took place between Dr Henry Kissinger and President Leonid Brezhnev in early 1976, we will cearly see the positions of the

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[1]   Jonas Savimbi, *Jeune Afrique,* 1990, p. 43 (Author's translation).

[2]   Jonas Savimbi, in *ACR* 1977-1978, p. B507 (Author's translation.)

[3]   Arthur Gavshon, *Crisis in Africa:Battleground of East and West,* Suffolk, Penguin Books Ltd, 1981, p. 223.

USSR and that of the US in relation to global issues. It is through it that we will clearly see at long distance, the global implications of the Angolan war in superpower perspective.

On January 29 Kissinger spoke first of "The Soviet Union's massive and unprecedented intervention in the internal affairs of Africa - with nearly $200 million of arms, and its military technicians and advisers, with 11.000 Cuban combat troops and with substantial sea and airlift and naval cover in adjacent waters, is a matter ... directly [affecting] global stability."[1]

Brezhnev gave his reply twenty-six hours later: "The Soviet Union does not meddle in the internal affairs of other countries and people".[2]

Speaking of America's own aims, Kissinger insisted: "The objectives which the United States has sought in Angola have not been aimed at defending or acquiring intrinsic interests in that country. We are not opposing any particular faction. We could develop constructive relations with any Angolan government. We have never been involved militarily in Angola. We are not so involved now. We do not seek to be so involved in the future.[3]

Brezhnev, too, declared: "The Soviet Union is not looking for any benefits for itself, is not hunting for concessions, is not trying to gain political supremacy and is not seeking any military bases."[4]

Kissinger pressed his argument: "If a continent, such as Africa, recently freed from external oppression, can be made the arena for great power ambitions, if immense quantities of arms

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[1]   Ibid.

[2]   Ibid.

[3]   Ibid.

[4]   Ibid.

can affect far-off events, if large expeditionary forces can be transported at will to dominate virtually helpless people - then all we have hoped for in building a more stable and rational international order is in jeopardy".[1]

"We do not hide our views, " Brezhnev countered. "In the developing countries, as elsewhere, we are on the side of the forces of progress, democracy and national independence and we treat them as our friends and comrades-in-arms".[2]

"To the Soviet Union and Cuba", Kissinger warned, "the administration says we will ... not tolerate wanton disregard for the interests of others and for the cause of world peace".[3]

"Our party is rendering and will render support to peoples who are fighting for their freedom", an unmoved Brezhnev retorted. "We are acting as our revolutionary concience and our communist convictions permit us".[4]

"Let's make no mistake", Kissinger said sombrely. "The real culprits in the [Angolan] tragedy are the Soviet Union and Cuba".[5]

Brezhnev finally declared that the struggle of the People's Republic of Angola to "defend its independence [with the] support of progressive forces throughout the world"[6] is what Moscow looked favourably upon.

A careful study of the above exchanges between Kissinger and

1   Ibid.

2   Ibid.

3   Ibid.

4   Ibid.

5   Ibid.

6   Ibid.

Brezhnev reveals the stakes of the various parties in Angola, how each was determined to hold an advantage over the over, and how this determination is what pushed the US in 1981 to adopt the controversial linkage policy that frustrated attempts at achieving Namibian independence on time, and prolonged the conflict in Southern Africa. Let us attempt a survey of the stakes of the parties involved in a more detailed manner, so as to see how these stakes pushed and conditioned each party's will to hold on to its ground, while the majoirity of the people in the region perished in hardship, famine, diseases and war.

C.1. The stakes of Linkage to the MPLA Government:

The reticence of the MPLA government in accepting the policy of linkage can be analysed by a reflection of a security problem. This is because, the departure of Cuban forces, a principal supporter of the Luanda government, in the context of a troubled history and politics, would be synonymous to suicide. The second major consideration was the independence fo Namibia which would no longer constitute a base for UNITA in the South, thus reducing the capacity of action of this movement. Thus the presence of the Cuban troops in Angola constituted a major resource to the FAPLA - Armed Forces of the People's Republic of Angola. In testimony of this, the victory of the MPLA in the great battle of Cuito Cuanavale (see Map. 7) in February 1988 according to Savimbi, was a Cuban victory.[1]

We easily understand that the principal rancour of the Western camp in its wish to establish in Southern Africa a "liberal strategic consensus"[2] results form the presence of Cuban troops, an element of "communist subversion" in its region.[3] Concerning Namibian independence the position of the MPLA was clear. As long as UN Security Council Resolution 435 had not been applied, there could be no question of a Cuban troop

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[1]   Interview in *Jeune Afrique*, 1990, p. 44.

[2]   Arthur Klinghofer, p. 47, quoted in Sobngwi, 1990, p. 125.

[3]   Zaki Laïdi, 1986, p. 105.

withdrawal. Luanda from this policy wanted to put an end to UNITA operations from its south-eastern frontier. The UNITA forces thus deprived of a base, it was thought, and lacking South African support, could be forced to negotiate. Namibian independence could in effect reduce the fighting fronts of the MPLA.[1] The stakes were clouded by the lack of faith by the MPLA government on the US and South Africa, especially as the dubious attitude of the latter heightened the mutual suspicion and the deep-rooted mistrust that guided its policies.

C.2 The stakes of Linkage to the U.S. and South Africa:

In the application of the policy of linkage, the US followed one strategic objective: reduce the presence of communists in the Southern African sub-region. The presence of Cuban forces in Angola was counter to the interest of the U.S , thus it was necessary to reach a strategic anti-communist consensus. To assure the realisation of this difficult task, the cooperation of the RSA would be necessary.

In the same vein, for the RSA linkage constituted a means of reducing communist pressence in the Southern African sub-region, and secondly, a means for it to reduce the sanctuaries of opposition groups in Namibia as well as in South Africa itself - a tacit reference to the ANC. The bases of the ANC in the majority of the Frontline States and Angola in particular had to be withdrawn if linkage was applied.

On the other hand the RSA was well established in Namibia and was not willing to quit. In the best case, there could envisage for this country, a resolution that will guarantee the interests of the RSA; clearly, a government "à la solde". Angola here is a problem for South Africa, because it constitutes a santuary for SWAPO guerillas. On the other hand, the presence of a Marxist government in Luanda, was a risk that must not be condoned, especially if we consider that SWAPO too was a Marxist

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[1]   *A.C.R.*, 1983-1984, p; B602.

organisation. Thus Cuban presence which acted as a menace to South African intentions contributed heavily to its decision as to whether or not to apply the policy of linkage.

C.3.   The tortuous Road to the Acceptance of Linkage

With the signing on December 22, 1988 of the New York Accords, linkage had been tacitly accepted by the parties involved in the Angola/Namibia conflict.   This was not an easy process to come by.   While the negotiation of the Contact Group members favoured the application of UN Resolution 435 that the RSA hated, the latter conditioned the re-opening of negotiations on the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola.   This proposal, taken up by the US, was apposed naturally by the Angolan government which finally softened its stands with time. Earlier in 1980 and Angolan Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Paulo Jorge had affirmed that:

> The presence of Cuban troops in Angola is a
> legitimate and sovereign decision of the two
> countries. Consequently the Angolan government
> cannot accept the link that is made with the
> independence of Namibia.[1]

He insisted that if the international community could totally liberate Angola with the withdrawal of South Africa, the Angolan government could consider a Cuban troop withdrawal.[2]
It is clear that the Luanda government looked at linkage as an intervention in its internal affairs.[3]

For Pieter Botha, the acceptance of the Contact Group condition for Namibian independence could only be based on a Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola.   For him, this was the most important aspect in the peace process.[4]   He was later to declare

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[1]   Quoted in *A.C.R.*, 1982-1983, p. B593

[2]   See *A.C.R.* 1982-1983, p. B591.

[3]   See *A.C.R.* 1982-1983, p. B593.

[4]   See *A.C.R.* 1983-1983 pp. B600-601.

on September 13 that: "We think that the presence of Cuban troops in a Southern African country constitutes for this area a serious menace which we cannot tolerate".[1]

Vice President George Bush in 1982 in a speech in Nairobi on November 19, declared that he favoured the South African position. Negotiations went on between the parties, that is, South Africans and Angolans. Between January 1981 and January 1983, the Americans had held 8 meetings with the Angolans on the subject of linkage. Dr Crocker met with Mr Paolo Jorge twice in Paris on January 15 and on March 4, 1982. Following this trend, Mr Frank Wisner, the assistant of Crocker in the State Department and General Vernon Walters, Roving Ambassador, met in Luanda, with President José Eduardo dos Santos, on June 6 and 7. On June 20 and July 21, they again met President Dos Santos. Frank Wisner alone was later to meet Dos Santos again on August 17. The American and Angolan authorities still held talks at ministerial level on a quasi-permanent basis.

Concurrently, negotiations were taking place between the Angolan and South African authorities. On December 8, 1982 at Ile de Sal in Cape Verd, a South African delegation of 16 members led by General Magnus Malan and South African Foreign Minister Reolof Pik Botha, met with a 40-man-strong Angolan delegation led by Lt. Col. Alexandres Rodrigues, MInister of the Interior, and Faustino Muteka, Minister of Transport. The holding of these meetings did not change the position of the parties. Another round of talks was slated for the same venue, on February 23, 1983, and just like the first, it ended in a fiasco. The positions remained fixed for some time. During the tour of U.N. Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar in 1983, President Dos Santos gave Angolan conditions for a Cuban troop withdrawal: the immediate and unconditional withdrawal the SADFs from Angola; and a halt to all aid to UNITA.

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[1]   See *A.C.R.* 1982-1983, p. B601.

Of course South Africa was to reject all these and it was only the great battle of Cuito Cuanavale and the detente in East/West relations which were to push the protagonists to negotiate the simultaneous withdrawal of Cubans from Angola, and the SADFs from Angola and Namibia. This signified the difficult, but tacit acceptance of linkage by the parties. The long and bumpy road that the negotiations took, ended up with the signing of the Tripartite and Bilateral Accords on December 22, 1988 in New York. This signing heralded the final victory of linkage and that of the US in their hegemonistic attempts at dominating events in Southern Africa. The Accords put a stop to the international dimension of the civil war in Angola, but did not resolve it. They left an open gap on the future of the process of resolution, but nevertheless created an incentive for the search for peace in the region. The horizon was now clear, leaving the Angolans themselves to profit from this and do something for their future.

D. The significance of Linkage to the Parties.

In examining the consequences of linkage on the parties that adopted it, we shall look at how it influenced events in Namibia, Angola and South Africa. Beginning with Namibia, the adoption of linkage by the signing of the New York Accords was a final consecration. It constituted a veritable guarantee for the independence of Namibia later in 1991. Dr Crocker admitted in the end that the Accords were signed, leaving no victor and no vanquished, but taking into consideration, the interest of all the parties.

Angola could now forget about a future South African menace, while Cuba had shown the world the might of its armed forces, especially to the RSA. South Africa could now breath as a result of the departure of the deadly Cuban forces. The success of linkage opened the way for the beginning of diplomatic ovatures by the RSA towards the USSR.[1] We do not tend to agree with

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[1] Lally Weymouth, "A Moscow-Pretoria Axis" in *The Washington Post*, December 18, 1988.

Crocker that the Accords left no winners and no losers because the settlement in New York and the attempts at resolution that preceded it, did not always reflect fairplay and justice on the part of the U.S. that was pulling the strings. We say this because the control of the Cuban troop withdrawal could be criticised, given that no person can actually tell with exactitude, the number of Cuban interventionists present in Angola. The number could be smaller or bigger than what was often evoked. This and other criticisms could be made on the Accords. The final adoption of linkage by South Africa pushed the Pretoria regime in spite of itself to change its attitude vis-à-vis its neighbours, and to review its internal policies.

The liberation of Southern Africa from internationalist intervention as a consequence of the adoption of linkage, has paved a new way for the resolution of conflict in that part of Africa. The meeting at Gbadolité on June 22, 1989 which remains very significant, is the result of a process of negotiations that were led by Dr Crocker on the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola and the independence of Namibia. This signified the search for an African solution to the multiferous problems of this region which we shall examine in the subsequent chapters.

Throughout the negotiations that resulted in the success of linkage, most often the parties evoked the second aspect of the problem, which was, and still is, that of national reconciliation in Angola. For the American and South Africans it simply meant a recognition of the political role of UNITA, and all their efforts were going to be geared towards this.[1] On the part of the MPLA, the problem was instead looked at from the angle of the intergration of the movement into the already existing national institutions.[2]

The position of the USSR was much cloudy, or ambiguous;

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[1]   "Good signs in Angola "in *Los Angeles Times*, January 3, 1988.

[2]   *Keesing's*, Vol. 35, No. 2, February 1989, p. 36479.

unlike that of the US. Even if it had to maintain its aid to the MPLA this did not in any way disturb its position that favoured a negotiated national reconciliation.[1] We will want to recall that this was its position in 1977, eventhough the MPLA had by this time appeared to have seriously dominated the Angolan political platform. All of the parties, eventhough being favourable to a pacific resolution of the conflict, none was ready to pay the price. This explains why external support for UNITA and the Luanda government continues to come in. External intervention in the conflict makes the question much difficult. At first it was the neccesity to make concessions on a certain equilibrium in the sub-region. Henceforth, the problem to be resolved will remain purely political. The protagonists are fighting to conquer political power in Angola. A peaceful resolution without a victor and a vanquished[2] can no longer be envisaged. There must absolutely be a winner and a loser.

In this context, if it happens that the Luanda government crumbles the structures of UNITA, we could legitimately consider it to be the victor. Conversely, if UNITA obtains the status quo ante, that is, the organisation of elections before determining to whom comes the principal political roles, victory will be on its side. There exists of course, between the two possibilities a middle-of-the-course-road decision or compromise to both parties. While the fighting between UNITA and the MPLA forces persisted and the peace process initiated by Crocker was at the point of success, President Dos Santos met his Gabonese and Congolese counterparts at Franceville on October 1, 1988.[3] The main point on the Agenda was of course, the Angolan civil war. On the same day Presidents Mobutu and Botha met in Gbadolité. After these meetings, rumour started circulating on an eventual mini-summit regrouping the presidents of Gabon, Zaire, Congo,

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[1]   William Claiborne, "Soviet role in Angola Pact marks major shift" in *The Washington Post*, December 15, 1988.

[2]   The expression of Dr Chester Crocker.

[3]   "Angola:crunch time" in *New African*, December 1988.

Zambia, Angola and the RSA in Lusaka. This rumour was dispelled by Kuanda who declared that he could not welcome in his country the South African president without certain conditions being met.[3]

With these summit meetings, the UNITA leader started talking once more about peace. He talked of his withdrawal from attacking the Luanda government, and the organisation of free and fair elections.[4] He considered that the New York Accord sacrificed his movement because it did not make mention of UNITA in its deliberations. He also considered as unacceptable the amnesty propositon offered to his movement by the Luanda government and instead launched a military offensive against Luanda on Febraury 4, 1989. On February 14, he announced a halt to this offensive, not to be mistaken for a ceasefire, in response to a call for peace by President Félix Houphouët-Boigny.[5]

The Luanda government on its part opposed all negotiations with UNITA but remained divided on the question.[6] It was realised that the majority of the MPLA supported by a number of African countries remained hostile to any dialogue with UNITA. Nevertheless, direct and secret negotiations were already taking place between the protagonists.[7] Some observers hold that the reticence of the Luanda government to negotiate with Savimbi was due to the fear of the charisma of the latter.[8]

The first veritable proposition of negotiation after the

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[3]   *Keesing's,* 1989, p. 46479.

[4]   *New African,* 1988, p. 21.

[5]   *Keesing's,* "News digest for February 1989," p. 36453.

[6]   "Angola-Namibia Accord:Act two", in *The Christian Science Monitor,* February 23, 1989.

[7]   Ibid.

[8]   E.A. Wayne, "Congress keeps wary eyes on Angola" in *The Christian Science Monitor,* April 20, 1989.

signing of the New York Accords was launched by UNITA on March 13, 1989. In its five-point proposition, UNITA considerably widened the possibilities of negotiation.[1] The most significant of these propositions was the withdrawal of Savimbi from all negotiations, and for the government of transition to prepare free and fair elections.[2] The proposition of the Luanda government remained that of general amnesty for members of UNITA, and government clemency to those "misled brothers".[3] One step forward was made when in Luanda on May 16, 1989, 8 South and Central African Heads of State met to discuss the Angolan question.[4] In his peace plan for the first time Dos Santos used the term "national reconciliation."[5] It equally appeared that dialogue could be established between the two protagonists. This plan envisaged the departure to exile of Savimbi, the reintegration of UNITA into the structures of the MPLA, and the respect of the constitution of the Popular Republic of Angola.

As a result of this meeting, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman Cohen declared that he was confident of a future pacific resolution of the Angolan problem.[6] Whereas to the MPLA it signified a rallying of all the national forces into the government,[7] for UNITA it signified a

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[1] Orrin Hatch, "The Lessons of Angola," in *The Washington Post*, June 13, 1989.

[2] "Hearings Before the House of Representation", quoted in Sobngwi, 1990, p. 151.

[3] Ibid.

[4] David B. Ohaway, "Angola agrees to negotiate a settlement", in *The Washington Post*, May 20, 1989.

[5] Hearings Before the House of Representation," 1990.

[6] E.A. Wayne, "U.S. wants to play role of catalyst" in *The Christian Science Monitor,* May 24, 1989.

[7] Interview of Mr. Pedro de Castro Van-Dunem "Loy" in Yaounde March 27, 1990, broadcast by C.R.T.V. Radio News Bulletin, 3 p.m.

reorganisation of national institutions in a democratic manner.[8]
In this controversy was to be born another one later, on the
significance of the term "integration" at Gbadolité.

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[1]   Interview of Jonas Savimbi in *Jeune Afrique*, 1989, p. 46.

CHAPTER THREE
CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW YORK ACCORDS AND THEIR
APPLICATION TO THE ANGOLAN CONFLICT

A.   Disappearance of the International Aspect of the War:

> "The bell of every regional conflict tolls
> for all of us."[1]
> > - Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev,
> > . Former President of the Soviet Union.

The failure to reach a consensus in ideology and thinking between the principal warring factions in Angola in 1975, led to the celebration of independence amidst turmoil. November 11, 1975 was the date. Luanda was the venue. UNITA, FNLA and the MPLA were the principal protagonists. And Angola was the central object of discord. The civil war that broke out immediately after independence has never been equaled in the history of Africa. The intensity of this war owed its allegiance to extra-African and African powers intervention, that escalated an otherwise local conflict, giving it an international dimension, unequaled in the beleagued history of Africa. Never before have so many countries been so involved in the affairs of an African country in so short a time.

While the MPLA government got its support form the U.S.S.R. and its protégé, Cuba, UNITA on its part relied on the U.S. and South Africa, with other accesories such as China, Zaire, to name just these. If one were to go into the roles played individually by these external powers in the Angolan conflict, it will end up

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[1]   Mikhail S. Gorbachev, "Statement at Plenary Meeting of the U.N. General Assembly", December 7, 1988, p. 15.

making our work boringly too long and out of focus. Suffice to
say here that the internalisaiton of the war, made resolution of
it practically impossible; but today, with the changing
international environment, one can see a silver lining on the
horizon, indicating that there are prospects.

December 22, 1988. New York. The parties directly involved
in the troubled situation in Southern Africa meet. The main item
on the agenda is the signing of two accords. The Tripartite and
Bilateral Accords that today are famous for their contribution
towards the resolution of the troubled history of the sub-region.
Angolan, Cuban, and South African delegates sat with their
mediator, the US - with the USSR acting as official observer.
The withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, and the pullout of
the SADF from Southeastern Angola, and Namibia, paving the way
for the implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 435.
A tacit acceptance of the theory of linkage - a historic
breakthrough. The interest of all the parties was taken into
consideration, the terms of the accords respected to the letter
by all, the impressive role played by the U.N. Security Council
in brokering the peace, absolved the desire of the
interventionist parties, to participate again in a war that was
not theirs, in a region that was not theirs, and in an affair
that was not their own.

The rapprochement between Washington and Moscow and the
virtual end of the Coldwar are essentially the outcome of the
"New Realism"[1] in Soviet policies that enabled the changes in
Southern Africa to take place. It should be noted that the
change in Soviet policy was discernible earlier in the Third
World than in Europe.[2] With this change, the role of Third World
conflicts in the international system has dramatically changed.
In the past they were a lever to shift the international balance

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[1]   Winrich Kühne, "Africa and Gorbachev's "New Realism", in *Conflict
        Resolution in Africa,* Francis Deng and William Zartman (eds),
        Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1991, p. 43.

[2]   Ibid.

of power ideologically and militarily from one side to the other. Now they have become a burden to the superpowers and their allies, if not a disturbing factor in East/West relations, and the problems therein. The superpowers today have entered a new era of cooperation symbolized by joint efforts to resolve regional conflicts.

Within the United Nations, for the first time since this world body was formed in 1945, an exceptional partnership now exists between the five permanent members of the Security Council, rekindling the hope that the defunct collective security system envisaged in the U.N. Charter, but rendered impotent by the Coldwar, could now be revived.[1]

When we retrospect at the spectre that this international intervention had caused in most regional conflicts with Angola in particular, we see that the picture is gloomy. It has seriously affected the socio-economic development process in the regions, which was already hampered by colonial heritage, distorted economic structures, natural disasters, and errors in policy implementation. With the disappearance of the international aspect in regional conflicts, the big question is, what future for them? This future will very much depend on what the protagonists like in the case of Angola, decide. It will also depend on the contribution of the international community.

The South Africans found it increasingly difficult to justify heavy military expenditures on their intervention in Angola and the defense of Namibia. But they needed a political and strategic victory to show that the benefits of letting Namibia go free and leaving Angola to its own fate outweighed the costs. The Cubans having invested their prestige and the blood of their youth in the inconclusive war in Angola, had come to see it as a quagmire. They needed a way to be able to declare their "internationalist" mission honourably fulfilled. A visible Cuban role in the achievement of Namibian independence and the

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[1]   Ibrahim S.R. Msabaha, "The Implications of International changes for African States", in Deng and Zartman, 1991, p. 68.

consequent removal of South African threat to Angola's sovereignty and territorial integrity could provide the political victory and security gains they needed to allow them to go home. For the Soviets, as they embraced perestroïka and looked afresh at Southwest Africa, they came to see their escalating exposure as more expensive in both economic and political terms than their interests could justify. They sought to cut their losses, and to do so in a way that would gain for them a reputation as responsible international actors with the US and the West generally.[1]

The parties had no way to talk to each other. Only the U.S. was in touch with all of them and willing to broker peace. The only available framework for settlement was the concept of linkage and the only plausible mediator was US Assistant Secretary of State, Dr Chester Crocker. The spectacle of an escalating foreign troop presence and endless war in Angola is drawing to a close. Promoting peace among Angolans remains a very high priority for the US today, and even Russia. There has been a reformulation of security objectives - a rejection of the power-based concept of security and the so-called security delimma, a notion that interdependence, rather than anarchic power struggle, should be, and indeed is becoming, the main driving force in international relations, an acknowledgement of the importance of non-military aspects of security, and a reappraisal of the role of the Third World as an arena for the competition between socialism and capitalism. Thus international interventionism by way of influencing the warring factions is on the wane, but what ramains to be concluded is the war proper, since "only time really resolves conflicts, and even the wounds it heals leaves their scars for future reference.[2]

B.   External Intervention Limited to Financial Assistance

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[1]   Chas. W. Freeman, JR. "The Angola/Namibia Accords", in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 68, No.3, Summer 89, p. 133.

[2]   I. William Zartman, "Conflict Reduction: Prevention, Management, and Resolution" in Deng and Zartman, 1991, p.299.

> "I want to assure you that American
> diplomacy will continue to encourage
> African and other interested governments
> to provide maximum support to a process
> of negotiation leading to national
> reconciliation in your country".[1]
>
>   - George Herbert Walker Bush,
>   Former President of the United States.

This assurance of support, which of course is that of financial assistance, goes to portray the involvment of the U.S. government in the Angolan conflict, even after the New York Accords of 1988. With the application of the terms of the accords, military intervention by outside powers in the Angolan conflict has come to an end, but still leaves another problem - that of continued economic assistance to the warring factions. This continues to exacerbate the conflict. In what amounted to the first formal foreign policy commitment of his administration, President Bush wrote a personal letter to Jonas Savimbi, dated January 6, 1989, promising the rebel leader that the US would continue to give "all appropriate and effective assistance to UNITA"[2] until a political settlement could be reached in Angola. Since 1986, the Reagan administration had officially funnelled about \$15 million[3] a year of "covert" military aid - including sophisticated weapons like stinger missiles - to UNITA through the C.I.A. - Central Interlligence Agency. "UNITA is to be [encouraged] and congratualted for its courageous demonstration over more than a decade that solutions to Angola's problems cannot be found through repressive military force".[4] Bush wrote. "... I also want to assure you that American diplomacy will continue to encourage African and other interested governments

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1   George Herbert Walker Bush, in a secret letter to Savimbi, quoted in *Africa Report*, March-April, 1989, pp. 5-6.

2   *Africa Report*, March-APril 1989, p. 5.

3   Ibid.

4   Ibid.

to provide maximum support to a process of negotiation leading to national reconciliation in your country", he concluded. President Bush did not even wait to take oath of office before making it known that he would continue to provide Jonas Savimbi and his UNITA surrogates with US economic assistance to finance the war effort, and diplomatic support.

The new administration's strong commitment to UNITA came at a crucial time for the rebel movement. For years, South Africa had been UNITA's principal backer,[1] but now that Pretoria had pledged to end its military support for Savimbi and formally agreed to withdraw from Angola and neighbouring Namibia as part of the December 1988 settlement, additional US aid took on a far greater importance. President Bush's assurances to Savimbi that the new administration will not allow UNITA to be left out in the cold only serves to undermine the New York Accords and leaves the door open for increased U. financial commitment to the war effort of Savimbi. In recent years, South Africa has not only had to airlift huge weapons shipments to UNITA, but also moved troops to bail out the rebel movement fighting against Angolan and Cuban forces. The US can now be expected to replace South Africa as Savimbi's principal financier, making additional use of Southern Zaire to ensure that UNITA receives sufficient firepower to wage its war against the Angolan government.

Some 51 senators led by Sen. Dennis DeConcini had in October 1988 wote to President Reagan, urging him that the US should not "cease, suspend, diminish, or otherwise restrict"[2] assistance to UNITA, and this is exactly the policy followed by George Bush when he took power, as attested by DeConcini's remark later that "I'm pleased with the strong position Bush has taken and I urge him to continue".[3] A top UNITA official, Tony da Costa Fernades,

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[1]   UNITA received $80 million annually from Pretoria. See *Africa Report*, March-April 1989, p. 6.

[2]   *Africa Report*, March-April 1989, p. 6.

[3]   Ibid.

had made a direct appeal to the Bush administration, requesting assistance beyond the annual covert aid programme in order to compensate for the loss of South African support.[1] More specifically, Fernades said he had asked the Bush administration to increase "very urgently"[2] US "material help"[3] to enable UNITA withstand an expected Angolan government offensive in coming months. "We need more sophisticated, up-to-date equipment", he added, noting that UNITA was in dire need of help at this hour that the Cubans are pulling out, so as to topple the MPLA regime. Fernandes also revealed that he had met with a number of senior administration officials and that he was "satisfied"[4] with the response so far to UNITA's appeal for additional aid. "I think there is an understanding,"[5] he said, pointing out as a matter-of-fact, "if there is aid, aid will reach us [through Zaire, of course]".[6]

The era of Soviet involvement in Southern Africa began, during the earliest days of the Angolan civil war. The military position of the MPLA in late October 1975 was precarious. Unable to stand the combined strength of both UNITA and FNLA, Agostino Neto, the MPLA leader, had to turn to the Soviets for help. The reasons for Soviet intervention in Angola have been debated by many scholars, since the implementation of Operation Carlotta (the Cuban name for the military operation to bolster the MPLA). Some have argued that Sino-Soviet desire to score an ideological victory in the developing world, drove Soviet actions.[7] Others

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[1]   Ibid.

[2]   Ibid.

[3]   Ibid.

[4]   Ibid.

[5]   Ibid.

[6]   Ibid.

[7]   See Colin Legum, (1976) "The Soviet Union, China and the West in Southern Africa". See also *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 54, No. 1. Summer 1989, pp. 46-62.

contend that the primary adversary of the USSR in Angola was the US, and that American failure in Vietnam, coupled with domestic troubles arising from the "Watergate Scandal", emasculated U.S. power and shifted the "global correlatin of forces" in favour of the USSR[1]. Still, others claim that Soviet moves in Angola were based on regional rather than international factors, and marked a clear recognition of the strategic value of Southern Africa's minerals and water ways.[2] Finally, there is a body of opinion which believes Soviet motivations were complex and can be attributed not to just one, but to some combinations of the above facts.[3]

What is important here is not the reason for which the Soviets intervened, but how these reasons pushed them to contribute to the war effort, and by how much. In this way, we can begin to evaluate on the future of such financial commitments in the present international system of disengagement the world over, and make value judgements for posterity. The point to make here, and clearly is that the time "...to strengthen the defense capability, independence, and territorial integrity of Angola"[4] for ideological reasons now belongs to history. Gone are the days when the USSR used to pledge huge sums of money to help the Angolan government in its war effort. With the present world environment characterised by changing situations and options, the poor economic situation of the C.I.S. itself, that largesse of

[1] See Arthur Klinghoffer (1980) *The Angolan War: A Study of Soviet Policy in the Third World*, Boulder, Westview.

[2] These statements are more prevalent among conservative South African commentators like Vanneman, P. and James, M. III (1976). See "The Soviet Intervention in Angola: Intentions and Implications", Strategic Review, Summer 1978.

[3] See Nappor, L.C.(1983) "The African Terrain and U.S. - Soviet Conflict in Angola and Rhodesia" in A.L. George (ed), *Managing U.S.-Soviet Rivalry*, Boulder:Westview, pp. 155-185.

[4] Quoted by Kurt M. Campbell, "Soviet Policy in Southern Africa/Angola and Mozambique", in Kurt Campbell et al(eds), *Gorbachev's Third World Delimmas*, London, Routledge, 1989, p. 216.

spending badly-needed cash for senseless overseas adventures will stop, or reduce. This presupposes that the C.I.S. unlike the U.S. will no longer squander badly-needed funds, but will contribute on efforts to seek a negotiated settlement to the dispute. Intermittent droplets of aid could continue to flow to Angola from the Soviets, but this can not be expected for long. Soviet acceptance to play the ceremonial role of official observer in the New York Accords demonstrates the willingness of the party apparachik to hands off regional conflict situations.

However, despite the end of direct C.I.S. military assistance to the MPLA, they will continue to maintain trade links with Luanda. This has been a long-standing tradition. Soviet trade surplus with Angola in 1984 totalled $100 million.[1] They continue to be arch-rivals of South Africa in the region, but maintain a mutually profitable pact to market diamonds and gold. In the midst of all this confusion of shifting alliances and hidden agendas, one thing appears certain for the immediate future of Angola: the process of military disengagement and "national reconciliation" is bound to hold some surprises".[2] This ensures that Soviet interest and involvement in Angolan affairs will remain salient.

For the US, the time has come "To meet the challenge of renewal, it is time to rid ourselves of the past legacy of excusing, ingnoring or even justifying atrocities by leaders simply because they are on the "left"".[3] No matter how much financial assistance they give to Savimbi and his UNITA stalwarts, this assistance is bound to drop, if not, end, with the increasing realization that dialogue, not guns, are needed, to build the new international order. Gradually and progressively U.S. financial support to Savimbi will suffer a

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[1]   Campbell, 1989, p. 220.

[2]   Campbell, 1989, p. 221.

[3]   Nigerian Nobel Laureate, Wole Soyinka in *The Los Angeles Times*, quoted in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 71, No. 1, 1991.92, p. 162.

drastic volte face, especially with the recent decison by Washington to recognise the MPLA government in Luanda, and the appointment of the first U.S. Ambassodor to Angola in 1993.

C. Increased Possibility of Settlement in Southern Africa:

The multiferous reasons that made external power intervention in Southern Africa begin to see their close with the changes that are taking place in the international system, and the birth of a new order. With the apparent end of the Coldwar, the external arm of the superpowers, driven by ideological rivalry and proxy confrontation appears to be withdrawing. But the question to be raised is whether external dependency will cease with the withdrawal of support or restraint from involvement or might extend into positive cooperation in solving regional conflicts?

In our attempt to answer the above puzzle, we shall turn to the continental regulatory body - the OAU and see how this condominium of states could exploit the available chances of settlement and solve the problems in Southern Africa. In recent years, complaints have come to focus on the organisation's failure to prevent or resolve the violent conflicts that have caused vast human misery in several parts of the continent and opened the door to penetration by non- African powers. If the OAU cannot make dramatic and gigantic strides now in resolving these conflicts, then "it is hard to see an effective future for the OAU"[1]. Pundits and pessimists on the ability of the OAU to exploit the present situation abound in the numerous scholars of conflict resolution in Africa. Chief amongst them is I. William Zartman. The organisational structures of the OAU and the means at its disposal to organise concrete action is what makes Zartman to affirm that "There is no OAU; there are only members, and

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[1]   *Africa Confidential,* Vol. 30, August 11, 1989, p. 4.

their interests come first".[2] If the OAU must seize this opportunity of a silver lining on the horizon, then it must review and overhaul itself, and adapt its machinery to the changing times. It is in doing this that it will escape rabid criticisms, even by its ex-Secretary-Generals.[2]

The final acceptance by both Angola and the RSA to allow a pullout of troops from the embattled region, and the success of the policy of linkage, present an olive branch that must be seized. For more than decades, the impass in Southern Africa had seemingly become a fait accompli, with the result that extra-African solutions were being sought for intra-African problems - what irony! This worried OAU members who felt as to "air the dirty linen at home",[3] and not to "afford to bring bulls into [their] china shop"[4]. By 1989 the surprisingly rapid progress of detente in superpower relations had already facilitated African peace initiatives in Southern Africa. It is inconceivable that in that year either the Gbadolité national reconciliation meetings on Angola or the Nairobi meeting on Mozambique would have gone forward with strong African support, without the implied joint blessings of the US and the USSR.[5] Exaggerated optimism in these cases is certainly premature, especially if the superpowers do not stop from adding fuel to the already existing fires, by continuing their financial support to the protagonists. This is a vexed situation.

We do not want to say that conflicts have gone away or are over, with the present superpower condominium - far from it.

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[1]   I. William Zartman, "The OAU in the African State System" in Yassin El-Ayouty et al (eds), *The OAU after Twenty Years,* New York, Praeger, 1984, p. 41.

[2]   See Edem Kodjo, *Et Demain l'Afrique*, Paris, stock, 1985, p. 29.

[3]   Lamentations of an OAU official assigned to the U.N., quoted by William Foltz in "The Organisation of African Unity", in Deng and Zartman, 1991, p. 355.

[4]   Ibid.

[5]   William J. Foltz, 1991, p. 365.

Nevertheless, the changes in Southern Africa have begun to resolve the myriad conflicts in the region. We do not either want to assume that such changes are irreversible - not true. But they suggest however that even seemingly intractable problems can be resolved; that fundamental change is the most difficult of processes to predict; and that one must approach the subject of conflict resolution in Africa with an eye toward the unexpected.[1] Albert Hirschman once remarked that given that the enormous revolutionary changes in the world in 1989 swept away decades of expert gospel, it is somewhat bizzare to see so many experts dogmatically professing what the implications of those changes will be. After all, he states, if these pundits were blindsided by the changes, how likely are they to foresee the implications of those changes?[2] So we must watch out, because "conflict resolution [is] as multifaceted as conflict itself".[3]

Given the multiplicity of actors in African conflicts, and the complexities of the issues at all levels, from local to global, speculations on the prospects for conflict resolution cannot be optimistic in the short run. Indeed, a cursory look at the field suggests that conflicts are seldom resolved finally and that, although a temporary settlement may be arrived at, old wounds tend to open up with new conflicts, and the need to negotiate or resolve the whole situation anew may then arise. Nevertheless, the contention should not make us to be overwhelmingly pessimistic about the future of conflict resolution in Southern Africa, because the present changes taking place there are unprecedented, and call, for hope.

The final years of the 1980s saw many favourable developments that seemed to portend a reduction in conflict in

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[1]   Stephen John Stedman, "Conflict and Conflict Resolution in Africa: A Conceptual Framwork" in Deng and Zartman, 1991, p. 367.

[2]   Stedman, 1991, p. 368.

[3]   Albert O. Hirschman, "Good News Is Not Bad News", in *New York Review of Books*, Vol. 37, October 11, 1990, p. 20.

Africa. The most surprising developments were taking place in Namibia, which was moving rapidly toward independence, and the Cuban army was withdrawing from Angola. The Namibian problem had vexed diplomats for nearly a quarter century, and the Cuban troops had been a disturbing factor in international relations ever since 1979, when their arrival helped catapult Angola onto the Coldwar stage. Both problems today belong to history. Eventhough fighting still continues in Angola, there is still sufficient room to believe that with the attempts bring made to being the parties to reason, coupled with the new world order, this could be the ripe moment for resolution. The Angolan government acceded in some measure to African peace initiatives in 1989, in order that it avoids a reputation for intransigence that might have jeopardized international aid flows and Soviet military assistance. In addition, as some observers pointed out, it was clear that Angola faced a stalemate, at least for the time being, in its war with UNITA, adding to the incentives for exploring a negotiated solution.

A number of African leaders, recognising the negative consequences wars were having for entire sub-regions and for Africa as a whole, are showing new interest in promoting the resolution of Africa's wars as the 1990s draw to a close. A case in point is the pressure that African states, led by Zaire, were putting and still continue to put on the MPLA and UNITA to talk peace. Skeptics doubted that Zaire's president, Mobutu was sincere in his search for peace in Angola and argued that he had launched the initiative largely to improve on his public image in the West. Mobutu may also have concluded that UNITA was unlikely to succeed in the long run, after the December 1988 New York Accords and South Africa's pledge to cut off aid to the movement. Thus he may have felt that the time had come for the war to end, and for him to improve relations with Luanda. These are all assumptions, and in their own way, debateable. Mobutu, however, clearly did not enjoy the full trust of the MPLA government, because of Zaire's record in backing UNITA. Zaire's importance as a conduit for assistance to UNITA, it could be

argued, gave Mobutu both carrots and sticks that he should have been able to use to bring an end to the fighting.[1] But eventhough he held some influence over the contending parties, he was unable to budge them from their long-held positions.

South Africa had begun to suffer unacceptable casualties among white soldiers in Southern Angola, where it had lost command of the air. It had reasons to leave Angola, because domestic problems, a strained defense budget, and the need to fend off international criticism were adding to the pressure for tougher economic sanctions. These problems helped persuade South Africa to compromise not only on Angola but also on the Namibian question and to cut back or even terminate its aid to RENAMO in Mozambique. These changes in South African policy contributed to a clear reduction in tension throughout Southern Africa. The reduction in tension between the superpowers seems certain to reduce weapon flows to Africa and to create an environment more conducive for negotiated settlement. Presumably, Gorbachev's interest in reducing Soviet expenditures overseas (when he was in office), and his related interest in encouraging regional conflict resolution, will lead to a reduction in military assistance in the form of tanks, artillery, and other heavy weapons for Angola, and Mozambique. Emphasis must be given to "presumably", since hard evidence of any such cuts is not yet in. Indeed, some have speculated that Soviets intend to "dump" unneeded weapons in Africa and elsewhere to shore up their faltering economy. Over the long term, however, few of the African governments waging war against armed opposition forces could afford to pay had currency for such arms, even at bargain prices.[2]

For the U.S., the incentive to provide arms to African governments on geo-strategic grounds is much reduced. Pressure

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[1] Raymond W. Copson, "Peace in Africa? The Influence of Regional and International Change" in Deng and Zartman, 1991, p. 35.

[2] Copson, 1991, p. 37.

from human rights organisations and Congress continue to mount on the government to review its policy towards Southern Africa. That pressure would probably have been less effective if the Coldwar had been at its height. U.S. aid for UNITA will probably dwindle, either because of possible progress toward a reconciliation in Angola, or because of U.S. pressure on Savimbi to agree to such a reconciliation. The Coldwar rationale for aiding UNITA in order to hobble the expanding Soviet empire on its fringes is weakened as that empire collapses at the centre.[1] Nevertheless, many see Savimbi as a "freedom fighter" and continue to favour increased aid to UNITA. It is not yet clear how the debate on this issue will turn out.

Changes in the regional and international systems suggest that the outlook for African conflicts during the 1990s is somewhat more favourable than in the 1980s. There are some tendencies in the regional and international systems working to reduce arms transfers to the combatants in Africa's wars, to reduce external intervention, and to promote negotiated solutions. It is possible that these tendencies will help to persuade the participants in some of Africa's ongoing major conflicts to come to terms. They certainly contributed to the New York Accords in 1988. Yet, underlying internal causes of conflict are not deeply affected by the changes now underway. Consequently, many wars may be expected to continue even if heavy weapons flows are reduced and the more mechanised forms of violence become less frequent. The reintensification of the war in Angola today after hopes for negotiated settlement had been raised - demonstrates the power of these underlying causes of conflict. Thus the changes now being seen in the regional and international systems are hopeful, but they do not yet offer lasting solutions to Africa's conflicts. By the end of the 1990s, the changes in Soviet policy, the restraint being shown today may be seen as transitory phenomena or not highly relevant to the more permanent reality of African conflict and violence.

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[1]   Ibid.

Africa and the world will have to undergo much more fundamental change if this future is to be avoided.

We welcome the liberalization policies of De Klerk. Prospects for a negotiated settlement and democratization of South African politics look much brighter today than ever before. The release of Nelson Mandala, the unbanning of the ANC, and other prohibited organisations, the ANC's suspension of guerrilla hostilities, and the present constitutional discussions between its leaders and members of De Klerk's administration - are developments that seem to reflect swifter and more powerful compulsions toward reconciliation. Already, reforms have been undertaken in the constitution and elections have been billed for April 27, 1994. The compromise decision by the ANC to accept certain demands of the Conservative Party-CP and the Zulu Inkatha Movement, is a pointer to the right direction and a platform for hope. In 1989 the bid for Namibian independence and the upsurge of township violence represented important setbacks from opponents of negotiation within the government. The general election results, Conservative Party gains notwithstanding, may have helped to convince De Klerk and his colleagues that a majority of whites favoured political reforms that would lead to African participation in the central government.[1]

The changes are there - we must accept. The hopes are high - undisputable. he 1980s witnessed an unprecedented expansion of externally directed measures intended to coerce political democratization in South Africa, and it is likely that these changes will continue.[2] The relaxation of East/West tension has produced the possibilities for superpower condominium in the Security Council. This was evident in the 1988 Resolution 598 on the Iran-Iraq war and in the implementation of the 1978

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[1]   Tom Lodge, "Conflict Resolution in South Africa", in Deng and Zartman, 1991, p. 147.

[2]   For a list of the more important of these measures, see Charles Becker, "The Impact of Sanctions on South Africa and its periphery" in *African Studies Review,* Vol. 31, No. 2, 1989, pp. 62-63.

Resolution 435 on Namibian independence. It became more distinct
in the joint resolution to punish Iraq in the 1991 UN - backed
invasion of Iraq to free Kuwait. We are hoping for a more
peaceful future for Africa. Quiet diplomacy should be
intensified.

Despite hopeful trends and developments, major changes that
would transform the African situation have not yet taken place.
What we witness today are interludes, due to periods of relative
calm. The continuing prospect of violent outbreaks due to social
cleavages, poverty, and repressive government policies will show
up. Nonetheless, the easing of the coldwar has tended to make
the more mechanized forms of war as seen in Angola, less common.
We may be entering a period when the modern military capabilities
of some governments will wither as tanks, planes, and guns break
down for lack of maintenance and spare parts. Such governments
will need to become more flexible in negotiations with their
armed internal opposition - or face military defeat. Is this the
situation that is approaching the MPLA in Luanda? Are there
signs of cracks in the Marxist apparachick to call UNITA come in?
Only posterity has the answer.

D. **Internal Changes in Angola vis-à-vis new dynamism:**
The birth of a new international order and the new values
that came with it, signalled magnificient changes in the conflict
situation in Africa. Peace initiatives took a more intense
momentum eventhough with no concrete results. In Angola,
exciting changes are taking place. After 15 years of a bloody
conflict, neither UNITA with all its military support from the
US, South Africa and Zaire, nor the MPLA with Soviet and Cuban
backing, could justifiably claim to have been on the brink of
pushing the other over the precipice and becoming the outright
victor. The war, throughout its duration, has always been
something of a see-saw, with one side seemingly having the
upperhand for some time, only for the other to regain the
initiative later.

Portugal, the former colonial master, was forced to take a peace initiative as a result of the gruesome massacre of people that was being witnessed. The town was Estoril. The parties were UNITA and the MPLA. And the brokers, of course, were the Portuguese. Both parties agreed on important aspects of the deal such as the ceasefire date, the integratin of their fighting forces into a single-army, and the holding of free elections within 15-18 months. This accord was seen as the clearing of the first hurdle; but this is not the first time such arrangements had been made.[1]

December 1991, Savimbi and UNITA finally agreed to participate in a coalition government with the MPLA. Mid-December, the UN decided to send in peace-keepers, the United Nations Angola Verification Mission - UNAVEM, to monitor the situation. Pressure from the US is brought to bear on UNITA to sign the Bicesse peace accord in 1991. The agreement called for a ceasefire, demobilization of their rival armed forces, and national elections in September 1992. Before the September 29-30 elections, Savimbi unequivocally told international journalists that if he and UNITA lost the elections, they would claim the polls were rigged and return to war.[2] This is exactly what happened. Although UNITA did relatively well in the elections, winning more than a third of the parliamentary seats and even more of the presidential votes for Savimbi, it accused the MPLA of cheating and rejected the results!

After weeks of uncertainty, fighting broke out in the first weeks of November, in Luanda. More than 2000 people were killed. UNITA controlled strategic positions of the city, but after a week, it was surrounded by MPLA forces and fled Luanda. Savimbi's men took over Huambo, Angola's second city, and a UNITA

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[1] In June 1989 not less than 18 African Heads of State converged in Gbadolité, Zaire to witness a similar ceremony mediated by President Mobutu. But the results we know today are not encouraging.

[2] Andrew Meldrum, "Lessons from Angola" in *Africa Report*, January-February 1993, p. 23.

stronghold. They also took control of Caxito, and N'Dalatando, secured control of Lobito port and encircled the neighbouring city of Benguela. In addition, UNITA encircled key provincial cities like Malange, Kuito, Luena, and Saurino. (See Map 5). Virtually all the roads throughout the countryside fell under UNITA's control. The country was in a precarious situation.

The U.N. brokered a ceasefire to the post-election fighting, but it did not appear to solve the country's division. Savimbi refused to come to Luanda, to meet with President Dos Santos, claiming, with some justification, that Luanda was not safe for UNITA.[1] On November 20, when the MPLA and other parties met to form a new government based on the election results, UNITA refused to take part. By the end of November, it looked as though UNITA intended to continue with its plan to cut Luanda off from the rest of the country.(See Map 7). In December, however, UNITA pledged to join a government of national unity and respect a ceasefire, just three days before the expiration of a government ultimatum for the band to halt hostilities and join a coalitin government or face a declaration of war. But the situation remained tenuous, with no assurances that the UNITA statement would be adhered to. Angola hung in this precarious balance between war and peace, between unity and division, with the pendulum not knowing which way to settle when the clock stops.

Many criticisms have been levied on UNAVEM for its role in the Angolan situation. UNAVEM openly admitted that only 50% of the armed forces had been demobilized just one week before the elections, with the greater part of this being the regular government troops, leaving the highly-equiped UNITA forces largely in place. A large UN team and peace-keeping force could have insisted on complete demobilization and disarmament of both forces. The election campaign should not have begun until the

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[1] Memories are still fresh of numerous UNITA officials and supporters who were summarily executed in Luanda. Many of Savimbi's top generals were killed, some taken captive.

international team could confirm that both sides were disarmed and dispersed and a new joint force was in place. It does not appear wise to have trusted a notoriously corrupt government like the MPLA to have administered the election process. Although some of UNITA's specific charges of vote-rigging are valid, they would not have changed the overall outcome of the elections. Rather than playing a monitoring role, the UN should have run the elections itself, as it did in Namibia[1], to ensure a fair outcome. A larger UN team with more responsibility might have prevented any charges of foul play, thus obviating an excuse for rejecting the outcome. If nothing else, the elections provided the international community with useful lessons to prevent a similar fiasco another time.

The large oversized dove that hung in the main square in Luanda signally peace was never given the chace to become reality. The UN special representative in Luanda, Margaret Anstee, echoed the thoughts of many outsiders when she called the elections "generally free and fair,"[2] and said the real winners were the Angolan people. Moreover, the end of the Coldwar renewed hopes that the superpower rivalry fought on Angolan soil had lost its supporters, and that the 4.8 million registered voters would have had their hand in shaping the future government of their country. But this was not to be so.

International mediation efforts by South Africa's Foreign Minister, Reolof Pik Botha, as well as, Portuguese, and Soviet

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[1] In Namibia in 1989, the UN had close to 9000 officials overseing elections for a country of 318.250 sq.miles, and just under 2 million people. In Angola in 1992, the same UN had 500 officials to monitor elections in a country of 418.354 sq.miles and a population of 12 million people. Nevertheless, it could be argued that the U.N. was so concerned with the former because it was titularly still under the mandate given it in 1945, whereas with the later, it was a case of a sovereign entity in a democratic process; thus the UN could not violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Angola, by taking control of the whole process. This would have created a precedence, and perhaps would have been in bad taste to the Luanda authorities, who we do not know would have refused. It is still subject to debate.

[2] *Africa Report,* 1993, p. 26.

diplomats failed to bring Savimbi and Dos Santos together in a meeting to pave the way for a peaceful settlement to what had become an increasingly volatile armed conflict. "We and the Americans created Savimbi, but no one controls him",[1] a Senior South African diplomat who had for years commanded UNITA troops, said in Luanda. The UN - observed voting was the final stage in a peace agreement signed by Dos Santos and Savimbi. The accord was heralded as the final seal to the country's 16-year civil war, which followed a brutal 14-year armed liberation struggle against Portuguese colonialists. But the post-election days were fraught with tension, measured by vehement allegations of fraud and strategic movements of armed forces around the country. "We are back to a pre-peacetime situation, with people running into the bush for safety", [2] said Paulette Nicohls, emergency officer for UNICEF.

The National Electoral Council released the results of the elections, showing no clear-cut winner of the presidential pools, and also slating a second round for both the presidential and parliamentary polls. Dos Santos won 49.57% and Savimbi, 40.07%. In the parliamentary race, the MPLA received a clear majority of 53.85% to form the new government, gaining 129 of the 220 parliamentary seats; UNITA trailed with 33.85% or 70 seats, while the remaining 21 seats were divided among 10 third parties. The expected second round of the elections could not take place, due to the MPLA insistence that UNITA disarms its troops and allow the government to extend its administration throughout the entire country. Accusing South Africa of ongoing support to UNITA, the government declared Pik Botha persona non grata. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman Cohen's assertion that "Savimbi will face international condemnation and isolation if he returns to the civil war",[3]seemed to have very little

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[1]   Quoted by Meldrum, 1993, p. 26.

[2]   *Africa Report*, 1993, P. 27.

[3]   *Africa Report*, 1993, p. 28.

effect on the U.S.'s former "democratic freedom fighter".[4]

Savimbi's erstwhile allies started questioning their hold on the military commander. With the election results published, the MPLA attained a mandate to govern and also recognition from the international community. After vain attempts to reach a peaceful settlement, international mediators appeared to throw up the towel due to fruitless bids to settle the fued. Moreover, the MPLA had long since secured the backing of the Luanda populace to wage what became a bitter offensive in the capital. In the fighting that ensued, Savimbi lost his nephew and chief spokesman in Luanda, Elias Salupto Pena, and UNITA Vice President Jeremias Chitunda, including thousands of people all over the country. The US imposed a 60-day moratorium on all U.S. funded projects in the country. The UN under - Secretary-General for peace-keeping operations, Morrack Goulding, talked to both Dos Santos and Savimbi in mid-November, in an ongoing effort to mediate the conflict. With the UNAVEM mandate expiring on November 30, Goulding expressed reluctance to commit to an extension of UNAVEM's stay in Angola, until he was assured that both sides would abide by the peace accords. In a letter to Margaret Anstee, Savimbi, after meeting Goulding, said that "eventhough the elections were rigged"[2] he would respect the results, but added that if provocked, he "will fight for 10 more years".[3] In early December, three days before the expiration of a government ultimatum to halt hostilities and join a coalition government or face a declaration of war, the rebels agreed to be a party to a government of national unity and to respect a ceasefire. But as long as UNITA remains heavily armed, its promises bore little weight.

The appalling situation in Angola has raised many eyebrows.

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[1]   Ibid.

[2]   Ibid.

[3]   Ibid.

UN special representative who replaced Margaret Anstee,[4] Alioune
Blondin Beye in a tour in August 1993 in Africa lamented:

> The military situation is difficult, the
> humanitarian situation is catastrophic,
> and the political situation is critical.[2]

He called for an urgent "regional solution"[3] in a war that had
taken inappropriate levels "with thousands of deads per day. Its
worse than Somalia, Bosnia or Cambodia",[4] he concludes.

Rather bilatedly, the international community has now come
to realise who the real culprit is, and for the first time, they
have said so openly, without resorting to the diplomatic
etiquette of the past. Through UN Security Council Resolution
851, UNITA was condemned for its failure to abide by the terms
of the May 31, 1991 peace agreement, which if it had not been
violated, would have ended 16 years of war in Angola. The
Resolution also extended the mandate of UNAVEM until September
15, by which time UNITA would have agreed to a ceasefire and
signed the Abidjan protocole regulating the implementation of the
Bicesse peace accord, and withdrawn its forces from areas it
occupied since its defeat in the September general election.

The UN threatened punitive measures should UNITA fail to
comply with the Resolution, including an arms embargo,
restriction of international movement of UNITA personnel, and
closure of UNITA offices world-wide and freezing all its foreign
bank accounts. International pressure against Savimbi and UNITA
escalated, following U.S. President Clinton's decision to
recognise the MPLA government in Luanda, following UNITA's
refusal to sign a peace protocole in Abidjan. With the collapse

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[1]   Savimbi and UNITA insisted that Anstee be replaced due to her
        open declaration of the fairness of the elections.

[2]   Alioune Blondin Beye, in *Jeune Afrique*, No.1705 - of 9-15
        September, 1993, p. 21 (Author's translation).

[3]   Ibid. (Author's translation).

[4]   Ibid (Author's translation).

of the Abidjan talks, representatives of the trioka of observers in the Angolan peace process (Portugal, Russia and the United States) met in Moscow and concluded that UNITA was "not observing the key principles of the peace accords, including its pledges to respect the results of the September elections, to participate in a government of national unity and to integrate its military in a unified national armed forces".[1] At their summit in Cairo, Egypt, on June 28-29, 1993, the leaders of the OAU passed a resolution "firmly"[2] condemning UNITA for the war in Angola, launched an "urgent appeal"[3] to governments of neighbouring countries not to allow their territories or airspace to be used as transit points or bases for supporting UNITA (an indirect reference to Zaire) The latest developments in the international arena opened the way for the legal acquisition of arms by the Angolan government, thus relieving it form the "Triple Zero" arrangement of Bicesse, which barred all parties in the Angolan conflict from buying weapons on the international market. The peace initiative currently (1994) going on in Lusaka, Zambia, is just one kind of the numerous peace attempts that had been undertaken in the past. Aspiration is high, hope is full, especially in this era of a new dynamism.

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[1]   *Africa Report*, Jan-February 1993, p. 30.

[2]   Ibid.

[3]   Ibid.

TABLE 2: ILLUSTRATION OF ARMED FORCES, G.N.P. PER CAPITA
INCOME AND MILITARY EXPENDITURES OF 14 AFRICAN
STATES[1]

Country	Military Expenditures $ millions	Armed Forces Thousands	GNP $ millions.	Population millions.	GNP Per capita $
ALGERIA	1.930	170	65.200	23.5	2.779
EGYPT	6.527	450	71.170	51.9	1.370
LIBYA	3.063	91	27.560	3.8	7.188
MOROCCO	1.114	200	15.640	24.4	642
ETHIOPIA	442	300	5.217	46.7	112
KENYA	182	21	7.618	22.4	340
SUDAN	231	59	8.691	23.5	369
CAMEROON	246	15	12.880	10.3	1.256
COTE D'IVOIRE	178	8	9.440	10.8	877
NIGERIA	180	138	23.270	108.6	214
ANGOLA	666	74	9.165	8.0	1.145
ZAIRE	155	53	5.140	31.4	169
ZIMBABWE	283	45	5.714	9.4	610
SOUTH AFRICA	3400	102	77.130	34.3	2.248

SOURCE: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World
Military and Arms Transfers. 1988, Washington, 1989, pp.32-68.

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[1] Statistics as at 1987.

Table 3: MILITARY EXPENDITURE OF TWENTY SUB-SAHARAN COUNTRIES
          WITH PER CAPITA INCOME BELOW $350 IN 1987

COUNTRY	1970		1977		1987	
	% GNP	% CGE	% GNP	% CGE	%GNP	% CGE
Ethiopia	2.3	12.4	5.7	23.2	8.5	24.0
Chad	2.9	12.4	3.3	28.7	3.5	40.0
Zaire	5.4	14.5	1.9	10.8	3.0	18.2
Malawi	0.5	1.5	1.9	8.0	1.4	5.1
Mozambique	n.a	n.a	3.7	15.6	8.4	34.6
Tanzania	1.4	6.0	3.2	12.2	3.3	14.3
Burkina-Faso	1.3	11.3	3.0	20.8	3.1	17.6
Madagascar	1.4	8.1	2.7	12.8	2.1	7.2
Mali	2.3	17.8	2.6	18.5	2.5	7.2
Burundi	1.3	12.7	2.7	12.4	3.1	12.7
Zambia	1.9	5.6	13.8	33.0	6.6	19.6
Niger	0.8	6.5	0.6	4.6	0.7	5.7
Uganda	1.9	10.8	1.9	21.0	1.4	15.6
Somalia	3.5	25.3	3.1	16.2	3.2	30.0
Togo	1.2	8.5	6.2	13.3	3.3	13.3
Rwanda	2.0	23.5	2.1	15.8	2.0	12.0
Sierra Leone	0.8	5.4	1.0	4.1	0.8	5.0
Benin	n.a	n.a	1.4	5.3	2.1	15.5
C.A.R.	2.9	12.4	1.9	10.3	n.a	n.a
Kenya	1.0	4.9	2.4	11.1	2.4	8.0

Source: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. World
Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1988 (Washington,
1989), Table 1, and U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1970-1979
(Washington March 1982) Table 1, See also Zartman and Deng,
1990, p. 276.

n.a. Data not available
     Notice that the order of the countries reflects their
     level of per capita income, with the poorest country at
     the top.

Table 4 : Showing Eighteen African Countries, their Military Expenditure, No. of Armed Forces, % of Defense per GDP and Military Expenditure per inhabitant in 1980 and 1991.

Country	Military Expenditure 1980 ($ millions)	Number of Armed Forces (1991)	% of Defense per GDP	Military Expenditure per inhabitant ($)
Egypt	6,810	450,000	6.7	124
RSA	3,190	77,400	4.2	104
Libya	1,384	85,000	5.4	304
Morocco	1,207	192,500	5.2	48
Algeria	0,854	125,000	1.8	33
Angola	0,819	100,000	17.4	81
Sudan	0,800	75,700	4.5	19
Tunisia	0,482	38,000	4.8	60
Ethiopia	0,472	438,000	-	-
Zimbabwe	0,363	54,600	6.7	36
Nigeria	0,268	94,500	1.2	2
Cameroon	0,144	11,600	-	12
Mozambique	0,116	72,000	-	7
Senegal	0,106	9,700	-	14
Chad	0,057	17,000	-	10
Zaire	0,047	51,00	-	-
Ghana	0,04	64,500	8.4	3
Somalia	0,011	12.200	6.9	7

Source: Table conceived and designed by the author, from statistics taken from, **L'Année Strategique: Les Equilibres Militaires, IISS,** Paris, Editions Stock, 1991, Pascal Boniface (ed). The International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) publishes statistics annually to illustrate security situation of countries of the world. A close and careful look at the table will reveal one trend:Countries with ferocious internal situations like the RSA, Mozambique, Angola, Somalia, Zaire, spend too much on defense, so too with countries that maintain aggressive or militaristic foreign policies like Libya & Egypt. The overall effect of the defense phobia that leads to currency squandering is that conflict is instead heightened, leaving the populace suffering in a squalor of excruciating poverty, social malaise, famine, diseases and rabid underdevelopment.

FIGURE 3 : GRAPH ILLUSTRATING THE ECONOMIC BURDEN ON AN ECONOMY THAT SPENDS LARGELY ON DEFENSE.

<u>Source</u>: Conceived and illustrated by the author.

Our graph illustrates a typical opportunity cost situation. A country has many needs, but the means to satisfy them are very limited. This is the situation of African countries. When vital resources that are needed for productive sectors of the economy are diverted into the production of arms or the sponsoring of a large army, the result of course is a negative trend on the economy. The slope in our graph clearly illustrates this, and it could be reversed if policy is changed. Ironically, this is not usually the trend with African countries.

Notice how the slope of the production possibility curve at Point S_1 tells us that an extra improvement could be made on the economy by giving up some units of armaments. Point S_0 illustrates the state of the economy when more units of armaments are given up. The more armament production that is given up, the greater the production possibility for the economy as illustrated on Point S_2.

MAP 1, OF THE WORLD, SHOWING THE MAIN ACTORS OF THE ANGOLAN CONFLICT

Source: (Map conceived by the author, following information got from
         Collin Legum.)

- A close look at the shadded areas will reveal that only the main actors
  are taken into consideration. The other small ones, like Zaire, East
  Germany, Zambia et al, are for purposes of convenience, left out.

MAP 2, Africa: SHOWING FOREIGN TROOP PRESENCE AND
SPREAD OF DOMINANT NATURAL RESOURCES

N

2,670,000
6,400
TUNISIA

Phosphate Rock
14%* 63%**
150 44
MOROCCO

C S F
ALGERIA
6,600,000
25,000

C S F
LIBYA
25,000,000
25,000

C S F
EGYPT
2,450,000
3,200

SPANISH
SAHARA

F
MAURITANIA

ERDE

S
MALI

F
NIGER

F
CHAD

SUDAN
100

F
DJIBOUTI

F SENEGAL

AMBIA
UINEA-
ISSAU
S

Bauxite
13%* 33%

F
UPPER
VOLTA

GUINEA

NIGERIA
18,700,000
43,000

F

F
SOMALIA

C S
ETHIOPIA

SIERRA LEONE
LIBERIA

GHANA
IVORY
COAST

F TOGO
BENIN

C CAMEROON
60,000

CENTRAL
AFRICAN
EMPIRE

ZAIRE

UGANDA

KENYA

RWANDA

C EQU. GUINEA

C SAO TOME & PRINCIPE

GABON

F
CONGO

C Cobalt 47% 31%
Copper 6% 31%

Diamonds—
Industrial 38% 73%
Germanium 30% 2%

BURUNDI F

F

Manganese
9% 2% **
2,050,000
2,450

150,000
50

S
TANZANIA
50

Ile de Mayone,
COMORO IS.

GEND

ROOPS IN AFRICA

: CUBAN : 35 - 37,000 Total

: FRENCH : 11,000 Total

S SOVIET : 6,800

Share of Free World Production(%)
Share of Free World Reserves (%)

OIL (Thousands of Barrels)

GAS (Billion Cubic Feet)

360,000
10

C S
ANGOLA
1,180,000
1,500

ZAMBIA
Copper 8% 6%

RHODESIA
Chromium
7% 22%

C S
MOZAMBIQUE

MADAGASCAR
Mica
(Natural Sheet)
less than
25% **

NAMIBIA
Uranium
14%*
6% **

Diamonds—
Industrial
7% 7%
BOTSWANA

MALAWI

SWAZILAND

SOUTH
AFRICA

LESOTHO

Antimony	16%*	7%**
Chromium	29%	14%
Diamonds—		
Industrial	11%	7%
Gold	57%	49%
Manganese	22%	37%
Platinum	46%	73%
Uranium	12%	11%
Vanadium	35%	19%

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MAP 3 AFRICA : SHOWING SOME CONFLICT ARENAS

N

Cueta Melilla Tunis
Algiers TUNISIA
Rabat
Benghazi
MOROCCO Tripoli Cairo
ALGERIA
El Aiun LIBYA EGYPT
WESTERN
SAHARA
MAURITANIA
CAPE
VERDE IS Nouakchott
Praia NIGER Khartoum DJIBOUTI
SENEGAL Ouagadougou CHAD Djibouti
THE Dakar Niamey Ndjemena SUDAN
GAMBIA MALI Bamako ETHIOPIA
Banjul BURKINA BENIN Addis Ababa
GUINEA FASO Porto SOMALIA
BISSAU Conakry NIGERIA Novo
Bissau IVORY GHANA Lagos CENTRAL AFRICAN Mogadishu
Freetown COAST Accra TOGO REPUBLIC
SIERRA LEONE Abidjan Lome CAMEROON Bangui UGANDA
Monrovia Yaounde Kampala KENYA
LIBERIA EQUATORIAL GUINEA Nairobi
MALABO RWANDA
SAO TOME E Libreville Kigali
PRINCIPE GABON ZAIRE BURUNDI ZANZIBAR
CONGO Brazzaville Bujumbura Dar es Salaam
Kinshasa TANZANIA
SEYCHELLES IS.
Luanda Victoria
KEY: Moroni
ANGOLA COMORO IS.
CONFLICT ARENAS ZAMBIA MALAWI
Lusaka Lilongwe
Salisbury Tananarive
SOUTHERN MAURITIUS
RHODESIA MOZAMBIQUE
NAMIBIA BOTSWANA MALAGASY
Windhoek Gaborone REPUBLIC REUNION
Pretoria Port
Maputo Louis
SOUTH SWAZILAND
AFRICA Mbabane
LESOTHO
Maseru

SOURCE: Africa Report (1981), 26(3), see also Nosakhare O. Obaseki, Managing Africa's Conflicts (New York International Peace Academy, 1982) p. 3.

MAP 4, SHOWING THE COUNTRIES OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN SUB-REGION

Source: Africa Research Bulletin, January 15- February 14, 1984 p. 7143

MAP 5:   THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN CONFLICT REGION

SOURCE: Alain Gresh, "Afrique Australe: une "Sphère de Conflits" in le Monde Diplomatic Février 1988 p. 9.

MAP 6, SHOWING ADMINISTRTIVE UNITS OF ANGOLA

Source: Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbour, p. 152

MAP 7, ANGOLA SHOWING ZONES OF INSTABILITY

Source: Africa Confidential, July 15, 1988

KEY

☐	MPLA ZONE
✕✕✕	PRINCIPAL UNITA STRONGHOLD
⧄	ZONE CONTROLLED BY R.S.A.
◆	CUBAN RADAR
⌒	CUBAN DEFENSE LINE
✛✛✛	RAILWAY LINE

PART TWO
THE ANGOLAN CONFLICT WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE
NEW INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

CHAPTER ONE
SOVIET AND CUBAN DISENGAGEMENT VIS-A-VIS UNITED STATES PREEMINENCE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

A. Emergence of the United States as Principal Power in the Region.

> "The United States has attained an international
> preeminence beyond challenge. As the leader of
> the West during the years of confrontation with
> the Soviet bloc,... it is now well placed to
> define both the character of this new stage in
> international history and the West's role
> within it."[1]
>
> — Lawrence Freedman.

The escalation of violence in the southern flank of Africa, principally in Angola, welcomed the intervention of both the East and the West, as each camp came in for various motives. In this rabble-rousing, the US championed the course of the Western allies, dictating the trend of the policies they followed, while the USSR coordinated the Eastern bloc, and influenced their participation in the atrocious war in Angola. The negotiations that started in the mid-1980s to achieve a pacific settlement to this conflict, ended up with the signing of the New York Accords of December 22, 1988 in which all the parties involved came to accept the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 435, as the basis for Namibian independence, and the pullout of all foreign troops from the Southern African region. The US was so skillful in the negotiations that so much care was taken not to mention the internal situation in Angola because their secret aim was to achieve a Cuban pullout from Angola, and let the latter porous for UNITA forces to take a very short time and topple the

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[1]   Lawrence Freedman, "Order and Disorder in the New World", in *Foreign Affairs,* Vol. 71, No. 1, 1991/92, p. 20.

MPLA government in Luanda. The final pulling out of Cuban troops in 1991, Namibian independence in April 1991, the total pullout of SADF from Southern Angola and Namibia, had given a successful end to the US linkage policy and left the latter the de facto leader in the region.

The birth of the New World Order that was signalled with the collapse of the USSR and the latter's acceptance to embrace democracy, and therefore, collaborate with the West in every respect, signalled the demise of the almost half century-old East/West confrontation in not just the entire world spectrum, but also in the more than 13 years superpower rivalry in the southern end of Africa. The ceremony that took place in New York on December 22, 1988, showed the world what the US could achieve, notwithstanding the fact that a powerful giant like the USSR was there present. The colonial era in Africa finally drew to a close, the 13-year presence of Cuban expeditionary forces in Angola and the three-quarter-century-long South African administration of Namibia, were set on the way to ending.[1] Diplomats and generals from Angola, Cuba, South Africa, the USSR, SWAPO, and neighbouring African states, raised their glasses to the historic achievements of an American mediation effort that they had spent nearly a decade denigrating and obstructing.[2]

The question on every lip is, how did the US which had no significant historical ties to Southern Africa and few concrete interests there, come to play a central role in the resolution of that region's problems? How did the US, which had not recognised Angola, has no diplomatic ties with Cuba, and had none either with Angola, with severely strained relations with South Africa, come to be the indispensable mediator of a peace between them? How did Southwestern Africa, which had become a focal point of East/West contention, suddenly emerge as a symbol of

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[1] Chas. W. Freeman, Jr. "The Angola/Namibia Accords" in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 68, No.3, Summer 1989, p. 126.

[2] Ibid.

creative diplomatic cooperation between Washington and Moscow in the resolution of regional disputes? In answering these questions, we come to find answers to the reason why the US was able to placate the USSR in the region, cajole the other small powers and emerge as the undisputable power-broker and champion of this region of the continent.

There are other very salient reasons that could be brought to back up the emergence of the US as the principal power in the region. Angolan nationalists who had chaffed under the growing Cuban expeditionary force and yearned for relief from the economic collapse brought about by the war and the failure of Soviet-inspired policies, paid heed to US efforts towards resolving this dilemma.[1] The South Africans found it increasingly difficult to justify heavy military expenditures on their intervention in Angola, and defense of Namibia, the white casualties and the rising cost of subsidizing their ungrateful Namibian colony, especially as these actions diverted resources from efforts to calm down their own domestic "revolutionary climate" through advances in black educational and living standards. They thus needed a political and strategic victory to show that the benefits of letting Namibia go free and leaving Angola to its own fate outweighed the costs. The Cubans, having invested their prestige and the blood of their youth in the inconclusive war in Angola, had come to see it as a quagmire. They needed a way to be able to declare their "internationalist" mission honourably fulfilled. The Soviets embraced perestroïka and looked afresh at Southwestern Africa, came to see their escalating exposure as more expensive in both economic and political terms than their interests could justify. They sought to cut their losses, and to do so in a way that would gain them a reputation as responsible international actors with the US and the West more generally.

Since the parties had no way to talk to each other, only the

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[1]   See Freeman, 1989, p. 132.

US was in touch with all of them and willing to broker peace.[1]
With the policy of linkage and the plausible mediating role of
Chester Crocker, all this was achieved, leaving the US with "the
yam and the knief" to decide as they so pleased. It should be
noted that African countries themselves had become increasingly
disgusted with the spectacle of an escalating foreign troop
presence and enless war in Angola. All hands were now on deck
to solve the appalling situation in Southern Africa.

The signing of the New York Accords, though a great
ceremony, did not deter the US from continuing to support their
old time faction in the Angolan war. In fact, while the USSR due
to bisecting economic and political problems at home and a desire
to win Western support and sympathy let go this region, the US
on the other hand took it as an opportunity to gather the spoils
and emerge as the principal guarantor of peace in the region.
As Pedro de Castro Van-Dunem "Loy", Angolan Foreign Minister
lamented soon after the accords were signed;

> We attained an acceptable calender and signed
> a global accord, but to our surprise the
> American administration publicly affirms that
> it will continue support to UNITA and the
> destabilization of Angola.[2]

the lamentation of overt US declaration of continued support to
UNITA that did not welcome a reciprocal action by their arch
rivals, the USSR, was a tacit subjugation of the latter in the
continued struggle not just in Angola, but also in the whole sub-
region. The resolution of the Angola-Cuba-South Africa conflict
had come to show that not just military force is required to
solve a problem, but tact, persuasion, and - at times,
circumstances affecting the parties involved. The new world
order has come to show the triumph of liberalism and the free
market system, the rule of international law and an era of peace

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[1]   Ibid.

[2]   Pedro de Castro Alfonso Van-Dunem, in *Africa Report,* March-April
       1989, p. 24.

and prosperity, over conservatism and communism, dictatorship and rabid authoritarianism.

The emergence of the US in this new order as the unchallenged and undisputable leader of the world is appreciable. The previous order was frequently described in terms of bipolarity. The two poles were the superpowers to which all other states were obliged to relate for security purposes. Because neither pole could defeat the other, their antagonism could not be resolved and so acquired a sense of permanence. The global reach of both superpowers, and their tendency to interpret developments in all regions in terms of their underlying antagonism, resulted in bipolarity coming to be held as the defining feature of the contemporary international system.[1] The determination in both Washington and Moscow to prevent the logic of confrontation from leading to a catastrophic conclusion meant that the bipolar system depended on tacit cooperation and understanding as much as pure antagonism.

Today, bipolarity has given way to multipolarity, but with the US still exerting much control over the other powers. From an oasis of confrontation, the birth of a condominium has seen the light of day. The beginning of the 1990s saw the culmination of the decolonization process that began at the same time as the Coldwar. Nineteen years after the last Western empire – the Portuguese – collapsed, Soviet acquisitions have been liberated, with the final coming in an implosion of the old Russian empire. Bipolarity is an obvious victim of changed circumstances, but so also is the representation of the international system upon which it was based – that of a magnetic field governing the political behaviour of the individual state units.

In the present world order we cannot attempt to proclaim a "unipolar" world led by the US which remains a superpower in military terms, but occupies a less than commaning role in the

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[1]   Freeman, 1989, p. 23.

international economy. This idea of a unipolar world is dubious, for it makes the implosion of the USSR for the rise of the US. Nevertheless, the kind of multipolaity we have today is not the sort mooted in the 1970s, which posited Chinese and possibly OPEC additions to the power structure, with Japan and Western Europe increasingly asserting themselves independently of the US. The new world order of multipolarity is a transformed one, with a number of poles, but grouped closely together so that for many parts of the globe their pull is only faint.

The critical consequence of the decline of the Soviet pole is that there is now nothing to attract those states once oriented in this direction; there is no counter pull for those states hitherto suspended somewhere between East and West. All these states must now reorient themselves toward the West, but the Western poles may not be strong enough to provide the necessary sense of direction and political process. The West is now composed of three distinct poles - North America, the European Community, and Japan. Each of these poles acts as a regional magnet - the US for the countries of Latin America and the Caribean, Japan for East Asia and the EC for the Central and Eastern Europe, and to some extent, North Africa. In each region political life appears no longer as a dialectique between imperialism and national liberation, or capitalism and socialism, but of order and disorder, with the relatively orderly states by a large majority characterized by liberal democracy and market economies, and the disorderly suffering from fragile economies and often deep social and political tensions.

In this new order of US supremacy both in the entire globe and in Southern Africa, one realises that things can be managed from the top. In the future, international response to conflict will be more likely, as was seen in the gulf war of 1990. But the management of local conflicts that have not yet reached this stage, or that are much more ambiguous in their origins, is less pressing. If the absence of a profound strategic imperative is the hall mark of the new order, then there will be little

incentive to take on new security commitments in any serious
form. Old commitments - like those in Africa, may still be
honoured, but no extra entanglements will be accepted. The USSR
had withdrawn; its army was divided and disgraced in the events
that marked the changes in the country. The Communist Party was
shattered. The union of 15 Republics fell off like broken china.
All these events did not take place in the US - its traditional
rival. This left the latter with a deserved occasion to reap
from the spoils, and impose itself all over the world, and in
Southern Africa in particular, as John Lewis Gaddis puts it:

> For the first time in half a century,
> no single great power, or coalition of
> powers, poses a "clear and present danger"
> to the national security of US. The end
> of the Coldwar has left Americans in the
> fortunate position of being without an
> obvious major adversary.[1]

B. Review of U.S. Policy, and Rapprochement with Luanda:

> "The United States is committed to the
> search for constructive change in
> Southern Africa... We are determined
> to help turn the sad tide of growing
> conflict and tension in Southern Africa."[2]
>
>   - Vice President George Bush
>   Nairobi, November 19, 1982

The declarations above of George Bush, which were later to
be concretized by President Clinton, shows the new approach of
US foreign policy towards Angola, and the entire Southern African
region. The war in Angola, the independence struggle in Namibia,
and the revolts against apartheid in South Africa, made it

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[1]   John Lewis Gaddis, "Toward the Post-Coldwar World" in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 70, No. 2, Spring 1991, p. 102.

[2]   George Bush, November 19, 1982 in Nairobi, quoted in *Realism, Strength, Negotiation : Key Foreign Policy Statements of the Reagan Administration; United States Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs*, Washington D.C., May 1984, p. 17.

plausible for the US to re-shape its policy towards the region, so as to come out with veritable solutions to these problems. Too much has been said on the bilateral and tripartite accords that finally sanctioned a virtual end to the bitting and multiferous problems in the region. The presence of foreign troops, especially Cuban in Angola, was a vexing problem to the US that saw this as a challenge to its strategic interests in the country. "Wouldn't Angola be better off with all foreign troops out of the country, South African and Cuban forces?"[1] George Bush questioned. To him "Their introduction tore the fabric of reciprocal restraint between the US and the USSR in the developing world".[2] Thus the US viewing the MPLA government of Dos Santos as pro-communist, did everything to isolate it, and perpetuate acts of distabilization towards it. In this venture, the US sought and used the services of its regional "policeman", South Africa, and financed the opposing UNITA of Jonas Savimbi in his war of attrition against the Angolan government.

Savimbi became the "democratic freedom fighter" of the US and his movement was considered to be one that will "liberate" Angola from the shackles of communism. Acts of calomny were carried out against the Luanda government, while Savimbi was constantly accorded red-carpet treatment befitting a Head of State in his numerous trips to Washington. This "enfant cheri" of the US multiplied acts of aggression towards the MPLA government each time he returned from "home" and used Zaire and Namibia as bases - all with the express approval of the US government. Thinking that the US will have more to reap from a future Savimbi government in Luanda (since victory for the latter was apparent), the US manipulated the New York talks, ostensibly avoiding a discussion of the Angolan internal problem, so that a possible Cuban troop pullout from Angola, could render the MPLA government vulnerable to being overthrown by UNITA. Failing in this objective, the US thus turned to "reconciliation of the

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[1]   *Realism, Strength, Negotiation*, May 1984, p. 17.

[2]   Ibid.

various forces" in Angola, and later started talking about the formation of a "coalition government" that will embrace UNITA. The aim of course, was to eventually let the charismatic Savimbi to use the occasion to dominate events and finally remove the MPLA from power. Half-hearted commitment was given to efforts towards seeking a pacific settlement[1] in Angola so much so that each time this was done, the result, of course, was negative.

With all the negotiations that took place and the final acceptance of general elections in Angola by all the parties, the road was now clear for the US to observe and monitor the events and draw conclusions. The US came to accept elections in Angola because as George Bush put it, "We do not believe that armed conflict must be the road to justice, and we doubt that it can be the road to lasting freedom and well-being".[2] The US had come to realise that they had nothing to reap from a continuous East/West confrontation in Angola, a confrontation that instead increased the threat to world peace. They had come to realise that :

> Internal stability, often fueled by outside
> interference, and longstanding border and
> ethnic disputes tax heavily on the resources
> of African governments.[3]

and their overall concern, including that which guides their military assistance, was to dissuade countries from undertaking military solutions and to encourage negotiated settlement of differences between them. The strategic importance of Angola in Coldwar terms was too great that Secretary of State George Shultz had to affirm that "we have a significant geo-political stake in the security of the continent... we are affected when the

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[1] A typical example of this is the US – engineered Gbadolité talks under the auspices of a dubious Mobutu that ended up not solving any real problem for Angolans.

[2] *Realism, Strength, Negotiation,* 1984, p. 17.

[3] *Realism,* 1984, p. 18.

Soviets, Cubans ... seek to expand their influence [here]",[4] thus continued and prolong fighting was not going to augur well for the US. This had to occasion a drastic revision of its policy towards the entire region, and Angola in particular. According to Secretary Shultz, "The Soviet/Cuban meddling [in Angola] ... injects an East-West dimension where none should be".[2] America cannot "stand by and do nothing when friendly states are threatened by our own adversaries".[3] This vision started weaning with the events that came to see the collapse of the USSR and later developments within Angola itself. Even President Reagan had warned that "We should not confuse the signing of agreements with the solving of problems ... Agreements genuinely reinforce peace only when they are kept".[4] This statement was later to find its essence in the events that cropped up after the general elections in Angola, and of course was to mark a turning point in US policy towards Angola.

American foresight of the problem in Angola was too short-sighted, and needed a drastic review. Quoting George Washington, President Reagan thought that "To be prepared for war is ... the most effectual means of preserving peace",[5] but he was later to realise that:

> ...the one clear pattern to world events...
> is in the opposite direction. It is the
> determination of men and women of all races
> and conditions to gain control of their own
> destinies and free themselves from arbitrary
> domination ... the burning desire to live
> unhindered in a world that respects the

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1   *Realism*, 1984, p. 19.

2   *Realism*, 1984, p. 21.

3   Ibid.

4   *Realism*, 1984, p. 31.

5   *Realism*, 1984, p.3.

rights of individuals and nations.[6]

William Jefferson Clinton was innaugurated into office on January 20, 1993. Viewing the events that unfolded in Angola after the UN supervised elections, and in purely democratic style, was intent on making a volte face with the past. After the labourious negotiations that gave birth to the Bicesse peace accord in 1991, and the subsequent elections that took place in Angola in September 1992, it was with dismay that the US and the entire international community witnessed a resumption of violence, at the behest of UNITA, whose leader Savimbi had promised to "turn Luanda into ash and rubble".[2] The lamentations of a Senior South African diplomat (allies of the US in supporting Savimbi) were very touching: "We and the Americans created Savimbi, but no one controls him."[3] Even the resolutions of UNAVEM, calling on the parties in the Angolan conflict to halt violence and move to the negotiating table were not heeded to, as Savimbi continued to rampage the country, sending cold sweat down the spines of Herman Cohen who warned that "Savimbi will face international condemnation and isolation if he returns to the civil war".[4] The condemnation of Savimbi by the troika (Portugal, Russia and the US) who brokered the Abidjan talks that led to the general elections of September 1992, and the condemnation of the OAU leaders meeting in June 1993 in Cairo, Egypt on UNITA and the general deterioration of the situation in Angola was bound to affect US policy in a remarkable manner.

With all these in mind, Clinton had to re-fashion US policy towards Angola, focusing it on a post-Coldwar security strategy that could deal with conflicts arising from the legacy of

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[1] *Realism,* 1984, p. 6

[2] *Africa Report,* January-February 1993, p. 28.

[3] *Africa Report,* January-February 1993, p. 28.

[4] *Africa Report,* Januray-February 1993, p. 28.

superpower-sponsored regional military build-ups[5]. Such a policy, he thought, "would not necessitate only structuring a revitalized UN-based global peace-keeping system, but also relying heavily on strengthening regional institutions, such as the OAU", [2] A reformulation of his African policy cannot be separated from a broader coming to terms by the US with a new global environment - one that is rife with instability stemming from superpower-sponsored regional military build-ups and arms races that are bitter legacies of the Coldwar. With the realization that the unsettled situation in Angola, Mozambique and South Africa continued to threaten and undermine the potential for regional cooperation and integration in Southern Africa on which the continent is hitching its economic recovery, Clinton came to see the real importance of conflict resolution as a pre-condition for recovery. The election results that showed the MPLA government in Luanda as victors, coupled with the fact that the results were appraised by the UN and other countries, the recalcitrant attitude of Savimbi at the time when the US was interested in seeing democracy implant itself in the world, made Clinton's administration to take the unprecedented decision of "dumping" Savimbi, and recognising the MPLA government in Luanda. This act, that received the tacit approval of the international community was followed by the appointment of Edmund T. De Jarnette, as Washington's ambassador to Luanda, on November 8, 1993, changing history. The recognition of the Luanda government by the US and the appointment of an ambassador by the US to Luanda, is a clear indication that henceforth the US will be ready to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Angola and this will imply rescinding cooperation with Savimbi and his UNITA clique. If this happens, as the signs are already there, then the rebel leader will be forced in spite of himself to negotiate, this time from a position of weakness,

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[1]   It is Major-General Joe Garba, one-time Nigerian Foreign Minister and Ambassador to the UN who wrote that "Interests change over time and are relative to each other" in *Diplomatic Soldiering*, Ibadan, Spectrum Books Ltd., 1987, p. 210

[2]   *Africa Report*, January-February 1993, p. 14.

or face the wrath of a joint US-Luanda-international community - this will be too much for him to bear. If Clinton ever comes to strike Savimbi very hard, he will only be confirming what Reagen in 1984 had said, that "Power and diplomacy always go together",[1] and in doing this, he will have the cooperation of the international community.

c.   Changing US policy towards Angola vis-à-vis the sub- sib- region and the International Community.

> "The next phase of US involvement can be
> construtive if we bear in mind that we are
> dealing with a region, not a set of isolated
> problems. It has never made sense to conjure
> up one policy towards South Africa and another
> towards one or more of its neighbours."[2]
>   - Dr Chester A. Crocker,
>   Former US Secretary of State.

The appointment of DeJarnette as US ambassador to Luanda by President Clinton, following formal US recognition of the MPLA government, is a culmination of a process that had started as far back as the 1980s, when the US sought to achieve peace in the embattled Southern African region. For various reasons, Washington sought to replace the pro-communist MPLA government of Dos Santos, with a pro-Western one of Savimbi. Althrough the negotiations that culminated into the signing of the New York Accords, the secret US intention was never revealed. Savimbi who was not invited to take part in the talks felt betrayed by the US, especially as the accords confirmed the withdrawal of the SADF from both Angola and Namibia and a halt to the RSA from aiding UNITA. The fact that the cutting of this aid was going to affect UNITA and its efforts to topple the MPLA, Savimbi felt bitter about the New York Accords and decided to take new initiatives.

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[1]   *Realism*, 1984, P. 10.

[2]   Dr Chester Crocker, "Southern Africa: Eight Years Later" in *Foreign Affairs,* Vol. 68, No. 4, Fall 1989, p. 164.

Washington, of course, was calculative. The withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola was going to render the Luanda government permeable and inccessant UNITA attacks at this time of the "Triple Zero[1]" option, it was thought that the MPLA will run into difficulties, and will be forced to negotiate or see its collapse. This was not to happen as UNITA resumed violence after the September 28-29 1992 elections, voilence that won for the movement, the contempt of even the most ardent of its supporters. In the face of the stupenduous and recalcitrant attitude of Savimbi, the US government in its bewildered state was left with nothing other than a change in policy.

The outcome of the US-sponsored talks between Angola, Cuba and South Africa had led to the independence of Namibia and was going to "influence the opportunities for a new relationship with the Angolan government", affirmed Michael Clough.[2] "Southern Africa has always been a difficult terrain for US policymakers".[3] The several failures involved in the Reagan Administration's policy of "constructive engagement" (that was adopted by his successor, George Bush), are only the latest in a long series of frustrated initiatives. Over the past three decades, Republican and Democratic officials alike have repeatedly miscalculated the stability of white rule, with equally damaging consequences.[4] In their efforts to promote political change in Southern Africa, some administrations have relied on strategies emphasizing "quiet diplomacy"[5] and "positive measures"[6], others on strategies

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[1]   Triple Zero is an option that was adopted after the Bicesse peace accord, banning the importation of arms from the international market by the parties to the Angolan Conflict.

[2]   See Michael Clough, "Southern Africa: Challenges and Choices", in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 66, No. 5, Summer 1988. p. 1067.

[3]   Ibid.

[4]   Michael Clough, Summer 1988, p. 1068.

[5]   Ibid.

[6]   Ibid.

emphasizing pressure and isolation. Both approaches have been tried several times, and each time they have failed to produce quick results. As one approach falls into disfavour, the other is revised, and the cycle begins anew.

There has always been differences between the administration and Congress over issues concerning Southern Africa, especially when it comes to imposing sanctions on the Pretoria government or to give aid to UNITA. The so-called "Reagan doctrine",[1] looked at aid to UNITA as "part of a global struggle for freedom."[2] A critical first step in developing a more effective policy towards Southern Africa was to resolve at long last, the tangle of issues that had blocked the establishment of a normal relationship between the US and Angola. US policy towards Angola had been proceeding on two contradictory tracks - one, the effort to achieve a diplomatic settlement leading to Namibian independence, and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola - these two were considered as being consistent with US commitment to regional stability. Michael Clough holds that "the decision to provide aid to UNITA was based on ideological and domestic political consideratins that had little to do with the situation in Southern Africa.[3] But the realization by both the USSR and Cuba that the Angolan conflict could not be won militarily, that a continued stalement is a costly drain on scarce resources, and most important, that a politcally acceptable settlement is possible, had to make them to accept negotiations in preference for a continued military support for the MPLA.

The change of government from the Republican George Bush to the Democrat Bill Clinton, the changes in the

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1. A doctrine that formed the basis of Reagan's foreign policy, that aimed at withholding the earlier Monroe doctrine of not allowing any territory in the Western hemisphere from falling into communist insurgency. This doctrine, that originally was to apply to the American continent, to Reagan, became a global policy with no defined dimensions.

2. Michael Clough, Summer 1988, p. 1069.

3. Michael Clough, Summer 1988, 1088.

international environment, and the disastrous turn of events in Angola, had to prompt Clinton to change policy toward Angola. In doing this, he kind of was accepting with Daniel Webster that:

> our true mission [is] not to propagate our
> opinions or impose upon other countries
> our form of government by artifice or force,
> but to teach by example and show by our
> success, moderation and justice, the
> blessings of self-government and the
> advantages of free institutions.[1]

Thus with the end of the Coldwar in 1989, democratic changes were brought into America's position in the international system, "forcing a rethinking of the assumptions that guided foreign policy for nearly half a century."[2] The implications of these epocal changes for American Foreign policy were highly paradoxical. The novel situation that came to exist made the connection drawn between world order and American security more tenuous than ever. American foreign policy now aimed for the "high, plain, yet dizzy ground that separates influence from intervention"[3], to quote David Hendrickson.

The change in US policy toward Angola has of course had a great effect in the sub-region and even beyond. The rapid changes that are taking place there are thanks to this change in US policy. In Angola itself, the peace negotiations currently taking place in Lusaka, Zambia, is progressing, this notwithstanding the fighting that is on between the rival factions in Angola. The recognition of the Luandan government by the US, marking a shift in policy has acted as a deus-ex-machina to the South African government that has also accepted to seriously consider opting for better relations with all the

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[1]   Daniel Webster, quoted by David Hendrickson, in "The Renovation of American Foreign Policy" in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 71, No. 2, 1990, p. 51.

[2]   Hendrickson, 1990, p. 54.

[3]   Hendrickson, 1990, p. 62.

frontline states and Angola and Mozambique in particular. It has also drastically reduced tension in the region; and this change in direction of US policy, it should be remarked, was already visible as early as 1991 and this positively affected Pretoria's relationship with Luanda, creating an opening for Pretoria to launch a diplomatic offensive the world over.

In recent months a variety of nations have indicated that renewed or new diplomatic ties to South Africa are in the making.[1] In Africa this includes the new Zambian President, Frederick Chiluba, who stated just after his election that he intended to "normalize"[2] relations with South Africa. Diplomatic missions from Zaire, Kenya, Côte d'Ivoire, Togo and several other African nations have been sniffing around South Africa on a regular basis. Namibia has announced that it will hold off on full diplomatic relations until it is joined by all Front Line States, but it is opening an "interest"[3] section. In the Far East, the stampede is more open, with Japan announcing its intention to establish relations, and China making similar declarations. Taiwan had a mission in Pretoria but trimmed it down a few years ago. It is opening on a full time basis, has set up direct air links, hosted a visit by President De Klerk and looks set to move to an uninhibited financial and trade relationship.

Most of Western Europe had kept its ties, but were cool to the South African regime. Now they are turning around in attitude and commercial intercourse. The former East European nations are also flocking in. Romania is the first to establish a mission but the others are following. The USSR itself has already got an "interest"[4] section with senior diplomatic

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[1] See *Washington Report on Africa*, "Diplomatic Ties To South Africa", November 19, 1991, p. 71.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

personnel and is actively pursuing full relations. They invited De Klerk and the latter responded. Israel which had always kept open private and possibly intelligent lines to South Africa, has come out fully to normalize, including hosting De Klerk and , in a unique approach, has actually apologized for adhering to sanctions in the past and harming South Africa.[1] There have been ovatures to Angola, Italy, France and the Baltic States of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania. In the first instance, Angola and South Africa have announced they will open "representative offices"[2] in order to "facilitate better communications"[3] between the two countries. In the case of Italy, the Italian Deputy Foreign Minister visited South Africa and announced that the two countries were "on the threshold of a new phase of relations".[4] France which had been one of the harshest European critics of South Africa for years, sent its National Assembly President to "mend fences"[5] as the *Johannesburg Star* reported it, and meet with the government and other political leaders. The visit was looked at as a "breaking of the ice"[6]. Foreign Minister Pik Botha visited all the Baltic states and announced, on his departure, the formal establishment of full diplomatic relations.

This warm embrace given the RSA by the international community has positively affected the Pretoria regime. Several important sanctions have been removed, as well as the formal establishment of diplomatic relations with Japan,[7] on January 13, 1992. Japan's Minister of Foreign Affairs said that this was

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[1]   Ibid.

[2]   *Washington Report on Africa*, "Diplomatic Ties to South Africa Grow", December 4, 1991, p. 78.

[3]   Ibid.

[4]   Ibid.

[5]   Ibid.

[6]   Ibid.

[7]   *Washington Report on Africa*, "South Africa Gaining Acceptance", January 17, 1992, p. 6.

occuring because of "the positive developments in South Africa towards establishing democratic institutions."[1] On the sanctions agenda, South Korea, the Philippines and Thailand announced in early January 1992 that they were removing trade sanctions.[2] Thailand promised opening a consulate in South Africa. Most importantly, in terms of South Africa's needs, Denmark announced on January 9, 1992[3] the lifting of its sanctions on iron, steel and gold coins, although it would maintain coal and a few other selective bans. According to the *Wall Street Journal*, Denmark was the only European Community country that was maintaining sanctions and had blocked the other 11 members from removing any further bans. Its action will propel the other EC member states into removing their remaining sanctions. Finally, Australia, which had been warming up to South Africa, but still had formal sanctions in place, announced on January 9, 1992 the resumption of Quantas Airline flights between Perth and Johannesburg on a weekly basis. The diplomatic ovatures made by the RSA in recent months and the cooling down of tension in the region, must be looked at as consequences of a changing US foreign policy toward not just Angola, but towards the entire sub-region.[4]

D. **Options open to Savimbi and the international community in the wake of a changed United States policy toward Angola.**

"Savimbi will face international condemnation and isolation if he returns to the civil war."[5]

- Andrew Meldrum.

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Notice the open tradefair that was organised in Johannesburg in 1993 to attract foreign investors and the subsequent economic missions like SIDCO that came to Cameroon to promote South African industrial production.

[5] Quoted by Andrew Meldrum in *Africa Report*, January-February 1993, p. 28.

The changing stakes of US policy toward Angola are going to impact the former's relationship with UNITA and Savimbi in predictable domains. After the signing on December 22, 1988 of the New York Accords, an Angolan clergyman expressed his feelings of satisfaction in the following words: "We have solved our external problems",[1] but nevertheless contended that: "We still have UNITA to contend with."[2] There was, and still remain every reason to worry about UNITA and its leader Savimbi, who for close to 30 years has embarked in guerilla warfare until he finds it difficult to abandon this life-style and come to live without the clacking of guns. The New York Accords worked well for Namibia and SWAPO, but also gave Angola the chance to make a fresh start; it left an unresolved internal conflict, which still remains the biggest challenge to the warring factions.

Jonas Savimbi is a charismatic figure, who has always used his fluency in many languages to influence Western journalists and personalities. His eloquence and oratory is far beyond comparison and his sharp and crisp responses to questions has always revealed him as an intelligent man who should not be underestimated. Nevertheless, behind this bulky and astute personality, who brades in intelligence and patriotic attachment, hides the true impostor. A detailed analysis of his utterings and background will reveal the other side of him - parochial, impatient, vaultingly ambitious, super-confident, and proud. After the signing of the New York Accords, a disgusted Savimbi was quick to say that unless the MPLA government is prepared to share power with him, he will fight on as he has done for the past 30 years[3]. His narrow-mindedness and over-confident nature let him to quickly proclaim that:

> If only 50% of [the Cubans] leave, the
> situation will change completely. If all

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[1]   Quoted in *New African*, March 1989, p. 13.

[2]   Ibid.

[3]   *New African*, March 1989, p. 11.

> of them leave, it becomes a new ballgame.
> MPLA will be extremely weakened and unless
> they negotiate with UNITA, they risk losing
> everything.[1]

The short-sightedness inherent in such declarations is glaring. Five years after the statement, and three years after the complete pullout of Cuban troops, Jonas Malheiro Savimbi is still to realise his dream - an indication that he does not actually weild the power he pupports.

"All I want is for multi-party democracy to be installed".[2] This became a reality in 1991 when the MPLA recognised the legal existence of UNITA, accepted to go into talks with the movement, and even planned for general elections before the end of September 1992. Shamelessly, Savimbi told a Western journalist that if UNITA lost the elections, he will claim that they were rigged, and will go back to war.[3] Such declarations betray the so-called "democratic freedom fighter" as he is known in Washington. Jonas Savimbi's character is complicated, energetic and restless, eratic and impulsive, melodramatic and exhibitionist. It is this nature in him that has led to his virtual abandonment by his mentors, the US and the RSA.

"We and the Americans created Savimbi, but no one controls him".[4] This statement by a senior South African diplomat reveals how embarassing Savimbi has become to the people who made him what he is. After the signing of the New York Accords the South Africans told him that, "we are sorry, we remain sympathetic to your cause, but we cannot contribute any more",[5] this could have been a nice occasion for the rebel leader to realise that the

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[1]   Ibid.

[2]   Ibid.

[3]   *Africa Report*, January-February 1993, p. 28.

[4]   *New African*, March 1989, p. 11.

[5]   Ibid.

stakes in international relations are never the same; in this light, he ought to have started considering abandoning the military option, and taking seriously to dialogue. The recognition of the MPLA government by the US and the appointment of an ambassador to Luanda reaffirms the fact that in international relations, there are no permanent friends, nor permanent enemies, but there are permanent interests. Once these interests are pursued, the pendulum of policy options can swing to any direction that these interests are found. This is exactly what has happened to Savimbi.

The abandonment of UNITA and Savimbi by the South Africans at a time that he needs them the most, is a clear indication that the latter are no longer willing to indulge in useless warfare. Savimbi ought to realise that the stakes have have changed and start picking the spoils. The best option opened to him will be to engage in veritable dialogue with the MPLA, in order that the greatest shock and embarassment should not come his way.

A compromise option that was reached for Savimbi by some eminent African leaders, was for the rebel leader to quit the political scene if he has patriotic feelings for Angola. In doing this, he must have sacrified all in the name of peace, and go on exile to a willing African country, leaving the MPLA with the choice of intergrating members of his movement into the government and other structures of the state. This proposal which was mooted by African leaders chose Morocco as the country of exile, and King Hassan II expressed his willingness to receive Savimbi. Sadly enough, Savimbi turned down this offer, saying "No, never! If any one has to step down, it is Eduardo dos Santos, not me. He has not fought the liberation war... I have fought for 30 years for this country."[1] In the light of this refusal, one begins to wonder what the rebel leader is up for. "Neither army can completely destroy the other",[2] says a Cuban

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[1]   *New African*, March 1989, p. 12.

[2]   *New African*, March 1989, p.13

diplomat in Luanda, and the situation in Angola is the classic case of a conventional army facing guerilla forces".[1] Savimbi must understand that with the present situaion, and in the new international environment, coupled with the imposition of the "Triple Zero" option, a military victory is far-fetched. The only true option that is open to him is for his movement to abandon the fighting and live with the changing times, by accepting true dialogue. Recently in the Lusaka talks, the rebel movement came up with conditionalities that appeared difficult, if not, impossible, for the MPLA to accept. UNITA insisted that its participation in any coalition government with the MPLA will be based on the latter's acceptance to cede to UNITA, three strategic portfolios – Defense, Internal Security and Finance.[2] We see this as foolhardiness, because no true government no matter how weak it is, will sacrifice these ministries of sovereignty, on the alter of peace. This will be tantamount to capitulation. There has been moderation on the side of UNITA on the Lusaka talks, with the announcement of the abandonment of the conditionalities on portfolio by the head of delegation of UNITA.[3] This of course, could be a realization of the impossibility inherent in it, and a means to break the deadlock in negotiations, and push forward the stalled talks. As events unfold, the world looks with increasing anxiety, which way things will turn.

The tribal factor can hardly be dismissed from African politics. Savimbi hails from the Ovimbundu country, which is a stronghold of UNITA (see Map No. 7), situated in the central part of Angola, conserving the largest population among the tribes. There is a possibility that if Savimbi abandons warfare and

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[1]   Ibid.

[2]   C.R.T.V. Radio News Bulletin, 3 p. m. Monday 14 March, 1994.

[3]   C.R.T.V. Radio News Bulletin, 3 p.m. Wednesday 16 March 1994. The MPLA government on March 21, 1994 announced other concessions to UNITA. They offered 3 cabinet posts, 3 ambassadorial posts, and 3 provincial governorships to UNITA. Of course, UNITA turned it down, claiming that it was insufficient.

resorts to veritable dialogue with the authorities in Luanda, penetrating the country and his stronghold, he might have many voices to listen to him. In this case, in the course of an election he might carry the day. The result of the hurriedly concluded general elections seem to confirm this hypothesis. Savimbi was able to pull a 40.3% in the first round of the presidentials, as against the 48.8% of Dos Santos, despite the fact that he did not have enough time to do campaigning. The second round of elections could have turned the tables, but Savimbi abandoned it and once more took to the bush. Had Savimbi accepted to wait for three years as demanded by the MPLA, he could have had enough time to penetrate the country, and perhaps, the results would have been different. But being an over-confident and impatient man, he hurriedly and emphatically pressed for elections and lost in the end.

The international community especially those countries that were actively aiding UNITA in its internercine war with the MPLA, now have only one option - stop aid to this movement and force Savimbi to accept true dialogue. Zaire especially must cease from allowing UNITA insurgents using its territory as a base for acts of destabilization against the Luanda government. The countries of the world must impose an arms embargo on UNITA, isolate the movement, close its offices the world over, freeze its accounts in foreign banks and force it to negotiate.

In doing this they, should bear in mind that UNITA has ceased from being the "liberation movement" it claimed to be at the dawn of independence in 1975, but a "destabilization movement" in present times. Savimbi should not be viewed any more as a "democratic freedom fighter", but rather, an "anti-democratic, trouble-shooter". If the interntional community (the OAU and UNO inclusive) can reason in this light, the problems in Angola will be half solved. In this way, it will be easy for concerted action to be taken against both the rebel movement and the rebel leader, which might open the way for true peace in the beleagued country. It is too early for one to suggest a joint

military action against Savimbi and UNITA in the like of the
ECOMOG on Charles Taylor and his NPFL, but this option is not
dismissed, if the rampage continues. If the present attempts at
reaching a pacific settlement of the dispute fail to present any
real solution due to the recalcitrance of UNITA, such an option
should not be down-played.

The superpowers and all bellingerents in the Angolan
conflict should completely withdraw all support to factions they
support. Eventhough the coldwar has virtually ended and the
superpowers have disengaged militarily from Angola, they still
have not committed themselves veritably to the search for peace
in the country in the same spirit as they did to come out
militarily. A re-dynamised OAU could be a good instrument to put
such an item such as the search for peace in Angola, on its
agenda. If this is done, it could lead to an awareness on how
to solve the other intractable conflicts that bisect the
continent. In this way, Africa will cease from being the
perpetual trouble spot of the world. Its rich and diverse
resources(see Map 2 and 5) will be put into veritable
development, and in the end, this continent that prides itself
in being the richest in terms of the possession of raw materials,
could become the economic melting point of the world in the 21st
century.

CHAPTER TWO

THE GBADOLITE TALKS AND THEIR CONTRIBUTION
TO THE ANGOLAN PEACE PROCESS

A.   The Search for an African Solution:

In the long and oudious task of negotiations to arrive at
a veritable success for the theory of linkage, most often the
parties concerned in the Southern African situation evoked
another problem, that of the resolution of the internal problem
in Angola; a desire to achieve real reconciliation for the
parties involved in the conflict. For the US and South Africa,
it was a desire to obtain a political role for UNITA, and all
their efforts were imbued in this.[1]   On the part of the MPLA
government, the problem was envisaged on how to integrate the
rebel movement into the structures of national institutions that
were already existing.[2] The USSR's position was a bit cloudy; if
it had to maintain its support for the MPLA, will that not
perturb the process of national reconciliation that was under
survey?[3] It must be recalled that this was the USSR's position
as far back as 1977, even when the MPLA seemed to be effectively
dominating the political scene in Angola.

Each of these actors, eventhough being favourable to a
pacific settlement to the conflict, was not willing to bear the
cost. This explains why external support for UNITA and to the
MPLA remained constant. External intervention in the dispute
persisted, and this factor remained the most difficult obstacle
in the search for peace. At first, it was a problem of making
concessions to arrive at a certain equilibrium of forces in the
sub-region. Later, the problem to be resolved became purely
political. The protagonists were fighting to conquer political

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[1]   "Good signs in Angola," in *Los Angeles Times*, January 3, 1988.

[2]   *Keesing's*, Vol. 35, No. 2, February 1989, p. 36479.

[3]   William Claiborne, "Soviet role in Angola Pact marks major
shift", in *The Washington Post*, December 5, 1988.

power in Angola. In this situation, peace without losers became an illusion and unattainable.[1] There had to be a victor and a vainquished. In this light, if the MPLA government succeeded in crumbling the structures of UNITA, it could be legitimately considered as the victor in the war. Counterwise, if UNITA succeeded in obtaining the status quo ante, that is, pressing for the organisation of elections before determining to whom the principal political roles had to go, victory will obviously be to its side. There nevertheless existed a middle-of-the-course road to these two propositions: a mediation that will reconcile and compromise the two parties. It is this option that was chosen by African leaders, in their numerous attempts at resolving the Angolan conflict.

While the fighting between UNITA and the MPLA continued, and the peace process initiated by Dr Chester Crocker was nearing the point of success, President José Eduardo Dos Santos of Angola met his Gabonese and Congolese counterparts in Franceville on October 1, 1988[2] to resolve the Angolan civil war. On the same day, but this time in Gbadolité, Presidents Mobutu Sese Sékou of Zaire and Pieter Botha of the RSA met. At the end of these two meetings, rumours started circulting on the eventuality of a mini-summit regrouping the Presidents of Gabon, Zaire, Congo, Zambia, Angola and the RSA, in Lusaka. This rumour was later dispelled by President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, who declared that he could not welcome into his country the South African President, without certain conditions being fulfilled.[3]

With these meetings at the summit level, the UNITA leader started proposing peace. He proposed withdrawing from all negotiation process to be carried out with the Luanda government, that is, staying behind the scene and letting the other members

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[1]   This expression is that of Chester Crocker.

[2]   "Angola: Crunch time," in *New African*, December 1988.

[3]   *Keesing's*, February 1989, p. 36453.

of his movement carry on with the negotiations. He also talked of the organisation in Angola of free and fair elections[1] within the shortest possible time. Nevertheless, he considered that the New York Accords of December 22, 1988 was a sell-out of his movement, because UNITA was not mentioned in the deliberations. He equally considered as unacceptable the proposition of amnesty that was offered his movement by the Luanda authorities and even launched a military offensive against it on February 4, 1989. On February 14, 1989 he announced a halt to this offensive - ten days after it was started, but not to be mistaken for a ceasefire. This was in response to a call for peace by the late Ivorian leader, Félix Houphouët-Boigny.[2] The government of Luanda which was fervently opposed to any negotiation with UNITA on such conditionalities, found itself divided on the question.[3] It became obvious that a majority in the MPLA central committee, supported by many African countries remained hostile to any form of dialogue with UNITA. Nevertheless, direct and secret contacts were being made between the two protagonists, UNITA and the MPLA.[4] Some observers hold that the hesitance of the Luanda government to accept to negotiate with Jonas Savimbi is thanks to the fear of the latter's charisma.[5] Whether or not this is plausible, still has to be verified.

The first concrete and veritable proposition to negotiate, after the signing of the peace accords of New York came from UNITA on March 13, 1989. In a 5-point proposition, UNITA considerably enlarged the possibilities of negotiation.[6] The

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[1] *New African*, December 1988, p. 21.

[2] *Keesing's*, News digest for February 1989, p. 36453.

[3] "Angola-Namibia Accord: Act two" in *The Christian Science Monitor*, February 23, 1989.

[4] Ibid.

[5] E.A. Wayne, "Congress keeps wary eyes on Angola", in *The Christian Science Monitor*, April 20, 1989.

[6] Orrin Hatch, "The lessons of Angola", in *The Washington Times*, June 13, 1989.

most significant of these propositions was the decision for Savimbi to withdraw from all negotiations, leaving his party to dialogue with the MPLA, and also, the installation of a transitional government that will prepare the country for free and fair elections.[1] On this point, the Luanda government instead talked of a general amnesty for UNITA adherents, and a government clemency for these "lost brothers".[2] A step forward was made when on may 16, 1989 in Luanda, 8 Central and South African heads of state met to discuss the Angolan civil war.[3] For the first time in his peace plan, President Eduardo dos Santos talked of "national reconciliation".[4] It also appeared that dialogue could be established between the protagonist factions. Obviously, certain points in this peace plan directly contradicted the position of the rebel movement. In this meeting, it was suggested and proposed that Jonas Savimbi should go on exile, that UNITA be integrated into the MPLA, and that the constitution of the Popular Republic of Angola be respected.

As a result of this meeting, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs in the State Department, Mr Herman Cohen, became confident on the possibilities of a peaceful solution in future, of the Angolan imbroglio.[5] This, of course, did not take into consideration, the controversies that already existed, as regards to certain expressions. In particular to be mentioned, was that of "national reconciliation". While for the MPLA this expression signified a rallying of all national political sensibilities into a government of national unity,[6]

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[1]   Hearings before the House of Representatives, p. 79.

[2]   David B. Ottaway, "Angola agrees to negotiate a settlement" in *The Washington Post*, May 20, 1989.

[3]   Ibid.

[4]   Hearings before the House of Representatives, p. 79.

[5]   E.A. Wayne, "U.S. wants to play role of catalyst", in *The Christian Science Monitor*, May 24, 1989.

[6]   Interview of Mr Pedro de Castro Van-Dunem "Loy" in Yaounde on March 20, 1990, to C.R.T.V. Radio News Bulletin, 3 p.m.

for UNITA it was rather a question of a reorganisation of all national institutions in a democratic manner.[1] In line with this controversy, was of course, that of "integration" which later came out of the Gbadolité conference of June, 22, 1989.

B.   The Gbadolité Conference of June 22, 1989

The disappearance of the international aspect of the Angolan conflict - that included the presence of Cuban and South African troops in Angola and the link that this problem had with the Namibian question - in effect increased the possibilities of a solution to the Angolan conflict. Influenced by the dynamism of the peace initiative that was given birth by the New York Accords of December 22, 1988, the actors who were directly involved in the Angolan internal conflict consented to put all their efforts into a process of negotiation that obviously will be difficult, but not impossible. The brainchild of this commendable effort, was none other than President Mobutu Sese Sékou of Zaire, and the birth of it all, was the Gbadolité conference of June 22, 1989.

We might tend to ask why Zaire, and Mobutu and not any other African country or leader? The choice of Gbadolité in Zaire, of course, is obvious. For a very long time, in fact, since the inception of the war in 1975, the US had been using Zaire as a passage for the supply of military hardware to UNITA, and also as a safe base for the training of the latter's forces. Besides, Zaire had been for long one of the strongest allies of the Angolan rebel movement, and its leader had established a reputation as an "enfant cheri" of the US, just like Savimbi. Mobutu being the spoilt child of the US, he had been manipulated for quite a long time by Washington, and could still be manipulated any time Washington so desired.

In this context, Mobutu became the power broker in the central African sub-region, and a very instrumental figure in determining the course of peace in Angola. He had been more

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[1]   Interview of Jonas Savimbi to *Jeune Afrique,* 1989, p. 46.

committed than any other African head of state in the Angolan conflict, not only because of the economic interests his country was going to reap in the event of a UNITA victory, but also as the Dean of the leaders of this region in terms of age and longivity in service, and the strategic advantage of sharing common borders with Angola (notice that President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia also had this last aspect, but not the first two), he was in a vantage position to talk peace with the parties involved in the conflict. Most important, and a non negligible aspect, was the faint American hand behind this initiative. The conference holding at a time that the stakes of the US in Angola and the entire southern African sub-region had not changed, the choice of Mobutu to act as mediator, and Zaire to be the venue was of course, not accidental, but deliberate. It was an American design intended to perpetuate its influence in the whole process. This accounts for why the whole process flopped. It flopped because it was a conference stemmed from far away, and the strings pulled by unconcerned parties. This decision, that heavily belies the reason why the conference failed to produce the required results, is debateable, nevertheless, one will agree without much ado that Mobutu and Zaire, were not the best choice in terms of seriousness of the personality and the impartiality of his judgements.

While Mobutu presided, a careful observer saw the invisible hand of the US manipulating, in the hope of obtaining the expected results. But this was not to be the case, as the parties broke off from Gbadolité, more confused, more diversed and more resolute in their bid to go back to the fighting grounds. Gbadolité revealed that a pre-established motive for any negotiation that involves ideologically disparaged parties, hardly comes out with satisfying results. This will act as a lesson for future negotiators.

Gbadolité. Zaire. June 22, 1989. 18 African heads of state came to perform one scene in the many acts of the Angolan tragedy. The event remains remarkable, at least for its

precedence. This conference, at least in its attempt at bringing the protagonist parties together in great concertation with the aim of reaping a concensus, ended up as a non event. The gesture of two enemy brothers shaking hands for the first time in the presence of 18 heads of state remains commendable, and a fresh memory to the multitude of journalists who thronged the conference room to see the "great event". Apart from the ceremonial, it is convenient to remember only that there was a Gbadolité.

After the Luanda meeting of May 16, 1989,[1] a rendez-vous was taken for another meeting in August. In between this period of waiting, President Mobutu met with Jonas Savimbi on May 30, and on June 5, he met with Dos Santos - all in Gbadolité. The essence of these two meetings was of course, obvious - to prepare the stage for the "great" Gbadolité conference that was still in gestation. It was here that the date of June 22, 1989 was arrived at, for the next process of negotiation. It should be remarked that a small controversy came up on the genesis of this conference; President Mobutu later held that the idea of this conference came to him on February 22, 1989 during the funeral ceremony of the late Japanese Emperor, Hiro Hito,[2] a point that was sharply contradicted by all the heads of state who were present in Franceville on October 1, 1988.[3]

As earlier mentioned, the conference was built for June 22, 1989. The following heads of state and government were invited to attend: Presidents José Eduardo dos Santos of Angola, Quet Mazire of Botswana, Gen. Pierre Buyoya of Burundi, Aristides Pierera of Cape Verd, Gen. Hissen Habré of Chad, Gen. Denis Sassou-Nguesso of Congo, Gen. André Kolingba of the Central African Republic, Paul Biya of Cameroon, Omar Bongo of Gabon,

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1   This meeting grouped the presidents of Angola, Congo, Gabon, Mozambique, Sao Tomé and Principé, Zaire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

2   "Accord de Cessez-le-feu entre Luanda et l'UNITA" in *Le Monde*, 15-07-89, p. 6.

3   "Recherche en parternité pour un accord de paix", in *Le Monde* 15-07-89, p. 6.

Gen. Moussa Traoré of Mali, Joachim Chissano of Mozambique, Gen. Ibrahim Gbadamasi Babangida of Nigeria, Gen. Juvenal Habriarimana of Rwanda, Manuel Pinto da Costa of Sao Tomé and Principé, Dr Kenneth David Kaunda of Zambia, Dr Robert Gabriel Mugabe of Zimbabwe, General Joâo Bernardo Vieira of Guinea Bissau, and Field Marshal Mobutu Sese Sekou of Zaire – in fact, an agglomeration of the biggest heads in Africa, for a talk-shop. To this list should be added the representative of Morocco, and Tanzania.

Arriving at the end of the morning of June 22, 1989, these remarkable guests had to concert for about 5 hours. It is after this concertation that the UNITA leader, Dr Jonas Malheiro Savimbi was invited into the conference hall, by Dr Kaunda, who was presiding over the occasion. He enjoined Savimbi "to join the legitimate government of Luanda" and to "stop all external intervention in the conflict".[1] It is here that Omar Bongo exploded, "But no, Kaunda! We have exchanged viewpoints on the problem of external aggression, but we have not agreed on any accord on this point".[2] It is here that Savimbi retorted in the following terms: "I have come to listen to you people with much attention and respect. The eyes of the whole world are turned towards Gbadolité. Please
help us to find a solution that will honour Angola and Africa."[3]

The 3-point plan proposed by President Mobutu was later to be accepted by the two protagonist parties. After having made a synthesis of the propositions of the MPLA and UNITA, Mobutu came out with his, which comprised of : the willingness of the parties to achieve national reconciliation; a ceasefire as form June 24, 1989; and the creation of a committee which, under the guidance of a mediator, the Zairean president was going to work

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[1]   Sennen Andriamirado, "Angola, duel pour la paix", in *Jeune Afrique*, No. 1530 du 30 Avril, 1990, p. 29.

[2]   Ibid.

[3]   *Jeune Afrique*, 1990, p. 47 (Author's translation).

to prepare for direct negotiatons.[1] A consensus was not reached
on a forth point, due to UNITA's refusal to "integrate" or to
"participate" in the Luanda government and armed forces.[2] Before
the chairmen of the two conflicting parties which had to
negotiate were to be introduced - the Army Chief of Staff, Gen.
França Ndalu for the MPLA and the Secretary for Information Jorge
Valentin for UNITA, the hall witnessed the famous headshake
between President José Eduardo dos Santos of the MPLA and Dr
Jonas Malheiro Savimbi of UNITA. Gbadolité, in this respect, was
at least, an event.

After this conference, the two parties held four meetings
of negotiation between June 22 and August 17, in a bide to arrive
at a ceasefire.[3] These efforts unfortunately got drowned in the
war of words that had already been taking place between the MPLA
and UNITA. The heads of state who participated in Gbadolité
affirmed three principles that were taken in secret; respect of
the constitution and the laws of the Popular Republic of Angola;
the integration of UNITA into the structures and institutions of
the MPLA; and the voluntary and temporary withdrawal of Savimbi
from all negotiations between his UNITA and the MPLA.[4] On this
last point were rumours circulating that the rebel leader had
accepted to go on exile in exchange for $10 million.[5] Savimbi
was to dispel such rumour with a refusal on the subject, in an
interview he accorded *New African*. He was later to dispel the
same rumour in a meeting on August 6, 1989 at Jamba,[6] and quoted
in *Jeune Afrique* of April 30, 1990. The heads of state of
central and Southern Africa were to meet once more on September
18, 1989, this time in Kinshasa, Zaire, and affirmed the

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[1]   Decisions taken at the Gbadolité Summit, p. 33.

[2]   *Le Monde* du Samedi 24 Juin 1989, p. 3.

[3]   Hearings before the House of Representatives, p. 82.

[4]   Decisions of the Harare Summit, pp. 45-46.

[5]   *New African*, March 1989, p. 12.

[6]   *Jeune Afrique*, 30 Avril, 1990, p. 30.

disposition of Harare. A new rendez-vous was taken for Gabon.
The peace of Gbadolité had died at a glance.

C.   The Search for new solutions after Gbadolité:

.Two aspects are remarkable in this after Gbadolité period -
in the first, the different parties were still revelling in the
memories of Gbadolité, while the second was characterised by the
search for new independent solutions, uninfluenced by the
propositions of Gbadolité.   In the light of this, peace
initiatives were undertaken, in view of resuscitating the old
spirit; but all this was in vain. After the failure of Gbadolité
to solve the Angolan problem, it became more evident that the
final declaration of the summit was partial. Many terms of the
accord had been manifestly guarded in secret. Why was there
secrecy in the first place? Had there really been agreement on
the other three points? From June 22, 1989 to August 22, when
the parties met at Harare, doubts had already been manifesting
among the participants and the protagonists. UNITA leader, Jonas
Savimbi contributed much to this doubt even ·before the different
heads of state who were present in Gbadolité started on separate
occasions to make declarations that were to reveal that they had
no faith in the Gbadolité accords.   In some cases, they even
compromised with Savimbi, in believing that Gbadolité was after
all, a waste of time. This of course explains why Savimbi had
sometimes. to energetically intervene to dispel all what was
agreed upon in Gbadolité, denouncing and dismissing the accords.

UNITA rejected the ceasefire, and continued its attacks all
over the country, against the hydro-electric installations of
Luanda, against the population, against transportation means,
communication facilities, and many others. On August 24, UNITA
had equally rejected the Harare communiqué. On August 26, it
announced the suspension of the peace talks including all that
had to do with a ceasefire. At the same time, it demanded a
truce of one month, during which time no offensive had to be
launched. In this contradiction of things, Savimbi also brought
to question the mediation of President Mobutu. The causes of

this failure could be found on at least two factors: a certain laxity or care-freeness in the negotiations, and the sudden change in position of Savimbi who manifestly had confidence in Mobutu.

As regards the aspect of laxity in the negotiations, certain observers have qualified Gbadolité as a "failed operation"[1], taken with extreme rapidity and hurriedness which did not entirely take into account the situation and different positions of the parties to the conflict in Angola. Another aspect, of course, concerned the second point of the accord which was secret. If it was really secret, then the heads of state had sinned by displaying a lack of modesty, especially in their declarations that gave a semblance of simple process – eventhough we realise that their accord was a fragile one, creating enough doubt as to how a brief conference was to resolve a conflict of such great magnitude.

As regards the second aspect of the failure, which is that of change of position of Savimbi, many hypotheses are discenible. The first engages the responsibility of the Ivorian President Félix Houphouët Boigny to whom Jonas Savimbi remained attached, and who loved to play an important role in the process to arrive at peace for Angola. The probability of the existence of such rivalry between African "wisemen" in as much as being plausible, is not totally verifiable. The second hypothesis and that which appears more plausible is that advanced by Luanda,[2] in this case, the influence of the US. It should be noted that before going to Gbadolité, Savimbi had lost assurance. Debates in Washington on continued assistance to him had become very intense. A great part of Congress viewed the anti-democratic and inhumanitarian actions of Savimbi with dismay and many complained that the UNITA leader should no longer be counted upon. Savimbi amongst other

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[1]   *Le Monde*, Mercredi 12, juillet 1989, p. 4.

[2]   Interview of a Luanda personnel working with the African service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Angola.

things was accused of eliminating his opponents within UNITA; of
utilizing chemical weapons in fighting the MPLA; of depending on
the revelations of sorcerers before decisions were taken; and
above all, of dominating UNITA, personalizing the movement, and
being critically undemocratic, dictatorial, autocratic,
authoritarian, totalitarian and so on.

Reference to Savimbi's anti-democratic and personality cult
nature is found in an article "Meeting in the Bush", published
in *Africa Event* of May 1991 in which the author Ahmed Rajab talks
about the seventh congress of UNITA, in which the effigy of the
bulky Savimbi dotted all areas in Jamba, even hospitals, and how
the only exceptions were those of his father and mother. In
fact, the image here is a portrayal of the rabid personality cult
that Savimbi built around himself, a thing that the U.S. Congress
reproached in bitter terms about him. He argues to such charges
that "I did not put up my posters nor has anyone asked for them
to be put down"[1] - eventhough he knows that no body could dare to
say this. According to Ahmed Rajab, Savimbi's detractors really
believe that the rebel leader eats babies![2] Citing an election
that took place in Jamba, Congress remarked with dismay that
Savimbi was the sole, unchallenged candidate, and the electoral
slogan was "Savimbi e o nosso futuro"[3] - meaning Savimbi is our
future. All these accusations, of course, had the consequence
of reducing his popularity in the US. In the same light, the
perspective of a combat to be launched in future by Savimbi alone
against the well-equiped Luanda government forces, taking into
consideration isolated guerrilla actions, that could not produce
any real result, were also points considered. At least for these
reasons, Savimbi had course to doubt himself. With Zaire
remaining as the sole ally in the sub-region, and Mobutu
enjoining him to participate in an encounter of this nature,
Savimbi felt that discussion would really be impossible, though

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[1]   *Africa Event,* May 1991, p. 20.

[2]   Ibid.

[3]   Ibid.

he went all the same. UNITA went to Gbadolité out of obligation, and not out of conviction.

Thinking about the terms of the Gbadolité meeting, the US which had earlier before proposed such a "purely African" initiative, in a letter of the State Department, criticized the Harare communiqué. Later on in the meeting of Kinshasa on September 18, in a press release, the US affirmed their supportf for Jonas Savimbi. They openly alligned themselves to the position of the latter. The question of national reconciliation followed by free and fair elections, the rejection of the idea of "exile" and of "amnesty" or that of "integration", but the pursuance of negotiations were the points Savimbi and the US stood for. This US support for Savimbi practically reversed the whole process, taking it back to the starting point.

In a last attempt, the Zairean President attempted in a series of meetings undertaken in his Côte d'Azur residence, to bring the Angolan conflicting parties into some good sentiments for each other. In this situation, he received the accord of the US. These meetings that started on October 13, 1989 ended a few days later. He received Messers Pedro de Castro Van-Dunem of Angola, Jonas Savimbi of UNITA, Herman Cohen of the US, and of course, Reolof Pik Botha of the RSA. Herman Cohen was later to confide to the press that President Mobutu and Dr Jonas Savimbi had finally reconciled with each other, after the incomprehensions of Gbadolité. The Zairean president on the other hand came out satisfied with confidence, for the success of the negotiations, or at least for the mediation role he had played.

This pacific atmosphere goes to confirm the birth of two other peace initiatives: the first in Côte d'Ivoire where President Félix Houphouët-Boigny was thinking of the holding on November 30, 1989 of a mini-summit in Yamoussoukro in relation

to the Angolan peace initiative,[1] and the second in Gabon where President Omar Bongo was also thinking of a meeting of such ovature in Libreville in the first week of January 1990. [2] On December 21, 1989 in an offensive christianed "the last assault", Angolan government forces were directed towards the strategic UNITA base of Mavinga[3] - this battle lasted three months and it completely damaged all that had been achieved, leaving the parties to begin on a fresh start.

D. The New Approach to peace between the MPLA and UNITA

In the continuous process to arrive at a negotiated settlement of the Angolan conflict, many approaches have been used. A new approach in this long process, is the one undertaken directly between UNITA and the MPLA. Being particularly worried about the failures so far in efforts to arrive at a veritable solution, taking into consideration the economic cost of the war that has dragged on for 19 years, the loss in human life, and the near exasperation of the different peace brokers who had participated in the past in these resolution efforts, the protagonists now resolved to take the bull by the horns and see what they could do on their own. Most remarkable in the reasons that led to this initiative, of course, remains the government offensive on Mavinga, the stronghold of UNITA, towards the end of 1989. LT. Gen. Antonio dos Santos França "Ndula"[4] Head of General staff of the FAPLA (The People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola) held that, "... the battle of Mavinga... was a turning point in the conflict".[5] In this war, UNITA suffered many casualties, and was almost losing initiative. According to the Chief of Staff, the battle "had a two-fold

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[1]   *Le Monde*, Jeudi 19, Octobre 1989, p. 5.

[2]   *Le Monde*, Samedi 21, October 1989, p. 3.

[3]   *West Africa*, 12-18 February, 1990, p. 241.

[4]   He had been responsible to negotiate with UNITA after Gbadolité.

[5]   *AfricAsia*, No. 38, July 1990, p. 41.

importance"[6] in that UNITA over-estimated its capacity and suffered the biggest defeat ever. Secondly, it came to the knowledge of FAPLA that South Africans were fighting alongside UNITA forces. Thus after UNITA was virtually incapacitated, it was forced to seriously take any moves for dialogue that could salvage the situation.

On December 21, 1989 government forces were directed towards the strategic UNITA position of Mavinga, in the south of the country. (See Map 7). This offensive was the first of its kind and of a large magnitude, since the beginning of the conflict. 12.000 soldiers were engaged, proceeded and protected by 400 tanks, supported by MI-35 combat helicopters and MIG-23 and SU625 bombers. BMP-1 Amphibias broke through the defensive lines of UNITA which was forced to withdraw for about 10 Kms. Military tactics had also changed. Before this offensive, the infantry used to engage troops that were protected by tanks. This time it was the reverse. The FAPLA encircled the 1st AGPR (the equivalent of an army corps) in the north and the 6th tactical group in the south; midway between Cuito-Cuanavale and Mavinga, (See Map No. 7) at Dinde, another group controlled supply roads. Their principal objective was to take control of the landing sites of Mavinga, to facilitate the supplies of food and munitions to the troops engaged in combat, and from here, to direct them towards the south to invade the other UNITA bases at Likuwa, and why not, Jamba (See Map No. 7).

Under the supervision and directive of Gen. Antonio dos Santos França, the troops were confident of victory. Combat groups with him in command had always brought back large reserves of munitions. The FALA (Angola Liberation Army) of UNITA which was used to guerrilla tactics, effectively succeeded in certain operations, in destabilizing and cutting the supply lines of the FAPLA forces. The latter was thus caught in this trap, and naturally had to start asking for negotiation. Savimbi was badly

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[1]   Ibid.

wounded, but survived to make a proposition in March. "If the MPLA forces voluntarily quit their positions around Mavinga and return to their base at Cuito-Guanavale, we will allow them to pass and will accept a ceasefire. But if they refuse to return, we will fight them and systematically destroy them".[1] During this period of fighting between the FAPLA and the FALA forces, and in transit in Luanda, Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze after having made declarations on the pacificism of the USSR, declared that it was not impossible that the war should stop before the end of the year - this was in March 1990.

The effect of this declaration was immediately felt. Having engaged in a ferocious battle, the two forces had come to realise that none could effectively neutralize the other. During the ceremonies marking the independence of Namibia in Windhoek, President José Eduardo dos Santos asked his South African counterpart Frederick Willeim de Klerk, to transmit to Savimbi his propositions for peace : the withdrawal of UNITA commandos from Luanda, in exchange for a corresponding FAPLA withdrawal from Mavinga; and direct and secret meeting in Ile de Sal in Cape Verd. Savimbi, of course, refused, but was forced by his allies who saw in this, a means to bring an end to the war. By the end of March 1990, UNITA was ready for immediate and direct negotiations. It no longer demanded the withdrawal of FAPLA from Mavinga, but refused to withdraw its FALA commandos from Luanda. The MPLA on its part, after concerting in Sao Tomé with Presidents Omar Bongo, Sassou-Nguesso, and Manuel Pinto da Costa, affirmed that it wanted and would priviledge direct contacts between its government and the rebels of UNITA. The two delegations were to meet in Lisbon. Since then, negotiations have not really progressed, but efforts are being made to revive the impetus, especially with the Lusaka talks currently going on, in spite of continuous UNITA's difficult conditionalities. One great evolution that could have taken place in the negotiation was lost when the Zairean mediator, Mobutu was sidelined by

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[1] *Jeune Afrique*, No. 1530, April 30, 1990, p. 31 (author's translation).

UNITA, eventhough the former displayed undeniable qualities and influence. This could have been a vital option on the part of UNITA which could have asphixiated the MPLA by a single blink of an eye. The strategic position of Zaire, bordering on the left of Angola, could have been a good opportunity too for the Luanda government to exploit, which too would have been a welcome wish by the U.S. that now believed in a pacific settlement of the Angola imbroglio.

Peace was now in the hands of the Angolans themselves and to repeat the words of Reolof Pik Botha a few minutes after the signing of the accords of principle in New York on july 13, 1988, the protagonists, he held, had moved up to the foot of the mountain, and what was left of them was only to climb. The problem henceforth remained in the hands of the Luanda government which remained divided on the question of negotiating with UNITA.[1] In this divided lot, we can in effect distinguish five small groups that held power, and upon whose decision, the future of negotiation lay: The "mestizos" (metis) at the head of which you have the Chief of General Staff of the army, and member of the political bureau of the MPLA, Gen. Antonio dos Santos França "Ndalu". The other distinguished personalities are the Minister of Justice, França Van-Dunem and the First Secretary of the Popular Assembly, " the theorician", Lucio Lara. Their sole aim stood for the maintenance of their priviledges. Then you have the president's men with the most distinguished being the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pedro de Castro Van-Dunem" "Loy". This old "Netoist", member of a powerful Luandan family of Van-Dunem, owes his rehabilitaion to dos Santos – of Sao Tomé origin, who used him to implant himself in Luanda. The others are Pinto Jaào, Venancio da Moura, Pascoal Luvualu and Pedro Pacaviera, the ambassador to the U.N. Dos Santos is also regarded as the "chef de fil" of the young generation of technocrats of the administration. However, the peace initiatives of the president are welcomed by the Luanda bourgeosie "the nouveau riche", who

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[1]   *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 30, No. 16, August 11, 1989, pp. 1-2.

hope to live the rhythm of life in Libreville, of Kinshasa or Brazaville. Thus these cheiks of the equator cherished the politics of rapprochement with UNITA, and consequently, with the West.[1]

The presidential clan is rabidly opposed to Savimbi and any form of dialogue with the latter. They acknowledge the lack of charisma of their leader, Dos Santos, and feel that it will be fatal for them to engage him in any electoral competition with Savimbi, whom they know is oratorial, has an astute personality, and is charismatic – all qualities deficient in Dos Santos. This clan is supported by Omar Bongo, was supported by Sassou-Nguesso and is also supported in French business circles. In the US where diplomats are favourable to Dos Santos, the C.I.A. on the contrary are rabidly opposed to him, just like their counterpart the Israeli Security Service – I.S.S. The pro-Cuban group which is composed in the majority by the military, was alarmed by the withdrawal of the Cuban expeditory forces. The head of this group is Gen. Pedro Maria Tonha "Pedale", the Defense Minister. Figures frequently seen are Gen. Julião Mateus Paulo "Dino Matross", Admiral Antonio José Condessa de Carvalho "Tola", head of the marine, Col. Santana André Pitra "Petroff", Kundi Paihama, the Minister of State Security, and Alfonso Van-Dunem "Mbinda", the former Minister of Foreign Affairs.[2]

Most of the groups enumerated above are generally opposed to the integration of the FALA that is trained in Morocco and the US into the FAPLA that got its training basically from the East. Certain observers believe that the FALA could easily organise a coup d'Etat which in the present context will weaken the MPLA, which is Netoist. These are the faithfuls of Augustino Neto – first president of the MPLA and of the Popular Republic of Angola. Their symbolic leader is Luico Lara. Here we also find Gen. Francisco Magalhais Puiva

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[1] Expression of Kamga Sobngwi, 1990, p. 159.

[2] Ibid.

"Mvunda", Mambo Cafe and Lopo de Nascimento. They have a great influence in the army and also command the support of Jorge Risquet, the Cuban Minister incharge of African Affairs. Lastly, there is also the business circle whose desire is for the opening up of commercial relations with the RSA. This group believes strongly on the former Interior Minister, Alexandres Rodrigues "Kito" who is a non-conformist and a good negotiator.[1]

In the face of all these divisions within the MPLA, UNITA had the good reason to demand the liberation of political life in Angola, and the organisation of general elections, especially as it is known that the group, that is, the MPLA, has a rigid control of the existing structures. UNITA on the other hand was counting on the stable support from Washington, and this gave it an assurance of cohesion in the face of any mediation. The Angolan situation is one in which a legitimate government is being opposed by a rebel movement that counts mainly on its strength. Peace has to be made without losing feathers, but how is this possible, when it is the flesh that is envisaged?

After the September 28-29, 1992 general elections in which UNITA woefully lost and the ensuing fighting for the control of Luanda, the situation has degenerated into a veritable holocaust, indeed it is, to say the least, genocidal. The Secretary-General of the UN Dr Pierre Boutros-Boutros Ghali has classified the sitaution in Angola as catastrophic. More than 1000 people loss their lives daily in causes directly related to the war. Not even the "rich man's war"[2] in ex-Jugoslavia or the fraticidal war in Somalia or liberia can equal the carnage and pogrom in Angola. At the present rate of things, the situation could generate into a general entropy. Savimbi and FALA, while embarking on the Lusaka talks, still hope to unleash their last offensive that they hope will take them into Luanda. The MPLA is trying all it

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[1]   Ibid.

[2]   The discription given to the war in Bosnia-Herzogovina by the Secretary General of the UN in comparison to the war of destitutes that is going on in Somalia and Angola.

can do to preserve its acquired strength, possessions and positions.

In this internecine struggle between two giants, it is the grass that suffers - of course, the women, the children, especially the young and old ones who keep on dying of hunger, famine, malnutrition, epidemics, you name them. Eyes have now been turned to Lusaka, where the MPLA and UNITA are cureently engaged in negotiations to bring an end to the endemic conflict. Everyone hopes to have peace born in Lusaka, else, if a still birth, then the carnage and pogrom will continue. The conditionalities recently brought up by UNITA that appear impossible might stall the talks. No one prays for this anyway. Our only concern at this hour of reckoning, is for the international community to halt this butchery that is going on in Angola, and to give peace a chance.

CHAPTER THREE

THE FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES AND VALUES OF THE NEW
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

A. The preeminence of economy over military options

> "The same kind of effort that we
> mounted to achieve technological
> prosperity in the military arena
> must now be mounted to integrate
> our military technology with
> commercial activities, to translate
> our edge in basic research and
> innovation into competitive and
> marketable high-tech products".[1]
> - Theodore G. Sorensen

Many predictions have been made on the state of the world system at the close of this millenium. The end of the Coldwar and the birth of a new international order has evoked a new euphoria that has replaced that which was born after 1945 when the second world war ended. The new fulcrum today, is the economy, that must be treated with priority, as it has taken prevalence over the military. This preeminence which the economy of states have taken vis-à-vis their military options, is thanks to the new thinking born out of glasnost and perestroïka. Economic prosperity in the market-oriented system of aggressiveness and competitivity has replaced the old order - one that was based on military confrontation, rabid propoganda, ideological gesticulations and internecine struggles. Statistics have shown that the gap between military expenditure and economic development is too wide, whereas the returns from the military,

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[1]   Theodore G. Sorensen, "Rethinking National Security" in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 69, No.3, Summer 1990, p. 11.

compared to the level of development, are embarassing.

1945. The second world war had just ended. The celebration
of allied victory was not yet over. Kalinin, the Soviet President
stunned the world:

> Eventhough we have achieved the greatest victory
> known to mankind, what we must not forget is the
> fact that our country remains the sole socialist
> country in the world.[1]

The events of 1945-1950 are still fresh in our minds. They evoke
the first clear manifestations of the Coldwar. The world had been
divided. Allied collaboration had ceased to exist. A dejected
Winston Churchill lamented :

> From Stettin in the Baltic to Treiste in the
> Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across
> the continent ... Whatever conclusions may be
> drawn from this... This is not the United Europe
> we fought to build.[2]

This was in 1946, in a speach in Fulton, Missouri. 1947. Harry
S. Truman climbed the scene to denounce Soviet expansionism :

> It must be the policy of the United
> States of America to support free peoples
> who are resisting attempted subjugation by
> armed minorities, or outside pressure...
> Unless Russia is faced with an iron fist
> and strong language, another war is in
> the making.[3]

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[1]   Kalinin, quoted in *International Problems Since 1919*, by Vincent
I. Wantim (Polycopy), p. 176.

[2]   Winston Churchill, quoted in Cornwell, 1984, p. 73.

[3]   Harry S. Truman, quoted in Cornwell, 1984, p. 74.

The fear of this new war that was on the horizon preoccupied the leaders of the Western world and this was transformed into an East/West confrontation, that heightened and coalesed, as events pushed them.

1988. Another Soviet Leader breaks new ice. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev this time did not announce a frightful turn, but a spectre of hope for the future : "The bell of every regional conflict [begins to] toll for all of us". [1]
A new detente was initiated. The wind from the East was welcomed in the West. The East started the Coldwar and ended it - what coincidence ! Ballistic missiles, intermediate nuclear forces, chemical and biological weapons, were now to take the back bench. Economic aspects, in a new economic and market-oriental atmosphere, now came to take the lead. The biggest question to be asked in all this is, why this sudden change at this time ?

The toughstone for each of the superpower's security concept - the containment of each other's military and ideological power - is gone. The primary threat cited over the last forty-nine years in justification for most of their military budgetary exependiture ; bases and overseas assistance, is gone. The principal prism through which they viewed most of their worldwide diplomatic activities and alliances is all gone. The search for a new form of security is now born. It must be pursued in earnest.

It has been realised that like in the case of the US, those leaders and experts who coolly stressed geo-political realities, thought the Coldwar - the reality of Moscow's ruthless treatment of its neighbours, its drive to export and exploit revolution around the globe, its desire to expand its ideological and military reach into the affairs of others, and above all, its capacity to inflict unacceptable damage upon the US, now faces

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[1]   Mikhail S. Gorbachev, quoted by Deng and Zartman, 1991, p. 20.

a new reality.[2] The Soviet treat has not only been contained ;
it has collapsed. The Soviet empire has disintegrated. Its
long-time ideology has been repudiated. Its combat forces are
being unilaterally drawn down. Its military alliance is in
tatters. Its attraction as a political or economic model or
mentor for new and developing nations has vanished. Its ability
to invade, arm, subvert, subsidize or even threaten those nations
or virtually anyone else has been substantially reduced. Given
the grave economic, ethnic, social and political problems that
the CIS faces today, the long-term future is in doubt.

These observations have greatly shaped the present world
order and its values. Although the changes in the world system
are universal, we have to look at them from the light of the main
actors — those in the two blocs, the USSR and the US. They
originated the old system. They manned it. They perpetuated it.
They cooled it when they wanted to. They steamed it when it
pleased them. They have decided to kill it. They have today
burried it. And they have given birth to a new thinking — the
economic development of the world at large. They have always led
the world, and will continue to lead it — at least, for the
foreseable future. It is in this respect that our analysis in
this chapter will swing much around the changes experienced in
the former blocs, giving our judgements based on careful
observation.

Enough damage has been done on the international environment
due to the proliferation of arms. The project for global warming
looms as a constraint upon future economic development. The
protection of the sea and the ozone layer cannot be realised in
the escalating pillage of armaments. Humanity is threatened by
this damage to the environment — the air, ozone, ocean and
climate upon which its very survival depends. Mankind has to stop
these threats before the threats undo him. This can be done
through unilateral disarmament. A reduction — if possible, a

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[1]   Sorenson, Summer 1990, p. 2.

stop, to the arms race. The once powerful beacon of nation's military strength onlonger shines brightly in the global market place of today - it has been rendered obsolete ; it is today "caduque".

Theodore Sorensen holds, and we agree with him that : "economy still leads the world" and that the ability of a nation to fend for itself, is an indispensable aspect of its national security, instead of a wanton expenditure on arms. [1] In analysing American economic potentials he asserts that :

> our loss of economic influence would
> diminish our diplomatic and strategic
> influence, making us more dependent on
> others to take the initiative on
> international economic problems, less of
> a model for others to emulate, less
> than others to provide assistanceto
> struggling democracies, and less
> able to decide forourselves the
> fiscal, monetary and trade measures
> with which we promote our values
> and interests both at home and abroad.[2]

Propagandistic, we might think of such assessement, but full of reality in the new world order that is dictated more by bread than by guns.

The priority given to the economy over the military in the present world system is not only the affair of Sorensen, but of numerous other scholars and leaders of opinion the world over. In an article entitled "The World Economy After the Coldwar"[3]

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[1] Sorensen, Summer 1990, p. 9.

[2] Ibid.

[3] See "The World Economy After the Coldwar", in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 69, No. 3, 1991, p. 96.

Bergsten does not hesitate to proclaim that :

> Economics will move much closer to the top
> of the global agenda. The international
> position of individual countries will
> derive increasingly from their economic
> prowess rather than their military capacity.[1]

In elaborating further, he comes out with a new configuration for the world. This one is no longer based on the military bipolarity of East and West, but on economic tripolarity between the US - European Community - and Japan. "The world economy", he claims, "will complete its evolution from the American-dominated regime of the first postwar generation to a state of US - European - Japanese "tripolarity"[2]". In this new era, international relations will look very different, especially by the year 2000, as a result of these transformations. The hierarchy of nations will shift considerably. The big three of economies will supplant the big two of nuclear competition as the powers that will shape much of the 21st century. Eventhrough the US can for the time being boast of possessing both economic and military strength, to some observers, - occupies the top position in both,[3] such status will be of decreased utility as global military tensions are substantially reduced and international competition becomes largely economic. America's quest to become the only military superpower is in the view of many, an obsolete idea ; archaic and redundant, retrogressive and outmoded. The relative economic decline that the US is facing today, calls for concern. Eventhough the dangers of physical annihilation that was posed by the USSR has not quite disappeared, there nevertheless does not exist the capacity to order their rapid deployment and use

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[1] Fred Bergsten, "The Economy of the World After the Coldwar", in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 69, No.3, 1991, p.96.

[2] Ibid.

[3] This thesis is highly debateable, given the potential military strength of Germany and Japan who conceal in secrecy their prowess.

in the present order. This explains why the US can boast of solely commanding the rapid deployment of weapons of mass destruction.

In the present world economic system, we realize a sharp and steady fall of the dollar, in contradistinction to the Deutsche Mark and the Yen that continue to mount and dominate the economic platform. There is visible economic growth in Asia and Europe. Productivity increases in Japan and many other Asian countries are considerably higher than in America, and much more higher than in the CIS where economic structures have all collapsed. The world now realizes the need for bread and butter, than guns and tanks. In spite of their military capacity that made them superpowers, both the US and the USSR, could not measure up with either Germany or Japan in terms of economic output – GNP and per capita income, considered. This thus gave reason for the reversal of the policy of militarization that had gripped the world for more than forty years. Europe is now buoyed by the onset of economic unification in the West (almost certain to go beyond" competition of the international market" to an Economic and Monetary Union, or EMU) and by economic revival in Eastern Europe where the structures for economic take off and development are already existent.[1] Fred Bergsten Forcasts that "By 2000, the Big three economies will be more alike than different on most key counts : levels of GNP and external trade, and degree of dependence on international trade and financial flows".[2]

A pertinent question for the present world system is whether the new international framework will produce conflict over economic issues, or a healthy combination of competition and cooperation? Posterity will judge that, but suffice to state that the possibility of conflict to exist outweighs that of

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[1] Class lectures by Prof. Dieudonné Oyono in which he evokes the possibilities of an economic take-off in the former Eastern bloc countries, due to the availability in them of viable economic structures, even in the time of economic stagnation.

[2] Bergsten, 1991, p. 97.

collaboration, at least, if one draws from the present Americano - Japanese rivalry in economic domination of the world. The world must adjust to this fundamental shift in economic relationships among its major countries as security arrangements change. The end of the Coldwar could sharply heighten the prospect of a trade war. Throughout the postwar period, the overriding security imperative blunted trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific economic disputes. The US and its allies, particularly West Germany, frequently made economic concessions to avoid jeopardizing their global security structures.[1] Coldwar politics, in fact, sheltered the economic recoveries of Europe and Japan.

The removal of the "security blanket" could erode the compartmentalization that was made between military pursuits and economic goals. Indeed, the US and the CIS could be tempted today to use security issues to seek economic advantage. Such a policy will make it possible to maintain cooperation in both the economic and military dimensions. Observers of the international system dominated by economic prevalence suggest that since East/West confrontation provided the rationale for much engagement throughout the world by the superpowers, the ending of the Coldwar should instigate a withdrawal from such engagement, and redeploy it into veritable economic development.[2]

The risk of economic conflict is already acute. Japanese politician, Shintano Ishihara has predicted that "the 21st century will be a century of economic warfare".[3] Such conflict is most likely to surface, as we said earlier, between Japan and the US. There is an intimate interaction between basic international political and economic transformations : removal of the security blanket increases the risk of economic conflict,

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[1] Note should be taken of the Marshall Aid Programme which was used by the US as a propagandistic tool to subjugate economically-dependent Western Europe and prevent them from falling prey to the pangs of communism.

[2] See Bergsten, 1991, p. 98.

[3] Ibid.

which could erode security ties. The ultimate paradox of the 20th century would be a realization of the Marxist prophecy of an inevitable clash among the capitalist nations, just as the political conflict spured by Maxist ideology is waning. The end of history[1] might not be so dull after all.

The basic problem that faces the world today in relation to this transformation of the world system is that of the conversion of the military knowledge and expediture into economic welfare. The CIS is attempting this already. The record of massive defense conversion is one unblemished by success, with two notable exceptions : the defense dominated economies and mammoth military facilities of Japan and Germany, which were converted into civilian production after the second world war. Then, the two defeated powers were militarily occupied, their defense industries were immediately destroyed and rebuilt with extensive foreign aid ; now, decades later, both countries enjoy economic prosperity.[2] Can this not be done to both the US and the CIS including the other militaristic states ? Propositions on this are already being made for the former Warsaw Pact countries, using Western bulldozers rather than Allied tanks. The future could be promising. Perharps the former Eastern Europe could become a "new Japan". After all, "No central east-European country was thoroughly militarized - or is as economically failing, politically shifting - as the ex-Soviet Union".[3] While these populations often complain about their predicament, they now at least have hope. This, like so many things, they lacked for half a century.

Joseph Nye holds that "Americans are now more worried about

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[1] Francis Fukuyama, American-born Japanese, whose write-up "La fin d'Histoire, ou un nouveau chapitre de l'Histoire" evokes the end of history in the collapse of the old system and order, and the birth of a new era that is completely different.

[2] Kenneth L. Adelman and Norman R. Augustine, "Defense Conversion: Bulldozing the Management" in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 71, No. 2, Spring 1992, p. 26.

[3] We exclude Jugoslavia in our classification here.

the state of the US economy and drugs than about the (ex -) Soviet Union and threat of nuclear weapons".[1] This is to show again how the economy has taken priority. Some political scientists have gone so far as to argue that war has become obsolete and will follow the practices of dueling, slavery and colonialism in history.[2] Since 1980, the UN Conference on Disarmament has been engaged in negotiations on a Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) that would take a complete and total ban on chemical weapons in all states. The ban would prohibit the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and would require the destructions of all existing chemical weapons stocks. If this happens, then the income spent here will be redirected and reconverted into more productive sectors of the economy.

In this direction, military too could become productive, especially when re-oriented into economic and developmental ventures. In the post-Coldwar era, arms control may lead to major reductions in the forces of the superpowers. The re-unification of Germany, together with the enfeeblement and collapse ot the USSR is one of the most abrupt realignments of political, military and economic power in modern history. Today, conflicts still exist that need military intervention; but this should be re-examined, reshaped, reduced and re-oriented towards the speedy projection of conventional deterent forces to these other parts of the world, toward local low-intensity conflicts, terrorist activities, hostile and undemocratic governments.[3] If we can put to constructive use the additional resources that the ending of the Coldwar has made available to mankind, then the prospects for maintaining this planet's genuine security in a peaceful way will be bright.

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[1]   Joseph Nye, "Arms Control after the Coldwar" in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 68, No. 5, Winter 1989/90, p. 42.

[2]   See John Muller, *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolence of Major War*, New York, Basic Books, 1988.

[3]   Sorensen, 1991, p. 17.

What options are open to the world in this new value system
? Historian, Robert Gilpin notes that "almost all (students of
international relations) agree that a tripolar system is the most
unstable confirmation".[1] History and game theory both suggest a
strong tendency for each of the partners in such an arrangement
to fear that the other will line up against it permanently,
leading each to adopt excessive policies. Two could ally against
one, due to the vulnerability of states, possibly to create what
Bergsten calls "bi-gemonic" domination. America and Europe could
band together against a United Europe. A very plausible third
possibility could be a European - Japanese nexus, coalesing due
to higher growth rates, and economic inter-dependency as we
already see in the recent link up between Mitsubishi and Daimler
- Benz to conduct joint aerospace research and possibly cooperate
in automobile productions.

To restore effective systemic defenses, America, Japan and
a uniting Europe must join to provide collective leadership. In
this way, the world could be saved from conflict. The big three
have to start acting as an informal steering committee for the
world economy - reinvigorating the existing institutional
structures, creating new ones, and initiating concrete steps to
utilize them consistently. Such leadership must rest on firm
internal foundations in each area. "The US has to make the
difficult adjustment from hegemon to partner"[2] asserts Bergsten.
It is possible, with determination, honesty and a strong will.
If this happens, it would mark the beginning of a new era of
collective leadership of the world economy. The global economic
environment in this wise would be enhanced, and conflict will
thus reduce.

A fundamental question to be asked here is, where is
Africa's place in this new prospective dispensation ? We said at

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[1]   See *War and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge, Cambridge
       University Press, 1981, p. 235.

[2]   Bergsten, 1991, p. 105.

the beginning of this chapter that our analysis will be based on the two superpowers, given the role both played in the past, and still continue to play in the present international system. Our analysis has shown that all countries must realise the new dynamism in world thinking and in consequence, make adjustments. Africa needs not to be left behind. Ibrahim R.S. Msabaha recommends that the relaxation of East/West tension that dichotomised Africa should give way for a new thinking in the Africans.[1] African states should abandon militarism and support a revitalized UN. They should institute democratic reforms that re-orient state – society relationships so that political accountability will be the hub of decision and as such, money will no longer be wasted on arms that will be dumped by the superpowers – especially the CIS. They should join the wagon, but with caution, as these extra-African leaders have never worked for the interest of Africa; it is not in the new order that this will change. This is the ripe moment for sober reflexion.

B. Democracy, Human Rights and Liberalization.

> "France is deeply attached to maintaining
> and developing relations only when the
> principle she judges essential –
> progress towards democracy and human
> rights, are respected".[2]
>
> – President François MITTERAND,
> President of the Republic of France.

The respect for human rights and the existence of democracy is not something new to the countries that are experiencing it today. When most African countries were liberated from the yoke of colonialism almost all were inbued with democratic

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[1] Ibrahim R.S. Msabaha, "Implications of International Change for African states", in Deng and Zartman, 1991, p. 85.

[2] Quoted in *Al Hayat* and requoted in *Cameroon Tribune* No. 1355 of January 29, 1992, p. 15.

governments. But sadly enough, these governments rested on weak structures and institutions that were to crumble a few years later. In Latin America like in central and eastern Europe, oppressive regimes dictated by the Communist appeal violated the rights of the people and installed centrist forms of governments based on the Marxist - Leninist principle.

The surprising thing about some of these happenings was that, they enjoyed enormous support from outside - at least the dictatoral regimes that proved to be anti-Communist. A mere proclamation of support for anti-Communism was enough to win the approval of the US and its Western allies. South Africa, Zaire, in Africa were the real benefactors of this Western largesse as they overtly manifested their anti-Communist stance ; the former even went as far as enacting laws banning communism, and associating all forms of dissent on this ideology's influence.

After being stiffled for almost a quarter-century in Africa, and much longer in Latin America, central and eastern Europe and Asia, the "wind from the East"[1] started blowing across the world. It should be remarked that before the Eastern wind came to shake the foundations of the world, there had been calls for the installation of democracy and human rights as early as the first part of the 1980s, but these calls fell on deaf ears. Talking in the British Parliament on June 8, 1982, President Ronald W. Reagan had this to say :

> We are approching the end of a bloody
> century plagued by a terrible political
> invention - totalitarianism. Opportunism
> comes less easily today, not because
> democracy is less vigorous but because
> democracy's enemies have refined their

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[1]   This expression was first used by Carol Lancaster in an article, "Democracy in Africa" in *Foreign Policy*, No. 85, Winter 1991-92.

instruments of repression.[2]

As early as the 1980s the world was going through serious transformations of its structures that needed much caution, to prevent embarassing situations. The stiffling of the press, the muzzling of unions, the restriction of all forms of liberty and the limitation of human movement was now being challenged. The system of government that replaced the elected governments Africans had at independence, was similar everywhere. Citizens were alienated from genuine political participation, with the result that they went underground and resorted to violence. Those who were unlucky to be arrested were tortured, incarserated, or sometimes killed.[2] These regimes had equiped themselves with instruments of perpetual self-reproduction : the authoritarian legacy of colonial rule, a patrimonial power structure, single political parties and the ossification of authoriry under de facto or de jure presidents - all these, anti-democratic. All these became the impetus for political transformation due to the economic and political decadence that resulted from it.[3] The reaction against these repressive forms of government were felt all over. A grandmother in El Salvador who was threatened with death because of her political views, retorted by saying that:

> You can kill me, kill my family, kill my
> neighbours, but you can't kill us all.[4]

The mangitude of this resistance is as a result of the frustrations that were manifested in most of the citizenery, due to the harshness of totalitarism, dictatorship, autocracy and authoritarianism that existed. In the new order that started

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[1]   President Ronald Wilson Reagan, quoted in Realism, *Strength, Negotiation*, 1984, p. 77.

[2]   Notice the pathetic case of Ernest Ouandie of the Union des Populations du Cameroun - UPC in Cameroon and Diallo Telli, first Secretary-General of the OAU, to name just these.

[3]   See Besong Samuel Enoh, "Multipartism and Democratic Changes" in "Changes in Soviet Foreign Policy..." 1991, p. 65.

[4]   See *Realism*, 1984, p. 79.

appearing in the early part of the 1980s, President Reagan exaulted humanity to break from the domination of the past, and make "the march of freedom and democracy which will leave Marxism-Leninism on the ash heap of history". [1]

The doctrine of democracy, which is not a new phenomenon, but simply re-born, was a constant item in the speeches of the major policy-makers at the dawn of this new order. Addressing the Creve Coeur Club of Illinois, Peoria on February 22, 1984, Secretary of State George Shultz said :

> Democracy is a great liberator of the
> human spirit, giving free reign
> to the talents and aspirations of
> individuals, offeringevery man and
> woman the opportunity to realize his
> or her fullest potential.This ideal
> of freedom has been a beacon to
> immmigrants from many lands.[2]

The collapse of autoratic regimes in east and central Europe was a great event that came with the fall of the one party system of government in the USSR. In initiating glasnost and perestroïka, Gorbachev wondered whether the system practised in his country was not that which was responsible for the catastrophic economic malaise that the country was experiencing."History vigorously poses the question if the socialist idea can survive".[3] The "New Realism" and "New thinking" were innovations that he brought into the life of the USSR, with the result that the satellite states quickly fell into the dance and within a short time, and with no Soviet intervention, but with Western assitance, the monolithic structures were put down, and the foundation for multiparty

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[1] *Realism*, 1984, p. 87.

[2] *Realism*, 1984, p. 87.

[3] "Die Sozialistische Idee und die revolutionare Umgestaltung", in *Der Spiegle*, 1990, p. 2.

democracy were set in place.

In Africa, this "Eastern wind" came with full force. Almost all the countries had their fair share of turbulence that came with these democratic changes. While there was compliance in some countries, in others it was a rabid opposition to the ideal of democracy, preaching the idea that it was going to break the fabrics of national unity. Zbigniew Brzezinski in an interview in *The World Today*, said that, " Political liberalization and economic retrogression is a classic formula for revolution - or, we might say, counter-revolution".[1] This is exactly what happened in Africa when this democratic wind came, especially as the continent was languishing in an economic quagmire unequalled in any period in its history. The reticence with which the various African governments embraced this change in the international environment was very significant.

In Cameroon, the ruling Cameroon People's Democratic Movement -CPDM criticized this "precipitated multipartism" and at first attemped to resist the new call for change. When the authorities finally realized that this was vain, in November 1990 in parliament President Paul BIYA warned his militants that they "should be prepared for emminent competition".[2] He finally cautioned that "democracy and multipartism in Cameroon are not a pretext to obtain aid from Western countries... It is the culmination of unflinching national will".[3] How true this statement was, how plausible it was taken by cameroonians, still leaves to be desired. The reactions of the different countries to the advent of democracy and liberalization can not be discussed here. Suffice to state that these reactions were profound, varied and intense. It is Gorbachev who observed that

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[1]   Zbigniew Brzezinski, in *The World Today*, Vol. 45, No. 3, p.44.

[2]   President Paul BIYA in an address to deputies in Parliament, The Green Palace, quoted in *Cameroon Tribune*, No. 1077, of November 30, 1990, p. 20.

[3]   Ibid.

the events happening in his country had :

> evoked extraordinary interest everywhere
> and [have] had an impact on the
> international atmosphere and the
> realities of the political
> situation in the world.[1]

With the advent of the new values of the international system, many monolithic and totalitarian regimes have come to realize the emptiness and coarse buffonery of the one party system. Robust repression, muzzling press censorship, autocracy, are gradually giving way, but not without serious problems. Reacting to the development in Eastern Europe. "Mwalimu" Julius Nyerere, former president of Tanzania and a long - time advocate of one - party rule in Africa, declared that "Tanzanians should not be dogmatic to think that a single party is God's wish"[2]. Even Joe Slovo, the Secretary General of the South African Communist Party - SACP noted that :

> We have had sufficient experience of
> one - party rule in various parts of
> the world to perhaps conclude that
> the "mission" to promote real democracy
> under one - party system is not
> just difficult but, in the
> longrun, impossible.[3]

Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo observes that :
> The so-called revolution of rising
> expectations in the decade of

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[1]   Mikhail S. Gorbachev, April 7, 1988, Speech delivered during a visit to Britain. Quoted in *The World Today*, June 1988, p. 94.

[2]   Julius Nyerere, quoted in *Front File, Southern African Brief*, Vol. 4, February 1990, p. 4.

[3]   Joe Slovo, quoted in *International Herald Tribune*, February 28, 1990, p. 8.

independence (the 1960s) has
been replaced by a new "revolution
of rising frustrations. [1]

Realising that the African countries were not going to accept democracy and liberalization of political life with ease, Western donor countries decided to put conditionalities on aid, especially to the new democracies. The warning was that, unless these countries accepted to democratize, they will not continue to benefit from Western aid. The liberated countries of Eastern Europe benefitted the most from this change as the attention of the West was now focused on them. In a visit to France in February 1992, Russian President, Boris Yeltsin was promised French aid by President François MItterand to the tune of 600.000.000 FF (six Hundred million French Francs)[2] This is just an example of the kind of "Marshall aid"[3] that was pumped into the economies of Eastern European countries as they quickly demolished communist centralized systems and embraced democracy.

African countries were not to benefit like their east and central European counterparts. Winrich Kühne writing on "Africa and Gorbachev's "New Realism"," warned that "Africa can not hope that foreign assistance will solve its economic problems. Nor will it help to appeal to the conscience of Western societies and Nations.[4]

This Western attitude, that is geared more towards assisting new democracies in East and Central Europe has occasioned wild alarms all over Africa where it is denounced as the marginalization of

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[1]   Gen. Olusengun Obasanjo, in Preface to Deng and Zartman, 1991, p. XIV.

[2]   C.R.T.V. Radio News Bulletin, 3 p. m. February 13, 1992.

[3]   Expression used in 1945 to describe American aid to Western Europe, named after US Secretary of State, Alfred Marshall, under the Truman Administration.

[4]   Winrich Kühne, "Africa and Gorbachev's "New Realism"" in Deng and Zartman, 1991, p. 66.

the continent. Nevertheless, the West has stood firm in its association of any future aid to Africa with efforts towards achieving democratic institutions, human rights and the liberalization of life in general. Ibrahim Msabaha[1] calls this intimidation. In spite of these criticisms, this linkage strategy adopted towards aid still looms in the horizon of Africa. Smith Hempston, US Ambassador to Nairobi in May 1990 spoke of :

> a strong political tide [that is]
> flowing in our Congress... to
> concentrate our economic
> assistance on those of the
> world's nations that nourish
> democratic institutions, defend
> human rights and practise
> multiparty policies.[2]

Barely a month later, on the occasion of the Franco-African summit at Le Baule, Brittany, President Mitterand speaking to Le Monde Diplomatique, asserted that :

> We do not conceal our expectation that
> true democracies with multipartism, free
> elections and respect for human rights
> will be established, and we encourage the
> developments that lead to them.[3]

Later, in January 1992, he was to caution that :

> France is deeply attached to maintaining
> and developing relations only when the

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[1] Msabaha, 1991, p. 90.

[2] Smith Hempston, May 1990 in Nairobi, quoted in *Cameroon Tribune*, No. 1305 of November 8, 1990, p. 12.

[3] François Mitterand, to *Le Monde Diplomatique* quoted in *Cameroon Tribune*, No. 1305 of November 8, 1990, p. 12.

principle she judges essential - progress
towards democracy and human rights,
are respected.[1]

The British took a harder stand on the matter. Sir Douglas Hurd,
British Foreign Secretary on September 30, 1990 called on his
government to "use economic aid as a pressure for good
government", and warned that :

Donors will have to discuss in
detail with aid recipients the
mechanisms of safeguarding
individual rights as well as the
promotion of political pluralism.[2]

In a BBC interview accorded the British Minister for Overseas
Development and monitored in Lusaka, Mrs Lynda Chalka said that
her government would make "the observance of human rights a major
constitution for economic aid", and further stressed that African
governments that needed British aid :

must be accountable to the people
[and that] countries with poor
human rights records will not
receive British development aid.[3]

The linkage between future Western aid and the implementation of
democratic and liberalization reforms is as a result of the
realization that most of the conflicts that plague Africa today
are due to the continent lacking political freedom. In the course
of these conflicts, the economies are plunged into debilitating

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[1]   François Mitterand, quoted in *Al Hayat*, requoted in *Cameroon Tribune*, No. 1355 of January 29, 1992, p. 15.

[2]   Sir Douglas Hurd, quoted in *Afrique Relance*, No. 2, July-September 1990, Vol. 4, p. 3.

[3]   *Cameroon Tribune*, No. 1077 of November 30, 1990, p. 20.

situations and the result is suffering for the masses. Angola is not an exception. Nor is Mozambique. All of Africa. If democracy is installed, and human rights respected, it is hoped that conflicts will be reduced, and the resources that are today wasted in the purchase of weapons for destruction will be redeployed into vital sectors of the economy.

Theodore Sorensen[1] affirms that the peaceful enhancement of democracy around the world is consistent not merely with the moral impulse traditionally underlying American foreign policy. He further elaborates to talk of :

> A global community of free nations adhering
> to the democratic principles of pluralism,
> human rights and equal opportunity under
> the law would be a far safer and friendlier
> world for the United States.[2]

To Sorensen, "History tells us that governments that respect the rights of their citizens are more likely to respect the rights of their neighbours"[3] and in this way the peace of the world will be safeguarded. American financial, military and other support for oppresive and corrupt regimes in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America will cease in this new international environment. No longer can states play off one superpower against the other. No longer will the US maintain that their willingness to speak in opposition to Soviet expansion is more important than their willingness to tolerate opposition parties and newspapers in their countries[4]. He concludes that "as new democracies emerge seeking from us financial and other forms of assistance, we will have reason enough to move away from those

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[1]   See *Foreign Affairs*, "Rethinking National Security", Summer 1990, p. 12.

[2]   Ibid.

[3]   Ibid.

[4]   Sorensen, Summer 1990, p. 14.

unwilling to adopt true reforms".[1]

The passage of nations from dictatorship to freedom is inevitably slow, difficult and often umpermanent. Transition will be difficult and long, but not impossible. After all it took the already developed nations of Japan and West Germany a quarter century - aided by benevolent foreign occupation and massive infusions of foreign assistance - to convert their economies after world war II. It took South Korea about the same time after its war in the early 1950s, again with massive

aid (but no occupation), to develop. Polish President Lech Walesa reflected this sentiment when addressing the Council of Europe in February 1992. He contended that "Democracy is losing its supporters [due to hardship][2] and claimed that some people even said "let's go back to authoritarian rule".[3] And in fact, Poland has gone through three prime ministers in the past two and a half years, largely due to its jolting economic reforms. Capitalism demands individual initiative, an often alien concept for those who lived under communist rule. Democracy needs patience, tact and caution - all qualities that African leaders lack. Nevertheless, promising signs are emerging in east and central Europe, Latin America and in Africa let's only hope that this advent of democracy, human rights and liberalization of political life will remove the world from the present abyss to prosperity, peace and the rich expectations of the new international order. In this way, we shall see the factions in countries like Angola and Mozambique move from conflict to confluence. It is only through this means that the present deadlock could be broken, giving democracy a chance in such countries so that they could tackle their problems with verve and vision, and learn to build bridges rather than walls between its citizens.

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[1]   Ibid.

[2]   Quoted in *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 71, No.2, Spring 1992, p.38.

[3]   Ibid.

C   **The Impacting Change in World Order on South Africa's International Situation.**

> "At no other time in our history
> has it become so crucial for our people
> to speak with one voice and to pool
> their efforts"[1]
>
> Dr Nelson Mandela
> President of the ANC

Ever since the RSA adopted the policy of apartheid as its official doctrine, the lives of its citizens, particularly the blacks have always been in constant danger. This danger came due to the fact that the blacks who are in the majority, could not believe how their rights were trampled by a small group of whites, for purely racial reasons. The policy of apatheid, which meant separate development for races, was an inhuman policy that raped blacks of their rights, reaping them of their personalities, and ruined their progress in all aspects. During the Coldwar period, the RSA hid behind the condemnation of communism and cloaked the hideous happening internally, to the somewhat tacit approval of her Western allies. The sadistic Soweto massacres of 1976, the incarceration of Nelson Mandela, the Sharpville shootings of 1960, the killing of Steve Biko, to name just these, are some of the horrendous crimes that were committed by this regime during this period.

Pieter W. Botha, the South Africa Prime Minister for ten tumultuous years, was probalbly the most autocratic of the leaders who have ever ruled this country. Shooting of blacks during his reign was commonplace and this in turn orchestrated black demonstrations that only ended up worsening and already hopeless situation. The catastrophic internal environment was bound to change with the change in leadership at the helm of the state, coinciding with the change in the international system.

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[1]   Dr Nelson Mandela, in a letter to Zulu Chief, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, quoted in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 69, No. 1, p. 139.

Pieter W. Botha ceded his place to Frederick Willeim de Klerk and this ushered in hope. Hope, first because a moderate was replacing a conservative hardliner, and secondly, because De Klerk's assession to power coincided with the changes that were being enacted in the international environment, changes that were going to greatly influence change in South Africa. Our theoretical analysis attempted to show how both the international environment and the internal, influence each other. The advent to power of Gorbachev in March 1985 and his adoption of glasnost and perestroïka resulted in profound changes in the international system, changes that did not spare South Africa.

December 22, 1988. UN Head Quarters. New York. Like surprise, South Africa joined Angola and Cuba to sign the Tripartite Accords. Its was a historic and remarkable event. This was the first time that the three parties were sitting to append their signatures on a document that was going to have profound effect on their policies in the southern African region. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister and US Secretary of State who were present, both displayed visible signs of happiness. The world was going through a transformation. The walls of the Coldwar were beginning to crack. The separate Bilateral Accord signed between Angola and Cuba, put an end to the presence of the latter's forces in the former's territory. The world by this act, was spared one great worry. The concormittant acceptance of South Africa to pullout from both Angola and Namibia, opened the scene for negotiations. It was a matter of time for the Coldwar to be packed into the ash heap of history.

The signing of the Tripartite and Bilateral Accords greatly impacted international relations in predictable domains. Gradually and progressively, South Africa started opening up, adapting itself to the changes in the international environment. Accentuated by internal wranglings, bitting economic problems and a rabid isolation in conjunction with sanctions imposed on it, the RSA had to effect profound changes in its internal system, so as to march up with contemporary expectations. The visible

cracks in the system soon gave way like a pack of cards. The obnocious aparthied laws were either reformed or abolished. Like a mountain of mud, the slopes started slipping. Like new wonder, South Africa started changing. Like in a choir, the whole world joined to sing the new halleluya ; this time not hossanah in the highest, but a new South Africa is born.

Frederick Willeim de Klerk, 58 years old, a scion of the flinty voortrekker country of northern Transvaal province, is the son, grandson and great-grand son of leading NP politicians. Prime Minister J.G. Strydom was his uncle. He grew up immersed in the traditions of Afrikaner cultural life and the "Christian National Education" that its schools and organisations used to instill Afrikaner values. He joined the Youth Wing of the NP even before he enrolled at Potchefstoom University for Christian Higher Education, where he earned a law degree in 1958. After practising law in Vereeniging, he entered parliament in 1972 and has held cabinet posts for many years.[1] This background information on him, is to lay the groundwork for our research on how this upbringing, parentage and education helped in making him flexible to embrace the changes in the international environment. The great difference between Botha and De Klerk lay in style: while De Klerk appears more reasonable, a problem solver and someone who believes in consensus-building, Botha on the other hand is hot-tempered and a hardliner.

Several factors coincided during 1989 to produce sentiments both inside South Africa and abroad. De Klerk's reputation for pragmatism and intelligence, combined with his more open form of leadership that bore resemblance to his Soviet counterpart Gorbachev, made the world to see in him a reformer. He resembled the latter not only in behaviour and policies, but also in looks, and education - both are law graduates ! They both replaced hardliners, and inherited stiffling political systems that were yearning for change. De Klerd's rhetoric was replete with

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[1] Bruce W. Nelan, "Changes in South Africa " in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 69, No. 1, 1989/90, p. 135.

references to reconciliation, social justice and an end to discrimination. There were indications that he would rely more on traditional forms of politics and diplomacy than on the police and army networks of which his predecessor had been both master and slave. With the US brokering a settlement of the intractable problems in southern Africa, the eminent pullout of Cuban troops from Angola, and a concurrent pullout of South African troops from southern Angola and Namibia, all these leading to the independence of Namibia, change was now eminent in the southern African sub-region. More to these, the Western and Commonwealth consideration for additional sanctions on Pretoria in abeyance, the stage was now cleared for a "dress -rehearsal".

In this new setting, South Africa's black majority also had to reformulate its strategy. With this new "dispensation of De Klerk, they had to reform their instruments, and see what could be reaped from the spoils. The pre-conditions that were set for talks were not going to augur well for the black movements, but at least, had some influence. At first De Klerk sought a system that would give some power to blacks without taking power away froms whites. It was a kind of "Rubicon", the kind which Botha had opted for in a speech in August 1985, but obtained no results. The blacks held to one-man, one - wote majority rule. Zulu Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, one of the leaders the government most hoped to involve in its proposal, joined the more militant groups in setting forth a list of pre-conditions that had to be met before talks could even begin - the release of nationalist hero Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners. The legalization of the ANC and all banned organizations and an end to the state of emergency so that normal political activities could take place. The result, of course, was stalemate.

January 18, 1989. Botha suffers a stroke and resigns on February 2 as leader of the NP. De Klerk takes over the realms of power, but not without opposition and manipulation by Botha and other conservatives in the NP. In this first parliamentary speech as party leader, he pledged to strive for a country "free

of negative discrimination on the basis of race"[1] and to provide for "a just and equitable dispensation"[2] for all South Africans irrespective of race. He called for an "indaba"[3] - a national conference, to negotiate its terms. "There is no such thing as a nonracial society in a multiracial country"[4] he said. His upbeat approach was welcomed by most factions, eventhough the retired Botha felt that he was "being misused by some people,"[5] as his behaviour seemed to lie "more in the realm of geriatric psychology than in political analysis".[6]

The emergence of De Klerk and his emphasis on negotiations with the black majority found the anti-apartheid movement off balance and disorganised. The most public manifestation of black activism in the first half of 1989 was the bloody war in Natal province, where fighting between the Zulu-based Inkatha movement and the United Democratic Front - UDF had claimed more that 1.400 lives since 1984. From his bungalow at the Victor Vester Prison outside Paarl, Nelson Mandela was moved to write to Chief Buthelezi, to "join forces"[7] to end the "deplorable conflicts"[8] in Natal. Mandela reminded him that "At no other time in our history has it become so crucial for our people to speak with one voice and to pool their efforts".[9] De Klerk's hints of flexibility, was taken for his being worried, and a kind of wavering, thus the ANC leadership instead called for more

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[1]   See *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 69, No. 1, p. 138.

[2]   Ibid.

[3]   Ibid.

[4]   Ibid.

[5]   Ibid.

[6]   Johannesburg *Sunday Times*, quoted in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 69, no. 1989/90, p. 138.

[7]   *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 69, No. 1, 1989/90, p. 140.

[8]   Ibid.

[9]   Ibid.

pressure, not compromise, no renoucing of violence, but to step up guerilla campaigns inside South Africa. The weakened "Umkhonto we Sizwe" - spear of the Nation, the military wing of the ANC, was reactivated.

In the election campaign that followed, De Klerk dropped the traditional white slogan "swart gevaar", the black peril, and "kragdadigherd", toughness, and opted for a power-sharing that meant that on issues of special importance to one racial group, each group would decide its "own affairs",[1] on the basis of "self-government".[2] Issues of common interest would be decided together on the basis of consensus ; if consensus can not be achieved, "a reliable refree"[3] should be provided by some kind of constitutional court. Buried in the verbiage was the government's insistence that the ANC was a terrorist organisation, and thus will not be negotiated with, until it formally renounced the use of violence. Failure to achieve this, in June it said in a manifesto that those "who have a commitment to peace"[4] could take part in any talks, and an NP spokesman emphasized the difference by saying that the government was "almost moving away from the meaningless requirement of the renunciation of violence."[5]

It should be remarked that Botha had attempted to achieve a breakthough in the deadlock by inviting Mandela while in prison to meet and discuss with him in secret. But this did not far. Both men met face-to-face for the first time in Cape Town, for 45 minutes on July 5, sipping tea and talking. Officially, it was not a negotiation, but in fact, it was the result of months of

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[1]   *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 69, No. 1, 1989/90, p. 141.

[2]   Ibid.

[3]   Ibid.

[4]   *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 69, No. 1, 1989/90, p. 142.

[5]   Ibid.

discussion between Mandela and four cabinet ministers.[6] The two old foes confirmed "their support for peaceful development in South Africa".[2] By agreeing that, Mandela qualified as a person with "a commitment to peace"[3] and thus for admission to the government's proposed negotiation process. Eventhough the blacks reacted violently when they got wind of this secret meeting, their insistence that "only the armed struggle will bring the Boers to negotiations"[4] was vain. Nevertheless government spokesmen and Afrikaans - language newpapers started refering to Mandela now in the most respectful terms, completing the transformation of his public image from terrorist to diplomat. The Mandela-Botha meeting stirred confusion, but also clarified two key points. Mandela will be released sooner or later, and the ANC in some form will be included in future negotiations.

The attempts by De Klerk to seize the high ground as peace-maker and show the ANC to be the spoiler did not bear fruits in a changing international environment in which all nations, including the Western ones, were now resolute in their calls for change in South Africa. August 15. 1989. Historic. De Klerk is sworn in as acting president and pledges to follow his party's political reform and to consider the release of Mandela after the elections. "I commit myself", he said, "to making a breakthrough with negotiations".[5] With the NP winning an absolute majority in the house of Assembly, De Klerk claimed a "resounding mandate" for reform. It's a clear majority for the parties that stand for the granting of political rights to all South Africans",[6] he said.

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[1]   Bruce Nelan, 1989/90, p. 143.

[2]   Ibid.

[3]   Ibid.

[4]   Joe Modise, Commander of" Umkhonto we Sizwe" quoted in *Foreign Affairs,* 1989/90? P. 143.

[5]   *Foreign Affairs,* 1989/90, p. 145.

[6]   Ibid.

The week after election, the government banned the use of "sjamboks" - long, hard rubber whips - by the police. The police and security forces were not to be his principal political tools. The removal of "sjambok" from police arsenals was the prelude to an even more unexpected policy shift. De Klerk called a press conference to announce that the government had "no objection" to political protests so long as they were peaceful. "The door to a new South Africa is open",[1] he said. The police were now forbidden to crush any protest march. This, to the CP, was a switch in policy by De Klerk, "a knife thrust in the back"[2] of the security forces.

In a cabinet reshuffle, De Klerk dumped many Botha men, but kept the key minister of defense, internal security, foreign affairs and finance in their posts. The most significant appointment was that of Gerrit Viljoen, who became minister of constitutional development, that is, chief negotiator with the black majority. Being a former chairman of the secret Afrikaaner Broaderbond, is considered one of the most reform-minded men at the top of the NP. A former professor and intellectual, and most recently in charge of the upgrading of the black educational system, his return to the political platform was an indication of De Klerk's seriousness about getting talks started.

September 20. Pretoria. Innaugural speech. De Klerk asked all South Africans to commit themselves to reaching a peaceful accord and promised a completely new approach to removing obstacles - "discussion and negotiation between anyone who seeks peace"[3]. Being aware that "unreasonable expectations" had been aroused about his change in the rules on public protest, he cautioned that he could not be held responsible for

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[1]   *Foreign Affairs*, 1989/90, p. 146.

[2]   Ibid.

[3]   *Foreign Affairs*, 1989/90, p. 147.

"over-enthusiastic or even twisted versions of our policy"[4] . He received Allan Boesak, Desmond Tutu and other black leaders, and layed the groundwork for "talks about talks". He released Walter Sisulu, the 77-year-old Secretary- General of the ANC who had been imprisoned since 1984, and exploited this to obtain Britain's call for the upliftment of sanctions on his country, during the Commonwealth conference in Malaysia. De Klerk asserted that the release of the black leaders, would contribute to reconcilation, but that the release of Mandela, "is not now on the agenda".[2] Obsevers feel that a reason for the delay was that Mandela would be held as a guarantee for "reasonable behaviour" on the part of those released. Sisulu's release set off a wave of celebrations and parades that added up to a de facto unbanning of the ANC. De Klerk's intention was to share power without surrendering it, and this the blacks interpreted as his "not (being) interested"[3] in having "genuine negotiations", [4] and his objective being to make apartheid" palatable",[5] to the country and the entire world.

December 1, 1989. Cape Town. Mandela and De Klerk met for the first time. The main discussion was on how the government could meet the pre-conditions of the black movements, which made De Klerk to tell a Western diplomat that "don't expect me to negotiate myself out of office".[6] A worried Pik Botha asked De Klerk "why should we surrender when we have not been defeated ?"[7] The wranglings in negotiations were to make De Klerk in July to observe that :

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[1]   Ibid.

[2]   Ibid.

[3]   *Foreign Affairs*, 1989/90, p. 148.

[4]   Ibid.

[5]   Ibid.

[6]   *Foreign Affairs*, 1989/90, p. 149.

[7]   *Foreign Affairs*, 1989/90, p. 151.

> I sincerely believe that much too much
> credence is attached to the ANC, to the
> detriment of the status of recognised
> leaders who command substantial support
> throughout or in large regions of
> South Africa.

Black leaders saw in this statement De Klerk's design to continue apatheid with a human face. They pressed for a unitary state, which the government looked at as a negotiation to create conditions for Pretoria'a surrender. They called for an end to the state of emergency, lifting restrictions on activists and organizations, release of political prisoners, rescind all death sentences, and repeal legislation instituting the central apartheid laws.

February 11, 1990. Victor Vester Prison. The gates were flung open. The eyes of the world were turned to South Africa. A tall, lanky, majestic, grey-haired figure came out. Dressed in an equally grey suit, his frail hands and soft smile told who he was. Nelson Mandela. Standing ovation. No speech, no ceremonies. Journalists with television cameras throng the place. The event was monitored life by more than 5.000 television stations the world over, and watched by an estimated crowd of more than 500 million people.[1] He was escorted to his home. The birth of a new era. Another historic event. A hot knife had cut through apartheid, and the drops were trinkling down. Mandela's release received the salute of the world. De Klerk was invited to Washington; so too was Mandela. The changes came - in their numbers. The constitution was reformed. "Talks about talks" took off with steam. The ANC was unbanned. Other political prisoners were released. Apartheid laws were repealed. General elections were built for April, 27, 1994. The wind of change kept on blowing, pushing the waters with an effervescent current. The

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[1] C.R.T.V. Radio News Bulletin, February 11, 1990, at 3 p.m.

reforms which De Klerk had enacted in 5 years turned Botha into a sinister despot, proper heir to Hitler, who had tormented and terrified South Africa in the dark past.

The internal changes in South Africa have occasioned a concomittant change in its external policy. Today, Pretoria is gradually embracing the world and joining the concert of civilized nations. UNITA and its erstwhile leader, Savimbi have been abandoned. The liquidation of Savimbi by Pretoria is an indication that externally, the regime is polishing its image. This drastic change in policy was occasioned by two factors : the desire to move along with the changes in the international environment, and second, the internal economic and political problems within South Africa itself, which had cemented the calls for change. This volte face in Pretoria's policy towards Savimbi, will brighten the hopes for a resolution of the Angolan imbroglio.

There is no doubt that Pretoria's decision was motivated also by the desire to mend fences with Luanda and perhaps, save needed resources. The plundering of wealth in a gainless adventure, the pursuance of negative policies that alienate it from the rest of the world, all belong today to the past. International relations has always placed interest first in all considerations. Pretoria has come to terms with reality, and is adapting with time. Without fear of contradiction, one can predict the future.

D.   Effects of Changes in South Africa on the Sub-region and Beyond :

The quarantine that was drawn around the RSA by its immediate neighbours and the entire international community, was beginning to give way with the perceptions of real change in the internal system. The boycott that was imposed on her, resulting in international isolation, was beginning to end. Despite the

fact that a few countries stubbornly continued to flirt with
South Africa, ignoring appeals by the OAU and the international
community, Pretoria still felt estranged and thought that it was
time policy was reversed, so as to benefit from the warmth of
civilized nations.

For many people, affirms Harvey Glickman, "February 1990 was
the month that the South African world turned upside down",[1] with
the unbanning of the ANC, the Pan-Africanist Congress and the
Communist Party, the release of Mandela and a number of political
prisoners, and the reduction of some emergency regulations. These
changes, no doubt impacted a reciprocal change in the attitude
of the rest of the world, towards Pretoria. Canada, Cameroon,
Senegal, Russia, Japan and Singapore are now poised to do
business with Pretoria.[2]
In an article titled "South Africa/Nigeria : No longer poles
apart", *Africa Confidential* reports that "Economic prospects for
Africa depend increasingly on the fortunes of two dominant states
in the region - South Africa and Nigeria. [3] The paper highlights
the four growth poles of economic development on the continent,
and pinpoints Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt and Kenya (see table
1) below :

TABLE 1
AFRICA'S FOUR GROWTH POLES

	GDP	IMPORTS*	EXPORTS*	POPULATION**
EGYPT	33.2	10.3	2.9	52
KENYA	7.5	2.1	1.1	24.2
NIGERIA	34.8	5.7	13.7	88.5

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[1] Harvey Glickman, in Introduction to *ISSUE: A Journal of Opinion*,
Vol. XVII/2 of Summer 1990, p. 3.

[2] See *Africa Confidential*, June 19, 1992, Vol. 33, No. 12, P. 2.

[3] Ibid.

S. AFRICA	90.7	18.2	23.6	35.9

* In U.S. $ 000 millions

** In millions

Source : World Bank, quoted in *Africa Confidential*, vol. 33 N°
12, June 19, 1993 p.3

Amongst the four, Nigeria and South Africa are the most
significant for Africa, in terms of economic muscle and
population. The paper however concludes that South Africa with
deepest and most sophisticated money and capital markets, is
likely to become the continent's capital market, exporting
capital to the rest of Africa. Africa as a block was virtually
invisible in the negotiations for the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, GATT ; a constructive Lagos - Pretoria axis
could help change this. South Africa is going into high –
technology manufactoring and services while importing primary
commodities and basic manufactures from other African states. It
will develop its marketing and distribution services which offer
higher rewards than the initial production and sell them to other
African states. Then South Africa's "first world" enclave
economy's relationship with the rest of Africa could start to
displace some industrialized country exporters.[1]

Recent developments in South Africa as we have pointed out
have had the effect of opening up the continent to South African
trade and investment. Always involved in clandestine commerce
with a number of African countries, South Africa has now come out
in the open and is actively courting overt and official
relations. Certain countries, like Zaïre, Mozambique, Malawi,
Côte-d'Ivoire, have always trafficked with Pretoria, but now more
"hard core" nations are coming around. Recent reports from South
Africa indicate that business and trade delegations have visited

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[1]   Ibid.

from Burundi, Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria, Madagascar and Cameroon.[2]
South Africa itself has sent high level delegations to Togo,
Angola, Kenya and Gabon. Trade delegations are already resident
in Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Botswana. *Business Day*[2] newspaper in
Johannesburg reported that 1989 saw a 40 % jump in South African
exports to Africa and 1990 witnessed a further 22% increase.
Zimbabwe remains South Africa's largest market with Zaïre now a
close second. This close openness was reflected in a meeting in
the second week of March 1991 held in Swaziland in which business
representatives from 14 African countries met with their South
African counterparts to discuss business opportunities. Besides
individual business representatives, there was representation
from the Southern African Development Coordination Conference -
SADCC and the Preferential Trade Agreement - PTA, both bodies
that exclude South Africa, as well as the African Development
Bank - ADB and the UN Development Programme - UNDP. Obviously,
current recessionary economies as well as a lessening of interest
in Africa by Europe and the US, seems to be throwing Africans
together to seek ways to spour growth and development. South
Africa, which still brings the most dominant and dynamic economy
to the table, is obviously looked at with some envy by the rest
of the continent which is stuggling through some of its toughest
times[3].

The US is also making some remarkable efforts in its bid to
salvage the economies of South Africa that had been boycotted by
many coutries and as a result, faced many set backs. The
government of President Bush[4] launched the South African

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[1] For the first time since independence, Cameroon businessmen made
an official trip to South Africa to negotiate trade links. It
was code-named M.D.C.   , and the Indomitable lions football
club even accompanied the businessmen.

[2] *Washington Report on Africa*, Vol. IX, No. 5, March 18, 1991,
p.20.

[3] Ibid.

[4] The announcement of a multi-billion dollar aid initiative for
South Africa coming on the hills of President Bush's doubling of
current US assistance to South Africa to $ 80.000.000 amounts to
overkill, especially compared to other equally important, if not
more pressing, priorities elsewhere in Africa.

Democracy Aid Initiative - SADAI in October 1991. A group of
Congress members in a letter to the president opened a new
chapter in Congresses approach to South Africa. Led by a New
York Democratic Congressman Stephen Solarz, the initiative was
billed as the spear head of an intended multi-billion dollar,
internationally-backed plan to finance the launching of the new
South Africa in much the same way as the US mobilized the
Multilateral Aid Initiative - MAI for the Philippines. Solarz was
involved in the Philippine's initiative which is the inspiration
behind SADAI.[1] To flesh out SADAI into a coherent and well-
thought initiative, the Congressional sponsors of the initiative
could consider authorizing AID to undertake a South African
Democracy Aid Analysis Project - SADAAP, reports *WROA*,[2] and in
the process, underwrite an opportunity for black South African
development professionals, scholars and researchers to lay out
the political and socio-economic development needs facing South
Africa and the optional foreign assistance strategies available
for meeting these needs.

Washington holds that the SADAI initiative will get underway
"only after the adoption of a new constitution, the holding of
free and fair elections, and the establishment of a
democratically elected government.[3] With the current
democratization and liberalization that is taking place in South
Africa and the general elections of April 27, 1994 which saw the
victory of Nelson Mandala, the way is now set for South Africa
to receive Congressional largesse, a situation unparalled in
Africa.

The openings that are being made towards South Africa and
those which South Africa itself is making towards the world, are
a consequence of the liberalization of political life and the

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[1]   Francis A. Kornegay in *WROA*, Vol. IX, No. 20, December 4,
        1991, p. 77.

[2]   *WROA*, December 4, 1991, P. 80.

[3]   *WROA*, December 4, 1991, p. 77

impressive changes that are going on in the internal environment. These changes that adapt to the changing international environment, confirms *The Citizen*, are occuring because of "the positive developments in South Africa towards establishing democratic institutions".[1]

President De Klerk was aware of this and made all diplomatic efforts to open up South Africa to the rest of the world, by keeping firm to his engagement to liberate the country from the pangs and bondage of apartheid; the bastion of evil. In a visit to Washington in September 1990, he fought for the upliftment of sanctions from his country, and styled his initiative:

> A journey toward full democracy at home
> and abroad, full participation in the
> family of nations... [and a vision]
> of a new South Africa.[2]

Even President Bush affirmed on this visit that change in South Africa was "irreversible". In a press conference in his plane while returning to Pretoria, De Klerk said he was "positively encouraged" and that South Africa "had been welcome back into the international community, which had an understanding of what the government was doing."[3] *The Citizen*, in an editorial on this US trip started that "Mr De Klerk has achieved a diplomatic and psychological break-through"[4]and concluded that "South Africa is returning to the community of nations... De Klerk is putting South Africa back on the map again as a country with which the world can deal and which it can respect."[5]

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[1] *WROA*, vol. X, No. 2, January 27, 1992, p. 6.

[2] *WROA*, vol. VII, No. 19, October 1, 1990, p. 71.

[3] WROA, October 1, 1990, p. 72.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

In the efforts to get South Africa back into the concepts of nations as a result of the internal changes that are going on in the country, even international organisations are huzzling to get their way in. Eventhough officails of the IMF did not directly embrace De Klerk on his Washington visit, they nevertheless showed positive signs and De Klerk succeeded in getting the US administration support to his effort to obtain an IMF loan. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman Cohen was quoted as saying that Bush" would certainly be willing to look at" an IMF loan application from South Africa.[1] Cohen openned the door to that possibility by removing the IMF loan from any linkage to the 1986 sanction's act criteria. All this was happening as a result of South Africa's resolve to democratize, and open up.

With South Africa's transition to majority rule, the country is now seen as the key to southern Africa's economic future and to continental recovery beyond. Yet, the new South Africa's potential to rejuvinate the sub-continental economy will greatly hinge on the state of its own internal economic health and political stability. Hence, the importance of SADAI to the region as well as South Africa itself. The infighting between the factions in the country do not augur well for th future. Efforts should be made by the opposing parties and the International community to see that these wranglings are arrested at the bud and resolved, so that the country's transition to democratic rule should not turn out to be a poisoned gift, and sour grapes for the expectations and hopes of Africa and beyond. For sure, this is not the expectation of anybody.

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[1]   Ibid.

CONCLUSION

A. Original Goals and Observations drawn from the Analysis

At the beginning of this research endeavour, our intention was to prospect on conflict resolution in the post-coldwar period, with particular emphasis on the Angolan civil war. In the course of our analysis, we have attempted to show that the changes in the international environment have added to the efforts towards achieving a negotiated settlement of not just this Angolan civil war, but also most of the conflicts that are Coldwar oriented oriented. This is because we discovered in our forage that extra-African intervention in civil conflicts tended to change local conflicts into international headaches, which in turn produced catastrophic consequences. In our analysis, cross-cultural examinations have been made, just to show that Angola is not an island, neither the situation happening there. The internecine struggle in Angola is just the same kind in Mozambique. Thus parallels like these are made when there is need. In our attempt to make our findings on the topic, we came out with the following observations:

(i) The accords that were signed in New York on December 22 1988 in as much as they helped to solve a problem and created possibilities for future resolution of the Angolan conflict, they nevertheless had loopholes. As in the case of all negotiations and settlements, these accords did not resolve all issues of concern and even generated some new problems. While they are significant in the hopes that they raised for the resolution of other long-standing problems in the region, such as the anarchy and carnage in Mozambique, they nevertheless fell short in their efforts to come out with veritable solutions, especially for the Angolan civil war. Our observation on this aspect leads us to suggest that the only deal that will work is one that is good for all the parties to it and tolerable to those who have the capacity to wreck it, that is, a peace without losers. A formula

that has the logic of fundamental national interests behind it is worth sticking with ; patience will reward such a formula.

(ii) A second observation we have made is that military force remains a persuasive tool of foreign and national security policy. Without South African intervention in Angola, there would have been no recognition in Luanda of an Angolan security interest in Namibia's independence and no Cuban consideration of withdrawal to realize it. Without Cuba's demonstration of its willingness to match South African escalation, there would have been no urgency to reach an agreement. Without US aid to UNITA, there would have been no convincing stalemate to propel the parties to the negotiation table. Nor, absent a convincing US commitment to help UNITA maintain its military balance with the MPLA, would the South African military have been willing to consider an end to its own aid to UNITA.

(iii) The third observation which we have made is that mediation is different from negotiation per se. It provides an opportunity to guide the parties to definitions of their national interests and toward outcomes compatible with the mediator's objectives, but in the end they - not the mediator - determines the result. At various stages in the Angola/Namibia negotiations, the parties gave in on points Crocker did not believe they needed to concede, and which the US would rather they had not. Recognition of the limits of the mediator's role and of his power to compel a result is his first virtue; forbearance from pointing out the petty and grand stupidities of the parties to the negotiation is his second.

(iv) The fourth observation we have made from our analysis is that the immediate background of the conflict in Angola is the war of independence between 1961-1975, which terminated with a situation where the three major liberation movements, the MPLA, FNLA and UNITA could not agree on how to share power. Attempts to reconcile the parties were made through the Alvor conference in 1975 and several other initiatives, but the agreements fell

apart as a result of antagonisms related both to political views, national support base, external ties, and personal relations. The main actors in the war that followed, and has lasted for 19 years, have been the MPLA (with support from the RSA and the US). Other foreign powers, such as East Germany, China, Zaire, Israel, Congo and Zambia have had more marginal roles. The FNLA, as well as the Cabinda based FLEC, have largely stayed away from the scene.

The most important aspects for Angola of the agreements made between May 1988 and the final ratification of an accord in New York on December 22 1988 have been:

(a) The RSA has withdrawn its troops from Angola, and has terminated its direct support to UNITA.

(b) The RSA has also withdrawn its troops from Namibia and the country has attained its independence in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 435. On February 28, 1994, South Africa officiallly handed the port of Walvis Bay to Namibia, after 80 years control. This came after 4 years of Namibian independence. Namibian President, Dr Sam Nujoma was present as the South African flag was pulled down, and the Namibian flag hoisted amidst cheering crowds.[1]

(iii) Cuba has withdrawn the 50.000 troops it had in Angola within the 2-year time limit fixed, the ANC (which had 4 military and 3 civilian camps and at least 6,000 members in Namibia) have been expelled in conformity with the New York Accords.

In addition to these, the US came to insist on national reconciliation (for them a euphemism for a coalition government) between UNITA and the MPLA. Important aspects not agreed upon have been the question of continued economic support to UNITA from the US, and the role of Zaire as an active supporter of the same movement. As of February 1989, it seemed clear that the RSA had gained most from the peace process, and that the question of a final peace in Angola still remained an open one. The present

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[1]   B.B.C. (Africa) Radio news, 5.30 a.m. March 1, 1994.

situation seems to be as follows:

(a) Angola has sent away the Cuban troopes according to schedule.
(b) The RSA has withdrawn from Namibia, and the latter has gained
its economic security, and independence.
(c) UNITA suffers from internal strives and attacks by government
forces, but receives external aid from the US and the RSA, thus
continuing to play a key role in the conflict. It could have
been expected that the end of the Coldwar will spell an end also
to external commitment to the war.
(d) Angola has expelled ANC members from its territory, and the
latter now have to operate within the RSA, since they have been
legalized.
(e) The political development in the RSA have increased the
degree of support for the peaceful settlement of the Angolan
conflict.

For Angola, the combination of the withdrawal of Cuban
troops and the continued financial support given to UNITA by the
US and the RSA, must be unsatisfying. The continuous attacks by
UNITA on economic installations and the massive killings of
civilians increases insecurity and renders the situation worse.
Eventhough peace is still not at hand, however, the long term
trend points toward a final solution with the MPLA in power in
Luanda, especially with the recent Washington recognition of the
MPLA government. All parties involved, with the exception of
UNITA, seem to be interested in this. The ultimate aim of the US
is to have a government strong enough to protect the values of
capitalism and democracy, but weak enough to be influenced. For
the RSA a policy of destabilization will be useful for some time
to come, but in the long run they cannot afford not to have
contacts with a country as potentially strong and economically
important as Angola (in contrast to the rest of the countries in
the region, the RSA is in no position to assert economic pressure
on Angola). The CIS seems to have accepted the war as an internal
problem to be solved by the Angolans. And for the present
government in Angola, a final solution is most likely a matter

of life or death.

Parallel with the development in the military conflict, there have been developments within Angola pointing in the direction of peace and recovery. The problem is, however, that most of these developments precondition a peaceful situation: Recovery in important economic sectors like agriculture and mining will be jeopardized by continued military activities in the countryside. Necessary investments in infrastructure and industry will be jeopardized by continued military build-up. A continued war will effectively preclude the popular support necessary for recovery to succeed. And lack of results from the policy of reconciliation and economic liberalization will jeopardize the position of the present power holders in relation to more dogmatic elements.

Throughout the period after the end of the Coldwar, however, the prospects for peace has largely been considered from an international angle. The main themes have been the plausibility of the US stopping economic aid to UNITA, and the possibility of RSA to halt its support, albeit economic to the former. The questions of peace in Angola and independence for Namibia have been interrelated since Chester Crocker introduced "linkage" in 1981, and had most likely delayed both processes by several years. The main purpose of this thesis which was to explore on conflict resolution in the post-Coldwar period, focusing on the Angolan civil war, made us to look at the internal options for peace and recovery. Obviously external and internal factors are closely interlinked, as a continued war-situation will effectively preclude any sound and peaceful development in Angola. However, it is also true that the violent conflict in Angola could not have been sustained for 19 years without a national base and that peace and recovery will depend on a solution also of the internal problems.

B. Effects of Conflicts on the Economies of States.

The history of post-independent Africa has been a catalogue of woes - the debilitating economic crisis that surfaced in the 1970s has been agravated by the prevalence of wars and other natural causes that leave a gloomy picture on the horizon. From Western Sahara to the Horn, from Liberia to the Southern end of the continent, the picture has remained the same. While these conflicts owe their root causes in the infighting between religious and interest groups, political and ideological differences have added the steam. The result of course, is a continent that is torn apart, and "things [are falling] apart". The over-stretched hands of the superpowers and other intervening powers, has helped to worsen an already gloomy picture, leaving behind its trail, famine, hunger, unemployment, disease, social strive, you name them. In this section of our research, we shall attempt to figure out the obvious effects of conflicts on the economies of African states, with a justification of our limitation based on the fact that this continent remains the poorest in the world, but ironically, the most heavily stricken by internecine conflicts that continue to tear its people apart. Angola has tasted this gloomy experience for 19 years,[1] Mozambique about the same, Ethiopia and Somalia perhaps much longer, with Liberia just falling into it. The greed of the various parties involved continues to push them to conflict, even when the original causes that set the conflict off have disappeared.

The anticipated benefits of economic and political independence have frequently not materialized or have been squandered. Wealth has been concentrated in the hands of a relatively few individuals. Rates of unemployment and underemployment have plumeted, due to the involvement of vital economic needs into a wanton military struggle that has borne the weight of the economy. War has left a "season of anormy" in

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[1] The United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund-UNICEF has estimated that at least 1.3 million people were killed either directly or indirectly in Angola and Mozambique during the years 1980-1988. At least 850.000 of these were children below the age of 5!

Angola, Mozambique, Somalia and many others. Even where the wars have come to an end - as in the Congo (now Zaire) and Nigeria, the people have still been embattled by one main problem: that of "surviving the peace". The societies have been plagued by men whose atarvistic urge to achieve their interests, their spirit of acquisitiveness, their rabid unpatriotism, has left behind chaos. All around Africa, there are pogroms, carnage, fratricidal battles, internecine struggles, and the question one asks is: How man, a product of social determinism, can survive in such an anormic situation? Africa is characterized and distinguished for its self-reproduction in systems that are akin only to it - political and administrative over-centralization, bureaucratization, corruption, and the absence of participatory government. Continued elite dominance of the political system has produced and accentuated rivalry, rather than lessening it.

Sub-Saharan Africa has seen many conflicts, which have ranged from relatively low-level, if protracted, border disputes that are a legacy of colonialism, or ethnic rivalries predating colonial conquest to full-blown wars of secession or national liberation that have consumed far greater human and financial resources. The reliance of many governments on their security forces has rendered the situation gloomier, with military expenditure in most cases (even in the poorest countries), absorbing a significant share of state and government resources. (See Table 2 and 3). This section attempts to examine four types of effects that conflicts and expenditure in the security sector can be expected to have on African economies:

(i) effects generated by direct expenditure on the security forces;

(ii) indirect effects of expenditure in the security sector;

(iii) short- and long-term disruption of the economy from conflicts; and

(iv) effects of a politically active security forces.[1]

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[1] For a detailed examination of the issues surrounding the measurement of security expenditure, see Nicole Ball, *Security and Economy in the Third World* (Princeton University Press, 1988) pg-84-122; and Nicole Ball, *Third World Security Expenditure: A*

(i) **Direct Expenditure on the Security Forces:**

All security expenditure has an opportunity cost. Once resources are allocated to the security forces, they cannot be used for any other purpose. A huge chunck of the national budget of states is devoted to defense purposes. In most countries, this budget even competes with that of vital sectors such as education and health, and in some cases, surpasses them. Look at the table illustrating defense expenditure of the security-inclined African states (see Table 2 and 3). Most often, all security expenditure is not conveniently listed in government budgets and accounts under "Defense" or "Armed Forces", making it necessary to comb through a number of categories to compile a (reasonably) accurate figure. Some countries include different types of expenditure under headings of the same name and, from time to time, move expenditure from one category to another.[1] A more problematic practice involves the concealment of security-related expenditure. Easiest to conceal are those involving foreign exchange that can be funded off-budget or through special accounts, a frequent occurence in African states.[2]

A large proportion of military personnel choose to spend their salaries on imported goods, thus reducing the benefits to the domestic economy. When military personnel are trained at the expense of civilians or if the training they receive is not transferable to the civilian sector, economic growth is hindered. Military-related investment that occurs at the expense of more

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Statistical Compendum (Stockholm: National Defense Research Institute, May 1984).

[1] For example, the paramilitary Garde Républicaine in the Central African Republic has at times been listed under the Ministry of Defense and at another times under the Ministry of the Interior. See Ball, *Security and Economy*, p. 86; Ball, *Third World Security Expenditure*, pp. 114–115.

[2] See David Jenkins, "The Military's Secret Cache" in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, vol. 107 (February 8, 1980) p. 70; David Jenkins, "The Military in Business" in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, vol. 99 (January 13, 1978) p. 24; David Jenkins, "The Defense Budget Gives Little Away", in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, vol. 21 (September 15, 1983) p. 46.

productive civil-sector investment encourages an emphasis on "inappropriate" technologies, ultimately reducing the growth potential of an economy. Procurement of military-related material from abroad imposes an intolerable burden on an economy short of foreign exchange. Because sub-Saharan Africa's per capita external public debt is the heaviest in the Third world, any addition to it worsens an already bad situation. A remarkable aspect is that most heavily indebted African countries are those whose military-related debt as a share of total debt is the largest.[1]

(ii) Some Indirect Effects of Expenditure in the Security Sector:

There are several indirect effects that security expenditure has on Third World economies. Whereas the direct effects pertain to how much is spent and where in the economy it is spent, indirect effects relate to the efficiency with which resources are employed and derive from the degree to which resources are misallocated or misused. Development strategies that tend to emphasize industrialization as the most efficient means of promoting economic growth and modernization, has frequently resulted in relative neglect of the agricultural sector. By failing to eradicate rural poverty, most African governments (example, Nigeria and Egypt) have weakened the long-term prospects of attaining self-sustaining growth. Since the security sector usually occupies a priority in the planning of investment priorities, the result is that an abandonment of the rural sector increases poverty, malnutrition and disease. Due to conflicts and the fear of it, the armed forces usually insist on industralization in the military sector, as a means to procure the armaments that will be necessary to crush any rebellion. Industrialization is believed to enhance economic independence and thus lay the basis for the domestic production of weapons. Where the military is in power, as is the case in many African

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[1]   Nicole Ball, "Effect of Conflict on Third World Countries" in *Conflict Resolution in Africa*, Francis M. Deng/I. William Zartman, (eds), Washington D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1991, p. 279.

countries, their ability to influence investment priorities naturally increase.

By building up a defense-industrial sector, not only is any bias in favour of the urban-industrial sector increases, but capital-intensive processes will be favoured over labour-intensive ones, and large investments will be made in industries that may well produce goods and industrial imputs that are too specialized for the civilian market. The South African government in its bide to hold on to power against the wishes of the majority blacks created and sustained an arms industry that was larger and more technologically sophisticated than the government could economically support over the long term.

Manpower is wasted when it is allocated to the military sector, with a total abandonement of the civilian sector. This misallocation of resources in the military sector removes youngmen from the civilian economy when they are in their most productive years. During wars or periods of protracted conflicts, (like the case with Angola and Mozambique) the manpower needs of the armed forces rise and a larger proportion of the economically active population is removed from the civilian economy. Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Somalia, the RSA - countries that for many years have prefered to pursue military solutions to conflicts that require negotiated political solutions, have experienced a constant drain on manpower resources.[1] When a good proportion of the vital human force is concentrated in the army, the result of course, is adverse on the economy.

This misallocation of resources, concentrating them on the military sector, has increased corruption. In 1985, the OAU announced that many African countries were on the verge of collapse because of a combination of "an unjust and inequitable

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[1] It should be remarked that about 6% of the population of these countries that fall between the age group 15-44 years, one actively involves in the military - especilly males. See Ball, 1984, p. 410-411.

economic system", natural disasters, and "domestic policy shortcomings".[1] A survey of 29 coups that occured in Sub-Saharan African countries between 1958 and 1980 reported that corruption was cited as a justification for the coup in 40% of the cases.[2] Government by the armed forces almost often guarantees corruption, inefficient practices, and abuse of power. Corruption, holds Ball, "respects no ideological or occupational boundaries",[3] thus the failure of civilians should not be a pretext for the usurpation of power by the military.[4]

(iii) Disruption of the Economy by Conflict:

The most distinct and pernicious disruption of the economy by conflict is the inability to plan rationally, particularly in a situation of prolonged conflict, as is the case with the Angola and Mozambique civil wars. These wars have dragged on for too long, and in the process, planning during lulls have often been disrupted to meet urgent war needs when there is an escalation. This difficulty also arises because of a dependency on external sources of funding that may be slow in arriving, funds that may be offered for a purpose other than what the government would have liked to fund; because of difficulties in obtaining financial resources from the local population, whose ability to earn their livelihood has been severely disrupted; and because of war-related destruction of infrastructure. The personal tool of conflict, manifested in refugees, displaced persons, and

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[1] See Nicole Ball, 1984, p. 285.

[2] Staffan Wiking, *Military Coups in Sub-Saharan Africa: How to Justify Illegal Assumptions of Power* (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1983), p. 99. The most frequently cited justification, "economic failures" appeared in just over 50% of the cases.

[3] Ball, 1984, p. 286

[4] See Lucien Pye, "Armies in the Process of Modernization" in John J. Johnson, (ed), *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries,* (Princeton University Press, 1962). See also Robert M. Price, "Military Officers and Political Leadership: The Ghanaian Case", *Comparative Politics,* vol. 3 (April 1981). See also Robert M. Price, "Neo-Colonialism and Ghana's Economic Decline: A Critical Assessment", *Canadian Journal of African Studies,* Vol. 18, No.1 (1984).

deaths, results in reductions of output, particularly in the agricultural sector. There are also reductions in GDP that derive from direct war damage, loss of income from exports, tourism, aid, and the like, as well as higher costs in sectors like transportation and energy.

(iv) The Political Role of the Armed Forces:

A frequent outcome of wars and long-term conflicts is the increased involvement of the security forces in the political systems of the states party to the conflict. Nigeria, for example, has been under direct military rule for more than half the time since becoming independent.[1] In South Africa, where civilians have ruled without interruption, attention nonetheless has been accorded to the security forces in determining government policy.[2]

The inability or unwillingness of many governments to attack seriously domestic inequalities at the root of underdevelopment has led many of them to arm themselves against their own people as well as against potential external enemies. Whether suppressing an internal uprising (like in the case of street demonstrations in the early 1990s calling for democracy to be established) or protecting the territorial integrity and sovereignty (like in the case of incursions into their territories) of the states, conflicts have always tended to create forums for the military to have a big say in the political process, thus leading to sometimes, regrettable situations. By relying on the armed forces to remain in power, or by producing political and economic conditions that provide the military with the justification for intervention, many civilian governments have facilitated the entry of the armed forces into the political

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[1] Since independence, Nigeria has had 7 military rulers-Gen. Johnson Aguiyi Ironsi, Gen. Yakubu Gowon, Gen. Murtala Mohammed, Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo, Gen. Mohammed Buhari, Gen. Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida, and Gen. Sani Abacha.

[2] The situation is bound to change with the election of Nelson Mandala to the Supreme Magistracy of the country, and hopes for a change in policy towards its neighbours.

arena. Instead of solving the problems that bisect the elite groups in Africa, the military has instead intervened in most cases to become one of the elite groups itself, and of guarantor of elite-dominated political and economic systems.

By helping to maintain a system in which the state is seen as a source of wealth to be tapped by a priviledged minority of the population, the security forces seriously complicated the task of implementing growth, and in the process, they contribute to maldevelopment. Opportunities arise out of the reduction in tension in the present world system that encourage peaceful resolution of conflicts. This will make it harder for the armed forces to justify an active domestic political role for themselves. Security forces that have posed a serious obstacle to political development in the Third World by preserving elite-dominated political systems have also frequently complicated the resolution of domestic conflicts by seeking military solutions to problems that are inherently political and economic and by creating conflict, through their refusal to countenance economic and political pluralism.

C. Prospects for Conflict Resolution in the Post-Coldwar Period.

If the effects of conflict on the economies of African states is anything to go by, then our findings could be helpful in leading to ways of arresting conflicts and resolving them in the post-Coldwar period. What are the challenges that lie ahead? The continued existence of conflicts, as we have already seen, breaks the peace and security which are so vital to national independence and development. The changing international system has produced a new picture for conflicts in general. They have tended to become defensive rather than offensive, peaceful and conciliatory rather than militaristic and aggressive. This tendency has shown up due to the fact that the superpowers have relaxed tension, ideological disparity has ceased to have any meaning, cut down in external financing to parties involved in

conflicts, and the more participatory role of governments and bodies now, more than ever before, to resolve these crisis. In this section, our analysis dwells on the prospects of both the OAU and the UNO to resolve these conflicts that plague Africa, especially in an era marked by the desire to conceptualize new roles for these bodies.

Both the OAU and the UNO must join hands in making parties to realize that their modus operandi which has always been "offense is that best defense" is now obsolete. UNITA in Angola, RENAMO in Mozambique, SPLA in the Sudan, NPFL in Liberia and the SADF in the RSA should all be persuaded through all available means (if possible, military action) to put a stop to the carnage they are causing, if at all the world must live in peace, harmony and concord. The situation cannot remain the same as we grope into the next millenium. Pressure must be brought to bear on the parties, at all cost. The RSA and its neighbours cannot continue to live in antagonism. The present climate of world detente appears to favour negotiations toward achieving a political settlement to the conflicts that bisect Africa.

The present international climate appears to favour negotiations toward political solutions both to the conflict between apartheid and the forces of liberation inside South Africa and the other conflicts in the region. There are a number of pointers indicating that there exists prospects for the resolution of conflicts in this post-Coldwar period, in Southern Africa; some of these are:

(i) The military setbacks at Cuito Cuanavale, which high-lighted the limitations of militaristic aggression as a means of guaranteeing long-term security for apartheid.
(ii) The gradual withering away of white political cohesion on what the future path of South Africa should be, especially with the disagreement between the NP and the CP on the elections billed for April 27th 1994; elections that will lead South Africa

to majority rule.[1]

(ii) The growing pressures of international isolation, and most particularly the effect of South Africa's exclusion from the "normal facilities" of internaitonal financial markets on the South African economy.

(iv) The changing international environment, resulting particularly from the adoption of the policies of glasnost, perestroïka, and "new thinking" in the USSR (now CIS) and the West in seeking "Political solutions to regional conflicts". There is also in the West a growth in anti-apartheid sentiment, and fatigue in continuing the war situation in Southern Africa.

(v) The military option has become extremely costly in miltary, economic and political terms. Pretoria does not cherish any longer to continue the plunder of scarce resources on a war effort that is not rewarding. Destabilization has become too expensive diplomatically and ideologically, since it would lead to an increase in South Africa's international isolation at precisely a moment when economic pressures dictate the necessity for a major effort to reduce this isolation. Meanwhile, the government needs more time, space, and a degree of legitimacy to tackle the problem of how to proceed with domestic restructuring, given the growing recognition that the policies it adopts are incapable of producing a viable solution to the continuing crisis facing the country.

The South African government had involved its diplomats in various negotiations in order to substitute some endorsement by the region and the international community for its lack of domestic legitimacy. Through maximum utilization of its current international goodwill (after the Namibia accord and the substitution of De Klerk for Botha), South Africa is currently using diplomatic and economic action to gain tacit support for three of its currently most important regional policy objectives:

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[1] This election finally took place with the ANC coming out victorious with 64% and Mandela elected as the first black president for a multi-racial South African government.

(i) breaking out of the international isolation through an acceptance of its "constructive" political role as a regional peace maker;

(ii) gaining greater access to the regional markets by promoting itself as the regional economic power-house through which the region can be economically "restabilized"; and

(iii) winning regional and international endorsement for enacting reforms internally; reforms that will lead the country to majority rule come, April 27.[1]

The new realities in South and Southern Africa have widened the range of possible near-term scenarios. The transition to a phase of regional relations involving some element of dialogue between Pretoria and its neighbours had opened up new terrain with certain possibilities for South Africa to buy time and enhance its image with the major Western Powers. There are several assumptions about the international, regional and domestic domains, that are likely to influence future scenarios:

(i) the conflicts in South and Southern Africa will not be considered sufficiently important by the superpowers to provoke large-scale military intervention, either directly or indirectly.

(ii) the superpowers and other large powers with interest in the region will continue to favour a non-revolutionary transition to democracy in South Africa.[2]

(iii) South Africa's external trade and financial linkages, as well as its economic growth, will continue to be hampered by internal political opposition, and external action, sanctions in

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[1]   These reforms finally led to constitutional changes that saw the effective holding of elections on April 27, leading to the victory of the ANC and a proclamation of black rule in South Africa.

[2]   This is exactly what happened when elections were held leading to the formation of a transitional government of national unity, on Tuesday May 10, 1994. The government that was formed turned out to be an agglomeration of the major political parties that took part in the elections - 18 portfolios for the ANC, 6 for the NP, and 3 for the Inkatha Freedom Party(IFP).
Such a wide range government, that included F.W. de Klerk and radical Zulu Chief Mangosutho Gathsa Buthelazi is short of being revolutionary; rather it is a compromise government.

particular.[1]

(iv) South Africa's neighbours will continue to be willing to offer substantial concessions on both their economic links with South Africa and their domestic socio-economic development projects as long as they can see light at the end of the tunnel.

(v) the goal of the FLS-SADCC diplomacy will continue to be raising the costs to Pretoria of supporting the destabilization of its neighbours and bringing about a withdrawal of such policies, thus securing national independence and creating conditions for economic recovery. Among the FLS-SADCC member states there is also an interest in exploring whether the new realities are conducive to some form of negotiated end to apartheid.[2]

(vi) there is widespread dissent within South Africa's white population, a dissent that covers the entire South African political spectrum. This discord will grow as the extreme right, with its socially and geographically limited support base, (they are made up only of a minute white population of the CP.) finds its breathing space further diminished and as the more powerful interests linked to "big business" find the prospects for capital accumulation and economic growth hampered by apartheid and the external reaction to it.

(vii) The NP strata are also likely to become further divided. Such divisions within the party, paired with a split white political constituency as a whole, will make it difficult to formulate a long term strategy and mobilize the resources required to support it. The capacity of the regime to control events is likely to diminish.[3]

(viii) the leadership of the ANC and the mass democratic movement

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[1] The situation drastically changes with the elections that has changed this scenario.

[2] This situation has changed with the change in government in Pretoria after the April 27, 1994 elections.

[3] This capacity actually diminished with the heavy split that was witnessed between the NP and the CP, that ended up reinforcing the position of the black parties (ANC and IFP). The split ended up weakening the whites leading them to relinguish power against their will.

will continue to be disposed toward conciliation at least until all attempts at a negotiated transformation to democracy have proved futile.[1]

In the light of the above, we see that resolution is yet to come; the signals are clear. It now remains the duty of the international community, and the parties involved in South Africa to understand that transition to democratic rule is not a condition sine qua non for peace. For there to be veritable peace all hands must be put on deck and all efforts must be deplored to seize this ripe moment for resolution. If we take into consideration the dominant role that is displayed by the US in the region today, we could be convinced to hope that it might seize the bull by the horns and make the parties talk and understand each other. The pre-election discord between Buthelezi and Mandela should not be allowed to spill over into the post-election period. The acceptance by the former to be Interior Minister in the new government of national unity is a pointer of hope. We can only wait and see what the future will hold.

D. Recommendations

After observing the various aspects related to the changes in the international encironment, the developments in Southern Africa, in particular the war in Angola, we have explored on the prospects for resolution of conflicts in the post-Coldwar period. The last aspect of our research endeavour is based on making some recommendations, that we hope could help policy makers and negotiators in their bide to solve the multitude of wars that plague Africa. In doing this that we shall have done our greatest contribution to the efforts towards seeking a pacific solution to conflicts in the post-Coldwar period. To prevent inevitable competition from turning into violent conflicts, Africa needs to improve and expand mechanisms for conflict management.[2] This is

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[1]   This of course was not the case since elections effectively took place on April 27, 1994 leading to a smooth transition to democracy.

[2]   Deng and Zartman, 1991, p. 9.

the viewpoint of Francis Deng and William Zartman, in their introduction to *Conflict Resolution in Africa*. The mechanism for conflict resolution and management found within the structures of the OAU must be revitalized, so as to adapt to new, changing realities of the present international order.

In recent years, writes William Foltz, "complaints have come to focus on the organisation's failure to prevent or to resolve the violent conflicts that have caused vast human misery in several parts of the continent and opened the door to penetration by non-African powers".[1] If the OAU has survived all these while, it is not because it lacked problems, or because it enjoyed material prosperity, but simply because of the dynamism of its members - the states. If this dynamism could be transfered to real interest and involvement in solving Africa's disputes, then the organisation must have saved its life. But if it remains in the old order, refusing to acquaint itself with the new international environment, it will remain a talk-shop, and its future will be bleak. It is this pessimism that makes *Africa Confidential* to confide to its readers that if the OAU's new leadership fails to make dramatic strides in resolving these crises that worry the continent, then "it is hard to see an effective future for the OAU."[2]

Any realistic appreciation of the OAU's current weaknesses and capabilities must begin with the organisation's origins, which find explanation on the fact that it was much a product of its time. The immediate needs and fears of the founding members marked the organisation's structure and agenda in ways that have endured. For the OAU to be able to solve conflicts in the present world context and even in the future, it must be able to reinvigorate its structures and agenda, adapting them to the

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[1] William J. Foltz, "The Organisation of African Unity and the Resolution of Africa's Conflicts" in Deng and Zartman, 1991, p. 347.

[2] *Africa Confidential*, vol. 30 (August 11, 1989), p. 4.

changing times, and also replace rhetoric with concrete action in matters of urgency and great concern.

The OAU Charter that emerged at Addis Ababa in 1963, with principles and procedures defined in the first two years of meetings, provided for an organisation of sovereign and juridically equal states whose most authentic voices were to be those of their individual national leaders. On the internal affairs of its member states, the Charter is a most conservative document; six of the seven "principles" enumerated in article II are designed to serve in part or in whole to protect the autonomy of member states from interference or coercion by other members, but they fail to come out with proper principles that will guide the internal peace of individual states from separatist attacks. If the OAU must succeed in solving the intractable and bisecting internal issues that affect states, then it must put this point in its agenda; that is, come out of its avowed principle of respecting "the territorial integrity and sovereignty of states:

The Charter, according to William Foltz[1] is also conservative in its concern to protect the organisation as a whole from being manipulated by a determined and organised faction. The requirement of two-thirds for a quorum, for the calling of special meetings, and for all decisions in the summit meetings demonstrates a protective preference for inaction and delay over decisive movement, in the absence of general support. Likewise, the few explicit powers given the Secretary-General and the Secretariat, as well as the refusal to empanel the proposed Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration, and the quick hamstringing of the Liberation Committee when it tried to take autonomous decisions, make it clear that the executive action is reserved for the chiefs of state and government, and then only for those subjects on which they can achieve broad consensus. Lest even that protection is guaranteed by the absence of any formal sanction, such as suspension or termination

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[1]   Foltz, in Deng and Zartman, 1991, p. 350.

of membership, that could be applied against a recalcitrant state.

The OAU is thus not a command organisation, nor is it equipped with independent executive instruments capable of enforcing decisions against either members or non-members. This explains why William Zartman writes that "There is no OAU; there are only members, and their interests come first".[1] If the OAU can be able to transform itself into a veritable command institution, making its organs really functional, it will command the awe and respect of its members, and will go a step further, towards resolving African disputes. Containing no power or hegemony, not being able and willing to pay the set-up and running costs and to bribe or bully others into complying with the normative order, the OAU will remain unusual among regimes of its kind. "Sovereign equality" of members is a legal fiction common to most international organisations, which the OAU adopted, failing to realise the loopholes it carries. In an organisation of weak and fragile states, none possessing the military resources capable of coercing its fellows into compliance, or economic resources to bankroll an enticing new order, it will be difficult to realise objectives. States like Nigeria that command a certain economic and military strength, and the newly free South Africa, should pick up this challenge and solve this marasma affecting Africa. Leadership should cease from being mere political rhetoric and reputation - it should be replaced with action and strength.

Some basic factors render the OAU incapable of preventing or imposing solutions on serious conflicts in Africa. Three interrelated systemic factors have in particular made the OAU's task more difficult: the greatly increased level of armaments on the African continent, the growing inequality among members, and the increased tendency of member states to divide into stable

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[1]   I. William Zartman, "The OAU in the African State System" in Yassin El-Ayouty and I. William Zartman, (ed), *The OAU after Twenty Years*, (Praeger, 1984). p. 41.

factions based on international alignment. This buildup of arms and the development of force projection capacity instead of being used against the population of other nations could be helpful to assist weak states. The economic inequalities that make some countries to be revelling in a kind of squandermania of luxury, while others are languishing in a squalor of poverty and distress must be bridged. This has to be done by the formation and activation of regional economic groupings so that the rich countries can help the poor. In this way, causes of misery and frustration will diminish, and with them, conflict. The principal cleavage that divided the states of Africa (the East/West alignment of the Coldwar) has disappeared, that is, what sharpened the cleavage between these states was the confrontation and rivalry between Washington and Moscow; since this has disappeared in the new order, African states too should move from conflict to confluence so that, together, they will achieve better things.

What role for the former superpowers and the other large powers of the West in helping to solve regional conflicts in the post-Coldwar world? To the extent possible, it is incumbent on the governments of the major industrialized powers, particularly the US and Germany, to encourage the peaceful resolution of conflicts and to support the implementation of economic and political reforms that will give all segments of society in the Third World the opportunity to contribute to the decision-making process and to benefit from economic development. Ultimately, it is the people and governments of the Third World that must seize the opportunities presented by the changes occuring in East/West relations and create a more equitable future for themselves. A first step in this process for many countries in Africa and other parts of the Third World is to remove the military from politics.

Considering the effect of global change, the process of political and economic reconstruction of Angola and Mozambique, the continuation of destabilization, and the volatile internal

situation in South Africa,[1] what are the actions and outcomes that in the present regional conjuncture would seem to best promote peace and security in the whole of Africa? On the regional level, the actors in conflict should begin to lay an institutional basis for concrete discussions on such vital regional matters as security, trade, migrant labour, transport, mining and energy. There should be a total and unconditional end to all forms of external support for movements like UNITA and RENAMO. In addition, all available domestic resources in Angola and Mozambique should be mobilized to facilitate the socio-economic infrastructure in rural areas. This also applies to Liberia, to Somalia, to Ethiopia, to Chad, in fact, to all the conflict regions in the African continent.

A bottom-up type of rural development strategy based on dynamization, local resources, and local initiative needs to be adopted. Also essential is a major effort to reach the poorest, most marginalized, and "semi-banditized" segments of rural poor in Africa. If this is not done, a perpetuation of violence in rural areas is unavoidable. Substantial amounts of donor funds must be earmarked for support of the efforts described in the last two points. There must be implemntation of some form of a distributionist welfare system, particularly aimed at urban poor. Furthermore, there needs to be a general recognition - in the regions and among the donors - of the important role of the state, not only as a facilitator for the operation of market forces but as an actor in its own right. It will also be necessary to create political and other institutions, methods and procedures, and norms that can strengthen regional and national values, further the nation-building process, and prevent future conflict issues from triggering overt violence.

In this new international environment, how should the international community respond to the so-called "liberation movements" and their "freedom fighters"? The international

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[1] The situation has improved with the change in government in Pretoria.

community has to realise that with the independence of Erithrea, one of the last vestigies of colonial legacies in Africa, the continent no longer is in need of these self-styled liberation movements. The National Liberation Front NPLA in Liberia, the Sudan People's Liberation Army SPLA, the Mozambique National Resistence RENAMO, the National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola UNITA and their kind, should all cease to exist. The only movement that should be tolerated should be the likes of the Polisario Front, since such movements are fighting for self-determination. But where independence is already accorded, the so-called nationalist movements should be crushed with collective action by the international community. It is here that we salute the ECOMOG forces in their action against Charles Taylor. The likes of John Garang, Jonas Savimbi, Alfonso Dhlakama should not be allowed to fool the world that they are "freedom fighters". The international community should rather look at these quacks as "rebel leaders" and their organisations as "Trouble movements". Unless this is done, a dark cloud will continue to hang on Africa's horizon and its future peace must have been compromised. Is this our wish and hope for the year 2000? Certainly not.

In aiming at the future, we would miss the traget if we do not reflect, at least by way of conjecture, on the possible impact of recent events in Eastern Europe on the future of Africa. Today we have a global situation wherein the two superpowers have sunk their differences and are acting in communion, not rivalry. Confrontation has been replaced with confluence and concertation in their considerations. Now we are entering a period when NATO has been transformed into a political institution due to the disappearance of its opposite antagonistic equivalent - The Warsaw Pact. A unified Germany has emerged, and is a member of NATO - with Soviet agreement. Ethnic rivalries are going to change the face of Europe. A European market is in the offing, all these with the blessing of a European Monetary Union - EMU. If these become reality; as it is possible, it will become a vehicle for an all-European integration and development.

Where is Africa, with regard to conflict resolution, from all
these historical earthquakes? Where is the OAU, from an overall
plan for economic and social development in Africa? The OAU
Assembly in 1985 stressed the inter-relationship between
security, disarmament and development. It is possible to predict
that aid to the continent may decline; that foreign indebtedness
could worsen, that religious animosities, in the absence of an
all-African agenda for development, would be agravated; and that
our overall standard of living on the continent, with few
exceptions, will decline.

Is it not time to look afresh at the SADCC, UDEAC, ECOWAS,
the Maghreb Union, the newly revised East African Community, and
the like as links in the chain of integration which may be
gradually welded under the aegis of the OAU? It is also time to
look at our human rights record and inter-ethnic relationships
in the light of the impact of the new Europe on Africa and the
rest of the southern world. We can foresee aggravation of border
disputes/tensions unless we affirm again the sanctity of the
inherited frontiers except when changed by mutual consent. The
Cameroon/Nigerian border skirmish at the Bakassi Peninsular and
the Jabane islands in December 1993 - February 1994 is an
indication of some of the ugly scenarios that await Africa. The
OAU should also stimulate all African education in the art of
democratic rule within the framework of our African heritage. The
African tribe has always been a democratic participatory vehicle
whose norms should be projected on the national plane. In this
scheme of things, our African minorities is the corner-stone of
a national democratic consensus. When we look at all these, we
conclude that difficult, yes; but insummountable, no. How can
we plan simultaneously to feed our growing population, catch up
with the technology age, clean our environment, and pay our
debts? "I believe it is "doable"," affirms Yassin El-Ayouty, "it
is mandatory. A new agenda for the OAU and conflict resolution

await all of us",[1] he concludes.

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[1] Yassin EL-Ayouty, "The Organisation of African Unity and Conflict Resolution: Looking at the Past, Aiming at the Future" in *Disarmament:Programme of Training on Conflict Resolution, Crisis Prevention and Management and Confidence-building among African States*, (Workshop for Senior African Military and Civilian Officals), New York, United Nations, 1991, p. 58.

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A P P E N D I X   1

RESOLUTION 435 (1978)

**Adoptée par le Conseil de Sécurité à sa 2087ème séance
Le 29 septembre 1978.**

Le Conseil de Sécurité,

Rappelant ses résolutions 385 (1976), 431 (1978) et 432 (1978),

Ayant examiné le rapport présenté par le Secrétaire Général en exécution du paragraphe 2 de la résolution 431 (1978) (S/12827) ainsi que la déclaration explicative qu'il a faite le 29 septembre 1978 devant le conseil de Sécurité (S/12869).

Prenant acte des communications pertinentes adressées au Secrétaire Général par le gouvernement sud-africain,

Prenant acte également de la lettre datée du 8 septembre 1978, adressée au Secrétaire par le Président de la South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) (S/12841),

Réaffirmant la responsabilité juridique de l'Organisation des Nations Unies à l'égard de la Namibie,

1. **Approuve** le rapport du Secrétaire Général (S/12827) pour l'application de la proposition de règlement de la situation namibienne (S/12636) ainsi que sa déclaration explicative (S/12869);

2. **Réaffirme** que son objectif est le retrait de l'administration illégale de l'Afrique du Sud en Namibie et le transfert du pouvoir au peuple de la Namibie avec l'assistance de l'organisation des Nations Unies conformément à la résolution 385 (1976) ;

3. **Décide** de créer sous son autorité, pour une durée pouvant aller jusqu'à douze mois, un Groupe d'assistance aux Nations Unies pour la période de transition (GANUPT), conformément au rapport sus-mentionné du Secrétaire Général, aux fins d'aider son Représentant Spécial à exécuter le mandat qui lui a été confié au paragraphe 1 de la résolution

431 (1978) du Conseil de Sécurité, à savoir assurer dans un proche avenir l'indépendance de la Namibie au moyen d'élections libres sous la supervision et le contrôle de l'organisation des Nations Unies ;

4. **Constate avec satisfaction** que la SWAPO est disposée à coopérer à la mise en application du rapport du Secrétaire Général, et notamment qu'elle est prête à signer et à respecter les dispositions relatives au cessez-le-feu, comme l'a exprimé son Président dans sa lettre datée du 8 septembre 1978 (S/12841) ;

5. **Demande** à l'Afrique du Sud de coopérer immédiatement avec le Secrétaire Général à l'appliction de la présente résolution ;

6. **Déclare** que toutes les mesures unilatérales prises par l'admi-ministration illégale en Namibie en relation avec le processus élec-toral, y compris l'établissement unilatéral des listes électorales, ou le transfert du pouvoir, en contreventions des résolutions 385 (1976), 431 (1978) et de la présente résolution du Conseil de Sécurité sont nulles et non avenues ;

7. **Prie** le Secrétaire Général de faire rapport au Conseil de Sécurité sur l'application de la présente résolution, au plus tard le 23 octobre 1978.

A P P E N D I X   2

PROTOCOLE DE BRAZZAVILLE

Brazzaville , le 13 Décembre 1988

Les délégations représentant les Gouvernements de la
République Populaire d'Angola, la République de Cuba et la République
d'Afrique du Sud,

Se retrouvant à Brazzaville avec la médiation du Gouverne-
ment des Etats-Unis d'Amérique,

Exprimant leur profonde appréciation à l'égard du Président
de la République Populaire du Congo, le Colonel Sassou-Nguesso, pour
son indispensable contribution à la cause de la paix en Afrique
australe et pour l'hospitalité offerte aux délégations par le
Gouvernement de la République Populaire du Congo,

Confirmant leur engagement à agir en accord avec les
principes d'un Règlement Pacifique en Afrique Australe, signé à New
York le 13 juillet 1988 et approuvé par leurs Gouvernements respectifs
le 20 juillet 1988, chaque élément étant indispensable pour un règle-
ment global; avec les accords conclus à Genève le 5 août 1988 qui ne
sont pas remplacés par ce document, et avec l'accord conclu à Genève
le 15 novembre 1988 pour le redéploiement au Nord, et le retrait total
et par étape des troupes Cubaines d'Angola,

Exhortant la communauté internatinale de fournir un soutien
financier et économique pour la mise en place de tous les aspects de
ce règlement,

Conviennent de ce qui suit :

1. Les parties conviennent de recommander au Secrétaire
Général des Nations Unies que le 1er avril 1989 soit désigné comme la
date de la mise en place de la Résolution 435/78 du Conseil de Sécurité
des Nations Unies.

2. Les parties conviennent de se rencontrer le 22 décembre
1988 à New York pour la signature de l'accord tripartite et pour la
signature par l'Angola et Cuba de leur accord bilatéral. Au moment de

la date de la signature, l'Angola et Cuba auront conclu un accord avec
le Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies sur les arrangements concernant
la vérification qui doivent être approuvés par le Conseil de Sécurité.

3. Les parties acceptent d'échanger les prisonniers de guerre
après la signature de l'accord tripartite.

4. Les parties acceptent de créer une Commission Conjointe en
accord avec l'annexe attaché au présent protocole.

POUR LE GOUVERNEMENT	POUR LE GOUVERNEMENT	POUR LE GOUVERNEMENT
DE LA REPUBLIQUE	DE LA REPUBLIQUE DE	DE LA REPUBLIQUE
POPULAIRE D'ANGOLA	CUBA	D'AFRIQUE DU SUD
Antonio Dos Santos	Ricardo Alarconde	Reolof Pik Botha
França Ndalu	Quessandra. Vice	Ministre des Affaires
Vice-Ministre de la	Ministre des Relations	Etrangères.
Défense	Extérieurs	

ANNEXE A PROPOS DE LA COMMISSION CONJOINTE

1. Avec l'objectif de faciliter la résolution de toute dispute concernant l'interprétation ou la mise en place de l'accord tripartite, les parties, par la présente, établissent une Commission Conjointe qui commencera son travail à la signature de l'accord tripartite.

2. La Commission Conjointe servira comme forum de discussion et de résolution des questions relatives à l'interprétation et la mise en place de l'accord tripartite, et autres buts sur lesquels les parties se seront, à l'avenir, mutuellement entendus.

3. Les parties invitent les Etats-unis d'Amérique et L'U.R.S.S. à participer comme observateurs à la tâche de la commission. En outre, les parties conviennent que, à l'independance de la Namibie, le Gouvernement Namibien soit inclus comme membre à part entière de la Commission conjointe. A cet effet, les parties enverront une invitation formelle au Gouvernement Namibien de faire partie de la Commission Conjointe à la date de l'indépendance de la Namibie.

4. La Commission Conjointe sera constituée dans les trente jours qui suivent la signature de l'accord tripartite. La Commission Conjointe établira ses propres règlements et ses règles de procédure pour les réunions ordinaires et les réunions spéciales qui peuvent être convoquée par chacune des parties.

5. La décision par une partie de discuter ou de chercher à résoudre une question au sein de la Commission Conjointe ne devra pas exclure le droit pour cette partie de soulever le problème, si elle le juge appropriée, devant le Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies ou de chercher d'autres moyens de résolution de disputes disponibles de par le droit international.

6. La Commission Conjointe, en aucune manière, ne fonctionnera comme substitut de l'UNTAG (y compris le rôle de surveillance chargée de l'UNTAG hors de la Namibie) ou de l'entité des Nations Unies chargée de la vérification en Angola.

A P P E N D I X   3

DECLARATION DE GBADOLITE SUR L'ANGOLA
Jeudi, 22 Juin 1989

1. A l'invitation du Maréchal Mobutu Sesse Seko, Président-Fondateur
du Movement Populaire de la Révolution, Président de la République du
Zaire, une rencontre historique s'est tenue dans la ville de Gbado-lite
au Zaire, ce Jeudi 22 Juin 1989.

2. Ont été conviés à cette importante conférence:

- Son Excellence le Général Moussa Traore, Président en exercice de
l'Organization de l'Unité Africaine et Président de la République du
Mali;

- Son Excellence Monsieur Kenneth David Kaunda, Doyen de notre
région d'Afrique Centrale et Australe, Président de la République
de la Zambie;

- Ainsi que, dans l'ordre alphabétique des pays:

- Son Excellence Monsieur José Eduardo dos Santos, Président de la
République Populaire d'Angola ;

- Son Excellence le Dr. Quette K. J. Masire, Président de la
République du Botswana ;

- Son Excellence le Major Pierre Buyoya, Président de la République
du Burundi;

- Son Excellence · Monsieur Paul Biya, Président de la République
du Cameroun;

- Son Excellence Monsieur Aristides maria Pereira, Président de la
République du Cap Vert;

- Son Excellence le Général d'Armée André Kolingba, Président de
la République Centrafricaine:

- Son Excellence le Général d'Armée Denis Sassou-Nguesso, Président
de la République Populaire du Congo;

- Son Excellence El. Hadj Omar Bongo, Président de la République
Gabonaise;

- Son Excellence le Général Joâo Bernardo Vieira, Président de la
Guinée Bissau;

- Sa Majesté Hassan II, Roi du Maroc, représenté par Monsieur Ahmed
Osman, Président de la Chambre de Représentants;

- Son Excellence Monsieur Joachim Chisano, Président de la République Populaire du Mozambique;

- Son Excellence le Général Ibrahim Babangida, Président de la République Fédéral du Nigeria;

- Son Excellence le Général-Major Juvénal Habyarimana, Président de la République Rwandaise;

- Son Excellence Monsieur Manuel Pinto da Costa, Président de la République de Sao Tomé & Principe;

- Son Excellence Monsieur Idris Abdul Wakil, Deuxième Vice-Président de la République Unie de Tanzanie et Président de Zanzibar;

- Son Excellence Monsieur Hissène Habre Président de la République du Tchad;

- Son Excellence Monsieur Robert Gabriel Mugabe, Président de la République du Zimbabwe;

3. Cette rencontre s'inscrit dans le cadre des efforts déployés par le Président de la République Populaire d'Angola et d'autre Chefs d'Etat Africains, nottament le Président de la République Populaire du Congo et le Président de la République Gabonaise, ainsi que des décisions adoptées par le Sommet de Luanda le 16 Mai 1989 de tenir une deuxième réunion de concertation en République du Zaire au mois d'Août 1989.

4. Devant l'évolution positive des événements permetant d'attendre l'objectif de Paix et de Réconciliation Nationale, les Présidents de la République Populaire d'Angola et de la République du Zaire ont convenu de suggérer à leurs collègues et fréres que ce Sommet soit avancé à la date de ce jour.

5. A l'issue de leurs travaux, les Chefs d'Etat réunis à Gbodo-Lite ont pris acte, avec beaucoup de satisfaction et de légitime fierté, des grands principes tendant à amener la Paix et la Réconciliation Nationale en Angola, et favorisant le processus de l'indepéndance de la Namibie;

6. A cet effet, sur base du Plan de Paix présenté par le Gouvernement de la République Populaire d'Angola et des propositions

du Chef de l'Etat de la République du Zaire dans ses efforts de
médiation, les grandes principes suivants ont obtenu l'adhésion de tous
les frères angolais:

A. Volonté de toutes les filles et de tous les fils de l'Angola
de mettre fin à la guerre et de proclamer à la face du monde
la Réconciliation Nationale;

B. Cessation de toutes les hostilités ainsi que proclamation du
cessez-le-feu, dont l'entrée en vigueur est fixée au 24 Juin
1989 à 0 heure;

C. Constitution d'une commission chargée d'arrêter les modalités
d'appplication de ce Plan de Paix visant la Réconciliation
Nationale sous la médiation du Président de la République du
Zaire.

7.   Les Chefs d'Etat se réjouissent des progrès substantiels et
rapides accomplis dans le processus de paix de Réconciliation Nationale
en Angola grâce à la volonté de tous les filles de ce pays de mettre
fin à plusieurs anées de guerre civile pour se consacrer désormais au
développement de leur grande nation.

8.   A cet effet, les Chefs d'Etat félicitent et remercient le
Président e la République du Zaire pour les efforts exceptionels qu'il
a déployés en vue de rendre possible l'événement historique de ce jour.

9.   Les Chefs d'Etat se sont félicités de l'atmosphère empreinte
d'amitié et de fraternité ayant marqué leurs travaux.

10.   Ils ont, par ailleurs, convenu de se recontrer très
prochainement au Zimbabwe en vue de procéder à l'évaluation des
résultats des présentes assises.

11.   Enfin, les Chefs d'Etat ont tenu à exprimer leur
profonde gratitude au Président-Fondateur du Mouvement Populaire de la
Révolution, Président de la République du Zaire, le Maréchal Mobutu Sese
Seko, pour l'hospitalité et la chaleur d'un accueil authentiquement
africain dont ils ont été l'objet tout au long de leur séjour en
République du Zire et à transmettre, par la même occasion, au peuple
zairois, représenté par la dynamique population de Gbado-Lite, le
message d'amitié, de fraternité et de solidarité agissante de leurs
peuples respectifs.

                    Fait à Gbado-Lite, le 22 Juin 1989.

A P P E N D I X 4

COMMUNIQUE FINAL DU SOMMET DE HARARE
Le 22 Août, 1989

Invités par Son Excellence Robert Gabriel Mugabe, Président de la République du Zimbabwé, Son Excellence José Eduardo dos Santos, Président de la République Populaire d'Angola, Son Excellence Denis Sassou Nguesso, Président de la République Populaire du Congo, Son Excellence El Hadj Omar Bongo, Président de la République du Gabon, Son Excellence Joaquim Alberto Chissano, Président de la République Populaire de Mozambique, Son Excellence Manuel Pinto da Costa, Président de la République Démocratique de Sao Tomé et Principe, Son Excellence Maréchal Mobutu Sesse Seko, Président de la République du Zaire, Son Excellence Kenneth Kaunda, Président de la République de la Zambie, se sont réunis à Harare, le 22 août 1989, afin d'analyser l'évolution de la situation sur le conflit interne en Angola, après le Sommet de Gbadolité, réalisé le 22 juin 1989.

Au cours de la rencontre, les Chefs d'Etat ont écouté et analysé le rapport présenté par Son Excellence le Maréchal Mobutu en sa qualité de médiateur.

Le Sommet des huit Chefs d'Etat, après une analyse profonde de la situation, a décidé ce qui suit:

1. Réitérer l'Accord de Gbadolité, dont les aspects principaux sont les suivants:

a) Respect de la Constitution et des principales lois de la République Populaire d'Angola;

b) Cessation de toutes les interférences externes dans les affaires internes d'Angola;

c) Intégration des éléments de l'Unita dans les institutions de la Réublqiue Populaire de l'Angola;

d) Cesser le feu et cessation des hostilités à l'intérieur du territoire angolais, à partir de minuit de 24 juin 1989;

e) Acceptation du retrait volontaire et temporaire de Jonas Savimbi;

f) Formation d'une Commission afin de définir les modalités de la mise en oeuvre du Plan visant la reconciliation, sous la médiation du Président de la République du Zaïre.

2. Réaffirmer leur confiance totale au médiateur, l'encourager et l'appuyer dans ses efforts, jusqu'à la mise en oeuvre effective des Accords de Gbadolité;

3. Se retrouver de nouveau à Kinshasa, République du Zaïre, le 18 septembre 1989.

Les Chefs d'Etat réunis à Harare ont exprimé leur gratitude à Son Excellence le Président Robert Gabriel Mugabe, au Peuple et au Gouvernement du Zimbabwé pour l'hospitalité et la gentille solidarité manifestées à leur égard pendant leur séjour à Harare.

Fait à Harare, le 22 Août 1989

A P P E N D I X 5

TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
OF ANGOLA, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA AND THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, BRINGING NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE.

NEW YORK, DECEMBER, 22, 1989

UNITED NATIONS -- The Governments of Angola, Cuba, and South
Africa December 22 signed an agreement designed to bring independence
to Namibia.

Following is the text of this tripartite agreement, which resulted
from negotiations mediated by the United States.

The governments of the People's Republic of Angola, the Republic
of Cuba, and the Republic of South frica, hereinafter designated as
"the Parties,"

Taking into account the "Principles for a Peaceful Settlement in
Southwestern Africa," approved by the Parties on 20 July 1988, and the
subsequent negotiations with respect to the implementation of these
principles , each of which is indispensable to a comprehensive
settlement,

Considering the acceptance by the Parties of the implementation
of U.N. Security Council Resolution 435 (1978), adopted on 29 September
1978, hereinafter designated as "UNSCR 435/78,"

Considering the conclusion of the bilateral agreement between the
People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba providing for the
redeployment toward the North and the staged and total withdrawal of
Cuban troops from the territory of the People's Republic of Angola,

Recognizing the role of the U.N. Security Council in implementing
UNSCR 435.78 and in supporting the implementation of the present
agreement,

Affirming the sovereignty, sovereign equality, and independence
of all states of southwestern Africa.

Affirming the principle of non-interference in the internal
affairs of states,

Affirming the principle of abstention from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of states,

Reaffirming the right of the peoples of the southerwestern region of Africa to self-determination, independence, and equality of rights, and of the states of southwestern Africa to peace, development, and social progress,

Urging African and international cooperation for the settlement of the problems of the development of the southwestern region of Africa

Expressing their appreciation for the mediating role of the government of the United States of America,

Desiring to contribute to the establishment of peace and security in southwestern Africa,

Agree to the provisions set forth below.

(1) The Parties shall immediately request the secretary-general of the United Nations to seek authority from the Security Council to commence implementation of UNSCR 435/78 on 1 April 1989.

(2) All military forces of the Republic of South Africa shall depart Namibia in accordance with UNSCR 435/78.

(3) Consistent with the provisions of UNSCR 435.78, the Republic of South Africa and the People's Republic of Angola shall cooperate with the Secretary-General to ensure the independence of Namibia through free and fair elections and shall abstain from any action that could prevent the execution of UNSCR 435/78. The Parties shall respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of borders of Namibia and shall ensure that their territories are not used by any state, organization, or person in connection with acts of war, aggression, or violence against the territorial integrity or inviolability of borders of Namibia or any other action which could prevent the execution of UNSCR 435/78.

(4) The People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba shall implement the bilateral agreement, signed on the date of signature

of this agreement, providing for the redeployment toward the North and the staged and total withdrawal of Cuban troops from the territory of the People's Republic of Angola, and the arrangements made with the Security Council of the United Nations for the on-site verification of that withdrawal.

(5) Consistent with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, the Parties shall refrain from the threat or use of force, and shall ensure that their respective territories are not used by any state, organization, or person in connection with any acts of war, aggression or violence, against the territorial integrity, inviolability of borders, or independence of any state of southwestern Africa.

A P P E N D I X   6

BILATERAL AGREEMENT

BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA AND THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA ON THE CONCLUSION OF THE
INTERNATIONALIST MISSION OF THE CUBAN MILITARY CONTINGENT
NEW YORK, DECEMBER, 22, 1989

The government of the People's Republic of Angola and the
government of the Republic of Cuba, designated hereof as the parties.
CONSIDERING

That the implementation of Resolution 435/78 of the Security
Council of the United Nations for the independence of Namibia will
begin on 1 April.

That the question of the independence of Namibia and the safeguard
of the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the
People's Republic of Angola are intimately interconnected and linked
to peace and security in the southwest region of Africa.

That on the same date of the signing of the present agreement
a Tripartite Agreement shall also be signed by the government of the
People's Republic of Angola, the government of the Republic of Cuba and
the government of the Republic of South Africa which contains the
esential elements to achieve peace in the southwest region of Africa.

That the acceptance and strict fulfilment of the preceding
provisions eliminate the causes which motivated the request by the
government of the People's Republic of Angola -- in legitimate use of
its rights envisaged by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter -- for
the sending into Angolan territory of a Cuban internationalist military
contingent to ensure, together with the FAPLA, its territorial
integrity and sovereignty against the invasion and occupation of a part
of its territory.

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT

The agreements signed by the government of the People's
Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba on 4 February 1982 and 19
March 1984, the platform of the government of the People's Republic of

Angola adopted in November 1984 and the Protocol of Brazzaville signed by the governments of the People's Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba and the Republic of South Africa on 13 December 1988, it is thus established.

IN CONSEQUENCE

That conditions have been created to begin the return home of the Cuba military contingent present in Angolan territory, after having successfully accomplished its internationalist mission. Therefore the parties agree to the following :

ARTICLE 1

To begin a staged redeployment to the 15th and 13th parallels and the total withdrawal to Cuba of the contingent of approximately 50,000 troops which make up the Cuban forces in the People's Republic of Angola, according to the paces and time frames established by the annexed calendar, which is an integral part of the present agreement. The total withdrawal will conclude on 1 July 1991.

ARTICLE 2

The governments of the People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba reserve for themselves the right to modify or alter their obligations under Article 1 of this Agreement if blatant breach of the Tripartite Agreement occurs.

ARTICLE 3

Both parties, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, request the Security Council to carry out the verification of the redeployment and staged and total withdrawal of the Cuban troops from the territory of the People's Republic of Angola. With this purpose the corresponding protocol shall be established.

ARTICLE 4

This Agreement shall come into force as of the signing of the Tripartite Agreement between the governments of the People's Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba and the Republic of South Africa.

Signed on the 22nd day of December 1988 at the Headquarters of the United Nations Organization in two equally valid copies in Portuguese and Spanish.

(signed) For the government of the People's Republic of
            Angola

(signed) For the government of the Republic of Cuba

ANNEX TO THE AGGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF CUBA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA
ON THE CONCLUSION OF THE INTERNATIONALIST MISSION OF THE CUBAN MILITARY
CONTINGENT

In fulfilment of Article 1 of the Agreement between the
Government of the Republic of Cuba and the Government of the People's
Republic of Angola on the conclusion of the internationalist mission
of the Cuban military contingent present in Angolan territory, both
parties establish the following calendar for the withdrawal :

Time frames
Before 1 April 1989   3,000 troops
(Date of implementation of Res. 435)
Total length of the calendar as of
    1 April 1989   27 months

Redeployment to the north
    To the 15th Parallel   1 August, 1989
    To the 13th Parallel   31 October, 1989

Total troops to be withdrawn :
    By 1 November 1989   25,000 (50 percent)
    By 1 April 1990   33,000 (66 percent)
    By 1 October 1990   38,000 (76 percent)
                                  approximately 12,000 remain

By 1 July 1991 .   50,000 (100 percent)

The data base is a Cuban force of 50,000 troops.

A P P E N D I X   7

TESTIMONY FROM UNITA DESERTERS *
TESTIMONY 1

Rufino Satumbo

My name is Rufino Satumbo, my "nom de guerre " is Makàrof. I am 26 years old and I was born at the Kuando mission station. I have been to 3rd grade and in 1975 I was a worker. I worked on a Portuguese wharf, in Viana. I have no father and my mother was already quite old in 1975; I have not seen her since then.

On February 4, I was 18 then, I became a UNITA soldier. I don't know how. They sent me first to Huambo, then to Bié and finally to Kuando-Kubango. My work was to give permission for soldiers to hunt game. On these trips we went with a car and I had never had military training, but I did have a weapon.

In 1976 we had to go into the forest on foot; we made huts out of branches. There we didn't do much, just hunt for food. We forced people to give us maize to make porridge. Those who refused were killed.

When we went to the villages, sometimes we set fire to them, while the people we knew to sympathize with the MPLA were killed. Sometimes we only went to the villages to steal food.

At our bases there were also civilians, many women and children. The civilians were guarded by the soildiers to prevent them from running away and telling where we could be found.

Most of the women were for the leaders, who picked them out in the villages. They chose girls of 12, 13, 14, and 15 years old;

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* Note: These testimonies are taken from Angolans who fled UNITA ranks and testified at a tribunal in Luanda, at the beginning of December, 1983. They were videotaped and replayed at hearings in Amsterdam by the Dutch Anti-Apartheid Movement, December 14-18, 1983. The texts below are translated from Karel L. Roskam et al, Grenzeloze Oorlog: Zuid-Afrika's Agressie Tegem De Buurlanden (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Jan Mets, 1984); English translation by William Minter.

This information holds same for Appendix 8 and 9.

those who didn't come by themselves were tied up. The leaders had many women and often changed them.

The women and children were there against their will. The mothers were always concerned to find food for their babies; many starved of hunger because the nourishment was not good . There was no clinic; there were only traditional doctors. The people who died were not buried, they lay in the corners rotting.

I often thought about running away, but we were watched closely. They also said that those who reported themselves to FAPLA would be killed.

In 1977 or 1978 the FAPLA (Angolan government troops) arrived at the base where we were. I got a bullet in my leg and I was taken to the Chivanda clinic in Namibia. The patients in the clinic were all Angolans and the doctors were South Africans. Afterwards they sent me to a school in Chivanda, where I got military training. The instructors were an Angolan, Eugénio Dala, and three South Africans. I stayed seven months at the clinic. They taught me to set mines on roads. The lesson material came from South Africa, it was written in English. I had six months training and afterwards we waited for some months at Delta base in Namibia. Afterwards, they organized a batallion and we were sent to Angola. At our departure they said, "You should destroy bridges, dams and other things." And they pointed out on the map where we should go.

The leaders of the batallion were Francisco Chinhama and Zé Maria. We first stayed near the Cunene. We attacked villages to sabotage things and steal food. We had instructions to sabotage everything. When we went to attack people in villages, we went alone. When we were going to attack the FAPLA, the South Africans went with us because we couldn't manage that alone. The South Africans had the habit of taking vehicles with them to South Africa, as well as tractors and people's cattle. After the South Africans left our platoon we went further inside the country.

We went first in the direction of Elanda base, but we stayed in the bush. There we did many things. Above all, my specialty, planting mines on the road. The first mine I planted blew up a car

with many people, including women and children. We planted the mines at night, at 2 or 3 o'clock, so that people from the villages couldn't see us. After planting the mines we lay in ambush. When a car hit the mine, we killed the people or captured them. We stole the food they had, when we couldn't take any more, we set fire to it. Of the people we captured, the young men stayed with us to become soldiers; the women and children also stayed with us. The somewhat older men were taken to Namibia to go work for the South Africans. The South Africans paid our leaders 2,000 escudos (?) apiece. It was the same in recruiting soldiers. The money stayed with the leaders, it didn't go to the workers who were sold.

We attacked mostly not military vehicles but civilian vehicles, of merchants and of ordinary people and even two times a car full of women and children. They all died. Those were instructions our leaders gave us. I planted many mines, so many I can't count, and I don't know how many people were killed by them.

I have time and again thought of running away, but I was very scared. When the leaders found out that someone wanted to run away, they took him to Namibia to be punished by the South Africans. They tied up soldiers who wanted to run away and set fire to them. The common people also couldn't run away, they were well guarded to prevent them from reporting where we were.

One day in 1982 a major named Carlos wanted to surrender to the FAPLA. The leaders found him out, tied his legs and took him to Namibia. I was scared to death and then I really decided to run away. On september 28 of that year I turned myself in in Huambo.

A P P E N D I X   8

TESTIMONY 2

Florindo Joaquim Jonatao

My name is Florindo Joaquim Jonatao, I come from Huambo and I am 22 years old.

In 1976 I was only 14 and I was a student in the fourth grade of the Sarmento Rodrigues industrial school. On Saturday, February 8 of that year, I was playing football with seven of my fellow students, when a major of UNITA, named Bantua, appeared and forced us to go with him in a Range-Rover. We didn't know where we were going.

We left Huambo at 4 pm and came on the next day, the 9th, at 6 am to Kuito Kuanavale. A white captain, Perestrelo, came up to us and said that the MIGs of the FAPLA were coming. We set the vehicles we had come in on fire and we went in the forest. In June or July of that year we met colonel N'zau Puna, Chindondo and others, who joined our leaders. During the nights we stayed spread out in the woods. My fellow students and I carried the luggage of the leaders.

Then there began for me and my football friends the way of suffering: a long trip through the wilderness, without shoes, with cold and hunger.

In March 1977 we came to a base where we met Savimbi. At that moment the FAPLA attacked the base and Savimbi fled to South Africa. We followed our leaders. In October Savimbi came back with a batallion of troops, who accompanied an American journalist who came to film an attack of the UNITA troops on FAPLA. The soldiers of the batallion carried new weapons, AKs of Chinese manufacture. This was the first of this kind I had seen. They organized a spectacle, with one half of the troops on one side and the other half on the other side. The two groups shot in the air and those who played the role of the FAPLA fell to the ground, let their weapons fall and acted as if they were dead. And that was the 'battle' that the American journalist filmed. After that they went away and I didn't see Savimbi again.

I continued carrying the baggage through the woods and I
suffered a lot. After that, when they had seen that I was intelligent,
they let me do the planning of the work.

In 1978 I was separated from my fellow students, of whom two
had died of hunger. We were quite weak because we ate only fruit of
the trees and bushes. Numerous soldiers tried to run away and to link
up with the FAPLA.

In the year 1979 we went to another area, in the Kuanza-Sul
province, where major Chissango was the leader. We were with about one
hundred men and because we were quite weak, we stayed there to strengthen
up. I stayed there six months, and because we had better to eat,
cassava and game from hunting, my body developed rapidly. They let me
do administrative work for about a year.

One night in April 1981 we were called for roll-call. We
grouped ourself into battle formation and began to run without knowing
what our destination was. We ran for three days and then we came to
Kangolo plateau, on the border of the Bie, Kuanza-Sul and Huambo
provinces. When we had arrived, there also came troops and captured
people from other areas. We stayed divided into groups, each with its
own task, cut down trees, clearing the grass to make an open space. We
didn't eat more than a corn cob a day.

Some days later, on a night in April, the commanders gave us
instructions to make fires. Because it was raining, the fire didn't
and the leaders began to beat us. Then we succeeded in starting the
fire. At that moment an airplane appeared and we began to run away.
The commanders told us not to run away, because these were our allies
and not the enemy. The leaders always spoke of "our allies" and they
forbade us to use the words "South Africans" or "Carcamanos." After
this reconaissance flight three other airplanes came - it was about
midnight - which dropped crates with parachutes.

One of the parachutes didn't open and the crates broke open
and the preserves they contained got mixed with explosives which were
in other crates. People gathered it up and ate everything, food mixed
with explosives By 6 am there were more than 25 dead from eating the
explosives.

The following day we began to transport the material which,
among other things, contained: AK-47 weapons of South African manufacture,
mines including anti-tank mines, 81-and 82-mm mortars, AK-21 weapons,
RPG rockets, other AK weapons of Chinese manufacture, weapons of the
FAL type from South Africa , and G-3 weapons made in Portugal.

There were also some uniforms and blankets for the leaders
and small boxes of food. All this material was without any marks of
the country of origin, so that no one could identify it. But we knew
that everything came from South Africa. In August 1981, they called me
for a course in communications technology which lasted a month. The
instructor was lieutenant Fuma and the material that we use was RACAL-
radios from South Africa and England. After the course I trained for
six months and afterwards I was placed in the southern sector as a
radio operator.

In the reports that we had to give one often spoke of the
deaths of FAPLA soldiers. But really it was the civilian population
that they killed, because when they came back, they had dishes, washbowls,
grain, and household animals with them. They said that these were from
the Department of Military Affairs, the results of thefts from the
people. Often they put animal blood on their uniforms so as to say that
they had killed FAPLA soldiers.

That was in agreement with the orders of Savimbi in 1980. He
had given instructions to all leaders of bases to open a "surprise
offensive" against people who refused to work with UNITA. This "surprise
offensive" was cutting off of noses, cutting off of breasts, raping
women, and above all killing those who didn't accept the UNITA policy.

The night of December 31, 1981, the FAPLA came close to our
base. Several of us, mainly women and children, tried to run away and
about 6 am on January 1, 1982, I was taken prisoner by FAPLA. They
brought me to Catchiungo, afterwards to Huambo and to Bié. They have
treated me well. In March 1982 I saw my parents again after seven years
separation and now they visit me every week.

In all the years that I was in the bush, I saw no school and
I never again played football. All family members of the leaders go
for six months each year outside the country for military courses. In

all these years I never got clothes, not even a pair of shoes and the sandals that I had on when I was captured were quickly broken by so much walking. I had to walk barefoot, for kilometers with the food of the leaders on my back. They didn't share the food with us and I had to fend for myself. The leaders disliked us, they disliked intelligent children. Some couldn't even write their names. They were just soldiers.

All the time my only concern was to get enough food. Now I want to study, to do a course in agriculture. I didn't have anything all these years, for me it was lost time.

TESTIMONY   3

Luciana Joào Nanga Batista

My name is Luciana Joào Nanga Batista, I am 16 years old and born in Huambo. My mother's name is Amélia Namala, I have two brothers and a sister. I haven't seen them for some time. My father is dead. I cannot read or write.

I lived with my mother in Huambo. One day, I was then 10, I went with my friend Joaquina to Bié to visit some friends of ours. The day we came to Cangulo, we sat talking in the house and then we heard shots. When we went outside, we saw that we were surrounded. They were soldiers of UNITA. When they saw us, they picked a number of us. They blindfolded me and took us with them. We didn't know where. With us the soldiers also took many people; men, women, and children were forced to go with them. We travelled several days and came to Mussende. There they let us work; do washing, cook, carry water, and other things. They never let me play. I never again played. We slept in the forest, in the rain and in the cold. The houses were for the leaders and their wives. We were very hungry.

They forced all the women to be naked in order not to escape. One time one of the leaders picked me out to sleep with him and become is wife. I didn't want to because I was still very young, I had not even menstruated yet, I didn't want any man. Moreover, he was very big strong, and old; he had gray hair.

When I said that I didn't want to, he threatened to beat me. Then I went with him and lived with him in his house. Each time that he made love with me and I didn't want to, he threatened to beat me and he did beat me. Each time I had to go to bed with him.

I didn't have to live outside anymore and I stayed in the house with the leader. I still had to be naked, but I ate better. Apart from having to sleep with him, I worked in the kitchen, did his washing and at night I had to fetch water from the river.

But I could not help it that I felt how my family must think and my husband hit me. I liked nothing about the life there. My husband often went away at night to attack the people. He stayed away

several days and when he came back he said: we have taken much food, pigs, chickens, and other things. Who was not with us, we have killed or brought with us. He brought the possessions of the people to the house. My husband often reported what he had done.

One night there came helicopters with white men from South Africa. They brought weapons and food. They went away again.

I have seen many horrible things. The babies which came with their mothers. Some died of hunger. When the children died, the mothers couldn't cry or mourn for they would be killed.

There was no clinic. Those who got sick had to take care of themselves with herbs. Other girls were just like me wives of the leaders. My friend Joaquina was also with a leader and she had a son.

Because I was suffering a lot, I began to think about running away, even without clothes. I talked about it with my friend, because she had come together with me, but she was afraid because of the baby. I then decided to run away alone. In October of this year, one night when I went to get water, I ran away. I ran a long distance and then came to a village. I met a nurse who was working the land with his wives. They took me with them to N'Dalatando.

SUMMARY OF THE THESIS OF MR. BESONG SAMUEL ENOH, FOR THE DOCTORAT DE TROISIEME CYCLE EN RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES, SPONSORED BY THE COUNCIL FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH (CODESRIA) DAKAR SENEGAL.

TOPIC : CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE POST - COLD WAR ERA : A CASE STUDY OF THE ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR.*

The end of the coldwar and the collapse of the two main power blocs raised hopes for a speedy resolution of the intractable conflicts that had gripped Africa for decades. The Angolan civil war, a purely internal civil problem, resulting from the Portuguese malpreparation of Angola for independence, quickly degenerated into one of the most horrendous civil conflagration that came to have the widest implication of the international community as both factions (East and West) supported the MPLA and UNITA respectively. As the coldwar ended, the geostrategic considerations that made Angola a focal point of East / West rivalry waned and the clarion call was for the seeking of ways and means of ending this protracted conflict.

Our thesis is broadly divided into two parts, with each part looking at a distinctly different phase of the conflict. While part one examines the attempts at reaching a negotiated settlement of the conflict, the different accords signed in London, New York and Gbadolité, part two examines the aftermath of the conflict and the political, economic and social consequences for the country and the partisans of this gruesome conflict. It would not be worthwhile to give a chapter by chapter summary of the thesis, since a global examination of the two main parts has been made, but perhaps we should look at some key aspects of research which set out our original goals.

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* Thesis supervised by Professor Peter Agbor-Tabi (PhD), professor of International Economics at I.R.I.C., Rector of the University of Yaounde 1,minister of Higher Education, Cameroon.

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The central problem of our thesis was the desire to find out why contrary to expectations for the end of the Angolan war especially after the end of the coldwar, there was rather an escalation unprecedented in its history, what are the new roots of this war? What are the implications of a 'post - coldwar' world for African conflicts and their resolution? Are there internal and regional factors that determine the course of the war? If major powers are less eager to acquire clients and fight proxy battles, will that dampen regional conflicts or will it stimulate them by removing the restraining danger of superpower confrontation? What is the impact of external actors on the sources of conflict and the potential for their resolution? Once a conflict erupts, to what extent is it sustained by the grievances that triggered it? In the course of examining these questions and more, we used the following hypothesis, and made the following findings:

- The Angolan conflict continues to escalate due to other course that have nothing to do with superpower rivalry.

- The change in the international scene has created new conditions for conflict resolution in the post coldwar period.

- Internal factors continue to fan the conflict.

- External actors have a big role to play in resolving the conflict.

- Original grievances hadly sustain a conflict.

Briefly, these are the major highlights of the thesis that was marked at 17/20, mention très bien, in a defence presided over by Professor Jean Mfoulou of the University of Yaounde 1. (PhD).