



## Section III

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### Exploratory Empirical Investigations



# 5

## Linking Values and Development: An Empirical Analysis

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### **Introduction**

What has loosely been called ‘traditional African values’ has historically been viewed by scholars as a significant impediment to political and economic development in the twenty-first century. As argued by Mattes and Shin (2005:5-6), those following traditional value patterns have been said to prioritise the collective good of the family and community over procedure and individual rights. Similarly, self-identification as members of sub-national kinship groups rather than modern nation-states is said to prevail. These factors, together with uncritical respect for authority and social hierarchies, are often seen to make traditional societies inhospitable for market economies and democratic consolidation to take root. We have argued against a monolithic and simplistic notion of traditional society. However, the data available is, to some extent, tied to these notions and we will explore it taking these terms into consideration.

The question is: what exactly are these traditional value patterns assumed or argued to be? Is there any consciousness that it may be an oversimplification to merely view values in terms of set ‘mental programmes’ instead of complex orientations which are constantly in flux? This chapter starts the discussion of these questions by way of an empirical exploration of Afrobarometer survey data in six Sub-Saharan African countries (Botswana, South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Mozambique).<sup>1</sup> Through linking various value dimensions to the extent of development<sup>2</sup> at the aggregate country level, vital insights are

provided into possible relationships between these variables. Although secondary data analysis necessarily brings with it certain limitations,<sup>3</sup> this exploratory study, nevertheless, takes some initial steps towards a better grasp of the often misunderstood concept of African values.

### **The Link between Values and Development**

Kluckhohn, Parsons and Shills (1951:64) have probably provided one of the most used definitions of the values concept as 'a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable which influences the selection from available modes, means and ends of action'. They also formulated the concept of 'value orientations' which they defined as being organised complexes of values which apply to broad segments of life and are a key factor in cultural integration.<sup>4</sup> There is a significant debate about the role of values in the integration of society and we do not agree with the Parsonian version of this matter. However, the definition is not dependent on that application.

The theory of political culture argues that traditional values result from norms and values embedded in ethnic cultures which are transmitted through socialisation. Scholars such as Almond (1963), Eckstein (1997) and Inglehart (1988) claimed that these values have a profound influence on how individuals order and conduct their lives. By extension, these value patterns were seen to have a direct influence on the country's economic and political regimes.

As noted by Mattes and Shin (2005:7-8), modernisation theorists<sup>5</sup> accepted these premises and advocated policies that would bring about rapid urbanisation, industrialisation, an increase in formal education, and growth of middle classes. It was thought that these factors would in turn change individual values over the course of a lifetime.<sup>6</sup> However, this process should perhaps rather be seen as a circular chain in which a changing environment influences values, which in turn impact on environmental factors (i.e. development or the lack of it) (Van Deth and Scarbrough 1995a:65). Here, the question arises as to where Africa currently finds itself within this circular chain and whether the effect of the forces of globalisation changes the conceptualisation associated with the idea of modernisation. In order to adequately assess this, we are left with the challenging task of 'measuring' the evolution of values and environmental factors over time.

### **'Measuring' Values**

It is clear that when empirically testing the relationship between values and development within given societies, one is presented with various methodological challenges. What is required is cross-national data about individual and collective value structures across a wide range of countries. One such study which potentially provides particularly useful data in this respect is the Afrobarometer survey, with

three rounds of the survey having been conducted since 1999 (2007a). In this chapter, we will analyse data from six countries in the Southern African region which participated in the second round of the survey (between 2002 and 2004) - South Africa (2002), Tanzania (2003), Mozambique (2002), Zambia (2003), Zimbabwe<sup>7</sup> (2004) and Botswana (2003). Background information on these six countries with regard to socio-economic trends is given in Appendix A. Although these countries only provide us with a limited number of cases (making significant results highly unlikely), interesting initial insights into the empirical relationship between development and values in the Southern African region will nevertheless be gained.

In each country that participated in Round 2 of the Survey, the Afrobarometer Network trained researchers interviewed a representative sample of the adult (i.e., those over 18 and eligible to vote) population in face-to-face conversations in the language of the respondent's choice. A random sample was developed based on a multi-stage, stratified, clustered area approach, which aimed to give every eligible adult in each country an equal chance of being selected. Across 15 countries, a total of 23,197 respondents were interviewed during Round 2 of the survey. The sample size in each country ranged from 1,200 to 2,400. A sample size of 1,200 is sufficient to yield a margin of sampling error of plus or minus 3 per cent at a confidence level of 95 per cent. In the countries with sample sizes of approximately 2,400, the margin of sampling error decreases to plus or minus 2 per cent (Afrobarometer 2007a).

**Table 5.1** Sample Sizes for the Countries Included in this Analysis

Country	Date	N
South Africa	Sep/Oct 2002	2,400
Botswana	Jul/Aug 2003	1,200
Tanzania	Jul/Aug 2003	1,200
Zambia	Jun/Jul 2003	1,200
Mozambique	Aug/Oct 2002	1,400
Zimbabwe	Jun/Jul 2004	1,104

It is important to note that the Afrobarometer results should not be generalised to Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole. The selection of countries is intentionally biased toward liberalising regimes, with authoritarian regimes and countries in conflict therefore being under-represented (Afrobarometer 2007a).

Furthermore, the significance of the fact that this is an opinion survey and not a value survey has to be noted. Value analysis requires significant sets of data on individual level on opinions, beliefs, attitudes, behaviour and cosmology; and this data can only be reduced to the underlying and latent values if the variation and changeability of opinions is cancelled out by the variety and volume of data that is analysed.

While analysing the data, one continually has to remain cognisant of the limitations inherent in aggregating attitudinal data on a country level.<sup>8</sup> Firstly, the survey instrument is of vital importance, in that reliable measures of values need to be developed which have validity across various cultures. Secondly, one may ask how widely these values are, in fact, held across these mass publics (i.e. does the aggregation of data blind us to internal variation?).

Thirdly, the question of causality comes into play. Even if a relationship between development and value systems is found, one may ask to what extent traditional values as such actually preclude development; or whether there are in fact certain environmental factors which are shaping these values. Similarly, it is important to note that survey items often simply provide an uncontextualised snapshot of certain attitudes at a given point in time. In many cases, this does not adequately capture the ever-changing nature of values within a complex social environment.<sup>9</sup> Ideally, longitudinal analysis of changing value patterns should, therefore, be undertaken to draw meaningful conclusions.<sup>10</sup>

Finally, surveying the worldviews of individuals may give us some insights into their systems of beliefs and may help us in developing explanatory theories about individuals and the world they live in. However, these beliefs must find expression in action. As noted by Hammond-Tooke<sup>11</sup> (1974:319), we need to constantly remain aware of the realm of ritual, both religious and magical, which can be defined as 'the techniques man has devised to manage satisfactorily his relations with gods, nature and other men'. He refers to ritual as the 'articulation point between the belief system and the network of day to day interactions between men' (1974:320). Although surveys may tap into broad worldviews of individuals, an understanding of the translation of orientations into concrete action is often neglected.

Despite these limitations, however, findings from surveys such as the Afrobarometer provide a valuable exploratory macro view<sup>12</sup> which then needs to be contextualised within the specific societies.

### **Conceptualising African Values**

Reflecting on the traditional frame of analysis of African values when comparing them to European values, Mattes (2005:7) points out that African values<sup>13</sup> (used as a generic term which naturally requires further interrogation – see chapter 2) are generally seen to be in conflict with the values necessary for sustained

development in several ways.<sup>14</sup> First, the emphasis on “communal good” means that producing just outcomes, even if it requires the use of violence, may be valued more than procedure and rule of law.

Similarly, the “history of traditional rule” is said to lead people to think and act as clients dependent on patrimonial relations to provide for their welfare. Individuals are therefore seen as ‘passive, deferential subjects of external forces rather than as agents, with some degree of control over their lives<sup>15</sup> or the wider polity’ (Mattes and Shin 2005:25).

The patriarchal nature of many African polities is also understood to mean that women are seen as inferior and unequal. In addition, a sustained emphasis on consensus may breed intolerance of dissent, while individuals with strong group-based identities may be more likely to develop antipathies towards others (Owusu 1992:85). Indeed, as Mattes and Shin (2005:12) argue, in many cases the ‘lack of national identity may deny young democracies the necessary ‘political glue’, turning every element of political contestation into a zero-sum, group-based conflict’.

The above identification of certain ‘types’ of African values quite possible, in terms of our previous discussion of these categories, would merely be an oversimplification, essentially setting them against certain ‘ideal’ western norms. In the process of conceptualising African values, ethnocentrism necessarily becomes a particular impediment. From the time anthropology emerged in the nineteenth century, controversies have continually arisen regarding how to conceive differences among people, and how to understand where western civilisation fits in relation to other societies. It is clear that what Westerners consider as progress, is not necessarily seen as progress in the eyes of others who have been raised with different cultural preferences. As highlighted by Hatch (1983:64), the standard we use in judging is in many respects determined by the culture in which we were raised.

In order to provide a more nuanced view of African values, we have subdivided this rather broad and nebulous term into various dimensions which seem to have particular applicability in the Southern African region in terms of the previous theoretical discussions.<sup>16</sup> Various items in the Afrobarometer questionnaire have been identified under the following four dimensions: Human qualities (subdivided into “paternalism/dependency,<sup>17</sup> “consensus-seeking<sup>18</sup> and pursuit of justice vs. pursuit of rule of law<sup>19</sup>); Human relationships “Community vs. Individual Interest<sup>20</sup>, “Social Capital<sup>21</sup> and “Identity<sup>22</sup> and “Identity<sup>22</sup>); Power “Gender Equality<sup>23</sup>; Although the dimension of Cosmology is a crucial one in the Southern African region, no items in the Afrobarometer survey seemed to adequately gauge its complexity. Some cursory comments on this dimension will, however, be given in the concluding section.

Admittedly, the above four dimensions and their subdivisions may in themselves not fully tap the full range and immense diversity of African values, yet this analysis aims to provide a starting point on which future studies may expand. The aspects

defined as value dimensions have been discussed in chapter 4, but have had to be reduced to the barest of essentials to create terms that cannot be seen as anything else than broad proxies for the actual intention of the book.

### Measuring Development

Scores on the UN Human Development Index (HDI) will be used as an indicator of development in each of the six countries under investigation. In an effort to blend the economic and social approaches to measuring development, the HDI was first introduced in the 1990 *United Nations Human Development Report* and is based on an equal weighting of three factors: purchasing power parity adjusted real per capita GDP, literacy and life expectancy<sup>25</sup> (Lindenberg 2002:304). Table 5.2 shows the scores which the six countries obtained on the HDI in 2003.

**Table 5.2:** Human Development Index Rank 2003 (UN Development Report, 2005)

Country and Rank	HDI	Score
South Africa	(120)	0.658
Botswana	(131)	0.565
Zimbabwe	(145)	0.505
Tanzania	(164)	0.418
Zambia	(166)	0.394
Mozambique	(168)	0.379

In the data analysis section below, the HDI scores were correlated with various value dimensions within the categories of Human qualities, Human relationships and Power.

### Analysis of Data

#### *Human Qualities*

The first value dimension to be analysed is that of human qualities, and more specifically the degree of paternalism/dependency<sup>26</sup> prevalent in the given societies. This dimension seems to have particular relevance in Africa, as in pre-colonial times political rule was rarely exercised on the scale of the modern state. As noted above, this may have led people to act as clients dependent on patrimonial relations for their welfare, essentially lacking control over their own lives (Chazan 1993:78).<sup>27</sup>




**Figure 5.1:** HDI Score vs. Mean Level of Dependency


Figure 5.1 seems to indicate a slight negative relationship between level of development and level of dependence prevalent in the six countries. South Africa, which has the highest level of development, also has the highest proportion of individuals who feel they should take responsibility for themselves and not be reliant on government or patronage networks. A weak correlation (Pearson's  $r = -.272$ ) was found, although not significant due to the limited number of cases. For more conclusive arguments to be made, this finding would, therefore, need to be tested amongst a broader array of countries, with adequate controls being applied.

The second value orientation is extent to which individuals feel the need to build consensus within the given societies. In his analysis of value systems of the 'Bantu-speaking peoples of Southern Africa', Hammond-Tooke (1974:318-320) found that basic to traditional cosmological ideas is the great value placed on harmonious social life, the elimination of discord, and the insurance of cooperation and mutual good-will between individuals. By extension, illness and misfortune are almost inevitably interpreted in human terms, with a failure in health or fortune typically seen as the result of some failure in social relations. The nature of traditional societies, with their small-scale relationships, meant that even stronger pressures operated to eliminate conflict that may have disrupted the group than is the case

in modern industrialised society. With regard to development, an excessive emphasis on reaching agreement/consensus on certain issues may lead towards an intolerance of dissent, thereby preventing diverse voices from being heard.

It is, however, not only within the field of development where this notion has relevance. As noted by Owusu (1992), this emphasis placed on consensus has had a crucial impact on democratisation on the African continent. In fact, the desire to agree, which is supposed to safeguard the rights and opinions of individuals and minorities, is often exploited to enforce group solidarity and oppressive group conformity. In this way, it may, therefore, be used to legitimize what Sono (1994, quoted in Louw 1998) refers to as 'totalitarian communalism' which 'frowns upon elevating one beyond the community'.<sup>28</sup>

**Figure 5.2:** HDI Score vs. Mean Level of Consensus-seeking




Although the above results should once again be analysed with caution due to the limited number of cases, the graph seems to indicate an inverse relationship between level of development and the need to build consensus (Pearson's  $r = -.578, p > 0.05$ ). Mozambique represents the extreme case in this regard. As mentioned in Appendix A, Mozambique was only declared 'party free' in the 2005 Freedom House rankings. One of the major contributing factors to this low ranking was the fact

that the Mozambican government has the power to restrict the freedom of the press, political parties and party members should they deem it necessary. Amongst the country's leaders, therefore, there seems to be a distinct tendency to repress opposing opinions.

The third value orientation in the realm of human qualities is support for justice vs. support for rule of law. As noted above, this value orientation can be seen to have direct consequences for development, as the emphasis on communal good prevalent in traditional African societies may lead to situations where producing "just outcomes", even if it requires the use of violence, may be valued more than procedure and "rule of law" (Mattes and Shin 2005:14).

**Figure 5.3:** HDI Score vs. Mean Level of Support for Justice over Rule of Law



A very weak negative relationship between development and the pursuit of justice over the rule of law seems to be evident in the above graph (Pearson's  $r = -.163$ ,  $p > 0.05$ ). This could be explained in terms of an excessive emphasis on just outcomes clearly having the tendency to lead to vigilantism, which could have dire consequences for the peaceful resolution of conflicts. Once again Mozambique represents the extreme case, with the highest levels of support for justice over rule of law, coupled with the lowest levels of development. However, due to the weak nature of this relationship and the lack of significance, this variable does not have much explanatory power.


Nevertheless, the scores obtained by the individual countries can perhaps once again be explained by the situation on the ground. In countries such as Mozambique, structural constraints may in fact make the pursuit of rule of law untenable, with individuals forced to pursue their own form of justice. High levels of organized crime have continued to plague Mozambique after the civil war, facilitated by an understaffed and ineffective police and judicial system (Country Watch Mozambique [2007f])<sup>29</sup>. Similarly, South Africa has been experiencing extremely high levels of crime in recent years, possibly leading people to take justice into their own hands.

### ***Human Relationships***


Lawuyi (1998:82) emphasises the extreme importance of social relations when trying to gain an understanding of African worldviews. The mere fact of living together in society divides individuals into families, lineages and territorial units, each with its own sense of solidarity and hostility to others. In this regard, Hammond-Tooke (1974:342) highlights the fact that one of the primary functions of African religious and moral systems is to lay down norms of behaviour between individuals, with these norms and values having to be restated with a greater than human authority. Here, the role of ancestors and other supernatural or super-empirical beings comes into play. This point is reinforced by Keesing and Strathern (1998:56), who state that people's religious beliefs and their social organisation are indeed closely interrelated. Thus, in analysing human interaction during the process of development, the role played by these supernatural orders needs to be carefully considered.<sup>30</sup>

In more pragmatic terms, the concept of "Ubuntu" also needs to be taken into account when analysing social relations in southern Africa. This term roughly translates into 'I am because you exist' and once again emphasises the extent of interconnectedness between individuals within a given society. In essence, 'the individual knows him or herself to be immersed in the community to such an extent that personality can develop only in and through it' (Maluccio 1999:67).

Taking the above dynamics into consideration, the link between development and community versus individual interest was analysed under the Human Relationships dimension. Indeed, the emphasis in traditional societies on communal relationships seems to inextricably link individuals to their social environments. The Afrobarometer questionnaire provided two items which tapped into levels of individualism. Unfortunately, these two items did not correlate very well (Chronbach's Alpha = .382) and were, therefore, analysed independently in relation to development.


**Figure 5.4:** HDI Score vs. Mean Level of Individualism

With regard to the first item, a strong Pearson's correlation ( $r = .884$ ) was found, coming close to significance at  $p = .074$ . South Africa and Botswana are particularly striking in that they both show high levels of development coupled with an emphasis on individualism. This strong relationship seems to highlight the need for individual entrepreneurial spirit in terms of bringing about development within the respective countries. In line with these findings, Samli et al (2007) highlight the need for struggling economies in Sub-Saharan Africa to generate or nurture an entrepreneurial culture.

**Figure 5.5:** HDI Score vs. Mean Level of Individualism 2

Surprisingly, a much weaker correlation (Pearson's  $r = .182$ ;  $p > 0.05$ ) between individualism and development was found for the second item. This would seem to indicate that the notion of 'individual interest' may be multi-faceted and may operate differently where actual wealth differentials are involved.

The level of social capital within the societies forms another component of the Human Relationships value dimension. A wide body of literature has shown that social capital (networks between individuals and the norms of reciprocity and trust that arise from them) can be seen to have a direct influence on the attainment of developmental objectives.<sup>31</sup> Unfortunately, however, the Afrobarometer questionnaire only allowed us to tap into the 'network' dimension of social capital, and not its corollary, namely 'trust between individuals'.


**Figure 5.6:** HDI score vs. Mean Level of Social Capital

Surprisingly, there seems to be a relatively strong negative relationship between development and social capital amongst the five countries ( $r = -.609$ ,  $p > 0.05$ ). Although the correlation is not significant, it nevertheless seems to contradict the social capital hypothesis. South Africa, which has the highest level of development, obtains a low score on the social capital index, while Tanzania, which has a much lower level of development, obtains the highest score (all countries however score lower than 1 on the index, range = 0-3). Further investigation into the trust dimension of social capital is however necessary, as the measure of social capital used in the survey (i.e. excluding the trust dimension) may have led to distorted findings.

Identity politics is another major factor which needs to be taken into consideration when analysing the progress which Africa has made in terms of reaching developmental goals. The Berlin Conference of 1884-1885<sup>32</sup> essentially created heterogeneous national societies in Africa, which was exacerbated by the fact that kinship identities were often so strong that they resisted attempts at forming overarching identities. This can naturally be seen to have severe consequences for development, as people with strong group-based identities may be more likely to develop antipathies to others and less likely to accept competing

groups in working towards a common goal. In line with an analysis of Afrobarometer data by Mattes and Shin (2005), self-reported identities of individuals were divided into traditional (including racial, ethnic, religious, regional or age identities) and modern (including occupation, class, country, political party, individual identities) categories. The subdivision of identities into these two categories can be motivated by the fact that the often still limited influences of industrialisation may have led Africans to continue to identify themselves 'according to where they live or the kinship group to which they belong, rather than by what they do or the broader polity in which they have been included by colonial mapmakers' (Mattes and Shin 2005:25).

**Figure 5.7:** Mean Level of Development vs. Type of Identity




Interestingly, Tanzania seems to show the highest mean level of modern identity markers.<sup>33</sup> However, all the countries score higher than 1.6 (range of 1 to 2; traditional to modern), seemingly indicating that individuals in these countries generally tend towards so-called 'modern' forms of self-identification. However, no distinct conclusions in terms of the link between development and identity can be drawn, with only a weak correlation emerging (Pearson's  $r = -.396, p > 0.05$ ). Further analysis and the development of more comprehensive indicators is therefore necessary.



### **Power**

Under the value dimension of power, support for gender equality in the respective countries was analysed. The patriarchal nature of many African polities in many cases continues to place women in inferior and unequal positions. This naturally also places severe limitations on the agency of women in the developmental context.


**Figure 5.8:** HDI Score vs. Mean Level of Support for Gender Equality



There seems to be a clear linear relationship between level of development and level of support for gender equality in these countries. The Pearson's correlation ( $r = .843$ ) comes close to significance at  $p = .073$ . This finding highlights the extreme importance of developing policies that respect the rights of women in the Southern African region, allowing them to play an active role in developmental outcomes. In this regard, Appendix A provides some cursory insights into how the above countries are currently performing in terms of achieving gender equality. South Africa has made particular progress in terms of achieving gender equality in government, moving from 141 in the world before the 1994 elections to number seven in terms of women occupying seats in the national government, when the African National Congress adopted a 30 per cent quota on its party list (Garson, 2007).

The final value orientation analysed under the dimension of power was the level of support for elite rule within the respective countries. This value orientation poses a crucial question: Where should the power reside? In other words, should it reside with the masses or with economic experts and elites within the respective countries? This question has particular relevance, as traditional Southern African societies have historically been highly stratified into both kinship and political hierarchies.

**Figure 5.9:** HDI Score vs. Mean Level of Support for Elite Rule



A very weak inverse relationship between development and support for elite rule emerges (Pearson's  $r = -.034$ ;  $p > 0.05$ ). The extreme case is once again Mozambique, showing very low levels of development in conjunction with high support for rule by elites. A more comprehensive index is, however, necessary to provide more conclusive insights.

Although the dimension of cosmology could not be comprehensively analysed due to the lack of suitable items in the Afrobarometer questionnaire, it should be seen, however as a crucial component in terms of explaining developmental outcomes in Africa.

### ***Cosmology***

It is clear that in order to fully understand belief systems one cannot simply identify isolated value orientations. What needs to be developed is a deeper understanding of cosmology - how people conceptualise their universe, see the place of humans in it, and relate to unseen beings and powers. As noted by Keesing and Strathern (1998:64), 'striving to understand the religious philosophy of non-Western people, demands every ounce of one's analytical and intuitive powers, and often more'.

Hammond-Tooke (1974:320) notes that traditional systems (focusing specifically on the 'Bantu'-speaking peoples of Southern Africa) differ remarkably from the so-called 'World Religions' – they are all firmly rooted in the social structure, the objects of worship are structurally determined, and they are mostly this-worldly in orientation:

Unlike Christianity, for example, which accepts suffering as inevitable and indeed necessary, merely promising grace in the face of it, all Bantu religions are concerned with attaining the good life here on earth, and their rituals tend to be essentially pragmatic. A dualism is recognized, as in Christianity, between good and evil, but the war waged between them, with its resulting rewards and penalties, is essentially here and now, and not in an apocalyptic future existence. The witch and the sorcerer, the very embodiment of evil, is a constant threat to the well-being of man and beast, and the whole complex of witch beliefs, with its related institution of divination must, therefore, be seen as an integral part of the religious system (Hammond-Tooke 1974:318).

Keesing and Strathern (1998:67) also highlight the fact that 'magical thinking', prevalent in many African cultures, reflects a kind of model of a universe far more deterministic than the Western one, a universe where things do not just happen by chance or accident (see also Horton 1993; Lawuyi 1998). In such a universe, death, illness and crop failure call for explanation. As noted by Hammond-Tooke (1974:328), these misfortunes are almost inevitably believed to be caused by some external agent. This agent may be a supernatural being in its own right, or a human being using supernatural means. Magic, then, represents human attempts to manipulate chains of cause and effect between events which to Western eyes may seem unrelated. Yamba (1997) emphasizes that these cosmologies have daily relevance in all spheres of life, noting the impact of cosmology, and more specifically witchcraft, on the discourse surrounding AIDS in Zambia.

Despite the unavailability of suitably operationalised survey items tapping into cosmologies within the Southern African context, it is nevertheless crucial that these dynamics are further investigated. This will allow us to gain a fuller understanding, not only of their impact on everyday interactions between

individuals, but also on attitudes towards achieving developmental goals. Indeed, the very notion of 'development' may take on distinct variations based on the differing cosmologies of given societies.

### Conclusion

The above analysis has provided an exploratory empirical analysis investigating whether there may indeed be a link between value orientations and development within the Southern African context. Although the use of such a small sample (6 countries), the limited type of data available (quantitative and opinion survey), has precluded significant results from being found, interesting trends have nevertheless emerged. However, the development of a survey instrument which takes particular cognisance of the intricacies of value orientations in the Southern African region, particularly in the complex field of cosmology, would allow us to gain a much-needed understanding of how particular values manifest themselves in people's lived realities.

As noted above, it is particularly within the fields of gender, consensus-seeking and individualism where links with development seem apparent. Yet, these cursory findings need to be verified through adequately controlling for the effect of various environmental factors and taking a closer look at questions of causality. It is also important to note that the above findings merely provide a macro view of the link between values and development, without taking into account the vast socio-economic and cultural variation that often characterises the African landscape. Within-country analyses and the thick descriptions and confounding nature of qualitative studies of the spread of value orientations therefore also have a valuable contribution to make.

Augmenting the use of empirical analysis of survey data with qualitative analyses (such as focus groups) will go a long way in contextualising findings within diverse environments. This will ultimately allow us to gain a much-needed deeper understanding of specific values driving individual actions, thereby making crucial inroads in addressing developmental shortfalls in a sustainable manner.

### Notes

1. These countries were chosen due to the fact that they form part of the Southern African region. All six of these countries were also included in Round 2 of the Afrobarometer survey, providing an ideal opportunity for comparative empirical analysis. More information on the Afrobarometer survey will be provided below.
2. Rist (Berry 2002) has questioned the very notion of national development, particularly its universality. He argues that development is one of the Western world's favourite myths and that one needs to attack the accepted truths about development held by Western 'developers'. Indeed, not every culture has a concept for development and that if there is, it may not be at all like the one in the developer's programme. It is, therefore, necessary to discern the very existence and important variations in the meaning of

development across cultures. According to Sindima (1995:xiii), liberalism is a thoroughly materialistic philosophy which understands development in 'purely economic terms'. This notion of progress and orientation towards social change 'corrupted the African way of life' and 'destroyed the African holistic concept of the world, [pushing] religion into the realm of the private'.

3. See chapter 2 on the 'comparative method' for more on these limitations.
4. See also Graeber (2001) in this regard.
5. Modernisation theory (often contrasted with dependency theory) is a socio-economic theory which highlights the role played by the developed world in modernising and facilitating sustainable development in underdeveloped nations (mostly through the acculturation of the modern policies and values of the Western world). The theory has, however, been subject to major criticisms, especially for its western, ethnocentric approach. See Rostow (1960), McClelland (1967) and Inkeles (1974).
6. Mazrui (1990:4) observed that: 'A central aspect of the gap in technique is the relationship between culture and technical modernization. In order to modernize industrially, is it necessary to Westernize culturally? Japan from 1868 decided that a country could modernise industrially without Westernizing culturally. "Western technique, Japanese spirit" was Japan's slogan. Japan proceeded on that basic assumption. Turkey under Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in the 1920s and 1930s decided that in order to modernize industrially a country had to Westernize culturally.' He goes on to state that Africa has not followed the Japanese fate of technical modernisation without cultural Westernisation, nor the Ataturk fate of technical modernisation through cultural Westernisation. Instead, Africa has followed the painful process of 'cultural Westernisation without technical modernization'.
7. In some cases Zimbabwe was excluded from the analysis, due to certain items not having been included in the Zimbabwean questionnaire.
8. For more on the pitfalls inherent in cross-cultural analysis, see Landman (2000).
9. For more on the complexity of value systems in relation to a changing environment, see Graeber (2001).
10. Data limitations did not allow us to put this into practice in this analysis. As mentioned above, Round 2 of the Afrobarometer survey was the first time the six countries under investigation in this study were simultaneously included in a survey. The release of Round 3 data will allow the evolution of values in these countries to be investigated over time, albeit over a relatively short period.
11. Hammond-Tooke is regarded as one of South Africa's most prolific authors of anthropological texts. His best-known works are those on the peoples of southern Africa and the history of Southern African anthropology. Hammond-Tooke was primarily interested in the type of topics investigated by the founders of South African anthropology, which led the more progressive of his generation of anthropologists in the 1970s and 1980s to perceive his approach as conservative and outdated. As noted by Niehaus (2005:6), from an activist vantage point, Hammond-Tooke's more scholarly concerns – such as demonstrating how old Zulu folk tales display the fundamental logic of the human mind – seemed rather pedestrian. Yet Niehaus acknowledges that the classical theories and concerns represented in his work are now seen as indispensable for understanding the complex and dynamic society we live in. His work is a reminder

that 'any vision of human nature that excludes myths, morality, symbols and religion will always be partial and incomplete' (2005:6).

12. See Afrobarometer Round 2 compendium for a summary of major findings from the surveys (Afrobarometer, 2007a). These findings however focus particularly on political attitudes rather than individual value orientations as such.
13. The values which characterize African cultures are widely seen to be the product of four formative and dominant influences. First, until relatively recently, Africans have traditionally lived in small-scale villages. Second, Africans traditionally governed themselves through a mostly patriarchal system of largely hereditary, unelected traditional leaders. Third, political rule was rarely exercised on the scale of the modern state, often extending only to the boundaries of the village, and beyond that only indirectly in loose confederation with other villages sharing tribal, clan or linguistic similarities. Fourth, Africa's modern political topography often bears little resemblance to the continent's ethnic or tribal makeup. Colonial mapmakers essentially divided and recombined Africa's agrarian and herding societies into heterogeneous national societies (Mattes and Shin 2005:8-9).
14. Similarly, Hyden (2001) argues that African values are impediments to development and the reduction of fertility in Africa. Thus, demographic change will only occur in Africa if political systems are willing to move beyond the structural limitations of populism. However, Chowdhry (1992:33), in her review of this work, argues that this focus on the negative impact of African values is disturbingly reminiscent of modernisation theory.
15. This degree of control over individual destiny naturally also relates to the degree of internal versus external locus of control which the individual experiences.
16. The identification of these four broad value dimensions resulted from a series of workshops during which African academics participating in the Southern African values project deliberated extensively regarding the most appropriate conceptual framework to guide this study.
17. The level of paternalism / dependency within the 6 countries was measured with an index consisting of the following items (across the five countries where all six questions were asked, Chronbach's Alpha = .762); Only the first and the fifth questions listed below were included in the Zimbabwean questionnaire.  
Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement A or Statement B  
Response categories: Agree Strongly with A; Agree with A; Agree with B; Agree Strongly with B.  
\*Items were re-coded into the same direction – higher value = greater dependency  
A: People should look after themselves and be responsible for their own success in life  
B: The government should bear the main responsibility for the well-being of people.  
A: As citizens, we should be more active in questioning the actions of our leaders.  
B: In our country these days, we should show more respect for authority.  
A: It is better to have wealthy people as leaders because they can help provide for the community.  
B: It is better to have ordinary people as leaders because they understand our needs.  
A: Since everyone is equal under the law, leaders should not favour their own family or group.

B: Once in office, leaders are obliged to help their own family or group.

A: People are like children; the government should take care of them like a parent.

B: Government is an employee; the people should be the bosses who control the government.

Across five countries, these items produce a Chronbach's Alpha of .762 (Zimbabwe was not included as not all of the items were asked in this country).

18. Consensus-seeking was measured using the following variable:

Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement A or Statement B.

Response categories: Agree Strongly with A; Agree with A; Agree with B; Agree Very Strongly with B.

A: In order to make decisions in our community, we should talk until everyone agrees.

B: Since we will never agree on everything, we must learn to accept differences of opinion within our community.

\*Response categories were reversed – higher value = increased consensus-seeking

Unfortunately other variables testing the same concept were not available, preventing an index from being constructed.

19. The following items were included in an index, testing whether the pursuit of justice takes precedence over respect for the rule of law (Chronbach's Alpha = .645). In Zimbabwe only the 'violent crime' item was included in the questionnaire.

Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement A or Statement B.

Response categories: Agree Strongly with A; Agree with A; Agree with B; Agree Very Strongly with B.

A: If you were a victim of violent crime, you would turn to the police for help

B: If you were a victim of a violent crime you would find a way to take revenge yourself

A: The use of violence is never justified in [this country's] politics.

B: In this country, it is sometimes necessary to use violence in support of a just cause.

20. The following two items were assessed individually in relation to individualism. These items were not asked in Zimbabwe.

Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement A or Statement B.

Response categories: 1 = Agree Strongly with A; 2 = Agree with A; 3 = Agree with B; 4 = Agree Very Strongly with B.

Item 1:

A: Each person should put the well-being of the community ahead of their own interests.

B: Everybody should be free to pursue what is best for themselves as individuals.

Item 2:\*

A: It is alright to have large differences of wealth because those that work hard deserve to be rewarded.

B: We should avoid large gaps between the rich and the poor because they create jealousy and conflict.

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\*Item 2 was recoded – higher value = greater emphasis on individualism.

21. The following items were combined into a social capital index (Chronbach's Alpha = .803); Items not asked in Zimbabwe.

Now I am going to read out a list of groups that people join or attend. For each one, could you tell me whether you are an official leader, an active member, an inactive member, or not a member.

- A religious group
- A trade union or farmers association
- A professional or business association
- A community or development organisation

22. The following question testing identity was asked of respondents:

We have spoken to many [South Africans] and they have all described themselves in different ways. Some people describe themselves in terms of their language, ethnic group, race, religion, or gender and others describe themselves in economic terms, such as working class, middle class, or a farmer. Besides being [South African] which specific group do you feel you belong to first and foremost?

Responses were recoded into the following categories:

Traditional: racial, ethnic, religious, regional or age identities.

Modern: occupation, class, country, political party, individual identities.

23. The following items were combined into a 'support for gender equality' index (Chronbach's Alpha = .896):

Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement A or Statement B.

Response categories: Agree Strongly with A; Agree with A; Agree with B; Agree Very Strongly with B.

A: Women have always been subject to traditional laws and customs, and should remain so.

B: In our country, women should have equal rights and receive the same treatment as men do.

A: A married man has the right to beat his wife and children if they misbehave.

B: No-one has the right to use physical violence against anyone else.

24. The following items were used to measure support for elite rule (Chronbach's Alpha = .468):

Item 1: Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement A or Statement B.

Response categories: Agree Strongly with A; Agree with A; Agree with B; Agree Very Strongly with B.

A: All people should be permitted to vote, even if they do not fully understand all the issues at hand.

B: Only those who are sufficiently well educated should be allowed to choose our leaders.

Item 2: There are many ways to manage an economy. Would you disapprove or approve of the following alternatives:

Economic experts (including foreign donors and investors) make the most important decisions about our economy.

Response categories: Agree strongly, agree, disagree, disagree strongly.



25. Various criticisms have, however, been levelled against the HDI in recent years. Although it has many strengths, the HDI remains a very blunt instrument since it relies on incomplete sets of cross-national aggregate data that (particularly in developing countries) are not necessarily collected systematically on an annual basis (Lindenberg 2002:307). In addition, the HDI seems to fall short of providing a context-sensitive measure of development, which can be seen to be particularly important in Africa. What is, therefore, needed is the development of indices constructed from culturally rich data, which take into account the local way of life. Global developmental measures are inherently problematic in this regard, as they are designed to be applicable in diverse contexts, yet often miss out on valuable context-specific information. For more on this, see Alkire (2002); Anand & Sen (2000) and Atkinson (1973). See also chapter on the 'Comparative Method' for more on aggregate data collection in developing countries.
26. Paternalism, as it is used in this context, can be defined as the policy of governing or controlling people through providing for their needs, but giving them no responsibility during this process. More specifically, the survey items used to measure this concept tap into whether or not individuals consider it to be acceptable to be governed in a paternalistic manner.
27. See also Mamdani (1996); Etounga-Manguelle (2000).
28. By contrast, Wiredu (2001) argues that the value of consensus was pivotal in the organisation of non-centralised African states. He claims it constituted African democratic culture and that it is still important for post-colonial Africa to promote it.
29. See Appendix A.
30. This will be more closely analysed in the section on cosmology.
31. The central premise of social capital is that social ties have value. Of course this value is conceptualised in capitalist terms (Fine 2001). Social capital refers to the collective value of all social networks (who people know) and the inclinations that arise from these networks to do things for each other (norms of reciprocity and trust). The term, therefore, emphasises a wide variety of specific benefits that flow from the information, and cooperation associated with social networks (Cohen and Prusak 2001:65). In this way, value is created for people that are connected and - at least sometimes - for bystanders as well. Indeed, there is considerable evidence that communities with a good stock of social capital are more likely to benefit from lower crime figures, better health, higher educational achievement, and better economic growth (Putnam 2000:296-306; 307-318).
32. For more on the impact of the 'Scramble for Africa' on African consciousness, see Petringa (2006).
33. This seems to stand in sharp contrast to the agricultural policy of collectivisation - *ujamaa* or 'familyhood' - instituted by Nyerere in Tanzania. This policy was based on the belief that life should be structured around the *ujamaa*, or extended family found in traditional Africa (Yakan 999).

