



Dissertation

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**UNIVERSITY OF DAR ES SALAAM
INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPMENT
STUDIES**

**Forms of peasant agricultural cooperatives in Uganda
: a case study in Lango**

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
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**FORMS OF PEASANT
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CO OPERATIVES IN UGANDA:
A CASE STUDY IN LANGO**



By

EBONG - OPYENE JAMES

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF
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
DECLARATION

I, EBONG-OPYENE JAMES, hereby declare that the contents of this dissertation are as a result of my own work and findings and to the best of my knowledge, has never been submitted and is not being submitted for a degree in any other University.



EBONG-OPYENE JAMES

Date: May, 26th, 1993



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Date: 26th May 1993

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DEDICATION

To my Dad Napthal Opyene-Okara, Mum Hellen Mary and to Beth,
Friend and Companion.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADB	-	Africa Development Bank
ADF	-	Africa Development Fund
CBR	-	Centre for Basic Research
ECPP	-	Emergency Cotton Production Programme
FUAP	-	Federation of Uganda African Producers
GCS	-	Growers Co-operative Society
IBRD	-	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IFAD	-	International Fund for Agricultural Development
MOP	-	Mode of Production
RC	-	Resistance Council
UCA	-	Uganda Co-operative Alliance
UG	-	Uganda Government
UNC	-	Uganda National Congress
UNDP	-	United Nations Development Programme
UP	-	Uganda Protectorate

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ABSTRACT

This study set out to investigate the extent to which the character of the forms of capital that penetrated the Uganda economy in general, and Lango in particular, has contributed to the reproduction of non-capitalist forms of peasant co-operatives in agriculture within the context of the development of the state-regulated form of peasant co-operatives; and how the interaction between the two resulted in contradictions that overtime led to social differentiation in Lango social formations. The basic assumption of the study is that the character of capital that penetrated Lango society resulted in the transformation/subjugation of forms of peasant co-operative organizations it articulated with, to the degree that their autonomy have largely been compromised in the interest of capital; and that the character of both the colonial and post-colonial state greatly impacted on the trends of the development of peasant co-operatives in Uganda as a whole and Lango in particular.

The result of the findings basically confirm these assumptions. It reveals that there exist a dynamic interaction or articulation of production relations between non-capitalist and capitalist forms. And that within this

articulation process the pre-capitalist non-state regulated forms of peasant co-operatives, although still surviving in the countryside, do so in form and not content. The analysis shows that massive state assistance to the state-regulated co-operative has been linked with corresponding state control and patronage. And that this overbearing and improper state influence has not only retarded the autonomous and successful development of the co-operative organization but has also contributed to the low participation of members in co-operative affairs. Consequently, the peasants have largely lost control over the state-regulated co-operative organization to the state.

On the basis of these findings the study concludes that a broad and popular democratization reform process whose basis is the changing of production relations and the attainment of social transformation be considered. The study recognizes the centrality of peasant co-operatives within this democratization process. It argues for the transformation of marketing-based state-regulated co-operatives into both production-based and marketing-based (popular) peasant co-operatives. This in turn ought to be linked with the non-state regulated production based co-operatives. The ultimate objective in the linkage should be the transformation of the productive forces in peasant

agriculture which today are based on these non-state regulated forms of peasant co-operative organization.

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PART ONE

INTRODUCTORY ASPECTS OF THE STUDY

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 An Overview of the Study Problem

Understanding how the state regulated and non-state regulated forms of peasant co-operatives are part and parcel of a single historical process forms the central subject of this study. At a broader level, the need to understand the relationships between forms of peasant co-operative institutions and social formations is necessary if at all we are to identify the socio-economic and political conditions that affect the evolution, organization, operations and development of such institutions. These relationships shall be examined both under conditions of stateless-based social formation during pre-colonial Lango society, and during the period of the transition to, and the establishment of class-based social formation (including the mechanisms by the colonial and neo-colonial states in achieving it). Hence, underlying this study is the view that to understand the interaction between state-regulated and non-state regulated forms of peasant co-operatives is indeed to understand how non-capitalist and capitalist forms of co-operatives co-exist and affect each other. This is important if we are to explain how capital penetrates the countryside. It is also important if we are to explain

how capitalist relations and forms of production interact with and/or tries to subjugate non-capitalist forms of production, and how this in turn resists and continue to remain resilient in the face of hightened social, political, economic, and environmental crises confronting them.

For Lango in particular the objective conditions in the pre-colonial period were such that population was sparse, the general environment harsh and the productive forces underdeveloped. Land was owned on a communal basis. A non-commodity form of production based on gathering, fishing and hunting as well as gardening and shifting cultivation of grain crops (millet) dominated. Production, therefore, was mainly for subsistence: trade affected only surpluses or specific jobs, often complementary. Most income was from agriculture, millet being the major product. Hunting and gathering formed an integral part of the productive cycle. Given the primitive level of development of the productive forces, the dominant form of labour organization was in the form of co-operative labour teams called "*Wang tic*"¹ which was a direct response to the objective conditions at the time. For clearly co-operation in labour paid greater dividends for peasants more than individual labour.

We will argue in this study that, in the same way that it adopted kinship structures, the capitalist

economy did make this form of peasant co-operation its own. Although the form, in terms of organization and operations continued to be the same, the degree that the requesting household/party occupied a socially dominant position in society (as a result of social differentiation) meant that overtime the content or the underlying socio-economic relations among the members was no longer quite the same. The content of this form of peasant co-operation had changed. And having changed, the principal idea of reciprocity became undermined and excluded. So that rich peasants and capitalist farmers soon used *Wang tic* as wage-labour teams. While simultaneously the colonial as well as the neo-colonial state utilized them as forced-labour teams.

Specifically, in the colonial era, a blend of this "non-capitalist" (here-in-after: non-state-regulated) and the colonial/capitalist "modern" or "official" (here-in-after: state-regulated) peasant co-operatives evolved. Central to the evolution of the state-regulated peasant co-operative was the introduction of cotton as a commodity (cash) crop. The introduction of cotton brought about changes in the traditional land tenure system and seasonal labour shortages as an outcome of the conflicting labour demands for food-crop production. But also due to the region's incorporation into the wider colonial economy as a labour reserve providing migrant

labour for the raw material producing region of the south. More significant the introduction of cotton and the state-regulated co-operatives also saw the emergence of a non-producing class of merchants and state-regulated co-operative bureaucrats - under whom the peasants increasingly became marginalised, as the co-operative institution became more and more an arena where different political and economic interests came at play.

With these developments the non-state-regulate form of peasant co-operation became reorganized or transformed to serve the export production interests. It became a form of disguised wage-labour teams. Importantly, there emerged marked altered socio-economic (especially property ownership) relations as a result of class differentiations among peasant families. And this when confronted by the market took on different forms, generating conflicts between the different classes but specifically in the form of peasant struggles for viability and autonomy. To this extent we see also that an examination of the dynamics of forms of peasant organizations, their potentials and/or limitations in the process of social transformation and democratization is a significant aspect in this study.

1.2 Conceptual Issues

We use the term "non-state regulated" co-operatives

to refer to those "informal" forms of peasant co-operative organizations in agricultural production commonly found in Lango society and called "*Wang tic*." They are not legally registered or recognized (i.e. existing outside the framework of state laws). Under this form of co-operative arrangement some or all members of different peasant households in Lango help one another by labouring together during agricultural production, while maintaining their separate existence as economic entities. It is a form of peasant co-operative organization that is indigenous to rural Africa. It involves both peasant men and women. But the term is also class-specific as we shall see later. Such organizations appear fragile and impermanent. Their structures are often voluntary, self-managed and participatory in traditionally accepted ways. Nonetheless, they play a critical role not only in the labour process in agricultural production but also in peasant struggles for viability and help create the enabling conditions for the discreet pursuit of peasant autonomy.

The above conceptual clarification, we hope, clearly distinguishes the state-regulated ones, which are founded upon the Rochedalian-conventional co-operative principles as joint undertakings formed for the explicit purpose of running a modern business and are legally registered under state laws. Such organizations have hierarchical

forms of leadership structures, and may not be voluntary and/or participatory.

1.3 Background to the Study

A number of studies have sought to identify the salient features of forms of peasant co-operative organizations. Primary importance is usually placed on the analysis of the economic impact of the state-regulated peasant co-operatives in relation to government agricultural policies. Consequently, most of the analysis has been concerned with the origin, organization, operations, benefits, successes and failures, and possibilities of continued expansion and support assistance from government. With few exceptions² most of such studies have erroneously assumed that state regulated peasant co-operatives are characterised by popular participation and control. Likewise, not many of them make attempts to distinguish between participation and control especially the extent to which the mass membership of the co-operatives direct and influence the affairs/functioning of the co-operative organization. Still only fewer have focused directly at the analysis of the class content of these organizations.³

More importantly, great emphasis is usually placed on studying the state-regulated peasant co-operatives. Little efforts have been made to study the dynamics of

those peasant co-operative organizations found in rural areas and which have their roots in pre-colonial social formations but today exist, in their articulated forms, side by side with the state regulated peasant co-operatives. The tendency has been to rate these as "traditional," "backward" and "primitive" to be destroyed before development can ever take place; which in itself begs the question of their resilience i.e the question of how, why, in what form and in what content they still continue to survive. To address these questions is indeed in itself a re-examination of the broader issues of popular organizations, popular participation and the whole question of democratization and the development process in rural areas.

1.4 The Problem Area

The broad problem for investigation in this study is the extent to which the character of capital that penetrated the Uganda economy (Lango inclusive) and the underdeveloped character of the colonial economy did contribute to the persistence of pre-capitalist (non-capitalist) modes of production and reproduction on the one hand, and the process and mechanisms of preservation of non-state regulated co-operatives within the context of the development of the state-regulated co-operatives, on the other hand; and how this in turn led to

contradictions within the Lango society i.e contradictions resulting from the development of classes among the Langi. Hence, the need to understand what identifiable social classes has arisen with the development of the colonial and post-colonial economy, and the conflicts and struggles that accompanies it.

The study, therefore, is an inquiry into the process(es) of the integration of the non-state regulated peasant co-operatives or *Wang tic* into the capitalist system; the extent of its penetration by capital and the major transformations that have taken and are taking place in the features of these forms of peasant co-operatives, now serving the interest of capitalism. It is, thus, an inquiry into the mechanisms of transition from stateless-based social formation to capitalist social formation which accounts for the process of social differentiation that took place and is taking place in Lango society as a whole. This will involve investigating into the character of the production relations and the ownership relations of the means of production such as land that has evolved, its changing character and the impact and implications they have had and is having for the organization of labour as a whole, and the division of labour/roles in the society between men, women and the youth.

Linked with these is the question of the role of the

state and its functionaries in the whole process of capital penetration, capital accumulation and specifically in the sphere of co-operative institutional development. That is, examining the changing character of the state and state ideology on development as it affects both forms of peasant co-operatives. The problem is to address the specific question of the mechanism of transition or changes in the form, class and gender contents of both forms of peasant co-operative institutions resulting from the establishment of the capitalist market and capitalist institutions. That is, in-depthly studying the nature of the interaction between the two forms of peasant co-operatives, and the resistance(s) and/or organized struggles engaged in by the peasants as they get confronted by the capitalist market.

Some of the additional specific questions the study is interested in include, for example, how has the application of *Wang tic* and state-regulated co-operatives varied over time with the social differentiation taking place; the changing gender and class content of these peasant co-operatives particularly the extent to which the women are participating in their formation, running and control. Which classes are organizing each form of co-operative and in whose interest. In other words, what have been the consequences of the establishment of the

capitalist market on the form and content of these peasant co-operative organizations in terms of membership, leadership, internal democracy, participation and the class interest it serves. And to what extent do these forms of peasant co-operation assist and influence production, processing and marketing of agricultural products. Basically, how have (do) these peasant co-operatives related (relate) to the capitalist market or the merchant capitalist class in Lango and Uganda as a whole.

This means that at a more specific level, the study is also interested in finding the explanation for the apparent exploitative character of the state regulated co-operatives, and the ideology that legitimises it. Particularly, how the various social forces (economic or political) relate to and use peasant co-operative organizations to serve their interests, and the different forms of resistance adopted by the peasants in response to the changing character of the state and the forms of capital development in the rural *loci*.

1.5 Significance of the Study

There exist a growing need to understand pre-colonial Africa generally and forms of peasant co-operative labour organizations during that era in particular, together with the dynamics of its transition

to the colonial and post-colonial era. From the theoretical angle, we believe that a major function of the colonial rule was the establishment and consolidation of capitalist relations of production that came to permeate the entire African continent. The establishment of those relations ought to be the dominant motif of colonial and post-colonial African historiography, with due attention paid to the survival of pre-capitalist institutions or forms and to African resistance to subjugation.

Thus, the significance of this study draws first and foremost from the knowledge that the interaction of capitalist and pre-capitalist forms of production is, and ought to be a central theme of the agrarian question/history of Africa during the colonial and post-colonial era. Within this context there is, therefore, the need to undertake careful analytical study of forms of peasant co-operative organizations particularly because of the great importance attached to them as channels for economic development in Africa. The outcome of such an investigation would help us suggest what could be done towards the improvement of the labouring peasants' economic productivity and their economic/social progress.

Moreover, in the light of the failure of the "modernization" or state-controlled co-operative organizations, the non-state regulated co-operative

structures could well be our focus, as a starting point for development. It is imperative, therefore, that the linkage, strength, limitations and class content of forms of peasant co-operative organizations be concretely understood, if such institutions are to be strengthened as popular organizations that could serve not only as significant elements in the development of participatory democratic governance in Africa, but also as critical structures for democratically organizing economic activities both at the national and local levels.

1.6 The Argument and Expectations of the Study

The main thesis we advance in this study is that the character of the colonial economy which developed in Lango did lead to social differentiation in that society and to the transformation/subjugation of the then existing forms of peasant co-operative organizations that it found on the ground, so that the autonomy of those forms of peasant organizations have largely been subordinated in the interest of capital; And that the character of the colonial and neo-colonial state in Uganda has had a direct bearing on the trends of the development of the different forms of peasant agricultural co-operatives we find in rural areas today.

The tenability/validity of this thesis is to be dependant upon the extent to which the expected

results/findings of this study hold true that:-

1. although non-state regulated forms of peasant co-operatives continue to survive today in rural Africa, they do so in form and not content;
2. policy intervention by the state in the affairs of peasant agricultural co-operatives has largely compromised the autonomy of these peasant organizations and has had a considerable impact on the trends of their development, mode of organization, role of members and their participation in co-operative organizations;
3. the continued reproduction of non-state regulated forms of peasant co-operative organization suggest the existence of a dynamic interconnection (articulation) of production relations between non-capitalist and capitalist institutions.

1.7 The Specific Objectives of the Study

1. To undertake a critical historical approach that explores, *inter-alia*, the historical development of the peasant co-operatives: forms of organization, forms of participation, accountability/internal democracy and the strength and limits of both the non-state regulated co-operatives and state regulated ones in the process of democratization and economic and social progress of the rural poor.

2. To examine how the non-state regulated peasant agricultural co-operative organizations have progressively been entrenched into the capitalist economy, and how the state regulated peasant agricultural co-operative has been used by different social forces as an organ for economic exploitation, political domination and capital accumulation.
3. To analyse the process of social differentiation and social relations that have resulted from capital penetration of Lango countryside.
4. To assess the extent to which the different co-operative organizations assist, or play a role in and influence production, processing and marketing of agricultural products.
5. To analyse the class content of peasant co-operative organizations in Lango.
6. To examine the state policy interventions in peasant agricultural production and peasant co-operative affairs, and the forms of peasant struggles arising from the conflicts in the interests of the different social forces at paly.

1.8 Research Methodology

One of the most important aspects of a research work is the methodology. The methodology used in any research largely determines the quality and reliability of its

findings. By methodology, we mean the methods used in data collection⁴ and the underlying theoretical reference informing the interpretation of the data so collected. The former may include survey research, observations, interviews, administration of questionnaires, the use of written documents like books, newspapers, reports, magazines, and diaries. In the case of the latter, we have tried (without arguing that it sheds full light on all issues or solve most of the questions), to place our present study within the realm of the theory of social formations⁵ and specifically in the articulation of modes of production theory which constitutes our basic epistemological methodology⁶ in the handling of our data. Our adoption of the theory of the articulation of modes of production is first a genuine effort to contribute to concrete analysis which exposes the strategic political or ideological implications of different theoretical tendencies. Secondly, we find it a most useful tool not only in clarifying the location and role of peasantries within under-developed societies, but also in shaping the character of periodization and development of our analysis.

1.8.1 The Study Area

This study is a focused in-depth case study based on a three months field research in two villages, **Otwon**

groups, we were guided by considerations of the social and gender composition of the members.

In each village our ultimate sampling unit was the household. Household listing/register for each village was obtained from the Resistance Council 1 (RCI) Chairperson/Secretary, and a simple random selection technique was used to obtain a sample of 78 households in Otwon village and 81 households in Alenga village. This was done by assigning sequential numbers to the households listed in the village RCI register, and then using random tables we selected the households. Within the households, one member of the household viz. the head of the household, (ie. a total of 159 respondents) constituted the first cohort of our interviewees/respondents.

The second cohort consisted of the following:-

(1) leaders/officials of the non-state regulated co-operatives namely the chairman, vice-chairman, secretary, treasurer, "askari" and three committee members 8 members. (2) Officials/leaders of the state-regulated co-operatives at the primary society level (9 members). (3) The co-operative union officials at the Union head-office in Lira; the district co-operative officials; and the officials in the Ministry of commerce, Co-operatives and Marketing; former veteran politicians (elders) both women and men, particularly those whose names were mentioned as

associated with the nationalist movement and/or the founding of the co-operative movement. Four of these were located and interviewed. Current local political leaders, at village and district levels were also contacted and interviewed. Particularly the local village chiefs and the RC executive members - specifically, the secretaries for youth, women affairs, mass mobilization for development, and the chairman and treasurer. While in the field we learnt that there was an on-going World Bank/Swedish/Uganda Government Co-operative Rehabilitation Project covering 1990-5, under the Uganda Co-operative Alliance (UCA). We interviewed two of the project implementors.

1.8.3 Data Collection Techniques

1.8.3.1 Primary Sources of Data

Four methods were used simultaneously in the collection of data for this study. First, by methods of oral history or popular memories which provided data for most of our descriptive analysis in this study. Identified village elders/veteran political activists (both men and women) were asked to recount their knowledge of the various forms of co-operative organizations in Lango society from pre-colonial through colonialism to the present day, dealing with the changes in their organization, operations, membership and

leadership. The aim here was to obtain data that could help us achieve a reconstruction of the history of the various forms of peasant co-operative organizations and to elicit the mechanisms of their interaction.

For that matter we also asked the identified elders to recount their experiences of, and involvement in, the introduction/initiation and propagation of state and non-state regulated co-operatives. The accounts by the elders also encompassed their knowledge of the link between the co-operative movement and nationalist/post independence politics and the question of political leadership and leadership of the co-operative movement, including the major issues of concern for the co-operative movement then. They were also asked to describe the organization of production, processing and marketing of crops, particularly the role of co-operatives in these and the question of merchant capitalist (Indians/Africans). Our aim here was to capture the historical developments and the major conjectures (and trajectories) in the development of both forms of peasant co-operative organizations. However, aware of the complexity and intricacy of the history of the development of these co-operatives, we thought that the narratives by the elders could likely not be totally complete. Therefore, during the period of field research we resided in the villages. At the end of every day we joined the village members at

their various "Akiba" group meetings and opened discussions/debate with them over these issues, with the purpose of corroborating the narrative facts. The group discussions were useful in enabling us cross-check for memory failures by individual respondents in their narration.

Our second method of data collection was by use of a combination of structured and unstructured questionnaire. This was administered to the heads of the sampled households and the leaders of co-operatives. With it we obtained household level data covering the socio-demographic information on households - the name of the household heads, their occupation, sex and age of the family members, education level, and settlement pattern. The questionnaire also asked specific information on the means and forces of production (eg. land ownership, labour arrangement for farm work and nature of technology), major sources of household income/expenditure patterns and indebtedness and money lending. Information on crop production by area cultivated and output, utilization of surplus and access to market and credits were also sought. This set of data was tabulated to discern among other things the levels of social differentiation in the study villages, labour organization at household and village levels and economic activities engaged in by households as sources of

household income and property relations.

Through the same instrument another set of data enabled us to determine the degree of peasant participation in either forms of co-operation and the linkage factors between them including their limitations and potentials. Questions here sought to reveal the levels, duration and flexibility of participation in both state-regulated and non-state regulated co-operatives by household members. Questions were also asked on the institutional framework and the local power structure in the villages in relation to each form of co-operative organization including election of leaders and intervention of the state. These sets of data did allow us to determine the exploitative character of each form of co-operative organization, their interaction with capital and the state, the changing trends in their organization/management, and the forms of accountability and internal democracy in each.

1.8.3.2 Secondary Sources of Data

Secondary data constituted one of the sources of data we collected. The method of data collection used here was the analysis of written documents, such as reports, unpublished theses and dissertations, News papers and other relevant documents obtained from the authority and other institutions. Specifically, a re-

reading of monographic accounts of co-operative labour studies appearing in anthropological studies was done. This was used to reconstruct the past particularly the aspects dealing with the pre-colonial social formations and its history and the labour organization/production relations then. The official records (files and reports) at all levels of the relevant Government departments at the district headquarters, especially the departments of Agriculture, Lands, and Co-operatives, were consulted. We also looked at the records (files, minutes and reports) at the Co-operative Union office, primary societies and those with the leaders of non-state regulated co-operative organizations. Archival records at the Entebbe Government archive was used to obtain secondary data too. The Makerere University Africana section and the East Africana section of the University of Dar es Salaam main library, Centre for Basic Research library in Kampala provided most of the secondary data we analyse in respect of the state and co-operatives during the colonial and post-colonial periods. Especially we were able to obtain vital statistics on agricultural production, the history of participation by peasants and merchants in state-regulated co-operatives and generally the relationship between politics and co-operatives.

1.9 Limitation of the Study

This study was carried out in only two villages in Lango, Apac district. For that matter we find that the biggest limitation of the study is constituted by its lack of a basis for comparison with both other rural areas of Lango - particularly in the far east of the region where cattle herding is extensively practiced and in the Lake Kyoga region where many households engage in fishing - and Uganda as whole. This obviously renders generalization from our findings difficult. Nonetheless, the crucial point for us here is that this study is basically exploratory theoretically and empirically and, therefore, does not aim to prove or measure any given specific hypothesis.

1.10 Format of Presentation:

The basic material for this study is presented as follows: Part one is concerned with the introductory aspects of the study. It provides the theoretical context of the study and examines the basic theoretical propositions on the subject of capitalism in the agricultural sector of the underdeveloped economies. The discussion focuses mainly on the broad survey of the literature/debates on the incorporation of the "traditional" or pre-capitalist sector into the "modern" capitalist sector.

In Part two we examine the historical context in the development of the forms of peasant agricultural co-operative organizations from the pre-colonial to the colonial periods together with the impact of each era on them. Part three deals with the question of the post-colonial state and peasant agricultural co-operatives. It deals specifically with the question of social differentiation of the peasantry and forms of labour, popular participation and democratic control, the relevance, limitations and potentials of peasant co-operatives and the issue of peasant struggles. Part four is the conclusion. It is made up of the general summary of the thesis, the major findings of the study and offers some general recommendations.

FOOTNOTES

1. 'Wang Tic' literally defined is "the **Eye of Work**" but really a demarcated area within the boundaries of which co-operation in labour could take place among peasant households. It was a form of reciprocal communal labour by which peasant households helped one another in agricultural production. The beneficiary of *Wang tic* provided millet brew. *Wang tic* is pronounced "wang-tich"
2. Koda, et al. (1987), *Women Initiatives in Tanzania: A Technical Co-operation Report*, Geneva: ILO.
3. Mamdani, M. (1984), "Forms of Labour and Accumulation of Capital: Analysis of a Village in Lango, Northern Uganda," *MAWAZO*, 5(4):44-65.
4. Kotheri, C.R. (1992), *Research Methodology: Methods and Techniques*, New Delhi, Wiley Eastern Ltd., pp. 117-145.
5. For theories of social formation see, for example, works by Mamdani, M. (1976), *Politics and Class Formation in Uganda*, London: Heinmann; Rodney, W. (1972), *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, Dar es Salaam and most recently Mpangala, G.P. (1992), *Major Issues in Tanzania Economic History: Pre-colonial Economy and Social Formations*, Dar es Salaam University Press.
6. See for example Wamba-dia-Wamba (1981), "Concerning Henry Slater's Paper, 'Africa and the Production of Historical Knowledge,': Further consideration on the Issue of History in Africa," (memoir), University of Dar es Salaam.
7. Our original plan here was to judgementally select non-cotton and cotton producing areas for this study if only for comparative purposes. However, in consultation with the officials (and the records) at the district Agricultural and Co-operative departments in Apach and Lira officers and the Lango co-operative union officials at Odokomit during our reconnaissance survey prior to sampling, it became clear to us that there is not a single area or village in Lango where cotton is not cultivated.

CHAPTER TWO
THEORETICAL CONTEXT

2.1 Introduction

For many years the promotion of peasant co-operative institutions in the developing countries has generally been influenced and shaped by the modernization/developmentalist dichotomy between "traditional" and "modern" forms of co-operation. Academic studies have been victims of this dichotomy and for long remained structured along it.¹ These see peasant co-operatives as based on the ratio-legal character of the co-operative organization i.e. membership being an outcome of a criteria and values formalised and legalised. This organizational mode is usually contrasted with one believed to prevail in Africa in which membership is determined by customs, absence of ratio-legal management procedures, and with organizational objectives and functions which are diffusely defined.²

But this dichotomization between "modern" and "traditional" is both theoretically and analytically inadequate in any explanation of the different forms of peasant co-operative institutions in African societies. The tendency to structure analysis of peasant co-operative institutions in this manner has led to an exclusive emphasis on the state-regulated forms of peasant co-operatives at the expense of other forms.³ In

addition, because nearly all current studies on co-operatives in Uganda are based mainly on official government and union records and reports, they fail to capture those other forms of peasant co-operation lying outside the state-regulated co-operative framework. This constitutes a methodological limitation. The limitation derives from the methodological and theoretical problems inherent in the modernization approach which most of these studies deploy in their analysis of co-operative institutions.

2.2 The Modernization Approach

Fundamental to theories of modernization is a perceived dichotomy between two parallel, qualitatively unequal sets of values, and a notion of social evolution. Here, traditional value systems are viewed as the opposite of modern value systems.⁴ On the one hand, the industrialized countries are seen as having attained the status of modernity after a long transition to contractual, individualistic, achievement oriented, economizing and scientific-rational values. The non-industrialized world, on the other hand, is said to be dominated by values lumped together as traditional: predominance of kinship relations, communal loyalty, ascriptive status and maximizing economic behaviour where social ends take precedence over accumulation.⁵ The theory

assumes that the alleged attributes of traditional societies "are both an expression and a cause of underdevelopment"⁶ and view their persistence as a serious obstacle to development. The prescription contained in these arguments is for non-industrial societies to abandon their traditional values in order to develop. Development, thus, equals Westernization a strikingly ethnocentric perspective.

Modernization as a concept also carries with it an evolutionary connotation, since it assumes that all societies necessarily pass through a determined number of stages "from a state of relatively indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a state of relatively definite, coherent heterogeneity".⁷ A common starting point is assumed for all societies, and western societies are regarded to have passed through the traditional stage which the underdeveloped societies are yet to overcome.⁸

According to the modernization theorists even after the underdeveloped economies have been absorbed into the capitalist relations, they must still pass through a period of "dualism," characterized by parallel sectors which are not yet integrated, and characterized by different operations. The dual sector, it is argued, varies between rural/urban, agricultural/industrial or traditional/modern. This dual structure is seen by Rostow as inhibiting saving by elites, who are subject to a

"demonstration effect," and only a "big push" by all sectors can bring about a fundamental change.⁹ This big push is to be achieved through a combination of capital accumulation and western technology, which in Africa means export trade and capital importation. Thus, neo-colonial states have to specialize in primary commodity production for export. Given the unquestioned *laissez-faire* basis of this model, the neo-colonial state is assigned the role of mobilizing savings, giving directions for investments, negotiating loans and guiding expenditures, all on behalf of the inexperienced natives. A comparatively recent reassertion of modernization ideas is the "Berg Report" of the I.B.R.D, which sees Africa's economic crisis as due mainly to internal constraints with external factors held to be marginal.¹⁰

But modernization as a theory of development has had extremely limited success in explaining the economic problems of Africa, and even less at prescribing solutions. The crux of the matter is empirical: First both the conceptual validity and selectivity of terms employed by the school are disputable. Characterization in terms of "traditional" and "modernity" are superficial; and the assumption of a dichotomy between them as mutually exclusive possibilities is wrong. For the interaction between capital and pre-capitalism gives rise to new social relations in the countryside which,

despite their appearance as pre-capitalist patriarchal relations, are in fact very much part and parcel of the process of capital accumulation. And so to treat them exclusively as pre-capitalist is to mistake form for content. On this score we find Hyden's *Uncaptured Peasantry* (1980) and *No shortcuts to Progress* (1983) interesting.¹¹ Hyden argues that in much of Sub-saharan Africa there exist a distinct peasant mode of production and that the peasantry remains "uncaptured" by the market and the state. He persists that development can only take place if the autonomy of the peasants is removed by coercion. This leads him to argue that democratic participation in the co-operatives will only be possible in Africa after a change in the "mode" of production and consequently in the "mentality" of the people has taken place. In other words, after the supposedly "economy of affection" has been replaced by capitalist economic social relations. Hyden falsely assumes here that a mentality developed through a capitalist discipline of labour is necessary for co-operation and democratic participation to take place.

Obviously it is clear that "inappropriate attitudes" or "non-capitalist values" are no explanations for underdevelopment. To be sure, every society, be it in Africa, North America or Europe, has its own share of inappropriate attitudes as far as development is

concerned. The paradox which has yet to be explained however, is why such values should block development in some societies while not in others. After nearly a century of experiments with capitalist development theory, which is what modernization is all about, underdevelopment and poverty in Africa has not decreased. This fact requires that, on the whole, modernization theory be rejected as an explanation of Africa's post-colonial development experience.

The evident failure of the modernization theory ushered in the dependency discourse. But perhaps before we deal with the dependency discourse let us briefly turn to the contribution of the classical Marxists on the debate on the relationship between pre-capitalism and capitalism.

2.3 Marxist Theories:

2.3.1 Classical Marxist Theories

Marx and many of his influential followers such as K. Kautsky and V.I. Lenin had the tendency to forecast the imminent eradication of those forms or relations of production that were alien to the logic of production founded on capital and wage-labour.¹² That is, they expected the peasantry to be eradicated by expanding capitalism. According to them a process of social differentiation was expected to split the peasantry into

a class of capitalist farmers and rural proletariat - Lenin and Mao Ze Dong particularly emphasize class differentiation of the peasantry and its dynamics.¹³ It would seem that the perception of the peasantry by the orthodox Marxist was premised on the "orthodoxies of evolutionary stage theory"¹⁴ or conceptualization of modes of production which presupposes that all societies in the world have to pass through a five mode of production namely, from primitive communalism, through slave mode, feudal mode, capitalist mode to the most advanced stage of socialism.

Historical evidence, however, has proved that such a unidirectional process has not occurred;¹⁵ Not even in case of Russia or China. This has subjected classical Marxist theories to criticism which basically points out that although the peasantry was not an integral part of capitalism, it has nevertheless been able to resist direct capitalism's penetration, and essentially because of their characteristic of self-exploitation. In a much similar way as classical Marxists, the *dependentistas* have insisted upon the historically determining role of capitalism as the main path of the 'modern wheel of history.' This led scholars such as G. Frank, Wallerstein and many others to a broad reformulation of the Marxian discourse, or to a redefinition of under-development, from being a direct effect of the economic backwardness

of poorer countries to being an immediate consequence of capitalist growth.¹⁶

2.3.2 The Dependency Approach

Theories that have arisen in antithesis to the modernization theory such as the dependency theory which explain development in terms of the development of the capitalist system on an integrated world scale¹⁷ also suffer from inadequacies. Hopkins succinctly put it that:

"Whereas modernization attributed economic backwardness to internal constraints of 'traditional' societies and presumed that external contacts would be instrumental in removing them, the dependency thesis argues that it is the external links which have created economic backwardness by forging chains of dependency and inequality between the privileged core and an unexploited periphery".¹⁸

This formulations points out that what had been regarded as a constant in the modernization theory, namely the external context of the society in question, is taken as the crucial explanatory variable in the dependency approach. This argument runs throughout all the various stands of the dependency school that have specifically studied Africa.¹⁹ Yet it is this focal assumption which, constitutes dependency school's major draw-back, since while the external factor is obviously crucial, it is by no means the only important variable.

Dependency theory takes national development as

involving such elements as: the autonomous accumulation of national capital, the complete elimination of pre-capitalist modes of production and the freeing of labour from the means of production. Implicit in this is the idea that there exist one path along which productive forces will become developed: this is for the pre-capitalist modes either to be destroyed completely or entirely transformed; for national capital to be freed from its dependence on metropolitan capital, and the national bourgeoisie from its allegiance to the imperialist bourgeoisie.²⁰ This view, thus obscures the forms or character and function of the state. It artificially restricts the existence of relationships which reach beyond the national framework to relations among national states. Thus, giving an impression that within each 'nation society' capitalism will develop along the same lines as previously within some of the core states.

However, in seeking an explanation of the differences in development between core states and periphery states, we should certainly consider the relative strength or weakness of their capitalist classes. And the relative power of the capitalist class should in turn be studied in terms of the existing class structure and the conflicts inherent within each, that is, as the outcome of the continuing class struggle.

Since, therefore, the main internal dynamics is located at the level of class structure and class conflict, our analysis should then proceed in terms of forms of production or co-operation, or rather of the social relations within a given specific articulation of a number of co-existent forms of (peasant) cooperation/production, within which a definite class structure is defined, specifically focusing on the articulation of capitalism or capitalist forms of co-operation with non-capitalist forms of co-operation.

2.4 Class Analysis in the Context of Articulation and the Theory of the Neo-Colonial State

2.4.1 The Process of Articulation and Class Analysis

It is a well recited fact that capital confronts pre-capitalist institutions and bends them to suit the requirements of capital accumulation, thereby formally subsuming labour under capital, and at that without altering the institution's internal formal relations. Hence, today after a century after formal colonialism began we still find in Africa rural communities where activities are still organized within "traditional" or pre-capitalist forms of arrangements. Evidently, there is need to inquire why and how these pre-capitalist forms of peasant Co-operatives still persist in the face of capital dominated relations, with its labour activities

subordinated to the demands of capital accumulation.

Rey has argued that once the domestic communities have been integrated into the capitalist system, capitalism will ultimately transform all pre-capitalist modes of production (co-operation) completely.²¹ This argument seem to us to come dangerously very close to the central thesis of the modernization thesis which assumes that the failure for development to take place lies with the pre-capitalist society itself. Infact both Wallerstein and Wolpe have argued that it may precisely be capitalism rather than the pre-capitalist mode of production that is obstructing a radical transformation of the pre-capitalist production relations.²² Their argument is that under certain circumstance and/or during a specific period, it may very well be in the interest of capitalism to preserve (articulate) rather than destroy completely the pre-capitalist mode of production or social relations. Hence their conclusion that it was also in the interest of capital to preserve the pre-capitalist peasant institutions.

One of the explanations for the tendency of capitalism to articulate and not destroy the pre-capitalist forms of peasant co-operative institutions is that the traditional institutions found in many pre-colonial African societies proved to be extremely resistant to external influence. Consequently, the

capitalist mode of production/co-operation was unable to penetrate fully to the core of the old order and establish its hegemony except in certain white settler enclaves and a few modern "growth-poles."²³

As an analytical tool, the "theory of the articulation of modes of production has been useful in as far as it emphasizes the continuing existence and importance of the (partially transformed) pre-capitalist modes of production within the under-developed social formations, and the necessity of studying the development of class and power structures in relation to the various modes of production (and their articulation). Both emphasis presuppose a historical perspective²⁴ or their complex articulation and interaction in the context of capitalism's own historical development.

Taken a step further and integrated with the theory of class analysis or the theory of social formations,²⁵ the contribution of the "articulationist" school is an important one since it permits us to go beyond the treatment of non-capitalist modes of production as passive 'horizons' of capitalism, that is, as historically given 'environments' that simply furnish some of the elements needed for the growth of capital accumulation, such as raw materials, labour and markets. The theory of social formations in particular attempts to relate systematically the intense neo-colonial states'

exploitation of the domestic communities to the "class character" of the neo-colonial state, thereby providing us with useful insights in the analysis of social formations.²⁶

2.4.2 The "Theory of the Neo-Colonial State"

The main thesis of the "theory of the neo-colonial state" is that the post-colonial state has been taken over by a class without any economic power base in society, namely, the petty bourgeoisie (specifically the dominant faction of the petty bourgeoisie). They argue that, lacking any economic base in society, the ruling class in order to reproduce itself seeks to accumulate either through the promotion of state or private property or through the exploitation of labour and the extraction of surplus from the pre-capitalist forms of production. To them this constitutes the reason why the neo-colonial state has generally been disinterested in the total transformation of the pre-capitalist mode of production, but is, on the contrary, profiting from its continued existence.

However, up to now the "theory of the neo-colonial state" has failed to take into consideration the continuing existence and perhaps the significance of the (partially transformed) pre-capitalist mode of production, and to study class and power structures

within the under-developed social formations in African societies in relation to the various modes of production (and their articulation). Instead it has tended to study the class of petty bourgeoisie in isolation from other classes and social forces in society whose formations must have definitely also resulted from the historical processes of the articulation of modes of production.

It is, therefore, our central thesis in this study that both the "theory of the articulation of modes of production" and "the theory of the neo-colonial state" should go along way in explaining why and how the colonial and post-colonial state suppressed independent farmers' organizations, and specifically the co-operatives, and in the main succeeded in ousting the class of capitalist farmer-traders (*Kulaks*) from cotton trade, thus blocking their sources of accumulation. And secondly, how the partial preservation of the pre-capitalist forms of peasant co-operation and production/reproduction has guaranteed a continuing supply of cheap commodities to the state while at the same time making the producers withdraw from production of commodity crops for the capitalist market and revert to food production. We shall particularly have recourse to the historical materialist framework within which we shall locate and integrate class analysis in the context of the articulation of forms of co-operation/production

and the theory of the neo-colonial state in our analysis. The critical theoretical concepts in the study include 'relations of production,' 'forms of cooperation in production' and 'means of production', which are theoretical constructs as well as real categories. The central concept for our analysis is the 'form of cooperation', conceived through a double specification of the unit of cooperation in production and the social formation.

The unit is the 'cell' or locus of petty production while the social formation provides the context for reproduction of units of production and in combination with the internal structure of the unit, determines its conditions of reproduction, decomposition or change. The concept Mode of Production (MOP) is an articulated combination of relations and forces of production²⁷ structured by the dominance of the relations of production. In a sense, then, it means that under any given level of social formation there is one or more than one MOP. Where more than one MOP is existent, then one of them is a dominant mode articulating on the subordinate modes. Depending on the levels of existence in the given social formation, the MOP i.e the economic base of the society will determine the nature and the character of the superstructure (the political and ideological structural levels), while the superstructure in turn

providing the conditions of the existence of that MOP. This means, as we observed already, that the concept of a MOP is the concept of a determinate articulated combination of relations and forces of production. And by extension it also means, therefore, that there can be no definition of a social formation (of relations and forces of production) independently of the MOP in which they are combined.

On the basis of the above theoretical considerations we now briefly provide below our application of these theories to the studying of the complex social relations (social formation) during the various levels/stages in the development of Lango society, constituted by the articulated combination of both capitalist and non-capitalist forms of production (co-operation). This articulation is a complex, conflict ridden process characterised by the dialectic of subjugation and preservation of pre-capitalist forms of peasant co-operatives or production due to the 'weakly' penetrating capital. By placing our analysis of the peasant co-operatives in Lango within the articulation of MOP problematique we should be enabled to grasp the processes by which the capitalist MOP penetrated the agrarian sector in Lango leading to the subjugation of the pre-capitalist modes of production, but preserving the forms (the household, the co-operative units of production or

the so-called 'subsistence sector').

Understandably, therefore, because a 'form of production' can be articulated with the complexes of relations and processes which constitute another form of production, and, because a 'mode of production' is merely a description and a classification of those 'forms of production', a 'form of production' cannot, therefore, be articulated with 'a mode of production'. For to think otherwise, would mean that the term 'mode of production' becomes a real category which *ipso facto*, ought to be dismissed, as a fallacy of misplaced concreteness.

2.4.3 Theoretical Tools for Analyzing Forms of Peasant co-operatives

The spread of capitalism to other parts of the world other than those social formations where it originally developed, has usually taken the form of developing new social formations dominated by capitalist relations, but where the capitalist MOP is articulated with pre-capitalist modes to a higher degree than in its countries of origin. This is attributed to the fact that it did not grow out of internal contradictions within the existing pre-capitalist MOP, but was imposed through capital penetration from outside. In Uganda, as in the

rest of Africa, the initial break in the self-sufficiency of pre-capitalist MOP was achieved in two ways: either peacefully through the activities of merchant capital or through the colonial state using extra-economic coercion in the form of taxes, forced labour, or the compulsory production of cash crops. Specifically in the case of Lango, through the penetration and dissolution by the capitalist MOP of pre-capitalist social formation, the communal MOP in Lango was transformed into the form of petty commodity production. Through a variety of colonial economic, political and administrative methods the peasants have been forced to obtain items of necessary consumption in the market, resulting also in the atomization of the household as an economic unit and in the destruction of the original function that the earlier communal forms of surplus absorption may have had.

Within this context we find that *Wang tic* is a distinct form of peasant co-operation/production found in Lango which is in articulation with forms of cooperation or production in a different MOP - the capitalist mode. The contradictions emerging out of this articulation are not objectively only class contradictions because of the persistence of non-capitalist relations and form of production. It gives forth a complex structure of class and non-class (or pre-capitalist) relations, with the latter not only being fettered by the former but is

dependent and complementary to it. Hence, *Wang tic* is both subordinated and yet preserved by capital penetration leading to the partial and uneven changes in some of its elements. This is so because while pre-capitalist MOP may seemingly appear to continue to survive, they have been subordinated to capital through a process of preservation/subjugation whereby they are articulated in their diverse relations with capital, particularly through (unequal) exchange relations. As such they remain outside the extended reproduction of the capitalist MOP, but are forced to contribute to it through a kind of primitive accumulation process.

Our point of argument in this analysis then is that although pre-capitalist forms of peasant co-operation/production is maintained, in reality the peasant sells and is compelled to sell his labour power to, and produce surplus value for capital. And if we accept that in essence the income the peasant gets from the sales of commodities is in fact "a wage in disguise" then it means that the pre-capitalist MOP is "emptied of its content." But in accepting this position we necessarily have to accept also that the actual labour process takes place in a petty-commodity form in which the appropriation of surplus value takes the form of unequal exchange.

In short, the petty-commodity producers in Lango have been subordinated to capital through the market both in regard to their backward and forward linkages, and also by the dominant objective of production becoming directed towards the cycle of capital accumulation and the domination of the labour process by the non-producers. This commoditization of petty - commodity producers succeeds only to the extent that non-commodity relations or reciprocal ties have been largely undermined. This partial subordination has not only depended on the existence of specifically new material base, but has also been wielded by those classes supportive of the penetration of capital. For the process of the articulation of MOP necessarily leads to a complicated process of class formation as we shall demonstrate. The classes so formed are weak in a sense since they do emerge out of a dominant contradiction. Above all the political and ideological relations that emerge are also limited by the continued reproduction of non-capitalist relations and forms of production.

More importantly, in all these processes entailed in the subjugation/preservation dialectic of articulation, the state has continually assumed a central role in managing the struggles between classes and agents of different forms of production. But, since the state itself is a result of these contradictions, it remains

locked in the very struggles it sets out to neutralize, thereby turning into an arena for accumulation by a minority and a target of political action for the majority. In sum, from the contradictions between capital's interest in keeping peasant producer prices as low as possible while at the same time trying to keep the goose that lays the golden eggs alive, stems the peculiar role of the state and merchant capital in that social formation which is the result of the processes entailed in the subjugation-preservation dialectic of articulation. For that matter we witness in the countryside the intensified combined function of the state and capital to draw the peasants into the capitalist market and keep them there by using a blend of economic and compulsory measures. The end result of which is the state's and merchant capital's free-hand in surplus appropriation from the peasants - the size of surplus appropriate being determined by market prices and the degree of monopolistic tendencies. For the peasants, being confronted by the barrage of mechanisms of exploitation, they individualistically try to escape into either petty commodity production with internal market, or into the sphere of the so-called "informal sector."

FOOTNOTES

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6. *Ibid.*
7. Roxbrough, I. (1979), *Theories of Underdevelopment*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, p. 14.
8. *Ibid.*, See also, Apter, D. (1965), *The Politics of Modernization*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Huntington, S.P. (1968), *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Harven: Yale University Press; Rostow, D.A. (1960), *A World of Nations: Problems of Political Modernization*, Washington D.C., Brooking Institute.

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PART TWO

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

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CHAPTER THREE

INTRODUCTION

We have already outlined in the introduction the problem of this study namely, the investigation of how the nature and character of capitalism that penetrated the Lango economy, and the underdeveloped character of the colonial economy, did contribute to the persistence of pre-capitalist forms of production/ reproduction, and the process and mechanism of the preservation of non-state regulated forms of peasant co-operative organizations within the context of the development of the state regulated ones.

In the preceding chapter we have provided an elaboration of the theoretical perspective that has guided the collection, interpretation and presentation of data for the study. In that framework, we have provided a broad review of the debates on capitalist penetration of the "traditional" sector and how it impacts on the development process in underdeveloped societies. The thrust of the theoretical debates reviewed points to the fact that whereas capitalism in the developed countries such as Britain developed as a result of the internal contradictions within its socio-economic formations, in Uganda capitalism was super-imposed via British colonization which then gave it a dependent character. Hence our adoption of an analysis which looks at the process of articulation of forms of peasant co-operative

organizations, their class content and their relation with the colonial and neo-colonial states. This approach demands us first to place the two villages studied in their broader historical and social context. And to achieve this our focus shall be on two features: the form of integration into the colonial economy and the process of capital penetration on production relations.

In part two, therefore, we discuss the situation during the pre-colonial and colonial periods. Chapter four provides a general picture of the nature of pre-colonial economic and political organization in Lango. It proceeds to examine the forms of pre-colonial peasant co-operatives during the period. It is argued in this chapter that the pre-colonial mode of production was pre-capitalist and was not dependent on foreign capital and technology. For this reason the pre-colonial production system and its social relations had devised certain ways of dealing with the problems of an underdeveloped productive forces namely, through a specific form of agricultural labour co-operative organization.

We proceed in chapter five to examine some of the aspects of the penetration of capitalism in Lango during British colonialism. It is argued that British colonialism altered the relations of production without completely revolutionizing the forces or means of production. Neither did it transform fundamentally those

modes of peasant cooperative organizations it found on the ground. The Colonial agrarian policy with its emphasis on cash (cotton) crop production for British industrial capital, generated a process of dependence on the part of the peasant farmer on the world capitalist market. In addition colonialism also destroyed the traditional measures developed by the pre-colonial productive system to combat food shortages. Above all colonial capitalism started the process of social differentiation which characterised all commercial agriculture.

CHAPTER FOUR
PRE-COLONIAL SITUATION

**4.1 Pre-colonial Economic and Socio-Political
Organization**

4.1.1 Systems of Production

The climate of Lango, Northern Uganda, is such that annual rainfall is lower than in the South of Uganda, and the dry season a little longer. As a result the vegetation is more characteristic of well-drained Savannah: shorter and more scattered trees, thinner soils and higher grass cover. The natural vegetation of the region is deciduous woodland.¹ Right from pre-colonial days the economy of Lango has been very much dependent on these geographical factors. Lango at the time conformed to the pattern of seed agriculture so prevalent in Northern Uganda as a whole. Prior to contact with British imperialism, Lango agriculture, based on communal tenure, was basically a subsistence economy, producing finger millet, sorghum, simsim, pigeon peas and sweet potatoes.

There are effectively two seasons, and rainfall comes to a single peak, instead of two. The Langi recognized this by dividing the year into one dry season (*oro*) - December to March, and one rainy season (*cwir*) - April to November. The agricultural year begins at the end of the dry season, with the clearing and digging of the ground in preparation for sowing at the start of the

rains. There might be a second sowing in June/July for the second crop season which is shorter. Harvesting could begin as early as June and continue to November. By the time the dry season begins in December no crops could be expected for six months. It is, therefore, essential to cultivate the largest possible area, and to store the surplus in granaries; millet is well suited for this, since after careful preparation it can be kept for up to three or more years.²

In pre-colonial times hunting could be organized at any time - for example to protect crops - but it was mainly concentrated in the dry season. Those Langi who lived on the shore of Lake Kyoga or along the principal rivers supplemented hunting with fishing. At the village level, the work-group (*Wang tic*) provided co-operative labour for clearing fallow ground, ploughing and weeding on a reciprocal basis among its 20 to 40 members. The *Wang tic* elected a leader to oversee the work and subsequent millet brew (beer) provided at the end of work by the one whose plot is worked on, and to negotiate alliances with other *wang tic* co-operative labour groups for larger projects. The person in charge of rotational communal cattle-herding was not elected but was the owner of the kraal (*won awii dyang*). Regulation of hunting was the task of hereditary guardians of hunting areas (*won arum*).

Besides cultivation and hunting, there was in the early 19th century Lango one other means of subsistence - animal husbandry.³ Goats, Sheep and poultry were kept. But more important were cattle.⁴ Until the rinderpest epidemic⁵ of the 1890s, the short-horned Zebu was kept in large numbers nearly everywhere in Lango. Cattle were crucial in a wide range of economic and social contexts. They were the principal form of wealth and unit of accounts, and the preferred form of payment for both bridewealth and compensation for offences.⁶ Thus, throughout the 19th century the pattern of Lango subsistence was made up of crops, livestock and game, and the balance between them did not shift until the great rinderpest epidemic of the 1890s.

The technology with which these resources were exploited was based on iron, and this too hardly changed. Iron spearheads (for hunting game) and iron knives. Iron hoes were also used, though it was not until the beginning of the colonial period that they began to supersede the traditional wooden digging-sticks in some parts of Lango.

Inter-tribal trade was also noticeable. Trade was minimal and affected only surplus. As in much of Sub-Saharan Africa, the most important article of indigenous trade in pre-colonial Uganda were iron and mineral-salt, natural deposits of which were relatively rare. And so

during the 19th century there was a brisk trade in salt⁷ and iron throughout the interlacustrine region and beyond. The Langi imported metal works from their neighbours - the *Labwor* in the east and the *Banyoro* in the west. Bracelets and wire were imported for use as bodily ornaments, and also hoes, which were turned into spear-heads as well as put to agricultural use. The main commodities exchanged for salt and ironware were foodstuffs - primarily millet and simsim. Goats and poultry were also bartered. Both the *Labwor* and the *Banyoro* regarded Lango as an important source of food to supplement inadequate supplies at home; such shortages were very common in *Bunyoro*,⁸ though more irregular in *Labwor*. By the beginning of the 20th century imported hoes had begun to replace wooden-digging sticks, especially in those parts within easy reach of the Nile and Lake Kyoga, and grain crops were still Lango's main exports. This suggests that the Langi produced considerable surpluses of food. This impression is strengthened by the reliance which the protectorate government was able to place on food exports from Lango during the years 1913 - 14, when there were severe shortages in Busoga and Northern Buganda.⁹

Lango traditions are almost unanimous that the traders did not travel at random, but stayed at the homes of well-known leaders for protection. Such a home could

be used either as a base for touring the immediate vicinity, or as a market place from which salt and ironware were redistributed in small quantities by individual Langi.¹⁰ No doubt a clan leader's prestige was increased if he played host to foreign traders but there is no evidence that he controlled either the product of agricultural surpluses or the distribution of the trade goods. Trade with non-Langi involved the humblest cultivators and was in no sense a source of political patronage. In short, neither local trade nor the importing of exotic goods affected the standing or powers of clan leadership. That is, there was no question of control over or appropriation of the trade assets eg. in terms of tax, which could have constituted a political resource for the clan leaders. This was possible only because at the time Lango was basically a classless-based social formation.

4.1.2 Land Tenure¹¹

In pre-colonial Lango, the lineage elders controlled the land inhabited by and cultivated by their ancestors. But their control was only in a formal way; in reality the local community and households owned and controlled land and the various aspects of its use. Membership of a lineage entitled a family, or more specifically the head of the household to usufructuary rights to lineage land.

Land that was not being cultivated could be allocated by the lineage elder(s) to another family. Lineage land that was not needed by lineage members could be granted to non-lineage persons following their admittance by clan elders.

Land was obtained in two main ways: It was cleared from the bush or inherited: clearing was naturally the main method in those many grain areas of Eastern and Northern Uganda where shifting or recurrent cultivation was practiced and population was low. Members of the community could usually clear land without restrictions. That is, access to land that was unsettled or uncultivated remained open to all the members of the community. However, strangers had to obtain permission from a local or village leader (*Adwong Wang-tic*) or clan leader (*Adwong Atekere*). In inheritance, the guiding principal was that land should remain within the lineage or within whatever decent group was operative in this respect. The man who cleared a new piece of land could himself decide how to transfer it. However, if he passed it as inheritance to his children, which must have been the common procedure, it became lineage land and subject to restrictions in transfer. In pre-colonial Lango, it is thus misleading to speak of land ownership in the sense of exclusive rights, individual or corporate, which made land a commodity to be treated at the will of the owner.

Rather, the community owned the land, and control and access to land was regulated by a complicated series of retreating and multiple revisionary rights from the final user through the descent group up to the leader of the community. Women, were never allocated land either as members of their original descent groups or of those of their husbands.

Today the family head may allocate part of the family land to individual members of the family. As a rule land is allocated only to men and divorcees may be given a portion of land (donated land) on which they can cultivate on their own. Married women usually cultivate their husband's land. Now, female usufructuary rights are not heritable, but are dissolved in the case of death or divorce.

Though lineage land and family land was, in the pre-colonial times, controlled by the lineage head and the family head respectively, the clan members as a whole, more particularly the clan elders, had the overall control over the land of any one of their members. The clan always had to be consulted before lineage or family land was allocated to non-clan members. However, a member of a family who wished to establish his new compound needed not obtain permission from the clan elders. If any conflict about lineage or family land arose and could not be settled within the lineage or family, then the *Adwong*

Wang-tic together with *Adwong-Atekere* would call the clan elders to make a final decision binding on both interested parties.

There were uncultivated and unoccupied or unsettled land - rivers, forests, roads, swamps, grazing areas (*bar dok*) etc. These were all regarded as communal (common) land. Community members had unrestricted access to the use of resources on such land. The *Adwong Wang-tic* could allocate pieces of those unoccupied lands to anyone - either a community member or a stranger - to sustain himself and his dependents. This was especially true of land which was unoccupied and never in use by members of the community. In case of forested land the allocation was done on its fringes, since wild animals made settlement in the interior of the forested land impossible. Land allocated in this way was never paid for. In pre-colonial Lango land was never sold. Not because it was abundant and had not acquired any commercial value as yet, but rather because land was held to belong to the ancestors and had, therefore, to be passed intact onto the next and next generations.¹²

In regard to land use, block-farming was common practice. This was especially feasible as fields were further from homesteads (usually concentrated human settlement) and so block farming provided the only way to deal with plant eating wild animals eg. monkeys, that

could destroy crops. Labour was organized along *Wang Tic* communal co-operative.

One feature of the pre-colonial Lango land tenure system which ought to be mentioned so as complete the picture had to do with hunting-grounds. In pre-colonial times there existed in Lango hunting-bush or minors (*tim* or *arum*) the hunting rights over which were owned individually. The owner whose position was heritable, was known as "*won tim*" ie "owner of the bush" (*tim*) or "*won arum*". We were not able to ascertain, during our field research, the exact rules and pattern of inheritance governing *tim*, but clearly the office of the *won-tim* was independent of that of the *adwong atekere* or that of *adwong wang-tic*. However, no land was reserved entirely for hunting since no one could be prevented by the *won-tim* from either settling or cultivating a parcel of the *tim* as they wished or as the clan system allowed. The right to the use of the natural resources on such land was general and uncontrolled within the limits of the village and the neighbouring villages.

In sum, the picture of the pre-colonial Lango land tenure system indicate that control of land seem to have been a mixture of clan ownership with village (*wang-tic*) and family controls; with each level of ownership providing absolute rights for the male individual's unrestricted access to the use of land and a well

systematised and institutionalised methods of land allocation, access, use, inheritance, and land conflict resolution. Meanwhile, the only aspect of the tenure which could be said to be "individual" remained the idea of "*tim.*"

4.1.3 Socio-Political Organization

In considering the social and political structure/organization of the nineteenth-century Lango it is recognized that the role of the clan (*atekere*) leadership was paramount. The Lango socio-political system during the pre-colonial era can best be described as egalitarian. There was no aristocratic-commoner distinction among clans in Lango. Combining hereditary and democratic succession, clan members elected their clan-head (*adwong atekere*) from the sons of the deceased leader. In the absence of a centralized political institution the village and clan were the two most important groups for the individual. The village of up to a hundred households being primarily an economic and defense unit; and the clan, while considerably larger than the village, still relatively a small group.

In qualitative terms, clan leadership was given little or no symbolic expression and it carried with it no control over economic resources, whether produced by

the clan itself or brought-in from outside through trade and warfare. Control over land and responsibility for communal rituals which in other African societies have often been the foundation of chiefly power, were in Lango both exercised by broadly-recruited clan elders, rather than individuals. The clan leaders' role was limited to command in battle and the settlement of disputes. Gertzel points out that the Lango pre-colonial socio-political system was characterised by two features: "its small scale and the importance of individual leadership."¹³ Land was communally owned by the clan, which also regulated inheritance of cattle and personal property. Clans or clan groupings were dispersed and it is even doubtful whether clan institution was politically important in the pre-colonial period. More significant were the ritual groupings (*etogo*) which linked different clans together for ritual and social purpose, and which appear to have been territorial.

However, by the beginning of the twentieth century, it is clear that there was a process towards social differentiation and class formation. For example Tosh records that in 1902, Odongo Aja, the clan leader (*rwot*) in Kamdini attacked the clans in Ibuje, and those in Iceme, subduing the clan leaders there, plundering the village and looting a sizeable proportion of cattle booty and human captives. At his own village in Kamdini, Odongo

maintained about six warriors called *Ogwok rwot* ('rwots guards'), which was indeed a process towards the establishment of a standing army, and therefore, state formation. The guards guarded Odongo's compound and accompanied him on campaigns.¹⁴ It would seem, therefore, that the clans headed by Odongo Aja was in transition towards a state formation that is, in transition toward a class-based social formation just as British colonialism was stepping in.

The reason for the delay in state formation in Lango society prior to the twentieth century in spite of the rampant inter tribal and clan wars in Lango draws explanation from the facts that previously leadership was based on the clan institution or kinship which was not territorial. Such leadership was only symbolic, justified by nominal control over land, and success in war. Neither did the clan leaders have a standing army - an armed power standing above and separate from a disarmed people. The whole clan constituted the army only assemble at times of raid expeditions. This loose arrangement, therefore, denied the clan leaders any means of accumulation of wealth and made it difficult for them to subordinate the clan, kinship relations and ideology. All these made the realization of a centralized political system, characterised by the division of society into classes held in check by a state power, before the

beginning of the twentieth century difficult.

4.2 Forms of Pre-Colonial Peasant Co-operation and Communal Co-operatives

Thus, from birth through marriage until death, lineage and clan loomed large in the daily life of the individual Lango, but they did not serve all his requirements. As a sedentary farmer he was a member of other groups, which were defined territorially rather than on kinship principles. The composition of these groups depended in the first instance on the requirements of co-operative labour. A millet-based agriculture requires much more labour. Millet in particular requires heavy labour every year for clearing the ground, weeding, and harvesting. In Lango, therefore, both men and women were regularly employed in the fields.

The system of subsistence agriculture practiced in Lango - then as now - could only work satisfactorily if labour resources were pooled. Seed agriculture based on finger millet involves seasonal peak demands on labour for sowing, weeding, and harvesting. Moreover, the annual cycle of only two seasons means that there is great pressure to cultivate the largest possible area in order to supply food all the year round. As McMaster put it: "Northern Uganda faces the problem of concentrating agricultural activity to meet the requirements of the

convergence of the rainfall regime towards a single peak."¹⁵

The response of the Langi to these objective conditions was to arrange for the heavier tasks to be performed by work-group or communal co-operative labour teams which attended each member's plot in turn, thus ensuring that at crucial points in the year, labour resources were used to the best advantage. This co-operative principle did not extend to land tenure or consumption, but in the labour context it was, and still is, integral to Lango agricultural production system.¹⁶

At the most rudimentary level, co-operative labour teams comprising a handful of households carried out the less exacting parts of the farming routine such as weeding. These groups, were then called *alea* (turns). These were very informal and membership included both men and women of two to four households. The core of the system, however was the *Wang tic*.¹⁷ This comprised of a much larger number of households with a fixed membership and a territorial identity. The *Wang tic* was concerned with the heaviest agricultural tasks, above all with clearing the ground before sowing. The basis of the group was reciprocity of labour, but the man whose land was being worked was also expected to provide beer for his fellows at the end of the day. All married men and fully grown male youths took part as a matter of course,

failure to do so being tantamount to opting out of the community. The *Wang tic* organised not only labour but also land-use since land was of little value without access to labour which was conferred by membership of the *Wang tic* communal co-operative labour. The elders of the *Wang tic* were the people who approved the marking-out of new fields and allocated abandoned land. *Wang tic* had a leader called *Adwong Wang Tic*.

The size of the *Wang tic* communal co-operative labour is not easy to determine. Nowadays it varies from location to location from 60 to 120 households, 80 being regarded as the ideal number of active members.¹⁸ But these figures cannot be assumed to be valid for the 19th. Century since patterns of land use and population settlement have changed so much in the last 70 years. For the same reason; elders have difficulty in giving detailed description of the physical lay-out of settlements before colonial era. The figures we obtained during field work suggest that the *Wang tic* is larger today than it used to be. Driberg writing of the period 1912 - 1918 regarded 20 as the maximum number of participants,¹⁹ Jorgensen puts it between 20-40 participants.²⁰

Estimating the size of the *Wang Tic* membership would have been easier if it had been consistently reflected in residential patterns. But during pre-colonial Lango this

was by no means the case. The *Wang tic* was not the same as the village (*paco*). Sometimes the two did coincide exactly, but in fact the size and situation of the village were determined by factors other than labour. The village was by definition a concentration of households. Villages were sometimes built according to a linear or circular design, but it is unlikely that they had ever followed a set pattern. There is no doubt, though, that the Langi found it necessary to live in compact residential groups.²¹ This pattern of settlement had little to do with the communal co-operative labour system.

During the last 70 years the compact village has vanished from the landscape. Its components being dispersed as scattered households, and yet the communal co-operative labour system is as strong as ever. Provided the exact composition or membership of the co-operative labour team is recognized, there is after all no reason why its members should all live in one place rather than on their respective holdings. The reason for the village then was not economic so much as military. It was intended to provide security against attacks, especially at night, and greater protection for cattle which were kept in a single village kraal.

Oral accounts are explicit that some villages contained more than one *Wang tic*, while others had to combine in order to muster enough men for a *Wang tic*. All

individuals were members of both a *Wang tic* and village at the same time, and in some instances these two were identical; but in origin and function they were different, the first being an economic and the second a strategic arrangement. Once law and order had been established in Lango by the protectorate government, the village ceased to have any purpose, and the dispersed *Wang tic* became the basic unit of territorial organization.

4.2.1 Communal Co-operatives

In the grain areas communal work was resorted to mainly in such labour intensive stages of cultivation as clearing, weeding, harvesting and threshing as well as in some other non-agricultural activities. Much of the work was undertaken on the basis of reciprocity. Members of households worked successively on each others' fields, receiving local beer (millet brew) for compensation. This means that labouring was in gangs, each in his turn providing the rest with beer. Members would not work unless beer was to be provided at the end of work. This seems to have been practically universal. In any case all households then could afford to provide the beer. It would seem that prior to late pre-colonial days recruitment for communal labour was based on kinship or neighbourhood or in combination with each other. Work was

done together by all members of the co-operative, meaning all men and women of working age.

The reciprocity involved in *Wang tic* co-operative labour was in fact more complex than we have presented here. This is because, although at first glance it does appear that labour services were being exchanged for beer, what in fact was being exchanged here was labour for labour. This was in two senses: first living (manual) labour in one man's garden for the same in another man's garden; secondly living labour in agricultural production for labour embodied in beer. In the latter sense, the role of women became crucial. Brewing of beer is hard work, undertaken by women. They had to prepare great amounts of millet flour, fetch water to mix the flour with, prepare the mixture for fermentation, prepare the yeast, fry the mould and brew it in vessels. The obvious implication from this is that the greatest amounts of labour were (as today) allocated to those households which frequently brewed and offered the greatest amounts of beer. What this meant in practical terms is that the bigger the household labour was (in terms of wife's or wives' and daughters' labour for beer brewing) the more surplus that household was likely realise, all factors, especially weather, remaining constant. The head of such a household thus commanded a relatively bigger surplus which he might have used to enhance both his social

status among the wider community as well as his economic power. We shall examine this process a little bit more closely later, as it appears to have been at the centre in the process of social differentiation (due to accumulation) and thus leading to the rise of the divide between poor and 'better-of' households.

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FOOTNOTES

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CHAPTER FIVE
COLONIAL SITUATION

5.1 Capital Penetration and Colonial Agricultural Production:

In this chapter we shall mainly be examining the process and form of regional integration into the colonial economy and the wider world capitalist system. Particularly we deal here with how British colonialism impacted on the mode of agricultural production in general and the labour process in particular, and how the colonial economy affected forms of peasant organizations. We particularly pay attention to some of the structural developments during the period, pointing to the way in which the non-capitalist (non-state regulated) forms of peasant co-operative organization in agricultural production were affected by colonialism and capitalist penetration. We argue that the balance of social forces within Lango society during this period did determine to a large degree the particular forms that capital penetration took and especially how the penetration of mercantile capital produced contradictory developments within the society.

Colonial conquest was a necessary outcome of capitalism. Capitalism is inherently expansionary and the contradictions of capitalist accumulation will always tend to transport capitalism to economically backward

nations.¹ British industrial capitalism was already in crisis in the 1870s. Prices, profits and trade fell drastically due to depression. Unemployment increased and Britain faced intense competition and protectionism from the newly emerging European capitalist states such as France and Germany. To resolve these contradictions and ensure its further expanded reproduction British industrial capitalism began a new and aggressive search for untapped markets and sources of industrial raw materials. Fredrick Lugard in his address to an audience of the Royal Colonial Institute in 1895 underscored the mandate of European countries to find new markets in order for their survival:

*"Settlers driven to seek their fortunes in new colonies, by motives such as these do not embark for Africa with the primary objective of benefitting the natives, but themselves. In our case [Britain] the hostile tariff imposed by other nations upon our industries, the competition of foreign made goods, and the depression of trade, have driven us to seek new markets and new fields for our surplus energy"*²

Prior to the Great Depression, Britain and other European commercial interests had carved out their spheres of geographical influence through treaties of protection. The renewed competition between European capitalist powers necessitated the establishment of formal colonial control over peasant production in order to protect the market, extend cheap bulk transport and

consolidate profitable trading networks. In particular, the periodic irregularities in the supply of raw cotton from the United States of America plunged the British cotton textile industry into successive economic crisis. The prospect of turning Uganda into an alternative source of raw cotton made Lugards' demand for the establishment of British rule in Uganda even more urgent.

The first contact which Uganda had with the British colonial power was through the Imperial British East Africa Company (**IBEA**) which in 1887 were granted a royal charter by the British Government to administer or open East Africa to legitimate commerce to replace the allegedly widespread slave trade.³ The **IBEA's** attempt at private colonialism ended in bankruptcy. In 1894 its charter was revoked and British protectorate declared over Uganda.⁴ Once introduced, colonial rule marked both the unification and incorporation of Uganda into the World capitalist system.

The development of the colonial economy in Uganda had many dimensions. At one level it was a struggle over ownership and control of the means of production. At another level it signified a transformation in the economic, social and political structures, a shift in the orientation of the economy, and of changes in what was produced, how and for whom. It also marked changes in the forms of appropriation and in the social relations of

production. However, the capitalist development that took place in Uganda was partial and uneven. In so far as generalized commodity production and/or generalized wage labour were incompletely established, the co-ercive force of markets remained weak. Consequently pre-capitalist forms of production could not be fully destroyed. It must be emphasized that two processes of integration evolved during the colonial period and, in both cases, the agency of change was the colonial state; and both express the reality of imperialist domination over agriculture.

First and foremost is the divorce of domestic agriculture from domestic industry through the creation of an export-dependent agriculture and an import-dependent industry in the colonial period; and contraposed to this export oriented production in agriculture at the local level, there also evolved an industrial sector which, though producing for the local market, did so through an exclusive dependence on imported technology, raw materials, component parts, technical skills and finance.⁵ The pivot of this imperialist-dominated economy, because it was the real connecting link through which relations between industry and agriculture were mediated, was import-export trade. While its overall direction is export oriented, domestic agriculture reflects a variety of processes at the local level.⁶ Three different such processes, each representing

a different form of regional integration into the colonial economy can be discerned.

In the regions of the south, for example, the form of integration into the colonial economy took the form of cheap raw material production. In these regions, peasant households produced industrial raw materials like cotton or coffee or staples like banana or millet as exchange values alongside food as use values. Since food for the household is domestically produced, the impetus behind commodity production was the need for cash to pay tax, to purchase a few manufactured necessities such as salt, soap, paraffin, medicine, sugar, cloth, etc and, over the long run, to replenish a minimum stock of labour implements. The division of labour internal to the family was also adjusted to realise this two-fold production plan: for commodity production alongside food production.

Outside the regions of the South, two forms of integration can be identified: cheap labour production and cheap cattle production. In the case of the former, instead of producing raw materials, the family produces labour-power as a commodity. Here, commodity production was discouraged, and male members of the household were sent to work in the pockets of capitalist large farm production (plantations, processing industries, etc.) in the cash crop areas of the South; while the rest of the

family remained on the land to carry out subsistence production. Migrant labour is the response to the need for cash, generated by the same circumstances as those behind commodity production. Here, too, a two-fold production plan developed, requiring a division of family labour between commodity and food production. The difference is that in this case the two production processes are separated in space: the worker migrates to a distant location while the rest of the family continues to reside in the village and produce food for domestic consumption.⁷

Those regions integrated into the colonial economy as cheap cattle production were originally areas where shifting pastoral practices took place. These areas were subject to a double pressure: on the one hand, forcible land alienation; on the other, forcible commoditisation of cattle. Here, a single production plan continued, for cattle functioned both as commodities and as sources of family consumption.⁸

What is clear then is that just as petty commodity production supplied cheap raw material to the capitalist mode internationally, the communal form/mode provided cheap labour to the capitalism at the national level. In all cases the form of integration were dependent on the peasant family meeting its own food requirements, and therefore, the bulk of its own cost of reproduction of

cheap labour, whether appropriated directly (as wage labour) or indirectly (as the products of labour).⁹

The point that peasant labour is cheap labour was undoubtedly understood by some of the colonising bourgeoisies in Africa. For instance, the preference for peasant commodity production was categorically stated by Governor Clifford in his response to Lord Leverhulme's request for land to establish oil palm plantations in Southern Nigeria:

"As further agricultural industries in tropical countries which are mainly, or exclusively in the hands of the native industry (a) Have a firmer root than similar enterprises when owned and managed by Europeans, because they are natural growth, not artificial creations, and are self-supporting, as regards labour, while European plantations can only be maintained by some form of compulsory labour; (b) Are incomparably the cheapest instruments for the production of agricultural produce on a large scale that have yet been devised; and (c) Are capable of rapidity of expansion and a progressive increase of output that beggar every record of the past.... For these reasons I am very strongly opposed to any encouragement being given... to projects for creation of European owned and managed plantations to replace or even supplement, agricultural industries which are already in existence, or which are capable of being developed by peasants."

It can be emphasized that, in fact, part of the reason peasant producers are "the cheapest instruments" yet devised for the large-scale production of agricultural produce is precisely because they are "self-supporting as regards labour."¹¹

However, given the policy position of the colonial state, it is undoubtedly clear that colonial state policy on agriculture was directed at facilitating the growth of export production based on peasant agriculture. This was followed by the development of infrastructural facilities such as roads and railway system which connected major areas of export crop production to the East African coast. With this strategy peasant commodity production as the basis of accumulation by foreign capital was established and generalized in all British colonial Africa.

For that matter, therefore, the historical and social context of Lango wherein lies the villages of Alenga and Otwon which we studied ought to be understood first as the history of a labour reserve. For Lango was incorporated into the colonial political economy as a labour reserve, and only slowly turned into a commodity producing area after 1920s. Otherwise between the years 1894, when the British declared a protectorate over Uganda, to 1920, Lango functioned as a labour reserve.¹²

In addition to the broad processes of the integration of Uganda's economy into World capitalist system, and the creation of structures for the imperialist domination of domestic agriculture at the

local level that we have seen above, the colonial state also created entire classes. It undermined the political autonomy and material base of the pre-colonial leaders in the society; just as it undermined the indigenous traders whose activities were located in internal trade. This was achieved by the subordination of the African to the Indian trader which was an objective subordination of internal to external or export trade.

With intensification of commodity production came the gradual disintegration of the pre-capitalist mode of production which was characterised by subsistence agriculture, communal ownership of land and utilization of communal labour in production. And because it gave emphasis to cash crop production colonial capitalism transformed the conditions of the forms of peasant production that it found pertaining in Lango. For to achieve the reality of imperialist domination over agriculture, the colonial state systematically put in place measures calculated to reorient the economy toward cash crop production for external markets. The first was colonial taxation (*Owalo*) policy. Taxation was systematized, fixed and monetized. Lord Hindlip upon visiting British East Africa in 1905 reported on tax payment saying:

"The payments are made by means of sheep, goats, ivory, grain, labour and cash. I am strongly inclined to say that the payment in kind (such as grain, sheep, goats, tobacco, cotton, etc.) should be discouraged forthwith for the following reasons: One of the most important questions to be considered is that of labour, without a sufficiency of which no development can take place. And if much encouragement is given to the natives to pay their taxes in grain, etc., the supply of labour will visibly decrease. I am convinced that as far as possible taxes should be paid entirely in labour or in cash. A demand for cash should be created among the natives, who would then have to obtain coin [cash] in order to pay their taxes. Thus, the agricultural natives would be induced to work, and the pastoral natives both to work and trade; the former, it is only too true by this means would be encouraged to grow produce for sale."¹³

In practical terms the monetization of taxes meant wage labour and greater cash crop production at the expense of food crops. Indeed the monetization of taxes did end the grain levies which used to be paid by peasants in the past. This grain was normally stored in granaries for distribution during famine periods¹⁴. The (millet) famine reserve granaries (*Ogini*) for Lango were located at Chawente, in present day Kwania county.¹⁵

The Colonial state also regulated the process of cash-crop production through bye-laws, extension schemes, agricultural input programmes and quality control legislation which tied rural producers to specific forms of agricultural production. However, the peasants

themselves were sometimes not passive to the activities of the colonial state. In many areas of Lango cotton cultivation was resisted by peasants as it interfered with their labour time for food crop production.¹⁶ This made the colonial state utilize traditional rulers, intensive propaganda and extra-economic coercion to ensure their compliance.

The Colonial Government and merchant firms also intervened in agricultural production through the free distribution of new and improved crop seedlings, the introduction of extension work, labour policy, the establishment of experimental stations and farm schools and the promotion of mixed farming schemes.

In line with the policy of encouraging mixed farming (so-called modern agriculture) the Colonial Government introduced ox-ploughs. The peasants, especially in Teso and Lango were encouraged to purchase ploughs imported from Britain to be pulled by the bullocks to expand the farmers' capacity for ploughing and planting larger areas of land. The programme never attained its objective of integrating animal and crop husbandry, although it led to the expansion of cultivated land and cotton production output levels in Teso.¹⁷

Initially the cultivation of cotton in Lango spread slowly. By 1913-14 the output had only reached 1,420 tons of seed-cotton.¹⁸ We shall return to the colonial impress on agricultural production in Lango later. Let us now turn to the question of peasant co-operatives under colonial administration.

5.2 The Process of Capitalist Penetration and Peasant Co-operative Organizations

The methods through which capitalist penetration was effected are well known: forced labour, taxation, introduction of cash crops as well as of manufactured goods - in other words, the creation of a cash economy.¹⁹ The nature of participation determined whether the Africans were being proletarianised or were being transformed into a peasantry. The question of the proletarianisation or the peasantisation of the peasantry vis-a-vis capitalism has been widely debated by Marxist Scholars and substantial literature generated on it. Among the classical Marxists,²⁰ it was expected that within a relatively short span of time the peasantry would be eradicated by expanding capitalism, and a

process of social differentiation would split the peasantry into a class of capitalist farmers and a rural proletariat.

However, historical evidence has proved that such a unidirectional process has not occurred. Particularly, it is generally recognized that in Africa, capitalism has not been able to fully transform African societies into capitalist societies similar to those in Western capitalist countries. Consequently, classical Marxist theories have been subjected to criticism, mainly based on the concept that although the peasantry was an integral part of capitalism, it has nevertheless been able to resist direct capitalist penetration due to certain characteristics like the self-exploitation of the peasantry.²¹

In this context, similar and substantial literature on the African peasantry has accumulated over the last three decades. Most of the writings in this case is located in the MOP analysis and is demonstrative of those tendencies in the debate on the location of the peasantries within the underdeveloped societies, their role in development and/or under-development and their internal dynamics, which attempts to explain the failure of the peasantry to disintegrate in the face of capital

penetration, as was postulated by the earlier Marxists.

The MOP theories attempt to go beyond the empirical, historical study of the various processes through which peasants have been incorporated into the world economy, producing commodities, including the commodity 'labour power,' for the market. It discusses the general characteristics behind the variety of the relations of production and surplus appropriation from peasants, focusing on the relations between capital and peasant production. The main line of argument here is that in those colonised areas where capitalism dominated, it neither simply nor primarily destroyed the pre-capitalist modes by appropriating the producers and making wage labourers of them but rather restructured and conserved them in a dependent relation. While the pre-capitalist modes lost their independence, they were conserved in their forms. While pre-capitalist relations (forms) were conserved their content, the productive forces, now functioned strictly in the interest of capitalist accumulation,²² thus contributing to the rate of surplus value produced within the capitalist mode.

From the foregoing discussion it means, therefore, that an analysis of the development of capitalism in the African context must necessarily involve the analysis of

the (partial) preservation of the pre-capitalist forms of production (in their articulated forms) as functional to the capitalist mode of production: for it ensures a continuous supply of cheap labour and commodities to the capitalist system. Our main concern in this section therefore is to identify the nature and specific manner in which the indigenous non-state regulated (pre-capitalist) forms of peasant co-operative organization was penetrated by capital, which should concretise the fact that the interaction between capital and the pre-capitalist forms of production did not lead to the development of a fully fledged capitalist mode. Instead it led to the process of articulating the pre-capitalist forms of production with the capitalist forms. And that just as it did at the national level, at the local level this process was achieved through the colonial state.

In the surplus labour producing area of Lango located in the so-called sub-sistence areas of the colonial economy, two processes of articulation occurred the proletarianisation of the peasantry and communal production for use. Here, initially commodity production was actively discouraged and male members of the household were sent to work in the pockets of capitalist production (plantations, processing industries) while the

rest of the family (the wife and children) remained on the land to carry out "subsistence" production. The male member was a migrant worker seasonally employed when the plantation or the processing industry needed him. He could remain at work for up to six months. For the remainder of the year he returned to his family, whose production met his cost of subsistence: his wage, the price of his labour power, being sufficient to maintain him alone for the six months, not the family for a year.

But because communal production co-existed with capitalist mode of production, labour power was paid drastically below its value; the communal form (the family) though producing for use, was subordinated to and subsidized the cost of production of the capitalist mode. Basically, therefore, the communal forms in Lango provided cheap labour to the capitalist mode at the national level, while petty commodity production supplied cheap raw materials to the capitalist mode internationally. This means that a scrutiny of its relation with the capitalist mode renders the "subsistence" character of the communal mode null and void.²³ But this particular aspect of articulation increasingly brought pre-capitalist forms under threat of erosion. The process of migrant labour, due to its male

and youth character, did starve the pre-capitalist mode of able-bodied male-labour and their participation in co-operative labour in the village.

Secondly, Lango generally witnessed a progressive neglect of food production in favour of cotton production, due to the colonial state's promotion of cotton production as opposed to food crop production. The food crop production sector itself became starved of labour as a result of the domestic or family division of labour whereby cash-crop became regarded as "male-crop" while food crop was seen as "female-crop." This perhaps also explains the development about the years, of co-operative labour which are women-based to enable them cope with the labour demand for food crop production

In sum, the colonial state created the structures of the underdeveloped economy at both the levels of production and exchange. The very purpose of peasant's production was altered - he now produced commodities for the metropolitan market - and the system of cash taxation, backed by the coercive apparatus of the colonial state, was instrumental in generalizing this change. With colonialism, the relationship between trade and production was reversed: the very purpose of production became trade, and the demands of the

metropolitan market determined what would be produced. Moreover, it also undermined the indigeneous traders whose activities were located in internal trade, and thereby destroying that class which produced manufactured goods for internal exchange, the artisans. So that the most important technology of production in the agricultural economy, the hoe, previously manufactured internally was now imported from the metropole.

5.2.1 Colonialism and Peasant Co-operative Organizations

Colonialism, in Cabral's words, is "the negation of the historical process of the dominated people by means of violent usurpation of the freedom of development of the national productive forces."²⁴ In essence, it is a "politico-economic system which stifles the productive forces in the colonised society.

The incorporation of Lango under British administration took along time because the weak economic condition of the colonial regime then made it discourage rapid territorial expansion. The explanation for the delay was economic. The Secretary of State for the colonies repeatedly warned against imperial adventures based on non-business propositions. Commissioner Sadler

was, for example, specifically instructed to avoid pushing "too quickly among tribes in the outlying districts who have little to offer at the present in the way of commerce, and who have not yet become accustomed to the white man in their midst."²⁵

Thus, Lango was maintained as a labour reserve while its economic potential remained undetermined by the colonialist. Indeed, Major Archibald Church writing in 1911 observed that:

*"At the present time more and more natives are being brought from the West Nile, the Teso and Lango areas to work on the cotton, rubber, and coffee plantations in the Eastern province and Buganda within a belt extending fifty miles from the lake shore of Victoria Nyanza, as the cost of transport of crops for more than fifty miles from a port makes their production unprofitable."*²⁶

A side from this mercantile reasons, the northern people were also viewed by the colonialists "neither as potential threats to established interests nor as potential allies to share the burden of administrative expansion."²⁷ British administration was, therefore, only reluctantly established in Lango in 1907.

Thus, a new epoch was beginning. It was to be distinguished from the previous epoch by the accelerated expansion of capitalist relations of exchange and the concomitant transformation of indigenous relations of

production. As we have discussed earlier, the fundamental shifts that took place in Lango at this moment in time brought about the articulation of pre-capitalist forms of production with the capitalist forms. Increasingly the peasants came to be governed by the demands of the colonial state, itself bound up with the world capitalist economy. Taxation (owalo) followed the establishment of British control over Lango, and so did the development of an export sector to provide taxable income, and to contribute to the colonial state's, export-import trade. Cotton, introduced in 1907, was grafted onto the Lango agricultural system.

It is clear, though that the period 1920s marks the start of rapid expansion in cotton acreage. This was an outcome of increased demands for taxes, education and consumer goods. After slowly increasing to 4,872 acres in 1914, Lango cotton production rose to 16,050 acres in 1919 and 71,000 acres in 1928²⁸ (table 5.1).

The organization of household commodity production was such that cotton production became mandatory, and specific by-laws were enacted to ensure that every peasant (taxpayer) produced at least an acre of cotton. By late 1950s cotton production in the Lango cotton zone had reached an average output of 5,500 metric tons of

TABLE 5.1

THE EXPANSION OF NATIVE COTTON PRODUCTION IN LANGO DISTRICT, 1911-1930

Year	Estimated District Cotton Acreage	Estimated Regional Cotton Acreage	District Acreage as % of Regional	Estimated National Cotton Acreage	District Acreage as % of National
1911-12	1,000	29,720	3.67	-	-
1912-13	1,200	39,430	3.04	48,100	2.49
1913-14	4,872	83,714	5.82	110,264	4.42
.....
.....
1919	16,050	114,050	14.52	155,550	10.32
1920	23,000	148,000	15.54	207,100	11.11
1921	20,300	127,520	15.92	169,559	11.97
1922	35,000	250,619	13.97	345,119	10.14
1923	45,000	298,070	15.10	418,609	10.75
1924	54,000	355,000	15.21	572,814	9.43
1925	61,000	383,614	16.03	617,324	9.96
1926	61,000	380,819	16.20	570,189	10.82
1927	53,000	302,601	17.51	533,004	9.94
1928	71,000	447,130	15.99	698,800	10.23
1929	57,000	419,902	13.58	663,157	8.60
1930	66,000	484,553	13.78	739,690	9.02


Source: Compilation from the Annual Reports of the Department of Agriculture, Uganda Protectorate, Opio-Odongo, J.M.A. The Cotton Co-operative as an Institutional Innovation in Uganda, Ph.D Thesis, Cornell University, p. 110.

cotton lint, 13% higher than in 1937-8.²⁹ And with the systematic construction of a cob-web like network of roads throughout Lango, through the Public Works Programme, the colonial state created the basic infrastructure it needed to enhance cotton production and marketing (Map 1).

However, through the Produce Marketing and Cotton Zoning Ordinances and similar legislations the colonial state guaranteed the Indian merchants a free hand in cotton trade. For instance, under the Cotton Rules of 1910³⁰ issued under the Cotton Act of 1908 itinerant cotton buyers were forbidden from buying cotton from growers unless they were licensed. Cotton buying was limited to Government approved Markets. Under the 1918 Cotton Rules³¹ the purchasing of raw cotton and the keeping of any factory for purposes of processing cotton were forbidden, unless by a license issued by the District Commissioner who could, at his own discretion, refuse to issue such a license, or revoke any such license already issued.

In 1932 the colonial state issued the Native Produce Marketing Ordinance (1932) under which only a limited number of buyers were to be licensed to purchase crops in the country. The cotton Zone Ordinance of 1933 abolished competitive buying in the cotton industry. It divided the

LANGO DISTRICT
 Location of Cotton Growers Co-operative Societies, Ginneries
 Map 1: and Major Communication Network's 1992.



country into 14 different Cotton Buying Zones.³² Both the Cotton zoning Ordinance and the Produce Marketing Ordinance did consolidate a rigid framework into which it was virtually impossible for small-scale African entrepreneurs to penetrate.³³ In the cotton industry, processing was controlled by European and Asian businessmen who formed seed Cotton Buying Associations in order to protect their trade.³⁴ The Africans were, however, becoming restive and opposed to these restrictive tendencies. The second world war prevented the immediate implementation of the recommendations by Mr. Steil.

5.2.2 The Emergence and Development of State-Regulated Co-operatives

Meanwhile as far back as 1934, the idea of co-operative development had engaged the attention of the Uganda Administration. A draft Bill on Co-operative Societies had been drawn up in 1935 and revised in 1937 but was strongly opposed by the cotton merchants on the grounds that co-operative legislation was yet inopportune in the country and was therefore dropped pending an investigation of the whole situation. The immigrant community (Indian Cotton Merchants) argued that

the formation of a co-operative movement would be as "grave risk"; that the proposed societies would involve the Government in indirect participation in commerce; that the societies might grow in size and become politically powerful and hence a source of embarrassment to the Administration; that the societies might indulge in unfair competition with established business.³⁵ Further grounds for dropping the Bill were that the Africans lacked entrepreneurial ability and that co-operative activities would bring too much money into African hands and that would cause inflation in the country.

In the years that followed, a more favourable attitude towards co-operatives developed as a result of official report and recommendations by Mr. J.W. Steil who, in 1938 carried out an investigation on the introduction and regulation of the co-operative movement in the country.³⁶ His report showed that there had been a number of societies of semi-co-operative nature in existence but that their operations left much to be desired.³⁷ The report stressed that co-operative development must precede by co-operative education.

After 1946 though, when the colonial state passed the Co-operative Societies Ordinance arising out of the

discontent with the Asian-controlled monopoly buying system, which both exploited the peasant producer by legal means and cheated him through corrupt or illegal methods, the co-operative movement began to swell in membership and number of marketing societies (see table 5.2).

TABLE 5.2

UGANDA: THE GROWTH OF THE CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENT 1951-1992				
Year	Primary Societies	Total No. Members	Union	Total tonnage handled
1951	401	36,620	5	14,300
1952	574	54,968	10	23,675
1953	799	71,458	12	24,268
1954	1,025	94,315	11	31,948
1955	1,099	114,047	11	37,623
1956	1,256	126,962	12	36,176
1957	1,408	135,014	15	47,453
1958	1,534	147,421	15	58,012
1959	1,583	187,860	15	80,630
1960	1,622	211,214	16	89,308
1961	1,622	252,378	21	N/A
..
1965	1,825	450,590	34	N/A
..
1970	2,239	646,625	36	N/A
1971	2,500	750,000	36	N/A
..
1978	3,054	1,100,000	41	N/A
1980	3,260	1,136,000	41	25,000
1981	N/A	N/A	42	11,500
1983	3,414	1,262,300	42	65,000
1985	3,478	N/A	42	70,000
1986	N/A	N/A	43	30,000
1987	N/A	1,338,000	45	100,000
1988	5,217	1,462,000	45	N/A
1990	N/A	N/A	45	N/A
1992	5,236	N/A	46	N/A

Source: UP, Commission of Inquiry into ... Cotton - Ginning Industry 1962, Appendix 8, p.80; Annual Coop. Departmental Reports for various years

Now the historical development of the state-regulated co-operatives can, however, be structured into

four phases: (1) the Early Co-operative phase, 1913-1946; (2) Dynamic Growth 1946-1970; (3) a Period of Decline 1970-1979 and, (4) the Recovery phase, beginning 1980.

The first sign of any co-operative activity, approximating the Rochadelian co-operative principles, in Uganda dates from 1913. The first co-operative society formed was by farmers in Kiboga, gombolola Sabawali, Singo County in Mubende district and was known as The Kinakulya Growers Co-operative Society. However, despite the early existence of the society, it operated unofficially until 1941 when the Colonial State finally allowed its registration under the Business Names Ordinance of 1923.³⁸

But the rise of the Co-operative Movement in Uganda between the years 1913-1946 can best be understood within the background of the struggle by Africans against Indian merchant capitalists' monopoly of cotton marketing. The struggle was led by the militant nationalists who drew their strength from the peasants and workers who were organized into co-operatives and trade Unions. Besides claiming the right to organise, they also demanded higher prices for cotton and coffee, co-operatives to market these crops and higher wages for workers. Essentially

they made anti-monopoly demands. Their methods of struggle involved organizing mass demonstrations, strikes and boycotts.

As a response to the growing political power of the peasant cultivators led by the militant nationalist,³⁹ the colonial state in 1946, passed the Co-operative Societies Act (1946) which allowed for the registration of co-operative societies, and the entry of the Africans into cotton ginning.⁴⁰ However, it must be noted that in passing the ordinance, the colonial state merely used the law to divide and tame the co-operative movement.

The Co-operative Ordinance of 1946 introduced a series of regulations and controls and British 'advisors' were installed in each co-operative. Apart from managing co-operative accounts, they were to groom a new leadership which the colonial state considered 'responsible'. The so-called responsible leadership came to manage the co-operatives as if they were profit-making businesses and not mass organization of peasants. The period 1946 thus marks the beginning of the hijacking of the autonomous peasant organization by the Colonial State and the establishment of state control over it. From then on, a Co-operative Union bureaucracy began to develop in Uganda. Consequently, the co-operative movement gradually

underwent a change in its content. In name co-operatives were presented as peasants' organizations, but in reality, their control was in the hands of a middle-class bureaucracy. Thus, just as it did with the Trade Unions, by depoliticizing the mass organization of the peasants (the co-operatives), the colonial state cut the link between militant nationalism and the working people.⁴¹

The point here is that while prior to the second phase in the development of the co-operative movement in Uganda, the chiefs and Kings were sufficient to ensure colonial law and order, the situation after 1946 was quite different. The mass of the working people had awoken and a militant tendency was beginning to surface in the petty-bourgeoisie ranks. On its part, the colonial state in an abid to save its skin began in earnest to look for new allies which it found in the petty-bourgeoisie.⁴²

This shift when it was translated into reality resulted into a comprehensive economic and political reform of the colonial economy. Economic reforms were designed to expand the ranks of the upper petty bourgeoisie, and consolidate their tendency to compromise. Cotton ginneries (and coffee factories) were bought by Government from Asian and British comprador companies and transferred to the newly depoliticised co-

operatives. Political reforms were designed to incorporate the upper petty bourgeoisie into the colonial political system, hence the Local Government reform of 1949 and 1955 which allowed elected members to the district councils. This new stratum was to replace the chiefs as the main pillar of the colonial system.

Although they had been subject to strict managerial and financial supervision under the Co-operative Societies Act of 1946, the organizational base of the petty-bourgeoisie, the co-operatives, were still relatively independent of state control. This act was repealed upon independence and replaced by the Co-operative Societies Act (1963), which gave them complete financial and managerial autonomy. In 1970, having consolidated its alliance with the Asian commercial bourgeoisie and expanded state control over the economy, the bureaucratic state prepared to undermine the substantial organizational independence of the co-operatives. The 1963 act was replaced by the Co-operative Societies Act of 1970, whose purpose was

"to give government greater powers for the guidance, direction and control of the Co-operative Societies and Unions generally, and on matters of finance and management of their affairs particularly, in order to make the movement a worthy vehicle of the new political culture of Uganda".⁴³

In this context, the state appropriated to itself control over all expenditures, borrowing, or investment, while giving itself the power to propose and enforce measures on the co-operatives. Such was the final nail that sealed state control and regulation of co-operatives.

The years 1971-79 marked a bleak phase in the history of the development of the Co-operative Movement. With a declining cotton production the Cotton Unions incurred losses. The Amin regime intervened not by revising cotton prices, but it promulgated a decree breaking the co-operative monopoly and throwing open cotton buying and ginning to private traders. The profit margin of 50 cents allowed on each kilogram attracted no entrants and the co-operatives continued to monopolize the ginning process.⁴⁴

To try and improve the situation, the regime launched a double Crop Production campaign in the 1970s with a view to increase cotton production each year. In spite of the intensive campaigns, no satisfactory results were achieved. Instead production continued to decline. The low official prices paid to farmers and malignant inflation made the decline irreversable. Cotton

production fell from 466,775 bales in 1970 its peak year to 32,160 bales in 1980. Production has continued to fall and rise since then. Member participation in the movement was lowest.⁴⁵

In the current phase of recovery, the movement through UCA has obtained support from the Swedish Co-operative centre. With this support UCA has embarked on the rehabilitation of Co-operative Societies and Unions, and ginneries. It has also mounted a management improvement programme which is aimed at improving the efficiency of the business administration of agricultural marketing Co-operative Societies and Unions.⁴⁶

In sum, the rise of the Co-operative Movement in Uganda in general must be understood in political as well as economic terms. In the years immediately following the war, economic and political grievances were not clearly distinguishable. The co-operative movement found that most economic issues which the movement agitated had political overtones. The economic dominance of the Asians and their exploitation provided the starting point. So that the co-operative movement became a forum for airing political grievances as well. For a sure way of contact with the countryside was through the co-operative.

In Lango which by 1952 had become a major cotton

growing district in Uganda the grievances which characterised the cotton production industry did find a lively ground for its further propagation. And this coincided with the founding of the UNC Lango branch in 1952.⁴⁷ The support of UNC in the district very much depended on the grievances of the peasant producers, particularly against malpractices by the Indian cotton buyers. So that the leading personalities in the Co-operative Movement were also the leading personalities in the leadership of UNC in the district.⁴⁸

In conclusion the above discussion shows clearly that the establishment of colonial rule and the introduction of cotton (commodity) production in Lango at the start of the twentieth century intensified capitalist commodity production in rural areas leading to the contradiction between peasant producers and merchant capital. This development particularly had a wider import and implication for the organization of agricultural production based on co-operative labour. To this we now turn.

5.2.3 Colonialism and Re-organization of Communal Co-operatives

We have stated already that pre-colonial Lango

society was basically egalitarian and stateless. A broad assessment of the social formation indicates that the society was only in transition to state formation at the time of colonisation. Here we argue that the net effect of colonial rule were to further stamp the society with a class character. Nothing that happened in this period served to homogenise Lango productive units. Rather, the process of social differentiation were enhanced as a result of capital penetration of the society. The first thing to note, therefore, is the way the political domination of colonial rule restructured the loose political institution it found on the ground, to suit its demands, while at the same time undermining the pre-capitalist forms of production.

To grasp what took place at the local level in Lango under colonial rule, our starting point necessarily has to begin with the examination of the nature and character of the colonial state and, more particularly, the class interests served by it. Alavi and Saul have argued that by and large the colonial state sought to promote the interests of the metropolitan bourgeoisie and to dominate the pre-capitalist social formations and indigenous classes.⁴⁹ With regard to Uganda specifically, Mamdani has demonstrated that it was primarily in response to

pressure from the metropolitan bourgeoisie that the British Government declared a "protectorate" over Uganda in 1894, even though this 'protection' differed very little in practical terms from annexation. In all aspects the colonial state aimed at furthering the interest of, and capital accumulation by the metropolitan bourgeoisie. Moreover, the colonial state also strove to safeguard colonial interests and to achieve this it created in the colonies that class that would protect the interest of capital.

In Lango, the colonial Government created a new system of local administration based on appointed chiefs, an unhitherto known phenomena in Lango society. This in turn ensured the creation of a rural power structure dominated by the appointed chiefs, who themselves enjoyed unlimited powers as they kept sway over society. The starting point for the colonialist here was the *Wang tic*. This was seen as would provide the smallest administrative unit at the local grassroots level. Realizing how strongly the Lango peasants were organized around *Wang tic* co-operative principles, the colonial state quickly moved in to turn this into a territorial (administrative) unit which they called 'amagoro'. The previously elected *Wang tic* leader whose (earlier)

functions we have seen above, was co-opted into the colonial administrative structure and appointed as the village headman (chief).

The new functions of the chief or village headman were vast and with unlimited powers. They included, *inter alia*, tax collection; ensuring maintenance of law and order; organizing members of the *amagoro* (formerly *Wang tic*) to perform forced (free) labour service (*ber lobo*) on public works such as roads, bridges, mission schools, hospitals, churches, village cotton block-farms and on the plots of chiefs, including the construction of chiefs' residences and administrative headquarters. He also supervised household cotton production i.e ensuring strict adherence to planting measurements; enforcing the cutting and burning of cotton stems after harvest on the gazetted dates and ensuring that a strip of grass is left in-between plots, and that food crops are grown. They were also the agents of the Indian cotton merchants. Point here is that for the first time in the history of Lango society, Langi males had to perform corvee (*arododo*). Apart from being alien and distateful to the society, forced labour competed with household production labour demands, and interfered with the *Wang tic* communal co-operative labour arrangements.

Crucially though, the undifferentiated role structure of the appointed chiefs - acting as intermediaries in all aspects of the organization of agricultural production and marketing, health, community development, and law remained unchallenged for quite a time. But as the commercialization of the rural economy gained momentum, the availability of wage labour, coupled with the more lucrative avenues of inter-district trade in cattle, cowhides, goatskins, simsim, colobos monkey skins, giraffe hair, and bicycles provided the impetus for peasants to challenge the powers of the chiefs. Given these new income sources, the peasants now had better alternatives to obtain cash with which to meet their tax obligations on time, and therefore stronger reasons for resisting the frequent calls for the provision of free labour on public works projects.⁵⁰ And since the destructured social system still permitted easy upward mobility, a few cultivators took advantage of it to accumulate wealth and attain economic power, which made them more influential in the rural areas than the chiefs.⁵¹

The emergence of this new class together with the educated elites marked the emergence of a new power group with which the chiefs had to contend. The council system

introduced in late 1940s provided an effective fora for the rural political power struggle as the chiefs and the non-chief elites competed for its control, even though the councilors themselves lacked executive powers. So that in later years when the ordinary peasant cultivator and local traders at the village level could also get elected to the council, the composition of the district council changed as it became more dominated (representative) of the rural areas.⁵² The elected rural leaders were less wealthy, more critical, and generally more militant than the elites in the council. They raised new kinds of grievances (issues) from the rural areas which had not hitherto been discussed by the district council. For example, they criticized the working of the cotton marketing system and the behaviour of European administrative officials on tour.⁵³

The militancy of the elected non-elite council members was partly bolstered by the co-operative ideology of the Federation of Uganda African Producers (FUAP) and the nationalist political movement of the Uganda National Congress (UNC). However we must note that the significance of the struggles between the chiefs, the rural poor and the non-chief elites lie in how such struggles impacted on both the state-regulated co-

operatives and the *Wang tic* communal co-operative labour. What is clearly dramatic about the difference between rural (peasant) leaders and the elites in the district council in their different stands vis-a-vis the colonial state, is the compromised position of the latter. Being a product of the very process of colonial class formation the elites saw themselves as part of the colonial state and, therefore, were loath to criticize it.

In the final analysis, however, it was they, the elite class, that came to dominate and reap the benefits of the state-regulated co-operatives. They led the fight for crop marketing by the Africans. And like the Indian commercial capitalists, this class was able to secure through colonial legislation, the monopoly over cotton crop marketing, through the state-regulated co-operative organization.

But this monopoly was not an outgrowth of a competitive economy. It was the result of a political action. As such its base was not an expression of internal strength but an expression of the monopoly base of metropolitan capital to which the monopolistic marketing system that the elites controlled was tied in a dependent relation. Further more, because this monopoly was not also a result of an internal class struggle

between different sections within capital with one section emerging a dominant monopoly, it was void of that tendency that leads to the constant revolutionizing of the productive forces. Hence peasant production of cotton crop remained unrevolutionised. Cotton continued to be produced by peasants within the realm of pre-capitalist forms while its marketing took place within the capitalist framework through the state-regulated co-operatives. This then formed the link between the non-capitalist form of peasant co-operatives and the state-regulated co-operatives. The social consequence of this link was the pauperization of the agricultural (cotton) producers.

We can however, confidently argue that as part of the resistance by the peasants to the coercive use of *Wang tic* co-operative labour teams by the colonialists and their local agents as a form of free labour team, and also partly as a result of the process of social differentiation that was taking place internally within the membership of the *Wang tic* co-operative labour groups, there occurred a re-organization in membership, mode of operation and role in agricultural production.

With its role in household and village level agricultural production of food crops having been undermined, and its leadership having been co-opted to the colonial administrative structure, the peasants sought to find a new co-operative framework for agricultural production. These two factors account for the coming into existence of the co-operative labour groups called *Awak*. Unlike *Wang tic*, *Awak* was not organized along a territorial unit. Its leader was elected. And its membership transcended or cut across amagoro (*Wang tic*) boundaries. The importance of the change from '*Wang tic*' to '*Awak*' is that it signify the poor peasants' struggle, albeit weakly expressed, against colonial state policies. Secondly, it should be interpreted as a significant logical response by the peasants to capital penetration which by now had generated a process of social differentiation within the peasantry.

We can discern as the objective responsible for this change the effort by the peasants to get the co-operative agricultural production labour out of the colonial territorial framework and the chiefs' leadership. For this reason the change should also be understood as a

protest against the use of *Wang tic* co-operative labour as a form of forced (free) labour team. With this change *Wang tic* functioned exclusively as an administrative unit, headed by the chief while the *Awak* institution became the new co-operative labour teams around which households co-operated in agricultural production, and over which the chiefs had no control.

The importance of these developments which we ought to emphasize is the fact that from this moment on we are witnessing a transformation in the indigenous forms of peasant co-operative organizations: fighting for autonomy as a result of colonial policies that aimed at integrating the peasants and their institutions further and further into the capitalist nexus. It must also be borne in mind that although the form of *Awak* took on that of *Wang tic*, the content had, in fact, fundamentally changed as a result of internal social differentiation, as some of the households could no longer meet the beer (millet brew) requirement. The internal social differentiation was hinged to the capacity of households to provide local millet brew at the end of the day's work.

The dynamics of the changes was to become a continuous process as the villages became even more and more penetrated by the various forms of capital during the neo-colonial era. For this reason therefore we find Jorgenson's observation that "The Langi preserved the element of reciprocity in the *Wang tic*, preventing it from being used as a disguised form of wage labour" and that, in fact, by the time of independence in 1962, "... the proportion of Langi cultivators participating in communal work-groups was higher than in any other districts in Uganda,"⁵⁴ a failure to grasp the extent of contradictions that arose from the process of capital penetration of the countryside. While the latter assertion could have been true, the former is hard to accept.

For sure when analysing the development of capitalism in the context of non-capitalist social formations, it is essential to analyse the social relations, the economic units (forms of co-operation in production) and the class forces within the relevant non-capitalist forms of production. The failure to do this leads to such observations which mistake form for content and thereby underplaying the dynamics of non-capitalist forms of production, and the social relations and forms

of exchange that govern their interaction with capital.

In the chapters that follow, we shall illustrate this point further.

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FOOTNOTES

1. Lenin, I. (1986), *Imperialism, the Highest State of Capitalism*, Moscow: Progress publishers, pp. 59-64.
2. F.D. Lugard, "The Extension of British Influence and Trade in Africa", in *Proceedings of the Royal Colonial Institute (1895-6)*, p. 6; quoted in Galbraith, John S. (1972), *Mackinnon and East Africa 1878 -1895: A Study in the "New Imperialism"*; Cabridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 8-9.
3. Galbraith, op. cit., 12-20; Woolf, Leonard (1920), *Empire and Commerce in Africa: A Study in Economic Imperialism*, London: George Allen and Unwin, pp. 242-302.
4. Donald Anthony Low, (1954), "British Public Opinion and the Uganda Question: October-December, 1992", *Uganda Journal*, 8:81-100.
5. For details on the Uganda Political Economy see the following works: Mamdani, M. (1976), *Politics and Class formation in Uganda*, London: Heinemann; Jorgensen, J.J. (1981), *Uganda: A Modern History*, London: Croom Helm; Nabudere, D.W. (1980), *Imperialism and Revolution in Uganda*; London: Onyx Press Ltd., Campbell, H. (1974), "The Political Struggle of African businessmen to Enter the Market Place in Uganda-1978," M.A. Thesis, Makerere University. Also Ginyere-Pinyewa, A.G.G. (1978), *Apolo Milton Obote and His Times*, New York/Lagos: Nok Publishers; and Mukherjee, R. (1956), *The Problem of Uganda: A study in Acculturation*, Berlin: Akademie-verlag.
6. Mamdani, (1976) op. cit., pp. 138-146.
7. Mamdani, (1984b), a Forms of Labour and Accumulation of Capital: Analysis of a Village in Lango, Northern Uganda", *MAWAZO*, 5(4):44-65.
8. *Ibid.*
9. *Ibid.*
10. Governor Clifford, cited in Forrest, Tom (1981),

"Agricultural Policies in Nigeria: 1900-78" in Heyer, J., Roberts, P. and G. Williams (1981) (eds.), *Rural Development in Tropical Africa*, London; MacMillan Press, p. 224

11. Mamdani, M. (1985) "Extreme but not Exceptional: Towards an Analysis of the Agrarian Question in Uganda", *Development Policy and Practice*, No. 5, The Open University, p. 3-4.
12. Besides Lango these labour reserves included Acholi and W. Nile in N. Uganda and Kigezi in South-Western Uganda - See Mamdani (1985), "Extreme But not Exceptional: Towards an analysis of the Agrarian Question in Uganda", *Development Policy and Practice*, No. 5, The Open University. pp. 6-10. Mamdani observes however that as external sources of labour became available, particularly from Rwanda, these areas gradually contracted as sources of labour. He points out that as a response to the brutality of Belgian feudal-type administration, there was a first major out-migration from Rwanda in the 1920s. The Colonial state responded by introducing cotton cultivation in Lango and Acholi. And when in the 1950s there occurred a second wave of out-migration from Rwanda, the colonial state introduced tobacco cultivation in West Nile. So that the only regional labour reserve within Uganda by independence was Kigezi.
13. Lord Hindlip (1905), *British East Africa: Past, Present, and Future*, London: T. Fisher Unwin, pp. 66-67.
14. For detailed discussion of the food question and food self-sufficiency in Uganda see for example Nyangabyaki-Bazara, P. (1984), "Famine in Bunyoro (Kitara), 1900-1939", *MAWAZO*, 5(3):65-75; Lofchie, F.M. (1975), "The Political and Economic Origins of African Hunger", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 3(14):151-553.
15. Tarantino, A. (1949); 'Notes on the Lango', *Uganda Journal*, 13:145-53
16. Okai M. (1966), "Some Aspects of Labour use in the

Agriculture of Lango District", Faculty of Agriculture Rural Development Research Paper, No. 25 Makerere University.

17. Jorgensen, op., cit., p. 102-106; Wrigley, C.C. (1959), *Crops and Wealth in Uganda*, Kampala, pp. 19-20. See also, Okai, M. (1975), "The Development of Ox-Cultivation in Uganda", *East African Journal of Rural Development*, Vol. 8 Nos. 1 and 2; Ker, A.D.R. (1973), "The Development of Improved Farming Systems Based on Ox-cultivation", in V.F. Amann (ed.), *Agricultural Policy Issues in East Africa* Kampala: Makerere University pp. 291-321. The first ploughs used were made locally of wood from an Indian pattern, but this type was soon abandoned in favour of European-manufactured iron ploughs, on the pretext that the Indian ploughs were unsuited to the soils of Uganda. By the late 1930s, various American and Czechoslovakian ploughs had been imported and tested on the local market, but without success; finally it was the British made Ransome ploughs which were recommended for use by the peasants in Uganda see Wrigley, op., cit., pp. 54, 58. Okai, M. op. cit., reports that over 343 ploughs were sold annually under the subsidy scheme in Northern Uganda as a whole, pp. 199-200.
18. Wrigley, op. cit., p. 19-20.
19. Cohen, R. (1976), "From Peasants to Workers in Africa," in Gutkind, P.C.W. and I. Wallerstein (eds.) (1976), *The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa*, Beverly Hills: Sage; see also Bernstein, H. (1979), "African Peasantries: A Theoretical Framework", *Journal of Peasant Studies* 6 (4):412-43.
20. Although K. Marx never presented an elaborate and comprehensive theory on the peasantry, elements of it can be found *Capital Vol. III* and in *Theories on the Surplus value*. See also Kautsky, K. (1899), *The Agrarian Question* and J. Banajii (1976), "Summary of selected parts of Kart Kautsky's 'The Agrarian Question,' *Economy and Society*, Vol. 5 (1); Lenin (1964) *The Development of capitalism in Russia, 1899, Collected Works Vol. III*; Moscow: Progress Publishers.

21. Among the classical critics of Marxism is A.V. Chayanov (1966) *The Theory of Peasant Economy*, (ed., D. Thorner, et al.) Hanework.
22. Mamdani, M. (1976) *op. cit.*, pp. 138-314.
23. *ibid.*, p. 142
24. Cabral, A. (1969), *Revolution in Guinea* London: Sage, p. 81.
25. Barber, J.P. (1965), "The Moving Frontier of British Imperialism in Northern Uganda 1898-1919", *The Uganda Journal*, 29:27-43 esp. p. 29.
26. Major Archibald Church, DSO M.C. (1928), *East Africa a New Dominion: A Critical Experiment in Tropical Development and its Significance to the British Empire*, London: H.F. & F. Witherby, p. 116.
27. Barber, *op. cit.*, p. 32
28. Jorgensen, *op. cit.*, p. 101
29. Uganda Protectorate (1939), *Report of the Uganda Cotton Commission, 1938*, Entebbe Government Printer, p. 199 and Uganda Protectorate (1960) *Annual Report of the Department of Agriculture 1960*, Entebbe Government Printer, p. 32.
30. *Uganda Gazette*, 1910, p. 182 and the Cotton Act of 1908, No. 5, 1908.
31. *Uganda Gazette*, 1918, No. 594 of 1918, p. 472.
32. Kuiper, F.E.S. *A Comparative Economic Analysis of Government's Intervention in the Marketing and Ginning of Cotton in Uganda, the Belgian Congo and Ruanda Urundi*, p. 80, quoted in Okereke, (1968) "Co-operative Development in Uganda 1900-39", *East African Journal of Rural Development*, 1(2):60-71.
33. Ehrlich, C. (1957), "Cotton and the Uganda Economy, 1903-1909", in *Uganda Journal*, 21(2):1667-72 and C. Ehrlich (1963), "Some Social and Economic Implications of Paternalism in Uganda", *Journal of African History*, 2:275-85.

34. Ehlich, C. (1958), "The Marketing of Cotton in Uganda, 1900-1950," Ph.D Thesis, University of London, p. 134.
35. Engholm, G.F. (1967), "The Decline of Immigrant Influence in the Uganda Administration, 1945-53", *Uganda Journal* 31(1):73-88.
36. Okereke, O., *op. cit.*, p.70.
37. *ibid.*, p. 71
38. Kyamulesire, A.R. (1988), *History of the Uganda Co-operative Movement, 1913-1988*, UCA: Kampala, p.1.
39. Leading militant nationalists of this period included Ignatius Musazi and Semakula Mulumba, who organized the Uganda Farmers Union.
40. The first African to apply for a ginning license was in 1926, but was denied on the grounds that no further licenses were to be issued. See Okereke, O. *op. cit.*, p. 62.
41. Mamdani, M. (1983) *Imperialism and Facism in Uganda*, London: Heinemann, pp. 18-19.
42. *ibid.*
43. Minister of Co-operatives and Marketing, Uganda Parliamentary Debates, July 23, 1970, *Hansard*, pp. 198-201, quoted in Mamdani, M. (1976), *op. cit.*, pp. 277-278.
44. Kyamulesire, A.R. *op. cit.*, p. 31.
45. *ibid.*
46. UCA Ltd., *Co-operative Development Programmes* (Revised, May 1990), Kampala.
47. Formed in 1952, the bulk of the UNC Central Committee came from the petty bourgeois intelligensia. Its Secretary General was Ignatus Musazi, the Organizer of Bana Ba Kintu and the Uganda Farmers Union. The bulk of its members came from areas where the commodity producing peasantry was seething with discontent: Bunda, Lango, Acholi,

Teso and bukedi. At its peak, around 1955, the UNC had a membership of 50,000. See Mamdani, M. (1976), *op. cit.*, p. 20

48. These included personalities such as: Ben Otim Etura, Yokosafati Engur, Olyech Omara, Pulicikira Okweny and Luci Okello. See Gertzel, C. (1974), *Party and Locality in Northern Uganda, 1945-1962*, London: Athlone Press, p. 49; Kayunga, S.S. (1991), "Uganda National Congress and the Struggle for Democracy, 1952-1962", *Working Paper*, Centre for Basic Research, Kampala.
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50. See Hayley, T. (1940), *op.cit.*, p. 110 and Tosh, J. (1974), "Small-Scale Resistance in Uganda: The Lango 'Rising' at Adwari in 1919," *Azania*, 9:51-64.
51. Opio-Odongo, *op.cit.*, p. 110.
52. Gertzel, C. *op. cit.*, p. 28
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PART THREE

PEASANT CO-OPERATIVE ORGANIZATIONS AND THE NEO-COLONIAL STATE

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CHAPTER SIX

INTRODUCTION - THE NEO-COLONIAL STATE

In the foregoing chapter we have indicated some of the structural developments of the years between 1894 and 1962, pointing to the way in which the non-capitalist elements of Lango society were affected by colonialism and capitalist penetration. The balance of social forces within the colonial economy as a whole determined to a large degree the particular forms that this capitalist penetration or integration took. We have also dealt with the processes that led to the colonial state's control of the co-operative movement.

In part three we now discuss the developments under the post-colonial state. We make use of the analysis of concrete empirical conditions in the two case study villages to underline the nature of social and economic property relations within the forms of peasant co-operatives at the microscopic village and household levels, and the process of social differentiation at that level. This kind of analysis ought to clarify the process(es) of capital accumulation taking place, the nature of exploitative relations among households in the two villages; and the growing inroads of capital and the state in their attempts to considerably undermine and control forms of peasant co-operative

organizations. We relate these issues to the broader question of the character and the role of the neo-colonial state in relation to agrarian crisis and peasant struggles. To this end we examine the agricultural policies of the neo-colonial state in relationship to the different classes and strata within the agrarian context and the neo-colonial economy as a whole.

In our theoretical discourse we noted that upon the attainment of formal independence, the post-colonial state intensified its intervention into the rural or domestic communities as they continue to produce commodity crops. We observed that a combination of "the articulation of MOP theory" and "the theory of the neo-colonial state" provides us with some useful explanations on this front.¹ The theory of the post colonial state rejects the modernization theory² - according to which the growing intervention by the post-colonial state must be seen as an expression of the 'selfless' involvement of the 'political elite' in the modernization of the 'traditional' society - and focuses attention on the 'class character' of those who man the state apparatus in 'dependent', 'neo-colonial' or 'peripheral-capitalist' societies.

The theory of the post-colonial state holds that in the absence of a strong indigenous bourgeoisie - a direct result

of colonial intervention - the post-colonial state has been taken over by a class with no economic power base in society. This group has variously been termed as a 'political class'³; a 'petty-bourgeoisie' or more specifically the dominant factions within the petty bourgeoisie⁴; a 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie'.⁵ On the basis of their direct control over state machinery, the dominant factions of the petty-bourgeoisie, the leading political cadres, the senior military officers, and the upper strata of the bureaucracy have been able to distance themselves more and more from other fractions of the petty-bourgeoisie (including businessmen, petty traders, small manufactures and entrepreneurs, and intellectuals and professionals). At the same time these dominant factions have acquired a larger measure of 'relative autonomy' from,⁶ or 'freedom of action'⁷ vis-a-vis those other groups - not least through their 'privileged access to surplus'.⁸ It is not only its 'development' or 'modernization' efforts that accounts for the post-colonial state's 'central' role in the economy but also its 'class character'.

It is argued that lacking an economic base in society, the ruling class reproduces itself and seeks to accumulate capital in two ways: One, through the promotion of state or private property (depending on the faction of the petty-

bourgeoisies in power) or, at times, through a combination of these two forms as in Kenya,⁹ and in various alliances with international capital. In this connection, Mamdani has penetratingly argued that, in its attempts to accumulate property, the African petty-bourgeoisie has two options open to it: first, it can use the state either to create public property which the petty bourgeoisie is then able to control directly through its hold over the state - the so-called progressive option; or to expand private property which the petty bourgeoisie is able to control directly through ownership.¹⁰ Second, through the exploitation of labour and the extraction of surplus from the pre-capitalist mode of production. It is this second path of accumulation which is of interest to us in this study. For it is one of the main reasons why the post-colonial state has generally not been interested in the (total) transformation of the pre-capitalist mode of production but is, on the contrary, profiting from its continuing existence.

One of the major points in part three of this study therefore, is to show that precisely because the petty bourgeoisie lack any power base in society, it is largely dependant upon the increased supply of cheap labour and commodities from the pre-capitalist mode of production through extra-economic pressures. So that at the village

level we find that the peasant cultivator, depending on the objective and subjective circumstances of the household, is engulfed in a dual relation of exploitation: one in which he enters into voluntarily in his relations with the various social classes eg. marchant/agricultural capitalists, the comprador bourgeoisie emerging out of the process of the articulation of modes of production; and the other which he enters into involuntarily in his relationship to state power and state institutions.¹¹ We find this a strong case for the reason the post colonial state continues to be interested in the domestic community's (further) subordination to, and integration into, the capitalist mode of production.

In Uganda, political independence was achieved on 9th October, 1962. At independence, those who took over the reins of government in the country largely came from the petty-bourgeoisie: the intelligentsia, bureaucrats, traders and rich peasants. The aftermath of independence saw an ever increasing struggles between these elements on the one hand and the predominantly Asian commercial bourgeoisie that controlled the wholesale and import-export trade on the other. Mamdani has, in fact, argued that unlike Kenya and Tanzania, Uganda did not emerge after independence with one ruling petty-bourgeoisie, a section of it controlling state power. Instead two separate petty-bourgeoisies came forth,

one Baganda and one non-Baganda: the *Kulaks* at the core of the former and the governing bureaucracy at the core of the latter. He notes that the political expression of this fact was the emergence of two states - Buganda and Uganda - each with separately defined powers. This separation, however, was only relative, because the Buganda petty-bourgeoisie failed to secede at independence. Confronted by a successful organization by the chiefs, the two petty-bourgeoisies formed a class coalition at independence.

He points out that though it controlled political power at independence, the petty-bourgeois coalition did not yet dominate at the level of production. He argues that, in fact, its most important political battles were waged less against the colonial state than against the class that monopolised (controlled) the bulk of the nationally accumulated surplus, the Indian commercial bourgeoisie. And so he concludes that actually at the time of independence, two contradictions among the propertied classes in Uganda were carried into the neo-colonial era: one within the petty-bourgeoisie coalitions, and one between the petty-bourgeoisie as a whole and the Asian commercial bourgeoisie.¹²

The petty-bourgeoisie, therefore, had to find a foothold in the economy if its political position was to be

consolidated. Steps taken by the petty-bourgeoisie soon after independence to achieve that goal included the intensification of the replacement of private buyers of agricultural produce by government organs and government controlled co-operative institutions. For example, the promulgation of the Produce Marketing Board Act at the beginning of 1968; and, earlier, the creation of a Minor Crop Marketing Board in 1966. All these moves culminated into a policy document called "The Common Man's Character."¹³ The strongest advocates of establishing the Minor Crops Marketing Board included the state-controlled co-operatives since they expected the scheme to strengthen their position as against private buyers.¹⁴

In the case of the Produce Marketing Board, its most important functions included the registration and licensing of all buying agents, millers and dealers,¹⁵ and hence the effort by the bureaucratic-bourgeoisie to gain control of selling channels.

In the agricultural sector as in the rest of the economy, major changes were effected in the Government economic policy. The economic policy of the Obote regime (1962-71) evolved into a 'commanding heights' strategy¹⁶ in which the state assumed control or direction of leading institutions in the (dependent) economy. The culmination of

which was the Nakivubo Pronouncement in May 1970 of The Move to the Left which called for 60% nationalization of 80 major firms and abolished strikes. The strategy placed all commanding heights of the economy under the direct control of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie. But the commanding heights strategy was hardly a new or radical economic shift. It merely continued the colonial policy to operate infranstrucutural services.

Henceforth, a class which by virtue of its position in the state apparatus controlled the major means of production in the country. But because of the nature of the economy itself and its relation to the World capitalist system, this bureaucratic bourgeoisie was - and continues to be - a dependant bourgeoisie. This explains the continuation of the colonial export-oriented agricultural policy. For, in-order to ensure their reproduction and capital accumulation this petty-bourgeoisie faction perpetuated a neocolonial economic structures in which the Uganda economy came not only under the domination of British bourgeoisie but also foreign bourgeoisies of various nationalities. To this end the post-colonial state's policies have, therefore, been primarily aimed at maintaining, protecting and expanding the conditions of capitalist accumulation in general without which neither the foreign nor the Uganda

bourgeoisie class can prosper.

6.1 State Intervention in Agricultural Production and State-Regulated Co-operatives

Intervention in the agricultural economy was widely seen by the post-colonial state as an imperative. The stand of a Uganda Government white paper may be seen as representative on this score: "*[agricultural] production and marketing... are political issues and [Government] must therefore be associated with them.*"¹⁷ The rationale for state intervention in agricultural production and marketing is based on the arguments that given the predominantly agricultural basis of the economy, state intervention is necessary so as to provide government with the vital local and foreign currency revenues. In addition, since agriculture provides employment and incomes to a major proportion of the population, intervention is required to allow national political leadership to reward supporters, punish opponents, and prevent the growth of autonomous centres of economic, and thus political, power within the rural sector. Finally, intervention is readily justified in terms of widely held beliefs concerning its efficiency - indeed necessity - as a means of promoting economic growth.¹⁸

The (state-regulated) peasant co-operative institution is an ideal mechanism for intervention. It transfers agricultural operations of a multitude of individual small peasant farmers to the framework of a formal body, registered and recorded in government files, and operating within the context of government laws and regulations. Thus, co-operation transforms innumerable, anonymous, informal, and unrecorded activities to a set of uniform behaviours and exchanges, channeled through the state-regulated co-operative and recorded by it.

Indeed, we have to emphasise that the Uganda Government legislation on co-operatives of 1964 was aimed at getting the government more and more involved in the organization, direction, guidance and control of the co-operative movement. The crucial point in the legislation is that the democratic principles of co-operation as practised in Western countries, were modified so as to enable the Government to (effectively) use the movement as a public organ to implement its development objective.¹⁹ It would seem, however, that state intervention in the agricultural sector through co-operatives was to affect crop marketing rather than production. The First Five-Year Development Plan (1961/62-1965/66) was very explicit about this in its policy on Uganda co-operative development:

"An integral part of Government's policy for agriculture is its policy for the development of the co-operative movement in the sphere of crop marketing and agricultural credit".²⁰

This position effectively turned the co-operative organization into a state institution, controlled and supported by it, rather than an autonomous peasant organization. So that the function of the co-operative became to provide the neo-colonial state with the opportunity to enter village economies in several capacities namely: as monopoly distributors of farm-inputs such as machinery for hire (service), fertilizers, seeds or tools; as principal source of local credit i.e as a banker who also sells to and buys from the peasants; and finally as a political agent in village life, distributing patronage to followers and offering employment on the basis of party support, hence, stifling the movement in a gigantic bureaucratic maze.

Crucially then, the state-regulated co-operative institution becomes a means by which the bureaucratic bourgeoisie incorporates independent economic activities in the rural areas, including the non-state regulated forms of peasant co-operation, into a framework of government control; and once these are routinized as they have been, they become an instrument of almost absolute state power in

the village. The state then becomes a usurer under these circumstances, offering credit that draws more and more peasants into a nexus of indebtedness built on buying cheap and selling dear. This, of course, generates changes in the agrarian social relations which we deal with in the next sub-sections. But let us hasten to deal with the history of how those agrarian social relations catapulted out of the neo-colonial state's policy on agricultural production and state-regulated co-operative development.

Between the years 1962-1971 state intervention in agricultural production and co-operative development reflects five strands of specific policy instruments all of which came to be imbibed in Obote's development policy document for Uganda, the Common Man's Charter. These specific policy instruments were: the Progressive Farmer's Scheme, the Tractor Hire (Service) Scheme, Rural Credit Scheme, Group Farming Scheme, and the highend use of the co-operative institution as a Government policy instrument. Later during the period under the Idi Amin regime (1971-79) state intervention in agriculture took the form of a Crop Production Campaign that aimed at doubling cash crop production by the peasants.

6.1.1 'Progressive Farmers' Scheme

In the immediate years following independence, in those areas of Uganda where communal agricultural production was still dominant, the neo-colonial state policy attempted to create and consolidate a group of 'progressive farmers' i.e. *Kulak* farmers.²¹ A facet of the Progressive Farmers Scheme was the provision of institutional credit to producers through the Uganda Credit and Savings Bank. The Scheme was administered by the Department of agriculture in conjunction with the Bank.

But as is clear from the name the scheme aimed at the rich/*Kulak* farmers rather than the mass of peasant producers. Moreover, the default rates for loan repayment proved very high. State commitment to the loan scheme for progressive farmers also declined. In 1964, the programme was suspended. In its stead the state embarked on yet another form of rural credit scheme, administered through the network of co-operative unions and societies in the country.


6.1.2: Tractor Hire Scheme

In those areas where private property in land already existed, the object of state policy was to subsidize the rich farmer's cost of production by providing him with a

"tractor hire service". The tractor hire service began in the post war period, when colonial economic policy was trying to consolidate an indigenous propertied class. Thus, whereas there were only twenty tractors in Uganda in 1954,²² at independence, 40 tractors were run by the Government and by 1964, the programme was 390 tractors and had another 215 on order.²³

However, in the relatively less populated Lango cotton zone where the average size of farm is about nine acres per household, the tractor hire service was mainly utilized by the rich peasants with 20 or more acres, or group farms.²⁴ In order to increase the efficiency of the tractor service, the Government decentralized the tractor mechanization unit by establishing different grades of workshops in various areas throughout the country where tractors would be repaired and serviced.²⁵ But, land clearing services were offered at subsidized rates. For example, despite the fact that operating expenses continually increased over the years, the Government's fixed charge to the farmer was never increased or revised. Total cost per running hour in 1969 was Shs. 76/88/= whereas charge per hour were Shs. 24/70/=,²⁶ resulting in a subsidy of Shs. 51/98/= per hour, which was over 200% hourly subsidy.

A study by Diana Hunt in Lango district reveals that



the scheme was riddled with a number of problems. Such that by 1966 all the tractors which had been acquired with credit by individual farmers were out of service, due to cost and logistical difficulties of maintenance.²⁷ Furthermore, Okai, demonstrates that labour costs for two ploughing operations which could be performed by tractor were only Shs. 60/= per acre with the use of hand labour only, as opposed to Shs. 85/= for the tractor (a rental rate which recovered less than half the real operating costs).²⁸ The tractor hire service finally broke down during the Amin regime due to inflation, high tractor charges, and lack of spare parts. The Tractor Hire Services Mechanical Workshops run by the Department of Agriculture also came to a complete halt.

6.1.3: Rural Credit Scheme

The tractor hire service was linked to the Agricultural Credit Scheme. Members of a credit-worthy society could obtain loans through the Agricultural Credit Scheme in order to avail themselves of loans for tractor hire.²⁹ But the credit-worthy society members were mainly the rich peasants. By mid 1967, 876 tractors had been purchased through the scheme. The Government also encouraged the acquisition by private individuals i.e progressive farmers of tractors of their own and gave subsidies on the purchase of tractors

amounting to Shs. 4,000/= each.³⁰

Together with the related group farm scheme, co-operative credit was slated to absorb one-fourth of the resources available for agricultural development during the second Five-Year Plan period from 1966 to 1971. Following the recommendations of the IBRD the government launched the scheme with 100 primary societies. The African Development Fund (ADF) provided £ 75,000 through the Uganda Credit and Savings Bank for loans to these societies. Government contribution was Shs. 13m/= for lending to farmers under the scheme³¹. Between 1962-1971 total loan to peasant farmers amounted to Shs. 83,647,435/=.³² Cotton production alone took 46.3% of this amount.³³ The peak of the loans scheme was in 1971 and 1972 when a total of 557 and 519 loans were approved respectively and a total of 139,643 borrowers received credit, with a peak total of 16.4/= m. in 1971 and 16.5/= m. in 1972 lent to the farmers (table 6.1).

TABLE 6.1

co-operative credit scheme summary 1971-1977

Loan Year	No of Loans	Total lent to members	Number of Borrowes
1970	399	4,528,722	47,957
1971	557	16,454,310	62,534
1972	519	16,511,569	77,109
1973	505	7,427,965	NA
1974	403	9,505,980	49,205
1975	421	9,128,691	42,000
1976	250	6,070,935	35,000
1977	225	6,497,878	21,317

Source: Kyamulesire, A.R. (1988), *A History of the Uganda Co-operative Movement 1913-1988*, Kampala: UCA, p. 106.

However, with rapid expansion (appendix 3) the scheme rapidly turned sour. Default rates were soaring, and its impact on productivity was not visible. Vincent shows in her study of a primary cotton society in Teso that the loans were concentrated on the more affluent farmers, who had the best opportunity to evade repayment. Pressures from above could lead to loan recovery campaigns. She notes that in one such campaign in 1967, ten bicycles were confiscated from "small"/young farmers, but no "Big Man" was likely to be successfully prosecuted.³⁴ Young, et al. observe that as farmers learnt that less of their numbers

were making repayment, the loans came to be viewed as a grant. Further, with the swift pace of expansion, state appointed loan officers in the co-operatives found it impossible to render adequate supervision.³⁵ Hunt estimates that, in fact, only about 50 per cent of the loans were actually used for agricultural production purposes in the first place.

6.1.4: Group Farm Scheme

Co-operative Farming Groups were established and received support from the post-colonial state. The establishment of the Co-operative Farming Groups was the intention of the state that such group farms would, in the characteristic manner of "modernization" serve as 'shining examples of progress' to peasant agriculture and hence induce peasants to adopt more 'modern' production techniques. However, Co-operative Group Farms merely gave to the 'progressive' farmers as a social group, access to mechanized farming (in the case of Lango, tractor hire service). And, although they controlled collectively or individually the means of production (land) often the benefits of co-operative group farming did not even accrue to peasants but rather to urban and local petty bourgeoisie (civil servants, party cadres, small businessmen) employing

labour drawn from local peasants organized in co-operative labour teams. Thus, the largely untransformed pre-capitalist forms of co-operation in production served as a source of cheap labour for capitalist, 'progressive' farms.

The Group Farm Scheme was a joint exercise between the Department of Co-operative Development and that of Agriculture. It entailed the establishment of large planned farming enterprises to replace the small, unplanned peasant holdings. They were to use mechanization and 'modern' agricultural methods, and were to be formed around an existing primary co-operative cotton marketing society in a given locality.

The societies and members were made to sign two agreements before the state could recognize them as a group farm. The agreements covered the issue of credit and repayment of loans, the rules governing the Group Farm Committee and its functions, the payment of tractor hire services, and the individual responsibilities of each member.³⁶ The group farm was to be managed by a management committee whose membership was to be constituted by state bureaucrats namely; agricultural officer as chairman, the district co-operative officer as secretary, and other members from within the membership of the group farmers. The committee's function was to decide on cropping programme and

allocate plots to individual group farm members. The day to day running of the farm, along the lines approved by the committee were to be handled by a state appointed farm manager.³⁷ The formation and operation of group farms was closely linked to co-operative credit scheme societies. All loans to finance group farming schemes were made through registered co-operative societies.³⁸

Kyamulesire, in assessing why the group farming scheme failed provides the following reasons: "political propaganda against change in land tenure system, production of uneconomic crop (i.e cotton), reluctance of farmers to move from their traditional pices of land or settlements to the group farm, inflation and breakdown of credit system, selection of unsuitable, infertile, and unproductive land, and dishonesty of officials."³⁹

6.2 State Patronage, Support and Control of Co-operatives

State intervention in agriculture also took the form of state support, both political and financial particularly for the *Kulaks*/ 'progressive' farmers as a social group. The larger farmers' organizational base, the co-operative movement, increased its share of marketing and processing cotton. The neo-colonial state introduced the Cotton

(Amendment) Bill of 1963 under which the Co-operative Unions would be subsidized through a Government loan to purchase ginneries. The Unions were required to produce only 10% while Government guaranteed the remaining 90%.⁴⁰ C o - operative ginneries increased from 17 to 31 during the year 1962/3 period; co-operative membership grew from 292,438 in 1962 to 350,009 in 1963; turnover increased from 168,759 (48%) bales in 1962-63 to 209,279 (58%) in 1963-64 season.⁴¹ By 1966, the co-operatives controlled 42 (ie. 36.5%) ginneries out of a total of 115 but had been given control of 75% of the crop by government⁴² (see appendix 3)

In addition, in order to broaden state patronage, the 1963 Co-operative Bill effected some administrative changes among co-operatives. For example, the West Nile Co-operative Union was in 1964, split into the Central West Nile co-operative Union Ltd. South West Nile Co-operative Union Ltd., and Madi Co-operative Union Ltd. In 1968 the Uganda Growers Cooperative Union was split into three: East Mengo Co-operative Union Ltd., West Mengo Cooperative Union Ltd. and Wamala Co-operative Central Union. The Co-operative share of the total crop over the years 1950-1970 are contained in Appendix 4.

The Lint Marketing Board was and still is, by far, the only buyer and seller of lint and cotton seed. In practice,


therefore, the ginnery functioned merely as an agent of the Lint Marketing Board. In the early independence period lint and seed were sold by the Board, at auctions in Kampala, to licensed cotton exporters or to oil mills; direct exports also took place especially to eastern block countries and China.⁴³

In the period 1970-1980, political and economic conditions fundamentally changed under the Amin regime. Cotton production fell to uneconomical levels and Unions experienced losses but due to the monopoly they had acquired, they continued to gin cotton all the same. Cotton prices to peasants hit record low, crop financing was inadequate, farm tools, especially the hoe, were lacking, ginneries were breaking down due to lack of spare parts and transport was a problem. The Amin regime decided to squash the co-operative monopoly of buying and ginning cotton by decree in 1976. But no private buyer or ginner got involved for the reason that it was an unpaying sector. Figure 6.1 shows the drastic decline in total cotton marketed between 1969-1987.

In the absence of a local capitalist bourgeoisie to take over the ginneries, the Amin regime resorted to foreign loans which merely drew the peasants into debt. Under the cotton ginneries project the state obtained Africa

Development Bank (ADB)-Iraq loan to the tune of US \$ 56 million.⁴⁴ Although the project was intended to increase ginning capacity and improve ginning standards, cotton production did not increase correspondingly. Cotton production plummeted so much so that ginneries were being erected or rehabilitated where peasants had long abandoned.

Figure 6.1
THE DECLINE IN TOTAL COTTON MARKETED 1969-1987



cotton growing in favour of other cash crops, such as maize, beans, simsim or raising cattle. In 1988 a fresh campaign was launched by the Museveni government in support of the Emergency Cotton Production Programme (ECPP) with the sponsorship of UNDP/World Bank fund.

However a co-operative, like a political party, is an organizational form; to understand its political significance it is necessary to analyse its social content i.e the social groups that control the co-operative and in whose interests the organization works.

First, the co-operative movement in Uganda is built from bottom to top (or top to bottom). At the bottom are the members who form the village Cotton Growers' Primary Societies (G.C.S) The primary society is responsible for the buying of peasants' seed cotton and to deliver them to the district Union. The primary society does not operate beyond the village level. All primary societies in a district join together to form the Union at the district level. In the case of Lango, the Lango co-operative Union, Ltd. with headquarters at Odokomit, in Lira town. The district co-operative Union's task is to process or gin peasants' seed cotton into lint cotton; to market this to the Lint Marketing Board; provide transport to the primary societies; arrange financial facilities i.e manage crop finance at the

district level; and procure inputs for members.⁴⁵

The primary society is managed by a committee.⁴⁶ In defining the role of members and that of the committee the 1963 Co-operative Societies Rules is very explicit. Rule 16 states that:

*"The members are the owners of the society and have a right in the control of their organization ... the supreme authority in a registered society shall be vested in the general meeting of [these] members at which every member has a right to attend and vote on all questions ... [Rule 25]... the committee shall be the controlling authority of the society and direct its affairs subject to any directions from a general meeting...."*⁴⁷

TABLE 6.2

THE OCCUPATION/POSITION OF THE COMMITTEE MEMBERS OF OTWON AND ALENGA G.C.S. 1992

Position/Occupation	Number	%
Poor Peasant farmer	4	22.2
Former chief	1	5.6
Former School teacher	4	22.2
Rich peasant farmer	2	11.0
Petty trader	5	27.8
Produce dealer	1	5.6
Former police officer	1	5.6
Total	18	100.0

Source: Field Research data (1992).

However, at the village primary society level, the committee members are usually composed of what Brett has termed the "big men" of the village - those who are already

relatively well placed in terms of the local social situation.⁴⁸

The vested interests of these committee members, is well captured in the Report of the Committee of Inquiries into the Affairs of All Co-operatives

*"....you find many different categories of people who sit on Union boards... people who secure elections to the committee membership for ulterior motives, and these are many and varied:- (a)... [to] have a tremendous opportunity of acquiring widespread popularity, if they can play their cards very well... Those who are ambitious and do very well can, easily command the respect of their electorates and often jump onto this opportunity to enhance their personal prestige and rise to higher positions in government... These have turned committee membership into a mere stepping stone or a tool in the attainment of their own ends (b) There is also a class of people who secure elections ... purely for personal gains,.... are merely interested in pillaging as much as possible from the movement...."*⁴⁹

Indeed, as was to be revealed by the Report of the Committee, state-regulated co-operatives has become the organizational means for capital accumulation for the rich farmers, traders and co-operative society or union officials who controll the committees and thus the surplus fund. In Lango, for example, the Inquiry uncovered instances of

corruption and private embezzlement totaling Shs. 131,537/95, all being monies taken by 5 ginnery managers, 1 chief accountant 1 produce manager, 2 supervisors, 2 cashiers, and 3 committee primary society treasures.⁵⁰ At Aroca G.C.S the committee members were accused to the district co-operative office by the RCI Chairman for selling the society's iron-sheets to a businessman in the village, embezzling Shs. 376,065/= and selling the society's cotton weighing scale."⁵¹ In 1992 the Secretary Manager for Lango Co-operative Union was sacked on Radio Uganda by the Commissioner for Co-operative's amidst accusations of embezzlement of Lango Co-operative Union funds.⁵²

This primitive accumulation tendency by those who control the co-operative would not be possible without critical assistance from the State. First of all the purchase of private ginneries by the co-operative movement was not from funds accumulated from market operations or members' contributions but was from government loans at below-market rates of interest.⁵³ Secondly following independence, the petty-bourgeoisie state repealed the 1946 Act - which gave the colonial state strict control over the financial operations of the co-operatives - and replaced it with the Co-operative Societies Act (1963), which reduced the co-operative department to an advisory capacity and

granted financial autonomy to the co-operatives. In other words while the flow of state funds to the co-operatives increased, state control over the expenditure of those same funds declined. Moreover, the control of the co-operative is vested not in members but in entrenched committees. Because of state financial support, and therefore, the need to control and regulate the co-operative movement, the petty-bourgeois state has put in place an elaborate bureaucratic structure to run the movement (see Appendix 5).

The implication of all these is obviously loss of control by peasant producers in the affairs of state-regulated co-operatives. Our analysis of field data in respect of members' participation in the affairs of the primary society reveals that less than 50% of household heads we interviewed attend G.C.S General meetings, when such meetings are to discuss cotton marketing. Yet, over 50% attendance is realised if failure to attend implies reprisal from the chiefs eg. road or store repairing which are regarded as community work (table 6.3) This means that less and less peasants regard the state-regulated co-operative organization as their own (peasants' organization). Instead it is viewed as a state business institution.

TABLE 6.3

MEMBER PARTICIPATION IN MEETINGS OF
COTTON GCS IN ALENGA AND OTWON, 1990-1992

Year	Number of Meetings	Reasons for Meeting	Members in Attendance (%)
1990	4	(a) Store repair	62
		(b) General Meeting	25
		(c) To discuss cotton marketing	15
		(d) Road repair	58
1991	4	(a) General Meeting	27
		(b) Road Repair	71
		(c) To discuss embezzlement by officials	87
		(d) To discuss cotton marketing	21
1992	1	(a) General Meeting	23

Source: Minute Record books at Alenga and Otwon GCS 1990, 1991, 1992.

FOOTNOTES

1. See, for example, Alavi, H. (1972), "The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh", *New Left Review* 74:59-81; Saul, J.S. (1974a), "The State in Postcolonial Societies: Tanzania", in: *The Socialist Register 1974* (Millibrand, R. and J. Saville eds.), London: Merlin Press, pp. 349-72; Mamdani, M. (1975), 'Class Struggles in Uganda', *Review of African Political Economy* 4:26-61; Shivji, (1976), *Class Struggles in Tanzania*, New York/London: Monthly Review Press; Leys, C. (1982), "Capital Accumulation, Class Formation and Dependency: Kenya, in: Fransman, M. (ed.) (1982), *Industry and Accumulation in Africa*, London: Heinemann, pp. 170-92; Ziemann, W. and M. Lanzendorfer (1977), "The State in Peripheral Societies", in: *The Socialist Register 1977* (Milliband, R. and J. Saville, eds.), London: Marlin Press, pp. 143-77 and Goulbourne, H. (ed) (1979), *Politics and State in the Third World*, London: MacMillan Press.
2. Refer to Apter, D. (1965), *The Politics of Modernization*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
3. Murray, R. (1967), "Second Thoughts on Ghana," *New Left Review* 42:25-39.
4. See Saul, *op. cit* and Mamdani, *op. cit*.
5. Ziemann and Lanzendorfer, *op. cit.*; Shivji, *op. cit.* and Meillasoux, C. (1970), "A Class Analysis of the Bureaucratic Proces in Mali", *Journal of Development Studies* 6(2):97-110.
6. Alavi, *op. cit.* and Saul, *op. cit*.
7. Ziemann and Lanzendorfer, *op. cit*.
8. Saul, *op. cit*.
9. Leys, C. (1975), *Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Political Economy of Neo-Colonialism*, London: Heinemann; Leys, (1982), *op. cit.*; Swainson, N. (1977), "The Rise of a National Bourgeoisie in Kenya", *Review of African Political Economy* 8:39-56 and N. Swainson (1980), *The Development of Corporate Capitalism in*

Kenya, 1918-77, London: Heinemann.

10. Mamdani, *op. cit.*; Hutchful, however, observes that this distinction may not be so-clear-cut because the ruling factions of the petty-bourgeoisie may utilize state property to generate property controlled directly by them, thereby increasingly diversifying from their immediate base in the state, and, in addition, assuming the role of 'businessmen', 'entrepreneurs' and 'farmers' - see Hutchful, E. (1979), "A Tale of Two Regimes: Imperialism, the Military and Class in Ghana", *Review of African Political Economy* 14:36-55.
11. See for example earlier studies by Mamdani, (1984a), "Analyzing the Agrarian Question: The Case of a Buganda Village" in: *MAWAZO* 5(3): 47-64 and M. Mamdani (1984b), "Forms of Labour and Accumulation of capital: Analysis of a Village in Lango, Northern Uganda", in: *MAWAZO* 5(4): 44-65.
12. Mamdani, (1976), *Politics and Class Formation in Uganda*, New York London: Monthly Review Press.
13. Obote, A.M. (1970), *The Common Man's Charter*, Entebbe: Government Printer.
14. See for example, *Co-op News*, No.2 (May, 1966), "The Uganda Cooperative Central Union, Ltd., and Marketing of Economic Minor Crops", "... doubts that existed as to the determination of the Co-operatives were cleared by the tone of 'We will not go back', and 'We want a monopoly now', which dominated all speeches at the two conferences." Also refer to Berg, J. (1964), 'Socialism and Economic Development in Tropical Africa', in: *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 78: pp. 558-560.
15. Uganda Government (1961), *First Five-Year Development Plan*, Entebbe: Government Printer, p. 26.
16. The elements of the "commanding height" strategy were three - fold: (1) establishment of new state corporations and expansion and reorganization of existing parastatal bodies inherited from the colonial period; (2) setting forth a more active state role in economic development in the Second Five - Year Plan; and (3) the ambitious nationalisation measures issued

as part of the 1969-70. 'Move to the Left' - See Jorgensen, J.J. (1981), *Uganda: A Mordern History*, London: Croom Helm, pp. 231-237; Mandani, M. (1976), *op. cit.*, pp. 281-5 and Mamdani, M. (1983), *Imperialism and Fascism in Uganda*, London: Heinemann, pp. 277-78. The 'Move to the Left' consisted of five documents by Obote: (1) The National Service Proposals (Oct. 1969) which called for one to two years of compulsory national service by every able-bodied Ugandan; (2) The Common Man's charter (Dec. 1969) which outlined the ideological framework of the Move to the Left and called for the nationalisation of private firms and *mailo* land as a way of placing the control of the means of production in the 'hands of the people' in effect, into the hands of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie; (3) Communication from the Chair (April 1970); (4) The Nakivubo Pronouncement (May 1970); and (5) The 'One-plus three' Election Proposal (July/Aug. 1970). These documents are contained in A.M. Obote (1970), *The Common Man's Charter*, Entebbe: Government printer, and the fifth document is in Obote, A.M. (1970), *Proposals for New Methods of Election of Representatives of the People of Parliament*, Kampala: Milton Obote Foundation. For a discussion of these documents, see Mamdani, *ibid.*; Jorgensen, *ibid.*

17. *Government White Paper on Group Farming Scheme* (1964), quoted in Crowford Young, et al. (eds.) (1981), *Co-operatives and Development: Agricultural Politics in Ghana and Uganda*, London: The University of Wisconsin Press, p. 26.
18. *ibid*
19. Okereke, O. (1974), *The Economic Impact of the Uganda Co-operatives*, Nairobi: EALB, p.9
20. Uganda Government (1961), *op. cit.*, p. 26.
21. Mamdani, (1976), *op. cit.*, p. 229.
22. Uganda Goverment (1954), *White Paper on Mechanization*, p. 6, quoted in Mamdani, M. (1976), *op. cit.*, p. 230.
23. Uganda Parliamentary Debates, *Hansard* vols. 27-30, July 9, 1964, p. 2373 in Mamdani, M. *ibid.*, p. 231.

24. Mamdani, M. *ibid.*, p. 230.
25. The Tractor Hire Service and Mechanization Station for Lango zone was located at Ngetta DFI, 4 miles North of Lira town, while the Group Farming Scheme was at Aler Group Farm, 10 miles North of Lira on Lira-Kitgum road.
26. In Busoga the actual cost of running a tractor was shs. 111/90/= an hour but the farmer was only charged shs. 43/42/=, which amounted to an hourly subsidy of shs. 68/48= - over 150% subsidy see Report of the Mechanical Cultivation Officer in Busoga quoted in Mamdani, (1976), *op. cit.*, p. 231.
27. Hunt, Dianna (1975), *Credit for Agriculture: A case study of Uganda*, Nairobi: EAPH, p. 95.
28. Okai, Mathew (1972), "Some Aspects of Agricultural Labour Use in the Main Short Grass Zone of Uganda" in: *East African Journal of rural Development*, 5 (1&2):103-122. See also Okai, M. (1966), "Some Aspects of Labour use in Agriculture of Lango District of Uganda", *Rural Development Research Senior Paper*, Kampala: Makerere University.
29. Kyamulesire, A.R. (1988), *A History of the Uganda Co-operative Movement 1913-1988*, Kampala: UCA. pp. 98-101.
30. *ibid.*
31. Kyamulesire, A.R. *op.cit.*, p. 103
32. *ibid.*
33. *ibid.*
34. Vincent, J. (1970), "Local Co-operatives and Parochial Politics in Uganda: Problems of Organization, Representation and Communication", *Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies* VIII: 3-17.
36. Kyamulesire, A.R., *op. cit.*, p. 120.
37. *ibid.*
38. *ibid.*, pp. 118,125

39. *ibid.*
40. Sessional Paper No.5, "Proposals for the Future of Cotton Industrys, 1963", p. 7. Also Uganda Government, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Co-operatives, *Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Cotton Industry, 1966*; Entebbe: Government Printer, pp. 24-5.
41. Kyamulesire, *op. cit.*, p. 58
42. Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Co-operatives, *Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Cotton industry 1966*. Entebbe: Government Printer, pp. 24-5. Also Laumer, H. (1970), "Channels of Distribution in Uganda, in: Zajadacz, P. (ed.) (1970), *Studies in Production and Trade in East Africa*, Munchen/New York: Weltforum Verlag/Humanities Press Inc., pp. 358- 95.
43. *ibid*,; In the 1965-66 Season, 17 exporters had licences. Among them the Liverpool Uganda Co. Ltd.; East Africa Cotton Exporters Ltd. and Jamal Ramji & Co. Ltd. were the most prominent. These companies' total share of the market was about 50%. During the 1967 season the price of auctioned lint varied between shs. 1/90 and shs. 1/95 per lb. For every lb of raw cotton the farmer received shs. -/40. Since 3 lbs of raw cotton make 1 lb of lint, that is equivalent of shs. 1/20 per lb of lint, the ginnery received a processing margin of shs. - /40.
44. Kyamulesire, *op. cit.*, p. 61.
45. Muwanga, Samuel (1992), "History of Organization of Coops in Uganda", *The New Vision*, (Sept. 24), pp. 10-11.
46. These rules have since been amended - see *The Co-operative Societies Regulations, 1992* and *The Co-operative Societies Statute, 1991 Esp. Part II, Sects. 12-18*.
47. Uganda Government: (1967), *The Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Affairs of All Co-operative Unions in Uganda, 1967*, Entebbe: Government Printer, p. 28.

48. Brett, E.A. (1970), "Problems of Co-operative Development in Uganda", in: Apthorpe, R.J. (ed.) (1970), *Rural Co-operatives and Planned Change in Africa*, Geneva: UNRISD, pp. 95-156.
49. Uganda Government (1967), *op. cit.*, p. 30
50. *ibid.*, pp. 317, 319, 320, 326.
51. Akalo RCI Chairman's letters to the District Co-operative officer, Apac dated 6.9.88, and to the General Secretary Lango Co-operative Union dated 10.12.89, The Department of Co-operatives, Commerce and Marketing, Apac district, *File Coop. 6/37.16.*
52. Similar reports of corruption, embezzlement abounds in the Uganda Press. Fore example, "Farmers Demand Cotton Money" *The Economy*, Feb. 26, 1991; "Farmers Caution on Political Influence in Unions", *Financial Times*, Oct. 11, 1990; "Lira Farmers Boo Minister", *Sunday vision*, April 18, 1993, p. 1-2.
53. Mamdani, (1976), *op. cit.* p., 235

CHAPTER SEVEN

CO-OPERATIVES AND SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION OF THE PEASANTRY

7.1 On Agrarian Classes

By social differentiation we refer to a process that divides the peasantry into groups whose conditions of life are defined by qualitatively different production relations and material conditions.¹ It is a process associated with the development of commodity production in agriculture, and is based on the penetration of capitalist relations of production developed during the colonial era.

The penetration of capital into Lango gave rise to the process of social differentiation among the countryside dwellers. To translate this process of social differentiation into class terms is a difficult and risky undertaking. Nonetheless, peasant differentiation in response to increasing commoditization is a reality even though it may have been a slow and protracted process differing in intensity within and between societies. Significant differentiation of the peasantry has been along labour and instruments of production variables. Admittedly, it is therefore pointless to insist on aggregating rural dwellers as though they were a monolithic lot.

Marx² writing on the issue of capitalism in agriculture on the basis of his studies of Britain and continental Europe, maintained that when capitalism develops in agriculture, it brings about fundamental changes in the existing system of production one of which is that the rural class structure tends to polarize into agrarian capitalists and rural proletarians. The peasantry disappears and joins the ranks of either the capitalist (the rich) or the working class (the poor). This transitional character of the peasantry was also reiterated by Engels, when he said that the peasant:

"...like every other survival of past mode of production is hopelessly doomed. He is a future proletariat".³

But Marx and Engels were writing in a specific historical and social context: that of a transition from petty commodity production to capitalist production in agriculture. Thus their emphasis on the development of wage labour that gave rise to capital accumulation by one stratum of the peasantry (the rich) and the progressive proletarianization of another stratum, (the poor), as the central factor in peasant differentiation.

Mao Tse-Tung⁴ also writing in a different historical and social context: that of an imperialist dominated society

emphasized not only the employment of wage labour factor, but also the tenancy relations as routes by which a stratum of the peasantry is enriched at the expense of another. That is: in Mao's China then exploitation could not only be based on terms of labour relations. So that a poor peasant needed not necessarily enter the labour market to be exploited, but could be regularly exploited by being forced to become a tenant.

Although we adopt, in this study, Mao's analytical categorization of rural Chinese society in the 1920s, as we view the model as effective concepts which within our analytical framework does usefully structure and illuminates the explanation of our empirical data, it ought to be borne in mind that the differentiation process proceeds by way of multiple routes and, therefore, each historical and social context requires concrete analysis in its own right. This is perhaps one major lesson that we draw from the works by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Mao.

The Mao hierarchy of agrarian classes when applied to the household level data that we collected for the 159 households we studied broadly leaves us with a class structure which include the strata of capitalist farmer, the peasantry class and land labourers. However, still considerable difficulty can be discerned among the peasantry

as we show below. Class distinctions are often very fluid and lines of demarcation between them are not easy to draw; because it is not uncommon to find peasant household which both sell and buy labour power for different purposes and at different moments in the annual cycle of economic activity.⁵ It is, in fact, this fluidity of the agrarian class structure that ought to all the more prompt researchers grappling with agrarian studies in situation different from that of Marx, Lenin or Mao, to engage in concrete empirical analysis of agrarian classes in their own specific historical and social contexts.

In the case of Uganda, very few studies have been carried out that tries to gauge the process of social differentiation among the peasantry there. A study conducted by Mamdani⁵² uncovered the actual processes of peasant exploitation in Lango, and how those exploitative relations objectively differentiates the peasantry (and other classes) in a multiplicity of routes. In his research findings Mamdani provides us with a useful criteria for such an analysis, criteria which to us appear to hold relevancy to our own study. He writes:

"The pool of unequal relations that differentiate peasant households from one another may develop around any one of the elements of the labour process: land, labour or its implements. This

pool can include, besides wage labour and land tenancy relations, the renting of major implements of labour... that is households with roughly equal landholdings [as in Lango] may yet belong to different strata because of unequal access to implements of labour..."⁵³

Since on the average, land is still plentiful in Lango, it is difficult to differentiate the peasantry on the basis of the actual size of their holdings - most of them own vast tracts of unutilized land. Neither can we accept Government survey data (especially agricultural surveys) which places emphasis on income indices and, therefore differentiate peasants into low income, middle (average) income or rich income groups. For, while the quantitative data so presented enables us to differentiate the peasantry on the basis of income differentials, such data do not, however, allow us to distinguish among the peasantry strata with different class characteristics.

Since it is clear that class distinction is fluid with many peasants selling and/or buying labour, it is perhaps more useful to pay greater attention to both labour buying and selling by a household, and the type of labour employed by the households in the various strata of the peasantry.

Applying this to our own household level field data we obtained quantitative data on the basis of which we were

able to distinguish the agrarian classes in the two study villages as presented in table (even though admittedly, we are still dealing with very fluid demarcation lines between the strata.

TABLE 7.1

CLASS	DISTRIBUTION	OF	HOUSEHOLDS	IN	OTWON	AND	ALENGA
Village	Percentage distribution of household in agrarian classes						
	Capitalist farmers	Rich peasants	Middle peasants	Poor peasants	Land labour	Total	
<i>Alenga</i>							
# Households	-	5	11	56	9	81	
%	-	6.2	13.6	69.1	11.1	100	
<i>Otwon</i>							
# Households	1	7	19	117	15	159	
%	0.6	4.4	12	73.6	9.4	100	

Source: Author's tabulation of household level data from field research, 1992.

7.1.1 Capitalist Class

The capitalist is that who was together with his household members completely divorced from the material production process. Exploitation of cheap labour plus profits from sale of merchandise and agricultural produce constituted his major source of income. His agricultural production was mainly for sale. He also bought agricultural

produce especially simsim, millet, beans and maize cheaply from the peasants and sold these dearly later to the same peasants and produce merchants and educational institutions in Lira town.

The sole capitalist in the two villages studied employed four permanent labourers and he was the only household head in the two villages who admitted the ability to hire tractor service for ploughing his land on a regular basis. This class constituted 0.6 percent of the households we sampled for the two villages and he owned up to 13.69% of the total land calculated for the two villages (see table 7.2). He leased the land in 1978.

7.1.2 Peasantry Class

The bulk of the classes in the two villages is constituted by the peasantry class as a whole. But the peasantry class is highly differentiated further with the **Poor Peasant** stratum forming the bulk of it. They constitute up to 117 households i.e 73.6% of the total households interviewed. The poor peasants are characterised by a high degree of self-engagement of their own labour power and that of their household members (family labour) in their own fields, for up to seven days a week.

They do not at all hire in others labour power yet

maximumly hire out their own and that of household members for wages. This is done in two ways: either by contracting out their own individual labour power i.e casual wage labour, or their turn(s) of co-operative labour (*Awak*). In fact, our findings show that it is this stratum of the peasantry that is highly involved in *Awak* in comparison to other strata (see table below). This strata comprising up to 73.6 per cent of the total number of households in the two villages, owned 60.84 per cent of the total land calculated for the villages, with an average of 3.8 acres per household.

Close to the poor peasants is the **Middle Peasants**. These are those households whose major source of income is derived solely from the use of family labour on family plots. The middle peasants neither hire out their own labour and that of their household members, nor are they involved in renting the instruments of labour such as tractor, hoe, and plough. But this class is very diverse. While they all exhibit the above characteristics, at various points during the year some of them get involved in wage labour once in a while, such that while some, though predominantly using family labour do, albeit irregularly, support their family by some form of exploitative relations in the form of hiring wage labour and/or *Awak* co-operative labour groups. The form

of payment being more in kind than cash. This internal differentiation in the middle peasantry means that some middle peasant households are better off while others are not, and, therefore, would require us to disentangle the class into upper-middle peasants and lower-middle peasants. However, for convenience we shall lump them together under the rubric: middle peasants.

Our analysis of the land distribution in the two villages show that the middle peasant stratum own 8.32 per cent of the total land in the two villages with an average of 3.2 acres per household. The stratum constitute 12 percent of the households sampled. Together with the poor peasants they constitute 85.6 per cent of the total households sampled and owned up to 69.16 per cent of the total land. This means that although the poor and middle peasant strata form the majority in the countryside and own the largest proportion of land, the average land owned per household is only 1.51 acres which is 11.9 times less than the average land owned by the rich peasant households.

TABLE 7.2

CLASS DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLDS BY TOTAL AND AVERAGE LAND OWNED
BY EACH STRATA

Agrarian Classes	Distribution of households by Total and Average land owned by each class		
	Households %	Total Land owned %	Average Land owned (acres)
Capitalist	0.6	13.69	100
Rich Peasant	4.4	17.15	17.9
Middle Peasant	12	8.32	3.2
Poor Peasants	73.6	60.84	3.8
Land Labourers	9.4	-	-
Total	100	100	

Source : Field Research data (1992)

This skewed land distribution pattern leaves the majority in the countryside to exist on holdings which are far below what they require to meet their own needs. It also has serious implications for any further redistribution or sub-division of land through traditional inheritance patterns. But above all it is also explanative of the changes in the mode of access to land by new entrants and particularly, the trend land borrowing and land lending is taking in rural areas.

Table 7.3 below shows the relationship between agrarian classes and land borrowing and lending. Up to 21 poor peasant households reported that they borrowed or lent out land. The rest of the other strata did not borrow but lent out land to the poor peasant households for a duration of one crop season. It is clear that the reason for these other classes lending out land is to avoid the cost of opening new plots which are often bushy.

TABLE 7.3

AGRARIAN CLASSES AND LAND BORROWING AND LENDING

Agrarian Classes	Total No of households	No borrowing & lending land	Land borrowed (acres)	Land lent (acres)
Capitalist	1	1	-	15
Rich Peasants	7	3	-	10
Middle Peasants	19	5	12	4
Poor Peasants	117	21	51	23
Land Labourers	15	4	4	-
Total	159	34	67*	52*

Source: Field Research data

Note: * Some of this land is borrowed from outside the two villages we studied while at the same time land is lent to peasants in the neighboring villages.

The poor peasants borrowed and also lent land amongst themselves. 51 acres was borrowed while 23 acres was lent

out by them. Borrowed land, however, is not transmissible to the borrowers. The borrower enjoys usufructuary rights only as long as the land-lender does not himself need that piece of land. Land is lent for not more than two crop seasons and such land is sometimes resumed at will by the owner. But more important to underscore is the fact that the land available within the poor peasantry for borrowing and lending is rapidly becoming overcrowded and worked. Continuous fragmentation of landholdings through the existing inheritance patterns coupled with the leasing of large tracts of land by capitalist farmers is fast leading to shortage of land for the poor. It was evident in the two villages studied that land among the poor peasants has been subdivided through the traditional inheritance pattern into tiny family possessions, making it difficult for new entrants to acquire any additional land. And the most affected sector of the poor peasant households seem to be the women and the youth. So that because sale of land is still minimum in Lango, land borrowing is increasingly becoming the most common form of access to additional land. And all these carry a grim picture of land sufficiency for the poor. But it could also ultimately affect their participation in the non-state regulated forms of cooperatives, since access to or ownership of land forms the

basis upon which this form of co-operation is organized.

7.1.3 Rich Peasants

The rich peasants engage their own labour only once or twice a week on their own fields, regularly hiring in others' labour power. They do not hire out their own labour power and that of their individual household members. Their main source of income is thus dependent on family labour and others' labour with whom they have an exploitative relation. They constituted 4.4 per cent of our total population. Generally, their and their wives' role on the family farm is supervision of both household labour and wage labourers. The rich peasant stratum owned 17.15 per cent of the total land in the two villages with an average of 17.9 acres per household. Three households here were found to be lending out a total of 10 acres of land.

7.1.4 Land Labourers

Finally, is the stratum of land labourers or rural proletariats whose major source of income is exclusively the wage they earn by selling their labour power. This class own no productive property, whether land, simple implements or instruments of production. They constitute 9.4 per cent of the households sampled. Although constituting a small number, the fact of their existence signify a process towards rural

proletarianization. In terms of land distribution this class can be described as landless. Four of them were found to have been employed by the capitalist farmer as permanent wage labourers. The capitalist had lent them one acre each on which they had built huts and grown simsim and cassava crops.

7.2 Social Differentiation and Ownership of Means of Production

We have seen above that the poor peasant households own on the average 3.8 acres of land which is 0.6 acres above the average land size owned by the middle peasant household. We have also noted that comparatively, therefore, the poor peasant household cannot be said to be land poor.

TABLE 7.4

PEASANT HOUSEHOLDS' OWNERSHIP OF LAND, LAND UNDER CULTIVATION, LABOUR AND IMPLEMENTS IN ALENGA AND OTWON

Peasant Strata	Average land owned & cultivate per household (acres)		Average labour per household	Average Implements per household	
	owned	cultivated		hoes	plough
Rich Peasant	17.90	6.40	3.12	5.60	0.14
Middle Peasant	3.20	2.50	2.62	4.23	-
Poor Peasant	3.80	2.35	3.60	3.06	-

Source: Author's Tabulation of Field Data

However, when we look at the data (table 7.4) pertaining to that land which the poor peasant is able to bring under cultivation in one year we find that it is only 2.35 acres (i.e 61.8% of the land owned, while the middle peasant household is able to cultivate 2.5 acres which is 78.5% of the land owned by the household (although owning less land, on the average, than the poor peasant household).

The explanation for the difference between the amount of land under cultivation by the poor and middle peasants does not seem to be answered by the amount of family labour available per household in the two strata. Because as the data in table 7.4 reveals the labouring strength of a poor peasant household is more than that of the middle peasant household. By tabulating the number of adults in each household sampled and assigning 1 point to every adult of working age in the household (i.e above 15 years of age), we calculated the labouring capacity of households per strata. The results show that the average labouring capacity of the poor peasant household is 3.60 while that of the middle peasant household is 2.62.

But it does appear that in spite of its high labouring capacity the poor peasant household is unable to put to full use that labouring strength available to it due to lack of instruments of labour. This means that the explanation for

the difference in the amount of land a poor peasant household and a middle peasant household is able to cultivate lie in the difference in their ownership of the instruments of production. By adding - up the number of hoes and ploughs owned by each household in the different peasant strata, we also calculated average implement ownership by households in each strata. The result shown in table indicate that while the middle peasant households on the average own 4.23 hoes and 1.2 ploughs, the poor peasant household own only 3.06 hoes (ie 27.66% less than the hoes owned by a middle peasant household), and no ploughs.

The implication of this difference in implement ownership is that, although owning more land on the average, and having a higher labouring strength capacity than the middle peasant household, the poor peasant household is able to till only 2.35 acres as compared to 2.5 acres cultivated by the middle peasants, and this is not because the poor peasant household is land poor or labour poor, but because it is implement poor. In other words, at no moment does the poor peasant household is land poor or labour poor, but because it is implement poor. In other words, at no moment does the poor peasant household have sufficient hoes to fully utilize family labour and therefore be able to bring under cultivation all the land it owns. Apart from being

insufficient in numbers, the poor peasant's hoe is usually blunt and worn-out due to hardships of renewal. Because they own more implements of labour and therefore are able to cultivate more land perhaps also explains why a higher percent of middle peasants are found to be borrowing land than the poor peasants (table 7.3).

But, being implement poor and confronted by the reality of market forces, the poor peasant enters into exploitative relations with the other classes in the countryside. These exploitative relations may take the form of labour relations, relations in trade and relations with the state and state institutions.

FOOTNOTES

1. Mamdani, M. (1984a), "Forms of Labour and Accumulation of Capital: Analysis of a village in Lango, Northern Uganda", *MAWAZO* Vol. 5(4): 44-65 and Mamdani, M. (1985), "Extreme But Not Exceptional: Towards an Analysis of the Agrarian Question in Uganda", *Development Policy and Practice* Paper No. 5, The Open University cf. Mpangala, G.P. (1992), *Major Issues in Tanzania Economic History: Pre-Colonial Economy and social Formations*, Dar es Salaam: University Press, p. 57. ff. 151.
2. Marx, K. (1954), *Capital* Vol. 1, Mosco: Progress Publishers, pp. 715-7. See also F. Engels, "The Peasant Question in France and Germany", in: Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 3 and V.I. Lenin, "The Development of Capitalism in Russia", *Selected Works* Vol. 3.
3. Cited in David Goldman and Michael Redcliff (1981), *From Peasant to Proletarian: Capitalist Development and Agrarian Transitions*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publishers Ltd., p. 5.
4. Mao Tse-Tung, "Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society" *Selected Works* Vol. 1, Peking: Foreign Languages.
5. Bernstein, H. (1979) "Notes on capital and Peasantry", *Review of African Political Economy* 10:60-73.
6. See Mamdani, (1984b) *op. cit.*
7. Mamdani, M. (1985), *op. cit.*, p. 38.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CO-OPERATIVES AND FORMS OF WAGE LABOUR

8.1 Co-operative Labour: Transition from *Wang tic* to *Awak*

Historically co-operative labour organizations developed in response to the objective conditions pertaining in Lango society in the pre-colonial days namely; the undeveloped conditions of production characterised by relatively plentiful land, sparse population and a generally harsh environment. Under such conditions it paid dividends for peasants to cultivate individually-held plots of land in turns on the basis of communal co-operative labour groups, organized on a more or less permanent basis. The beneficiary of the day's cooperative labour offered the local millet brew to the group as a token of appreciation.

Significantly then, for any one member to have access to and reap the benefits of the co-operative system it was necessarily mandatory that every household afforded the local millet brew. It was, however, the total absence of differentiation among the peasant households that allowed the system to function in a way that ensured the equal distribution and access to the cooperative labour by all households in the village.

Both Curley and Tosh observe that with the establishment of colonial law and order, the dissolution of the traditional village - with its high concentration of households and heavy preponderance of a single clan section - took place leaving the basic unit of territorial organization as *Wang tic*, the largest unit within which labour resources were regularly pooled.¹ In other words changing patterns of local settlement meant that descent groups were counting less and less in the membership composition of the *Wang tic*. So that by the 1930s when clan leadership had completely declined as an effective political force, the key position became that of *Adwong Wang tic*. We have already discussed the role and functions of the *Adwong Wang tic* then, and how the colonial state manipulated the position in an abid to co-opt it into the colonial administrative structure.

In addition to these changing conditions there was also taking place simultaneously, the internal differentiation of the peasantry along lines of those who could still continue to afford the local millet brew offered to the co-operative labour group members at the end of the day's work, and those who could no longer meet this mandatory requirement. Increasingly, therefore, there evolved a situation whereby those households who could still afford to provide the local

millet brew participated in the co-operative labour system as recipients of labour, while those who could not, now participated as contributors of labour. Thus, the latter category of households, having been limited by their inability to provide the customary token of traditional millet brew now constituted a pool of cheap labour force. It was always at the peak of crisis that this condition of differentiation among the peasant households emerged and intensified.

In its history the co-operative labour system experienced three crisis points when more and more peasant households were unable to provide millet brew so as to have access to co-operative labour: during the 1928 famine, 1960 draught and the economic hardships under the Amin regime of the 1970s. At each moment the system reorganized itself, principally as a result of pressure from below - ie. measures adapted by the poor peasants to cope with the crisis.

It is the reorganization of *Wang tic* that followed the 1960s draught that reveals a most interesting trajectory in its historical development. The 1960s famine affected different households differently. The majority of the peasants were rendered unable to continue providing millet brew to the co-operative labour groups, therefore, they were

unable to have access to co-operative labour. The outcome of this differentiation was to lead to the complete abolition of the requirement that the beneficiary of co-operative labour offers a token of local brew. Instead all were now required to work equally and to receive labour in turns. The turns being decided by lot not the affordability of millet brew. This then became the basic principle of the co-operative labour.

Furthermore, in an abid to get rid of the tendency by the state to treat the co-operative labour groups and their leaders as synonymous to Government administrative units and state local agents (chiefs) respectively, as we saw earlier, the reorganized co-operative labour system adopted the nomenclature **AWAK** to describe the new form of co-operative labour organization. Its leadership was to be based on no other criteria but elections through secret balloting or raising of hands. The work turns was now determined through lottery. Because of the use of secret ballots and lottery **AWAK** also came to be known as **ALULU**.

The most important reorganization was however in the membership of the new (*Awak*) form of co-operative labour organization. The membership of *Awak* was now exclusively confined to the poor peasant households, that is, those households which were unable to meet the millet brew

requirements. Basically then the emergence of *Awak* was a tacit recognition by the peasants that the community was divided in distinct classes with contradictory interests. *Awak*, therefore, should be understood as a class organization whose class content is the poor peasant households. The significant difference here is that while the original form of co-operative labour, *Wang Tic*, was organized on a territorial basis with all households residing in a particular location constituting the membership of a single *Wang tic* co-operative labour group, the new form of co-operative labour, *Awak* was now, and still is, organized on a strictly class basis with common labour as the basis of common membership, not territory.

8.1.1 The Organizational Structure and Functioning of *Awak*

The formation of a new *Awak* begins with a general meeting of all interested village members. This usually takes place at the beginning of the year. In a village there can be 2-3 *Awak* groups. The purpose of the general meeting is two-fold: to register members to the group (recruitment) and secondly, to carry out the election of the leaders for the year. The first round of work-turns is also decided at the end of this general meeting. The venue of the general

meeting is usually the courtyard of one of the village members agreed upon informally. Membership can also be drawn from the neighbouring villages. Membership in any one *Awak* ranges from 10-30 but 18-22 members is most common. *Awak* is used for opening new gardens, sowing/planting, weeding and sometimes in activities other than digging, such as food store construction. *Awak* owns no land as a group but cultivates individually held family land. Nor does it own implements of production as a group.

The *Awak* is led by a committee: The chairman (*Adwong Awak*), secretary, works-supervisor (*askari*), treasurer and three committee members. The chairman's role is to attend to complaints and disputes and to solve them. He chairs the *Awak* meetings. The secretary keeps the records of the group such as attendance, absence, fines and the records of sequence of turns. The *askari* is responsible for checking on each members' workmanship. Should he identify a member as a rough cultivator, such a member is cautioned at least three times before dismissal. The treasurer keeps the money earned by the group as a whole. He also keeps the money generated from members in fine. For every defaulter whether by absence, bad cultivation or indiscipline, there is a fine which vary from group to group, ranging from Shs. 400/= to Shs. 600/=. The three committee members are advisors to the

members and the committee, while the general membership is expected to check on the performance of all the elected committee members.

In a situation where the *Awak* is big such as '*Note Ber Awak Group* (lit. meaning 'unity is good'), with 32 members, the composition of the committee is such that it caters for the interest of the minority members who are regarded to be special interests categories, and therefore, may also have special problems. For instance, in *Note Ber* the committee was found to be very elaborate including women's advisor and women's *askari*.

As is clear from the functions of the committee members *Awak* operates by well established rules and regulations. Take, for example, the rules of *Note Ber Awak Group* as formulated in 1973 which we translate below (summarised).

Regulations of *Note Ber Awak Group*²:

Ruff digging - warnings is given up to three times and persistence leads to the member paying a fine of Shs. 50/= (revised to Shs. 400/= in 1991) or to dismissal. A members who during his turn deliberately cheats others by extra measurement is fined and asked to pay the cost of the extra measurement in cash. Absence three times consecutively without notice leads to warning, subsequent absences is fined equivalent to the number of days missed. Any member

found to be engaging in rumour-mongering is dismissed without appeal or negotiations.

Should the treasurer misappropriate or lose *Awak* fund, his property worth the loss is confiscated and he, dismissed. Election of leaders is by show of hands at the general meeting. The person to be elected is nominated and seconded. In the same manner is he also removed from leadership. Co-operation with other groups is allowed, but only to do heavier activities. Any member who takes *Awak* outside his/her fields for money without sound reasons is expelled from the group.

What is noticeable from these regulations is the element of popular participation in drawing up the rules and regulations governing the operation of the *Awak* for the common benefit of its members. It is in away representative of or epitomises the existence of real power and authority hinged on the poor peasants' perception of self-governance, popular participation and accountability at the local level for their own social and economic betterment.

However, the objective necessities that confront the labouring poor in the villages is firmly wed-locked in a capitalist dominated market. The peasant is constantly in need of money (cash), either to purchase consumption necessities like paraffin, matches, salt, cloth and

medicine, or to buy producer necessities like hoes or a panga or to pay state taxes - needs which cannot be met within the institutional framework of *Awak*. Necessarily, therefore, the peasant finds himself compelled to voluntarily engage in exploitative labour relations. So that we find that *Awak* itself, by and large, has been drawn into the broader dictates of capitalist relations, the nature of which is the strong pull towards its use as a wage labour team. This then is the point at which capitalist relations articulate with the non-capitalist forms. Our study findings show that *Awak* used as wage labour team benefits not the poor peasant members but the village capitalists and rich peasants.

The significant point is that although, with a change from *Wang tic* to *Awak*, the poor peasants did succeed in changing the internal organization and structure of the co-operative labour system, the harsh objective conditions that face the poor peasant households, which make them implement poor, and, therefore, persistently food and cash deficient - the overall socio-economic and political environment, have not changed. Moreover, the very reality of capitalist penetration which generated social differentiation still continues to prevail in the countryside. Now, once confronted with this reality the members of *Awak* in order to

meet their household cash demands, instead of taking the work teams to their own fields when their turns come, resort to using their turns of co-operative labour in the fields of the capitalist and rich peasants and receive cash worked for by the whole group. Mamdani aptly puts it that in this sense the co-operative labour while appearing to be co-operative in form is, in fact, in its social content a disguised form of wage labour.³

There are variations in *Awak* though. We need not deal with them in any details here since they all work on the same principles as we have discussed above. One variant is called *Awak Otino* (Children's co-operative labour) while the other is *Awak Gede* or *Gede-gede* i.e. small scale or minor *Awak* usually consisting of 2-4 members (of both males and females and working for a shorter time usually 4.00 pm - 6.00 pm in the evening). It is a casual arrangement and only light work is performed under this arrangement. It has no strict rules regarding turns and measurements. The most urgent work is done first, sometimes repeatedly until completed. In some areas in Lango there is also *Awak Amon* (Women's *Awak*) whose members are exclusively women.

8.1.2 Akiba

During the 1970s political and economic crisis in Uganda, the Idi Amini military regime banned all sorts of meetings of more than two persons. Co-operative labour groups became automatically affected. Which in turn affected the very foundation of agricultural production. It is during this decade that household food security became a problem and famine became rampant. Cotton production also plummeted as figure 6.1 shows for the whole of Uganda. Due to state harassment the peasants abandoned the cultivation of cash (cotton) crop production. The production of food crops was now based on family labour and so the harvest was always too small to sustain a household throughout the year. Moreover, part of the harvest had to be sold for cash to meet household necessities such as soap, salt, paraffin, dress, health care, etc.

At the peak of the 1970s crisis a form of co-operative organization called *Akiba*⁴ emerged among the peasants. Having abandoned cultivation on the basis of co-operative labour due to state intervention, the role of millet brew shifted from being a token of appreciation offered to co-operative labour members to sale for cash. Under this arrangement the peasants instead of contributing labour in turns now contributed cash in turns. With the cash the

household was supposed to meet its basic subsistence needs, pay tax, purchase meat for christmas celebrations, pay school fees, etc. There have been variations in its organization too. During the 1970 decade a variant of *Akiba* called *Gomasi* whose members were exclusively women emerged. Under this arrangement women members (5-10) brewed millet beer rotationally on a weekly basis (turns decided by lot). The members drank the beer but paid cash. Non-members (men and women) paid a higher charge. The money collected is received by the member who brewed to enable her purchase a *gomasi* dress at the end of the year.

In 1980 a severe famine swept throughout Uganda. In Lango the millet crop failed. *Akiba* then reorganized itself and started labouring for money as a wage labour team. The sharper the differentiation in the village the more the *Akiba* worked the fields of non-members. But also, just like *Awak*, *Akiba* is compelled to turn to disguised wage labour because when it comes to selling a part of their produce from the land actually cultivated, the peasants confront a market dominated by monopoly-based capital. The exchange relations in the market is highly unequal; the returns to the peasant is much less than his/her cash needs. Thus the compulsion to labour for cash.

During the research we found out that membership to *Akiba* is both men and women. Some are members to more than one *Akiba* groups. This is particularly true of polygamous household heads. Some of the rich peasants eg. chiefs, co-operative society officials, RC officials are members of *Akiba* groups in Lira or Apac towns as well as in their own villages.

The officials of *Akiba* groups are elected. The records of the group is kept by the Secretary who records attendance and finance records. The Treasurer keeps the group's cash. There is also a Chairman. The *Akiba* members pay membership fee varying between Shs. 1,000/= to 1,500/=. The *Akiba* meets once in a week and at each meeting money is collected from 'host' members. This money covers the cost of millet brew and is handed over to the brewer. But the *Akiba* also admits non-members (*olak-lek*) and receives money from them. The money collected from *olak-lek* is strictly regarded as profits or savings. It is counted, recorded and handed over to the treasurer for custody.

8.2 Wage Labour and State Extraction of Peasant Labour

We have seen above that the much altered socio-economic conditions of peasant households which took place during the 1960s and 70s coupled with drastic increase in population

and social differentiation, resulted in major changes in the internal organization of forms of peasant co-operation. We have noted that as a result of these changes *Wang tic* co-operative labour became reorganized into new forms: *Awak* in the 1960s and *Akiba* in the 1970s. These new forms of peasant co-operative efforts were predominantly poor peasant based in membership and leadership.

However, because the overall economic and political environment did not change, alongside these developments therefore there also evolved new forms of wage labour relations in the countryside. These took two forms: co-operative wage labour and individual (casual) wage labour or *Leja leja*. The development of both the co-operative wage labour and *Leja leja* did signify the internal reorganization that *Awak* itself was undergoing.

Meanwhile, *Wang tic* did not disappear following these developments. Instead it became even more entrenched as an administrative sub-division inside the village. But its function as a co-operative labour unit that benefitted the village community in agricultural production was altered. It now functioned as a unit upon which the state authorities depended for free labour to perform compulsory labour - euphemistically called "community work" or "*Ber Lobo*" (for the good of the country/land) which evokes the nostalgic

ideals of equal co-operation for equal benefits.

8.2.1 Co-operative Wage Labour

There are instances when *Awak* co-operative labour team is hired out to a capitalist farmer or rich peasant for a wage. Once hired the co-operative labour team functions as a wage labour team. The conditions which compels an *Awak* to be engaged as a co-operative labour team is varied. The situation may arise when a member of an *Awak* requires cash to purchase manufactured consumer and producer goods. In such a situation instead of taking the *Awak* to the family garden during his/her turn, the member takes the *Awak* to the garden of a capitalist or rich peasant. The capitalist or rich peasant who employes the *Awak* pays cash, but this cash payment goes to the member whose *Awak* turn that would have been. Sometimes such a poor peasant breaks the *Awak* into two, part of it being taken to the family garden while the rest is taken for wage labour. This however depends very much on the amount of money the member needs for his household requirements and the amount of cash the employer may want to part with, or the amount of work available for cash. Such work may only be available outside the village, 2-4 miles away which the peasants have to walk.

It was clear from our interviews that this practice of

turning an *Awak* into a co-operative wage labour team is generally distasteful to the peasants. It is regarded as a form of corruption. About 68% of the household heads interviewed and were not members to an *Awak* group gave this as their major reason for not joining *Awak* groups. In fact, some *Awak* groups are even named according to what the group would not do. Such was the case with *Pe Puru Cente Awak group* (lit. meaning, 'does not dig or work for money') - as it were, echoing the (peasants) struggle against capitalism, but also signifying the contradiction between non-capitalist relations and capitalist relation. Other groups, in order to avoid their members resorting to this practice, make it mandatory for members of the *Awak* not to take their turns to work for a wage. Joining such a group is then conditioned by consenting to this provision. Such is the case with *Note Ber Awak* group, as is evident from their rules and regulations.

The other variation is whereby an *Awak* functions both as a wage labour team and an *Akiba*. Under this arrangement the *Awak* members agree to put aside one day of the week, usually Saturday, to function as a wage labour team and/or an *Akiba*. It is the responsibility of every member to locate a possible employer and to inform the group members. In this case the amount of work per person is still the same as in ordinary co-operative labour. In the case of **Otwon Ipiny**

Awak group which was engaged in this practice, the measurement for individual tasks was 1m x 50m (ie. 50sq. meters) which was equivalent to Shs. 200/=. Thus, for every moment **Otwon Ipin**y functioned as a wage labour team it earned Shs. 200/-x23 members. The amount of money is recorded by the Secretary and handed over to the treasurer for safe keeping. By the time of our field research the group had in its coffers Shs. 396,000/=.

At times the group does not get paid in cash but in kind in terms of millet brew. In this case the **Awak** group then functions as an **Akiba** group and so operates by the principles of an **Akiba** as we saw earlier. The money earned during the year is shared equally among the members just before Christmas. The members use the money to purchase meat for the family at christmas, pay school fees and pay state taxes.

The failure of the **Awak** and **Akiba** to invest the money earned as a group during the entire year in ways other than celebrations perhaps constitute one of the major limitations of the non-state regulated forms of peasant co-operation, thus re-enforcing the chronic poverty of the poor peasant members in rural areas. The money sharing at the end of the year, only to be used in celebrations and feasting, obviously works against the possibility of building strong

labour co-operatives that are financially viable, and thus able to extricate the systems from exploitative labour relations with the rich. For admittedly, when an *Awak* functions as a wage labour team (whether paid in cash or in kind) the benefit of co-operative labour accrues to the employers who are the capitalist farmers or the rich peasants. As the table below shows co-operative wage labour constitutes the major type of labour used by the capitalist farmer and the rich peasants on their farms; while the poor and middle peasants depend largely on co-operative labour and family labour.

TABLE 8.1

TYPE OF LABOUR USED BY HOUSEHOLDS IN THE DIFFERENT PEASANT

STRATA

STRATA	TYPE OF LABOUR (% of households)				N	
	Hired Labour		Permanent wage Labour	Co-op Labour		Family Labour
	Co-op wage Labour	Leja-leja				
Capitalist	0.6	0.6	0.6	-	-	1
Rich Peasants	4.4	4.4	-	-	1.3	7
Middle Peasants	-	-	-	11.9	11.9	19
Poor Peasants	-	-	-	73.6	73.6	117
Total Replies	3.0	5.0	0.6	85.5	86.8	144

Source: Author's tabulation of field data, 1992.

8.2.2 Leja leja Casual Wage Labour

Lejaleja is a term borrowed from the Swahili word for 'retail' - *Rejareja*. It is used to describe a type of labour practice based on individual piece work in return for cash. This type of labour is practiced almost on a daily basis and predominantly by the poorest of the poor peasant strata and the land-labourers whose cash needs are almost on a daily basis. Particularly those households that are permanently food-deficient and need cash to purchase not only food but also manufactured consumer and producer goods. All members of such households without exception participate in *Leja leja*. In most cases they neither belong to an *Awak* nor to an *Akiba* group. 63.5% of the peasant household heads interviewed admitted hiring out their labour for *Leja leja*. Of these 85.1% were from the poor peasant strata while the rest (14.9%) were the land labourers. The practice is a permanent feature of the land labourers interviewed. They roam the village, particularly the capitalist and rich peasants' homes, looking for any work that could be available for *Leja leja*. And they perform the task at any time of the day. The need to buy food, pay debts and for their daily evening drinks was a common response as to why they engage in *Leja leja*.

As we have seen above the majority of the poor peasants

are involved in *Awak*, and although some do participate in co-operative wage labour through their *Awak* groups, their resort to *Leja leja* is not so prominent. Only 36.4% of those who belonged to *Awak* groups said they hired out their labour to the capitalist peasants under the *Leja leja* labour arrangement. For this category engagement in *Leja leja* is infrequent since most of them are involved in *Awak*. For them, therefore, *Leja leja* is undertaken not on a daily basis but once or twice a week, and this only after *Awak* is over. That is, they spend half of the morning in co-operative labour team in the garden of a member or his own and the other half of the morning (usually between 10.00 am to 12.00 noon) as a wage labourer in the garden of a capitalist or rich peasant. Sometimes he/she has to walk 2-4 Km. away from the village to perform *Leja leja*.

The compulsion for the poor peasants to engage in *Leja leja* is due to the need to meet the daily household and individual private requirements such as soap, salt, paraffin, medical care, pay debts and pay for the weekly *Akiba* drinking. Obviously the peasant's wage-earning per work piece per day is extremely low and can hardly meet all his requirements. For instance at the time of research a kg. of salt was at Shs. 480/- while an *Akiba* sitting was at Shs. 200/= for members. One peasant told me that to meet these

needs one has to work for two to three or more work pieces, or alternatively, he/she may in addition receive in advance cash from the employer for which he/she may work the following day or later. The result is that most of the poor peasants are perpetually indebted to the rich peasants and village petty traders who are their employers. In Alenga alone 58% of the household heads interviewed said they had contracted debts from the capitalist which they had to pay in labour service. Some of the debts are as a result of receiving salt, soap and second hand clothes from the capitalist. The capitalist demands payment in labour service equal to the cash amount of the items taken by the peasant.

What is interesting is that the level of *Leja leja* wage is actually controlled or dictated by the women brewers through their fixing of the cost of *Lira-Lira Waragi* (local gin). So that implicitly it is the women who control labour cost per work piece. At the time of research a glass of *Lira-Lira* cost Shs. 200/=, so a single work piece (50 sq. m) too was Shs. 200/= as well as *Akiba* sitting. In the event of a glass of *Lira-Lira* rising, the cost of labour for the same work piece ($\frac{1}{2}$ m x 100m) also goes up correspondingly.

However, by tying the cost of labour to that of a glass of *Waragi* means that any real increases in farm wage labour is unduly suppressed vis-a-vis the rapid increases in

the cost of manufactured consumer and producer goods. Take for example the case of hand hoes sold by IFAD. While in January 1992 the peasants bought the hoes from IFAD at Shs. 500/= by September 1992 the same hoes were being bought from the village businessmen at Shs. 850/=. This is 70% increase within just nine months! And yet the cost of wage labour had experienced no increase at all. The implication of this is that for a peasant who obtains hand hoe from a businessman and has to pay in labour service, now has to cultivate, at the same wage, 1.75 more land (or work pieces) than he did in January for the same hoe! This type of increase in the price of agricultural inputs and farm implements, even the traditional hand-hoe! at a rate so phenomenal like this cannot but only lead to increased marginalization of the majority of the rural producers.

8.3 Free Labour, Forced Contribution

This is the moment to examine what remained of the vestiges of the *Wang tic* form of peasant co-operative organization. Today the whole structure of *Wang tic* has been completely integrated into the state local administrative system, and forms the organizational base for the extraction of peasants' free labour by the state, state connected institutions and even individual state functionaries, all in

the name of 'Community Efforts'.

The position of the leader (*Adwong Wang tic*) is today strategically located in the administrative chain of command, receiving orders from the county chief through the gombolola chief and Parish chief or the village RC 1 in that order. Basing on the well known traditional practice of community work (*Ber lobo*), previously organised along *Wang tic*, the post-colonial state continually extracts peasants' labour in a variety of ways. We shall concern ourselves here with two levels of state extraction of peasants labour namely; forced or compulsory labour and forced contributions. In the next section we shall look at forced appropriation of agricultural surplus.

In the two villages we studied every local undertaking is based on community effort, but this is always as a result of the orders from state authorities who issue orders to the *Adwong Wang tic* to mobilize and take his village members for a specified work on a specified day. Such work may include repairing of roads, building and/or repairing school buildings, a Government dispensary, Church, Cooperative Growers Society buildings or cleaning a well, clearing the county or gombolola headquarter compound etc. Work is

portioned according to *Wang tic* and all adult members (women and men) of every *Wang tic* are required to contribute labour freely for that so-called 'community work'. They are supervised by the *Adwong Wang tic*. The immediate implication of this is that *Awak* for that day is cancelled for all the *Wang tic* involved.

In Otwon village for example, whenever the headmasters of Akalo Senior Secondary School and that of Akalo primary school needed the collapsing walls of their school buildings repaired, or the roof thatched, or new staff quarter erected, he calls a meeting of the School Management Board whose chairman is the Anglican Bishop of Lango Dioces. The rest of the committee members include rich peasants, businessmen and bureaucrats. It is this committee which sends their demand for free labour to the chiefs. The chiefs in turn order the leaders of *Wang tic* to mobilize the adults under their jurisdiction for the work, which he must supervise personally and report back to the chief.

In the case of school work the women cut and deliver roofing grass or fetch water. The men cut poles, dig holes or thatch the roof, or plaster the wall. The work lasts up to 4 hours. The work each individual performs is equated to

a days's *Awak* work and so is valued at Shs 400/=. Such that if any member does not report for the work he/she is made to pay Shs 400/=. This is mainly practiced by the rich peasants and the capitalist, who prefer to contribute not their labour but cash. The women respondents in Otwon villagge, for example, told me that between January and September 1992, they were summoned 13 times for work at the two schools. Each time, they were ordered to take spear grass for roofing. Each woman delievered one big heap of such grass (tied into 15 small pieces) valued at shs. 400/=. This means that for the 13 times the women worked at the school each contributed free labour worth Shs 5,200/=. therefore, by implication, lost 13 rounds of *Awak* in agricultural production.

If we were to assume that all housewives and women-headed households in the two villages contributed labour in this manner (This form of forced contribution of labour is a common feature in nearly all the villages in Lango), then the monertary value extracted in free labour would amount to shs. 824,8007= (ie. 13 x 159 x 400) for the nine months. This amounts to 52- man hour loss in free labour service by the women only.

The state does not only demand free labour, it also subjects the peasants to monetary demands. For instance, in the case discussed above, should the school management committee decide that the school building require iron sheets, then aside from contributing free labour the peasants have, in addition, to contribute cash. This demand for money is the most taxing for the poor and middle peasants as it carries with it serious implications. For to be able to raise the money the poor and middle peasants have to sell either food reserves or their food reserves or their labour to the rich classes.

The Cotton Growers' Co-operative Society in both villages is not even exceptional in its relation to the peasant members. For instance, Aroca GCS which started in 1963 to serve Adyeda parish including Otwon village did expand with 8 branches by 1989, although only 4 branches are functioning currently. But like the schools, the chiefs and the church, the GCS is also locked-up in the intricate exploitative relationship with the peasants in a manner described above. Whereas not all peasants are registered members of the GCS save for those who have paid their annual share contribution of Shs. 1,000/=, in actuality membership

is compulsory by the fact of cotton cultivation and the need to market it and the state regulated co-operative is the only avenue available for marketing cotton crop.

Yet at the local GCS level whenever the peasant has to market his cotton, the GCS imposes forced contribution and forced labour service on the peasant. In the same manner the school or church management committees appropriate free labour services from the peasants through the chiefs, the GCS Committee Members too use the chiefs to compel peasants to perform free labour service that the GCS may require during the cotton marketing season. Again the work is supervised by the *Adwong Wang tic* under the orders of the chief or the RC of the area. Such work include repairing of the GCS cotton store and repairing of the road to the store to enable lorries to collect seed cotton for delivery to the Union. Both men and women are involved, and yet sadly enough the records at the GCS does not show that any woman is a registered member, nor is there any women in the management committee of the GCS. For long membership to the state-regulated co-operative remained a preserve for men. This gender imbalance both in membership and leadership of the state regulated co operatives does not seem to have changed

over the years.

However, while the poor and middle peasants are compelled to perform this forced labour (and this is irrespective of whether they are registered members or not or have cultivated cotton or not), the rich peasants make cash contribution sometimes as low as shs. 100/=. The poor and middle peasants who fail to turn up for work at the GCS usually have their chicken confiscated by the chiefs and the cooperative committee.

In sum, the rural poor are confronted by a state managed labour regime (extra economic coercion) that merely inhibits peasant productivity. The state extracts free labour through these non-state regulated (non-capitalist) forms of peasants co-operatives, thus further undermining them.

8.4 The State and Increasing Surplus Extraction

In addition to the free labour service they offer, those peasants who cultivate cotton and have to market it at the GCS store, find themselves still subjected to compulsory cash contribution. The GCS makes the following deductions every time a member takes his cotton for sale: 3 kg is

automatically deducted from the total weight reading on the weighing scale. The committee's claim is that 1 kg. is the weight of the gunny bag or sack or bed-sheet in which cotton is wrapped at the time of weighing and 2 kg is for the weight-recorder's 'pen' - in fact a form of corruption called 'Leb alam'. These deductions alone total to Shs. 660/= at the 1992 cotton price. In addition the GCS also deducts Shs. 500/= as loading and off-loading fee on every sack of cotton sold. Moreover, Shs 1,000/= is also compulsorily deducted as membership fee at this time of marketing. At once, therefore, the peasant, right away at the GCS has his total income forcefully reduced by Shs. 2,160/= or even more if he has many bags of cotton.

Because of these the peasants remain dissatisfied with the GCS, accusing the committee of being dominated by non-culticators. Of the 9 members in the committee of Aroca GCS only one was a poor peasant and a member of an *Awak* group, two are government civil servants while the remaining six are local businessmen. They have held office since 1989 each time failing to call a meeting for fresh elections. The leaders are also accused of corruption and of embezzling GCS finance; of having sold off the GCS weighing scale and iron

sheets. The most bitter complaint against the state-regulated co-operatives is its failure to pay the peasants for the cotton sold. In Otwon and Alenga peasants are owed money for cotton sold as far back as 1989. This has affected membership to the GCS.

In 1969 there were 1,203 fully registered members of Aroca GCS. In 1992 they numbered only 316.⁶ This is a drop of 73.7% over two decades. When asked as to why they are not registered members to the GCS, the reasons put forward were a combination of the following: cannot afford to pay share fee (38.9%) no longer cultivated cotton (65%), accumulated cotton debts with the GCS (72.4%) and all the 159 respondents (100%) gave the reason of low cotton crop price as compared to food crops.

In 1992 the state fixed the price for cotton crop at Shs. 220/= per Kg. While the free market price of simsim crop was at Shs. 340/= per Kg. The state-controlled cotton price, it has been argued now and again, is below the real market value and cannot enable the peasant to reproduce itself. The state extracts cotton surplus through the Lint Marketing Board which is the state monopoly for cotton

marketing. For instance during the 1992 cotton season while the world market price was US \$ 0.60⁷ per kg. (ie U. Shs. 723/= at the exchange rate of U. Shs 1, 205/= to 1 US \$), the state fixed price payable to the peasant at US \$ 0.18 per kg. (ie U. Shs. 220/=). This means that while the peasant producer received only 30% of the world market price, the state appropriated 70%.

The peasant producers in Otwon and Alenga are fully aware of their exploitation by the state but feel themselves incapable of undertaking any collective action against it so as to voice their resentment about the decline in their incomes. No less than 69.7% of the household heads interviewed stated that they could do nothing about the producer prices because of Government control and the lack of a powerful, popular and representative peasants' organization autonomous of Government. They see the state-regulated co-operative organization as closely tied with the Government. The committee members of GCs, for example, are either also local ruling party officials, or state bureaucrats (civil servants) or have been co-opted by the state.⁸ In the majority of cases they are not even located

in agricultural production proper. An overwhelming majority of all those interviewed mistrust the co-operative, considering it to be a Government structure for robbing their money. Indeed Hyden correctly summarises the experience with state-regulated co-operatives in Africa when he states that while they:

*"do deserve an important function of integrating peasants into the monetary economy, they do not constitute a powerful economic instrument of their ordinary members, the genuine small holder [producers].... co-operatives in Africa ... have primarily been stepping - stones for ambitious members of the nascent rural "bourgeoisie" teachers, traders, politicians, and even administrators and have therefore served to promote rural class formation rather than to prevent it."*⁹

One of the end results of peasants' mistrust for state-regulated co-operatives has been the steady decline in cotton production output not only in Lango but in Uganda as whole. Uganda has lost its position in the world market as one of the leading cotton producers in Africa. Its share of total world output has dropped from 0.7% in 1968 to 0.04% in 1991 (Appendices 6 and 7). Overall physical production has slumped from 76,000 metric tonnes in 1968 to just about 24,000 metric tones in 1991.¹⁰ The area put under cotton

cultivation has also been declining. For example from 284,000 ha. in 1979/80 to 130,000 ha. in 1991¹¹ (see Appendixes 7).

In addition these developments have also compelled cotton producers to pay more attention to the production of non-traditional cash crops, or in most cases, even switched to them completely. Of those interviewed only 39% indicated that they would continue cotton cultivation because it is the best way to prepare simsim and millet seed-bed, while up to 61% expressed the intention to continue engaging in simsim growing as a commercial crop.

In the face of all these labour and surplus extortions from the peasants by the state, it is clear also that although the state extracts a considerable proportion of the peasants' income from cotton, its expenditure on agricultural sector in general and cotton production in particular, has been kept low since the 1970s. Consequently, neither an improvement in the forces of production nor a rise in agricultural production could be realised. Cotton growers in particular have been unable to make up - not even in part - for the yearly increases in producer prices

offered by the state. Instead there is strong evidence to show that the domestically tradables such as simsim, millet etc. are experiencing increases in production output as compared to the internationally traded commodity crops such as cotton. Production output of major crops contained in table 8.2 reveals that sesame production, for example, increased in 1991, an increase of 215%. Millet, maize and groundnuts have increased by 31%, 74.8% and 100% respectively. Cotton production on the other hand has declined from a peak of 42,000 metric tonnes in 1984 to just 24,000 metric tonnes in 1991, marking a decline of 42.9%. The data we collected for Apac district reveals the same trend (see Appendix 8).

TABLE 8.2

UGANDA: PRODUCTION OF PRINCIPAL CROPS 1980-1991 (Thousand tons)

	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
Cotton Seed	9	11	11	22	42	31	17	15	12	10		
Cotton Lint	4	5	5	10	23	16	8	7	6	5		
G.Nuts in shell	70	80	90	99	102	93	118	122	134	140		
Millet	458	480	528	545	223	480	350	471	578	600		
Maize	286	342	393	413	281	343	286	330	440	500		
Sesame seed	20	25	35	42	39	33	35	33	36	45	62	63

Source: Extracted from UNO Africa Statistical Year Book Vol. II East and Southern Africa Part 3, 1998/89. Table 14, p. 38-40; World Tables 1992 (The World Bank), Baltimore/London: The Johns Hopkins University press, Table 7, pp. 26-27 and UNO-FAO Years Book Production Vol. 45 1991, FAO Statistical Series No. 104, Rome pp. 17, 20, 36.

Clearly then the immense extraction of surplus from peasant cotton producers and inadequate supply of agricultural inputs, coupled with low International market price for cotton have inevitably resulted in the endangering of the goose that lays the golden eggs - cotton production, and in various forms of rural protest by producers against state robbery of their income, state engineered rural poverty and low living standards. One such protest took place at Adok GCS in Agwatta sub-countyr where in February 1991 the peasants who had delivered their cotton to the GCS and had not been paid, set fire on the cotton at the GCS store. An estimated five lorry-loads of cotton valued at U. Shs. 1.1m burnt to ashes, including the GCS building.¹²

Forms of peasant struggles of this type against the extraction of peasants' incomes through the state-regulate co-operatives, and the state's efforts to promote cotton production have been a common feature in Lango. Between 1972 to 1988 peasant struggles against the state took the form of frying the cotton seeds distributed by the state-regulated co-operatives before they could be planted. It was only in 1989 crop season that cotton production resumed in Lango on

a larger scale, and this was due to intense Government campaign.

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FOOTNOTE

1. For the history of patterns of settlements in Lango during this period see; Curley, R.T. (1973), *Elders, Shades, and Women: Ceremonial Change in Lango, Uganda*, London: Berkeley, pp. 34-5; Tosh, J. (1978), *Clan Leaders and Colonial Chiefs in Lango: The Political History of An African Stateless Society C. 1800 - 1939*, Oxford: Clarendon, pp. 215-17
2. This we curled from the Secretary's Minute Book No. 3, *Note Ber Awar Group*.
3. Mamdani, M. (1984a), "Forms of Labour and Accumulation of capital: Analysis of a village in Lango, Northern Uganda," *MAWAZO*, Vol. 5(4): 49.
4. Akiba is a Kiswahili word which means 'to keep or store away' i.e to 'save'. In Lango the word was adulterated to refer to a 'drinking (saving) group'. The reason for the choice of the word seemed to have been aimed at leaving no doubts in the minds of Amin's state agents as to what this form of co-operative organization stood for. For unlike 'Awak', 'Akiba' was a Swahili word familiar to state agents.
5. It is interesting to note that these forms of Akiba also developed in the towns among civil servants.
6. Members Register, Aroca Growers Co-operative Society, 1969 and 1992.
7. UNCTAD *Commodity Year Book 1992*, UNO, New York, 1992, p. 402.
8. Analysis of the members of the Committee of Directors for Lango Co-operative Union Shows the following: Mr. Ojok B'leo - Union Chairman, RC 5 chairman and chairman Lira Development Agency, (a government supported NGO); M. Amot-Olong - Union member, Chairman Lira district L and Committee, Member P.T.A Lango College, RC 5 official; Mr. N. Apitta -Former District commissioner,, RC 5 official, chairman church Development Committee.

9. Goran Hyden, "Co-operatives and their Socio-Political Environment" in Hyden, et al., *Development Administration*, p. 314 quoted in Ann Seidman (1974), *Planning for Development in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, p. 223.
10. UN FAO Year Book Production 1991 Vol. 45, Statistical Series No. 104, tables 42 & 45, pp. 114 & 117, Rome.
11. *ibid.*
12. Interview with the District Co-operative Officer, Lira District.

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PART FOUR

CONCLUSION

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CHAPTER NINE

GENERAL SUMMARY AND MAJOR FINDINGS

This study has investigated the extent to which the character of capital that penetrated the Uganda economy in general, and Lango in particular, did contribute to the persistent survival and reproduction of pre-capitalist non-state regulated forms of peasant co-operation in agricultural production within the context of the development of state-regulated forms of peasant co-operative organization; and how the interaction between the two resulted into contradictions that overtime has seen the evolvment of classes among the Langi.

The underlying assumption in the study has been that the character of colonial economy that developed in Lango led to social differentiation in that society and to the transformation/subjugation of the then existing forms of peasant cooperative organizations that it found on the ground such that the autonomy of those forms of peasant cooperative organizations have largely been compromised in the interest of capital; and that at the same time the character of the colonial and post-colonial state in Uganda has had a direct bearing/impact on the trends of the

development of these forms of peasant agricultural co-operatives. To explore this assumption further the study has, implicitly, shunned the neo-classical market approach such as exemplified by scholars like Bates which largely restricts state intervention in peasant agriculture to the level of exchange,¹ but utilizes the Neo-Marxist theories of articulation and the theory of the neo-colonial state which provides insights into the nature of transformation that takes place when a specific form of capital penetrates rural agricultural production.

Using these theories, we have examined historically, the nature and patterns of forms of peasant agricultural co-operative development during both the colonial and post-colonial periods focusing on Lango. We have attempted to demonstrate that the introduction of the capitalist mode of production in Uganda has resulted in neither the complete destruction of the pre-capitalist forms of peasant co-operation in agricultural production nor their total integration into the market. The study reveals that the continuing existence of partially transformed pre-capitalist forms of peasant co-operative organization in agricultural production account for the considerable measure of control that is still being exercised by the producers over the means of production and over the process of

production and exchange. Therefore, implying that the further integration of the producers into the market is, after all, rather problematic and the existing state control (through monopoly marketing boards) over the relations of exchange precarious. Withdrawal from the state controlled and regulated marketing cooperatives and reversal to the production of non-traditional commodity crops (or the so called food/subsistence crops) within the non-state regulated forms of cooperative production has, in fact, become one of the most important strategies being employed by cotton producers in Lango in their struggle against state exploitation in the market. The producers' control over the process of production and their refusal to cultivate low priced agricultural commodities have necessitated increasing state intervention in the process of production so as to establish control over the process of production and enlarge the marketable surplus. State strategies to destroy the domestic communities' autonomy and to integrate them more fully into the capitalist system have involved various interventionist measures. The state regulated cooperative structure has been a most important institution through which the state has executed its interventionist policies.

By focusing on the organization and relations of productions we have also attempted to make a detailed and

thorough analysis of the class and power structure in Uganda both within the state regulated and non-state regulated forms of peasant co-operative organizations. Such an analysis is necessary, as our study demonstrates, in order to understand the class character of the post-colonial state's interventions in the agricultural production and marketing; and to distinguish the various (factions of) classes both within the state regulated forms of peasant co-operatives and non-state regulated forms of cooperatives which benefit or suffer from such state interventions in agricultural production and crop marketing.

Additionally, the analysis also enables us to consider the varied responses of the different classes or social forces in production to such state intervention. In this way we have been able to differentiate various agrarian classes in rural Lango with their different levels of consciousness and potentialities for class action against their exploitation in labour relations and the capitalist crop market. We have demonstrated that particularly the top cooperative bureaucrats being so closely allied with the ruling petty bourgeoisie have been able to profit more from state intervention in agricultural production in general and state regulated cooperative marketing in particular.

The historical approach that we adopt in this study has

enable us to show and explain historically the intensification of state intervention in the development of peasant agricultural co-operatives and the variations over the years in class action on the part of the producers in respect of increasing state control over the relations of exchange and their exploitation. We have established that the threat of a class of capitalist farmer traders (Kulaks) capable of organizing collective action by cotton producers against the colonial patterns of surplus extraction, was one of the major reasons for the increasing state intervention in the cotton market under colonialism; and that the militancy of the said class has been circumscribed in various ways by the post-colonial state, particularly by coopting them into the structures of control over the producers.²

As an analytical tool the theory of the articulation of modes of production has been used in this study to emphasize the continuing existence and importance of the (partially transformed) pre-capitalist forms of peasant cooperation in agricultural production within the Lango social formations, and the necessity of studying the development of class and power structures in relation to the various forms of co-operation and their articulation. Using this theory we show that the integration of the pre-capitalist forms of

production into the market was not an easy and automatic process. State intervention was used in the initial process of articulating the pre-capitalist forms with the capitalist. Once integrated into the capitalist system, the domestic communities became subject to the laws of motions of capitalism.³ This process accounts for the enormous variations in state interventionist policies and the subsequent process of rural class formation both between and within the regions of Uganda. As we explain the transformation of Lango and other Northern and South-Western domestic communities into labour reserves for the capitalist forms of production in Southern Uganda did necessitate state coercion as the North in particular, lacked any market and social forces that could facilitate the integration of domestic communities into the capitalist system. We have shown that the colonial state in Uganda regularly intervened in various ways in the domestic communities be it in labour supplying regions or commodity producing areas of Uganda. The aim of such intervention was always to preserve as much as possible of the pre-capitalist forms of productions not merely for economic but also for socio-political reasons.

The theory of the neo-colonial state has helped us to discuss the class character of the post-colonial state. The main thesis of this theory is that the post colonial state

has been taken over by a class without any economic power base in society, namely the petty bourgeoisie (or the dominant factions within the petty bourgeoisie). However, the theory of the neo-colonial state has often tended to study the class of petty bourgeoisie in isolation from other classes in society. In essence, however, classes can only be understood in relation to other classes both in the pre-capitalist form of production and in the capitalist form of production. Thus if employed within a theoretical framework of the continuing articulation of various forms of production or cooperatives, the theory of the neo-colonial state does account for the post-colonial state's continued intensified interventions in the domestic communities.

This study has attempted to demonstrate that the ruling petty bourgeoisie factions in Uganda are chiefly dependant on increasing surplus extraction, accumulation and in their own reproduction (as they lack any economic base in society). On the whole, the Uganda post-colonial state, like its colonial predecessor does not aim at the complete destruction of the domestic community for economic and socio-political reasons. Rather it seeks to extend and intensify its exploitation of the domestic community and to integrate them more fully into the capitalist system. To this end the post-colonial state has utilized various methods. Our study has paid particular

attention to one of these methods and provide analysis of the changes it has brought about in the domestic communities as well as the various concomitant contradictions and conflicts that has accompanied it; namely the continued entrenchment and support by the state of the state-regulated forms of peasant cooperative organization within the rural areas. We show that the entrenchment and support of state-regulated co-operatives has enabled the ruling petty bourgeoisie faction to acquire an economic and political base. In doing so the organization has been turned into an arena where different political and economic interests come at play as the organization provides a potential lucrative source of capital accumulation. Meanwhile, the non-state regulated form of peasant agricultural co-operative organization continue to be articulated with the state-regulated form as a supplier of cheap land, labour and commodity crops, particularly cotton. Our findings reveal that:

- (a) the establishment of state-regulated form of peasant co-operative is fast intensifying the process of expropriation and proletarianization of peasants in rural Lango;
- (b) that state intervention in agricultural production has not effected the intended demonstration effect on the

peasantry as only a few rural dwellers have become petty capitalist farmers. The majority of the peasantry still continue to eke out their living using by and large the same old techniques on tired land. Their labour process continue to bear the hallmark of an old age pre-capitalist process as it remains subordinate to the accumulation needs of a particular historical form of capital.³

- (c) that the likely failure of the state regulated form of peasant co-operative organization will not only be due to a lack of proper management and state control over peasants' production and exchange, but also to local peasants resistance against state control.
- (d) that there exist in the countryside a situation which can best be described as a regime of labour controls whereby practices of extra-economic coercion has become an integral part of labour or production relations; that itself is intrinsic to the process of surplus labour extraction from the direct producers by the state power.

FOOTNOTES

1. Bates, R.H. (1981) *Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies*, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press.
2. Mamdani, M. (1976), *Politics and Class Formation in Uganda*, New York: Weekly Review Press, pp. 277-278 and Mamdani, M. (1983), *Imperialism and Fascism in Uganda*, London: Heinemann, pp. 14,18-20.
3. Cf. Mamdani, M. (1985), "Extreme But Not Exceptional: Towards an Analysis of the Agrarian Question in Uganda", *Development Policy and Practice*, The Open University, Working paper No 5; Mapolu, H. (1984), "Imperialism, the State and the Peasantry in Tanzania," *MAWAZO*, VOL. 5(3): 3-17 and Kasfir, N. (1984), "The Notion of an Autonomous Peasantry", *MAWAZO*, *ibid.*; pp. 35-46.

CHAPTER TEN

RECOMMENDATIONS

Our study exposes one important fact that the origins of the peasants co-operative movement lies in the struggle of peasant producers against exploitative middlemen. However, without the organizational strength to control and hold accountable co-operative officials, the peasants lost control of the co-operative movement and their resources, first to these officials and then to the state, which put in place a series of legislative acts to bring the co-operative movement under its direct control. Today, the co-operative, once meant for free peasants, is run by state appointed officials who have the odacity to swindle, with impunity, even the whole of the peasants' entitlement for the sale of an export crop like cotton.

Thus, without a comprehensive wave of sweeping reforms in co-operative policies, the organization will continue to remain unstable as it continues to be controlled by the non-producing officials and to simultaneously face resistance from the peasants who lost control over it. It is, therefore, our belief that the transformation of co-operatives is a political question which requires deliberate and decisive state action aimed at changes which gives the

organization maximum autonomy and allows it to guide its own priorities. For surely the needs of the current state-controlled co-operative does not seem to be the question of the role of the state in guiding the organization, nor a question of state intervention but democratization of the organization, a democratization which allows for majority control and accountability to the majority, the peasants.

But again, democratic reforms confined to the institutional framework of the state-regulated co-operatives alone cannot be but sufficient. What is needed, therefore, is a broad and popular conception of democracy, whose strength must be the emancipation of the peasantry, the majority of the direct producers, from all forms of extra-economic coercion, represented in the countryside by the galaxy of chiefs and other state organs and institutions that are tied up with the regime of labour controls. Such a broad conception of democratization ought to form the basis for change in the production relations of our society and ultimately lead to social transformation. It is important to grasp this terrain if we are to achieve the evolvement of an autonomous agrarian programme that counters the bureaucratic bourgeoisie who control the peasant co-operatives and thereby allowing for the reconstitution of the peasantry community from below.

Here then is where the centrality of peasant co-operatives as the viable linch-pin between politics and peasant production must be recognized. More than any other institutions, it is the peasant co-operative organizations that are close to the peasant producers. Therefore, if democratized, they can be a most effective democratic mobilizing institutions for the transformations of peasant agriculture. This is why we are convinced that the divide between state-regulated and non-state-regulated forms of peasant co-operatives is artificial and misleading. For, although the former is marketing-based and the latter is production-based, producing commodity crops for marketing through the former form of co-operative, the link between the two forms of co-operative organisations is obvious. Once the realization of the advantages offered by this link is achieved, the central aspect in the restructuring of the state-regulated co-operatives should therefore, involve changing its role from merely being marketing-based co-operative to that of being both production-based and marketing based.¹

In practical terms this means that the objectives, functions and roles of the co-operative organization should focus on both the development of production processes and the development of marketing processes, whereby both

processes have close links. The state-regulated co-operative should go beyond collecting and selling peasant produce and also get deeply involved in the provision of inputs aimed at improving the productive forces within the already existing framework of the non-state regulated peasant co-operatives in agricultural production, such as those found in Lango.

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FOOTNOTE

1. The argument here is adopted from Mpangala, G.P., "The Role of Co-operative Organizations in Rasing Peasant Production and Productivity in Both Food and Export Crops in Songea District, Ruvuma Region - Tanzania," (*Mimeo*), University of Dar es Salaam, 1993, p. 63.

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APPENDIX 1

HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Socio-Demographic Data
 - 1.1 Date -----
 - 1.2 Household Code No.
 - 1.3 Name -----
 - 1.4 M/F -----
 - 1.5 Age -----
 - 1.6 Status in household ----- (male head/female head).
 - 1.7 Education level -----
 - 1.8 Occupation -----
 - 1.9 Marital status -----
 - 1.10 Number children: Males - females - (include their ages)
 - 1.11 Number of dependants other than your own ----- (include their age and relation to the head of household).
 - 1.12 State your home district/county/village -----
 - 1.13 Place of birth -----
 - 1.14 Ethnic and clan affiliation
 - 1.15.1 Are you an original descendant of this village (Y/N)
 - 1.15.2 If Yes, how long have you been settled in the village
 - 1.15.3 If No, State when you migrated to this village -----
 - 1.15.4 State reason for migrating -----
 - 1.16 What occupation were your parents? -----
2. CO- OPERATION, LABOUR AND PRODUCTION
 - 2.1 Membership to state-regulated co-ops (Y/N)
 - (a) Name of society -----
 - (b) Year joined -----
 - (c) Reasons for joining -----
 - (d) Membership fee paid (in Shs.) -----
 - (e) Activities undertaken by the co-operative ---
 - (f) Number of meetings attended in the following
 - (i) 1990 (ii) 1991 (iii) 1992
 - 2.2 If no, reasons for not joining (explain) -----
 - 2.3 Membership to non-state regulated co-ops (Yes/No)
 - (a) Name of Association -----
 - (b) Year joined -----
 - (c) Reasons for joining -----
 - (d) membership fee paid (in U Shs.) -----
 - (e) Activities of the Co-op. group (elaborate)
 - (f) Number of meetings attended during the year
 - 2.4 If no, reason for not joining (explain) -----
 - 2.5 Under what circumstances/conditions is your co-operative group sometimes hired out.....
 - 2.6 Source of labour for your farm work -----
(permanent hired/casual/seasonal/family/co-op.).
 - 2.7.1 Do you sometimes hire out your own labour (explain) -----

 - 2.7.2 To whom do you hire out your labour -----
 - 2.7.3 In what different forms is your labour remunerated
(kind/cash). If cash, how much U Shs. -----
----- (probe to establish rates for each work done)

- 2.7.4 Under what circumstances do you hire out your labour?
- 2.7.5 Under what circumstances do members of you household hire out their labour (explain) -----
- 2.7.6 State the following:
- (a) How often they hire out their labour -----
- (b) To whom -----
- (c) For what work -----
- (d) Amount of money they earn ----- (U Shs.)
- 2.8 In what use is money earned in this way put? -----
- 2.9.1 Do you receive labour assistance from your wife/husband; children or relatives (kinsmen)? Y/N (probe for elaborations - family labour).
- 2.9.2 Wife/husband: Y/N -----
- (a) Through out the season
- (b) Only during vacation/spare time
- (c) Never received
- 2.9.3 Children -----
- (a) throughout the season
- (b) only during vacation/their spare time
- (c) Never received
- 2.9.4 Relatives -----
- (a) throughout the season
- (b) only during vacation/spare time
- (c) Never received
- 2.9.5 What form of remuneration or payment (reward) do you give each for the labour assistance they render you?
- (a) Wives/husbands -----
- (b) Children -----
- (c) Relatives -----
- 2.10.1 Do you use casual labourers ----- (Y/N)
- 2.10.2 Under what circumstances? (explain)
- 2.11.1 Do you use co-operative wage labour? ----- (Y/N)
- 2.11.2 Under what circumstances? (explain)
- 3.1.1 Size of land owned -----
- 3.1.2 Methods of acquisition -----
- 3.1.3 Year acquired -----
- 3.1.4 Is your land Leased? (Yes/No)
- 3.1.5 If yes, Year leased -----
- 3.2.16 Activities currently performed on your land:

Activity	No. of acres
Agriculture (crops)	
1. -----	-----
2. -----	-----
3. -----	-----
4. -----	-----
Livestock	
Fallowing	

Others (specify)

Total No. of acres in use:

- 3.2.2 How much of each crop was harvested in the last season
(bags/kgs) -----
- 3.3.1 How much sold -----
- 3.3.2 To whom -----
- 3.3.3 How much purchased -----
- 3.3.4 From whom -----
- 3.3.5 Which is you most profitable crop today -----
- 3.4 In what activities do you put many earned from crop
sales.
- 4.1.1 What agricultural implements do you own/use
- | Implement | No. |
|-----------|-------|
| ----- | ----- |
| ----- | ----- |
| ----- | ----- |
- 4.1.2 Source of each -----
- 4.1.3 Cost of each -----
- 4.1.4 Which implements do you hire -----
- 4.1.5 From Whom? -----
- 4.1.6 At what costs -----

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APPENDIX 2

**QUESTIONNAIRE FOR LEADERS/
OFFICIALS OF CO-OPERATIVES**

- 1.1 Name the forms of co-ops in this village
- (a) When was each formed ----- (Yr.)
- (b) Their objectives -----
- (c) Activities -----
- (d) Who are the members -----
- (e) The leaders (their occupation) -----
- 1.2 Are there some specifically formed by the women? -----
- (a) Yr. formed -----
- (b) Objectives -----
- (c) Activities -----
- (d) Membership (their occupation) -----
- (e) The leaders (their occupation) -----
- 1.3 Are there some specifically formed by the youth?
- (a) Yr. formed -----
- (b) Objectives -----
- (c) Activities -----
- (d) Membership (their occupation) -----
- (e) Leaders (their occupation) -----
- 1.4 How are the records of the co-op -----
- 1.5 What would you consider to be the major problems of state regulate co-ops and non-state regulated co-ops?-----
- 1.6.1 When the co-op runs into difficulties with records, finances, or election disputes how is it solved (explain) -----
- 1.6.2 Are your co-op books audited (Yes/No) -----
- (a) When was the last auditing -----
- (b) By whom (occupation) -----
- 1.6.3 Is any form of bonus/interest paid to members by the co-op Society/Association? -----
- (a) how is it determined -----
- (b) When were they last paid -----
- 1.7.1 Is membership to two or more co-operative groups permitted (elaborate) -----
- 1.7.2 Are there instances where leaders of co-operatives have benefited from the activities of the group? -----
- 1.7.3 What channels exist for sending receiving information between members and leaders (elaborate). -----
- 1.7.4 Do you know of cases of conflicts between co-op officials and members? (Y/N) -----
- (a) If yes specify the nature of conflict -----
- (b) Parties involved -----
- (c) How resolved -----
- 1.7.5 What has been the impact of conflict on the operations of either parties involved (explain) -----

- 1.8.1 Are the local chief/Rcs involved in the mobilization of local people for Co-operative work on behalf of the Growers co-operative Society (elaborate) -----
- 1.8.2 What activities are members usually called upon to perform voluntarily outside co-op activities -----
- (a) By whom -----
- (b) Who supervises -----
- 1.9.1 What dissatisfaction do you have against the state regulated co-ops. -----
- 1.9.2 What are the major weaknesses of the non-state regulated co-ops. -----
- 1.9.3 In each case what suggestions for improvement do you make -----

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APPENDIX 3

EXPANSION OF THE CO-OPERATIVE CREDIT SCHEME

Year	Number of Societies	Total Loans (shillings)	No. of Borrowers	No. of Borrowers in Default	Total in Default (Shillings)
1962/3	101	830	6,859	168	10,640
1963/4	250	2,438,366	15,143	441	41,548
1964/5	281	3,701,965	23,382	1,635	195,291
1965/6	358	6,097,003	33,827	4,702	691,391
1966/7	286	4,915,553	27,842	NA	NA

Source: Dianna Hunt (1975), *Credit for Agric: A Case Study of Uganda*, Nairobi: EAPH, p. 96.

APPENDIX 4


THE CO-OPERATIVE SHARE OF COTTON CROP
1950 - 1970 (in thousands)

SEASON	TOTAL CROP		CO-OPERATIVE SHARE			
	Seed Cotton	Lint Cotton	Seed cotton Sold by Societies	Lint cotton Sold by Unions	% of total Seed Cotton	% of total lint Cotton
	Tons (000)	Bales (000)	Tons (000)	Bales (000)	%	%
1950-51	206	346	7	4	3.2	1.3
1951-52	224	380	10	6	4.6	1.6
1952-53	200	320	15	11	7.8	3.6
1953-54	234	398	21	23	8.8	5.9
1954-55	176	300	19	20	10.7	6.6
1955-56	213	364	23	21	11.8	5.9
1956-57	218	372	28	26	14.3	11.0
1957-58	208	351	30	44	16.0	12.4
1958-59	237	401	39	52	18.1	13.1
1959-60	210	361	41	60	22.5	16.0
1960-61	215	371	62	76	31.0	20.0
1961-62	105	181	33	33	32.5	18.1
1962-63	207	358	108	97	47.8	29.5
1963-64	221	479	119	148	58.4	38.9
1964-65	243	438	150	225	62.5	53.7
1965-66	262	445	197	300	75.0	67.5
1966-67	251	427	206	307	82.0	72.0
1967-68	203	345	162	276	80.0	80.0
1968-69	249	423	249	423	100	100
1969-70	275	467	275	476	100	100

Source: The Annual Report of the Department of Co-operative Development; the LMB Reports and the Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Affairs of all Co-operative Unions in Uganda 1967.

APPENDIX 5

**STRUCTURE OF THE STATE-REGULATED
CO-OPERATIVE IN UGANDA**



APPENDIX 6

OUTPUT OF AFRICA'S MAJOR COTTON-PRODUCING COUNTRIES
1952 - 1956 AND 1968

Country	1952-56 Metric tons (in thousand)	% of world Total	1968 Metric tons (in thousands)	% of world Total
Central Africa				
Republic	13	0.1	22	0.2
Chad	21	0.2	57	0.5
Congo (K)	49	0.5	12	0.1
Mali	2	-	15	0.1
Mozambique	32	0.3	44	0.3
Nigeria	25	0.2	27	0.2
S. Africa	6	-	16	0.1
Sudan	87	0.9	184	1.6
Tanzania	18	0.1	52	0.4
Uganda	64	0.6	76	0.7
United Arab Republic	354	3.8	437	3.8
Africa Total	671	6.77	-	-
World Total	9,227	100	11,336	100
U.S.A. Total	3,197	34.6	2,384	21.0

Source: *FAO Annual Year Book*, 1969, pp. 176, 319-20

APPENDIX 7

WORLD SEED COTTON AND SESEAME PRODUCTIONS 1979-91

Seed Cotton				
	1979-81	1989	1990	1991
<i>Area harvested</i> (000 ha.)				
World	34,403	31,976	33,043	33,445
Africa	3,598	3,641	3,676	3,794
Uganda	284	106	116	130
<i>Production Output</i> (000 MT)				
World	43,053	50,095	53,628	60,095
Africa	3,221	3,871	3,871	3,817
Uganda	17	11	14	24
Sesame				
<i>Area harvested (000 ha.)</i>				
World	6,500	6,481	6,360	6,590
Africa	1,553	1,887	1,287	1,370
Uganda	65	92	124	125
<i>Production Output (000 MT)</i>				
World	1,991	2,115	2,399	2,424
Africa	493	457	433	463
Uganda	20	45	62	63

Source: UN FAO Year Book Production 1991 Vol. 45, Statistical Series No. 104, table 42 & 45, pp. 114 & 117, Rome.

APPENDIX 8

Production of Selected Crops by Output and
Area in Apach District 1990 - 1992

Crop	Area Cultivated (ha.)			Output (MT)		
	1990	1991	1992	1990	1991	1992
Cotton	7,106	29,618	120	2,842.4	118.5	48
Sesame	19,712	79,140	111,700	7,688	30,864.6	43,563
Finger						
Millet	30,000	33,025	50,952	50,400	55,482	85,599
Maize	44,854	21,908	31,300	112,135	54,770	78,250
Beans	65,175	24,014	45,000	81,468	30,018	56,250
Cassava	71,786	25,510	45,000	987,057	350,763	618,750
G. Nuts	33,828	25,962	35,000	61,359	46,732	63,000
Soya Beans	23	13	200	26	15	226
Sweet						
Potatoes	35,643	3,306	6,000	224,367	28,928	52,500

Source: Department of Agriculture Apach District Annual Report 1990, 1991 & 1992.

